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Last time we spoke about the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. The battle of the philippine sea saw Admiral Ozawa toss numerous aircraft carrier attacks against US Task Force 58. The numerous strikes proved terribly ineffective, seeing most Japanese aircraft shot down and failing to return to their carriers. Ozawa's forces faced issues with uncorrected compass deviations and poor communication leading to misidentified targets and unsuccessful attacks. The American pilots managed to intercept and shoot down incredible numbers of Japanese aircraft, dealing Ozawa a terrifying defeat. By the end, they had lost three carriers sunk, two carriers damaged, 395 carrier aircraft, about 200 land-based aircraft, two oilers, and four other damaged ships, with around 3,000 Japanese fatalities. The Americans lost 130 aircraft and 76 aviators, with none of their damaged ships rendered out of service. The Battle of the Philippine Sea, the last carrier-versus-carrier battle of the war, stood out because the most conservative and defensive-minded side emerged victorious. This episode is the the Changsha-Hengyang Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are first jumping back into the fighting on Saipan, where General Holland Smith's forces were preparing for the start of the drive into the center of the island. General Holland Smith's strategy involved the 4th Marine Division advancing along the inland road to secure the area southeast of Mount Tapotchau and take Hill 600, which is just north of Magicienne Bay. Meanwhile, the 2nd Marine Division was tasked with capturing Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau, while the 27th Division stood ready to support either Marine division if needed. On the morning of June 22, after a 10-minute artillery barrage, the offensive began. On General Schmidt's front, the 24th Marines moved along the shore, facing obstacles in the form of ravines but still reaching the O-4A Line by 13:30. The 25th Marines, advancing in battalions, secured three small ridgelines before being stopped at the fourth, gaining approximately 2000 yards. By noon, as the connection between the two regiments became weak, Schmidt had to send in the reserve 23rd Marines to bridge the gap and push toward Hill 600. Fighting especially troublesome terrain, the 23d Marines made slow progress. Only light enemy resistance from riflemen and machine gunners was encountered, but contact difficulties and time lost trudging up, down, around and through the rugged ground formations, limited the speed of advance. Progress ceased at a point about 200 yards south of objective O-4A, where the unit dug in. To the west, General Watson also made significant advances. The 6th Marines reached the summit of Mount Tipo Pale while the 8th Marines progressed closer to Mount Tapotchau. However, both units encountered obstacles due to enfilading fire from a Japanese stronghold on Tipo Pale, which remained undefeated for two days. Throughout the night, the 27th Division began relieving the worn-out 25th Marines. The 106th Regiment took position against the eastern slopes of Tapotchau, while the 165th faced off against Death Valley. Due to this shift, Holland Smith instructed the 105th Regiment to move north as the division's reserve, leaving just its 2nd Battalion to clear Nafutan Point. The following morning, the 27th Division's advance was delayed because its regiments struggled to assemble at the line of departure. Meanwhile, Generals Watson and Schmidt had already resumed their offensive, encountering more resistance than the day before. The 8th Marines initially encountered little resistance as they moved towards Tapotchau, but were stopped when the 106th Regiment had yet to advance. To the left, Colonel Riseley's 3rd Battalion managed to advance about 400 yards, while the rest of the forces faced the Tipo Pale strongpoint. The 23rd Marines, attacking with battalions in column, Dillon's 2d Battalion leading, advanced rapidly over rough terrain against machine-gun and rifle fire from Hill 600. Approached from the south. Hill 600 presented an extremely steep slope; and, in the words of the battalion commander, “It was all you could do to climb it, let alone light up it.” The number of Japanese defending the height was not great, but the area was admirably suited for defense and, for about 30 minutes, the fight was close and vicious. Hand grenades passed back and forth as in an overgrown, uncontrolled game of “hot potato.” Despite their struggle against gravity and an obstinate foe, Dillon's Marines seized the peak and set up a hasty defense against counterattack. From its newly-won position, Dillon's battalion had an unimpaired view of the whole of Kagman Peninsula. This surge had been executed without benefit of contact with the 27th Division on the left; and, when it was apparent that the latter was still some distance to the rear. General Schmidt ordered the 23d to hold up its advance until Army elements had tied in. Though the peak of the hill was securely in the hands of the 2d Battalion, the battle continued. The hill's northern slope, cloaked in thick vegetation, was alive with Japanese soldiers. Dillon endeavored to strip them of their concealment by burning the area with flamethrowers, but the efforts were largely unsuccessful. Throughout the remainder of the day and during the night the grenade pitching continued. In the afternoon, General Ralph Smith's forces began their assault, with the 106th encountering a strongpoint known as Hell's Pocket and the 165th being stopped by heavily fortified positions on Purple Heart Ridge. The nature of the terrain facing the 27th Division was to have an unusually vital bearing on the unit's operations for many days to come. This terrain is well described by the historian attached to the division at Saipan: “The whole mountain [Tapotchau] was stoutly defended by the enemy, but the situation on the two flanks of it was somewhat unusual. On the west side of the peak, the ground sloped sharply to the sea. On the east, Kagman Point side, it dropped in sheer cliffs to a bench or plateau, some six hundred feet below the summit. This plateau, a saddle-shaped piece of land, was some twelve hundred yards across and bordered on the east by a low chain of hills covered with heavy foliage. Beyond them the ground sloped down to Kagman Point on the east or dropped off abruptly to Magicienne Bay on the southeast. The cliffs of Mt. Tapotehau and the chain of hills made a corridor out of the plateau. In the fighting which ensued this corridor was named Death Valley by the men who fought there and the chain of hills came to be known as Purple Heart Ridge.” At d three divisions of Japanese troops and tanks were massing in front of the 27th Infantry Division. The expected enemy attack materialized at about 6:30, when Japanese tanks struck near the boundary between the 165th and 106th Regiments. The combined efforts of 37mm guns and bazookas in the areas of the 2d Battalion, 165th, and the 3d Battalion, 106th, destroyed five Japanese tanks, but a sixth escaped. This was not enough for the intruders. At about 7:30, in company with infantrymen, five more Japanese tanks struck the right center of the 106th Infantry. The 3d Battalion's Antitank Platoon and the 1st Platoon of the Regimental Cannon Company accounted for four of the tanks while the fifth, though suffering a hit, broke through the 3d Battalion's lines. Firing wildly, it sprayed the battalion aid station with machine-gun bullets and set fire to a large ammunition dump nearby. The resultant exploding shells forced the right of the 3d Battalion to withdraw about 100 yards, returning to its original positions after the lire had burned itself out. Holland Smith expressed displeasure over the 27th Division's failure to start its attack on time. He was even more upset when he found out that Colonel Bishop's 2nd Battalion had not made progress at Nafutan Point. As a result, Major-General Sanderson Jarman had to brief Ralph Smith, who committed to ensuring his regiments advanced on schedule the next day. On June 24, the 106th and 165th Regiments once again struggled to advance against strong resistance and difficult terrain. An attack toward Nafutan Point in the south also failed, prompting Holland Smith to remove Ralph Smith from command and temporarily appoint Jarman to lead the 27th Division. Colonel Geoffrey O'Connell was assigned to clear Nafutan. In contrast, the 2nd Marines made progress toward Garapan and reached Radio Road on the O-6 Line, where they repelled two strong enemy counterattacks. On the right of the 2nd Marine Division, the 8th Marines continued the fight over nightmarish terrain. As Lieutenant Colonel Hays' 1sl Battalion moved into the attack, the troublesome pocket, developed on the previous day, came alive again. Matted with undergrowth and trees, the irregular coral limestone formation was favorable for the type of defense the Japanese were employing. Improving the area's natural assets, they had developed a honeycomb of underground positions. The 1st Battalion, utilizing the most unspectacular of tactics, plodded at its unpleasant task of sealing the caves and killing the occupants. The former chore proved the easier, since in most cases the Japanese had not neglected to plan routes and methods of escape. When the “cavemen" had done as much damage as possible from one position, they would retire to another from which to resume the fight. Shortly after midday, the coordinated efforts of combat engineers armed with flame-throwers, bazookas and demolitions and riflemen showed results; the pocket was eliminated and contact with the 6th Marines again established. By late afternoon the battalion reached the edge of a vast cleared area, desirable from the defense-for-the-night point of view. Since the next satisfactory site was 700 yards farther to the north, the unit halted and dug in. Major Larsen's 3d Battalion, advancing along the base of a cliff, made good progress, limited only by fairly difficult terrain and the necessity of maintaining contact with flank units. Above the 3d Battalion, along the top of the cliff, moved Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins' 1st Battalion. 29th Marines. Here the cliff was broken into a rough plateau dotted with smaller plateaus of coral limestone which con tinned rising like irregular stair steps toward Mt Tapotcliau's crest. The undergrowth in this area was a tangle of fern trees, the roots of which spread out three to eight feet above ground like the ribs of an inverted umbrella, overgrown and interlaced with a strait-jacket of vines. On the battalion's right flank was a narrow flat ledge covered with grass five feet high and the usual tangle of trees. This ledge, part of the north-south ridge leading to Mt. Tapotchau, was within machine-gun range of the summit. Moving through this intricate snarl was like attempting to swim through a fishermen's net, and Tompkins' battalion became overextended. At this juncture Colonel Wallace, commanding the 8th Marines, ordered the 2d Battalion to move in behind Tompkins' right to protect the open flank. As the 8th Marines dug in for the night after an advance of about 700 yards, it again became essential to commit the 37mm Platoon from the Regimental Weapons Company to extend south along the ridge facing the hiatus between the 2nd and 27th Divisions. Schmidt's division also moved east on Kagman Peninsula, with the 23rd Marines reaching Chacha village and the 24th Marines making rapid coastal gains of around 1200 yards. The next day, while the 2nd Marines held their ground outside Garapan and the 6th Marines tackled the Tipo Pale strongpoint, Colonel Wallace's forces finally attacked Mount Tapotchau. However, the summit was secured by a bold patrol along a ridge line on the right flank, which had to fend off multiple Japanese counterattacks. The 27th Division, under new leadership, resumed its attack, with the 165th taking one-third of Purple Heart Ridge and the 106th making a small entry into Death Valley before withdrawing during the night under enemy pressure. Further south, O'Connell struggled to make headway at Nafutan Point, while on Kagman Peninsula, Schmidt's Marines faced minimal resistance and secured Kagman Hill and the Brown Beaches along the O-6 Line. Additionally, recognizing their desperate situation, Generals Igeta and Saito requested reinforcements from Tinian.  From Sunharon Harbor on the west coast of Tinian, 11 personnel barges carrying a company of the 1st Battalion, 135th Regiment moved out during darkness of 25-26 June bent upon reinforcing Saipan. Spotted by the destroyer Bancroft and the destroyer escort Elden, the barges were fired upon and dispersed. One was reported sunk, while the remainder scurried back to Tinian Town. Later, at about 2:25am, LCI(G)s 438 and 456 observed several barges moving out of Tanapag Harbor on Saipan's west coast. Immediately opening fire, the LCI(G)s accounted for one sunk and a second damaged; the remainder returned to Tanapag. Both LCI(G)s received some damage during this repulse, however. The 438 received 12 holes in her hull from one of the barges' 37mm guns, damaging the fire main, starting batteries and radar. The 456 suffered less, with only slight damage to her winch and refrigerator. The 438 suffered one man killed and two wounded and the 456 two wounded. A report from one of the LCIs that the Japanese barges had unleashed torpedoes during this action was later substantiated by a prisoner of war who stated that there were at least three torpedoes fired at U. S. ships at this time. The Americans responded by initiating a systematic bombardment of Tinian on June 26.Air and naval gunfire alternated daily, working first in one half and then in the other, while artillery fired on any targets escaping other attention. A target map was maintained, information exchanged and new targets posted. Cruisers Birmingham, Montpelier and Indianapolis, using both air and direct shipboard spot, were assigned to execute the naval gunfire portion of the plan, while planes would be provided by Carrier Support Groups One and Two. Meanwhile, Schmidt's Marines were clearing the Kagman Peninsula, and the 6th Marines bypassed the Tipo Pale strongpoint and secured the ridge linking it to Tapotchau.  In the 8th Marines zone the day's advances were small. On the left the 1st Battalion regulated its progress on that of the 6th Marines. On the right the 2d Battalion's advance was restrained because of the lack of contact with 27th Division elements. In the 8th Marines' center, the 3rd Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, made only small gains. The attached 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines, remained with the regiment during the greater portion of the day, Company E being used in the lines, while the remainder of the battalion was employed in mopping-up operations. As already noted, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, could move only as fast as the 6th Marines to its left if it were to retain contact. The cleeply-gashed ground, more than enemy opposition, governed the rate of advance. One unusual enemy tactic employed against the battalion at this time is worthy of note: bundles of picric acid blocks were catapulted upon the Marines by Japanese soldiers located in the craggy rocks along the route. This device showed originality but little else; no casualties were inflicted upon the Marines. Higher on Tapotehau's western slopes, the 3rd Battalion also fought through difficult terrain. A statement from the 8th Marines' action report gives an indication of the problems in that zone: “To go from the left flank of 3/8 to the right flank of 3/8 required a two hour and 40 minute march over rough terrain.” At some points the Japanese threw or rolled grenades and demolition charges down upon the Marines as they struggled through the hilly thickets. And as if that were not enough, Japanese positioned above directed plunging machine-gun fire upon the advancing men. The 3d Battalion's left flank kept pace with the 1st Battalion, but the right flank lagged behind. By nightfall the 3d Battalion's lines stretched almost north and south along the base of a steep slope. On 25 June the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, less one company, had secured a foothold on the summit of Mt. Tapotchau. It remained on 26 June, then, for Company B to move up the mountain's western slope and join the battalion. While waiting for this unit, Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins sent a 25-man combat patrol from Company A to seize the northernmost rise of Tapotehau's crest. This patrol was repulsed after some hard fighting, and it became apparent that this area would have to be thoroughly battered before a successful effort could be made. In the meantime Company B reached the mountain to,. combing the area on the way. From the 2d Battalion position , the Marines observed men of the 2nd Battalion, 106th Infantry, attempting to move up on the division flank. By the close of the day, however, a gap of 600 yards still existed. To protect the exposed flank, the 2nd Battalion bent its lines to the shape of a horseshoe with one company facing north, one east, and one south. To sum up, the most important developments in the 8th Marines' sector during the day were the straightening of several small bulges in the lines and consolidation of the dominating heights won on 25 June. The 106th Regiment, under Colonel Albert Stebbins, failed to launch its attack amid confusion. The 165th Regiment bypassed Death Valley and joined the 4th Marine Division. In the south, after heavy bombardment, O'Connell began making progress against Nafutan Point. Life had not been pleasant for the Japanese defenders on Nafutan Point. From seaward, destroyers pounded the rocks and caves unmercifully; from land, a monotonously heavy volume of fire was maintained by 40mm and 90mm anti-aircraft guns, and 81mm and 60mm mortars, as well as fires of the light tank platoon, the self-propelled mount, and small arms of the 2nd Battalion, 105th Regiment. Movement on the point was rendered very difficult, and the shortage of food and water became acute. As a result, on June 26, Captain Sasaki, commanding the 317th Independent Infantry Battalion of the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, determined to move his battalion from the Nafutan Point trap and join other Japanese forces which he believed to be in the vicinity of Hill 500. This attack, though better planned than the average Japanese effort, achieved very little, and Sasaki's password “seven lives for one's country” remained only a slogan. However, during the night, the trapped Japanese forces managed to break through O'Connell's defenses. Moving undiscovered through the thinly spread outposts of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, Sasaki's force headed for Aslito Airfield. The only indication that men of the 2d Battalion had that the enemy was on the move came at about 0200 when “an extremely large group” stumbled into the command post, about 1,500 yards in rear of the front lines. After a lively skirmish, in which the soldiers suffered 24 casualties, the intruders disappeared. The next morning the bodies of 27 Japanese were found in the immediate command post area. At about 0230 Sasaki's force struck Aslito Airfield. All U. S. personnel in that area were alerted after the enemy succeeded in setting fire to one P-47 and damaging three others. Seabees and engineers quickly rallied to their unexpected mission, cleared the field of Japanese and set up a hasty defense. At 0430 the Commander, Air Defense Command, reported that enemy .50-caliber machine guns and 20mm guns were firing on Aslito Airfield. After causing confusion at the airfield, the force advanced toward Hill 500, where they expected to find Colonel Oka's 47th Independent Mixed Brigade Headquarters . At about 0520 there were two surprises: the first was to Sasaki's men, who received an unexpected reception from the 25th Marines on Hill 500, and the second surprise was for the 25th Marines, who were not expecting visitors and, in some cases, found the Japanese in their midst before they realized that anything was afoot. Both participants quickly recovered from the shock, however, and a lively small arms and hand grenade battle ensued. At about the same time, the 14th Marines, in artillery firing positions between Hill 500 and Aslito Airfield, was attacked by another portion of Sasaki's force. The brunt of this assault was borne by the 2nd Battalion led by Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, which held its fire until a precariously late moment, mistaking the advancing Japanese column for a large U. S. Army patrol scheduled to pass through the area at about this time. A savagely-fought, close-in battle ensued, virtually annihilating the attacking force. Total 14th Marines' casualties in the skirmish were 33 killed and wounded, while 143 Japanese bodies lay sprawled in the regiment's immediate area. With the coming of daylight, the 25th Marines were assigned the mission of mopping up the stragglers from the abortive enemy effort of the previous night. Total Japanese losses in the fight around Aslito Airfield, at Hill 500, and in the 14th Marines' area, plus the 27 June mop-up by the 25th Marines, amounted to approximately 500 dead. The participants, some of whom wore United States uniforms and carried M-1 rifles, appeared greatly in need of water and rations. Yet that is all for Saipan for now, as we will be traveling over to China War. After the success of Operation Kogo, the Japanese planned for General Yokoyama's 11th Army to initiate a three-pronged assault in Hunan. The 34th, 58th, 68th, and 116th Divisions would head straight for Changsha, while the 3rd, 13th, and 27th Divisions provided coverage on the eastern flank by advancing towards Liling. Meanwhile, the 40th Division, the 17th Independent Mixed Brigade, and the 5th Independent Brigade secured the Dongting Lake region on the western flank. Additionally, the 70th Division in Jiangxi would launch a diversionary attack towards Hunan. On the night of May 27, following heavy artillery bombardment, Yokoyama initiated his offensive. The 34th, 58th, 68th, and 116th Divisions crossed the Xinqiang River swiftly, while the 3rd, 13th, and 27th Divisions moved south towards Liling. Furthermore, the 216th Regiment launched an amphibious operation towards Yingtianzhen and Xiangyin, catching the Chinese defenders off guard. The following day, the 40th Division and the 109th Regiment began their assault southwards, capturing Anxiang, Nan, Tianxingzhou, and the port of Sanxianhu by May 30. Simultaneously, the 5th and 17th Brigades advanced west towards the Songzizhong River to secure the northern shores of Dongting Lake. In the east, the Japanese forces encountered minimal resistance and advanced almost 100 kilometers, capturing Tongcheng, Nanjiangzhen, Pingjiang, and Changshouzhen by June 1. In the center, the main Japanese divisions breached the 20th Army's positions at Guanwang and Changlezhen and reached the Guluo River on June 3. With the enemy seemingly in full retreat, Yokoyama's forces continued southward, hindered only by a sudden downpour, and reached the Laodao River line by June 6, preparing to besiege Changsha. However, heavy rains delayed these preparations, allowing General Xue Yue time to gather his forces around the city. According to a prearranged plan, the 11th Army used the 27th Division to repair the Chongyang-Tongcheng-Pingjiang-Liuyang road and all engineer regiments under the direct command of the Field Engineer commander to repair the Xinqiang-Xinshizhen-Mianhuapo-Changsha road. Continuous rains, however, greatly delayed the road work and turned the roads into a sea of mud. Lines of communication became extremely difficult to maintain and, until the middle of June, the Japanese first-line troops received very few supplies from the rear. In spite of strenuous efforts on the part of the Army to improve these two roads, they eventually had to be abandoned. The situation became critical as all field artillery and motor units became congested on the muddy Yueyang-Changsha road. In the meantime, the 40th Division crossed Dongting Lake to seize Yuanjiang, making contact with elements of the 58th Division at Qiaokou. On June 11, the 40th Division successfully took control of the Yiyang area, while the 34th Division bypassed the Tamoshan Range and launched an attack towards Yuelu Mountain and Fengshupu. The 68th and 116th Divisions bypassed Changsha and moved forward towards Guanqiao, Changlingxiang, and Yisuhe, and the 3rd and 13th Divisions advanced towards Liuyang, facing significant resistance in the region. Despite this, Liuyang fell on June 14, after which the 13th Division proceeded towards Liling. Finding himself completely surrounded, Xue Yue decided to leave Changsha and retreat towards Liling. In the earlier three battles of Changsha, the Chinese had managed to defend the city and counterattack from the flanks; however, both the western and eastern flanks had now fallen to the Japanese, leaving the defenders with no choice but to withdraw. Now I want to take a short detour. Since mid-1943, the Americans had been constructing airfields in India, Ceylon, and China to house 16 squadrons of B-29 Superfortress Very-Long-Range heavy bombers under Brigadier-General Kenneth Wolfe's 20th Bomber Command. As part of Operation Matterhorn, these bombers were assigned to target locations in Japan, Manchuria, Korea, Formosa, Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies. A key target was the Japanese steel industry, which relied on a few coke plants situated in Kyushu, Manchuria, and Korea—within reach of the B-29s stationed in Chengdu. Before launching an attack on Japan, Wolfe decided to conduct a test combat mission against the Makkasan railway yard facilities in Bangkok, Thailand. On June 5, at 05:45, Brigadier-General LaVerne Saunders led 98 B-29s on a 2,261-mile round trip from India, marking the longest mission of the war up to that point.  Each bomber carried a fuel load of 6846 US gallons and 5 short tons of bombs; three groups carried 500-pound general-purpose bombs while the fourth carried M18 incendiary bombs. The XX Bomber Command wanted to test out the new M18 incendiary bombs and the large number of wooden buildings and freight cars and a small oil facility in the area offered good targets. The resulting 134000-pound takeoff weight was too heavy for the temporary field at Charra, so the 444th Bombardment Group had to stage from the other three fields. The attack was launched at 5:45 local time on 5 June 1944 to avoid high ground temperatures that were bad for the R-3350 engines and to allow the whole mission to be conducted in daylight. Wolfe had suggested a night-time raid, but Arnold insisted on daylight precision bombing. Only 77 bombers reached Bangkok, conducting a chaotic series of bombing runs between 10:52 and 12:32 due to cloud cover. The bomber's aim was to destroy the Memorial Bridge and a major power plant. They missed and instead knocked down tram lines and destroyed a Japanese military hospital as well as the headquarters of the Japanese secret police. No civilian buildings were damaged, a fact that aroused admiration among the Thai authorities. It was only in 1947 that the Thais discovered the American bombers had been aiming at the Memorial Bridge, almost two and-a-half kilometres away. Following the raid, schools and universities were closed in Bangkok and children moved out of the city for their safety. Upon returning to India, 42 B-29s had to land at alternative airfields due to low fuel, leading to the loss of five bombers and 15 aircrew fatalities. Despite the setbacks, the mission was deemed successful enough for Wolfe to plan a night attack on Japan for June 15. The B-29s began relocating to Chengdu on June 13 to prepare for the strike against the Imperial Iron and Steel Works in Yawata, producing approximately 2,250,000 metric tons of steel annually, or 24% of Japan's steel output. On June 15 at 16:16, Saunders led 68 B-29s on a 3,182-mile round trip to Yawata. Although some bombers crashed during takeoff, 47 reached the city and attacked for nearly two hours starting at 12:28. Only forty-seven of the sixty-eight B–29s launched hit the target area: one crashed en route, six jettisoned their bombs because of mechanical difficulties, and seven bombed secondary targets or targets of opportunity. Only 15 American aircraft visually aimed their bombs, as Yawata was obscured by darkness and smoke, with 32 others bombing via radar. Two more B-29s targeted Laoyao harbor, while five attacked other nearby targets. In total, 107 tons of bombs were dropped during the raid. While returning to Chengdu, three additional B-29 bombers were lost in China. In total, seven B-29s and 55 crew members were lost by the Americans, who managed only to inflict minor damage on Yawata. However, this marked the first attack on the Japanese home islands since the Doolittle raid in April 1942, signaling the start of the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. This raid caused panic in Japanese society, prompting Tokyo to pressure Yokoyama to quickly conquer Changsha and then target the B-29 airfields in central China. As a result, on June 16, the 58th Division launched its assault on Changsha, with the 34th Division also attacking Yuelu and Fengshupu. Changsha fell two days later, leading to the collapse of Chinese resistance in the area. By June 22, Liling and Pingxiang were also captured, allowing the Japanese to gain control over the Jiangxi-Zhejiang railway. Upon hearing of the defeat at Changsha, the Allies worried about the role of Kuomintang forces during Operation Ichi-Go. President Roosevelt proposed placing the entire Nationalist Army under General Stilwell, a suggestion that infuriated Chiang Kai-Shek and was quickly rejected, “Due to our errors in Henan and Changsha, the prestige of our nation and our army, including that of the military command, has been questioned. The foreigners haven't respected neither our combatants nor our commanders. This offense is more intolerable than the Japanese occupation of our homeland by force of arms.” Meanwhile, Yokoyama's next target was Hengyang to the south, where he planned to encircle the city using the 116th and 68th Divisions while the 40th Division secured Xiangxiang to the west. To the east, the 3rd and 13th Divisions would advance beyond You to secure Leiyang, with support from the 27th Division. The 216th Regiment was set to move upstream along the Xiang Jiang to attack Hengyang from the northeast. Meanwhile, in Henan, General Uchiyama continued his offensive by capturing the Hotsin Airdrome on May 30 and occupying the towns of Lingbao and Wenxiang by June 11. However, the Chinese forces managed to regroup, ambush, and counterattack the Japanese troops, reclaiming the recently lost towns and ultimately forcing the Japanese to retreat from Loyang and other towns by June 15. Nonetheless, the railway remained under Japanese control and was further reinforced with the capture of Runan and Shangcai on June 16. Back in Hunan, the second phase of Yokoyama's offensive got off to a strong start as the 40th secured Xiangxiang, trapping many retreating Chinese soldiers and compelling them to surrender. Meanwhile, the 68th and 116th moved quickly toward Hengyang, with the 68th occupying Hengyang airfield on June 26 and the 116th reaching the sector northwest of Hengyang the next day. On that day, the 68th also maneuvered around the city, crossing the Xiangjiang River to launch an attack on Hengyang from the southwest. Both divisions commenced their assault on Hengyang, but the strong Chinese fortifications held by the well-prepared defenders proved impenetrable. The attackers faced a shortage of ammunition and were further challenged by General Chennault's B-25s, P-40s and P-51s, who bombed and strafed the besiegers. As a result, Major-General Fang Xianjue's 10th Army repelled all Japanese assaults by the end of June. The heavy Japanese losses during these attacks, including severe injuries to Lieutenant-General Sakuma Tameto, compelled Yokoyama to suspend the attacks on July 2 until his artillery could support the siege. Yet that will be all for the China front for today as we are now heading over to Biak. After General Fuller was relieved on June 15th, General Eichelberger assumed command and decided to follow General Doe's plans for the June 16th attack. The 186th Infantry's unit began attacking eastward along the ridge shortly after 9:00. Company E led, with the 2d Platoon on the ridge, the 3d Platoon in flats 100 yards to the north, and the 1st Platoon 100 yards beyond the 3d. The 2d Platoon quickly found itself in a maze of Japanese positions and was halted by Japanese automatic weapons fire. The 1st Platoon of Company G thereupon moved up on Company E's right and began advancing along the southern slope of the low ridge. Together, the two platoons continued eastward against slackening resistance. They cleared innumerable enemy slit trenches, foxholes, and bunkers, destroyed several machine guns of various calibers, and at 10:50 reached the lines of the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry. The task of closing the ridge line gap was completed in less than two hours, many of the previous Japanese defenders apparently having withdrawn north into the West Caves the preceding night. The Americans also moved northeast but encountered heavy resistance from enemy machine-gun and mortar fire. After intense artillery support, the battalion regrouped and attacked again in the afternoon, reaching the western limits of the West Caves positions. However, concerned about a possible counterattack on his left flank, Doe decided to pull his forces back to the low ridge while Haney's 2nd Battalion took over from the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment. The 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment could look back on the day's operations with a good deal of satisfaction. It had closed the gap on the low ridge; it had located the western limits of the enemy's West Caves positions; it had discovered that more Japanese troops were located north of the enemy encampment area both along the main road and on ridges west and northwest of Hill 320; it had eliminated most of the machine-gun nests and rifle pits in the encampment area and many of those on high, forested ground near that bivouac; it had destroyed many Japanese automatic weapons and rifles; and it had killed at least 65 Japanese. The battalion in turn lost 15 men killed and 35 wounded. There had been only local patrolling by the rest of the units in the forward area during the day, for the 1st Battalions of the 162nd and 186th Regiments had been kept in place by American artillery and mortar fire which supported the operations of the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment. On June 17, after identifying the western limits of the West Caves, Doe instructed Newman's 1st Battalion to advance northwest to high ground while Haney's 1st Battalion moved south and southwest towards the West Caves. Facing strong opposition, the 162nd Battalion, supported by tanks, managed to eliminate several pillboxes before being halted around midday. At the same time, the 186th Battalion approached the high ground from the east and joined forces with Haney's Company C, which had just cleared the final major enemy position on the hill. The Americans then continued their westward attack but made only modest progress by nightfall. With the high ground overlooking the West Caves secured, Doe planned to launch a coordinated attack on the strongpoint the following day. However, on June 18, Eichelberger changed his plans due to dissatisfaction with the progress of the operation. Instead, the 162nd and 186th Regiments reorganized for a coordinated attack, with Newman assigned to attack the rear of the West Caves position while the 3rd Battalion, 163rd Regiment gathered near Hill 320 to block enemy reinforcements.  The main effort was to be made by the 186th Infantry, the 2d and 3d Battalions of which were to attack from the southwest and west while the 1st Battalion struck from the east. The 162d Infantry would hold its positions. An egg-shaped terrain feature on the low ridge 1,000 yards northeast of Borokoe Drome and on the left flank of the 186th Infantry's prospective line of advance was to be seized for flank security and as a line of departure for subsequent attacks north and northeast. On 18 June only local patrolling was undertaken, while the bulk of the troops rested or redeployed in preparation for the attack on the 19th. The egg-shaped feature was secured against no opposition and a few Japanese stragglers along the low ridge in the area were mopped up. The regiment was to advance east from the egg-shaped protrusion of the low ridge with the 2nd Battalion leading, two companies abreast. The 3rd Battalion was to follow the 2nd, and the 1st Battalion would start moving northwestward once the other two had begun moving east. The attack, which was to begin at 6:30 on the 19th, would be supported by the 121st, 167th, 205th, and 947th Field Artillery Battalions, Company D of the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and ten tanks of the 603d Tank Company. Furthermore, the 34th Regiment was deployed to relieve the 186th west of Mokmer Drome, prepared to take over Borokoe and Sorido Dromes as per Eichelberger's orders. On the morning of June 19, following intense artillery preparation, Eichelberger's offensive began, with Newman's 2nd and 3rd Battalions attacking east and then northwest against light rifle fire and eventually reaching a rugged, heavily-forested coral ridge west of Hill 320 by midday. Around noon, Newman's 1st Battalion started clearing the southern extension of the coral ridge line, successfully advancing through the Japanese encampment area up the road to the 2nd Battalion's position by late afternoon. Facing minimal resistance, the 186th Regiment surrounded the rear of the Japanese in the West Caves, preventing reinforcement or escape. Eichelberger's plans for the next day involved the 186th continuing its operations in the Hill 320 area and the western ridges, while the 162nd attacked the West Caves and the 34th advanced towards the airdromes. On the morning of June 20, Haney's 1st Battalion, supported by two tanks, attacked the West Caves, facing lighter resistance initially but ultimately being halted by heavy Japanese fire. At the same time, Newman's troops extensively patrolled and discovered the Teardrop position, while the 34th Regiment quickly took control of the Borokoe and Sorido Dromes and Sorido village, facing minimal opposition. During the 1st Battalion, 162nd Regiment again moved up to the West Caves on June 21 and sent patrols out to clear Japanese riflemen from brush and crevices on hillocks north and northwest of the caves. The patrols, actually flamethrower teams supported by riflemen, accomplished their mission without much difficulty while the rest of the battalion, again covered by two tanks from the 603rd Tank Company, surrounded the sump depressions. The infantry and tanks concentrated on the most westerly of three large sinkholes comprising the West Caves. The tanks fired into cave entrances; the infantrymen lobbed hand grenades into holes and crevices within reach; and all Japanese observed were quickly killed by rifle fire. But the battalion was unable to force its way into the main entrance to the underground caverns. Fire into this entrance was also ineffective, for the opening was shielded by stalagmites and stalactites. Engineers poured the contents of five gasoline drums into the cavern through crevices or seepage points found on the surface of the ground. Flamethrowers then ignited the gasoline and the 1st Battalion withdrew to await developments. There were no immediately apparent results and, since it was believed that the West Caves were still strongly held, the battalion did not attempt to send any more men into the entrance. In the late afternoon the unit again pulled back to its bivouac area. The attacks during the night of June 21-22 had apparently resulted from a decision on the part of Colonel Kuzume to acknowledge defeat. In an impressive ceremony in the West Caves, Colonel Kuzume, surrounded by his staff, burned the colors of the 222nd Regiment and, according to some American reports, disemboweled himself in the tradition of the Samurai. Japanese reports of the Biak action state that Colonel Kuzume did not die then but was killed in action or committed suicide some days later. Whatever the cause and date of his death, on the night of June 21-22 Colonel Kuzume had instructed the forces remaining in the West Caves to withdraw to the north and west. Many of the remaining troops of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 222nd Regiment, who had originally held the low ridge north of Mokmer Drome, had already been killed or had moved north, and most of the Japanese killed by the 186th Regiment during the night of June 21-22 were identified as members of the 221st Regiment, elements of which had been included in the reinforcements sent to Biak after Z Day. At 4:00 am on June 22, the Japanese launched another attack, relying on stealth, hand grenades, and bayonets. Japanese poured out of the caves and rushed northwest up the road toward the lines of the 186th Infantry, attempting to escape to the west or north. At 2100 Japanese infantry, supported by light machine guns and light mortars, hit the southeast flank of the American regiment. When the Japanese were about fifty yards away, the 186th Infantry's .50-caliber machine guns opened fire and broke up the attack. Undaunted, the Japanese made another break-through attempt about midnight, this time supported only by light mortars. Machine guns, both .50- and .30-caliber, aided by Company G's 60-mm. mortars, forced the enemy to withdraw for a second time. This final assault was so fierce that the enemy reached the 186th's foxholes, resulting in hand-to-hand combat across the regiment's southern flank. Mortar fire eventually scattered the disorganized enemy, though small groups of Japanese soldiers continued to mount sporadic attacks until dawn. Haney's 1st Battalion continued to face enemy resistance at the West Caves; however, after dropping two 500-pound TNT charges into one of the cave entrances, the Americans initially reported the caves cleared. This assessment proved premature when another small group of Japanese attempted to breach the 186th Regiment's lines later that night.   On the following morning, Haney's 1st Battalion set up a permanent camp around the various caves and indentations, continuing their search through the area. Although the remaining Japanese troops were trapped in a hopeless situation, they managed to hold their ground. It wasn't until the afternoon of June 25 that any soldiers managed to access the caves, but without making any deep inroads. It wasn't until June 27 that patrols reached the innermost parts of the West Caves. The stench of rotting Japanese bodies was revolting, and the sight nauseating. The entire cave area was strewn with Japanese bodies or parts of bodies. One gruesome area had apparently been used as an aid station and another possibly as a butcher shop for cannibalistically inclined survivors of the carnage since June 18. Three more Japanese were killed in the caves during the day, and large quantities of equipment and documents were found. Because of the advanced stage of decomposition of many of the dead, a complete count of Japanese bodies could not be made, but before overpowering odors drove the patrols out of the caves 125 more or less whole bodies were counted. This was considered a minimum figure, for no estimate could be made of the numbers of Japanese represented by separated arms, legs, or torsos and it was impossible to guess how many Japanese had been sealed in smaller caves or crevices by artillery and mortar fire or by explosions of TNT and Japanese ammunition within the caves. With the suppression of Japanese cave positions near Mokmer airfield, the strip was finally operational, and P-40s and B-24s started using it from June 22. Between June 22 and 24, the 186th Regiment also took down some Japanese positions northwest of its perimeter. By June 25, Colonel Newman managed to subdue the Teardrop position. Despite lacking supplies and water, some Japanese managed to flee westward, where the 34th Regiment would eventually clean up the area by the end of June. Over at the East Caves from 7 through 10 June the 4.2-inch mortars of the 2d Platoon, Company D, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, lobbed over 1,000 shells into the East Caves area. On the 9th and 10th, tanks in LCT's cruising offshore added their fire, and on the latter day the 205th and 947th Field Artillery Battalions swung into action against the East Caves. Bombardments by artillery, mortars, tanks, and destroyers continued from 11-13 June, but the Japanese still managed to deny to the HURRICANE. Task Force the use of the coastal road during much of the period. In between artillery and naval gunfire concentrations, elements of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, probed more deeply into the Japanese positions from the north and northeast and located the north flank of the main enemy defenses. By noon on the 13th, the combination of American fire and infantry action had succeeded in silencing enough of the Japanese fire so that truck convoys could safely use the coastal road without interruptions for the first time. Infantry patrolling and all types of bombardment continued from 14 through 23 June, but the Japanese still occasionally harassed truck convoys along the coastal road. On the 23d or 24th (the records are contradictory) there was undertaken a series of aerial bombardment missions which are among the shortest on record. Fifth Air Force B-25's, based on Mokmer Drome, took off from that field to skip-bomb the East Caves. Although most of the bombs missed the main sump holes, the air missions did cause many explosions and started a number of fires in the East Caves. For a few days, at least, almost all the enemy fire was silenced. On 27 June Company E, 542d Engineer, Boat and Shore Regiment, started to construct a jetty near Mokmer, and in connection with this mission began working a gravel pit at the base of the ridge northwest of the village. Japanese mortar and rifle fire from the East Caves impeded the latter work and on 29 June 4.2-inch mortars and tanks had to be moved back into the area to shell the caves and protect the engineers. Within three days the mortars fired over 800 rounds into the caves. The engineer company, borrowing bazookas from an infantry unit, sent its own patrols into the caves, and Company I, 163d Infantry, sent patrols back into the area from the north. On 30 June the 205th Field Artillery Battalion sent one gun of Battery C to a position near Mokmer village to place about 800 rounds of smoke and high explosive shells into the caves. Light harassing fire continued, however, and on 3 July elements of Company E, 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, moved into the caves under cover of tank fire from the base of the ridge. Some tunnels were sealed shut, twelve Japanese were killed, and two light machine guns were captured. Almost simultaneously, Company E, 163d Infantry, pushed into the caves from Mokmer village. Neither the engineer nor the infantry unit met as much resistance as had been anticipated. Patrolling throughout the caves was continued on the 4th and 5th, and on the latter day a platoon of Company E, 163d Infantry, entered the larger sump holes, where were found many automatic weapons, mortars, rifles, all types of ammunition, food, clothing, cooking utensils, and pioneer equipment. The next day loudspeakers and interpreters were sent into the caves to persuade the few remaining Japanese to surrender. Only ten Japanese, of whom eight were killed, were seen in the area. The Japanese who had lived uninjured through the heavy bombardments since 7 June had evacuated the East Caves. The few Japanese left alive in the East Caves after 6 July were still capable of causing some trouble. On 15 July six souvenir hunters of the Royal Australian Air Force (elements of which were staging through Biak for operations farther west) were killed near the caves. Tanks and infantry were sent into the area to mop up the remaining Japanese and recover the Australian dead. On the 16th and 17th, three badly mutilated bodies of Australian airmen were found and two Japanese machine gun nests were wiped out. On the 20th the infantry and tanks returned to the caves, found the other Australian bodies, and eliminated the last enemy resistance. Meanwhile, the determined and resourceful defenders of the Ibdi Pocket resisted repeated attacks from the 2nd Battalion, 163rd Regiment and ongoing artillery barrages. By the end of June, the Japanese had been pushed into a 600-yard-square area, with American patrols continuing the cleanup in July. Through the use of bazookas, flamethrowers, tanks, and artillery, the remaining Japanese were gradually confined to an even smaller area until the pocket was cleared on July 28. The American forces would then mop-up the remainder of the island up to August 20, accounting for a total of 4700 Japanese dead and 220 captured since the start of the battle. Total American casualties were an estimated 400 killed, 2000 wounded, 150 injured in action and 5 missing. Additionally, there were 7234 non-battle casualties due to sickness, many of whom were returned to duty. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Ichi-Go was continuing its horror show deeper into central China. B-29 Superfortresses are arriving to the scene, first from India and China, but as the Pacific Island hoping campaign makes more and more progress, soon they will be lifting off from airfields much closer to the Japanese home islands.

Last time we spoke about the Siege of Myitkyina. General Vinegar Joe made huge gains in northern Burma. Myitkyina's airstrip was taken, now the main town was under siege. The Japanese resistance around Kamaing was greatly reduced. However setbacks were also seen, such as the Chindits abandonment of the Blackpool stronghold, prompting Stiwell to toss a new attack at Mogaung. Likewise American officers embedded with the Chinese units were sending reports of how the Chinese were suffering very heavy casualties and utilizing far too much ammunition for their objectives. Regardless, it seemed the Ledo Road to China was going to pan out. Calvert chose a new stronghold location, this time at Lakum, where his Chindits faced heavy resistance. Over on New Guinea, the allies were advancing west of their new beachheads to assault Lone Tree Hill. Soon assaults against Arare and Biak would also be made. This episode is the Landing against Biak Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In the last episode, plans were made for an amphibious assault against Biak, yet there were some hiccups. The Hurricane Task Force staged at Humboldt Bay, were facing issues with terrain. Terrain considerations forced most of the task force to assemble on the southern of the two sand spits dividing Humboldt and Jautefa Bays. On this spit the beach had a steep slope which made it impossible for more than a very few LST's to be held against the shore line long enough to load bulk stores. The LST's had to beach on the northern spit, where clearing and salvage after the fires and explosions which had ravaged that beach during the early phases of the Hollandia operation had not been completed. In addition, the northern spit was being used to unload supplies destined to be used at Hollandia, to load supplies being sent to the Tornado Task Force at Wakde-Sarmi, and to unload cargo for the Hurricane Task Force. No road connected the northern and southern sandspits. Consequently, most of the supplies and equipment, as well as many of the troops, had to be transported by water from the southern to the northern loading area. There were only a few LCT's available for this work and only by working twenty-four hours a day, were all the troops and supplies transported to the loading beach in time for departure on the 25th.  Finally, General Fuller's task force would depart the bay on the evening of May 25th, covered by Admiral Fectheler's cruisers and destroyers. Taking the most direct route, the convoy would be able to arrive off Biak on the morning of May 27th. At the time, Biak was held by the Biak Detachment, under Colonel Kuzume Naoyoki. It consisted of the 222nd Regiment; the 19th Guard Unit; and some rear echelon, service, and construction units. There were 10000 IJA personnel, 4000 were combat troops in total and 2000 IJN personnel, 125 were combat troops in total. In view of the intense enemy concentration on the Sorido-Mokmer airfield sector, Colonel Kuzume decided on May 22nd to shift the operational center of gravity of the detachment to the west. The 1st Battalion, 222nd Infantry, was relieved of its mission in the sector east of Opiaref and sent to replace the naval garrison unit in the Bosnek sector. The naval troops were, in turn, shifted westward into the Sorido airfield sector, while the tank company was brought over from Arfak Saba and assembled in the area northwest of Mokmer airfield. Although most of the Japanese efforts had been directed to the construction of airfields, Kuzume had ably managed to build a system of strong cave positions.  In this amphitheater-like terrain and along the low ridge, both of which were covered with thick growth, the Biak Detachment emplaced many field artillery and antiaircraft weapons. There were also many automatic weapons and a few mortars. All these weapons were located within range of Mokmer Drome and most of them could also fire on Borokoe Drome. The key to Colonel Kuzume's defenses in this area was the West Caves area, located about 50 yards north of the low ridge and about 1200 yards north of the western end of Mokmer Drome. The West Caves were actually three large sumps, or depressions in the ground, which were connected by underground tunnels and caverns. The caves were ringed with pillboxes, bunkers, and foxholes, and an extensive system of coral and log emplacements was built along the spur ridge above Mokmer Drome. Biak naval headquarters was originally located in the West Caves, which could shelter 1000 men, and Colonel Kuzume planned to move Biak Detachment headquarters to the caves for the final defense of the airdromes. As long as the West Caves and the positions along the low ridge were occupied by the Japanese, Allied planes could not safely use the airfields. Chief of Staff of 2nd Area Army, Lieutenant-General Numata Takazo and Rear-Admiral Senda Sadatoshi, Commander of the 28th Special Base Force, with HQ at Manokwari had come to visit the garrison just as the Allies were preparing to invade, with Numata choosing to stay on the island to direct the battle alongside the resourceful Kuzume. Yet all of the Japanese at Biak were about to be caught with their pants down as many of their troops were scattered about the island. The Biak Detachment would not be in their defensive positions on Z Day but were apparently being held mobile. Detachment headquarters, the 1st Battalion of the 222nd Infantry about half of the 19th Naval Guard Unit, and miscellaneous service organizations were all located in a cave and garden area on the inland plateau about 3,000 yards north-northwest of Bosnek. Outposts at Saba and Opiaref were held by the 1st Company, 222nd Infantry, and a platoon of the 2nd Company was stationed along the main ridge behind Bosnek. The bulk of the 2nd Battalion, the rest of the naval guard unit, and some naval antiaircraft organizations were located at the East Caves. Naval headquarters, various naval service units, and the 6th Company, 222nd Infantry, were at the West Caves. Most of the army service units were at Mokmer Drome or disposed along the low ridge north of that field. The bulk of the 3rd Battalion was posted at the west end of the same airfield. One platoon of the 10th Company was at Sorido, guarding the southern terminus of a trail which led north across the island to Korim Bay. The tanks had not yet moved to Saba but were assembled on the terrace north of the eastern end of Mokmer Drome. On the morning of May 27, Fechteler carried out his naval fire support as planned and General Kenney's bombers also launched their air bombardment, receiving little answering fire from the surprised Japanese shore installations. Yet there was a westerly current off Biak that would push the transports over 3000 yards to the west, which would complicate the landings. A rocket-equipped LCI, which began firing on the beaches about H minus 4 minutes, led the first LVT wave toward the shore. The LCI fire, consisting of rockets and fire from automatic weapons, continued until H plus 2 minutes, when it was lifted because it began to endanger the troops who were unloading and pushing inland. The first waves of LVTs then formed rapidly and crossed the line of departure; but because of the westerly current and the smoke and dust raised by the preliminary bombardment, they would end up landing on a mangrove swamp almost 3000 yards west of Green Beach 4. Nevertheless, by 7:30, the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment had successfully landed and was pushing beyond the swamps to the main coastal road connecting Bosnek and the airfields. Five minutes later, Companies I and K of Colonel Newman's 186th Regiment also landed about 700 yards east of the 2nd Battalion. Realizing about the westerly current, Fechteler then started to turn succeeding waves eastward to the proper beaches, with the troops coming ashore in disorder for the next thirty minutes.  With more than half of his regiment already far west of the proper landing beaches, and knowing that the landing had become disorganized and that the rest of the boat waves were being delayed, Colonel Newman asked the task force commander if the 186th Regiment should continue with its original mission or whether it might be feasible to switch missions with the 162nd Regiment and start moving west toward the airfields. General Fuller, the Task Force commander, ordered the 186th Regiment to continue with its original mission. As events turned out, it might have been better had the regiment continued west, and it is possible that a great deal of time might have been saved if the missions had been switched. In the first place, the maps with which the task force was supplied were so inaccurate that both regiments soon came upon terrain features that threw much planning out of gear. Secondly, most of the 186th Regiment had landed so far west that both it and the 162nd consumed much valuable time getting to their proper locations. Finally, an exchange of missions might have been executed without much difficulty, for, in amphibious training, the 41st Division had learned to switch missions when such mistakes were made. Luckily, the landings would face no opposition, though the confusion would give Kuzume time to prepare his defense. By 8:00, the rest of Newman's 3rd Battalion had landed to secure the jetties; and by 10:30, Companies I and K arrived to take their position west of Old Jetty. Entangled with the landed artillery and tanks, the 2nd Battalion would only be able to reach the area east of New Jetty by noon, then sending patrols to the north and east to secure the Bosnek perimeter. The face of the coral ridge behind Bosnek was found to be rough and honeycombed with small caves. Companies F and G, aided by elements of the Support Battery, 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, sent patrols along the steep slope and to the top of the ridge to investigate many of the caves, most of which proved to be unoccupied, though three Japanese were killed near caves directly north of New Jetty. The companies moved over the first slope to a second ridge line which was parallel to and about seventy-five yards north of the first. Company G started looking for a trail which was thought to lead over the ridges to the plateau north of Bosnek, but it was Company E which, shortly after noon, found the ill-defined track. A few Japanese from the 2nd Company, 222nd Regiment in a pillbox temporarily prevented the two companies from securing the trail, which was not cleared until 2:00 hours, after the pillbox had been destroyed. During the late afternoon, patrols were sent north of the ridges to the area which the Japanese had surveyed for an airdrome. A few Japanese , most of whom fled upon being sighted, were found at the airdrome site, but there were no signs of large organized enemy groups north, northeast, or east of Bosnek insofar as the 186th Infantry could ascertain. The only enemy action during this day would be an air attack by four Japanese bombers.  A few enemy planes which flew over Biak around noon fled before anti-aircraft guns from ship or shore could be brought to bear. But all anti-aircraft crews were on the alert to expect further Japanese air action late in the afternoon. Because of the difference in time of sunset at the closest Allied and Japanese bases, Japanese aircraft could remain in the Biak area about half an hour after Allied planes had to leave. The expected attacks developed shortly after 4:00, when four Japanese two-engined bombers, accompanied by three or four fighters, approached the beachhead from the north, flying low over the ridge behind Bosnek and thus escaping radar detection. Some excellent targets were ready for the Japanese. Admiral Fechteler had permitted four LST's to tie up side by side at one of the jetties. Although he knew this move to be tactically unsound, he considered it justified because of the importance of the cargo aboard the LST's and because the jetty provided the only good spot for LST beaching. The Japanese bombing was accurate, but the LST's were lucky. None of the Japanese bombs exploded! Though the Japanese planes also bombed and strafed the beaches, none of the bombs dropped ashore exploded, while the strafing runs killed only one man and wounded two others. All four bombers were shot down by ground or ship-based antiaircraft, and the Japanese fighters were driven off by some Allied fighter planes which had remained late in the area. One Japanese bomber crashed into the water, sideswiping an SC which was standing offshore. Two of the ship's crew were killed and nine wounded. The SC had to be towed away for repairs, and a few other naval vessels suffered minor damage from strafing. There was negligible damage to supplies and equipment ashore. Total Allied losses as a result of the air raid were three killed and fourteen wounded, most of them naval personnel. Unloading also progressed satisfactorily, with 12000 men, 12 medium tanks, 29 artillery pieces, about 500 vehicles, and an estimated 3000 tons of bulk cargo being landed by 5:15. Meanwhile, Colonel Haney's 162nd Regiment had begun landing shortly after 9:00 and immediately started moving west along the main coastal road towards Biak's three airdromes. Moving with speed, the 3rd Battalion passed through Ibdi village at 10:30 and then began to traverse the difficult Parai Defile. At 11:15, the regimental Intelligence and Reconnaissance Platoon discovered an enemy position on the face of the cliff west of Ibdi, that the 162nd Infantry first learned of the existence of the Parai Defile. At 1:00 the 3rd Battalion, with six tanks of the 603rd Tank Company leading the advance, arrived at the eastern entrance to the defile. There was no large Japanese force stationed along the cliff, but the few Japanese had such a tactical advantage over troops moving along the coastal road that they were able to delay the 162nd Infantry's advance for some time. Meanwhile Company E, which had been attempting to advance along the ridge north of the rest of the regiment, had found that the terrain and thick vegetation made progress along that route next to impossible. Since the company was lagging far behind the rest of the advance and since strong enemy opposition had not yet been encountered either inland or on the coastal route, it withdrew to join the rest of the 2nd Battalion on the beach, and by the time that battalion had reached Parai, Company E was back in place.  By 3:00, the 3rd Battalion had successfully pushed through the defile and had secured Parai and a large jetty at that village. Progress west of the Parai Defile was without noteworthy incident during the rest of the afternoon, so Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalion would be able to dig in at Parai by nightfall. On the other side, Kuzume was surprised by the landings, but he was expecting the enemy to land exactly there, where the extreme narrowness of the beach and the few entrances inland would make deployment difficult. Deciding to seize this momentary advantage, he thus ordered his 1st and 3rd Battalions to carry out an attack all along the Bosnek beachhead during the night. On the 3rd Battalion front, after an unsuccessful raid against two batteries near Ibdi. Then the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry , renewed the attack with grenades and rifle fire, some circling to the north around Battery C and a few others moving against Battery B, located 200 yards to the east. Attacks on Battery C continued until daylight, when the last Japanese withdrew. The action cost Battery C 4 men killed and 8 wounded, while a near-by antiaircraft detachment lost 1 man killed and 1 wounded. Over 15 of the enemy had been killed during the night and an unknown number wounded. The 1st Battalion also raided the beachhead, suffering many casualties as a result.  On the morning of May 28th, the 162nd then resumed its westward advance, with its 3rd Battalion rapidly proceeding through Mokmer village without opposition. By 9:30, however, the Americans began to face stiff resistance at a road junction nearly 1500 yards west of Mokmer. Supported by artillery, Company K would be able to push to within 200 yards of Mokmer Drome; yet Kuzume would rapidly counterattack them with his 2nd Battalion. Charging repeatedly, the Japanese would eventually force the Americans to pull back by noon, with Lieutenant Yokoyama Hideo dying heroically during these attacks. Emboldened by this success, Kuzume then launched an all out assault from the East Caves area. On the main ridge north of Mokmer the Japanese had another strongpoint east of the West Caves, which was called by the Japanese the East Caves. Behind Mokmer the ridge rose to a height of 240 feet. It was not so steep a cliff as the Parai Defile barricade, but it could not be climbed without the use of hands. About three quarters of the way to the top was a flat ledge from which two large caverns, similar to those in the West Caves area, could be entered. The Japanese constructed pillboxes on the ridge both below and above the ledge, and in the caverns they emplaced mortars, 20-mm. guns, and heavy machine guns. Observation posts were also set up at the East Caves, from which an unobstructed view of the coast from Parai to the west end of Mokmer Drome could be obtained. The Biak Detachment used the East Caves principally as living quarters, supply dumps, and as a connecting link between the Ibdi Pocket and the West Caves. Continued Japanese occupation of the East Caves would endanger Allied troop and supply movements along the coastal road from Parai to Mokmer Drome. The enemy threw more troops into the battle from the East Caves area until the attackers were coming not only from the west but also from the northwest and north. The Japanese split the 3rd Battalion by driving a wedge along the cliff between the troops on the shore and those on the terrace. Companies L and M were cut off. The 2nd Battalion, attempting to get on the terrace to the north of the 3rd Battalion, was pinned down by Japanese fire from the East Caves and was unable to advance. Company G, on the terrace north of the main road and between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, was also cut off. In response to the attacks, Haney ordered the 1st Battalion to move north from Parai onto the main coastal ridge to outflank the enemy positions, but efforts to do so were halted by enemy fire from the East Caves. Two companies patrolled in the broken terrain along the main ridge but were unable to move westward. Most of Company L and the Company M detachment which was also on the coral terrace managed to find a covered route back to the rest of the 3rd Battalion on the shore, but one platoon, initially surrounded, had to fight its way eastward into the lines of the 2nd Battalion, north of Mokmer village. Company G, on the terrace north of the main road and between the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, was also cut off and withdrew to the 2nd Battalion only with difficulty, and after it had suffered many casualties from Japanese fire. During the afternoon the 3rd Battalion stood off two more concerted enemy counterattacks, one at 12:00 and another shortly after 2:00, and suffered more casualties from the enemy mortar and artillery fire. During the latter attack, the Japanese began moving some light tanks forward from the Mokmer Drome area. The 3rd Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, engaged these tanks at a range of 1,200 yards and, with the aid of fire from destroyers lying offshore, drove the enemy tanks back into defilade positions. Three tanks of the 603rd were damaged by Japanese artillery fire and three men of the same organization were wounded during the action. Meanwhile, General Fuller had decided to reinforce the 3rd Battalion, 162nd Infantry. The 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, moved west along the coastal road. At the same time small boats manned by the 542nd Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment were also sent forward with ammunition and medical supplies, both dangerously low. The small craft moved along the shore out of range of Japanese mortar and artillery fire until opposite the 3rd Battalion's position and then shot inshore at full speed, one by one. Supplies were replenished and the worst casualties evacuated despite continued shelling of the 3rd Battalion's position by the Japanese. The 1st and 2nd Battalions continued their efforts to clear the Japanese from the terrace behind the 3rd but met with little success. By late afternoon, just as the 3rd Battalion's position was becoming untenable, Fuller gave up plans for further attempts at reinforcement and ordered Haney to withdraw his 3rd Battalion. The withdrawal started slowly because communications difficulties still prevented concentration of supporting fires. However, at 5:00 the regimental commander finally ordered the 3rd Battalion to start moving back along the coastal road. Tanks were to act as point, and rear guard and close-in artillery fire was substituted for a disengaging force. The battalion was to continue eastward until it had passed through the 2nd, which was setting up a new defensive position east of Mokmer village. The men of the 3rd Battalion moved in small parties along the beach and main road, which was intermittently swept by Japanese mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire. Many troops were unable to use the main road, but had to drop down to the beach below the overhanging cliff. Four tanks brought up the rear and protected the north flank. Between 1830 and 1900 all elements of the 3rd Battalion reached safety beyond the 2nd Battalion's lines and began digging in for the night east of the latter unit. Casualties for the day, almost all of them suffered by the 3rd Battalion, were 16 killed and 87 wounded. Facing strong resistance, he also decided to commit his tank company to the attack. At around 8:00, new waves of Japanese infantry, now supported by four tanks, appeared west and north of the 2nd Battalion, thus beginning the first tank battle of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area. The 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry, with the 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, in support, was astride the main coastal road 1,000 yards east of Mokmer. The battalion's left flank was on the beach while its right was against the coastal cliff and less than forty yards inland. Between the beach and the cliff was a coconut grove. The main coastal road crossed the rise of the cliff at a point about 475 yards west of the 2nd Battalion's lines. Shortly after 8:00 the Japanese tanks, followed by an infantry column, advanced down the incline where the main road crossed the cliff and deployed in echelon left formation in the coconut grove. The Japanese vehicles were light tanks, Type 95, weighing about nine tons, carrying a crew of three men, and armed with one 37-mm. cannon and two 7.7-mm. machine guns. They were opposed by two General Sherman M4A1 medium tanks, the heaviest armament on which was the 75-mm. Each Japanese tank was stopped by one round of 75-mm. armor-piercing ammunition, while the enemy infantry was literally mowed down by the machine guns and mortars of the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry. Armor-piercing 75-mm. shells passed right through the Japanese light tanks, and the Shermans followed with a few rounds of 75-mm. high explosive, which tore holes in the Japanese vehicles and blew loose their turrets. During this action several hits scored on the Shermans by the Japanese 37-mm. guns caused no damage. About thirty minutes after the first attack the Japanese sent in a second wave of three tanks, which used the same route of approach and the same formation in the coconut grove. These three were quickly destroyed by three Shermans. One enemy 37-mm. shell locked the 75-mm. gun of one Sherman in place, but the American tank backed part way into a shell hole to obtain elevation for its weapon and, despite the damage, managed to destroy one of the enemy tanks. The Japanese tanks having been stopped and the leading elements of the second infantry wave killed, the attack disintegrated and the enemy withdrew. For an hour or so the Japanese were quiet, but late in the morning, under the cover of machine gun fire and mortar barrages, they began to circle north of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, 162nd Infantry. New infantry attacks began about 12:00. The enemy was unable to dislodge the 162nd Infantry, but his mortar fire caused many casualties within the regimental perimeter and the Japanese managed to cut the coast road east of a large T-jetty at Parai. Company B and the Cannon Company counterattacked the Japanese roadblock behind close-in mortar support and succeeded in dislodging the enemy by fire and movement. During the afternoon of May 29, the 162nd thus moved back to Parai, where the 2nd Battalion and two companies boarded some amphibious craft back to Bosnek while the rest of the regiment moved overland through the Parai Defile and took up positions at Ibdi The 162nd Infantry's casualties during the day were 16 killed, 96 wounded, and 3 injured. The regiment estimated that it had killed over 500 Japanese during the day. Though Kuzume's forces had suffered massive casualties, they had heroically managed to stop the enemy advance and would subsequently push troops forward to Parai and into the cliffs along the Parai Defile. They would however also lose most of their armor during these attacks. Only five tanks survived and were withdrawn to the West Caves. Pending the arrival of reinforcements, General Fuller planned to use his available troops to hold the west flank at Ibdi and expand the beachhead at Bosnek. The 162nd Infantry was to establish a semicircular perimeter beginning on the beach west of Ibdi, reaching north to the main ridge, and returning to the beach at the village. The 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, would maintain a perimeter around Mandom, where the Hurrican Task Force HQ was located, while the 3rd Battalion moved over the ridge behind Bosnek to set up defenses on the inland plateau. The 2nd Battalion, with part of the 3rd attached, would remain at the Bosnek beachhead. During this period, the 800 well-armed men of the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry in the Ibdi Pocket, made only harassing attacks with small groups against the positions of the 162nd Infantry. On 30th and 31st of May the 162nd Infantry patrolled around the main ridge near Ibdi for a route over which large bodies of troops might move north to the inland plateau in preparation for the second attack westward. During the course of this patrolling, it was discovered that the main ridge from Bosnek to the Parai Defile actually comprised a series of seven sharp coral ridges, the crests of which were 50-75 yards apart and separated by gullies 50-100 feet deep. These separate ridges were honeycombed with small natural caves, potholes, and crevices. There was little soil on most of the coral, yet the area maintained a cover of dense rain forest containing trees 8-20 inches thick and 100-150 feet high. The 162nd Infantry discovered two native trails over the ridges. The most easterly of these, designated "Old Man's Trail," began on the beach road about 1,200 yards west of Mandom. It was a fairly well defined track which swung north over the seven ridges along a comparatively easy route. Another track began 1,200 yards to the west, near Ibdi. Called "Young Man's Trail," the latter followed a very difficult route over the ridges to the inland plateau. Both of these trails ran through the outer defenses of the Ibdi Pocket, into which the Biak Detachment, on 30 May, moved the 3rd Battalion, 222nd Infantry. On 30 and 31 May the 162nd Infantry's patrols along the ridges north of Ibdi and Mandom were harassed by the Japanese in the Ibdi Pocket, which had not yet been recognized as a major enemy strong point. On 30 May the 162nd Infantry located a water hole near the beach terminal of Old Man's Trail. A regimental water point established there was constantly harassed by Japanese rifle fire from the Ibdi Pocket area or by small enemy parties which moved down out of the ridges north of Ibdi and Mandom. The Cannon Company, 162nd Infantry, was therefore assigned the missions of clearing the enemy from the water point area and protecting that important installation from Japanese attacks. Halfway through the Parai Defile, a little over a mile west of the 162nd Infantry's main perimeter, an underground stream ran from the base of the cliff into Soanggarai Bay. At the point where the main road crossed the stream, the 162nd Infantry set up an ambush to prevent Japanese infiltration from the west along the beach. The ambush site was also used as a patrol base from which small parties reconnoitered along the cliffs of the Parai Defile to discover enemy dispositions in the area. Patrolling on 30th and 31st of May cost the 162nd Infantry 6 men killed, 17 wounded, and 4 injured. On the main coastal ridge between the village of Ibdi and the Parai Defile the Biak Detachment developed another center of resistance which came to be known as the Ibdi Pocket. The terrain in the area was a series of knifelike east-west ridges separated by depressions and crevices up to fifty feet deep. These ridges were connected in places by cross-ridges, and the entire area was covered with thick rain forest and dense jungle undergrowth which had found a foothold in the coral. Pillboxes of coral and logs, hasty emplacements of the same materials, small caves and crevices, and foxholes at the bases of large trees were all utilized by the enemy to defend the area. Back to the Wakde-Sarmi area, General Patrick was preparing to launch another assault on Lone Tree Hill. On the morning of May 27th at 7:00 two destroyers, firing on Lone Tree Hill and the Maffin Strip area, started scheduled fire support for the day's advance. Artillery and infantry action on this morning was much more closely coordinated than on the previous day. The destroyer fire lasted until 7:45, at which time the field artillery and all the 81-mm. mortars of the 158th Infantry laid concentrations on suspected and known enemy positions in the defile, on Lone Tree Hill, and on Hill 225. After this Colonel Herndon sent his 1st Battalion against the defile between Lone Tree Hill and the eastern nose of Mount Saksin and his 2nd Battalion against Hill 225. At 8:30 Company F, moving around Company E on the south flank, started its attack. Behind close artillery support, apparently controlled by artillery liaison planes for the most part, Company F pushed up a terrain feature initially believed to be Hill 225. It was not discovered until late the next day that F Company was actually on the eastern nose of Mt. Saksin and about 700 yards east of its reported location. Since artillery fire had knocked out two enemy machine gun nests which had been delaying the advance, patrols of Company F were able to reach the top of the eastern ridge. The rest of the company moved up the hill at 10:00; encountering scattered rifle fire from enemy positions to the southwest. Company E, just before noon, arrived atop the same hill on F's right. Company E had orders to secure the southern slopes of the defile between Hill 225 and Lone Tree Hill. Company B, still at the eastern entrance to the defile, was again unable to make any progress and during the morning was held up by machine gun and mortar fire from concealed enemy positions on the southern and southwestern slopes of Lone Tree Hill. No sooner had some of these positions been eliminated by American artillery and mortar fire than Company B was subjected to enemy machine gun and mortar fire originating from the northeast side of Hill 225, the reported location of Companies E and F. Actually, the artillery fire had not been entirely effective, because it had not reached into deep draws or caves in which many of the Japanese weapons were emplaced. Company E, attempting to move down the northern slopes of the eastern ridge to Company B's aid, was soon forced back by enemy rifle fire and infantry counterattacks from the west. At the same time small parties of Japanese, under cover of their own machine guns, started a series of minor counterattacks against Company B. Company F did not become engaged in this action. Instead, the company dug in on the ridge it was holding and sent patrols to the south and west to probe Japanese defenses. It was soon discovered that the combination of rugged terrain and Japanese machine gun and rifle fire limited patrolling to a very small area. North of Company B, Company A patrolled along the west bank of the Snaky River and on the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill during the morning and early afternoon. About 4:30 the company moved in force up Lone Tree, finding the eastern slope of the hill to be unoccupied. Most of the fire that had harassed the company during the morning had apparently originated on the beach below the northern face of Lone Tree Hill. For the night the unit dug in at the crest of the hill. Again, little ground had been gained, although the eastern nose of Mr. Saksin and Lone Tree Hill had been at least partially occupied. At the same time, Patrick was informed that two battalions of the 163rd Regiment would be shipped to Biak to reinforce Fuller on June 1st, with General Krueger also preparing the 6th Division led by Major General Franklin Silbert  to be dispatched to Wakde to replace the 163rd. Yet before this could occur, Colonel Matsuyama crossed the Tementoe River and launched a surprise night attack against Toem. During pitch-black night at 8:30, an estimated 100 Japs struck 1st Battalion's area. Divided into small groups, but in two major commands, they carried grappling hooks, knives, grenades, knee-mortars, and rifles. Their grappling hooks had two prongs, like anchors and were attached to long ropes by which they could pull to explode booby traps harmlessly. A knee mortar barrage began the attack. While their mortars drove the men to ground, their grappling hooks caught booby trap wires and exploded attached grenades. They struck from southeast and southwest, two different commands about 150 yards apart. First command shouted wildly and threw grenades. They fired a light machine gun down A Company's street and holed up their tents. But this command's howling rush with grenades was just a feint to cause confusion. The second command, around 35-40,  made the main drive. Easily they broke through 1st Battalion's far-spread perimeter holes. An estimated 25 made the serious penetration. They were trying to reach the Regimental command post to kill the top officers. Some of the staff officers were actually cut off outside their holes in a tent and actually unarmed. Ten Japanese almost reached the command post before they were cut down. Such was the official report, but 163rd men said that they tried to blow up the motor poo, nearly 100 of them. From a slit trench, four blazing M-1s stopped them, from the motor pool chief Staff Sergeant Burton, Staff Sergeant Engbretson, T/4 Switzer, and T/5 Donakowski. They piled up 13 dead Japanese, the last just 20 feet away. On a whistle signal, all Matsuyama's men withdrew. The wild attack prompted Patrick to not to ship the 163rd towards Biak. The following morning, after another well-timed preliminary artillery bombardment, Herndon once again threw his forces against the Ilier Mountains, yet the result was the same as before. Nonetheless, his troops would be able to cover the amphibious arrival of two tanks to aid in further attacks; but with the situation soon becoming untenable because of strong Japanese counterattacks, all his companies ultimately had to withdraw to the Snaky River line. On May 29th, Krueger finally notified Patrick that the two battalions of the 163rd would have to leave for Biak the next day, so this would force Patrick to cease offensive action and withdraw the 1st Battalion, 158th Regiment back to Arare. Yet further Japanese counterattacks also forced Herndon to withdraw his remaining forces to the Maffin area as well, where he would form a new defensive line.  Patrick ultimately disagreed with Herndon's decision to retreat, judging the withdrawal to be unwarranted and would relieve Herndon of his command, replacing him with Colonel Earle Sandlin. Colonel Herndon's fears of attack along his line of communications had been well taken, for the Right Sector Force had begun flanking movements designed to recapture the entire Maffin Bay area. However, the combat engineers quickly proved their versatility by driving off the enemy force with rifle, carbine, and machine gun fire. Five of the engineers were killed. Enemy casualties could not be estimated since the Japanese removed their dead and wounded during the night. The remainder of the night was more quiet, and the next morning the defenses along the Tirfoam were improved. There were a couple of minor attacks during the afternoon and desultory rifle and 70-mm. or 75-mm. artillery fire was directed against all American units still west of the Tor. The 147th Field Artillery Battalion, withdrawing to the east bank of the Tor late in the afternoon, was struck by some of this enemy artillery fire and lost one man killed. A new defensive line along the Tirfoam was being developed on May 30th as the bulk of the 163rd Regiment would depart for Biak. This left Patrick's forces spread out over almost twelve miles of coastline, just as Colonel Yoshino was about to launch his night attack. After the difficult river crossing, the 223rd Regiment had spent three days moving into the jungle southwest of Arara, from where they launched a series of simultaneous attacks against some anti-aircraft positions along the beach.  A 6:05 on June 30th, a guard at B Battery's Position No 6 challenged two men in the jungle across the beach road. Other Japanese were moving west down the road. When they did not answer his challenge, he fired, and hit the ground. Instantly, Japanese machine guns, rifles, mortars, and even grenades hit the B-6 position. The anti-aircraft men killed 10 Japs, but one heavy machine gun jammed. The second gun became overheated and had to cease fire. The Japanese were hard to hit in the dark. They were heavily camouflaged with leaves and nets down to their hips. After one American was killed, the anti-aircraft men left their emplacement and fled 500 yards east on the beach road to Battery A's Position 7. Joined with the men of A-7 - they had already stopped one attack - the B-6 men helped fight about 15-25 Japanese. From 6:40 to 4:30 next day, the Japanese struck intermittently, but rifle and machine guns fire repelled them. About 500 yards west of the B-6 position where the first attack had occurred, Battery A-6 also endured harassment from Japanese mortar, rifle, and machine gun fire. At least twice, the gunners repulsed attacks. A fourth position, Battery B-8, which was 400 yards west of A-6, was assailed about 6:30 also. The anti-aircraft men's .50 multiple heavy machine gun became overheated and jammed. Rifle ammo was running out. Scurrying from the gun-pit, they took cover in the shore brush until the Japanese left at 4:30. All attacks began about the same time, about 8:30, and some men glimpsed a Jap officer with his saber who was giving orders. All Japanese dead had rolls of white gauze in their mouths, and the Japanese officer had completely covered his lower face. The Americans thought that they used these means to prevent them from shouting or screaming when they were wounded. While they attacked the anti-aircraft batteries, Yoshino's men also tried to storm 1st Battalion 158 Infantry protecting Task Force Headquarters and the supply dumps. About 7:00, rifle and machine gun fire began impacting 1st Battalion positions. A captured heavy machine gun fired also. At 10:00 came a furious suicidal attack against B Company - beaten off with rifles, grenades, bayonets, pistols, and even knives. They failed to fire the supply dumps with demolition charges and Molotov cocktails. In the end, the Americans miraculously only lost 12 killed and 10 wounded while inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy. But fearing more enemy attacks, Patrick would decide to reduce the number of separate perimeters along the beach, from 21 to only 8.  The bulk of the 158th had to withdraw behind the Tor, leaving only its 2nd Battalion west of the river to secure the bridgehead. Facing little resistance, the Japanese recaptured Maffin, though they would be unable to push Sandlin's troops behind the river. Yoshino and Matsuyama were unable to coordinate their efforts however, allowing the Americans to continue to strengthen their defenses for the next few days, with the Japanese only able to launch nightly raiding attacks that were easily repelled. On June 5, the first units of Major-General Franklin Sibert's 6th Division then began to arrive, freeing up the 158th to continue with its offensive.  Sandlin then launched an attack with his 1st and 2nd Battalions supported by tanks crossing the Tor to attack Maffin on June 8, meeting increasingly strong enemy resistance from a line of hastily-repaired bunkers and pillboxes. The tanks were able to reduce the Japanese defenses due to their strong firepower, but not before the Americans had to dig in by nightfall.  The night passed without incident and early on June 9th patrols began to probe westward toward the Tirfoam. Scouts reported that the Japanese were holding another defense line, including reoccupied bunkers, on a slight rise at the west bank of the river. About 10:00, tank-infantry teams began to destroy the Japanese-held positions along the new line. While tank 75-mm fire was destroying bunkers or forcing the Japanese to seek cover, infantrymen crept forward to toss grenades into bunker gun ports or shoot down Japanese who tried to escape from the area. While these tank-infantry team operations were taking place, the rest of the two infantry battalions rested. Japanese 75-mm. fire, from a weapon emplaced on the beach between the Snaky River and Lone Tree Hill, harassed the 1st Battalion for a while, but this fire was summarily stopped when a 155-mm howitzer of the 218th Field Artillery Battalion scored a direct hit on the enemy piece. By 11:30 the enemy defensive positions had been cleaned out and the 1st and 2nd Battalions resumed the advance westward. Aided by fire from the 147th Field Artillery, which had supplanted the 167th in the close support role, the two infantry units probed cautiously forward, and it was not until 3:30 that both reached the east bank of the Tirfoam. Opposition was scattered, but the American units lost 6 men killed and 6 wounded. It was estimated that 50 of the enemy had been killed and one was captured. At this point, the 158th would have to stop its advance because they received new orders from Krueger, who planned to employ the regiment for an assault on Noemfoor Island, 300 miles northwest of Sarmi, in late June or early July. As such, advances west of the Tirfoam would be postponed until a second combat team of the 6th Division could arrive in the area to relieve the 158th in mid-June.  General Sibert assumed command of the Tornado Task Force on June 12th. On 10 and 11th June the 158th Infantry limited its activities to patrolling, consolidating defensive positions, and driving Japanese outposts westward. One outpost, lying southeast of the 2nd Battalion, was manned by about a hundred Japanese and had to be cleared by tank fire and infantry assault. The Japanese, who were members of a 223rd Infantry company assigned to the Right Sector Force, fled toward Mr. Saksin, leaving behind 4 heavy machine guns, 1 light machine gun, 2 70-mm. howitzers, and 1 37-mm. antitank gun. On 14 June the 20th Infantry, 6th Division, relieved the 158th Infantry at the Tirfoam. The 158th recrossed the Tor and went into a defensive perimeter on the west bank of Tementoe Creek. Patrols sent south and east during the next week encountered a few stragglers from the Japanese garrison at Hollandia or from the Matsuyama Force. On the 22nd the entire regimental combat team was relieved of all combat responsibility in the Wakde-Sarmi area and began final preparations for the Noemfoor Island operation. During its operations in the Wakde-Sarmi area the 158th Regimental Combat Team lost 70 men killed, 257 wounded, and 4 missing. The unit took 11 Japanese prisoners and estimated that it killed 920 of the enemy. With their supply line compromised, Yoshino and Matsuyama would also decide to withdraw from their present positions about this time, which would allow the 36th Division to establish better defensive positions in the Ilier Mountains line. Yet that is all for Operation Tornado and Hurricane for now, as we now need to head over to the Imphal-Kohima front. By June, the situation at Manipur saw General Slim's 14th Army losing all of their advantages. Despite the extreme odds, with a slim chance of success, General Mutaguchi continued his wild attacks against Imphal. As it was, the two armies had been battling it out in difficult terrain and conditions. There were the steep and often jungle-covered hills, the heat for men not accustomed to it, the risk of tropical diseases like malaria and the leeches – not to mention the weeks and months of both physical and psychological strain from fighting a formidable enemy. The monsoon rains that began later in May only made matters worse. As the days passed by, the low-lying areas in the Imphal Valley would flood because of the downpours, while the streams and small rivers everywhere would become raging torrents. The water level of Loktak Lake would also rise, making it especially uncomfortable for the units of both sides dug in at some of the lakeside villages on the Tiddim Road. Dysentery and diarrhea became an ever-greater concern. Foot rot would start to set in for men in their flooded positions. The slopes in the hills became slippery and that much more treacherous to navigate. The incessant rains would dissolve stretches of ‘fairweather' roads and ‘jeepable' tracks into mud and slush everywhere, while triggering landslides in the hills. For the units on higher altitudes like the Shenam Saddle, Point 5846 and the Ukhrul area, the nights would become shockingly cold and damp, adding to their misery. Yet things were undoubtedly harder for the Japanese, who had carried few supplies and didn't expect to be strung out fighting for so long.  To the north, General Sato's 31st Division were withdrawing from Kohima towards Ukhrul, defying Mutaguchi's orders, with General Miyazaki providing rearguard at Viswema, whileGeneral Grover's 2nd Division pursued them. Miyazaki's men held out at Visweman until June 12th, before withdrawing to Maosongsang. Then they held out at Maosongsang until June 16, before retreating to the last holding position at Maram. Over to the south, General Brigg's 5th Division was engaging Colonel Matsumura's 60th Regiment, fighting brutally for control over the Imphal-Kohima road. The battered Japanese defenders were fighting tooth and nail to prevent the opening of this vital supply line.  The 9th and 123rd Brigades pushed on, they would only be able to capture the Zebra hill on June 7. The following day, the 3/14th Punjabis made a wide hook and arrived on the road behind Japanese lines by nightfall, where they would repel three heavy counterattacks. This would allow the 123rd to clear the hill positions near Modbung and link up with the Punjabis on June 11th. The 9th Brigade made great progress during these days, pushing on to Satarmaina by June 13th. General Gracey's 20th Division was also attacking towards the Ukhrul Road during this period, with the 80th Brigade advancing northwards from Kameng up the Iril River Valley on a wide encircling move towards Litan while the 100th Brigade attacked up the road towards Kasom. Though the 80th faced little resistance, the 100th would struggle to progress against the fierce counterattacks of the recently-arrived 67th Regiment. By mid-June, the 51st Regiment was also ordered to abandon its positions and support the 67th on the Ukhrul Road.  Over in the southwest front, the arrival of reinforcements in the form of the 2nd Battalion, under the command of Colonel Yanagisawa Kanji at the end of May, gave General Tanaka a gleam of hope that he could launch another offensive in early June. On June 6th, four battalions under Colonel Sasahara attacked the 63rd Brigade's hill positions, applying such great pressure, General Cowan was forced to withdraw his brigade to Bishenpur the following day. On June 7th, Tanaka ordered his recently-arrived reinforcements to clear Ningthoukhong and retake Potsangbam, yet their first coordinated attack would end in failure. The attack was almost single-handedly held by Sergeant Hanson Victor Turner of the 1st West Yorks. Defending his platoon's position on the perimeter, Turner grabbed some grenades and charged forward, throwing them at the Japanese. He did this five times, going back to gather grenades each time and returning to the attack in the face of Japanese grenade and small-arms fire. He was killed on the sixth occasion while throwing a grenade. For his bravery, Turner was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The Japanese eventually captured some ground in North Ningthoukhong, but withdrew after being struck from the air and shelled. In the meantime, after the Japanese defeat at the Gibraltar Box, the Yamamoto Detachment would continue to harass the British-Indian positions from Nippon and Scraggy Hills in early June. On the evening of June 9, the Japanese put in their last major attack on Scraggy, starting with a heavy artillery bombardment. Artillery concentrations were directed at the Japanese and an airstrike was made on their part of Scraggy and Lynch. The Gurkhas followed up with an advance. Although some ground was recovered, the Japanese maintained their grip on Scraggy's crest. Having suffered many casualties and feeling that the Gurkhas' new position was sufficiently strong, General Roberts then decided to halt the counterattacks, thus leaving General Yamamoto in control of Scraggy up until the end of July. Concurrently, as a last hope to break through towards Imphal, Mutaguchi was planning to conduct a desperate offensive on Palel with some reinforcements that would fail to arrive in time. Due to these delays, he would end up sending some of Yamamoto's exhausted troops to recover Langgol and advance to the hill northeast of Palel. The Japanese managed to get beyond Langgol and attack some positions in the foothills near Palel Airfield, but were soon rebuffed. They finally sent in a commando raid on the airfield in early July, which succeeded in blowing up eight planes. Over in Ningthoukhong, Tanaka launched another heavy assault on June 12th. Though a salient on the other side was initially captured, a ferocious counterattack would ultimately evict them. This action was performed by units of the 48th Brigade, including reinforcements sent from Potsangbam.  Rifleman Ganju Lama of the 1/7th Gurkha Rifles who earned a Victoria Cross in this action. To the west, Tanaka ordered the newly-arrived 151st Regiment of Colonel Hashimoto Kumakoro to attack the British picquets overlooking the Silchar Track. After a wave of assaults, Water Picquet would fall on June 21; yet the 32nd Brigade would respond immediately with a series of counterattacks that developed into confused fighting as positions were won and lost by both sides.  On the night of 25 June, no less than a company of Japanese began attacking Mortar Bluff, a picquet position bereft of cover and a short distance away from Water Picquet. It was held by a small garrison of some 40-odd men of the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles who had replaced the 7/10th Baluchis. In pouring rain, the Japanese first bombarded the position with mortars and guns at point-blank range. For the next few hours, the infantry repeatedly attacked the surrounded and dwindling garrison. Subedar Netra Bahadur Thapa defended the besieged position almost through the night, organizing counter-attacks with whatever ammunition and grenades his unit had left. The Japanese finally overran Mortar Bluff the next morning, with Netra Bahadur Thapa fighting to his death. He was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. A few hours later, a company of the same unit formed for a counterattack on Mortar Bluff. In the face of heavy fire, Naik Agan Singh Rai led his section in charging a Japanese machine-gun post and killing its crew. It then recaptured Mortar Bluff and neutralized a 37mm gun position and crew. Rai now advanced on a Japanese bunker and killed its occupants, after which his company also recovered Water Picquet. For his actions that day, Rai won the Victoria Cross, the second for the 2/5th Royal Gurkha Rifles the same day. Faced with such counter-attacks and intense artillery fire from Gun Box, the last throw of the Japanese 33rd Division around the Silchar Track ended in failure. This left Hashimoto and Tanaka empty-handed for all the losses they had suffered. Tanaka was forced to withdraw units before they were annihilated. On July 2st the 214th Infantry, with only 400 effectives remaining, completed its withdrawal to the area south of Nouyangtek and the 151st was directed to move back to Laimanai. Having been decimated by sickness and straggling en route to the front, the strength of the entire 151st Infantry Regiment was, at that time, less than 100 men. Back in the north, Briggs' units continued to struggle for control of the Satarmaina area. The struggle over the next week centered on the main feature east of the road, the hill named Liver. The 3/9th Jats attacked repeatedly to try to dislodge the Japanese from this feature. One such attempt was made on June 15th, when Hurribombers strafed the hill, followed by heavy artillery concentrations from 25-pdrs, 3.7in  howitzers and 3in  mortars. A Jat company climbed the hill, but had to withdraw some 100 meters from its objective because of heavy machine-gun fire. At the same time, the 1/17th Dogras were sent off on a wide hook left of the road and the 3/14th Punjabis were able to secure the Octopus position by June 20.  North of them, Grover's troops would also be able to break through Maram and continue south down the road on June 20, finally meeting the Dogras two days later. Beaten, Miyazaki had nonetheless fulfilled his task and could now withdraw east towards Ukhrul. Sato's rearguard fought determinedly. Often a few men with an artillery piece, grenades and a machine-gun would take up positions on the high ground above tracks, ambushing the British advance guards before melting away to repeat the performance a few km further back or, as was often the case, remaining obstinately in their positions until they were killed. Few were free from disease and fatigue, but surrender played no part in these men's vocabulary; they fought on till overtaken by a British bullet or bayonet or, more often, by starvation and exhaustion. But the 31st Division had literally fought itself to death. Exhausted men lay in pits unable to defend themselves, suicide squads with anti-tank mines tottered towards the advancing Lee Grants and Stuarts to be mown down by accompanying infantry, or obliterated by shellfire Although the battered 31st Division would manage to survive the Kohima disaster, General Sato would be relieved of his command as he had refused to carry Mutaguchi's orders numerous times. As a result, Miyazaki was promoted to Lt-General and given temporary command of the division by the end of June. Meanwhile, though his men had resisted like demons, Matsumura now had no choice but to abandon the road and retreat east towards Ukhrul with what remained of his command due to this new threat to the north. On June 21, the Liver position would fall at last. Again, the Japanese positions were bombed and strafed from the air, this time by three squadrons of Hurribombers for half an hour. The 4th and 28th Field Regiments, as well as a troop of the 8th Medium Regiment, fired a concentration on Liver that covered it in dust and smoke. Three companies of the Jats now went in, and yet this attack was also held by the Japanese on and around Liver. They had had enough, however, and by the next morning were found to have withdrawn from the feature. The Jats suffered around 150 casualties that week, including 33 killed. The 15th Division would adopt new defensive positions at Ukhrul to cover the withdrawal of Miyazaki and Matsumura. The main force of the 15th Division then went into defense positions in a line extending generally from Ukhrul through Tongou, Shongphel and Aishan to the 3524 Pass in order to be in position to cover and pick up the Right Assault Unit and the Miyazaki Detachment as they withdrew to the east. In order to hold the new defense positions, all available men, including all those in the rear service units, were thrown into the line. Finally the Imphal-Kohima road was reopened. Slim knew while the battle was not yet over, it had already been won. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landings at Biak was another allied success. The first tank battle of the war in the Southwest Pacific Area saw the American Sherman's absolutely devastate Japanese Type-95's. Within the Burma front, General Slim had finally reopened the Imphal-Kohima road spelling doom for Mutaguchi's failed offensive.  

0:00 Intro 1:53 Stabilizing Braces 6:20 San Francisco 9:20 Common Chemicals 21:22 Nordstream 25:00 Z-Day 37:35 Trump 45:20 Vaccines 1:04:26 Economic News For more updates, visit: http://www.brighteon.com/channel/hrreport NaturalNews videos would not be possible without you, as always we remain passionately dedicated to our mission of educating people all over the world on the subject of natural healing remedies and personal liberty (food freedom, medical freedom, the freedom of speech, etc.). Together, we're helping create a better world, with more honest food labeling, reduced chemical contamination, the avoidance of toxic heavy metals and vastly increased scientific transparency. ▶️ Every dollar you spend at the Health Ranger Store goes toward helping us achieve important science and content goals for humanity: https://www.healthrangerstore.com/ ▶️ Sign Up For Our Newsletter: https://www.naturalnews.com/Readerregistration.html ▶️ Brighteon: https://www.brighteon.com/channels/hrreport ▶️ Join Our Social Network: https://brighteon.social/@HealthRanger ▶️ Check In Stock Products at: https://PrepWithMike.com

Today is Day 2 with Joseph Z! Get your coffee, your Bible, and your notepad and join us today as Joseph explains that the best way to show that you don't have a money problem is to sow a seed!! Sowing into other ministries will help you to grow and proper right now! Heather Z also joins the panel to talk about her experience of seeing mansions in Heaven when she broke her neck. Heather says, “You cannot be contained once you've had a revelation of Jesus' love!”

Yıllardır sabah alışkanlıklarımızdan birisi haline gelen Modern Sabahlar dinleyicileriyle birlikte doğaçlama akışıyla artık her Pazartesi, Çarşamba ve Cuma sabahı 09.00'da canlı olarak Onedio Twitter Spaces yayınında.

Why not join us on Bank Holiday Monday (2nd May) from 9am as we take you on a journey through the alphabet! www.radioglamorgan.com/listen

on this weeks BGP its Willie's Birthday. we get together to discuss our weekly topics.. missing Willa this week. we talk about our definition of sucess, the show Snow Fall and plenty other topics

A lovely, globe spanning chat with Shawn Taylor on the west coast of Canada, and Robert Dunlop, although living in the UK, originally from New Zealand. We talk about the future of Great War Spearhead, version 3 and future supplements.   As a bonus we talk about Shawn's Indo China Kickstarter, launching on 15th January 2022. Taylor Wargaming Publications Great War Spearhead IO group Shawn's Kickstarter Great War Spearhead Facebook Group   Shawn's book reccomendation - Austrian War Records Roberts book - Zero Hour, Z Day. 2D6 WargamingGod's Own Scale Facebook Group God's Own Scale Patreon

0:00:00 Start 0:00:41 Dzień dobry Panu! 0:02:40 Valve Steam Deck 0:20:02 Tom Clancy's XDefiant i śmierć mobilek 0:22:28 Wiedźmin GO 0:23:26 Ciężki poród Skull & Bones oraz Beyond Good & Evil 2, problemy z zatrudnianiem w Ubi 0:29:29 GAAS na PlayStation, WitcherCon był słaby, Netflix zrobi gry 0:35:24 Bezos w kosmosie, GPU w śmietniku, a Ferrari 296 GTB w Fortnite 0:38:53 Molestowanie w Blizzardzie 0:49:28 Tencent na zakupach, War Thunder ze znerfionymi czołgami 0:51:22 Tennocon był świetny 0:54:00 Grane (Realms of the Haunting, Z Day) 1:22:46 O GRID Legends i FMV w grach wyścigowych 1:27:56 Pa, pa!

Joe Z fills in for Hoch! Crowder and Joe talk to Safid Deen for an update on the Phins minicamp and Coach Larrañaga talks NBA playoffs.  See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This is a stand-alone podcast that I am making utilizing the zombie Paradigm to help beekeepers imagine a time where we might be beekeeping in a third-world type situation. Beekeeping has long been a path out of poverty. Today we are working on different types of hives that you can build from raw products with few tools. This is not a New Concept but I think it's very useful for us to be able to build simple hives and keep beekeeping.

We are going to delve in to the world of 3rd world beekeeping. Why? Because 2020.

The Best of Jay-Z!

It was supposed to be a simple mountain hike. Find out what went wrong, today on Podcastmagoria!

What's in your head, in your head? Zombie! Zombie! Zombie-ie-ie! In preparation for the inevitable Z Day, Bret and Shira are taking notes from this week's movies on how to get by. Good cardio may help you survive one Night of the Living Deb but it's the friends you make along the way who will help you last through 28 Days Later. Not content to let dead things lie, our hosts rise from their graves to pitch their own zombie movies. 

It is bad enough when a hero dies. It is so much worse when they come back as the undead. Please join us as we descend into the world of Rotted Capes, a Table Top RPG, by Paradigm Concepts. Our Story takes place in a fictional Denver, CO, only a couple of years after the Apocalyptic Events of "Z-Day". As winter begins to bite a struggling enclave hears about a possible "Grand Opening". The opportunity is to good to pass up, and our poor heroes set forth to brave the dangers of this rotten world.

Greetings and songs by Jad & Akilah. --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app

REMINDER: We'll be attending Tekko 2020 in Pittsburgh, PA (April 2-5). You can still preregister if that's your thing. https://tekko.us/registration Gohan starts his training and we visit a restaurant in the afterlife. Topics of discussion include: homework, a sassy mantis, Suits, Swamp Thing, and Jack Skellington. We also experience an invasion of the bodysnatchers. Music by 8-Bit Suicidehttps://8bitsuicide.bandcamp.com/ website: https://www.kamehouseparty.com/ merch: https://teespring.com/stores/kame-house-party email: kamehousepartypod@gmail.com facebook: https://www.facebook.com/kamehouseparty/ twitter: https://twitter.com/kamehouseparty?lang=en instagram: https://www.instagram.com/kamehouseparty/?hl=en youtube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCnRm6TPfF

January 1st is national z-day (a day celebrating people whose names start with the letter Z) and we are celebrating our favorite Z hero Zatanna Zatara. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/comicbookqueens/support

In this special episode of the Futurum Tech Podcast Interview Series, Daniel Newman welcomes IBM's Z Team Melissa Sassi, IBM Z Startup Program Manager, and Meredith Stowell, Vice President of the IBM Z Ecosystem, to discuss IBM Z Day and IBM's efforts to democratize skill-building throughout the world. Thank you to IBM for sponsoring this edition of Futurum Tech Podcast in partnership with Futurum Research. INFORMATION: This Futurum Podcast features Daniel Newman (@danielnewmanUV). If you haven't already, please subscribe to our show on iTunes or SoundCloud. For inquiries or more information on the show, email the team at podcast@futurumresearch.com or follow @FuturumPodcast on Twitter. To learn more about Futurum Research please visit www.futurumresearch.com. DISCLOSURE: Futurum Research is a research and analysis provider, not an investment advisor. The Futurum Tech Podcast (and all related written notes and materials) is a newsletter/podcast intended for entertainment and informational purposes only. Futurum Research does not provide personalized investment advice and no investment advice is offered or implied by this podcast.

IT'S FINALLY HALLOWEEN, FANS! It's Adam's favorite time of year, and that finally brings us to our final Freaky Fandoms episode of the month. And what better way to end the spookiest month of the year than to discuss ZOMBIES?! If you're a true fanboy or fangirl, then you're most likely into the movie Zombieland–a breakout classic taking a comedic view on the zombie medium. Full of decaying gore, a star-studded cast, and lots and lots of guns, Zombieland is one of the good ones. And this month marked the debut of its long-awaited sequel, Zombieland 2: Double Tap. Nate and Adam are ready to talk all things Zombieland 2, and how much they love (or as Nate says, “Hate”) zombies. Not only that, they're also prepared to ask the important Z-day questions, like WHAT WEAPON TO USE, WHAT LOCATION IS BEST FOR YOUR CAMP, and more! Listen in today to enjoy our comprehensive zombie-related spooky chat! We hope you've enjoyed our month of Freaky Fandoms as much as we have, and we look forward to doing another month of it next year! And if you haven't listened to all freaky episodes this month, make sure to go back and binge. Oh, and HAPPY HALLOWEEN, FANS!

Where our hosts talk about how Komal Nahata is a better economist than any Nobel winner, ever. Then they go on to discuss how well made the beach cleaning movie was and how brilliant of an actor Papaji is as well as how ordinary the Indian reboot of Top Gun looks. They go into the science of using nimbu mirchi to protect the most cutting-edge technology like Rafael. They also discuss the lesser nobel winner from JNU and how twitter reacted to it. The discussion ends with a look into how Dada becoming the BCCI chief could have an impact on Indian cricket.

Jay Z NFL Deal, MAC Miller Alleged Drug Dealer, Nicki Retiring, Conway Releases, WestSide Gunn Day In Buffalo

the draft was "Z-Day" but the best storylines were not about him! Coby White shows what it's about to be a great teammate, the Pelicans missed by trading #4 and the Cavs may have the rookie of the year! Everyone knew Rob Pelinka would get to trade for AD. We didn't know he'd screw that up too! Indians prospect Adam Scott joins the show and Ryan Sparks is live from the Golden Tee World Championships! Rick Carpenter joins the show and more!

We sit down with facilitator, instructional designer, meeting host and leadership consultant David Foster of Capgemini to talk about the importance of social and emotional intelligence.David's LinkedInTRANSCRIPTAde: “EQ is our ability to manage ourselves and our emotions. In the workplace, this means acting and reacting to events appropriately, such as maintaining your composer and ability to perform under pressure. However, as important as EQ is, it is also necessary but not sufficient for success. Confidence in navigating the workplace culture, high SQ, is the major obstacle for women and minorities. Culture is largely shaped by the dominant group, which for most workplaces is straight white men. This is not a conspiracy or a plot. We all tend to befriend people who are similar to us or with whom we have the most common. We take work breaks with our buddy. We grab a quick lunch with our friend. Women do this. Minorities do this. Straight white men do this. For the latter group however, this often results in power begetting power. Women and minorities in particular need to have high SQs. They need to be perceptive, vigilant, and deliberate in how they navigate the workplace culture. Not being automatically part of the workplace power club is a given for women and minorities. We can bemoan that fact, or we can take action. Taking offense or feeling hurt keeps us stuck. Successfully navigating the workplace culture--demonstrating high SQ--is the key to career growth and success.” The excerpt I just read from Smart Is Not Enough: Why Social Intelligence (SQ) may be the key to career success for women and minorities by Phyllis Levinson challenges what being good enough looks like in the working world, and social and emotional intelligences are the secret sauces to climbing the corporate ladder. How do people groups with lesser social capital and access thrive in these highly competitive spaces? This is Ade, and you're listening to Living Corporate. So today we're talking about social and emotional intelligence.Zach: Yeah. So I know you gave the definitions in your intro, but when I think of definitions for these terms, I think of it as emotional intelligence being your ability to understand and manage yourself where as social intelligence is your ability to understand and manage the relationships around you. Ade: That's about right. And I think it's interesting because I would argue that by the nature of black and brown folks being the minority, minorities in the workplace have some of the highest emotional intelligence, right? I mean, I know I'm always thinking about how I'm going to come across, how to speak, how to phrase my questions both in email and in person, and, you know, not live up or down to some stereotypes and come across as angry. And I'd say that's pretty common. I think that code-switching speaks to this phenomenon the most. The fact that we change our voices with the hopes of being accepted and making others feel more comfortable with us speaks to a certain level of emotional intelligence, no?Zach: No, I absolutely agree. And look, I don't think we're saying that minorities don't need help in better developing and honing their emotional intelligence, but it is me saying that you don't often see minorities in the corporate workplace with emotional, like, outbursts. In your experience, how many times have you seen someone that was not white just completely lose control at work, Ade?Ade: Never, and I definitely get your point. Your point is well-taken, but to me the social intelligence part is a huge hurdle. So the article you referenced earlier is interesting because I posit that if power resides with the majority group and people of color don't heavily engage with the majority--like you were saying, people tend to associate with people who are most like them--how do we learn how to navigate those spaces?Zach: It kind of--it actually kind of throws the whole idea or the term of social intelligence into question, right? Because it's not particularly an issue of mental capacity or capability as it is access. Like, I don't know how to manage this particular relationship in the workplace, not because I'm inept but because I don't have access to these relationships in the same ways as folks who don't look like me are. I mean, am I--am I tripping? Am I onto something?Ade: I do think you're onto something. It reminds me of our very first episode with Fenorris when he was talking about the white executive giving him the real talk in that plane, which by the way, side note, I know y'all have been rocking with us for a while, but if you haven't listened to our very first episode with Fenorris Pearson you definitely should go give it a listen. Back to reality. Fenorris was saying that it is essentially obvious when his black colleagues were trying to mimic behavior and mimic a culture that isn't necessarily theirs, and it built more distrust than not ironically. You might also remember this conversation about authenticity in our episode with Janet Pope essentially saying that people who find themselves in the minority, particularly folks of color, often put on personas that we believe mirrors that of the majority when in actuality the people around us who we're trying to mirror don't recognize themselves and they recognize that lack of authenticity.Zach: Right, and that's not really our fault. Like I said before, we don't have access because historically we haven't been allowed access. We're just now really engaging in these spaces [inaudible]. It's only been what, like, 50 years since the last civil rights bill was passed? So it's been, like, a pretty short line. The point is because of the way that Corporate America is set up, we have to have skills that extend beyond the X's and O's. It's not just critical for our growth, it's really needed for our corporate survival.Ade: Right. And you know, it would be great if we could at some point, I mean, over the course of this season, be able to speak to someone who is a bit of a subject matter expert on social and emotional intelligence. Maybe someone with outstanding communication, conflict resolution and interpersonal skills, and I would feel really comfortable, even more comfortable, maybe if they had maybe 20 years of experience as an instructional designer, a corporate facilitator and [inaudible]. And just to put some nice little icing on top, if they were actually responsible for the coaching and professional development of executives for an international consulting firm, I might just faint.Zach: Oh, you mean like our guest David Foster?Zach and Ade: Whaaaaaat?Zach: *imitating air horns* Sound Man, you know what it is. Put 'em right there. Let's go. Ade: That's never gonna fail to make me laugh. All right, so next up we're gonna get into our interview with our guest, Mr. David Foster. Hope y'all enjoy.Zach: And we're back. And as we said, we have David Foster on the show. David, welcome to the show, man. How are you doing?David: Hey. I'm doing great, Zach. Thanks for inviting me. A real pleasure.Zach: Absolutely, man. So look, as you know, today we're talking about the importance of emotional intelligence in the workplace. Can you talk to us about what emotional intelligence is and how it comes into play with how you do your job?David: Yeah. So a couple things, you know? I work as a facilitator in Capgemini's Accelerated Solutions Environment. You know, despite the fact that we're a technology company we're really in the people business, and, you know, what we specialize in in the ASE is helping people getting aligned really quickly, helping them making decisions, and helping them come up with really innovative solutions to really wicked, challenging problems, and that's not something that you can do without having a high degree of emotional intelligence. You know, as a facilitator I'm typically at the front of the room, and for me it's not really about presenting myself as an expert as much as it is shepherding people through our process. So emotional intelligence for me is something that I have to pay real close attention to. You know, when I think about it, there are a couple of pieces to emotional intelligence. You've got the idea of just perceiving emotions, and so for me, you know, when I'm in front of an audience or a client group, it's about trying to understand where they are emotionally. And a lot of times we're dealing with really charged topics, so understanding what position they are on that rollercoaster is really important, you know? And that's the other part of it is, like, understanding emotions. So you can perceive them and you can feel them, but you have to be able to interpret them a little bit, a lot of bit, you know? That helps you decide what questions you need to ask or helps you decide how you might shift the focus of a session or how you might even capitalize on the emotions that you're perceiving. You know, for me and my position, it's about managing that emotion sometimes, and I'm speaking not only about the client and about the audience, but I'm speaking about myself as a facilitator. Look, we're all human. You know that, Zach. Right? Like, we're all human beings, and when you're standing up in front of a group or even if it's one-on-one, the emotion that comes off of someone or someones, you feel that, right? And so sometimes it's about not only managing the emotion that's coming from folks--maybe it's questioning, you know, the origin of it or where it's coming from, but it's also understanding what it's doing to you, you know? Because it can certainly either trigger your emotions--it might put you in a position where you end up feeling some emotions, you know, based on empathy with a group, but managing those emotions is key. And then it's really about using emotions. So if I think about those four things, like perceiving, understanding, managing and then using--and when I say using, it's not--you're not trying to take advantage of folks in terms of using emotion, but you're looking at and perceiving those emotions, understanding them and trying to figure out, "Okay, how best can we tap into this to help us achieve our goals?" So if there's energy and intent to do something, you know, how do we make sure that we put people in the position so that they can do that? Emotional intelligence is essential, you know? And it's not just in my role. I think it's in every role in our corporate environment, you know? Because like I said, we're a people business, and people have emotions, you know? We are emotional, sentient beings, and so if you think that just your IQ is enough, I think you're sadly mistaken. So that's--in a nutshell, I think, you know, the synopsis of how I think about EQ and how I think about emotional intelligence and it impacts me when it comes to how I do my job as a facilitator. Now, I can extend that even further, you know? There are lots of touch points where I'm not only interacting with colleagues or I'm interacting with clients in different ways, you know? And emotional intelligence extends beyond just when you're in front of the room. It has to do with your interpersonal relationships in terms of how you work with others, you know, how you contribute to a team and how you ultimately can add value to an organization, so.Zach: See, that's so intriguing. So have you had any situations--rather, have you had any situations where you've seen business relationships completely be broken by a lack of emotional intelligence? And if so, would you mind sharing a story?David: Yeah. You know what? Broken is, like, the end, but I think there's a continuum. If you're not keen on or at least focused on emotional intelligence, you can fracture relationships, you can damage relationships. So there's a whole lot that you can do outside of just breaking them. I just did a session this weekend that's really interesting. The guy that was one of the main sponsors of our session, the CIO, you know, he's taken the DiSC profile, and I have my own opinions about assessments. I think they're all information, you know? I don't know if that truly defines who you are and how you are as much as it just gives you information to help you decide how you might proceed in terms of your relationships or in terms of your preferences. And this guy, you know, he had taken the DiSC profile, and so he characterizes himself as a driver, you know? "I'm just a high D. I'm a high D." And it's almost like he uses that as his lead into any sort of conversation, you know? Not to mention that he's also a lawyer by trade, you know? And he's got a penchant for, you know, winning arguments no matter the cost, and he has a penchant for arguing and driving people very, very hard no matter the cost. So here we are in this ASE session, and, you know, the way we work is we have large-group stuff and then we get into breakouts, and I always talk to my sponsors about, you know, when you get into these breakouts you want your people to do the work, and you want to almost sit back, and you want to ask more questions than give more answers, and you don't want to stand up and pontificate. Well, he took this opportunity--they were sharing some information about a particular work stream, and he took this opportunity in front of, you know, a small group of folks to run up one side of this person and down the other, basically asking a lot of pointed questions, creating an argument, trying to win an argument about why certain work hadn't been done, right? And what I saw happen was not only did that change the tone and the tenor of the breakout, but it also changed the tone and tenor of their relationship for the rest of the session, where this person who had been on the receiving end of these very pointed and very argumentative sort of interjections, you know, almost shut down, right? And you don't want to do that, and I think about that, specifically in the session seeing that, but I was wondering, "Man, what is it like every day to work with this person if that's what you have to deal with?" And I actually pulled her aside to check on her and said, you know, "Are you doing okay?" And she said, "That's my everyday." And so when you think about that--you know, here you have this leader who is, you know, putting out front the idea that because "I'm a D, because I'm a high driver, I almost don't have to pay attention to how or what I do and how or what I say impacts the folks that I'm saying it to," because he can hold that shield up in front. And like I said, those assessments and those types of things are really only information, and the fact that he took that opportunity to basically confront this person, you know, not really understanding--well, it's not even not that--he understood what we were doing, but not being sensitive enough or being aware enough to know, you know, what those actions could possibly do to that person within our session. You know, that indicated a pretty severe lack of emotional intelligence. Now, whether or not he's able to repair that relationship I think is up to him. You know, Zach, I've got--and we've talked before about leadership, and we've talked before about, you know, how to lead and different styles of leadership, and I think EQ is, like, a really important arrow in the quiver. It's just one thing, you know? And having a high degree of emotional intelligence allows you to not only be self-aware, but it also allows you to be flexible, right? If you're--if you're focused not only on the things that are triggers for you, your own emotions, you know, that's part of it. You have to pay attention to the other emotions, and you almost have to--you have to be flexible, and you have to be able to adapt your approach, and you have to be able to adapt how you communicate based on the emotions of the other folk in the room, you know? Not just yours, but others, and it was obviously--it was a pretty charged conversation. He had some things he wanted to get out, but there's a way of communicating that so that you don't, like you said, break or damage your relationship. And just to extend the story further, you know, I had a confrontation with him. He wanted to--we have this thing in the ASE called proposals where, you know, people put proposals in front of a group of judges to--you know, what does the way forward look like? Take your best shot, right? So we have--we have the judges, and, you know, he wanted to be a judge, and I told him--I said, "I don't know if that's a good idea." I said, "Based on your closeness to the problem, based on your position in the organization, and based on what I observed," you know, based on how his interactions could change the tone and tenor of conversations, I advised him against it. And he didn't push too hard on that, and he said, "Well, how do the judges work?" I said, "Well, they develop criteria," and he said, "I want to be part of that conversation." And I stopped him and I said, you know, "What's your interest?" Right? And he said, "I want to make sure that my opinions are represented," and I proceeded to lay it out for him. I said, "Look, you know, ASE sessions are a chance for you to let the people in the room own the work, and it's a great chance for leaders to watch their people work. You know, you've got some smart folks here, you know? And you almost have to trust that they're gonna come up with the right criteria," et cetera, et cetera, and Zach, we went back and forth.Zach: Really?David: And talk about emotional intelligence. You know, at that point I have to know what my triggers are, right? So I could've gotten into this back-and-forth argument, but I have to remember my role. My role is a facilitator, right? I can't really hold a position. And I told him that. I said, "I'm not gonna hold a position. As a matter of fact, I'm not gonna argue with you." I said, "I've laid out the risks. I've told you what could happen if you involve yourself in this conversation. Ultimately it's up to you to make the choice, and I'm not gonna stand in your way, but you can't come back to me and look at me and say, "That didn't go the way I thought it would," because I cautioned you and I warned you," and I said, "I'm basically done arguing with you because it's obvious that you want to win this argument. So, you know, if you want to be part of this criteria development, have at it." And so we walked away from each other. Relationship wasn't broken. You know, still respected me as a facilitator, and as we're getting back into the main space--'cause we were pulling people together to get them ready to do this assignment--he stops me and he says, "You know, I've changed my mind. I'm not gonna be part of it." I said, "Okay," and so I proceeded to set up the assignment, send people out, and then I found him and I said, "Would you mind telling me what changed your mind?" And he said it was ego. He said, "That conversation between you and I was all about ego," and he said, "I have to be better about managing my emotions, and I have to be better about managing my ego, and sometimes I need to exercise a bit more humility." And he actually went back to the other conversation. He said, "You know, I had a situation where I went at somebody on my team pretty hard, and that wasn't a good thing. And I did the same thing to you, and that wasn't a good thing." So in that small little microcosm you had somebody who was on the one end, you know, really not aware. Like, self--maybe self-aware, you know, using the DiSC assessment as his form of awareness, but not aware of how he was behaving would impact others, right? Really not understanding the emotions that he was generating based on how he was interacting, and he actually--the pendulum actually swung for him, you know? So I don't know when it happened, how it happened. I don't know if I had anything to do with it. You know, maybe it was just the switch flipped, and he was--you know, all of a sudden he had the ability to say, "You know what? I really need to take a step back and look at how my behavior and how I'm managing my emotions and how I'm using my emotions is actually impacting others," you know? And I think that's an important point, and I'm sorry to just prattle on, but, you know, emotional intelligence is a skill. It's something that you can develop. It's something that you can learn, and a lot of times one of the ways we learn is by reflecting, self-reflection, on the situations that we've been presented with, how we've responded, how we've behaved, and how we might change or how we might do things differently.Zach: As you know, our show focuses on people of color in the workplace, like their experiences and perspectives and really having authentic discussions around that idea and around that identity. So I would posit minorities have more pressure to be self-aware by the nature of them just being minorities, by the nature of them being--David: [inaudible].Zach: Right? The smallest group in the space. There's pressure, or there's an expectation that we just need to be more self-aware. So what advice would you give to a people group who's already aware that they are the minority when it comes to growing and developing emotional intelligence?David: Yeah. You know what? We could--how much time do we have? Man, [laughs] because--so I think about that a lot, and maybe some historic context here. This idea that we, because we have been so excluded as people of color from institutions of--I mean, call it whatever. Learning. Institutions of earning. You know, social institutions. We've always been in positions where we've had to extend the olive branch, or if I think about the middle ground, we're always crossing that middle ground, do you know what I mean? Like, we're always expected to reach further and reach farther because these institutions have been established before us, and they weren't designed with us in mind, right? And it's--you know, if we want entry into them, you know, we're the ones that have to make the choices and decisions about how to interact with people. It's almost like we have to present ourselves in ways that make it okay for people to accept us, right? Which is an emotionally charged conversation, and again, we could spend, you know, four, five, eight podcasts. It's an ongoing conversation, right? So I don't disagree with you. I think we have to be, as people of color and as a minority group within, you have to be extremely self-aware, number one about your emotions, because there's a lot that could trigger you, you know? And understanding what your triggers are and understanding intent behind what people say or how they interact with you, being able to manage your emotions. It's a skill you have to have, you know? I would almost say forget about excelling, right? Forget about the idea of being promoted or moving up in an organization. I mean, talk just surviving, right? So think about being on projects. Think about being part of teams. How do you, as someone coming to this already in a position where, you know, people have perceptions of you whether or not we're welcome, whether or not we're able to perform at the same level. How do you manage that and then still do your job? I think emotional intelligence is something that you absolutely have to have. Without that, you know, this business will chew you up and basically spit you out. And it's not just EQ, Zach. You know, it's not just emotional intelligence. It's almost like you have to have some social awareness, you know what I mean? Like, you have to--you have to have a bit of empathy, a lot of empathy. You've got to really understand, you know, the organization, you know what I mean? You really have to know where you're working and who you're working for, and in that self-management, you know, how to be--how to control yourself in what can be emotionally charged situations. It's critical, you know? The only way that you're gonna succeed, you know, is if you have a strong sense of, you know, social EQ or social IQ and emotional intelligence. I read something--you know, this guy Daniel Goleman, which--I mean, his model of emotional intelligence is one that's been around for a really long time, you know? He said, "IQ is only 20% of it." Right? EQ is 80%, and I would--I'd offer that social IQ is key. So I don't know if I answered the question completely. You know, I'll get back to the advice. The advice I would--I would give to folks is, you know, you want to position yourself with mentors who have been successful navigating this organization, you know? They haven't moved up into leadership positions by accident. There's something that they're doing right, and whether it's, you know, that they have a highly evolved sense of self or they have a really highly evolved ability to perceive social and emotional situations, you know, you want to find mentors who can actually coach you on how to navigate some of these situations 'cause they're gonna repeat themselves, you know? And if you get good at handling them, you know, I think that is what positions you to do well in this organization. Now, that doesn't change the fact that there's some messed up stuff that goes on out there, right? I mean, let's just be real. You know, we have to deal, as people as color, as the minority group in an organization, there are some folks who, you know, quite frankly may not care whether we succeed or not, right? And that's just the reality, and part of what we deal with I think is, you know, our ability to understand who's in the room. You know, maybe the position that they're holding in terms of, you know, does this person care about me as person or not? Does it matter, right? And then what do I do with that, right? So that's my emotional intelligence, right? My ability to be reflective, you know? My ability to notice my emotional self within a work situation, you know? My ability to evaluate those situations and really begin to notice patterns, right? And then if you notice the patterns, you might start to see some opportunities for you to do something different.Zach: So you've given advice around what people of color and underrepresented groups in Corporate America can do to really develop or continue to sharpen their emotional intelligence and their social IQ. I'm curious, what advice would you give to the C-Suite regarding emotional intelligence and those who seek to be more ethnically inclusive and more welcoming so that they can actually acquire or procure the talent that they're looking for from these ethnically diverse spaces?David: Yeah. That's a multifaceted conversation, right? I think, you know, leaders that are looking to be more inclusive, first of all you have to have a high degree of EQ, right? Your sense of self needs to be very, very strong. You also have to--and within that sense of self, I think it's understanding your intent. Like, what's my intention? You know, is it checking a box? Do I really believe that involving and having a diverse workforce is gonna be advantageous, not only to the things that I touch but to the broader organization? You know, that sense of self is critical, and I would offer something else. It's not just emotional intelligence, it's not just social intelligence, but there's this thing. I don't know if you've heard of this, but the empathy quotient too. Like, your ability to put yourself in the shoes of others, right? Your ability to really walk a mile in the shoes of somebody else, you know? That whole idea of active listening and understanding the intent with which someone is communicating to you, you know? What's the message behind the words? I think--you know, I'm not part of the C-Suite, you know? And I think anything that I'm offering is really just what I've observed in terms of what's really been successful for people looking to be more inclusive. You know, you've got to be awesome at problem solving, and I think the combination of those three things--you know, the social intelligence, the emotional intelligence, your empathy quotient--helps you solve problems, you know? You've got to provide and be a supportive communicator. I think you have to be able to be flexible and be able to communicate with different types of folk. That's just the bottom line. You've got to be confident, you know, truly in empowering people, you know? A to B is always gonna be A to B, but the road may look completely different than you thought, and when you're involving diverse populations in a workforce, you know, you have to believe that the road to get from A to B may be something different just based on the types of people that you get involved, you know? And, I mean, I think in terms of attracting folks to work in a situation, you know, where we work, in this corporate environment, you know, you have to do your best to provide an opportunity and to provide and create an environment where people can contribute and add value, and the only way that you can do that I think is if you have a high degree of not only how you lead, right, but the environment that you want to create, and you have to model that behavior, right? You've got to make sure that no matter what it is, whether it's problem solving, whether it's managing conflict, whether it's how you empower others, whether it's how you communicate, whether it's how you motivate people, you know, I think as a leader, modeling that kind of behavior, that inclusive behavior, and modeling the fact that you need to have a high degree of emotional intelligence, a high degree of social intelligence, a high empathy quotient, you know, that's what makes people want to work with you, right? You know this, Zach. People don't leave jobs. They leave people, right? So the work that you can do on yourself, you know, to become more self-aware, it's gonna be reflected in your leadership style, right? The work that you do to become and increase your emotional intelligence, your empathy quotient, your social IQ, it's gonna be reflected in your leadership style, and people are gonna want to work with you, you know? They're gonna want to be part of an organization, you know, especially if you're modeling that behavior.Zach: Man. David, this has been a great conversation, man. Before we wrap up, do you have any parting words and/or any shout outs?David: Wow, shout outs? You know what? Here's the thing. I want to give a big shout out to the A3 posse at Capgemini. Doing incredible work, and a shout out and an apology, right, that I am not more involved. It's one of my goals this year to make myself, as part of the senior leadership of the organization, a bit more present, but I notice and I pay attention, and it's a potent group. Anybody out there who's listening who's not part of A3, you definitely want to get involved because they are doing great things to not only represent within this broader organization but it's a great resource, and it's just nice to be able to have conversations at times with people who speak the same language, who are going through the same things, you know, as we are as people of color trying to navigate, you know, this corporate environment. And I also want to thank you, Zach. I think Living Corporate is a step in the right direction, you know? The more that we can start talking about these things, the more that we can start to talk about the stuff that matters to us as people of color, especially in this day and age, without getting too political. You know, we recognize the times that we live in, and so it's extremely important that we hunker down and that we empower ourselves, right? With the tools that we need, with the kind of support that we need. You know, surround ourselves with the mentors that we need so that we can succeed, you know? And so that we can thrive, and ultimately so that we can definitely survive. So thank you, Zach. I can't--you're doing great work, brother. I want you to keep it up.Zach: Man, I appreciate it, David. And absolutely, man. Shout out for those who are listening. A Cubed is an African-American employee resource group at Capgemini, a great resource for black folks to come together and really, to David's point, really a strong point of relation and community within the community. So definitely shout out to A3, shout out to A Cubed. Shout out to Janet Pope, who was on the show before. I know that she leads that group. And David, man, thank you again for the love, man. We want to make sure to have you back, and we appreciate it, dude. We'll talk to you soon.David: All right. Zach, thank you very much.Zach: All right, man. Peace.David: Peace.Ade: And we're back. Zach, that was a great interview. I really appreciated his candid tone and vulnerability. I also really appreciated his stories around facilitating and managing personalities as well. I'm just out here trying to manage myself [inaudible].Zach: Right. In my experience in working with David, it's amazing to even just see it in action. I appreciated his points around being reflective and being able to interpret emotions and move accordingly.Ade: Well, he talked about emotional and social intelligence being what helps you solve problems. That really resonated with me because in my own head I get really, really nervous about dealing with people or being at work and having the right answer, and I've been noticing that when I take a breath and think through how I feel as well as those around me, beyond the X's and O's, the zeroes and ones, I'm able to arrive at a solution that actually works. To me, that's the simplest hook for the why behind why emotional and social intelligence might be a focus. They help you solve problems, and who doesn't want to be good at solving problems? With that being said, unless you have any further thoughts, let's get into our Favorite Things. How do you feel?Zach: No, that's awesome. Let's do it. So my favorite thing right now has to be DeRay Mckesson's book The Other Side of Freedom. I was really excited when he announced the fact that he was--he was almost finished with it, and so I preordered it, and I've been waiting, and it dropped on my birthday, September 4th. So I'm, like--I'm just excited to read it. I haven't really gotten fully into it yet, but I finished the intro, and I'm loving what I'm reading so far, and I can tell already that it's a favorite.Ade: So I'm confused. You said September 4th. Do you mean Beyonce's birthday? [Sound Man throws in car slamming on its brakes effect]Ade: Beyonce? Her birthday?Zach: I mean my birthday, and listen, I've been on this earth long enough now to realize that, yes, it's B Day. I get it, but, you know, it's my birthday too, okay? Beyonce does not own the day.[car slams on its brakes again]Ade: She does, because as you said, it's B Day, not Z Day. Which, you know, cool. You can have, like, September 5th or something, but September 4th is B Day. So, like, I guess you can rent September 4th. It's fine. It's fine. We'll be nice.Zach: [laughs] Okay. We might have to subtitle this show (B?) Happy Z Day. That would be kind of funny. We might do that.[again]Ade: Why not B Day?Zach: [sighs] Why don't we go ahead and go to your favorite things? How about that?Ade: All right. All right, okay. I'm gonna stop frustrating you. All right, so my current favorite thing is this book called The Storied Life of A.J. Fikry. Now, it is purely a work of fiction. It is comedy and it is drama and it is a tragedy, and if you're the sort of person who likes an emotional rollercoaster with your literary works I certainly recommend that book. My second favorite thing, because I can never choose just one, is this, like, nifty invention called a water bottle. I've been training for a marathon again, and I don't know how much you know about training for marathons, but they suck. The training sucks, the marathon sucks. I don't know why I'm doing this. Somebody help me. But water bottles have been saving my life so far, so there's that upside. Yay.Zach: [laughs] Okay. Well, yeah, definitely shout out to the book, and shout out to water bottles, you know? My wife, she just recently toured Route 66.Ade: Aye!Zach: Yeah, and one thing I remember I told her--I was like, "Listen, make sure you have water," and she said, "I will in my water bottle." So yes, shout out to water and shout out to Favorite Things, and as a reminder, to see all of our favorite things, go to our website, living-corporate.com, and click Faves. You'll see all of our favorite things for the season right there. Make sure you go check it out.Ade: Yep. And that's our show. Thank you for joining us on the Living Corporate podcast. Please make sure to follow us on Instagram at LivingCorporate, Twitter at LivingCorp_Pod, and subscribe to our newsletter through www.living-corporate.com. If you have a question you'd like us to answer and read on the show, please make sure you email us at livingcorporatepodcast@gmail.com. Also, don't forget to check out our Patreon at LivingCorporate as well. We're Living Corporate everywhere! That does it for us on this show. My name is Ade.Zach: And this has been Zach.Ade and Zach: Peace.Kiara: Living Corporate is a podcast by Living Corporate, LLC. Our logo was designed by David Dawkins. Our theme music was produced by Ken Brown. Additional music production by Antoine Franklin from Musical Elevation. Post-production is handled by Jeremy Jackson. Got a topic suggestion? Email us at livingcorporatepodcast@gmail.com. You can find us online on Twitter, Facebook, Instagram, and living-corporate.com. Thanks for listening. Stay tuned.

You awaken in that room, again. Why do you keep coming back? Your guide stares at you with wild eyes, muttering about peanut butter. It's going to be one of THOSE days. The Gremlins, from Gremlins, were actually the good guys or at least not the WORST people in that movie, Infinity War is Justice League with more superheroes and why the office jerk should factor into your Z-Day survival plans and soon because THANKS SCIENCE. What are you waiting for? Press Start, Player 2.

Yup, 3 pairs of Jay Z tickets given away this morning, 3 different ridiculous games for them. We also talk depression, and going to stuff by yourself.

As seen on the TV's, we talk about EVERYTHING

Promo mix for Z-DAY 2017 party vk.com/zday17

Session one of two using Masks: A New Generation. In this frame the teens must deal with life in a zombie apocalypse and protecting survivors. Draws inspiration from the EX-Heroes series and the Rotted Capes rpg.

Session two of two using Masks: A New Generation. In this frame the teens must deal with life in a zombie apocalypse and protecting survivors. Draws inspiration from the EX-Heroes series and the Rotted Capes rpg.

In honor of the 20th anniversary of Jay Z's debut album, "Reasonable Doubt," The Ringer's Jay Z aficionados reflect on Hov's impact on the modern-day rap mogul and discuss what the next step is in his career.

Pants Pending Studios comes together to capture the Z Day event for internet consumption! Check out this informative and fun experience!

Andrew discusses some news regarding Z Day, NERD, Football, and the Visual Narrative Imperative

Promo for an annual hardcore festival in Tula, Russia.

Rou Reynolds is the lead singer of Enter Shikari, a British post-hardcore band known for their mix of music genres and bold political messages.  I hooked up with him the day he was giving the closing talk at Z-Day, the Zeitgeist Movement's global celebration of unity, activism, and education.

So I am going to do another news show today. Talk a bit about the recent debate, world events, and share with you the audio version of my Z-DAY presentation which some of you might of seen on youtube.

The post Qt3 Games Podcast: Day Z, Day Z, give me your answer do appeared first on Quarter to Three.

The post Qt3 Games Podcast: Day Z, Day Z, give me your answer do appeared first on Quarter to Three.

On this show we will be talking with Rob Ninowski, a student of Sociology. Rob will be doing a presentation involving his studies in anthropology and sociology at the Z-DAY event here in Michigan. We had a great conversation that is relevant to TZM as well as the upcoming "TROLL" documentary that I am working on with Aaron Moritz. On today's episode we are going to talk about the various elements of sociology that people don't consider in day to day life despite the fact that they have a great deal of impact on their lives. The truths of social interaction that we are concious of but work hard to keep ourselves from thinking about. Why is it OK for "popular" people to bully "unpopular" people? Yet such behavior is rebuked when the roles are reversed? Why is it OK for certain people to behave aggressively and for some people not to? Why does insulting or making fun of an opponent in debate help them "win" even if their facts are dead wrong? Rob's studies have revealed some of the underlying causes of these phenomena that have held mankind back for centuries. And we will talk about them today on V-RADIO. V-RADIO is now looking for donations for the month of March, and thank you to everyone who donated previously!

New World Witchery – Z-Day Dispatch 497 News, Tips and Tricks, Culinary Corner, Poetry, Z of the Week (complete shownotes at https://newworldwitchery.wordpress.com)

On this episode of V-RADIO we again have Jacque Fresco and Roxanne Meadows of the Venus Project! We will be talking about some of the questions in the Q&A at Z-DAY and the Venus Project world tour! Tune in!