Podcasts about Tinian

Today we discuss Tinian on Trial, the next short story in Tales from the Empire. Tinian I'att and her family are designing better stormtrooper armor for the Empire. With the money they make from the deal, Tinian's grandparents plan to retire, while she and her fiance Daye Azur-Jamin take over the factory. However, Moth Kerioth has other plans for the family.

72 minuter tros det ta innan världen som vi känner den går under vid ett totalt kärnvapenkrig. Dan Jönsson reser till Hiroshima och ser hur ingenting tycks ha hänt och allt förändrats. Lyssna på alla avsnitt i Sveriges Radio Play. ESSÄ: Detta är en text där skribenten reflekterar över ett ämne eller ett verk. Åsikter som uttrycks är skribentens egna.AtomvårSom ett förfärligt fossil från något av framtidens naturhistoriska museer ligger den där och ruvar i all sin nakenhet: den suddiga konturen, skuggan av en mänsklig kropp. Fortfarande tydligt urskiljbar efter så många år tecknar den sin svartnade silhuett i det slitna brottstycket av den stentrappa som fram till den 6 augusti 1945 utgjorde entrén till bankkontoret i Hiroshima. På morgonen den dagen, som verkade bli varm och solig, hade någon slagit sig ner på trappan i väntan på att banken skulle öppna; någon, som när atombomben briserade klockan kvart över åtta i likhet med tiotusentals andra invånare i denna storstad helt enkelt försvann, förintades i den extrema hettan. Men skuggan blev kvar. Framtida civilisationer till varnagel och besinning.Nu ingår stenen med skuggan bland artefakterna på Fredsmuseet i Hiroshima, bland föremål som smälta klockor, sönderbrända skor, väggbitar med spåren av det svarta, radioaktiva regn som följde senare på dagen – ett museum som i sin krampaktiga saklighet kramar hjärtat ur besökaren. Plötsligt förstår jag precis vad han menar, den japanske mannen i Alain Resnais film ”Hiroshima, mon amour”, när han gång på gång förnekar att hans tillfälliga franska älskarinna skulle kunna förstå något: ”Tu n'as rien vu a Hiroshima.” Du såg ingenting i Hiroshima. Ute i parken blommar körsbärsträden; vid utgången skriver jag en rad i museets gästbok och hajar till vid något som någon har präntat dit ett litet stycke ovanför. ”If only they had surrendered earlier…” läser jag på engelska. Om de bara gett upp tidigare.Föreställningen att atombomberna över Hiroshima och Nagasaki var moraliskt försvarbara eftersom de gjorde slut på kriget och tvingade fram den japanska kapitulationen några veckor senare, hör till den västerländska historieskrivningens mest långlivade myter. Men sann, det är den inte. Bomben bör kallas för vad den var, en förbrytelse; vill man förklara den bör man förstå den som en maktdemonstration inte bara mot Japan utan kanske främst mot Sovjetunionen, vars röda armé i krigets slutskede avancerade mot de japanska öarna. Men förödelsen i Hiroshima ska också ses som det logiska slutsteget i en process som påbörjats nästan femtio år tidigare, en vetenskaplig omvälvning som redan i grunden hade skakat bilden av vår värld och vår plats i den. Människan hade dyrkat upp naturens lås, sprängt den gamla världsbilden i småbitar. Det återstod att demonstrera.Fram till dess hade naturvetenskapen varit överens om att materiens minsta beståndsdelar utgjordes av ett slags rörliga partiklar, atomer. Ordet atom användes första gången av den grekiske naturfilosofen Leukippos på 400-talet före vår tideräkning och betyder odelbar – när den moderna atomläran formulerades i början av 1800-talet var det alltså ett sätt att hävda just att vetenskapen i dessa elementarpartiklar hade identifierat en materiens orubbliga grund, en fast punkt. Den rubbades 1897, när fysikern Joseph John Thomson lyckades visa att atomen förutom sin positiva kärna också består av en mindre, negativ partikel, elektronen. Året innan hade Henri Becquerel upptäckt det som Marie Curie några år senare skulle ge namnet radioaktiv strålning, och decennierna som följde kom genombrotten slag i slag: makarna Curies utforskande av radioaktiviteten, Ernest Rutherfords kartläggning av atomens inre struktur och hans modell – som sedan utvecklades och förfinades av den danske fysikern Niels Bohr – av hur elektronerna kretsar runt kärnan som i ett litet solsystem.Människan öppnade dörren till atomåldern, och världen var förändrad. ”Upplösningen av atomen,” skrev den ryske konstnären Vassily Kandinsky 1913, ”var för min själ detsamma som upplösningen av världen. De tjockaste murar störtade med ens samman. Allt blev osäkert, instabilt, mjukt.” Det var ungefär samtidigt som Kandinsky gjorde sina första helt abstrakta bilder – och känslan av en värld i upplösning var han knappast ensam om. Kubister, futurister, rayonnister: alla försökte de på olika sätt spegla denna söndersprängda verklighet. ”Jag är en atom i universum,” skrev Hilma af Klint om sina målningar i serien ”Atom”, och i Paris uppförde dansösen Loïe Fuller sin experimentella ”Radiumdans” med fosforescerande kostymer och – enligt uppgift – Marie och Pierre Curie som förundrade åskådare.Men fascinationen för det nya och oerhörda bar redan från början på ett mörkt stråk. 1909 publicerade H G Wells sin autofiktiva roman ”Tono-Bungay” där kvacksalvaren George Ponderevo upptäcker det radioaktiva materialet ”quap”, ett ämne med en outsinlig inre energi som också med tiden drabbar dem som kommer i kontakt med det med en dödlig, lepraaktig sjukdom. Detta kärnfysikens janusansikte var alltså tidigt uppenbart för både forskare och konstnärer, liksom för den breda allmänheten. I USA inleddes mot slutet av 20-talet en rättsprocess när en grupp kvinnliga arbetare i en urfabrik, ”the radium girls”, stämde staten efter att många av dem drabbats av cancer på grund av exponering för fluorescerande radiumfärg. Bävande anade man i den nya fysiken samtidigt lösningen på många av mänsklighetens problem – och fröet till dess slutgiltiga undergång.Men någon väg tillbaka fanns inte. Modernitetens bild av den tekniska utvecklingen som ett framåtskridande till varje pris laddade atomteorin med en ödesmättad förening av utopiska löften och dödliga hot. Dadaisten Hugo Ball förkunnade hur ”elektronteorin orsakat en märklig vibration i alla ytor, linjer och former”, hur ”dimensionerna krökte sig och gränser föll”. Men det slutliga genombrottet kom först 1938 när en grupp tyska fysiker gjorde upptäckten att en urankärna kunde klyvas när den besköts med neutroner. Och hur det då frigjordes extrema mängder energi.Det återstod nu sju år till Hiroshima. Om vetenskapen fram till dess stått på tröskeln till atomåldern togs nu de sista stegen in i den – och som så ofta var det vapenindustrin som gick i bräschen. Redan i januari 1939 tog USA:s president Roosevelt emot en rapport som visade hur man med en nukleär kedjereaktion skulle kunna producera en förödande bomb; samma teknik kunde också användas för att producera fredlig elektricitet, men med det krig som snart bröt ut kom andra prioriteringar. Från nyåret 1943 sysselsatte det så kallade Manhattanprojektet mer än hundratusen personer runt om i USA och efter två och ett halvt år, i juli 1945, gjordes den första provsprängningen. Bara tre veckor kvar: vid tvåtiden på morgonen den 6 augusti lyfte bombplanet Enola Gay från sin bas på ön Tinian i Marianerna. Vid spakarna satt piloten Paul Tibbets och i lastutrymmet fanns en fyra ton tung bomb som kärleksfullt fått namnet Little Boy. Knappt sju timmar senare nådde den sitt mål. Framtidens portar hade sprängts. Och ljuset flödade. AtomsommarDet sägs att det första som sker när en atombomb exploderar är att allt blir vitt. Berättelserna från dem som överlevde och kan berätta är fyllda av en vantrogen bävan, en övertygelse om att ha varit med om något som är omöjligt att beskriva. Ändå måste man försöka. Hisashi Tohara var arton år och satt just på ett tåg i väntan på att det skulle lämna perrongen. Dagen var en måndag, skriver han. Höstterminen hade precis börjat. Eleverna i hans gymnasieklass var mobiliserade vid ett stålverk, men den här dagen hade strömmen slagits ut och arbetarna fått ledigt. Pendeltåget in till centrum skulle alldeles strax gå när plötsligt allt flammade upp i ett bländande ljus – ögonblicket efter var det som om jorden skakade i sina grundvalar och hans nacke blixtrade till av en ohygglig smärta.Hisashi Tohara ägnar nästan en sida åt att försöka ge en föreställning om detta oerhörda ljus. Det var, förklarar han, ett ljus som aldrig slutade att strömma ut: ”oräkneliga partiklar av ljus” – ”bländande, gyllene med röda reflexer” – ”mikroskopiska, finare än ett damm av ljus” – ”en stormflod av ljus som översvämmade världen” – ”himmel och jord flöt i ett rött, gult, gyllene skimmer där man urskilde myriader av partiklar, än mer strålande. Under två eller tre sekunder kanske? Men det tycks mig” – minns han – ”som det varade betydligt längre. Och ändå inte mer än ett ögonblick.”Ögonvittnesskildringarna från Hiroshima har alla det gemensamt att de står mer eller mindre vanmäktiga inför den intensiva intighet som bomben utlöser. Hisashi Toharas minnesbilder är nedtecknade ett år efter bomben, därefter skrev han aldrig något mer. Enligt hans hustru var det heller ingenting han någonsin talade om; först efter hans död 2011 hittade hon berättelsen i en byrålåda. Som hos så många andra som överlevt liknande katastrofer genomsyras den inte bara av försöken att ge konkret gestalt åt det obeskrivliga, utan också av en dov, irrationell skam över att vara den som skonades. De sargade, sönderbrända, fastklämda, drunknande offer som kantar flyktvägen ut ur den förstörda staden hemsöker hans minnen som en kör av tysta, anklagande spöken.Samma dunkla upplevelse av hur skulden på något obevekligt vis faller på de oskyldiga offrens axlar går också som en sugande underström genom den främsta litterära skildringen av katastrofen i Hiroshima: Masuji Ibuses dokumentära kollektivroman ”Kuroi ame” – Svart regn. Ibuse var redan före kriget en av Japans mest uppburna författare, och ”Svart regn” blev bland det sista han skrev. Boken utgavs först 1969 och bygger på ett stort antal vittnesmål som fogats samman till en lågmäld, kollektiv berättelse. Titeln, ”Svart regn”, syftar på det våldsamma skyfall som bröt ut några timmar efter explosionen och som många av de brännskadade offren hälsade med jubel – utan att veta, förstås, att vattnet var radioaktivt och att de som drack det gick en säker död till mötes.Detta historiska markperspektiv är det fina med Ibuses roman. Ingen vet ju riktigt vad som hänt. Men att det är något exceptionellt blir uppenbart redan under de första veckor efter bomben när berättelsen utspelar sig. Ogräsen skjuter fart och blir monsterhöga, mystiska utslag visar sig på de överlevandes kroppar och leder snabbt till döden. Inga förklaringar ges, allt framstår som en obarmhärtig prövning. Frågan är, å andra sidan, om någon alls skulle bli lugnad av att veta vad sådana fenomen beror på, vad som faktiskt sker i en kropp som smittas av akut strålsjuka. Hur vävnaderna i de inre organen faller sönder, hur blodkärlens väggar drabbas av nekros, hur blodet slutar producera antikroppar och immunförsvaret upphör att fungera. Hur vatten tränger ut under huden där det bildar stora blåsor som brister, hur syrebristen i blodet orsakar så kallad cyanos, ett slags lilafärgade utslag som spricker upp och blöder. Hur bakterier från inälvorna tar sig ut och infekterar blodet och leder till akut sepsis.Som sagt, jag vet inte om det gör katastrofen mer begriplig. Men allt detta vet vi idag. Det är helt enkelt några av de nya kunskaper atomåldern fört med sig. Dessutom: med bomben föddes insikter som också utlöste en helt ny etisk diskussion. Den tyske filosofen Günther Anders, som besökte Hiroshima och Nagasaki i slutet av femtiotalet, beskrev det som att det som drabbat dessa båda städer var den första konkreta erfarenheten av hur kärntekniken och dess konsekvenser från och med nu förenar hela mänskligheten i en kuslig ödesgemenskap. Historiefilosofiskt, skriver han, är dessa vapensystem inte längre ett medium utan själva scenen där historien utspelar sig.Efter hemkomsten från Japan tar Anders kontakt med Hiroshimapiloten Claude Eatherly, som vid den här tiden sitter intagen på ett mentalsjukhus för sina samvetsbetänkligheter. Deras korrespondens, som sträcker sig över nästan två år, utkommer så småningom under titeln ”Samvete förbjudet” – och i ett av dessa publicerade brev minns Eatherly hur han på morgonen den 6 augusti slås av den förfärande insikten om vad som är på väg att ske. Han sitter själv inte i bombplanet, utan flyger i förväg för att rekognoscera målet: en järnvägsbro i utkanten av staden. Han ser den tydligt genom de lätta cumulusmolnen. I samma ögonblick som han ger klartecken glider molnen bort, bomben riktas fel och han inser att den nu kommer att träffa stadens centrum.Claude Eatherly kommer så länge han lever aldrig att bli fri från det han varit med om. Samma sak gäller förstås de tusentals överlevande, på japanska hibakusha, som likt offren för de nazistiska förintelselägren bär sitt ofattbara trauma i tysthet mitt i en till synes likgiltig omvärld. Vad är det för mening att berätta? Hur beskriver man det obeskrivliga? Hur förklara skuldkänslorna hos den som överlevt? ”Du såg ingenting i Hiroshima”, som det heter i Marguerite Duras manuskript till Alain Resnais ”Hiroshima, min älskade”. Nej – men på stadens Fredsmuseum finns några konkreta kvarlevor: en bit vägg med långa strimmor av det svarta, radioaktiva regnet, trappstenen med skuggan efter någon som satt och väntade på att banken skulle öppna. Men också mängder med teckningar, utförda av hibakusha under åren efter bomben; bilder som började dyka upp i offentligheten på sjuttiotalet och sedan vuxit till en egen genre av vittnesmål. Enkla, expressiva försök att skildra förödelsen, paniken, massdöden. Mänskliga spöken med håret på ända, kläderna i trasor och skinnslamsor hängande från kroppen. Floden som svämmar över av lik. Vanmäktiga bilder av de första sekundernas intensiva ljus.Barnen som överlevde, skriver Hisashi Tohara, kom att kalla bomben för ”pikadon”: av orden för ”ljus” och ”dån”. Det ljuset, och det dånet, är det som lyser upp och genljuder genom decennierna som följer. Med skuggorna av hundratusen döda. Atomhöst”Din första tanke när du vaknar skall vara 'atom'.” Så inleder Günther Anders sina Atomålderns bud, publicerade i dagstidningen Frankfurter Allgemeine 1957. Den tyske filosofen och författaren hade då sedan ett decennium ägnat sig åt att försöka greppa den moraliska vidden av atombomberna mot Hiroshima och Nagasaki – och kommit till slutsatsen att bombens själva existens i grunden hade förändrat mänskligheten som kollektiv. Som han uttryckte det i sin brevväxling med den olycklige Hiroshimapiloten Claude Eatherly något år senare hade hotet om planetens totala förintelse fört oss alla samman i en ofrivillig ödesgemenskap av ”oskyldigt skyldiga”. Eatherly, med sina förtärande självförebråelser – som till slut drev honom så långt att han upprepade gånger begick våldsbrott och bankrån, bara för att bevisa sig skyldig till något, och slippa ifrån sin roll som krigshjälte – framstod för Anders som en förebild i denna universella olycksgemenskap. Ett offer för bomben, han också.Om någon tycker det här påminner om hur man idag tänker kring klimatförändringarna, ligger det mycket i det. Men detta första decennium efter bomben var det inte många i västvärlden som delade Anders tankar. När han och Eatherly brevväxlade satt piloten inspärrad på ett militärt mentalsjukhus med sina skuldkänslor. I femtiotalets USA fanns ingen plats för sådana som han. Det skulle så småningom förändras – men trots att bilderna och vittnesmålen från Hiroshima nått den amerikanska allmänheten redan 1946, i John Herseys berömda reportage, fick de väldigt liten effekt i offentligheten. Här dominerade den officiella historieskrivningen där det som skett i Hiroshima och Nagasaki var ett nödvändigt ont, närmast framtvingat för att äntligen få den japanska krigsmakten att kapitulera. Den berättelsen gäller till stor del än idag, trots att den faktiskt inte har mycket fog för sig. Som historikern Tsuyoshi Hasegawa kunde visa redan 2005 var Japans kapitulation bara en tidsfråga; det som fick USA att detonera bomberna var att Sovjetunionen efter Tysklands kapitulation fått händerna fria i Fjärran Östern. I en stormoffensiv hade Röda armén ockuperat Manchuriet och var på väg mot Japan över öarna i norr. Vad det handlade om för USA:s del var att inte Sovjet skulle hinna först.Atombombsåldern kom alltså att inledas i en stämning av förnekelse och förträngning. Medan efterkrigstidens optimistiska konsumtionssamhälle tog form började en vanvettig atomkapprustning. Från de första bomberna hade den amerikanska atombombsarsenalen vuxit till 170 stycken 1949, när Sovjetunionen gjorde sitt första kärnvapenprov, och åren som följde gick det slag i slag. 1952 testsprängde USA sin första termonukleära vätebomb, stark som tusen Hiroshimabomber, och redan i mitten av decenniet hade de båda kärnvapenmakterna bomber nog för att med marginal spränga hela den mänskliga civilisationen till grus. Detta samtidigt som politikerna drömde om en framtida teknokratisk utopi flödande av billig energi, där bilarna drevs av små kärnreaktorer. Skulle kriget ändå råka bryta ut fick skolbarnen lära sig att krypa ner under bänkarna, och speciella dräkter tillverkades för att skydda mot strålningen.Under tiden drogs ritningarna upp för den oundvikliga förintelsen. 2008 berättade den pensionerade amerikanske försvarstjänstemannen John Rubel hur han i december 1960 suttit med under ett hemligt möte där ett par höga officerare lade fram de detaljerade planerna för en så kallad förebyggande kärnvapenattack mot Sovjetunionen. Som Rubel mindes det skulle angreppet enligt ingenjörernas beräkningar leda till döden för cirka sexhundra miljoner människor. Rubel erkände att han själv i stunden saknat civilkurage för att protestera, och jämförde med den nazistiska Wannseekonferensen där planerna för den slutliga, industriella lösningen av judefrågan tog form. ”Jag kände,” skrev han, ”att det jag bevittnade var ett liknande nedstigande i mörkrets hjärta, en grumlig underjordisk värld som styrdes av ett disciplinerat, noggrant och livaktigt men hjärndött grupptänkande med syfte att utrota hälften av människorna som levde på nästan en tredjedel av jordytan.”I Japan däremot var de postnukleära stämningarna annorlunda – av naturliga skäl. Trots att det under hela femtiotalet rådde ett offentligt tabu mot att diskutera katastrofen och dess följder är det ingen överdrift att säga att hela den japanska konsten och litteraturen under efterkrigstiden utvecklades i skuggan av Hiroshima och Nagasaki. Bomberna och den amerikanska ockupationen sände chockvågor genom den japanska kulturen och födde experimentella konströrelser som den minimalistiska arte poveragruppen Mono-ha, eller den betydligt våldsammare Gutai, vars medlemmar besköt sina målardukar med kanon: bägge strömningar som i sin tur också gjorde djupa intryck på yngre konstnärer som Yoko Ono, Tetsumi Kudo och Yayoi Kusama. Nobelpristagaren Kenzaburo Oe gav 1965 ut sina Anteckningar från Hiroshima, en samling personliga reportage där de överlevande, som efter tjugo år fortfarande lever i skräck för blodcancer och andra efterverkningar, lyfts upp till en sorts nationella, moraliska förebilder: ”Bara genom liv som deras,” skriver Oe, ”kan människor framträda med värdighet i vårt samhälle.”Och med tiden växte protesterna i styrka även i västvärlden. Precis som man likt Theodor Adorno kunde se det som ”barbariskt” att skriva poesi efter Auschwitz kunde man som Günther Anders spekulera i vad det betydde att bedriva filosofi efter Hiroshima. Hans kollega Hannah Arendt delade synen på bomben som en mänsklighetens vändpunkt – men för henne stod den framför allt för en förlust av politiskt handlingsutrymme, där teknologins råa styrka tog förnuftets plats. Man frestas citera president Trumans tillkännagivande den 6 augusti 1945, där han proklamerar Hiroshimabomben som ”den organiserade vetenskapens största historiska bragd”. Som Arendt uttrycker det i Människans villkor har denna etiskt förblindade vetenskap trätt ut i offentligheten som en av ”de mäktigaste, maktgenererande grupperingar historien skådat.”Atomålderns etik måste med andra ord ta formen av en civilisationskritik. Mot slutet av sextiotalet uppgick antalet atombomber i världen till över 30 000 – men då var också motståndet i full kraft. Ett motstånd som inte bara riktades mot kärnvapenrustningen utan också mot den fredliga atomkraften och hela den teknokratiska kultur som gjort det möjligt att spela med så fruktansvärda insatser. Att en olycka vid ett kärnkraftverk kan få precis samma förödande effekter som en bomb har världen sedan dess tvingats till insikt om, gång på gång: i Harrisburg, Tjernobyl, Fukushima. Namnen hemsöker vår tid, som skuggan av en mardröm. Den där tanken som man nuddar när man vaknar. Och som sedan försvinner. AtomvinterEtt minne från när det kalla kriget var som kallast, början på åttiotalet: jag sitter hemma i soffan i föräldrahemmet och ser på teven där USA:s president Reagan flinande avslöjar att en kärnvapenattack mot Sovjetunionen kommer att starta om fem minuter. Ett skämt, tydligen. Mitt minne av händelsen är lite oklart: eftersom ”skämtet” gjordes inför en radiosändning borde ljudupptagningen ha spelats upp till stillbilder, jag vet inte – men det jag tydligt minns är hur det medan skratten klingar ut i teven ändå hinner gå ett frostigt spöke genom vardagsrummet. Hur mina föräldrar liksom fryser till i tevesoffan och hur vi sedan också skrattar, lättade – och lite chockade: det var nära ögat. Om det är något vi har förstått på sista tiden är det ju hur nära det faktiskt verkar vara. Atomklockan, som den kallas, har länge stått på bara någon minut i tolv.Världen, kanske särskilt Europa, gick i detta tidiga åttiotal nästan bara och väntade på den stora smällen. Om vi idag förskräcks av de klimatförändringar som utsläppen av växthusgaser är på väg att leda till så är de trots allt ingenting emot det som skulle bli följden om ett fullskaligt kärnvapenkrig bröt ut. Inte som en effekt av själva explosionerna – men allt stoft de rörde upp, alla bränder de orsakade skulle lägga sig som ett lock på atmosfären i flera års tid och sänka temperaturen på jordytan till katastrofala nivåer. Fenomenet gick under begreppet atomvinter: ett ord som de här åren låg som ett kylelement under den dystopiska tidsandan med dess undergångsfantasier och nihilistiska yuppieideal. Med dess apolitiska alienering, och en popkultur som manglade ut sin svarta depprock och sina frostiga syntslingor över en ekande posthistorisk avgrund.Men den hotande atomvintern gav också näring åt en växande proteströrelse. Civilisationskritiken, som under sextio- och sjuttiotalen blivit ett allt tyngre inslag i kärnvapenmotståndet förenades på åttiotalet med feministiska, postkoloniala och antikapitalistiska strömningar i en gränsöverskridande skepsis mot den tekniska utvecklingen som filosofen och antikärnvapenveteranen Günther Anders såg som ett senkommet historiskt genombrott när han i början av åttiotalet samlade sina reflexioner i de här frågorna i boken Hiroshima ist überall, Hiroshima är överallt. I England tog ett feministiskt fredsläger form i protest mot utplaceringen av kärnvapen vid armébasen i Greenham Common. I Australien protesterade urbefolkningen mot uranbrytningen på traditionell aboriginsk mark, i New Mexico i USA krävde Navajofolket kompensation för kärnvapenprovens radioaktiva kontaminering. Och i Oceaniens övärld växte rörelsen för ”ett kärnvapenfritt Stilla Havet”, som en reaktion på de franska och amerikanska provsprängningar som gjort många öar obeboeliga. För dem som tvingats bort från sina hem var stormakternas så kallade ”nukleära kolonialism” bara ännu en form av cyniskt imperialistiskt våld.Denna världsomspännande folkrörelse såg för en kort tid ut att faktiskt stå inför ett globalt genombrott. I juni 1982 samlade en demonstration i New York en miljon deltagare i protest mot kärnvapenrustningen; några veckor tidigare hade bortåt hundratusen människor tågat genom Göteborg under samma paroller. Jag var själv en av dem. Liknande fredsmarscher ägde rum över hela den europeiska kontinenten. Vad vi kanske inte riktigt förstod, tror jag – hur vi nu skulle kunnat göra det, där vi vällde fram, mitt i alltihop – var hur snärjda vi alla redan var i den nukleära terrorbalansens världsordning. För om nu ”Hiroshima är överallt”, som Günther Anders skrev – måste det då inte betyda att också protesterna blir en del av systemet: en balanserande motvikt som invaggar oss i tron att den nukleärteknologiska utvecklingen trots allt ska gå att tämja och hantera? Sedda från dagens tidsavstånd kan de ju faktiskt se så ut, som en avledande, kringgående rörelse, en historiens list som tillfälligt öppnade en politisk ventil och lät oron pysa ut, utan att i grunden ändra något överhuvudtaget. Allt medan utvecklingen gick vidare i sina obevekliga spår.Nej, jag vet inte. Men kanske var det en sådan insikt som landade i världens medvetande i april 1986, med haveriet i Tjernobyl. Plötsligt visade det sig mycket konkret – om man nu inte redan hade förstått det – att Hiroshima verkligen var överallt: i luften, i vattnet, i maten vi äter. Helt oberoende av nationsgränser och politiska system. Sociologen Ulrich Beck skrev i sin uppmärksammade bok Risksamhället hur händelser som just den i Tjernobyl tvingar hela samhället att orientera sig efter potentiella risker, försöka förutse och förebygga – och inte minst: uppfostra sina medborgare i riskmedvetenhet, eller uttryckt på ett annat sätt, i oro. Vi får i förlängningen ett samhälle där rädslan är det som binder samman, ett samhälle vars främsta uppgift blir att vidmakthålla en bedräglig illusion om säkerhet.I detta risksamhälle måste till slut också kärnteknologin banaliseras och kläs i termer av säkerhet. Det talas om kärnvapnen som ett skyddande ”paraply”, om kärnenergin som en trygghet i en osäker och föränderlig omvärld. Hiroshima känns mycket avlägset. Att besöka staden idag ger upphov till en märklig svindelkänsla: åttio år efter bomben sjuder staden av liv som vilken modern metropol som helst, de hypersnabba shinkansentågen anländer och avgår på sekunden på den centrala järnvägsterminalen, nästan som om inget hänt. Men det har det. Det har det, verkligen – under ytan ömmar fortfarande traumat, men med sin ärrvävnad av monument och museala artefakter, all denna rekvisita i en minneskultur som hoppas läka det som inte går att läka.Kanske är det det han menar, den japanske mannen i Alain Resnais film Hiroshima, min älskade, när han säger till sin franska älskarinna att hon aldrig har sett något i Hiroshima. För det som skett går inte att se. Med varje gest som återkallar minnet följer en som hjälper till att utplåna det. I filmen är den franska kvinnan själv på flykt undan ett krigstrauma: hennes första kärlek var en tysk ockupationssoldat – och minnet av hur hon blev vittne till hans död för en anonym kula från en motståndsman är, förstår man, det hon nu på ett bakvänt sätt försöker bearbeta genom att vara med och spela in en ”fredsfilm” (som det kallas) i Hiroshima.Men traumat, visar det sig, går inte att förtränga. Det finns kvar. Precis som atomvintern finns kvar – som en iskall, omedveten rysning under kärnvapenparaplyet. Spöket från Hiroshima, skuggan av den okände som satt och väntade på bankens trappa just när bomben föll, har vuxit till ett skymningsdunkel som vi mer eller mindre tycks ha vant oss vid. Om det totala atomkriget bryter ut skulle det, enligt en vanlig uppgift, ta sjuttiotvå minuter innan det mesta av vår civilisation är ödelagd. En dryg timme. Längre är den inte, framtiden.Dan Jönssonförfattare och essäistLitteraturAnnie Jacobsen: Kärnvapenkrig – ett scenario. Översättare: Claes-Göran Green. Fri Tanke, 2024.Tsuyoshi Hasegawa: Racing the Enemy – Stalin, Truman, and the Surrender of Japan. Harvard University Press, 2005.Marguerite Duras: Hiroshima, mon amour – filmmanus och berättelse. Översättare: Annika Johansson. Modernista, 2014.H. G. Wells: Tono-Bungay. (Ej översatt till svenska i modern tid, original: Macmillan, 1909.)Günther Anders: Hiroshima ist überall. C. H. Beck, 1982.Hisashi Tōhara: Il y a un an Hiroshima. översättare: Dominique Palmé. Gallimard, 2011 (postum utgåva från återfunnen text).Masuji Ibuse: Black Rain. Översättare: John Bester. Kodansha International, 1969.Claude Eatherly / Günther Anders: Samvete förbjudet – brevväxling. Översättare: Ulrika Wallenström. Daidalos, 1988.Kenzaburō Ōe: Hiroshima Notes. Översättare: David L. Swain & Toshi Yonezawa. Marion Boyars, 1995.Peter Glas: Först blir det alldeles vitt – röster om atomvintern. Natur & Kultur, 1984.Ulrich Beck: Risksamhället – på väg mot en annan modernitet. Översättare: Svenja Hums. Bokförlaget Daidalos, 2018.Hannah Arendt: Människans villkor. Översättare: Alf Ahlberg. Rabén & Sjögren, 1963.LjudSylvain Cambreling, Nathalie Stutzmann, Theresa Kohlhäufl, Tim Schwarzmaier, August Zirner med Bayerska Radions Kör och Symfoniorkester (München): Voiceless Voice In Hiroshima. Kompositör: Toshio Hosokawa med texter från liturgin, Paul Celan och Matsuo Bashō. Col legno, 2001.Sveriges Radios arkiv.US National archives.Hiroshima mon amour (1959), regi: Alain Resnais, manus: Marguerite Duras. Producent: Argos Films. Musik: Georges Delerue och Giovanni Fusco.

För exakt 80 år sedan höll den flygflottilj som skulle bära de ökända bomberna Little Boy och Fat Man på att förflyttas till Stillahavsön Tinian. Man kan förvisso tycka att det är mer rimligt att släppa det här dagen i augusti. 80-årsdagen av andra världskrigets vedervärdiga crescendo. Men då har vi semester. Det fanns en lucka i vårt schema för att hinna göra det här avsnittet noggrant och bra under våren: därför kommer här vårt stora avsnitt om bomberna.Läslista:DeGroot, Gerard J., Bomben: ett liv, Natur och Kultur, Stockholm, 2006Glas, Peter, Först blir det alldeles vitt: en bok om atombomben, Novapress, Lund, 2016Englund, Peter, Brev från nollpunkten: historiska essäer, Atlantis, Stockholm, 1996Wall, Gunnar, Andra världskriget och myten om det goda kriget, Bokförlaget Semic, [Sundbyberg], 2021Hersey, John, Hiroshima, New ed., with a new chapter, Penguin, London, 1986 Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Tinian — barely more than a point on the map — is moving back into the strategic spotlight: The Pacific island is to serve as an addition to the US spearhead Guam. The expansion of the historic airfield is a symbol of the muscle play of the superpowers in the Indo-Pacific, reports SBS-correspondent Barbara Barkhausen. - Tinian – kaum mehr als ein Punkt auf der Landkarte – rückt wieder ins strategische Rampenlicht: Die Pazifikinsel soll als Ergänzung zur US-Speerspitze Guam dienen. Der Ausbau des geschichtsträchtigen Flugfeldes ist Sinnbild für das Muskelspiel der Supermächte im Indopazifik, das berichtet SBS-Korrespondentin Barbara Barkhausen.

In this powerful, first-person interview, 97-year-old World War II veteran Frank Wal, Jr. reflects on his life, service, and the events that shaped a generation. From the hardship of losing his mother at age eight, to enlisting in the U.S. Navy at just 17, Frank takes us through his remarkable journey—from radar duty aboard LSD-25 to witnessing the aftermath of kamikaze attacks and passing the USS Indianapolis just before its fateful sinking. Frank shares his firsthand memories of Okinawa, the atomic bomb's impact on Japan, the occupation of Tokyo, and even a surprise encounter with General MacArthur. He speaks candidly about post-war life, teaching science and serving as a principal, building a life with his wife of 68 years, and raising four children. Frank's story is a story of war, but it's also a reflection on resilience, service, and the quiet strength of the Greatest Generation.

This week Bill and Seth take a deep look at the final mission of one of the most storied warships in naval history, USS Indianapolis. Bill goes through each and every step of Indy's final mission, destroying myths and highlighting the many survivors he came to know as friends. You don't want to miss this one as our Captain dishes on his favorite ship and her heroic story. #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #usnavy #usa #usarmy #medalofhonor #enterprise #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #cv6 #midway #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #worldwar2 #usnavy #usnavyseals #usmc #usmarines #saipan #usa #usarmy #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #battleship #battleships #ussenterprise #aircraftcarriers #museum #essex #halsey #taskforce38 #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #usnavy #usa #usarmy #medalofhonor #enterprise #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #cv6 #midway #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #worldwar2 #usnavy #usnavyseals #usmc #usmarines #saipan #usa #usarmy #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #battleship #battleships #ussenterprise #aircraftcarriers #museum #hollywood #movie #movies #books #mastersoftheair #8thairforce #mightyeighth #100thbombgroup #bloodyhundredth #b17 #boeing #airforce wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #usnavy #usa #usarmy #medalofhonor #enterprise #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #cv6 #midway #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #worldwar2 #usnavy #usnavyseals #usmc #usmarines #saipan #usa #usarmy #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #battleship #battleships #ussenterprise #aircraftcarriers #museum #hollywood #movie #movies #books #oldbreed #1stMarineDivision #thepacific #Peleliu #army #marines #marinecorps #worldwar2 #worldwar #worldwarii #leytegulf #battleofleytegulf #rodserling #twilightzone #liberation #blacksheep #power #prisoner #prisonerofwar #typhoon #hurricane #weather #iwojima#bullhalsey #ace #p47 #p38 #fighter #fighterpilot #b29 #strategicstudying #tokyo #boeing #incendiary #usa #franklin #okinawa #yamato #kamikaze #Q&A #questions #questionsandanswers #history #jaws

Last time we spoke about the liberation of Bataan and Corregidor. The Shimbu Group's commander launched a coordinated raid on northern Manila, aiming to weaken enemy defenses. Despite heavy casualties, the Allies captured key locations, including Nichols Field. Meanwhile, General Chase's 38th Division overcame strong Japanese defenses at ZigZag Pass, while General Hall's forces secured Bataan. Plans for an airborne assault on Corregidor were set for February 16, leveraging surprise against the outnumbered Japanese garrison. American forces launched the strategic attack on Corregidor, dropping paratroopers from the 503rd Regiment. Despite facing sporadic fire, they secured key positions. The following days saw intense skirmishes as the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment landed and established a foothold. Over eight days, they repelled numerous Japanese counterattacks, inflicting heavy casualties. By February 26, organized resistance crumbled, leading to the island's capture. Meanwhile, in Manila, American troops advanced, clearing buildings and securing the city, inching closer to victory in the Philippines. This episode is the Invasion of Iwo Jima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A few weeks ago we spoke about Operation Detachment. Admirals Nimitz and Spruance were planning an invasion of Iwo Jima with General Schmidt's 5th Amphibious Corps. During a thorough campaign of preliminary air and naval bombardment against the Volcano Islands, the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, along with other Corps units, were loading at Hawaii between December 25 and January 25. Once training and loading were complete, Admiral Turner's Task Force 51 and Admiral Hill's Task Force 53 left Pearl Harbor on January 27, initially heading toward Saipan. By February 12, Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet had gathered in the Marianas and was prepared to sail for Iwo Jima. Additionally, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 had departed Ulithi to conduct a series of supporting air strikes over and around Tokyo, known as Operation Jamboree. Task Force 58 sortied from Ulithi 10 February and shaped a course eastward of the Marianas and Bonins. On the 12th, the air groups rehearsed with the 3rd Marine Division on Tinian. Two days later the task force fueled at sea from one of Admiral Beary's replenishment groups. Everything possible was done to guard against detection. Measures included radio deception, scouting by Pacific Fleet submarines to dispose of any picket vessels there might be en route, scouting by B-29s and Navy Liberators from the Marianas to clear the air. On the 15th a scouting line of five destroyers ranged ahead of the carriers, and antisubmarine air patrol was set up. At 1900 a high-speed run-in began towards launching positions, where the carriers arrived at dawn 16 February. Thanks to these precautions, and to thick weather most of the way, they arrived undetected. General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command, which was being reinforced by the 313th and 314th Bombardment Wings, would also assist Detachment with several strikes against Japan. Following some unremarkable high-altitude daytime missions in late January, 129 B-29s from the 73rd and 313th Bombardment Wings targeted Kobe on February 3, using a mix of incendiaries and fragmentation bombs. This attack caused significant damage to the urban area and local war production, resulting in the loss of 2 bombers and damage to 35 others. Subsequently, on February 10, a precision strike was launched against Ota's Nakajima aircraft factory, with 84 out of 118 dispatched B-29s successfully bombing the site. However, only 14% of the bombs hit the target, leading to the loss of 12 bombers and damage to 29. Nearly one-third of the factory buildings sustained damage, primarily from the incendiaries combined with high-explosive bombs. Five days later, LeMay dispatched 117 B-29 bombers to target Mitsubishi's engine works in Nagoya. However, an unexpected cold front resulted in only 33 bombers reaching the target area, yielding lackluster results. Meanwhile, after conducting some assault rehearsals, Spruance's amphibious support forces and tractor groups set sail for Iwo Jima on February 14, followed two days later by Turner's main assault convoy. At the same time, the reserve 3rd Marine Division continued loading at Guam, with its 21st Marines departing for Iwo Jima on February 16, followed by the main body of the division the next day. On the morning of February 16, Admiral Blandy's Amphibious Support Force arrived off Iwo Jima and promptly commenced the final preliminary bombardment and minesweeping operations, although inclement weather hindered these efforts. However, the next day, Task Force 52 successfully carried out these missions; beach reconnaissance by UDTs faced heavy mortar fire, resulting in the sinking of one LCI gunboat, damage to eleven others, and casualties of 44 killed and 152 wounded. Despite this, the frogmen encountered no obstacles on the beaches and managed to create accurate maps of the approaches. Meanwhile, by February 16, Mitscher's carriers had quietly moved to a position 60 miles off the coast of Honshu, launching extensive fighter sweeps against airfields in Tokyo Bay and bombing raids on aircraft frame and engine plants in the Tokyo area.  About 100 Japanese fighters attacked Admiral Davison's planes as they crossed the coast and about 40 of them were shot down. American pilots found the Japanese on the whole reluctant to engage; Admiral Mitscher had correctly told his pilots, "He is probably more afraid of you than you are of him". In fact the IJAAF 10th Hiko Shidan immediately ordered an IJAAF night-fighter group and all “second-class” personnel to take cover, while all aircraft not intercepting were ordered to be dispersed, fuel tanks drained, and ammunition unloaded. In contrast, American pilots reported Tokyo antiaircraft fire “the most accurate and intense yet encountered.” By nightfall, Rear-Admiral Matthias Gardner's night-flying carrier group conducted a sweep of night fighters to cover the enemy airfields at dusk. This operation was repeated the following morning, but poor weather ultimately forced the carriers to retreat toward Iwo Jima. Despite this, significant damage was inflicted on aircraft frame and engine facilities, with 10 vessels sunk, including the unfinished escort carrier Yamashio Maru. A total of 531 aircraft were reported destroyed, at the expense of losing 88 planes and damaging two destroyers. On February 18, after the enemy battery camouflage had been obliterated during the previous two days of bombardment. This revealed batteries not previously known to exist, the island's defenses were for the first time properly revealed; and formidable they were indeed. Fortunately for the Americans, the support of UDTs with LCI gunboats had convinced General Kuribayashi that the main landing had started, and to repel it he unmasked batteries that would have caused very heavy casualties on D-day had they not been discovered two days before. This was the only serious mistake made by the Japanese general in his defensive tactics, which won the rueful admiration of his enemies. Blandy opted to focus on the immediate area and flanks of the eastern beaches. Heavy ships moved closer to 2,500 yards to deliver concentrated direct fire on all targets. Consequently, bombardment ships provided continuous direct fire throughout the day, effectively dismantling enemy defenses. However, during the night, the Japanese launched a minor raid that caused significant damage to the destroyer minesweeper Gamble and the destroyer escort Blessman. At 06:00 on February 19, Turner's main force arrived off Iwo Jima and began maneuvering into final positions. Simultaneously, Admiral Rodgers' warships executed the last pre-landing bombardment, coordinated with air strikes from Mitscher's carriers. Between 08:25 and 08:55, as the first wave crossed the line of departure and advanced toward the shore under the protective rocket fire of gunboats, shells fell heavily on Iwo Jima, marking the most intense pre-landing bombardment of World War II. At 08:57, as the leading armored amtracs approached their targets, naval gunfire shifted inland and to the flanks. The LVTs of the first wave touched down on Iwo Jima at 09:02 and began moving forward through the high terraces of soft black volcanic ash, engaging inland targets from the water to support subsequent landings. Three minutes later, the Marines of the 4th and 5th Divisions started landing side by side on the Green, Red, Yellow, and Blue beaches. The assault infantry battalions of the Landing Force received assistance throughout D-Day from all the supporting arms available to the Amphibious Support Force. Carrier pilots of Task Force 58 and the escort carriers of Task Force 52 flew missions all day as airborne observers and spotters maintained constant vigilance over the target. Including pre-H-Hour strikes, 606 support aircraft flew 26 missions on February 19 and dropped 274500 pounds of bombs. These planes also fired 2254 rockets into the island defenses and dropped over a hundred napalm bombs. Air and naval gunfire liaison teams remained in communication with both air and sea supporting units through the hectic hours that followed the beach assault. Naval rifles from 5- to 16-inch caliber pounded enemy positions in response to Marine requests. Gunfire support vessels engaged enemy artillery that covered landing areas from high ground to the north, and concentrated on concealed Japanese mortars that shelled landing areas with deadly effect. The units quickly reorganized and began their advance inland, facing only light resistance, although their progress was hampered by the sandy terrain. General Kuribayashi's forces, however, had been waiting in well-fortified underground positions as planned, emerging only after the bombardment ceased to unleash a barrage of machine-gun, rifle, and mortar fire on the advancing troops. As the initial waves of Marines struggled to advance, congestion along the shore became increasingly critical, while the full force of the Japanese defenders was unleashed shortly after 10:00. By 10:30, elements from all eight assault battalions had landed on the island, successfully bringing ashore about 6,000 men and bulldozers that were clearing paths for tank deployment. On the far left flank, Colonel Harry Liversedge's 28th Marines, having landed on Green Beach, initiated a rapid advance across the half-mile isthmus below Mount Suribachi to isolate this crucial position. The attack unfolded in such a way that some units were delayed while others managed to break through and continue westward despite suffering heavy casualties, ultimately crossing the island while the bypassed enemy was being dealt with. By midday, the reserve 3rd Battalion and tanks landed under heavy fire to join the afternoon assault on Suribachi, but intense enemy fire hindered their progress to the assault positions. Consequently, the 2nd Battalion launched an attack on its own, gaining only 150 yards before retreating to regroup with the 3rd Battalion for the night. At the same time, Colonel Thomas Wornham's 27th Marines had landed on the Red Beaches, making swift progress inland despite increasing casualties and bypassing numerous enemy positions. By 11:30, Company A was moving across the southern end of Airfield No. 1, establishing a presence along the western edge while other units continued to advance past the airfield. The 1st Battalion launched an attack on the airfield with tank support but faced strong enemy resistance, resulting in minimal gains. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion pushed westward and reached the cliffs overlooking the western coast. Additionally, the reserve 3rd Battalion landed and began clearing bypassed positions, while the artillery units from the 13th Marines and General Rockey's reserve 26th Marines also arrived in the afternoon as the 27th and 28th Marines solidified their positions. By nightfall, although the 5th Marine Division was still a considerable distance from the O-1 Line, it had established a firm foothold on the island, with Mount Suribachi isolated and portions of the airfield under their control. To the east, General Cates' 4th Marine Division also landed successfully, with Colonel Walter Wensinger's 23rd Marines coming ashore at the Yellow Beaches and Colonel John Lanigan's 25th Marines landing on Blue Beach 1 and the southern part of Blue Beach 2. The two regiments began their advance inland, hindered by intense enemy fire but managing to gain between 400 and 600 yards by midday. As tanks were being deployed, the 3rd Battalion of the 25th Marines moved to the right to clear the remaining area of Beach Blue 2 and encircle the threatening quarry zone. At this stage, as the assault battalions continued their advance, Wensinger and Lanigan deployed their reserve battalions to cover the gaps in their attack lines. With the support of tanks that had finally reached the front, the 23rd Marines advanced towards Airfield No. 1 and successfully captured its outskirts. Meanwhile, the 25th Marines initiated a coordinated assault, with the 3rd Battalion advancing about 200 yards along the beach to secure the problematic quarry, while the other two battalions moved north to seize the high ground to the northwest of the quarry. By the end of the day, Cates had also landed half of the artillery from the 14th Marines, along with his reserve 24th Marines, which began to relieve some of the frontline units from both assault regiments. Although the penetration by the 4th Marine Division was not as extensive as intended, by nightfall, the front lines included the eastern edge of the airfield and extended sufficiently inland from the Blue Beaches to ensure the beachhead could be held successfully. The Marines, forced to advance across open terrain while enduring intense fire from well-concealed positions that were difficult to target, fell significantly short of the O-1 objective. Nonetheless, by the end of the day, six Marine regiments, an equal number of artillery battalions, and two tank battalions had landed and were positioned to defend the narrow beachhead against a potential night counterattack.  Throughout this first day, the situation on the beaches prevented landing of any but the highest priority "hot cargo." This consisted of ammunition, rations, water, and signal equipment brought to the beach in LCVPs and LCMs. Shore party teams, working under extremely adverse conditions without sufficient trucks and other heavy equipment, could do little more than stack the supplies on the beach above the high water mark. LVTs and weasels made trips from the beach dumps inland carrying these supplies to the troops and returned bearing wounded men. The busy amtracs also made nonstop trips from LSTs, ferrying critically needed items direct to Marines on the front lines. Most of the transports and other vessels of the task force retired from the island at nightfall, but some command ships, preloaded LSTs, and hospital LSTs remained behind. Emergency items, especially 81mm mortar ammunition, were brought in during the night, but actually very little unloading was accomplished and many of the wounded spent this night on the beach because they could not be evacuated. Some progress was made cutting exits through the terrace and clearing mines, but enemy fire and the shortage of equipment limited this activity. Despite this, the Japanese did not launch any large-scale assaults, although their mortars and artillery relentlessly bombarded Marine lines along the front throughout the night. Consequently, Allied casualties on this first day totaled 548 killed and 1,755 wounded. On February 20, the goal was for the 28th Marines to take Mount Suribachi while other units advanced north to capture the two airfields. Initially, in the south, after a coordinated air and naval bombardment, Liversedge launched another assault on the volcano but managed to gain only 75 yards by midday. During the forenoon, Marines gained only 50-70 yards. Aircraft and ships pounded Japanese positions and the 3d Battalion, 13th Marines fired mission after mission, but stiff enemy resistance continued, particularly from well-camouflaged pillboxes hidden in the brush to the front of the Marine lines. These emplacements, too close to friendly troops to be engaged by heavy support weapons, could only be silenced by coordinated attacks of assault demolition teams using flamethrowers and explosive charges. Tanks then moved in to provide support, allowing the attack to progress from pillbox to pillbox; however, by the end of the day, the Marines had only advanced 200 difficult yards. Meanwhile, Schmidt's other regiments initiated a coordinated offensive to the north following extensive artillery, naval gunfire, and air support. Despite facing heavy resistance, the 23rd Marines successfully overran most of Airfield No. 1 by noon. Wensinger continued to push his units in the afternoon, but progress was limited as tanks were hindered by minefields and rough terrain. Wornham's 27th Marines pressed their attack on the left flank, overcoming enemy mortar and artillery fire to gain about 800 yards along the coast. In contrast, Lanigan's 25th Marines, affected by friendly fire, made only minimal advances against enemy crossfire from concealed positions. At 1600, friendly planes misdirected their fire to the 25th Marine's area, adding terror to the situation. An air strike consisting of .50-caliber machine-gun strafing, rockets, and bombs fell on troops of Company B of the 24th Marines, which was positioned on top of the quarry some 400 yards inland from the eastern shore. This strike was made without a preliminary "dry-run", and despite the fact that yellow front line panels were displayed prior to and during the aerial attack. The 1st Battalion, 24th Marines suffered five killed and six wounded as a result of this misguided effort. Shortly after the planes left the area, this battalion reported that friendly artillery and naval gunfire was being registered on its lines. Due to the slow progress, Schmidt attempted to land his reserve 21st Marines, but high seas and congested beaches ultimately thwarted these efforts. Nevertheless, the remaining 14th Marines were landed, albeit with significant casualties, and elements of the corps artillery began to come ashore. During the night, there were no counterattacks on Mount Suribachi, but the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions had to fend off some small counterattacks on their front lines. On February 21, following a strike involving 40 aircraft, Liversedge's 28th Marines launched another assault on the volcano. The 1st Battalion on the right swiftly advanced along the west beach to the base of Suribachi, while the 3rd Battalion in the center pushed nearly to the foot of the mountain despite facing heavy resistance. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion on the left moved cautiously along the east beach toward the volcano's base, with Company F heading toward Tobiishi Point. At the same time, other regiments continued their offensive towards O-1 after a bombardment from air, artillery, rockets, and naval gunfire. Rockey's units made significant progress, advancing over 1,000 yards, while the 23rd Marines achieved similar gains on the left flank, where slightly sheltered areas allowed for local and limited encirclement, but only advanced 100 yards in the right and center. The 25th Marines maintained steady pressure against the strong enemy defenses, gaining between 50 and 300 yards across the front. Colonel Hartnoll Withers' 21st Marines successfully landed this time; due to heavy casualties in the center, they were assigned to relieve the exhausted 23rd Marines. By nightfall, the Marines had to fend off several local counterattacks and infiltration attempts.  During the night, 50 kamikaze planes targeted Blandy's Task Force 52. They were picked up by the radar of the USS Saratoga, a veteran carrier of the Pacific War, and six fighters were sent to intercept. They shot down two Zeros but the remaining Zeros plowed on through the low lying cloud, two of them trailing smoke, and slammed into the side of the carrier turning the hangers into an inferno. Another solitary attacker smashed into the flight deck leaving a gaping hole 100 yards from the bow. Damage control teams worked wonders and within one hour the fires were under control and the Saratoga was able to recover a few of her planes. Another aircraft, a "Betty" twin engined bomber, tore into the escort carrier USS Bismarck Sea. The decks were full of aircraft and the ensuing explosion caused uncontrollable fires. Abandon ship was sounded and 800 men went over the side. Within a few minutes a huge explosion ripped off the entire stern of the carrier and she rolled 38 over and sank. Three other ships were also damaged: the escort carrier USS Lunga Point was showered with flaming debris as four aircraft were blasted out of the sky; the minesweeper Keokuk was damaged when a "Jill" dive bomber hit her deck; and LST 477 loaded with Sherman tanks received a glancing blow. The Saratoga, with destroyer escort, returned to Pearl Harbor, but by the time the damage was repaired the war was over. The kamikazes had done their work well: 358 men killed, one carrier sunk, and another severely damaged. It was a grim preview of the mayhem they would later cause during the invasion of Okinawa in April. On February 22, amidst a dreary cold rain, Liversedge renewed his assault on Suribachi, where only half of the original garrison remained to oppose the Marine advance. There was no let-up in the weather on Wednesday as Marines of the 28th Regiment, drenched to the skin and bent by the wind, prepared to renew the attack on Suribachi. Fresh supplies of ammunition had been brought to the front during the night, but the Shermans were mired in mud and the Navy declined to supply air support in the appalling weather. It was to be up to the foot soldier with rifle, flamethrower, grenade, and demolition charge to win the day. Colonel Atsuchi still had 800-900 men left and they had no intention of allowing the Americans an easy victory. Major Youamata announced: "We are surrounded by enemy craft of all sizes, shapes and descriptions, enemy shells have smashed at our installations and defenses, their planes bomb and strafe yet we remain strong and defiant. The Americans are beginning to climb the first terraces towards our defenses. Now they shall taste our steel and lead." Throughout the day, the 28th Marines engaged Japanese positions on the lower slopes of the mountain, with the 3rd Battalion making the final push to the base of Suribachi while the other two battalions cleared the coastline to completely encircle the volcano. Simultaneously, Schmidt's northern sweep continued, with the 21st Marines replacing Wensinger's troops, and Colonel Chester Graham's 26th Marines taking over on the 5th Division front. The 26th Marines advanced approximately 400 yards in the center but ultimately had to withdraw as the flanking units could not progress; the 21st Marines began their assault on the formidable defenses of Colonel Ikeda's 145th Regiment in front of Airfield No. 2, managing to advance only about 250 yards on the right; and the 25th Marines were unable to launch an attack on the left due to Withers' lack of significant gains and had to fend off several local Japanese counterattacks. Marine "Howlin' Mad" Smith aboard the USS Auburn was counting the cost. Three days of battle and the Regimental Returns listed 2,517 casualties for the 4th Division and 2,057 for the 5th: 4,574 dead and wounded and the O-1 line had just been reached. Little did he know that as his Marines approached the hills, ravines, canyons, gullies, and cliffs of the north the worst was yet to come. Additionally, as the 4th Division remained stalled, Cates ordered Colonel Walter Jordan's 24th Marines to relieve the weary troops of Lanigan on the right. During the night, most of Task Force 58 departed the area for a second air strike against Tokyo, which significantly limited the availability of aircraft for direct support of ground forces on Iwo Jima. On February 23, the 28th Marines under Liversedge launched their final assault on Suribachi. The 2nd Battalion was tasked with scaling the volcano's heights, while the 1st Battalion advanced south around the mountain's western side. To their surprise, they encountered no enemy fire, and small patrols reached the crater's edge by 09:40. 1st Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, executive officer of Company E, and a 40-man detachment set out to follow the patrols and occupy the highest point of land on Iwo Jima. The number of live Japanese lurking in caves along this north face was unknown, so flankers were sent out to guard against ambush as Schrier's men clawed their way warily upward. Still there was a mysterious lack of enemy activity, and the only Japanese encountered were the harmless dead. Positions along the rim of the crater were reached at about 10:15, and as Marines scrambled over the lip, the tenseness was eased by action. A small defending force challenged the patrol and a short, hot fight developed. Even while this skirmish was in progress, some of the men located a length of Japanese iron pipe, secured a small American flag to one end, and raised the Stars and Stripes at 10:20. It was an inspiring sight for thousands of Americans on Iwo as the flag waved bravely from the summit. Shortly after the mounting of this flag that measured only 54 inches by 28 inches, an unidentified Marine went aboard LST 779, beached near the base of the volcano, to obtain a larger set of colors. As this second and larger (8 feet by 4 feet 8 inches) flag was being carried up the slopes of Suribachi, photographer Joe Rosenthal, who covered the Iwo operation for the Associated Press, noticed it and instantly started in close pursuit. His efforts that morning resulted in the now famous picture of the second flag raising. Also since it's one of my favorite movies, I wanted to add this passage from the book “Flags of our Fathers” by James Bradley The Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, had decided the previous night that he wanted to go ashore and witness the final stage of the fight for the mountain. Now, under a stern commitment to take orders from General Holland "Howlin' Mad" Smith, the secretary was churning ashore in the company of the blunt, earthy general. Their boat touched the beach just after the flag went up, and the mood among the high command turned jubilant. Gazing upward, at the red, white, and blue speck, Forrestal remarked to Smith: "Holland, the raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years". Forrestal was so taken with fervor of the moment that he decided he wanted the Second Battalion's flag flying on Mt. Suribachi as a souvenir. The news of this wish did not sit well with 2nd Battalion Commander Chandler Johnson, whose temperament was every bit as fiery as Howlin Mad's. "To hell with that!" the colonel spat when the message reached him. The flag belonged to the battalion, as far as Johnson was concerned. He decided to secure it as soon as possible, and dispatched his assistant operations officer, Lieutenant Ted Tuttle, to the beach to obtain a replacement flag. As an afterthought, Johnson called after Tuttle: "And make it a bigger one." Following this, the 28th Marines conducted mopping-up operations to eliminate remaining enemy positions and seal off caves at the base of Suribachi. All accessible outer and inner slopes were covered as the Marines annihilated enemy snipers and blasted shut the many cave entrances, sealing in an uncounted number of Japanese. Much observation equipment was found, emphasizing the fact that this had been an excellent point of vantage from which hostile observers directed murderous fire against the entire beachhead. Marine artillerymen, ready and eager to seize this advantage, hastened to move flash-ranging equipment into position. By nightfall, approximately 122 Japanese soldiers were killed while attempting to infiltrate American lines. Over the five-day period, the 28th Marines suffered 895 casualties, while nearly 2,000 Japanese were either killed or trapped in over 1,000 caves in the area. Kuribayashi had not anticipated the loss of this strategically significant location so early in the battle, and the survivors who managed to breach American lines faced severe reprimands upon their return to the north. For the remainder of the month, the 28th Marines focused on clearing out stubborn Japanese forces, reorganizing, and reequipping. Meanwhile, fighting in the north persisted as the three assault regiments advanced toward the O-2 Line. The 26th and 21st Marines faced heavy fire and struggled to make progress, while the 24th Marines advanced along their entire front, gaining up to 300 yards in some areas. On this day, the situation on the beach steadily improved as clearance efforts, construction of exits, and unloading continued, facilitating the arrival of essential ammunition and an additional 25 tanks. On February 24, following extensive air, naval, and artillery preparations, the offensive resumed. However, the initial failure of tanks to join the assault due to minefields and heavy anti-tank fire forced the Marines to advance slowly under intense fire from various sources. In the center, the 3rd Battalion, 21st Marines advanced 800 yards, reaching the north side of the east-west runway of Airfield No. 2, while the 2nd Battalion gradually moved northward around the end of the runway by noon. In the afternoon, as tank support began to arrive, Withers' 3rd Battalion captured the hill north of the airstrip after a fierce hand-to-hand battle. Simultaneously, his 2nd Battalion coordinated with the 26th Marines to seize the elevation beyond the airfield. Graham's troops easily secured the ground in front but had to pause their advance when they found themselves about 400 yards ahead of the 21st Marines. On the right flank, the 24th Marines initially made significant progress alongside Withers' men toward the airfield but were ultimately halted by the strong defenses on Charlie-Dog Ridge.  Running along the southeast edge of the east-west runway of Airfield Number 2 was a ridge known only as "Charlie-Dog Ridge." In prolongation of this ridge, on a lower level to the southeast, was a semicircular rise of ground that formed the "Amphitheater." In this area, Japanese engineers had constructed some of the most formidable defenses on the island. From the south, the approach traversed bare flat ground swept by guns on the ridge. To the east, the route led across a weird series of volcanic outcroppings and draws. It was against these positions that the 24th Marines moved out on D-plus-5. Assault squads then had to methodically clear the ridge, moving from one strongpoint to another, using fire and explosives until Charlie-Dog was secured. While the overall gains for the day were notable by Iwo Jima standards, the casualty figures were also high, with the Marines suffering 1,034 killed and 3,741 wounded during the five-day push to the second airfield. Additionally, the remainder of General Erskine's 3rd Marine Division began landing that day to officially take control of the central area. On February 25, a decision was made to hold back the 26th Marines to allow the 3rd Division to align with them. After another intense bombardment, Colonel Howard Kenyon's 9th Marines advanced through the 21st to continue the assault, but the two-battalion attack only managed to gain a meager 100 yards against Ikeda's determined defenders. Kenyon then deployed his reserve 3rd Battalion in the center, but it also failed to break through. To the east, the 23rd and 24th Marines launched simultaneous attacks, but only the 23rd made significant progress, overrunning the eastern end of the strip and establishing a foothold on the high ground to the north. Meanwhile, in the morning, Mitscher's carriers conducted a second strike on Tokyo. The Japanese sighted 600 US carrier aircraft on February 25, but Rear Admiral “Ted” Sherman reported, “The enemy opposition was only halfhearted and Japanese planes which were not shot down seemed glad to withdraw from the scene … as swiftly and unceremoniously as possible. Even here, over their own capital, the enemy were notably inferior to our naval aviators in aggressiveness, tactics, and determination.” TF-58 aircraft hit the Ota and Koizumi aircraft plants, but increasingly snowy, stormy weather meant Mitscher canceled further Tokyo strikes at 1215hrs. Spruance and Mitscher decided to hit Nagoya instead. En route to Nagoya that night destroyers USS Hazelwood and Murray sank three small Japanese craft. Eventually Mitscher realized TF-58 would not reach launching position on time, and at 0530hrs Spruance and Mitscher canceled the Nagoya strikes and headed south to refuel. TF-58 claimed 47 Japanese planes shot down and 111 destroyed on the ground for a total of 158 Japanese planes destroyed on February 25. Two hangars, one radar station, and two trains were destroyed. About 75 percent of the Ota engine plant's buildings were destroyed and an additional 15 percent heavily damaged. The Koizuma plant had also been heavily hit, and five coastal vessels and several smaller craft sunk, with another 14 vessels damaged. Total US losses were nine aircraft to antiaircraft fire and four to operational causes; four pilots were lost.. After TF-58 aircraft had plastered the Nakajima Ota airframe plant with 45 tons of bombs, February 25 photoreconnaissance revealed Ota to be 60 percent destroyed and 30 percent heavily damaged, although half of this was believed due to B-29s. After the photos TF-58 aircraft dropped another 13 tons on the plant. The Nakajima Koizuma plant was attacked on February 25 with 35 to 40 tons of bombs, with hits concentrated in the center of the plant. Reconnaissance showed 20 percent of the Koizuma roof damaged. The Hitachi–Tachikawa aircraft engine plant was attacked by one Task Group strike, with US airmen reporting “excellent results.” Photographs showed many bomb hits, but smoke made precise damage assessments difficult. Slight damage was also inflicted on the Tachikawa airframe plant. TF-58 planes struck the B-29s' nemesis, the Musashino-Tama aircraft engine plant, with 40 tons of bombs in the center of the Tama complex.  On that day, LeMay also dispatched 231 B-29s to attack Tokyo with incendiaries, with 172 successfully dropping 453.7 tons of bombs, incinerating a square mile of the city. This operation served as the "conclusive" test of the incendiary bombs that the 20th Air Force had requested, with valuable lessons to be learned for future use. The next day, the 26th Marines resumed their attack despite the high ground on the left remaining unclaimed, successfully advancing over 300 yards in the right and center. In the center, the 9th Marines continued their assault with the 1st and 2nd Battalions side by side, but they made no notable gains. On the right flank, the 23rd Marines launched another assault towards Hill 382, facing heavy resistance and managing to advance only about 200 yards. Concurrently, Lanigan's 25th Marines moved through the battered 24th Marines, achieving an advance of approximately 100 yards before encountering intense machine-gun fire from the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. On February 27, Wonrham's 27th Marines took over from the exhausted 26th and continued to push northward despite rising casualties, successfully overrunning several strongpoints and gaining about 500 yards across the front. In the center, the 9th Marines finally breached the enemy's main defenses towards Hill 199-O and captured Hill Peter, securing Airfield No. 2. Meanwhile, on the right, the 4th Division pressed on against the heavily fortified Japanese positions at the Meatgrinder, advancing only 150 to 200 yards on each flank while struggling to make headway against the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. In the final attack of the month, the 27th Marines advanced towards Hill 362A, reaching its base but were forced to retreat nearly 100 yards due to Japanese counterattacks and loss of communication. In the center, Withers' 21st Marines moved past the 9th Marines and rapidly advanced north of Airfield No. 2, making significant progress on the right as they swept through Motoyama village and captured the high ground overlooking Airfield No. 3. To the east, Cates continued to send troops into the Meatgrinder, with the 23rd Marines gaining over 200 yards and launching an attack on Hill 382, while the 25th Marines struggled to make any headway against the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob, achieving only minor gains along the coast. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And thus we have begun one of the most brutal battles of WW2, let alone the Pacific War. It was a controversial decision to invade Iwo Jima and the Americans could never have predicted how the Japanese would change their tactics to turn the entire ordeal into one giant meat grinder.

Corporal Roy Roush served in the United States Marine Corps during World War II. He fought in the Guadalcanal Campaign, the Battle of Tarawa, the Battle of Saipan, and the Battle of Tinian.  He later served in the Air Force as a fighter pilot during the Korean War.  In this interview, Roush describes his experiences during the Battle of Saipan & the Battle of Tinian To learn more about Roush, check out his book, Open Fire. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Corporal Roy Roush served in the United States Marine Corps during World War II. He fought in the Guadalcanal Campaign, the Battle of Tarawa, the Battle of Saipan, and the Battle of Tinian.  He later served in the Air Force as a fighter pilot during the Korean War.  In this interview, Roush describes the Battle of Tarawa. To learn more about Roush, check out his book, Open Fire. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Last time we spoke about the Victory at Leyte. In the Ormoc Valley, General Krueger's forces pushed the Japanese into a retreat toward Palompon. As the Americans advanced, they faced entrenched enemy positions and challenging terrain. On Christmas Day, the 77th Division successfully captured Palompon, cutting off the Japanese's main route. General Suzuki, forced to relocate his headquarters, prepared for a counteroffensive. Despite fierce resistance, American troops continued to push forward, eliminating remaining Japanese units and securing strategic positions along the coast as the year closed. As General Eichelberger's 8th Army took command of Leyte Island, the 77th Division relieved other units in preparation for future operations. Meanwhile, American forces faced fierce resistance while securing strategic positions on Samar and Mindoro. Despite enemy air assaults, they successfully disrupted Japanese plans, including a failed counter-landing. In Bougainville, Australian troops engaged in intense fighting, capturing Pearl Ridge after fierce battles. Their victory provided a crucial vantage point for future offensives, marking a significant moment in the campaign. This episode is the Aitape-Wewak Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As previously discussed, General Dunckel's task force successfully invaded Mindoro. Despite recent enemy efforts to reclaim control of the island, the Americans managed to establish airfields that enabled land-based aircraft to target specific locations on Luzon while also safeguarding the assault and resupply ships heading to Lingayen Gulf. This location was chosen because it had direct access to Luzon's key military objective, the Central Plains-Manila Bay region, and it featured the best and most extensive landing beaches on the island. With General Eichelberger's 8th Army taking charge of Leyte and Mindoro, General Krueger's 6th Army was assigned to capture and secure a beachhead at Lingayen Gulf and then advance south through the Central Plains to seize Manila and open Manila Bay. Furthermore, air and logistical bases would be established on Luzon to support future operations against Japan, and the legitimate government of the Philippine Commonwealth would be reinstated in its capital. For Operation Mike I, the reconquest of Luzon island, the Southwest Pacific's intelligence estimates concerning Japanese strengths, dispositions, capabilities, and intentions on Luzon were reasonably accurate from the start of planning. The abundance of information must be attributed in large measure to the efforts of guerrillas on Luzon, an island that was becoming a veritable hotbed of guerrilla resistance, both American-led and Filipino-led. Carefully nurtured by MacArthur's headquarters, especially after mid-1943, the guerrilla organizations had grown steadily in strength and effectiveness not only as sabotage units but also as valuable sources of information. The Leyte invasion in October 1944 gave great encouragement to the guerrillas, who redoubled their efforts in preparation for the invasion of Luzon, which they realized could not be too far off. Throughout 1944 supplies of all types had been sent to the guerrillas, first by submarine and later by airdrop and clandestine inter-island transportation. After the establishment of the Allied base on Leyte, the flow of supplies increased by leaps and bounds. The guerrillas themselves established a network of radio communications that soon came to be sustained and, to some extent, controlled by MacArthur's headquarters, which also sent into Luzon special intelligence parties to develop new sources of information and provide guerrilla efforts with more effective direction. In the end, one of the major difficulties Southwest Pacific intelligence agencies had was not obtaining information from Luzon but rather sifting the plethora of guerrilla reports, which attained every conceivable degree of accuracy and detail. Once sifted, the information had to be evaluated and correlated with that received from other sources such as radio intercepts, captured documents, and prisoner interrogations. MacArthur allocated the majority of his Army's ground combat and support forces, most of General Kenney's Allied Air Forces, and nearly all of Admiral Kinkaid's Allied Naval Forces ships and landing craft. He needed to ensure enough forces to defeat a strong Japanese garrison, secure a beachhead against potential fierce resistance, advance south through the Central Plains against expected strong defenses, defend the beachhead from anticipated counterattacks, and secure the Central Plains-Manila Bay area within four to six weeks. Krueger was assigned command of the 1st Corps, which included the 6th and 43rd Divisions, as well as the 14th Corps, comprising the 37th and 40th Divisions. In reserve were the 25th Division, the 11th Airborne Division, the 158th Regiment, the 13th Armored Group, and the separate 6th Ranger Battalion. Supporting these units were 13 nonorganic field artillery battalions of various calibers, two chemical mortar battalions, two additional tank battalions, the majority of five engineer boat and shore regiments, four amphibious tractor battalions, and 16 engineer aviation battalions, totaling approximately 203,000 personnel, of which 131,000 were classified as combat troops.  By the way, since I mentioned one, for those curious, a Chemical Mortar Battalion were US Army non-divisional units attached to infantry divisions during WW2. They were armed with 4.2-inch chemical mortars. Chemical shells were on standby during WW2, to be used in retaliation should the enemy employ chemical weapons first. Toxic agents such as phosgene or mustard gas could be used as well as white phosphorus. Additionally, Eichelberger's 8th Army was tasked with conducting a subsidiary landing on Luzon with the 11th Corps, which included the 32nd Division and the separate 112th Cavalry and 503rd Parachute Regiments. Furthermore, MacArthur designated the 33rd and 41st Divisions as General Headquarters Reserve and made plans to send the 33rd and 38th Divisions, along with the 1st Cavalry Division and the 19th and 34th Regiments, to Luzon within two months. Krueger's plan for the Lingayen assault, set for January 9, involved an amphibious attack on the southern beaches of the gulf, which were lightly defended but presented numerous obstacles that impeded maneuverability. Aiming for a swift landing with a robust force to achieve tactical surprise, Krueger opted for a broad front assault, with Major-General Innis Swift's 1st Corps landing on the eastern beaches near San Fabian and Major-General Oscar Griswold's 14th Corps on the western beaches facing Lingayen town. Each corps would land two divisions side by side, with one regiment from each division held in floating reserve. The initial missions of the two corps were the same: to capture the beachhead area within their designated zones, protect the flanks of the 6th Army, and maintain communication with one another. Both corps were also ready to advance quickly inland to secure a crossing over the Agno River, which would serve as the starting point for the final push south toward Manila and Manila Bay. Anticipating some congestion on the beaches, Krueger decided to keep the 25th Division, the 158th Regiment, and the 13th Armored Group afloat until January 11. On that date, the 158th would land on the extreme left of the 1st Corps to block the coastal corridor along the eastern shore of the gulf, preventing any Japanese counterattacks from the north. Similarly, the 25th Division and the 13th Armored Group were also ready to be deployed in Swift's area for both defensive and offensive operations. To facilitate the amphibious assault, Kinkaid took direct command of Task Force 77, which comprised the entire 7th Fleet, along with some Australian and Dutch vessels assigned to MacArthur, as well as warships borrowed from Admiral Nimitz's Pacific Ocean Areas. Kinkaid organized his Luzon Attack Force into several combat components, with Admiral Barbey's Task Force 78 tasked with landing the 1st Corps and Admiral Wilkinson's Task Force 79 responsible for the 14th Corps. Admiral Oldendorf once again led the Bombardment and Fire Support Group, which included six battleships and five heavy cruisers, while Admiral Berkey headed the Close Covering Group of four light cruisers. This time, Kinkaid's escort carriers were under the command of Rear-Admiral Calvin Durgin, who had a total of 17 escort carriers to provide convoy protection, conduct airstrikes on the target area alongside pre-assault minesweeping and bombardment, and offer close air support for ground operations until that responsibility was handed over to Kenney's land-based aircraft. Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet would once again play a crucial role in the operation by targeting enemy airfields, while also being ready to provide direct support if the Japanese gathered enough surface forces to initiate a significant naval confrontation. Meanwhile, Kenney's Allied Air Forces were tasked with safeguarding the convoy's sides and rear through overwater reconnaissance and attacks on enemy facilities in the southern Philippines and the Dutch East Indies, with General Whitehead's 5th Air Force responsible for carrying out most of these missions. Additionally, army aircraft were to protect convoys traversing central Philippine waters and offer air support for ground operations whenever possible. To complement Operation Mike I, a comprehensive deception strategy was in place, aimed at diverting the enemy's attention to a potential Allied threat against Formosa and southern Japan through naval activities in nearby waters. Consequently, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 launched its initial strikes in support of the Lingayen operation on January 3 and 4. Although poor weather conditions hindered attacks on Formosa and the Ryukyu Islands, they still achieved moderate success. MacArthur also aimed to mislead the Japanese into believing that the primary focus of any Allied offensive on Luzon would be directed towards western Batangas or the Bicol Provinces. Therefore, on January 1, Company I of the 21st Regiment advanced on Bongabong along Mindoro's east coast, beginning the clearance of northeastern Mindoro. The next day, Company B of the 503rd Parachute Regiment started operations on the northwestern coast, moving towards Mamburao. On January 3, Company K of the 21st Regiment landed without opposition at Buenavista on the southwestern shore of Marinduque Island and established positions to set up radar installations. Meanwhile, other troops continued their advance toward Calapan, ultimately intercepting the recently landed enemy raiding unit at Pinamalayan on January 8, compelling it to retreat back to Calapan. Although some Japanese forces managed to reach Mansalay on the southeast coast of Mindoro and infiltrated overland toward San Jose, all attempts to raid enemy airfields were unsuccessful. Conversely, the 21st Regiment successfully captured Calapan on January 24, resulting in approximately 135 Japanese casualties, while the Americans incurred the loss of 1 soldier killed and 7 wounded. By the end of the month, Dunckel's forces had killed 170 Japanese and taken 15 prisoners, at a cost of 16 American soldiers killed, 71 wounded, and 4 missing, not including casualties from Japanese air attacks, which raised the Allied totals to 475 killed and 385 wounded. Looking back to Luzon, General Yamashita was also focused on finalizing plans and preparations to counter the impending enemy assault. During the latter part of December, battle preparations proceeded with discouraging slowness. Overburdened transport facilities, enemy strafing and bombing attacks, guerrilla interference and an acute shortage of automotive fuel impeded progress in every direction. On the other hand, there were numerous indications that General MacArthur was virtually ready to strike. In the Batangas area, enemy air reconnaissance was conspicuously frequent, while the dropping of dummy parachutists and the activity of small surface craft along the coast also caused grave alarm in the 8th Division. Other reports indicated that guerrilla forces were beginning to assemble in the mountains east of Manila, and that enemy submarines were delivering arms to guerrillas in the Lamon Bay area. Yamashita accurately predicted that the invasion would occur between January 10 and 20, targeting either the Batangas area or Lingayen Gulf. However, recognizing that he lacked sufficient forces for a decisive battle, particularly given the decimation of Japanese air power and the enemy's air superiority. As of the 1st of December the Japanese Army and Navy had probably had a combined air strength of some 500 planes in the Philippines, the bulk of them based on Luzon. This strength had been largely destroyed by Allied air strikes in support of the Mindoro operation and during Japanese air attacks against Mindoro-bound convoys and the Mindoro beachhead area. By the 20th of December, the Japanese Naval Air Service in the Philippines had no more than 30 planes, and the Japanese Army Air Force was down to approximately 100 first-line combat aircraft. About that date, some 50 naval planes flew to Luzon from Formosa to renew attacks against Mindoro, and shortly thereafter, it appears, a few Army aircraft also came down from Formosa or the home islands to reinforce Luzon. Many of these planes were lost during continued attacks against Mindoro until, by 31 December, the Japanese had probably no more than 150 operational aircraft left on Luzon, and about a third that many on other fields in the Philippine archipelago, for a total of about 200. Yamashita planned to execute a coordinated delaying strategy, launching local counteroffensives only when conditions were favorable. This approach aimed to deplete enemy resources and buy valuable time to reinforce Japanese defenses in Formosa and the Ryukyus. Consequently, on December 19, Yamashita finalized a new operational outline that established two forces: one to cover northern Luzon and the other for central and southern Luzon. The plans outlined an initial strategy for the forces defending coastal regions to inflict significant damage on the enemy during their landing. This would be followed by delaying actions aimed at hindering the capture of crucial inland communication hubs and airfields. The final phase would involve a sustained last stand in the three mountainous areas previously identified as zones of ultimate resistance. To delay further enemy operations against Formosa and the Ryukyus, Yamashita decided to strengthen the northern sector, as its mountainous terrain and limited access routes from the central Luzon plain offered the best tactical conditions for prolonged resistance. As a result, Southern Luzon would be nearly stripped of troops to reinforce the second-largest concentration of forces in the mountains east of Manila. Yamashita positioned the 103rd Division in the Aparri coastal area, with three battalions stationed on the northwest coast; the 23rd Division, along with the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade, near the eastern shore of Lingayen Gulf; the 10th Division in the San Jose, Umingan, and Natividad sectors, along with the 11th Independent Regiment at Baler and Dingalan Bays; the 2nd Tank Division as a mobile unit in the Cabanatuan-San Miguel area, with the 6th Tank Regiment in Manila; the Manila Defense Force responsible for Manila and the surrounding mountains, with a garrison on Corregidor and the 39th Regiment on the Bataan Peninsula; the 8th Division securing key communication points to the east and west of Lake Taal, as well as important coastal positions in Batangas; the majority of the 105th Division stationed in the critical area east of Manila, while the Noguchi Detachment continued to hold Bicol; and the 82nd Brigade occupying coastal positions in the Lamon Bay region. Upon its arrival on Luzon, the 19th Division was tasked with gathering its main forces south of San Leon, while also deploying units to secure critical locations around Tuguegarao and Echague. Additionally, the 2nd Mobile Regiment and the newly landed 2nd Glider Regiment were ordered to bolster defenses in the Clark Field area, which was primarily protected by ground air units. However, by the end of the month, due to the slower-than-anticipated withdrawal of the 105th Division, Yamashita instructed the 8th Division to relocate its main forces to the region east of Manila, leaving only the 17th Regiment stationed in Batangas Province. Lieutenant-General Yokoyama Shizuo then took command of the Shimbu Group, which encompassed all forces in the southern half of Luzon, below a line approximately extending from Manila to Lamon Bay. That is gonna be it for the Philippines today as we now need to head over to the Aitape-Wewak region.  In the coastal sector the 19th Brigade had moved forward in accordance with Stevens' orders of 26th November that it should relieve the 2/7th Commando Squadron, clear the enemy from the area west of the Danmap, and concentrate round Babiang and Suain in preparation for operations east of the river. A company of the 2/4th Battalion had therefore relieved the 2/7th Squadron at Suain and Babiang on the 29th and 30th November. In the next 16 days patrols clashed with small groups of Japanese on seven occasions, and killed 28 without loss to themselves. By 17th December the main body of the 2/4th Battalion was at Suain, with a company at Idakaibul and one at Babiang.  In the second week of December, the squadron expanded its control by establishing outposts at Yasile and Yambes, from which they successfully repelled several minor Japanese attacks. On 11th December an enemy patrol approached the perimeter held by Byrne's troop at Yambes. The Australians held their fire until the Japanese were 35 to 50 yards away, killed 6 and, during the day, 2 more. There were patrol clashes that day and on the 13th. At 1.30 a.m. on the 15th an enemy force of at least 35 attacked. This time the Australians let the leading Japanese come to within three yards of the perimeter then fired with automatic weapons and threw grenades. After pressing the attack for a while the enemy withdrew, dragging away their wounded and about 10 dead. By mid-December, the commandos had advanced along the coastal sector to the Danmap, over 40 miles from Aitape and approximately 20 miles into the Torricellis, without encountering significant enemy forces. The majority of Lieutenant-General Mano Goro's 41st Division was positioned south of the Danmap, with the reinforced 237th Regiment under Major-General Aotsu Kikutaro occupying forward positions between the Anumb and Danmap Rivers. Following the defeat at the Driniumor River, General Adachi's 18th Army implemented a strategy to minimize contact with the enemy. They positioned outpost forces for ambush and scattered their units across a broad area, especially in locations where they could cultivate food and regain their strength. Despite these measures, many soldiers faced hunger, malnutrition, and illness, and they often lacked essential modern military equipment. Meanwhile, on December 12, Stevens instructed the seasoned 17th Brigade, led by Brigadier Murray Moten, to relieve the 2/7th Squadron at Tong and conduct patrols south towards Mimbiok and Yanatong, southeast to establish a base at Musimbe, and east to set up a base at Musu. Subsequently, the 2/7th Squadron was to relocate to Makuir and scout a route through Chem to the Dandriwad River and Babiang, aiming to establish a forward base on the Danmap, about five miles east of Makuir. In line with this plan, Moten dispatched Major Ian McBride's Piper Force, consisting of two companies from the 2/5th Battalion, which arrived at Tong on December 20. That day Major Goode of the 2/7th Squadron reported that, except for foraging parties, the area which he had been ordered to patrol had been cleared of the enemy. The squadron had killed 26 Japanese and lost two killed and five wounded; two attached Papuan police had been wounded. The squadron's headquarters were now moved to Lambuain and it began its new task: to clear the Walum area. Walum village was occupied on 30th December after clashes in which several Japanese were killed. Documents captured by the squadron that day indicated that the main enemy line of communication from the coast to Balif was via Walum- Womisis-Womsak. At the same time, Piper Force occupied Musimbe and Musinau, coinciding with the arrival of the rest of the 2/5th Battalion in the Yambes area. Meanwhile, Stevens ordered the 19th Brigade to seize the Abau-Malin line and eliminate the enemy at the Danmap. On December 14, Martin sent the majority of the 2/4th Battalion to cross the river, with one company successfully fighting through Lazy Creek to reach Rocky Point. As the other companies assembled, the 2/8th Battalion began its advance into the foothills to establish a forward base at Idakaibul and move towards Malin. Patrolling from Lazy Creek the 2/11th had two sharp clashes with the enemy force west of Niap on 30th and 31st December, three Aus- tralians and 11 Japanese being killed. At Matapau village, early on 2nd January, from 30 to 35 Japanese attacked the perimeter of Captain Royce's company. Artillery fire was brought down and the Japanese with- drew leaving six dead. This was the beginning of five days of sharp fighting against Japanese who seemed determined to stop the advance along the Old German Road. As soon as the enemy's attack had been repulsed Royce's company pushed forward along the road to a spur whence the artillery observer, Captain Lovegrove, might direct fire. A platoon crossed the little Wakip River at 10.20 a.m. but came under fire from Japanese on the steep-sided spur. The infantry withdrew and accurate artillery fire was brought down. At 2.10 p.m. the spur was occupied and from it Lovegrove directed fire on a pocket of Japanese so close that he had "to almost whisper his orders into the phone". In the day 14 Japanese were killed, and two Australians killed and five wounded, of whom four remained on duty. Next day, and on the 4th and 5th, there was sharp fighting round the spur and towards Niap, and on the 6th, after a strike by 11 bombers and a bombardment by the artillery, a platoon attacked across the Wakip but was held by the resolute enemy pocket at Niap. On January 7, the Japanese defense was finally breached when three tanks broke through the beach and entered the town, followed by infantry. The next day, the leading company of the 2/8th Battalion entered Malin without facing any opposition. However, the 2/11th Battalion struggled to advance towards Doreto Bay, as the determined defenders repelled their attacks for another ten days. On January 18, a company executed a successful flanking maneuver through the foothills to Nimbum Creek and eventually positioned itself south of Abau, capturing the town two days later. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Alfred Buttrose had sent one company to assault Perembil and secure the Musu area, while another advanced through Sumul towards Maharingi, and McBride's company at Musinau moved eastward to patrol deep into the south. On January 3, the Australians unexpectedly drove a strong force of the 238th Regiment from Perembil, though they had to fend off several counterattacks in the following days. Continuing their advance, Asiling fell on January 9, followed by Samisai two days later, and another company secured Maharingi by January 15. Now, it is time to return to the Marianas to prepare for the next missions of General Hansell's 21st Bomber Command.  The United States military took steps to improve Saipan's defenses after the damaging raids of November 27. In a frantic effort to detect future intruders, Admiral Hoover stationed two destroyers 100 miles northwest of Saipan to provide early radar warning, and an AN/TPS-3 radar was rushed to Saipan from Oahu by air. The destroyers in some instances gave ample warning, but on other occasions the enemy planes still managed to come in unannounced. Arnold became frustrated that the microwave early warning radar set still was not in use; and on December 3 Admiral Nimitz ordered that the highest priority be given to installing the radar. Despite this, it still was not ready until after the conclusion of the Japanese air campaign. Two B-24 Liberator bombers fitted with air-to-air radar sets were also dispatched to Saipan. This was the first use of airborne warning and control aircraft by the United States, but they were not used in combat. To maintain pressure on the enemy following the San Antonio strikes, he conducted a night radar mission with 30 Superfortresses on November 29, although it was unsuccessful. This mission was part of his preparations for a daylight attack on the Nakajima Aircraft Plant in Ota, scheduled for December 3. By D minus I weather reports were forbidding: at bombing altitudes over Ota, winds were reaching velocities of I 80 miles per hour or more. At 01:30 on the 3d it was decided that the only hope for the day was to go back to Musashino where visible bombing might be possible." Crews had already been briefed twice for the target; the 73d Wing hurriedly cut field orders and by 0945 eighty-six bombers were heading for Tokyo. Seventy-six got over the city to find clear weather but high winds; 59 planes bombed visually from a mean altitude of 28,700 feet with poor results. Out of this mission, six bombers were lost, and another six were damaged, resulting in just 26 bombs hitting the plant area, causing minimal damage to buildings and equipment. Once again, the strike was disappointing. Musashi's records indicate that twenty-six bombs fell in the plant area with some small damage to buildings and equipment and almost none to machinery; Japanese casualties were moderately high. Strike photos, the command's only source of information, seemed to show even less damage, and for these slight results the command had paid dearly, with six B-29's lost and six damaged. In response, on December 7, several Japanese aircraft, including two squadrons of Ki-67 bombers, launched a coordinated attack from both high and low altitudes, destroying three B-29s and damaging 23 others. This assault was observed by Lieutenant-General Millard Harmon, the commander of Army Air Forces in the Pacific, who had been sent by Nimitz to coordinate an extensive attack on Iwo Jima's installations using both air and surface forces. On December 8th, at 0945 twenty-eight P-38's swept over the island, followed at 1100 by the B-29's and at noon by the Liberators. Hoover's crusiers began seventy minutes of shelling at I 347. The bomb load carried by the planes forcefully illustrated the difference in performance between the heavy and very heavy bomber at 725 miles tactical radius: the 62 B-29's dropped 620 tons, 102 B-24's only 194 tons.” All told, enough metal was thrown to produce a good concentration on Iwo's eight square miles, but because the bombers had been forced to loose by radar, results, so far as they could be judged from photography-handicapped, like the bombing, by adverse weather-were much less decisive than had been expected. Eyen so, the enemy's raids on Saipan stopped until 25 December. Although the results were not as decisive as hoped, the enemy raids on Saipan were temporarily halted. On December 13, Hansell sent 90 Superfortresses to bomb the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works in Nagoya.  The choice for primary visual target was the Mitsubishi Aircraft Engine Works at Nagoya, and the same company's aircraft works was named as radar target; strays, it was hoped, would spill into crowded Nagoya, Japan's second city and an industrial center of great importance. The engine works, still in top priority for 21st Bomber Command, lay in the northeast section of Nagoya, about two and a half miles from Nagoya Castle. The plant was considered by the JTG as a single target though it actually consisted of three separate but closely related units of the vast complex comprising the Mitsubishi Heavy Industries, Ltd.: I) the No. 2 Engine Works, responsible for research, design, and manufacture of prototype engines; 2) the No. 4 Engine Works, which between 1939 and 1945 manufactured 44,004 engines, the most important model being the Ha-102, a 1,000-horsepower motor used on the Nick and Dinah 2; and 3) the No. 10 Engine Works, which furnished castings and forgings for all Mitsubishi engine plants. On the 13th, the 73d Wing was able to get ninety bombers up, most of them carrying ten 500-pound GP's but one squadron from each group loaded with incendiary clusters. As on previous missions, a number of planes failed to reach the primary target: sixteen B-29's aborted and three bombed targets of opportunity. Japanese resistance was lively and, in all, four B-29's were lost, thirty-one damaged. Despite significant losses, the recent bombing campaign demonstrated improvement, resulting in the destruction of an assembly shop and seven auxiliary buildings. Additionally, damage was inflicted on an assembly shop, a prototype engine-manufacturing facility, two other shops, and 11 buildings, leading to approximately 351 casualties. The bombing, if of less than pickle-barrel precision, showed improvement. Strike photos indicated that 16 per cent of the bombs dropped had fallen within 1,000 feet of the aiming point and that 17.8 per cent of the roofed area had been destroyed?' Although this in itself was encouraging, had intelligence officers been able to read from their photos the whole story, there would have been even more optimism on Saipan. At the No. 4 Engine Works an assembly shop and 7 auxiliary buildings were destroyed, and an assembly shop and 11 buildings were damaged; at the No. 2 Engine Works a prototype engine-manufacturing shop and 2 other shops were damaged; and personnel losses ran to 246 killed and 105 injured.  For the first time, the 21st Bomber Command made a noticeable impact on the aircraft industry, prompting the Japanese to start relocating equipment to underground facilities. Plant officials calculated that the attack reduced productive capacity from 1,600 to 1,200 engines per month; after December 13 parts were no longer machined at No. 4 Engine Works, and engine production was limited to assembling parts on hand and those received from other plants. Mitsubishi officials had been considering the advisability of dispersing the Nagoya facilities ever since the fall of Saipan. After the strike of December 13 the transfer of equipment to underground sites began, but even at the end of the war the movement had not progressed far enough to allow production in the new plants. Five days later, Hansell dispatched 89 B-29s to target the Mitsubishi Aircraft Works in Nagoya. The Mitsubishi Aircraft Works was the giant assembly plant which used most of the engines produced in the No. 4 Engine Works. Located on reclaimed land at the northeast corner of Nagoya harbor, it was, like the engine works, composed of three integrated plants: I) the No. I Airframe Works for research and experimental engineering; 2) the No. 3 Airframe Works, which built navy planes-Zeke and Jack fighters and Betty bombers; and 3) the No. 5 Airframe Works, which manufactured bombers and reconnaissance and transport planes for the army. Large, compact, and conspicuous, this complex offered an excellent visual target, and the proximity of the harbor's shore line made it suitable for radar strikes as well. On this 18 December attack many planes, as usual, failed to follow the flight plan so that only sixty-three planes bombed the primary target. Cloud cover was heavy and forty-four of these dropped by radar, to add considerably to the damage caused by an earthquake on 7 December. Though few bombs were plotted in the area, 17.8 percent of the roofed area appeared to have been destroyed. The No. 3 Works suffered extensive damage to the sheet-metal, heat-treatment, fuselage assembly, and final-assembly shops, and at No. 5, approximately 50 per cent of the total assembly area was damaged. Casualties, in dead and injured, amounted to 464.  On December 22, Hansell was compelled to alter his tactics and initiated a daylight incendiary mission. Unfortunately, only 48 B-29s targeted Mitsubishi's engine works due to poor weather, resulting in minimal damage. The Nagoya mission on the next day, though using only incendiaries, was not in fulfillment of Norstad's request; it involved only 78 bombers dispatched instead of IOO and it was planned as a daylight precision attack. The weather turned bad, however, and before the last formations were over Nagoya the target was covered by 10/10 cloud. Only forty-eight planes bombed the Mitsubishi plant and they had to drop by radar; strike photos were few and revealed little. Actually there was not much damage to reveal: 252 fire bombs fell in the area of the No. 4 Works, damaging a few buildings but hurting no machine tools and causing no loss to pruduction On Christmas night, the newly renamed 6th Air Army, led by Lieutenant-General Sugawara Michio, launched its final significant assault on the Marianas, deploying 25 aircraft to bomb from both high and low altitudes. This attack resulted in the destruction of one B-29, serious damage to three others, and minor damage to 11. Overall, the Japanese had deployed over eighty planes over Saipan and Tinian, losing around 37, while managing to destroy 11 B-29s, seriously damaging 8, and causing minor damage to 35. Finally, on December 27, Hansell's last mission involved a return trip to Nakajima, where only 39 out of 72 dispatched B-29s caused little damage to the Musashi plant, although an incendiary attack unfortunately set a hospital on fire. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In a fierce battle for control, forces devised a strategy to defend coastal regions and key locations in Luzon. As troops repositioned, Australian commandos clashed with Japanese units, achieving victories despite challenges. Meanwhile, U.S. bombers targeted Japanese industrial sites, inflicting damage but facing heavy losses, marking a pivotal struggle in the Pacific theater.

#OCEANIA: SAIPAN: US Navy Seabees created a Christmas Party for the war-ravaged children who survived the Battle of Saipan and Tinian, a celebration long remembered for the first time the children met Santa Claus. 1944 Guam invasion bombardment.  Cleo Paskal, FDD @cleopaskal

On this episode, Derek sits with John Whipkey.  John is a decorated World War 2 veteran.  He is 99 years old and is a Veteran of several battles including the Battles of Saipan, Iwo Jima, Tinian and the Tokyo Fire Bombings.  As a gunner on the B-29 Superfortress, John has 5 Battle Stars.  He will be discussing growing up during the Great Depression in Oklahoma, getting drafted, life in World War 2, adjusting to post war life and so much more.SPONSOR - Go to https://betterhelp.com/derekduvallshow for 10% off your first month of therapy with @betterhelp and get matched with a therapist who will listen and help #sponsored

Today we discuss The Prize Pelt: The Tale of Bossk, the next short story in Tales of the Bounty Hunters. Bossk is in pursuit of Chewbacca and Han Solo. Two other bounty hunters approach him with a lead, but Tinian and Chenlambec are not who they appear to be. Bossk decides to work with them, if only to be able to get Chenlambec's pelt.

Darkness Syndicate members get the ad-free version: https://weirddarkness.tiny.us/yud2bwr2Info on the next LIVE SCREAM event: https://weirddarkness.com/LiveScreamIN THIS EPISODE: Defiance Ohio is a small town that reported a rash of werewolf sightings in the early 1970's, and it's a legend that still persists to this day. (The Werewolf of Defiance) *** What would happen if the First Lady of the United States disclosed that she believed she traveled with extraterrestrials to Venus? That's exactly what happened to the First Lady of Japan! (First Contact With The First Lady) *** The island of Guam is well known for the part it played in World War II – but 120 miles northeast of Guam is the tiny island of Tinian, and while it too had a part in World War II, it also contains secrets millennia old of a people that might have existed before the oldest people recorded living there. (The Mysterious People Before Time) *** Robert Nelson had no professional background in medicine or refrigeration, he didn't even have a college degree, but this everyday TV repairman found himself in the center of the cryogenics movement – and that's when things started to get messy. (Cryogenics And The TV Repairman)CHAPTERS & TIME STAMPS (All Times Approximate)…00:00:00.000 = Disclaimer and Cold Open00:01:45.956 = Show Intro00:04:13.956 = Werewolf of Defiance00:19:30.936 = Cryogenics And The TV Repairman00:30:23.749 = First Contact With The First Lady00:35:39.171 = The Mysterious People Before Time00:46:13.929 = Show Close SOURCES AND REFERENCES FROM THE EPISODE…“Cryogenics And The TV Repairman” by Marco Margaritoff for All That's Interesting https://tinyurl.com/yaowv6j6“First Contact With The First Lady” from AncientCode.com: https://tinyurl.com/yxww2yv2“The Mysterious People Before Time” by A. Sutherland for AncientPages.com: https://tinyurl.com/yyuzyu4g“The Werewolf of Defiance” from ArmedWithSilver.com: https://tinyurl.com/y4zlhnxh (Defiance werewolf, “Toledo Blade” newspaper articles: Article One= https://tinyurl.com/y3dtkx4v, Article Two= https://tinyurl.com/y2q2c8tl,Article Three= https://tinyurl.com/y5l89z25; Defiance werewolf, Crescent News” newspaper article:https://tinyurl.com/yya7vyku; “Werewolf Shamans In The Ancient Woodlands…” published paper:https://tinyurl.com/yxka58st)“Ohio Police Capture Drunken Local Werewolf” by Jack Dickey for Deadspin.com: https://tinyurl.com/y6rpckbvWeird Darkness theme by Alibi Music Library. = = = = =(Over time links seen above may become invalid, disappear, or have different content. I always make sure to give authors credit for the material I use whenever possible. If I somehow overlooked doing so for a story, or if a credit is incorrect, please let me know and I will rectify it in these show notes immediately. Some links included above may benefit me financially through qualifying purchases.)= = = = ="I have come into the world as a light, so that no one who believes in me should stay in darkness." — John 12:46= = = = =WeirdDarkness® is a registered trademark. Copyright ©2024, Weird Darkness.= = = = =Originally aired: January 26, 2021CUSTOM LANDING PAGE: https://weirddarkness.com/WerewolfOfDefiance

Emissions from anesthesia are one of the largest sources of greenhouse gases from hospitals. This anesthesiologist wants to change that. And, a cultural anthropologist discusses the Mariana Islands' long history of colonization and why demilitarization matters for climate progress.A Major Source Of Greenhouse Gases In Hospitals? AnesthesiaDid you know that some of the gases used in anesthesia are strong greenhouse gases? A few years ago, Seattle Children's Hospital analyzed its carbon footprint and found that the gases used in anesthesia made up about 7% of the hospital's total emissions, right behind emissions from heating and power and those from commuting.Faced with this problem, Dr. Elizabeth Hansen, a pediatric anesthesiologist at Seattle Children's, took matters into her own hands and slashed the operating room's emissions. She now helps other hospitals do the same with Project Spruce.Guest host Anna Rothschild talks with Dr. Hansen about how and why she took on the problem.Militarization And Environmental Injustice In The Mariana IslandsLet's take a trip to the Northern Mariana Islands, a string of islands in the Pacific just north of Guam. The islands were sites of major battles during World War II and were captured by the United States in 1944. The US established a military presence across the territory—including building the world's largest air force base at the time, on an island called Tinian.The US military never left, and in the 1980s, the Northern Mariana Islands became a US territory. A few years ago, the Pentagon proposed building a bombing range on an island called Pagan, but residents of the islands pushed back.Dr. Isa Arriola is a cultural anthropologist at Concordia University in Montreal and co-founder of the organization Our Common Wealth 670, based in Saipan, the capital of the Northern Mariana Islands. She's fought back against the militarization of her home islands, and she talks with guest host Anna Rothschild about how the military presence has affected the people and environment of the Marianas, and why demilitarization needs to be part of climate action.Transcripts for each segment will be available after the show airs on sciencefriday.com. Subscribe to this podcast. Plus, to stay updated on all things science, sign up for Science Friday's newsletters.

Donate (no account necessary) | Subscribe (account required) Explore SurfShark — For anti-virus and VPN protection: surfshark.com/TWR Join Bryan Dean Wright, former CIA Operations Officer, as he dives into today's top stories shaping America and the world. In today's episode, we cover: Teamsters Snub Kamala Harris: The powerful Teamsters Union refuses to endorse Kamala Harris, a significant blow in the crucial swing state of Pennsylvania. Border Security Concerns: A former Border Patrol Sector Chief reveals that the Biden-Harris administration suppressed information about migrants with potential terrorist ties. European Migration Crisis: Sweden and the Netherlands crack down on asylum seekers as violent crime and social unrest surge due to unchecked immigration. Zelensky's "Victory Plan": Ukraine's President prepares to pitch his new peace plan to the U.S. as the war with Russia grinds on with staggering casualties. Reviving a WWII Airfield: The U.S. military restores the Tinian airfield in the Pacific as tensions with China escalate. "And you shall know the truth, and the truth shall make you free." - John 8:32

Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Palau Islands. General Rupertus's 1st Marine Division was tasked with attacking Peleliu, while General Mueller's 81st Division would land on Angaur. Prior to the landings, extensive neutralization of Japanese airfields was carried out by Allied forces. On September 6, carrier-based aircraft attacked the Palaus, significantly damaging enemy targets but encountering minimal resistance. The invasion fleet, led by Admiral Fort, began landing operations on September 15. Despite strong Japanese defenses, especially around Peleliu's rugged coral ridges, the Marines made some progress but faced intense resistance. Notable figures such as Eugene Sledge, author of “With the Old Breed,” provided personal insights into the brutal conditions faced. The landing saw heavy casualties and challenges, including ineffective pre-landing bombardments and fierce counterattacks, but the Marines managed to secure key positions by the end of the first day. The 81st Division then proceeded with landings on Angaur on September 17, facing lighter resistance but difficult terrain. This episode is the Battles of Peleliu and Angaur Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last time we left off, Peleliu and Anguar had just been amphibiously assaulted by US Marines. While the landings on Angaur were underway, General Rupertus pressed on with the Peleliu offensive on September 17. In the southern sector, Colonel Hanneken's 7th Marines made headway against the isolated Japanese defenders. The 3rd Battalion cleared a minefield and captured the southeast promontory, while the 1st Battalion took on the southwestern promontory but only managed to secure half of it due to fierce enemy resistance. To the north, the 1st and 5th Marines advanced further, encountering the Umurbrogol Mountains for the first time, where Colonel Nakagawa had fortified his defenses. On the left flank, Colonel Puller's 1st and 3rd Battalions encountered minimal opposition as they moved along the relatively flat coastal plain but had to halt their advance when the 1st Battalion was impeded by a reinforced concrete blockhouse. On the right, Colonel Harris' 2nd Battalion progressed well while staying hidden from Japanese artillery and mortar fire. However, despite reaching their objectives by mid-morning, Harris' 1st Battalion faced difficulty when Puller's 2nd Battalion, after making initial gains, was halted by the Umurbrogol defenses. They fought hard to secure Hill 200 but were immediately met with fire from the next ridge. Additionally, Harris' 3rd Battalion was pinned down by heavy flanking fire from the left. That night, additional armor was sent to the 7th Marines to support the ongoing operations in the south. The next morning, Hanneken's 3rd Battalion launched a final assault. During the night of D+2, additional armor (tanks and 75mm gun-mounted halftracks) was brought up and at 10:00 on September 18 the advance was resumed. Again progress was painfully slow with many reserve elements being attacked by Japanese from bypassed caves and underground emplacements. At 13:44 elements of Companies A and C reached the southern shores, though the area being assaulted by Company B was still heavily defended. Tank support had withdrawn to re-arm and before Company B was in a position to resume the attack, a bulldozer was needed to extricate the gun-mounted half-tracks, which had become bogged down. At that time, several explosions were heard from the Japanese defenses and it was found that remaining Japanese defenders had finished the job for the Marines. The final handful leaped from the cliff tops into the sea in an effort to escape, only to be picked off by Marine riflemen. With the taking of the two promontories, the southern part of Peleliu was secured. 1/7 and 3/7 squared themselves away for a well-earned rest, while headquarters reported "1520 hours D+3, 7th Marines mission on Peleliu completed." Unfortunately, this was not quite the case. Despite the slow progress and intense Japanese resistance, the Marines managed to secure the southern portion of Peleliu by the end of September 18. At the same time, the 1st and 5th Marines continued their fierce and costly push north. On the right flank, Colonel Harris's 2nd Battalion faced only sporadic resistance as it cut through the dense jungle. The Americans eventually reached a causeway leading east to Peleliu's northeastern peninsula, a potentially dangerous obstacle to their advance. After a successful patrol, Harris opted to call in an airstrike before crossing, but the strike missed its target and hit the area while the Marines were crossing. Despite this, the bridgehead was established, though further casualties were incurred due to friendly artillery and mortar fire. With this new foothold, Harris redirected his 3rd Battalion eastward across the causeway to support the 2nd Battalion's advance. On the left flank, the 1st Marines, having sustained 1,236 casualties, were urged by Rupertus to "maintain the momentum." This led Colonel Puller to commit all available reserves, including engineers, support personnel, and Hanneken's reserve 2nd Battalion. The 1st Marines suffered about 240 casualties during the 17th and in Japanese counterattacks the ensuing night; the 3rd Battalion was reduced to about one third of its original strength; and two companies of the 1st Battalion were practically finished as fighting units. On the other hand, there was some reason for optimism. Progress on the 17th had been measured in hundreds of yards in the rough, high ground at the southern end of the central ridges and strong Japanese resistance had been overcome. Whatever optimism may have existed was not to last too long. On the 18th, in what the Marine Corps' history of the operation characterizes as "savage and costly fighting," elements of the 1st and 7th Marines managed to advance more than 500 yards in the center, principally along the ridge lines and hills oriented north and south. But the advance during the day was held up at a group of peaks which seemed at first to form a continuous ridge line that was oriented more east and west than the rest of the Peleliu ridges. Soon, the name Five Sisters came to be applied to a cluster of peaks forming the western side of the terrain feature. A towering hill at its eastern extremity, separated from Five Sisters by a saddle, was designated Hill 300, or Old Baldy. With the 7th Marines held up in the center, at Five Sisters, the units on both sides of the central ridges halted so as not to create exposed flanks. Puller's 3rd Battalion made progress along the coastal plains but had to pause to stay in contact with other units. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion struggled against the Umurbrogol Mountains, capturing Hill 210 before being forced to withdraw due to a fierce Japanese counterattack on Hill 200 behind them. At Anguar, following a three-hour artillery bombardment supported by aircraft, General Mueller's 321st and 322nd Regiments resumed their advance north and west with tank support. After linking their advances, Colonel Venable pushed west and reached the high ground where Major Goto had established his main defenses, while Colonel Dark made significant progress south until his forces encountered the formidable defenses at Green Beach. The night of 18-19 September was noisy and nerve-racking all along the front and few troops got much sleep. Minor Japanese attacks harassed the exposed salient held by the 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry, while bats and large land crabs helped the Japanese to create distraction and started troops firing on nonexistent enemy infiltrators. Apparently no casualties resulted either from Japanese action or indiscriminate small arms fire. Friendly artillery fire did, however, cause some casualties. About 2030, four or five 105-mm. shells from the 316th Field Artillery Battalion hit the lines of the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, killing 4 men and wounding 15 others. The artillery fire was stopped before further damage could be done. On September 19, following a night of numerous Japanese infiltrations and small-scale counterattacks, the 322nd Regiment swiftly secured Saipan Town and advanced to the north shore of Garangaoi Cove. Meanwhile, the 321st Regiment successfully attacked and captured the Green Beach fortifications from their vulnerable side. To manage the exposed Japanese forces on the beaches, Dark's 2nd Battalion, supported by tanks, maneuvered left and progressed down the southwest of the island, halting just short of the shoreline by nightfall. At Peleliu, Harris' Marines made headway towards the Ngardololok area, overcoming light resistance and quickly dispatching the few enemy stragglers they encountered, reaching Purple Beach by day's end. However, in front of the O-3 line, Puller's weary troops, having endured a grueling night of Japanese counterattacks, resumed their assault on the Umurbrogol Mountains.  Despite some local advances, by evening on 20 September the 1st Marines had been stopped and, ". . . as an assault unit on the regimental level, had ceased temporarily to exist," having suffered almost 1,750 casualties, well over half its strength. Relief was absolutely necessary, not only because casualties were heavy but also because the survivors were physically exhausted from heat, lack of water, and continuous combat. Elements of the 7th Marines therefore relieved all 1st Marines units except those along West Road. While the 7th Marines took over from the exhausted 1st Marines on the right, the 5th Marines continued their advance through western Peleliu, securing its two peninsulas, including Island A and Ngabad Island, by September 21. General Mueller, concerned lest the Japanese reported on the south break through gaps or weak points in the forward lines, had special defenses in depth set up at RED and BLUE Beaches, utilizing Shore Party and antiaircraft troops. All units were alerted to expect Japanese attacks during the night. The division expected (and perhaps hoped) that the Japanese still believed to be located in southern Angaur might launch a suicidal desperation charge during the night or at dawn on the 20th. The night proved very quiet until, toward morning, some small, scattered Japanese parties infiltrated through the lines of both regiments. There was no banzai effort--rather, these Japanese troops were apparently attempting to escape to the northwest hill mass from positions in the mangrove swamp and GREEN Beach 3 areas. Action at dawn was limited to a mopping-up operation directed against four Japanese discovered in the headquarters area of the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry. By 11:00 on September 20, Mueller reported to General Geiger that all organized resistance on Angaur had ended and that the island was secure. General Mueller's statement was probably prompted by his realization that the remaining Japanese were compressed into the northwest hills and by the reports that about 850 of the enemy had been killed through the 20th. This casualty figure was an overestimation. Probably fewer than 600 Japanese had been killed through the 20th, and Major Goto still had possibly 750 men with which to conduct an organized defense in the northwest. On orders from General Inoue, Goto planned no final banzai attack which would decimate his forces. Instead he withdrew over half his force to rugged terrain and emplaced them in natural or prepared fortifications. His lines of defense in the northwest were well conceived; many of his positions were mutually supporting; the amphitheater configuration of the bowl provided him with defensive areas whence heavy cross fires could be directed at attackers; the broken coral, with its crevices, fissures, caves, and ridgelets, gave him defensive advantages at least as good as those at the Ibdi Pocket on Biak; and he had available a number of artillery and anti-tank weapons, heavy and light mortars, and heavy and light machine-guns, most of them so emplaced as to give maximum support to his riflemen. In addition, he could still exercise effective control over the men he had gathered in the Lake Salome bowl. For whatever it was worth, Goto was ready to conduct a protracted defense, though the best he could hope for was to tie down the 322nd Regiment. Nevertheless, the real issue at Angaur--securing the prospective airfield area--had already been decided. To the north, while southern Angaur was being secured, Venable's men were probing the enemy's northwestern defenses with a series of company-sized attacks. These attacks allowed the Americans to gather crucial information about Goto's remaining positions, centered around the Lake Salome bowl. Venable discovered that organized resistance was still strong, prompting him to rearrange his units for a final push. Following a heavy artillery and air bombardment, the 322nd Regiment attacked the bowl with tank support, initially making some gains but soon encountering obstacles due to the terrain and enemy fire. By the end of September 21, Venable deemed the newly gained positions too exposed and decided to withdraw to the previous night's defenses. Meanwhile, the 1st and 7th Marines continued to face heavy casualties as they fought through the Umurbrogol Mountains, with the latter advancing less than 175 yards after two days of intense combat. Nakagawa's fierce defenders managed to halt the 1st Marine Division on the rough and well-defended terrain, resulting in a total of 4,000 casualties by this time. After visiting the front, Geiger decided to replace the battered 1st Marines with Dark's 321st Regiment, which had suffered minimal casualties and had completed its mission at Angaur. The 1st Marines by this time reported 1749 casualties. One Marine later described the fighting in the Umurbrogol, which attests to the level to which the 1st Marines had deteriorated: "I picked up the rifle of a dead Marine and I went up the hill; I remember no more than a few yards of scarred hillside, I didn't worry about death anymore, I had resigned from the human race. I crawled and scrambled forward and lay still without any feeling towards any human thing. In the next foxhole was a rifleman. He peered at me through red and painful eyes. I didn't care about him and he didn't care about me. As a fighting unit, the 1st Marines was finished. We were no longer human beings, I fired at anything that moved in front of me, friend or foe. I had no friends, I just wanted to kill." OnSeptember 19, he also dispatched Colonel Arthur Watson's reserve 323rd Regiment to secure Ulithi Atoll. After a successful reconnaissance mission, the infantrymen landed on September 22, discovering that the atoll's airfield and seaplane base had been abandoned by the Japanese. The Americans later established a major advanced fleet anchorage, a Marine airbase, and a Navy seaplane base there. Ulithi Atoll contained a 300-berth anchorage and a seaplane base. Occupation of these Western Caroline islands provided still another base from which future operations against the enemy could be supported. The construction of an airstrip on Ameliorate Island made possible fighter plane protection for the anchorage and afforded a base from which US aircraft could continue neutralization of the nearby Japanese bases on Yap. Together with Angaur and Peleliu Islands to the southwest and Guam, Tinian, and Saipan to the northeast, the capture of Ulithi Atoll completed a line of American bases that isolated Japanese holdings in the Central and South Pacific. The occupation of Ulithi Atoll further denied it to the enemy as a fleet anchorage, weather and radio station, and possible air and submarine base, in addition to precluding its use by the enemy to observe and report the activities of American forces in the sector. By September 25 the unloading of all the support ships had been completed and Vice Admiral John H. Hoover, Commander, Forward Areas Western Pacific, took over the task of developing Ulithi Atoll into an advanced fleet base. Within a month after its capture, more than 100 Navy craft from self-propelled types to lighters, floating drydocks, barges, landing craft, and seaplane wrecking derricks were en route to the island. During subsequent operations in the Philippines, the Pacific Fleet found Ulithi to be an extremely valuable base. Prior to the invasion of Okinawa, the island served as a staging area for fleet and amphibious forces. The atoll thus fulfilled a vital strategic role in the final phase of the Pacific War. On that day, Venable resumed his assault on the Lake Salome bowl. The coastal offensive faced little resistance, but the attack through the southern defile encountered heavy enemy fire. Despite this, the troops reached the shores of Lake Salome. However, Venable was severely wounded during the action and had to be evacuated, with his troops retreating to more defensible positions by nightfall. The main strength of the attack was placed on the right (southeast) section of the bowl, and tanks fired along the eastern rim about 200 yards in front of the leading elements. The mediums had been undisturbed by enemy fire all morning, but, apparently attracted by an incautious grouping of officers and men near the lead tanks and defile exit, a Japanese anti-tank gun opened fire from a hidden emplacement along the east rim. Three officers (including Colonel Venable, who was in the forward area to observe the new attack) and one enlisted man were severely wounded and had to be evacuated. During the retirement on the 22nd, one of the three forward tanks was so badly damaged by a mine or buried shell that it could not be moved through the defile. This tank blocked the defile's northern entrance and prevented the withdrawal of another medium, which had to be destroyed to keep it from falling into Japanese hands. In four days of fruitless effort to push into the bowl from the south, three tanks and two 75-mm SPM's had been lost. Heavier infantry losses also began to be sustained now that the Japanese, cornered, were fighting to the death. On that day, for instance, the 2nd Battalion lost 2 men killed and about 35 wounded. At 0730 on the morning of the 23d, the 2d Battalion, with Companies B, C, and E attached, continued the attack into the bowl from the south. Companies B and C worked up the east shore of Lake Salome. Companies I and G pushed toward the southwest and western shores, while Company F paid particular attention to caves along the southwest rim of the bowl. During the first part of the attack all companies moved forward rapidly, and Company I reached the northwest corner of the lake without much trouble. But Company B, pushing forward against increasingly heavy Japanese fire from the north, was pinned down by this fire when it reached the northeast corner of the lake. Company C was sent north on B's right to try to outflank the enemy machine gun and mortar positions from which the fire on Company B originated. The intention was to flush the Japanese from their positions and push them southwest and south against the main body of the 2d Battalion. But Company C could make little progress toward the northern section of the bowl, and its own position became precarious as Japanese mortar and machine gun fire increased and the 1st Battalion's own 81-mm. mortar ammunition ran out, making further mortar support impossible. Japanese fire continued to increase and the positions of all forward companies became untenable. A general withdrawal to the defile entrance was ordered. The withdrawal was painfully slow; companies were broken up; all units suffered more casualties. One small group of Company I, separated from its parent unit, worked over the cliffs and ridges at the bowl's western rim to the coast at BLACK Beach. Company B, retreating in small segments, lost men as it withdrew from the northeast corner of the lake. All told, the 2d Battalion and attached companies lost 18 men killed and over 75 wounded during the day. Concurrently, as the 1st and 7th Marines continued to struggle with the formidable Umurbrogol Mountains, Harris' Company G successfully secured the undefended Carlson Island, finally completing the 5th Marines' original mission. Despite concerns about a potential enemy attack on Koror and Babelthuap after the Peleliu operation, General Inoue decided to reinforce Nakagawa's beleaguered garrison. By 21 September effective Japanese infantry strength in the central ridges was down to 1,300 men. That, of course, does not paint a true picture of the situation in the central pocket. A trained soldier, well armed, can be tenacious on the defense in such terrain as the central ridges of Peleliu whether or not he be trained for infantry service. There were probably 4,000 Japanese troops (including the 1,300 infantrymen) still firmly ensconced in the central pocket as of 21 September, and there were at least 1,000 more troops in the Amiangal Mountain area at northern Peleliu. Nevertheless, Colonel Nakagawa, commanding the Peleliu Sector Unit, clearly needed reinforcements if he was to hold out much longer. There were perhaps 30,000 Japanese troops in the northern Palaus to draw from, including two battalions of the 59th Infantry, two battalions of the 15th Infantry, and four or five recently organized infantry battalions of the 53d Independent Mixed Brigade. The Japanese were not to reach their destination undetected. At 0535, the destroyer H.L. Edwards spotted seven enemy barges about 1,000 yards northeast of Akarakoro Point at the northern tip of Peleliu, obviously headed for the island. The destroyer opened fire, sinking one barge before the remainder reached the beach. A combination of bombing and strafing, naval gunfire, and artillery hit the barges on the beach, and by 0845 the cruiser Louisville reported all barges destroyed. The enemy version of this incident agrees only in part with the American account, adding that "despite receiving severe enemy air and artillery fire at a point two kilometers off the coast, they made a successful landing at 0520 hours under the command of 1st Lieutenant Murahori". Knowing that some Japanese forces had reached Peleliu, Rupertus decided to deploy his own reinforcements between the central ridges and the western shore, targeting the enemy's weak spot for an offensive up the western coast. The 7th Marines supported the Army by attacking enemy positions from the south and center, with Hanneken's 3rd Battalion advancing along the high ground to the right rear of the 321st. After relieving the 1st Marines, Dark sent patrols up the coastal flat to Garekoru, encountering little opposition initially. However, Dark's 2nd Battalion faced heavier resistance in the afternoon and had to retreat, postponing the northward advance until the next day. During the night, Inoue sent the remainder of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Regiment, and despite being shelled, most reinforcements reached Peleliu. By September 23, the Americans had secured important footholds on Peleliu and Angaur. However, intense fighting remained, with the 321st Regiment relieving the 1st Marines against Nakagawa's fortified positions, while the 322nd Regiment continued to attack Goto's defenses on the northwest hills. Yet that is it for the Palau's as we now need to turn to Mortai. General Persons' troops quickly secured and expanded the island perimeter, successfully repelling the enemy's night raids with little difficulty. An example of these raids is the September 18 attack. This is the Japanese report: “On 18 September the main body of the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit, which had moved into position along the upper Tjao, launched a strong night infiltration attack with the objective of disrupting the enemy's rear area in the vicinity of Doroeba and Gotalalmo. Although deep penetration of the enemy lines was achieved and considerable casualties inflicted, the attack failed to reduce the beachhead or to interfere with the enemy's rapid preparation of Doroeba airfield.” In truth, the Americans easily repelled this attack, suffering very few casualties. These raids would continue throughout September and October. American engineers were busy constructing a new fighter strip at the Pitoe Drome area. This strip was scheduled to be ready for use by September 29 but was eventually abandoned and downgraded to an emergency field. A number of factors influenced the decision to abandon the site, which was renamed Pitoe Crash Strip. Japanese air reaction had been so ineffectual that the need for a fighter base on Morotai was not as urgent as had been expected. Aircraft based on escort carriers, some of which remained in the Morotai area for weeks, were able to keep away most of the Japanese planes, and their efforts were supplemented by long-range land-based fighters from Sansapor. Moreover, the line of approach which planes had to use to land on Pitoe Crash Strip interfered with that of the more important bomber base at Wama Drome. Finally, the terrain at the crash strip was by no means as well drained as that at other locations on the Doroeba Plain, and it was necessary to expend much engineer effort to keep the strip operational. The new field, which acquired the designation Pitoe Drome, was located about 1,200 yards north of Wama Drome. Construction proceeded slowly at Pitoe Drome because so much engineer effort had to be devoted to the completion of Wama Drome. By 4 October almost 7,000 feet at the new site had been cleared, but it was not until the 17th, D plus 32, that even one runway was surfaced, let alone taxiways and dispersal lanes. Meanwhile, the construction of a new bomber field at Wama Drome faced significant delays due to heavy rainstorms and a shortage of suitable surfacing material. Despite almost constant struggles with soggy ground and tropical downpours, engineers managed to make 4,000 feet of Wama Drome operational by October 4. However, the overall progress on building Morotai's new airbase, intended for the upcoming invasion of the Philippines, was slower than anticipated. Nevertheless, the Tradewind Task Force was disbanded on September 25, as the island was considered secure enough. General Hall then assumed command of the Morotai base as the commander of the 11th Corps. However, unbeknownst to the Americans, who believed the only possible Japanese response to the invasion was the ineffective air raids already carried out against them, troops in Halmahera were preparing to embark on a dangerous mission to reinforce Morotai and contest control of this key island. In the meantime, after the successful invasion of the Palaus, new developments were unfolding on the Philippines front following Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 38's recent successful strikes. These strikes had revealed an unexpected vulnerability in the enemy's air defenses, prompting Admirals Halsey and Nimitz to cancel the Yap operation, thereby freeing up many resources for the Philippines Campaign. Approximately 500 aircraft, or about 57% of the 884 believed to be in the Philippines, were rendered nonoperational or destroyed during these air attacks. Consequently, General MacArthur decided to cancel the preliminary Mindanao operations and instead make a direct jump from the Palaus-Morotai line to Leyte on October 20. Shortly after this change in schedule, MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs that he could advance from Leyte to Luzon by December 20, two months earlier than planned. Meanwhile, the carrier raids on Mindanao and the Visayas strengthened the Southern Army command's belief that the Allies were preparing for an early invasion of the Philippines. As a result, Marshal Terauchi recommended accelerating the reinforcement of the Philippines, activating Operation Sho-Go, and authorizing the 4th Air Army to employ its main strength against enemy carrier task forces. This was in contrast to the current policy of not committing available air strength against enemy raiders, which was failing to conserve Japanese air power for a decisive battle. However, Tokyo denied these last two requests while also receiving concerning reports about General Kuroda's neglect of his duties as field army commander. In the middle of September, IGHQ decided to replace General Kuroda with General Yamashita. Not only did General Kuroda have a concept of the Philippine operations that differed from that of his superiors, but he was charged with neglecting his duty as field army commander. Lt. Col. Yoshie Seiichi of the Personnel Bureau of the War Ministry, who had been sent to the Philippines to investigate personnel matters in the Southern Army, said of the incident: “Stories reached the War Ministry that Lt. Gen. Kuroda was devoting more time to his golf, reading and personal matters than to the execution of his official duties. It appeared that his control over staff officers and troops was not sufficiently strong and that there was a good deal of unfavorable criticism of his conduct among the troops. There were also indications that discipline was becoming very lax. On September 4, I left Tokyo under orders . . . to investigate. As a result I obtained many statements substantiating the unfavorable stories in regard to Lt. Gen. Kuroda. The recommendations of all the staff was that Lt. Gen. Kuroda be relieved as soon as possible, and be replaced by Gen. Yamashita . . . who was a superb tactician and excellent leader.” Random note, for those interested, over on my personal podcast at the Pacific War Channel I did a single episode covering how Yamashita became the Tiger of Malaya and plan to do more pieces on him as I find him to be one of the more interesting generals of the Pacific War. Before an effective change in command could take place, the Japanese were about to experience a more dramatic display of Allied offensive power that they would soon encounter in the Philippines. On September 18, Mitscher's Task Force 38 was ordered to head back toward the islands for a major strike against Luzon, the heart of Japanese control in the Philippines. The American carriers achieved complete surprise and successfully attacked Luzon three days later. Despite the fierce defense by approximately 42 Zeros, between 09:30 and 18:00 on September 21, four waves of over 400 aircraft targeted the harbor area and airfields around Manila with bombs and strafing runs. The assault on the harbor and shipping along the west coast resulted in the sinking or severe damage of 34 vessels totaling over 100,000 gross tons, while the raids on the airfields inflicted significant damage on grounded aircraft. At 0610 the following day, 22 September, search planes discovered the enemy carrier groups still lurking off the coast of Luzon, and at 0730 a hit-and-run attack was carried out by 27 Japanese aircraft, with reported bomb hits on two carriers and one cruiser. Naval air units at Legaspi attempted to carry out a second attack on the enemy carriers during the late afternoon, but the attack force of 19 planes failed to locate the carrier groups. Following the failed Japanese hit-and-run counterattack, Mitscher continued his assaults on Manila, destroying an estimated 110 aircraft in the air and 95 on the ground, and sinking or damaging 44 vessels. After the apparent withdrawal of enemy carriers, the Japanese decided to relocate their remaining ships in Manila Bay to other anchorages, many of which were directed to the secure docks of Coron Bay. However, Mitscher's carriers returned on September 24 to launch further strikes against Luzon, including a raid by about 96 Hellcats and 24 Helldivers on Coron Bay, which resulted in the sinking or damaging of 10 more vessels. Additional attacks on other targets led to the sinking or damaging of 12 more ships. Despite the ongoing air attacks, the Imperial Japanese Navy still deemed it premature to fully activate Operation Sho-Go, believing the decisive battle would take place in or after late October. Meanwhile, the Imperial Japanese Army accelerated its preparations to defend the Philippines. The reserve 1st Division was ordered to move to the islands immediately, and plans were made to assign ten surface raiding regiments to the area. On September 26, as plans for air reinforcement to the Philippines were being approved, General Yamashita was confirmed as the new commander of the 14th Area Army. He arrived in the Philippines on October 6 and found the situation "unsatisfactory," with poor planning for the Leyte campaign and many of his staff unfamiliar with the conditions in the Philippines. Lt. Gen. Makino Shiro, now commanding the 16th Division, which was the major force on Leyte, had directed his efforts since April 1944 toward the construction of defensive positions on the island. The first line of defense, which was on the east coast in the Dulag area, was practically completed by the middle of October. The third defensive line was in the middle of Leyte Valley in the vicinity of Dagami. The second line of defense was between the two others, while the bulk of supplies was assembled in the central mountain range at Jaro. The distribution of the other troops at the time of the American landings was as follows: one battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment in the Catmon Hill and Tanauan district, and the main strength of the 33d Infantry Regiment in the Palo and Tacloban area. The larger part of the 33d Infantry Regiment, which was less adequately trained than the other regiments, had arrived on Leyte in mid-September from Luzon. Its officers were unfamiliar with the terrain and did not fortify their positions. However, the supply situation was favorable, with Manila serving as the main Japanese depot in the region. Following established plans, he instructed his subordinates that the Area Army would "seek decisive battle on Luzon" while in the central and southern Philippines, the focus would be to delay the enemy's advance and prevent them from securing naval and air bases. However, the September air strikes had led to a noticeable increase in guerrilla activity and civil disorder due to widespread destruction and panic. Small Japanese garrisons were attacked, pro-Japanese Filipinos molested and intimidated, and communications disrupted. In central Luzon there were indications that some guerrilla units were planning a move to the Lamon Bay area in order to be the first to cooperate with an American landing force, and on Negros and Panay guerrilla raids on Japanese airfields became boldly persistent. The Fourteenth Area Army feared that, as soon as enemy forces landed, the guerrillas would not only give them direct assistance as scouts and guides, but seriously hamper Japanese operations by attacking rear communication lines. Consequently, martial law was declared across the archipelago in anticipation of enemy landings. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Despite fierce and costly combat, American forces made significant advances in the Palaus, securing critical islands and establishing bases. The battle for Peleliu was marked by high casualties and intense fighting, with heavy losses on both sides. The successful capture of strategic locations like Ulithi Atoll and the subsequent strikes on Luzon further demonstrated Allied dominance and strategic planning in the Pacific Theater.

Radio weddings, part 10 - Radio Caroline. Daniel Robinson, Red Telecom, part 2. VOA Sao Tome, Saipan and Tinian go off the air.

#NAGASAKI: Charles Sweeney knew of the schools and church in the target area. Charles Pellegrino, author, LAST TRAIN FROM HIROSHIMA. https://www.amazon.com/Last-Train-Hiroshima-Survivors-Look/dp/1400165636 https://www.amazon.com/Hell-Back-Hiroshima-Pacific-Perspectives/dp/1442250585/ref=pd_lpo_sccl_1/134-2223588-5107711?pd_rd_w=C1tNF&content-id=amzn1.sym.4c8c52db-06f8-4e42-8e56-912796f2ea6c&pf_rd_p=4c8c52db-06f8-4e42-8e56-912796f2ea6c&pf_rd_r=8YHST5KM6QKX5089S0GX&pd_rd_wg=TRfkl&pd_rd_r=b3d6b49c-6fee-4cd1-8f7c-916db954ba07&pd_rd_i=1442250585&psc=1 1945 TINIAN

Last time we spoke about fall of Tinian and battle of Sansapor. Following the capture of Noemfoor and Biak, the Allies advanced to the Vogelkop Peninsula, constructing vital airbases. MacArthur initially focused on seizing Sorong and Waigeo Island, but operations accelerated, making Klamono oilfields non-viable, and oil rehabilitation projects in the Dutch East Indies were prioritized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. MacArthur planned reconnaissance in the Mar-Sansapor area. The 6th Division launched Operation Typhoon, and Task Force 77 executed landings on July 30, 1944. Airfields were built, and patrols eliminated Japanese forces. Meanwhile, Tinian saw intense fighting, with Marines securing key objectives by July 31. Following massive bombardments, Marines continued advancing, encountering heavy resistance but eventually declaring Tinian secure on August 1. Guam operations saw similar advances with coordinated attacks overcoming Japanese defenses. This episode is the Fall of Guam Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  This weeks podcast brings us back into the intense action in Guam. As we previously observed in Guam, General Shepherd's Marine brigade had effectively captured the Orote Peninsula, while General Turnage's 3rd Marine Division had reached the designated beachhead line, pushing back a weakened Japanese force retreating northward. Meanwhile, General Bruce's 77th Division maintained control of the southern beachhead line, preparing for a general eastward assault. An engineer battalion began constructing a supply road towards Yona, a project that ultimately failed to support the infantry's advance. On July 30, Turnage's Marines and the infantrymen sent patrols to gauge the strength of the Japanese forces, but dense foliage obscured enemy movements. Geiger eventually concluded that defensive positions were likely near the Agaña-Pago Bay Road. He planned an initial advance toward the general line of Agaña-Famja-Pago Bay, followed by a northeastward attack. Turnage's Marines were assigned to capture the capital, Agaña, and the strategic Tiyan Airfield on the left, while Bruce's infantry aimed to secure the Pago Bay area on the right. Following two days of intense artillery and naval bombardment, Geiger's offensive commenced at 06:30 on July 31. On the left, Turnage's units encountered minimal resistance. The 3rd Marines, now led by Colonel James Stuart, quickly occupied the ruins of the abandoned Agaña and moved beyond the O-1 Line to secure the main northbound roads. The 21st Marines advanced through dense underbrush, reaching O-1 after neutralizing an enemy pillbox near Famja. When Lieutenant Colonel Duplantis 3rd battalion, 21st marines brought his command post forward, a curious incident occurred which illustrated the confusion of the Japanese. Someone in the battalion command group sighted one of the bypassed enemy groups, estimated to be about 15-20, led by an officer, moving toward the new CP area. The Marines held their fire, and when the small unit got to within 150 yards of the waiting men, an interpreter called to the Nipponese to surrender. Apparently thinking they had finally reached friendly lines, they started forward, then stopped to hold a hurried conference. The chattering was interrupted by the interpreter urging them forward, but by this time the aggregation had decided they were in unfriendly territory. They broke and ran in all directions; the Marines opened fire, killing and wounding about half of the intruders. Those still alive escaped into the protecting foliage. The 9th Marines destroyed a delaying detachment at Ordot and two tanks during their successful push to O-1. Colonel Hamilton's 1st and 3rd Battalions, along with Colonel Tanzola's 3rd Battalion, advanced to the right, moving through steep slopes and narrow gorges in columns. They successfully reached Yona and the Pago River without encountering any opposition. With the Reconnaissance Troop protecting the south flank, General Bruce's 77th Infantry Division started toward the east coast of Guam at 7:00, 31 July. Elements of the 307th, with 3/305 attached, led the way in a column of battalions. Lack of enemy resistance permitted battalions to move with companies in column; even so, the march proved most difficult. The troops initially scaled steep slopes, slid down into narrow gorges, and followed along the foothills southwest of the central mountain range of Guam. For a time, vehicles followed, but soon the terrain became so rough that even jeeps could not traverse it. As one infantryman later wrote: “The distance across the island is not far, as the crow flies, but unluckily we can't fly. The nearest I came to flying was while descending the slippery side of a mountain in a sitting position. . . . After advancing a few yards you find that the [bolt] handle of the machine gun on your shoulder, your pack and shovel, canteens, knife, and machete all stick out at right angles and are as tenacious in their grip on the surrounding underbrush as a dozen grappling hooks. . . . The flies and mosquitos have discovered your route of march and have called up all the reinforcements including the underfed and undernourished who regard us as nothing but walking blood banks. We continue to push on. . . .”  During this movement, Hamilton's Company L liberated 2,000 Guamanians from a concentration camp near Asinan. Soldiers willingly gave their rations and cigarettes to the undernourished men and women who were almost overcome with joy at once again seeing Americans. Men of the 77th Division soon forgot the long, tiresome cross-island march as the full realization of the expression, "liberation of enslaved peoples," came to the troops. Following the Orote operations, Shepherd's brigade was ordered to take over the southern half of the beachhead line from Inalas to Magpo Point, relieving the 305th and 306th Regiments. On August 1, Geiger's northward push continued, with the 305th moving to the Yona area and the 306th heading to Pago Bay. The 305th and 307th Regiments advanced slowly through rough terrain without opposition, reaching the O-2 Line by nightfall. On the left, Turnage began his advance with three regiments abreast, but the 3rd and 9th Marines eventually pinched out the 21st upon reaching the intermediate D-2A Line. At 15:00, these two regiments resumed their advance against slight resistance and reached O-2 by nightfall. The main challenge during this period was moving supplies forward, as both divisions relied on the same coastal road, heavily mined by the Japanese. With the rapid advance came the necessity to move supply distribution points closer to the front. Trucks began to roll over the already crowded coast highway to establish an advanced division dump in the Agaña Central Plaza area. Artillery units started to displace forward so that continuous direct support would be available to the assault units. This added traffic, plus the fact that the 77th Division would have to move supplies over the same road, presented a problem to the engineers. In an effort to alleviate the situation, the 25th Naval Construction Battalion and the 19th Marines put all available men to work improving existing roads and trails. Yet despite these efforts, by August 1, the problem of getting supplies forward was becoming more serious. The main coast road –and only one that ran from west to east on northern Guam– over which all traffic had to move had been heavily mined. The Japanese had placed aerial bombs and single-horned mines at road junctions and intersections in and around Agaña. In addition to being mined and heavily congested, the two-lane, hard-surfaced Agaña-Pago Bay Road was overused, poorly maintained and, with frequent rain, soon deteriorated badly. In the end, the engineers could not properly maintain the road and still allow the essential supply convoys through. On the morning of August 2, artillery and warships bombed the new positions General Obata was trying to establish around Mount Santa Rosa. Meanwhile, the Marines and infantrymen continued their pursuit northwards, aiming to reach the O-3 Line behind Japanese delaying positions at Finegayan and Mount Barrigada. On the left, the 9th Marines swiftly captured Tiyan Airfield, but their advance was hampered by dense jungle. Despite this, they managed to gain 1800 yards while the 21st Marines cleared the Saupon Point-Ypao Point area of small enemy groups. On the right, the 77th Division's advance was initially covered by a 14-tank patrol conducting reconnaissance in the Barrigada area, where they faced heavy resistance. The 307th Regiment quickly secured Price Road, but Tanzola's 3rd Battalion was halted by concealed machine-gun positions near Barrigada Well. Subsequently, the 307th, now led by Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Manuel, was also stopped near the village, with Manuel's 1st and 3rd Battalions becoming mixed up just as an enemy tank broke through their lines. After numerous failed attempts to dislodge the enemy, Companies G and E managed to penetrate the Japanese lines in the afternoon, although Company G had to be evacuated by nightfall. Meanwhile, the 305th moved up and consolidated its lines with the 307th. Since Bruce's infantrymen failed to link up with the Marines, Colonel Butler's 2nd Battalion was sent to fill the gap between the divisions. Following a reorganization, the 305th and 307th Regiments attacked again the next morning, encountering surprisingly little resistance as they moved through Barrigada and secured the vital well. The 77th Division had a special reason for wanting to reach Barrigada quickly. The reservoir and pump, located 100 yards northwest of Road Junction 306, could supply 20000 gallons of water daily to the troops. Until now, the men of the division had quenched their thirst by getting water from streams and creeks. But in the northern part of Guam there were no streams, and the reservoir would be the only source of supply. With tanks leading the way, Manuel's 3rd Battalion advanced quickly and reached the summit of Mount Barrigada, although the 2nd Battalion lagged behind. Meanwhile, the 305th Regiment engaged in several isolated skirmishes but still managed to link up with the 307th. To the left, Turnage had also resumed his advance toward O-3. Although the 3rd Marines encountered little resistance and reached their objective successfully, Colonel Craig's 1st Battalion was halted by heavy fire near Finegayan after destroying a Japanese stronghold. That night, the Marines faced mortar and tank attacks, but these assaults made little progress. Meanwhile, as the 22nd Marines patrolled southern Guam, the 4th Regiment was held in reserve at Toto. On August 4, the remainder of Shepherd's brigade began moving to Toto, leaving only Colonel Schneider's 1st Battalion and the 6th Defense Battalion behind. Following Turnage's orders, the 21st Marines were positioned between the other two regiments to reach O-3 near Dededo. At the same time, Craig's 1st Battalion made minimal gains toward Finegayan, while the rest of the 9th Marines advanced to O-3 and successfully severed the Finegayan-Barrigada Road. To the right, Bruce's infantrymen, following an artillery barrage, advanced to O-3, overcoming terrain difficulties and securing the objective line by nightfall. On August 5, Turnage's three regiments continued their advance, pushing past O-3. The 3rd Marines reached Amantes Point, and Craig's 1st Battalion finally overran the remaining Japanese positions at Finegayan. Behind them, Shepherd's brigade moved to Dededo, preparing to take over the left flank for the final push. Meanwhile, as the 306th Regiment relieved the exhausted 307th, Tanzola's men continued to fight through the dense jungle, with his 2nd Battalion reaching the O-4 Line by nightfall. During a nighttime raid, the 1st Battalion was targeted, resulting in 48 casualties. Following this, the 2nd Battalion encountered the tanks the next morning, eventually neutralizing them but suffering an additional 46 casualties. Bruce's regiments gathered at O-4 to prepare for an attack on Mount Santa Rosa, where Obata had concentrated his forces. Turnage's regiments also resumed their attack, advancing with minimal resistance. Geiger initiated the final push on August 7, with Turnage's Marines facing minor obstacles due to jungle terrain. Despite this, the 3rd Marine Division reached the O-5 Line by nightfall. Shepherd's brigade swiftly progressed along the coast, joining forces with the 3rd Marines. Meanwhile, the 306th and 307th Regiments prepared for a coordinated attack. Bruce's strategy involved the 306th securing ground north of the Japanese defensive lines, the 307th leading a tank-infantry assault on Yigo, and the 305th closing in on Mount Santa Rosa. Once each objective was secured, Santa Rosa would be encircled from Anao to Lumuna Point, leaving the enemy with no escape route except into the sea. By midday, despite facing delays from the narrow road and enemy sniper activity, Manuel's tanks surged ahead of the infantry, veering right to swiftly eliminate several Japanese machine-gun positions at the road's edge. However, their advance was halted by heavy Japanese fire from the left rear as they crested a slight elevation. In a wedge formation, commanded by Captain Seger from his tank at the right rear, the light tanks swept rapidly over the slight crest. As they pushed on there was an explosion to the left of the tanks directly in front of Seger. He radioed to Colonel Stokes: "There's a burst in front of me; could be mine or antitank gun. Call for the mediums." Just before the mediums came up more explosions sounded from the left. The tankers could not locate the source of the fire because of the dense woods to the left and the absence of flash and smoke. When the mediums reached the open area, their crews could tell that the light tanks were in trouble but they could not see where the fire was coming from. Only when they advanced up the slight rise and began themselves to have steel shrapnel and bullets smash on the left of their hulls and turrets did they turn and pour fire back into the woods at the left rear. Fifty yards behind the stricken tanks the infantrymen struggled to push through the positions by the road that the tanks had overrun. Japanese still fired from a pillbox that had been blasted by the medium tanks as they raced ahead. The troops put rifle and machine-gun fire into it. They threw six grenades before one landed inside the position. The enemy continued to fire from it. A flame-thrower man maneuvered cautiously up to the position and put the searing flame in through an opening. The heat was too much for the defenders; one of them scurried out and fell before the American guns. The enemy position, so skillfully concealed from the front but vulnerable from the rear, was built around two light tanks. Two antitank guns, two 20mm guns, six light and two heavy machine guns, plus about a makeshift battalion of infantry added their fire to make the Yigo defense formidable. One medium was hit in its gas tank. Flames shot out of the bottom and quickly enveloped the sides. The crew hastily clambered out of it just before the ammunition inside began exploding. Another tank stalled under the heavy fire. As bullets hit the vehicle, the tankers dashed for a shell hole. Some of the mediums moved on out of the area. One of them tried to sweep around to the right below the line of enemy fire and promptly threw a track. As more tanks came up, they swung their cannons and machine guns around for brief fire on the enemy positions to the left and then passed on to the objective ahead. The leading light tank had similarly been destroyed and another was destroyed shortly afterwards. The American armor suffered losses against this well-concealed enemy position. Fortunately, Colonel Smith's 3rd Battalion, encountering minimal resistance in the jungle, directed Company K to flank the Japanese from the rear, catching them off guard and eliminating them without casualties. This enabled the 307th to secure the Yigo area and the elevated terrain to the northeast in readiness for the Santa Rosa assault. Meanwhile, the 306th consolidated west and north of Yigo, while the 305th advanced to the Lumuna Point line. The day also witnessed the inaugural combat flights of Marine planes from the newly completed Orote airfield over Guam. By nightfall, Obata dispatched his remaining tanks on a futile infantry-tank raid against the 306th, which repelled the attack successfully. On August 8, as the 305th and 307th Regiments closed in on Santa Rosa, Smith's forces continued north towards Lulog to complete the encirclement. Although the 306th captured Lulog, the 307th encountered minimal resistance in capturing Santa Rosa. Consequently, Bruce instructed Smith to push north towards Salisbury, but progress was limited by day's end. On the left flank, Shepherd's brigade and Turnage's division continued their advance. The 22nd Marines progressed to Ritidian Point, establishing three roadblocks. The 4th Marines secured O-5 and advanced to RJ 462. The 21st Marines patrolled the Chaguian area, while the 3rd Marines fought through dense jungle to defeat a Japanese roadblock and reach the Salisbury-Tarague Road. Patrols returned late in the afternoon and reported few enemy contacts, but one such unit from 3/21 had discovered a Japanese truck containing the bodies of 30 native men who had been beheaded. According to the official account of the incident, the Guamanians, found near Chaguian, had not been dead more than 24 hours. The next morning another patrol found an additional 21 bodies in the jungle near the same village. The 9th Marines faced heavy resistance as they dug in around Salisbury, close to Obata's headquarters. A tank-infantry counterattack targeted Stuart's 2nd Battalion at night, dispersing the enemy but necessitating retreat due to the threat of Obata's remaining tanks. Stuart's 3rd Battalion and Butler's 1st Battalion attacked the next morning but found no sign of the tanks. Meanwhile, the 77th Division patrolled the Yigo-Salisbury area, and the 9th Marines advanced rapidly towards the northeastern coast before redirecting patrols to Savana Grande, where 3000 Japanese were suspected to be hiding. Following artillery bombardment, the Marines occupied Savana Grande and Pati Point but found little evidence of Japanese presence. Patrols from the 4th and 22nd Marines also reached the northern beaches, leading Shepherd to declare an end to organized resistance in the brigade zone. The last known resistance persisted in the 3rd Marines' sector, where Obata's tanks were last observed. Accordingly, on August 10th, Stuart's 2nd Battalion initiated an attack to the east, establishing contact with two tanks on the road. Swiftly disabling these tanks, the Marines pressed forward, swiftly overpowering the Japanese positions and successfully seizing a total of seven abandoned tanks. By 11:30, Geiger declared an end to organized resistance on Guam. American casualties up to this point totaled 1214 killed, 5704 wounded, and 329 missing, with 10971 Japanese reported dead. Despite this announcement, Obata persisted at Mount Mataguac, fending off Bruce's infantry patrols since August 8th. Finally, on August 11th, Smith's 1st Battalion launched a meticulously planned attack supported by tanks and mortar barrages, stunning the defenders and enabling soldiers to destroy cave entrances. When the caves were reopened four days later, more than 60 bodies, including General Obata's, were found inside the well-fortified command post. Following the battle, Major-General Henry Larsen's garrison forces maintained intensive patrols on Guam throughout the remainder of the year under close scrutiny from Island Command.  Island Command, Guam under General Larsen, had taken command of Orote Peninsula and Cabras Island on August 2 to begin base development, namely the airfield and seaport. It then assumed formal command of Guam on August 15. Island Command grew rapidly as it took over all logistics, construction, and civil affairs tasks in stages. It included the 5th Naval Construction Brigade with the 27-29th Seabee Regiments with 12 Seabee, four Army, and one Marine engineer battalions plus "Lion 6", a Navy advance base force responsible for building and operating Naval Operating Base, Guam. Island Command was also responsible for the care of 21000 Guamanian civilians and built replacement housing for 15000. Both the 3rd and 77th Divisions maintained an infantry regiment and an artillery battalion in the north to deal with diehards. Up to 80 Japanese were killed each day during the first two weeks after Guam was declared secure. The nightmare would continue for the Japanese for some time to come. The 3rd Marine Division took over sole responsibility for island defense under Island Command on August 22. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade then departed for Guadalcanal on August 31, where it would be expanded into the 6th Marine Division to fight on Okinawa. The 3rd Marine Division finally remained on the island to train for Iwo Jima, as did the 77th for Leyte and later Okinawa.An estimated 8500 Japanese soldiers remained scattered in the jungles of the north and the mountains of the south, engaging in guerrilla warfare until the war's conclusion. However, most were either killed or captured before then. The final tally for Guam by August 1945 included 18377 Japanese killed and 1250 captured, with American losses totaling 1407 killed, 6010 wounded, and 376 missing. By the conclusion of the Marianas Campaign, the Japanese suffered casualties exceeding 50,000, while the Americans solidified their control by positioning themselves strategically along the inner ring of Imperial defenses. This positioning enabled them to cut off the flow of supply ships and submarines that had previously supported remote enemy garrisons. Additionally, the Americans established a naval base with the capacity to support one-third of the Pacific Fleet, set up extensive forward supply depots, which posed a threat of swifter assaults on the Japanese home islands, and constructed several B-29 airfields. These airfields facilitated the unleashing of devastating aerial bombardments on Japan, bringing the full force of total war to its people through a relentless barrage of explosives and fire. That finishes up the story of the Marianas, now we need to travel back over to New Guinea. Despite the initial success of the Japanese offensive, General Hall's forces successfully halted the enemy advance and reorganized their river line by July 15th, although there remained a 1500-yard gap in the center. Aware of this vulnerability in the American defenses, the Japanese exploited it, particularly under the cover of darkness. However, Colonel Starr's 3rd Battalion actively patrolled this area and occasionally engaged with the enemy, such as the night of July 14th when they eliminated 135 Japanese soldiers. Nonetheless, General Cunningham reported that his South Force had expanded its lines nearly 1000 yards beyond its designated sector without encountering any elements of the 124th Regiment. Consequently, on July 15th, Starr concluded that his regiment had not advanced as far south as previously thought, prompting him to order his units to adjust their positions southward and fortify their defenses along the Driniumor River towards Cunningham's Troop E location. The next morning, the 3rd Battalion began its journey southward to close the gap. However, upon reaching the area by nightfall, Troop E came under attack from two companies of the 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment. As the cavalrymen sought cover from this assault, Starr's 3rd Battalion also faced fire from Colonel Nara's 3rd Battalion, which had redirected southward following its defeat at the Paup villages. This division split the American force, with Companies L and M encountering increasing resistance as they pressed southward towards South Force lines, while Companies I and K fortified their positions for the night. Despite the engagement resulting in the death of several Japanese soldiers and the narrowing of the gap to 500 yards, nightfall on the coast witnessed General Adachi's Coastal Attack Force launching suicide banzai charges towards Anamo, only to be swiftly repelled by the defenders' lethal machine-gun fire, resulting in the complete annihilation of the force. In the rear, Colonel Howe's 1st and 2nd Battalions were dispatched by Hall to eliminate remaining enemy units west of the Driniumor. Over the course of two days, in a series of complex and occasionally disjointed company maneuvers, the Americans successfully subdued Colonel Nara's remaining troops in the area. Meanwhile, further south, Japanese groups were spotted crossing the Driniumor at a fording point approximately 2500 yards south of Afua, prompting Cunningham to deploy Troop A to strategic high ground behind the river to halt westward Japanese movements. There, the 78th and 80th Regiments, led by Major-General Miyake Sadahiko, were gathering in preparation for a fresh offensive. Adachi devised a fresh strategy, envisioning Miyake's forces striking Afua from the southern front, while the 239th Regiment prepared to advance against the Kawanaka Shima area. Furthermore, the retreating 237th Regiment and the reserve 66th Regiment received orders to head south to reinforce future assaults by the 20th Division, although they wouldn't reach the destination until July 25. Meanwhile, as the Miyake Force gradually maneuvered into position on the right and rear of Cunningham's 1st Squadron, Starr faced ongoing challenges in filling the gap in the center, eventually managing to close it by the morning of July 18. That night, Miyake finally dispatched two battalions to launch an assault on the 1st Squadron's command post and the adjacent perimeter held by Troop A, successfully pushing them back 250 yards to the northeast. However, swift reinforcements enabled Cunningham to recapture the lost ground the following morning, prompting the enemy to retreat northwest into the jungles. By afternoon, fresh Japanese units had once again encircled the Troop A position; yet, after an effective artillery barrage, the cavalrymen thwarted Adachi's plans by pushing 600 yards to the southwest. Following this triumph, on July 21, Troop C relieved the battered Troop A; Howe's battalions successfully established a patrol base on the East Branch of Koronal Creek; and Starr's 2nd Battalion relocated to Palauru to enhance outer security southwest of the airfield. Concurrently, on July 19, the initial units of General Wing's 43rd Division commenced landing at Aitape, with the 2nd Battalion, 169th Regiment subsequently assuming control of approximately 1000 yards of the river line on the right flank of the 124th Regiment by July 22. Meanwhile, Adachi instructed the still-reorganizing Miyake Force to launch another assault on Afua from the north and west, while General Nakai's 79th Regiment crossed the Driniumor River to strike from the south. On July 21, in the evening, Miyake initiated an attack on Troop C's position, effectively isolating it from the remainder of South Force. Despite the cavalry's resistance against the intense Japanese onslaughts, Miyake's units successfully thwarted Cunningham's efforts to relieve the besieged troop in the subsequent days. Faced with the threat to his command post and reluctant to divert more forces from the river defenses, Cunningham ultimately opted to establish a new defensive line 1000 yards north of Afua, consequently abandoning the town and leaving Troop C stranded. It was not until the night of 21-22 July that the Japanese forward units were able to organize for any sort of attack. During that night, elements of the 124th Infantry received considerable mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire from east of the Driniumor. This fire increased the next morning, and about noon the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, was attacked from the west by elements of the 237th Infantry. The first Japanese attack was ". . . finally broken up by a bayonet charge . . ." conducted by elements of the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, but other attacks followed as troops of the 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, tried to move across the Driniumor from the east, striking both the 124th Infantry's unit and part of the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry. Before dark on the 22d, the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, counted 155 new Japanese dead in its area. That unit and the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, reported their own losses as five killed and twenty-five wounded. Despite further unsuccessful attempts to reopen the river crossing by the 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment, Adachi eventually decided on July 25 to dispatch the 41st Division south to reinforce the southern front. Following the fall of Afua, Hall directed Howe's battalions to depart from their East Branch base and reinforce Cunningham's South Force, successfully arriving at the new defensive line by July 23. With these reinforcements in place, Cunningham early in the afternoon of the same day decided to deploy Troops A and B to advance westward toward Troop C, while Howe's 2nd Battalion pushed southeast to support the isolated troop. Despite the lack of coordination in the attack, infantrymen managed to infiltrate Troop C's perimeter from the northwest, aiding in repelling a fierce Japanese assault from the southwest, while the cavalry troops reclaimed Afua and established new defensive positions. Despite an initial triumph, American efforts to advance on July 24 were thwarted by the resolute defense of the Japanese, who fiercely guarded all paths, trails, and ridges in the densely forested terrain northeast of the perimeter. However, on July 25, Companies E and B under Howe surprisingly made contact roughly 500 yards north of the besieged forces, encountering minimal resistance, which allowed the beleaguered Troop C to retreat. With Troop C relieved, Howe's units continued their assault southward and westward toward the Afua-Palauru trail, driving the Japanese forces into the Torricelli Mountains. Nonetheless, a significant number of Japanese troops remained within a triangular area delineated by the sloping ground, Afua, and Company G's ridgeline position, persistently harassing Cunningham's forces. Throughout the night, additional Japanese reinforcements, including the 66th Regiment, maneuvered behind Howe's 2nd Battalion, securing control over trails leading southeast through dense jungle from the banana patch to a point on the Afua-Palauru trail near the 2nd Battalion's command post. Consequently, on July 26, Howe's 1st Battalion was withdrawn toward the sloping ground, with the 2nd Battalion expanding its positions to the east to cover the vacated area. On July 27, the battalion launched a successful southward attack; however, menacing Japanese movements to the west compelled the American forces to withdraw, despite other units under Cunningham also repelling enemy advances. Subsequently, Cunningham reorganized his lines on July 28 to strengthen defenses, anticipating imminent large-scale Japanese assaults. Nonetheless, on July 29, the 1st Squadron and the 2nd Battalion renewed their offensive toward the south and west into the Triangle, yet this time Adachi's determined defenders successfully rebuffed them. Therefore, local patrol activity was the primary focus on July 30 and 31 while Cunningham devised plans for another offensive into the Triangle. Major combat activity revolved around the withdrawal of Company G, 127th Infantry, from its exposed outpost west of Afua. On the afternoon of the 29th the unit had been driven more than 400 yards east of its original position by Japanese attacks and had established new defenses on high ground about 300 yards west of Afua. On the 30th the company was surrounded and spent all day fighting off a series of small-scale attacks. The next morning it fought its way north to the dropping ground, where it arrived about 1330. Thence, it moved on to the Driniumor and joined the rest of the 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, which had switched positions with the 3d Battalion. During the period from 13 to 31 July, South Force had suffered almost 1,000 casualties, of which 260 had been incurred by the 112th Cavalry. For the understrength cavalry regiment, this was a casualty rate of over 17 percent. The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, had also lost heavily and was in need of rest, reorganization, and re-equipment--needs which had prompted General Cunningham to change the places of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 127th Infantry. South Force casualties were as follows: 106 killed, 386 wounded, 18 missing, and 426 evacuated as a result of disease and sickness. South Force estimated that it had killed over 700 Japanese. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. With the capture of Guam, the Marianas campaign had finally come to an end. Yet it seemed apparent to the frontline commanders, the closer the island hopping got to the Japanese home islands, casualties were exponentially mounting. How much American blood was it going to take to end the Pacific War?

Last time we spoke about invasion of Guam and Tinian. Japanese forces, led by General Obata on Guam and Colonel Ogata on Tinian, prepared defenses with trenches, pillboxes, and artillery. The Americans bombarded these defenses extensively. Despite resistance, they successfully landed on Guam and Tinian, securing beachheads. Intense fighting ensued, with Marines facing heavy casualties. Despite Japanese counterattacks, American forces gradually expanded their footholds, leading to the eventual containment of the Japanese on Orote Peninsula. The Japanese launched a fierce assault against Marine positions on Guam, engaging in close combat with heavy casualties on both sides. Despite initial success, the Japanese offensive was repelled by intense artillery and machine-gun fire, leaving the remaining enemy forces to defend Orote Peninsula. On Tinian, after extensive naval bombardment, Marines landed successfully, repelling Japanese counterattacks and establishing a beachhead. Despite heavy Japanese casualties, the Marines suffered relatively few losses, ultimately breaking the enemy's resistance. This episode is the Battle of Sansapor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Following the successful capture of Noemfoor and Biak, the Allies possessed ample air and supply bases to advance to the Vogelkop Peninsula, fulfilling General MacArthur's aim of establishing a vital airbase supporting further operations northwestward, potentially towards Mindanao or via Halmahera. Initially considering Manokwari as a non-critical objective, MacArthur's plan centered on seizing Sorong and Waigeo Island for crucial supply and air bases in New Guinea. However, the rapid pace of Pacific theater operations raised doubts about the feasibility of bringing the Klamono oilfields into production before the war's end, prompting the cancellation of exploitation plans by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.  The Joint Chiefs assumed responsibility for the direction and coordination of oil rehabilitation projects in the Dutch East Indies and undertook necessary liaison with British and Dutch agencies. By mid-February 1943 they had decided that military units would at least start all oil rehabilitation and exploitation projects in the Indies, although the final development of the oil resources might be left to civilian agencies. MacArthur was instructed to plan the location and timing details of oil rehabilitation projects in the Indies, and, subject to the Joint Chiefs' approval, execute those plans. At the same time, the Joint Chiefs directed that the organization of special military petroleum production and refining units begin. The requisite troops, most of them US Army engineers and many especially recruited from civilian pursuits, soon began to assemble and train in California. Orders were also placed with manufacturers for the special production and refining equipment, which was sent to California as it was obtained. While these steps were being taken to coordinate oil rehabilitation projects, it had become obvious that in accordance with MacArthur's plans the first significant oil producing region that could be recaptured in the Netherlands East Indies would be the Klamono district on the Vogelkop Peninsula. The Klamono oil was especially valuable in that it could be used as fuel for naval vessels without refining beyond a little "topping" to remove excess naphtha. With limited effort, the wells could be expected to bring in some 16000 barrels of crude oil per day; with additional development, about 25000 barrels. Such production would presumably save the Allies considerable shipping space and time, for, instead of the long haul from United States ports, navy bunker fuel could be produced and topped as necessary much nearer to the scene of combat. With the oilfields no longer a priority and aerial surveys indicating unsuitable conditions for airstrips on Waigeo, MacArthur opted for ground reconnaissance of the Mar-Sansapor area. This exploration revealed promising landing beaches and potential airfield sites, albeit requiring significant effort to develop. Consequently, MacArthur directed Alamo Force to secure the lightly-defended Sansapor-Mar area instead of Sorong-Waigeo, scheduling a landing for July 30. General Krueger tasked General Sibert's 6th Division with Operation Typhoon, designating the 20th Regiment at Wakde-Sarmi as reserve and arranging relief by Major-General John Persons' 31st Division. Admiral Fechteler's Task Force 77 had devised a strategy: to deploy Colonel Forbie Privett's 1st Regiment, consisting of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, onto the Red Beaches northeast of Mar. Concurrently, Sibert's 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop was tasked with securing Middleburg Island. Following the landings, airfields were to be constructed at these sites. The subsequent phase involved Privett's 3rd Battalion executing a shore-to-shore movement to establish a PT base on Sansapor's Green Beach, scheduled for the day after the initial landings. To set this plan in motion, the 31st Division commenced unloading operations at Maffin Bay on July 14 and successfully relieved Sibert's units four days later. The two regimental combat teams of the 31st Division, the 155th and the 167th, which operated at Wakde-Sarmi had no previous combat experience but received much valuable training in a series of patrol actions, company-sized scouting missions, and battalion reconnaissances in force. General Persons wanted to mount an offensive to drive the Japanese from a main line of resistance which they had established in the low hills between Metimedan Creek and Sarmi, but the demands for labor at the Maffin Bay staging area and the necessity for committing many troops to the defense of that area made it impossible to assemble sufficient strength for such an attack. Then, by the time the 6th Division's requirements had been met, the 31st Division itself had to begin preparations for another operation. The 31st Division therefore had to confine itself principally to its patrolling missions, both west and east of the perimeter. Patrols east of the perimeter were sent out to hunt down stragglers from the Japanese Hollandia garrison, and most of them, comprising armed natives of the Wakde-Sarmi area, were led by a Dutch officer, 1st Lt. C.J. Sneeuwjagt. Meanwhile, work went on at the Maffin Bay staging area; and during the period July 18-August 31 a daily average of 2,500 tons of various supplies was unloaded at the bay. During the same period the 31st Division lost 39 men killed, 195 wounded, 34 injured, and 3 missing. The division in turn killed 294 Japanese, found 497 dead, and captured 14 others. However, the deployment of the 6th Division faced delays due to heavy congestion in the Wakde-Sarmi area. It wasn't until July 27 that Sibert's combat units began departing from Maffin Bay towards Sansapor. Maintaining the element of surprise was paramount to General Krueger, hence no preliminary naval or air bombardment was conducted in the Sansapor-Mar area. Instead, General Kenney's aircraft targeted Japanese bases at Manokwari, Sorong, and the Halmahera-Ceram-Ambon region. To further deceive the Japanese, Fechteler's convoy took a circuitous route to approach Sansapor, apparently arriving undetected around 05:00 on July 30. As anticipated, no opposition was encountered, and the first wave successfully landed at 07:01. While Privett's troops swiftly unloaded on the mainland, one LST proceeded toward Middleburg Island. By 07:30, it began deploying the amtracs carrying the reinforced 6th Cavalry Reconnaissance Troop, which safely landed by 08:00. Encountering no resistance, the island was promptly secured, and the troop regrouped before setting sail for nearby Amsterdam Island, which was also secured unopposed by 11:30. Upon returning to the mainland, following the incident where three unarmed Japanese were killed, Privett's 2nd Battalion proceeded inland and eastward. They successfully established defenses along low hills roughly 800 yards from the shore. Meanwhile, the 1st Battalion encountered challenges navigating through dense jungle undergrowth. At 07:40, the 3rd Battalion landed and moved west along the beach to the Wewe River mouth, preparing for the next day's advance to Sansapor. By nightfall, all units were ashore, securing the desired beachhead perimeter. The following day, Privett's 3rd Battalion embarked for Green Beach at Cape Sansapor, meeting no resistance upon landing at 08:44. They then proceeded south along the beach to secure Sansapor Plantation and Village by 10:00. While Cape Sansapor proved unsuitable for the planned PT boat base due to reef-bound shorelines and poor beaches, Amsterdam Island emerged as a promising alternative location. Subsequent operations in the Sansapor-Mar area involved patrolling to eliminate scattered Japanese groups, expanding the beachhead, and safeguarding airfield installations. A significant event occurred on August 3 when 92 sick or wounded Japanese and Formosan troops were captured at a Japanese hospital near Cape Opmarai. Concurrently, General Anami acknowledged the untenable positions on the northeastern Vogelkop and General Ikeda's 35th Division abandoned Manokwari on July 16, embarking on a challenging overland march towards Sorong with limited supplies. Around the same time, General Teshima's headquarters at Manokwari and other small garrisons in the region commenced an overland journey to Windehsi. By August 15, as units of the 35th Division approached the Kor River, the 63rd Regiment moved into the vicinity, engaging in skirmishes with retreating Japanese forces. In these encounters, they eliminated 17 enemy combatants and captured 4. By August 31, the 63rd Regiment had further success, neutralizing 155 Japanese soldiers and capturing an additional 42, with minimal losses on their own side: 3 soldiers killed and 4 wounded. Similarly, patrols from the 1st Regiment on the western flank encountered retreating Japanese forces, resulting in the elimination of 197 enemies and the capture of 154, with only 4 soldiers wounded by the end of August. The total casualties for the Typhoon Task Force amounted to 14 killed, 35 wounded, and 9 injured, while they managed to account for 385 Japanese and Formosans killed and 215 captured. Ikeda's division remnants reached Sorong on August 25 after enduring a grueling 40-day march. Additionally, construction of the Middleburg strip was successfully completed by August 14, and the Mar Drome was slated to be operational by September 3 to accommodate Kenney's fighters and medium bombers. Transitioning to Tinian, following the successful landing on July 24 and the subsequent destruction of the Japanese counterattacking force, General Schmidt's primary objectives for July 25 included landing the 2nd Marine Division and expanding the beachhead. While General Watson's Marines disembarked swiftly, General Cates' 4th Marine Division initiated their advance at 10:00. Colonel Jones' 23rd Marines navigated through dense canefields and underbrush along the coast beyond the O-1 Line. Colonel Batchelder's 25th Marines executed an enveloping maneuver against Mount Maga, securing its summit after intense combat supported by mortars and tanks. Colonel Hart's 24th Marines swiftly moved south and eastward, reaching the O-2 Line. Upon arrival, Colonel Wallace's 8th Marines assumed control of the far left flank and proceeded slowly through the rugged coastal terrain and dense undergrowth toward Ushi Point. Following the successful capture of a Japanese stronghold, the Marines advanced unopposed, advancing 200 yards past O-2 swiftly. However, the day brought hardship for the 14th Marines, facing heavy counter-battery fire resulting in the loss of 13 soldiers killed and 22 wounded. Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 conducted a reconnaissance-in-force of the western Carolines and launched a third raid on the Volcano-Bonin Islands to thwart enemy bomber interference, resulting in the destruction of five ships, damage to others, and the loss of 13 enemy planes for only 16 aircraft lost. The next day, Schmidt's undermanned divisions, later reinforced with 1782 replacements to fill Saipan-related gaps, commenced the advance to the O-3 Line. While the 23rd Marines steadily advanced with minimal resistance towards the vicinity of the O-4 Line, the bolstered 25th Marines cleared Mount Maga and, securing the summit of Mount Lasso, advanced into the O-4A Line virtually unchallenged. Meanwhile, the 8th Marines rapidly secured the Ushi Point flats and its airfield, Colonel Stuart's 2nd Marines swiftly advanced eastward, securing Asiga Point upon reaching the east coast by 12:30, and Colonel Riseley's 6th Marines, after landing, pushed southward to establish a line abreast of the 2nd Marines. On July 27 and 28, encountering minimal opposition, the Marines advanced southward in a concerted effort, with riflemen in formation and skirmishers leading the way. The NTLF G-2 Lieutenant Colonel Thomas R. Yancey came to a conservative conclusion on July 27 that summarized not only that day's enemy situation but the entire operation's enemy situation as well: “Without saying so, he seemed to indicate the importance of all units conducting aggressive patrolling far to the front: To date there have been no indications that our front line units have encountered the 50th Infantry Regiment in force [since the first night's counterattacks]. It is believed that this unit is largely intact and it is known that they are well equipped and seasoned troops. They are capable of intervention at any time and may be expected to offer a strong opposition when encountered.” In the same report, Yancey noted that the "most likely enemy capability" was: "To fight a delaying action, withdrawing to, and organizing further defenses in, the high ground in the southeastern end of the island." Faced with this enigmatic enemy situation, General Schmidt formulated his scheme of maneuver and assigned his objectives on July 27 and 28 to facilitate an irregular "elbowing" advance. From the front lines held on the morning of July 27, Objective O-4 was near for the 4th Division, far for the 2nd Division; once Objective O-4 had been reached, the emphasis would shift--Objective O-5 would be near for the 2nd Division, far for the 4th Division. The Corps' attack on these two days, then, would find the 2nd Division carrying the ball on July 27, the 4th Division on the 28th. On the first day the 2nd Division would push forward at 07:30, the 4th Division at 10:00; on the second day the 4th Division would attack at 07:00, the 2nd Division at 10:00. Variations in these attack hours were consistent with plans to punch first with the left, then with the right. Principal advantage of this arrangement was that the bulk of the supporting fires could be allotted first to one division, then to the other. Not only did the 14th Corps Artillery mass its fires to support the main effort, but two 105mm howitzer battalions of the division executing the secondary attack were also made available to support the principal thrust in each case.    Despite the gradual progress made by Cates' Marines as they secured key positions on higher terrain, they successfully reached the O-4 Line by the end of the first day. Simultaneously, Watson's Marines made significant strides on more favorable terrain, aided by tanks, covering a distance of 4000 yards to also reach the O-4 Line. The following day, amidst worsening weather conditions, the 2nd and 6th Marines quickly moved forward to secure the O-5 Line. The weather at Tinian had been unpleasant. Nearly every day featured rain squalls, gusty winds, and ominous clouds. And yet, for Jig-Day and three days following, the seas remained calm enough for reasonably convenient shore activities. The "three days of good weather" that Admiral Hill had considered vital had already expired. On the afternoon of 28 July the weather got worse--much worse. This condition resulted from the effects of a typhoon that built up west of the Marianas and sent its swells and winds against Tinian's west coast. The seas surrounding Tinian changed to a dirty gray-blue as the winds mounted and the waves boiled over one another and grew into larger, uglier masses. Surf roaring against the tiny WHITE Beaches and their rocky flanking shelves forced temporary suspension, at 1800 on 28 July, of all unloading over the beaches. On the left flank, after intense artillery bombardment, Cates' Marines swiftly advanced to the O-5 Line, then, supported by naval forces, resumed their march to secure Gurguan Point and its airfield, advancing to the intermediate O-6A Line, with Jones' 23rd Marines covering a total distance of 7300 yards. On July 29, with half of the island under control, Schmidt directed his forces to push beyond the O-6 Line. Accordingly, the 24th and 25th Marines advanced with minimal resistance and reached the O-6 Line. Although Watson's Marines faced initially light opposition, resistance intensified as they crossed the O-6 Line. The 6th Marines managed to secure advantageous positions just shy of the intermediate O-7A Line, while the 2nd Marines encountered opposition around the Masalog Point hill, halting their progress. The next day, Cates' Marines resumed their southward advance, encountering resistance from Japanese machine-gunners and riflemen entrenched in coastal caves. While tanks engaged the enemy, the 24th and 25th Marines surged forward, effectively securing Tinian Town and its airfield, and eventually reaching the O-7 Line. On the right flank, Watson's Marines also pressed southward, with the 2nd Marines swiftly securing Masalog Hill and advancing along the coast despite heavy machine-gun fire, reaching O-7, while the 6th Marines advanced against sporadic resistance, also reaching O-7. Additionally, the 8th Marines took position at the center of the corps' line. With the capture of four-fifths of the island and over 3000 Japanese either killed or captured, Schmidt's Marines successfully pushed the remaining Japanese forces under Colonel Ogata's command into an unnamed ridge between Lalo and Marpo Points at Tinian's southern end. On July 31, following a massive artillery, air, and naval barrage, the Marines launched another assault to the south. The 24th Marines made significant progress along the coast and on less steep cliffs, securing the road to the ridge top. The 23rd Marines faced stiffer resistance but advanced with remarkable discipline, aided by tanks, gaining high ground. On the right flank, the 2nd and 6th Marines advanced against light machine-gun and mortar fire, reaching the intermediate O-8A Line. In the center, the 8th Marines encountered stronger resistance but managed to establish a foothold on the zigzag road to the top. By nightfall, a 600-yard gap emerged between the 8th and 23rd Marines, which the Japanese could exploit. At 23:00, a banzai charge was repelled; however, at 01:00 on August 1, a 150-man force blocked Wallace's rear road and launched an attack. A counterattack force was quickly organized, driving back the enemy. Ogata's final banzai charge at 05:15 was directed at the left of Company E but failed to breach Marine defenses. Both Colonel Wallace and the enemy commander probably still Colonel Ogata had realized the tactical implications of the cliff-line penetration. Both knew that it provided a route over which thousands of Marines could move into the Japanese rear. The two commanders' reactions were classic. As soon as one of his battalions grasped a toe hold, Wallace exploited the success by committing his reserve there. The enemy commander, as soon as he received word of the penetration, ordered a counterattack to throw the Marines off the cliff and restore the position. Each selected a tactically sound course of action. Only one could be successful. At dawn, as the Japanese began to withdraw, Cates' Marines continued the attack southward, with the 24th Marines reaching the O-8 Line at Lalo Point, and the 23rd Marines, after encountering a sheer cliff, retracing their steps to reach the cliffline in front of O-8. On the right flank, the 8th Marines swiftly advanced to O-8A and moved alongside the 6th Marines toward the cliffs overlooking the water. Finally, the 2nd Marines secured the high ground to prevent enemy escape along the east coast. Despite not reaching Marpo Point, organized resistance crumbled, leading Schmidt to declare Tinian secure at 18:55.  Organized resistance had ceased. But on the early morning of August 2, an enemy force–estimated variously from 100 to 250–struck headlong into the command post of the 3rd Battalion, 6th Marines. Headquarters personnel, armed for the most part with carbines and pistols (although two automatic rifles were also used), considered the enemy group very well "organized." Initially, personnel of the aid station bore the brunt, but soon everyone in the headquarters group–clerks, communicators, corpsmen, assault engineers, mortarmen, and staff personnel–rallied behind their commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Easley, to defend themselves. The Japanese, carrying rifles, grenades, and machine guns, hurled themselves at the Marines with characteristic violence. As soon as one fell, another took his place. In search of substantial assistance, Captain John R. Steinstra, Headquarters Company commander, dashed to the nearby Company F, 6th Marines, acquired a medium tank and a rifle platoon, and led them back to the fight. Here was welcome reinforcement to the 3rd Battalion Headquarters Group, which had fought the enemy at close quarters for over two hours. The machine barged into the battle with guns blazing, and the tide turned. The battalion executive officer later stated that he considered the tank's appearance "vitally important" to the outcome. Those enemy soldiers who remained on their feet hastily departed the area. Daylight made results of the enemy effort visible: 119 Japanese bodies lay almost side by side in and around the 3rd Battalion command post. But the Marines had also taken casualties, one of the dead being Colonel Easley. Nearly 400 Japanese perished in the week following the island's capture. From August 7 onward, the 8th Marines conducted cleanup operations on Tinian until January 1, 1945, eliminating an additional 542 Japanese at the cost of 38 killed and 125 wounded. Throughout the Battle of Tinian, a total of 5,745 Japanese were killed and 404 captured, while American losses amounted to 389 killed and 1,816 wounded. Similar to Saipan, around 4,000 civilians either took their own lives or were killed, but unlike Saipan, the majority—approximately 13,000 civilians—were interned.  On April 15, 1944, there were 16,029 civilians residing on Tinian, out of which 1,658, primarily consisting of women, children, and the elderly, were relocated to Japan prior to the American invasion. Approximately 2,610 civilians lost their lives during the conflict. Journalist Robert Sherrod observed that most casualties occurred due to direct combat, as the Americans heavily utilized artillery, aerial bombardment, and naval attacks, often forcing civilians to seek refuge alongside soldiers. Some perished from diseases, thirst, or hunger. Tragically, some were also victims of atrocities committed by Japanese soldiers, such as being tied together and attacked with grenades. Instances of mass suicide occurred, notably at the "Suicide Cliff," where parents threw their children off the 120-foot precipice, and some civilians were pushed by Japanese soldiers. According to a captured Japanese soldier, a large group willingly perished in caves at the military's behest. By August 1, only 2,468 civilians had been documented, but within three days, this number surged to 8,491. The 2nd Marine Division established a camp for civilians at Ushi Point Airfield, while the 4th Marine Division set up another at the ruins of Churo village, which became a permanent settlement for all displaced civilians. By October 15, Camp Churo housed 10,926 civilians, comprising mainly Japanese and Korean nationals, with nearly half being children under 15 years old. The military administration struggled to provide adequate care due to shortages of relief supplies. Seabees oversaw the construction of temporary shelters initially, which were later replaced by more durable structures using salvaged materials. The internees also supplemented their provisions by salvaging food and cultivating gardens, with Seabees stepping in to provide improvised diesel stoves as firewood became scarce. In late 1945, Admiral Spruance, who succeeded Nimitz as CINCPOA, ordered the repatriation of all Japanese and Korean civilians, a process completed by late 1946. Shifting focus to Guam, by July 25, General Geiger's Marines had secured two beachhead areas, with General Turnage's 3rd Marine Division advancing on the Fonte Plateau and General Shepherd's brigade sealing off the Orote Peninsula. Despite a fierce enemy counterattack on both fronts, Japanese resistance was effectively shattered. On July 26, while mop-up operations continued in General Turnage's sector, General Shepherd's Marines prepared to assault Orote. Following coordinated air, naval, and artillery bombardment, the 4th Marines launched their attack at 07:00, making swift progress. However, the 22nd Marines faced delays due to enemy artillery fire, necessitating the 4th Marines to extend their line to cover the exposed flank. Although the mangrove swamp hindered Colonel Schneider's Marines, they successfully cleared the area by afternoon, establishing contact with Colonel Shapley's forces at RJ 15, albeit with a slight eastern bend in their line. Meanwhile, Shepherd's units encountered mines, pillboxes, and bunkers, halting their advance by nightfall. On the morning of July 27th, the offensive recommenced, yet the 4th Marines encountered difficulties in penetrating the robust enemy defenses without tank support. However, once the mines were cleared, the Shermans neutralized enemy positions, enabling the Marines to take control of the ridge ahead, although they couldn't advance further through the coconut grove. Meanwhile, the 22nd Marines, moving alongside Shapley's 3rd Battalion along the inland road, faced delays due to the swamp. They encountered numerous obstacles including pillboxes, trenches, dugouts, and mines near the old Marine Barracks. Remarkably, the determined enemy abandoned their fortified line around 5:00 PM after a substantial bombardment, allowing Schneider's Marines to swiftly advance ahead of the 4th Marines and seize strategic terrain by nightfall. Following another intense bombardment, Shepherd's forces prepared to attack on July 28th. Despite Japanese resistance, Schneider's tank-supported advance reached the O-4 Line by 10:05 AM, creating a significant gap between Marine regiments. Nonetheless, the 22nd Marines persisted, fighting through the Marine Barracks and halting just 100 yards east of Sumay. Meanwhile, the 4th Marines faced slow progress and fierce opposition, stopping within 150 yards of the airfield. On June 29th, Shepherd launched a final assault after yet another heavy barrage, with both regiments successfully advancing the entire length of the airstrip against minimal resistance, establishing a defensive line 150 yards beyond the strip by 2:00 PM. As the 22nd Marines redirected their efforts to clean up the devastated Sumay area, effectively eliminating the last remaining enemy stronghold the next day, the 4th Marines continued their advance northward, with a combined tank and infantry patrol reaching the tip of the peninsula. With the peninsula now under control, the American flag was once again raised over the ruins of the Marine Barracks.General Shepherd proclaimed “On this hallowed ground, you officers and men of the 1st Marine Brigade have avenged the loss of our comrades who were overcome by the numerically superior enemy three days after Pearl Harbor.” Orote saw over 2500 Japanese casualties, while Marine losses amounted to 115 killed, 721 wounded, and 38 missing. Moving northward, following a failed Japanese counterattack, Takashina's forces were preparing to retreat further into the island's interior, but the Americans were relentless in their pursuit. After regrouping and subjecting the enemy to heavy bombardment, battalions from Turnage's regiments launched an assault towards the Fonte Plateau on July 27, albeit encountering stubborn resistance from the still-active enemy. Meanwhile, Colonel Butler's 3rd Battalion successfully advanced to the D-2 Line on the same day. Following successful defense against several small-scale enemy counterattacks overnight, Turnage initiated the main push towards the objective beachhead line on the morning of July 28. The depleted 3rd Marines, with Colonel Craig's 2nd Battalion attached, launched another assault, encountering minimal resistance and securing the D-3 Line by afternoon, thereby completely controlling the abandoned Fonte area. Further bolstered by the 3rd Battalion, 307th Regiment, the 9th Marines made progress in their attack towards the strategic Chachao-Alutom-Tenjo ridgeline, marking a significant initial victory. Simultaneously, the 2nd Battalion, 307th Regiment, supported by units from the 305th Regiment, advanced towards Mount Tenjo from the south. Under the protective cover of artillery neutralization fire, Craig's 3rd Battalion effectively demolished a concrete emplacement at the center of Mount Chachao's summit and swiftly secured the beachhead line adjacent to Mount Alutom. Simultaneously, General Bruce's infantry units swiftly captured Mount Tenjo, with Craig's 1st Battalion joining them by day's end. The 21st Marines faced minimal resistance, eliminating remaining enemy pockets around the radio towers and reaching the designated beachhead line. Thus, Turnage's attack objectives were achieved, extending the beachhead line across the entire front. Additionally, the 21st Marines overran the 29th Division command post near the Fonte River, resulting in Takashina's demise as he supervised his retreating units. Consequently, General Obata assumed direct command of the remaining forces, adhering to Takashina's plan for a strategic withdrawal to Mount Santa Rosa, with delaying positions established at Finegayan and Mount Barrigada. The Japanese launched eleven localized counterattacks against Turnage's beachhead line on July 29, all of which were successfully repelled, inflicting 800 casualties on the attackers. The 3rd Marine Division then focused on consolidation and reorganization for the remainder of the day while rear areas were cleared of enemy presence. In the meantime, as the 306th Regiment secured the unoccupied Mounts Alifan and Taene, Bruce had also dispatched several patrols to the southern end of the island since July 27, successfully discovering by the end of July that the sector had been completely abandoned.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The allies chose to focus on the Vogelkop Peninsula over the Klamono oilfields, as MacArthur's focus shifted to the Mar-Sansapor region for airfield development. The Marines faced a horror show in Tinian but managed to secure her while progress was made on Guam. The Americans were clawing ever closer to the Japanese home islands.

Last time we spoke about beginning of the bombing campaign against Japan. The Japanese 11th Army faced setbacks at Hengyang due to resilient Chinese defenses and supply shortages. Reinforced by General Xue Yue, Chinese forces launched effective counterattacks, regaining some territories before being pushed back. By July 20, the Japanese resumed their offensive but faced heavy resistance and were paused. American air raids on Japan and Manchuria intensified under General Arnold's orders, despite logistical challenges. In Burma, Allied forces under General Stilwell made slow but steady advances, capturing strategic positions and repelling Japanese counterattacks. The Chindits, severely depleted, were eventually evacuated. In Yunnan, Chinese forces encircled and assaulted Japanese positions, achieving significant gains despite heavy resistance and logistical issues.  This episode is the Invasion of Guam and Tinian Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today our week begins with the ongoings of Operation Forager. By late July, American plans for the invasions of Guam and Tinian were finalized. General Cates' 4th Marine Division was assigned to land on Tinian's White Beaches, while General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps planned two amphibious landings nearly seven miles apart to trap the Japanese in a double envelopment. General Obata, who had relocated his headquarters to Guam, commanded several troops on these islands. On Tinian, Colonel Ogata Keiji's forces included the 50th Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 135th Regiment, the tank company of the 18th Regiment, and the 56th Naval Guard Unit, totaling 8,039 men. Similar to Saipan, he divided Tinian into three sectors, with most troops defending Tinian Town and Asiga Bay. The 1st Battalion of the 135th Regiment, supported by Ogata's artillery, formed the Mobile Counterattack Force, ready to respond swiftly to landings. This left only Ogata's 3rd Company to defend the northwest coast where the Americans planned to land. Meanwhile, General Takashina's 29th Division was assigned to Guam and reinforced by Major-General Shigematsu Kiyoshi's 48th Independent Mixed Brigade and Colonel Kataoka Ichiro's 10th Independent Mixed Regiment. Takashina's units fortified the landward neck of the Orote Peninsula and established strong positions on the beaches of Agat, Asan, Tumon, and Agaña Bays. The main fortified area ran along the west coast from Tumon Bay to Facpi Point and included, of course, Orote Peninsula. Other fortified beaches, on the south and east coasts from Merizo to Pago Bay, had been abandoned before W Day, their defenders having moved to the north. Outside the main fortified area, the airfields were provided local defense by anti-aircraft and dual-purpose guns. The most notable and certainly the most effective fortifications on the island were constructed across the neck of Orote Peninsula, which contained a fairly elaborate system of trenches and foxholes arranged in depth, together with large numbers of pillboxes and heavy-caliber weapons. Outside of Orote, the prepared defenses were generally hastily constructed and often incomplete. The typical beach defense was arranged, from the seaward side, in four parallel lines: first were obstacles and mines on the fringing reef offshore; second came beach obstacles and tank traps; third were trenches, machine-gun positions, pillboxes, heavy weapons, artillery, and coast defense guns on the beaches or immediately inland; and, finally, came the machine-guns, heavy weapons, and artillery emplaced on the high ground inland. Insufficient advantage was taken of the high ground, and except on Orote little provision was made for defense in depth. Even as late as the five-week period of pre-invasion bombardment, the Japanese continued to work frantically on improving offshore obstacles and beach defenses, to the neglect of positions in the rear.They also had three tank companies in reserve to strike the beachhead alongside the infantry. Additionally, the 54th Naval Guard Unit, equipped with coastal defense and anti-aircraft guns, secured many positions with reinforced concrete. The Japanese set up specific defense sectors on this island. Shigematsu's brigade and Colonel Ohashi Hikoshiro's 18th Regiment held the Asan Beaches and the Agaña and Tumon Bays. Colonel Suenaga Tsunetaro's 38th Regiment defended the Agat Beaches, while Kataoka's forces manned the southern defenses. Additionally, Takashina had a mobile reserve behind the Fonte Plateau, which included five infantry companies, one naval unit, and one tank company. Only Ohashi's 2nd Battalion was positioned at Guam's northern end, while Kataoka's 1st Battalion was deployed to Rota Island. The Americans conducted the longest preliminary air and sea bombardment of the war against Guam, beginning on June 16 after the invasion of Saipan. This bombardment intensified after July 8, when American warships launched the greatest single naval bombardment program of the war, coordinated with Admiral Mitscher's carrier aircraft. Over the next 13 days, a total of 836 rounds of 16-inch, 5422 of 14-inch, 3862 of 8-inch, 2430 of 6-inch, and 16214 of 5-inch shells were fired at Guam's main defenses.  At the invasion of Roi-Namur Admiral Conolly had earned the sobriquet "Close-in Conolly" for his insistence that warships cruise close to shore when firing at land targets. At Guam, he reaffirmed his right to the title, but more important was the systematic procedure he introduced for coordinating naval gunfire and aerial bombardment and checking the results of each. A target board of six officers, representing the air, gunnery, and intelligence sections of the staff, was set up to assign primary missions for air strikes and naval gunfire and assess the damages daily before designating the next day's targets. Aerial photographs were taken each morning and on the basis of these damage was assessed and new targets were assigned. In these operations, the admiral's staff was aided by the presence aboard Appalachian of General Geiger who, as commanding general of the landing force, naturally had the greatest personal concern about the accuracy both of the bombardment and of the damage reports submitted afterward. In the final three days before the landing, Mitscher's planes conducted 1430 bombing sorties and 614 strafing attacks, dropping a total of 1131 tons of bombs, depth charges, and rockets, while losing only 16 aircraft. Despite the extensive bombardment, positions reinforced with coral and concrete remained in good condition. Anti-aircraft artillery and harbor installations suffered minimal damage, power installations in caves were unharmed, and communications were not interrupted. The intensity of the attacks on the western defenses suggested a likely amphibious landing there, prompting Takashina to abandon the ineffective southern and northern defenses. Meanwhile, Conolly's vessels, carrying Geiger's Southern Landing Forces, departed Eniwetok for Guam between July 11 and 18, arriving successfully by July 21. Between July 14 and 17, three underwater demolition teams scouted the landing beaches, and under the protection of LCI gunboats, they removed 640 obstacles from the Northern Beaches and 300 from the Southern Beaches. On the morning of July 21, in excellent weather conditions, the Americans began a preliminary bombardment. Admirals Conolly and Reifsneider directed the shelling of Asan and Agat beaches, respectively, while Admiral Mitscher's carrier aircraft bombed and strafed the fourteen miles of coastline from Agaña to Bangi Point. At 07:40, the assault waves crossed their departure lines under the cover of rocket fire from LCI gunboats. Eight minutes before landing, when the vehicles were 1200 yards from shore, Conolly's warships launched a final massive bombardment, and Mitscher's fighters provided covering strafing attacks. These attacks were to be shifted inland as the troops approached the shore. Despite the intense bombardment from ships and aircraft, the Japanese managed to target the assault waves, destroying nine amtracs from the 3rd Marine Division. Nevertheless, the waves of vehicles advanced, and at 08:28, the first LVTs landed, two minutes ahead of schedule. Further south, shore fire was even heavier, hitting one LCI gunboat and destroying 13 amtracs. However, the landing formation held, and the troops landed on schedule. Despite numerous concrete pillboxes still manned by the Japanese, both assault regiments advanced rapidly. Colonel Merlin Schneider's 22nd Marines successfully captured Agat amid strong resistance but were eventually halted at a hill position northwest of the town. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-Colonel Alan Shapley's 4th Marines cleared Bangi Point and Hill 40, setting up a roadblock supported by five tanks on Harmon Road. By the end of the day, General Shepherd had established a beachhead approximately 1300 to 2300 yards deep, at the cost of around 350 casualties and 24 lost LVTs. At 08:30, the infantrymen of Lt. Col. Robert D. Adair's 2nd Battalion were climbing down cargo nets from their transports into the bobbing landing craft that were to carry them to the edge of the reef. By 10:30 all boats were in position near the line of departure waiting for the signal to go in. For three and a half hours they circled impatiently. At last, at 14:05, came the message to proceed to the beach and assemble in an area 300 yards inland from Gaan Point. Unfortunately, no amphibian tractors were on hand to transport Adair's men over the reef and onto the shore line, and of course their LCVPs were too deep-drafted to negotiate either the reef or the shallow waters inland of it. Over the sides of their boats the men climbed, and waded the rest of the way in water at least waist deep. Some lucky few were able to pick up rides in Marine LVTs on the landward side of the reef, but most stumbled in over the rough coral bottom, cutting their shoes en route and occasionally falling into deep potholes. Luckily, no enemy fire impeded their progress, and except for the dousing they got and the exhaustion they suffered the troops of the 2nd Battalion, 305th Regiment completed their ship-to-shore movement without injury.To the north, Colonel Edward Craig's 9th Marines advanced steadily against fairly heavy machine-gun and rifle fire, securing a beachhead about 1500 yards deep. Colonel Arthur Butler's 21st Marines, facing only moderate opposition but difficult terrain, cleared Asan Town and gained a foothold on the face of the Fonte Plateau. On the left flank, Colonel William Hall's 3rd Marines encountered the heaviest resistance from two complex cave defense systems on Chonito Cliff and Bundschu Ridge. Hall's men cleared Chonito Cliff and Adelup Point after several costly assaults and heavy casualties, but progress against Bundschu Ridge was limited, resulting in a 200-yard-wide gap between the 3rd and 21st Marines. Nevertheless, General Turnage secured a beachhead approximately 1600 by 4000 yards and had landed all division infantry, artillery, and support units, at the cost of 105 killed, 536 wounded, and 56 missing. Upon receiving the alert of enemy landings, Takashina promptly mobilized his reserve units to the Fonte Plateau in an attempt to contain Turnage's Marines within their limited beachhead. Throughout the night, he initiated several fragmented counterattacks, all of which were easily thwarted, resulting in significant Japanese casualties. In the southern sector, the 4th and 22nd Marines heroically fended off numerous well-coordinated counterattacks, managing to destroy four enemy tanks and eliminate Colonel Suenaga along with his 38th Regiment. By July 22, Geiger's forces began to expand their footholds on the beaches. In the northern front, Hall's assault on the Bundschu Ridge faced formidable resistance. Despite some Marines reaching the ridge with support from 20mm and 40mm fire, they were compelled to withdraw due to intense mortar shelling. Unbeknownst to them, their relentless attack forced the Japanese to abandon the position, albeit at a significant cost to the 3rd Marines, which suffered up to 615 casualties and was unable to sustain the advance. Meanwhile, Butler's 21st Marines encountered difficulty clearing the ravine separating them from the 3rd Marines, necessitating the deployment of their reserve 1st Battalion to support the depleted 2nd Battalion. On the right flank, Craig's 9th Marines encountered minimal resistance as they swiftly secured the Piti Navy Yard, followed by the landing of the 3rd Battalion on Cabras Island after extensive naval and aerial bombardment. The only significant engagement during the night was a Japanese bayonet charge backed by mortar fire, which Butler's 1st Battalion successfully repelled, inflicting heavy losses on the enemy. To the south, following the night landings, the 305th Regiment underwent reorganization while Tanzola's 2nd Battalion relieved Shapley's 2nd Battalion. Schneider's 22nd Marines encountered moderate resistance as they moved northward after crossing the Ajuya River. Despite lacking tank support, they advanced until halting approximately 250 yards north of RJ 5. Simultaneously, Shapley's 4th Marines launched an assault towards Mount Alifan's steep slopes, successfully neutralizing entrenched enemy positions using demolitions and grenades, though hindered by rugged terrain. Eventually, a platoon reached the summit, finding no enemy presence. Tanzola's 1st and 3rd Battalions then advanced along Harmon Road towards the Maanot Pass, navigating eroded hills and dense vegetation to secure the O-a high ground line.  The 306th Infantry Regiment's landing on the White Beaches required the entire day because of communications problems and landing craft shortages. It was not until the next day that the 4th Marines was fully replaced by the 306th. 3rd Amphibious Corps Artillery was landing over White 1 at this same time, as was the 77th Division Artillery, leading to a great deal of congestion, especially when coupled with the landing of smaller units, supplies, and ammunition. Most artillery battalions were in-place by nightfall as was the 9th Defense Battalion deployed along the beaches. The defense battalions, besides providing air defense and direct fire support on ground targets, were positioned to engage any Japanese counter-landing attempts on the beachhead. The 77th Division, with the 305th on the right (center of the beachhead) and the 306th on the left, would secure the southern portion allowing the 4th Marines to move north with the 22nd Marines to seal off the neck of Orote Peninsula. They continued their advance beyond Harmon Road and Maanot Pass, securing commanding positions overlooking Orote Peninsula. Meanwhile, Schneider's 22nd Marines, initially advancing rapidly against scattered resistance, encountered intense enfilade fire from hills surrounded by rice paddies while attempting to maneuver across the neck of Orote Peninsula. This compelled them to withdraw approximately 400 yards to a line of hills south of Old Agat Road. Further to the north, Hall's 3rd Marines eventually discovered that the Bundschu Ridge had been deserted. However, following their clean-up operations, they were not in a condition to advance any further. Craig's 3rd Battalion successfully secured Cabras Island and then relieved the 2nd Battalion on the mainland. Meanwhile, Butler's 21st Marines faced challenges in bridging the gap with the 3rd Marines and encountered limited progress against well-fortified enemy pillboxes on the plateau's slopes. Turnage initiated the first contact attempt with Shepherd's brigade on July 24th, but the 30-man patrol was forced to retreat due to enemy fire. Despite Butler's 2nd Battalion's efforts to close the gap by attacking up the ravine, they were repeatedly hindered by heavy machine-gun fire from caves on the cliff sides. Although both the 3rd and 9th Marines managed to enhance their positions, Turnage's casualties rose to 2034 since the initial landing. Further south, Shepherd, in response to the formidable defense on the neck of the Orote Peninsula, instructed Schneider to advance the 1st and 3rd Battalions in company columns along the Agat-Sumay Road. The objective was to penetrate the enemy lines and seize the O-2 Line from the coast to Apra Harbor, while the 2nd Battalion shifted to occupy strategic high ground near Atantano from its position on the Old Agat Road. This maneuver not only flanked the Japanese strongholds guarding the rice paddies but also established a barrier across the neck of Orote, securing the beachhead line in front of the brigade. Following an extensive air, artillery, and naval bombardment, Schneider's primary thrust along the Agat-Sumay Road encountered determined resistance but successfully advanced to the R-2 Line. The 1st Battalion then spread out to the right, while the 3rd Battalion veered further east across the hills, swiftly capturing the fortified positions around the rice paddies that had posed significant challenges the previous day. By nightfall, the 1st Battalion had reached the O-2 Line, but the 3rd Battalion halted 400 yards short of its target, prompting Shapley's 2nd Battalion to fill the breach between them. After repulsing a vigorous counterattack, the 2nd Battalion pushed forward with minimal opposition and secured Atantano. Consequently, by the end of July 24, Shepherd had firmly established his beachhead and contained the enemy on the Orote Peninsula, albeit with casualties totaling 200 killed, 748 wounded, and 97 missing. General Bruce, with the remainder of the 77th Division, assumed control of most of the beachhead perimeter, while Shepherd's Marines readied for the capture of Orote. Subsequently, after repelling several tank-led counterattacks resulting in the destruction of 12 Japanese tanks, they sealed off the peninsula entirely on July 25. By afternoon, approximately 2500 troops under Commander Tamai Asaichi were confined to the eight square miles of Orote Peninsula. Meanwhile, Turnage pressed his forces to secure the objective beachhead definitively. Accordingly, the 9th Marines progressed southward along the Apra Harbor shoreline towards the Aguada River, reaching the midpoint before being compelled to retreat to the Laguas River due to Craig's stretched lines. Meanwhile, the 21st Marines faced formidable defenses at the Mount Chachao-Aluton-Tenjo complex, managing to establish defensive positions just shy of Mount Tenjo Road after slow progress. Simultaneously, the beleaguered 3rd Marines, with reinforcements from Craig's 2nd Battalion, launched a determined assault, overcoming moderate resistance and mortar fire to seize Mount Tenjo Road and gain a vantage point. Despite the extended frontline, troops stationed on the newly captured high ground could finally survey the terrain ahead by nightfall. As Takashina consolidated his forces on the plateau, he prepared for a coordinated counterattack aimed at dividing and conquering the enemy. The 48th Independent Mixed Brigade planned to strike Turnage's left flank before pivoting northeast to target Hall's rear. Meanwhile, the 18th Regiment aimed to assault Butler's positions and advance toward the coast to establish a new defensive line, targeting the enemy's headquarters, artillery, and supply units. Additionally, elements of the 10th Independent Mixed Regiment were tasked with exploiting an 800-yard gap between the 9th and 21st Marines, protected only by the 3rd Reconnaissance Company. In a desperate move following a failed attempt to evacuate by barge, Tamai opted for a nighttime banzai charge with his trapped 2500-strong force, seeking to break free from the Orote Peninsula and join Takashina's troops at Fonte. After dusk, the intermittent showers that had been falling all day became more frequent. A heavy downpour hampered organization of the brigade's defense for the night. On the other hand, the pitch blackness and the unpleasant weather aided the Japanese in making preparations for their supreme effort. Marines in the front lines could hear screaming, yelling, laughter, and the breaking of bottles as the Japanese made final arrangements. At times so much clamor could be heard that reports reached the command post that the assault had started. Afterwards someone aptly said that the confusion "sounded like New Year's Eve in the Zoo." While the enemy made ready and drank, Marine artillerymen laid down normal barrages along the swamp's edge and at all other points of possible penetration. Shortly before midnight the Japanese commanders felt that their men had reached the proper emotional state, and the assault began. Sake-crazed attackers swarmed from the cover of the mangroves in front of the 3rd Battalion, 22nd Marines. Led by flag-waving, sword-swinging officers, the enlisted men stumbled forward, carrying everything conceivable. Unsteady hands clutched pitchforks, sticks, ballbats, and pieces of broken bottles, together with the normal infantry weapons. The assault faced formidable resistance from Marine forces, particularly Shapley's 1st Battalion, which alone accounted for 256 enemy casualties.  When the surging Japanese mass came within range, Marine forward observers and company commanders gave the order to commence firing. Brigade, 77th Division, and corps artillery, 37mm guns, 81mm and 60mm mortars, machine guns, rifles, and grenades saturated the entire area. At one time officers brought the fire of the Pack Howitzer Battalion, 22d Marines, to within 35 yards of 3/22's front lines in an at tempt to stop the swarming horde. One weapons company lieutenant reported: "Arms and legs flew like snowflakes. Japs ran amuck. They screamed in terror until they died." But in a powerful attack it is inevitable that some men will seep through the blocking fire. Company L, 3/22, received the brunt of the subsiding attack and repulsed it before too much damage could be done. Those Japanese who survived fled to the momentary safety of the swamp. But observers shifted the artillery fire and between midnight and 0200 some 26,000 shells took a heavy toll of the remaining peninsular defenders. On the right flank of the 22d Marines a second counterattack hit. The Island War describes the action quite vividly: “. . . At its height, flares revealed an out-of-this-world picture of Nipponese drunks reeling about in our forward positions, falling into foxholes, tossing aimless grenades here and there, yelling such English phrases as they had managed to pick up, and laughing crazily, to be exterminated in savage close-in fighting. Succeeding waves were caught in a deadly cross-fire. Not until dawn did this attack finally dwindle out, at which time more than four hundred bodies were counted in front of the position.” In contrast to the frenzied close quarter action in the 3/22 zone, the platoon from Company A (1/4) that filled the gap between the two regiments participated in a shooting gallery affair with the Japanese. Enemy troops made no attempt at a concerted attack, and the platoon plus artillery, without the loss of a single Marine, killed 256 Imperial soldiers. This fantastic figure was verified by officers from regiment the following morning. Despite the intense machine-gun and artillery fire, some Japanese managed to infiltrate Marine positions, engaging in fierce hand-to-hand combat. However, by dawn, the Japanese offensive had been halted, with most remaining enemy forces eliminated, leaving Tamai with no option but to defend Orote Peninsula to the end. Meanwhile, Takashina's main assault, launched on July 26 at 04:00, faced initial success in overrunning Company B positions but was ultimately contained by the relentless machine-gun fire of the 1st Battalion.  Major Maruyama's men (2/18) advanced noisily, shouting, "Wake up American and die." The initial impetus of the assault passed completely over Company B in the center, previously reduced to about 50 men, and streamed through the gap down a draw toward the cliff. Despite the breakthrough, companies held the shoulders of the penetration and Lieutenant Colonel Williams ordered the units to refuse their flanks to the cliff. Company A on the left, commanded by Captain William G. Shoemaker, rallied in the face of the withering fire and overwhelming numbers. Shoemaker pulled back his right platoon to deny his flank to the enemy and to permit regrouping for a local counterattack. Company C (Captain Henry M. Helgren, Jr.) also successfully refused its flank to protect the position and immediately began firing into the onrushing Japanese. Tanks parked in the rear of the Marine positions took a great toll as the intruders surged through the widening gap. One report described the rush on the tanks as resembling a horde of ants. It went on to say of the Nipponese: “Savagely they swarmed upon the mechanized vehicles, oblivious of the vicious machine-gun fire, and frantically pounded, kicked, and beat against the turrets in an attempt to get the crew within. When this seemed futile they leaped to the ground and continued their wild rush down the draw to the rear areas. . .” Demolition charges were forgotten in the mad scramble to reach deeper into Marine-held territory. Machine gunners of 1/21 had a field day. Never had they seen such lucrative targets, but grenades and bayonets soon silenced the Marines as enemy soldiers overran the gun positions. Many of the Japanese were killed as they moved through the lines and into the ravine. Although some of the infiltrating Japanese got down the cliff to attack the battalion command post and Butler's mortar platoons, killing most of the mortarmen before being repelled by service troops, To the left, Craig's tenacious 2nd Battalion, in its exposed position, received the brunt of Shigematsu's attack, yet it managed to defeat seven determined counterattacks without losing any ground. Nonetheless, though they killed 950 Japanese, they suffered 50% casualties as well. Looking right, Ohashi's 3rd Battalion hit Butler's 3rd; and although two machine-guns were initially captured, their attack ended up being rapidly repelled. Consequently, the Japanese slid along the front and attacked down the vulnerable 800-yard gap, successfully defeating a strong roadblock to set up a dangerous line on the high ground behind Butler's 3rd Battalion.  The lack of a swiftly organized regimental reserve line led to approximately 70 Japanese infiltrating into the Division Hospital area, where they were eventually repelled by a pioneer force. The first warning came about 6:30 when corpsmen reported that a number of enemy soldiers could be seen on the high ground to the right of the hospital. Division headquarters immediately ordered Lieutenant Colonel George O. Van Orden (Division Infantry Training Officer) to take command of two companies of pioneers standing by for just such an eventuality and clear the enemy from the hard-pressed area. At the hospital, doctors ordered patients to evacuate the tents and go to the beach. Onlookers saw a pathetic sight as half-clothed, bandaged men hobbled down the coast road helping the more seriously wounded to safety. 41 of the patients grabbed rifles, carbines, hand grenades, and whatever else they could find and joined the battle. The hospital doctors, corpsmen, and pajama-clad patients presented a rare sight as they formed a defensive line around the tents. It was a solid line, however, and one that held until the recently organized reinforcements arrived. Only one patient was wounded during the fighting, but one medical officer and one corpsman later died of wounds. The casualty list also included one medical officer, one dental officer, one Navy warrant officer, 12 corpsmen, and 16 Marines from the medical companies wounded in action. This does not include those casualties suffered by Van Orden's force. After cleaning out the assigned area, Van Orden proceeded up the Nidual River Valley in pursuit of the fleeing Japanese. The attack had pushed the enemy back to the hill at the head of the ravine by 11:00, but a request to send a Marine patrol to the ridge to determine the hostile strength was denied. Other plans had already been made for the assault of this dominating terrain. It was from this high ground that Major Yukioka's men paralyzed the operation of 3/21's CP and threatened the flank of both the 9th and 21st Marines. While this action was taking place, the 12th Marines CP and several of its battalions were engaged in stopping the suicide squad attacks. In order to have these parties in position to make their foray in conjunction with the all-out offensive, enemy commanders had ordered the groups to infiltrate behind Marine lines on the night of 24-25 July. With typical Japanese patience, the raiders lay hidden in caves all day. As soon as darkness came on the night of 25-26 July they started firing random shots into the headquarters of the 12th Marines and began to move in small groups down the Asan Valley. A hand grenade duel went on during the early hours of darkness, but some of the intruders sought the safer confines of a cave not 20 feet from the headquarter's fire direction center. The artillerymen's perimeter defense held, and only one of the enemy succeeded in getting through to the guns. He was killed in the 3d Battalion's area before he could do any damage. In the five-hour long fighting around the regimental headquarters, 17 explosive-laden Japanese died. Most of them carried packs containing about 20 pounds of TNT with ready detonators, while others carried magnetic mines. With the coming of daylight, patrols went out to clean up any troops that might cause trouble later in the day. Men of the 12th Marines killed approximately 50-60 more enemy soldiers and drove the remainder into other areas where they were liquidated one by one. Despite the initial success of Takashina's well-coordinated counterattack, by noon, his forces had suffered defeat, marking the breaking of the backbone of Japanese resistance on Guam. Marine casualties were significant, with around 166 killed, 645 wounded, and 34 missing between July 25 and 27. Consequently, the 9th Marines retreated approximately 1500 yards to establish better defensive positions, and a battalion of Colonel Stephen Hamilton's 307th Regiment was deployed near Piti Navy Yard. However, the focus now shifted to covering the invasion of Tinian. While naval guns had intermittently harassed Tinian since June 11, the preliminary bombardment of Saipan's sister island commenced on June 20, with the first Army artillery battery targeting northern Tinian. By July 9, the 531st Field Artillery Battalion had fired a total of 7571 rounds. Following the fall of Saipan, the remaining 24th Corps Artillery and Marine howitzers intensified the bombardment, maintaining a continuous round-the-clock schedule and expending a total of 24,536 rounds on northern Tinian. For the most part, 14th Corps Artillery confined its efforts to the area north of the line between Gurguan Point and Masalog Point, while aircraft restricted their efforts to the southern half of the island. Naval ships were assigned any targets on Tinian deemed unsuitable to either of the other two arms. Coordination of the three supporting arms was assigned to the corps artillery representative attached to General Schmidt's staff. In one instance, an artillery air observer discovered three 140-mm. coastal defense guns on Masalog Point that were within easy firing range of White Beaches 1 and 2, but were masked from field artillery. The battleship Colorado was called in and, with its main batteries adjusted by an airborne artillery observer, succeeded in neutralizing or destroying the enemy weapons. Because the spotting plane was not in direct radio contact with the ship, it was necessary for the plane to submit its spotting data to the artillery post by radio, whence they were relayed by telephone to General Schmidt's headquarters, and in turn by radio on another frequency to the firing ship. In spite of this somewhat complicated system of communications, the time lag was so slight as to be insignificant. Meanwhile, starting from June 22, the P-47s belonging to the 318th Fighter Group maintained a relentless barrage on the airfields at Ushi, Gurguan Point, and just east of Tinian Town through constant strafing and bombing, further devastating the town to ruins. Beginning on July 15, naval gunfire operations were reinstated, with Admiral Hill's cruisers and destroyers delivering destructive bombardment daily against Tinian's harbor defenses. Then, on July 22, two P-47s dropped the first napalm bombs used in the Pacific war on Tinian, proving highly effective in incinerating canefields, underbrush, and enemy personnel located in open trenches and dugouts. The following day, Hill intensified preparatory fire with a formidable naval force comprising three battleships, two heavy cruisers, three light cruisers, and sixteen destroyers, positioned strategically to shell Tinian from all directions. However, there was no attempt to focus on the White Beaches to mislead the Japanese about the actual landing point. Throughout the rainy night, destroyers and cruisers maintained control over crucial road junctions while an UDT conducted a last-minute underwater reconnaissance, albeit unsuccessfully attempting to detonate recently discovered mines due to adverse weather conditions. At dawn on July 24, Hill's transports carrying the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions finally departed from Tanapag Harbor for the short journey to Tinian, successfully reaching their designated areas by 06:00. Simultaneously, the onslaught of artillery, air raids, and naval bombardment persisted over the Japanese defenses, intensifying into a full-scale onslaught by 07:00, with particular focus on the White Beaches. Additionally, efforts were made to neutralize mines on White 2, although these attempts proved futile. As the assault waves took shape, General Watson's Marines effectively executed the demonstration near Tinian Town without suffering any casualties. This demonstration effectively held the defenders in place, preventing them from deploying northward. However, a cleverly concealed Japanese battery managed to inflict significant damage on the battleship Colorado and the destroyer Norman Scott, resulting in the loss of 62 lives and 245 wounded before being neutralized. At 07:17, the initial landing wave crossed the designated line and began the 3000-yard journey to the beach, supported by intense pre-landing bombardment and rocket fire from LCI gunboats.  At about the same moment small-caliber fire--estimated variously as 50-caliber, 20mm and 40mm--began falling around the LST's. Its source could not be located because of the pall of smoke and dust that cloaked the island. Regarding this incident the logistics officer of the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, aboard one of the LST's in the area, recalled: “The fire . . . wounded two or more Navy enlisted men of the crew of the vessel, and possibly a couple of Marines belonging to the landing team. . . . My recollection concerning the Marines who were wounded is hazy . . . the incident created a stir and speculation concerning the source of the fire, but everyone soon settled down to the business at hand.” Despite encountering the sporadic small-caliber fire, the LVTs successfully reached the narrow beaches by 07:50. Upon landing, Company E of the 24th Marines swiftly engaged and eliminated a small beach-defense unit on White 1, while the remainder of the battalion made landfall. On White 2, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 25th Marines landed simultaneously but faced a delay in advancing due to the need for engineers to clear 100 horned mines that had destroyed three LVTs. Subsequently, Colonel Batchelder's Companies G and I circumvented two enemy blockhouses and initiated an inland attack, while other units subdued strongpoints. However, the presence of additional mines and staunch resistance from caves and ravines prevented them from reaching their objective at the O-1 Line and Mount Maga. Meanwhile, Colonel Hart's 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 24th Marines successfully advanced to the O-1 Line amid minimal opposition. Later in the day, reserve and artillery battalions were landed, along with Colonel Jones' 23rd Marines, although their landing was delayed due to communication issues. This delay proved beneficial due to heavy congestion on White 2 at the time. By nightfall, Colonel Wallace's 1st Battalion, along with the 2nd and 4th Tank Battalions, under Hill's command, successfully disembarked 15614 men ashore. General Cates, anticipating Japanese counterattacks, directed his troops to halt at 16:30 to fortify defenses, achieving a beachhead spanning about 7000 yards. This came at a cost of 15 Marines killed and 225 wounded. Ogata, as expected by Cates, immediately ordered counterattacks with the 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 50th Regiment and mobilized the Mobile Counterattack Force. While Japanese probes commenced at 22:30, the major assaults, marked by fierce banzai charges, began after midnight.  The attack on the left came first and lasted longest. At 2:00, men of the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, straining their eyes through the black moonless night, suddenly saw a compact group of Japanese a short 100 yards away. The Marines opened fire. The compact group became a screaming mass of attackers as the first Marine bullets and shells found targets. Now the shadows were alive with about 600 leaping Japanese naval troops, loaded with aggressive spirit, requiring no instructions to make their screaming charge. Marines called flares into action; the battlefield became light. Marines needed no orders either: the 37mm guns sprayed canister; machine guns cut into the enemy area with grazing fire; rifles pounded out at sighted or suspected targets; mortars crunched into the defilade areas; artillery crashed steadily behind the Japanese to shatter and destroy any reinforcement group. The tightly packed foe was a choice target for all these weapons, and hundreds of shells lashed his ranks. At no time did the enemy penetrate the 1st Battalion; but extremely heavy pressure against Company A, the unit that bore the brunt, caused the battalion commander to reinforce it with engineers, corpsmen, communicators, naval gunfire liaison and shore party personnel. The fight continued hot and heavy until about 0545, when dawn and the vigor of the enemy effort broke simultaneously. Medium tanks from Company B, 4th Tank Battalion, entered the fray at this time and stopped all further thrusts at the Marines' lines. Many Japanese, convinced that all was lost, committed suicide with grenades. While armored amphibians afloat fired on enemy groups hiding along the coast, Marines of the 1st Battalion, 24th Marines, mopped up the area to their front, an activity completed by 0700. They counted 476 Japanese bodies, most of them within 100 yards of Company A's lines. Although no figures are available for Marine casualties in this action, the battalion commander estimated that ". . . Company A was reduced to about 30 men with usable weapons before the enemy was repulsed." Ogata's infantrymen struck Cates' center thirty minutes later, yet their efforts were thwarted by intense small-arms, mortar, and 37mm fire. Despite briefly breaching the line through weak points, they were ultimately defeated by rear elements after prolonged and heavy fighting.  This time, though many of the attackers fell forward of the lines, others penetrated a weak spot at the boundary between the two Marine regiments. About 200 Japanese poured through this spot before the flow could be stopped. After pausing in a swamp behind the lines, the enemy force speared out in two prongs: one straight into the beachhead toward U. S. artillery positions, the other turning west into the 25th Marines' rear areas. The latter group of Japanese attained first contact when they met a well-prepared support platoon from the 3d Battalion, 25th Marines. Positioned to contain just such a penetration as had occurred, the Marines quickly eliminated this Japanese threat, killing 91 in a brief, violent skirmish. The other prong pushed deep into the rear of the beachhead, finally reached the 75mm howitzer firing positions of the 2d Battalion, 14th Marines. Battery D, firing a mission for the 24th Marines, suddenly found itself beset from the front by many determined Japanese. Marines not actively engaged in servicing the howitzers rallied to the defense of their positions with small arms, while the remainder continued firing an artillery mission for the 24th Regiment. Later, as pressure mounted, all hands turned to the task of stopping the Japanese close at hand. At this juncture the .50-caliber machine guns of the other two batteries (E and F) of the battalion levelled a heavy volume of enfilading fire into the area forward of besieged Battery D. This fire, in the words of the battalion executive officer, "literally tore the Japanese . . . to pieces." To reinforce Battery D in its bitter fight, Company C, 8th Marines, arrived at 0445. But by then the situation was well in hand; the Japanese had faltered and stopped before the deluge of small-arms fire. Morning revealed about 100 dead Japanese in the area, while the artillerymen had lost but two of their number--both killed manning a .50-caliber machine gun with Battery D. The only Japanese penetration of the night had shattered itself against a prepared rear area. Up at the front, meanwhile, Marines of the 25th Regiment and the right (2d) battalion of the 24th Regiment, fought off a series of frontal rushes upon their positions. In each case the Japanese were stopped at the barbed wire forward of the Marines' lines. The all-night firing had taken a heavy toll of the Marines' ammunition stocks, however, and by shortly before daylight there was concern along the lines that another heavy attack might exhaust supplies. Dawn came first. Attached tanks moved up at once to range the area forward of the lines. They blasted points of resistance with their 75mm guns, killing or chasing such few Japanese as had survived the night melee. Nearly 500 Japanese were killed in the attacks against the center of the beachhead and in the skirmishes behind the lines following the penetration. The third and last major enemy effort struck the extreme right (south) flank of the beachhead at 3:30. The 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, in position along the coast, bore the brunt of this thrust, although the 2d Battalion, 25th Marines, also figured prominently in the action. Moving north along the coastal road, the enemy force consisted of five or six light tanks (about half of those available to the Japanese at Tinian) with infantrymen riding and following on foot. First warning of the enemy move came when Marine listening posts stationed along the road a short distance forward of the lines reported enemy tanks rumbling in from the south. With the tanks an estimated 400 yards in front of the lines, Marine artillery opened up. The tanks came on. Ready for just this situation, U. S. ships began firing illuminating shells over the area, virtually turning night into day. Bazookas, 75mm half-tracks, and 37mm guns attached to three battalions now went into action. One of the 37mm platoons, positioned astride the coral road, leveled point-blank fires into the enemy armor. Even so, one fast-moving tank weathered a 37mm hit and drove through the front lines into rear areas before a Marine bazookaman finished it off. An officer present on the scene described the action as he saw it: “The three lead tanks broke through our wall of fire. One began to glow blood-red, turned crazily on its tracks, and careened into a ditch. A second, mortally wounded, turned its machine guns on its tormentors, firing into the ditches in a last desperate effort to fight its way free. One hundred yards more and it stopped dead in its tracks. The third tried frantically to turn and then retreat, but our men closed in, literally blasting it apart. . . . Bazookas knocked out the fourth tank with a direct hit which killed the driver. The rest of the crew piled out of the turret, screaming. The fifth tank, completely surrounded, attempted to flee. Bazookas made short work of it. Another hit set it afire, and its crew was cremated.” Thus, five tanks stood immobile on the field of battle. If a sixth accompanied this incursion, it escaped, since there was no trace of it the following morning when Marines moved through the area. Despite the fact that their armor was gone, enemy foot soldiers from the 1st and 2d Battalions, 50th Infantry, and the 1st Battalion, 135th Infantry, pressed toward the Marines. The fighting that ensued was close-in and savage, but the Japanese never cracked the tight defense. The few who seeped through the lines met a quick end at the hands of the 23d Marines' reserve (1st Battalion), positioned to provide depth in this precise area. The operations officer of the 2d Battalion, 23d Marines, described the weird termination of the Japanese activities: “. . . as it began to get light, Jap bodies began to fly ten to fifteen feet in the air in the area in front of our lines. . . . We knew that hand grenades did not have the power to blow a man's body that high and could not figure out what was happening. [Later] we moved out to mop up. . . . It turned out that about fifty percent of the dead Japs carried magnetic mines and had obviously been ordered to break through our lines and destroy the tanks in the rear of us. . . . The Japs who were wounded and unable to flee were placing the tank mines under their bodies and tapping the detonators.” Daylight revealed that the enemy had expended 267 men and five tanks (of 12 on the island) against the right flank of the beachhead with no success. By the end of the night's counterattacks, 1241 Japanese bodies lay scattered along Cates' front, with the 1st Battalion, 135th Regiment virtually decimated, while Marine casualties numbered less than 100. Reflecting on the engagement, they later concluded: "It was there and then that [we] broke the Jap's back in the battle for Tinian". This assessment proved accurate, as Ogata's forces began retreating towards the southern end of the island. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Similar to the experience invading Saipan, Guam and Tinian proved to be literal horror shows. The savagery of the Island hoping campaign had increased ten-fold. The Japanese hoped by inflicted as much pain as possible, the Americans might simply come to the peace table, but was there any real chance of that?

GOOD EVENING: The show begins in Afghanistan... 1867 Khyber Pass CBS EYE ON THE WORLD WITH JOHN BATCHELOR FIRST HOUR 9-915 #Afghanistan: The Taliban are spending on weapons. & What is to be done? Bill Roggio, FDD  https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/07/generation-jihad-ep-190-partnering-with-terrorists-to-fight-terrorists.php 915-930 #PAKISTAN: Taliban Cutouts and Islamabad. Bill Roggio, FDD https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2024/07/generation-jihad-ep-190-partnering-with-terrorists-to-fight-terrorists.php 930-945 #PRC: Is the Factory floor in China coming home to Detroit? Charles Ortel of the On the Money with Charles Ortel podcast @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/business/international-business/how-trumps-return-may-impact-indian-chinese-stock-markets/articleshow/111831020.cms this is correct bfa 945-1000  #POTUS: Trump trade in Asia: Alan Tonelson, independent economic policy analyst who blogs at RealityChek and tweets at @AlanTonelson, @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill https://finance.yahoo.com/video/europe-could-suffer-most-us-164329843.html https://fortune.com/2024/07/20/trump-tariffs-60-percent-china-trade-war-economic-growth-impact-deflation/ SECOND HOUR 10-1015 #ISRAEL: Netanyahu to Washington & Wht is to be done. Malcolm Hoenlein @Conf_of_pres @mhoenlein1@ThadMcCotter @theamgreatness 1015-1030 #GAZA: Deif is dead. Malcolm Hoenlein @Conf_of_pres @mhoenlein1 @ThadMcCotter @theamgreatness 1030-1045 1/2: #CAMPUS: Princeton group think & What is to be done? Peter Berkowitz, Hoover Institution ."Campus Indoctrination's Costs Outweigh Unintended Benefits," RealClearPolitics, July 21, 2024https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2024/07/21/campus_indoctrinations_costs_outweigh_unintended_benefits__151304.html 1045-1100 2/2: #CAMPUS: Princeton group think & What is to be done? Peter Berkowitz, Hoover Institution ."Campus Indoctrination's Costs Outweigh Unintended Benefits," RealClearPolitics, July 21, 2024https://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2024/07/21/campus_indoctrinations_costs_outweigh_unintended_benefits__151304.html THIRD HOUR 1100-1115 #POTUS: Perils of the lame-duck president. John Bolton, WSJ https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-dangers-of-a-lame-duck-biden-withdraw-race-2024-election-foreign-policy-national-security-d8101017?page=1 1115-1130 #PRC: Third Plenum sames as the old Third Plenum: no way out.  @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill https://www.csis.org/blogs/third-plenum-hot-takes-skepticism-and-concern 1130-1145 #TAIWAN: Prepping for a possible Trump Second Term.  Cleo Paskal,FDD https://sundayguardianlive.com/investigation/what-could-a-trump-vance-china-policy-look-like#google_vignette1145-1200 #OCEANIÅ: PRC cash and corruption assault on the Northern Marianas as Tinian celebrates 80 years since the Battle of Tinian.  Cleo Paskal,FDD FOURTH HOUR 12-1215 #NewWorldReport:  Milei promises justice for AMIA and Nisman. Joseph Humire @JMHumire @SecureFreeSoc. Ernesto Araujo, Former Foreign Minister Republic of Brazil. #NewWorldReportHumire https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/argentinas-milei-promises-justice-1994-bombing-jewish-community-2024-07-18/ 1215-1230 #NewWorldReport:  How will Maduro handle the election? Joseph Humire @JMHumire @SecureFreeSoc. Ernesto Araujo, Former Foreign Minister Republic of Brazil. #NewWorldReportHumire https://www.reuters.com/world/americas/venezuela-election-organization-is-designed-confuse-voters-opposition-says-2024-07-19/ 1230-1245 #HOUTHIS: The IAF finally responds after nearly 10 months of attacks. Joe Truzman, Bill Roggio, FDD https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/watch-idf-releases-footage-of-strike-on-houthi-controlled-hodeida-port-in-yemen/ar-BB1qmDTT 1245-100 am #RUSSIA: The Kremlin threatens to send anti-ship missiles to the Houthis & What is to be done? https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/us-launches-effort-to-stop-russia-from-arming-houthis-with-antiship-missiles/ar-BB1qgthk G: The show begins in Afghanistan where the Taliban is buying weaponry...

#OCEANIÅ: PRC cash and corruption assault on the Northern Marianas as Tinian celebrates 80 years since the Battle of Tinian.  Cleo Paskal,FDD https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Tinian 1947 B-29

PREVIEW: #TINIAN: #PRC: Conversation with colleague Cleo Paskal of FDD re: the threat to the Northern Marianas (Saipan, Tinian, and more) by PRC agents seeking to undermine the politics of the island chain -- a vital link in the defense of Taiwan and the Philippines from PRC attack. More tonight. 1945 Fat Man on Tinian

Last time we spoke about battle of Noemfoor. General MacArthur initiated a successful offensive on Noemfoor, with General Patrick's troops securing a beachhead. American forces encountered minimal resistance, occupying key positions. Despite initial skirmishes, American defenses held firm, inflicting heavy casualties. Meanwhile, in Aitape, ongoing clashes saw American forces repelling Japanese assaults. Despite setbacks, American defenses held, and preparations for a counteroffensive were underway. The Japanese breached American lines, occupying a 1300-yard gap but faced intense resistance. Martin ordered counterattacks and reorganization of forces along the X-ray River-Koronal Creek line. Despite some delays, American forces repelled Japanese assaults. In the Battle of Imphal, British-Indian troops repelled Japanese attacks, leading to their retreat. Operation Crimson saw successful naval and air assaults on Japanese positions, though with some setbacks. Admiral Somerville's diplomatic transfer followed, amidst reorganization of SEAC's higher officers due to internal conflicts. This episode is the First Bombing Campaign against Japan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Our week's story first takes us over to the China Theater. Last time we spoke about China, the 11th Army's progress was halted at Hengyang in early July due to the resilient defense led by General Fang and a severe shortage of ammunition. General Yokoyama had to pause the offensive until his artillery unit could arrive to bolster the siege. Meanwhile, the 64th Division was dispatched to Changsha to relieve garrison duties. Despite these setbacks, the 13th Division secured Leiyang by July 4, and the 40th Division took control of Yongfeng on the same day, followed by Zhajiang on July 6. Although Hengyang was nearly surrounded, the Japanese forces had to entrench due to lack of supplies, which were delayed and harassed by General Chennault's aircraft. Seizing this opportunity, General Xue Yue sent reinforcements and launched counterattacks against the besiegers. The 58th Army recaptured Liling on July 8 before being pushed back by the 27th Division two days later, while the Chinese forces began encircling Maoshizhen from the southwest by mid-July. By July 10, Yokoyama had received sufficient artillery and ammunition to resume the attack on Hengyang. Despite heavy air and artillery support, the 116th Division's assaults from the southwest failed to breach Fang's defenses once again. On July 15, the Japanese launched another assault, this time managing to displace the exhausted defenders from their outer positions and into the city itself. Two days later, the 13th Division also gained control of the airfield on the east bank of Hengyang and strategic points along the railway near the town. Despite these territorial gains, they were deemed insufficient considering the significant loss of life endured during the intense fighting of that week. Consequently, Yokoyama decided to pause the offensive once more on July 20, intending to concentrate his forces around Hengyang. The 40th and 58th Divisions were already en route to reinforce the front lines. However, during this period, two significant aerial operations occurred. Initially, following the bombing of Yawata, General Arnold ordered a subsequent night raid on Japan to underscore that Operation Matterhorn marked the beginning of a sustained bombing campaign, distinct from the isolated nature of the Doolittle raid. This was followed by a 100-plane attack on Manchuria and a 50-plane attack on Palembang.  Two days after the Yawata show General Arnold informed Wolfe that, despite the depleted fuel stocks in China, it was “essential” to increase pressure against Japan. Immediate objectives were: a major daylight attack on Anshan, small harassing raids against the home islands, and a strike against Palembang from Ceylon. When Arnold asked for an estimate of the command's capabilities, Wolfe's reply was none too hopeful. With low storage tanks at Chengdu (only 5000 gallons) he could not with his own resources build up for an all-out mission to Anshan before August 10. Ceylon fields would not be ready before July 15, and either the Palembang mission or the night raids would delay the Anshan attack. In spite of Wolfe's cautious estimate, Arnold on June 27 issued a new target directive calling for a 15-plane night raid over Japan by July 10, a minimum of 100 planes against Anshan between by July 30, and a 50-plane mission to Palembang as soon as Ceylon airfields were ready. To meet this schedule, Wolfe was admonished to improve radically the operations of C-46s and B-29s on the Hump run. He outlined conditions necessary for fulfilling the directive: build-up of his B-29 force and a flat guarantee of ATC Hump tonnage. Even when it was decided that the command would get back its 1500 tons for July, Wolfe's operational plan set up the Anshan mission for 50 to 60 B-29s, not 100 as Arnold wanted. Arnold received this plan on July 1. On the 4th General Wolfe was ordered to proceed immediately to Washington to take over an “important command assignment” and two days later he departed. Thus General Wolfe was in reality sacked, leaving General Saunders to assume temporary leadership.  Subsequently, on July 7, the requested night raid was carried out, involving 18 B-29s targeting the Sasebo Naval Base, with an additional six attacking other sites in Nagasaki, Omura, Yawata, and Tobata. Of the 24 bombers, 11 successfully bombed Sasebo using radar; individual planes struck Omura and Tobata, while the B-29 assigned to Yawata inadvertently bombed the secondary target at Laoyao harbor. Two other bombers, experiencing fuel-transfer issues, redirected to bomb Hankow, narrowly missing it by 20 miles. Despite witnessing explosions in all targeted areas, the damage inflicted on Japanese infrastructure was minimal. Only one bomber sustained damage, yet the successful attack heightened panic within the Home Islands.   After the disastrous loss of Saipan, it was clear to many of Japan's elite that the war was all but lost.  Now Japan needed to make peace before the kokutai and perhaps even the Chrysanthemum Throne itself was destroyed. Tojo had been thoroughly demonized by the United States during the war, thus for the American people, Tojo was clearly the face of Japanese militarism. It was thus  inconceivable that the United States would make peace with a government headed by Tojo. British historian H. P. Willmott noted that a major problem for the "doves" was that: "Tojo was an embodiment of 'mainstream opinion' within the nation, the armed services and particularly the Army. Tojo had powerful support, and by Japanese standards, he was not extreme." Tojo was more of a follower than a leader, and he represented the mainstream opinion of the Army. This meant his removal from office would not end the political ambitions of the Army who were still fanatically committed to victory or death. The jushin, elder statesmen, had advised Emperor Hirohito that Tojo needed to be sacked after Saipan and further advised against partial changes in the cabinet, demanding that the entire Tojo cabinet resign. Tojo, well aware of the efforts to bring him down, sought the public approval of the Emperor Hirohito, which was denied. Hirohito sent him a message to the effect that the man responsible for the disaster of Saipan was not worthy of his approval. Tojo then suggested reorganizing his cabinet to retain his position, but was rebuffed again. Hirohito said the entire cabinet simply had to go. Once it became clear that Tojo no longer held the support of the Emperor, his enemies had little trouble bringing down his government.The politically powerful Lord Privy Seal, Marquis Kōichi Kido spread the word that the Emperor no longer supported Tojo. Thus after the fall of Saipan, he was forced to resign on July 18, 1944. Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa and General Koiso Kuniaki were appointed by Hirohito to form a new government, with Koiso ultimately becoming Prime Minister as Tojo's replacement. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Shimoyama Takuma's 5th Air Army discovered Chennault's aircraft and two Chinese squadrons concentrated at Guilin airfield on July 13. Seizing this opportunity, Shimoyama launched a daring raid that caught the Allies off guard, resulting in 80 aircraft destroyed on the ground. Despite this initial setback, Chennault's P-51 Mustangs maintained superiority over the Zero, downing 88 Japanese aircraft in the following weeks at the cost of 27 Allied planes. In Hengyang, preliminary artillery bombardment commenced on July 27 as Yokoyama's forces prepared for their final offensive. Despite minor attacks in the subsequent days, little progress was made while the Japanese awaited the arrival of the 58th Division. Concurrently, the 27th and 34th Divisions advanced towards Lianhua to eliminate the 58th Army, resulting in heavy casualties and their subsequent withdrawal. By August 1, Yokoyama had amassed 110,000 troops around Hengyang, along with heavy artillery and mountain artillery pieces. In contrast, only 3,000 exhausted Chinese troops remained, valiantly resisting despite being cut off for over a month. Returning to Matterhorn, Arnold insisted on a meticulously planned daylight attack involving 100 planes to be executed in July. Saunders managed to fit in the Anshan strike at the month's end by delaying Palembang until mid-August. The primary target was the Showa Steel Works at Anshan in Manchuria–specifically, the company's Anshan Coke Plant, producing annually 3793000 metric tons of metallurgical coke, approximately ⅓ of the Empire's total. About half of this was used by Showa's own steel works, second in size only to Imperial's, and the rest for various industrial purposes in Manchuria, Korea, and Japan. The secondary target was Qinhuangdao harbor whence coking coal from the great Kailan mines was exported to Japan. Tertiary target was the Taku port near Tianjin, which handled coal, iron ore, and pig iron. And as a last resort, bombers were to hit the railroad yards at Zhengxian, a possible bottleneck along a Japanese supply route. Aiming point at Anshan, as at Yawata, was to be a battery of coke ovens and again the bomb load was set at eight soo-pound GPs per plane.  Consequently, on July 25, 111 B-29s began staging to China, with 106 successfully arriving four days later. However, on July 29, only 72 B-29s managed to take off for the Anshan strike due to rain muddying the runway at Guanghan, preventing the 444th Group from launching. Mechanical issues further hindered eleven bombers from reaching Anshan, resulting in one bombing Qinhuangdao, two targeting Zhengxian, and four hitting other targets of opportunity. Despite these challenges, the sixty B-29s that reached Anshan maintained formation and bombed from altitudes close to the designated 25,000 feet under clear skies. However, the first wave mistakenly bombed a by-products plant adjacent to the aiming point, enveloping it in thick smoke. Anti-aircraft opposition was relatively light, with heavy flak damaging five B-29s and Japanese fighters downing only one bomber, whose crew escaped with the help of Chinese guerrillas. B-29 gunners claimed three probable hits and four damaged Japanese fighters. Chinese forces aided in rescuing a stranded bomber near Ankang. The plane was on the ground for five days while an engine, spare parts, tools, and mechanics came in by C-46 from Hsinching to effect an engine change and other repairs. Air cover was furnished by 14th Air Force fighters, who shot down a Lily bomber during a night attack. With full assistance from the Chinese and American garrisons at Ankang, the B-29 took off on August 3 and returned to Chiung-Lai. Another B-29 crash-landed in Vladivostok. Fortunately, on July 30, the wet strip at Kwanghan had dried sufficiently to launch 24 bombers of the 444th, albeit nearly five hours behind schedule. However, they were too late for Anshan, with 16 bombing the Taku port and three targeting Zhengxian instead. The day's efforts, though not flawlessly executed, brought encouragement to the command. American reconnaissance reported significant damage at Anshan, including hits and near misses on several coke-oven batteries, related installations, and the by-products plant. Taku and Zhengxian also showed substantial damage. The command gained valuable insights into conducting daylight missions, and despite the loss of five B-29s, it was deemed acceptable. That is all for now for the China theater as we now need to jump over to Burma. Meanwhile, in north Burma, General Wessels decided to resume the offensive on July 12. Following a heavy air and artillery bombardment, a coordinated attack was launched, supported by 39 B-25s and the 88th Fighter Squadron, which successfully dropped 754 tons of bombs on Myitkyina. However, approximately 40% of the bombs landed among American troops north of Sitapur, resulting in casualties and confusion. Consequently, the coordinated attack stalled, with minimal gains by the 88th and 89th Regiments. Subsequently, Wessels' forces reverted to patient day-by-day advances, pushing back Japanese forces gradually. The tightening grip around Myitkyina was evident, with previously separated units now in close contact, preventing Japanese movement. Further south, General Stilwell directed the weary Chindit brigades to converge on Sahmaw and eliminate the 18th and 53rd Divisions. West African troops fought for control of Hill 60 to the north, while the depleted 111th Brigade engaged in battles at Taungni and the heavily fortified Point 2171. Stilwell also ordered the 300-man 77th Brigade towards Myitkyina, but Brigadier Calvert opted to cut off radio communications and withdraw his men to Kamaing, eventually evacuating them to India. After returning back to Allied lines, Calvert and Lentaigne drove to Stilwell's headquarters, where they found the general at a table with his son and Boatner. Then, speaking with the same sort of blunt honesty that Stilwell prided himself on, Calvert went into a long monologue explaining that despite their crippling losses and lack of heavy weapons, his men had sacrificed so much at Mogaung that now they had nothing left to give. To order the survivors into combat now was to pass nothing more than a death sentence. Stilwell seemed stunned at Calvert's contained monologue. Then his shock turned to scathing anger towards his own staff. “Why wasn't I told?' he demanded. It quickly became obvious to Calvert that Stilwell had not realized the true tribulations his Chindits had gone through since the gliderborne invasion some months ago. As Calvert later wrote: “It became obvious from Stilwell's repeated ‘Why wasn't I told? Is this true?' that his sycophantic staff had kept the true nature of the battle from him.” Overcome with the truth of it all, Stilwell apologized. “You and your boys have done a great job, I congratulate you.” Calvert was then allowed to evacuate his brigade. Their campaign was finally over. The other brigades, nearing the edge of their endurance, didn't experience the same fortune and had to persist in battling against the determined Japanese defenders. With morale faltering, Major Masters' only opportunity for success came through a bold flank attack on July 9 led by Company C of the 3/9th Gurkhas. As the Gurkhas fell back in disarray, savaged by machine-guns firing straight down the ridge, the surviving men scattered, diving into the jungle. Major Gerald Blaker moved on alone, firing his M1 carbine, yelling: “Come on, C Company!” Seeing him, the Japanese threw grenades. Braving the blasts despite an arm savaged by shrapnel, he charged the Japanese. At the last moment, the enemy gunners found the range and a volley of seven bullets plunged into Blaker who fell against a tree, bleeding profusely. He turned his head to call on his men: “Come on, C Company, I'm going to die. Take the position.” The Gurkhas surged forward, bayonets glinting in the dull light, crying: “Ayo Gurkhali, the Gurkhas have come!” Point 2171 then fell into Allied hands. 50 Japanese dead were counted on the summit. Major Gerald Blaker sacrificed his life during the assault and earned a posthumous Victoria Cross.  Shortly thereafter, the 14th Brigade relieved the exhausted 111th, which now counted only 119 fit men; and on July 17, Stilwell finally authorized the evacuation of Masters' men. Thankfully, the seasoned 36th Division under Major-General Francis Festing would arrive in the frontline area to replace the depleted Chindits by the end of July, enabling General Lentaigne's remaining forces to be brought back to India. The final to depart were the West Africans, who assisted the British in capturing Hill 60 on August 5, prompting the Japanese to withdraw towards Pinbow and Mawhun. Since the inception of Operation Thursday, the Chindits had suffered 5000 casualties, including killed, wounded, or missing, 3800 of them after Wingate's demise. Their unconventional warfare had effectively diverted numerous potential reinforcements away from Imphal and Myitkyina; severed the 18th Division's supply line, rendering its holding operation futile; and highlighted the importance of air supply as the sole means of sustenance during military campaigns, a lesson pivotal in the 14th Army's subsequent offensives. Shifting focus to Yunnan, by the beginning of July, General Wei's Y Force had successfully halted General Matsuyama's counteroffensive in the Longling region. In the interim, General Kawabe's Burma Area Army was formulating strategies to address the impending aftermath of Operation U-Go's unfavorable results. Following the completion of the 15th Army's retreat in central Burma, plans were set in motion for Operation Ban, a defensive maneuver aimed at countering anticipated Allied advancements along the Irrawaddy River. Concurrently, General Sakurai's 28th Army was organizing Operation Kan in anticipation of potential Allied incursions along the Bay of Bengal coastline. Additionally, General Honda's 33rd Army initiated preparations for Operation Dan, a synchronized offensive designed to repel the invading Chinese forces eastward across the Nujiang River and deep into Yunnan, thus thwarting the establishment of a land route between India and China by the Allies. Consequently, the 2nd Division under Lieutenant-General Okazaki Seisaburo was reassigned to the 33rd Army on July 19 to partake in the offensive, while Matsuyama's 56th Division was tasked with maintaining defensive positions in Yunnan. The 18th and 53rd Divisions were directed to safeguard the western flank against potential assaults originating from Myitkyina. Subsequently, Matsuyama opted to relocate his primary force from Longling to Mangshi, where he planned to rendezvous with Okazaki at a later date. To facilitate this relocation, Colonel Matsui's task force was dispatched on July 5 to dislodge the 76th Division from Mukang. Following a stealthy infiltration behind enemy lines on July 7, Matsui launched a surprise attack the following day, compelling the Chinese forces to retreat. With the route to Mangshi cleared, the 56th Division vacated Longling and began regrouping in the Mangshi vicinity, leaving a modest garrison of 2500 men to secure Longling. Throughout July, the city faced intense aerial and artillery bombardments, culminating in the capture of East Hill by the 87th Division on July 17. Fortunately, Y Force's efforts were now focused on the previously bypassed blocks at Tengchong, Lameng, and Pingda, as the Chinese prioritized securing the flow of supplies to the front lines. At Tengchong, Colonel Kurashige was compelled to abandon Feifeng Hill after his 3rd Battalion departed to join Matsui's task force, leaving him with just 2025 men. Facing him, Lieutenant-General Huo Kuizhang's five divisions spread out around Tengchong, occupying the surrounding heights. Despite attempts at medium-level bombing causing severe damage to the residential area, it only resulted in rubble piling around Japanese positions. Thus, entrenched in their dugouts, the Japanese remained steadfast and successfully repelled Chinese attacks, with the Chinese managing to take Kaoliang Hill only by July 9th. Meanwhile, from the south, the 2nd Reserve Division severed Tengchong from Longling and initiated unsuccessful assaults against Laifeng Hill. By mid-July, with the city completely encircled, Huo was poised to launch a coordinated assault, but heavy rains delayed the operation. Concurrently, with the arrival of the 8th Army at Lameng, General Song aimed to continue his attacks against Major Kanemitsu's garrison. Following a night-long artillery bombardment, the 1st and 39th Divisions fiercely assaulted Japanese positions on July 5th, successfully overrunning some of them and destroying Kanemitsu's main water reservoir. However, despite ammunition shortages, Japanese counterattacks pushed them back to their original positions by nightfall. In the second week of July, Song deployed the 82nd and 103rd Divisions for an attack against Kanemitsu's southwest defenses, initially achieving success but ultimately being repelled by Japanese counterattacks. In the meantime, the Pingda garrison, devastated by cholera, was reaching its breaking point. Consequently, the Matsui Force was dispatched to provide relief on July 11, successfully reaching their designated gathering point northwest of Pingda after a challenging two-day march. On July 13, Matsui's initial assaults only secured the forward positions of the 226th Regiment; however, the following day, they managed to breach the Chinese defenses, delivering much-needed supplies to the Pingda Garrison and evacuating its sick patients. Having performed its mission, the Matsui Task Force started its return trip on the morning of 15 July. The following evening, an enemy group was discovered near Chungchai and the Task Force prepared to attack. Just before the actual launching of the attack, Col. Matsui received a message from division headquarters stating that, "A powerful enemy force is advancing toward Mangshih. The Matsui Force will return as soon as possible." To the north, Song opted to halt the sporadic attacks and initiated a synchronized assault with his four divisions on July 23. Backed by intense artillery fire, the Chinese exerted significant pressure, eventually overrunning the Hondo Position by the end of July. Only the timely intervention of Japanese fighters halted the offensive. Further north, following the subsiding of the storms and a heavy air bombardment, Huo finally launched a general offensive on July 26, supported by artillery and mortars. Moving swiftly and with strength, the Chinese successfully demolished all fortifications on Laifeng Hill, compelling the Japanese, grappling with ammunition shortages and heavy casualties, to abandon their other outposts in the vicinity.  The Chinese attack that followed revealed that previous experiences with Japanese positions had not been wasted. The Chinese infantry moved off quickly, on time, and as whole regiments rather than squads committed piecemeal. Mortar and artillery fire was brought down speedily on suspected Japanese positions, and the infantry took full advantage of it by advancing again the minute it lifted. Having taken one pillbox, the Chinese infantry kept right on going rather than stopping to loot and rest. At nightfall they were on top of the mountain and had taken a fortified temple on the summit. After mopping up the next day, the Chinese tallied about 400 Japanese dead. They themselves had lost 1200. Nevertheless, the speedy capture of Laifeng Hill was a brilliant feat of arms and dramatic evidence of the capabilities of Chinese troops when they applied proper tactics While the simultaneous attack on the southeast wall of Tengchong did not breach the massive wall, the Chinese now held a solid position in the sparse cluster of mud huts just outside the wall. Yet that will be all for today for the Burma-Yunnan front as we now are heading over to the Marianas. As we remember, Admiral Spruance devised a plan to initiate the invasions of Guam and Tinian following the capture of Saipan. Tinian's strategic significance stemmed from its close proximity to Saipan and its relatively flat terrain, making it more suitable for bomber airfields compared to its mountainous counterpart. However, its natural features also posed challenges for a seaside landing, with most of its coastline characterized by steep cliffs. Consequently, the American forces had limited options for landing: the well-defended beaches of Tinian Town, particularly the northeast Yellow Beach at Asiga Bay, or the less fortified but narrow White Beaches on the northwest coast. However, the latter option risked congestion and immobility due to the confined space. After assessing the landing beaches firsthand, they opted for the latter, anticipating lower resistance. General Smith's Northern Landing Forces were tasked with this operation, although there were some changes in the chain of command. Smith was appointed commander of Fleet Marine Force, Pacific, overseeing all Marine Corps combat units in the region. General Schmidt assumed command of the 5th Amphibious Corps and the Northern Landing Forces, while Major-General Clifton Cates replaced him as commander of the 4th Marine Division. Additionally, Admiral Hill assumed command of a reorganized Northern Attack Force for the amphibious assault. The strategy outlined was for Cates' 24th and 25th Marines to land on the White Beaches on July 24, securing a beachhead line encompassing Faibus San Hilo Point, Mount Lasso, and Asiga Point. This offensive would receive heavy artillery support from Saipan, as well as backing from carrier-based aircraft, Aslito airfield-based planes, and naval gunfire. One of the main justifications for the final decision to land over the unlikely beaches on the northwestern shore of the island was the feasibility of full exploitation of artillery firing from Saipan. Consequently, all of the field pieces in the area except for the four battalions of 75-mm. pack howitzers were turned over to 14th Corps Artillery during the preliminary and landing phase. General Harper arranged his 13 battalions, totaling 156 guns and howitzers, into three groupments, all emplaced on southern Saipan. Groupment A, commanded by Col. Raphael Griffin, USMC, consisted of five 105-mm. battalions, two each from the Marine divisions and one from V Amphibious Corps. It was to reinforce the fires of the 75-mm. pack howitzers and be ready to move to Tinian on order. Groupment B, under the 27th Division's artillery commander, General Kernan, was made up of all of that division's organic artillery except the 106th Field Artillery Battalion. It was to reinforce the fires of Groupment A and also to be ready to displace to Tinian. Groupment C, commanded by General Harper himself, contained all the howitzers and guns of 24th Corps Artillery plus the 106th Field Artillery Battalion. It was to support the attack with counterbattery, neutralization, and harassing fire before the day of the landing, deliver a half-hour preparation on the landing beaches immediately before the scheduled touchdown, and execute long-range counterbattery, harassing, and interdiction fire. Concurrently, General Watson's 2nd Marine Division would stage a feint near Tinian Town before landing behind the main assault force post-beachhead establishment. Meanwhile, General Griner's 27th Division would remain on standby in corps reserve, ready to embark on landing craft at short notice. A notable logistical innovation for Tinian involved a dual shuttle system to prevent congestion. Loaded trucks and Athey trailers shuttled between Saipan's base supply dumps and Tinian's division supply depots, while amphibious vehicles directly transported supplies from ship to shore to division dumps, aiming to minimize beachside handling of supplies. Additionally, General Geiger's 3rd Amphibious Corps, comprising the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade, assisted by Admiral Conolly's Southern Attack Force, were tasked with capturing Guam. Due to formidable coastal defenses, Geiger's plan necessitated landings north and south of Apra Harbor on July 21, bypassing the heavily fortified Orote Peninsula. General Turnage's 3rd Marine Division was tasked with landing on the shores between Adelup Point and the Tatgua River mouth, proceeding southward to occupy the eastern area of Apra Harbor. Simultaneously, General Shepherd's 1st Provisional Marine Brigade was to land between Agat village and Bangi Point, then pivot northward towards the base of the Orote Peninsula. The establishment of a secure beachhead line from Adelup Point to Facpi Point was crucial before Geiger's forces could launch their assault on Orote Peninsula and subsequently secure the rest of the island. With the 27th Division committed elsewhere, Major-General Andrew Bruce's 77th Division, slated to assemble at Eniwetok by July 18, was designated as the new reserve under Geiger's command. The 305th Regiment was assigned to land behind Shepherd's Marines to reinforce the beachhead line. To optimize support for the troops, Conolly divided his Southern Attack Force into two: his Northern Attack Group, backing the 3rd Marine Division's landing, and Rear-Admiral Lawrence Reifsnider's Southern Attack Group, aiding the 1st Provisional Brigade's landing. Coordination of pre-landing bombardments was planned between Conolly's ships and aircraft, synchronized with scheduled strikes by aircraft from Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The time had finally come for the Japanese home islands to be subjected to the horrors of modern bombing campaigns. It would begin gradually, but would escalate to a literal horror show that starved the population of Japan into submission. Meanwhile Hideki Tojo was finally sacked, though by no means was he gone.

The sinking of the USS Indianapolis was a tragic and harrowing event that occurred during World War II. In July 1945, after successfully delivering components for the atomic bomb to the Pacific island of Tinian, the USS Indianapolis was struck by two torpedoes from the Japanese submarine I-58. The torpedoes caused massive explosions, leading to the cruiser's rapid sinking in the Philippine Sea.Approximately 900 crew members were cast adrift into shark-infested waters. They faced a brutal struggle for survival, dealing with dehydration, exposure, and relentless shark attacks. The crew's distress signal was delayed, and rescue efforts were slow to reach them. By the time they were rescued, four days after the sinking, only 316 of the USS Indianapolis's crew members had survived.(commercial at 9:25)to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.com

Last time we spoke about operation forager and the Changsha-Hengyang campaign. On Saipan, General Holland Smith's forces advanced with the 4th Marine Division targeting Hill 600 and the 2nd Marine Division capturing Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau. The 27th Division supported these efforts, encountering resistance and challenging terrain. Meanwhile, the 27th Division, under new leadership, made progress despite difficulties. Concurrently, Japanese forces initiated a three-pronged assault in Hunan, capturing significant territory despite supply challenges and heavy rain. On June 11, the 40th Division took control of Yiyang while the 34th Division moved toward Yuelu Mountain. The 68th and 116th bypassed Changsha towards Guanqiao, with the 3rd and 13th facing resistance near Liuyang, which fell on June 14. Xue Yue retreated to Liling as Chinese defenses crumbled. Concurrently, the U.S. initiated Operation Matterhorn, targeting Japan's industrial sites. Despite challenges, the initial bombing runs prompted further strategic bombings, marking a significant phase in the Pacific War. This episode is the Fall of Saipan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    As we last saw, the Americans had begun their advance into Central Saipan. They achieved significant success on the right with the 4th Marine Division, but faced difficulties breaking through on the left and center. Following the victory in the Philippine Sea, Admiral Turner successfully completed unloading operations, landing approximately 60,000 troops and 75,000 tons of supplies by June 26. To maintain air superiority, Admiral Mitscher conducted raids on the islands of Pagan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Iwo Jima, and continued these raids over the next few days, despite ongoing Japanese night air attacks against the American beachhead. In a strategic effort to keep the Japanese unsettled and unable to prepare for counterattacks, Carrier Task Group One raided Pagan Island on June 23rd. The neighboring islands in the Marianas were also not ignored; almost daily photo reconnaissance missions were conducted over Guam and Tinian to monitor any changes in their situation or positions before the landings. On June 25, Carrier Task Group Three carried out intense bombing raids on Guam and Rota to further incapacitate the airfields and installations there. The first significant naval raid following the battle, beyond routine operations, was an attempted strike against the Volcano-Bonin group, which escalated into a substantial air battle initiated by the Japanese. At 6:00 on June 24th, Vice Admiral Joseph J. Clark's Task Group 58.1, comprising the Hornet, Yorktown, and Bataan launched a long-range fighter sweep of 48 Hellcats against Iwo Jima, which was intercepted by numerous enemy fighters. In the ensuing battle, four U.S. Hellcats were lost, while Japanese losses were estimated at 68 fighters and bombers. Despite this defeat, the Japanese attempted another attack against Clark's task group with the remnants of their local air force. This attempt ended disastrously for them, as U.S. interceptors shot down an additional 46 aircraft, bringing the day's total to 114. Task Group 58.1, having completed its mission without bombing the airfields, safely returned to Eniwetok without incident. On the opposing side, after the fall of Mount Tapotchau, General Saito organized a final line of resistance between Tanapag, Radar Hill, and Tarahoho. In a brief resume on the morning of 27th June, Major General Igeta summarized the situation: “The summit of Tapotchau was occupied yesterday evening. Front line units tried to retake it with a night attack, but did not succeed as planned. In Donnay the enemy broke through with a number of tanks, but their advance was slow. Thereafter, no great change in the situation. The defense force, along with the firmest possible defense of its present front line and its activities toward annihilation of the enemy, is at present setting up with a line between Tanapag--Hill 221 (Radar Hill)--Tarahoho as the final line of resistance… Meanwhile, about 50 men of the 118th Infantry are improving their positions on the east side of Hill 343, and one company of the 136th Infantry is improving its position on Hill 268, and about 50 men of the 118 Infantry are digging in on the north side of that hill. The main body of the 9th Expeditionary Force, about 200 men, and about 100 men from the 9th Tank Regiment are consolidating their positions north and east of there in the high ground (Chacha water area).”Although the pre-landing preparations had been largely ineffective, continuous naval bombardment during the battle forced his troops to stay low and defend under intense pressure. For the June 27 attack, General Smith ordered the three divisions to advance side by side and capture the O-6 Line. On General Schmidt's front, progress was swift. The 23rd Marines advanced quickly, facing only sporadic rifle fire from the villages of Donnay and Hashigoru, and reached their objective. Meanwhile, the 165th Regiment moved rapidly through the hills but struggled to maintain contact, requiring the deployment of a battalion from the 24th Marines to fill the gap and repel an enemy tank attack. In the center, the 106th Regiment encircled Hell's Pocket and established a cordon at the north end of Death Valley, although they made little progress against Hill Able. To the left, General Watson's Marines advanced about 200 yards along Mount Tapotchau's western slopes while the division realigned its lines. Despite largely ineffective pre-landing preparations, the continuous naval bombardment during the battle forced enemy troops to stay under cover and defend under intense pressure. In General Saito's words “The practical experiences of the defense forces of Saipan… have to do with the power of the enemy naval bombardment. If there just were no naval gunfire, we feel with determination that we could fight it out with the enemy in a decisive battle.” Underwater mines, which the Japanese had used as land mines, were found along the road and railroad in the vicinity of Donnay. Tanks detoured these mined areas without difficulty, however. A Japanese supply dump, found near Hashigoru, contained new clothing, ammunition, and infantry weapons. Lieutenant Colonel Dillon's 2nd Battalion, moving through the matted vegetation and ragged cliff line along the coast, experienced difficulty keeping abreast of the faster-moving 3d Battalion. Since a detailed search of the gnarled coast line could not be instituted without sacrificing the momentum of the attack, Colonel Jones ordered the 1st Battalion to follow Dillon's unit at 400 yards, mopping up and investigating suspicious areas. By 4:40pm the 23rd Marines had trudged to objective O-6. Both battalions immediately dispatched security-reconnaissance patrols to their front but made no contacts with the enemy.  The next day, Major-General George Griner arrived to assume command of the 27th Division, immediately reorganizing his units and deploying the reserve 3rd Battalion, 105th Regiment. The 3rd Battalion, 106th Regiment had suffered heavy casualties in its Death Valley fight. By June 28 its effective strength of riflemen numbered approximately 100, and it was reorganized into a single rifle company. Among the 3rd Battalion's casualties on June 28 was the commanding officer, Lieutenant Colonel Harold I. Mizony, USA, killed in action when two Japanese tanks unexpectedly appeared just forward of his battalion observation post. By chance, the two enemy vehicles had found a lucrative target; commanders of the 2nd and 3rd Battalions, together with their company commanders, were gathered to plan the next move. Tightly grouped a short distance behind them were the men of the two battalions, waiting for the orders that would send them into action. Within a matter of moments the enemy tankers reaped an awful harvest, including 12 killed and 61 wounded, and then disappeared unscathed. On General Watson's front, Major Hunt's 2nd Battalion continued to fight across the open canefield toward its objective, a low ridge line north of Tipo Pale. Japanese riflemen and machine gunners, secure in their hillside grotto, raked the clearing with grazing fire. Light flame-thrower and medium tanks were available to the 6th Marines, but their use in this instance was limited because of difficult routes of approach to enemy positions, and support had to be delivered from long ranges. This left the task to the infantrymen. As everywhere demonstrated, reduction of cave positions proved a slow, painful job. By late afternoon the situation had improved slightly and the volume of Japanese fire had diminished somewhat, but the 2nd Battalion's unceasing efforts since 6:30 found it still short of the ridge line objective and very tired. A great store of energy had been burned in moving across the murderous field, yet more effort would be required. It appeared that the Japanese were rooted to the pock-marked ridge line. The Tipo Pale strong point, at which Company K, 6th Marines, had been whittling for many days, finally was secured on 28 June, permitting the company to rejoin its battalion. The tenacious Japanese soldiers in this pocket had sold their lives but had exacted from the 6th Marines a high price in time, men and effort. The 8th Marines encountered tough Japanese resistance and difficult terrain while advancing against four small hills known as the Pimples, achieving minimal progress. Meanwhile, Schmidt, positioned well behind the 27th Division, received orders to maintain current positions. However, the 23rd Regiment conducted patrols beyond its lines up to 500 yards, and the 165th Regiment secured Hill 700 to complete the movement to the O-6 Line. Over the following two days, combat fatigue and the need for the 27th Division to catch up slowed the Marine divisions almost to a halt. Beginning their attack at 11:00 on June 29, the 3rd Battalion, 105th Regiment successfully closed the gap on Griner's right flank by about 800 yards, eventually linking up with the 24th Marines the next day. On the left, the 106th Regiment encountered heavy resistance but eventually captured Death Valley and Hell's Pocket, establishing contact with the 8th Marines by June 30. Behind them, the 2nd Battalion, 165th Regiment secured Hill Able and the remaining portion of Purple Heart Ridge. Meanwhile, the Marines and the 165th Regiment conducted patrols, cleared out remaining enemy forces, and fortified their positions. The 6th and 8th Marines also made some limited progress northward, culminating in the capture of Bill's Pimple. During the night of June 30, the Japanese commenced their withdrawal towards Saito's final defensive line in an organized manner despite facing artillery fire. This new defensive line, though shorter, provided an opportunity for Saito to regroup his troops and strengthen their defense. However, failure to hold this position would spell disaster for him and his soldiers. Upon learning of the Japanese retreat, the American forces resumed their offensive on July 1, encountering stubborn resistance from remaining Japanese pockets that needed to be cleared out. The following day, General Smith's forces launched a coordinated attack. On the left flank, Colonel Stuart's 2nd Marines swiftly advanced through Garapan, Flametree, and Sugarloaf Hills, while the 6th Marines made significant gains after neutralizing an enemy stronghold. The 8th Marines, after securing the Pimples, faced heavy Japanese resistance at Limestone Hill. In the meantime, evacuation of casualties had become a problem: Marines had fallen on the open field, and all attempts to rescue them only resulted in more men being hit. The scheme finally adopted, and the one which brought success, was for a tank to position itself between the casualty and the limestone hill. By following directly behind the tanks, hospital corpsmen could then move safely to the wounded, apply hasty bandages, give them a shot of morphine, and place them on stretchers. Then, carefully coordinating their moves with the tank by talking to the driver through the sound-powered phone on the rear sponson, the stretcher bearers would precede the tank from the site, all the while shielded from Japanese fire. White phosphorous rounds dropped on the hill by the 81mm mortar platoon plus frontal blasts from the chaperoning medium tanks also contributed to the success of this resourceful project. The fact that only small arms fire spattered against the thick hulls of the tanks indicated that the Japanese had no heavier weapons readily available in the limestone hill. By dark, all wounded had been rescued, but the task of seizing the hill still remained. Only a clever night tank raid, utilizing illuminating shells and flamethrower tanks, could eliminate this stubborn Japanese position. In the center, the 106th Regiment advanced despite sporadic fire, while the 105th Regiment had to overcome the Papako strongpoint to make modest gains. With the arrival of the 27th Division at the O-6 Line, the right units could resume their advance. Consequently, the 165th Regiment encountered minimal opposition, advancing 1700 yards, while the 23rd and 24th Marines made virtually unopposed progress to the intermediate O-6A Line. On June 3, the general offensive persisted, now targeting the O-7 Line. On the front under Watson's command, the 2nd Marines successfully took control of the remaining portions of Garapan, though they encountered difficulty clearing Mutcho Point on the town's northwestern edge. Duty in the town had little to commend it; battered skeletons of what had once been buildings, and humans, and animals, dotted the area; the choking smell of death hung about like a fog. And everywhere were the pieces of corrugated iron which the Japanese and natives had used as roofing for almost every structure from the hen house to the bank. To step on one of these huge rattling sheets was to inform everyone thereabouts of one's presence. Garapan's trash and garbage dump appearance was further enhanced by odd clothing, shoes, papers, books, and miscellaneous bric-a-brac strewn through the area. Perhaps the only bright point was the copious wells, providing adequate water for the 2nd Marines to bathe away some of the filth on their bodies. The 6th Marines also advanced, halting 1000 yards from the coast, while the 8th Marines faced minimal resistance and gained approximately 1000 yards. Meanwhile, Schmidt's three regiments advanced side by side and in formation, making swift progress over challenging terrain but were ultimately halted before Hill 721 and 4th of July Hill. Nonetheless, the 24th Marines managed to capture Radar Hill, situated at the center of Saito's final defensive line. In the central area, Japanese delaying units hindered the 27th Division's progress towards the coast, with the 106th advancing another 1000 yards and the 165th about 500 yards. During the night of July 3rd the 165th Infantry command post became the scene of violent activity when 27 Japanese advanced into the installation, apparently by mistake. All of the Japanese intruders were killed with no loss to personnel of the 165th. In the morning, when an identification could be made, Colonel Ogawa Yukimatsu, commander of the Japanese 136th Infantry, was discovered among the dead. Piecing the story together, it appears that Ogawa and his headquarters group had been by-passed by U. S. advance and that he was attempting to displace to the northeast when he blundered into the 165th's command post. Detailed instructions pertaining to the establishment of Saito's final line of defense were found on his body, providing the Americans with valuable intelligence for future operations. The next morning, Griner's forces continued their northward advance, successfully securing Flores Point and the surrounding high ground. To the right, despite a disappointing artillery barrage, Schmidt's Marines swiftly captured Hill 721 and 4th of July Hill, with a bold patrol securing Hill 767 to the northeast. On the left flank, while the 2nd Marines cleared Mutcho Point and Tanapag Harbor, the 6th and 8th Marines rapidly pushed to the coast, reaching the O-7 Line. Watson's involvement in the offensive came to an end, with subsequent shifts in the axis of attack by the 27th Division and the 4th Marine Division towards the northeast.  Mindful of the significance of the day in American history and pleased with progress at Saipan, General Holland Smith distributed the following message to the landing force on the evening of July 4th: “The Commanding General takes pride on this INDEPENDENCE DAY in sending his best wishes to the fighting men on Saipan. Your unflagging gallantry and devotion to duty have been worthy of the highest praise of our country. It is fitting that on this 4th of July you should be extremely proud of your achievements. Your fight is no less important than that waged by our forefathers who gave us the liberty and freedom we have long enjoyed. Your deeds to maintain these principles will not be forgotten. To all hands a sincere well done. My confidence in your ability is unbounded.” The entire northern part of the island remained to be seized, including the important Marpi Point area; and this demanded a swing of the axis of attack to the northeast. Holland Smith, therefore, split the unconquered portion in half, assigning the left segment to the 27th Division and the right to the 4th Division. To allow sufficient time for the juggling of frontages and zones, the attack hour was delayed until noon of 5 July. Generals Griner and Schmidt, of the 27th and 4th Divisions respectively, were to "conduct such adjustment of their lines or make minor attacks prior to King-hour as they [deemed] necessary to launch a coordinated attack. . . ." The 4th Division's thrust had pushed well into the newly-assigned zone of the 27th Division, so that the previously described reliefs and shifts were necessary.  The Japanese forces remaining in the upper end of the island were poorly equipped, supplied, and often in poor health, yet they maintained high morale and a readiness to fight to the end. In the final push northward, Griner assumed control of the western front on June 25th. However, the advancement of his 105th and 165th Regiments was hindered by difficult terrain and strong resistance from fortified positions around Harakiri Gulch. On the right flank, the 24th and 25th Marines made successful progress to the O-8A Line after the 23rd Marines secured the intermediate O-7Z Line. Despite concerns of a potential Japanese counterattack during the night, accurate artillery fire dispersed enemy concentrations. The following day, Griner aimed to reach Makunsha by midday, but faced slow progress against obstacles like Harakiri Gulch and along the coastline. Consequently, Smith decided to adjust division boundaries, allowing Schmidt's Marines to expand northwestward, envelop the 27th Division north of Makunsha, and assume responsibility for the entire front for the sweep to Marpi Point. Under this revised plan, the 27th Division resumed its assault in the afternoon, breaking through a coastal ditch but encountering resistance at the Gulch. Meanwhile, the 23rd Marines, on Schmidt's front, pushed northwest and northeast, with limited progress towards Makunsha. The 24th Marines gained approximately 1800 yards, and the 25th Marines secured Mount Petosukara, where 800 civilians surrendered. Overnight, attempts to counterattack against Petosukara were swiftly thwarted, but significant action unfolded in the Makunsha region. For the 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, stationed to protect the regiment's exposed left flank, the action was particularly vicious. Just before dawn the enemy rushed forward, armed with grenades and "idiot sticks," encouraging themselves with loud shouts and screams. Though this thrust failed to penetrate the Marines' lines, some of the enemy fell within five yards of the foremost foxholes. The action report of the 3d Battalion, 24th Marines, estimated the number of enemy killed in this attack at "more than 200." On July 6, facing the complete breach of his last line of defense and with no options left, Saito realized the futility of the situation. With his forces depleted of essential supplies and under relentless artillery barrage, he issued orders for the remaining troops to execute gyokusai, a final suicidal assault aimed at inflicting maximum damage on the enemy. Several days prior to Saito's final order the assembly of remaining Japanese forces had begun. Some Japanese were out of reach behind U. S. lines, others were hidden in the deep shadows of caves, but all available were mustered. Marpi Point, Paradise Valley and Harakiri Gulch were sites for mobilization and reorganization. Many provisional units were formed in an effort to achieve some degree of tactical unity among the assorted groups and individuals. Weapons and equipment were wanting and some Japanese were armed only with grenades or crudely-fashioned spears. One Japanese staff officer, Major Kiyoshi Yoshida who participated in the battle estimated the total participants at 1,500, many with no weapons. In the light of subsequent events, however, his estimate appears too low. Assuming that he was misinformed on this point, it is not at all surprising; even at the assembly points, U. S. artillery and mortar fire hampered Japanese efforts to organize their troops and an accurate count was impossible. As the conglomerate force moved toward Makunsha, which would serve as a point of departure, it was subjected to persistent, heavy concentrations of artillery fire. This resulted in a limping approach with leaders calling upon every conceivable device to maintain the unity of their commands. Greater silence by the sprawling force would have helped; early in the evening patrols from the 27th Division Reconnaissance Troop had detected unusual activity. This had resulted in the large number of unobserved fire concentrations thrown into the Makunsha vicinity. By nightfall, Generals Saito and Igeta, along with Admiral Nagumo, performed seppuku after a final meal, while Colonel Suzuki Takuji gathered 3000 Japanese fighters, including naval and support personnel, unarmed civilians, and the injured, for a final desperate charge.  The blow fell at 4:45am. First and hardest struck were the isolated positions held by the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 105th Infantry. The attack on these units hit from front, flank and, after moving through the gap, the rear. Almost as soon as the attack was launched, communications to the rear were cut. It was then simply a matter of two isolated battalions of soldiers fighting for their lives. This they did and did well. Some of the soldiers stacked so many dead Japanese forward of their positions that it was necessary to move to get fields of fire. Major McCarthy, commanding the 2d Battalion, described the onslaught: “It reminded me of one of those old cattle stampede scenes of the movies. The camera is in a hole in the ground and you see the herd coming and then they leap up and over you and are gone. Only the Japs just kept coming and coming. I didn't think they'd ever stop.” The sheer weight of this attack, its ponderous momentum, carried it through the soldiers' lines. In addition, hundreds of Japanese moved past the isolated defense area, using the gap on the right. The fanatical surge then carried to the 3rd Battalion, 105th Infantry, located on the high ground overlooking Harakiri Gulch. Here the soldiers were on better defensive terrain; the Japanese had to climb up to them. The lines held, and the Japanese suffered staggering losses. This portion of the battle did not cease with the coming of daylight on 7th July but continued until midafternoon. Next to feel the impetus of the determined thrust was the 3d Battalion, 10th Marines, in firing positions about 500 yards southwest of Tanapag Village. The Japanese mass that struck this unit was apparently that portion of the banzai force which had moved through the gap between the 1st and 3rd Battalions, 105th Infantry. Hardest hit were Batteries H and Headquarters and Service, in position on the left of the railroad track. Batteries I and G, set up on the right of the track also got into the fight, although they were not as closely engaged as the other two. The only battery that actually fired its howitzers during the melee was H, the others being forced to remain silent by the presence of other artillerymen to their front. During the early phases of the battle, before Battery H was forced to abandon its firing positions, one of its howitzers was turned completely around to engage a Japanese medium tank which had ploughed through to the rear. At a range of less than 50 yards the artillerymen sent 105mm shells crashing into, and destroying, their armored target. Eventually, however, the pressure from Japanese infantrymen was too great; Battery H's outnumbered survivors pulled back. In the frantic confusion and haste of the retreat, they failed to remove the breech blocks or firing locks from the howitzers. The Japanese, oddly enough, neither used nor destroyed the weapons while they had control of the area. Battery I had been attacked at 0455, with Japanese advancing astride the railroad track. The first thrust was repulsed and the Japanese fell back to reorganize. A series of actions, followed this same pattern, continued until 0650, when all of the battery's small-arms ammunition was expended. At this time the battery commander, Captain John M. Allen ordered the firing locks removed from the howitzers and the unit to fall back to the positions of Battery G. Here the two batteries continued the fight until relieved by elements of the 106th Infantry later in the day. Located directly behind Battery H, headquarters and service personnel of the battalion were forced to retire after heavy, close-in fighting. Among the 136 casualties in the battalion was the commanding officer, Major William L. Crouch, who was killed. Japanese killed in the encounter numbered 322. Even as the Japanese surged directly against the 3rd Battalion, brother artillerymen of the 4th Battalion, 10th Marines, in position to the southeast, received pressure from the fringe of the main enemy tide. In defense of its firing positions, the battalion killed about 85 Japanese. Despite the turmoil of the banzai attack, the 4th Battalion responded on the morning of 7 July to an urgent request for support originated by the 23d Marines, fighting down the cliffs above Makunsha.  By 05:30, they had advanced further, reaching the command post of the 105th Regiment, where Bishop's hastily assembled American forces, aided by artillery, managed to repel the attack. Concurrently, secondary assaults were launched in Paradise Valley and Harakiri Gulch but were promptly quelled by American firepower. By midday, the banzai charge had been effectively halted, and the few surviving Japanese soldiers retreated to Mamushka, engaging in sporadic skirmishes with American troops throughout the day. Despite a counterattack by the 106th Regiment, they were forced to halt just 200 yards short of the Tanapag perimeter, and by midnight, the remaining American survivors were successfully evacuated. During this engagement, the 105th incurred 406 fatalities and 512 injuries, while Marine artillery units sustained 45 deaths and 82 injuries. On July 8, at 04:30, the remaining Japanese forces launched another attack on the 106th's positions, only to be swiftly repelled. Against the coastal portion of this line the Japanese executed a vigorous thrust during the night of July 7th. Though the strength, organization and planning of this second attack were weak by comparison with the previous effort, the vigor and determination with which it was executed did not vary. Shortly after midnight a report came from the observation post atop Hill 767; Japanese force moving south. Enemy "feeler" patrols probing for weak spots were engaged as early as 3:00am, but the information that they took back to their commanders must not have been encouraging. No holes existed. The attack, launched about 4:30am, struck the 1st Battalion, 106th Infantry, along the beach. Grazing defensive fires swept across the flat beach like a scythe, cutting all in its path. The Japanese never seriously threatened penetration of the lines and those that attempted to swim around the flank were spotted and killed. Shortly after 7:00am the Japanese attack petered out and died. The 106th Infantry estimated that it had slaughtered about 1,000 of the enemy, while at the same time its own losses were practically negligible. Watson's Marines then assumed control over most Army units and conducted cleanup operations for the ensuing two days. They discovered a total of 4,311 Japanese casualties, including those inflicted earlier by artillery and naval bombardment. Meanwhile, Schmidt's regiments, supported by the 2nd Marines, faced resistance as they advanced northeast and northwest. The NTLF Operation Order for 8 July instructed the 2d Marine Division, less detachments, to "advance in the present 27th Infantry Division zone of action, pass through elements of [that] division on its front line, attack, mop up and destroy enemy elements. . . . Upon passing through the 27th Infantry Division assume operational control 165th Infantry and 3d Battalion, 6th Marines, . . . assume tactical control within the assigned zone of action at 0630 [8 July]." Upon passage of its lines the 27th Division would revert to NTLF reserve. No effective resistance was offered the 2nd Marine Division after it had passed through the 27th Division on the morning of 8 July, although large numbers of poorly armed and totally disorganized enemy were encountered. Some Japanese used the familiar device of hiding in caves and firing from the deep shadows, but the bulk seemed eager to die and made headlong rushes at the Marines. This foolish expenditure simplified the mop-up. The 6th Marines' action report characterized the day's activities as an "attack . . . against a disorganized, swarming mass of Japs . . . waiting for the final death blow. . . ." Adding the hundreds found strewn through its zone to the number that it disposed of, the 6th Marines made a "conservative estimate" for 8 July of 1,500 dead Japanese in its area. On more rugged terrain inland the 8th Marines encountered much the same type of resistance. Here, with more caves to investigate, the sweep was somewhat slower. One wooded pocket encountered, a deep ravine, caused a minor delay. The tactic that previously had worked so well was again employed: one company stayed behind to contain and mop-up while the rest continued the push. The 8th Marines' zone, being inland of the main path of the banzai attack, contained fewer enemy bodies; but, even so, there was conclusive evidence that a terrific battle had taken place.With this final push, Turner declared the island secured, although General Jarman's garrison troops continued mop-up operations for several months.  Following the declaration that the island was secured, efforts to induce cave-occupants to surrender were intensified. Interpreters, using public address systems, pleaded with people in caves to come out. The device was not only attempted from land but from sea as well. LCI gunboats moved close inshore and broadcast promises of good treatment, for which they were answered with fire from Japanese soldiers in the caves. Even some of Saipan's leading citizens, who had surrendered and received good treatment, talked to those in the caves, urging them to yield. But, for the effort expended, the results were not encouraging. The primary reason for this failure was that the people had been saturated with Japanese propaganda to the effect that the Americans intended to torture and kill them. This had been repeated so often that the people came to believe it. At this time the very zenith of horror occurred. Hundreds of civilians, believing that the end had come, embarked on a ghastly exhibition of self-destruction. Casting their children ahead of them, or embracing them in death, parents flung themselves from the cliffs onto the jagged rocks below. The places they jumped from would become known as "Suicide Cliff" and "Banzai Cliff". Some waded into the surf to drown or employed other gruesome means of destroying themselves. How many civilians died in this orgy of mass hysteria is not known, but it is estimated that around 1000 committed suicide. A commander of a patrol craft (YP) said that the progress of his boat around Marpi Point at this time was slow and tedious because of the hundreds of corpses floating in the water. On July 13, Colonel Riseley's 3rd Battalion executed the last Marine operation on Saipan, successfully assaulting Maniagassa Island, resulting in 14 Japanese deaths and the capture of 15 others. By the end of the battle, almost the entire Japanese garrison of approximately 28,000 personnel had been eliminated. About 1,700 were taken prisoner, including roughly half who were Korean laborers. Nearly 10,000 Saipan civilians, roughly 40% of the population, perished, with another 14,000 interned. American forces suffered approximately 16,500 casualties, comprising 3,100 fatalities and 13,000 wounded out of a total assault force of 71,000. This casualty rate, exceeding 20%, was comparable to Tarawa and marked the costliest battle for the Americans in the Pacific theater up to that point. That is all for today with Saipan as we now need to head over to New Guinea. General MacArthur's next offensive was to be the invasion of Noemfoor Island, codenamed Operation Cyclone. Noemfoor served as a crucial staging ground for Japanese forces destined to reinforce the Biak Detachment, owing mainly to its possession of two vital airfields. Despite being guarded by a modest contingent, primarily consisting of six infantry companies from Colonel Shimizu Suesada's 219th Regiment, the Japanese presence on the island was scattered, rendering their defense disorganized. Allied estimates of Japanese strength on Noemfoor were too high, for there were not more than 2,000 Japanese on the island. Probably not more than 900 of these could be counted infantry effectives. In addition to the 2,000 Japanese, there were 600-odd Formosan laborers and approximately 500 Javanese slave laborers. The 3d Battalion, 219th Infantry, contained the bulk of the combat troops, but there were also present about 180 men of the 2d Battalion, 219th Infantry, and a like number of the 222d Infantry, 36th Division, troops which had been unable to reach Biak. The Japanese garrison on Noemfoor was commanded by a Colonel Shimizu, who was also the commanding officer of the 219th Infantry. Another unit, commanded by a Major Mori, but apparently under Colonel Shimizu's operational control, seems to have been a provisional organization containing mostly armed service personnel and numbering about 600 men.  General Krueger, anticipating minimal resistance, tasked Colonel Sandlin's 158th Regiment with Operation Cyclone, overseen by General Patrick. The assault was to be facilitated by Admiral Fechteler's Task Force 77, supported by cruisers under Admiral Berkey and aircraft from the 5th and 13th Air Forces, which had been conducting preparatory bombings on Noemfoor and enemy air bases in the Vogelkop Peninsula. Patrick's strategy involved landing on Yellow Beach, where the enemy's defenses were perceived to be strongest, aiming for swift American control over Noemfoor's airfields. In many essentials, the landing plans for Noemfoor were very similar to those used at Biak; but in one major essential the Noemfoor landing plan differed radically from that employed at Biak. At the latter island the HURRICANE Task Force had used a beach which, while within easy marching distance of the principal objectives and the main concentration of enemy troops, was relatively undefended. But at Noemfoor, the landing was to be made in the face of the enemy's strongest defenses, known to be located in the Kamiri Drome area. YELLOW Beach, as the landing area was designated, extended approximately 800 yards along the western end of the airfield, which was situated almost at the high water mark. The reef presented fewer hazards there than elsewhere, since it was somewhat narrower than at most other points along the island's coast. The relative narrowness of the reef at Kamiri would also permit LCIs, LCTs, LCMs and LSTs to approach to within 450 yards of the beach, which was believed to be firm at the airfield. Moreover, landing at YELLOW Beach had the advantage of placing the assault troops immediately on their objective, permitting a rapid seizure of Kamiri Drome before the Japanese could recover from the shock of the naval and air bombardments. Enemy forces on the island would be split, and those stationed at Namber and Kornasoren Dromes would be isolated. To minimize casualties during the assault, the landing plan required the most intense naval bombardment witnessed in the Southwest Pacific Area thus far. Additionally, Krueger kept the 503rd Parachute Regiment on standby at Hollandia for airdrop once a suitable landing zone was secured, with the 34th Regiment stationed at Biak in reserve. With all preparations finalized by the end of June, Fectheler's unit set off from Toem at 18:00 on June 30, reaching southeastern Biak around 17:40 the following day. Subsequently, the American forces sailed towards Noemfoor, commencing deployment off Yellow Beach by 05:00 on July 2. Prior to the landings, the island had endured significant bombardment from General Kenney's aircraft the previous day, with additional air assaults conducted leading up to the arrival of the troops. As the soldiers readied for the shoreline assault, Berkey's cruisers and Fechteler's destroyers bombarded Yellow Beach and its surroundings for approximately 50 minutes. Immediately before the landing, air bombardment, like much of the naval gunfire, was directed against the low coral ridges and hills behind Kamiri Drome. It was believed that the most determined enemy opposition would come from positions in these ridges, and to neutralize these possible defenses the 33 B-24's, at approximately H minus 15 minutes, dropped 500-pound bombs along the ridge lines. The intensity of the Allied air and naval bombardment effectively dispersed most of the Japanese forces from the beach or kept those remaining pinned down. With the cessation of bombing, the initial wave of troop-carrying LVT's approached the outer edge of the reef, supported by rocket fire from LCI gunboats. Encountering no resistance, Sandlin's 1st and 2nd Battalions disembarked near a coral ledge overlooking Kamiri Drome. The American forces then commenced advancement in the west, east, and south directions to expand the beachhead, facing only minor resistance from caves approximately 500 yards from the eastern end of Kamiri Drome. Simultaneously, Sandlin's 3rd Battalion landed and swiftly joined mop-up operations at the east end of the airstrip, enabling the 2nd Battalion to turn southward towards the Kamiri River without encountering opposition along the way. By 4:00, the 158th had successfully secured a rectangular area approximately 3000 yards wide and around 800 yards deep, reaching south to the banks of the Kamiri River. Despite enemy mortar fire, unloading operations had progressed well, with over 7100 men, 500 vehicles, and 2250 tons of supplies successfully brought ashore by evening. American casualties for the day were limited to 3 killed, 19 wounded, and 2 injured, while the Japanese suffered 115 dead and 3 captured. In anticipation of potential Japanese resistance elsewhere, Patrick had requested reinforcements, leading Krueger to order Colonel George Jones' 503rd Parachute Regiment to advance to Kamiri. On July 3 around 05:15, regimental headquarters and the 1st Battalion began loading onto 38 C-47s at Cyclops Drome, with plans for the other two battalions to drop over the following days. Launching was completed by 07:47, with successful arrival over Noemfoor at 10:00. The leading C-47's paratroopers were on the ground just ten minutes later.  The planes were to fly over Kamiri Drome in flights of two each, the first plane at a height of 400 feet and the second echeloned slightly to the right rear at 450 feet. Subsequent flights were to follow at a distance of 300 yards. Contrary to plans, the first two C-47s flew over the strip at a height of about 175 feet, and the next eight planes all flew below 400 feet. Dropping from this low altitude caused the paratroopers in the first ten C-47s to suffer many casualties; more casualties resulted because the planes flew over the strip two abreast. The broad formation caused many paratroopers to land off the southern edge of the 100-foot-wide runway in an area where Allied vehicles, bulldozers, supply dumps, and wrecked Japanese aircraft were located. Additional hazards beyond the cleared area were jagged tree stumps, trees partially destroyed by pre-assault air and naval bombardments, and a number of anti-aircraft gun emplacements.  The drop resulted in 72 casualties among the 739 men dropped on July 3, including 31 severe fracture cases, many of whom would not be able to parachute again. Despite these challenges, Jones's 1st Battalion took control of approximately 2000 yards in the center of the defenses around Kamiri Drome upon arrival, allowing Sandlin's 2nd and 3rd Battalions to concentrate at the eastern end of the field and expand the perimeter. These battalions then proceeded eastward toward Kornasoren Drome, encountering well-prepared but unmanned defensive positions. Additionally, the 1st Battalion conducted patrols south of the Kamiri River but encountered only a few scattered enemy soldiers. The next day, Jones' 3rd Battalion initiated their drop on Kamiri Drome. They encountered casualties, with 56 jump injuries among the 685 paratroopers who landed by 10:25. Given the significant injuries from both drops, Krueger and Patrick opted to transport his remaining battalion via water. They would arrive at Noemfoor by July 11. But for now, let's shift focus from Noemfoor to the Wakde-Sarmi area to discuss its final clean-up.  Following the main conflict's conclusion on June 25, General Sibert directed the 3rd Battalion, 1st Regiment and the 3rd Battalion, 63rd Regiment to clear Lone Tree Hill. By June 30, they successfully secured the area. On the same day, the 1st Battalion, 20th Regiment moved through the defile south of the hill and encountered only a few stragglers. Seeking to fully secure the Maffin Bay staging area, Sibert extended the perimeter to the Woske River on July 1 through the 1st Regiment's efforts. By July 4, elements of the 63rd occupied Hill 225, seizing the crest of Mount Saksin the following day. However, Hill 265, located southwest of Hill 225, presented greater challenges due to Japanese resistance and difficult terrain. Yet by July 9, the 1st Battalions of the 1st and 63rd Regiments secured the hill crest, previously held by elements of the 224th Regiment. With the capture of Hill 265, the last enemy stronghold in the Maffin Bay region fell. Meanwhile, General Tagami abandoned the idea of a decisive battle in the Woske sector, opting instead to withdraw the majority of his 36th Division toward Sarmi and Sawar, with remnants of the 224th Regiment assuming defense of Woske.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The fall of Saipan pierced the Japanese inner defensive perimeter, now the home islands were vulnerable to strategic bombing. The battle claimed nearly 50,000 casualties and at least 8000 civilian deaths. The intense percentage of casualties suffered by the Americans would have a profound effect on future American planning for the Pacific War.

Last time we spoke about the Invasion of Saipan, Tinian and Guam. The Japanese mistakenly believed that the Americans were preparing for a decisive battle near New Guinea, not realizing the real target was Saipan. The US assembled a large fleet for Operation Forager, aiming to capture Saipan, Tinian, and Guam, advancing the US strategy to establish strategic airfields to hit  Tokyo. Japanese defenses were ill-prepared, with shortages of ammunition and inadequate inland defenses. The Americans hit Saipan with extensive air and naval bombardments, neutralizing Japanese positions, and faced stiff resistance during landings but ultimately secured a beachhead. The 23rd Marines of Colonel Louis Jones, advanced through Charan Kanoa and secured Mount Fina Susu despite significant losses. Heavy artillery pinned them down at the O-1 Line, leading Jones to reposition his forces. Casualties mounted on both sides as American forces fought to secure the beachhead and push inland. This episode is the the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Before his death Admiral Yamamoto instilled a sort of mind virus into the Imperial Japanese Navy. To be honest, the virus was a pre war doctrine, laying around ever since perhaps the First-Sino Japanese War of 1894-1895, but Yamamoto certainly focused attention more so upon it. The infamous decisive naval battle. The event that could turn the tide of the war, to bolster Japan's poker hand for peace negotiations. If Japan could simply knock out a enormous sum if not the entire strength the American Pacific fleet, something extremely unrealistic by this point of the war, but if they could, would America not reconsider settling this all up at the peace table? It had been the strategy of not just the IJN but for the Japanese military as a whole. Japan would never be able to win a war of attrition with the US, but they could make them pay so dearly, perhaps the Americans would just sue for peace. This idea consumed Yamamoto, leading to the disaster at the Battle of Midway. After the Guadalcanal Campaign, Japan lost the initiative, they retreated behind an inner perimeter. Henceforth the IJN scoured over the actions of the American navy, looking for any opportunity to unleash their full might down upon a significant American naval force. So many times the American navy eluded them, but here, with the invasion of Saipan, the IJN felt the decisive naval battle had finally come.  Admiral Turner and General Smith's American forces had just successfully invaded Saipan, establishing a beachhead with some challenges by June 17. This incited a strong Japanese response, as Admiral Toyoda initiated Operation A-Go, the IJN's strategy for a decisive battle that could potentially win them the war. Following Admiral Koga's Plan Z, Toyoda's A-Go involved Admiral Kakuta's land-based aircraft providing early warning and reconnaissance, aiming to neutralize one third of the enemy carriers before Admiral Ozawa's carriers completed the destruction of the enemy fleet with large-scale daytime air attacks, operating beyond the enemy's aircraft range. Additionally, Toyoda planned a nighttime surface engagement where enemy screening forces would be targeted by massed torpedo attacks. On June 16, at 9:00, the First Mobile Fleet departed the Guimaras and headed to the northeast. At 5:30pm, the Japanese fleet entered the Philippine Sea through the San Bernardino Strait. Admiral Ugaki's battleships Yamato and Musashi were not with the main body, but were proceeding independently through the Philippine Sea with two heavy cruisers, a light cruiser and five destroyers to join with Ozawa. Once into the Philippine Sea, Ozawa headed southeasterly. At about 5:00 on the 16th, Yamato and Musashi joined with the First Mobile Fleet. The Japanese began to refuel which was not completed until 10:00 on the 17th.  In response, Admiral Spruance directed Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58, strengthened by Admiral Lee's battleships and Turner's cruisers and destroyers, to remain positioned west of the Marianas, prepared to counter any IJN attack. On June 16, Mitscher continued strikes against Guam and Tinian. Several Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the ground and in the air, but their airfields remained usable. The following day saw an increase in Japanese air activity. A small strike flown from Truk, five torpedo bombers and one J1N1-S night fighter attacked a transport group east of Saipan at 5:50pm. Three Japanese aircraft were claimed as destroyed, but a torpedo hit the small landing craft LCI-468 that later sank. On June 18th, the Japanese mounted a larger raid, this time from Yap Island. This operation featured 31 Zeros, 17 Judys and two P1Y twin-engined bombers. Combat Air Patrol did not intercept this group before it attacked shipping off the landing beach at Saipan that resulted in damage to an LST. The attack group then encountered the American escort carrier groups and attacked them at dusk. Two escort carriers were nearmissed and Fanshaw Bay was hit by a bomb which penetrated to the hangar deck. The carrier was forced to retire for repairs. As usual, Japanese aviators over-claimed, stating that three or four carriers from Task Force 58 had been hit.Furthermore, Admirals Lockwood and Christie's submarines were tasked with reconnaissance of IJN fleet movements, launching attacks when possible, and rescuing downed aircrews. Since Ozawa's fleet maintained radio silence and operated beyond the reach of American search planes, the only way to track his movements was through submarines, leaving the Americans mostly uninformed until the battle began. Unknown to Ozawa and Toyoda, Mitscher's carrier aircraft had already disabled Kakuta's land-based air power in the area, which significantly weakened a major part of A-Go. Additionally, the Americans, who had acquired Plan Z on April 3, were prepared for the critical carrier battle, although they were hesitant to engage in nighttime combat. Meanwhile, on June 18, the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions began their attacks at 10:00 a.m. The 4th Marine Division attacked toward the east coast with three regiments abreast: 25th Marines on the right, 24th Marines in the center, and 23rd Marines on the left. The 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, remained attached to the 23rd Regiment. Good progress was made by the 24th and 25th Marines, although the former sustained an attack at 10:15 by two Japanese tanks which surged to within 350 yards of the front lines. The situation for a while was alarming: American tanks had departed for rear areas to refuel and rearm so that only bazookas were immediately available for anti-tank defense. Though the 24th Marines' Weapons Company was immediately alerted, it arrived too late to participate in the fight. The enemy tanks were finally chased by bazookas and artillery, but not before they had sprayed the area, causing 15 casualties with machine-gun and small cannon fire. A portion of the O-3 line was reached by the 24th and 25th Marines during the day, placing the latter along the coast of Magicienne Bay. This healthy gain severed the island's southern portion, including Nafutan Point, from the remainder of the island. To maintain the momentum of the attack and avoid the long delay of a mopping-up process, the 24th Marines by-passed the southern extremity of a heavily defended cliff line running north and south through its zone of action. However, since the direction of attack for the division would soon Swing north through the by-passed area, it was necessary to secure the cliff line. This mission was assigned to the division reserve, 1st Battalion, 25th Marines. This, the unit's first experience with cleaning cave positions, proved a sIow, unpleasant and dangerous task. Rather than a coordinated move, the task took the form of a series of small, separated actions, each employing groups of four or five men. At 7:30, the 3rd Battalion, 24th Marines, relieved Haas' 1st Battalion on the division's left wing and commenced the move on O-2, which would serve as the line of departure. As will be seen, however, events of the day prevented the regiment from reaching this line. Organizational readjustments within the 23rd Marines included the attachment of the 3rd Battalion's rifle companies and 81mm mortar platoon to Dillon's 2nd Battalion and formation of a composite battalion from the 1st Battalion and the 3rd Battalion Headquarters. The latter unit would support the attack of the other two battalions from positions on Mt. Fina Susu. Machine-gun fire stopped the 23rd Marines' left elements after an advance of 200 to 250 yards. Most of this fire came from a clump of trees to their front, but a definite location of enemy weapons was impossible. Frequent barrages of Japanese mortar fire hampered efforts to spot the enemy, and the attack faltered. At this juncture, Cosgrove's composite battalion was committed on the left of the 3rd Battalion. 24th Marines, in an attempt to retain the impetus, and the attack again moved forward. But the advance was slow. By 5:15, the 23rd Marines had moved to a line about 400 yards short of O-2. Prior to darkness, 23rd Marines' patrols were dispatched to the east. On the right, these patrols reached O-2, but on the left machinegun fire denied movement as far as O-2. Colonel Jones, the 23rd Marines' commander, requested permission from General Schmidt to withdraw to more favorable ground for the night. General Schmidt approved, and the 23rd pulled back to a position about 400 yards east of Lake Susupe, breaking contact with the 2nd Division. The 23rd Marines emerged from the swamps, the 24th Marines reached the base of Hill 500, and the 25th Marines progressed to Magicienne Bay, effectively dividing the island. General Smith's soldiers also captured the Aslito Airfield, with the 165th and 105th Regiments securing Cape Obiam and the area south of the field. This isolated numerous Japanese forces in the north at Nafutan Point. Concurrently, General Saito was shifting his remaining troops to the Garapan-Mount Tapotchau area, facing relentless artillery, naval, and air attacks that left the Japanese in a dire situation.  The chief of staff of the 31st Army, General Igeta, drafted a message on the morning of June 18th to the commanding general at Yap Island and the chief of staff in Tokyo. In it he summarized the situation as he saw it and, in the process, revealed how very little he knew of what was taking place. Not that the general was caught in the bog of apathy, nor was he too frightened or lazy to find out what was going on; it was simply impossible for him to penetrate the shroud of obscurity resulting from ruptured communications in the vast area over which the action was taking place. As such, he erroneously reported that the 43rd Division HQ “underwent an enemy attack this morning and the division CO died along with his staff officers.” In another dispatch later in the day, Igeta corrected his error in regard to the division commander's death, reporting that General Saito was “all right, but that his staff officers were wounded.” He also added that “the secret documents in custody of the 31st Army Headquarters… were completely burned at 1830 of 18 June…” Recognizing the desperate circumstances, Prime Minister Tojo sent a fatalistic message to the garrison, despite reinforcements en route. “Have received your honorable Imperial words. By becoming the bulwark of the Pacific with 10000 deaths; we hope to acquire Imperial favor.” Reports indicated that Ozawa's mobile fleet was approaching the Marianas and expected to arrive on June 19. When Spruance finally received the spotting report from Cavalla, this prompted a decision that turned out to be the most important of the battle. Assuming that the report from Cavalla was Ozawa's main force, and assuming it would continue at a speed of 19 knots to the east, Spruance's staff calculated that the Japanese would still be about 500nm from TF 58 at 5:30 on the 18th. This placed the Japanese well out of range of American searches or strikes. The only way to alter this situation was to steam TF 58 to the southwest toward the contact and plan to locate and engage the Japanese during the afternoon of the 18th. Mitscher advised the aggressive option of steaming to the southwest to close the range on Ozawa's force. He wanted to launch afternoon strikes to locate and possibly attack Ozawa and even advocated a nighttime surface engagement. While this offered the possibility of opening the battle on terms set by the Americans, there were several problems with it in Spruance's calculating mind. The first was that TF 58 was not yet concentrated; TGs 58.1 and 58.4 were not due to link up with the other two task groups operating west of Saipan until 1200 on the 18th. If he allowed Mitscher to take off to the west, it would only be with two task groups. Since the Japanese possessed longer-range strike aircraft, this offered Ozawa the chance to attack TF 58 and defeat it piecemeal. As for the prospects of a night engagement, both Spruance and Lee declined that possibility.  In response, Spruance adopted a cautious approach, instructing Mitscher to gather his carrier groups and redirect them toward Saipan. In a last effort to change Spruance's mind, Mitscher sent him a message at about 11:30pm and proposed a course change to the west at 1:30am in order to position TF 58 to launch a strike against the Japanese carrier force at 5:00am. At 12:38am on the 19th, Spruance sent a message rejecting the proposal. The die was finally cast for a defensive battle on June 19.Spruance's priority was to safeguard the invasion force rather than eliminate the Japanese fleet. At 6:00am on the 18th, Japanese search floatplanes from the First Mobile Fleet spotted six carriers from TF 58. In the afternoon, seven aircraft from Carrier Division 1 flying out to 420nm spotted TF 58 after its 1200 rendezvous. The first report was issued at 3:14pm and included detection of an American task group with two carriers. A second aircraft sighted a task group with an “unknown number of carriers” at 4:00 and later issued another report at 1710 which identified two task groups, each with two carriers. These were within strike range, but Ozawa elected not to launch an immediate strike since his pilots were so inexperienced in night flying. Nonetheless, Rear-Admiral Obayashi Sueo of the 3rd Carrier Division boldly ordered the launch of 67 aircraft from the carriers Zuiho, Chitose, and Chiyoda, hoping to surprise the Americans. However, when he learned of Ozawa's decision, Obayashi reluctantly called off his strike. Ozawa had correctly assessed that the enemy would hold its position near Saipan, allowing him to maintain his own position without fearing an American attack. With this understanding, he changed course southwest to maintain the distance, while Admiral Kurita's Vanguard Force moved east, and Forces A and B shifted south. At 03:00 on June 19, all three forces turned northeast and increased their speed to 20 knots. Ozawa executed his plan flawlessly, positioning himself to launch significant attacks against the unsuspecting Americans the next morning. His only misstep was breaking radio silence at 20:20 to coordinate the decisive operation with Kakuta, who consistently misrepresented the true condition of his air forces while giving overly optimistic reports of successes by his aviators. As a result, an American station intercepted the transmission and geo-located it accurately. Once the mobile fleet reached strike positions, the Japanese began launching search aircraft, sending 16 floatplanes at 04:45 and another 14 planes about 30 minutes later. Although they lost seven scouts, the Japanese were able to spot the northern elements of Task Force 58 and the picket destroyers deployed ahead by 7:00. Starting at 05:30, Mitscher's combat air patrol engaged Japanese aircraft from Guam, which were unsuccessful in bombing destroyers. At 6:30am, American radar detected Japanese air activity over Guam and four Hellcats were sent to investigate. At 7:20am, these arrived and found themselves in the middle of many Japanese aircraft taking off. More Hellcats rushed in and, beginning at 8:07am for the next hour, there was constant combat over and near Guam. Up to 33 American fighters were involved, and they claimed 30 fighters and five bombers. The Americans claimed to have destroyed 30 aircraft, successfully hindering Kakuta's support for Ozawa's decisive battle. However, with the return of Japanese floatplanes, Ozawa was preparing to launch his first strike, deploying 69 aircraft: 16 Zero fighters, 45 Zeros with bombs and eight Jills with torpedoes at 08:30 under Obayashi's command. Fortunately for the Americans, radar warnings enabled Mitscher to dispatch every available Hellcat for interception. At 10:23am, launching of every available Hellcat from TF 58 began as the force headed east into the wind. The American carriers cleared their decks and all airborne bombers on search and patrol missions were instructed to clear the area. This allowed the fighters to return as necessary to rearm and refuel. The goal was to keep as many fighters in the air as possible to intercept incoming threats. The Hellcats had reached their interception altitudes of between 17,000 and 23,000ft when at 10:35am they spotted the incoming Japanese aircraft identified as two groups of strike aircraft with escorting Zeros on each flank. The first American fighters on the scene were Hellcats from Essex. Lieutenant Commander C. Brewer of Fighter Squadron 15 VF-15 led them.  The escorting Japanese fighters did not protect the bombers and the bombers scattered making them easy to pick off. Brewer claimed four aircraft, and his wingman claimed another four. In all, VF-15 pilots claimed 20 Japanese aircraft. Joining the Hellcats from Essex were others from Hornet and Bunker Hill as well as from five light carriers for a total of 50 Hellcats. Altogether, some 25 out of the 69 Japanese aircraft in this raid were accounted for by this initial interception. In return, three Hellcats were lost in combat and a Bunker Hill Hellcat was lost when it ditched on its way back to its carrier. The remaining Japanese aircraft continued their approach but were intercepted by Bunker Hill's Hellcats, which claimed another 16. Only around 28 Japanese planes remained and made minor attacks on Admiral Lee's group. Two targeted battleship South Dakota, with one scoring a direct bomb hit at 10:49, though causing minimal damage. Another narrowly missed heavy cruiser Minneapolis, while another almost missed cruiser Wichita. The Japanese reported  losing 42 aircraft:  eight fighters, 32 fighter-bombers, and two torpedo bombers. Most had been destroyed by Hellcats, with anti-aircraft gunnery from TG 58.7 accounting for the rest. Meanwhile, Ozawa launched his main strike at 08:56, composed of the 1st Division's best-trained pilots from three fleet carriers. This was a large strike designated Raid II from the three fleet carriers of Carrier Division 1 with the best-trained aviators in the First Mobile Fleet. The raid consisted of 128 aircraft – 48 Zero fighters, 53 Judy dive-bombers and 27 Jills with torpedoes. Launching began at 08:56 but was disrupted when at 09:09 Taiho came under attack by American submarine Albacore. The submarine fired six torpedoes at the fast-moving carrier. A last-second glitch in the boat's fire-control computer made it necessary to fire the six torpedoes by eye. One of Taiho's aircraft saw the torpedoes headed for the ship and dove into one in an effort to save the ship. In spite of this, one of the torpedoes hit the carrier abreast the forward elevator and created a hole which resulted in flooding. The ship's forward elevator, which was raised for the launch, was knocked out of alignment and fell several feet. Within 30 minutes, the elevator space was planked over by damage-control personnel and the launch continued. In addition to the aircraft lost from Taiho, eight other aircraft developed engine trouble and were forced to return. More trouble soon followed. When the attack group flew over the Vanguard Force deployed about 100nm in front of the main carrier force, it was engaged by the Japanese ships. This fire was effective enough to shoot down two more aircraft and damage another eight that were forced to return.  This attack and some friendly fire reduced the Japanese force to just 109 aircraft for the largest strike of the day, which was detected by radar. In a swirling action that began at 11:39am, the Hellcats again tore through the Japanese formation. McCampbell claimed three Judys and his wingman two. Other Hellcats joined the fray resulting in about 70 Japanese aircraft being shot down. VF-16 from Lexington claimed 22 Japanese aircraft without a loss; 12 Bunker Hill Hellcats were unable to gain a solid intercept but still claimed five kills, and Hellcats from light carriers Bataan, Monterey and Cabot claimed ten, seven and five, respectively. VF-1 from Yorktown also scored heavily. This still left a number of Japanese aircraft headed for TF 58. Twenty were reported in three groups at 11:45. Most of these made the mistake of attacking the picket destroyers deployed in advance of TG 58.7 or Lee's battleship force itself. Destroyer Stockham reported being under attack for 20 minutes, but again the ship suffered no damage. Around noon, TG 58.7 came under attack. Two torpedo bombers attacked South Dakota with no success, and two more selected Indiana in the center of TG 58.7's formation as their target. One crashed into the waterline of the heavily armored ship but caused little damage. Another Jill went after Iowa, but again missed. Alabama was undamaged by two bombs aimed at her. Potentially more serious was a group of six Judy dive-bombers that escaped the Hellcats and proceeded south until running across TG 58.2. Of this group, four selected carrier Wasp for attack. None scored a hit, but one of the bombs detonated overhead which rained down shrapnel that killed one and wounded 12 crewmen. The other two selected TG 58.2's other fleet carrier, Bunker Hill, for attack at 12:03. They scored two near misses that caused minor fires and other damage, in addition to killing three and wounding 73. Both carriers continued in action. Four of the aircraft were shot down by antiaircraft fire, with the other two landing on Rota and Guam. Finally, six B6N bombers attacked Admiral Reeves' carriers, but their attacks began at 11:57 and were also ineffective, failing to hit any targets. One missed Enterprise, and another three attacked light carrier Princeton, but all three were destroyed by antiaircraft fire.Thus, Ozawa's second strike resulted in a significant loss for the Japanese, with 97 of the 128 aircraft not returning to their carriers. His losses totaled 32 fighters, 42 dive-bombers and 23 Jills. At 5:30, the third group of Japanese scout aircraft took off. This comprised 11 Judys from Shokaku and two Jakes from heavy cruiser Mogami. The aircraft flew 560nm to the east. Two contacts were radioed back to Ozawa. The first, at 9:45, was reported at a position well to the south of TF 58's actual position. The problem resulted from an uncorrected compass deviation on the search aircraft. This contact was designated “15 Ri” by the Japanese. The second contact, designated “3 Ri”, was reported at 10:00. It was of a task force of three carriers and escorts to the north of TF 58's actual position, but may have been of TG 58.4.This third Japanese strike designated Raid III by the Americans was mounted by Carrier Division 2. This effort, from Junyo, Hiyo and Ryuho, comprised 47 aircraft including 15 fighters, 25 Zeros with bombs, and seven Jills with torpedoes. The remaining 20 aircraft saw what they believed to be two battleships but chose to keep searching for carriers. After a failed search, the group eventually attacked the battleships they initially spotted at 12:55 but were intercepted by Hellcats and lost seven aircraft. Nonetheless, the group pressed on and attacked Rear-Admiral William Harrill's carriers at 13:20. The effort was ineffective with one aircraft dropping a bomb 600 yards from Essex. Ozawa's third strike had accomplished nothing, but at least 40 of its 47 aircraft survived to return to their carriers. At 11:00, Ozawa launched his final attack of the day, consisting of 82 aircraft from the carriers Junyo, Hiyo, Ryuho, and Zuikaku of Carrier Division 1. It comprised 30 Zero fighters, ten Zeros with bombs, 27 Vals and nine Judys and six Jills. The planes set off for the new, incorrect southern target and found nothing, causing them to divide into three groups. The largest group of 49 planes headed toward Guam, where the Americans had been periodically discarding their ordnance to neutralize Kakuta's airfields.  As Ozawa sent his series of strikes against TF 58, Spruance directed Mitscher to keep a number of Hellcats active over Guam to disrupt any Japanese attempt to mount attacks from there. This reflected Spruance's fear that the Japanese would use Guam as a base for “shuttle bombing” using aircraft from the 1st Mobile Fleet. Before the first Japanese carrier raid, Hellcats encountered airborne Japanese aircraft over Guam. This action continued throughout the day and periodically intensified when TF 58 dive-bombers and Avengers, ordered to the east to steer clear of the air battle, dumped their ordnance on Guam. Before noon, 15 Yorktown and 17 Hornet Helldivers bombed Orote Field on Guam. Another attack was mounted at 13:30 by Dauntlesses from Lexington and Enterprise, nine Avengers from Enterprise and ten Hellcats for escort. The armor-piercing bombs carried by the dive-bombers did little damage, but the Avengers succeeded in cratering the runway. Other attacks continued throughout the afternoon including Hellcats from Bunker Hill strafing Japanese aircraft on the ground and 11 Helldivers from Essex just before 14:00. The price to keep Guam suppressed during the day was steep – six Hellcats and one Helldiver – but the Base Air Force did not support Ozawa's main attack. Back over at the carrier action, Ozawa's first group approaching Guam were picked up by TF 58 radar at 1449hrs. Before long, 27 Hellcats were on the scene. Among these were 12 from light carrier Cowpens, seven from Essex again led by McCampbell, and eight from Hornet. The Hellcats did great execution, shooting down 30 of the 49 Japanese trying to land on Guam. The remaining 19 planes landed but were damaged on the ground and could no longer fly.Another 15 aircraft headed for Rota but changed course to attack Montgomery's group when they sighted it en route. Six aircraft approached Wasp unmolested until 2:23 when they were engaged by antiaircraft fire just as they were dropping their bombs. Adept maneuvering by Wasp thwarted the aircraft, identified as Judys. Another group of divebombers appeared and split up; two went after Bunker Hill, and one after Wasp. All missed, and of the nine attackers, only one escaped. The final 18 aircraft of Raid IV, including the eight from Zuikaku and ten Zeros with bombs, were returning to their carriers when they encountered two American scout groups consisting of Hellcats and Avengers some 200nm west of Guam.This encounter cost the Japanese six aircraft, but they did gain a measure of revenge when at 3:30 the same group of returning Japanese aircraft encountered and shot down two Bunker Hill aircraft on a search mission. Despite these efforts, none of the American ships were hit during this fourth attack, while Ozawa suffered a significant loss of 73 aircraft. The situation worsened when the submarine Cavalla spotted Shokaku recovering aircraft at 11:52 and launched six torpedoes. Three torpedoes hit the carrier's starboard side at 12:22, sparking fires in the hangar and causing the ship to list. Soon, the ship came to a halt and was left behind when Carrier Division 1 moved north. At 1310, the fires on the hangar set off a bomb that set off fumes from the cracked forward fuel tank. Large explosions ensued and it was obvious the carrier was doomed. Shokaku sank at 15:01, resulting in the deaths of 1,272 crew members. The light cruiser Yahagi and destroyers Urakaze, Wakatsuki, and Hatsuzuki rescued Captain Matsubara and 570 men. Additionally, a torpedo hit Taiho, cracking the forward aviation fuel tank and turning the IJN's newest and most heavily protected carrier into a floating bomb. At 3:32pm, a massive explosion hit Taiho, lifting her flight deck and causing damage to her hull that led to the ship sinking. Despite Ozawa's initial desire to stay with the carrier, he and his team were eventually evacuated by a destroyer. However, 660 members of Taiho's crew perished as the ship sank. The transfer to the Haguro, added to the confusion for Ozawa was the fact that he and his staff were jammed into inadequate facilities aboard heavy cruiser Haguro after they were forced to depart from Taiho. Communications were grossly inadequate; Ozawa admitted later that he should have turned over command to Kurita until he could have moved to a ship with adequate command and control facilities. After the final strike aircraft returned, the Japanese turned northwest at 18:08, preparing to refuel the following day before continuing their attack. In their four strikes, the Japanese had launched 373 aircraft; of these 243 were lost. Added to these losses were another 50 from Guam, nine when Shokaku went down, and another 13 from Taiho to bring the total to 315. Some 296 Hellcats had been engaged during the day in combat, and only 14 were lost in combat with another six recorded as operational losses. The lack of sufficient training and experience among Japanese aircrews was evident, as seasoned American pilots compared the battle to “an old-time turkey shoot down home.” As a result of the significant losses inflicted on Japanese aircraft by American forces, the aerial portion of the Battle of the Philippine Sea was known as the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. In the war upon the land, after an uneventful night, the 2nd Marine Division conducted patrols as Generals Schmidt and Smith focused on securing the rest of southern Saipan. Although the 4th Marine Division's assault was postponed due to their need to disperse a sizable Japanese group near Tsutsuran village, the 27th Division pressed forward in the morning with the 165th Regiment swiftly reaching Magicienne Bay. In contrast, the 105th advanced more slowly through challenging terrain, resulting in a gap between the two regiments and requiring the 165th to extend its lines to maintain contact. Further north, Colonel Jones' 23rd Marines succeeded in advancing close to Hill 500 after intense artillery bombardment, but were compelled to withdraw about 400 yards to protect their vulnerable flank. At this stage, Brigadier-General Arthur Harper's Corps artillery had arrived on the island, offering essential reinforcement to the division's artillery units. By the end of the day, Schmidt's division realigned its regiments and shifted north. The most vicious action of the night occurred in the sector occupied by the 2nd Battalion, 24th Marines. Starting at about 3:50am and lasting until daylight, an enemy force of approximately 75 attacked the Marines with grenades and bayonets. In the close-in fighting that ensued, 11 Marines were wounded, but, in the process, the enemy attack was broken. By daylight, many of the attackers were sprawled forward of the Marines' foxholes, the rest had taken to their heels. Meanwhile, Admiral Mitscher, having retrieved all his aircraft, set a westerly course and increased speed to 23 knots in an attempt to catch up with the enemy. However, on June 20, his usual morning search found no results. The Japanese also maintained radio silence during the day, with no new intelligence obtained by American submarines or PBM flying boats based in Saipan. In the afternoon, a successful search finally established contact, prompting Mitscher to prepare for a bold night strike against an enemy fleet beyond the maximum strike range. Meanwhile, the plan to refuel the 1st Mobile Fleet on June 20 fell through amid confusion, prompting Ozawa to abandon the attempt after noon. He transferred to the Zuikaku and restored communications, discovering the extent of his aircraft losses. Ozawa's hope that he could continue strikes was buoyed by reports from Kakuta that some of Ozawa's aircraft had landed on Guam and the prospects that additional land-based aircraft reinforcements would flow into the area. The only concession he made was to move his next attack until the 21st. However, at 16:45, Ozawa's reconnaissance revealed he had been spotted, so he decided to retreat northwest at 24 knots. Thirty minutes later, when his scout aircraft located Task Force 58, Ozawa opted to initiate a night attack with seven B5Ns and three radar-equipped B6Ns. Meanwhile, Mitscher launched a full deckload from 11 carriers, including 85 Hellcats, 77 dive-bombers, and 54 Avengers. The First Mobile Fleet was not well positioned to meet the attack. The Van Force with most of the heavy escorts and the best antiaircraft capabilities was not the closest formation to the incoming American strike. Each of Ozawa's three groups was headed northwesterly with the Van Force to the south, Carrier Division 2 in the center and Zuikaku to the north. Astern of the carrier groups were the two supply groups composed of six oilers with their escorts, making this the closest group to the Americans. After an uneventful flight, the American aircraft found the 1st Mobile Fleet at 18:40, at the edge of their fuel range after nearly 300 miles. Lacking time for a coordinated attack, the American aircraft easily bypassed the 40 fighters and 28 bombers sent to intercept them and individually targeted the enemy carriers. The veteran carrier Zuikaku was defended by 17 fighters and put up a good fight with heavy antiaircraft fire and adept maneuvering. She avoided the four torpedoes aimed at her from the Hornet Avengers and took only a single direct hit by a 500- pound bomb aft of the island. After departing, the Americans reported the big carrier with heavy fires onboard. However, the damage was not as great as it appeared. The single bomb hit penetrated to the upper hanger deck where a fire started among the remaining aircraft. These were not fueled, so after a few tense moments and an order to abandon ship that was quickly rescinded, the fire was extinguished. Six near misses were recorded, but overall damage was light. Zuikaku, the last surviving carrier from the Pearl Harbor attack force, lived to fight again. Aircraft from Bunker Hill, Monterey, and Cabot attacked the Chiyoda group, which evaded five torpedoes and sustained one bomb hit, surviving to fight another day. The Japanese were organized into three groups, each centered on a light carrier with several escorting battleships or heavy cruisers. The Zuiho and Chitose groups were not attacked, but the Chiyoda group was. The light carrier was the target of over 20 Helldivers and Avengers with bombs, but only a single bomb hit Chiyoda on the flight deck resulting in 20 dead, 30 wounded and two aircraft destroyed. The Avengers from Monterey probably scored the single hit, which caused a fire that was quickly extinguished. Chiyoda successfully dodged five torpedoes from Bunker Hill Avengers and lived to fight another day. Escorting battleship Haruna was hit by a 500-pound bomb that penetrated her stern and flooded the steering compartment. The ship's speed was reduced, and 15 crewmen were killed and 19 wounded. Cruiser Maya endured a near miss that caused flooding. The strike group from Lexington, with support from the Avengers from Enterprise, Yorktown, and Belleau Wood, and the bomb-carrying Hellcats from Hornet and Yorktown, attacked Admiral Jojima's carriers. They inflicted minor damage on Junyo and Ryuho. Most of Lexington's Dauntless dive-bombers selected Junyo for attention. At 7:04, one or two bombs hit the carrier's island, and several near misses created minor flooding. Casualties included 53 dead, but overall damage was light. Light carrier Ryuho was attacked by the five Avengers from Enterprise with bombs at 7;10; eight hits were claimed, but only slight damage was caused by near misses. The carrier also survived attacks from Enterprise Dauntlesses, Avengers from Yorktown five with torpedoes and probably Hellcats from Hornet. Hiyo suffered the most successful attack of the evening. The carrier left the formation to launch two Jills to lay a smoke screen and was caught behind the main body when the American strike arrived. In the opening attack by Dauntlesses from Lexington, one bomb hit the foremast and exploded above the bridge resulting in heavy casualties to bridge personnel. The Japanese reported that another bomb hit the flight deck. However, the group of four Belleau Wood Avengers with torpedoes caused fatal damage. Three conducted an anvil attack, and one torpedo hit the carrier's starboard engine room. This was followed by a dive-bomb attack from six Enterprise Dauntlesses. The single torpedo hit, the only one scored by Avengers during the entire attack, proved fatal to the largely unprotected carrier. Within minutes, the damage created a list. The ship proceeded for a time on its port engine, but then went dead in the water. Just before sunset, at 1917, there was a large explosion amidships that caused a loss of power. The Japanese were convinced that this was the result of a submarine-launched torpedo, but there were no submarines in the area. A fuel-fed conflagration ensued, causing multiple explosions. The fire was beyond being contained, and the order to abandon ship was given. Hiyo sank at 20:32, claiming 247 crew members. The final American counterattack came from Wasp's aircraft, targeting Ozawa's Supply Group to disrupt the withdrawal of the 1st Mobile Fleet by damaging the oilers. Three oilers were damaged, and two were later scuttled. In this series of uncoordinated attacks, the Americans lost 20 aircraft and destroyed 80 Japanese planes; although the results were underwhelming, with only one carrier sunk, they fared better than Ozawa's combined strikes the previous day. At 20:45, American aircraft began returning to their carriers. The distance from the targets to TF 58 was between 240 and 300 miles, so fuel exhaustion was a real danger for many pilots. On a dark night, the returning aircraft began to return to their carriers at 8:45. Mitscher decided to ignore the potential Japanese air and submarine threats and ordered his ships to use extra illumination beyond the normal landing lights on each carrier deck to guide his appreciative aviators home. Any pretense of order was quickly lost and soon aircraft were ordered to land on any deck in sight. Almost half of the returning aircraft landed on the wrong carrier. This hectic scene took over two hours to play out. When the final accounting was complete, aircraft losses were expectedly heavy. The Americans would end up losing a total of 100 pilots and 109 crew members. Meanwhile, Admiral Toyoda ordered Ozawa to disengage from the decisive battle and retreat northwest, with the Japanese fleet successfully evading Mitscher's slow pursuit and reaching Okinawa on the afternoon of June 22. Once more, the Japanese sought a decisive battle but were decisively defeated. By the end, they had lost three carriers sunk, two carriers damaged, 395 carrier aircraft, about 200 land-based aircraft, two oilers, and four other damaged ships, with around 3,000 Japanese fatalities. In contrast, the Americans lost 130 aircraft and 76 aviators, with none of their damaged ships rendered out of service. The Battle of the Philippine Sea, the last carrier-versus-carrier battle of the war, stood out because the most conservative and defensive-minded side emerged victorious. In terms of scale the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot dwarfed the four carrier battles that preceded it. At the Battle of the Coral Sea, the Battle of Midway, the Battle of the Eastern Solomons, and the Battle of Santa Cruz Islands, the largest carrier engagement involved 7 carriers at Midway; by comparison there were 24 carriers at the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. It was, by a factor of almost 350 percent, the biggest carrier battle in history. Though Mitscher's Combat Air Patrol was not flawless, the combination of inadequate Japanese aircrew training and American radar-directed fighter interception rendered a significant Japanese strike ineffective. Ozawa conducted an intelligent battle, accurately assessing American intentions to launch carrier air strikes that would have been catastrophic to a carrier task force by 1942 standards. Nevertheless, his tools failed him. Despite Ozawa's skilled fleet handling, he lacked the airpower to inflict serious damage on Task Force 58. Admiral Spruance has faced criticism for his cautious approach, which exposed his carriers to attack without a strong chance of striking back at the enemy. Only the significant difference in skill between American and Japanese aviators and some good luck prevented this strategy from failing.  Now back over on Saipin, General Watson continued to focus mainly on patrolling, while the 8th Marines worked to secure Hill 500. Colonel Wallace's 2nd Battalion encountered minimal resistance, enabling them to quickly advance to the O-4 Line. Around 09:00, the 25th Marines moved towards Hill 500, subjecting the Japanese to a severe, thundering beating administered by the 4.5-inch rockets. As the Marines charged up the hill through the thinning smoke, artillery shells walked ahead in sturdy escort. Shortly before noon the hill was seized, and mopping up of the cave network began. Compartments at different levels and angles made it possible for the Japanese occupants to retreat from one cave-room to another, and the cleaning out process was a slow one. The price for Hill 500 was not light. Chambers' battalion suffered 49 casualties, nine of whom were killed. Counted Japanese dead numbered 44. Upon examination, it was found that Hill 500 had been well organized for defense but that the positions were not strongly manned. As darkness approached, the Marines dug in to defend their newly won possession. Meanwhile, the 24th Marines also reached the O-4 Line near Tsutsuran, but the 27th Division struggled to push the Japanese forces onto the challenging terrain at Nafutan Point. Additionally, the 106th Regiment arrived on June 20, and Aslito Airfield became operational, putting the security of the Japanese home islands in jeopardy. The following day involved reorganizing, resupplying, mopping-up, and patrolling to prepare for the next day's attack into central Saipan. General Smith's infantry continued their offensive south toward Nafutan Point, making incremental progress through each cave and ravine.  At 12:15, while engaged in the Nafutan Point attack, the 27th Division received a change of mission and disposition. NTLF Operation Order 9 dictated less one battalion and one light tank platoon, to assemble northwest of Aslito Airfield in NTLF reserve. Control of the division artillery would pass to the 23rd Corps Artillery. The designated infantry battalion was ordered to “operate in the Garrison Area and mop up remaining enemy detachments, maintain anti-sniper patrols within the Garrison Area and along the coast line to protect installations within its zone of action with particular attention to Aslito Airfield.” At 5:00, after consideration of the NTLForder, Ralph Smith telephoned Holland Smith and urged that a complete regiment be used to clean up Nafutan Point, rather than one battalion. He said that he planned to use the 105th Infantry for the job and that he believed they could finish in a couple of days. Holland Smith agreed to this but specified that one battalion of the 105th must be retained in reserve for possible use elsewhere. For this task, the 2nd Battalion would be selected. This modification was later confirmed in a mailbrief from NTLF which arrived at the 27th Division command post at 8;30, 22 June. Ralph Smith then issued an order to his division, the 105th will hold the present front line facing Nafutan Point, with two battalions on the line and one battalion in regimental reserve. It would relieve elements of 165th now on the front line by . Reorganization of the present front line to be effected not later than 11:00, 22 June and offensive operations against the enemy continued. Reserve battalion will maintain anti-sniper patrols in the vicinity of Aslito Airfield.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Battle of the Philippines  was the last hurrah of the once proud IJN carrier fleet that had humbled the American two and a half years earlier. Admiral Spruance's strategic patience led to a decisive American victory. Japan's carrier threat, which had driven its early wartime expansion, was annihilated in the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot.

Last time we spoke about the Great Marianas Turkey Shoot. The battle of the philippine sea saw Admiral Ozawa toss numerous aircraft carrier attacks against US Task Force 58. The numerous strikes proved terribly ineffective, seeing most Japanese aircraft shot down and failing to return to their carriers. Ozawa's forces faced issues with uncorrected compass deviations and poor communication leading to misidentified targets and unsuccessful attacks. The American pilots managed to intercept and shoot down incredible numbers of Japanese aircraft, dealing Ozawa a terrifying defeat. By the end, they had lost three carriers sunk, two carriers damaged, 395 carrier aircraft, about 200 land-based aircraft, two oilers, and four other damaged ships, with around 3,000 Japanese fatalities. The Americans lost 130 aircraft and 76 aviators, with none of their damaged ships rendered out of service. The Battle of the Philippine Sea, the last carrier-versus-carrier battle of the war, stood out because the most conservative and defensive-minded side emerged victorious. This episode is the the Changsha-Hengyang Campaign Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are first jumping back into the fighting on Saipan, where General Holland Smith's forces were preparing for the start of the drive into the center of the island. General Holland Smith's strategy involved the 4th Marine Division advancing along the inland road to secure the area southeast of Mount Tapotchau and take Hill 600, which is just north of Magicienne Bay. Meanwhile, the 2nd Marine Division was tasked with capturing Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau, while the 27th Division stood ready to support either Marine division if needed. On the morning of June 22, after a 10-minute artillery barrage, the offensive began. On General Schmidt's front, the 24th Marines moved along the shore, facing obstacles in the form of ravines but still reaching the O-4A Line by 13:30. The 25th Marines, advancing in battalions, secured three small ridgelines before being stopped at the fourth, gaining approximately 2000 yards. By noon, as the connection between the two regiments became weak, Schmidt had to send in the reserve 23rd Marines to bridge the gap and push toward Hill 600. Fighting especially troublesome terrain, the 23d Marines made slow progress. Only light enemy resistance from riflemen and machine gunners was encountered, but contact difficulties and time lost trudging up, down, around and through the rugged ground formations, limited the speed of advance. Progress ceased at a point about 200 yards south of objective O-4A, where the unit dug in. To the west, General Watson also made significant advances. The 6th Marines reached the summit of Mount Tipo Pale while the 8th Marines progressed closer to Mount Tapotchau. However, both units encountered obstacles due to enfilading fire from a Japanese stronghold on Tipo Pale, which remained undefeated for two days. Throughout the night, the 27th Division began relieving the worn-out 25th Marines. The 106th Regiment took position against the eastern slopes of Tapotchau, while the 165th faced off against Death Valley. Due to this shift, Holland Smith instructed the 105th Regiment to move north as the division's reserve, leaving just its 2nd Battalion to clear Nafutan Point. The following morning, the 27th Division's advance was delayed because its regiments struggled to assemble at the line of departure. Meanwhile, Generals Watson and Schmidt had already resumed their offensive, encountering more resistance than the day before. The 8th Marines initially encountered little resistance as they moved towards Tapotchau, but were stopped when the 106th Regiment had yet to advance. To the left, Colonel Riseley's 3rd Battalion managed to advance about 400 yards, while the rest of the forces faced the Tipo Pale strongpoint. The 23rd Marines, attacking with battalions in column, Dillon's 2d Battalion leading, advanced rapidly over rough terrain against machine-gun and rifle fire from Hill 600. Approached from the south. Hill 600 presented an extremely steep slope; and, in the words of the battalion commander, “It was all you could do to climb it, let alone light up it.” The number of Japanese defending the height was not great, but the area was admirably suited for defense and, for about 30 minutes, the fight was close and vicious. Hand grenades passed back and forth as in an overgrown, uncontrolled game of “hot potato.” Despite their struggle against gravity and an obstinate foe, Dillon's Marines seized the peak and set up a hasty defense against counterattack. From its newly-won position, Dillon's battalion had an unimpaired view of the whole of Kagman Peninsula. This surge had been executed without benefit of contact with the 27th Division on the left; and, when it was apparent that the latter was still some distance to the rear. General Schmidt ordered the 23d to hold up its advance until Army elements had tied in. Though the peak of the hill was securely in the hands of the 2d Battalion, the battle continued. The hill's northern slope, cloaked in thick vegetation, was alive with Japanese soldiers. Dillon endeavored to strip them of their concealment by burning the area with flamethrowers, but the efforts were largely unsuccessful. Throughout the remainder of the day and during the night the grenade pitching continued. In the afternoon, General Ralph Smith's forces began their assault, with the 106th encountering a strongpoint known as Hell's Pocket and the 165th being stopped by heavily fortified positions on Purple Heart Ridge. The nature of the terrain facing the 27th Division was to have an unusually vital bearing on the unit's operations for many days to come. This terrain is well described by the historian attached to the division at Saipan: “The whole mountain [Tapotchau] was stoutly defended by the enemy, but the situation on the two flanks of it was somewhat unusual. On the west side of the peak, the ground sloped sharply to the sea. On the east, Kagman Point side, it dropped in sheer cliffs to a bench or plateau, some six hundred feet below the summit. This plateau, a saddle-shaped piece of land, was some twelve hundred yards across and bordered on the east by a low chain of hills covered with heavy foliage. Beyond them the ground sloped down to Kagman Point on the east or dropped off abruptly to Magicienne Bay on the southeast. The cliffs of Mt. Tapotehau and the chain of hills made a corridor out of the plateau. In the fighting which ensued this corridor was named Death Valley by the men who fought there and the chain of hills came to be known as Purple Heart Ridge.” At d three divisions of Japanese troops and tanks were massing in front of the 27th Infantry Division. The expected enemy attack materialized at about 6:30, when Japanese tanks struck near the boundary between the 165th and 106th Regiments. The combined efforts of 37mm guns and bazookas in the areas of the 2d Battalion, 165th, and the 3d Battalion, 106th, destroyed five Japanese tanks, but a sixth escaped. This was not enough for the intruders. At about 7:30, in company with infantrymen, five more Japanese tanks struck the right center of the 106th Infantry. The 3d Battalion's Antitank Platoon and the 1st Platoon of the Regimental Cannon Company accounted for four of the tanks while the fifth, though suffering a hit, broke through the 3d Battalion's lines. Firing wildly, it sprayed the battalion aid station with machine-gun bullets and set fire to a large ammunition dump nearby. The resultant exploding shells forced the right of the 3d Battalion to withdraw about 100 yards, returning to its original positions after the lire had burned itself out. Holland Smith expressed displeasure over the 27th Division's failure to start its attack on time. He was even more upset when he found out that Colonel Bishop's 2nd Battalion had not made progress at Nafutan Point. As a result, Major-General Sanderson Jarman had to brief Ralph Smith, who committed to ensuring his regiments advanced on schedule the next day. On June 24, the 106th and 165th Regiments once again struggled to advance against strong resistance and difficult terrain. An attack toward Nafutan Point in the south also failed, prompting Holland Smith to remove Ralph Smith from command and temporarily appoint Jarman to lead the 27th Division. Colonel Geoffrey O'Connell was assigned to clear Nafutan. In contrast, the 2nd Marines made progress toward Garapan and reached Radio Road on the O-6 Line, where they repelled two strong enemy counterattacks. On the right of the 2nd Marine Division, the 8th Marines continued the fight over nightmarish terrain. As Lieutenant Colonel Hays' 1sl Battalion moved into the attack, the troublesome pocket, developed on the previous day, came alive again. Matted with undergrowth and trees, the irregular coral limestone formation was favorable for the type of defense the Japanese were employing. Improving the area's natural assets, they had developed a honeycomb of underground positions. The 1st Battalion, utilizing the most unspectacular of tactics, plodded at its unpleasant task of sealing the caves and killing the occupants. The former chore proved the easier, since in most cases the Japanese had not neglected to plan routes and methods of escape. When the “cavemen" had done as much damage as possible from one position, they would retire to another from which to resume the fight. Shortly after midday, the coordinated efforts of combat engineers armed with flame-throwers, bazookas and demolitions and riflemen showed results; the pocket was eliminated and contact with the 6th Marines again established. By late afternoon the battalion reached the edge of a vast cleared area, desirable from the defense-for-the-night point of view. Since the next satisfactory site was 700 yards farther to the north, the unit halted and dug in. Major Larsen's 3d Battalion, advancing along the base of a cliff, made good progress, limited only by fairly difficult terrain and the necessity of maintaining contact with flank units. Above the 3d Battalion, along the top of the cliff, moved Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins' 1st Battalion. 29th Marines. Here the cliff was broken into a rough plateau dotted with smaller plateaus of coral limestone which con tinned rising like irregular stair steps toward Mt Tapotcliau's crest. The undergrowth in this area was a tangle of fern trees, the roots of which spread out three to eight feet above ground like the ribs of an inverted umbrella, overgrown and interlaced with a strait-jacket of vines. On the battalion's right flank was a narrow flat ledge covered with grass five feet high and the usual tangle of trees. This ledge, part of the north-south ridge leading to Mt. Tapotchau, was within machine-gun range of the summit. Moving through this intricate snarl was like attempting to swim through a fishermen's net, and Tompkins' battalion became overextended. At this juncture Colonel Wallace, commanding the 8th Marines, ordered the 2d Battalion to move in behind Tompkins' right to protect the open flank. As the 8th Marines dug in for the night after an advance of about 700 yards, it again became essential to commit the 37mm Platoon from the Regimental Weapons Company to extend south along the ridge facing the hiatus between the 2nd and 27th Divisions. Schmidt's division also moved east on Kagman Peninsula, with the 23rd Marines reaching Chacha village and the 24th Marines making rapid coastal gains of around 1200 yards. The next day, while the 2nd Marines held their ground outside Garapan and the 6th Marines tackled the Tipo Pale strongpoint, Colonel Wallace's forces finally attacked Mount Tapotchau. However, the summit was secured by a bold patrol along a ridge line on the right flank, which had to fend off multiple Japanese counterattacks. The 27th Division, under new leadership, resumed its attack, with the 165th taking one-third of Purple Heart Ridge and the 106th making a small entry into Death Valley before withdrawing during the night under enemy pressure. Further south, O'Connell struggled to make headway at Nafutan Point, while on Kagman Peninsula, Schmidt's Marines faced minimal resistance and secured Kagman Hill and the Brown Beaches along the O-6 Line. Additionally, recognizing their desperate situation, Generals Igeta and Saito requested reinforcements from Tinian.  From Sunharon Harbor on the west coast of Tinian, 11 personnel barges carrying a company of the 1st Battalion, 135th Regiment moved out during darkness of 25-26 June bent upon reinforcing Saipan. Spotted by the destroyer Bancroft and the destroyer escort Elden, the barges were fired upon and dispersed. One was reported sunk, while the remainder scurried back to Tinian Town. Later, at about 2:25am, LCI(G)s 438 and 456 observed several barges moving out of Tanapag Harbor on Saipan's west coast. Immediately opening fire, the LCI(G)s accounted for one sunk and a second damaged; the remainder returned to Tanapag. Both LCI(G)s received some damage during this repulse, however. The 438 received 12 holes in her hull from one of the barges' 37mm guns, damaging the fire main, starting batteries and radar. The 456 suffered less, with only slight damage to her winch and refrigerator. The 438 suffered one man killed and two wounded and the 456 two wounded. A report from one of the LCIs that the Japanese barges had unleashed torpedoes during this action was later substantiated by a prisoner of war who stated that there were at least three torpedoes fired at U. S. ships at this time. The Americans responded by initiating a systematic bombardment of Tinian on June 26.Air and naval gunfire alternated daily, working first in one half and then in the other, while artillery fired on any targets escaping other attention. A target map was maintained, information exchanged and new targets posted. Cruisers Birmingham, Montpelier and Indianapolis, using both air and direct shipboard spot, were assigned to execute the naval gunfire portion of the plan, while planes would be provided by Carrier Support Groups One and Two. Meanwhile, Schmidt's Marines were clearing the Kagman Peninsula, and the 6th Marines bypassed the Tipo Pale strongpoint and secured the ridge linking it to Tapotchau.  In the 8th Marines zone the day's advances were small. On the left the 1st Battalion regulated its progress on that of the 6th Marines. On the right the 2d Battalion's advance was restrained because of the lack of contact with 27th Division elements. In the 8th Marines' center, the 3rd Battalion and the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, made only small gains. The attached 2nd Battalion, 25th Marines, remained with the regiment during the greater portion of the day, Company E being used in the lines, while the remainder of the battalion was employed in mopping-up operations. As already noted, the 1st Battalion, 8th Marines, could move only as fast as the 6th Marines to its left if it were to retain contact. The cleeply-gashed ground, more than enemy opposition, governed the rate of advance. One unusual enemy tactic employed against the battalion at this time is worthy of note: bundles of picric acid blocks were catapulted upon the Marines by Japanese soldiers located in the craggy rocks along the route. This device showed originality but little else; no casualties were inflicted upon the Marines. Higher on Tapotehau's western slopes, the 3rd Battalion also fought through difficult terrain. A statement from the 8th Marines' action report gives an indication of the problems in that zone: “To go from the left flank of 3/8 to the right flank of 3/8 required a two hour and 40 minute march over rough terrain.” At some points the Japanese threw or rolled grenades and demolition charges down upon the Marines as they struggled through the hilly thickets. And as if that were not enough, Japanese positioned above directed plunging machine-gun fire upon the advancing men. The 3d Battalion's left flank kept pace with the 1st Battalion, but the right flank lagged behind. By nightfall the 3d Battalion's lines stretched almost north and south along the base of a steep slope. On 25 June the 1st Battalion, 29th Marines, less one company, had secured a foothold on the summit of Mt. Tapotchau. It remained on 26 June, then, for Company B to move up the mountain's western slope and join the battalion. While waiting for this unit, Lieutenant Colonel Tompkins sent a 25-man combat patrol from Company A to seize the northernmost rise of Tapotehau's crest. This patrol was repulsed after some hard fighting, and it became apparent that this area would have to be thoroughly battered before a successful effort could be made. In the meantime Company B reached the mountain to,. combing the area on the way. From the 2d Battalion position , the Marines observed men of the 2nd Battalion, 106th Infantry, attempting to move up on the division flank. By the close of the day, however, a gap of 600 yards still existed. To protect the exposed flank, the 2nd Battalion bent its lines to the shape of a horseshoe with one company facing north, one east, and one south. To sum up, the most important developments in the 8th Marines' sector during the day were the straightening of several small bulges in the lines and consolidation of the dominating heights won on 25 June. The 106th Regiment, under Colonel Albert Stebbins, failed to launch its attack amid confusion. The 165th Regiment bypassed Death Valley and joined the 4th Marine Division. In the south, after heavy bombardment, O'Connell began making progress against Nafutan Point. Life had not been pleasant for the Japanese defenders on Nafutan Point. From seaward, destroyers pounded the rocks and caves unmercifully; from land, a monotonously heavy volume of fire was maintained by 40mm and 90mm anti-aircraft guns, and 81mm and 60mm mortars, as well as fires of the light tank platoon, the self-propelled mount, and small arms of the 2nd Battalion, 105th Regiment. Movement on the point was rendered very difficult, and the shortage of food and water became acute. As a result, on June 26, Captain Sasaki, commanding the 317th Independent Infantry Battalion of the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, determined to move his battalion from the Nafutan Point trap and join other Japanese forces which he believed to be in the vicinity of Hill 500. This attack, though better planned than the average Japanese effort, achieved very little, and Sasaki's password “seven lives for one's country” remained only a slogan. However, during the night, the trapped Japanese forces managed to break through O'Connell's defenses. Moving undiscovered through the thinly spread outposts of the 2d Battalion, 105th Infantry, Sasaki's force headed for Aslito Airfield. The only indication that men of the 2d Battalion had that the enemy was on the move came at about 0200 when “an extremely large group” stumbled into the command post, about 1,500 yards in rear of the front lines. After a lively skirmish, in which the soldiers suffered 24 casualties, the intruders disappeared. The next morning the bodies of 27 Japanese were found in the immediate command post area. At about 0230 Sasaki's force struck Aslito Airfield. All U. S. personnel in that area were alerted after the enemy succeeded in setting fire to one P-47 and damaging three others. Seabees and engineers quickly rallied to their unexpected mission, cleared the field of Japanese and set up a hasty defense. At 0430 the Commander, Air Defense Command, reported that enemy .50-caliber machine guns and 20mm guns were firing on Aslito Airfield. After causing confusion at the airfield, the force advanced toward Hill 500, where they expected to find Colonel Oka's 47th Independent Mixed Brigade Headquarters . At about 0520 there were two surprises: the first was to Sasaki's men, who received an unexpected reception from the 25th Marines on Hill 500, and the second surprise was for the 25th Marines, who were not expecting visitors and, in some cases, found the Japanese in their midst before they realized that anything was afoot. Both participants quickly recovered from the shock, however, and a lively small arms and hand grenade battle ensued. At about the same time, the 14th Marines, in artillery firing positions between Hill 500 and Aslito Airfield, was attacked by another portion of Sasaki's force. The brunt of this assault was borne by the 2nd Battalion led by Lieutenant Colonel Wilson, which held its fire until a precariously late moment, mistaking the advancing Japanese column for a large U. S. Army patrol scheduled to pass through the area at about this time. A savagely-fought, close-in battle ensued, virtually annihilating the attacking force. Total 14th Marines' casualties in the skirmish were 33 killed and wounded, while 143 Japanese bodies lay sprawled in the regiment's immediate area. With the coming of daylight, the 25th Marines were assigned the mission of mopping up the stragglers from the abortive enemy effort of the previous night. Total Japanese losses in the fight around Aslito Airfield, at Hill 500, and in the 14th Marines' area, plus the 27 June mop-up by the 25th Marines, amounted to approximately 500 dead. The participants, some of whom wore United States uniforms and carried M-1 rifles, appeared greatly in need of water and rations. Yet that is all for Saipan for now, as we will be traveling over to China War. After the success of Operation Kogo, the Japanese planned for General Yokoyama's 11th Army to initiate a three-pronged assault in Hunan. The 34th, 58th, 68th, and 116th Divisions would head straight for Changsha, while the 3rd, 13th, and 27th Divisions provided coverage on the eastern flank by advancing towards Liling. Meanwhile, the 40th Division, the 17th Independent Mixed Brigade, and the 5th Independent Brigade secured the Dongting Lake region on the western flank. Additionally, the 70th Division in Jiangxi would launch a diversionary attack towards Hunan. On the night of May 27, following heavy artillery bombardment, Yokoyama initiated his offensive. The 34th, 58th, 68th, and 116th Divisions crossed the Xinqiang River swiftly, while the 3rd, 13th, and 27th Divisions moved south towards Liling. Furthermore, the 216th Regiment launched an amphibious operation towards Yingtianzhen and Xiangyin, catching the Chinese defenders off guard. The following day, the 40th Division and the 109th Regiment began their assault southwards, capturing Anxiang, Nan, Tianxingzhou, and the port of Sanxianhu by May 30. Simultaneously, the 5th and 17th Brigades advanced west towards the Songzizhong River to secure the northern shores of Dongting Lake. In the east, the Japanese forces encountered minimal resistance and advanced almost 100 kilometers, capturing Tongcheng, Nanjiangzhen, Pingjiang, and Changshouzhen by June 1. In the center, the main Japanese divisions breached the 20th Army's positions at Guanwang and Changlezhen and reached the Guluo River on June 3. With the enemy seemingly in full retreat, Yokoyama's forces continued southward, hindered only by a sudden downpour, and reached the Laodao River line by June 6, preparing to besiege Changsha. However, heavy rains delayed these preparations, allowing General Xue Yue time to gather his forces around the city. According to a prearranged plan, the 11th Army used the 27th Division to repair the Chongyang-Tongcheng-Pingjiang-Liuyang road and all engineer regiments under the direct command of the Field Engineer commander to repair the Xinqiang-Xinshizhen-Mianhuapo-Changsha road. Continuous rains, however, greatly delayed the road work and turned the roads into a sea of mud. Lines of communication became extremely difficult to maintain and, until the middle of June, the Japanese first-line troops received very few supplies from the rear. In spite of strenuous efforts on the part of the Army to improve these two roads, they eventually had to be abandoned. The situation became critical as all field artillery and motor units became congested on the muddy Yueyang-Changsha road. In the meantime, the 40th Division crossed Dongting Lake to seize Yuanjiang, making contact with elements of the 58th Division at Qiaokou. On June 11, the 40th Division successfully took control of the Yiyang area, while the 34th Division bypassed the Tamoshan Range and launched an attack towards Yuelu Mountain and Fengshupu. The 68th and 116th Divisions bypassed Changsha and moved forward towards Guanqiao, Changlingxiang, and Yisuhe, and the 3rd and 13th Divisions advanced towards Liuyang, facing significant resistance in the region. Despite this, Liuyang fell on June 14, after which the 13th Division proceeded towards Liling. Finding himself completely surrounded, Xue Yue decided to leave Changsha and retreat towards Liling. In the earlier three battles of Changsha, the Chinese had managed to defend the city and counterattack from the flanks; however, both the western and eastern flanks had now fallen to the Japanese, leaving the defenders with no choice but to withdraw. Now I want to take a short detour. Since mid-1943, the Americans had been constructing airfields in India, Ceylon, and China to house 16 squadrons of B-29 Superfortress Very-Long-Range heavy bombers under Brigadier-General Kenneth Wolfe's 20th Bomber Command. As part of Operation Matterhorn, these bombers were assigned to target locations in Japan, Manchuria, Korea, Formosa, Indochina, and the Dutch East Indies. A key target was the Japanese steel industry, which relied on a few coke plants situated in Kyushu, Manchuria, and Korea—within reach of the B-29s stationed in Chengdu. Before launching an attack on Japan, Wolfe decided to conduct a test combat mission against the Makkasan railway yard facilities in Bangkok, Thailand. On June 5, at 05:45, Brigadier-General LaVerne Saunders led 98 B-29s on a 2,261-mile round trip from India, marking the longest mission of the war up to that point.  Each bomber carried a fuel load of 6846 US gallons and 5 short tons of bombs; three groups carried 500-pound general-purpose bombs while the fourth carried M18 incendiary bombs. The XX Bomber Command wanted to test out the new M18 incendiary bombs and the large number of wooden buildings and freight cars and a small oil facility in the area offered good targets. The resulting 134000-pound takeoff weight was too heavy for the temporary field at Charra, so the 444th Bombardment Group had to stage from the other three fields. The attack was launched at 5:45 local time on 5 June 1944 to avoid high ground temperatures that were bad for the R-3350 engines and to allow the whole mission to be conducted in daylight. Wolfe had suggested a night-time raid, but Arnold insisted on daylight precision bombing. Only 77 bombers reached Bangkok, conducting a chaotic series of bombing runs between 10:52 and 12:32 due to cloud cover. The bomber's aim was to destroy the Memorial Bridge and a major power plant. They missed and instead knocked down tram lines and destroyed a Japanese military hospital as well as the headquarters of the Japanese secret police. No civilian buildings were damaged, a fact that aroused admiration among the Thai authorities. It was only in 1947 that the Thais discovered the American bombers had been aiming at the Memorial Bridge, almost two and-a-half kilometres away. Following the raid, schools and universities were closed in Bangkok and children moved out of the city for their safety. Upon returning to India, 42 B-29s had to land at alternative airfields due to low fuel, leading to the loss of five bombers and 15 aircrew fatalities. Despite the setbacks, the mission was deemed successful enough for Wolfe to plan a night attack on Japan for June 15. The B-29s began relocating to Chengdu on June 13 to prepare for the strike against the Imperial Iron and Steel Works in Yawata, producing approximately 2,250,000 metric tons of steel annually, or 24% of Japan's steel output. On June 15 at 16:16, Saunders led 68 B-29s on a 3,182-mile round trip to Yawata. Although some bombers crashed during takeoff, 47 reached the city and attacked for nearly two hours starting at 12:28. Only forty-seven of the sixty-eight B–29s launched hit the target area: one crashed en route, six jettisoned their bombs because of mechanical difficulties, and seven bombed secondary targets or targets of opportunity. Only 15 American aircraft visually aimed their bombs, as Yawata was obscured by darkness and smoke, with 32 others bombing via radar. Two more B-29s targeted Laoyao harbor, while five attacked other nearby targets. In total, 107 tons of bombs were dropped during the raid. While returning to Chengdu, three additional B-29 bombers were lost in China. In total, seven B-29s and 55 crew members were lost by the Americans, who managed only to inflict minor damage on Yawata. However, this marked the first attack on the Japanese home islands since the Doolittle raid in April 1942, signaling the start of the strategic bombing campaign against Japan. This raid caused panic in Japanese society, prompting Tokyo to pressure Yokoyama to quickly conquer Changsha and then target the B-29 airfields in central China. As a result, on June 16, the 58th Division launched its assault on Changsha, with the 34th Division also attacking Yuelu and Fengshupu. Changsha fell two days later, leading to the collapse of Chinese resistance in the area. By June 22, Liling and Pingxiang were also captured, allowing the Japanese to gain control over the Jiangxi-Zhejiang railway. Upon hearing of the defeat at Changsha, the Allies worried about the role of Kuomintang forces during Operation Ichi-Go. President Roosevelt proposed placing the entire Nationalist Army under General Stilwell, a suggestion that infuriated Chiang Kai-Shek and was quickly rejected, “Due to our errors in Henan and Changsha, the prestige of our nation and our army, including that of the military command, has been questioned. The foreigners haven't respected neither our combatants nor our commanders. This offense is more intolerable than the Japanese occupation of our homeland by force of arms.” Meanwhile, Yokoyama's next target was Hengyang to the south, where he planned to encircle the city using the 116th and 68th Divisions while the 40th Division secured Xiangxiang to the west. To the east, the 3rd and 13th Divisions would advance beyond You to secure Leiyang, with support from the 27th Division. The 216th Regiment was set to move upstream along the Xiang Jiang to attack Hengyang from the northeast. Meanwhile, in Henan, General Uchiyama continued his offensive by capturing the Hotsin Airdrome on May 30 and occupying the towns of Lingbao and Wenxiang by June 11. However, the Chinese forces managed to regroup, ambush, and counterattack the Japanese troops, reclaiming the recently lost towns and ultimately forcing the Japanese to retreat from Loyang and other towns by June 15. Nonetheless, the railway remained under Japanese control and was further reinforced with the capture of Runan and Shangcai on June 16. Back in Hunan, the second phase of Yokoyama's offensive got off to a strong start as the 40th secured Xiangxiang, trapping many retreating Chinese soldiers and compelling them to surrender. Meanwhile, the 68th and 116th moved quickly toward Hengyang, with the 68th occupying Hengyang airfield on June 26 and the 116th reaching the sector northwest of Hengyang the next day. On that day, the 68th also maneuvered around the city, crossing the Xiangjiang River to launch an attack on Hengyang from the southwest. Both divisions commenced their assault on Hengyang, but the strong Chinese fortifications held by the well-prepared defenders proved impenetrable. The attackers faced a shortage of ammunition and were further challenged by General Chennault's B-25s, P-40s and P-51s, who bombed and strafed the besiegers. As a result, Major-General Fang Xianjue's 10th Army repelled all Japanese assaults by the end of June. The heavy Japanese losses during these attacks, including severe injuries to Lieutenant-General Sakuma Tameto, compelled Yokoyama to suspend the attacks on July 2 until his artillery could support the siege. Yet that will be all for the China front for today as we are now heading over to Biak. After General Fuller was relieved on June 15th, General Eichelberger assumed command and decided to follow General Doe's plans for the June 16th attack. The 186th Infantry's unit began attacking eastward along the ridge shortly after 9:00. Company E led, with the 2d Platoon on the ridge, the 3d Platoon in flats 100 yards to the north, and the 1st Platoon 100 yards beyond the 3d. The 2d Platoon quickly found itself in a maze of Japanese positions and was halted by Japanese automatic weapons fire. The 1st Platoon of Company G thereupon moved up on Company E's right and began advancing along the southern slope of the low ridge. Together, the two platoons continued eastward against slackening resistance. They cleared innumerable enemy slit trenches, foxholes, and bunkers, destroyed several machine guns of various calibers, and at 10:50 reached the lines of the 3d Battalion, 162d Infantry. The task of closing the ridge line gap was completed in less than two hours, many of the previous Japanese defenders apparently having withdrawn north into the West Caves the preceding night. The Americans also moved northeast but encountered heavy resistance from enemy machine-gun and mortar fire. After intense artillery support, the battalion regrouped and attacked again in the afternoon, reaching the western limits of the West Caves positions. However, concerned about a possible counterattack on his left flank, Doe decided to pull his forces back to the low ridge while Haney's 2nd Battalion took over from the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment. The 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment could look back on the day's operations with a good deal of satisfaction. It had closed the gap on the low ridge; it had located the western limits of the enemy's West Caves positions; it had discovered that more Japanese troops were located north of the enemy encampment area both along the main road and on ridges west and northwest of Hill 320; it had eliminated most of the machine-gun nests and rifle pits in the encampment area and many of those on high, forested ground near that bivouac; it had destroyed many Japanese automatic weapons and rifles; and it had killed at least 65 Japanese. The battalion in turn lost 15 men killed and 35 wounded. There had been only local patrolling by the rest of the units in the forward area during the day, for the 1st Battalions of the 162nd and 186th Regiments had been kept in place by American artillery and mortar fire which supported the operations of the 2nd Battalion, 186th Regiment. On June 17, after identifying the western limits of the West Caves, Doe instructed Newman's 1st Battalion to advance northwest to high ground while Haney's 1st Battalion moved south and southwest towards the West Caves. Facing strong opposition, the 162nd Battalion, supported by tanks, managed to eliminate several pillboxes before being halted around midday. At the same time, the 186th Battalion approached the high ground from the east and joined forces with Haney's Company C, which had just cleared the final major enemy position on the hill. The Americans then continued their westward attack but made only modest progress by nightfall. With the high ground overlooking the West Caves secured, Doe planned to launch a coordinated attack on the strongpoint the following day. However, on June 18, Eichelberger changed his plans due to dissatisfaction with the progress of the operation. Instead, the 162nd and 186th Regiments reorganized for a coordinated attack, with Newman assigned to attack the rear of the West Caves position while the 3rd Battalion, 163rd Regiment gathered near Hill 320 to block enemy reinforcements.  The main effort was to be made by the 186th Infantry, the 2d and 3d Battalions of which were to attack from the southwest and west while the 1st Battalion struck from the east. The 162d Infantry would hold its positions. An egg-shaped terrain feature on the low ridge 1,000 yards northeast of Borokoe Drome and on the left flank of the 186th Infantry's prospective line of advance was to be seized for flank security and as a line of departure for subsequent attacks north and northeast. On 18 June only local patrolling was undertaken, while the bulk of the troops rested or redeployed in preparation for the attack on the 19th. The egg-shaped feature was secured against no opposition and a few Japanese stragglers along the low ridge in the area were mopped up. The regiment was to advance east from the egg-shaped protrusion of the low ridge with the 2nd Battalion leading, two companies abreast. The 3rd Battalion was to follow the 2nd, and the 1st Battalion would start moving northwestward once the other two had begun moving east. The attack, which was to begin at 6:30 on the 19th, would be supported by the 121st, 167th, 205th, and 947th Field Artillery Battalions, Company D of the 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, and ten tanks of the 603d Tank Company. Furthermore, the 34th Regiment was deployed to relieve the 186th west of Mokmer Drome, prepared to take over Borokoe and Sorido Dromes as per Eichelberger's orders. On the morning of June 19, following intense artillery preparation, Eichelberger's offensive began, with Newman's 2nd and 3rd Battalions attacking east and then northwest against light rifle fire and eventually reaching a rugged, heavily-forested coral ridge west of Hill 320 by midday. Around noon, Newman's 1st Battalion started clearing the southern extension of the coral ridge line, successfully advancing through the Japanese encampment area up the road to the 2nd Battalion's position by late afternoon. Facing minimal resistance, the 186th Regiment surrounded the rear of the Japanese in the West Caves, preventing reinforcement or escape. Eichelberger's plans for the next day involved the 186th continuing its operations in the Hill 320 area and the western ridges, while the 162nd attacked the West Caves and the 34th advanced towards the airdromes. On the morning of June 20, Haney's 1st Battalion, supported by two tanks, attacked the West Caves, facing lighter resistance initially but ultimately being halted by heavy Japanese fire. At the same time, Newman's troops extensively patrolled and discovered the Teardrop position, while the 34th Regiment quickly took control of the Borokoe and Sorido Dromes and Sorido village, facing minimal opposition. During the 1st Battalion, 162nd Regiment again moved up to the West Caves on June 21 and sent patrols out to clear Japanese riflemen from brush and crevices on hillocks north and northwest of the caves. The patrols, actually flamethrower teams supported by riflemen, accomplished their mission without much difficulty while the rest of the battalion, again covered by two tanks from the 603rd Tank Company, surrounded the sump depressions. The infantry and tanks concentrated on the most westerly of three large sinkholes comprising the West Caves. The tanks fired into cave entrances; the infantrymen lobbed hand grenades into holes and crevices within reach; and all Japanese observed were quickly killed by rifle fire. But the battalion was unable to force its way into the main entrance to the underground caverns. Fire into this entrance was also ineffective, for the opening was shielded by stalagmites and stalactites. Engineers poured the contents of five gasoline drums into the cavern through crevices or seepage points found on the surface of the ground. Flamethrowers then ignited the gasoline and the 1st Battalion withdrew to await developments. There were no immediately apparent results and, since it was believed that the West Caves were still strongly held, the battalion did not attempt to send any more men into the entrance. In the late afternoon the unit again pulled back to its bivouac area. The attacks during the night of June 21-22 had apparently resulted from a decision on the part of Colonel Kuzume to acknowledge defeat. In an impressive ceremony in the West Caves, Colonel Kuzume, surrounded by his staff, burned the colors of the 222nd Regiment and, according to some American reports, disemboweled himself in the tradition of the Samurai. Japanese reports of the Biak action state that Colonel Kuzume did not die then but was killed in action or committed suicide some days later. Whatever the cause and date of his death, on the night of June 21-22 Colonel Kuzume had instructed the forces remaining in the West Caves to withdraw to the north and west. Many of the remaining troops of the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 222nd Regiment, who had originally held the low ridge north of Mokmer Drome, had already been killed or had moved north, and most of the Japanese killed by the 186th Regiment during the night of June 21-22 were identified as members of the 221st Regiment, elements of which had been included in the reinforcements sent to Biak after Z Day. At 4:00 am on June 22, the Japanese launched another attack, relying on stealth, hand grenades, and bayonets. Japanese poured out of the caves and rushed northwest up the road toward the lines of the 186th Infantry, attempting to escape to the west or north. At 2100 Japanese infantry, supported by light machine guns and light mortars, hit the southeast flank of the American regiment. When the Japanese were about fifty yards away, the 186th Infantry's .50-caliber machine guns opened fire and broke up the attack. Undaunted, the Japanese made another break-through attempt about midnight, this time supported only by light mortars. Machine guns, both .50- and .30-caliber, aided by Company G's 60-mm. mortars, forced the enemy to withdraw for a second time. This final assault was so fierce that the enemy reached the 186th's foxholes, resulting in hand-to-hand combat across the regiment's southern flank. Mortar fire eventually scattered the disorganized enemy, though small groups of Japanese soldiers continued to mount sporadic attacks until dawn. Haney's 1st Battalion continued to face enemy resistance at the West Caves; however, after dropping two 500-pound TNT charges into one of the cave entrances, the Americans initially reported the caves cleared. This assessment proved premature when another small group of Japanese attempted to breach the 186th Regiment's lines later that night.   On the following morning, Haney's 1st Battalion set up a permanent camp around the various caves and indentations, continuing their search through the area. Although the remaining Japanese troops were trapped in a hopeless situation, they managed to hold their ground. It wasn't until the afternoon of June 25 that any soldiers managed to access the caves, but without making any deep inroads. It wasn't until June 27 that patrols reached the innermost parts of the West Caves. The stench of rotting Japanese bodies was revolting, and the sight nauseating. The entire cave area was strewn with Japanese bodies or parts of bodies. One gruesome area had apparently been used as an aid station and another possibly as a butcher shop for cannibalistically inclined survivors of the carnage since June 18. Three more Japanese were killed in the caves during the day, and large quantities of equipment and documents were found. Because of the advanced stage of decomposition of many of the dead, a complete count of Japanese bodies could not be made, but before overpowering odors drove the patrols out of the caves 125 more or less whole bodies were counted. This was considered a minimum figure, for no estimate could be made of the numbers of Japanese represented by separated arms, legs, or torsos and it was impossible to guess how many Japanese had been sealed in smaller caves or crevices by artillery and mortar fire or by explosions of TNT and Japanese ammunition within the caves. With the suppression of Japanese cave positions near Mokmer airfield, the strip was finally operational, and P-40s and B-24s started using it from June 22. Between June 22 and 24, the 186th Regiment also took down some Japanese positions northwest of its perimeter. By June 25, Colonel Newman managed to subdue the Teardrop position. Despite lacking supplies and water, some Japanese managed to flee westward, where the 34th Regiment would eventually clean up the area by the end of June. Over at the East Caves from 7 through 10 June the 4.2-inch mortars of the 2d Platoon, Company D, 641st Tank Destroyer Battalion, lobbed over 1,000 shells into the East Caves area. On the 9th and 10th, tanks in LCT's cruising offshore added their fire, and on the latter day the 205th and 947th Field Artillery Battalions swung into action against the East Caves. Bombardments by artillery, mortars, tanks, and destroyers continued from 11-13 June, but the Japanese still managed to deny to the HURRICANE. Task Force the use of the coastal road during much of the period. In between artillery and naval gunfire concentrations, elements of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, probed more deeply into the Japanese positions from the north and northeast and located the north flank of the main enemy defenses. By noon on the 13th, the combination of American fire and infantry action had succeeded in silencing enough of the Japanese fire so that truck convoys could safely use the coastal road without interruptions for the first time. Infantry patrolling and all types of bombardment continued from 14 through 23 June, but the Japanese still occasionally harassed truck convoys along the coastal road. On the 23d or 24th (the records are contradictory) there was undertaken a series of aerial bombardment missions which are among the shortest on record. Fifth Air Force B-25's, based on Mokmer Drome, took off from that field to skip-bomb the East Caves. Although most of the bombs missed the main sump holes, the air missions did cause many explosions and started a number of fires in the East Caves. For a few days, at least, almost all the enemy fire was silenced. On 27 June Company E, 542d Engineer, Boat and Shore Regiment, started to construct a jetty near Mokmer, and in connection with this mission began working a gravel pit at the base of the ridge northwest of the village. Japanese mortar and rifle fire from the East Caves impeded the latter work and on 29 June 4.2-inch mortars and tanks had to be moved back into the area to shell the caves and protect the engineers. Within three days the mortars fired over 800 rounds into the caves. The engineer company, borrowing bazookas from an infantry unit, sent its own patrols into the caves, and Company I, 163d Infantry, sent patrols back into the area from the north. On 30 June the 205th Field Artillery Battalion sent one gun of Battery C to a position near Mokmer village to place about 800 rounds of smoke and high explosive shells into the caves. Light harassing fire continued, however, and on 3 July elements of Company E, 542d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment, moved into the caves under cover of tank fire from the base of the ridge. Some tunnels were sealed shut, twelve Japanese were killed, and two light machine guns were captured. Almost simultaneously, Company E, 163d Infantry, pushed into the caves from Mokmer village. Neither the engineer nor the infantry unit met as much resistance as had been anticipated. Patrolling throughout the caves was continued on the 4th and 5th, and on the latter day a platoon of Company E, 163d Infantry, entered the larger sump holes, where were found many automatic weapons, mortars, rifles, all types of ammunition, food, clothing, cooking utensils, and pioneer equipment. The next day loudspeakers and interpreters were sent into the caves to persuade the few remaining Japanese to surrender. Only ten Japanese, of whom eight were killed, were seen in the area. The Japanese who had lived uninjured through the heavy bombardments since 7 June had evacuated the East Caves. The few Japanese left alive in the East Caves after 6 July were still capable of causing some trouble. On 15 July six souvenir hunters of the Royal Australian Air Force (elements of which were staging through Biak for operations farther west) were killed near the caves. Tanks and infantry were sent into the area to mop up the remaining Japanese and recover the Australian dead. On the 16th and 17th, three badly mutilated bodies of Australian airmen were found and two Japanese machine gun nests were wiped out. On the 20th the infantry and tanks returned to the caves, found the other Australian bodies, and eliminated the last enemy resistance. Meanwhile, the determined and resourceful defenders of the Ibdi Pocket resisted repeated attacks from the 2nd Battalion, 163rd Regiment and ongoing artillery barrages. By the end of June, the Japanese had been pushed into a 600-yard-square area, with American patrols continuing the cleanup in July. Through the use of bazookas, flamethrowers, tanks, and artillery, the remaining Japanese were gradually confined to an even smaller area until the pocket was cleared on July 28. The American forces would then mop-up the remainder of the island up to August 20, accounting for a total of 4700 Japanese dead and 220 captured since the start of the battle. Total American casualties were an estimated 400 killed, 2000 wounded, 150 injured in action and 5 missing. Additionally, there were 7234 non-battle casualties due to sickness, many of whom were returned to duty. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Operation Ichi-Go was continuing its horror show deeper into central China. B-29 Superfortresses are arriving to the scene, first from India and China, but as the Pacific Island hoping campaign makes more and more progress, soon they will be lifting off from airfields much closer to the Japanese home islands.

PREVIEW: #SAIPAN: Conversation with colleague Cleo Paskal of FDD in Saipan of the Northern Mariana Islands re the 80th anniversary of the USMC, USN, USA landings and liberation of Saipan from the Imperial Japanese Empire -- on Green Beach on June 15. More tonight and on Monday. 1945 Fat Man plutonium bomb on Tinian, Northern Marinas

Last time we spoke about the fall of Mogaung. General Vinegar Joe's strategy against Myitkyina had turned into a brutal struggle. Stillwells forces were besieging the town while the Chindits battled for Mogaung, diverting Japanese reinforcements in the process. Despite heavy losses, the Chindits captured Naungkyaiktaw with the help of flamethrowers. Gradually Mogaung fell, but the credit was wrongly attributed to the Chinese while it should have gone to the Chindits. Mytikyina withstood endless attacks and at Biak the Americans repelled numerous Japanese assaults. The 2nd battalion, 162nd regiment tossed over to help, but this further complicated supply issues on the plateau. Progress was deeply hampered by water shortages, difficult jungle terrain and supply roads needing repairs. Lastly the battle for Lone Tree Hill saw absolute mayhem and horror, something the Americans and Japanese would never forget. This episode is the Invasion of Saipan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    The use of US fleet and escort carriers during the landings on Hollandia and Aitape had convinced Admiral Toyoda's staff that the American naval force could be drawn into decisive naval battle off of New Guinea. On June 1st, however, a reconnaissance flight had discovered a major build up of enemy vessels at Majuro, suggesting that a new invasion was just days away. The Imperial General Staff reeled with shock in response to this, not knowing whether the Allied objective was Biak, Palau or Saipan. Aboard Toyoda's flagship Oyodo in Tokyo Bay, the naval staff debated, and the debate degenerated into argument. The truth was that no one had a “feel” for the American strategy except one lone staff intelligence officer, Commander Nakajima Chikataka. He said it had to be Saipan. But his fellow staff members scoffed at this. Even the Americans did not have such power that they could mount an operation the size of the three-pronged New Guinea strike as just a feint, they argued. They  further argued that an enemy airfield at Biak would allow the Allies to bomb the Philippines and Palau with their long-range B-24 Liberators. And the American carriers were in evidence off New Guinea, unlike at Majuro. Thinking that Nakajima must be seeing things, Toyoda thus decided that Biak had to be the place. The Japanese unleashed Operation KON, diverting an enormous sum of their naval and air resources to bolster Biak in response to the perceived allied advance.   However, in actuality, Admiral Spruance was gathering the largest Pacific force yet seen at Pearl Harbor, comprising approximately 535 ships, ranging from battleships to tugs, carrying a total of 127,500 personnel of Lt-General Holland Smith's 5th Amphibious Corps.  They were going to hit Saipan, Tinian and Guam. Designated “Operation Forager” it was to be the end game of Admiral Nimitz Central thurst into the Pacific. Taking these would see strategic airfields only 1400 miles away from Tokyo in the hands of the allies. From there the US Army Air Force could begin their long wished bombing campaign against the Japanese home islands. For the Japanese, Saipan in particular was considered a “home island”. Japan had seized Saipan during WW1 from the German Colonial Empire and she heavily invested in “Japanizing” the island. The Japanese government had encouraged southern Japanese and Okinawans to colonize Saipan, introducing Japanese language and culture to the indigenous peoples there. It was more than just another Imperial asset, in many ways Saipan had become a home island. Part of the new operation would include Admiral Mitscher commanding the Fast Carrier Task Force 58 stationed at the Marshalls, along with Vice-Admiral Charles Lockwood overseeing 19 submarines and Rear-Admiral Ralph Christie leading 9 submarines operating across the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Operation Forager entailed Admiral Turner's Task Force capturing Saipan and Tinian sequentially with the 2nd and 4th Marine Divisions, followed by the 3rd Marine Division and the 1st Provisional Marine Brigade attacking Guam. The 27th Division was reserved for Saipan and the 77th Division for Guam. The outcome on Saipan would determine subsequent operations, with the Southern Landing Forces also held in reserve for the Northern Landing Forces until June 25. Lieutenant-General Holland Smith's strategy for the Saipan invasion involved landing four assault regiments simultaneously on four beaches in the Charan Kanoa area. Following three days of continuous air and naval bombardments, Major-General Thomas Watson's 2nd Marine Division's 6th and 8th Marine Regiments were to land north of Afetna Point on the Red and Green Beaches, while Major-General Harry Schmidt's 4th Marine Division's 23rd and 25th Marine Regiments would land south of Afetna Point on the Blue and Yellow Beaches. Thomas Watson was then going to seize the Charan Kanoa Airstrip, afterwards he would sing northeast towards Mounts Tipo Pale and Tapotchau while Schmidt secured Charan Kanoa village, the Aslito Airfield and the islands southern end before moving north to take part in clearing the remainder of Saipan. Alongside this, Smith planned to dispatch the reserve 2nd and 24th Marine Regiments of Lt Colonel Walter Stuart and Lt Colonel Guy Tannyhill over to Scarlet and Black Beaches in the north to divert enemy attention. Two innovations would be tried for Forager. The 4th Marine Division had recently and optimistically accepted the proposal to employ amphibian tanks inland. This was a large part due to the unit's experiences on low and level Roi-Namur, during the Kwajalein assault. The 2nd Marine Division on the other hand, having fought on rugged Guadalcanal and experienced the limitations of LVTs during the Tarawa assault, were more pessimistic. General Watson convinced General Smith that he would only allow the amphibian tanks to advance inland far enough to clear the immediate beach area and that only the first troop-carrying LVT wave would follow them to discharge their troops beyond the beach. All subsequent waves would discharge troops on the beach and not proceed beyond the Tractor Control Line. The reason for this pessimism was that the Marines expected the terrain to be rougher than some predicted. They feared control would be lost over troops embarked in LVTs, concentrated groups of men would be exposed to fire, and that more amtracs would be lost to enemy fire inland. They were needed to return to the Transfer Control Line on the reef's lip where support troops boated aboard LCVPs would be picked up and run to shore in the amtracs. Furthermore, LVTs are not designed for cross-country movement. They have comparatively narrow tracks and low ground clearance, making it easy for them to "belly-out" on rough ground, rocks, and stumps. Amphibian tanks are poor substitutes for medium tanks for the same reasons, and in addition they have very thin armor and a high profile. The Marine divisions commenced training for Saipan in March, conducting a significant rehearsal between May 14 and 20 off Maui. With all arrangements in place, Admiral Turner's invasion fleet was poised to depart Hawaii by late May. The slower LSTs were scheduled to set sail for Eniwetok on May 25, followed by the troop transports departing Hawaii five days later. Turner's vessels were slated to gather at Eniwetok on June 6, coinciding with the departure of Admiral Mitscher's carriers from Majuro for the Marianas. Between June 8 and 10, Turner then embarked from Eniwetok in echelons, experiencing a relatively uneventful voyage towards Saipan. Meanwhile, the Japanese expedited the deployment of 31st Army units to the Central Pacific, successfully positioning most of their line units at designated locations by the end of May. Additionally, certain disparate units of the 31st Army underwent reorganization into seven independent mixed brigades and five independent mixed regiments to enhance chain of command and troop cohesion.   This, however, did not allow adequate time to prepare inland defenses in multiple lines, especially in the case of the Marianas. The larger elevated islands within the Marianas offered strategic advantages for establishing multi-layered defenses, creating strongholds on key terrain features, and positioning reserves centrally for potential counterattacks. However, the Japanese were unable to fully exploit these opportunities due to various factors. Insufficient troop deployments occurred until less than two months prior to the US assault, leaving limited time for comprehensive inland defense preparations. Many coastal defense and anti-aircraft guns were discovered still packed and alongside incomplete positions, due to a shortage of construction materials for fortified installations. Consequently, the high ground at the island's center remained unprepared for defense, and several beach defenses were unfinished. There was an overestimation of the natural ruggedness of the terrain to impede American advances. Despite this, some coastal defense guns were strategically placed within earlier reinforced concrete structures. While Saipan and Tinian lacked significant artificial underwater or beach obstacles, mines were sporadically utilized on their shores. The Japanese also suffered from a lack of anti-aircraft ammunition to counter the enemy air superiority. Over on Saipan, Lieutenant-General Saito Yoshitsugu commanded a significant military presence including the 43rd Division, the 47th Independent Mixed Brigade, the 9th Tank Regiment, the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment, and various support units totaling 25,500 personnel. Despite its apparent strength, a convoy carrying reinforcements for the 43rd Division was ambushed by two American submarines between June 4 and 6, resulting in the loss of five transports and nearly decimating the 118th Regiment. Saito, overseeing Saipan as commander of the Northern Marianas Army Group, was joined by Admiral Nagumo's Central Pacific Area Fleet headquarters, bolstering defense with an additional 6,200 naval personnel. Additionally, General Obata, stationed at Saipan's army headquarters, delegated authority to his chief of staff, Major-General Igeta Keiji, as he inspected defenses in Palau during the American landings. Saito organized Saipan's defense into five sectors, anticipating landings on the island's west and northwest coasts, Tanapag Harbor, and the north shore of Magicienne Bay. The Japanese strategy relied on tank-infantry counterattacks launched at night from designated positions to repel enemy landings. However, American bombardment of Saipan commenced before Saito's forces could fully fortify their positions. Large numbers of heavy weapons, ranging from 200mm mortars to 5-inch coastal defense guns and literally dozens of searchlights and antiaircraft guns still remained in naval depots or loaded on railroad cars or still packed in cosmoline near partially excavated gun positions. The high ground in the island's center had received little attention in the defensive preparations; and, indeed, beach defenses themselves were in many cases far from complete. In so far as training in defensive warfare is concerned, Japanese forces displayed a marked deficiency; there was little evidence of organization of the ground, the principal airfield (Aslito) was virtually undefended against ground troops, and their counterattack plans were poorly conceived. On the afternoon of June 11, Mitscher's Task Force 58, began a relentless three and a half day heavy bombardment against Saipan, Tinian, Guam, Rota, and Pagan. This onslaught, featuring a 225-plane fighter sweep, caught the Japanese off guard in the Marianas and resulted in the destruction of 150 enemy aircraft, securing air superiority for the rest of the campaign. On June 12th and 13th, 216 carrier bombers hit Guam, Saipan, and Tinian, while Admiral Hoover's B-24s started pounding the southern Marianas airfields. You might be raising your eyebrows, the B-24's belonged to Task Force 57, under Vice-Admiral John Hoover, which was currently formed by the 5th Air Force over on Cape Gloucester and New Guinea; the 7th Air Force and 4th Marine Aircraft Wing on the Marshall and Gilbert Islands; and the 13th Air Force on the Admiralty Islands. Concurrently, two Japanese convoys were intercepted, leading to the sinking of 16 enemy vessels. The first of these, was a formation of 20 ships, fleeing on a northerly course 125 miles west of Pagan Island. They were attacked on the afternoon of the 12th by planes of Rear Admiral William K. Harrill's Task Group 58.4. Further  south, 135 miles west of Guam, the other convoy of six ships became the target for a special attack mission sent by Rear Admiral Joseph J. Clark, commanding Task Group 58.1. Between the two attacks 12 cargo ships, three submarine chasers, and one patrol-torpedo boat were sunk. Additionally, on June 13th, Mitscher's fast battleships shelled Saipan, though with limited success. The following day, Turner's fire support ships joined Task Force 58 in bombarding Saipan's beaches and installations, effectively neutralizing most of the Japanese coastal defenses and anti-aircraft positions. Despite some damage inflicted on the destroyer Braine and battleship California, Saito's defenses were not completely destroyed, indicating that the preliminary bombardment was not entirely effective. Meanwhile, underwater demolition teams surveyed the landing beaches, clearing them of mines and obstacles and creating gaps in the reefs for the amphibious approach. Smith's reserves staged a demonstration off Tanapag to divert Japanese attention, while carrier groups were dispatched to prevent enemy aircraft staging through the Bonins, successfully attacking Iwo Jima, Chichi-jima, and Haha-jima. To deter the Japanese from utilizing the Bonins in the north as a staging area for aircraft, two task groups led by Clark's 58.1 and Harrill's 58.4 set sail from Saipan on June 14th for an offensive. This marked the furthest advance into Empire waters by a carrier striking force at that time. Task Groups 58.1 and 58.4 refueled on June 14th and were then dispatched that night toward Chichi and Iwo Jima. Airstrikes on Japanese airfields in those locations commenced the following afternoon despite challenging weather conditions. Despite facing strong resistance from the Japanese, American fighter sweeps and bombing runs resulted in the destruction of 28 out of 37 Zeros engaged, with an additional seven destroyed on the ground, while only two American aircraft were lost. Adverse weather hampered morning strikes on the 16th, but the afternoon sortie of 54 American aircraft encountered Japanese planes on the runway, claiming 63 destroyed, though this wasn't confirmed by Japanese sources. Only two American aircraft were lost due to anti-aircraft fire and operational issues. Despite airborne opposition and unfavorable flying conditions, the mission achieved its objectives, significantly diminishing the Bonins' effectiveness as an aircraft staging area. After the afternoon raid, the two task groups headed south as per Mitscher's orders to position themselves off Saipan by the 18th. This operation proved successful, as around 100 Japanese aircraft that could have intervened in the impending battle were eliminated. On the morning of June 15, while the landing craft were lowered and began the complex assembly process, the Americans carried the last air and naval preparations on Saipan. At 8:12am, Turner finally gave the landing signal and the amtracs began to approach their assigned beaches under the cover of the LCI gunboats' rockets. Enemy fire was light until the LVTs reached the coral reef's lip, at which time artillery, mortar, and machine-gun fire increased drastically. Some control craft had drifted slightly to the north and coupled with a stronger than expected current some 2nd Marine Division units landed north of their intended beaches. The UDTs had not experienced this as the sea conditions and tides were different when they went to work the day before. Once over the reef lip some 400yds from shore, the swell made stationkeeping even more problematic. The swell increased through the day, making unloading and transfer difficult as well as capsizing landing craft and LVTs. The 2nd Marine Division had 31 of its 68 amphibian tanks hit or mechanically disabled before reaching the Tractor Control Line ashore. Nonetheless, in 20 minutes, some 8000 assault troops were ashore despite the strong Japanese artillery fire, albeit suffering heavy casualties. On the Red Beaches, Colonel James Riseley's 2nd and 3rd Battalions encountered stiff resistance from Hill 500 but still managed to secure a shallow beachhead, subsequently repelling a savage counterattack as the reserve 1st Battalion was landing. To the south, as Colonel Clarence Wallace's 2nd and 3rd Battalions had both come ashore on Green Beach 1, the 2nd would be sent south to seize Afetna Point while the 3rd advanced inland. Afetna Point was important for another reason than just denying the Japanese excellent positions for enfilading the American landing craft. Possession of the point would make Beach Green 3 available for landing of the tanks of both divisions. Because of an open channel off Green 3, LCM's carrying tanks could proceed directly to the beach without crossing the troublesome reef that fenced all other beaches. Once through the channel the craft could either move straight into Green 3 or fan out to the north or south and put the tanks ashore, wherever it was desired. The same channel could also be used for logistical purposes after tanks were ashore. As a result, the 2nd met strong resistance, progressing slowly and costly against a determined foe while the 1st Battalion was being landed; yet the 3rd managed to push inland against weaker resistance, finally halting about 900 yards from the O-1 Line. In the afternoon, the reserve 1st Battalion, 29th Marines was also landed and employed to fill the gap between Wallace's battalions. It's also important to note that the 4th Company, 9th Tank Regiment conducted piecemeal counterattacks on either side of Charan Kanoa with 14 tanks, losing all but three. Meanwhile, along the Blue Beaches, the 23rd Marines led by Colonel Louis Jones made headway through Charan Kanoa, facing occasional gunfire, and successfully advanced to the O-1 Line. Despite encountering challenging terrain and harassment from Japanese riflemen, their amtracs managed to secure Mount Fina Susu, albeit with significant losses. Upon reaching the O-1 Line, heavy artillery fire pinned down the Americans. Because of the concentrated mortar and artillery fire which had struck his troops throughout the day, the commander of the 23rd Marines, Colonel Jones estimated that the light forces on the O-1 line would be incapable of holding there for the night without being virtually annihilated. In addition, the regimental commander felt that “pulling back would allow our artillery and air to bring fire on the Jap batteries a short distance inland, better contact could be obtained on the right, and the exposed left flank could be better protected.” Dillon's 2nd Battalion and Cosgrove's 3rd Battalion were therefore ordered to establish a defense line generally 800 yards west of O-1 for the night. This involved a withdrawal under cover of darkness of the meager forces on O-1.Concerned about the exposed left flank between the 2nd and 4th Divisions, Colonel Jones directed the reserve 1st Battalion to fill the dangerous gap. Further south, Colonel Merton Batchelder's 1st Battalion faced fierce resistance from Agingan Point, repelling enemy counterattacks with the aid of air and naval support. Reinforcement from 3rd Battalion units allowed partial clearance of Japanese positions. The 2nd Battalion to the left encountered enemy concentrations but benefited from the heroic actions of the LVTAs, enabling them to advance inland.  About half the assault Marines of this battalion were carried to a railroad embankment prior to debarkation from LVTs. Until it reached there, the battalion was subjected to frontal small-arms fire from Japanese behind the embankment. There the small arms fire ceased, but mortar and artillery fire continued. From the direction of Nafutan Point came shells which burst overhead, apparently from antiaircraft guns depressed to fire at ground targets. And, as if troubles to the front and flanks were not enough, two enemy mortars began firing on the Marines from positions 500 yards to the rear. Before a request for assistance could be made, friendly planes spotted the mortars, attacked, and silenced them. Much credit for the 2nd Battalion's success in pushing inland goes to the LVT(A)s of the Army's 708th Amphibian Tank Battalion, which, according to the Marine battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hudson, took “more than their share of punishment diverted enemy attention from the amphibious tractors carrying troops ... I shall always re- member the excellent support given to my battalion by the Army LVT(A)'s”. Meanwhile, Marine tanks and artillery, under Turner's command, were successfully brought ashore, although some tanks and howitzers from the 4th Division were lost to fire and reef obstacles. By late afternoon, the bulk of the reserve 2nd and 24th Marines were landed, with the latter sustaining 400 casualties from accidents and artillery fire.  Lieutenant Colonel Alexander A. Vandergrift,  therefore, deployed his battalion and moved it on foot to an assembly area some 700 yards inland from Yellow 1, near a fork in the rail- road tracks. The men had no more than taken entrenching tools in hand when a barrage of well-directed Japanese artillery fire engulfed them. After the day's casualties were totalled, it was discovered that the unit had suffered heavily, though it had yet to enter the front line fighting: 25 killed, 72 wounded, 39 missing, mostly those lost on board the overturned LVTs. Other battalions had suffered more heavily, but the real significance of these figures lies in the fact that the 3rd Battalion did not arrive on the beach until 5:27pm. However, by nightfall, only the 25th Marines had reached the O-1 Line, constituting less than one-third of the planned beachhead, with casualties exceeding 2000 during the landings. After half an hour of the Saipan Invasion, Admiral Toyoda announced Operation A-Go proclaiming "The fate of the Empire rests upon this single battle. Every man is expected to do his utmost." The same Nelsonia words used by Admiral Togo at the legendary battle of Tsushima in 1905. He had created that statement taking Nelson's signal "England expects that every man will do his duty" at the Battle of Trafalgar. Toyoda planned to destroy the American fleet. Admiral Ugaki's battleships were to rendezvous with Admiral Ozawa's carriers in the Philippine Sea to attack the American fleet around Saipan. At 6:35pm on June 15th, the submarine Flying Fish reported that a force of Japanese battleships and at least three carriers had passed through the San Bernardino Strait. The submarines were under orders to report sightings before attempting to attack, so Flying Fish waited until nightfall, then surfaced to radio in its report. The sighting report from the submarine was monitored by the Japanese who knew they had been located. About one hour later, submarine Seahorse also sighted a Japanese force 200nm east-southeast of Surigao Strait. The exact composition of this force was unclear, but was thought to be Yamato and Musashi plus escorts. The submarine was not able to send a signal of its sighting until 4:00am on June 16th. Additionally, throughout the 15th, a growing body of signals intelligence indicated that a major IJN fleet action was underway.   Receiving this intelligence on the enemy's intentions, Admiral Spruance made the decision to halt the Guam landings, instructed for unloading at Saipan to continue until June 17th only, and tasked Turner with preparing for an imminent decisive battle. However, that's a podcast for next week. General Saito was on the verge of initiating his counterattack. Throughout the night, there were various probes and minor counterattacks that were swiftly repelled. Nonetheless, the 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines faced a major assault at 3am when a Japanese bugler 75 sounded a loud, clear call on the tense night air, and with a waving of flags, loud screams, and a brandishing of swords, the attack was launched. Added to the din were the shouts of the 6th Marines for “flares.” Illumination shells, fired by the three destroyers, Halsey Powell, Coghlan and Monssen of Task Unit 52.17.3 began to burst over the area, clearly revealing the Japanese attackers. Men of Companies F and I opened with accurate, devastating lire. California joined with a tornado of salvos in front of the Marine lines. The Japanese, stripped by the illumination of the advantage afforded by their superior knowledge of the terrain (so helpful in night lighting), dropped before the Marines' fusillade. As Japanese fell, others replaced them in the determined onslaught.  At one point in the fighting, it was feared that the enemy had effected a penetration of Company I, along the coastal road. To contain this Japanese prong, Colonel Riseley shifted one company of the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, company L, into the area. The light of morning, however, revealed that no penetration had been made and that Company B had, in effect, formed a secondary line. By 5:45, the Japanese pressure reached a peak; two Marine 37mm guns near the beach were knocked out and their crews forced back. Although the main positions held, a false report reached the 6th Marines' command post to the effect that Company F's lines along the beach had been forced back about 50 yards. This erroneous report, probably fostered by the withdrawal of the two 37mm crews and the infiltration of small enemy groups to the regimental command post, had no basis in fact. Fortunately, five medium tanks arrived in the nick of time to halt the Japanese advance and thwart their assault. With the dawn of June 16th, the battlefield revealed approximately 700 enemy casualties strewn across the terrain. Meanwhile, as the 6th Marines consolidated their position and the remaining 2nd Marines landed, Colonel Wallace's 2nd Battalion resumed its offensive against Afetna Point, successfully eliminating enemy resistance and bridging the gap between Marine divisions. Further south, General Schmidt led his three regiments towards Fina Susu Ridge in a coordinated advance. Despite the 23rd Marines encountering formidable enemy opposition in the mountains and marshes, the 25th Marines managed to clear Agingan Point and extend beyond the beachhead, while Colonel Franklin Hart's 24th Marines in the center made significant progress towards the O-1 line despite facing fierce resistance. Meanwhile,  Spruance opted to withdraw the unnecessary transports in anticipation of the impending naval confrontation. General Smith made the decision to deploy the reserve 27th Division for landing. Consequently, Major-General Ralph Smith's units, excluding the 106th Regiment, commenced landing operations in the afternoon. However, during the night, Saito initiated his second significant counterattack. The Japanese 136th Infantry (two battalions) and 9th Tank Regiments were to counterattack the center of the 2nd Marine Division sector at 17.00hrs. Yokosuka 1st SNLF was to attack the north flank from the Garapan area and “cooperate with the tanks to annihilate the enemy's front line and advance towards Oreai (Charan Kanoa) Airfield.” Vice Admiral Nagumo, Commander Central Pacific Fleet and 5th Base Force, was ordered to command the attack personally. The units were still disorganized from the previous night's action and the attack was not launched until 03.30hrs. The objective of the Japanese attack was modest enough: the Saipan radio station, a short 400 yards behind the 6th Marines' lines. This objective, in itself, represented a revision in Saito's pre-D-Day policy to “destroy the enemy, during the night, at the water's edge." Seizure of the radio station area would still leave 500—600 yards distance to the water. This resulted in an estimated 44 tanks and 500 infantry attacking the positions of the 1st Battalion, 6th Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. The attack began at about 3:30, and the brunt struck Lieutenant Colonel Jones' 1st Battalion, 6th Marines,  and to a lesser extent the 2nd Battalion, 2nd Marines. The tanks advanced in groups of four or five with Japanese soldiers clinging to them. Poor and ineffective tactics reflected the inadequacy of Saito's order; some tanks cruised about in an aimless fashion, some bogged down in the swampy ground, some made an effort to break through the lines, still others stopped to let off their pugnacious passengers. The Japanese suffered heavy losses, including approximately 24 tanks and 300 men, while inflicting only 97 casualties. By the end of the initial two days, American forces had incurred roughly 3,500 casualties, approximately 20% of the total for the operation. Concurrently, General Obata had instructed the commanders of Guam, Truk, and Tinian to send reinforcements to Saipan via barge, although only two companies managed to land on Rota by June 22nd. On June 17th, the American offensive resumed, yielding significant progress, partly due to artillery support. General Watson expanded the beachhead area nearly twofold, with the 3rd Battalion, 2nd Marines, and 2nd Battalion, 6th Marines advancing northward to within 1000 yards of Garapan. Meanwhile, Colonel Riseley's remaining units secured the base of Mount Tipo Pale along the O-2 Line, and Colonel Wallace's Marines maneuvered around Lake Susupe to reach the O-1 Line.  To the south, the 25th Marines led by Colonel Batchelder advanced in a column formation, making headway towards Aslito Airfield by approximately 1500 yards. They managed to secure advantageous high ground along the O-2 Line on the northwest perimeter of the airfield. Simultaneously, Colonel Gerard Kelley's 165th Regiment also moved towards Aslito, making gains of around 1200 yards despite encountering light resistance. By 2:00pm, the 2nd Battalion had moved to the southwest edge of Aslito Airfield, while the 1st Battalion had become involved in a fight for a dominating ridge line extending from the airfield's southwest corner to the vicinity of Cape Obiam. Infantrymen of the 1st Battalion led by Major James H. Mahoney inched slowly up the steep and open slope, so that, by 5:00pm, a toehold had been gained at the crest. At this point, however, the Japanese launched a counterattack and drove the soldiers back off the hill. Reorganizing and reforming the lines at the base of the ridge, the battalion dug in for the night. Amid heavy artillery bombardment, the 24th Marines reached and secured the O-2 Line, consolidating their position on the ridge. In contrast, progress for the 23rd Marines to the south of Lake Susupe's swamps was minimal as they faced entrenched enemy forces. With the expansion of the beachhead, additional Corps units landed, including General Smith's command post, advance parties of the Corps artillery, and Colonel Leonard Bishop's 105th Regiment. During the night, Saito launched another counterattack, deploying the 1st Battalion of the 18th Regiment to stage a counterlanding on the Marine beachhead. However, the intervention of LCI gunboats and Marine artillery thwarted the attempt, driving the enemy back to Tanapag Harbor. Shifting focus to the Battle of Biak, General Fuller's forces had previously seized Mokmer but now found themselves encircled by Colonel Kuzume's formidable positions in the East and West Caves. Despite progress in repairing the airdrome, intense Japanese fire prevented its use until the enemy cave strongholds were neutralized. In contrast, the Japanese had attempted twice to reinforce Biak but failed both times. However, Operation KON drew the Allied forces away from the island, allowing barges to discreetly bring reinforcements from the southwest to Biak without naval protection. As a result, most of the 2nd Battalion, 221st Regiment was successfully transported to the island by June 12, and General Numata was evacuated during this period. Following this success, the 2nd Battalion, 219th Regiment was loaded onto barges in Sorong and transported to Biak via Noemfoor Island, arriving successfully by June 16. Meanwhile, as Colonel Newman's 186th Regiment secured its positions on June 8, Fuller decided to send the rest of Colonel Haney's 162nd Regiment to the recently secured Parai Jetty. With the Ibdi Pocket contained, Haney made significant progress toward Mokmer. The next day, Haney continued his advance, successfully connecting with his 2nd Battalion despite heavy mortar fire. Newman faced multiple night counterattacks and was unable to expand his beachhead. On June 10th the 1st Battalion, 186th Infantry, sent two companies to the point on the low ridge where Company B had been halted the previous afternoon. Despite artillery support, the two units could make little progress and were themselves pinned down about 10:30. Japanese rifle and mortar fire was silenced by the 1st Battalion's 60-mm. mortars, but the Japanese continued to pour machine gun fire from a number of bunkers and pillboxes which proved impervious to bazooka and 75-mm. tank fire. The units withdrew while more artillery fire was placed along the low ridge. On the east flank, enemy fire from the East Caves had died down, and the 2nd Battalion, 162nd Infantry, was able to move on eastward. On that same day, as Admiral Toyoda ordered a third attempt for Operation KON, Admiral Ugaki's battleships were directed to support Admiral Sakonju's convoy, assembling at Batjan Island on June 11th. The start of the Marianas bombardment on that day forced Toyoda to suspend the operation and prepare for A-Go, ordering the battleships to rejoin Admiral Ozawa's command and sending the 23rd Air Flotilla to Palau to reinforce Admiral Kakuta's 1st Air Fleet. With two regiments now stationed at Mokmer, Fuller decided to resume his offensive by advancing westward towards Borokoe and northward towards the low ridge. The 163rd Regiment was assigned to hold the Ibdi Pocket and the East Caves. On June 11, the assault battalions began moving to the starting point in front of Menoebaboe. Haney's forces faced strong resistance and only reached the starting point by afternoon. The Americans then crossed the starting line, encountering minimal resistance along the coast but significant opposition on the low ridge. As a result, three battalions reached the 1st Phase Line, while Haney's 3rd Battalion couldn't move beyond the starting line. This forced Newman to pause his advance temporarily until Haney cleared enemy positions on the ridge. On June 12, Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions advanced on the low ridge. The 3rd Battalion fought doggedly forward during the afternoon, discovering an ever increasing number of Japanese pillboxes, bunkers, and hasty automatic weapons and rifle emplacements of all kinds, manned by 1st Battalion and 5th Company, 222nd Regiment. Dusk found the unit still some 100 yards short of the line of departure and about 1,300 yards east of the 2nd Battalion. The 1st Battalion, taking no part in the action during the day, moved forward to Mokmer Drome from Parai. Due to heavy Japanese resistance, their progress was slow. The next day, the Americans continued their attacks against enemy positions, but they couldn't close the gap between Haney's 2nd and 3rd Battalions. Fuller concluded that his troops were fatigued and that the Japanese had likely received reinforcements, so he requested an additional infantry regiment. General Krueger planned to send the 34th Regiment from Hollandia, scheduled to arrive on June 18. In response to recent setbacks, General Doe ordered the 1st Battalions of the 162nd and 186th Regiments to support the 3rd Battalion on June 14. These battalions positioned themselves on the terrace above the low ridge, facing the main Japanese strongpoint directly. In response to the enemy's aggressive action, Colonel Kuzume initiated a tank-infantry counterattack with his remaining forces to push back the enemy battalions, inflicting heavy casualties and disrupting the American advance. Despite this, the Americans managed to regroup and establish a continuous line, while the Japanese sustained significant losses and were unable to execute any further major counterattacks for the rest of the battle. Generals Krueger and MacArthur were unhappy with the progress of operations in Biak, which led them to relieve Fuller of his duties as task force commander. Whether General Fuller's relief as commander of the HURRICANE Task Force was entirely justifiable is a question which cannot be answered categorically. At the time of his relief, the task force had seized Mokmer Drome. Patrols sent westward to Borokoe and Sorido Dromes had found no enemy at those two fields, and General Fuller knew they could be occupied with ease. But he had not sent more troops beyond Mokmer Drome because he believed it more important to secure an overland line of communications to that field and to clear the low ridge so that repair work could continue and at least one strip could be put in service. By June 14th it was only a question of time before the West Caves area and the low ridge would be secured. Indeed, General Eichelberger, who took 3.5 days to acquaint himself with the situation at Biak, drew up new attack plans according to which the 162nd and 186th Infantry Regiments were to be employed in the same area and in much the same manner as General Fuller had been using them. General Eichelberger realized, as had General Fuller, that Borokoe and Sorido Dromes would be no safer than Mokmer Drome as long as the Japanese held the low ridge and West Caves positions. But, in the last analysis, the mission of the HURRICANE Task Force, quick seizure and rehabilitation of the Biak fields, had not been accomplished by mid-June. General Eichelberger then took command of Operation Hurricane on June 15. Although the initial plan was to keep Fuller in charge of the 41st Division, he felt unjustly treated and requested to be relieved of this role as well. Consequently, Doe was promoted to command the 41st Division in Fuller's place. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invasion of Saipan was seeing tremendous casualties for both the Japanese and Americans. By the end of the initial two days, American forces had incurred roughly 3,500 casualties, approximately 20% of the total for the operation. This island was not going to be a cake walk by any measure, it would be paid for in blood.  

PREVIEW: #OCEANIA: #PRC: Conversation with colleague Cleo Paskal of FDD regarding the planeloads of Chinese nationals from Hong Kong entering the US without a visa at the US territory of the Northern Mariannas, capitol at Saipan -- with easy accesss by water to the casino at Tinian and the US military base at Guam -- and exploring the potential motives and implications of this development. More details on this topic to follow tonight. 1900 Guam after typhoon

Last time we spoke about Operation Reckless, Operation Persecution and the Japanese retreat in New Britain. General Douglas MacArthur unleashed his two amphibious assaults, opening up the Western New Guinea Campaign. Both Operation Reckless and Persecution achieved complete surprise upon the Japanese. Múltiple Japanese units already performing withdrawals were caught into a chaotic new flight when the allies landed and began seizing key territory such as Hollandia and Aitape. The Japanese commanders fell into disarray leaving some to seize command and order further withdrawals in the face of hopeless battles. Yet again, forces already used to retreating through rough terrain without adequate provisions, were hitting the jungle track. Morale was all but collapsing in New Guinea. Over on New Britain matters were similar as the Japanese continued to retreat under heavy pressure from American patrols. Competent commanders would lose their lives beside their men in another hopeless battle.  This episode is the Drive for Myitkyina Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Operation Reckless and Persecution were tremendous successes. There was very little opposition for the men advancing upon Hollandia, the Japanese simply did not even attempt to defend their well developed defenses there. The drive towards Hollandia's airfields was led by the 1st Battalion, 186th regiment. From Leimok Hill to Brinkman's Plantation, they did encounter opposition, but it was scattered and uncoordinated. Colonel Oliver Newman was very cautious, he believed thousands of Japanese were still around the airfields. Just before they came across the airfields, they found large, undefended Japanese supply dumps. This would be one of many Japanese supply dumps captured through the following days, as General Eichelberger recalled “There were more than six hundred supply dumps. There were clothing dumps as high as houses. There were ammunition dumps everywhere. There were pyramids of canned goods and tarpaulin-covered hills of rice which looked like Ohio haystacks. There were saki and beer. There were tons and tons of quinine and other medical supplies, which, as a result of our landing, never reached the Japanese troops at the front. I believe Hollandia was the richest prize—supply wise—taken during the Pacific War”. These types of discoveries indicated the Japanese were extremely desperate. By May 4th, Major General William Gill's 32nd Division had just arrived at Aitape to relieve the 163rd regiment, who were earmarked to take part in the next amphibious assault. The terrain, alongside the weather was dreadful at Hollandia, making it impossible to provide the needed airfields suitable for heavy bombers without some legendary engineer work. General MacArthur considered it necessary to seize and develop new heavy bomber airfields in the Wakde-Sarmi-Biak region in order to neutralize enemy bases in the western Caroline. To be honest given the track records of these amphibious assaults in causing absolute mayhem for Japanese commanders, forcing them to keep on running, it was a great idea to keep the pace up. With the knowledge General Tagami's 36th Division was still in the region and that the enemy might still seek to reinforce that said area before the allies could land there, MacArthur initially planned to send the full 41st Division against Wakde-Sarmi on May 15th, once the Hollandia fields were ready to support the amphibious assault. However supply congestion at Hollandia's beaches was thwarting such designs. Admiral Barbey proposed that D Day be postponed until May 21 and gave two reasons for the postponement. First, tides would be higher in the Wakde area on the 21st than on the 15th. Second, postponement would allow orderly and complete preparations to be made. Congestion was severe at the Hollandia beaches, where the bulk of the 41st Division was to stage. Lack of lighterage and beach space, combined with an inadequate road net, hampered unloading of equipment, supplies, and troops which were pouring into the Hollandia area. The arrival of such supplies and units, some of which had to be reloaded for Wakde-Sarmi, seriously interfered with mounting the 41st Division. As such, General Krueger decided that the operation could be started no earlier than the 16th but that unless important strategic considerations dictated otherwise, the 21st would be much preferable. Additionally, a number of engineer and air force organizations were scheduled to arrive at Hollandia on the 12th, either for employment there or to be staged for Wakde-Sarmi. The shipping bringing these units to Hollandia was needed to support the Wakde phase of the new operation, which could not begin until the vessels were reloaded. As beach congestion at Hollandia remained a major problem, this reloading could not be accomplished quickly. It was therefore proposed that the Wakde landings be postponed at least another day to the 17th. Although MacArthur initially approved the proposed delay, new aerial photography of the coastal area from Sarmi eastward to Wakde indicated the ground conditions of the region were not suited for heavy bomber airstrips. Thus MacArthur decided that the Sarmi portion of the operation should be axed and instead they would focus on Wakde Island slated for D-day May 17th. 10 days after the capture of Wakde, or as soon as the airfields were repaired, the allies would next hit Biak, where more suitable airstrip sites were known to exist. General Doe thus prepared the Wakde Landings, Codenamed Operation Tornado while General Fuller's remaining regiments were expected to seize the airdrome areas on Biak. Over on the other side, General Anami planned to send the 36th division over to perform an immediate counterattack against Hollandia, but was denied. General Adachi over to the east had more freedom to act. The 18th Army had found itself cut off from all provisions and supplies, thus deprived of every possibility of rejoining the 2nd Area Army west of Hollandia, for the crucial defense of Western New Guinea. Because of this Adachi reasoned the best move for his 55,000 troops was to perform some quick actions before their strength was sapped out. Thus on April 26th, Adachi ordered the 20th, 41st and 51st Divisions to prepare a counterattack against the enemy beachhead at Aitape. Adachi hoped such a bold action against his enemy's rear might force a major diversion of the enemy eastwards, in turn hampering their drive against Western New Guinea.  Now back in mid-February the Japanese were adjusting their forces in the Central Pacific. They had established the 31st Army in Saipan, formed around the 52nd and 29th Division, led by Lt General Obata Hideyoshi. The bulk of the 52nd division, led by Lt General Mugikura Shunzaburo had landed in Truk mid-February, Lt General Takashina Takesi's 29th Division meanwhile were still in the progress of traveling to the Marianas, escorted by the destroyers Kishinami, Asashimo and Okinami. The bulk of the division departed Busan on February 24; but the convoy would be torpedoed some 200 km south of Okidaitōjima by the submarine Trout on February 28. The 18th Regiment, led by Colonel Monma Kentaro suffered 1657 deaths, including its commanding officer, and 570 wounded. Because of this the 18th regiment was landed at Saipan to recover; 50th regiment was diverted to land at Tinian under the command of Colonel Ogata Keiji and the 38th regiment was sent to Guam on March 4th. Allied submarine interceptions of these troop movements was no mere coincidence. The submarine activities were frequently guided by 'Magic' intelligence relating to ship movements which was collected by intercepting and decrypting encoded radio transmissions. The IJN routinely broadcast the location and intended route of convoys under its protection, and decrypting these messages allowed Allied naval commanders to alert submarines in the vicinity of convoys. The submarine commanders were free to plan their interception and attack where conditions were most favorable. The IJN's faulty anti-submarine doctrine also contributed to Japan's shipping losses. The Navy had placed a low priority on protecting merchant shipping from submarine attack before and during the early years of the war and convoys were not routinely assembled until 1943. Vast swathes of Japanese shipping was being sunk in early 1944. There were two large reasons for this. Number 1) obviously the IJN was greatly diminished and thus allied submarines were operating further into enemy territory. Number 2) fixing the torpedo issue, yes those pesky Mark 14s/15s were now hitting hard and providing enormous results. In response to this emerging crisis, the Japanese established the Grand Escort Fleet Headquarters, under the overall command of Admiral Oikawa Koshiro, to coordinate convoys and implement a standard doctrine. The first order of business was to increase the average size of Japanese convoys from 5 ships to "large" convoys of 10 to 20 ship in order to assign more escort ships to protect against enemy submarine activity. To further reinforce the Central Pacific, the Japanese also created nine expeditionary units from the forces of the 1st and 7th Kwantung and 8th Korean Armies. They also decided to assign the 14th and 43rd Divisions of Lieutenant-Generals Inoue Sadae and Saito Yoshitsugu to General Obata's command, designated Truk Sector Group. To support them, the IJN decided to combine the 4th Fleet and the 14th Air Fleet on March 4th to form the Central Pacific Area Fleet, under Admiral Nagumo. Between March-April, the 31st Army was assigned the priority for shipping, so Nagumo would send a total of eleven large convoys collectively known as the Matsu Fleet to bring said reinforcements to the Central Pacific. Though the deadly American submarines would hunt relentlessly to prevent these reinforcements, they would only be able to sink the light cruiser Tatsuta, the destroyer Asanagi, six transports and one submarine chaser, so the Matsu Fleet was considered as largely successful.  By mid-April the success of the Matsu Fleet allowed the IJN to allocate more shipping to the 2nd Area Army. Thus the Take-Ichi convoy was formed to carry the 32nd division of Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio and the bulk of the 35th division to Western New Guinea. The large convoy consisting of 15 transports was escorted by an unusually strong force under Admiral Kajioka consisting of minelayer Shirataka; destroyers Asakaze, Shiratsuyu, Fujinami and Kuri; Mikura-class escort ship Kurahashi; Type D escort ships No. 20 and No. 22; gunboats Ataka and Uji; minesweepers No. 22 and No. 101; and submarine chasers No. 37, No. 38 and Tama Maru No. 7. They departed Shanghai on April 17th enroute for Manila. Unbeknownst to the Japanese allied code breakers were decrypting their radio signals and managed to figure out the convoys departure and arrival points. The Submarine Jack was given the coordinates and intercepted Kajioak's convoy around nightfall of April 26th. Jack fired 19 torpedoes from long range, managing to sink the 5425-ton freighter SS Yoshida Maru No. 1, which was carrying the entire 210th Regiment of the 32nd Division. 3000 soldiers and their commander Colonel Koike Yasumasa all drowned with the ship. Its moments like these I always find myself taking a step back. Thousands of men fighting on all these islands in the Pacific, absolute carnage in places like New Guinea, Guadalcanal, later on Peleliu….one submarine and woosh, a regiment gone. The allied submarine campaign during the Pacific War, did a lion's share of work, horrifying work. War is a horrible thing.  The remaining convoy ships continued to Manila, arriving there on April 29th. Upon reaching Manila, however, Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio learned that his 32nd Division was reassigned to the 2nd Army to further reinforce western New Guinea, so a new convoy of eight transports would resume the journey to New Guinea on May 1st, carrying the bulk of the 32nd and 35th Divisions. You can bet after hearing what happened to the 210th regiment on the Yoshida Maru, these men were dreading to sail again. They had every reason to feel that dread, as the American intelligence operators figured out the convoys departure and arrival information again. They pinpointed the convoys route, speed, daily noon positions, everything. This time the submarine Gurnard intercepted Kajioka's convoy in the Celebes Sea on May 6. Gurnard's captain, Commander Herb Andrew  submerged his boat and made a cautious approach to avoid detection by aircraft. He reached a firing position 4 hours later and fired 6 torpedoes at 2 transports. Only 1 of these torpedoes struck its mark, and a 2nd salvo missed its intended targets but hit another transport. Andrews then turned his boat and fired further torpedoes from Gurnard's stern torpedo tubes which hit a 3rd transport. One of the Japanese destroyers then counterattacked Gurnard and forced Andrews to break off his attack. The destroyer was traveling at too great a speed for its detection gear to function, however, and did not damage the submarine, despite dropping approximately 100 depth charges. Two hours later, Gurnard rose to periscope depth and found that a major effort to rescue troops and equipment from the torpedoed transports was under way. That night, the submarine also torpedoed one of the crippled transports which was still afloat. In the end, its attack successfully sank transports Aden Maru (5,825 tons) and Taijima Maru (6,995 tons) as well as the cargo ship Tenshinzan Maru (6,886 tons). Although the Japanese rescue effort was relatively successful, 1290 troops were killed, The 4th Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment was completely destroyed and much of their equipment was lost.   Due to these heavy losses, the Take-Ichi convoy finally docked at Halmahera on May 9th, where the remnants of the 32nd and 35th Divisions were ultimately unloaded. General Ikeda's 35th division, including the 219th regiment from Palau were shipped over to Sorong, with the 219th left to guard the St.Andrew Strait Islands. General Ishii's 32nd division, was retained at Halmahera to garrison the island. The terrible loss of the Take-Ichi convoy forced the Japanese leadership to acknowledge it was no longer possible to reinforce Western New Guinea, thus General Anami would have to fight with what he had on hand. Alongisde this, IJA General HQ decided to pull back the perimeter of the absolute defense zone in the southern area to a line extending from Sorong to Halmahera, with units at Geelvink Bay, Biak and Manokwari ordered to hold out as long as possible to delay the enemy advance. Anami did not like the orders one bit, as he belived the forward line should be aggressively defended to secure the valuable land holding air bases between Palau and Western New Guinea. What Anami was not aware of, was that the IJN combined fleet were preparing for the famed decisive naval battle in the area. This was part of Admiral Toyoda's Operation A-Go. Under the plans elaborated by the Combined Fleet, the First Mobile Fleet, and the First Air Fleet were assigned the principal roles in the projected battle. The former assembled its surface strength at Tawitawi in the Sulu Archipelago on May 16th, while the land-based units of the First Air Fleet continued to be widely deployed in the Marianas and Carolines to take advantage of any tactical opportunity that might arise. Tawitawi was chosen as the main staging point for the First Mobile Fleet because of its proximity to both the refueling facilities of Balikpapan and the sea area which the Navy High Command expected to be the scene of the decisive battle.  It was also safely beyond the range of enemy land-based air power and afforded greater security against Allied intelligence than other anchorages in the Philippines. Orders are orders, thus Anami ordered General Teshima to hold onto Geelvink Bay at all costs while also contuining to secure the Sarmi area as a lifeline for the 18th Army who were being cut off from east of Hollandia. While Admiral Ozawa's 1st Mobile Fleet assembled its at Tawi Tawi for Operation A-Go and Admiral Kakuta's 1st Air Fleet deployed its land-based units in the Marianas and Carolines, Admirals King, Nimitz and Spruance had also been planning their invasion of the Marianas, aiming to secure Saipan, Tinian and Guam as advance air and naval bases to allow striking of the Philippines, Formosa and Okinawa. After the landings at Hollandia and Aitape, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 realized there was very little opposition and he still had plenty of strength to continue operating. Thus Nimitz decided to carry out a preventive strike against Truk, to ensure that the Japanese would not be able to build up their air power before the Marianas invasion scheduled for June.  Intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese had been rebuilding their strength at Truk. Indeed Truk's air garrison had grown enough to be a concern again. By late March, 30 flyable Zero fighters had been pieced together from aircraft destroyed during the February raids. Additionally, aircraft were being withdrawn from bypassed bases in the Marshalls and sent to Truk. By April, the Japanese had 104 flyable aircraft at Truk: 6 G4M twin-engine bombers, 12 D4Y1s dive bombers/reconnaissance bombers, 13 B5N or B6N torpedo bombers, 55 Zero fighters, 10 J1N1 night fighters, and 8 floatplanes used for observation and reconnaissance. Moen No. 1 airfield housed the G4Ms and 20 Zero, while Eten had the rest of the Zeros and all the night fighters. The single-engine bombers, the D4Y1s, B5Ns, and B6Ns, were all at Param, with the floatplanes at Dublon. There were another 63 unserviceable aircraft scattered throughout Truk's airfields. Admiral Spruance's 5th fleet would also conduct a bombardment of the Satawa and Ponape islands. On its return from Hollandia, Task Force 58 traveled to Truk, arriving shortly before dawn on April 30th and immediately tossed a fighter sweep consisting of 84 Hellcats. 5 Nakajima bombers from Param were aloft doing a dawn sweep, something that had become routine since February. Truk's radar detected the inbound US aircraft when they were 30 minutes out, shortly before the scout's interrupted radio report. The warning gave the Japanese ample time to launch air cover. Before the US fighters arrived, Moen No. 1 had scrambled 20 Zeros, Eten another 29, and Param its remaining eight Nakajima bombers. Yet the 57 Japanese aircraft were brushed aside, nearly 25 Zeros were shot down at the cost of 2 Hellcats. Just like we saw in February, Task Force 58 began staggering air strikes throughout the day. The carriers launched full deckloads seeing fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers continously over Truk for the entire day. Task Force 58 performed 2,200 bomber sorties, 467 of which were flown by fighters carrying bombs. In all, US Navy aircraft dropped 748 tons of bombs during the two-day operation. The Hino Maru No. 2, a 1,500-ton cargo ship and auxiliary gunboat, was hit and heavily damaged by a bomb by an Avenger from USS Cabot during the attack's first day. It sank four days later on May 4. The Sapporo Maru, a 600-ton auxiliary provision stores ship, was bombed on April 30 and sank north of Fefan. The 300-ton auxiliary minelayer Minsei Maru and 20 other craft were also destroyed in the harbor during the two days of raids. While a small haul when compared to February's results, these losses further reduced the number of vessels remaining in Truk Atoll. This increased the difficulty of moving supplies and personnel between the different islands in the lagoon, further decreasing Truk's usefulness as an outpost. Additionally, the Japanese submarine I-174 was detected 20 miles south of the atoll on May 1. Aircraft from the light carrier Monterey teamed up with the destroyers MacDonough and Stephen Potter to sink the submarine. Whether the submarine was fleeing Truk or heading back to it after a patrol is not known. Its loss contributed to the decision to abandon Truk as a submarine base later in 1944. The Japanese losing 23 auxiliary vessels and one submarine, but this time the American bombers also targeted Truk's shore facilities, giving special attention to the airfields on Moen and Eten, the Dublon naval headquarters and oil storage tanks, and Fefen's docks warehouses and ammo dumps.  On the morning of May 1st, the Japanese attempted several straggling strikes against the American carriers, but none managed to cause any damage. The largest attack against the US fleet contained 8 bombers, D4Y1 dive bombers, and Nakajima torpedo bombers which survived the first day's attack. They found Task Group 58.2 and Task Group 58.3 at 8:15am, making a series of attacks against aircraft carriers in both groups. Met by heavy antiaircraft fire, they were shot down, most before they could drop their torpedoes or bombs. Only one came close enough to drop a bomb, which fell near the Lexington but caused no damage. Task Force 58 contuined to pound Truk throughout the day before finally retiring towards Majuro during the night. Based on interpretation of post-strike aerial photography, US intelligence estimated 40 percent of the buildings on Dublon, 80 percent of those on Eten, 75 percent of those at Moen, 20 percent of the buildings on Fefan, 15 percent of those on Param, and 80 percent at Ulalu were destroyed during the airstrikes of April 30 and May 1. Roughly 423 buildings and six hangars were destroyed, 44 others were damaged, 59 Japanese aircraft were shot down, a further 60 were destroyed on the ground, 36 were left damaged, and only 12 were still flyable. All of this cost Mitscher 35 aircraft, with another 33 damaged. Furthermore, half the airmen shot down were rescued by planes or by submarines.  Thus the threat posed by Truk was yet again neutralized. After this, Admiral Montgomery's carrier group Task Force 58 was given orders to hit Minami Torishima and Wake Island for mid May. Leaving Majuro on May 15th, Montgomery assemled his forces about 420 miles southeast of Marcus Island on the17th. On the 19th, light carrier San Jacinto hunted for enemy picket boats north and west of Minami Torishima. At 7:28am a Avenger of VT-9 and a Hellcat of VF-9 found and attacked an enemy trawler 475 miles north of Marcus Island. They dropped their bombs and strafed it with machine gun fire. No direct bomb hits were obtained but the target was well covered with machine gun fire. The Japanese trawler was left dead in the water and down by the stern, with a 1/4 miles oil slick and debris behind it. No personnel were visible on the boat. Meanwhile fleet carriers Wasp and Essex launched a predawn fighter sweep. A flight of 4 night fighters launched at 5am from the Wasp on an intruder mission over Marcus Island, but the Essex had to cancel its flight of night fighters. At 11:15, another air attack commenced. Aircraft dove through antiaircraft bursts with bomb blasts occuring all over the island. At one time the entire island was completely smothered by smoke and dust, but the Anti-aircraft fire contuined undiminished. After the planes left, explosions and fires continued on Marcus Island for some time. They managed to inflict a moderate amount of damage to buildings, shot down one G4M and sunktwo small boats; ut the defenders' anti-aircraft fire was ferocious, successfully shooting down 4 American planes and damaging another 69. On May 21st, San Jacinto rejoined the group and also reported sinking one sampan. Montgomery's carriers then launched a series of composite carrier strikes against Wake on May 23, further damaging many installations there and sinking a slugger and three barges, at the cost of only one plane. But that is all for carrier actions today as we now need to jump oer to the Burma front. General Stilwell was contuining his offensive, with the 22nd division advancing south towards Inkangahtawng. General Lioa's 65th Regiment plus the 3rd Battalion, 66th regiment were advancing down the Kamaing road when they ran into Japanese resistance north and west of Inkangahtawng. The 64th regiment was kept behind to guard the Japanese flank until May 3rd, while the rest of the 22nd Division awaited better weather to perform a coordinated attack against the town. But this was Burma, and Burma is going to Burma. There was an outbreak of monsoons that quickly prevented the effective use of tanks and made supply movement over the Ledo Road a nightmare. By June about one inch of rain fell daily. Though supply convoys could still move from Ledo to Shingbwiyang, the combat trail from Shingbwiyang south was very difficult. The road was graded to Tingkawk Sakan known also as mile post 164 and metaled almost to Mile Post 138. However, rainfall had blocked the road over the flats north of Tingkawk Sakan. At the end of June the situation was unchanged. The Japanese stand at Kamaing and the heavy rains immobilized the survey party and the road trace. As the flood waters rose in the valley, they effectively barred armor from moving south to Mogaung or Myitkyina. Thus on May 3rd, the 64th avaned east across the Kamaing Road to try and cut the trail 500 yards south of the Hwelon Hka. The next day presented clearer skies, so the Chinese troops initiated their attack. Once Inkangahtawn fell, the 22nd Division would hold the area for several weeks while the first elements of Lt General Pen Yukun's 50th Division arrived to the front to reinforce them. To the east, General Sun's 114th regiment were engaging General Tanaka's 55th regiment along the Lahkraw Hka. To break the stalemate along the Lahkraw Hka, the Chinese 114th Regiment had to clear away the Japanese observation posts in the hills. The 1st battalion, 114th on the regiment's east flank cut around the flank of the 55th Regiment on April 28th, while the 2nd battalion, 114th pushed the same Japanese unit back a few hundred yards. This bending process continued during the next two days, and the 114th Regiment was well south of the enveloped Japanese flank and within half a mile of Wala. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 114th then began moving straight south, leaving behind them pockets of determined Japanese who held up the 3rd battalion, 114th. The Chinese managed to envelope the Japanese, pushing them all the way to Wala. The 113th Regiment also came back into line at the end of April to put frontal pressure on the Japanese positions along the Lahkraw Hka and Tigrawm Hka while the 112th Regiment held its salient without attempting to move. Though the Japanese managed to stabilize their lines on the creeks east and west of Wala, a company of the 114th would cross the Nawngmi Hka on May 6th, thus starting the advance southwards again. Two days later, the 114th's advance became general, while on the east, at Stilwell's order, the 112th began to gather its companies to take Warong.  On the 9th, the 114th Regiment finally took East Wala and Hlagyi and subsequently linked with the 112th Regiment pushing south towards Warong. The 114th's penetration, driving deeper into the Japanese lines, began to approach the 112th's outposts just north of Manpin. By the 12th the 114th and 112th Regiments were able to maintain communications, with very few Japanese between them. The 114th's penetration further weakened the position of the Japanese facing the 113th Regiment, which in turn began to roll up slowly from east to west as its 1st and 2nd Battalions pressed on to Wala and Maran. Between the 28-30th, Merrills End Run Force began the long grueling advance upon Ritpong. K Force moved out on 28 April; H Force, on 30 April. The so-called trail over the pass was more nearly a route used by the Kachins; in some places there was no path. Twenty pack animals slipped and fell off the narrow, muddy way. It was a grueling march for men who had already marched 500 miles and fought several battles, most of the time on K ration. Before End Rrun Force reached Ritpong, it had only one contact with the Japanese. A few of the enemy were flushed from cover by the 1/88th, but it was feared the Japanese held Ritpong in strength. On May 5th, the Japanese 2nd Battalion, 114th Infantry Regiment made contact with the K Force at Ritpong, 16 miles northwest of Nsopsup, and a four day battle ensued. The Battalion was forced to withdraw to Tingkrukawng, about eight miles to the southeast. There, after several skirmishes, contact with the enemy was lost for a period of five days. On the 5th, when the leading elements of K Force were a mile from Ritpong, Colonel Kinnison began an envelopment to hit the village from north and south. The 3rd Battalion managed to cut its way through the woods and place itself across the southern approaches to Ritpong on the 6th. Meanwhile, the 89th Regiment tried to take Ritpong from the north but failed. Next day an American reinforced company attacked Ritpong from the south but was stalled by a machine gun nest. Merrills Marauders would block the trail to the south, while the 80th Regiment contuined to hit their enemy positions. As the Chinese captured Ritpong on the 9th, M Force had had one skirmish with Japanese, routed them, and begun to cut its own paths. The march was fatiguing in the extreme; fully half the animals died of exhaustion or fell into the gorges. The men were farther harassed by fevers and dysentery, but they were only two days behind H and K Forces To the south, General Lentaigne's Chindits were contuining Operation Thursday. Yet under the overall direction of Stilwell, the Chindits were no longer a “special force”, now they were line infantry tasked with the traditional role of advancing and seizing well defended objectives, for which they did not have the training nor equipment to do effectively. Brigadiers Brodie and Ricketts men covered the general Chindit movement heading north. The plan called for closure of Aberdeen, Broadway and White City before the Monsoon broke. It was now the turn of 14 Brigade to play a major role. The new Block near Hopin would cut the road and rail link to the town of Mogaung. Meanwhile Major Masters' 111th Brigade began to establish the Blackpool Stronghold on May 5. The site was occupied on the night of May 5/6, and Masters spent the entirety of the following day setting up defenses. What he should have done was immediately attack the Japanese-held village of Namkwin just ahead of his positions. Instead, he busied himself with preparing the stronghold. It was a critical mistake, and says much about the lack of enterprise from the brigade. Blackpool Block was finally established on May 7th, with the King's Own's 46 Column the first to arrive at the site. They came under fire as they dug in. For the next 5 nights they would be attacked by a railway unit based out of Pinbaw. The railway unit was using 105mm guns firing from up the valley, while troops from Pinbaw attacked for the next five nights, held at bay by the rifles and machine guns of the King's own Rifles, and the mortars, which Masters had gathered from the battalions and wielded as single battery of eight. Despite the strong defense, in one section of the northern line nicknamed the “Deep”  which was the tip of the “boar's nose,” the Japanese were as close as 10 to 20 yards from the wire. Enemy snipers took shots at anything that moved while the King's own snipers and Bren gunners occupied hidden places among the shattered trees, firing whenever they saw the target, after which a cry would resound amid the quiet that followed: “got him!” The Japanese brought up a single 75mm artillery piece from Pinbaw, with which they shelled the camp, blasting the airstrip with impunity and setting the gliders and Dakotas on fire, until May 13 when Masters came into possession of three airlifted 25-pdr guns, allowing him to hit back. Overhead Cochran's Air Commandos mounted sortie after sortie against the Japanese positions but it was clear they could not maintain the ante. The dark clouds of the monsoon were gathering in strength. After the successful establishment of Blackpool, Brigadier Calvert's 77th brigade began advancing north towards Mogaung on the 8th. The night night, White City was abandoned as Brigadiers Broddie and Ricketts marched north to defend Blackpool. On May 11th, Lt General Takeda launched an attack against White City, but was surprised to find it abandoned. It then advanced to the then-abandoned Broadway and onwards to the Namkwin area, where the Blackpool stronghold was located. Having rushed through empty Broadway and White City, the 53rd Division thus tore into the zone in strength. Takeda Kaoru's 53rd Division began pursuing Broddie and Ricketts forces. For the next few days Master's troops continued to repel increasingly stronger and stronger Japanese attacks. Masters quote “Where in the name of God were the floater brigades? White City had been evacuated 13 days earlier and 14th Brigade was supposed to come straight up here. My brigade had marched 140 route miles in 14 days to establish this block. Surely those bloody nitwits could cover 120 route miles in 13 days? Where the hell were they? Where were the West Africans?… 20 bloody battalions, 40 flaming columns of Chindit bullshit sat on their arses and drank eat and wondered how we were getting on.” In mid-May, the 3rd Battalion, 114th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment tried to break through towards Kamaing and Myitkyina to reinforce Tanaka's spent defenders and would join in on the attacks against Blackpool. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment would also support their attacks. The Japanese continued their efforts to quickly crush Blackpool Block. A Company-strength attack on May 14 was backed by artillery support. It was repulsed, the Japanese losing 60 killed. They returned the following morning, when another 50 were killed. Air strikes were called in to further punish the enemy. Then the monsoon took hold and air support and supply became more difficult – Lalaghat and Hailakandi were fair weather fields. The Japanese also retaliated through a single heavy mortar, firing 60lb bombs, note in comparison, Chindit's standard 81mm mortar fired a 10lb bombs. Delayed by the outbreak of the monsoons on May 15, the brigades of Brodie and Ricketts had managed to secure the vital Kyunsalai Pass, but they failed to get close enough to provide significant support for the stronghold. At the same time, the flooding of the Namyin river would leave Calvert's 77th Brigade unable to aid Masters in the defense of Blackpool; and Morris Force, which had successfully cut the Myitkyina road, was too far to the east to come into the stronghold's assistance. The monsoons had also hampered the airdrop of supplies, so the Chindits would have to make their five days' rations last up to 14 days. Meanwhile, proceeding from Ritpong, K Force feinted towards the Japanese supply point at Nsopzup in order to attract the Japanese attention while H Force advanced directly to Myitkyina.  On the 12th, Colonel Henry Kinnison's Marauders engaged the 2nd Battalion, 114th Regiment, near Tingkrukawng. The Japanese at Tingkrukawng were strong enough to pin both of K force's combat teams to the ground and then to halt the Chinese when they were committed. Attempts to envelop the Japanese failed. Since H Force was proceeding unmolested, Merrill told Kinnison to withdraw. K Force then picked up H's trail and followed it to Myitkyina. While K Force was fighting at Tingkrukawng, H Force kept on to a river just south of the village of Namkwi on the Mogaung-Myitkyina railroad and about two miles from the principal Myitkyina airstrip that lay almost due west of Myitkyina itself. Despite the several brushes with the Japanese, Kachin informants were sure that the Myitkyina garrison was not on the alert. To ensure surprise, before Colonel Hunter and his force bivouacked for the night of the 16th they rounded up the local Burmans and kept them under careful watch. Kinnison would reach Hkumchet by the 17th, where the Colonel had to be evacuated because he had contracted a deadly mite typhus, dying shortly after with shocking speed. In all, 149 men contracted this little-known scourge. While M Force was about to reach Arang, H Force began an attack of Pamati and the Myitkyina airstrip on the 17th. The 150th Regiment was ordered to take the airstrip, while GALAHAD personnel took the Irrawaddy ferry terminal at Pamati. The other airstrip, north of the town, was left alone for the present. The attack went like a service school demonstration, for though the Japanese knew Myitkyina was in danger, the actual assault was a complete surprise. Colonel Maruyama, the Japanese commander, had two understrength battalions of the 114th Regiment in the town of Myitkyina and in its little suburb of Sitapur. There were 100 more men of the 15th Airfield Battalion on the north and south airstrips, 318 men from labor and service units on various details in Myitkyina, and 320 patients in a military hospital. Perhaps 700 able-bodied Japanese were present when the battle began. They took the Japanese by complete surprise and subsequently securing both positions.  As soon as Hunter considered his hold on the major airstrip secure, he sent the prearranged code signal, “Merchant of Venice”, which meant the process of supply and reinforcement could begin. Consequently, some reinforcements began to be flown into the airstrip, though to the disappointment of General Merrill most of these were engineers and anti-aircraft instead of the needed infantry.  Back at his HQ, Stilwell was exultant. The brilliant seizure of the Myitkyina airstrip was the height of his career and the grand climax of the North Burma Campaign, as his forces had driven 500 miles into Burma and won engagements against seven Japanese regiments in the last six months. Stilwell's triumph also came right on time, as American planners in Washington were beginning to adopt the British position suggesting an end to offensive action in north Burma. Stilwell's bold stroke at Myitkyina would instead see the Americans issue a directive encouraging Admiral Mountbatten's command to exploit the opening of the Ledo Road and to secure enough of north Burma to protect the Allied hold on China's lifeline.   After the capture of the airstrip, Hunter immediately sent two battalions of the 150th Regiment to take Myitkyina. One battalion of the Chinese 89th Regiment, which had arrived from Ledo, would defend the air strip while two battalions of the 150th Regiment attacked Myitkyina. The other battalion of the 150th Regiment would be in reserve at the strip. They would encounter the 114th Regiment HQ and its 1st Battalion. As early as 1700 on 17 May Colonel Maruyama had also brought the 3rd Company, 148th Regiment, 56th Division, in across the Irrawaddy to reinforce Myitkyina. Following the wrong road, however, they went to Sitapur instead, where they were ambushed by the Japanese. On encountering Japanese rifle fire, they lost direction completely and engaged in fighting among themselves. Furthermore, some Marauders would continue toward Zigyun to secure the ferry crossing south of the city. On May 18, as more Chinese battalions were flown to reinforce the Chindits, the 150th again moved against Myitkyina; but repeating the mishap of the day before, the Chinese became confused, fought among themselves, and ultimately drove themselves right back out of the town. Nonetheless, the Siege of Myitkyina had just begun. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invasion of Hollandia and Aitape was such quick successes it allowed the Americans to bombard further islands. The Take-Ichi convoy improved the transportation of troops, but it also came at a horrifying cost. The loss of such shipping was yet again the paint on the wall for the Empire of Japan. Despite this the IJN was fully committed to forcing a decisive naval victory. 

The Elite professors discuss Operation FORAGER. This World War II operation secured the Northern Marianas Islands of Saipan, Tinian, and Guam in 1944. The islands remain an important strategic asset in the Pacific and JAWS will soon depart for its Field Research Trip to the second island chain. Comments, questions, please email Jon at jon.b.mikolashek.civ@ndu.edu

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Japanese counteroffensive on Bougainville, action on the Burma front and New Guinea. General Hyakutake was under immense pressure to dislodge the Americal force from Bougainville. He unleashed a grand counter offensive trying to break the American defensive lines. Both the Japanese and Americans began suffering heavy casualties, yet neither side wavered in its resolve. Over in the Burma front, the Galahad unit, aka Merrills marauders joined their British, American and Chinese allies in pushing the Japanese back. There were some issues involving friendly fire, but overall the allies were making gains in a theater where the Japanese had dominated for years. Over in New Guinea, the Japanese were continuing to retreat to Madang. Things were going so terribly, units were now being deployed to defend the western part of New Guinea. Japan was simply not winning the war of attrition.  This episode is the Operation Thursday Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Things have really been heating up on the Burma front. General Mutaguchi basically tricked his own superiors into allowing him to invade India under the guise of Operations HA-GO and U-GO. This saw Japanese units advancing towards Imphal and Kohima. On the other side General Stilwell's forces were advancing upon Myitkyina in the north, as General Slim's 15th corp were clashing with the Japanese in the Arakan region. Americans, British, Indians, Chinese were all performing operations to halt Japanese attacks and push further into Burma, but on top of all of that, we now need to talk about our favorite child born from the onion eating madman Wingate, the Chindits.  All the way back in early February, Operation Thursday was in development. The operation was basically an extended version of the first Chindit raid, this time in two waves, with 3 brigades making long marches across the Chindwin. The first wave would go into the enemy territory, then 2-3 months later the second wave would come in to reinforce them. There were large issues with the operation, namely a lack of aircraft. Aircraft were being used for the Arakan campaign and flying supplies over the Hump. Chiang Kai-shek would not part with any aircraft set to go over the Hump and not even Mountbatten had the authority to touch the issue. Regardless Thursday would be authorized and its goals were as follows; to assist Stilwell's advance; to create favorable conditions for the Y-Force to gord the Salween and to inflict maximum damage to the Japanese in northern Burma. Their principles targets were the Shwebo-Myitkyina railway and the Myitkyina-Bhamo-Indaw road. There would be 4 strongholds to be designated, Piccadilly, Chowringhee, Broadway and Templecombe, the last one later renamed Aberdeen. The US 900th airborne engineer company would clear strips suitable for Dakotas to land. On February 4th Wingate and Stratemeyer, commander of the Eastern Air command issued the essential guidelines for Thursday, stressing this raid would require the wounded being flown out from the strongholds rather than to be abandoned as was the case with the first expedition. Stratemeyer added orders to bomb the stronghold areas prior to their establishment, though Wingate had instead favored diversionary bombings of Rangoon, Mandalay and Bangkok.  On February 5th of 1944, Fergussons 16th brigade kicked off first from Ledo and onlookers would remark they looked more like a mule train than a commando force. There were elephants, 250 bullocks, 547 horses and 31314 mules assigned to the operation. Fergusson's 4000 men took 500 mules, fully laden along with them. They avoided Japanese forces by traversing exceptionally difficult terrain. It would be a full month before all Brigade Battalions crossed the Chindwin river. The main target was Indaw, although two Columns were tasked to attack the town of Lonkin, in the Kachin Hills and 20 miles west of Kamaing. Two gliders, loaded with folding boats, outboard engines, and gasoline, were towed by air to the Chindwin River and softly set down on a sandbar. Not only were the necessities delivered to Fergusson, but also for reuse the pair of C-4As were plucked from the scene by a C-47. Wingate traveled with Fergusson and his men for the first the start of the grueling ascent up the Paktai. They faced mud slides, torrential rain, the usual Burma experiences. It would take them all of February to reach the Chindwin, after that it was another 200 miles to their target of Indaw. Wingate departed after the first few days, but would come back over by aircraft to observe the crossing of the Chindwin. Fergusson had been critical of Wingate in January, describing him as a liar, but he continued to believe in the man. “Wingate was sometimes wrong in small things but never in big.' When Wingate met Fergusson he showed up with an entourage of war correspondents, trying to publicize the Chindits activities. He began talking to them of a new fad he came across, turtle eggs which he declared provided singular nourishment. Like so many of Wingate's eccentric ideas, no one favored it. Turtles' eggs were found to be no more appetizing than those of any other reptile, and in fact many of the Chindits experienced stomach pains and other digestive problems after eating them. Then Fergusson had to tell Wingate they could not possibly reach Indaw earlier than March 20th. The expectation had been March 5th, thus Wingate was pissed. At the same time, the 1st air commando had performed aerial reconnaissance over the 3 selected locations suitable for bringing gliders, Broadway, Piccadilly and Chowringhee. Yet Wingate had issued strict orders banning any further overflights fearing it would give up their intentions to the Japanese. Despite the warning, Colonel Cochram dispatched a B-25 on March 5th to perform a final look over the sites, giving last minute reports that Broadway and Chowinghee were clear, but it looked like teak logs were sprawled over the Piccadilly site. Since the Piccadilly site seemed unsuitable, Brigadier Calvert persuaded Wingate to send the Gliders into Broadway. On the night of March 5th, the gliders carrying the second wave were flown in. The pathfinder gliders, first to touch down, set out flare pots to facilitate succeeding waves of gliders. However, the field proved far less accessible than expected. For many years, the local people had logged teak and during the wet season, slid the huge logs across the ground down to a river. Over time the technique gouged deep ruts that elephant grass covered, making the trenches invisible to aerial photographs or reconnaissance. Co-commander of the 1st air commando group John Richardson Alison recalled "They formed perfect glider traps, and there was no way to avoid them. The gliders arrived overhead in large numbers, and when a glider starts down there is no way to stop it. As each one hit the trenches the landing gears would come off and the gliders would go in a heap. We tried to arrange the lights to spread the gliders all over the field to avoid collisions, but this was impossible. They were coming in too fast to change directions, and glider after glider piled into each other while landing.” The next day the gliders landed successfully on Chowringhee and the airstrip was completed by nightfall. Meanwhile transports began to bring Calverts 77th brigade, followed by Brigadiers Lentaigne's 111th brigade. By the 11th, the fly in was complete, now 9250 Chindits were landed on Broadway and Chowringhee. The Chindits then began their advance east to hit the Lashio-Bahmo-Myitkyina motor supply line. Trekking from Chowringhee, Morris Force Columns headed north-east, to cut the Bhamo-Myitkyina road, as 111 Brigade's British Battalions marched south from Broadway to link up with other elements flown into Chowringhee. Their job was to stop Indaw being reinforced from the south. Thus, 111th Brigade set up ambushes and roadblocks south of Indaw although part of the brigade which landed at Chowringhee was delayed in crossing the Irrawaddy River, before moving west to Pinlebu. Broadway was held with a garrison that included field artillery, anti-aircraft guns and some six Spitfires that would successfully repel a Ki-43 attack on March 13.  Meanwhile Calvert's columns advanced over the railway towards Henu, where they would establish the White City stronghold, roughly 20 miles north of Indaw. Columns were directed to demolish bridges and railroads around the Kadu, Mawhun and Pinwe stations. It was a long and gruesome march over some very tough terrain. For example, it took Column 45, bringing up the Brigade's rear, nine days to cover the first 35 miles, to Hkalak Ga. They set out again on February 22nd. By this time, the men were tiring of K-rations, which gave calories but no bulk. Smoking was confined to lunch and evening bivouacs. The Leicesters were in the lead and reached the Chindwin on February 29th. Meanwhile, 45 Recce's columns, still in the rear, reached the Chindwin during the afternoon of Saturday March 4. It had taken them 21 days to cover some of the wildest, toughest country on earth. After successfully crossing the Chindwin, on March 12th Fergusson received orders to seize Indaw's airfield, destroy supply dumps in the area and establish a new Stronghold, to be known as Aberdeen. The Brigade continued south, moving parallel to and west of the railway. Meanwhile Calvert's 5 columns to 5 days to reach Henu. The South Staffords were the first to arrive and the Japanese reacted before they could dig in – they would have to fight for the Block. were on the alert to resist their incursion. In the afternoon of 16th, Calvert launched a bayonet charge up Pagoda Hill, with the Chindits soon engaging the Japanese engineers, who were charging down, in a vicious hand-to-hand combat. Eventually, with the assistance of the 1st Air Commando's close support, the Japanese were successfully pushed off the hill and the White City stronghold was established. For the loss of 23 dead and 64 wounded, Calvert's Chindits had killed 42 Japanese and had effectively cut the line of communications supporting the 18th Division far to the north. In the ensuing days, the stronghold would be developed into a fortress, with some airstrips becoming operational by March 21st. The time chosen to drop the Chindits near the 18th Division's line of communications was most embarrassing to General Tanaka. On January 10, Headquarters, 15th Army, had suspended movement of supplies to the 18th Division in order to accumulate stocks for the projected attack on Imphal. Shipment was to resume as soon as the Imphal operation was underway. Then the Chindits cut the rail line, and just when the supply movement was to have resumed, the 18th Division had to start living on what was at hand in north Burma. It was aided by the 56th Division, which shipped about ninety tons of vital supplies to Myitkyina via Bhamo, but Tanaka's supply position was fundamentally compromised by the Chindits fighting along the railway to north Burma. On the 18th Calvert's force took a large night drop, including wire and entrenching tools. They slaved away to turn the Block into a fortress. The parachutes festooned across the forest canopy gave the Block its popular name – White City – soon a maze of slit trenches and bunkers roofed with heavy timbers. White City, with its commanding position, became a powerful concentration of force, with Calvert's three Battalions steadily reinforced. The Block grew a heavily wired perimeter and a garrison strong enough to raise a substantial force for mobile action. Calvert regarded White City as “ideally situated around a series of hills about 30ft to 50ft high, with numerous small valleys in between, with water at the north and south. I brought the village of Henu into our defended area, so that we would have a good field of fire across the paddy to the south. I also brought into the perimeter what we called ‘OP Hill', a feature slightly higher than our own little hills, to give us good observation. Our perimeter was now about 1,000 yards long, mostly along the railway, and 800 yards deep.” Calvert now had 2,000 men inside the Block, with mobile “floater” columns operating to north and south, together with a sizeable force protecting Broadway. He called in air strikes to punish a Japanese force at nearby Mawlu. Meanwhile the 15th Army's staff were beginning to panic. Many of the officers were beginning to see the paint on the wall and were calling for the Imphal offensive to be abandoned. General Mutaguchi refused to give up and instead directed some troops to thwart the Chindits. To do this a reserve battalion was taken from the 15th, 18th, 33rd and 56th divisions and redirected to Indaw while Colonel Yanagisawa Hiroshi's 67th regiment moved over to Napin. Major General Hayashi Yoshihide's 24th independent mixed brigade was ordered to advance north along with some units of the 2nd division who would open a new HQ at Indaw by March 25th. Further behind the lines, the 53rd division led by Lieutenant-General Kono Etsujiro were directed to rush north to engage the enemy as fast as possible. All of this was still a diversion from the main effort against Imphal and it basically helped Stilwell's operations. To aid the war effort the IJA air force were also stepping up their game. On march 18th, a KI-43 raid managed to destroy some Spitfires grounded at broadway. William 'Babe' Whitamore and Alan M Peart managed to get airborne, with both shooting down one 'Oscar' each. Whitamore was shot down and killed but Peart survived for over half an hour, holding off over 20 enemy fighters. The remaining Spitfires were destroyed on the ground for the loss of another pilot, Lt Coulter. Peart flew back to Kangla the same day in his damaged Spitfire and reported the action.  The following day, Fergusson's footsore columns finally neared Manhton village and prepared to establish the Aberdeen Stronghold. After an appalling final leg of their terrible march into Burma, with progress reduced at some points to 100 yards per hour, the 16th Brigade elements finally reached Aberdeen clearing, some 60 miles west of Broadway Stronghold. The Aberdeen clearing was at Manhton, just east of the Meza River and 25 miles from the railway supplying the Japanese 18th Division, fighting Stilwell's Chinese troops, and the 56th Division, opposing the Yunnan Chinese. Aberdeen took in three villages: Manhton, Kalat and Naunghmi. Aberdeen's site had a lot of advantages. It was only two days' march from Indaw and 14 miles from the Indaw-Banmauk road. The dominant feature was a hill at the northern end, where the permanent garrison would be quartered. There were, however, some drawbacks – mainly the fact that, as Fergusson himself acknowledged, it was “highly accessible” to the enemy. The 16th brigade were exhausted and needed rest, the planned attack against Indaw would have to be delayed. To the south, on the 21st the Japanese launched a major night attack against White City. The battle was ferocious, Calvert's Chindits managed to successfully repel numerous attacks for over 8 hours until the Japanese finally pulled back. The Japanese suffered an estimated 300 deaths, the Chindits also suffered heavy losses. In the White City perimeter, men took solace from the companionship of the animals sharing their hardships. A pony gave birth to a foal during a Japanese attack and murderous mortar barrage. The foal was named “Minnie” after a nearby mortar post. In another attack, Minnie was kicked in the eye by a panic-stricken mule. They fought to save the eye and Brigadier Mike Calvert ordered regular reports of Minnie's progress to be circulated to all forward positions. When recovered, Minnie took to “doing the rounds” of the mortar positions, on the scrounge for tea – which she drank from a pint pot. Minnie survived White City and further battles and went on to enjoy a distinguished military career as the Lancashire Fusiliers' mascot. Minnie got out to India, traveled to Britain and subsequently joined the Regiment on a tour of duty in Egypt. On the 23rd, leading elements of Brigadier Thomas Brodies 14th brigade began to arrive to Aberdeen with the task of blocking the Indaw-Banmauk road.  At the same time, the 111th Brigade's columns were ordered to stop Japanese movements along the Pinlebu-Pinbon. The advance on Indaw may have been compromised inadvertently by the movements of 111 Brigade. One of its British Battalions, the Cameronian's, moved in a wide sweep west of Indaw, crossed the Banmauk road on the 22nd, with orders to cut the Indaw-Homalu road. They bumped into a Japanese patrol at night and their two wounded were flown out by light aircraft the next day. The men became hardened to the realities of jungle warfare against the Japanese, who fought to the death. Some columns were luckier than others regarding their supply drops. The King's Own columns had a reputation for being unlucky. During the 21-23, three successive attempts to re-supply them failed. Already, the columns were heavily reliant on food purchased in villages.  Wingate then visited Bernard Fergusson at Aberdeen. Fergusson wanted to rest 16 Brigade after its exhausting march in but Wingate told him to press on to Indaw before it could be reinforced. Unfortunately, however, the Japanese had already accomplished this. The 16th brigade departed Aberdeen on the 24th, heading south to Auktaw, drawing closer to the heavily-reinforced Indaw. Between them were strongpoints at Thetkegyin village. This part of the country was quite dry and the Japanese controlled all the water sources, thus the Chindits would be forced to fight to drink. Despite successfully blocking the Indaw-Banmauk road, most of Fergussons columns would get sucked into heavy fighting around Thetkegyin on the 26th. Only the 2nd Leicester's columns 17 and 71 made it to Indaw, holding a toehold grimly until they were ordered to pull back. After 5 intense days of fighting, Fergusson ordered his men to withdraw and regroup at Aberdeen.  Back on the 24th, Wingate flew down to Broadway and White City on a morale-boosting mission to 77 Brigade. After a side trip to Aberdeen, he flew back to Broadway and then on to Imphal. This would be the last time Calvert ever saw him. Wingate flew back to Imphal, landing at 6:23pm before taking off again at 8pm for Hailakandi airfield. Half an hour later the B-25 crashed into the Naga hills due west of Imphal near the village of Thilon. Cochran dispatched a special force to search for the crash and they found it the next day. Everyone inside the B-25 had died instantly. Investigators believed the crash could have occurred from freak weather, engine failure or pilot error. But since it was Wingate, there was an air of reluctance to accept it was just an accident. An official investigation concluded it had been the result of engine failure and that the pilot unsuccessfully tried to return to Imphal. Yet other theories emerged and were tested out. Sabotage was the first, but it was ruled out because the B-25 had been closely guarded at all times and nobody knew Wingates intentions or flight plans. Thunderstorms and turbulence were cited as plausible, but all pilots in the area confirmed no thunderstorms.  General Slim opted for extreme turbulence, even though the pilots' testimony also ruled that out. ‘The wreckage was eventually found on the reverse side of a ridge, so that it was unlikely that the aircraft had flown into the hill. The most probable explanation is that it had suddenly entered one of those local storms of extreme turbulence so frequent in the area. These were difficult to avoid at night, and once in them an aeroplane might be flung out of control, or even have its wings torn off.' Another theory had it that the B-25's cluster bombs had broke loose from the bay's rolled into the fuselage and detonated. Given, well how Wingate was, many in the Indian army rejoiced at his death, some quoted Shakepears Macbeth ‘Nothing in his life became him like the leaving it.' Mountbatten wrote to his wife Edwina ‘I cannot tell you how much I am going to miss Wingate. Not only had we become close personal friends but he was such a fire-eater, and it was such a help to me having a man with a burning desire to fight. He was a pain in the neck to the generals over him, but I loved his wild enthusiasm and it will be difficult for me to try to inculcate it from above.' General Slim had this to write on Wingate “With him, contact had too often been collision, for few could meet so stark a character without being violently attracted or repelled. To most he was either prophet or adventurer. Very few could regard him dispassionately; nor did he care to be so regarded. I once likened him to Peter the Hermit preaching his Crusade. I am sure that many of the knights and princes that Peter so fierily exhorted did not like him very  much – but they went crusading all the same. The trouble was, I think, that Wingate regarded himself as a prophet, and that always leads to a single-centredness that verges on fanaticism, with all his faults. Yet had he not done so, his leadership could not have been so dynamic, nor his personal magnetism so striking.” And so went Wingate, probably one of the most colorful characters of the Pacific War. In light of Wingates death, General Slim promoted Lentaigne to Major-General and appointed him the new commander of the 3rd Division. Slim, had loose operational control over Special Force, selected Brigadier Lentaigne to be Wingate's replacement after conferring with Brigadier Derek Tulloch, Wingate's Chief of Staff. Lentaigne was judged to be the most balanced and experienced commander in the force; he had been an instructor at the Staff College at Quetta, had led a Gurkha battalion with distinction during the grueling retreat from Burma in 1942 and had commanded a Chindit brigade in the field. As an officer of Gurkha troops, he had a similar outlook and background to Slim. The other Chindit brigade commanders were unknown quantities, mostly without staff qualifications, some of whom had never even commanded a battalion-sized unit in combat before 1944, and Wingate's staff officers lacked the necessary combat experience. The force's second-in-command, Major General George Symes, was bypassed by Slim and formally protested and asked to be relieved. In selecting Lentaigne, Slim did not take into account the tensions between those Chindit commanders and staff who were closely associated with Wingate, and Lentaigne, who had a classical "line" officer's background and had been critical of Wingate's methods and techniques. The loss of Wingate caused significant damage to the Chindits, it was as if they lost their persona. The month following Wingate's death, the 14th, 16th and 111th Brigades appeared to lack direction. They stayed around Indaw, ambushing the Japanese but with no major objective. As Slim, noted, "The immediate sense of loss that struck like a blow, even those who had differed most from him—and I was not one of these- was a measure of the impact he had made. He had stirred up everyone with whom he had come in contact. " At Broadway, for instance, after days of aerial attack, the 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment stormed across the airstrip on March 27th and attacked its lightly defended western perimeter. Thankfully, the attack was repulsed, partly due to superior numbers. Three days of hard fighting at Broadway then ended with counterattacks and concentrated airstrikes finally dislodging the enemy. Though the Japanese regrouped, they were again pushed back by counterattacks supported by airstrikes in the end. Meanwhile, White City's defenses were strengthened. The Dakota brought over four 25 pounders, six Bofors anti-aircraft guns and four two-pounder anti-tank guns. This would allow Calvert to attack Mawlu on the 27th. As a result, the village was successfully taken and burnt out with flamethrowers, with the Chindits then reducing the remaining Japanese strongpoints. By the end of March, however, several major changes were made at the highest level. Much of the air support was diverted to the critical battles of Imphal and Kohima, where troops were cut off and could only be resupplied by air. The 23rd Brigade, yet to fly in, was also dispatched to Kohima. Finally, the Chindits were formally subordinated to General Stilwell, who ordered them to abandon their dispersed operations around Indaw and concentrate on interdicting the supply lines to the Japanese forces opposing his troops. In early April, while the 3rd West African Brigade and the remainder of Brodie's 14th Brigade were being brought in to Aberdeen, Lentaigne ordered the 111th Brigade led by Major John Masters to advance north and build the new Blackpool stronghold, which would block the railway and main road at Hopin. To Calvert's disgust, he was ordered to abandon White City and Broadway and move north to support the new stronghold, as Lentaigne insisted that the Chindit brigades were too far apart to support each other. But that is all for today in the Burma front as we now need to head over to Bougainville. The counterattack on Bougainville shifted on March 15th. General Kanda noticed Iwasa and Muda's Units were struggling to break through in their areas, so he changed the point of attack for the Magata Unit. He withdrew the bulk of the forces from Hills 700 and 260, sending them westward in preparation for a final attempt to break through towards the Piva airfields. The reserve 6th cavalry regiment was sent to reinforce Mugata's rear while the 2nd battalion, 4th South Seas Garrison was brought forward to try and contain the Americans at the Saua river mouth. Thus, there was a five-day break in the major action while the Japanese transferred the 13th and 23rd Regiments to reinforce what was left of Colonel Mugata's 45th Regiment. At this time the Japanese maintained patrols, which sometimes got into firefights with American patrols. A number of Japanese were taken prisoner during these patrol actions. From time to time the Japanese would lob mortar shells into the 129th's sector. During this lull in the fighting, the tired American riflemen and engineers were busy strengthening the defenses. Pillboxes were rebuilt, tactical wire reestablished, illuminating devices installed, communications improved, and the many Japanese dead buried. Information gained from prisoners and reconnaissance led General Beightler to conclude that the Japanese would launch a major assault on March 23rd. It was estimated that General Kanda had approximately 4850 men at his disposal to renew the attack on the 129th's front. Meanwhile the American artillery was smashing the South Knob who were now only being defended by a screening force. On the 18th, General McCulloch launched a final combined assault against the Knob. Companies A and B of the 132nd regiment performed a enveloping maneuver and enjoyed some initial success until they came upon heavy fire from Japanese bunkers. At 2:10pm the next day the attack resumed, this time successfully destroying several pillboxes, but the Americans were halted short of the crest. On the 20th, Company B was reinforced with a platoon from A and they circled the south end of the Knob, reaching the base of the trail going east. There they discovered the Japanese could pour down just as much fire, seeing another failed attack. Because of this failure it was decided to leave the reduction of Hill 260 to artillery and mortars. On the 23rd, the Iwasa and Muda units had completed their movement, now 4850 troops were concentrated on the northern sector ready to perform a major assault. Having been forewarned by the captured documents, the American forces were expecting the attack. The Americans unleashed a heavy artillery bombardment against Magata's assault forces as they were forming up, disrupting their initial advance and causing massive casualties. Late in the evening, Kanda launched his own assault, with General Iwara's 2nd battalion, 23rd regiment and 2nd battalion, 13th regiment through Cox Creek followed by Muda's men. Advancing under darkness, the Japanese surprised the Americans and managed to knock out 3 pillboxes under heavy fire. The area of attack was so narrow, artillery and air strikes could not be performed safely, so General Beightler ordered the 148th regiment to respond with a combined tank-infantry assault. With the support of Sherman's the Americans stormed the Japanese positions at 7:25am successfully reoccupying must of their lost territory within only 20 minutes. The Japanese tossed further attacked but were being gradually pushed from the narrow area by noon.  During the afternoon, General Kreber's corp and divisional artillery began concentrating their fire on a very narrow sector where the bulk of the surviving Japanese were dug in. An infantryman of the 129th recalled: “All these big guns opened fire into this area about 500 yards in front of us, and I remember what they called a million dollar barrage and it's something you never forget–the big guns shooting over your head. It was very frightening because you wondered whether one of these shells would not go far enough. It was all jungle out in front of us and when they got done it was all cleared out. They had knocked everything down. A lot of Japs were killed by this… I can remember the day after the big attack the bulldozers came in and dug these huge trenches and we had to go out and take the Japanese and drag them into these. Because of the warm weather they began to smell pretty bad. Many, many killed!” It was the heaviest artillery concentration seen as of yet during the Pacific War. It completely disrupted the Magata unit, causing tremendous casualties. The 2nd Battalion, 45th Regiment were completely disorganized; the 1st and 3rd Battalions were reduced to 20 men; the 1st Battalion, 81st Regiment were reduced to 40 men; and the 3rd Battalion, 53rd Regiment were down to 100 men. The massive losses forced the Japanese to withdraw. General Hyakutake now realized his counteroffensive was a failure and forced to call it off.  The Japanese were in full retreat by the 28th. The Magata force, with an estimated strength of over fifteen hundred men, utilized the Numa Numa Trail and withdrew toward the northern part of Bougainville. The remnants of the Iwasa and Muda forces, covered by reinforcements from the 4th South Seas Garrison unit and the 6th Cavalry Regiment, moved quickly along a number of trails to the relative safety of southern Bougainville. The units of the 17th Infantry Group returned to northern Bougainville and rejoined its parent unit. On the 28th, the 182nd regiment found the South Knob abandoned and finally secured Hill 260. The three-week battle for the rather insignificant knoll had cost the Americans 98 deaths and 581 wounded, counting 560 dead Japanese on the knob. Total casualties for the final Japanese counteroffensive on Bougainville would be 263 American dead and over 2489 Japanese bodies counted. In reality, Hyakutake's 17th Army lost a total of 3000 killed and 4000 wounded in their March operations, including 2398 killed and 3060 wounded from the 6th Division. General Beightler expressed the feelings of many in stating that the beating administered to the 6th Division was a partial repayment for its role in the rape of Nanking in 1937. Although the Japanese would plan another concentrated assault on Allied positions later down the line, they would never again launch a major attack. For all practical purposes, the battle for the Solomons was now over. Now we need to jump over to the Southwest Pacific.  As a result of the Admiralty Islands being invaded a month ahead of schedule. Yet General MacArthur kept his gaze on the development in the Central Pacific. He needed to pick up the pace if he wanted to win the race, so he planned to carry out the invasion of Kavieng, bypassing the Hansa Bay area with a direct jump to Holland before the end of April. General Sutherland gave the Joint Chiefs an outline calling for the Southwest Pacific forces to move into the Hollandia area with two divisions on April 15, supported by the Pacific Fleet. Air, naval, and logistic bases would be established at Hollandia to support subsequent Southwest Pacific advances northwest to the Geelvink Bay region of Dutch New Guinea. The Southwest Pacific forces would then move to Geelvink Bay about June. In the middle of the next month, according to General Sutherland's presentation, three Southwest Pacific divisions would be sent against the Arafura Sea islands, southwest of Dutch New Guinea. There, air bases would be established from which to cover later advances to the Vogelkop Peninsula and Halmahera, both scheduled for mid-September, when Central Pacific forces might be ready to move to the Palaus. If the Marianas were bypassed, however, the Palaus might then be invaded as early as mid-July. Land-based aircraft of the Southwest Pacific Area could support a July invasion of the Palaus from air bases in the Hollandia and Geelvink Bay regions. If air bases on the Vogelkop, Halmahera, and the Arafura Sea islands proved inadequate to provide left flank protection for the move into the Philippines, then airdrome sites on Ambon Island might also be seized in September or October. The entry into the Philippines would be effected at southeastern Mindanao on 15 November 1944. Yet for all of this, MacArthur needed something he did not have, the Pacific Fleet's aircraft carriers. After concluding the Marshall islands campaign, Admiral Nimitz argued that the next move would be to bypass Truk and invade the southern Marianas and the Palaus islands to further neutralize the Carolines. To seize the Philippines a good fleet base would be required in the western Pacific. Nimitz proposed seizing Ulithi atoll, around midway between the Marianas and Palaus. Nimitz also argued the case for Woleai in the Carolines, 400 miles south of the Marianas. By early March, the Joint Chiefs of Staff thus met at the Washington Planning Conferences with Nimitz and Lieutenant-General Richard Sutherland, to hear about their plans and discuss what the best course of action would be. In the end, on March 12th, they issued a new directive for operations in 1944.  The Joint Chiefs ordered MacArthur to cancel his Kavieng operation and instead to complete the neutralization of Rabaul and Kavieng with minimum forces necessary. The Southwest Pacific's forces were to jump from eastern New Guinea to Hollandia on April 15, thus bypassing Wewak and Hansa Bay, with the mission to develop an air center from which heavy bombers could start striking the Palaus and Japanese air bases in western New Guinea and Halmahera. Once Hollandia was secured, MacArthur was to conduct operations northwest along the northern New Guinea coast in preparation for the invasion of the Palaus and Mindanao.  The target date for the Southwest Pacific's landing on Mindanao in the Philippines was set for November 15. Admiral Nimitz, in turn, was ordered to cancel his Truk operation and to speed the aerial neutralization of Truk, Woleai, and other Japanese bases in the central and eastern Carolines. He was also directed to conduct heavy carrier strikes against the Marianas, the Carolines and the Palaus, and to provide carrier support and amphibious means for the Southwest Pacific's landings in the Hollandia area. The Marianas would be occupied by Central Pacific forces beginning in mid June and Palaus by mid September. The Joint Chiefs, were looking to extend Allied control over the eastern approaches to the Philippines and Formosa and to secure air and naval bases from which to support operations against Mindanao, Formosa, and the China coast. The invasion of the Admiralty and Green Islands led the Americans to seize full control over the South Pacific. This allowed the US Navy to begin sending destroyers to harass the Japanese at Rabaul and Kavieng. Admiral Halsey at Guadalcanal assembled an invasion force to hit Kavieng. When he heard about the decision to cancel the Kavieng invasion, he searched for another task for the boys he got together. He decided to capture the Emirau island, lying halfway between Kavieng and the Admiralties, thinking it could be the last link to strangle Rabaul. For what would be the last operation of Cartwheel, Admiral Wilkinson put Commodore Reifsneider in command of the amphibious operation and assigned Lieutenant-Colonel Alan Shapley's 4th Marines to carry out the landing. As a preliminary, Admiral Griffin's Task Force 36, formed around four battleships and two escort carriers, also bombarded Kavieng and its nearby airfields on March 20th. The bombardment gave Rear-Admiral Tamura Ryukichi the impression that the expected invasion by Allied forces was imminent and he gave the order to kill all the European prisoners in Kavieng. At least 25 of them were executed in the Kavieng Wharf Massacre, which later led to six of the perpetrators being sentenced for war crimes in 1947. Sentenced to death by hanging, Tamura was executed at Stanley Prison on March 16, 1948. Meanwhile Reifsneider's convoy  departed Guadalcanal in two echelons, successfully reached the unoccupied Emirau Island at 6:05am. The Marines of the two assault battalions, the 1st and 2nd Battalions, 4th Marines, traveled on nine high speed transports while the remainder of the force were on the dock landing ships, Epping Forest, Gunston Hall and Lindenwald, and the attack transport Callaway. One LSD carried the 66 LVTs for crossing Emirau's fringing reef, one carried three LCTs, two of them loaded with tanks, and the third carried three LCTs with radar sets and anti-aircraft guns. The LVTs were launched, and the assault troops transferred to the amphibious tractors using the APDs' boats, supplemented by those from Callaway while F4U Corsairs of VMF-218 flew overhead to make a last-minute check of the island for any signs of the Japanese. The assault waves touched down on schedule. The reserve 3rd Battalion's boats grounded on the reef soon afterwards, and its marines waded ashore through knee deep water. The only problem encountered was with launching the LCTs carrying the tanks. The LSD's flooding mechanism failed and the LCTs had to be dragged out by a fleet tug. While the detachment sent to occupy Elomusao Island was approaching the beach, some supposed opposition caused the amphibious tractors and then a destroyer to open fire, and a man was wounded by a shell fragment. After all of this…well the Marines were told by the natives the Japanese had left Emirau two months before and only a small detachment remained on Mussau Island. Thus 3727 troops and 844 tons of cargo were ashore by nightfall, when the ships sailed; and within a month, some 18,000 men and 44,000 tons of supplies had been landed and it had become a motor torpedo base that could keep watch on the north coast of New Ireland.  As for the Japanese Admiral Koga was planning to carry out a desperate program of reorganization, including the creation of the Mobile Fleet. Admiral Ozawa's 1st Mobile Fleet was formed by the 2nd and 3rd Fleets; consisting of most of the IJN's warships. This would leave the combined fleet as a mere administrative organization. Land-based forces in the Central Pacific were expanded, their main base was at Tinian; Saipan was fortified and it became the new fleet HQ. Fuel shortages and loss of tankers to submarine attacks had become so severe, Admiral Ozawa's new command would have to remain within the Singapore zone. They would operate close to the Dutch East Indies oilfield and within Japanese waters for training. Koga also prepared a new defensive plan, with the inner perimeter now extending from the Kuriles to the Nanpo Islands,  then the Marianas and the Carolines to the west end of New Guinea. He also drew up plans for the formation of a 3rd Aircraft Carrier Fleet, in three divisions, each composed of three carriers. It looked very impressive on paper, but the reality was that the 3rd division actually consisted of two converted tankers the Zuiho and Chitose and the converted naval auxiliary ship Chiyoda. Furthermore, the carriers lacked any experienced pilots, with most of them having been lost around Rabaul and in the Solomons and Marshalls. Thus, new pilots for the three carrier divisions would have to be trained. Finally, he developed Plan Z, a strike against the American fleet the moment it entered the Philippine Sea.  For this decisive battle, that in his eyes could allow the Japanese to win an “honorable peace”, Koga wanted to be prepared to use 500 planes on the carriers and another 500 on the islands, so he needed to increase the Japanese air force by about 50%, something that would be hard to achieve.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And with that the South Pacific was liberated from the Japanese Empire. Operation Cartwheel was effectively done. The allies were squeezing the Japanese empire back to the home islands and honestly it was a good time to negotiate a peace on the side of the Japanese. But they would not do so, always on the search for the famed decisive victory. 

UNENDING BOMBING OF EASTASIA:  1/4: The Socialist Patriot: George Orwell and War by Peter Stansky https://www.amazon.com/Socialist-Patriot-George-Orwell-War/dp/150363549X   Few English writers wielded a pen so sharply as George Orwell, the q uintessential political writer of the twentieth century. His literary output at once responded to and sought to influence the tumultuous times in which he lived—decades during which Europe and eventually the entire world would be torn apart by war, while ideologies like fascism, socialism, and communism changed the stakes of global politics 1945 Tinian

#wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #usnavy #usa #usarmy #medalofhonor #enterprise #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #cv6 #midway #wwii #wwiihistory #ww2 #worldwar2 #usnavy #usnavyseals #usmc #usmarines #saipan #usa #usarmy #aircraft #aircraftcarrier #battleship #battleships #ussenterprise #aircraftcarriers #museum

After the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor, Royal Earle, Jr. and a buddy were on their way to join the the U.S. Marine Corps to take the fight to Japan. But his friend got snagged by the U.S. Navy instead. Unfazed, Earle endured Parris Island and Camp Pendleton and received training as a switchboard operator and wireman in preparation for service in the Pacific.In this edition of "Veterans Chronicles," Mr. Earle walks us through his biggest challenge in boot camp and a big mystery during his time at Camp Pendleton. Then he describes operations in the Marshall Islands before the landing and combat on Saipan, which Earle says involved the most terrifying moments of his wartime experience.Earle goes on to tell us about landing on Iwo Jima, navigating the black sand beaches, and the toll the Japanese inflicted on the Marines, including switchboard personnel. He also shares the most harrowing moment on Iwo Jima that brought a much happier ending than he first feared.Finally, Mr. Earle explains the pride and honor her feels to have served in the Marines and how that feeling welled up in him many decades later.

PLEASE SHARE THIS EPISODE in your social media so others who loves strange and macabre stories can listen too! https://weirddarkness.com/werewolf-of-defiance/IN THIS EPISODE: Defiance Ohio is a small town that reported a rash of werewolf sightings in the early 1970's, and it's a legend that still persists to this day. (The Werewolf of Defiance) *** What would happen if the First Lady of the United States disclosed that she believed she traveled with extraterrestrials to Venus? That's exactly what happened to the First Lady of Japan! (First Contact With The First Lady) *** The island of Guam is well known for the part it played in World War II – but 120 miles northeast of Guam is the tiny island of Tinian, and while it too had a part in World War II, it also contains secrets millennia old of a people that might have existed before the oldest people recorded living there. (The Mysterious People Before Time) *** Robert Nelson had no professional background in medicine or refrigeration, he didn't even have a college degree, but this everyday TV repairman found himself in the center of the cryogenics movement – and that's when things started to get messy. (Cryogenics And The TV Repairman) *** (Originally aired January 26, 2021)SOURCES AND REFERENCES FROM THE EPISODE…“Cryogenics And The TV Repairman” by Marco Margaritoff for All That's Interesting https://tinyurl.com/yaowv6j6“First Contact With The First Lady” from AncientCode.com: https://tinyurl.com/yxww2yv2“The Mysterious People Before Time” by A. Sutherland for AncientPages.com: https://tinyurl.com/yyuzyu4g“The Werewolf of Defiance” from ArmedWithSilver.com: https://tinyurl.com/y4zlhnxh (Defiance werewolf, “Toledo Blade” newspaper articles: Article One= https://tinyurl.com/y3dtkx4v, Article Two= https://tinyurl.com/y2q2c8tl, Article Three= https://tinyurl.com/y5l89z25; Defiance werewolf, Crescent News” newspaper article:https://tinyurl.com/yya7vyku; “Werewolf Shamans In The Ancient Woodlands…” published paper:https://tinyurl.com/yxka58st)“Ohio Police Capture Drunken Local Werewolf” by Jack Dickey for Deadspin.com: https://tinyurl.com/y6rpckbvVisit our Sponsors & Friends: https://weirddarkness.com/sponsorsJoin the Weird Darkness Syndicate: https://weirddarkness.com/syndicateAdvertise in the Weird Darkness podcast or syndicated radio show: https://weirddarkness.com/advertise= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =Weird Darkness theme by Alibi Music Library. Background music provided by Alibi Music Library, EpidemicSound and/or StoryBlocks with paid license. Music from Shadows Symphony (https://tinyurl.com/yyrv987t), Midnight Syndicate (http://amzn.to/2BYCoXZ) Kevin MacLeod (https://tinyurl.com/y2v7fgbu), Tony Longworth (https://tinyurl.com/y2nhnbt7), and Nicolas Gasparini (https://tinyurl.com/lnqpfs8) is used with permission of the artists.= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =OTHER PODCASTS I HOST…Paranormality Magazine: https://weirddarkness.tiny.us/paranormalitymagMicro Terrors: Scary Stories for Kids: https://weirddarkness.tiny.us/microterrorsRetro Radio – Old Time Radio In The Dark: https://weirddarkness.tiny.us/retroradioChurch of the Undead: https://weirddarkness.tiny.us/churchoftheundead= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =(Over time links seen above may become invalid, disappear, or have different content. I always make sure to give authors credit for the material I use whenever possible. If I somehow overlooked doing so for a story, or if a credit is incorrect, please let me know and I will rectify it in these show notes immediately. Some links included above may benefit me financially through qualifying purchases.)= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = ="I have come into the world as a light, so that no one who believes in me should stay in darkness." — John 12:46= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =WeirdDarkness® is a registered trademark. Copyright ©2023, Weird Darkness.= = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = = =CUSTOM WEBPAGE: https://weirddarkness.com/werewolf-of-defiance/This show is part of the Spreaker Prime Network, if you are interested in advertising on this podcast, contact us at https://www.spreaker.com/show/3655291/advertisement

This is Garrison Hardie with your CrossPolitic Daily News Brief for Friday , December 22nd, 2023. Quick shout out to Andrea & Jonah Briggs! Samaritan Ministries: November This is the time of year many of us are thinking about how we’re going to pay our medical bills next year. Before making a final decision, take a look at health care sharing with Samaritan Ministries. As a Samaritan member, you’re connected to 80,000 Christan households across the nation who stand ready to care for one another spiritually and financially when a medical need arises. Samaritan Ministries is affordable, and with no network restrictions you’re in control of your health care, choosing the doctors, hospitals, and treatments that are right for you. And with direct member-to-member sharing, you’ll always know who your money is helping, and that you’re not supporting medical procedures that go against your values. Get started today at samaritan ministries dot org slash cross politic. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/us/politics/trump-colorado-ballot-14th-amendment.html Trump Is Disqualified From 2024 Ballot, Colorado Court Says in Explosive Ruling Colorado’s top court ruled on Tuesday that President Donald J. Trump is disqualified from holding office again because he engaged in insurrection with his actions leading up to the Jan. 6 storming of the Capitol, an explosive ruling that is likely to put the basic contours of the 2024 election in the hands of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Colorado Supreme Court was the first in the nation to find that Section 3 of the 14th Amendment — which disqualifies people who engage in insurrection against the Constitution after taking an oath to support it — applies to Mr. Trump, an argument that his opponents have been making around the country. The ruling directs the Colorado secretary of state to exclude Mr. Trump’s name from the state’s Republican primary ballot. It does not address the general election. “We do not reach these conclusions lightly,” a four-justice majority wrote, with three justices dissenting. “We are mindful of the magnitude and weight of the questions now before us. We are likewise mindful of our solemn duty to apply the law, without fear or favor, and without being swayed by public reaction to the decisions that the law mandates we reach.” Mr. Trump’s campaign said immediately that it would appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Colorado justices anticipated that likelihood by putting their ruling on hold at least until Jan. 4; if Mr. Trump appeals before then, the hold will continue until the Supreme Court rules. And while Tuesday’s ruling applies only to one state, it could all but force the nation’s highest court to decide the question for all 50. “It’s hard for me to see how they don’t take this one, because this certainly seems to be one of those questions that requires some national resolution,” said Anthony Michael Kreis, an assistant professor of law at Georgia State University who has closely followed the Colorado case and related lawsuits around the country. If the justices take up the case, it will join a pile of other Trump-related matters they have agreed or are likely to decide, including whether he is immune from criminal prosecution for actions he took in office and the scope of an obstruction charge that is central to his federal Jan. 6 case. The U.S. Supreme Court has a 6-to-3 conservative majority, with three justices appointed by Mr. Trump himself, and it is already under extraordinary political pressure and scrutiny both for its rulings and its justices’ ethics. “Once again, the Supreme Court is being thrust into the center of a U.S. presidential election,” said Richard L. Hasen, an election law expert at the University of California, Los Angeles, who compared the stakes to Bush v. Gore. “But, unlike in 2000, the general political instability in the United States makes the situation now much more precarious.” In the Colorado court’s lengthy ruling on Tuesday, the justices there reversed a Denver district judge’s finding last month that Section 3 did not apply to the presidency. They affirmed the district judge’s other key conclusions: that Mr. Trump’s actions before and on Jan. 6, 2021, constituted engaging in insurrection, and that courts had the authority to enforce Section 3 against a person whom Congress had not specifically designated. “A majority of the court holds that President Trump is disqualified from holding the office of president under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution,” the justices wrote. “Because he is disqualified, it would be a wrongful act under the Election Code for the Colorado secretary of state to list him as a candidate on the presidential primary ballot.” Mr. Trump’s campaign denounced the ruling, which is likely to inflame a Republican base that he has primed to see the array of civil and criminal cases against him as a witch hunt. Politically, his standing among Republican primary voters has only risen in the wake of the dozens of criminal charges against him. “Unsurprisingly, the all-Democrat appointed Colorado Supreme Court has ruled against President Trump, supporting a Soros-funded, left-wing group’s scheme to interfere in an election on behalf of Crooked Joe Biden by removing President Trump’s name from the ballot and eliminating the rights of Colorado voters to vote for the candidate of their choice,” a campaign spokesman, Steven Cheung, said. “We have full confidence that the U.S. Supreme Court will quickly rule in our favor and finally put an end to these un-American lawsuits.” Similar lawsuits in Minnesota and New Hampshire were dismissed on procedural grounds. A judge in Michigan ruled last month that the issue was political and not for him to decide, and an appeals court affirmed the decision not to disqualify Mr. Trump there. The plaintiffs have appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court. Tuesday’s ruling “is not only historic and justified, but is necessary to protect the future of democracy in our country,” Noah Bookbinder, the president of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, said in a statement. His organization represented the voters seeking to disqualify Mr. Trump in Colorado. Mr. Trump himself, who has routinely railed against unfavorable rulings, did not explicitly mention the Colorado Supreme Court decision in a speech Tuesday evening in Waterloo, Iowa — but his campaign was already fund-raising off it. An email to his supporters accused Democrats of trying to “nullify” Trump votes and asked for contributions to help defend his place on ballots. Republican elected officials quickly circled the wagons around Mr. Trump, and a super PAC supporting him blasted out some of their comments to supporters. In one more illustration of the unusual nature of the 2024 Republican primary race — in which even the candidates seeking to defeat Mr. Trump for the party’s nomination have largely shied away from condemning him — his main rivals, Ron DeSantis and Nikki Haley, both suggested that the ruling was an abuse of judicial power. The case hinged on several questions: Was it an insurrection when Trump supporters stormed the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, trying to stop the certification of the 2020 election? If so, did Mr. Trump engage in that insurrection through his messages to his supporters beforehand, his speech that morning and his Twitter posts during the attack? Do courts have the authority to enforce Section 3 of the 14th Amendment without congressional action? And does Section 3 apply to the presidency? Again, an explosive ruling that is likely to put the basic contours of the 2024 election in the hands of the U.S. Supreme Court. https://thenationalpulse.com/2023/12/21/at-least-11-dead-in-prague-shooting/ At Least 15 Dead in Prague Shooting. At least 15 people have been reported dead and injured in a shooting incident at Charles University’s Faculty of Arts located near the Old Town, a major tourist hub within the city, as per the official statement from Prague police. The horrific event unraveled at this educational facility in the capital city of the Czech Republic, erupting fear and panic among students and faculty present at the scene. Local authorities confirmed the shooter’s elimination shortly after the attack, while refraining from revealing exactly how many victims were impacted. Eyewitness reports and visual evidence posted on social media depicted the terrifying scene on the university campus, with sirens blaring and police vehicles flooding the streets around the building. Videos on social media platforms showed bystanders looking visibly panicked and attempting to escape the premises. Prague police issued a plea, urging residents to stay away from the area and to remain indoors for safety reasons. Jakob Weizman, a journalist sheltering inside a darkened classroom, shared his experience on social media: “Currently stuck inside my classroom in Prague. Shooter is dead, but we’re waiting to be evacuated. Praying to make it out alive,” he wrote. He later added, “Locked the door before the shooter tried to open it. F—ing hell.” Yet another social media user furnished the world with a chilling image of what appeared to be students desperately huddled on the university building’s scaffolding, emphasizing the level of fear and panic induced by the tragic event. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/game-on-with-china-us-to-restore-tinian-airfield-once-home/ Game-On With China! US To Restore Tinian Airfield Once Home To Largest B-29 Bomber Fleet During WWII US Air Force General Kenneth Wilsbach shared this development in a discussion with Asia Nikkei, revealing that the military branch is increasing construction efforts at Tinian North Airfield and Tinian International Airfield. This effort is a crucial component of a broader initiative to disperse aircraft strategically across the Indo-Pacific region, responding to the escalating missile threat posed by China. “If you pay attention in the next few months, you will see significant progress, especially at Tinian North,” Wilsbach said. During World War II, the Tinian North Airfield served as the operational base for the largest B-29 bomber fleet. Describing the airfield as having extensive pavement hidden beneath an overgrown jungle, he revealed plans to clear the jungle between now and summertime. The goal is to transform the site into a comprehensive facility upon completion. Tinian, positioned approximately 200 kilometers north of Guam within the Northern Mariana Islands, is undergoing a revitalization in line with the US Air Force’s operational strategy, Agile Combat Employment. This strategic approach, a departure from post-Cold War era tactics, involves deliberately relocating aircraft to various sites across the western Pacific. The primary goal is to mitigate vulnerability to potential enemy missile strikes during periods of crisis. As documents released in March revealed, as part of the Air Force’s 2024 budget request, several projects are outlined for Tinian, seeking a budget allocation of US$78 million for the fiscal year. Among these projects is an airfield development initiative encompassing the demolition of World War II-era airfield pavements, clearing and leveling surfaces, and installing drainage, utilities, and secure fencing. Another project focuses on establishing a fuel-pipeline system involving the installation of storage tanks, pipes, and safety equipment to facilitate fuel unloading from ships for transport to the airfield via pipeline and truck. Additionally, a parking-apron project is detailed, which aims to pave areas designated for aircraft parking and taxiways. The taxiways must adhere to the Pentagon’s standards for ground control operations for large-frame aircraft, as specified in the documents. The proposed apron size would accommodate up to 12 KC-135 and KC-46 tanker aircraft and the necessary fueling equipment. Tinian currently houses one international airfield, while Tinian North Airfield, once the most extensive B-29 base during World War II, lies largely concealed by jungle growth. However, the runways and taxiways remain intact. Tinian was captured from Japanese control by US forces in the summer of 1944, toward the end of World War II. The northern expanse of the island hosted a substantial and historically momentous airfield, famously recognized as North Field. This airfield played a crucial role in Operation Silverplate, serving as the departure point for two specially modified B-29 bombers on separate sorties, marking the sole operational use of nuclear weapons to date. Beyond these historic missions, North Field was instrumental as the launch site for many bomber and reconnaissance flights conducted over Japan and across the Western Pacific during the latter phases of the war. In the aftermath of World War II, the airfield witnessed a substantial deterioration in maintenance, resulting in the decline of its expansive parallel runways, aprons, and supporting infrastructure. The US Air Force is now intensifying its endeavors to enhance the airfield’s capabilities to accommodate fighter jets, bombers, and significant support aircraft. These expanded capabilities align with the standards commonly met by the nearby Andersen Air Force Base on Guam. However, the US believes that if Andersen Air Force Base faces disruption due to enemy actions, notably those from China, or natural disasters, this facility on Tinian would be crucial in ensuring continuity and resilience in US military operations in the Pacific region. https://pagesix.com/2023/12/20/celebrity-news/hulk-hogan-70-gets-baptized-surrenders-to-jesus-greatest-day-of-my-life/ Hulk Hogan, 70, gets baptized, ‘surrenders’ to Jesus: ‘Greatest day of my life’ WWE icon Hulk Hogan has been baptized. His ceremony took place at Indian Rocks Baptist Church in Florida, as noted by the social media slideshow he shared Wednesday night. “Total surrender and dedication to Jesus is the greatest day of my life,” the 70-year-old star captioned the post. “No worries, no hate, no judgment… only love!” Hogan’s slideshow included a video of him and his wife, Sky Daily Hogan, submerging themselves in a pool of water and resurfacing with huge grins on their faces. They were both garbed with white clothing, with the former pro wrestler rocking his signature bandana and a gold cross necklace. A photo included at the end of the post appeared to show Hulk and Sky, plus others, bowing their heads in prayer. The Indian Rocks Baptist Church took to its Instagram Story to celebrate the “Hogan Knows Best” alum’s special moment.

This is Garrison Hardie with your CrossPolitic Daily News Brief for Friday , December 22nd, 2023. Quick shout out to Andrea & Jonah Briggs! Samaritan Ministries: November This is the time of year many of us are thinking about how we’re going to pay our medical bills next year. Before making a final decision, take a look at health care sharing with Samaritan Ministries. As a Samaritan member, you’re connected to 80,000 Christan households across the nation who stand ready to care for one another spiritually and financially when a medical need arises. Samaritan Ministries is affordable, and with no network restrictions you’re in control of your health care, choosing the doctors, hospitals, and treatments that are right for you. And with direct member-to-member sharing, you’ll always know who your money is helping, and that you’re not supporting medical procedures that go against your values. Get started today at samaritan ministries dot org slash cross politic. https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/19/us/politics/trump-colorado-ballot-14th-amendment.html Trump Is Disqualified From 2024 Ballot, Colorado Court Says in Explosive Ruling Colorado’s top court ruled on Tuesday that President Donald J. Trump is disqualified from holding office again because he engaged in insurrection with his actions leading up to the Jan. 6 storming of the Capitol, an explosive ruling that is likely to put the basic contours of the 2024 election in the hands of the U.S. Supreme Court. The Colorado Supreme Court was the first in the nation to find that Section 3 of the 14th Amendment — which disqualifies people who engage in insurrection against the Constitution after taking an oath to support it — applies to Mr. Trump, an argument that his opponents have been making around the country. The ruling directs the Colorado secretary of state to exclude Mr. Trump’s name from the state’s Republican primary ballot. It does not address the general election. “We do not reach these conclusions lightly,” a four-justice majority wrote, with three justices dissenting. “We are mindful of the magnitude and weight of the questions now before us. We are likewise mindful of our solemn duty to apply the law, without fear or favor, and without being swayed by public reaction to the decisions that the law mandates we reach.” Mr. Trump’s campaign said immediately that it would appeal the decision to the U.S. Supreme Court. The Colorado justices anticipated that likelihood by putting their ruling on hold at least until Jan. 4; if Mr. Trump appeals before then, the hold will continue until the Supreme Court rules. And while Tuesday’s ruling applies only to one state, it could all but force the nation’s highest court to decide the question for all 50. “It’s hard for me to see how they don’t take this one, because this certainly seems to be one of those questions that requires some national resolution,” said Anthony Michael Kreis, an assistant professor of law at Georgia State University who has closely followed the Colorado case and related lawsuits around the country. If the justices take up the case, it will join a pile of other Trump-related matters they have agreed or are likely to decide, including whether he is immune from criminal prosecution for actions he took in office and the scope of an obstruction charge that is central to his federal Jan. 6 case. The U.S. Supreme Court has a 6-to-3 conservative majority, with three justices appointed by Mr. Trump himself, and it is already under extraordinary political pressure and scrutiny both for its rulings and its justices’ ethics. “Once again, the Supreme Court is being thrust into the center of a U.S. presidential election,” said Richard L. Hasen, an election law expert at the University of California, Los Angeles, who compared the stakes to Bush v. Gore. “But, unlike in 2000, the general political instability in the United States makes the situation now much more precarious.” In the Colorado court’s lengthy ruling on Tuesday, the justices there reversed a Denver district judge’s finding last month that Section 3 did not apply to the presidency. They affirmed the district judge’s other key conclusions: that Mr. Trump’s actions before and on Jan. 6, 2021, constituted engaging in insurrection, and that courts had the authority to enforce Section 3 against a person whom Congress had not specifically designated. “A majority of the court holds that President Trump is disqualified from holding the office of president under Section 3 of the 14th Amendment to the United States Constitution,” the justices wrote. “Because he is disqualified, it would be a wrongful act under the Election Code for the Colorado secretary of state to list him as a candidate on the presidential primary ballot.” Mr. Trump’s campaign denounced the ruling, which is likely to inflame a Republican base that he has primed to see the array of civil and criminal cases against him as a witch hunt. Politically, his standing among Republican primary voters has only risen in the wake of the dozens of criminal charges against him. “Unsurprisingly, the all-Democrat appointed Colorado Supreme Court has ruled against President Trump, supporting a Soros-funded, left-wing group’s scheme to interfere in an election on behalf of Crooked Joe Biden by removing President Trump’s name from the ballot and eliminating the rights of Colorado voters to vote for the candidate of their choice,” a campaign spokesman, Steven Cheung, said. “We have full confidence that the U.S. Supreme Court will quickly rule in our favor and finally put an end to these un-American lawsuits.” Similar lawsuits in Minnesota and New Hampshire were dismissed on procedural grounds. A judge in Michigan ruled last month that the issue was political and not for him to decide, and an appeals court affirmed the decision not to disqualify Mr. Trump there. The plaintiffs have appealed to the Michigan Supreme Court. Tuesday’s ruling “is not only historic and justified, but is necessary to protect the future of democracy in our country,” Noah Bookbinder, the president of Citizens for Responsibility and Ethics in Washington, said in a statement. His organization represented the voters seeking to disqualify Mr. Trump in Colorado. Mr. Trump himself, who has routinely railed against unfavorable rulings, did not explicitly mention the Colorado Supreme Court decision in a speech Tuesday evening in Waterloo, Iowa — but his campaign was already fund-raising off it. An email to his supporters accused Democrats of trying to “nullify” Trump votes and asked for contributions to help defend his place on ballots. Republican elected officials quickly circled the wagons around Mr. Trump, and a super PAC supporting him blasted out some of their comments to supporters. In one more illustration of the unusual nature of the 2024 Republican primary race — in which even the candidates seeking to defeat Mr. Trump for the party’s nomination have largely shied away from condemning him — his main rivals, Ron DeSantis and Nikki Haley, both suggested that the ruling was an abuse of judicial power. The case hinged on several questions: Was it an insurrection when Trump supporters stormed the Capitol on Jan. 6, 2021, trying to stop the certification of the 2020 election? If so, did Mr. Trump engage in that insurrection through his messages to his supporters beforehand, his speech that morning and his Twitter posts during the attack? Do courts have the authority to enforce Section 3 of the 14th Amendment without congressional action? And does Section 3 apply to the presidency? Again, an explosive ruling that is likely to put the basic contours of the 2024 election in the hands of the U.S. Supreme Court. https://thenationalpulse.com/2023/12/21/at-least-11-dead-in-prague-shooting/ At Least 15 Dead in Prague Shooting. At least 15 people have been reported dead and injured in a shooting incident at Charles University’s Faculty of Arts located near the Old Town, a major tourist hub within the city, as per the official statement from Prague police. The horrific event unraveled at this educational facility in the capital city of the Czech Republic, erupting fear and panic among students and faculty present at the scene. Local authorities confirmed the shooter’s elimination shortly after the attack, while refraining from revealing exactly how many victims were impacted. Eyewitness reports and visual evidence posted on social media depicted the terrifying scene on the university campus, with sirens blaring and police vehicles flooding the streets around the building. Videos on social media platforms showed bystanders looking visibly panicked and attempting to escape the premises. Prague police issued a plea, urging residents to stay away from the area and to remain indoors for safety reasons. Jakob Weizman, a journalist sheltering inside a darkened classroom, shared his experience on social media: “Currently stuck inside my classroom in Prague. Shooter is dead, but we’re waiting to be evacuated. Praying to make it out alive,” he wrote. He later added, “Locked the door before the shooter tried to open it. F—ing hell.” Yet another social media user furnished the world with a chilling image of what appeared to be students desperately huddled on the university building’s scaffolding, emphasizing the level of fear and panic induced by the tragic event. https://www.eurasiantimes.com/game-on-with-china-us-to-restore-tinian-airfield-once-home/ Game-On With China! US To Restore Tinian Airfield Once Home To Largest B-29 Bomber Fleet During WWII US Air Force General Kenneth Wilsbach shared this development in a discussion with Asia Nikkei, revealing that the military branch is increasing construction efforts at Tinian North Airfield and Tinian International Airfield. This effort is a crucial component of a broader initiative to disperse aircraft strategically across the Indo-Pacific region, responding to the escalating missile threat posed by China. “If you pay attention in the next few months, you will see significant progress, especially at Tinian North,” Wilsbach said. During World War II, the Tinian North Airfield served as the operational base for the largest B-29 bomber fleet. Describing the airfield as having extensive pavement hidden beneath an overgrown jungle, he revealed plans to clear the jungle between now and summertime. The goal is to transform the site into a comprehensive facility upon completion. Tinian, positioned approximately 200 kilometers north of Guam within the Northern Mariana Islands, is undergoing a revitalization in line with the US Air Force’s operational strategy, Agile Combat Employment. This strategic approach, a departure from post-Cold War era tactics, involves deliberately relocating aircraft to various sites across the western Pacific. The primary goal is to mitigate vulnerability to potential enemy missile strikes during periods of crisis. As documents released in March revealed, as part of the Air Force’s 2024 budget request, several projects are outlined for Tinian, seeking a budget allocation of US$78 million for the fiscal year. Among these projects is an airfield development initiative encompassing the demolition of World War II-era airfield pavements, clearing and leveling surfaces, and installing drainage, utilities, and secure fencing. Another project focuses on establishing a fuel-pipeline system involving the installation of storage tanks, pipes, and safety equipment to facilitate fuel unloading from ships for transport to the airfield via pipeline and truck. Additionally, a parking-apron project is detailed, which aims to pave areas designated for aircraft parking and taxiways. The taxiways must adhere to the Pentagon’s standards for ground control operations for large-frame aircraft, as specified in the documents. The proposed apron size would accommodate up to 12 KC-135 and KC-46 tanker aircraft and the necessary fueling equipment. Tinian currently houses one international airfield, while Tinian North Airfield, once the most extensive B-29 base during World War II, lies largely concealed by jungle growth. However, the runways and taxiways remain intact. Tinian was captured from Japanese control by US forces in the summer of 1944, toward the end of World War II. The northern expanse of the island hosted a substantial and historically momentous airfield, famously recognized as North Field. This airfield played a crucial role in Operation Silverplate, serving as the departure point for two specially modified B-29 bombers on separate sorties, marking the sole operational use of nuclear weapons to date. Beyond these historic missions, North Field was instrumental as the launch site for many bomber and reconnaissance flights conducted over Japan and across the Western Pacific during the latter phases of the war. In the aftermath of World War II, the airfield witnessed a substantial deterioration in maintenance, resulting in the decline of its expansive parallel runways, aprons, and supporting infrastructure. The US Air Force is now intensifying its endeavors to enhance the airfield’s capabilities to accommodate fighter jets, bombers, and significant support aircraft. These expanded capabilities align with the standards commonly met by the nearby Andersen Air Force Base on Guam. However, the US believes that if Andersen Air Force Base faces disruption due to enemy actions, notably those from China, or natural disasters, this facility on Tinian would be crucial in ensuring continuity and resilience in US military operations in the Pacific region. https://pagesix.com/2023/12/20/celebrity-news/hulk-hogan-70-gets-baptized-surrenders-to-jesus-greatest-day-of-my-life/ Hulk Hogan, 70, gets baptized, ‘surrenders’ to Jesus: ‘Greatest day of my life’ WWE icon Hulk Hogan has been baptized. His ceremony took place at Indian Rocks Baptist Church in Florida, as noted by the social media slideshow he shared Wednesday night. “Total surrender and dedication to Jesus is the greatest day of my life,” the 70-year-old star captioned the post. “No worries, no hate, no judgment… only love!” Hogan’s slideshow included a video of him and his wife, Sky Daily Hogan, submerging themselves in a pool of water and resurfacing with huge grins on their faces. They were both garbed with white clothing, with the former pro wrestler rocking his signature bandana and a gold cross necklace. A photo included at the end of the post appeared to show Hulk and Sky, plus others, bowing their heads in prayer. The Indian Rocks Baptist Church took to its Instagram Story to celebrate the “Hogan Knows Best” alum’s special moment.

1/2 #NuclearWeapons: "America's Strategic Posture" can cost 5% of the DoD and DoE & What is to be done? Henry Sokolski, NPEC https://www.ida.org/-/media/feature/publications/a/am/americas-strategic-posture/strategic-posture-commission-report.ashx 1945 Tinian

RAGE OF THE USAAF MARCH-AUGUST 1945: 2/8: Black Snow: Curtis LeMay, the Firebombing of Tokyo, and the Road to the Atomic Bomb by  James M. Scott  https://www.amazon.com/Black-Snow-Curtis-Firebombing-Atomic/dp/1324002999/ref=sr_1_1?crid=1X64JYW3Z1OT9&keywords=BLACK+SNOW+JAMES+SCOTT&qid=1674137497&s=books&sprefix=black+snow+james+scott%2Cstripbooks%2C61&sr=1-1 Seven minutes past midnight on March 10, 1945, nearly 300 American B-29s thundered into the skies over Tokyo. Their payloads of incendiaries ignited a firestorm that reached up to 2,800 degrees, liquefying asphalt and vaporizing thousands; sixteen square miles of the city were flattened and more than 100,000 men, women, and children were killed. 1945 TINIAN

1/4: Tactical Nuclear Weapons and NATO by  Tom Nichols  (Author), Douglas Stuart, Jeff McCausland  (Author),  https://www.amazon.com/Tactical-Nuclear-Weapons-NATO-Nichols/dp/1479181951 The role and future of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe are subjects that sometimes surprise even experts in international security, primarily because it is so often disconcerting to remember that these weapons still exist. Many years ago, an American journalist wryly noted that the future of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was “a subject that drives the dagger of boredom deep, deep into the heart”— a dismissive quip which would have remained true right up until the moment World War III broke out. The same goes for tactical nuclear weapons: compared to the momentous issues that the East and West have tackled since the end of the Cold War, the scattering of hundreds (or in the Russian case, thousands) of battlefield weapons throughout Europe seems to be almost an afterthought, a detail left behind that should be easy to tidy up. Such complacency is unwise. Tactical nuclear weapons (or NSNWs, “non-strategic nuclear weapons”) still exist because NATO and Russia have not fully resolved their fears about how a nuclear war might arise, or how it might be fought. They represent, as Russian analyst Nikolai Sokov once wrote, “the longest deadlock” in the history of arms control. Washington and Moscow, despite the challenges to the “reset” of their relations, point to reductions in strategic arms as a great achievement, but strategic agreements also reveal the deep ambiguity toward nuclear weapons as felt by the former superpower rivals. The numbers in the 2010 New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) are lower than at any point in history, but they are based on leaving each side a reliable ability to destroy up to 300 urban targets each. Inflicting this incredible amount of destruction is, on its face, a step no sane national leader would take. But it is here that tactical weapons were meant to play their dangerous role, for they would be the arms that provided the indispensable bridge from peace to nuclear war. Thus, the structures of Cold War nuclear doctrines on both sides remain in place, only on a smaller scale.1945 Tinian

If you can't beat ‘em, join ‘em! Crows may pull up some plants in your garden - but they may also protect your chickens and other animals from predators.  EG shop homepage: https://growepic.co/43vuMo1 EG books: https://growepic.co/3OcDB1D EG homesteading book: https://growepic.co/3PRWbh3 Connect With Kaeli Swift: Dr. Swift earned her PhD in avian behavioral ecology from the University of Washington. While there, she studied American crows, with a special emphasis on behaviors around death. She is currently a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Washington, where she is studying the breeding ecology of the Tinian monarch. Video, audio, and print reports of her research have been featured by: National Geographic, PBS, the New York Times, The Atlantic, Ologies podcast, Science Friday and many others. Blog Twitter Instagram TikTok Buy Birdies Garden Beds Use code EPICPODCAST for 5% off your first order of Birdies metal raised garden beds, the best metal raised beds in the world. They last 5-10x longer than wooden beds, come in multiple heights and dimensions, and look absolutely amazing. Click here to shop Birdies Garden Beds Buy My Book My book, Field Guide to Urban Gardening, is a beginners guide to growing food in small spaces, covering 6 different methods and offering rock-solid fundamental gardening knowledge: Order on Amazon Order a signed copy Follow Epic Gardening YouTube Instagram Pinterest Facebook Facebook Group