Podcasts about Baltic states

Larry Ostola speaks with Nick Etheridge and Phil Calvert about their book, Supervising a Peace that Never Was: Recollections of Canadian Diplomatic Personnel in Indochina, 1954–1973. Supervising a Peace that Never Was: Recollections of Canadian Diplomatic Personnel in Indochina, 1954–1973 is a collection of essays written by former Canadian diplomats who served on international commissions in Indochina. These individuals were initially deployed to oversee the implementation of the 1954 Geneva Accords (through the International Commission for Supervision and Control, or ICSC) and later, in 1973, to monitor compliance with the Paris Peace Agreement (under the International Commission of Control and Supervision, or ICCS). Over the course of two decades, young Canadians were posted to Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos—regions in which Canada had previously played a minimal role. The chapters that follow reflect their personal memories and experiences during these diplomatic missions. Read the full book here: https://www.uvic.ca/research/centres/capi/assets/docs/books/supervising-a-peace-that-never-was.pdf Nick Etheridge joined External Affairs in 1967 and held postings in Australia, Vietnam, and Europe, including roles in the CSCE. He served as Canada's representative in Cambodia (1993), Chargé d'Affaires in the Baltic States (1993–95), and High Commissioner to Bangladesh (1996–99). He retired in 2002 as Director of the Defence Relations Division. Phil Calvert joined the Department of External Affairs in 1982 and served in Beijing during three postings. He held key roles in trade negotiations, including as Deputy Chief Negotiator for China's WTO accession, and was Ambassador to Thailand, Cambodia, and Laos from 2011 to 2016. He retired in 2016. Image Credit: University of Victoria - CAPI Publications If you like our work, please consider supporting it: bit.ly/support_WTY. Your support contributes to the Champlain Society's mission of opening new windows to directly explore and experience Canada's past.

On this episode, we discuss the tactics of who violates Article 5 of NATO first. Does the US take Greenland? Does this then allow Russia to move on the Baltic States? Is it a disinformation game to see who moves first? Do the Russians need to trick America into it first? Also, what does media stupidity look like? Who would make such ridiculous statements about destroying your relationships with other nations? We ask the questions. Contact and Support - https://www.subscribestar.com/dynamic-independence

This week on Chain Reaction, we feature an installment of the Baltic Ways podcast. Host Indra Ekmanis welcomes back professors Margarita Šešelgytė (Vilnius University), Daunis Auers (University of Latvia), and Andres Kasekamp (University of Toronto) for a roundtable discussion on the first two months of Donald Trump's second term and the US administration's impact on the Baltic countries and broader Europe. This episode was recorded on March 14, 2025.You May Be Interested InBaltic Roundup | March 2025 A look back on the month's major political, cultural, and economic events in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.Explore more from FPRI's Baltic Initiative here. Baltic Ways is a podcast from the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI. Get full access to FPRI Insights at fpriinsights.substack.com/subscribe

The Baltic Ways podcast welcomes back professors Margarita Šešelgytė (Vilnius University), Daunis Auers (University of Latvia), and Andres Kasekamp (University of Toronto) for a roundtable discussion on the first two months of Donald Trump's second term and the US administration's impact on the Baltic countries and broader Europe. This episode was recorded on March 14, 2025.“It's a bit of a shock therapy…and we have to reconsider who we are security-wise in this different situation.” -Margarita ŠešelgytėBaltic Ways is a podcast from the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fpribalticinitiative.substack.com

It's a bad time for official Washington to be consumed with a Signal group chat involving top national security officials and a highly partisan journalist. After all, Russia and China appear poised for military aggression that, if not deterred, could prove catastrophic. Reportedly, there are multiple divisions worth of Russian troops massing in Belarus near its borders with NATO members Poland and the Baltic States.  And the Chinese Communists are now exercising – without prior notice – the use of air and sea forces against Taiwan, the latest incremental step towards surprise attacks there, and perhaps far beyond.  Regrettably, our ability to dissuade these “no limits” partners from engaging, presumably jointly, in aggression is largely locked in for the short-term – and probably seriously discounted. Therefore, we must ensure our adversaries are not further encouraged to strike by our perceived internal divisions and distractions.    This is Frank Gaffney.

All Family Pharmacy https://allfamilypharmacy.com/HermanBe prepared for when you need medicine the most. Don't go to urgent care YUCK. Use code HERMAN10 to save 10% on your order. Alan's Soaps https://www.alansartisansoaps.comUse coupon code TODD to save an additional 10% off the bundle price.Bioptimizers https://bioptimizers.com/toddEnter promo code TODD to get 10% off any order.Bonefrog https://bonefrogcoffee.com/toddThe new GOLDEN AGE is here!  Use code TODD at checkout to receive 10% off your first purchase and 15% on subscriptions.Bulwark Capital Bulwark Capital Management (bulwarkcapitalmgmt.com)Get a second opinion on the health of your retirement portfolio today. Schedule your free Know Your Risk Portfolio review go to KnowYourRiskRadio.com today.Renue Healthcare https://renue.healthcare/toddYour journey to a better life starts at Renue Healthcare. Visit https://Renue.Healthcare/ToddCS Lewis once said "Of all tyrannies, a tyranny sincerely exercised for the good of it's victims may be the most oppressive..." The question today is - Can we rescue the woke elite from this delusion?Episode Links:The Davos devolution; and the revolution underway - EL GATO MALOSame Driver as before harassing other Tesla owner in Fargo North Dakota The Rise of the Brutal American; This is how the bad guys act. By Anne Applebaum writing in The Atlantic.The Biden Stranded NASA astronauts have sent a thank you to Elon Musk and Donald Trump. Surprise, surprise! The media never covered it…Three years ago, Joe Biden declared a “winter of death” for the unvaccinated. Never again with this insanity. Also, I don't know a single person who regrets **not** getting the COVID vax. Not one.Now with complete control of the Ukrainian government, then the Bidens began their dirty work. Biden visited Ukraine 13+ times, securing US funding for Ukrainian oligarchs. Then used his power to fire a State prosecutor who figured out Biden's kick-back/laundering scheme.Donald Trump's advisor, Alina Habba, discovered the fake Oval Office where Joe Biden allegedly pretended to be president. The room includes a teleprompter positioned directly in front of him and a smaller desk for when he would play his role as president. The whole setup looks like a Hollywood studio.Joe Biden in 1997: Admitting the Baltic States into NATO would cause a vigorous and hostile reaction from Russia. Fast forward to today, and NATO has expanded right up to Russia's border in the Baltics, and has triggered the vigorous and hostile reaction from Russia by crossing the last red line of Ukraine. @ggreenwald “Simply by opposing the U.S. war in Ukraine, or questioning the false claims of the United States and its media about the war, you will be counted as a pro-Russian propagandist who should be censored from the Internet under EU law because you have quote, ‘ideological alignment with the Russian state.'”Islamic scholars in UK are shocked and appalled that British women dare to show themselves and even dare to laugh in public. They say Allah is very angry with this.JASMINE CROCKETT: "Free speech is not about whatever it is thatch'all want somebody to say - and the idea thatchu wanna shut down everybody that is not Fox News is BULLSH*T! We need to stop playin'! Because that's whatch'all are doin' in here!"

In today's episode, we cover the collapse of the Gaza ceasefire, US deportations, the global landmine ban, and US strikes on Yemen.Watch TLDR's latest videos here:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WMmGBvp5dQg https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8tH9TdzmnhQTLDR's Daily Briefing is a roundup of the day's most important news stories from around the world. But we don't just tell you what's happening, we explain it: making complex topics simple to understand. Listen to the Daily Briefing for your global news bulletin every weekday.Pre-order the next edition of Too Long, TLDR's print magazine, here: https://toolong.news/dailyProduced and edited by Scarlett WatchornHosted by Georgina FindlayWritten by Rory Tayor and Nadja LovadinovMusic by Epidemic Sound: http://epidemicsound.com/creator//////////////////////////////Sources:✍️ Gaza Ceasefire Collapseshttps://apnews.com/article/israel-hamas-war-news-ceasefire-hostages-f2d70486a9f863ac420a48c4d9efe83bhttps://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-military-conducts-strikes-hamas-targets-gaza-army-says-2025-03-18/https://www.theguardian.com/world/2025/mar/18/why-has-israel-resumed-large-scale-airstrikes-on-gaza ✍️ US Deports Alleged Gang Members to El Salvadorhttps://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2025/mar/16/deportation-alleged-gang-members-el-salvador ✍️ Poland & Baltic States to Withdraw from Global Landmine Banhttps://www.politico.eu/article/poland-baltic-states-inch-closer-to-leaving-antipersonnel-mine-treaty/ ✍️ US Renewed Houthi Attacks https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/articles/cwyd2l17ygpo See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Send us a textIn this episode, Wild Bird Acoustic's is delighted to welcome a well known Swedish birding and field recording figure, Mr. Teet Sirotikin, for an extensive interview. In this episode, Teet talks about his sound recording journey and shares some quite incredible audio from many parts of Sweden. Furthermore, we journey to the Baltic States, into Latvia and Lithuania and listen to some incredible recordings and soundscapes, in areas rich in phenomenal birdlife. Join me here with Teet as we discuss his personal voyage into the world of field recording birds, as he shares some simply remarkable recordings from the past couple of decades. Some of the species here include some of the most sought after European bird species. In short, this is a very special episode, which you will not want to miss...Support the showSubscibe to Wild Bird Acoustics here;https://wildbirdacoustics.buzzsprout.comLots more audio related material here at my long running website;https://blogbirder.blogspot.com/

Since restoring their independence, the Baltic states have focused on pursuing historical justice related to Soviet crimes, which included widespread repressions and mass deportations. Under the influence of international actors, the Baltic states have also engaged in political processes associated with Holocaust justice. Political scientist Dovilė Budrytė and anthropologist Neringa Klumbytė explain how their interdisciplinary approach has revealed new findings, exposed gaps in existing scholarship, and may influence policy in years to come.Ben Gardner-Gill is the Assistant Director for Outreach and Engagement for the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies and Co-Host of Baltic Ways.Dovilė Budrytė is professor of political science at Georgia Gwinnett College.Neringa Klumbytė is professor of anthropology and Russian and post-Soviet studies, and director of the Lithuania Program at the Havighurst Center for Russian and Post-Soviet Studies, Miami University.Baltic Ways is a podcast from the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fpribalticinitiative.substack.com

The Baltic Way was the event that helped secure the three Baltic States' independence from Russia 35 years ago. The idea was simple - a chain of people linking the three capital cities of Vilnius in Lithuania, Riga in Latvia and Tallinn in Estonia. It was a significant act of protest, striving for freedom against an oppressor. We will look at how it was planned and hear stories from participants. We will examine what effect it had. Thanks for listening!

Alex and Bernard are joined by former SNP Defence Spokesperson in the UK Parliament, Stewart McDonald.On the Ukraine War and Trump's Role“We survived this old man one time before, we'll survive him a second time around.” – Stewart McDonald on Ukrainian resilience against Putin and Trump“This idea that their land can just be chopped up by Washington DC and the Kremlin in Moscow, over the heads of Ukraine, over the heads of Ukraine's neighboring allies in Poland and the Baltic States and the rest of European NATO, is something that horrifies them. But it's not something that necessarily surprises them.” – Stewart McDonald on Ukrainian fears of an imposed deal“Trump sees this as a transaction, and a transaction is not a peace deal.” – Stewart McDonald on Trump's approach to Ukraine“The real consequence of Trump's manoeuvres on Ukraine won't actually be Ukraine—because if they're not in the room, there won't be a deal—but he's risking in the process a whole series of transatlantic relationships.” – Bernard Ponsonby on the diplomatic fallout“If Putin has his ear, and I think he has more than his ear, who knows what Trump will come out and impose in Ukraine?” – Stewart McDonald on the dangers of Trump's relationship with PutinOn Russia's Long-Term Strategy“Putin's long game is avenging Russia for its 1990s humiliation as he sees it.” – Alex Massie on Putin's geopolitical ambitions“Russia wants to sow, feed and cause as much chaos as possible. It's not necessarily about getting you to think in a certain way—it just wants to throw so much stuff at you that people become confused, distrusting, and retreat into information vacuums.” – Stewart McDonald on Russia's disinformation tactics“This has been Trump's most successful week… sorry, I mean Putin's most successful week in a while.” – Stewart McDonald on how recent events have played into Russia's handsOn the Future of NATO and Western Security“A huge wedge has now been driven between Europe and the US. I would go so far as to suggest that Article 5 is practically meaningless.” – Stewart McDonald on NATO's weakening position“If you lose the essential guarantor of Western security, and if the United States can no longer be considered a fully trustworthy actor or partner on the international stage, then you have an enormous vacuum at the heart of the international security apparatus.” – Alex Massie on the crumbling transatlantic alliance“If we go back to the old rules of might is right, then not only will that be catastrophic in terms of loss of life, it will be far more financially expensive than making the investments in defence today.” – Stewart McDonald on the long-term risks of inaction“Decades of conventional thinking on Western defence have been ripped up this week.” – Alex Massie on the impact of recent geopolitical events Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

From hotel Wientjes, in the Netherlands, it's Van den Beukel en de Boer in search of Europe's energy future, with independent energy analyst Jilles van den Beukel and Remco de Boer. In this episode: - Europe's number 1 petrostate: Norway. We take a bit of a deep dive into one of the EU's most important suppliers of natural gas - Jilles wrote an article in which he answers seven questions about recent developments in natural gas. - News in brief: Last Saturday, the Baltic States severed their electricity ties with Russia, and the EU is trying to bring down the price of energy, while at the same time making the industry more sustainable and more competitive

Tech oligarchs have risen to dominate global politics and public discourse, posing grave threats to democracy and governance. Under Donald Trump's presidency, the consolidation of power among Silicon Valley elites has exacerbated critical challenges, including the spread of misinformation, the weaponization of social media, and the unchecked development of artificial intelligence. These forces have not only deepened political polarization but also paved the way for the normalization of extremism, undermining the foundations of truth in the digital era. The intersection of technological exploitation, political radicalization, and the information war presents urgent questions for the future of democratic societies. In this episode of Beyond the Headlines, we unpack these critical dynamics with two distinguished guests. Andres Kasekamp, an expert on populist radical right movements and European governance, explores the historical and political parallels of authoritarian trends. Ron Deibert, a global authority on cybersecurity and digital rights, highlights the ways in which tech platforms enable political manipulation and disinformation campaigns. Together, they offer in-depth insights into the complex role of digital platforms in amplifying authoritarianism and discuss potential pathways for mitigating their impact on democracy. Andres Kasekamp is the Elmar Tampõld Chair of Estonian Studies and Professor of History at the University of Toronto's Department of History and the Munk School of Global Affairs and Public Policy. He is a leading scholar on Baltic politics, memory politics, and populist radical right movements. Formerly a Professor of Baltic Politics at the University of Tartu and Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute in Tallinn, Kasekamp has held visiting positions at esteemed institutions such as Humboldt University in Berlin and the Norwegian Institute for International Affairs. Among his acclaimed works is A History of the Baltic States, which has been translated into multiple languages and remains a definitive text in the field. His research explores European foreign and security policy and the intricate dynamics of cooperation and conflict in the Baltic Sea region. Currently, he is editing The Oxford Handbook of Modern Baltic History. Ron Deibert is a Professor of Political Science and the Director of the Citizen Lab at the Munk School of Global Affairs & Public Policy, University of Toronto. A pioneer in cybersecurity and human rights, Deibert has led the Citizen Lab's groundbreaking investigations into cyber espionage, commercial spyware, and digital censorship, producing over 120 influential reports. These include the Tracking Ghostnet investigation into cyber-espionage and the Reckless series, which revealed spyware abuses targeting journalists and activists. Deibert is also the author of RESET: Reclaiming the Internet for Civil Society, a winner of the Shaughnessy Cohen Prize for Political Writing. His work has earned numerous accolades, including the Electronic Frontier Foundation Pioneer Award and the Order of Ontario. Beyond academia, he serves on advisory boards for organizations like Amnesty International and PEN Canada, making him a critical voice in addressing the intersection of technology, democracy, and civil liberties. Produced by: Julia Brahy

https://youtu.be/KpI9AW3ymyI The British- French Guarantee of Poland and Rumania in 1939 Fourth. The fourth abysmal loss of statesmanship was when the British and French guaranteed the independence of Poland and Rumania at the end of March, 1939. It was at this point that the European democracies reversed their previous policies of keeping hands off the inevitable war between Hitler and Stalin. It was probably the greatest blunder in the whole history of European power diplomacy. Britain and France were helpless to save Poland from invasion. By this act, however, they threw the bodies of democracy between Hitler and Stalin. By their actions they not only protected Stalin from Hitler but they enabled him to sell his influence to the highest bidder. The Allies did bid but Stalin's price was annexation of defenseless people of the Baltic States and East Poland, a moral price which the Allies could not meet. Stalin got his price from Hitler. Yet Hitler had no intention of abandoning his determination to expand in Southeast Europe and to destroy the Communist Vatican in Moscow. But now he must of necessity first neutralize the Western Democracies which he proceeded to do. The long train of the hideous World War II started from the blunder of the Polish guarantees. Roosevelt had some part in these power politics but the record is yet too incomplete to establish how much. Churchill, not yet in the government, had contributed something by goading Chamberlain to desperate action aft er his appeasement at Munich. - Herbert Hoover, Freedom Betrayed Watch on X Watch on BitChute Watch on Rumble Watch on Odysee

Guest post by Karlis Skuja, co-founder of HackTribe. A hackathon is an event where people engage in rapid and collaborative engineering over a relatively short period of time such as 24 or 48 hours. The first event labelled a hackathon was the OpenBSD Hackathon in Calgary, Canada, on June 4, 1999. Since then this event format was rapidly integrated into startup movements all around the world. Today, the hackathon is the common practice of creating ideas and innovations inside specific communities, as well as big corporations. Due to their different backgrounds, every person can be a valuable source of innovation as we all look at the same situation differently. The hackathon is a great place for them to come together and work out the solution with different perspectives in mind. It is possible for a heart surgeon and a poet to work together and the only place for them to meet with a common goal is a hackathon. What can we expect to happen in the future with this form of experimentation? Rise of virtual hackathons The recent pandemic clearly demonstrated the potential of virtual events. Until then hackathons had mostly happened at one particular spot where a crowd of professionals and people with different backgrounds levels of skills would gather to solve some challenges. Virtual hackathons provide the opportunity to make events bigger and involve people from around the world. This means connecting different and even quite opposite experiences and cultures to create something truly amazing and inspiring. In addition, a virtual format is way more accessible to participants. Hackathons often happen at weekends so that participants can successfully manage family time with challenging themselves professionally in a team of experts and enthusiasts. Integration of artificial intelligence These days, nothing happens without the involvement of Artificial Intelligence (AI). And it can provide a real productivity boost during a hackathon. There are several ways AI can become a valuable member of the team. For example, it can help to process a lot of specific information and create comprehensive summaries. Of course, it can help to generate some ideas or find new perspectives of existing ones. AI can also offer a significant helping hand when it comes to design. AI is an interesting topic itself as a result of which there is a tendency for hackathons to also be about AI and finding the right AI applications in particular industries. For example, this year organizations from three Baltic countries came together to organize the first ever "Baltic AI" hackathon. The event invited students of all levels and study programmes in the Baltic States to use the limitless possibilities of artificial intelligence to tackle real societal challenges. More open data available The open data trend means that data is freely available to the public in a usable format, with the goal of promoting transparency, collaboration, and innovation. Open data is provided by governments, businesses, and different organizations. The more data is available, the more opportunities there are to use it for developing new ideas and solutions. Importance of sustainability Sustainability is a huge topic these days. On the one hand, this is due to the understanding that the action of every person counts to save our planet. On the other, Europe has introduced quite strict regulations to urge companies to act with sustainability in mind. Creative and innovative solutions are welcomed in both cases, but especially in the second, where companies admit that ESG reporting needs some additional tools for data collection and processing. If there is a need, then there is room for a hackathon. It is worth mentioning that communities usually gather around topics that concern societal values. And the Climathon organized by EIT Climate-KIC is a perfect example. Through the hackathon, the organization reaches a global community of climate-minded people who then collaborate to help cities...

This week on Baltic Ways - The US election is approaching quickly with implications for America's allies in the world. Professors Margarita Šešelgyte (Vilnius University), Daunis Auers (University of Latvia), and Andres Kasekamp (University of Toronto) join a roundtable discussion on the impact that a Kamala Harris or Donald Trump presidency could have on the security and future outlook of the Baltic countries and broader European, and how people in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are feeling about the state of democracy in the US. This episode was recorded on September 25, 2024.Explore more from FPRI's Baltic Intiative.Baltic Ways is a podcast brought to you by the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI.

The US election is approaching quickly with implications for America's allies in the world. Professors Margarita Šešelgyte (Vilnius University), Daunis Auers (University of Latvia), and Andres Kasekamp (University of Toronto) join a roundtable discussion on the impact that a Kamala Harris or Donald Trump presidency could have on the security and future outlook of the Baltic countries and broader Europe, and how people in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are feeling about the state of democracy in the US. This episode was recorded on September 25, 2024. TranscriptIndra Ekmanis: Thank you everyone for joining me in this discussion today. As we all know, the US presidential campaign has been rather unprecedented on many fronts this cycle. There's been the late change in the candidates at the top of the Democratic ticket from Joe Biden to Kamala Harris. And now we've had already multiple assassination attempts on the Republican candidate Donald Trump.And we know that whatever happens in November will certainly have effects on Americans, but it will also have reverberations around the world. And so I'm very glad to today be in discussion with you all about the potential impacts in the Baltic countries. But before we jump in, I'd like to ask you all to briefly introduce yourselves.Andres Kasekamp: I'm Andres Kasekamp. I'm the Professor of Estonian Studies at the University of Toronto. I used to be the Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute in Tallinn and a Professor at the University of Toronto.Daunis Auers: Hi, I'm Daunis Auers, a professor at the University of Latvia and also the director of a new think tank Certus in Riga.Margarita Šešelgytė: Hello, I'm Margarita Šešelgytė, and I'm a professor of security studies, but also a director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University.IE: Well, thank you all. So, I'd like to start with what is perhaps top of mind when people are thinking about the impacts of the US elections on the Baltic countries, and that's security, NATO, and Russia's war in Ukraine.So if we start with NATO: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania marked two decades in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization this year. The alliance itself is now 75 years old, celebrating at its summit in Washington, D.C., hosted by president and at that point in time, still beleaguered Democratic candidate Joe Biden, where Biden underscored NATO unity. And during the summit, it was widely reported that the allies were working to “Trump proof” the Alliance as polls showed that Biden was slipping in the presidential race.Trump, of course, is remembered as deriding the Alliance, threatening to pull out entirely during his presidency. And at the same time, he is also somewhat credited with pushing member states to up their defense spending. With Biden out, of course, the calculus has perhaps changed a little bit.Vice President and now candidate Kamala Harris represents some measure of continuity with the Biden administration, though we know that her foreign policy experience is not necessarily as deep as Biden's. But a Harris presidency would be more compatible theoretically with the tradition of America as a stable leader in the transatlantic relationship.And obviously a strong NATO is critical to the security of the Baltic States. So, I wonder how you perceive the candidate stances on NATO and how they align with Baltic interests.AK: All right, briefly, Trump would be a disaster and Harris, indeed, would represent continuity with, with Biden. It goes back to the nature of the candidates, right, that Trump is a purely transactional individual, and doesn't seem to understand how NATO works.He's always said that the NATO countries owe the Americans money. It's not an organization where you pay a membership fee, so he simply doesn't get it. It is sort of partly true that European members who weren't doing enough spending on their own defense budgets, have been frightened into contributing more.Trump has something to do with it, but it has more to do with Russian aggression, in the region. So starting already in 2014 when Russia seized Crimea, European countries started increasing their spending. With the Harris presidency, it would be sort of more of the same, which is better than Trump, but it's certainly not as good as America could do, because Joe Biden has been failing Ukraine recently and placing these unreasonable restrictions on Ukraine's right to strike at Russian targets to defend itself.And hopefully Harris wouldn't continue that weak kneed policy.DA: I agree with what Andres has said, but I think it's quite interesting to look at the perspective also of Baltic Americans who after all will be voting in the election, unlike, I presume, the three of us—Margarita, Andres and I—who, as not being American citizens won't have a vote in the elections.And traditionally, there's been quite a lot of support for the Republican Party amongst the Baltic diasporas, because during the Cold War, the Republicans were seen as having the strongest backbone in defending Baltic interests. And much of this support actually carried over into the Trump era with a significant portion of Baltic Americans, especially from the older generation, still holding out support for Trump.And what I thought was interesting was that after Trump announced J.D. Vance as his vice-presidential candidate, the attitudes of many Baltic Americans actually changed because a lot of the affection for Trump is deeply personal, connected to his charismatic personality, the way he speaks, the way he does business, the way he calls back, sort of an ancient era of essentially a white America, from the 1950s.J.D. Vance doesn't have this affection. And when J.D. Vance was announced as the vice-presidential candidate, people were bringing out his notorious op-ed in the New York Times on April 12th, which was very defeatist in its nature, calling out various quotes that he had of not really caring who won in the war between Ukraine and Russia.And this was the moment that a number of Baltic Americans turned away from the Republicans and turned towards the Democrats. So, I would perhaps highlight the role of J.D. Vance in furthering support for the Democrats at least amongst the Baltic community in the United States.MS: I totally agree to what has been said already, but then I'd like to look from a more systemic perspective, and just to add to what has been said: We live in a very volatile security situation at the moment and this dynamism, security-wise, will not be changing pretty soon because there are some changes in the balance of power the rivalry between autocracies and democracies.So where do we stand as Baltic countries? We are small countries, and we have a major war in our region. And therefore, for us, it is essentially important to have our allies strong and to have our allies helping us. The United States is our main ally when it comes to security. Yes, we are members of NATO, but in terms of deterring Putin, one has to think about deterrence as a psychological concept.Putin is less afraid of NATO as overall organization than he is afraid of the United States of America. So having this in mind, the one who sits in Washington D.C. in the presidential position for us is essential as well. In Athena, we had already two elections this year, presidential and European Parliament elections, and the parliamentary elections are coming in October.But we're joking that the elections in the United States are more important than the elections in Lithuania and the change would be felt stronger of who comes to power in the United States.Interestingly enough, one of our media outlets just recently published a survey asking Lithuanians: Who would be a better president for Lithuania in the United States, Trump or, Harris? The majority of Lithuanians, 66 percent, said Harris and only 12 indicated that that could be Trump. So, for us, it's very important. It matters. We follow this election very, very closely.And I would say there are two points which are particularly important for Lithuania. Yes, NATO and US presence in the region. And we don't know what position Harris will take or if she will be more involved in the Pacific. But it's about stability. That's important.And another very important question, and it's very intertwined, is the war in Ukraine. And we already heard what Trump was saying about Ukraine, that when he becomes the president, he will seek for a certain deal. And for us Baltics, it's clear that no deal with Putin can be achieved at the moment, and it would be dangerous, and it would endanger our situation. So it's not acceptable.IE: You're actually running into kind of my next question here, which is exactly about Russia and Ukraine. And as we know, the Baltic states have been among the most ardent supporters of Ukraine following the full-scale invasion in 2022. Also, we know that the Baltic leadership has been quite hawkish warning about Russia for some time.And as you just mentioned, Donald Trump has refused to say that he wants Ukraine to end the war. He often talks about his rapport with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Harris, on the other hand, has called Putin a dictator who would, “eat Trump for lunch.” She has condemned the Russia's actions in Ukraine as crimes against humanity and underscored the US commitment.But as you also mentioned, there has been a slow roll of US advanced weaponry and providing the ability for Ukraine to hit targets deeper into Russia, something that is actually being talked about right now at the UN General Assembly.Could you say a little bit more on the candidates' stances on Ukraine and Russia and in the war more broadly, what that means for Baltic leaderships and Baltic publics?DA: I think that the presidential debate, which I think looks like being the only debate between the two candidates, pretty accurately sketched in the difference, between the candidates. President Trump very much was hooked into the Kremlin narrative.He said that he was for peace, which we understand here in Europe as meaning you are for Russia because you bought into the narrative. He even mentioned that the United States holds some responsibility for the war as opposed for it to be a decision made by Russia to invade a sovereign country.I think we quite clearly saw that one of the candidates is, despite the macho image, quite soft on Russia. And the other one is fixing more clearly with the governing elites in the Baltic States perspective on, the war on Ukraine. One thing we should mention, however, there is an undercurrent of support for Trump in the Baltic States.In, Latvia, there is a political party named Latvia First—where did they get that name from—which sits in the parliament in opposition and is clearly Trumpian. They managed to have one MEP (Member of European Parliament) elected to the European Parliament. And in one of the debates, he was asked a very technical question about how he would vote on a trade deal with certain countries.He said, “well, I would do whatever Trump does. If it's good enough for Trump, it's good enough for me.” And he pretty much attached this to any other form of foreign policy. Now, this is a minority party, but we should recognize that there is some support for the Trumpian position albeit not in a governing position in the Baltic states. I'll hand over to Andres now.AK: Well, the same applies for Estonia, where the major opposition party EKRE (Conservative People's Party) on the far right is very clearly Trumpian. There's also, more alarming in this case, a lot of the mainstream media, like Postimees and the foreign news desk of the national broadcaster seem to normalize Trump.They don't point out his really deviant and demented behavior but treat him like a normal candidate. So, I also feel that there are plenty of people in Estonia who think that Trump has some good ideas, or at least they're so angry at the woke folks, that they're willing to entertain Trump, not recognizing the great damage that Trump would do to the Transatlantic Alliance and how he would put NATO deterrence, its credibility, in question.And I think that's what Margarita was saying earlier, right? Deterrence is psychological. It's not only what we do, it's what Putin believes, right? If Putin believes that the United States is ready to defend us, then he will be deterred. And that's, that's the bottom line.And with Trump, that's the one thing that's been consistent. I mean, he flip-flops on everything, criticizes everything, but the one thing he's been consistent on, he's never said a bad word about Putin, which really is not just odd, but quite alarming.MS: Well, I just want to add on what has been said in terms of the differences between the Harris and Trump. We don't know exactly what the policies of Harris will be because we don't know her so well, but for us, the most important thing is the stability, because if Trump becomes US president, it's not only what he does, but what kind of messages he sends.Andrus was already mentioning the messages for Putin, what's happening in Putin's head, understanding what Trump's messaging is. But also for the world, we are more secure and stronger together in European Union, in NATO, as transatlantic family and community.If Trump comes to power, the world will become a more dangerous place, because there will be more rifts and disagreements between allies, and we will be seen as weaker as a transatlantic community, not only by Russia, but by China, by Iran, by North Korea. So, it is a very dangerous scenario for us small states, because we cannot change the system. The system affects us.DA: And in the event of a Trump victory, I think there would be a much greater focus from policymakers in the Baltic states on the diaspora community in the United States. The diaspora community played a very important role in the Baltic accession to NATO in the late 1990s, early 2000s. And clearly one thing that Trump does listen to is voters, supporters, and interest groups in Washington. And I think the role of JBANC (Joint Baltic American National Committee) and also the three national lobby groups of American Latvians, American Lithuanian, and Estonian Americans will simply grow in importance, hugely. We can expect them to have quite a lot of communication and cooperation with our foreign ministries and with our embassies, even more so than at the moment.IE: Yeah, that's a really fascinating point too, that the impact of the diaspora lobbying groups in the United States. You all are touching on something that I also wanted to get at, which is the impact of the US elections on European solidarity. You mentioned how Trump's America first agenda has also emboldened right wing politicians in Europe and the Baltics.He has a close relationship with Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary. Who has also even spoken at CPAC, the Conservative Political Action Conference in the United States, but has been in some ways a thorn in the side of the European Union particularly around Russia.During his presidency, Donald Trump also often tried to bypass European institutions, kind of favoring a bilateral approach and personal appeals to national leaders. Harris presidency represents more of a stable transatlantic relationship, but there's also the concern that, as Margarita mentioned, that there's going to be a shift in attention to the Indo-Pacific. The People's Republic of China is seen kind of as this coming-up threat.So, some questions here. What is the situation of the European Union? How united or divided might the block be with either candidate? How is Europe thinking about retaining the focus of the United States as opposed to a shift to other global regions?Where do the Baltic states fit into that? Maybe we start from the Lithuanian perspective this time.MS: It's a very tough question. I think that when the war in Ukraine started, the European Union has surprised itself by its unity. And over the last three years, I think that this unity pertained, and we continue to be united.We sometimes disagree on how fast Europe has to be in providing certain aid for Ukraine. We sometimes disagree on how strict we have to be on punishing Putin in terms of sanctions, et cetera, et cetera. But in general, there is a consensus that we're sitting in the same boat, and this is a European war andI think that this is very important.Therefore, there is an appetite to continue supporting Ukraine until the end of the war, until the victory. But the problem is that there is this unity, which is very strong on the decision takers, decision-makers' level. But if you scratch the surface, you see that there are many different opinions.Businesses, communities, general society, different players do not share the general decision-makers' opinion, not in every country. States of the European Union are facing their own economic, political, and identity problems. And what makes me anxious is the tide of radical populism in certain European countries, and in particular in the biggest countries who matter a lot in the decision-making of the European Union.And maybe in the next two or three years, we won't be seeing those radicals overtaking the government. Well, let's hope fingers crossed that in Germany, the elections will not bring AfD (Alternative for Germany) to power. However, it reduces certain policies, international policies, foreign policies, to a minimal level rather than emboldening them.So there could be some steps back, which might be quite dangerous in these final stages of the war, or what we are seeing now, when at least Ukrainian side is trying to search for certain agreements. So, yes, there is a unity that also benefits the Baltic countries.European countries are listening to what we said more and Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, in her State of the Union speech, said we should have listened more to the Baltic countries. But I guess the appetite to listen to Baltic countries is shrinking a bit for the time and also when we propose certain solutions, they still seem very provocative and more provocative than some of the EU countries would like to take.AK: Let me just add that in American debate, when they talk about Europe, they talk about Europe as kind of lagging behind and being a slacker in support for Ukraine, which is absolutely false, right? The United States is obviously spending more in absolute terms than any other country in terms of military. But as a whole Europe is providing more altogether.And of course, we should really be looking at the contribution in terms of the percentages. And here, the three Baltic states, from the beginning, have been the leaders, along with some other countries like, like Denmark and Sweden, who have given a percentage of their defense budget to Ukraine, which is much greater than the percentage that the Americans are giving.Americans are actually being quite miserly, even though the sums sound huge. And of course, in the American case, the money, which in the US political debate seems that it's just being handed over to Ukraine, is actually going to American manufacturers. And a lot of the money is actually just nominal sums, which are old American armament, equipment, and ammunitions, which were destined to be written off. In any case they're given some monetary value.So, this is something that's really caught on in the narrative in the US: The Americans are paying so much, and the Europeans are doing so little, which is certainly not the case. When you look at the three Baltic states, which have been, continue to be in the lead, and that leads to what Margarita was highlighting.Our establishments, our political leadership in the Baltic States are very firm on Russia, but as a society, there's a cost to that. If we've all raised our defense spending, that means cuts in societal programs, and that leads to dissatisfaction and unrest.So, that's difficult for the governments to keep a check on.DA: Europe is changing. We see this in the European Parliament elections in 2024, that you have this growing support for political parties on the fringes, which we sometimes call as populists, and the support for the centrist mainstream parties, which we typically understand as the liberals, the center right, the Christian Democrats, or the European People's Party and the centrist socialists are declining.Now, they still make up a majority, and we see this in the European Commission as well. The European Commission, which is likely to be approved over the next couple of weeks under Ursula von der Leyen, is still a centrist European Commission, but Europe is changing. And I think it's quite interesting if we look at the Baltic States here.30 years ago, as the Baltic States were just beginning to build democracies and capitalistic systems after 50 years of Soviet occupation, they were quite crackpot, right? I was reading some newspaper articles from the early 1990s, and the one that stayed with me—it's a casual throwaway article written sometime in late 1992 about, oh by the way, 62 prisoners escaped to prison yesterday, and they haven't been caught yet.And the next day, it's not even on the front page of a newspaper, because there's some kind of mafia killing that's being reported on. And that's how things were 30 years ago. Today, the Baltic states are a sea of tranquility. We see that our political systems are actually far more stable, if you look at recent indicators, than the Nordic states.You look at the profile of our governments, the female prime ministers that we had in office in the summer, Europe's first, openly gay president. We have very progressive political systems, and it's Western Europe where democracy is declining in quality, where crackpot political parties are appearing, where you have extremely dodgy political leaders being elected to lead governments and extremely odd parties coming into governments or propping up minority governments.Europe is changing quite a lot, which is unfortunate for the Baltic States in a sense, because just as we have achieved a level of normality. Lithuania is achieving huge economic success as being the fastest growing economy in Europe in the 21st century, the rest of Europe is fraying.Fortunately, there's still a majority, let's say a mainstream majority, which favors support for Ukraine and whose policies broadly align with the very centrist and mainstream policies that all three Baltic governments have long been adopting. But things are changing and there is a risk that the longer the war possibly drags on in Ukraine, the more—I'm sure that opinion in the Baltic states won't change because this is such an existential issue for us—but elsewhere in Western Europe, we might see these radical populist forces rise even further and perhaps begin to fray away at the coalition, which is still broadly supportive of Ukraine. But it is being chipped away at almost monthly, I would say.IE: I want to put a pin in some of the things that you just touched on around the state of democracy, maybe we can turn back to that in a moment.Perhaps we can briefly turn to the impacts of either candidate on US trade policy and energy.MS: It's a global issue. And globally, it is important when it comes to the general situation in transatlantic community, the feeling of trust. But when it comes to Baltics, I don't that it has this direct link to what is important for us. I believe that neither decision-makers nor society are looking in particular what Trump or Harris are saying in terms of energy policy and trade.Okay, he [Trump] can increase tariffs for Latin products, but there are now so many going to the United States.DA: For the Baltic States, our biggest trading partners are our Western neighbors. In the case of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, are one and two. Then the Nordic countries, Poland, Germany, and so on.I took a look at the data for 2022, and the United States was Latvia's 11th biggest trading partner: small, single digits. Latvia for the United States was the 117th biggest trading partner. So, when it comes to economic relations, including also energy, it's not a critical relationship.Politically, the relationship is very, very important. But economically, when it comes to trade, it's marginal.AK: Well, let me just add that for the bilateral relationship, it's not important, but the tone that the US administration sets is not a good direction for the Baltic states. Trump initiated this protectionism, and Biden unfortunately has continued in that same vein.And we don't really know how Harris will continue Biden's legacy on that front. But in any case, the world has become more protectionist. And the three Baltic states have been amongst the biggest champions and beneficiaries of free trade, right? And for an open, globalized economy. This wave of protectionism, which Trump initiated, and Biden has continued in a general picture, is bad for the world and bad for the Baltic states.DA: There is an alternative view to that, Andres, which is that, because of the policies, the global value chains are becoming more compact, they're becoming more localized. And as the global value chains are, let's say, semi-returned to Europe, away from Asia, then the Baltic States together with Poland and other countries are expected to be the big beneficiaries of, say, manufacturing returning to Europe.I don't think it's such a black and white picture, but a collapsing global trade is necessarily bad for the Baltic States. It depends on the domestic policies which are adopted that can seize the opportunity in a sense.MS: And when it comes to energy, if the United States chooses to become the major player in the world in terms of energy supply, it could change and change in general, the picture of the world that we have.But that is a big question: the tracking issue, getting further away from the green plan or implementing this plan. There are advantages and disadvantages of either path.In order to stop climate change, I think fracking would be quite a bad decision because it's increasing dependency on this fuel. But when it comes to changing the power balance, that could be the way to end the war in Ukraine, pushing Russia to the corner, because the bulk of its budget comes from natural resources.This would add more competition: increasing the supply of energy resources in the world's market.IE: For a non-question, that actually was a quite interesting response.But to come back to the idea—Donna you were talking about people's feelings of democracy and the shift in the way that the Baltic states perhaps are perceiving or showing off their strength, in democracy—you all sort of mentioned attitudes on the ground.I'd like to explore that a little bit more. I mean, Margarita noted that people think of the American elections as potentially more consequential than the upcoming elections in Lithuania. Do you feel that on a day-to-day basis? Is it just in surveys or are people paying attention? Do they care?And how do they view the state of democracy in the United States, which I think is a big question on this side of the Atlantic.DA: Well, I think we clearly see that the media in Latvia, at least, are following this election much more closely than previous elections. Certainly, that's because of the nature of the election taking place at a time of war, not so far away from us.But it's also because of the candidates and especially Trump. I mean, Trump is news. He's magnetic. And there is a feeling about, “Wow, look at this guy.” Some people look at him in awe. I would say a majority look at him in confusion as to, as to why is it that he's so attractive to American voters.But certainly, the nature of the candidates, as well as the context of the election, is something which draws public attention. And we see a lot of newscasts, a lot of discussion shows, both on television and online portals, dedicated to the American elections more so than in previous years.AK: In fact, as soon as we finish recording this, I will have to go to an Estonian webcast to discuss the US election. So, indeed, there's plenty of interest and a realization that this matters to us in the Baltic states quite a bit, but that's been the case for previous US elections as well.Trump just adds this more of a circus atmosphere to it that was perhaps not present and a sort of polarizing view. But when you talked earlier about the impact of Trump on Europe, I can remember back to when Obama was elected, right?And the response in Europe was: Western Europeans loved him. Eastern Europeans were a little bit more skeptical, but even the Western Europeans who loved Obama were very disappointed by the man because he was focused on a pivot to Asia. And he didn't give the Europeans the deference and the time of day that his predecessors had.So that's already a shift that's been going on for quite some time and Biden has been the throwback to the way things were, but I think we can expect that Biden will be sort of the last real trans-Atlanticist American president.MS: Yeah, I just want to pick what Andras was mentioning in terms of the policies of the potential US leader, President Harris or President Trump, and the consequences for the Baltic countries. I think that this pivot to Asia is very consequential, and the consequences are increasing with time.And first of all, it was more economic and political, but now it's also related to defense. We've seen, one of the former advisors of Trump, Elbridge Colby, say that Taiwan and the security of Taiwan, would be a more important issue than the security of Europe or Eastern Europe and that he would advise Baltic countries to not stop at 3 percent spending from GDP, but continue spending more for defense and reaching perhaps 10 percent, which is a lot of money.And I don't think it's attainable in the near future. However, the US Pivot to Asia had an effect on Lithuanian policies. If your major ally pivots to Asia, you have to pivot there as well. I think that there is more Asia in Lithuania and there is more Lithuania in Asia in the Indo-Pacific at the moment.First of all, it started with the hosting of Taiwanese representation in Vilnius under the name of Taiwan, which became a major issue for China. A major argument with China ensued on economic, secondary sanctions that China was threatening with political ranting and a lot of other things.But then due to this disagreement, we discovered a lot of potential for cooperation in this area. At the moment, the economic relationships with Indo-Pacific countries are increasing quite speedily. And there are more of those countries, like South Korea and Japan, in Lithuania, both politically, but also economically.And we are also discussing our security corporation, particularly in the era of cyber security. I think that this is an important turn for Lithuania, probably for other Baltic countries to a less extent, but still, and this is also a certain security net for us. If there will be some more speedy pivot to Asia under the Trump presidency, we might also try to ask our friends in Taiwan to say some good words about Lithuania and our security to the ear of Trump, because Trump most likely will listen what Taiwanese are saying.IE: Well, you've kind of tackled the last question head on, which is what are the Baltic States doing to ensure their own futures? Regardless of who ends up in the White House in November. I want to open it up for any last words or thoughts on the subject.Any final conclusions that you'd like to share?DA: Well, I think a big development, possibly a positive outcome from the events in Ukraine, is the additional impetus for Baltic cooperation. Because Baltic cooperation really has lagged for the last 30 years. If we compare the way in which the Baltic states work with each other to our closest neighbors, the Nordics, we don't really cooperate. We've imitated some of the institutions of the North, but we haven't really enacted them. We haven't sort of like full-bloodedly, adopted them. But we can see that when it comes to defense, there are some very serious initiatives, which have moved ahead recently.I think procurement is one of the big areas where we see Latvia cooperating with Estonia, for example, in air defense systems, in buying training grenades. We also have a cooperation between Latvia and Lithuania on respirators. We have the Baltic defense line—although that seems to be being executed individually by each state—but it was still a common announcement with a common aim, and so on. It would be great if this was an impetus for even further Baltic cooperation, because there are many areas where we would benefit from cooperating with each other in a sort of Nordic style politically, economically, culturally, and so on.Because we are an extremely dynamic region of Europe, especially if we look at the Lithuanian economy, which is to an outsider, an amazing story. What's happened there over the last 20 years is a story to tell, and there is a common identity and common political structures which can be built upon, beginning with this enhanced military cooperation, but taking that to various political and economic levels as well.So that's one thing that I would end on attempting to be more positive.AK: I would just add and expand on Daunis, for the regional cooperation, of course, is much wider. It's a Nordic Baltic cooperation, which is the most intense and active at the moment. And the one good outcome of Putin's invasion of Ukraine has been Finland and Sweden joining NATO, which has given a real impetus to Nordic Baltic cooperation, which was already strong in all other fields.But now with defense cooperation also, we're all much closer together in the region and it's one of the most dynamic regions in the European Union.MS: I guess I'm obliged to step even further on the European level. I don't know how strong this political will and commitment in the European institutions and in some European countries will continue to be. I guess it will depend at the end of the day on the level of a threat—but we will not be living in a less threatening environment in the future—and the appetite to build strong defense industry and defense in Europe.That's a very, very important step forward. And if one thing is to come from the Ukrainian War, I would say that this would be a very, very important thing for the future of the European Union as the player in international politics.IE: Well, Professors Kasekamp, Šešelgytė, Auers. Thank you so much for your time for your commentary and we really appreciate you taking the time to speak on this subject. Thank you very much. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fpribalticinitiative.substack.com

Robert Ward hosts Dr Matsuda Takuya, Adjunct Lecturer at Aoyama Gakuin University, Dr Vida Macikenaite, Assistant Professor at the Graduate School of International Relations of the International University of Japan, and Dr Wrenn Yennie Lindgren, Senior Research Fellow and Head of the Centre for Asian Research at the Norwegian Institute of International Affairs. Robert, Takuya, Vida and Wrenn discuss:  The recent development of Japan's relationship with the Nordic and Baltic statesJapan's security cooperation with the Nordic and Baltic states from defense equipment to cyber securityThe Nordic and Baltic approach to authoritarian powers, including their eyes on the potential cooperation between Russia and China in the High NorthThe similarities and differences in the security architecture of the Euro-Atlantic and the Indo-Pacific regions We hope you enjoy the episode and please follow, rate, and subscribe to Japan Memo on your podcast platform of choice. If you have any comments or questions, please contact us at japanchair@iiss.org. Date recorded: 6 September 2024  Japan Memo is recorded and produced at the IISS in London.  Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Helsing, a defense-focused AI startup, has raised €450 million ($487 million) to enhance security in Estonia and the Baltic states. The company's valuation surged from $1.85 billion to $5.4 billion. U.S. venture funds with defense tech plans are engaging investors with Department of Defense and military backgrounds. PitchBook reports peak startup valuations in 2024, primarily in top-tier companies. DreamFlare aims to aid content creators and animation artists through AI. Scribble Journey introduced an app for art therapy. Alma, founded by Aizada Marat, simplifies visa applications using AI for skilled professionals. Nala, an African payments startup, raised $40 million, showing potential in international remittances. Regard secured $61 million to improve diagnostic accuracy with AI in medical charts. Kudos raised $3 million to enhance diapers with 100% cotton. Index Ventures announced $2.3 billion in new funds, while Alpine Space Ventures collected $184 million for the space sector. Kearny Jackson raised a $65 million fund for B2B SaaS and fintech startups. Arianna Huffington and Sam Altman launched Thrive AI Health to promote healthier lifestyles.Learn more on this news visit us at: https://greyjournal.net/news/ Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This year, NATO marks its 75th anniversary, while the Baltic countries celebrate 20 years as members of the alliance. Dr. Lukas Milevski speaks about the history of that inclusion, and shares his thoughts about the future. Milevski is a tenured assistant professor at Leiden University, where he teaches strategic studies in the BA International Studies and MA International Relations programs. He has published widely on strategy, including two books with Oxford University Press: The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought (2016) and The West's East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective (2018).For more from the world of Baltic studies visit us on Substack. Baltic Ways is a podcast brought to you by the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI.

This year, NATO marks its 75th anniversary, while the Baltic countries celebrate 20 years as members of the alliance. Dr. Lukas Milevski speaks about the history of that inclusion, and shares his thoughts about the future.Milevski is a tenured assistant professor at Leiden University, where he teaches strategic studies in the BA International Studies and MA International Relations programs. He has published widely on strategy, including two books with Oxford University Press: The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought (2016) and The West's East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective (2018).Baltic Ways is a podcast brought to you by the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI.TranscriptIndra Ekmanis: Hello, and welcome to Baltic Ways, a podcast bringing you interviews and insights from the world of Baltic studies. I'm your host, Dr. Indra Ekmanis. And today we speak with Dr. Lucas Milevski, a tenured assistant professor at Leiden University, where he teaches strategic studies. This year marks 75 years of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 20 years of the Baltic states' inclusion in that alliance. Dr. Milevski gives us his insights into the history, and what may be next for the Baltic states as part of NATO. Stay tuned.IE: Thank you so much for joining us today on Baltic Ways. Perhaps we can start with you telling us a little bit about yourself, your background and how you came to be involved in this field of study.Lukas Milevski: I'm Lukas Milevski. I'm presently an assistant professor at Leiden University in the Netherlands. And for an American audience, it's worthwhile to mention that in the Netherlands, assistant professor is a tenured position. And I research and write about military strategy in general, theory, history, contemporary analysis, as well as contemporary military defense.I am a Latvian American dual citizen, so I've also maintained both a personal and a professional interest in Baltic defense. I published my first piece on that topic way back in 2010 when I was still a master's student. I published a book on the subject, The West's East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective, in 2018, and have continued writing on the topic regularly ever since for various venues, including FPRI's own Baltic Bulletin.IE: Well, thank you for sharing that background. We are here to talk a little bit about NATO today. NATO this year celebrates its 75th anniversary in April. In March, the Baltic states also celebrate 20 years of being in the alliance, having joined in 2004. As we commemorate these milestones, how would you describe the organization's evolution, its history with the Baltic states from your perspective?LM: So 75 years of history is quite a bit, especially for an international alliance. And I'm sure there will be plenty written on this history to mark the 75th anniversary. So what I'll do now is just sketch out certain inflection points in NATO's history and the degree to which the Baltic states featured in those points or experienced consequences as a result, whether positive or negative.So the first inflection point is obviously 75 years ago itself, when NATO was founded. In the words of Lord Ismay, who was its first Secretary General, NATO was founded to keep the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out. We don't consider that second purpose relevant anymore, but the other two have remained wholly relevant.The Baltic states during this time were, of course, occupied by the Soviet Union, and simply formed part of the enemy for NATO. The next real inflection point was the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, which allowed the Baltic states to spring out of national captivity, and begin plotting their own national courses again. Unsurprisingly, this pointed them toward NATO, which in any case, had lost its primary reason for existence and only awkwardly found itself seeking organizational purpose in intervening in the Western Balkans as Yugoslavia collapsed. During the 1990s, there was a Western defense professional debate about Baltic membership in NATO, which played out in various venues, including professional and academic journals.Notably, there were some quite prescient arguments that leaving them out of NATO would ultimately be destabilizing as they would present power vacuums, which would only invite invasion at some subsequent undetermined later date. You know, essentially exactly what happened to Ukraine.IE: Right.LM: The next key inflection point was the terror attack on, terror attacks on 9/11, which finally gave NATO a mission again, counterterrorism, and incidentally the only invocation of Article 5, NATO's mutual defense clause, in the history of the alliance, by the United States. In the early atmosphere of the war on terror, Russia was a quasi ally, and this atmosphere helped, perhaps enabled, the Baltic states to slip into NATO and the European Union simultaneously in spring 2004 — March for NATO, May for the EU.The relatively warm atmosphere between NATO and Russia, and NATO's counter terrorism and counter insurgency focus, somewhat precluded NATO membership from meaning terribly much for the Baltic States. There is no real contingency defense planning for national defense, for example. Because the only threat was Russia, and the West mostly did not see Russia as a possible threat, the Baltic states and maybe some other Eastern Flank countries excepted. The one exception to this relative negligence was the Baltic air policing mission, which began right from the Baltic accession to NATO and continues to the present day. It took until the next inflection point in 2008, Russia's invasion of Georgia, to shake NATO's complacency about Russia, albeit not by that much.IE: Yeah.LM: Baltic defense planning became permissible, but without a proper political decision, more sort of as an annex to defense planning for Polish defense. And then NATO and most of its constituent countries sank back into unwarranted complacency. The story somewhat repeated in 2014. Russia invaded another country, NATO responded, including this time by redefining Russia as a potential enemy and moving some tripwire forces into the Baltic states.IE: Can you say what that means? What a tripwire force is?LM: Idea of a tripwire force is simply to have forces from other member countries present in the region so that if Russia were to invade, they'd not just be shooting at local Baltic armed forces, but also those of ideally each of the other member states as well. And this would then immediately, in principle, involve those other states in Baltic defense.So NATO moves some tripwire forces into the Baltic states. This was probably mostly due to strenuous U.S. pressure on European member states, which seemed rather unwilling at the time. Nonetheless, this was done, and then afterward NATO slipped back into a certain degree of unwarranted complacency, again, particularly the European member states and the Western European member states.And finally, most recently, 2022 and the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine. Baltic defense is again high on the agenda. NATO's four deployed forces, the tripwire forces, are to be expanded from battalion size to brigade size, basically from 1,000 men to about four to five thousand-ish. And the unwarranted complacency about Russia has yet to return.Hopefully it won't, but of course we don't know the future. As a result of this infection point as well, Finland and, finally, Sweden have also joined NATO, thereby turning the Baltic [Sea] into a NATO lake and increasing military and naval security in the region. But what we really see as a history is that NATO has only gradually, and mostly unwillingly, paid any attention, let alone serious attention, to Baltic defense.Fortunately, for most of that history, it turned out not to be a fatal mistake. And we can now hope, and perhaps work, to develop NATO defense planning and policies finally to ensure real Baltic defense. This is work not only by NATO or the larger states, but also, and of course crucially, by the Baltic states themselves, and we do see that this is happening.IE: Yeah. It strikes me that, you know, we have many headlines in U.S. outlets since 2022 and the Russian invasion — full scale invasion of Ukraine — featuring Baltic leaders. Just the other day I heard Kaja Kallas on, on NPR's “Morning Edition,” for example. And so this has become kind of a mainstay.I wonder if you can tell us — we talked about that now the Baltics are here in NATO for two decades — and over the last two decades, how has NATO's presence influenced regional security dynamics in the Baltic region? Maybe, the addition of Finland and Sweden and the creation of Lake NATO, if you will. But also how have the Baltic states themselves influenced NATO?LM: So NATO's presence in the Baltic Sea region, particularly with the accession of the Baltic states, resolved the one major geopolitical issue which I already mentioned, the notion of the power vacuum in between NATO and Russia, at least in this region, which could have — and knowing Russia — would have eventually invited trouble. And so in principle, this issue is no more. But in practice, as I was sort of saying, in terms of defense planning and everything, this remains a work in progress. So besides this key point, NATO's presence in the Baltic region over the last 20 years hasn't really affected security dynamics all that much, I think, for a number of reasons.First of all, besides the Baltic region's national forces — the local Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian forces and so on — the NATO presence itself has been quite minimal for most of those two decades. The air policing mission since 2004, the tripwire forces from 2016 onward, but the additional NATO non-Baltic physical, material, military manpower capability to affect security dynamics meaningfully has not really been there.It's only now, you know, in the past few years that we've been seeing some actual substantial change. As I also already mentioned, for most of the past 20 years, NATO has not been focusing on territorial defense, but it's been looking halfway across the world, generating expeditionary capabilities to wage war in Afghanistan.So the alliance had little time, little capability, and little desire really to consider the Baltic seriously. Third, for the early years of the war on terror, Russia was, as I said, something of an ally. And moreover, it was also wrestling with its own internal security issues. Its war with Georgia in 2008 showed major problems in its armed forces, which it spent the next few years fixing, or at least thinking it was fixing them.And as a bit of an aside on this war: This, the Russian perspective, is very distinct. They feel like they almost lost the war because of how poorly their armed forces performed, hence the need to reform them. And then of course, after Georgia, it focused on supporting the Assad regime in Syria and then add into all this is its perpetual fixation with Ukraine in 2014, even prior to 2014. And of course, after 2014 as well. So there's a good recipe for Russia also perhaps not dedicating an enormous amount of attention to the Baltic states either, and I'm no fan of Russia, but I think it's notable nonetheless that at the worst of the 2008 financial crisis, and Latvia was hit harder than most, there was no special Russian attempt to exploit the crisis to topple the Latvian or any other Baltic government.You know, nothing beyond the usual corruption, money laundering, subversion, and general criminality. Why not is a different question, and one which we can't answer. You know, even if we had Putin here on a table, and we cracked his skull open with a hammer and chisel, presumably we would find that he had a brain, but that wouldn't tell us anything about his thoughts. So we don't know why they didn't do anything, but it is perhaps notable that they didn't really do anything — at least nothing special.Finally, if you look at the defense literature, once Western military analysts began paying attention to the problems of Baltic defense again after 2014, the recurring theme which you see is one of apprehension: That Russia has the advantage in the Baltic Sea region. Because with its missiles — anti-ship missiles, anti-air missiles — it could create a Baltic bubble, from which, it could deny access to NATO forces. So there's a distinct sense in which it's actually been Russia which maintains an advantage in the Baltic Sea region.And this is only beginning to change now as a result of the war and its consequences. Both in terms of Finnish and Swedish accession to NATO, as well as in terms of damage to Russia's own armed forces. And in terms of Baltic influence, I see relatively little. As mentioned, improvements of Baltic defense have generally followed Russian aggression, and usually have been as little as NATO believed it could get away with, especially the Western European countries. Is that changing now? We'll see.IE: Yeah, well, tell us tell us in a little bit about — I mean, I feel like there was a lot of conversation early on in after the renewed invasion about the Baltics kind of having this “we told you so mentality,” to their Western Western European partners and to their American partners too in some to some degree. And then, yes, we have seen kind of these incremental shifts in the way that NATO is taking their Eastern Flank a little bit more seriously. You mentioned the increase in their tripwire forces. But what about tangible sort of feeling on the ground? How do you assess NATO's ability to deter a potential threat and uphold security? What are some of those key challenges, or maybe opportunities, in the Baltics? You talked about the Russian advantage. And maybe aside from NATO, what are the steps that the Baltic states are taking on their own? We have a lot of talk about defense investments in the Baltic states themselves. So, I'd love to hear your thoughts.LM: Yes. Well, to start with deterrence, the problem with deterrence is that, sort of, to deter, the infinitive verb is grammatically correct, but strategically inaccurate. We cannot deter. The other side chooses to be deterred. We can provide the reasons for them to choose to be deterred, but beyond that, it's fundamentally out of our hands. And we have a hard time knowing what the other side is thinking. You know, again, think of poking around Putin's brain, it tells us nothing. Worse still, he has to believe that anything we try to do is to strengthen deterrence. You know, truly, if we're putting forces into the Baltic states, it's for the purposes of deterrence and not something else, invasion.IE: Right.LM: But what the Russians are doing is giving constant signals that they don't trust the NATO presence in the Baltic states. They feel like a country under siege and generally speaking, they're paranoid of surprise attacks. So in communicating this to us, are they telling the truth or are they just cynically trying to dissuade us? Or is a little of Column A, a little of Column B, depending on the person speaking at that moment? We don't know, but this complicates the picture.It does not, however, mean that we should appease them and not try to strengthen deterrence. We obviously should. That's part of NATO's core mission. So then, going to what NATO is trying to do or what it can try to do — NATO's fundamental posture to try to instill deterrence rests on Article 5, the Mutual Defense Clause, as well as extended nuclear deterrence. In abstract, the latter is always a hard sell, just like it was during the Cold War. The notion of extended nuclear deterrence is that, essentially, the United States would protect Europe with a nuclear umbrella. It's extending its hand, willing to take nuclear blows to protect its allies. But would the United States, or for that matter Britain or France, you know, really sacrifice Washington, D.C., London, or Paris for the sake of Tallinn, Riga, or Vilnius?That's impossible to know, but at the same time, it's not a possibility that the Russians can ignore. So, allies never find it particularly compelling, and this was true during the Cold War as well, but adversaries do still have to take it seriously. Article 5, meanwhile, depends on NATO's ability actually to sustain a major military operation in the Baltic states, something which it is still in the process of trying to develop. It might also rely on keeping substantial forces positioned in the Baltic states, something which it is also developing. I mentioned the forward deployed forces expanding from battalion to brigade size, which will help with that. Germany is planning on deploying an entire brigade into Lithuania. And so this will all help with that.Is this enough to present a sufficiently credible threat of successful defense that the Russians would think better of any hypothetical future invasion? We simply don't know. Prudence is pulling us in two ways. We don't want to leave the Baltics undefended because that might invite invasion. But at the same time, we don't want to put too much in because the Russians might take that really seriously the wrong way. We need to find somewhere a middle ground, notwithstanding all of NATO's and especially all, all other American commitments elsewhere in the world.So, it's a thorny problem.IE: Yeah.LM: As for the Baltic states themselves, they face a wide variety of challenges to improving their own defense. The most fundamental one is that the Russian threat can be quite multi-dimensional, and so the Baltic states need to have some sort of capability to answer, to some degree, each of those dimensions, even without NATO support, to buy time for NATO support to arrive.You know, we're talking from land invasion with heavy armor to airborne coup de main, such as what Russia tried to do in the very first days of their invasion, renewed invasion of Ukraine back in February 2022. Russian air and missile strikes against land, sea, and air targets, cyber attacks, and electronic warfare, and many other forms of attack.You know, Russia can make the life of a Baltic defense planner really difficult, just as it currently is for Ukrainian strategists. So the Baltic challenge is spreading their limited budgets around in ways which are, or at least appear to be, good enough. At least good enough to be able to blunt an initial attack and buy time.So for this reason, Latvia and Estonia jointly procured a German IRIS-T medium range air defense system, which has been doing excellent work in Ukraine to help contribute against the missile plane and the possibility of an airborne coup de main threat. If you have air defense, it's less likely that Russian helicopters will get through, that Russian missiles will get through, and so on. Baltic states are developing a Baltic defense line, and they are expanding their armed forces, including reintroducing conscription, in Latvia's case, to help defend against a major ground invasion. They are procuring coastal defense systems to deny Russia the ability to attack them by sea.And this is all very good. It's very important. It's demonstrating a clear will to defend to the rest of NATO that the Baltic states will defend themselves in the hypothetical event of invasion. And so it puts additional political and moral pressure on the rest of NATO also to step up more. But of course, the Baltic states, on their own will, will simply never be enough to defend successfully against a country with a military the size of Russia's.This is an unavoidable fact. And this is the final challenge for the Baltic States, that ultimately they cannot guarantee their own national security, their own national survival by themselves without NATO support if Russia were really to try to challenge it with a major invasion.IE: Yeah. You mentioned this kind of goodwill, or moral pressure that is also part of the Baltic states' defense plan in some ways. And I am thinking about that in their accession and the way that the Baltic states responded and showed up, for example, in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks. So, I wonder if you can tell us a little bit about how the Baltic states have contributed to NATO's missions and operations. Whether or not their participation has shaped any of the alliance's strategies or priorities.LM: So ever since they regained independence and developed their own armed forces, the Baltic states have tried to be good citizens of the liberal international order and have committed forces to international operations, including NATO, but also EU missions, UN missions, other allied missions — of course, within the scope of their own available resources.For most missions over the past 30 years, the Baltic commitment has been small, both comparatively and sort of absolutely. And of course, the degree of commitment for each mission in which the Baltic states individually or collectively have been involved has also varied over time.So just to sort of touch on a few examples, they sent soldiers to the various missions resulting from the violent collapse of Yugoslavia. Even today, Latvia and Lithuania are still contributing to KFOR in Kosovo. Lithuania has one soldier there, but with a Seimas mandate for up to five, while Latvia has committed 136 military personnel to that mission.Estonia, meanwhile, participated in the French Operation Barkhane in Mali, originally dedicating 50 troops and raising the number to 95 in 2019, until the end of the operation there in 2022. And Estonia's participation in Barkhane was appreciated in Paris and led to a considerable amount of French goodwill.So this indicates the importance of not just NATO missions, but looking beyond NATO missions, to other missions, because, yes, a lot of countries are part of NATO, they're also part of EU, membership overlaps, and even contributing to other states' national missions can have beneficial consequences within the NATO context.IE: Sure.LM: Most prominently, of course, the Baltic states had all contributed troops to the wars in Iraq as part of the Coalition of the Willing, as well as to the International Security Assistance Force, the NATO force in Afghanistan. So from the Baltic point of view of the past 20 years, which is totally understandable, the United States was always going to be the single most important guarantor of Baltic military and national security.The subsequent question — the degree to which Baltic involvement has led to influence — is much less clear. For one, you know, much of that would happen behind closed doors. But it is fair to say that there were some early attitudes toward the Baltic states, which were quite fundamentally not promising, notably from some Western European countries.The most infamous example is probably Jacques Chirac's outburst, as president of France in 2003 — and this was admittedly, you know, a year before Baltic accession to NATO and the EU — dismayed by the Vilnius letter, which a number of current Eastern Flank countries drafted in support of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and publicly criticized those Eastern Flank countries, or now Eastern Flank countries, for failing to take the opportunity, and this is a quote, to 'shut up.' So there's always been this sort of sense that the older member states, particularly in Western Europe, simply know better than the newer Eastern Flank members, including, totally absurdly, about Russia.This has proved a rather difficult cultural bias for the Baltic states and other Eastern Flank countries to overcome. And one in which the star player in any Baltic success, as I've already said, really has been Russia for consistently defying European expectations and European excuses for Russian behavior.So from 2022 onward, the older Western European member states have finally, and I do think it's finally, begun learning a bit of humility, which opens up more space and willingness to listen to others. The U.S. pattern in all this has been notably different pretty consistently for most of the past 25 years. New administrations entered the White House seeking cooperation with Russia. Bush, after 9/11, when he looked into Putin's eyes and saw his soul, famously. Obama, when he sought to reset relations with Russia. Trump, with his near total subservience to Russia. Yet almost as consistently, the outgoing administration had become totally disillusioned about Russia as a result of outrageous Russian behavior. Bush after the invasion of Georgia, Obama after the invasion of Crimea and Donbass. Only Trump didn't experience that. And with the Biden administration, which came in in 2020, it at least entered office finally already wary of Russia. So the U.S. track record is actually quite different from the Western European track record. It's much more variable, much more uneven, but at key moments, it's been much more in favor of Russia, of Baltic defense, and of supporting the Baltic states.IE: Yeah. So NATO leaders are going to gather in D.C. in July, for the summit that marks the 75th anniversary of the alliance. But we're also coming up on the American elections in November. So I wonder how you see the US elections impacting NATO, especially as we are looking again at a rematch between Donald Trump and Joe Biden, and what you might see for the future of NATO in the coming years — particularly for the Baltics, but more generally too.LM: This is, of course, the big question, and the correct answer is, it's impossible to say. It'll be hard enough to imagine, even when we know who the next president will be, let alone now. But we can talk about what we know now, and try to think about the future.Because both Trump and Biden do have presidential track records now. And Trump's isn't as bad as everyone imagined beforehand, but that's largely because policy is slow to change. And throughout much of his administration, the Department of Defense was following plans already laid down and confirmed and set in motion by the previous Obama administration. Moreover, Trump actually had intelligent adults in the room with him for much of his administration, and the Senate in particular remained very pro-NATO. Both of which limited the negative consequences.In the unfortunate event of a Trump victory in November, the basic policy reality that change is hard to achieve will remain in force. But he is unlikely to have in the room nearly the same number or quality of intelligent adults as before. The Republican contingent in the Senate may also become less pro-NATO as well, with Mitch McConnell passing the torch — his pro-NATO attitudes being one of his very few virtues.On the other hand, you know, we can, and if you like, should, hope for a Biden victory. Then hopefully there won't be much change, at least for another four years. So just a continued trajectory for strengthening Baltic defense further. Or we might even plausibly expect, or hope for, at least, change for the better, as the Republican Party, which has been held hostage by Trump over the past half year or so in particular, will lose the need to try to deny Democrats political victories in the lead up to the national election, which is something they're doing now.But besides the variable of the U.S., there is still Europe, and it remains a variable as well. One increasingly highlighted as Trump has had contact with Orbán recently.IE: Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary.LM: Yes, who is also quite pro-Russian. But so in Europe too, a certain degree of pro-Russian feeling is spreading. Most recently With Robert Fico, a Slovakian populist, being elected prime minister in Slovakia. Moreover, many European countries still are not hitting the 2 percent of GDP mark agreed upon nearly a decade ago now, in September, 2014. And even if they were, the money spending practices of certain number of states is quite suspect. Now, regardless of the amount of money, the German defense budget is in an absolute state and one which more money on its own simply will not change at this moment. You need to change the processes, the bureaucracy, and the practices first before more money will make much of a difference. We have seen, however, a recent headline from Trump saying that if European NATO members were to pay more then, he'd be more amenable to staying in NATO.So he's shown some degree of flexibility, whether that's just for show or real is a different question. But nonetheless, Trump is trying to soften some bits of his sort of anti-NATO rhetoric. And even as the war continues in Ukraine and even assuming NATO countries individually and in cooperation are able to return to supporting Ukraine effectively, the next years will see NATO as an alliance, or its member states as individuals, addressing a wide variety of problems to both improve the quality and the quantity of the defense which can be provided — to the Baltic states, to Europe in general. Every Western military is probably feeling a certain sense of crisis in the face of what they see going on in Ukraine right now. And, going, sort of going back to the professional literature which I read on military strategy and all that, there have been some expressed doubts as to whether or not the U.S. could actually wage war. A major war going back to well before the Russian invasion in 2022 and what we see going on now and the difficulty of winning on the battlefield and so on and so forth. There's a lot of thinking going on, so a lot of this doesn't have much to do necessarily with political leadership, but it's just how militaries are trying to reimagine how they might want to, or perhaps might need to do things on and off the battlefield in order to continue being effective organizations for national defense. So the presidential race is a big story, but there's plenty of other stories, as well.IE: Yeah. So reminding us there's plenty going on beneath the surface beyond political leadership changes. Well, Dr. Milevski, I want to thank you so much for being with us on Baltic Ways, for giving us your insights as we are approaching these significant milestones, this significant year for NATO, for the Baltics in NATO. And we really appreciate your commentary.Thank you. Thank you so much.LM: Thank you for having me.IE: Thank you for tuning in to Baltic ways. A podcast from the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. A note that the views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI. I'm your host Indra Ekmanis. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fpribalticinitiative.substack.com

GUEST OVERVIEW: Pelle Neroth Taylor started his career writing for the Economist from the Baltic States in the early 1990s, a time of post-communist chaos in eastern Europe. He has been a close and interested observer of European current affairs ever since. Having lived in Brussels, Prague, London (his native city) and now Sweden, he has had articles published in the Lancet, New Scientist, the Sunday Times, Financial Times and the European. He also worked editing shifts at the Guardian, the Times, the FT Group, and the Independent on Sunday. For ten years he was a columnist on European affairs for E&T magazine. Since spending more time in Sweden, he has made several documentary films, two of which are featured on Amazon Prime (Sweden, Dying to be Multicultural and Cancel Nation), and written several ebooks, including What did you do in the war Sweden? and the Life and Death of Olof Palme. He lives in a small Swedish town with his girlfriend and a twelve-year-old cat

I was going to use a quote from Drachen here, because I remembered being quite proud of how I described Tallinn in there, but it turns out I remembered... generously So let's just say that Estonia is a fantastic place to visit this summer. But don't stop there, explore the other Baltic States while you're at it, maybe make a road trip of it and check out Poland, Czechia, and Germany, too. The borderless EU is your playground.And, before the disaster that is Brexit, I enjoyed that freedom of movement as a resident, spending two wonderful years living and working in Copenhagen. Many still do, and that's where Mifundo come into the picture. We've spoken about cross-border credit bureau solutions before, and how they help immigrants, Kaido Saar will talk about that today, too, but within Europe immigration is often more of a tidal flow than a river's unidirectional run to the sea so we'll also discuss how that's baked into their solution.Kaidoo and the team will once again be at Money20/20 in Amsterdam next month as part of the Estonian Fintech booth - https://europe.money2020.com/ I should be there, too, provided I get my logistics sorted in time, so if you're going to be in town, let's make a plan to meet up at the event or at one of the many after parties

GUEST 1 OVERVIEW: Radha Stirling is a leading UK based human rights advocate, crisis manager and policy consultant, focusing on the UAE and the wider Middle East. She is the founder and CEO of British based organisation Detained in Dubai (which have helped almost twenty thousand victims of injustice over the past 13+ years), Due Process International and IPEX (Interpol and Extradition) Reform. Stirling also hosts the Gulf in Justice Podcast. http://www.radhastirling.com/ GUEST 2 OVERVIEW: Pelle Neroth Taylor started his career writing for the Economist from the Baltic States in the early 1990s, a time of post-communist chaos in eastern Europe. He has been a close and interested observer of European current affairs ever since. Having lived in Brussels, Prague, London (his native city) and now Sweden, he has had articles published in the Lancet, New Scientist, the Sunday Times, Financial Times and the European. He also worked editing shifts at the Guardian, the Times, the FT Group, and the Independent on Sunday. For ten years he was a columnist on European affairs for E&T magazine. Since spending more time in Sweden, he has made several documentary films, two of which are featured on Amazon Prime (Sweden, Dying to be Multicultural and Cancel Nation), and written several ebooks, including What did you do in the war Sweden? and the Life and Death of Olof Palme. He lives in a small Swedish town with his girlfriend and a twelve-year-old cat

Sir Stephen Tallents was a distinguished British civil servant and a trailblazer in public relations. I focus on his work in Latvia between 1919 - 1920.   Due to his skill and determination, he assisted Latvia and the other newly independent Baltic States to achieve peace and prosperity for 20 years. His story is fascinating. Join me as we learn more about the man and how he operated, like how he created the Tallents Line border between Latvia and Estonia. We will even visit the town that Tallents divided, Valka/Valga. Thanks for listening!

In this episode of Battle Lines, we speak to the Telegraph's Chief Political Correspondent Camilla Turner and US Editor Tony Diver on an alleged Chinese hacking plot against the UK and the US. Then we speak to Senior Foreign Correspondent Sophia Yan on her visit to Latvia to understand how the Baltic nations are mobilising to counter any future attack by the Russian Federation. Finally, we speak to Senior Foreign Correspondent Roland Oliphant on the rising tensions after decades of conflict, between Armenia and Azerbaijan. Contributors David Knowles (Host) @djknowles22 on XCamilla Turner (Chief Political Correspondent) @camillahmturner on XTony Diver (US Editor)@Tony_Diver on XSophia Yan (Senior Foreign Correspondent) @sophia_yan on XRoland Oliphant (Roland Oliphant) @RolandOliphant on XReadThe Latvian sandwich makers training to push Putin's army into ‘kill zones' by Sophia YanFor 3 months access to The Telegraph for just £1: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/audio |Email: battlelines@telegraph.co.uk Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

GUEST 1 OVERVIEW: Pelle Neroth Taylor started his career writing for the Economist from the Baltic States in the early 1990s, a time of post-communist chaos in eastern Europe. He has been a close and interested observer of European current affairs ever since. Having lived in Brussels, Prague, London (his native city) and now Sweden, he has had articles published in the Lancet, New Scientist, the Sunday Times, Financial Times and the European. He also worked editing shifts at the Guardian, the Times, the FT Group, and the Independent on Sunday. For ten years he was a columnist on European affairs for E&T magazine. Since spending more time in Sweden, he has made several documentary films, two of which are featured on Amazon Prime (Sweden, Dying to be Multicultural and Cancel Nation), and written several ebooks, including What did you do in the war Sweden? and the Life and Death of Olof Palme. He lives in a small Swedish town with his girlfriend and a twelve-year-old cat. GUEST 2 OVERVIEW: Basil Valentine is a TNT Political Editor. 

GUEST 1 OVERVIEW: Madeleine Hunt serves as the General Secretary of the Heritage Party. GUEST 2 OVERVIEW: Pelle Neroth Taylor started his career writing for the Economist from the Baltic States in the early 1990s, a time of post-communist chaos in eastern Europe. He has been a close and interested observer of European current affairs ever since. Having lived in Brussels, Prague, London (his native city) and now Sweden, he has had articles published in the Lancet, New Scientist, the Sunday Times, Financial Times and the European. He also worked editing shifts at the Guardian, the Times, the FT Group, and the Independent on Sunday. For ten years he was a columnist on European affairs for E&T magazine. Since spending more time in Sweden, he has made several documentary films, two of which are featured on Amazon Prime (Sweden, Dying to be Multicultural and Cancel Nation), and written several ebooks, including What did you do in the war Sweden? and the Life and Death of Olof Palme. He lives in a small Swedish town with his girlfriend and a twelve-year-old cat.

Timo takes us on a journey through the tumultuous events of the 1991 Soviet coup attempt, as experienced from the streets of the Baltic States. As the coup unfolds, Timo finds himself in Lithuania, planning to covertly visit the closed city of Kaliningrad. He shares the tension sharing a dining table with a Soviet officer, unknowingly on the eve of the coup. As the coup escalates, Timo's narrative becomes a vivid street-level account of the Estonian people's defiance. He describes the formation of human walls against Soviet tanks, the strategic significance of the TV tower, and the Estonians' ingenious methods of maintaining communication despite Russian interference. Timo's reflections on the morality of his curiosity, the fear of violence, and the spirit of resistance that pervaded Estonia during those critical hours are a testament to the resilience of a nation on the brink of reclaiming its freedom. Timo's book “Tanks & Roaches” is only currently available in Finnish, Estonian and Slovak and can be purchased on the links here https://coldwarconversations.com/episode334/ Timo can be contacted at timlaine@gmail.com  The fight to preserve Cold War history continues and viaa simple monthly donation, you will give me the ammunition to continue to preserve Cold War history. You'll become part of our community, get ad-free episodes, and get a sought-after CWC coaster as a thank you and you'll bask in the warm glow of knowing you are helping to preserve Cold War history.Just go to https://coldwarconversations.com/donate/If a monthly contribution is not your cup of tea, we welcome one-off donations via the same link.   Find the ideal gift for the Cold War enthusiast in your life! Just go to https://coldwarconversations.com/store/ Follow us on Twitter https://twitter.com/ColdWarPod Instagram https://www.instagram.com/coldwarconversations/ Facebook https://www.facebook.com/groups/coldwarpod/ Youtube https://youtube.com/@ColdWarConversations Love history? Check out Into History at this link https://intohistory.com/coldwarpod Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

PREVIEW: #BALTICSTATES: Excerpt frm conversation with colleague Anatol Lieven re the opinion in the Baltic States and in NATO that after Ukraine, the Kremlin will attack Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania.  More of this later today. 1949 Lithuania

In a national address, Russian President Vladimir Putin has threatened to use nuclear weapons if NATO countries were to join a ground offensive in Ukraine.The suggestion of NATO forces was made by France's President Emmanuel Macron but quickly dismissed by the US, Britain, and Germany.However, it comes amid calls to show more strength against the Kremlin from Baltic leaders, as Russian troops ramp up military operations along land and sea borders in the region.Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are now bolstering their civilian armies and have urged other NATO countries, including the UK, to do the same. Today on the Daily, Anna Jones speaks to Sky's international affairs editor Dominic Waghorn to unpack what Mr Putin said in his latest speech. She also speaks to security and defence editor Deborah Haynes about how Russia's neighbours are readying themselves for battle. Senior podcast producer: Annie Joyce Podcast Producer: Sydney Pead Assistant producer: Evan Dale Podcast promotion producer: Jada-Kai Meosa John Editor: Philly Beaumont

On today's show, Pelle Neroth Taylor discusses the Deep State and Jacob Rothschild's death. Later, Matt 'Kung Fu Medic' Taylor discusses why "Breathtaking" is not reflective of the hospitals he or other medics have worked in. He highlights that they were often empty, with some places having a ratio of 2 nurses to 1 patient. Taylor points out the dismissive response to whistleblowers who highlighted dancing doctors and nurses on TikTok, labeling them as 'party poopers'. He emphasizes that not a single paramedic he knows would refuse to administer CPR, unlike depicted in "Breathtaking." GUEST 1 OVERVIEW: Pelle Neroth Taylor started his career writing for the Economist from the Baltic States in the early 1990s, a time of post-communist chaos in eastern Europe. He has been a close and interested observer of European current affairs ever since. Having lived in Brussels, Prague, London (his native city) and now Sweden, he has had articles published in the Lancet, New Scientist, the Sunday Times, Financial Times and the European. He also worked editing shifts at the Guardian, the Times, the FT Group, and the Independent on Sunday. For ten years he was a columnist on European affairs for E&T magazine. Since spending more time in Sweden, he has made several documentary films, two of which are featured on Amazon Prime (Sweden, Dying to be Multicultural and Cancel Nation), and written several ebooks, including What did you do in the war Sweden? and the Life and Death of Olof Palme. He lives in a small Swedish town with his girlfriend and a twelve-year-old cat.  GUEST 2 OVERVIEW: Matt Taylor is a former paramedic.

GUEST 1 OVERVIEW: Pelle Neroth Taylor started his career writing for the Economist from the Baltic States in the early 1990s, a time of post-communist chaos in eastern Europe. He has been a close and interested observer of European current affairs ever since. Having lived in Brussels, Prague, London (his native city) and now Sweden, he has had articles published in the Lancet, New Scientist, the Sunday Times, Financial Times and the European. He also worked editing shifts at the Guardian, the Times, the FT Group, and the Independent on Sunday. For ten years he was a columnist on European affairs for E&T magazine. Since spending more time in Sweden, he has made several documentary films, two of which are featured on Amazon Prime (Sweden, Dying to be Multicultural and Cancel Nation), and written several ebooks, including What did you do in the war Sweden? and the Life and Death of Olof Palme. He lives in a small Swedish town with his girlfriend and a twelve-year-old cat. GUEST 2 OVERVIEW: Dave Oneegs a prominent Freedom Fighter has been heavily targeted by the mainstream media and labeled “Australia's most prominent conspiracy theorist.”

GUEST HOST: Basil Valentine filling in for Patrick Henningsen.  GUEST 1 OVERVIEW: Rick Munn is a TNT host, Serving up a diet of current affairs with a healthy dose of salt and light. Promoting truth and exposing lies, global and local. Highlighting and discussing issues mainstream media are paid to ignore. GUEST 2 OVERVIEW: Pelle Neroth Taylor started his career writing for the Economist from the Baltic States in the early 1990s, a time of post-communist chaos in eastern Europe. He has been a close and interested observer of European current affairs ever since. Having lived in Brussels, Prague, London (his native city) and now Sweden, he has had articles published in the Lancet, New Scientist, the Sunday Times, Financial Times and the European. He also worked editing shifts at the Guardian, the Times, the FT Group, and the Independent on Sunday. For ten years he was a columnist on European affairs for E&T magazine. Since spending more time in Sweden, he has made several documentary films, two of which are featured on Amazon Prime (Sweden, Dying to be Multicultural and Cancel Nation), and written several ebooks, including What did you do in the war Sweden? and the Life and Death of Olof Palme. He lives in a small Swedish town with his girlfriend and a twelve-year-old cat.

On today's show, Scott McConnell explores the question: Is there a Peace and Prosperity Candidate in 2024? GUEST 1 OVERVIEW: Scott McConnell is an author and the founder of the American Conservative. GUEST 2 OVERVIEW: Pelle Neroth Taylor started his career writing for the Economist from the Baltic States in the early 1990s, a time of post-communist chaos in eastern Europe. He has been a close and interested observer of European current affairs ever since. Having lived in Brussels, Prague, London (his native city) and now Sweden, he has had articles published in the Lancet, New Scientist, the Sunday Times, Financial Times and the European. He also worked editing shifts at the Guardian, the Times, the FT Group, and the Independent on Sunday. For ten years he was a columnist on European affairs for E&T magazine. Since spending more time in Sweden, he has made several documentary films, two of which are featured on Amazon Prime (Sweden, Dying to be Multicultural and Cancel Nation), and written several ebooks, including What did you do in the war Sweden? and the Life and Death of Olof Palme. He lives in a small Swedish town with his girlfriend and a twelve-year-old cat.

The mountain has labored and brought forth a mouse - this might be the best depiction of the outcome of the Swedish investigation of the Nordstream sabotage. Like in the Estonia and Olof Palme murder investigation, it seems the Swedish government knows enough to know it really doesn't want to know more. Knowing nothing also helps to get onboard NATO, which Sweden wants badly. But why? Dirk Pohlmann discusses the German/swedish wish to see, hear and speak no truth as well as the mainstream media nuclear fallout from the Tucker Carlson - Vladimir Putin interview. GUEST OVERVIEW: Pelle Neroth Taylor started his career writing for the Economist from the Baltic States in the early 1990s. He has had articles published in the Lancet, New Scientist, the Sunday Times, Financial Times and the European. He also worked editing shifts at the Guardian, the Times, the FT Group, and the Independent on Sunday. For ten years he was a columnist on European affairs for E&T magazine. Since spending more time in Sweden, he has made several documentary films. Pelle is a TNT Presenter.

#EU: Central Europe and the Baltic States need security guarantees by Brussels. Judy Dempsey, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Editor-in-Chief: Strategic Europe, in Berlin. https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategiceurope/91568 1789 Bucharest

On today's show, Lucinda Lidstone discusses the rise in ADHD cases among children and adults, exploring concerns about the authenticity of some diagnoses. These concerns, attributed in part to factors like a robust benefit system, prompt deeper examination. Psychotherapist Lucinda Lidstone, who has voiced her own reservations regarding ADHD diagnosis and prevalence, provides her perspective. Later, Pelle Neroth Taylor delves into the topic of multiculturalism in Sweden, touching on media representation, freedom of speech, and academic censorship. GUEST 1 OVERVIEW: Lucinda began her early career working with adults in NHS Primary care with brief cognitive intervention and later moved to a more clinical setting in Private Mental Health on inpatient wards and in an outpatient day hospital. Here she supported both Adults and Adolescents in Crisis with severe presentations such as Eating Disorders and Hearing Voices, providing both individual and group therapy. Lucinda has also been in private practice for a number of years; concerned about a lack of provision for adolescents she founded ASC to support young people and their families in the South Essex area. Lucinda values research and new ideas and encourages talking and thinking about mental health & emotional wellbeing through the ASC monthly Podcast ‘ASCit'. She has developed a further service for adults who wish to explore their spirituality and expand personal awareness and consciousness. GUEST 2 OVERVIEW: Pelle Neroth Taylor started his career writing for the Economist from the Baltic States in the early 1990s, a time of post-communist chaos in eastern Europe. He has been a close and interested observer of European current affairs ever since. Having lived in Brussels, Prague, London (his native city) and now Sweden, he has had articles published in the Lancet, New Scientist, the Sunday Times, Financial Times and the European. He also worked editing shifts at the Guardian, the Times, the FT Group, and the Independent on Sunday. For ten years he was a columnist on European affairs for E&T magazine. Since spending more time in Sweden, he has made several documentary films, two of which are featured on Amazon Prime (Sweden, Dying to be Multicultural and Cancel Nation), and written several ebooks, including What did you do in the war Sweden? and the Life and Death of Olof Palme. He lives in a small Swedish town with his girlfriend and a twelve-year-old cat.

GUEST OVERVIEW: Pelle Neroth Taylor started his career writing for the Economist from the Baltic States in the early 1990s, a time of post-communist chaos in eastern Europe. He has been a close and interested observer of European current affairs ever since. Having lived in Brussels, Prague, London (his native city) and now Sweden, he has had articles published in the Lancet, New Scientist, the Sunday Times, Financial Times and the European. He also worked editing shifts at the Guardian, the Times, the FT Group, and the Independent on Sunday. For ten years he was a columnist on European affairs for E&T magazine. Since spending more time in Sweden, he has made several documentary films, two of which are featured on Amazon Prime (Sweden, Dying to be Multicultural and Cancel Nation), and written several ebooks, including What did you do in the war Sweden? and the Life and Death of Olof Palme. He lives in a small Swedish town with his girlfriend and a twelve-year-old cat.

On today's show, Pelle Neroth Taylor discusses what is going on in Europe today. GUEST OVERVIEW: Pelle Neroth Taylor started his career writing for the Economist from the Baltic States in the early 1990s, a time of post-communist chaos in eastern Europe. He has been a close and interested observer of European current affairs ever since. Having lived in Brussels, Prague, London (his native city) and now Sweden, he has had articles published in the Lancet, New Scientist, the Sunday Times, Financial Times and the European. He also worked editing shifts at the Guardian, the Times, the FT Group, and the Independent on Sunday. For ten years he was a columnist on European affairs for E&T magazine. Since spending more time in Sweden, he has made several documentary films, two of which are featured on Amazon Prime (Sweden, Dying to be Multicultural and Cancel Nation), and written several ebooks, including What did you do in the war Sweden? and the Life and Death of Olof Palme. He lives in a small Swedish town with his girlfriend and a twelve-year-old cat.

(Ep 182) In Conversation on Sikyong Penpa Tsering's Official Visit to the Baltic States by Tibet TV

On today's show, Pelle Neroth Taylor provides insights into the current events in Europe. Later, he delves into the immigration crisis in the USA and Sweden, followed by a discussion of his book and views on JFK, including the question of who was behind the assassination. GUEST OVERVIEW: Pelle Neroth Taylor began his career by writing for the Economist from the Baltic States during the early 1990s, a period marked by post-communist upheaval in Eastern Europe. He has remained a keen and attentive observer of European current affairs ever since. Pelle has lived in various European cities, including Brussels, Prague, London (his hometown), and now Sweden. Over the years, he has contributed articles to esteemed publications such as the Lancet, New Scientist, the Sunday Times, Financial Times, and the European. Additionally, he has worked on editing shifts at the Guardian, the Times, the FT Group, and the Independent on Sunday. For a decade, he served as a columnist focusing on European affairs for E&T magazine. With his increasing time in Sweden, Pelle has produced several documentary films, two of which are featured on Amazon Prime ("Sweden, Dying to be Multicultural" and "Cancel Nation"). He has also authored several ebooks, including "What did you do in the war Sweden?" and "The Life and Death of Olof Palme." Pelle currently resides in a small Swedish town with his girlfriend and a twelve-year-old cat.

GUEST OVERVIEW: Pelle Neroth Taylor started his career writing for the Economist from the Baltic States in the early 1990s, a time of post-communist chaos in eastern Europe. He has been a close and interested observer of European current affairs ever since. Having lived in Brussels, Prague, London (his native city) and now Sweden, he has had articles published in the Lancet, New Scientist, the Sunday Times, Financial Times and the European. He also worked editing shifts at the Guardian, the Times, the FT Group, and the Independent on Sunday. For ten years he was a columnist on European affairs for E&T magazine. Since spending more time in Sweden, he has made several documentary films, two of which are featured on Amazon Prime (Sweden, Dying to be Multicultural and Cancel Nation), and written several ebooks, including What did you do in the war Sweden? and the Life and Death of Olof Palme. He lives in a small Swedish town with his girlfriend and a twelve-year-old cat.

PREVIEW: #Putin: #Nukes: #NATO: Part of a conversation with Henry Sokolski re the fear in the Baltic States and in the eastern frontier of NATO that, once Russia conquers Ukraine, that Putin will keep going against the former Soviet states -- and that the likelihood of Russian nuclear weapons use on the battlefield increases. https://www.ft.com/content/7b94ec46-c761-4de3-8df7-055602ace279?accessToken=zwAGDjWyPJAokc97lOxGx2FN49ON9wVWAqzieQ.MEUCIQCcRo04n-w5ZyLiVrjuovHnNkPHZQaB_c3REh5cIKB94AIgRYbbJ-z2jVinDQrGFQmxZPPDzNc6h8ygLNvfiVegQ38&sharetype=gift&token=7c35e6a0-fa9b-4e6e-8e72-d3f4f6e52606 https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/real-russian-nuclear-threat 1922 Soviet Union Empire

World leaders have gathered for a major security meeting in North Macedonia, while others have boycotted the event due to Russia's presence. Meanwhile, foreign ministers have also gathered in Brussels for a NATO meeting - where the war in Ukraine has been front and centre.

Ben and Aaron are joined by Professor Ulrike von Hirschhausen for an extended discussion of the ties that bind the Baltic States and Germany and the opportunities that new ways of seeing each other offer for greater mutual understanding.

Ben and Aaron are joined this week by an all-star panel of Baltic politicians, including Marko Mihkelson and Žygimantas Pavilionis – who chair the Foreign Affairs Committees in Estonian and Lithuanian Parliament...

The Russian invasion of Finland in November 1939 came as a bloody shock to the people of the small Baltic state, not least the government which appeared to have misread Joseph Stalin's intentions. The location for this terrible saga lies at the easternmost end of the Baltic Sea, between the Gulf of Finland and the huge Lake Ladoga, this is the rugged and very narrow Karelian Isthmus. Flying over this territory in a light plane reveals its stark and stern beauty, cut laterally by crisp blue lakes, blanketed in an evergreen forest, stubby grey and reddy grey hills pop up here and there. There was virtually nothing of value here at least at first, no minerals, very little agriculture as the soils are poor. That was going to change when the Finns discovered large deposits of nickel in the Petsamo region and would hand over mining concessions to the British. The Russians did not like that one little bit. But it wasn't minerals that led to Moscow invading their much smaller neighbour, it was the fear of the Germans. This little bit of land was going to be fought over as it had been so often through history. The Karelian Isthmus is a land bridge between the seething eastward mass of mother Russia and Asia, and the immensity of the Scandinavian Peninsular that swells downward to the west. It's like a highway for tribal migration, a route for trade, a channel for cultural movements, and a gateway for conquest. The armies that have stormed across this isthmus include the Mongols, the Teutons, Swedes, the Russians themselves. And as the drumbeat towards war in the 1930s pounded, Soviet president Joseph Stalin was acutely aware that the German's could use this same route to attack Leningrad and Russia from the north west. This Third Reich juggernaut could pass eastwards through the Karelian Isthmus at the point where it widens into the Finnish mainland, and hit Leningrad in a matter of hours. At least that was what Moscow convinced itself on the eve of World War II. The fact that to get there the Germans would have to ship a vast quantity of material across the Baltic Sea was not really taken into account. It would have been a logistic nightmare which wasn't really feasible at that stage of the war. Attacking via Sweden overland was even more difficult. It made sense for Hitler and his generals to attack Leningrad, but using a far more common route via Lithuania. Leningrad is of course, St Petersburg, and St Petersburg is the hometown of Vladimir Putin. Another Russian leader who is paranoid about the Baltic States these days. When the Russian revolution in November 1917 led to the Tsar's overthrow, the Finns declared independence and Lenin could do very little — he was fighting his own civil war against the pro-Monarchy forces so Moscow initially recognized the new Finnish government. Finland now experienced a series of social ructions, class struggles, famine, and a standard of living that plunged. There were 40 000 Russian soldiers stationed in Finland, and these joined the new Finnish communist Red Guard which began to fight the White Guard, the militant arm of the upper classes and the bourgeoisie. A Finnish Civil war had begun. A right wing uprising in 1932 collapsed and that pretty much ended the effectiveness of the Finnish fascists, the country had survived the depression, coup attempts, fascist uprisings and their economy seemed to be looking up. Moscow kept the pressure up saying that Finland had to prove their good faith with a tangible, real world gesture. Finnish Prime Minister Cajander put out feelers, what would this entail? Ah, that's easy, replied the Russians, the most suitable gesture would be for Finland to cede, or lease, what the communist country called “the valueless islands in the Gulf of Finland” to Russia. Both Cajander and Holsti rejected this as out of the question. Desmond Latham blog

Why are many church rooftops across the Baltic States and Europe adorned with roosters instead of a cross? Jim Daly explains the symbolism of the rooster and why it urges us to live with humility.   Support Family Ministry   If you've listened to any of our podcasts, please give us your feedback.

BIO: Harvey Sawikin is the co-founder and co-manager of Firebird. Launched in early 1994, Firebird's funds were the first dedicated to the stock markets of Russia and the former Soviet Union.STORY: Harvey invested twice in a bank and a vodka company without due diligence. Instead, he believed that other companies who had invested in those investments had done the job of verifying their viability. Harvey lost huge amounts in both investments.LEARNING: You'll fail if you rely on someone else's due diligence and work. The most dangerous time to invest is when it's the easiest to invest. “Relying on someone else's due diligence is a mistake because you never know what's going on or when stuff starts to go wrong.”Harvey Sawikin Guest profileHarvey Sawikin is the co-founder and co-manager of Firebird. Launched starting in early 1994, Firebird's funds were the first dedicated to the stock markets of Russia and the former Soviet Union. Harvey also co-founded the Amber funds, which do private equity in the Baltic States. Before Firebird, he was an M&A lawyer at Wachtell Lipton after attending Harvard Law School and clerking for a Federal judge. Harvey's novel, about a young lawyer who becomes an inside trader, was published by Simon & Schuster in 1995. He lives in Manhattan with his wife of 32 years and a neurotic 15-year-old cockapoo.Worst investment everOne of the largest banks in Kazakhstan, BTA Bank, approached Harvey's company with an investment proposal. Another fund in the region had taken a position in it. The bank was supposedly very close with management and had excellent insight into how the company would build. The company looked cheap, with a reasonable price to book, and the economy was performing well. So Harvey invested in the bank.It turns out the bank's loan book was crooked, and there was a lot of self-dealing. The guy who was the main power behind the bank was arrested for misappropriating millions of dollars from the bank through bad loans. The bank was put into bankruptcy and was taken over by another bank. The shareholders were almost wiped out. Harvey's company had invested $20 million and got under a million back.In another incident, Harvey was very interested in getting involved in Ukraine. When a vodka company was brought to their attention, they became keen on investing in it, especially since a famous hedge fund in New York had bought a direct position. The fund said they had maxed out how much they could take and were willing to sell Harvey part of their stake.Harvey's company made its investment, and within two or three weeks, the vodka company released gross earnings. Its financial results were 40% below where they were supposed to be.Harvey believed they had been duped by the hedge fund and wound up litigating against them. He eventually dropped the case due to the ruinous litigation costs in England and where the loser pays. He surrendered to losing that investment.Lessons learnedYou'll fail if you rely on someone else's due diligence and work.Be careful when investing during a bubble because it becomes invisible to you when you're inside it.Andrew's takeawaysDo your own due diligence.Don't overestimate the knowledge, skills, and persistence of other investors.The most dangerous time to invest is when it is the easiest to invest.Harvey's recommendationsHarvey recommends Twitter as a source of real-time information as long as you follow the right...