NATO-led security mission in Afghanistan, 2001–14
POPULARITY
Send us a textIn this powerful conversation, retired four-star General Stanley McChrystal joins Joe to discuss his new book, On Character: Choices That Define a Life. Drawing from decades of military leadership and personal reflection, General McChrystal breaks down why character is more than just a word—it's a daily practice rooted in conviction and discipline.In this episode, they explore:Why journaling would have made him a better leaderA practical method he used to align his time with his priorities in AfghanistanHow reading shaped his thinking both in and out of uniformThe subtle but dangerous effects of power on rising leadersWhy leaders must continuously test their convictions under pressureWhether you're in uniform or leading in another capacity, this episode is a must-listen for anyone striving to lead with authenticity, courage, and character.Stan McChrystal retired in July 2010 as a four-star general after over 34 years of service in the U.S. Army. His final assignment was as the commander of NATO's International Security Assistance Force and all US forces in Afghanistan. He had previously served as the director of the Joint Staff and almost five years in command of the Joint Special Operations Command.General McChrystal's memoir, My Share of the Task, was a New York Times bestseller in 2013. He is also the author of New York Times bestseller Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World and wrote the forward for the sequel, One Mission:How Leaders Build a Team of Teams. He is a senior fellow at Yale University's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs and a partner at McChrystal Group, where he transforms organizations into adaptable teams. He and his wife, Annie, live in Virginia.A Special Thanks to Our Sponsors!Veteran-founded Adyton. Step into the next generation of equipment management with Log-E by Adyton. Whether you are doing monthly inventories or preparing for deployment, Log-E is your pocket property book, giving real-time visibility into equipment status and mission readiness. Learn more about how Log-E can revolutionize your property tracking process here!Meet ROGER Bank—a modern, digital bank built for military members, by military members. With early payday, no fees, high-yield accounts, and real support, it's banking that gets you. Funds are FDIC insured through Citizens Bank of Edmond, so you can bank with confidence and peace of mind.
Good evening. To the United States Corps of Cadets, to the men and women of our Armed Services, and to my fellow Americans: I want to speak to you tonight about our effort in Afghanistan -- the nature of our commitment there, the scope of our interests, and the strategy that my administration will pursue to bring this war to a successful conclusion. It's an extraordinary honor for me to do so here at West Point -- where so many men and women have prepared to stand up for our security, and to represent what is finest about our country.To address these important issues, it's important to recall why America and our allies were compelled to fight a war in Afghanistan in the first place. We did not ask for this fight. On September 11, 2001, 19 men hijacked four airplanes and used them to murder nearly 3,000 people. They struck at our military and economic nerve centers. They took the lives of innocent men, women, and children without regard to their faith or race or station. Were it not for the heroic actions of passengers onboard one of those flights, they could have also struck at one of the great symbols of our democracy in Washington, and killed many more.As we know, these men belonged to al Qaeda -- a group of extremists who have distorted and defiled Islam, one of the world's great religions, to justify the slaughter of innocents. Al Qaeda's base of operations was in Afghanistan, where they were harbored by the Taliban -- a ruthless, repressive and radical movement that seized control of that country after it was ravaged by years of Soviet occupation and civil war, and after the attention of America and our friends had turned elsewhere.Just days after 9/11, Congress authorized the use of force against al Qaeda and those who harbored them -- an authorization that continues to this day. The vote in the Senate was 98 to nothing. The vote in the House was 420 to 1. For the first time in its history, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization invoked Article 5 -- the commitment that says an attack on one member nation is an attack on all. And the United Nations Security Council endorsed the use of all necessary steps to respond to the 9/11 attacks. America, our allies and the world were acting as one to destroy al Qaeda's terrorist network and to protect our common security.Under the banner of this domestic unity and international legitimacy -- and only after the Taliban refused to turn over Osama bin Laden -- we sent our troops into Afghanistan. Within a matter of months, al Qaeda was scattered and many of its operatives were killed. The Taliban was driven from power and pushed back on its heels. A place that had known decades of fear now had reason to hope. At a conference convened by the U.N., a provisional government was established under President Hamid Karzai. And an International Security Assistance Force was established to help bring a lasting peace to a war-torn country.Then, in early 2003, the decision was made to wage a second war, in Iraq. The wrenching debate over the Iraq war is well-known and need not be repeated here. It's enough to say that for the next six years, the Iraq war drew the dominant share of our troops, our resources, our diplomacy, and our national attention -- and that the decision to go into Iraq caused substantial rifts between America and much of the world.Today, after extraordinary costs, we are bringing the Iraq war to a responsible end. We will remove our combat brigades from Iraq by the end of next summer, and all of our troops by the end of 2011. That we are doing so is a testament to the character of the men and women in uniform. (Applause.) Thanks to their courage, grit and perseverance, we have given Iraqis a chance to shape their future, and we are successfully leaving Iraq to its people. But while we've achieved hard-earned milestones in Iraq, the situation in Afghanistan has deteriorated. After escaping across the border into Pakistan in 2001 and 2002, al Qaeda's leadership established a safe haven there. Although a legitimate government was elected by the Afghan people, it's been hampered by corruption, the drug trade, an under-developed economy, and insufficient security forces. Over the last several years, the Taliban has maintained common cause with al Qaeda, as they both seek an overthrow of the Afghan government. Gradually, the Taliban has begun to control additional swaths of territory in Afghanistan, while engaging in increasingly brazen and devastating attacks of terrorism against the Pakistani people.Now, throughout this period, our troop levels in Afghanistan remained a fraction of what they were in Iraq. When I took office, we had just over 32,000 Americans serving in Afghanistan, compared to 160,000 in Iraq at the peak of the war. Commanders in Afghanistan repeatedly asked for support to deal with the reemergence of the Taliban, but these reinforcements did not arrive. And that's why, shortly after taking office, I approved a longstanding request for more troops. After consultations with our allies, I then announced a strategy recognizing the fundamental connection between our war effort in Afghanistan and the extremist safe havens in Pakistan. I set a goal that was narrowly defined as disrupting, dismantling, and defeating al Qaeda and its extremist allies, and pledged to better coordinate our military and civilian efforts. Since then, we've made progress on some important objectives. High-ranking al Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been killed, and we've stepped up the pressure on al Qaeda worldwide. In Pakistan, that nation's army has gone on its largest offensive in years. In Afghanistan, we and our allies prevented the Taliban from stopping a presidential election, and -- although it was marred by fraud -- that election produced a government that is consistent with Afghanistan's laws and constitution.Yet huge challenges remain. Afghanistan is not lost, but for several years it has moved backwards. There's no imminent threat of the government being overthrown, but the Taliban has gained momentum. Al Qaeda has not reemerged in Afghanistan in the same numbers as before 9/11, but they retain their safe havens along the border. And our forces lack the full support they need to effectively train and partner with Afghan security forces and better secure the population. Our new commander in Afghanistan -- General McChrystal -- has reported that the security situation is more serious than he anticipated. In short: The status quo is not sustainable. As cadets, you volunteered for service during this time of danger. Some of you fought in Afghanistan. Some of you will deploy there. As your Commander-in-Chief, I owe you a mission that is clearly defined, and worthy of your service. And that's why, after the Afghan voting was completed, I insisted on a thorough review of our strategy. Now, let me be clear: There has never been an option before me that called for troop deployments before 2010, so there has been no delay or denial of resources necessary for the conduct of the war during this review period. Instead, the review has allowed me to ask the hard questions, and to explore all the different options, along with my national security team, our military and civilian leadership in Afghanistan, and our key partners. And given the stakes involved, I owed the American people -- and our troops -- no less. This review is now complete. And as Commander-in-Chief, I have determined that it is in our vital national interest to send an additional 30,000 U.S. troops to Afghanistan. After 18 months, our troops will begin to come home. These are the resources that we need to seize the initiative, while building the Afghan capacity that can allow for a responsible transition of our forces out of Afghanistan. I do not make this decision lightly. I opposed the war in Iraq precisely because I believe that we must exercise restraint in the use of military force, and always consider the long-term consequences of our actions. We have been at war now for eight years, at enormous cost in lives and resources. Years of debate over Iraq and terrorism have left our unity on national security issues in tatters, and created a highly polarized and partisan backdrop for this effort. And having just experienced the worst economic crisis since the Great Depression, the American people are understandably focused on rebuilding our economy and putting people to work here at home. Most of all, I know that this decision asks even more of you -- a military that, along with your families, has already borne the heaviest of all burdens. As President, I have signed a letter of condolence to the family of each American who gives their life in these wars. I have read the letters from the parents and spouses of those who deployed. I visited our courageous wounded warriors at Walter Reed. I've traveled to Dover to meet the flag-draped caskets of 18 Americans returning home to their final resting place. I see firsthand the terrible wages of war. If I did not think that the security of the United States and the safety of the American people were at stake in Afghanistan, I would gladly order every single one of our troops home tomorrow. So, no, I do not make this decision lightly. I make this decision because I am convinced that our security is at stake in Afghanistan and Pakistan. This is the epicenter of violent extremism practiced by al Qaeda. It is from here that we were attacked on 9/11, and it is from here that new attacks are being plotted as I speak. This is no idle danger; no hypothetical threat. In the last few months alone, we have apprehended extremists within our borders who were sent here from the border region of Afghanistan and Pakistan to commit new acts of terror. And this danger will only grow if the region slides backwards, and al Qaeda can operate with impunity. We must
“This Troubled Ground” by is part memoir/part fiction. Les served our nation for 28 years, beginning with four years in the active duty Air Force and the remainder in the National Guard. He retired at the rank of Lt. Colonel in 2013. Dover Air Force Base is often the first domestic stop for the remains of the fallen coming from overseas. During the height of the Afghanistan War, President Obama changed the policies to allow families to have media presence if they wished. This required a public affairs team to be present on the ramp for the dignified transfer. Les was one of the first public affairs officers to arrive following the policy change and estimates he oversaw over 100 dignified transfers. He also participated in the dignified transfer of the team of CIA officers. Les emphasizes that “the job is NOT for everyone. You are going to witness some of the hardest things in your life.” His publisher calls “This Troubled Ground” an autobiographical novel. Les says it was the product of a combination of his experiences at Dover and his deployments to Afghanistan. While deployed he was attached to the International Security Assistance Force, facilitating interactions between our foreign allies and the Afghan media. He says for the most part he was privileged to work with some amazing leaders. An overriding theme of “This Troubled Ground” is the question of whether “Afghanistan was worth it?” The book takes us from a family member asking that question on the ramp at Dover to the second time Les deployed to Afghanistan. Even though he swore he would never go back, Les DID volunteer for a second deployment and suggests it was because he might have been searching for the answer to that question. Though “This Troubled Ground” is a fictional story, one of the families he met on the ramp at Dover specifically asked him to use the real name of their fallen son so that he wouldn't be forgotten.
Send us a textWelcome to a special episode ; The Outer Game of Change. In these unique episodes, I am joined by leaders and executives who drive change and shape the future of their organizations. We listen to their unique insights, explore how they perceive change, and uncover what is simmering in their minds. Today, I am thrilled to have with me Professor Theo Farrell, the 7th Vice-Chancellor and President of La Trobe University here in Australia. Professor Farrell has a distinguished career in academia and research, having held leadership positions at top universities around the world. He is an author, and renowned advocate for academic excellence, inclusivity, and transformative change. Most importanly, I find Theo to be a great human.In this episode, we will dive into the dynamics of change leadership, exploring how transformative forces like AI are reshaping higher education. We discuss the evolving nature of academia, the challenges and opportunities of integrating advanced technologies, and what it takes to lead an institution through such significant transformation.With his extensive background in both strategic leadership and research, Professor Farrell offers unique insights into the future of higher education and how universities can adapt to and thrive in a rapidly changing world. I am grateful to have Professor Farrell chatting with me today. About Theo FarrellProfessor Theo Farrell commenced as the 7th Vice-Chancellor and President of La Trobe University in February 2024. He brings a deep commitment to advancing academic excellence, building inclusive communities, forging external partnerships, and leading transformative change.Prior to joining La Trobe, Professor Farrell held a number of leadership roles including Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Academic and Students), Deputy Vice-Chancellor (Education), and Executive Dean of Law, Humanities and the Arts, all at the University of Wollongong, and Dean of Arts and Social Sciences at City, University of London. From 2006 to 2016, he held a chair in online learning at King's College London. At UOW, City and King's, Professor Farrell led numerous initiatives to develop research capacities, innovate learning and teaching, and enhance student experience. Professor Farrell has held ten UK research council awards. His most recent book, Unwinnable: Britain's War in Afghanistan (Vintage 2021), was shortlisted for three national book awards and selected book of the year by The Sunday Times. Professor Farrell is a champion of real-world impact from academic research. A leading expert on the conflict in Afghanistan, he acted as strategic advisor to the UK government and the International Security Assistance Force in Kabul, and participated in track II talks with the Taliban.Professor Farrell is a Fellow of the Academy of Social Sciences (UK), Fellow of the Royal Society of New South Wales, Visiting Professor at King's College London, and past President of the British International Studies Association.Contact InfoLinkedIn linkedin.com/in/theo-farrell-35698b1b3Ali Juma @The Inner Game of Change podcast
Dr. John Sherwood interviews General David H. Petraeus about his new book, co-authored with Andrew Roberts, entitled Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine. Topics covered include the characteristics of strategic leadership in war; and how technology has changed war since World War II. He also offers some career advice to midshipmen and cadets drawn from his life experiences, which include command of the surge in Iraq, U.S. CENTCOM, and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan
This year, NATO marks its 75th anniversary, while the Baltic countries celebrate 20 years as members of the alliance. Dr. Lukas Milevski speaks about the history of that inclusion, and shares his thoughts about the future.Milevski is a tenured assistant professor at Leiden University, where he teaches strategic studies in the BA International Studies and MA International Relations programs. He has published widely on strategy, including two books with Oxford University Press: The Evolution of Modern Grand Strategic Thought (2016) and The West's East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective (2018).Baltic Ways is a podcast brought to you by the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI.TranscriptIndra Ekmanis: Hello, and welcome to Baltic Ways, a podcast bringing you interviews and insights from the world of Baltic studies. I'm your host, Dr. Indra Ekmanis. And today we speak with Dr. Lucas Milevski, a tenured assistant professor at Leiden University, where he teaches strategic studies. This year marks 75 years of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and 20 years of the Baltic states' inclusion in that alliance. Dr. Milevski gives us his insights into the history, and what may be next for the Baltic states as part of NATO. Stay tuned.IE: Thank you so much for joining us today on Baltic Ways. Perhaps we can start with you telling us a little bit about yourself, your background and how you came to be involved in this field of study.Lukas Milevski: I'm Lukas Milevski. I'm presently an assistant professor at Leiden University in the Netherlands. And for an American audience, it's worthwhile to mention that in the Netherlands, assistant professor is a tenured position. And I research and write about military strategy in general, theory, history, contemporary analysis, as well as contemporary military defense.I am a Latvian American dual citizen, so I've also maintained both a personal and a professional interest in Baltic defense. I published my first piece on that topic way back in 2010 when I was still a master's student. I published a book on the subject, The West's East: Contemporary Baltic Defense in Strategic Perspective, in 2018, and have continued writing on the topic regularly ever since for various venues, including FPRI's own Baltic Bulletin.IE: Well, thank you for sharing that background. We are here to talk a little bit about NATO today. NATO this year celebrates its 75th anniversary in April. In March, the Baltic states also celebrate 20 years of being in the alliance, having joined in 2004. As we commemorate these milestones, how would you describe the organization's evolution, its history with the Baltic states from your perspective?LM: So 75 years of history is quite a bit, especially for an international alliance. And I'm sure there will be plenty written on this history to mark the 75th anniversary. So what I'll do now is just sketch out certain inflection points in NATO's history and the degree to which the Baltic states featured in those points or experienced consequences as a result, whether positive or negative.So the first inflection point is obviously 75 years ago itself, when NATO was founded. In the words of Lord Ismay, who was its first Secretary General, NATO was founded to keep the Americans in, the Germans down, and the Russians out. We don't consider that second purpose relevant anymore, but the other two have remained wholly relevant.The Baltic states during this time were, of course, occupied by the Soviet Union, and simply formed part of the enemy for NATO. The next real inflection point was the end of the Cold War and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union, which allowed the Baltic states to spring out of national captivity, and begin plotting their own national courses again. Unsurprisingly, this pointed them toward NATO, which in any case, had lost its primary reason for existence and only awkwardly found itself seeking organizational purpose in intervening in the Western Balkans as Yugoslavia collapsed. During the 1990s, there was a Western defense professional debate about Baltic membership in NATO, which played out in various venues, including professional and academic journals.Notably, there were some quite prescient arguments that leaving them out of NATO would ultimately be destabilizing as they would present power vacuums, which would only invite invasion at some subsequent undetermined later date. You know, essentially exactly what happened to Ukraine.IE: Right.LM: The next key inflection point was the terror attack on, terror attacks on 9/11, which finally gave NATO a mission again, counterterrorism, and incidentally the only invocation of Article 5, NATO's mutual defense clause, in the history of the alliance, by the United States. In the early atmosphere of the war on terror, Russia was a quasi ally, and this atmosphere helped, perhaps enabled, the Baltic states to slip into NATO and the European Union simultaneously in spring 2004 — March for NATO, May for the EU.The relatively warm atmosphere between NATO and Russia, and NATO's counter terrorism and counter insurgency focus, somewhat precluded NATO membership from meaning terribly much for the Baltic States. There is no real contingency defense planning for national defense, for example. Because the only threat was Russia, and the West mostly did not see Russia as a possible threat, the Baltic states and maybe some other Eastern Flank countries excepted. The one exception to this relative negligence was the Baltic air policing mission, which began right from the Baltic accession to NATO and continues to the present day. It took until the next inflection point in 2008, Russia's invasion of Georgia, to shake NATO's complacency about Russia, albeit not by that much.IE: Yeah.LM: Baltic defense planning became permissible, but without a proper political decision, more sort of as an annex to defense planning for Polish defense. And then NATO and most of its constituent countries sank back into unwarranted complacency. The story somewhat repeated in 2014. Russia invaded another country, NATO responded, including this time by redefining Russia as a potential enemy and moving some tripwire forces into the Baltic states.IE: Can you say what that means? What a tripwire force is?LM: Idea of a tripwire force is simply to have forces from other member countries present in the region so that if Russia were to invade, they'd not just be shooting at local Baltic armed forces, but also those of ideally each of the other member states as well. And this would then immediately, in principle, involve those other states in Baltic defense.So NATO moves some tripwire forces into the Baltic states. This was probably mostly due to strenuous U.S. pressure on European member states, which seemed rather unwilling at the time. Nonetheless, this was done, and then afterward NATO slipped back into a certain degree of unwarranted complacency, again, particularly the European member states and the Western European member states.And finally, most recently, 2022 and the renewed Russian invasion of Ukraine. Baltic defense is again high on the agenda. NATO's four deployed forces, the tripwire forces, are to be expanded from battalion size to brigade size, basically from 1,000 men to about four to five thousand-ish. And the unwarranted complacency about Russia has yet to return.Hopefully it won't, but of course we don't know the future. As a result of this infection point as well, Finland and, finally, Sweden have also joined NATO, thereby turning the Baltic [Sea] into a NATO lake and increasing military and naval security in the region. But what we really see as a history is that NATO has only gradually, and mostly unwillingly, paid any attention, let alone serious attention, to Baltic defense.Fortunately, for most of that history, it turned out not to be a fatal mistake. And we can now hope, and perhaps work, to develop NATO defense planning and policies finally to ensure real Baltic defense. This is work not only by NATO or the larger states, but also, and of course crucially, by the Baltic states themselves, and we do see that this is happening.IE: Yeah. It strikes me that, you know, we have many headlines in U.S. outlets since 2022 and the Russian invasion — full scale invasion of Ukraine — featuring Baltic leaders. Just the other day I heard Kaja Kallas on, on NPR's “Morning Edition,” for example. And so this has become kind of a mainstay.I wonder if you can tell us — we talked about that now the Baltics are here in NATO for two decades — and over the last two decades, how has NATO's presence influenced regional security dynamics in the Baltic region? Maybe, the addition of Finland and Sweden and the creation of Lake NATO, if you will. But also how have the Baltic states themselves influenced NATO?LM: So NATO's presence in the Baltic Sea region, particularly with the accession of the Baltic states, resolved the one major geopolitical issue which I already mentioned, the notion of the power vacuum in between NATO and Russia, at least in this region, which could have — and knowing Russia — would have eventually invited trouble. And so in principle, this issue is no more. But in practice, as I was sort of saying, in terms of defense planning and everything, this remains a work in progress. So besides this key point, NATO's presence in the Baltic region over the last 20 years hasn't really affected security dynamics all that much, I think, for a number of reasons.First of all, besides the Baltic region's national forces — the local Latvian, Estonian, Lithuanian forces and so on — the NATO presence itself has been quite minimal for most of those two decades. The air policing mission since 2004, the tripwire forces from 2016 onward, but the additional NATO non-Baltic physical, material, military manpower capability to affect security dynamics meaningfully has not really been there.It's only now, you know, in the past few years that we've been seeing some actual substantial change. As I also already mentioned, for most of the past 20 years, NATO has not been focusing on territorial defense, but it's been looking halfway across the world, generating expeditionary capabilities to wage war in Afghanistan.So the alliance had little time, little capability, and little desire really to consider the Baltic seriously. Third, for the early years of the war on terror, Russia was, as I said, something of an ally. And moreover, it was also wrestling with its own internal security issues. Its war with Georgia in 2008 showed major problems in its armed forces, which it spent the next few years fixing, or at least thinking it was fixing them.And as a bit of an aside on this war: This, the Russian perspective, is very distinct. They feel like they almost lost the war because of how poorly their armed forces performed, hence the need to reform them. And then of course, after Georgia, it focused on supporting the Assad regime in Syria and then add into all this is its perpetual fixation with Ukraine in 2014, even prior to 2014. And of course, after 2014 as well. So there's a good recipe for Russia also perhaps not dedicating an enormous amount of attention to the Baltic states either, and I'm no fan of Russia, but I think it's notable nonetheless that at the worst of the 2008 financial crisis, and Latvia was hit harder than most, there was no special Russian attempt to exploit the crisis to topple the Latvian or any other Baltic government.You know, nothing beyond the usual corruption, money laundering, subversion, and general criminality. Why not is a different question, and one which we can't answer. You know, even if we had Putin here on a table, and we cracked his skull open with a hammer and chisel, presumably we would find that he had a brain, but that wouldn't tell us anything about his thoughts. So we don't know why they didn't do anything, but it is perhaps notable that they didn't really do anything — at least nothing special.Finally, if you look at the defense literature, once Western military analysts began paying attention to the problems of Baltic defense again after 2014, the recurring theme which you see is one of apprehension: That Russia has the advantage in the Baltic Sea region. Because with its missiles — anti-ship missiles, anti-air missiles — it could create a Baltic bubble, from which, it could deny access to NATO forces. So there's a distinct sense in which it's actually been Russia which maintains an advantage in the Baltic Sea region.And this is only beginning to change now as a result of the war and its consequences. Both in terms of Finnish and Swedish accession to NATO, as well as in terms of damage to Russia's own armed forces. And in terms of Baltic influence, I see relatively little. As mentioned, improvements of Baltic defense have generally followed Russian aggression, and usually have been as little as NATO believed it could get away with, especially the Western European countries. Is that changing now? We'll see.IE: Yeah, well, tell us tell us in a little bit about — I mean, I feel like there was a lot of conversation early on in after the renewed invasion about the Baltics kind of having this “we told you so mentality,” to their Western Western European partners and to their American partners too in some to some degree. And then, yes, we have seen kind of these incremental shifts in the way that NATO is taking their Eastern Flank a little bit more seriously. You mentioned the increase in their tripwire forces. But what about tangible sort of feeling on the ground? How do you assess NATO's ability to deter a potential threat and uphold security? What are some of those key challenges, or maybe opportunities, in the Baltics? You talked about the Russian advantage. And maybe aside from NATO, what are the steps that the Baltic states are taking on their own? We have a lot of talk about defense investments in the Baltic states themselves. So, I'd love to hear your thoughts.LM: Yes. Well, to start with deterrence, the problem with deterrence is that, sort of, to deter, the infinitive verb is grammatically correct, but strategically inaccurate. We cannot deter. The other side chooses to be deterred. We can provide the reasons for them to choose to be deterred, but beyond that, it's fundamentally out of our hands. And we have a hard time knowing what the other side is thinking. You know, again, think of poking around Putin's brain, it tells us nothing. Worse still, he has to believe that anything we try to do is to strengthen deterrence. You know, truly, if we're putting forces into the Baltic states, it's for the purposes of deterrence and not something else, invasion.IE: Right.LM: But what the Russians are doing is giving constant signals that they don't trust the NATO presence in the Baltic states. They feel like a country under siege and generally speaking, they're paranoid of surprise attacks. So in communicating this to us, are they telling the truth or are they just cynically trying to dissuade us? Or is a little of Column A, a little of Column B, depending on the person speaking at that moment? We don't know, but this complicates the picture.It does not, however, mean that we should appease them and not try to strengthen deterrence. We obviously should. That's part of NATO's core mission. So then, going to what NATO is trying to do or what it can try to do — NATO's fundamental posture to try to instill deterrence rests on Article 5, the Mutual Defense Clause, as well as extended nuclear deterrence. In abstract, the latter is always a hard sell, just like it was during the Cold War. The notion of extended nuclear deterrence is that, essentially, the United States would protect Europe with a nuclear umbrella. It's extending its hand, willing to take nuclear blows to protect its allies. But would the United States, or for that matter Britain or France, you know, really sacrifice Washington, D.C., London, or Paris for the sake of Tallinn, Riga, or Vilnius?That's impossible to know, but at the same time, it's not a possibility that the Russians can ignore. So, allies never find it particularly compelling, and this was true during the Cold War as well, but adversaries do still have to take it seriously. Article 5, meanwhile, depends on NATO's ability actually to sustain a major military operation in the Baltic states, something which it is still in the process of trying to develop. It might also rely on keeping substantial forces positioned in the Baltic states, something which it is also developing. I mentioned the forward deployed forces expanding from battalion to brigade size, which will help with that. Germany is planning on deploying an entire brigade into Lithuania. And so this will all help with that.Is this enough to present a sufficiently credible threat of successful defense that the Russians would think better of any hypothetical future invasion? We simply don't know. Prudence is pulling us in two ways. We don't want to leave the Baltics undefended because that might invite invasion. But at the same time, we don't want to put too much in because the Russians might take that really seriously the wrong way. We need to find somewhere a middle ground, notwithstanding all of NATO's and especially all, all other American commitments elsewhere in the world.So, it's a thorny problem.IE: Yeah.LM: As for the Baltic states themselves, they face a wide variety of challenges to improving their own defense. The most fundamental one is that the Russian threat can be quite multi-dimensional, and so the Baltic states need to have some sort of capability to answer, to some degree, each of those dimensions, even without NATO support, to buy time for NATO support to arrive.You know, we're talking from land invasion with heavy armor to airborne coup de main, such as what Russia tried to do in the very first days of their invasion, renewed invasion of Ukraine back in February 2022. Russian air and missile strikes against land, sea, and air targets, cyber attacks, and electronic warfare, and many other forms of attack.You know, Russia can make the life of a Baltic defense planner really difficult, just as it currently is for Ukrainian strategists. So the Baltic challenge is spreading their limited budgets around in ways which are, or at least appear to be, good enough. At least good enough to be able to blunt an initial attack and buy time.So for this reason, Latvia and Estonia jointly procured a German IRIS-T medium range air defense system, which has been doing excellent work in Ukraine to help contribute against the missile plane and the possibility of an airborne coup de main threat. If you have air defense, it's less likely that Russian helicopters will get through, that Russian missiles will get through, and so on. Baltic states are developing a Baltic defense line, and they are expanding their armed forces, including reintroducing conscription, in Latvia's case, to help defend against a major ground invasion. They are procuring coastal defense systems to deny Russia the ability to attack them by sea.And this is all very good. It's very important. It's demonstrating a clear will to defend to the rest of NATO that the Baltic states will defend themselves in the hypothetical event of invasion. And so it puts additional political and moral pressure on the rest of NATO also to step up more. But of course, the Baltic states, on their own will, will simply never be enough to defend successfully against a country with a military the size of Russia's.This is an unavoidable fact. And this is the final challenge for the Baltic States, that ultimately they cannot guarantee their own national security, their own national survival by themselves without NATO support if Russia were really to try to challenge it with a major invasion.IE: Yeah. You mentioned this kind of goodwill, or moral pressure that is also part of the Baltic states' defense plan in some ways. And I am thinking about that in their accession and the way that the Baltic states responded and showed up, for example, in 2001 after the 9/11 attacks. So, I wonder if you can tell us a little bit about how the Baltic states have contributed to NATO's missions and operations. Whether or not their participation has shaped any of the alliance's strategies or priorities.LM: So ever since they regained independence and developed their own armed forces, the Baltic states have tried to be good citizens of the liberal international order and have committed forces to international operations, including NATO, but also EU missions, UN missions, other allied missions — of course, within the scope of their own available resources.For most missions over the past 30 years, the Baltic commitment has been small, both comparatively and sort of absolutely. And of course, the degree of commitment for each mission in which the Baltic states individually or collectively have been involved has also varied over time.So just to sort of touch on a few examples, they sent soldiers to the various missions resulting from the violent collapse of Yugoslavia. Even today, Latvia and Lithuania are still contributing to KFOR in Kosovo. Lithuania has one soldier there, but with a Seimas mandate for up to five, while Latvia has committed 136 military personnel to that mission.Estonia, meanwhile, participated in the French Operation Barkhane in Mali, originally dedicating 50 troops and raising the number to 95 in 2019, until the end of the operation there in 2022. And Estonia's participation in Barkhane was appreciated in Paris and led to a considerable amount of French goodwill.So this indicates the importance of not just NATO missions, but looking beyond NATO missions, to other missions, because, yes, a lot of countries are part of NATO, they're also part of EU, membership overlaps, and even contributing to other states' national missions can have beneficial consequences within the NATO context.IE: Sure.LM: Most prominently, of course, the Baltic states had all contributed troops to the wars in Iraq as part of the Coalition of the Willing, as well as to the International Security Assistance Force, the NATO force in Afghanistan. So from the Baltic point of view of the past 20 years, which is totally understandable, the United States was always going to be the single most important guarantor of Baltic military and national security.The subsequent question — the degree to which Baltic involvement has led to influence — is much less clear. For one, you know, much of that would happen behind closed doors. But it is fair to say that there were some early attitudes toward the Baltic states, which were quite fundamentally not promising, notably from some Western European countries.The most infamous example is probably Jacques Chirac's outburst, as president of France in 2003 — and this was admittedly, you know, a year before Baltic accession to NATO and the EU — dismayed by the Vilnius letter, which a number of current Eastern Flank countries drafted in support of the U.S. invasion of Iraq, and publicly criticized those Eastern Flank countries, or now Eastern Flank countries, for failing to take the opportunity, and this is a quote, to 'shut up.' So there's always been this sort of sense that the older member states, particularly in Western Europe, simply know better than the newer Eastern Flank members, including, totally absurdly, about Russia.This has proved a rather difficult cultural bias for the Baltic states and other Eastern Flank countries to overcome. And one in which the star player in any Baltic success, as I've already said, really has been Russia for consistently defying European expectations and European excuses for Russian behavior.So from 2022 onward, the older Western European member states have finally, and I do think it's finally, begun learning a bit of humility, which opens up more space and willingness to listen to others. The U.S. pattern in all this has been notably different pretty consistently for most of the past 25 years. New administrations entered the White House seeking cooperation with Russia. Bush, after 9/11, when he looked into Putin's eyes and saw his soul, famously. Obama, when he sought to reset relations with Russia. Trump, with his near total subservience to Russia. Yet almost as consistently, the outgoing administration had become totally disillusioned about Russia as a result of outrageous Russian behavior. Bush after the invasion of Georgia, Obama after the invasion of Crimea and Donbass. Only Trump didn't experience that. And with the Biden administration, which came in in 2020, it at least entered office finally already wary of Russia. So the U.S. track record is actually quite different from the Western European track record. It's much more variable, much more uneven, but at key moments, it's been much more in favor of Russia, of Baltic defense, and of supporting the Baltic states.IE: Yeah. So NATO leaders are going to gather in D.C. in July, for the summit that marks the 75th anniversary of the alliance. But we're also coming up on the American elections in November. So I wonder how you see the US elections impacting NATO, especially as we are looking again at a rematch between Donald Trump and Joe Biden, and what you might see for the future of NATO in the coming years — particularly for the Baltics, but more generally too.LM: This is, of course, the big question, and the correct answer is, it's impossible to say. It'll be hard enough to imagine, even when we know who the next president will be, let alone now. But we can talk about what we know now, and try to think about the future.Because both Trump and Biden do have presidential track records now. And Trump's isn't as bad as everyone imagined beforehand, but that's largely because policy is slow to change. And throughout much of his administration, the Department of Defense was following plans already laid down and confirmed and set in motion by the previous Obama administration. Moreover, Trump actually had intelligent adults in the room with him for much of his administration, and the Senate in particular remained very pro-NATO. Both of which limited the negative consequences.In the unfortunate event of a Trump victory in November, the basic policy reality that change is hard to achieve will remain in force. But he is unlikely to have in the room nearly the same number or quality of intelligent adults as before. The Republican contingent in the Senate may also become less pro-NATO as well, with Mitch McConnell passing the torch — his pro-NATO attitudes being one of his very few virtues.On the other hand, you know, we can, and if you like, should, hope for a Biden victory. Then hopefully there won't be much change, at least for another four years. So just a continued trajectory for strengthening Baltic defense further. Or we might even plausibly expect, or hope for, at least, change for the better, as the Republican Party, which has been held hostage by Trump over the past half year or so in particular, will lose the need to try to deny Democrats political victories in the lead up to the national election, which is something they're doing now.But besides the variable of the U.S., there is still Europe, and it remains a variable as well. One increasingly highlighted as Trump has had contact with Orbán recently.IE: Viktor Orbán, the prime minister of Hungary.LM: Yes, who is also quite pro-Russian. But so in Europe too, a certain degree of pro-Russian feeling is spreading. Most recently With Robert Fico, a Slovakian populist, being elected prime minister in Slovakia. Moreover, many European countries still are not hitting the 2 percent of GDP mark agreed upon nearly a decade ago now, in September, 2014. And even if they were, the money spending practices of certain number of states is quite suspect. Now, regardless of the amount of money, the German defense budget is in an absolute state and one which more money on its own simply will not change at this moment. You need to change the processes, the bureaucracy, and the practices first before more money will make much of a difference. We have seen, however, a recent headline from Trump saying that if European NATO members were to pay more then, he'd be more amenable to staying in NATO.So he's shown some degree of flexibility, whether that's just for show or real is a different question. But nonetheless, Trump is trying to soften some bits of his sort of anti-NATO rhetoric. And even as the war continues in Ukraine and even assuming NATO countries individually and in cooperation are able to return to supporting Ukraine effectively, the next years will see NATO as an alliance, or its member states as individuals, addressing a wide variety of problems to both improve the quality and the quantity of the defense which can be provided — to the Baltic states, to Europe in general. Every Western military is probably feeling a certain sense of crisis in the face of what they see going on in Ukraine right now. And, going, sort of going back to the professional literature which I read on military strategy and all that, there have been some expressed doubts as to whether or not the U.S. could actually wage war. A major war going back to well before the Russian invasion in 2022 and what we see going on now and the difficulty of winning on the battlefield and so on and so forth. There's a lot of thinking going on, so a lot of this doesn't have much to do necessarily with political leadership, but it's just how militaries are trying to reimagine how they might want to, or perhaps might need to do things on and off the battlefield in order to continue being effective organizations for national defense. So the presidential race is a big story, but there's plenty of other stories, as well.IE: Yeah. So reminding us there's plenty going on beneath the surface beyond political leadership changes. Well, Dr. Milevski, I want to thank you so much for being with us on Baltic Ways, for giving us your insights as we are approaching these significant milestones, this significant year for NATO, for the Baltics in NATO. And we really appreciate your commentary.Thank you. Thank you so much.LM: Thank you for having me.IE: Thank you for tuning in to Baltic ways. A podcast from the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. A note that the views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI. I'm your host Indra Ekmanis. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fpribalticinitiative.substack.com
General David H. Petraeus is a retired United States Army general and a prominent commentator on contemporary security issues, military developments and global affairs, widely respected as a leading warrior intellectual. The General graduated with distinction from the US Military Academy and earned a PhD from Princeton University. He served in the US Army for thirty-seven years, concluding his time in uniform with six consecutive commands as general officer, five of which were in combat, including command of the Surge in Iraq, US Central Command, and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. He then served as the director of the CIA. The General has held academic appointments at six universities and is a senior fellow and lecturer at Yale University. He is currently a partner in a major investment firm and chairs that firm's Global Institute. The General is also a brilliant author. His latest book, Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare from 1945 to Ukraine released at the end of 2023 and is a must read. He co-wrote it with noted biographer and historian Andrew Roberts. It's published by Harper, an imprint of Harper Collins. You can pick up a copy wherever you like to buy your books. On this episode, General Petraeus discusses: Israel's war against Hamas and why Gaza poses a challenging situation more so than any other urban operation since the end of 1945 The release of Israeli hostages The four tasks of strategic leadership How lessons of war are institutionalized The danger of lack of Western resolve on the world stage How what happens in one part of the world reverberates in another (e.g., if you have a red line in Syria over use of chemical weapons and it turns out not be a red line, that undermines deterrence in the Indo-Pacific) The importance of soldier morale Warfare of the future and the technology he's following. As for the General's very creative answer to where he'd go if given a one way ticket, please listen to our interview with him on episode 268 from August 2022.
In this deep and incisive study, General David Petraeus, who commanded the US-led coalitions in both Iraq, during the Surge, and Afghanistan and former CIA director, and the prize-winning historian Andrew Roberts, explore over 70 years of conflict, drawing significant lessons and insights from their fresh analysis of the past. Drawing on their different perspectives and areas of expertise, Petraeus and Roberts show how often critical mistakes have been repeated time and again, and the challenge, for statesmen and generals alike, of learning to adapt to various new weapon systems, theories and strategies. Among the conflicts examined are the Arab-Israeli wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the two Gulf Wars, the Balkan wars in the former Yugoslavia, and both the Soviet and Coalition wars in Afghanistan, as well as guerilla conflicts in Africa and South America. Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare From 1945 to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (Harper, 2023) culminates with a bracing look at Putin's disastrous invasion of Ukraine, yet another case study in the tragic results when leaders refuse to learn from history, and an assessment of the nature of future warfare. Filled with sharp insight and the wisdom of experience, Conflict is not only a critical assessment of our recent past, but also an essential primer of modern warfare that provides crucial knowledge for waging battle today as well as for understanding what the decades ahead will bring. General David Petraeus is a retired United States Army general and widely respected as a leading warrior intellectual. He graduated with distinction from the US Military Academy and earned a Ph.D. from Princeton University. He served for 37 years in the US Army, culminating his time in uniform with 6 consecutive commands as a general officer, 5 of which were in combat, including Command of the Surge in Iraq, US Central Command, and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. He then served as Director of the CIA. He has held academic appointments at six universities and currently is a Senior Fellow and Lecturer at Yale. He is a prominent commentator on contemporary security issues, military developments, and global affairs. He is currently a Partner in a major investment firm and chairs that firm's Global Institute. Sam Canter is a strategic planner, a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations, and an Army Reserve intelligence officer. His views are his own and do not reflect any institution, organization, or entity with which he is affiliated. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
In this deep and incisive study, General David Petraeus, who commanded the US-led coalitions in both Iraq, during the Surge, and Afghanistan and former CIA director, and the prize-winning historian Andrew Roberts, explore over 70 years of conflict, drawing significant lessons and insights from their fresh analysis of the past. Drawing on their different perspectives and areas of expertise, Petraeus and Roberts show how often critical mistakes have been repeated time and again, and the challenge, for statesmen and generals alike, of learning to adapt to various new weapon systems, theories and strategies. Among the conflicts examined are the Arab-Israeli wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the two Gulf Wars, the Balkan wars in the former Yugoslavia, and both the Soviet and Coalition wars in Afghanistan, as well as guerilla conflicts in Africa and South America. Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare From 1945 to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (Harper, 2023) culminates with a bracing look at Putin's disastrous invasion of Ukraine, yet another case study in the tragic results when leaders refuse to learn from history, and an assessment of the nature of future warfare. Filled with sharp insight and the wisdom of experience, Conflict is not only a critical assessment of our recent past, but also an essential primer of modern warfare that provides crucial knowledge for waging battle today as well as for understanding what the decades ahead will bring. General David Petraeus is a retired United States Army general and widely respected as a leading warrior intellectual. He graduated with distinction from the US Military Academy and earned a Ph.D. from Princeton University. He served for 37 years in the US Army, culminating his time in uniform with 6 consecutive commands as a general officer, 5 of which were in combat, including Command of the Surge in Iraq, US Central Command, and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. He then served as Director of the CIA. He has held academic appointments at six universities and currently is a Senior Fellow and Lecturer at Yale. He is a prominent commentator on contemporary security issues, military developments, and global affairs. He is currently a Partner in a major investment firm and chairs that firm's Global Institute. Sam Canter is a strategic planner, a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations, and an Army Reserve intelligence officer. His views are his own and do not reflect any institution, organization, or entity with which he is affiliated. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history
In this deep and incisive study, General David Petraeus, who commanded the US-led coalitions in both Iraq, during the Surge, and Afghanistan and former CIA director, and the prize-winning historian Andrew Roberts, explore over 70 years of conflict, drawing significant lessons and insights from their fresh analysis of the past. Drawing on their different perspectives and areas of expertise, Petraeus and Roberts show how often critical mistakes have been repeated time and again, and the challenge, for statesmen and generals alike, of learning to adapt to various new weapon systems, theories and strategies. Among the conflicts examined are the Arab-Israeli wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the two Gulf Wars, the Balkan wars in the former Yugoslavia, and both the Soviet and Coalition wars in Afghanistan, as well as guerilla conflicts in Africa and South America. Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare From 1945 to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (Harper, 2023) culminates with a bracing look at Putin's disastrous invasion of Ukraine, yet another case study in the tragic results when leaders refuse to learn from history, and an assessment of the nature of future warfare. Filled with sharp insight and the wisdom of experience, Conflict is not only a critical assessment of our recent past, but also an essential primer of modern warfare that provides crucial knowledge for waging battle today as well as for understanding what the decades ahead will bring. General David Petraeus is a retired United States Army general and widely respected as a leading warrior intellectual. He graduated with distinction from the US Military Academy and earned a Ph.D. from Princeton University. He served for 37 years in the US Army, culminating his time in uniform with 6 consecutive commands as a general officer, 5 of which were in combat, including Command of the Surge in Iraq, US Central Command, and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. He then served as Director of the CIA. He has held academic appointments at six universities and currently is a Senior Fellow and Lecturer at Yale. He is a prominent commentator on contemporary security issues, military developments, and global affairs. He is currently a Partner in a major investment firm and chairs that firm's Global Institute. Sam Canter is a strategic planner, a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations, and an Army Reserve intelligence officer. His views are his own and do not reflect any institution, organization, or entity with which he is affiliated. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history
In this deep and incisive study, General David Petraeus, who commanded the US-led coalitions in both Iraq, during the Surge, and Afghanistan and former CIA director, and the prize-winning historian Andrew Roberts, explore over 70 years of conflict, drawing significant lessons and insights from their fresh analysis of the past. Drawing on their different perspectives and areas of expertise, Petraeus and Roberts show how often critical mistakes have been repeated time and again, and the challenge, for statesmen and generals alike, of learning to adapt to various new weapon systems, theories and strategies. Among the conflicts examined are the Arab-Israeli wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the two Gulf Wars, the Balkan wars in the former Yugoslavia, and both the Soviet and Coalition wars in Afghanistan, as well as guerilla conflicts in Africa and South America. Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare From 1945 to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (Harper, 2023) culminates with a bracing look at Putin's disastrous invasion of Ukraine, yet another case study in the tragic results when leaders refuse to learn from history, and an assessment of the nature of future warfare. Filled with sharp insight and the wisdom of experience, Conflict is not only a critical assessment of our recent past, but also an essential primer of modern warfare that provides crucial knowledge for waging battle today as well as for understanding what the decades ahead will bring. General David Petraeus is a retired United States Army general and widely respected as a leading warrior intellectual. He graduated with distinction from the US Military Academy and earned a Ph.D. from Princeton University. He served for 37 years in the US Army, culminating his time in uniform with 6 consecutive commands as a general officer, 5 of which were in combat, including Command of the Surge in Iraq, US Central Command, and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. He then served as Director of the CIA. He has held academic appointments at six universities and currently is a Senior Fellow and Lecturer at Yale. He is a prominent commentator on contemporary security issues, military developments, and global affairs. He is currently a Partner in a major investment firm and chairs that firm's Global Institute. Sam Canter is a strategic planner, a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations, and an Army Reserve intelligence officer. His views are his own and do not reflect any institution, organization, or entity with which he is affiliated. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs
In this deep and incisive study, General David Petraeus, who commanded the US-led coalitions in both Iraq, during the Surge, and Afghanistan and former CIA director, and the prize-winning historian Andrew Roberts, explore over 70 years of conflict, drawing significant lessons and insights from their fresh analysis of the past. Drawing on their different perspectives and areas of expertise, Petraeus and Roberts show how often critical mistakes have been repeated time and again, and the challenge, for statesmen and generals alike, of learning to adapt to various new weapon systems, theories and strategies. Among the conflicts examined are the Arab-Israeli wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the two Gulf Wars, the Balkan wars in the former Yugoslavia, and both the Soviet and Coalition wars in Afghanistan, as well as guerilla conflicts in Africa and South America. Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare From 1945 to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (Harper, 2023) culminates with a bracing look at Putin's disastrous invasion of Ukraine, yet another case study in the tragic results when leaders refuse to learn from history, and an assessment of the nature of future warfare. Filled with sharp insight and the wisdom of experience, Conflict is not only a critical assessment of our recent past, but also an essential primer of modern warfare that provides crucial knowledge for waging battle today as well as for understanding what the decades ahead will bring. General David Petraeus is a retired United States Army general and widely respected as a leading warrior intellectual. He graduated with distinction from the US Military Academy and earned a Ph.D. from Princeton University. He served for 37 years in the US Army, culminating his time in uniform with 6 consecutive commands as a general officer, 5 of which were in combat, including Command of the Surge in Iraq, US Central Command, and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. He then served as Director of the CIA. He has held academic appointments at six universities and currently is a Senior Fellow and Lecturer at Yale. He is a prominent commentator on contemporary security issues, military developments, and global affairs. He is currently a Partner in a major investment firm and chairs that firm's Global Institute. Sam Canter is a strategic planner, a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations, and an Army Reserve intelligence officer. His views are his own and do not reflect any institution, organization, or entity with which he is affiliated. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/national-security
In this deep and incisive study, General David Petraeus, who commanded the US-led coalitions in both Iraq, during the Surge, and Afghanistan and former CIA director, and the prize-winning historian Andrew Roberts, explore over 70 years of conflict, drawing significant lessons and insights from their fresh analysis of the past. Drawing on their different perspectives and areas of expertise, Petraeus and Roberts show how often critical mistakes have been repeated time and again, and the challenge, for statesmen and generals alike, of learning to adapt to various new weapon systems, theories and strategies. Among the conflicts examined are the Arab-Israeli wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the two Gulf Wars, the Balkan wars in the former Yugoslavia, and both the Soviet and Coalition wars in Afghanistan, as well as guerilla conflicts in Africa and South America. Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare From 1945 to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (Harper, 2023) culminates with a bracing look at Putin's disastrous invasion of Ukraine, yet another case study in the tragic results when leaders refuse to learn from history, and an assessment of the nature of future warfare. Filled with sharp insight and the wisdom of experience, Conflict is not only a critical assessment of our recent past, but also an essential primer of modern warfare that provides crucial knowledge for waging battle today as well as for understanding what the decades ahead will bring. General David Petraeus is a retired United States Army general and widely respected as a leading warrior intellectual. He graduated with distinction from the US Military Academy and earned a Ph.D. from Princeton University. He served for 37 years in the US Army, culminating his time in uniform with 6 consecutive commands as a general officer, 5 of which were in combat, including Command of the Surge in Iraq, US Central Command, and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. He then served as Director of the CIA. He has held academic appointments at six universities and currently is a Senior Fellow and Lecturer at Yale. He is a prominent commentator on contemporary security issues, military developments, and global affairs. He is currently a Partner in a major investment firm and chairs that firm's Global Institute. Sam Canter is a strategic planner, a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations, and an Army Reserve intelligence officer. His views are his own and do not reflect any institution, organization, or entity with which he is affiliated. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/science-technology-and-society
In this deep and incisive study, General David Petraeus, who commanded the US-led coalitions in both Iraq, during the Surge, and Afghanistan and former CIA director, and the prize-winning historian Andrew Roberts, explore over 70 years of conflict, drawing significant lessons and insights from their fresh analysis of the past. Drawing on their different perspectives and areas of expertise, Petraeus and Roberts show how often critical mistakes have been repeated time and again, and the challenge, for statesmen and generals alike, of learning to adapt to various new weapon systems, theories and strategies. Among the conflicts examined are the Arab-Israeli wars, the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the two Gulf Wars, the Balkan wars in the former Yugoslavia, and both the Soviet and Coalition wars in Afghanistan, as well as guerilla conflicts in Africa and South America. Conflict: The Evolution of Warfare From 1945 to the Russian Invasion of Ukraine (Harper, 2023) culminates with a bracing look at Putin's disastrous invasion of Ukraine, yet another case study in the tragic results when leaders refuse to learn from history, and an assessment of the nature of future warfare. Filled with sharp insight and the wisdom of experience, Conflict is not only a critical assessment of our recent past, but also an essential primer of modern warfare that provides crucial knowledge for waging battle today as well as for understanding what the decades ahead will bring. General David Petraeus is a retired United States Army general and widely respected as a leading warrior intellectual. He graduated with distinction from the US Military Academy and earned a Ph.D. from Princeton University. He served for 37 years in the US Army, culminating his time in uniform with 6 consecutive commands as a general officer, 5 of which were in combat, including Command of the Surge in Iraq, US Central Command, and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. He then served as Director of the CIA. He has held academic appointments at six universities and currently is a Senior Fellow and Lecturer at Yale. He is a prominent commentator on contemporary security issues, military developments, and global affairs. He is currently a Partner in a major investment firm and chairs that firm's Global Institute. Sam Canter is a strategic planner, a PhD candidate in Politics and International Relations, and an Army Reserve intelligence officer. His views are his own and do not reflect any institution, organization, or entity with which he is affiliated. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/book-of-the-day
Mr. Joseph Wassel is the Executive Director (CEO) of the First Responder Network Authority. He is responsible for overall management of all FirstNet Authority operations and the organization's strategic direction, to include its unique public-private arrangement to deploy and enhance the Nationwide Public Safety Broadband Network. Prior to joining the FirstNet Authority, Mr. Wassel served as the Executive for the Cyberspace Operations Directorate within the Defense Information Systems Agency. He is also the former Director of C4 Resilience & Mission Assurance in the Department of Defense (DoD) Chief Information Officer's office. He was also the founder and chair of DoD's Public Safety Communications Working Group, where he led the Services, Joint Staff, National Guard, NORTHCOM, and other DoD partner activities for the Department's public safety communications efforts, including Next-Generation Public Safety Wireless capabilities, Next-Generation 9-1-1 implementation, and Enterprise Mass Warning and Notification capabilities for DoD. Prior to assuming his former positions, Mr. Wassel served as the Assistant to the Secretary of Defense for Communications and Deputy Chief Information Officer for the Office of the Secretary of Defense. A retired Air Force Officer, he has commanded troops during several tours in the United States and overseas and deployed as a reservist in support of Operation Enduring Freedom as the Chief of Command and Control Operations for the International Security Assistance Force at the Combined Joint Operations Center in Kabul, Afghanistan. Mr. Wassel Joined the Senior Executive Service (SES) Corps in 2019. His military and civilian decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, and the Secretary of Defense Meritorious and Exceptional Civilian Service Medals. He was decorated for his actions during the attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001.
Recorded October 4, 2023 Signed on Oct. 1, 1953, in the wake of the armistice, the U.S.-South Korea alliance has matured into a dynamic partnership, deterring conflict and fostering cooperation with respect to trade, technology and people-to-people ties. This expert panel reflected on the legacy and future of the alliance. This program was jointly hosted by The Korea Society, the Korea Defense Veterans Association and the Korea-Pacific Program at the UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy. About the Speakers: Thomas J. Byrne joined The Korea Society as its President in August of 2015 following a distinguished career that included Senior Vice President of Moody's Investor Services and Senior Economist of the Asia Department at the Institute of International Finance. Byrne has an M.A. degree in International Relations with an emphasis on economics from The Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). Before doing graduate work at SAIS, he served in South Korea for three years as a U.S. Peace Corps volunteer. His commentary on Korean affairs has appeared in the Wall Street Journal, The New York Times, The Washington Post and The Financial Times among others. Stephen Haggard is the Lawrence and Sallye Krause Distinguished Professor and director of the Korea-Pacific Program at the UC San Diego School of Global Policy and Strategy. He teaches courses on the international relations of the Asia-Pacific at GPS covering political economy as well as security issues. He has done extensive research on North Korea in particular. In addition, he has a long-standing interest in transitions to and from democratic rule and the current phenomenon of democratic backsliding. His recent research on South Korea addresses the issue of political polarization, including with respect to foreign policy. Allison Hooker is a foreign policy and national security specialist with 20 years of experience in the U.S. Government working on Asia. She served as Deputy Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Asia, where she led the coordination and implementation of U.S. policy toward the Indo-Pacific region. Prior to that, Hooker served as Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for the Korean Peninsula, where she staffed the U.S.-DPRK Summits in Singapore, Hanoi, and the DMZ. Prior to her service at the White House, Hooker was a senior analyst for North Korea in the Department of State and staffed the Six-Party Talks on North Korea's nuclear program. She received a Masters' of Arts Degree in International Affairs from the George Washington University, and has been a research fellow at Osaka University and Keio University, where she focused on Japan-Korea relations, and Japan-China relations, respectively. Youngwan Kim is a career diplomat who joined the Foreign Ministry of the Republic of Korea in 1993. He worked at various Ministries of the Korean Government, including Foreign Ministry, Unification Ministry, and Office for Government Policy Coordination, Prime Minister's Office. Prior to his current post as Consul General in LA, he served as Director-General for National Security and Foreign Policy at the Prime Minister's office. He also worked as Director-General for Planning and Management of the Foreign Ministry. His most recent foreign post was a Member of the Panel of Experts, UN Security Council Sanctions Committee at the United Nations headquarter. His foreign posts also include Washington D.C., New York, Beijing and Baghdad. Munseob Lee is an economist who concentrates his research efforts on macroeconomics, growth and development, firm dynamics, and Korea. He has investigated the factors that determine the growth of firms, with a particular focus on how government purchases can promote long-term growth of small businesses. Additionally, he examined the disproportionate effect of inflation, revealing that low-income households and black families are the most affected by rising prices in the United States. Lee, who is an Associate Director in GPS's Korea-Pacific Program, teaches courses including Fiscal and Monetary Policy, Macroeconomics of Development and The Korean Economy. In 2019, General Curtis “Mike” Scaparrotti completed a distinguished 41-year career in the U.S. Army as the Commander, U.S. European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe, NATO. Prior to that he served as the Commander of U.S. Forces Korea / United Nations Command / Combined Forces Command in Seoul from 2013 to 2016. Other prominent postings in his highly-decorated career include Director of the Joint Staff, Commander of the International Security Assistance Force, the Deputy Commander of U.S. Forces – Afghanistan, the Commanding General of I Corps and Joint Base Lewis-McChord, and the Commanding General of the 82nd Airborne Division. Additionally, over the years, General Scaparrotti served in key leadership positions at the tactical, operational, and strategic level. He has commanded forces during Operations Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom (Afghanistan), Support Hope (Zaire/Rwanda), Joint Endeavor (Bosnia-Herzegovina), and Assured Response (Liberia). General Scaparrotti holds a Master's degree in Administrative Education from the University of South Carolina. In addition to his work with The Cohen Group, General Scaparrotti sits on the boards iof the Atlantic Council and Patriot Foundation, and is a Senior Fellow at the National Defense University. Yoo Myung-hee served at the Ministries of Trade, Industry and Energy and Foreign Affairs and Trade of the Republic of Korea for nearly three decades before becoming Korea's first female trade minister (2019-2021). In a variety of roles she designed and implemented Korea's trade policy and negotiation strategies and led numerous bilateral and multilateral trade negotiations as Korea's chief negotiator, including the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (RCEP) and Korea's free trade agreements with the United States and ASEAN. As trade minister, she contributed to international initiatives to ensure supply chain resilience and to address digital trade policy. She received her BA and MPA from Seoul National University and JD from Vanderbilt University Law School and currently teaches at the Graduate School of International Studies of Seoul National University. For more information, please visit the link below: https://www.koreasociety.org/policy-and-corporate-programs/item/1745-the-u-s-republic-of-korea-alliance-at-70-legacy-and-future
The first episode of our three-part series on Afghanistan lessons discussed building armies. This episode focuses exclusively on assessing them. In the studio for this second episode are LTG (R) Eric Wesley, who brings experience from both the National Security Council Staff and the International Security Assistance Force, and Dr. Ben Connable, author of a RAND monograph entitled, "Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency." They join guest host and U.S. Army War College Fellow LTC Ranjini Danaraj for a serious discussion about the assessment of military forces in Afghanistan. The conversation covers assessment shortfalls, optimism in reporting, holding commanders accountable to their assessments, creating competitive perspectives, taking a long view of war, and measuring the will to fight. Assessing is no easy task, but this episode provides insights on how to get it right, breaking the military's assessment failure cycle, and helping military leaders accurately and credibly inform strategy decisions.
The first episode of our three-part series on Afghanistan lessons discussed building armies. This episode focuses exclusively on assessing them. In the studio for this second episode are LTG (R) Eric Wesley, who brings experience from both the National Security Council Staff and the International Security Assistance Force, and Dr. Ben Connable, author of a RAND monograph entitled, Embracing the Fog of War: Assessment and Metrics in Counterinsurgency, They join guest host and U.S. Army War College Fellow LTC Ranjini Danaraj for a serious discussion about the assessment of military forces in Afghanistan. The conversation covers assessment shortfalls, optimism in reporting, holding commanders accountable to their assessment, creating competitive perspectives, taking a long view of war, and measuring will to fight. Assessing is no easy task, but this episode provides insights on how to get it right, breaking the military's assessment failure cycle, and helping military leaders accurately and credibly inform strategy decisions.
This edition features stories on the Afghan National Army's 205th Hero Corps and the International Security Assistance Force improving security north of Laskar Gah, medics volunteering their skills at a civilian Afghan clinic and Afghan National Army soldiers receiving HUMVEE vehicle training. Hosted by Cpl. Kimberly Crawford.
To conclude Season Three of Talking Strategy, US Army General (ret.) Dr David Petraeus shares with us his philosophy about making good strategy. A scholarly soldier with a long and varied career, he commanded the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan in 2010–11 and subsequently served as director of the CIA. General Petraeus's experience has taught him that the best results can arise from what he describes as his own ‘intellectual construct for strategic leadership', comprised of four tasks: brainstorming, communication, implementation and assessment. Successful results can be achieved from initially brainstorming with the best and brightest around the commander to find the next ‘big idea' – thinking through all good proposals, and deciding which is the best. Then, the challenge is to communicate it to the entire defence establishment both at home and abroad, including one's own forces and allied/coalition forces. Then comes the implementation, requiring energetic leadership. Finally, the results must be assessed – and here the circle closes. For General Petraeus, making and implementing good strategy is possible when the armed forces are turned into a learning organisation, one that can draw lessons and jettison approaches that have been unhelpful. For communication with multiple audiences during an armed conflict, his motto is: ‘Be first with the truth'.
This edition features stories on International Security Assistance Force troops stopping during a convoy to provide medical care to Afghans involved in a car accident and the Lt. Dan Band performing for troops at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan as part of the 2009 Fall USO Tour. Hosted by Senior Airman Jarid Watson.
This edition features stories on militants near a taliban training facility targeted by International Security Assistance Force during an air strike and Marines and Afghan National Army soldiers working together to fight taliban and gain the trust of local civilians in rural Afghanistan Hosted by Senior Airman Jonathan Porter.
This edition features stories on Gen. David Petraeus, the new leader of the Afghan war effort, meeting troops and observing, first hand, the conditions on the ground in Afghanistan and members of the Kentucky National Guard Agricultural Development Team meeting with Afghan villagers to educate them about agriculture that will infuse their economy in hopes of releasing them from the influence of Taliban and an opium based economy. Hosted by Petty Officer 1st Class Dustin Diaz. Afghanistan
This edition features a story on International Security Assistance Force Joint Commander Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez spoke to the Pentagon about Joint Operations in Afghanistan. Also American service members in Paktia Province are meeting regularly with the members of a local Agricultural College to help its students and faculty. Sound bites include Lt. Gen. David Rodriguez, 1st Lt. Christopher Thoms and Dr. Fida Mohd Fida. Hosted by Cpl. Bryan Lett.
This edition features stories on Afghan and International Security Assistance Forces conducting a joint operation to capture an insurgent cell leader in Khost province, Afghanistan and discussing the national rule of law with Afghan leaders and implementing the rule of law. Hosted by Petty Officer 3rd Class Cody Boyd. Includes a soundbite from Abraham Sutherland, Rule of Law Advisor.
This edition features stories on the Afghan National Police and the International Security Assistance Force discovered an Improvised Explosive Device in a soccer field near Kandahar Province, Afghanistan. The 4th of July is a time to celebrate American's independence and remember those who served in the Military before us. One Airman decided to honor his Fathers service with a special "Flag Flight". Hosted by Petty Officer 1st Class Dustin Diaz.
This edition features stories on a combined patrol between an Afghan National Security force and an International Security Assistance Force in which a narcotics drug network in Kandahar province, Afghanistan was overcome and large quantities of opium were seized cutting off a source of money for the Taliban and Afghan students graduating from an Afghan-led contractors course in Paktika province, Afghanistan. Hosted by Senior Airman Barbara Patton. Includes soundbites from Lt. Col. Paul Stephens, commander of the 1092nd Engineer Battalion, and Mohammad Sawab, workshop technical director.
This edition features a stories about more than 600 Afghan and International Security Assistance Force service members conducting operations against Al-Qaida and the Taliban, and the Chief Master Sgt. of the Air Force, James Roy, visiting Airmen at Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan. Hosted by Senior Airman Barbara Patton.
This edition features a story on how members from the Ghazni Provential Reconstruction Team conducted a survey at the Ghazni City Prison, Ghazni Province, Afghanistan and soldiers from the Afghan National Army are fighting the insurgency with bullets, bombs and books. Petty Officer Dustin Diaz tells us how troops from the Afghan 215th Corps increased their literacy level and ability at Camp Leatherneck, Afghanistan. Sound bites include Aziz Rahman, Non Commissioned Officer, 215th Corps, Afghan National Army, from Parwan Province. Command Sgt. Maj. Marvin Hill, Command Senior Enlisted, International Security Assistance Force. Hosted by Petty Officer 1st Class Dustin Diaz.
This edition features a stories on how the International Security Assistance Forces are countering Insurgency in Helmand Province, Afghanistan by removing Taliban Key Leaders and the Missouri Agribusiness Development Team started a new program to promote Afghan sustainment for the future. Senior Airman Chris Pyles traveled to Nangarhar Povince, Afghanistan to see the Team's efforts in action. Sound bite includes Sgt. 1st Class Dan Thompson, Engineer, Missouri Agribusiness Development Team - Hometown Jefferson City, Mo. Hosted by Lance Cpl. Benjamin Harris has the story.
This edition features a story about how Monday, Gen. Petreaus relinquishes command of the NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and United States Forces, Afghanistan. The man some call "king David" has spent much of the last decade commanding troops in the Central Command Theater of Operations. Tech Sgt. Trevor Pedro takes us on a journey with the man behind the stars. Soundbite includes Gen. David Petreaus - USFOR-A/ISAF Commanding Officer. Produced by Tech Sgt. Trevor Pedro.
This edition features a story about how Afghan Airmen and Soldiers secure a local area in Spin Boldak, Afghanistan and a story about how Marine Corps General John R. Allen Commander of NATO and International Security Assistance Force troops in Afghanistan sent 20 runners in Kabul on there way for the Marine Corps Marathon or MCM Forward by blowing the start whistle. The 26.2 mile run allows runners that participate in the run to test their endurance in unfriendly terrain. Soundbites include Benjamin Ranta - Event Coodinator, COL. Gary Johnson - Commander, 504th Battlefield Intelligence Group. Produced by SSgt. Jose Rodriquez and hosted by SSgt. Melissa Hay. Also available in High Definition.
This edition features a story about how International Security Assistance Force Commander Gen. John R. Allen and U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan Ryan Crocker participated to officially transfer security responsibilities of the Parwan Province to Afghan National Security Forces and another story about how building an independent and strong Afghanistan is an important part of coalition forces missions. Soundbite includes LTC. John Walsh - PRT Nangarhar. Produced by PO2 Brandon Shelander and hosted by SSgt. Melissa Hay. Also available in High Definition.
This edition features stories on an Afghan foot patrol, a new drainage tunnel and power generation plant in Bagram, a mine clearing unit, transfer of a US base to the Afghan Army and a special reunion for two Navy Sailors. Also available in high definition.
On this episode of The Global Exchange, Colin Robertson speaks to Julian Lindley-French, Kate Hansen Bundt, Rob de Wijk, and John Allen about the support the West needs to provide Ukraine to win the war. This episode explore the content of a strategy written by The Alphen Group: https://www.cgai.ca/a_comprehensive_strategy_to_secure_ukraines_future Participants' bios Dr. Julian Lindley-French is a Fellow at CGAI. https://www.cgai.ca/julian_lindley_french Kate Hansen Bundt has been Secretary General of the Norwegian Atlantic Committee since 2010. https://thealphengroup.com/kate-hansen-bundt/ Rob de Wijk is the founder and non-executive director of The Hague Centre for Strategic Studies. https://thealphengroup.com/rob-de-wijk/ Gen. John Allen, USMC (Ret.), a member of the Washington Institute's Board of Advisors, is former commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/experts/john-allen Host bio: Colin Robertson is a former diplomat and Senior Advisor to the Canadian Global Affairs Institute, https://www.cgai.ca/colin_robertson Recording Date: 21 February 2023. Give 'The Global Exchange' a review on Apple Podcast! Follow the Canadian Global Affairs Institute on Facebook, Twitter (@CAGlobalAffairs), or on Linkedin. Head over to our website www.cgai.ca for more commentary. Produced by Charlotte Duval-Lantoine. Music credits to Drew Phillips.
Description: NOTE: In the coming weeks, Jack is releasing a series of “best of” collections from the Danger Close archives. Each episode contains portions of past interviews, all centered around a theme or topic. Today's episode features conversations with current and former members of the intelligence community and intelligence analysts. FEATURED INTERVIEWS: DOUGLAS LONDON Douglas London is a retired senior CIA operations officer. Today, Doug is an Adjunct Associate Professor at Georgetown University's Center for Security Studies. Full Interview: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/danger-close-with-jack-carr/id1557814875?i=1000538426102 RIC PRADO Ric Prado is a retired CIA operations officer who specialized in paramilitary, counter-terrorism and special/clandestine operations. He is also the New York Times bestselling author of Black Ops. Full Interview: https://podcasts.apple.com/za/podcast/ric-prado-black-ops/id1557814875?i=1000558891242 CLINT EMERSON Clint Emerson is an author, an entrepreneur, survival expert, podcast host, and former SEAL. He is the author of theThe Rugged Life and the 100 Deadly Skills series and hosts Can You Survive This Podcast? Full Interview: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/clint-emerson-living-the-rugged-life/id1557814875?i=1000569047146 SAMUEL KATZ Samuel Katz is an expert on the Middle East, counterterrorism, and special operations. He has written more than 20 books including The Ghost Warrior, No Shadows in the Desert, and Beirut Rules. Full Interview: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/samuel-katz-no-shadows-in-the-desert/id1557814875?i=1000552241030 MARC POLYMEROPOULOS Marc Polymeropoulos retired from the CIA in 2019 after 26 years of service. He is the author of the book Clarity in Crisis. Currently, Marc serves as senior fellow in the Forward Defense practice of the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security. Full Interview: https://podcasts.apple.com/gh/podcast/marc-polymeropoulos-clarity-in-crisis-at-the-cia/id1557814875?i=1000549795436 FRED BURTON Fred Burton is a former police officer, Diplomatic Security Service special agent, author, and security consultant. During his career, Fred was involved in some of the most notable terrorism investigations in law enforcement history. Full Interview: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/fred-burton-protective-security-specialist-author-and/id1557814875?i=1000516096247 DAVID KILCULLEN David Kilcullen served in the Australian military for more than 20 years before being recruited as the Chief Strategist in the Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism for the U.S. State Department. He was also a counterinsurgency adviser to NATO and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan. Full Interview: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/dr-david-kilcullen-a-student-of-warfare/id1557814875?i=1000525709471 KARA FREDERICK Kara Frederick serves as the director of The Tech Policy Center at The Heritage Foundation. She previously served as a counterterrorism analyst at the Department of Defense and was a Senior Intelligence Analyst for a U.S. Naval Special Warfare Command. Full Interview: https://podcasts.apple.com/nz/podcast/kara-frederick-big-techs-totalitarianism/id1557814875?i=1000576378628 Sponsors: Navy Federal Credit Union: Today's episode is presented by Navy Federal Credit Union. Learn more about them at navyfederal.org Black Rifle Coffee Company: Today's episode is also brought to you by Black Rifle. Purchase at http://www.blackriflecoffee.com/dangerclose and use code: dangerclose20 at checkout for 20% off your purchase and your first coffee club order! SIG: This episode is sponsored by SIG Sauer. You can learn more about SIG here. KC Cattle Company: Check out the Jack Carr Bundles: https://shop.officialjackcarr.com/collections/jack-carr-x-kc-cattle
Today we hear the Combat Story of Kristen Murdock, who spent 13 years in the Navy as a Naval Intelligence Officer from an Aviation Squadron off a carrier to Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU).[Check out our Patreon page for more images of Kristen and for an upcoming Q&A with Ryan]Kristen spent most of her military time deployed around the world and focused primarily on intelligence in the Middle East, South Asia, North Africa, and the Horn of Africa, including deployments at the strategic level with joint staffs to the tactical with SEAL Team 3 and DEVGRU.After her time in service, Kristen transitioned thanks to a phenomenal program designed for Special Operations service members and support staff called The Honor Foundation which helped her find her next career in Silicon Valley working in the Trust and Safety space at Facebook and, most recently, Twitch, as a senior leader.Kristen narrowly avoided be kicked out of the Naval Academy and had her dreams of flying shattered at the last moment but ended up hustling to find a more rewarding path in Intel that serves as a great lessons for those still rising through the ranks and I hope you enjoy her insights into the shadowy world of intel at a Tier 1 unit as much as I did.Find Kristen online:- Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/kristenmichele/- LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/kristen-murdock/- Twitter: https://twitter.com/kristenmurdockFind Ryan Online: - Ryan's Linktree https://linktr.ee/combatstory- Merch https://www.bonfire.com/store/combatstory/- Instagram @combatstory https://www.instagram.com/combatstory- Facebook @combatstoryofficial https://fb.me/combatstoryofficial- Send us messages at https://m.me/combatstoryofficial- Email ryan@combatstory.com- Learn more about Ryan www.combatstory.com/aboutus- Intro Song: Sport Rock from Audio JungleShow Notes0:00 - Intro00:41 - Guest introduction for Kristen Murdock6:05 - Reality check from an active duty father and aviator at Dover Air Force Base12:17 - Avoiding the use of Intel “Jedi mind tricks” on regular people12:38 - What is the “2” in military language (S2, N2, J2, G2, etc)15:54 - Going to the US Naval Academy and almost not making it25:00 - Losing your ‘dream' career and finding your true path30:27 - Unfortunate advice from another officer to a woman in service32:27 - Arriving to your first assignment as the intel officer on a carrier42:22 - Running intel at SEAL Team 345:02 - Strategic work as an intel officer and preparing “The Book”49:47 - Doing time with DIA to get broader intel experience53:48 - Detailed to a Special Forces Team (ODA) and then sent to support ISAF (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=tgRf_vdx0lg the International Security Assistance Force)55:19 - Supporting General Stanley A. McChrystal (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OA0yXWAAais) and General Michael Flynn while meeting tribal leaders like Karzai1:03:01 - Learning of the deaths of Brendan Looney and Travis Manion (https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Xhn4vAgQneE)1:05:28 - Working threat finance as an intelligence officer and the skills it teaches you1:08:30 - Getting to SEAL Team 31:15:55 - The weight of giving intel to a team of operators and how much confidence you need to have1:17:19 - Walking past the memorial for a fallen friend (Brendan Looney) at SEAL Team 3 HQs1:18:28 - The transition to Naval Special Warfare Development Group (DEVGRU, also known as SEAL Team Six)1:20:43 - Had a great experience with all the Team guys1:22:19 - Transitioning out of the military and into Tech with Facebook (now Meta) and then on to Twitch1:30:18 - What did you carry with you on deployments?1:31:12 - Would you go back and do it again?1:32:55 - Listener comments and shout outs.Thanks for listening ya'll! Stay safe.The video is all about special operations and special operators and intelligence officers and the intelligence profession. If you want to learn more about special operations and intelligence, you can click: https://www.combatstory.com/This video is describing what it takes to be in special operations and make it in Intelligence but also try to cover the following subjects:- What are special operations?- Combat Story- Navy SEALs- Combat Operations- DIA (Defense Intelligence Agency)_________________________Have I responded to all of your questions about what are special operations and what is intelligence?Individuals who searched for Kristen Murdock and intelligence also searched for Navy SEALs and intelligence officers and we have interviews with many Navy SEALs and former Intelligence Officers at www.combatstory.com, including those in Naval Special Warfare Development Group (or DEVGRU), which many people refer to as SEAL Team Six, and with the CIA (Central Intelligence Agency).If you would like to learn more about the intelligence profession or SEALs, look into our various other video clips: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCCyApoJr-mNmdMNwdk22xEQ
DISCLAIMER: 1) This episode was recorded on Saturday, May 28th. There have been several updates to the story and timeline since that date. Please keep that in while listening, thank you. 2) The data base referenced in this episode that meet the proposed definition of a public mass shooting are only ones that have taken place at a school since 1966, which is 13. Today's episode, with Robert Allen, focuses on the recent tragedy in Uvalde, Texas regarding the school shooting at Robb Elementary. The episode commences by Robert giving his thoughts on the response by the police to the crisis as well as what standard police doctrine is when dealing with a school shooter. Shortly after we discuss possible measures and solutions to prevent these shootings as well as the shooter himself. As mentioned above, there have been several updates to the timeline/story since the episode was recorded. Follow 'overcoming_the_divide' on Instagram and Twitter to receive updates, participate in polls, and questions.Robert Allen is currently a Professor of Homeland Security at Tulane University. Robert has an extensive background in law enforcement, security and intelligence. His experiences include service in the UN Police Mission in the Balkans, and the State Department's Diplomatic Security Mission in Israel and Afghanistan. Robert was also a part of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan and Operation Iraqi Freedom. His law enforcement experience includes service with the Jefferson Parish District Attorney and their Sheriff's Office as well as the Port of New Orleans and Slidell Police Departments.Music: Coma-Media (intro) WinkingFoxMusic (outro)Recorded: 5/28/22
This week Dr. Plaster is joined by Dr. Frederick Flynt to discuss when to consider genetic testing and the role genetic testing can play in providing the necessary information to support early detection and prevention of cancer, as well as in the evaluation of additional screening measures or procedures which may be of service. Dr. Flynt is board-certified in Internal Medicine, Hematology, and Medical Oncology and is a distinguished military physician who served on active duty in the United States Air Force as an Oncologist / Hematologist and Flight Surgeon, including a tour in Afghanistan as part of the International Security Assistance Force for Operation Enduring Freedom. Dr. Flynt is an oncologist at University Cancer & Blood Center. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
CAPT Kevin “Mac” McGovern, U.S.N. (Ret.) is running as a conservative congressional candidate in Central Florida. McGovern is a retired Navy Captain who has served across the globe over decades with the U.S. Navy and has firsthand experience in Foreign Affairs. A veteran of the war in Afghanistan, he served as a Senior Officer assigned to NATO, the International Security Assistance Force under GEN Petraeus. He has also patrolled the East China Sea and has developed specific knowledge concerning Taiwan and the threat China poses to the U.S. His resume includes experience in Washington, D.C. overseeing production of F-35s, America's latest generation of supersonic, stealth, multi-role fighter planes. His civilian engineering expertise in the telecommunications industry has given him keen insight into the issues we currently have with electronic media censorship. As a decorated war veteran and successful businessman, Kevin is well suited to lead our nation in Congress. https://mcgovernforflorida.com
Former Commander of Afghanistan General (Ret.) Stanley McChrystal shares lessons from Afghanistan, the impact of the withdrawal, what makes a great leader and what he is most proud of in his career. Former Defense Secretary Robert Gates has described General McChrystal as, "Perhaps the finest warrior and leader of men in combat I have ever met." Learn what General McChrystal believes to be the biggest risk facing the U.S. and the solution.Gen. McChrystal rose to four-star general in the U.S. Army and Commander of both the International Security Assistance Force and Commander of the U.S. Forces in Afghanistan. He previously served as Director of the Joint Staff and as Commander of the Joint Special Operations Command. He is the author of several books, including Leaders and Risk, and is currently a senior fellow at Yale University's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs and co-founder of the McChrystal Group, a leadership consulting firm.
In this special Bonus episode, Chris has an extended dialogue with General Stan McChrystal, US Army (Retired) about his new book: Risk: A User's Guide, co-authored with Anna Butrico. They talk through assessing risk in our own lives: amid the pandemic and persistent uncertainty at work and at home, with real world examples of how to systematically detect and respond to it. This is a conversation not to miss. General Stanley McChrystal retired in July 2010 as a four-star general in the U.S. Army. His last assignment was as the commander of the International Security Assistance Force and as the commander of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan. He had previously served as the director of the Joint Staff and as the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command. The author of My Share of the Task, Team of Teams, and Leaders, he is currently a senior fellow at Yale University's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs and the cofounder of the McChrystal Group.
Dose of Leadership with Richard Rierson | Authentic & Courageous Leadership Development
General Stanley McChrystal retired in July 2010 as a four-star general in the U.S. Army. His last assignment was as the commander of the International Security Assistance Force and as the commander of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan. He had previously served as the director of the Joint Staff and as the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command. The author of My Share of the Task, Team of Teams, and Leaders, he is currently a senior fellow at Yale University's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs and the cofounder of theMcChrystal Group, a leadership consulting firm.
Text LEARNERS to 44222 for more... Full show notes at www.LearningLeader.com Twitter/IG: @RyanHawk12 https://twitter.com/RyanHawk12 General Stanley McChrystal retired in July 2010 as a four-star general in the U.S. Army. His last assignment was as the commander of the International Security Assistance Force and as the commander of the U.S. forces in Afghanistan. He had previously served as the director of the Joint Staff and as the commander of the Joint Special Operations Command. The author of My Share of the Task, Team of Teams, and Leaders, he is currently a senior fellow at Yale University's Jackson Institute for Global Affairs and the co-founder of the McChrystal Group, a leadership consulting firm. Notes: Stan's mentor for his military career and still to this day: an Army officer with a thick southern accent, Major John Vines. His advice: “If there are 3 people responsible for feeding the dog, the dog is going to starve.” Stan graduated from West Point 31 years after his father did. Major General George Smith Patton (General George Patton's son) handed him his diploma. Stan wondered at that moment, what kind of leader you wanted to be. And he came up with, “a good one.” Now the more fundamental question is “What do good leaders do?” Instead of just being a good leader, Stan desires to be an effective leader. Effective leaders: Tactically competent Are morally good Respected They create an environment where others want to follow They shape how people think and behave People that others want to follow Have high standards Risk: in reality, risk is neither mathematical nor finite. Its impact depends to a great extent on how we perceive, process, and respond. A healthy risk immune system successfully executes 4 imperatives: Detect, Assess, Respond, and Learn "Risk comes at you from out of the blue, from every angle, when least convenient. There is a cost in becoming overly focused on risk and another at ignoring them. And the sweet spot between the two extremes moves with the circumstances around you.” “I chose a soldier's life for many reasons, one of which was the desire to perceive myself as a courageous risk taker. I liked the idea of taking risks that others would not.” Threat x Vulnerability = Risk Risk is an eternal challenge. But trying to anticipate or predict every possible risk is a fool's errand. The key is to understand how we need to think about risk, and to then respond appropriately. Rather than living in dread of things we often can't anticipate, duck, or dodge – we must remember these five key insights. Look Inward: The greatest risk to us is us. It's Up to Us: We have a risk immune system Be holistic: It's the system. Make it work Balance: The muscles you exercise will be strong: those you ignore will be vulnerabilities Risk is always with us, and it's our responsibility to make our teams ready for it When taking command of the 2nd Ranger Battalion, Stan, along with the leaders of the unit, established The foundational skills - They called them the big 4: Physical conditioning Marksmanship Medical Skills Small Unit Drills But even before mastering basic skills, grounding both individuals and organizations with answers to the most basic questions that relate to the narrative is essential: What are our values? What exactly do we do? And why do we do it? What is expected of each of us? What went wrong with our response to COVID-19? 50 states operated separately instead of a united response "We weren't unified" "Our leaders did not communicate effectively." "You have to act before the population sees the requirement for it." Have a front-line obsession - Stan was known for going on the front lines with his soldiers. As leaders, we should do the same with our teams. Be on the front lines to: See how it's done with your own eyes, not just reports They need to see you go. They'll appreciate it It helps create your self-identity The new hybrid model of in-office and at-home working... Be intentional Use technology Understand what you're not doing Don't get lazy How to deal with imposter syndrome? Ask, "What do I know?" "What's my responsibility?" "You have to fight that crisis of confidence." Excellence = Be less flexible on your basic values Be flexible with how a problem gets solved
The war in Afghanistan is over. In this episode, we document how and why the Biden administration finally admitted defeat in our 20 year attempt to create a new government in Afghanistan and we take a hard look at the lessons we need to learn. Afghanistan is a country in a far away land, but there are disturbing similarities between the Afghanistan government that just collapsed and our own. We'd be wise not to ignore them. Executive Producer: Rachel Passer Executive Producer: Anonymous Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD236: January 6: The Capitol Riot CD218: Minerals are the New Oil CD210: The Afghanistan War CD124: The Costs of For-Profit War How We Got Here Craig Whitlock. The Afghanistan Papers: A Secret History of the War. Simon and Schuster, 2021. Patrick Tucker. August 18, 2021. “Trump's Pledge to Exit Afghanistan Was a Ruse, His Final SecDef Says.” Defense One. Eugene Kiely and Robert Farley. August 17, 2021. “Timeline of U.S. Withdrawal from Afghanistan.” FactCheck.org. Eric Schmitt and Jennifer Steinhauer. July 30, 2021. “Afghan Visa Applicants Arrive in U.S. After Years of Waiting.” The New York Times. Craig Whitlock, Leslie Shapiro and Armand Emamdjomeh. December 9, 2019. “The Afghanistan Papers: A secret history of the war.” The Washington Post. Mark Landler and James Risen. July 25, 2017. “Trump Finds Reason for the U.S. to Remain in Afghanistan: Minerals.” The New York Times. John F. Harris. October 15, 2001. “Bush Rejects Taliban Offer On Bin Laden ” Washington Post. The Evacuation: Those Left Behind William Mauldin. September 2, 2021. “Afghanistan Voice of America, Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty Staff Left Behind.” Wall Street Journal. Zolan Kanno-Youngs and Annie Karni. August 29, 2021. “Series of U.S. Actions Left Afghan Allies Frantic, Stranded and Eager to Get Out.” The York Times. Sami Sadat. August 25, 2021. “I Commanded Afghan Troops This Year. We Were Betrayed.” The New York Times. Marjorie Censer. August 18, 2021. “US contractors rush to get former employees out of Afghanistan.” Defense News. Siobhan Hughes. August 18, 2021. “Afghanistan Veterans in Congress Trying to Prevent ‘a Death Warrant' for Helping America.” Wall Street Journal. Alex Sanz and Tammy Webber. August 18, 2021. “US friends try to rescue brother in arms in Afghanistan.” AP News. Seth Moulton. June 04, 2021. "Moulton, Bipartisan Honoring Our Promises Working Group to White House: Evacuate our Afghan Partners.” Contractors in Afghanistan Matt Taibbi. August 18, 2021. “We Failed Afghanistan, Not the Other Way Around.” TK News by Matt Taibbi on Substack. Jack Detsch. August 16, 2021. “Departure of Private Contractors Was a Turning Point in Afghan Military's Collapse.” Foreign Policy. Matt Stoller. July 15, 2021. “‘A Real S*** Show': Soldiers Angrily Speak Out about Being Blocked from Repairing Equipment by Contractors.” BIG by Matt Stoller. Lynzy Billing. May 12, 2021. “The U.S. Is Leaving Afghanistan? Tell That to the Contractors.” New York Magazine. Oren Liebermann. March 29, 2021. “Pentagon could open itself to costly litigation from contractors if US pulls out of Afghanistan this year.” CNN. Lucas Kunce and Elle Ekman. September 15, 2019. “Comment Submitted by Major Lucas Kunce and Captain Elle Ekman.” [Regulations.gov(https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Regulations.gov). Aaron Mehta. Oct 25, 2016. “30 Years: William Perry — Reshaping the Industry.” Defense News. Jared Serbu. August 22, 2016. “DoD now awarding more than half its contract spending without competitive bids.” Federal News Network. 41 U.S. Code § 3307 - Preference for commercial products and commercial services. Money: Lost and Gained David Moore. August 23, 2021. “Lawmakers Benefit From Booming Defense Stocks.” Sludge. Lee Fang. August 20, 2021. “Congressman Seeking to Relaunch Afghan War Made Millions in Defense Contracting.” The Intercept. Anna Massoglia and Julia Forrest. August 20, 2021. “Defense contractors spent big in Afghanistan before the U.S. left and the Taliban took control.” OpenSecrets.org. Stephen Losey. April 16, 2021. “The Bill for the Afghanistan War Is $2.26 Trillion, and Still Rising.” Military.com. Eli Clifton. February 16, 2021. “Weapons Biz Bankrolls Experts Pushing to Keep U.S. Troops in Afghanistan.” Daily Beast. Open Secrets. 2021. Defense: Lobbying, 2021. Open Secrets. 2021. Defense: Money to Congress. Laws S.1790 - National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2020 Sponsor: Senator Jim Inhofe (R-OK) Status: Became Public Law No: 116-92 on December 20, 2019 H.R. 3237: Emergency Security Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2021 Sponsor: Rep. Rosa DeLauro (D-CT) Status: Signed into law, 2021 May 20 House Vote Breakdown Congressional Budget Office Score Law Outline TITLE IV: BILATERAL ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE GENERAL PROVISIONS EXTENSION AND MODIFICATION OF THE AFGHAN SPECIAL IMMIGRANT VISA PROGRAM Sec. 401: Amends the Afghan Allies Protection Act of 2009 to expand eligibility to include Afghans who worked not only for the US Government for more than 1 year but also our allies as an off-base interpreter or if they performed "activities for United States military stationed at International Security Assistance Force (or any successor name for such Force). Increases the number of Special Immigrant Visas (SIV) to Afghan partners by 8,000, for a total of 34,500 allocated since December 19, 2014. Sec. 402: Authorizes the Secretary of Homeland Security and Secretary of state to jointly waive for 1 year (maximum 2 years with an extension) the requirement that Afghan partners eligible for SIVs get a medical exam before they can receive their visa. The Secretary of Homeland Security has to create a process to make sure Afghan SIV holders get a medical exam within 30 days of entry into the United States. Sec. 403: Allows the surviving spouse or child or employee of the United States Government abroad to be eligible for immigration into the United States if the employee worked for our government for at least 15 years or was killed in the line of duty. It also expands entry permissions for Afghan SIV applicants in addition to those who have already been approved. This is retroactive to June 30, 2021. Policies for Visa Processing: U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services. Policy Manual, Chapter 9: Certain Afghan Nationals U.S Department of State -- Bureau of Consular Affairs. “Special Immigrant Visas for Afghans - Who Were Employed by/on Behalf of the U.S. Government.” Audio Sources Gen. Mark Milley: "There was nothing that I or anyone else saw that indicated a collapse of this army and this government in 11 days." August 18, 2021 General Mark Milley: The time frame of rapid collapse that was widely estimated and ranged from weeks to months, and even years following our departure, there was nothing that I or anyone else saw that indicated a collapse of this army and this government in 11 days. Central Command submitted a variety of plans that were briefed and approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense and the President. These plans were coordinated, synchronized and rehearsed to deal with these various scenarios. One of those contingencies is what we are executing right now. As I said before, there's plenty of time to do AARs(After Action Reviews) and key lessons learned and to delve into these questions with great detail. But right now is not that time. Right now, we have to focus on this mission, because we have soldiers at risk. And we also have American citizens and Afghans who supported us for 20 years also at risk. This is personal and we're going to get them out. President Biden on Afghanistan Withdrawal Transcript July 8, 2021 Sound Clips 01:30 President Biden: When I announced our drawdown in April, I said we would be out by September, and we're on track to meet that target. Our military mission in Afghanistan will conclude on August 31. The drawdown is proceeding in a secure and orderly way, prioritizing the safety of our troops as they depart 3:40 President Biden: Together with our NATO allies and partners, we have trained and equipped nearly 300,000 current serving members of the military, the Afghan national security force, and many beyond that are no longer serving. Add to that hundreds of thousands more Afghan national defense and security forces trained over the last two decades. 04:04 President Biden: We provided our Afghan partners with all the tools, let me emphasize, all the tools -- training, equipment -- of any modern military. We provided advanced weaponry, and we're going to continue to provide funding and equipment and we'll ensure they have the capacity to maintain their Air Force. 5:54 President Biden: We're also going to continue to make sure that we take on Afghan nationals who worked side by side with US forces, including interpreters and translators. Since we're no longer going to have military there after this, we're not going to need them and they'll have no jobs. We're [sic] also going to be vital to our efforts. they've been very vital, and so their families are not exposed to danger as well. We've already dramatically accelerated the procedure time for Special Immigrant Visas to bring them to the United States. Since I was inaugurated on January 20, we've already approved 2,500 Special Immigrant Visas to come to the United States. Up to now, fewer than half have exercised the right to do that. Half have gotten on aircraft and come commercial flights and come and other half believe they want to stay, at least thus far. We're working closely with Congress to change the authorization legislation so that we can streamline the process of approving those visas. And those who have stood up for the operation to physically relocate 1000s of Afghans and their families before the US military mission concludes so that, if they choose, they can wait safely outside of Afghanistan, while their US visas are being processed. 8:13 President Biden: For those who have argued that we should stay just six more months, or just one more year, I asked them to consider the lessons of recent history. In 2011, the NATO allies and partners agreed that we would end our combat mission in 2014. In 2014, some argued one more year. So we kept fighting. We kept taking casualties. In 2015, the same, and on and on. Nearly 20 years of experience has shown us that the current security situation only confirms that just one more year of fighting in Afghanistan is not a solution, but a recipe for being there indefinitely. It's up to the Afghans to make the decision about the future of their country. Others are more direct. Their argument is that we should stay with the Afghans and Afghanistan indefinitely. In doing so they point to the fact that we we have not taken losses in this last year. So they claim that the cost of just maintaining the status quo is minimal. 9:19 President Biden: But that ignores the reality, and the facts that already presented on the ground in Afghanistan when I took office. The Taliban is at its strongest militarily since 2001. The number of US forces in Afghanistan had been reduced to a bare minimum. And the United States and the last administration made an agreement that they have to with the Taliban remove all our forces by May 1 of this year. That's what I inherited. That agreement was the reason the Taliban had ceased major attacks against US forces. 9:55 President Biden: If in April, I had instead announced that the United States was going to go back on that agreement, made by the last administration, the United States and allied forces will remain in Afghanistan for the foreseeable future, the Taliban would have again begun to target our forces. The status quo was not an option. Staying would have meant US troops taking casualties, American men and women back in the middle of a civil war, and we would run the risk of having to send more troops back in Afghanistan to defend our remaining troops. Once that agreement with the Taliban had been made, staying with a bare minimum force was no longer possible. 10:34 President Biden: So let me ask those who want us to stay: how many more? How many 1000s more Americans' daughters and sons are you willing to risk? How long would you have them stay? Already we have members of our military whose parents fought in Afghanistan 20 years ago. Would you send their children and their grandchildren as well? Would you send your own son or daughter? After 20 years, a trillion dollars spent training and equipping hundreds of 1000s of Afghan National Security and Defence Forces. 2,448 Americans killed, 20,722 more wounded, and untold 1000s coming home with unseen trauma to their mental health. I will not send another generation of Americans to war in Afghanistan with no reasonable expectation of achieving a different outcome. 11:51 President Biden: Today the terrorist threat has metastasized beyond Afghanistan. So, we are repositioning our resources and adapting our counterterrorism posture to meet the threats where they are now: significantly higher in South Asia, the Middle East and Africa. 12:07 President Biden: But make no mistake, our military and intelligence leaders are confident they have the capabilities to protect the homeland and our interests from any resurgent terrorist challenge emerging or emanating from Afghanistan. We're developing a counterterrorism over-the-horizon capability that will allow us to keep our eyes firmly fixed at any direct threat to the United States in the region and act quickly and decisively if needed. 12:38 President Biden: We also need to focus on shoring up America's core strengths to meet the strategic competition competition with China and other nations that is really going to determine our future. 14:58 Reporter: Is the Taliban takeover of Afghanistan now inevitable? President Biden: No. It is not. Because you have the Afghan troops, 300,000. Well equipped, as well equipped as any army in the world, and an air force against something like 75,000 Taliban. It is not inevitable. 15:45 President Biden: Do I trust the Taliban? No, but I trust the capacity of the Afghan military who is better trained, better equipped, and more competent in terms of conducting war. 18:07 Reporter: Your own intelligence community has assessed that the Afghan government will likely collapse President Biden: That is not true 18:53 President Biden: And I want to make clear what I made clear to Ghani, that we are not going to walk away and not sustain their ability to maintain that force. We are. We're going to also work to make sure we help them in terms of everything from food necessities and other things in the region. But there is not a conclusion that in fact, they cannot defeat the Taliban. I believe the only way there's going to be -- this is now Joe Biden, not the intelligence community -- the only way there's only going to be peace and secure in Afghanistan, is that they work out a modus vivendi with the Taliban, and they make a judgement as to how they can make peace. And the likelihood there's going to be one unified government in Afghanistan, controlling the whole country is highly unlikely. 21:30 Reporter: Mr. President, how serious was the corruption among the Afghanistan government to this mission failing there? President Biden: First of all, the mission hasn't failed yet. 22:00 President Biden: There were going to be negotiations between the Taliban and the Afghan national security forces, and the Afghan government that didn't come to fruition. So the question now is where do they go from here? The jury is still out, but the likelihood there's going to be the Taliban overrunning everything and owning the whole country is highly unlikely. 23:20 Reporter: Mr. President, "speed is safety," as you just said in your remarks. Are you satisfied with the timeline of relocating Afghan nationals? Is it happening quickly enough to your satisfaction if it may not happen until next month at the end? President Biden: It has already happened, there have already been people, about 1000 people have gotten on aircraft and come to the United States already on commercial aircraft. So as I said, there's over 2500 people, that as from January to now, have have gotten those visas and only half decided that they wanted to leave. The point is that I think the whole process has to be speeded up -- period -- in terms of being able to get these visas. Reporter: Why can't the US evacuate these Afghan translators to the United States to await their visa processing as some immigrants of the southern border have been allowed to? President Biden: Because the law doesn't allow that to happen. And that's why we're asking the Congress to consider changing the law. President Biden Remarks on Afghanistan Strategy Transcript April 14, 2021 Sound Clips 00:38 President Biden: I'm speaking to you today from the Roosevelt -- the Treaty room in the White House -- the same spot where in October of 2001, President George W. Bush informed our nation that the United States military had begun strikes on terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. It was just weeks, just weeks after the terrorist attack on our nation that killed 2,977 innocent souls, that turned Lower Manhattan into a disaster area, destroyed parts of the Pentagon and made hallowed ground in a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, and sparked an American promise that we would never forget. We went to Afghanistan in 2001, to root out al Qaeda to prevent future terrorist attacks against the United States planned from Afghanistan. Our objective was clear, the cause was just, our NATO allies and partners rallied beside us. And I supported that military action along with the overwhelming majority of the members of Congress. More than seven years later, in 2008 weeks before we swore the oath of office -- President Obama and I were about to swear -- President Obama asked me to travel to Afghanistan and report back on the state of the war in Afghanistan. I flew to Afghanistan to the Kunar Valley, a rugged, mountainous region on the border of Pakistan. What I saw on that trip reinforced my conviction that only the Afghans have the right and responsibility to lead their country. And that more and endless American military force could not create or sustain a durable Afghan Government. I believed that our presence in Afghanistan should be focused on the reason we went in the first place: to ensure Afghanistan would not be used as a base from which to attack our homeland again. We did that, we accomplished that objective. I said, along with others, we would follow Osama bin Laden to the gates of hell if need be. That's exactly what we did. And we got him. It took us close to 10 years to put President Obama's commitment into form. And that's exactly what happened Osama bin Laden was gone. That was 10 years ago. Think about that. We delivered justice to Bin Laden a decade ago. And we've stayed in Afghanistan for a decade since. Since then, our reasons for remaining in Afghanistan have become increasingly unclear, even as the terrorist threat that we went to fight evolved. Over the past 20 years, the threat has become more dispersed, metastasizing around the globe. Al Shabaab in Somalia, Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, on Al Nusra in Syria, ISIS attempting to create a caliphate in Syria and Iraq and establishing affiliates in multiple countries in Africa and Asia. With the terror threat now in many places, keeping 1000s of troops grounded and concentrated in just one country at a cost of billions each year makes little sense to me and our leaders. We cannot continue the cycle of extending or expanding our military presence in Afghanistan, hoping to create ideal conditions for the withdraw and expecting a different result. I'm now the fourth United States President to preside over American troop presence in Afghanistan: two Republicans, two Democrats. I will not pass this responsibility on to a fifth. After consulting closely with our allies and partners, with our military leaders and intelligence personnel, with our diplomats and our development experts, with the Congress and the Vice President, as well as with Mr. Ghani and many others around the world. I concluded that it's time to end America's longest war. It's time for American troops to come home. 5:01 President Biden: When I came to office, I inherited a diplomatic agreement, duly negotiated between the government of the United States and the Taliban, that all US forces would be out of Afghanistan by May 1 2021, just three months after my inauguration. That's what we inherited. That commitment is perhaps not what I would have negotiated myself, but it was an agreement made by the United States government. And that means something. So in keeping with that agreement, and with our national interest, the United States will begin our final withdrawal beginning on May 1 of this year. 8:11 President Biden: You all know that less than 1% of Americans serve in our Armed Forces. The remaining 99%, we owe them. We owe them. They've never backed down from a single mission that we've asked of them. I've witnessed their bravery firsthand during my visits to Afghanistan. They've never wavered in their resolve. They paid a tremendous price on our behalf and they have the thanks of a grateful nation. The Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) High-Risk List Center for Strategic and International Studies Transcript March 10, 2021 Speaker: John Sopko - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction Sound Clips 7:40 John Sopko: But right now, that state is under threat. In the wake of the February 2020 withdrawal agreement, all is not well. Compromise appears in short supply on either side. Taliban attacks have actually increased since the agreement was signed. Assassination of prominent officials, activists, journalists, aid workers and others have also increased, including an unsuccessful attack on one of the female members of the peace negotiating team. And the Taliban offensive on Kandahar city last October, as peace negotiations were ongoing, may well have succeeded, were it not for U.S. air support. Peace talks between the Afghan government and the Taliban have achieved little for Afghanistan so far, and only time will tell as to whether the new Biden administration initiative will bear fruit. And the Afghan people's fears for its own government survival are exacerbated by the knowledge of how dependent their country is on foreign military and financial support. 12:56 John Sopko: Another equally serious threat to Afghanistan's stability has also largely been ignored as we focus on the boots on the ground in Afghanistan. And that is the provision of last year's U.S.-Taliban agreement that stipulates that in addition to the departure of U.S. and coalition troops, or non-diplomatic civilian personnel: private security contractors, trainers, advisors, and supporting service personnel also must leave the country by May 1. Should this come to passSIGAR and many others believe this may be more devastating to the effectiveness of the Afghan security forces than the withdrawal of our remaining troops. Why is that? Because the Afghan government relies heavily on these foreign contractors and trainers to function. In the first quarter of fiscal year 2021 there are over 18,000 Defense Department contractors in Afghanistan, including 6000 Americans, and 7,000 3rd country nationals, 40% of whom are responsible for logistics, maintenance, or training tasks. Now, it is well known that the Afghan security forces need these contractors to maintain their equipment, manage supply chains, and train their military and police to operate the advanced equipment that we have purchased for them. For example, as of December, the Afghan National Army was completing just under 20% of its own maintenance work orders, well below the goal of 80% that was set and the 51% that they did in 2018. So that's actually going down. The Afghan National Police were just as bad if not worse, undertaking only 12% of their own maintenance work against a target of 35% and less than the 16% that we reported in our 2019 high risk list. Additionally, and more troubling. The Department of Defense does train, advise and assist command air, or commonly called TAC air recently reported that since late 2019, they have reduced their personnel in Afghanistan by 94%, and that the military drawdown now requires near total use of contract support to maintain the Afghan Air fleet. They assess that quote “further drawdown in the associated closure basis will effectively end all in country aviation training contracts in Afghanistan.” Again, why is this significant? Why do we view this as a high risk? Namely because contractors currently provide 100% of the maintenance for the Afghan Air Force, UAE 60 helicopters and CE 130 cargo aircraft and a significant portion of Afghans Light Combat Support aircraft. TAC air this January gave a bleak assessment, namely, that no Afghan airframe can be sustained as combat effective for more than a few months in the absence of contractor support. 17:51 John Sopko: Continued funding for U.S. reconstruction programs aimed at promoting economic development, rule of law, respect for human rights, good governance and security for the Afghan people may be more significant, because it may be the primary lever left for the US and other donors to influence that country. It appears that even the Taliban understand Afghanistan's dire need for foreign assistance. Because, as one of the few commitments that the US had to make last year was, “to seek economic cooperation for reconstruction, with the new post settlement, Afghan Islamic government.” Now how much the donor community wishes to stay involved will of course depend on what that government looks like and how it behaves. Numerous officials, including then Secretary of State Pompeo and Ambassador Halley, have stated that the US will be able to advance its human rights goals, including the rights of women and girls with the Taliban by leveraging or conditioning this much needed financial assistance. But unfortunately, as SIGAR has long reported, even when conditionality involved only dealing with the Afghan government, donors do not have a stellar record of successfully utilizing that conditionality to influence Afghan behavior. 27:19 John Sopko: Today our report suggests the donor community should realize the Afghan government is focused on a single goal, its survival. Afghanistan is more dependent on international support than ever before. It may not be an overstatement that if foreign assistance is withdrawn and peace negotiations fail, Taliban forces could be at the gates of Kabul in short order. Hearing: A PATHWAY FOR PEACE IN AFGHANISTAN: EXAMINING THE FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE AFGHANISTAN STUDY GROUP House Committee on Oversight and Reform: Subcommittee on National Security February 19, 2021 Testimony was heard from the following Afghanistan Study Group officials: Kelly A. Ayotte, Co-Chair; News Corp Board of Directors since April 2017 BAE Systems Board of Directors since June 2017 Blackstone Board of Directors Boston Properties Board of Directors Caterpillar Board of Directors Board of Advisors at Cirtronics General Joseph F. Dunford, Jr. (Retired), Co-Chair Former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the Obama and Trump presidencies. Lockheed Martin Board of Directors since February 2020 Nancy Lindborg, Co-Chair President and CEO of the David Lucile Packard Foundation Former President and CEO of the US Institute for Peace Former Assistant Administrator for the bureau for democracy conflict and humanitarian assistance at USAID During the mid-Obama years. Sound Clips 3:13 Rep. Stephen Lynch (MA): I'd also like to take a moment to thank the nonpartisan US Institute of Peace for the support and expertise they provided to the study group during the course of its work. 3:23 Rep. Stephen Lynch (MA): In the fiscal year 2020 omnibus bill Congress led by Senator Graham Senator Patrick Leahy and the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee of state foreign ops and related programs. They tasked the independent and bipartisan Afghanistan study group to quote, consider the implications of a peace settlement or the failure to reach a settlement on US policy, resources and commitments in Afghanistan. After nearly nine months of review and consultation with current and former US and Afghan government officials, allies and partners and other key stakeholders, the Afghanistan study group issued its final report earlier this month. 15:12 Kelly Ayotte: We recommend that US troops remain beyond may 1. We believe a precipitous withdrawal of US and international troops in May, would be catastrophic for Afghanistan, leading to civil war, and allow the reconstitution of terror groups which threaten the United States within an 18 to 36 month period. 15:41 Kelly Ayotte: Let me be clear, although we recommend that our troops remain beyond may 1, we propose a new approach toward Afghanistan, which aligns our policies, practices and messaging across the United States government to support the Afghan peace process, rather than prosecute a war. Our troops would remain not to fight a forever war, but to guarantee the conditions for a successful peace process and to protect our national security interests to ensure that Afghanistan does not become a haven again, for terrorists who threaten the United States of America. 37:15 General Joseph F. Dunford: Do we need to increase forces if the Taliban don't accept an extension past the first of May, and if they then would re initiate attacks against US forces? and Chairman, we heard exactly what you heard. In the fall. What we were told by commanders on the ground in the department of fence was that 4500 US forces, in addition to the NATO forces that are there was the minimum level to address both the mission as well as protection of our forces in the context of the conditions that existed in the fall in as you've highlighted, those conditions have only gotten worse since the fall so in in our judgment 2500 would not be adequate. Should the Taliban re initiate attacks against the United States Hearing: Examining the Trump Administration's Afghanistan Strategy House Committee on Oversight and Reform, Subcommittee on National Security January 28, 2020 Witness: John Sopko - Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) Sound Clips 48:54 John Sopko: We've almost created a system that forces people in the government to give happy talk success stories because they're over there on very short rotations. They want to show success. The whole system is almost geared to give you, and it goes up the chain of command, all the way to the President sometimes. He gets bad information from people out in the field because somebody on a nine month rotation, he has to show success, and that goes up. 54:24 John Sopko: Maybe incentivize honesty. And one of the proposals I gave at that time,be cause I was asked by the staff to come up with proposals, is put the same requirement on the government that we impose on publicly traded corporations. Publicly traded corporations have to tell the truth. Otherwise the SEC will indict the people involved. They have to report when there's a significant event. So put that onus, call it The Truth in Government Act if you want, that you in the administration are duty bound by statute to alert Congress to significant events that could directly negatively impact a program or process. So incentivize honesty. 1:10:25 John Sopko: Over 70% of the Afghan budget comes from the United States and the donors. If that money ended, I have said before and I will stand by it, then the Afghan government will probably collapse. Wartime Contracting Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs September 21, 2011 Witnesses: Charles Tiefer: Commissioner on the Commission on Wartime Contracting Clark Kent Ervin: Commissioner on the Commission on Wartime Contracting Sound Clips 1:11:30 Charles Tiefer: Our private security in Afghanistan appears to be a major source of payoffs to the Taliban. Our report has the first official statement that it's the second-largest source of money for the Taliban. Sen. Carl Levin: After drugs. Charles Tiefer: After drugs, that's right. 1:25:18 Clark Kent Ervin: It's critical that the government have a choice, and that means that there needs to be at least a small and expandable, organic capacity on the part of these three agencies to perform missions themselves, so the next time there's a contingency, the government has a choice between going with contractors and going in-house and the determination can be made whether it's more effective to do it either way, whether it's cheaper to do it either way. As we said at the inception, right now the government doesn't have an option. Contractors are the default option because they're the only option. President George W. Bush announces U.S. Military Strikes on Afghanistan October 7, 2001 President George W. Bush: Good afternoon. On my orders, the United States military has begun strikes against Al-Qaeda terrorist training camps and military installations of the Taliban regime in Afghanistan. These carefully targeted actions are designed to disrupt the use of Afghanistan as a terrorist base of operations and to attack the military capability of the Taliban regime. More than two weeks ago, I gave Taliban leaders a series of clear and specific demands: close terrorist training camps, hand over leaders of the Al-Qaeda network, and return all foreign nationals including American citizens unjustly detained in your country. None of these demands were met and now the Taliban will pay a price by destroying camps and disrupting communications. We will make it more difficult for the terror network to train new recruits and coordinate their evil plans. ** International Campaign Against Terrorism Senate Foreign Relations Committee October 25, 2001 Witness: Colin Powell: Secretary of State Sound Clip 27:00 Colin Powell: Our work in Afghanistan though, is not just of a military nature. We recognize that when the Al Qaeda organization has been destroyed in Afghanistan, and as we continue to try to destroy it in all the nations in which it exists around the world, and when the Taliban regime has gone to its final reward, we need to put in place a new government in Afghanistan, one that represents all the people of Afghanistan and one that is not dominated by any single powerful neighbor, but instead is dominated by the will of the people of Afghanistan. Executive Producer Recommendations Elect Stephanie Gallardo 2022 Krystal Kyle and Friends. August 21, 2021. “Episode 35 Audio with Matthew Hoh.” Cover Art Design by Only Child Imaginations Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)
This year marks 20 years since the September 11, 2001 terror attacks on the United States, the precursor to US-led military operations in Afghanistan, joined by Australia. For the two decades, counter-terrorism and counter-insurgency in theatres far from both the US and Australian mainlands was the dominant, operational focus of the Australia-US alliance. Now both Australia and the United States look to focus the Alliance much closer to Australia, the Australia-US alliance a key element in a network of allies and partners working on a wide array of challenges in the Indo-Pacific. What lessons should both countries take from the twenty years since 9/11 for this next phase of the Australia-US alliance? To explore these questions, the United States Studies Centre hosted USSC Non-Resident Senior Fellow Duncan Lewis AO, DSC, CSC and General David H. Petraeus (US Army, Retired). Both held senior leadership roles in uniform and in civilian life during the post-9/11 conflicts and are uniquely well placed to discuss this topic. Moderating the conversation was USSC Visiting Senior Fellow Jane Hardy, whose most recent posting was as the most senior Australian civilian representative at INDOPACOM in Honolulu. Duncan Lewis rose to the rank of Major General in the Australian Army and was appointed the inaugural commander of Australian Special Operations in January 2001. In civilian life, Lewis served as National Security Adviser in the Rudd government (2008-2011), Secretary of the Department of Defence (2011-2012) and Director-General of Security (2014-2019) under Coalition governments. He joined the United States Studies Centre as Non-Resident Fellow earlier this year. David Petraeus served in the US Army for 37 years, with leadership roles including serving as commanding general, Multi-National Force - Iraq (2007-2008), US Central Command (2008-2010) and commander of the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from 2010-11. He served as Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (2011-12) during the presidency of Barack Obama. In 2009, Petraeus was awarded an honorary Order of Australia.
With the US and its allies out of Afghanistan, there's no real contest for power anymore. But the next challenge facing the Taliban is arguably even greater, albeit in a different way: how to run a country. Today on The Signal, major aid donors have frozen their support, and many public officials have fled the country or gone into hiding. So do the Taliban actually have the resources and know-how to run Afghanistan? And if they don't, where does that leave the Afghan people? Featured: Dr Greg Mills, Director, Brenthurst Foundation, Johannesburg, and former advisor to International Security Assistance Force, Afghanistan
Shownotes:(0:01) Highlights of the episode(0:01)- A lot of what we do is to be like someone we admire or individuals we admire, and that's what prompted that decision.(0:10)- There are very, very bright people in the world who don't see it at all the same way that I do, or that many in uniform way.(0:17)- People who don't seem to see the world the same way you do can still be exceedingly bright, and exceedingly well informed.(0:25)- Cyberspace is a new entire domain of warfare without question.(1:01) A brief introduction to General David Petraeus General Petraeus, has served in the US military for 37 years, including tours in cold war Europe, United States, Central America, Heidi, Bosnia, Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the greater Middle East. He culminated his military service with six consecutive commands as a general officer, five of which were in combat, including command of the 101st Airborne Division, Air Assault during the fight to Baghdad, and the first year in Iraq multinational security transition command Iraq over 15 subsequent months multinational forces Iraq during the surge from February 2007, to September 2008. US Central Command from 2008 to 2010, and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from 2010 to 2011. General Petraeus graduated with distinction from the US Military Academy, subsequently earned a Ph.D. from Princeton University, and has held academic appointments at six universities. He has received numerous US military State Department, NATO, and UN medals, including four Defence Distinguished Service Medals, the Bronze Star Medal for valor, and the Combat Action Badge and he has been decorated by 13 foreign countries. Following his service in the military, General Petraeus served as the director of the CIA, leading the agency through a period that saw significant achievements in the global counterterrorism effort, development of a strategic plan for the agency, and an initiative to increase worldwide human intelligence coverage. General Petraeus joined KKR in June, June 2013, as chairman of the KKR Global Institute, he went on to become a partner at KKR in December 2014. The Global Institute supports the KKR investment process and KKR portfolio companies with analysis of geopolitical macroeconomic, environmental, social, and governance issues. General Petraeus is also a member of the board of directors at successful companies like optive and onestream. General Petraeus is also a successful venture capitalist himself, a visiting fellow at Yale University's Jackson center, and an honorary professor of international security at the University of Birmingham, England. (3:44) Question 1 -Can you just recall a few incidents which may have had a significant impact on you, the direction of your career, any mentor you met, any meetings, chance meetings that you had?(4:03) General David Petraeus talks about what inspired him to join the military, and shares stories that profoundly affected his life. He shares his experiences of working with people who had different opinions than him, and how that opened up his perspective.He also shares the incident of him getting shot.(18:25) Question 2-Going into combat going into the rSupport the show (https://tetranoodle.com)
United Nations Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325 on Women, Peace, and Security (WPS) recognized the disproportionate impact of violent conflict on women and girls and the critical role that women play in peace and security processes. Passed in October 2000, UNSCR 1325 called for strategies to protect women and girls in conflict, and to engage women in all mechanisms, at all levels, and in all stages of conflict. Today, the WPS Agenda is a legal and political framework for gender in international security that is based on four pillars for policy-making: prevention, protection, participation, and relief and recovery. Implementation is usually measured in each of these four pillars. The United Nations Security Council has passed nine additional resolutions since 2000, which have updated WPS's concepts and definitions, and reinforced the continuing importance of UNSCR 1325. Together, these resolutions and an emerging set of global norms guide the work of security organizations like NATO, steering them toward gender equality and the promotion of women's participation, protection, and equal rights under law. On this episode of the NATO 20/2020 podcast, Ms. Cori Lynne Fleser, a National Security Policy Analyst for Booz Allen Hamilton, joins to discuss ongoing efforts to implement the Women, Peace, and Security agenda, what progress has been made, and what challenges remain. Key Takeaways: 0:00 Intro 1:23 Teri summarizes the Security Council resolution 1325, what it is, when it was passed and reasons why it was created 2:36 Cori talks about where people thought we would be now after resolution 1325 was passed 21 years ago and where we are now 4:19 Cori talks about the progress has been made and what has changed since 2000 after the resolution 1325 was passed 6:56 Cori talks about security sector institutions and what Women, Peace and Security is advocating for especially in these institutions 9:14 Cori talks about the importance of having women in the decision making team of an institution and how they can help solve the problem for women in conflict and how Women, Peace and Security agenda helps 10:42 Cori explains if the implementation of awareness about women and the need of women on the institutional side has made any difference on women as the main victims of conflict 13:25 Cori talks about how receptive the defense institutions are to the Women, Peace and Security agenda and what has changed in the past 21 years after the resolution 1325 16:07 Cori talks about how some people are beginning to understand the importance of having a more diverse team of both men and women and the rate of success of these kind of teams 17:21 Cori also talks about if the Trump administration was in support of Women, Peace and Security agenda or if it caused a setback in having diverse teams especially in the security institutions 19:36 Cori talks about why Trumps administration needed to focus more on Women, Peace and Security than the women's participation like it did 21:24 Cori explains if the Afghanistan case is going to be one of the examples brought up as a semi failure with Women, Peace and Security agenda 24:29 Cori explains why there should be women leaders in the military in Afghanistan even is countries with high levels of gender equality don't have women leaders in military 27:49 Cori also explains what NATO should do to have more women in high ranking positions as a role model Shows Mentioned: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/content-series/nato20-2020/listen-to-women/ https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/ Booz Allen Hamilton Holding Corporation is the parent of Booz Allen Hamilton Inc., an American management and information technology consulting firm, headquartered in McLean, Virginia, in Greater Washington, D.C., with 80 other offices around the globe. Resolution 1325 urges all actors to increase the participation of women and incorporate gender perspectives in all United Nations peace and security efforts. The International Security Assistance Force was a NATO-led military mission in Afghanistan, established by the United Nations Security Council in December 2001 by Resolution 1386, as envisaged by the Bonn Agreement. The Taliban, who refer to themselves as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, are a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist political movement and military organization in Afghanistan currently waging war within that country. Quotes Mentioned: “NATO militaries around the world are hierarchical organizations that are really top down driven.” “Diversity of teams helps create different innovative ways to addressing conflict or addressing national security challenges.” “Having more women as well allows us to tailor teams so that we can have appropriate engagement with women that is reflective of some of the constraints on the ground from a cultural perspective.” “Lessons learned are the ones that you can really take and reapply it to other context.” “Having civil military teams that are mixed teams of men and women have proven to be slightly more successful.” “Gender equality is the direction that we're moving as a global community and the security sector plays a role in that.” “Women, Peace and Security uniquely highlight gender as this key component for understanding security.” “It was the Trump administration that signed the Women, Peace and Security legislation from a US perspective.” “Afghanistan is one of the most challenging places to be as a woman or a girl.” “Everybody kind of tackles Women, Peace and Security a little bit more differently based on their own politics and their own socio-cultural context.” “Implementation is everything.” Guests Social Media Links: LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/cori-lynne-fleser-0868b06/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/CoriFleser Website: https://www.nato.int/nato2030/ Website: https://www.boozallen.com/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/profile.php?id=7817341 Disclaimer: This guest is speaking in her personal capacity. Her views do not reflect those of the U.S. Department of Defense or Booz Allen Hamilton.
Welcome to this episode of “Bootstrapping Your Dream Show”. I am Manuj Aggarwal, and I will be having a very interesting conversation with General David Petraeus.Gen. Petraeus served over 37 years in the U.S. military, including tours in Cold War Europe, the United States, Central America, Haiti, Bosnia, Kuwait, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the greater Middle East. He culminated his military service with six consecutive commands as a general officer, five of which were in combat, including command of: the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) during the fight to Baghdad and the first year in Iraq; Multinational Security Transition Command-Iraq over 15 subsequent months; Multi-National Force-Iraq during the Surge from February 2007 to September 2008; U.S. Central Command from 2008 to 2010; and the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan from 2010-2011. Gen. Petraeus graduated with distinction from the U.S. Military Academy, subsequently earned a Ph.D. from Princeton University, and has held academic appointments at six universities. He has received numerous U.S. military, State Dept, NATO, and UN medals, including four Defense Distinguished Service Medals, the Bronze Star Medal for Valor, and the Combat Action Badge, and he has been decorated by 13 foreign countries.Following his service in the military, Gen. Petraeus served as the Director of the CIA, leading the Agency during a period that saw significant achievements in the global counter-terrorism effort, development of a strategic plan for the Agency, and an initiative to increase worldwide human intelligence coverage.General Petraeus joined KKR in June 2013 as Chairman of the KKR Global Institute. He went on to become a Partner at KKR in December 2014. The Global Institute supports the KKR investment process and KKR's portfolio companies with an analysis of geopolitical, macro-economic, environmental, social, and governance issues. General Petraeus is also a member of the board of directors at successful companies like Optiv and OneStream. David is also a successful venture capitalist himself, a Visiting Fellow at Yale University's Jackson Center, and an Honorary Professor of International Security at the University of Birmingham (England).Glad to have you on the show, General Petraeus. Welcome!General David H. Petraeus talks about:(3:08) What prompted him to join the US military academy.(4:11) What he loved about military life.(5:42) His academic life. (9:40) Publicly committing yourself to a particular goal.(11:56) The pivotal role that mentors played in his life. (18:00) Lessons learned in combat. (22:00) Fateful choices and decision making in war. (26:00) How do we end the never-ending wars and maintain peace?(30:20) The future of warfare. (38:00) How a socially distant economy is going to affect business?(43:00) Some valuable lessons learned while working in the private sector and the military sector.(49:24) Causes he's passionate about. Find General David H. Petraeus on: LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/davidpetraeus/Reach us on:Facebook:Support the show (https://tetranoodle.com)