Podcast appearances and mentions of christian democrats

The Non-Prophets take on Texas' latest Christian nationalist push—a bill requiring public schools to display the Ten Commandments. But Rep. James Talarico, a Christian Democrat, is having none of it. In a series of epic takedowns, Talarico grills his colleagues on their hypocrisy, biblical illiteracy, and blatant disregard for the Constitution. The hosts analyze the bill's legal problems, political motives, and the power of standing up for real religious freedom.The Friendly Atheist, “Texas Democrat Exposes GOP Hypocrisy Behind Ten Commandments Bill”By Hemant Mehta, May 28, 2025https://www.friendlyatheist.com/p/texas-democrat-exposes-gop-hypocrisyThe Non-Prophets 24.23.2 with Eli Slack, Kelley Laughlin, and AJTexas Passes Commandments Bill—One Rep Fights Back ✊Rep. Talarico Roasts Hypocrisy with Bible and Constitution

Eliezer Sandberg, former Israeli MK - Selje Udjus and Lilly Kristin, Head Oslo Christian Democrats - MP Humanshu Gilati, Norwegian Parliament - Parliament Commentary (SHORT clip) Oslo, Norway 04/04/2025 2025/05/08 (Radio Air Date) World Ministries International Eagles Saving Nations Dr. Jonathan Hansen - Founder & President Rev. Adalia Hansen worldministries.org Visit our Rumble channel https://rumble.com/c/WarningTVJonathanHansen (360) 629-5248 WMI P.O. Box 277 Stanwood, WA 98292 warning@worldministries.org Visit our website http://www.worldministries.org/ and subscribe to Eagle Saving Nations https://www.worldministries.org/eagles-saving-nations-membership.aspx Sign up for Dr. Hansen's FREE newsletters http://www.worldministries.org/newsletter-signup.html Support Dr. Hansen through your financial gift https://www.worldministries.org/donate.aspx Order Dr. Hansen's book “The Science of Judgment” https://www.store-worldministries.org/the-science-of-judgment.html

I've always been a fan of MMP. And I still am, but there's one thing about it that I do struggle with – the list MPs. I know it took some of us a while to totally understand why we have list MPs. I understand – but I don't necessarily like it. Which is why I thought retiring Labour MP David Parker raised some good points about MMP in his valedictory speech in Parliament. He reckons we should replace it with something else. His preference is the single transferable vote system, and he thinks we should have another referendum to see if people want to stick with the MMP voting system. I don't think we need a referendum because I think most people are happy with it. I am, anyway. Where I am with David Parker is list MPs. He didn't say straight out that he thinks they're a waste of time. That's probably because he's a list MP himself – or he was, anyway. But he thinks that, even if you're a list MP, you should be connected to an electorate. I know you see some list MPs driving around the place with signage on their vehicle saying “so-and-so, so-and-so, your such-and-such MP in wherever you might be”. Example: Tracey McLellan bills herself as a Labour list MP based in Banks Peninsula. But that's just optics. It's just done to make us think that a list MP is just as approachable and interested in their local community as someone specifically elected to represent an area. And I think list MPs have got a big sell job on their hands to convince us of the value they bring. I know they say they work frantically. But how does that stack up when we've got the likes of Prime Minister Christopher Luxon dealing with everything that comes with being PM – plus he's also the MP for Botany. So David Parker is right to be saying that list MPs need to do more than just meat in the room at Parliament when it comes to voting in a pack. I disagree with him though when he says MMP is to blame for polarising people. He says MMP has based politics in New Zealand on identity, but I thought that's what MMP is all about. Because identity politics is when you get a political view based on things like ethnicity, race, nationality, religion, denomination, gender, sexual orientation, social background, political affiliation, caste, age, education, disability, intelligence and social class. My response is: what's so bad about that? It's not as if we didn't have special interest political parties before MMP. We had Christian Heritage and the Christian Democrats. And the Values Party was pretty much an environmental political outfit. Even Social Credit had a particular identity –it wasn't just another mainstream political party. Another thing I disagree with is David Parker's view that MMP is bad because it polarises people. He says under the first-past-the-post system, New Zealand was one of the best countries in the world and that, with MMP, the place was meant to get even better. But he says it hasn't. He says politicians are more divided than ever and New Zealand society is more divided than ever. But I don't think MMP is to blame. People are polarised all over the world – more so after Covid. And there are many different voting systems all over the world. Nevertheless, David Parker thinks MMP has run its course and he reckons it's time to put it to the people and have another referendum to see if we're still happy with MMP, or whether we'd like to change to something else. Even though I've got issues with list MPs, I'm good with the way things are. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Will Bain hears from Germany where Friedrich Merz has become Chancellor - after unexpectedly suffering a setback in the first round of voting in Parliament. His party ,the Christian Democrats, have agreed a coalition with the centre-left Social Democrats, promising a responsible and stable administration that'll boost Germany's stagnant economy. The UK and India have announced a free trade deal after years of negotiations, which the British prime minister Kier Starmer called a historic day for both countries. Canada's Prime Minister, Mark Carney, is set to sit down with President Trump to discuss easing some of their trade tensions. OpenAI, the parent of artificial intelligence service ChatGPT, has announced a new governance plan after a bitter power struggle over the business and criticisms from the world's richest man, Elon Musk.

I've been in London this week talking to America watchers about the current situation in the United States. First up is Edmund Fawcett, the longtime Economist correspondent in DC and historian of both liberalism and conservatism. Fawcett argues that Trump's MAGA movement represents a kind of third way between liberalism and conservatism - a version of American populism resurrected for our anti-globalist early 21st century. He talks about how economic inequality fuels Trumpism, with middle-class income shares dropping while the wealthy prosper. He critiques both what he calls right-wing intellectual "kitsch" and the left's lack of strategic vision beyond its dogma of identity politics. Lacking an effective counter-narrative to combat Trumpism, Fawcett argues, liberals require not only sharper messaging but also a reinvention of what it means to be modern in our globalized age of resurrected nationalism. 5 Key Takeaways* European reactions to Trump mix shock with recognition that his politics have deep American roots.* Economic inequality (declining middle-class wealth) provides the foundation for Trump's political appeal.* The American left lacks an effective counter-narrative and strategic vision to combat Trumpism.* Both right-wing intellectualism and left-wing identity politics suffer from forms of "kitsch" and American neurosis.* The perception of America losing its position as the embodiment of modernity creates underlying anxiety. Full TranscriptAndrew Keen: Hello everybody, we are in London this week, looking westward, looking at the United States, spending some time with some distinguished Englishmen, or half-Englishmen, who have spent a lot of their lives in the United States, and Edmund Fawcett, former Economist correspondent in America, the author of a number of important books, particularly, Histories of Liberalism and Conservatism, is remembering America, Edmund. What's your first memory of America?Edmund Fawcett: My first memory of America is a traffic accident on Park Avenue, looking down as a four-year-old from our apartment. I was there from the age of two to four, then again as a school child in Washington for a few years when my father was working. He was an international lawyer. But then, after that, back in San Francisco, where I was a... I kind of hacked as an editor for Straight Arrow Press, which was the publishing arm of Rolling Stone. This was in the early 70s. These were the, it was the end of the glory days of Haight-Ashbury, San Francisco, the anti-war movement in Vietnam. It was exciting. A lot was going on, a lot was changing. And then not long after that, I came back to the U.S. for The Economist as their correspondent in Washington. That was in 1976, and I stayed there until 1983. We've always visited. Our son and grandson are American. My wife is or was American. She gave up her citizenship last year, chiefly for practical reasons. She said I would always feel American. But our regular visits have ended, of course. Being with my background, my mother was American, my grandfather was American. It is deeply part of my outlook, it's part of my world and so I am always very interested. I read quite a bit of the American press, not just the elite liberal press, every day. I keep an eye on through Real Clear Politics, which has got a very good sort of gazetteer. It's part of my weather.Andrew Keen: Edmund, I know you can't speak on behalf of Europe, but I'm going to ask a dumb question. Maybe you'll give me a smarter answer than the question. What's the European, the British take on what's happening in America? What's happened in this first quarter of 2025?Edmund Fawcett: I think a large degree of shock and horror, that's just the first reaction. If you'll allow me a little space, I think then there's a second reaction. The first reaction is shock and terror, with good reason, and nobody likes being talked to in the way that Vance talked to them, ignorantly and provocatively about free speech, which he feels he hasn't really thought hard enough about, and besides, it was I mean... Purely commercial, in largely commercial interest. The Europeans are shocked by the American slide from five, six, seven decades of internationalism. Okay, American-led, but still internationalist, cooperative, they're deeply shocked by that. And anybody who cares, as many Europeans do, about the texture, the caliber of American democracy and liberalism, are truly shocked by Trump's attacks on the courts, his attacks on the universities, his attack on the press.Andrew Keen: You remember, of course, Edmund, that famous moment in Casablanca where the policeman said he was shocked, truly shocked when of course he wasn't. Is your shock for real? Your... A good enough scholar of the United States to understand that a lot of the stuff that Trump is bringing to the table isn't new. We've had an ongoing debate in the show about how authentically American Trump is, whether he is the F word fascist or whether he represents some other indigenous strain in US political culture. What's your take?Edmund Fawcett: No, and that's the response to the shock. It's when you look back and see this Trump is actually deeply American. There's very little new here. There's one thing that is new, which I'll come to in a moment, and that returns the shock, but the shock is, is to some extent absorbed when Europeans who know about this do reflect that Trump is deeply American. I mean, there is a, he likes to cite McKinley, good, okay, the Republicans were the tariff party. He likes to say a lot of stuff that, for example, the populist Tom Watson from the South, deeply racist, but very much speaking for the working man, so long as he was a white working man. Trump goes back to that as well. He goes back in the presidential roster. Look at Robert Taft, competitor for the presidency against Eisenhower. He lost, but he was a very big voice in the Republican Party in the 1940s and 50s. Robert Taft, Jr. didn't want to join NATO. He pushed through over Truman's veto, the Taft-Hartley bill that as good as locked the unions out, the trade unions out of much of the part of America that became the burgeoning economic America, the South and the West. Trump is, sorry, forgive me, Taft, was in many ways as a hard-right Republican. Nixon told Kissinger, professors are the enemy. Reagan gave the what was it called? I forget the name of the speech that he gave in endorsing Barry Goldwater at the 1964 Republican Convention. This in a way launched the new Republican assault on liberal republicanism. Rockefeller was the loser. Reagan, as it were, handed the palm to Rocket Goldwater. He lost to Johnson, but the sermon they were using, the anti-liberal went into vernacular and Trump is merely in a way echoing that. If you were to do a movie called Trump, he would star, of course, but somebody who was Nixon and Reagan's scriptwright, forgive me, somebody who is Nixon and Reagan's Pressman, Pat Buchanan, he would write the script of the Trump movie. Go back and read, look at some of Pat Buchanan's books, some of his articles. He was... He said virtually everything that Trump says. America used to be great, it is no longer great. America has enemies outside that don't like it, that we have nothing to do with, we don't need allies, what we want is friends, and we have very few friends in the world. We're largely on our, by our own. We're basically a huge success, but we're being betrayed. We're being ignored by our allies, we're being betrayed by friends inside, and they are the liberal elite. It's all there in Pat Buchanan. So Trump in that way is indeed very American. He's very part of the history. Now, two things. One is... That Trump, like many people on the hard right in Europe, is to some extent, a neurotic response to very real complaints. If you would offer a one chart explanation of Trumpism, I don't know whether I can hold it up for the camera. It's here. It is actually two charts, but it is the one at the top where you see two lines cross over. You see at the bottom a more or less straight line. What this does is compare the share of income in 1970 with the share of the income more or less now. And what has happened, as we are not at all surprised to learn, is that the poor, who are not quite a majority but close to the actual people in the United States, things haven't changed for them much at all. Their life is static. However, what has changed is the life for what, at least in British terms, is called the middle classes, the middle group. Their share of income and wealth has dropped hugely, whereas the share of the income and wealth of the top has hugely risen. And in economic terms, that is what Trumpism is feeding off. He's feeding off a bewildered sense of rage, disappointment, possibly envy of people who looked forward, whose parents looked forward to a great better life, who they themselves got a better life. They were looking forward to one for their children and grandchildren. And now they're very worried that they're not those children and grandchildren aren't going to get it. So socially speaking, there is genuine concern, indeed anger that Trump is speaking to. Alas, Trump's answers are, I would say, and I think many Europeans would agree, fantasies.Andrew Keen: Your background is also on the left, your first job was at the New Left Reviews, you're all too familiar with Marxist language, Marxist literature, ways of thinking about what we used to call late-stage capitalism, maybe we should rename it post-late-stage-capitalism. Is it any surprise, given your presentation of the current situation in America, which is essentially class envy or class warfare, but the right. The Bannonites and many of the others on the right fringes of the MAGA movement have picked up on Lenin and Gramsci and the old icons of class warfare.Edmund Fawcett: No, I don't think it is. I think that they are these are I mean, we live in a world in which the people in politics and in the press in business, they've been to universities, they've read an awful lot of books, they spend an awful lot of time studying dusty old books like the ones you mentioned, Gramsci and so. So they're, to some extent, forgive me, they are, they're intellectuals or at least they become, they be intellectualized. Lenin called one of his books, What is to be Done. Patrick Deneen, a Catholic right-wing Catholic philosopher. He's one of the leading right-wing Catholic intellectuals of the day, hard right. He named it What is To Be Done. But this is almost kitsch, as it were, for a conservative Catholic intellectual to name a book after Vladimir Lenin, the first Bolshevik leader of the Russian Revolution. Forgive me, I lost the turn.Andrew Keen: You talk about kitsch, Edmund, is this kitsch leftism or is it real leftism? I mean if Trump was Bernie Sanders and a lot of what Trump says is not that different from Sanders with the intellectuals or the few intellectuals left in. New York and San Francisco and Los Angeles, would they be embracing what's happening? Thanks, I've got the third again.Edmund Fawcett: No, you said Kitsch. The publicists and intellectuals who support Trump, there is a Kitsch element to it. They use a lot of long words, they appeal to a lot of authorities. Augustine of Hippo comes into it. This is really kind of intellectual grandstanding. No, what matters? And this comes to the second thing about shock at Trump. The second thing is that there is real social and economic dysfunction here that the United States isn't really coping with. I don't think the Trumpites, I don't think the rather kitschy intellectuals who are his mature leaders. I don't think they so much matter. What I think matters here is, put it this way, is the silence of the left. And this is one of the deep problems. I mean, always with my friends, progressive friends, liberal friends, it's terribly easy to throw rocks at Trump and scorn his cheerleaders but we always have to ask ourselves why are they there and we're here and the left at the moment doesn't really have an answer to that. The Democrats in the United States they're strangely silent. And it's not just, as many people say, because they haven't dared to speak up. It's not that, it's a question of courage. It's an intellectual question of lacking some strategic sense of where the country is and what kinds of policy would help get it to a better place. This is very bleak, and that's part of, underlies the sense of shock, which we come back to with Trump after we tell ourselves, oh, well, it isn't new, and so on. The sense of shock is, well what is the practical available alternative for the moment? Electorally, Trump is quite weak, he wasn't a landslide, he got fewer percentage than Jimmy Carter did. The balance in the in the congress is quite is quite slight but again you could take false comfort there. The problem with liberals and progressives is they don't really have a counter narrative and one of the reasons they don't have a counter-narrative is I don't sense they have any longer a kind of vision of their own. This is a very bleak state of affairs.Andrew Keen: It's a bleak state of affairs in a very kind of surreal way. They're lacking the language. They don't have the words. Do they need to reread the old New Left classics?Edmund Fawcett: I think you've said a good thing. I mean, words matter tremendously. And this is one of Trump's gifts, is that he's able to spin old tropes of the right, the old theme music of the hard right that goes back to late 19th century America, late 19th century Europe. He's brilliant at it. It's often garbled. It's also incoherent. But the intellectuals, particularly liberals and progressives can mishear this. They can miss the point. They say, ah, it doesn't, it's not grammatical. It's incoherent. It is word salad. That's not the point. A paragraph of Trump doesn't make sense. If you were an editor, you'd want to rewrite it, but editors aren't listening. It's people in the crowd who get his main point, and his main point is always expressed verbally. It's very clever. It's hard to reproduce because he's actually a very good actor. However, the left at the moment has nothing. It has neither a vocabulary nor a set of speech makers. And the reason it doesn't have that, it doesn't have the vocabularies, because it doesn't have the strategic vision.Andrew Keen: Yeah, and coming back to the K-word you brought up, kitsch. If anything, the kitsch is on the left with Kamala Harris and her presentation of herself in this kitschification of American immigration. So the left in America, if that's the right word to describe them, are as vulnerable to kitsch as the right.Edmund Fawcett: Yes, and whether it's kitsch or not, I think this is very difficult to talk to on the progressive left. Identity politics does have a lot to answer for. Okay, I'll go for it. I mean, it's an old saying in politics that things begin as a movement, become a campaign, become a lobby, and then end up as a racket. That's putting it much too strongly, but there is an element in identity politics of which that is true. And I think identity politics is a deep problem for liberals, it's a deep problem for progressives because in the end, what identity politics offers is a fragmentation, which is indeed happened on the left, which then the right can just pick off as it chooses. This is, I think, to get back some kind of strategic vision, the left needs to come out of identity politics, it needs to go back to the vision of commonality, the vision of non-discrimination, the mission of true civic equality, which underlay civil rights, great movement, and try to avoid. The way that identity politics is encouraged, a kind of segmentation. There's an interesting parallel between identity politics and Trumpism. I'm thinking of the national element in Trumpism, Make America Great Again. It's rather a shock to see the Secretary of State sitting beside Trump in the room in the White House with a make America it's not a make America great cap but it says Gulf of America this kind of This nationalism is itself neurotic in a way that identity politics has become neurotic.Andrew Keen: Yeah, it's a Linguistic.Edmund Fawcett: Neurosis. Both are neurotic responses to genuine problems.Andrew Keen: Edmund, long-time viewers and listeners to the show know that I often quote you in your wonderful two histories of conservatism and liberalism when you, I'm not sure which of the books, I think it may have been in conservatism. I can't remember myself. You noted that this struggle between the left and the right, between liberalism and conservatives have always be smarter they've always made the first move and it's always been up to the liberals and of course liberalism and the left aren't always the same thing but the left or progressives have always been catching up with conservatives so just to ask this question in terms of this metaphorical chess match has anything changed. It's always been the right that makes the first move, that sets the game up. It has recently.Edmund Fawcett: Let's not fuss too much with the metaphor. I think it was, as it were, the Liberals made the first move for decades, and then, more or less in our lifetimes, it has been the right that has made the weather, and the left has been catching up. Let's look at what happened in the 1970s. In effect. 30-40 years of welfare capitalism in which the state played ever more of a role in providing safety nets for people who were cut short by a capitalistic economy. Politics turned its didn't entirely reject that far from it but it is it was said enough already we've reached an end point we're now going to turn away from that and try to limit the welfare state and that has been happening since the 1970s and the left has never really come up with an alternative if you look at Mitterrand in France you look at Tony Blair new Labor in you look at Clinton in the United States, all of them in effect found an acceptably liberal progressive way of repackaging. What the right was doing and the left has got as yet no alternative. They can throw rocks at Trump, they can resist the hard right in Germany, they can go into coalition with the Christian Democrats in order to resist the hard right much as in France but they don't really have a governing strategy of their own. And until they do, it seems to me, and this is the bleak vision, the hard right will make the running. Either they will be in government as they are in the United States, or they'll be kept just out of government by unstable coalitions of liberal conservatives and the liberal left.Andrew Keen: So to quote Patrick Deneen, what is to be done is the alternative, a technocracy, the best-selling book now on the New York Times bestseller list is Ezra Klein, Derek Thompson's Abundance, which is a progressive. Technocratic manifesto for changing America. It's not very ideological. Is that really the only alternative for the left unless it falls into a Bernie Sanders-style anti-capitalism which often is rather vague and problematic?Edmund Fawcett: Well, technocracy is great, but technocrats never really get to do what they say ought to be done, particularly not in large, messy democracies like Europe and the United States. Look, it's a big question. If I had a Leninist answer to Patrick Deneen's question, what is to be done, I'd be very happy to give it. I feel as somebody on the liberal left that the first thing the liberal left needs to do is to is two things. One is to focus in exposing the intellectual kitschiness, the intellectual incoherence on the one hand of the hard right, and two, hitting back in a popular way, in a vulgar way, if you will, at the lies, misrepresentations, and false appeals that the hard-right coasts on. So that's really a kind of public relations. It's not deep strategy or technocracy. It is not a policy list. It's sharpening up the game. Of basically of democratic politics and they need to liberals on the left need to be much tougher much sharper much more vulgar much more ready to use the kinds of weapons the kinds of mockery and imaginative invention that the Trumpites use that's the first thing the second thing is to take a breath and go back and look at the great achievements of democratic liberalism of the 1950s, 60s, 70s if you will. I mean these were these produced in Europe and the United States societies that by any historical standard are not bad. They have terrible problems, terrible inequities, but by any historical standard and indeed by any comparative standard, they're not bad if you ask yourself why immigration has become such a problem in Western Europe and the United States, it's because these are hugely desirable places to live in, not just because they're rich and make a comfortable living, which is the sort of the rights attitude, because basically they're fairly safe places to live. They're fairly good places for your kids to grow up in. All of these are huge achievements, and it seems to me that the progressives, the liberals, should look back and see how much work was needed to create... The kinds of politics that underpinned that society, and see what was good, boast of what was and focus on how much work was needed.Andrew Keen: Maybe rather than talking about making America great again, it should be making America not bad. I think that's too English for the United States. I don't think that should be for a winner outside Massachusetts and Maine. That's back to front hypocritical Englishism. Let's end where we began on a personal note. Do you think one of the reasons why Trump makes so much news, there's so much bemusement about him around the world, is because most people associate America with modernity, they just take it for granted that America is the most advanced, the most modern, is the quintessential modern project. So when you have a character like Trump, who's anti-modernist, who is a reactionary, It's bewildering.Edmund Fawcett: I think it is bewildering, and I think there's a kind of bewilderment underneath, which we haven't really spoken to as it is an entirely other subject, but is lurking there. Yes, you put your absolutely right, you put your finger on it, a lot of us look to America as modernity, maybe not the society of the future, but certainly the the culture of the future, the innovations of the future. And I think one of the worrying things, which maybe feeds the neurosis of Make America Great Again, feeds the neurosis, of current American unilateralism, is a fear But modernity, talk like Hegel, has now shifted and is now to be seen in China, India and other countries of the world. And I think underlying everything, even below the stuff that we showed in the chart about changing shares of wealth. I think under that... That is much more worrisome in the United States than almost anything else. It's the sense that the United States isn't any longer the great modern world historical country. It's very troubling, but let's face it, you get have to get used to it.Andrew Keen: The other thing that's bewildering and chilling is this seeming coexistence of technological innovation, the Mark Andreessen's, the the Musk's, Elon Musk's of the world, the AI revolution, Silicon Valley, who seem mostly in alliance with Trump and Musk of course are headed out. The Doge campaign to destroy government or undermine government. Is it conceivable that modernity is by definition, you mentioned Hegel and of course lots of people imagine that history had ended in 1989 but the reverse was true. Is it possible that modernity is by-definition reactionary politically?Edmund Fawcett: A tough one. I mean on the technocracy, the technocrats of Silicon Valley, I think one of their problems is that they're brilliant, quite brilliant at making machines. I'm the machinery we're using right here. They're fantastic. They're not terribly good at. Messy human beings and messy politics. So I'm not terribly troubled by that, nor your other question about it is whether looming challenges of technology. I mean, maybe I could just end with the violinist, Fritz Kreisler, who said, I was against the telegraph, I was against the telephone, I was against television. I'm a progressive when it comes to technology. I'm always against the latest thing. I mean, I don't, there've always been new machines. I'm not terribly troubled by that. It seems to me, you know, I want you to worry about more immediate problems. If indeed AI is going to take over the world, my sense is, tell us when we get there.Andrew Keen: And finally, you were half-born in the United States or certainly from an American and British parent. You spent a lot of your life there and you still go, you follow it carefully. Is it like losing a lover or a loved one? Is it a kind of divorce in your mind with what's happening in America in terms of your own relations with America? You noted that your wife gave up her citizenship this year.Edmund Fawcett: Well, it is. And if I could talk about Natalia, my wife, she was much more American than me. Her mother was American from Philadelphia. She lived and worked in America more than I did. She did give up her American citizenship last year, partly for a feeling of, we use a long word, alienation, partly for practical reasons, not because we're anything like rich enough to pay American tax, but simply the business of keeping up with the changing tax code is very wary and troublesome. But she said, as she did it, she will always feel deeply American, and I think it's possible to say that. I mean, it's part of both of us, and I don't think...Andrew Keen: It's loseable. Well, I have to ask this question finally, finally. Maybe I always use that word and it's never final. What does it mean to feel American?Edmund Fawcett: Well, everybody's gonna have their own answer to that. I was just... What does it mean for you? I'm just reading. What it is to feel American. Can I dodge the question by saying, what is it to feel Californian? Or even what is to be Los Angelino? Where my sister-in-law and brother-in-law live. A great friend said, what it is feel Los Angeles you go over those mountains and you put down your rucksack. And I think what that means is for Europeans, America has always meant leaving the past behind.Edmund Fawcett was the Economist‘s Washington, Paris and Berlin correspondent and is a regular reviewer. His Liberalism: The Life of an Idea was published by Princeton in 2014. The second in his planned political trilogy – Conservatism: The Fight for a Tradition – was published in 2020, also by Princeton University Press. The Economist called it ‘an epic history of conservatism and the Financial Times praised Fawcett for creating a ‘rich and wide-ranging account' that demonstrates how conservatism has repeated managed to renew itself.Keen On America is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit keenon.substack.com/subscribe

America's "State of exception" / Trump administration defies court on illegal deportations / Germany's rearmament programme Christian Democrats and Social Democrats declare war on the working class

Germany's Christian Democrats, Social Democrats and Green Party have struck a deal that will see them vote to amend the country's constitution in order to ramp up defence and infrastructure spending. The deal will be voted on next week and requires a two-thirds majority in the Reichstag. It comes as the G7 backed security guarantees for Ukraine and Donald Trump said he'd had "good calls" with Russia and Ukraine on his ceasefire proposal.The BBC has heard evidence of atrocities committed by retreating fighters in a battle which is raging for control of Sudan's capital Khartoum.And a British explorer is aiming to become the first woman to walk solo across Baffin Island in the Arctic Circle.

Germany's recent election paved the way for the leader of the opposition conservative Christian Democrats, Friedrich Merz, to take over as chancellor once coalition talks wrap up. The election is also raising broader questions about German and European politics, with the far-right AfD making big gains, while the question remains whether Merz is up to the challenge given the new geopolitical landscape taking shape. Tom Nuttall, The Economist's chief Germany correspondent and head of the Berlin bureau, joins Thanos Davelis to look into Germany's recent election, and break down why it matters for Europe. You can read the articles we discuss on our podcast here:Merz wins a messy election then calls for independence from AmericaAsylum cases in Europe fell 11% last year. Here's a look at the numbersCyprus, US strengthen military alliance with special operations drill

In Germany, there's been an election.And The Reichstag is on fire - with a new cohort of AfD members . Will Keiser Merz see this as his opportunity to seize total control? After all, on Saturday, the incoming Chancellor decided that Germany can quote go it alone. Whatever that means. Is the real threat to European democracy about to come from besieged Christian Democrats? Meanwhile, what exactly is Donald Trump up to? In the past few weeks, America's Sun King has sprayed the geopolitical flak a mile high. From Gaza-a-lago to dropping his piledriver on Zelensky. In four years everyone went from assuming him merely mad to assuming method in all his madness. Still, no one has yet discerned exactly what that method is. Of course, this is a PayWall edition. So if you're not feeding us coins, not only will you be left with a vague miasma of guilt, you'll also be leaving us in 15 minutes time. That means leaving without 45 minutes of primo audio in which we reveal, plain as day, the TRUTH of Trump's grand strategy. Would be a hard one to miss out on. You'd really feel kinda bummed.

As Germany's Christian Democrat alliance (CDU/CSU) is in talks about forming a new government with the Social Democrats, this week's episode discusses the country's role in the new global order. It comes against a backdrop where US president Donald Trump is abandoning old friends in Europe and proposing a trade war instead of aiding old allies. Not only could this have implications for US-sourced LNG but the new government in Berlin must make key decisions on the future of fossil fuels, the renewables transition and on whether to embrace hydrogen. The coalition will also have to deal with pressure from domestic industry and consumers demanding cheaper and more reliable power provision, as well as a backlash against wind turbines in the east of the country.Host: Richard Sverrisson - Editor-in-Chief, Montel News.Guest: Claudia Kemfert, Professor of Energy, Economics and Energy Policy at Leuphana University. She also heads the Energy, Transport, Environment Department at the German Institute for Economic Research.Podcast editor: Bled Maliqi, Montel. 

Elections in Germany have delivered a major rise in support for the far-right nationalist party Alternative for Deutschland. It ran second to the centre-right Christian Democrats. What role did immigration play in the result?

Our guest Rick Kuhn explains the results of the German election. Rick is a socialist economist and political analyst. He is the author of a biography of Marxist economist Henryk Grossman, for which he won the Deutscher Prize.  In understanding the German election, the key word is "polarisation". The fascist AfD have received their best vote yet, of over 20%. Meanwhile the anti-racist left party, Die Linke, tapped into a movement of young antifascists and picked up 9%. The centre ruling coalition has collapsed after years of economic stagnation and migrant-bashing, and has been replaced by the conservative Christian Democrats who court the far-right.  Further reading: "Far right surges, but left surprises, in German elections" by Sean Larson in Red Flag Buy Rick Kuhn's book: Labor's Conflict Rick Kuhn on economic crisis: https://marxistleftreview.org/articles/economic-crises-are-unavoidable-under-capitalism/   

Over the past year, right-wing parties across the West have been sweeping elections. Donald Trump in the United States, Argentina's Javier Milei, Italy's Giorgia Meloni, El Salvador's Nayib Bukele, and now Germany. On Sunday, 83 percent of Germans went to the polls—the highest turnout since the Cold War. The Christian Democrats, the country's center-right party led by Friedrich Merz, won. But that's not the big story. The big story is that the right-wing populist party, the AfD, came in second place with nearly 21 percent, the strongest showing since WWII. There is a single reason why. It's not the economy. It's not the war with Russia. It's not climate change. It's immigration. And I'm not talking about jobs or wage deflation. I'm talking about the fact that over the past decade, Germany has seen a net migration of 5 million people, with more than 1 million of the new arrivals coming from Syria and Afghanistan. And the rifts have been palpable. And here, I'm choosing two examples from just last week: An Afghan migrant suspect rammed a car through a crowd of people. Thirty-nine people, including several children, were injured. Just the day before the election, a Syrian migrant became the lead suspect for a stabbing outside of the Holocaust memorial. This all fundamentally tests the limits of assimilation and multiculturalism. The dynamic here is the same that has characterized many Western nations. The center-left and the left have ignored the problem. And the right has named it—and filled the vacuum. As Michael Sandel has put it: “Fundamentalists rush in where liberals fear to tread.” If there's a line that captures the politics of our era, it is that. Last week, the very question of whether migrants can adopt pluralism and Western ideals was also put to Australians, after two Sydney nurses went viral when caught on camera saying that they would kill Israeli patients that came into their hospital. One nurse was an Afghan refugee. Here to unpack it all is Free Press columnist Batya Ungar-Sargon, Democratic fundraising powerhouse Brianna Wu, and the founder of Quillette, Claire Lehmann. If you liked what you heard from Honestly, the best way to support us is to go to TheFP.com and become a Free Press subscriber today. Go to groundnews.com/Honestly to get 40% off the unlimited access Vantage plan and unlock world-wide perspectives on today's biggest news stories. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

“In Germany after 1945 . . . it was always sort of an unwritten rule or law that the more radical these [right wing populist] parties become, the less votes they get, and at some point they just disappear. And what is troubling with the AfD is that the more radical they become, the more votes they get.” Following Germany's recent election results, the far-right party AfD, or Alternative for Germany, is now a more prominent force than ever, doubling its support. Director of AJC Berlin Lawrence and Lee Ramer Institute for German-Jewish Relations Remko Leemhuis breaks down the rise of AfD, the role of Christian Democrat's Friedrich Merz—widely expected to be Germany's next chancellor—and the challenges ahead for Germany's relationship with Israel and the United States. Leemhuis also discusses the dangers of political polarization and its consequences for the Jewish community in Germany. As the Christian Democrats form a coalition and Merz takes the lead, how will Germany navigate the rise of populism while strengthening its alliances on the global stage? Resources: -What is the Alternative for Germany or AfD Party? Listen – AJC Podcasts: -The Forgotten Exodus: with Hen Mazzig, Einat Admony, and more. -People of the Pod:  Unpacking Trump's Gaza Plan The Oldest Holocaust Survivor Siblings: A Tale of Family, Survival, and Hope Israeli Hostages Freed: Inside the Emotional Reunions, High-Stakes Negotiations, and What's Next Follow People of the Pod on your favorite podcast app, and learn more at AJC.org/PeopleofthePod You can reach us at: peopleofthepod@ajc.org If you've appreciated this episode, please be sure to tell your friends, and rate and review us on Apple Podcasts or Spotify. __ Transcript of Conversation with Remko Leemhuis: Manya Brachear Pashman:   German citizens went to the polls on Sunday for the fourth snap election in that nation's postwar history. Public opinion surveys indicated that the far right party, AFD Alternative for Germany, was poised to play a larger political role than ever before.  The party also has attracted significant attention from US political leaders of late, including US Vice President JD Vance, who, in addition to visiting a Holocaust concentration camp during a recent trip to Europe, also met with Alice Weidel, the head of Germany's AFD party. Here to discuss the outcome of the election, its impact on Germany's relationship with Israel, and the German Jewish community is AJC Berlin director Remko Leemhuis. Remko, welcome to People of the Pod.  Remko Leemhuis:   Hello, and thanks for having me. Manya Brachear Pashman:   So if you could just brief our audience on who exactly AfD is- what their history is and their ideology? Remko Leemhuis:   So the party started out in 2013 and started out as a – I don't want to make it a joke, but they started out as a sort of party of professors who were in opposition to the European austerity policy during the financial crisis. Meaning, especially keeping Greece, who was in a deep financial crisis, and they advocated for expelling Greece, for example, from the European Union, because they were afraid that their debt will be then sort of distributed among all member states of the Europeans. So that was their starting point.  But that was also their only issue. And I remember that in 2015 they were around 3-4%. But then the party changed. We had, as many of your listeners know, the influx of over a million refugees from mostly Syria, and the party sort of reinvented itself. And from then on, migration policy, illegal migration, all of the issues connected to these issues were at the center. And from there, they rose, and again, radicalized ever since. And right now, the migration issue is their central issue on which they are campaigning.  And it doesn't matter what you ask. I've seen a lot of these debates that we have before elections with all the heads of the parties, and it is really astonishing how the party is always able to tie every single issue to migration, be it taxes, be it–you can come up with every issue. At the end, it's always about migration, illegal migration, and migrants. And that is something that is their central platform. Manya Brachear Pashman: Well the Trump administration also made illegal immigration central to its platform, but I think what AJC here in America found so alarming about Vance's meeting with Weidel, perhaps there was alarm there in Germany too, was the party's clear record of antisemitism and hostility to America. Weidel herself has called Germany a “slave state” to America and Germany's Holocaust remembrance culture a “guilt cult”. AJC pointed these things out after the vice president's meeting.   So did AfD do as well as expected, Remko? What are the election results so far?  Remko Leemhuis:   So we had the highest voter turnout since 1990. We were above 80%. 83-84% which is the highest turnout since 1990, so the elections after reunification.  The AfD was able to double their result. In the last general election that around 10%, now they came in with 20%. And just for comparison, the Social Democrats came in with 15, close to 16%. So this is something that should concern us very much.  The Christian Democratic Union, so the German conservative center right party won the election. Although not with that many votes as expected. So their aim was 30% plus X. They now have 28-29% but still they are the strongest party. And given German election tradition, the party with the most votes then forms the government and invites other parties to form a government. Manya Brachear Pashman:   And that means that Friedrich Merz is poised to be the next chancellor. Is that correct? Remko Leemhuis:   Yes, if he's able to form a government, yes. I mean, at this point, he still has to talk to one party, and this will be the Social Democrats, even though they lost almost 10% compared to previous elections. Together, they have a majority, and everything indicates that they will form the next government. Manya Brachear Pashman:   Is there a possibility that Alternative for Germany or AfD could be part of the coalition as well?  Remko Leemhuis:   No, that has been ruled out by Friedrich Merz, given that he was ahead on the polls for at least over a year, he has ruled this out on numerous occasions. He has ruled it out yesterday in interviews, so there's no chance that the AfD will be part of a federal government. Manya Brachear Pashman:   So is there any reason for concern, given the trajectory of this election, and given AfD's results in this election? They came in second, correct? Remko Leemhuis:   There's a lot of reason for concern, because  we can say, of course, this is a broader trend in Europe and in the Western world, that you have the rise of these right wing populist parties. But in Germany, after 1945, it's not the first time that we have right wing extremist parties in Parliament, state or federal, but it was always sort of an unwritten rule or law that the more radical these parties become, the less votes they get, and at some point they just disappear.  And what is troubling with the AfD is that the more radical they become, the more votes they get. And this is something that is pretty hard to grapple with, and where I very honestly, also don't have an answer why they are able to sort of break with this rule. But this is very, very troubling, especially in light of the fact, and that is something that is well known to the German public, that the German domestic security services are surveilling the AfD and classifying them as a case of suspected right wing extremism.  So the whole party and three regional branches of this party are officially confirmed by German domestic security as far right. So which means that they are in opposition to liberal democracy. And this is something that, again, is very, very concerning. Manya Brachear Pashman:   Of course, AfD did not win. The Christian Democratic Union won. Could that victory have any impact on the special relationship between Germany and Israel? This is, of course, the return of the party of Angela Merkel, correct? Remko Leemhuis:   First of all, we have to get credit for the outgoing government coalition, because since October 7, this coalition has been a reliable ally of Israel. Of course, there were issues where there were differences, but in general, the outgoing coalition has stood by Israel's side, which was also recognized by Israel. And it is not just a talking point for Israel diplomats when they say that Germany is Israel's second most important ally.  And they have done it despite the fact that they had a lot of pressure from their respective voter bases, especially the Greens and the Social Democrats. So this is something where we really have to credit these parties. Now, the Christian Democratic Union, as you have mentioned, is the party of Angela Merkel, and it's the party that and she came up with the term of the staatsräson (reason of state), and that Israel's security is essential to Germany's policy.  I think there are areas where the relationship will even improve. And just to give you one example, we are talking, today on Monday, the day after the election. And it's really astonishing. Freidrich Merz gave a press conference today, the first after the election yesterday. And really the first question was about his call that he had with the Israeli Prime Minister yesterday.  And he stated very clearly that he has invited the Israeli prime minister to Germany, and that he will find a way to make sure that the Israeli prime minister will be able to visit Germany without being arrested, given the ICC warrant, something that the outgoing coalition didn't say this clearly or said they will adhere to the ICC arrest warrant. So this is something that, from our perspective, is very positive.  And also, I think that the military cooperation and the defense cooperation between Israel and Germany will again, first of all, all of that will not be, again openly debated, but again in the formats where they belong. And so in general, I would say the relations will improve. But this will not mean that also this government or the next government will only say, and do what Israel wants. But I think in general, the trend and the relationship will be more positive and even improve. Manya Brachear Pashman:   So what about relations with the United States? As I mentioned before, Vice President Vance met with one of the AfD leaders. Do you foresee that relationship changing significantly? Remko Leemhuis:   Well, first of all, I have to say Freidrich Merz is very committed to the transatlantic relationship. But yesterday, again, in a post-election interview, he said something that I thought I would have never hear from him. But he said that, We in Europe maybe have to grapple with the fact that the US will not be the sort of ally that it was before, and that we in Europe have to think about a situation where the US will only be very little or not present at all in Europe. Especially when it comes to war in Ukraine and the support for Ukraine. So even though he is very committed to the transatlantic relationship, given the recent developments he looks much more concerned to Washington and what is happening and what is coming out of Washington. Manya Brachear Pashman:   In other words, he sees a bit of a destabilizing effect when it comes to transatlantic relations and security from the direction of the United States, not within Europe itself. Remko Leemhuis:   Yes, destabilizing is the right word. And that doesn't mean that he doesn't see the failures that Europe and Germany has made over the past years. And I think that's something we also, as AJC, try to highlight every time. That the Europeans, especially the Germans, for decades, haven't lived up to their commitments when it comes to defense spending. And 11 years ago now, after Russia annexed Ukraine and the NATO states agreed on the 2% goal, Germany hasn't met this. And a lot of other European countries that are member of NATO haven't met that 2% goal.  And the discussion about this goes even, you know, way back longer. I think it was even started with President George W. Bush, who always highlighted this issue and that the Germans, the Europeans, have to do more. And especially the Germans as the third-largest economy in the world and the biggest economy in Europe, has to shoulder more responsibility, which means they have to spend more. So he's very aware of the fact of all these shortcomings, and he's very willing to fix that and to spend more money on defense if the US cuts its spending here, if the US withdraws troops from the European continent.  And still being aware that even if you know, Europe does its best, we will not be able to fill these gaps, because we just don't have the resources or the infrastructure to do that. So we still need the US, no matter what. So he will need to find a line, sort of working with the US, and then looking at what can Europe do to become a bit more independent from the US in all of these questions. Manya Brachear Pashman:   So let's zoom in and talk about the impact of the rise of AFD on the German Jewish community. Has it given license to those who might otherwise keep antisemitic attitudes to themselves? Remko Leemhuis:   So in general, as I said at the beginning, nothing of this is a big surprise. The AfD in the polls over the past year or so, I would say, you know, fared around 20%. So the result yesterday wasn't a surprise, and it was also not a surprise because we have seen the AfD having even bigger successes in state elections. But of course, this is concerning.  This is concerning because the AfD is also a symbol of polarization, and polarization that we see across the western world, in all democracies at this point, I think, and historically speaking, times of polarization have never been good times for the Jewish community.  But I also have to say that the German Jewish community is also very aligned in how to deal with the AfD, and that means no Jewish organization speaks to the AfD. Every Jewish organization at some point in time has come out against the AfD.  We as AJC have had numerous publication on highlighting the threat to democracy, and by that also to the Jewish community, by the AfD. And the AfD so far, hasn't been successful in using Jews, or, you know, Israel, or pretending to be Israel's biggest friend and the Jewish community's biggest friends. No one, no one buys into that, and everyone can see through that, and everyone understands that this is performative at best. Manya Brachear Pashman:   Here in the United States, people of opposite political persuasions are honestly having a hard time facing each other. Those who voted for Kamala Harris, they see the speed with which Trump is enacting his campaign promises. They're having a hard time facing their neighbors who voted for him, or who had yard signs up for him. People are organizing boycotts of businesses and CEOs who are aligning themselves with Trump.  Is the same dynamic playing out on the ground in Berlin or Munich, for example. Do you see that kind of, as you said, the polarization. Does it play out on the very personal level? Can neighbors face each other? Remko Leemhuis:   Yes. I'm not sure if we see it to the extent that we see it in the US. But of course, we see that and that political questions, political issues, have become a dividing line among friends, among families, and that people stop talking to each other. And that is a very worrying trend, that this happens. I mean, of course, there is a line, where I would say it is legitimate to say, I'm not going to discuss these issues. And I personally, and we as AJC, don't talk to AFD. For the reasons we have talked about there's nothing for us to discuss with them. But yes, I have to say that, especially over the past weeks, we have seen even an increase in this polarization and in this lack of unity, at least in terms of, everyone agrees that it is okay to fight and to fight about the issues and to have even hard debates on issues. And this is part of democracy.  And I guess we Germans also have to learn that, more that democracy means debating things and having hard debates about issues. But the last weeks have seen that it then ventures into contempt and denigration, and if you are not having this position, then you're automatically on the other side, not even to be talked to. And that you don't often run into people that have an opposing view, because we all live in a bubble, and that, I guess, the only place where you encounter people with different opinions is social media. And I guess we can all agree that social media is, for sure, not the best place to debate controversial issues. We all have to come out of our bubbles, that we all have to you know, even if we have political differences with other people, still see that there's much more that aligns us with most of these people, and that if one person doesn't exactly hold the same view as you on any given policy, doesn't mean that it is an inherently bad person. But still, someone that isn't just inherently bad, but your neighbor, your co-worker. And I think that is the biggest challenge for all democratic societies in the West at this point. Manya Brachear Pashman:   Remko, thank you so very much for joining us and for explaining the outcome of this election and what it narrowly avoided. Remko Leemhuis:   Not narrowly but, one thing is clear, and I think that is that is much more what I'm thinking about is that certain issues aren't addressed in a way that people feel, you know, they are addressed and they are taken serious. I mean, we just have to look to our neighbor, Austria, where an openly right wing extremist party is now the strongest party. And we should do everything we can to avoid that scenario. But that means then even having difficult debates and making also difficult decisions.  But, if we want the center to hold, there is no alternative. And that's why our appeal as AJC is. And a lot of people find this lame or undecided, that we have appealed on numerous occasions, also in this campaign cycle, on all democratic parties to find solutions for the pressing issues and to find a middle ground. And this is what we will continue to do.  And also we'll try to continue to then bring together people from different parties to debate these issues and give, you know, these conversations a platform, and do what we can do in order to facilitate such discussions, and hopefully by that, have a healthier culture of debate and a healthier political culture. Manya Brachear Pashman:   Thank you so much, Remko.  Remko Leemhuis:   Thank you. Manya Brachear Pashman: If you missed last week's episode, be sure to tune in for the second installment of our two-part series on the faces behind antisemitism as part of AJC's State of Antisemitism in America 2024 Report. I ask two Jewish college students about the report's findings that nearly a third of Jewish students in the U.S. reported feeling uncomfortable or unsafe at a campus event because of their Jewish identity. Our guests shared their own experience.

The center-right Christian Democrats won the most votes in Germany's election, and the US stock market had its worst day in two months on Friday. Britain and India will relaunch talks on a long-awaited trade deal, plus, China's holdings of US Treasuries have fallen to their lowest level since 2009. Mentioned in this podcast:Friedrich Merz set to become Germany's next chancellor, exit polls say US stocks post worst slide in two months on gloomy economic dataChina's holdings of US Treasuries fall to lowest level since 2009UK and India relaunch trade talks in bid to boost investment opportunitiesDecaffeinated Brazilians blame Lula for surging cost of morning brewCredit: @casaljb_brasil/InstagramThe FT News Briefing is produced by Fiona Symon, Sonja Hutson, Kasia Broussalian, Ethan Plotkin, Lulu Smyth, and Marc Filippino. Additional help from Breen Turner, Sam Giovinco, Peter Barber, Michael Lello, David da Silva and Gavin Kallmann. Our engineer is Joseph Salcedo. Topher Forhecz is the FT's executive producer. The FT's global head of audio is Cheryl Brumley. The show's theme song is by Metaphor Music.Read a transcript of this episode on FT.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This week, Tom and Helen discuss the aftermath of Germany's election, where the Christian Democrats won but with their second-lowest vote tally ever. They explore what these results mean for the future of European politics and the shifting dynamics of Europe's relationship with the United States. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In today's episode, we cover the morning after Germany's election, the third anniversary of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Emmanuel Macron meeting Donald Trump, and Israel deploying tanks in the occupied West Bank.Watch TLDR's latest videos here:https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-PrMHoku-G0 TLDR's Daily Briefing is a roundup of the day's most important news stories from around the world. But we don't just tell you what's happening, we explain it: making complex topics simple to understand. Listen to the Daily Briefing for your global news bulletin every weekday.Pre-order the next edition of Too Long, TLDR's print magazine, here: https://toolong.news/dailyProduced and edited by Scarlett WatchornHosted by Georgina FindlayWritten by Georgina Findlay and Rory TaylorMusic by Epidemic Sound: http://epidemicsound.com/creator//////////////////////////////Sources:✍️ German Electionhttps://www.politico.eu/europe-poll-of-polls/germany/https://www.dw.com/en/german-election-results-and-voter-demographics-explained-in-charts/a-71724186https://www.politico.eu/article/sahra-wagenknecht-party-bsw-5-percent-bundestag-parliament-threatens-legal-challenge-germany-election-result/ ✍️ Ukraine War Anniversaryhttps://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-anniversary-84e4c62519fc15b34e17f661cf3dd20ehttps://edition.cnn.com/2025/02/24/europe/zelensky-ukraine-war-anniversary-kyiv-summit/index.html ✍️ Macron in Washingtonhttps://www.euractiv.com/section/politics/news/europes-last-chance-macron-in-washington-to-make-last-ditch-eu-pitch/https://www.reuters.com/world/macron-arrives-white-house-ukraine-talks-with-trump-2025-02-24/ ✍️ Israel Deploys Tanks to West Bankhttps://apnews.com/article/israel-palestinians-hamas-war-ceasefire-hostages-02-23-2025-1c2dc86afd2e05888d5d588f462e898bhttps://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/israeli-defence-minister-tells-military-prepare-extended-west-bank-stay-2025-02-23/ See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Germany is set to have a new chancellor, Friedrich Merz. From the conservative Christian Democrat party (CDU), Merz will now look to form a coalition government.    The leader-in-waiting has made striking remarks in a post-victory speech, saying Donald Trump is indifferent to Europe's fate, putting the US president's America on a par with Russia.    What does Merz's tone mean for Europe? Niall Paterson is joined by our Europe correspondent Adam Parsons to discuss how the Merz-Trump relationship could work. 

Matt Frei, Europe Editor and Presenter with Channel 4 News

Yesterday, fifty-nine million voters cast their ballots in what is considered a defining election for Europe's future. It was a big night for the Christian Democrats, which came out on top. This is a good reason for Merz, the likely next chancellor, to celebrate – but maybe not too hard, as the far-right AfD is now the second force in parliament. For the Social Democrats, it was more of an existential crisis, performing the lowest score ever in a result that Scholz himself described as a "defeat." But what happens next? And what does Merz hold for the future of the EU? Euractiv's editor-in-chief Matthew Karnitschnig and German bureau chief Nick Alipour reacted to the results as they were coming in from our Berlin office.

The centre-right Christian Democrats look likely to lead in the German election, with the far-right AfD party coming second with around a fifth of the vote. We ask what it all means, and hear from politicians of both parties.Also in the programme: Christians across the world pray for the health of Pope Francis, who remains in hospital in Rome; and after major cuts to jobs in the US federal government, Elon Musk shocks civil servants with an email asking them to justify their positions.(Photo: Christian Democratic Union (CDU) supporters dance after the first exit poll results are announced in the 2025 general election in Berlin, Germany. Credit: REUTERS/Fabrizio Bensch)

Exit polls from Germany's election suggest the conservative Christian Democrats have won

Sunday's crunch elections in Germany are coming at perhaps the most pivotal moment since the fall of the Berlin Wall. Back then, it was about making a success of reunification. Now comes a reckoning over the German model that ensued. Under threat is the kind of global free trade that powers Germany's export-driven economy. Instead we're seeing Donald Trump's tariffs, a Russian aggression that's inching closer in not-so-far-off Ukraine and an ageing population that needs to replenish its workforce, but doesn't want more migrants. Seizing on the mood of a nation in recession is the far-right AfD, which polls suggest could finish second behind the Christian Democrats. With the US vice president last Friday passing up a chance to meet the incumbent centre-left chancellor Olaf Scholz, instead seeing AfD leader Alice Weidel on the sidelines of the Munich Security Conference, voters are wondering if the usual warnings of foreign election meddling concern this time the United States more than usual suspect Russia.The pressure is on in a nation where lead candidates know they that can't bash their rivals too hard. After all, they know that come Monday morning when the ballots are counted, they might have to call them for coalition-building. Could this election be different? If so, how?Produced by Rebecca Gnignati, Elisa Amiri, Ilayda Habip.Watch moreA model in crisis: Germans head to polls amid economic downturn

On this episode of The UK in a Changing Europe podcast, leading German journalist and television presenter Theo Koll joins our host Jill Rutter to discuss the upcoming election in Germany that has seen one of the most volatile election campaigns the country has experienced. What can we expect from Friedrich Merz's conservative Christian Democrats, currently the frontrunners to win? How much of an impact is the far-right party 'Alternative for Germany' having? And what is the most important issue for German voters? Listen in for all of this and more.

The elections in Germany will be held on February 23rd, and the Christian Democrats alliance of CDU/CSU, led by Friedrich Merz, is currently leading the polls. Everything suggests that Merz will be the next Chancellor. But with whom will he form a coalition? Can CDU/CSU cooperate with the extremist Alternative for Germany (Alternative für Deutschland - AfD)? Alexander Clarkson, a lecturer in German, European, and International Studies at King's College London, answered my question about the potential collaboration between the German centrist-conservative right and the far-right. We also discussed what the AfD represents, how it fits into Donald Trump's world, and what we can expect from Merz. Listen to our conversation. And if you enjoy what I do, please support me on Ko-fi! Thank you. ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://ko-fi.com/amatisak

Has Friedrich Merz unlocked what a senior socialist MP called “the gates of hell” by accepting AfD support on two key immigration votes? With less than three weeks until the German elections, the CDU leader and likely future chancellor insists he won't govern with the far right—but who will he partner with? What's his real strategy? And has the AfD gained a boost from Elon Musk's backing?Today Radio Schuman answers these questions with Euronews' Berlin correspondent Liv Stoud.Merz and his Christian Democrats, now polling above 30%, shook German politics last week by seeking AfD support for tough new immigration measures—breaking a long-held taboo against working with the far right. Though the bill failed, the backlash was swift, with tens of thousands protesting nationwide. Has this gamble hurt Merz's popularity, or will it shape the upcoming elections?We also look at the pros and cons of hotels and Airbnbs while travelling.Radio Schuman is hosted and produced by Maïa de la Baume, with journalist and production assistant Eleonora Vasques, audio editing by David Brodheim. Music by Alexandre Jas. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Germany's Christian Democrats unite with far-right AfD against refugees / Mid-air collision between passenger flight and military helicopter kills 67 in US capital

Germany's parliament descended into heckles and recriminations as politicians from the right-wing Christian Democrats were accused of undermining the “firewall” against co-operation with the far-right Alternative for Germany. The CDU tabled a non-binding motion calling for toughter border and asylum rules after a spate of stabbings linked to foreign nationals in the country. The motion passed with the support of the AfD, prompting German Chancellor Olaf Scholz to slam the move as an “unforgivable mistake”.As the government puts its weight behind a third runway at Heathrow, as well as expansion of other UK airports, we ask whether the ambition contradicts its climate commitments.And as the fourth instalment of Bridget Jones premieres in London, why is the character's appeal so enduring?

Ahead of Germany's general election on Feb. 23, Energy Evolution looks at the energy implications for Europe's largest economy. With the center-right Christian Democrats leading in the polls, correspondent Camilla Naschert lays out the party's energy plans and discusses the main priorities for Germany's energy system with expert guests.  Guests on the episode are Christoph Maurer, managing director at advisory firm Consentec; Daniel Muir, senior power and renewables analyst at S&P Global Commodity Insights; and Christian Schnibbe, communications chief at wind developer WPD. The episode is hosted by Eklavya Gupte. Energy Evolution is merging with Platts Future Energy, and episodes are now published on Tuesdays. 

Ahead of Germany's general election on Feb. 23, Energy Evolution looks at the energy implications for Europe's largest economy. With the center-right Christian Democrats leading in the polls, correspondent Camilla Naschert lays out the party's energy plans and discusses the main priorities for Germany's energy system with expert guests.  Guests on the episode are Christoph Maurer, managing director at advisory firm Consentec; Daniel Muir, senior power and renewables analyst at S&P Global Commodity Insights; and Christian Schnibbe, communications chief at wind developer WPD. The episode is hosted by Eklavya Gupte. Energy Evolution is merging with Platts Future Energy, and episodes are now published on Tuesdays. 

Ahead of Germany's general election on Feb. 23, Energy Evolution looks at the energy implications for Europe's largest economy. With the center-right Christian Democrats leading in the polls, correspondent Camilla Naschert lays out the party's energy plans and discusses the main priorities for Germany's energy system with expert guests.  Guests on the episode are Christoph Maurer, managing director at advisory firm Consentec; Daniel Muir, senior power and renewables analyst at S&P Global Commodity Insights; and Christian Schnibbe, communications chief at wind developer WPD. The episode is hosted by Eklavya Gupte. Energy Evolution is merging with Platts Future Energy, and episodes are now published on Tuesdays. 

Ahead of Germany's general election on Feb. 23, Energy Evolution looks at the energy implications for Europe's largest economy. With the center-right Christian Democrats leading in the polls, correspondent Camilla Naschert lays out the party's energy plans and discusses the main priorities for Germany's energy system with expert guests.  Guests on the episode are Christoph Maurer, managing director at advisory firm Consentec; Daniel Muir, senior power and renewables analyst at S&P Global Commodity Insights; and Christian Schnibbe, communications chief at wind developer WPD. The episode is hosted by Eklavya Gupte. Energy Evolution is merging with Platts Future Energy, and episodes are now published on Tuesdays. 

Germany votes for a new parliament on February 23. While the center-right Christian Democrats maintain a lead in the polls, the three parties of Olaf Scholz's outgoing “traffic light” coalition …

President Jimmy Carter has died at the age of one-hundred. He is remembered as a man of paradoxes: an evangelical-Christian Democrat, a white Southern champion of civil rights and solar energy, and a one-term President whose policies have come to seem prescient. Carter was unpopular when he departed the White House, in 1981, but, more than any other President, he saw his reputation improve after he left office. What does the evolution of Carter's legacy tell us about American politics, and about ourselves? Lawrence Wright spent significant time with Carter and even wrote a play about the Camp David Accords, the peace deal that only Carter, Wright argues, could have brokered between Israel and Egypt. He joins Tyler Foggatt to remember Carter as a man and leader.  Learn about your ad choices: dovetail.prx.org/ad-choices

Reach Out to Us Today!This week for our regular time together, we have Josh Noel (host of The Whole Church, Systematic Geekology, Theology for Dummies, etc) joining us to talk about the aftermath of the election. What is our role as Christians? Who are we called to love? This one is going to get a little controversial at points but hopefully you'll here our hearts in the midst of all of this. Support the show If you have any questions about the subjects covered in today's episode you can find us on Facebook at the links below or you can shoot me an email at joe@buddywalkwithjesus.com One Stop Shop for all the links Linktr.ee/happydeamedia

With the collapse of the ruling coalition in Germany, hosts Cameron Abadi and Adam Tooze take a deep dive into the future of the country from both a political and economic perspective. The two delve into what doomed the government of current chancellor Olaf Scholz and what lies ahead for likely future chancellor Friedrich Merz. Merz is the head of the main opposition party in parliament, the center-right Christian Democrats. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The US election is approaching quickly with implications for America's allies in the world. Professors Margarita Šešelgyte (Vilnius University), Daunis Auers (University of Latvia), and Andres Kasekamp (University of Toronto) join a roundtable discussion on the impact that a Kamala Harris or Donald Trump presidency could have on the security and future outlook of the Baltic countries and broader Europe, and how people in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are feeling about the state of democracy in the US. This episode was recorded on September 25, 2024. TranscriptIndra Ekmanis: Thank you everyone for joining me in this discussion today. As we all know, the US presidential campaign has been rather unprecedented on many fronts this cycle. There's been the late change in the candidates at the top of the Democratic ticket from Joe Biden to Kamala Harris. And now we've had already multiple assassination attempts on the Republican candidate Donald Trump.And we know that whatever happens in November will certainly have effects on Americans, but it will also have reverberations around the world. And so I'm very glad to today be in discussion with you all about the potential impacts in the Baltic countries. But before we jump in, I'd like to ask you all to briefly introduce yourselves.Andres Kasekamp: I'm Andres Kasekamp. I'm the Professor of Estonian Studies at the University of Toronto. I used to be the Director of the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute in Tallinn and a Professor at the University of Toronto.Daunis Auers: Hi, I'm Daunis Auers, a professor at the University of Latvia and also the director of a new think tank Certus in Riga.Margarita Šešelgytė: Hello, I'm Margarita Šešelgytė, and I'm a professor of security studies, but also a director of the Institute of International Relations and Political Science at Vilnius University.IE: Well, thank you all. So, I'd like to start with what is perhaps top of mind when people are thinking about the impacts of the US elections on the Baltic countries, and that's security, NATO, and Russia's war in Ukraine.So if we start with NATO: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania marked two decades in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization this year. The alliance itself is now 75 years old, celebrating at its summit in Washington, D.C., hosted by president and at that point in time, still beleaguered Democratic candidate Joe Biden, where Biden underscored NATO unity. And during the summit, it was widely reported that the allies were working to “Trump proof” the Alliance as polls showed that Biden was slipping in the presidential race.Trump, of course, is remembered as deriding the Alliance, threatening to pull out entirely during his presidency. And at the same time, he is also somewhat credited with pushing member states to up their defense spending. With Biden out, of course, the calculus has perhaps changed a little bit.Vice President and now candidate Kamala Harris represents some measure of continuity with the Biden administration, though we know that her foreign policy experience is not necessarily as deep as Biden's. But a Harris presidency would be more compatible theoretically with the tradition of America as a stable leader in the transatlantic relationship.And obviously a strong NATO is critical to the security of the Baltic States. So, I wonder how you perceive the candidate stances on NATO and how they align with Baltic interests.AK: All right, briefly, Trump would be a disaster and Harris, indeed, would represent continuity with, with Biden. It goes back to the nature of the candidates, right, that Trump is a purely transactional individual, and doesn't seem to understand how NATO works.He's always said that the NATO countries owe the Americans money. It's not an organization where you pay a membership fee, so he simply doesn't get it. It is sort of partly true that European members who weren't doing enough spending on their own defense budgets, have been frightened into contributing more.Trump has something to do with it, but it has more to do with Russian aggression, in the region. So starting already in 2014 when Russia seized Crimea, European countries started increasing their spending. With the Harris presidency, it would be sort of more of the same, which is better than Trump, but it's certainly not as good as America could do, because Joe Biden has been failing Ukraine recently and placing these unreasonable restrictions on Ukraine's right to strike at Russian targets to defend itself.And hopefully Harris wouldn't continue that weak kneed policy.DA: I agree with what Andres has said, but I think it's quite interesting to look at the perspective also of Baltic Americans who after all will be voting in the election, unlike, I presume, the three of us—Margarita, Andres and I—who, as not being American citizens won't have a vote in the elections.And traditionally, there's been quite a lot of support for the Republican Party amongst the Baltic diasporas, because during the Cold War, the Republicans were seen as having the strongest backbone in defending Baltic interests. And much of this support actually carried over into the Trump era with a significant portion of Baltic Americans, especially from the older generation, still holding out support for Trump.And what I thought was interesting was that after Trump announced J.D. Vance as his vice-presidential candidate, the attitudes of many Baltic Americans actually changed because a lot of the affection for Trump is deeply personal, connected to his charismatic personality, the way he speaks, the way he does business, the way he calls back, sort of an ancient era of essentially a white America, from the 1950s.J.D. Vance doesn't have this affection. And when J.D. Vance was announced as the vice-presidential candidate, people were bringing out his notorious op-ed in the New York Times on April 12th, which was very defeatist in its nature, calling out various quotes that he had of not really caring who won in the war between Ukraine and Russia.And this was the moment that a number of Baltic Americans turned away from the Republicans and turned towards the Democrats. So, I would perhaps highlight the role of J.D. Vance in furthering support for the Democrats at least amongst the Baltic community in the United States.MS: I totally agree to what has been said already, but then I'd like to look from a more systemic perspective, and just to add to what has been said: We live in a very volatile security situation at the moment and this dynamism, security-wise, will not be changing pretty soon because there are some changes in the balance of power the rivalry between autocracies and democracies.So where do we stand as Baltic countries? We are small countries, and we have a major war in our region. And therefore, for us, it is essentially important to have our allies strong and to have our allies helping us. The United States is our main ally when it comes to security. Yes, we are members of NATO, but in terms of deterring Putin, one has to think about deterrence as a psychological concept.Putin is less afraid of NATO as overall organization than he is afraid of the United States of America. So having this in mind, the one who sits in Washington D.C. in the presidential position for us is essential as well. In Athena, we had already two elections this year, presidential and European Parliament elections, and the parliamentary elections are coming in October.But we're joking that the elections in the United States are more important than the elections in Lithuania and the change would be felt stronger of who comes to power in the United States.Interestingly enough, one of our media outlets just recently published a survey asking Lithuanians: Who would be a better president for Lithuania in the United States, Trump or, Harris? The majority of Lithuanians, 66 percent, said Harris and only 12 indicated that that could be Trump. So, for us, it's very important. It matters. We follow this election very, very closely.And I would say there are two points which are particularly important for Lithuania. Yes, NATO and US presence in the region. And we don't know what position Harris will take or if she will be more involved in the Pacific. But it's about stability. That's important.And another very important question, and it's very intertwined, is the war in Ukraine. And we already heard what Trump was saying about Ukraine, that when he becomes the president, he will seek for a certain deal. And for us Baltics, it's clear that no deal with Putin can be achieved at the moment, and it would be dangerous, and it would endanger our situation. So it's not acceptable.IE: You're actually running into kind of my next question here, which is exactly about Russia and Ukraine. And as we know, the Baltic states have been among the most ardent supporters of Ukraine following the full-scale invasion in 2022. Also, we know that the Baltic leadership has been quite hawkish warning about Russia for some time.And as you just mentioned, Donald Trump has refused to say that he wants Ukraine to end the war. He often talks about his rapport with Russian President Vladimir Putin. Harris, on the other hand, has called Putin a dictator who would, “eat Trump for lunch.” She has condemned the Russia's actions in Ukraine as crimes against humanity and underscored the US commitment.But as you also mentioned, there has been a slow roll of US advanced weaponry and providing the ability for Ukraine to hit targets deeper into Russia, something that is actually being talked about right now at the UN General Assembly.Could you say a little bit more on the candidates' stances on Ukraine and Russia and in the war more broadly, what that means for Baltic leaderships and Baltic publics?DA: I think that the presidential debate, which I think looks like being the only debate between the two candidates, pretty accurately sketched in the difference, between the candidates. President Trump very much was hooked into the Kremlin narrative.He said that he was for peace, which we understand here in Europe as meaning you are for Russia because you bought into the narrative. He even mentioned that the United States holds some responsibility for the war as opposed for it to be a decision made by Russia to invade a sovereign country.I think we quite clearly saw that one of the candidates is, despite the macho image, quite soft on Russia. And the other one is fixing more clearly with the governing elites in the Baltic States perspective on, the war on Ukraine. One thing we should mention, however, there is an undercurrent of support for Trump in the Baltic States.In, Latvia, there is a political party named Latvia First—where did they get that name from—which sits in the parliament in opposition and is clearly Trumpian. They managed to have one MEP (Member of European Parliament) elected to the European Parliament. And in one of the debates, he was asked a very technical question about how he would vote on a trade deal with certain countries.He said, “well, I would do whatever Trump does. If it's good enough for Trump, it's good enough for me.” And he pretty much attached this to any other form of foreign policy. Now, this is a minority party, but we should recognize that there is some support for the Trumpian position albeit not in a governing position in the Baltic states. I'll hand over to Andres now.AK: Well, the same applies for Estonia, where the major opposition party EKRE (Conservative People's Party) on the far right is very clearly Trumpian. There's also, more alarming in this case, a lot of the mainstream media, like Postimees and the foreign news desk of the national broadcaster seem to normalize Trump.They don't point out his really deviant and demented behavior but treat him like a normal candidate. So, I also feel that there are plenty of people in Estonia who think that Trump has some good ideas, or at least they're so angry at the woke folks, that they're willing to entertain Trump, not recognizing the great damage that Trump would do to the Transatlantic Alliance and how he would put NATO deterrence, its credibility, in question.And I think that's what Margarita was saying earlier, right? Deterrence is psychological. It's not only what we do, it's what Putin believes, right? If Putin believes that the United States is ready to defend us, then he will be deterred. And that's, that's the bottom line.And with Trump, that's the one thing that's been consistent. I mean, he flip-flops on everything, criticizes everything, but the one thing he's been consistent on, he's never said a bad word about Putin, which really is not just odd, but quite alarming.MS: Well, I just want to add on what has been said in terms of the differences between the Harris and Trump. We don't know exactly what the policies of Harris will be because we don't know her so well, but for us, the most important thing is the stability, because if Trump becomes US president, it's not only what he does, but what kind of messages he sends.Andrus was already mentioning the messages for Putin, what's happening in Putin's head, understanding what Trump's messaging is. But also for the world, we are more secure and stronger together in European Union, in NATO, as transatlantic family and community.If Trump comes to power, the world will become a more dangerous place, because there will be more rifts and disagreements between allies, and we will be seen as weaker as a transatlantic community, not only by Russia, but by China, by Iran, by North Korea. So, it is a very dangerous scenario for us small states, because we cannot change the system. The system affects us.DA: And in the event of a Trump victory, I think there would be a much greater focus from policymakers in the Baltic states on the diaspora community in the United States. The diaspora community played a very important role in the Baltic accession to NATO in the late 1990s, early 2000s. And clearly one thing that Trump does listen to is voters, supporters, and interest groups in Washington. And I think the role of JBANC (Joint Baltic American National Committee) and also the three national lobby groups of American Latvians, American Lithuanian, and Estonian Americans will simply grow in importance, hugely. We can expect them to have quite a lot of communication and cooperation with our foreign ministries and with our embassies, even more so than at the moment.IE: Yeah, that's a really fascinating point too, that the impact of the diaspora lobbying groups in the United States. You all are touching on something that I also wanted to get at, which is the impact of the US elections on European solidarity. You mentioned how Trump's America first agenda has also emboldened right wing politicians in Europe and the Baltics.He has a close relationship with Viktor Orban, the prime minister of Hungary. Who has also even spoken at CPAC, the Conservative Political Action Conference in the United States, but has been in some ways a thorn in the side of the European Union particularly around Russia.During his presidency, Donald Trump also often tried to bypass European institutions, kind of favoring a bilateral approach and personal appeals to national leaders. Harris presidency represents more of a stable transatlantic relationship, but there's also the concern that, as Margarita mentioned, that there's going to be a shift in attention to the Indo-Pacific. The People's Republic of China is seen kind of as this coming-up threat.So, some questions here. What is the situation of the European Union? How united or divided might the block be with either candidate? How is Europe thinking about retaining the focus of the United States as opposed to a shift to other global regions?Where do the Baltic states fit into that? Maybe we start from the Lithuanian perspective this time.MS: It's a very tough question. I think that when the war in Ukraine started, the European Union has surprised itself by its unity. And over the last three years, I think that this unity pertained, and we continue to be united.We sometimes disagree on how fast Europe has to be in providing certain aid for Ukraine. We sometimes disagree on how strict we have to be on punishing Putin in terms of sanctions, et cetera, et cetera. But in general, there is a consensus that we're sitting in the same boat, and this is a European war andI think that this is very important.Therefore, there is an appetite to continue supporting Ukraine until the end of the war, until the victory. But the problem is that there is this unity, which is very strong on the decision takers, decision-makers' level. But if you scratch the surface, you see that there are many different opinions.Businesses, communities, general society, different players do not share the general decision-makers' opinion, not in every country. States of the European Union are facing their own economic, political, and identity problems. And what makes me anxious is the tide of radical populism in certain European countries, and in particular in the biggest countries who matter a lot in the decision-making of the European Union.And maybe in the next two or three years, we won't be seeing those radicals overtaking the government. Well, let's hope fingers crossed that in Germany, the elections will not bring AfD (Alternative for Germany) to power. However, it reduces certain policies, international policies, foreign policies, to a minimal level rather than emboldening them.So there could be some steps back, which might be quite dangerous in these final stages of the war, or what we are seeing now, when at least Ukrainian side is trying to search for certain agreements. So, yes, there is a unity that also benefits the Baltic countries.European countries are listening to what we said more and Ursula von der Leyen, the President of the European Commission, in her State of the Union speech, said we should have listened more to the Baltic countries. But I guess the appetite to listen to Baltic countries is shrinking a bit for the time and also when we propose certain solutions, they still seem very provocative and more provocative than some of the EU countries would like to take.AK: Let me just add that in American debate, when they talk about Europe, they talk about Europe as kind of lagging behind and being a slacker in support for Ukraine, which is absolutely false, right? The United States is obviously spending more in absolute terms than any other country in terms of military. But as a whole Europe is providing more altogether.And of course, we should really be looking at the contribution in terms of the percentages. And here, the three Baltic states, from the beginning, have been the leaders, along with some other countries like, like Denmark and Sweden, who have given a percentage of their defense budget to Ukraine, which is much greater than the percentage that the Americans are giving.Americans are actually being quite miserly, even though the sums sound huge. And of course, in the American case, the money, which in the US political debate seems that it's just being handed over to Ukraine, is actually going to American manufacturers. And a lot of the money is actually just nominal sums, which are old American armament, equipment, and ammunitions, which were destined to be written off. In any case they're given some monetary value.So, this is something that's really caught on in the narrative in the US: The Americans are paying so much, and the Europeans are doing so little, which is certainly not the case. When you look at the three Baltic states, which have been, continue to be in the lead, and that leads to what Margarita was highlighting.Our establishments, our political leadership in the Baltic States are very firm on Russia, but as a society, there's a cost to that. If we've all raised our defense spending, that means cuts in societal programs, and that leads to dissatisfaction and unrest.So, that's difficult for the governments to keep a check on.DA: Europe is changing. We see this in the European Parliament elections in 2024, that you have this growing support for political parties on the fringes, which we sometimes call as populists, and the support for the centrist mainstream parties, which we typically understand as the liberals, the center right, the Christian Democrats, or the European People's Party and the centrist socialists are declining.Now, they still make up a majority, and we see this in the European Commission as well. The European Commission, which is likely to be approved over the next couple of weeks under Ursula von der Leyen, is still a centrist European Commission, but Europe is changing. And I think it's quite interesting if we look at the Baltic States here.30 years ago, as the Baltic States were just beginning to build democracies and capitalistic systems after 50 years of Soviet occupation, they were quite crackpot, right? I was reading some newspaper articles from the early 1990s, and the one that stayed with me—it's a casual throwaway article written sometime in late 1992 about, oh by the way, 62 prisoners escaped to prison yesterday, and they haven't been caught yet.And the next day, it's not even on the front page of a newspaper, because there's some kind of mafia killing that's being reported on. And that's how things were 30 years ago. Today, the Baltic states are a sea of tranquility. We see that our political systems are actually far more stable, if you look at recent indicators, than the Nordic states.You look at the profile of our governments, the female prime ministers that we had in office in the summer, Europe's first, openly gay president. We have very progressive political systems, and it's Western Europe where democracy is declining in quality, where crackpot political parties are appearing, where you have extremely dodgy political leaders being elected to lead governments and extremely odd parties coming into governments or propping up minority governments.Europe is changing quite a lot, which is unfortunate for the Baltic States in a sense, because just as we have achieved a level of normality. Lithuania is achieving huge economic success as being the fastest growing economy in Europe in the 21st century, the rest of Europe is fraying.Fortunately, there's still a majority, let's say a mainstream majority, which favors support for Ukraine and whose policies broadly align with the very centrist and mainstream policies that all three Baltic governments have long been adopting. But things are changing and there is a risk that the longer the war possibly drags on in Ukraine, the more—I'm sure that opinion in the Baltic states won't change because this is such an existential issue for us—but elsewhere in Western Europe, we might see these radical populist forces rise even further and perhaps begin to fray away at the coalition, which is still broadly supportive of Ukraine. But it is being chipped away at almost monthly, I would say.IE: I want to put a pin in some of the things that you just touched on around the state of democracy, maybe we can turn back to that in a moment.Perhaps we can briefly turn to the impacts of either candidate on US trade policy and energy.MS: It's a global issue. And globally, it is important when it comes to the general situation in transatlantic community, the feeling of trust. But when it comes to Baltics, I don't that it has this direct link to what is important for us. I believe that neither decision-makers nor society are looking in particular what Trump or Harris are saying in terms of energy policy and trade.Okay, he [Trump] can increase tariffs for Latin products, but there are now so many going to the United States.DA: For the Baltic States, our biggest trading partners are our Western neighbors. In the case of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, are one and two. Then the Nordic countries, Poland, Germany, and so on.I took a look at the data for 2022, and the United States was Latvia's 11th biggest trading partner: small, single digits. Latvia for the United States was the 117th biggest trading partner. So, when it comes to economic relations, including also energy, it's not a critical relationship.Politically, the relationship is very, very important. But economically, when it comes to trade, it's marginal.AK: Well, let me just add that for the bilateral relationship, it's not important, but the tone that the US administration sets is not a good direction for the Baltic states. Trump initiated this protectionism, and Biden unfortunately has continued in that same vein.And we don't really know how Harris will continue Biden's legacy on that front. But in any case, the world has become more protectionist. And the three Baltic states have been amongst the biggest champions and beneficiaries of free trade, right? And for an open, globalized economy. This wave of protectionism, which Trump initiated, and Biden has continued in a general picture, is bad for the world and bad for the Baltic states.DA: There is an alternative view to that, Andres, which is that, because of the policies, the global value chains are becoming more compact, they're becoming more localized. And as the global value chains are, let's say, semi-returned to Europe, away from Asia, then the Baltic States together with Poland and other countries are expected to be the big beneficiaries of, say, manufacturing returning to Europe.I don't think it's such a black and white picture, but a collapsing global trade is necessarily bad for the Baltic States. It depends on the domestic policies which are adopted that can seize the opportunity in a sense.MS: And when it comes to energy, if the United States chooses to become the major player in the world in terms of energy supply, it could change and change in general, the picture of the world that we have.But that is a big question: the tracking issue, getting further away from the green plan or implementing this plan. There are advantages and disadvantages of either path.In order to stop climate change, I think fracking would be quite a bad decision because it's increasing dependency on this fuel. But when it comes to changing the power balance, that could be the way to end the war in Ukraine, pushing Russia to the corner, because the bulk of its budget comes from natural resources.This would add more competition: increasing the supply of energy resources in the world's market.IE: For a non-question, that actually was a quite interesting response.But to come back to the idea—Donna you were talking about people's feelings of democracy and the shift in the way that the Baltic states perhaps are perceiving or showing off their strength, in democracy—you all sort of mentioned attitudes on the ground.I'd like to explore that a little bit more. I mean, Margarita noted that people think of the American elections as potentially more consequential than the upcoming elections in Lithuania. Do you feel that on a day-to-day basis? Is it just in surveys or are people paying attention? Do they care?And how do they view the state of democracy in the United States, which I think is a big question on this side of the Atlantic.DA: Well, I think we clearly see that the media in Latvia, at least, are following this election much more closely than previous elections. Certainly, that's because of the nature of the election taking place at a time of war, not so far away from us.But it's also because of the candidates and especially Trump. I mean, Trump is news. He's magnetic. And there is a feeling about, “Wow, look at this guy.” Some people look at him in awe. I would say a majority look at him in confusion as to, as to why is it that he's so attractive to American voters.But certainly, the nature of the candidates, as well as the context of the election, is something which draws public attention. And we see a lot of newscasts, a lot of discussion shows, both on television and online portals, dedicated to the American elections more so than in previous years.AK: In fact, as soon as we finish recording this, I will have to go to an Estonian webcast to discuss the US election. So, indeed, there's plenty of interest and a realization that this matters to us in the Baltic states quite a bit, but that's been the case for previous US elections as well.Trump just adds this more of a circus atmosphere to it that was perhaps not present and a sort of polarizing view. But when you talked earlier about the impact of Trump on Europe, I can remember back to when Obama was elected, right?And the response in Europe was: Western Europeans loved him. Eastern Europeans were a little bit more skeptical, but even the Western Europeans who loved Obama were very disappointed by the man because he was focused on a pivot to Asia. And he didn't give the Europeans the deference and the time of day that his predecessors had.So that's already a shift that's been going on for quite some time and Biden has been the throwback to the way things were, but I think we can expect that Biden will be sort of the last real trans-Atlanticist American president.MS: Yeah, I just want to pick what Andras was mentioning in terms of the policies of the potential US leader, President Harris or President Trump, and the consequences for the Baltic countries. I think that this pivot to Asia is very consequential, and the consequences are increasing with time.And first of all, it was more economic and political, but now it's also related to defense. We've seen, one of the former advisors of Trump, Elbridge Colby, say that Taiwan and the security of Taiwan, would be a more important issue than the security of Europe or Eastern Europe and that he would advise Baltic countries to not stop at 3 percent spending from GDP, but continue spending more for defense and reaching perhaps 10 percent, which is a lot of money.And I don't think it's attainable in the near future. However, the US Pivot to Asia had an effect on Lithuanian policies. If your major ally pivots to Asia, you have to pivot there as well. I think that there is more Asia in Lithuania and there is more Lithuania in Asia in the Indo-Pacific at the moment.First of all, it started with the hosting of Taiwanese representation in Vilnius under the name of Taiwan, which became a major issue for China. A major argument with China ensued on economic, secondary sanctions that China was threatening with political ranting and a lot of other things.But then due to this disagreement, we discovered a lot of potential for cooperation in this area. At the moment, the economic relationships with Indo-Pacific countries are increasing quite speedily. And there are more of those countries, like South Korea and Japan, in Lithuania, both politically, but also economically.And we are also discussing our security corporation, particularly in the era of cyber security. I think that this is an important turn for Lithuania, probably for other Baltic countries to a less extent, but still, and this is also a certain security net for us. If there will be some more speedy pivot to Asia under the Trump presidency, we might also try to ask our friends in Taiwan to say some good words about Lithuania and our security to the ear of Trump, because Trump most likely will listen what Taiwanese are saying.IE: Well, you've kind of tackled the last question head on, which is what are the Baltic States doing to ensure their own futures? Regardless of who ends up in the White House in November. I want to open it up for any last words or thoughts on the subject.Any final conclusions that you'd like to share?DA: Well, I think a big development, possibly a positive outcome from the events in Ukraine, is the additional impetus for Baltic cooperation. Because Baltic cooperation really has lagged for the last 30 years. If we compare the way in which the Baltic states work with each other to our closest neighbors, the Nordics, we don't really cooperate. We've imitated some of the institutions of the North, but we haven't really enacted them. We haven't sort of like full-bloodedly, adopted them. But we can see that when it comes to defense, there are some very serious initiatives, which have moved ahead recently.I think procurement is one of the big areas where we see Latvia cooperating with Estonia, for example, in air defense systems, in buying training grenades. We also have a cooperation between Latvia and Lithuania on respirators. We have the Baltic defense line—although that seems to be being executed individually by each state—but it was still a common announcement with a common aim, and so on. It would be great if this was an impetus for even further Baltic cooperation, because there are many areas where we would benefit from cooperating with each other in a sort of Nordic style politically, economically, culturally, and so on.Because we are an extremely dynamic region of Europe, especially if we look at the Lithuanian economy, which is to an outsider, an amazing story. What's happened there over the last 20 years is a story to tell, and there is a common identity and common political structures which can be built upon, beginning with this enhanced military cooperation, but taking that to various political and economic levels as well.So that's one thing that I would end on attempting to be more positive.AK: I would just add and expand on Daunis, for the regional cooperation, of course, is much wider. It's a Nordic Baltic cooperation, which is the most intense and active at the moment. And the one good outcome of Putin's invasion of Ukraine has been Finland and Sweden joining NATO, which has given a real impetus to Nordic Baltic cooperation, which was already strong in all other fields.But now with defense cooperation also, we're all much closer together in the region and it's one of the most dynamic regions in the European Union.MS: I guess I'm obliged to step even further on the European level. I don't know how strong this political will and commitment in the European institutions and in some European countries will continue to be. I guess it will depend at the end of the day on the level of a threat—but we will not be living in a less threatening environment in the future—and the appetite to build strong defense industry and defense in Europe.That's a very, very important step forward. And if one thing is to come from the Ukrainian War, I would say that this would be a very, very important thing for the future of the European Union as the player in international politics.IE: Well, Professors Kasekamp, Šešelgytė, Auers. Thank you so much for your time for your commentary and we really appreciate you taking the time to speak on this subject. Thank you very much. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fpribalticinitiative.substack.com

A TBTP LIVE EVENT: As the presidential election gets closer, let's do the thing you're never supposed to do and - talk about politics and religion! Republican Austin Freeman (who will be voting for Trump) and Christian Democrat, Josh Crawford (who will be voting for Harris) explain how their faith informs their ballot-casting. Don't worry, we'll have a Libertarian there too - Doug Stuart from the Libertarian Christian Institute! Our larger panel in the second half of the night will includes Evan McClanahan and Cody Pogue.

Christian Democrats advocate criminalization of paradigmatically innocent conduct, and they do it in the name of the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. One such example is the book by Mike Austin called "God, Guns and America." This is part one of a review of the book with Kurtis Olson on FB LIVE 17 March 2021 at 6:33 pm The Republican Professor is produced and hosted by Dr. Lucas J. Mather, Ph.D. This episode was co-hosted and co-produced by Mr. Kurtis Olson. Warmly, Lucas J. Mather, Ph.D. The Republican Professor Podcast The Republican Professor Newsletter on Substack https://therepublicanprofessor.substack.com/ https://www.therepublicanprofessor.com/podcast/ https://www.therepublicanprofessor.com/articles/ YouTube channel: https://www.youtube.com/@TheRepublicanProfessor Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/TheRepublicanProfessor Twitter: @RepublicanProf Instagram: @the_republican_professor

Die ÖVP ist von der Volkspartei zu einer Mittelpartei geworden. Das liegt aber nicht nur an ihrer Politik, sondern an großen Veränderungen, die sich überall in Westeuropa vollziehen. Ein deep dive zur Lage der ÖVP – und warum stabile Mitte-Rechts-Parteien so wichtig sind, mit Reinhard Heinisch. Die Folge ist erstmals im Dezember 2021 erschienen.Reinhard Heinisch ist Politikwissenschafter an der Universität Salzburg. Zuvor war er 30 Jahre in den USA, hat dort studiert und als Professor an der University of Pittsburgh geforscht und unterrichtet.Grundlage für das Gespräch sind diese Studien:Riding the Populist Wave. Europe's Mainstream Right in Crisis.  Zu Österreich hat Reinhard, gemeinsam mit Annika Werner, die Studie "Tracing the Christian Democrats' Adaptation to the Silent Counter-Revolution" geschrieben.Center-Right Political Parties in Advanced DemocraciesThe Kurz affair has uncovered the Trumpian dimension of Austrian politics ***Erklär mir die Welt hilft dir dabei, die Welt besser zu verstehen. Hilf wie 380+ andere Hörer:innen mit, den Podcast zu finanzieren. Danke an alle Unterstützer:innen! ***So kannst du noch mithelfen Schick uns deine Fragen und Wünsche für EpisodenErzähl uns von dir! Mach bei der Hörer:innen-Befragung mit ***Du willst mehr?Bewirb dich als Hörer:in des MonatsHol dir Updates zum Podcast per WhatsApp, Newsletter, Telegram oder SignalFolge uns bei Tiktok, Instagram und FacebookQuatsche mit anderen Hörer:innen auf DiscordAlle Folgen ab Mai 2023 gibt es mit Video auf YouTubeSchau im Merch-Shop vorbeiHier kannst du Werbung im Podcast buchenAndreas' Buch "Alles gut?!" darüber, was er im Kampf gegen Armut auf der Welt beitragen kannGroße Empfehlung für Steady, wenn du wie ich von deiner Community leben möchtest ***Das Team:Mitarbeit: Sidonie SagmeisterVermarktung: Missing LinkAudio Production: Audio Funnel Video Production: DomotionLogo: Florian HalbmayrMusik: Something Elated by Broke For Free, CC BYBeatbox am Ende: Azad Arslantas

This week we talk about the National Rally, Macron, and the European Union.We also discuss Marine Le Pen, elections, and the French National Assembly.Recommended Book: Pockets by Hannah CarlsonTranscriptThe first week of June 2024, the EU held its parliamentary election, the tenth since it began holding such elections in 1979, and this one was notable in part because the number of MEPs—Members of European Parliament—increased from 705 to 720, due to population changes in the bloc, those new seats given to growing countries, one apiece to Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, Latvia, Austria, Poland, Finland, Slovenia, and Slovakia, and two apiece to Spain, France, and the Netherlands—though that figure still a far cry from where it was before the UK left as part of its Brexit withdrawal from the union, which culminated in 2020.These elections happen every five years, so this was the first EU election since the UK left, which means we got to see how things would shake out, post-British-presence in the bloc, a bit of a power vacuum beginning to be filled by those that remain, alliances adjusting somewhat to account for that change.Those few structural items aside though, this election was also notable in its outcome, as, while centrist parties like the European People's Party, or EPP, which is center-right, and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats, or S&D, which is center-left, each claimed substantially more seats than any other party—about 190 and 136, respectively, as of the day I'm recording this, though the final votes are still being counted, so some of these numbers are prone to changing a bit in the coming days—and Renew Europe—a fairly center-aligned party—coming in at a distant third with about 80 seats, the Identity and Democracy Group, which is made up of mostly far-right parties, looks to have achieved a strong fifth place; again, the numbers are still being tallied as I record this, so these numbers are still provisional, but it looks like they grabbed about 58 seats, which is 9 more than they had, pre-vote.While centrist politicians and parties still hold the reins, then, their collective majority is shrinking, Identity and Democracy, and a slew of smaller, also further-right parties scooping up quite a few seats in this election, these groups attracting a lot more support from certain demographics, especially young men under 30, and especially in Germany, France, Spain, Italy, Portugal, Belgium, and Finland.This shift in ideology is being attributed to many things, including but not limited to the rise in so-called identity politics, which some data suggest is causing young men, in particular, to feel excluded from some aspects of modern social life, the success of far-right groups in spreading their messages on social networks, heightened levels of immigration, which far-right groups seem to have successfully tied to all manner of societal ills, and the general tendency of whatever group is in power to spark discontent, tipping the scale toward their opposition simply because they've been governing, and you can't really govern without upsetting someone about something, and without taking the blame for things that are beyond your control, as well.This surge in votes for far-right groups isn't expected to substantially change the direction of the EU, as a lot of policies, including aspects of the bloc's regulatory apparatus, their pivot toward net zero efforts and renewable energy, and their general position on foreign antagonists like Russia, and by some estimates, China, as well, are basically locked in for the next few voting periods, at the minimum.But there is a chance specific elements of these goals, and other, less central pursuits, will be more difficult to pass and support over the long-haul, and policies that centralize power with the EU, rather than individual countries, will likely have a harder time getting passed, as most of these far-right groups are also quite Euro-skeptical and nationalist.What I'd like to talk about today is the outcome of this election in one EU nation—France—and why French President Macron decided to call a snap vote following the tallying of the ballots.—In 2022, the liberal coalition Ensemble, which includes French President Macron's party, Renaissance, lost the absolute majority it had previously enjoyed in France's National Assembly, its lower house of government, which marked the first time since 1997 the French President hadn't also held an absolute majority in that parliamentary body.That same year, the nationalist, far-right National Rally party gained a bunch of seats, as did the left-wing to far-left New Ecological and Social People's Union. This resulted in a hung parliament, which hadn't happened since 1988, and among other consequences, that meant passing laws and other sorts of governance became a lot trickier, as Macron had to make deals with people and groups he didn't typically ally with, and with whom his party had a lot of disagreements.This sort of setup often leads to creative approaches to collaboration, including, at times, the formation of new coalitions, alongside alliances between existing coalitions—that's the general European model for this sort of thing, and that's why centrist parties tend to do the best, most of the time, because they're often made up of parties that would otherwise be at each others' throats; sharing power tends to result in better outcomes, basically, at least over the long-haul, even if they are simultaneously frustrating and sluggishness-inducing.Some parties are more primed for collaboration than others, though, and Macron's Renaissance and the National Rally, the latter of which is led by former presidential candidate in the country's 2012, 2017, and 2022 elections, Marine Le Pen, have long been at odds, the Renaissance party claiming a broad spectrum of stances across the French political center, while Le Pen's party has scooped up the religious, conservative right, promoting, especially, causes related to anti-immigration, protectionism, and nationalism, in recent years trying to temper her party's reputation for racism, anti-homosexuality, and anti-abortion stances and scandals, among other issues that have made attracting a wider base of votes difficult for her party and party leaders, in the past.The Christian Democrats, which are part of the leading European coalition, shifted some of their platform policies to the right, seemingly to great effect, to stave-off the worst of the attacks they faced related to immigration and climate, leading up to the most recent EU election, but the National Rally managed to attain around 32% of the total vote in that election, crushing Macron's Renaissance party, which only attracted something like 15%.In response, Macron announced what's being seen as a bit of a desperate gambit: he dissolved parliament, which means he's announced a snap national election—so for French parliamentary seats, rather than EU seats—3 years ahead of the next scheduled vote, which will result in the election of a brand new batch of parliamentarians; that vote will begin on June 30, and that initial vote will determine who makes it to the second ballot on July 7 of this year.Macron is framing this dissolution and election as an effort to fight what he calls "unnatural alliances" between far left groups on one side, and far right groups on the other, accusing enemies of teaming up to take out him and his centrist allies, basically. And his argument is that voters need to use this opportunity to preserve the governance of centrist parties in the country, because if his party and allies don't hold onto the reins of power, those who take over will tear France apart, pushing things to greater and greater extremes, left and right, and casting everyday life, and the basic functions of government—which is imperfect but relatively stable—into chaos.Folks may have cast protest votes in the EU elections, in other words—which is a fairly common thing for folks to do across Europe, as many citizens don't pay particularly close attention to the machinations of politics at the Union scale—but at the local level, his argument goes, this is important. And it's important enough that he's willing to risk his position at the top of some aspects of governance, and his party's seats in the Assembly, in order to make that point; vote smart, not angry, essentially.There's a chance this pitch and gamble will work, that voters will rally behind the center, more people coming out to do more than just protest vote, and that things will go back to something like the normalcy of the past decade.But there's also a chance votes will accumulate primarily with far-right and far-left parties, as they did in the EU election that triggered this gambit, which would likely mean Macron would lose a lot of the power he currently wields—France's president is elected separately from parliamentarians, so he would exist in a state of what's called "cohabitation," where he would wield some powers, and the prime minister, put into their position by the dominant group in the Assembly, would wield others—would struggle against each other while a grand realignment of the country's economy, politics, and society, and in turn, that of the EU as a whole, France being one of the most vital and powerful states in that bloc, would play out over the course of the next several years.There are concerns from the currently governing centrists that a victory for Le Pen and her allies might also mean renewed vigor for far-right groups throughout the EU, as while typically those in charge experience a degradation of support eventually, after they've had the chance to govern and fumble things for a while, taking the blame for all the bad stuff that happens, that usually takes years, and the number of bastions for far-right thinking and support throughout the bloc right now indicates that side of the political spectrum has been out of power long enough that folks might support them—even people who wouldn't usually opt for their politics—just to get something different. And it could be a while before they, once more, become the parties folks are scrambling to move away from; they're the underdog rebels right now, and it will take time before they're the unpopular establishment.Polls from just after the snap election was announced suggest that Le Pen's National Rally could win up to 265 seats, just shy of the around 290 required for an absolute majority in France's National Assembly.The dominant further-left alliance, New Popular Front, is in second place, with Macron's party languishing in third; in percentage terms, one of those polls gave the far-right National Rally 35% of all seats, the further-left New Popular Front about 26%, and Macron's left-ish-centrist Renaissance party just 19%.Even lacking an absolute majority, though, the National Rally, which is loaded with young, social media-savvy politicians, in contrast to the aging power players in most of the centrist parties in the region, could set itself up for a series of near-future wins, carving out space as chief-antagonist during Macron's remaining days in office, however long that ends up being, which in turn would give them the chance to make authoritative decisions with fewer perceptual consequences: the bad stuff will still often land on Macron's shoulders, regardless of who made what happen, or disallowed what from happening, but they could still nudge things across the country, and the bloc, to their liking in a variety of less headline-grabbing ways.Macron could of course establish new alliances, as is the European way, though the closer the National Rally gets to that absolute majority, the more desperate and discordant those alliances would have to be, and that would put more power in the hands of non-centrist entities, potentially shoving France to new ideological extremes, even if it's still technically guided by the same, centrist hands; they would have to cater to the desires of those less-than-ideal, from their perspective, allies, basically.At the moment, markets in the country are tumbling on concerns about what might happen if France has something like a Brexit-moment, pulled apart by more extreme parties after a long period of centrism, and there's a larger concern about the EU as a whole, as these sorts of successes for far-right parties in even a handful of countries may portend a wave of anti-immigration, anti-gay rights, anti-abortion, and anti-renewable energy policies, among other policies that tend to make nationalists and harder-core religious folks happy, but which often come with dire consequences for everything from foreign investments to cultural exports, in countries where those sorts of policies are deployed, en masse; great for the folks votes for these sorts of efforts, in other words, but not great for economics and soft-power, cultural influence.On the other hand, some of the policies these groups have supported, including somewhat popular ones, like those related to cutting prices on fundamentals like energy and food, and less popular in practice, but somewhat popular in promotion efforts, like cutting public spending, might find their way into governance across the EU, whomever ends up in power, as any outcome will almost certainly rely on new or edited coalition arrangements, plus some bending on the part of centrist parties—similar to what we saw by the Christian Democrats at the bloc-level. Centrists might lean further right in order to avoid being beaten by further right parties, and that could sway things rightward, even without those further-right parties taking the reins, officially.Which means, through some lenses at least, this aggregation of victories for far-right parties in France and across the EU may have already tallied some practical outcomes, nudging governance toward something more aligned with their preferences, even if further success is limited.It could also have the politically opposite effect, though, pushing centrists toward also burgeoning further-left parties, creating new coalitions on that side of the spectrum to counter the growing ranks of those on the right.France may provide a bellwether for what happens across the rest of the bloc over the course of the next several election periods, though, so what happens on June 30th and July 7th could portend what happens elsewhere in the coming years.Show Noteshttps://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/14/french-leftwing-parties-popular-front-contest-snap-electionhttps://www.britannica.com/topic/cohabitationhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_European_Parliament_electionhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Marine_Le_Penhttps://www.reuters.com/markets/europe/french-finance-minister-warns-financial-crisis-yields-surge-snap-elections-2024-06-14/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Identity_and_Democracy_Partyhttps://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/article/2024/jun/14/far-right-seduced-young-voters-europe-electionshttps://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jun/15/macron-gamble-marine-le-pen-france-polls-far-righthttps://results.elections.europa.eu/en/european-results/2024-2029/https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/why-you-should-care-about-european-parliament-election-2024-04-24/https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/how-far-right-gained-traction-with-europes-youth-2024-06-13/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_to_the_European_Parliamenthttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2024_French_legislative_electionhttps://www.france24.com/en/europe/20240612-france-fighting-two-fronts-macron-flags-extremist-fever-right-left-electionhttps://www.npr.org/2024/06/09/nx-s1-4997712/far-right-europe-elections-france-macron-germany-scholzhttps://www.politico.eu/article/eu-european-election-results-2024-emmanuel-macron-dissolve-parliament-france/https://www.politico.eu/article/ursula-von-der-leyen-european-commission-president-european-election-2024/https://sg.news.yahoo.com/frances-far-national-rally-finally-162408806.html?guccounter=1 This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe

In this next episode recorded during the 2024 Kuyper Conference at Calvin University, the team sits down with James Bratt author of the biography Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist, Christian Democrat. They discuss how Bratt discovered the neo-Calvinist tradition and how he wrote the biography. Publications mentioned in this episode: James D. Bratt, Abraham Kuyper: Modern Calvinist, Christian Democrat, Library of Religious Biography (Grand Rapids, Mich: W.B. Eerdmans Pub. Co, 2013). Abraham Kuyper and James D. Bratt, Abraham Kuyper: A Centennial Reader (Grand Rapids, Mich. : Carlisle: W.B. Eerdmans ; Paternoster Press, 1998). Our theme music is Molly Molly by Blue Dot Sessions (www.sessions.blue) ⁠⁠CC BY-NC 4.0⁠⁠ Reach us at graceincommonpodcast@gmail.com. If you want to make a donation, please visit ⁠⁠⁠⁠https://donorbox.org/graceincommon

Roger Cohen writes: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/05/world/europe/europe-far-right.html Mass immigration — some 5.1 million immigrants entered the European Union in 2022, more than double the number the previous year — is the core issue behind the changing nature of the right in Europe. It is widely resented, particularly because aging populations have put enormous financial pressure on the cherished social safety nets that they, and previous generations, have long paid into. Overlooked are the benefits that immigrants can bring to societies with shrinking labor forces and tax bases. Instead the focus is on migrants benefiting from handouts. “We have to make our country less attractive to a form of immigration that sees us as a social cash machine,” Mr. Bardella said. “The vocation of France is not to support all the world's misery! Social assistance and child benefits must be reserved for French citizens.” Over the almost 80-year arc of the postwar period, the once-dominant center-left and center-right — represented in France by the Socialists and the Gaullists, and in Germany by the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats — have seen the foundations of their support (labor unions for the left and the church for the right) gradually erode. Increasingly, with major ideological disputes over the place of the state in the economy settled, moderate right and moderate left began to feel indistinguishable to many people. They had no answers to mass migration. The working class, long the cornerstone of socialism in Europe, migrated en masse to the anti-immigrant right as an expression of frustration at growing inequality and stagnant paychecks. https://odysee.com/@LukeFordLive, https://rumble.com/lukeford, https://dlive.tv/lukefordlivestreams Superchat: https://entropystream.live/app/lukefordlive Bitchute: https://www.bitchute.com/channel/lukeford/ Soundcloud MP3s: https://soundcloud.com/luke-ford-666431593 Code of Conduct: https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=125692 http://lukeford.net Email me: lukeisback@gmail.com or DM me on Twitter.com/lukeford, Best videos: https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=143746 Support the show | https://www.streamlabs.com/lukeford, https://patreon.com/lukeford, https://PayPal.Me/lukeisback Facebook: http://facebook.com/lukecford Book an online Alexander Technique lesson with Luke: https://alexander90210.com Feel free to clip my videos. It's nice when you link back to the original.

Roger Cohen writes: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/05/world/europe/europe-far-right.html Mass immigration — some 5.1 million immigrants entered the European Union in 2022, more than double the number the previous year — is the core issue behind the changing nature of the right in Europe. It is widely resented, particularly because aging populations have put enormous financial pressure on the cherished social safety nets that they, and previous generations, have long paid into. Overlooked are the benefits that immigrants can bring to societies with shrinking labor forces and tax bases. Instead the focus is on migrants benefiting from handouts. “We have to make our country less attractive to a form of immigration that sees us as a social cash machine,” Mr. Bardella said. “The vocation of France is not to support all the world's misery! Social assistance and child benefits must be reserved for French citizens.” Over the almost 80-year arc of the postwar period, the once-dominant center-left and center-right — represented in France by the Socialists and the Gaullists, and in Germany by the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats — have seen the foundations of their support (labor unions for the left and the church for the right) gradually erode. Increasingly, with major ideological disputes over the place of the state in the economy settled, moderate right and moderate left began to feel indistinguishable to many people. They had no answers to mass migration. The working class, long the cornerstone of socialism in Europe, migrated en masse to the anti-immigrant right as an expression of frustration at growing inequality and stagnant paychecks. https://odysee.com/@LukeFordLive, https://rumble.com/lukeford, https://dlive.tv/lukefordlivestreams Superchat: https://entropystream.live/app/lukefordlive Bitchute: https://www.bitchute.com/channel/lukeford/ Soundcloud MP3s: https://soundcloud.com/luke-ford-666431593 Code of Conduct: https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=125692 http://lukeford.net Email me: lukeisback@gmail.com or DM me on Twitter.com/lukeford, Best videos: https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=143746 Support the show | https://www.streamlabs.com/lukeford, https://patreon.com/lukeford, https://PayPal.Me/lukeisback Facebook: http://facebook.com/lukecford Book an online Alexander Technique lesson with Luke: https://alexander90210.com Feel free to clip my videos. It's nice when you link back to the original.

Roger Cohen writes: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/05/05/world/europe/europe-far-right.html Mass immigration — some 5.1 million immigrants entered the European Union in 2022, more than double the number the previous year — is the core issue behind the changing nature of the right in Europe. It is widely resented, particularly because aging populations have put enormous financial pressure on the cherished social safety nets that they, and previous generations, have long paid into. Overlooked are the benefits that immigrants can bring to societies with shrinking labor forces and tax bases. Instead the focus is on migrants benefiting from handouts. “We have to make our country less attractive to a form of immigration that sees us as a social cash machine,” Mr. Bardella said. “The vocation of France is not to support all the world's misery! Social assistance and child benefits must be reserved for French citizens.” Over the almost 80-year arc of the postwar period, the once-dominant center-left and center-right — represented in France by the Socialists and the Gaullists, and in Germany by the Social Democrats and the Christian Democrats — have seen the foundations of their support (labor unions for the left and the church for the right) gradually erode. Increasingly, with major ideological disputes over the place of the state in the economy settled, moderate right and moderate left began to feel indistinguishable to many people. They had no answers to mass migration. The working class, long the cornerstone of socialism in Europe, migrated en masse to the anti-immigrant right as an expression of frustration at growing inequality and stagnant paychecks. https://odysee.com/@LukeFordLive, https://rumble.com/lukeford, https://dlive.tv/lukefordlivestreams Superchat: https://entropystream.live/app/lukefordlive Bitchute: https://www.bitchute.com/channel/lukeford/ Soundcloud MP3s: https://soundcloud.com/luke-ford-666431593 Code of Conduct: https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=125692 http://lukeford.net Email me: lukeisback@gmail.com or DM me on Twitter.com/lukeford, Best videos: https://lukeford.net/blog/?p=143746 Support the show | https://www.streamlabs.com/lukeford, https://patreon.com/lukeford, https://PayPal.Me/lukeisback Facebook: http://facebook.com/lukecford Book an online Alexander Technique lesson with Luke: https://alexander90210.com Feel free to clip my videos. It's nice when you link back to the original.

President Trump is absolutely right. Jewish Democrats hate their religion and so do Christian Democrats. Agree or disagree?See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

PREVIEW: #UKRAINE: WEIMAR TRIANGLE: Conversation with Judy Dempsey, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Editor-in-Chief: Strategic Europe, in Berlin re the meeting on March 15 in Berlin of Weimar Triangle) Donald Tusk of Poland, Emanuel Macron of France and Olaaf Scholz of Germany -- and how the Bundestag opposition, the Christian Democrats, are in position to drive the case in Germany that what is critical in the Ukraine War is that Ukraine must win --unlike the fact that Olaf Scholz deoes not call for Ukraine to win.  More later on the German dispute with the EU, with NATO, within the Bundestag.   1945 Berlin

Join The Local with our podcast listener offerIn the latest episode of the Germany in Focus podcast, host Rachel Loxton is joined by panelists Rachel Stern and Aaron Burnett. Our sound engineer is Rhys Edwards.We chat about American football's popularity in Germany and Rachel Loxton's trip to Frankfurt to see an NFL game. Millions of fans: How Germany fell in love with American footballWe get into the latest strikes in Germany and how they might affect you. How will Germany's public service strikes affect you?Is Germany set for more train strikes in the weeks ahead?We talk about how long Germans typically live and why life expectancy is falling. In which parts of Germany do people live the longest?After a group of hikers were questioned by police, we discuss border checks in Germany and heightened tensions following the outbreak of the Middle East war. Why are German police carrying out checks on hikers at the borders?Since we recorded our podcast, it emerged that the opposition Christian Democrats have a submitted a bill for discussion that would see foreigners lose their citizenship rights if they are found to be anti-Semitic. Could Germany strip citizenship rights from foreigners over anti-Semitism?Under Germany's new immigration law, family reunification rules are being eased - but only for future skilled workers. We hear from a Local reader who wants to bring an ageing parent to Germany. Why is Germany only easing family reunification rules for future skilled workers?Finally, we talk about the most surprising taxes in Germany. What is Germany's lucrative dog tax and how much do you have to pay? Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Lights on! Democratic superstar James Talarico joins Jessica Denson for this special episode of Lights On. Applying his own faith to call out the hypocrisy of Republicans on everything from gun legislation to Ten Commandments bills, Rep. Talarico's viral moments in the Texas legislature are garnering national praise. Now the Christian Democrat is eyeing a statewide run to finally turn Texas from fascist to blue. Watch as Rep. Talarico joins Jessica LIVE to discuss Christianity in politics, extreme Supreme Court decisions, the Texas climate emergency, and more! Thanks to our sponsor! ROCKET MONEY: Cancel unwanted subscriptions – and manage your expenses the easy way – by going to RocketMoney.com/lightson Remember to subscribe to ALL the Meidas Media Podcasts: MeidasTouch: https://pod.link/1510240831 Legal AF: https://pod.link/1580828595 The PoliticsGirl Podcast: https://pod.link/1595408601 The Influence Continuum: https://pod.link/1603773245 Kremlin File: https://pod.link/1575837599 Mea Culpa with Michael Cohen: https://pod.link/1530639447 The Weekend Show: https://pod.link/1612691018 The Tony Michaels Podcast: https://pod.link/1561049560 American Psyop: https://pod.link/1652143101 Burn the Boats: https://pod.link/1485464343 Majority 54: https://pod.link/1309354521 Political Beatdown: https://pod.link/1669634407 Lights On with Jessica Denson: https://pod.link/1676844320 MAGA Uncovered: https://pod.link/1690214260 Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices