Podcasts about Baltic

 In 1576, Tycho Brahe was offered something no astronomer had ever received before: an island of his own. On the remote Baltic isle of Hven, Tycho set out to build the most advanced observatory in Europe.  But just as construction began, a brilliant comet appeared in the night sky. For Tycho, it was more than a celestial spectacle: it was a chance to test Aristotle, challenge old ideas, and prove that careful observation could overturn centuries of dogma. This episode traces Tycho's transformation from wandering scholar to scientific institution, as he turns a lonely island into the centre of the astronomical world. Contact: thecompletehistoryofscience@gmail.comBlueSky: https://bsky.app/profile/gethinrichards.bsky.socialMusic Credit: Folk Round Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com) Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 3.0 License

Europe's potential as an investment destination appears bright but realizing that potential depends on how the continent responds to the new geopolitics and the military threat from Russia. Confluence Chief Market Strategist Patrick Fearon Hernandez joins Phil Adler to focus on a key region where Europe is vulnerable, the Baltics. 

Forget Brussels, the first European Union was built by medieval merchants, not politicians. This week, we dive into the Hanseatic League: a loose alliance of 200 city-states that dominated trade across the Baltic and North Seas for 500 years. They pioneered free trade, built Europe's first banking networks, and forged a multilateral model that still shapes today's EU. Their story is also a warning. The League eventually lost out to land-based nation-states, a tension that's alive again in today's battles between globalists and nationalists, city-states and populist powers. Along the way, we also explore the unlikely African roots of Russia's greatest poet, medieval slave routes linking Dublin to Iran (!), and why the architecture of Lutheran cities tells the story of global trade. Join the gang! https://plus.acast.com/s/the-david-mcwilliams-podcast. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Jūrmala is Latvia's premier resort town. Originally a series of fishing villages by the sea just a short distance from Rīga, it transformed from a 19th-century Baltic spa destination to the Soviet Union's most exclusive holiday retreat. It is still a wonderful place to relax. Join me as we explore Jūrmala's past and present. Thanks for listening!

In this episode of Big Blend Radio's "Quiltripping Travel with Rose" podcast, travel writer and photographer Rose Palmer shares her experiences cruising aboard the Emerald Princess through the Baltic region. From the charm of Scandinavian cities to authentic cultural encounters and culinary delights, this engaging conversation is packed with travel insights and inspiration.

Rose Boyt tells Gyles about her unconventional childhood, and about her experiences of being parented by - and painted by - her father Lucian Freud, the celebrated modern artist. This is an extraordinary story: even Gyles is bowled over by the twists and turns of Rose's childhood. Rose's parents were Lucian Freud and the artist Susie Boyt, with whom Freud had three other children. He also had many other children with other women - 14 children in all - and was never a conventional husband or father to any of them. But he was brilliant - dazzlingly entertaining, talented, intelligent and inspiring - and Rose experienced this at first hand when she was painted by him for a nude portrait which is the starting point for her book, Naked Portrait. Rose also spent a year living on a cargo ship in the Baltic, DJ'd with Neneh Cherry, and was briefly engaged to Andy Warhol. This is a fascinating interview about Rose, about Lucian Freud, about the artistic life, and about alternative ways of living and looking at the world.Rose Boyt's book, Naked Portrait is out in paperback, published by Picador. It is highly recommended.This episode was recorded at the JW Marriott Grosvenor House in London. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Koncerty, kursy mistrzowskie oraz międzynarodowy konkurs wykonawczy, pomagający młodym adeptom rozwijać swoje umiejętności i budować muzyczną karierę. Tak przedstawia się program tegorocznych Baltic Guitar Days. To jedyne takie wydarzenie w zachodniej części  kraju.

By J. Overton Dr. Sebastian Bruns joins the program to talk about his article, “Conundrums, Right Ahead: Five strategic concerns for Baltic Sea decision-makers.” Sebastian is a naval strategist and sea power expert based in Kiel, Germany, where he is senior researcher at the Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University. Download Sea Control 575: … Continue reading Sea Control 575: Baltic Conundrums with Sebastian Bruns →

A government-appointed inquiry recommends Sweden stop international adoptions due to irregularities, including instances of child trafficking. And: We hear about threats to a mainstay of Swedish cuisine, the humble Baltic herring. Radio Sweden's Ulla Engberg's been looking into the issue.Presenters: Michael Walsh & Dave RussellProducer: Sujay Dutt

Darren Hefty — South Dakota farmer, co-host of Ag PhD TV and Radio, and a respected leader in both agriculture and ag business. With a legacy rooted in service, innovation, and education, Darren shares the powerful story of how he, his brother Brian, and their father built Hefty Seed Company into the 7th largest crop production firm and the 9th largest seed retailer in the U.S., now operating across 50 locations in 12 states.Darren walks us through his early days on the farm, starting at just 7 years old in the farrow-to-finish hog operation, making auction decisions with his dad at 10, and managing hired help by age 13. His passion for agriculture was matched by an early sense of responsibility — a trait that continues to define his leadership today..You'll also hear about the upcoming Ag PhD Field Day on July 31 in Baltic, South Dakota, now available for streaming on AcresTV, and why the mission of Ag PhD remains focused on serving farmers first.Whether you're a farmer, ag business owner, or just someone looking to learn from one of the industry's most experienced and grounded voices, this episode is full of real-world perspective, ag innovation, and leadership lessons you won't want to miss. Want Farm4Profit Merch? Custom order your favorite items today!https://farmfocused.com/farm-4profit/ Don't forget to like the podcast on all platforms and leave a review where ever you listen! Website: www.Farm4Profit.comShareable episode link: https://intro-to-farm4profit.simplecast.comEmail address: Farm4profitllc@gmail.comCall/Text: 515.207.9640Subscribe to YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCSR8c1BrCjNDDI_Acku5XqwFollow us on TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@farm4profitllc Connect with us on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Farm4ProfitLLC/

James Ginn is senior pastor to the Baltic, Nordic and Eastern European countries.  He and his wife, Kristine, have embarked on an ingenious translation process using AI to translate UCG articles and booklets.  You can help with some steps in this process that do not require you to know the languages.  We have tested it and it works great!  Heidi Braun in Cincinnati just completed a booklet in short order successfully!    You can do it, too!    Can you help us?   Contact James Ginn at  ucgtranslations@gmail,com Please listen to how this is done.  We also talk about our work in this part of the world. Thanks for helping! Visit our NordicBaltic podcast at  https://nordicbaltictopics.podbean.com/

Erin Hunt and Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan work for Mines Action Canada, which supports the global ban on anti-personnel mines. The Baltic states, with ther justifiable history of fearing Russia, are about to withdraw from the treaty unless NATO countries can talk them out of it. For the video and audio podcast: https://tosavetheworld.ca/episode-685-updating-landmines-action

When World War II ended, about one million people whom the Soviet Union claimed as its citizens were outside the borders of the USSR, mostly in the Western-occupied zones of Germany and Austria. These “displaced persons,” or DPs—Russians, prewar Soviet citizens, and people from West Ukraine and the Baltic states forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939—refused to repatriate to the Soviet Union despite its demands. Thus began one of the first big conflicts of the Cold War. In Lost Souls, Sheila Fitzpatrick draws on new archival research, including Soviet interviews with hundreds of DPs, to offer a vivid account of this crisis, from the competitive maneuverings of politicians and diplomats to the everyday lives of DPs.American enthusiasm for funding the refugee organizations taking care of DPs quickly waned after the war. It was only after DPs were redefined—from “victims of war and Nazism” to “victims of Communism”—in 1947 that a solution was found: the United States would pay for the mass resettlement of DPs in America, Australia, and other countries outside Europe. The Soviet Union protested this “theft” of its citizens. But it was a coup for the United States. The choice of DPs to live a free life in the West, and the West's welcome of them, became an important theme in America's Cold War propaganda battle with the Soviet Union. A compelling story of the early Cold War, Lost Souls: Soviet Displaced Persons and the Birth of the Cold War (Princeton UP, 2024)is also a rare chronicle of a refugee crisis that was solved. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

1. "Conundrums, right ahead: Five strategic concerns for Baltic Sea decision-makers," by Sebastian Bruns, Royal Swedish Naval Society, 2024. (Website is in Swedish, Click the Ladda ned button to download the issue, the article is on page 61 of the PDF in English.)2."From 'Flooded Meadow' to Maritime Hotspot: Keeping the Baltic Sea Free, Open, and Interconnected," by Sebastian Bruns, Carnegie Endowment, December 20, 2023.3. Sea Control 548 – Maritime Competition in the Mediterranean with Dr. Sebastian Bruns & Dr. Jeremy Stöhs, by Jared Samuelson, CIMSEC, September 21, 2024.4. Institute for Security Policy at Kiel University.

When World War II ended, about one million people whom the Soviet Union claimed as its citizens were outside the borders of the USSR, mostly in the Western-occupied zones of Germany and Austria. These “displaced persons,” or DPs—Russians, prewar Soviet citizens, and people from West Ukraine and the Baltic states forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939—refused to repatriate to the Soviet Union despite its demands. Thus began one of the first big conflicts of the Cold War. In Lost Souls, Sheila Fitzpatrick draws on new archival research, including Soviet interviews with hundreds of DPs, to offer a vivid account of this crisis, from the competitive maneuverings of politicians and diplomats to the everyday lives of DPs.American enthusiasm for funding the refugee organizations taking care of DPs quickly waned after the war. It was only after DPs were redefined—from “victims of war and Nazism” to “victims of Communism”—in 1947 that a solution was found: the United States would pay for the mass resettlement of DPs in America, Australia, and other countries outside Europe. The Soviet Union protested this “theft” of its citizens. But it was a coup for the United States. The choice of DPs to live a free life in the West, and the West's welcome of them, became an important theme in America's Cold War propaganda battle with the Soviet Union. A compelling story of the early Cold War, Lost Souls: Soviet Displaced Persons and the Birth of the Cold War (Princeton UP, 2024)is also a rare chronicle of a refugee crisis that was solved. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

When World War II ended, about one million people whom the Soviet Union claimed as its citizens were outside the borders of the USSR, mostly in the Western-occupied zones of Germany and Austria. These “displaced persons,” or DPs—Russians, prewar Soviet citizens, and people from West Ukraine and the Baltic states forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939—refused to repatriate to the Soviet Union despite its demands. Thus began one of the first big conflicts of the Cold War. In Lost Souls, Sheila Fitzpatrick draws on new archival research, including Soviet interviews with hundreds of DPs, to offer a vivid account of this crisis, from the competitive maneuverings of politicians and diplomats to the everyday lives of DPs.American enthusiasm for funding the refugee organizations taking care of DPs quickly waned after the war. It was only after DPs were redefined—from “victims of war and Nazism” to “victims of Communism”—in 1947 that a solution was found: the United States would pay for the mass resettlement of DPs in America, Australia, and other countries outside Europe. The Soviet Union protested this “theft” of its citizens. But it was a coup for the United States. The choice of DPs to live a free life in the West, and the West's welcome of them, became an important theme in America's Cold War propaganda battle with the Soviet Union. A compelling story of the early Cold War, Lost Souls: Soviet Displaced Persons and the Birth of the Cold War (Princeton UP, 2024)is also a rare chronicle of a refugee crisis that was solved. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies

When World War II ended, about one million people whom the Soviet Union claimed as its citizens were outside the borders of the USSR, mostly in the Western-occupied zones of Germany and Austria. These “displaced persons,” or DPs—Russians, prewar Soviet citizens, and people from West Ukraine and the Baltic states forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939—refused to repatriate to the Soviet Union despite its demands. Thus began one of the first big conflicts of the Cold War. In Lost Souls, Sheila Fitzpatrick draws on new archival research, including Soviet interviews with hundreds of DPs, to offer a vivid account of this crisis, from the competitive maneuverings of politicians and diplomats to the everyday lives of DPs.American enthusiasm for funding the refugee organizations taking care of DPs quickly waned after the war. It was only after DPs were redefined—from “victims of war and Nazism” to “victims of Communism”—in 1947 that a solution was found: the United States would pay for the mass resettlement of DPs in America, Australia, and other countries outside Europe. The Soviet Union protested this “theft” of its citizens. But it was a coup for the United States. The choice of DPs to live a free life in the West, and the West's welcome of them, became an important theme in America's Cold War propaganda battle with the Soviet Union. A compelling story of the early Cold War, Lost Souls: Soviet Displaced Persons and the Birth of the Cold War (Princeton UP, 2024)is also a rare chronicle of a refugee crisis that was solved.

Interpreten: PhilharmonixLabel: Supreme Music GroupEAN: 4028098000784Bisher waren die Philharmonix bekannt für die absolute Abwechslung in ihren Programmen. „Von bis“ hieß die Devise. Auf ihrem neuen Album Baltic sind sie nun ausschließlich mit Kompositionen ihres geigenden Gruppenmitgliedes Sebastian Gürtler zu erleben. Auch so natürlich absolut abwechslungsreich und sehr „philharmix'isch“, findet Michael Gmasz.Zuletzt, auf Volume 3, reichte die Palette noch von Requiem for Falco, über einen Tanz der Salome bis hin zum Odessa Bulgar. Nun heißen die Stücke Noriet Saula Vakarā, Laumas Kāzas oder Tumša Nakte und sind allesamt an lettische Melodien, Volksweisen und sogar Kinderlieder angelehnt. Sebastian Gürtler, auch familiär mit Lettland verbandelt, hat für sich und seine sechs Philharmonix Kollegen neun Stücke geschrieben. Eine bunte Mischung an melancholischen, tänzerischen, sanglichen und manchmal spröden Klängen bieten in einer knappen Dreiviertelstunde eine Abwechslung an Stimmungen, wie immer originell arrangiert und auf allerhöchstem musikalischen Niveau gespielt.Wippende Rhythmen, ungewohnte Harmonien, breite Klangflächen usw. all das ist es, was die Musik des Baltikums oft ausmacht. Und auch Sebastian Gürtler hat sich bei vielen dieser Merkmale für seine eigenen Werke bedient. Jedes der neun Stücke erzählt seine Geschichte, vom galoppierenden Reiter auf der Suche nach seiner Braut, oder eben jener, genannt Lauma, deren Gefühlswelt vor ihrer Trauung zu einem nachdenklichen und doch fröhlichen Klanggemälde wird, oder vom Fischer, der nachts auf dem Wasser sowohl Mond- als auch Polarlicht genießt. Sebastian Gürtler hat seinen Zyklus im Philharmonix Stil arrangiert, sodass seine Kollegen Noah Bendix-Balgley, Thilo Fechner, Daniel Ottensamer, Christoph Traxler, Stephan Koncz und natürlich Ödön Rácz auch auf ihre Kosten kommen. Die Stücke sind zwar stilistisch ähnlich komponiert und dann doch wieder so unterschiedlich, dass ich selbst nach mehrmaligem Hören noch keinen Favoriten festgelegt habe. Wobei die Hymne an die Sommersonnenwende, Laumas Hochzeit und des Waisenkindes Dudelsäcke schon ganz oben stehen. Oder doch die Reiter oder der nächtliche Fischerausflug? (mg)

When World War II ended, about one million people whom the Soviet Union claimed as its citizens were outside the borders of the USSR, mostly in the Western-occupied zones of Germany and Austria. These “displaced persons,” or DPs—Russians, prewar Soviet citizens, and people from West Ukraine and the Baltic states forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939—refused to repatriate to the Soviet Union despite its demands. Thus began one of the first big conflicts of the Cold War. In Lost Souls, Sheila Fitzpatrick draws on new archival research, including Soviet interviews with hundreds of DPs, to offer a vivid account of this crisis, from the competitive maneuverings of politicians and diplomats to the everyday lives of DPs.American enthusiasm for funding the refugee organizations taking care of DPs quickly waned after the war. It was only after DPs were redefined—from “victims of war and Nazism” to “victims of Communism”—in 1947 that a solution was found: the United States would pay for the mass resettlement of DPs in America, Australia, and other countries outside Europe. The Soviet Union protested this “theft” of its citizens. But it was a coup for the United States. The choice of DPs to live a free life in the West, and the West's welcome of them, became an important theme in America's Cold War propaganda battle with the Soviet Union. A compelling story of the early Cold War, Lost Souls: Soviet Displaced Persons and the Birth of the Cold War (Princeton UP, 2024)is also a rare chronicle of a refugee crisis that was solved. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

When World War II ended, about one million people whom the Soviet Union claimed as its citizens were outside the borders of the USSR, mostly in the Western-occupied zones of Germany and Austria. These “displaced persons,” or DPs—Russians, prewar Soviet citizens, and people from West Ukraine and the Baltic states forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939—refused to repatriate to the Soviet Union despite its demands. Thus began one of the first big conflicts of the Cold War. In Lost Souls, Sheila Fitzpatrick draws on new archival research, including Soviet interviews with hundreds of DPs, to offer a vivid account of this crisis, from the competitive maneuverings of politicians and diplomats to the everyday lives of DPs.American enthusiasm for funding the refugee organizations taking care of DPs quickly waned after the war. It was only after DPs were redefined—from “victims of war and Nazism” to “victims of Communism”—in 1947 that a solution was found: the United States would pay for the mass resettlement of DPs in America, Australia, and other countries outside Europe. The Soviet Union protested this “theft” of its citizens. But it was a coup for the United States. The choice of DPs to live a free life in the West, and the West's welcome of them, became an important theme in America's Cold War propaganda battle with the Soviet Union. A compelling story of the early Cold War, Lost Souls: Soviet Displaced Persons and the Birth of the Cold War (Princeton UP, 2024)is also a rare chronicle of a refugee crisis that was solved. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this episode of Uptime News, Allen covers leadership changes at Eneco, historic renewable energy deals in Poland, strong support for wind energy in Ireland, and a surge in American clean energy investment. Sign up now for Uptime Tech News, our weekly email update on all things wind technology. This episode is sponsored by Weather Guard Lightning Tech. Learn more about Weather Guard's StrikeTape Wind Turbine LPS retrofit. Follow the show on Facebook, YouTube, Twitter, Linkedin and visit Weather Guard on the web. And subscribe to Rosemary Barnes' YouTube channel here. Have a question we can answer on the show? Email us! Welcome to Uptime News. Flash Industry News Lightning fast. Your host, Allen Hall, shares the renewable industry news you may have missed. Allen Hall: Leading off the week, there's a leadership change at a major European energy company. As Templeman is stepping down as CEO of Dutch Energy firm, Eneco on August 1st. Templeman is leaving to become the new chief executive of lighting company, signify in September. Eneco says Kees Jan Rameau will serve as interim CEO starting July 4th. The company's board has already started searching for a permanent replacement. Templeman joined an Eneco as CEO in July of 2020. The supervisory board chair Mel Kroon says Templeman led the successful launch of the company's one planet plan before Eneco. Templeman held senior positions at Shell across [00:01:00] Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and Africa. Over in Poland, energy companies have closed one of the largest renewable energy deals in European history. Norwegian firm, Equinor, and Polish company, Polenergia, have secured 6 billion euros in financing for two offshore wind projects. That's about $6.8 billion. The companies say it's the largest project finance deal in Poland's energy history. The Baltic two and Baltic three Wind Farms will feature 100 turbines with a combined capacity of 1.4 gigawatts. Polenergia, CEO Adam Purwin says they have secured financing from around 30 institutions. He says The company's obtained exceptionally favorable terms despite challenging market conditions, construction has already begun. Onshore marine operations will start next year. The wind farms should begin full commercial operation in 2028, and they'll provide power to more than 2 million [00:02:00] Polish households. And Irish citizens are showing strong support for wind energy development. A new national survey by Wind Energy Ireland found 80% of the public supports wind energy development, 62% back having a wind farm in the local area. The survey found people support wind energy because it offers more affordable electricity and reduces carbon emissions. Energy independence was also a key motivator. CEO. Noel Cunniffe says, Irish people know wind power is the leading solution to rising energy costs and climate change. He says, wind power is already helping reduce electricity prices and create jobs. 75% of those surveys support offshore wind energy. 82% recognize its role in securing Ireland's energy supply. Research shows Ireland's offshore wind farms could generate 38 billion euros for the Irish economy by 2050. And American clean energy investment continues to surge. The American [00:03:00] Clean Power Association says developers installed 7.4 gigawatts of new solar, wind and storage capacity in the first quarter. That represents $10 billion in domestic investment. The trade group says it was the second strongest start to a year on record. Battery storage achieved record first quarter installations surpassing 30 gigawatts of total capacity nationwide. The development pipeline grew 12% to reach 184 gigawatts. That represents $328 billion in potential project investment. CEO. Jason Grumet says, clean power is shovel-ready at scale. He says the industry has a technology. Investment capital and workforce needed. Grumet warns that the greatest threat to reliable energy is an unreliable political sys...

Coast Guard's Bruce English on the status of the MSC Baltic lll + Jim Sheppard with his new song about the stranded cargo ship + Barry Fordham takes his protest for an expanded food fishery to DFO + Iris Stunzi tells us about Trap Berth Day on Fogo Island

Šimtai kvadratinių metrų, prabangios medžiagos ir išskirtinės vietos. Iš tikrųjų prabangaus nekilnojamojo turto Lietuvoje atsiranda vis daugiau. O perka jį – vis jaunesni žmonės. Koks tas būstas ir jo pirkėjas?Įkišime nosį su „Sotherby's Baltic" vadovu Mariumi Bružu.Dar apie besibaigiančią Warreno Buffetto legendą ir kiek miestams atsieina balandžių išdaigos.Ved. Mindaugas Aušra ir Jurgita Čeponytė

In this episode of The SAF Podcast, we welcome Gediminas Ziemelis, Founder and Chairman of Avia Solutions Group, to discuss the company's move into sustainable aviation fuel (SAF) production through its NorSAF project. As the world's largest wet-leasing provider, Avia Solutions Group operates across six continents and is now leveraging its extensive infrastructure to help decarbonize aviation.Gediminas shares how the company is developing a state-of-the-art SAF and eSAF production facility in Liepāja, Latvia, strategically positioned to serve the Baltic, Nordic, and Central European regions. He reveals how acquiring an existing oil storage terminal has saved years on permitting and construction, while enabling cost-effective scaling of synthetic SAF production using KBR's PureSAF technology—based on captured CO₂ and green hydrogen.Behind this ambitious venture lies a revealing look at how nimble, privately-held companies can move faster in the green transition. Unlike publicly-listed giants retreating from environmental initiatives to focus on core business, Avia Solutions Group can make rapid decisions without justifying every move to shareholders. This agility might be exactly what's needed to accelerate aviation's sustainability journey.Beyond environmental benefits, Ziemelis frames the project as a strategic move toward European energy independence—drawing parallels to how Europe developed sugar beet production in the 18th century to reduce dependency on imported sugar cane. Could synthetic aviation fuel represent the next chapter in Europe's quest for energy sovereignty? Listen now to discover how the future of flight might be taking shape in the Baltic region.Check out our previous discussion with Dani Charles, Veriflux on AI and traceability here: https://www.buzzsprout.com/2202964/episodes/17201492

Quand on passe une semaine à avaler les kilomètres sur les routes du Tour Auto, il y a deux certitudes : un, on prend cher ; deux, on mesure à quel point le temps compte. Et qui dit temps, dit chronométreur. Cette année, c'est la jeune maison française Baltic qui officiait en tant que chronométreur officiel de l'événement – un rôle à la fois technique, symbolique, et furieusement élégant. De retour à Paris, on est allés prolonger la conversation avec Étienne Malec, le cofondateur de Baltic, dans leur studio/bureau/showroom pour un épisode spécial de L'Heure Sup, le podcast où l'on prend (justement) le temps de parler montres autrement. Dans cet échange à trois voix, avec Marie Ulrich au micro, on revient sur : – l'ascension fulgurante de Baltic depuis ses débuts en 2017, – la philosophie derrière ses designs et son storytelling inspiré des chronos d'époque, – son rôle dans le Tour Auto 2025 (et les coulisses du partenariat), – et surtout, les prochains grands jalons de la marque, dont l'ouverture très attendue de leur première boutique physique. Un épisode qui plonge à la fois dans les rouages d'un entrepreneur passionné, dans les mécaniques du monde horloger contemporain, et dans la belle aventure d'une marque française qui coche toutes les cases : audace, rigueur et passion.

Into the Baltic

Campervan travels with an intrepid German grandmother, a loaf of heavenly batch bread, and the Heysel Stadium Disaster remembered, with Alexander McMaster, Maeve Edwards, Michael Hamell, Elizabeth Oxley and Vincent Woods

VOV1 - Ngày 23/5, Thủ tướng Ba Lan Donald Tusk cảnh báo, tình hình an ninh khu vực Biển Baltic đang ngày càng trở nên xấu đi, đe dọa nghiêm trọng đến các cơ sở hạ tầng quan trọng của nước này. Ba Lan đang thực hiện nhiều biện pháp chiến lược để ứng phó với các mối đe dọa mới trong khu vực.

In this edition of the Analog Explorer Podcast, I catch up with Rémi Martin, the showroom manager of Baltic's New York boutique, live from the Vancouver Timepiece Show.

VOV1 - Ngày 21/5, trên trang cá nhân, Thủ tướng Ba Lan Donald Tusk cho biết quân đội nước này đã can thiệp sau khi phát hiện một tàu thuộc "hạm đội bóng tối" của  Nga  thực hiện các động thái đáng ngờ gần đường cáp điện nối Ba Lan với Thụy Điển.

A round-up of the main headlines in Sweden on May 21st, 2025. You can hear more reports on our homepage www.radiosweden.se, or in the app Sveriges Radio Play. Presenter/Producer: Kris Boswell

BBC Defence Correspondent Jonathan Beale speaks to Dovilė Šakalienė, Lithuania's Defence Minister.The Baltic nation, along with its neighbours Latvia and Estonia, share a border with Russia, and have nervously watched the invasion of Ukraine, fearing they could be next.All three countries have had turbulent relationships with their much larger neighbour, Russia. They were annexed by the Soviet Union during the Second World War, and were subject to decades of rule from Moscow up until the end of the Cold War.In 2004, Lithuania joined both the European Union and NATO, and just over a decade later, adopted the Euro as its currency. But despite looking westwards, the country has always kept one eye on developments over its eastern border in Russia.Russia's annexation of the Ukrainian region of Crimea in 2014 set off alarm bells in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius, and when the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia began in 2022, Lithuania and its neighbours began fearing - and preparing - for the worst.The Interview brings you conversations with people shaping our world, from all over the world. The best interviews from the BBC. You can listen on the BBC World Service, Mondays and Wednesdays at 0700 GMT. Or you can listen to The Interview as a podcast, out twice a week on BBC Sounds, Apple, Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts.Presenter: Jonathan Beale Producer: Ben Cooper Editor: Richard Fenton-Smith

In an era where government tech projects often end in billion-dollar failures and privacy nightmares, there's a tiny Baltic nation that's quietly revolutionized what's possible. Estonia—a country of just 1.3 million people—has built what might be the world's most efficient digital government. Every public service is online. Digital signatures save 2% of GDP annually. And in a twist that should intrigue American conservatives, they've done it with smaller government, not bigger.How did a former Soviet republic become a model of lean digital governance? What's their secret for avoiding the "big-bang IT project" disasters that plague Washington? And most importantly—can America's divided political system learn anything from Estonia's success?Joining for this episode are two experts who've studied Estonia's digital miracle up close. Dr. Keegan McBride is senior policy advisor in emerging technology and geopolitics at the Tony Blair Institute. He's also a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation. Joel Burke is the author of Rebooting a Nation: the Incredible Rise of Estonia, E-Government, and the Startup Revolution, and Senior Public Policy Analyst at Mozilla.

"I live on the Danish island of Bornholm, which is in the western end of the Baltic Sea. People here share a long, rich history with the Baltic countries, so choosing a field-recording from Tallinn felt natural. The dastardly Russian war feels really close here at the moment, and many of us here are more conscious about our cultural heritage and friendship across the sea now than we used to be. "This is, however, not a work about war, but more about celebrating the fact that we're still able to take a silly walk through the old historical part of Tallinn, not being at war, walking through a town that isn't in ruins - and simply exploring and enjoying what that's like.  "As you can probably hear, all sounds heard throughout the piece are from the original field-recording. I've used samplers and various sampling effects (like delays and reverbs), and a ton of manual edits (literally thousands of manual edits made over a two week period). The tonal sounds were made with "frozen reverbs". All this editing mainly serves to enhance the original recording, which is kept mostly intact (the enhanced version follows the original recording closely - and therefore also ahas the same duration). "The effect is a sort of personal interpretation of micro-events along the way, as I responded to them while slowly working my way through the piece. "The idea of doing it this way was partly inspired by reading Wittgenstein's "Philosphische Untersuchungen". At one point the philosopher asks about thought-images: "How does one point twice at the same image?" (PU 382), - and, in a way, this way of working with field recordings is a possible answer to this - presenting the same image twice in two different versions at the same time." Tallinn old town walkthrough reimagined by Samatha Dubs (Karsten Høegh).

Gabrielius Landsbergis served as Lithuania's Minister of Foreign Affairs from December 2020 until November 2024. Interestingly, 20 years ago, I also interviewed his grandfather, Vytautas Landsbergis. But we live in a very different world now – one in which the Baltic countries, including Lithuania, have closed their airspace to Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, who felt compelled to visit Russian dictator Vladimir Putin. So, what does Mr. Landsbergis think about such a visit? What does Russian aggression against Ukraine mean for Lithuania? How worried is he that Lithuania could become the target of a Russian attack? And would Lithuanians fight if they were attacked by Russia? Listen to our conversation. And if you enjoy what I do, please support me on Ko-fi! Thank you. ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://ko-fi.com/amatisak

Good afternoon, I'm _____ with today's episode of EZ News. Tai-Ex opening The Tai-Ex opened up 81-points this morning from Friday's close, at 20,996 on turnover of 4.6-billion N-T. The market gained ground last Friday as it moved closer the challenging at 21,000-point mark. The rise after after the U-S Federal Reserve left its main interest rate unchanged overnight and as investors were pinning their hopes (把希望寄托在…上) on weekend trade talks between China and the U-S. Tsai talks Taiwan and Lithuania standing united in defending democracy Former President Tsai Ing-wen is expressed here gratitude to Lithuania over its support for Taiwan - saying that both countries are united as partners (合作夥伴) in defending democracy. Tsai arrived in Lithuania on Saturday and what is her first visit to the Baltic state Speaking at a reception organized by the Lithuania-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group, Tsai said while she was Taiwan's president she received visits from many Lithuanian friends in Taiwan … …. and believes that Taiwan and Lithuania share similar fates as both are neighbors to authoritarian countries. Tsai will head to Denmark next to attend to the Copenhagen Democracy Summit. Taipei's Yongkang Street pedestrianized on weekends through June 10 A trial pedestrian zone has been launched in Taipei's Yongkang Street this past weekend. The trial will run on weekends through June 10 and sees the popular road closed to most vehicles. The Taipei City Government says the aim (目的) is to promote a more pedestrian-friendly environment. The campaign limits vehicle access from 2 to 8PM on Saturdays and Sundays and covers approximately 250 meters of Yongkang Street, and includes nearby alleys around the popular tourist destination. Hamas to Release US Hostage Hamas says the last living American hostage in Gaza will be released as part of efforts to establish a ceasefire, reopen crossings into the Israeli-blockaded territory and resume aid delivery. Two Hamas officials tell The Associated Press they expect the release of Edan Alexander in the next 48 hours. U.S. President Donald Trump's envoy Steve Witkoff is confirming in a message to the AP that Hamas has agreed to release Alexander as a good will gesture toward Trump. The announcement of the first hostage release since Israel shattered (擊毀) a ceasefire in March comes shortly before Trump visits the Middle East this week. Alexander is an Israeli-American soldier who grew up in the United States. Iran US in 4th Round of Nuclear Program Negotiations Iran and US conclude a fourth round of negotiations (談判) over Tehran's nuclear program in Oman AP correspondent Donna Warder reports Pope Leo Calls for Ceasefires and Peace Pope Leo XIV has called for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and an immediate ceasefire in Gaza with the release of hostages and delivery of humanitarian aid. In his first Sunday noon blessing as pontiff, Leo said, “Never again war!” from St. Peter's Basilica to an estimated 100,000 people below. Recalling the end of World War II 80 years ago, Leo quoted Pope Francis in denouncing the number of conflicts ravaging (摧殘) the globe today, saying it was a “third world war in pieces.” The 69-year-old Chicago-born missionary was elected 267th pope on Thursday. He has a busy week of audiences before his formal installation Mass Sunday. That was the I.C.R.T. EZ News, I'm _____. －－－－以下訊息由 SoundOn 動態廣告贊助商提供－－－－ 早餐是補充蛋白質的黃金期，吃錯食物小心可能吃進精緻澱粉、加工品、油脂、熱量…等隱形負擔早餐補充蛋白質，首選統一陽光，嚴選非基改黃豆、植物性大豆蛋白、零膽固醇，營養少負擔！ https://sofm.pse.is/7krrp4 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

How did the Great Northern War, which saw Sweden pitted against Peter the Great's Russia and her allies, and would transform Europe forever, begin? Who was Charles XII, Sweden's King, and a worthy antagonist for the formidable Peter? What terrible miscalculation saw Russia's Danish allies brutally knocked from the war in its early stage? What dreadful havoc did Peter's Cossacks wreak upon the Eastern Baltic? And, who was the young farm girl who would go on to capture the heart of a Tsar?  Join Dominic and Tom as they discuss Peter the Great, the early stages of the tumultuous Great Northern War, and his scandalous marriage to a serving girl? The Rest Is History Club: Become a member for exclusive bonus content, early access to full series and live show tickets, ad-free listening, our exclusive newsletter, discount book prices on titles mentioned on the pod, and our members' chatroom on Discord. Just head to therestishistory.com to sign up, or start a free trial today on Apple Podcasts: apple.co/therestishistory. For more Goalhanger Podcasts, head to www.goalhanger.com _______ Twitter: @TheRestHistory @holland_tom @dcsandbrook Producer: Theo Young-Smith Assistant Producer: Tabby Syrett + Aaliyah Akude  Executive Producers: Jack Davenport + Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The Germania (Latin: De Origine et situ Germanorum, literally The Origin and Situation of the Germans), written by Gaius Cornelius Tacitus around 98, is an ethnographic work on the Germanic tribes outside the Roman Empire. Germania fits squarely within the tradition established by authors from Herodotus to Julius Caesar. Tacitus himself had already written a similar essay on the lands and tribes of Britannia in his Agricola. The Germania begins with a description of the lands, laws, and customs of the Germanic people; it then segues into descriptions of individual tribes, beginning with those dwelling closest to Roman lands and ending on the uttermost shores of the Baltic, among the amber-gathering Aesti, the primitive and savage Fenni, and the unknown tribes beyond them.Tacitus' descriptions of the Germanic character are at times favorable in contrast to the opinions of the Romans of his day. He holds the strict monogamy and chastity of Germanic marriage customs worthy of the highest praise, in contrast to what he saw as the vice and immorality rampant in Roman society of his day, and he admires their open hospitality, their simplicity, and their bravery in battle. One should not, however, think that Tacitus' portrayal of Germanic customs is entirely favorable; he notes a tendency in the Germanic people for what he saw as their habitual drunkenness, laziness, and barbarism, among other traits. Tacitus says that physically, the Germans appeared to be a distinct race, not an admixture of their neighbors. In Chapter 4, he mentions that they have common characteristics of blue eyes, blond or reddish hair and large size.In Chapter 7, Tacitus describes their government and leadership as somewhat merit-based and egalitarian, with leadership by example rather than authority and that punishments are carried out by the priests. In Chapter 9, Tacitus describes a form of folk assembly rather similar to the public Things recorded in later Germanic sources: in these public deliberations, the final decision rests with the people of the tribe as a whole.Translated by Alfred J. Church and William J. Brodribb, in 1877. (Adapted from Wikipedia.)This is a collaborative reading.Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Ukrainians have resisted Russia's aggression for years. Since the full-scale invasion of their country in 2022, Ukrainian women in particular have taken on important roles on the frontlines, in civil society, and at home. Gražina Bielousova's research examines how Ukrainian leftist feminists advocate for their causes at home and abroad, facing distinct challenges as they attempt to defend their country. The Ukrainian case is also distinct from Latvia and Lithuania, whose organizing takes on different shapes for the same cause. Bielousova joins Ben Gardner-Gill to explain these interactions and discuss the ongoing process of decolonization in Baltic Studies.Transcript Ben Gardner-Gill: Hello, and welcome to Baltic Ways. I'm your co-host, Ben Gardner-Gill. Today we're talking with Gražina Belousova. Gražina is a feminist scholar of race, religion, and gender in post-Soviet Europe. She earned her PhD from Duke University in 2022. Currently, she is a postdoctoral scholar at Vilnius University's Institute of International Relations and Political Science and a researcher at Vytautas Magnus University.Her current research project focuses on leftist feminisms in East Europe in light of Russia's war against Ukraine, which will culminate in her first book, What's Left of Feminism in East Europe.Gražina, welcome to Baltic Ways.Gražina Belousova: Thank you so much for having me, Ben.BGG: So let's kick off by just hearing a little bit more about your background. I know you finished your PhD pretty recently. Could you tell us a little bit more about how you got into academia, sort of your research interests, and what you're working on at the moment?GB: Right. Yes, I just defended my PhD in 2022. It's hard to believe that it's been nearly three years now. In my PhD, I focused on historical matters. My PhD was in religion and cultural anthropology. And one of the things that I found missing when I was trying to theorize the part of the world that I call home and that most of the world calls Eastern Europe—I realized that I was lacking a solid theory that would bridge economics, anthropology, and religious studies.I wanted to understand how religious difference, especially perceived religious difference, played a role in creating the space that we call Eastern Europe today. And that took me to 18th and 19th century travel writings by Western travelers, oftentimes who were on an official mission, to the edges or to the depths of the Russian Empire.So I've read a lot of ambassadors' letters. I've read a lot of dispatches from St. Petersburg and Moscow, trying to understand how Westerners thought about that religious difference and how that thinking structured their understanding of what this place was and why it was different. What I tried to argue is actually that perceived religious difference was at the root of thinking of Eastern Europe as something different.Now, when I chose to embark on that topic, I had to put another topic aside, which was the question of very contemporary matters, the question of leftist political thought and feminism. At that point, it felt to me more pertinent to write the kind of theory that I felt was missing. When I was given the opportunity to pursue a postdoctoral position at Vilnius University Institute of International Relations and Political Science, I pitched this idea to them.And we very quickly pulled together the application. And the next thing I knew, I was embarking on a project on leftist feminisms in Eastern Europe in light of the war in Ukraine. So, the path was windy, but here I am today, knees and elbows deep, in the project on leftist feminism.BGG: Wonderful. I mean, a windy path is going to be familiar to so many people listening.So, no surprise and no surprise as well that the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has really impacted your work and your life as it has for many of us. So tell us a little bit more about that.Over the last three years, we've been watching and seeing the horrors in Ukraine. From your perspective, from your academic work, what are some of the main things that you're looking at?GB: One of the things that I'm particularly interested in is the way that groups that are on the edges of society, on the margins of society, such as leftists, such as feminists, and especially leftist feminists—when the two come together and try to articulate their social and political vision and explain to themselves and to their fellow compatriots and oftentimes foreign donors, in my case, also Western leftist feminists, their relevance, how they're trying to articulate their position.War has a penchant for heightening nationalist tendencies. And this is not some kind of particular Eastern European pathology. War anywhere is going to produce these results. That is normal. People defend themselves and articulate themselves on the basis on which they're being attacked, on the basis on which they're being bombed.So this is what we are seeing in Ukraine. Leftism in Eastern Europe, because of the Soviet past, is often associated with Soviet nostalgia. Feminism, on the other hand, is oftentimes seen as something antithetical to national identity, something that is imported from the West, and something that either has no relevance or can be dangerous, especially when questions of national unity, questions of national defense come about.That is one of the reasons why I embarked on this journey, and this is one of the reasons why Ukraine had to be part of this picture. Because while the other countries that I'm looking at—Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Moldova—experience the threat of invasion, Ukraine is under attack.And one of the things that I'm finding is that Ukrainian leftist feminists are incredibly resourceful and incredibly gifted at articulating their relevance.One of the things that I'm going to say that stems from that understanding of leftist feminism that's erroneous, but that's pervasive, is that Ukrainian leftist feminists do not debate the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. What is in question is the way things are happening under the conditions of war.The questions of most vulnerable people—so questions of what happens with people with disabilities, questions of what happens to single mothers, questions of what happens to the elderly people who are maybe unable to evacuate, questions of what happens to the working class people—all of these things are at the forefront of their minds. They're trying to be the advocates of their pleas to the larger society, while at the same time trying to articulate Ukraine's right to self-defense to Western leftist feminists.BGG: So they have both this tension, maybe tension is the wrong word, tell me if it isn't, but they have this tension internally where they're trying to advocate for what they see as justice or what is right with a domestic audience who, understandably, may be more frequently focused on what's happening at the front lines.And then there's also this international question, the foreign audience for these Ukrainian leftist feminists, who have a very different perspective on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. And I specifically use that verbiage instead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine because they're going to think about it very differently.So let's split those out a little bit, and I want to start with the domestic. You talked about the advocacy of these leftist feminists for the most marginalized groups in society, for those who are most vulnerable.In your view, where have they been most successful, perhaps? Where have they seen actual progress happen from their advocacy?GB: One of the things that immediately comes to mind, and many of my interlocutors were directly involved with, is the nurses' movement–the unionization and self-organization of the nurses.There is a movement called Be Like Nina, referring to one of the nurses seen as a pioneer of resisting exploitation. And, of course, under the conditions of war, the labor of nurses is incredibly valuable and needed, but not always appropriately compensated. This is what we can call essential labor, especially when we talk about the front lines, where people are wounded.Many of them are wounded very badly on a daily basis. However, there are other things that are happening in the background as well. While a lot of the resources are pulled to the front, there are people who are experiencing regular daily struggles with their health. And the nurses are being stretched very thin.And this was something that was really amazing to me. This was really one of the very few instances where I saw academics who are leftist feminists actually touching the ground with their ideas: where they got involved with helping the nurses organize, but not taking the center stage, where they acted as support, as a resource, but not overtaking the movement, rather creating the conditions under which nurses themselves could articulate what it was that they needed, what their goals were.And that was incredibly impressive to me because healthcare is severely underfunded across the whole region, and to achieve such tangible goals as wage increases and regulations that empower nurses to do their job was truly impressive. With every conversation with a woman—because I specifically talk only to women—I just felt sheer amazement, because this is so contrary to so many imaginations of what civil society, self-organization, or networks are like in Eastern Europe.This is so contrary to what some have called ‘uncivil' society. What is happening is really self-organization and civil society at its best, organized by women who are oftentimes stretched very thin, not just at work, but also at home, women whose husbands are potentially on the front lines.So to me, I really cannot think of anything else that, in terms of real life impact and in terms of transforming people's lives, has been grander (I'm going to go for that word) than this.BGG: That's remarkable, and thank you for bringing that. I had very little idea of this progress and this happening.So you use the term civil society, which I think is quite apt, and Western conceptions of civil society in the region that we call Eastern Europe can be highly misguided. Let's just put it like that. I think back to a webinar that the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies (AABS) hosted on Ukrainian civil society, democratization, responses to the war, and we have this comparative Ukrainian and Baltic perspective, where we looked at how Ukrainian civil society was responding.We looked at how Baltic civil society was responding, and you're doing something similar in your research here. You're looking at Latvia and Lithuania as two of the other case studies, in addition to Poland, Moldova, and, of course, Ukraine. One thing that I think we can all observe just from watching the news, let alone being in the countries as well, is that civil society across the region has had this really robust response in the last few years.So could you speak a little bit more to that in the comparative cases outside of Ukraine that you're looking at in your research, especially Latvia and Lithuania?GB: For sure. I think that in order to theorize civil society and the region in general, we need better theory than has been used often to talk about civil society at large.Here, for example, I'm thinking about Emily Channel Justice and her work and the way that she articulates the notion of self-organization. The way that she thinks about Ukraine, especially in the context of Maidan. The way that it left a self-organization, but that can be applied also to any form of civil society, regardless of ideology, is really a network of decentralized, self-organized people's groups.If you were to look for some kind of central organizing pattern, or some kind of centralized way of doing things, most likely you're not going to find it because it's based on personal network, connections, and localized issues. And I think that's definitely something that I'm seeing in Ukraine.One of the things that I'm seeing in Lithuania and Latvia is that it's going to differ slightly because there are going to be more central organizing figures. If we talk about organizing support for Ukraine, one of the things that we're going to see is that people are going to point to nationwide initiatives.Right now in Lithuania, there is an initiative called Radarum, which is a play on words, on radar and on darom, which is a Lithuanian word for let's do it. And it's a nationwide initiative to collect funds to purchase drones and anti-drone equipment for Ukraine. And there are particular faces that we associate with this initiative.National television is running ads for it. So there's a little bit more of a centralized sense to it. But once again, I would say that this is the mainstream way of organizing civil society, which, of course, with Westernization, has taken on some of the patterns that are similar to the West.If we look towards the left, we're going to see very much that it is self-organized, small groups of people who take different initiatives, such as raising funds for medical care, such as raising funds for queer people in Ukraine. So the more mainstream we go, the more patterns that are akin to those that we see in the West we're going to see.That is also going to be true in Latvia. The further left we go, the more organic, grassroots, self-organized cells of people we're going to find who participate in smaller, less visible initiatives. So that's probably the best way that I can explain the difference.BGG: Got it. We see this distinction of centralization and decentralization.One could consider these different types of movements organic in their own ways, but different in different ways. When one thinks of leftist organizing, which has a long and rich history, organic is sort of one of the key words.It's perpetual, and these society-wide initiatives, like what's currently going on in Lithuania, that we've seen across other countries over the last few years, are maybe a little bit less frequent and less common. So there's an important distinction there.So I want to pivot to the international dimension of how the Ukrainian leftist feminists are talking, especially with Western counterparts. And by Western, we mean Western Europe. We mean American and Canadian. We mean Western, as in not Eastern Europe. So could you talk a little bit about the challenges they're facing there?I think I alluded to it earlier. You alluded to it earlier, but could you dive a little bit more into that discourse, that dialogue between the Ukrainians and their counterparts?GB: This is the main point of contention. What does it mean to be leftist? How much does local experience shape being leftist?What is the relationship of the left to the national question? And I think this is where we are seeing the real tension. Underlying this tension, of course, is the question of Russia. Let me try to unpack this. And I'm going to start from the other end than I listed, which is with the question of Russia.Eastern European in general, and Ukrainian in particular, leftist feminists have a very different understanding as to what Russia is in terms of geopolitics than the Western counterparts are going to have. This stems from very different histories. Western leftism—especially the new wave of leftism that arose in the sixties and the seventies—in many ways has redefined itself not just through the questions of class, which I would argue were lost to some extent. They lost their centrality.And they redefined themselves through the anti-colonial, anti-racist struggle. And that struggle was particularly important because after the fall of the formal colonial system, the colonial patterns of economic exploitation, of social exploitation, of brain drain still very much persisted. And naming that and defining themselves against Western neoimperialism or neocolonialism in the Global South was one of the most defining features of the Left, both in the Global South and in the West. Now, Russia at that time had positioned itself as the ally of the colonized countries. And some of it was pure show, and some of it was actual money, resources, and help that were sent, for example, to Angola. And that made a real difference. Whether that was genuine concern for the colonized people or whether that was an ideological tool is a matter of debate.Whatever it was, it had a profound impact on the way that Western leftists relate to Russia. They continue to see Russia out of that tradition, in many ways, as an ally against Western capitalism and imperialism. Their empire, against which they define themselves, continues to be in the West, and oftentimes is seen as centered on the United States.The empire against which we define ourselves in Eastern Europe is Russia, because Russia was the colonizing power in a very real sense in the region. It was our empire that subjugated us. It was the colonial power that engaged in just about every single practice in which any colonial power engages in the region.For us, if we think outside of ourselves, Russia continues to be the colonial power in the way that it relates to Central Asia, in the way that it relates to the indigenous people of Siberia, in the way that it continues to conduct business. So both the left in the West and the left in the East continue to define themselves against the empire, but disagree on who the empire is.The fundamental difference is the question of Russia. Because of the way that Western leftists, and particularly Western leftist feminists, have been taught to see the world, the way that they have been habituated to see the world, they're unable to see Russia as an aggressor. They're unable to change their narrative about how NATO might act.And of course, the criticisms of continued Western abuses of power, especially when they center on the United States—such as Afghanistan or such as Iraq, but also here in the European context, intra-European context, Serbia is another context in which that comes up—are highly debatable questions, but they're seen a certain way. They're understood in a certain way by Western leftists. And because of Russia's criticism of the West, Western leftists see it as a natural ally, or at least as an equally guilty party.BGG: That's a really great explanation. I think the way that you've laid that out makes a lot of sense.It also harkens back to where I want to bring this, which is the debate that has been going on in Baltic studies and other academic fields, especially those focusing on the region, about thinking about Baltic history in particular as a colonial history and thinking about what it means to decolonize Baltic studies as a field, to decolonize our academic thinking. There have been a lot of discussions.I know that we were in the same room at the AABS panel at Yale last year on that fantastic panel about decolonization. Where do you think this leads with regard to your research specifically? There's already this trend in this field. I get the sense that you are an advocate and moving forward in land seeking for the field as a whole to move in that direction.What do you think the next steps are? What paths do you think could be taken? What do people need to be thinking about that they may not already be thinking about?GB: Well, I think for me, the key question when we are talking about Baltic studies and decolonization is what is it that we talk about when we talk about decolonizing Baltic studies or Baltic countries?Because I think sometimes we're talking about four different things. We are talking about the question of colonialism and coloniality. That's one. We are talking about imperialism, Russian imperialism, and Russian imperiality. We are talking about Russification and what it means to de-Russify. And we are also talking about Sovietization and what it means to de-Sovietize.And I would argue that while these four concepts are very much interrelated, they have very different agendas. So, I think it's a question of definitions. How do we define what our agenda is? Which of the four do we have in mind when we talk about decolonizing Baltic countries, Baltic studies, or anything else?And I would say that each of the four has its place and is significant. But the flip side of that, especially if we stay with the question of decolonization, is the question of Western theory, practice, and scholarship as it relates to Baltic studies. Because if we go back to the early questions in the conversation of what is civil society and whether there is a civil society, Baltic countries and the region as a whole are pathologized.Because the concept of what civil society is, or is not, was based on Western understandings and Western practices. And it rendered civil society in the region invisible. In what ways does the production of scholarship and knowledge about the region continue to be based in very unequal power relationships, in such a way that it continues to pathologize the region?And these are very uncomfortable questions, because much like, you know, in the late eighteenth century when the Lithuanian Polish Commonwealth was divided between the three powers, we're facing the same question: Who is our ally? Because we have learned that Russia is definitely not, but the West is also a problematic ally.This is where I think the question of what it means to center the study of the region in the theory, in the practice, in the questions that actually originate from the ground up, are so important. And I'm not ditching all Western scholarship out the window. That would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater.But I'm saying, what does it mean to balance? What does it mean to center? What does it mean to change the parameters of the conversation?BGG: Those are some weighty questions. I think they're good questions that the field is, I would say not even starting to engage with, but is engaging with, which is really excellent, but it's a long path.As anyone who is a scholar of decolonization will tell you, it doesn't happen overnight. It doesn't happen over a decade. It's sort of a continuous process. So, I think that is where we're going to have to leave it, knowing that there is so much more we could have talked about. But, Gražina, thank you so much.This has been a fascinating conversation. Thank you for joining Baltic Ways.GB: Thank you so much for having me, Ben. It's been a privilege.BGG: Thank you for listening to this episode of Baltic Ways, a co-production of the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies and the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). A note that the views expressed in this and every Baltic Ways episode do not necessarily reflect those of AABS or FPRI.To ensure you catch the next episode of Baltic Ways, make sure you're subscribed to your podcast feed or wherever you get your shows. Thanks so much, and we'll see you next time. Get full access to FPRI Insights at fpriinsights.substack.com/subscribe

Todays' Episode is an invigorating catch-up with someone who was last on the podcast over two years ago. Risto Rossar is CEO of Insly and is a really rare combination in that he is an insurance business builder who realised that helping the insurance industry fully digitise would be a better and more scalable business proposition than continuing to grow the highly successful digital Baltic insurance broker that he had founded. Insly continues to grow at speed, serving fast-growing segments of the market such as MGAs that need full end-to-end insurance software, but are unlikely to be on the radar of the largest vendors. Risto really gets tech and insurance – but he is also a very strong communicator who tends to tell things the way he sees them. This is where we come to the invigorating part that I mentioned at the beginning. Risto's trademark is no-nonsense, down-to-earth analysis of what technologies are and are not likely to be genuinely disruptive to the insurance industry. He is good at seeing through hype and puncturing bubbles. So when someone in his position, with his level of understanding and natural sense of healthy scepticism starts getting genuinely excited about AI, we all need to sit up and listen. What follows is one of the most interesting and credible conversations about the likely long-term disruptive effects of AI on the insurance sector I have had on the show. If you think AI is just going to be nice productivity tool that removes all your dull admin tasks, you need to think again – it will do that but an awful lot more besides. The opportunities to be seized here are enormous but are difficult for those of us used to a very slow-moving status quo to get our heads around. Risto is on exceptional form and is clearly feeling energised and excited for the future – listen on and I think you will too. LINKS:  https://insly.com/

Ukrainians have resisted Russia's aggression for years. Since the full-scale invasion of their country in 2022, Ukrainian women in particular have taken on important roles on the frontlines, in civil society, and at home. Gražina Bielousova's research examines how Ukrainian leftist feminists advocate for their causes at home and abroad, facing distinct sets of challenges as they attempt to defend their country. The Ukrainian case is also distinct in comparison to Latvia and Lithuania, whose organizing takes on different shapes for the same cause. Bielousova joins Ben Gardner-Gill to explain these interactions and discuss the ongoing process of decolonization in Baltic Studies.TranscriptBen Gardner-Gill: Hello, and welcome to Baltic Ways. I'm your co-host, Ben Gardner-Gill. Today we're talking with Gražina Belousova. Gražina is a feminist scholar of race, religion, and gender in post-Soviet Europe. She earned her PhD from Duke University in 2022. Currently, she is a postdoctoral scholar at Vilnius University's Institute of International Relations and Political Science and a researcher at Vytautas Magnus University.Her current research project focuses on leftist feminisms in East Europe in light of Russia's war against Ukraine, which will culminate in her first book, What's Left of Feminism in East Europe.Gražina, welcome to Baltic Ways.Gražina Belousova: Thank you so much for having me, Ben.BGG: So let's kick off by just hearing a little bit more about your background. I know you finished your PhD pretty recently. Could you tell us a little bit more about how you got into academia, sort of your research interests, and what you're working on at the moment?GB: Right. Yes, I just defended my PhD in 2022. It's hard to believe that it's been nearly three years now. In my PhD, I focused on historical matters. My PhD was in religion and cultural anthropology. And one of the things that I found missing when I was trying to theorize the part of the world that I call home and that most of the world calls Eastern Europe—I realized that I was lacking a solid theory that would bridge economics, anthropology, and religious studies.I wanted to understand how religious difference, especially perceived religious difference, played a role in creating the space that we call Eastern Europe today. And that took me to 18th and 19th century travel writings by Western travelers, oftentimes who were on an official mission, to the edges or to the depths of the Russian Empire.So I've read a lot of ambassadors' letters. I've read a lot of dispatches from St. Petersburg and Moscow, trying to understand how Westerners thought about that religious difference and how that thinking structured their understanding of what this place was and why it was different. What I tried to argue is actually that perceived religious difference was at the root of thinking of Eastern Europe as something different.Now, when I chose to embark on that topic, I had to put another topic aside, which was the question of very contemporary matters, the question of leftist political thought and feminism. At that point, it felt to me more pertinent to write the kind of theory that I felt was missing. When I was given the opportunity to pursue a postdoctoral position at Vilnius University Institute of International Relations and Political Science, I pitched this idea to them.And we very quickly pulled together the application. And the next thing I knew, I was embarking on a project on leftist feminisms in Eastern Europe in light of the war in Ukraine. So, the path was windy, but here I am today, knees and elbows deep, in the project on leftist feminism.BGG: Wonderful. I mean, a windy path is going to be familiar to so many people listening.So, no surprise and no surprise as well that the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has really impacted your work and your life as it has for many of us. So tell us a little bit more about that.Over the last three years, we've been watching and seeing the horrors in Ukraine. From your perspective, from your academic work, what are some of the main things that you're looking at?GB: One of the things that I'm particularly interested in is the way that groups that are on the edges of society, on the margins of society, such as leftists, such as feminists, and especially leftist feminists—when the two come together and try to articulate their social and political vision and explain to themselves and to their fellow compatriots and oftentimes foreign donors, in my case, also Western leftist feminists, their relevance, how they're trying to articulate their position.War has a penchant for heightening nationalist tendencies. And this is not some kind of particular Eastern European pathology. War anywhere is going to produce these results. That is normal. People defend themselves and articulate themselves on the basis on which they're being attacked, on the basis on which they're being bombed.So this is what we are seeing in Ukraine. Leftism in Eastern Europe, because of the Soviet past, is often associated with Soviet nostalgia. Feminism, on the other hand, is oftentimes seen as something antithetical to national identity, something that is imported from the West, and something that either has no relevance or can be dangerous, especially when questions of national unity, questions of national defense come about.That is one of the reasons why I embarked on this journey, and this is one of the reasons why Ukraine had to be part of this picture. Because while the other countries that I'm looking at—Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Moldova—experience the threat of invasion, Ukraine is under attack.And one of the things that I'm finding is that Ukrainian leftist feminists are incredibly resourceful and incredibly gifted at articulating their relevance.One of the things that I'm going to say that stems from that understanding of leftist feminism that's erroneous, but that's pervasive, is that Ukrainian leftist feminists do not debate the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. What is in question is the way things are happening under the conditions of war.The questions of most vulnerable people—so questions of what happens with people with disabilities, questions of what happens to single mothers, questions of what happens to the elderly people who are maybe unable to evacuate, questions of what happens to the working class people—all of these things are at the forefront of their minds. They're trying to be the advocates of their pleas to the larger society, while at the same time trying to articulate Ukraine's right to self-defense to Western leftist feminists.BGG: So they have both this tension, maybe tension is the wrong word, tell me if it isn't, but they have this tension internally where they're trying to advocate for what they see as justice or what is right with a domestic audience who, understandably, may be more frequently focused on what's happening at the front lines.And then there's also this international question, the foreign audience for these Ukrainian leftist feminists, who have a very different perspective on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. And I specifically use that verbiage instead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine because they're going to think about it very differently.So let's split those out a little bit, and I want to start with the domestic. You talked about the advocacy of these leftist feminists for the most marginalized groups in society, for those who are most vulnerable.In your view, where have they been most successful, perhaps? Where have they seen actual progress happen from their advocacy?GB: One of the things that immediately comes to mind, and many of my interlocutors were directly involved with, is the nurses' movement–the unionization and self-organization of the nurses.There is a movement called Be Like Nina, referring to one of the nurses seen as a pioneer of resisting exploitation. And, of course, under the conditions of war, the labor of nurses is incredibly valuable and needed, but not always appropriately compensated. This is what we can call essential labor, especially when we talk about the front lines, where people are wounded.Many of them are wounded very badly on a daily basis. However, there are other things that are happening in the background as well. While a lot of the resources are pulled to the front, there are people who are experiencing regular daily struggles with their health. And the nurses are being stretched very thin.And this was something that was really amazing to me. This was really one of the very few instances where I saw academics who are leftist feminists actually touching the ground with their ideas: where they got involved with helping the nurses organize, but not taking the center stage, where they acted as support, as a resource, but not overtaking the movement, rather creating the conditions under which nurses themselves could articulate what it was that they needed, what their goals were.And that was incredibly impressive to me because healthcare is severely underfunded across the whole region, and to achieve such tangible goals as wage increases and regulations that empower nurses to do their job was truly impressive. With every conversation with a woman—because I specifically talk only to women—I just felt sheer amazement, because this is so contrary to so many imaginations of what civil society, self-organization, or networks are like in Eastern Europe.This is so contrary to what some have called ‘uncivil' society. What is happening is really self-organization and civil society at its best, organized by women who are oftentimes stretched very thin, not just at work, but also at home, women whose husbands are potentially on the front lines.So to me, I really cannot think of anything else that, in terms of real life impact and in terms of transforming people's lives, has been grander (I'm going to go for that word) than this.BGG: That's remarkable, and thank you for bringing that. I had very little idea of this progress and this happening.So you use the term civil society, which I think is quite apt, and Western conceptions of civil society in the region that we call Eastern Europe can be highly misguided. Let's just put it like that. I think back to a webinar that the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies (AABS) hosted on Ukrainian civil society, democratization, responses to the war, and we have this comparative Ukrainian and Baltic perspective, where we looked at how Ukrainian civil society was responding.We looked at how Baltic civil society was responding, and you're doing something similar in your research here. You're looking at Latvia and Lithuania as two of the other case studies, in addition to Poland, Moldova, and, of course, Ukraine. One thing that I think we can all observe just from watching the news, let alone being in the countries as well, is that civil society across the region has had this really robust response in the last few years.So could you speak a little bit more to that in the comparative cases outside of Ukraine that you're looking at in your research, especially Latvia and Lithuania?GB: For sure. I think that in order to theorize civil society and the region in general, we need better theory than has been used often to talk about civil society at large.Here, for example, I'm thinking about Emily Channel Justice and her work and the way that she articulates the notion of self-organization. The way that she thinks about Ukraine, especially in the context of Maidan. The way that it left a self-organization, but that can be applied also to any form of civil society, regardless of ideology, is really a network of decentralized, self-organized people's groups.If you were to look for some kind of central organizing pattern, or some kind of centralized way of doing things, most likely you're not going to find it because it's based on personal network, connections, and localized issues. And I think that's definitely something that I'm seeing in Ukraine.One of the things that I'm seeing in Lithuania and Latvia is that it's going to differ slightly because there are going to be more central organizing figures. If we talk about organizing support for Ukraine, one of the things that we're going to see is that people are going to point to nationwide initiatives.Right now in Lithuania, there is an initiative called Radarum, which is a play on words, on radar and on darom, which is a Lithuanian word for let's do it. And it's a nationwide initiative to collect funds to purchase drones and anti-drone equipment for Ukraine. And there are particular faces that we associate with this initiative.National television is running ads for it. So there's a little bit more of a centralized sense to it. But once again, I would say that this is the mainstream way of organizing civil society, which, of course, with Westernization, has taken on some of the patterns that are similar to the West.If we look towards the left, we're going to see very much that it is self-organized, small groups of people who take different initiatives, such as raising funds for medical care, such as raising funds for queer people in Ukraine. So the more mainstream we go, the more patterns that are akin to those that we see in the West we're going to see.That is also going to be true in Latvia. The further left we go, the more organic, grassroots, self-organized cells of people we're going to find who participate in smaller, less visible initiatives. So that's probably the best way that I can explain the difference.BGG: Got it. We see this distinction of centralization and decentralization.One could consider these different types of movements organic in their own ways, but different in different ways. When one thinks of leftist organizing, which has a long and rich history, organic is sort of one of the key words.It's perpetual, and these society-wide initiatives, like what's currently going on in Lithuania, that we've seen across other countries over the last few years, are maybe a little bit less frequent and less common. So there's an important distinction there.So I want to pivot to the international dimension of how the Ukrainian leftist feminists are talking, especially with Western counterparts. And by Western, we mean Western Europe. We mean American and Canadian. We mean Western, as in not Eastern Europe. So could you talk a little bit about the challenges they're facing there?I think I alluded to it earlier, and you alluded to it earlier, but could you dive a little bit more into that discourse, that dialogue between the Ukrainians and their counterparts?GB: This is the main point of contention. What does it mean to be leftist? How much does local experience shape being leftist?What is the relationship of the left to the national question? And I think this is where we are seeing the real tension. Underlying this tension, of course, is the question of Russia. Let me try to unpack this. And I'm going to start from the other end than I listed, which is with the question of Russia.Eastern European in general, and Ukrainian in particular, leftist feminists have a very different understanding as to what Russia is in terms of geopolitics than the Western counterparts are going to have. This stems from very different histories. Western leftism—especially the new wave of leftism that arose in the sixties and the seventies—in many ways has redefined itself not just through the questions of class, which I would argue were lost to some extent. They lost their centrality.And they redefined themselves through the anti-colonial, anti-racist struggle. And that struggle was particularly important because after the fall of the formal colonial system, the colonial patterns of economic exploitation, of social exploitation, of brain drain still very much persisted. And naming that and defining themselves against Western neoimperialism or neocolonialism in the Global South was one of the most defining features of the Left, both in the Global South and in the West. Now, Russia at that time had positioned itself as the ally of the colonized countries. And some of it was pure show, and some of it was actual money, resources, and help that were sent, for example, to Angola. And that made a real difference. Whether that was genuine concern for the colonized people or whether that was an ideological tool is a matter of debate.Whatever it was, it had a profound impact on the way that Western leftists relate to Russia. They continue to see Russia out of that tradition, in many ways, as an ally against Western capitalism and imperialism. Their empire, against which they define themselves, continues to be in the West, and oftentimes is seen as centered on the United States.The empire against which we define ourselves in Eastern Europe is Russia, because Russia was the colonizing power in a very real sense in the region. It was our empire that subjugated us. It was the colonial power that engaged in just about every single practice in which any colonial power engages in the region.For us, if we think outside of ourselves, Russia continues to be the colonial power in the way that it relates to Central Asia, in the way that it relates to the indigenous people of Siberia, in the way that it continues to conduct business. So both the left in the West and the left in the East continue to define themselves against the empire, but disagree on who the empire is.The fundamental difference is the question of Russia. Because of the way that Western leftists, and particularly Western leftist feminists, have been taught to see the world, the way that they have been habituated to see the world, they're unable to see Russia as an aggressor. They're unable to change their narrative about how NATO might act.And of course, the criticisms of continued Western abuses of power, especially when they center on the United States—such as Afghanistan or such as Iraq, but also here in the European context, intra-European context, Serbia is another context in which that comes up—are highly debatable questions, but they're seen a certain way. They're understood in a certain way by Western leftists. And because of Russia's criticism of the West, Western leftists see it as a natural ally, or at least as an equally guilty party.BGG: That's a really great explanation. I think the way that you've laid that out makes a lot of sense.It also harkens back to where I want to bring this, which is the debate that has been going on in Baltic studies and other academic fields, especially those focusing on the region, about thinking about Baltic history in particular as a colonial history and thinking about what it means to decolonize Baltic studies as a field, to decolonize our academic thinking. There have been a lot of discussions.I know that we were in the same room at the AABS panel at Yale last year on that fantastic panel about decolonization. Where do you think this leads with regard to your research specifically? There's already this trend in this field. I get the sense that you are an advocate and moving forward in land seeking for the field as a whole to move in that direction.What do you think the next steps are? What paths do you think could be taken? What do people need to be thinking about that they may not already be thinking about?GB: Well, I think for me, the key question when we are talking about Baltic studies and decolonization is what is it that we talk about when we talk about decolonizing Baltic studies or Baltic countries?Because I think sometimes we're talking about four different things. We are talking about the question of colonialism and coloniality. That's one. We are talking about imperialism, Russian imperialism, and Russian imperiality. We are talking about Russification and what it means to de-Russify. And we are also talking about Sovietization and what it means to de-Sovietize.And I would argue that while these four concepts are very much interrelated, they have very different agendas. So, I think it's a question of definitions. How do we define what our agenda is? Which of the four do we have in mind when we talk about decolonizing Baltic countries, Baltic studies, or anything else?And I would say that each of the four has its place and is significant. But the flip side of that, especially if we stay with the question of decolonization, is the question of Western theory, practice, and scholarship as it relates to Baltic studies. Because if we go back to the early questions in the conversation of what is civil society and whether there is a civil society, Baltic countries and the region as a whole are pathologized.Because the concept of what civil society is, or is not, was based on Western understandings and Western practices. And it rendered civil society in the region invisible. In what ways does the production of scholarship and knowledge about the region continue to be based in very unequal power relationships, in such a way that it continues to pathologize the region?And these are very uncomfortable questions, because much like, you know, in the late eighteenth century when the Lithuanian Polish Commonwealth was divided between the three powers, we're facing the same question: Who is our ally? Because we have learned that Russia is definitely not, but the West is also a problematic ally.This is where I think the question of what it means to center the study of the region in the theory, in the practice, in the questions that actually originate from the ground up, rather than are solely important. And I'm not ditching all Western scholarship out the window. That would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater.But I'm saying, what does it mean to balance? What does it mean to center? What does it mean to change the parameters of the conversation?BGG: Those are some weighty questions. I think they're good questions that the field is, I would say not even starting to engage with, but is engaging with, which is really excellent, but it's a long path.As anyone who is a scholar of decolonization will tell you, it doesn't happen overnight. It doesn't happen over a decade. It's sort of a continuous process. So, I think that is where we're going to have to leave it, knowing that there is so much more we could have talked about. But, Gražina, thank you so much.This has been a fascinating conversation. Thank you for joining Baltic Ways.GB: Thank you so much for having me, Ben. It's been a privilege.To ensure you catch the next episode of Baltic Ways, make sure you're subscribed to your podcast feed or wherever you get your shows. Thanks so much, and we'll see you next time.(Image: Facebook | Феміністична майстерня)Baltic Ways is a podcast from the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fpribalticinitiative.substack.com

In this episode, we speak with Martin Gauss, former CEO of airBaltic, who transformed the Latvian flag carrier into one of Europe's most innovative airlines while connecting the entire Baltic region.Gauss discusses:The benefits of operating a single-fleet airline with the highly efficient Airbus A220-300, resulting in 30% lower fuel consumption than older generation aircraft and contributing to airBaltic's path to carbon neutrality by 2050.airBaltic's innovative dual business model that combines scheduled operations with wet lease services for major carriers like Lufthansa Group, creating flexibility and financial resilience.The airline's commitment to sustainability through fleet modernisation, gradually increasing SAF usage, and partnerships with innovative manufacturers like Fokker NextGen for hydrogen-powered aircraft.How airBaltic established itself as an industry leader in adopting new technologies, from becoming the first airline to accept Bitcoin in 2014 to pioneering Starlink internet service in Europe.His perspective on balancing growth with sustainability, emphasising that connectivity is essential for economic development while working toward emission-free aviation.The Baltic states' capacity for innovation, demonstrating how a small country like Latvia can lead the way in aviation technology and sustainability.As an airline pilot-turned-CEO, Gauss offers valuable insights into how smaller airlines can lead industry change through bold technology choices and business model innovation.If you LOVED this episode, you'll also love the conversation we had with Anko van der Werff, President & CEO of Scandinavian Airlines (SAS), who shares the airline's ambitious sustainability initiatives. Check it out here. Learn more about the innovators who are navigating the industry's challenges to make sustainable aviation a reality, in our new book ‘Sustainability in the Air'. Click here to learn more.Feel free to reach out via email to podcast@simpliflying.com. For more content on sustainable aviation, visit our website green.simpliflying.com and join the movement. It's about time.Links & More:ESG - airBaltic Fokker Next Gen partners with airBaltic on new liquid hydrogen powered commercial aircraft – GreenAir News airBaltic achieves one-Year milestone in increased SAF implementation - Travel And Tour World airBaltic to Expand Training Fleet With All-Electric eD40 - FLYING Magazine 

May the road rise to meet you. My note from a slow coach this week reflects on Baltic endorphins, some internal torment due to a decision made by my past self that my present self didn't appreciate, and a poem contemplating whether adventure is always just around the corner. It's an excerpt from a journal entry a couple of weeks ago when I was in Finland. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w_VzkTNi53E I'm still feeling invigorated from last night's dip in the Baltic Sea. I don't know if it's the exhilaration of spending 90 seconds in 4-degree (Celsius) water or the satisfaction I feel from following through on my intention. Something caught me when I looked across the water a few days ago—a pull I couldn't ignore. The idea of getting in the water was great. Until it was time to do it. What was I thinking? The two hours leading up to my plunge were filled with antsy-pantsy pacing and flip-flopping. I was not amused by my decision. Still, I knew that if I didn't go through with it, the regret of missing this opportunity would far outweigh the momentary despair of doing something I knew would be wildly rewarding (once I resurfaced and was safely ensconced in the sauna—my happy place). This morning's inner calm is a blend of satisfaction and physical aliveness. The sauna not only offered a delightful reward for completing my challenge but also enhanced the experience. The contrast of fire and ice creates a unique sensation. Forever on the horizon This morning, I am returning to the list of phrases and ideas we developed at the start of our month of “Adventure” in The Haven. I had intended to use one each morning in my journal practice, but it hasn't happened yet. No problem, I am up for it today. Now. I spin the wheel, and it throws “Adventure is waiting just beyond view” onto the screen. I don't think it's a saying, but it feels familiar. Similar to the idea that adventure (or growth) lies on the other side of your comfort zone. I've always had a complex relationship with these platitudinal sayings. They carry kernels of truth for particular situations but are often espoused as universal, all-encompassing statements of fact. May the branch rise to meet them My eyes are drawn through the window. My first coffee of the day is on the cabinet beside me. Adventure is waiting just beyond view. Those words feel coarse to me here. Itchy. Like an irritant on my skin. I can see a squirrel moving effortlessly through the trees and a crow perched on a breeze-flexed branch above, and I wonder if they ever wonder about these things. It's tempting to get caught up in the assumption that everything good is just beyond view. It's the engine of consumer culture, the ideology of endless striving. Like a perpetual mirage, we see the reward, but it moves further as we get closer. "Just a little further" becomes a mantra in the meditation of hustle. Advice is cheap and contradictory. I am interested in how we can develop a more nuanced and healthy relationship with growth, purpose, and flow in life. If adventure is forever around the corner, what am I overlooking right here? To feel settled without settling and expectant without expecting. Isn't this moment the adventure that was just around the corner from that previous one? I think of the old blessing: “May the road rise to meet you.” Maybe that's the real adventure—the road meeting us where we are. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjJXAL40MC4 May the flow rise to meet you From the edge of this perch,I strain my neck to watch a squirreldart, weightless, certain of the branchesthat will reach out and catch herwith every flight, twist, and descent. Is it true that I can find anAdventure waiting just beyond view? If I round the corner.If I push the button.If I make the call.If I am patient.If I lead.If I trust the process.If I take a step.If I listen.If I dare.If I follow.If I let this grow.If I am brave.If I am gentle.

Returning for the full hour will be Dr. Sebastian Bruns.Sebastian is a seapower expert and maritime strategist. His current project as Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Policy Kiel University (ISPK) is “NATO Maritime Strategies and Naval Operations since 1985”, a multi-year effort to explore the Alliance's maritime and naval roles between the late Cold War and today. Sebastian is the founder of the Kiel International Seapower Symposium (KISS), the Baltic Sea Strategy Forum (BSSF), the “Dreizack” young voices in maritime research workshop, and the ISPK Seapower publication series (NOMOS). From 2021-2022, Dr. Bruns served as the inaugural John McCain-Fulbright Distinguished Visiting Professor at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, teaching Baltic Sea security and U.S. naval strategy to Midshipmen at the Political Science Department. He is a former Congressional staffer (then-Rep. Todd Young, IN-09), a fellow at the Royal Swedish Society of Naval Sciences, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre.ShowlinksHow much do Nato members spend on defense?Kiel Seapower.West-up map of the Baltic.Kaliningrad.German-Norwegian submarine program.SummaryIn this episode, Sal and Mark welcome Dr. Sebastian Bruhn to discuss the evolving security landscape in the Baltic Sea region, particularly in light of recent Russian activities. They explore NATO's response, the historical context of the Baltic, and the implications of the Kaliningrad exclave. The conversation also touches on the concept of the 'NATO lake', the challenges of gray zone tactics, and the future of naval cooperation and shipbuilding partnerships within NATO.TakeawaysThe Baltic Sea is experiencing increased military activity due to Russian threats.Kaliningrad's strategic position poses significant risks to NATO operations.The concept of the 'NATO lake' may lead to complacency in security measures.Gray zone tactics are complicating maritime security in the Baltic.NATO spending is increasing, particularly among Baltic nations.Germany's naval capabilities are being modernized but remain limited.Coast Guards are playing a crucial role in detaining shadow fleet vessels.Transatlantic shipbuilding partnerships are becoming more important.Historical context is vital for understanding current Baltic security dynamics.Chapters00:00: Introduction to NATO's Maritime North03:40: The Baltic Sea: A Strategic Overview10:04: Historical Context and Current Threats18:38: Kaliningrad: A Geopolitical Challenge21:27: Russian Military Capabilities in the Baltic29:00: Gray Zone Tactics and Hybrid Warfare29:27: Historical Context of Naval Warfare31:40: NATO Spending and Defense Strategies39:17: The Role of Coast Guards in Maritime Security44:40: Bureaucracy and Naval Operations48:03: International Collaboration in Shipbuilding53:15: Maritime Domain Awareness and NATO's Role

Day 1,142.Today, as a new helicopter drone is spotted flying over the Moscow region, we assess movements on the frontlines and ask why Japan is offering to provide increased support for Ukraine. Then later we discuss the new defence line the Baltic nations of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are building against Russia. Do they think an invasion is imminent?Contributors:Francis Dearnley (Executive Editor for Audio). @FrancisDearnley on X.James Crisp (Europe Editor). @JamesCrisp6 on X.Iona Cleave (Foreign Reporter). @cleaveiona on X.Content Referenced:The Baltics are building a defensive line against Russia. Can they do it fast enough? (Iona Cleave in The Telegraph):https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/07/baltic-secret-defensive-line-keep-russia-out-europe/Hungary could turn on Russia by backing US sanctions (James Crisp in The Telegraph):https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/08/hungary-could-turn-on-russia-by-backing-us-sanctions/The Telegraph's Ukraine Live Blog:https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/10/russia-ukraine-zelensky-putin-war-latest/ Video shows 4 captive Ukrainian troops killed by men identified as Russian forces (AP):https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-pows-war-crimes-putin-zelenskyy-a2185297338af410fb5122448e62db76 NOW AVAILABLE IN NEW LANGUAGES:The Telegraph has launched translated versions of Ukraine: The Latest in Ukrainian and Russian, making its reporting accessible to audiences on both sides of the battle lines and across the wider region, including Central Asia and the Caucasus. Just search Україна: Останні Новини (Ukr) and Украина: Последние Новости (Ru) on your on your preferred podcast app to find them, or click the links below.Listen here: https://linktr.ee/ukrainethelatestLearn more about the tech: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/02/24/ukraine-the-latest-podcast-russian-ukrainian-ai-translation/Subscribe: telegraph.co.uk/ukrainethelatestEmail: ukrainepod@telegraph.co.uk Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

As Putin wages a shadow war across the European continent—and the US commitment to NATO grows uncertain—we ask: would the West really defend the Baltic states if Russia advanced?Andrew Marr is joined by Oliver Moody, Berlin bureau chief for The Times and author of Baltic: The Future of Europe.Drawing on deep history, extensive reporting, and sobering military realities, Moody argues that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are not just small nations on the edge of Europe—they are a test of whether the West still believes in itself.Sign up to the New Statesman's daily politics newsletter: Morning Call Submit a question for a future episode: You Ask Us Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The 'accidental' severing of undersea cables or pipelines seem an almost daily occurrence these days but how reliant are we on this infrastructure, how much of it is there, and what steps are being taken to protect it? Business and economics editor Douglas Fraser investigates who might be behind these thinly veiled acts of sabotage and what their motivation might be. With much of the activity happening in the North and Baltic seas Douglas travels to Norway to see how the Navy there have long anticipated this risk and have partnered with the oil and gas industry to create a 'total defence' concept that extends deep beneath the waves.

“I swear I will not flee from this fight. I will triumph, or I will die!” In the 1066 game of thrones for the crown of England, the most extraordinary of the three contenders is arguably Harald Hardrada: viking warrior, daring explorer, emperor's bodyguard, serpent slayer, alleged lover to an empress, King of Norway, and legend of Norse mythology. How did this titan of a man come to cross the North Sea with his army, and take on Harold Godwinson, in the titanic showdown of Stamford Bridge? His story before this point is so colourful that it may be one the most exciting lives in all history. Fighting from the age of twelve, Harald was born to a petty regional king of Norway, in a Scandinavia of competing religions and kingships. As a teenager, he would then join his fearsome brother Olaf, the man who united Norway but later fell foul of King Cnut, and subsequently sailed the seas and mysterious waterways of Russia, in a mighty battle to take back Norway. Their defeat was terrible and absolute, leaving the young Harald wounded and on the run. A journey of horrors and hardship would then lead him at last to the awe inspiring city of Kyiv, where he would serve as mercenary for the Grand Prince. But still hungry for wealth and glory he then travelled on to the most remarkable city in the world: Constantinople, where his life would take an even more dramatic turn… Join Dominic and Tom as they describe the electrifying early life of Harald Hardrada. From Scandinavian prince, warrior, and would-be usurper, to Baltic mercenary, and member of the elite Varangian Guard, in the glittering Constantinople or Miklagard - Asgard on earth. The stage is set for the greatest adventure of his life so far. But will Harald ever seize his ultimate destiny and become a king? EXCLUSIVE NordVPN Deal ➼ https://nordvpn.com/restishistory Try it risk-free now with a 30-day money-back guarantee! Head to investengine.com/history or use promo code HISTORY for a welcome bonus of up to £100 _______ Twitter: @TheRestHistory @holland_tom @dcsandbrook Producer: Theo Young-Smith Assistant Producer: Tabby Syrett + Aaliyah Akude Executive Producers: Jack Davenport + Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

In this weekend episode, Victor Davis Hanson and cohost Sami Winc discuss the impact of WWI on the West, the recent attacks on Tesla, the failed leadership of the Left, suggestions of Justice Roberts, Baltic states and Poland pull out of ban on landmines, and the JFK files.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week we talk about Euromaidan, minerals deals, and propaganda.We also discuss European security, NATO, and the western-led world order.Recommended Book: Storm Front by Jim ButcherTranscriptIn February of 2014, pro-Russian protests racked parts of southeastern Ukraine and Russian soldiers, their uniforms and weapons stripped of flags and other identifying markers, occupied another part of Ukraine called Crimea.This was seemingly in response to Ukraine's overthrow of its pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, who was toppled as part of the Euromaidan protests, which were themselves a response to Yanukovych deciding to aim for closer ties with Russia, rather than signing an association agreement with the EU, which would have committed Ukraine to several EU-oriented reforms, related to corruption, among other things, while also giving Ukrainians many new rights, including visa-free movement and access to the European Investment Bank, beginning a few years later, in 2017.This sudden pivot away from the EU and toward Russia didn't go down well with the Ukrainian public, which had repeatedly shown it wanted to lean toward the west, and the Euromaidan protests were focused on weeding out government corruption; the existing government was accused of being all sorts of corrupt, and had also been accused of human rights abuses and allowing Russian oligarchs undo influence at the highest rungs of power; Yanukovych was in Russia's pocket, basically, and his overthrow made Russia worry that they would lose control of their neighbor.So Russia moved in to take part of Ukraine, basically uncontested, both internally and externally—a lot of other governments made upset noises about this, but Russia gave itself cover by removing their flags from their personnel, and that gave them the ability to paint everything that happened as a natural uprising from within Ukraine, the people wanting freedom from their Ukrainian oppressors, and Russia was just supporting this cry to overthrow oppressive tyrants, because they're very nice and love freedom.For the next eight years, the Ukrainian government fought separatist forces, funded and reinforced by the Russian government, in the southeastern portion of their country, while Russia expanded their infrastructure in Crimea, which again, they stole from Ukraine early on, and where they previously leased vital naval facilities from Ukraine; and those facilities are assumed to be a big part of why all this went down the way it did, as without said naval facilities, they wouldn't have a naval presence in the Black Sea.Then, in February of 2022, after a multi-month buildup of troops and military hardware along their shared border, which they provided all sorts of excuses for, and which many commentators and governments around the world excused as just a bunch of saber-rattling, nothing to worry about, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, initially aiming for a blitzkrieg-like assault that was meant to take Ukraine's capital city, Kyiv, and decapitate the country's government within just days, at which point they could replace the government with someone who's working for them, another puppet they controlled.As of the day I'm recording this, in early March of 2025, the war is still ongoing, though. And in the years since it began, it's estimated that more than a million people have been killed or injured, while entire cities across Ukraine have been leveled and tens of thousands of Ukrainian refugees have fled Russia's forces as they've raped and pillaged and murdered their way across the Ukrainian countryside, those refugees leaving for destinations around the world, but creating a refugee crisis in nearby European nations like Poland and Germany, in particular.There's been a lot of back and forth in this conflict, Russia initially thought to have a massive upper hand, probably winning within days, as intended, but then Ukraine held fast, Russia redeployed its troops and armor, Ukraine got some remarkable counter-attacks in, and then Russia started to reset its economy to allow for a more drawn-out conflict.As of early 2025, Russia is once against considered to have the upper-hand, and though Ukraine has been holding the line even in the most under-assault regions in the eastern portion of its territory, and has in recent weeks managed to take some Russian-held territory back, Russia's comparably larger number of troops, its recent resupply of soldiers from North Korea, its larger economy and number of supply chains, and its relationships with entities like China and Iran, in addition to North Korea, all of which have been supplying it with things it needs to keep the war effort going, at length, have all conspired to put Ukraine on the back foot.Additionally, Ukraine is struggling, after this many years of total war, to refill empty boots and make do with whatever their allies can and will offer them, in terms of money, weapons, but also the basics, like food and fuel. They've been able to shore-up some limited aspects of their economy, and have innovated like crazy when it comes to things like drones and other fundamentals of asymmetric, defensive warfare, but right now at least, the larger forces swirling around in the geopolitical realm are making life difficult for Ukraine, and for those who are still supporting them.And that's what I'd like to talk about today; the continuing conflict in Ukraine, but especially what's happening on the sidelines, beyond the battle itself—and how those sideline happenings might lead to some fundamental changes in how Europe is organized, and the makeup of the modern world order.—At this point I've done probably half a dozen or more episodes on this conflict; it's long-lasting, it's big, it's important locally, but also globally, and it's been informing both geopolitical and economic outcomes since day one.Today I'd like to talk about some recent happenings, most of them from the past few months, that could prove impactful on the eventual outcome of this conflict, and might even determine when that end of fighting arrives.And at the center of these happenings is recently reelected US President Trump, who has always had a, let's call it unusual, public appreciation for Russian President Putin, and the strongman image he and other global authoritarians wield, while at the same time not being a big fan of Ukrainian President Zelensky—perhaps in part because Trump called Zelensky back in 2019 to try to get him to come up with evidence supporting a debunked conspiracy theory about his opponent, Joe Biden's administration, related to alleged impropriety in US-Ukrainian relations.Zelensky could find no such evidence, and when he told Trump there was nothing to be found, Trump blocked payments on $400 million worth of military aid for Ukraine, holding it hostage until Zelensky came up with what he wanted. This became a big scandal only after the fact, and before it could be made public or became known by congress via a whistleblower complaint, Trump released the money. This led to a formal impeachment inquiry into Trump later that year, which led to his impeachment for abusing his power and obstructing Congress—but he was then acquitted by the Republican-led Senate.This, it's thought, may have colored Trump's behavior toward Zelensky when the two men sat down, alongside several other US officials, including US Vice President JD Vance, to discuss a potential mineral deal between the US and Ukraine, which was based on an earlier deal that the Ukrainian government dismissed.The original deal basically required that Ukraine exploit its mineral wealth and put half of the money it makes from those minerals into a fund that would be used to pay the US back for the military assistance it's provided so far, to the tune of $500 billion; which is quite a lot more than the $175 billion or so the US has spent on this conflict since Russia invaded, only $128 billion of which has directly aided the Ukrainian government, as opposed to funding US activities associated with the war, or supporting other affected countries thereabouts.So originally the US asked for more than double what's been provided so far, in return, paid for by Ukraine's mineral wealth, which includes a lot of the types of rare earth minerals that are vital for common modern technologies, like computers, batteries, and solar panels.That didn't fly, mostly because it didn't contain a security guarantee for Ukraine—the US saying it would protect them if necessary, basically, in exchange for this huge sum of money—so the new deal asked for $500 billion be placed in a fund, and that fund would be jointly controlled by the US and Ukraine, the funds used to rebuild the country after the war.50% of all revenues from Ukrainian natural resources newly exploited after the war, so not from existing mines and ports and such, would be put into this fund. Like the first time around, this deal didn't include a security agreement from the US, but the general idea was that this fund would incentivize new investment in the area, and because Ukraine has a lot of unexploited mineral wealth, this could give the US a new source for these sorts of valuable raw materials that are currently mostly controlled by China, but which the US government is attempting to claim more of, now that it's realized it's way behind on locking down sources of these really important things.At the meeting where this second deal was meant to be signed, though, Zelensky flying to the US to sit down with Trump to make it happen, the President and Vice President more or less verbally attacked Zelensky, criticizing him for not being more overtly grateful, and telling him he was wrong when he said that Russia started the war by invading Ukraine.It was all pretty bizarre, and even folks in Trump's own party seemed pretty puzzled by the whole thing, some of them calling it embarrassing, as Trump and Vance were basically parroting Putin's propaganda that no one actually believes because they ignore easily verifiable facts.In any event, this led to a lot of fallout between the US and Ukrainian governments, with Trump suggesting he would lean more heavily on Ukraine to get them to accept peace on Russia's terms, because the Ukrainians couldn't see reason and accept his version of reality, essentially.Trump has also suggested that he's been talking a lot with Putin, and that he believes Putin wants peace, and it's time to end the war. Putin, for his part, has not seemed inclined to give up anything in order to achieve peace, and Russian attacks on Ukraine have increased in scale since Trump came into office, and even more so after talks about a supposed peace agreement began.All of which has had implications on the ground.In Ukraine, Ukrainian soldiers have had to operate with fewer resources, as Trump cut off additional funding and supply shipments, post-meeting. He recently ordered that the US not share intelligence with them, too, and they cut off the sharing of satellite imagery, which Ukraine has used to great effect to strike Russian targets from a distance.This has also had implications across Europe, though, as while Ukraine is being invaded now, there are concerns that if Putin gets away with taking part or all of Ukraine, he'll go for other previous Soviet assets, next, maybe starting with the Baltic nations—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—and then tearing off chunks of Poland, Finland, or other neighbors that were previously part of the Soviet Union, like eastern Germany.The European Union, despite a fair bit of warning about Trump's stance on the issue, and the possibility that he would return to office, has been seemingly dumbstruck by Trump's sudden pivot away from supporting Ukraine, and away from NATO more broadly, toward a stance that favors Russia, instead. European governments have been scrambling to come up with an aid package that will replace some of what the US would have given, and have started sharing more intelligence, as well, including satellite imagery.It won't be easy, though, as the US versions of these things, from monetary resources to eyes in the sky vastly outshine what even the combination of British, French, and German assets can offer—at least at this stage. And the US has traditionally handled the lion's share of spending and building in these areas, shouldering the majority of NATO spending, because, well, it could, and that was a major premise of the post-WWII, western-led world order. The US said it would protect global capitalist democracies with its military might and nukes, if necessary, and European nations have been generally happy with this setup as it has generally allowed European governments to spend less money on their militaries and more on other stuff.That state of affairs seems to have ended, or at the very least become too unreliable to bet on, though, so EU nations are attempting to fill in the gaps left by the suddenly less-reliable-seeming US government, not just for Ukraine, but for themselves, as well.Poland's president recently announced that he wants to develop nuclear weapons and wants every adult male to undergo military training, so the country can field an army 500,000-strong.The French president has said he wants to extend his country's nuclear umbrella—guaranteed deterrence, basically, using nuclear weapons—to the whole of the EU. France has far fewer nukes than the US and Russia, but this captures a sense of the moment in the Union, where a bunch of currently underfunded militaries are realizing they might not be able to rely on the US in a pinch. And while they collectively have a lot more people and resources than Russia, Russia is fully mobilized and has shown itself to be willing to attack sovereign nations, whenever it pleases, caring a lot less for the human lives it spends, in the process, than is typical in western-style democracies.Even short of full-scale, out of nowhere invasions, Russia could pose a threat to European governments via asymmetrical routes. It's been seemingly approving all sorts of espionage operations meant to increase immigration arrivals in European nations where immigration is already a hot-button issue, nudging politics to the far-right, and it's allegedly been attacking infrastructure, in terms of hacking and just blowing stuff up, in order to sow discord and fear.As I mentioned earlier, too, part of Germany was previously held by the Soviet Union, and that same part of the country has recently voted heavily in favor of the country's furthest-right party, which wants stronger ties with Russia. So while conventional military issues are at the forefront of discussion, right now, Russia's long history of asymmetric warfare is also getting a fair bit of attention, as it could conceivably use these groups as a casus belli to attack, carving off pieces of its European neighbors and slowly incorporating them into its sphere of influence, similar to what it did in Ukraine, beginning in 2014; if eastern Germany supports Russia, it could fund and in other ways support uprising efforts in these regions, creating chaos and potentially even breaking off separatist states that would pull those regions into Russia's orbit.It's a tumultuous moment in this part of the world, then, in part because of the conflict that's still ongoing—a much larger and more powerful nation having invaded its smaller, less-powerful neighbor. But it's also tumultuous because of the implications of that conflict, especially if Russia comes out on top. If they win, there would seem to be a far greater chance of their deciding to keep the ball rolling, replicating a model that worked (without significant long-term consequences) across more neighboring nations.And if they can do that before Europe reinforces itself—assuming that's what the EU does, as it can be difficult to get a bunch of people with a bunch of at times competing interests to agree on anything, and even more so when said agreement involves both money and potentially sending civilians into harm's way—if Russia can get there before a new, restructured and reinforced Europe emerges, we could see another, similar conflict soon, and this one could be even more successful than the last, if Russia tweaks its formula to make it more effective, and European governments succumb to war weariness, exhausted by the war in Ukraine, in the meantime.Show Noteshttps://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-us-aid-going-ukrainehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trump%E2%80%93Ukraine_scandalhttps://www.csis.org/analysis/breaking-down-us-ukraine-minerals-dealhttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/08/world/europe/ukraine-russia-north-korea-kursk.htmlhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/03/08/zelensky-trump-fallout-ukraine/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/04/world/europe/ukraine-us-trump-military-support.htmlhttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/06/us/politics/ukraine-zelensky-trump-russia.htmlhttps://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-dobropillya-us-intelligence-3d0bad105a93933e9cdaca5cf31fcf74https://mwi.westpoint.edu/no-substitute-for-victory-how-to-negotiate-from-a-position-of-strength-to-end-the-russo-ukraine-war/https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-leaders-cautiously-welcome-macrons-nuclear-umbrella-offer-2025-03-06/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/07/world/europe/bulgarians-guilty-spying-russia-uk.htmlhttps://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/08/europe-scrambles-to-aid-ukraine-after-us-intelligence-cutoff-00219678https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9wpy9x890wohttps://www.cbsnews.com/news/keith-kellogg-ukraine-intelligence-sharing-pause/https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce8yz5dk82wohttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/07/world/us-ukraine-satellite-imagery.htmlhttps://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c05m907r39qohttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/07/us/politics/trump-russia-sanctions-tariffs.htmlhttps://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-future-vision-and-current-capabilities-waging-ai-enabled-autonomous-warfarehttps://www.politico.eu/article/donald-tusk-plan-train-poland-men-military-service-russiahttps://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/03/08/poland-says-it-plans-to-give-every-adult-male-military-traininghttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/22/world/europe/ukraine-trump-minerals.htmlhttps://apnews.com/article/ten-days-that-upended-us-support-for-ukraine-8930c01a15910a7ad8a7f7c7fac9ba3ahttps://www.wsj.com/world/white-house-and-ukraine-close-in-on-deal-for-mineral-rights-e924c672https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-us-still-ironing-parts-191805611.htmlhttps://www.reuters.com/business/us-could-cut-ukraines-access-starlink-internet-services-over-minerals-say-2025-02-22/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/25/world/europe/ukraine-minerals-deal.htmlhttps://www.cnn.com/2025/02/26/europe/ukraine-us-mineral-resources-deal-explained-intl-latam/index.htmlhttps://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/electric-power/122624-eu-moving-to-develop-infrastructure-for-nuclear-energy-expansion-officialshttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-07/european-stocks-see-most-inflows-in-decade-amid-defense-splurgehttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/10/business/ai-summit-paris.htmlhttps://apnews.com/article/germany-ukraine-debt-brake-economy-military-spending-74be8e96d8515ddddd53a99a69957651https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/03/03/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-drones-deaths.html?unlocked_article_code=1.2U4.b15Z.1EA4tDb_37Bqhttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/10/world/europe/ukraine-russia-eastern-front-line.htmlhttps://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/02/combat-losses-and-manpower-challenges-underscore-the-importance-of-mass-in-ukraine/https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2025https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euromaidanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union%E2%80%93Ukraine_Association_Agreementhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Ukrainian_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine_(1_January_2025_%E2%80%93_present) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe