Podcasts about Baltic

A round-up of the main headlines in Sweden on May 21st, 2025. You can hear more reports on our homepage www.radiosweden.se, or in the app Sveriges Radio Play. Presenter/Producer: Kris Boswell

BBC Defence Correspondent Jonathan Beale speaks to Dovilė Šakalienė, Lithuania's Defence Minister.The Baltic nation, along with its neighbours Latvia and Estonia, share a border with Russia, and have nervously watched the invasion of Ukraine, fearing they could be next.All three countries have had turbulent relationships with their much larger neighbour, Russia. They were annexed by the Soviet Union during the Second World War, and were subject to decades of rule from Moscow up until the end of the Cold War.In 2004, Lithuania joined both the European Union and NATO, and just over a decade later, adopted the Euro as its currency. But despite looking westwards, the country has always kept one eye on developments over its eastern border in Russia.Russia's annexation of the Ukrainian region of Crimea in 2014 set off alarm bells in the Lithuanian capital Vilnius, and when the full-scale invasion of Ukraine by Russia began in 2022, Lithuania and its neighbours began fearing - and preparing - for the worst.The Interview brings you conversations with people shaping our world, from all over the world. The best interviews from the BBC. You can listen on the BBC World Service, Mondays and Wednesdays at 0700 GMT. Or you can listen to The Interview as a podcast, out twice a week on BBC Sounds, Apple, Spotify or wherever you get your podcasts.Presenter: Jonathan Beale Producer: Ben Cooper Editor: Richard Fenton-Smith

In an era where government tech projects often end in billion-dollar failures and privacy nightmares, there's a tiny Baltic nation that's quietly revolutionized what's possible. Estonia—a country of just 1.3 million people—has built what might be the world's most efficient digital government. Every public service is online. Digital signatures save 2% of GDP annually. And in a twist that should intrigue American conservatives, they've done it with smaller government, not bigger.How did a former Soviet republic become a model of lean digital governance? What's their secret for avoiding the "big-bang IT project" disasters that plague Washington? And most importantly—can America's divided political system learn anything from Estonia's success?Joining for this episode are two experts who've studied Estonia's digital miracle up close. Dr. Keegan McBride is senior policy advisor in emerging technology and geopolitics at the Tony Blair Institute. He's also a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Foundation for American Innovation. Joel Burke is the author of Rebooting a Nation: the Incredible Rise of Estonia, E-Government, and the Startup Revolution, and Senior Public Policy Analyst at Mozilla.

Trong vòng chưa đầy hai tuần đầu của tháng 5 năm nay, Liên Hiệp Châu Âu chứng kiến nhiều sự kiện quan trọng. Tân thủ tướng Đức  Friedrich Merz một ngày sau khi nhậm chức (06/05/2025), đã sang thăm Pháp và Ba Lan, để phục hồi quan hệ ba bên trong khuôn khổ Tam giác Weimar. Hai ngày sau (09/05), Pháp cùng Ba Lan ký Hiệp ước Nancy về an ninh- quốc phòng, và ngày 10/05, các lãnh đạo Đức, Pháp, Ba Lan, Anh đã tới Kiev ủng hộ tổng thống Volodymyr Zelensky yêu cầu Nga chấp nhận ngưng bắn. Trong cục diện địa chính trị mới này, Ba Lan đóng vai trò như thế nào ?---------- ***** ----------Sự ra đời của Tam Giác WeimarTam giác Weimar, mà báo chí còn gọi là « Ủy ban Thúc đẩy Hợp tác Ba Lan với Pháp và Đức », được thành lập ở cấp ngoại trưởng ba nước vào tháng 8/1991 ở thành phố Weimar của Đức, nhằm tạo diễn đàn trao đổi, tư vấn cho Ba Lan khi đó vừa mới chọn cải tổ dân chủ đại nghị, kinh tế thị trường sau hơn 40 năm thuộc phe XHCN do Liên Xô lãnh đạo.Đó là một giai đoạn có một không hai của lịch sử châu Âu hiện đại. Tam giác Weimar là sáng kiến ngoại giao nằm trong khuôn khổ một hội nghị lớn hơn : Hội nghị 2+4 vào tháng 3/1990, quyết định việc thống nhất nước Đức. Hai + bốn tức là bốn đại cường Liên Xô, Hoa Kỳ, Anh và Pháp và hai nước Tây Đức và Đông Đức.Đến tháng 7/1990, Ba Lan được mời tham gia, vì thiếu Ba Lan thì vấn đề biên giới mới của nước Đức thống nhất với Ba Lan khó có thể ổn định được châu Âu. Rồi còn có các cuộc đàm phán để đưa các sư đoàn quân đội Liên Xô đóng ở Ba Lan về nước, thực ra là về nước Nga thời tổng thống Boris Yeltsin và cuộc rút quân này phải đến năm 1992 mới hoàn tất.Nhưng nói riêng về quan hệ Đức-Pháp-Ba Lan thì các cuộc họp trong khuôn khổ Tam giác Weimar có mục tiêu dùng mô hình hòa giải Pháp và Đức sau Thế Chiến II để giúp cho Ba Lan hòa giải với Đức, vì di sản của Thế Chiến II ở Ba Lan, quốc gia bị phát-xít Đức giết hàng triệu công dân, là rất nặng nề. Trong lĩnh vực này, Tam giác Weimar đã hoàn thành xuất sắc nhiệm vụ.Sau đó, Tam giác Weimar giúp Ba Lan chuẩn bị hành lang pháp lý (hoạt động liên nghị viện từ 1992) và quân đội (từ 1997) để có  thể gia nhập khối NATO (1999). Tức là các cuộc họp của Tam giác Weimar mở rộng từ ngoại giao sang cấp bộ trưởng quốc phòng, và sau đó thì giúp về tham vấn cải cách kinh tế cho tới khi Ba Lan gia nhập Liên Hiệp Châu Âu năm 2004.Tam giác Weimar có nhiều hoạt động chung giữa ba nước với giải thưởng mang tên thi hào Ba Lan Adam Mickiewicz tặng cho các cá nhân, chính trị gia có công xây đắp quan hệ ba bên, giúp Ba Lan trở thành một quốc gia dân chủ, thành viên NATO và EU.Tam Giác Weimar : Nỗi lo « hòa nhập mạnh là hòa tan »Sau giai đoạn 1 khi Ba Lan đã gia nhập NATO và EU, phe dân tộc chủ nghĩa ở Ba Lan không hài lòng và họ cho rằng “hòa nhập mạnh là hòa tan”. Năm 2006, tổng thống Ba Lan Lech Kaczynski thuộc phe thiên hữu dân tộc chủ nghĩa Công giáo (nông thôn) đã từ chối dự họp với lãnh đạo Pháp và Đức. Tam giác Weimar coi như bị ngưng hoạt động. Phải đến năm 2011, khi ông Boleslaw Komorowski – thuộc phái ôn hòa, từng đến thăm Việt Nam – trở thành tổng thống, Tam giác Weimar mới được phục hồi hoạt động ở cấp cao nhất.Tuy nhiên, càng về sau này thì Tam giác Weimar càng giảm đi ý nghĩa. Ví dụ sau khi vào EU, người dân Ba Lan được tự do đi lại, du học và đến làm việc ở Pháp, Đức, Hà Lan, Anh (trước Brexit)..., thì việc trao đổi sinh viên như trước đây không còn cần thiết nữa. Ngoài ra, Ba Lan đã ở trong bộ máy NATO do Hoa Kỳ lãnh đạo nên vai trò của Đức và Pháp cũng giảm đi.Chiến tranh Ukraina: Sự hồi sinh Tam giác WeimarTừ sau khi Nga xâm lược Ukraina vào năm 2022, vai trò của Tam giác Weimar được phục hồi, vì các chuyển biến địa chính trị khiến Pháp và Đức phải tìm lại một “platform” hợp tác chặt chẽ, mang tính nòng cốt với Ba Lan, nước đóng vai trò căn cứ hậu cần cho phe NATO cung cấp vũ khí sang Ukraina chống Nga.Người ta nay nói đến Tam giác Weimar +, với ý tưởng là mời Anh, và Ý tham gia, tức là, như có người nói đùa, sẽ không còn là Tam giác mà là Tứ giác, Ngũ giác. Câu hỏi ở Ba Lan là “trong hình khối đó thì cạnh nào dài nhất, quan trọng nhất”.Thắc mắc này hiện chưa có lời giải vì còn đang định hình. Nhưng sau cuộc hội đàm ở Kiev hôm 10/05 của Emmanuel Macron, Friedrich Merz, Donald Tusk và Kier Starmer cùng Volodymyr Zelensky rồi có thêm lãnh đạo Ý, Hy Lạp, rồi cả tổng thống Donald Trump điện đàm nữa, có vẻ như là vai trò hạt nhân của Pháp – Đức – Ba Lan đang được đề cao.Hiệp ước Nancy và ô nguyên tử PhápKhông chỉ hợp tác chặt với Mỹ và để Hoa Kỳ đóng căn cứ tại nước họ, Ba Lan vừa ký với Pháp Hiệp ước Nancy ngày 09/05 về an ninh quốc phòng. Pháp cho biết sẵn sàng thảo luận về việc chia sẻ ô bảo vệ bằng vũ khí nguyên tử với Ba Lan.Về điểm này, người dân Ba Lan phản ứng dè dặt, ủng hộ nhưng không mấy tin tưởng vào khả năng Pháp chia sẻ cái ô hạt nhân bảo vệ Ba Lan, dù Hiệp ước Nancy không nói thẳng ra như thế.Ví dụ nhiều giới ở Ba Lan (như Joana Jaroch-Pszeniczna, đại diện cho doanh nghiệp làm ăn với Pháp), thì ủng hộ và nhấn mạnh rằng quan hệ lịch sử, văn hóa và sự gắn bó chính trị Pháp-Ba Lan từ thời Napoleon cứu Ba Lan chống lại Nga (1807), qua các quan hệ đồng minh ở hai Thế Chiến, tới thời sau này, là nền tảng tốt cho Hiệp ước Nancy phát huy tác dụng.Nhà bình luận chuyên về nước Pháp, ông Kacper Kita thì cho rằng “từ 100 năm qua, nay là lúc hai nước gần nhau nhất”. Nhưng theo ông, còn phải chờ xem Mỹ có rút khỏi Ba Lan hay không thì Pháp mới có chỗ chen chân vào, ví dụ như thị trường vũ khí vì Ba Lan đang đặt mua vũ khí (F-35) của Mỹ, của Hàn Quốc (trọng pháo). Còn cựu Tổng tham mưu trưởng, tướng Mieczyslaw Cieniuch, phát biểu trước giới báo chí, tỏ ra ngờ vực khả năng tổng thống Macron hay người kế nhiệm ông ở Pháp sẵn sàng dùng vũ khí nguyên tử bảo vệ Ba Lan.Tuy nhiên, tướng Stanislaw Koziej, cựu Chủ tịch Hội đồng An ninh Quốc gia Ba Lan, cho rằng cần phân biệt hai loại vũ khí nguyên tử : Vũ khí của Pháp là của châu Âu, như Pháp nói, và vũ khí của Mỹ là của NATO. Vì thế, theo ông, Ba Lan cần thận trọng, vẫn phải làm sao giữ cam kết của Mỹ bảo vệ các nước NATO châu Âu bằng ô nguyên tử. Theo ông, vì Hoa Kỳ ở xa châu Âu, khả năng bị tấn công bằng vũ khí hạt nhân chiến thuật thấp hơn các nước châu Âu gồm Anh và Pháp nên Mỹ có ưu thế hơn. Tuy thế, nếu Pháp bán lò phản ứng nguyên tử cho Ba Lan thì Ba Lan sẽ rất hoan nghênh.Ba Lan : Sườn đông của NATO « vẫn chưa sẵn sàng »Tại Ba Lan, khá nhiều khẩu hiệu ái quốc và cả biểu ngữ mời gọi thanh niên nhập cũ đăng trên đường phố. Lý do là vì Ba Lan không còn chế độ quân dịch (nghĩa vụ quân sự), mà chỉ có quân đội chuyên  nghiệp, lính tình nguyện. Anh và Pháp là hai nước châu Âu duy nhất thuộc NATO có vũ khí nguyên tử. Còn Ba Lan tuy không có tên lửa hạt nhân nhưng đã tăng chi tiêu quốc phòng rất nhanh, mua hàng nghìn cỗ trọng pháo, hàng trăm xe tăng và phi đội F-35 để phòng thủ, sau khi Nga đánh Ukraina vào tháng 2/2022.Tuy thế, báo chí Ba Lan vẫn xem sự chuẩn bị của chính phủ là chưa đủ nhanh, chưa đủ mạnh. Tính theo các kế hoạch của chính quyền, phải đến năm 2030, Ba Lan, với dân số 37,5 triệu, mới có đủ 6 sư đoàn bộ binh trang bị hiện đại. Có thể lúc đó đã muộn chăng ?Theo đánh giá từ chuyên gia Marek Budzisz, nếu bị tấn công từ phía Đông vào lúc này, Ba Lan chỉ cầm cự được chưa tới 2 tuần và có thể mất toàn bộ vùng bờ Đông sông Vistula, tức là một nửa lãnh thổ. Do vậy, nhiều tờ báo cho rằng Ba Lan cần đưa toàn dân vào tình trạng sẵn sàng chiến đấu, theo mô hình Phần Lan, để có hàng triệu quân dự bị chờ chống trả Nga.Hiện nay ở Ba Lan ai muốn đi tập quân sự 3 tháng thì công ty, công sở phải cho nghỉ làm ăn lương và quân đội sẽ bố trí các khóa huấn luyện quân sự cho họ. Những ai trong độ tuổi bị điều động muốn vào lính một năm thì nhà nước sẵn sàng tuyển.Từ cuối năm 2024, Ba Lan đưa tập quân sự trở lại trường phổ thông, để học sinh 14 tuổi trở lên học về kỹ năng ứng phó khi có tình trạng khẩn cấp, làm quen với các loại vũ khí mô phỏng, ví dụ súng bắn laser trên máy tính, trò chơi điện tử... Chỉ có sinh viên 21 tuổi trở lên, nếu muốn, mới được học bắn súng thật.Chiến tranh Ukraina : Ba Lan không tin vào « thiện chí » của NgaĐa số người dân Ba Lan không tin cuộc chiến ở Ukraina sẽ chấm dứt trong 2-3 tháng tới, khác hẳn những gì chính quyền Trump tự khen tiến triển đàm phán với Nga về Ukraina. Một điều tra của United Surveys (cho trang Wirtualna Polska) được báo Ba Lan đăng hôm 05/04/2025 cho thấy 65,1% người được hỏi không tin là cuộc chiến ở Ukraina sẽ sớm chấm dứt, và  14,2% cho rằng “không  biết, khó trả lời”.  Điều đáng chú ý là điều tra dư luận của CBOS cho thấy chỉ có người lao động, công nhân, kỹ thuật viên tỏ ra sẵn sàng tham gia bảo vệ tổ quốc, trong khi tầng lớp có học, có tiền thì không, thậm chí cho rằng, nếu “có biến”, họ lái xe chạy ra nước ngoài. Điều này trái với luật Tổng động viên của Cộng hòa Ba Lan (bản mới tháng 19/2024), quy định người đã có thẻ dự bị quân sự phải có mặt ở đơn vị quân sự gần nhất trong vòng 6 tiếng đồng hồ sau khi tổng thống Ba Lan tuyên bố tổng động viên. Số người được điều động sẽ gồm khá nhiều phụ nữ, chứ không chỉ có đàn ông, ví dụ sinh viên y khoa là nữ, y tá, hộ lý, kỹ sư hóa học...Đối với những người song tịch, luật Ba Lan quy định những ai có cả quốc tịch một nước thuộc khối NATO thì không cần phải trình diện với lãnh sự quán Ba Lan tại nước đó, bởi đằng nào thì thanh niên nam ở những nước thành viên NATO cũng thuộc sự quản lý của nước sở tại và Ba Lan sẽ không đi truy tìm công dân song tịch ở các nước đồng minh.Một điều tra dư luận khác của CBOS mới được công bố hôm 15/04/2025 cho thấy một bức tranh khá bi quan về tình hình an ninh khu vực Đông Âu và Baltic, theo đa số người dân Ba Lan. Họ nghĩ rằng nước Nga không phải là một quốc gia bình thường, và còn thiếu vắng kiểm soát quyền lực hay cơ chế giám sát chéo hơn cả thời Liên Xô, khi tổng bí thư Đảng Cộng sản ít nhiều còn phải chịu trách nhiệm trước Bộ Chính trị.Nước Nga ngày nay, theo đa số người dân Ba Lan, là do tổng thống Vladimir Putin và một nhóm rất nhỏ quanh ông ta điều khiển, và đã bước vào con đường chiến tranh, đã quân sự hóa nền kinh tế để phục hồi đế chế Nga, nên mối đe dọa trực tiếp từ Nga với Ba Lan là thường trực và lâu dài, chừng nào còn ông Putin.Đối với Ba Lan, an ninh khu vực là vấn đề lâu dài và mang tính sinh tử. Một mặt họ vẫn phải chờ xem Mỹ và NATO làm gì và đang tăng cường liên kết với Pháp, Anh và Đức, mặt khác họ không tin tưởng gì vào “thiện chí” từ nước Nga hiện nay và không tin là cuộc chiến ở Ukraina chấm dứt nhanh chóng.

Gabrielius Landsbergis served as Lithuania's Minister of Foreign Affairs from December 2020 until November 2024. Interestingly, 20 years ago, I also interviewed his grandfather, Vytautas Landsbergis. But we live in a very different world now – one in which the Baltic countries, including Lithuania, have closed their airspace to Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico, who felt compelled to visit Russian dictator Vladimir Putin. So, what does Mr. Landsbergis think about such a visit? What does Russian aggression against Ukraine mean for Lithuania? How worried is he that Lithuania could become the target of a Russian attack? And would Lithuanians fight if they were attacked by Russia? Listen to our conversation. And if you enjoy what I do, please support me on Ko-fi! Thank you. ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://ko-fi.com/amatisak

Driving through the night I continue the analysis of whether consciousness is always good or whether there is a Holy consciousness and a malevolent consciousness, and whether you should trust your best guess.

Nach knapp einem Monat Pause standen in Hildesheim wieder Players Championships an. Während Krzysztof Ratajski eine längere Durststrecke beenden konnte, überragte Ross Smith einen Tag später mit 24 Legs in Folge und zwei 9-Dartern. Marvin van den Boom und Benni Scherp finden, dass auch aus deutscher Sicht ansehliche Ergebnisse mit dabei waren, die es auch am Wochenende zuvor bei der Development Tour gab, an dem Cam Crabtree mit drei Titeln hervorstach. Dazu der Endspurt in der Premier League und viel World Cup of Darts in Darts aus aller Welt.Shortleg, der dartn.de Podcast, mit⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Marvin van den Boom⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠, ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Kevin Barth⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠,⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Moritz Käthner⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠,⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Benni Scherp⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ und⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Lutz Wöckener⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Alle Infos zum Podcast:⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ https://www.dartn.de/Shortleg⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Ihr wollt Shortleg und dartn.de unterstützen?[⁠⁠⁠⁠Patreon⁠⁠⁠⁠][⁠⁠⁠⁠Buy us a beer⁠⁠⁠⁠][⁠⁠⁠⁠Paypal-Spende⁠⁠⁠⁠][⁠⁠⁠⁠dartn.de Merchandise Shop⁠⁠⁠⁠][⁠⁠⁠⁠DAZN Affiliate⁠⁠⁠⁠][⁠⁠⁠⁠Abo Spotify⁠⁠⁠⁠][⁠⁠⁠⁠YouTube Kanalmitgliedschaft⁠⁠⁠⁠]0:00 Intro & Begrüßung2:05 Players Championship 1515:22 Players Championship 1632:27 PDC Development Tour 11-1539:15 Premier League Spieltag 1445:06 Dart aus aller Welt (Nordic & Baltic, World Cup Qualifier, CDC, WDF, Modus Super Series)53:44 Ausblick kommende Tage

Good afternoon, I'm _____ with today's episode of EZ News. Tai-Ex opening The Tai-Ex opened up 81-points this morning from Friday's close, at 20,996 on turnover of 4.6-billion N-T. The market gained ground last Friday as it moved closer the challenging at 21,000-point mark. The rise after after the U-S Federal Reserve left its main interest rate unchanged overnight and as investors were pinning their hopes (把希望寄托在…上) on weekend trade talks between China and the U-S. Tsai talks Taiwan and Lithuania standing united in defending democracy Former President Tsai Ing-wen is expressed here gratitude to Lithuania over its support for Taiwan - saying that both countries are united as partners (合作夥伴) in defending democracy. Tsai arrived in Lithuania on Saturday and what is her first visit to the Baltic state Speaking at a reception organized by the Lithuania-Taiwan Parliamentary Friendship Group, Tsai said while she was Taiwan's president she received visits from many Lithuanian friends in Taiwan … …. and believes that Taiwan and Lithuania share similar fates as both are neighbors to authoritarian countries. Tsai will head to Denmark next to attend to the Copenhagen Democracy Summit. Taipei's Yongkang Street pedestrianized on weekends through June 10 A trial pedestrian zone has been launched in Taipei's Yongkang Street this past weekend. The trial will run on weekends through June 10 and sees the popular road closed to most vehicles. The Taipei City Government says the aim (目的) is to promote a more pedestrian-friendly environment. The campaign limits vehicle access from 2 to 8PM on Saturdays and Sundays and covers approximately 250 meters of Yongkang Street, and includes nearby alleys around the popular tourist destination. Hamas to Release US Hostage Hamas says the last living American hostage in Gaza will be released as part of efforts to establish a ceasefire, reopen crossings into the Israeli-blockaded territory and resume aid delivery. Two Hamas officials tell The Associated Press they expect the release of Edan Alexander in the next 48 hours. U.S. President Donald Trump's envoy Steve Witkoff is confirming in a message to the AP that Hamas has agreed to release Alexander as a good will gesture toward Trump. The announcement of the first hostage release since Israel shattered (擊毀) a ceasefire in March comes shortly before Trump visits the Middle East this week. Alexander is an Israeli-American soldier who grew up in the United States. Iran US in 4th Round of Nuclear Program Negotiations Iran and US conclude a fourth round of negotiations (談判) over Tehran's nuclear program in Oman AP correspondent Donna Warder reports Pope Leo Calls for Ceasefires and Peace Pope Leo XIV has called for a just and lasting peace in Ukraine and an immediate ceasefire in Gaza with the release of hostages and delivery of humanitarian aid. In his first Sunday noon blessing as pontiff, Leo said, “Never again war!” from St. Peter's Basilica to an estimated 100,000 people below. Recalling the end of World War II 80 years ago, Leo quoted Pope Francis in denouncing the number of conflicts ravaging (摧殘) the globe today, saying it was a “third world war in pieces.” The 69-year-old Chicago-born missionary was elected 267th pope on Thursday. He has a busy week of audiences before his formal installation Mass Sunday. That was the I.C.R.T. EZ News, I'm _____. －－－－以下訊息由 SoundOn 動態廣告贊助商提供－－－－ 早餐是補充蛋白質的黃金期，吃錯食物小心可能吃進精緻澱粉、加工品、油脂、熱量…等隱形負擔早餐補充蛋白質，首選統一陽光，嚴選非基改黃豆、植物性大豆蛋白、零膽固醇，營養少負擔！ https://sofm.pse.is/7krrp4 -- Hosting provided by SoundOn

Tallink Silja har gjort en storsatsning på Åbolinjen genom renoveringen av BALTIC PRINCESS. Fartygspodden har testat fartyget som får både ris och ros. Dessutom har vi provat att åka på femtimmarskryssning med MYSTAR mellan Helsingfors och Tallinn. Dessutom snackar vi om batterisatsningen på AURORA BOTNIA, förseningen av nya vägfärjan ALVARET och om försäljningen av COSTA FORTUNA. Välkomna ombord! /Christopher & Patrik

How did the Great Northern War, which saw Sweden pitted against Peter the Great's Russia and her allies, and would transform Europe forever, begin? Who was Charles XII, Sweden's King, and a worthy antagonist for the formidable Peter? What terrible miscalculation saw Russia's Danish allies brutally knocked from the war in its early stage? What dreadful havoc did Peter's Cossacks wreak upon the Eastern Baltic? And, who was the young farm girl who would go on to capture the heart of a Tsar?  Join Dominic and Tom as they discuss Peter the Great, the early stages of the tumultuous Great Northern War, and his scandalous marriage to a serving girl? The Rest Is History Club: Become a member for exclusive bonus content, early access to full series and live show tickets, ad-free listening, our exclusive newsletter, discount book prices on titles mentioned on the pod, and our members' chatroom on Discord. Just head to therestishistory.com to sign up, or start a free trial today on Apple Podcasts: apple.co/therestishistory. For more Goalhanger Podcasts, head to www.goalhanger.com _______ Twitter: @TheRestHistory @holland_tom @dcsandbrook Producer: Theo Young-Smith Assistant Producer: Tabby Syrett + Aaliyah Akude  Executive Producers: Jack Davenport + Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Driving through the night I begin the analysis of whether consciousness is always good or whether there is a Holy consciousness and a malevolent consciousness, and whether you should trust your best guess.

Join host Lucie Gardiner at the Palma Superyacht Village 2025 for an exclusive tour aboard the groundbreaking sailing yacht Canova with Kenneth Nyfelt, Sales Director at Baltic Yachts. Together, they explore the pioneering features of this custom-built vessel—from its diesel-electric propulsion system to its DSS foil technology for unmatched stability and comfort. Kenneth shares insights into Baltic's role at the Palma show, the significance of the New Build Hub, and why Palma remains a key destination for the global sailing community.

The Germania (Latin: De Origine et situ Germanorum, literally The Origin and Situation of the Germans), written by Gaius Cornelius Tacitus around 98, is an ethnographic work on the Germanic tribes outside the Roman Empire. Germania fits squarely within the tradition established by authors from Herodotus to Julius Caesar. Tacitus himself had already written a similar essay on the lands and tribes of Britannia in his Agricola. The Germania begins with a description of the lands, laws, and customs of the Germanic people; it then segues into descriptions of individual tribes, beginning with those dwelling closest to Roman lands and ending on the uttermost shores of the Baltic, among the amber-gathering Aesti, the primitive and savage Fenni, and the unknown tribes beyond them.Tacitus' descriptions of the Germanic character are at times favorable in contrast to the opinions of the Romans of his day. He holds the strict monogamy and chastity of Germanic marriage customs worthy of the highest praise, in contrast to what he saw as the vice and immorality rampant in Roman society of his day, and he admires their open hospitality, their simplicity, and their bravery in battle. One should not, however, think that Tacitus' portrayal of Germanic customs is entirely favorable; he notes a tendency in the Germanic people for what he saw as their habitual drunkenness, laziness, and barbarism, among other traits. Tacitus says that physically, the Germans appeared to be a distinct race, not an admixture of their neighbors. In Chapter 4, he mentions that they have common characteristics of blue eyes, blond or reddish hair and large size.In Chapter 7, Tacitus describes their government and leadership as somewhat merit-based and egalitarian, with leadership by example rather than authority and that punishments are carried out by the priests. In Chapter 9, Tacitus describes a form of folk assembly rather similar to the public Things recorded in later Germanic sources: in these public deliberations, the final decision rests with the people of the tribe as a whole.Translated by Alfred J. Church and William J. Brodribb, in 1877. (Adapted from Wikipedia.)This is a collaborative reading.Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Host: Mirja Freye Autor: Thorsten Reinke, Ostseestudio Rostock Redaktion: Sabine Frömel und Melanie Jaster, Ostseestudio Rostock Schreibt uns gerne eine Mail an: mvimfokus@ndr.de NDR Berichte über die Villa Baltic: https://www.ndr.de/fernsehen/sendungen/nordmagazin/Villa-Baltic-in-Kuehlungsborn-Sanierung-weiter-ungewiss,nordmagazin126900.html https://www.ndr.de/nachrichten/mecklenburg-vorpommern/Villa-Baltic-Stadt-Kuehlungsborn-schreibt-offenen-Brief-an-Investor,mvregiorostock2448.html Damals und heute: https://www.ndr.de/geschichte/schauplaetze/Pracht-und-Verfall-Villa-Baltic-damals-und-heute,villabaltic168.html Weitere Folgen von MV im Fokus findet ihr hier: https://www.ardaudiothek.de/sendung/mv-im-fokus-darueber-spricht-mecklenburg-vorpommern/81280474/ Podcast Tipp Hörspiel „De ole Villa“ von Bremen 2: https://www.ardaudiothek.de/episode/niederdeutsches-hoerspiel/de-ole-villa/bremen-zwei/10546377/

Join me on a night drive as I consider whether brokenness or achievement makes the best frame for a divine painting.

Ukrainians have resisted Russia's aggression for years. Since the full-scale invasion of their country in 2022, Ukrainian women in particular have taken on important roles on the frontlines, in civil society, and at home. Gražina Bielousova's research examines how Ukrainian leftist feminists advocate for their causes at home and abroad, facing distinct challenges as they attempt to defend their country. The Ukrainian case is also distinct from Latvia and Lithuania, whose organizing takes on different shapes for the same cause. Bielousova joins Ben Gardner-Gill to explain these interactions and discuss the ongoing process of decolonization in Baltic Studies.Transcript Ben Gardner-Gill: Hello, and welcome to Baltic Ways. I'm your co-host, Ben Gardner-Gill. Today we're talking with Gražina Belousova. Gražina is a feminist scholar of race, religion, and gender in post-Soviet Europe. She earned her PhD from Duke University in 2022. Currently, she is a postdoctoral scholar at Vilnius University's Institute of International Relations and Political Science and a researcher at Vytautas Magnus University.Her current research project focuses on leftist feminisms in East Europe in light of Russia's war against Ukraine, which will culminate in her first book, What's Left of Feminism in East Europe.Gražina, welcome to Baltic Ways.Gražina Belousova: Thank you so much for having me, Ben.BGG: So let's kick off by just hearing a little bit more about your background. I know you finished your PhD pretty recently. Could you tell us a little bit more about how you got into academia, sort of your research interests, and what you're working on at the moment?GB: Right. Yes, I just defended my PhD in 2022. It's hard to believe that it's been nearly three years now. In my PhD, I focused on historical matters. My PhD was in religion and cultural anthropology. And one of the things that I found missing when I was trying to theorize the part of the world that I call home and that most of the world calls Eastern Europe—I realized that I was lacking a solid theory that would bridge economics, anthropology, and religious studies.I wanted to understand how religious difference, especially perceived religious difference, played a role in creating the space that we call Eastern Europe today. And that took me to 18th and 19th century travel writings by Western travelers, oftentimes who were on an official mission, to the edges or to the depths of the Russian Empire.So I've read a lot of ambassadors' letters. I've read a lot of dispatches from St. Petersburg and Moscow, trying to understand how Westerners thought about that religious difference and how that thinking structured their understanding of what this place was and why it was different. What I tried to argue is actually that perceived religious difference was at the root of thinking of Eastern Europe as something different.Now, when I chose to embark on that topic, I had to put another topic aside, which was the question of very contemporary matters, the question of leftist political thought and feminism. At that point, it felt to me more pertinent to write the kind of theory that I felt was missing. When I was given the opportunity to pursue a postdoctoral position at Vilnius University Institute of International Relations and Political Science, I pitched this idea to them.And we very quickly pulled together the application. And the next thing I knew, I was embarking on a project on leftist feminisms in Eastern Europe in light of the war in Ukraine. So, the path was windy, but here I am today, knees and elbows deep, in the project on leftist feminism.BGG: Wonderful. I mean, a windy path is going to be familiar to so many people listening.So, no surprise and no surprise as well that the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has really impacted your work and your life as it has for many of us. So tell us a little bit more about that.Over the last three years, we've been watching and seeing the horrors in Ukraine. From your perspective, from your academic work, what are some of the main things that you're looking at?GB: One of the things that I'm particularly interested in is the way that groups that are on the edges of society, on the margins of society, such as leftists, such as feminists, and especially leftist feminists—when the two come together and try to articulate their social and political vision and explain to themselves and to their fellow compatriots and oftentimes foreign donors, in my case, also Western leftist feminists, their relevance, how they're trying to articulate their position.War has a penchant for heightening nationalist tendencies. And this is not some kind of particular Eastern European pathology. War anywhere is going to produce these results. That is normal. People defend themselves and articulate themselves on the basis on which they're being attacked, on the basis on which they're being bombed.So this is what we are seeing in Ukraine. Leftism in Eastern Europe, because of the Soviet past, is often associated with Soviet nostalgia. Feminism, on the other hand, is oftentimes seen as something antithetical to national identity, something that is imported from the West, and something that either has no relevance or can be dangerous, especially when questions of national unity, questions of national defense come about.That is one of the reasons why I embarked on this journey, and this is one of the reasons why Ukraine had to be part of this picture. Because while the other countries that I'm looking at—Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Moldova—experience the threat of invasion, Ukraine is under attack.And one of the things that I'm finding is that Ukrainian leftist feminists are incredibly resourceful and incredibly gifted at articulating their relevance.One of the things that I'm going to say that stems from that understanding of leftist feminism that's erroneous, but that's pervasive, is that Ukrainian leftist feminists do not debate the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. What is in question is the way things are happening under the conditions of war.The questions of most vulnerable people—so questions of what happens with people with disabilities, questions of what happens to single mothers, questions of what happens to the elderly people who are maybe unable to evacuate, questions of what happens to the working class people—all of these things are at the forefront of their minds. They're trying to be the advocates of their pleas to the larger society, while at the same time trying to articulate Ukraine's right to self-defense to Western leftist feminists.BGG: So they have both this tension, maybe tension is the wrong word, tell me if it isn't, but they have this tension internally where they're trying to advocate for what they see as justice or what is right with a domestic audience who, understandably, may be more frequently focused on what's happening at the front lines.And then there's also this international question, the foreign audience for these Ukrainian leftist feminists, who have a very different perspective on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. And I specifically use that verbiage instead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine because they're going to think about it very differently.So let's split those out a little bit, and I want to start with the domestic. You talked about the advocacy of these leftist feminists for the most marginalized groups in society, for those who are most vulnerable.In your view, where have they been most successful, perhaps? Where have they seen actual progress happen from their advocacy?GB: One of the things that immediately comes to mind, and many of my interlocutors were directly involved with, is the nurses' movement–the unionization and self-organization of the nurses.There is a movement called Be Like Nina, referring to one of the nurses seen as a pioneer of resisting exploitation. And, of course, under the conditions of war, the labor of nurses is incredibly valuable and needed, but not always appropriately compensated. This is what we can call essential labor, especially when we talk about the front lines, where people are wounded.Many of them are wounded very badly on a daily basis. However, there are other things that are happening in the background as well. While a lot of the resources are pulled to the front, there are people who are experiencing regular daily struggles with their health. And the nurses are being stretched very thin.And this was something that was really amazing to me. This was really one of the very few instances where I saw academics who are leftist feminists actually touching the ground with their ideas: where they got involved with helping the nurses organize, but not taking the center stage, where they acted as support, as a resource, but not overtaking the movement, rather creating the conditions under which nurses themselves could articulate what it was that they needed, what their goals were.And that was incredibly impressive to me because healthcare is severely underfunded across the whole region, and to achieve such tangible goals as wage increases and regulations that empower nurses to do their job was truly impressive. With every conversation with a woman—because I specifically talk only to women—I just felt sheer amazement, because this is so contrary to so many imaginations of what civil society, self-organization, or networks are like in Eastern Europe.This is so contrary to what some have called ‘uncivil' society. What is happening is really self-organization and civil society at its best, organized by women who are oftentimes stretched very thin, not just at work, but also at home, women whose husbands are potentially on the front lines.So to me, I really cannot think of anything else that, in terms of real life impact and in terms of transforming people's lives, has been grander (I'm going to go for that word) than this.BGG: That's remarkable, and thank you for bringing that. I had very little idea of this progress and this happening.So you use the term civil society, which I think is quite apt, and Western conceptions of civil society in the region that we call Eastern Europe can be highly misguided. Let's just put it like that. I think back to a webinar that the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies (AABS) hosted on Ukrainian civil society, democratization, responses to the war, and we have this comparative Ukrainian and Baltic perspective, where we looked at how Ukrainian civil society was responding.We looked at how Baltic civil society was responding, and you're doing something similar in your research here. You're looking at Latvia and Lithuania as two of the other case studies, in addition to Poland, Moldova, and, of course, Ukraine. One thing that I think we can all observe just from watching the news, let alone being in the countries as well, is that civil society across the region has had this really robust response in the last few years.So could you speak a little bit more to that in the comparative cases outside of Ukraine that you're looking at in your research, especially Latvia and Lithuania?GB: For sure. I think that in order to theorize civil society and the region in general, we need better theory than has been used often to talk about civil society at large.Here, for example, I'm thinking about Emily Channel Justice and her work and the way that she articulates the notion of self-organization. The way that she thinks about Ukraine, especially in the context of Maidan. The way that it left a self-organization, but that can be applied also to any form of civil society, regardless of ideology, is really a network of decentralized, self-organized people's groups.If you were to look for some kind of central organizing pattern, or some kind of centralized way of doing things, most likely you're not going to find it because it's based on personal network, connections, and localized issues. And I think that's definitely something that I'm seeing in Ukraine.One of the things that I'm seeing in Lithuania and Latvia is that it's going to differ slightly because there are going to be more central organizing figures. If we talk about organizing support for Ukraine, one of the things that we're going to see is that people are going to point to nationwide initiatives.Right now in Lithuania, there is an initiative called Radarum, which is a play on words, on radar and on darom, which is a Lithuanian word for let's do it. And it's a nationwide initiative to collect funds to purchase drones and anti-drone equipment for Ukraine. And there are particular faces that we associate with this initiative.National television is running ads for it. So there's a little bit more of a centralized sense to it. But once again, I would say that this is the mainstream way of organizing civil society, which, of course, with Westernization, has taken on some of the patterns that are similar to the West.If we look towards the left, we're going to see very much that it is self-organized, small groups of people who take different initiatives, such as raising funds for medical care, such as raising funds for queer people in Ukraine. So the more mainstream we go, the more patterns that are akin to those that we see in the West we're going to see.That is also going to be true in Latvia. The further left we go, the more organic, grassroots, self-organized cells of people we're going to find who participate in smaller, less visible initiatives. So that's probably the best way that I can explain the difference.BGG: Got it. We see this distinction of centralization and decentralization.One could consider these different types of movements organic in their own ways, but different in different ways. When one thinks of leftist organizing, which has a long and rich history, organic is sort of one of the key words.It's perpetual, and these society-wide initiatives, like what's currently going on in Lithuania, that we've seen across other countries over the last few years, are maybe a little bit less frequent and less common. So there's an important distinction there.So I want to pivot to the international dimension of how the Ukrainian leftist feminists are talking, especially with Western counterparts. And by Western, we mean Western Europe. We mean American and Canadian. We mean Western, as in not Eastern Europe. So could you talk a little bit about the challenges they're facing there?I think I alluded to it earlier. You alluded to it earlier, but could you dive a little bit more into that discourse, that dialogue between the Ukrainians and their counterparts?GB: This is the main point of contention. What does it mean to be leftist? How much does local experience shape being leftist?What is the relationship of the left to the national question? And I think this is where we are seeing the real tension. Underlying this tension, of course, is the question of Russia. Let me try to unpack this. And I'm going to start from the other end than I listed, which is with the question of Russia.Eastern European in general, and Ukrainian in particular, leftist feminists have a very different understanding as to what Russia is in terms of geopolitics than the Western counterparts are going to have. This stems from very different histories. Western leftism—especially the new wave of leftism that arose in the sixties and the seventies—in many ways has redefined itself not just through the questions of class, which I would argue were lost to some extent. They lost their centrality.And they redefined themselves through the anti-colonial, anti-racist struggle. And that struggle was particularly important because after the fall of the formal colonial system, the colonial patterns of economic exploitation, of social exploitation, of brain drain still very much persisted. And naming that and defining themselves against Western neoimperialism or neocolonialism in the Global South was one of the most defining features of the Left, both in the Global South and in the West. Now, Russia at that time had positioned itself as the ally of the colonized countries. And some of it was pure show, and some of it was actual money, resources, and help that were sent, for example, to Angola. And that made a real difference. Whether that was genuine concern for the colonized people or whether that was an ideological tool is a matter of debate.Whatever it was, it had a profound impact on the way that Western leftists relate to Russia. They continue to see Russia out of that tradition, in many ways, as an ally against Western capitalism and imperialism. Their empire, against which they define themselves, continues to be in the West, and oftentimes is seen as centered on the United States.The empire against which we define ourselves in Eastern Europe is Russia, because Russia was the colonizing power in a very real sense in the region. It was our empire that subjugated us. It was the colonial power that engaged in just about every single practice in which any colonial power engages in the region.For us, if we think outside of ourselves, Russia continues to be the colonial power in the way that it relates to Central Asia, in the way that it relates to the indigenous people of Siberia, in the way that it continues to conduct business. So both the left in the West and the left in the East continue to define themselves against the empire, but disagree on who the empire is.The fundamental difference is the question of Russia. Because of the way that Western leftists, and particularly Western leftist feminists, have been taught to see the world, the way that they have been habituated to see the world, they're unable to see Russia as an aggressor. They're unable to change their narrative about how NATO might act.And of course, the criticisms of continued Western abuses of power, especially when they center on the United States—such as Afghanistan or such as Iraq, but also here in the European context, intra-European context, Serbia is another context in which that comes up—are highly debatable questions, but they're seen a certain way. They're understood in a certain way by Western leftists. And because of Russia's criticism of the West, Western leftists see it as a natural ally, or at least as an equally guilty party.BGG: That's a really great explanation. I think the way that you've laid that out makes a lot of sense.It also harkens back to where I want to bring this, which is the debate that has been going on in Baltic studies and other academic fields, especially those focusing on the region, about thinking about Baltic history in particular as a colonial history and thinking about what it means to decolonize Baltic studies as a field, to decolonize our academic thinking. There have been a lot of discussions.I know that we were in the same room at the AABS panel at Yale last year on that fantastic panel about decolonization. Where do you think this leads with regard to your research specifically? There's already this trend in this field. I get the sense that you are an advocate and moving forward in land seeking for the field as a whole to move in that direction.What do you think the next steps are? What paths do you think could be taken? What do people need to be thinking about that they may not already be thinking about?GB: Well, I think for me, the key question when we are talking about Baltic studies and decolonization is what is it that we talk about when we talk about decolonizing Baltic studies or Baltic countries?Because I think sometimes we're talking about four different things. We are talking about the question of colonialism and coloniality. That's one. We are talking about imperialism, Russian imperialism, and Russian imperiality. We are talking about Russification and what it means to de-Russify. And we are also talking about Sovietization and what it means to de-Sovietize.And I would argue that while these four concepts are very much interrelated, they have very different agendas. So, I think it's a question of definitions. How do we define what our agenda is? Which of the four do we have in mind when we talk about decolonizing Baltic countries, Baltic studies, or anything else?And I would say that each of the four has its place and is significant. But the flip side of that, especially if we stay with the question of decolonization, is the question of Western theory, practice, and scholarship as it relates to Baltic studies. Because if we go back to the early questions in the conversation of what is civil society and whether there is a civil society, Baltic countries and the region as a whole are pathologized.Because the concept of what civil society is, or is not, was based on Western understandings and Western practices. And it rendered civil society in the region invisible. In what ways does the production of scholarship and knowledge about the region continue to be based in very unequal power relationships, in such a way that it continues to pathologize the region?And these are very uncomfortable questions, because much like, you know, in the late eighteenth century when the Lithuanian Polish Commonwealth was divided between the three powers, we're facing the same question: Who is our ally? Because we have learned that Russia is definitely not, but the West is also a problematic ally.This is where I think the question of what it means to center the study of the region in the theory, in the practice, in the questions that actually originate from the ground up, are so important. And I'm not ditching all Western scholarship out the window. That would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater.But I'm saying, what does it mean to balance? What does it mean to center? What does it mean to change the parameters of the conversation?BGG: Those are some weighty questions. I think they're good questions that the field is, I would say not even starting to engage with, but is engaging with, which is really excellent, but it's a long path.As anyone who is a scholar of decolonization will tell you, it doesn't happen overnight. It doesn't happen over a decade. It's sort of a continuous process. So, I think that is where we're going to have to leave it, knowing that there is so much more we could have talked about. But, Gražina, thank you so much.This has been a fascinating conversation. Thank you for joining Baltic Ways.GB: Thank you so much for having me, Ben. It's been a privilege.BGG: Thank you for listening to this episode of Baltic Ways, a co-production of the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies and the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). A note that the views expressed in this and every Baltic Ways episode do not necessarily reflect those of AABS or FPRI.To ensure you catch the next episode of Baltic Ways, make sure you're subscribed to your podcast feed or wherever you get your shows. Thanks so much, and we'll see you next time. Get full access to FPRI Insights at fpriinsights.substack.com/subscribe

Todays' Episode is an invigorating catch-up with someone who was last on the podcast over two years ago. Risto Rossar is CEO of Insly and is a really rare combination in that he is an insurance business builder who realised that helping the insurance industry fully digitise would be a better and more scalable business proposition than continuing to grow the highly successful digital Baltic insurance broker that he had founded. Insly continues to grow at speed, serving fast-growing segments of the market such as MGAs that need full end-to-end insurance software, but are unlikely to be on the radar of the largest vendors. Risto really gets tech and insurance – but he is also a very strong communicator who tends to tell things the way he sees them. This is where we come to the invigorating part that I mentioned at the beginning. Risto's trademark is no-nonsense, down-to-earth analysis of what technologies are and are not likely to be genuinely disruptive to the insurance industry. He is good at seeing through hype and puncturing bubbles. So when someone in his position, with his level of understanding and natural sense of healthy scepticism starts getting genuinely excited about AI, we all need to sit up and listen. What follows is one of the most interesting and credible conversations about the likely long-term disruptive effects of AI on the insurance sector I have had on the show. If you think AI is just going to be nice productivity tool that removes all your dull admin tasks, you need to think again – it will do that but an awful lot more besides. The opportunities to be seized here are enormous but are difficult for those of us used to a very slow-moving status quo to get our heads around. Risto is on exceptional form and is clearly feeling energised and excited for the future – listen on and I think you will too. LINKS:  https://insly.com/

Das neue Album der Philharmonix "Baltic" widmet sich der Musik des Baltikums und kombiniert Melodien, Volksweisen und Kinderlieder Lettlands in einer einzigartigen, oft melancholischen und tänzerischen Tonsprache. Das Album führt durch eine emotionale Reise, die von lebenslustigen Hymnen bis zu nachdenklichen Gebeten reicht. Eine vielfältige Klangwelt, die die unterschiedlichen Stimmungen des Baltikums einfängt.

Ukrainians have resisted Russia's aggression for years. Since the full-scale invasion of their country in 2022, Ukrainian women in particular have taken on important roles on the frontlines, in civil society, and at home. Gražina Bielousova's research examines how Ukrainian leftist feminists advocate for their causes at home and abroad, facing distinct sets of challenges as they attempt to defend their country. The Ukrainian case is also distinct in comparison to Latvia and Lithuania, whose organizing takes on different shapes for the same cause. Bielousova joins Ben Gardner-Gill to explain these interactions and discuss the ongoing process of decolonization in Baltic Studies.TranscriptBen Gardner-Gill: Hello, and welcome to Baltic Ways. I'm your co-host, Ben Gardner-Gill. Today we're talking with Gražina Belousova. Gražina is a feminist scholar of race, religion, and gender in post-Soviet Europe. She earned her PhD from Duke University in 2022. Currently, she is a postdoctoral scholar at Vilnius University's Institute of International Relations and Political Science and a researcher at Vytautas Magnus University.Her current research project focuses on leftist feminisms in East Europe in light of Russia's war against Ukraine, which will culminate in her first book, What's Left of Feminism in East Europe.Gražina, welcome to Baltic Ways.Gražina Belousova: Thank you so much for having me, Ben.BGG: So let's kick off by just hearing a little bit more about your background. I know you finished your PhD pretty recently. Could you tell us a little bit more about how you got into academia, sort of your research interests, and what you're working on at the moment?GB: Right. Yes, I just defended my PhD in 2022. It's hard to believe that it's been nearly three years now. In my PhD, I focused on historical matters. My PhD was in religion and cultural anthropology. And one of the things that I found missing when I was trying to theorize the part of the world that I call home and that most of the world calls Eastern Europe—I realized that I was lacking a solid theory that would bridge economics, anthropology, and religious studies.I wanted to understand how religious difference, especially perceived religious difference, played a role in creating the space that we call Eastern Europe today. And that took me to 18th and 19th century travel writings by Western travelers, oftentimes who were on an official mission, to the edges or to the depths of the Russian Empire.So I've read a lot of ambassadors' letters. I've read a lot of dispatches from St. Petersburg and Moscow, trying to understand how Westerners thought about that religious difference and how that thinking structured their understanding of what this place was and why it was different. What I tried to argue is actually that perceived religious difference was at the root of thinking of Eastern Europe as something different.Now, when I chose to embark on that topic, I had to put another topic aside, which was the question of very contemporary matters, the question of leftist political thought and feminism. At that point, it felt to me more pertinent to write the kind of theory that I felt was missing. When I was given the opportunity to pursue a postdoctoral position at Vilnius University Institute of International Relations and Political Science, I pitched this idea to them.And we very quickly pulled together the application. And the next thing I knew, I was embarking on a project on leftist feminisms in Eastern Europe in light of the war in Ukraine. So, the path was windy, but here I am today, knees and elbows deep, in the project on leftist feminism.BGG: Wonderful. I mean, a windy path is going to be familiar to so many people listening.So, no surprise and no surprise as well that the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has really impacted your work and your life as it has for many of us. So tell us a little bit more about that.Over the last three years, we've been watching and seeing the horrors in Ukraine. From your perspective, from your academic work, what are some of the main things that you're looking at?GB: One of the things that I'm particularly interested in is the way that groups that are on the edges of society, on the margins of society, such as leftists, such as feminists, and especially leftist feminists—when the two come together and try to articulate their social and political vision and explain to themselves and to their fellow compatriots and oftentimes foreign donors, in my case, also Western leftist feminists, their relevance, how they're trying to articulate their position.War has a penchant for heightening nationalist tendencies. And this is not some kind of particular Eastern European pathology. War anywhere is going to produce these results. That is normal. People defend themselves and articulate themselves on the basis on which they're being attacked, on the basis on which they're being bombed.So this is what we are seeing in Ukraine. Leftism in Eastern Europe, because of the Soviet past, is often associated with Soviet nostalgia. Feminism, on the other hand, is oftentimes seen as something antithetical to national identity, something that is imported from the West, and something that either has no relevance or can be dangerous, especially when questions of national unity, questions of national defense come about.That is one of the reasons why I embarked on this journey, and this is one of the reasons why Ukraine had to be part of this picture. Because while the other countries that I'm looking at—Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Moldova—experience the threat of invasion, Ukraine is under attack.And one of the things that I'm finding is that Ukrainian leftist feminists are incredibly resourceful and incredibly gifted at articulating their relevance.One of the things that I'm going to say that stems from that understanding of leftist feminism that's erroneous, but that's pervasive, is that Ukrainian leftist feminists do not debate the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. What is in question is the way things are happening under the conditions of war.The questions of most vulnerable people—so questions of what happens with people with disabilities, questions of what happens to single mothers, questions of what happens to the elderly people who are maybe unable to evacuate, questions of what happens to the working class people—all of these things are at the forefront of their minds. They're trying to be the advocates of their pleas to the larger society, while at the same time trying to articulate Ukraine's right to self-defense to Western leftist feminists.BGG: So they have both this tension, maybe tension is the wrong word, tell me if it isn't, but they have this tension internally where they're trying to advocate for what they see as justice or what is right with a domestic audience who, understandably, may be more frequently focused on what's happening at the front lines.And then there's also this international question, the foreign audience for these Ukrainian leftist feminists, who have a very different perspective on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. And I specifically use that verbiage instead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine because they're going to think about it very differently.So let's split those out a little bit, and I want to start with the domestic. You talked about the advocacy of these leftist feminists for the most marginalized groups in society, for those who are most vulnerable.In your view, where have they been most successful, perhaps? Where have they seen actual progress happen from their advocacy?GB: One of the things that immediately comes to mind, and many of my interlocutors were directly involved with, is the nurses' movement–the unionization and self-organization of the nurses.There is a movement called Be Like Nina, referring to one of the nurses seen as a pioneer of resisting exploitation. And, of course, under the conditions of war, the labor of nurses is incredibly valuable and needed, but not always appropriately compensated. This is what we can call essential labor, especially when we talk about the front lines, where people are wounded.Many of them are wounded very badly on a daily basis. However, there are other things that are happening in the background as well. While a lot of the resources are pulled to the front, there are people who are experiencing regular daily struggles with their health. And the nurses are being stretched very thin.And this was something that was really amazing to me. This was really one of the very few instances where I saw academics who are leftist feminists actually touching the ground with their ideas: where they got involved with helping the nurses organize, but not taking the center stage, where they acted as support, as a resource, but not overtaking the movement, rather creating the conditions under which nurses themselves could articulate what it was that they needed, what their goals were.And that was incredibly impressive to me because healthcare is severely underfunded across the whole region, and to achieve such tangible goals as wage increases and regulations that empower nurses to do their job was truly impressive. With every conversation with a woman—because I specifically talk only to women—I just felt sheer amazement, because this is so contrary to so many imaginations of what civil society, self-organization, or networks are like in Eastern Europe.This is so contrary to what some have called ‘uncivil' society. What is happening is really self-organization and civil society at its best, organized by women who are oftentimes stretched very thin, not just at work, but also at home, women whose husbands are potentially on the front lines.So to me, I really cannot think of anything else that, in terms of real life impact and in terms of transforming people's lives, has been grander (I'm going to go for that word) than this.BGG: That's remarkable, and thank you for bringing that. I had very little idea of this progress and this happening.So you use the term civil society, which I think is quite apt, and Western conceptions of civil society in the region that we call Eastern Europe can be highly misguided. Let's just put it like that. I think back to a webinar that the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies (AABS) hosted on Ukrainian civil society, democratization, responses to the war, and we have this comparative Ukrainian and Baltic perspective, where we looked at how Ukrainian civil society was responding.We looked at how Baltic civil society was responding, and you're doing something similar in your research here. You're looking at Latvia and Lithuania as two of the other case studies, in addition to Poland, Moldova, and, of course, Ukraine. One thing that I think we can all observe just from watching the news, let alone being in the countries as well, is that civil society across the region has had this really robust response in the last few years.So could you speak a little bit more to that in the comparative cases outside of Ukraine that you're looking at in your research, especially Latvia and Lithuania?GB: For sure. I think that in order to theorize civil society and the region in general, we need better theory than has been used often to talk about civil society at large.Here, for example, I'm thinking about Emily Channel Justice and her work and the way that she articulates the notion of self-organization. The way that she thinks about Ukraine, especially in the context of Maidan. The way that it left a self-organization, but that can be applied also to any form of civil society, regardless of ideology, is really a network of decentralized, self-organized people's groups.If you were to look for some kind of central organizing pattern, or some kind of centralized way of doing things, most likely you're not going to find it because it's based on personal network, connections, and localized issues. And I think that's definitely something that I'm seeing in Ukraine.One of the things that I'm seeing in Lithuania and Latvia is that it's going to differ slightly because there are going to be more central organizing figures. If we talk about organizing support for Ukraine, one of the things that we're going to see is that people are going to point to nationwide initiatives.Right now in Lithuania, there is an initiative called Radarum, which is a play on words, on radar and on darom, which is a Lithuanian word for let's do it. And it's a nationwide initiative to collect funds to purchase drones and anti-drone equipment for Ukraine. And there are particular faces that we associate with this initiative.National television is running ads for it. So there's a little bit more of a centralized sense to it. But once again, I would say that this is the mainstream way of organizing civil society, which, of course, with Westernization, has taken on some of the patterns that are similar to the West.If we look towards the left, we're going to see very much that it is self-organized, small groups of people who take different initiatives, such as raising funds for medical care, such as raising funds for queer people in Ukraine. So the more mainstream we go, the more patterns that are akin to those that we see in the West we're going to see.That is also going to be true in Latvia. The further left we go, the more organic, grassroots, self-organized cells of people we're going to find who participate in smaller, less visible initiatives. So that's probably the best way that I can explain the difference.BGG: Got it. We see this distinction of centralization and decentralization.One could consider these different types of movements organic in their own ways, but different in different ways. When one thinks of leftist organizing, which has a long and rich history, organic is sort of one of the key words.It's perpetual, and these society-wide initiatives, like what's currently going on in Lithuania, that we've seen across other countries over the last few years, are maybe a little bit less frequent and less common. So there's an important distinction there.So I want to pivot to the international dimension of how the Ukrainian leftist feminists are talking, especially with Western counterparts. And by Western, we mean Western Europe. We mean American and Canadian. We mean Western, as in not Eastern Europe. So could you talk a little bit about the challenges they're facing there?I think I alluded to it earlier, and you alluded to it earlier, but could you dive a little bit more into that discourse, that dialogue between the Ukrainians and their counterparts?GB: This is the main point of contention. What does it mean to be leftist? How much does local experience shape being leftist?What is the relationship of the left to the national question? And I think this is where we are seeing the real tension. Underlying this tension, of course, is the question of Russia. Let me try to unpack this. And I'm going to start from the other end than I listed, which is with the question of Russia.Eastern European in general, and Ukrainian in particular, leftist feminists have a very different understanding as to what Russia is in terms of geopolitics than the Western counterparts are going to have. This stems from very different histories. Western leftism—especially the new wave of leftism that arose in the sixties and the seventies—in many ways has redefined itself not just through the questions of class, which I would argue were lost to some extent. They lost their centrality.And they redefined themselves through the anti-colonial, anti-racist struggle. And that struggle was particularly important because after the fall of the formal colonial system, the colonial patterns of economic exploitation, of social exploitation, of brain drain still very much persisted. And naming that and defining themselves against Western neoimperialism or neocolonialism in the Global South was one of the most defining features of the Left, both in the Global South and in the West. Now, Russia at that time had positioned itself as the ally of the colonized countries. And some of it was pure show, and some of it was actual money, resources, and help that were sent, for example, to Angola. And that made a real difference. Whether that was genuine concern for the colonized people or whether that was an ideological tool is a matter of debate.Whatever it was, it had a profound impact on the way that Western leftists relate to Russia. They continue to see Russia out of that tradition, in many ways, as an ally against Western capitalism and imperialism. Their empire, against which they define themselves, continues to be in the West, and oftentimes is seen as centered on the United States.The empire against which we define ourselves in Eastern Europe is Russia, because Russia was the colonizing power in a very real sense in the region. It was our empire that subjugated us. It was the colonial power that engaged in just about every single practice in which any colonial power engages in the region.For us, if we think outside of ourselves, Russia continues to be the colonial power in the way that it relates to Central Asia, in the way that it relates to the indigenous people of Siberia, in the way that it continues to conduct business. So both the left in the West and the left in the East continue to define themselves against the empire, but disagree on who the empire is.The fundamental difference is the question of Russia. Because of the way that Western leftists, and particularly Western leftist feminists, have been taught to see the world, the way that they have been habituated to see the world, they're unable to see Russia as an aggressor. They're unable to change their narrative about how NATO might act.And of course, the criticisms of continued Western abuses of power, especially when they center on the United States—such as Afghanistan or such as Iraq, but also here in the European context, intra-European context, Serbia is another context in which that comes up—are highly debatable questions, but they're seen a certain way. They're understood in a certain way by Western leftists. And because of Russia's criticism of the West, Western leftists see it as a natural ally, or at least as an equally guilty party.BGG: That's a really great explanation. I think the way that you've laid that out makes a lot of sense.It also harkens back to where I want to bring this, which is the debate that has been going on in Baltic studies and other academic fields, especially those focusing on the region, about thinking about Baltic history in particular as a colonial history and thinking about what it means to decolonize Baltic studies as a field, to decolonize our academic thinking. There have been a lot of discussions.I know that we were in the same room at the AABS panel at Yale last year on that fantastic panel about decolonization. Where do you think this leads with regard to your research specifically? There's already this trend in this field. I get the sense that you are an advocate and moving forward in land seeking for the field as a whole to move in that direction.What do you think the next steps are? What paths do you think could be taken? What do people need to be thinking about that they may not already be thinking about?GB: Well, I think for me, the key question when we are talking about Baltic studies and decolonization is what is it that we talk about when we talk about decolonizing Baltic studies or Baltic countries?Because I think sometimes we're talking about four different things. We are talking about the question of colonialism and coloniality. That's one. We are talking about imperialism, Russian imperialism, and Russian imperiality. We are talking about Russification and what it means to de-Russify. And we are also talking about Sovietization and what it means to de-Sovietize.And I would argue that while these four concepts are very much interrelated, they have very different agendas. So, I think it's a question of definitions. How do we define what our agenda is? Which of the four do we have in mind when we talk about decolonizing Baltic countries, Baltic studies, or anything else?And I would say that each of the four has its place and is significant. But the flip side of that, especially if we stay with the question of decolonization, is the question of Western theory, practice, and scholarship as it relates to Baltic studies. Because if we go back to the early questions in the conversation of what is civil society and whether there is a civil society, Baltic countries and the region as a whole are pathologized.Because the concept of what civil society is, or is not, was based on Western understandings and Western practices. And it rendered civil society in the region invisible. In what ways does the production of scholarship and knowledge about the region continue to be based in very unequal power relationships, in such a way that it continues to pathologize the region?And these are very uncomfortable questions, because much like, you know, in the late eighteenth century when the Lithuanian Polish Commonwealth was divided between the three powers, we're facing the same question: Who is our ally? Because we have learned that Russia is definitely not, but the West is also a problematic ally.This is where I think the question of what it means to center the study of the region in the theory, in the practice, in the questions that actually originate from the ground up, rather than are solely important. And I'm not ditching all Western scholarship out the window. That would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater.But I'm saying, what does it mean to balance? What does it mean to center? What does it mean to change the parameters of the conversation?BGG: Those are some weighty questions. I think they're good questions that the field is, I would say not even starting to engage with, but is engaging with, which is really excellent, but it's a long path.As anyone who is a scholar of decolonization will tell you, it doesn't happen overnight. It doesn't happen over a decade. It's sort of a continuous process. So, I think that is where we're going to have to leave it, knowing that there is so much more we could have talked about. But, Gražina, thank you so much.This has been a fascinating conversation. Thank you for joining Baltic Ways.GB: Thank you so much for having me, Ben. It's been a privilege.To ensure you catch the next episode of Baltic Ways, make sure you're subscribed to your podcast feed or wherever you get your shows. Thanks so much, and we'll see you next time.(Image: Facebook | Феміністична майстерня)Baltic Ways is a podcast from the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fpribalticinitiative.substack.com

Send us a textUnd heute gibt es endlich mal wieder eine Stammtisch Episode.Wie immer völlig ungeplant und wir sind sehr gespannt auf Marc's "Sammlungsenthüllung", Oliver's Japan Trip, Saman's Flippomania und vieles Weiteres....Danke für Deine Zeit und für's Zuhören. Sendet mir eine Voicemail und wir hören uns im Podcast:https://www.speakpipe.com/opportunistischesdurcheinanderBitte folgt mir/uns auf instagram IG: @leuchtmasse_podcast oder schreibt mir: opportunistischesdurcheinander@gmail.com

In this episode, we speak with Martin Gauss, former CEO of airBaltic, who transformed the Latvian flag carrier into one of Europe's most innovative airlines while connecting the entire Baltic region.Gauss discusses:The benefits of operating a single-fleet airline with the highly efficient Airbus A220-300, resulting in 30% lower fuel consumption than older generation aircraft and contributing to airBaltic's path to carbon neutrality by 2050.airBaltic's innovative dual business model that combines scheduled operations with wet lease services for major carriers like Lufthansa Group, creating flexibility and financial resilience.The airline's commitment to sustainability through fleet modernisation, gradually increasing SAF usage, and partnerships with innovative manufacturers like Fokker NextGen for hydrogen-powered aircraft.How airBaltic established itself as an industry leader in adopting new technologies, from becoming the first airline to accept Bitcoin in 2014 to pioneering Starlink internet service in Europe.His perspective on balancing growth with sustainability, emphasising that connectivity is essential for economic development while working toward emission-free aviation.The Baltic states' capacity for innovation, demonstrating how a small country like Latvia can lead the way in aviation technology and sustainability.As an airline pilot-turned-CEO, Gauss offers valuable insights into how smaller airlines can lead industry change through bold technology choices and business model innovation.If you LOVED this episode, you'll also love the conversation we had with Anko van der Werff, President & CEO of Scandinavian Airlines (SAS), who shares the airline's ambitious sustainability initiatives. Check it out here. Learn more about the innovators who are navigating the industry's challenges to make sustainable aviation a reality, in our new book ‘Sustainability in the Air'. Click here to learn more.Feel free to reach out via email to podcast@simpliflying.com. For more content on sustainable aviation, visit our website green.simpliflying.com and join the movement. It's about time.Links & More:ESG - airBaltic Fokker Next Gen partners with airBaltic on new liquid hydrogen powered commercial aircraft – GreenAir News airBaltic achieves one-Year milestone in increased SAF implementation - Travel And Tour World airBaltic to Expand Training Fleet With All-Electric eD40 - FLYING Magazine 

May the road rise to meet you. My note from a slow coach this week reflects on Baltic endorphins, some internal torment due to a decision made by my past self that my present self didn't appreciate, and a poem contemplating whether adventure is always just around the corner. It's an excerpt from a journal entry a couple of weeks ago when I was in Finland. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=w_VzkTNi53E I'm still feeling invigorated from last night's dip in the Baltic Sea. I don't know if it's the exhilaration of spending 90 seconds in 4-degree (Celsius) water or the satisfaction I feel from following through on my intention. Something caught me when I looked across the water a few days ago—a pull I couldn't ignore. The idea of getting in the water was great. Until it was time to do it. What was I thinking? The two hours leading up to my plunge were filled with antsy-pantsy pacing and flip-flopping. I was not amused by my decision. Still, I knew that if I didn't go through with it, the regret of missing this opportunity would far outweigh the momentary despair of doing something I knew would be wildly rewarding (once I resurfaced and was safely ensconced in the sauna—my happy place). This morning's inner calm is a blend of satisfaction and physical aliveness. The sauna not only offered a delightful reward for completing my challenge but also enhanced the experience. The contrast of fire and ice creates a unique sensation. Forever on the horizon This morning, I am returning to the list of phrases and ideas we developed at the start of our month of “Adventure” in The Haven. I had intended to use one each morning in my journal practice, but it hasn't happened yet. No problem, I am up for it today. Now. I spin the wheel, and it throws “Adventure is waiting just beyond view” onto the screen. I don't think it's a saying, but it feels familiar. Similar to the idea that adventure (or growth) lies on the other side of your comfort zone. I've always had a complex relationship with these platitudinal sayings. They carry kernels of truth for particular situations but are often espoused as universal, all-encompassing statements of fact. May the branch rise to meet them My eyes are drawn through the window. My first coffee of the day is on the cabinet beside me. Adventure is waiting just beyond view. Those words feel coarse to me here. Itchy. Like an irritant on my skin. I can see a squirrel moving effortlessly through the trees and a crow perched on a breeze-flexed branch above, and I wonder if they ever wonder about these things. It's tempting to get caught up in the assumption that everything good is just beyond view. It's the engine of consumer culture, the ideology of endless striving. Like a perpetual mirage, we see the reward, but it moves further as we get closer. "Just a little further" becomes a mantra in the meditation of hustle. Advice is cheap and contradictory. I am interested in how we can develop a more nuanced and healthy relationship with growth, purpose, and flow in life. If adventure is forever around the corner, what am I overlooking right here? To feel settled without settling and expectant without expecting. Isn't this moment the adventure that was just around the corner from that previous one? I think of the old blessing: “May the road rise to meet you.” Maybe that's the real adventure—the road meeting us where we are. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bjJXAL40MC4 May the flow rise to meet you From the edge of this perch,I strain my neck to watch a squirreldart, weightless, certain of the branchesthat will reach out and catch herwith every flight, twist, and descent. Is it true that I can find anAdventure waiting just beyond view? If I round the corner.If I push the button.If I make the call.If I am patient.If I lead.If I trust the process.If I take a step.If I listen.If I dare.If I follow.If I let this grow.If I am brave.If I am gentle.

Returning for the full hour will be Dr. Sebastian Bruns.Sebastian is a seapower expert and maritime strategist. His current project as Senior Researcher at the Institute for Security Policy Kiel University (ISPK) is “NATO Maritime Strategies and Naval Operations since 1985”, a multi-year effort to explore the Alliance's maritime and naval roles between the late Cold War and today. Sebastian is the founder of the Kiel International Seapower Symposium (KISS), the Baltic Sea Strategy Forum (BSSF), the “Dreizack” young voices in maritime research workshop, and the ISPK Seapower publication series (NOMOS). From 2021-2022, Dr. Bruns served as the inaugural John McCain-Fulbright Distinguished Visiting Professor at the United States Naval Academy in Annapolis, Maryland, teaching Baltic Sea security and U.S. naval strategy to Midshipmen at the Political Science Department. He is a former Congressional staffer (then-Rep. Todd Young, IN-09), a fellow at the Royal Swedish Society of Naval Sciences, and a Non-Resident Fellow at the Royal Navy Strategic Studies Centre.ShowlinksHow much do Nato members spend on defense?Kiel Seapower.West-up map of the Baltic.Kaliningrad.German-Norwegian submarine program.SummaryIn this episode, Sal and Mark welcome Dr. Sebastian Bruhn to discuss the evolving security landscape in the Baltic Sea region, particularly in light of recent Russian activities. They explore NATO's response, the historical context of the Baltic, and the implications of the Kaliningrad exclave. The conversation also touches on the concept of the 'NATO lake', the challenges of gray zone tactics, and the future of naval cooperation and shipbuilding partnerships within NATO.TakeawaysThe Baltic Sea is experiencing increased military activity due to Russian threats.Kaliningrad's strategic position poses significant risks to NATO operations.The concept of the 'NATO lake' may lead to complacency in security measures.Gray zone tactics are complicating maritime security in the Baltic.NATO spending is increasing, particularly among Baltic nations.Germany's naval capabilities are being modernized but remain limited.Coast Guards are playing a crucial role in detaining shadow fleet vessels.Transatlantic shipbuilding partnerships are becoming more important.Historical context is vital for understanding current Baltic security dynamics.Chapters00:00: Introduction to NATO's Maritime North03:40: The Baltic Sea: A Strategic Overview10:04: Historical Context and Current Threats18:38: Kaliningrad: A Geopolitical Challenge21:27: Russian Military Capabilities in the Baltic29:00: Gray Zone Tactics and Hybrid Warfare29:27: Historical Context of Naval Warfare31:40: NATO Spending and Defense Strategies39:17: The Role of Coast Guards in Maritime Security44:40: Bureaucracy and Naval Operations48:03: International Collaboration in Shipbuilding53:15: Maritime Domain Awareness and NATO's Role

Ansambli liikmed on stuudios külas. The Baltic Sisters on rahvusvaheline pärimusmuusika projekt, mis koosneb neljast lauljast - need on Marion Selgall Eestist, Liene Skrebinska ja Vineta Romāne Lätist ning Laurita Peleniūte Leedust.

Day 1,142.Today, as a new helicopter drone is spotted flying over the Moscow region, we assess movements on the frontlines and ask why Japan is offering to provide increased support for Ukraine. Then later we discuss the new defence line the Baltic nations of Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia are building against Russia. Do they think an invasion is imminent?Contributors:Francis Dearnley (Executive Editor for Audio). @FrancisDearnley on X.James Crisp (Europe Editor). @JamesCrisp6 on X.Iona Cleave (Foreign Reporter). @cleaveiona on X.Content Referenced:The Baltics are building a defensive line against Russia. Can they do it fast enough? (Iona Cleave in The Telegraph):https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/07/baltic-secret-defensive-line-keep-russia-out-europe/Hungary could turn on Russia by backing US sanctions (James Crisp in The Telegraph):https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/08/hungary-could-turn-on-russia-by-backing-us-sanctions/The Telegraph's Ukraine Live Blog:https://www.telegraph.co.uk/world-news/2025/04/10/russia-ukraine-zelensky-putin-war-latest/ Video shows 4 captive Ukrainian troops killed by men identified as Russian forces (AP):https://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-pows-war-crimes-putin-zelenskyy-a2185297338af410fb5122448e62db76 NOW AVAILABLE IN NEW LANGUAGES:The Telegraph has launched translated versions of Ukraine: The Latest in Ukrainian and Russian, making its reporting accessible to audiences on both sides of the battle lines and across the wider region, including Central Asia and the Caucasus. Just search Україна: Останні Новини (Ukr) and Украина: Последние Новости (Ru) on your on your preferred podcast app to find them, or click the links below.Listen here: https://linktr.ee/ukrainethelatestLearn more about the tech: https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2025/02/24/ukraine-the-latest-podcast-russian-ukrainian-ai-translation/Subscribe: telegraph.co.uk/ukrainethelatestEmail: ukrainepod@telegraph.co.uk Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This February, with the flick of a switch, there was a vast shift of power on Europe's borders. The Baltic states' electrical grids, built in the 1960s while these countries were forcibly incorporated into the Soviet Union, had been under the control of Moscow. In one weekend, the transmission system operators in Latvia, Lithuania, and... The post #324 A Shift of Power on Europe's Borders first appeared on Engineering Matters.

In this solo episode, Alexa unveils a brand-new podcast feature all about repertoire. But why is choosing the right song so much more than just picking a tune your student likes?Join Alexa as she shares 10 songs for a range of student needs.   WHAT'S IN THIS PODCAST? 1:27 Should singing teachers assign repertoire?  2:14 What might we want to consider when suggesting repertoire to singers?  6:37 Alexa's 10 song selections   About the presenter click HERE RELEVANT MENTIONS & LINKS Kaya Herstad Carney Dr Jenevora Williams  Teaching Singing to Children and Young Adults by Jenevora Williams  Joanne Bozeman Singing Teachers Talk - Ep.102 Understanding Singing and Menopause with Joanne Bozeman The Great Gatsby  Jason Robert Brown Singing Teachers Talk - Ep.145 Style Vs Technique with Kaya Herstad-Carney Musicnotes Natalie Weiss   ABOUT THE GUEST After graduating with a BA Musical Theatre degree, Alexa Terry donned her sailor's cap and performed as a lead soloist on cruise ships travelling the Mediterranean, Caribbean and Baltic seas. She trod the boards in London's West End as the protagonist in a new Musical Theatre project, studied as a librettist with Book, Music and Lyrics (BML), and has written for the likes of BritishTheatre.com as a reviewer.   Alexa runs a singing tuition practice in the South of England, and is a singing tutor at one of the UK's leading performing arts schools - Italia Conti, where she also regularly panels entry auditions. Alexa is the host of the BAST Training Singing Teachers Talk podcast, mentors for the BAST Training Level 5 qualification, and has presented on topics of Musical Theatre repertoire, authentic Musical Theatre performance, and imposter syndrome for Vocology in Practise and The Sing Space.   Website: www.aterryvocalcoaching.com Instagram: @AlexaTerryVocalCoaching BAST Training helps singers gain the confidence, knowledge, skills & understanding required to be a successful singing teacher. "The course was everything I hoped it would be and so much more. It's an investment with so much return. I would recommend this course to any teacher wanting to up-skill, refresh or start up." Kelly Taylor, NZ ...morebasttraining.com | Subscribe | Email Us | FB Group

Ukens episode spilles inn mandag 7. april, og denne uken skal vi både se på to som blir én, noen mister jobben og vi har fått passasjertall med påskefri. Neste uke er det ikke vanlig episode, men en slags påskespesial. Følg med! Og velkommen ombord på flight 337.Cessna 337 Super Skymaster AKTUELT:Riyadh Air har fått saudisk AoCMesa Air Group slås sammen med RepublicNorwegians passasjertall for januarWiderøes passasjertall for marsNorwegian vinner statlig rammeavtale ...det gjør SAS ogsåair Baltic sparker sjefen

As Putin wages a shadow war across the European continent—and the US commitment to NATO grows uncertain—we ask: would the West really defend the Baltic states if Russia advanced?Andrew Marr is joined by Oliver Moody, Berlin bureau chief for The Times and author of Baltic: The Future of Europe.Drawing on deep history, extensive reporting, and sobering military realities, Moody argues that Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania are not just small nations on the edge of Europe—they are a test of whether the West still believes in itself.Sign up to the New Statesman's daily politics newsletter: Morning Call Submit a question for a future episode: You Ask Us Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

This week on Chain Reaction, we feature an installment of the Baltic Ways podcast. Host Indra Ekmanis welcomes back professors Margarita Šešelgytė (Vilnius University), Daunis Auers (University of Latvia), and Andres Kasekamp (University of Toronto) for a roundtable discussion on the first two months of Donald Trump's second term and the US administration's impact on the Baltic countries and broader Europe. This episode was recorded on March 14, 2025.You May Be Interested InBaltic Roundup | March 2025 A look back on the month's major political, cultural, and economic events in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania.Explore more from FPRI's Baltic Initiative here. Baltic Ways is a podcast from the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI. Get full access to FPRI Insights at fpriinsights.substack.com/subscribe

The 'accidental' severing of undersea cables or pipelines seem an almost daily occurrence these days but how reliant are we on this infrastructure, how much of it is there, and what steps are being taken to protect it? Business and economics editor Douglas Fraser investigates who might be behind these thinly veiled acts of sabotage and what their motivation might be. With much of the activity happening in the North and Baltic seas Douglas travels to Norway to see how the Navy there have long anticipated this risk and have partnered with the oil and gas industry to create a 'total defence' concept that extends deep beneath the waves.

The Baltic Ways podcast welcomes back professors Margarita Šešelgytė (Vilnius University), Daunis Auers (University of Latvia), and Andres Kasekamp (University of Toronto) for a roundtable discussion on the first two months of Donald Trump's second term and the US administration's impact on the Baltic countries and broader Europe. This episode was recorded on March 14, 2025.“It's a bit of a shock therapy…and we have to reconsider who we are security-wise in this different situation.” -Margarita ŠešelgytėBaltic Ways is a podcast from the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fpribalticinitiative.substack.com

From 1986-1991, a “Singing Revolution” took place in the Baltic states, leading to their independence from the Soviet Union. This episode of Folk Files looks at the rich musical history that paved the way for the Singing Revolution to occur and provides an introduction to Estonian folk and choral music. (Apologies for any horrible Estonian pronunciation).Host: Olivia HardingSpecial thanks to: Cliff S., Ramona Holmes, and Aaron J. MortonCheck out Basic Folk: https://basicfolk.com/Musical excerpts:ARTIST: Singers at Laulupidu 2019WORK: Mu isamaa on minu armSOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XTdOiCa0-4oARTIST: Tuule KannWORK: Estonian Folk Music Instrument: KANNELSOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_lqpRd9kU_oARTIST: Timo Lige / Students from HiiumaaWORK: Kiigelaul (A Swinging Song)SOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6x5QslTDXW4ARTIST: Written by L. Raudkepp, Composed by J. Aavik WORK: Hoia, jumal EestitSOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6O9D0ZN1kkIARTIST: Singers at Laulupidu 2019WORK: KoiSOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=v_cCvMuDLTgARTIST: Eteläsuomalaisen Osakunnan LaulajatWORK: Kangakudumise laulSOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=izYbVvt-DPoARTIST: Singers at Laulupidu 2014WORK: Mis need ohjad meida hoidvadSOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aHuaIz6ZK6sARTIST: Tartu Boys ChoirWORK: Mu isamaa on minu armSOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8oX4yvG5ApUARTIST: Tartu Boys ChoirWORK: Veel kaitse Kalev oma lapsiSOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KbdpHz4s7-4ARTIST: Ell TaburWORK: Lenda, lenda, lepalindSOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-oSswM_7sBYARTIST: Tallinna KammerkoorWORK: Priiuse hommikulSOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ru-picL-OzoARTIST: Tallinna Meestelaulu SeltsWORK: Üks kindel linn ja varjupaikSOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=B37doTWWFwkARTIST: Singers at Laulupidu 2019WORK: TuljakSOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2k2lsqm8JLkARTIST: Singers at Öölaulupidu 2008WORK: Ei ole üksi ükski maaSOURCE: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e3BSN0P8-no

“I swear I will not flee from this fight. I will triumph, or I will die!” In the 1066 game of thrones for the crown of England, the most extraordinary of the three contenders is arguably Harald Hardrada: viking warrior, daring explorer, emperor's bodyguard, serpent slayer, alleged lover to an empress, King of Norway, and legend of Norse mythology. How did this titan of a man come to cross the North Sea with his army, and take on Harold Godwinson, in the titanic showdown of Stamford Bridge? His story before this point is so colourful that it may be one the most exciting lives in all history. Fighting from the age of twelve, Harald was born to a petty regional king of Norway, in a Scandinavia of competing religions and kingships. As a teenager, he would then join his fearsome brother Olaf, the man who united Norway but later fell foul of King Cnut, and subsequently sailed the seas and mysterious waterways of Russia, in a mighty battle to take back Norway. Their defeat was terrible and absolute, leaving the young Harald wounded and on the run. A journey of horrors and hardship would then lead him at last to the awe inspiring city of Kyiv, where he would serve as mercenary for the Grand Prince. But still hungry for wealth and glory he then travelled on to the most remarkable city in the world: Constantinople, where his life would take an even more dramatic turn… Join Dominic and Tom as they describe the electrifying early life of Harald Hardrada. From Scandinavian prince, warrior, and would-be usurper, to Baltic mercenary, and member of the elite Varangian Guard, in the glittering Constantinople or Miklagard - Asgard on earth. The stage is set for the greatest adventure of his life so far. But will Harald ever seize his ultimate destiny and become a king? EXCLUSIVE NordVPN Deal ➼ https://nordvpn.com/restishistory Try it risk-free now with a 30-day money-back guarantee! Head to investengine.com/history or use promo code HISTORY for a welcome bonus of up to £100 _______ Twitter: @TheRestHistory @holland_tom @dcsandbrook Producer: Theo Young-Smith Assistant Producer: Tabby Syrett + Aaliyah Akude Executive Producers: Jack Davenport + Tony Pastor Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

This episode of the Fire Sprinkler Podcast is my conversation with Bogdan Reciega. Bogdan is a Fire Protection Engineer from Baltic Laboratory, a UL, USGC testing facility that works closely with FM as well. They perform burns daily at this facility, and looks like a lot of fun! Enjoy!

EU nations want to snap up US researchers sidelined by Trump, Poland and Baltic states to pull out of global landmine treaty, and Finland named happiest country for 8th year in a row.

In this weekend episode, Victor Davis Hanson and cohost Sami Winc discuss the impact of WWI on the West, the recent attacks on Tesla, the failed leadership of the Left, suggestions of Justice Roberts, Baltic states and Poland pull out of ban on landmines, and the JFK files.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

March 2025 In 1943 there seemed to be few mysteries left unsolved for Bletchley Park. But by the middle of that year, whispers would be heard of new threats: the V-1 ‘flying bomb' and V-2 rocket. What began with hints of secret trials on the Baltic would grow into an investigation which would strain Allied scientific intelligence to the utmost, as well as revealing serious flaws in the operation at Bletchley Park. But by the time ‘vengeance-weapon' attacks against the United Kingdom began in 1944, the Allies knew what they were facing; enabling countermeasures to be put in place which, despite the immense destruction the weapons caused, likely saved thousands of lives. In this ‘It Happened Here' episode, Head of Audiences and Programmes Vicki Pipe is joined by Research Officer Dr Thomas Cheetham to discuss the secret weapons which represented Nazi Germany's last-gasp attempt to turn the tide of World War Two. This episode features Oral History recordings of WAAF Filter Officer Eileen Younghusband. Many thanks to Dr Ben Thomson for voicing our archival documents. Image: ©Bundesarchiv, Bild 141-1880 / CC-BY-SA 3.0 #BPark, #Bletchleypark, #WW2, #Enigma,

Estonia, one of the Baltic states, sits on Europe's front line with Russia. The country that was, like Ukraine, once part of the Soviet Union is increasingly worried about the threat Putin poses, and has plans in place if there is an invasion. But, if western Europe can no longer rely on the transatlantic alliance, will it work? And what could Britain learn from it?This podcast was brought to you thanks to the support of readers of The Times and The Sunday Times. Subscribe today: http://thetimes.com/thestoryGuest: Oliver Moody, Berlin Correspondent, The Times and The Sunday Times.Host: Manveen Rana.Producer: Olivia Case.Further reading: Could Poland and Germany acquire nuclear bombs?Further listening:   ‘A lawlessness that's deeply alarming': William Hague on Trump's new presidency.Photo: Getty Images.Get in touch: thestory@thetimes.com Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

A reminder that nuclear submarines don't react well to bullets, as the Joes must rescue a downed U.S. sub in the Baltic, while the Oktober Guard and Cobra circle like sharks! It's Special Missions #1 on this latest episode of Joe on Joe Illustrated. Big announcement about the contest winners too! Subscribe to the Joe on Joe Podcast! www.joeonjoe.com Apple Podcasts PodBean YouTube Help Support the Show thru Patreon! @JoeonJoepod on  Twitter Facebook Instagram Email Me Here!    

I'm excited to introduce you to a new podcast, the Nordic Baltic Topics, A Biblical Outlook for a Sustainable Tomorrow-- where I will assist host James Ginn. James coordinates the United Church of God's work in the Baltic Republics, Scandinavia, and Eastern Europe, including Russia and Ukraine.                                   It can be found most places where you get your podcasts. https://nordicbaltictopics.podbean.com/ In this podcast, we will discuss global events related to Europe and Russia, areas significant for prophetic fulfillment. I recommend bookmarking the Nordic Baltic Report. We will also talk about news and events in the United Church in the Baltic Republics, Scandinavia and Eastern Europe. I am including our latest episode, recorded a few weeks ago. Please keep in mind that some of the news may be outdated, but it will give you an idea of how quickly and dangerously events are evolving. James is not only an elder but also brings professionalism and extensive knowledge of media and radio to the podcast. I've truly enjoyed collaborating with him on this project. From time to time, I will integrate some of our presentations into the Kubik Report, as they address topics of universal interest in our rapidly changing world.

‘The Foreign Desk’ speaks to leaders from Nato’s Baltic members about the vexing, existential questions they face: what happens if Russia strikes one of them? Is Nato’s Article 5 the unassailable security that it used to be? Is it worthwhile to keep telling Western Europe “we told you so”?See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Since restoring their independence, the Baltic states have focused on pursuing historical justice related to Soviet crimes, which included widespread repressions and mass deportations. Under the influence of international actors, the Baltic states have also engaged in political processes associated with Holocaust justice. Political scientist Dovilė Budrytė and anthropologist Neringa Klumbytė explain how their interdisciplinary approach has revealed new findings, exposed gaps in existing scholarship, and may influence policy in years to come.Ben Gardner-Gill is the Assistant Director for Outreach and Engagement for the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies and Co-Host of Baltic Ways.Dovilė Budrytė is professor of political science at Georgia Gwinnett College.Neringa Klumbytė is professor of anthropology and Russian and post-Soviet studies, and director of the Lithuania Program at the Havighurst Center for Russian and Post-Soviet Studies, Miami University.Baltic Ways is a podcast from the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fpribalticinitiative.substack.com

This week we talk about Euromaidan, minerals deals, and propaganda.We also discuss European security, NATO, and the western-led world order.Recommended Book: Storm Front by Jim ButcherTranscriptIn February of 2014, pro-Russian protests racked parts of southeastern Ukraine and Russian soldiers, their uniforms and weapons stripped of flags and other identifying markers, occupied another part of Ukraine called Crimea.This was seemingly in response to Ukraine's overthrow of its pro-Russian president, Viktor Yanukovych, who was toppled as part of the Euromaidan protests, which were themselves a response to Yanukovych deciding to aim for closer ties with Russia, rather than signing an association agreement with the EU, which would have committed Ukraine to several EU-oriented reforms, related to corruption, among other things, while also giving Ukrainians many new rights, including visa-free movement and access to the European Investment Bank, beginning a few years later, in 2017.This sudden pivot away from the EU and toward Russia didn't go down well with the Ukrainian public, which had repeatedly shown it wanted to lean toward the west, and the Euromaidan protests were focused on weeding out government corruption; the existing government was accused of being all sorts of corrupt, and had also been accused of human rights abuses and allowing Russian oligarchs undo influence at the highest rungs of power; Yanukovych was in Russia's pocket, basically, and his overthrow made Russia worry that they would lose control of their neighbor.So Russia moved in to take part of Ukraine, basically uncontested, both internally and externally—a lot of other governments made upset noises about this, but Russia gave itself cover by removing their flags from their personnel, and that gave them the ability to paint everything that happened as a natural uprising from within Ukraine, the people wanting freedom from their Ukrainian oppressors, and Russia was just supporting this cry to overthrow oppressive tyrants, because they're very nice and love freedom.For the next eight years, the Ukrainian government fought separatist forces, funded and reinforced by the Russian government, in the southeastern portion of their country, while Russia expanded their infrastructure in Crimea, which again, they stole from Ukraine early on, and where they previously leased vital naval facilities from Ukraine; and those facilities are assumed to be a big part of why all this went down the way it did, as without said naval facilities, they wouldn't have a naval presence in the Black Sea.Then, in February of 2022, after a multi-month buildup of troops and military hardware along their shared border, which they provided all sorts of excuses for, and which many commentators and governments around the world excused as just a bunch of saber-rattling, nothing to worry about, Russia launched a full-scale invasion of Ukraine, initially aiming for a blitzkrieg-like assault that was meant to take Ukraine's capital city, Kyiv, and decapitate the country's government within just days, at which point they could replace the government with someone who's working for them, another puppet they controlled.As of the day I'm recording this, in early March of 2025, the war is still ongoing, though. And in the years since it began, it's estimated that more than a million people have been killed or injured, while entire cities across Ukraine have been leveled and tens of thousands of Ukrainian refugees have fled Russia's forces as they've raped and pillaged and murdered their way across the Ukrainian countryside, those refugees leaving for destinations around the world, but creating a refugee crisis in nearby European nations like Poland and Germany, in particular.There's been a lot of back and forth in this conflict, Russia initially thought to have a massive upper hand, probably winning within days, as intended, but then Ukraine held fast, Russia redeployed its troops and armor, Ukraine got some remarkable counter-attacks in, and then Russia started to reset its economy to allow for a more drawn-out conflict.As of early 2025, Russia is once against considered to have the upper-hand, and though Ukraine has been holding the line even in the most under-assault regions in the eastern portion of its territory, and has in recent weeks managed to take some Russian-held territory back, Russia's comparably larger number of troops, its recent resupply of soldiers from North Korea, its larger economy and number of supply chains, and its relationships with entities like China and Iran, in addition to North Korea, all of which have been supplying it with things it needs to keep the war effort going, at length, have all conspired to put Ukraine on the back foot.Additionally, Ukraine is struggling, after this many years of total war, to refill empty boots and make do with whatever their allies can and will offer them, in terms of money, weapons, but also the basics, like food and fuel. They've been able to shore-up some limited aspects of their economy, and have innovated like crazy when it comes to things like drones and other fundamentals of asymmetric, defensive warfare, but right now at least, the larger forces swirling around in the geopolitical realm are making life difficult for Ukraine, and for those who are still supporting them.And that's what I'd like to talk about today; the continuing conflict in Ukraine, but especially what's happening on the sidelines, beyond the battle itself—and how those sideline happenings might lead to some fundamental changes in how Europe is organized, and the makeup of the modern world order.—At this point I've done probably half a dozen or more episodes on this conflict; it's long-lasting, it's big, it's important locally, but also globally, and it's been informing both geopolitical and economic outcomes since day one.Today I'd like to talk about some recent happenings, most of them from the past few months, that could prove impactful on the eventual outcome of this conflict, and might even determine when that end of fighting arrives.And at the center of these happenings is recently reelected US President Trump, who has always had a, let's call it unusual, public appreciation for Russian President Putin, and the strongman image he and other global authoritarians wield, while at the same time not being a big fan of Ukrainian President Zelensky—perhaps in part because Trump called Zelensky back in 2019 to try to get him to come up with evidence supporting a debunked conspiracy theory about his opponent, Joe Biden's administration, related to alleged impropriety in US-Ukrainian relations.Zelensky could find no such evidence, and when he told Trump there was nothing to be found, Trump blocked payments on $400 million worth of military aid for Ukraine, holding it hostage until Zelensky came up with what he wanted. This became a big scandal only after the fact, and before it could be made public or became known by congress via a whistleblower complaint, Trump released the money. This led to a formal impeachment inquiry into Trump later that year, which led to his impeachment for abusing his power and obstructing Congress—but he was then acquitted by the Republican-led Senate.This, it's thought, may have colored Trump's behavior toward Zelensky when the two men sat down, alongside several other US officials, including US Vice President JD Vance, to discuss a potential mineral deal between the US and Ukraine, which was based on an earlier deal that the Ukrainian government dismissed.The original deal basically required that Ukraine exploit its mineral wealth and put half of the money it makes from those minerals into a fund that would be used to pay the US back for the military assistance it's provided so far, to the tune of $500 billion; which is quite a lot more than the $175 billion or so the US has spent on this conflict since Russia invaded, only $128 billion of which has directly aided the Ukrainian government, as opposed to funding US activities associated with the war, or supporting other affected countries thereabouts.So originally the US asked for more than double what's been provided so far, in return, paid for by Ukraine's mineral wealth, which includes a lot of the types of rare earth minerals that are vital for common modern technologies, like computers, batteries, and solar panels.That didn't fly, mostly because it didn't contain a security guarantee for Ukraine—the US saying it would protect them if necessary, basically, in exchange for this huge sum of money—so the new deal asked for $500 billion be placed in a fund, and that fund would be jointly controlled by the US and Ukraine, the funds used to rebuild the country after the war.50% of all revenues from Ukrainian natural resources newly exploited after the war, so not from existing mines and ports and such, would be put into this fund. Like the first time around, this deal didn't include a security agreement from the US, but the general idea was that this fund would incentivize new investment in the area, and because Ukraine has a lot of unexploited mineral wealth, this could give the US a new source for these sorts of valuable raw materials that are currently mostly controlled by China, but which the US government is attempting to claim more of, now that it's realized it's way behind on locking down sources of these really important things.At the meeting where this second deal was meant to be signed, though, Zelensky flying to the US to sit down with Trump to make it happen, the President and Vice President more or less verbally attacked Zelensky, criticizing him for not being more overtly grateful, and telling him he was wrong when he said that Russia started the war by invading Ukraine.It was all pretty bizarre, and even folks in Trump's own party seemed pretty puzzled by the whole thing, some of them calling it embarrassing, as Trump and Vance were basically parroting Putin's propaganda that no one actually believes because they ignore easily verifiable facts.In any event, this led to a lot of fallout between the US and Ukrainian governments, with Trump suggesting he would lean more heavily on Ukraine to get them to accept peace on Russia's terms, because the Ukrainians couldn't see reason and accept his version of reality, essentially.Trump has also suggested that he's been talking a lot with Putin, and that he believes Putin wants peace, and it's time to end the war. Putin, for his part, has not seemed inclined to give up anything in order to achieve peace, and Russian attacks on Ukraine have increased in scale since Trump came into office, and even more so after talks about a supposed peace agreement began.All of which has had implications on the ground.In Ukraine, Ukrainian soldiers have had to operate with fewer resources, as Trump cut off additional funding and supply shipments, post-meeting. He recently ordered that the US not share intelligence with them, too, and they cut off the sharing of satellite imagery, which Ukraine has used to great effect to strike Russian targets from a distance.This has also had implications across Europe, though, as while Ukraine is being invaded now, there are concerns that if Putin gets away with taking part or all of Ukraine, he'll go for other previous Soviet assets, next, maybe starting with the Baltic nations—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania—and then tearing off chunks of Poland, Finland, or other neighbors that were previously part of the Soviet Union, like eastern Germany.The European Union, despite a fair bit of warning about Trump's stance on the issue, and the possibility that he would return to office, has been seemingly dumbstruck by Trump's sudden pivot away from supporting Ukraine, and away from NATO more broadly, toward a stance that favors Russia, instead. European governments have been scrambling to come up with an aid package that will replace some of what the US would have given, and have started sharing more intelligence, as well, including satellite imagery.It won't be easy, though, as the US versions of these things, from monetary resources to eyes in the sky vastly outshine what even the combination of British, French, and German assets can offer—at least at this stage. And the US has traditionally handled the lion's share of spending and building in these areas, shouldering the majority of NATO spending, because, well, it could, and that was a major premise of the post-WWII, western-led world order. The US said it would protect global capitalist democracies with its military might and nukes, if necessary, and European nations have been generally happy with this setup as it has generally allowed European governments to spend less money on their militaries and more on other stuff.That state of affairs seems to have ended, or at the very least become too unreliable to bet on, though, so EU nations are attempting to fill in the gaps left by the suddenly less-reliable-seeming US government, not just for Ukraine, but for themselves, as well.Poland's president recently announced that he wants to develop nuclear weapons and wants every adult male to undergo military training, so the country can field an army 500,000-strong.The French president has said he wants to extend his country's nuclear umbrella—guaranteed deterrence, basically, using nuclear weapons—to the whole of the EU. France has far fewer nukes than the US and Russia, but this captures a sense of the moment in the Union, where a bunch of currently underfunded militaries are realizing they might not be able to rely on the US in a pinch. And while they collectively have a lot more people and resources than Russia, Russia is fully mobilized and has shown itself to be willing to attack sovereign nations, whenever it pleases, caring a lot less for the human lives it spends, in the process, than is typical in western-style democracies.Even short of full-scale, out of nowhere invasions, Russia could pose a threat to European governments via asymmetrical routes. It's been seemingly approving all sorts of espionage operations meant to increase immigration arrivals in European nations where immigration is already a hot-button issue, nudging politics to the far-right, and it's allegedly been attacking infrastructure, in terms of hacking and just blowing stuff up, in order to sow discord and fear.As I mentioned earlier, too, part of Germany was previously held by the Soviet Union, and that same part of the country has recently voted heavily in favor of the country's furthest-right party, which wants stronger ties with Russia. So while conventional military issues are at the forefront of discussion, right now, Russia's long history of asymmetric warfare is also getting a fair bit of attention, as it could conceivably use these groups as a casus belli to attack, carving off pieces of its European neighbors and slowly incorporating them into its sphere of influence, similar to what it did in Ukraine, beginning in 2014; if eastern Germany supports Russia, it could fund and in other ways support uprising efforts in these regions, creating chaos and potentially even breaking off separatist states that would pull those regions into Russia's orbit.It's a tumultuous moment in this part of the world, then, in part because of the conflict that's still ongoing—a much larger and more powerful nation having invaded its smaller, less-powerful neighbor. But it's also tumultuous because of the implications of that conflict, especially if Russia comes out on top. If they win, there would seem to be a far greater chance of their deciding to keep the ball rolling, replicating a model that worked (without significant long-term consequences) across more neighboring nations.And if they can do that before Europe reinforces itself—assuming that's what the EU does, as it can be difficult to get a bunch of people with a bunch of at times competing interests to agree on anything, and even more so when said agreement involves both money and potentially sending civilians into harm's way—if Russia can get there before a new, restructured and reinforced Europe emerges, we could see another, similar conflict soon, and this one could be even more successful than the last, if Russia tweaks its formula to make it more effective, and European governments succumb to war weariness, exhausted by the war in Ukraine, in the meantime.Show Noteshttps://www.cfr.org/article/how-much-us-aid-going-ukrainehttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trump%E2%80%93Ukraine_scandalhttps://www.csis.org/analysis/breaking-down-us-ukraine-minerals-dealhttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/08/world/europe/ukraine-russia-north-korea-kursk.htmlhttps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2025/03/08/zelensky-trump-fallout-ukraine/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/04/world/europe/ukraine-us-trump-military-support.htmlhttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/06/us/politics/ukraine-zelensky-trump-russia.htmlhttps://apnews.com/article/russia-ukraine-war-dobropillya-us-intelligence-3d0bad105a93933e9cdaca5cf31fcf74https://mwi.westpoint.edu/no-substitute-for-victory-how-to-negotiate-from-a-position-of-strength-to-end-the-russo-ukraine-war/https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/eu-leaders-cautiously-welcome-macrons-nuclear-umbrella-offer-2025-03-06/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/07/world/europe/bulgarians-guilty-spying-russia-uk.htmlhttps://www.politico.com/news/2025/03/08/europe-scrambles-to-aid-ukraine-after-us-intelligence-cutoff-00219678https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c9wpy9x890wohttps://www.cbsnews.com/news/keith-kellogg-ukraine-intelligence-sharing-pause/https://www.bbc.com/news/articles/ce8yz5dk82wohttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/07/world/us-ukraine-satellite-imagery.htmlhttps://www.bbc.com/news/articles/c05m907r39qohttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/07/us/politics/trump-russia-sanctions-tariffs.htmlhttps://www.csis.org/analysis/ukraines-future-vision-and-current-capabilities-waging-ai-enabled-autonomous-warfarehttps://www.politico.eu/article/donald-tusk-plan-train-poland-men-military-service-russiahttps://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2025/03/08/poland-says-it-plans-to-give-every-adult-male-military-traininghttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/22/world/europe/ukraine-trump-minerals.htmlhttps://apnews.com/article/ten-days-that-upended-us-support-for-ukraine-8930c01a15910a7ad8a7f7c7fac9ba3ahttps://www.wsj.com/world/white-house-and-ukraine-close-in-on-deal-for-mineral-rights-e924c672https://ca.finance.yahoo.com/news/ukraine-us-still-ironing-parts-191805611.htmlhttps://www.reuters.com/business/us-could-cut-ukraines-access-starlink-internet-services-over-minerals-say-2025-02-22/https://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/25/world/europe/ukraine-minerals-deal.htmlhttps://www.cnn.com/2025/02/26/europe/ukraine-us-mineral-resources-deal-explained-intl-latam/index.htmlhttps://www.spglobal.com/commodity-insights/en/news-research/latest-news/electric-power/122624-eu-moving-to-develop-infrastructure-for-nuclear-energy-expansion-officialshttps://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2025-03-07/european-stocks-see-most-inflows-in-decade-amid-defense-splurgehttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/02/10/business/ai-summit-paris.htmlhttps://apnews.com/article/germany-ukraine-debt-brake-economy-military-spending-74be8e96d8515ddddd53a99a69957651https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2025/03/03/world/europe/ukraine-russia-war-drones-deaths.html?unlocked_article_code=1.2U4.b15Z.1EA4tDb_37Bqhttps://www.nytimes.com/2025/03/10/world/europe/ukraine-russia-eastern-front-line.htmlhttps://www.iiss.org/online-analysis/military-balance/2025/02/combat-losses-and-manpower-challenges-underscore-the-importance-of-mass-in-ukraine/https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/russian-offensive-campaign-assessment-march-7-2025https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Euromaidanhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Union%E2%80%93Ukraine_Association_Agreementhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Russo-Ukrainian_Warhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Timeline_of_the_Russian_invasion_of_Ukraine_(1_January_2025_%E2%80%93_present) This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe

In this episode of GREAT POWER PODCAST, host Ilan Berman speaks with Andrew Michta of the Atlantic Council on the growing divisions between the U.S. and Europe, and what it might mean for Ukraine, Russia and beyond. BIO:Andrew A. Michta is a senior fellow in the GeoStrategy Initiative in the Atlantic Council's Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security and the former dean of the College of International and Security Studies at the George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies. He holds a PhD in international relations from Johns Hopkins University. His areas of expertise include international security, NATO, and European politics and security, with a special focus on Central Europe and the Baltic states.

The Holy Roman Empire wilts under the combined pressure of Sweden and France. Spain exits our stage. And Central Europe lurches toward peace.Western Civ 2.0

On the GZERO World Podcast, we're bringing you two starkly different views on Ukraine's future and European security. First, Ian Bremmer speaks with Latvian Foreign Minister Baiba Braže about the growing security threats facing the Baltics—from cyberattacks and disinformation to undersea sabotage in the Baltic Sea. When an oil tanker linked to Russia's shadow fleet recently severed a vital power cable between Estonia and Finland, it was a stark reminder of how hybrid warfare is playing out beyond the battlefield. Braže warns that Putin's ambitions extend far beyond Ukraine, aiming to weaken US alliances and destabilize Europe. She also pushes back against claims that Ukraine's NATO ambitions provoked the war, calling them “complete nonsense,” and outlines why Latvia is boosting its defense spending to 5% of GDP.The conversation then shifts to Moscow, where Bremmer speaks with former Russian colonel and ex-Carnegie Moscow Center director Dmitri Trenin. Once considered a pro-Western voice, Trenin's views now align closely with the Kremlin. He argues that the fate of Ukraine should be decided primarily by Russia and the United States—not Ukraine or Europe.Host: Ian BremmerGuest: Baiba Braže & Dmitri Trenin Subscribe to the GZERO World with Ian Bremmer Podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or your preferred podcast platform, to receive new episodes as soon as they're published.

On Episode 99 of A Week in Watches, Zach takes us through a few new releases and ends on a brand-obit. First up are a few new models from Grand Seiko that, shocker, are inspired by nature. Next is a look at a new take on the Hermétique sport/field watch by Baltic with added functionality. After, it's over to Germany to check out the new and very impressive watches by Jochen Benzinger. Finally, it's time to bid farewell to Carl F. Bucherer.The DIY Watch Club sponsors this episode of A Week in Watches. Building a watch will elevate your appreciation for timepieces. Perfect bezel alignment? Blued steel hands? Mind-blowing lume? With DIY Watch Club, you get to experience the craftsmanship firsthand and gain a whole new level of appreciation for your watches. Learn more here

From the BBC World Service: U.S. President Donald Trump plans a 25% import tax on all steel and aluminum entering the U.S. China, Canada and Mexico — some of the biggest suppliers — could be hit hard. Also: China’s trade flow shifted in response to tariffs, three Baltic nations cut ties with Russia’s power grid, and global leaders and tech bosses meet in Paris to figure out how to regulate artificial intelligence.

From the BBC World Service: U.S. President Donald Trump plans a 25% import tax on all steel and aluminum entering the U.S. China, Canada and Mexico — some of the biggest suppliers — could be hit hard. Also: China’s trade flow shifted in response to tariffs, three Baltic nations cut ties with Russia’s power grid, and global leaders and tech bosses meet in Paris to figure out how to regulate artificial intelligence.