Podcasts about crypto ag

Blog: https://medium.com/asecuritysite-when-bob-met-alice/the-art-of-the-backdoor-e39f001ea8b9 Do you ever worry that your locksmith may take a copy of your key when they fit a new lock? Or that your locksmith has defined a lock which they know they have a skeleton key for? Or that your locksmith modifies the lock so that they can compromise it? And so we trust those that create locks to design them so that they cannot be broken easily, and that lock standard agencies around the world to set standards that promote good lock design, and, most of all, that locksmiths can be trusted to fit them without compromising them (and in giving us good advice). Introduction Well, let's look at software backdoors. Overall it's not an easy thing to put in a backdoor in a piece of software. Well, let me re-phrase that … “it is not an easy thing to put in a backdoor in a piece of software and for it not to be seen”. Computer security is a serious business, but you must smile a little when you see the lengths that some intruders will go to in order to compromise systems. Organisations such as the NSA have long been accused of applying backdoors into cryptography software, but the recent Apple login hack shows that there are lots of opportunities for others to get in on the act. The addition of a backdoor in the Apple compiler showcased the opportunity for large-scale compromises. Overall there are a number of ways that a backdoor can be added to a piece of software: Escrow. In encrypted communications, one method is to keep of copy of the encryption key that could be used at some time in the future. Details [here]. Defining a standard that you know you can crack. The NSA and law enforcement agencies around the world have been accused of helping to define a standard and setting various parameters, and they know they have the methods to crack them. Source code addition backdoor. This is the typical way that an intruder would add a backdoor, and where the additional code is added which will perform a task that allows the source code writer back into the system. Normally the code is added by the writer, but then an intruder finds out the backdoor and can exploit it. Injected code backdoor. With these, packages such as Metasploit insert some additional code into the application, which allows it to work the same, but creates a backdoor connection. Normally this is a call-out method, where the program calls out to the malware writer. Compiler backdoor. This is the best method for going undetected, and where the compiler, itself, adds the additional code to every program which uses the compiler. In terms of a mass exploit, the compiler backdoor will have the greatest scope as it will exploit a wide range of applications. The executable will also be signed to verify that it is a valid application. Vulnerability and XSS exploit. This involves compromising a system in order to create a backdoor, typically injecting code into a running application which causes the system to open up a backdoor connection. The open-up of a network connection will obviously be detected on the system, but code writers have implemented a number of smart ways to cover this up, including passing secret passphrases for passwords, or with port knocking, where network packets are sent to a well-known open port, which then causes another port to open. A. Defining a standard you know you can crack A key focus for law enforcement is the cracking of cryptography, especially for tunnels and VPN connections. Devices created by Juniper were found to have a flaw which allows agencies to decrypt VPNs traffic. The company may have also used Dual EC (Elliptic Curve) DRBG (Deterministic Random Bit Generator) for generating the random numbers required to create VPN tunnels. This method, which was promoted by the NSA, has a known weakness and can be cracked. The possible backdoor in Dual EC DRBG has been known about since 2004, and the team who worked on it had the chance to plug the gap but failed too. It thus allows law enforcement agencies to crack SSL/TLS encrypted traffic which used the method for random number generation. It was thus assumed that no one would use the method, but, in Juniper's case, it has been found in some of their devices. In 2013, Edward Snowden showed NSA memos which indicated that the NSA had been the sole editor of the standard, whereas NIST responded that it did not deliberately weaken any cryptography standard. The following year, NIST recommended that companies stop using it, and withdrew it from its draft guidance on random number generation. In 2013, also, OpenSSL was found to be implementing the method, which allowed TLS/SSL connections to be decrypted. The back door in the standard for Elliptic Curve method for Dual_EC_DRBY caused a great deal of suspicion on the definition of NIST's P curve standards, and that they had selected them so they could have an advantage in breaking the public keys. Most of the industry has moved away from the P standards (such as P-256) and towards Curve25519 (which is shown in the graphic on the right-hand side and which was created by Daniel J Bernstein), and now used by Tor, Signal, What's App, Facebook, OpenSSH, and many other standards. In 2013, Bruce Scheiner stated that he didn't trust the values selected: I no longer trust the constants. I believe the NSA has manipulated them through their relationships with industry I have plotted some of the standard Elliptic Curve parameters [here]. B. Source code additional back door It has long been the case where code writers have added additional code which allows them back into the code whenever required. They will often add debug functions which can be remotely enabled, but where they forget to switch-off. This backdoor method works well until the source code is read, and the additional code is revealed. With the rise of Git hub repositories, it can become obvious as to when the backdoor has been added. The following outlines a few backdoors: A classic backdoor was added to an FTP server (vsftp), which has an intentional backdoor within the version running on it. The back door is exploited with the username ending with: “:)” and then the server listens on port 6200 and awaits a connection: root@ubuntu:~# telnet 1.2.3.4 21Trying https://www.linkedin.com/redir/invalid-link-page?url=192%2e168%2e99%2e131...Connected to https://www.linkedin.com/redir/invalid-link-page?url=10%2e200%2e0%2e1.Escape character is '^]'.220 (vsFTPd 2.3.4)user mybackdoor:)331 Please specify the password.pass none ^]telnet> quitConnection closed.telnet 1.2.3.4 6200Trying https://www.linkedin.com/redir/invalid-link-page?url=10%2e200%2e0%2e1...Connected to https://www.linkedin.com/redir/invalid-link-page?url=10%2e200%2e0%2e1.Escape character is '^]'.id;uid=0(root) gid=0(root) The UnrealRCD IRC daemon runs on port 6667. The version on Metasploitable has a backdoor where the user sends “AB”, and then follows it with a system command on a listening port (see demo above). Intentional backdoors Cryptography cracking is often one of the most challenging areas for investigators to crack, so there have been many allegations of companies tampering with source code in order to create backdoors. While these are not necessarily network connections, the software is modified in a way which changes the functionality of the encryption function. One company — Crypto AG, a Swiss cryptography company who make encryption machines — has been accused of modifying their software in collusion with intelligence agencies from Germany (BND), the UK (GCHQ) and US (NSA). This was highlighted, in 1986, when Ronald Regan announced that the US had intercepted encrypted diplomatic communications between Tripoli and the Libyan embassy in East Berlin, related to a bombing in Berlin. In 1992, the Iranian government even arrested Hans Buehler, a salesman for the company, but was released in 1993 without revealing any flaws in the machines (and after $1 million bail money was paid). Crypto AG soon after dismissed Hans and requested he pay back the $1m. Since then Der Spiegel has interviewed former employees and concluded that the machine was indeed rigged. Even after several other investigations, there is still no conclusive proof of the rigging, but some suspect that the relationship with defence agencies goes back to 1954. Juniper backdoor Juniper recently announced that there were two backdoors on their devices, and which allowed intruders to gain administrator access and also decrypt the encrypted content. It was the kind of shock that has not been seen since the asleep script was released, and which could crack most Cisco Wi-fi access points which used the LEAP authentication method. With backdoors in cryptography being a hot topic, Juniper revealed that it had traced “unauthorized” code within its ScreenOS operating system on some of its firewalls, and which allowed an intruder to take complete control of Juniper's NetScreen firewalls using a hard-wired password. This would allow them to decrypt all the encrypted traffic for VPN connections. There is a patch for this, but intruders can now determine the required password — which has been hard-wired into the code — by examining the ARM code used in the backdoor: The strange thing is that the password is “

In episode 20 we are joined by Ian Ferguson to do a deep dive into the murky past of cryptocurrencies. We trace their initial development all the way back to the 1980's when the NSA first began releasing white papers on the future creation of digital money. We then go over some key stages in their evolution through the decades until we reach the infamous Bitcoin whitepaper, at which point we consider just who was really behind it and if a great deception has taken place? In this we explore a host of interesting narratives including sharing the little known story of Crypto AG, an NSA and CIA deep state operation which used cryptography to trick the worlds leading intelligence agencies for 50 years straight. In part 2 Mike and Ian switch it up a gear by debating the morality of investing in cryptos that are explicitly being designed as platforms for CBDC's such as XRP/ Ripple and moreover, the ethics of investing in general.   EPISODE LINKS: MEMBERS: www.parallelmike.com ROKFIN: www.rokfin.com/parallelsystems MIKE'S INVESTING NEWSLETTER: www.patreon.com/parallelsystems GUEST LINKS: IANS CHANNEL: https://www.youtube.com/@WhiteLotusOfLightJeff White WEBSITE: https://www.whitelotusoflight.com/    

Der niederländische Ingenieur Paul Reuvers und sein Kollege Marc Simons haben bei der Recherche über die Cryptoleaks eine Schlüsselrolle gespielt. Sie verfolgen nämlich die Diskussionen um die Firma Crypto und die Vorwürfe, die ihr gemacht wurden, seit langem. Sie kennen auch die historischen Verbindungen zwischen er Crypto AG und den US-Geheimdiensten. Die beiden gehören weltweit zu den angesehensten Spezialisten für die Geschichte der Krytologie - sie selber haben eine umfangreiche Sammlung mit einer aktuellen Website. Dominik Landwehr hat an der Ham Radio - der Messe für Amateurfunktechnik in Friedrichshafen - Paul Reuvers getroffen. Im Gespräch erzählt er, welche Rolle er und sein Kollege bei den Recherchen gespielt haben. Das Gespräch wurde am 23.Juni 2023 geführt und dauert 37 Minuten. https://www.cryptomuseum.com/

«Ein Spionage-Thriller aus dem Kalten Krieg»: Schlagzeilen wie diese begleiteten den Skandal um die Crypto AG. Im Februar 2020 hatten internationale Medien, darunter die «Rundschau» von SRF eine Spionageaffäre öffentlich gemacht: Die Crypto AG im Kanton Zug war gar nicht so neutral, wie man bis anhin gedacht hatte. Sie gehörte dem westdeutschen und dem US-amerikanischen Geheimdienst, dem BND und der CIA. Sie hatte über Jahrzehnte Chiffriergeräte mit schwacher Verschlüsselung verkauft. Dies ermöglichte eine Abhöraktion in gigantischem Ausmass: Die beiden Geheimdienste konnten bei der Kommunikation von über hundert Staaten mitlesen. Hunderttausende vertrauliche Mitteilungen zwischen Regierungsbeamten, Militärs und Botschaftspersonal konnten ausgewertet werden. Und in diese Affäre verwickelt ist auch ein Winterthurer: Oskar Stürzinger ist am 5. Dezember 1920 an der Zürcherstrasse auf die Welt gekommen. Als Elektroingenieur war er ein Mitarbeitern der ersten Stunde bei der Crypto AG. Er wurde 1979 frühpensioniert – und obwohl er nie erzählt hat, was er wusste, steht ausser Zweifel, dass er über die Machenschaften der Geheimdienste Bescheid wusste und sich im Klaren war, bei wem er in Lohn und Brot steht. Einer, der Oskar Stürzinger gut kannte, ist Dominik Landwehr: Er hatte nicht nur jahrelang Kontakt zu Stünzinger, sondern nach seinem Tod auch einige der Chiffriermaschinen geerbt. Dominik Landwehr ist im Studio und erzählt von den Cryptoleaks, seiner Beziehung zum Winterthurer CIA-Mitarbeiter, die jüngste Wendung – und was von der ganzen Sache bleibt. Die Links zur Episode: https://nerdfunk.ch/nerdfunk-661/

Crypto AG, Part 3: The Truth Is RevealedAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brands

By the 1970s, Crypto AG was a large and thriving company, employing over 400 people. This final episode of the series is going to explore how a spying operation affecting over 100 countries, for 70 years, was kept secret the whole time -- from governments, from militaries and intelligence services, and even the company's own personnel.

Crypto AG, Part 2: The Death of Bo Jr.Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brands

How did Boris Hagelin succeed in selling compromised cipher machines to half the world, for more than 50 years? Some have speculated that it was some kind of backdoor. But, no - it was more clever than that... but Bo Jr., Hagelin's son, who became an important part of his father's company, did not approve of the secret deal with the NSA...

Crypto AG - The Greatest Espionage Operation Ever, Part 1Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brands

General McArthur, Egpyt's Anwar Sadat, and Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini: These are just a few of the dozens, likely hundreds of targets of arguably the biggest, most ambitious hacking operation ever. A secret mission that lasted nearly a century, and influenced the course of so many of the most important events of history. The history you thought you knew.

Halil Said Cankurtaran ve Enes Öz'ün yer aldığı Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Gelişmeler serimizin yeni bölümünde IEEE Spectrum'un Eylül sayısı ele alınmıştır. Yayın hayatına 1964 yılında başlayan IEEE Spectrum, mühendislik, fizik, matematik, biyoloji ve daha pek çok alanda güncel gelişmeleri okuyucularına aktarmayı hedeflemektedir. IEEE Spectrum, akademik makalelerden farklı olarak temel düzeyde eğitime sahip hemen hemen herkesin anlayabileceği bir içeriğe sahiptir. Günümüzde hem basılı hem de çevrimiçi olarak yayın hayatına devam eden IEEE Spectrum, bilimsel anlatım konusunda IEEE'nin bayrak gemilerinden biri olarak sınıflandırılabilir. Bu bölümümüzde de Eylül sayısının içerisinde bulunan IEEE Specturum'un ağ sayfasında gerçekleştirilen yenilikler, Dünya'daki yaşamın sürdürülebilirliği, elektronik cihazların tamir edilebilirliği, SUV araçların karbon salınım miktarları, elektrik destekli bisikletler, şifreleme, şifreli haberleşme ve geçtiğimiz haftalarda Amerika ve Almanya'nın diğer ülkelerin şifreli haberleşmelerini piyasanın büyük bir kısmına hakim olan Crypto AG firması sayesinde izlemesi, otonom tarım araçları ve tarımın geliştirilmesi gibi farklı konulara değinilmiştir. Keyifli dinlemeler. IEEE Spectrum: https://spectrum.ieee.org/ IEEE Spectrum Eylül Sayısı: https://spectrum.ieee.org/magazine/2021/september/ IEEE Spectrum Bölümlerimiz: #108. IEEE Spectrum Ağustos - Çip Krizi, İklim Değişikliği, Sürdürülebilirlik, Europa: https://youtu.be/OBthwmOZJfE #105. IEEE Spectrum Temmuz - İklim Değişikliği, Yapay Zeka, Mars ve Zamanın Ölçümü: https://youtu.be/_dT9l9DZsP8 #99. IEEE Spectrum Haziran - SİHA, Blok Zinciri, Süper Bilgisayarlar, RISC-V, DNA Aşısı: https://youtu.be/rX8VPfWpf8Q #94. IEEE Spectrum Mayıs - Yapay Zeka, Yarı İletkenler, Kodlama ve Jacob Ziv: https://youtu.be/R__mpZcBlec #91. IEEE Spectrum Nisan - Bilimsel ve Teknolojik Gelişmeler: https://youtu.be/KK8M_WMbxh8 Tapir Lab. GitHub: @TapirLab, https://github.com/tapirlab/ Tapir Lab. Instagram: @tapirlab, https://www.instagram.com/tapirlab/ Tapir Lab. Twitter: @tapirlab, https://twitter.com/tapirlab Tapir Lab.: http://www.tapirlab.com

Hallo bei den Fake Busters. Heute widmen wir uns der Kryptologie. Also dem Verschlüsseln von Botschaften – und auch deren Entschlüsselung. Kryptographie gibt de facto seit es das Alphabet gibt. Aber wie haben sich die Codes und natürlich auch die Knackmethoden im Laufe der Zeit verändert? Warum können Geheimdienste wie der CIA und BND mithilfe von manipulierten Geräten weltweit Nachrichten mitlesen und steckt in Strichcodes im Supermarkt wirklich die Zahl des Teufels? Die Fake Busters haben nachgeforscht. Dieser Podcast wird unterstützt vom IST, dem Institute of Science and Technology Austria in Klosterneuburg bei Wien. Am IST Austria Campus findet 23. – 25. August 2021 das **Fake Busters Bootcamp** statt. Dort lernst du von Wissenschafter_innen, wie sie den Unterschied zwischen verlässlicher wissenschaftlicher Information und Fake News erkennen. Mindestalter ist 15 Jahre, Anmeldung unter: https://ist.ac.at/en/news-events/event/?eid=3171 Abonniert unseren Podcast auch auf Apple Podcasts, Spotify, FYEO oder Google Podcasts und hinterlasst uns eine Bewertung, wenn euch der Podcast gefällt. Mehr Podcasts gibt es unter www.kurier.at/podcasts

En este programa nos visita David Marugan (@RadioHacking) uno de los referentes de la ciberseguridad en España y un reconocido especialista en radiocomunicaciones. Junto a David analizamos varios temas, la utilidad de la radio en las comunicaciones en momentos de crisis como el que se vive en Madrid desde el pasado viernes. Este tipo de comunicaciones, aun teniendo muchos años, siguen siendo de gran utilidad en multitud de escenarios de nuestro día a día y sobre todo en momentos de crisis. También hablamos del mayor caso de espionaje descubierto recientemente por varios medios de comunicación y que implica a la empresa Crypto AG. +info: https://psaneme.com/

Join Scott Young and Shaun Sturby from Optrics Engineering as they discuss the CIA owning Swiss crytography company Crypto AG, the $1 billion worth of Bitcoin that we were seized and the hacker who released 49,000 firewall passwords after hacking Fortinet's VPN. For more IT tips go to: > https://www.OptricsInsider.com Timecodes: 0:00 - Intro 0:17 - Today's 3 topics 0:40 - Topic 1: CIA & Swiss Crypto AG working together 2:39 - Topic 2: $1 Billion Bitcoin seized from Silk Road 4:27 - Topic 3: Hacker releases 49k Fortinet passwords 6:40 - Closing remarks Learn more about the CIA & Crypto AG: > https://www.theregister.com/2020/11/12/crypto_ag_swiss_parliament_report Learn more about the seizure of $1 billion worth of Bitcoin: > https://www.secplicity.org/2020/11/10/us-justice-department-makes-one-billion-dollar-drug-seizure Learn more about the hacker who posted 49,000 firewall passwords: > https://www.bleepingcomputer.com/news/security/hacker-posts-exploits-for-over-49-000-vulnerable-fortinet-vpns #OptricsInsider #TechNews #ITNews --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/optrics-insider/message

Arrivano i giga gratis per gli studenti; cashback di stato in Italia: serve SPID; lotteria degli scontrini; Twitter e Facebook trasferiranno l’account POTUS il 20 gennaio 2021; Senato USA contro i deepfake; nuove agenzie in UK; come ti spio con Facebook Messenger; GO SMS Pro: epic fail; Svizzera: i servizi segreti sapevano del caso Crypto AG ma non hanno detto niente per 30 anni; NSO Group si dedica a scrivere sceneggiature per Hollywood.

De Zwitserse inlichtingendienst participeerde als junior partner van de CIA in de spionage-operatie Rubicon, maar de Zwitserse regering werd daar slechts mondjesmaat over geïnformeerd. Dit concludeert de onderzoekscommissie van het Zwitserse parlement in haar rapport ‘Fall Crypto AG'. De commissie spreekt over ‘een inlichtingendienst binnen de inlichtingendienst', die een ‘joint venture' met de Amerikaanse inlichtingendiensten aanging nadat de Duitse BND in 1993 uit Operatie Rubicon was gestapt. De commissie constateert dat ‘buitenlandse inlichtingendiensten' het neutrale imago van Zwitserland gebruiken als dekmantel voor spionage-operaties. Operatie Rubicon wordt in een ‘Top Secret' intern evaluatierapport van de CIA ‘de inlichtingencoup van de eeuw' genoemd. Daarbij werden in versleutelingsapparaten van het Zwitserse bedrijf Crypto AG stiekem achterdeurtjes ingebouwd. De operatie werd op 11 februari 2020 onthuld door de Washington Post, het Duitse ZDF, de Zwitserse publieke omroep SRF en Argos. In Argos nu deel zeven in deze serie. Een verslag over het onderzoek van de Zwitserse onderzoekscommissie en een interview met SRF-collega Fiona Endres.

Bringing news a different perspective on politics and spirituality. This episode we discussed Crypto AG, congressional clowns, Operation Condor, Henry Kissinger and much more.

Im Februar dieses Jahres wurde der Skandal um die Crypto AG publik: Durch die ehemalige Zuger Firma konnten Geheimdienste aus den USA und Deutschland während mehr als 70 Jahren über 100 Länder abhören. Sechs Monate lang arbeitete ein kleines Team der SRF Rundschau, des ZDF und der Washington Post daran, diese Affäre aufzudecken. Zusammen lasen sie 5000 Archiv-Seiten, führten 300 Stunden Gespräche und produzierten daraus einen 100-minütigen Dok-Film.Wie enthüllte das Rundschau-Team die vielleicht grösste Geheimdienst-Operation aller Zeiten? So! sagen Fiona Endres und Anielle Peterhans, die an vorderster Front recherchierten.Im Gespräch erzählen sie uns, wie sie das Thema gefunden haben, wie sie eine so grosse Recherche organisiert haben und was seit der Publikation der Beiträge passiert ist. Natürlich beantworten sie auch Fragen aus dem Publikum.Intromusik: Book the rental wit it - RAGE / YouTube Music Library

Archive 32 - Crypto AG Dans cette archive j'explique l'influence de l'entreprise suisse Crypto AG qui pendant 60 aura permis à la NSA et au BND (renseignement extérieur allemand) d'intercepter la majeure partie des communications top secrètes de 120 pays. La chaine YVB podcast a pour émission principale "Archives par YVB" qui consiste à vous résumer une affaire de corruption dans un format d'environ 5 minutes. J'utilise la méthode de l'archivage pour parler d'affaires, qui concernent toutes l'intérêt général, le plus simplement possible. Je sélectionne des sujets qui me semblent capitaux à la bonne comprehension du fonctionnement de notre société. Cette chaine est indépendante et ouverte à toutes les propositions de partenariats en cohérence avec son fond et sa forme. ABONNEZ-VOUS - SOUTENEZ - PARTAGEZ De quoi parle la chaîne ? De corruption - anticorruption - intérêt général - monopoles - cartels - scandales politiques - géopolitique - lanceurs d'alerte - d'histoire moderne - conflit d'interet Cette chaine est indépendante et ouverte à toutes les propositions en cohérence avec son fond et sa forme. ABONNEZ-VOUS : Les liens: - Twitter: @YVBpodcast - Find me on Apple Podcasts - Find me on Google Podcasts - Soundcloud: @yvbpodcast ------------ Music by: Auteur: CloudKicker Titre: Night Album: Unending Year:2019 Visit: cloudkicker.bandcamp.com www.auboutdufil.com/index.php?license=CC-BY www.auboutdufil.com/get.php?web=htt…icker_Night.mp3

Er zijn nieuwe documenten opgedoken over Operatie Rubicon, de grote spionage-operatie van de CIA en de Duitse BND, die Argos medio februari samen met de Washington Post, het ZDF en de Zwitserse publieke omroep onthulde.Orlando Letelier, de oud-minister van Buitenlandse Zaken van Chili, was na de militaire coup van 1973 naar de Verenigde Staten gevlucht. Op 21 september 1976 werd hij samen met zijn assistente in Washington door een autobom om het leven gebracht. Bij de voorbereiding van die dubbele moord werd gebruik gemaakt van apparaten waar versleuteld mee werd gecommuniceerd. De apparaten waren geleverd door het Zwitserse bedrijf Crypto AG, maar de Amerikaanse en de Duitse afluisterdiensten hadden er stiekem achterdeurtjes ingebouwd. In Argos deel drie van de Cryptoleaks-affaire.

Washington Post Pulitzer Prize winner Greg Miller joins me to talk about his breaking story about Crypto AG, a company secretly owned by the CIA. The CIA used this company to spy on countries all over the world. Miller covers national security for the post and won a Pulitzer Prize for Public Service for his help with the stories about US surveillance exposed by Edward Snowden. He also won a Pulitzer for his reporting on Russian interference in the 2016 election.

In breaking news from 1995, the Washington Post takes advantage of a leaked CIA history paper to retell the remarkable tale of Crypto AG, a purveyor of encryption products to dozens of governments – and allegedly a wholly controlled subsidiary of US and German intelligence. Nick Weaver, Paul Rosenzweig, and I are astonished at the derring-do and unapologetic enthusiasm for intelligence collection. I mean, really: The Pope? This week's interview is with Jonathan Reiber, a writer and strategist in Oakland, California, and former Chief Strategy Officer for Cyber Policy and Speechwriter at the Department of Defense, currently senior advisor at Technology for Global Security and visiting scholar at the UC Berkeley Center for Long-Term Cybersecurity. His recent report offers a candid view of strained relations between Silicon Valley and the Pentagon. The interview explores the reasons for that strain, the importance of bridging the gap and how that can best be done. Nick reports that four PLA members have been indicted over the Equifax breach. He speculates that the US government is sending a message by disclosing a photo of one soldier that appears to have been taken by his own webcam. Paul and I note that China's motivation for the hack was very likely the assembly of records on Americans not dissimilar to the records we know the Chinese keep on Uighurs – which are extraordinarily detailed and surprisingly artisanal.  The arrest of a Bitcoin mixer allows Nick to explain how Bitcoin mixing services work and why they're illegal. Paul lays out the potentially serious impact of Amazon's lawsuit to stop a $10 billion Microsoft-DOD cloud contract. We note that Amazon wants to take testimony from President Trump. Thanks to his Twitter habit, we conclude, that's not out of the question. I preview my remarks at a February 19 Justice Department workshops on Section 230. I will reprise my article in Lawfare and the encryption debate with Nick Weaver that inspired it. And I hope to dig as well into the question whether Section 230 provides too much protection for Silicon Valley's censors. Speaking of which, Jeff Bezos's company has joined the censors but won't tell us which books it's suppressing. Nick and I give a favorable review to CISA's new #Protect2020 election strategy. We search for deeper meaning in the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority's (IANA's) failure to complete its Domain Name System Security Extensions (DNSSEC) root key signing ceremony because of… a physical safe. And we all take a moment to mock the latest vote-by-phone snake-oil app seller, Voatz. Download the 300th Episode (mp3). You can subscribe to The Cyberlaw Podcast using iTunes, Google Play, Spotify, Pocket Casts, or our RSS feed! As always, The Cyberlaw Podcast is open to feedback. Be sure to engage with @stewartbaker on Twitter. Send your questions, comments, and suggestions for topics or interviewees to CyberlawPodcast@steptoe.com. Remember: If your suggested guest appears on the show, we will send you a highly coveted Cyberlaw Podcast mug! The views expressed in this podcast are those of the speakers and do not reflect the opinions of the firm.

Het nieuws dat de Duitse en Amerikaanse inlichtingendiensten eind vorige eeuw via gemanipuleerde apparatuur allerlei bevriende landen afluisterden, dendert na. Het was een Zwitserse bedrijf (Crypto AG) dat als dekmantel diende om de apparatuur te leveren. De zo gekoesterde neutraliteit van Zwitserland staat ineens ter discussie. Correspondent Renske Heddema over de ophef daar. België gebruikte cryptomachines die aangepast waren om ze makkelijker te kunnen kraken. De Belgen zijn verontwaardigd. Jelle van Buuren, inlichtingenexpert van de Universiteit Leiden, geeft uitleg over de betekenis van de cryptoleaks-onthullingen en waarom de ophef in Nederland veel minder groot is dan in Zwitserland en België. D66-Kamerlid Kees Verhoeven reageert op de internationale commotie en de belangrijke bijrol van Nederland. Voor meer informatie over de 'cryptoleaks' kijk ook op: vpro.nl/cryptoleaks

Wieso-weshalb-warum? Tagesschau ist nicht auf KiTA-Niveau. Während im Kinderfernsehen der Sesam-Straße tapfer nach dem Wer, Wie, Was und sogar nach dem Warum gefragt wird, schweigt die Tagesschau eisern, wo Fragen dringend geboten wären. Typisches Beispiel ist die Affäre rund um die "Crypto AG", ein Laden, der von Bundesnachrichtendienst und CIA gekauft und der Siemens AG-gesteuert wurde. Zwar berichtete die ARD-Nachrichtensendung unter der Überschrift "Ein einmaliger Skandal" darüber, dass die Geheimdienst-Firma aufgeflogen war, hüllte sich aber sonst in Schweigen. Sogar über die Millionenprofite wurde berichtet, und über die schwarzen Kassen des BND musste die regierungsamtliche Sendung inzwischen berichten, nachdem sie jahrelang von nichts zu wissen schien. Aber die spätestens jetzt notwendigen Fragen wurden nicht gestellt. Ein Fragenklassiker wäre der nach der Versteuerung des Geldes gewesen, denn nur so könnte man den mafiösen Zu- und Umständen der miesen Abhöraffaire auf die Spur kommen. Doch die Hamburger Redakteure schweigen. "Wer nicht fragt, bleibt dumm", weiß das Kinderlied zu singen und wer jetzt die Redakteure meint, der kennt nur die halbe Wahrheit. Dumm bleiben sollen vor allem die Zuschauer, die man bisher im Dunkeln über das Drumherum lässt. Das "Wer, Wie, Was" wird mal wieder nicht recherchiert, denn eine wesentliche Tugend des Journalismus, gute Fragen zur Aufklärung zu stellen, scheint die Hamburger Gurkentruppe nicht zu kennen. Dabei hätte man das Kanzleramt fragen können und müssen; auch die Frage an die Strafjustiz stellen, wann denn jene Verantwortlichen in den Knast gehen, die gemeinsam mit den US-Behörden über Jahrzehnte die Bundesbürger bespitzelt haben. Statt knallharte Fragen nach der Rolle der Türkei zu stellen, erzählt die Tagesschau über eine sogenannte "Rebellenhochburg" in Syrien. Hier verstellt bereits das Wording, der Sprachgebrauch, die richtigen Fragen. Denn was da so romantisch "Rebellen" genannt wird, ist nichts anderes als der Tarnname für Khan al-Assal, Söldner des Emirat Kaukasus oder die islamistische Partei Turkestans. Diese Terrorgruppen gehören zu den Einheiten rund um den syrischen Ort Idlib. In dieser Gegend setzt die türkische Armee zu einer Offensive an und droht mit "Vergeltungsschlägen". Jetzt wären eigentlich interessante Fragen an das deutsche Außen- und Verteidigungsministerium fällig: Wie ist das deutsche Verhältnis zum NATO-Partner Türkei, die in Syrien zur Ausweitung des Krieges beiträgt. Doch die Redaktion stellt die Fragen nicht, die ja auch die Frage aufwerfen würde, was Deutschland eigentlich in der NATO macht und wie lange es denn noch in diesem aggressiven Militärbündnis verbleiben will. Jeder denkt, jetzt endlich kommt die journalistische Frage, denn unter der Überschrift "Beratung zu NS-Opfergruppen - Endlich Anerkennung für enormes Leid" fällt der Tagesschau auf, dass auch Arbeitslose und Obdachlose zu Opfern des Naziregimes wurden und in die Konzentrationslager verschleppt wurden. Aber konsequent, wie schon seit mehr als 70 Jahren existieren in der deutschen Öffentlichkeit die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen nicht, da will die Tagesschau lieber nicht nachhaken. Von den 5,7 Millionen wurden 3,3 Millionen durch Arbeit und Hunger vernichtet. Die Tagesschau wagt nicht mal die Frage zu stellen, wo denn die Erinnerung an die Lager sind. Denn überall im Land gab es sie, und bis heute erinnert fast nichts an die deutschen Mordmaschinen, denen die Völker der Sowjetunion zum Opfer fielen. Das Schweigen lastet auch auf der ARD wie ein Sargdeckel. Ganz redselig wird Ralf Borchard vom Bayerischen Rundfunk, wenn er agitiert: "Außenpolitik Deutschland darf sich nicht mehr wegducken". Was Burchard kaum getarnt sagt: Die Deutschen sollen mehr für die Kriegsvorbereitung tun. Hier stellt die MACHT-UM-ACHT die längst fällige Frage: Wie lange dürfen solche Kriegstrommler noch auf die Pauke des öffentlich-rechtlichen Rundfunks hauen? Wer hat dem Mann erlaubt, das Friedensgebot des Grundgesetzes zu ignorieren? Welcher Zweig der Rüstungsindustrie bezahlt für die Propaganda? Alles Fragen, die sich viele Zuschauer stellen und auf die sie keine Antwort bekommen. Fragen, die unsere Zuschauer auch gern unter dieser Mailadresse stellen können: DIE-MACHT-UM-ACHT@KENFM.DE. So können sie helfen, die alternative Nachrichten-Sendung besser zu machen. Unterstütze uns mit einem Abo: https://steadyhq.com/de/kenfm Dir gefällt unser Programm? Informationen zu weiteren Unterstützungsmöglichkeiten hier: https://kenfm.de/support/kenfm-unters... Abonniere jetzt den KenFM-Newsletter: https://kenfm.de/newsletter/ KenFM jetzt auch als kostenlose App für Android- und iOS-Geräte verfügbar! Über unsere Homepage kommt Ihr zu den Stores von Apple und Google. Hier der Link: https://kenfm.de/kenfm-app/ https://www.kenfm.de https://www.twitter.com/TeamKenFM https://www.instagram.com/kenfm.de/ https://www.youtube.com/KenFM https://www.instagram.com/kenfm.de/ See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Ouça os destaques internacionais desta terça-feira (18/02/20) no EstadãoSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The Department of Justice has been tossed into turmoil once again after Attorney General Bill Barr changed sentencing recommendations for Trump ally Roger Stone and after Barr gave an interview to ABC news saying that President Trump's constant tweets make it impossible for him to run the DOJ properly. Now, over 1,100 former DOJ officials are calling on Barr to resign. Ginger Gibson, political reporter for Reuters, joins us for this and also how democrats focus is increasingly turning to Michael Bloomberg and the money he is pouring into the race for President. Next, we are learning about how the CIA and NSA spied on both allies and enemies through a company they owned that made cryptography equipment. The company was called Crypto AG and sold its encryption machines to countries like Iran, India, Pakistan, countries in Latin America, and even the Vatican. What none of the countries knew was that the machines had been rigged by the CIA so they could easily break the codes that countries used to send encrypted messages. It was one of the most audacious operations run by the CIA and provided a wealth of intelligence for the U.S. Greg Miller, reporter for the Washington Post, joins us for more on Operation Rubicon. Learn more about your ad-choices at https://www.iheartpodcastnetwork.com

İlginç Zamanların Gündemi (12 -18 Şubat) | #71 (18 Şubat.2020) Bilal Eren ve Cem Sünbül ile teknoloji çağının haftalık gündemini her salı saat 22.00'da DijitalHayatTV YouTube/Facebook/Periscope/LinkedIn canlı yayınında değerlendiriyoruz; - 3D Yazıcıdan 48 Saatte Ev! - Münih Güvenlik Konferansı'nda Zuckerberg Ne Söyledi! - Etkinlik: Antalya Diplomasi Forumu - Rekabet Kurulu'ndan Google'a Ceza! - Barcelona Mobil Kongresi İptal! - Pentagon İhalesi Durdu! - Facebook Yalan Haber İçin Reuters İle Anlaştı! - Oyuncuları Savaşa Alet Eden Proje! - Crypto AG Skandalı! - Crypto AG, Türkiye'yi Dinlemiş mi? Başlıklarını konuştuk. Haftaya salı saat 22.00'da canlı yayında görüşmek üzere. Hem canlı hem de geçmiş yayınlarımız için tıklayın; YouTube: www.youtube.com/dijitalhayattv Facebook: www.facebook.com/dijitalhayattv Twitter: www.twitter.com/dijitalhayattv Web: www.dijitalhayat.tv

2e épisode de février 2020 Préambule Nous avons rencontré plusieurs problèmes d'enregistrement. Nous avons essayé de réduire le désagrément. Shameless plug Prochaines activités 27 février 2020 - QuebecSec - CVE-2020-0601 ‘Chain Of Fools' 10 mars 2020 - Sécurité de l'information 11 et 12 mars 2020 - Cloud & Cyber Security Expo 2020 (Londres) 26 mars - Colloque cybersécurité, fuite de données 26 Mars 2020- [Podcast Live QuebecSec] 10 Avril 2020 -Global Hackcess organise le sa 4ème édition d'un événement orienté Cybersécurité. Conférences et CTF dans la capitale du Vin, Bordeaux. Ils offrent en téléchargement un mini challenge pour vous donner un avant goût 16 au 26 avril – Semaine du numérique 20 avril 2020 - Québec Numérique - SéQCure Shownotes and Links Revente des données de Desjardins (40 000$) - Plus de 3 ans que le voleur voulait! LA nouvelle de la semaine: Hydro-Québec resserre ses mesures de sécurité informatique (!!!) Un couple de canadien expulsé d'un avion Huawei et le Canada : Canada's military wants Ottawa to ban Huawei from 5G Huawei backdoor access equipment Plusieurs attaques et fuites au gouvernement Nouvelle loi pour aider la fuite des données personnelles Emotet Evolves With new Wi-Fi Spreader Campagne de désinformation: UK police deny responsibility for poster urging parents to report kids for using Kali Linux Rapport IC3 du FBI U.S. indicts 4 Chinese military officials for role in Equifax hack Foreign hackers are targeting more US government agencies, NCSC report says La CIA et Crypto AG de suisse US Cyber Command, DHS, and FBI expose new North Korean malware Révision de votre plan de continuité des affaires: Coronavirus Raises New Business Continuity, Phishing Challenges for InfoSec Suivi en temps réel de la pandémie: Reconnaissance faciale (Start-Up) Fraudé, il poursuit Bell pour 98 300 $ Crew Nicolas-Loïc Fortin Vincent Groleau Steve Waterhouse Patrick R. Mathieu Crédits Montage audio par Intrasecure inc Music Terranigma “Groovin' Like a '90s Kid” par Jorito, Gnegon Galek, Juan Medrano via OverClocked ReMix Locaux virtuels par Jitsi

Ouça os destaques internacionais desta sexta-feira (14/02/20) no EstadãoSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Crypto AG, Part 3: The Truth Is RevealedAdvertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brands

Crypto AG - The Greatest Espionage Operation Ever, Part 1Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brands

Crypto AG, Part 2: The Death of Bo Jr.Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brands