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In this episode of "Orbital Convergence," join Brian Fox and Gordon Deng as they explore the evolution of software factories within the Department of Defense. They will dive into the origins of these initiatives, starting with Secretary of Defense Ash Carter's 2015 announcement that established the Defense Innovation Unit in Silicon Valley. Discover how active-duty service members are leveraging partnerships with commercial industries through programs to gain new skills outside traditional government paths. Brian and Gordon also discuss the challenges of driving real progress without relying on overused buzzwords and look at how industry collaboration continues to advance defense technology. Tune in to learn how the DOD is staying ahead by learning from the best in the commercial world.

American global leadership is due in great part to its innovators — visionaries who drive society beyond the preconceived limits. Historically, government-led initiatives like the Manhattan Project or the Apollo Project pushed boundaries. Today, too often, government lags behind technologically.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Katherine Boyle about American Dynamism, the spirit of pro-progress innovation, and how a new generation of Silicon Valley startups is spurring government to break out of its old habits.Boyle is a general partner at VC giant Andreessen Horowitz, having previously been a partner at General Catalyst and a general assignment reporter at The Washington Post. She primarily invests in national security, aerospace and defense, and public safety companies, among others.In This Episode* American Dynamism (1:25)* From software to the physical world (7:23)* Government collaboration: challenges & opportunities (11:29)* Playing the long-game in Washington (21:16)* Building the American Dream (24:35)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationAmerican Dynamism (1:25)Let's just start with a little bit of definition about American Dynamism. Broadly, what challenges or problems is this effort directed toward?It's a bit of a long story as to what American Dynamism is, how it arrived to be a category of innovation, but the short definition is American Dynamism is built for companies that support the national interest. So a very broad category of companies, everything from aerospace, defense, national security, companies that sell directly to the US government and to our allies, but also things like housing, education, transportation, infrastructure, things that are built in the physical world where Washington or states usually like to regulate those things.So one of the things that we saw in our own portfolio is that there are a lot of companies that we used to be classifying as “enterprise” or “consumer,” and really what they were were government companies because they had to interface with a regulator much earlier in their trajectory, or they saw government as a potential buyer of the product. So in cases of things like aerospace and defense, those are very obvious government buyers, but things like public safety, where we have companies like Flock Safety, for example, that started out selling to homeowners associations thinking they were a consumer company, but ultimately got extraordinary pull from local governments and from public safety officials because of how good the technology was. So the companies, in some ways, they were these N-of-One companies, really solving really important civic problems, but over time it became very clear that this was a growing category of technology.But the broader underlying thesis, I'd say, of where the movement came from, and when we really started seeing this as an area where founders, in particular, were excited to build, I think it did come out of “It's Time to Build,” my partner Mark Andreessen's canonical post where he basically said during Covid that we have to be able to build things in the physical world. And there was sort of this realization that technology has solved many, many problems in the digital realm that I think, in some ways, the last 15 years of the Silicon Valley technology story has really been about changes in consumer technology or changes in the workplace, but now we're finally seeing the need for changes in government and civic goods, and there's just an extraordinary amount of momentum from young founders who really want to build for their country, build for the needs of the citizenry.Does it change what you do, or maybe the kinds of expertise that are needed, to think about these things as a category, rather than different companies scattered in these other kinds of categories. Thinking of them as like, “Oh, there's some sort of commonality,” how is that helpful for you?The thing that's interesting is that there's sort of a “yes” and “no” part to that question. The yes is that the founders are coming from different places. So the companies that have led to this sort of, I would say, extraordinary wealth of engineering talent where people are not afraid to tackle these problems, there's a handful of the companies that have scaled: it's companies like SpaceX, companies like Palantir, where, 20 years ago, they were banging their heads against the wall trying to figure out, “How do we sell to government?” In many cases, they had to sue the government in order to be able to sell and compete against the larger incumbents that have been around for, in many cases, 50, 70 years. But now you have these talented engineers who've sort of seen those playbooks, both in terms of, they understand what good engineering looks like, they understand the pace of innovation, how quickly you have to bring new products to market, and they also understand that you have to be in touch with your customer, constantly iterating.And so you now have companies that have scaled in these categories where there is this nice thing that happens in Silicon Valley, and I always say it's a mark of a really successful company when three, four, five years into the journey, you start seeing the early people at that company say, “Well, I want to solve this problem,” or “I want to go be a founder, myself,” and they start building more companies. So I think that, in some ways, the natural order of how Silicon Valley progresses, in terms of, do you need to have different expertise, or are there different talent pools? Yes, they're coming from different companies, but it's the same story of Silicon Valley Dynamism, which is, someone comes in, I always joke, they go to the University of Elon Musk and they learn how to manufacture, and then they say, “Well, actually, I don't want to just work on rockets anymore, I'd like to work on nuclear.” And so then you have companies like Radiant Nuclear that have spun out of SpaceX several years ago that are building in a totally different category for the built world, but have that sort of manufacturing expertise, that engineering expertise, and also know what it's like to work in a highly regulated environment.Does it require a different expertise, then, to advise these companies because of that government interface?I think in some ways it does, yes, the types of people who are investing in this category, maybe there's a number of investors where they got their start at Palantir, for example, or they understand the early journey of SpaceX. But at the same time, the thing that I think has been most surprising to us is just how quickly this movement caught on among the broader Silicon Valley ecosystem. And I think that's a very good thing, because, at its core, these are software companies in many cases. Yes, they're building hardware, but software is the lever that's allowing these companies to scale. So you are seeing the traditional venture capital firms that used to say, “Oh, I would never touch anything that is operating in the physical world,” or the meme you had five years ago, which is, “You'll never be able to sell anything to the US government, I'm not wasting my money there.” You've seen a complete 180 in the Silicon Valley ecosystem in terms of venture firms where they're now willing to take bets on these types of companies.And you're also seeing, there's a number of founders where their first company, for example, might've done very well, and it might've just been pure software, or in a consumer enterprise, sort of a more classical Silicon Valley domain, and now you're seeing those founders say, “Actually, I want to build for the civic need. I want to build for the national interests. These are issues I care about.” And so you're seeing those founders actually decide to build in the category and team up with founders who maybe have a little bit more experience in government, or maybe have a little more experience in terms of how they're building in the physical world.From software to the physical world (7:23)That period you referred to, which seems like a lot of what Silicon Valley was doing with the first 15 years or so of this century: they're doing internet, social media, very consumer-facing. How valuable was that period? Because that is a period that, here in Washington, is much criticized as trivial, “Why wasn't Silicon Valley solving these huge problems like we did in the '60s?” Again, there were some critics who just looked at it as a waste of brainpower. To what extent is that a fair criticism, and do you think, is that unfair? That stuff was valuable, people valued the kinds of products that were producedYou would actually be better able to speak to this than me, but I'll say, the graph or the chart that's going viral today, as we speak, is the comparison of 2009 US GDP versus Eurozone GDP, which were roughly equal in 2009, coming right off the Great Recession, to today, which I actually think it was tweeted something like, I think it's. . .  the US is 77 percent greater in terms of GDP than the Eurozone countries, which means that, for some reason, the Silicon Valley ecosystem — and it is largely attributed to Silicon Valley. When I first wrote the thesis on American Dynamism, I looked actually at 1996, because it was 25 years when I published it, but 1996, if you looked at the top US companies by market cap, all six of them were outside of technology as an ecosystem. They were energy companies, I would say almost archaic industries that had grown over a long period of time, but if you look at those six companies today, they are all tech companies. And so something has happened in the 21st century. You could say the new American Century is actually built off the back of software. It's built off of these large tech companies that were built in California, in many cases. And so the 15-year period that you're talking about, which is this sort of, it was a zero-interest-rate environment, cost of capital was very low, there was a lot of experimentation going on, it was, in many ways, the canonical example of American Dynamism broadly, that you had risk capital going after many new ideas in many different areas, but they were particularly really focused on the areas that government was not interested in regulating.And that's always been the theme of innovation in Silicon Valley is, “Let's go where they're not necessarily paying attention.” Maybe you had some one-offs in terms of, you'll always have to meet with your regulator at some point—in the case of Uber or Airbnb—but these companies were really born of the needs that founders understood. They were built off the back of a platform shift in terms of, 2007, 2008, the iPhone becomes the thing that everyone wants to build on, it becomes the mobile era. And so you really did have this focus of software, and enterprise software, and consumer, and companies were able to grow to extraordinary heights. And if you just look at what it has done for US GDP in comparison to even something like Europe, it is really extraordinary. So that is a story that I think we should be celebrating and telling.But what has happened, I think, since Covid is this new shift, which is, we've explored many of the digital frontiers that we can. And of course there's always a new digital frontier. Every time we think it's over, we get hit with a new one — in the case of AI. But the thing that I think has really changed is that entrepreneurs now are not afraid of the physical world, and they are realizing — and I hate to use the word “inevitable,” but in some ways this is an inevitability — that you are going to have to interface with government at a certain point if you are going to build in the physical world. And there are so many opportunities, there are so many different places where founders can build, that that really did take on new meeting post- this slew of black swan events, in the case of Covid, and then of course Russia invaded Ukraine, where I think it did wake up a lot of founders who said, “I want to work on these really hard problems.” And thankfully we have companies that have scaled during that time, that have trained these manufacturing capabilities, they've trained engineers how to do these things. So it is our view that that 15-year period was extraordinary for software, but the next 10 years are going to be extraordinary for these American Dynamism companies, as well.Government collaboration: challenges & opportunities (11:29)When you talk about interfacing with government, what popped into my head was a bit of video of a congressional hearing, and they were trying to decide, do we want to bring the private sector and SpaceX into the space program, and so not just have it be a government effort by NASA? And I just remember these senators just lambasting the idea. And I think they might've brought in some astronauts, too. And if I was interested in interfacing with government and I had seen that video, I'm like, “Boy, oh boy, I hope the attitude of government has changed since then, because it seems like that's a wall.” What is the attitude on the other side? You said the attitude of the entrepreneurs has changed, of funders, but what about on the other side? What is the openness to the kinds of solutions that your companies are presenting?I think it's changed because it has to, and I always point to the late former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, who in 2015 started DIUx [Defense Innovation Unit Experimental] as an innovation unit for the DoD [Department of Defense], recognizing that there's a talent problem that US government has had; and it didn't start in the last 10 years. When I was exploring this talent problem, I actually realized that there had been a commission on the lack of talent going into the bureaucracy at the federal level.In the 1990s, Paul Volcker actually chaired the commission, it was called a “Quiet Crisis.” Basically that young people today, unlike in the '50s and the '60s where government was seen as this extraordinary job that you could have or that you could go into one of these companies and work in a company for 30 years and then draw a pension, that young people today want to go work in the private sector, and the growth and dynamism of the private sector has actually been an issue for government, and that is not a new issue. It was explored in the late '80s, early '90s, and it has gotten precipitously worse because of tech. I would say that the technological innovation risk capital going to Silicon Valley and saying, “We're going to fund young people as they come out of college because they understand this new type of engineering.” You're seeing some of the best and brightest young people decide not to go to traditional companies, which has been a huge issue for the prime contractors that supply 40 percent of the government programs for the DoD, but what has happened is you're seeing this extraordinary engineering talent go to startups. And so I think what even — this is 10 years ago now — DIU saw, if all of our best and brightest software talent is avoiding government, or much of it is avoiding government, they're avoiding traditional companies that we work with, we have to meet them where they are.And so the DoD I actually think was the first government organization to really recognize this crisis and to decide, we're going to need to have new interfaces. Now, whether that means new procurement, that's always going to be a debate, and that's a Washington issue that I think we've been fighting for several years now in order to change how these companies are able to work with the DoD on these big programs, but I think even just recognizing that this was an issue 10 years ago was a huge step for government.And over time now, we've seen a handful of what we would call “defense 1.0” companies, in terms of startups, many of them kind of built off the back of a company like SpaceX, now realizing that you can build for USG [US Government], you can build hardware-software hybrid that you can then sell into production contracts, and it's companies like Anduril that were started in 2017 when people said, “This is impossible to do. You're never going to be able to sell to USG,” and this year was chosen for a massive program, the CCA [Collaborative Combat Aircraft] program with the Air Force, over many prime contractors.And so I think that is the story now that Silicon Valley has seen, and I always joke that, particularly investors and founders, they really only need to see a handful of winners to know that something is a category, and so you're going to see more and more of these companies being founded, scaling, and I think that circuitous cycle and that virtuous cycle actually leads more to the DoD saying, “Okay, this is a real ecosystem now.” It's not as risky to take a chance on a startup, which is what government is always worried about, if we take a chance on anything innovative, are we going to look foolish? And so I think, in some ways, you are seeing the government respond to what's happened in the private sector, but this is not something that's a year old, two years old, or three years old, this is something that's been talked about for almost 10 years now, and of course SpaceX now is an over-20-year-old company.Is this still primarily a Defense Department-focused effort? Are there other areas of government who are looking at what's happening with DoD and they're drawing lessons? How diverse of an effort has this become?We see this across every sector that government cares about. So it's not just defense, it's aerospace, it's energy, it's logistics, it's transportation. We always joke, if there is a department in Washington that exists to regulate a sector, that is American Dynamism, and you are seeing innovation in those sectors. But it's happening at different rates. I'd say the DoD is one of the largest spenders. The largest private US company right now is SpaceX, so there's success in those categories, so you're seeing a lot of interest in it now, but then there's companies in public safety. That's an area where I think there's just been an extraordinary explosion of innovation in the last few years, largely driven by the fact that there is a labor crisis happening in public safety across America, but it is a different sale, it's not selling to federal government, selling to state and local.One of our companies, Flock Safety, which I mentioned at the beginning of our chat, they now are involved in solving 10 percent of vehicular crimes in America.What do they do?So, it's a great story about a company that was founded in Atlanta in 2017, and they built a very small modular license plate reader that only tracks cars, not people, and started building for homeowners associations with the recognition that most crimes in America are committed with a car, and so if you can put these in areas of high traffic, areas to augment the work of law enforcement, crime will go down. And they started selling to homeowners associations and immediately got pull around Atlanta and suburban Atlanta from police chiefs who said, “I need 10 of these in areas where we don't have enough people who can look at different areas.”So now this company is operating across America, they're in all 50 states, and what's extraordinary about what they've been able to do as a technology company, just putting up cameras in different sectors and following cars, is one of the hardest problems for law enforcement is when a car that has committed at theft or — one of the most extraordinary stories they've told us recently was there was a young girl kidnapped, a young child kidnapped in Atlanta, and the car went into a different county. And so when that happens, for law enforcement it's often one of the most difficult things, if a car goes into a different county, to do data sharing across these places. But if you have a network of cameras that can track the car, you find that kidnapped child, or you find that stolen vehicle much, much faster. In many ways, catching the cars at the moment where they've moved from county to county has actually solved one of the bigger data issues that law enforcement has.What's interesting about this example — and it provides a nice lead-in to my next question — is, in that situation, the solution wasn't to help the various databases communicate better, it was a completely different sort of solution. So, are what these companies doing — it seems like what they're not doing is taking existing operations and improving efficiency, but providing a new way to approach the problem that they're trying to tackle.Yes. And what's incredible about that story is it was not started as a company that was supposed to support law enforcement. It was started for homeowners associations, it was a consumerization of a civic problem. And I think that's what's really interesting is, one of the biggest issues, and this is why I think you're now seeing really interesting technology companies enter government at all levels is, you have a population that has grown up with consumer technology now. So as the boomers retire, the boomers remember what it was like to be in government, or to be in office places without Zoom, without the consumer internet, and without the things that make life much easier and tangible, as those people retire, you have young people demanding, “We have to use better technology.”And so the solutions are not, “Okay, let's iterate on the existing systems that we've used for the last 10 or 20 years,” it's, “Why can't my experience when I walk into my job in government feel exactly the same way that it does when I walk into my home and I experience the consumerization of everything around me?”So I think that is part of it, that you have this millennial generation that's now coming into leadership. In many cases, you have people who don't necessarily remember the world before the internet or didn't have formative experiences in the workplace or in government before the internet. And that is shaping and reshaping all of how government functions, and likely will for the next 20 years. The thing that, especially when we talk about the Department of Defense and the warfighter, the thing that has always been tragic is that you have more technology in your phone than you do when you go onto the battlefield. And so I think there's this understanding that young people are demanding to have the same level of technology and the same ease-of-use in all aspects of governance, in all aspects of civic goods.Playing the long-game in Washington (21:16)You seem like a very upbeat, positive person. My experience as people from Silicon Valley — or now, in your case, from Miami, a new startup hotbed — they come through Washington, they bring that optimism with them, then after a few days of dealing with people on Capitol Hill, the optimism is drained out of them, they go back shells of their former selves, because if you've dealt with a lot of people on Capitol Hill and staffers, what they're really good at saying is, “That will never pass . . . that will take 20 years . . . three of my predecessors worked on it, it didn't work . . .” How have you been able to maintain a fairly upbeat attitude, given that this is the world that your companies have to deal with?I agree with you that one of the biggest problems that we see, and which we joke about, is that the only reason why people in Silicon Valley 10 years ago were going to Washington was to apologize for the things that they did. They would get hauled in front of Congress, say they're sorry, and so I think what we've seen in these sectors, in particular, is it's a specific type of founder and person who knows that this is very mission-driven. They are called to build these companies. They care about these companies. They're passionate about the national interest. And so they know they have to go to Washington repeatedly, and I think some of the mistakes that, say, founders who had no exposure to Washington, or have no exposure to regulated industries, when they would go to Washington, they'd say, okay, maybe I go once a year, shake some hands, it's kind of fun, and then I go back and I build, and they would be surprised when they got nowhere. And of course, I think that the most sophisticated companies recognize that they have to learn to play the game that Washington cares about. And there is a totally different culture in Washington, there's a totally different set of incentives. I say it's really the difference between, Silicon Valley is a positive-sum culture: Everyone helps everyone, knowing that the pie can always get bigger, and you always want a piece of that bigger pie as it's growing, and so the more things that you're doing, the better. It's why we have this beautiful angel investing network. It's why we have all of these things that make no sense to people in Washington where it's elections, where 10,000 votes in a state could decide the election, and it's a zero-sum game, and that is what decides who is in office and who is in think tanks. And so it's a very different way of thinking about things.The thing that I think has changed the most about Silicon Valley is recognizing, we might not be good at zero-sum games and zero-sum thinking, but that is the people that we are interfacing with, and we need to understand their incentive systems when they decide to make a purchasing decision, when they decide whether they're going to vote on a bill in a certain way, when they think about, what do their constituents care about back home in a place that has nothing to do with Silicon Valley or California. So I think that level of empathy for what Washington does, which is very different than what Silicon Valley does, is important.Is it hard to stay optimistic? There are times where you're banging your head against the wall, we're on very short time horizons, Washington can go in perpetuity doing what it does without necessarily seeing much change. But having those points of connection, and constantly having the conversation, and recognizing that it is a long game and not a short game, I think has been very beneficial, and now there are success stories: Palantir, Anduril, Shield AI, these companies that have been around for 10 years now, that have really shown that it is possible to do good work and to support the needs of the DoD, and to speak the language of the DoD, as well, I think has really led to this next generation of founders understanding what they need to do to be successful as well.Building the American Dream (24:35)What kind of world are you trying to create? I'm sure it's intellectually challenging, I'm sure it's well-paying, but, fundamentally, why are you doing this? And I would think it's to create some world that is better than the one we're currently living. What is the world you're trying to create?I think there is a recognition post-Covid, in particular, for a lot of young people, a lot of engineers, that things were broken, things are broken in this country. The physical world has not kept up with the digital world, and there's been extraordinary changes, technology is moving as fast as it possibly can, and a lot of the things that people care the most about have been left out of that story: Education, which is something we haven't necessarily talked about yet, but education needs to be completely transformed in an era where technology is at our fingertips and where people who are good at learning learn faster than they ever possibly could, and people who are not good at learning don't, and so you have a disparity between those people.But there's an extraordinary amount of change that has happened in the last 25 years where the things that American citizens care most about have not changed in the way that they need to keep up with, again, the changes in the consumer internet and what we've seen in the enterprise.And so the story of, how do we make America strong? How do we continue to be the most dynamic country in the world? How do we make sure that all American citizens and the things they care about most in terms of the American Dream are part of that story? I think that is something that the founders who work in American Dynamism care deeply about. They recognize, and I always point this out, but there are so many founders now who are working at companies like Anduril, like Saronic, where they don't necessarily even remember September 11th — they weren't old enough — but they care deeply about the idea that America needs to be a strong country, and that we need to have a mode of deterrence, and we need to have a strong national defense that keeps America the most dynamic country so that people can build inside of it. The same thing with recognizing that there needs to be changes in housing, needs to be changes in education, these are things that were part of the American Dream when our parents were growing up and feel a little bit distant for a lot of other young people growing up today. So I think there is a recognition that technology has to be a part of those big sectors in order to support the American Dream that many of us grew up with and that many of us aspire to.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

℠2015 – Secretary of Defense Ash Carter met with servicemembers at Naval Air Station Sigonella, Italy as a part of his five-day trip to Europe. Secretary Carter discussed the Defense Department's transition to a more complex mission set and the role Europe-based troops will play in future operations.

℠2015 – Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen. Paul Selva, hosted a remembrance ceremony at the Pentagon Memorial in honor of those who paid the ultimate sacrifice in the 9/11 terrorist attack.

℠2015 – Secretary of Defense Ash Carter discusses the importance of the U.S. – Japan defense cooperation guidelines

Chris Li, director of research of the Asia-Pacific Initiative and fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, leads the conversation on U.S. strategy in East Asia. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to today's session of the Winter/Spring 2023 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR.  Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic, if you would like to share it with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.  We're delighted to have Chris Li with us to discuss U.S. strategy in East Asia. Mr. Li is director of research of the Asia-Pacific Initiative, and a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, where he focuses on U.S.-China relations, Asia-Pacific security, and technology competition. Previously, he was research assistant to Graham Allison in the Avoiding Great Power War Project, and coordinator of the China Working Group, where he contributed to the China Cyber Policy Initiative and the Technology and Public Purpose Project, led by former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter.  Chris, thanks very much for being with us today. I thought we could begin with you giving us your insights and analysis of the Biden administration's foreign policy strategy in East Asia, specifically vis-à-vis China.  LI: Great. Well, first of all, thanks, Irina, for the invitation. I'm really looking forward to the conversation and also to all the questions from members of the audience and, in particular, all the students on this seminar. So I thought I'd start very briefly with just an overview of how the Biden administration's strategy in the Indo-Pacific has shaped up over the last two years, two and a half years. What are the key pillars? And essentially, now that we're about halfway through the first term—or, you know, if there is a second term—but President Biden's first term, where things are going to go moving forward?  So as many you are probably familiar, Secretary of State Tony Blinken laid out essentially the core tenets of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, of which China, of course, is a focal centerpiece. And he did so in his speech last summer at the Asia Society, where he essentially described the relationship between the U.S. and China as competitive where it should be, cooperative where it can be, and adversarial where it must be. So sort of three different pillars: competition, cooperation, a sort of balance between the two. And in terms of the actual tenets of the strategy, the framing was three pillars—invest, align, and complete.  And so briefly, just what that meant according to Secretary Blinken was really investing in sources of American strength at home. Renewing, for example, investment in technology, investment in STEM education, infrastructure, and many of the policies that actually became known as Build Back Better, a lot of the domestic spending packages that President Biden proposed, and some of which has been passed. So that first pillar was invest sort of in order to o compete with China, we need to first renew our sources of American strength and compete from a position of strength.  The second element was “align.” And in this—in this pillar, I think this is where the Biden administration has really distinguished itself from the Trump administration. Many folks say, well, the Biden administration's China policy or its Asia policy is really just Trump 2.0 but with a little bit—you know, with essentially a nicer tone to it. But I think there is a difference here. And I think the Biden administration's approach has really focused on aligning with both traditional security partners—our allies, our alliances with countries like the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines—but also invigorating those nontraditional partnerships, with India, for example.   I think another part of this strategy, another part of this dimension, has also been reinvigorating U.S. presence and U.S. leadership, really, in multilateral organizations. Not only, for example, taking the Quad and reestablishing some of the leader-level summits, the ministerials, proposing, for example, a COVID cooperation regime among new members of the Quad, but also establishing newer frameworks. So, for example, as many of you have read about, I'm sure, AUKUS, this trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. when it comes to sharing of nuclear submarine technology. That's been a new proposed policy. And I think we're about to see an update from the administration in the next couple of weeks.  And even with elements of the region that have been unappreciated and perhaps under-focused on. For example, the Solomon Islands was the focal point of some attention last year, and you've seen the administration propose the Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative, which seeks to establish greater cooperation among some of the Pacific Island nations. And there was actually a summit hosted by President Biden last fall with leaders of the Pacific Island countries. So that alignment piece I think has really been significant as a cornerstone of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy.  The third element, of course, competition, I think is the most evident. And we've seen this from some of the executive orders on semiconductors, the restrictions on advanced chips, to elements of trade, to even sort of advocacy for human rights and greater promotion of democracy. You saw the Summit for Democracy, which has been a pillar of the administration's foreign policy agenda. So that's basically what they've done in the last two and a half years.  Now, in terms of where that's actually brought us, I think I'll make four observations. The first is that, unlike the Biden—unlike the Trump administration, where most of the policy pronouncements about the People's Republic of China had some tinge of inducing change in China—that was the phrase that Secretary Pompeo used in a speech on China policy—I think the Biden administration largely has said: The assumption and the premise of all of our policy toward China is based on the idea that the U.S. government does not seek fundamentally to change the Chinese government, the Chinese regime, the leadership, the administration, the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.  So that is both a markedly important difference, but it's also a part of the strategy that I believe remains ambiguous. And here, the problem is, you know, invest, align, and compete, competitive coexistence, where does that all actually take us? And I think this is where analysts in the strategic community and think tank world have said, well, it's great to invest, of course. You know, there's bipartisan support. Alignment with partners and allies is, of course, a pretty uncontroversial, for the most part, approach. And competition is, I think, largely a consensus view in Washington, D.C. But where does this actually take us?  You know, for all of its criticisms, the Trump administration did propose a specific end state or an end objective. And I think the Biden administration has just sort of said, well, it's about coexisting. It's about just assuming to manage the relationship. I think there are, of course, valid merits to that approach. And on an intellectual level, the idea is that because this is not necessarily a Cold War 2.0, in the words of the Biden administration, we're not going to have an end state that is ala the Cold War—in essence a sort of victory or demise, you know, the triumph of capitalism over communism, et cetera. In fact, it's going to be a persistent and sustained rivalry and competition. And in order to harness a strategy, we essentially need to manage that competition.   So I think that's—it's an intellectually coherent idea, but I think one of the ambiguities surrounding and one of the criticisms that has been proposed is that there is no clear end state. So we compete, we invest, we align, but to what end? Do we just keep—does the administration continue to tighten up and enhance alliances with partners and allies, and then to what end? What happens next? And sort of where does this lead us—leave us in ten years from now? So I think that's the first comment I'll make about the approach to the Indo-Pacific.  The second is that one of the tenets, of course, as I describe, is this compartmentalization of compete, cooperate. In essence, you know, we will compete—we, being the United States—with China on issues of technology, issues of economics, but we will also cooperate on areas of shared concern—climate change, nonproliferation. I think what you've seen is that while the Biden administration has proposed this idea, we can split—we can cooperate on one hand and also compete on the other—the People's Republic of China, the Chinese government, has largely rejected that approach.   Where you've seen statements from senior officials in China that have said, essentially, we will not cooperate with you, the United States, until you first cease all of the behavior, all of the negative policies that we don't like. In essence, if you will continue to sell arms to Taiwan, if you continue, the United States, to restrict semiconductors, to crackdown on espionage, to conduct military exercises in the region, then forget about any potential cooperation on climate, or forget about any cooperation on global health, et cetera.   So in essence, being able to tie the two compartments together has prevented a lot of what the Biden administration has sought to achieve. And we've seen that very clearly with Special Envoy John Kerry and his relentless efforts to conduct climate diplomacy. And I think largely—for example, last summer in the aftermath of Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, you saw a lot of those collaborative efforts essentially derailed. That's the second comment I'll make, which is while this approach, again, logically to most Americans would seem sound, it's actually met a lot of resistance because the Chinese reaction to it is not necessarily the same.  The third is I think we've seen increasingly, even though there has been an increased alignment since the Trump administration with allies and partners, there's still a degree of hedging among countries in the region. And that makes sense because from the perspectives of many of those leaders of countries in the region, the United States is a democratic country. We have an election coming up in 2024. And there's no guarantee that the next president, if President Biden is no longer the president in 2024 or even in 2028, will continue this policy.   And I think all of you, as observers of American politics, know the degree to which American politics has become largely one that is dysfunctional, is almost schizophrenic in a way. And so one would imagine that if you are a leader of a country in the Asian-Pacific region, to support the Biden administration's engagement, but also to maintain a degree of strategic autonomy, as this is often called. And so what I think we'll continue to see and what will be interesting to watch is how middle powers, how other countries resident in the region approach the United States in terms of—(inaudible). I think India will be key to watch, for example. Its defense relationship with the United States has increased over the years, but yet it still has close interests with respect to China.  The final comment I'll make is that on the military dimension I think this is another area of concern, where the Biden administration has said that one of its priorities is creating guardrails, constructing guardrails to manage the potential escalation in the event of an accident, or a miscommunication, miscalculation that could quickly spiral into a crisis. And we needn't—we need not look farther than the 2001 Hainan incident to think of an example, which was a collision between a(n) EP-3 aircraft and a Chinese intelligence plane. And that led to a diplomatic standoff.  And so I think the United States government is very keen on creating dialogue between militaries, risk reduction mechanisms, crisis management mechanisms. But I think they've encountered resistance, again, from the People's Republic of China, because the perspective there is that much of the U.S. behavior in the region militarily is invalid, is illegitimate. You know, the Chinese government opposes, for example, U.S. transits through the Taiwan Strait. So the idea therefore that they would engage and essentially deconflict and manage risk is sort of legitimizing American presence there militarily. And so we've encountered that obstacle as well.  So I think going forward on all four elements, we're going to continue to see adjustment. And I think, as students, as researchers, I think these are four areas where there's fertile room for discussion, for debate, for analysis, for looking at history. And I look forward to a conversation. Hopefully, many of you have ideas as well because there's no monopoly on wisdom and there are many creative proposals to be discussed. So I look forward to questions. I'll stop there.  FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Thank you, Chris. That was great. Now we're going to go to all of you.  (Gives queuing instructions.)  Our first written question comes from Grace Wheeler. I believe a graduate student at the University of West Florida. Kissinger proposed the future of China-U.S. relations be one of coevolution instead of confrontation. Is it still realistically possible for the future of China-U.S. relations to be one of cooperation instead of confrontation?  LI: So terrific question. Thank you for the question. It's a very interesting idea. And I think Henry Kissinger, who I know has long been involved with the Council on Foreign Relations, has produced through his many decades,strategic frameworks and new ways of thinking about cardinal challenges to geopolitics. I have not yet actually understood or at least examined specifically what the concrete pillars of coevolution entail. My understanding on a general level is that it means, essentially, the United States and the People's Republic of China adjust and sort of mutually change their policies to accommodate each other. So a sort of mutual accommodation over time to adjust interests in a way that prevent conflict.  I think on the face—of course, that sounds—that sounds very alluring. That sounds like a terrific idea. I think the problem has always been what would actually this look like in implementation? So for example, on the issue of Taiwan, this is an issue where the Chinese government has said: There is no room for compromise. You know, the refrain that they repeat is: Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. It is part of sovereignty. And there is no room for compromise. This is a red line. So if that's the case, there's not really, in my view, much room for evolution on this issue, for example. And it's an intractable problem.  And so I don't necessarily know how to apply the Kissinger framework to specific examples. And, but, you know, I do think it's something worth considering. And, you know, I would encourage you and others on this call to think about, for example, how that framework might actually be adapted. So I think it's an interesting idea, but I would—I think the devil's in the details. And essentially, to think about how this would be applied to specific issues—South China Sea, human rights, trade—would be the key to unpacking this concept.  I think the second part of your question was, is cooperation possible? And again, I think, as I stated in my remarks, the Biden administration publicly says—publicly asserts that they do seek to maintain a space for cooperation in climate, in nonproliferation, in global health security. I think, again, what we've encountered is that the Chinese government's view is that unless the United States ceases behavior that it deems detrimental to its own interests, it will not pursue any discussion of cooperation.   And so I think that's the problem we're facing. And so I think there are going to be discussions going forward on, well, given that, how do we then balance the need for cooperation on climate, in pandemics, with, for example, also concerns about security, concerns about military activity, concerns about Taiwan, et cetera? And I think this is the daily stuff of, of course, the conversations among the Biden administration and senior leadership. So personally, my view, is I hope cooperation is possible, of course. I think there are shared issues, shared vital interests, between the two countries and, frankly, among the global community, that require the U.S. and China to be able to work out issues. But I'm personally not optimistic that under this current framework, this paradigm, there will be a significant space open for cooperation.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. Going next to Hamza Siddiqui, a raised hand.   Q: Thank you. Hi. I'm Hamza Siddiqui, a student from Minnesota State University, Mankato.   And I actually had two questions. The first was: What kind of role does the U.S. envision Southeast Asian states—especially like the Philippines and Vietnam—playing in their U.S. strategy when it comes to Asia-Pacific security issues, specifically? And the second is that for the last few years there's been some discussion about Japan and South Korea being formally invited to join the Five Eyes alliance. And I wanted to get your take on that. What do you think are the chances that a formal invitation would be extended to them? Thank you.  LI: Great. Thank you for the question. Two terrific questions.  So, first, on the role of countries in Southeast Asia, I think that under the Biden administration they have continued to play an increasing degree of importance. So you've seen, for example, even in the Philippines, which you cited, I think just last month Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made a visit there. And in the aftermath of the visit, he announced a new basing agreement. I haven't reviewed the details specifically, and I'm not a Philippines expert, but in short my understanding is that there is going to be renewed American presence—expanded American presence, actually, in the region.   And the Philippines, just based on their geostrategic location, is incredibly important in the Indo-Pacific region. So I think that the administration is very active in enhancing cooperation on the defense element, but also on the political and economic side as well. So with the Quad, for example, in India, you've seen cooperation on elements of economics as well, and technology. I think there's an initiative about digital cooperation too. So I think the answer is increasingly an important role.   On Japan and Korea, there have, of course, been discussions over the years about expanding the Five Eyes intelligence alliance to other countries in Asia as well. My assessment is that that's probably unlikely to occur in a formal way in the near term. But I could be wrong. And that assessment is primarily based on the fact that the countries that currently are part of the Five Eyes agreement share certain elements of linguistic convergence. They all speak English. There are certain longstanding historical ties that those countries have. And I think that to necessarily expand—or, to expand that existing framework would probably require a degree of bureaucratic sort of rearrangement that might be quite difficult, or quite challenging, or present obstacles.  I think what you will see, though, is enhanced security cooperation, for sure. And we've seen that even with Japan, for example, announcing changes to its military, its self-defense force, and increased defense spending as well in the region. So I think that is a trend that will continue.  FASKIANOS: Next question I'm taking from Sarah Godek, who is a graduate student at the University of Michigan.   What do guardrails look like, from a Chinese perspective? Thinking how China's foreign ministry has consistently put out lists of demands for the U.S. side, I'm wondering how guardrails are formulated by Wang Yi and others.  LI: Great. Thanks for the question.  So I guess I'll step back first and talk about what guardrails, in my view, actually entail. So I think the idea here is that in the event of a crisis—and, most of the time, crises are not planned. (Laughs.) Most of the time, crises, you know, occur as a result of an accident. For example, like the 2001 incident. But an accidental collision in the South China Sea between two vessels, the collision accidentally of two planes operating in close proximity. And as Chinese and American forces operate in closer proximity and increasing frequency, we do have that risk.   So I think, again, the idea of a guardrail that essentially, in the military domain, which is what I'm speaking about, entails a mechanism in place such that in the event of an accident or a crisis, there are ways based on that mechanism to diffuse that crisis, or at least sort of stabilize things before the political leadership can work out a solution. In essence, to prevent escalation because of a lack of dialogue. And I think for those of you who've studied history, you know that many wars, many conflicts have occurred not because one power, one state decides to launch a war. That has occurred. But oftentimes, because there is an accident, an accidental collision. And I think many wars have occurred this way.  So the idea of a guardrail therefore, in the military domain, is to create, for example, channels of communication that could be used in the event of a conflict. I think the easiest parallel to imagine is the U.S. and the Soviet Union, where there were hotlines, for example, between Moscow and between Washington, D.C. during that era, where the seniormost national security aides of the presidents could directly reach out to each other in the event of a crisis.   In the China context, what has been difficult is some of those channels exist. For example, the National Security Council Coordinator for Asia Kurt Campbell has said publicly: We have hotlines. The problem is that when the Americans pick up the phone and call, no one picks up on the other side. And in short, you know, having just the structure, the infrastructure, is insufficient if those infrastructure are not being used by the other side.   I think with respect to the U.S.-China context, probably, again, as I mentioned earlier, the largest obstacle is the fact that guardrails help the United States—or, in the Chinese perspective—from the Chinese perspective, any of these guardrails would essentially allow the U.S. to operate with greater confidence that, in the event of an accident, we will be able to control escalation. And from the Chinese perspective, they argue that because the United States fundamentally shouldn't be operating in the Taiwan Strait anyway, therefore by constructing that guardrail, by, for example, having dialogue to manage that risk, it would be legitimizing an illegitimate presence in the first place.   So that's always been perennially the problem. And I think the argument that the United States has made is that, well, sure, that may be your position. But it is in your interest as well not to have an accident spiral into a conflict. And so I think we've seen not a lot of progress on this front. I think, for example, in the aftermath of Speaker Pelosi's visit, there—you know, a lot of the defense cooperation ties were suspended.   But the last comment I'll make is that that doesn't necessarily mean that all dialogue has been stayed. There are still active channels between the United States and China. We have embassies in each other's countries. From public remarks, it seems like during moments of enhanced tension there are still ways for both governments to communicate with each other. So I think the good news is that it's not completely like the two countries aren't speaking to each other, but I think that there are not as many channels for reducing risk, managing potential crises, in the military sphere that exist today, that probably should exist.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Michael Long. Let's see. You need to unmute yourself.  LI: It looks like he's dropped off.  FASKIANOS: It looks like he put down his hand. OK. So let's go next to Conor O'Hara.  Q: Hi. My name is Conor O'Hara. And I'm a graduate student at the Pepperdine University School of Public Policy.  In one of my classes, titled America's Role in the World, we often talk about how America really does not have a comprehensive understanding of China. Not only China's military and state department, but really China as a society. How can Americans change that? And where does America need to focus its efforts in understanding China? And then also, one other thing I think of, is, you know, where does that understanding begin? You know, how early in someone's education or really within, say, the United States State Department do we need to focus our efforts on building an understanding? Thank you.  LI: Great. Well, thanks for the question. It's a great question. Very hard challenge as well.  I think that's absolutely true. I think the degree of understanding of China—of actually most countries—(laughs)—around the world—among senior U.S. foreign policy practitioners, I think, is insufficient. I think particularly with respect to China, and also Asia broadly, much of the diplomatic corps, the military establishment, intelligence officers, many of those people have essentially cut their teeth over the last twenty-five years focusing on the Middle East and counterterrorism. And that makes sense because the United States was engaged in two wars in that region.  But going back farther, many of the national security professionals before that generation were focused on the Soviet Union, obviously because of the Cold War. And so really, you're absolutely correct that the number of people in the United States government who have deep China expertise academically or even professionally on the ground, or even have the linguistic ability to, you know, speak Mandarin, or other countries—or, languages of other countries in East Asia, I think is absolutely limited. I think the State Department, of course, has—as well as the intelligence community, as well as the Department of Defense—has tried to over the last few years reorient and rebalance priorities and resources there. But I think it's still—my understanding, today it's still limited. And I think there's a lot of work to be done.  I think your question on how do you understand China as a society, I think with any country, number one, of course, is history. You know, every country's politics, its policy, its government is informed by its history of, you know, modern history but also history going back farther. And I think China is no exception. In fact, Chinese society, and even the Communist Party of China, is deeply, I think, entrenched in a historical understanding of its role in the world, of how it interacts compared with its people, its citizens, its foreign conflicts. And so I think, number one is to understand the history of modern China. And I think anyone who seeks to be involved in discussions and research and debate on China does need to understand that history.  I think the second point is linguistics is actually quite important. Being able to speak the language, read the language, understand the language is important. Because so much of what is written—so much of our knowledge as, you know, American think tank researchers, is based on publicly available information in China. And a lot of that primarily is in Mandarin. So most speeches that the senior leadership of China deliver are actually in Mandarin. And some of them are translated, but not all of them. A lot of the documents that they issue, a lot of academics who write about—academics in China who write about foreign policy and international relations, write in Mandarin.  And so I think that an ability to be able to read in the original text is quite important. And in fact, you know, a lot of the nuances, and specifically in the Communist Party's ideology, how it sees itself, its role in the world, a lot of that really is best captured and best understood in its original language. Some of the—you know, the ideology, the campaigns of propaganda, et cetera.  And I think the last part of your question was how early. I am not an education scholar. (Laughs.) I don't study education or developmental psychology. But, you know, I imagine, you know, as with anything, linguistics, language, is best learned—or, most easily learned early on. But I think that does not mean that, you know, someone who's in college or graduate school can't begin to learn in a different language. So I'd answer your question like that.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Lucksika Udomsrisumran, a graduate student at New York University.  What is the implication of the Biden administration's three pillars of the Indo-Pacific strategy on the Mekong and the South China Sea? Which pillars do you see these two issues in, from the Biden administration's point of view?  LI: OK. I think, if I'm understanding the question correctly about South China Sea, you know, I think in general the South China Sea probably would most easily fall into the competition category. There are obviously not only the United States and China, but other countries in the region, including the Philippines, for example, are claimants to the South China Sea. And so I think there's always been some disagreement and some tensions in that region.  I think that that has largely been—the U.S. response or U.S. policy in South China Sea is just essentially, from the military perspective, has been to—you know, the slogan is, or the line is, to fly, sail, operate, et cetera—I'm not quoting that correctly—(laughs)—but essentially to operate wherever international law permits. And so that means Freedom of Navigation Operations, et cetera, in the South China Sea. I think that, of course, raises objections from other governments, mainly China, in the region.   So I would say that probably belongs in the competition category. And we spoke about earlier the idea of managing some of the risk that occurs or that emerges when the PLA Navy and the United States Navy operate in close proximity in that region. So from that perspective, if you're talking about risk reduction and crisis management, that actually could fall into collaboration or cooperation. But I think primarily it's competition.   FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Joan Kaufman. And, Joan, I know you wrote your question, but if you could ask it that would be great.  Q: Yes, will. Yes, certainly. Hi, Chris. Really great to see you here during this talk.  LI: Yeah, likewise.  Q: A proud Schwarzman Scholar.  I wanted to ask you a question about Ukraine and China's, you know, kind of difficult position in the middle almost, you know, as sort of seemingly allied with Russia, or certainly not criticizing Russia. And then just putting forth this twelve-point peace plan last week for—and offering to broker peace negotiations and a ceasefire for Ukraine. You know, there's no love lost in Washington for China on, you know, how it has positioned itself on this issue. And, you know, frankly, given China's own kind of preoccupation with sovereignty over the years, how do you see the whole thing? And what comments might you make on that?  LI: Right. Well, first of all, thanks so much, Joan, for joining. And very grateful for all of—all that you've done for the Schwarzman Scholars Program over the past. I appreciate your time very much.  The Ukraine problem is an incredibly important one. And I think absolutely China is involved. And it's a very complicated position that it's trying to occupy here, with both supporting its security partner, Russia, but also not directly being involved in the conflict because of U.S. opposition and opposition from NATO. So I think it's—obviously, China is playing a very delicate balancing role here.  I think a couple points. So the first is that I think my view is that, for the Chinese leadership, Ukraine—or, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a deeply uncomfortable geopolitical situation, where there is essentially not a—there's no good outcome, really, because, as you mentioned, Ukraine is a country with which China has diplomatic recognition. It recognizes it. It has an embassy there. And the Chinese foreign ministry, Chinese foreign policy, has long very much supported the concept of sovereignty, and being able to determine your own future as a country. And I think, in fact, that's been one of the pillars and one of the objections to many American actions in the past. So on one hand, it says: We support sovereignty of every country, of which Ukraine is a country that is recognized by China.  And on the other hand, though, Russia, of course, which has had long complaints and issues with NATO expansion, is a partner of China. And so it's obviously supporting Russia. It has alignment of interests between Russia and China in many ways, in many dimensions, including objections to, for example, U.S. presence in Europe, U.S. presence in Asia. So it's a delicate balancing act. And I think from what we've seen, there hasn't been sort of a clear one-sided answer, where you've seen both statements, you know, proposing peace and saying that, you know, all sides should deescalate. But on the other hand, the U.S. government, the Biden administration, is now publicly stating that they are concerned about China potentially lending support to Russia.  So, you know, in short, I think it's very difficult to really understand what exactly is going on in the minds of the Chinese leadership. But I think that we'll continue to see sort of this awkward back and forth and trying—this purported balancing act between both sides. But I think, you know, largely—my assessment is that it's not going to go very clearly in one direction or the other.  I think the other comment I would make is that I think, from Beijing's perspective, the clear analogy here is one for Taiwan. Because—and this has been something that has been discussed in the think tank community very extensively. But the expectation I think among many in Washington was that Ukraine would not be able to put up much resistance. In short, this would be a very, very easy victory for Putin. And I think that was a—you know, not a universal consensus, but many people believed that, in short, Russia with all of its military might, would have no issues subjugating Ukraine very quickly.  I think people have largely found that to be, you know, a strategic failure on Russia's part. And so today, you know, one year after the invasion, Ukraine is still sovereign, is still standing, is still strong. And so I think—from that perspective, I think this—the war in Ukraine must give many of the leaders in China pause when it comes to thinking about a Taiwan continency, especially using force against Taiwan. Because, again, I think the degree of support, both militarily, politically, economically, for the resistance that Ukraine has shown against Russia among NATO members, among other Western countries, I think has been deeply surprising to many observers how robust that support has been. And I think that if you're sitting in Beijing and thinking about what a potential response to a Taiwan contingency might be, that would absolutely inform your calculus.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Lindsey McCormack, a graduate student at Baruch College.  How is the Biden administration's compete, cooperate, limited adversarial approach playing out with climate policy? What are you seeing right now in terms of the Chinese government's approach to energy security and climate?  LI: Yeah. It's a great question. Thanks for the question.  You know, we mentioned earlier, you know, I think the Biden administration's approach has been, you know, despite all of the disagreements between the United States and the Chinese government, there should be room for cooperation on climate because, as the Biden administration says, the climate is an existential risk to all of humanity. It's an issue of shared concern. So it's one that is not defined by any given country or constrained to one set of borders. I think it's largely not been very successful, in short, because China has not seemed to display much interest in cooperating on climate with the United States. And, again, China has largely coupled cooperation, linked cooperation in climate—or, on climate to other issues.  And so, you know, I think it's been reported that at several of the meetings between Secretary Blinken, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, and their Chinese counterparts, the Chinese officials had essentially given the American officials a list saying: Here are the twenty-something things that we object to. Why don't you stop all of these, correct all of your mistakes—so to speak—and then we'll talk about what we can do next. And so I think, again, that—you know, that, to me, indicates that this framework of compartmentalizing cooperation and competition has some flaws, because the idea that you can simply compartmentalize and say: We're going to cooperate at full capacity on climate, but we're not going to—you know, but we'll compete on technology, it just—it actually doesn't work in this situation.  I think the other comment I'll make is that what the Biden administration has done is—which I think has been effective—is reframed the notion of cooperation. Where, in the past, cooperation was sort of viewed as a favor that the Chinese government did to the Americans, to the American government. That if we—if the United States, you know, offered certain inducements or there were strong elements of the relationship, then China would cooperate and that would be a favor.   And I think the Biden administration has reframed that approach, where cooperation is now presented not as a favor that any country does to another, but rather sort of is shared here. And that this is something of concern to China, to the United States, to other countries, and so all major countries need to play their part, and step up their game, to take on. I think, unfortunately, it hasn't been extremely successful. But I think that there—I hope that there will be future progress made in this area.  FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to go next to Jeremiah Ostriker, who has raised—a raised hand, and also written your question. But you can ask it yourself. And you have to accept the unmute prompt. Is that happening? All right. I think I might have to read it.  Q: Am I unmuted now?  FASKIANOS: Oh, you are. Fantastic.  Q: OK. First, I'll say who I am. I am a retired professor from Princeton University and Columbia University and was an administrative provost at Princeton.  And our China policies have puzzled me. I have visited China many times. And I have wondered—I'll quote my questions now—I have wondered why we are as negative towards China as we have been. So specifically, does the U.S. foreign policy establishment need enemies to justify its existence? Is it looking around the world for enemies? And why should we care if other countries choose to govern themselves in ways which are antithetical to the way that we choose to govern ourselves? And, finally, why not cooperate with all countries on projects of common interest, regardless of other issues?  LI: Great. Well, first of all, thank you for the question—or, three questions, which are all extremely important. I'll do my best to answer, but these are very difficult questions, and I think they touch on a more philosophical understanding of what is American foreign policy for, what is the purpose of America's role in the world, et cetera. But I'll try to do my best.  I think on the first part, does the United States need enemies, is it looking to make enemies? I think if you asked any—and these are, of course, my own assessments. I think if you asked any administration official, whether in this current administration or in previous administrations—Republican or Democrat—I don't think anyone would answer “yes.” I think the argument that has been made across administrations in a bipartisan fashion is that foreign policy is fundamentally about defending American interests and American values. In essence, being able to support the American way of life, which obviously is not necessarily one clearly defined entity. (Laughs.)  But I think, therefore, all of our policy toward China is sort of geared at maintaining, or securing, defending U.S. interests in the region. And where the argument about your question comes into play is that I think a lot of—the Biden administration, the Trump administration, the Obama administration would argue that many of the concerns that the United States has with China are not fundamentally only about internal issues, where this is a question of how they govern themselves. But they touch upon issues of shared concern. They touch upon issues that actually affect U.S. interests.   And so, for example, the South China Sea is, again—is a space that is—contains much trade. There are many different countries in the region that access the South China Sea. So it's not necessarily just an issue—and, again, this is Secretary Blinken's position that he made clear—it's not just an issue specific to China. It does touch upon global trade, global economics, global rules, and global order. And I think this is the term that has been often used, sort of this liberal international rules-based order.   And while that's sort of an amorphous concept, in essence what I think the term implies is the idea that there are certain standards and rules by which different countries operate that allow for the orderly and for the peaceful and the secure exchange of goods, of ideas, of people, of—so that each country is secure. And I think this—again, this broader concept is why I think successive U.S. administrations have focused on China policy, because I think some of, in their view, China's behaviors impinge on U.S. interests in the region.   I think the second question is why should we care about how other countries govern themselves? I think in a way, the answer the Biden administration—this current administration has given to that question is: The U.S. government under President Biden is not trying to fundamentally change the Chinese system of governance. And I think you've seen Jake Sullivan and Tony Blinken say that publicly, that they are not seeking the collapse or the fundamental change in the Communist Party's rule of China. So I think in that sense, they have made that—they have made that response. I think, again, where there are issues—there are tensions, is when actions that the Chinese government take then touch upon U.S. interests. And I think we see that in Taiwan. We see that with economics. We see that with trade, et cetera.   And then finally, why not cooperate with every country in the world? I think obviously in an ideal world, that would be the case. All countries would be able to only cooperate, and all concerns shared among different nations would be addressed. I think unfortunately one of the problems that we're seeing now is that large major powers, like China and Russia, have very different worldviews. They see a world that is very different in its structure, and its architecture, and its organization, than the one that the U.S. sees. And I think that's what's led to a lot of tension.  FASKIANOS: So we have a written question from Julius Haferkorn, a student at California State University and Tübingen University, in Germany.  Ever since the escalation of the Ukraine war, there are discussions about the risk that, should Russia be successful with its invasion, China might use this as a template in regards to Taiwan. In your opinion, is this a realistic scenario?  LI: Great. Thanks for the question.  I think there are definitely analogies to be drawn between Ukraine and Taiwan, but I think there are also significant differences. The first is the relationship between Russia and Ukraine is one of two sovereign nations that the United States and international community recognizes. I think with Taiwan, what has—going back to our history question—Taiwan is a very complicated issue, even with regard to U.S. policies. The United States does not recognize Taiwan formally as an independent country. The United States actually does not take a position on the status of Taiwan. Briefly, the One China Policy, as articulated in the three communiques, the three joint communiques, essentially says that the United States government acknowledges the Chinese position that there is one China, and Taiwan is part of China, et cetera, et cetera.  And that word “acknowledge” is pretty key, because in essential its strategic ambiguity. It's saying, we acknowledge that the PRC government says this. We don't challenge that position. But we don't necessarily recognize or completely accept. And, obviously, the Mandarin version of the text is slightly different. It uses a term that is closer to “recognize.” But that ambiguity, in a way, permitted normalization and led to the democratization of Taiwan, China's economic growth and miracle, its anti-poverty campaign. So in essence, it's worked—this model has worked for the last forty-something years.  But I think that does mean that the situation across the Taiwan Strait is very different, because here the United States does not recognize two countries on both sides of the strait. Rather, it has this ambiguity, this policy of ambiguity. And in short, the only U.S. criterion for resolution of issues across the Taiwan Strait is peace. So all of the documents that the U.S. has articulated over successive administrations essentially boil down to: As long as the resolution of issues between Taiwan and the PRC and mainland China are peaceful, then the United States is not involved. That the only thing that the United States opposes is a forceful resolution—use of military force, use of coercion. And that's what is problematic.  I think what you've seen increasingly over the last few years is a sort of—it's not a formal shift away from that policy, but definitely slowly edging away from that policy. Now, any administration official will always deny that there are any changes to our One China Policy. And I think that's always been the refrain: Our One China Policy has not changed. But you've actually seen within that One China Policy framework adjustments, accommodations—or, not accommodations—but adjustments, recalibrations. And the way that the successive U.S. administrations defend that or justify it, is because it is our—it is the American One China Policy. Therefore, we can define what that One China Policy actually means.  But you have seen, in essence, greater increased relations and exchanges between officials in Taiwan, officials in the United States. I think it was publicly reported just a couple weeks ago that some of the senior national security officials in Taipei visited the United States. Secretary Pompeo at the end of his tenure as secretary of state changed some of the previous restrictions on—that were self-imposed restrictions—on interactions between the government in Taiwan and the government in the United States. So we're seeing some changes here. And I think that has led to—or, that is one element that has led to some of the tensions across the Taiwan Strait.   Obviously, from Beijing's perspective, it sees that as the U.S. sliding away from its commitments. Now, on the other hand, Beijing, of course, has also started to change its policy, despite claiming that its policy is exactly the same. You've seen greater military incursions in Taiwan's air defense identification zone, with planes, fighter jets, that are essentially flying around the island. You've seen greater geoeconomic coercion targeted at Taiwan in terms of sanctions. So you've seen essentially changes on all sides.  And so the final point I'll leave here—I'll leave with you is that the refrain that the United States government articulates of opposing any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, to me, is actually quite ambiguous. Because there's never been a status quo that has truly existed. It's always been a dynamic equilibrium between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington, D.C. Where Beijing is seeking to move Taiwan toward unification. Taiwan, at least under its current leadership, under Tsai Ing-wen, is obviously seeking, in a way, to move from at least—at least to move toward de facto or maintain de facto independence. Whether it's moving toward de jure is a topic of debate. And then the United States, of course, is enhancing its relationship with Taiwan.  So there's never been a static status quo between the three sides. It's always been a dynamic, evolving and changing equilibrium. Which is why the concept of opposing unilateral changes to the status quo, in my view, is almost paradoxical, because there has never been a status quo in the first place.  FASKIANOS: There has been some talk that Kevin McCarthy, the speaker of the House, is planning a trip to Taiwan. Given what happened with Speaker Pelosi, is that a—what do you think of that musing, to go to Taiwan, to actually do that?  LI: Mhm, yes. I think that's obviously been reported on. I think it's an area of close attention from everyone watching this space. I haven't seen any reports. All I can say is based on what I've seen reported in the media. And it seems like, based on—because of domestic preoccupations, that trip, whether it happens or not, is right now, at the moment, on the back burner. But I think that if he were to go, I think it would certainly precipitate a quite significant response from China. And I think whether that would be larger or smaller than what happened after Speaker Pelosi's visit, I think is something that is uncertain now.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. We'll go next to Autumn Hauge.  Q: Hi. I'm Autumn Hauge. I'm a student at Minnesota State University, Mankato.  So my question is, since a focus of the Biden administration's foreign policy is the relationship between the United States and China, and another focus is to invest and grow a presence in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically looking at the relationship between the United States and the Micronesian country of the Republic of Palau, whose government has openly shared their support for Taiwan, do you think that the United States' long history with the Republic of Palau, and their connection to their support—the Republic of Palau's support to Taiwan, halters the ability for the U.S. to grow a positive relation with China? Thank you.  LI: Great. Thanks for the question. It's a great question.  I am not an expert on Palau or its politics. I do know that Palau has enhanced its exchanges, it relationship with Taipei, over the last few years. I think we saw Palau's president, I think, visit Taipei. I think the U.S. ambassador to Palau actually visited Taipei. And there have been increasing—during COVID, there was a discussion of a travel bubble between Taiwan and Palau. So there's definitely been increasing exchange.  I think in general this has always been a key obstacle to U.S.-China relations, which is any country that still recognizes the Republic of China—that is the formal name of the government currently in Taiwan—I think presents a significant issue. Because for the PRC, recognition of the One China—what they call the One China Principle, the idea that there is one China, Taiwan is part of that China, and the legitimate government of China is the People's Republic of China, is a precondition for any diplomatic normalization with Beijing. And so I think certainly, you know, there are a small handful of countries that still recognize the ROC, but I think that they—you know, for those countries and their relationships with the PRC, of course, that's a significant hindrance.  In what you've seen in the U.S. government in the past few years is that for countries that derecognize Taipei and sort of switch recognition to Beijing, the PRC, there's been discussion—I think, there have been several bills introduced, in essence, to punish those countries. I don't necessarily think that those bills have ended up becoming law, but I think there is, given the current political dynamics, the sort of views on China in Washington, D.C., there is this sense that the U.S. needs to support countries that still recognize Taiwan, the ROC, and be able to provide support so that they don't feel pressured to switch their recognition.  My personal view is that I think that that is, on the whole, relatively insignificant. I won't say that it's completely not significant, but I think that in general issues around the Taiwan Strait, cross-strait relations, I think military issues, I think political issues related to exchanges between Taiwan and Beijing, I think those issues are much more important and much more critical to driving changes in the relationship across the Taiwan Strait.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to try and sneak in one last question from Wim Wiewel, who's a student at Portland State University.   Given your pessimism about cooperation combined with competition, what do you think is the long-term future for U.S.-China relations?  LI: OK. Well, thanks for the question. I'm not sure that I can provide a satisfying answer. And, in fact, I don't have the answer. You know, I think if anyone had the answer, then they should immediately tell the Biden administration that they've solved the problem.  Even though I am pessimistic about this current framework, just because of its demonstrated effects, I still think that in general the likelihood of a real war, which I think people have floated now—you know, Professor Graham Allison, who I used to work for, wrote a book called Destined for War? I still believe that the probability of all-out great-power conflict in a kinetic way, a military way, is still relatively low. I think that there are significant differences today compared to the era during World War I and World War II era.   I think that the degree of economic interdependence between China and not only the United States but the rest of the world, I think is a significant gamechanger in how countries position themselves vis-à-vis China. I think Europe is the great example here of how there are many countries that invest, have business relationships, have trade with China. And so therefore, their policy on China has been a little bit more calibrated than what the United States has been doing.   And so on the whole, I think most people still recognize that any great-power war between the United States and China would be utterly catastrophic. And I think that despite all the tensions that exist today, I think that that recognition, that consensus is pretty universally held, that a great-power war between the U.S. and China would be extremely bad. I think that is—that is probably something that is understood by Republican administrations, Democratic administrations, folks in Beijing, folks around the world, in the region. And so I think that, hopefully, that idea, that despite disagreements, despite political tensions, the need to prevent all-out global conflict is quite important, is a vital interest, I think, hopefully, to me, provides some optimism. And hopefully we'll be able to continue to carry our relationship with China through.  And I'm hopeful especially that all of you students, researchers, who hope to study, and write about, and even perhaps participate in American foreign policy, will continue to think. Because so much of the future of the U.S.-China relationship and U.S. foreign policy is going to be determined by your generation. So with that, I guess this would be a perfect place to stop. And I thank you for the question.   FASKIANOS: Absolutely. Well, Chris, this has been fantastic. I apologize to all of you. We had many more—many questions in the written part and raised hands. And I'm sorry that we could not get to all of them. We'll just have to have you back and continue to cover this issue. So we really appreciate your insights, Chris Li. So thank you again.  The next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, March 22, at 1:00 p.m. (EDT). Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly will lead a conversation on U.S. relations with South America. And in the meantime, please do learn more about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/careers. You can follow us at @CFR_academic, and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. And I'm sure you can also go to the Belfer Center for additional analysis by Chris Li. So I encourage you to go there as well.  Thank you all, again, for being with us, and we look forward to continuing the conversation on March 22. So thank you, all. Thanks, Chris.  LI: Thank you.  (END) 

Worried about a nuclear war with Russia? Maybe you SHOULD be worried about beluga whales. Let's dive in (pun intended) on why. This week on Cyber.RAR, we discuss global infrastructure in the form of undersea cables transmitting data through light traveling along silicon tubes - and how fragile these systems really are. We discuss how to monitor and defend these cable networks given how massive and interconnected they are and how geography and technology factor into strategic decision-making about espionage and cyber-enabled attacks. We conclude the episode with a tribute to Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and his tremendous impact on the Kennedy School and the nation.Relevant Sources: https://www.submarinecablemap.com/ https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/03/10/technology/internet-cables-oceans.htmlhttps://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/07/the-creepy-long-standing-practice-of-undersea-cable-tapping/277855/https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/in-depth-research-reports/report/cyber-defense-across-the-ocean-floor-the-geopolitics-of-submarine-cable-security/

Frank Morano brings you the issues that matter the most with style and wit in the Other Side of Midnight Local Spotlight. Frank discusses the recent shooting in Staten Island outside of the high school that he attended, the former U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter passing away this past Monday, a Staten Island Supreme Court Justice writing a decision in support of those who were fired for refusing to adhere to the Covid-19 vaccine mandate, and a super intendent of schools in Clifton, New Jersey who wants to eliminate the districts non-federal religious holidays. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Dr. John Gans is the Managing Director of Executive Communications and Strategic Engagement at the Rockefeller Foundation. In addition, Gans teaches graduate and undergraduate classes on the international order, the politics and process of American foreign policy, and national security. He is also a fellow at the University of Pennsylvania's Perry World House, a fellow at the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and a board member at the World Affairs Council of New Jersey. In the wake of the September 11th attacks, Gans was a press liaison at Ground Zero in lower Manhattan, where he helped brief the media on behalf of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The experience drove his interest in public service and global affairs, and his desire to help individuals and institutions tell their stories and achieve their objectives, whether in war, for the bottom line, at the ballot box, in Washington, or in the marketplace of ideas. In the years since, Gans served at the Pentagon as chief speechwriter to Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. He was the principal adviser to the secretary on the planning, positioning, and preparation of remarks, managed a team of writers, and drafted dozens of speeches delivered around the world on defense policy in the Asia-Pacific region, Europe, Russia, the Middle East, and elsewhere. Previously, Gans worked for Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel, Secretary of the Treasury Jack Lew, Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives Nancy Pelosi, and U.S. Senator Hillary Rodham Clinton. For a decade, he served in the U.S. Navy Reserve. In 2019, Gans published White House Warriors: How the National Security Council Transformed the American Way of War, and this book is the subject of our conversation today.

In Episode 255 of Hidden Forces, Demetri Kofinas speaks with Ian Bremmer. Ian Bremmer is the president and founder of Eurasia Group, the world's leading global research and consulting firm, and GZERO Media, a company dedicated to providing intelligent and engaging coverage of international affairs. Bremmer is also the author of ten books, including his latest, “The Power of Crisis,” in which he argues that we are unprepared for a trio of looming crises in the areas of pandemic response, climate change, and the next technological revolution. All of these looming crises that Ian focuses on are subjects that we've explored in great depth over the years with folks like fmr. FDA commissioner Scott Gottlieb, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, NASA's Chief Climate Scientist Gavin Schmidt, Google's Eric Schmidt, and so many more. You can find all of those previous and relevant conversations in the related section on the episode page of our website. Because of the ongoing war in Ukraine and its effect on global commodity markets—and in particular oil & gas—our conversation with Ian leads with a discussion about climate policy. The discussion focuses specifically on the war in Ukraine, what it reveals about our vulnerabilities as we try transition towards more sustainable, carbon-free forms of energy production, and how to balance our national security concerns while still ensuring that we can meet the long-term climate goals set out in the 2016 Paris Agreement. In the second part of their conversation Kofinas and Bremmer continue their discussion about energy markets, eventually pivoting to a much broader conversation about the upcoming elections in 2022 and 2024, and specifically why there seems to be a persistent leadership deficit in American politics today and what we can do to change that. They also discuss media reform and what we can do as individuals and in some cases as influencers with large followings to have more constructive and good-faith conversations around the issues that matter to all of us as we navigate what may well be the most dangerous time for the international system since at least the early stages of the Cold War. The goal of today's conversation, among other things, is to bring you the perspective of someone who operates within some of the most powerful networks of people in the world—and is an advisor to many of them. Ian Bremmer has years of experience speaking with global leaders, CEO's of Fortune 100 companies, and experts across all industries & territories, making him an invaluable resource for anyone trying to think about the future path of policy, risks to global governance, and so much more.  You can access the full episode, transcript, and intelligence report to this week's conversation by going directly to the episode page at HiddenForces.io and clicking on "premium extras." All subscribers gain access to our premium feed, which can be easily added to your favorite podcast application. If you enjoyed listening to today's episode of Hidden Forces you can help support the show by doing the following: Subscribe on Apple Podcasts | YouTube | Spotify | Stitcher | SoundCloud | CastBox | RSS Feed Write us a review on Apple Podcasts & Spotify Subscribe to our mailing list at https://hiddenforces.io/newsletter/ Producer & Host: Demetri Kofinas Editor & Engineer: Stylianos Nicolaou Subscribe & Support the Podcast at https://hiddenforces.io Join the conversation on Facebook, Instagram, and Twitter at @hiddenforcespod Follow Demetri on Twitter at @Kofinas Episode Recorded on 06/21/2022

Corie Weathers, a licensed professional counselor (LPC), sought-after speaker, and consultant, discusses teen apathy, dimensions of wellness and how parents can help kids find their value. Show Notes:  5 Minute Check-in: https://www.life-giver.org/5-minute-check-in/ Gallup Strength: https://www.gallup.com/cliftonstrengths/en/252137/home.aspx Feelings wheel: https://feelingswheel.com/ Angela Duckworth's book Grit: https://angeladuckworth.com/grit-book/   Bio: Corie Weathers, licensed professional counselor (LPC), is a sought-after speaker, consultant, and author of the award- winning book Sacred Spaces: My Journey to the Heart of Military Marriage. Corie has focused her career for the last 20 years as a clinician specializing in marriage, military and first responders, the service culture, and its impact on families. She has traveled to Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf to visit troops and report on deployment conditions with Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and has taught service families across the globe, including Japan. Nicknamed “#Coriespondent”, Corie consults on military and first responder culture, produces content through interviews and videos, emcees events as well as facilitates meaningful and productive sessions and retreats for families on how to live, lead, find purpose, and build relationships using their natural talents. Her Lifegiver Podcast provides encouraging content and inspirational interviews to service families and marriages.      

Kanwar Singh, a technologist by day and also a Signal Officer in the US Army Massachusetts National Guard, joins Jerry to share about his journey to America to pursue higher education, what led to him joining the National Guard, and the challenges he has faced to ensure accommodation for him and others religious beliefs. We thank Officer Singh, the US Army, and the Department of Defense for making this interview possible.Meet Kanwar SinghFirst Lieutenant (1LT) Kanwar Singh is a financial services professional by training. After graduating from Virginia Commonwealth University in 2011, he enrolled at Harvard University. While at Harvard, then-Specialist (SPC) Singh attended a speech by Senator John McCain, who encouraged attendees to serve their country through the U.S. military. Inspired by this call to service, as well as the resilience of those who survived the Boston Marathon attack, then-SPC Singh applied to join the Army National Guard in Massachusetts in 2014.In June 2014, then-SPC Singh took the Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery (ASVAB) exam and scored in the top one percent. Instead of embracing him and giving him an equal opportunity to prove his abilities, the U.S. military subjected him to a frustrating bureaucratic process that lasted nearly two years. In January 2015, then-SPC Singh joined Boston University's ROTC program and participated in all field exercises but was not permitted to do so in uniform. In May 2015, he was selected for the Massachusetts Army National Guard's State Officer Candidate School and later enlisted in the Massachusetts National Guard. At this point, then-SPC Singh submitted a religious accommodation request.While his request was pending, then-SPC Singh was segregated from his battalion and not issued an Army uniform. In December 2015, he met Secretary of Defense Ash Carter at a Harvard University event and publicly asked him whether he would support equal opportunity for Sikhs who wish to serve in the U.S. military. The Defense Secretary applauded then-SPC Singh's desire to serve and emphasized the importance of diversity in our nation's military.In March 2016, while his accommodation request was still pending, then-SPC Singh was asked if he would cut his hair and remove his turban in violation of his religion in order to attend Basic Combat Training. In response, the Sikh Coalition and its partners at the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty and the law firm McDermott Will & Emery filed a lawsuit on Specialist Singh's behalf.IMPACTIn response to our lawsuit, the U.S. Army realized that the law is not on its side. After nearly two years of perseverance, then-SPC Kanwar Singh was successfully accommodated by the Massachusetts Army National Guard. Consistent with the Army's promulgation of a new policy accommodating observant Sikhs, the Army issued a new accommodation for then-SPC Singh in January of 2017 that extends throughout his military career.In August 2018, then-Second Lieutenant (2LT) Kanwar Singh successfully graduated from Army Officer Candidate School as part of the Massachusetts Army National Guard. In February 2021, he was promoted to First Lieutenant. 1LT Singh is now responsible for leading soldiers during humanitarian, homeland security, and combat operations as a Signal Corps officer.(Source: SikhCoalition.org)Connect with KanwarInstagram: kanwar91 TikTok: @SikhSoldierKanwar in the media:USA Today: https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/militarykind/2021/06/21/sikh-soldier-honors-religion-and-country/7773476002/Sikh Coalition: https://www.sikhcoalition.org/our-work/legal-and-policy/specialist-kanwar-singh/US Army: https://www.army.mil/article/239236/for_massachusetts_soldier_path_to_military_service_was_a_spiritual_one// Support Dear Asian Americans:Merch: https://www.bonfire.com/store/dearasianamericans/Buy Me a Coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/jerrywonLearn more about DAA Creator and Host Jerry Won:LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/jerrywon/Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/jerryjwon/// Listen to Dear Asian Americans on all major platforms:Transistor.fm: http://www.dearasianamericans.comApple: https://apple.dearasianamericans.comSpotify: https://spotify.dearasianamericans.comStitcher: https://stitcher.dearasianamericans.comGoogle: https://google.dearasianamericans.com  Follow us on Instagram: http://www.instagram.com/dearasianamericans Like us on Facebook: http://www.facebook.com/dearasianamericans Subscribe to our YouTube: http://www.youtube.com/dearasianamericans // Join the Asian Podcast Network:Web: https://asianpodcastnetwork.com/Facebook Group: https://www.facebook.com/groups/asianpodcastnetwork/Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/asianpodcastnetwork/Dear Asian Americans is produced by Just Like Media:Web: http://www.justlikemedia.comInstagram.com: http://www.instagram.com/justlikemedia

Photo: Secretary of Defense Ash Carter greets the Saudi Arabian Minister of Defense Mohammad bin Salman as they meet at NATO headquarters in Brussels to discuss matters of mutual importance Feb. 11, 2016.. CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor CBS Audio Network @Batchelorshow The Biden Administration quietly welcomes the "unacceptable" Kingdom @JoshRogin https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2021/07/07/biden-administration-khalid-bin-salman-khashoggi/?utm_medium=social&utm_source=twitter&utm_campaign=wp_opinions

Meet Ash Carter, the former Secretary of Defense and current director of the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard. Carter brings his unique perspective to everything from cybersecurity in schools, to the dangers of misinformation, to aliens.   Read more on our Shaped blog, including a full transcript and research for this episode: https://www.hmhco.com/blog/podcast-school-cyber-attacks-and-the-rise-of-misinformation-with-secretary-ash-carter

 The National Security Innovation Network (NSIN) is a United States Department of Defense (DoD) program office, under the Defense Innovation Unit, that seeks to create new communities of innovators to solve national security problems. NSIN partners with national research universities and the venture community to reinvigorate civil-military technology collaboration. As opposed to making investments in specific technologies, government R&D programs, or startups, NSIN focuses on human capital innovation, specifically developing and enabling innovators and human-centered networks. NSIN provides tools, training, and access to DoD assets that enable entrepreneurs and intrapreneurs to develop and commercialize high potential products in the national interest. Morgan Plummer is the Managing Director of the National Security Innovation Network at the U.S. Department of Defense. Prior to his appointment as Managing Director, Morgan served as the Senior Advisor to the Director of the NSIN and was a Visiting Senior Research Fellow at National Defense University in Washington, D.C. Prior to joining NSIN, Morgan served as a senior defense official in the Obama Administration, departing in April 2016 as the Senior Advisor to the Undersecretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness. As the senior public policy advisor and principal deputy to the Department's chief human resources officer, Morgan helped oversee a bold set of sweeping and progressive reforms, including the full integration of women into ground combat units, the repeal of the ban against open transgender service and Secretary of Defense Ash Carter's signature set of civilian, and military personnel policy reforms, collectively referred to as the “Force of the Future” initiative. Before his role at Personnel and Readiness, Morgan served as the Special Assistant and Deputy Chief of the Staff to the Under Secretary of the US Army. While there, he focused on strategic planning, improving the organizational design of the Army's headquarters and refining its business processes. Morgan joined the Obama Administration after almost 12 years on active duty in the United States Army, where he served in a variety of command and staff assignments and completed multiple combat tours. Morgan has received numerous meritorious service and achievement medals, been decorated for valor and received the Office of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Exceptional Public Service. In addition to his military and civilian awards, Morgan holds a BS degrees from Michigan State University (Criminal Justice/Law Enforcement Administration) and a masters Georgetown University (Policy Management). He also serves as the Executive Director of the Defense Entrepreneurs Forum (DEF), a non-profit dedicated to enabling a culture of innovation in the US national security community. 

Corie Weathers, licensed professional counselor (LPC), is a sought-after speaker, consultant, and author of Sacred Spaces: My Journey to the Heart of Military Marriage. Corie has focused her career for the last 15 years as a counselor specializing in marriage, divorce, women's issues, PTSD, and substance abuse. In 2015, Corie was named the 2015 Armed Forces Insurance Military Spouse of the Year® where she advocated for mental health issues and served as a media correspondent writing online and print publications, consulting for command teams, and speaking to groups on issues like PTSD, grief, and marriage. She traveled to Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf with Secretary of Defense Ash Carter to visit troops and see deployment conditions. She has also traveled across the globe teaching individuals and couples how to live, lead, find purpose, and build relationships using their natural talents. Today, Corie continues to encourage others through her inspirational blog and podcast available on the free Lifegiver App- With Corie Weathers. She currently serves as an Ambassador for the Chris Kyle Frog Foundation serving military and first responder families and volunteers with the Red Cross training mental health professionals to be more culturally competent in their work with military and first responders. --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/changeyourpov/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/changeyourpov/support

INSS Director Maj. Gen. (ret.) Amos Yadlin and former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter of Harvard's Belfer Center sat down to discuss US national security priorities, great power competition, and the “war of ideas.” In speaking about the US-China relationship, Dr. Carter noted that the rivalry with Beijing is a top priority for Washington and that it extends into the trade, diplomatic, technological, and military realms. He also explained that fatigue from “endless wars” in the Middle East is now prevalent among the US public, although the desire to disengage from the world is misguided and could have dangerous consequences. In their concluding remarks about the US-Israel relationship, Gen. Yadlin expressed his appreciation for Dr. Carter's strong commitment to Israel's security.

In this episode, former US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter discusses his views on key issues in US foreign policy and the role of technology and innovation in addressing America’s greatest national security challenges. The interview is moderated by Goldman Sachs' Sharmin Mossavar-Rahmani. Date: June 21, 2019 This podcast should not be copied, distributed, published or reproduced, in whole or in part, or disclosed by any recipient to any other person. The information contained in this podcast does not constitute a recommendation from any Goldman Sachs entity to the recipient. Neither Goldman Sachs nor any of its affiliates makes any representation or warranty, express or implied, as to the accuracy or completeness of the statements or any information contained in this podcast and any liability therefore (including in respect of direct, indirect or consequential loss or damage) is expressly disclaimed. The views expressed in this podcast are not necessarily those of Goldman Sachs, and Goldman Sachs is not providing any financial, economic, legal, accounting or tax advice or recommendations in this podcast. In addition, the receipt of this podcast by any recipient is not to be taken as constituting the giving of investment advice by Goldman Sachs to that recipient, nor to constitute such person a client of any Goldman Sachs entity. Copyright 2019 Goldman Sachs & Co. LLC. All rights reserved.

In this episode we speak with former Sec. of Defense Carter about crafting national security strategy, the role of international lawyers, and his new book Inside the Five-Sided Box.

Bloomberg Opinion columnist Barry Ritholtz interviews former U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, who led the department from 2015 to 2017 and now serves as the director of Harvard University’s Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. His latest book, “Inside the Five-Sided Box: Lessons From a Lifetime of Leadership in the Pentagon,” was released this year. 

In this Tea Leaves episode, Kurt and Rich sit down with John Gans, Director of Communications and Research for Perry World House and former chief speechwriter to Secretary of Defense Ash Carter at the Pentagon. Kurt and Rich chat with John about his new book, “White House Warriors: How the National Security Council Transformed the American Way of War” and dive into the inner workings of the National Security Council (NSC).

In this Tea Leaves episode, Kurt and Rich sit down with John Gans, Director of Communications and Research for Perry World House and former chief speechwriter to Secretary of Defense Ash Carter at the Pentagon. Kurt and Rich chat with John about his new book, “White House Warriors: How the National Security Council Transformed the American Way of War” and dive into the inner workings of the National Security Council (NSC).

In this Tea Leaves episode, Kurt and Rich sit down with John Gans, Director of Communications and Research for Perry World House and former chief speechwriter to Secretary of Defense Ash Carter at the Pentagon. Kurt and Rich chat with John about his new book, “White House Warriors: How the National Security Council Transformed the American Way of War” and dive into the inner workings of the National Security Council (NSC).

Air-date October 20, 2019: President Trump's Syria decision-will it result in the resurgence of ISIS? Former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter joins Fareed to discuss. Then, the Trump administration is in the spotlight for its quid pro quo approach to foreign policy - Fareed talks to two former top national security officials to get their takes. And, across the pond, Parliament punts once again on Brexit. GUESTS: Ash Carter, Stephen Hadley, Meghan O'Sullivan, Zanny Minton Beddoes

In this Tea Leaves episode, Kurt and Rich sit down with John Gans, Director of Communications and Research for Perry World House and former chief speechwriter to Secretary of Defense Ash Carter at the Pentagon. Kurt and Rich chat with John about his new book, “White House Warriors: How the National Security Council Transformed the American Way of War” and dive into the inner workings of the National Security Council (NSC).

Jack Goldsmith sat down in Cambridge, Massachusetts, to have a conversation with former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. They talked about Carter's time as head of the Pentagon, the challenges of conveying national security threats to the American public, the Obama administration's response to the rise of the Islamic State, offensive cyber operations, and the role of lawyers in defense policy. They also discussed Carter's new book, "Inside the Five-Sided Box: Lessons from a Lifetime of Leadership in the Pentagon."

Ash Carter served as President Obama's Secretary of Defense from 2015 to 2017. What made Ash Carter so unique among his predecessors was that by the time he became the Secretary of Defense, he'd already spent nearly 30 years working at the Pentagon. This included stints as both the deputy Secretary of Defense and as the number three in the department, a position often referred to as the acquisitions Tsar. Ash Carter is out with a new book "Inside the Five-Sided Box: Lessons from a Lifetime of Leadership in the Pentagon." This is not your conventional Washington, DC memoir. Rather, what I found so valuable about the book is that offers a grounds-eye view of how the world's largest national security bureaucracy operates. Decisions made at the Pentagon -- from the kinds of weapons bought, to the bases that are opened, to personnel decisions --  really do have world-shaping implication. This book takes you inside that decision making process. In our conversation, we kick off discussing the sheer vastness of the pentagon. The annual budget of the pentagon is about half of all discretionary spending in the US--that is, money spent on government programs excluding things like social security and medicare. This comes to over $700 billion. For comparison's sake the budget of the State Department is about $50 billion; and UN peacekeeping budget is under $7 billion. We then discuss what he thinks the US--and world--get for that huge investment. We also discuss his views of the role of the United Nations and UN Peacekeeping; and also the significance of the fact that the US has not had a secretary of defense since Jim Mattis left on December 31. If you have 25 minutes and want to learn insights from the former Secretary of Defense, have a listen. Unlock Premium Content and Other Rewards https://www.patreon.com/GlobalDispatches

Tommy sits down with former Defense Secretary Ash Carter to chat about his book “Inside the Five-Sided Box”, and some of the most complex challenges facing our national security community today, including the war in Afghanistan and closing the prison in Guantanamo Bay.

Researchers at the University of Tubingen demonstrate that virtual neurons spontaneously develop a “number sense” when assessing the number of visual items (such as dots) in a set. The Allen Institute for AI create Grover, a neural network that can generate fake news, but that can also detect NN-generated fake news; Grover uses the same architecture as GPT-2 (the previous “unreleasable for the safety of humanity” algorithm), but these researchers highlight the importance of making available such generators. In related news, Witness Media Lab releases a report on the current state of deepfake tech; a CNN report looks at how Finland is fighting fake news; and a NY Times article examines the “weaponization” of AI-generated disinformation. A Mashable article from Marcus Gilmer looks at the state of software that attempts to identify deepfakes. The International Committee of the Red Cross releases a report a “human-centered approach” to AI and machine learning in armed conflict. A paper from Springer-Verlag provides a history and references for the “neural-symbolic debate.” Hiroki Sayama at SUNY Binghamton makes available “Introduction to the Modeling and Analysis of Complex Systems.” The US-China Commission releases testimony on a day-long session, with testimony from experts on three topics, including the US-China Competition in AI. The Allen Institute brain atlases available for exploring online. The 36th International Conference on Machine Learning meets in Long Beach, CA, with over 6,000 participants. Meanwhile, CogX meets in King’s Cross, London. And former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter pens a “letter to a young Googler” on the morality of defending America. Click here to visit our website and explore the links mentioned in the episode. 

Former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter takes me behind the scenes to reveal the inner workings of the Pentagon, its vital mission, and what it takes to lead it.  He describes just how massive the D.O.D. is, how he managed a $700 billion dollar budget, and how he recruited top tech talent to the Pentagon.  Ash Carter reveals why his background as a physicist came in handy in the Pentagon and how it led him to oppose President Ronald Reagan’s "Star Wars" program in the 80s.  He discusses how he came up with his successful strategy to defeat ISIS, but cautions President Trump against pulling out of Iraq and Syria entirely.  He talks about his effort to reach out to non-traditional military recruits and his history-making decision to open all combat roles to women.  Order Ash Carter's book Inside the Five-Sided Box: Lessons from a Lifetime of Leadership in the Pentagon on Amazon, Audible or wherever books are sold.  Today's podcast was sponsored by TruGreen mosquito defense.

The Department of Defense is the single largest institution in America, managing the most complex information network, carrying out more research and development than Google, Apple and Microsoft combined, owning and operating more real estate and spending more money than any other entity. As such, it has incredible power and immense responsibility. There is no better person to explain the inner workings of such a place than the man who ran it all. In his new book, Inside the Five-Sided Box: Lessons from a Lifetime of Leadership in the Pentagon, former U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter gives us an inside look into all that happens in one of the most secretive and secure locations in the nation—the obstacles it faces and the innovation taking place there. Unlike many of his colleagues in the Department of Defense, Carter was not always a career bureaucrat. His straightforward explanations of American foreign policy, and the ways in which the private sector and public sector can work together towards greater peace and security, reflect a refreshingly moderate perspective in such a highly-politicized era. Join us for a conversation with America's 25th secretary of defense about what really goes on inside that mysterious five-sided box, and how people are learning to think outside it. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this live conversation recorded at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government, Recode's Kara Swisher talks with Ash Carter, the former Secretary of Defense under President Obama who now runs the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. In this episode: Government regulation vs. self-regulation in tech; CDA Section 230; privacy laws and the potential for new regulations around the world; antitrust action that doesn't require a breakup; does regulation ruin innovation?; Mark Zuckerberg's plea for regulation; the problems with automated algorithms; AI ethics in lethal warfare and beyond; can we keep AI in check with norms?; tech workers who don't want their companies partnering with the Defense Department; China's AI and surveillance habits; what Carter worries about in tech; Edward Snowden; encryption and the US intelligence agencies; is Congress savvy enough to regulate?; are the tech giants ready for attempt meddling in the 2020 elections?; what tech has done to journalism; and what will actually get Big Tech to change? Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Ash Carter is a physicist and a defense-policy expert, having served in government periodically for decades. He was secretary of defense from 2015 to 2017. He has spent his academic career at Harvard, where he is today. In this “Q&A,” Jay asks him about some of the biggest issues: nuclear proliferation, North Korea, Iran, the size of the U.S. military. He also asks about the relation between our... Source

Summary: Corie Weathers, licensed professional counselor (LPC), is a sought-after speaker, consultant and author of Sacred Spaces: My Journey to the Heart of Military Marriage. Corie has focused her career for the last 15 years as a counselor specializing in marriage, divorce, women's issues, PTSD, and substance abuse.    In 2015, Corie was named the 2015 Armed Forces Insurance Military Spouse of the Year® where she advocated for mental health issues and served as a media correspondent writing online and print publications, consulting for command teams, and speaking to groups on issues like PTSD, grief, and marriage.  She traveled to Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf with Secretary of Defense Ash Carter to visit troops and see deployment conditions.  She has also traveled across the globe teaching individuals and couples how to live, lead, find purpose, and build relationships using thier natural talents.   Today, Corie continues to encourage others through her inspirational blog and podcast available on the free Lifegiver App- With Corie Weathers.  She currently serves as an Ambassador for the Chris Kyle Frog Foundation serving military and first responder families and volunteers with the Red Cross training mental health professionals to be more culturally competent in their work with military and first responders. IN THIS PARTICULAR EPISODE YOU WILL LEARN: Corie's Background The reason why mental health professionals don't communicate much How therapists can learn how to develop competence in working with veterans The need for a veteran to be patient when looking for a mental health professional The need for natural curiosity on the part of the counselor AND client The counseling session as a safe place to understand difficult things The difference between being broken and being changed The need for greater awareness around first responder mental health LINKS AND RESOURCES MENTIONED IN THIS EPISODE:  Corie's Web Site The Lifegiver Podcast App The Lifegiver Podcast The Sacred Spaces book Change Your POV Book Club

Corie Weathers, licensed professional counselor (LPC), is a sought-after speaker, consultant and author of Sacred Spaces: My Journey to the Heart of Military Marriage. Corie has focused her career for the last 15 years as a counselor specializing in marriage, divorce, women's issues, PTSD, and substance abuse.    In 2015, Corie was named the 2015 Armed Forces Insurance Military Spouse of the Year® where she advocated for mental health issues and served as a media correspondent writing online and print publications, consulting for command teams, and speaking to groups on issues like PTSD, grief, and marriage.  She traveled to Turkey, Iraq, Afghanistan, and the Persian Gulf with Secretary of Defense Ash Carter to visit troops and see deployment conditions.  She has also traveled across the globe teaching individuals and couples how to live, lead, find purpose, and build relationships using thier natural talents.   Today, Corie continues to encourage others through her inspirational blog and podcast available on the free Lifegiver App- With Corie Weathers.  She currently serves as an Ambassador for the Chris Kyle Frog Foundation serving military and first responder families and volunteers with the Red Cross training mental health professionals to be more culturally competent in their work with military and first responders. IN THIS PARTICULAR EPISODE YOU WILL LEARN: Corie's Background The reason why mental health professionals don't communicate much How therapists can learn how to develop competence in working with veterans The need for a veteran to be patient when looking for a mental health professional The need for natural curiosity on the part of the counselor AND client The counseling session as a safe place to understand difficult things The difference between being broken and being changed The need for greater awareness around first responder mental health LINKS AND RESOURCES MENTIONED IN THIS EPISODE:  Corie's Web Site The Lifegiver Podcast App The Lifegiver Podcast The Sacred Spaces book Change Your POV Book Club

Neil Tyson explores the future of science and technology in national defense with former U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter. With comic co-host Leighann Lord, defense expert Michael Horowitz, strategist P.W. Singer, Mona Chalabi, Chuck Nice, & Bill Nye. NOTE: StarTalk All-Access subscribers can listen to this entire episode commercial-free. Find out more at https://www.startalkradio.net/startalk-all-access/

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter travelled to the Middle East to visit with Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines and thank them for their service while deployed during the holiday season...And our 2015 Armed Forces Insurance Military Spouse of the Year, Corie Weathers, went with him! Check out Corie's first video journal as she starts her trip.

In this Pacific Newsbreak, Secretary of Defense Ash Carter meets with Indian Defense Minister in New Delhi, and U.S. and Republic of Korea forces hold bilateral talks.

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter met with Japan’s Minister of Defense in Tokyo.

As the battle for Mosul continues, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter co-chairs a meeting of the anti-Daesh coalition in France. But these are the powers that fragmented Iraq in the first place. Syrian government forces continue their drive to liberate the eastern part of Aleppo from the opposition forces including al-Nusra and like-minded groups, as Russia says it is not considering a new truce. This comes after the UN said it was opening an inquiry into war crimes committed by Syria and Russia -- but is that just a western ploy for push for their intervention? Becker speaks to Syrian journalist Alaa Ebrahim who joins him from Damascus. Venezuela is on edge as supporters of President Nicolas Maduro have been rallying to stop possible right-wing attempts at a coup against the United Socialist Party government. This came after the recall referendum against Maduro was put on hold amid allegations of widespread fraud on the part of the right-wing opposition. Becker speaks to Dr. Francisco Dominguez about what's ahead for Venezuela.

During a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, U.S. Senator Lindsey Graham (R-South Carolina) questions Secretary of Defense Ash Carter and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs General Joseph Dunford about the U.S. military strategy in Syria and Iraq. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WnMyhyrG6eQ

Max Fisher sits down with Defense Secretary Ash Carter to talk about the modern international environment, why Carter thinks great power rivalry is making a comeback, and for some deep weedsy talk about nuclear weapons. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter talks with Kara Swisher about his efforts to unite the Pentagon and Silicon Valley behind common goals, including a new "innovation advisory board" chaired by Eric Schmidt. He also explains why he is a strong supporter of encryption, why he almost never uses a cell phone and why he does not want to cede control of the Internet to countries like China and Russia. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Tii - iTem 0384 - iOS 9.3 Beta 4 and Beta 5 Give us a call - 1-206-666-6364 Send us an email - todayinios@gmail.com   Links Mentioned in this Episode: Today's Sponsor - Harrys.com - Promo Code = tii iOS 9.3 beta 4 update  Latest iOS 9.3 Beta Unbricks iPhones Night Shift In iOS 9.3 Beta 5 iOS 9.3 lets admins enforce home screen layouts iOS 9.3 beta 5 – Apple Pencil support  iOS 9.3 will tell you if your employer is tracking your iPhone iOS 9.3 Beta update can tell if the device is being managed Hacker confirms it is still possible to jailbreak iOS 9.3 Apple Watch Leads The Charge As Smartwatches Outshipped Swiss Watches Google+ Community - Ep 384 iPhone 7 will be completely different, slimmer body  12 most credible iPhone 7 rumors Apple iPhone 5SE in retail box Apple new 4-inch iPhone SE is said to feature 12Mp rear camera AT&T and Verizon testing 5G Google pulls adblocking app for Samsung phones Amazon quietly disabled encryption in the latest version of Fire OS IronWire Mini - IndieGogo What to do when your iPhone keeps requesting your iCloud password Microsoft president warns at RSA Customer Letter - FAQ - Apple Apple CEO Likens iPhone-Cracking Software to Cancer Husband of San Bernardino survivor pens letter in Apple's favor US Secretary of Defense Ash Carter speaks out for strong encryption New York court rejects FBI argument for breaking iPhone  FBI Director Comey says 'of course' the agency would seek to use precedent Government using sci-fi, fantasy to justify iPhone unlocking     Apps Mentioned in this Episode: Tii - Free App Garageband Skitch Rokumotion SnapAnActor Enter The Witness Pictoso WordSwag Harrys App    

Four Americans are freed in a prisoner swap with Iran. Twitter is facing a lawsuit over jihadist messages posted on the site. And Secretary of Defense Ash Carter is cracking down on...everybody! 

How will the U.S. military stay competitive? This is about far more than platforms, bombs, and guns. It is fundamentally about people. And with archaic personnel systems plaguing the armed forces and the Department of Defense, our talented young men and women are being drawn away into the private sector in Silicon Valley and on Wall Street. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter sat down with WOTR's Ryan Evans to talk about the Force of the Future initiative - a sweeping program of reforms that aims to bring the Department of Defense into the 21st Century in terms of how it manages its most important asset: human beings. TRANSCRIPT EDITOR-IN-CHIEF RYAN EVANS:  Welcome a very special edition of the War on the Rocks podcast series, with Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter. Thanks for making the time for us, Mr. Secretary. SECRETARY OF DEFENSE ASH CARTER:  Ryan, thanks for being here.  Welcome to the Pentagon. EVANS:  We're here to talk about Force of the Future.  It's a program of reforms, aimed at changing the way the Department of Defense handles its human capital.  And you have just announced the first sort of tranche for these reforms earlier this afternoon. Personnel reforms are not generally considered the sort of sexiest topic out there, when you look at Defense, particularly when you're competing with attention in terms of issues with the Islamic State, Russia, what just happened in France. Why should the American people care about what you're trying to do with Force of the Future? SEC. CARTER:  Well, they care about having, in the future, as they have now, the finest fighting force the world has ever known.  That's what protecting them tonight; that's what's fighting ISIL; that's what is keeping the peace and making a better world for our children everywhere in the world. Now, we have, today, the best. In addition to using that wisely, as we do, we need to make sure that ten years, 20 years from now, since we don't know what the future will hold, that we have the very best men, also. That means attracting the people who are young people today to be part of our future. So, my job, as secretary of Defense, on behalf of our people is to -- both to deal with today's crisis and to leave behind me, to my successor and my successor's successor as fine a fighting force as it is my privilege to lead. And we're good for lots of reasons.  We're good because we have great technology, we're good because we stand for great values, we're good because we have lots of friends around the world, because people like working with Americans. But the chief reason we're the best is because we have the best people.  Now, you say this is kind of an abstract thing; maybe it is to most Americans, but I don't want them to think that way.  I want them to think that -- as many Americans, in fact, do -- how can I make a contribution? Many of them saw what happened in Paris over the weekend, and I was talking to a group of college students today, and I hope they're asking themselves, how can I contribute to making a better world? Some of them will join the military, but that's not the only way they can contribute.  They could join DOD in other ways.  And -- but I want to create as many different avenues as I can, to make sure that the talented people who are part of our future join our force. And the last thing is, Ryan, I mean, it may be abstract in some way to the general citizen, but for our millions of people -- military, civilian, and by the way, contractors who do a lot of our work as well -- that's what they do in life.  And they want to -- I need to make sure that they continue to improve themselves, keep up with the latest technology, get advanced degrees.  That they have opportunities to take care of their families, to have children if they want to have children. And that -- to the extent I can, consistent with military needs and with the profession of arms,

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter talks Pacific rebalance in Joint Base Pearl Harbor Hickam; and Yokota Air Base serves an essential role in Vigilant Ace 16.

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter​ meets with China's National Defense Minister; and Yokota Air Base​ opens exercise Vigilant Ace 16.

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter​ holds a joint press conference with Republic of Korea Defense Minister, and the newly appointed Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Gen Joseph Dunford, Jr., visits the DMZ.

The Secretary of Defense Ash Carter​ and Indonesia's Minister of Defense meet at the Pentagon; and kids attempt to become legends at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni​.

Pacific Newsbreak: Secretary of Defense Ash Carter signs a SOFA agreement with Japan's Foreign Minister; Sailors strengthen partnerships at ‪CARAT‬ Bangladesh; USS Ronald Reagan (CVN 76) arrives at Commander Fleet Activities Yokosuka.

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter​ speaks on the importance of the Asia-Pacific; Navy divers take the mission below the surface in Thailand; and gamers get serious at Omnicon.

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter​ speaks on military children; and Commander, Fleet Activities Sasebo Japan​ Sailors train to fight shipboard fires.

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter addresses athletes, caregivers and other guests during the opening ceremonies of the 2015 Department of Defense Warrior Games in Quantico, VA, June 19. Over 250 competitors throughout the armed forces are participating in the games, which are designed to aid in the recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration of wounded, ill and injured service members.

Secretary of Defense Ash Carter attended and spoke to a room of delegates about topics from the Trans-Pacific-Partnership Agreement and about the increased activity in the South China Sea.

The 14th Asia Security Summit was held in Singapore over the weekend. Officials from around the region and elsewhere gathered to discuss key issues. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter attended and spoke to a room of delegates about topics from the Trans-Pacific-Partnership Agreement to increased activity in the South China Sea. Includes sound bites from Lee Hsien Loong, Singapore Prime Minister and Dr. Ashton Carter, Secretary of Defense. Also available in high definition.

Silicon Valley and the U.S. Department of Defense have had a long history of partnership -- including the government funding R&D that was commercialized by major companies and is now used by people everyday. But lately, there's been a more "commercial" evolution of technology, with both government and startups shifting focus in what they did (and didn't do) before. Where does this leave innovation around big ideas? In this segment of the a16z Podcast, we grabbed a few moments with U.S. Secretary of Defense Ash Carter to hear his thoughts on these and other questions. Including how startups should partner with the government -- one of the biggest IT buyers in the world -- as well as what security areas he thinks are important to work on. And: why he hates GPS.