Faster, Please! — The Podcast

My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,America is embarking upon a New Space Age, with companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin ready to partner with NASA to take Americans to a new frontier — possibly as far as Mars. Lately, however, the world is witnessing uncertainty surrounding NASA leadership and even an odd feud between SpaceX boss Elon Musk and the White House. At a critical time for US space competition, let's hope key players can stick the landing.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I chat with James Meigs about the SLS rocket, NASA reforms, and the evolving private sector landscape.Meigs is a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute. He is a contributing editor of City Journal and writer of the Tech Commentary column at Commentary magazine. He is also the former editor of Popular Mechanics.Meigs is the author of a recent report from the Manhattan Institute, U.S. Space Policy: The Next Frontier.In This Episode* So long, Jared Isaacman (1:29)* Public sector priorities (5:36)* Supporting the space ecosystem (11:52)* A new role for NASA (17:27)* American space leadership (21:17)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. So long, Jared Isaacman (1:29)The withdrawal of Jared Isaacman . . . has really been met with total dismay in the space community. Everyone felt like he was the right kind of change agent for the agency that desperately needs reform, but not destruction.Pethokoukis: We're going to talk a lot about your great space policy report, which you wrote before the withdrawal of President Trump's NASA nominee, Jared Isaacman.What do you think of that? Does that change your conclusions? Good move, bad move? Just sort of your general thoughts apart from the surprising nature of it.Meigs: I worked sort of on and off for about a year on this report for the Manhattan Institute about recommendations for space policy, and it just came out a couple of months ago and already it's a different world. So much has happened. The withdrawal of Jared Isaacman — or the yanking of his nomination — has really been met with total dismay in the space community. Everyone felt like he was the right kind of change agent for the agency that desperately needs reform, but not destruction.Now, it remains to be seen what happens in terms of his replacement, but it certainly pulled the rug out from under the idea that NASA could be reformed and yet stay on track for some ambitious goals. I'm trying to be cautiously optimistic that some of these things will happen, but my sense is that the White House is not particularly interested in space.Interestingly, Musk wasn't really that involved in his role of DOGE and stuff. He didn't spend that much time on NASA. He wasn't micromanaging NASA policy, and I don't think Isaacman would've been just a mouthpiece for Musk either. He showed a sense of independence. So it remains to be seen, but my recommendations . . . and I share this with a lot of people advocating reform, is that NASA more or less needs to get out of the rocket-building business, and the Space Launch System, this big overpriced rocket they've been working on for years — we may need to fly it two more times to get us back to the moon, but after that, that thing should be retired. If there's a way to retire it sooner, that would be great. At more than $4 billion a launch, it's simply not affordable, and NASA will not be an agency that can routinely send people into space if we're relying on that white elephant.To me what was exciting about Isaacman was his genuine enthusiasm about space. It seemed like he understood that NASA needed reform and changes to the budget, but that the result would be an agency that still does big things. Is there a fear that his replacement won't be interested in NASA creative destruction, just destruction?We don't know for sure, but the budget that's been proposed is pretty draconian, cutting NASA's funding by about a quarter and recommending particularly heavy cuts in the science missions, which would require cutting short some existing missions that are underway and not moving ahead with other planned missions.There is room for saving in some of these things. I advocate a more nimble approach to NASA's big science missions. Instead of sending one $4 billion rover to Mars every 20 years, once launch costs come down, how about we send ten little ones and if a couple of them don't make it, we could still be getting much more science done for the same price or less. So that's the kind of thing Isaacman was talking about, and that's the kind of thing that will be made possible as launch costs continue to fall, as you've written about, Jim. So it requires a new way of thinking at NASA. It requires a more entrepreneurial spirit and it remains to be seen whether another administrator can bring that along the way. We were hoping that Isaacman would.Public sector priorities (5:36)Congress has never deviated from focusing more on keeping these projects alive than on whether these projects achieve their goals.It seems to me that there are only two reasons, at this point, to be in favor of the SLS rocket. One: There's a political pork jobs aspect. And the other is that it's important to beat China to the moon, which the Artemis program is meant to do. Does that seem accurate?Pretty much, yeah. You can be for beating China the moon and still be against the SLS rocket, you kind of just grit your teeth and say, okay, we've got to fly it two more times because it would be hard to cobble together, in the timeframe available, a different approach — but not impossible. There are other heavy lift rockets. Once you can refuel in orbit and do other things, there's a lot of ways to get a heavy payload into orbit. When I started my report, it looked like SLS was the only game in town, but that's really not the case. There are other options.The Starship has to quit blowing up.I would've loved to have seen the last couple of Starship missions be a little more successful. That's unfortunate. The pork part of SLS just can't be underestimated. From the get go, going way back to when the Space Shuttle was retired in 2011, and even before to when after the Columbia Space Shuttle disaster — that's the second disaster — there was a really big effort to figure out how to replace the space shuttle, what would come next. There was a strong movement in Congress at that time to say, “Well, whatever you build, whatever you do, all the factories that are involved in working on the Space Shuttle, all of the huge workforces in NASA that work on the space shuttle, all of this manpower has to be retained.” And Congress talked a lot about keeping the experience, the expertise, the talent going.I can see some legitimacy to that argument, but if you looked at the world that way, then you would always focus on keeping the jobs of the past viable instead of the jobs of the future: What are we going to do with the blacksmiths who shoe horses? If we lose all this technological capability of shoeing horses . . . we'd better not bring in all these cars! That's an exaggeration, but as a result, first they aim to replace the Space Shuttle with a rocket called Constellation that would recycle some of the Shuttle components. And then eventually they realized that that was just too bloated, too expensive. That got canceled during the Obama administration replaced with the Space Launch System, which is supposed to be cheaper, more efficient, able to be built in a reasonable amount of time.It wound up being just as bloated and also technologically backward. They're still keeping technology from the Shuttle era. The solid fuel engines, which, as we recall from the first Shuttle disaster, were problematic, and the Shuttle main engine design as well. So when SLS flies with humans on board for the first time, supposedly next year, it'll be using technology that was designed before any of the astronauts were even born.In this day and age, that's kind of mind-blowing, and it will retain these enormous workforces in these plants that happen to be located in states with powerful lawmakers. So there's an incredible incentive to just keep it all going, not to let things change, not to let anything be retired, and to keep that money flowing to contractors, to workers and to individual states. Congress has never deviated from focusing more on keeping these projects alive than on whether these projects achieve their goals.I've seen a video of congressional hearings from 15 years ago, and the hostility toward the idea of there being a private-sector alternative to NASA, now it seems almost inexplicable seeing that even some of these people were Republicans from Texas.Seeing where we are now, it's just amazing because now that we have the private sector, we're seeing innovation, we're seeing the drop in launch costs, the reusability — just a completely different world than what existed 15, 16, 17 years ago.I don't think people really realize how revolutionary NASA's commercial programs were. They really sort of snuck them in quietly at first, starting as far back as 2005, a small program to help companies develop their own space transportation systems that could deliver cargo to the International Space Station.SpaceX was initially not necessarily considered a leader in that. It was a little startup company nobody took very seriously, but they wound up doing the best job. Then later they also led the race to be the first to deliver astronauts to the International Space Station, saved NASA billions of dollars, and helped launch this private-industry revolution in space that we're seeing today that's really exciting.It's easy to say, “Oh, NASA's just this old sclerotic bureaucracy,” and there's some truth to that, but NASA has always had a lot of innovative people, and a lot of the pressure of the push to move to this commercial approach where NASA essentially charters a rocket the way you would charter a fishing boat rather than trying to build and own its own equipment. That's the key distinction. You've got to give them credit for that and you also have to give SpaceX enormous credit for endless technological innovation that has brought down these prices.So I totally agree, it's inconceivable to think of trying to run NASA today without their commercial partners. Of course, we'd like to see more than just SpaceX in there. That's been a surprise to people. In a weird way, SpaceX's success is a problem because you want an ecosystem of competitors that NASA can choose from, not just one dominant supplier.Supporting the space ecosystem (11:52)There's a reason that the private space industry is booming in the US much more than elsewhere in the world. But I think they could do better and I'd like to see reform there.Other than the technical difficulty of the task, is there something government could be doing or not doing, perhaps on the regulatory side, to encourage a more sort of a bigger, more vibrant space ecosystem.In my Manhattan Institute report, I recommend some changes, particularly, the FAA needs to continue reforming its launch regulations. They're more restrictive and take longer than they should. I think they're making some progress. They recently authorized more launches of the experimental SpaceX Starship, but it shouldn't take months to go through the paperwork to authorize the launch of a new spacecraft.I think the US, we're currently better than most countries in terms of allowing private space. There's a reason that the private space industry is booming in the US much more than elsewhere in the world. But I think they could do better and I'd like to see reform there.I also think NASA needs to continue its efforts to work with a wide range of vendors in this commercial paradigm and accept that a lot of them might not pan out. We've seen a really neat NASA program to help a lot of different companies, but a lot of startups have been involved in trying to build and land small rovers on the moon. Well, a lot of them have crashed.Not an easy task apparently.No. When I used to be editor of Popular Mechanics magazine, one of the great things I got to do was hang out with Buzz Aldrin, and Buzz Aldrin talking about landing on the moon — now, looking back, you realize just how insanely risky that was. You see all these rovers designed today with all the modern technology failing to land a much smaller, lighter object safely on the moon, and you just think, “Wow, that was an incredible accomplishment.” And you have so much admiration for the guts of the guys who did it.As they always say, space is hard, and I think NASA working with commercial vendors to help them, give them some seed money, help them get started, pay them a set fee for the mission that you're asking for, but also build into your planning — just the way an entrepreneur would — that some product launches aren't going to work, some ideas are going to fail, sometimes you're going to have to start over. That's just part of the process, and if you're not spending ridiculous amounts of money, that's okay.When we talk about vendors, who are we talking about? When we talk about this ecosystem as it currently exists, what do these companies do besides SpaceX?The big one that everybody always mentions first, of course, is Blue Origin, Jeff Bezos's startup that's been around as long as SpaceX, but just moved much more slowly. Partly because when it first started up, it was almost as much of a think tank to explore different ideas about space and less of a scrappy startup trying to just make money by launching satellites for paying customers as soon as possible. That was Musk's model. But they've finally launched. They've launched a bunch of suborbital flights, you've seen where they carry various celebrities and stuff up to the edge of space for a few minutes and they come right back down. That's been a chance for them to test out their engines, which have seemed solid and reliable, but they've finally done one mission with their New Glenn rocket. Like SpaceX, it's a reusable rocket which can launch pretty heavy payloads. Once that gets proven and they've had a few more launches under their belt, should be an important part of this ecosystem.But you've got other companies, you've got Stoke Aerospace, you've got Firefly . . . You've got a few companies that are in the launch business, so they want to compete with SpaceX to launch mostly satellites for paying customers, also cargo for payloads for governments. And then you have a lot of other companies that are doing various kinds of space services and they're not necessarily going to try to be in the launch business per se. We don't need 40 different companies doing launches with different engines, different designs, different fuels, and stuff like that. Eight or 10 might be great, six might be great. We'll see how the market sorts out.But then if you look at the development of the auto industry, it started with probably hundreds of little small shops, hand-building cars, but by the mid-century it had settled down to a few big companies through consolidation. And instead of hundreds of engine designs that were given 1950, there were probably in the US, I don't know, 12 engine designs or something like that. Stuff got standardized — we'll see the same thing happen in space — but you also saw an enormous ecosystem of companies building batteries, tires, transmissions, parts, wipers, all sorts of little things and servicing in an industry to service the automobile. Now, rockets are a lot more centralized and high-tech, but you're going to see something like that in the space economy, and it's already happening.A new role for NASA (17:27)I think NASA should get more ambitious in deep-space flight, both crewed and uncrewed.What do you see NASA should be doing? We don't want them designing rockets anymore, so what should they do? What does that portfolio look like?That's an excellent question. I think that we are in this pivotal time when, because of the success of SpaceX, and hopefully soon other vendors, they can relieve themselves of that responsibility to build their own rockets. That gets out of a lot of the problems of Congress meddling to maximize pork flowing to their states and all of that kind of stuff. So that's a positive in itself.Perhaps a bug rather than a feature for Congress.Right, but it also means that technology will move much, much faster as private companies are innovating and competing with each other. That gives NASA an opportunity. What should they do with it? I think NASA should get more ambitious in deep-space flight, both crewed and uncrewed. Because it'll get much cheaper to get cargo into orbit to get payload up there, as I said, they can launch more science missions, and then when it comes to human missions, I like the overall plan of Artemis. The details were really pulled together during the first Trump administration, which had a really good space policy overall, which is to return to the moon, set up a permanent or long-term habitation on the moon. The way NASA sketches it out, not all the burden is carried by NASA.They envision — or did envision — a kind of ecosystem on the moon where you might have private vendors there providing services. You might have a company that mines ice and makes oxygen, and fuel, and water for the residents of these space stations. You might have somebody else building habitation that could be used by visiting scientists who are not NASA astronauts, but also used by NASA.There's all this possibility to combine what NASA does with the private sector, and what NASA should always do is be focused on the stuff the private sector can't yet do. That would be the deep-space probes. That would be sending astronauts on the most daring non-routine missions. As the private sector develops the ability to do some of those things, then NASA can move on to the next thing. That's one set of goals.Another set of goals is to do the research into technologies, things that are hard for the private sector to undertake. In particular, things like new propulsion for deep-space travel. There's a couple of different designs for nuclear rocket engines that I think are really promising, super efficient. Sadly, under the current budget cuts that are proposed at NASA, that's one of the programs that's being cut, and if you really want to do deep space travel routinely, ultimately, chemical fuels, they're not impossible, but they're not as feasible because you've got to get all that heavy — whatever your fuel is, methane or whatever it is — up into either into orbit or you've got to manufacture it on the moon or somewhere. The energy density of plutonium or uranium is just so much higher and it just allows you to do so much more with lighter weight. So I'd like to see them research those kinds of things that no individual private company could really afford to do at this point, and then when the technology is more mature, hand it off to the private sector.American space leadership (21:17)Exploration's never been totally safe, and if people want to take risks on behalf of a spirit of adventure and on behalf of humanity at large, I say we let them.If things go well —reforms, funding, lower launch costs — what does America's role in space look like in 10 to 15 years, and what's your concern if things go a darker route, like cutting nuclear engine research you were just talking about?I'll sketch out the bright scenario. This is very up your alley, Jim.Yeah, I viewed this as a good thing, so you tell me what it is.In 15 years I would love to see a small permanent colony at the south pole of the moon where you can harvest ice from the craters and maybe you'd have some habitation there, maybe even a little bit of space tourism starting up. People turn up their nose at space tourism, but it's a great way to help fund really important research. Remember the Golden Age of Exploration, James Cook and Darwin, those expeditions were self-funded. They were funded by rich people. If rich people want to go to space, I say I'm all for it.So a little base on the moon, important research going on, we're learning how to have people live on a foreign body, NASA is gathering tons of information and training for the next goal, which I think is even more important: I do agree we should get people to Mars. I don't think we should bypass the moon to get to Mars, I don't think that's feasible, that's what Elon Musk keeps suggesting. I think it's too soon for that. We want to learn about how people handle living off-planet for a long period of time closer to home — and how to mine ice and how to do all these things — closer to home, three or four days away, not months and months away. If something goes wrong, they'll be a lot more accessible.But I'd like to see, by then, some Mars missions and maybe an attempt to start the first long-term habitation of Mars. I don't think we're going to see that in 10 years, but I think that's a great goal, and I don't think it's a goal that taxpayers should be expected to fund 100 percent. I think by then we should see even more partnerships where the private companies that really want to do this — and I'm looking at Elon Musk because he's been talking about it for 20 years — they should shoulder a lot of the costs of that. If they see a benefit in that, they should also bear some of the costs. So that's the bright scenario.Along with that, all kinds of stuff going on in low-earth orbit: manufacturing drugs, seeing if you can harness solar energy, private space stations, better communications, and a robust science program exploring deep space with unmanned spacecraft. I'd like to see all of that. I think that could be done for a reasonable amount of money with the proper planning.The darker scenario is that we've just had too much chaos and indecision in NASA for years. We think of NASA as being this agency of great exploration, but they've done very little for 20 years . . . I take that back — NASA's uncrewed space program has had a lot of successes. It's done some great stuff. But when it comes to manned space flight, it's pretty much just been the International Space Station, and I think we've gotten most of the benefit out of that. They're planning to retire that in 2030. So then what happens? After we retired the Space Shuttle, space practically went into a very low-growth period. We haven't had a human being outside of low-earth orbit since Apollo, and that's embarrassing, frankly. We should be much more ambitious.I'm afraid we're entering a period where, without strong leadership and without a strong focus on really grand goals, then Congress will reassert its desire to use NASA as a piggy bank for their states and districts and aerospace manufacturers will build the stuff they're asked to build, but nothing will move very quickly. That's the worst-case scenario. We'll see, but right now, with all of the kind of disorder in Washington, I think we are in a period where we should be concerned.Can America still call itself the world's space leader if its role is mainly launching things into Earth orbit, with private companies running space stations for activities like drug testing or movie production if, meanwhile, China is building space stations and establishing a presence on the Moon? In that scenario, doesn't it seem like China is the world's leader in space?That's a real issue. China has a coherent nationalistic plan for space, and they are pursuing it, they're pouring a lot of resources into it, and they're making a lot of headway. As always, when China rolls out its new, cutting-edge technology, it usually looks a lot like something originally built in the US, and they're certainly following SpaceX's model as closely as they can in terms of reusable rockets right now.China wants to get to the moon. They see this as a space race the way the Soviets saw a space race. It's a battle for national prestige. One thing that worries me, is under the Artemis plan during the first Trump administration, there was also something called the Artemis Accords — it still exists — which is an international agreement among countries to A) join in where they can if they want, with various American initiatives. So we've got partners that we're planning to build different parts of the Artemis program, including a space station around the moon called Gateway, which actually isn't the greatest idea, but the European Space Agency and others were involved in helping build it.But also, all these countries, more than 50 countries have signed on to these aspirational goals of the Artemis Accords, which are: freedom of navigation, shared use of space, going for purposes of peaceful exploration, being transparent about what you're doing in space so that other countries can see it, avoiding generating more space junk, space debris, which is a huge problem with all the stuff we've got up there now, including a lot of old decrepit satellites and rocket bodies. So committing to not just leaving your upper-stage rocket bodies drifting around in space. A lot of different good goals, and the fact that all these countries wanted to join in on this shows America's preeminence. But if we back away, or become chaotic, or start disrespecting those allies who've signed on, they're going to look for another partner in space and China is going to roll out the red carpet for them.You get a phone call from SpaceX. They've made some great leap forwards. That Starship, it's ready to go to Mars. They're going to create a human habitation out there. They need a journalist. By the way, it's a one-way trip. Do you go?I don't go to Mars. I've got family here. That comes first for me. But I know some people want to do that, and I think that we should celebrate that. The space journalist Rand Simberg wrote a book years ago called Safe Is Not An Option — that we should not be too hung up on trying to make space exploration totally safe. Exploration's never been totally safe, and if people want to take risks on behalf of a spirit of adventure and on behalf of humanity at large, I say we let them. So maybe that first trip to Mars is a one-way trip, or at least a one-way for a couple of years until more flights become feasible and more back-and-forth return flights become something that can be done routinely. It doesn't really appeal to me, but it'll appeal to somebody, and I'm glad we have those kinds of people in our society.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedMicro Reads▶ Economics* Trump economy shows surprising resilience despite tariff impacts - Wapo* Supply Chains Become New Battleground in the Global Trade War - WSJ* This A.I. Company Wants to Take Your Job - NYT* The Mirage of Geoeconomics - PS* Japan urged to use gloomier population forecasts after plunge in births - FT* Europe's nuclear fusion potential draws record investment round - FT▶ Business* How Disney's AI lawsuit could shift the future of entertainment - Wapo* Meta plans big bet on AI's secret ingredient: human brains - FT* Nvidia and Perplexity Team Up in European AI Push - WSJ* CRMArena-Pro: Holistic Assessment of LLM Agents Across Diverse Business Scenarios and Interactions - Arxiv* Fervo Snags $206 Million for Cape Station Geothermal - Heatmap* BYD launches cut-price EVs in Europe amid global price war - Semafor▶ Policy/Politics* The right refuses to take AI seriously - Vox* The Gig Economy Benefits Freelance Workers—Until Regulation Steps In - AEI* The war is on for Congress' AI law ban - The Verge* Disney and Universal Sue AI Company Midjourney for Copyright Infringement - Wired* Big Tech Is Finally Losing - NYT Opinion* American Science's Culture Has Contributed to the Grave Threat It Now Faces - Real Clear Science▶ AI/Digital* New Apple study challenges whether AI models truly “reason” through problems - Ars* The problem of AI chatbots telling people what they want to hear - FT* With the launch of o3-pro, let's talk about what AI “reasoning” actually does - Ars* ‘This is coming for everyone': A new kind of AI bot takes over the web - Wapo* Europe's AI computing shortage ‘will be resolved' soon, says Nvidia chief - FT* We're Not Ready for the AI Power Surge - Free Press▶ Biotech/Health* Pancreatic cancer vaccine eradicates trace of disease in early trials - New Atlas* World first: brain implant lets man speak with expression — and sing - Nature* The Alzheimer's drug pipeline is healthier than you might think - The Economist▶ Clean Energy/Climate* Big Tech Cares About Clean Energy Tax Credits — But Maybe Not Enough - Heatmap* Nvidia ‘Climate in a Bottle' Opens a View Into Earth's Future. What Will We Do With It? - WSJ* Oil's Lost Decade Is About to Be Repeated - Bberg Opinion* How the Pentagon Secretly Sparked America's Clean Energy Boom - The Debrief▶ Space/Transportation* Musk-Trump feud is a wake-up call on space - FT* Trump's 2026 budget cuts would force the world's most powerful solar telescope to close - Space▶ Up Wing/Down Wing* ‘Invasive Species'? Japan's Growing Pains on Immigration - Bberg Opinion* Incredible Testimonies - Aeon* How and When Was the Wheel Invented? - Real Clear Science▶ Substacks/Newsletters* Trump's "beautiful" bill wrecks our energy future - Slow Boring* DOGE Looked Broken Before the Trump-Musk Breakup - The Dispatch* Steve Teles on abundance: prehistory, present, and future - The Permanent Problem* Is Macroeconomics a Mature Science? - Conversable EconomistFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. 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My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,As we seemingly grow closer to achieving artificial general intelligence — machines that are smarter than humans at basically everything — we might be incurring some serious geopolitical risks.In the paper Superintelligence Strategy, his joint project with former Google CEO Eric Schmidt and Alexandr Wang, Dan Hendrycks introduces the idea of Mutual Assured AI Malfunction: a system of deterrence where any state's attempt at total AI dominance is sabotaged by its peers. From the abstract: Just as nations once developed nuclear strategies to secure their survival, we now need a coherent superintelligence strategy to navigate a new period of transformative change. We introduce the concept of Mutual Assured AI Malfunction (MAIM): a deterrence regime resembling nuclear mutual assured destruction (MAD) where any state's aggressive bid for unilateral AI dominance is met with preventive sabotage by rivals. Given the relative ease of sabotaging a destabilizing AI project—through interventions ranging from covert cyberattacks to potential kinetic strikes on datacenters—MAIM already describes the strategic picture AI superpowers find themselves in. Alongside this, states can increase their competitiveness by bolstering their economies and militaries through AI, and they can engage in nonproliferation to rogue actors to keep weaponizable AI capabilities out of their hands. Taken together, the three-part framework of deterrence, nonproliferation, and competitiveness outlines a robust strategy to superintelligence in the years ahead.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Hendrycks about the potential threats posed by superintelligent AI in the hands of state and rogue adversaries, and what a strong deterrence strategy might look like.Hendrycks is the executive director of the Center for AI Safety. He is an advisor to Elon Musk's xAI and Scale AI, and is a prolific researcher and writer.In This Episode* Development of AI capabilities (1:34)* Strategically relevant capabilities (6:00)* Learning from the Cold War (16:12)* Race for strategic advantage (18:56)* Doomsday scenario (28:18)* Maximal progress, minimal risk (33:25)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Development of AI capabilities (1:34). . . mostly the systems aren't that impressive currently. People use them to some extent, but I'd more emphasize the trajectory that we're on rather than the current capabilities.Pethokoukis: How would you compare your view of AI . . . as a powerful technology with economic, national security, and broader societal implications . . . today versus November of 2022 when OpenAI rolled out ChatGPT?Hendrycks: I think that the main difference now is that we have the reasoning paradigm. Back in 2022, GPT couldn't think for an extended period of time before answering and try out multiple different ways of dissolving a problem. The main new capability is its ability to handle more complicated reasoning and science, technology, engineering, mathematics sorts of tasks. It's a lot better at coding, it's a lot better at graduate school mathematics, and physics, and virology.An implication of that for national security is that AIs have some virology capabilities that they didn't before, and virology is dual-use that can be used for civilian applications and weaponization applications. That's a new concerning capability that they have, but I think, overall, the AI systems are still fairly similar in their capabilities profile. They're better in lots of different ways, but not substantially.I think the next large shift is when they can be agents, when they can operate more autonomously, when they can book you flights reliably, make PowerPoints, play through long-form games for extended periods of time, and that seems like it's potentially on the horizon this year. It didn't seem like that two years ago. That's something that a lot of people are keeping an eye on and think could be arriving fairly soon. Overall, I think the capabilities profile is mostly the same except now it has some dual-use capabilities that they didn't have earlier, in particular virology capabilities.To what extent are your national security concerns based on the capabilities of the technology as it is today versus where you think it will be in five years? This is also a way of me asking about the extent that you view AGI as a useful framing device — so this is also a question about your timeline.I think that mostly the systems aren't that impressive currently. People use them to some extent, but I'd more emphasize the trajectory that we're on rather than the current capabilities. They still can't do very interesting cyber offense, for instance. The virology capabilities is very recent. We just, I think maybe a week ago, put out a study with SecureBio from MIT where we had Harvard, MIT virology postdocs doing wet lab skills, trying to work on viruses. So, “Here's a picture of my petri dish, I heated it to 37 degrees, what went wrong? Help me troubleshoot, help me guide me through this step by step.” We were seeing that it was getting around 95th percentile compared to those Harvard-MIT virology postdocs in their area of expertise. This is not a capability that the models had two years ago.That is a national security concern, but I think most of the national security concerns where it's strategically relevant, where it can be used for more targeted weapons, where it affects the basis of a nation's power, I think that's something that happens in the next, say, two to five years. I think that's what we mostly need to be thinking about. I'm not particularly trying to raise the alarm saying that the AI systems right now are extremely scary in all these different ways because they're not even agential. They can't book flights yet.Strategically relevant capabilities (6:00). . . when thinking about the future of AI . . . it's useful to think in terms of specific capabilities, strategically-relevant capabilities, as opposed to when is it truly intelligent . . .So that two-to-five-year timeline — and you can debate whether this is a good way of thinking about it — is that a trajectory or timeline to something that could be called “human-level AI” — you can define that any way you want — and what are the capabilities that make AI potentially dangerous and a strategic player when thinking about national security?I think having a monolithic term for AGI or for advanced AI systems is a little difficult, largely because there's been a consistently-moving goalpost. So right now people say, “AIs are dumb because they can't do this and that.” They can't play video games at the level of a teenager, they can't code for a day-long project, and things like that. Neither can my grandmother. That doesn't mean that she's not human-level intelligence, it's just a lot of people don't have some of these capabilities.I think when thinking about the future of AI, especially when thinking about national security, it's useful to think in terms of specific capabilities, strategically-relevant capabilities, as opposed to when is it truly intelligent or something like that. This is because the capabilities of AI systems are very jagged: they're good at some things and terrible at others. They can't fold clothes that reliably — most of the AI can't —and they're okay at driving in some cities but not others, but they can solve really difficult mathematics problems, they can write really long essays and provide pretty good legal analysis very rapidly, and they can also forecast geopolitical events better than most forecasters. It's a really weird capabilities profile.When I'm thinking about national security from a malicious-use standpoint, I'm thinking about weapon capabilities, I'm thinking about cyber-offensive capabilities, which they don't yet have, but that's an important one to track, and, outside of malicious use, I'm thinking about what's their ability to do AI research and how much of that can they automate? Because if they can automate AI research, then you could just run 100,000 of these artificial AGI researchers to build the next generations of AGI, and that could get very explosive extremely quickly. You're moving from human-speed research to machine-speed research. They're typing 100 times faster than people, they're running tons of experiments simultaneously. That could be quite explosive, and that's something that the founders of AI pointed at as a really relevant capability, like Alan Turing and others, where that's you could have a potential loss-of-control type of event is with this sort of runaway process of AI's building future generations of AIs quite rapidly.So that's another capability. What fraction of AI research can they automate? For weaponization, I think if it gets extremely smart, able to do research in lots of other sorts of fields, then that would raise concerns of its ability to be used to disrupt the balance of power. For instance, if it can do research well, perhaps it could come up with a breakthrough that makes oceans more transparent so we can find where nuclear submarines are or find the mobile launches extremely reliably, or a breakthrough in driving down the cost by some orders of magnitude of anti-ballistic missile systems, which would disrupt having a secure second-strike, and these would be very geopolitically salient. To do those things, though, that seems like a bundle of capabilities as opposed to a specific thing like cyber-offensive capabilities, but those are the things that I'm thinking about that can really disrupt the geopolitical landscape.If we put them in a bucket called, to use your phrase, “strategically-relevant capabilities,” are we on a trajectory of a data- and computing-power-driven trajectory to those capabilities? Or do there need to be one or two key innovations before those relevant capabilities are possible?It doesn't seem like it currently that we need some new big insights, in large part because the rate of improvement is pretty good. So if we look at their coding capabilities — there's a benchmark called SWE-bench verified (SWE is software engineering). Given a set of coding tasks — and this benchmark was weighed in some years ago — the models are poised to get something like 90 percent on this this summer. Right now they're in this 60 percent range. If we just extrapolate the trend line out some more months, then they'll be doing nine out of 10 of those software engineering tasks that were set some years ago. That doesn't mean that that's the entirety of software engineering. Still need coders. It's not 100 percent, obviously, but that suggests that the capability is still improving fairly rapidly in some of these domains. And likewise, with their ability to play that take games that take 20-plus hours, a few months ago they couldn't — Pokémon, for instance, is something that kids play and that takes 20 hours or so to beat. The models from a few months ago couldn't beat the game. Now, the current models can beat the game, but it takes them a few hundred hours. It would not surprise me if in a few months they'll get it down to around human-level on the order of tens of hours, and then from there they'll be able to play harder and harder sorts of games that take longer periods of time, and I think that this would be indicative of higher general capabilities.I think that there's a lot of steam in the current way that things are being done and I think that they've been trapped at the floor in their agent capabilities for a while, but I think we're starting to see the shift. I think that most people at the major AI companies would also think that agents are on the horizon and I don't think they were thinking that, myself included, a year ago. We were not seeing the signs that we're seeing now.So what we're talking about is AIs is having, to use your phrase, which I like, “strategically-relevant capabilities” on a timeline that is soon enough that we should be having the kinds of conversations and the kind of thinking that you put forward in Superintelligence [Strategy]. We should be thinking about that right now very seriously.Yeah, it's very difficult to wrap one's head around because, unlike other domains, AI is much more general and broad in its impacts. So if one's thinking about nuclear strategy, you obviously need to think about bombs going off, and survivability, and second strike. The failure modes are: one state strikes the other, and then there's also, in the civilian applications, fissile material leaking or there being a nuclear power plant meltdown. That's the scenario space, there's what states can do and then there's also some of these civilian application issues.Meanwhile, with AI, we've got much more than power plants melting down or bombs going off. We've got to think about how it transforms the economy, how it transforms people's private life, the sort of issues with them being sentient. We've got to think about it potentially disrupting mutual assured destruction. We've got to think about the AIs themselves being threats. We've got to think about regulations for autonomous AI agents and who's accountable. We've got to think about this open-weight, closed-weight issue. We've got, I think, a larger host of issues that touch on all the important spheres society. So it's not a very delimited problem and I think it's a very large pill to swallow, this possibility that it will be not just strategically relevant but strategically decisive this decade.Consequently, and thinking a little bit beforehand about it is, useful. Otherwise, if we just ignore it, I think we reality will slap us across the face and AI will hit us like a truck, and then we're going, “Wow, I wish we did something, had some more break-glass measures at a time right now, but the cupboard is bare in terms of strategic options because we didn't do some prudent things a while ago, or we didn't even bother thinking about what those are.”I keep thinking of the Situation Room in two years and they get news that China's doing some new big AI project, and it's fairly secretive, and then in the Situation Room they're thinking, “Okay, what do we know?” And the answer is nothing. We don't have really anybody on this. We're not collecting any information about this. We didn't have many concerted programs in the IC really tracking this, so we're flying blind. I really don't want to be in that situationLearning from the Cold War (16:12). . . mutual assured destruction is an ugly reality that took decision-makers a long time to internalize, but that's just what the game theory showed would make the most sense. As I'm sure you know, throughout the course of the Cold War, there was a considerable amount of time and money spent on thinking about these kinds of problems. I went to college just before the end of the Cold War and I took an undergraduate class on nuclear war theory. There was a lot of thinking. To what extent does that volume of research and analysis over the course of a half-century, to what extent is that helpful for what you're trying to accomplish here?I think it's very fortunate that, because of the Cold War, a lot of people started getting more of a sense of game theory and when it's rational to conflict versus negotiate, and offense can provide a good defense, some of these counterintuitive things. I think mutual assured destruction is an ugly reality that took decision-makers a long time to internalize, but that's just what the game theory showed would make the most sense. Hopefully we'll do a lot better with AI because strategic thinking can be a lot more precise and some of these things that are initially counterintuitive, if you reason through them, you go, actually no, this makes a lot of sense. We're trying to shape each other's intentions in this kind of complicated way. I think that makes us much better poised to address these geopolitical issues than last time.I think of the Soviets, for instance, when talking about anti-ballistic missile systems. At one point, I forget who said that offense is immoral, defense is moral. So pointing these nuclear weapons at each other, this is the immoral thing. We need missile-defense systems. That's the moral option. It's just like, no, this is just going to eat up all of our budget. We're going to keep building these defense systems and it's not going to make us safer, we're just going to be spending more and more.That was not intuitive. Offense does feel viscerally more mean, hostile, but that's what you want. That's what you want, to preserve for strategic stability. I think that a lot of the thinking is helpful with that, and I think the education for appreciating the strategic dynamics is more in the water, it's more diffused across the decision-makers now, and I think that that's great.Race for strategic advantage (18:56)There is also a risk that China builds [AGI] first, so I think what we want to do in the US is build up the capabilities to surgically prevent them . . .I was recently reviewing a scenario slash world-building exercise among technologists, economists, forecasting people, and they were looking at various scenarios assuming that we're able to, on a rather short timeline, develop what they termed AGI. And one of the scenarios was that the US gets there first . . . probably not by very long, but the US got there first. I don't know how far China was behind, but that gave us the capability to sort of dictate terms to China about what their foreign policy would be: You're going to leave Taiwan alone . . . So it gave us an amazing strategic advantage.I'm sure there are a lot of American policymakers who would read that scenario and say, “That's the dream,” that we are able to accelerate progress, that we are able to get there first, we can dictate foreign policy terms to China, game over, we win. If I've read Superintelligence correctly, that scenario would play out in a far more complicated way than what I've just described.I think so. I think any bid for being a, not just unipolar force, but having a near-strategic-monopoly on power and able to cause all other superpowers to capitulate in arbitrary ways, concerns the other superpower. There is also a risk that China builds it first, so I think what we want to do in the US is build up the capabilities to surgically prevent them, if they are near or eminently going to gain a decisive advantage that would become durable and sustained over us, we want the ability to prevent that.There's a variety of ways one can do things. There's the classic grayer ways like arson, and cutting wires in data centers, and things like that, or for power plants . . . There's cyber offense, and there's other sorts of kinetic sabotage, but we want it nice and surgical and having a good, credible threat so that we can deter that from happening and shaping their intentions.I think it will be difficult to limit their capabilities, their ability to build these powerful systems, but I think being able to shape their intentions is something that is more tractable. They will be building powerful AI systems, but if they are making an attempt at leapfrogging us in a way that we never catch up and lose our standing and they get AIs that could also potentially disrupt MAD, for instance, we want to be able to prevent that. That is an important strategic priority, is developing a credible deterrent and saying there are some AI scenarios that are totally unacceptable to us and we want to block them off through credible threats.They'll do the same to us, as well, and they can do it more easily to us. They know what's going on at all of our AI companies, and this will not change because we have a double digit percentage of the employees who are Chinese nationals, easily extortable, they have family back home, and the companies do not have good information security — that will probably not change because that will slow them down if they really try and lock them up and move everybody to North Dakota or wherever to work in the middle of nowhere and have everything air-gapped. We are an open book to them and I think they can make very credible threats for sabotage and preventing that type of outcome.If we are making a bid for dictating their foreign policy and all of this, if we're making a bid for a strategic monopoly on power, they will not sit idly by, they will not take kindly to that when they recognize the stakes. If the US were to do a $500 billion program to achieve this faster than them, that would not go unnoticed. There's not a way of hiding that.But we are trying to achieve it faster than them.I would distinguish between trying to develop just generally more capable AI technologies than some of these strategically relevant capabilities or some of these strategically relevant programs. Like if we get AI systems that are generally useful for healthcare and for . . . whatever your pet cause area, we can have that. That is different from applying the AI systems to rapidly build the next generation of AIs, and the next generation of that. Just imagine if you have, right now, OpenAI's got a few hundred AI researchers, imagine if you've got ones that are at that level that are artificial, AGI-type of researchers or are artificial researchers. You run 10,000, 100,000 thousand of them, they're operating around the clock at a hundred X speed, I think expecting a decade's worth of development compressed or telescoped into a year, that seems very plausible — not certain, but certainly double-digit percent chance.China or Russia for instance, would perceive that as, “This is really risky. They could get a huge leap from this because these rate of development will be so high that we could never catch up,” and they could use their new gains to clobber us. Or, if they don't control it, then we're also dead, or lose our power. So if the US controls it, China would reason that, “Our survival is threatened and how we do things is threatened,” and if they lose control of it, “Our survival is also threatened.” Either way, provided that this automated AI research and development loop produces some extremely powerful AI systems, China would be fearing for their survival.It's not just China: India, the global south, all the other countries, if they're more attuned to this situation, would be very concerned. Russia as well. Russia doesn't have the hope about competing, they don't have a $100 billion data centers, they're busy with Ukraine, and when they're finished with that, they may reassess it, but they're too many years behind. I think the best they can do is actually try and shape other states' intents rather than try to make a bid for outcompeting them.If we're thinking about deterrence and what you call Mutually Assured AI Malfunction [MAIM], there's a capability aspect that we want to make sure that we would have the capability to check that kind of dash for dominance. But there's also a communication aspect where both sides have to understand and trust what the other side is trying to do, which was a key part of classic Cold War deterrence. Is that happening?Information problems, yeah, if there's worse information then that can lead to conflict. I think China doesn't really need to worry about their access to information of what's going on. I think the US will need to develop more of its capabilities to have more reliable signals abroad. But I think there's different ways of getting information and producing misunderstandings, like the confidence-building measures, all these sorts of things. I think that the unilateral one is just espionage, and then the multilateral one is verification mechanisms and building some of that institutional or international infrastructure.I think the first step in all of this is the states need to at least take matters into their own hands by building up these unilateral options, the unilateral option to prevent adversaries from doing a dash for domination and also know what's going on with each other's projects. I think that's what the US should focus on right now. Later on, as the salience of AI increases, I think then just international discussions to increase more strategic stability around this would be more plausible to emerge. But if they're not trying to take basic things to defend themselves and protect their own security, then I don't think international stuff that makes that much sense. That's kind of out of order.Doomsday scenario (28:18)If our institutions wake up to this more and do some of the basic stuff . . . to prevent another state dominating the other, I think that will make this go quite a bit better. . .I have in my notes here that you think there's an 80 percent chance that an AI arms race would result in a catastrophe that would kill most of humanity. Do I have that right?I think it's not necessarily just the race. Let's think of people's probabilities for this. There's a wide spectrum of probability. Elon, who I work with at xAI, a company I advise, xAI is his company, Elon thinks it's generally on the order of 20 to 30 percent. Dario Amodei, the CEO of philanthropic, I think thinks it's around 20 percent, as well. Sam Altman around 10 percent. I think it's more likely than not that this doesn't go that well for people, but there's a lot of tractability and a lot of volatility here.If our institutions wake up to this more and do some of the basic stuff of knowing what's going on and sharpen your ability to have credible threats, credible, targeted threats to prevent another state dominating the other, I think that will make this go quite a bit better. . . I think if we went back in time in the 1940s and were saying, “Do we think that this whole nuclear thing is going to turn out well in 50 years?” I think we actually got a little lucky. I mean the Cuban Missile Crisis itself was . . .There were a lot of bad moments in the '60s. There were quite a few . . .I think it's more likely than not, but there's substantial tractability and it's important not to be fatalistic about it or just deny it's an issue, itself. I think it's like, do we think AI will go well? I don't know, it depends on what our policy is. Right now, we're in the very early days and I'm still not noticing many of our institutions that are rising to the occasion that I think is warranted, but this could easily change in a few months with some larger event.Not to be science fictional or anything, but you talk about a catastrophe, are you talking about: AI creates some sort of biological weapon? Back and forth cyber attacks destroy all the electrical infrastructure for China and the United States, so all of a sudden we're back into the 1800s? Are you talking about some sort of more “Terminator”-like scenario, rogue AI? When you think about the kind of catastrophe that could be that dangerous humanity, what do you think about?We have three risk sources: one are states, the other are rogue actors like terrorists and pariah states, and then there's the AI themselves. The AI themselves are not relevant right now, but I think could be quite capable of causing damage on their own in even a year or two. That's the space of threat actors; so yes, AI could in the future . . . I don't see anything that makes them logically not controllable. They're mostly controllable right now. Maybe it's one out of 100, one out of 1000 of the times you run these AI systems and deploy them in some sort of environments [that] they do try breaking free. That's a bit of a problem later on when they actually gain the capability to break free and when they are able to operate autonomously.There's been lots of studies on this and you can see this in OpenAI's reports whenever they release new models. It's like, “Oh, it's only a 0.1 percent chance of it trying to break free,” but if you run a million of these AI agents, that's a lot of them that are going to be trying to break free. They're just not very capable currently. So I think that the AIs themselves are risky, and if you're having humanity going up against AIs that aren't controlled by anybody, or AIs that broke free, that could get quite dangerous if you also have, as we're seeing now, China and others building more of these humanoid robots in the next few years. This could make them be concerning in that they could just by themselves create some sort of bioweapon. You don't need even human hands to do it, you can just instruct a robot to do it and disperse it. I think that's a pretty easy way to take out biological opposition, so to speak, in kind of an eccentric way.That's a concern. Rogue actors themselves doing this, them reasoning that, “Oh, this bioweapon gives us a secure second strike,” things like that would be a concern from rogue actors. Then, of course, states using this to make an attempt to crush the other state or develop a technology that disables an adversary's secure second strike. I think these are real problems.Maximal progress, minimal risk (33:25)I think what we want to shoot for is [a world] where people have enough resources and the ability to just live their lives in ways as they self-determine . . .Let me finish with this: I want continuing AI progress such that we can cure all the major chronic diseases, that we can get commercial nuclear fusion, that we can get faster rockets, all the kinds of optimistic stuff, accelerate economic growth to a pace that we've never seen. I want all of that.Can I get all of that and also avoid the kinds of scenarios you're worried about without turning the optimistic AI project into something that arrives at the end of the century, rather than arrives midcentury? I'm just worried about slowing down all that progress.I think we can. In the Superintelligence Strategy, we have three parts to that: We have the deterrence part, which I'm speaking about here, and we have making sure that the capabilities aren't falling into the hands of rogue actors — and I think this isn't that difficult, good export controls and add some just basic safeguards of we need to know who you are if we're going to be helping you manipulate viruses, things like that. That's easy to handle.Then on the competition aspect, there are many ways the US can make itself more competitive, like having more guaranteed supply chains for AI chips, so more manufacturing here or in allied states instead of all of it being in Taiwan. Currently, all the cutting-edge AI chips are made in Taiwan, so if there's a Taiwan invasion, the US loses in this AI race. They lose. This is double-digit probability. This is very foreseeable. So trying to robustify our manufacturing capabilities, quite essential; likewise for making robotics and drones.I think there's still many axes to compete in. I don't think it makes sense to try and compete in building a sort of superintelligence versus one of these potentially mutual assured destruction-disrupting AIs. I don't think you want to be building those, but I think you can have your AIs for healthcare, you can have your AIs doing all the complicated math you want, and whatever, all this coding, and driving your vehicles, and folding your laundry. You can have all of that. I think it's definitely feasible.What we did in the Cold War with the prospect of nuclear weapons, we obviously got through it, and we had deterrence through mutual assured destruction. We had non-proliferation of fissile materials to lesser states and rogue actors, and we had containment of the Soviet Union. I think the Superintelligence Strategy is somewhat similar: If you deter some of the most stabilizing AI projects, you make sure that some of these capabilities are not proliferating to random rogue actors, and you increase your competitiveness relative to China through things like incorporating AI into your military by, for instance, improving your ability to manufacture drones and improving your ability to reliably get your hands on AI chips even if there's a Taiwan conflict.I think that's the strategy and this doesn't make us uncompetitive. We are still focusing on competitiveness, but this does put barriers around some of the threats that different states could pose to us and that rogue actors using AI could pose to us while still shoring up economic security and positioning ourselves if AI becomes really relevant.I lied, I had one more short question: If we avoid the dire scenarios, what does the world look like in 2045?I would guess that it would be utterly transformed. I wouldn't expect people would be working then as much, hopefully. If you've controlled it well, there could be many ways of living, as there is now, and people would have resources to do so. It's not like there's one way of living — that seems bad because there's many different values to pursue. So letting people pursue their own values, so long as it doesn't destroy the system, and things like that, as we have today. It seems like an abstract version of the picture.People keep thinking, “Are we in zoos? Are AIs keeping us in zoos?” or something like that. It's like, no. Or like, “Are we just all in the Zuckerberg sort of virtual reality, AI friend thing?” It's like no, you can choose to do otherwise, as well. I think we want to preserve that ability.Good news: we won't have to fold laundry. Bad news: in zoos. There's many scenarios.I think what we want to shoot for is one where people have enough resources and the ability to just live their lives in ways as they self-determine, subject to not harming others in severe ways. But people tend to think there's same sort of forced dichotomy of it's going to be aWALL-EWALL-E world where everybody has to live the same way, or everybody's in zoos, or everybody's just pleasured-out and drugged-up or something. It's forced choices. Some people do that, some people choose to have drugs, and we don't hear much from them, and others choose to flourish, and pursue projects, and raise children and so on.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedMicro Reads▶ Economics* Is College Still Worth It? - Liberty Street Economics* Scalable versus Productive Technologies - Fed in Print▶ Business* AI's Threat to Google Just Got Real - WSJ* AI Has Upended the Search Game. 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A Political Storm Could Cripple It. - NYT* DARPA-Funded Research Develops Novel Technology to Combat Treatment-Resistant PTSD - The Debrief▶ Clean Energy/Climate* What's the carbon footprint of using ChatGPT? - Sustainability by Numbers* OpenAI and the FDA Are Holding Talks About Using AI In Drug Evaluation - Wired▶ Robotics/AVs* Jesse Levinson of Amazon Zoox: ‘The public has less patience for robotaxi mistakes' - FT▶ Space/Transportation* NASA scrambles to cut ISS activity due to budget issues - Ars* Statistically Speaking, We Should Have Heard from Aliens by Now - Universe Today▶ Substacks/Newsletters* Globalization did not hollow out the American middle class - Noahpinion* The Banality of Blind Men - Risk & Progress* Toys, Pencils, and Poverty at the Margins - The Dispatch* Don't Bet the Future on Winning an AI Arms Race - AI Prospects* Why Is the US Economy Surging Ahead of the UK? - Conversable EconomistFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. 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My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,With the rise of American populist nationalism has come the rise of nativism: a belief in the concept of “heritage Americans” and a deep distrust of immigration. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Alex Nowrasteh about the ideology beneath this severe skepticism, as well as what Americans lose economically if we shut our doors to both low- and high-skilled immigrants.Nowrasteh is the vice president for economic and social policy studies at the Cato Institute. He is the author of his own Substack with David Bier, as well as the co-author of Wretched Refuse? The Political Economy of Immigration and Institutions.Read more of Nowrasteh's work on immigration, nationalism, and other research.In This Episode* Illegal immigration (1:16)* Rise of xenophobia (3:48)* Psychology of immigration skeptics (9:20)* The future American workforce (14:04)* Population decline and assimilation (17:35)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Illegal immigration (1:16)The system that I would favor is one that allows a substantially larger number of people at every skill level to come into this country legally, to work, to live, and to become Americans . . . because this country demands their labor and there's no way for them to come legally.Pethokoukis: Will you, in a very short period of time, give me a sense of the situation at the southern border of the United States of America in terms of immigration, how that has evolved from Trump 1, to Biden, to now? Is it possible to give me a concise summary of that?Nowrasteh: From Obama through Trump 1, the border apprehension numbers were pretty reasonable, you were talking about somewhere between 400,000 and 800,000 per year. Then came Covid, crashed those numbers down to basically nothing by April of 2020.After that, the numbers progressively rose. They were at the highest point in December of 2020 than they had been for any other December going back over 25 years. Then Biden takes office, the numbers shoot through the roof. We're talking about 170,000 to 250,000, sometimes 300,000 a month until January or so of 2024; those numbers start coming down precipitously. December of 2024, they're at 40,000 or so, 45,000. January 2025, Trump comes in, they go down again. First full month of Trump's administration in February, they're about 8,000, the lowest numbers without a pandemic in a very long time.What's the right number?That's a hard question to answer? In an ideal world where costs and benefits didn't matter, I think the ideal number is zero. But the question is how do you get to that ideal number, right? Is it by having an insane amount of enforcement, of existing laws where you basically end up brutalizing people to an incredible extent? Or is it practically zero because we let people come in lawfully to work in this country. The system that I would favor is one that allows a substantially larger number of people at every skill level to come into this country legally, to work, to live, and to become Americans, and that would bring that number down to about what it is now or even lower than what it is now every month, because the reason people come illegally is because this country demands their labor and there's no way for them to come legally.Rise of xenophobia (3:48). . . I just don't think the economic argument is what moves people on this topic.As I've understood it, and maybe understand it wrong, is this issue has developed that — at first it seemed like the concern, and it still is the concern, was with illegal undocumented immigrants. And then it seems to me the argument became, “Well, we don't want those, and then we also really don't want low-skill immigrants either.” And now it seems, and maybe you have a different perspective, that it's, “Well, we don't really want those high-skill immigrants either.”You gave me the current state of illegal immigration at the southern border. What is the current state of the argument among people who want less, perhaps even no immigration in this country?State of the argument is actually what you described. When I started working on this topic about 15 years ago, I never thought I would've heard people come out against the H-1B visa, or against high-skilled immigrants, or against foreign entrepreneurs. But you saw this over Christmas actually, December of 2024. You saw this basically online “H-1 B-gate” where Vivek Ramaswamy and Elon Musk were saying H-1Bs are great. I think Musk had tweeted, “over my dead body we're going to cut the H-1B,” right? And you see this groundswell of conservatives and Republicans — not all of them, by any means — come out and say, “We don't even want these guys. We don't want these skilled immigrants,” using a whole range of arguments. None of them economic, by the way. Almost none of them economics; all culture, all voting habits, all stereotypes, a lot of them pretty nasty in my opinion.So there is this sense where some people just don't want immigrants. The first time I think I encountered this in writing from a person who was prominent was Anne Coulter, Jeff Sessions when he was senator, and these types of people around 2015, in a big way, and it seems to have become much more prominent than I ever thought it would be.Is it that they don't understand the economic argument or they just don't care about that argument?They don't care about it. I have come to the realization — this makes me sad because I'm an economist by training — but I just don't think the economic argument is what moves people on this topic. I don't think it's what they care about. I don't think it animates . . . It animates me as a pro-immigration person, I think it animate you, right?It does, yeah, it sure does.It does not animate the people who are opposed to it. I think it is a cultural argument, it is a crime element, it is a threat element, it is a, “This makes us less American somehow” weird, fuzzy-feeling argument.Would it matter if the immigrants were all coming from Germany, France, and Norway?Maybe for a handful of them, but generally no, I don't think so. I think the idea that America is special, is different, is some kind of unique nation that ethnically, or in other ways cannot be pierced or contaminated by foreigners — I think it's just like an “Ew, foreigners,” type of sentiment that people have. A base xenophobia that a lot of people have combined with a very reasonable fear and dislike of chaos. When people see chaos on the border, they hate it.I hate chaos on the border. My answer is to get rid of the chaos by letting people come in legally, because you legalize a market, you can actually regulate it. You can't regulate an illegal market. But I think other people see chaos, they have this sort of purity conception of America that's just fanciful, in my opinion, and they just don't want foreigners, and the chaos prompts them, makes it even more powerful.To what extent is it fear that all these immigrants will eventually vote for things you don't want? Or in this case, they're all going to become Democrats, so Republicans don't want them.That's definitely part of it. I think that's more of an elite Republican fear, or an elite sort of nativist or conservative fear than it is amongst the people online who are yelling at me all the time or yelling at Elon Musk. I think that resonates a lot more in this city and in online conservative publications, I think that resonates much more. I don't think it's borne out by the facts, and people who say this will also loudly trumpet how Hispanics now basically split their vote in the 2024 election. David Shore, who is the progressive analyst of electoral politics, said he thinks that Trump actually won the naturalized immigrant vote, which is probably the first time a Republican has won the naturalized immigrant vote since the 19th century.The immediate question is, does that kind of thing, will that resonate into a changing opinion among folks on the right if they feel like they feel like they can win these voters?I don't think so because I think it's about deeper issues than that. I think it's a real feelings-, values-based issue.Psychology of immigration skeptics (9:20)When people feel like they don't have control of something in their country or their government doesn't have control of something, they become anti- whatever is the source of that chaos, even the legal versions of it.Has this been there for a long time? Was it exacerbated for some reason? Was it exacerbated by the financial crisis and the slow economy afterward? The only time I remember hearing about people using the idea of “heritage Americans” were elite people whose great great grandparents came over on the Mayflower and they thought they were better than everybody else, they were elites, they were these kind of Boston Brahmans. So I was aware of the concept from that, but I've never heard people — and I hear it now — about people who were not part of the original Mayflower wave, or Pilgrims, think of themselves as “heritage Americans” because their parents came over in the 1850s or the 1880s, but now their “heritage.” That idea to me seems new.I hadn't heard of it until just a few years ago, frankly, at all. I racked my brain about this because I used to have a lot of affinity for the Republican Party, just to be frank. And I'm from California, and I'm in my '40s, so I remember Prop 187 in 1994 when the state had a big campaign about illegal immigrants' enforcement and welfare, and it really changed the state's voting patterns to be much more democratic, eventually.Then I saw the Republican Party under George W. Bush, and John McCain, and all these other guys who were pro-Republican, but always in California the Republicans were very skeptical of immigration across the board, but I didn't really see that spread. Then I saw it go to Arizona in 2010, 2009, 2008, around there. I saw it go to South Carolina, Mississippi, some of these places, and then all of a sudden with Trump, it went everywhere.So I racked my brain thinking, did I miss something? Was there always something there and I was just too myopic to view it, or I wasn't in those circles, or I wanted to convince myself that it wasn't there? And I really think that it was always there to some small extent, but Trump is the most brilliant political entrepreneur of our lifetime and probably of our country's history, and that he took over this party from the outside and he convinced people to be nativists. Because what he was saying, the words — not that different from Scott Walker saying about immigration. It was not that different from what Mike Huckabee was saying about immigration. It wasn't that different from Santorum. But he said it or sold it in a way that just worked, I guess. That maybe absolves me of some responsibility or maybe allows me to say that I didn't miss anything, but I do think that that largely explains it.And how does it explain that, and you may not have an answer. I can sort of understand the visceral concern about chaos at the border or people coming here illegally. But then to take it to the point that we don't even want AI engineers to come to this country from India, or, “I'm really angry that someone from a foreign country is taking my kid's spot at Harvard.” That, to me, seems almost inexplicable.It's not the fact of the chaos, but it's the perception of the chaos, because when Trump came in in 2015, the border crossing numbers were really low. They were in the 300,000s, low 400,000s, but he talked about it like it was millions, and he created this perception of just insane, outrageous chaos.There's a research and political psychology field about the locus of control. When people feel like they don't have control of something in their country or their government doesn't have control of something, they become anti- whatever is the source of that chaos, even the legal versions of it. In some way, it's an understandable human reaction, but in some ways it is so destructive. But, like you said, it spreads to AI engineers from China because it's like all immigration, and it's so bad, and it's so destructive, and that is the best explanation that I've seen out there about that.The future American workforce (14:04)What we notice in the economics of immigration, when we do these types of studies and we take a look at the wage impacts, we've got basically no wage effect on those of native-born Americans.I write a lot about, hopefully, this technological wave that we're going to be experiencing, and then I also write a little about immigration. The question I get is, if we're going to be worried about the jobs of the future being taken over by software or by robots, if we really think that's going to happen, shouldn't we really be thinking very hard about the kinds of people we let enter into this country, even legally, and their ability to function in that kind of economy?I think we need to think about what is the best mechanism to select people to come here that the economy needs. What you described . . . assumes an amount of knowledge, and foresight, and, frankly, the incentive to make a wise decision in the hands of bureaucrats and politicians that they just do not have and that they will never have. and what matters most and who can pick the best in the market,You can say STEM degrees only. I only want people who have STEM degrees from colleges that, on some global ranking, are in the top 500 universities. You could say that. That would be one way of selecting.They could try to centrally plan it like that. . .You're saying “centrally planned” because you know that's going to get a reaction out of me, but go ahead.I do. The thing is, there's all different types of ways to have an immigration system and there's going to be a little bit of planning any immigration system. But I think the one that will work best is the one that allows the market to have the widest possible choice. We don't know how automation is going to turn out.There's this thing called Moravec's paradox in a lot of AI writing, which is the idea that you'll probably be able to automate a lot of high-skill jobs more easily than you will be able to automate, say, somebody who's a maid, or a nanny, or a nurse, or a plumber, just because the real world is harder than . . . You and I type, and talk, and do math. That's probably easier to do. So maybe the optimal thing to do would be to increase immigration for low-skilled people because all the jobs in the future are going to be low-skilled anyway, because we're going to be able to automate all the high-skilled jobs.Though you could say then that that would take away the jobs from the natives.You could say that, of course. What we notice in the economics of immigration, when we do these types of studies and we take a look at the wage impacts, we've got basically no wage effect on those of native-born Americans. If we were to have a situation where let's say massive amounts of jobs disappear in entire sectors of the economy, vanished, automated . . . well, that just means that we're going to have more opportunities and specialization, division of labor, where there's going to be a lot more lower-skilled and mid-skill jobs, just because there's such a much larger and more productive side of the economy.There's going to be so much more profits in these other ones that we're going to have a bigger economy in the same way that when agriculture basically shrank as a massive section of the workforce, those people got other jobs that were more productive, and it was great. I think we could maybe see that again, and I hope we do. I don't want to have to work anymore.Population decline and assimilation (17:35). . . if the whole world is going to have population decline in 20, 30, 50 years, we're going to have to deal with that at some point, but I'd rather deal with that problem with a population of 600 million Americans than a population of 350 million Americans.The scenario — and this was highlighted to me by one of our scholars who looks a lot about demographics and population growth — his theory is that all the population-decline estimates, shrinkage, and slowing down estimates from the United Nations are way too optimistic, that population would begin to level off much faster. Whatever the UN's low or worst-case scenario is, if you want to put a qualifier on it like that, it's probably like that. And a lot of policymakers are underestimating the decline in fertility rates, and eventually everyone's going to figure that out. And there'll be a mad global scandal for population — for people.There's going to be tons of labor shortages and you're going to want people, and there's going to be this scramble, and not every country is going to be as good at it. If people want to immigrate, they're probably more likely, everything else equal, they're going to want to go to the United States as opposed to — not to smear another country — I don't know, Argentina or something. We have this great ability to accept people to come here and for them to succeed and build companies. Maybe that company is a bodega, maybe that company is a technology company. So we're at this moment where we have this great natural advantage, but it seems like we're utterly rejecting it.We are not just rejecting it, we are turning it from a positive into a big negative. You have these students who are being apprehended and having their visas canceled because of a fishing license violation six years ago. People who are skilled science students studying the United States who could go on to be founders of big companies or just high-skilled workers, and we're saying, “Nope, can't do it, sorry.” We're kicking people out for reasons of speech — speech that I often don't like, by the way, but it doesn't matter, because I believe it on principle. It's important.We already see it showing up in tourism numbers plummeting to the United States, and I think we're going to see it in student visa numbers shortly. And student visas are the first step on that long chain of being able to be a high-skilled immigrant one day. So we are really doing long-term damage.On the population stuff, I completely agree, and if the whole world is going to have population decline in 20, 30, 50 years, we're going to have to deal with that at some point, but I'd rather deal with that problem with a population of 600 million Americans than a population of 350 million Americans.What is your general take on the notion of assimilation? Is that a problem? Should we doing more to make sure people are successful here? How do you think about that?I do think assimilation is important. I don't think it's a problem. When I talk about assimilation, I use it in the way that Jacob Vigdor — Jake is a professor, University of Washington economist, and he says, assimilation is when an immigrant or their kids are indistinguishable from long-settled Americans on the measurements of family size, civic participation, income, education, language. Basically it takes three generations. That is, the first generation are the immigrants, second are their kids, third are their grandkids, on average.Some, much faster. Like my Indian neighbors are more than assimilated in the first generation. They do better than native born Americans on most of those measures. Some lower-skilled Hispanic or some East African immigrants, takes three, three and a half, four sometimes, to do that well, but it's going very well.We do not have the cultural issues that some countries in Europe have. To some extent, it's overblown in Europe, those problems, but they do exist and they exist to a greater extent than they do here. Part of that is because we have birthright citizenship. People who are born in this country are citizens, they don't feel like they're an illegal underclass because they're not. They feel totally accepted because they are legally, and we have an ethos in this country, because we don't have an ethnic identification of being American like they do in places like Germany or in Norway. I have family members in Norway who are half Iranian and they're not really considered to be Norwegian, culturally. Here it's the opposite. If I were to go say I'm not an American, people would be offended. There, if you say, “Oh, I'm Norwegian,” they'll correct you and be like, “No, you're not Norwegian, you're something else.”We have this great secret sauce born of our culture, born of our lack of an ethnic Americanness. It doesn't matter what ethnicity or race you are, or religion, anybody can be American. And we have done it so well and we just don't have these issues, and I don't think, as a result, we should do more because I'm worried about the government breaking it.Based on what you just said, at a gut level, how do you feel when someone uses the phrase “heritage Americans,” and they hate the idea of America as an idea, and to be an American you need to have been here for a long time. That whole way of looking at it — do you get it, or do you at some level [think], I am not a psychologist, I do not understand it?A way to make sense of it [is] by swapping out the word “American” in their sentence and we place it with the word “Frenchman,” or “German,” or “Russian,” or “Japanese,” or some other country that's a nation state where the identity is bound up with ethnicity. That's the way that I make sense of it, and I think this is a concept that just does not work in the United States; it cannot work. Maybe it's the most nationalistic I am, but I think that that's just a fundamentally foreign idea that could never work in the United States. It sounds more at home in Europe and other places. That's what strikes meAs I finish up, I know you have all kinds of ideas to improve the American immigration system, which we will try to link to, but instead of me asking you to give me your five-point plan for perfection, I'm going to ask you: How does this turn around? What is the scenario in which we become more accepting again of immigrants, perhaps the way we were 30 years ago?That really is a $64,000 question. The idea that I have floated — which probably won't work, but at least gets people to pause — is the entitlement programs are going insolvent, and I have pitched to my grandmother-in-law, who is a very nice woman, who is a Republican who is skeptical of immigration, but who is worried about Social Security going bankrupt, I say, “Well, there is one way to increase the solvency of this program for 30 or 40 years.” And she said, “What's that?” and I say, “Let in 100 million immigrants between the age of the 20 and 30.” And it gives her pause. I think if that idea can give her pause, then maybe it has a shot. When this country seriously starts to grapple with the insolvency of entitlement programs, that's looming.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedMicro ReadsPlease check out the website or Substack app for the latest Up Wing economic, business, and tech news contained in this new edition of the newsletter. Lots of great stuff!Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

In the 1960s, a deep anxiety set in as one thing became seemingly clear: We were headed toward population catastrophe. Paul Ehrlich's “The Population Bomb” and “The Limits to Growth,” written by the Club of Rome, were just two publications warning of impending starvation due to simply too many humans on the earth.As the population ballooned year by year, it would simply be impossible to feed everyone. Demographers and environmentalists alike held their breath and braced for impact.Except that we didn't starve. On the contrary, we were better fed than ever.In his article in The New Atlantis, Charles C. Mann explains that agricultural innovation — from improved fertilization and irrigation to genetic modification — has brought global hunger to a record low.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I chat with Mann about the agricultural history they didn't teach you in school.Mann is a science journalist who has worked as a correspondent for The Atlantic, Science, and Wired magazines, and whose work has been featured in many other major publications. He is also the author of 1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus and1493: Uncovering the New World Columbus Created, as well as The Wizard and the Prophet: Two Remarkable Scientists and Their Dueling Visions to Shape Tomorrow's World.In This Episode* Intro to the Agricultural Revolution (2:04)* Water infrastructure (13:11)* Feeding the masses (18:20)* Indigenous America (25:20)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Intro to the Agricultural Revolution (2:04)I don't think that people realize that the fact that most people on earth, almost the average person on earth, can feed themselves is a novel phenomenon. It's something that basically wasn't true since as far back as we know.Pethokoukis: What got my attention was a couple of pieces that you've worked on for The New Atlantis magazine looking at the issue of how modern Americans take for granted the remarkable systems and infrastructure that provide us comfort, safety, and a sense of luxury that would've been utterly unimaginable even to the wealthiest people of a hundred years ago or 200 years ago.Let me start off by asking you: Does it matter that we do take that for granted and that we also kind of don't understand how our world works?Mann: I would say yes, very much. It matters because these systems undergird the prosperity that we have, the good fortune that we have to be alive now, but they're always one generation away from collapse. If they aren't maintained, upgraded and modernized, they'll fall apart. They just won't stand there. So we have to be aware of this. We have to keep our eye on the ball, otherwise we won't have these things.The second thing is that, if we don't know how our society works, as citizens, we're simply not going to make very good choices about what to do with that society. I feel like both sides in our current political divide are kind of taking their eye off the ball. It's important to have good roads, it's important to have clean water, it's important to have a functioning public health system, it's important to have an agricultural system that works. It doesn't really matter who you are. And if we don't keep these things going, life will be unnecessarily bad for a lot of people, and that's just crazy to do.Is this a more recent phenomenon? If I would've asked people 50 years ago, “Explain to me how our infrastructure functions, how we get water, how we get electricity,” would they have a better idea? Is it just because things are more complicated today that we have no idea how our food gets here or why when we turn the faucet, clean water comes out?The answer is “yes” in a sort of trivial sense, in that many more people were involved in producing food, a much greater percentage of the population was involved in producing food 50 years ago. The same thing was true for the people who were building infrastructure 50 years ago.But I also think it's generally true that people's parents saw the change and knew it. So that is very much the case and, in a sense, I think we're victims of our own success. These kinds of things have brought us so much prosperity that we can afford to do crazy things like become YouTube influencers, or podcasters, or freelance writers. You don't really have any connection with how the society goes because we're sort of surfing on this wave of luxury that our ancestors bequeathed to us.I don't know how much time you spend on social media, Charles — I'm sure I spend too much — but I certainly sense that many people today, younger people especially, don't have a sense of how someone lived 50 years ago, 100 years ago, and there was just a lot more physical suffering. And certainly, if you go back far enough, you could not take for granted that you would have tomatoes in your supermarket year round, that you would have water in the house and that water would be clean. What I found really interesting — you did a piece on food and a piece on water — in the food piece you note that, in the 1980s, that was a real turning point that the average person on earth had enough to eat all the time, and rather than becoming an issue of food production, it became an issue of distribution, of governance. I think most people would be surprised of that statistic even though it's 40 years old.I don't think that people realize that the fact that most people on earth, almost the average person on earth, can feed themselves is a novel phenomenon. It's something that basically wasn't true since as far back as we know. That's this enormous turning point, and there are many of these turning points. Obviously, the introduction of antibiotics for . . . public health, which is another one of these articles they're going to be working on . . .Just about 100 years ago today, when President Coolidge was [president], his son went to play tennis at the White House tennis courts, and because he was lazy, or it was fashionable, or something, he didn't put on socks. He got a blister on his toe, the toe got infected, and he died. 100 years ago, the president of the United States, who presumably had the best healthcare available to anybody in the world, was unable to save his beloved son when the son got a trivial blister that got infected. The change from that to now is mind boggling.You've written about the Agricultural Revolution and why the great fears 40 or 50 years ago of mass starvation didn't happen. I find that an endlessly interesting topic, both for its importance and for the fact it just seems to be so underappreciated to this day, even when it was sort of obvious to people who pay attention that something was happening, it still seemed not to penetrate the public consciousness. I wonder if you could just briefly talk to me about that revolution and how it happened.The question is, how did it go from “The Population Bomb” written in 1968, a huge bestseller, hugely influential, predicting that there is going to be hundreds of millions of people dying of mass starvation, followed by other equally impassioned, equally important warnings. There's one called “Famine, 1975!,” written a few years before, that predicted mass famines in 1975. There's “The Limits to Growth.” I went to college in the '70s and these were books that were on the curriculum, and they were regarded as contemporary classics, and they all proved to be wrong.The reason is that, although they were quite correct about the fact that the human race was reproducing at that time faster than ever before, they didn't realize two things: The first is that as societies get more affluent, and particularly as societies get more affluent and give women more opportunities, birth rates decline. So that this was obviously, if you looked at history, going to be a temporary phenomenon of whatever length it was be, but it was not going to be infinite.The second was there was this enormous effort spurred by this guy named Norman Borlaug, but with tons of other people involved, to take modern science and apply it to agriculture, and that included these sort of three waves of innovation. Now, most innovation is actually just doing older technologies better, which is a huge source of progress, and the first one was irrigation. Irrigation has been around since forever. It's almost always been done badly. It's almost always not been done systematically. People started doing it better. They still have a lot of problems with it, but it's way better, and now 40 percent, roughly, of the crops in the world that are produced are produced by irrigation.The second is the introduction of fertilizer. There's two German scientists, Fritz Haber and Carl Bosch, who essentially developed the ways of taking fertilizer and making lots and lots of it in factories. I could go into more detail if you want, but that's the essential thing. This had never been done before, and suddenly cheap industrial fertilizer became available all over the world, and Vaclav Smil . . . he's sort of an environmental scientist of every sort, in Manitoba has calculated that roughly 40 percent of the people on earth today would not be alive if it wasn't for that.And then the third was the development of much better, much higher-yielding seeds, and that was the part that Norman Borlaug had done. These packaged together of irrigation fertilizer and seeds yielded what's been called the Green Revolution, doubled, tripled, or even quadrupled grain yields across the world, particularly with wheat and rice. The result is the world we live in today. When I was growing up, when you were growing up, your parents may have said to you, as they did me, Oh, eat your vegetables, there are kids that are starving in Asia.” Right? That was what was told and that was the story that was told in books like “The Population Bomb,” and now Asia's our commercial rival. When you go to Bangkok, that was a place that was hungry and now it's gleaming skyscrapers and so forth. It's all based on this fact that people are able to feed themselves through the combination of these three factors,That story, the story of mass-starvation that the Green Revolution irrigation prevented from coming true. I think a surprising number of people still think that story is relevant today, just as some people still think the population will be exploding when it seems clear it probably will not be exploding. It will rise, but then it's going to start coming down at some point this century. I think those messages just don't get through. Just like most people don't know Norm Borlaug, the Haber-Bosch process, which school kids should know. They don't know any of this. . . Borlaug won the Nobel Prize, right?Right. He won the Nobel Peace Prize. I'll tell you a funny story —I think he won it in the same year that “The Population Bomb” came out.It was just a couple years off. But you're right, the central point is right, and the funny thing is . . . I wrote another book a while back that talked about this and about the way environmentalists think about the world, and it's called the “Wizard and the Prophet” and Borlaug was the wizard of it. I thought, when I proposed it, that it would be easy. He was such an important guy, there'd be tons of biographies about him. And to this day, there isn't a real serious scholarly biography of the guy. This is a person who has done arguably more to change human life than any other person in the 20th century, certainly up in the top dozen or so. There's not a single serious biography of him.How can that be?It's because we're tremendously disconnected. It's a symptom of what I'm talking about. We're tremendously disconnected from these systems, and it's too bad because they're interesting! They're actually quite interesting to figure out: How do you get water to eight billion people? How do you get . . . It is a huge challenge, and some of the smartest people you've ever met are working on it every day, but they're working on it over here, and the public attention is over here.Water infrastructure (13:11). . . the lack of decent, clean, fresh water is the world's worst immediate environmental problem. I think people probably have some vague idea about agriculture, the Agricultural Revolution, how farming has changed, but I think, as you just referred to, the second half, water — utter mystery to people. Comes out of a pipe. The challenges of doing that in a rich country are hard. The challenges doing a country not so rich, also hard. Tell me what you find interesting about that topic.Well, whereas the story about agriculture is basically a good story: We've gotten better at it. We have a whole bunch of technical innovations that came in the 20th century and humankind is better off than ever before. With water, too, we are better off than ever before, but the maddening thing is we could be really well off because the technology is basically extremely old.There's a city, a very ancient city called Mohenjo-daro that I write about a bit in this article that was in essentially on the Pakistan-India border, 2600 BC. And they had a fully functioning water system that, in its basics, was no different than the water system that we have, or that London has, or that Paris has. So this is an ancient, ancient technology, yet we still have two billion people on the planet that don't have access to adequate water. In fact, even though we know how to do it, the lack of decent, clean, fresh water is the world's worst immediate environmental problem. And a small thing that makes me nuts is that climate change — which is real and important — gets a lot of attention, but there are people dying of not getting good water now.On top of it, even in rich countries like us, our water system is antiquated. The great bulk of it was built in the '40s, '50s, and '60s, and, like any kind of physical system, it ages, and every couple years, various engineering bodies, water bodies, the EPA, and so forth puts out a report saying, “Hey, we really have to fix the US water system and the numbers keep mounting up.” And Democrats, Republicans, they all ignore this.Who is working on the water issue in poorer countries?There you have a very ad hoc group of people. The answer is part of it's the Food and Agricultural Organization because most water in most countries is used for irrigation to grow food. You also have the World Health Organization, these kinds of bodies. You have NGOs working on it. What you don't have in those countries like our country is the government taking responsibility for coordinating something that's obviously in the national interest.So you have these things where, very periodically — a government like China has done this, Jordan has done this, Bolivia has done this, countries all over the world have done this — and they say, “Okay, we haven't been able to provide freshwater. Let's bring in a private company.” And the private company then invests all this money in infrastructure, which is expensive. Then, because it's a private company, it has to make that money back, and so it charges people for a lot of money for this, and the people are very unhappy because suddenly they're paying a quarter of their income for water, which is what I saw in Southwest China: water riots because people are paying so much for water.In other words, one of the things that government can do is sort of spread these costs over everybody, but instead they concentrate it on the users, Almost universally, these privatization efforts have led to tremendous political unhappiness because the government has essentially shifted responsibility for coordinating and doing these things and imposed a cost on a narrow minority of the users.Are we finally getting on top of the old water infrastructure in this country? It seems like during the Biden administration they had a big infrastructure bill. Do you happen to know if we are finally getting that system upgraded?Listen, I will be the only person who probably ever interviews you who's actually had to fix a water main as a summer job. I spent [it at] my local Public Works Department where we'd have to fix water mains, and this was a number of years ago, and even a number of years ago, those pipes were really, really old. It didn't take much for them to get a main break.I'm one of those weird people who is bothered by this. All I can tell you is we have a lot of aging infrastructure. The last estimate that I've seen came before this sort of sudden jerky rise of construction costs, which, if you're at all involved in building, is basically all the people in the construction industry talk about. At that point, the estimate was that it was $1.2 trillion to fix the infrastructure that we have in the United States. I am sure it is higher now. I am delighted that the Biden people passed this infrastructure — would've been great if they passed permitting reform and a couple of other things to make it easier to spend the money, but okay. I would like to believe that the Trump people would take up the baton and go on this.Feeding the masses (18:20)I do worry that the kind of regulations, and rules, and ideas that we put into place to try and make agriculture more like this picture that we have in our head will end up inadvertently causing suffering for the people who are struggling.We're still going to have another two billion people, maybe, on this earth. Are we going to be able to feed them all?Yeah, I think that there's no question. The question is what we're going to be able to feed them? Are we going to be able to feed them all, filet mignon and truffled . . . whatever they put truffle oil on, and all that? Not so sure about that.All organic vegetables.At the moment, that seems really implausible, and there's a sort of fundamental argument going on here. There's a lot of people, again, both right and left, who are sort of freaked out by the scale that modern agriculture operates on. You fly over the middle-west and you see all those circles of center-pivot irrigation, they plowed under, in the beginning of the 20th century, 100 million acres of prairie to produce all that. And it's done with enormous amounts of capital, and it was done also partly by moving people out so that you could have this enormous stuff. The result is it creates a system that . . . doesn't match many people's vision of the friendly family farmer that they grew up with. It's a giant industrial process and people are freaked out by the scale. They don't trust these entities, the Cargills and the ADMs, and all these huge companies that they see as not having their interests at heart.It's very understandable. I live in a small town, we have a farm down there, and Jeremy runs it, and I'm very happy to see Jeremy. There's no Jeremy at Archer Daniels Midland. So the result is that there's a big revulsion against that, and people want to downsize the scale, and they point to very real environmental problems that big agriculture has, and they say that that is reason for this. The great problem is that in every single study that I am aware of, the sort of small, local farms don't produce as much food per acre or per hectare as the big, soulless industrial processes. So if you're concerned about feeding everybody, that's something you have to really weigh in your head, or heavy in your heart.That sort of notion of what a farm should look like and what good food is, that kind of almost romantic notion really, to me, plays into the sort of anti-growth or the degrowth people who seemed to be saying that farms could only be this one thing — probably they don't even remember those farms anymore — that I saw in a storybook. It's like a family farm, everything's grown local, not a very industrial process, but you're talking about a very different world. Maybe that's a world they want, but I don't know if that's a world you want if you're a poor person in this world.No, and like I said, I love going to the small farm next to us and talking to Jeremy and he says, “Oh look, we've just got these tomatoes,” it's great, but I have to pay for that privilege. And it is a privilege because Jeremy is barely making it and charging twice as much as the supermarket. There's no economies of scale for him. He still has to buy all the equipment, but he's putting it over 20 acres instead of 2000 acres. In addition, it's because it's this hyper-diverse farm — which is wonderful; they get to see the strawberries, and the tomatoes, and all the different things — it means he has to hire much more labor than it would be if he was just specializing in one thing. So his costs are inevitably much, much higher, and, therefore, I have to pay a lot more to keep him going. That's fine for me; I'm a middle-class person, I like food, this can be my hobby going there.I'd hate to have somebody tell me it's bad, but it's not a system that is geared for people who are struggling. There are just a ton of people all over the world who are struggling. They're better off than they were 100 years ago, but they're still struggling. I do worry that the kind of regulations, and rules, and ideas that we put into place to try and make agriculture more like this picture that we have in our head will end up inadvertently causing suffering for the people who are struggling.To make sure everybody can get fed in the future, do we need a lot more innovation?Innovation is always good. I would say that we do, and the kinds of innovation we need are not often what people imagine. For example, it's pretty clear that parts of the world are getting drier, and therefore irrigation is getting more difficult. The American Southwest is a primary candidate, and you go to the Safford Valley, which I did a few years ago — the Safford Valley is in southeast Arizona and it's hotter than hell there. I went there and it's 106 degrees and there's water from the Colorado River, 800 miles away, being channeled there, and they're growing Pima cotton. Pima cotton is this very good fine cotton that they use to make fancy clothes, and it's a great cash crop for farmers, but growing it involves channeling water from the Colorado 800 miles, and then they grow it by what's called flood irrigation, which is where you just fill the field with an inch of water. I was there actually to see an archeologist who's a water engineer, and I said to him, “Gee, it's hot! How much that water is evaporated?” And he said, “Oh, all of it.”So we need to think about that kind of thing if the Colorado is going to run out of water, which it is now. There's ways you can do it, you can possibly genetically modify cotton to use less water. You could drip irrigation, which is a much more efficient form of irrigation, it's readily available, but it's expensive. So you could try to help farmers do that. I think if you cut the soft costs, which is called the regulatory costs of farming, you might be able to pay for it in that way. That would be one type of innovation. Another type of thing you could do is to do a different kind of farming which is called civil pastoral systems, where you grow tree crops and then you grow cattle underneath, and that uses dramatically less water. It's being done in Sonora, just across the border and the tree crops — trees are basically wild. People don't breed them because it takes so long, but we now have the tools to breed them, and so you could make highly productive trees with cattle underneath and have a system that produces a lot of calories or a lot of good stuff. That's all the different kinds of innovation that we could do. Just some of the different kinds of innovation we could do and all would help.Indigenous America (25:20)Part of the reason I wrote these things is that I realized it's really interesting and I didn't learn anything about it in school.Great articles in The New Atlantis, big fan of “Wizard and the Prophet,” but I'm going to take one minute and ask you about your great books talking about the story of the indigenous peoples of the Americas. If I just want to travel in the United States and I'm interested in finding out more about Native Americans in the United States, where would you tell me to go?One of my favorite places just it's so amazing, is Chaco Canyon, and that's in the Four Corners area — that whole Four Corners area is quite incredible — and Chaco Canyon is a sign that native people could build amazing stuff, and native people could be crazy, in my opinion. It's in the middle of nowhere, it has no water, and for reasons that are probably spiritual and religious, they built an enormous number of essentially castles in this canyon, and they're incredible.The biggest one, Pueblo Bonito as it's called now, it's like 800 rooms. They're just enormous. And you can go there, and you can see these places, and you can just walk around, and it is incredible. You drive up a little bit to Mesa Verde and there's hundreds of these incredible cliff dwellings. What seems to have happened — I'm going to put this really informally and kind of jokingly to you, not the way that an archeologist would talk about it or I would write about it, but what looks like it happened is that the Chaco Canyon is this big canyon, and on the good side that gets the southern exposure is all these big houses. And then the minions and the hoi polloi lived on the other side, and it looks like, around 800, 900, they just got really tired of serving the kings and they had something like a democratic revolution, and they just left, most of them, and founded the Pueblos, which is these intensely democratic self-governing bodies that are kind of like what Thomas Jefferson thought the United States should be.Then it's like all the doctors, and the lawyers, and the MBAs, and the rich guys went up to Mesa Verde and they started off their own little kingdoms and they all fought with each other. So you have these crazy cliff dwellings where it's impossible to get in and there's hundreds of people living in these niches in these cliffs, and then that blew up too. So you could see history, democracy, and really great architecture all in one place.If someone asked me for my advice about changing the curriculum in school, one, people would leave school knowing who the heroes of progress and heroes of the Agricultural Revolution were. And I think they'd also know a lot more about pre-Columbian history of the Americas. I think they should know about it but I also think it's just super interesting, though of course you've brought it to life in a beautiful way.Thank you very much, and I couldn't agree with you more. Part of the reason I wrote these things is that I realized it's really interesting and I didn't learn anything about it in school.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. 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In his famous 1962 address to Rice University, President Kennedy declared,We choose to go to the moon in this decade and do the other things, not because they are easy, but because they are hard . . .The current administration has chosen, among other things, to go to Mars. Some, Elon Musk included, are looking for a backup planet to Earth. For others, like Robert Zubrin, Mars is an opportunity for scientific discovery, pure challenge, and a revitalized human civilization.Today on Faster, Please — The Podcast, Zubrin and I discuss how to reorient NASA, what our earliest Mars missions can and should look like, and why we should go to Mars at all.Zubrin is the president of aerospace R&D company Pioneer Astronautics, as well as the founder and president of the Mars Society. He was also formerly a staff engineer at Lockheed Martin. He has authored over 200 published papers and is the author of seven books, including the most recent, The New World on Mars: What We Can Create on the Red Planet.For more, check out Zubrin's article in The New Atlantis, “The Mars Dream is Back — Here's How to Make It Actually Happen.”In This Episode* Colonization vs. exploration (1:38)* A purpose-driven mission (5:01)* Cultural diversity on Mars (12:07)* An alternative to the SpaceX strategy (16:02)* Artemis program reform (20:42)* The myth of an independent Mars (24:17)* Our current timeline (27:21)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Colonization vs. exploration (1:38)I do think that it is important that the first human mission to ours be a round-trip mission. I want to have those people back, not just because it's nice to have them back, but I want to hear from them. I want to get the full report.Pethokoukis: Just before we started chatting, I went and I checked an online prediction market — one I check for various things, the Metaculus online prediction market — and the consensus forecast from all the people in that community for when will the first humans land successfully on Mars was October 2042. Does that sound realistic, too soon, or should it be much further away?I think it is potentially realistic, but I think we could beat it. Right now we have a chance to get a Humans to Mars program launched. This current administration has announced that they intend to do so. They're making a claim they're going to land people on Mars in 2028. I do not think that is realistic, but I do believe that it is realistic for them to get the program well started and, if it is handled correctly — and we'll have to talk a lot more about that in this talk — that we could potentially land humans on Mars circa 2033.When I gave you that prediction and then you mentioned the 2020s goal, those are about landing on Mars. Should we assume when people say, “We're going to land on Mars,” they also mean people returning from Mars or are they talking about one-way trips?Musk has frequently talked about a colonization effort, and colonization is a one-way trip, but I don't think that's in the cards for 2028 or 2033. I think what is in the cards for this time period on our immediate horizon is exploration missions. I do think that we could potentially have a one-way mission with robots in 2028. That would take a lot of work and it's a bit optimistic, but I think it could be done with determination, and I think that should be done, actually.To be clear, when people are talking about the first human mission to Mars, the assumption is it's not a one way trip for that astronaut, or those two astronauts, that we intend on bringing them back. Maybe the answer is obvious, but I'm not sure it's obvious to me.From time to time, people have proposed scenarios where the first human mission to Mars is a one-way mission, you send maybe not two but five people. Then two years later you send five more people, and then you send 10 people, and then you send 20 people, and you build it up. In other words, it's not a one-way mission in the sense of you're going to be left there and your food will then run out and you will die. No, I don't think that is a credible or attractive mission plan, but the idea that you're going to go with a few people and then reinforce them and grow it into a base, and then a settlement. That is something that can be reasonably argued. But I still think even that is a bit premature. I do think that it is important that the first human mission to ours be a round-trip mission. I want to have those people back, not just because it's nice to have them back, but I want to hear from them. I want to get the full report.A purpose-driven mission (5:01)In the purpose-driven mode, the purpose comes first, you spend money to do things. In the vendor-driven mode, you do things in order to spend money. And we've seen both of these.So should we just default to [the idea] that this mission will be done with government funding on SpaceX rockets, and this will be a SpaceX trip? That's by far the most likely scenario? This is going to need to be a public-private partnership. SpaceX is rapidly developing the single most important element of the technology, but it's not all the technology. We need surface systems. We need the system for making rocket fuel on Mars because the SpaceX mission architecture is the one that I outlined in my book, The Case for Mars, where you make your return propellant on Mars: You take carbon dioxide and water, which are both available on Mars, and turn them into methane and oxygen, which is an excellent rocket fuel combination and which, in fact, is the rocket fuel combination that the Starship uses for that reason. So that's the plan, but you need the system that makes itWe're going to need surface power, which really should be a nuclear power source and which is difficult to develop outside of the government because we're talking about controlled material. Space nuclear reactors will need to use highly enriched uranium, so it should be a partnership between NASA and SpaceX, but we're going to have to reform NASA if this is going to work. I think, though, that this mission could be the vehicle by which we reform NASA. That is, that NASA Artemis moon program, for example, is an example of how not to do something.That's the current government plan to get us back to the moon.Right. But you see, NASA has two distinct modes of operation, and one I call the purpose-driven mode and the other is the vendor-driven mode. In the purpose-driven mode, the purpose comes first, you spend money to do things. In the vendor-driven mode, you do things in order to spend money. And we've seen both of these. To be fair, there's been times when NASA has operated with extreme efficiency to accomplish great things in very short amounts of time, of which, of course, the Apollo Program is the most well-known example where we got to the moon and eight years from program start. The difference between Apollo and Artemis was it wasn't human nature — and there were plenty of greedy people in the 1960s that, when the government's spending money, they want a piece of the action, they were all there.There's no shortage of people who, when you've got a lot of money to spend, are willing to show up and say, “Hi, you got a great idea, but you can't do it until you fund me.” And there were plenty of them then, but they were shown the door because it was clear that if we did all these side projects that people were trying to claim were necessary (“you can't do your program until you do my program”) we would not make it to the moon by 1969. So actually, the forcing function was the schedule. That's what forced the nonsense out of the room.Artemis, on the other hand, has been undertaken as a project whose leadership thought that they could secure a lot of support for the program if they gave a lot of people money. So Artemis has five different flight systems which are incompatible with each other. It's a ridiculous program. That's not the way to do things. We have to have a program leadership which is committed to humans-to-Mars not as a way to get pet technology programs funded, or pet constituencies funded, or pet vendors funded, or any of that stuff. It's got to be: the mission comes first. And if you have that kind of emphasis on this, this can be done and it can be the way to reform NASA.I liken NASA today to a peacetime military, but then it gets thrown into battle, and you get rid of your McClellans and you bring in your Grants. In other words, you have a certain period of chaos and disorganization because you've got deadwood running the place, but under the stress of actually beginning a decisive mission and not being tolerant of anything less than real performance, you actually get the army you need.So that sounds like that's a presidential decision, to give that agency a very specific goal, and perhaps a timeline, to create that kind of purpose-driven culture.Yes. Now that's one necessity. There's another necessity as well, which is that the conceptual base of this program, the political base, if you will, which is derived from its intellectual base, has got to be expanded. This cannot be seen as a Trump-Musk boondoggle because Trump and Musk have both defined themselves in extremely partisan terms, and if this is seen as their program and not America's program, it will be gone as soon as the political fortunes of war shift, which they always do. Musk has this concept that he's been promoting, which is the reason why we have to go to Mars is so that there'll be survivors on Mars after the Earth is destroyed, and I don't think this is particularly —You don't find that a compelling reason, given that there's not currently an obvious threat of us being destroyed, to run a program that could necessarily exist over multiple administrations and be quite expensive.That idea is derived from Isaac Asimov's Foundation novel: The scientists go to the planet Terminus so they can reestablish civilization after the Galactic Empire collapsed. It may please science-fiction fans, but I don't think it's attractive to the general public, and also, frankly, I don't think it's practical. I don't think a Mars colony could have a million people on Mars that will survive as an autarchy. There's no nation on earth that survives as an autarchy. The ones that try are extremely poor as a result for trying.The correct reason to go to Mars is, immediately, for the science, to find out the truth about the prevalence of diversity of life in the universe; for the challenge, to challenge our youth, learn your science and you can be an explorer and maker of new worlds; and for the future, but for the future, it's not for a few survivors to be hiding away after the earth is destroyed, it's to create a new branch, or perhaps several new branches, of human civilization which will add their creative inventiveness to human progress as a whole, as America did for Western civilization. By establishing America, you had a new branch of Western civilization which experimented in everything from democracy to light bulbs and airplanes and greatly enhanced human progress as a result.And the Martians, you are going to have a group of technologically adept people in a frontier environment that's going to challenge them. They're going to come up with lots of inventions that they need for their own progress, but which will benefit human as a whole. And that is why you should colonize Mars.Cultural diversity on Mars (12:07)I believe that there will . . . be many colonies on Mars established by different people with different ideas on what the ideal civilization should be, and the ones with the best ideas will attract the most immigrants and therefore outgrow the rest.It very much reminds me of the scenario laid out in The Expanse book and TV series where mankind has spread throughout the solar system. They're all branches of human civilization, but being out there has changed people, and Mars is different than Earth. Mars has a different society. The culture is different. I think that's a very interesting reason that I had not heard Elon Musk discuss.I have a book called The New World on Mars, which you might want to check out because I discuss this very thing. I believe that there will, once it's possible to colonize Mars, there'll be many colonies on Mars established by different people with different ideas on what the ideal civilization should be, and the ones with the best ideas will attract the most immigrants and therefore outgrow the rest. So, for example, the one thing I disagree with about The Expanse is they have this militaristic Spartan civilization on Mars.There's just one sort of universal culture.Yeah, and I don't think that that civilization would attract many immigrants. The reason why the American North outgrew the South is because the North was free. That's why all the immigrants went to the North. That's why the North won the Civil War, actually. It had a larger population of more industry because all the immigrants went there and became far more creative. This is a very good thing, that the form of civilization that ultimately prevails on Mars will be one, I think, that will offer human freedom and be the most attractive in as many other respects as possible. That's why it will prevail, because it will attract immigrants.But I want to get back to this program. If it is possible not to land humans on Mars in 2028, but to land — if you can land Starship on Mars, you can land not a robot, but a robotic expedition.Starship, Musk claims it could land 100 tons on Mars. Let's say it could land 30. That's 30 times as much as we can currently land. The JPL (Jet Propulsion Laboratory)-led Mars science community, they're still thinking about Mars exploration in the terms it's been done since the '60s, which is single spacecraft on single rockets. Imagine you can now land an entire expedition. You land 30 rovers on Mars along with 30 helicopters that are well instrumented and a well instrumented science lab in it. So now you are bringing not only heavy lift, but heavy lander capability to the Mars science program, and now you have a robotic expedition on Mars. For every instrument that made it onto perseverance, there were 10 that were proposed because they could only take six, and like 100 teams wanted to get their instruments on the rover. So imagine now we can actually land 30 rovers and 30 helicopters, not little ones like Ingenuity, but ones that can carry five or six instruments each themselves.So now you have 100 science teams, you've got life-detection experiments, you've got ground penetrating radar, you've got all sorts of things that we haven't done on Mars all being done. You're expanding Mars science by two orders of magnitude by bringing into existence the kind of transportation capability that is necessary to enable humans to Mars. So now you bring on board the science community and the science-interested public, which includes all parts of the political spectrum, but frankly it leans somewhat left, overall — university scientists, people like this.So now this isn't just about Elon Musk, the Bond villain. This is about what we as America and we as a culture which is committed to pushing the boundaries of science. This is what we are doing. It's not what SpaceX is doing, it's not what Musk is doing, it's not what Trump is doing, it's what America is doing, and celebrating the highest values of Western civilization, which is the search for truth.An alternative to the SpaceX strategy (16:02)Starship plus Starboat is the flight hardware combination that can do both the moon and Mars.That said — and we're talking about this being a public-private partnership —should we just default into thinking that the private part is SpaceX?Well, SpaceX is one part of it. There's no question, to me anyway —There's other companies that are building rockets, there's other rocket companies, maybe they aren't talking about Mars, but Blue Origin's building rockets.I think it should be fairly competed, but SpaceX is well ahead of anyone else in terms of a booster capability. That said, I think that the mission architecture that Musk has proposed, while workable, is not optimal, that there needs to be another vehicle here. He's got the Starship, I want to have a Starboat. I've written an article about this, which was just published in The New Atlantis.Basically, the problem with Musk's architecture is that the direct return from Mars using a Starship, which is a 100-ton vehicle, would require manufacturing 600 tons of methane oxygen on the surface of Mars, and if that's to be done in a reasonable amount of time, requires 600 kilowatts, which is about 13 football fields of solar panels, which means we're not doing it with solar panels, which means it has to be done with a nuke, and that then adds a lot to the development.If we had a Starboat, which is something 10 to 20 percent the size of Starship, but it would go from Mars orbit to the surface and we refuel it, and then it is what takes the crew down to the surface — although the crew could go one way to the surface in a Starship, that's okay, but whether they go down in a Starship or down in a Starboat, they come up in a Starboat, and now you're reducing the propellant requirement by an order of magnitude. It makes this whole thing work much better. And furthermore, Starship plus Starboat also enables the moon.We've forgotten about the moon in this conversation.Starship plus Starboat is the flight hardware combination that can do both the moon and Mars. If you take the Starship version of the Artemis thing, it takes 10 to 14 Starship launches to land a single crew on Mars refueling Starship on orbit, then refueling it in lunar orbit, and with tankers that have to be refueled in earth orbit, and doing all this, it's crazy. But if you positioned one Starship tanker in lunar orbit and then used that to refuel Starboats going up and down, you could do many missions to the lunar surface from a single Starship positioned in lunar orbit. Once again, Starship is suboptimal as an ascent vehicle to come back from the moon or Mars because it's so heavy. It's a hundred tons. The lunar excursion module we used in Apollo was two tons. So we make the Starboat — Starship plus Starboat gives you both the moon and Mars.Here's the thing: With rockets, you measure propulsion requirements in units we call delta V, velocity changes. That's what rockets actually do, they change your velocity, they accelerate you, they decelerate you. To go down from lunar orbit to the lunar surface is two kilometers a second. Delta V to come back up is two kilometers a second. Roundtrip is four. To go down from Mars orbit to the Martian surface is practically nothing because there's an atmosphere that'll slow you down without using your rocket. To come up is four. So the round trip on Mars and the round trip from orbit to the surface on the moon are the same, and therefore the same combination of the Starship plus the Starboat as a landing craft and, in particular, ascent vehicle (because ascent is where small is beautiful), this will give us both. So we don't have to wreck the moon program in order to do Mars. On the contrary, we can rationalize it.I mentioned one group of potential enemies this program has been the anti-Musk Democrats. The other group of enemies that this program has are the moon people who are very upset that their moon program is about to be wrecked because Musk says the moon is a diversion. Now, if it was a choice between the moon and Mars, then I would choose Mars. But we can do both. We can do both and without it being a diversion, because we can do both with the same ships.Artemis program reform (20:42)SLS was worth a lot in its time, but its time was the '90s, not now.There's been some talk about canceling — I'm not sure how serious it is — the Artemis program. If we want the next person on the moon to be an American rather than a Chinese, do we need to keep Artemis to make sure that happens?We need to reform Artemis and this is the way to do it: Starship plus Starboat will give you the moon.Aren't we under a time constraint, given that if we are competing and if we think for whatever national pride reasons we want the next person on the moon to be an American, do we just kind of have to continue with the Artemis program as sort of a wasteful boondoggle as it is?No, because there are things in the Artemis program that don't even make any sense whatsoever, like the lunar orbit gateway, which is simply not necessary. The SLS (Space Launch System) as a launch vehicle is not necessary now that we have Starship. SLS made a lot of sense when it was first proposed in the late 1980s under a different name. I happen to know that because, as a young engineer, I was on the design team that did the preliminary design for what we now call SLS at Martin Marietta in 1988. And it was really just a simplification of the Space Shuttle, and if it had been developed in flying by the mid-'90s, as was entirely reasonable, it could have had a great role in giving us massively improved space capabilities over the past quarter-century. But they let this thing go so slowly that by the time it has appeared, it's obsolescent, and it's as if someone had stalled the development of the P-51 fighter plane so it wasn't available during World War I, but it's just showing up now in a world of jet fighters — this is worthless. Well, it was worth a lot in its time. SLS was worth a lot in its time, but its time was the '90s, not now.Orion doesn't really make that much sense, and the National Team lander would make sense if it was modified to be Starboat. What happened was NASA gave the contract to SpaceX to use Starship as a lunar lander, and it can be, but it's suboptimal. In any case, the National Team, which was Lockheed, and Boeing, and Blue Origin, they complained, but basically their complaint was, “We want a contract too or we won't be your friends.” And so they had sufficient political heft to get themselves a contract. The least NASA could have done is insist that the lander they were getting a contract for run on methane-oxygen, the same propellant as Starship, so Starship could service it as a tanker. Instead, they let them do their own thing and they've got a hydrogen-oxygen rocket, which makes no sense! It's like someone going to the Air Force and proposing a fighter plane that runs on propane and saying, “Well, I can make a fighter run on propane, but my tankers use jet fuel.” Air Force, being sensible, insists that all their planes run on the same fuels. They don't just let someone come along and use whatever fuel they like. So the National Team contract should be changed to a Starboat contract, and the requirements should be interoperability with Starship.The myth of an independent Mars (24:17)We go to Mars not out of despair, we go to Mars out of hope, and by establishing new branches of human civilization, they'll be able to do all sorts of things.As we finish up, I just want to quickly jump back to something you mentioned earlier about autarchy. Do you think it's possible to have a thriving, successful, sustainable Mars colony that's on its own?No. I don't think it's possible to have a thriving, successful nation on earth that's on its own. This is why I think Trump's trade war is a big mistake. It will damage our economy. Now, obviously, we can survive a trade war better than a Mars —That's what Musk is also suggesting in its whole light of consciousness that we need to be able to establish sustainable, permanent colonies elsewhere that can be just fine without a relationship with Earth.I think that's incorrect, and as you know, since you are an expert in economics, it's nonsensical. I don't think a colony of one million people would have the division of labor to build anything like an iPhone or even an iPhone battery if you think of the complexity of what is involved.There's this famous essay, “I, Pencil,” which I'm sure you're acquainted with. An economist went through all the different things that went into —Yes, Milton Friedman used that example famously. I think I get your point.iPhones are more complex than pencils. I mean, you probably could build a pencil with a million-person city, but we need to build things more complicated than that. But that's not the point here, that's not why we're going on. And I object to this. It's the Masque of the Red Death theory of how you're going to survive a plague: We'll have our castle and we can go into it and we'll be fine. No, it's extremely unattractive and it's false. The people in that castle in the Masque of the Red Death, the Edgar Allen Poe story, did not survive the plague, and it's not why we should go to Mars. We go to Mars not out of despair, we go to Mars out of hope, and by establishing new branches of human civilization, they'll be able to do all sorts of things.America developed steamboats because we needed inland transportation because the only highways we had were rivers, and so forth, and so we've been an engine of invention. Mars is going to be an engine of invention. Mars is going to want to have not just nuclear reactors, but breeder reactors, and they're going to want to have fusion power because deuterium is five times as common on Mars as it is on earth, and they're going to be electrolyzing water all the time as part of their life-support system, which means releasing hydrogen, making deuterium separation very cheap, and one could go down this kind of thing. There's all sorts of things that a Martian civilization would develop, to say nothing of the fact that a spacefaring civilization will have the capability to divert asteroids so that they don't impact the earth. So that's why we're going to Mars. We increase the creative capacity of humanity to deal with all challenges raging from asteroid impacts to epidemics.Our current timeline (27:21). . . if you have your first humans on Mars in early 2030s, I think we can have a permanent Mars base by the end of that decade . . .So let me just finish up with this, and I think as far as a justification for going to Mars, that's about the most persuasive I know, and maybe I'm an easy audience, but I'm persuaded.Let's set aside just putting an astronaut or a few astronauts on the moon and bringing them home, and let's set aside the permanent, sustainable, solo, doesn't-need-Earth colony. Just as far as having a sort of a permanent outpost, what do you think is the reasonable timeframe, both technologically and given the politics?I do think, if we do what I am arguing for, which is to make it the mission of this administration to not only just land a Starship on Mars, but land a Starship on Mars bringing a massive robotic expedition to Mars, and then following that up with several more robotic landings to Mars that prepare a base, set up the power system, et cetera, then yes, I think landing the first humans on Mars in 2033 is entirely reasonable. What the Trump administration needs to do is get this program going to the point where people look at this and say, “This is working, this is going to be great, it's already great, let's follow through.”And then, if you have your first humans on Mars in early 2030s, I think we can have a permanent Mars base by the end of that decade, by 2040, a base with 20–30 people on it. A human expedition to Mars doesn't need to grow food. You can just bring your food for a two-year expedition, and you should. You establish a base of 10 or 20 to 30, 50 people, you want to set up greenhouses, you want to be growing food. Then you start developing the technologies to make things like glass, plastic, steel, aluminum on Mars so you can build greenhouses on Mars, and you start establishing an agricultural base, and now you can support 500 people on Mars, and then now the amount of things you can do on Mars greatly expands, and as you build up your industrial and agricultural base, and of course your technologies for actually implementing things on Mars become ever more advanced, now it becomes possible to start thinking about establishing colonies.So that's another thing. Musk's idea that we're going to colonize Mars by landing 1,000 Starships on Mars, each with a hundred people, and now you've got a hundred thousand people on Mars, kind of like D-Day, we landed 130,000 men on the Normandy Beach on D-Day, and then another 100,000 the next day, and so forth. You could do that because you had Liberty Ships that could cross the English Channel in six hours with 10,000 tons of cargo each. The Starship takes eight months to get to Mars, or six, and it takes a 100 tons. You can't supply Mars from Earth. You have to supply Mars from Mars, beyond very small numbers, and that means that the colonization of Mars is not going to be like the D-Day landing, it's going to be more like the colonization of America, which started with tiny colonies, which as they developed, created the crafts and the farms, and ultimately the industries that could support, ultimately, a nation of 300 million people.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedMicro Reads▶ Economics* Why the Fed's Job May Get a Lot More Difficult - NYT* America's Economic Exceptionalism Is on Thin Ice - Bberg Opinion* Trump Is Undermining What Made the American Economy Great - NYT Opinion* Don't Look to the Fed for the Answer to Stagflation - Bberg Opinion▶ Business* Inside Google's Two-Year Frenzy to Catch Up With OpenAI - Wired* Some Nvidia Customers Are OK With Older Chips - WSJ* SoftBank to Buy Ampere, a Silicon Valley Chip Start-Up, for $6.5 Billion - NYT* Nvidia CEO Says He Was Surprised That Publicly Held Quantum Firms Exist - Bberg* The promise of the fifth estate is being squeezed - FT* Boeing Beats Lockheed for Next-Gen US Fighter Jet Contract - Bberg▶ Policy/Politics* Six Ways to Understand DOGE and Predict Its Future Behavior - Cato* Government Science Data May Soon Be Hidden. They're Racing to Copy It. - NYT* Stopping Child Porn Online Is a Worthy Goal. But Beware the Proposed Cure - WSJ▶ AI/Digital* Mini-satellite paves the way for quantum messaging anywhere on Earth - Nature* The Impact of GenAI on Content Creation – Evidence from Music Videos - SSRN* AI weather forecast project eyes access through desktop computers - FT▶ Biotech/Health* Why a weight-loss drug could become a geopolitical bargaining chip - FT* We've entered a forever war with bird flu - The Verge* Doctors Told Him He Was Going to Die. Then A.I. Saved His Life. - NYT▶ Clean Energy/Climate* Inside a new quest to save the “doomsday glacier” - MIT* Glaciers are melting at record speed, says UN - Semafor▶ Robotics/AVs* Disney's Robotic Droids Are the Toast of Silicon Valley - WSJ* The fantasy of humanoid robots misses the point - FT▶ Space/Transportation* The ax has become an important part of the Space Force's arsenal - Ars* NASA Won't Let Starliner Die Just Yet, Even After Boeing's Space Fiasco - Gizmodo* How Warp Drives Don't Break Relativity - Universe Today▶ Up Wing/Down Wing* Japan Urgently Needs an AI Vibe Shift - Bberg Opinion* What left-wing critics don't get about abundance - Niskanen Center▶ Substacks/NewslettersWhat is Vibe Coding? - AI SupremacyFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. 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The American economy is growing, and, in many ways, it's looking a lot like the 1990s. Upward trends in productivity growth and employment paired with downward trends in inflation are cause for optimism. The question is whether we will maintain this trajectory or be derailed by this emerging era of uncertainty.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Skanda Amarnath about trade policy, fiscal and monetary policy, AI advancement, demographic trends, and how all of this bodes for the US economy.Amarnath is the Executive Director of Employ America, a macroeconomic policy research and advocacy organization. He was previously vice president at MKP Capital Management, as well as an analyst at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York.In This Episode* The boomy '90s (1:24)* Drivers of growth (7:24)* The boomy '20s? (11:38)* Full employment and the Fed (22:03)* Demographics in the data (25:37)* Policies for productivity (27:55)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. The boomy '90s (1:24)The '90s stand out as a high productivity growth, low inflation, high employment economy, especially if we look at the years 1996 to the year 2000.Pethokoukis: What got me really excited about all the great work that Employ America puts out was one particular report that I think came out late last year called “The Dream of the 90's is Alive in 2024,” and hopefully it's still alive in 2025. By '90s of course you mean the 1990s.Let me start off by asking you: What was so awesome about the 1990s that it is worth writing about a dream of its return?Amarnath: The 1990s — if you're a macroeconomist, at least — had pitch-perfect conditions. Employment was reasonably high, we achieved the highest levels of prime-age employment relative to the population. We had low and declining inflation, and that variable that we use to say, this is the driver of welfare over time, productivity outcomes, the amount of output we can spin up from finite inputs, was also growing at a very strong rate, and one that we haven't really seen replicated since or really in the decades before.The '90s stand out as a high productivity growth, low inflation, high employment economy, especially if we look at the years 1996 to the year 2000. We'd had high productivity maybe even afterwards . . . but that was also a period where a lot of that productivity was gained from the recession. When employment falls really quickly, productivity can go up for illusory reasons, but it's really that '90s sweet spot where everything was kind of moving in the right direction.Obviously, over the last several years, we've seen a lot of those different challenges flare up, whether it was employment during Covid, but then also inflation over the last few years. So . . . a model to build towards, in some ways.Some of us — not me, and I don't think you — remember the very boomy immediate post-war decades. Probably many more of us remember the go-go 1990s. One thing I always find interesting is how gloomy people were in those years right before the takeoff, which is a wonderful contrarian indicator that we had this period [when] we appeared to have won the Cold War but we had a nasty recession early in the decade, kind of a choppy recovery, and there was plenty of gloom that the days of fast growth were over. And just as we sort of reached the nadir in our attitudes, boy, things took off. So maybe that's a good omen for right nowIf we're a contrarian, and if the past can be present, maybe that is a positive indicator to consider. In some ways, it's a bit surprising how much you hear the talk about growth [being] stuck in a very low-growth environment. Over the last two years, we have seen above-trend real GDP growth, above-trend productivity growth. We're going to get some productivity data revisions tomorrow. Again, this measure of productivity is output per hour, so it's basically, to a first approximation, real GDP divided by hours worked. We've seen that the labor market has, largely speaking, held itself up over the last few years, and yet, at the same time, real output has accelerated.So that's at least something that suggests better things are possible. It's a sign that productivity can accelerate, and with the benefit of revisions tomorrow, we are likely to see at least . . . I'd say if you take a fair reading of the pre-pandemic trend on productivity growth, so five to 15 years, maybe you want to include the financial crisis and what happened before, maybe you don't, but you end up with something like 1.4 percent is what we were seeing. 1.4, maybe 1.45, that's a pretty generous view of pre-pandemic productivity growth.I would like to do better than that going forward.I would too. And since 2019 Q4, with the benefit of data revisions, until now, we're likely to see something like 1.9 percent — 50 basis points higher, 0.5 percent higher, we could ideally like to do even better than that. But it's 0.5 percent better over a five-year horizon in which whatever labor market weirdness spanned Covid, we've largely recovered from that. Obviously, there are a lot of different things that have changed between now and five years ago, but at least the data distortion issues should hopefully have been filtered out at this point. And yet, we probably are posting much better real output outcomes.So through a lot of this turbulence, through a lot of the dynamism that's kind of transpired over the last few years, especially in terms of business formation activity, there was a high labor turnover environment in '21 and '22. That churn has come down in more recent quarters, but we have seen better productivity outcomes.Now, can they sustain? There's a lot of things that probably go into that. There are some new potential risks and shocks on the horizon, but at least it tells you better things are possible in a way that if — I'm sure you've had these discussions throughout the previous decade, in the 2010s, when people made a lot of claims about why productivity growth was destined to be stuck, that we were either not innovating enough, or we were not able to capture that into GDP, or else there are just some secular reasons, and so I think it's an instructive moment. If people are actually looking at the data, the last two years, real output and productivity growth has been very impressive, objectively. And it's not just about, “Hey, we're reverting to the pre-pandemic trend and nothing more.” I think there are signs that this is something at least a little different from what an honest forecast pre-pandemic would've suggested.Drivers of growth (7:24)The three-legged stool is one where you want have a labor market that's strong, fixed investment that's growing (ideally faster than usual), and on the third leg it's the set of things that you can do to control really salient costs that everyone's paying.Let's talk about those signs, but first let's take a quick step back. When you look at what drove growth, and productivity growth, specifically, in the '90s, give me the factors that drove growth and then why those factors give us lessons for policymaking today.I think there are three drivers I can point to that are a little bit independent of each other.One is we had — I don't want to say a tight labor market, but especially a fully employed labor market is helpful in so far as, and we see this now over multiple episodes, especially when you're at high levels of prime-age employment, that's typically a point when there's a lot of human capital that's accumulated. People who have been employed for a while, they've been trained up, there's a little more returns to scale, they can scale revenue, they can scale output better. You don't need to add an additional worker to add additional unit of GDP.In the more tangible sense, it's that people are trained up, they have more tangible experience, productive experience. You're able to see output gains without necessarily having to add hours worked. We generally saw over the late ‘90s: Hours worked slowed down, but real GDP growth held up very well.The labor market wasn't contracting by any stretch, it was just, largely speaking, finding an equilibrium in which employment levels were high, job growth was solid if not always spectacular, but we were still seeing that real GDP growth could still be scaled up in a lot of ways. So there is a labor market dynamic to this.There is a fixed investment dynamic. Fixed investment growth is very strong in the late '90s. That was about information processing equipment, IT, software. We did telecommunications deregulation in 1996, which is meant to really expand and accelerate the rollout of things. That became the fiber boom. We saw a lot of construction that went into those sectors, and so we saw it really touch construction, we saw it touch equipment, and we also saw it effect intellectual property.An investment to prevent the millennium bug?There was probably a lot of overinvestment that also was born of some of that deregulation, but at least in terms of it adding to our welfare, making it easier for us to use the internet and the long-term benefits of that, a lot of that was built in the late '90s. You could probably point to some stuff in policy, obviously interacting with technology that was very favorable.The third thing I would say is also probably underrated is inflation fell over that whole period. While some of that inflation falling would've been some fortuitous dynamics, especially in the late '90s around food and energy prices falling, the Asian financial crisis, there were also things that were very important for creating space for the consumer to spend more. Things like HMOs. Healthcare inflation really fell throughout the '90s.Now, HMOs became more unpopular for a lot of reasons. These health management organizations were meant to control costs and did a pretty good job of it. This is something that Janet Yellen actually wrote about a long time ago, talking about the '90s and how the healthcare dynamic was very underrated. In the 2000s, healthcare inflation really picked up again and a lot of the cost-control measures in the private sector were less effective, but you could see evidence that that was also creating space in terms of price stability, the ability for the consumer to spend more on other types of goods and services. That also allows for both more demand to be available but also for it to be supplied.I think with all these stories there's a demand- and a supply-side aspect to them. I think you kind of need both for it to be successful. The three-legged stool is one where you want have a labor market that's strong, fixed investment that's growing (ideally faster than usual), and on the third leg it's the set of things that you can do to control really salient costs that everyone's paying. Like healthcare, obviously there's a lot of cost bloat, and thinking about ways to really curb expenditure without curbing quality or real consumption itself, but there's obviously a lot of room for reforms in that area.The boomy '20s? (11:38)Right now, you have still an increasing number of people who have had meaningful work experience over the last one, two, three, years. That human capital should accumulate and be more relevant for GDP growth going forward . . .So you've identified what, in your view, is a very successful mix of these very critical factors. So if you want to be bullish about the rest of this decade, which of those factors — maybe all of them — are at play right now? Or maybe none of them!Right now, the labor market is still holding up rather well. While we may not be seeing quite the level of labor market dynamism we saw earlier in this expansion, at the same time, that was also a period of great turbulence and high inflation. Right now, you have still an increasing number of people who have had meaningful work experience over the last one, two, three, years. That human capital should accumulate and be more relevant for GDP growth going forward, assuming we don't have a recession in the next year or two or whatever.If we do, I think it obviously would mean a lot of people are probably likely to not be as employed, and if that's the case, their marketable and productive skills may atrophy and depreciate. That's the risk there, but, all things considered, right now, non-farm payroll growth has been roughly speaking 160,000 per month. Employment rates adjusted for demographics are a little higher than they were before the pandemic. It's pretty historically high. That's not a bad outcome to start with and those initial conditions should hopefully bode well for the labor market's contribution to productivity growth.The challenge is in terms of real GDP growth. It's also a function of a lot of other factors: What are we going to see in terms of cost stability? I would generally say there's obviously a lot of turbulence right now, but what's going to happen to a lot of these key costs? On one hand, commodity prices should hopefully be stable, there's a lot of signs of, let's say, OPEC increasing production.On the other hand, we have also things about tariffs that are pretty significant threats on the table and I think you could also be equally concerned about how much this could matter. We've already had a bigger run-through of this with a lot of this supply chain turbulence, pandemic error stimulus, and how that stuff interacted. That was quite turbulent. Even if tariffs aren't quite as turbulent as that, it could still be something that detracted from productivity growth.We saw, actually, in the first two quarters of 2022 when inflation exploded, there were a compounding number of shocks on the supply side with the demand side that it did have a depressing effect on productivity in the short run. And so you can think if we see things on the cost side blow out, it will also restrict output. If you have to mark up the price of a lot of things to reflect different costs and risks, it's going to have some output-throttling effect, and a productivity-throttling effect. That's one side of things to be concerned about.And then the other side of it, in terms of fixed investment, I think there's a lot of reasons for optimism on fixed investment. If we just took the start of the year, there's clearly a lot of investment tied to the artificial intelligence boom: Data centers, all of the expenditures on software that should change, expenditures on hardware that should be upgraded, and there's a whole set of industrial infrastructure that's also tied to this where you should see capital deepening really emerge. You should see that there should be more room to scale up in capital formation relative to labor. You can probably point to some pockets of it right now, but it hadn't shown up in the GDP data yet. That was the optimistic case coming into this year and I think it's still there. The challenge is there's now other headwinds.The tariffs make me less optimistic. I really worry about the uncertainty freezing business investment and hiring, for that matter.I share your sentiment there. I think we learned in 2018 and -19, there were tariffs being implemented but on much smaller scale and scope, and even those had a pretty meaningful or identifiable impact on the manufacturing sector, leave aside even the other sectors that use manufactured inputs from imports or otherwise. So these are going to be likely headwinds if you're any kind of company that exports at any point in time to something across borders, you have to now incorporate higher costs, more uncertainty. We don't know how long this is supposed to stick. Are you supposed to assume this is going to be a transition period, as Treasury Secretary Bessent said, or is this something that is just like a little negotiation tactic, you get a win and then we move on?I don't think anyone's quite sure how this is supposed to play out and I worry both for the manufacturing sector itself because, contrary to the popular conception of it, we still export a lot of things. We still export, and the most competitive industries are exporting industries, and so that's a concern for whether you're a manufacturing construction machinery, you're Caterpillar, or if you're agricultural machinery and you're John Deere, you have to start to think about this stuff more and the risk that's attached to it. The hurdle rates to investment go up, not down.And on the other side of the ledger then we have, or at least in terms of the sectors that use manufactured inputs. Transformers are really important for building out the energy infrastructure if we're going to have load growth that's driven by AI or whatever else, we're kind of entering more uncertainty on that side as well, and not really clear what the full strategy is. It strikes me as going to be very challenging.And then on the monetary policy [side], and this is the difference, you had in the '90s a Federal Reserve which seems to have defeated the Great Inflation Monster of the 1970s while the Fed today is battling inflation.What do you make of that as far as setting the stage for a productivity boom, a Fed which is quite active and still quite concerned about that inflation surge and perhaps tariffs further playing into it going forward?I think the Fed's stuck in a hard spot here. If you think about a trade shock as likely being some mix of — well, it could be output throttling. Maybe the output throttling and the effects in the labor market are more outsized than the inflation effects? That was what we saw in 2018 and 19, but it's not a given that that's going to be the case this time. The scale of the threats are much bigger and much wider, and especially coming through a period now where there's higher inflation, maybe there's more willingness to raise prices in response to these shocks. So these things are a little different.The Fed has basically said, “We don't know exactly how this is going to play out and we're going to need to watch the data, keep an open mind, be pretty risk-averse about how we're going to adjust interest rate policy.” We've seen evidence of inflation expectations going up. That will not give the Fed a lot of confidence about cutting interest rates in the absence of other things getting worse. What the Fed's supposed to do in response to supply shock is almost a philosophical question because you obviously don't want to break things if there's really just a supply shock that is a one-off that you can see through, but if it starts to have longer term consequences, create bigger pain points in terms of inflation, it's just a tough spot.When I try to square the circle here — and this will be no surprise to the listeners — I can't help but thinking, boy, it would be really fantastic if all the most techno-optimist dreams about AI came true, and this is not just an important technology, but an unbelievably important technology that diffuses through the economy in record time. That would be a wonderful factor to add into that mix.If there are ways for that to be a bigger tailwind — and there could be, I wouldn't be too pessimistic about how that could filter through even the GDP data amidst a lot of these trade policy headwinds, we're expected to see a lot grand buildout of data centers, for example. There's an energy infrastructure layer to that.But even beyond the investment side, actually being used, improving total factor productivity. Super hard to predict, and no one wants to do a budget forecast under the assumption we're going to be doubling a productivity growth, but it would be nice to have.Sure would. I will say about one of the things on the inflation side, especially with the Fed, we've come through a period now where the Fed has kept restrictive interest rate policies, but only more recently have we seen a little bit more of that show up in financial markets, for example. So the stock market over the last two years has ran up quite a bit, historically, and only now we've seen some signs of maybe some pricing of risk and some of the issues around the Fed.Inflation data itself coming into this year, relative to the Fed's target on the Fed's gauges, it was right now about 2.6, 2.7 percent. Most of that reflects a lot of lags of the past, I would say. If you look through the details, you see a lot of it in how inflation is measured for housing rent. How inflation is measured for financial services really tracks the stock market, and then there's obviously some other idiosyncratic stuff around where they're using wages as the measure of prices in PCE, which is the Fed's inflation gauge. If you take that stuff out, we still have a little bit of inflation work to do in terms of getting inflation down, but it would sound pretty manageable. If I told you, actually, if you take away those lags, you probably get some only 2.2 percent, that seems like we're almost there.Let's take away a little more, then we get to two percent. We can just keep cutting things outAnd there would probably be conditions for a lot. But if we can give the benefit of the time and do no harm, there's probably a positive story to be told. The challenge is, we may not be doing no harm here. There may be new things that rear up, to your point. If you start just deducting stuff just because you think it lags, but you don't think about forward-looking risks, which there are, then you start to get into a more challenged view of how things improve on the inflation side.I think that's a big dilemma for the Fed, which is, they have to be forward-looking. They can't just say, well, this stuff is lagging, we can ignore it. That doesn't cash when you have forward-looking risks, but if we do see that maybe some of these trade policy risks go away, if there's a change of heart, a change of mind, I think you can possibly tell yourself a more positive story about how maybe interest rates can come down a bit more and financial conditions can be more supportive of investment over time. So I think that that is the optimistic case there.Full employment and the Fed (22:03)Taking people away from their job and then trying to just bring them back in several years later, don't expect the productivity dividends to be quite the same.For someone who cares about full employment, how would you rate the Fed's performance after the global financial crisis? Too tight?It was too tight and also it was an environment in which the Fed, at various points from 2010, maybe 2009, through to 2015, they were very eager to try and get interest rates up before the economy was giving their hard signal that it was time to raise interest rates. Inflation hadn't really reared its head, nor had we seen evidence of really strong labor markets. We were seeing a recovery that was very gentle, and slow, and maybe we were slowly getting out of it, but it was a slow grind. GDP growth was not particularly stellar over that period. That's pretty disappointing, right? We don't want do that again. Obviously, there are things like maybe fiscal policy could have been done differently, as well as monetary policy on some level, but I think the Fed was very eager to get off of zero to the point where they weren't looking at the data, just didn't like the fact they were at zero.Coming out of it, now it's like that recovery is a lot of wasted output. We lost a lot of output out of that. We lost a lot of employment out of that. It's kind of just a big economic waste. Obviously, this past recovery has been very different and Covid was a different type of shock relative to the global financial crisis.The thing that worries me is actually, when we start to look at the global financial crisis and we look at, say, even the recession from the dot com boom, or even the recession, to your point, in the early '90s, prime-age employment rates took a long time to recover and it's not ideal from a productivity perspective that you want to have people out of the labor force for long periods of time, people out of employment for an extended number of years —Also not good for social cohesion.The social fabric, yeah. There's a lot of stuff it's not great for. We don't want hysteresis of that kind. We don't want to have people who are, “Oh, because I lost my job, I'm not going to be able to get a new job in the foreseeable future.” A lot of skills, general intangible knowledge, that's kind of part of how people become more productive and how firms become more productive. You want that stuff to keep going on some level. That's also probably why even Covid was very turbulent. It's a lot of things that we kind of have in motion, we just switched it off and then switched it back on. Even that over a short horizon can be very disruptive. There was a reason, on some level, to do it, but it is also something to learn from: Taking people away from their job and then trying to just bring them back in several years later, don't expect the productivity dividends to be quite the same.So I look at those three recessions at least to say, if we're going to have slow recoveries out of those, it's going to cause problems. So it's a balance of Fed and fiscal policy, I'd say, because there are certain things — there was a 2001, -2, -3, there were attempts to lower taxes at the same time. That actually may have been the key catalyst, more so than the Fed cutting rates, but when you think about how the Fed is sometimes antsy to get off of low rates when the economy is depressed, that's not great. Right now the Fed has a very different set of trade-offs. Thankfully, on some level, for full employment especially, [we're] not in that world, we're now more trying to defend full employment, protect full employment, ideally not have a recession now, would be great.Demographics in the data (25:37)When you see how population growth has a twofold dynamic, we typically see in periods of high population growth are the periods also where you tend to see both strong investment but also inflation risk.I would love to avoid that. That's the last thing we need.I have two questions: One, how much do demographics, and there's been a lot of talk about falling fertility rates, is that something you think about much?I think demographics play a lot of tricks on the data itself. When you see how population growth has a twofold dynamic, we typically see in periods of high population growth are the periods also where you tend to see both strong investment but also inflation risk. Obviously, when you know that there's a bigger base of people who you can sell your goods and services to, you might be more inclined to go forward with a longer-dated investment with some confidence that there will be growth to validate it. On the other hand, it's also because there's more spending that's happening in the economy, that's higher growth, there might be more inflation risk.I think that those background conditions then filter in various ways. You can kind of see how Japan and Europe have, generally speaking, at least maybe prior to this pandemic-era episode of inflation, are seeing lower inflation rates, lower growth rates, though, too. So lower real growth, lower inflation, real per capita outcomes are always hard to square in terms of Japan's population is declining, but also Japan's real GDP, is it declining as much more or less? These things are very hard to identify going forward.I think it's going to just muddy a lot of different math as far as what counts as strong investment. We've gotten used to a world of non-farm payroll growth every month in the job report. If it's like 150,000 to 200,000, that's pretty solid and great. Do we need to change our expectations to it being a 100,000 is good enough because we're not actually expanding the working age population as much? Those things are going to have an effect on the macroeconomic data and how we evaluate it in real time. Even just this year, because for some people's assessments of what counts as strong payroll growth, there was a sense that payroll employment was strong in '23 and '24 because of immigration. I'm a little bit more skeptical than most of those claims, but if it's true, which I think it's still possibly true, that it's then the case right now if we do see less immigration, is that the breakeven, the place where what counts as healthy employment growth might be a lot lower because of it.Policies for productivity (27:55)Healthcare cost growth and managing it will be important both in terms of what people see in the budgetary outcomes, but also inflation outcomes.My last question for you, I'll give you a choice of what to answer. If you were to recommend a pro-productivity piece of public policy, either give me your favorite one or the least-obvious one that you would recommend.Right now, I'd say the things that worry the most in productivity, and it's on the table, is the trade policy. This stuff has adverse impacts on prices and investment, and it may have impacts on employment, too, over time, if they stick. We're talking about really high, sizable numbers here, in terms of what's threatened now. Maybe it's all bark and no bite, but I would say this is what's on the table right now. I don't know what else is on the table at the very moment, but I'd say that's a place where you have to wonder what's the merits of any of this stuff, and I think I'm not seeing it.I am more intellectually flexible than most about where sometimes some very specific, targeted, narrow trade barriers have a lot of sense in them, either because solving a particular externalities, over-capacity kind of problem that might exist. There are some intellectualized reasons you can offer if it's narrow and targeted. If you're doing stuff at a really broad-based level, the way it's currently being evaluated, then I have to ask, what are we doing here? I am not sure this is good for investment, and investment is also part of how we are able to unlock a lot of general corporate technologies, able to actually see total factor productivity growth and increase over time. So I worry about that. That's top of mind.Things that are kind of underrated that I think is really important over time, that'll probably be also important, both for people who are thinking about efficiency, thinking about where there's room for public policy to support productivity growth, I'd say healthcare is a really prominent place right now. Healthcare cost growth and managing it will be important both in terms of what people see in the budgetary outcomes, but also inflation outcomes. There's just a lot of expenditures there where there's not a lot of incentive for rationalization that needs to be brought. And there's a way to do it equitably. There's a lot of low-hanging fruit out there in terms of ways we can reform the healthcare system. Site neutral payments, being one easy example to point to.The federal government itself and private insurers, both of them, though, in terms of paying for healthcare, how they pay for healthcare and actually ensure cost control in that process, if we're able to do that well, I think the space for productivity is pretty underrated and could be quite sizable. That's also, I'd say, an underrated reason why the 2000s became far less productive. Healthcare services inflation, healthcare cost growth really exploded over that period, and we did not get a good handle on it, and we kind exited the '90s productivity boom phase. It was more obvious towards the latter half of the 2000s as a result.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedMicro ReadsFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. 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The space business landscape is changing. Companies like SpaceX and Blue Origin are moving at breakneck speed toward goals Americans have dreamed of since the 1960s. At the same time, a whole host of smaller startups are arriving on the scene, ready to tackle everything from asteroid mining to next-gen satellites to improved lunar missions.Today on Faster, Please — The Podcast, I'm talking with Matt Weinzierl about what research developments and market breakthroughs are allowing these companies to thrive.Weinzierl is the senior associate dean and chair of the MBA program at Harvard Business School. He is also a research associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. Weinzierl is the co-author of a new book with Brendan Rosseau, Space to Grow: Unlocking the Final Economic Frontier.In This Episode* Decentralizing space (1:54)* Blue Origin vs. SpaceX (4:50)* Lowering launch costs (9:24)* Expanding space entrepreneurship (14:42)* Space sector sustainability (20:06)* The role of Artemis (22:45)* Challenges to success (25:28)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Decentralizing space (1:54). . . we had this amazing success in the '60s with the Apollo mission . . but it was obviously a very government-led, centralized program and that got us in the mode of thinking that's how you did space.You're telling a story about space transitioning from government-led to market-driven, but I wonder if you could just explain that point because it's not a story about privatization, it's a story about decentralization, correct?It really is, I think the most important thing for listeners to grab onto. In fact, I teach a course at Harvard Business School on this topic, and I've been teaching it now for a few years, and I say to my students, “What's the reason we're here? Why are we talking about space at HBS?” and it's precisely about what you just asked.So maybe the catchiest way to phrase this for folks, there was one of the early folks at SpaceX, Jim Cantrell, he was one of the earliest employees. He has this amazing quote from the early 2000s where he says, “The Great American Space Enterprise, which defeated Communism in defense of Capitalism, was and is operating on a Soviet economic model.” And he was basically speaking to the fact that we had this amazing success in the '60s with the Apollo mission and going to the moon and it truly was an amazing achievement, but it was obviously a very government-led, centralized program and that got us in the mode of thinking that's how you did space. And so for the next 50 years, basically we did space in that way run from the center, not really using market forces.What changed in various ways was that in the early 2000s we decided that model had kind of run its course and the weaknesses were too big and so it was time to bring market forces in. And that doesn't mean that we were getting rid of the government role in space. Just like you said, the government will always play a vital role in space for various reasons, national security among them, but it is decentralizing it in a way to bring the power of the market to bear.Maybe the low point — and that low point, that crisis, maybe created an opportunity — was the end of the Space Shuttle program. Was that an important inflection point?It's definitely one that I think most people in the sector look to as being . . . there's the expression “never waste a crisis,” and I think that that's essentially what happened. The Shuttle was an amazing engineering achievement, nobody really doubts that, and what NASA was trying to do with it and with their contractors was incredibly hard. So it's easy to kind of get too negative on that era, but it is also true that the Shuttle never really performed the way people hoped, it never flew as often, it was much more costly, and then in 2003 there was the second Shuttle tragedy.When that happened, I think everybody felt like, "This just isn't the future." So we need something else, and the Shuttle program was put on a cancellation path by the end of that decade. That really did force this reckoning with the fact that the American space sector, which had put men on the moon and brought them back safely in 1969, launching all sorts of dreams about space colonies and hotels, now, 40 years later, it was going to be unable to even put a person into orbit on its own rockets. We were going to be renting rockets from the Russians. That was really a moment of soul searching, I guess is one way you think about it in the sector.Blue Origin vs. SpaceX (4:50)I guess the big lesson . . . is that competition really does matter in space just like in any other business.I think naturally we would lead into talking about SpaceX, which we certainly will do, but the main competitor, Blue Origin, the Jeff Bezos company, which seems to be moving forward, but it's definitely seemed to have adopted a very different kind of strategy. It seems to me different than the SpaceX strategy, which really is kind of a “move fast, break things, build them back up and try to launch again” while Blue Origin is far more methodical. Am I right in that, is that eventually going to work?Blue Origin is a fascinating company. In fact, we actually opened the book — the book is a series, basically, of stories that we tell about companies, and people, and government programs, sprinkled in with some economics because we can't resist. We're trying to structure it for folks, but we start with the story of Blue Origin because it really is fascinating. It illustrates some really fundamental aspects of the sector these days.To your specific question, we can talk more about Blue in many of its aspects. The motto of Blue from its beginning has been this Latin phrase, gradatim ferociter or, “step-by-step, ferociously,” and Bezos in the earliest days, they even have a tortoise on their company shield, so to speak, to signal this tortoise and the hair metaphor or fable. From the earliest days the idea was, “Look, we're going to just methodically work our way up to these grand visions of building infrastructure for space,” eventually in the service of having, as they always said, millions of people living and working in space.Now there's various ways to interpret the intervening 20 years that we've had, or 25 now since they were founded. One interpretation says, well, that's a nice story, but in fact they made some decisions that caused them to move more slowly than even they would've wanted to. So they didn't continue working as closely with NASA as, say, for instance SpaceX did. They relied really almost exclusively on funding from Bezos himself issuing a lot of other contracts they could have gotten, and that sort of reduced the amount of external discipline and market competition that they were facing. And then they made some other steps along the way, and so now they're trying to reignite and move faster, and they did launch New Glenn, their orbital rocket, recently. So they're back in the game and they're coming back. That's one story.Another story is, well yes, they've made decisions that at the time didn't seem to move as fast as they wanted, but they made those decisions intentionally. This is a strategy we will see pay off pretty well in the long run. I think that the jury is very much still out, but I guess the big lesson for your listeners and for me and hopefully for others in the sector, is that competition really does matter in space just like in any other business. To the extent that Blue didn't move as fast because they didn't face as much competition, that's an interesting lesson for the private sector. And to the extent that now they're in the game nipping at the heels of SpaceX, that's good for everybody, even for SpaceX, I think, to have them in the game.Do you think they're nipping at the heels?Well, yeah, I was just thinking as I said that, that might have been a little optimistic. It really does depend how you look at it. SpaceX is remarkably dominant in the commercial space sector, there's no question there. They launch 100 times a year plus and they are . . . the latest statistic I have in 2023, they launched more than 80 percent of all the mass launched off the surface of Earth, so they run more than half the satellites that are operational in space. They are incredibly dominant such that concerns about monopoly are quite present in the sector these days. We can talk about that.I think “nipping at the heels” might be a little generous, although there are areas in which SpaceX still does have real competition. The national security launch sector, ULA (United Launch Alliance) is still the majority launcher of national security missions and Blue is looking to also get into the national security launch market. With Amazon's satellite constellation, Kuiper, starting to come into the launch cadence over the next couple of years, they will have demand for lots of launch outside of SpaceX and that will start to increase the frequency with which Blue Origin and ULA also launch. So I think there is reason to believe that people in the sector will have more options, even for the heavy-lift launch vehicles.Lowering launch costs (9:24)[SpaceX] brought the cost of getting a kilogram of mass into orbit down by 90 percent in less than, really 10 or 15 years, which had been a stagnant number for going on four or five decades.People in Silicon Valley like talking about disruption and disruptors. It's hard to think of a company that is more deserving, or A CEO more deserving than Elon Musk and SpaceX. Tell me how disruptive that company has been to how we think about space and the economic potential of space.We open our chapter in the book on SpaceX by saying we believe it'll go down as one of the most important companies in the history of humanity, and I really do believe that. I don't think you have to be a space enthusiast, necessarily, to believe it. The simplest way to summarize that is that they brought the cost of getting a kilogram of mass into orbit down by 90 percent in less than, really 10 or 15 years, which had been a stagnant number for going on four or five decades. It had hovered around — depending on the data point you look at — around $30,000 a kilogram to low earth orbit, and once SpaceX got Falcon 9 flying, it was down to $3,000. That's just an amazing reduction.What's also amazing about it is they didn't stop there. As soon as they had that, they decided that one of the ways to make the business model work was to reinvent satellite internet. So in a sector that had just over a decade ago only 1000 operational satellites up in space, now we have 10,000, 6,000 plus of which are SpaceX's Starlink, just an incredibly fast-growing transformational technology in orbit.And then they went on to disrupt their own disruption by creating a rocket called Starship, which is just absolutely massive in a way that's hard to even imagine, and that, if it fulfills the promise that I think everyone hopes it will, will bring launch costs down, if you can believe it, by another 90 percent, so a total of 99 percent down to, say, $300 a kilogram. Now you may not have to pass those cost savings on to the customers because they don't have a lot of competition, but it's just amazingWhat's possible with those launch costs in that vicinity? Sometimes, when I try to describe it, I'm like, well, imagine all your 1960s space dreams and what was the missing ingredient? The missing ingredient was the economics and those launch costs. Now plug in those launch costs and lots of crazy things that seem science-fictional may become science-factual. Maybe give me just a sense of what's possible.Well first tell me, Jim, which of the '60s space dreams are you most excited about?It's hard for me, it's like which of my seven kids do I love more? I love the idea of people living in space, of there being industry in space. I like the idea of there being space-based solar power, lunar mining, asteroid mining, the whole kit and caboodle.You've gone through the list. I think we're all excited about those things. And just in case it's not obvious to your listeners, the reason I think you asked that question is that, of course, the launch cost is the gateway to doing anything in space. That's why everyone in the industry makes such a big deal out of it. Once you have that, it seems like the possibilities for business cases really do expand.Now, of course, we have to be careful. It's easy to get overhyped. It's still very expensive to do all the things you just mentioned in space, even if you can get there cheaply. Once you put humans in the mix, humans are very hard to keep alive in space. Space is a very dangerous place for lots of reasons. Even when there aren't humans in space, operating in space, even autonomously, is obviously quite hard, whether it's asteroid mining or other things. It's not as though, all of a sudden, all of our biggest dreams are immediately going to be realized. I do think that part of what's so exciting, part of the reason we wrote the book, is that there is a new renaissance of enthusiasm of startups building a bit on the SpaceX model of having a big dream, being really cost-conscious as you build it, moving fast and experimenting and iterating, who are going after some of these dreams you mentioned..So whether it's an asteroid mining company — actually, in my course later this week, we're having Matt Gialich, who's the CEO of AstroForge, and they're trying to reboot the asteroid mining industry. He's coming in to talk to our students. Or whether it's lunar mining, we have Rob Meyerson who ran Blue Origin for more than a decade, now he's started up a company that's going to mine Helium 3 on the moon; or whether you're talking about commercial space stations, which could eventually house tourists, manufacturing, R&D, a whole new push to bring the cost savings from the launch sector into the destinations sector, which we really haven't had.We've had the International Space Station for 20 plus years, but it wasn't really designed for commercial activity from the start and costs are pretty high. So there is this amazing flowering, and we'll see. I guess I would say that, in the short run, if you're trying to build a business in space, it's still mostly about satellites. It's still mostly about data to and from space. But as we look out further, we all hope that those bigger dreams are becoming more of a reality.Expanding space entrepreneurship (14:42)The laws of supply and demand do not depend on gravity.To me, it is such an exciting story and the story of these companies, they're just great stories to me. They're still, I think, pretty unknown. SpaceX, if you read the books that have been published, very harrowing, the whole thing could have collapsed quite easily. Still today, when the media covers — I think they're finally getting better —that anytime there'd be a SpaceX rocket blow up, they're like, “Oh, that's it! Musk doesn't know what he's doing!” But actually, that's the business, is to iterate, launch again, if it blows up, figure out what went wrong, use the data, fix it, try again. It's taken a long time.To the extent people or the media think about it, maybe 90 percent of the thought is about SpaceX, a little bit about Blue Origin, but, as you mentioned, there is this, no pun intended, constellation of other companies which have grown up, which have somewhat been enabled by the launch costs. Which one? Give me one of those that you think people should know about.There's so many actually, very much to your point. We wrote the book partly to give folks inside the industry a view they might not have had, which is, I'm an economist. We thought there was room to just show people how an economist thinks through this amazing change that's happening.Economics is not earthbound! It extends above the surface of the planet!The laws of supply and demand do not depend on gravity. We've learned that. But we also wrote the book for a couple other groups of people. One, people who are kind of on the margins of space, so their business isn't necessarily involved in space, but once they know all the activity that's happening, including the companies you're hinting at there, they might think, “Wait a minute, maybe my business, or I personally, could actually use some of the new capabilities in space to drive my mission forward to have an impact through my organization or myself.” And then of course the broader population of people who are just excited and want to learn more about what's going on and read some great stories.But I'll give you two companies, maybe three because I can't help myself. One is Firefly, which just landed successfully on the moon . . . 24 hours ago maybe? What a great story. It's now the second lander that's successfully landed, this one fully successfully after Intuitive Machines was a little bit tipped over, but that's a great example of how this model that includes more of a role for the commercial sector succeeds not all the time — the first lunar lander in the program that was supporting these didn't quite succeed — but try, try again. That's the beauty of markets, they find a way often and you can't exactly predict how they're going to work out. But that was a huge success story and so I'm very excited about what that means for our activity on the moon.Another really fascinating company is called K2. A lot of your listeners who follow space will have heard of it. It's two brothers who basically realized that, with the drop in launch costs being promised by Starship, the premium on building lightweight small satellites is kind of going away. We can go back to building big satellites again and maybe we don't need to always make the sacrifices that engineers have had to make to bring the mass down. So they're building much bigger satellites and that can potentially really increase the capabilities even still at low cost. So that's really exciting.Finally, I'll just mention Varda, which is a really fun and exciting startup that is doing manufacturing in automated capsules right now of pharmaceutical ingredients. What I love about them, very much to your point about these startups that are just flowering because of lower launch costs, they're not positioning themselves really as a space company. They're positioning themselves as a manufacturing company that happens to use microgravity to do it cheaper. So you don't have to be a space enthusiast to want your supply chain to be cheaper and they're part of that.Do you feel like we have a better idea of why there should be commercial space stations, or again, is that still in the entrepreneurial process of figuring it out? Once they're up there, business cases will emerge?I was just having a conversation about that this morning, actually, with some folks in the sector because there is a wide range of views about that. It is, as you were sort of implying, a bit of a chicken-and-the-egg problem, it's hard to know until you have a space station what you might do with it, what business cases might result. On the other hand, it's hard to invest in a space station if you don't know what the business case is for doing it. So it is a bit tricky.I tend to actually be slightly on the optimistic end of the spectrum, perhaps just because, as an economist, I think you are trained to know that the market can't be predicted and that at some level that is the beauty of the market. If we drive down costs, there's a ton of smart entrepreneurs out there who I think will be looking very hard to find value that they can create for people, and I'm still optimistic we'll be surprised.If I had to make the other side of the case, I would say that we've been dreaming about using microgravity for many decades, the ISS has been trying, and there hasn't been a killer app quite found yet. So it is very true that there are reasons to be skeptical despite my optimism.Space sector sustainability (20:06)Space does face a sort of structural problem with investing. The venture capital industry is not really built for the time horizons and the level of fundamental uncertainty that we're talking about with space.It's also a sector that's gone through a lot of booms and busts. That certainly has been the case with the idea of asteroid mining among other things. What do you see as the sustainability? I sort of remember Musk talking about there was this kind of “open window to space,” and I don't know what he thought opened that window, maybe it was low interest rates? What is the sustainability of the financial case for this entire sector going forward?It is true that the low interest rate environment of the early 2020s was really supportive to space in a way that. Again, opinions vary on whether it was so hot that it ended up actually hurting the sector by creating too much hype, and then some people lost their shirts, and so there was some bad taste in the mouth there. On the other hand, it got a lot of cash to a lot of companies that are trying to make really hard things happen. Space does face a sort of structural problem with investing. The venture capital industry is not really built for the time horizons and the level of fundamental uncertainty that we're talking about with space. We don't really know what the market is yet. We don't really know how long it's going to take to develop. So that's I think why you see some of these more exotic financing models in space, whether it's the billionaires or the so-called SPAC boom of the early 2020s, which was an alternative way for some space companies to go public and raise a big pile of cash. So I think people are trying to solve for how to get over what might be an uncomfortably long time before the kind of sustainable model that you're talking about is realized.Now, skeptics will say, “Well, maybe that's just because there is no sustainable model. We're hoping and hoping, but it's going to take 500 years.” I'm a little more optimistic than that for reasons we've talked about, but I think one part we haven't really mentioned, or at least not gone into that yet, which is reassuring to investors that I talked to and increasingly maybe an important piece of the puzzle, is the demand from the public sector, which remains quite robust, especially from the national security side. A lot of startups these days, even when capital markets are a bit tighter, they can rely on some relatively stable financing from the national security side, and I think that will always be there in space. There will always be a demand for robust, innovative technologies and capabilities in space that will help sustain the sector even through tough times.The role of Artemis (22:45)Artemis is a really good example of the US space enterprise, broadly speaking, trying to find its way into this new era, given all the political and other constraints that are, of course, going to impinge on a giant government program. I can imagine a scenario where most of this book is about NASA, and Artemis, and what comes after Artemis, and you devote one chapter to the weird kind of private-sector startups, but actually it's just the opposite. The story here is about what's going on with the private sector working with NASA and Artemis seems like this weird kind of throwback to old Apollo-style way of doing things. Is Artemis an important technology for the future of space or is it really the last gasp of an old model?It's a very timely question because obviously with all the change going on in Washington and especially with Elon's role —Certainly you always hear rumors that they'll cancel it. I don't know if that's going to happen, but I certainly see speculations pop-up in the Wall Street Journal or the Financial Times from time to time.Exactly, and you probably see debates in Congress where you see some Congress-people resistant to canceling some contracts and debates about the space launch system, the SLS rocket, which I think nobody denies is sort of an older model of how we're going to get to space. On the other hand, it's an incredibly powerful rocket that can actually get us to the moon right now.There's a lot of debate going on right now. The way I think about it is that Artemis is a really good example of the US space enterprise, broadly speaking, trying to find its way into this new era, given all the political and other constraints that are, of course, going to impinge on a giant government program. It's a mix of the old and the new. It's got some pieces like SLS or Gateway, which is a sort of station orbiting the moon to provide a platform for various activities that feel very much like the model from the 1980s: Shuttle and International Space Station.Then it's got pieces that feel very much like the more modern commercial space era with the commercial lunar payload services clips contracts that we were briefly talking about before, and with some of the other pieces that are — whether it's the lander that's also using commercial contracts, whether it's those pieces that are trying to bring in the new. How will it all shake out? My guess is that we are moving, I think inexorably, towards the model that really does tap into the best of the private sector, as well as of the public, and so I think we'll move gradually towards a more commercial approach, even to achieving the sort of public goods missions on the moon — but it'll take a little bit of time because people are naturally risk averse.Challenges to success (25:28)We're going to have some setbacks, some things aren't going to go well with this new model. There's going to be, I'm sure, some calls for pulling back on the commercial side of things, and I think that would be a real lost opportunity. . .How do we not screw this up? How do we not end up undermining this momentum? If you want to tell me what we can do, that's great, but I'm also worried about us making a mistake?There are threats to our ability to do this successfully. I'll just name two which are top of mind. One is space debris. That comes up in virtually every conversation I have. Especially with the increasing number of satellites, increasing number of actors in space, you do have to worry that we might lose control of that environment. Again, I am on the relatively more optimistic end of the spectrum for reasons we explain in the book, and I think the bottom line there is: The stakes are pretty high for everybody who's operating up there to not screw that part up, so I hope we'll get past it, but some people are quite worried.The second, honestly, is national security. Space has always been a beacon, we hope, of transcending our geopolitical rivalries, not just extending them up there. We're in a difficult time, so I think there is some risk that space will not remain as peaceful as it has — and that could very much short-circuit the kind of growth that we're talking about. Sadly, that would be very ironic because the economic opportunities that we have up there to create benefit for everybody on Earth and are part of what hopefully would bring people together across borders up in space. It's one of those places where we can cooperate for the common good.How could we screw this up? I think it's not always going to be smooth sailing. We're going to have some setbacks, some things aren't going to go well with this new model. There's going to be, I'm sure, some calls for pulling back on the commercial side of things, and I think that would be a real lost opportunity. I hope that we can push our way through, even though it might be a little less clearly charted.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedMicro Reads▶ Economics* The Case Against Tariffs Is Getting Stronger - Bberg Opinion* NYC's Congestion Pricing Is Good for the US - Bberg Opinion* Musk and DOGE Are Doing It Wrong - Project Syndicate▶ Business* With GPT-4.5, OpenAI Trips Over Its Own AGI Ambitions - Wired* Google is adding more AI Overviews and a new ‘AI Mode' to Search - Verge* Home Depot Turns to AI to Answer Online Shoppers' Questions - Bberg▶ Policy/Politics* Trump Set to Meet With Technology Leaders Early Next Week - Bberg* EU Lawmakers Push Back on U.S. Criticism of Tech Antitrust Regulation - WSJ* China aims to recruit top US scientists as Trump tries to kill the CHIPS Act - Ars* Rebuilding the Transatlantic Tech Alliance: Why Innovation, Not Regulation, Should Guide the Way - AEI* A New Way of Thinking About the N.I.H. - NYT Opinion▶ AI/Digital* You knew it was coming: Google begins testing AI-only search results - Ars* Are Large Language Models Ready for Business Integration? A Study on Generative AI Adoption - Arxiv* Turing Award Goes to 2 Pioneers of Artificial Intelligence - NYT* ChatGPT for President! Presupposed content in politicians versus GPT-generated texts - Arxiv* Chat-GPT4 Does Enhance Creativity. But Human Ego Can Hamper its Potential - SSRN▶ Biotech/Health* Alzheimer's could be treated by enhancing the brain's own immune cells - NA* Will NIH Cuts Boost Public Health—or Destroy It? - Free Press▶ Up Wing/Down Wing* Many Chinese See a Cultural Revolution in America - NYT▶ Substacks/Newsletters* On the US AI Safety Institute - Hyperdimensional* What is Vibe Coding? - AI Supremacy* In defense of Gemini - Strange Loop Canon* Economic Uncertainty in the US Economy - Conversable EconomistFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. 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The 2020s have so far been marked by pandemic, war, and startling technological breakthroughs. Conversations around climate disaster, great-power conflict, and malicious AI are seemingly everywhere. It's enough to make anyone feel like the end might be near. Toby Ord has made it his mission to figure out just how close we are to catastrophe — and maybe not close at all!Ord is the author of the 2020 book, The Precipice: Existential Risk and the Future of Humanity. Back then, I interviewed Ord on the American Enterprise Institute's Political Economy podcast, and you can listen to that episode here. In 2024, he delivered his talk, The Precipice Revisited, in which he reassessed his outlook on the biggest threats facing humanity.Today on Faster, Please — The Podcast, Ord and I address the lessons of Covid, our risk of nuclear war, potential pathways for AI, and much more.Ord is a senior researcher at Oxford University. He has previously advised the UN, World Health Organization, World Economic Forum, and the office of the UK Prime Minister.In This Episode* Climate change (1:30)* Nuclear energy (6:14)* Nuclear war (8:00)* Pandemic (10:19)* Killer AI (15:07)* Artificial General Intelligence (21:01)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Climate change (1:30). . . the two worst pathways, we're pretty clearly not on, and so that's pretty good news that we're kind of headed more towards one of the better pathways in terms of the emissions that we'll put out there.Pethokoukis: Let's just start out by taking a brief tour through the existential landscape and how you see it now versus when you first wrote the book The Precipice, which I've mentioned frequently in my writings. I love that book, love to see a sequel at some point, maybe one's in the works . . . but let's start with the existential risk, which has dominated many people's thinking for the past quarter-century, which is climate change.My sense is, not just you, but many people are somewhat less worried than they were five years ago, 10 years ago. Perhaps they see at least the most extreme outcomes less likely. How do you see it?Ord: I would agree with that. I'm not sure that everyone sees it that way, but there were two really big and good pieces of news on climate that were rarely reported in the media. One of them is that there's the question about how many emissions there'll be. We don't know how much carbon humanity will emit into the atmosphere before we get it under control, and there are these different emissions pathways, these RCP 4.5 and things like this you'll have heard of. And often, when people would give a sketch of how bad things could be, they would talk about RCP 8.5, which is the worst of these pathways, and we're very clearly not on that, and we're also, I think pretty clearly now, not on RCP 6, either. So the two worst pathways, we're pretty clearly not on, and so that's pretty good news that we're kind of headed more towards one of the better pathways in terms of the emissions that we'll put out there.What are we doing right?Ultimately, some of those pathways were based on business-as-usual ideas that there wouldn't be climate change as one of the biggest issues in the international political sphere over decades. So ultimately, nations have been switching over to renewables and low-carbon forms of power, which is good news. They could be doing it much more of it, but it's still good news. Back when we initially created these things, I think we would've been surprised and happy to find out that we were going to end up among the better two pathways instead of the worst ones.The other big one is that, as well as how much we'll admit, there's the question of how bad is it to have a certain amount of carbon in the atmosphere? In particular, how much warming does it produce? And this is something of which there's been massive uncertainty. The general idea is that we're trying to predict, if we were to double the amount of carbon in the atmosphere compared to pre-industrial times, how many degrees of warming would there be? The best guess since the year I was born, 1979, has been three degrees of warming, but the uncertainty has been somewhere between one and a half degrees and four and a half.Is that Celsius or Fahrenheit, by the way?This is all Celsius. The climate community has kept the same uncertainty from 1979 all the way up to 2020, and it's a wild level of uncertainty: Four and a half degrees of warming is three times one and a half degrees of warming, so the range is up to triple these levels of degrees of warming based on this amount of carbon. So massive uncertainty that hadn't changed over many decades.Now they've actually revised that and have actually brought in the range of uncertainty. Now they're pretty sure that it's somewhere between two and a half and four degrees, and this is based on better understanding of climate feedbacks. This is good news if you're concerned about worst-case climate change. It's saying it's closer to the central estimate than we'd previously thought, whereas previously we thought that there was a pretty high chance that it could even be higher than four and a half degrees of warming.When you hear these targets of one and a half degrees of warming or two degrees of warming, they sound quite precise, but in reality, we were just so uncertain of how much warming would follow from any particular amount of emissions that it was very hard to know. And that could mean that things are better than we'd thought, but it could also mean things could be much worse. And if you are concerned about existential risks from climate change, then those kind of tail events where it's much worse than we would've thought the things would really get, and we're now pretty sure that we're not on one of those extreme emissions pathways and also that we're not in a world where the temperature is extremely sensitive to those emissions.Nuclear energy (6:14)Ultimately, when it comes to the deaths caused by different power sources, coal . . . killed many more people than nuclear does — much, much more . . .What do you make of this emerging nuclear power revival you're seeing across Europe, Asia, and in the United States? At least the United States it's partially being driven by the need for more power for these AI data centers. How does it change your perception of risk in a world where many rich countries, or maybe even not-so-rich countries, start re-embracing nuclear energy?In terms of the local risks with the power plants, so risks of meltdown or other types of harmful radiation leak, I'm not too concerned about that. Ultimately, when it comes to the deaths caused by different power sources, coal, even setting aside global warming, just through particulates being produced in the soot, killed many more people than nuclear does — much, much more, and so nuclear is a pretty safe form of energy production as it happens, contrary to popular perception. So I'm in favor of that. But the proliferation concerns, if it is countries that didn't already have nuclear power, then the possibility that they would be able to use that to start a weapons program would be concerning.And as sort of a mechanism for more clean energy. Do you view nuclear as clean energy?Yes, I think so. It's certainly not carbon-producing energy. I think that it has various downsides, including the difficulty of knowing exactly what to do with the fuel, that will be a very long lasting problem. But I think it's become clear that the problems caused by other forms of energy are much larger and we should switch to the thing that has fewer problems, rather than more problems.Nuclear war (8:00)I do think that the Ukraine war, in particular, has created a lot of possible flashpoints.I recently finished a book called Nuclear War: A Scenario, which is kind of a minute-by-minute look at how a nuclear war could break out. If you read the book, the book is terrifying because it really goes into a lot of — and I live near Washington DC, so when it gives its various scenarios, certainly my house is included in the blast zone, so really a frightening book. But when it tried to explain how a war would start, I didn't find it a particularly compelling book. The scenarios for actually starting a conflict, I didn't think sounded particularly realistic.Do you feel — and obviously we have Russia invade Ukraine and loose talk by Vladimir Putin about nuclear weapons — do you feel more or less confident that we'll avoid a nuclear war than you did when you wrote the book?Much less confident, actually. I guess I should say, when I wrote the book, it came out in 2020, I finished the writing in 2019, and ultimately we were in a time of relatively low nuclear risk, and I feel that the risk has risen. That said, I was trying to provide estimates for the risk over the next hundred years, and so I wasn't assuming that the low-risk period would continue indefinitely, but it was quite a shock to end up so quickly back in this period of heightened tensions and threats of nuclear escalation, the type of thing I thought was really from my parents' generation. So yes, I do think that the Ukraine war, in particular, has created a lot of possible flashpoints. That said, the temperature has come down on the conversation in the last year, so that's something.Of course, the conversation might heat right back up if we see a Chinese invasion of Taiwan. I've been very bullish about the US economy and world economy over the rest of this decade, but the exception is as long as we don't have a war with China, from an economic point of view, but certainly also a nuclear point of view. Two nuclear armed powers in conflict? That would not be an insignificant event from the existential-risk perspective.It is good that China has a smaller nuclear arsenal than the US or Russia, but there could easily be a great tragedy.Pandemic (10:19)Overall, a lot of countries really just muddled through not very well, and the large institutions that were supposed to protect us from these things, like the CDC and the WHO, didn't do a great job either.The book comes out during the pandemic. Did our response to the pandemic make you more or less confident in our ability and willingness to confront that kind of outbreak? The worst one that saw in a hundred years?Yeah, overall, it made me much less confident. There'd been general thought by those who look at these large catastrophic risks that when the chips are down and the threat is imminent, that people will see it and will band together and put a lot of effort into it; that once you see the asteroid in your telescope and it's headed for you, then things will really get together — a bit like in the action movies or what have you.That's where I take my cue from, exactly.And with Covid, it was kind of staring us in the face. Those of us who followed these things closely were quite alarmed a long time before the national authorities were. Overall, a lot of countries really just muddled through not very well, and the large institutions that were supposed to protect us from these things, like the CDC and the WHO, didn't do a great job either. That said, scientists, particularly developing RNA vaccines, did better than I expected.In the years leading up to the pandemic, certainly we'd seen other outbreaks, they'd had the avian flu outbreak, and you know as well as I do, there were . . . how many white papers or scenario-planning exercises for just this sort of event. I think I recall a story where, in 2018, Bill Gates had a conversation with President Trump during his first term about the risk of just such an outbreak. So it's not as if this thing came out of the blue. In many ways we saw the asteroid, it was just pretty far away. But to me, that says something again about as humans, our ability to deal with severe, but infrequent, risks.And obviously, not having a true global, nasty outbreak in a hundred years, where should we focus our efforts? On preparation? Making sure we have enough ventilators? Or our ability to respond? Because it seems like the preparation route will only go so far, and the reason it wasn't a much worse outbreak is because we have a really strong ability to respond.I'm not sure if it's the same across all risks as to how preparation versus ability to respond, which one is better. In some risks, there's also other possibilities like avoiding an outbreak, say, an accidental outbreak happening at all, or avoiding a nuclear war starting and not needing to actually respond at all. I'm not sure if there's an overall rule as to which one was better.Do you have an opinion on the outbreak of Covid?I don't know whether it was a lab leak. I think it's a very plausible hypothesis, but plausible doesn't mean it's proven.And does the post-Covid reaction, at least in the United States, to vaccines, does that make you more or less confident in our ability to deal with . . . the kind of societal cohesion and confidence to tackle a big problem, to have enough trust? Maybe our leaders don't deserve that trust, but what do you make from this kind of pushback against vaccines and — at least in the United States — our medical authorities?When Covid was first really striking Europe and America, it was generally thought that, while China was locking down the Wuhan area, that Western countries wouldn't be able to lock down, that it wasn't something that we could really do, but then various governments did order lockdowns. That said, if you look at the data on movement of citizens, it turns out that citizens stopped moving around prior to the lockdowns, so the lockdown announcements were more kind of like the tail, rather than the dog.But over time, citizens wanted to kind of get back out and interact more, and the rules were preventing them, and if a large fraction of the citizens were under something like house arrest for the better part of a year, would that lead to some fairly extreme resentment and some backlash, some of which was fairly irrational? Yeah, that is actually exactly the kind of thing that you would expect. It was very difficult to get a whole lot of people to row together and take the same kind of response that we needed to coordinate the response to prevent the spread, and pushing for that had some of these bad consequences, which are also going to make it harder for next time. We haven't exactly learned the right lessons.Killer AI (15:07)If we make things that are smarter than us and are not inherently able to control their values or give them moral rules to work within, then we should expect them to ultimately be calling the shots.We're more than halfway through our chat and now we're going to get to the topic probably most people would like to hear about: After the robots take our jobs, are they going to kill us? What do you think? What is your concern about AI risk?I'm quite concerned about it. Ultimately, when I wrote my book, I put AI risk as the biggest existential risk, albeit the most uncertain, as well, and I would still say that. That said, some things have gotten better since then.I would assume what makes you less confident is one, what seems to be the rapid advance — not just the rapid advance of the technology, but you have the two leading countries in a geopolitical globalization also being the leaders in the technology and not wanting to slow it down. I would imagine that would make you more worried that we will move too quickly. What would make you more confident that we would avoid any serious existential downsides?I agree with your supposition that the attempts by the US and China to turn this into some kind of arms race are quite concerning. But here are a few things: Back when I was writing the book, the leading AI systems with things like AlphaGo, if you remember that, or the Atari plane systems.Quaint. Quite quaint.It was very zero-sum, reinforcement-learning-based game playing, where these systems were learning directly to behave adversarially to other systems, and they could only understand the kind of limited aspect about the world, and struggle, and overcoming your adversary. That was really all they could do, and the idea of teaching them about ethics, or how to treat people, and the diversity of human values seemed almost impossible: How do you tell a chess program about that?But then what we've ended up with is systems that are not inherently agents, they're not inherently trying to maximize something. Rather, you ask them questions and they blurt out some answers. These systems have read more books on ethics and moral philosophy than I have, and they've read all kinds of books about the human condition. Almost all novels that have ever been published, and pretty much every page of every novel involves people judging the actions of other people and having some kind of opinions about them, and so there's a huge amount of data about human values, and how we think about each other, and what's inappropriate behavior. And if you ask the systems about these things, they're pretty good at judging whether something's inappropriate behavior, if you describe it.The real challenge remaining is to get them to care about that, but at least the knowledge is in the system, and that's something that previously seemed extremely difficult to do. Also, these systems, there are versions that do reasoning and that spend longer with a private text stream where they think — it's kind of like sub-vocalizing thoughts to themselves before they answer. When they do that, these systems are thinking in plain English, and that's something that we really didn't expect. If you look at all of the weights of a neural network, it's quite inscrutable, famously difficult to know what it's doing, but somehow we've ended up with systems that are actually thinking in English and where that could be inspected by some oversight process. There are a number of ways in which things are better than I'd feared.So what is your actual existential risk scenario look like? This is what you're most concerned about happening with AI.I think it's quite hard to be all that concrete on it at the moment, partly because things change so quickly. I don't think that there's going to be some kind of existential catastrophe from AI in the next couple of years, partly because the current systems require so much compute in order to run them that they can only be run at very specialized and large places, of which there's only a few in the world. So that means the possibility that they break out and copy themselves into other systems is not really there, in which case, the possibility of turning them off is much possible as well.Also, they're not yet intelligent enough to be able to execute a lengthy plan. If you have some kind of complex task for them, that requires, say, 10 steps — for example, booking a flight on the internet by clicking through all of the appropriate pages, and finding out when the times are, and managing to book your ticket, and fill in the special codes they sent to your email, and things like that. That's a somewhat laborious task and the systems can't do things like that yet. There's still the case that, even if they've got a, say, 90 percent chance of completing any particular step, that the 10 percent chances of failure add up, and eventually it's likely to fail somewhere along the line and not be able to recover. They'll probably get better at that, but at the moment, the inability to actually execute any complex plans does provide some safety.Ultimately, the concern is that, at a more abstract level, we're building systems which are smarter than us at many things, and we're attempting to make them much more general and to be smarter than us across the board. If you know that one player is a better chess player than another, suppose Magnus Carlsen's playing me at chess, I can't predict exactly how he's going to beat me, but I can know with quite high likelihood that he will end up beating me. I'll end up in checkmate, even though I don't know what moves will happen in between here and there, and I think that it's similar with AI systems. If we make things that are smarter than us and are not inherently able to control their values or give them moral rules to work within, then we should expect them to ultimately be calling the shots.Artificial General Intelligence (21:01)Ultimately, existential risks are global public goods problems.I frequently check out the Metaculus online prediction platform, and I think currently on that platform, 2027 for what they would call “weak AGI,” artificial general intelligence — a date which has moved up two months in the past week as we're recording this, and then I think 2031 also has accelerated for “strong AGI,” so this is pretty soon, 2027 or 2031, quite soon. Is that kind of what you're assuming is going to happen, that we're going to have to deal with very powerful technologies quite quickly?Yeah, I think that those are good numbers for the typical case, what you should be expecting. I think that a lot of people wouldn't be shocked if it turns out that there is some kind of obstacle that slows down progress and takes longer before it gets overcome, but it's also wouldn't be surprising at this point if there are no more big obstacles and it's just a matter of scaling things up and doing fairly simple processes to get it to work.It's now a multi-billion dollar industry, so there's a lot of money focused on ironing out any kinks or overcoming any obstacles on the way. So I expect it to move pretty quickly and those timelines sound very realistic. Maybe even sooner.When you wrote the book, what did you put as the risk to human existence over the next a hundred years, and what is it now?When I wrote the book, I thought it was about one in six.So it's still one in six . . . ?Yeah, I think that's still about right, and I would say that most of that is coming from AI.This isn't, I guess, a specific risk, but, to the extent that being positive about our future means also being positive on our ability to work together, countries working together, what do you make of society going in the other direction where we seem more suspicious of other countries, or more even — in the United States — more suspicious of our allies, more suspicious of international agreements, whether they're trade or military alliances. To me, I would think that the Age of Globalization would've, on net, lowered that risk to one in six, and if we're going to have less globalization, to me, that would tend to increase that risk.That could be right. Certainly increased suspicion, to the point of paranoia or cynicism about other nations and their ability to form deals on these things, is not going to be helpful at all. Ultimately, existential risks are global public goods problems. This continued functioning of human civilization is this global public good and existential risk is the opposite. And so these are things where, one way to look at it is that the US has about four percent of the world's people, so one in 25 people live in the US, and so an existential risk is hitting 25 times as many people as. So if every country is just interested in themself, they'll undervalue it by a factor of 25 or so, and the countries need to work together in order to overcome that kind of problem. Ultimately, if one of us falls victim to these risks, then we all do, and so it definitely does call out for international cooperation. And I think that it has a strong basis for international cooperation. It is in all of our interests. There are also verification possibilities and so on, and I'm actually quite optimistic about treaties and other ways to move forward.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedMicro Reads▶ Economics* Tech tycoons have got the economics of AI wrong - Economist* Progress in Artificial Intelligence and its Determinants - Arxiv* The role of personality traits in shaping economic returns amid technological change - CEPR▶ Business* Tech CEOs try to reassure Wall Street after DeepSeek shock - Wapo* DeepSeek Calls for Deep Breaths From Big Tech Over Earnings - Bberg Opinion* Apple's AI Moment Is Still a Ways Off - WSJ* Bill Gates Isn't Like Those Other Tech Billionaires - NYT* OpenAI's Sam Altman and SoftBank's Masayoshi Son Are AI's New Power Couple - WSJ* SoftBank Said to Be in Talks to Invest as Much as $25 Billion in OpenAI - NYT* Microsoft sheds $200bn in market value after cloud sales disappoint - FT▶ Policy/Politics* ‘High anxiety moment': Biden's NIH chief talks Trump 2.0 and the future of US science - Nature* Government Tech Workers Forced to Defend Projects to Random Elon Musk Bros - Wired* EXCLUSIVE: NSF starts vetting all grants to comply with Trump's orders - Science* Milei, Modi, Trump: an anti-red-tape revolution is under way - Economist* FDA Deregulation of E-Cigarettes Saved Lives and Spurred Innovation - Marginal Revolution* Donald Trump revives ideas of a Star Wars-like missile shield - Economist▶ AI/Digital* Is DeepSeek Really a Threat? - PS* ChatGPT vs. Claude vs. DeepSeek: The Battle to Be My AI Work Assistant - WSJ* OpenAI teases “new era” of AI in US, deepens ties with government - Ars* AI's Power Requirements Under Exponential Growth - Rand* How DeepSeek Took a Chunk Out of Big AI - Bberg* DeepSeek poses a challenge to Beijing as much as to Silicon Valley - Economist▶ Biotech/Health* Creatine shows promise for treating depression - NS* FDA approves new, non-opioid painkiller Journavx - Wapo▶ Clean Energy/Climate* Another Boffo Energy Forecast, Just in Time for DeepSeek - Heatmap News* Column: Nuclear revival puts uranium back in the critical spotlight - Mining* A Michigan nuclear plant is slated to restart, but Trump could complicate things - Grist▶ Robotics/AVs* AIs and Robots Should Sound Robotic - IEEE Spectrum* Robot beauticians touch down in California - FT Opinion▶ Space/Transportation* A Flag on Mars? Maybe Not So Soon. - NYT* Asteroid triggers global defence plan amid chance of collision with Earth in 2032 - The Guardian* Lurking Inside an Asteroid: Life's Ingredients - NYT▶ Up Wing/Down Wing* An Ancient 'Lost City' Is Uncovered in Mexico - NYT* Reflecting on Rome, London and Chicago after the Los Angeles fires - Wapo Opinion▶ Substacks/Newsletters* I spent two days testing DeepSeek R1 - Understanding AI* China's Technological Advantage -overlapping tech-industrial ecosystems - AI Supremacy* The state of decarbonization in five charts - Exponential View* The mistake of the century - Slow Boring* The Child Penalty: An International View - Conversable Economist* Deep Deepseek History and Impact on the Future of AI - next BIG futureFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. 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My 2023 book, The Conservative Futurist, is based on the idea that we, as a society, are failing to meet our potential: Inefficiency, overregulation, and an overabundance of caution is robbing us of the world we might be living in.Nicole Kobie shares some of my frustrations in her recent book, The Long History of the Future: Why tomorrow's technology still isn't here. She explores the evolutionary history of past technologies and why we just can't seem to arrive at the future we've all been waiting for.Today on Faster, Please — The Podcast, I chat with Kobie about the role of regulators, the pace of progress, and what careers in journalism have taught us about innovation hypeKobie is a science and technology journalist whose articles appear in publications fromTeen Vogue, toNew Scientist, toGQ. She is the futures editor forPC Pro and a contributing editor forWired. She is based out of London.In This Episode* Repeating history (1:42)* The American system of innovation (7:12)* The cost of risk-aversion (16:10)* The problem dynamic (20:28)* Our future rate of change (23:34)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Repeating history (1:42)I'm supposed to forget that I basically wrote the same version of this story a year ago . . .Pethokoukis: I wrote a book about a year ago, and I wrote that book out of frustration. I was frustrated, when I originally started writing it in 2020, that, how come we already didn't have a vaccine for Covid? And then I started thinking about all the other technologies that we didn't have, and it was that frustration that led me write my book.I'm guessing there was a frustration that led you to write your much better-written book.Kobie: So I think it's really interesting that you start with Covid vaccines because here, out in the UK, the vaccine that was developed here — this is not something of my area of expertise, but obviously all journalists ended up having to write about Covid quite a bit — but the reason we managed to create a vaccine so quickly (they usually take several years) is because we have this vaccine platform that they'd been coming up with, and they kind of had this virus in their heads of, “Oh, it would probably be this type of a virus, and if we were to design a system that would help us design a vaccine really quickly, what would it look like?” And they had it mostly done when everything hit, so actually we got quite lucky on that one. It could have been a lot worse, we could have been much further behind.But you're right, I have been writing about technology for a very long time and I keep hearing things about AI, things about driverless cars, and you just feel like you're writing the same headline time after time after time because news has such a short memory. I'm supposed to forget that I basically wrote the same version of this story a year ago, and that every year I'm writing about driverless cars and how they're going to be here imminently, and then 10 years goes by and I'm like, “Maybe I should have renewed my license.” That sort of a thing. And I find that very frustrating because I don't like hype. I like having the reality of the situation, even if it's a bit pessimistic, even if it's not the most happy scenario of what could happen with technology. I'd rather know the downsides and have a better sense of what is actually going to happen. So it really came out of that.I was writing a section for a British computing magazine called PC Pro, a future section, and it's a very cynical magazine a lot of the time, so I kind of got used to writing why things weren't going to happen and I had this whole list of these different technologies that I'm not necessarily pessimistic about, but I could see why they weren't going to happen as quickly as everyone has said. So just put it together in a book. So a little bit the same as you, but bit of a different story.So that phenomenon, and I wonder, is it partly sort of a reporter's problem? Because most reporters you have a certain . . . you don't want to write the same story over and over again. I think a lot of reporters have a soft spot for novelty. I think that's not just true with technology, I think it's with economic theories, it's with a lot of things. Then you have the founders or technologists themselves, many of whom probably would like to raise money and to continue raising money, so they're going to hype it, but yet, history would suggest that there's nothing new about this phenomenon, that things always take longer to get from the breakthrough to where it is a ubiquitous technology, everything from electrification, to PCs, to the internal combustion engine.Is there an actual problem or is it really a problem of our perceptions?I think it is a problem of perception. We have this idea that technology happens so quickly, that development happens so quickly, and it does, especially something like a smartphone. It went from being something you heard about to something you carried with you in a matter of years — very, very quickly. Of course, the technologies that make up a smartphone took many, many, several decades, a long, long time.The problem with a lot of innovation and development, especially when it's things like things like AI, they start as almost a philosophical, academic idea. Then they become science and we start to work out the science of how something's going to work. And then you have to engineer it and make it work physically. And then you have to commercialize it. And for every single different aspect of a technology, that's what you're kind of doing. That is a very long road involving very different people. And the academics are like, “Yeah, we solved this. I wrote a paper about this ages ago, a hundred years ago we were talking about AI.” And then the scientists who are doing stuff in the lab, they can make it work in the lab, they can make it work in theory, they can do that in-the-lab bit, and that's amazing. We read about those breakthroughs. Those are the kinds of things that make really great headlines and journalists love those kinds of stories because, hey, it's new. And then you've got engineers who've actually got to physically build it, and that is where the money really needs to come in because this is always harder. Building anything is harder than you think it's going to be. It doesn't matter what it is, it's always harder because you've got the real world, you're out of the lab and you have to think about all of the things that the scientists who were very smart people did not think about.And then you've got to try to come up with a way to make it work for people, and people are hard. You need to think about regulators, you need to think about business models, and all of that sort of thing. There's a lot of problems in all of that, and a lot of the time, the innovation isn't about that original academic idea. It's about how you're going to bring it to market, or how you're going to make it safe, and all of those kinds of things. There's so much to think about with even the smallest piece of technology.The American system of innovation (7:12)It's too easy for people to just kind of jump up and say, “Well, it's corporations being evil. That's the problem.” Well sometimes, yeah. “It's governments being too heavy-handed and regulators being too tight. That's the problem.” Well, it is until your plane crashes, then you definitely wish that those aviation regulators were stricter, right?I'm old enough to remember in the 1990s, I remember writing stories when I was a reporter about AI. There was a huge AI boom in the 1990s which then kind of fizzled out, and then it sort of came up again. So I've certainly heard about the hype about technologies, and when people talk about hype, often they'll point out the Internet Boom — but to me, that's, again, really just a case of things taking longer than what people expected because all the big moneymaking ideas in the 2010s about how to use the internet and apps — these are not new ideas. These are all ideas people had in the '90s, but what they lacked was bandwidth to make them work out, and we also lacked the smartphones, but the idea of ordering things online or the sharing economy, the technology wasn't there.Sometimes the problem is that the technology just isn't there yet. Is there an actual problem — you're in Great Britain — is there a problem with the American system of innovation, which, the stylized version of that would be: government funds lots of basic research on the kinds of questions that businesses would never really do their own — even though they do a lot of R&D, they don't do that kind of R&D because it's not immediately commercial — and that creates this stock of knowledge that then businesses can use to commercialize, see what people will actually buy as a way of valuing it., does it pass the market test, and then we end up with stuff that businesses and consumers can use — that, ideally, is the American system.Is that a good system? Can that system be improved? What is your contention?It depends what you're making. If you're making a consumer product, I think yeah, that works decently well. You can see in some ways where it doesn't work, and you can see in some ways where it does work, and to me that's where regulation and the government needs to sit, is to try to push things the right way. Obviously, social media probably needed something helping it along the way at some point so it didn't go down the road that we have now. Smartphones are pretty good, they're a pretty great technology, we're used to using them, there's some issues with surveillance and that sort of thing, but that kind of worked pretty well.But it depends on the technology. Like I mentioned, these Covid vaccines. Here in the UK, that wasn't a project that was funded by corporations. It definitely got out in the world and was mass-produced by them quickly, which was great, but it was something that came through the academic world here and there was a lot of government funding involved. Of course, the UK has a very strong academic system, and an academic network, and how you get funding for these things.It depends on the product, it depends what you're trying to buy, and this is the issue when you come into things like transport: so driverless cars, or goofy ideas like hyperloop, or flying taxis and things like that. Is that a consumer product? Is that public transport? How are we deciding what the value is in this? Is it just about how much money it makes for Google, or is it about how it solves problems for cities? And we probably need it to do both, and walking that line to make sure that it does both in a way that works for everybody is very difficult, and I don't think we have easy answers for any of that, partially some of this stuff is so new and partially because we're not very good at talking about these things.It's too easy for people to just kind of jump up and say, “Well, it's corporations being evil. That's the problem.” Well sometimes, yeah. “It's governments being too heavy-handed and regulators being too tight. That's the problem.” Well, it is until your plane crashes, then you definitely wish that those aviation regulators were stricter, right? So it depends on what the technology is, and we just use technology to cover such a range of innovation that maybe we need some different ways of talking about this.Flying cars has become such the example, but the reason there isn't a flying car, some might blame regulation, but I think, whether it's regulations were too heavy for some reason, or the technology wasn't there, it didn't make economic sense. And even though there's been a lot of flying taxi startups, it still may not make economic sense. So who determines if it makes economic sense? Does the government determine or do you need to raise money and then try out a product, then the entrepreneur realizes it doesn't make economic sense, and then the company collapses?To me, that's what I see as the American system, that somebody has an idea, maybe they base the idea off research, and then they try the idea, and they raise money, and then they actually try to create a product, and then the thing fails, and, well, now we know. Now we know that's probably not ready.Is there a different way of doing it? What country does it better?I think China does, and I think that's because companies in China and the government are much more linked, and they serve each other. That's not necessarily a good thing, to be clear, especially not for the wider world, all of the time, but China has driverless cars and they're out on the roads. It's not that they work better than the ones in the US, they don't, but there's less of a concern about some of the negative impacts. Where you fall on where that sits, that's kind of up to individuals. Personally, I think a driverless car shouldn't be on the road if it's not perfectly safe, if it's not a really trusted technology, and I am willing to wait for that because I think it is a thing that is worth waiting for, or ensuring that we can actually build it in a way that's affordable. But they're out on the roads in China, they're being tested, you can catch a robot taxi there.But that should be a worse system because it sounds like you're very skeptical about how safe they are. The fact that they're only on the roads in this country in certain places, in certain cities, there's a slow rollout — that should be a better system.Personally, I think it is. Now, if you live in San Francisco or you live in the places that are kind of being treated as test labs for these vehicles, you might not be a fan of them, and there's been a lot of pushback in San Francisco around this, especially because it's taken so long and they can actually be quite disruptive to the cities when they don't work out, and it's not like you, as somebody who lives locally, gets compensated because you get delayed on your way to work because a Waymo car got on the way of your bus, or whatever.But I think that we do need to be slower with technology, and I think that there's nothing wrong with taking a bit of time to make sure that we get it right. It is very likely that, in the next couple of years, there are going to be cities that have these air taxis. To a certain extent, they're just electric helicopters that are cheaper and easier to fly, and we already have those to get people above traffic to get between places. That's an idea that already exists. This isn't a huge, massive leap forward. It is going to happen in cities where people are a little bit less afraid of disrupting everybody. But again, I'm not sure that that's right for people. That might be right for the company; so all of the various aviation companies that are trying this, they're going to end up flying for the first time in cities like Dubai and places like that that aren't worried about what everyday people on the ground think, they don't really care what you think. A place like New York or LA, it's going to be a little bit tougher to convince people that they should have to suffer the safety implications of this if one of these things crashes, because people in the US have a really great ability to be able to speak out about these technologies, and better government regulations, and things like that.I think it is a very tough question and I think it is almost impossible to get it perfectly, so the question is more about getting it to be good enough, and to me, what I think that requires is good communication between companies and regulators. And in aviation, that is pretty good— you will not talk to any company that is making the so-called “flying cars” and the air taxis. They all go on about how well they work with regulators and how much they appreciate the support of regulators, and I think that's a good thing, but regulators are probably also maybe not making it as easy as it could be to develop a new technology because one of the problems with these companies is that it takes a certain length of time to come up with this idea and how the technology is going to work, and then you have to get all these different certifications, and it is a long road — and this is good, you want to make sure the plane works, but by the time you're certified, the technology has come along enough that now you're out-of-date and your technology is out-of-date, so you want to drop a new piece of technology, a new battery, a new idea, AI, and whatever. To a certain extent you have to come back to the beginning, and now you're behind again, and by the time you get everything certified, that's out-of-date again. So we probably do need to come up with faster ways of looking at new technologies and finding new ways of letting these companies safely work in a new technology into an existing design, new things like that.The cost of risk-aversion (16:10)I don't want to talk about this really wide-ranging AI stuff. I want really specifics now, now that we're starting to apply this stuff and we have really specific AI models that work in a very specific way, let's talk about that. Isn't that kind of the big story, that the reason we don't have some of these technologies is because we've been — at least in the United States — we've been wildly risk-averse. That's the whole story of nuclear energy: We became very risk-averse, and now we're sitting here worried about climate change when we have an established technology that, had we not paused it, we would've had 50 years of improvements, and when we talk about small nuclear reactors, or microreactors, or even fusion, we're 50 years behind where we could be. So don't some of these tech folks have a point that there was a proper reaction in the '50s and '60s about regulation and the environment and then we had an overreaction, now it's become just very hard to build things in this country and get them deployed, whether it's flying taxis or nuclear reactors. Now we're going to have this debate about AI. Does does that sound logical to you?I'm not sure that that is always what is holding these things back. The thing that has been holding AI back is just processing power. Jeffrey Hinton was working on all of these ideas in the '90s, and he couldn't make it work because the technology wasn't there, and it has taken us this long to get to a point where maybe some of these systems are starting to do useful things. And it is being deployed, it is being used and we should do that.But some people don't want it deployed, they would like to pause it. You've described this ideal that we've been developing this, and the technology's not there yet, it repeatedly took longer than what people expected, I think you correctly know. And now we're at the point where it seems to maybe be there, and now the second it's there, they're like, “Stop it. Let's slow down.” That's sort of the exact problem you've identified.Yeah, I do think it is fair to be concerned about the impact of this huge technology. When the whole internet thing happened, we probably should have been slightly more afraid of it and slightly more careful, but you can kind of solve a lot of problems along the way and kind of, “Oh, okay, we need to think about safety of children online — probably should have thought of that a little bit sooner,” and things like that. There's problems that you can kind of solve as you go along, but I think the biggest problem with the discussion and the debate around AI now is we're talking about this huge range of technology. AI is not one thing. So when you say, “AI is here now,” well, AI has been here for decades, it's been doing things for decades, it's not new, but we're talking about a very specific type of AI, we're talking about generative AI that is run by large language models.Personally, I have absolutely no problem with a large language model generating an AI response to an email so I can just hit a button and say, “Yeah, thanks, that sounds good” without having to type it all out. No one is scared of that. Lots of people are concerned about if you start rolling this out in government widely, which is what the UK government is planning at the moment, and you're letting AI make decisions and reply to people. You're going to get some problems, you're going to get people getting letters from their doctor that are incorrect, or people getting turned down for benefits, and things like that when they should be getting those benefits.That doesn't mean we can't use AI, it just means we need to think about what are all the downsides. What are the ways that we can mitigate those downsides? What are the ways we can mitigate those risks? But if you ask anyone at an AI developing company now, “Well, how are we going to fix this?” They're like, “Oh, the AI will do it.” Well, how? I just want to specific answer. How are you going to use the AI? What's it actually going to do? What problems do you see and how are you going to fix those problems? Very specific. I don't want to talk about this really wide-ranging AI stuff. I want really specifics now, now that we're starting to apply this stuff and we have really specific AI models that work in a very specific way, let's talk about that. And I think people are capable of having that conversation, but we just really gloss over the details with this one a lot.The problem dynamic (20:28)We need more nuance, really, and realize that there aren't villains, this isn't us versus them, it doesn't need to be like this.So do you view as sort of the problem players here, are they regulators, are they technologists, are they entrepreneurs? Is it the public — which, again, has a very poor understanding of technology, what technology can do. A lot of people I know, when they first tried ChatGPT, they were a little disappointed because they figured, after watching all these sci-fi movies, “I thought computers were already supposed to be able to do this.”I don't want to say who are the villains, but who are the problem players and what do you do about it?I mean this in the nicest way possible, but I think that framing is the problem.Good, that's fine, attack my framing, that is totally permitted!I think all of this would be better if we didn't have an “us versus them” thing. I think it's great that OpenAI is trying to develop this technology and is trying to make it useful and to make it work in a way that we might benefit from it. That's what they say they're trying to do, they're trying to make a lot of money while doing it. That's great. That's how this all works. That's fine. Regulators are keeping a close eye on it and want more information from them, and they want to know more about what they're doing, and what they're planning, and how these things are going to work. That seems fair. That's not OpenAI battling regulators, that's not regulators slapping down OpenAI.Journalists have a lot of blame on this because of the way we frame things. Everything is a battle. Everything is people going head-to-head — no, this is how this is supposed to work. Regulators are supposed to keep them in check. That can be very difficult when you are trying to regulate a very, very new technology. How could you possibly know anything about it? Where are you going to get your information from? From the company themselves. That kind of brings in some inherent challenges, but I think that's all surmountable.It's kind of like this idea that you're either a Luddite, and you hate AI, and you think it's evil, or you're completely pro-AI and you just can't wait to have your brain uploaded — there's a lot of nuance and variety of what people actually think in between. I think what you mentioned about ChatGPT and how, when you go use it the first time, you're kind of like, “Huh, this is it, hey?”I think that is the number one thing: Everyone should go use it, and then you're going to be half impressed that this machine is talking to you, that this system can actually chat with you, but then also a little bit disappointed because it's making things up, it's incorrect, it's a bit silly sometimes, that sort of a thing. Personally, I look at it and I just go, I wouldn't trust my business to this. I wouldn't trust the running of a government to a system that operates like this.Could it write some letters to help the NHS out here not have to have a person sit and type all of these things out, or to send more personalized letters to people so they get better information, and things like that? Yeah, that sounds good. Is that going to completely change how government operates? No. So we need to be a bit more honest about the limitations. We need more nuance, really, and realize that there aren't villains, this isn't us versus them, it doesn't need to be like this. But I see why you think there's villains.Our future rate of change (23:34)I think we're really bad at tracking change mentally. We want to see a big, dramatic change and then we look back and we're like, “Whoa . . . This is all very different.”That was just more my provocative framing. This is a question that you may not like at all, but I'm still going to ask it: You've looked at all these technologies. Do you think that the world of 2035 will look significantly different? The difference between the world of 2025 versus 2015, whatever that change has been, do you anticipate a bigger change between 2025 and 2035, whether because of energy, AI, rockets, flying cars, CRISPR. . . ?I think it will be different, but I don't think it's going to be as different. I'm kind of thinking back to when I was a kid and how we all lived life pre-internet and things like that, and things were genuinely different, and that gap between that and now is such a big difference. I think about my kid, when she's an adult, how different is it going to be? I think it's going to be different. I think we're going to look back at conversations like this and be like, “Oh gosh, we were naive. How could we have thought this, or not thought this?”Do I think that no one is going to be working because AI is going to do all work? No, I don't think it's going to be capable of that. Do I think that things like medicine could be really changed by technologies like CRISPR? I really hope so. I think we spend a lot of time talking about things like AI without seeing some of the really big-picture stuff. I write a lot of business technology stories, and it's a lot about how we can improve productivity by a few points, or it might impact a few thousand jobs — let's talk about some bigger things. Let's talk about how we can really change life. Let's talk about how we could work less. I would love to be able to see people actually working three or four days a week instead of these five-day weeks and still maintain productivity and still maintain salaries. I love that idea. I don't think that's going to happen. I think the changes are going to be small and incremental ones.I think we'll have a lot better transport options. I think all this driverless technology, even if we don't end up with the driverless cars that we fantasize about, it's definitely going to get applied to public transportation in some really good ways. I'm hoping that medicine will change. I'm worried about the climate change side of it because we are not putting our technology and our innovation into that, the mitigations for that, and I really think that that's where we need some very creative thinking for how we're going to deal with all of this.So 10, 15, 20 years from now, I think life is going to be relatively the same, but I think in certain industries it's going to be really, really different — but I think I'm still going to be working five days a week sitting in front of a computer, more often than not.That's because we're grinders, we love to grind.I don't, I do not, no.My last question, I'm not sure if this is quoted in the book, I think it was a Bill Gates quote, “We overestimate what we can accomplish in two years,” or “We underestimate what we can accomplish in 10 years,” something like that. Is that sort of the phenomenon, that there's an announcement and we figure everything's going to be different in 10 years, and then it isn't, and then we look back in 10 years, we're like, “Whoa, actually, there has been a lot of change!”I think we're really bad at tracking change mentally. We want to see a big, dramatic change and then we look back and we're like, “Whoa,” like you say, “What happened? This is all very different.”I think we're so focused on the here and now all of the time, we're so thinking about what's going to happen in the next quarter for our company or within the next year with our family, or our careers and things like that, that it's very easy for us to just get caught up in the day-to-day, and I think it is a good thing to look back. That's one of the reasons I wanted to write my book as a history. If you look back, we were talking about flying cars in the '50s, we were talking about AI . . . the mid-'50s is when this idea kind of really came to life. It takes a long time, but also we've done a lot in that time. There's been a huge amount of change and a huge amount of technologies that have started to enable all of this, and all of that is really positive.I can get accused of being a bit of a cynic because I'm like, “Where are driverless cars?” But if we manage to make driverless cars happen by 2035, I don't think that that's bad that it took that long. That's just how long it took — and hey, now we have driverless cars. Creating technology is sometimes just going to take longer than we want it to, and that's okay. That's not that the technology is wrong, that's just that we're bad at predicting timelines. I never know how long it's going to take me to finish a story, or get ready in the morning or, whatever, so I'm not surprised that these world-changing technologies were bad judges of that, too.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedMicro Reads▶ Economics* Trump's Arrival Brightens U.S. Outlook, Darkens Everyone Else's - WSJ* Coup d'États, Institutional Change, and Productivity - SSRN* I, Google: Estimating the Impact of Corporate Involvement on AI Research - SSRN▶ Business* How Chinese A.I. Start-Up DeepSeek Is Competing With Silicon Valley Giants - NYT* OpenAI's Stargate Deal Heralds Shift Away From Microsoft - WSJ* Oracle Takes Run at Cloud's Big Three With Trump-Backed AI Pact - Bberg* Remote work matters, but culture is the elephant in the room - CEPR* Why Mark Zuckerberg Is Ditching Human Fact-Checkers - Wired* OpenAI spars with Elon Musk over $500bn Stargate project - FT* How Oracle Plays Cheaply in AI - WSJ▶ Policy/Politics* Who Is Russell Vought? Probably the Most Important Person in Trump 2.0. - NYT Opinion* Bannon berates Musk over his attacks on Trump's AI infrastructure project - Politico▶ AI/Digital* When A.I. Passes This Test, Look Out - NYT* Anthropic chief says AI could surpass “almost all humans at almost everything” shortly after 2027 - Ars* Elon Musk's Silence on AI Risks Is Deafening - Bberg Opinion* Worry About Sentient AI—Not for the Reasons You Think - IEEE* There can be no winners in a US-China AI arms race - MIT▶ Biotech/Health* Sam Altman-backed Retro Biosciences to raise $1bn for project to extend human life - FT* Scientists Complete First Comprehensive Map of Human DNA Recombination - The Debrief▶ Clean Energy/Climate* Private companies aim to demonstrate working fusion reactors in 2025 - Science* How Trump's executive orders could tilt US energy markets - E&E News* Trump's Dream of Energy Dominance Relies on Canada - Bberg Opinion* The Wind Industry Is Putting on a Brave Face - Heatmap▶ Space/Transportation* Beam me to the stars: Scientists propose wild new interstellar travel tech - Space* The Hyperloop: A 200-Year History of Hype and Failure - MIT Press▶ Up Wing/Down Wing* What Los Angeles Can Learn From Another Great American City That Burned - NYT Opinion▶ Substacks/Newsletters* What if AI timelines are too aggressive? - Understanding AI* Trump's executive orders: Five big takeaways - Noahpinion* Open-Source AI and the Future - Hyperdimensional* 'ChatGPT' Robotics Moment in 2025 - AI Supremacy* The Big Problem Paradox - Conversable EconomistFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. 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Big changes are happening: space; energy; and, of course, artificial intelligence. The difference between sustainable, pro-growth change, versus a retreat back into stagnation, may lie in how we implement that change. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Virginia Postrel about the pitfalls of taking a top-down approach to innovation, versus allowing a bottom-up style of dynamism to flourish.Postrel is an author, columnist, and speaker whose scholarly interests range from emerging technology to history and culture. She has authored four books, including The Future and Its Enemies (1998) and her most recent, The Fabric of Civilization: How Textiles Made the World (2020). Postrel is a contributing editor for the Works in Progress magazine and has her own Substack.In This Episode* Technocrats vs. dynamists (1:29)* Today's deregulation movement (6:12)* What to make of Musk (13:37)* On electric cars (16:21)* Thinking about California (25:56)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Technocrats vs. dynamists (1:29)I think it is a real thing, I think it is in both parties, and its enemies are in both parties, too, that there are real factional disagreements.Pethokoukis: There is this group of Silicon Valley founders and venture capitalists, they supported President Trump because they felt his policies were sort of pro-builder, pro-abundance, pro-disruption, whatever sort of name you want to use.And then you have this group on the center-left who seemed to discover that 50 years of regulations make it hard to build EV chargers in the United States. Ezra Klein is one of these people, maybe it's limited to center-left pundits, but do you think there's something going on? Do you think we're experiencing a dynamism kind of vibe shift? I would like to think we are.Postrel: I think there is something going on. I think there is a real progress and abundance movement. “Abundance” tends to be the word that people who are more Democrat-oriented use, and “progress” is the word that people who are more — I don't know if they're exactly Republican, but more on the right . . . They have disagreements, but they represent distinct Up Wing (to put it in your words) factions within their respective parties. And actually, the Up Wing thing is a good way of thinking about it because it includes both people that, in The Future and Its Enemies, I would classify as technocrats, and Ezra Klein read the books and says, “I am a technocrat.” They want top-down direction in the pursuit of what they see as progress. And people that I would classify as dynamists who are more bottom-up and more about decentralized decision-making, price signals, markets, et cetera.They share a sense that they would like to see the possibility of getting stuff done, of increasing abundance, of more scientific and technological progress, all of those kinds of things. I think it is a real thing, I think it is in both parties, and its enemies are in both parties, too, that there are real factional disagreements. In many ways, it reminds me of the kind of cross-party seeking for new answers that we experienced in the late '70s and early '80s, where . . . the economy was problematic in the '70s.Highly problematic.And there was a lot of thinking about what the problems were and what could be done better, and one thing that came out of that was a lot of the sort of deregulation efforts that, in the many pay-ins to Jimmy Carter, who's not my favorite president, but there was a lot of good stuff that happened through a sort of left-right alliance in that period toward opening up markets.So you had people like Ralph Nader and free-market economists saying, “We really don't need to have all these regulations on trucking, and on airlines, and these are anti-consumer, and let's free things up.” And we reaped enormous benefits from that, and it's very hard to believe how prescriptive those kinds of regulations were back before the late '70s.The progress and abundance movement has had its greatest success — although it still has a lot to go — on housing, and that's where you see people who are saying, “Why do we have so many rules about how much parking you can have?” I mean, yes, a lot of people want parking, but if they want parking, they'll demand it in the marketplace. We don't need to say, “You can't have tandem parking.” Every place I've lived in LA would be illegal to build nowadays because of the parking, just to take one example.Today's deregulation movement (6:12). . . you've got grassroots kind of Trump supporters who supported him because they're sick of regulation. Maybe they're small business owners, they just don't like being told what to do . .. . and it's a coalition, and it's going to be interesting to see what happens.You mentioned some of the deregulation in the Carter years, that's a real tangible achievement. Then you also had a lot more Democrats thinking about technology, what they called the “Atari Democrats” who looked at Japan, so there was a lot of that kind of tumult and thinking — but do you think this is more than a moment, it's kind of this brief fad, or do you think it can turn into something where you can look back in five and 10 years, like wow, there was a shift, big things actually happened?I don't think it's just a fad, I think it's a real movement. Now, movements are not always successful. And we'll see, when we saw an early blowup over immigration.That's kind of what I was thinking of, it's hardly straightforward.Within the Trump coalition, you've got people who are what I in The Future and Its Enemies would call reactionaries. That is, people who idealize an idea of an unchanging America someplace in the past. There are different versions of that even within the Trump coalition, and those people are very hostile to the kinds of changes that come with bottom-up innovation and those sorts of things.But then you've also got people, and not just people from Silicon Valley, you've got grassroots kind of Trump supporters who supported him because they're sick of regulation. Maybe they're small business owners, they just don't like being told what to do, so you've got those kinds of people too, and it's a coalition, and it's going to be interesting to see what happens.It's not just immigration, it's also if you wanted to have a big technological future in the US, some of the materials you need to build come from other countries. I think some of them come from Canada, and probably we're not going to annex it, and if you put big tariffs on those things, it's going to hamper people's ability to do things. This is more of a Biden thing, but the whole Nippon Steel can't buy US Steel and invest huge amounts of money in US plants because, “Oh no, they're Japanese!” I mean it's like back to the '80s.Virginia, what if we wake up one morning and they've moved the entire plant to Tokyo? We can't let them do that!There's one thing about steel plants, they're very localized investments. And we have a lot of experience with Japanese investment in the US, by the way, lots of auto plants and other kinds of things. It's that sort of backward thinking, which, in this case, was a Biden administration thing, but Trump agrees, or has agreed, is not good. And it's not even politically smart, and it's not even pro the workers because the workers who actually work at the relevant plant want this investment because it will improve their jobs, but instead we get this creating monopoly. If things go the way it looks like they will, there will be a monopoly US Steel supplier, and that's not good for the auto industry or anybody else who uses steel.I think if we look back in 2030 at what's happened since 2025, whether this has turned out to be a durable kind of pro-progress, pro-growth, pro-abundance moment, I'll look at how have we reacted to advances in artificial intelligence: Did we freak out and start worrying about job loss and regulate it to death? And will we look back and say, “Wow, it became a lot easier to build a nuclear power plant or anything energy.” Has it become significantly easier over the past five years? How deep is the stasis part of America, and how big is the dynamist part of America, really?Yeah, I think it's a big question. It's a big question both because we're at this moment of what looks like big political change, we're not sure what that change is going to look like because the Trump coalition and Trump himself are such a weird grab bag of impulses, and also because, as you mentioned, artificial intelligence is on the cusp of amazing things, it looks like.And then you throw in the energy issues, which are related to climate, but they're also related to AI because AI requires a lot of energy. Are we going to build a lot of nuclear power plants? It's conceivable we will, both because of new technological designs for them, but also because of this growing sense — what I see is a lot of elite consensus (and elites are bad now!) that we made a wrong move when we turned against nuclear power. There's still aging Boomer and older are environmentalist types who still react badly to the idea of nuclear power, but if you talk to younger people, they are more open-minded because they're more concerned with the climate, and if we're going to electrify everything, the electricity's got to come from someplace. Solar and wind don't get you there.To me, not only is this the turnaround in nuclear, to me, stunning, but the fact that we had one of the most severe accidents only about 10 years ago in Japan, and if you would have asked anybody back then, they're like, “That's the death knell. No more nuclear renaissance in these countries. Japan's done. It's done everywhere.” Yet here we are.And yet, part of that may even be because of that accident, because it was bad, and yet, the long-run bad effects were negligible in terms of actual deaths or other things that you might point to. It's not like suddenly you had lots of babies being born with two heads or something.What to make of Musk (13:37)I'm glad the world has an Elon Musk, I'm glad we don't have too many of them, and I worry a little bit about someone of that temperament being close to political power.What do you make of Elon Musk?Well, I reviewed Walter Isaacson's biography of him.Whatever your opinion was after you read the biography, has it changed?No, it hasn't. I think he is somebody who has poor impulse control, and some of his impulses are very good. His engineering and entrepreneurial genius are best focused in the world of building things — that is, working with materials, physically thinking about properties of materials and how could you do spaceships, or cars, or things differently. He's a mixed bag and a lot of these kinds of people, I say it well compared.What do people expect that guy to be like?Compared to Henry Ford, I'd prefer Elon Musk. I'm glad the world has an Elon Musk, I'm glad we don't have too many of them, and I worry a little bit about someone of that temperament being close to political power. It can be a helpful corrective to some of the regulatory impulses because he does have this very strong builder impulse, but I don't think he's a particularly thoughtful person about his limitations or about political concerns.Aside from his particular strange personality, there is a general problem among the tech elite, which is that they overemphasize how much they know. Smart people are always prone to the problem of thinking they know everything because they're smart, or that they can learn everything because they're smart, or that they're better than people because they're smart, and it's just like one characteristic. Even the smartest person on earth can't know everything because there's more knowledge than any one person can have. That's why I don't like the technocratic impulse, because the technocratic impulse is like, smart people should run the world and they tell you exactly how to do it.To take a phrase that Ruxandra Teslo uses on her Substack, I think weird nerds are really important to the progress of the world, but weird nerds also need to realize that our goal should be to create a world in which they have a place and can do great things, but not a world in which they run everything, because they're not the only people who are valuable and important.On electric cars (16:21)If you look at the statistics, the people who buy electric cars tend to be people who don't actually drive that much, and they're skewed way to high incomes.You were talking about electrification a little earlier, and you've written a little bit about electric cars. Why did you choose to write about electric cars? And it seems like there's a vibe shift on electric cars as well in this country.This is the funny thing, because this January interview is actually scheduled because of a July post I had written on Substack called “Don't Talk About Electric Cars!”It's as timely as today's headlines.The headline was inspired by a talk that I heard Celinda Lake, the Democratic pollster (been around forever) give at a Breakthrough Institute conference back in June. Breakthrough Institute is part of this sort of UP Wing, pro-progress coalition, but they have a distinct Democrat tilt. And this conference, there was a panel on it that was about how to talk about these issues, specifically if you want Democrats to win.She gave this talk where she showed all these polling results where you would say, “The Biden administration is great because of X,” and then people would agree or disagree. And the thing that polled the worst, and in fact the only thing that actually made people more likely to vote Republican, was saying that they had supported building all these electric charging stations. Celinda Lake's opinion, her analysis of that, digging into the numbers, was that people don't like electric cars, and especially women don't like electric cars, because of concerns about range. Women are terrified of being stranded, that was her take. I don't know if that's true, but that was her take. But women love hybrids, and I think people love hybrids. I think hybrids are very popular, and in fact, I inherited my mother's hybrid because she stopped driving. So I now have a 2018 Prius, which I used to take this very long road trip in the summer where I drove from LA to a conference in Wichita, and then to Red Cloud Nebraska, and then back to Wichita for a second conference.The reason people don't like electric cars is really a combination of the fact that they tend to cost more than equivalent gasoline vehicles and because they have limited range and you have to worry about things like charging them and how long charging them is going to take.If you look at the statistics, the people who buy electric cars tend to be people who don't actually drive that much, and they're skewed way to high incomes. So I live in this neighborhood in West LA, and it is full of Priuses — I mean it used to be full of Priuses, there's still a lot of Priuses, but it's full of Teslas and it is not typical. And the people in LA who are driving many, many miles are people who have jobs like they're gardeners, or their contractors, or they're insurance adjusters and they have to drive all around and they don't drive electric cars. They might very well drive hybrids because you get better gas mileage, but they're not people who have a lot of time to be sitting around in charging stations.I think what's happened is there's some groups of people who are see this as a problem to be solved, but then there are a lot of people who see it as more symbolic than not. And they let their ideal, perfect world prevent improvements. So instead of saying, “We should switch from coal to natural gas,” they say, “We should outlaw fossil fuels.” Instead of saying, “Hybrids are a great thing, great invention, way lower emissions,” they say, “We must have all electric vehicles.” And what will happen, California has this rule, it has this law, that you're not going to be able to sell [non-]electric vehicles in the state after, I think it's 2035, and it's totally predictable what's going to happen: People just keep their gasoline cars longer. We're going to end up like Cuba with a bunch of old cars.I swear, every report I get from a think tank, or a consultancy, or a Wall Street bank, for years has talked about electric cars, the energy transition, as if it was an absolutely done deal, and maybe it is a done deal over some longer period of time, I don't know, but to me it sort of gets to your point about top-down technocratic impulse — it seems to be failing.And I think that electric cars are a good example of that because there are a lot of people who think electric cars are really cool, they're kind of an Up Wing thing, if you will. It's like a new technology, there've been big advances, and exciting entrepreneurs . . . and I think a lot of people who like the idea of technological progress like electric cars, and in fact, the adoption of electric cars by people who maybe don't drive a whole lot but have a lot of money, it's not just environmental, cool, or even status, it's partly techno-lust, especially with Teslas.A lot of people who bought Teslas, they're just like people who like technology, but the top-down proclamation that you must have an electric vehicle, and we're going to use a combination of subsidies and bans to force everybody to have an electric vehicle, really doesn't acknowledge the diversity of transportation needs that people have.One way of looking at electric cars, but also the effort to build all these chargers, which has been a failure, the effort to start to creating broadband connectivity to all these rural areas — which isn't working very well — there was this lesson learned by people on the center-left, and Ezra Klein, that there was this wild overreaction, perhaps, to environmental problems in the '60s and '70s, and the unintended consequence here is that one, the biggest environmental problem may be worse because we don't have nuclear power and climate change, but now we can't really solve any problems. So it took them 50 years, but they learned a lesson.My concern is to look at what's going on with some of the various Biden initiatives which are taking forever to implement, may be wildly unpopular — will they learn the risk of this top-down technocratic approach, or they'll just memory hold that and they'll move on to their next technocratic approach? Will there be a learning?No, I'm skeptical that there will be. I think that the learning that has taken place — and by the way, I hate that: “a learning,” that kind of thing. . .That's why I said it, because it's kind of delightfully annoying.The “learning,” gerund, that has taken place is that we shouldn't put so much process in the way of government doing things. And while I more or less agree with that, in particular, there are too many veto points and it is too easy for a very small group of objectors to hold up, not just private, but also public initiatives that are providing public goods.I think that the reason we got all of these process things that keep things from being done was because of things like urban renewal in the 1960s. And no, it was not just Robert Moses, he just got the big book written about him, but this took place every place where neighborhoods were completely torn down and hideous, brutalist structures were built for public buildings, or public housing, and these kinds of things, and people eventually rebelled against that.I think that yes, there are some people on the center-left who will learn. I do not think Ezra Klein is one of them, but price signals are actually useful things. They convey knowledge, and if you're going to go from one regulatory regime to another, you'll get different results, but if you don't have something that surfaces that bottom-up knowledge and takes it seriously, eventually it's going to break down. It's either going to break down politically or it's just waste a lot of money. . . You have your own technocratic streak.Thinking about California (25:56)Everybody uses California fires as an excuse to grind whatever axe they have.But listen, they'd be the good technocrats.Final question: As we're speaking, as we're doing this interview, huge fires raging sort of north of Los Angeles — how do you feel about the future of California? You live in California. California is extraordinarily important, both the American economy and to the world as a place of culture, as a place of technology. How do you feel about the state?The state has done a lot of shooting itself in the foot over the last . . . I moved here in 1986, and over that time, particularly in the first decade I was there, things were going great, the state was kind of stupid. I think if California solves its housing problem and actually allows significant amounts of housing to be built so that people can move here, people can stay here, young people don't have to leave the state, I think that will go a long way. It has made some positive movement in that direction. I think that's the biggest single obstacle.Fires are a problem, and I just recirculated on my Substack something I wrote about understanding the causes of California fires and what would need to be done to stop them.You've got to rake that underbrush.I wrote this in 2019, but it's still true: Everybody uses California fires as an excuse to grind whatever axe they have.Some of the Twitter commentary has been less-than-generous toward the people of California and its governor.One of the forms of progress that we take for granted is that cities don't burn regularly. Throughout most of human history, regular urban fires were a huge deal, and one of the things that city governments feared the most was fire and how were they prevented. There's the London fire, and the Chicago fires, and I remember, I just looked up yesterday, there was a huge fire in Atlanta in 1917, which was when my grandparents were children there. I remember my grandparents talking about that fire. Cities used to regularly burn — now they don't, where you have, they call it the “urban wildlife,” I forget what it's called, but there's a place where the city meets up against the natural environment, and that's where we have fires now, so that people like me who live in the concrete are not threatened. It's the people who live closer to nature, or they have more money, have a big lot of land.It's kind of understood what would be needed to prevent such fires. It's hard to do because it costs a lot of money in some cases, but it's not like, “Let's forget civilization. Let's not build anything. Let's just let nature take its course.” And one of the problems that was in the 20th century where people had the false idea — again, bad technocrats — that you needed to prevent forest fires, forest fires were always bad, and that is a complete misunderstanding of how the natural world works.California has a great future if it fixes this housing problem. 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Farmer is the Baillie Gifford Professor of Complex Systems at Oxford's Institute for New Economic Thinking. Before joining Oxford in 2012, he worked at Los Alamos National Laboratory and the Santa Fe Institute, where he studied complex systems and economic dynamics. During the 1990s, he took a break from academia to run a successful quantitative trading firm using statistical arbitrage strategies.Farmer has been a pioneer in chaos theory and complexity economics, including the development of agent-based models to understand economic phenomena. His work spans from housing markets to climate change, and he recently authored Making Sense of Chaos exploring complexity science and economic modeling.In This Episode* What is complexity economics? (1:23)* Compliment or replacement for traditional economics (6:55)* Modeling Covid-19 (11:12)* The state of the science (15:06)* How to approach economic growth (20:44)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. What is complexity economics? (1:23)We really can model the economy as something dynamic that can have its own business cycles that come from within the economy, rather than having the economy just settle down to doing something static unless it's hit by shocks all the time, as is the case in mainstream models.Pethokoukis: What does the sort of economics that people would learn, let's say, in the first year of college, they might learn about labor and capital, supply-demand equilibrium, rational expectations, maybe the importance of ideas. How does that differ from the kind of economics you are talking about? Are you looking at different factors?Farmer: We're really looking at a completely different way of doing economics. Rather than maximizing utility, which is really the central conceptual piece of any standard economic model, and writing down equations, and deducing the decision that does that, we simulate the economy.We assume that we identify who the agents in the and economy are, who's making the decisions, what information do they have available, we give them methods of making the decisions — decision-making rules or learning algorithms — and then they make decisions, those decisions have economic impact, that generates new information, other information may enter from the outside, they make decisions, and we just go around and around that loop in a computer simulation that tries to simulate what the economy does and how it works.You've been writing about this for some time. I would guess — perhaps I'm wrong — that just having more data and more computer power has been super helpful over the past 10 years, 20 years.It's been super helpful for us. We take much more advantage of that than the mainstream does. But yes, computers are a billion times more powerful now than they were when Herb Simon first suggested this way of doing things, and that means the time is ripe now because that's not a limiting factor anymore, as it was in the past.So if you're not looking at capital and labor per se, then what are the factors you're looking at?Well, we do look at capital and labor, we just look at them in a different way. Our models are concerned about how much capital is there to invest, what labor is available. We do have to assign firms production functions that tells, given an amount of capital and labor and all their other inputs, how much can the firms produce? That part of the idea is similar. It's a question of the way the decision about how much to produce is made, or the way consumers decide how much to consume, or laborers decide at what price to provide their labor. All those parts are different.Another difference — if I'm understanding it correctly — is, rather than thinking about economies that tend toward equilibrium and focusing how outside shocks may put an economy in disequilibrium, you're looking a lot more at what happens internally. Am I correct?We don't assume equilibrium. Equilibrium, it has two senses in economics: One is supply equals demand. We might or might not run a model where we assume that. In many models we don't, and if that happens, that's great, but it's an outcome of the model rather than an assumption we put in at the beginning.There's another sense of equilibrium, which is that everybody's strategy is lined up. You've had time to think about what you're doing, I've had time to think about what I'm doing, we've both come to the optimal decision for each of us to make, taking the other one into account. We don't assume that, as standard models typically do. We really can model the economy as something dynamic that can have its own business cycles that come from within the economy, rather than having the economy just settle down to doing something static unless it's hit by shocks all the time, as is the case in mainstream models. We still allow shocks to hit our models, but the economy can generate dynamics even without those shocks.This just popped in my head: To whom would this model make more intuitive sense, Karl Marx or Adam Smith?Adam Smith would like these models because they really allow for emergent behavior. That is, Smith's whole point was that the economy is more than the sum of its parts, that we get far more out of specializing than we do out of each acting like Robinson Crusoes. Our way of thinking about this gets at that very directly.Marx might actually like it too, perhaps for a different reason. Marx was insightful in understanding the economy as being like, what I call in the book, the “metabolism of civilization.” That is, he really did recognize the analogy between the economy and the metabolism, and viewed labor as what we put together with natural resources to make goods and services. So those aspects of the economy are also embodied in the kind of models we're making.I think they both like it, but for different reasons.Compliment or replacement for traditional economics (6:55)There are many problems where we can answer questions traditional methods can't even really ask.The way I may have framed my questions so far is that you are suggesting a replacement or alternative. Is what you're suggesting, is it one of those things, or is it a compliment, or is it just a way of looking at the world that's better at answering certain kinds of questions?I think the jury is out to find the answer to that. I think it is certainly a compliment, and that we're doing things very differently, and there are some problems where this method is particularly well-suited. There are many problems where we can answer questions traditional methods can't even really ask.That said, I think time will tell to what extent this replaces the traditional way of doing economics. I don't think it's going to replace everything that's done in traditional economics. I think it could replace 75 percent of it — but let me put an asterisk by that and say 75 percent of theory. Economists do many different things. One thing economists do is called econometrics, where they take data and they build models just based on the data to infer things that the data is telling them. We're not talking about that here. We're talking about theories where economists attempt to derive the decisions and economic outcomes from first principles based on utility maximization. That's what we're talking about providing an alternative to. The extent to which it replaces that will be seen as time will tell.When a big Wall Street bank wants to make a forecast, they're constantly incorporating the latest jobless claims numbers, industrial production numbers, and as those numbers get updated, they change their forecasts. You're not using any of that stuff?Well, no. We can potentially could ingest any kind of data about what's going on.But they're looking at big, top-down data while you're bottom-up, you're sort of trying to duplicate the actual actors in the economy.That is true, but we can adjust what's at the bottom to make sure we're matching initial conditions. So if somebody tells us, “This is the current value of unemployment,” we want to make sure that we're starting our model out, as we go forward, with the right level of unemployment. So we will unemploy some of the households in our model in order to make sure we're matching the state of unemployment right now and then we start our simulation running forward to see where the economy goes from here.I would think that the advent of these large language models would really take this kind of modeling to another level, because already I'm seeing lots of papers on their ability to . . . where people are trying to run experiments and, rather than using real people, they're just trying to use AI people, and the ability to create AI consumers, and AI in businesses — it would have to be a huge advance.Yes. This is starting to be experimented with for what we do. People are trying to use large language models to model how people actually make decisions, or let's say, to simulate the way people make decisions, as opposed to an idealized person that makes perfect decisions. That's a very promising line of attack to doing this kind of modeling.Large language models also can tell us about other things that allow us to match data. For example, if we want to use patents as an input in our modeling — not something we're doing yet, but we've done a lot of studies with patents — one can use large language models to match patents to firms to understand which firms will benefit from the patents and which firms won't. So there are many different ways that large language models are likely to enter going forward, and we're quite keen to take advantage of those.Modeling Covid-19 (11:12)We predicted a 21.5 percent hit to UK GDP in the second quarter of 2020. When the dust settled a year later, the right answer was 22.1. So we got very close.Tell me, briefly, about your work with the Covid outbreak back in 2020 and what your modeling said back then and how well it worked.When the pandemic broke out, we realized right away that this was a great opportunity to show the power of the kind of economic modeling that we do, because Covid was a very strong and very sudden shock. So it drove the economy far out of equilibrium. We were able to predict what Covid would do to the UK economy using two basic ideas: One is, we predicted the shock. We did that based on things like understanding a lot about occupational labor. The Bureau of Labor Statistics compiles tables about things like, in a given occupation, how close together do people typically work? And so we assumed if they worked closer together than two meters, they weren't going to be able to go to their job. That combined with several other things allowed us to predict how big the shock would be.Our model predicted how that shock would be amplified through time by the action of the economy. So in the model we built, we put a representative firm in every sector of the economy and we assumed that if that firm didn't have the labor it needed, or if it didn't have the demand for its product, or if it didn't have the inputs it needed, it wouldn't be able to produce its product and the output would be reduced proportional to any of those three limiting factors.And so we started the model off on Day One with an inventory of inputs that we read out of a table that government statistical agencies had prepared for each sector of the economy. And we then just looked, “Well, does it have the labor? Does it have demand? Does it have the goods?” If yes, it can produce at its normal level. If it's lacking any of those, it's going to produce at a lower level. And our model knew the map of the economy, so it knew which industries are inputs to which other industries. So as the pandemic evolved day by day, we saw that some industries started to run out of inputs and that would reduce their output, which, in turn, could cause other industries to run out of their inputs, and so on.That produced quite a good prediction. We predicted a 21.5 percent hit to UK GDP in the second quarter of 2020. When the dust settled a year later, the right answer was 22.1. So we got very close. We predicted things pretty well, industry by industry. We didn't get them all exactly right, but the mistakes we made averaged out so that we got the overall output right, and we got it right through time.We ran the model on several different scenarios. At the time, this was in April of 2020, the United Kingdom was in a lockdown and they were trying to decide what to do next, and we tested several different scenarios for what they might do when they emerged from the full lockdown. The one that we thought was the least bad was keeping all the upstream industries like mining, and forestry, and so on open, but closing the downstream, customer-facing industries like retail businesses that have customers coming into their shop, or making them operate remotely. That was the one they picked. Already when they picked it, we predicted what would happen, and things unfolded roughly as we suggested they would.The state of the science (15:06)Mainstream models can only model shocks that come from outside the economy and how the economy responds to those shocks. But if you just let the model sit there and nothing changes, it will just settle down and the economy will never change.I'm old enough to remember the 1990s and remember a lot of talk about chaos and complexity, some of which even made it into the mainstream, and Jurassic Park, which may be the way most people heard a little bit about it. It's been 30 years. To what extent has it made inroads into economic modeling at central banks or Wall Street banks? Where's the state of the science? Though it sounds like you're really taking another step forward here with the book and some of your latest research.Maybe I could first begin just by saying that before Jurassic Park was made, I got a phone call and picked up the phone, and the other end of the line said, “Hi, this is Jeff Goldblum, have you ever heard of me?” I said, “Yeah.” And he said, “Well, we're making this movie about dinosaurs and stuff, and I'm going to play a chaos scientist, and I'm calling up some chaos scientists to see how they talk.” And so I talked to Jeff Goldblum for about a half an hour. A few of my other friends did too. So anyway, I like to think I had a tiny little bit of impact on the way he behaved in the movie. There were some parallels that it seemed like he had lifted.Chaos, it's an important underlying concept in explaining why the weather is hard to predict, it can explain some forms of heart arrhythmias, we use it to explain some of the irregular behavior of ice ages. In economics, it was tossed around in the '90s as something that might be important and rejected. As I described in the book, I think it was rejected for the wrong reasons.I'm proposing chaos, the role it plays in here is that, there's a debate about business cycles. Do they come from outside? The Covid pandemic was clearly a business cycle that came from outside. Or do they come from inside the economy? The 2008 financial crisis, I would say, is clearly one that came from inside the economy. Mainstream models can only model shocks that come from outside the economy and how the economy responds to those shocks. But if you just let the model sit there and nothing changes, it will just settle down and the economy will never change.In contrast, the kinds of models we build often show what we call endogenous business cycles, meaning business cycles that the model generates all on its own. Now then, you can ask, “Well, how could it do that?” Well, basically the only plausible way it can do that is through chaos. Because chaos has two properties: One is called sensitive dependence on initial conditions, meaning tiny changes in the present can cause large changes in the future; but the other is endogenous motion, meaning motion that comes from within the system itself, that happens spontaneously, even in very simple systems of equations.Would something like consumer pessimism, would that be an external shock or would something more internal where everybody, they're worried about the futures, then they stop spending as much money? How would that fit in?If the consumer pessimism is due to the fear of a nuclear war, I would say it's outside the economy, and so that's an external shock. But if it's caused by the fact that the economy just took a big nose dive for an internal reason, then it's part of the endogenous dynamicsI spent many years as a journalist writing about why the market's going up, the market's going down, and by the end of the day, I had to come up with a reason why the market moved, and I could — I wasn't always quite confident, because sometimes it wasn't because of a new piece of data, or an earnings report, they just kind of moved, and I had no real reason why, even though I had to come up . . . and of course it was when I was doing that was when people started talking about chaos, and it made a lot of intuitive sense to me that things seem to happen internally in ways that, at least at the time, were utterly unpredictable.Yeah, and in fact, one of the studies I discuss in the book is by Cutler, Poterba, and Summers — the Summers would be Larry Summers — where they did something very simple, they just got the 100 largest moves of the S&P index, they looked up what the news was the next day about why they occurred in the New York Times, and they subjectively marked the ones that they thought were internally driven, versus the ones that were real news, and they concluded they could only find news causes for about a third of them.There is always an explanation in the paper; actually, there is one day on the top 12 list where the New York Times simply said, “There appears to be no cause.” That was back in the '40s, I don't think journalists ever say that anymore. I don't think their paper allows them to do it, but that's probably the right answer about two-thirds of the time, unless you count things like “investors are worried,” and, as I point out in the book, if the person who invests your money isn't worried all the time, then you should fire them because investors should worry.There are internal dynamics to markets, I actually show some examples in the book of simple models that generate that kind of internal dynamics so that things change spontaneously.How to approach economic growth (20:44)I'm not saying something controversial when I say that technological change is the dominant driver of economic growth, at least for the economy as a whole. You recently founded a company, Macrocosm, trying to put some of these ideas to work to address climate change, which would seem to be a very natural use for this kind of thinking. What do you hope to achieve there?We hope to provide better guidance through the transition. We're trying to take the kind of things we've been doing as academics, but scale them up and reduce them to practice so they can be used day-in and day-out to make the decisions that policymakers and businesspeople need to make as the transition is unfolding. We hope to be able to guide policymakers about how effective their policies will be in reducing emissions, but also in keeping the economy going and in good shape. We hope to be able to advise businesses and investors about what investments to make to make a profit while we reduce emissions. And we think that things have changed so that climate change has really become an opportunity rather than a liability.I write a lot about economic growth and try to figure out how it works, what are the key factors. . . What insights can you give me, either on how you think about growth and, since I work at a think tank, the kind of policies you think policy makers should be thinking about, or how should they think about economic growth, since that seems to be on top-of-mind in every rich country in the world right now?I'm not saying something controversial when I say that technological change is the dominant driver of economic growth, at least for the economy as a whole. And we've spent a lot of time studying technological change by just collecting data and looking for the patterns in that data: What does the technology cost through time and how rapidly is it deployed? We've done this for 50 or 60 technologies where we look at past technological transitions, because typically, as a technology is coming in, it's replacing something else that's going out, and what we've seen are a couple of striking things:One is, many technologies don't really improve very much over time, at least in terms of cost. Fossil fuels cost about the same as they did 140 years ago once you adjust for inflation. In fact, anything we mine out of the ground costs about the same as it did a hundred years ago.In contrast, solar energy from solar photovoltaic panels costs 1/10,000th what it did when it was introduced in the Vanguard satellite in 1958. Transistors have been going down at 40 percent per year, so they cost about a billionth of what they did back in 1960. So some technologies really make rapid progress, and the economy evolves by reorganizing itself around the technologies that are making progress. So for example, photography used to be about chemistry and film. Photography now is about solid-state physics because it just unhitched from one wagon and hitched itself to another wagon, and that's what's happening through the energy transition. We're in the process of hitching our wagon to the technologies that have been making rapid progress, like solar energy, and wind energy, and lithium ion batteries, and hydrogen catalyzers based on green energy.I think we can learn a lot about the past, and I think that when we look at what the ride should be like, based on what we understand, we think the transition is going to happen faster than most people think, and we think it will be a net saving of moneySo then how do you deal with a wild card, which I think if you look at the past, nuclear power seems like it's super expensive, no progress being made, but, theoretically, there could be — at least in the United States — there could be lots of regulatory changes that make it easier to build. You have all these venture capital firms pouring money into these nuclear startups with small reactors, or even nuclear fusion. So a technology that seems like it's a mature technology, it might be easy to chart its future, all of a sudden maybe it's very different.I'm not arguing we should get rid of nuclear reactors until they run their normal lifetime and need to be gotten rid of, but I think we will see that that is not going to be the winning technology in the long run, just because it's going to remain expensive while solar energy is going to become dirt cheap.In the early days, nuclear power had faced a very favorable regulatory environment. The first nuclear reactors were built in the '50s. Until Three Mile Island and Chernobyl happened, it was a very regulatorily friendly environment and they didn't come down in cost. Other countries like France have been very pro-nuclear. They have very expensive electricity and will continue to do so.I think the key thing we need to do is focus on storage technologies like green hydrogen. Long-term storage batteries have already come down to a point where they're beginning to be competitive; they will continue to do so. And in the future, I think we'll get solid-state storage that will make things quite cheap and efficient, but I don't think small modular reactors are going to ever be able to catch up with solar and wind at this point.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedMicro Reads▶ Economics* United States Economic Forecast - Deloitte* The Hidden Threat to National Security Is Not Enough Workers - WSJ▶ Business* DOGE Can't Do It All. Here's What It Can Do. - Politico* AI Startup Perplexity Closes Funding Round at $9 Billion Value - Bberg▶ Policy/Politics* US Homeland Security chief attacks EU effort to police AI - FT* The Trump Bump: The Republican Fertility Advantage in 2024 - IFS* House unveils AI ‘road map' but punts on setting priorities - Wapo* Did Tariffs Make American Manufacturing Great? - Cato▶ AI/Digital* Call ChatGPT from any phone with OpenAI's new 1-800 voice service - Ars* Homo-Silicus: Not (Yet) a Good Imitator of Homo Sapiens or Homo Economicus - SSRN* Is AI finally ready to replace your doctor? - NS* The Age of Quantum Software Has Already Started - WSJ* This is where the data to build AI comes from - MIT* The New AI Stock Pickers Are Destined to Disappoint - Bberg Opinion▶ Clean Energy/Climate* Fusion Start-Up Plans to Build Its First Power Plant in Virginia - NYT* Will the World's First Nuclear Fusion Power Plant Be Built in Virginia? Here's Why We're Skeptical - SciAm* The deepest hole on Earth: Inside the race to harness unlimited power from our planet's core - SF* Dubai transforms into walkable city with air-conditioned paths - New Atlas* Oklo inks record deal for using nuclear to power data centers - E&E▶ Robotics/AVs* AI Robots Are Coming, and They'll Be Made in Asia - Bberg Opinion▶ Space/Transportation* Boeing Starliner crew's long awaited return delayed to March - Wapo▶ Up Wing/Down Wing* What Could Go Right? The Best News of 2024 - The Progress Network▶ Substacks/Newsletters* Why Don't EU Firms Innovate? The Hidden Costs of Failure - Conversable Economist* Why Did the Industrial Revolution Happen? - Oliver Kim* One Down, Many To Go - Hyperdimensional* The Experience Curve - Risk & Progress* The case for clinical trial abundance - Slow Borin* Nuclear Waste: Yes, In (or Under) My Backyard - Breakthrough Journal* Answer Time: Can We Imagine Pluralistic Futures? - Virginia's Newsletter* What just happened - One Useful ThingFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

The future will be built on the big ideas we dare to conjure up today. We know that the most groundbreaking ideas often seemed ludicrous or simply impossible when first dreamed up, from the telephone, to human flight, to artificial intelligence. The key was a willingness to be creative and test the limits.While many of us might not consider ourselves creative people, Duncan Wardle assures us that we can take our ideas and brainstorms to the next level, no matter who we are or what we do. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, Wardle and I explore some concrete tools for breaking down our own barriers to innovation and accessing the genius within all of us.Wardle is the former Head of Innovation and Creativity at Disney and founder of ID8. He has delivered multipl eTED Talks and teaches innovation Master Classes at Yale,Harvard, and the University of Edinburgh. His interactive book, The Imagination Emporium: Creative Recipes for Innovation has just been released.In This Episode* Creativity is learnable (1:37)* Building a career of creativity (8:09)* Tools for unlocking innovation (13:50)* Expansionist vs. reductionist tools (18:39)* Gamifying learning (25:20)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. Creativity is learnable (1:37)I believe we're all born creative with an imagination. We're all born curious. We're all born with intuition. We're all born with empathy. They may not have been the most employable skill of our entire careers. They are now.Pethokoukis: One of my favorite economists, Paul Romer, loves to use recipes as a metaphor to explain how innovation works in an economy. Like cooking recipes, innovation and ideas can be used repeatedly without being used up, you can combine different ideas as ingredients and create something new. I love that idea, and I love the way you present the book as kind of a recipe book you can sort of dip in and out of to help you be more creative and innovative.How should someone use this book, and who is it broadly for?Wardle: Me. Seriously. When I say me, I mean the busy, normal, hardworking person who says 10 times a day, “I don't have time to think.” And often considered the number one barrier to innovation and creativity: “I don't have time to think.” And I thought, “Okay, when you walk into a business office and you will look around, where's the book?” It's on the bookshelf, it's on the coffee table — nobody reads them. I thought, “Well, that's a waste of their money.” So I thought, “What book have I ever read — nonfiction — that I could read one page, know exactly what I need to do, and don't have to read the rest of the book today?” I thought, “My mom's cookbook! You want shepherd's pie? You go to page 67.” So I've designed the contents page the same way. It says, “Have you ever been to a brainstorm where nothing ever happened? Go to page 14. Fed up with your boss, shooting your ideas down? Go to page 12.”So it is designed to be hop in and hop out, but I also designed the principles around: take the intimidation out of innovation, make creativity tangible for people who are uncomfortable with ambiguity and gray, far more importantly, make it fun, give people tools they choose to use when you and I are not around. I also designed it around this principle and I'll see if this works: Close your eyes for me for a second. How many days are there in September?31?Well, we'll pretend it's 30.Or 30! That's the one thing I always confuse, which is the 30 and the 31.Close your eyes for a second. Just think about how you might have known there were 30 days in September. How might you have remembered? What might you have learned or what can you see with your eyes closed?Well, if I was a more melodic, musical person, loved a good rhyme, I might've used that very famous rhyme, which apparently I don't know veryWell, that's okay, neither do I, but I'll attempt it. About 30 percent of people go, “30 days has September, blah, blah, blah, and November.” They've just told me they're an auditory learner. That's their preferred learning style. They probably read a lot. How do I know that? Because when they learned it, they were six. When I asked the question, they learned it because they'd heard it.I'm sure you've seen somebody at some point in your life count their knuckles: January, February, March, April, May, June, July, et cetera. You may not remember this because you might not be a kinesthetic learner. Those are the people who learn by doing. Again, how do we know this? They learned it when they were six. How did they remember it? By doing it.And then 40 percent of an audience would just go, “No, no, I could just see a calendar with a number 30.” They're your visual learners. So I've designed the book to appeal to all three learning styles. It has a QR code in each chapter with a Spotify playlist for the auditory learners, animated videos where Duncan is now an animated character (who knew?) who pops out with a bunch of characters to tell you how to use the tools. And then hopefully, as of next Tuesday, the QR code on the back for kinesthetic learners will allow you to engage with the book and learn kinesthetically through artificial intelligence and ChatGPT and actually ask the book questions.The fundamental conceit of the book, though, is that being innovative, being creative, that can be learned. You can get better at it. Some people say, “I'm not a math person,” which I also don't believe. They'll say, “I'm not a super creative person. I'm not super innovative.” One, I'm assuming you think that's wrong; and two, you mentioned AI, if people are worried about robots doing more repetitive kinds of tasks, then having the tools to bring out or enhance that imagination seem more important now than ever.There's one thing I firmly believe in: We were all born a human, shockingly enough, and when you were given a gift for a holiday, perhaps, it came in an enormous box and it took you ages of time to take the toy out of the box because the box was the same height as you were. What do you spend the rest of the week playing with?I love a good box.Right? It was your castle, it was your rocket.Love a good box. Oh man, that box can be a time machine, anything.It was anything you wanted it to be until you went to the number one killer of creativity in imagination: western education, and the first thing you were told to do was, “Don't forget the color in between the lines.” Children are very curious. They ask, “Why, why, why, why?” Again, because they're after the insight for innovation. The insight for innovation comes on the sixth or seventh, why not the first one?If I were to survey you and ask you, “Why do you go to Disney on holiday?” People would say they go for the new attractions. But that's not strictly true, is it?So if you say, “Well, why do you go for the new attractions?”“Well, no, I like the classics.”“Well, why do you like the classics?” Why?“I like It's a Small World.”“Well, why do you like It's a Small World?”“I remember the music.”“Why the music?”“Well, that's my mom's favorite ride. We used to go every summer.”“Why is that important to you 25 years later?”“Oh, I take my daughter now.”There's your insight for innovation. It has nothing to do with the capital investment strategy whatsoever and everything to do with that person's personal memory and nostalgia. But then we go to the number one killer of curiosity: western education. And the next thing our teacher tells us to do is stop asking “why,” because there's only one right answer.We know when somebody is staring at the back of our head. When you've stared at the back of the head of somebody that you think is really hot, a stranger, they turn around and look at you. You have to look away really quickly. It's okay, we've all done it. We have 120 billion neurons in our first brain and 120 million neurons in our second brain, the brain with which we say we make lots of our decisions, when we say “with our gut.” We are all empathetic.I believe we're all born creative with an imagination. We're all born curious. We're all born with intuition. We're all born with empathy. They may not have been the most employable skill of our entire careers. They are now. Why? Because I've been working with Google on DeepMind with their chief programmer — this is the AI program — and I asked her, “How the hell am I going to compete with this? How will any of us compete with this?” She said, “Well, by developing the things which will be the hardest for her to program into AI.” And I asked her what they were. She said, “The ones with which you were born: creativity, imagination, curiosity, empathy, and intuition.”Will they be programmed one day? Interestingly enough, she said intuition will go first. I was like, oh, that hurt. So I said, “Why intuition?” She said, “It's built on experience and we could build an algorithm that will give them experience.” I'm like, oh, so will they be programed one day? Perhaps. Anytime in the short term? No.Building a career of creativity (8:09)Your subconscious brain is 87 percent of the capacity. Every innovation you've ever seen, every creative problem you've ever solved, is back here to work as unrelated stimulus, but when the door is shut, you can't access it. So what do I do? I'm playful. I'm deliberately playful. In a moment, I want to briefly roll through the book, but first I want to ask about your job as the former head of innovation and creativity at Disney, which sounds like a fake job. It sounds like the kind of job someone would dream up and they wish there was such a job. It sounds like a dream job, but that was a real job. And what did you do there? Because it sounds fairly awesome.I finished as Head of Innovation — I didn't start that way. I started as a coffee boy in the London office. In 1986, I used to go and get my boss six cappuccinos a day from Bar Italia, and about three weeks into the role, I was told I would be the character coordinator, the person that looks after the walk-around characters at the Royal Premier of Who Framed Roger Rabbit in the presence of the Princess of Wales, Diana. I was like, “What do I do?” They said, “Well you just stand at the bottom of the stairs, Roger Rabbit will come down the stairs, the princess will come in on the receiving line, she'll greet him or blow him off and move into the auditorium.” How could you possibly screw that up? Well, I could. That was the day when I found out what a contingency plan was, because I didn't have one.A contingency plan would tell you, if you're going to bring a very tall rabbit with very long feet down a very large staircase towards the Princess of Wales, one might want to measure the width of the steps first before Roger trips on the top stair, is now hurdling like a bullet, head over feet at torpedo speed directly down the stairs towards Diana's head, whereupon he was taken out by two royal protection officers. There's a very famous picture of Roger being taken out on the stairs and a 21-year-old PR guy in the background from Disney. “Oh s**t, I'm fired.” I got a call from somebody called a CMO — didn't know who that was, I thought I was going to tell me I'm fired. He goes, “That was great publicity.” I was like, “Wow, I can make a career out of this.”So for the first 20 years I had some of the more mad, audacious, outrageous ideas for Disney, and then Disney purchased Pixar, then they purchased Marvel, then they purchased Lucasfilm, and we found that we all had different definition of creativity and different innovation models. I tried four models of innovation.Number one, I hired an outside consultant and said, “Make me look good.” They were very good at what they did, but they weren't around for execution and they weren't going to show us how they did what they did. They were worried we wouldn't hire them again.Model number two, innovation team. Duncan will be in charge. What could possibly go wrong? Well, when you have a legal team, nobody outside of legal does legal. When you have a sales team . . . So when you have an innovation team, the subliminal message you've sent to the rest of the organization is: You are off the hook, we've got an innovation team.Third model was an accelerator program where we were bringing some young tech startups and take a 50-50 stake in their business. They could help us bring it to market much quicker than we could. We could help them scale it. But we had failed in the overall goal that Bob Iger had set for us: How might we embed a culture of innovation and creativity into everybody's DNA? So I set out to create a toolkit. A toolkit that takes the intimidation out of innovation, makes creativity tangible, and the process fun. And essentially, that's what the book is. It's not a book, it's a toolkit. Why? Because I want you to use it. It's broken up into creative behaviors, which I think if you don't get the creative behaviors right, the tools won't matter. They'll just be oblivious. I think the creative behaviors are the engine, and I'll explain what I mean by that.Let me ask you a question. Close your eyes if you would?I've done very poorly on the questions. Very poorly, but I will continue to answer them.Where are you usually, and what are you doing when you get your best ideas?I would say either on walks or, I think a lot of people say, in the shower, one of the two.There we go. Alright. But here's the thing. I've done it with 20,000 people in the audience. Do you know how many people say at work? Nobody ever says at work. Why do we never have our best ideas at work?Well, think about that last argument you were in. You turn to walk away from that argument, now you're still a bit angry, but you're beginning to relax, you're 10 seconds away, 20 seconds, and what pops into your brain? The killer one liner, that one perfect line you wish you'd used during but you didn't, did you? No. Why? Because when you are in an argument, your brain is moving at a thousand miles an hour defending yourself.When you're in the office, you're doing emails, reports, quarterly results, and meetings. And I hear myself say, “I don't have time to think.” When you don't have time to think, the door between your conscious and subconscious brain is firmly closed. You're in the brain state called beta, and you're only working with your conscious brain. 90 percent of your working day — you can look this up — your conscious brain is 13 percent of the capacity of your brain. Your subconscious brain is 87 percent of the capacity. Every innovation you've ever seen, every creative problem you've ever solved, is back here to work as unrelated stimulus, but when the door is shut, you can't access it. So what do I do? I'm playful. I'm deliberately playful. There's a chapter of energizers in the book. They're 60-second exercises. What are they for? To make you laugh, laughter with purpose.What's an example of one of those?Okay, I'll tell you what then, you are the world's leading designer of parachutes for elephants. I will now interview you about your job. So question, “How did you get into this industry in the first place?”I was actually interviewing for a different job, I walked in the wrong door, and I ended up interviewing for that job.Okay, and do you have to use different material for the parachutes? What are the parachutes made of? How big are they? Do you have to make bigger ones for elephants with smaller ears and smaller ones for elephants with big ears, the African and Indian elephants?Thankfully the kind of material is changing all the time. A lot of advances: graphene, nanotechnology materials. So the kind of material is changing, which actually gives us a lot more flexibility for the kind of material and the sizes, depending, of course, on the size of the elephants and perhaps even their ears, and tails, and tusks.So we'll stop there. You do that in a room full of people and you'll hear laughter. And the moment I hear laughter, I've opened the door between your conscious subconscious brain and placed you metaphorically back in the shower where you are when you have your best idea. I don't expect people to be playful every minute of every day. I do expect, particularly leaders, to be playful when they're trying to get other people to open up their brains and have big ideas.Tools for unlocking innovation (13:50)If you like breaking rules, this tool is for you. It's about breaking rules metaphorically. So step one, you list the rules of your challenge. Step two, you take one and ask the most audacious question. Step three, you land a big idea.In the book, you sort of create these three animated characters representing . . . there's Spark who represents creative behaviors; Nova, innovation tools; and then Zing for these energizing exercises. But you sort of need all three of those?You do, but you don't have to know them all at the same time, and that's the beauty of the book. But here's the thing: I created a character called Archie. Archie was a direct descendant of Archimedes, because when I ask people where they are when they get the best ideas, they say the shower. Archimedes was in the bath. And my daughter, who's about 25, walks in the room and she goes, “Dad, he's an old white guy. You are an old white guy. You can't do that s**t anymore.” So I created three new characters. Spark is male, introduces creative behaviors; Zing, gender-neutral, introduces the energizers; and Nova, the brains of the organization, introduces innovation tools. The tools are split between what I call expansionist tools and reductionist tools. The more expertise and the more experience we have, the more reasons we know why the new idea won't work.But here's the challenge: Up until 2020, we pretty much got away with doing what we did, and then came a global pandemic, enormous climate change, generation Z entering the workplace who don't want to work for us, and here comes AI. We don't get to think the way we thought four years ago. So the tools are designed specifically to stop you thinking the way you always do and give you permission to think differently.I'll give you an example of one, it's called “What If.” A lot of people will say, “Oh, but we work in a very heavily regulated industry.” If you like breaking rules, this tool is for you. It's about breaking rules metaphorically. So step one, you list the rules of your challenge. Step two, you take one and ask the most audacious question. Step three, you land a big idea. So for example, it was created by Walt, but that's in the book, I won't go through the whole Walt Disney story because I want people to understand that this tool can work for them too.There was a very tiny company in Great Britain in the late '60s, before the days of mass automation, that used to make glasses that we drink out of, and they found too much breakage and not enough production when the glasses were being packaged and shipped. So they went down to the shop floor, observed the process for eight hours, and just wrote down the rules. Don't think about them, because then you'll think of all the reasons you can't break them, just write them down. So they wrote them down. 26 employees convey about cardboard box, six glasses on the top, six on the bottom, separated by corrugated cardboard, glasses wrapped in newspaper, employees' reading newspaper. So somebody asked these somewhat provocative “what if” question, “What if we poke their eyes out?” Well, that's against the law and it's not very nice, but because they had the courage to ask the most audacious “what if” question of all, the lady sitting next to them immediately got out of her river of thinking — her expertise and experience — and said, “Well, hang on a minute, why don't we just hire blind people?” So they did. Production up 26 percent, breakage down 42 percent, and the British government gave them a 50 percent salary subsidy for hiring people with disabilities. Simple, powerful, fun.You just mentioned briefly this notion of the river of thinking, which is sort of your thoughts and the assumptions that really come from your lifetime of experience. People obviously really, when evaluating ideas, they really value their own personal experience. You could have a hundred studies saying this will work, but if something about their personal experience says it won't, they won't listen to it. Now, I believe experience is important, it helps you make judgments, but sometimes I think you're right, that it's an absolute trap that leads us to say no when we should say yes, and yes when we should say no.So that was one of the expansionist tools. One of the reductive tools is ideas. Ideas are the most subjective thing on the planet. You like pink, I like green, our boss likes yellow, there's a very good chance we're going to be doing the yellow idea. Well, wait a minute, was that the right one targeted for our consumer? Was it aligned with our brand? So there's a tool called stargazer. I borrowed it with pride from Richard Branson of Virgin. Virgin is the most elastic brand on the planet, right? They've done condoms, they've done space travel, and everything in between. Disney is a non-elastic brand. They do family magical experiences. So how does Virgin decide, of all these ideas they get pitched, how do they decide which ones to bring to market?They have a tool, I call it stargazer, it looks like a starfish, it's got five prongs on it, you'll see it in the book, and each one has three criteria, and you can make up your own criteria at the beginning of the project. Let's say, is this a strategic brand fit? Is this aligned with who we stand for as a brand? Is this embedded in consumer truth? Is it relevant to our consumer? Can I get this into the market the next 18 to 24 months? Is it going to hit my financial goals? And is it socially engaging? Is it going to get people excited? And all you do with all of your ideas at the end is go around those five criteria and ask, does this do a poor job, a good job, or an outstanding job of being aligned with our brand, a poor job, a good job, or an outstanding job of being targeted at our consumer, relevant to our consumer? And then guess what? With different colors for each idea, you join the dots just as you did when you were a kid. And one idea will rise to the top as to meeting your criteria, objectives, the most, not the one you like the best.Expansionist vs. reductionist tools (18:39)I define creativity as the ability to have an idea. We all have hundreds a day. I define innovation is the ability to get it done. That's the hard part, and that's what the tools are designed and helping you with.Do you think that the book and your approach is most helpful in helping people be more creative and come up with ideas or helping other people judge ideas as being good ideas and being open to ideas and closed to the wrong ideas?I think people use confusing terms just to make themselves more intelligent. The amount of times I've been in a meeting and somebody used an acronym, nobody knows what it is, but nobody's going to put their hand up. I call it expansionist and reductionist, the official name is divergent and convergent, who cares? Expansionist tools are the ones that help you get out of your river of thinking and help you think differently, and the reductionist tools are okay, now we've got all of these ideas, which one goes to market, how do we take it to market, how do we actually get it done?A lot of people say, as you said at the beginning, “I'm not creative.” Well, if you define yourself as a musician or an artist, then guess what? I'm not creative either. I define creativity as the ability to have an idea. We all have hundreds a day. I define innovation is the ability to get it done. That's the hard part, and that's what the tools are designed and helping you with.If you're running a business and you're like, “I want to implement this,” how do you . . . I'm sure you would love this, buy everybody the book, buy everybody three copies of the book. How do you implement it? I mean, I'm just curious how you do that job.How do I do the job? Or how does the business?How would someone do that job if they're like, I'm trying to make my workforce more creative, I'm trying to make sure that we are open to good ideas. How do you institute that at an existing business?Here's a tool that can change a culture overnight: Now you and I have been tasked with coming up with an idea for a birthday party. We've been given a $100,000, which is a reasonable budget for a birthday party. The theme could be Star Wars or Harry Potter. What would you like it to be?I'd probably go with Star Wars.Okay, so I'm going to come at you some amazing ideas for a Star Wars birthday. I'd like you to start each and every response with the words “No, because.” They'll be the first two words you use in each response, and then you'll tell me why not.So I was thinking of coming to your house, painting your kitchen dark, turn it into the Death Star canteen, and we'll have a food and wine festival from Hoth and Naboo and Tatooine.No, no, no. We can't do that because I like the way it looks now, I'm worried about repainting it and matching those colors. That's too significant of a change.What if, then, we just turn the lights out, we do a glow-in-the dark lightsaber fight full of our favorite alcoholic liquid?Well, that sounds like a better idea. Am I still supposed to say “no, because?”“No, because.” Stay on the “no, because.”No, can't do it. Listen, I worry about those lightsabers breaking, I'll be honest with you, and that alcohol flying over the place. Also, there are going to be kids there, and I just worry about the alcohol aspect. Because I'm an American, and we're very tight.So perhaps if there's kids there, we could do a cosplay party, and all the tall people could come as Vader and all the little people could come as ewoks.No, because I think some of the tall people would like to be the good guy, and I think some of the people who are not quite as tall might feel we were infantilizing them by turning them into ewoks.I'll tell you what, then, we'll do a movie marathon and we'll show all seven films back-to-back with some popcorn and coke. What do you say?No, because that would be a really long event. I think people would be super sick of even watching their favorite movies after about two movies, so can't do it.Alright, so we'll stop there. When somebody's constantly saying “no, because” to you, how does that make you feel?Like I really don't feel like coming up with any more ideas and like they will just not get to “yes.”And we started there with a food and wine festival and we ended up with showing the movies. Would you say the idea was getting bigger as we were going, or was it getting smaller? Which direction was it?It was getting progressively smaller and less imaginative.So let's try that again. Can we do Harry Potter?Well, I don't know as much, but I'll do my best.Okay, so have you seen a couple of the films?Kind of?You pick the theme, then. What do you want?Marvel. A beautifully licensed property. Yes, Marvel.I'm going to come at you with some ideas for a Marvel party. I'd like you to start each and every response this time with the words, “yes, and,” and we'll just build it together, okay?I tell you what, we could do a Spider-Man party where everybody gets those little web things that they could shoot out of their hands, but are actually made out of cotton candy, so we could eat it, we could eat the webs.Oh yes, and perhaps we could have villain-themed targets the shoot at?Oh, yes, and we could have a room full of superheroes and a room full of villains, and we have cosplay party and there'll even be a make-your-own Iron Man suit!Yes, we can have an Iron Man suit, obviously, and we can have the other costumes, and perhaps some of their other tools, like Thor's hammer, those could somehow also be candy-related.Oh yes, and we could actually invite the stars of the film, we could have Chris Hemsworth, Robert Downey, Jr., and Chris Pratt, and Rocket, and Groot.Yes. Love the idea. And perhaps if that's not quite possible —— That was a “no, because!”Oh that sounded like a “no.”Come on, come on.We've reached the limits of my creativity.We'll stop there. A couple of observations: a lot more laughter, a lot more energy.Bigger or smaller?We're taking our steps into an ever-wider world!We work in big organizations, we work in small organizations, we have colleagues, we have constituencies, we have bosses, we have local regulators, et cetera, to bring on board with our ideas. By the time we just finished building that idea together, whose idea was it by the time we'd finished?That is lost to the fog of history. It is now a collaborative idea that we both can take credit for when it's a huge success.Ours. Two very simple words from the world of improv that have the power to turn a small idea into a big one really quickly. You can always value-engineer a big idea back down again, but you can't turn a small idea into a big idea. Far more importantly, it transfers the power of “my idea,” which we know never goes anywhere outside an organization, to “our idea” and accelerate its opportunity to get done.For people listening today, I'll give you one word of advice to take away: Don't let the words “no, because” be the first two words you use when somebody comes bouncing into your office with an idea you are not thinking of. They may have genius two seconds from now, two weeks from now — they ain't coming back.Just remind yourselves: I know you have responsibilities, I know you've got deadlines, I know you've got quarterly results. We are not green-lighting this idea for execution today, we are mainly green-housing it together using “yes, and.”Gamifying learning (25:20)Gaming is the future of education, there's no question. So now I have one more question I think that's super valuable advice, actually. As you were talking about western education squashing the creativity. . . Do you have you any thoughts about how to change that, keeping the best of what we do?Gamify. Gamify everything. Gaming is the future of education, there's no question. Universities will fall, but why will universities fall? That's a fairly outrageous statement. Well, let me think. Blue-collar workers, the white collar workers laughed at them because they didn't go to university. Let me think — people who use their hands, artificial intelligence, probably not taking them out anytime soon. White collar workers, not so much. Goodbye. Not quite, that's a slight exaggeration, but universities are teaching the same thing that we learned.So I walk into a classroom, a professor says, “In the year 3 AD, Brutus stabbed Julius Caesar in the back on the steps of the Senate of Rome.” Okay, well I'm asleep already. However, if I could walk into the Senate in Rome, in virtual reality, or in Apple Vision Pro — hello, thank you very much — walk right up to Julius Caesar and Brutus debating with the senators and say, “Hey Julius, look behind you!”I tell you for why: My son sat down at the breakfast table many years ago, he was probably about 13 or 14 at the time, and he said, “Do you know the Doge's Palace in Venice was built in 14 . . .” And he went on this whole diatribe. I was like, where the hell did you learn that? He goes, “Oh, Assassin's Creed.” Gaming will annihilate.See, when you say online training, the first words out of somebody's mouth are, “Boring!” So, what I aim to develop within a year from today is to gamify the Imagination Emporium and actually help people, train them how to be more imaginative using gaming.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedMicro Reads▶ Economics* AI and the Future of Work: Opportunity or Threat? - St. Louis Fed* Industrial policies and innovation in the electrification of the global automobile industry - CEPR▶ Business* What Is Venture Capital Now Anyway? - NYT* When IBM Built a War Room for Executives - IEEE▶ Policy/Politics* How U.S. Firms Battled a Government Crackdown to Keep Tech Sales to China - NYT* Was mocking Musk a mistake? 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Washington's initial thinking about AI regulation has evolved from a knee-jerk fear response to a more nuanced appreciation of its capabilities and potential risks. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with technology policy expert Neil Chilson about national competition, defense, and federal vs. state regulation in this brave new world of artificial intelligence.Chilson is the head of AI policy at the Abundance Institute. He is a lawyer, computer scientist, and former chief technologist at the Federal Trade Commission. He is also the author of “Getting Out of Control: Emergent Leadership in a Complex World.”In This Episode* The AI risk-benefit assessment (1:18)* AI under the new Trump Administration (6:31)* An AGI Manhattan Project (12:18)* State-level overregulation (15:17)* Potential impact on immigration (21:15)* AI companies as national champions (23:00)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. The AI risk-benefit assessment (1:18)Pethokoukis: We're going to talk a bit about AI regulation, the future of regulation, so let me start with this: Last summer, the Biden administration put out a big executive order on AI. I assume the Trump administration will repeal that and do their own thing. Any idea what that thing will be?We have a lead on the tech, we have the best companies in the world. I think a Trump administration is really going to amp up that rhetoric, and I would expect the executive order to reflect the need to keep the US and the lead on AI technology.Chilson: The Biden executive order, repealing it is actually part of the GOP platform, which does not say a lot about AI, but it does say that it's definitely going to get rid of the Biden executive order. I think that's the first order of business. The repeal and replace process . . . the previous Trump administration actually had a couple of executive orders on AI, and they were very big-picture. They were not nearly as pro-regulatory as the Biden executive order, and they saw a lot of the potential.I'd expect a shift back towards a vision of AI as a force for good, I'd expect to shift towards the international dynamics here, that we need to keep ahead of China in AI. We have a lead on the tech, we have the best companies in the world. I think a Trump administration is really going to amp up that rhetoric, and I would expect the executive order to reflect the need to keep the US and the lead on AI technology.That emphasis differs from the Biden emphasis in what way?The Biden emphasis, when you read the executive order, it has some nice language up top about how this is a great new technology, it's very powerful, but overwhelmingly the Biden executive order is directed at the risk of AI and, in particular, not existential risk, more the traditional risks that academics who have talked about the internet have had for a long time: these risks of bias, or risks to privacy, or risks to safety, or deepfakes. And to be honest, there are risks to all of these technologies, but the Biden executive order to really pounded that home, the emphasis was very much on what are the problems that this tech could cause and what do we as the federal government need to do to get in here and make sure it's safe for everybody?I would expect that would be a big change. I don't see, especially on the bias front, I don't see a Trump administration emphasizing that as a primary thing that the federal government needs to fix about AI. In fact, with people like Elon Musk having the ear of the president, I would expect maybe to go in the opposite direction, that these ideas around bias are inflated, that these risks aren't really real, and, to the extent that they are, that it's no business of the federal government to step in and tell companies how to bias or de-bias their products.One thing that sort of confuses me on the Elon Musk angle is that it seemed that he was — at least used to be — very concerned about these somewhat science-fictional existential risks to AI. I guess my concern is that we'll get that version of Musk again talking to the White House and maybe he says, “I'm not worried about bias, but I'm still worried about it killing us all.” Is there any concern there, that that theme, which I think seems to have faded a little bit from the public conversation (maybe I'm wrong) that that will reemerge.I agree with you that I think that theme has faded. The early Senate hearings were very much in that vein, they were about the existential risk, and some of that was the people who were up there talking. This is something that's been on the mind of some of the leaders of the cutting edge of the tech space, and it's part of the reason why they got into it. There's always been a tension there. There is some sort of dynamic here where they're like, “This stuff is super dangerous and super powerful, so I need to be the one creating it and controlling it.” I think Musk still kind of falls in that bucket, so I share a little bit of that concern, but I think you're right that Congress has said, “Oh, those things seem really farfetched. That's not how we're going to focus our time.” I would expect that to continue even with a Musk-influenced administration.I actually don't think that there is necessarily a big tension between that and a pushback against the sort of red-tape regulatory approach to AI that was kind of the more traditional pessimistic, precautionary approach to technology, generally. I think Musk is a guy who hates red tape. I think he's seen it in his own businesses, how it's slowed down launches of all sorts. I think you can hate red tape and be worried about this existential risk. It's not necessarily in intentioned, but it'll be interesting to see how those play out, how Musk influences the policy of the Trump administration on AI.AI under the new Trump Administration (6:31)One issue that seemed to be coming up over and over again is differing opinions among technologists, venture capitalists, about the open-source issue. How does that play out heading into a Trump administration? When I listen to the Andreessen Horowitz podcast, those guys seem very concerned.They're going to get this software. They're going to develop it themselves. We can't out-China China. We should lean into what we're really good at, and that is a dynamic software-development environment, of which open source is a key component.So there's a lot of disagreements about how open source plays out. Open source, it should be pointed out first, is a core technology across everything that people who develop software use. Most websites run on open source software. Most development tools have a huge open source component, and one of the best ways to develop and test technology is by sharing it with people and having people build on it.I do think it is a really important technology in the AI space. We've seen that already, people are building smaller models, doing new things in open source that it costs a lot of money to do in the first instance, maybe in a closed source.The concerns that people raise is that this, especially in the national security space or the national competition, that this sort of exposes our best research to other countries. I think there's a couple of responses to that.The first one is that closed source is no guarantee that those people don't have that technology as well. In fact, most of these models fit on the thumb drive. Most of these AI labs are not run like nuclear facilities, and it's much easier to smuggle a thumb drive out than it is to smuggle a gram of plutonium or something like that. They're going to get this software. They're going to develop it themselves. We can't out-China China. We should lean into what we're really good at, and that is a dynamic software-development environment, of which open source is a key component.It also offers, in many ways, an alternative to centralized sources of artificial intelligence models, which can offer a bunch of user interface-based benefits. They're just easier to use. It's much easier to log into OpenAI and use their ChatGPT than it is to download and build your own model, but it is really nice as a competitive gap filler to have thousands and thousands of other that might do something specific, or have a specific orientation, which you can train on your own. And those exist because of the open source ecosystem. So I think it solves a lot of problems, probably a lot more than it creates.So what would you expect — let's focus on the federal level — for this congress, for the Trump administration, to do other than broadly affirm that we love AI, we hope it continues? Will there be any sort of regulatory rule, any sort of guidance, that would in any way constrain or direct this technology? Maybe it's in the area of the frontier models, I don't know.I think we're likely to see a lot of action at the use level: What are the various uses of various applications and how does AI change that? So in transportation and healthcare . . . this is a general purpose technology, and so it's going to be deployed in lots of spaces, and a lot of these spaces already have a lot of regulatory frameworks in place, and so I think we'll see lots of agencies looking to see, “Hey, this new technology, does it really change anything about how we regulate medical devices? If it does, how do we need to accommodate that? What are the unique risks? What are the unique opportunities that maybe the current framework doesn't really allow for?”I think we'll see a lot of that. I think, once you get up to the abstract model level, it's much harder to figure out what problem both are we trying to solve at the model level and do we have the capability to solve at the model level. If we're worried about people developing bio weapons with this technology, is making sure the model doesn't allow that, is that useful? Is it even possible? Or should we focus those attentions maybe down on, people can't secure the components that they need to execute a biohazard? Would that be a more productive place? I don't see a lot of action, honestly, at the model level.Maybe there'll be some reporting requirements or training requirements. The executive order had those, although they used something called the Defense Production Act — I think probably unconstitutionally, how they use that. But that's going to go away. If that gets filled in by Congress, that there's some sort of reporting regime — maybe that's possible, but Congress doesn't seem to be able to get those types of really high-level tech regulations across the line. They haven't done it with privacy legislation for a long time and everybody seems to think that would be a good idea.I think we'll continue to see efforts at the agency level. One thing Congress might do is they might spend some money in this space, so maybe there will be some new investment or maybe the national laboratories will get some money to do additional AI research. That has its own challenges, but most of them are financial challenges, they're not so much whether or not it's going to impede the industry, so that's kind of how I think it'll likely play out at the federal level.An AGI Manhattan Project (12:18)A report just came out (yesterday, as we're recording this) from the outside advisory group on US-China relations that advises the government, and they're calling for a Manhattan Project to get to an artificial general intelligence, I assume before China or anybody else.Is that a good idea? Do you think we'll do that? What do you make of that recommendation, which caused quite a stir when it came out?For the most part, artificial general intelligence, I don't understand what the appeal of that is, frankly . . . Why not train something that could do something specific really well?Yeah, it's a really interesting report. If you read through the body of the report, it's pretty standard international competitiveness analysis that says, “What are the supply chains for chips? How does it look? How do we compare on talent development? How do we compare on the industry backing investment?” Things like that. And we compare very well, overall, the report says.But then, all of a sudden at the top level, the first recommendation talks about artificial general intelligence. This is the kind of AI that doesn't exist yet, but it's the kind that could basically do everything a human could do at the intellectual level that a human could do it. It's interesting because that recommendation, it doesn't seem to be founded on anything that's actually in the report. There's no other discussion in the report about artificial general intelligence, or how important it is strategically, or anything like that, and yet, they want to spend Manhattan Project-level amounts of money — I think in today's dollars, that'd be like $30 billion to create this artificial general intelligence. I don't know what to make of that, and, more than that, I think it's very unlikely to move the policy discussion. Maybe it moves the Overton window, so people are talking like, “Yeah, we need a Manhattan Project,” but I don't think that it's likely to do anything.For the most part, artificial general intelligence, I don't understand what the appeal of that is, frankly. It has a sort of theoretical appeal, that we could have a computer that could do all the things that a person could do, but in the modern economy, it's actually better to have things that are really good at doing a specific set of things rather than having a generalist that you can deploy lots of different places, especially if you're talking about software. Why not train something that could do something specific really well? I think that would slot into our economy better. I think it's much more likely to be the most productive value of the intense computation time and money that it takes to train these types of models. So it seems like a strange thing to emphasize in our federal spending, even if we're talking about the national security implications. It would seem like it'd be much better to train a model that's specifically built for some type of drone warfare or something rather than trying to make it good at everythi ng and then say, “Oh, now we're going to use you to fly drones.” That doesn't seem to make a ton of sense.State-level overregulation (15:17)We talked about the federal level. Certainly — and not that the states seem to need a nudge, but if they see the Washington doing less, I'm sure there'll be plenty of state governments saying, “Well then we need to do more. We need to fill up the gap with our state regulation.” That already seems to be happening. Will that continue to happen and can the Trump administration stop that?I think it will continue to happen, the question is what kind of gap is left by the Trump administration. I would say what the Biden administration left was a vision gap. They didn't really have an overarching vision for how the US was going to engage with this technology at the federal level, unlike the Clinton administration which set out a pretty clear vision for how the federal government planned to engage on the early version of the internet. What it said was, for some really good reasons, we're going to let the commercial sector lead on development here.I think sending a signal like that could have sort of bully-pulpit effect, especially in redder states. You'll still see states like California and New York, they're listening to Europe on how to do stuff in this space.Still? Are we still listening to . . . Who are the people out there who think, “They've got it figured out”? I understand that maybe that's your initial impulse when you have a new technology and you're like, “I don't know what to do, so who is doing something on it?” But we've had a little bit of time and I just don't get anybody who would default to be like, “Man, we're just going to look at a couple of EU white papers and off to the races here in our state.”I think we're starting to see . . . the shopping of bills that look a lot like the way privacy has worked across the states, and in some cases are being pushed by the same organizations that represent compliance companies saying, “Hey, yeah, we need to do all this algorithmic bias auditing, or safety auditing, and states should require it.”I think a lot of this is a hangover of the social media fights. AI, if you poll it just at that level, if you're like, “Hey, do you think AI is going to be good or bad for your job or for the economy?” Americans are somewhat skeptical. It's because they think of AI in the cultural context that includes Terminator, and automation, and so they think of it that way. They don't think about the thousands of applications on their phones that use artificial intelligence.So I think there's a political moment here around this. The Europeans jumped in on and said, “Hey, we're the first to regulate in this space comprehensively.” I think they're dialing that back since some of their member states are like, “Hey, this is killing our own homegrown AI industry.” But for some reason, you're right, California and New York seem to be embracing that, and I think they probably will continue to. At the very local level, at the state level, there's just weird incentives to do something and then you don't really pay a lot of consequences down the road.Having said that, there was a controversial bill that was very aggressively pushed, SB 1047, in California over the summer, and it got killed. It got canned by Gavin Newsom in the end. And I think that's a sort of a unique artifact of California's “go along to get along” legislature process where even people who don't support bills vote for them, kind of knowing that Gavin, or that the governor, will bring down the veto when it doesn't make political sense.All of this is to say, California's going to California. I think we're starting to see, and what concerns me is, we're starting to see the shopping of bills that look a lot like the way privacy has worked across the states, and in some cases are being pushed by the same organizations that represent compliance companies saying, “Hey, yeah, we need to do all this algorithmic bias auditing, or safety auditing, and states should require it.”There's a Texas draft bill that has been floated right now, and you wouldn't think that Texas would be on the frontier of banning differential effects in bias from AI. It doesn't really sound particularly red-state-y, but these things are getting shopped around and if it moves in Texas, it'll move other places too. I worry about that level of red tape coming at the state level, and that's just going to be ground warfare on the legislative front at the state level.So federal preemption, what is that and how would that work? And is that possible?It's really hard in this space because the technology is so general. Congress could, of course, write something that was very broad and preempted, certain types of regulation of models, and maybe that's a good idea, I've seen some draft language around that.On the other hand, I do believe in federalism and these aren't quite the same sort of network-based technologies that only make sense in a national sweep. So maybe there's an argument that we should let states suffer the consequences of their own regulatory approaches. That hurts my heart a little bit just to think about the future because there are a lot of talented people in those states who are going to find out it's the lawyers who are their main constraint. Those types of transaction costs, they will slow us down. I think if it looks like we're falling behind in the US because we can't get out of our own way regulatorily, I think there will be more impulse to fix things.There are some other creative solutions such as interstate compacts to try to get people to level up across multiple states about how they're going to treat AI and allow innovation to flourish, and so I think we'll see more of those experiments, but it is really hard at the federal level to preempt just because there's so many state-based interests who are going to push back against that sort of thing.Potential impact on immigration (21:15)As far as AI influencing what we do elsewhere — one thing you wrote about recently in a really great essay, which I've already drawn upon in some of these questions is — thinking about immigration and AI talent coming to the United States — what I think is now a widely accepted understanding, that this is an important technology and we certainly want to be the leader in this technology — does that change how we think about immigration, at least very high-skilled immigration?We should be wanting the most talented people to come here and stay here.I think it should. Frankly, we should have changed our minds about some of this stuff a long time ago. We should be wanting the most talented people to come here and stay here. The most talented people in the world already come here for school often. When I was in computer science grad school, it was full of people who really desperately wanted to stay in the US and build companies and build products, and some of them struggled really hard to figure out a way to do it legally.I think that making it easier for those people to stay is essential to keeping not just our lead in the world, I don't want to say it that way — I mean that's important, I think national competitiveness is sort of underrated, I think that is valuable — but those people are the most productive in the US system where they can get access to venture capital that's unlike any other part of the planet. They can get access to networks of talent that are unavailable on other parts of the planet. Keeping them here is good for the US, but I think it's good overall for technological development, and we should really, really, really focus on how to make that easier and more attractive.AI companies as national champions (23:00)This isn't necessarily a specific AI issue, but again, as you said earlier, it seems like a lot of the debate, initially, is really a holdover from the social media debates about moderation, and bias, and all that, and a lot of those sorts of people, in many cases, and frameworks just got globed onto AI.Another aspect is the antitrust, and now we're worried about these big companies owning these platforms, and they're biased.Do we begin to look at issues of how we look at our big companies who have been leading in AI, doing a lot of R&D — does the politics around Big Tech change if we begin to see them as our vanguard companies that will keep us ahead of China?. . . in contrast to the Biden sort of “big-is-bad” rhetoric that they sort of leaned into entirely, I think a Trump administration is going to bring more nuance to that in some ways. And I do think that there will be more of a look towards our innovative companies as being the vanguard of what we do in the US.I think it already has, honestly. You saw early on, the Senate hearings around AI were totally inflected with the language of social media and that network-effects type of ecosystem. AI does not work like that. It doesn't work the same way. In fact, the feedback loops are so much faster from these models, we saw things like Google Gemini that had ahistorical renderings of the founding fathers, and that got so much shouting on Twitter, and on X, and lots of other places that Google very quickly adjusted, tweaked its path. I think we're seeing the toning down of that rhetoric and the recognition that these companies are creating a lot of powerful, useful products, and that they are sort of national champions.Trump, on the campaign trail, when asked about breaking up Google for an ongoing antitrust litigation was like, “Hold on guys, breaking up these companies might not be in our best interest. There might be other ways we can solve these types of problems.” I think that that level of, in contrast to the Biden sort of “big-is-bad” rhetoric that they sort of leaned into entirely, I think a Trump administration is going to bring more nuance to that in some ways. And I do think that there will be more of a look towards our innovative companies as being the vanguard of what we do in the US.Now, having said that, obviously I think there's tons of AI development that is not inside of these largest companies in the open source space, and especially in the application layer, building on top of some of these foundation models, and so I think that ecosystem is also extremely important. Things that sort of preference the big companies over the small ones, I would have a lot of concerns about, and there have been regulatory regimes proposed that, even while opposed by some of the bigger companies, would certainly be possible for them to comply with in a way that small companies would struggle to comply with, and open-source developers just don't have any sort of nexus with which to comply, since there is no actual business model that's propping that type of approach up. So I'd want to keep it pretty neutral between the big companies, the small companies, and open source, while having the cultural recognition that big companies are extremely valuable to the US innovation ecosystem.If you had some time with, I don't know, somebody, the president, the vice president, the Secretary of Commerce, someone in an elevator going from the first to the 10th floor, and you had to quickly say, “Here's what you need to be keeping in mind about AI over the next two to four years,” what would you say?I think the number one thing I would say is that, at the state level, we're wrapping a lot of red tape around innovative companies and individuals, and that we need to find a way to clear that thicket or stop it from growing any further. That's the number one challenge that I see facing this.Secondary to that, I would say the US government needs to figure out how to take advantage of these tools. The federal government is slow to adopt new technologies, but this technology has a lot of applications to the types of government work that hundreds of thousands of federal employees do every day, and so finding ways to streamline using AI to do the job better I think is really valuable, and I think it would be worth some investment at the federal level to think about how to do that well.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedMicro Reads▶ Economics* Productivity During and Since the Pandemic - San Francisco Fed* The Effect of COVID-19 Immigration Restrictions on Post-Pandemic Labor Market Tightness - St. Louis Fed* Trump Plans Tariffs on Canada, China and Mexico That Could Cripple Trade - NYT▶ Business* Nvidia's new AI audio model can synthesize sounds that have never existed - Ars* Europe's Mistral expands in Silicon Valley in hunt for AI staff - FT▶ Policy/Politics* Musk Wants $2 Trillion of Spending Cuts. Here's Why That's Hard. - WSJ* AI Governance: From Fears and Fearmongering to Risks and Rewards - AEI* Newsom says California to offer EV subsidies if Trump kills federal tax credit - Wapo▶ AI/Digital* A new golden age of discovery - AI Policy Perspectives* How Do You Get to Artificial General Intelligence? Think Lighter - Wired* Is Creativity Dead? - NYT Opinion* The way we measure progress in AI is terrible - MIT* AI's scientific path to trust - Axios* AI Dash Cams Give Wake-Up Calls to Drowsy Drivers - Spectrum▶ Biotech/Health* Combining AI and Crispr Will Be Transformational - Wired* Neuralink Plans to Test Whether Its Brain Implant Can Control a Robotic Arm - Wired* Scientists are learning why ultra-processed foods are bad for you - Economist▶ Clean Energy/Climate* Taxing Farm Animals' Farts and Burps? Denmark Gives It a Try. - NYT* These batteries could harness the wind and sun to replace coal and gas - Wapo▶ Robotics/AVs* On the Wings of War - NYT▶ Up Wing/Down Wing* ‘Genesis' Review: Rise of the New Machines - WSJ* The Myth of the Loneliness Epidemic - Asterisk▶ Substacks/Newsletters* The Middle Income Trap - Conversable Economist * America's Productivity Boom - Apricitas Economics* The Rise of Anthropic powered by AWS - AI Supremacy* Data to start your week - Exponential View* Trump's economic team is on a collision course with reality - Slow Boring* Five Unmanned SpaceX Starships to Mars in 2026 with Thousands of Teslabots - next BIG futureFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

Housing in the United States has come to be known as a panacea problem. Gone are the days when tossing the graduation cap meant picking up the keys to a front door, and the ripple effects of unaffordable housing stretch across society: poor social mobility, smaller families, worse retirement-readiness, just to name a few.Today on Faster, Please — The Podcast, I talk to Bryan Caplan about the seemingly obvious culprit, government regulation, and the growing movement to combat it.Caplan is a professor of economics atGeorge Mason University. His essays have been featured in the New York Times, Wall Street Journal, Washington Post, and TIME Magazine. He is editor and chief writer of theBet On It Substack, and is the author of several books, including Build, Baby, Build: The Science and Ethics of Housing Regulation.In This Episode* America's evolving relationship with housing (1:31)* The impact of regulation (3:53)* Different regulations for different folks (8:47)* The YIMBY movement (11:01)* Homeowners and public opinion (13:56)* Generating momentum (17:15)* Building new cities (23:10)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. (Note: This was recorded just before the presidential election.)America's evolving relationship with housing (1:31)The main thing that changed is that we've seen a long-run runup of housing prices. Pethokoukis: What was going on with housing prices and housing affordability from the war to the 1970s? Was it kind of flattish? People were recovering from the Great Depression; what was going on then?Caplan: Yeah, it was quite flat, so there were decades where we had rapidly expanding population, the Baby Boom, and markets were working the way that markets normally do: You get demand going up, raises prices in the short run, but then that means the prices are above the cost of production, and so you get entry, and you build more until prices come back down to the cost of production. That's the way markets are supposed to work!I don't know how people thought about their homes in the late '40s, '50s, and '60s, but did they view them as, “This is our primary investment,” or did they view them more as a place to live? Were there any expectations that this was their retirement plan?I honestly don't know. I don't remember reading anything about that. I grew up in Los Angeles where in the '70s and '80s people already had some sense of, “Your home is an important retirement vessel,” but it is plausible that when you are going back to earlier decades, people did have a different view.I've often heard Americans say that Japanese don't think about their homes as retirement vessels, but I've never talked to anyone in Japan to assure me this is so, so I don't know.But that scenario changed.It did.How did it change and are we confident we know why it changed?The main thing that changed is that we've seen a long-run runup of housing prices. Depending upon what series you're looking at, the runup might be starting in the early '70s or the early '80s, but in any case, there was what economists would call a structural break where a series that was generally flat over the long term started rising over the long term. There have been a few times when prices fell back down, like after the Great Recession, but now, inflation adjusted, we are higher than the peak right before the Great Recession.Now, is that the same as affordability? Because I assume incomes could be going up, so has it outpaced median income over that period?Probably not, although it's in the right ballpark, and maybe.One thing you can say is, well, there's regulation before, there's regulation after, so how can you go and blame the rise on the regulation?The impact of regulation (3:53)I would like to blame regulation. Intuitively, that makes sense to me, but I suppose we need more than intuition here.. . . there's a lot of regulation almost everywhere a lot of people live.I would say that we do have very good evidence that regulation is indeed to blame. If you look at it very quickly, you might say, “Well, there was regulation before; it didn't seem to matter that much.” The answer to this really was death by a thousand cuts, where we just piled regulation on regulation, but also where regulations that have been interpreted mildly before started being interpreted strictly afterwards.How do we know that it really is regulation? The easiest thing to do is just to look at the strictness of regulation in different parts of the country, and you can see that there are some places that are crazy strict and the prices are crazy high. There's other places where the regulation is a lot lighter and even though they're getting plenty of population increase, they nevertheless do not have these long-run rises.So the contrast between the Bay Area and the Texas Triangle is very strong. So these are both areas that, in some sense, they are growth areas, a lot of tech there, but the Bay Area has seen very little rise in the amount of housing and massive increase in prices, whereas Texas has, in contrast, seen a large rise in the number of houses and very low rises in the price of housing.The main method that economists have used in order to disentangle all this is it really starts with trying to figure out: What is land that you are not allowed to build anything on worth? So just think about whatever your excess land is in a single-family area, you're not allowed to put another structure there, you can put a volleyball court or something like that. So you just find out, well, what is land where you can't build anything worth? And usually, even in a good area, that land is not worth much. If you can't build on it, it's like, I guess we can put some grass, but that's not that good. Then the next step is to just go to a construction manual and to see what the cost of construction is in a given area and then compare it to the price. This is a quite reasonable approach and it has gotten better over time because data has gotten better.The main thing is that Joe Gyourko, who's been working on this for about 20 years, in his last big paper, he got data on actual vacant lots, and so you can see, this is a vacant lot, usually because you just can't build anything on it, can't get the permission, and as a result of this, he's also able to find out, how bad does the regulation get as you move away from the city center. We've got details like Los Angeles looks like it's regulated out to the horizon. You've got 50 miles away from downtown LA and it's still pretty bad regulation. On the other end, a city like Chicago is very regulated in the downtown, but 30 miles out, then there's not that much effect anymore.The punchline of all this work is that there's a lot of regulation almost everywhere a lot of people live. If you want to go and build a skyscraper in the middle of nowhere in Kansas, you could probably do it, but you wouldn't want to build a skyscraper in the middle of nowhere in Kansas, that defeats the whole purpose of building a skyscraper.That leads to two questions: The first question is, just to be clear, when we're talking about regulation, is it single-family homes versus multifamily? Is it also the coding, what the home has to be made out of? Do the walls have to be so thick, or the windows? What are we talking about?The honest answer is that most economists' estimates are just giving you an estimate of all regulation combined with a considerable agnosticism about what actually are the specific regulations that matter. There are other papers that look at specific kinds of regulation and come up with at least very credible claims that this is a big part of the puzzle.The main things that matter a lot in the US: We've got height restrictions — those matter in your biggest, most expensive cities; you can just look at a place like Central Park or get a helicopter shot of San Francisco and say, don't tell me you can't build more stuff here. There's endless room to build more stuff here as long as you can go vertically.It's also very standard to say that you are only allowed to have single-family homes in most residential land in the US, it's just zoned single family only, so you just are not legally allowed to squeeze in a larger number of dwellings.Then you've got, even with single-family regulation, it's very standard to have minimum lot sizes, which just says that you've got to have at least like an acre of land per house, which, whenever I'm speaking in metric countries, I'm always telling, what is that . . .? It's a lot. It's a lot of land, and the amount of land that's normally required has gone up a lot. One-acre zoning in the past would've seemed crazy. Now plenty of places have five-acre zoning. You could obviously just squeeze way more houses in that space. And what is clear is that builders normally build the absolute maximum number they're allowed to build. Anytime someone is going up to the very border of a rule, that is a strong sign the rule is changing behavior.Different regulations for different folks (8:47)Very rarely did someone sit around saying, “You know what's great about Texas? Our lack of housing regulation.”Why are these rules different in different places? That may be a dumb question. Obviously San Francisco is very different from Texas. Is the answer just: different places, different people, different preferences? Do we have any idea why that is?Matt Kahn, who is based in Los Angeles, he's been I think at UCLA and USC, he's got a very good paper showing, at least in California, it's the most progressive left-wing places that have the worst regulation, and it just seemed to be very philosophical. On the other hand, I spent a lot of time during Covid in Texas. Very rarely did someone sit around saying, “You know what's great about Texas? Our lack of housing regulation.” It's not so much that they are opposed to what's going on in California, it just doesn't occur to them they could be California.In a way, you might actually get them to be proud about what they're doing if you could remind them, “Oh, it's really different in California,” and just take them on a tour, then they might come back and say, “God bless Texas.” But it's more of, there's the places where people have an ideological commitment to regulation, and then the rest of the country is more pragmatic and so builders are able to get a lot more done because there just aren't fanatics that are trying to stop them from providing the second most basic necessity for human beings.Now, this is all striking because the YIMBY [Yes In My Backyard] movement, and my book Build, Baby, Build — I definitely think of that as a YIMBY book. My goal is to make it the Bible of YIMBY, and it's in comic book form, so it's a Bible that can be read by people starting at age five.In any case, the YIMBY movement is definitely left-coded. People that are in that movement, they think of themselves as progressives, usually, and yet they are just a small piece of a much broader progressive coalition that is generally totally hostile to what they're doing. They are punching above weight and I want to give them a lot of credit for what they've been able to accomplish, and yet, the idea that YIMBYs tend to be left-wing and therefore they are the main people that are responsible for allowing housing is just not true. Most places in the country basically don't have a lot of pro- or anti-housing activism. They just have apathy combined with a construction industry that tries to go and build stuff, and if no one stops them, they do their job.The YIMBY movement (11:01)Who the hell decided that was a good idea that everybody should have an acre of land?I want to talk a bit more about the economic harms and benefits of deregulation, but if I was a center-left YIMBY, I would think, “Oh, I have all kinds of potential allies on the right. Conservatives, they hate regulation.” I wonder how true that is, at least recently, it seems to me that when I hear a lot of conservatives talking about this issue of density, they don't like density either. It sounds like they're very worried that someone's going to put up an apartment building next to their suburban home, YIMBY people want every place to look [the same] — What's the home planet in Star Wars?Coruscant.Yeah Coruscant, that that's what the YIMBYs want, they want an entire planet to look like a city where there's hundreds of levels, and I'm not sure there's the level of potential allyship on the right that center-left YIMBYs would want. Is that a phenomenon that you've noticed?I actually I have a whole chapter in Build, Baby, Build where I try to go and say we can sell these policies to very different people in their own language, and if they actually believe their official philosophy, then they should all be coming down to very similar conclusions.I think the main issue of center-left YIMBYs talking to people who are right wing or conservative, it's much more about polarization and mutual antipathy than it is about the people on the right would actually object to what they're hearing. What I say there is there are certain kinds of housing regulation that I think the conservatives are going to be sympathetic to. In particular, not liking multifamily housing in suburbs, but I don't really think there is any conservative objection to just allowing a lot more skyscrapers in cities where they don't even go. There's not going to be much objection there and it's like, “Yeah, why don't we go and allow lots of multifamily in the left-wing parts of the country?”But I think the other thing is I don't think it's really that hard to convince conservatives that you shouldn't need to have an acre of land to go and have a house. That one, I think, is just so crazy, and just unfair, and anti-family, you just go and list all the negative adjectives about it. Did you grow up in a house on a one-acre lot? I didn't! Who the hell decided that was a good idea that everybody should have an acre of land? Wouldn't you like your kids to be able to walk to their friends' houses?A lot of it seems to be that government is just preventing the development of something that people would actually want to live in. I remember when my daughter finally made a friend within walking distance, I wanted to light a candle, hallelujah! A child can walk to be friends with a child! This has not happened in all my years! But that was the normal way things were when you'd be on a quarter-acre or a third of acre when I was growing up.Homeowners and public opinion (13:56)People generally favor government policies because they believe . . . the policies are good for society.If someone owns a house, they like when that price goes up, and they might see what you're saying as lowering the price of homes. If we were to have sort of nationwide deregulation, maybe deregulation where the whole country kind of looks like wherever the lightest-regulated place is. People are going to say, “That's bad for me! I own a home. Why would I want that?”Lots of people think this, and especially economists like this idea of, of course we have all this regulation because it's great for homeowners; homeowners are the main wants to participate in local government. Sounds likely, but when we actually look at public opinion, we see that tenants are strong advocates regulation too, and it's like, gee, that really doesn't make any sense at all. They're the ones that are paying for all this stuff.But it does make sense if you switch to a much simpler theory of what's going on, which fits the facts, and that is: People generally favor government policies because they believe —underscore believe — the policies are good for society. So many people from the earlier decades say, “Oh, all those Republicans, they just want tax cuts.” Now we're finally at the level where Republicans are poorer than Democrats. It's like, “Yeah, I guess it's getting a little bit hard to say that people become Republicans to get tax cuts when they're the ones paying lower taxes.” How about there's an actual disagreement about what policies are good for society, which explains why people belong to different parties, support different policies.So most of what I'm doing in Build, Baby, Build is trying to convince people, look, I'm not impugning your motives, I don't think that you're just favoring whatever policies are selfishly best for you. I think that whatever policies you're into are ones that you think are genuinely good for your community, or your area, or your country, but we are not thinking very well about everything that's going on.So part of it is that a lot of the complaints are just overblown or wrong, but another thing is that generally we base a regulation purely on complaints without any thought of any good thing that we might be losing. I make a big deal in the book about how, if you don't want to have noise, and traffic, and pollution, it's really easy — just move to some remote part of the country and you solve all those problems; yet hardly anybody wants to do that.Why are people staying in congested areas with all these problems and paying a lot of extra money for them? Many of these people now have telework jobs, they don't even have a job reason to stay there. And the answer's got to be, there's just a bunch of really good things about living near other people that we hardly ever talk about and which have no political voice. There's almost no one's going to show up in a meeting and [say], “I favor this because I want there to be more commercial opportunities. I favor this because I want there to be more social opportunities, more cultural opportunities, more economic opportunities,” and yet these are all the reasons why people want to live near other people. So we have a set of regulation just based upon complaints: complaints which are generally out of context, not quantified. So we just see that people are willing to pay a lot of money for the package of living in an area with a bunch of other people, so that's got to mean that the good of other people exceeds the bad of the other people; otherwise, why aren't you living out in the middle of nowhere?Generating momentum (17:15)The sad truth is that symbolic issues are much more likely to get people excited, but this is something that determines the quality of life for most people in this country.When I read the book, and I read a really good New York Times essay —Would that be my essay, Jim?I think it is your essay! In fact, it was, I should have been clearer on the author of that essay. The brilliant Bryan Caplan was the author of that essay.If you look at the potential benefits on inequality, there's environmental impact, maybe people are really worried about birth rates, it really seems like housing really is sort of the “everything problem.”Panacea problem, or the “housing theory of everything.”It really does. I think the current election season, it's probably the most I've heard it talked about, and not really talked about very much.And thoughtlessly. Spoken of thoughtlessly.To me there seems to be a lot more — I'll use a nice think tank word — there's been a lot more ideation about the issue in recent years, and maybe it's only now kind of breaking through that filter where politicians start talking about it, but boy, when you look through what you've written about it, it seems like it should be a top three issue that politicians talk about.The sad truth is that symbolic issues are much more likely to get people excited, but this is something that determines the quality of life for most people in this country. It's the difference between: Are you going to keep living with your parents until you're 30, or are you going to be able to afford to get your own place, start your own family? And again, it's one where older people remember how things used to be, and the idea of, well, why can't things just be like that? Why can't it be that a person who gets out of college can go and immediately afford to get a pretty good house?At AEI, Mark Perry, for example, who is one of your colleagues, I think probably a remote colleague, he has done stuff on how new houses are better and so on, and that's also true, so I don't want to go and act like there's been no progress at all. But still, of course a lot of people are not moving into those new houses, they're moving into old houses, which are the same as they were in the past, but just way more expensive if you want to go and live in that areaThe other thing that is worth pointing out is that it's really temping to say, well, of course housing naturally gets more expensive as population rises. The period after World War II that we were mentioning, that's the Baby Boom era, population was rising at a much faster rate then than it did now, even counting immigration, and yet prices were much flatter because we were able to just go and legally build way more stuff.I feel like you feel like you need to drive home the point about demand not being met by supply for this artificial reason: regulation. Even though, to me, it seems utterly natural and a classic case, people struggle to come up with alternative reasons that it's really not that. That it's because of . . . there's private equity firms buying up all the homes, or the reason apartment rents go up is because there's a cabal of apartment owners . . . They look for these other reasons, and I don't quite get that when there seems to be a pretty obvious reason that we theoretically know how to fix.Some of these other stories, they are half-truths, but they're not helpful. So the thing of, “Gee, if we just shut down tourism and letting foreign buyers buy stuff here, then demand will be lower, and prices will be lower, and we won't need to build anything new.” And it's like, do you realize what you're saying? You're basically saying that you want to destroy one of your best export industries.If people around the world want to go and buy houses in your area, why do you want to turn them away instead of saying, cha-ching, let's capitalize on this by building a ton of housing for them? If there's a lot of tourists that want to go and rent a place in your area, why is it you want to go and strangle the market, which obviously it's a great industry — Build stuff and rent it to people, and it's not like there's some fixed amount unless the law says it must be fixed.One benefit I didn't mention was social mobility where we need people, if they want to be able to move towards high-wage, high-productivity cities, to find good jobs, and then not have the wages of those good jobs mostly gobbled up by housing costs. That kind of circulation system, if that's the right phrase.Certainly in some parts of the country, that has just been stopped and that has been a traditional way people move up the ladder.We've got very good data on this. In earlier periods of US history, there was basically a foolproof way for someone in a low-income part of the country to get a big raise, and that was just to move. Steinbeck's Grapes of Wrath not withstanding, this almost always works. It wasn't normally the case that you starve to death on your way to California from Oklahoma. Instead, normally, it's just a simple thing: You move from a low-wage area to a high-wage area and you get a lot more money, and you get a much higher take-home salary. But then in those days, there was not much difference in housing prices between different areas of the country, and therefore you would actually have a rise in not just your paycheck, but your standard living.Now it's still true that you can get a rise in your paycheck by moving to the Bay Area. The problem is your standard of living, if you're coming from Mississippi, will generally crash because the housing cost eats up much more than 100 percent of the raise.I remember I had a colleague who had a son who was an investment banker in the Bay Area. He and his wife were sharing a small apartment with two roommates, and it's like investment bankers can't afford apartments! Things have gotten out of hand, I think we can say with great confidence now.Building new cities (23:10). . . politics is an area where there's a lot of ideas where it's like no one's trying it, it must be because it wouldn't work if tried, and then someone tries it with a little panache, or a little twist, and it catches on, and you're like, alright, maybe that's the real story.Should we be building new cities somewhere? I think former President Trump has talked about this idea that we, is that something you've thought about at all?Yes. I didn't put it into the book, but when I was writing up some follow-up posts on things that I wished I would've talked about, or just more speculative things, I do have some friends who are involved in that project to go and build a new city in the Bay Area. I hope it works.There is always the problem of there's almost always going to be some existing people where you want to build your new city, and then what do you do about them? You can try buying them out. There is this holdout problem, a few people are going to stay there and say, “I'm not going to sell.” Or you could just go and do what happened in the movie Up: We'll buy everybody around you, and if you don't like it, too bad.But on the other hand, it may be that activists will put a stop to your plan before you can get it off the ground. So in that case, it was going and selling off empty federal or state land, which we have in abundance. If I remember, I think that 23 percent of the land of the United States is owned by the federal government. Another 10 percent is owned by state governments. And even if you subtract out Alaska, there's still a ton. If you look at the map, it's really cool because you might think, “Oh, it's just that the government owns land no one in the right mind would want.” Not true.Desert land in Nevada next to Area 51 or something.Virtually all of Texas, even those western deserts, are privately owned. I've driven through them. Have you ever driven through West Texas?I have.Alright, so you're there and you're like, “Who wants to own this stuff?” And it's like, well, somebody at whatever the market price is considers this worth owning, and as to whether it's for mineral extraction, or for speculation on one day it'll be worth something when the population of Texas is greater, or they're going to do ranching there, I don't know. But it is at a price someone is willing to go and own almost every piece of land.What the map really shows is it was ideology that led all this land to be held by the government. It's basically the ideology of conservation that we hear about. You get John Muir and Teddy Roosevelt, and as a result, they didn't just wind up protecting a few really beautiful national parks, they wind up putting millions of square miles of land off-limits for most human use.Again, when the population of the country is lower, maybe it didn't even matter that much, but now it's like, “Hey, how about you go and sell me a hundred square miles so I can put a new city here?” The idea that an Elon or Zuckerberg couldn't go and just say, “I'm putting a pile of money into this. I'm going to build a new city and have a decent chance of it working.” Maybe it would be just a disaster and they waste their money. Then more likely I think it's going to be like Seward's Folly where it's like, “What's the point of buying Alaska?” Oh, actually it was fantastic. We got a great bargain on Alaska and now it is an incredible, in hindsight, investment.As we were talking, I started thinking about Andrew Yang who ran for president, I think that was in 2020, and he had one issue, really: Universal Basic Income. He thought that he had found an issue that was going to take him to the White House. It did not.I kind of think if you were going to have a candidate focus a lot on one issue, this would not be a bad issue, given how it touches all these concerns of modern American society.As an economist, I always hesitate to say that anyone who is a specialist in an area and is putting all their resources into it is just royally screwing up. At the same time, politics is an area where there's a lot of ideas where it's like no one's trying it, it must be because it wouldn't work if tried, and then someone tries it with a little panache, or a little twist, and it catches on, and you're like, alright, maybe that's the real story.Just to give Trump credit where credit is due, there's just a lot of things that he said that you would think would've just destroyed his candidacy, and instead it seemed like he came out and he was more popular than ever. Maybe he just saw that there were some ideas that are popular that other people didn't realize would be popular.Now I'm not optimistic about what he's going to do about housing, although anytime he says one good thing, it's like, I don't know, maybe he'll just get fixated on that, but more likely ADHD will kick in, unfortunately.But just to go and allow one new laissez-faire city to be built on federal land in some non-crummy area of the country — just as a demonstration project, the value of that would be enormous, just to see, hey, there's no reason why you can't have spacious, cheap homes in a really nice area that is not that remote from the rest of the country. Just imagine the airport you could build there, too — before all the noise complaints. You probably know about the noise complaints against Reagan Airport and how one single guy filed over half the complaints. It's like, how are we going to build anything? 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In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with economist Robin Hanson about a) how much technological change our society will undergo in the foreseeable future, b) what form we want that change to take, and c) how much we can ever reasonably predict.Hanson is an associate professor of economics at George Mason University. He was formerly a research associate at the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford, and is the author of the Overcoming Bias Substack. In addition, he is the author of the 2017 book, The Elephant in the Brain: Hidden Motives in Everyday Life, as well as the 2016 book, The Age of Em: Work, Love, and Life When Robots Rule the Earth.In This Episode* Innovation is clumpy (1:21)* A history of AI advancement (3:25)* The tendency to control new tech (9:28)* The fallibility of forecasts (11:52)* The risks of fertility-rate decline (14:54)* Window of opportunity for space (18:49)* Public prediction markets (21:22)* A culture of calculated risk (23:39)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationInnovation is Clumpy (1:21)Do you think that the tech advances of recent years — obviously in AI, and what we're seeing with reusable rockets, or CRISPR, or different energy advances, fusion, perhaps, even Ozempic — do you think that the collective cluster of these technologies has put humanity on a different path than perhaps it was on 10 years ago?. . . most people don't notice just how much stuff is changing behind the scenes in order for the economy to double every 15 or 20 years.That's a pretty big standard. As you know, the world has been growing exponentially for a very long time, and new technologies have been appearing for a very long time, and the economy doubles roughly every 15 or 20 years, and that can't happen without a whole lot of technological change, so most people don't notice just how much stuff is changing behind the scenes in order for the economy to double every 15 or 20 years. So to say that we're going more than that is really a high standard here. I don't think it meets that standard. Maybe the standard it meets is to say people were worried about maybe a stagnation or slowdown a decade or two ago, and I think this might weaken your concerns about that. I think you might say, well, we're still on target.Innovation's clumpy. It doesn't just out an entirely smooth . . . There are some lumpy ones once in a while, lumpier innovations than usual, and those boost higher than expected, sometimes lower than expected sometimes, and maybe in the last ten years we've had a higher-than-expected clump. The main thing that does is make you not doubt as much as you did when you had the lower-than-expected clump in the previous 10 years or 20 years because people had seen this long-term history and they thought, “Lately we're not seeing so much. I wonder if this is done. I wonder if we're running out.” I think the last 10 years tells you: well, no, we're kind of still on target. We're still having big important advances, as we have for two centuries.A history of AI advancement (3:25)People who are especially enthusiastic about the recent advances with AI, would you tell them their baseline should probably be informed by economic history rather than science fiction?[Y]es, if you're young, and you haven't seen the world for decades, you might well believe that we are almost there, we're just about to automate everything — but we're not.By technical history! We have 70-odd years of history of AI. I was an AI researcher full-time from '84 to '93. If you look at the long sweep of AI history, we've had some pretty big advances. We couldn't be where we are now without a lot of pretty big advances all along the way. You just think about the very first digital computer in 1950 or something and all the things we've seen, we have made large advances — and they haven't been completely smooth, they've come in a bit of clumps.I was enticed into the field in 1984 because of a recent set of clumps then, and for a century, roughly every 30 years, we've had a burst of concern about automation and AI, and we've had big concern in the sense people said, “Are we almost there? Are we about to have pretty much all jobs automated?” They said that in the 1930s, they said it in the 1960s — there was a presidential commission in the 1960s: “What if all the jobs get automated?” I jumped in in the late '80s when there was a big burst there, and I as a young graduate student said, “Gee, if I don't get in now, it'll all be over soon,” because I heard, “All the jobs are going to be automated soon!”And now, in the last decade or so, we've had another big burst, and I think people who haven't seen that history, it feels to them like it felt to me in 1984: “Wow, unprecedented advances! Everybody's really excited! Maybe we're almost there. Maybe if I jump in now, I'll be part of the big push over the line to just automate everything.” That was exciting, it was tempting, I was naïve, and I was sucked in, and we're now in another era like that. Yes, if you're young, and you haven't seen the world for decades, you might well believe that we are almost there, we're just about to automate everything — but we're not.I like that you mentioned the automation scare of the '60s. Just going back and looking at that, it really surprised me how prevalent and widespread and how serious people took that. I mean, you can find speeches by Martin Luther King talking about how our society is going to deal with the computerization of everything. So it does seem to be a recurrent fear. What would you need to see to think it is different this time?The obvious relevant parameter to be tracking is the percentage of world income that goes to automation, and that has been creeping up over the decades, but it's still less than five percent.What is that statistic?If you look at the percentage of the economy that goes to computer hardware and software, or other mechanisms of automation, you're still looking at less than five percent of the world economy. So it's been creeping up, maybe decades ago it was three percent, even one percent in 1960, but it's creeping up slowly, and obviously, when that gets to be 80 percent, game over, the economy has been replaced — but that number is creeping up slowly, and you can track it, so when you start seeing that number going up much faster or becoming a large number, then that's the time to say, “Okay, looks like we're close. Maybe automation will, in fact, take over most jobs, when it's getting most of world income.”If you're looking at economic statistics, and you're looking at different forecasts, whether by the Fed or CBO or Wall Street banks and the forecasts are, “Well, we expect, maybe because of AI, productivity growth to be 0.4 percentage points higher over this kind of time. . .” Those kinds of numbers where we're talking about a tenth of a point here, that's not the kind of singularity-emergent world that some people think or hope or expect that we're on.Absolutely. If you've got young enthusiastic tech people, et cetera — and they're exaggerating. The AI companies, even they're trying to push as big a dramatic images they can. And then all the stodgy conservative old folks, they're afraid of seeming behind the times, and not up with things, and not getting it — that was the big phrase in the Internet Boom: Who “gets it” that this is a new thing?I'm proud to be a human, to have been part of the civilization to have done this . . . but we've seen that for 70 years: new technologies, we get excited, we try them out, we try to apply them, and that's part of what progress is.Now it would be #teamgetsit.Exactly, something like that. They're trying to lean into it, they're trying to give it the best spin they can, but they have some self-respect, so they're going to give you, “Wow 0.4 percent!” They'll say, “That's huge! Wow, this is a really big thing, everybody should be into this!” But they can't go above 0.4 percent because they've got some common sense here. But we've even seen management consulting firms over the last decade or so make predictions that 10 years in the future, half all jobs would be automated. So we've seen this long history of these really crazy extreme predictions into a decade, and none of those remotely happened, of course. But people do want to be in with the latest thing, and this is obviously the latest round of technology, it's impressive. I'm proud to be a human, to have been part of the civilization to have done this, and I'd like to try them out, and see what I can do with them, and think of where they could go. That's all exciting and fun, but we've seen that for 70 years: new technologies, we get excited, we try them out, we try to apply them, and that's part of what progress is. The tendency to control new tech (9:28)Not to talk just about AI, but do you think AI is important enough that policymakers need to somehow guide the technology to a certain outcome? Daron Acemoglu, one of the Nobel Prize winners, has for quite some time, and certainly recently, said that this technology needs to be guided by policymakers so that it helps people, it helps workers, it creates new tasks, it creates new things for them to do, not automate away their jobs or automate a bunch of tasks.Do you think that there's something special about this technology that we need to guide it to some sort of outcome?I think those sort of people would say that about any new technology that seemed like it was going to be important. They are not actually distinguishing AI from other technologies. This is just what they say about everything.It could be “technology X,” we must guide it to the outcome that I have already determined.As long as you've said, “X is new, X is exciting, a lot of things seem to depend on X,” then their answer would be, “We need to guide it.” It wouldn't really matter what the details of X were. That's just how they think about society and technology. I don't see anything distinctive about this, per se, in that sense, other than the fact that — look, in the long run, it's huge.Space, in the long run, is huge, because obviously in the long run almost everything will be in space, so clearly, eventually, space will be the vast majority of everything. That doesn't mean we need to guide space now or to do anything different about it, per se. At the moment, space is pretty small, and it's pretty pedestrian, but it's exciting, and the same for AI. At the moment, AI is pretty small, minor, AI is not remotely threatening to cause harm in our world today. If you look about harmful technologies, this is way down the scale. Demonstrated harms of AI in the last 10 years are minuscule compared to things like construction equipment, or drugs, or even television, really. This is small.Ladders for climbing up on your roof to clean out the gutters, that's a very dangerous technology.Yeah, somebody should be looking into that. We should be guiding the ladder industry to make sure they don't cause harm in the world.The fallibility of forecasts (11:52)I'm not sure how much confidence we should ever have on long-term economic forecasts, but have you seen any reason to think that they might be less reliable than they always have been? That we might be approaching some sort of change? That those 50-year forecasts of entitlement spending might be all wrong because the economy's going to be growing so much faster, or the longevity is going to be increasing so much faster?Previously, the world had been doubling roughly every thousand years, and that had been going on for maybe 10,000 years, and then, within the space of a century, we switched to doubling roughly every 15 or 20 years. That's a factor of 60 increase in the growth rate, and it happened after a previous transition from forging to farming, roughly 10 doublings before.It was just a little over two centuries ago when the world saw this enormous revolution. Previously, the world had been doubling roughly every thousand years, and that had been going on for maybe 10,000 years, and then, within the space of a century, we switched to doubling roughly every 15 or 20 years. That's a factor of 60 increase in the growth rate, and it happened after a previous transition from forging to farming, roughly 10 doublings before.So you might say we can't trust these trends to continue maybe more than 10 doublings, and then who knows what might happen? You could just say — that's 200 years, say, if you double every 20 years — we just can't trust these forecasts more than 200 years out. Look at what's happened in the past after that many doublings, big changes happened, and you might say, therefore, expect, on that sort of timescale, something else big to happen. That's not crazy to say. That's not very specific.And then if you say, well, what is the thing people most often speculate could be the cause of a big change? They do say AI, and then we actually have a concrete reason to think AI would change the growth rate of the economy: That is the fact that, at the moment, we make most stuff in factories, and factories typically push out from the factory as much value as the factory itself embodies, in economic terms, in a few months.If you could have factories make factories, the economy could double every few months. The reason we can't now is we have humans in the factories, and factories don't double them. But if you could make AIs in factories, and the AIs made factories, that made more AIs, that could double every few months. So the world economy could plausibly double every few months when AI has dominated the economy.That's of the magnitude doubling every few months versus doubling every 20 years. That's a magnitude similar to the magnitude we saw before from farming to industry, and so that fits together as saying, sometime in the next few centuries, expect a transition that might increase the growth rate of the economy by a factor of 100. Now that's an abstract thing in the long frame, it's not in the next 10 years, or 20 years, or something. It's saying that economic modes only last so long, something should come up eventually, and this is our best guess of a thing that could come up, so it's not crazy.The risks of fertility-rate decline (14:54)Are you a fertility-rate worrier?If the population falls, the best models say innovation rates would fall even faster.I am, and in fact, I think we have a limited deadline to develop human-level AI, before which we won't for a long pause, because falling fertility really threatens innovation rates. This is something we economists understand that I think most other people don't: You might've thought that a falling population could be easily compensated by a growing economy and that we would still have rapid and fast innovation because we would just have a bigger economy with a lower population, but apparently that's not true.If the population falls, the best models say innovation rates would fall even faster. So say the population is roughly predicted to peak in three decades and then start to fall, and if it's falls, it would fall roughly a factor of two every generation or two, depending on which populations dominate, and then if it fell by a factor of 10, the innovation rate would fall by more than a factor of 10, and that means just a slower rate of new technologies, and, of course, also a reduction in the scale of the world economy.And I think that plausibly also has the side effect of a loss in liberality. I don't think people realize how much it was innovation and competition that drove much of the world to become liberal because the winning nations in the world were liberal and the rest were afraid of falling too far behind. But when innovation goes away, they won't be so eager to be liberal to be innovative because innovation just won't be a thing, and so much of the world will just become a lot less liberal.There's also the risk that — basically, computers are a very durable technology, in principle. Typically we don't make them that durable because every two years they get twice as good, but when innovation goes away, they won't get good very fast, and then you'll be much more tempted to just make very durable computers, and the first generation that makes very durable computers that last hundreds of years, the next generation won't want to buy new computers, they'll just use the old durable ones as the economy is shrinking and then the industry that commuters might just go away. And then it could be a long time before people felt a need to rediscover those technologies.I think the larger-scale story is there's no obvious process that would prevent this continued decline because there's no level at which, when you get that, some process kicks in and it makes us say, “Oh, we need to increase the population.” But the most likely scenario is just that the Amish and [Hutterites] and other insular, fertile subgroups who have been doubling every 20 years for a century will just keep doing that and then come to dominate the world, much like Christians took over the Roman Empire: They took it over by doubling every 20 years for three centuries. That's my default future, and then if we don't get AI or colonize space before this decline, which I've estimated would be roughly 70 years' worth more of progress at previous rates, then we don't get it again until the Amish not only just take over the world, but rediscover a taste for technology and economic growth, and then eventually all of the great stuff could happen, but that could be many centuries later.This does not sound like an issue that can be fundamentally altered by tweaking the tax code.You would have to make a large —— Large turn of the dial, really turn that dial.People are uncomfortable with larger-than-small tweaks, of course, but we're not in an era that's at all eager for vast changes in policy, we are in a pretty conservative era that just wants to tweak things. Tweaks won't do it.Window of opportunity for space (18:49)We can't do things like Daylight Savings Time, which some people want to change. You mentioned this window — Elon Musk has talked about a window for expansion into space, and this is a couple of years ago, he said, “The window has closed before. It's open now. Don't assume it will always be open.”Is that right? Why would it close? Is it because of higher interest rates? Because the Amish don't want to go to space? Why would the window close?I think, unfortunately, we've got a limited window to try to jumpstart a space economy before the earth economy shrinks and isn't getting much value from a space economy.There's a demand for space stuff, mostly at the moment, to service Earth, like the internet circling the earth, say, as Elon's big project to fund his spaceships. And there's also demand for satellites to do surveillance of the earth, et cetera. As the earth economy shrinks, the demand for that stuff will shrink. At some point, they won't be able to afford fixed costs.A big question is about marginal cost versus fixed costs. How much is the fixed cost just to have this capacity to send stuff into space, versus the marginal cost of adding each new rocket? If it's dominated by marginal costs and they make the rockets cheaper, okay, they can just do fewer rockets less often, and they can still send satellites up into space. But if you're thinking of something where there's a key scale that you need to get past even to support this industry, then there's a different thing.So thinking about a Mars economy, or even a moon economy, or a solar system economy, you're looking at a scale thing. That thing needs to be big enough to be self-sustaining and economically cost-effective, or it's just not going to work. So I think, unfortunately, we've got a limited window to try to jumpstart a space economy before the earth economy shrinks and isn't getting much value from a space economy. Space economy needs to be big enough just to support itself, et cetera, and that's a problem because it's the same humans in space who are down here on earth, who are going to have the same fertility problems up there unless they somehow figure out a way to make a very different culture.A lot of people just assume, “Oh, you could have a very different culture on Mars, and so they could solve our cultural problems just by being different,” but I'm not seeing that. I think they would just have a very strong interconnection with earth culture because they're going to have just a rapid bandwidth stuff back and forth, and their fertility culture and all sorts of other culture will be tied closely to earth culture, so I'm not seeing how a Mars colony really solves earth cultural problems.Public prediction markets (21:22)The average person is aware that these things, whether it's betting markets or these online consensus prediction markets, that they exist, that you can bet on presidential races, and you can make predictions about a superconductor breakthrough, or something like that, or about when we're going to get AGI.To me, it seems like they have, to some degree, broken through the filter, and people are aware that they're out there. Have they come of age?. . . the big value here isn't going to be betting on elections, it's going to be organizations using them to make organization decisions, and that process is being explored.In this presidential election, there's a lot of discussion that points to them. And people were pretty open to that until Trump started to be favored, and people said, “No, no, that can't be right. There must be a lot of whales out there manipulating, because it couldn't be Trump's winning.” So the openness to these things often depends on what their message is.But honestly, the big value here isn't going to be betting on elections, it's going to be organizations using them to make organization decisions, and that process is being explored. Twenty-five years ago, I invented this concept of decision markets using in organizations, and now in the last year, I've actually seen substantial experimentation with them and so I'm excited to see where that goes, and I'm hopeful there, but that's not so much about the presidential markets.Roughly a century ago there was more money bet in presidential betting markets than in stock markets at the time. Betting markets were very big then, and then they declined, primarily because scientific polling was declared a more scientific approach to estimating elections than betting markets, and all the respectable people wanted to report on scientific polls. And then of course the stock market became much, much bigger. The interest in presidential markets will wax and wane, but there's actually not that much social value in having a better estimate of who's going to win an election. That doesn't really tell you who to vote for, so there are other markets that would be much more socially valuable, like predicting the consequences of who's elected as president. We don't really have much markets on those, but maybe we will next time around. But there is a lot of experimentation going in organizational prediction markets at the moment, compared to, say, 10 years ago, and I'm excited about those experiments.A culture of calculated risk (23:39)I want a culture that, when one of these new nuclear reactors, or these nuclear reactors that are restarting, or these new small modular reactors, when there's some sort of leak, or when a new SpaceX Starship, when some astronaut gets killed, that we just don't collapse as a society. That we're like, well, things happen, we're going to keep moving forward.Do you think we have that kind of culture? And if not, how do we get it, if at all? Is that possible?That's the question: Why has our society become so much more safety-oriented in the last half-century? Certainly one huge sign of it is the way we way overregulated nuclear energy, but we've also now been overregulating even kids going to school. Apparently they can't just take their bikes to school anymore, they have to go on a bus because that's safer, and in a whole bunch of ways, we are just vastly more safety-oriented, and that seems to be a pretty broad cultural trend. It's not just in particular areas and it's not just in particular countries.I've been thinking a lot about long-term cultural trends and trying to understand them. The basic story, I think, is we don't have a good reason to believe long-term cultural trends are actually healthy when they are shared trends of norms and status markers that everybody shares. Cultural things that can vary within the cultures, like different technologies and firm cultures, those we're doing great. We have great evolution of those things, and that's why we're having all these great technologies. But things like safetyism is more of a shared cultural norm, and we just don't have good reasons to think those changes are healthy, and they don't fix themselves, so this is just another example of something that's going wrong.They don't fix themselves because if you have a strong, very widely shared cultural norm, and someone has a different idea, they need to be prepared to pay a price, and most of us aren't prepared to pay that price.If we had a healthy cultural evolution competition among even nations, this would be fine. The problem is we have this global culture, a monoculture, really, that enforces everybody.Right. If, for example, we have 200 countries, if they were actually independent experiments and had just had different cultures going different directions, then I'd feel great; that okay, the cultures that choose too much safety, they'll lose out to the others and eventually it'll be worn out. If we had a healthy cultural evolution competition among even nations, this would be fine. The problem is we have this global culture, a monoculture, really, that enforces everybody.At the beginning of Covid, all the usual public health efforts said all the usual things, and then world elites got together and talked about it, and a month later they said, “No, that's all wrong. We have a whole different thing to do. Travel restrictions are good, masks are good, distancing is good.” And then the entire world did it the same way, and there was strong pressure on any deviation, even Sweden, that would dare to deviate from the global consensus.If you look about many kinds of regulation, it's very little deviation worldwide. We don't have 200, or even 100, independent policy experiments, we basically have a main global civilization that does it the same, and maybe one or two deviants that are allowed to have somewhat different behavior, but pay a price for it.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.Micro Reads▶ Economics* The Next President Inherits a Remarkable Economy - WSJ* The surprising barrier that keeps us from building the housing we need - MIT* Trump's tariffs, explained - Wapo* Watts and Bots: The Energy Implications of AI Adoption - SSRN* The Changing Nature of Technology Shocks - SSRN* AI Regulation and Entrepreneurship - SSRN▶ Business* Microsoft reports big profits amid massive AI investments - Ars* Meta's Next Llama AI Models Are Training on a GPU Cluster ‘Bigger Than Anything' Else - Wired* Apple's AI and Vision Pro Products Don't Meet Its Standards - Bberg Opinion* Uber revenues surge amid robust US consumer spending - FT* Elon Musk in funding talks with Middle East investors to value xAI at $45bn - FT▶ Policy/Politics* Researchers ‘in a state of panic' after Robert F. Kennedy Jr. says Trump will hand him health agencies - Science* Elon Musk's Criticism of ‘Woke AI' Suggests ChatGPT Could Be a Trump Administration Target - Wired* US Efforts to Contain Xi's Push for Tech Supremacy Are Faltering - Bberg* The Politics of Debt in the Era of Rising Rates - SSRN▶ AI/Digital* Alexa, where's my Star Trek Computer? - The Verge* Toyota, NTT to Invest $3.3 Billion in AI, Autonomous Driving - Bberg* Are we really ready for genuine communication with animals through AI? - NS* Alexa's New AI Brain Is Stuck in the Lab - Bberg* This AI system makes human tutors better at teaching children math - MIT* Can Machines Think Like Humans? A Behavioral Evaluation of LLM-Agents in Dictator Games - Arxiv▶ Biotech/Health* Obesity Drug Shows Promise in Easing Knee Osteoarthritis Pain - NYT* Peak Beef Could Already Be Here - Bberg Opinion▶ Clean Energy/Climate* Chinese EVs leave other carmakers with only bad options - FT Opinion* Inside a fusion energy facility - MIT* Why aren't we driving hydrogen powered cars yet? There's a reason EVs won. - Popular Science* America Can't Do Without Fracking - WSJ Opinion▶ Robotics/AVs* American Drone Startup Notches Rare Victory in Ukraine - WSJ* How Wayve's driverless cars will meet one of their biggest challenges yet - MIT▶ Space/Transportation* Mars could have lived, even without a magnetic field - Big Think▶ Up Wing/Down Wing* The new face of European illiberalism - FT* How to recover when a climate disaster destroys your city - Nature▶ Substacks/Newsletters* Thinking about "temporary hardship" - Noahpinion* Hold My Beer, California - Hyperdimensional* Robert Moses's ideas were weird and bad - Slow Boring* Trading Places? No Thanks. - The Dispatch* The Case For Small Reactors - Breakthrough Journal* The Fourth Industrial Revolution and the Future of Work - Conversable EconomistFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. 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On October 13, SpaceX and Elon Musk successfully launched their Starship rocket into low-Earth orbit. Then, in a milestone moment for space technology, they successfully captured the rocket's Super Heavy booster with “chopstick” arms on the launch tower upon reentry, marking the first time a booster was ever caught in mid-air.The achievement is a mind-blowing feat of human engineering — one that hasn't gotten nearly the recognition that it deserves. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with must-read space journalist Eric Berger about the role of SpaceX in the new, 21st-century Space Race, the significance of the company's achievements, and our potential to become a spacefaring, inter-planetary species.Berger is the senior space editor at Ars Techica, and is the author of both Liftoff: Elon Musk and the Desperate Early Days that Launched SpaceX and his most recent excellent book, Reentry: SpaceX, Elon Musk, and the Reusable Rockets that Launched a Second Space Age.In This Episode* Starship's big reentry (1:43)* Race (back) to the moon (8:54)* Why Starship? (11:48)* The Mars-shot (18:37)* Elon in the political area (22:10)* Understanding SpaceX (24:06)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationStarship's big reentry (1:43)James Pethokoukis: After the launch tower caught that booster stage of the rocket, I saw someone on Twitter a day later say, “Hey, do you guys remember over the weekend when SpaceX sent a Statue-of-Liberty-sized object to space and then caught it when it came back down? That was amazing!”So two things: First, as a space guy, what was your reaction? Two, beyond the sheer coolness of it, why was this an important thing to happen?It seemed inconceivable a few years ago, but now, all of a sudden, it's the future of rocketry, just like that.Eric Berger: Just from a space perspective, it's epic to see, to use your adjectives, the Statue of Liberty comparison. I mean, it's a small skyscraper, but they essentially launch that thing to space at thousands of miles per hour, then it slows down, it comes back right where it took off from, hovers, and it falls precisely into these two arms that are designed to catch it. The cool thing is that we'd never seen anything like that before. It seemed inconceivable a few years ago, but now, all of a sudden, it's the future of rocketry, just like that.the significance of this, of course, is SpaceX has shown that with the reusability of the Falcon 9 rocket, it can really change the economics of launch. This year they've launched 101 times. No country had ever done that many launches before in a year. They're going to launch 95 percent of all the mass into orbit this year with primarily the Falcon 9 Rocket, and all that's because the first stage is entirely reusable, they're flying them more than 20 times now, and so they're just taking that and scaling it.What was amazing about the tower catch this weekend was the fact that it really removes the need for landing legs. You may think, “Well, what's the big deal about that?” Well, there's a lot of mass involved with those landing legs: You need powerful actuators to drive them, you need hydraulic fluid, and that's a lot of dead mass in the vehicle. Also, it's not insignificant to transport the rocket from wherever it lands, either on a boat or on land, to the factory and to refurbish the rocket and launch again. Ideally, with this step, they're eliminating days from that process of reuse and ideally, in the future, they're literally going to be catching the rocket, setting it back on the launch mount and then potentially flying again.So it's not just the Starship, right? So for the other launches, is this is going to become the landing procedure?No, it will be just for Starship. They will continue to fly Falcon 9 as is. That's a mature product, everyone's pretty comfortable with that vehicle. But, look, other companies have tried different things. When Rocket Lab was trying to reuse its small Electron vehicle, its plan was to have the first stage come back under a parachute and then basically swoop in with a helicopter and catch it so that the rocket didn't fall into the ocean. That ended up not working.It seems very whimsical.Well, it made sense from an engineering standpoint, but it was a lot more difficult to snag the rocket than they ended up finding out. So, up until now, the only way to get a rocket back vertically was on a drone ship or landing straight up, and so this is a brand new thing, and it just creates more efficiencies in the launch system.What is the direction now, as far as launch costs and the continued decline of launch costs if this will be the new landing procedure for Starship?It's impossible to say that, of course. We can look to a Falcon 9 for an analog. SpaceX sales started out selling Falcon 9 for $60 million, it's upped that price to about $67 or $68 million — still the lowest-cost medium-lift launch vehicle in the world, but that's the price you or I or NASA would pay for a rocket. Internally, the estimate is that they're re-flying those vehicles for about $15 million. So, in effect, SpaceX has taken the cost of the lowest-price vehicle on the market and divided it by four, basically.Starship, of course, can lift much more payload to orbit than Falcon 9. By some measures, five to 10 times as much, eventually. And so if they can get the cost down, if they can make the first and second stage reusable, I think you're talking about them bringing the cost down potentially another order of magnitude, but they've got a lot of work to get there.I think the second most common comment I saw on social media — the first one being like, “This is amazing, I'm crying, this is so cool” — the second one is, “Why is NASA not using this Starship to get to the moon?” It seems like progress is being made quickly, and you mentioned the costs, I think people are just befuddled. It's a question you must get a lot.The reality is that if we want to go to the moon before 2030, we probably need to do it with a combination of NASA's Space Launch System rocket and Starship. It's a complicated answer, but the reality is that NASA, in conjunction with Congress, has basically, over the last quarter of a century, pivoted away from reusable launch vehicles, and at one point in the early 2000s, they were actually funding three different reusable launch vehicles. The most famous of those, of course, was the Space Shuttle. It stopped funding the Space Shuttle in 2011 and it went back to developing this large, expendable rocket called the Space Launch System. That was the tried and true pathway, and no one really had faith in what SpaceX is doing. And so now here we are, almost 15 years later, and SpaceX has gone out and proved it with the Falcon 9, the Falcon Heavy, and now Starship.The reality is that if we want to go to the moon before 2030, we probably need to do it with a combination of NASA's Space Launch System rocket and Starship. In 2021, NASA did select Starship as its lunar lander. So Starship is a critical part of the architecture. Probably the most challenging part, actually, is getting down to the lunar surface and then getting back up reliably. And so Starship plays a key role, and I just really think that it's inevitable that Starship and potentially Blue Origin's architecture will be how humans get to the moon and back, but we're kind of in an interim period right now.Is it just sort of too late to switch?Yeah, it is. It's too late to switch. You could conceive of scenarios in which humans launch in Crew Dragon, transfer over to a Starship, and then come back in Crew Dragon, but even then you've got some challenges. And the problem — problem is the wrong word, but one of the major issues with Starship is that it has no redundancy when you come back and land. It has got to nail the landing or people inside of it die. So you're going to want to see hundreds of Starship launches and many, many successful landings in a row before you put people on the vehicle. And to have the idea of launching humans from Earth to the moon at this point, we're pretty far from that. I would think a decade from now, at least, and by then China will be on the moon. And so it's really a matter of, do you want to sort of continue to delay the human return of the moon, or do you want to take the tools that you have now and make your best run for it?Race (back) to the moon (8:54)Since you brought it up, are we going to beat China to the moon with the SLS?Very much an open question. The SLS Rocket is basically ready. In its current form, it performed very well during Artemis I. It's obviously super expensive. You may have seen the Europa Clipper launch on Monday of this week, that launched on a Falcon Heavy. For almost a decade, Congress mandated NASA that it launched on the SLS rocket, and that would've cost 10 times as much. NASA paid about $200 million for the Clipper launch on Falcon Heavy, SLS would've been in excess of $2 billion, so it's a very expensive rocket, but it does work, it worked well during Artemis I. The best way we have right now, Jim, to get astronauts from Earth out to lunar orbit is SLS and the Orion deep spacecraft vehicle. That will change over time, but I think if we want to put humans on the moon this decade, that's probably the best way to do it.Is it going to be a close call? I don't want to overemphasize the competition aspect, but I guess I would like to see America do it first.It's going to be close. NASA's current date is 2026 for the Artemis III moon landing. There's no way that happens. I think 2028 is a realistic no-earlier-than date, and the reality is SpaceX has to make a lot of progress on Starship. What they did this past weekend was a great step. I think the key thing about the fact of this weekend's launch is that it was a success. There were no anomalies, there's going to be no investigation, so SpaceX is going to launch again. As long as they continue to have success, then they can start popping these off and get to some of the really key tests like the in-space propellant transfer tests, which they hope to do sometime next year.[W]hen you're on the moon, there's no launch tower, there's no launch crew, you've just got the astronauts inside Starship, and if that vehicle doesn't take off on the moon, the crew's going to die. So it's got to work.What Starship will do is it'll launch into low-earth orbit, and then it'll be refueled, and it'll go to the moon, and you need lots of launches to refuel it. And then really the key test, I think, is landing on the moon, because the South Pole is pretty craterous, you've got to have high confidence in where you land, and then the big challenge is getting back up to lunar orbit safely.Think about it: When you watch any rocket launch, you see this very detailed, very intricate launch tower with all these umbilicals, and all of these cables, and power, and telemetry, and stuff, and humans are looking at all this data, and if there's any problem, they abort, right? Well, when you're on the moon, there's no launch tower, there's no launch crew, you've just got the astronauts inside Starship, and if that vehicle doesn't take off on the moon, the crew's going to die. So it's got to work. And so that's really a big part of the challenge, as well, is getting all that to work. So I think 2028, for all that to come together, is a realistic no-earlier-than date, and China's pretty consistently said 2030, and they're starting to show off some hardware, they recently demonstrated that suggests they have a chance to make 2030.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedWhy Starship? (11:48)What is the commercial case for Starship, assuming that these next launches continue to go off well? What is it supposed to be doing here on Earth and in Earth orbit?The next big race is to deliver internet, not to a dish that you set up, but actually to your mobile phone. It's called direct-to-cell, and you need much bigger satellites for this. And so SpaceX needs the Starship to launch these satellites, so that will really be the commercial use case for Starship in the near term.Its primary function, and I think the most important function for SpaceX in the near term, is launching these much larger Starlink satellites. I think it's been pretty well proven that there's a large demand for broadband internet from low-earth orbit. Starlink has now up to four million customers and they're actually signing almost at an exponential rate. Then growth, the business is profitable. So that's been super impressive. The next big race is to deliver internet, not to a dish that you set up, but actually to your mobile phone. It's called direct-to-cell, and you need much bigger satellites for this. So SpaceX needs the Starship to launch these satellites, so that will really be the commercial use case for Starship in the near term.I think once the vehicle starts flying reliably, we're going to see where the commercial customers go because we've never really been in a launch environment where you're not really constrained by mass and, more importantly, by volume. You can just build bigger, less-efficient things. Instead of hyper-managing your satellite to be small, and light, and compact, you can kind of make trades where maybe you have a lower-cost vehicle that's bigger. The capability of Starship with its voluminous payload fairing and being able to lift a hundred or more tons to low-earth orbit for low cost — entirely new regime. And so I think it's a case of Field of Dreams, “If you build it, they will come,” and in the near term, Starship will be the business case, and longer-term we'll see some unique opportunities.You've been covering this for quite a while, documenting, books, including your most recent book. Really an amazing ride as a space journalist for you here.I've been covering space now for two decades, and really with a focus on commercial space over the last decade because I think that's where a lot of the excitement and innovation is coming from. But the reality is that you've got this whole ecosystem of companies, but the 800-pound gorilla is SpaceX. They're the company that has consistently had success. They are the only provider of crew transportation services for NASA, still, even five years after their initial success, and they're the only provider right now that's launching cargo missions to the space station. They've got huge Starlink satellites, constellation. As a journalist, you really want to understand the biggest, most dominating force in the industry, and that's clearly SpaceX, and so that's why I've chosen to dedicate a lot of time to really understand where they started out and how they got to where they are, which is at the top of the heap.The story that you lay out in your book, which came out last month — Reentry: SpaceX, Elon Musk, and the Reusable Rockets that Launched a Second Space Age — to me, it's still a story people mostly don't know, and one that I think a lot of non-space reporters don't understand. What are some common misunderstandings that you come across that make you feel like you need to tell this story?I think, until recently, one of the things that people might say about SpaceX is, “Well, what's the big deal? NASA's launched humans to orbit in the past, NASA's launched cargo, they had a reusable space vehicle in the Space Shuttle.” What's different is that SpaceX is doing this at scale, and they're building for a long-term plan that is sustainable.I'll give you an example: The Space Shuttle was reusable. Everything was reusable except the external tank. However, you needed a standing army of thousands of people to pour over the Space Shuttle after it came back from space to make sure that all of its tiles and every piece of equipment was safe. Now, when it was originally sold to Congress back in the 1970s, the program manager for the space shuttle, George Mueller said that the goal was to get the cost of payload-to-orbit for the Space Shuttle down to $25 a pound, which sounded great because then they were saying dozens of people could fly on the vehicle at a time. Well, of course, at the end of the day, it only ever flew at a maximum of seven people, and the cost of payload-to-orbit was $25,000. So yes, it was reusable, but it was the kind of thing that was super expensive and you couldn't fly very often. You could do limited things.It's really the first vehicle we ever developed to go to Mars. SpaceX is doing some of the same things that NASA did, but it's doing them better, faster, and a lot cheaper.SpaceX is proposing kind of an order-of-magnitude change. We went to the moon in the 1960s with the Lunar Module, and everyone remembers it carried two astronauts down to the lunar surface. And that whole thing launched on a giant stack, the Saturn V rocket. So if you were to take the Lunar Module and replace the astronauts and just use it to deliver cargo to the moon, it could take five tons down to the lunar surface. Starship, in a reusable mode, can take a hundred tons. If you send an expendable version of Starship, it's 200 tons. And oh, by the way, even if you're not bringing that Starship back, you're getting the whole first stage back anyway.And so that's really the promise here, is you're building a sustainable system in space where it doesn't cost you $6 billion to go to the moon, it costs you half a billion dollars or to go to the moon, and you can then go on and do other things, you can fill your Starship up with methane repellent and go further. It's really the first vehicle we ever developed to go to Mars. SpaceX is doing some of the same things that NASA did, but it's doing them better, faster, and a lot cheaper.That $25-a-pound number you gave for Space Shuttle, where are we with SpaceX? Where is SpaceX, or where are they and what's their goal in that context?They're getting down in a couple of thousand dollars a pound with a Falcon 9, and the idea is, potentially, with Starship, you get down to hundreds of dollars a pound or less. They have a big challenge too, right? They're using tiles on Starship as well. They showed some of them off during the webcast this weekend, and I think we have yet to have any kind of information on how reusable, or how rapidly reusable Starship will be, and we'll have to see.The Mars-shot (18:37)To the extent the public understands this company — this is my understanding — the point here is to build Starship, to further this satellite business, and then that satellite business will fund the eventual Mars mission and the Mars colonization. I think that's the public perception of what is happening with this business. How accurate is that? Is that how you look at it? I mean, that's how I look at it from my uninformed or less-informed view, but is that really what we're talking about here?Yeah, fundamentally, I think that is accurate. There is no business case right now to go to Mars. AT&T is not going to pay $5 billion to put an AT&T logo on a Starship and send a crew to Mars. There are no resources right now that we really can conceive of on Mars that would be profitable for humans to go get and bring back to Earth. So then the question is: How do you pay for it?Financially, the business case for Mars is not entirely clear, so you've got to figure out some way to pay for it. That was one reason why Elon Musk ultimately went with Starlink. That would pay for the Mars vision.Even when settlers went to the New World in the 1500s, 1600s, in United States, they were exporting tobacco and other products back to Europe, and there's no tobacco that we know of on Mars, right? Financially, the business case for Mars is not entirely clear, so you've got to figure out some way to pay for it. That was one reason why Elon Musk ultimately went with Starlink. That would pay for the Mars vision.I think that's still fundamentally the case. It's effectively going to be paying for the entire development of Starship, and then if it becomes highly profitable, SpaceX is not a public company, so they can take those revenues and do whatever they want with them, and Elon has said again and again that his vision is to settle Mars, and he's building the rockets to do it, and he's trying to find the funding through Starlink to accomplish it. That is the vision. We don't know how it's all going to play out, but I think you're fundamentally correct with that.I think when he mentions Mars, there are some people that just give it a roll of the eye. It just sounds too science fictional, despite the progress being made toward accomplishing that. It sounds like you do not roll your eyes at that.Well, it's interesting. He first really talked publicly about this in 2016, eight years ago, back when there was no Starship, back when they just were coming off their second Falcon 9 failure in about a year, and you kind of did roll your eyes at it then . . . And then they got the Falcon 9 flying and they started re-flying it and re-flying it. They did Falcon Heavy, and then they started building Starship hardware, and then they started launching Starship, and now they're starting to land Starship, and this is real hardware.And yes, to be clear, they have a long, long way to go and a lot of technical challenges to overcome, and you need more than just a rocket in a spaceship to get to Mars, you need a lot of other stuff, too: biological, regulatory, there's a lot of work to go, but they are putting down the railroad tracks that will eventually open that up to settlement.So I would not roll my eyes. This is certainly the only credible chance, I think, for humans to go to Mars in our lifetimes, and if those early missions are successful, you could envision settlements being built there.Elon in the political arena (22:10)Given SpaceX's accomplishments and their lead, is that company politics-proof? Obviously there's always going to be controversy about Elon, and Twitter, and who he gives money to, and things he says, but does any of that really matter for SpaceX?I think it does. We've already seen a couple examples of it, especially with Elon's very public entree into presidential politics over the last several months. I think that does matter. In his fight with Brazil over what he termed as free speech, they were confiscating Starlink, and so they were trying to shut Starlink down in their country, and that directly affects SpaceX. In California, over the last week we have seen a commission vote to try to limit the number of launches Falcon 9 launches from Vandenberg Space Force Base, and they clearly did that because they were uncomfortable with Elon's behavior publicly. So yeah, this is going to bleed over.Now, in the near term, there will be limited impacts because the US Department of Defense clearly needs SpaceX rockets. They need SpaceX's Starlink, they use a branded version of it called Starshield for military communications. The launch and Starlink capabilities are essential for the military. NASA is even more reliant on SpaceX for the International Space Station and beyond; the entire moon program runs through Starship, so it's not going to change in the near term, but longer term you could see this having impacts, and it's not clear to me exactly what those would be — I don't think you could really nationalize SpaceX, and I think if you did try to nationalize SpaceX, you would sort of destroy its magic, but I do think there will ultimately be consequences for the Elon's political activity.Understanding SpaceX (24:06)About Reentry, is there a particular story in there that you think just really encapsulates, if you want to understand SpaceX, and what it's doing, and where it's come from, this story kind of gets at it?The point of the book was to tell the story behind the story. A lot of people knew, generally, what SpaceX has accomplished over the last decade, or the last 15 years, but this really takes you behind the scenes and tells the stories of the people who actually did it.It's a company that's moving so fast forward that, like I said, there are all these challenges they're facing and they're just tackling them one-by-one as they go along.I think one of the best stories of the book is just how they were making this up as they went along. The very first time they were going to try to land on the barge was in January of 2015, the drone ship landing, and the night before that barge was going to set out to sea, the guy who had developed the barge realized that, wait a minute, if we come back with a rocket this week, we have nowhere to put it in the port of Jacksonville, because they were staging out of Jacksonville at the time. And there had been this whole discussion at SpaceX about where to put these pedestals, but no one had actually done it. That night, he and another engineer stayed up all night drinking red wine and CADing out designs for the pedestals, and they met the concrete pores the next morning and just built these pedestals within 24 hours. It's a company that's moving so fast forward that, like I said, there are all these challenges they're facing and they're just tackling them one-by-one as they go along.Elon has spoken about there's sort of this window of opportunity open for space. In the United States, at least, it was open and then it kind of closed. We stopped leaving Earth orbit for a while, we couldn't even get our people into Earth orbit; we had to use another country's rockets.Is this window — whether for space commerce, space exploration — is it sort of permanently open? Are we beyond the point where things can close — because satellites are so important, and because of geopolitics, that window is open and it's staying open for us to go through.I think he's talking about the window for settlement of Mars and making humans a multi-planetary species. And when he talks about the window closing, I think he means a lot of different things: One, the era of cheaper money could end — and that clearly did happen, right? We've seen interest rates go way up and it's been much more difficult to raise money, although SpaceX has been able to still do that because of their success. I think he's thinking about his own mortality. I believe he's thinking about a major global war that would focus all of our technological efforts here on planet Earth trying to destroy one another. I think he's thinking about nuclear weapons — just all the things that could bring human progress to a screeching halt, and he's saying, “Look, the window may be 100 years or it may be 20 years.” So he's like, “We should seize the opportunity right now when we have it.”Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. 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Eli Dourado is on a mission to end the Great Stagnation, that half-century period of economic and technological disappointment that began in the 1970s (what I refer to in my 2023 book, The Conservative Futurist, as the Great Downshift). If we want to turn the page on this chapter of slow progress and deserved skepticism, we're going to have to accept some creative destruction.Dourado believes that the courage to embrace major change is key to meeting our potential. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Dourado about the future of the US job market and energy production in a world of AI.Dourado is chief economist at the Abundance Institute, and author of his own Substack newsletter.In This Episode* The dawn of a productivity boom? (1:26)* Growing pains of job market disruption (7:26)* The politics of productivity growth (15:20)* The future of clean energy (23:35)* The road to a breakthrough (30:25)* Reforming NEPA (35:19)* The state of pro-abundance (37:08)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationThe dawn of a productivity boom? (1:26)Pethokoukis:  Eli, welcome to the podcast.Dourado: Thanks for having me on, Jim.I would like to think that what we are experiencing here in the 2020s is the beginnings of an extended productivity boom. We have some good economic data over the past year and a half. I know this is something that you care about, as I do . . . What's your best guess?I think the seeds of a boom are there. There's plenty of low-hanging fruit, but I'd say the last few quarters have not been that great for TFP growth, which is what I followed most closely. So we actually peaked in TFP in the US in Q4, 2021.Now what is that, what is TFP?Total factor productivity. So that's like if you look at inputs and how they translate into outputs.Capital, labor . . .Capital and labor, adjusting for quality, ideally. We've gotten less output for the amount of inputs in the last quarter than we did at the end of 2021. So slight negative growth over the last three years or so, but I think that you're right that there is room for optimism. Self-driving cars are coming. AI has immense potential.My worry with AI is other sociopolitical limits in the economy will hold us back, and you kind of see the news breaking today as we're recording this, is there's a strike at the ports on east coast, and what's at issue there is are we allowed to automate those jobs? Are the owners of the ports allowed to automate those jobs? And if the answer ends up being “no,” then you can say goodbye to productivity gains there. And so I really think the technology is there to do a lot more to kick off a productivity boom, but it's the sociopolitical factors that are slowing us down.And I definitely want to talk about those sociopolitical factors, and the port strike is hopefully not a harbinger. But before I leave this topic, I suppose the super bullish case for productivity is that AI will be so transformative, and so transformative throughout the economy, both automating some things, helping us do other things more efficiently, and creating brand new high-productivity things for us to do that we will have maybe an extended 1990s, maybe more, I might hope?What is your bullish case, and does that bullish case require what they call artificial general intelligence, or human-level, or human-level plus intelligence? Is that key? Because obviously some people are talking about that.Can we have an important productivity boom from AI without actually reaching that kind of science-fictional technology?I don't actually think that you need one-to-one replacement for humans, but you do need to get humans out of the loop in many, many more places. So if you think about the Baumol effect, the idea here is if there are parts of the economy that are unevenly growing in productivity, then that means that the parts of the economy where there is slow productivity growth, perhaps because you have human labor still being the bottleneck, those parts are going to end up being massive shares of the economy. They're going to be the healthcares, the educations, the parts of the economy where we have lots of inflation and increased costs. So the real boom here, to me, is can you replace as many humans as possible? Over the short run, you want to destroy jobs so that you can create a booming economy in which the jobs are still available, but living standards are much higher.If you think about these big chunks of GDP like health, housing, energy, transportation, that's what you need to revolutionize, and so I can think of lots of ways in health that we could use AI to increase productivity. And I also have very little doubt that even current levels of AI could massively increase productivity in health. I think the big question is whether we will be allowed to do it.So you don't need AGI that is as good as a human in every single thing that a human might do to limit the number of humans that are involved in providing healthcare. Housing, I think there's construction robots that maybe could do it, but I think the main limits are, like land use regulation, more sociopolitical. In energy, it's kind of the same thing, NIMBYism is kind of the biggest thing. Maybe there's an R&D component that AI could contribute to. And then in transportation, again, we could automate a lot of transportation. Some of that's happening with autonomous cars, but we are having trouble automating our ports, for example, we're having trouble automating cargo railroads for similar make-work reasons.I think the bull case is you don't need AGI, really, really sophisticated AI that can do everything, but you do need to be able to swap out human workers for even simpler AI functions.I don't actually think that you need one-to-one replacement for humans, but you do need to get humans out of the loop in many, many more places.Growing pains of job market disruption (7:26)I'm sure that some people are hearing you talk about swapping out human workers, replacing human workers. They're thinking, this is a world of vast technologically-driven unemployment; that is what you are describing. Is that what you're describing?Not at all. If we had the kind of productivity boom we're talking about, the economy would be so incredibly hot, and you need that hot market. People have all kinds of fantasies about how good AI could get. Can it substitute for a human in every single thing? And I'm not even positing that. I'm saying if we could just get it good enough to substitute in some things, the economy's going to be booming, it's going to be hot, there will still be things that humans can do that AIs can't. There's lots of things that maybe we want a human to do, even if the AI can do it, and we will be able to afford that a lot better.I think that the world I'm thinking about is one where living standards are way higher for everybody — and higher levels of equality, even. If you have the sort of uneven productivity gains that we've had for the last several decades, where tech does really well, but every other part of the economy does badly, well, that drives a lot of regional inequality, that drives a lot of different kinds of demographic inequality, and if we had broad-base productivity growth, that means better living standards for everybody, and I think that's what we should aim for.When I talk about what you've been referring to as these sociopolitical factors or how we might slow down progress, slow down automation, the whimsical example I use is there being a law saying that yes, you can have kiosks in every McDonald's, but you have to have an employee standing next to the kiosk to actually punch the buttons.As you mentioned with this port worker strike, we don't need my scenario. That is kind of what's happening on these ports, where there could be a lot more automation, but because of both unions and our acquiescence to these unions, we don't have the kind of automation — forget about sci-fi — that doesn't exist in other places in the world. And I wonder if that doesn't sort of encapsulate, at least in this country, the challenge: Can we get our heads around the idea that it's okay in the long run, that there will be some downsides, and some people might be worse off, and we need to take care of those people, but that's the disruption we need to tolerate to move forward?You can't have a growing economy where there's no churn, where there's no displacement, where it's complete, where there's no dynamism. You need to be able to accept some level of change. I sympathize with people whose jobs get destroyed by automation. It is hard, but it's much less hard if the economy is super hot because we've been prioritizing productivity growth, and if that were the case, I think we'd find new jobs for those people very quickly. The process is not automatic, but it's much slower when you have low productivity growth and a stagnant economy than it is when you have high productivity growth and a booming economy.The question I always get is, what about the 60-year-old guy? What's he going to do? And I'm not sure I have a much better answer. Maybe there's other jobs, but it's tough to transition, so maybe the answer there is you cut him a check, you cut that 60-year-old a check, and if you have a high-productivity economy, you have the resources for that to be an option.Right! So that's the other thing is that we can afford to be generous with people if we have a really rapidly growing economy. It's that we don't have the resources if we're stagnating, if we're already overextended fiscally, that's a terrible position to be in because you can't actually afford to be generous. And if there are people that truly, like you said, maybe they're very old and it doesn't make sense to retrain, or something like that, they're near retirement, yeah, absolutely, we can afford that much better when GDP is much higher.Where do you think, as a nation, our head is at as far as embracing or not being fearful of disruption from technological change? If I only looked at where our head was at with trade, I would be very, very worried about entering a period of significant technological disruption, and I would assume that we will see lots and lots of pushback if AI, for instance, is the kind of important, transformative, general purpose technology that I hope it is.Again, if I look at trade, I think, “Boy, there's going to be a lot of pushback.” Then again, when I think about risk broadly, and maybe it's not quite the same thing, I think, “Well, then again, we seem to be more embracing of nuclear energy, which shows maybe — it's not the same thing, but it shows a greater risk tolerance.” And I'm always thinking, what's our societal risk tolerance? Where do you think we're at right now?I think most people, most Americans, don't actually think in those terms. I think most Americans just think about, “How are things going for me?” They kind of evaluate their own life, and if their communities, or whatever, have been struggling due to trade stuff, or something like that, they'll be against it. So I think the people who think in these more high-level terms, it's like societal elites, and I think normal people who have just lived under 50 years of stagnation, they're kind of distrustful of the elites right now: “I don't pay attention to policy that closely, and my life is bad, at least in some dimensions is not as good as I wanted it to be, it's hasn't had the increase that my parents' generation had,” or something like that. And they're very distrustful of elites, and they're very mad, and you see this nihilistic populism popping up.You see kind of a diverse array of responses to this nihilistic populism. Some people might say, “Well yeah, elites really have messed up and we need to do what the common people want.” And then the other people are like, “No, we can't do that. We need to stay the course.” But I think that there's a hybrid response, where it's like, the elites really have done bad, but we don't just want to do what the populists want, we want to just have better elite-led policies, which include things like, we have to take productivity growth seriously, we can't just paper over a lot of the tensions and the conflicts that arise from that, we need to embrace them head-on and do everything we can to produce an economy that is productive, that works for everybody, but maybe not in the way that the populists think it will work.You can't have a growing economy where there's no churn, where there's no displacement, where it's complete, where there's no dynamism. You need to be able to accept some level of change.The politics of productivity growth (15:20)I would love to see what American politics looks like if the rest of this decade we saw the kind of economic productivity and wage growth that we saw in the fat part of the 1990s. We act like the current environment, that's our reality, and that's our reality as far as the eye can see, but I'll tell you, in the early '90s, there was a lot of gloom and doom about the economy, about productivity, how fast we could grow, the rise and fall of great powers, and America was overstretched, and after really three or four years of strong growth, it's like America Triumphant. And I'm wondering if that would be the politics of 2030 if we were able to generate that kind of boom.Yeah, I think that's totally right. And if you look at total factor productivity, which is my KPI [key performance indicator] or whatever, if you look at 1995 to 2005, you were back to almost two percent growth, which is what we had from 1920 to 1973. So you had a slow period from 1973 to 1995, and an even slower period since 2005, and you get back to that two percent. That's the magic number. I think if we had TFP at two percent, that changes everything. That's a game-changer for politics, for civility, for social stability, we'd really be going places if we had that.I was mentioning our reaction to trade and nuclear power. The obvious one, which I should have mentioned, is how we are reacting to AI right now. I think it's a good sign that Congress has not produced some sort of mega regulation bill, that this recent bill in California was not signed by Governor Newsom. Congress has spent time meeting with technologists and economists trying to learn something about AI, both the benefits and risks.And I think the fact that it seems like, even though there was this rush at some point where we needed to have a pause, we needed to quickly regulate it, that seems to have slowed down, and I think that's a good sign that perhaps we're able to hit a good balance here between wanting to embrace the upside and not utterly panicking that we're producing the Terminator.Absolutely. I think AI is something where the benefits are very clear, we're starting to see them already. The harms are extremely hypothetical, it's not evidence-based, it's really a lot of sci-fi scenarios. I think the right attitude in that kind of world is to let things ride for a while. If there are harms that arise, we can address them in narrowly tailored ways.I think government is sometimes criticized for being reactive, but reactive is the right approach for a lot of issues. You don't want to slow things down preemptively. You want to react to real facts on the ground. And if we need to react quickly, okay, we'll react quickly, but in a narrowly tailored way that addresses real harms, not just hypothetical stuff.I love what you're saying there about reaction. I'm a big preparer. I love preparation. If I'm going to go anywhere, I over-prepare for all eventualities, I will bring a messenger bag so if the world should end while I'm out, I'll be okay. I love to prepare. But one lesson I draw from the pandemic is that only gets you so far, preparation, because before the pandemic, there were a gazillion white papers about the possibility of a pandemic, all kinds of plans as a culture, we were sort of marinating in pandemic apocalypse films, maybe about turning us into zombies rather than giving us a disease.And then when we finally have a pandemic, it's like, “Where's the respirators? Where's this, where's that? We didn't have enough of this.” And so, while I'm sure preparation is great, what really helped us is we reacted. We reacted in real time because we're a rich country, we're a technologically advanced country, and we came up with a technological fix in a vaccine. To me — and again, I'm not sure how this is you meant it — but the power of being able to react effectively, boy, that's a pretty good capability of a well-functioning country.Yeah, and a slight difference between the pandemic and AI is it was not the first pandemic. AI is just such a unique set of theorized risks that people are like, nothing like this has ever happened before. This is like the introduction of a brand new super-intelligent species to the planet. This is the first time two intelligent species — if you want to count humans as an intelligent species — two intelligent species will the planet at the same time. And the theorization here is just so far out of the spectrum of our experience that it is hard to even see how you could prepare if those risk materialize. The only intelligent thing that is likely to do any good is to have our eyes open, and let's see what the harms are as they materialize.The problem with coming up with remedies for theorized harms is that the remedies never go away once they're implemented. Safety regulation never gets laxer over time. And so if you're implementing safety regulations because of real safety problems, okay, fair play, to some extent. I think in some dimensions we're too safe, but it kind of makes sense. But if you're doing it to just theorized harms that have never materialized, I think that's a big mistake.And you've written about this fairly recently. To me, there's a good kind of complexity with an economy that you have a high-functioning economy where people can connect, and colleges and universities, and businesses, and entrepreneurs, these networks work together to produce computer chips or large language models. That's a good kind of complexity.But then there's the other kind of complexity, in which you just have layer after layer of bureaucracy, and programs meant to solve a problem that was a problem 20 years ago and is no longer a problem, and that kind of complexity, that's not the kind we want, right?Yeah, I think you want the sophistication in the economy, but in a way that works for everybody. There have to be benefits to it. If you increase the burden of complexity without producing any net benefits, then people start to rebel against it, they start to be indifferent to or apathetic about the health of society. And there's an anthropologist, Joseph Tainter, who wrote this book, The Collapse of Complex Societies, and his theory is that once you have complexity without the marginal benefits of complexity, you're in for a shock, at some point, when people start becoming apathetic or hostile to the current order. And the complexity grows and shrinks as a system, you can't ever just control like, “Oh, let's do more, or let's do one percent less complexity.” Once people start to rebel against it, it snowballs and you could end up with a very bad situation.The problem with coming up with remedies for theorized harms is that the remedies never go away once they're implemented. Safety regulation never gets laxer over time.The future of clean energy (23:35)Nuclear versus solar versus geothermal: What do you like there?Solar panels have massively come down in cost, and we're not that far away from — in sort of number of doublings of deployment, and sort of long-deployment space — we're not that far away from the cost being so low that . . . you could almost round the panels cost to free. It almost makes sense. And the problem is, if you look at the solar electricity costs on utility-scale farms, they have not really moved in the last few years. And I think this is in large part because we're designing the solar farms wrong, we're not designing them for the era of cheap panels, we're designing them, still, to track the sun, and complex mechanisms, and too much space between the panels, and too much mowing required, and all that. So as we adapt to the new paradigm of very, very cheap panels, I think that you'll get lower solar costs.I think the other thing that is obviously complimentary to all of these sources actually is battery innovation. I'm very excited about one particular new cathode chemistry that maybe could drive the cost way, way down for lithium ion batteries. And so you're in a world where solar and batteries is potentially very, very cheap. And so for nuclear and geothermal, they have some advantages over solar.If batteries get cheap, the advantage of not the firmness . . . I think people think that the advantage of these sources versus solar is just that solar is variable and the other sources are constant, but that's less of an advantage if batteries are cheap, and I think you also want batteries to be able to respond to the fluctuations in demand. If we had an entirely nuclear-powered economy, the nuclear plants actually want to run at constant speed. You don't want to ramp them up and down very quickly, but demand fluctuates. And so you still want batteries to be a buffer there and be the lowest-cost way to balance the network.So the things that nuclear and geothermal can really compete on is land density — even gigawatt-scale nuclear where you have these giant exclusion zones and tons of land around them and so on, they're still more dense per acre than solar, and geothermal is maybe even denser because you don't need that exclusion zone, and so they could be much, much better in terms of density.There's an advantage — if you want a lot of power in a city, you probably want that to be supplied by nuclear. If you're more rural, you could do solar. Another possibility is portability. So there's future versions of nuclear that are more mobile. People have talked about space-based nuclear for being able to go to Mars or something like that, you want thermonuclear propulsion and you can't do that with solar. Or powering submarines and stuff. So I think there's always a place for nuclear.And then the other advantage for both nuclear and geothermal is if you don't need to produce electricity. So if you're producing just the heat — it turns out a big part of the cost of any sort of thermal source is converting it to electricity. You have to have these giant steam turbines that are very capital intensive. And so, if you just need heat, say up to 600 degrees C heat for nuclear and maybe 400 degrees C heat for deep geothermal, those are really good sources for doing that, and maybe if we had continued advances in drilling technology for geothermal or if we could figure out the regulatory stuff for nuclear, I think you could have very cheap industrial thermal energy from either of those sources.Nuclear and geothermal are competing against a backdrop where we'll probably have pretty cheap solar, but there's still some advantages and these sources still have some utility and we should get good at both of them.What do you think that energy mix looks like in 25 years, the electrical generation mix for this country?It would be surprising if it wasn't a lot of solar. My friend Casey Handmer thinks it's going to be 90-plus percent solar, and I think that's a little crazy.Do you happen to know what the percent is now?Oh, I don't know. It's probably like three or four or something like that, off the top of my head, maybe less. The other question is, what's the base? I think a lot of people just want to replace the energy we have now with clean energy, and much more we need to be thinking about growing the energy supply. And so I think there's a question of how much solar we could deploy, but then also how much other stuff are we deploying? Let's do a lot of everything. You do have to drive the cost of some of these sources down a bit for it to make sense, but I think we can.And then the real gains happen when maybe some of these . . . what if you could do some sort of conversion without steam turbines? What if you had ways to convert the thermal energy to electricity without running a steam cycle, which is hundreds-of-year-old technology? EssentiallyYou're just finding a new way to heat it up.Yeah, so you look at why has solar come down so much? It's because it's solid-state, easy to manufacture, any manufacturing process improvements just move forward to all future solar panels. If we had thermoelectric generators or other ways of converting the heat to electricity, that could be really great, and then there's other kinds of nuclear that are like solid-state conversion, like alpha voltaics and things like that. So you could have a box with cobalt 60 in it that's decaying and producing particles that you're converting to electricity, and that would be solid state. It's sometimes called a “nuclear battery,” it's not really a battery, but that would be a way to power cars maybe with something like that. That would be awesome.Nuclear and geothermal are competing against a backdrop where we'll probably have pretty cheap solar, but there's still some advantages and these sources still have some utility and we should get good at both of them.The road to a breakthrough (30:25)When, if ever, this century, do you think we get AGI, and when, if ever, this century, do you think we get a commercial fusion reactor?AGI, I'm still not really a 100 percent clear on how it's defined. I think that AI will get increasingly more capable, and I think that's an exciting future. Do we even need to emulate every part of the human brain in silicon? I don't think so. Do we need it to have emotions? Do we need it to have its own independent drive? We definitely don't need it to be a perfect replica of a human brain in terms of every capability, but I think it will get more capable over time. I think there's going to be a lot of hidden ways in which AGI, or powerful AI, or highly capable AI is going to happen slower than we think.I think my base reasoning behind this is, if you look at neurons versus transistors, neurons are about a million times more energy efficient. So six orders of magnitude is kind of what we have to traverse to get something that is equally capable. And maybe there's some tricks or whatever that you can do that means you don't have to be equally capable on an energy basis, but you still need to get four orders of magnitude better. And then the other thing about it is that, if you look at current margins that people are working on, things like the ChatGPT o1 model, it's a lot slower, it does a lot of token generation behind the scenes to get the answer, and I think that that's the kind of stuff that could maybe drive progress.Let's say we have a world where you ask an AI for a cure for cancer, and you run it on a big data center, and it runs for six months or a year, and then it spits out the answer, here's the cure for cancer, that's still a world where we have very, very powerful AI, but it's slow and consumes a lot of resources, but still ultimately worth it. I think that might be where we're headed, in a way, is that kind of setup. And so is that AGI? Kind of. It's not operating the same way as humans are. So this is different.You're not going to fall in love with it. It's nothing like that.I'm pretty uncertain about AGI: A) what it means, but what does it even look like in the end?Fusion, I'll give you a hot take here, which is, I think there will be net energy gain fusion developed in this decade. I think that someone will have it. I think that probably the first people to get it will be doing it in a completely uneconomical way that will never work economically. Most of the people that are working on fusion are working on DT fusion, which is another one of these sources that basically produces heat, and then you use a steam turbine, and then that produces electricity. I think that the steam turbine is just a killer in terms of the added costs.So all these sources are basically fancy ways of boiling water and then running a steam turbine. So what you want to look at is: What is the cheapest way to boil water? With fission, you just hold two magic rocks together and they boil water. With geothermal, you drill a hole in the ground and send water down there and it boils. With these DT fusion reactors, you build the most complex machine mankind has ever seen, and you use that to boil water — that's not going to be as cheap as fission should be. So I think that we'll struggle to compete with fission if we can ever get our act together.There's other kinds of fusion called aneutronic fusion. That's harder to do. I think it's still possible, maybe this decade, that someone will crack it, but that's harder to do. But the nice thing about that is that you can harvest electricity from those plasmas without a steam turbine. So if it's going to be economical fusion, I think it's plausible by 2030 somebody could crack it, but it would be that aneutronic version, and it is just technically a bit harder. You'll see some reports in a couple of years, like, “Oh, these people, they got net energy out of a fusion reactor.” It's like, okay, it's a scientific breakthrough, but look for the cost. Is it going to be competitive with these other sources?Do we even need to emulate every part of the human brain in silicon? I don't think so . . . We definitely don't need it to be a perfect replica of a human brain in terms of every capability, but I think it will get more capable over time.Reforming NEPA (35:19)Do you think we've sort of got a handle, and we've begun to wrangle the National Environmental Policy Act [NEPA] to the ground? Where are we on reforming it so that it is not the kind of obstacle to progress that you've written so much about and been a real leader on?My base scenario is we're going to get reforms on it every two years. So we had some a year and a half ago with the Fiscal Responsibility Act, I think we were possibly going to get some in the lame duck session this year in Congress. None of these reforms are going to go far enough, is the bottom line. I think that the problem isn't going to go away, and so the pressure is going to continue to be there, and we're just going to keep having reforms every two years.And a lot of this is driven by the climate movement. So say what you will about the climate movement, they're the only mainstream movement in America right now that's not complacent, and they're going to keep pushing for, we've got to do something that lets us build. If we want to transform American industry, that means we've got to build, and NEPA gets in the way of building, so it's going to have to go.So I think my baseline case is we get some reforms this year in the lame duck, probably again two years later, probably again two years later, and then maybe like 2030, people have kind of had enough and they just say, “Oh, let's just repeal this thing. We keep trying to reform it, it doesn't work.” And I think you could repeal NEPA and the environment would be fine. I am pro-environment, but you don't need NEPA to protect the environment. I think it's just a matter of coming to terms with, this is a bad law and probably shouldn't exist.I am pro-environment, but you don't need NEPA to protect the environment. I think it's just a matter of coming to terms with, this is a bad law and probably shouldn't exist.The state of pro-abundance (37:08)What is the state of, broadly, a pro-abundance worldview? What is the state of that worldview in both parties right now?I think there's a growing, but very small, part of each party that is thinking in these terms, and I think the vision is not really concrete yet. I think they don't actually know what they're trying to achieve, but they kind of understand that it's something in this general direction that we've been talking about. My hope is that, obviously, the faction in both parties that is thinking this way grows, but then it also develops a little bit more of a concrete understanding of the future that we're trying to build, because I think without that more-concrete vision, you're not actually necessarily tackling the right obstacles, and you need to know where you're trying to go for you to be able to figure out what the obstacles are and what the problems you need to address are.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. 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Some signs of tech progress are obvious: the moon landing, the internet, the smartphone, and now generative AI. For most of us who live in rich countries, improvements to our day-to-day lives seem to come gradually. We might (might), then, forgive some of those who claim that our society has not progressed, that our lives have not improved, and that a tech-optimist outlook is even naïve.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with economist Noah Smith about pushing the limits in areas like energy technology, how geopolitical threats spur innovation, and why a more fragmented industrial policy might actually be an advantage.Smith is the author of the popular Noahpinion Substack. He was previously an assistant finance professor at Stony Brook University and an economics columnist for Bloomberg Opinion.In This Episode* Recognizing progress (1:43)* Redrawing the boundaries of energy tech (12:39)* Racing China in research (15:59)* Recalling Japanese economic history (20:32)* Regulating AI well (23:49)* Rethinking growth strategy in the EU (26:46)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationRecognizing progress (1:43)Pethokoukis: Noah, welcome to the podcast.Smith: Great to be here!Not to talk about other podcast guests, but I will very briefly — Last year I did one with Marc Andreessen and I asked him just how tech optimistic he was, and he said, “I'm not sure I'm an optimist at all,” that the most reasonable expectation is to expect the future to be like the past, where we have a problem building things in the real world, that some of our best ideas don't necessarily become everything they could be, and I think a perfectly reasonable baseline forecast is that, for all our talk about optimism, and “let's go,” and “let's accelerate,” that none of that happens. Does that sound reasonable to you or are you more optimistic?I'm optimistic. You know, a few years ago we didn't have mRNA vaccines. Now we do. And now we have a magical weight loss drug that will not only make you lose weight, but will solve half your other health problems for reasons we don't even understand yet.So much inflammation.Right. We didn't even have that a few years ago. That did not exist. If you told someone that would exist, they would laugh at you. A magic pill that not only makes you thin, but also just solves all these other health issues: They would laugh at you, Scott Alexander would laugh at you, everyone would laugh at you. Now it's real. That's cool.If you had told someone a few years ago that batteries would be as insanely cheap as they are, they would've been like, “What? No. There's all these reasons why they can't be,” but none of those reasons were true. I remember because they did actually say that, and then batteries got insanely cheap, to the point where now Texas is adding ridiculous amounts of batteries for grid storage. Did I predict that was going to happen? No, that surprised me on the upside. The forecasters keep forecasting sort of a leveling off for things like solar and battery, and they keep being wrong.There's a lot of other things like reusable rockets. Did you think they'd get this good? Did you think we'd have this many satellites in the low-earth orbit?AI just came out of nowhere. Now everyone has this little personal assistant that's intelligent and can tell them stuff. That didn't exist three years ago.So is that, perhaps, growing cluster of technologies, that's not just a short-term thing. Do you think all these technologies — and let's say particularly AI, but the healthcare-related stuff as well — that these taken together are a game-changer? Because people always say, “Boy, our lives 30 years ago didn't look much different than our lives today,” and some people say 40 years ago.But that's wrong!Yes, I do think that is wrong, but that people's perception.When I was a kid, people didn't spend all day looking at a little screen and talking to people around the world through a little screen. Now they do. That's like all they do all day.But they say that those aren't significant, for some reason, they treat that as a kind of a triviality.Like me, you're old enough to remember a thing called “getting bored.” Do you remember that? You'd just sit around and you're like, “Man, I've got nothing to do. I'm bored.” That emotion just doesn't exist anymore — I mean, very fleetingly for some people, but we've banished boredom from the world.Remember “getting lost?” If you walk into that forest, you might get lost? That doesn't happen unless you want to get lost, unless you don't take your phone. But the idea that, “Oh my God, I'm lost! I'm lost!” No, just look at Google Maps and navigate your way back.Being lost and being bored are fundamental human experiences that have been with us for literally millions of years, and now they're just gone in a few years, just gone!Remember when you didn't know what other places looked like? You would think, “Oh, the Matterhorn, that's some mountain in Switzerland, I can only imagine what that looks like.” And then maybe you'd look it up in an encyclopedia and see a picture of it or something. Now you just type it into Google Images, or Street View, or look at YouTube, look at a walking tour or something.Remember not knowing how to fix things? You just had no idea how to fix it. You could try to make it up, but really what you'd do is you'd call someone who was handy with stuff who had this arcane knowledge, and this wizard would fix your cabinet, or your dresser, or whatever, your stereo.Being lost and being bored are fundamental human experiences that have been with us for literally millions of years, and now they're just gone in a few years, just gone!So why does that perception persist? I mean, it's not hard to find people — both of us are probably online too much — who just will say that we've had complete and utter stagnation. I don't believe that, yet that still seems to be the perception, and I don't know if things haven't moved fast enough, if there are particular visions of what today should look like that haven't happened, and people got hung up on the flying-car, space-colony vision, so compared to that, GPS isn't significant, but I think what you have just described, not everybody gets that.Because I think they don't often stop to think about it. People don't often stop to think about how much the world has changed since they were young. It's like a gradual change that you don't notice day-to-day, but that adds up over years. It's like boiling the frog: You don't notice things getting better, just like the frog doesn't notice the water getting hotter.Do you think it's going to get hotter going forward, though? Do you think it's going to boil faster? Do you think that AI is such a powerful technology that it'll be indisputable to everybody that something is happening in the economy, in their everyday lives, and they look a lot different now than they did 10 years ago, and they're going to look a whole lot different 10 years from now?Utility, remember — back to econ class — utility is concave. A utility of wealth, utility of consumption, is concave, which means that if you get 10,000 more dollars of annual income and you're poor, that makes a hell of a lot of difference. That makes a world of difference to you. But if you're rich, it makes no difference to you. And I think that Americans are getting rich to the point where the new things that happen don't necessarily increase our utility as much, simply because utility is concave. That's how things work.In the 20th century, people escaped material poverty. They started out the century with horses and buggies, and wood-burning stoves, and freezing in the winter, and having to repair their own clothes, and having food be super expensive, and having to work 60-hour weeks, 80-hour weeks at some sweatshop, or just some horrible thing, and horrible conditions with coal smoke blackening the skies; and then they ended in nice, clean suburbia with computers and HDTVs —I guess maybe we didn't get those till the 2000s — but anyway, we ended the 20th century so much richer.Basically, material poverty in rich countries was banished except for a very few people with extreme mental health or drug problems. But then for regular people, material want was just banished. That was a huge increment. But if you took the same increment of wealth and did that again in the next century, people wouldn't notice as much. They'd notice a little bit, but they wouldn't notice as much, and I think that it's the concavity of utility that we're really working against here.In the 20th century, people escaped material poverty. They started out the century. . . having to work 60-hour weeks, 80-hour weeks at some sweatshop. . . and then they ended in nice, clean suburbia with computers and HDTVs . . .So is economic growth overrated then? That kind of sounds like economic growth is overrated.Well, no. I don't know that it's overrated. It's good, but I don't know who overrates it. Obviously it's more important for poor countries to grow than for rich countries to grow. Growth is going to make a huge difference to the people of Bangladesh. It's going to be life-changing, just as it was life-changing for us in the 20th century. They're going to have their 20th century now, and that's amazing.And, to some extent, our growth sustains their growth by buying their products; so that helps, and contributing to innovations that help them, those countries will be able to get energy more easily than we were because they're going to have this super-cheap solar power, and batteries, and all this stuff that we didn't have back in the day. They're going to have protections against diseases, against malaria, and dengue fever, and everything. We didn't have those when we were developing, we had to hack our way through the jungle.So growth is great. Growth is great, and it's better for the people in the poor countries than for us because of concavity of utility, but it's still good for us. It's better to be advancing incrementally. It's better to be feeling like things are getting better slowly than to be feeling like things aren't getting better at all.So many things have gotten better, like food. Food has gotten immeasurably better in our society than it was in the '90s. The food you can eat at a regular restaurant is just so much tastier. I don't know if it's more nutritious, but it's so much tastier, and so much more interesting and varied than it was in the '90s, and people who are in their 40s or 50s remember that. And if they stop to think about it, they'll be like, “You know what? That is better.” We don't always stop to remember what the past was. We don't remember what food was like in the '90s — I don't. When I'm going out to a restaurant to eat, I don't think about what a restaurant was like in 1994, when I was a kid. I don't think about that. It just doesn't come to mind. It's been a long time.In Japan I noticed it a lot, because Japan had, honestly, fairly bland and boring food up until about 2010 or so. And then there was just this revolution where they just got the most amazing food. Now Japan is the most amazing place to go eat in the world. Every restaurant's amazing and people don't understand how recent that is. People don't understand how 20 years ago, 25 years ago, it was like an egg in a bowl of rice and sort of bland little fried things. People don't remember how mediocre it was, because how often did they go to Japan back in 2005?It's better to be feeling like things are getting better slowly than to be feeling like things aren't getting better at all.Redrawing the boundaries of energy tech (12:39)Your answer raised several questions: One, you were talking about solar energy and batteries. Is that enough? Is solar and batteries enough? Obviously I read about nuclear power maybe too much, and you see a lot of countries trying to build new reactors, or restart old reactors, or keep old nuclear reactors, but over the long run, do we need any of that other stuff or can it really just be solar and batteries almost entirely?Jesse Jenkins has done a lot of modeling of this and what would be the best solutions. And of course those models change as costs change. As battery costs go down and battery capabilities improve, those models change, and we can do more with solar and batteries without having to get these other things. But the current models that the best modelers are making right now of energy systems, it says that we're probably looking at over half solar and batteries, maybe two thirds, or something like that. And then we'll have a bunch of other solutions: nuclear, wind, geothermal, and then a little bit of gas, we'll probably never completely get rid of it.But then those things will all be kind of marginal solutions because they all have a lot of downsides. Nuclear is very expensive to build and there's not much of a learning curve because it gets built in-place instead of in a factory (unless it's on a submarine nuclear plant, but that's a different thing). And then wind takes too much land, really, and also the learning curve is slower. Geothermal is only certain areas. It's great, but it's only certain areas. And then gas, fossil fuel, whatever.But the point is that those will all be probably part of our mix unless batteries continue to get better past where we even have expected them to. But it's possible they will, because new battery chemistries are always being experimented with, and the question is just: Can we get the production cost cheap enough? We have sodium ion batteries, iron flow batteries, all these other things, and the question is, can we get the cost cheap enough?Fortunately, China has decided that it is going to pour untold amounts of capital and resources and whatever into being the Saudi Arabia of batteries, and they're doing a lot of our work for us on this. They're really pushing forward the envelope. They're trying to scale every single one of these battery chemistries up, and whether or not they succeed, I don't know. They might be wasting capital on a lot of these, or maybe not, but they're trying to do it at a very large scale, and so we could get batteries that are even better than we expect. And in that case, I would say the share of solar and batteries would be even higher than Jesse Jenkins and the other best modelers now predict.But you don't know the future of technology. You don't know whether Moore's Law will stop tomorrow. You don't know these things. You can trace historical curves and forecast them out, and maybe come up with some hand-wavy principles about why this would continue, but ultimately, you don't really know. There's no laws of the universe for technological progress. I wish there were, that'd be cool. But think solar and batteries are on their way to being a majority of our total energy, not just electricity, but total energy.Racing China in research (15:59)Does it concern you, in that scenario, that it's China doing that research? I understand the point about, “Hey, if they want to plow lots of money and lose lots of money,” but, given geopolitical relations, and perhaps more tariffs, or war in the South China Sea, does that concern you that that innovation is happening there?It absolutely does concern me. We don't want to get cut off from our main sources of energy supply. That's why I favor policies like the Inflation Reduction Act. Basically, industrial policy is to say, “Okay, we need some battery manufacturing here, we need some solar panel manufacturing here in the country as a security measure.” Politicians always sell it in terms of, “We created this many jobs.” I don't care. We can create jobs anyway. Anything we do will create jobs. I don't care about creating specific kinds of jobs. It is just a political marketing tactic: “Green jobs, yes!” Okay, cool, cool. Maybe you can market it that way, good for you.But what I do care about is what you talked about, which is the strategic aspect of it. I want to have some of that manufacturing in the country, even if it's a little inefficient. I don't want to sacrifice everything at the altar of a few points of GDP, or a few tenths of a percent of points of GDP at most, honestly. Or sacrifice everything in the altar of perfect efficiency. Obviously the strategic considerations are important, but, that said, what China's doing with all this investment is it's improving the state of technology, and then we can just copy that. That's what they did to us for decades and decades. We invented the stuff, and then they would just copy it. We can do that on batteries: They invent the stuff, we will copy it, and that's cool. It means they're doing some of our work, just the way we did a lot of their work to develop all this technology that they somehow begged, borrowed, or stole.. . . what China's doing with all this investment is it's improving the state of technology, and then we can just copy that. That's what they did to us for decades and decades. We invented the stuff, and then they would just copy it. We can do that on batteries. . .The original question I asked about: Why should we think the future will be different than the recent past? Why should we think that, in the future, America will spend more on research? Why do we think that perhaps we'll look at some of the regulations that make it hard to do things? Why would any of that change?And to me, the most compelling reason is, it's quite simple just to say, “Well, what about China? Do you want to lose this race to China? Do you want China to have this technology? Do you want them to be the leaders in AI?” And that sort of geopolitical consideration, to me, ends up being a simple but yet very persuasive argument if you're trying to argue for things which very loosely might be called “pro-progress” or “pro-abundance” or what have you.I don't want to whip up any international conflict in order to stimulate people to embrace progress for national security concerns. That wouldn't be worth it, that's like wagging the dog. But, given that international conflict has found us — we didn't want it, but given the fact that it found us — we should do what we did during the Cold War, during World War II, even during the Civil War, and use that problem to push progress forward.If you look at when the United States has really spent a lot of money on research, has built a lot of infrastructure, has done all the things we now retrospectively associate with progress, it was for international competition. We built the interstates as part of the Cold War. We funded the modern university system as part of the Cold War. And a lot of these things, the NIH [National Institutes of Health], and the NSF [National Science Foundation], and all these things, of course those came from World War II programs, sort of crash-research programs during and just before World War II. And then, in the Civil War, of course, we built the railroads.So, like it or not, that's how these things have gotten done. So now that we see that China and Russia have just decided, “Okay, we don't like American power, we want to diminish these guys in whatever way we can,” that's a threat to us, and we have to respond to that threat, or else just exceed to the loss of wealth and freedom that would come with China getting to do what it wants to us. I don't think we should exceed to that.I don't want to whip up any international conflict in order to stimulate people to embrace progress. . . But, given that international conflict has found us. . . we should do what we did during the Cold War, during World War II, even during the Civil War, and use that problem to push progress forward.Recalling Japanese economic history (20:32)You write a lot about Japan. What is the thing you find that most people misunderstand about the last 30 years of Japanese economic history? I think the popular version is: Boom, in the '80s, they looked like they were ahead in all these technologies, they had this huge property bubble, the economy slowed down, and they've been in a funk ever since — the lost decades. I think that might be the popular economic history. How accurate is that?I would say that there was one lost decade, the '90s, during which they had a very protracted slowdown, they ameliorated many of the effects of it, but they were very slow to get rid of the root cause of it, which was bad bank debts and a broken banking system. Eventually, they mostly cleaned it up in the 2000s, and then growth resumed. By the time per capita growth resumed, by the time productivity growth and all that resumed, Japan was aging very, very rapidly, more rapidly than any country has ever aged in the world, and that masked much of the increase in GDP per worker. So Japan was increasing its GDP per worker in the 2000s, but it was aging so fast that you couldn't really see it. It looked like another lost decade, but what was really happening is aging.And now, with fertility falling all around the world right now in the wake of the pandemic, probably from some sort of effect of social media, smartphones, new technology, whatever, I don't know why, but fertility's falling everywhere — again, it looked like it had bottomed out, and then now it's falling again. We're all headed for what happened to Japan, and I think what people need to understand is that that's our future. What happened to Japan in the 2000s where they were able to increase productivity, but living standards stagnated because there were more and more old people to take care of. That is something that we need to expect to happen to us, because it is. And, of course, immigration can allay that somewhat, and it will, and it should. And so we're not because of immigrationWill it in this country? In this country, the United States, it seems like that should be something, a major advantage going forward, but it seems like it's an advantage we seem eager to throw away.Well, I don't know about eager to throw away, but I think it is in danger. Obviously, dumb policies can wreck a country at any time. There's no country whose economy and whose progress cannot be wrecked by dumb policies. There's no country that's dumb-proof, it doesn't exist, and it can't exist. And so if we turn off immigration, we're in trouble. Maybe that's trouble that people are willing to accept if people buy the Trumpist idea that immigrants are polluting our culture, and bringing all kinds of social ills, and eating the pets, and whatever the hell, if people buy that and they elect Trump and Trump cracks down hard on immigration, it will be a massive own-goal from America. It will be a self-inflicted wound, and I really hope that doesn't happen, but it could happen. It could happen to the best of us.There's no country whose economy and whose progress cannot be wrecked by dumb policies. There's no country that's dumb-proof, it doesn't exist, and it can't exist.Regulating AI well (23:49)Do you think what we're seeing now with AI, do you think it is an important enough technology that it is almost impossible, realistically, to screw it up through a bad regulation, through a regulatory bill in California, or something on the national level? When you look at what's going on, that if it's really as important as what perhaps the most bullish technologists think it is, it's going to happen, it's going to change businesses, it's going to change our lives, and unless you somehow try to prohibit the entire use of the technology, there's going to be an Age of AI?Do people like me worry too much about regulation?I can't say, actually. This is not something I'm really an expert on, the potential impact of regulation on AI. I would never underestimate the Europeans' ability to block new technologies from being used, they seem to be very, very good at it, but I don't think we'll completely block it, it could hamper it. I would say that this is just one that I don't know.But I will say, I do think what's going to happen is that AI capabilities will outrun use cases for AI, and there will be a bust relatively soon, where people find out that they built so many data centers that, temporarily, no one needs them because people haven't figured out what to do with AI that's worth paying a lot of money for. And I have thoughts on why people haven't thought of those things yet, but I'll get to that in a second. But I think that eventually you'll have one of those Gartner Hype Cycles where eventually we figure out what to do with it, and then those data centers that we built at that time become useful. Like, “Oh, we have all these GPUs [graphics processing units] sitting around from that big bust a few years ago,” and then it starts accelerating again.So I predict that that will happen, and I think that during the bust, people will say, just like they did after the Dot-com bust, people will say, “Oh, AI was a fake. It was all a mirage. It was all useless. Look at this wasted investment. The tech bros have lied to us. Where's your future now?” And it's just because excitement about capabilities outruns end-use cases, not all the time, obviously not every technology obeys this cycle, for sure . . . but then many do, you can see this happen a lot. You can see this happen with the internet. You can see this happen with railroads, and electricity. A lot of these things, you've seen this pattern. I think this will happen with AI. I think that there's going to be a bust and everyone's going to say, “AI sucks!” and then five, six years later, they'll say, “Oh, actually AI is pretty good,” when someone builds the Google of AI.Rethinking growth strategy in the EU (26:46)To me, this always gets a lot of good attention on social media, if you compare the US and Europe and you say, the US, it's richer, or we have all the technology companies, or we're leading in all the technology areas, and we can kind of gloat over Europe. But then I think, well, that's kind of bad. We should want Europe to be better, especially if you think we are engaged in this geopolitical competition with these authoritarian countries. We should want another big region of liberal democracy and market capitalism to be successful.Can Europe turn it around? Mario Draghi just put out this big competitiveness report, things Europe can do, they need to be more like America in this way or that way. Can Europe become like a high-productivity region?In general, European elites' answer to all their problems is “more Europe,” more centralization, make Europe more like a country. . . But I think that Europe's strength is really in fragmentation . . .I think it can. I wrote a post about this today, actually, about Mario Draghi's report. My bet for what Europe would have to do is actually very different than what the European elites think they have to do. In general, European elites' answer to all their problems is “more Europe,” more centralization, make Europe more like a country. You know, Europe has a history of international competition. France, and Germany, and the UK, and all these powers would fight each other. That's their history. And for hundreds of years, it's very difficult to change that mindset, and Mario Draghi's report is written entirely in terms of competitiveness. And so I think the mindset now is “Okay, now there's these really big countries that we're competing with: America, China, whatever. We need to get bigger so we're a big country too.” And so the idea is to centralize so that Europe can be one big country competing with the other big countries.But I think that Europe's strength is really in fragmentation, the way that some European countries experiment with different institutions, different policies. You've seen, for example, the Scandinavian countries, by and large, have very pro-business policies combined with very strong welfare states. That's a combination you don't see that in Italy, France, and Germany. In Italy, France, and Germany, you see policies that specifically restrict a lot of what business can do, who you can hire and fire, blah, blah, blah. Sweden, and Denmark, and Finland, and Norway make it very easy for businesses to do anything they want to do, and then they just redistribute. It's what we in America might even call “neoliberalism.”Then they have very high taxes and they provide healthcare and blah, blah, and then they basically encourage businesses to do business-y things. And Sweden is more entrepreneurial than America. Sweden has more billionaires per capita, more unicorns per capita, more high-growth startups per capita than America does. And so many people fall into the lazy trap of thinking of this in terms of cultural essentialism: “The Swedes, they're just an entrepreneurial bunch of Vikings,” or something. But then I think you should look at those pro-business policies.Europeans should use Sweden as a laboratory, use Denmark, use Norway. Look at these countries that are about as rich as the United States and have higher quality of life by some metrics. Look at these places and don't just assume that the Swedes have some magic sauce that nobody else has, that Italy and Greece and Spain have nothing to learn from Sweden and from Denmark. So I think Europe should use its fragmentation.Also, individual countries in Europe can compete with their own local industrial policies. Draghi talks about the need to have a Europe-wide industrial policy to combat the industrial policies of China and America, but, often, when you see the most effective industrial policy regimes, they're often fragmented.So for example, China until around 2006, didn't really have a national industrial policy at all. At the national level, all they did was basically Milton Friedman stuff, they just privatized and deregulated. That's what they did. And then all the industrial policy was at the provincial and city levels. They went all out to build infrastructure, to attract FDI [foreign direct investment], to train workers, all the kinds of things like that. They did all these industrial policies at the local level that were very effective, and they all competed with each other, because whichever provincial officials got the highest growth rate, you'd get promoted, and so they were competing with each other.Now, obviously, you don't want to go for growth at the expense of anything else. Obviously you'd want to have things like the environment, and equality, and all those things, especially in Europe, it's a rich country, they don't just want to go for growth, growth, growth only. But if you did something like that where you gave the member states of the EU more latitude to do their local policies and to set their local regulations of things like the internet and AI, and then you use them as laboratories and copy and try to disseminate best practice, so that if Sweden figures something out, Greece can do it too, I think that would play to Europe's strength, because Draghi can write a million reports, but Europe is never going to become the “United States of Europe.” Its history and ethno-nationalism is too fragmented. You'll just break it apart if you try.The European elites will just keep grousing, “We need more Europe! More Europe!” but they won't get it. They'll get marginally more, a little bit more. Instead, they should consider playing to Europe's natural strengths and using the interstate competitive effects, and also laboratory effects like policy experimentation, to create a new development strategy, something a little bit different than what they're thinking now. So that's my instinct of what they should do.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.Micro Reads▶ Business/ Economics* Behind OpenAI's Audacious Plan to Make A.I. Flow Like Electricity - NYT* OpenAI Pitched White House on Unprecedented Data Center Buildout - Bberg* OpenAI Executives Exit as C.E.O. 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Build it. - MIT* The Celebrities Lending Their Voices to Meta's New AI - WSJ▶ Biotech/Health* Why do obesity drugs seem to treat so many other ailments? - Nature* Antimicrobial resistance is dangerous in more ways than one - FT Opinion* Who's Really Keeping Ozempic and Wegovy Prices So High? - Bberg Opinion▶ Clean Energy/Climate* Microsoft's Three Mile Island Deal Is Great News - Bberg Opinion* China's accelerating green transition - FT* Microsoft's Three Mile Island Deal Isn't a Nuclear Revival — Yet - Bberg Opinion* A Faster, Cheaper Way to Double Power Line Capacity - Spectrum* A Public Path to Building a Star on Earth - Issues▶ Space/Transportation* Hypersonic Weapons — Who Has Them and Why It Matters - Bberg▶ Up Wing/Down Wing* Trump Offers Scare Tactics on Housing. Harris Has a Plan. - Bberg Opinion* The Sun Will Destroy the Earth One Day, Right? Maybe Not. - NYT* How supply chain superheroes have kept world trade flowing - FT Opinion* Can machines be more ‘truthful' than humans? - FT Opinion▶ Substacks/Newsletters* America's supply chains are a disaster waiting to happen - Noahpinion* The OpenAI Pastiche Edition - Hyperdimensional* The Ideas Anticommons - Risk & Progress* Sam Altman Pitches Utopian impact of AI while Accepting UAE Oil Money Funding - AI Supremacy* The Government's War on Starter Homes - The Dispatch* NEPA Nightmares III: The Surry-Skiffes Creek-Whealton Transmission Line - Breakthrough Journal* Dean Ball on AI regulation, "hard tech," and the philosophy of Michael Oakeshott - Virginia's NewsletterFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

When it comes to sports, everybody is basically aligned that the goal here is helping every kid reach their potential. We celebrate talent, we give athletes the resources and personalized support they each need to develop their skills. We have varsity leagues, we have junior varsity leagues. We make sure that kids are challenged at the appropriate level for their current level abilities. And for some reason, when it comes to academics, we throw all of that out the window.Our progress as a society depends a lot on the brilliant ideas of our greatest thinkers. To improve our way of life, we should be promoting our best and brightest to the highest heights of their potential. Instead, we seem to be stemming the flow of great minds at the source: in our public schools. With a one-size-fits-all, equality-of-outcome model, we rob our kids, and our society, of their potential.Today on Faster, Please — The Podcast, I talk with Niels Hoven, founder and CEO of Mentava, an educational software company. Hoven's goal: to help kids learn at their own pace, whether that includes additional support, or simply the resources to excel beyond expectations.Hoven is the father of four, former product manager at Cloudflare, and was VP of product development at Pocket Gems.In This Episode* Treating academics like athletics (1:35)* School as childcare and instruction (5:44)* The role of parents (8:04)* Mentava's mission (10:04)* Reframing the public school (15:20)* The San Francisco algebra ban (17:50)* Investing in our future (20:05)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationPethokoukis: Niels, welcome to the podcast.Hoven: Thank you so much. I appreciate you having me here.Treating academics like athletics (1:35)You argue that the current American education system is fundamentally flawed.I do think it has some issues.How does closing achievement gaps hurt our education system? How does it hold students back?So obviously my problem is not with closing achievement gaps, my problem is what happens when you set up policies with that as the only goal. I think what we've seen is that the goal of today's modern education policy is closing the gaps between high achievers and low achievers, which is, of course, wonderful, but the way that has actually manifested in schools is by slowing down high achievers and not giving them the opportunity to achieve their potential. In San Francisco, you're literally not allowed to teach material above grade level, which I think is crazy.Most school systems have gifted programs. Doesn't that meet your concern?So those gifted programs, I think they don't go far enough to support the learning needs of students who are really capable of achieving dramatically more, and, in a lot of places they're very, very hard to get into. So in our school district right now, in order to qualify for the gifted program, you have to take a series of tests and you basically have to score 99th percentile on all of those tests. All of those tests are basically grade-level tests, so they're not really teaching seeing how far above grade level you are, so it's really, “Are you really, really good at taking the tests, so well that three times in a row you can score 99th percentile on grade level stuff?” That's not really getting the kids who need their learning needs supported by these special programs, and these programs really only operate a single grade above grade level. What about the kids who could be doing calculus in middle school, or want to be moving much faster than that: Two years of math a year, every single year — we aren't supporting them.You've proposed treating academics more like sports. What does that look like in practice and how might that change how we approach education and how we think about education more broadly?When it comes to sports, everybody is basically aligned that the goal here is helping every kid reach their potential. We celebrate talent, we give athletes the resources and personalized support they each need to develop their skills. We have varsity leagues, we have junior varsity leagues. We make sure that kids are challenged at the appropriate level for their current level abilities.And for some reason, when it comes to academics, we throw all of that out the window. We just say, “Okay, everybody must progress at the same speed, learn the same thing at the same time.” To me that's like saying, “Okay LeBron, you are not allowed to dunk until everybody else can dunk also.” And so I want to see us treat academics more like sports, where we encourage students to pursue their interests, to develop their talents to the fullest potential, and respect the diversity of kids' ability and motivations.To what do you attribute the staying power of this — I don't know if it's a one-size-fits-all system, but of a system that, in many key ways, isn't different than it was a hundred years ago?It is a government-sponsored monopoly, so I guess that would be my answer. How did the taxi cab medallion system last so long, even though it was dramatically underserving everybody who wanted to take a taxi? There's no competition.What does that more sports-like environment look like? It sounds like there'd be more freedom, there'd be less regimentation. What does that world look like?What I'm really pushing for is I would like to see students receiving instruction appropriate for their current level. I talk a lot about high-achieving students, but this is also true for struggling students. Right now we have a very one-size-fits-all model of education, and that means students who are struggling and need extra attention to get caught up aren't given the opportunity that they need to perhaps move at a slower pace or get extra support, and kids who want to be moving faster and maybe learning two years of math a year, every single year, so that they can be doing college-level math in middle school, they're also not getting that support. We managed to do that in sports, we have lots of different leagues so that kids can find the level of competition that is appropriate for them, but for some reason, when it comes to academics, we refuse to allow that amount of differentiation.School as childcare and instruction (5:44)You advocate reducing instruction time to two hours a day. One, is that enough? And two, what are the kids doing for the other . . . are they getting into mischief? What are they doing for the rest of the day if they're not studying?I think we've really conflated the role of school, and I think an important question to ask is: Is school as we provide it now, is it childcare or is it academics? And I think it is both. An interesting fact about school is, despite all of the problems that we all understand our schools have, schools have like an 80 percent approval rating from parents, and that's because the job that schools do for most parents is actually childcare. It is free childcare for while the parents are at work, it is finding a place where your children are entertained and loved, and that is super important.But somehow we have also layered this layer of academic theater on top of that childcare instead of saying, “Okay, these kids can play in the woods for eight hours a day, or they can play dodgeball or grow their social-emotional skills and build their friendships with a friend.” We had to say, “No, they have to be learning something – but not too fast at this very, very slow pace.” And if you look at things like homeschoolers, you see most homeschoolers do two hours of academics a day, and they have the same outcomes as kids who are going to public schools, so we really don't need that much more time doing academics as long as that time is being spent efficiently.Is this new world possible within a mostly public school system as it exists today? Can you do this, or are you talking about private school, homeschooling, but does this have anything to do with the public school system, which seems to me fairly resilient? Certainly, I think the changes of the sort of magnitude you're talking about.I like the public school system. I went to public school, I had a really positive experience in public school. My own kids go to public school. And I think the difference is that when I was in public school, people were much more accepting of the idea of kids who wanted to move at their own pace. And so Mentava, certainly we're happy to support kids who are homeschoolers, who are in private school, but the real vision is to allow kids to be part of, essentially, their local public school community, go to school with friends from the neighborhood, but still have the opportunity to progress at their own paceThe role of parents (8:04)Tell me a little bit about your personal educational experience and how that shaped your views and how it eventually led to your company.Education has always been very important to my family. My dad taught me to read early, when I arrived at kindergarten, I could already read, I was roughly a year ahead in math. And so he negotiated with my school to just let me, during math class, just for an hour a day, could I just go to the next grade up and sit in on their math class and then come back to my own class for the rest of the day. And we did that, and that worked great until third grade, because my school only went up to third grade, so there wasn't a class for me. So at that point, I just started doing independent study. Just during math class, for an hour a day, I would go to the back of the classroom, I would study out of a math book, and then at the end of that hour I would come back and rejoin my friends for the rest of the day.And I did that for the next four years, and basically, thanks to that accelerated support, I ended up taking calculus in eighth grade. There are kids who can be moving that fast if you just kind of get out of their way. My own son — he goes to a public school — we also got permission for him to do independent study last year, and now in fourth grade he'll probably be ready to start pre-algebra.This is doable now. This was doable when I was a kid with textbooks, this is doable now with off-the-shelf software, but it's harder than it needs to be. And so our vision is: We can make this easier. I think a lot of kids could have done what I did, but they weren't given the opportunity. We want to make sure that more kids have this opportunity to have their learning needs supported.Do you think parents underestimate what their kids are capable of doing?Parents have no idea what their kids are capable of doing, especially parents of high-achieving kids. We've seen this over and over again with the families who are entering in Mentava's learn-to-read software now. We target our software at kids as young as two, but often age three and four, we're trying to teach them to read, trying to get them to about a second grade reading level in maybe six to 12 months. We just had a three-year-old complete our entire curriculum, which gets us close to a second grade reading level, in about six months. So it is doable, it can move fast, and we have parents who say, “I had no idea that my kid was capable of doing this at this point!”Mentava's mission (10:04)So walk me through what your company does, the service it provides, how it all works.The long-term vision for our company is to support the learning needs of kids who are not being supported in school. If you have a child who wants to learn two years of math in a year, the real gating factor of that is, a lot of times it's teacher availability, or it's school policy that says there's no one available to give them that instruction. But imagine that they had the opportunity to just go open a math book.It's a resource issue. We'd love to do it, but we don't have the resources.We don't have the resources. Sometimes that's true, sometimes that's not true, sometimes it's policy, but whatever. But they could go get a math book, they could just study that book and go as fast as they wanted — but that's boring. Not every kid is going to have that motivation. And so, to some extent, we're not really solving for curriculum, we are solving for motivation. We want to build software that can deliver that same curriculum — we know how to teach math, we know how to teach reading — deliver it in a more sort of fun, entertaining, motivating way, and allow kids to essentially continue to progress at their own pace without being gate-kept by the availability of teachers to essentially unlock that knowledge for them. And so we are starting at a very young age by teaching kids to read with software.What I really want to teach is math. I want to get kids to learn math as fast as possible, but in order for kids to be able to teach themselves math, they have to be able to read, and so that is our first piece of software: learn-to-read software for preschoolers.And obviously preschoolers, these are young kids, so is your expectation that software will be done at home? Are there schools trying to incorporate in some way? How's that working?We've started talking to schools about pilots, but I think, right now, we get a lot of attention from parents. Incentives are just better aligned that way. Schools right now are not particularly concerned with, “Are we supporting our kids achieving their fullest potential or are we ensuring our kids can learn as fast as possible?” But parents really care about that. And so right now we have a lot of customers who are basically parents at home who realize, “Oh, my three- or four-year-old is ready to start reading, what can I do to best support them now?”How long has the company been in business?We kind of accidentally launched about six months ago.Was this a pandemic-related idea?This was. I have four kids. I had three kids during the pandemic and the fourth one arrived during the pandemic. They were at home, doing school at home, and I also had a job at the time, so did my wife, we had two working parents trying to take care of three kids at home, we were trying to figure out how to help them learn, and really the only way to make that work was to give them the skills that they needed to teach themselves. And at that time, my kids were five and three. And so how can I get my five-year-old teaching themselves math? How do I get my three-year-old teaching themselves to read? And the solution to that is software. We know the curriculum, we know if you want to teach reading, it's phonics, but how do you get the kid to sit down and memorize the 44 sounds in the English language? Well, turns out that software and games are really, really good at solving motivation, so we just needed to package that all together and that was how Mentava was started.So during this exact period that you've thought of this idea, you're putting together a company, putting together the software, we have sort of a new stage in software happening with chatbots and large language models. Are those technologies that compliment what you're doing? Are you going to have to do something different to use those technologies? How's that going to work out for you?It's very complimentary. So we're not using AI right now, but we see it coming. There is kind of this perfect storm of timing right now where, I think because of Covid, parents started to realize that, “Oh, my kid is not learning as much in school as I thought. This is what they're doing in school?” We had all that visibility when our kids were doing homeschool in front of screens at home.Technology has gotten to a point where we can give screens to every kid, and iPads, and other tablets. Touchscreens make learning much more accessible. We're seeing the effectiveness of some learning software — a lot of learning software is really, really bad, but some of it is good, and people are seeing that. And then, at the same time, like you see AI coming out and getting people very excited about the potential of software to affect education.It's funny, when we were raising money, the idea that software could be a teacher was a very contrarian perspective. Everybody said, “How could software possibly be a teacher? You're going to need a human there.” And then about 12 months later, AI came out, people said, “Oh, of course you're going to have software teachers. We've always believed that.”But my take on AI is that the power of AI is really in its adaptability, and you actually don't need that much adaptation for teaching reading or teaching math. You memorized the 26 letters, the 44 sounds in the English language, you learn addition, and then you learn subtraction, then you learn multiplication, then you learn division. It's pretty linear. It's pretty sequential. And so my belief is that there's actually this core learning pathway that you can really, really optimize, and we should focus on that. And it's fairly sequential, and it's fairly deterministic. And then the power of AI is to catch the kids who fall off of that and get confused and ask, “Okay, what are you confused about? I see you're confused about this thing. Let me give you some custom instruction and then get you back on that main pathway.”Reframing the public school (15:20)In an ideal world — and let's just stick with, I think it's reasonable to think that, for the time being, most kids are going to be educated by public schools. That's a lot of kids, a magnitude difference in how many kids are in private school or are homeschooled. What should that public school day look like, ideally, given what you've learned going through this process?The biggest challenge for public school is that there's such a diversity of student needs there. Public schools are simultaneously academics, but they're also childcare, and they're also a social support network. They're a safety net for a lot of kids, and they're trying to provide all those services to all these different kids by giving them all the exact same thing. To me that makes no sense, and what I would really love to see in our public schools is just more differentiation, more acceptance of diversity of needs, diversity of motivations, diversity of abilities, and saying, “Okay, these children need this particular service from our public schools. Let's make sure that they're in a place where they can get those services. But we have these other kids who want to learn two years of math every year. They can do that in two hours a day, and then they want to spend the rest of the day playing in the forest.” That would be amazing.Should that actual classroom time look markedly different? I'm sure that if I went into most classrooms — I had kids, one currently in high school and ones who were in high school not that long ago — that those classrooms, blackboards, teachers, lecturing: That's the classroom experience. That's in 2024, that was the classroom experience in 1924. Should that classroom experience look fundamentally different?I think that's an interesting question. I think it's going to look different for different kids. I think there is a sense that some of the rigor I would say of the old days has been lost, and I think that there's good and bad to that. I think a lot of that is a result of conflating childcare with academics. You can't do rigorous academics for eight hours a day. It's sort of like weightlifting; you can't do squats for eight hours a day, but you can do them very effectively for half an hour. But if you want to pretend that you're exercising for eight hours a day, then you, by definition, have to remove a lot of that rigor. So I would like to get rid of the academic theater and be very clear about, “Okay, this time is play time, this is childcare time, and this time is academic time, and we're really going to buckle down and focus here.”The San Francisco algebra ban (17:50)A few years back, there was a ban on teaching middle school algebra in San Francisco. Can you give me some background on that?So this was passed about 10 years ago. The way it used to work is that most kids took algebra in eighth grade. If you were ready earlier, you could take algebra in seventh grade, but essentially in San Francisco, because some kids were not prepared to take algebra in eighth grade, they said across the board, all kids must take algebra in ninth grade. So even the kids who used to take it in seventh grade, the kids who used to take it in eighth grade, “Sorry, we're not doing it in middle school anymore. You all have to take it in ninth grade.”Usually these sorts of educational decisions, they're just lost in the noise, parents don't have time to focus on the nitty and gritty of curriculum, but this was a big problem for parents because this meant that you could not get through calculus in high school without essentially taking summer school or getting private tutoring. And for a lot of competitive colleges, you need to be in calculus, have taken calculus, in high school. And so parents had a real problem with this particular curriculum change.The irony of all of this is that this was enacted with the hope of increasing equity, of driving more equal outcomes, and it had the opposite effect because now it's just the parents with the resources who are able to go out and do summer school, and private tutors, and then get their kids the math support that they needed. So this happened a decade ago, and it has been a battle for 10 years to get algebra back into middle schools in San Francisco, and it actually went the other way: California statewide nearly got rid of algebra in their statewide middle school curriculum because of the quote-unquote “success of San Francisco,” which is basically, if you look into it, it's just San Francisco cooking the books, literally lying about their outcomes.And so finally, this past year, parents essentially had enough and they put it on the ballot and said, “We're going to take a vote about, should middle schoolers be allowed to learn algebra.” It's funny because a lot of times people think that this cuts along party lines: Conservatives versus Democrats, red versus blue, but even in San Francisco, the most progressive city in the United States, 80 percent of families were like, “Yes, we should support all kids learn these. Yes, if a kid is ready to take algebra in middle school, we should allow them to do that.”Investing in our future (20:05)I'll tell you the one thing I kept thinking of as I was learning more about your company and your outlook was it seems to me like it'd be really important, as a country, that every kid can reach their potential, but especially the very smartest kids, that we get everything out of them that we can, right? That's pretty important. These are people who are going to be designing the next stage of AI, they're going to be designing the new computer chips, they're going to be in biotechnology. If we can get more out of those kids, there's a huge multiplier there.I believe that very deeply. I believe leaders are important. I believe in the power of single individuals to create huge amounts of change, but not everybody agrees with that. I was at a school the other day, and a bench outside the school literally has carved into it —a bench that every student sees as they go into the school — it says, “Strong people do not need strong leaders.” And I fundamentally disagree with that. I think we need strong people and we also need strong leaders, and the way we get both of those is ensuring that every student has the opportunity to have their learning needs supported and have the opportunity to achieve their potential.What's the direction of the company? Where are you going to be in five years? What's the dream?Right now, we are in the process of officially launching our learn-to-read app, targeted at preschoolers, and then what I really want to do is start transitioning into math. So once we have taught kids to read, we have essentially unlocked their ability to teach themselves. And so our goal is to keep up with this earliest cohort of kids who are learning to read and support them as they continue through their K–12 career. If they want to learn two years of math a year, then I would love to build two years of math curriculum each year so that they continue using Mentava to support their K–12 experience, and then they discovered that, I don't know, they're done with math in middle school, and then they get to figure out what's next after that. Do I go start a company? Do I do internships? Do I go learn marine biology? I don't know.What about computer science? Does that play a role here?When I say math, I would say specifically math and computer science are what I'm most passionate about. I think of it almost as vocational school. Those are the skills that we can teach that directly contribute to, okay, this person is able to create more value in the world because they know these two fundamental skills now.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. 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American global leadership is due in great part to its innovators — visionaries who drive society beyond the preconceived limits. Historically, government-led initiatives like the Manhattan Project or the Apollo Project pushed boundaries. Today, too often, government lags behind technologically.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Katherine Boyle about American Dynamism, the spirit of pro-progress innovation, and how a new generation of Silicon Valley startups is spurring government to break out of its old habits.Boyle is a general partner at VC giant Andreessen Horowitz, having previously been a partner at General Catalyst and a general assignment reporter at The Washington Post. She primarily invests in national security, aerospace and defense, and public safety companies, among others.In This Episode* American Dynamism (1:25)* From software to the physical world (7:23)* Government collaboration: challenges & opportunities (11:29)* Playing the long-game in Washington (21:16)* Building the American Dream (24:35)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationAmerican Dynamism (1:25)Let's just start with a little bit of definition about American Dynamism. Broadly, what challenges or problems is this effort directed toward?It's a bit of a long story as to what American Dynamism is, how it arrived to be a category of innovation, but the short definition is American Dynamism is built for companies that support the national interest. So a very broad category of companies, everything from aerospace, defense, national security, companies that sell directly to the US government and to our allies, but also things like housing, education, transportation, infrastructure, things that are built in the physical world where Washington or states usually like to regulate those things.So one of the things that we saw in our own portfolio is that there are a lot of companies that we used to be classifying as “enterprise” or “consumer,” and really what they were were government companies because they had to interface with a regulator much earlier in their trajectory, or they saw government as a potential buyer of the product. So in cases of things like aerospace and defense, those are very obvious government buyers, but things like public safety, where we have companies like Flock Safety, for example, that started out selling to homeowners associations thinking they were a consumer company, but ultimately got extraordinary pull from local governments and from public safety officials because of how good the technology was. So the companies, in some ways, they were these N-of-One companies, really solving really important civic problems, but over time it became very clear that this was a growing category of technology.But the broader underlying thesis, I'd say, of where the movement came from, and when we really started seeing this as an area where founders, in particular, were excited to build, I think it did come out of “It's Time to Build,” my partner Mark Andreessen's canonical post where he basically said during Covid that we have to be able to build things in the physical world. And there was sort of this realization that technology has solved many, many problems in the digital realm that I think, in some ways, the last 15 years of the Silicon Valley technology story has really been about changes in consumer technology or changes in the workplace, but now we're finally seeing the need for changes in government and civic goods, and there's just an extraordinary amount of momentum from young founders who really want to build for their country, build for the needs of the citizenry.Does it change what you do, or maybe the kinds of expertise that are needed, to think about these things as a category, rather than different companies scattered in these other kinds of categories. Thinking of them as like, “Oh, there's some sort of commonality,” how is that helpful for you?The thing that's interesting is that there's sort of a “yes” and “no” part to that question. The yes is that the founders are coming from different places. So the companies that have led to this sort of, I would say, extraordinary wealth of engineering talent where people are not afraid to tackle these problems, there's a handful of the companies that have scaled: it's companies like SpaceX, companies like Palantir, where, 20 years ago, they were banging their heads against the wall trying to figure out, “How do we sell to government?” In many cases, they had to sue the government in order to be able to sell and compete against the larger incumbents that have been around for, in many cases, 50, 70 years. But now you have these talented engineers who've sort of seen those playbooks, both in terms of, they understand what good engineering looks like, they understand the pace of innovation, how quickly you have to bring new products to market, and they also understand that you have to be in touch with your customer, constantly iterating.And so you now have companies that have scaled in these categories where there is this nice thing that happens in Silicon Valley, and I always say it's a mark of a really successful company when three, four, five years into the journey, you start seeing the early people at that company say, “Well, I want to solve this problem,” or “I want to go be a founder, myself,” and they start building more companies. So I think that, in some ways, the natural order of how Silicon Valley progresses, in terms of, do you need to have different expertise, or are there different talent pools? Yes, they're coming from different companies, but it's the same story of Silicon Valley Dynamism, which is, someone comes in, I always joke, they go to the University of Elon Musk and they learn how to manufacture, and then they say, “Well, actually, I don't want to just work on rockets anymore, I'd like to work on nuclear.” And so then you have companies like Radiant Nuclear that have spun out of SpaceX several years ago that are building in a totally different category for the built world, but have that sort of manufacturing expertise, that engineering expertise, and also know what it's like to work in a highly regulated environment.Does it require a different expertise, then, to advise these companies because of that government interface?I think in some ways it does, yes, the types of people who are investing in this category, maybe there's a number of investors where they got their start at Palantir, for example, or they understand the early journey of SpaceX. But at the same time, the thing that I think has been most surprising to us is just how quickly this movement caught on among the broader Silicon Valley ecosystem. And I think that's a very good thing, because, at its core, these are software companies in many cases. Yes, they're building hardware, but software is the lever that's allowing these companies to scale. So you are seeing the traditional venture capital firms that used to say, “Oh, I would never touch anything that is operating in the physical world,” or the meme you had five years ago, which is, “You'll never be able to sell anything to the US government, I'm not wasting my money there.” You've seen a complete 180 in the Silicon Valley ecosystem in terms of venture firms where they're now willing to take bets on these types of companies.And you're also seeing, there's a number of founders where their first company, for example, might've done very well, and it might've just been pure software, or in a consumer enterprise, sort of a more classical Silicon Valley domain, and now you're seeing those founders say, “Actually, I want to build for the civic need. I want to build for the national interests. These are issues I care about.” And so you're seeing those founders actually decide to build in the category and team up with founders who maybe have a little bit more experience in government, or maybe have a little more experience in terms of how they're building in the physical world.From software to the physical world (7:23)That period you referred to, which seems like a lot of what Silicon Valley was doing with the first 15 years or so of this century: they're doing internet, social media, very consumer-facing. How valuable was that period? Because that is a period that, here in Washington, is much criticized as trivial, “Why wasn't Silicon Valley solving these huge problems like we did in the '60s?” Again, there were some critics who just looked at it as a waste of brainpower. To what extent is that a fair criticism, and do you think, is that unfair? That stuff was valuable, people valued the kinds of products that were producedYou would actually be better able to speak to this than me, but I'll say, the graph or the chart that's going viral today, as we speak, is the comparison of 2009 US GDP versus Eurozone GDP, which were roughly equal in 2009, coming right off the Great Recession, to today, which I actually think it was tweeted something like, I think it's. . .  the US is 77 percent greater in terms of GDP than the Eurozone countries, which means that, for some reason, the Silicon Valley ecosystem — and it is largely attributed to Silicon Valley. When I first wrote the thesis on American Dynamism, I looked actually at 1996, because it was 25 years when I published it, but 1996, if you looked at the top US companies by market cap, all six of them were outside of technology as an ecosystem. They were energy companies, I would say almost archaic industries that had grown over a long period of time, but if you look at those six companies today, they are all tech companies. And so something has happened in the 21st century. You could say the new American Century is actually built off the back of software. It's built off of these large tech companies that were built in California, in many cases. And so the 15-year period that you're talking about, which is this sort of, it was a zero-interest-rate environment, cost of capital was very low, there was a lot of experimentation going on, it was, in many ways, the canonical example of American Dynamism broadly, that you had risk capital going after many new ideas in many different areas, but they were particularly really focused on the areas that government was not interested in regulating.And that's always been the theme of innovation in Silicon Valley is, “Let's go where they're not necessarily paying attention.” Maybe you had some one-offs in terms of, you'll always have to meet with your regulator at some point—in the case of Uber or Airbnb—but these companies were really born of the needs that founders understood. They were built off the back of a platform shift in terms of, 2007, 2008, the iPhone becomes the thing that everyone wants to build on, it becomes the mobile era. And so you really did have this focus of software, and enterprise software, and consumer, and companies were able to grow to extraordinary heights. And if you just look at what it has done for US GDP in comparison to even something like Europe, it is really extraordinary. So that is a story that I think we should be celebrating and telling.But what has happened, I think, since Covid is this new shift, which is, we've explored many of the digital frontiers that we can. And of course there's always a new digital frontier. Every time we think it's over, we get hit with a new one — in the case of AI. But the thing that I think has really changed is that entrepreneurs now are not afraid of the physical world, and they are realizing — and I hate to use the word “inevitable,” but in some ways this is an inevitability — that you are going to have to interface with government at a certain point if you are going to build in the physical world. And there are so many opportunities, there are so many different places where founders can build, that that really did take on new meeting post- this slew of black swan events, in the case of Covid, and then of course Russia invaded Ukraine, where I think it did wake up a lot of founders who said, “I want to work on these really hard problems.” And thankfully we have companies that have scaled during that time, that have trained these manufacturing capabilities, they've trained engineers how to do these things. So it is our view that that 15-year period was extraordinary for software, but the next 10 years are going to be extraordinary for these American Dynamism companies, as well.Government collaboration: challenges & opportunities (11:29)When you talk about interfacing with government, what popped into my head was a bit of video of a congressional hearing, and they were trying to decide, do we want to bring the private sector and SpaceX into the space program, and so not just have it be a government effort by NASA? And I just remember these senators just lambasting the idea. And I think they might've brought in some astronauts, too. And if I was interested in interfacing with government and I had seen that video, I'm like, “Boy, oh boy, I hope the attitude of government has changed since then, because it seems like that's a wall.” What is the attitude on the other side? You said the attitude of the entrepreneurs has changed, of funders, but what about on the other side? What is the openness to the kinds of solutions that your companies are presenting?I think it's changed because it has to, and I always point to the late former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter, who in 2015 started DIUx [Defense Innovation Unit Experimental] as an innovation unit for the DoD [Department of Defense], recognizing that there's a talent problem that US government has had; and it didn't start in the last 10 years. When I was exploring this talent problem, I actually realized that there had been a commission on the lack of talent going into the bureaucracy at the federal level.In the 1990s, Paul Volcker actually chaired the commission, it was called a “Quiet Crisis.” Basically that young people today, unlike in the '50s and the '60s where government was seen as this extraordinary job that you could have or that you could go into one of these companies and work in a company for 30 years and then draw a pension, that young people today want to go work in the private sector, and the growth and dynamism of the private sector has actually been an issue for government, and that is not a new issue. It was explored in the late '80s, early '90s, and it has gotten precipitously worse because of tech. I would say that the technological innovation risk capital going to Silicon Valley and saying, “We're going to fund young people as they come out of college because they understand this new type of engineering.” You're seeing some of the best and brightest young people decide not to go to traditional companies, which has been a huge issue for the prime contractors that supply 40 percent of the government programs for the DoD, but what has happened is you're seeing this extraordinary engineering talent go to startups. And so I think what even — this is 10 years ago now — DIU saw, if all of our best and brightest software talent is avoiding government, or much of it is avoiding government, they're avoiding traditional companies that we work with, we have to meet them where they are.And so the DoD I actually think was the first government organization to really recognize this crisis and to decide, we're going to need to have new interfaces. Now, whether that means new procurement, that's always going to be a debate, and that's a Washington issue that I think we've been fighting for several years now in order to change how these companies are able to work with the DoD on these big programs, but I think even just recognizing that this was an issue 10 years ago was a huge step for government.And over time now, we've seen a handful of what we would call “defense 1.0” companies, in terms of startups, many of them kind of built off the back of a company like SpaceX, now realizing that you can build for USG [US Government], you can build hardware-software hybrid that you can then sell into production contracts, and it's companies like Anduril that were started in 2017 when people said, “This is impossible to do. You're never going to be able to sell to USG,” and this year was chosen for a massive program, the CCA [Collaborative Combat Aircraft] program with the Air Force, over many prime contractors.And so I think that is the story now that Silicon Valley has seen, and I always joke that, particularly investors and founders, they really only need to see a handful of winners to know that something is a category, and so you're going to see more and more of these companies being founded, scaling, and I think that circuitous cycle and that virtuous cycle actually leads more to the DoD saying, “Okay, this is a real ecosystem now.” It's not as risky to take a chance on a startup, which is what government is always worried about, if we take a chance on anything innovative, are we going to look foolish? And so I think, in some ways, you are seeing the government respond to what's happened in the private sector, but this is not something that's a year old, two years old, or three years old, this is something that's been talked about for almost 10 years now, and of course SpaceX now is an over-20-year-old company.Is this still primarily a Defense Department-focused effort? Are there other areas of government who are looking at what's happening with DoD and they're drawing lessons? How diverse of an effort has this become?We see this across every sector that government cares about. So it's not just defense, it's aerospace, it's energy, it's logistics, it's transportation. We always joke, if there is a department in Washington that exists to regulate a sector, that is American Dynamism, and you are seeing innovation in those sectors. But it's happening at different rates. I'd say the DoD is one of the largest spenders. The largest private US company right now is SpaceX, so there's success in those categories, so you're seeing a lot of interest in it now, but then there's companies in public safety. That's an area where I think there's just been an extraordinary explosion of innovation in the last few years, largely driven by the fact that there is a labor crisis happening in public safety across America, but it is a different sale, it's not selling to federal government, selling to state and local.One of our companies, Flock Safety, which I mentioned at the beginning of our chat, they now are involved in solving 10 percent of vehicular crimes in America.What do they do?So, it's a great story about a company that was founded in Atlanta in 2017, and they built a very small modular license plate reader that only tracks cars, not people, and started building for homeowners associations with the recognition that most crimes in America are committed with a car, and so if you can put these in areas of high traffic, areas to augment the work of law enforcement, crime will go down. And they started selling to homeowners associations and immediately got pull around Atlanta and suburban Atlanta from police chiefs who said, “I need 10 of these in areas where we don't have enough people who can look at different areas.”So now this company is operating across America, they're in all 50 states, and what's extraordinary about what they've been able to do as a technology company, just putting up cameras in different sectors and following cars, is one of the hardest problems for law enforcement is when a car that has committed at theft or — one of the most extraordinary stories they've told us recently was there was a young girl kidnapped, a young child kidnapped in Atlanta, and the car went into a different county. And so when that happens, for law enforcement it's often one of the most difficult things, if a car goes into a different county, to do data sharing across these places. But if you have a network of cameras that can track the car, you find that kidnapped child, or you find that stolen vehicle much, much faster. In many ways, catching the cars at the moment where they've moved from county to county has actually solved one of the bigger data issues that law enforcement has.What's interesting about this example — and it provides a nice lead-in to my next question — is, in that situation, the solution wasn't to help the various databases communicate better, it was a completely different sort of solution. So, are what these companies doing — it seems like what they're not doing is taking existing operations and improving efficiency, but providing a new way to approach the problem that they're trying to tackle.Yes. And what's incredible about that story is it was not started as a company that was supposed to support law enforcement. It was started for homeowners associations, it was a consumerization of a civic problem. And I think that's what's really interesting is, one of the biggest issues, and this is why I think you're now seeing really interesting technology companies enter government at all levels is, you have a population that has grown up with consumer technology now. So as the boomers retire, the boomers remember what it was like to be in government, or to be in office places without Zoom, without the consumer internet, and without the things that make life much easier and tangible, as those people retire, you have young people demanding, “We have to use better technology.”And so the solutions are not, “Okay, let's iterate on the existing systems that we've used for the last 10 or 20 years,” it's, “Why can't my experience when I walk into my job in government feel exactly the same way that it does when I walk into my home and I experience the consumerization of everything around me?”So I think that is part of it, that you have this millennial generation that's now coming into leadership. In many cases, you have people who don't necessarily remember the world before the internet or didn't have formative experiences in the workplace or in government before the internet. And that is shaping and reshaping all of how government functions, and likely will for the next 20 years. The thing that, especially when we talk about the Department of Defense and the warfighter, the thing that has always been tragic is that you have more technology in your phone than you do when you go onto the battlefield. And so I think there's this understanding that young people are demanding to have the same level of technology and the same ease-of-use in all aspects of governance, in all aspects of civic goods.Playing the long-game in Washington (21:16)You seem like a very upbeat, positive person. My experience as people from Silicon Valley — or now, in your case, from Miami, a new startup hotbed — they come through Washington, they bring that optimism with them, then after a few days of dealing with people on Capitol Hill, the optimism is drained out of them, they go back shells of their former selves, because if you've dealt with a lot of people on Capitol Hill and staffers, what they're really good at saying is, “That will never pass . . . that will take 20 years . . . three of my predecessors worked on it, it didn't work . . .” How have you been able to maintain a fairly upbeat attitude, given that this is the world that your companies have to deal with?I agree with you that one of the biggest problems that we see, and which we joke about, is that the only reason why people in Silicon Valley 10 years ago were going to Washington was to apologize for the things that they did. They would get hauled in front of Congress, say they're sorry, and so I think what we've seen in these sectors, in particular, is it's a specific type of founder and person who knows that this is very mission-driven. They are called to build these companies. They care about these companies. They're passionate about the national interest. And so they know they have to go to Washington repeatedly, and I think some of the mistakes that, say, founders who had no exposure to Washington, or have no exposure to regulated industries, when they would go to Washington, they'd say, okay, maybe I go once a year, shake some hands, it's kind of fun, and then I go back and I build, and they would be surprised when they got nowhere. And of course, I think that the most sophisticated companies recognize that they have to learn to play the game that Washington cares about. And there is a totally different culture in Washington, there's a totally different set of incentives. I say it's really the difference between, Silicon Valley is a positive-sum culture: Everyone helps everyone, knowing that the pie can always get bigger, and you always want a piece of that bigger pie as it's growing, and so the more things that you're doing, the better. It's why we have this beautiful angel investing network. It's why we have all of these things that make no sense to people in Washington where it's elections, where 10,000 votes in a state could decide the election, and it's a zero-sum game, and that is what decides who is in office and who is in think tanks. And so it's a very different way of thinking about things.The thing that I think has changed the most about Silicon Valley is recognizing, we might not be good at zero-sum games and zero-sum thinking, but that is the people that we are interfacing with, and we need to understand their incentive systems when they decide to make a purchasing decision, when they decide whether they're going to vote on a bill in a certain way, when they think about, what do their constituents care about back home in a place that has nothing to do with Silicon Valley or California. So I think that level of empathy for what Washington does, which is very different than what Silicon Valley does, is important.Is it hard to stay optimistic? There are times where you're banging your head against the wall, we're on very short time horizons, Washington can go in perpetuity doing what it does without necessarily seeing much change. But having those points of connection, and constantly having the conversation, and recognizing that it is a long game and not a short game, I think has been very beneficial, and now there are success stories: Palantir, Anduril, Shield AI, these companies that have been around for 10 years now, that have really shown that it is possible to do good work and to support the needs of the DoD, and to speak the language of the DoD, as well, I think has really led to this next generation of founders understanding what they need to do to be successful as well.Building the American Dream (24:35)What kind of world are you trying to create? I'm sure it's intellectually challenging, I'm sure it's well-paying, but, fundamentally, why are you doing this? And I would think it's to create some world that is better than the one we're currently living. What is the world you're trying to create?I think there is a recognition post-Covid, in particular, for a lot of young people, a lot of engineers, that things were broken, things are broken in this country. The physical world has not kept up with the digital world, and there's been extraordinary changes, technology is moving as fast as it possibly can, and a lot of the things that people care the most about have been left out of that story: Education, which is something we haven't necessarily talked about yet, but education needs to be completely transformed in an era where technology is at our fingertips and where people who are good at learning learn faster than they ever possibly could, and people who are not good at learning don't, and so you have a disparity between those people.But there's an extraordinary amount of change that has happened in the last 25 years where the things that American citizens care most about have not changed in the way that they need to keep up with, again, the changes in the consumer internet and what we've seen in the enterprise.And so the story of, how do we make America strong? How do we continue to be the most dynamic country in the world? How do we make sure that all American citizens and the things they care about most in terms of the American Dream are part of that story? I think that is something that the founders who work in American Dynamism care deeply about. They recognize, and I always point this out, but there are so many founders now who are working at companies like Anduril, like Saronic, where they don't necessarily even remember September 11th — they weren't old enough — but they care deeply about the idea that America needs to be a strong country, and that we need to have a mode of deterrence, and we need to have a strong national defense that keeps America the most dynamic country so that people can build inside of it. The same thing with recognizing that there needs to be changes in housing, needs to be changes in education, these are things that were part of the American Dream when our parents were growing up and feel a little bit distant for a lot of other young people growing up today. So I think there is a recognition that technology has to be a part of those big sectors in order to support the American Dream that many of us grew up with and that many of us aspire to.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

In our highly globalized economy, exogenous shocks and unsettling headlines are everywhere. It makes sense that market forecasters should be biting their nails, but so often their prophecies of doom prove completely false. Philipp Carlsson-Szlezak is a proponent of “rational optimism.” He believes there's a calmer, more measured way of going about financial and economic analysis that sets us up to be more flexible to the highs and lows of the economic events. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Carlsson-Szlezak about why an overreliance on models — and a tendency to assume the worst — can impair our ability to roll with unexpected events and make the best of them.Carlsson-Szlezak is the global chief economist at Boston Consulting Group, and leads the Center for Macroeconomics at their Henderson Institute. He is the co-author of the new book, Shocks, Crises and False Alarms: How to Assess True Macroeconomic Risk.In This Episode* Optimism during a polycrisis (1:39)* AI employment panic (7:47)* Risk-assessment strategy (13:08)* Federal Reserve predictions (19:44)* Impending shocks? (23:41)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationPethokoukis: Philipp, welcome to the podcast.Carlsson-Szlezak: Thanks for having me.Optimism during a polycrisis (1:39)It seems as if there are multiple challenges facing the world and the global economy simultaneously. People described it as a “polycrisis,” and it could be everything from trying to navigate economies to a soft landing after a bout of inflation; part of it, I guess, is the big rise in debt; we have war in Europe; maybe, eventually, war in Asia over Taiwan; and, of course, climate change; aging population; falling birth rates; and some people seem to view AI as more of a threat than a positive, it's going to take jobs, and perhaps other bad things. If I've given a sensible description of the world, how can one be a “rational optimist” in a world of polycrisis?Just taking maybe two of your examples: The soft landing that was supposed to be impossible, remember that? We need, what was it, six percent unemployment for how many years to bring inflation down? So clearly that didn't pan out like the pessimists said. Or think about the war in Ukraine that you mentioned, which, of course, is the tragedy, but the fact is that there is no recession in the Eurozone so far. The fact is that industrial production has held up rather well, even in the heartland of industrial production in Germany. So real industrial output is actually remarkably resilient. Overall, there's little doubt that there are many, many risks. There are crises, but, more often than not, we're focusing on the tail ends of the distribution and pretend that those risks are at the very center of the risk distribution.It sort of reminds me — it's not a perfect analogy — of where we were in the early 1990s. I suppose you can always point to, and maybe this is part of your point, if you want to focus on bad news, the world will give you plenty of bad news to focus on. But I remember at the beginning of the 1990s, very bad recession here in the United States, a lot of concerns about the ability for rich economies to grow quickly. Again, debt was an issue, and though, looking back, it may seem like, wow, people should have been really excited: end of the Cold War, there was a lot of uncertainty what would happen to the former Soviet Union, a lot of talk back then about suitcase nukes, who knew what was going to happen in the world? And of course, all of this kind of concern and uncertainty led right into a big economic boom.So to kind of get back to what you were saying, it seems to me that, rather than being rational optimists, we're sort of naturally irrational pessimists.Yeah, but we shouldn't be. I think your example of the '90s and what the mid- and late '90s delivered, I think is not a bad analogy for what I think will play out in the 2020s, the rest of the decade. We're in an “era of tightness,” is what we call it in the book, which is really a structural condition of the labor market. Lots of people think that shortages in the labor market are a byproduct of Covid, but that's not true. The labor market turned tight already in 2017, so, in technical language, that's when unemployment dropped below U*. Covid was an interruption of this tightness. Unemployment went to almost 15 percent, and then it came down just as fast, but we are in this era of tightness, and I think it will persist.To be clear, even if and when you get another recession, you will return to a tight stance. And there are a lot of silver linings that come with eras of tightness: It translates into better real wage growth, it nudges and forces firms do capital-for-labor substitution, it pushes them towards the technological frontier in their respective areas, and all of that should lead into some boost of productivity growth. I'm not of the kind where we're predicting this big jump in productivity growth, I think that's too hyped, but I do believe that the structural tightness, which is almost like a spark to the fuel of technology, I think that will push gradually and measurably over the years to come.And the driving forces of that tightness are what?We have a number of things going. Essentially, you had a mismatch of demand of supply already in the late '10s, as I described, so there's a supply issue, we don't have enough labor supply. You have certain forces on the demographic side that constrained that. And I think often we hear the story that AI is going to produce so much unemployment that there will be mass unemployment, and I don't believe any of this. I think that will play out very differently. Historically, technology has never given us structural or technological unemployment. On the contrary, technology is the deflationary force in the medium- and long-run. Firms that can deliver cost savings, they can lower prices, they will do so to grab market share. That is a real income boost for consumers. So when their real incomes grow, they redeploy that gained real income to new services, new goods purchase and consumption, and that leads to new employment. And so I think, essentially, you will remain with a story where labor is tight, and that is the defining underpinnings of what's coming. Today people don't remember that even in the 2010s, I think it was Bill Gates, he wanted a robo-tax, a robot tax. Because why? Because automation was taking over the assembly lines and we're going to have to provide for all these people who are going to lose their jobs! Well, where are we today? Near record-low unemployment. And this is in a line of a long tradition where Nobel Prize winners, and technologists, and politicians, they've all predicted technological unemployment.AI employment panic (7:47)I wanted to talk a bit about AI labor, since you brought it up. If you don't think mass-unemployment is a valid concern, could there be other downsides from deployment of generative AI in an economy? Could it be, instead of higher employment, might it just be greater inequality? Maybe, before, we had technology hurting blue-collar workers; certainly there's a lot of white collars worried about it. I was just reading a story in the New York Times — all of these people in Hollywood are just terrified, whether they're doing special effects, or they're sound editors, they're all terrified that their white-collar jobs are going away. So do you see, in the near term, any downside from AI?In macro there's always this tension between the aggregate, which is what macroeconomics is about, and then the distribution of experiences under the hood of macro, if you will. So there will be winners and losers, and there will be those that are harder hit than others, but I think when you look at the aggregate, you add it all up the net-net, I don't anticipate this being a structural or technological unemployment situation.To go to the micro level, you can take the other side of that argument, too. This is not a big area of research for me, so I'm straying outside of my field of expertise here, but plenty of people have argued that perhaps AI will give a lift to those least-skilled. Why? Because AI is a companion for them that makes them more productive and allows them to create more value, and therefore to be paid better. So I think the jury is out on that.I don't anticipate a smooth ride where everyone will be a winner and everything will be just plain sailing. Of course this is disruptive, of course there will be gyrations, but the story about technological unemployment's been told for so long. Today people don't remember that even in the 2010s, I think it was Bill Gates, he wanted a robo-tax, a robot tax. Because why? Because automation was taking over the assembly lines and we're going to have to provide for all these people who are going to lose their jobs!Well, where are we today? Near record-low unemployment. And this is in a line of a long tradition where Nobel Prize winners, and technologists, and politicians, they've all predicted technological unemployment.There's a nice story with Wassily Leontief, a Nobel Prize winner in economics. He said in the '70s that human labor was going to go the way of the horse after the introduction of the automobile. Well, 50 years on, we're here with very tight labor markets. And Kennedy was worried about it, too, and others before him. And so I think we have to point to something that's truly different about AI to tell that story. I think we can potentially find some reasons that are genuinely different about AI, but before we all become hysterical about it, I think we should take a deep breath.Does it strike you as odd that, in a world of low unemployment and, if you're correct, perhaps a longer-term structural tightness, that it's at this moment that people are very worried about technological unemployment, it's at this very moment that they're very worried about immigration coming in and taking jobs. You would think these would be concerns at periods of very high unemployment: people standing in line around the block to get a job, but that's not where we're at. Yet the public mood seems to not be in sync with that.I think that's a good observation, I don't have a great explanation for it. The technology that's on display is impressive, it is novel, and what's different, generally, is that it makes a credible promise to impact the service economy. In our book, the way we position the slump of productivity growth has little to do with high debt and all those explanations that are occasionally fashionable. It has a lot to do with the fact that the US economy transitioned from being a physical economy to a service economy. And in the physical economy, the production of goods, you always had pretty respectable productivity growth, including the last few decades. But because of this mix shift into services where you did not have the technology to make progress on the productivity side, this mix shift dragged down aggregate productivity growth. If you have zero or very little productivity growth in services, which is like 65, 70 percent of the economy, and you have very high productivity growth and the part that is 30 or 35 percent of the economy, well the blended average is going to be low. And so, as we now have productivity growth promises from AI and services, I think a lot can change there. Again, not in a step change way, this is not like flipping a switch, it's going to be hard slog, and incremental, and cumulative, but something will happen there.There's plenty of risk out there. New crises will come and happen, but for every true crisis, there are many false alarms, and that is something that I think we need to internalize more, and that is something that can help us see risk a little more calmly and in a measured way.Risk-assessment strategy (13:08)Just to take a quick step back: Describe your process for assessing risk. Where do you begin? What are the factors? Do you have a fundamental baseline model of the way the world works? How does that process start and work for you?The way we go about risk in the book is to say macroeconomic risk should be viewed both as the downside, which is how we commonly view risk, like a recession, or even a structural downside like a deflationary depression — these are downsides. But for practitioners, risk is also hidden in potential upside if you miss out on it. And both the downside and the upside, they come in two flavors: tactical, short-term stuff, cyclical stuff; and the more structural strategic kind, like shifts that happen over longer periods of time. And so we like to think of macro risk in those four flavors: the short, the long term, and the upside and the downside, if you willGenerally when we look at risk, it's very seductive and tempting to focus on bad outcomes and then start analyzing how bad will it be and how quickly they're going to happen. In most situations, it pays off to take a step back, and take a deep breath, and say, “Well, how is the system constructed? What are the drivers? What is the history of this thing?” and an important question, “What would it take to get that outcome from the edges of the risk distribution? What does it take to get there?” Too often in public discourse, we jump straight to the tails of the risk distribution. We're immediately obsessing with the cliff edge and the fall into economic death, and then we're pretending that that risk outcome, which is part of the distribution, so we can't ignore it, but we're pretending that the edges of the distribution are the very center.And so what we do in the book for a number of areas of risk in the real economy, the financial economy, and the global economy, we go over and over again into these approaches of asking, “How is this thing constructed? What are the drivers? What do you have to believe for the truly bad outcome?” There's plenty of risk out there. New crises will come and happen, but for every true crisis, there are many false alarms, and that is something that I think we need to internalize more, and that is something that can help us see risk a little more calmly and in a measured way.How well did markets, investors, economists — how well was their risk-assessment process in 2020, given where we are today? My guess is that the global economy is better in 2024 than people thought in February, or March, or April of 2020 as the pandemic was kicking in. Did we do a good job assessing risk and reward back then?No. Public discourse did a terrible job at that. The conventional wisdom and received wisdom in March and April, May, even June, July, and even August, the summer, when you had the first signs of recovery, the conventional wisdom was: This is worse than 2008, and this could be as bad as the Great Depression. And we have a great collection of headlines that we keep, there are lots of them in the book as well. It was, in my mind, a prediction failure. Why? Because what happens is that a lot of the commentary, a lot of the thinking, was too model-based, what we call “master-model mentality” in the book.So how do you project a recovery, typically? You look at the unemployment rate as a proxy for the health of the economy, and if you have a high unemployment rate and a recession, well, it can take a long time to bring that down. After 2008, it took the better part of the 2010s to bring unemployment down, and you had “only” (in quotation marks) unemployment of 10 percent after the Global Financial Crisis. Now with Covid, you almost went to 15 percent. So the models extrapolated outside their empirical range. They said, “Well, if it took almost a decade to bring down this unemployment rate after 10 percent unemployment, then after 15 percent unemployment, well it's going to take even longer.” Hence, the narrative of “worse than 2008,” “as bad as the 1930s,” and blah, blah, blah.Even at the time, you could ask exactly these questions, and I'm not saying this with hindsight bias. We did a piece on March 28th, 2020 in Harvard Business Review where we did exactly that thought experiment. We said, “What does it take for this to be a structural downgrade for the US economy? What does it take for to be worse than 2008?” You're going to need to see damage on the supply side of the economy. You're going to need to see the downgrading of the labor market of a window of capital investment that isn't happening, and the loss of skills, et cetera. And we asked, “Well, how likely is that?” And, of course, it comes down to stimulus. Of course it does, and it comes down to how innovative, fast, and big are we in backstopping the real economy? And we were. And so even in March — and this is shelter-in-place phase, right? This is not even sort of the full lockdown. Even then, you could ask sober questions about very bad risks. And if you did that, you arrived at answers that weren't predictive in “this will happen” at a point forecast level of accuracy. But there was clearly a path and a narrative in March 2020 that was consistent with what actually happened: the tightest recovery on record, and a US economy that was not pushed off its trend path. So after 2008, the US economy was actually pushed off its prior trend path, never made it back in terms of what the trend was, did make it back in terms of growth rates after 2008, but it never made this levels recovery in that sense. All of that was avoided in 2020, and you didn't have to be a magician to at least entertain the possibility that that was a meaningful part of the outcome distribution.Federal Reserve predictions (19:44)Speaking of models, how has the Fed's model performed? Which is another way of saying, how has the Fed performed, and continues to perform?In the recent inflation surge, et cetera? I think the Fed has taken too much flak for what happened in the inflation spike. The inflation spike, by the way, again, was immediately spun into a structural inflection point, the 1970s narrative, off to the races, wage price spirals, all that nonsense. It was an idiosyncratic mismatch of demand and supply. It was an overshoot in consumption following stimulus, and you had the supply chain crunch, and then you had a number of exogenous shocks that nobody could foresee, and those who like to take credit for having predicted the spike, they didn't foresee the Ukraine war, the shock in oil that followed, and many other of the things that played into the spike. The bigger story, though, is quite simply that, as this mismatch of demand and supply unwound, inflation also came down pretty fast.Now, back to the Fed: Yes, there were slow in responding. Would it have been better for them to go early, perhaps, yes, let's say yes. But at the same time, the idea that they would fail to step up and act, and reign this in, and stand by and watch this whole thing go to hell. I mean that was never credible. And they did step up, and they did what they had to do, and I think also attempting the soft landing was the right thing. People at the time did say, “We need a draconian recession right now to remove all the risk of a regime break in inflation!” Well, you would've cut short a really tight labor market that has a lot of real wage gain that delivers a lot of good things for particularly the bottom of the labor market. So it was the right call to attempt a soft landing rather than saying, “Look, we're going to cut this cycle short right now to remove any risk of inflation spiraling out of control.” They did the right thing. They're successful at it. The soft landing is a success. We're well into it. And so I give them more credit.Is that what you think is the biggest mistake people are making, that they're still asking, “What about the soft landing?” And what you're saying is, “We're already into it. You sort of missed it. It happened. You're still looking for it.”Every so often you still see the headline, “Are we going to get a soft landing?” And I'm like, “Well, let's just take a step back.” What is a soft landing? The task was to cool down the labor market, best seen through the eyes of job openings, to cool that down without pushing up the unemployment rate. These two are mirror images of each other. When firms stop hiring, they usually also start firing, so we had to pull off this trick: You stop hiring, but you don't start firing.That was the soft landing. That's the definition of a soft landing, nothing else. And that is what happened: Job openings are down more than three-and-a-half million or so — don't nail me on the decimal — and the unemployment rate is up a little, but, as you and I know, the unemployment rate is not up because of firings. The unemployment rate is up for compositional and participation reasons. So if that is not a soft landing, at least, I would call it the second of three stages, if you will, I don't know what it is. And back to the topic of headlines, most of them are just confusing people more than they're helping them. It's always nice to write something clickbaity that people will be scared of and think this is the cliff edge. How about a headline: “Wow, this is a really great soft landing! This is remarkably good!” Why don't we acknowledge that for a moment?You can always speculate. You can speculate on, for example, exogenous shocks. Covid is an exogenous shock, and there are others: There are solar flares, and there are new pandemics, and there are things that can do immediate damage, and you can spend millions of dollars on models, and they simply won't capture that exogenous risk. Impending shocks? (23:41)Yeah, I mean, the name of the book is Shocks, Crises and False Alarms. As I look over the rest of this decade, if you take the most bullish and extravagant predictions about AI, it's not clear to me what the economy looks like a decade from now. Again, if you take the most bullish kind of [view]: we get the human-level AI and all that. So there's that.I also am not quite sure what the world looks like if some of these worst-case scenarios with Taiwan, and the US, and China, because that seems to me to be so potentially bad, I don't want to think about it. I don't know what the global economy looks like on the other side.What are the big risks, or the things which you believe pose the greatest risk of disruption? Disruptions are going to be good and bad. If you're really worried about AI, that must mean AI is very powerful, it can do a lot of good things, too. So what out there do you really worry about that the disruption will be just bad and have far more downside?You can always speculate. You can speculate on, for example, exogenous shocks. Covid is an exogenous shock, and there are others: There are solar flares, and there are new pandemics, and there are things that can do immediate damage, and you can spend millions of dollars on models, and they simply won't capture that exogenous risk. So that's one story.Geopolitics, since you mentioned it, a third of the book, roughly, the third part is about those types of risks, and they can be devastating, there's no doubt about it; but would you build a central case around this and make that the base case and expectation of how to view the future? Geopolitics is extremely treacherous when it comes to translating its impact on the economy. It's fascinating to me often how little the complexity is acknowledged and understood, and, in the book, we use an example juxtaposing a start of World War I and World War II.So when World War I breaks out, the Dow is down 10 percent, they close it for 136 days, and when they reopen it, it's down another 20 percent. Exactly as you would expect, right? It makes a lot of sense, a world war and the market's in the gutter. Yet, when World War II breaks out in '39, the market jumps 10 percent and stays up. Why? It ends the Great Depression, it puts to use labor, it has capital expenditure and investment, and it singlehandedly ends a decade of malaise.And there is a silver lining to this, and all of this doesn't sit well with how we want to think and should also think about geopolitics, which is in humanitarian terms, and also values and idealistic views. All of this is true and correct, but if we are to assess the impact on the economy, we are going to have to restrain some of these instincts, and we're going to have to say, what are the transmission channels from geopolitics to the real economy, to the financial economy, and to the institutions that we have in place that govern our economy? What are those transmission channels? And often, the bar is higher than you think.Just think about it, the Ukraine war. It's left no mark on the US economy at all, virtually. Why? Because the real linkages weren't there; virtually no trade into this part of the world, either Ukraine or Russia. The financial linkages weren't really there; it's not like balance sheets of US banks were impaired by shutting off that part of the world. And on the institutional side, we can discuss sanctions, and we can discuss using the US dollar as a means of punishing Russia, and all that. But essentially, once you think soberly about, well, how is that shock supposed to transmit to the economy? Well, it looks a lot different.The same could be said about the tragedy in the Middle East. The oil price is lower than before the attack on Israel, right? If you look at futures and forward pricing, or the price of insurance against swings in the oil price, it's lower today than before the attack on Israel and before the retaliation that Israel enacted. So any of these geopolitical risks and hotspots, they are to be taken seriously. I'm not saying they don't matter, but when we extrapolate from them straight to the economy, it more often goes wrong than it goes right.And a final thought: I'm not a Taiwan and China watcher, but one thing that's also clear to me, since you mentioned the unthinkable and the worst-case scenario, my next question would be, okay, what shape would that take? Would that be a blockade? Would that be an actual invasion? Would it be something that involves airlifting semiconductors out of the island? Would that be . . . There's a myriad ways of how such a thing could play out. It'd be a big shock, and terrible, but I can't say with confidence what it would do linearly to an economy like the US economy. It would come down to the details of that.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

In a world of Artificial General Intelligence, machines would be able to match, and even exceed, human cognitive abilities. AGI might still be science fiction, but Séb Krier sees this technology as not only possible, but inevitable. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I chat with Krier about how our public policy should facilitate AGI's arrival and flourishing.Krier is an AI policy expert, adviser, and attorney. He currently works in policy development and strategy at Google DeepMind. He previously served as Head of Regulation for the UK Government's Office for Artificial Intelligence and was a Senior Tech Policy Researcher at Stanford's Cyber Policy Center.In This Episode* The AGI vision (1:24)* The risk conversation (5:15)* Policy strategy (11:25)* AGI: “if” or “when”? (15:44)* AI and national security (18:21)* Chatbot advice (20:15)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationPethokoukis: Séb, welcome to the podcast.Krier: Thank you. Great to be here.The AGI vision (1:24)Let's start with a bit of context that may influence the rest of the conversation. What is the vision or image of the future regarding AI — you can define it as machine learning or generative AI — that excites you, that gets you going in the day, that you feel like you're part of something important? What is that vision?I think that's a great question. In my mind, I think AI has been going on for quite a long time, but I think the aim has always been artificial general intelligence. And in a sense, I think of this as a huge deal, and the vision I have for the future is being able to have a very, very large supply of cognitive resources that you can allocate to quite a wide range of different problems, whether that's energy, healthcare, governance, there's many, many ways in which this technology can be applied as a general purpose technology. And so I guess my vision is seeing that being used to solve quite a wide range of problems that humans have had for decades, centuries, millennia. And I think you could go into so many different directions with that, whether it's curing diseases, or optimizing energy grids, and more. But I think, broadly, that's the way I think about it. So the objective, in a sense, is safe AGI [Artificial General Intelligence], and from that I think it can go even further. And I think in many ways, this can be hugely beneficial to science, R&D, and humanity as a whole. But of course, that also comes with ways in which this could be misused, or accidents, and so on. And so huge emphasis on the safe development of AGI.So you're viewing it as a tool, as a way to apply intelligence across a variety of fields, a variety of problems, to solve those problems, and of course, the word in there doing a lot of lifting is “safely.” Given the discussion over the past 18 months about that word, “safely,” is, one, I think someone who maybe only pays passing attention to this issue might think that it's almost impossible to do it safely without jeopardizing all those upside benefits, but you're confident that those two things can ultimately be in harmony?Yeah, absolutely, otherwise I wouldn't be necessarily working on an AGI policy. So I think I'm very confident this can be done well. I think it also depends what we mean by “safety” and what kind of safety we have in mind. Any technology, we will have costs and trade-offs, but of course the upside here is enormous, and, in my mind, very much outweighs potential downsides.However, I think for certain risks, things like potentially catastrophic risks and so on, there is an argument in treading some careful path and making sure this is done scientifically with a scientific method in mind, and doing that well. But I don't think there's fundamentally a necessary tension, and I think, in fact, what many people sometimes underestimate is how AI itself, as a technology, will be helpful in mitigating a lot of the risks we're foreseeing and thinking about. There's obviously ways in which AI can be used for cyber offense, but many ways in which you can also use that for defense, for example. I'm cautiously optimistic about how this can be developed and used in the long runThe risk conversation (5:15)Since these large language models and chatbots were rolled out to public awareness in late 2022, has the safety regulatory debate changed in any way? It seems to me that there was a lot of talk early on about these existential risks. Now I seem to hearing less about that and more about issues about, maybe it's disinformation or bias. From your perspective, has that debate changed and has it changed for the better, or worse?I think it has evolved quite a lot over the past — I've been working in AI policy since 2017 and there's been different phases, and at first a lot of skepticism around AI even being useful, or hype, and so on, and then seeing more and more of what these general models could do, and I think, initially, a lot of the concerns were around things like bias, and discrimination, and errors. So even things like, early-on, facial-recognition technologies were very problematic in many ways: not just ways in which they were applied, but they would be prone to a lot of errors and biases that could be unfair, whereas they're much better now, and therefore the concern now is more on misuse than it accidentally misidentifying someone, I would say. So I think, in that sense, these things have changed. And then a lot of the discourse around existential risk and so on, there was a bit of a peak a bit last year, and then this switched a bit towards more catastrophic risks and misuse.There's a few different things. Broadly, I think it's good that these risks are taken seriously. So, in some sense, I'm happy that these have taken more space, in a way, but I think there's also been a lot of alarmism and unnecessary doomerism, of crying wolf a little bit too early. I think what happens is that sometimes people also conflate a capability of a system and how that fits within a wider risk or threat model, or something; and the latter is often under-defined, and there's a tendency for people to often see the worst in technology, particularly in certain regions of the world, so I think sometimes a lot has been a little bit exaggerated or overhyped.But, having said that, I think it's very good there's lots of research going on on the many ways in which this could potentially be harmful, certainly on the research side, the evaluation side, there's a lot of great work. We've published some papers on sociotechnical evaluations, dangerous capabilities, and so on. All of that is great, but I think there has also been some more polarized parts calling for excessive measures, whether regulatory, or pausing AI, and so on, that I think have been a little bit too trigger-happy. So I'm less happy about these bits, but there's been a lot of good as well.And much of the debate about policy has been about the right sort of policy to prevent bad things from happening. How should we think about policy that maximizes the odds of good things happening? What should policymakers do to help promote AI to reshape science, to help promote AI diffusing as efficiently as possible throughout an economy? How do we optimize the upside through policy rather than just focusing on making sure the bad things don't happen?I think the very first thing is not having rushed regulation. I'm not personally a huge fan of the Precautionary Principle, and I think that, very often, regulations can cause quite a lot of harm downstream, and they're very sticky, hard to remove.The other thing that you can do beyond avoiding bad policy is I think a lot of the levers to making sure that the development goes well aren't necessarily all directly AI-related. So it'll be things like immigration: attracting a lot of talent, for example, I think will be very important, so immigration is a big one. Power and energy: you want there to be a lot more — I'm a big fan of nuclear, so I think that kind of thing is also very helpful in terms of the expected needs for AI development in the future. And then there are certain things governments could potentially do with some narrow domains like Advance Market Commitments, for example, although that's not a panacea.Commitments to do what?Oh, Advance Market Commitments like pull mechanisms to create a market for a particular solution. So like Operation Warp Speed, but you could have an AI equivalent for certain applications, but of course there's a lot of parameters in doing that well, and I wouldn't want a large industrial-policy-type approach to AI. But I think generally it's around ensuring that all the enablers, all the different ingredients and factors of a rich research and development ecosystem continue to thrive. And so I think, to a large extent, avoiding bad regulation and ensuring that a lot of things like energy, immigration, and so on go well is already a huge part of the battle.How serious of a potential bottleneck is the energy issue? It seems to me like it's a serious issue that's coming fast, but the solutions seem like they'll take more time, and I'm worried about the mismatch between the problem and finding a solution to the problem.I suspect that, over the coming years, we will see more and more of these AI systems being increasingly useful, capable, and then integrated into economic systems, and I think as you start seeing these benefits more and more, I think it'll be easier to make the case for why you need to solve some of these kind of policy issues a bit faster.And I also think these solutions aren't that difficult, ultimately. So I think there's a lot that can be done around nuclear, and wind, and solar, and so on, and many regulatory processes that could be simplified, and accelerated, and improved to avoid the vetocracy system we're in at the moment. So I don't think the solutions are that difficult, I think mustering the political will might be right now, but I expect that to be less of a challenge in the coming years with AI showing more and more promise, I think.Policy strategy (11:25)Speaking of vetocracy, whatever the exact substance of the regulation, I am concerned, at least in the United States, that we have 50 states, and perhaps even more bodies if you look at cities, who all have a lot of ideas about AI regulation, and I'm extremely concerned that that sort of fractured policy landscape will create a bottleneck.Can we get to where we need to go if that's the regulatory environment we are looking at, at least in the United States? And does, ultimately, there need to be a federal . . . I think the technical word is “preemption” of all those efforts? So there's a federal approach, and there aren't a federal approach, plus a 50-state approach, plus a 175-city approach to regulation. Because if it's going to be what I just described, that seems like a very difficult environment to deal with. I'm not wildly optimistic around a patchwork of different state-level regulatory systems. I think that will come with various externalities, you'll have distortionary effects. It will be a very difficult environment, from a commercial perspective, to operate in smoothly. I think I'm a lot more open to something at a federal level at some point, rather than a big patchwork of city-level or state-level regulation. Now, it depends on exactly what we're talking about. There might be specific domain, and context, and application-specific regulations that might make sense in some state and not another, but in general, from a first principles level at least, I think that would probably not be desirable.A second regulatory concern — and maybe this is dissipating as policy makers learn more, especially at the federal level, maybe, learn more about AI — is that, at least initially, it seems to me that whatever your policy idea was for social media, or about content moderation or what have you, you just kind of took that policy framework and applied it to AI because that was what you had. You pulled that baby right off the shelf. Are we still seeing that, or are people beginning to think, “This is its own thing, and my ideas for social media may be fine for social media, but I need to think differently about AI”? Obviously the technology is different; also, I think both the risks and potential rewards are very different.Yeah, totally. I think that has been an issue. Now, I wouldn't say that's the case for everyone. There's been some groups and some institutions doing some very careful work that really think about AI, and AGI, and so on in careful, more calibrated ways; but also I've seen quite a lot of reports where you could have easily imagined the same text being about social media platforms, or some kind of other policy issue, or blockchain, or something just being repurposed for AI. And there's a lot of stuff out there that's just very high level, and it's hard to disagree with at a high level, but it's far harder to apply and look at from an operational or practical perspective.So I've been seeing quite a lot of that; however, I think over time, the field is maturing more and more, and you're seeing better thinking around AI, what it really is, what's appropriate at the model level versus at the application level and the existing landscape of laws and regulation and how these might apply as well, which is often that's something that's forgotten, or you have lots of academics coming in and just trying to re-regulate everything from first principles, and then you're like, “Well, there's tort law, and there's this and that over there.” You got to do your gap analysis first before coming out with all this stuff.But I think we are seeing the field of AI governance and policy maturing in that space, and I expect it to continue, but I still, of course, see a lot of bad heuristics and poor thinking here, and particularly an underestimation of the benefits of AI and AGI. I think there's a tendency to always think of the worst for everything, and it's necessary, you need to do that too, but few are really internalizing how significant AGI would be for growth, for welfare, and for solving a lot of the issues that we've been talking about in the first place.The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedAGI: “if” or “when”? (15:44)Is AGI an “if” issue, or is it a “when” issue, and if it's a “when,” when? And I say this with the caveat that predictions are difficult, especially about the future.In my mind, it's definitely a “when” question. I see no real strong reason why it would be an “if,” and that being completely impossible. And there's been many, many, many examples over the last 10 years of people saying, “Well, this is not possible with neural networks,” and then 10 minutes later, it is proven to be possible. So that's a recurring theme, and that may not be sufficient to think that AGI is feasible and possible, but I'm pretty confident for a variety of reasons. About AGI, by the way, I think there's an excellent paper by Morris and others on Levels of AGI [for] Operationalizing Progress on the Path of AGI, and I think it's a very good paper to [frame one's thinking about AGI].And that goes back to one point I made earlier in that, at some point, you'll have systems that will be capable of quite a lot of things and can do probably anything that your average human can do, starting at least virtually, remotely, to start with, and eventually to the physical world, but I think they'll be capable in that sense. Now, there's a difference between these systems being capable in an individual lab setting or something and then them being actually deployed and used in industrial processes, commercial applications, in ways that are productive, add value, create profits, and so on, and I think there's a bit of a gap here. So I don't think we'll have a day where we'll wake up and say, “Oh, that's it, today we have AGI.” I think it'll be more of a kind of blurry spectrum, but gradually I think it'll be harder and harder people to deny that we have reached AGI, and as this stuff gets integrated into production systems, I think the effects on growth and the economy will speak for themselves.As to when exactly, I would think that, at least the capabilities, I would expect that in the next five years you could easily see a point where people could make a very confident claim that, yeah, we've got systems now that are AGI-level. They're generally capable, and they are pretty competent, or even expert-level to at least 90th percentile of skilled adults, and then the challenge will be then operationalizing that and integrating that into a lot of systems. But in my mind, it's definitely not an “if,” and I would say the next five to 10 years is the kind of relevant period I have in mind, at least. It could be longer, and I think the tech community has a tendency to sometimes over-index, particularly on the R&D side.AI and national security (18:21)Do you have any thoughts, and maybe you don't have any thoughts, about the notion that, as perhaps AGI seems closer, and maybe the geopolitical race intensifies, that this becomes more of a national security issue, and the government takes a greater role, and maybe the government makes itself a not-so-silent partner with tech companies, and it really becomes almost like a Manhattan Project kind of deal to get there first. Leopold Aschenbrenner wrote this very long, very long paper — is that an issue that you have any thoughts on? Is it something that you discuss, or does it seem just science fictional to you?Yeah, I do do a lot of thinking on that, and I've read Leopold's report, and I think there's a lot of good things in there. I don't necessarily agree with everything. I think things like security are really critical, I think thinking about things like alignment, and so on, is important. One thing I really agree with with Leopold's report that I'm glad he emphasized was the need to secure and cement liberal democracy, “the free world must prevail” kind of thing. I think that is indeed true, and people tend to underestimate the implication on that front. Now, what that looks like, what that means and requires in practice is not fully clear to me yet. I think people talk about a Manhattan Project, but there are many other potential blueprints or ways to think about that. There could be just normal procurement partnerships, there could be different models for this. At some point, something like that could be defensible, but it's very hard to predict that in advance, given particularly. . . well, how hard it is to predict anything with AI to start with. And secondly, there's loads of trade-offs with all these different options, and some might be a lot better than others, so I think certainly more work might be needed there. But, in principle, the idea doesn't seem completely crazy or science fiction to me.Chatbot advice (20:15)You recently posted on X that you were baffled at how many people don't use these language models or chatbots daily. I think a lot of people don't know what they would use them for. Do you have any recommendations for ways that people who are not in your line, who are not coders, that people can use them? Do you use them in ways that are applicable to the way regular people might use them?Yeah, I think so, and under the post, I gave a few examples of how I use it. Now admittedly, most of these wouldn't be something that anyone would do, but I thought about this last weekend when I was seeing my parents and I was trying to get them to understand what Claude or Gemini is and how to think about it, what kind of questions are worth asking, and what kind of questions are not worth asking, and it's very hard to come up with a very crisp way of sharing these intuitions. I think the first piece of advice I'd give is probably to just take one of these models and have a very long conversation with it about some sort of topic, like try to poke holes, try to contradict, and I think that starts giving you maybe a few better intuitions about what this can do, as opposed to just treating it as some sort of question-and-answer Oracle-type search engine, which I think is not the right use case.That is probably the most unsatisfying way to look at it, and just treat it as a better Google search engine. I mean really that sort of conversational, curious aspect, rather than saying like, “Find me a link.” “Find me a link” isn't a great use.Exactly, and people will often do that. We'll do a thing, we'll get some incorrect answer, or hallucination, or whatever, and then we'll say, “Oh, these things are not good, they're not accurate,” and we'll stop using it, and to me, that is just crazy. It is very fundamentally incurious, and I think there's ways of using them and thinking of them that is very useful. So what have I done recently? I'm trying to think of an example. . .I had some papers that I couldn't understand very well, and I would just ask it for better analogies, explanations, try to dig into certain concepts and ideas and just play around with them until the insights and intuitions were easier for me to internalize and understand. And I think you could do that at different levels, and regular people also want to understand things, so I think that might be potentially an example. But the very first thing I would do is simply long, protracted conversations to really get a sense of how far the model can really go, and then, as you do that, you'll find things that are a bit more creative than, “Can you please rewrite this email for me? Can you find typos?” or “Can you fill in my tax report?” or something. I think one way a friend used it — and of course, there are obvious limitations to that, get a lawyer and everything — but he had a legal contract that someone sent to him, and he couldn't afford a lawyer straight away, so he just said, “Can you help me find potential issues and errors in here? Here's who I am in this kind of contract. Here's what I'm concerned with.” And it's a first starting point. It can be useful. It gives you interesting insights. It doesn't mean it replaces a lawyer straight away, but it is one potential interesting way that everyday people could use.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

✈ A quick note: I will be traveling through the middle of the month and will be posting a bit less than usual and perhaps a bit shorter than usual.These days, it seems that critics of capitalism are more prevalent and more vocal than ever. But Ruchir Sharma, author of What Went Wrong with Capitalism, argues that the free market never let us down; our government did. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, Sharma and I discuss the American addiction to “pain management” — unnecessary economic intervention aimed at dulling the effects of the natural ups and downs of a free market, and how it crippled American capitalism.Sharma is chairman of Rockefeller International and the founder and chief investment officer of Breakout Capital. He previously served as head of emerging markets and chief global strategist at Morgan Stanley.In This Episode* Disillusionment (1:20)* Economic booms (6:12)* Pain management (8:49)* Populist policy (14:38)* Catalyzing change (17:32)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationDisillusionment (1:20)Pethokoukis: In the book, you write with some concern about the declining faith in capitalism, really among all Americans, especially Democrats and the young. It may be worrisome, but is it really surprising, given we had a financial crisis . . . hard to believe it was, what, 14 years ago? 15? Well, I guess 16, 2008 . . . Financial crisis, slow recovery. So, for a lot of people, there's a pretty good chunk of their lives where the economy didn't seem to be really zipping along very quickly and making a big change in their lives, so if people are skeptical of capitalism, can you really blame them?Sharma: Well, as I argue in the book, Jim, that the current system we have in place is very far from capitalism. It's a very distorted form of capitalism that we have in place, and the surprise, I think, has to be the fact that, at the headline level, the numbers from the American economy look pretty good, which are the fact that the economy is growing at above two percent, the stock market is booming, America is seen as the center of all the tech innovation, AI, and, compared to its major rivals such as Europe, America seems to be in a much better place. And I think that a lot of people in the Biden administration try to put that out, which is that, “What's the problem, given how well the American economy is doing?”And I think that the polling data is obviously very different. It shows a persistent and consistent decline in faith in the American economy, that the voters and people have, and, as you pointed out at the outset, that a lot of young people, in fact, say that now they prefer socialism to capitalism. So I guess that's the surprise, which is the fact that, at the headline level, the numbers look fine, and especially when you compare it to other countries, and yet, if you look beneath the hood, both the numbers, in terms of polling numbers and then a deeper look at capitalism, which is what I've done in the book, reveal that something is wrong with the system. The general feeling that the average American has, that the system is almost rigged against them, and rigged in favor of Big Business.Clearly one reason people are sort of unhappy is because we had a big surge of inflation, and, even though the rate of inflation has come down, prices are still a lot higher than they remember. But that seems to me to be a temporary aberration. As every day, and month, and year goes by, we'll be a little further from this inflation surge. And then you mentioned all those positive things: in every sort of emerging technology, America seems to be the leader. Is there really a deep problem that will be more or less solved on its own the further we get away from the pandemic and that pandemic-era economy?Well, anything can happen, but I wouldn't bet on that because, as you said, that the decline in the faith in America's brand of capitalism and the number of people who feel that the country's moving in the wrong direction, all that data predates the pandemic. So it's not as if there was a surge in inflation and that suddenly changed people's thinking about the economy and they're feeling much worse off because their real wages got wiped out by inflation. This happened even before that. Through the last 10 or 20 years, you've seen a consistent decline in American faith in the economy, in American faith in government. So this is not just about the near-term inflation data, or even in terms of what's happened in the post-pandemic world, and to bet, therefore, that, with the passage of time, as the pandemic sort of becomes more and more of a distant memory that this is going to change. I think the problems are much deeper, and it shows up in the fact that, as I argue in the book, that economic and social mobility in America today is close to record lows. Only 35 percent of Americans feel today that they're going to be better off than their parents, and when the American Dream was really flowering, that number used to be 70 to 80 percent of people felt that they'd be better off than their parents. So there's a whole host of data to show here that the problem and the disaffection with the economic system is much deeper than just the pandemic-driven surge in inflation.Economic booms (6:12)Is there anything about this economy that four or five years of above-average economic growth won't solve? I sort of recall that in the early '90s, you could have made a very similar case that we had a nasty recession in the early '90s. Some people have forgotten about it, but it was a bad recession. And then we had the Gulf War, and there were a lot of newspaper articles saying that the era of fast growth was over, America just couldn't grow fast anymore, and just as people were convinced that the good days were over, the economy took over, internet boom, tech boom, and we had very rapid growth—and, interestingly, it was also a period of high inequality, but people didn't seem to care so much because the economy was cooking and real wages were rising. So is there anything wrong that a little bit of faster growth couldn't solve?In terms of the fact that I remember living through that era, and I think that if you compare the polling data, it shows the fact that the problems are much deeper now, and the disaffection is much deeper than what was there, in terms of the fact that what solved it back then — even back then, the basic faith in American capitalism was never lost. I think that what's happened now is a feeling that we don't have an equality of opportunity anymore, and that inequality levels now have risen much further than back then. So I think that it's always possible for some hopeful turn to take place, but I'd say that the problems this time are much deeper, and that's what I try and say: Why has this happened? The book is a deep investigation of why has this happened systematically over time. We've gotten to a point now where, across the Western world, leaders are universally, almost, unpopular, and they are also struggling to get reelected. This is happening in Europe, and I argue in the book that capitalism is in worse shape in Europe: much more statist, much more bureaucratic, much more intrusive, and Europe's an even greater regulatory hegemon than America is. So something which is going on across Western societies for this disaffection and feeling that the American government is more pro-business than it is pro-competition, which should be the essence of capitalism.Pain management (8:49)But where do you think it all went wrong?That's the crux of the argument. As the tagline of the book goes, that capitalism did not fail, it was ruined. What ruined it? As I show, that it is the suite of government habits, that how the government's role in American society has come to resemble that of pain management, which is the fact that every time there is the slightest hint of pain, we administer opiates. That's one of the reasons we have the opiate crisis, where people are just hooked to opiates, because at the slightest pain, you give them opiate to relieve the pain without quite solving the underlying cause of the problem. I think, in a similar way, what's happened with American capitalism is the fact that the government has been trying to socialize risk and take risk out of the system to try and mitigate pain, and in doing so, it's got the economy hooked to constant stimulus, constant government intervention, which is leading to a lot of perverse consequences.What are those purpose consequences? One of them, as I've argued in the book, is that productivity has declined. Now remember, capitalism is supposed to generate lots of competition, lead to more creative destruction, lead to an increase in productivity, and productivity is the key to economic growth. But in the last 30 to 40 years, we have seen a big decline in productivity growth across the western world, including in the United States.On the other hand, we have seen a lot of deadwood being kept alive due to all these interventions. The culture of bailouts, the culture of regulation, has kept a lot of deadwood alive in the system, which is not only dampening productivity growth, but it's preventing the entry of new businesses and new firms to come. As a result, the pace of startups in this country today has gone down significantly. It's picked up a bit after the pandemic, but for the last 30 to 40 years, the rate of new startups in this country has declined.So I think that the systematic increase in the government's involvement in the economy has led to these perverse consequences, and those changes are quite recent. The American government was never this involved at a very basic level. The share of government spending in the economy was just three percent a hundred years ago. It has gone up over time, now we're closing in on 40 percent, the government spending, the share of the economy.But it's not just that. The culture of bailouts: America never believed that it should be bailing out private sector enterprises. And yet, from the 1980s onwards, it's been an increased culture of bailouts. Before that, America did not do bailouts of private-sector companies, but once the precedent was set with the large financial sector bailout of 1984 of Continental Illinois, you've seen one bailout after another, and get bigger and bigger with each crisis.And then, of course, you have the entire role that the Fed has played the, US Central Bank, in the way it has tried to micromanage the cycle and always try to act with policies where, on the upside, it's fine if markets rise, but on the downside, it's there to protect and socialize risk, which, once again, has undermined productivity and kept a lot of deadwood and possibly zombie companies alive.So it's this suite of government habits that I think has corroded capitalism and brought us to this position today where capitalism is so distorted.Famously, during the financial crisis, President Bush said, in his own colloquial way, “This sucker is going down.” Would you just have “let this sucker go down” rather than bail out banks back in 2008?Each bailout seems justifiable because, at that point in time, you're in the midst of a crisis, and there's always this fear that if you don't bail out, we will end up being like the liquidationists of the 1929s and lead to a Great Depression. And I think that“Liquidate farmers! Liquidate labor!” Andrew Mellon.Totally correct. But I think that the impulse now is the opposite, which is, “liquefy, liquefy, liquefy.” So even in 2008, if you needed to intervene to prevent a financial crisis, they can argue that was justifiable. But after that, look at what happened: the Fed continued to do quantitative easing, to lift asset prices, thinking that high asset prices will be good for economic growth, whereas it only increased inequality because the owners of asset prices tend to be the rich, and put many aspirants of the property market, or buyers of the property market, it put those things out of reach.And then also the fact that you had, in terms of the last year, when you had the Silicon Valley Bank problems, you intervened again to try and prevent it. And again, the fear is raised that if you don't intervene, you'll have the Great Depression. So I think we need to find a balance here, which is that you've gone from “liquidate, liquidate, liquidate” to now “liquefy, liquefy, liquefy.” And I think that we need to get back to some balance and, yeah, there is a role for government, like in a terrible crisis, but you can't have a government always be there to intervene at this slightest hint of trouble. That is what causes problems.Populist policy (14:38)If we indeed live in a populist political age, I would assume that I would see more intervention, and more bailouts, and more pain-prevention, because that's what populism is. Populism is saying that you've been taken advantage of by the elites, it's not your fault, and if it's not your fault, you shouldn't feel any pain, therefore we will intervene to help you. Government will help you. So wouldn't you expect in the near future just to have more of this kind of thing: more pain-management public policy?I think that you're right that this trend can continue, because the default path of politicians is to keep doing what they've been doing unless there's a crisis which forces them to reverse course and forces, I'd say, American society then to wake up and say, “This is not working.” But to say that this is a populist thing, I'm not sure, because this is the strategy which has been pursued for the last few years, if not decades, which is what I've argued in the book. So if you're going to keep pursuing the same strategy, then you should not expect different outcomes. If the strategy of so-called populism of more intervention was working, then why should so many people be upset with what's going on?I've been in the last few days talking about this book. I'm surprised at how receptive people have been to the idea that it's not the government's business to be bail out private sector companies. It's not the government's business to be instituting 3,000 new regulations a year. The average number of new regulations that the government would put into a year has gone up dramatically over the last couple of decades. Now, again, it is not the job of the government to be putting in so many regulations because the more regulations you put in, the harder it is for small and midsize businesses to thrive, and it creates a barrier to entry, because the cost of regulation has gone up significantly, it can be borne only by big businesses, the average business finds it more difficult. And also the lobbyists, then, are able to rewrite regulations in their favor, and they're hired typically by the Big Tech firms or the people with all the money.I think a populist agenda would favor deregulation. A populist agenda would say that you can't have the Fed run monetary policy which keeps on inflating asset prices, particularly property prices, and makes it harder and harder for Americans to afford a home. And similarly, a populist agenda should be against bailouts, because bailouts typically help the entrenched powerful companies rather than the average person. And as I said, it's time to try something different also because what's been tried so far is clearly not working in terms of making Americans happy.Catalyzing change (17:32)Let me ask you this, then: What do you see, then, that makes you think we're going to do something differently?I don't see anything as yet in terms of that, just because, as I said, the politicians will keep doing the same thing unless there's a crisis. What forces countries to change course, including the countries which are held by liberals as these great paragons of economic virtue like Sweden or the other Nordic countries?The bond market? Is that the action-forcing entity here? Would it be the bond market?Eventually, yes. I think that that's it, which that only when the markets stop financing these incredible deficits do you begin to see a course-correction. But what my book tries and does here is, as I said, the first step to a cure is to at least diagnose the problem correctly. So far, the diagnosis that the Biden administration offered was, “Oh, the government needs to double down because we have had this era of small government for the last 30 to 40 years. We need to double down on what the government's been doing to correct all these problems.” But the problem is this, that we never had an era of small government! So to say that now we need to reverse that era is just wrong. As I demonstrate in the book, capitalism has been about just expanding the government over the last 30 to 40, at least the capitalism practiced by the Western societies in the last few decades.So I would say that you're right that the bond market, eventually, is obviously the ultimate disciplinarian. It did that to Greece, it did that to Sweden, and other countries before that. But we don't seem to be at that point yet, but we could be, because the next time you have an economic downturn in the US, the budget deficit will widen to nine, 10 percent of GDP. As revenues fall, more and automatic spending kicks in, and, after that's done, the ability for interest rates to come down, which typically do to help a country go through a recession, I think will be quite limited in countries such as the United States, because your government spending would've been so high already by then.If I were to put together a short-but-sweet economic agenda to deal with some of these, I might say, “Boy, you're worried about debt and deficits?” I would say, “What we need is a value-added tax and we need to at least lower the projected pace of spending on social security and Medicare.” So Medicare reform, social security reform, a value-added tax—and if I tried running on that agenda, I think they would run me out of town.Since we don't have politicians generally calling for that, isn't the revealed preference of American voters for more of the same: “Don't tax me, but also don't take away my benefits,” and off we go. If there was this deep swell for any change that you think might be there, based on maybe your conversations with folks, wouldn't it be already reflected by our politicians? But I don't see that.Yeah, you're absolutely correct that politicians don't live in a vacuum, they react to a societal chain. But my point is that no one seems to be doing . . . I just pointed out to you that outside of this so-called “tough medicine,” which you just highlighted, there are other things which can be done in terms of drawing the line on bailouts, drawing the line on instituting new regulations. Even Trump came to par, he spoke about the fact that he's going to withdraw two regulations for every one that he puts into place. In the end, though, he ended up putting out as many regulations per year as the Obama administration had done, so there was no change in that.So I think this tough medicine, which is hard to administer, and societies only bear tough medicine once they see an apparent crisis, not something more insidious, like what I'm describing in the book, maybe yes, but there are things, as I said, whether it's got to do with the conduct of monetary policy, or it's got to do with regulation, or the culture of bailouts, I think these things can change, and the American voter will be much more receptive to it.What's the option? That the politicians keep doing what they're doing today, the person in office will keep being unpopular and keep losing elections. As I pointed out in the book, as well, and in one of my FT [Financial Times] columns, that if you look at it, the number of politicians across the Western world who are getting reelected is declining. Typically, if you were in office, you had the platform, that if you stood for reelection, you'd get reelected. In the last few years, being an incumbent has become a disadvantage rather than an advantage. So clearly the people are unhappy, and if the politicians are going to keep doing the same thing, they should be more prepared to lose elections once in office.Well, I think maybe they should be prepared to lose elections. Maybe they all should pray for an AI-driven productivity boom, that'll cover up a lot of bad policy.Yes, we got that briefly in the late '90s and early 2000s when you had a big tech productivity boom, which took place with the internet, but that has faded over time, and as I argue in the book that you can keep doing all this great technological stuff, but if you're going to undermine the fabric of capitalism, the creative-destructive fabric of capitalism with much more government intervention and more statist policies, then you should be prepared also to see a decline in productivity, and that will offset the gains coming from technology like AI.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.Micro Reads▶ Business/ Economics* ChatGPT Maker OpenAI Goes Smaller and Cheaper With New AI Tech - WSJ* The Mysterious Slowdown in US Manufacturing Productivity - SSRN* Can the returns from Big Tech's staggering capex live up to the hype? - FT Opinion* Trapped! China and the ‘middle-income trap' - CEPR* The Economic Populists Have a Point - WSJ Opinion* Pandemic Layoffs and the Role of Stay-At-Home Orders - San Francisco Fed* Is Greece's Six-Day Work Week a Harbinger? - Project Syndicate▶ Policy/Politics* Trump's Tariffs Will Send Prices Up Mount McKinley for Americans - Bberg * California is a battleground for AI bills, as Trump plans to curb regulation - Wapo* Trump Is Wrong About Taiwan's Chip Industry - Bberg Opinion* Why planetary problems need a new approach to politics - Aeon* Political chaos rattles clean energy investors - E&E▶ AI/Digital* Data for A.I. Training Is Disappearing Fast, Study Shows - NYT* Generative AI Can Harm Learning - SSRN* The Push to Develop Generative A.I. Without All the Lawsuits - NYT ▶ Biotech/Health* Retinol's anti-ageing effects may work by changing your skin microbes - NS▶ Clean Energy/Climate* AI Is Already Wreaking Havoc on Global Power Systems - Bberg* Our Understanding Of How To Modulate Climate Change Is Ballooning – Issues & Insights ▶ Space/Transportation* Advanced Propulsion Researchers from GE Aerospace Successfully Test Cutting-Edge Dual-Mode Hypersonic Ramjet - The Debrief▶ Substacks/Newsletters* Bad and good arguments for industrial policy - Noahpinion* Forget Adapting to Climate Change - Breakthrough JournalFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

✈ A quick note: I will be traveling through the middle of the month and will be posting a bit less than usual and perhaps a bit shorter than usual.After decades of resistance to nuclear power, growing concern over climate change, rising electricity needs, and a desire for greater energy independence are spurring renewed public interest in a future powered by atomic fission (perhaps fusion, too). Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk to Dr. Mike Goff about the state of US nuclear power, the developing advancements in nuclear technology, and what it will take to reach our vast potential.Goff is the acting assistant secretary and the principal deputy assistant secretary for the Department of Energy's Office of Nuclear Energy. He previously spent over 30 years at Idaho National Laboratory, including a major advisory and management role. He has written over 70 publications on the nuclear fuel cycle.In This Episode* Atomic Age 2.0 (1:31)* Major concerns (7:37)* Out of practice (11:04)* Next-generation policy (17:38)* Human capital (21:48)* Fusion forecast (23:12)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationAtomic Age 2.0 (1:31)The Energy Secretary recently spoke about adding a lot more nuclear capacity, tripling it, I think, by 2050 or so. And before we get into whether that's possible, I wanted to ask you: As you understand it, what is the current consensus explanation for why the Nuclear and Atomic Age of the '50s and '60s, why that kind of ended? Because when the secretary spoke about building more capacity, I thought about the — and this is something maybe a lot of people are unaware of, that President Nixon had a plan to build a lot of more nuclear reactors in this country back in the '70s during the oil crisis; that didn't happen, and we all know about Three Mile Island. But is there a consensus as to why Atomic Age 1.0 came to an end? Obviously we still get a lot of energy from nuclear, but not what people had imagined 40 years ago.There are a variety of reasons. We did build a lot at one point, and we were building 10 plants a year, pretty extensive builds out there. We did then have Three Mile Island in the late '70s, and then we got costs started going up, and schedules started increasing on the builds, and we ended up not having a lot of energy growth, in fact, we went for a long period where we weren't having a lot of energy growth, and we had a lot of other energy sources, natural gas, coal, and all. We had a lot of other energy sources out there as well. So yeah, we became pretty stagnated around 20 percent of the electricity. But now, like you say, yeah, there's been a big change in what we think the needs are for nuclear going forward, for a variety of reasons.My background is journalism, and as a journalist I've written, I know, multiple stories in my life about a Nuclear Renaissance. So I'm wondering why this time looks to be different. You suggested in your previous answer that there might be some reasons. What are those reasons that we may be entering a new age where we will see an expansion in the nuclear sector?I do think we will see that expansion, and, in fact, I think we have to see that expansion, and it's because of a lot of the positive attributes of nuclear right now. Obviously there's a lot of focus on trying to get more clean energy out there, and nuclear is a large base load source of clean energy. And it's not just CO2 emission, but it doesn't emit particulates and all, as well, so it's good air, good quality of life. So it has those key attributes. But there are other clean energy sources as well: renewables, hydro, and all that. But I think the recognition that, if you are going to go toward decarbonization, you need still base load electricity too. You need base load electricity to help intermittent sources like renewables to be able to expand more as well. So nuclear is very good at enabling decarbonization, not just by adding clean electricity to the grid, but enabling you to expand out other renewables like wind and solar and all, as well.Additionally, nuclear is very reliable. Of the energy sources, it has the highest capacity factor of any of the energy sources. In the United States, we run 93 percent of the time, so the existing fleet that we have out there of 94 plants, they're producing a 100 percent of the power 93 percent of the time, which dwarfs what any other energy source does out there as well.Nuclear is safe. At times people are concerned about safety, but, in reality, it's actually one of the safest energy sources out there and continues to demonstrate that.It's resilient for different weather-related events. It can still produce electricity out there as well. It also has a lot of energy security. And as we've learned, unfortunately, from Russia's unprovoked and unjustified invasion of Ukraine, we recognize energy security is national security, so nuclear really does help us on that national security front. It provides an energy source that we can largely on-source from us and our allies. We've got assured fuel supplies, and provides that long-term power. You can put fuel in it and it can last for two years or so.And I guess one other thing I'll add out there as well, is it's a job creator. Of the different energy sources, the amount of jobs associated with nuclear are some of the highest on the amount of electricity produced. And when you actually start building nuclear, like we saw in Vogtle in Georgia where they were building the two plants, it creates huge amounts of jobs. In fact, I heard a stat recently that 35,000 union workers were trained as part of the construction of the Vogtle power plant, so it's a good job creator in all, as well. And again, the power density is great, it doesn't take up a lot of space, and with the advanced technologies that we've developed in the United States, you've continued to increase in the safety, you can have plants of a variety of different sizes that can be easily deployed to, say, retiring coal plants. It just has a lot of flexibility that it hasn't had in the past, but also it's that key recognition of its clean energy attributes, but its energy security attributes as well.Major concerns (7:37)I did not major in nuclear science, I majored in history and political science, but I remember I took a class as an undergraduate at Northwestern University on the nuclear fuel cycle, and I remember to this day that my professor — of course, this was obviously a while ago, and I think what most of the students knew about nuclear energy was probably Three Mile Island — and I remember to this day distinctly the professor saying, “If they wanted to build a nuclear reactor in my backyard, I would be totally fine with it.” He had zero fear on the safety issue. Now when you give that rap that you just gave me about the wonders of nuclear energy before regular people, what is their response? Do they worry about the nuclear waste? Do they worry about safety? Are they immediately sold, or what are the concerns that typically get raised to you?You brought them up. I mean, safety is brought up because you do see these high profile accidents like Three Mile Island, Chernobyl, Fukushima, which were accidents. They weren't good things that you want to have happen, but the industry's also a very learning industry. The improvements that come out of those events have just made the industry even safer and safer. And again, it's still safer than most any other electricity-producing industry out there as well.Waste does get brought up. We have not implemented a final disposal solution for the spent fuel from our reactors, but we have safely stored and managed the spent fuel over the last six decades, and the amount of fuel that's generated, I think the stat that gets tossed around, you could fit it all in a Walmart parking lot. This is not a lot of material because it's a high energy-density fuel. It's not a lot of material, and again, we safely manage that and store that. We have countries now that are moving forward with geological repositories, which we need to be doing in the United States. In fact, just last week, I went and visited the repository that hopefully will be operating next year in Finland for disposing of their spent fuel. We can do that, it's not a technical issue, so we can safely manage the spent fuel.The other issue that always comes up is still cost. We do have to demonstrate now that we can build these plants safely, and efficiently, and at a reasonable cost. On the Vogtle plant there were cost overruns and schedule overruns, but between Vogtle Unit 3 and Unit 4, there was about a 30 percent reduction in costs between those plants, so we are starting to get to where we can be deploying nth-of-a-kind cost plants out there as well. And hopefully with some of the small modular reactor designs and all that are going to rely more on modular construction, we can even get to nth-of-a-kind cost even quicker. It still takes some pushing and understanding to make sure that people do understand the advancements that have been made on nuclear technology, that it's not our parents' nuclear technology, there's a new round of technology out there.Out of practice (11:04)You raised two good points there. The cost issue, and that's a great stat about the Vogtle plant and the reduction between the two reactors. Is it your sense that the fact that we haven't been consistently building reactors and learning from the previous build, and having trained people who've worked on multiple reactors, that each one has become like this bespoke mega project? It's my sense, and it seems logical, at least to me, that that has been a cost driver, that we haven't been able to churn these out like 10 a year, every year, decade after decade, because clearly, if that was the case, I don't see how we don't learn how to build them better, faster, and more efficiently. But that's not what we've been doing, obviously.That's right. It's not. Even when I say with Vogtle, you had to stand back up the whole supply chain, you had to retrain the workforce, so there was a lot of learning in that process, even though, too, we did recognize on that plant you need to have designs very well finalized and standardized as well. One of the problems we realized from the buildout of the 90-something plants that we have now is no two plants were ever that similar. Everyone wanted to make a tweak in their plant, so we never got to where we had standardized designs. So I think now that we're getting that trained workforce, getting the supply chain up there, and our vendors are really saying, “We're doing standardized plants. If someone else wants to make a tweak on this plant, they have to go somewhere else,” that people are going to go with standardized designs so we can really replicate these and get that cost benefit from it. The challenges that you brought up, we have to overcome, and I think we're set up now to be able to overcome that. I appreciate all the effort that went into building Units 3 and 4 at Vogtle. We've got enough benefit from that learning there and hopefully build very soon here.There's a world where we have tripled our nuclear generating capacity, as Secretary Granholm said. Can that be a world where we get all our nuclear power from light water nuclear reactors, or must there be different kinds of reactors? You mentioned the small modular reactors, and I've interviewed startups doing microreactors, I don't know, maybe they'll be used to power data centers, but can that world of greatly increased nuclear generation, even with improvements in light water reactors, must there be different kinds of reactors?I wouldn't say “must.” I think there will be. I think we will have that variability. I think we will still have large plants being built. I think maybe five years ago you wouldn't hear that people were talking about building gigawatt-sizes plants again. I think we'll have the gigawatt-size plants, we'll have the small modular reactors that are water-cooled, but I think we will get some of those advanced reactors out there: the Generation IV reactors, the sodium-cooled fast reactors that have the capacity to be able to burn waste better and also increase the sustainability of the amount of fuel they use. I think you'll also have the high-temperature gas reactors that are helium-cooled, that use TRISO fuel. You'll have those because we need to not only decarbonize the electricity sector, we've got to decarbonize the industrial sector. That's much more challenging, and the high temperatures that can be provided from those reactors will help us in that decarbonization process. So I think we will have a mixture out there. There are cases where the Gen IV systems are going to be better than the gigawatt-sized plants for the needs that are out there, but large power plants are going to be needed as well. Especially, like you say, you bring up the data centers, the amount of growth that we're hearing for electricity right now, I think again, we'll see gigawatt-sized plants will be needed to be able to meet that growth.Yeah, I tell you, nothing frustrates me more than reading about what AI could perhaps do for our economy and then having people say, “Well, but we know we can't do it because we can't supply the power” or “We can't supply enough clean power,” I mean, well then it'd be sure great to have more nuclear energy. And I wonder, as you sort of tick off some of the potential advances and new kinds of reactors, maybe I look backward too much, but I can't help but wonder what nuclear reactors would be like today, where we would be today, maybe we would already have fusion reactors had we proceeded with this kind of momentum every decade since 1980. It drives me crazy, and you're a nuclear engineer, that must drive you crazy.It does, I've been doing this . . . my first job in the nuclear industry was almost 40 years ago when I was still in college, and there have definitely been ups and downs in funding. In fact, there were some periods where there was almost zero research and development dollars spent in the government on nuclear energy. Luckily, though, the thing that we have is, under the four presidential administrations, there's been a real steady climb in the recognition of the importance of nuclear, and the funding to support it. So I'm happy that we have had this period that goes back to the early 2000s that's been really steady growth in recognition of nuclear. If we would've not had some of those laws in the late '80s and '90s, yeah, we could probably be further ahead, especially on some of the advanced technologies. Because yes, some of those advanced technologies started on research that was back in the '50s, '60s and '70s: the sodium-cooled fast reactor, the molten salt reactor, all of those were based on R&D that we did back in the early days, as well.Next-generation policy (17:38)Which leads me to this question: You work for the government. I work for a public policy think tank, so of course I'm going to think about: Given where we are today, what government needs to do going forward, both on the R&D front and on the regulatory front, are we doing enough basic research for whatever the next, or the next next generation of nuclear is, and do we now have the kind regulatory framework we need for that next generation of reactors?I'll go to the research one first—and I should note, my background is, I'm an R&D person, I came out of the national labs, so of course we always need more research and development. But that said, we have been blessed by funding from Congress and the administration that there's a significant amount of money for research and development in the United States. And I'll say that's good, because the one thing I will note, I do believe innovation in the US, as far as the nuclear technology, we are the best. The technologies that we're developing and our vendors are deploying it, really, it is the cutting edge technology, so it's good we have that R&D, and it's important, as you know, we need to continue to have it to move forward on that next generation of technologies and continue to make improvements on the technologies out there. So I think we have a good research base.There's some infrastructure that we still need if we start deploying, say, when we mentioned that sodium-cooled fast reactor, we don't have a testing capability for that type of system. We shut down our last testing system on a fast reactor in 1994. We would probably need some additional infrastructure. But again, we have a pretty good base. And I'll say that also on the regulatory side. We do have a pretty good base as well. The Nuclear Regulatory Commission is obviously focused on light water reactors throughout its history, but they've actually been doing a good job at being able to work with some of the developers. We have three entities out there that are working on Generation IV reactors. TerraPower did submit their construction authorization to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, and they've accepted it, so they're working well with them, even though they have a water-based system. Hopefully X-energy, who's doing a high-temperature gas reactor, working with the government and all, as well, will be moving forward, as well. And we've had a third that's working in the molten salt space, a molten salt-cooled reactor that has already received a construction permit to go forward on a prototype reactor, a Kairos company.I'm sure there's got to be reforms still on the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and make sure that we are timely and responding to license applications, but they are moving in the right direction. There's been a lot of interface with various laws, whether it's the NEICA (Nuclear Energy Innovation Capabilities Act), or NEIMA (Nuclear Energy Innovation and Modernization Act), two bills that were passed a little while back looking at reforming. And I think there still needs to be improvements and still need to be increase in the resource and capacity of the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, but they're heading in the right direction.We have a good regulator, and that's one of the things that helps us make sure we feel that we can deploy this technology safely here, but also helps us in exporting our technology, where we can say, “Our technology has been licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission,” which has such a high view externally in other countries, that helps us. So I want them to continue to be that safe regulator, but again, they are continuing to work to improve and streamline the process. Hopefully we get toward where we're standardizing, that we don't have to have a lot of interface and we don't — that'll come to the utilities, too — we don't make changes once we've got something approved, so we hopefully can speed up the process from the utility side, and all is well.Human capital (21:48)Are we going to turn out enough nuclear engineers? I imagine that, for a while, that probably seemed like a hard sell to someone who had an interest in science and engineering, to be in this industry versus some others. Probably a little easier sell; are we going to have enough people going into that to build all these reactors?We are going to need to continue to increase it. We're already seeing the uptick, though, in that area. I'll note: Our office, the office of Nuclear Energy, we've really — going back to the 2010 timeframe — really recognized that we needed to do more in that area, so we actually started investing almost 20 percent of our R&D budget to the universities to hopefully foster that next generation. And in fact, this year we just hit the mark where we've now spent $1 billion since the start of those programs on the universities to make sure we're doing R&D there and getting that next generation of folks out there. It's something that we've got to continue to focus on to make sure that we do. Because yeah, if we triple, it's going to need a lot more nuclear engineers. But I also note, the thing I'm concerned about also is making sure we have the right trades and all, as well. If we're building these plants, making sure you have the welders, the pipe fitters, and all, that's going to be a big challenge, as well, especially if we're going to start building, say, 10 plants a year. That's a lot of people out there.Fusion forecast (23:12)I'm excited about the prospects for nuclear fusion, and I've talked to people at startups, and it has probably looked as promising as it ever has. How promising is it? How should I think about it as being part of our energy solution going forward, given where we're at? In fact, there are no commercial nuclear fusion reactors right now. Obviously people at startups give a lot of optimistic forecasts. How should I even think about that as being a partial solution in the coming decades? How do you look at it, at least?I think it can be part of the solution in the coming decades. I think some of the changes that's taken place, especially over the last two years where there is more of a change to focus on, not fusion as a science program, but fusion as deployment, as an energy producer, you look at it as an applied energy. I think that's an important change that's occurred over the last two years, and the fusion programs within the Department of Energy are much more focused to that. It's similar to what's happened somewhat with fission. Fission, about 15 years ago, it was government-driven, and you pull along industry, until about 15 years ago you started having industry investing a lot of money and pulling along the government. You're now starting to see that happen in fusion, where people are doing a lot of a private investment, they're pulling along the government, and the government's working to see, how can we use the resources of the government to enable it? So I think it will happen. I don't think fusion is going to be producing electricity to the grid this decade, but I think the vision that's been put forth by the government is their bold, decade-old vision to have a fusion pilot facility sometime within the decade. I think that is feasible. So maybe before the 2050s you can start having fusion generating some of our electricity. I'm a fission person at my heart, but I think fusion is, we're getting much more focused on moving it forward as an electricity source, and that'll help it be able to be deployed sometime here in our lifetime.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. 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Artificial intelligence may revolutionize the American economy, but whether we see that potential actualized depends on a few key factors: whether generative AI is a general purpose technology, whether the labor force makes a smooth pivot, how employers prioritize their resources, and whether the US chooses to take the lead in AI's deployment. These are just a few of the topics I cover on the podcast today with Guy Ben-Ishai.Ben-Ishai is the head of economic policy research at Google. He previously served as a principal at the Brattle Group and as chief economist in the office of the attorney general of the state of New York. He is also a co-author of the paper “AI and the Opportunity for Shared Prosperity: Lessons from the History of Technology and the Economy.”In This Episode* Is gen AI a general purpose tech? (1:22)* Risks and benefits (7:46)* Barriers to a boom (14:27)* Investing in employees (19:16)* Human-complimenting AI (25:29)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationIs GenAI a general purpose tech? (1:22)Pethokoukis: Do you have any doubt that generative AI, and perhaps machine learning more broadly, is an important general purpose technology that will eventually make a substantial and measurable impact in the economic statistics and productivity and economic growth? Ben-Ishai; The immediate response is absolutely, but let me unpack that: Do I have doubts about the immense potential of the technology? No, and I'm saying that very confidently, which is uncommon for an economist. We put together the paper that you've initially cited at Google to look exactly at that question: When we say that AI marks a pivotal moment in human history, what does that actually mean for an economist? And I think the conclusion there that we're looking not in an ordinary technology, but rather at a general purpose technology, that is immense. That means that we're probably looking at the most transformative economic development of our generation. And to think, Jim, that the two of us are having a conversation about that today, that is historic. I feel incredibly privileged and lucky to think and work of these issues in our day and age.But the second part of your question alluded to not the potential, but actually the actual impact. And if there's one takeaway from that exercise from the paper that we put together and from my conversation with so many academics and policymakers around the world, is that this is not just a watershed moment, it's not just a pivotal moment in human history, it's a fragile moment as well. This story can easily be a story of missed opportunity. I think that we so easily take for granted the fact that, yes, we will of course develop AI and deploy it and apply it very successfully. And it's so easy to get caught in the moment, particularly as the nation that advanced the science, I think somewhere in the back of the minds of all of us, there's that presumption that we will be the global leaders in deployment of AI. I am actually worried about that. To ensure that we are, it's a tumultuous, fragile, and careful process that we've got to be really thoughtful about, with a lot of deliberate action about what we do, how do we proceed, and how do we ensure that we are indeed the ones that capitalize on the potential?It's remarkable how quickly the narrative around American tech has shifted. Not long ago, Silicon Valley faced criticism for focusing on social media rather than groundbreaking innovations like the Apollo program or cancer cures. Now, they've unveiled generative AI, potentially the most significant technology of our era.Regarding fragility, it's worth considering why AI might need special handling. Unlike the seamless diffusion of technologies like the internal combustion engine or electricity, AI seems more akin to nuclear power - a technology that was stifled by regulation. Do we need a proactive agenda to prevent AI's potential from being similarly constrained?That's a great question, Jim. I'm so tempted to go back to your first part of the question about the importance of digital technologies, and economists get a really bad rap, but try to be a librarian these days. We tend to overlook the tremendous importance of information as a driver of economic growth in our economies. And even if you look just at small businesses and the tremendous opportunities that digital technologies have provided them. To think that a mom and shop store today can actually run a marketing campaign, analyze its customer base on large databases, export products to far markets, those are things that used to be the exclusive domain of just a few large companies that today are actually available broadly and widely through digital technologies. And maybe it's the fault of economists that we are not shouting off the tops of mountains frequently enough about the tremendous power of information and digital technologies and the accumulation of knowledge as a driver of economic growth.The application of knowledge and intelligence — that seems to me to be pretty important.I cannot agree more! And I think, to a great degree, it explains some of the tremendous optimism around AI as a technology that really reduces the barriers to interact with technology and democratizes its use in a way that we haven't seen before.Risks and benefits (7:46)We quickly shifted from marveling at AI's potential to fixating on its risks — existential threats, job losses, and disinformation. But let's step back for a moment. Can you elaborate on why you see this as an exciting technology with significant benefits? It seems many people aren't fully aware of its upside potential.That's a great question, this is really the reason why we at Google, too, we paused for a minute and kind of wanted to think about this. We're at a sector where enthusiasm is in no short supply, so what does it actually mean when we say that this is a pivotal moment in human history? What does it mean for economists? I think it really boils down to this question of: Is AI an ordinary technology, or is it really a general purpose technology? That is the term of art that economists use, and I think it's actually important to pause for a minute and think about that, because it's critical. A general purpose technology is not just pervasive in use, it is a technology that enables productivity-enhancing applications to be applied across all segments and entire economies in ways that are not just advancing and accelerating economic growth, but are also expanding the frontier of innovation and technology. It's a source of ongoing and continual innovations.And if you think about it for a minute, if you think about the prior general purpose technologies that we've had, if it's electricity, if it's personal computers, or it's the steam engine, their impact was tremendous. And at the time that they were launched, I think nobody had the perfect vision of where . . . we of course knew where we started, in the very same way that we do today about AI, but it's really difficult, if not impossible, to know where we will end. The compounding nature of these technologies is immense, particularly when you're looking at a general use technology and multi-domain technology that can lead to applications on such a broad basis. I don't think that today we can envision what new occupations, new applications, new sectors will emerge as a result of AI. And I think the fact that it's not an ordinary technology, but rather a general purpose technology, that is important, that does imply that we're probably looking at the most profound economic transformation in our generation. That is huge.It's relatively straightforward to assess AI's ability to replicate current human tasks. But predicting the new possibilities it might unlock, like accelerating scientific discovery, is far more challenging. These potential upsides are difficult to quantify or model economically.While we can more easily grasp potential downsides like job automation (which isn't necessarily negative), the upsides are less tangible. They depend on entrepreneurs creating new businesses and scientists leveraging AI for breakthroughs. This makes it harder to definitively argue that the benefits will outweigh any drawbacks.Oh my God, Jim, I cannot agree more, and I think that there's two issues, and you have written about this just recently, and I think that there's really two issues that come up, at least in my mind, as a reaction to some of the studies that really focus on the measurement. We're trying to really drill this question of, “What will be the productivity gain from AI over the next five or 10 years?” I don't want to dismiss that question —And can you give it to me within three decimal points, right?Exactly! But we're doing such a huge disservice as economists when we focus on that. I think it really pertains to two reasons that you brought up. The first one relates to measurement. We are really looking, these studies are primarily based on occupational exposure of existing work streams. Little do we know today about what new work streams, occupations, tasks, creativity, or human endeavors will actually be triggered by this new technology. In a way, we're really just looking under a flashlight rather than thinking about the broader issue, the broader economic benefits that will emerge, kind of like the unknown unknowns that we know today about this technology.Just to put it in perspective, think about the printing press that led to a scientific revolution. Think about the steam engine that led to an industrial revolution, to an electronic circuit that led to the digital age. We are at that point with AI today, and to think that we're looking at SOC, standard occupational codes, to look at the future impact on productivity, I think minimizes the value of our profession.The other point that you touched on, which I think is so incredibly important: We're missing the point. It's really not about the third decimal point of our estimates. It's about the fact that we can reshape technology. Rather than measuring its benefit, let's actually make sure that we can capitalize on the potential. That is far more important than anything else. And at some point, we'll go back to your other question about fragility, but there are genuine barriers that we need to address collectively as a society. And if we are not going to do it, other countries will, right? And I think economists have a role in that conversation. I think that is the critical issue that we need to focus on.Barriers to a boom (14:27)We have a technology that seems, right now, it's fast evolving, but it seems pretty darn important. It's hard to believe that we've only really been having the specific conversation about generative AI for maybe a year and a half or so publicly. So what are the barriers? If this turns out not to be an important technology that's widely diffused throughout the American economy, what went wrong? What are the barriers that concern you?I think there are three main categories that we focus on. First and foremost, you need digital infrastructure. I think it's a misconception, and I think we will learn that very quickly over the next few years, that AI or digital infrastructure is limited to broadband. It is increasingly becoming more so about access to data, large data centers, and compute power. And I think not just the US, but many other countries, will realize, or are in the process of understanding very soon, that those are the type of investments that one needs to make in order to deploy the technology. That's one category.Another one is the regulatory environment and the legal standards. You know Jim, and this is something you've of course written about a lot, I don't think that no single country deliberately chooses to fall behind, and I think that we often fail to recognize the long-term impact and unintended consequences of regulations. We, of course, have a duty to protect, and there are areas that raise concern, but we have to balance that duty to protect with the desire to capitalize on the potential, to foster innovation, and to make sure, at the end of the day, that we emerge as the global leaders of this technology, that we lead its deployment. I think that the legal ecosystem is incredibly important in that respect and an important current dimension of competition between countries and the future over the deployment of AI.And the third one is our workforce readiness. We need a workforce transition strategy. Let me pause here for a minute. If our workforce is not ready for an AI transition, our employers and our companies would find it very difficult to actually implement and adopt AI. It's simple as that. And if our companies do not adopt AI applications or technologies, we will quickly find out that we will fall behind. If you're looking at the history of our labor markets, we have been not just resilient, consistently resilient in our institutions and labor market operations, but we've also been highly effective at transitioning individuals from low-productivity to high-productivity occupations.We used to be a primarily agrarian economy in the 19th century. We transitioned successfully to manufacturing, which at some point was about 27 percent of our workforce, now it's below 10 percent. From there, we switched on to services. We absorbed women into the workforce in an effective way. We have highly effective labor markets, which is a competitive advantage when we're thinking about global competition.At the very same time, it's not without a cost. And in a lot of ways, I do think that it can be a double-edged sword, because the competitiveness of our labor markets also implies, at least factually, that the relationships that we have between employer and employee tend to be less permanent than they are in other economies, and that implies that employers have less of an incentive to actually invest in employees. That may put us at a relative disadvantage compared to other countries that have longer relationships between employers and employees and can afford for actually employers to participate, to take part, whether it's through apprenticeships or training programs, in making sure that their workforce is ready for an AI transition. That, Jim, worries me. I think it's more than just making sure that individuals that may lose their job get reinstated in the workforce, it's really an economic strategic objective for us. Unless we take care of our workforce, we will find it exceedingly difficult to implement AI on an economy-wide basis.Investing in employees (19:16)While Washington isn't dictating data center construction, companies are investing heavily in this infrastructure. Shouldn't the same logic apply to workforce development? If understanding and working with AI technology is crucial for business survival, there's a strong private incentive to invest in employees' skills. This holds true even considering the unique structure of the American labor market compared to, say, Europe's.Let me pause for a minute, take it back one step so that we can think about why is investment in worker training and vocational programs are so difficult? Why are they so challenging, and why do they perhaps create externalities, the way that we just discussed, more broadly? Why are they ultimately a strategic concern for the US economy? So look, these programs are exceptionally difficult to get right in an ordinary course of business. And we at Google have invested a tremendous amount of resources on these programs, which are not a core product for us. They're not even a monetizable product for us. And we're not the only ones. A lot of other tech companies have done the same, to be honest.Now, what are the challenges with these programs? First and foremost, they have to be relevant and they have to provide education, skills, programs that are actually relevant, that keep up to date with the advancements in technology. That is something that's really difficult to do. You have to make sure that employers are actually buying in. We may have the best program, but unless it enables the individuals who graduated from the program to signal to employers that these are individuals with high qualifications because they went through a program, let's say at Google, the program is simply not going to work.And then the third thing, think about it from the employee perspective: For an individual, it's not about giving somebody a pamphlet, “Hey, let's participate in this great program.” It's really about, can you take time off, at a tremendous opportunity cost of time with your family, career, and work, to invest in a serious program that would end up in an outcome which actually lands you at a better career, more stable job, that is better paid. Those are tremendously difficult in the ordinary course of business, let alone when we're going through a transition where we don't even know today how tasks and occupations will evolve. Now, as I mentioned, private tech firms, because of also market expertise and access to occupational data that is far better, in a lot of ways, than what the government data that we have on occupations are perfectly positioned to carry out those programs. The question is whether they can be actually carried out independently, unilaterally, without the collaboration of federal agencies, whether it's local governments, state or federal, without the participation of employers, colleges and other institutions —It sounds to me like employers will have to be part of this.For sure. Jim, maybe let me just mention one thing that we don't want to do. We've been in this movie before. Following NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement), we had the trade adjustment programs where we invested a lot of money in rescaling and training employees, and the results were very minimal, at best. So I do think that this is the type of a grand challenge, if you will, that no single actor can really solve independently. And I know that we're naturally, as economists, we're naturally hesitant about government intervention, but what better role for a government can you think of other than identifying a market failure that is of strategic importance to the US economy, and in a thoughtful way, collaborating with other relevant constituents to come up with solutions that are effective. Scaling those programs to a national level is going to be a real challenge. And I do think that there's a role for governments to actually lead, in collaboration with other constituents, those efforts.And of course you are aware of the sort of deep skepticism among people about these programs.Yes.So obviously we talk about innovation, technological innovation, we also need program innovation, education innovation here.Jim, I've got to be perfectly honest here — and this is just my individual experience — as economists, I would be lying if I wouldn't say that I share that skepticism and concern. At the very same time, I think that we need to consider the other ramifications and what is truly an issue. We are at a certain disadvantage because of the lower incentives that our businesses have, our employers have, to invest in employees, and we see it. Apprenticeship programs is one example that is working phenomenally well in other places, but not in the US. So I do worry about that. In the paper, we didn't offer any descriptive solutions, but we really highlight the challenge here: How do we find market-based, thoughtful solutions to scaling and vocational programs so that our workforce can be ready for an AI transition?Human-complimenting AI (25:29)I'm skeptical of the idea that we can guide AI development through policy to ensure it complements rather than just automates human work. It's unclear what policy levers could effectively achieve this — tweaking the tax code seems unlikely to produce specific AI outcomes.But where we can make a difference is in human capital development. If we want AI that complements human skills and enables new business creation, we need to ensure people understand this technology. Currently, many don't, given its novelty. Focusing on education and skill development seems a more practical approach to shaping AI's impact.You know, Jim, it's really interesting, so Chris Pissarides, the Nobel Prize winner from London School of Economics, has a phenomenal paper about this question. He comes up with a very interesting finding that countries that actually invest in right regulatory environments and legal standards, that have the right infrastructure, that have the right environment to foster innovation, ultimately witness less concerns about substitution because the technology that's being advanced tends to be more complimentary, and as an economist, that makes a lot of sense to me.Let me pause for a minute and explain why: There is a genuine concern about whether AI is being deployed or used to substitute labor. And I think if you think about the Turing Trap that Eric Brynjolfsson has written about, this notion that you can come up with the most myopic, plug-and-play, cheapest AI application, put that in some individual function in your business, and replace existing work streams that are being done by humans, that is a genuine concern, particularly for firms that are looking for the highest rate of return, at the lowest cost, without really investing and transforming their business.As an economist, I can understand why that happens, but keep in mind that when that happens, those businesses are actually really failing to leverage and capitalize on the full potential of the technology. They're really going for the plug-and-play, cheapest applications. That's not good for labor because it leads to substitution. But certainly that's not good to the business, itself. In a competitive market—and I think one thing that we need to stress is the importance of competition in our markets—you'd anticipate that firms that actually go through the effort to invest, to reform, to transform their businesses, to reinvent themselves, are the ones that will prevail.And I would think that would be a very powerful lesson for other businesses if that is indeed the case, right?Exactly. And the question is, how can we promote this broader, more meaningful, more valuable application and adoption of AI? And I think it goes back to the fundamentals: You need the AI infrastructure, the right legal institutions and regulatory standards, and ultimately a workforce that is ready to transform. And I think once you put those together, I do believe (and I'm deliberately saying belief, because I don't know that we can really study this explicitly) that that will lead to more complementarity and augmentation, and less substitution.Historical precedent suggests that extreme job loss scenarios, like robots taking all jobs, are unlikely. While AI will undoubtedly cause disruption, do you believe it will follow the pattern of past technologies? That is, replacing some tasks, enhancing others, and creating entirely new job categories. Given the policies we've discussed, are you confident that this balanced outcome is achievable with AI, or do you have doubts?Oh my God, that's a tough question, Jim. You saved it for last.I'll add an addendum, I'll add a qualifier: within the next 20 years. I don't know what it'll look like in 100 years from now, but within our immediate lifetimes as workers, you and me.Let me address it in this way. Yes, absolutely, I am, I want to say, cautiously optimistic, because if we learned one thing from the last century, a period of time that reflects the most advanced technological progress in human history, is that we didn't witness an increase in unemployment and we didn't witness a decline in labor participation. That leads me to be optimistic about the future of AI as well. Having said that — I think you alluded to this — history doesn't always repeat itself, and we've never faced a technology that can automate such a wide range of human tasks and activities. So that should be concerning for us. We also should mention that, even if AI does not lead to mass unemployment or to net loss of jobs, there will be significant occupational and sectoral shifts if we get this right, which I am optimistic about us doing so. So that will be something that we will need to consider as well. So I would say, optimistic: absolutely. Cautiously optimistic: that's probably more correct.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. 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The image of the skyscraper is the hallmark of the modern city. Futuristic depictions of urban landscapes nearly always feature towering structures high above the clouds. Today, however, developing countries seem to be putting the greatest effort into building the most impressive skyscrapers, from the Burj Khalifa in the UAE, to the future Jeddah Tower in Saudi Arabia. Whether you love them or hate them, it's worth asking why we build skyscrapers and what their role will be in future cities. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I sit down with Jason Barr, author of Cities in the Sky: The Quest to Build the World's Tallest Skyscrapers.Barr is a professor of economics at Rutgers University – Newark, and is a member of the Rutgers Global Urban Systems PhD program. He is also the author of Building the Skyline: The Birth and Growth of Manhattan's Skyscrapers.In This Episode* Demand for the skyscraper (1:35)* The end of the skyscraper (9:00)* Pillars of commerce (14:05)* The sky's the limit (18:36)* Manhattan extension (23:04)* Trends and styles (24:23)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationThe image of the skyscraper is the hallmark of the modern city. Futuristic depictions of urban landscapes nearly always feature towering structures high above the clouds. Today, however, developing countries seem to be putting the greatest effort into building the most impressive skyscrapers, from the Burj Khalifa in the UAE, to the future Jeddah Tower in Saudi Arabia. Whether you love them or hate them, it's worth asking why we build skyscrapers and what their role will be in future cities. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I sit down with Jason Barr, author of Cities in the Sky: The Quest to Build the World's Tallest Skyscrapers.Barr is a professor of economics at Rutgers University – Newark, and is a member of the Rutgers Global Urban Systems PhD program. He is also the author of Building the Skyline: The Birth and Growth of Manhattan's Skyscrapers.Demand for the skyscraper (1:35)Pethokoukis: You obviously love skyscrapers, you're fascinated by them. You wrote a whole book on them. So I want to just start the very basic question: Why do skyscrapers fascinate you, and the people who aren't fascinated by them, what are they missing?Barr: Great questions. Well, I grew up on Long Island, and so I was always really fascinated with Manhattan. I grew up in the '70s, and so New York back then was a very dark, mysterious place for a youngster. So when I grew up, actually when I was in college, I started hanging out in the city. So to me, the skyline of Manhattan and New York City, they're just two sides of the same coin. I really developed an interest in tall buildings through my interest and fascination with Manhattan's and New York City's history.So when I came to Rutgers Newark, I just started doing research on tall buildings, especially in New York City: what was driving the heights of these buildings; there's all these interesting height cycles over the last 150 years. So I wrote my first book on the Manhattan skyline, that was called Building the Skyline, and then after that I thought, let's see what's happening around the rest of the world. So to me, the tall building is an interesting thing because it's part and parcel with urbanization, and I just personally don't think you could have one without the other.I think some people might think that skyscrapers are, at least for rich countries, that they're kind of a 20th-century thing that we did as we were growing, and cities were getting bigger, and skyscrapers are a part of that, but now they're for other parts of the world, parts of the world which are still urbanizing, which are still getting richer. Are skyscrapers are still a thing for America?The short answer is yes, but, given how dense cities are, tall buildings are just being added a lot more slowly. In New York, the population's kind of slowly growing, and so tall buildings are either replacing old buildings that are wearing out, or there's always this push by big global corporations to be in the newest and latest tall building. And obviously there's this international demand from people abroad to have an apartment — or national demand — global demand to have some kind of residential presence in New York. But the thing is, people in other countries: cities, planners, residents in other countries, they look to New York, they look to Chicago, and I think, for many of them, they see New York as something they want to emulate, and New York is, on just about almost any metric, it's probably the top global city. And so I think cities today, especially in China, and Asia more broadly, they're trying to kind of replicate that, what you might call “the Manhattan magic,” and I don't really think people in this country realize how much tall building construction is going on in other cities around the world. People in this country are a little bit more cynical about the role of the tall building in urban growth and in housing affordability and stuff like this, but other cities are basically going gangbusters, is a way to put it.Is that driven by fundamental economic forces? Is it kind of a “national greatness” kinds of signaling projects? Are there fundamental reasons, not just to build skyscrapers, but to build very, very tall skyscrapers?“All of the above” is the answer. Fundamentally, if there's many, many people who want to be working, living, playing in the center, the only way to accommodate the demand to be in the center is to make more land in the center, so the skyscraper, at its heart, is what I would say is “land in the sky.” You just go vertical because there's constraints on how much land there is in the center.Having said that, definitely the skyscraper is seen as a kind of way to advertise, a way to increase confidence in the place, and so you boost foreign direct investment. Observatories are huge money makers, there's a big tourism component. A lot of critics will say, “Oh, it's all about spectacle and ego.” But really, for the book, and just more broadly my research, when you drill down on the economics of these super tall buildings, not all of them are profitable or profit-maximizing, but they all have a strong economic rationale.Now, I just also want to say, China has its own thing going on, which sort of compounds the skyscraper construction-building there because of their unique governance structure and land ownership structure, but China is building tall buildings because, at the end of the day, there's a kind of, what I call, a “tall building bling.” There's just something that says, “This city is growing, this city is drawing population.” So we build a tall building and we boost confidence in the city. And it works, really.The pictures don't have to be too old, if you look at a picture of Shanghai, it looks a lot different not too long ago. It's almost as if a whole other city just kind of fell from the sky, a city of skyscrapers, and where there were once goats or something grazing, there's now a bunch of massive skyscrapers.Yeah, absolutely, and there's a few reasons for this. One is, I think Chinese residents more broadly see tall building as a natural way to live. I've talked to many Chinese residents, whether it's Shanghai or other cities, and to them, to own an apartment in the sky is like the greatest thing. It's their equivalent of the single family home in the United States. Living in the clouds is something many people aspire to. The other aspect of it is, Shanghai, and the Pudong neighborhood in Shanghai, was chosen basically to become a financial hub. Basically, the leaders were looking at Hong Kong and they thought it was a, to quote, I forgot the author, but to quote him in the book, the Shanghai officials and the National Party officials saw Hong Kong as that frustratingly free city, and so they wanted to create a kind of a financial hub in Shanghai. And so the Shanghai Tower, for example, is part of that plan to really draw people's attention to Shanghai, itself. So it was part of a master plan.The end of the skyscraper (9:00)I certainly remember that, after 9/11, I heard about “the end of the skyscraper,” and then during the pandemic, I heard about “the end of the city.” Now I'm guessing that cities will continue to exist and we're going to continue to build tall buildings.Absolutely. What 9/11 did was just make sure that we make our building safer with fire protection measures. In many Asian countries, every 20 floors, let's say, are mechanical floors, so you have the electric equipment, and the heating, and the cooling, and water tanks. They can also surround these in concrete, and so if something's on fire, if a floor is on fire, they can go to this hermetically sealed floor, a refuge floor, and stay there and be protected. And the elevator cores, they're made of concrete, and so you wouldn't have something like what happened on 9/11. So it didn't really impact the demand; 9/11 didn't impact the demand for the tall building, it just made us make tall buildings safer. And of course the downside is if you want to go into an office building, you have to have a swipe and you have to have an entry, so the negative of 9/11 was more about heightened security and increasing protections in a way that engenders a little bit more mistrust of us. But the demand didn't go away.Same thing with Covid. For big cities like New York and San Francisco, I'm sure the empty-office problem is going to dissipate. It'll take a while. This may be an overly broad statement, but the truth is, our present and future is in cities. The funny thing about the internet and social media and all that, it was supposed to allow us to suburbanize more, or run away from these big, overcrowded cities, but the truth is, social media and internet technology has just made cities even more important. So, as long as cities are growing, there'll be a demand for tall buildingsOf the tallest, I don't know, half-dozen buildings, have you been to all of them?That's a good question. I've been to the Shanghai Tower, which was the second-tallest building in the world, now is the third-tallest. The one that replaced it, I think it's [Merdeka 118] in Kuala Lumpur, I believe. I didn't go to that one yet because that just opened up recently. I've been to the Burj Khalifa, which is the world's tallest building. I'd have to look at the list. I've been to the Sears Tower, Empire State Building . . . Anyway, so I've been to a handful of them. I can't say I've been to every single one of the super-tall buildings in the worldAnd in any of those super-tall buildings, can you open a window? Why can't you open the windows in these skyscrapers?Well, the wind forces are just tremendous! The biggest problem engineering tall buildings is making sure that the building doesn't sway so that people feel it. The really fascinating thing about engineering tall buildings is this question: How do you allow the building to sway enough so that you don't have to — you don't want to over-engineer a building so that you make it perfectly stiff because that's just completely uneconomic to do that, but you want to make sure the building sways just enough so if you're sitting there reading a newspaper or drinking a cup of coffee on the top floor, you don't feel it. And so the wind forces high, a thousand feet in the air, are just so tremendous. I think if you open the window, everything would just would just blow away.I was thinking about some of those very, super-skinny residential buildings, which I guess seem to be becoming more popular, and do those people really feel the motion?From what I can tell, the short answer is no. There's one lawsuit in Manhattan, in particular, where the engineering wasn't exactly perfectly right, but I think that represents the exception that proves the rule. The building is safe, that's not the problem, it's just that, when you're dealing with these super-skinny buildings — these are kind of a new kind of breed of super-tall buildings, so sometimes the engineering isn't perfectly right, so they will figure out ways to kind of fix those problems. The problems are solvable, but sometimes if you don't get it 100 percent right, people complain, and obviously there's lawsuits and you have to go back in and tweak the engineering. But these things are selling for 70, 80, 100 million dollars for a penthouse on the 90th floor, so people still value them, and if motion sickness was a problem, they'd be worthless.Pillars of commerce (14:05)In the book, you run through a number of myths: tall buildings being only for the rich, that they drive up housing prices in cities, again, that you mentioned a little bit earlier, that they're somehow bad economic deals. All these myths all tend to be very negative.I'm not going to rename your book, but I could call it “Cathedrals in the Sky,” I mean, I think these are beautiful buildings that say a lot about human aspiration and to create a sense of awe. Boy, but some people just do not see it that way.I think there's a few strands; I've been thinking about this. There's a kind of a NIMBY strand, and sort of a NIMBY/gentrification strand. So people in the middle income, let's say, they see their housing prices going up, their rent going up, and then they see these billionaire condos, and so they, in my opinion, or based on my research, there's a confusion of correlation and causation. So the most visible manifestation in people's minds of gentrification and affordability problems are the super-slim buildings, but New York City has something like 3.6 million housing units, and if you look at the outlying areas of Queens and Staten Island, they're just covered in one- and two-family homes. Those neighborhoods have added barely any housing. So all of the housing — I'm exaggerating here when I say the word “all,” but the vast majority of new housing units happens in the center where either the zoning is more permissive, or old industrial sites come online and things like this, so people don't realize that the problem of housing affordability is citywide, it just looks naturally to be in their neighborhood where high rises are going up.Then there's another strand, which I would say is kind of the “Jane Jacobs strand” / the anti-public-housing strand. Jane Jacobs has some great points in her book, The Death and Life of Great American Cities about walkability, about eyes on the street. She wasn't a big fan of tall buildings, and this has kind of given rise to this whole movement of “human scale,” where five-story Greenwich Village buildings, or 10-story Parisian mansard-roof-type buildings are perfect, and any other deviation from that is somehow destroying the city. So there's that part of it, that people see tall buildings as somehow destroying the feel or the perfect fabric of the city. And lastly, obviously, some of the failures with the public housing policy has made people convinced that it's unhealthy to live in these tall buildings. I think that gets at what you're inquiring about. I think there's those different strains.I wonder if part of it stems for a confusion about what are cities for, and I mean cities are, for a large part, are where people to come together for jobs and to conduct commerce. And if you think of them that way, then certain things make sense; but if you think of them as, I don't know, some sort of urban retreat, where it's kind of like a garden or . . . I don't know, but it's a very different view, and perhaps it is not just about bike paths, but it's about what facilitates people to connect.Without jobs, without a labor market, there's no purpose to have a city. Maybe in the 18th or 19th century, you can create a city for the king or the empire, as are many examples, or the Vatican or something like this; so you can have these sort of political capital cities, or even Washington DC, but, fundamentally, 99 percent of the world's cities are places where people go to work, and so, if you don't allow the labor market to function properly, which means having a functioning housing market, then all these ideas about “the good city” and “the perfectly crafted city,” they kind of are irrelevant.So you have to start with: what makes a city grow, what makes people productive, and then how do we accommodate that? To the extent that we can improve design, all the better. There's always a million ways to make things better for people design-wise. I think bike lanes are great, and I think pedestrian-friendly cities are better than car-centric cities, but you can't start with designing the city first and then seeing what happens. You have to start with “let's make an attractive place to live and work” first, and then work on the design feature second.The sky's the limit (18:36)How tall are these buildings going to get?Okay, well, the next world's tallest building is going to be one kilometer: The Jeddah Tower, which had started, I think back in 2013 or 2015, had been stalled, there was some sort of political turmoil in Saudi Arabia, and they've just restarted this Jeddah Tower in the city of Jeddah. And so when that's completed, that's going to be one kilometer. There were some plans floated to have a two-kilometer building in Riyadh. I don't think anyone really thinks that's going to happen.How long does it take to get up to your office in a two-kilometer building?Well, that's the thing. They're coming up with new ways to get people up there faster. The old conventional steel cables could maybe go 500 meters or something like that, which is maybe 80 floors or something. Maybe if you had a really good cable, you can get people to 80 floors and then they'd have to switch. Now they have these composite . . . it's KONE UltraRope, which could go 1000 meters, which could go basically one kilometer continuously. So if you can get people from the ground floor to wherever their destination is within a minute, that's kind of like the golden rule here. People are not willing to wait more than a minute once they get in the elevator. The trick really is the ear pressure, and that's probably the hardest part because you're going up so quickly, the air pressure changes, so you have to figure out ways to make sure the cabin remains pressurized, and then there's the air pressure up on the highest floors. So that, I would argue, is the fundamental issue that's going to be coming next on the horizon is how to efficiently pressurize the highest floors. Let's say you're a mile high; if you're a mile high on the top floor, that's the equivalent of going from New York to Denver in a minute, or two minutes. So you have to figure out a way how to pressurize the entire building so it has a constant air pressure.If I were to look at the skyline of major American cities 50 years from now, would you expect them to be radically different, futuristic looking, maybe not two-kilometer buildings, but a lot of very, very tall buildings? Or is it again, if they're not growing, if population isn't growing, then that won't happen?People are always asking me what I think about the doom loops and all that. Pick New York as one end of the spectrum: It's always going to be adding new buildings, that's just in its DNA, and so you're going to have this kind of collage of different building styles. But other cities, smaller cities, maybe where people are moving now because working from home, they'll add a few tall buildings here, they'll have mini-skylines. Then the other cities, like a St. Louis, that's just going to have to kind of figure out a plan for growth. So I don't see the world as a kind of Jetsons-type world.I mean, you never know what's going to happen with the technology. There's one company, TK or Thyssenkrupp elevators, they're working on Maglev elevators, and this can actually be a game changer because you have these shafts, so the Maglev elevator cars, they can go up or down or they can go horizontal. Part of the goal with that is that everybody has their own — if it's an apartment building, they have their own elevator car, it takes them up to their apartment, it becomes the door. So that could be a real game changer . . . And then you could run these things horizontally. So if you have these Maglev elevators, you can not only run them horizontally within the building, but, in principle, if you could work out property rights or whatever, you could connect these things across buildings. But at the end of the day, it's really about preferences and a kind of cultural perception of the tall building, and I just don't see us in the United States us having a dramatic, country-wide rethinking of where we live. There's always going to be this desire for the single-family home in the suburbs. Now maybe that'll diminish to some degree, but as long as people see their own little house as their own little castle . . .Unlike China, where there seems to be a great desire to live in these kinds of buildings.Manhattan extension (23:04)Have you had any takers about your proposal to make Manhattan bigger?No.You would extend it by about 2000 acres and maybe build some tall buildings on that, I don't know.The idea would be to create a new mini-Manhattan extending Manhattan into New York Harbor. Just briefly, the idea was both to add more housing and add more land, and to protect lower Manhattan against sea level rises and so forth. I proposed this in a New York Times op-ed piece, and, naturally, I would say the majority of commenters and people had this sort of kneejerk reaction against it.I had a kneejerk reaction for it! I loved it!You are part of a small, select core of appreciators, let's say. Having said that, in the 21st century it's just not something I think most people are willing to wrap their heads around. SoTo me, that's an idea with the future, and I think you should not be dejected that it was not initially well-received. I think that kind of idea might actually have some legs.Trends and styles (24:23)Finally, let me ask you, whether it's because of computers or new materials, would we expect skyscrapers in the future to look any differently? I think some people would love to go back to the 1930s style. They love that style of skyscraper, and they don't like the glass-and-steel, very rectangular skyscraper; they want it to look like Gotham City or something.Actually, if you look in Manhattan, in Brooklyn there's one, I think they're calling it something like the “Dark Knight Tower” or the “Gotham Tower.” It's in Brooklyn and it has this almost art deco sort of —It slipped my mind, I was thinking art deco, yes.And there's a high rise apartment near Columbia University, which uses the same color masonry as the surrounding buildings. I think it's the Union Theological Seminary, which sold some of the land to build a high rise. It sort of blends in. So I guess the question is really architecturally speaking, and it's sort of hard to say. I think maybe there'll be some neo-historical buildings coming up here or there, but there's two things: One is that people like glass windows. People love to have light and views, and so that's really just pushing the glass buildings. I think developers like glass too, because it's easy to work with, and architects — if you're a developer and you want a super-tall building, you usually go to a handful of architects and you have some kind of design competition, and, chances are, you're going to get something that looks full of glass and has some funky geometry to it.But they seem more twisty than they used to, so they're not just perfect rectangles.Right, so you're creating a lot of illusion. The interesting thing is, at the end of the day, you can only have certain internal shapes because you need functional spaces, so you have to have illusion with the twisting and these sort of Jenga towers, and a lot of that is due to massive improvements in computer technology; so the rendering software has dramatically improved, the engineering know-how, the engineering technology improved, you can send your designs right to the manufacturer where they can then use the computer programs to design exactly the shapes and sizes.So it's the learning curve of every building that you do adds to the knowledge of how to do something a little bit different, or some version of something before, and also just massive computer power. I think there'll be a lot more of these sort of funky architectural shape. How they hold up, only time tells. In the '80s there was this massive postmodern boom with all kinds of pastiche-type buildings with all kinds of references to old buildings, and funky buildings, and some of those haven't held up as well.Frankly, I'm from Chicago, and I know exactly what you're talking about. Also being from Chicago, I appreciate you calling that building the Sears Tower rather than what other name they try to put on it. Last question: Do you have a favorite skyscraper?I'm from New York and I like the Empire State Building, and it's not just because architecturally a classic building, but it speaks to New York as a city of strivers. And the more research I did into the Empire State Building, the more I appreciate the sheer guts of these guys who built this building. And the thing is, when it was completed in 1931, Great Depression was really starting to kick into high gear, and so the building was unrented, and it kind of gave this whole mythology about how these guys didn't know what they were doing, but when you crunch the numbers, they knew exactly what they were doing. They knew what the landscape looked like for New York, and the costs, and the revenues. Nobody saw the Great Depression coming, and so to say that the Great Depression showed how foolish these were, I just think it's a bad standard to hold them to. And if you look at the revenues and them building value over its 90-whatever, 93-year history, it's been a money-maker for almost a century. After the Great Depression, it recovered and has become an icon and a moneymaker, so what's not to love about that?Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. 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The media is full of dystopian depictions of artificial intelligence, such as The Terminator and The Matrix, yet few have dared to dream up the image of an AI utopia. Nick Bostrom's most recent book, Deep Utopia: Life and Meaning in a Solved World attempts to do exactly that. Bostrom explores what it would mean to live in a post-work world, where human labor is vastly outperformed by AI, or even made obsolete. When all of our problems have been solved in an AI utopia . . . well, what's next for us humans?Bostrom is a philosopher and was founding director of the Future of Humanity Institute at Oxford University. He is currently the founder and director of research at the Macrostrategy Research Initiative. He also wrote the much-discussed 2014 book, Superintelligence: Paths, Dangers, Strategies.In This Episode* Our dystopian predisposition (1:29)* A utopian thought experiment (5:16)* The plausibility of a solved world (12:53)* Weighing the risks (20:17)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationOur dystopian predisposition (1:29)Pethokoukis: The Dutch futurist, Frederik Polak famously put it that any culture without a positive vision of the future has no future. It's a light paraphrase. And I kind of think that's where we are right now, that despite the title of your book, I feel like right now people can only imagine dystopia. Is that what you think? Do I have that wrong?Bostrom: It's easier to imagine dystopia. I think we are all familiar with a bunch of dystopian works of fiction. The average person could rattle off Brave New World, 1984, The Handmaid's Tale. Most people couldn't probably name a single utopian work, and even the attempts that have been made, if you look closely at them, you probably wouldn't actually want to live there. It is an interesting fact that it seems easier for us to imagine ways in which things could be worse than ways in which things could be better. Maybe some culture that doesn't have a positive vision has no future but, then again, cultures that have had positive visions also often have ended in tears. A lot of the times utopian blueprints have been used as excuses for imposing coercively some highly destructive vision on society. So you could argue either way whether it is actually beneficial for societies to have a super clear, long-term vision that they are staring towards.I think if we were to ask people to give a dystopian vision, we would get probably some very picturesque, highly detailed visions from having sort of marinated in science fiction for decades. But then if you asked people about utopia, I wonder if all their visions would be almost alike: Kind of this clean, green world, with maybe some tall skyscrapers or something, and people generally getting along. I think it'd be a fairly bland, unimaginative vision.That would be the idea of “all happy families are alike, but each unhappy family is unhappy in its own unique way.” I think it's easy enough to enable ways in which the world could be slightly better than it is. So imagine a world exactly like the one we have, except minus childhood leukemia. So everybody would agree that definitely seems better. The problem is if you start to add these improvements and you stack on enough of them, then eventually you face a much more philosophically challenging proposition, which is, if you remove all the difficulties and all the shadows of human life, all forms of suffering and inconvenience, and all injustice and everything, then you risk ending up in this rather bland future where there is no challenge, no purpose, no meaning for us humans, and it then almost becomes utopian again, but in a different way. Maybe all our basic needs are catered to, but there seems to be then some other part missing that is important for humans to have flourishing lives.A utopian thought experiment (5:16)Is your book a forecast or is it a thought experiment?It's much more a thought experiment. As it happens, I think there is a non-trivial chance we will actually end up in this condition, I call it a “solved world,” particularly with the impending transition to the machine intelligence era, which I think will be accompanied by significant risks, including existential risk. In my previous book, Superintelligence, which came out in 2014, focused on what could go wrong when we are developing machine super intelligence, but if things go right—and this could unfold within the lifetime of a lot of us who are alive on this planet today—if things go right, they could go very right, and, in particular, all kinds of problems that could be solved with better technology could be solved in this future where you have superintelligent AIs doing the technological development. And we might then actually confront the situation where these questions we can now explore as a thought experiment would become pressing practical questions where we would actually have to make decisions on what kinds of lives we want to live, what kind of future we want to create for ourselves if all these instrumental limitations were removed that currently constrain the choices set that we face.I imagine the book would seem almost purely a thought experiment before November 2022 when ChatGPT was rolled out by OpenAI, and now, to some people, it seems like these are questions certainly worth pondering. You talked about the impending machine superintelligence—how impending do you think, and what is your confidence level? Certainly we have technologists all over the map speaking about the likelihood of reaching that maybe through large language models, other people think they can't quite get us there, so how much work is “impending” doing in that sentence?I don't think we are in a position any longer to rule out even extremely short timelines. We can't be super confident that we might not have an intelligence explosion next year. It could take longer, it could take several years, it could take a decade or longer. We have to think in terms of smeared out probability distributions here, but we don't really know what capabilities will be unlocked as you scale up even the current architectures one more order of magnitude like GPT-5-level or GPT-6-level. It might be that, just as the previous steps from GPT-2 to GPT-3 and 3 to 4 sort of unlocked almost qualitatively new capabilities, the same might hold as we keep going up this ladder of just scaling up the current architectures, and so we are now in a condition where it could happen at any time, basically. It doesn't mean it will happen very soon, but we can't be confident that it won't.I do think it is slightly easier for people maybe now, even just with looking at the current AI systems, we have to take these questions seriously, and I think it will become a lot easier as the penny starts to drop that we're about to see this big transition to the machine intelligence era. The previous book, Superintelligence, back in 2014 when that was published—and it was in the works for six years prior—at that time, what was completely outside the Overton window was even the idea that one day we would have machine superintelligence, and, in particular, the idea that there would then be an alignment problem, a technical difficulty of steering these superintelligent intellects so that they would actually do what we want. It was completely neglected by academia. People thought, that's just science fiction or idle futurism. There were maybe a handful of people on the internet who were starting to think about that. In the intervening 10 years, that has changed, and so now all the frontier AI labs have research teams specifically trying to work on scalable methods for AI alignment, and it's much more widely recognized over the last couple of years that this will be a transformative thing. You have statements coming out from leading policy makers from the White House, the UK had this global summit on AI, and so this alignment problem and the risks related to AI have sort of entered the Overton window, and I think some of these other issues as to what the world will look like if we succeed, similarly, will have to come inside the Overton window, and probably will do so over the next few years.So we have an Overton window, we have this technological advance with machine intelligence. Are you as confident about one of the other pillars of your thought experiment, which is an equally, what might seem science-futuristic advance in our ability to edit ourselves, to modify ourselves and our brains and our emotions. That seems to hand-in-hand with the thought experiment.I think once we develop machine superintelligence, then we will soon thereafter have tremendous advances in other technological areas as well because we would then not be restricted to humans trying to develop new technologies with our biological brains. But this research and development would be done by superintelligences on digital timescales rather than biological timescales. So the transition to superintelligence would, I think, mean a kind of telescoping of the future.So there are all these technologies we can see are, in principle, possible. They don't violate the law of physics. In the fullness of time, probably human civilization would reach them if we had 10,000 years to work on it, all these science fiction like space colonies, or cures for aging, or perfect virtual reality uploading into computers, we could see how we might eventually . . . They're unrealistic given the current state of technology, but there's no (in principle) barriers, so we could imagine developing those if we had thousands of years to work on them. But all those technologies might become available quite soon after you have superintelligence doing the research and development. So I think we will then start to approximate the condition of technological maturity, like a condition where we have already developed most of those general purpose technologies that are physically possible, and for which there exists some in principally feasible pathway from where we are now to developing them. The plausibility of a solved world (12:53)I know one criticism of the book is, with this notion of a “solved world” or technological maturity, that the combinatorial nature of ideas would allow for almost an unlimited number of new possibilities, so in no way could we reach maturity or a technologically solved state of things. Is that a valid criticism?Well, it is a hypothesis you could entertain that there is an infinite number of ever-higher levels of technological capability such that you'd never be able to reach or even approximate any maximum. I think it's more likely that there will eventually be diminishing returns. You will eventually have figured out the best way to do most of the general things that need doing: communicating information, processing information, processing raw materials, creating various physical structures, et cetera, et cetera. That happens to be my best guess, but in any case, you could bracket that, we could at least establish lower bounds on the kinds of technological capabilities that an advanced civilization with superintelligence would be able to develop, and we can list out a number of those technologies. Maybe it would be able to do more than that, but at least it would be able to do various things that we can already sort of see and outline how you could do, it's just we can't quite put all the pieces together and carry it out yet.And the book lists a bunch of these affordances that a technologically mature civilization would at least have, even if maybe there would be further things we haven't even dreamt of yet. And already that set of technological capabilities would be enough to radically transform the human condition, and indeed to present us with some of these basic philosophical challenges of how to live well in this world where we wouldn't only have a huge amount of control over the external reality, we wouldn't only be able to automate human labor across almost all domains, but we would also, as you alluded to earlier, have unprecedented levels of control over ourselves or our biological organism and our minds using various forms of bio technologies or newer technologies.In this kind of scenario, is the purpose of our machines to solve our problems, or, not give us problems, but give us challenges, give us things to do?It then comes down to questions about value. If we had all of these capabilities to achieve various types of worlds, which one would we actually want? And I think there are layers to this onion, different levels of depth at which one can approach and think about this problem. At the outermost layer you have the idea that, well, we will have increased automation as a result of advances in AI and robotics, and so there will be some humans who become unemployed as a result. At the most superficial layer of analysis, you would then think, “Well some jobs become unnecessary, so you need to maybe retrain workers to move to other areas where there is continued demand for human labor. Maybe they need some support whilst they're retraining and stuff like that.”So then you take it a step further, like you peel off another layer of the onion and you realize that, well, if AI truly succeeds, if you have artificial general intelligence, then it's really not just some areas of human economic contribution that gets affected, but all areas, with a few exceptions that we can return to. But AIs could do everything that we can do, and do it better, and cheaper, and more efficiently. And you could say that the goal of AI is full unemployment. The goal is not just to automate a few particular tasks, but to develop a technology that allows us to automate all tasks. That's kind of what AI has always been about; it's not succeeded yet, but that's the goal, and we are seemingly moving closer to that. And so, with the asterisk here that there are a few exceptions that we can zoom in on, you would then get a kind of post-work condition where there would be no need for human labor at all.My baseline—I think this is a reasonable baseline—is that the history of technology is a history of both automating things, but then creating new things for us to do. So I think if you ask just about any economist, they will say that that should be our guide for the future: that this exact same technology will think of new things for people to do, that we, at least up to this point, have shown infinite creativity in creating new things to do, and whether you want to call those “work,” there's certainly things for us to do, so boredom should not be an issue.So there's a further question of whether there is anything for us to do, but if we just look at the work part first, are there ways for humans to engage in economically productive labor? And, so far, what has been the case is that various specific tasks have been automated, and so instead of having people digging ditches using their muscles, we can have bulldozers digging ditches, and you could have one guy driving the bulldozer and do the work of 50 people with a shovel or something. And so human labor is kind of just moving out of the areas where you can automate it and into other areas where we haven't yet been able to automate it. But if AIs are able to do all the things that we can do, then that would be no further place, it would look like, at least at first sight, for human workers to move into. The exceptions to this, I think, are cases were the consumer cares not just about the product, but about how the productThey want that human element.You could have consumers with just a raw preference that a particular task was performed by humans or a particular product—just as now sometimes consumers play a little premium sometimes if a little gadget was produced by a politically favored group, or maybe handcrafted by indigenous people, we may pay more for it than if the same object was made in a sweatshop in Indonesia or something. Even if the actual physical object itself is equally good in both cases, we might care about the causal process that brought it into existence. So to the extent that consumers have those kinds of preferences, there could remain ineliminable demand for human labor, even at technological maturity. You could think of possible examples: Maybe we just prefer to watch human athletes compete, even if robots could run faster or box harder. Maybe you want a human priest to officiate at your wedding, even if the robot could say the same words with the same intonations and the same gestures, et cetera. So there could be niches of that sort, where there would remain demand for human labor no matter how advanced our technology.Weighing the risks (20:17)Let me read one friendly critique from Robin Hanson of the book:Bostrom asks how creatures very much like him might want to live for eons if they had total peace, vast wealth, and full eternal control of extremely competent AI that could do everything better than they. He . . . tries to list as many sensible possibilities as possible . . .But I found it . . . hard to be motivated by his key question. In the future of creatures vastly more capable than us I'm far more interested in what those better creatures would do than what a creature like me now might do there. And I find the idea of creatures like me being rich, at peace, and in full control of such a world quite unlikely.Is the question he would prefer you answer unanswerable, therefore you cannot answer that question, so the only question you can answer is what people like us would be like?No, I think there are several different questions, each of which, I think, is interesting. In some of my other work, I do, in fact, investigate what other creatures, non-human creatures, digital minds we might be building, for example, AIs of different types, what they might want and how one might think of what would be required for the future to go well for these new types of being that we might be introducing. I think that's an extremely important question as well, particularly from a moral point of view. It might be, in the future, most inhabitants of the future will be digital minds or AIs of different kinds. Some might be at scales far larger than us human beings.In this book, though, I think the question I'm primarily interested in is: What if we are interested in it from our own perspective, what is the best possible future we could hope for for ourselves, given the values that we actually have? And I think that could be practically relevant in various ways. There could, for example, arise situations where we have to make trade-offs between delaying the transition to AI with maybe the risk going up or down, depending on how long we take for it. And then, in the meantime, people like us dying, just as a result of aging and disease and all kinds of things that currently result in people.So what are the different risk tradeoffs we are willing to take? And that might depend, in part, on how much better we think our lives could be if this goes well. If the best we could hope for was just continuing our current lives for a bit longer, that might be a different choice situation than if there was actually on the table something that would be super desirable from our current point of view, then we might be willing to take bigger risks to our current lives if there was at least some chance of achieving this much better life. And I think those questions, from a prudential point of view, we can only try to answer if we have some conception of how good the potential outcome would be for us. But I agree with him that both of these questions are important.It also seems to me that, initially, there was a lot of conversation after the rollout of ChatGPT about existential risk, we were talking about an AI pause, and I feel like the pendulum has swung completely to the other side, that, whether it's due to people not wanting to miss out on all the good stuff that AI could create, or worried about Chinese AI beating American AI, that the default mode that we're in right now is full speed ahead, and if there are problems we'll just have to fix them on the fly, but we're just not going to have any substantial way to regulate this technology, other than, perhaps,   the most superficial of guardrails. I feel like that's where we're at now; at least, that's what I feel like in Washington right now.Yeah, I think that has been the default mode of AI development since its inception, and still is today, predominantly. The difficulties are actually to get the machines to do more, rather than how to limit what they're allowed to do. That is still the main thrust. I do think, though, that the first derivative of this is towards increased support for various kinds of regulations and restrictions, and even a growing number of people calling for an “AI pause” or wanting to stop AI development altogether. This used to be basically a completely fringe . . . there were no real serious efforts to push in this direction for almost all decades of AI up until maybe two years ago or so. And since then there has been an increasingly vocal, still minority, but a set of people who are trying hard to push for increased regulation, and for slowing down, and for raising the alarm of AI developments. And I think it remains an open question how this will unfold over the coming years.I have a complex view on this, what would actually be desirable here. On the one hand, I do think there are these significant risks, including existential risks, that will accompany a transition. When we develop superintelligent machines, it's not just one cool more gadget, right? It's the most important thing ever happening in human history, and they will be to us as we are to chimpanzees or something—potentially a very powerful force, and things could go wrong there. So I do agree with the C.So I've been told over the past two years!And to the point where some people think of me as a kind of doomsayer or anti-AI, but that's not the full picture. I think, ultimately, it would be a catastrophe if superintelligence was never developed, and that we should develop this, ideally carefully, and it might be desirable if, at a critical point, just when we figure out how to make machines superintelligent, whoever is doing this, whether it's some private lab, or some government Manhattan Project, whoever it is, has the ability to go a little bit slow in that, maybe to pause for six months or, rather than immediately cranking all the knobs up to 11, maybe do it incrementally, see what happens, make sure the safety mechanisms work. I think that might be more ideal than a situation where you have, say, 15 different labs all racing together first, and whoever takes any extra precautions just immediately fall behind and become irrelevant. I think that would seem . . .I feel like where we're at right now—I may have answered this differently 18 months ago—but I feel like where we're at right now is that second scenario. At least here in the United States, and maybe I'm too Washington-centric, but I feel we're at the “crank it up to 11,” realistically, phase.Well, we have seen the first-ever real AI regulations coming on board. It's something rather than nothing, and so you could easily imagine, if pressure continues to build, there will be more demand for this, and then, if you have some actual adverse event, like some bad thing happening, then who knows? There are other technologies that have been stymied because of . . . like human cloning, for example, or nuclear energy in many countries. So it's not unprecedented that society could convince itself that it's bad. So far, historically, all these technology bans and relinquishments have probably been temporary because there have been other societies making other choices, and eventually, just like each generation is, to some extent, like a new role of the die, and eventually you get . . .But it might be that we already have, in particular with AI technologies that, if fully deployed, could allow a society in a few years to lock itself in to some sort of permanent orthodoxy. If you imagine deploying even current AI systems fully to censor dissenting information—if you had some huge stigmatization of AI where it becomes just taboo to say anything positive about AI, and then very efficient ways of enforcing that orthodoxy by shadow banning people who dissent from it, or canceling them, or you could imagine surveilling anybody not to do any research on AI like that, the technology to sort of freeze in a temporary social consensus might be emerging. And so if 10 years from now there were a strong global consensus of some of these issues, then we can't rule out that that would become literally permanent. My probably optimal level of government oversight and regulation would be more than we currently have, but I do worry a little bit about it not increasing to the optimal point and then stopping there, but once the avalanche starts rolling, it could overshoot the target and result in a problem. To be clear, I still think that's unlikely, but I think it's more likely than it was two years ago.In 2050, do you feel like we'll be on the road to deep utopia or deep dystopia?I hope the former, I think both are still in the cards for what we know. There are big forces at play here. We've never had machine intelligence transition before. We don't have the kind of social or economic predictive science that really allows us to say what will happen to political dynamics as we change these fundamental parameters of the human condition. We don't yet have a fully reliable solution to the problem of scalable alignment. I think we are entering uncharted territories here, and both extremely good and extremely bad outcomes are possible, and we are a bit in the dark as to how all of this will unfold.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

While AI doomers proselytize their catastrophic message, many politicians are recognizing that the loss of America's competitive edge poses a much more real threat than the supposed “existential risk” of AI. Today on Faster, Please!—The Podcast, I talk with Adam Thierer about the current state of the AI policy landscape and the accompanying fierce regulatory debate.Thierer is a senior fellow at the R Street Institute, where he promotes greater freedom for innovation and entrepreneurship. Prior to R Street, he worked as a senior fellow at the Mercatus Center at George Mason University, president of the Progress and Freedom Foundation, and at the Adam Smith Institute, Heritage Foundation, and Cato Institute.In This Episode* A changing approach (1:09)* The global AI race (7:26)* The political economy of AI (10:24)* Regulatory risk (16:10)* AI policy under Trump (22:29)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationA changing approach (1:09)Pethokoukis: Let's start out with just trying to figure out the state of play when it comes to AI regulation. Now I remember we had people calling for the AI Pause, and then we had a Biden executive order. They're passing some sort of act in Europe on AI, and now recently a senate working group in AI put out a list of guidelines or recommendations on AI. Given where we started, which was “shut it down,” to where we're at now, has that path been what you might've expected, given where we were when we were at full panic?Thierer: No, I think we've moved into a better place, I think. Let's look back just one year ago this week: In the Senate Judiciary Committee, there was a hearing where Sam Altman of OpenAI testified along with Gary Marcus, who's a well-known AI worrywart, and the lawmakers were falling all over themselves to praise Sam and Gary for basically calling for a variety of really extreme forms of AI regulation and controls, including not just national but international regulatory bodies, new general purpose licensing systems for AI, a variety of different types of liability schemes, transparency mandates, disclosure as so-called “AI nutritional labels,” I could go on down the list of all the types of regulations that were being proposed that day. And of course this followed, as you said, Jim, a call for an AI Pause, without any details about exactly how that would work, but it got a lot of signatories, including people like Elon Musk, which is very strange considering he was at the same time deploying one of the biggest AI systems in history. But enough about Elon.The bottom line is that those were dark days, and I think the tenor of the debate and the proposals on the table today, one year after that hearing, have improved significantly. That's the good news. The bad news is that there's still a lot of problematic regulatory proposals percolating throughout the United States. As of this morning, as we're taping the show, we are looking at 738 different AI bills pending in the United States according to multistate.ai, an AI tracking service. One hundred and—I think—eleven of those are federal bills. The vast majority of it is state. But that count does not include all of the municipal regulatory proposals that are pending for AI systems, including some that have already passed in cities like New York City that already has a very important AI regulation governing algorithmic hiring practices. So the bottom line, Jim, is it's the best of times, it's the worst of times. Things have both gotten better and worse.Well—just because the most recent thing that happened—I know with this the senate working group, and they were having all kinds of technologists and economists come in and testify. So that report, is it really calling for anything specific to happen? What's in there other than just kicking it back to all the committees? If you just read that report, what does it want to happen?A crucial thing about this report, and let's be clear what this is, because it was an important report because senator Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer was in charge of this, along with a bipartisan group of other major senators, and this started the idea of, so-called “AI insight forums” last year, and it seemed to be pulling some authority away from committees and taking it to the highest levels of the Senate to say, “Hey, we're going to dictate AI policy and we're really scared.” And so that did not look good. I think in the process, just politically speaking—That, in itself, is a good example. That really represents the level of concern that was going around, that we need to do something different and special to address this existential risk.And this was the leader of the Senate doing it and taking away power, in theory, from his committee members—which did not go over well with said committee members, I should add. And so a whole bunch of hearings took place, but they were not really formal hearings, they were just these AI insight forum working groups where a lot of people sat around and said the same things they always say on a daily basis, and positive and negatives of AI. And the bottom line is, just last week, a report came out from this AI senate bipartisan AI working group that was important because, again, it did not adopt the recommendations that were on the table a year ago when the process got started last June. It did not have overarching general-purpose licensing of artificial intelligence, no new call for a brand new Federal Computer Commission for America, no sweeping calls for liability schemes like some senators want, or other sorts of mandates.Instead, it recommended a variety of more generic policy reforms and then kicked a lot of the authority back to those committee members to say, “You fill out the details, for better for worse.” And it also included a lot of spending. One thing that seemingly everybody agrees on in this debate is that, well, the government should spend a lot more money and so another $30 billion was on the table of sort of high-tech pork for AI-related stuff, but it really did signal a pretty important shift in approach, enough that it agitated the groups on the more pro-regulatory side of this debate who said, “Oh, this isn't enough! We were expecting Schumer to go for broke and swing for the fences with really aggressive regulation, and he's really let us down!” To which I can only say, “Well, thank God he did,” because we're in a better place right now because we're taking a more wait-and-see approach on at least some of these issues.A big, big part of the change in this narrative is an acknowledgement of what I like to call the realpolitik of AI policy and specifically the realpolitik of geopoliticsThe global AI race (7:26)I'm going to ask you in a minute what stuff in those recommendations worries you, but before I do, what happened? How did we get from where we were a year ago to where we've landed today?A big, big part of the change in this narrative is an acknowledgement of what I like to call the realpolitik of AI policy and specifically the realpolitik of geopolitics. We face major adversaries, but specifically China, who has said in documents that the CCP [Chinese Communist Party] has published that they want to be the global leader in algorithmic and computational technologies by 2030, and they're spending a lot of money putting a lot of state resources into it. Now, I don't necessarily believe that means they're going to automatically win, of course, but they're taking it seriously. But it's not just China. We have seen in the past year massive state investments and important innovations take place across the globe.I'm always reminding people that people talk a big game about America's foundational models are large scale systems, including things like Meta's Llama, which was the biggest open source system in the world a year ago, and then two months after Meta launched Llama, their open source platform, the government of the UAE came out with Falcon 180B, an open source AI model that was two-and-a-half times larger than Facebook's model. That meant America's AI supremacy and open source foundational models lasted for two months. And that's not China, that's the government of the UAE, which has piled massive resources into being a global leader in computation. Meanwhile, China's launched their biggest super—I'm sorry, Russia's launched their biggest supercomputer system ever; you've got Europe applying a lot of resources into it, and so on and so forth. A lot of folks in the Senate have come to realize that problem is real: that if we shoot ourselves in the foot as a nation, they could race ahead and gain competitive advantage in geopolitical strategic advantages over the United States if it hobbles our technology base. I think that's the first fundamental thing that's changed.I think the other thing that changed, Jim, is just a little bit of existential-risk exhaustion. The rhetoric in this debate, as you've written about eloquently in your columns, has just been crazy. I mean, I've never really seen anything like it in all the years we've been covering technology and economic policy. You and I have both written, this is really an unprecedented level of hysteria. And I think, at some point, the Chicken-Littleism just got to be too much, and I think some saner minds prevailed and said, “Okay, well wait a minute. We don't really need to pause the entire history of computation to address these hypothetical worst-case scenarios. Maybe there's a better plan than that.” And so we're starting to pull back from the abyss, if you will, a little bit, and the adults are reentering the conversation—a little bit, at least. So I think those are the two things that really changed more, although there were other things, but those were two big ones.The political economy of AI (10:24)To what extent do you think we saw the retreat from the more apocalyptic thinking—how much that was due from what businesses were saying, venture capitalists, maybe other tech . . . ? What do you think were the key voices Congress started listening to a little bit more?That's a great question. The political economy of AI policy and tech policy is something that is terrifically interesting to me. There are so many players and voices involved in AI policy because AI is the most important general-purpose technology of our time, and as a widespread broad base—Do you have any doubt about that? (Let me cut you off.) Do you have any doubt about that?I don't. I think it's unambiguous, and we live in a world of “combinatorial innovation,” as Hal Varian calls it, where technologies build on top of the other, one after another, but the thing is they all lead to greater computational capacity, and therefore, algorithmic and machine learning systems come out of those—if we allow it. And the state of data science in this country has gotten to the point where it's so sophisticated because of our rich base of diverse types of digital technologies and computational technologies that finally we're going to break out of the endless cycle of AI booms and busts, and springs and winters, and we're going to have a summer. I think we're having it right now. And so that is going to come to affect every single segment and sector of our economy, including the government itself. I think industry has been very, very scrambled and sort of atomistic in their approach to AI policy, and some of them have been downright opportunistic, trying to throw each other's competitors under the busNow let me let you go return to the political economy, what I was asking you about, what were the voices, sorry, but I wanted to get that in there.Well, I think there are so many voices, I can't name them all today, obviously, but obviously we're going to start with one that's a quiet voice behind the scenes, but a huge one, which is, I think, the National Security community. I think clearly going back to our point about China and geopolitical security, I think a lot of people behind the scenes who care about these issues, including people in the Pentagon, I think they had conversations with certain members of Congress and said, “You know what? China exists. And if we're shooting ourselves in the foot, we begin this race for geopolitical strategic supremacy in an important new general-purpose technology arena, we're really hurting our underlying security as a nation. I think that that thinking is there. So that's an important voice.Secondly, I think industry has been very, very scrambled and sort of atomistic in their approach to AI policy, and some of them have been downright opportunistic, trying to throw each other's competitors under the bus, unfortunately, and that includes OpenAI trying to screw over other companies and technologies, which is dangerous, but the bottom line is: More and more of them are coming to realize, as they saw the actual details of regulation and thinking through the compliance costs, that “Hell no, we won't go, we're not going to do that. We need a better approach.” And it was always easier in the old days to respond to the existential risk route, like, “Oh yeah, sure, regulation is fine, we'll go along with it!” But then when you see the devilish details, you think twice and you realize, “This will completely undermine our competitive advantage in the space as a company or our investment or whatever else.” All you need to do is look at Exhibit A, which is Europe, and say, if you always run with worst-case scenario thinking and Chicken-Littleism is the basis of your technology policy, guess what? People respond to incentives and they flee.Hatred of big tech is like the one great bipartisan, unifying theme of this Congress, if anything. But at the end of the day, I think everyone is thankful that those companies are headquartered in the United States and not Beijing, Brussels, or anywhere else. It's interesting, the national security aspect, my little amateurish thought experiment would be, what would be our reaction, and what would be the reaction in Washington if, in November, 2022, instead of it being a company, an American company with a big investment from another American company having rolled out ChatGPT, what if it would've been Tencent, or Alibaba, or some other Chinese company that had rolled this out, something that's obviously a leap forward, and they had been ahead, even if they said, “Oh, we're two or three years ahead of America,” it would've been bigger than Sputnik, I think.People are probably tired of hearing about AI—hopefully not, I hope they'll also listen to this podcast—but that would all we would be talking about. We wouldn't be talking about job loss, and we wouldn't be talking about ‘The Terminator,' we'd be talking about the pure geopolitical terms that the US has suffered a massive, massive defeat here and who's to blame? What are we going to do? And anybody at that moment who would've said, “We need to launch cruise missile strikes on our own data centers” for fear. . . I mean! And I think you're right, the national security component, extremely important here.In fact, I stole your little line about “Sputnik moment,” Jim, when I testified in front of the House Oversight Committee last month and I said, “Look, it would've been a true ‘Sputnik moment,' and instead it's those other countries that are left having the Sputnik moment, right? They're wondering, ‘How is it that, once again, the United States has gotten out ahead on digital and computational-based technologies?'” But thank God we did! And as I pointed out in the committee room that day, there's a lot of people who have problems with technology companies in Congress today. Hatred of big tech is like the one great bipartisan, unifying theme of this Congress, if anything. But at the end of the day, I think everyone is thankful that those companies are headquartered in the United States and not Beijing, Brussels, or anywhere else. That's just a unifying theme. Everybody in the committee room that day nodded their head, “Yes, yes, absolutely. We still hate them, but we're thankful that they're here.” And that then extends to AI: Can the next generation of companies that they want to bring to Congress and bash and pull money from for their elections, can they once again exist in the United States?Regulatory risk (16:10)So whether it's that working group report, or what else you see in Congress, what are a couple, three areas where you're concerned, where there still seems to be some sort of regulatory momentum?Let's divide it into a couple of chunks here. First of all, at the federal level, Congress is so damn dysfunctional that I'm not too worried that even if they have bad ideas, they're going to pursue them because they're just such a mess, they can't get any basic things done on things like baseline privacy legislation, or driverless car legislation, or even, hell, the budget and the border! They can't get basics done!I think it's a big positive that one, while they're engaging in dysfunction, the technology is evolving. And I hope, if it's as important as I think you and I think, more money will be invested, we'll see more use cases, it'll be obvious—the downsides of screwing up the regulation I think will be more obvious, and I think that's a tailwind for this technology.We're in violent agreement on that, Jim, and of course this goes by the name of “the pacing problem,” the idea that technology is outpacing law in many ways, and one man's pacing problem is another man's pacing benefit, in my opinion. There's a chance for technology to prove itself a little bit. That being said, we don't live in a legislative or regulatory vacuum. We already have in the United States 439 government agencies and sub-agencies, 2.2 million employees just at the federal level. So many agencies are active right now trying to get their paws on artificial intelligence, and some of them already have it. You look at the FDA [Food and Drug Administration], the FAA [Federal Aviation Administration], NHTSA [National Highway Traffic Safety Administration], I could go all through the alphabet soup of regulatory agencies that are already trying to regulate or overregulating AI right now.Then you have the Biden administration, who's gone out and done a lot of cheerleading in favor of more aggressive unilateral regulation, regardless of what Congress says and basically says, “To hell with all that stuff about Chevron Doctrine and major questions, we're just going to go do it! We're at least going to jawbone a lot and try to threaten regulation, and we're going to do it in the name of ‘algorithmic fairness,'” which is what their 100-plus-page executive order and their AI Bill of Rights says they're all about, as opposed to talking about AI opportunity and benefits—it's all misery. And it's like, “Look at how AI is just a massive tool of discrimination and bias, and we have to do something about it preemptively through a precautionary principle approach.” So if Congress isn't going to act, unfortunately the Biden administration already is and nobody's stopping them.But that's not even the biggest problem. The biggest problem, going back to the point that there are 730-plus bills pending in the US right now, the vast majority of them are state and local. And just last Friday, governor Jared Polis of Colorado signed into law the first major AI regulatory measure in Colorado, and there's a bigger and badder bill pending right now in California, there's 80 different bills pending in New York alone, and any half of them would be a disaster.I could go on down the list of troubling state patchwork problems that are going to develop for AI and ML [Machine Learning] systems, but the bottom line is this: This would be a complete and utter reversal of the winning formula that Congress and the Clinton administration gave us in the 1990s, which was a national—a global framework for global electronic commerce. It was very intentionally saying, “We're going to break with the Analog Era disaster, we're going to have a national framework that's pro-freedom to innovate, and we're going to make sure that these meddlesome barriers do not develop to online speech and commerce.” And yet, here with AI, we are witnessing a reversal of that. States are in the lead, and again, like I said, localities too, and Congress is sitting there and is the dysfunctional soup that it is saying, “Oh, maybe we should do something to spend a little bit more money to promote AI.” Well, we can spend all the money we want, but we can end up like Europe who spends tons of money on techno-industrial policies and gets nothing for it because they can't get their innovation culture right, because they're regulating the living hell out of digital technology.So you want Congress to take this away from the states?I do. I do, but it's really, really hard. I think what we need to do is follow the model that we had in the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and the Internet Tax Freedom Act of 1998. We've also had moratoriums, not only through the Internet Tax Freedom Act, but through the Commercial Space Amendments having to do with space commercial travel and other bills. Congress has handled the question of preemption before and put moratoria in place to say, “Let's have a learning period before we go do stupid things on a new technology sector that is fast moving and hard to understand.” I think that would be a reasonable response, but again, I have to go back to what we just talked about, Jim, which is that there's no chance of us probably getting it. There's no appetite in it. Not any of the 111 bills pending in Congress right now says a damn thing about state and local regulation of technology!Is the thrust of those federal bills, is it the kinds of stuff that you're generally worried about?Mostly, but not entirely. Some of it is narrower. A lot of these bills are like, “Let's take a look at AI and. . . fill in the blank: elections, AI and jobs, AI and whatever.” And some of them, on the merits, not terrible, others, I have concerns, but it's certainly better that we take a targeted sectoral approach to AI policy and regulation than having the broad-based, general-purpose stuff. Now, there are broad-based, general-purpose measures, and here's what they do, Jim: They basically say, “Look, instead of having a whole cloth new regulatory approach, let's build on the existing types of approaches being utilized in the Department of Commerce, namely through our NIST [National Institute of Standards and Technology], and NTIA [National Telecommunications and Information Administration] sub-agencies there. NIST is the National Standards Body, and basically they develop best practices through something called the AI Risk Management Framework for artificial intelligence development—and they're good! It's multi-stakeholder, it's bottom up, it's driven by the same principles that motivated the Clinton administration to do multi-stakeholder processes for the internet. Good model. It is non-regulatory, however. It is a consensus-based, multi-stakeholder, voluntary approach to developing consensus-based standards for best practices regarding various types of algorithmic services. These bills in Congress—and there's at least five of them that I count, that I've written about recently—say, “Let's take that existing infrastructure and give it some enforcement teeth. Let's basically say, ‘This policy infrastructure will be converted into a quasi-regulatory system,'” and there begins the dangerous path towards backdoor regulation of artificial intelligence in this country, and I think that's the most likely model we'll get. Like I said, five models, legislative models in the Senate alone that would do that to varying degrees.AI policy under Trump (22:29)Do you have any feel for what a Trump administration would want to do on this?I do, because a month before the Trump administration left office, they issued a report through the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), and it basically laid out for agencies a set of principles for how it should evaluate artificial intelligence systems, both that are used by the government or that they regulate in the private sector, and it was an excellent set of principles. It was a restatement of the importance of policy, forbearance and humility. It was a restatement of a belief in cost-benefit analysis and identifying not only existing regulatory capacity to address these problems, but also non-regulatory mechanisms or best practices or standards that could address some of these things. It was a really good memo. I praised it in a piece that I wrote just before the Trump administration left. Now, of course, the Trump administration may change.Yes, and also, the technology has changed. I mean, that was 2020 and a lot has happened, and I don't know where. . . . I'm not sure where all the Republicans are. I think some people get it. . .I think the problem, Jim, is that, for the Republican Party, and Trumpian conservatives, in particular, they face a time of choosing. And what I mean by this is that they have spent the last four to six years—and Trump egged this on—engaging in nonstop quote-unquote “big tech bashing” and making technology companies in the media out to be, as Trumps calls them, “the enemy of the American people.” And so many hearings now are just parading tech executives and others up there to be beaten with a stick in front of the public, and this is the new thing. And then there's just a flood of bills that would regulate traditional digital technologies, repeal things like Section 230, which is liability protection for the tech sector, and so on, child safety regulations.Meanwhile, that same Republican Party and Mr. Trump go around hating on Joe Biden in China. If it's one thing they can't stand more than big tech, it's Joe and China! And so, in a sense, they've got to choose, because their own policy proposals on technology could essentially kneecap America's technology base in a way that would open up the door to whether it's what they fear in the “woke DEI policies” of Biden or the CCP's preferred policy agenda for controlling computation in the world today. Choose two, you don't get all three. And I think this is going to be an interesting thing to watch if Mr. Trump comes back into office, do they pick up where that OMB memo left off, or do they go right back to beating that “We've got to kill big tech by any means necessary in a seek-and-destroy mission, to hell with the consequences.” And I don't know yet.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

Project Apollo was a feat of human achievement akin to, and arguably greater than, the discovery of the New World. From 1962 to 1972, NASA conducted 17 crewed missions, six of which placed men on the surface of the moon. Since the Nixon administration put an end to Project Apollo, our extraterrestrial ambitions seem to have stalled along with our sense of national optimism. But is the American spirit of adventure, heroism, and willingness to take extraordinary risk a thing of the pastToday on the podcast, I talk with Charles Murray about what made Apollo extraordinary and whether we in the 21st century have the will to do extraordinary things. Murray is the co-author with Catherine Bly Cox of Apollo: The Race to the Moon, first published in 1989 and republished in 2004. He is also my colleague here at AEI.In This Episode* Going to the moon (1:35)* Support for the program (7:40)* Gene Kranz (9:31)* An Apollo 12 story (12:06)* An Apollo 11 story (17:58)* Apollo in the media (21:36)* Perspectives on space flight (24:50)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationGoing to the moon (1:35)Pethokoukis: When I look at the delays with the new NASA go-to-the-moon rocket, and even if you look at the history of SpaceX and their current Starship project, these are not easy machines for mankind to build. And it seems to me that, going back to the 1960s, Apollo must have been at absolutely the far frontier of what humanity was capable of back then, and sometimes I cannot almost believe it worked. Were the Apollo people—the engineers—were they surprised it worked?Murray: There were a lot of people who, they first heard the Kennedy speech saying, “We want to go to the moon and bring a man safely back by the end of the decade,” they were aghast. I mean, come on! In 1961, when Kennedy made that speech, we had a grand total of 15 minutes of manned space flight under our belt with a red stone rocket with 78,000 pounds of thrust. Eight years and eight weeks later, about the same amount of time since Donald Trump was elected to now, we had landed on the moon with a rocket that had 7.6 million pounds of thrust, compared to the 78,000, and using technology that had had to be invented essentially from scratch, all in eight years. All of Cape Canaveral, those huge buildings down there, all that goes up during that time.Well, I'm not going to go through the whole list of things, but if you want to realize how incredibly hard to believe it is now that we did it, consider the computer system that we used to go to the moon. Jerry Bostick, who was one of the flight dynamics officers, was telling me a few months ago about how excited they were just before the first landing when they got an upgrade to their computer system for the whole Houston Center. It had one megabyte of memory, and this was, to them, all the memory they could ever possibly want. One megabyte.We'll never use it all! We'll never use all this, it's a luxury!So Jim, I guess I'm saying a couple of things. One is, to the young'ins out there today, you have no idea what we used to be able to do. We used to be able to work miracles, and it was those guys who did it.Was the Kennedy speech, was it at Rice University?No, “go to the moon” was before Congress.He gave another speech at Rice where he was started to list all the things that they needed to do to get to the moon. And it wasn't just, “We have these rockets and we need to make a bigger one,” but there was so many technologies that needed to be developed over the course of the decade, I can't help but think a president today saying, “We're going to do this and we have a laundry list of things we don't know how to do, but we're going to figure them out…” It would've been called pie-in-the-sky, or something like that.By the way, in order to do this, we did things which today would be unthinkable. You would have contracts for important equipment; the whole cycle for the contract acquisition process would be a matter of weeks. The request for proposals would go out; six weeks later, they would've gotten the proposals in, they would've made a decision, and they'd be spending the money on what they were going to do. That kind of thing doesn't get done.But I'll tell you though, the ballsiest thing that happened in the program, among the people on the ground — I mean the ballsiest thing of all was getting on top of that rocket and being blasted into space — but on the ground it was called the “all up” decision. “All up” refers to the testing of the Saturn V, the launch vehicle, this monstrous thing, which basically is standing a Navy destroyer on end and blasting it into space. And usually, historically, when you test those things, you test Stage One, and if that works, then you add the second stage and then you add the third stage. And the man who was running the Apollo program at that time, a guy named Miller, made the decision they were going to do All Up on the first test. They were going to have all three stages, and they were going to go with it, and it worked, which nobody believed was possible. And then after only a few more launches, they put a man on that thing and it went. Decisions were made during that program that were like wartime decisions in terms of the risk that people were willing to take.One thing that surprises me is just how much that Kennedy timeline seemed to drive things. Apollo seven, I think it was October '68, and that was the first manned flight? And then like two months later, Apollo 8, we are whipping those guys around the moon! That seems like a rather accelerated timeline to me!The decision to go to the moon on Apollo 8 was very scary to the people who first heard about it. And, by the way, if they'd had the same problem on Apollo 8 that they'd had on Apollo 13, the astronauts would've died, because on Apollo 8 you did not have the lunar module with them, which is how they got back. So they pulled it off, but it was genuinely, authentically risky. But, on the other hand, if they wanted to get to the moon by the end of 1969, that's the kind of chance you had to take.Support for the Program (7:40)How enthusiastic was the public that the program could have withstood another accident? Another accident before 11 that would've cost lives, or even been as scary as Apollo 13 — would we have said, let's not do it, or we're rushing this too much? I think about that a lot now because we talk about this new space age, I'm wondering how people today would react.In January, 1967, three astronauts were killed on the pad at Cape Canaveral when the spacecraft burned up on the ground. And the support for the program continued. But what's astonishing there is that they were flying again with manned vehicles in September 1967. . . No, it was a year and 10 months, basically, between this fire, this devastating fire, a complete redesign of the spacecraft, and they got up again.I think that it's fair to say that, through Apollo 11, the public was enthusiastic about the program. It's amazingly how quickly the interest fell off after the successful landing; so that by the time Apollo 13 was launched, the news programs were no longer covering it very carefully, until the accident occurred. And by the time of Apollo 16, 17, everybody was bored with the program.Speaking of Apollo 13, to what extent did that play a role in Nixon's decision to basically end the Apollo program, to cut its budget, to treat it like it was another program, ultimately, which led to its end? Did that affect Nixon's decision making, that close call, do you think?No. The public support for the program had waned, political support had waned. The Apollo 13 story energized people for a while in terms of interest, but it didn't play a role. Gene Kranz (9:31)500 years after Columbus discovering the New World, we talk about Columbus. And I would think that 500 years from now, we'll talk about Neil Armstrong. But will we also talk about Gene Kranz? Who is Gene Kranz and why should we talk about him 500 years from now?Gene Kranz, also known as General Savage within NASA, was a flight director and he was the man who was on the flight director's console when the accident on 13 occurred, by the way. But his main claim to fame is that he was one of — well, he was also on the flight director's desk when we landed. And what you have to understand, Jim, is the astronauts did not run these missions. I'm not dissing the astronauts, but all of the decisions . . . they couldn't make those decisions because they didn't have the information to make the decisions. These life-and-death decisions had to be made on the ground, and the flight director was the autocrat of the mission control, and not just the autocrat in terms of his power, he was also the guy who was going to get stuck with all the responsibility if there was a mistake. If they made a mistake that killed the astronauts, that flight director could count on testifying before Congressional committees and going down in history as an idiot.Somebody like Gene Kranz, and the other flight director, Glynn Lunney during that era, who was also on the controls during the Apollo 13 problems, they were in their mid-thirties, and they were running the show for one of the historic events in human civilization. They deserve to be remembered, and they have a chance to be, because I have written one thing in my life that people will still be reading 500 years from now — not very many people, but some will — and that's the book about Apollo that Catherine, my wife, and I wrote. And the reason I'm absolutely confident that they're going to be reading about it is because — historians, anyway, historians will — because of what you just said. There are wars that get forgotten, there are all sorts of events that get forgotten, but we remember the Trojan War, we remember Hastings, we remember Columbus discovering America. . . We will remember for a thousand years to come, let alone 500, the century in which we first left Earth. An Apollo 12 story (12:06)If you just give me a story or two that you'd like to tell about Apollo that maybe the average person may have never heard of, but you find . . . I'm sure there's a hundred of these. Is there one or two that you think the audience might find interesting?The only thing is it gets a little bit nerdy, but a lot about Apollo gets nerdy. On Apollo 12, the second mission, the launch vehicle lifts off and into the launch phase, about a minute in, it gets hit by lightning — twice. Huge bolts of lightning run through the entire spacecraft. This is not something it was designed for. And so they get up to orbit. All of the alarms are going off at once inside the cabin of the spacecraft. Nobody has the least idea what's happened because they don't know that they got hit by lightning, all they know is nothing is working.A man named John Aaron is sitting in the control room at the EECOM's desk, which is the acronym for the systems guide who monitored all the systems, including electrical systems, and he's looking at his console and he's seeing a weird pattern of numbers that makes no sense at all, and then he remembers 15 months earlier, he'd just been watching the monitor during a test at Cape Canaveral, he wasn't even supposed to be following this launch test, he was just doing it to keep his hand in, and so forth, and something happened whereby there was a strange pattern of numbers that appeared on John Aaron's screen then. And so he called Cape Canaveral and said, what happened? Because I've never seen that before. And finally the Cape admitted that somebody had accidentally turned a switch called the SCE switch off.Okay, so here is John Aaron. Apollo 12 has gone completely haywire. The spacecraft is not under the control of the astronauts, they don't know what's happened. Everybody's trying to figure out what to do.John Aaron remembers . . . I'm starting to get choked up just because that he could do that at a moment of such incredible stress. And he just says to the flight director, “Try turning SCE to auxiliary.” And the flight director had never even heard of SCE, but he just . . . Trust made that whole system run. He passes that on to the crew. The crew turns that switch, and, all at once, they get interpretable data back again.That's the first part of the story. That was an absolutely heroic call of extraordinary ability for him to do that. The second thing that happens at that point is they have completely lost their guidance platform, so they have to get that backup from scratch, and they've also had this gigantic volts of electricity that's run through every system in the spacecraft and they have three orbits of the earth before they have to have what was called trans lunar injection: go onto the moon. That's a couple of hours' worth.Well, what is the safe thing to do? The safe thing to do is: “This is not the right time to go to the moon with a spacecraft that's been damaged this way.” These guys at mission control run through a whole series of checks that they're sort of making up on the fly because they've never encountered this situation before, and everything seems to check out. And so, at the end of a couple of orbits, they just say, “We're going to go to the moon.” And the flight director can make that decision. Catherine and I spent a lot of time trying to track down the anguished calls going back and forth from Washington to Houston, and by the higher ups, “Should we do this?” There were none. The flight director said, “We're going,” and they went. To me, that is an example of a kind of spirit of adventure, for lack of a better word, that was extraordinary. Decisions made by guys in their thirties that were just accepted as, “This is what we're going to do.”By the way, Gene Kranz, I was interviewing him for the book, and I was raising this story with him. (This will conclude my monologue.) I was raising this story with him and I was saying, “Just extraordinary that you could make that decision.” And he said, “No, not really. We checked it out. The spacecraft looked like it was good.” This was only a year or two after the Challenger disaster that I was conducting this interview. And I said to Gene, “Gene, if we had a similar kind of thing happen today, would NASA ever permit that decision to be made?” And Gene glared at me. And believe me, when Gene Kranz glares at you, you quail at your seat. And then he broke into laughter because there was not a chance in hell that the NASA of 1988 would do what the NASA of 1969 did.An Apollo 11 story (17:58)If all you know about Apollo 11 is what you learned in high school, or maybe you saw a documentary somewhere, and — just because I've heard you speak before, and I've heard Gene Kranz speak—what don't people know about Apollo 11? There were — I imagine with all these flights — a lot of decisions that needed to be made probably with not a lot of time, encountering new situations — after all, no one had done this before. Whereas, I think if you just watch a news report, you think that once the rocket's up in the air, the next thing that happens is Neil Armstrong lands it on the moon and everyone's just kind of on cruise control for the next couple of days, and boy, it certainly doesn't seem like that.For those of us who were listening to the landing, and I'm old enough to have done that, there was a little thing called—because you could listen to the last few minutes, you could listen to what was going on between the spacecraft and mission control, and you hear Buzz Aldrin say, “Program Alarm 1301 . . .  Program Alarm 1301 . . .” and you can't…   well, you can reconstruct it later, and there's about a seven-second delay between him saying that and a voice saying, “We're a go on that.” That seven seconds, you had a person in the back room that was supporting, who then informed this 26-year-old flight controller that they had looked at that possibility and they could still land despite it. The 26-year-old had to trust the guy in the back room because the 26-year-old didn't know, himself, that that was the case. He trusts him, he tells the flight director Gene Kranz, and they say, “Go.” Again: Decision made in seven seconds. Life and death. Taking a risk instead of taking the safe way out.Sometimes I think that that risk-taking ethos didn't end with Apollo, but maybe, in some ways, it hasn't been as strong since. Is there a scenario where we fly those canceled Apollo flights that we never flew, and then, I know there were other plans of what to do after Apollo, which we didn't do. Is there a scenario where the space race doesn't end, we keep racing? Even if we're only really racing against ourselves.I mean we've got . . . it's Artemis, right? That's the new launch vehicle that we're going to go back to the moon in, and there are these plans that somehow seem to never get done at the time they're supposed to get done, but I imagine we will have some similar kind of flights going on. It's very hard to see a sustained effort at this point. It's very hard to see grandiose effort at this point. The argument of, “Why are we spending all this money on manned space flight?” in one sense, I sympathize with because it is true that most of the things we do could be done by instruments, could be done by drones, we don't actually have to be there. On the other hand, unless we're willing to spread our wings and raise our aspirations again, we're just going to be stuck for a long time without making much more progress. So I guess what I'm edging around to is, in this era, in this ethos, I don't see much happening done by the government. The Elon Musks of the world may get us to places that the government wouldn't ever go. That's my most realistic hope.Apollo in the Media (21:36)If I could just give you a couple of films about the space program and you just… thought you liked it, you thought it captured something, or you thought it was way off, just let just shoot a couple at you. The obvious one is The Right Stuff—based on the Tom Wolfe book, of course.The Right Stuff was very accurate about the astronauts' mentality. It was very inaccurate about the relationship between the engineers and the astronauts. It presents the engineers as constantly getting the astronauts way, and being kind of doofuses. That was unfair. But if you want to understand how the astronauts worked, great movieApollo 13, perhaps the most well-known.Extremely accurate. Extremely accurate portrayal of the events. There are certain things I wish they could include, but it's just a movie, so they couldn't include everything. The only real inaccuracy that bothered me was it showed the consoles of the flight controllers with colored graphics on them. They didn't have colored graphics during Apollo! They had columns of white numbers on a black background that were just kind of scrolling through and changing all the time, and that's all. But apparently, when their technical advisor pointed that out to Ron Howard, Ron said, “There are some things that an audience just won't accept, but they would not accept.”That was the leap! First Man with Ryan Gosling portraying Neil Armstrong.I'll tell you: First place, good movie—Excellent, I think.Yeah, and the people who knew Armstrong say to me, it's pretty good at capturing Armstrong, who himself was a very impressive guy. This conceit in the movie that he has this little trinket he drops on the moon, that was completely made up and it's not true to life. But I'll tell you what they tell me was true to life that surprised me was how violently they were shaken up during the launch phase. And I said, “Is that the way it was, routinely?” And they said, yeah, it was a very rough ride that those guys had. And the movie does an excellent job of conveying something that somebody who'd spent a lot of time studying the Apollo program didn't know.I don't know if you've seen the Apple series For All Mankind by Ronald D. Moore, which is based on the premise I raised earlier that Apollo didn't end, we just kept up the Space Race and we kept advancing off to building moon colonies and off to Mars. Have you seen that? And what do you think about it if you have? I don't know that you have.I did not watch it. I have a problem with a lot of these things because I have my own image of the Apollo Program, and it drives me nuts if somebody does something that is egregiously wrong. I went to see Apollo 13 and I'm glad I did it because it was so accurate, but I probably should look at For All Mankind.Very reverential. A very pro-space show, to be sure. Have you seen the Apollo 11 documentary that's come out in the past five years? It was on the big screen, it was at theaters, it was a lot of footage they had people had not seen before, they found some old canisters somewhere of film. I don't know if you've seen this. I think it's just called Apollo 11.No, I haven't seen that. That sounds like something that I ought to look at.Perspectives on space flight (24:50)My listeners love when I read . . . Because you mentioned the idea of: Why do we go to space? If it's merely about exploration, I suppose we could just send robots and maybe eventually the robots will get better. So I want to just briefly read two different views of why we go to space.Why should human beings explore space? Because space offers transcendence from which only human beings can benefit. The James Webb Space Telescope cannot articulate awe. A robot cannot go into the deep and come back with soulful renewal. To fully appreciate space, we need people to go there and embrace it for what it fully is. Space is not merely for humans, nor is space merely for space. Space is for divine communion.That's one view.The second one is from Ayn Rand, who attended the Apollo 11 moon launch. This is what Ayn Rand wrote in 1969:The next four days were torn out of the world's usual context, like a breathing spell with a sweep of clean air piercing mankind's lethargic suffocation. For thirty years or longer, the newspapers had featured nothing but disasters, catastrophes, betrayals, the shrinking stature of man, the sordid mess of a collapsing civilization; their voice had become a long, sustained whine, the megaphone a failure, like the sound of the Oriental bazaar where leprous beggars, of spirit or matter, compete for attention by displaying their sores. Now, for once, the newspapers were announcing a human achievement, were reporting on a human triumph, were reminding us that man still exists and functions as a man. Those four days conveyed the sense that we were watching a magnificent work of art—a play dramatizing a single theme: the efficacy of man's mind.Is the answer for why we go to space, can it be found in either of those readings?They're going to be found in both. I am a sucker for heroism, whether it's in war or in any other arena, and space offers a kind of celebration of the human spirit that is only found in endeavors that involve both great effort and also great risk. And the other aspect of transcendence, I'm also a sucker for saying the world is not only more complicated than we know, but more complicated than we can imagine. The universe is more complicated than we can imagine. And I resonate to the sentiment in the first quote.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

As I often remind subscribers to Faster, Please!, predictions are hard, especially about the future. The economic boom of the 1990s came as a surprise to most economists. Equally surprising was that it ended so soon. Neither of these events caught Ed Yardeni off-guard. Some forecasters, Yardeni included, anticipated a new Roaring '20s for this century… only to be interrupted by the pandemic. But is it too late for this prediction to become a reality? According to Yardeni, not at all.Ed Yardeni is president of Yardeni Research, and he previously served as chief investment strategist at a number of investment companies, including Deutche Bank.  He has additionally held positions at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Federal Reserve Board of Governors, and US Treasury Department. For more economic insights and investment guidance, visit yardeni.com.In This Episode* The '90s Internet boom (1:25)* The Digital Revolution (5:01)* The new Roaring '20s (9:00)* A cautious Federal Reserve (14:24)* Speedbumps to progress (18:18)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationThe '90s Internet boom (1:25)Pethokoukis: Statistically speaking, the PC Internet boom that you first started writing about back in the early '90s ended in 2004, 2005. How surprising was that to economists, investors, policy makers? I, to this day, have a report, a 2000 report, from Lehman Brothers that predicted, as far as the eye could see, we would have rapid growth, rapid productivity growth for at least another decade. Now, of course, Lehman didn't make it another decade. Was that a surprise to people that we didn't have an endless productivity boom coming out of the '90s?Yardeni: I think it definitely was a surprise. I mean, it was surprising both ways. Not too many people expected to see a productivity boom in the second half of the 1990s, which is what we had. I did, as an economist on Wall Street. More importantly, Alan Greenspan was a big promoter of the idea that the technology revolution would in fact lead to better productivity growth and that that might mean better economic growth and lower inflation. And it didn't look that way for a while; then suddenly the Bureau of Economic Analysis went back and revised the data for the late 1990s and, lo and behold, it turned out that there was a productivity boom. And then it all kind of fizzled out, and it raises the question, why did that happen? Why was it such a short lived productivity boom? And the answer is—well, let me give you a personal anecdote.I worked at Deutsche Bank in New York in the late 1990s, and I had to be very careful walking down the corridors of Deutsche Bank in midtown Manhattan not to trip over Dell boxes. Everybody was getting a Dell box, everybody was getting the Dell boxes loaded up with the Windows Office. And when you think back on what that was able to do in terms of productivity, if you had a lot of secretaries on Selectric typewriters, Word could obviously increase productivity. If you had a lot of bookkeepers doing spreadsheets, Excel could obviously increase productivity. But other than that, there wasn't really that much productivity to be had from the technology at the time. So again, where did that productivity boom come from? It couldn't have been just secretaries and bookkeepers. Now the answer is that the boxes themselves were measured as output, and so output per man hour increased dramatically. It doesn't take that many workers to produce Dell boxes and Windows Office and Windows software. So as a result of that, we had this big boom in the technology output that created its own productivity boom, but it didn't really have the widespread application to all sorts of business model the way today's evolution of the technology boom is, in fact, capable of doing.What you've just described, I think, is the explanation by, for instance, Robert Gordon, Northwestern University, that we saw a revolution, but it was a narrow revolution.It was the beginning! It was the beginning of a revolution. It was the Technology Revolution. It started in the 1990s and it's evolved, it's not over, it's ongoing. I think a big development in that revolution was the cloud. What the cloud allowed you to do was really increase productivity in technology itself, because you didn't need to have several hundred people in the IT department. Now, with the cloud, one person can upgrade the software on hundreds of computers, and now we're renting software so that it automatically upgrades, so that's been a big contribution to productivity.The Digital Revolution (5:01)So perhaps I spoke too soon. I talked about that boom—that '90s boom—ending. Perhaps I should have said it was more of a pause, because it seems what we're seeing now, as you've described it, is a new phase of the Digital Revolution—perhaps a broader phase—and, to be clear, if I understand what you've been speaking about and writing about, this isn't an AI story, this predates what we're seeing in the data now, it predates ChatGPT, when do you date this new phase beginning—and you mentioned one catalyst perhaps being the cloud, so—when did it begin and, again, what are the data markers that you've been looking at?I don't remember the exact date, but I think it was 2011 where my little investment advisory got ourselves on the Amazon cloud, and that's been a tremendous source of productivity for us, it saves us a lot of money. We used to have a couple of servers on a server farm in the old days, and every now and then it would go down and we'd have to reach somebody on the server farm and say, “Would you mind turning it on and off?” Remember the word “reboot?” I don't remember the word “reboot” being used in quite some time. Amazon's never gone down, as far as I can recall. I think they've always had their systems in Virginia, and they had a backup somewhere overseas, but it's always worked quite well for us.But now we're finding with some of the other software that's available now, we can actually cut back on our Amazon costs and use some of these other technologies. There's lots of technologies that are very user-friendly, very powerful, and they apply themselves to all sorts of different businesses, and, as you said, it's not just AI. I think the cloud—let's put it around 2011 or so—was a huge development because it did allow companies to do information processing in a much more efficient way, and the software gets automatically updated, and with what it used to take hundreds of people in an IT department to do, now you can do it with just one, which is what we, in fact, have, just one person doing it all for us. But I would say that's as good a point as any. But along the way here, what's really changed is the power of the software that's available, and how cheap it is, and how you can rent it now instead of having to own it.That's a fantastic example, and, of course, we want to see these sort of examples at some point reflected in the data. And going through some of your writings, one period that you were very focused on was, we may have seen a bottom, maybe at the end of 2015, before the pandemic, where we saw the slowest, I think 20-quarter average… annual average growth rate of productivity.0.5 annual rate.But by 2019, leading into the pandemic, it tripled. Is the story of that tripling, is it the cloud? And that certainly has to be one reason why you, among other people, thought that we might see a new Roaring '20s, right into the teeth of the pandemic, unfortunately.Well, it's not so unfortunate, I mean, clearly nobody saw the pandemic coming, but we weathered the storm very, very well, and I don't think we can come to any conclusion about productivity during the pandemic, it was all over the place. At first, when we were on lockdown, it actually soared because we were still producing a lot with fewer workers, and then it took a dive, but we're now back up to two percent. We had a really, really good year last year in productivity. The final three quarters of last year, we saw above-trend growth in productivity. And so we're already now back up to two percent, which, again, compared to 0.5, is certainly moving in the right direction, and I don't see any particular reason why that number couldn't go to three-and-a-half, four-and-a-half percent per year kind of growth—which sounds delusional unless you look back at the chart of productivity and see that that's actually what productivity booms do: They get up to something like three-and-a-half to four-and-a-half percent growth, not just on a one-quarter basis, but on a 20-quarter trailing basis at an annual rate.The new Roaring '20s (9:00)This forecast predates the word “generative AI,” predates ChatGPT, and, in fact, if I understand your view, it's even broader than information technology. So tell me a bit about your broader Roaring '20s thesis and the technological underpinnings of that.One of the developments we've seen here, which has been somewhat disconcerting, is the challenge to globalization. I'm a big believer in free trade, and the free trade creates more economic growth, but, on the other hand, we have to be realistic and realize that China hasn't been playing by the rules of the game. And so now, as a result, we're seeing a lot of production moving out of China to other countries, and we're seeing a lot of on-shoring in the United States, so we're building state-of-the-art manufacturing facilities that are full of robots and automation that I think are going to bring manufacturing productivity back quite significantly.Everybody seems to be of the opinion that the reason productivity is weak is because of services. It's actually manufacturing. What happened is, when China joined the World Trade Organization back at the end of 2001—December 11th, 2001, to be exact—manufacturers said hasta la vista to the United States, and we've had absolutely no increase in industrial production capacity since that time, since 2001. And so companies basically gave up on trying to do anything, either expand capacity or improve productivity of manufacturing here, when they could do it so much more cheaply over in China.I think what's really the most important thing that's changed here is, demographically, we've run out of workers. Certainly even in China, we don't have a growth in the working-age population. We don't have a growth in the working-age population here. And when it comes to skilled labor, that's even more the case, so there's tremendous incentive and pressure on companies to figure out, well, how do we deal with an environment where our business is pretty good, but we can't find the workers to meet all the demand? And the answer has to be productivity. Technology is part of the solution. Managing for productivity is another part of the solution. Giving workers more skills to be more productive is a very good use of money, and it makes workers sticky, it makes them want to stay with you because you're going to have to pay them more because they're more knowledgeable, and you want to pay them more because you want to keep them.I think a big part of the productivity story really has to do with the demographic story. China, of course, accelerated all that with the One Child Policy that, as a result, I kind of view China as the world's largest nursing home. They just don't have the workforce that they used to have. Japan doesn't have the workforce. Korea, Taiwan, all these countries… If you want to find cheap, young labor, it's still in Africa and in India, but there are all sorts of issues with how you do business in these countries. It's not that easy. It's not as simple as just saying, “Well, let's just go there.” And so I think we are seeing a tremendous push to increase productivity to deal with the worldwide labor shortage.We have three really good quarters of productivity growth and, as you mentioned, economists are always very cautious about those productivity numbers because of revisions, they're volatile. But if this is something real and sustainable, it should also reflect in other parts of the economy. We should see good capital investment numbers for here on out if this is a real thing.I think not only capital investment, but also real wages. Productivity is fairy dust. I mean it's a win-win-win situation. With better-than-expected productivity, you get better-than-expected, real GDP, you get lower-than-expected unit labor costs, which, by the way, unit labor costs, which reflect hourly wages offset by productivity, they're under two percent—or they're around two percent, I should say more accurately—and that's highly correlated with the CPI, so the underlying inflation rate has already come down to where the Fed wants it to be. This is not a forecast, this is where we are right now with unit labor costs. So there's a very strong correlation between productivity growth and the growth of inflation-adjusted compensation. So you can take average hourly earnings, you can take hourly compensation…There are a bunch of measures of wages, and divide them by the consumption deflator, and you'll see on a year-over-year basis that the correlation is extremely high. And, theoretically—it's the only thing I learned when I went to college in economics that ever made any sense to me, and that is—people in a competitive marketplace—it doesn't have to be perfectly competitive, but in a relatively competitive marketplace—people get paid their real wage. The productivity the workers have, they get paid in their real wages, and we've seen, for all the talk about how “standards of living have stagnated for decades,” if you look at average hourly earnings divided by the consumption deflator, it's been going up 1.4 percent since 1995. That's a doubling of the standard of living every 40 years. That's pretty good progress. And if productivity grows faster than that, you'll get even a better increase in real wages.If we don't have workers, if there's a shortage of workers—though, obviously, immigration puts a whole different spin on these things—but for what we know now in terms of the workers that are available that are allowed to work, they are getting paid higher real wages. I know that prices have gone up, but people sometimes forget that wages have also gone up quite a bit. But again, it's fairy dust: You get better real growth, you get lower inflation, you get real wages going up, and you get better profit margins. Everybody wins.A cautious Federal Reserve (14:24)In the '90s, we had a Fed chairman who was super cautious about assuming a productivity boom, but eventually saw the reality of it and acted accordingly. It seems to me that we have a very similar such situation where we have a Federal Reserve chairman who is certainly aware of these numbers, but seems to me, at this point, certainly reluctant to make decisions based on those numbers, but you would expect that to change.Yeah, well, I mean if you just look at the summary of economic projections that the Federal Open Market Committee… that comes out on a quarterly basis reflecting the consensus of Fed Chair Powell's committee that determines monetary policy, they're looking for real GDP growth of less than two percent per year for the next couple of years, and they're obviously not anticipating any improvement in productivity. So I think you're right, I think Fed Chair Powell is very much aware that productivity can change everything; and, in fact, he's talked about productivity, he knows the equation. He says, “Look, it's okay to have wages growing three percent if inflation's two percent.” Then he implied, therefore, that productivity is growing one percent. So he's basically in the one percent camp, recognizing that, if productivity is more than that, then four percent wage growth is perfectly fine and acceptable and non-inflationary. But at this point he's, in terms of his pronouncements, he's sticking to the kind of standard line of economists, which is, maybe we'll get one percent, and if we get one percent and the Fed gets inflation down, let's say to only two-and-a-half percent, then wages can grow three-and-a-half percent, and right now wages are growing at a little bit above. I think we're growing more like four percent, so the wage numbers aren't there yet, but they could be the right numbers if, in fact, productivity is making a comeback.If we hit productivity gains of the sort you've talked about—three percent, four percent by the end of the decade—that is a radically different-looking economy than what the Fed, or the CBO, or even a lot of Wall Street firms are talking about. So it's not just this statistic will be different; we're looking at really something very different. I would assume a much higher stock market; I'm not sure what interest rates look like, but what does that world look like in 2030?These are all good questions, they're the ones I'm grappling with. I mean, should interest rates be lower or should they be higher? It's the so-called real interest rates, so if the economy can live with a Fed funds rate of, let's say five and a half percent—five and a quarter, five and a half percent, which is what it is now—and the bond yield at four and a half percent and the economy is doing perfectly fine and inflation's coming down, and it's all because productivity is making comeback, then those rates are fine. They're doing their job, they're allocating capital in a reasonable fashion, and capital is going to get allocated to where capital should go. You mentioned before that, in order to increase productivity, we are going to need more capital investments.Here the Fed has raised interest rates dramatically, and most of the economists said, “Oh, that's going to lead to a big drop in capital,” because capital spending is dependent on interest rates, and that hasn't happened at all, really, because the technology capital spending—which now, in current dollars, technology capital spending accounts for about 50 percent of capital spending in nominal terms. You can't do it in real terms because there's an indexing problem. But in nominal terms, half of capital spending is technology. And by the way, that's an understatement because that's information technology, hardware, it's software and R&D. It doesn't even include industrial machinery, which is mostly technology, hardware and software these days. And even the trucking industry, the truck is sort of the device, and then there's a software that runs the device logistics. There's so many areas of the economy that have become very high-tech that people still think of as a low-tech industry.Speedbumps to progress (18:18)If this doesn't happen. Well, I suppose one thing we could say may have happened is that we've really overestimated these technologies and they're not as transformative. But let me give you two other things that people might point to as being—and you've written a bit about these—that could be speed bumps or barriers. One: debt, possible debt crisis. And two: this energy revolution, climate change transition, which we really have a lot of government involvement and a lot of government making decisions about allocating resources. So what is the risk that those two things could be a slow things down, speed bump, or what have you?There's three issues that you're raising. One is sort of the private sector issue of whether a lot of this artificial intelligence and technology stuff is hype, and it's not going to have the impact on productivity. The other one, as you mentioned, is the two government issues, government's meddling in the climate change policies, and then the government having this irresponsible fiscal excesses.With regards to artificial intelligence, even though I should be a cheerleader on this, because I should say, “See, I told you so…” I have been telling people I told you so because I said, I'll tell you when the stock market started to discount the Roaring '20s was November 30th, 2022 when Open AI introduced ChatGPT, and that's when these AI stocks went crazy. A week later I signed up for the $20 a month version of ChatGPT, figuring, “This is great! I'm not going to have to work anymore. This is going to do all my writing for me. I'll just ask it the question and say, ‘What do you think we should be writing about this? Go ahead and write about it.'” Well, it took me more time to correct all the errors for what it produced than it would've taken me just to write the damn thing.So I kind of cooled off to chat GPT, and I come to the conclusion that, from what I see right now in terms of what is available to the public and what's tied to the internet, it's really autofill on speed and the steroids. You know when you type Word and sometimes it guesses what you're going to say next? That's what this thing does at the speed of light. But, you know, “haste makes waste,” as Benjamin Franklin used to say, and it makes a lot of mistakes. And, by the way, garbage in, garbage out. It could create even more garbage on the internet because I've seen situations where it starts quoting its own sources that would never have existed in the first place. So there's some really funky stuff when you have it in the public domain.But I think that when you have it sort of segmented off and it only has the data that you need for your specific industry, and it's not polluted by other the open source ability to take any data, I think it may very well work very well. But it's basically just a really fast, lightning-speed calculations. So I think it has lots of potential in that regard, but I think there is a certain amount of hype. But look, so much money is being spent in this area. I can't believe it's all going to go for naught. I mean, we saw a lot of money spent in the late 1990s on internet and dotcoms and all that. The internet's still here, but the dotcoms are gone.With regards to the government policies, I have this very simplistic view that it's amazing how well this country has done despite Washington. Washington just keeps meddling and meddling, it just keeps picking our pockets, keeps interfering, comes up with industrial policies that, to a large extent, don't work. And yet, the economy continues to do well because working stiffs like you and me and people listening in, that's what we do for a living: we work. We don't have time for politics. So the politicians have plenty of time to figure out how to pick our pockets. Well, we have to just figure out, “Okay, given their meddling, how do we make our businesses better, notwithstanding these challenges.” Maybe it's really more my hope that we somehow in the private sector figure out how to keep doing what we're doing so well, including increasing productivity, in the face of the challenges that the government poses with its policies.But then, if we are successful in the private sector at creating good productivity growth that gives you better real GDP growth, that real growth is one way to reduce the debt burden. It doesn't make it go away and it would be a lot better if we didn't have it, but some of these projections of how this debt is going to eat us all up may be too pessimistic about their assumptions for economic growth. But look… I guess I had a happy childhood, so I tend to be an optimist, but I can't say anything good at all about this deficit problem. And we did get a little glimpse in August, September, October, of what happens when the bond market starts to worry about something like supply. It worried about it for three months, and then lower inflation and less supply of long-term bonds helped to rally the bond market. But here we are back at four and a half percent, and if we do have some more fears about inflation coming back, then we could very well have a debt crisis more imminently. People like Ray Dalio has been saying that we're under verge of getting it. I think it's an issue, but I don't think it's an issue that's going to be calamitous at this time.The problems people talk about, you have the skepticism about free enterprise, or the skepticism about trade, and immigration. I would like to see what this country looks like in 2030 with the economic scenario you've just outlined: Strong real wage growth. Maybe it's too simplistic, but I think people being able to see in their everyday lives, big gains year after year, I think the national mood would be considerably different.Well, I think, even now, if you look at real consumption per household, it's $128,000, it's at an all-time record high. And yeah, I guess the rich might be gluttons and might eat more than the rest of us, and maybe they have bigger and more houses and cars, but there just aren't enough of them to really explain how it could possibly be that real consumption per household is at an all-time record high. And I know that's materialistic, but I can't think of a better way to measure the standard of living than looking at real consumption per household: All-time record high.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber.Micro Reads▶ Business/ EconomicsMeta, in Its Biggest A.I. Push, Places Smart Assistants Across its Apps - NYTGoogle streamlines structure to speed up AI efforts - FTTesla's Layoffs Won't Solve Its Growing Pains - Wired▶ PolicyPut Growth Back on the Political Agenda - WSJRegulate AI? How US, EU and China Are Going About It - BbergThree ways the US could help universities compete with tech companies on AI innovation - MIT▶ AI/DigitalThe AI race is generating a dual reality - FTSearching for the Next Big AI Breakthrough at the TED Conference - BbergThese photos show AI used to reinterpret centuries-old graffiti - NSEnvironmental Damage Could Cost You a Fifth of Your Income Over the Next 25 Years - WiredAI now surpasses humans in almost all performance benchmarks - New Atlas▶ Biotech/HealthA new understanding of tinnitus and deafness could help reverse both - New ScientistBeyond Neuralink: Meet the other companies developing brain-computer interfaces - MIT▶ RoboticsHello, Electric Atlas: Boston Dynamics introduces a fully electric humanoid robot that “exceeds human performance” - IEEE Spectrum▶ Space/TransportationNASA may alter Artemis III to have Starship and Orion dock in low-Earth orbit - Ars▶ Up Wing/Down WingTechnological risks are not the end of the world - Science▶ Substacks/NewslettersFive things to be optimistic about in America today - NoahpinionWho Governs the Internet? - HyperdimensionalMeta is Surprisingly Relevant in Generative AI - AI SupremacyLarry Summers isn't worried about secular stagnation anymore - Slow BoringFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. 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As private and government interest in nuclear fusion technology grows, an array of startups have arisen to take on the challenge, each with their own unique approach. Among them: LaserFusionX. Today on Faster, Please!—The Podcast, I talk with CEO Stephen Obenschain about the viability of fusion energy, and what sets his approach apart.Obenschain is the president of LaserFusionX. He was formerly head of the Plasma Physics Division branch at the U.S. Naval Research Laboratory.In This Episode* Viability of commercial fusion (0:58)* The LaserFusionX approach (7:54)* Funding the project (10:28)* The vision (12:52)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationViability of commercial fusion (0:58)Pethokoukis: Steve, welcome to the podcast.Obenschain: Okay, I'm glad to talk with you. I understand you're very interested in high-tech future power sources, not so high tech right now are windmills…Well, I guess they're trying to make those more high tech, as well. I recall that when the Energy Department, the National Ignition Laboratory [NIF], they had the—I guess that's over about maybe 15 months ago—and they said they had achieved a net gain nuclear fusion, using lasers, and the energy secretary made an announcement and it was a big deal because we had never done that before by any means. But I remember very specifically people were saying, “Listen, it's a great achievement that we've done this, but using lasers is not a path to creating a commercial nuclear reactor.” I remember that seemed to be on the news all the time. But yet you are running a company that wants to use lasers to create a commercial fusion reactor. One, did I get that right, and what are you doing to get lasers to be able to do that?I don't know why people would come to that conclusion. I think we are competitive with the other approaches, which is magnetic fusion, where you use magnetic fields to confine a plasma and get to fusion temperatures. The federal government has supported laser fusion since about 1972, starting with the AEC [Atomic Energy Commission]. Originally it was an energy program, but it has migrated to being in support stockpiled stewardship because, with laser fusion, you can reach physics parameters similar to what occur in thermonuclear weapons.Yeah. So that facility is about nuclear weapons testing research, not creating a reactor—a fusion reactor.Yeah. All that being said, it does advance the physics of laser fusion energy, and what the National Ignition Facility did is got so-called ignition, where the fuel started a self-sustaining reaction where it was heating itself and increasing the amount of fusion energy. However, the gain was about three, and one of the reasons for that is they use so-called indirect drive, where the laser comes in, heats a small gold can, and the X-rays from that then that drive the pellet implosion, which means you lose about a factor of five in the efficiency. So it's limited gain you get that way.Your way is different. It sort of cuts out the middleman.Okay. The better way to go—which, we're not the only ones to do this—is direct drive, where the laser uniformly illuminates the target at the time that Livermore got started with indirect drive, we didn't have the technologies to uniformly illuminate a pellet. First at NRL [Naval Research Laboratories], and then later at University of Rochester in Japan, they developed techniques to uniformly illuminate the pellets. The second thing we're doing is using the argon fluoride laser. The argon fluoride laser has been used in lithography for many years because it's deep UV.The unique thing we have been trying to do—this was when I was supervising the program at the Naval Research Laboratory—was to take it up to high energy. We started years ago with a similar Krypton fluoride laser, built the largest operating target shooter with that technology, demonstrated the high repetition rate operation that you need for energy and NIF will shoot a few times a day—you need five to 10 shots per second to do a power plant—demonstrated that on a krypton fluoride laser, and, more recently, we switched to the focus to argon fluoride, which is deeper UV and more efficient than the Krypton  fluoride. And that basically—at NRL when I was supervising it—reached the energy record for that technology. But we've got a long ways to go to get it to the high energy needed for a power plant.Now, what the immediate goal of my company is to get the funds and to build a beam line of argon fluoride that would have the energy and performance needed for a power plant. One of the advantages to laser fusion: you want have a situation where I'm building more than one of something, so for an implosion facility, you have many beam lines, so you build one and then you have the advantage of building more, and a learning curve as you go toward a power plant. We developed a phase program where first we build the beamline, then we build a NIF-like implosion facility only operating with the argon fluoride, demonstrate the high gain—which is a hundred plus for a power plant—and then, after doing that, do the physics in parallel, develop the other technology you need, like low-cost targets. (They can't be expensive. The NIF targets are probably tens of thousands. We can't spend that.) We're going 10 shots per second. All the technologies required for a pilot power plant build a pilot power plant, which, in my view could be maybe 400 megawatts electricity. However, its main function would be to develop the procedures, test the components, and so forth for the follow-on, mass-produced power plants. So one, when you build a pilot power plant, you want to operate it for a few years to get the kinks out before going to mass production. The vision is to go from the beginning of that to the end in about 16 years.So the challenges are you have to generate enough heat, and you have to be able to do this over, and over, and over again.Right. That's right. It has to be high reliability. For an implosion facility, a hundred-thousand-shot reliability is okay. For a power plant, it's got to be in the billion-shot class.And at this point, the reason you think this is doable is what?I think we have confidence in the pellet designs. I have a lot, and I have colleagues that have a lot of experience with building large excimer systems: KrF [Krypton Fluoride Excimer Laser], ArF [Argon Fluoride Excimer Laser]…Those are lasers?Yes. And we have credible conceptual designs for the facility.There's a lot of companies right now, and startups, with different approaches. I would assume you think this is the most viable approach, or has some other advantages over some of the other things we're seeing with Commonwealth Fusion Systems, which gets mentioned a lot, which is using a different approach. So is the advantage you think it's easier to get to a reactor? What are the advantages of this path?The LaserFusionX approach (7:54)Well, for one, it's different. It's different challenges from the Commonwealth Fusion Systems. There is overlap, and there should be collaboration. For example, you have to, theirs is also deuterium-tritium. However, the physics challenges are different. I think we're farther along in laser fusion to be able—it's a simpler situation than you have. It's very complex interactions in tokamak, and you also have things… have you ever heard of a disruption? Basically it's where all of the magnetic energy all of a sudden goes to the wall, and if you have something like what Commonwealth Fusion Systems—they've got to be careful they don't get that. If they do, it would blow a hole in the wall. We don't have that problem with laser fusion. I think we're further along in understanding the physics. Actually, the National Ignition Facility is ahead of the highest fusion gains they've gotten in facilities. I think that they're somewhere just below one or so with the jet. They're up at one and a half. To what extent are the challenges of physics and science, and to what extent are the challenges engineering?Well, the physics has to guide the precision you have on the laser. And I won't say we're 100 percent done in the physics, but we're far enough along to say, okay. That's one reason where I envision building an implosion facility before the pilot power plant so we can test the codes and get all the kinks out of that. Nothing's easy. You have to get the cost of the targets down. The laser, okay, we've demonstrated, for example, at NRL—And NRL is…?Naval Research Laboratory.Naval Research Lab, right.A hundred-shot operation of the KrF laser. We use spark gap for that. We need to go to solid state pulse power, got up to 10 million shots. We need to get from there to a billion shots. And some of that is just simply improving the components. It's straightforward, but you've got to put time into it. I think you need really smart people doing this, that are creative—not too creative, but where you need to be creative, you are creative, and I think if, basically, if you can get the support, for example, to build (a beam line is somewhere around a hundred million dollars). To build the implosion facility and pilot power plant, you're getting into the billion shot, billion dollar class and you have to get those resources and be sure enough that, okay, if the investors put this money in, they're going to get a return on it.Funding the project (10:28)I think people who are investing in this sector, I would assume they may be more familiar with some of the other approaches, so what is the level of investor interest and what is the level of Department of Energy interest?Well, one of the challenges is that, historically, the Department of Energy has put money into two pots. One, laser fusion for stockpile stewardship, and magnetic fusion for energy. That's starting to change, but they don't have a lot of money involved yet, to put money into laser fusion or inertial fusion energy. And one of my challenges is not that the companies are aware of magnetic fusion, they don't understand the challenges of that, or laser fusion, or what's a good idea and a bad idea. And like Commonwealth Fusion systems I think has a good technical basis. If you go the next one down to Helion Energy, they're claiming they can burn helium three made from deuterium interactions, which violates textbook physics, so I'm very… I wonder about that.Would it surprise you, at the end of the day, that there are multiple paths to a commercial fusion reactor?Oh no. I think there are multiple paths to getting to where I get fusion burn, and maybe I make electricity. I think ultimately the real challenge for us is: Can we go reasonably fast? At 16 years, I'm considered somewhat slower than others. The ones that are saying five years I think are delusional. The ones that are saying 50 years, or say never, I don't think understand that yeah, we're pretty far along in this.How big, or rather, how small, theoretically, could one of these reactors be? I know there's been talk about using nuclear fusion as a way to provide power for these new data centers that gobble up so much power that they're using AI for. Would this be the kind of reactor that would power a city power, a big factory power, a data center, all of the above?I think you can get down, at least with our approach, to a couple hundred megawatts. However, my own vision is you're probably better off having power stations for some of the nuclear—with these, the big nuclear plants have multiple reactors at one place, and you'd get the advantage, for example, in our case, to just simply have one target factory and so forth. I don't think we're going to be able to compete. I don't know how small modular reactors go—a hundred megawatts or so, I would guess, and probably can't get down there, but one of my own goals is to get the size down as much as possible, but I think we're talking about hundreds of megawatts. The vision (12:52)What's the big vision? Why are you doing this?Why am I doing it?Yeah, what's the vision? What drives you and where do you think this goes over the next two decades?I may have the best route to get there. If I thought one of these other ones were going to get there, no problem… but all of us have challenges, and I think we can get there. I think from a standing start. As far as getting investment, I've just had pre-seed money, I don't have the big bucks yet. I've brought on people that are more experienced than me at extracting money from VCs and investors. (I was told you know a few billionaires.) Basically, for me, I need a few tens of millions to get started—like I'd say, about a hundred million to build the beamline. And then after that… actually I have a conference call on Friday with a representative of the investment bank industry that is very dubious about fusion.I mean, you can understand the skepticism, as a technology. What do they say? “It's the future of energy and always will be.”But the really good thing, I think, about the private investment is that the public investment has been too much focus on big machines which will give you physics, but have pretty much zero chance of being a direct path to fusion energy. You know, $25 billion and I make 500 megawatts thermal, occasionally, and we show that to a power plant executive, they're going to say, “You're kidding me.” We hope to get down cost for the power plants in the few-billion-dollar range.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

In a world facing climate change and clean energy challenges, it's starting to look like a nuclear energy renaissance is starting to happen. That is, if we can overcome our irrational fear of nuclear. In this episode of Faster, Please! - The Podcast, I talk with Dr. Spencer Weart about the cultural influences that shaped generations of anxiety around nuclear power, and how that tide may be turning.Weart holds advanced degrees in both Astrophysics and History. For over three decades, he served as Director of the Center for History of Physics at the American Institute of Physics. He is the author of two children's science books and has written or co-edited seven other books. Among his most recent is The Rise of Nuclear Fear, published in 2012.In This Episode* A history of radiation (1:05)* The rise of nuclear fear (7:01)* Anti-bomb to anti-nuclear (11:52)* Today's anti-nuclear voices (20:21)* Changing generational attitudes (24:01)* Nuclear fear in today's media (28:58)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationA history of radiation (1:05)Pethokoukis: To what extent, when radiation was discovered at the turn of the century—and then, of course, the discovery of nuclear fission—to what extent were we already as a society primed by our cultural history to worry about radiation and nuclear power?Weart: Totally. Because you say radiation was discovered, presumably you're referring first to the discovery of X-rays and then, shortly after that, the discovery of what they called “atomic radiation,” we now call it “nuclear radiation.” But, of course, before that, there was the very exciting discovery of infrared radiation. And before that, people have always known about radiation: the rays, the heat from the sun; and they've always had a very powerful cultural significance. You think of the halos of rays of light going out from holy figures in Buddhism and Christian iconography, or you think of the ancient Egyptians with the life-giving rays of the sun bestowing life on things because actually, of course, radiation of the sun is life-giving, it does contain a vital life force. So it's not a mistake to think of radiation as some kind of super magical, powerful thing.And then of course there's also death rays. Death rays actually did become very popular in the literature after the discovery of X-rays because X-rays could, in fact, cause great damage to people, and then so could atomic rays, so, already by the early 20th century there were lots of kids' books and exciting adventure fiction featuring death rays. But you go back before that, there's the evil eye. There's rays radiating out from the evil eye could cause harm. Then there's astrology, the rays from the stars could influence human destiny. So as soon as you mention radiation, there's an enormous complex of things that come out, which was very easily linked to atomic radiation because of all the other characteristics of atomic discoveries.And yet, certainly in the first half or first third of the 20th century, there was, people saw radiation as having great promise, even to create a Golden Age. Tell me a bit about that.It came out as soon as radiation was discovered. Whenever there's a new physics discovery, almost the first thing that people think about is medical applications. And that happened with electricity and with X-rays—of course, x-rays do have great medical applications—and nuclear radiation (I'll call it “nuclear,” even though they called it “atomic” back then). Nuclear radiation did turn out to be radon and radium and so forth that Curie discovered did turn out to be useful for curing certain types of skin cancers and so forth.But people went much beyond that because there was all this magical stuff associated with it. We have to remember that very early on it was discovered that nuclear radiation is the product of the transmutation of elements: uranium and radium and so forth and even other elements.Like alchemy.Yeah, transmutation was alchemy. It was immediately recognized that, oh, the nuclear physicists were the new alchemist and they were happy to talk of themselves as that. But of course, as soon as you have something powerful, as I said, the first thing, when you have a new discovery, that you think about is medicine. The second thing you think about 10 seconds later is weapons, so nuclear death rates were very early imagined. And the atomic bomb—the first atomic bomb actually was sort of a device carried by a terrorist in the 1901 novel. And then in 1915, H.G. Wells conceived of the idea of an atomic warfare weapon that civilization destroyed, but then followed by transmutation and of course humans destroy civilization, then we'll rise again in atomic powered cars. We love utopia powered by nuclear energy. So all these things were there together, the good side and the bad side. On one side you had people saying that this is the 1930s mind. This is before nuclear fission was discovered. This was entirely science fiction.Would you call that a period of general sort of pro-progress science and technology enthusiasm?Well, it was, except… this was certainly the case in the 1900s. People thought that radium could cure all ills. Nuclear energy was seen as the elixir of life, talking about the old alchemists and so forth. There were all these wonderful things it could do and by the time it got to the First World War and the Great Depression, people were a little less happy about technology. So in addition to the wonders of atomic power plants and so forth, there were also things like… my favorite is a movie in which Boris Karloff doesn't play the mad scientist's monster, he plays the mad scientist who discovers a new kind of radium rays, and of course he means to use it for good and he uses it… always using it to irradiate the young women to cure them, because, of course, radiation carries not only life force, but if you dig down deep into the radium side that has this sort of sexual thing. So these 1930s science fiction images of nuclear or mad scientists irradiating young women having a definite violation aspect. In this movie Boris Karloff gets too big a dose of radiation and goes mad and it turns him into a monster and goes around glowing in the dark—maybe the origin of the glowing in the dark idea—and then killing people with the touch of his radioactive hand. So it was all there together, both magical good and magical evil. Very, very strongly mythologized and Freudenized. The writers at the time read their Freud and they were happy to put in all these ideas of bad parents. And the mad scientist is the bad parent out to rape… well, I probably shouldn't go too far with this because… You have to see the pictures to really appreciate how deep this stuff goes.Would you say that, overall, pre-Hiroshima, that the general public attitude was sort of positive about the potential of radiation and, eventually, atomic fission? Was it overall positive?Yes, I would say it was generally positive, but with very deep roots. The positivity was mingled, when you go down deep enough, with all sorts of negative or ambiguous things: ideas of mad scientists as sort of the bad parent or the authority figure, the mean, merciless dictator, all of these things and the evil eye death ray kind of thing. They're all there sort of broiling around at a very deep level, a very deep psychological level and a very deep cultural level. And on the surface side, I would say it was generally positive and the overall idea was positive.The rise of nuclear fear (7:01)So if those things were sort of bubbling around, was it the atomic bombings of Japan that brought that stuff to a boil? Was that the key moment, or did that happen afterward? Was that the key inflection point?It came afterwards. When Hiroshima happened, all the commentators from President Truman on down, the feeling was, “Oh, oh, it's actually real!” All the stuff that we thought was things that teenage boys read in their pulp fiction or in horror movies, all this stuff is actually real, so that was a shock.And so it went two ways. One of course was the actual image of Hiroshima. And then when atomic bombs started to proliferate, when the Russians got the atomic bombs and we worried about them bombing our homes, then all this stuff that was sort of underground and seemed mythological—atomic war and the end of the world, and so forth—all became a scientific reality.But at the same time, the other side also was coming out very strongly, and this was partly done deliberately. The government—well, the American government, the British government, the French government, the Soviet government—all got very worried about how upset their publics were and how frightened they were by atomic bombs. So they made a very strong effort to promote what they called “Atoms for Peace:” nuclear reactors, nuclear-powered ships, nuclear-powered everything. We use radiation. Radiation has a life force, right? So we'll radiate seeds and we'll get these new kinds of petunias and better crops.Both of these things came out and there was a strong mixture of positivity and negativity, mostly connected with nuclear war, originally. It originally was connected with atomic explosions. And then this phase ended, this sort of 1950s Atoms for Peace thing ended with the hydrogen bomb, all of a sudden, there was a very big shift.Is that just because it was just obviously a much more powerful explosive, or was it the Bravo incident which you write about in the book?Yeah. There's two things going on here. First place is the hydrogen bomb is a thousand times more powerful than an atomic bomb. So this whole business of “duck and cover,” which, I was born in 1942, I did the “duck and cover” in school and so forth, that made sense with an atomic bomb. Okay, oh, the atomic bomb goes off in New York City, I'm in the suburbs, I duck under the desk. In a hydrogen bomb, you're inside the fireball. The whole idea of hiding from it is useless. So there's that one overwhelming thing. And the second thing with hydrogen bombs is that besides burning a city, they produce an enormous amount of fallout. Now, the fallout from the Hiroshima bomb actually didn't do much damage and the atomic bomb tests that people conducted in Nevada, they actually did do damage, but people didn't know it at the time because the atomic authorities were kind of hiding it. The Atomic Energy Commission had what they called—everybody at the time, called it—a “father-knows-best attitude,” which later turned out to be the bad father, the dangerous father.But with the hydrogen bombs coming along, you couldn't hide the fallout. It was just enormous. If you were a thousand miles away, you had to take shelter from the fallout. And so there was a big rush for a couple of years to build fallout shoulders. And then people realized, “No, what's the use of staying in a fallout shoulder for two weeks, and then when you come out, what are you going to get?” It was at this was point that the positivity got just overwhelmed. Particularly the positivity about radiation got overwhelmed.Radiation can be useful. Radiation is very medically useful. In fact, medical radiation and use of radioactive isotopes and nuclear rays saves, I don't know, millions of lives a year. In a single year it saves far more lives than I've ever died from nuclear radiation. But people then were sort of overwhelmed by the idea of nuclear war and of nuclear fallout, and this had a very strong political component.Anti-bomb to anti-nuclear (11:52)So tell me about the political component and then tell me how people sort of went from fearing radiation from nuclear war to fearing a nuclear reactor, which is not a bomb.After the hydrogen bomb an anti-war movement appeared, and it began in Japan, and it began in an interesting way. The first hydrogen bomb test polluted some fishermen who were nearby and they made them very sick and a pool of Marshall Islanders, Pacific Islanders, and made them very sick, and it caused some deaths, and the commission didn't want to admit it. But it also came down in the Pacific and all the tuna in the Pacific, the Japanese got very upset. Tuna to the Japanese is hamburger to Americans. Okay, it's a sacred thing. And the idea that you could hold a Geiger counter to it and there might be radioactivity in it was very frightening. And, of course, the Japanese had a natural worry about atomic warfare in the first place, so a movement began against fallout from nuclear weapons. It was against the testing of nuclear weapons.What they really didn't want—and this was true as the movement spread entirely around the world—what they mainly didn't want was to be bombed. The actual aim of the anti-nuclear movement, which ended up mobilizing millions and millions of people coming out into the streets, a very major movement, which had a very strong effect on politics and even in the Soviet Union. So what the leaders of the movement decided is they were going to focus on the fallout from bomb tests. The idea was to stop the bomb tests as a way of slowing down the nuclear arms race. If we could stop the tests, at least they won't be making more bombs. That's the first part, because it was a backyard issue. We can tell people the fallout is going into their backyard. My favorite is a kid says, “Oh, my mother says you shouldn't eat snow because there might be a piece of the bomb in it.” Okay, that's what radioactive material is now, it's a piece of the bomb. And so it was very powerful. It's in mother's milk, it's in your children's teeth. So it was a very powerful thing.And in order to do this, however, there was a certain little scientific difficulty, which is that the radioactivity in fallout, by the time it's thousands of miles away, is extremely low. Now, we do not know the effects of extremely low radiation. If you give a dose of unit one to one person, that person will die. If you give a dose of one millionth of a unit to one million people, will one person die? Well, that can be argued.And, in fact, the scientific evidence suggests that when you get to very, very low levels, that is, to the levels that are sort of normally in an environment, the levels that you get when you take one flight in the airplane or you go to some places in China where there's natural radioactivity, or if you live inside a brick house, these very low levels of radiation don't seem to be especially harmful. Life evolved for 5 billion years in the presence of low levels of radioactivity. So there's a scientific argument about this, and there's still a scientific uncertainty, but the scientists, feeling very bad about atomic weapons, decided, “We will say that, scientifically, very low levels of radioactivity experienced over millions of people are a bad thing.” And that's been the sort of official view of the anti-nuclear, anti-bomb scientists to this day. And so that became established. That was the point in which radiation, which is, as I said, is something we've lived with for three billion years, was established—this force of nature was established as just definitely an evil thing. It's a piece of the bomb. We don't want to have anything to do with it.And if it's an evil thing, then whether that radiation is generated for military use, or peaceful use, it's a bad thing, and there's just inherent risk. We cannot control this demon.It's the mad scientist's monster, it's the evil eye, it's the death ray. And, again, there's politics here because after the Cuban Missile Crisis and the tremendous excitement, and Kennedy and Khrushchev said, “We have to do something, our populaces are terrified now. This is very bad for us as leaders of our countries, to have our populace terrified that the things that we as leaders are doing are going to do…” Well it's very simple. We put the bomb test underground. Go on testing the bombs, we don't stop the arms race, we put the bomb test underground, so there's no fault. And the whole anti-nuclear movement just collapsed. They'd made this their issue. They made a good background issue. They say, we're going to stop fault. They did stop fault. So the thing went away. So what happened to these people? Well, meanwhile, atoms for peace was progressing.Nuclear reactors were beginning to come online, and some of the people who had been anti-atomic bomb began to worry about low level radiation for reactors. It's the same issue. And for reactor issues, this tiny, tiny amount of radioactivity, but that's over millions of people. Well, we've already decided it is a bad thing. And so an anti-nuclear reactor movement began up, and it made, through a very substantial extent, the same arguments about low level radioactivity and the same organizations and the same individuals, in many cases, who'd been agitating against atomic war. I would argue that this may be a case of psychological formation known as “displacement.” You can't deal with something: nuclear war, you deny. We're just going to go into denial about if the bombs are there. We're not going to think about, which is still the case, by the way. We're still largely in denial of the fact that the president of the United States and the president in the president of Russia, by their sole power, can press a button, so to speak, and can launch nuclear war. Each of these two men—well, I guess it's also true of Xi now, he seems to be pretty much in power in China—there's three people now who've been launched a nuclear war on their own say-so and launch hundreds and hundreds of missiles essentially destroy civilization. We're all in denial about that, and people have been in denial about that since about 1965.But if you're locked in a room with a guy with a flame thrower and somebody lights a match, you're going to get upset. And that seems to be what happened with the anti-nuclear reactor movement. And that's now become embedded, for example, the Green Party in Germany began as an anti-bomb party, converted to an anti-reactor party. What they actually are, if you get down to it, is an anti-additional low levels of radiation. When radiation is at a certain level, we don't want to add one percent in any place on earth from any reactor to it, and that's become their DNA, it's in their DNA. So the Green Party in Germany, it can't escape from their original orientation because of the same anti-bomb…So we see this transfer from nuclear weapons to nuclear reactors with radiation as sort of the common… But then in the '70s, it's also then sort of the anti-reactor position then seemed to get mixed up with a broader anti-modernity, anti-industrial society sort of attitude.Right, but actually this began more in Europe and the Europeans were very big on this, the whole 1960s thing, and really it's a 1960s phenomenon—the Baby Boomer, the 1968 generation, perhaps—that don't like nuclear. There is a feature of nuclear reactors, and this is an inherent feature of nuclear actors, is you need a lot of capital. If you're in a socialist country like the Soviet Union, you still need a lot of capital, it's just going to be under some big organization. In fact, the government always has to be involved, especially when people are worried about the safety of it, and you're going to need government regulations, so you're going to have a big government, you're going to have big corporations, and, because nuclear weapons are involved, you're also going to have secrecy. So, no matter what, you're dealing with these sort of secret, paternalistic authorities, which the kids of 1968 hated the whole idea of paternalistic authorities with their immense powers, and secrets, and God knows what they're up to with their machinations.Whereas, the original idea was, “Well, solar power is dispersed.” Okay, anybody can put up a solar panel, so that's very communitarian. So that became a very important part of the politics of it. Less so now, I would say. Today's anti-nuclear voices (20:21)Let me ask you about the politics of now because I understand that, and then obviously Three Mile Island was perhaps the capstone event, but yet, today, maybe the attitudes toward nuclear are changing and there's talk of nuclear renaissance, and in Europe—though not Germany—there's a lot of talk about building new reactors, keeping reactors open. Is the anti-nuclear sentiment today… in what ways is it different? Is it more about cost, or nuclear waste? It's not necessarily a fear of sort of “bigness,” we seem to generally like technology in this country.That was the thing of the '60s. That's not the thing now. In the United States and Western Europe, cost is a big feature because we can't seem to be able to build these things on time and in budget, but then we can't build a subway or a highway or a railroad on timer and budget, either. So these big projects we're not very good at these days, and that is a problem for the nuclear reactors. So the hope is to build smaller nuclear reactors so we don't run into this giant project syndrome that the United States and Western Europe seem to have problems with. But there's a lot of other things going on here.Certainly the younger generation doesn't have the same feelings that the older generation did. Nuclear energy for the young folks, it's the symptoms. It's a postmodern thing. The three-eyed fish is not a scary thing. It's kind of a postmodern reference to the stuff that your parents were afraid of. So it's all ironic. The game Fallout, which is enormously important, made a billion dollars of sale (well, four, I think it was a billion dollars of sales in the first 24 hours after it was released) these are big cultural phenomena, so it's the post-apocalyptic wasteland, but it's a reference to the scary post-apocalyptic wasteland. Like I say, we're in denial about the actual. Radioactive mutant monsters? Of course there are radioactive monsters. When I give this lecture, I show a picture of one, he's wearing shades, he's is kind of cool. It's all ironic and distancing, and so on and so on. The younger generation doesn't have that thing, but they have sort of an automatic response, which has just been built into the culture, an automatic response that, “Oh, there's something bad about radiation, I'm not actually viscerally afraid of it the way my parents were, but I just automatically think it's bad. And I'll give you an important example, okay, I'm going to give a life and death example.After the Fukushima accident, when the tsunami overcame this thing—the Japanese had done very bad job there—the Japanese evacuate a lot of people from around there. Two thousand people died in the immediate evacuation, mostly the older people were yanked out of their homes or retirement homes or hospitals and so forth. Since then, a lot of the people have not been allowed to go back. They've been displaced. There's a lot of morbidity and mortality among these people whose communities have disrupted. This was totally unnecessary. If they had just left everybody in place and maybe handed out some iodine pills, nobody would have died. The kind of reactions that people have to these things… But that's not the worst mortality from Fukushima, the worst mortality from Fukushima is that the Japanese and the Germans shut down the nuclear power plants and burned coal instead, and the death rate—the deaths from burning the coal instead of the nuclear reactors—is now estimated at about 400,000 people. 400,000 people died from—oh, sorry, I'm off by an order magnitude: 40,000 people. Anyway, many tens of thousands of people have died from coal smoke that didn't have to die if people hadn't panicked.Changing generational attitudes (24:01)It is significant. It's research I mentioned in my book, and I've actually had some of the economists who've done some of that research on this podcast, and it's a lesson that the Japanese seem to have learned, whether it's to have less pollution or meet various environmental objectives, they seem to have re-embraced nuclear. Given, perhaps, how younger people today, younger voters maybe don't have that sort of deeper repulsion toward radiation that their parents did. Do you think, one, maybe putting the economics aside, that from a public perceptions standpoint, are you positive or negative about a nuclear renaissance in this country and can any optimism survive any sort of nuclear accident almost no matter how small?It's going to be difficult because, like I say, the reaction to Fukushima shows that the government reaction and the media reaction shows that there's still an enormous amount of this stuff going on, both in the older people and also just by habit, by automatic response from the younger people. What's the worst power accident that's happened recently? Most people wouldn't realize it was the breaking of hydroelectric dams in Libya. They killed tens of thousands of people. Over 10,000 people died when a hydroelectric dam broke. A hydroelectric dams, that's renewable, that's supposed to be great stuff, right? Nobody talks about that. No nuclear reactor has ever killed 10,000 people, or a thousand people, or a hundred people, even. But hydroelectric dams, this isn't the first time a hydroelectric dam has broken and killed 10,000 people, either. It seems to happen every 20, 30 years or so, but people aren't afraid.So yes, it's very serious. Nevertheless, there is another thing which is becoming very prominent in many people's minds, and which has, in fact, led to quite a substantial number of environmentalists who were originally opposed to nuclear actors who were saying, “We must have nuclear reactors,” and you know what this is: This is climate change. This, as you may know, is the other thing I've spent 25 years of my life on, is climate change. And so I'm now just going to give you a very brief little homily.Under the current agreement, Paris Agreement as extended, if all the countries keep their pledges (that's a big “if”), they keep their pledges, some countries may do better than the pledges, but the estimate from the IPCC is that there will warm up to 2.7 degrees Celsius above the pre-industrial. We're now at about 1.4, so that's getting about twice as far as we are now. 2.7 degrees Celsius, in a world at that level, it will be rather difficult to maintain a prosperous and liberal civilization. Right now we have maybe a third of the world lives in a prosperous, liberal, fairly liberal free society. We would like that to be a hundred percent by the year 2100, but if we get up to 2.7 degrees C, which is the trajectory we're on now, then it's going to be extremely difficult to maintain that even for the third of the people who have it now.But there's another feature which the climate people mostly don't like to talk about. You actually have to read the footnotes in the IPCC report to get this. You have to look at the graphs and get the numbers off the graphs. People, when they say, everybody says 2.7 degrees C, that's what the IPCC says is the most likely outcome, but there are large error bars on that. It could be 4.5 C degrees Celsius. What's the probability of going above 4.5 if you read it off the graphs? Five percent. And I have quotes from two separate very senior climate scientists saying, “Well, you wouldn't get on an airplane if it had a five percent chance of crashing.” This is why people are fighting to keep it down below two degrees. Once we get above two degrees, the probability of the airplane crashing becomes fairly high.Is the consensus middle path or sort of these more extreme predictions, are they scary enough that environmental groups, which still are anti-nuclear, will change and there'll be a broader environmental pro-nuclear shift?It definitely has made a difference to some prominent individuals. I'm not going to name names, but they're quite a substantial number of people and increasing numbers of people who are… The scientists are terrified, and the climate scientists are just, they have a hard time sleeping at night, so they worry about their kids. I had experience because I lived for 25 years studying nuclear war and all that stuff, so I guess I have a little thick skin when I think about the climate, but it's even scarier than nuclear war, simple fact of the matter, because nuclear war was a question of, can we avoid it? But climate change is something we're on track for now. That's where we're actually heading.Nuclear fear in today's media (28:58)Let me finish up with this question, since you talk so much in the book about culture and the images that we sort of feed to ourselves. So I can think of two, perhaps, relevant bits of media over the past few years. I was wondering if you've seen either and if you had any general thoughts. One was the fine Chernobyl miniseries, which may have been on HBO, it was a four-part series on Chernobyl. And the film Oppenheimer. Have you seen either, and maybe give some context on how you look at those?I'm not going to comment on Oppenheimer, that's very complicated. Chernobyl, they did a wonderful job of reproducing the Soviet thing. Everybody was smoking all the time. I was in the Soviet Union, you know? I'll just give you one example. They showed a helicopter going over and they showed it crashing. And the implication there is, “Oh, somehow magical radiation from the reactor crashed the helicopter.” Well, there actually was a helicopter crash, and it crashed because it ran into a crane. So that's just dishonest. That's just dishonest. And unfortunately, this is the way that the media is still, to a substantial extent, treating radiation.There came a point in that miniseries, which, overall, I thought was excellent, when you finally found out what the actual death toll was, I think many viewers were surprised because if you watched every one of those episodes where they were talking about just how dangerous this meltdown was and the potential deaths, if the reactors exploded, you would've thought that many, many tens of thousands or a hundred thousand people had died—and they didn't! It was almost anti-climactic to find out how few people actually died. And if this is the first you had ever heard of Chernobyl, I think it was probably fairly surprising to people.People die all the time in coal mine accidents. I have no idea what the death toll is. It's terrible. But coal is familiar, okay, as one of the people said in 1946 when they were talking about reactors, “Well, it wasn't 10,000 tons of coal they dropped on Hiroshima.” We have these associations with nuclear things that we just don't have with traditional things. And the associations, as we've discussed, go very far back into death rays, mad scientists, bad fathers, sexual implications of things, all kinds of magical and mysterious things that get associated with nuclear energy that they've never been associated with the more traditional forms of energy production.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

Education was among the first victims of AI panic. Concerns over cheating quickly made the news. But AI optimists like John Bailey are taking a whole different approach. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Bailey about what it would mean to raise kids with a personalized AI coach — one that could elevate the efficacy of teachers, tutors, and career advisors to new heights.John Bailey is a colleague and senior fellow at AEI. He formerly served as special assistant to the president for domestic policy at the White house, as well as deputy policy director to the US secretary of commerce. He has additionally acted as the Director of Educational Technology for the Pennsylvania Department of Education, and subsequently as Director of Educational Technology for the US Department of Education.In This Episode* An opportunity for educators (1:27)* Does AI mean fewer teachers, or better teachers? (5:59)* A solution to COVID learning loss (9:31)* The personalized educational assistant (12:31)* The issue of cheating (17:49)* Adoption by teachers (21:02)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationEducation was among the first victims of AI panic. Concerns over cheating quickly made the news. But AI optimists like John Bailey are taking a whole different approach. Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Bailey about what it would mean to raise kids with a personalized AI coach — one that could elevate the efficacy of teachers, tutors, and career advisors to new heights.John Bailey is a colleague and senior fellow at AEI. He formerly served as special assistant to the president for domestic policy at the White house, as well as deputy policy director to the US secretary of commerce. He has additionally acted as the Director of Educational Technology for the Pennsylvania Department of Education, and subsequently as Director of Educational Technology for the US Department of Education.An opportunity for educators (1:27)Pethokoukis: John, welcome to the podcast.Bailey: Oh my gosh, it's so great to be with you.We'd actually chatted last summer a bit on a panel about AI and education, and this is a fast moving, evolving technology. People are constantly thinking of new things to do with it. They're gauging its strengths and weaknesses. As you're thinking about any downsides of AI in education, has that changed since last summer? Are you more or less enthusiastic? How would you gauge your evolving views?I think I grow more excited and enthusiastic by the day, and I say that with a little humility because I do think the education space, especially for the last 20 years or so, has been riddled with a lot of promises around personalized learning, how technology was going to change your revolutionize education and teaching and learning, and it rarely did. It was over promise and under-delivered. This, though, feels like it might be one of the first times we're underestimating some of the AI capabilities and I think I'm excited for a couple different reasons.I just see this as it is developing its potential to develop tutoring and, just in time, professional development for teachers, and being an assistant to just make teaching more joyful again and remove some of the drudgery. I think that's untapped area and it seems to be coming alive more and more every day. But then, also, I'm very excited about some of the ways these new tools are analyzing data and you just think about school leaders, you think about principals and superintendents, and state policy makers, and the ability of being able to just have conversations with data, not running pivot tables or Excel formulas and looking for patterns and helping to understand trends. I think the bar for that has just been dramatically lowered and that's great. That's great for decision-making and it's great for having a more informed conversation.You're right. You talked about the promise of technology, and I know that when my kids were in high school, if there were certain classes which were supposedly more tech adept, they would bring out a cart with iPads. And I think as parents we are supposed to be like, “Wow, every kid's going to have an iPad that's going to be absolutely amazing!” And I'm not sure if that made the teachers more productive, I'm not sure, in the end, if the kids learned any better.This technology, as you just said, could be different. And the one area I want to first focus on is, it would be awesome if we had a top-10-percent teacher in every classroom. And I know that, at least some of the early studies, not education studies, but looking at studies of using generative AI in, perhaps, customer service. One effect they notice is kind of raising the lower-performing group and having them do better. And so I immediately think about the ability to raise… boy, if we could just have the lowest-performing teachers do as well as the middle-performing teachers, that would seem to be an amazing improvement.I totally agree with you. Yeah, I think that was the BCG study that found when consultants used gen AI—I think, in that case, it was ChatGPT—everyone improved, but the folks that had the most dramatic improvement were the lowest performers in the consulting world. And here you could imagine something very similar for teachers that are teaching out of field—that happens a lot in science and mathematics. It's with new teachers, and the ability of helping them perform better… also, the ability, I think, of combining what they know with also what science and research is saying is the best practice. That's been very difficult.One of the examples I give is the Department of Ed has these guides called the What Works Clearinghouse Practice Guides, and this is what evaluation of research, and studies, and evaluation has to say, “This is the best way of teaching math, or the best way of teaching reading,” but these are dense documents, they're like 137 PDF pages. If you're asking a new teacher teaching out of field to read 137 pages of a PDF and apply it to their lesson that day, that's incredibly difficult. But it can happen in a matter of seconds now with an AI assistant that can read that practice guide, read your lesson, and make sure that you're getting just-in-time professional development, you're getting an assistant with your worksheets, with your class activities and everything. And so I totally agree with you, I think this is a way of helping to make sure that teachers are able to perform better and to really be an assistant to teachers no matter where they are in terms of their skill level.Does AI mean fewer teachers, or better teachers? (5:59)I recall a story, and I forget which sort of tech CEO was talking to a bunch of teachers, and he said, “The good news: in the future, all teachers will make a million dollars a year… bad news is we're only going to need like 10 percent of you” because each teacher would be so empowered by—this was pre-AI—by technology that they would just be so much more productive.The future you're talking about isn't necessarily a future of fewer teachers, it's just sort of the good part of it, which is more productive teachers, and any field where there's a huge human element is always tough to make more productive. Is the future you're talking about just… it's not necessarily fewer teachers, it's just more productive teachers?I think that's exactly right. I don't think this is about technology replacing teachers, I think it's about complimenting them. We see numerous studies that ask teachers how they spend their time and, on average, teachers are spending less than half of their time on instruction. A lot of it is on planning, a lot of it is on paperwork. I mean, even if we had AI that could take away some of that drudgery and free up teachers' times, so they could be more thoughtful about their planning or spend more time with students, that would be a gift.But also I think the best analog on this is a little bit in the healthcare space. If you think of teachers as a doctor, doctors are your most precious commodity in a healthcare system, you want to maximize their time, and what you're seeing is that now, especially because of technology and because of some tools, you can push a lot of decisions to be more subclinical. And so initially that was with nurses and nurse practitioners so that could free up doctor's time. Now you're seeing a whole new category, too, where AI can help provide some initial feedback or responses, and then if you need more help and assistance, you'd go up to that nurse practitioner, and if you need more help and assistance, then you go and you get the doctor. And I bet we're going to see a bunch of subclinical tools and assistance that come out in education, too. Some cases it's going to be an AI tutor, but then kids are going to need a human tutor. That's great. And in some cases they're going to need more time with their teacher, and that's great, too. I think this is about maximizing time and giving kids exactly what they need when they need it.This just sort of popped in my head when you mentioned the medical example. Might we see a future where you have a real job with a career path called “teacher assistant,” where you might have a teacher in charge, like a doctor, of, maybe, multiple classes, and you have sort of an AI-empowered teaching assistant as sort of a new middle-worker, much like a nurse or a physician's assistant?I think you could, I mean, already we're seeing you have teacher assistants, especially in higher education, but I think we're going to see more of those in K-12. We have some K-12 systems that have master teachers and then teachers that are a little bit less-skilled or newer that are learning on the job. I think you have paraprofessionals, folks that don't necessarily have a certification that are helping. This can make a paraprofessional much more effective. We see this in tutoring that not every single tutor is a licensed teacher, but how do you make sure a tutor is getting just-in-time help and support to make them even more effective?So I agree with you, I think we're going to see a whole category of sort of new professions emerge here. All in service by the way, again, of student learning, but also of trying to really help support that teacher that's gone through their licensure that is years of experience and have gone through some higher education as well. So I think it's a complimentary, I don't think it's replacing,A solution to COVID learning loss (9:31)You know, we're talking about tutoring, and the thing that popped in my head was, with the pandemic and schools being hybrid or shut down and kids having to learn online and maybe they don't have great internet connections and all that, that there's this learning-loss issue, which seems to be reflected in various national testing, and people are wondering, “Well great, maybe we could just catch these kids up through tutoring.” Of course, we don't have a nationwide tutoring plan to make up for that learning loss and I'm wondering, have people talked about this as a solution to try to catch up all these kids who fell behind?I know you and I, I think, share a similar philosophy of where… in DC right now, so much of the philosophy around AI is, it's doomerism. It's that this is a thing to contain and to minimize the harms instead of focusing on how do we maximize the benefits? And if there's been ever a time when we need federal policymakers and state policy makers to call on these AI titans to help tackle a national crisis, the learning crisis coming out of the pandemic is definitely one of those. And I think there's a way to do tutoring differently here than we have in the past. In the past, a lot of tech-based tutoring was rule-based. You would ask a question that was programmed, Siri would give a response, it would give a pre-programed answer in return. It was not very warm. And I think what we're finding is, first of all, there's been two studies, one published in JAMA, another one with Microsoft and Google, that found that in the healthcare space, not only could these AI systems be not just technically accurate, but their answers, when compared to human doctors, were rated as more empathetic. And I think that's amazing to think about when empathy becomes something you can program and maximize, what does it mean to have an empathetic tutor that's available for every kid that can encourage them?And for me, I think the thing that I realized that this is fundamentally different was about a year ago. I wanted to just see: Could ChatGPT create an adaptive tutor? And the prompt was just so simple. You just tell it, “I want you to be an adaptive tutor. I want you to teach a student in any subject at any grade, in any language, and I want you to take that lesson and connect it to any interest a student has, and then I want you to give a short quiz. If they get it right, move on. If they get it wrong, just explain it using simpler language.” That literally is the prompt. If you type in, “John. Sixth grade. Fractions. Star Wars,” every example is based on Star Wars. If you say, “Taylor Swift,” every example is on Taylor Swift. If you say, “football,” every example is on football.There's no product in the market right now, and no human tutor, that can take every lesson and connect it to whatever interest a student has, and that is amazing for engagement. And it also helps take these abstract concepts that so often trip up kids and it connects it to something they're interested in, so you increase engagement, you increase understanding, and that's all with just three paragraphs of human language. And if that's what I can do, I'd love to sort of see our policymakers challenge these AI companies to help build something that's better to help tackle the learning loss.The personalized educational assistant (12:31)And that's three paragraphs that you asked of a AI tutor where that AI is as bad as it's ever going to be. Oftentimes, when people sort of talk about the promise of AI and education, they'll say like, “In the future,” which may be in six months, “kids will have AI companions from a young age with which they will be interacting.” So by the time they get to school, they will have a companion who knows them very well, knows their interests, knows how they learn, all these things. Is that kind of information something that you can see schools using at some point to better teach kids on a more individualized basis? Has there been any thought about that? Because right now, a kid gets to school and all teacher knows is maybe how the kid did it in kindergarten or preschool and their age and their face, but now, theoretically, you could have a tremendous amount of information about that kid's strengths and weaknesses.Oh my gosh, yeah, I think you're right. Some of this we talked about in the future, that was a prompt I constructed, I think for ChatGPT4 last March, which feels like eons ago in AI timing. And I think you're right. I think once these AI systems have memory and can learn more about someone, and in this case a student, that's amazing, to just sort of think that there could be an AI assistant that literally grows up with the child and learns about their interests and how they're struggling in class or what they're thriving in class. It can be encouraging when it needs to be encouraging, it can help explain something when the child needs something explained, it could do a deeper dive on a tutoring session. Again, that sounds like science fiction, but I think that's two, three years away. I don't think that's too far.Speaking of science fiction, because I know you're a science fiction fan, a lot of what we're describing now feels like the 1995 Sci-Fi novel, The Diamond Age and that talked about this, it talked about Nell, who was a young girl who came in a possession of a highly advanced book. It was called the Young Lady's Illustrated Primer, and it would help with tutoring and with social codes and with a lot of different support and encouragement. And at the time when Neil wrote that in '95, that felt like science fiction and it really feels like we've come to the moment now—you have tablet computers, you have phones that can access these super-intelligent AI systems that are empathetic, and if we could get them to be slightly more technically accurate and grounded in science and practice and rigorous research, I don't know, that feels really powerful. It feels like something we should be leaning into more than leaning away fromJohn, that reference made this podcast an early candidate for Top Podcasts of 2024. Wonderful. That was really playing to your host. Again, as you're saying that, it occurs to me that one area that this could be super helpful really is sort of career advice when kids are wondering, “What I should do, should I go to college?” and boy, to have a career counselor's advice supplemented by a lifetime of an AI interacting with this kid… Counselors will always say, “Well, I'm sure your parents know you better than I do.” Well, I'll tell you, a career counselor plus a lifetime AI, you may know that kid pretty well.Let's just take instruction off the table. Let's say we don't want AI to help teach kids, we don't want AI to replace teachers. AI as navigators I think is another untapped area, and that could be navigators as parents are trying to navigate a school choice system or an education savings account. It could be as kids and high school students are navigating what their post-college plan should be, but these systems are really good with that.I remember I played with a prompt a couple months ago, but it was that, I said, “My name is John. I play football. Here's my GPA. I want to go to school in Colorado and here's my SAT score. What college might work well for me?” And it did an amazing job with even that rudimentary prompt of giving me a couple different suggestions in why that might be. And I think if we were more sophisticated there, we might be able to open up more pathways for students or prevent them from going down some dead ends that just might not be the right path for them.There's a medical example of this that was really powerfully illustrative for me, which is, I had a friend who, quite sadly a couple of months ago was diagnosed with breast cancer. And this is an unfolding diagnosis. You get the initial, then there's scans and there's biopsies and reports, and then second and third and fourth opinions, it's very confusing. And what most patients need there isn't a doctor, they need a navigator. They need someone who could just make sense of the reports that can explain this Techno Latin that kind of gets put into the medical jargon, and they need someone to just say, what are the next questions I need to ask as I find my path on this journey?And so I built her a GPT that had her reports and all she could do was ask it questions, and the first question she said is, “Summarize my doctor notes, identify they agree and where they disagree.” Then, the way I constructed the prompt is that after every response, it should give her three questions to ask the doctor, and all of a sudden she felt empowered in a situation where she felt very disempowered with navigating a very complex, and in that case, a life-threatening journey. Here, how can't we use that to take all the student work, and their assessments, their hobbies, and start helping them be empowered with figuring out where they should be pursuing a job or college or some other post-secondary pathway.The issue of cheating (17:49)You know I have a big family, a lot of kids, and I've certainly had conversations with, say, my daughters about career, and I'll get something like, “Ugh, you just don't understand.” And I'll say, “Well, help me, make me understand.” She's like, “Oh, you just don't understand.” Now I'm like, “Hey, AI, help me understand, what does she want to do? Can you give me some insights into her career?”But we've talked about some of the upsides here and we briefly mentioned, immediately this technology attracted criticism. People worried about a whole host of things from bias in the technology to kids using it to cheat. There was this initial wave of concerns. Now that we're 15 months, maybe, or so since people became aware of this technology, which of the concerns do you find to be the persistent ones that you think a lot about? Are you as worried, perhaps, about issues of kids cheating, on having an AI write the paper for them, which was an early concern? What are the concerns that sort of stuck with you that you feel really need to be addressed?The issue of cheating is present with every new technology, and this was true when the internet came out, it was true when Wikipedia came out, it was true when the iPhones came out. You found iPhone bans. If you go back and look at the news cycle in 2009, 2010, schools were banning iPhones; and then they figure out a way to manage it. I think we're going to figure out a way to manage the cheating and the plagiarism.I think what worries me is a couple different things. One is, the education community talks often about bias, and when they usually talk about bias, in this case, they're talking about racial bias in these systems. Very important to address that head on. But also we need to tackle political bias. I think we just saw that recently with Gemini that, often, sometimes these systems can surface a little bit of center-left perspective and thinking on different types of subjects. How do we fine-tune that so you're getting it a little bit more neutral. Then also, in the education setting, it's pedagogical bias. Like when you're asking it to do a lesson plan or tutoring session, what's the pedagogy that's actually informing the output of that? And those are all going to be very important, I think, to solve.The best case scenario, AI gets used to free up teacher time and teachers can spend more time in their judgment working on their lesson plans and their worksheets and more time with kids. There's also a scenario where some teachers may fall asleep at the wheel a little bit. It's like what you're seeing with self-driving cars, that you're supposed to keep your hands on the wheel and supposed to be at least actively supervising it, but it is so tempting to just sort of trust it and to sort of tune out. And I can imagine there's a group of teachers that will just take the first output from these AI systems and just run with it, and so it's not actually developing more intellectual muscle, it's atrophying that a little bit.Then lastly, I think, what I worry about with kids—this is a little bit on the horizon, this is the downside to the empathy—what happens when kids just want to keep talking to their friendly, empathetic, AI companion and assistant and do that at the sacrifice of talking with their friends, and I think we're seeing this with the crisis of loneliness that we're seeing in the country as kids are on their phones and on social media. This could exaggerate that a lot more unless we're very intentional now about how to make sure kids aren't spending all their time with their AI assistant, but also in the real life and the real world with their friends.Adoption by teachers (21:02)Will teachers be excited about this? Are there teachers groups, teachers unions who are… I am sure they've expressed concerns, but will this tool be well accepted into our classrooms?I think that the unions have been cautiously supportive of this right now. I hear a lot of excitement from teachers because I think what teachers see is that this isn't just one more thing, this is something that is a tool that they can use in their job that provides immediate, tangible benefits. And if you're doing something that, again, removes some drudgery of some of the administrative tasks or helps you with figuring out that one worksheet that's going to resonate with that one kid, that's just powerful. And I think the more software and systems that come out that tap that and make that even more accessible for teachers, I think the more excitement there is going to be. So I'm bullish on this. I think teachers are going to find this as a help and not as a threat. I think the initial threat around plagiarism, totally understandable, but I think there's going to be a lot of other tools that make teachers' lives better.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

Readers and listeners of Faster, Please! know how incredible the untapped potential of nuclear power truly is. As our society (hopefully) begins to warm to the idea of nuclear as an abundant, sustainable, and safe source of energy, a new generation of engineers and entrepreneurs is developing a whole new model of nuclear power: the microreactor.Here on this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with James Walker, a nuclear physicist and CEO of NANO Nuclear Energy about the countless applications of his company's under-development, mobile, and easily-deployable nuclear reactors.In This Episode* Why the microreactor? (1:14)* The NANO design plan (7:11)* The industry environment (11:42)* The future of the microreactor (13:45Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationWhy the microreactor? (1:14)Pethokoukis : James, welcome to the podcast.Walker: I would say the way NANO got going is probably of interest, then. When we first entered the nuclear space, and my background is a nuclear physicist, nuclear engineer, so I knew that there's a very high bar to entry in nuclear and there's a lot of well-established players in the space. But, really, when we actually took a look at the whole landscape, most of the development was in the SMR space, the Kairos, the Terra Powers, the NuScales, and we could see what they were doing: They were aiming for a much more manufactural reactor that could deploy a lot faster. It was going to be a lot smaller, fewer mechanical components, smaller operating staff to bring down costs. So that all made a lot of sense, but what I think was missing in the market—and there are a few companies involved in this—was that the microreactor space looked to be the larger potential market. And I say that because microreactors are more readily deployable to places like remote mining sites, remote habitation, disaster relief areas, military bases, island communities… you put them on maritime vessels to replace bunk fuel, charging stations for EV vehicles... Essentially hundreds of thousands of potential locations competing against diesel generators, which, up until now, up until microreactors, had no competition. So the big transformative change here is—obviously SMRs are going to contribute that, but—micro reactors can completely reshape the energy landscape and that's why it's exciting. That's the big change.You gave some examples, so I want you to give me a couple more examples, but I'll say that I was thinking the other day about the expansion, partially due to AI, of these big data centers around the country. Is that the kind of thing—and you can give me other examples, as well—of where a much smaller microreactor might be a good fit for it, and also tell me, just how big are these reactors?AI centers and data centers are particularly a big focus of tech at the moment. Microsoft even have people deliberately going out and speaking to nuclear companies about being able to charge these new stations because they want these things to be green, but they also want them in locations which aren't readily accessible to the grid. And a lot of the time, some of the power requirements of these things might be bigger than the town next to them where they've got these things. So their own microreactor or SMR system is actually a really good way of solving this where it's zero carbon-emitting energy, you can put it anywhere, and it is the most consistent form of energy. Now you can out-compete diesel in that front, it can go outcompete, wind or solar. It really has no competitors. So they are leaning in that direction and a lot of the big drive in nuclear at the moment is coming from industry. So that's the big change, I think. It's not strictly now a government-pushed initiative.What's the difference between these and the SMR reactors, which my listeners and readers might be a little bit more familiar with?SMRs, the small modular reactors, obviously if you think of a large conventional nuclear power station, you're thinking dozens and dozens of acres of land being occupied by essentially a big facility. An SMR brings that down by an order of magnitude. You still need to probably have an area about 10 city blocks, but the reactor itself is much, much smaller, occupied by a much smaller footprint than that.Microreactors are much smaller, again, so if you take our design as an example, the whole system, the core and the turbine that produces the electricity, all fits within an ISO container. If you think of the standard shipping container you see on the back of a ship or you see on the back of a truck or a train, that's where you're really looking at. And the reason for that is that we're trying to make it as deployable and as mobile as possible. So conventional transportation—infrastructure, trucks, trains, ships—get these things anywhere in the world. Helicopter them in, if you really want. And once they're down there you've got 10, 15, 20 years of power consistently without that constant need to import fuel like you would with the diesel generator. That's the real big advantage of these things. Obviously SMRs don't have that ability, but they are more powerful machines. So you're powering cities, or bit towns, and that kind of thing. They are catering to different markets. They're not exactly competitors, they're very complimentary.But even for big grid systems, micro reactors could play a big part because they could be intermittently placed within a grid system so that you have backup power systems all the time that's not reliant on one major area to produce power for the entire grid system. It can always draw power from wherever it needs. And there's a big advantage to micro correctors there.Other examples of where microreactors could be used: We know that the military is very interested because they have an obligation to be able to self-power for at least two weeks. And obviously micros can take you well beyond that for, like, 50 years, so that easily meets their requirements. They're looking to get rid of diesel and replace them with microreactors and they're putting money in that space.I would say a big market is going to be things like island communities that predominantly run on diesel at the moment, and that means it's expensive and it's polluting, and they're constantly bringing in diesel on a daily basis.  Countries like the Philippines, Indonesia, where they have the majority of their population on these island communities that all run on diesel, you would essentially be taking hundreds of millions of people off diesel generator and putting them onto nuclear if you could bring in that technology to these areas.And the US actually has an enormous population on island communities that run on diesel, too, that could be replaced with microreactors, and you could then have a zero carbon-emitting solution to energy requirements and less energy insecurity.  The NANO design plan (7:11)Would they need to be refueled and how many people would it take? How many technical people would you need to operate one of them?The idea here with our reactors is that we don't want to refuel at-site. What we would likely do is just decommission that reactor and remove it and we would just bring in a replacement. It's this less messy, there's no refueling process, it's easier to license that way. The interesting part about this is that we actually would probably only need a couple people on site while the reactor is running, and the reason for that is because obviously we need someone for physical security and maybe a mechanic on site who can just do some sort of physical intervention to modify the mechanical equipment.The way these will likely work is that you'll have a central location where it monitors the behavior of dozens of reactors that are deployed at any one time. And you have all your nuclear engineers and your operators in that space and they monitor everything.So you don't need a nuclear engineer at each site. And that way these things are very deployable and, to be honest, everybody who's going to work on these things are going to be quite bored. There's not going to be a lot to do because reactors are mostly self-regulating systems, and the intervention that's needed on a daily basis is very minimal. So even for the hub, it's mostly just an observation exercise to check on transient behavior as it's operating and then maybe some tweaks here and there, and that's essentially all that would need to be done for these things. And then you can bring down your OpEx costs very considerably.So just a bit about the technology itself: You're working on two different reactors? Can you explain the differences in reactors and where they are in the development-deployment stage?We have two expert technical teams working on two different reactor designs, and that's partly so we can de-risk our own operations. So we know that even if one meets critical problems, the other one will be able to go on, so we're just doubling our chances of success. The MO we gave to both of them was the same: It has to be modular, it needs to be passively cooling, it needs to be able to be shipped anywhere in the world, so it needs to be fit within an ISO container. And we gave both teams that MO. They both came up with very innovative and novel solutions to that problem.So the Zeus reactor, which draws from the scientists and engineers down in California, their solution was just completely remove the coolants and use a thermal conduction. And if you do that, you can remove all the mechanical systems in the reactor. You reduce the size, you reduce the pumps, and then you have something that's very, very simple and size shrinks right down and you can get it in that ISO container system. That's very innovative, that's the Zeus reactor.The Odin team, their solution was, “Well if you could introduce some initial heat into the system for a salt-based system and the uranium is providing that natural heat, and you create a natural circulation so you can remove pumps and you can remove circulatory systems and that way, again, you can shrink the reactor right down.”So two very different solutions to the same problem, and that's how they differ. Odin does have a coolant that has a natural circulation that moves it around and Zeus has removed the coolant completely, which is more novel, I would say, and relies on a thermal conduction mechanism where the uranium just gets hot and it conducts through a solid core to the periphery where heat just gets removed by a naturally circulated air just going around.Is there a difference with how much power each kind could potentially generate from a shipping container sized unit?There was, originally, but I think the constraints of having to confine it to a shipping container almost got them into the same ballpark. So they're now both about, well, I'd say Zeus is maybe four megawatt thermal, Odin, it might be five megawatt thermal, but the power of the electric, once the conversion goes through, it brings them out to that one, one-and-a-half megawatt electric power output.And what can that power?A thousand homes for 20 years, mine sites, oil and gas sites for bringing the oil to the surface, remote communities, military bases…Plenty of power for that kind of thing.Plenty of power for that kind of thing. And also a big upside would be places where there's communities that completely are removed from the grid, desalination plans, medical facilities. Suddenly that all becomes very possible. You can unlock an enormous amount of wealth from landlocked resources, which just aren't economic because of fuel requirements to mine those things. So you can unlock trillions of dollars of value in resources just by having microreactors come into these remote locations. The industry environment (11:42)Whenever I talk with an expert about this topic, we eventually get to these two questions: One question is sort of, what is this technology's timeline? So there's that technology question. And then the second issue: What's the regulatory environment like for you folks?You're going to see SMRs come online first. They're going to get licensed first. They've got a bit of a head start. Microreactors, at the moment, all of the main contenders, including us, are basically at the same point. We're going into physical and test work that's looking at about a two-year process to collect all the data and licensing. Licensing is actually the longest-lead item that's about just under four years. That takes us all out to about 2030 where, before you have a commercial deployment of a microreactor, you're able to go anywhere we want.I would imagine SMRs, it's going to be several years before that. But then once microreactors can deploy, you'll see many more of them being deployed than SMRs.Would they be regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC)? Is that who the chief regulator is?Yeah, the NRC deals with all commercial ventures. So if it's defense or public, then you obviously would be DOE or DOD. NRC manages commercial ventures, so they're going to be in charge of the licensing for all micro and SMRs. I would say to your comment about the regulatory environment, I assume there are going to be adjustments made to the way these things are licensed because they are a very different product to a big conventional civil power plant, which is gigawatts or multiple gigawatts down to one megawatt. It's a very different device, very different operating system. I anticipate there will be changes. If there are not, that might complicate the deployment of microreactors.We do know they are aware of the need to modify the regulatory framework around these new systems. So we're hoping obviously in time for when we go to licensing process, and all the other microreactors are probably hoping the same, that that framework is in place so we can be assessed on their own criteria.The future of the microreactor (13:45)Are you viewing this as primarily initially as an American market or as a European market, as an Asian market? What do you see as the potential market for this? Once we're up and running,The first market will be the American market, and that's going to hit things like mining sites, military bases, data centers, AI centers, things removed off from the grid; but then you can expand very quickly in this state to something like charging stations for your EV vehicles in the middle of nowhere. If you bring diesel generators in to power those things, it defeats the point. And you can't just put wind and solar farms wherever you want because they're very locationally dependent on weather systems. But microreactors actually mean you can suddenly electrify the entire country. So you can periodically cite charging stations or EV vehicles throughout the whole country, and that'll be tens of thousands of potential essentially recharging stations that you can then drive your EV vehicle across the country because there could be periodic charging stations for all these vehicles. So it'll begin with that way.And we'll see a similar thing in continents like Europe that have more sophisticated grid systems. But then as this expands into places like Southeast Asia and Indonesia, the Phillippines, Thailand, big island community countries where microreactors are replacing diesel generators and making them more green. And then in places like Africa, large swathes of population cut off from grid completely, and then you'll see them deploying into those areas for desalination, medical facilities, and then ultimately mining projects.Big picture then, what's the dream? What does the technology and the company look like in 2035 or 2040?So I would say 2035, what we want to do is we want to be really deploying thousands of these things across the world. Not just the States and North America, but internationally. There's essentially an unlimited market for these. We won't sell the reactors, but we will sell the power. So we'll be an operator for all these companies, industry partners, mining companies. We hope to be putting these things on ships and replacing bunker fuel and maritime vessels.We won't be hitting the main grid systems, exactly. I think SMRs will pick up a lot of slack there, but for the first time, we'll be in a position to really start taking our microreactors, and the cost of these things by 2035 will have fallen to such a point that they will be more economic than diesel generators in the middle of nowhere that rely on a constant importation of diesel and the associated costs with that, it could be very transformative. It could create an enormous amount of wealth, it could improve the health of the planet across the board, for locations that are cut off, cut off. And for NANO, I already believe we'll be a massive company anyway, but there'll be a lot of blue-sky potential for expanding into other industries.You're designing, you're developing, would you be the manufacturer, ultimately, of these reactors?Yes, we'll be the manufacturer of these things. As I mentioned though, we won't sell them because people won't be interested in a big upfront capital cost with the associated operating liability. So we will just sell power. You need 10 megawatts for 20 years? We'll supply that. You need 16 megawatts for five years? We'll supply that, too. And that'll be the business model.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

The US Space Force, the newest branch of the American military, takes national defense to a new frontier. Here on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I sit down with AEI senior fellow Todd Harrison to discuss the state of the Space Force and its evolving mission.Harrison has served as senior vice president and head of research at Metrea, a defense consulting firm, been a senior fellow for defense budget strategies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, directed the Defense Budget Analysis and Aerospace Security Project at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, and served as a captain in the US Air Force Reserve.In This Episode* Creating the Space Force (0:53)* A New Kind of Warfare (9:15)* Defining the Mission (11:40)* Conflict and Competition in Space (15:34)* The Danger of Space Debris (20:11)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationCreating the Space Force (0:53)Pethokoukis: I was recently looking at an image that showed the increase in the number of satellites around the earth, and it's been a massive increase; I imagine a lot of it has to do with SpaceX putting up satellites, and it's really almost like—I think to an extent that most people don't understand; between  government, military, and a lot of commercial satellites—it's really like the earth is surrounded by this information shell. And when looking at that, I couldn't help but think, “Yeah, it kind of seems like we would need a Space Force or something to keep an eye on that and protect that.” And I know there was a lot of controversy, if I'm not mistaken, like, “Why do we need this extra branch of government?” Is that controversy about why we need a Space Force, is that still an active issue and what are your thoughts?Harrison: To start with where you started, yes. The number of satellites in space has been growing literally exponentially in the past few years. I'll just throw a few numbers out there:  In 2023 alone, about 2,800 new satellites were launched, and in that one year it increased the total number of satellites on the orbit by 22 percent, just in one year. And all the projections are that the number of satellites, number of launches, are going to keep growing at a pace like that for the foreseeable future, for the next several years. A lot is going into space, and we know from all other domains that where commerce goes conflict will follow. And we are seeing that in space as well.Like the Navy protecting the shipping lanes. Yeah, exactly. So we know that to a certain extent that's inevitable. There will be points of contention, points of conflict, but we've already seen that in space just with the military dimension of our space. Back in 2007, I think a lot of the world woke up to the fact that space is a contested environment when the Chinese tested an anti-satellite weapon, which, by the way, produced thousands of pieces of space debris that are still in orbit today. More than 2,600 pieces of debris are still in orbit from that one Chinese ASAT test. And, of course, that was just one demonstration of counter-space capabilities. Space has been a contested war fighting domain, really, since the beginning of the Space Age. The first anti-satellite test was in 1959, and so it has become increasingly important for economic reasons, but also for military reasons. Now, when the Space Force debate kicked into high gear, I think it took a lot of people who weren't involved in military space, I think it took a lot of people by surprise that we were having this debate.Yeah, it really seemed like it came out of nowhere, I think probably for 99 percent of people who aren't professionals tracking the issue.In reality, that debate, it started in the 1990s, and there was a senator from up in New Hampshire who had written a journal article basically talking about, “Hey, we need to separate space into its own military service.” You had the Air Force chief of staff at the time in the mid-1990s, General Ron Fogleman. He said that the Air Force should eventually become an Air and Space Force, and then one day a Space and Air Force. So you had the seeds of it happening in the '90s. Then you had Congress wanting to look at, “Okay, how do we do this? How do we reorganize military space?” They created a commission that was led by Donald Rumsfeld before he became Secretary of Defense for the second time. That commission issued its report in 2001, and it recommended a bunch of reforms, but it said in the midterm, in five to 10 years we should create a separate military service for space, something like a Space Corps.Nothing happened, even though Rumsfeld then became Secretary of Defense. We kind of took our focus off of it for a while, there were a few other studies that went on, and then in 2016, two members of Congress, a Republican and a Democrat, Mike Rogers and Jim Cooper, who were on the House Armed Services Committee, they took this issue up. They got so fed up with the oversight of looking at how the Air Force was shortchanging space in many ways in terms of personnel and training and funding and modernization, that they then put a provision into the 2017 National Defense Authorization Act that would've created a Space Corps, they called it: a separate military service for space. And that bill actually passed the full House of Representatives.The Senate did not have a similar provision in their bill, so it died. It didn't make it into law—but then, all of a sudden, a couple of years later, President Trump, pretty much out of the blue floats this idea of creating a Space Force, and he did it at a rally that was at a Marine Corps base out in California, and, for some reason, it caught on with Trump. And then you already had the votes, a bipartisan group in the House of Representatives who had already pushed this, and so it started to gain momentum.It was very controversial at the time. The secretary of the Air Force at that time was adamantly opposed to it. Eventually, Trump forced it on the civilian establishment at DoD, and Congress ultimately enacted it, and the Space Force became a military service in December… I think December 20th, 2019. Now, there was some question, will the Biden administration keep it?Is this here to stay?It is written into law, so a president cannot unilaterally take it away, and, at this point, it's got its own roots in the ground and the Space Force is not going anywhere.A little bit off topic, but was there a similar debate when they separated the Air Force out of the Army?There was, yeah, and it lasted for a long time. So you had folks like Billy Mitchell who were in the Army Air Corps way back before World War II—I think in the late '20s, early '30s—they were advocating for a separate military service for Air. And I believe Billy Mitchell actually got court marshaled because he disobeyed orders from a superior about advocating for this with Congress.And so the idea of a separate service for Air pretty much died out until World War II hit. And, of course, that was a war that we were brought into it by an attack that came from the air, and that really brought air power into full effect in terms of a major component of military power. So then, at the end of World War II, the Air Power advocates got together, they created the Air Force Association to advocate for a separate military service and they got it in the National Security Reform Act in 1947, I think the Air Force actually stood up in 1948.It took longer, I would argue, a lot more advocacy and it took a World War, a crisis, to show us how important Air was to the military in order for us to actually create an Air Force. Now, I think, thankfully, we did that in advance of a crisis in terms of creating the Space Force.Right now, what the Space Force does, is it tracking satellites, tracking and space debris, is it a monitoring and tracking service? It's not a fighting service yet?Well, yes and no. A lot of what the Space Force does on a day-to-day basis is they provide space-enabling capabilities to the other military services. So if you want to get intelligence, reconnaissance, surveillance from space, you can go to the Space Force. Separately, we have intel space that's run through the National Reconnaissance Office—that has not changed its organization. If you want to get GPS, the Space Force runs our GPS constellation of satellites, and they're responsible for defending it against all forms of attack, which it is attacked daily. If you want satellite communications, the Space Force delivers that. If you want missile warning… So the Space Force delivers lots of enabling capabilities for other parts of the military. At the same time, it is tasked with defending those capabilities, and it's not just against kinetic forms of attack where an adversary is literally trying to shoot a satellite out of the sky.A New Kind of Warfare (9:15)I guess that's the first thing that popped in my mind. Too much science fiction maybe, but…Well, that is real, that's a real threat. The truth is there's not a lot you can do to actively protect against that—at least, we don't have a lot of capabilities right now—but the forms of attack we see on a daily basis are cyber, electromagnetic, and other forms of non-kinetic attack like lazing the sensors on a satellite. You could temporarily, or even permanently, blind the sensors on a satellite with a laser from an aircraft or from a ground station.I'll give you an example: When Russia invaded Ukraine, at the very beginning of the invasion, one of the first attacks they launched was a space attack. It was cyber, and it was against a commercial space capability. What they did is they exploited a vulnerability, previously unknown, in ViaSat modems. ViaSat's, a commercial satellite communications company, they had some sort of a vulnerability in their modems. The Russians, through a cyber attack, basically bricked all those modems. They locked them out. The Ukrainian military relied on ViaSat for satellite communications, so it locked up all of their terminals right at the beginning. They could not communicate using Satcom. Incidentally, it locked up lots of ViaSat terminals across Europe in that same attack. So we see this happening all the time. Russian forces are constantly jamming GPS signals. That makes weapons and drones much less effective. They can't use GPS for targeting once they go into a GPS-denied environment.But the Space Force has ways to overcome that. We have protected military GPS signals, we have ways of increasing the strength of those signals to overcome jamming. There's lots of things you can do with counter-space and then counter to the counter-space.The problem is that we kind of sat on our laurels and admired our advantage in space for a couple of decades and did not make a concerted effort to improve the protection of our space systems and develop our own capability to deny others the advantage of space because others didn't have that same advantage for a long time.Well, that has changed, and the creation of the Space Force, I think, has really set us in a positive new direction to get serious about space defense and to get serious about denying others the advantage of space if we need to.Defining the Mission (11:40)The Chief of Space Operation at the Space Force recently published a short white paper, which I guess begins to lay out kind of a doctrine, like, “What is the mission? How do we accomplish this mission?” Probably the first sort of Big Think piece maybe since Space Force became a branch. What did that white paper say? What do you make of it?Yeah, so I think one of the criticisms of military space for a while has been that we didn't really have space strategy, space doctrine, we didn't have a theory of space power that was well developed. I would argue we had some of those, but it's fair to say that they have not been that well developed. Well, one of the reasons you need a military service is to actually get the expertise that is dedicated to this domain to think through those things and really develop them and flesh them out, and so that's what this white paper did, and I think it did a pretty good job of it, developing a theory of space power. He calls it a “theory of success for competitive endurance in the space domain.”And one of the things I thought was really great that they highlight in the paper, that a lot of US government officials in the past have been reluctant to talk about, is the fact that we are under attack on a daily basis—gray zone-type aggression in the space domain—and we've got to start pushing back against that. And we've got to actually be willing and able to exercise our own defensive and counter-space capabilities, even in the competition phase before we actually get to overt conflict, because our adversaries are doing it already. They're doing it to us. We need to be able to brush them back. We're not talking about escalating and starting a conflict or anything like that, but when someone jams our satellite communication systems or GPS, they need to feel some consequences. Maybe something similar happens to their own space capabilities, or maybe we employ capabilities that show them we can overcome what you're doing. So I thought that was a good part of the theory of success is you can't just sit by and let an adversary degrade your space capabilities in the competition phase.How much of the focus of Space Force currently, and maybe as that paper discussed what the department's mission is, focused on the military capabilities, protecting military capabilities, the military capabilities of other nations, versus what you mentioned earlier was this really expanding commercial element which is only going to grow in importance?Today, the vast majority of the Space Force's focus is on the military side of providing that enabling military capability that makes all of our forces more effective, protecting that capability, and then, to a lesser extent, being able to interfere with our adversaries' ability to use space for their own advantage.They are just now starting to really grapple with, “Okay, is there a role for the Space Force in protecting space commerce, protecting commercial space capabilities that may be economically important, that may be strategically important to us and our allies, but are not directly part of a military capability?” They're starting to think through that now, and it really is the Space Force taking on a role in the future that is more like the Navy. The Navy does fight and win wars, of course, but the Navy also has a role in patrolling the seas and ensuring the free flow of commerce like we see the US Navy doing right now over in the Red Sea: They're helping protect ships that need to transit through that area when Houthi Rebels are targeting them. Do we need that kind of capability and space? Yeah, I think we do. It is not a huge priority now, but it is going to be a growing priority in the future.Conflict and Competition in Space (15:34)I don't know if such things even currently exist, but if you have satellites that can kill other satellites, do those exist and does the Space Force run them?Satellites that can kill other satellites, absolutely. That is a thing that exists. A lot of stuff is kept classified. What we know that's unclassified is, back in the 1960s and early '70s, the Soviets conducted many tests—a couple of dozen tests—of what they call a co-orbital anti-satellite system, that is a satellite that can kill another satellite, and there's still debris in space from some of those tests back in the '60s and '70s.We also know, unclassified, that China and Russia have on-orbit systems that appear to be able to rendezvous with other satellites, get very close. We've seen the Russians deploy a satellite that appeared to fire a projectile at another Russian satellite—looks like a test of some sort of a co-orbital weapon. So yes, those capabilities are out there. They do exist. We've never seen a capability like that used in conflict, though, not yet, but we know they existLooking forward a decade… One can imagine a lot more satellites, multiple space platforms, maybe some run by the private sector, maybe others not. One could imagine permanent or semi-permanent installations on the moon from different countries. Are plans being made to protect those things, and would the Space Force be the one protecting them? If you have a conflict between the Chinese military installation on the moon and the American, would that be in the Space Force domain? Again, it seems like science fiction, but I don't think it's going to seem like science fiction before too long.Well, that's right. We're not at that point today, but are we going to be at that point in 10, 20, 30 years? Perhaps. There are folks in the Space Force, like in the chief scientist's office that have thought about these things; they publish some papers on it. There's no real effort going into that right now other than thinking about it from an academic perspective. Should that be in the mandate of the Space Force? Well, I think it already is, it's just there's not a need for it yet, and so it's something to keep an eye on.Now, there are some rules, if you will, international agreements that would suggest, “Okay, some of these things should not happen.” Doesn't mean they won't; but, for example, the main treaty that governs how nations operate in space is the Outer Space Treaty of 1967. The Outer Space Treaty specifically says that you can't claim territory in space or on any celestial body like the moon or Mars, and it specifically says you cannot put a military installation on any celestial body.So, should China put a military base on the moon, they would be clearly violating the Outer Space Treaty. If China puts a scientific installation that happens to have some military capabilities on it, but they don't call it that, well, you know, what are we going to do? Are we going to call them before the United Nations and complain? Or if China says, “Hey, we've put a military installation in this key part of the lunar South Pole where we all believe that there is ice water, and if anyone tries to land anywhere near us, you're going to interfere with our operations, you might kick up dust on us, so we are establishing a keep-out zone of some very large area around this installation.”I think that there are some concerns that we could be headed in that direction, and that's one of the reasons NASA is pushing forward with the Artemis program to return humans to the moon and a set of international agreements called the Artemis Accords, where we've gotten, I think, more than 20 nations now to agree to a way of operating in the lunar environment and, to a certain extent, in Earth orbit as well, which will help make sure that the norms that develop in space, especially in deep space operating on the moon, are norms that are conducive to free and open societies and free markets. And so I give credit to former NASA administrator, Jim Breidenstein and the Trump administration; he came up with the Artemis Accords. I think it was wonderful. I would love to see us go even further, but NASA is still pursuing that and still signing up more countries to the Artemis Accords, and when they sign up to that, they can be part of our effort to go back to moon and the Artemis program, and right now we are on track to get there and put humans back on the moon before China. I just hope we keep it that way.The Danger of Space Debris (20:11)Let me finish up with a question based on something you've mentioned several times during our conversation, which is space debris and space junk. I see more and more articles about the concerns. How concerned are you about this? How should I think about that issue?Yeah, it is a concern, and, I mean, the physics of the space domain are just fundamentally different than what we see in other domains. So, in space, depending on what orbit you're in, if something breaks up into pieces, those pieces keep orbiting Earth indefinitely. If you are below about 600 kilometers, those pieces of debris, there's a tiny amount of atmospheric drag, and, depending on your mass and your surface area and solar weather and stuff, eventually things 600 kilometers and below are going to reenter the Earth atmosphere and burn up in weeks, months, years.Once you get above about 600 kilometers, things start staying up there much longer. And when you get out to geostationary orbit, which is 36,000 kilometers above the surface of the earth, those things aren't coming down, ever, not on their own. They're staying up there. So the problem is, imagine every time there was a shipwreck, or a car wreck, or a plane crash, that all of the debris kept moving around the earth forever. Eventually it adds up. And space, it's a very large volume, yes, but this stuff is whizzing by, if you're in low-earth orbit, you're going around 17,000 miles per hour constantly. And so you've got close approach after close approach, day after day, and then you run the risk of debris hitting debris, or debris hitting other satellites, and then creating more debris, and then increasing the odds that this happens again and again, the movie Gravity gave a dramatic effect to this.I was thinking about that scene as you're explaining this.Yeah. The timeline was very compressed in that movie, but something like that, the Kessler Syndrome, is theoretically possible in the space domain, so we do have to watch out for it. Debris is collecting, particularly in low Earth orbit above 600 kilometers, and ASAT tests are not helpful at all to that. So one of the things the Biden administration did is they instituted a unilateral moratorium on antisatellite testing by the United States. Well, it's easy for us to do. We didn't need to do any anti-satellite tests anymore because we already know we can do that. We have effective capabilities and we wouldn't want to use kinetic anti-satellite attacks anyway, 'cause it would hurt our own systems.We have been going around trying to get other countries to sign up to that as well, to a moratorium on ASAT testing. It's a good first step, but really you need Russia and China. They need to sign up to not do that anymore. And India, India conducted a kinetic ASAT test back in, I think, 2019. So those are the countries we really need to get on board with that.But there's a lot of accidental debris production that happens as well. When countries leave a spent rocket body up in orbit and then something happens. You know, a lot of times they leave their fuel tanks pressurized or they leave batteries on there, after five, 10 years in orbit, sometimes these things explode randomly, and then that creates a debris field. So there's more that we can do to kind of reach international agreements about just being smart stewards of the space domain. There are companies out there that are trying to work on technologies to clean up space debris. It's very hard. That is not something that's on the immediate horizon, but those are all efforts that should be ongoing. It is something to be concerned about.And actually, to circle back to the chief of space operations and his theory of success in his white paper, that's one of the tensions that he highlights in there, is that we want to use space for military advantage, including being able to deny other countries the ability to use space. But at the same time, we want to be good stewards of the space domain and so there's an inherent tension in between those two objectives, and that's the needle that the Space Force is trying to thread.I have one final question, and you may have no answer for it: If we were to track a large space object headed toward Earth, whose job would it be to stop it?So it would be NASA's job to spot it, to find objects like near-Earth orbit asteroids. Whose job is it to stop it? I think we would be figuring that out on the fly. First of all, we would have to figure out, can we stop it? Is there a way to stop it? And it would probably require some sort of an international effort, because we all have a common stake in that, but yeah, it is not in anyone's job jar.Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. 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What if there were a way to generate massive amounts of affordable, carbon-free energy with minimal environmental or safety risk? Sounds too good to be true, but nuclear fusion just might be the kind of energy source that America—and the world—has been waiting for.Michl Binderbauer is the CEO of California-based TAE Technologies, a company trying to develop an aneutronic commercial fusion reactor. Michl joins us on this episode of Faster Please! — The Podcast to explain how his team is trying to make fusion power a real thing.In This Episode* Fusion's Moment (1:11)* The Technical Challenge (12:11)* The Economic Challenge (15:33)* The Role of Government (22:20)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation.Pethokoukis: What is sort of the current state of your company's technology, and in describing that, could you tell me how it sort of differs from other approaches in the field, keeping in mind I am not a nuclear physicist?Binderbauer: Understood. Alright, well it's a great introductory question. So TAE has been around, as you probably have read, for a good two decades plus, but the 25 year anniversary was just this past April, actually. We're at the stage now, it's really exciting, where the machine we're under construction on now, which we call Copernicus, which is our generation six, is actually intended to get us to a point to demonstrate that we can harvest more energy than we have to feed it. And this is on a really engineering comparison, how much energy comes into the site and deploys on the machine versus how much can you harvest. To be fair, this is not a full power plant, so we're going to measure the heat output, the collective heat output on it. Now that's where we're going, and that's really enabled by 20 plus years of a journey of, interestingly enough, a lot of scientific nuance discoveries, but mostly technology development.What you learn is that the journey that we were on was mostly one of underestimating the complexity of power supplies, vacuum systems, heating systems in the form of us, this means energetic particle beams, and the technological tool chest around those things and making that work as a symphony, as a nice orchestra to do what we need it to do, and that's really where we spend most of the time, and now we're at the point where there's a confluence in understanding the science, understanding or having full practice capability, mastery of the tools, bringing these two things together in the sixth generation machine to drive net energy output. That's the goal. The other thing you asked me was how do we differ and to kind of contrast that a little bit?Because this is a very interesting moment for fusion, broadly, which are a number of startups, of course some of my listeners might be familiar with the breakthrough from the National Ignition Facility, which isn't really meant to create a nuclear power plant, but it was a great proof of concept that we can do some sort of fusion here. So I guess in a somewhat understandable way, given my own personal limitations, what are you doing that's sort of different than maybe some of the other companies such as, I mean I've written about Commonwealth Fusion and a few others, as well.Of course. Let me start by saying that, for most of that I should give credit to my brilliant PhD mentor who was a technical co-founder and co-founder in general of TAE. Norman Rostoker was his name, and Norman had an illustrious career in the field of fusion science and, in fact, accelerators and a few other areas of physics. He was a sort of polymath and really broad guy, which probably was a critical ingredient to get to where we are today. And so while he was very instrumental in the early days of the field in putting together a lot of the fundamental theory and things that I always joke and say, “You can't get a PhD in this field without suffering through a lot of the stuff he discovered.” But he also was very critical at the later stage in his career and he looked at this and said, “If we want to build something that caters to power production in a civilian way with good economics and the right kind of maintainability and practicality, then maybe what we're doing as a field today on the large sort of federal or national program-funded research was sort of missing the mark a little bit because it was building towards the Tokamaks, which some of your readers may know, those  donut-shaped machines, the biggest of which is under construction in the south of France right now, it's a big international project. And Norman looked at that and said, “That can get us to maybe net energy but not necessarily practical net energy or economic net energy.”In the end it's about an applied end product that we're going after, not textbook knowledge, in a sense, or a proof point for a laboratory experiment. With that in mind, when the company, before it even started—this is in the early '90s when I became a student—he had a very delineated philosophy of end in mind: Let's look what this needs to look like. And that's pretty trivial to define, right? If I ask you, what do you think a good power plant should look like, you could probably tell me. If we can make it non-polluting, great, we want to make sure that it doesn't have maintenance every day. It's up most of the time and it can compete with what the grid needs today in terms of economics, who else makes power with from coal, the gas to whatever else. And that's kind of how we started, we said that would be the ideal reactor, and now how can we cater to that. And what is the gap if you reverse engineer from there to today that you have to fill? And that's really where we started and that led to a remarkably different trajectory.One of those, the first one, frankly, was fuel, right? When you think about tritium, which is the conventional goal set, and that's a fuel that's heavy hydrogen, when you “burn” that, quote-unquote, you get neutrons, which we know from fission, those are what propagates the fission process, and if you have a lot of neutrons, you get radioactivity. And tritium by itself is also used in our warheads. It's not the ideal material you loose in a civilian setting, it's typically classified, et cetera, so there's all these headaches and there's very little tritium, by the way, to go around. There's like 50 kilograms of free tritium in the world, and that's super expensive, something like $30,000 a gram or so is what's usually quoted. So there's a lot of handicap there if you want to turn that into an economic prosperous thing. And so we said, “Alright, well, what else is terrestrially possible?”And so not to be philosophical and say God gave us a very narrow bookshelf, but it kind of is. On one end you've got the neutronic fuel cycle with tritium, and then on the other end of this small bookshelf you have hydrogen and boron which are copiously available, both. There's no radioactivity to go in, and by the way, when they burn you get three helium particles, which is where our initial name came from, Tri Alpha Energy, we call helium particles in nuclear physics alpha particles. And so you look at it and you say, “Oh, that's pretty good!” I don't have radioactivity as a byproduct, I don't have to worry about shielding, I don't have high costs associated with those things. And by the way, if you look where boron is used today, it's dirt-cheap commodity products, it's detergents and soaps and cleaning products and things like that. So, in a way, it fits the bill.Now its big handicap is it needs a higher burn temperature to cook.Very hot.Yeah. You look at tritium on one end, that's about a hundred million degrees, which already sounds insane, but keep in mind, as a physicist, we sort of define that as just the energy state in that material beyond the gas. We call these plasmas. This plasma is at a hundred million degrees for tritium. If you want to burn boron, you need about a billion degrees. Now that sounds absolutely crazy, but it's not the stove plate hot of a solid. It's a very few particles that get to zip around in the container at very high energy, and that gets you to that definition of eventually a billion degrees.By the way, for reference, the big Hadron Collider at CERN, the LHC, that actually makes charged particle clouds with temperatures up to five trillion degrees. So we can actually do this. Amazingly, humans have a technology base to actually do that. So we started with the idea of if we wanted that fuel cycle, we've got to find the container and the process that can hold that together and create those energetic states we need. And that led us ultimately to what is referred to as a “field reversed configuration,” and I won't bore everybody with the detail of that, it's a mouthful to begin with, but it's a very interesting magnetic container.I will say that much, that instead of, in the case of most other confinement systems where you have a lot of magnets on the outset—and by the way the magnets are a big cost component in a reactor, they're superconducting, they're large in scale, complex to manufacture—and in this case, in the FRC, most of the field is actually created by the plasma itself.So plasma is discharge particles, if they flow, they create a current and the current can make a magnetic field, and so the plasma can self-envelope with a magnetic field that it generates from its currents and that can help, believe it or not, hold it in place. It sounds kind of perverse, but it works. And the idea behind that was derived about 50 years ago—almost everything infusion had some origins back many, many decades ago—but it was always considered too finicky to make work because one thing you can appreciate, if there's anything wrong in the flow in the plasma, well then the fields start to deteriorate so it can very quickly get into negative feedback cycle unless you can keep it stable and well controlled.And that's what we developed now. So now we have this perfect incarnation of it where we can run at will for as long as we want. We control this with active feedback today with extremely fast circuits and very smart software that's machine learning based, that self-corrects, recognizes patterns, and stuff. So take it as a supposition. Now we have ability to make these field reversed configurations at scale, meters in size, and can hold them steady as long as we want. And now what's interesting about that container is that has a much easier scalability, from a physics perspective, to those high energy conditions. This is why it's the right container to marry with the hydrogen boron, and most people just didn't go there for two reasons, I would think.One is that when the field works mostly on, say, Tokamaks, then there is so much knowledge base developed there that, in a way, it self-propagates and the incoming young people that get graduate education, they work on what's the most prolific thing, which happen to be Tokamaks. So it sort of self-propagates.And the other thing, of course, is people felt that confinement or the ability to hold this material together is already really stressful, and so if you have to go to a hundred million degrees, let's try to celebrate there before we bother going further. Norman was more maverick and said, “But that's not a good endpoint to be, so why don't we shoot for something a bit more out there that can really bring all that together. As a graduate student, I was game for that. I thought this was a brilliant idea. It appealed to me enormously to say let's connect what we're trying to do to the applied end product, and that's where we started, first in the university and then built the business.neutral beams, the plasma maintains lasting, high-temperature field reverse configurations.The Technical Challenge (12:11)Where you are right now, what is required to get to the endpoint, which is a commercial reactor?  Does that require continuous incremental progress and success, or does it still require something that you might call “leaps” in the technology? Where are we to get to that endpoint?Of course I should also explain that temperature increments like you're walking up a ladder, there's different steps to it. At the step where we are now, we're operating today the machine, the generation five—which we actually call “Norman” by the way, in its honor, we named it Norman. The reason that was fitting is because it established the scientific proof that you can actually create stable, long-lift field reversed configurations with the right attributes, and today we're doing that about 75 million degrees in the current machine that runs every day about 50, 60 experiments. So we know we can scale, we're really sure we can scale this to a hundred million degrees. What gives a hundred million back to the fuels, that doesn't give you boron but that gives you tritium. If you think about an approach of sequences, is you ramp up to a billion degrees, somewhere you have to cross a hundred, so you have something harvestable there from an economic opportunity.And so Copernicus, the next machine generation six that I alluded to earlier is the machine that's going to enable us to get into the tritium-level regime. This machine is going to show net energy capability at the a hundred to 150 million degree mark, which is typically where people operate with tritium. We were slated to do that by about '26, somewhere late-'25 into '26, and that's what we're constructing and fully projected to do. Now assuming success on that—which I believe is very much in our favor, we've been less than a factor of two of those operating conditions already and we have the engineering and the mastery, the operational mastery on this in hand—then the next step after that is to scale that up and build a machine that's about a factor of eight or so up in energy, and that gets you into the regime of the boron operation, and that's the stage when we think we will have net energy demonstrated out of hydrogen boron, and that's probably early 2030s.So again, coming back the next three years, make a machine that gets into the tritium equivalent operational regime. One thing I should point out, perhaps people may question, are we using tritium in the machine directly? We are not. What we're doing, and I can get into why that is, Commonwealth for instance—you mentioned earlier Commonwealth Fusion Systems (CFS)—they're trying to be a bit more ambitious and build this Tokamak and eventually fuel it with tritium. That has a much larger price tag and operational complexity because tritium is not an end game for us. I just want to enable the energetic state to burn tritium without actually doing it. The field has today sufficient enough confidence and maturity to understand that if you can hold the material together at a hundred, 150 million degrees with the right density and everything, yes, you could make tritium-based net energy if you wanted to, and that'd be for somebody else to do, but TAE wants to march on and build its boron reactor.The Economic Challenge (15:33)So there's a technical challenge that you feel like you're on track and you're sort of hitting some milestones there, and then there's sort of the economic challenge that we just don't want to get this thing to work, you want to get this thing to work so it makes sense that someday this thing can get plugged into an electrical grid. How do you feel about that aspect? How pricey or inexpensive or expensive will this energy be, assuming the not-insignificant technical challenges are met sometime in the next decade or what have you?Yeah, so great question. Obviously, we haven't built one yet. We haven't built the prototypes yet, let alone the full power plant, but there is actually a quite sane projection forward to those cost points from the fact that, after 25 years of working on this, we have a pretty good sense what we need. We have a great supply chain and partnerships established with people who built, not exactly this, but things like this. So you can do some estimates and you also know, as I said earlier, magnets are one of the biggest items, so there's a large amount of cost in there. The other big item that between those two controls more than two thirds is the heating equipment, and that can be radiofrequency heating like a microwave basically, or what we mostly use is injecting highly directional beams of atomic particles, neutral atoms that come in and then they collide with the fuel and then they basically transfer the energy that we directly shoot in and it becomes heat in the machine.So those two things, the heaters and the container system, the magnets, are the big expense items. When you get a sense for where you need to be and what the geometry looks like and so on, you can actually make a reasonable estimate at cost, and so I'm saying this, at the same time I'm asking for forgiveness if we're going to be off because obviously, in the end, there'll be a lot of detail that'll add to that. But I think what we believe, and I have confidence that that's correct, that the first generation of plants coming out of this, let's say it's somewhere in the mid-2030s, we'd have the first commercial plants installing and not plant one, which is a hand-built one-of-a-kind, right? But if you built maybe tens of plants, you will be at a point where you have some learning curves that bring prices down, you kind of know now how to do it. I wouldn't say it's mass produced yet, but it's going into a more efficient production cycle. I think we will slot in somewhere in the midfield today of generation assets.So if you're looking at solar, wind—solar maybe more than wind today—but you also add things like gas in the US, those are on the low end of the economics in terms of what they call LCOE, the Levelized Cost of Electricity, and then if you look at the upper end, you will find nuclear and the things where there's a lot of safety margin built in. We'll be somewhere in the field in between there. That gets you pretty competitive right there because it has two other incredible attributes. One is that there is really no variability in fuel costs because it's literally free because you need so little. Fusion is super high energy dense, so you don't need much.And the other aspect is that it doesn't pollute, really. There's no carbon involved, there's really no radioactivity to speak of. And so you are ending with something that can be baseload power, that's dispatchable, as they call it today. The human controls when it's on and when it's not, not the sun or the wind. And you have essentially green energy. In that sense, even if it's more expensive than some of the cheapest things today, but it's midfield, it'll be very competitive on a global basis and it'll be an important component that the world will need.How big a facility would you need to power Cincinnati or Chicago? My only experience is looking at the rather big nuclear fission reactors which are fairly big, so would this be a lot smaller than that?Well, two things: There's the machine size and then there's the installation size, the site. In nuclear fission today you have exclusion zone around the plant. There's a lot of the plot of land that it's on and then some incremental infrastructure, safety, security shielding and so on adds a lot of additional cost and scale. If on the boron machine, the actual machine is a couple, maybe three double-decker buses back-to-back, something like that, maybe a bit taller, but not that much. So that would be comparable to a large gas turbine, for instance. Or if you are in a hydro plant and you're looking at the generating units, they'd be sort of on that scale. So it's not outsized relative to what conventionally is used in the utility space today.Now if you look in the land footprint, it's pretty minimal. You're looking at a handful of acres at most. In fact, maybe even less over time. Now that's with hydrogen and boron because you then don't have radioactivity to speak of. You don't have the chance during an accident. The worst-case accidents that a plant like that would suffer would be industrial scale things. Things like a bad fire in a factory would just be similar, but it doesn't have nuclear meltdown capability. There is no chain reaction kind of thing, like we know from Chernobyl—and by the way, this isn't just true for TAE, this is true for all of fusion, it makes it really safe. So those attributes will shrink the site down. So if you're asking me how much can we get out of one of these systems at that scale, probably somewhere in the order of half a gigawatt, 400 to 500 megawatts is sort of what we're shooting for.It's a larger gas turbine system and if you wanted to get gigawatt-level power like you would get out of a fission nuclear plant today, you would probably have, say, two, three of these units next to each other. What I really think the world will go to and what we hear from talking to a lot of the utility people, it's a more distributed grid, ideally. You have things on the 300–500 megawatt scale that deploys in a way where you have more redundancy if you needed it, there's more reliability, et cetera. This is the scale that I think you would look at, so feeding a city like Chicago out of one plant, or the whole Chicago metropolitan area, is not going to happen. You would have a distributed set of systems, and you think 400 megawatts or so, you get a few hundred thousand households that run on that, and then you scale from there.The Role of Government (22:20)You've been working on this for some time and obviously I work at a think tank, so I always think, do you want government to do something that it's not doing? Do you want government to stop doing something that it's currently doing? I know I've certainly talked to some startups, newer startups, they're in partnerships with the Department of Energy. So what is your engagement currently and what would you need, or not need, from government going forward to get to where you need to go?That's a great question and one that has evolved. In the past, we've been purely privately funded and we built everything we've done so far on private capital and we're kind of the oldest of that. Now, as you said, there's a lot of younger companies in the space too, and I think this is great. We get more shots on goal and it makes us more valid. We're not the only lone idiots out there. There's actually reason to believe that there's many smart people trying now, so that's a good thing.Now where we're going, though, is a stage where I think public-private partnerships actually start to make sense. When you look at the history of any kind of energy technology that came about, nuclear is sort of—I hate to use it because it seems like we're so similar, we're obviously very different in some ways, we share the taxonomy “nuclear,” but that's about it—but fission, if you look at the evolution, it gets subsidies. There's a risk offtake for the early plants that the government tends to shoulder. That can be a loan guarantee, it can be other kinds of financial arrangements, and then eventually it becomes commercial enough in the sense that people believe in the viability, they have a good sense for its reliability and so on, and then it just propagates into the market in a very capitalist free market sense. That transition out of the lab into that stage of really rolling out at scale I think is where we absolutely need to count on government support.In fact, what's wonderful to see now, over the last couple of years in particular, and you read about this, the White House last year had a summit where we and a few others in the front running in the private sector were there together with the national labs and people from DOE, and we had a very productive conversation about what the White House framed a bold decadal vision for fusion. Important in that is the recognition that it's not always 30 years away and always will be, it's much closer. And what can we do proactively and collectively to accelerate that?I think that's what's really heartening to see, that as we're getting to that proof point, now we're getting net energy and then we want to leap to a prototype and a power plant. We're going to need that help, and there is a public-private partnership around multiple things on the technology or production side, but then also moving into the ultimate: How do you fund and risk underwrite these early plants when utilities typically are more risk averse? That we see on the federal level, and then on the state level, I don't know if you follow that, but recently California and North Carolina had a couple of bills coming out—for instance, California, we've had this nuclear moratorium where everything nuclear in nature is sort of not tolerable, and that's been modified. Fusion now is excluded out of that and in fact is now part of what they would call the benign side of the future of energy. In fact, the California bill made it very clear that it's to be treated as clean energy, essentially. And so in North Carolina, so you have now a blue state and right state looking at and saying, we want this. We need this, and we recognize the chance is high that over the next decade this comes about.The other thing I can add is that the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, they just this year in a sort of landmark first step, the commission ruled in terms of where do we slop the regulatory framework around fusion. It's not in the old Part 50, which deals with the fission world, but it's going to be in a world that's much closer to where you would regulate medical accelerator that makes pet isotopes for oncology scanning and stuff. So they recognize that this is, while nuclear in taxonomy, it's a very different form of risk to the public, and therefore the level of regulation is lower, and that's equally important.The interaction with the government is super important now, and we're very heartened by the fact that we see there's really a nearing and a mutual excitement about bringing that out as quickly as possible against the backdrops from climate change to whatever else people are worried about with the national security and energy independence.Obviously, from my perspective, what I like is the idea that if fusion can succeed, it becomes eventually a source of abundance because there's so much fuel here that we can harvest and we think we can do this at very economic levels, that you can lift up those parts of the world that today are living on the other side of the gradient in a very sort of depressed, low quality of life. In fact, if you look at all the energy use projections or demand projections forward, you can see that we're going to more than double, and most of the demand comes from the underdeveloped world. Fusion can be a very big contributor to a more equitable world as a whole. It's all these attributes that I think get people really excited, and now it's no longer just this visionary dream. We're really, really close to doing it. I think that's why you see the government and everybody coming together now and beginning these earnest conversations over the next few years: How do we structure programs from regulation to working together to ultimately loan guarantees and other things in a public-private partnership, and bring it to the grid. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

Science. Ownership. Speed. Openness.These are the four pillars of Andrew McAfee's observed structure for successful companies. It is the “geeks,” the leaders at the forefront of cross-industry innovation, who embrace these norms and have the potential to redefine business as we know it. In order to break ground and create the kind of future we dream of, organizational leaders need to banish the fear of failure, embrace mistakes, and accept hard feedback with open arms.Andrew is a best-selling author, Principal Research Scientist at the MIT Sloan School of Management, and co-founder of MIT's Initiative on the Digital Economy. His books include More from Less and The Second Machine Age, co-authored with Erik Brynjolfsson. Today on the podcast, we discuss the ideas captured in his most recent book, The Geek Way: The Radical Mindset that Drives Extraordinary Results. In This Episode* The universal geek (1:35)* The four geek norms (8:29)* Tales of geeks and non-geeks (15:19)* Can big companies go geek? (18:33)* The geek way beyond tech (26:32)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation.The universal geek (1:35)Pethokoukis: Is The Geek Way really the Silicon Valley Way? Is this book saying, “Here's how to turn your company into a tech startup”?McAfee: You mentioned both Silicon Valley and tech, and this book is not about either of those—it's not about a region and it's not about an industry, it's about a set of practices. And I think a lot of the confusion comes because those practices were incubated and largely formulated in this region called “Silicon Valley” in this industry that we call “tech”. So I understand the confusion, but I'm not writing about the Valley. Plenty of people do that. I'm not writing about the tech industry. Plenty of people do that. The phenomenon that I don't think we are paying enough attention to is this set of practices and philosophies that, I believe, when bundled correctly, amounts to a flat old upgrade to the company, just a better way to do the thing a company is supposed to do. That needed a label, because it's new. “Geek” is the label that I latched onto.But there's a universal aspect to this, then.Yeah, I believe there is. I understand this sounds arrogant—I believe it's a flat better way to run a company. I don't care where in the world you are, I don't care what industry you are in, if you're making decisions based on evidence, if you're iterating more and planning less, if you're building a modular organization that really does give people authority and responsibility, and if you build an organization where people are actually comfortable speaking truth to power, I think you're going to do better.One reason I'm excited about this book is because, you as well, we think about technological progress, we think about economic growth and productivity and part of that is science and coming up with new ideas and a new technology, but all that stuff has to actually be turned into a commercial enterprise and there has to be well-run companies that take that idea and sell it. Maybe the economist's word might be “diffusion” or something like that, but that's a pretty big part of the story, which I think maybe economists tend not to focus as much on, or policy people, but it's pretty darn important and that's what I think is so exciting about your book is that it addresses that: How to create companies that can do that process—invention-to-product—better. So how can they do it better?Let me quibble with you just a little bit. There are alternatives to this method of getting goods and services to people, called “the company.” That's what we do in capitalist societies. Jim, like you know all too well, over the course of the 20th century, we ran a couple of experiments trying it a different way: These collectivist, command-and-control, centrally planned economies, those were horrible failures! Let's just establish that right off the bat.So in most of the parts of the world—I think in all the parts of the world where you and I would actually want to live—I agree with you, we've settled on this method of getting most goods and services to people, most of what they consume, via these entities called companies, and I don't care if you're in a Nordic social democracy, or in the US of A, or in Southeast Asia, companies are the things getting you most of what you consume. I think in the United States, about 85 percent of what you and I consume, by some estimates, comes from companies. So, like them or hate them, they're incredibly important, and if a doohickey comes along that lets them their work X percent better, we should applaud that like crazy because that's an X percent increase in our affluence, our standard of living, the things that we care about, and the reason I got excited and decided to write this book is I think there's an upgrade to the company going on that's at the same level as the stuff that [Alfred] Chandler wrote about a century ago when we invented the large, professionally managed, pretty big company. Those dominated the corporate landscape throughout the 20th century. I think that model is being upgraded by the geeks.It's funny because, I suppose maybe the geeks 50 years ago, maybe a lot of them worked at IBM. And your sort-of geek norms are not what I think of the old Big Blue from IBM in the 1960s. That has changed. Before we get into the norms, how did they develop? Why do we even have examples of this working in the real corporate world?The short answer is, I don't know exactly. That's a pretty detailed piece of corporate history and economic history to work on. The longer answer is, what I think happened is, a lot of computer nerds, who had spent a lot of time at universities and were pretty steeped in that style of learning things and building things, went off and started companies and, in lots of cases, they ran into the classic difficulties that occur to companies and the dysfunctions that creep in as companies grow and age and scale. And instead of accepting them, my definition of a geek is somebody who's tenacious about a problem and is willing to embrace unconventional solutions. I think a lot of these geeks—and I'm talking about people like Reed Hastings, who's really articulate about what he did at Netflix and at his previous company, which he says he ran into mediocrity—a lot of these geeks like Hastings sat around and said, “Wait a minute, if I wanted to not repeat these mistakes, what would I do differently?” They noodled that hard problem for a long time, and I think via some conversation among the geeks, but via these fairly independent vectors in a lot of cases, they have settled on these practices, these norms that they believe—and I believe—help them get past the classic dysfunctions of the Industrial Era that you and I know all too well: their bureaucratization, their sclerosis, their cultures of silence. They are just endless stifling meetings and turf wars and factions and things like that. We know those things exist. What I think is interesting is that the geeks are aware of them and I think they've come up with ways to do better.The four geek norms (8:29)It's funny that once you've looked at your book, it is impossible to read any other sort of business biography of a company or a CEO and not keep these ideas in your head because I just finished up the Elon Musk biography by Walter Isaacson, and boy, I just kept on thinking of speed and science and the questioning of everything: Why are we doing this? Why are we building this rocket engine like this? Who told us to do that? Somebody in legal told us to do that?Exactly.So certainly those two pop to mind: the speed and the constant iteration. But rather than have me describe them, why don't you describe those norms in probably a much better way than I can.There's a deep part of the Isaacson Musk biography that made my geek eyes light up, and it's when Isaacson describes Musk's Algorithm—I think it's capitalized, too, it's capital “The,” capital “Algorithm,”—which is all about taking stuff out. I think that is profound because we humans have a very strong status quo bias. We're reluctant to take things out. It's one of the best-documented human biases. So we just add stuff, we just layer stuff on, and before you know it, for a couple different flavors of reason, you wind up with this kind of overbuilt, encrusted, process-heavy, bureaucracy-heavy, can't get anything done [corporation]. You feel like you're pushing on a giant piece of Jell-O or something to try to get any work done. And I think part of Musk's brilliance as a builder and an organization designer is to come up with The Algorithm that says, “No, no, a big part of your job is to figure out what doesn't need to be there and make it go away.” I adore that. It's closest to my great geek norm of ownership, which is really the opposite of this processification of the enterprise of the company that we were super fond of starting in the '90s and going forward.So now to answer your question, my four great geek norms, which are epitomized by Musk in a lot of ways, but not always, are:Science. Just make decisions based on evidence and argue a lot about that evidence. Science is an argument with a ground rule. Evidence rules.Ownership. We were just talking about this. Devolve authority downward, stop all the cross-communication, coordination, collaboration, process, all that. Build a modular organization.Speed. Do the minimum amount of planning and then start iterating. You learn, you get feedback, you see where you're keeping up to schedule and where you're not by doing stuff and getting feedback, not by sitting around asking everybody if they're on schedule and doing a lot of upfront planning.Finally, openness, this willingness to speak truth to power. In some ways, a good synonym for it is “psychological safety” and a good antonym for it is “defensiveness.”If anything, from what I understand about Musk, the last one is where he might run into challenges.That's what I was going to say. The ownership and the speed and the science struck me and then I'm like… the openness? Well, you have to be willing to take some abuse to be open in that environment.There are these stories about him firing people on the spot and making these kind of peremptory decisions—all of that is a violation, in my eyes, of the great geek norm of openness. It might be the most common violation that I see classic Silicon Valley techies engage in. They fall victim to overconfidence like the rest of us do, and they're not careful enough about designing their companies to be a check on their own overconfidence. This is something Hastings is very humble and very articulate about in No Rules Rules, the book that he co-wrote with Erin Meyer about Netflix and he highlights all these big calls that he was dead-flat wrong about, and he eventually realized that he had to build Netflix into a place that would tell him he was wrong when he was wrong, and he does all these really nice jobs of highlighting areas where he was wrong and then some relatively low-level person in the organization says, “No, that doesn't make sense. I'm going to go gather evidence and I'm going to challenge the CEO of the company with it.” And to his eternal credit, Hastings goes, “It's pretty compelling evidence. I guess I was wrong about that.” So that, to me, is actually practicing the great geek norm of openness.So someone reading this book is thinking that this book is wrong. Where would that come from? Would that come from overconfidence? Would it come from arrogance? Would it come from the idea that if I am in the C-suite, that obviously I have it figured out and I can probably do all your jobs better than you can, so why are you challenging me? Why are you challenging the status quo? “Hey, that's how we got here was through a process, so trust the process!”It's one of the main flavors of pushback that I hear, and it's very often not as naked as you just made it, but it is, “Hey, the reason I'm sitting in this executive education classroom with you is because I'm fairly good at my job. I made some big calls right, and my job is to provide vision to my team and to direct them not to be this kind of lead-from-behind more coach-y kind of leader.” That's one flavor of pushback I get. Another one is a very pervasive tendency, when we come across some challenging information, to come up with reasons why this doesn't apply to us and why we're going to be just fine. It's some combination of the status quo bias and the overconfidence bias which, again, two of the most common human biases. So very often when I'm talking about this, I get the idea that people in the room are going, “Yeah, okay, wow, I really wouldn't want to complete with SpaceX, but this doesn't apply to me or to my industry.” And then finally, look, I'm clearly wrong about some things. I don't know exactly what they are. Maybe the incumbents of the Enterprise Era are going to mount a surprising comeback by falling back on their 20th-century playbook as opposed to adopting the geek way. I will be very surprised if that happens and I'm taking bets like, “Let's go, let's figure out a bet based on that,” but maybe it'll happen. I'm definitely wrong about some things.Tales of geeks and non-geeks (15:19)Given what you've said, I would certainly think that it would be easier to apply these norms at a newer company, a younger company, a smaller company, rather than a company with a hundred thousand employees that's been around for 30 years. But it's possible to do the second one, right?It is possible. Let me violently agree with you, Jim. You and I are of a vintage and we're both Midwesterners. We both remember Arthur Andersen, right? And what an iconic American Midwestern symbol of rectitude and reliability and a healthy culture that kept the business world honest by auditing their books. Remember all that? Remember how it fell apart?I knew people, and if you got an interview with Arthur Andersen, they're like, “Wow, you are with the Cadillac of accounting consulting firms.”But beyond that, you were doing a valuable thing for society, right? These people had status in the community because they kind of kept companies honest for a living.That's right. That's right. You were true of the truth tellers.Yeah. It was a big deal and a lot of your listeners, I think, are going to be too young to remember it firsthand, but that company became a dysfunctional, unethical, ongoing, miserable train wreck of an organization in its final years before it finally fell apart. It could not have been more surprising to people of our vintage and where we came from. I tell the story of how that happened a little bit in the book to drive home that cultures can go off track in profound ways and in AA's late years, if someone had teleported The Geek Way and waved it around, would it have made any difference? I'd like to hope so, but I kind of don't think so.However, to tell a more optimistic story, I had the chance to interview Satya Nadella about his turnaround at Microsoft, which I think is at a level maybe even above the turnaround that [Steve] Jobs executed when he came back to Apple. The amount of value that Nadella has created at Microsoft in nine years now is staggering, and Microsoft is back. Microsoft has mojo again in the tech industry. But when he took over, Microsoft was still a large profitable company, but it was dead in the water. It wasn't innovating. The geek elite didn't want to go work there. The stock price was flat as a highway for a decade. It was absolutely an afterthought in anything that we care about. And so I use Nadella and I learned from him, and I try to tell the story about how he executed this comeback, and, to my eyes, he did it in a very, very geek way kind of a way.Can you give me an example?My point in telling that story is: I do think it's possible for organizations that find themselves in a bad spot—Established organizations.Established. Large, established organizations find themselves in a bad spot. Those kinds of leopards can change their spots. I firmly believe that.Can big companies go geek? (18:33)What are the first steps to change the corporate culture of a big company?That's why I'm so blown away by what Nadella and his team were able to do. Let me pick out a couple things that seem particularly geeky to me that he did. One was to say that—it doesn't matter if you develop them or not—you do not own code or data at Microsoft. What he meant by that was, subject to legal requirements and safety and some guardrails, if you want to grab some of the code repository at Microsoft to go try something or some data and go try something, you have the right to do that. That just eliminates huge amounts of gatekeeping and hard and soft bureaucracy and all of that inside the company. And that led to things like Copilot. It's a very, very smart way to start dealing with bureaucracy: just saying, “No, you don't get to gatekeep anymore.”He also did fairly obvious things like make sure that their really dysfunctional evaluation system was over. He also emphasized this thing that he called “One Microsoft,” which at first sounded like just CEO rah-rah talk. And it is to some extent, but it's also incredibly clever because we humans are so tribal. In addition to the status quo bias and the overconfidence bias, the third easy, easy bias to elicit is “myside” bias. We are tribal. We want our tribe to win. I think part of Nadella's brilliance was to say, “The tribe that you belong to is not Office versus Windows versus Bing versus… the tribe you belong to is Microsoft.”And he changed compensation, so that it also worked that way. He worked with incentives—he took an Econ 101 class—but he also kept emphasizing that “we are one tribe,” and that makes a difference if the leader at the top keeps saying it and if they behave that way. I think one of the deepest things that he did was act in an open way and demonstrate the norm of openness that he wanted to see all over the place. He got a ton of help with it, but if you talk to him, you immediately realize that he's not this table-pounding, my-way-or-the-highway kind of a guy. He's somebody that wants to get it right, and if you have an idea, you might get a fair erring for that idea. He also embraced agile methods and started to move away from the old ways that Microsoft had to write software, which were out of date, and they were yielding some really unimpressive projects.So as he and I were talking, I was doing my internal checklist and I kept on saying, “Yep, that's speed. That is science. That is ownership. That is openness,” and just emphasizing, as I listened to him, I just kept hearing these norms come up over and over. But one thing that he clearly knows is that this ain't easy and it ain't fast, and cultural change is a long, slow, grinding process, and you've got to keep saying the same thing over and over. And then I think, especially as a leader, you've got to keep living it because people will immediately sense if what you're doing is not lining up with what you're saying.One bit that popped out, because obviously I'm in Washington and I see a government that doesn't work very efficiently, and you wrote, “To accelerate learning and progress, plan less and iterate more,” and to iterate means to experiment, it means you're going to fail. And boy, oh boy, failure-averse organizations, you can find that in government, you can find it in corporate America, that acceptance of: try something and if it fails, it's a learning experience. It's not a black mark on your career forever. Now let's go try the next thing.Exactly. To me, it's the most obvious thing that the geeks do that's starkly different from Industrial Era organizations, “plan less, iterate more.” The great geek norm of speed, and there are a bunch of exemplars of that. The clearest one to me is SpaceX, where they blow up a rocket and that is a win for them, not a loss. And even if it gets written up in the press as, “Oh, Starship blew up, or whatever”—they don't care, right? They'd rather that it didn't blow up or that it stayed together longer, but if they got the learning that they were looking for, then they're like, “Great, we're going to incorporate that, we're going to build another rocket, we're not going to put any people on until we're very, very, very sure, but we're going to blow up a bunch of rockets.” From the start of the company, that has been an okay thing to do.They also are willing to embrace pretty big pivots. The first plan for Starship was that it was going to be a carbon fiber rocket because carbon fiber is so strong and lightweight, but their method for making it was too slow, too expensive, and had a reject rate that was too high. The thing's now made out of stainless steel! It's the opposite kind of material! But they said, “Look, the goal is the goal, and the goal is not to stick to the original plan, the goal is to build a great big rocket that can do all kinds of things. The way we get there is by trying—legitimately trying—a bunch of stuff and failing at it with the eyes of the world upon us.”I want to draw a really sharp distinction between the process and the product, and what I mean by that is a failure-tolerant process can yield an incredibly robust, safe product. We don't need to look any farther for that than the Dragon Capsule that SpaceX makes, which is the only capsule currently made in America that is certified by NASA to take human beings into space. It's how all Americans these days get back and forth to the ISS. NASA doesn't have one. NASA gave a contract to Boeing at the same time it gave one to SpaceX. Boeing still has not had the first crude test of its capsule. This geek way of speed, it's uncomfortable, and you got to be willing to fail publicly and own it, but it works better.Is the geek way, to some degree, an American phenomenon?So far.I was going to say, can the geek way be implemented in other countries? Is there something special about American culture that allows the geek way to work and to be adopted—I said universal earlier, maybe I meant, is it truly universal? Can it be implemented in other places?Jim, you and I, as proud Americans, like to believe that we're an exceptional country, and I do believe that. I don't believe the geek way only works with a bunch of Americans trying it. I travel lots of different places, and especially the energy that I see among younger people to be part of this transformation of the world that's happening (that you and I are lucky enough to get to observe and try to think about), this transformation of the world in the 21st century because of the technological toolkit that we have, because of the amount of innovation out there, the thirst to be part of that is very, very, very widespread. And I don't think there's anything in the drinking water in Munich or Kyoto or Lima that makes this stuff impossible at all. It is true, we're an individualistic culture, we're kind of mouthy, we celebrate these iconoclastic people, but I don't think any of those are absolutely necessary in order to start following norms of science, ownership, speed and openness. I hope those are universal.The geek way beyond tech (26:32)We've been talking a lot about tech companies. Are there companies which really don't seem particularly techie (even though obviously all companies use technology) that you could see the geek way working currently?I haven't gone off and looked outside the tech industry for great exemplars of the geek way, so I have trouble answering this question. But think about Bridgewater, which is really one of the weirdest corporate cultures ever invented, and I haven't read the new biography of Ray Dalio yet, but it appears that all might not be exactly as it appears. But one thing that Bridgewater has been adamant about from the get-go, and Dalio has been passionate about, is this idea of radical transparency, is the idea of openness. Your reputation is not private from anybody else in the company at any point in time. So they've taken this norm of openness and they've really ran with it in some fascinating directions. In most organizations, there's a lot of information that's private, and your reputation is spread by gossip. Literally, that's how it works. Bridgewater said, “Nope. We really believe in openness and everything that's important about your performance as a professional in this company, you're going to get rated on it by your colleagues, and you're going to have these visible to everybody all the time inside the company so that if you start espousing how important it is to be ethical, but your score as an ethical leader is really low, nobody's going to listen to you.” I think that's fascinating, and I think as time goes by, we're going to come across these very, very geeky norms and practices being implemented in all kinds of weird corners of the global economy. I can't wait to learn about it.I would think that, given how every country would like to be more productive, every country's having a white paper on how to improve their productivity, and this, to me, is maybe something that policymakers don't think about, and I'm not sure if there's a policy aspect to this, but I hope a lot of corporate leaders and aspiring corporate leaders at least read your book.Well, the one policy implication that might come up is, what happens when the geeks start unignorably beating up the incumbents in your favorite industry. When I look at what's happening in the global auto industry right now, I see some of that going on, and my prediction is that it's going to get worse instead of better. Okay, then what happens?Save us! Save us from this upstart!Exactly, but then there could be some really interesting policy choices being made about protecting dinosaur incumbents in the face of geek competitors. I hope we don't retreat into nationalism and protectionism and that kind of stuff. What I hope happens instead is that the world learns how to get geeky relatively quickly and that this upgrade to the company spreads.The only thing I would add here is I would also urge business journalists to read the book so you understand how companies work and how these new companies that work, companies that look like they are—and not to keep harping on SpaceX, but so many people who I think should know better, will look at SpaceX and think, “Oh, they're failing. Oh, that rocket, as you said earlier, the rocket blew up! Apollo had a couple of problems, they're blowing up a rocket every six weeks!” And they just simply do not understand how this kind of company works. So I don't know. So I guess I would recommend my business journalists to read it, and I imagine you would think the same.That recommendation makes a ton of sense to me. Jim. I'm all on board with that.Andrew. This is an outstanding book and a wonderful companion piece to your other work which is very pro-progress, and pro-growth. I absolutely loved it, and thanks so much for coming on the podcast today,Jim, thanks for being part of the Up Wing Party with me. Let's make it happen.Absolutely. Thank you.Thank you, sir. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

If you're looking for a smart and punchy companion piece to my new book, The Conservative Futurist: How to Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised, then you are in luck. Look no further than venture capitalist Marc Andreessen's wonderful new mega-essay, “The Techno-Optimist Manifesto.”If there's a sentence or even a word in that manifesto that I disagree with, I have yet to find it. That's why I am so delighted to have Marc Andreessen, a founder and general partner at Andreessen Horowitz — as well as the co-author of Mosaic, the first widely used web browser, and co-founder of Netscape — on this special episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast. In This Episode* The time for techno-optimism is now (1:19)* Why has there been a downshift in innovation? (8:56)* The importance of embracing AI (16:08)* Slouching towards Utopia: Marc's response to AI critics (23:27)* The economics of techno-optimism (36:29)* The future of domestic technology policy (44:38)Oh, by the way, the transcript of our conversation will be posted tomorrow, November 9.Hey, I have a new book out! The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were Promised is currently available pretty much everywhere. I'm very excited about it! Let's gooooo!

Johan Norberg's work revolves primarily around economic and intellictual history and attempting to learn lessons from past financial systems. In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, Johan takes us through his version of capitalism, giving an especially interesting perspective on the economic system of his home country. Johan is a senior fellow at the Cato Institute and the author of several books. His latest is The Capitalist Manifesto: In Defense of Global Capitalism, available now. In This Episode* “Capitalism” and its meanings (0:55)* The state of contemporary capitalism (2:34)* Coordination in capitalism (7:59)* The cyclical nature of economic systems (13:54)* Swedish capitalism  (16:56)* The case for capitalism (21:48)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversationJames Pethokoukis: Let's begin with a little definitional work here. Capitalist Manifesto: “Capitalist” is a word people assign a variety of meanings to. What is the capitalism that you're talking about here?Johan Norberg: Yeah, it's not a great word. Quite often it's misunderstood; people think it's all about capital. It's not. We can have capital in many different economic systems. To me, free-market capitalism is about a decentralized economic system with private property where decisions are made locally, decentralized, not command and control, and the prices and wages and things are set in voluntary negotiations rather than top-down.The economist Deirdre McCloskey hates the word "capitalism." She prefers "innovism" or "trade-tested progress." Should we insist on using a different word to describe the world's dominant socio-economic system?Deirdre McCloskey is right. Capitalism is a bad word. I would much prefer “innovism” or something like that. But I've realized that in order to communicate with people, I'd better use some of the words that they are using. And I've realized that we're stuck with the word “capitalism” and the whole concept of capitalism, and if we don't fill it with meaning, those of us who like free markets and free trade, I've realized that somebody else is going to fill it with meaning, and in that case, we are losing the debate. Go to where the sinners are. That's my take.Twenty years ago, it seemed like markets had won. Capitalism was changing the world and bringing people out of poverty. President Clinton declared "the era of big government is over." China was opening its economy. What happened? Why did you feel the need to write this book in this moment?That's exactly why I wrote this book, because nowadays it seems like nobody likes free markets and free trade anymore. I've realized that, in the US, and that should be a place where people appreciate some of this, fewer people believe in capitalism than believe in ghosts nowadays. And there's this lack among politicians and governments everywhere in belief in global capitalism. There's this whole, repatriate stuff, subsidize specific businesses and sectors back home, rather than having global supply chains. So that's why I wrote this.I think this is all based on a complete misunderstanding of what has happened in the world in the past 20 years. It's not that markets have failed. On the contrary, despite the fact that we've had 20 rough years with financial crises and wars and the Great Pandemic and stuff like that, and yet we've seen, when you look at objective indicators of human living standards, more progress than ever before over these 20 years. When it comes to the reduction in poverty, more than 130,000 people lifted out of extreme poverty every day over the past 20 years. We've seen an increase in global GDP per capita of roughly a third. We've reduced child mortality by almost half, which means that four million fewer children died last year than in 2002. And this is because entrepreneurs and innovators, they keep innovating ourselves out of problems all the time — if we give them some freedom to do that. And that's what I'm worried about: that they'll have less freedom in the future if we do not keep on pounding and keep on explaining this.Those are some pretty impressive statistics. But people don't seem to notice. We keep hearing the same narrative of "late-stage, failed capitalism.” Why is that?I think the financial crisis is a very important part of this. If some capitalists do bad stuff, people lose faith in capitalism and I think we saw this in the US but also around the world. There's this sense that perhaps we shouldn't imitate what America is doing if these are the consequences. And I don't think that the financial crisis was a result of unleashed market forces. And I even wrote a book on this a couple of years back, Financial Fiasco. I think there were massive regulatory failures and central banks and ministers of finance trying to make capitalism very safe by implementing a very homogenous structure on everybody, telling everybody to go into the same way, searching for the same AAA-rated securities and stuff like that. And if everybody behaves in the same way, if that fails, there's massive disaster. We need decentralization partly to minimize risks like that. But — doesn't matter, we don't have to go into history. I think this partly explains why we're in this lack of trust in capitalism right now.But also other things. People, when they're afraid of the world, they tend to retreat. They don't want to explore. They don't want to innovate. It triggers their fight-or-flight mechanism and sometimes the societal fight-or-flight mechanism. You want to hide behind walls and tariff barriers and strong, big governments that protect you, and that is a misunderstanding of how we get out of crises. And this is what I think we've learned from these past 20 years. Yes, lots of bad stuff happened. It makes us afraid. It triggers some sort of evolutionary tendency to get away from openness and learning and discovery processes and instead we want just one instant solution to all the problems.But what we're learning is, how did we get out of the pandemic? We did it by having thousands of entrepreneurs constantly finding new ways to rebuild supply chains and find replacements for the resources they couldn't get. And innovators who were looking for new treatments and coming up with a vaccine in a record period of time. It didn't take a thousand years as it usually does, coming up with a vaccine against polio, but more like three months. But try to tell that to our reptilian brains. When we're fearful, we want one simple solution. And as H.L. Mencken once put it, there is always a solution to every problem: it is “neat, plausible, and wrong.” And it's so dangerous because it involves replacing all that discovery, all that learning and wisdom of millions with just the preferences of a few people at the top.Let me read a brief tweet by the right-wing populist writer, Sohrab Ahmari: “We are entering a new age of industrial war. The ‘California ideology,' neoliberalism, Reagan-Clintonism — whatever you want to call it, it's kaput. We're going to see close coordination between state, enterprise, labor. It took security threats to bring us here. I'll take it.” Why won't you take it?That's a scary prospect to me. There is a reason why he's talking about this Silicon Valley thing, because that worked splendidly, and one of the reasons it succeeded was that the outcomes weren't decided in advance by any kind of command-and-control thing. It was, as some criticized it in the ‘70s, it looks more like the Wild West, allowing entrepreneurs and innovators to experiment with crazy ideas, even in garages. And that's the way to … if you want to explore all possible avenues and ideas, we have to let everybody go out and look for it. I think the reason why Sohrab Ahmari is wrong is that he thinks that there is one solution to all the problems we face. Perhaps there is, but I don't know one and he doesn't know it. We have to allow more eyeballs to look at the problems and more brains to go out thinking hard about these things, and that involves not starting geopolitical divisions and nationalist temptations, but it involves having lots of people in other places helping us to find the solutions in a division of labor where we learn from what they're doing.Why has America been so successful so far? When people say that it's failing, this American, this Washington consensus thing, please keep in mind that just 15 years ago, the American economy was slightly smaller than the European one. Now it's almost a third bigger. It's not entirely broken, but some of the fixes might break it, I'm afraid, if we continue doing things like this. Why is it successful? Well, look at different areas. Look at AI. Why is America so successful? We thought that China would come up with it. Well, one reason is that the Chinese have to teach machines not just what to say, but also what not to say, but also the fact that America is learning from others. More than half of America's top AI experts have education or background in other countries and almost a third come from China. So if we want to win against China and everybody else, we also have to allow lots of Chinese to do the work for us.This notion of close coordination between state and business and labor, where does that work well? Is there a model? Is there an example of that kind of formula working elsewhere?A leading European economist just published a book called, I think it's some 50 of them, called Questioning the Entrepreneurial State, where they evaluate this whole idea that we would have this close coordination between governments and businesses, and what they say is that the history of it, at least in Europe but they look around the world as well, is that it's usually a full employment program for lobbyists and for attorneys who just reformulate everything that businesses would usually do as something that fits with this new industrial policy thing. If it was successful, you would look up stuff on the internet by using Quaero, because that's the close coordination stuff in Europe with the European and German and French governments heavily funded a “European Google.” The whole idea was that we will own the digital future by heavily subsidizing this one project. It doesn't work, because you lose some of the trial and error, you lose some of the mechanisms whereby we understand what's a success and what's not.It's okay to fail. Industrial policies fail all the time, but so does big tech. Entrepreneurial capitalism as well. But the great thing with free markets and not having the governments investing heavily in one particular model is that you replace this trial-and-error, constant experimentation and feedback and adaptation that comes when you work on markets and you're risking your own resources. Once you do that by having the government picking a winner, then, when you lose out, you spend more money on these projects instead. And you lose this learning process whereby we're constantly channeling capital and labor to more successful ones. What people would tell you is that China is the most successful place where we've had this…Yes, there seems to be a cyclical component to this belief. I mean, I'm old enough to have seen the version where Japan had figured it out. That didn't turn out so well. And then I think you have people who looked at China. If you have a natural inclination to like the idea of central planning and you eschew the kind of natural chaos of capitalism, you could point to China So that's why I wonder if this is a passing phase, because China doesn't seem like they're able to pull it off either.Yeah, but that'll keep on moving, then, and find another example where it seems to be working. Because it's always easy to find out in retrospect that something seemed to be working. And if the government is involved somewhere, they try to give it credit. But until recently, I think 49 American states tried to spend heavily to create a biotech cluster in their own state to attract businesses from other states. And if one of them succeeded, people would've said, “Look, this is because of this top-down government intervention,” but probably not, right?And it's the same thing with China. Yes, China has been tremendously successful for 30 years, but in which sectors? In the sectors that the government didn't plan for it, in places where we saw grassroots capitalism, farmers secretly privatizing their land, starting village enterprises. And then, and only then, did the Communist Party see that, “This seems to be more successful than what we've been doing recently, so allow them to continue to experiment,” experiment in export processing and stuff like that. But they wanted to keep it elsewhere so that it wouldn't spread throughout the rest of the economy. But it was so successful that it did. That's what succeeded: when people experimented. Entrepreneurs were allowed to innovate. What was it that failed? The large, state-owned enterprises. They were less productive. They were wasting cheap credit and ruining, destroying resources over the years. And once the government gets involved, there's plenty of research into this, they find less productive businesses and they become even less productive if they get access to this cheap credit and cheap land. And I think people are coming around to that now as they're seeing that China has many problems, some of them related to demography, as well. But they would need innovation, strange new business ideas, crazy people in garages coming up with new ideas. That's exactly the thing that top-down governments don't really like, and what they've been doing over the past few years is just destroying tech businesses, [education] businesses, and the gaming industry in China because authoritarians aren't good at spotting where the true potential lies.I wonder if you could clear up a question that confuses many Americans. Do you come from, and are you currently living in, a capitalist country?Yes, I am.We don't know. We're not sure. We're very confused about Sweden.Yes, I know, and that's because lots of perceptions, just like the ideas, are stuck in the 1970s. Sweden had a brief period of some 20 years when we really experimented with socialist ideas, but this was also the moment — the only moment in modern economic history — when Sweden lagged behind other countries. So up until the early 1970s, we had a very limited government, low taxes, free markets, and free trade — that made us rich. It made us so rich in Sweden that we thought that we could experiment with these ideas. Just stop thinking about how to create wealth, just spend it, redistribute it. And that resulted in an awful 20, 25 years when companies like Ikea and Tetra Pak and the greatest entrepreneurs, they just left Sweden because it wasn't possible to do business in Sweden.This is what people still remember: the 1970s. We did all these things: doubled the size of the government, jacking up taxes and so on. At the same time, it looked like a fairly successful place, it's a rich place. But it's like that old joke: How do you end up with a small fortune? Well, you start with a large fortune and then you waste most of it. And that's what we did. This is actually why, since that terrible economic financial crisis that we had in the early 1990s, Sweden has once again liberalized markets quite drastically compared to other places, and we're now back to a system which many Americans would actually think of as more free market in many ways than the US system.As you know, people think of Sweden and Scandinavia more generally as big government with a giant welfare [system], cradle-to-grave welfare, all the welfare you would ever want. So in what ways is Sweden maybe more market friendly than the United States, and perhaps some ways which would greatly surprise many Americans as well as Bernie Sanders?Yeah, I'm trying to tell the Bernie Sanders of the world that if they want to be like Sweden, they would have to do plenty of things. They would have to become more free trade-oriented in many ways. They would have to reform social security, partially privatize it with individual accounts, they would have to introduce a national school voucher system so private schools get the same funding as the public ones. They would actually have to lower taxes in many ways on the rich, and they would have to abolish taxes on property wealth inheritance and lower the corporate tax, and instead put most of the tax burdens on low- and middle-income households, because that's the dirty little secret of the Swedish welfare state. We learned in the 1970s that if you want to have a big universal welfare state that's very generous, in that case, everybody is going to have to pay for it.You have to redistribute over people's life cycle, rather than trying to get the rich to pay for it all, because we realized that the rich are too few and the economy is too dependent on them. So if we are trying to get them to pay for it all, they will flee Sweden, they will move to other places, leave their resources elsewhere, and we won't get the new businesses, the new successful ones that we all depend upon. So for 30 years, we didn't create a single net job in the private sector, the ‘70s, ‘80s, and the ‘90s. So instead, you have to move towards more taxing consumption, 25 percent value-added tax, and making sure that the poor and middle income households pay the bulk of income taxes. So, counterintuitively — and this is something that people really don't get—Sweden has a much less-progressive tax system than the United States does, less-progressive tax system than almost any other rich country because we've learned that the poor are loyal taxpayers. They don't move, they don't dodge taxes, and they don't have tax attorneys.What is the quick pitch for capitalism? If you're on an airplane next to someone who's heard a lot about inequality and wage stagnation and losing to the Chinese, how do you make the case for market capitalism?It's much, much better than you think, but it could be even better. It is much better because we can see, look at the long-term indicators and the data, and perhaps this is where I lose my fellow passenger. But wage stagnation was a phenomenon in the ‘70s and ‘80s, partly because we had to rebuild the economy because it was at risk of becoming much less competitive and we were about to lose jobs everywhere. Once we did that, from the ‘90s and onwards, we've had a tremendous increase in wages, and we can measure this in wages and total compensation and increase in 60 percent. I'd say if you look at the best indicators, but even more interesting is what can you do with those resources? And then you see that all those amenities and goods and technologies that we all considered luxuries in the ‘70 and ‘80s, we're getting close to 100 percent possession in American households.The poor people who fall below the poverty line in the US now own more amenities like that — washing machines, television sets, dryers, clothes washers, and of course cell phones and computers — than the rich did in 1970. That tells you something. If you look around the world, we've actually had the best era ever when it comes to poverty reduction, and we've even, since the turn of the millennium, reduced global inequality for the first time since the Industrial Revolution. So it's much better than the headlines. If you look at the trend lines, they're much better. Yeah, tell me about that. Give me a little of that “could be even better.” Give me a little flavor of that.Yeah. I think that we've lost — you know this and you just wrote a book on this — we've entered a period where we've thought that things cannot be better. We've tried to protect old business models and old ways of doing things, and often in a low interest rate environment, I think protected many businesses that should have been put out of their misery so that capital and labor could go to the new sectors, to the frontiers of the economy. We are seeing some of that happening now with everything from mRNA technology to the new space race to AI, but we're in a mindset and a regulatory situation where we don't want to experiment with the new weird stuff. But we have to do that because that's the only way where we'll get the new goods and services and jobs in the future. So here's to the crazy ones, as Steve Jobs would put it. And in that case, we can't be too protective of our old, safe ways of doing things. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

More than 20 years ago, the political scientist Francis Fukuyama characterized the Information Technology revolution as "benign" but cautioned that "the most significant threat posed by contemporary biotechnology is the possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby move us into a post-human stage of history." From Twitter to CRISPR to ChatGPT, a lot has changed since then. In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, Dr. Fukuyama shares his thoughts on those developments and the recent advances in generative AI, as well as the cultural importance of science fiction.Dr. Fukuyama is the Olivier Nomellini Senior Fellow at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies. His books include The End of History and the Last Man, Our Posthuman Future, and 2022's Liberalism and Its Discontents, among many others. Other writings can be found at American Purpose.In This Episode* The consequences of the IT revolution (1:37)* Can government competently regulate AI? (8:14)* AI and liberal democracy (17:29)* The cultural importance of science fiction (24:16)* Silicon Valley's life-extension efforts (31:11)Below is an edited transcript of our conversationThe consequences of the IT revolutionJames Pethokoukis: In Our Posthuman Future more than 20 years ago, you wrote, “The aim of this book is to argue that [Aldous] Huxley was right [in Brave New World], that the most significant threat posed by contemporary biotechnology is the possibility that it will alter human nature and thereby move us into a ‘posthuman' stage of history. This is important, I will argue, because human nature exists, is a meaningful concept, and has provided a stable continuity to our experience as a species.” But then you added, “It may be that, as in the case of 1984” — and, I think, parenthetically, information technology — “we will eventually find biotechnology's consequences are completely and surprisingly benign.” After 20 years, and the advent of social media, and now it seems like possibly a great leap forward in AI, would you still characterize the IT revolution as “benign”?Francis Fukuyama: That's obviously something that's changed considerably since I wrote that book because the downside of IT has been clear to everybody. When the internet was first privatized in the 1990s, most people, myself included, thought it would be good for democracy because information was power, and if you made information more widely available, that would distribute power more democratically. And it has done that, in fact. A lot of people have access to information that they can use to improve their lives, to mobilize, to agitate, to push for the protection of their rights. But I think it's also been weaponized in ways that we perhaps didn't anticipate back then.And then, there was this more insidious phenomenon where it turns out that the elimination of hierarchies that controlled information, that we celebrated back then, actually turned out to be pretty important. If you had a kind of legacy media that cared about journalistic standards, you could trust the information that was published. But the internet really undermined those legacy sources and replaced it with a world in which anyone can say anything. And they do. Therefore, we have this cognitive chaos right now where conspiracy theories of all sorts get a lot of credibility because people don't trust these hierarchies that used to be the channels for information. Clearly, we've got a big problem on our hands. That doesn't mean that the biotech is not still going to be a big problem; it's just that I think the IT part has moved ahead very rapidly. But I think the biotech will get there in time.While I think most of the concern that I've heard expressed about AI, in particular, has been about these science fiction-like existential risks or job loss, obviously your concern has more to do, as with in Our Posthuman Future, how it will affect our liberal democracy. And you point out some of the downsides of the IT revolution that weren't obvious 30 years ago but now seeing plainly obvious today.To me, the coverage of AI has been really very, very negative, and we've had calls for an AI pause. Do you worry that maybe we've overlearned that lesson? That rather than going into this with kind of a Pollyannaish attitude, we're immediately going into this AI with deep concerns. Is there a risk of overcorrecting?The short answer is, yes. I think that because of our negative experience with social media and the internet lately, we expect the worst from technology. But I think that the possibilities for AI actually making certain social problems much better are substantial. I think that the existential worries about AI are just absurd, and I really don't see scenarios under which the human species is going to face extinction. That seems to be this Terminator, killer, Skynet scenario, and I know very few serious experts in this area that think that that's ever likely to materialize. The bigger fears, I think, are more mundane ones about job loss as a result of advancing technology. And I think that's a very complicated issue. But it does seem to me that, for example, generative AI could actually end up complementing human skills and, in fact, could complement the skills of lower-skilled or lower-educated workers in a way that will actually increase economic equality.Up till now, I think most economists would blame the advance of computer technology for having vastly increased social inequality, because in order to take advantage of existing technologies, if you have a better education, you're going to have a higher income and so forth. But it's entirely possible that generative AI will actually slow that trend because it will give people with lower levels of education the ability to do useful things that they weren't able to do previously. There's actually some early empirical work that suggests that that's already been a pattern. So, yes, I think you're right that we've kind of overreacted. I just think in general, predicting where this technology is going to go in the next 50 years is a fool's errand. It's sort of like in the 1880s asking somebody, “Well, what's this newfangled thing called electricity going to do in 50 years?” Anything that was said back then I think would've been overtaken by events very, very rapidly.Can government competently regulate AI?Anyone who has sat through previous government hearings on social media has been underwhelmed at the ability of Congress to understand these issues, much less come up with a vast regulatory structure. Are you confident in the ability of government to regulate AI, whether it's to regulate deep fakes or what have you — why should I be confident in their ability to do that?I think you've got to decompose the regulatory challenge a little bit. I've been involved here at Stanford, we have a Cyber Policy Center, and we've been thinking about different forms of IT regulation. It's a particular challenge for regulators for a number of reasons. One of the questions you come up with in regulatory design is, “Is this something that actually can be undertaken by existing agencies, or do you actually need a new type of regulator with special skills and knowledge?” And I think, to me, pretty clearly the answer to that is yes. But that agency would have to be designed very differently, because the standard regulatory design, the agency has a certain amount of expertise in a particular sector and they use that expertise to write rules that then get written into law, and then things like the Administrative Procedure Act begins to apply. That's what's been going on, for example, with something like net neutrality, where the FCC put the different regulations up for notice and comment, and you go through this very involved procedure to write the new rules and so forth. I think in an area like AI, that's just not going to work, because the thing is moving so quickly. And that means that you're actually going to have to delegate more autonomy and discretionary power to the regulatory agency, because otherwise, they're simply not going to be able to keep up with the speed at which the technology advances. In normative terms, I have no problem with that. I think that governments do need to exercise social control over new technologies that are potentially very disruptive and damaging, but it has to be done in a proper way.Can you actually design a regulatory agency that would have any remote chance of keeping up with the technology? The British have done this. They have a new digital regulator that is composed of people coming out of the IT industry, and they've relaxed the civil service requirements to be able to hire people with the appropriate knowledge and backgrounds. In the United States, that's going to be very difficult because we have so many cumbersome HR requirements for hiring and promotion of people that go into the federal civil service. Pay, for one thing, is a big issue because we don't pay our bureaucrats enough. If you're going to hire some hotshot tech guy out of the tech sector and offer him a job as a GS-14, it just isn't going to work. So I don't think that you can answer the question, “Can we regulate adequately or not?” in a simple way. I think that there are certain things you would have to do if you were going to try to regulate this sector. Can the United States do that given the polarization in our politics, given all of these legacy institutions that prevent us from actually having a public sector that is up to this task? That I don't know. As you can tell, I've got certain skepticism about that.Is it a worthwhile critique of this regulatory process to think of AI as this discreet technology that you need a certain level of expertise to understand? If it is indeed a general-purpose technology that will be used by a variety of sectors, all sectors perhaps, can you really have an AI regulator that doesn't de facto become an economy regulator?No, you probably can't. This is another challenge, which is that, as you say, AI in general is so broad. It's already being used in virtually every sector of the economy, and you obviously don't want a “one size fits all” effort to govern the use of this technology. So I think that you have to be much more specific about the areas where you think potential harms could exist. There's also different approaches to this other than regulation. In 2020, I chaired a Stanford working group on platform scale, which was meant to deal with the old — at that point it was a kind of contemporary problem­ — but now it seems like an old problem of content mediation on the internet. So how do you deal with this problem that Elon Musk has now revealed to be a real problem: You don't want everything to be available on social media platforms, but how do you actually control that content in a way that serves a kind of general democratic public interest? As we thought about this in the course of this working group deliberation, we concluded that straightforward regulation is not going to work. It won't work in the United States because we're way too polarized. Just think about something like reviving the old fairness doctrine that the FCC used to apply to legacy broadcast media. How are you going to come up with something like that? What's “fair and balanced” coverage of vaccine denialism? It's just not going to happen.And what we ended up advocating was something we called “middleware,” where you would use regulation to create a competitive ecosystem of third-party media content regulators so that when you use the social media platform, you the user could buy the services or make use of the services of a content regulator that would tailor your feed or your search on Google to criteria that you specified in advance. So if you tended progressive, you could get a progressive one. If you only like right-wing media, you could get a content regulator that would deliver what you want. If you wanted to buy only American-made products, you could get a different one. The point is that you would use competition in this sphere because the real threat, as we saw it, was not actually so much this compartmentalization as the power of a single big platform. There's really only three of them. It's Google, Meta, and now X, or the formerly Twitter, that really had this kind of power. The danger to a democracy was not that you could say anything on the internet, the danger was the power of a single big platform owned by a private, for-profit company to have an outsized role over political discourse in the United States. Elon Musk and Twitter is a perfect example of that. He apparently has his own foreign policy, which is not congruent with American foreign policy, but as a private owner of this platform, he's got the power to pursue this private foreign policy. So that was our idea.In that particular case, you could use competition as an alternative to state regulation, because what you really wanted to do was to break up this concentrated power that was exercised by the platforms. So that's one approach to one aspect of digital regulation. It doesn't deal with AI. I don't know whether there's an analog in the AI sphere, but I think it's correct that what you don't want is a single regulator that then tries to write broad rules that apply to what is actually just an enormously broad technology that will apply in virtually every sector of the economy.AI and liberal democracyIn response to the call for a six-month "AI pause," critics of that idea pointed to competition with China. They suggested that given the difficulties of regulating AI, we might risk losing the "AI race" to the Chinese. Do you think that's a reasonable criticism?This is a general problem with technologies. Certain technologies distribute power and other technologies concentrate it. So the old classic 19th-century coal- and steel- and fossil fuel–based economy tended to concentrate power. And certainly nuclear weapons concentrate power because you really need to be a big entity in order to build a nuclear weapon, in order to build all the uranium processing and so forth. But other technologies, like biotech, actually do not concentrate power. Any high school student can actually now use CRISPR to do genetic engineering. And they make biotech labs that will fit in individual shipping containers. So the regulatory problem is quite different.Now, the problem with AI is that it appears that these large language models really require a lot of resources. In fact, it's interesting, because we used to think the problem was actually having big data sets. But that's actually not the problem; there's plenty of data out there. It's actually building a parallel computer system that's powerful enough to process all the words on the internet, and that's been the task that only the largest companies can do. I think that it's correct that if we had told these companies not to do this, we would be facing international competitive pressures that would make that a bad decision. However, I do think that it's still a risk to allow that kind of power to be not subject to some form of democratic control. If it's true that you need these gigantic corporations to do this sort of thing, those corporations ought to be serving American national interests.And again, I hate to keep referring to Elon Musk, but we're seeing this right now with Starlink. It turns out Starlink is extremely valuable militarily, which has been demonstrated very clearly in Ukraine. Should the owner of Starlink be allowed to make important decisions as to who is going to use this technology on the battlefield and where that technology can be used? I don't think so. I don't think that one rich individual should have that kind of power. And actually, I'm not quite sure, I thought that the Defense Department had actually agreed to start paying Musk for the Ukrainian use of Starlink. I think that's the actual appropriate answer to that problem, so that it should not be up to Elon Musk where Starlink can be used. It should be up to the people that make American foreign policy: the White House and the State Department and so forth. And so, I think by analogy, if you develop this technology that requires really massive scale and big corporations to develop it, it should nonetheless be under some kind of state control such that it is not the decision of some rich individual how it's going to be applied. It should be somehow subject to some kind of democratic control.On a normative level, I think that's very clear, but the specific modalities by which you do that are complicated. For example, let's say there's a gigantic corporation that is run by some lunatic that wants to use it for all sorts of asocial reasons, proliferating deep fakes or trying to use it to undermine general social trust in institutions and so forth. Is that okay? Is that a decision that should be up to a private individual or isn't there some public interest in controlling that in some fashion? I hate speaking about this in such general terms, but I think you have to settle this normative question and then you can get into the narrower technical question of, is it possible to actually exert that kind of control and how would you do that?You've questioned in your previous writings whether liberal democracy could survive a world with both humans and posthumans and where we're manipulating human nature. Can it survive in a world where there are two different intelligences? If we had a human intelligence and we had an artificial general intelligence, would such an entity pose a challenge our civilization, to a democratic capitalist civilization?It's hard to answer that question. You can imagine scenarios where it obviously would pose a challenge. One of the big questions is whether this general intelligence somehow escapes human control, and that's a tough one. I think that the experts that I trust think that that's not going to happen. That ultimately, human beings are going to be able to control this thing and use it for their own purposes. So again, the whole Skynet scenario is really not likely to happen. But that doesn't solve the problem, because even if it's under human control, how do you make sure it's the right humans, right? Because if this falls into the wrong hands, it could be very, very destructive. And that then becomes a political question. I'm not quite sure how you're going to want to answer it.The cultural importance of science fictionYou mentioned Skynet from the Terminator franchise. Do you worry that we're too steeped in dystopian science fiction? It seems like we can only see the downside when we're presented with a new technology like a biotechnology breakthrough or an AI breakthrough. Is that how it seems to you?I actually wrote a blog post about this. I really read a lot of science fiction. I have my whole life. There's a big difference between the sorts of stories that you saw back in the 1950s and ‘60s and the stuff that has come out recently. It's hard to generalize over such a vast field, but space odysseys and space travel was very common, and a lot of that was extremely optimistic: that human beings would colonize Mars and then the distant planets and you'd have a warp drive that would take you out of the solar system and so forth. And it was kind of a paean to unlimited human possibilities. Whereas I do think that, especially with the rise of environmentalism, there was a greater consciousness of the downsides of technological advance. So you got more and more dystopian kinds of imaginings. Now, it is not a universal thing. For example, I also wrote a blog about two kind of global warming–related recent science-fiction books. One is TheMinistry for the Future by Kim Stanley Robinson. And that actually is a very optimistic take on global warming, because it's set in the 2050s and basically the human race has figured out how to deal with global warming. They do it, I think, through a bunch of very implausible political scenarios, but there's a ministry for the future that wisely…That book seems a little too comfortable with violence and compulsion for my taste.The other one is Neal Stephenson's Termination Shock: Basically, there's a single rich oligarch in Texas that takes it upon himself to put all this sulfur dioxide in the upper atmosphere to cool the earth, and he succeeds, and it then changes the climate in China and India. I don't know whether that's optimistic or pessimistic. But I actually do think that it's very useful to have this kind of science fiction, because you really do have to imagine to yourself what some of the both upsides and downsides will be. So it's probably the case that there's more dystopian fiction, but I do think that if you didn't have that, you wouldn't have a concrete idea of what to look for.If you think about both 1984 and Brave New World, these were the big dystopian futures that were imagined in the 1950s. And both of them came true in many ways. It gave us a vocabulary, like, “Big Brother,” the “Telescreen,” or “Epsilons,” and “Gammas,” and “Alphas,” and so forth, by which we can actually kind of interpret things in the present. I think if you didn't have that vocabulary, it would be hard to have a discussion about what is it that we're actually worried about. So yes, I do think that there is a dystopian bias to a lot of that work that's done, but I think that you've got to have it. Because you do have to try to imagine to yourself what some of these downsides are.You mentioned a couple of books. Are there any films or television shows that you've watched that you feel provide a plausible optimistic vision?I don't know whether it's optimistic. One of my favorite book series and then TV series was The Expanse, written by a couple of guys that go by a pseudonym. It's not optimistic, in the sense that it projects all of our current geopolitical rivalries forward into a future in which human beings have colonized, not just the outer planets, but also intergalactically, figured out how to move from one place to another, and they're still having these fights between rich and poor and so forth. But I guess the reason that I liked it, especially the early parts of that series, when you just had an Epstein Drive, I mean, it was just one technological change that allowed you to move. It's sort of like the early days of sailing ships, where you could get to Australia, but it would take you six months to get there. So that was the situation early on in the book, and that was actually a very attractive future. All of a sudden, human beings had the ability to mine the asteroid belt, they could create gigantic cities in space where human beings could actually live and flourish. That's one of the reasons I really liked that: because it was very human. Although there were conflicts, they were familiar conflicts. There were conflicts that we are dealing with today. But it was, in a way, hopeful because it was now done at this much larger scale that gave hope that human beings would not be confined to one single planet. And actually, one of the things that terrifies me is that the idea that in 100 years, we may discover that we actually can't colonize even Mars or the Moon. That the costs of actually allowing human beings to live anywhere but on earth just make it economically impossible. And so we're kind of stuck on planet Earth and that's the human future.I wrote a small essay about The Expanse where I talked about having a positive vision. As I saw it, this is several hundred years in the future, and we're still here. We've had climate change, but we're still here. We've expanded throughout the universe. If an asteroid should hit the earth, there's still going to be humanity. And people were angry about that essay, because this is a future but there's still problems. Yes, because we're still part of that future: human beings.Silicon Valley's life-extension effortsGetting back to biotechnology and transhumanism and living forever, these things you wrote about in Our Posthuman Future: What do you make of the efforts by folks in Silicon Valley to try to extend lifespans? From a cultural perspective, from your perspective as a political scientist, what do you make of these efforts?I think they're terrible. I actually wrote about this and have thought about this a lot, about life extension. In fact, I think human biomedicine has produced a kind of disastrous situation for us right now because by the time you get to your mid-80s, roughly half of the population that's that old has some kind of long-term, chronic, degenerative disease. And I think that it was actually a much better situation when people were dying of heart attacks and strokes and cancer when they were still in their 70s. It's one of those things where life extension is individually very desirable because no individual wants to die. But socially, I think the impact of extending life is bad. Because quite frankly, you're not going to have adaptation unless you have generational turnover. There's a lot of literature now, Neil Howe has just written a new book on this about how important generations are. There's this joke that economists say, that the field of economics progresses one funeral at a time. Because, basically, you're born into a certain age cohort, and to the end of your life, you're going to retain a lot of the views of people that were born going through the same kind of life experiences. And sometimes they're just wrong. And unless that generation dies off, you're just not going to get the kind of social movement that's necessary.We've already seen a version of this with all these dictators like Franco and Castro that refuse to die, and modern medicine keeps them alive forever. And as a result, you're stuck with their kind of authoritarian governments for way too long. And so I think that, socially, there's a good reason why under biological evolution you have population turnover and we humans don't live forever. What's the advantage of everybody being able to live 200 years as opposed to let's say 80 or 90 years? Is that world going to be better? It's going to have all sorts of problems, right? Because you're going to have all of these 170-year-old people that won't get out of the way. How are you going to get tenure if all the tenured people are 170 years old and there's no way of moving them out of the system? I think that these tech billionaires, it's a kind of selfishness that they've got the money to fund all this research so that they hope that they can keep themselves alive, because they are afraid of dying. I think it's going to be a disaster if they're ever successful in bringing about this kind of population-level life extension. And I think we're already in a kind of disastrous situation where a very large proportion of the human population is going to be of an age where they're going to be dependent on the rest of the society to keep them alive. And that's not good economically. That's going to be very, very hard to sustain.Micro Reads▶ IBM Tries to Ease Customers' Qualms About Using Generative A.I. - Steve Lohr, NYT |▶ Six Months Ago Elon Musk Called for a Pause on AI. Instead Development Sped Up - Will Knight, WIRED |▶ AI is getting better at hurricane forecasting - Gregory Barber, Ars Technica |▶ The promise — and peril — of generative AI - John Thornhill, FT |▶ Uber Freight Taps AI to Help Compete in Tough Cargo Market - Thomas Black, Bloomberg |▶ Why AI Doesn't Scare Me - Gary Hoover, Profectus |▶ A top economist who studies AI says it will double productivity in the next decade: ‘You need to embrace this technology and not resist it' - Geoff Colvin, Yahoo! Finance |▶ Meta is putting AI chatbots everywhere - Alex Heath, Verge |▶ The Big AI Risk We're Not Talking About - Brent Skorup, Discourse |▶ Mark Zuckerberg can't quit the metaverse - Laura Martins, Verge |▶ This robotic exoskeleton can help runners sprint faster - Rhiannon Williams, MIT Technology Review |▶ The bizarre new frontier for cell-cultivated meat: Lion burgers, tiger steaks, and mammoth meatballs - Jude Whiley, Vox |▶ A power grab against private equity threatens the US economy - Drew Maloney, FT |▶ Risks Are Growing of a Double-Dip ‘Vibecession' - Jonathan Levin, Bloomberg |▶ NSF partners with the Institute for Progress to test new mechanisms for funding research and innovation - NSF |▶ It's Too Easy to Block a Wind Farm in America - Robinson Meyer, Heatmap |▶ Can we finally reverse balding with these new experimental treatments? - Joshua Howgego, NewScientist | This is a public episode. 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Is climate change an impending existential threat, or a serious but manageable problem we can tackle with innovation and human ingenuity? Zeke Hausfather joins this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast to explain the basics of climate modeling and give a clear-eyed assessment of the risks we face and the measures we can take.Zeke is a climate scientist and energy systems analyst. He is the climate research lead for Stripe and a research scientist at Berkeley Earth.In This Episode* Human impact on the climate (1:11)* Global temperature forecasting (6:33)* Low-probability, high-risk scenarios (15:07)* Reducing carbon emissions (17:06)* Carbon capture and carbon removal (25:25)Below is an edited transcript of our conversationFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Thanks!Human impact on the climateJames Pethokoukis: How do we know that our planet is warming? And secondarily, how do we know the actions of people are playing a key role?Zeke Hausfather: That's a great question. In terms of how we know it's warming: We've been monitoring the Earth's climate with reasonably dense measurements since the mid-1800s. That's when groups like NASA, NOAA, the UK Hadley Centre, my own Berkeley Earth group, have been able to put together reliable global surface temperature estimates. And we've seen in the period…That's since the 1980s?1850.1850. NASA was not around in 1850.No. But enough measurements were being taken both at weather stations around the world and on ships in the oceans that we can reconstruct global temperatures with an accuracy of a couple tenths of a degree going back that far. We know that the world has warmed by about 1.2 degrees centigrade since 1850 with the vast majority of that warming, about 1 degree of it, happening since 1970. That isn't in much dispute in the scientific community at all. Now, going further back is harder, obviously. We only invented the thermometer in the early 1700s. There are a few locations on land that go back that far, but to go back further in time, we need to rely on what we call climate proxies: things like ice cores, tree rings, coral sediments, pollen in lakes — various natural factors that are in some way related to the temperature when those things occurred.Those have much higher uncertainties, of course, but we do know using those reconstructions that current temperature levels are probably unprecedented in at least the last 2000 years and are at the high end of anything we've seen in the last 120,000 years or so. Certainly if current temperatures were to stay at today's levels for another century, they'd be higher than anything we've seen in 120,000 years. But it's harder to precisely make those claims because the time resolution of these indirect proxy measurements is very coarse when we go back further in time. You might have one ice core measurement reflect a hundred-year average period, for example, rather than a specific year. We know from the temperature record that the world has warmed. How do we know that human activity is playing a role? Well, we've known since the mid-1800s, due to pioneering work by folks like John Tyndall or Arrhenius, that carbon dioxide is a greenhouse gas and that greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide, water vapor, methane are critical to maintain a habitable planet. Without greenhouse gases in our atmosphere, the Earth would be a snowball and life would probably not exist.We also know that the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased pretty dramatically. We have measurements from ice cores going back about 800,000 years of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere at a reasonably high resolution. And because carbon dioxide is well mixed, knowing it in one location in one ice core gives us a good picture of carbon dioxide for the whole planet. And we know that prior to the year 1850, carbon dioxide concentrations in the atmosphere varied between about 170 to 280 parts per million. They're lower during ice age periods; they're higher during warmer interglacial periods. But since the 1850s, that value has increased dramatically. The amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere has increased by about 50 percent. It's gone from 280 parts per million, which was over the last 10,000 years since the end of the last ice age, up to about 420 parts per million today.And that reflects a huge amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere. I don't think people realize quite the magnitude we're talking about. The amount of carbon dioxide that humans have added to the atmosphere by digging up stuff from underground and burning it is roughly equal in mass to the entire biosphere. We took every single bit of life on Earth and burned it. That was about how much CO2 we put up in the atmosphere since the Industrial Revolution. Or to put it another way, it's equal in mass to all of everything humans have ever built: the pyramids, every skyscraper, every road. We took all that mass and put it up into the atmosphere. That's the amount of CO2 we've emitted. And so that's had a pretty big effect on what we call the radiative forcing of our climate, essentially the amount of outgoing longwave radiation — or heat, in common parlance — that gets absorbed and reradiated back toward the surface. And the estimate…That's the key mechanism we're talking about here, right?Yeah. Sunlight comes in from the sun, which provides pretty much all the Earth's energy. It gets absorbed by the surface of the Earth and reradiated as heat. That heat goes back out to space. Ideally, those two things should be an equilibrium: The amount of energy entering the Earth system matches the amount that leaves the Earth system, and the Earth stays a happy, healthy temperature. What we've seen in the last century, and we can verify this over the last few decades directly through satellite observations, is the amount of heat entering the Earth system is larger than the amount of heat leaving the Earth system. So the Earth is out of thermal equilibrium and is heating up. Most of that heat is going into the oceans, about 90 percent of it. But about 10 percent of that heat that's trapped goes into the atmosphere, and that's responsible for the warming we've seen.The climate is a hugely complex system, and when you're trying to project the response of the climate to our emissions, you're dealing with a lot of uncertainty around what we call feedbacks in the climate system.Global temperature forecastingLooking forward, various climate models, which is what we use to forecast what's going to happen next, look at what we've already put into the atmosphere and what we're continuing to put into the atmosphere, and they make a forecast about how that will impact temperatures going forward. Do I have that part right?Yep.Okay. So based on what these models are saying, what is reasonable to expect in coming decades as far as temperature increases and their impacts?The amount of future warming we end up having depends largely on how much CO2 and other greenhouse gases we emit. If we keep emissions roughly at current levels for the rest of the century — we're emitting about 40 billion tons of CO2 per year — if we keep that steady, we don't increase it at all, we expect somewhere in the range of 3 degrees centigrade warming by the end of the century, so that would be a bit above 5 degrees Fahrenheit warming globally, relative to the pre-industrial period or 1850. We've already experienced 1.2 degrees C. We'd have another 1.8 degrees C or so on top of that by the end of the century. If we emit more, it could be higher than that. If we emit less, it could be lower than that.That said, that's sort of the average estimate across the 40 different modeling centers around the world that do these sort of exercises. In reality, the climate is a hugely complex system, and when you're trying to project the response of the climate to our emissions, you're dealing with a lot of uncertainty around what we call feedbacks in the climate system. As an example: As we warm the surface, we get more evaporation and the atmosphere can hold more water vapor before rain falls out as the air is warmer. This is a fairly well-known physical relationship. And so for every degree of warming, you get about 7 percent more water vapor in the atmosphere. Now, water vapor itself is a greenhouse gas, and so that enhances the warming the world experiences. Because it's warmer, that water vapor can stay in the atmosphere — because usually the water vapor itself is very, very short-lived and can't force the climate by itself because it just rains out if you get too much.There are also uncertainties in how clouds respond to our emissions. More water vapor in the atmosphere leads to more cloud formation in some regions. Higher temperatures and changing wind patterns lead to changing cloud dynamics. Our emissions of other things like aerosols, small particles from burning fossil fuels also affect cloud formation. And how that all pans out and how those clouds change the balance of heat trapped versus heat reflected varies a lot across models. And for all these reasons, we like to give a range of what we call climate sensitivity, which is essentially, how sensitive is the climate to our emissions? And we usually define that as, if we double the amount of CO2 in the atmosphere — which is roughly what we're on track for by the end of the century today, we've already increased it by 50 percent — how much warming do we get at equilibrium? And that value is generally around three degrees C per doubling of CO2, but with a pretty wide range. In the most recent IPCC report, we said it could be anywhere from 2.5 degrees C at the low end of the likely range to about 4 degrees at the high end, 2 degrees to 5 degrees is the sort of very likely range that we gave in the most recent IPCC report.I recently watched an Apple TV+ miniseries called Extrapolations, and it looked at climate change and how it would affect us over the entire century. That was the number they really fixated on: 3 degrees Celsius. The environment they showed was pretty chaotic: lots of very, very bad heat waves, hurricanes, flooding. Civilization wasn't going to get wiped out or anything, but it seemed pretty nasty. So are we talking kind of really nasty climate effects from three degrees of warming Celsius?When we say 3 degrees, it sounds like a very small number, especially to us Americans are used to talking about things in Fahrenheit. But even when we think about the temperature from day to day, it might change, let's say 5.5 degrees Fahrenheit tomorrow, and that's noticeably warmer; 5.5 degrees Fahrenheit is the difference between 85 degrees and a bit above 90 degrees, but it doesn't sound huge. But the problem is, that's a global average number and no one lives in the global average. In fact, the global average is mostly the ocean. It turns out that where people do live, on land, is warming about 50 percent faster than the world as a whole. So if we talk about 3 degrees centigrade — or let's talk Fahrenheit for a moment, let's say 5.5 degrees Fahrenheit — over land, increase that by 50 percent, so let's say 8 degrees Fahrenheit globally over land where we all live. Even higher than that in high-latitude regions like the Arctic. We have bigger feedbacks associated with snow melting and exposing darker surfaces, so some regions are going to see really big changes.To put this number in perspective, the last ice age, which I think everyone would acknowledge was a very different planet than we have today, was only about 6 degrees centigrade colder than current temperatures globally. Obviously it was much colder in the northern latitudes, which were covered by ice sheets, but the tropics were not that much colder. And so it averages to about 6 degrees difference. So that would have impacts. Exactly what those impacts would be depends a lot on the systems we're talking about and the adaptive capacity of those systems. The natural world, I think in many ways, is going to be the worst hit by these changes. There are a lot of plant and animal species that live in fairly narrow ecological niches. And particularly in a world that's very fragmented by roads and human habitation, it's a lot harder for those plant and animal species to migrate to more temperate regions to be able to survive. So certainly there's a concern around large-scale extinction of many plant and animal species that can no longer live in the ecological niches that they've adapted to over the last tens of thousands of years and can't migrate quickly enough to adapt to that.In terms of impacts to human systems, there's a lot of different impacts from climate change and the degree to which those are catastrophic is going to depend a lot on how wealthy we are and how well we can adapt to it. If by the end of the century we're in a world that's similar to today, that has huge amounts of inequality with billions of people living at a dollar a day, I would worry a lot about the ability of people in those societies to adapt to more widespread extreme heat events, larger floods associated with more water vapor in the atmosphere, sea level rise, some of these other impacts. If we live in a world where we're all very wealthy and relatively equal on a country-by-country basis and within countries, then we have a much bigger ability to build sea walls, to have air conditioning inside, to genetically engineer crops to be more heat tolerance, the many other ways that humans can adapt to these changes. And so I think in many ways I see climate change less as an existential risk by itself and more as an existential risk multiplier. If we are in a world of weak institutions, of failing governments, of high inequality, I see climate as something that could help push societies over the edge. But I don't necessarily think at least a 3-degree world would be one that is the end of civilization by any stretch of the imagination, if we get our act together on these other issues.What is what you described as what is sort of the “business as usual” forecast, and then what is the, we really get serious about policy, and we can talk about what those policies are, that reduce carbon emissions?The good news is “business as usual” has already been changing a fair bit. Nowadays, it looks like business as usual is global emissions staying relatively flat. A decade ago, it seemed like doubling or tripling global emissions by the end of the century would not be out of the question. Certainly if you extrapolated the trends from previous decades, that's where we were headed. Nowadays, global coal use has largely plateaued and arguably is going to shrink in coming years. We have cheaper alternatives. Electric vehicles are taking off. There are many other technologies that are being developed and becoming increasingly cheap. And so it's harder to imagine a world where we're still burning massive amounts of coal, oil, and gas in 2100.We can reduce emissions, we can develop new technologies, and we can get them widely adopted. And if we do that and if we get emissions to zero by, say, 2070 or so globally, then we limit warming to below 2 degrees.Low-probability, high-risk scenariosDoes that make the very worst-case scenarios that maybe we were talking about a decade ago just highly unlikely?It certainly makes the worst-case emission outcomes highly unlikely. If we look at 3 degrees, for example, that could really end up anywhere between 2 degrees and above 4 degrees if we get unlucky because of the uncertainty in how the climate system responds to our emissions, because the Earth is such a complex system. Climate change is both planning for the central outcome but also trying to mitigate those risks. In some ways, we want to reduce emissions not just to get that mean down, but also as an insurance policy against the 5 or 10 percent more catastrophic potential outcomes there. I don't think we're necessarily completely out of the woods on a 4 C world by the end of the century if we roll sixes on all the proverbial climate dice, but I think we have made a lot of progress in making those outcomes less likely.Today we're headed toward, as I mentioned earlier, about 3 degrees of warming if emissions stay relatively constant, or a little bit below 3 degrees. But we can do much better than that. We can reduce emissions, we can develop new technologies, and we can get them widely adopted. And if we do that and if we get emissions to zero by, say, 2070 or so globally, then we limit warming to below 2 degrees. If we get emissions to zero by 2050, which is going to be a much harder lift given the amount of infrastructure in place today that relies on fossil fuels, then we could limit warming to maybe about 1.6 or 1.7 degrees. And if we build lots of machines to remove carbon from the atmosphere, plant lots of trees, do other things to actually get negative emissions, models suggest we could get temperatures down to 1.5 degrees, only 0.3 degrees above where we are today, by the end of the century.We are really on this acceleration of private sector and government spending on these technologies. But I think government does play a role here. I think most economists would acknowledge that what we're dealing with here is an externality. Reducing carbon emissionsWhen I look at what our responses might be, I tend to think, what will happen to emissions in a world where our responses will be constrained by our low collective tolerance for suffering and pain and deprivation and sacrifice? To me, that's a pretty important constraint. If there's one lesson I think we learned from the pandemic, it's people don't like shortages. We don't like to rough it in any way. In a world where, at least in the West, that's our attitude, how do we get emissions down in a somewhat timely manner?I think a lot of it relies both on the combination of human ingenuity and governments playing a role in catalyzing that ingenuity and allowing these technologies to scale. We've seen the biggest successes in mitigating climate change in technologies that slot in nicely to replace things that we enjoy today. We don't talk about it much, but Texas is the renewable energy capital of the US today, because it's cheaper to generate electricity with the wind and sun there than it is to burn coal and gas. Similarly, we've seen an explosion of electric vehicles in places like China and Europe, and the US is catching up, not necessarily because everyone there is a tree hugger, but because they're really fun to drive and they perform better and are lower cost in some cases than conventional vehicles. The more we can follow that model of developing new technologies that don't involve sacrifice, that don't involve necessarily giving up things we enjoy today, I think the more successful we're going to be.And that's led to a lot of money being spent on these things. In the last year, the globe spent about $1.1 trillion on mitigation technologies: renewable energy, electric vehicles, nuclear power, heat pumps, all that sort of stuff. That's up from $200 million a year or so a decade before or 15 years before. And so we are really on this acceleration of private sector and government spending on these technologies. But I think government does play a role here. I think most economists would acknowledge that what we're dealing with here is an externality. And by an externality, I mean it's something that has a social cost, but no one individually pays for it when they put carbon dioxide or other emissions in the atmosphere. So there has to be some role of internalizing that externality, either through (as economists would like to do) a price on carbon, or in a world where you can't do that for many reasons, subsidizing the good stuff to essentially account for the benefits it has of displacing fossil fuels, both in terms of their affecting climate change, but also conventional pollution. I think we discount a lot, particularly living in a place like the US, which has done a lot of work on this, how disastrous fossil fuels are for public health. There's somewhere in the range of a couple million people dying prematurely globally from pollution, particularly outdoor air pollution. And if you go to a place like India or China and walk around outside, it's pretty catastrophic some days in terms of the brown soup that is the air. We get a lot of co-benefits by cleaning up these conventional pollutants, particularly in places like Southeast Asia or South Asia, as well as reducing emissions of greenhouse gases.Reducing emissions, going to zero emissions, pulling emissions out of the air: Do these scenarios work with just renewable energy sources or is this a world that's using nuclear energy in some form far more than we currently are?So I think we necessarily need a variety of energy sources here, and there's been a lot of work done in recent years by the energy modeling community on this front. Renewables are great. Solar is super, super cheap; to be honest, a lot cheaper today than any of us thought it would be a couple decades ago. Wind is increasingly cheap. But they're also intermittent. The sun doesn't shine all the time; the wind doesn't blow all the time. Batteries are part of the solution to deal with that, but they're not a perfect solution. We tend to find that you get a much lower cost in scenarios where you also have a sizable chunk, maybe 20, 30, 40 percent, of your energy coming from what we call clean firm generation. Things like nuclear, like enhanced geothermal, potentially fossil fuels with carbon capture and storage, though those have some challenges in implementation, to support large amounts of renewable energy on the grid.You end up with a much more expensive system if you try to shoehorn in 100 percent renewables, and to be honest, it's pretty unnecessary. So I think we are going to see, and we're already starting to see, bigger investments in things like next-generation nuclear. I think we just need to figure out how to build them on time and on budget. The biggest problem with the nuclear industry in the US — certainly regulations have contributed to it — but I think it's just our inability to build these giant, bespoke megaprojects. Nuclear goes super over budget for the same reason the “Big Dig” in Boston does: You have this 10-year-long, many, many billion-dollar megaproject that has construction delays and all these other problems. The more we can learn from what renewables have gotten right, make things small, modular, pumped out in an assembly line, and less contingent on these giant construction projects, I think the better outcomes we'll see for things like nuclear.There's an economist, he passed fairly recently, Martin Weitzman from Harvard, and he wrote about the economics of climate change. And there's one quote that always sticks in my mind. He wrote that “Deep structural uncertainty about the unknown unknowns of what might go very wrong [with the climate] is coupled with essentially unlimited downside liability on possible planetary damages” and a “non-negligible” probability of a “collapse of planetary welfare.” He's talking about, you can't write off the possibility that we get some very bad outcomes. And I guess that's what worries me: If we're doing something to the atmosphere that we've never done before, what if the models are wrong and we get something really catastrophic, that really becomes a true existential risk? How much should I worry about that?I think we're all worried about unknown unknowns. For me, the odds of those happening, which are somewhat unknowable by definition, increase the more we push the Earth out of the climate we've seen for the past few million years. Right now we're around the range of what we saw in the Last Interglacial Period, about 120,000 years ago. If we get temperatures up to 3 degrees centigrade globally, we will be out of the range of anything we've seen for the last two million years or so, if not further back. And we know if we go further back into the Earth's history, there's some scary stuff back there. There are periods where we see very rapid increases of temperature associated with 90 percent extinction of all life on Earth, like the Paleocene/Eocene Thermal Maximum. And we don't have great explanations for all these things. A good example is, for warmer periods in the Earth's past, we think there's a mechanism where if temperatures get high enough, maybe 5 degrees above where they were in the pre-industrial period or a bit above 4 degrees above where we are today, suddenly all the stratocumulus cloud decks that cover much of the Earth's oceans disappear. And that leads to another 4 degrees warming on top of that. That sort of behavior seems to help explain some of these rapid warming events in the Earth's more distant past.Now, we think we're pretty far from experiencing something of that today. But maybe our models are wrong, or maybe the Earth is much more sensitive than we think. And again, rolling sort of sixes on the climate sensitivity and carbon cycle feedback dice leads us into those sorts of conditions. And so Marty Weitzman, who I did have the pleasure of knowing before he passed, had a great phrase to sum up that quote, which is that “when it comes to climate change, this thing is in the tail,” which is a very nerdy way to put it: The tails of these probability distribution functions, the low-probability but high-impact events, are really what should drive a lot of our concern around this and push us to reduce emissions more than we otherwise would if we were just planning for the most likely outcome.But whenever we talk about carbon dioxide removal, it is always important to emphasize that this stuff is expensive and it only makes sense to do at scale in a world where we're already cutting emissions dramatically. Carbon capture and carbon removalPeople will say, “What if the models are wrong?” and they assume they're only going to be wrong to the benefit of humanity. Maybe they're wrong to the detriment of humanity.We talked a little bit about reducing these emissions. You have carbon capture, where you pull it out of the air. How close is that technology to being something that can scale?When we talk about carbon capture, that's often a different thing than when we talk about carbon removal. Carbon capture generally means taking an existing fossil fuel plant…That could be trees too, right?Yeah, but carbon capture is mostly taking an existing fossil fuel plant like a coal, oil, and gas plant, sticking a unit on that captures the carbon coming out of it, and putting that underground. And there's a lot of funding for that in the new Inflation Reduction Act. The record on that over the last few decades has been a bit mixed. It's been hard for folks to make the economics work in practice. It's really complicated technically, but a lot of folks are confident that we can get there with some of those technologies. If a coal plant with carbon capture is going to be cheaper than a nuclear plant or renewable plant is a separate question. And I'm a lot more skeptical on the economics of carbon capture there.Now, carbon dioxide removal is a slightly different thing. And there we're talking about technologies that don't stop emissions from coming out of a smokestack, but instead take carbon that's already in the atmosphere and pull it back out. And most of our models suggest that we are going to need a lot of that down the road, in part because we can't fully get rid of all of the emissions from all of the parts of our economy. And the real challenge with climate change, or what I like to call the “brutal math” of climate change is that as long as our emissions remain above zero, the Earth continues to warm. CO2 remains in the atmosphere for an extremely long period of time; it takes about 400,000 years to fully clear out a ton of fossil CO2 we emit today through natural processes. So we end up needing a lot of carbon removal to both balance out what we call residual emissions and potentially to deal with overshoot. If we figure out that we really don't want temperatures to go above 1.5 degrees, but they're headed toward 1.7, we're going to have to pull a bunch of carbon out of the atmosphere to bring temperatures back down. It's only a small part of the solution. Maybe 10 percent of the solution to climate change writ large is carbon dioxide removal. But for a problem as big as climate change, 10 percent still matters a lot since solar is probably 20 percent, electric vehicles are probably 20 percent, heat pumps might be 10 percent. And there's a lot of technologies people are developing to do that. Direct air capture is the one that gets a lot of press: the sort of big fans that suck carbon out of the air, though they're incredibly energy intensive. But there are a lot of ways that leverage natural processes as well. Planting trees is a good one, though it has a lot of challenges in keeping the carbon in those trees in a warming world, particularly as we see more wildfires, more pine bark beetle outbreaks that used to die in cold winter temperatures and don't anymore. And so it's hard to justify planting trees as a way of permanently taking carbon out of the atmosphere, but it's still quite valuable. There's also a lot of interesting work being done around using biomass to sequester carbon, so taking residues from commercial timber operations, burning them, and putting their carbon content underground. Something called BECCS, or bioenergy with carbon capture and storage, that a lot of people are excited about.Then there are other interesting ways to leverage the natural carbon cycle. For example, over long periods, the weathering of certain types of rocks like basalt or olivine drives a lot of atmospheric CO2 absorption over the course of millions of years. And so a lot of scientists are trying to figure out ways to speed that up. If you take rock dust and spread it on farm fields, it can help manage the pH of soils, it can add some nutrients. And it turns out that as that basalt dust weathers, it absorbs carbon to the atmosphere, it turns it into stable bicarbonate and then flows out to the ocean and eventually forms limestone on the bottom of the ocean. Stuff like that, or adding alkalinity directly to the ocean to counteract ocean acidification, can also lead to more CO2 uptake from the air, because the amount of carbon dioxide the ocean absorbs in the atmosphere depends on how acidic the surface level of the layers of the water are. Scientists are working on tons of different technologies here. And actually my day job these days with Stripe and Frontier is helping support companies to do that. So there's lots of exciting stuff there. But whenever we talk about carbon dioxide removal, it is always important to emphasize that this stuff is expensive and it only makes sense to do at scale in a world where we're already cutting emissions dramatically. If you keep burning fossil fuels willy-nilly and spend a ton of money on a bit of carbon dioxide removal, it's not going to make any difference.Why are you interested in this subject?I think it's an underexplored area. Certainly until the last few years, no one was really putting any money or resources into it at scale. And it's something that is going to have to be an important part of the solution in the next few decades, and so I think this is the decade that we should be spending resources to figure out what works and what can scale for decades to come. We probably should spend about 1 percent of the money we spend on reducing emissions, but historically we've been spending a lot less than that.And why are you also more broadly interested in the entire topic of climate change rather than, I don't know, tax policy or something?I come to it from a scientific background. I just find the Earth's climate fascinating. It's super complex. It's hard to fully understand. We've really made leaps and bounds in progress over the last few decades, but there's so much we still don't know. And so it's just a fascinating area from a scientific standpoint, but it's also one where the importance to the society is quite large. I try not to wade too much into the policy solutions to it, but certainly helping understand the likely impacts of our actions affects a lot of choices that policymakers and others make. There's no one right answer. To your question earlier, people debate renewables versus nuclear and all these other things. Knowing what the impacts of climate change are, what the risks are, and how we can actually get to certain outcomes based on our decisions, I feel like is really important to set the stage for people to use the science in the real world. And it's exciting to work in an area of science where there is a practical, real-world application of it. And not just studying one plant species that lives on top of one mountain in a remote part of the world. We're looking at these big questions that affect everyone over the next century. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

As the cost to launch a rocket into orbit has come down over the past decade, a slew of startups have joined the emerging space economy. But is there enough business for all these companies? And what's the broad economic case for space? In this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I'm chatting about those questions and more with Michael Sheetz.Michael is a space reporter for CNBC where he also writes the "Investing in Space" newsletter.In This Episode* The business case for space (1:05)* SpaceX, Blue Origin, and the other players in space (4:03)* How much demand is there for space services? (10:15)* To the Moon and Mars (13:59)Below is an edited transcript of our conversationThe business case for spaceJames Pethokoukis: How do private companies intend on making money in space over the next decade?Michael Sheetz: The first and foremost way is the tried-and-true way when it comes to making money in space, which is providing communications data and other services back to people here on Earth. You're talking about communication systems like Starlink, which are the next generation of communication services that have been around, from the geo-communication satellites of decades prior. That's the primary, immediate way that people are making money right now in space. The second way that people are making money in space is by launching satellites for other customers: You're talking about the rocket business, the transportation business. You see stuff like OTVs, or orbital transfer vehicles. That's a way to deliver stuff into space.Then there's a third kind of newer way, which is just microgravity research in general. That's coming to the fore really in the last decade as NASA has really opened up the International Space Station as a testbed for commercial technologies and not just NASA's own technologies. And a lot of companies see that as really just a first foray into that ground. Some of them are trying to do it in their own way by sending capsules into orbit and bringing them back, not going to a space station. The other way is by sending it to a space station, and there are actually four or five major projects underway in the United States to build private space stations in orbit. Those are companies that are either working together or building their own solo units, and they're all just kind of vying for a future in which you don't just have one giant space station, because the International Space Station is huge, but instead of the ISS, you have lots of these little space stations that people can sign agreements with. Say a pharmaceutical company wants to test out a new drug in orbit, they'll sign a research agreement with a company that's going to fly them up there, test it out, fly it back down. They might have astronauts on board. They might not.The other way — this is the other kind of nascent sector — is the lunar infrastructure world, and that's all very much a new space race, if you will, because there's a geopolitical element there. We've got India, we have China both firmly in that mix. China has been arguably one of the most successful at landing on the Moon in the last decade. And NASA, instead of trying to fly themselves to the Moon for these cargo missions and research, they've actually gone to companies and said, “Hey, bid on these contracts, deliver services to us. We'll put our payloads onto your spacecraft, your lander, your rover, and then get it down to the Moon and either get us back data or even return materials.” But mostly just, “Let's try to figure out if we can actually make use of the water that's believed to be on the surface of the Moon.” And that's a really big key point: The first round in terms of trying to make use of the Moon is all about, can we harvest the resources that are on the lunar surface?SpaceX, Blue Origin, and the other players in spaceMuch of the conversation among regular people, to the extent they're aware of really what's going on, what you've just described so wonderfully, is SpaceX. Maybe they've heard of Jeff Bezos and Blue Origin. How far behind is Blue Origin of SpaceX? Do we have a feel for where that company is?I, at this point, wouldn't even put it as really a competition, because SpaceX is very much in a league of their own. Blue Origin has so dramatically taken a different approach to development, very much more akin to the aerospace and defense contractors of the past. It's fascinating because both companies are actually very similar sizes in terms of personnel, but SpaceX has taken this approach of, let's just get one win after the other and try to just break things a little bit at a time and keep pushing further that way. Whereas Blue Origin is taking the route of, we want everything to work the first go, the first launch, the first landing on the Moon, all these other nuances in there. And so far, SpaceX's strategy has been dominant. Now, the United States is not looking at United Launch Alliance, one of the existing providers for rocket launches, as its primary source of both getting astronauts and satellites in orbit, they're looking to SpaceX. There's a flipping of the head that's happened in the last decade.In this next decade, and even just in the next three to five years, it's a really critical point in Blue Origin's history where the company has been around longer than SpaceX, albeit they took a very different approach at the beginning and have taken a very different approach in recent years as well. But they need to show not just for the customers that they signed contracts for—such as United Launch Alliance, delivering engines for them, or different contractors like NASA, providing services to the Moon—they need to show that they can start delivering on those contracts and start actually competing. Maybe not head to head right away, but at least start to get some actual performance and execution as opposed to basically at this point saying, “Here's our grand architecture of everything that we want happen over the next 100 years,” which would be amazing. I can totally see where Jeff's vision for people in research laboratories and living in Lagrange points and all these kinds of things could happen. But you have to make some first inroads, and they haven't yet done that. It's a one-horse race right now.Since we've been talking about those two companies: Are the goals the same but the strategies and timelines different or are they fundamentally trying to achieve different things?They very much have distinct missions when you just look at how they think about where they're going, the trajectory of the company, the trajectory of the space industry writ large. They do have very similar fundamental steps that they have to achieve to get towards those missions. When you look at one of their main products at Blue Origin, for example, with their New Glenn rocket, you still have to do the same basics of, fly a satellite to orbit, land it a couple times successfully, start reusing it and show that you can reuse it efficiently. Those are all things that Falcon 9 did and now SpaceX is going to have to do with Starship as well. They both have similar incremental steps, even if their broader mission targets aren't the same.I think one really interesting thing about where the space industry is at today is that it actually really isn't about just SpaceX versus Blue Origin, but it's also Rocket Lab. It's also Maxar. It's also Planet. There are all these different pieces of the broader architecture that are in the space economy and they're all kind of vying for different revenue streams within the space economy. But when we talk about SpaceX and Blue Origin, and I think we might be kind of oversimplifying the industry just into launch and basic transportation as opposed to what it really is in a lot of ways, which is infrastructure. And that's the kind of holistic approach, when you think about the companies that are players in that, where you start actually seeing Rocket Lab just did their 40th electron launch. Yeah, it's a small launch. No, it's not the same service as Falcon 9. But they've carved out a really important niche in that, and they're trying to use that to not just build a larger rocket, Neutron, but also build out a very strong space systems division and then provide services.Sort of like how SpaceX did with Starlink where they were like, “Look, we've got the rocket business down. Let's go find revenue sources.” The first one right off the bat was, “Let's get better internet service, broadband into hard-to-reach areas at low cost comparatively to years past, and we'll do it in a way that just really provides this holistic coverage: You can go anywhere in the world, plug it in, it will connect to one of our satellites.” As opposed to just the regional focus of past communication systems. I think one really important key aspect of where the industry is at today is the fact that there are all these different companies that may not have billionaire backers, but they have big investors behind them, they have big revenue coming in: Planet and Rocket Lab, we're talking about pulling over $100 million in revenue a year. That's not inconsequential. Maxar and the like and others are really trying to further establish themselves. I think of Iridium with their communication systems.There are all these different players that have their pieces of the overall industry. Some of them compete head-to-head, some of them don't. And I think that's where you start to see an industry that isn't at a little bit of, for lack of a better way of saying it, a single-fault failure situation, where if Elon Musk or Jeff Bezos loses interest in space or something worse happens to them, all of a sudden the US progress in space evaporates. That's not the case today, and I think that's the most actually exciting thing about where the broader space economy is at.How much demand is there for space services?Is there enough business for all these companies? Are there enough people who want to put things in space and do things in space to justify this archipelago of companies that you've just described, or do people talk about [how] there's going to need to be a shakeout? Or is it just that there's so much potential demand, boy, it is going to be hard to fulfill it all?I'll give an example to answer your first question, but I want to hit the second aspect of what you talked about first. There is going to be a shakeout right now, and I think there is a shakeout underway. We've seen a lot of M&A [merger and acquisition] activity this year. We've seen a couple bankruptcies. We've seen a couple of people get acquired for likely very little money, and that's because the free money of the past has gone away, especially in a high capital-intensive industry with high risk. Even as we're seeing now, Viasat, one of the most established players, had their crown jewel new satellite malfunction shortly after getting into orbit. Then the company they recently acquired, a UK company, Inmarsat, one of their recently launched satellites malfunctioned in orbit. So now Viasat has got two malfunctioning satellites that they're trying to deal with. This is a really high-risk business that we're talking about, and that opens up new potential for M&A, and it also opens up new opportunities as valuations have come down where companies that might not have been either competing with each other but could see each other as compatible are now starting to join forces effectively. And other companies that had a stronger position coming into this shakeout period are starting to take advantage of that, as well as investors who are behind those companies.This first thing that you talked about, and I'll give the example, I think the data communications world is the perfect example of, is there enough money and is there enough demand to go around for everybody? When you look at just purely broadband services, which actually there's quite a bit of variety within how you provide those services, which kind of customers you target, that realm has seen no shortage of demand. Every single company you talk to, whether it's a company that provides regional-focused broadband service to enterprises in one location or another company that goes after transatlantic flights and providing in-flight Wi-Fi, every single executive I talk to across that data communications business says, “We need more satellites and orbits so that we can provide more supply because there's more demand than we can provide.”And we're talking about what's already one of the most crowded parts of the space industry, from an established perspective, with multiple players around the world providing services all over the place. The fact that all of those guys are looking at this hockey stick from a demand perspective and all the different layers that they can provide service to — whether it's households, governments, businesses, shipping companies, whatever — that's where there's a lot of excitement around, this established market is even growing at a high rate, what about all these other little nascent markets? I'm not talking space tourism. That might be a fun place to watch that people always get excited about. It's one of the lowest revenue sources in the industry. I'm talking about the lunar infrastructure that I mentioned before. Remote sensing is one of the wildest frontiers in the last decade, and when you look at the varieties of companies that are competing and the customer capture that they're getting and the new applications that are coming out of that, it's absolutely wild. And so I think those new growing verticals are just showing that, yes, there's still demand, it's still growing.To the Moon and MarsAssuming that the US, NASA, we're going to go to the Moon, we're going to stay on the Moon, we're going to build stuff on the Moon, over the next 15 years will most of those rockets be NASA rockets taking people and stuff to the Moon, or SpaceX rockets?I don't even think it's just going to be SpaceX rockets. I think Starship definitely, if they continue to make progress… But mind you, it's been a little bit of a bumpy road in recent years. We have some reliability issues with the Raptor engines we've got to still work out. Albeit the first flight was called a success, I think rightfully so, but it's an incremental one and they still have a lot of steps to go. And when you go back to years past, just even flying humans on Starship, SpaceX has been very candid about saying, “Look, we want to do hundreds of these flights before we put people on this thing.” So maybe it's not Starship, at least in this decade, that's flying tons of people to the Moon. But you've got a workhorse in Falcon 9 that can deliver lunar payloads. It is going to deliver lunar payloads even in the next year.You've got a number of other rockets that are coming online to deliver services. NASA's own rocket, SLS, really isn't going to fly more than once a year at best. And that's pretty optimistic. I see that as lifting the biggest stuff that we need to try to get there, such as getting Orion and Lunar Gateway and all these other things. But really the core of it is, when we're talking about building infrastructure on the Moon in a way that you have a sustained presence, that's a group effort. This is not a single company, single agency doing that. That's something where you need the services of the likes of Firefly building their lunar lander, Astrobotic out of Pittsburgh building their lander. You need Rocket Lab to get Neutron flying. You want Relativity to have Terran R flying. You want this robust ecosystem of transportation devices sort of like we do of any other method of transportation here in the United States and globally, where it's not just one company that builds all the ships. Even in airlines, Boeing and Airbus dominate; however, they're two of a broader ecosystem of several other companies that have carved out niches for them making regional aircraft and stuff like that. And that's what's going to be needed to build that broader lunar infrastructure.I love the notion of going to Mars and colonizing Mars. What is your sense of other people in the space industry who don't work for SpaceX, what do they make of that goal that Elon Musk talks about? Do they view it as just Elon being Elon, these kind of huge aspirational goals? Or do they think this is something we can do as a space industry over the next quarter century?One of the most fascinating things, I think, is that you would get a huge variety of answers from people in the space industry on whether or not (1) they fundamentally agree with that premise that we should be doing it, what it should look like, etc., and (2) how we're going to make it happen if they're even in favor of doing so. And I think that's an amazing reflection of the different interests and the variety of folks who are in this industry, the inspiration that they take from the different missions of either their companies or agencies or projects that they're working on. I think at its core, it's something that still feels too far out to really put a pin in it because there's not a right way to do it currently and not an effective way to do it currently. And so it's something that, sort of like with the Moon and the Artemis Accords providing this new framework of cooperation and how we use resources and space, going to Mars, it's only really going to become a question of how should we be doing this once we're actually getting closer to doing it.I think a commercial company getting a lander on Mars is going to be a first start in that new era. But even that I don't see happening for another five to six years at least, and that's just maybe a small spacecraft. So that's a question I think is extremely open ended. But I do see us on this trajectory where it's not just the Moon, it's not just Mars, it's other planetary bodies, it's asteroids, it's all these other things of exploration where once we start getting into the realm — and you can look at any of the explorers of the past to kind of find your guide for how this happened, there were people who made that first foray into a new land and a new realm, and then after that we're like, “Okay, so we can do this. Cool. Now let's try to figure out what this should really look like and what establishing a settlement on another planet would really look like.”My short answer is, we're so far away from it in a realistic sense that I think what I would point people to now, with the fear of them losing interest in what space can really provide to the rest of humanity and the benefits it provides, that they should be looking at the current infrastructure that we have here on Earth and how it benefits us and makes our everyday lives better, one, and two, the real near-term possibilities of what the United States putting a presence on the Moon, China putting a presence on the Moon, India putting a presence on the Moon, what that looks like geopolitically, what that looks like from a resources standpoint, how we can compete in a way that's not leading to some sort of new conflict in space. That just seems like a place where things could escalate really quickly and poorly. As opposed to what's really happening right now is, in the next couple of years we're going to see more and more spacecraft landing on the Moon, and I think that's an exciting near-term future. What we do on Mars, what we do on asteroids, what we do elsewhere, it's going to be something down the road. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe

Rapid progress in artificial intelligence, especially large language models such as ChatGPT, has rekindled an old debate about the feasibility of top-down economic planning. While 20th-century experiments in socialism ultimately failed, some techno-socialists have argued a new set of tools could help planners outperform markets. But today's guest argues no amount of computing power or sophisticated algorithms can overcome the fundamental issues with socialist planning. Pete Boettke joins this episode of Faster, Please! — The Podcast to discuss.Boettke is a university professor of economics and philosophy at George Mason University and director of the F.A. Hayek Program for Advanced Study in Philosophy, Politics, and Economics at the Mercatus Center. Last year, he and Rosolino Candela authored the paper, “On the Feasibility of Technosocialism.”In This Episode* Technosocialism in the 20th century (1:34)* The appeal of economic planning (6:14)* The recent resurgence of socialism (10:34)* Can AI aid industrial policy? (24:08)* Not wrong, just early (32:51)Check back tomorrow at Faster, Please! for the full transcript of this interview. (Typically each podcast includes the transcript, but I'm currently traveling. So please forgive me!)Faster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. Thanks! This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe