Podcast appearances and mentions of Graham Allison

Are we on the point of World War III - and what does Ancient Greece have to do with it?In this episode of English and Beyond: Advanced, we explore The Thucydides Trap - a theory from ancient history that's now being used to explain modern tensions between China and the United States.You'll learn:– Who Thucydides was and what he said about the Peloponnesian War– How Harvard professor Graham Allison revived this idea for the 21st century– Why some people believe war between China and the US is inevitable - and others say it's avoidable– Why fear, not ambition, might be the most dangerous force in international relations– And how studying Ancient Greece can help you understand today's world - and improve your English at the same time.This episode includes natural native English, cultural insight, and advanced vocabulary related to politics, diplomacy, and global conflict.

In a dramatic change of policy, US President Donald Trump hikes China tariffs to 125% on goods entering the United States. Most other countries will now see a 90-day pause on higher import taxes. We hear from Everett Eissenstat, an international economics adviser in the first Trump White House, and Natasha Sarin, who advised Janet Yellen when she was Treasury Secretary. Also, Graham Allison from Harvard Business Schools shares his analysis after recent meetings with President Xi Jinping in Beijing. And, Karin Karlsbro, vice-chair of the European Parliament's Committee on International Trade warns tensions between the EU and US are far from over.

In the wake of the New Orleans truck attack, Fareed is joined by Harvard professor of government Graham Allison to discuss what he believes to be a growing threat of terrorism in the United States, and the domestic and international factors at play.   Next, Fareed speaks with Kori Schake, director of foreign and defense policy studies at the American Enterprise Institute, and Richard Haass, president emeritus of the Council on Foreign Relations, about the foreign policy challenges facing incoming President Donald Trump, and the areas in which his administration might be able to make progress, from Ukraine to Iran to China.  Then, President Jimmy Carter's former chief speechwriter James Fallows joins the show to discuss the late president's legacy, including his post-presidency.  Finally, Ruchir Sharma, chairman of Rockefeller International, tells Fareed what financial trends he will be watching for in 2025.  GUESTS: Graham Allison (@GrahamTAllison), Kori Schake, Richard Haass (@RichardHaass), James Fallows, Ruchir Sharma   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Lee Kuan Yew took a crowded, dirty, poor port town, and turned it into one of the world's great cities. How was he able to lead such an incredible transformation of Singapore? --- Sponsors: https://www.costofglory.com/cog-retreats/texas-retreat - Austin Retreat with the Cost of Glory January 23-26. Use code TAKEOVER for $200 off. https://vanman.shop/discount/TAKEOVER - Use code TAKEOVER for 10% off your order https://www.vesto.com/ - All of your company's financial accounts in one view HTTOTW Premium - For all endnotes, takeaways, and bonus episode, subscribe to How to Take Over the World Premium --- Stay in touch: Twitter/X: @BenWilsonTweets Instagram: @HTTOTW Email me: Ben@takeoverpod.com Sources: No Man Is An Island: A Portrait of Singapore's Lee Kuan Yew by James Minchin Lee Kuan Yew: The Grandmaster's Insights on China, United States, and the World by Graham Allison, Michael McConnohie, et al. From Third World to First by Lee Kuan Yew Singapore: A Modern History by Michael D Barr --- Writing, research, and production by Ben Wilson. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Aspen Strategy Group executive director Anja Manuel joins the podcast to discuss issues surrounding AI and national security, and a new series of original papers and op-eds called “Intelligent Defense: Navigating National Security in the Age of AI.” The papers are authored by Aspen Strategy Group members including: Manuel, Mark Esper, General David Petraeus, David Ignatius, Nick Kristof, Steve Bowsher, Joseph S. Nye, Jr., Yoshua Bengio, Senator Chris Coons, Kent Walker, Jennifer Ewbank, Daniel Poneman, Eileen O'Connor, and Graham Allison.

Don Brash was the former Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand from 1988 until 2002. Don was also a Member of Parliament, and leader of the New Zealand National Party. We discuss Don's work at the Reserve Bank, which came at a pivotal time alongside the economic reforms of the late 80s.  Don shares the history of the famous 0 - 2% inflation target that he helped implement, and we talk more broadly about the state's understanding of inflation, its causes, and the role of Central Banking. We go on to talk about Don's current focus looking at both the geopolitical situation New Zealand faces in-between the US and China, as well as his work with Hobson's pledge looking at democracy issues closer to home. ‍--- Connect with The Transformation of Value X: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://x.com/TTOVpodcast⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Nostr at: npub1uth29ygt090fe640skhc8l34d9s7xlwj4frxs2esezt7n6d64nwsqcmmmu Or send an email to hello@thetransformationofvalue.com and I will get back to you! --- Support The Transformation of Value: Bitcoin tip address: bc1qlfcr2v73tntt6wvyp2yu064egvyeery6xtwy8t Lightning tip address: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠codyellingham@getalby.com⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ If you send a tip please email or DM me so I can thank you! --- Links: Don Brash Website - https://www.donbrash.com/ Incredible Luck, Don Brash Autobiography - https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/22036999-incredible-luck Hobson's Pledge - https://www.hobsonspledge.nz/ "Revolution" TV series on New Zealand from 1970s-1990s - https://www.nzonscreen.com/title/revolution-1996/series The Arrogance of Power by William Fulbright - https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/1355548.The_Arrogance_of_Power Oath and Honor: A Memoir and a Warning by Liz Cheney - https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/134156069-oath-and-honor Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? by Graham Allison - https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/31125556-destined-for-war The Fourth Turning: An American Prophecy—What the Cycles of History Tell Us About America's Next Rendezvous with Destiny by William Strauss , Neil Howe - https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/670089.The_Fourth_Turning On China by Henry Kissinger - https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/9328314-on-china Please note: James (Jim) Holt is the economist Don Brash mentions who inspired the policies of 1980s New Zealand. 

Thank you to The Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard Kennedy School for supporting this episode. Visit the link below to learn more about research, ideas, and leadership programs for a more peaceful world: https://www.belfercenter.org/ -------------------- In the 5th century BC, the Greek historian Thucydides chronicled the Peloponnesian War (431–404 BC), a conflict between Athens, a rising power, and Sparta, the established ruling power. Thucydides famously concluded that "it was the rise of Athens and the fear it instilled in Sparta that made war inevitable." Today, 2,400 years later, we face a similar situation: will a rising China and an uneasy America follow the same path? Can these two nations avoid falling into the 'Thucydides Trap'? #Endgame #GitaWirjawan #GrahamAllison -------------------- About Luminary: Graham Allison, former Director of Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, is a bestselling author of "Destined for War: America, China, and Thucydides's Trap" (2017). As the founding dean of the Harvard Kennedy School, Dr. Allison served as Assistant Secretary of Defense and advised defense secretaries from Reagan to Obama. He has received the Department of Defense's Distinguished Public Service Medal twice and serves on advisory boards for the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense. About the Host: Gita Wirjawan is an Indonesian entrepreneur, educator, and Honorary Professor of Politics and International Relations at the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Nottingham. He is also a visiting scholar at The Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research Center (APARC) at Stanford University (2022—2024) and a fellow at Harvard Kennedy School's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. -------------------- Get Prof. Allison's Books at Periplus Bookstore: https://www.periplus.com/p/9781911617303/?utm_source=EG https://www.periplus.com/p/9780262539500/?utm_source=EG https://www.periplus.com/p/9780805078527/?utm_source=EG -------------------- Earn a Master of Public Policy degree and be Indonesia's future narrator. More info: admissions@sgpp.ac.id https://admissions.sgpp.ac.id https://wa.me/628111522504 Visit and subscribe:  @SGPPIndonesia   @Endgame_Clips 

Andy talks with Michael about his June Foreign Affairs article, “The Terrorism Warning Lights Are Blinking Red Again: Echoes of the Run-Up to 9/11,” co-written with Graham Allison. Michael discusses the pre-9/11 threat and national security parallels with today's environment. He also shares his assessment of a newly unsealed 1999 video from Saudi intelligence officer Omar al-Bayoumi, which Michael says appears to be ‘casing' footage of the US Capitol. Additionally, Michael talks with Andy about the security vulnerabilities at the US-Mexico border.  

XVI ciclo di Dottorato della Scuola Superiore di Studi StoriciUniversità deglli Studi della Repubblica di San MarinoFORME DELLA GUERRA E PRATICHE DELLA VIOLENZAUso e abuso del pensiero strategico antico: da Machiavelli a Graham AllisonGiusto TrainaPodcast a cura di Giuseppe GiardiUna produzione Usmaradio - Centro di Ricerca per la Radiofonia

The relationship between China and the US is the most important in the world, and cutting through the cacophony of commentary to the heart of the matter is no easy task. Thankfully, Jon and Heather are joined by one of the leading experts on China and national security, Graham Allison. Graham shares his decades of experience to reveal why China and the US may be on a collision course — and why there are unprecedented opportunities for cooperation.  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The relationship between China and the US is the most important in the world, and cutting through the cacophony of commentary to the heart of the matter is no easy task. Thankfully, Jon and Heather are joined by one of the leading experts on China and national security, Graham Allison. Graham shares his decades of experience to reveal why China and the US may be on a collision course — and why there are unprecedented opportunities for cooperation.  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On today's show Andrew and Bill begin with takeaways from Tuesday's phone call between President Biden and President Xi, including the PRC rhetoric surrounding US trade and tech policies, and messages to both domestic audiences and allies. From there: Janet Yellen's visit to China and her evolving stance on PRC exports, the March Politburo meeting comes and goes without plenum news, Xi meets with U.S. business leaders, and Harvard's Graham Allison emerges as a potential Henry Kissinger successor. At the end: Escalating rhetoric and the latest confrontation between the PRC and the Philippines, Tesla's latest sales numbers and structural challenges in the PRC, and the debut of 3 Body Problem on Netflix.

Many books about US-China strategic competition have been published in recent years. This episode will focus on Facing China: The Prospect for War and Peace, which examines various flashpoints in the Indo-Pacific that could result in military conflict.There are several reasons why this book stands out: First, it includes an examination of debates within China about China's national interests; Second, it focuses not only on the challenges of major wars, but also on China's gray-zone strategy of deliberately pursuing its interests in ways that stay below the threshold that would trigger a US military response. And finally, it assesses the applicability of the Thucydides Trap to the US-China relationship. The Thucydides Trap concept was coined by Graham Allison who examined historical cases in which a rising power threatened to displace a ruling power in his book Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? Allison concluded that in the majority of historical cases the outcome was war.This book is especially interesting because it is written by a European expert who has deep knowledge of Taiwan, mainland China, and the United States: Jean-Pierre Cabestan. He is an emeritus senior researcher at the French Center for Scientific Research in Paris and an emeritus professor political science at the Department of Government and International Studies at Hone Kong Baptist University, and a visiting senior fellow at GMF.  Timestamps[02:07] Revisiting the Thucydides Trap [03:53] Why was China fascinated by this concept? [05:26] Reasons for the Risk of War Increasing[06:33] The US-China Cold War and its Characteristics[09:03] China's Gray-Zone Activities [10:53] Where has China's gray-zone strategy been the most successful? [12:37] Unifying Taiwan with China through Gray-Zone Activities[14:42] Chinese Use of Force in the Taiwan Strait in the 2020s[16:17] China's Ambitions in the International Arena[17:40] Future Overseas Operations of the PLA  

Congress is probably going to send approximately $50 billion more, most of that for weapons, to continue the war in Ukraine. In November, high ranking officials from the State Department testified about how the Biden administration intends to use our money and why. In this episode, hear the highlights of their testimony and decide for yourself if you think their goals are worth sacrificing more American money and Ukrainian lives. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via Support Congressional Dish via (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes WTF is the World Trade System? Naomi Klein. Picador: 2008. Nicole Narea. October 13, 2023. Vox. Offshore Technology. Ukraine: How We Got Here Branko Marcetic. February 7, 2022. Jacobin. Stanley Reed and Andrew E. Kramer. November 5, 2013. The New York Times. Marieke Ploegmakers. February 5, 2012. All About Feed. Arseniy Yatsenyuk Official Website. Retrieved on December 16, 2023. Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia. The Ukraine War, by the Map Defence Intelligence, UK Ministry of Defense. December 15, 2023. GlobalSecurity.org. Visual Journalism Team. November 16, 2023. BBC News. Josh Holder. September 28, 2023. The New York Times. @war_mapper. December 31, 2022. GlobalSecurity.org. U.S. Support for Ukraine Karoun Demirjian. December 6, 2023. The New York Times. The IMF in Ukraine Oleksandra Betliy. May 5, 2023. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. March 31, 2023. International Monetary Fund. Estelle Nilsson-Julien and Ilaria Federico. March 5, 2023. Euronews. December 21, 2022. International Monetary Fund. Diplomacy Connor Echols. December 1, 2023. Responsible Statecraft. Seymour Hersh. December 1, 2023. Seymour Hersh on Substack. Olena Roshchina. November 24, 2023. Ukrainska Pravda. The Toll of War Jonathan Landay. December 12, 2023. Reuters. John Mazerolle. December 8, 2023. CBC News. Inae Oh. November 8, 2023. Mother Jones. Oleg Sukhov. September 28, 2023. The Kyiv Independent. Israel-Palestine Ian Black. Narrated by Michael Page. Tantor Audio: 2018. Darryl Cooper. The Martyrmade Podcast. Audio Sources November 8, 2023 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Witnesses: , Assistant Secretary of State, European and Eurasian Affairs , Assistant Secretary of State, Energy Resources , Assistant Administrator, Europe and Eurasia, United States Agency for International Development (USAID) Clips 1:55 Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD): The supplemental funding will strengthen governance and anti-corruption systems. It will improve the resilience of our economies and our energy supply. It will support efforts to come out of the other side of this. We're ready for Ukraine to join EU and also NATO. But this investment in Ukraine goes far beyond its borders. By degrading Russia's military capabilities, we're also degrading the capabilities of those who Russia works with, like Iran, Hamas, and Hezbollah. 10:30 Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD): First Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs James O'Brien. Assistant Secretary O'Brien assumed his role just last month after serving as sanctions coordinator at the State Department. He is a former career employee of the department receiving numerous performance awards and serve to previous US administration's as Special Presidential Envoy for hostages and for the Balkans. 11:00 Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD): The next will be Assistant Secretary for Energy Resources, Jeffrey R. Pyatt. No stranger to this committee, career diplomat Assistant Secretary Pyatt has been in his current role since September 2022. He served as US Ambassador to Greece and Ukraine. He has held numerous leadership positions through out the department and has won numerous awards. 11:25 Sen. Ben Cardin (D-MD): And our third witness is Assistant Administrator Erin McKee, who serves as the Assistant Administrator in the Bureau of Europe and Eurasia at USAID. Prior to this position, she was the US Ambassador to Papua New Guinea and to the Solomon Islands. Prior to her Ambassador appointments, as a member of the Senior Foreign Service she served in numerous leadership roles throughout USAID and the embassies abroad. Before her US government career she developed private sector experience including throughout the former Soviet Union. 14:40 James O'Brien: This is around the Black Sea and Crimea. Ukraine has, through its own ingenuity and with weapons that have been provided, loosened Russia's grip. Russia tried to blockade the ability of Ukraine to export, but now Ukraine is starting to export more grain, more metals. And this is enabling it to pay for more of its war itself. So just a few numbers as we go through this. Ukraine is hoping to get about 8 million tons of grain and metals out through the Black Sea over the course of the next year. If it does that, it will provide about $5-6 billion more for its tax base than it has now. That helps to make up the shortfall that our supplemental will cover for the meantime. But it also then provides the employment for millions of its citizens to work within Ukraine. Now, that is a path to victory where we help Ukraine by providing assistance to have its energy grid strengthened, air defense over its employment centers, and the export routed needs so that it is able to fight this fight over the long term and to hold Russia off thereafter. 15:50 James O'Brien: The military assistance in the supplemental is about $45 billion. That goes to acquire American equipment that Ukraine will then use to pay for American service people to support Ukraine and to pay other countries to acquire American equipment after they provide equipment to Ukraine. 16:05 James O'Brien: The direct budget support that we provide to Ukraine enables Ukraine to put all of its tax dollars to support the war. Ukraine pays for about 60% of the costs of this war right now. The direct budget support pays for hundreds of thousands of educators, first responders, firefighters, and health care professionals to work within Ukraine. 16:55 James O'Brien: The next question is, who's with us? We have more than 40 countries. They provide much more assistance to Ukraine than we do. It's about $91 billion to our $70 billion so far. They've hosted 4.5 million Ukrainian refugees at a cost of around $18 billion. They are proposing another $50 billion in assistance just from the European Union. 17:30 James O'Brien: Right now, Ukrainians are willing to do this job because it's in their territory. If we abandon them, then somebody else is going to have to do this job later and it's likely to be us. So I'd rather confront Russia and its destabilizing attitudes right here, right now, and we can finish the job with the supplemental that we've proposed for your consideration. 18:45 Geoffrey R. Pyatt: For Ukraine, this coming winter promises to be even more challenging than the last. Ukraine's generation capacity has degraded about 50% since the start of the war. Ukrainian energy workers have labored day and night, often under fire, to repair, restore, and harden grid and generation facilities, often by cannibalizing parts from elsewhere. But most spare parts by now have been consumed, and Russia has recently resumed its bombardment of power plants and refineries, including just this morning in eastern Ukraine. 20:50 Geoffrey R. Pyatt: The World Bank has estimated that after last winter, Ukraine needed at least $411 billion to rebuild its infrastructure. That was eight months ago. Every day that number grows. Electricity grid damage alone amounted to $10 billion in 2022. Ukraine's economic future depends on investment by the private sector, and energy is key to unlocking that industrial recovery. 21:25 Geoffrey R. Pyatt: American energy companies like Halliburton, GE, and EQT have been active partners in this effort, providing vital equipment to Ukraine and actively exploring future commercial opportunities. We're working together to build a better future for and with Ukraine -- modern, cleaner, and with a more decentralized power sector that is fully integrated with Europe, even serving as a power exporter to the rest of the European Union. 22:10 Geoffrey R. Pyatt: After the full scale invasion, US LNG producers stepped up to surge supplies to Europe, as our allies turned away from Russia as an energy source. Since 2022, US exporters have supplied the EU with approximately 90 million tons of LNG -- three times as much as the next largest supplier. Last year, 70% of US LNG exports went to Europe. Europe's shift away from Russian energy has happened much faster than predicted, and marks a permanent shift in the International Energy map. 25:30 Erin McKee: In response to the immediate crisis, USAID has provided nearly $2 billion in humanitarian assistance to Ukraine since February of 2022. The generosity of the American people has supplied emergency health care, agriculture and energy support to Ukraine's most vulnerable populations. And thanks to the Congressional appropriations, USAID disbursed reliable, sustained direct budget support to the Ukrainian government, along with unprecedented levels of oversight. This enabled first responders, health care workers, teachers and others to continue their vital work and sustain Ukraine's economy and institutions while they defend their country's freedom and sovereignty. 26:10 Erin McKee: To respond to Russia's weaponization of hunger, USAID launched the Agriculture Resilience Initiative to keep farmers afloat. USAID also works very closely with the private sector to improve Ukraine's energy security and transform Ukraine's energy sector into a modern engine of growth. Side by side with our agriculture and energy efforts is USAID's support to small and medium enterprises, helping Ukraine increase jobs and generate revenue. 26:45 Erin McKee: At this time, there is no funding left for direct budget support. Without further appropriations, the government of Ukraine would need to use emergency measures such as printing money or not paying critical salaries, which could lead to hyperinflation and severely damage the war effort. USAID has also exhausted all of its supplemental humanitarian assistance funds. Additional funding is critical in the face of what remains an enormous need. If Congress does not approve supplemental funding, our partner organizations in Ukraine would have to either reduce the number of people getting this humanitarian assistance by up to 75% or suspend our humanitarian programs entirely. 27:30 Erin McKee: USAID also looks to the future to building resilient infrastructure and institutions that will support Ukraine's path towards European Union integration. For decades, USAID has buttressed Ukraine's progress towards transparent, inclusive and accountable governance. The United States continues to help Ukraine carry out judicial reform, institutionalized transparent financial systems, and respond to the people of Ukraine's zero tolerance for corruption. 33:15 Erin McKee: They have not skipped a beat in advancing the reform agenda. The EU report just came out this morning and both Ukraine and Moldova, and a variety of other countries, received support for continuing and opening chapters of recession talks. That's because our support to strengthening and deepening the institutions fighting corruption in Ukraine have received the top priority from the President. They had to pass and meet conditionality that we put on our direct budget support and did so without blinking. So while they're fighting a war and fighting for their survival, they are 100% dedicated to ensuring that the political economy model that they inherited during the Soviet Union is dismantled, which reflects the will of the Ukrainian people. 34:35 Geoffrey R. Pyatt: And one of the real success stories amid the tragedy of this war is that Europe has turned decisively away from its dependence, up until 2022, on Russian gas in particular. I see that as a permanent change in the landscape. It's reflected in the billions of dollars that European countries have invested in regasification facilities. It's reflected in the contracts that are being signed with American LNG producers. And it's also reflected in Europe's renewed and doubled commitment to accelerating the pace of its energy transition. So ironically, Putin's weaponization of his energy resource has induced Europe to break its vulnerability there and I think that is a permanent change in the landscape. That is also a positive benefit for American energy producers in our leadership on the energy transition. 35:55 Sen. James Risch (R-ID): I want to talk about the nuclear reactors we have in the United States, of which there are 95, give or take a few. Would you tell the committee, please, where does the fuel come from to operate these nuclear facilities? Geoffrey R. Pyatt: So, Ranking Member, about 20% of the fuel that operates our nuclear fleet here in the United States still comes from Russia. The President has included in his latest supplemental request for about $2.2 billion to help rebuild the nuclear enrichment capacity that we need here in the United States to end that dependency. And the administration has also stated its support for a ban on the import of Russian nuclear fuel. 43:30 Erin McKee: Right now Ukraine is able to spend all of their national budget in the fight. They are paying their soldiers salaries, they are dedicated to defeating Putin on the front lines. That means they don't have any resources to take care of their people and govern, which is as vital to keep up the unity of purpose and the resilience that we've seen from the Ukrainian people, because they're all in, both on the civilian and the military side. So the types of services that would be suspended are first responders who rush into the building and save lives, medical care to make sure that inoculations stay up so that the Ukrainian population stays healthy, particularly children's routine immunizations. We heard reports of polio outbreaks and some other concerns during the early days of the mass emigration of folks fleeing the conflict. We also are supporting teachers and continuing education so that they don't lose a generation as a result of Putin's attacks on civilians and civilian infrastructure so that the kids can stay in school, and that those families — Sen. Chris Coons (D-DE): Am I correct that the direct budget support requested gradually goes down over the next year, as the economy becomes more vibrant and we assess Ukraine is able to generate more revenue? Erin McKee: Correct. The direct budget support and their fiscal stability is also vital for the IMF program and other donors stepping in. Our leadership in this space -- and yes, we were first -- unlocked the other support that we've seen mobilized from the EU and other donors, as well as boosting the confidence in the multilaterals to be able to contribute to Ukraine's economic stability, which is as vital as winning the war. If their economy collapses, Putin will have won. 47:55 Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY): As Harvard's Graham Allison points out, if Putin is forced to choose between humiliating defeat on the one hand and escalating the level of destruction, there's every reason to believe he chooses the latter. There's a great deal of evidence that the war in Ukraine has come to a stalemate. Even Ukraine's Commander in Chief of the armed services has admitted as much. In Graham Allison's view, the Ukraine war has escalated far enough to see how bad things would become if we end up in a world where nuclear weapons are used. Allison believes that where we are now, both for Putin's Russia and for the Biden-led US and the Western alliance, it's time to search for an off ramp for all the parties. What is being done at the State Department to search for an off ramp. James O'Brien: Thank you, Senator. A few points. I mean, I can speak to the foreign policy implications. My belief is if we don't stand with Ukraine now, we'll be spending much more on defense in the future. Much of this supplemental goes to reinvest in the United States, so far from rot and ruin, we're actually shoring up the foundations in our energy sector as Assistant Secretary Pyatt — Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY): So your argument is that war and funding war around the world is good for our armaments industry. James O'Brien: I'm saying this supplemental is good for our economy — Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY): For the armaments industry. So really, it's a justification of war. To me, that's sort of reprehensible -- and this is coming from my side as well -- the idea that "Oh, glory be, the war's really not that bad. Broken windows are not that bad, because we pay people to fix them. Broken countries are not so bad, because hey, look, the armaments industry is gonna get billions of dollars out of this." I think that's a terrible argument. I wish y'all would go back to your freedom arguments or something. But the idea that you're going to enrich the armaments manufacturers, I think is reprehensible. James O'Brien: Well, Senator, I'm not making the argument war is good. I'm making the argument, in this case, war is necessary. Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY): And that we can make a little profit on the side. It's not so bad since the armaments guys who make a lot of profit on this, right. James O'Brien: Senator, I think you're proposing a kind of false choice that Ieither have to say that or say nothing. What I'm saying is that our economy rests on a foundation of innovation. And in the supplemental, we're investing in our energy sector — Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY): But the money is borrowed. We're borrowing the money. We don't have it. We don't have a pot of money. So what you're arguing is, in essence, that we borrow the money from China, we send it to Ukraine, Ukraine, sends it back to buy arms from us, and that's a win-win. How do we win when we're borrowing money to pay people. See this is this false sort of argument that "oh, look, we'll create five jobs for every dollar we spend," but we're borrowing the money. It doesn't make any sense. It's coming from somewhere where it would be a productive use, into the use of basically fomenting a war and continuing on a war. James O'Brien: No, that's not the choice in front of us, Senator. And I'm sorry that you feel that that's the way you want to frame it. The choice in front of us is do we invest in the capacities that allow this war to be won? Those include capacities in energy, in defense, in IT, and they include — Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY): Let's get away from funding the armaments people. You know, I'm not for that. But the original question is, what are you doing to develop an off ramp? You know, when I listen to your presentations, it sounds like the Department of War, I don't hear the Department of diplomacy in front of me. Where are the diplomats? Is anybody talking about negotiation? Do you really believe that Ukraine is gonna push Russia out of out of Ukraine, they're gonna push them out of Crimea, push them out of the East, and that Zelenskyy's is position, "we will not negotiate till they're gone from Ukraine," is viable? And that there's not going to have to be some negotiation beforehand? If you believe that, though, the meat grinder continues and Ukraine will be in utter destruction and tens of thousands more people will die if there is no negotiation. You would think that as a superpower, we would be involved somewhat with encouraging negotiation. But I've heard nothing from you, and nothing from anyone in your administration, frankly, that talks about negotiating. James O'Brien: Well, Senator, then I hope you would sit down and talk with me about what we're doing in this regard. Here, I'll give you a little sense of it. All wars end with a negotiation. We've made clear we'll do that with Ukraine, not over Ukraine's head. It takes two parties to negotiate the end of a war. President Putin is not serious about negotiating the end of the war. He has said he wants to wait and see what happens in November 2024. We're preparing for that eventuality so we can have a negotiation that will actually stick as opposed to the track record of broken agreements that President Putin has made with a whole range of his neighbors up until now. So that's successful diplomacy, not mere diplomacy. Sen. Rand Paul (R-KY): There are actually some who say we're back to about where we started as far as negotiating and tens of thousands of people have died on both sides, and we haven't been successful. But I still hear only war and I don't hear diplomacy. James O'Brien: No but I think what we're looking at is successful diplomacy. I just spent last weekend with 66 countries talking about the basis of a successful peace in Ukraine. Russia didn't show up. That, again, is the problem. You don't have a willing partner on the other side, so simply saying that there must be talks is -- you're asking for a monologue, not diplomacy. 55:00 Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-OR): You know, I'm really struck by the parallel to the journey of Chamberlain to Munich to say, "Okay, Hitler, you can take a third of Czechoslovakia" and then he declared peace in our time, under the assumption that somehow this would not whet Hitler's appetite. Did Chamberlain's strategy work? James O'Brien: No. Sen. Jeff Merkley (D-OR): Will this strategy now, of us bailing on Ukraine to appease Putin, work? James O'Brien: No, it'll invite more aggression. 1:01:40 Sen. Pete Ricketts (R-NE): Do you think we should condition US aid to prevent US tax dollars from supporting PRC-owned or controlled entities from providing the reconstruction? James O'Brien: Senator, we do. That's why it's so important to have the supplemental so that we remain in the game and can set the conditions that make it impossible for opaque, illegitimate contractors like the Chinese to enter. And I know my colleagues can speak at some length about how in energy, telecomms, and other sectors we do exactly that. But if we're not there, then we can't we can't provide the guarantees you want. 1:05:35 James O'Brien: There are about $2.2 billion to go to both the energy supply and to the economic activity that's needed for Ukraine to begin to repair its access to the outside world. That's also important to us. When Russia invaded Ukraine, grain prices went up six times in many places around the world, because Ukraine is an incredibly important part of the global grain trade. The work that AID does to help Ukrainian farmers get their products to market, in the supplemental, the $100 million that is for demining will help farmers get their product to market. All of that directly benefits the markets in which our consumers are a part. So if we do all that, if we can get them to about pre-war export levels, that's an extra $6 billion a year in tax revenue just from the exports, as well as what the industries pay and what happens around the society. Now, Secretary Pritzker, and she should come and testify this herself, she's doing an outstanding job at building a strategy that lets us focus our efforts in key places, so that Ukraine's economy will begin to work and contribute to the global economy, even while this war is going on. All of that works together to make sure that Ukraine can succeed and has the leverage needed when we get to a negotiation, as Senator Paul wants. 1:13:55 Geoffrey R. Pyatt: So I would point out that the greatest threat to the energy grid today are the Shahed drones, which Russia is now beginning to industrialize the production of those. We can talk about that in a classified setting, but there is a direct Iran-Russia nexus in the attacks on Ukraine's energy system. 1:24:10 Geoffrey R. Pyatt: We are working as hard as we can to accelerate that trend. We do that through two mechanisms. One is by accelerating our energy transition, both here in the United States, but also globally, as the Biden administration has done through the Inflation Reduction Act to reduce the dependence on fossil fuels. But the other aspect of this is what we are doing systematically to reduce Russia's future energy revenue. Just last week, for instance, we leveled new sanctions against a project in the in the Arctic, Arctic LNG 2, which is Novatek's flagship LNG project, which Novatek set in motion with the aspiration of developing Russia as the largest LNG exporter in the world. Our objective is to kill that project, and we're doing that through our sanctions, working with our partners in the G7 and beyond. 1:26:00 James O'Brien: Russia is losing its lucrative markets. That's what got it rich enough to afford this war. It's losing out in the sectors of innovation that are going to drive economic development in the future. So we look at this and say, "Does it put pressure on Putin to get to the table?" Well, yes, it does. It's going to take a little time. He started the war with 640 billion in a rainy day fund. By the start of this year, despite record profits last year, he was down around 580, we immobilized 300 of that, and he spent down further from there. So that gives them a year, two years maybe, of run room on that rainy day fund that all came from selling oil and gas. So that's gone. The second thing is that we don't see Russia able to play in the sectors that are going to drive innovation and economic growth in the future. The areas of quantum mechanics, artificial intelligence, the energy transition, including the new nuclear technologies that are coming on board, and Senator Risch, your work on this I really appreciate, because Russia entangled countries in these long term networks of corruption, with generation-long Rosatom contracts. We're now competing for those again, and taking those sectors away from Russia. That changes the long term prospect from what it was. The result of all this is we anticipate that Russia's GDP is going to be at least 20% smaller by 2030 than it would be if Putin had not started this war. So it's a long term strategic loss for him, and it creates a great opportunity for us in a number of important sectors. 1:35:30 Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL): I understand, and this is not critical. I agree that we can't allow borders to be changed unilaterally and we have to stand with our allies. I'm not diminishing any of those things. But those arguments are too vague. They make sense here, but I'm just telling you they're too vague. This notion that we need to do whatever it takes for however long it takes, is also misguided. Not because that's not necessarily what we need to do, but because that's not going to be enough for people who are asking these questions. I would just say if you had an opportunity, any of you three, or all you three to talk to someone, say someone that came up to me a week ago and said, "Why are we still putting all this money in Ukraine. I hate Putin, I hate what he's done, but we've got all these other things domestically and in other parts of the world that are more important, including China, and now what's happening in the Middle East. How are we going to be spending $60 billion every six months? For how long? Given the debt that we already have?" What would you say to them? And how would you explain to them that this fits into their national interest in that perspective I've just outlined? James O'Brien: That's really well framed, Senator, so I'll do my best here. I think the first thing I'd say is you got to shore up your own base. If we're going to confront China over the next decades, it's 1.4 billion people, that's looking to write the rules that the world economy will run on. We go at them with a coalition of 50-odd countries, Europe is about 600-700 million of that, we're 350 million. With that already, we're set to compete really effectively. Ukraine, though, is a challenge by Putin trying to fray that foundation. So we have to shore that up if we're going to have the heft to compete with China over time. The battle over Ukraine also allows us to reinvigorate our own industrial base, we're creating new energy technologies and putting them in place around the world. We're building new defense technologies, the work that's being done in IT, all of that's included in this supplemental, and that's going to make us better able to defend Taiwan, to work in the South China Sea, than we have otherwise. The final point I'd make is, this is the wrong time to walk away because Ukraine's winning. It's already taken back half the territory Putin seized since February 2022. It opened up the Black Sea grain lanes that Putin tried to shut down in July, did that mostly with its own creativity around a whole set of interesting drones and other technologies that are going to contribute to our security as Ukraine gets closer to NATO. So those are all reasons you don't walk away when you're partway through the job. 1:41:10 Geoffrey R. Pyatt: Ukraine is not a charity case. In economic and development terms, it's an opportunity. Developing that opportunity depends on restoring a level of peace. But as we look to the future, you're going to have a Europe which has decoupled from Russian energy supplies, which means that there's a hole of about 130 BCM per year in energy supply that Europe is going to have to fill. Over the short term, some of that is American LNG, but that's a very expensive option. Ukraine has fantastic resources on wind, on solar, on biomass. It has Europe's second largest civil nuclear industry. It has developed and has demonstrated an extraordinary technological acuity. Just look at how clever Ukrainian soldiers have been in the application of drone technology. These are all the skill sets that Ukraine will need to prosper as a member of the European Union. My colleague, Assistant Administrator McKee, referred to the statement which European President Vanderlaan delivered today welcoming the significant progress that Ukraine has made on its reforms, and her and the Commission's determination to move ahead with Ukraine's accession to the European Union. And I would say as somebody who served as an American ambassador in the EU for six years, what Ukraine represents is a demographically young population, a population which is fantastically committed to the values of the European Union. Ukraine is the only place in the world where people have fought and died under the flag of the EU for the values that are represented in the European constitutions. So I think these are the investments in the leadership that Secretary Pritzker is providing to help our companies and companies around the world begin to make plans for the day after and to work with Ukrainians to keep pushing forward the reforms, which are fundamental to creating the environment where American energy companies, renewable energy companies can come into Ukraine, where we can use Ukraine to help to fill the huge challenges that our global supply chain faces. In the Soviet Union, Ukraine was the center of Soviet metallurgy, the center of Soviet petrochemicals industries, all of those latent skills are still there. You talked about nuclear, Ukraine has a company in Kharkiv, Turboatom, which is one of the few facilities in all of Europe that has the industrial capacity to produce the large steel enclosures that are part of building modern nuclear reactors. So I applaud your focus on this and I know I speak for all three of us and how systematically we're focused on trying to lay the foundation for that better future that the Ukrainian people so richly deserve. 1:53:55 James O'Brien: Ukraine has won back 50% of the territory Russia took since February of 2022. The second piece that's important: Putin is playing a waiting game, like many Muscovite rulers before him. So it's difficult to get a decisive battle. So what we need is what's in the supplemental that has the ability to fight this fight over some time, and we do see real success. So in the Black Sea, Russia attempted to stop Ukraine from exporting. In July, exports were down 2-2.5 million tons; they're already more than doubled, and expect to see them go up substantially more. That's because of what Ukraine has done with its technology and its new weapons systems, more of which would be provided by the supplemental. February 4, 2014 On Demand News on YouTube Speakers: Victoria Nuland, Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs, 2013-2017 Geoffrey Pyatt, United States Ambassador to Ukraine, 2013-2016 Clips Victoria Nuland: Good. So I don't think Klitsch [Vitali Klitschko] should go into the government. I don't think it's necessary, I don't think it's a good idea. Geoffrey Pyatt: Yeah, I mean I guess, in terms of him not going into the government, just sort of letting him stay out and do his political homework and stuff. I'm just thinking in terms of, sort of, the process moving ahead, we want to keep the moderate Democrats together. The problem is going to be Tyahnybok and his guys and I'm sure that's part of what Yanukovych is calculating on all this. Victoria Nuland: I think Yatz [Arseniy Yatsenyuk] is the guy with the economic experience, the governing experience. He's the guy. What he needs is Klitsch [Vitali Klitschko] And Tyahnybok On the outside, he needs to be talking to them four times a week. You know, I just think Klitsch [Vitali Klitschko] Going in he's going to be at that level working for Yatsenyuk it's just not gonna work. Geoffrey Pyatt: We want to get someone out here with an international personality to come out here and help to midwife this thing. And then the other issue is some kind of outreach to Yanukovych. We'll probably regroup on that tomorrow as we see how things fall into place. Victoria Nuland: So on that piece, Jeff, I wrote the note, Sullivan's come back to me saying “you need Biden,” and I said probably tomorrow for an attaboy and get the deets to stick, Biden's willing. Geoffrey Pyatt: Great. December 19, 2013 The Atlantic Council Speaker: John McCain, U.S. Senator from Arizona, 1987-2018 Clips 16:45 Sen. John McCain: If Ukraine's political crisis persists or deepens, which is a real possibility, we must support creative Ukrainian efforts to resolve it. Senator Murphy and I heard a few such ideas last weekend—from holding early elections, as the opposition is now demanding, to the institution of a technocratic government with a mandate to make the difficult reforms required for Ukraine's long-term economic health and sustainable development. Decisions such as these are for Ukrainians to make—no one else—and if they request our assistance, we should provide it where possible. Finally, we must encourage the European Union and the IMF to keep their doors open to Ukraine. Ultimately, the support of both institutions is indispensable for Ukraine's future. And eventually, a Ukrainian President, either this one or a future one, will be prepared to accept the fundamental choice facing the country, which is this: While there are real short-term costs to the political and economic reforms required for IMF assistance and EU integration, and while President Putin will likely add to these costs by retaliating against Ukraine's economy, the long-term benefits for Ukraine in taking these tough steps are far greater and almost limitless. This decision cannot be borne by one person alone in Ukraine. Nor should it be. It must be shared—both the risks and the rewards—by all Ukrainians, especially the opposition and business elite. It must also be shared by the EU, the IMF and the United States. All of us in the West should be prepared to help Ukraine, financially and otherwise, to overcome the short-term pain that reforms will require and Russia may inflict. April 20, 1994 Southern Center for International Studies Speaker: Arthur Dunkel, Director-General of the World Trade Organization, 1980-1993 Clips 26:55 Arthur Dunkel: If I look back at the last 25 years, what did we have? We had two worlds: The so-called Market Economy world and the centrally planned world; the centrally planned world disappeared. One of the main challenges of the Uruguay round has been to create a world wide system. I think we have to think of that. Secondly, why a world wide system? Because, basically, I consider that if governments cooperate in trade policy field, you reduce the risks of tension – political tension and even worse than that." Music by Editing Production Assistance

Last week, former Secretary of State and National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger passed away. To assess his legacy, Jack Goldsmith sat down with Graham Allison, the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University. Allison knew Kissinger well. He first met Kissinger in 1965 when he was a student in Kissinger's class at Harvard. And Allison worked with Kissinger for decades, right up until the end of Kissinger's life, when he and Kissinger coauthored an essay published in October on arms control for artificial intelligence, perhaps Kissinger's last essay. Allison and Goldsmith discussed Kissinger's accomplishments as a statesman, his cast of mind and long intellectual productivity, his engagement with history as a guide to international diplomacy, and his particular brand of realism. They also discussed Kissinger's failures and mistakes and what Kissinger was most worried about at the end of his life.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

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Xi Jinping of China and Bashar al-Assad of Syria recently announced a new strategic partnership as U.S. adversaries band together economically and militarily. This episode explores the implications of this alliance, the history of U.S. involvement in Syria, and the shifting global order as American power declines. We discuss the blowback from financial sanctions on Russia, increasing BRICS cooperation, and compare the current geopolitical situation to the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta. With insight from experts, maps and historical context, this podcast analyzes potential future conflicts and the need for diplomacy in our multipolar world.   Podcast Script:  Introduction:  Hello everyone. Recently, the leaders of China and Syria announced a new strategic partnership as adversaries of the United States seek to align economically and militarily. Today we'll explore why this alliance matters, provide background on U.S. involvement in Syria, and discuss the shifting global order as American power declines relative to rival states.  Syria-China Partnership: Last week, Xi Jinping and Bashar al-Assad announced a landmark strategic partnership between China and Syria. This comes as Russia, China, Iran, Venezuela and other nations sanctioned by the U.S. increasingly cooperate. Though the U.S. and Western democracies have made poor strategic decisions, these countries now see banding together as key to resisting American military domination.  U.S. in Syria:  The U.S. invaded Syria in 2014 under the Obama administration, with the aim of removing Assad. Since then, the U.S. has maintained a military presence in northeast Syria near major oil fields. Though Trump said he wanted to withdraw, he admitted it was about "keeping the oil." The U.S. essentially controls Kurdish oil production, while adversaries like Russia and Iran are partnering with Syria's central government.  Global Order Shifting: U.S. financial sanctions on Russia have caused significant blowback, with sanctioned nations looking to trade outside the Western system. BRICS countries have focused on inter-trade and explored creating a joint currency. We're seeing the emergence of a multi-polar world, as the U.S. stands increasingly alone. When the U.N. refused to approve invading Iraq, the U.S. went ahead anyway, damaging international trust. Historical Parallels: This situation has parallels to the Peloponnesian War between Athens and Sparta, where rising Athenian power caused Sparta to fear it would displace them as regional hegemon. Graham Allison applies this "Thucydides Trap" framework to current U.S.-China tensions. Though war often seems inevitable in these scenarios, diplomacy and frank dialogue remains key to avoiding catastrophic outcomes.   Conclusion:  The emerging Syria-China alliance demonstrates Russia, China and other nations banding together economically and militarily in a multi-polar world. As American power declines, the blowback from imposing financial sanctions and attempting to control oil access shows the limits of military force. Avoiding war will require nuanced diplomacy and negotiations between all players on the global stage.

It's no secret that relations between China and the US are at an all time low. And at the centre of this fraught relationship is the question of Taiwan: China is moving closer to asserting its territorial rights over the island, while US President Joe Biden has pledged to defend Taiwan, even going so far as sending defensive weapons to protect the country against a Chinese invasion. How should a superpower like the US respond to a rising power like China? Foreign policy expert Graham Allison joins us for a wide reaching conversation about this important moment in history, and how shared interests in the climate, technology, finance, and health could force these powerful rivals to become unwilling partners.   The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths - @rudyardg.   Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to podcast@munkdebates.com.   To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 10+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ Senior Producer: Ricki Gurwitz  

This week's episode of From the Archive Originally aired August 2, 2022 Original Description: Nancy Pelosi has touched down in Taiwan and thrown the U.S.-China relationship into tumult. David sits down with Graham Allison of Harvard University, Rosa Brooks of Georgetown University, and David Sanger of the New York Times to discuss the trip and its impact on the future of Taiwan and U.S.-China relations. Should Nancy Pelosi have gone to Taiwan? How big a strain will this actually put on the relationship between the U.S. and China? Is strategic ambiguity dead or alive? Find out in this vital conversation. Join us! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This week's episode of From the Archive Originally aired August 2, 2022 Original Description: Nancy Pelosi has touched down in Taiwan and thrown the U.S.-China relationship into tumult. David sits down with Graham Allison of Harvard University, Rosa Brooks of Georgetown University, and David Sanger of the New York Times to discuss the trip and its impact on the future of Taiwan and U.S.-China relations. Should Nancy Pelosi have gone to Taiwan? How big a strain will this actually put on the relationship between the U.S. and China? Is strategic ambiguity dead or alive? Find out in this vital conversation. Join us! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

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Raquel Vaz-Pinto é Investigadora do Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais (IPRI) da Universidade Nova de Lisboa e Prof. Auxiliar Convidada da Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da mesma Universidade, onde lecciona as disciplinas de Estudos Asiáticos e História das Relações Internacionais. Foi consultora do Conselho de Administração da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian de 2020 a 2022 e Presidente da Associação Portuguesa de Ciência Política de 2012 a 2016. Autora de vários artigos e livros entre os quais A Grande Muralha e o Legado de Tiananmen, a China e os Direitos Humanos editado pela Tinta-da-China e Os Portugueses e o Mundo editado pela Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos.  Os seus interesses de investigação são Política Externa e Estratégia Chinesa; os EUA e o Indo-Pacífico; e Liderança e Estratégia. É analista residente de política internacional da SIC e da TSF. Actualmente, está a terminar um livro, que será publicado pela Tinta-da-china, sobre os desafios colocados pela China às democracias liberais europeias, incluindo a portuguesa. ->Workshop de Pensamento Crítico: sessões de Lisboa, Porto e online esgotadas! Inscreva-se aqui para ser avisado(a) de futuras edições. -> Apoie este podcast e faça parte da comunidade de mecenas do 45 Graus em: 45grauspodcast.com _______________ Índice (com timestamps): ​(9:47) O que mudou na rivalidade CN-EUA desde o nosso episódio de 2018? | Wolf warrior diplomacy | Os diplomatas chineses mal-comportados | Índia | Quad (30:18) A política externa dos EUA em relação à China começou por ser complacente e tornou-se demasiado agressiva? | Artigo de John Mearsheimer | Estratégia dos G7 em relação à CN: do decoupling ao de-risking | Matérias primas críticas e terras raras (e aqui) (42:10) Já podemos falar de uma Guerra Fria entre EUA e CN? | A Armadilha de Tucídides (Livro: História da Guerra do Peloponeso)| Houve uma crença exagerada no Ocidente nos efeitos da abertura económica? | Como os manuais de economia americanos sobrevalorizam a economia da URSS | Frase atribuída a Deng Xiaoping: «Hide your strength, bide your time» (55:26) Comparação China vs URSS | O papel da ideologia na guerra fria vs na nova ‘ordem chinesa' | Aumento do autoritarismo do regime chinês | Digital Dictators | Cimeira da Ásia Central, sem a Rússia | Nova política externa defendida pelo SPD alemão | A nova ambição da China para o Ártico (1:18:37) O que esperar do futuro -- e o que fazer para evitar uma escalada do conflito? | Tese do ‘peak China' | O problema demográfico da china (e os telefonemas aos recém-casados) | Livro: Leftover Women, de Leta Hong Fincher | Episódio com Hu Jintao no congresso do CCP | European Critical Raw Materials Act | A integração económica é um garante de que não ocorre uma guerra ou é, pelo contrário, uma fonte permanente de tensões? _______________ Pode parecer estranho o que vou dizer -- tendo em conta que a política internacional parece estar  dominada pela Guerra da Ucrânia desde fevereiro do ano passado -- mas a verdade é que, muito provavelmente, não será este o tema central das Relações Internacionais da nossa época.  O tema que vai marcar, muito provavelmente, as próximas décadas é outro: a rivalidade entre os Estados Unidos e a China, que se vai instalando à medida que esta vai ascendendo na ordem internacional e disputando a ordem unipolar até aqui dominada pelos norte-americanos. Há mesmo quem ache que já estamos a viver uma nova Guerra Fria entre as duas potências. Esta ideia não será novidade para os mais atentos a estas lides, e sobretudo não o é para quem ouviu o episódio #38 do 45 Graus, publicado em 2018, cuja convidada foi Raquel Vaz Pinto. O tema geral desse episódio foi a China e um dos tópicos que discutimos foi, precisamente, até que ponto a rivalidade entre Pequim e Washington iria marcar as próximas décadas. Ora, se já na altura, há quase 5 anos, isso era uma probabilidade forte, hoje é quase uma certeza. Ao mesmo tempo, passou-se entretanto muita coisa na relação entre os dois países, desenvolvimentos esses que nos vieram dar uma ideia mais clara (embora ainda repleta de incógnitas) sobre a forma que esta rivalidade poderá tomar nos próximos anos. Além disso, ao longo destes anos, fui recebendo muitos elogios ao episódio -- não só pela relevância do tema (que justificava mais do que um episódio), mas, sobretudo, pela convidada. A Raquel não só sabe muito, como é uma excelente comunicadora.  Por isso, decidi convidá-la para regressar ao 45 Graus para discutir este tema: com mais profundidade do que na 1ª conversa e tirando partido da informação adicional que hoje temos. E ela teve a gentileza de aceitar. Raquel Vaz-Pinto é Investigadora do Instituto Português de Relações Internacionais (IPRI) da Universidade Nova de Lisboa e Prof. Auxiliar Convidada da Faculdade de Ciências Sociais e Humanas da mesma Universidade, onde lecciona as disciplinas de Estudos Asiáticos e História das Relações Internacionais. Foi consultora do Conselho de Administração da Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian de 2020 a 2022 e Presidente da Associação Portuguesa de Ciência Política de 2012 a 2016. Autora de vários artigos e livros entre os quais A Grande Muralha e o Legado de Tiananmen, a China e os Direitos Humanos editado pela Tinta-da-China e Os Portugueses e o Mundo editado pela Fundação Francisco Manuel dos Santos.  Os seus interesses de investigação são Política Externa e Estratégia Chinesa; os EUA e o Indo-Pacífico; e Liderança e Estratégia. É analista residente de política internacional da SIC e da TSF. Actualmente, a terminar um livro, que será publicado pela Tinta-da-china, sobre os desafios colocados pela China às democracias liberais europeias, incluindo a portuguesa. Quando gravámos a nossa conversa em 2018, estas tensões entre os EUA e a China estavam ainda, de certa forma, no início. Donald Trump tinha tomado posse apenas no início do ano anterior, pondo em prática uma mudança radical na postura americana em relação à China, impondo tarifas a uma série de bens chineses. Essa medida gerou uma réplica do lado chinês, dando início a uma guerra comercial entre os dois países.  Mas, desde então, já muita tinta correu. A guerra comercial -- mesmo já com a Administração Biden -- acentuou-se e estendeu-se a outras áreas, e os dois países têm acumulado várias divergências na arena internacional, nomeadamente em relação à Guerra da Ucrânia, na qual a China tem adoptado uma postura no mínimo ambivalente. teoricamente neutra mas, na prática, próxima da Russia. Ao mesmo tempo, a retórica belicosa que Trump tinha inaugurado do lado norte-americano tem sido mais do que correspondida do lado chinês, com líderes políticos e diplomatas a adoptarem um discurso cada vez mais assertivo (e, em alguns casos, mesmo agressivo). Estas disputas comerciais e divergências geopolíticas são, no entanto, segundo muitos analistas, apenas as causas próximas do aumento da conflitualidade entre CN e EUA. A causa última – o factor fundamental por trás desta mudança – reside, para muitos, na denominada ‘Armadilha de Tucídides', de que falámos também no episódio de 2018.  A ‘armadilha' tem este nome porque foi postulada pela primeira vez pelo historiador ateniense Tucídides, na sua História da Guerra do Peloponeso, que opôs Atenas a Esparta. Segundo ele, a guerra entre os dois era inevitável, uma vez que Atenas estava a crescer e ganhar poder, o que fazia aumentar a sua ambição, enquanto essa situação gerava em Esparta, o poder incumbente uma forte ansiedade.  Esta ideia tem sido amplamente discutida nos últimos tempos, a propósito da rivalidade CN-EUA, por académicos e analistas, tanto do lado norte-americano como também do chinês. Um dos mais conhecidos é Graham Allison, que popularizou o conceito no seu livro: Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? , Segundo os proponentes da “Armadilha”, sempre que uma potência emergente ameaça substituir uma potência hegemónica existe uma tendência inexorável para a guerra entre as duas. Aplicada à relação entre a China e os EUA, isto implica que à medida que o poder económico e militar da primeira se vai aproximando do dos EUA, isso cria-lhe, inevitavelmente, um sentimento de auto-importância crescente e de direito a ter um papel mais activo na política global. Ao mesmo tempo, cria nos Estados Unidos, a potência incumbente, medo, insegurança e uma determinação de defender o status quo a todo o custo .  Esta visão da Armadilha de Tucídides enquanto espécie de “lei das relações internacionais” atinge o seu pináculo em académicos da chamada escola ultra-realista das RI. O maior exemplo -- de quem falamos no episódio -- é talvez John Mearsheimer (de quem também falei no episódio sobre a Guerra da Ucrânia, com Lívia Franco).  Para Mearsheimer, esta armadilha é de tal modo uma inevitabilidade, que afirma que o governo norte-americano deveria ter antecipado o perigo do crescimento económico acelerado da China e, simplesmente, tentado impedi-lo.  Ancorados nesta ideia, há, assim, um número crescente de analistas e oficiais -- tanto nos Estados Unidos como na China -- que discutem hoje, abertamente, a possibilidade de um conflito entre os dois países, seja ele uma guerra directa (de maior ou menor escala) ou uma guerra fria, como a com a URSS, sem conflitos directos mas com as charadas “guerras por procuração”.  No entanto, como a Raquel chama a atenção, as RI são demasiado complexas para podermos tomar esta armadilha como lei de forma simplista. Há factores que contribuem para este desenlace, mas outros há que não e, sobretudo, persistem ainda muitas incógnitas sobre o que pode acontecer.  Espero que gostem! _______________ Obrigado aos mecenas do podcast: Francisco Hermenegildo, Ricardo Evangelista, Henrique Pais João Baltazar, Salvador Cunha, Abilio Silva, Tiago Leite, Carlos Martins, Galaró family, Corto Lemos, Miguel Marques, Nuno Costa, Nuno e Ana, João Ribeiro, Helder Miranda, Pedro Lima Ferreira, Cesar Carpinteiro, Luis Fernambuco, Fernando Nunes, Manuel Canelas, Tiago Gonçalves, Carlos Pires, João Domingues, Hélio Bragança da Silva, Sandra Ferreira , Paulo Encarnação , BFDC, António Mexia Santos, Luís Guido, Bruno Heleno Tomás Costa, João Saro, Daniel Correia, Rita Mateus, António Padilha, Tiago Queiroz, Carmen Camacho, João Nelas, Francisco Fonseca, Rafael Santos, Andreia Esteves, Ana Teresa Mota, ARUNE BHURALAL, Mário Lourenço, RB, Maria Pimentel, Luis, Geoffrey Marcelino, Alberto Alcalde, António Rocha Pinto, Ruben de Bragança, João Vieira dos Santos, David Teixeira Alves, Armindo Martins , Carlos Nobre, Bernardo Vidal Pimentel, António Oliveira, Paulo Barros, Nuno Brites, Lígia Violas, Tiago Sequeira, Zé da Radio, João Morais, André Gamito, Diogo Costa, Pedro Ribeiro, Bernardo Cortez Vasco Sá Pinto, David , Tiago Pires, Mafalda Pratas, Joana Margarida Alves Martins, Luis Marques, João Raimundo, Francisco Arantes, Mariana Barosa, Nuno Gonçalves, Pedro Rebelo, Miguel Palhas, Ricardo Duarte, Duarte , Tomás Félix, Vasco Lima, Francisco Vasconcelos, Telmo , José Oliveira Pratas, Jose Pedroso, João Diogo Silva, Joao Diogo, José Proença, João Crispim, João Pinho , Afonso Martins, Robertt Valente, João Barbosa, Renato Mendes, Maria Francisca Couto, Antonio Albuquerque, Ana Sousa Amorim, Francisco Santos, Lara Luís, Manuel Martins, Macaco Quitado, Paulo Ferreira, Diogo Rombo, Francisco Manuel Reis, Bruno Lamas, Daniel Almeida, Patrícia Esquível , Diogo Silva, Luis Gomes, Cesar Correia, Cristiano Tavares, Pedro Gaspar, Gil Batista Marinho, Maria Oliveira, João Pereira, Rui Vilao, João Ferreira, Wedge, José Losa, Hélder Moreira, André Abrantes, Henrique Vieira, João Farinha, Manuel Botelho da Silva, João Diamantino, Ana Rita Laureano, Pedro L, Nuno Malvar, Joel, Rui Antunes7, Tomás Saraiva, Cloé Leal de Magalhães, Joao Barbosa, paulo matos, Fábio Monteiro, Tiago Stock, Beatriz Bagulho, Pedro Bravo, Antonio Loureiro, Hugo Ramos, Inês Inocêncio, Telmo Gomes, Sérgio Nunes, Tiago Pedroso, Teresa Pimentel, Rita Noronha, miguel farracho, José Fangueiro, Zé, Margarida Correia-Neves, Bruno Pinto Vitorino, João Lopes, Joana Pereirinha, Gonçalo Baptista, Dario Rodrigues, tati lima, Pedro On The Road, Catarina Fonseca, JC Pacheco, Sofia Ferreira, Inês Ribeiro, Miguel Jacinto, Tiago Agostinho, Margarida Costa Almeida, Helena Pinheiro, Rui Martins, Fábio Videira Santos, Tomás Lucena, João Freitas, Ricardo Sousa, RJ, Francisco Seabra Guimarães, Carlos Branco, David Palhota, Carlos Castro, Alexandre Alves, Cláudia Gomes Batista, Ana Leal, Ricardo Trindade, Luís Machado, Andrzej Stuart-Thompson, Diego Goulart, Filipa Portela, Paulo Rafael, Paloma Nunes, Marta Mendonca, Teresa Painho, Duarte Cameirão, Rodrigo Silva, José Alberto Gomes, Joao Gama, Cristina Loureiro, Tiago Gama, Tiago Rodrigues, Miguel Duarte, Ana Cantanhede, Artur Castro Freire, Rui Passos Rocha, Pedro Costa Antunes, Sofia Almeida, Ricardo Andrade Guimarães, Daniel Pais, Miguel Bastos, Luís Santos _______________ Esta conversa foi editada por: Hugo Oliveira

This past week, the G7 - the group of the world's richest democracies - gathered in Japan to discuss Ukraine, Russia, global affairs, and their increasing concerns about a rising power looking out at them from over the water: China. This was some of the sternest wording from the G7, and China dismissed it as a smear. But the West also doesn't want to completely antagonise and cut off China, with the Australian Prime Minister saying lessons had to be learnt from history. So, are we entering a new Cold War, where conflict is avoided but tensions remain? Or are we not far off from a catastrophic war? On today's episode, I speak to Graham Allison, a former member of Bill Clinton's defence department and one of the preeminent national security voices in America. He speaks to me about his historical theory called Thucydides Trap, where throughout the past a rising power has often come to blows with an established one. Will China and America go the same way? Producer: Freya Pickford Sources: AP

Geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China have been running high for some time, but are escalating as President Biden prepares to unveil further curbs on U.S. investment to China ahead of this month's G7 Summit. In this episode, which breaks down Goldman Sachs Research's recent Top of Mind report, “U.S.-China: more decoupling ahead,” Harvard's Graham Allison, who has extensively studied the relationship between the two countries, and Rhodium Group's Dan Rosen, who has analyzed investment and trade flows, explore the tensions between the two countries and how they're affecting the investing landscape for companies and investors. 

Chris Li, director of research of the Asia-Pacific Initiative and fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, leads the conversation on U.S. strategy in East Asia. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to today's session of the Winter/Spring 2023 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR.  Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic, if you would like to share it with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.  We're delighted to have Chris Li with us to discuss U.S. strategy in East Asia. Mr. Li is director of research of the Asia-Pacific Initiative, and a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, where he focuses on U.S.-China relations, Asia-Pacific security, and technology competition. Previously, he was research assistant to Graham Allison in the Avoiding Great Power War Project, and coordinator of the China Working Group, where he contributed to the China Cyber Policy Initiative and the Technology and Public Purpose Project, led by former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter.  Chris, thanks very much for being with us today. I thought we could begin with you giving us your insights and analysis of the Biden administration's foreign policy strategy in East Asia, specifically vis-à-vis China.  LI: Great. Well, first of all, thanks, Irina, for the invitation. I'm really looking forward to the conversation and also to all the questions from members of the audience and, in particular, all the students on this seminar. So I thought I'd start very briefly with just an overview of how the Biden administration's strategy in the Indo-Pacific has shaped up over the last two years, two and a half years. What are the key pillars? And essentially, now that we're about halfway through the first term—or, you know, if there is a second term—but President Biden's first term, where things are going to go moving forward?  So as many you are probably familiar, Secretary of State Tony Blinken laid out essentially the core tenets of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, of which China, of course, is a focal centerpiece. And he did so in his speech last summer at the Asia Society, where he essentially described the relationship between the U.S. and China as competitive where it should be, cooperative where it can be, and adversarial where it must be. So sort of three different pillars: competition, cooperation, a sort of balance between the two. And in terms of the actual tenets of the strategy, the framing was three pillars—invest, align, and complete.  And so briefly, just what that meant according to Secretary Blinken was really investing in sources of American strength at home. Renewing, for example, investment in technology, investment in STEM education, infrastructure, and many of the policies that actually became known as Build Back Better, a lot of the domestic spending packages that President Biden proposed, and some of which has been passed. So that first pillar was invest sort of in order to o compete with China, we need to first renew our sources of American strength and compete from a position of strength.  The second element was “align.” And in this—in this pillar, I think this is where the Biden administration has really distinguished itself from the Trump administration. Many folks say, well, the Biden administration's China policy or its Asia policy is really just Trump 2.0 but with a little bit—you know, with essentially a nicer tone to it. But I think there is a difference here. And I think the Biden administration's approach has really focused on aligning with both traditional security partners—our allies, our alliances with countries like the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines—but also invigorating those nontraditional partnerships, with India, for example.   I think another part of this strategy, another part of this dimension, has also been reinvigorating U.S. presence and U.S. leadership, really, in multilateral organizations. Not only, for example, taking the Quad and reestablishing some of the leader-level summits, the ministerials, proposing, for example, a COVID cooperation regime among new members of the Quad, but also establishing newer frameworks. So, for example, as many of you have read about, I'm sure, AUKUS, this trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. when it comes to sharing of nuclear submarine technology. That's been a new proposed policy. And I think we're about to see an update from the administration in the next couple of weeks.  And even with elements of the region that have been unappreciated and perhaps under-focused on. For example, the Solomon Islands was the focal point of some attention last year, and you've seen the administration propose the Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative, which seeks to establish greater cooperation among some of the Pacific Island nations. And there was actually a summit hosted by President Biden last fall with leaders of the Pacific Island countries. So that alignment piece I think has really been significant as a cornerstone of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy.  The third element, of course, competition, I think is the most evident. And we've seen this from some of the executive orders on semiconductors, the restrictions on advanced chips, to elements of trade, to even sort of advocacy for human rights and greater promotion of democracy. You saw the Summit for Democracy, which has been a pillar of the administration's foreign policy agenda. So that's basically what they've done in the last two and a half years.  Now, in terms of where that's actually brought us, I think I'll make four observations. The first is that, unlike the Biden—unlike the Trump administration, where most of the policy pronouncements about the People's Republic of China had some tinge of inducing change in China—that was the phrase that Secretary Pompeo used in a speech on China policy—I think the Biden administration largely has said: The assumption and the premise of all of our policy toward China is based on the idea that the U.S. government does not seek fundamentally to change the Chinese government, the Chinese regime, the leadership, the administration, the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.  So that is both a markedly important difference, but it's also a part of the strategy that I believe remains ambiguous. And here, the problem is, you know, invest, align, and compete, competitive coexistence, where does that all actually take us? And I think this is where analysts in the strategic community and think tank world have said, well, it's great to invest, of course. You know, there's bipartisan support. Alignment with partners and allies is, of course, a pretty uncontroversial, for the most part, approach. And competition is, I think, largely a consensus view in Washington, D.C. But where does this actually take us?  You know, for all of its criticisms, the Trump administration did propose a specific end state or an end objective. And I think the Biden administration has just sort of said, well, it's about coexisting. It's about just assuming to manage the relationship. I think there are, of course, valid merits to that approach. And on an intellectual level, the idea is that because this is not necessarily a Cold War 2.0, in the words of the Biden administration, we're not going to have an end state that is ala the Cold War—in essence a sort of victory or demise, you know, the triumph of capitalism over communism, et cetera. In fact, it's going to be a persistent and sustained rivalry and competition. And in order to harness a strategy, we essentially need to manage that competition.   So I think that's—it's an intellectually coherent idea, but I think one of the ambiguities surrounding and one of the criticisms that has been proposed is that there is no clear end state. So we compete, we invest, we align, but to what end? Do we just keep—does the administration continue to tighten up and enhance alliances with partners and allies, and then to what end? What happens next? And sort of where does this lead us—leave us in ten years from now? So I think that's the first comment I'll make about the approach to the Indo-Pacific.  The second is that one of the tenets, of course, as I describe, is this compartmentalization of compete, cooperate. In essence, you know, we will compete—we, being the United States—with China on issues of technology, issues of economics, but we will also cooperate on areas of shared concern—climate change, nonproliferation. I think what you've seen is that while the Biden administration has proposed this idea, we can split—we can cooperate on one hand and also compete on the other—the People's Republic of China, the Chinese government, has largely rejected that approach.   Where you've seen statements from senior officials in China that have said, essentially, we will not cooperate with you, the United States, until you first cease all of the behavior, all of the negative policies that we don't like. In essence, if you will continue to sell arms to Taiwan, if you continue, the United States, to restrict semiconductors, to crackdown on espionage, to conduct military exercises in the region, then forget about any potential cooperation on climate, or forget about any cooperation on global health, et cetera.   So in essence, being able to tie the two compartments together has prevented a lot of what the Biden administration has sought to achieve. And we've seen that very clearly with Special Envoy John Kerry and his relentless efforts to conduct climate diplomacy. And I think largely—for example, last summer in the aftermath of Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, you saw a lot of those collaborative efforts essentially derailed. That's the second comment I'll make, which is while this approach, again, logically to most Americans would seem sound, it's actually met a lot of resistance because the Chinese reaction to it is not necessarily the same.  The third is I think we've seen increasingly, even though there has been an increased alignment since the Trump administration with allies and partners, there's still a degree of hedging among countries in the region. And that makes sense because from the perspectives of many of those leaders of countries in the region, the United States is a democratic country. We have an election coming up in 2024. And there's no guarantee that the next president, if President Biden is no longer the president in 2024 or even in 2028, will continue this policy.   And I think all of you, as observers of American politics, know the degree to which American politics has become largely one that is dysfunctional, is almost schizophrenic in a way. And so one would imagine that if you are a leader of a country in the Asian-Pacific region, to support the Biden administration's engagement, but also to maintain a degree of strategic autonomy, as this is often called. And so what I think we'll continue to see and what will be interesting to watch is how middle powers, how other countries resident in the region approach the United States in terms of—(inaudible). I think India will be key to watch, for example. Its defense relationship with the United States has increased over the years, but yet it still has close interests with respect to China.  The final comment I'll make is that on the military dimension I think this is another area of concern, where the Biden administration has said that one of its priorities is creating guardrails, constructing guardrails to manage the potential escalation in the event of an accident, or a miscommunication, miscalculation that could quickly spiral into a crisis. And we needn't—we need not look farther than the 2001 Hainan incident to think of an example, which was a collision between a(n) EP-3 aircraft and a Chinese intelligence plane. And that led to a diplomatic standoff.  And so I think the United States government is very keen on creating dialogue between militaries, risk reduction mechanisms, crisis management mechanisms. But I think they've encountered resistance, again, from the People's Republic of China, because the perspective there is that much of the U.S. behavior in the region militarily is invalid, is illegitimate. You know, the Chinese government opposes, for example, U.S. transits through the Taiwan Strait. So the idea therefore that they would engage and essentially deconflict and manage risk is sort of legitimizing American presence there militarily. And so we've encountered that obstacle as well.  So I think going forward on all four elements, we're going to continue to see adjustment. And I think, as students, as researchers, I think these are four areas where there's fertile room for discussion, for debate, for analysis, for looking at history. And I look forward to a conversation. Hopefully, many of you have ideas as well because there's no monopoly on wisdom and there are many creative proposals to be discussed. So I look forward to questions. I'll stop there.  FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Thank you, Chris. That was great. Now we're going to go to all of you.  (Gives queuing instructions.)  Our first written question comes from Grace Wheeler. I believe a graduate student at the University of West Florida. Kissinger proposed the future of China-U.S. relations be one of coevolution instead of confrontation. Is it still realistically possible for the future of China-U.S. relations to be one of cooperation instead of confrontation?  LI: So terrific question. Thank you for the question. It's a very interesting idea. And I think Henry Kissinger, who I know has long been involved with the Council on Foreign Relations, has produced through his many decades,strategic frameworks and new ways of thinking about cardinal challenges to geopolitics. I have not yet actually understood or at least examined specifically what the concrete pillars of coevolution entail. My understanding on a general level is that it means, essentially, the United States and the People's Republic of China adjust and sort of mutually change their policies to accommodate each other. So a sort of mutual accommodation over time to adjust interests in a way that prevent conflict.  I think on the face—of course, that sounds—that sounds very alluring. That sounds like a terrific idea. I think the problem has always been what would actually this look like in implementation? So for example, on the issue of Taiwan, this is an issue where the Chinese government has said: There is no room for compromise. You know, the refrain that they repeat is: Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. It is part of sovereignty. And there is no room for compromise. This is a red line. So if that's the case, there's not really, in my view, much room for evolution on this issue, for example. And it's an intractable problem.  And so I don't necessarily know how to apply the Kissinger framework to specific examples. And, but, you know, I do think it's something worth considering. And, you know, I would encourage you and others on this call to think about, for example, how that framework might actually be adapted. So I think it's an interesting idea, but I would—I think the devil's in the details. And essentially, to think about how this would be applied to specific issues—South China Sea, human rights, trade—would be the key to unpacking this concept.  I think the second part of your question was, is cooperation possible? And again, I think, as I stated in my remarks, the Biden administration publicly says—publicly asserts that they do seek to maintain a space for cooperation in climate, in nonproliferation, in global health security. I think, again, what we've encountered is that the Chinese government's view is that unless the United States ceases behavior that it deems detrimental to its own interests, it will not pursue any discussion of cooperation.   And so I think that's the problem we're facing. And so I think there are going to be discussions going forward on, well, given that, how do we then balance the need for cooperation on climate, in pandemics, with, for example, also concerns about security, concerns about military activity, concerns about Taiwan, et cetera? And I think this is the daily stuff of, of course, the conversations among the Biden administration and senior leadership. So personally, my view, is I hope cooperation is possible, of course. I think there are shared issues, shared vital interests, between the two countries and, frankly, among the global community, that require the U.S. and China to be able to work out issues. But I'm personally not optimistic that under this current framework, this paradigm, there will be a significant space open for cooperation.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. Going next to Hamza Siddiqui, a raised hand.   Q: Thank you. Hi. I'm Hamza Siddiqui, a student from Minnesota State University, Mankato.   And I actually had two questions. The first was: What kind of role does the U.S. envision Southeast Asian states—especially like the Philippines and Vietnam—playing in their U.S. strategy when it comes to Asia-Pacific security issues, specifically? And the second is that for the last few years there's been some discussion about Japan and South Korea being formally invited to join the Five Eyes alliance. And I wanted to get your take on that. What do you think are the chances that a formal invitation would be extended to them? Thank you.  LI: Great. Thank you for the question. Two terrific questions.  So, first, on the role of countries in Southeast Asia, I think that under the Biden administration they have continued to play an increasing degree of importance. So you've seen, for example, even in the Philippines, which you cited, I think just last month Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made a visit there. And in the aftermath of the visit, he announced a new basing agreement. I haven't reviewed the details specifically, and I'm not a Philippines expert, but in short my understanding is that there is going to be renewed American presence—expanded American presence, actually, in the region.   And the Philippines, just based on their geostrategic location, is incredibly important in the Indo-Pacific region. So I think that the administration is very active in enhancing cooperation on the defense element, but also on the political and economic side as well. So with the Quad, for example, in India, you've seen cooperation on elements of economics as well, and technology. I think there's an initiative about digital cooperation too. So I think the answer is increasingly an important role.   On Japan and Korea, there have, of course, been discussions over the years about expanding the Five Eyes intelligence alliance to other countries in Asia as well. My assessment is that that's probably unlikely to occur in a formal way in the near term. But I could be wrong. And that assessment is primarily based on the fact that the countries that currently are part of the Five Eyes agreement share certain elements of linguistic convergence. They all speak English. There are certain longstanding historical ties that those countries have. And I think that to necessarily expand—or, to expand that existing framework would probably require a degree of bureaucratic sort of rearrangement that might be quite difficult, or quite challenging, or present obstacles.  I think what you will see, though, is enhanced security cooperation, for sure. And we've seen that even with Japan, for example, announcing changes to its military, its self-defense force, and increased defense spending as well in the region. So I think that is a trend that will continue.  FASKIANOS: Next question I'm taking from Sarah Godek, who is a graduate student at the University of Michigan.   What do guardrails look like, from a Chinese perspective? Thinking how China's foreign ministry has consistently put out lists of demands for the U.S. side, I'm wondering how guardrails are formulated by Wang Yi and others.  LI: Great. Thanks for the question.  So I guess I'll step back first and talk about what guardrails, in my view, actually entail. So I think the idea here is that in the event of a crisis—and, most of the time, crises are not planned. (Laughs.) Most of the time, crises, you know, occur as a result of an accident. For example, like the 2001 incident. But an accidental collision in the South China Sea between two vessels, the collision accidentally of two planes operating in close proximity. And as Chinese and American forces operate in closer proximity and increasing frequency, we do have that risk.   So I think, again, the idea of a guardrail that essentially, in the military domain, which is what I'm speaking about, entails a mechanism in place such that in the event of an accident or a crisis, there are ways based on that mechanism to diffuse that crisis, or at least sort of stabilize things before the political leadership can work out a solution. In essence, to prevent escalation because of a lack of dialogue. And I think for those of you who've studied history, you know that many wars, many conflicts have occurred not because one power, one state decides to launch a war. That has occurred. But oftentimes, because there is an accident, an accidental collision. And I think many wars have occurred this way.  So the idea of a guardrail therefore, in the military domain, is to create, for example, channels of communication that could be used in the event of a conflict. I think the easiest parallel to imagine is the U.S. and the Soviet Union, where there were hotlines, for example, between Moscow and between Washington, D.C. during that era, where the seniormost national security aides of the presidents could directly reach out to each other in the event of a crisis.   In the China context, what has been difficult is some of those channels exist. For example, the National Security Council Coordinator for Asia Kurt Campbell has said publicly: We have hotlines. The problem is that when the Americans pick up the phone and call, no one picks up on the other side. And in short, you know, having just the structure, the infrastructure, is insufficient if those infrastructure are not being used by the other side.   I think with respect to the U.S.-China context, probably, again, as I mentioned earlier, the largest obstacle is the fact that guardrails help the United States—or, in the Chinese perspective—from the Chinese perspective, any of these guardrails would essentially allow the U.S. to operate with greater confidence that, in the event of an accident, we will be able to control escalation. And from the Chinese perspective, they argue that because the United States fundamentally shouldn't be operating in the Taiwan Strait anyway, therefore by constructing that guardrail, by, for example, having dialogue to manage that risk, it would be legitimizing an illegitimate presence in the first place.   So that's always been perennially the problem. And I think the argument that the United States has made is that, well, sure, that may be your position. But it is in your interest as well not to have an accident spiral into a conflict. And so I think we've seen not a lot of progress on this front. I think, for example, in the aftermath of Speaker Pelosi's visit, there—you know, a lot of the defense cooperation ties were suspended.   But the last comment I'll make is that that doesn't necessarily mean that all dialogue has been stayed. There are still active channels between the United States and China. We have embassies in each other's countries. From public remarks, it seems like during moments of enhanced tension there are still ways for both governments to communicate with each other. So I think the good news is that it's not completely like the two countries aren't speaking to each other, but I think that there are not as many channels for reducing risk, managing potential crises, in the military sphere that exist today, that probably should exist.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Michael Long. Let's see. You need to unmute yourself.  LI: It looks like he's dropped off.  FASKIANOS: It looks like he put down his hand. OK. So let's go next to Conor O'Hara.  Q: Hi. My name is Conor O'Hara. And I'm a graduate student at the Pepperdine University School of Public Policy.  In one of my classes, titled America's Role in the World, we often talk about how America really does not have a comprehensive understanding of China. Not only China's military and state department, but really China as a society. How can Americans change that? And where does America need to focus its efforts in understanding China? And then also, one other thing I think of, is, you know, where does that understanding begin? You know, how early in someone's education or really within, say, the United States State Department do we need to focus our efforts on building an understanding? Thank you.  LI: Great. Well, thanks for the question. It's a great question. Very hard challenge as well.  I think that's absolutely true. I think the degree of understanding of China—of actually most countries—(laughs)—around the world—among senior U.S. foreign policy practitioners, I think, is insufficient. I think particularly with respect to China, and also Asia broadly, much of the diplomatic corps, the military establishment, intelligence officers, many of those people have essentially cut their teeth over the last twenty-five years focusing on the Middle East and counterterrorism. And that makes sense because the United States was engaged in two wars in that region.  But going back farther, many of the national security professionals before that generation were focused on the Soviet Union, obviously because of the Cold War. And so really, you're absolutely correct that the number of people in the United States government who have deep China expertise academically or even professionally on the ground, or even have the linguistic ability to, you know, speak Mandarin, or other countries—or, languages of other countries in East Asia, I think is absolutely limited. I think the State Department, of course, has—as well as the intelligence community, as well as the Department of Defense—has tried to over the last few years reorient and rebalance priorities and resources there. But I think it's still—my understanding, today it's still limited. And I think there's a lot of work to be done.  I think your question on how do you understand China as a society, I think with any country, number one, of course, is history. You know, every country's politics, its policy, its government is informed by its history of, you know, modern history but also history going back farther. And I think China is no exception. In fact, Chinese society, and even the Communist Party of China, is deeply, I think, entrenched in a historical understanding of its role in the world, of how it interacts compared with its people, its citizens, its foreign conflicts. And so I think, number one is to understand the history of modern China. And I think anyone who seeks to be involved in discussions and research and debate on China does need to understand that history.  I think the second point is linguistics is actually quite important. Being able to speak the language, read the language, understand the language is important. Because so much of what is written—so much of our knowledge as, you know, American think tank researchers, is based on publicly available information in China. And a lot of that primarily is in Mandarin. So most speeches that the senior leadership of China deliver are actually in Mandarin. And some of them are translated, but not all of them. A lot of the documents that they issue, a lot of academics who write about—academics in China who write about foreign policy and international relations, write in Mandarin.  And so I think that an ability to be able to read in the original text is quite important. And in fact, you know, a lot of the nuances, and specifically in the Communist Party's ideology, how it sees itself, its role in the world, a lot of that really is best captured and best understood in its original language. Some of the—you know, the ideology, the campaigns of propaganda, et cetera.  And I think the last part of your question was how early. I am not an education scholar. (Laughs.) I don't study education or developmental psychology. But, you know, I imagine, you know, as with anything, linguistics, language, is best learned—or, most easily learned early on. But I think that does not mean that, you know, someone who's in college or graduate school can't begin to learn in a different language. So I'd answer your question like that.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Lucksika Udomsrisumran, a graduate student at New York University.  What is the implication of the Biden administration's three pillars of the Indo-Pacific strategy on the Mekong and the South China Sea? Which pillars do you see these two issues in, from the Biden administration's point of view?  LI: OK. I think, if I'm understanding the question correctly about South China Sea, you know, I think in general the South China Sea probably would most easily fall into the competition category. There are obviously not only the United States and China, but other countries in the region, including the Philippines, for example, are claimants to the South China Sea. And so I think there's always been some disagreement and some tensions in that region.  I think that that has largely been—the U.S. response or U.S. policy in South China Sea is just essentially, from the military perspective, has been to—you know, the slogan is, or the line is, to fly, sail, operate, et cetera—I'm not quoting that correctly—(laughs)—but essentially to operate wherever international law permits. And so that means Freedom of Navigation Operations, et cetera, in the South China Sea. I think that, of course, raises objections from other governments, mainly China, in the region.   So I would say that probably belongs in the competition category. And we spoke about earlier the idea of managing some of the risk that occurs or that emerges when the PLA Navy and the United States Navy operate in close proximity in that region. So from that perspective, if you're talking about risk reduction and crisis management, that actually could fall into collaboration or cooperation. But I think primarily it's competition.   FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Joan Kaufman. And, Joan, I know you wrote your question, but if you could ask it that would be great.  Q: Yes, will. Yes, certainly. Hi, Chris. Really great to see you here during this talk.  LI: Yeah, likewise.  Q: A proud Schwarzman Scholar.  I wanted to ask you a question about Ukraine and China's, you know, kind of difficult position in the middle almost, you know, as sort of seemingly allied with Russia, or certainly not criticizing Russia. And then just putting forth this twelve-point peace plan last week for—and offering to broker peace negotiations and a ceasefire for Ukraine. You know, there's no love lost in Washington for China on, you know, how it has positioned itself on this issue. And, you know, frankly, given China's own kind of preoccupation with sovereignty over the years, how do you see the whole thing? And what comments might you make on that?  LI: Right. Well, first of all, thanks so much, Joan, for joining. And very grateful for all of—all that you've done for the Schwarzman Scholars Program over the past. I appreciate your time very much.  The Ukraine problem is an incredibly important one. And I think absolutely China is involved. And it's a very complicated position that it's trying to occupy here, with both supporting its security partner, Russia, but also not directly being involved in the conflict because of U.S. opposition and opposition from NATO. So I think it's—obviously, China is playing a very delicate balancing role here.  I think a couple points. So the first is that I think my view is that, for the Chinese leadership, Ukraine—or, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a deeply uncomfortable geopolitical situation, where there is essentially not a—there's no good outcome, really, because, as you mentioned, Ukraine is a country with which China has diplomatic recognition. It recognizes it. It has an embassy there. And the Chinese foreign ministry, Chinese foreign policy, has long very much supported the concept of sovereignty, and being able to determine your own future as a country. And I think, in fact, that's been one of the pillars and one of the objections to many American actions in the past. So on one hand, it says: We support sovereignty of every country, of which Ukraine is a country that is recognized by China.  And on the other hand, though, Russia, of course, which has had long complaints and issues with NATO expansion, is a partner of China. And so it's obviously supporting Russia. It has alignment of interests between Russia and China in many ways, in many dimensions, including objections to, for example, U.S. presence in Europe, U.S. presence in Asia. So it's a delicate balancing act. And I think from what we've seen, there hasn't been sort of a clear one-sided answer, where you've seen both statements, you know, proposing peace and saying that, you know, all sides should deescalate. But on the other hand, the U.S. government, the Biden administration, is now publicly stating that they are concerned about China potentially lending support to Russia.  So, you know, in short, I think it's very difficult to really understand what exactly is going on in the minds of the Chinese leadership. But I think that we'll continue to see sort of this awkward back and forth and trying—this purported balancing act between both sides. But I think, you know, largely—my assessment is that it's not going to go very clearly in one direction or the other.  I think the other comment I would make is that I think, from Beijing's perspective, the clear analogy here is one for Taiwan. Because—and this has been something that has been discussed in the think tank community very extensively. But the expectation I think among many in Washington was that Ukraine would not be able to put up much resistance. In short, this would be a very, very easy victory for Putin. And I think that was a—you know, not a universal consensus, but many people believed that, in short, Russia with all of its military might, would have no issues subjugating Ukraine very quickly.  I think people have largely found that to be, you know, a strategic failure on Russia's part. And so today, you know, one year after the invasion, Ukraine is still sovereign, is still standing, is still strong. And so I think—from that perspective, I think this—the war in Ukraine must give many of the leaders in China pause when it comes to thinking about a Taiwan continency, especially using force against Taiwan. Because, again, I think the degree of support, both militarily, politically, economically, for the resistance that Ukraine has shown against Russia among NATO members, among other Western countries, I think has been deeply surprising to many observers how robust that support has been. And I think that if you're sitting in Beijing and thinking about what a potential response to a Taiwan contingency might be, that would absolutely inform your calculus.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Lindsey McCormack, a graduate student at Baruch College.  How is the Biden administration's compete, cooperate, limited adversarial approach playing out with climate policy? What are you seeing right now in terms of the Chinese government's approach to energy security and climate?  LI: Yeah. It's a great question. Thanks for the question.  You know, we mentioned earlier, you know, I think the Biden administration's approach has been, you know, despite all of the disagreements between the United States and the Chinese government, there should be room for cooperation on climate because, as the Biden administration says, the climate is an existential risk to all of humanity. It's an issue of shared concern. So it's one that is not defined by any given country or constrained to one set of borders. I think it's largely not been very successful, in short, because China has not seemed to display much interest in cooperating on climate with the United States. And, again, China has largely coupled cooperation, linked cooperation in climate—or, on climate to other issues.  And so, you know, I think it's been reported that at several of the meetings between Secretary Blinken, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, and their Chinese counterparts, the Chinese officials had essentially given the American officials a list saying: Here are the twenty-something things that we object to. Why don't you stop all of these, correct all of your mistakes—so to speak—and then we'll talk about what we can do next. And so I think, again, that—you know, that, to me, indicates that this framework of compartmentalizing cooperation and competition has some flaws, because the idea that you can simply compartmentalize and say: We're going to cooperate at full capacity on climate, but we're not going to—you know, but we'll compete on technology, it just—it actually doesn't work in this situation.  I think the other comment I'll make is that what the Biden administration has done is—which I think has been effective—is reframed the notion of cooperation. Where, in the past, cooperation was sort of viewed as a favor that the Chinese government did to the Americans, to the American government. That if we—if the United States, you know, offered certain inducements or there were strong elements of the relationship, then China would cooperate and that would be a favor.   And I think the Biden administration has reframed that approach, where cooperation is now presented not as a favor that any country does to another, but rather sort of is shared here. And that this is something of concern to China, to the United States, to other countries, and so all major countries need to play their part, and step up their game, to take on. I think, unfortunately, it hasn't been extremely successful. But I think that there—I hope that there will be future progress made in this area.  FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to go next to Jeremiah Ostriker, who has raised—a raised hand, and also written your question. But you can ask it yourself. And you have to accept the unmute prompt. Is that happening? All right. I think I might have to read it.  Q: Am I unmuted now?  FASKIANOS: Oh, you are. Fantastic.  Q: OK. First, I'll say who I am. I am a retired professor from Princeton University and Columbia University and was an administrative provost at Princeton.  And our China policies have puzzled me. I have visited China many times. And I have wondered—I'll quote my questions now—I have wondered why we are as negative towards China as we have been. So specifically, does the U.S. foreign policy establishment need enemies to justify its existence? Is it looking around the world for enemies? And why should we care if other countries choose to govern themselves in ways which are antithetical to the way that we choose to govern ourselves? And, finally, why not cooperate with all countries on projects of common interest, regardless of other issues?  LI: Great. Well, first of all, thank you for the question—or, three questions, which are all extremely important. I'll do my best to answer, but these are very difficult questions, and I think they touch on a more philosophical understanding of what is American foreign policy for, what is the purpose of America's role in the world, et cetera. But I'll try to do my best.  I think on the first part, does the United States need enemies, is it looking to make enemies? I think if you asked any—and these are, of course, my own assessments. I think if you asked any administration official, whether in this current administration or in previous administrations—Republican or Democrat—I don't think anyone would answer “yes.” I think the argument that has been made across administrations in a bipartisan fashion is that foreign policy is fundamentally about defending American interests and American values. In essence, being able to support the American way of life, which obviously is not necessarily one clearly defined entity. (Laughs.)  But I think, therefore, all of our policy toward China is sort of geared at maintaining, or securing, defending U.S. interests in the region. And where the argument about your question comes into play is that I think a lot of—the Biden administration, the Trump administration, the Obama administration would argue that many of the concerns that the United States has with China are not fundamentally only about internal issues, where this is a question of how they govern themselves. But they touch upon issues of shared concern. They touch upon issues that actually affect U.S. interests.   And so, for example, the South China Sea is, again—is a space that is—contains much trade. There are many different countries in the region that access the South China Sea. So it's not necessarily just an issue—and, again, this is Secretary Blinken's position that he made clear—it's not just an issue specific to China. It does touch upon global trade, global economics, global rules, and global order. And I think this is the term that has been often used, sort of this liberal international rules-based order.   And while that's sort of an amorphous concept, in essence what I think the term implies is the idea that there are certain standards and rules by which different countries operate that allow for the orderly and for the peaceful and the secure exchange of goods, of ideas, of people, of—so that each country is secure. And I think this—again, this broader concept is why I think successive U.S. administrations have focused on China policy, because I think some of, in their view, China's behaviors impinge on U.S. interests in the region.   I think the second question is why should we care about how other countries govern themselves? I think in a way, the answer the Biden administration—this current administration has given to that question is: The U.S. government under President Biden is not trying to fundamentally change the Chinese system of governance. And I think you've seen Jake Sullivan and Tony Blinken say that publicly, that they are not seeking the collapse or the fundamental change in the Communist Party's rule of China. So I think in that sense, they have made that—they have made that response. I think, again, where there are issues—there are tensions, is when actions that the Chinese government take then touch upon U.S. interests. And I think we see that in Taiwan. We see that with economics. We see that with trade, et cetera.   And then finally, why not cooperate with every country in the world? I think obviously in an ideal world, that would be the case. All countries would be able to only cooperate, and all concerns shared among different nations would be addressed. I think unfortunately one of the problems that we're seeing now is that large major powers, like China and Russia, have very different worldviews. They see a world that is very different in its structure, and its architecture, and its organization, than the one that the U.S. sees. And I think that's what's led to a lot of tension.  FASKIANOS: So we have a written question from Julius Haferkorn, a student at California State University and Tübingen University, in Germany.  Ever since the escalation of the Ukraine war, there are discussions about the risk that, should Russia be successful with its invasion, China might use this as a template in regards to Taiwan. In your opinion, is this a realistic scenario?  LI: Great. Thanks for the question.  I think there are definitely analogies to be drawn between Ukraine and Taiwan, but I think there are also significant differences. The first is the relationship between Russia and Ukraine is one of two sovereign nations that the United States and international community recognizes. I think with Taiwan, what has—going back to our history question—Taiwan is a very complicated issue, even with regard to U.S. policies. The United States does not recognize Taiwan formally as an independent country. The United States actually does not take a position on the status of Taiwan. Briefly, the One China Policy, as articulated in the three communiques, the three joint communiques, essentially says that the United States government acknowledges the Chinese position that there is one China, and Taiwan is part of China, et cetera, et cetera.  And that word “acknowledge” is pretty key, because in essential its strategic ambiguity. It's saying, we acknowledge that the PRC government says this. We don't challenge that position. But we don't necessarily recognize or completely accept. And, obviously, the Mandarin version of the text is slightly different. It uses a term that is closer to “recognize.” But that ambiguity, in a way, permitted normalization and led to the democratization of Taiwan, China's economic growth and miracle, its anti-poverty campaign. So in essence, it's worked—this model has worked for the last forty-something years.  But I think that does mean that the situation across the Taiwan Strait is very different, because here the United States does not recognize two countries on both sides of the strait. Rather, it has this ambiguity, this policy of ambiguity. And in short, the only U.S. criterion for resolution of issues across the Taiwan Strait is peace. So all of the documents that the U.S. has articulated over successive administrations essentially boil down to: As long as the resolution of issues between Taiwan and the PRC and mainland China are peaceful, then the United States is not involved. That the only thing that the United States opposes is a forceful resolution—use of military force, use of coercion. And that's what is problematic.  I think what you've seen increasingly over the last few years is a sort of—it's not a formal shift away from that policy, but definitely slowly edging away from that policy. Now, any administration official will always deny that there are any changes to our One China Policy. And I think that's always been the refrain: Our One China Policy has not changed. But you've actually seen within that One China Policy framework adjustments, accommodations—or, not accommodations—but adjustments, recalibrations. And the way that the successive U.S. administrations defend that or justify it, is because it is our—it is the American One China Policy. Therefore, we can define what that One China Policy actually means.  But you have seen, in essence, greater increased relations and exchanges between officials in Taiwan, officials in the United States. I think it was publicly reported just a couple weeks ago that some of the senior national security officials in Taipei visited the United States. Secretary Pompeo at the end of his tenure as secretary of state changed some of the previous restrictions on—that were self-imposed restrictions—on interactions between the government in Taiwan and the government in the United States. So we're seeing some changes here. And I think that has led to—or, that is one element that has led to some of the tensions across the Taiwan Strait.   Obviously, from Beijing's perspective, it sees that as the U.S. sliding away from its commitments. Now, on the other hand, Beijing, of course, has also started to change its policy, despite claiming that its policy is exactly the same. You've seen greater military incursions in Taiwan's air defense identification zone, with planes, fighter jets, that are essentially flying around the island. You've seen greater geoeconomic coercion targeted at Taiwan in terms of sanctions. So you've seen essentially changes on all sides.  And so the final point I'll leave here—I'll leave with you is that the refrain that the United States government articulates of opposing any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, to me, is actually quite ambiguous. Because there's never been a status quo that has truly existed. It's always been a dynamic equilibrium between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington, D.C. Where Beijing is seeking to move Taiwan toward unification. Taiwan, at least under its current leadership, under Tsai Ing-wen, is obviously seeking, in a way, to move from at least—at least to move toward de facto or maintain de facto independence. Whether it's moving toward de jure is a topic of debate. And then the United States, of course, is enhancing its relationship with Taiwan.  So there's never been a static status quo between the three sides. It's always been a dynamic, evolving and changing equilibrium. Which is why the concept of opposing unilateral changes to the status quo, in my view, is almost paradoxical, because there has never been a status quo in the first place.  FASKIANOS: There has been some talk that Kevin McCarthy, the speaker of the House, is planning a trip to Taiwan. Given what happened with Speaker Pelosi, is that a—what do you think of that musing, to go to Taiwan, to actually do that?  LI: Mhm, yes. I think that's obviously been reported on. I think it's an area of close attention from everyone watching this space. I haven't seen any reports. All I can say is based on what I've seen reported in the media. And it seems like, based on—because of domestic preoccupations, that trip, whether it happens or not, is right now, at the moment, on the back burner. But I think that if he were to go, I think it would certainly precipitate a quite significant response from China. And I think whether that would be larger or smaller than what happened after Speaker Pelosi's visit, I think is something that is uncertain now.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. We'll go next to Autumn Hauge.  Q: Hi. I'm Autumn Hauge. I'm a student at Minnesota State University, Mankato.  So my question is, since a focus of the Biden administration's foreign policy is the relationship between the United States and China, and another focus is to invest and grow a presence in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically looking at the relationship between the United States and the Micronesian country of the Republic of Palau, whose government has openly shared their support for Taiwan, do you think that the United States' long history with the Republic of Palau, and their connection to their support—the Republic of Palau's support to Taiwan, halters the ability for the U.S. to grow a positive relation with China? Thank you.  LI: Great. Thanks for the question. It's a great question.  I am not an expert on Palau or its politics. I do know that Palau has enhanced its exchanges, it relationship with Taipei, over the last few years. I think we saw Palau's president, I think, visit Taipei. I think the U.S. ambassador to Palau actually visited Taipei. And there have been increasing—during COVID, there was a discussion of a travel bubble between Taiwan and Palau. So there's definitely been increasing exchange.  I think in general this has always been a key obstacle to U.S.-China relations, which is any country that still recognizes the Republic of China—that is the formal name of the government currently in Taiwan—I think presents a significant issue. Because for the PRC, recognition of the One China—what they call the One China Principle, the idea that there is one China, Taiwan is part of that China, and the legitimate government of China is the People's Republic of China, is a precondition for any diplomatic normalization with Beijing. And so I think certainly, you know, there are a small handful of countries that still recognize the ROC, but I think that they—you know, for those countries and their relationships with the PRC, of course, that's a significant hindrance.  In what you've seen in the U.S. government in the past few years is that for countries that derecognize Taipei and sort of switch recognition to Beijing, the PRC, there's been discussion—I think, there have been several bills introduced, in essence, to punish those countries. I don't necessarily think that those bills have ended up becoming law, but I think there is, given the current political dynamics, the sort of views on China in Washington, D.C., there is this sense that the U.S. needs to support countries that still recognize Taiwan, the ROC, and be able to provide support so that they don't feel pressured to switch their recognition.  My personal view is that I think that that is, on the whole, relatively insignificant. I won't say that it's completely not significant, but I think that in general issues around the Taiwan Strait, cross-strait relations, I think military issues, I think political issues related to exchanges between Taiwan and Beijing, I think those issues are much more important and much more critical to driving changes in the relationship across the Taiwan Strait.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to try and sneak in one last question from Wim Wiewel, who's a student at Portland State University.   Given your pessimism about cooperation combined with competition, what do you think is the long-term future for U.S.-China relations?  LI: OK. Well, thanks for the question. I'm not sure that I can provide a satisfying answer. And, in fact, I don't have the answer. You know, I think if anyone had the answer, then they should immediately tell the Biden administration that they've solved the problem.  Even though I am pessimistic about this current framework, just because of its demonstrated effects, I still think that in general the likelihood of a real war, which I think people have floated now—you know, Professor Graham Allison, who I used to work for, wrote a book called Destined for War? I still believe that the probability of all-out great-power conflict in a kinetic way, a military way, is still relatively low. I think that there are significant differences today compared to the era during World War I and World War II era.   I think that the degree of economic interdependence between China and not only the United States but the rest of the world, I think is a significant gamechanger in how countries position themselves vis-à-vis China. I think Europe is the great example here of how there are many countries that invest, have business relationships, have trade with China. And so therefore, their policy on China has been a little bit more calibrated than what the United States has been doing.   And so on the whole, I think most people still recognize that any great-power war between the United States and China would be utterly catastrophic. And I think that despite all the tensions that exist today, I think that that recognition, that consensus is pretty universally held, that a great-power war between the U.S. and China would be extremely bad. I think that is—that is probably something that is understood by Republican administrations, Democratic administrations, folks in Beijing, folks around the world, in the region. And so I think that, hopefully, that idea, that despite disagreements, despite political tensions, the need to prevent all-out global conflict is quite important, is a vital interest, I think, hopefully, to me, provides some optimism. And hopefully we'll be able to continue to carry our relationship with China through.  And I'm hopeful especially that all of you students, researchers, who hope to study, and write about, and even perhaps participate in American foreign policy, will continue to think. Because so much of the future of the U.S.-China relationship and U.S. foreign policy is going to be determined by your generation. So with that, I guess this would be a perfect place to stop. And I thank you for the question.   FASKIANOS: Absolutely. Well, Chris, this has been fantastic. I apologize to all of you. We had many more—many questions in the written part and raised hands. And I'm sorry that we could not get to all of them. We'll just have to have you back and continue to cover this issue. So we really appreciate your insights, Chris Li. So thank you again.  The next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, March 22, at 1:00 p.m. (EDT). Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly will lead a conversation on U.S. relations with South America. And in the meantime, please do learn more about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/careers. You can follow us at @CFR_academic, and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. And I'm sure you can also go to the Belfer Center for additional analysis by Chris Li. So I encourage you to go there as well.  Thank you all, again, for being with us, and we look forward to continuing the conversation on March 22. So thank you, all. Thanks, Chris.  LI: Thank you.  (END) 

Tonight's rundown:  Talking Points Memo: Russia pulls out of the last standing nuclear treaty with the U.S., this as China pledges to discuss the issue with Vladamir Putin. Bill examines where we stand with Russia and China Harvard Prof. Graham Allison joins the No Spin News The immigration crisis now moves north as the border patrol asks for help along the Candian Border The Biden administration rolls out new asylum policies that mirror the previous administration This Day in History: George Washington is born Final Thought: Ash Wednesday Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

To commemorate the 10th anniversary of the China in the World podcast, Carnegie China is launching a series of lookback episodes, using clips from previous interviews to put current international issues in context. For the first episode in this series, the podcast looks back on ten years of U.S.-China diplomacy following the postponement of U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken's planned visit to China in early 2023.The China in the World podcast has spanned three U.S. administrations and covered several historic bilateral meetings, from Obama and Xi's summit in Sunnylands, California in June 2013 to Trump and Xi's meeting at Mar-a-Lago in April 2017. This episode gives a glimpse into the evolution of U.S.-China relations during a pivotal decade and sheds light on what can be accomplished during high-level meetings–what went right and what went wrong during past meetings. The episode features clips from Paul Haenle's interviews with over 20 American, Chinese, and international experts on foreign affairs: Stephen J. Hadley, former U.S. National Security Advisor, Xie Tao, Dean of the School of International Relations at Beijing Foreign Studies University, Yan Xuetong, Dean of the Institute of International Relations at Tsinghua University, Randall Schriver, former Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, Evan Medeiros, Professor at Georgetown University and former advisor to President Obama, Zhao Hai, research fellow at the National Strategy Institute at Tsinghua University, Jia Dazhong, professor at the School of International Studies at Peking University, Ashley Tellis, senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, Danny Russel, former special assistant to President Obama and senior director for Asian Affairs on the National Security Council, Jake Sullivan, National Security Advisor and former senior fellow at the Carnegie Endowment, Cui Liru, former president of the China Institutes of Contemporary International Relations, Doug Paal, former vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment, Graham Allison, Director of the Belfer Center at the Harvard Kennedy School, William J. Burns, CIA Director and former President of the Carnegie Endowment, Susan Thornton, former Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the Department of State, Evan Feigenbaum, Vice President for studies at the Carnegie Endowment, Jie Dalei, associate professor at the School of International Studies at Peking University, Da Wei, director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, Tong Zhao, senior fellow at Carnegie China, and Hoang Thi Ha, senior fellow at the ISEAS-Yusof Ishak Institute.

REDIFF - La Chine peut-elle devenir le maître du monde ? La question ne cesse de revenir. Dans Vers la guerre : la Chine et l'Amérique dans le piège de Thucydide ?, Graham Allison explique que dans l'Histoire, de façon régulière, un combat se déroule entre deux puissances : une puissance dominante - mais déclinante - et une autre, en croissance, amenée à prendre la place. Pour étayer son analyse, Graham Allison s'appuie sur la rivalité entre Spartes et Athènes. Il estime qu'aujourd'hui cette rivalité est entre les États-Unis et la Chine. "Hors-série Lenglet & Co", un podcast hebdomadaire présenté par François Lenglet et Sylvain Zimmermann, qui vous donne les clés pour tout comprendre des évolutions et des mutations économiques, en Europe et dans le monde.

Has the world become more or less safe over the years? How do we measure risk in these times of crazy change? Neeti Bhalla Johnson joins Vasant Dhar in episode 52 of Brave New World to share her thoughts on how professionals do it! Useful resources: 1. Neeti Bhalla Johnson on LinkedIn and Liberty Mutual. 2. Daniel Kahneman on How Noise Hampers Judgement -- Episode 21 of Brave New World. 3. Noise: A Flaw in Human Judgement — Daniel Kahneman, Olivier Sibony and Cass Sunstein. 4. Thinking, Fast and Slow — Daniel Kahneman. 5. Dissecting “Noise” — Vasant Dhar. 6. Factfulness -- Hans Rosling. 7. Global Deaths in Conflicts Since the Year 1400 -- Chart by Max Roser. 8. War and Peace -- Max Roser, Joe Hasell, Bastian Herre and Bobbie Macdonald. 8. Destined for War.-- Graham Allison. 9. The Technology Wars — Episode 1 of Brave New World (w Arun Sundararajan). 10. The Fifth Risk: Undoing Democracy -- Michael Lewis. Check out Vasant Dhar's newsletter on Substack. Subscription is free!

It's no secret that relations between China and the US are at an all time low. And at the center of this fraught relationship is the question of Taiwan: China is moving closer to asserting its territorial rights over the island, while US President Joe Biden has pledged to defend Taiwan, even going so far as sending defensive weapons to protect the country against a Chinese invasion. How should a superpower like the US respond to a rising power like China? Foreign policy expert Graham Allison joins us for a wide reaching conversation about this important moment in history, and how shared interests in the climate, technology, finance, and health could force these powerful rivals to become unwilling partners.   The host of the Munk Debates is Rudyard Griffiths - @rudyardg.   Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to podcast@munkdebates.com.   To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 10+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ Senior Producer: Ricki Gurwitz

Этот выпуск - первый из "тематической" рубрики. В рамках этой рубрики мы будем анализировать одну конкретную тему либо одно конкретное государство: нынешнюю политическую обстановку, историю, факторы, которые влияли/влияют на развитие страны. В этом выпуске - важная и масштабная тема о геополитическом противостоянии между США и Китаем. Мы разбираем причины этого противостояния, а также мотивации сторон. Поскольку подкаст образовательный, для слушателей, желающих углубиться в тему, мы подготовили список рекомендуемой литературы по теме: - Aaron Friedberg. Getting China Wrong (2022) - Rush Doshi. The Long Game (2021) - Henry Kissinger. On China (2011) - C. Fred Bergsten. The United States vs. China: The Quest for Global Economic Leadership (2022) - Graham Allison. Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides's Trap? (2017)

This week on Intelligence Matters, Michael Morell speaks with Professor at the Harvard Kennedy School and national security analyst Graham Allison as he re-examines his interviews on China with Former Prime Minister of Singapore Lee Kuan Yew. Allison inspects how their analysis and predictions on China hold up ten years later. Allison discusses Xi's plan for China, the negative consequences of bellicose rhetoric, and how Taiwan could potentially trigger a war between the U.S. and China. See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Originally Aired: August 3, 2017 We present you, our beloved Deep State nerds, with the face-off you've been anticipating all summer. Our expert team breaks down rising powers, ruling powers, and the forces that drive war. Graham Allison and Kori Schake debate The Thucydides Trap, Rosa Brooks and David Rothkopf help us make sense of the similarities between ancient and modern history, all while convincing us to read The History of the Peloponnesian War. Come for the cage match and stay until the very end for some chilling insights into North Korea. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Originally Aired: August 3, 2017 We present you, our beloved Deep State nerds, with the face-off you've been anticipating all summer. Our expert team breaks down rising powers, ruling powers, and the forces that drive war. Graham Allison and Kori Schake debate The Thucydides Trap, Rosa Brooks and David Rothkopf help us make sense of the similarities between ancient and modern history, all while convincing us to read The History of the Peloponnesian War. Come for the cage match and stay until the very end for some chilling insights into North Korea. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

La Chine peut-elle devenir le maître du monde ? La question ne cesse de revenir. Dans Vers la guerre : la Chine et l'Amérique dans le piège de Thucydide ?, Graham Allison explique que dans l'Histoire, de façon régulière, un combat se déroule entre deux puissances : une puissance dominante - mais déclinante - et une autre, en croissance, amenée à prendre la place. Pour étayer son analyse, Graham Allison s'appuie sur la rivalité entre Spartes et Athènes. Il estime qu'aujourd'hui cette rivalité est entre les États-Unis et la Chine. "Hors-série Lenglet & Co", un podcast hebdomadaire présenté par François Lenglet et Sylvain Zimmermann, qui vous donne les clés pour tout comprendre des évolutions et des mutations économiques, en Europe et dans le monde.

Le fait géopolitique majeur des prochaines années, c'est la rivalité entre la Chine et les États-Unis. Une nouvelle guerre froide. Le chercheur Graham Allison estime qu'on est à la fin du "Siècle américain". On a l'impression que la rupture date de la présidence de Donald Trump. Il a été le déclencheur, mais les tensions s'étaient accumulées depuis Barack Obama. "Hors-série Lenglet & Co", un podcast hebdomadaire présenté par François Lenglet et Sylvain Zimmermann, qui vous donne les clés pour tout comprendre des évolutions et des mutations économiques, en Europe et dans le monde.

Le fait géopolitique majeur des prochaines années, c'est la rivalité entre la Chine et les États-Unis. Une nouvelle guerre froide. Le chercheur Graham Allison estime qu'on est à la fin du "Siècle américain". On a l'impression que la rupture date de la présidence de Donald Trump. Il a été le déclencheur, mais les tensions s'étaient accumulées depuis Barack Obama. "Hors-série Lenglet & Co", un podcast hebdomadaire présenté par François Lenglet et Sylvain Zimmermann, qui vous donne les clés pour tout comprendre des évolutions et des mutations économiques, en Europe et dans le monde.

Nancy Pelosi has touched down in Taiwan and thrown the U.S.-China relationship into tumult. David sits down with Graham Allison of Harvard University, Rosa Brooks of Georgetown University, and David Sanger of the New York Times to discuss the trip and its impact on the future of Taiwan and U.S.-China relations. Should Nancy Pelosi have gone to Taiwan? How big a strain will this actually put on the relationship between the U.S. and China? Is strategic ambiguity dead or alive? Find out in this vital conversation. Join us! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Nancy Pelosi has touched down in Taiwan and thrown the U.S.-China relationship into tumult. David sits down with Graham Allison of Harvard University, Rosa Brooks of Georgetown University, and David Sanger of the New York Times to discuss the trip and its impact on the future of Taiwan and U.S.-China relations. Should Nancy Pelosi have gone to Taiwan? How big a strain will this actually put on the relationship between the U.S. and China? Is strategic ambiguity dead or alive? Find out in this vital conversation. Join us! Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

US-based Post journalist Owen Churchill goes beyond the "playing with fire" headlines to analyse what was discussed – and what was not – in the 2.5-hour phone call between Xi Jinping and Joe Biden, as well as the domestic pressures from Nancy Pelosi's potential visit to Taiwan. Post diplomacy expert Shi Jiangtao looks at political scientist Graham Allison's theory of the 'Thucydides Trap', its forecast of war between the US and China and its relevance to the current state of Sino-US relations.

China has begun to meet with banks to discuss plans to protect itself against sanctions should it come to that. China is much more vulnerable to US sanctions than Russia given the massive reliance on the dollar and its huge holdings of US treasuries. However, the US is also extremely reliant on Chinese exports given the massive trade deficit each year.   Changing World Order by Ray Dalio: https://amzn.to/3ybpbp6 Destined for War by Graham Allison: https://amzn.to/2Dsku1R 

Russia raised the spectre of nuclear war this week as it struggles to make headway in Ukraine. How seriously should this threat be taken and can Vladimir Putin rely on his friendship with China's Xi Jinping? Gideon discusses these questions with US political scientist Graham Allison, author of the classic study of the Cuban missile crisis, ‘Essence of Decision', and of a book on US-China relations, ‘Destined for War'.Clips: ABC, BloombergWant to read more?‘At war with the whole world': why Putin might be planning a long conflict in UkraineBiden, Putin and the danger of VersaillesRussia's invasion of Ukraine in maps Subscribe to The Rachman Review wherever you get your podcasts - please listen, rate and subscribe.Presented by Gideon Rachman. Produced by Fiona Symon. Sound design by Jasiu SigsworthRead a transcript of this episode on FT.com See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Links1. "Winged Luddites: Aviators are the Biggest threat to Carrier Aviation," by Noah Spataro, Trevor Phillips-Levine and Andrew Tenbusch. War on the Rocks, January 10, 2022.2. "Regaining the High Ground at Sea: Transforming the Navy's Carrier Air Wing for Great Power Competition," by Bryan Clark, Adam Lemon, Peter Haynes, Kyle Libby and Gillian Evans. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2018.3. "US Navy Fly Two Remotely Controlled EA-18G Growlers in Test Flights," by Graham Allison. UK Defense Journal, 5 February 2020. 4. "Midrats Episode 614: Big Navy vs Reconnaissance & Strike Capable Drones." USNI Blog, January 22, 2022. 5. "The Rise of A.I. Fighter Pilots," by Sue Halpern. The New Yorker, January 24, 2022.6. "The Future is Unmanned: Why the Navy's Next Generation Fighter Shouldn't Have a Pilot," by Walker Mills, Trevor Phillips-Levine and Dylan Phillips-Levine. CIMSEC, February 25, 2021.

Graham Allison on World Affairs, Open Border Chaos, Peter Breen from the Thomas More Society, and Florida's 'Don't Say Gay' Bill, Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

THE THESIS: The information battles will only be won by behaviors. On a godly basis, the generations are watching how we behave and, in the case of families, values are inherited through behaviors not received through instruction. We must live our faith. On a secular basis, build a parallel society or take theirs over.  THE SCRIPTURE & SCRIPTURAL RESOURCES:  The Bible on teaching children 12 Biblical truths THE NEWS & COMMENT: The fog of war makes it difficult but there are three things we can say for certain about what's happening in Ukraine, says Dr. Graham Allison. "...the Russians, the Ukrainians, indeed the Americans, are engaged in an intense information war," he tells  - @BillOReilly Tesla CEO Elon Musk has become Left-wing social media platform Twitter's largest shareholder, taking 9.2% stake in Twitter Inc. (Blackrock and Vanguard are ahead if him and are effectively one company.) He may not be allowed to buy more than 14.9% Legislative approach to reigning in Twitter Elon Musk SLAMS Corporate Woke ESG Standards as ‘the Devil Incarnate' Russian nationals are crossing our southern border unlawfully. Americans deserve to know what's going on.  Rep.Andy Biggs on Newsmax China has a Covid PsyOp underway. Now, watch the supply chain crumble Hi Todd, I am a regular listener and a big fan. I often take notes from your show and share with others. When I heard the clip of the rise in military deaths by Todd Challender, I thought I had to look him up and see what more I could find on that information. Unfortunately what I found was concerning. Please tell me if this is just misinformation about your source or if there are other sources which I might seek out to verify this information apart from Todd Challender. https://narativ.org/2021/09/17/ghost-in-the-anti-vaccine-machine/ Thank you, Maria Military Doctor testifies in court that she was ordered to cover up & suppress huge amount of Covid-19 Vaccine injuries. NIH Admits it ‘Suppressed' Wuhan Lab Genetic Data, but Disputes Watchdog's ‘Deleted' Label Sequence data was removed from public access  Victoria Police wants Australians 'to forget what they've been up to'. @RitaPanahi nails it on @SkyNewsAust THE LISTENERS: Chad:  Todd I figured you should be the 1st to know. My Daughter, Banana, who is two years old didn't like her name. So she changed it. It was Lucy. I asked her if she was a girl. She said yes. I then asked her her name. She said Banana. Being loving parents we agree with The party that our two year old daughter knows what's best for her future so we are accepting of the new name change. We are concerned though, she changes her name every 20 minutes. Also, she did choose to be a kitty this morning. ---   ---   ---   --- Hey Todd, Love you man. Hey, I was just listening to my regular Christion programs on Bott Radio Network. I was surprised to hear a commercial for Harry's Razors. I can't believe a company that was offended by "Hate Speech" would go to a place where EVERYTHING would be considered "hate speech by the Left. Much less that BRN would take them on as an advertiser. I wrote Bott just a few minutes ago and let them know my feelings. (In a very Christian way:-). Just though you would want to know. Keep up the good work and stay strong. Your brother in Christ Bill MUSIC REVIEW A PERSONAL NOTE:   See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Today on Colloquy, we bring you a recent conversation with two of the country's leading experts on eastern Europe and national security. Dr. Fiona Hill is a senior fellow in the Center on the United States and Europe in the Foreign Policy program at the Brookings Institution. She recently served as deputy assistant to the president and senior director for European and Russian affairs on the National Security Council from 2017 to 2019. From 2006 to 2009, she served as national intelligence officer for Russia and Eurasia at The National Intelligence Council. She is author of the 2021 book, There Is Nothing for You Here: Finding Opportunity in the 21st Century and co-author of Mr. Putin: Operative in the Kremlin. She received her PhD from GSAS in 1998.Engaging Dr. Hill in discussion is Graham Allison,  the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University. Allison is a leading analyst of national security with special interests in nuclear weapons, Russia, China, and decision-making. As Assistant Secretary of Defense in the first Clinton Administration, Professor Allison received the Defense Department's highest civilian award, the Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service, for "reshaping relations with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to reduce the former Soviet nuclear arsenal." He received his PhD from GSAS in 1968.Next on Colloquy: Russia, Ukraine, and avoiding WWIII.

When Lee Kuan Yew speaks, presidents, prime ministers, diplomats, and CEOs listen. Lee, the founding father of modern Singapore and its prime minister from 1959 to 1990, has honed his wisdom during more than fifty years on the world stage. Almost single-handedly responsible for transforming Singapore into a Western-style economic success, he offers a unique perspective on the geopolitics of East and West. American presidents from Richard Nixon to Barack Obama have welcomed him to the White House; British prime ministers from Margaret Thatcher to Tony Blair have recognized his wisdom; and business leaders from Rupert Murdoch to Rex Tillerson, CEO of Exxon Mobil, have praised his accomplishments. This book gathers key insights from interviews, speeches, and Lee's voluminous published writings and presents them in an engaging question and answer format. Lee offers his assessment of China's future, asserting, among other things, that "China will want to share this century as co-equals with the U.S." He affirms the United States' position as the world's sole superpower but expresses dismay at the vagaries of its political system. He offers strategic advice for dealing with China and goes on to discuss India'sfuture, Islamic terrorism, economic growth, geopolitics and globalization, and democracy. Lee does not pull his punches, offering his unvarnished opinions on multiculturalism, the welfare state, education, and the free market. This audiobook belongs on the reading list of every world leader - including the one who took the oath of office on January 20, 2013.

Episode 117 I am super excited to share this episode with you!  Today, you get to hear from 3 of my mentors - people I trust, who have expertise in areas I am looking to improve and perfect.  Do you have mentors, people who you look to, to help you along the way to your goals?  If not, and you aren't sure how to find them, this episode is for you! Robyn Graham: https://robyngrahamphotography.com/resources/ https://www.instagram.com/therobyngraham/ Allison Scholes: https://bossladyinsweatpants.com/resources https://www.instagram.com/allisonscholes/ Shannon Baker:  http://bit.ly/CustomerCareProcessTemplate https://www.instagram.com/morethancapablemompreneur/ Important Links: Lora's Yeti Blue Mic click HERE For Lora's Dragon Pad pop filter click HERE For Lora's Sound Shield click HERE Learn Instagram and Canva easily and affordably, visit:  https://lorashipman.com/courses/  Check out Lora's Blog:  https://lorashipman.com/blog/ Connect with Lora on the Socials: Instagram:  https://www.instagram.com/lora_shipman/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/LoraShipmanOfficial/ YouTube Click HERE

Taking lessons from a historical pattern called "Thucydides's Trap," political scientist Graham Allison shows why a rising China and a dominant United States could be headed towards a violent collision no one wants -- and how we can summon the common sense and courage to avoid it. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

with Graham Allison and Matthew Colford "When a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power, shit happens." It's true of people, it's true of companies, and it's even more true of countries. It's also the fundamental insight captured by ancient Greek historian Thucydides in his History of The Pelopennesian War. But where he was describing the war between Sparta and Athens, modern historian and political scientist Graham Allison describes how U.S. and China can escape this rising vs. ruling power "Thucydides trap" in his new book, Destined for War. Allison -- advisor on U.S. national security and policy to several secretaries of defense spanning decades -- was former dean of the Kennedy School and most recently Director of Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. Based on an internal policy series lunch speaker event earlier this year (and moderated by a16z partner Matthew Colford), the conversation touches very briefly on centers of power and creativity; tech in China; North Korea; and finally, the role of applying history -- "applied history", much like the field of engineering could be considered applied physics -- to our thinking about the future. By analyzing the analogs and precedents in the historical record, what clues or insights or lessons might we draw? Because business as usual will produce history as usual argues Allison... but only those of us who fail to study history will repeat it.