Podcasts about one china

Good afternoon, I'm _____ with today's episode of EZ News. Tai-Ex opening The Tai-Ex opened down 45-points this morning from yesterday's close, at 21,492 on turnover of $2.9-billion N-T. Taiwan-China interactions continue despite stalled talks: MAC head Mainland Affairs Council head Chiu Chui-cheng says Taiwan and China still maintain some level of interaction, even though official dialogue has stalled. In an interview,Chiu said interactions with China are being carried out in line with the Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area. Chiu acknowledged that maintaining "normal dialogue" is currently difficult because Taiwan will never accept China's demand to treat the "1992 Consensus," based on the "One China principle," as a precondition (前提). Nevertheless, Chiu said some interaction continues between the MAC and China's Taiwan Affairs Office, as well as between the semi-official SEF and its Chinese counterpart, the Beijing-based Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits. Chiu also says individuals across the Strait, including Taiwanese businesspeople, scholars and journalists, frequently travel between the two sides and share information. World Masters Games' closing ceremony The closing ceremony of the 2025 World Masters Games will take place on the evening of May 30 at the New Taipei City Art Museum, featuring a star-studded lineup and spectacular visuals. New Taipei officials said the ceremony will begin at 7:00 p.m. and blend music, light, and live performances. To complement (為…增色) the artistic setting, the outdoor area will feature four major art installations highlighting the magic of light. And a 4.5-minute fireworks display will also light up the night sky, with popular band Energy headlining the event with a 20-minute finale performance. EU Trade Negotiator on US Talks A European Union official says he has had good trade talks with the Trump administration. AP correspondent Mike Hempen reports Amnesty Accuses M23 Rebels of War Crimes Human rights group Amnesty International accused the M23 rebels in eastern Congo of killing, torturing and forcibly disappearing civilian detainees in two rebel-controlled cities. Amnesty says “these acts violate (違反) international humanitarian law and may amount to war crimes.” The decades-long conflict in eastern Congo escalated in January. The Rwanda-backed M23 advanced and seized the strategic city of Goma in North Kivu province followed by Bukavu in February. Amnesty said that between February and April it interviewed 18 civilians who had been unlawfully detained by M23. They reported suffering brutal beatings and harsh detention conditions while their relatives were denied access to the detention sites. Canada King Charles Visit Britain's King Charles III has arrived in Ottawa on a visit that Canada's leader says will underscore (強調) his nation's sovereignty. The king and Queen Camilla were greeted at the airport by Mark Carney, Canada's new prime minister, along with Canada's first Indigenous governor general, Mary Simon. Aside from meeting privately with Carney, the king is scheduled to deliver the speech from the throne, which outlines the government's agenda for the new Parliament. The king is the head of state in Canada, which is a member of the British Commonwealth of former colonies. King Charles will return to the U.K. after today's speech and a visit to Canada's National War Memorial. That was the I.C.R.T. EZ News, I'm _____. －－－－以下訊息由 SoundOn 動態廣告贊助商提供－－－－ 【台灣虎航 台中獨家直飛名古屋】 開航價$2,399元起，中台灣虎迷每週3班直飛名古屋，說走就走！ 立即訂購：https://sofm.pse.is/7neb2p -- 你不理財，財不理你！想學理財，玉山罩你！ 玉山銀行全新Podcast節目《玉山學堂》 帶你深入淺出掌握每週市場脈動！ 還有知名主持人蔡尚樺領銜的跨世代對談， 從不同的角度打好理財基本功！ 現在就點擊連結收聽

In this week's episode of China Insider, Miles Yu discusses China-Holy See relations following the announcement of Pope Leo XIV, and China's historical policy record regarding religious freedom. Second, we revisit United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 and its varied interpretations from both sides of the Taiwan Strait, as the People's Republic of China seeks to legitimize the One China principle in international forums. Lastly, Miles unpacks China's historical role in the India-Pakistan conflict and the impact of Chinese military modernization efforts on the recent kinetic exchange in Kashmir.]China Insider is a weekly podcast project from Hudson Institute's China Center, hosted by China Center Director and Senior Fellow, Dr. Miles Yu, who provides weekly news that mainstream American outlets often miss, as well as in-depth commentary and analysis on the China challenge and the free world's future.

This week the guys return to have a quick mini-show all about the objectively insanely corruption that is happening in the open with the Trump administration. Donald Trump decides (AGAINST THE LAW) that he will accept a $400M plane from the Qatari government as the new Air Force One all the while structuring personal Trump Organization deals for a new multi-billion dollar Trump golf course resort in the Middle Eastern country. Also, the new tariffs rollback with China has begun, and lastly Trump pretends to care about lower drug prices through signing a completely useless executive order.Big TopicsTrump about to accept a luxury jet “gift” from the QatarisHey guess who was getting paid a ton of money to be a Qatar lobbyist?This has to be a coincidence, I am sureThe great tariff rollbackDrug Prices Coming Down?

A cross-party visit to Taiwan has drawn a strong rebuke from China, which has accused the New Zealand MPs of colluding with pro-independence separatist forces. New Zealand does not recognise Taiwan as a country, instead adhering to the One China policy. The co-leader of the delegation has defended the trip, saying it was in a private capacity to learn more about Taiwan. Political reporter Giles Dexter has more.

The State Department has deleted a key phrase about its stance over Taiwan, and China is outraged. Today, we will discuss a bit of historical context for why China is so upset and what it could mean for the One China policy and US-Chinese relations going forward.-----⭐ SPONSOR: Good Ranchers Did you know that over 85% of grass-fed beef is imported? Good Ranchers fixes that problem.

Ray and Jim welcome Victor Chin, the official representative of Taiwan's opposition Kuomintang (KMT) party, to discuss Taiwan's political landscape. They discuss how the KMT evolved from the flight with Chiang Kai-shek to Taiwan at end of the Chinese Civil War; through decades of unchallenged KMT rule over the island; its transition to a multiparty democracy; through to today as its primary opposition party to the ascendant Democratic People's Party (DPP).They turn to Taiwan's strategic geographic location, the building military threat from the People's Republic of China (PRC), the need for Taiwan to prepare its entire society for hostilities, and the crucial role the U.S. plays in ensuring its security.Victor explains why the KMT emphasizes its support for the “1992 Consensus” regarding “One China” and its ambiguous interpretation. He explains the difference in how the KMT looks at cross-strait relations, emphasizing dialogue over confrontation to manage tensions until democracy can be the force that unifies China.This conservative approach has earned the KMT the reputation of being Beijing's preferred party, but Victor insists it remains Taiwan's original and staunch bastion against communism.To close, Jim's “There I was” story leads him and Ray into a discussion about the promises of authoritarianism versus democracy, which Churchill described as “the worst form of government except for everything else that's been tried.”

Republicans with rare exception see the writing on the wall. Trump will get his 2nd term. Karl Rove, Liz Cheney and that ilk can't fathom the power shift that has occurred, and only the most catty Republican would not embrace what's happening. Trump has remade the Republican Party in the image of its founding. He has destroyed the Democrats and reclaimed the core values of the Republican Party. And he's doing this, fighting so-called Republicans, and of course the cabal.   For the ancient Olympic chariot-racer, see https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cimon_Coalemos. In https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Greek_mythology, Koalemos (https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ancient_Greek: Κοάλεμος) was the personification of https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stupidity, mentioned once by https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Aristophanes,https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koalemos#cite_note-1 and being found also in https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Parallel_Lives by https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Plutarch.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koalemos#cite_note-2 Coalemus is the Latin spelling of the name. Otherwise, the word κοάλεμος was used in the sense of "stupid person" or also "blockhead".https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koalemos#cite_note-3 An ancient https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/False_etymology derives κοάλεμος from κοέω (koeō) "perceive" and ἡλεός (ēleos) "distraught, crazed".https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koalemos#cite_note-4 This https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Etymology is not established, however.https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Koalemos#cite_note-5 In Suomi language, kuolemas means "in dying"; kuolemus means "the process of dying"; and, kuolemax/kuolemaks means "deadly". [X] SB – Reince Priebus 1st time in 32 years, Republicans beating Democrats straight up Black and Hispanic voters  I'm hearing that this sex scandal with Walz is heating up. Doug Emhoff rumors are still swirling out there. Kamala Harris tried to buy off Black people, particularly men with a $20,000 bribe… The stench of desperation is what I smell. Harris refused a Newsweek interview because they said they would publish the entire transcript. And her poll numbers are not good. Here's what Rasmussen reported for PA [X] SB – Rasmussen on PA polling PA in Sept was a tie Response-bias    [X] SB – Mike Johnson on NBC pushing back on Welker Pt 1   [X] SB – Mike Johnson on NBC pushing back on Welker Pt 2 Should he release his medical records. Harris issued her medical records for a distraction   They don't care about his ego, and they are fed up with the bullsh*t "democracy" cry by the very people who have turned America into a communist country yelling "democracy". What we are witnessing is Democrats' complete panic. Even the talking heads of the media can't hide it and they are experts at subterfuge. And if you think this is "bait and switch" or reverse psychology, think again. Brzezinski said the truth out loud: this election reminds her of 2016. I've been saying this for some time. Like Hillary Clinton, Kamala Harris is a flawed candidate; even more so than Clinton. Democrats know that they have far worse chances of getting Harris elected than they had of getting Clinton's fat ass over the finish line. Here are the 6 signs that Democrats have lost the election. 1. Strategy Shift 1 - The Felon Trump the "convicted felon" has gone by the way side. How many Democrats declared that Trump would end his campaign once he was convicted? And what's the number? Ninety-three indictments, yet this man walks free. And interestingly, almost all the people who attacked him are under fire in their own jobs. One of these cases was to bring Trump down, or at the very least provide a launch ramp for the Democrat candidate. 2. Dumping Biden Say what you will, but Democrats wanted to ride Biden to the bitter end. However, things got so bad for "the big guy", Democrats were forced to dump him. And I do mean forced. Dumping Biden showcased utter desperation by the Democrats. In the weeks leading to the coup of Biden Democrats began saying nicer things about Harris. I knew at the time that Biden was persona non grata, as the media tried to prop up the worst VP in the history of the Republic. And while Democrats were successful in dumping Biden and keeping him quiet by threatening him and the Biden crime family members, they really screwed up. Sixteen billion dollars invested in trying to sell buggy whips to the American public. Few people like or care about Kamala Harris, and the veneer has worn thin.    [X] SB – Rasmussen pollster on Trump in PA   3. Abandoning the Old Strategy for Harris The Democrats had no plans to parade Harris in front of the media, if they could have kept her hidden. Harris is a terrible campaigner. But due to her low poll numbers and lack of ability to resonate, Democrats panicked. So now Harris increased her interview schedule. Democrats thought Harris' parroting the story of her "growing up in a middle-class family" would be enough to keep her from talking policy. But now people are asking real questions about FEMA, Iran's nuclear plans, the One China policy, to name a few. And "growing up in a middle-class family" as an answer won't cut it. Check out Harris' answer on guns, based on her admitted gun ownership: Kamala Harris claimed in 2015 that she was a "good marksman" who had “shot a gun many times." POLITICO: “Have you shot a gun?” HARRIS: “Yes I have.” POLITICO: “Tell us about the last time.” HARRIS: “No — hahahahaha.” https://t.co/6p9g9L4VOB — NRA (@NRA) https://twitter.com/NRA/status/1844010250447585688?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw The only thing shocking about her answer is she didn't open with "I was born into a middle-class family". Let's look at the hints that things have derailed for Harris-Walz:   4. Harris wants another debate? If Harris won the debate, then why does she want another one? Simple question deserves a simple answer: because Harris lost the debate. Democrats set a low bar for Harris. And with the help of knowing the questions in advance and RF earrings, Harris answered every question with the same answer, as if she were making The Jerk II: "I was born a poor Black-Indian child." Notice that Harris has finally abandoned the canned answer, because as I pointed out earlier, she's being ridiculed for it. Moreover, as Harris tries to move to move substantive issues, she shoots herself in the foot ruining those $1000 shoes. The winner of a debate i.e. a fight doesn't need to fight again. And since Trump won, he's decided not to offer this courtesy. The nation saw Harris and now they are seeing more. Harris knows that she's slipping, and these are in the external polls. Imagine the carnage Harris-Walz sees in their internal polling. 5. Bring out the Big Gun Barack Obama I've already written about Obama as a strategy. Democrats overestimate Obama and Bill Clinton at their peril. Obama is practically despised by Blacks. And his recent tongue-lashing of Black men is more likely to get his ass kicked versus getting Black men to follow his orders. Check out Obama at this rally, and you will see that he can't control a crowd: Way to go, Patriots! Poor Barry can't seem to get a word in edgewise with the https://twitter.com/hashtag/FJB?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw chants! Keep it up, Patriots—we've got this!https://twitter.com/hashtag/TrumpVance2024?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw https://twitter.com/hashtag/TrumpVance2024ToSaveAmerica?src=hash&ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw https://t.co/9zSwPFKsiR —

平安 píng'ān - safe and sound 刺激 cìjī - stimulating; exciting 習近平 Xí Jìnpíng - Xi Jinping, President of China 馬英九 Mǎ Yīngjiǔ - Ma Ying-jeou, former President of Taiwan 會面 huìmiàn - meeting; encounter 中國大陸 Zhōngguó Dàlù - mainland China 國家主席 guójiā zhǔxí - President (of a country) 前總統 qián zǒngtǒng - former president 推進 tuījìn - to promote; to advance 兩岸關係 liǎng'àn guānxì - cross-strait relations 和平發展 hépíng fāzhǎn - peaceful development 時隔逾 shígé yú - after a lapse of; after a gap of 備受矚目 bèishòu zhǔmù - to attract widespread attention 商量 shāngliang - to discuss; to negotiate 親中派 qīnzhōng pài - pro-China faction 反中 fǎn zhōng - anti-China 親美 qīn měi - pro-American 賣台 màitái - to sell out Taiwan 舉辦 jǔbàn - to hold; to organize 資訊欄 zīxùn lán - show note 開放 kāifàng - open; to open up 媒體 méitǐ - media 採訪 cǎifǎng - to interview; to report 僅有 jǐnyǒu - only; merely 開頭 kāitóu - beginning; start 握手 wòshǒu - to shake hands 雙方 shuāngfāng - both sides; two parties 致詞 zhìcí - to deliver a speech 深入討論 shēnrù tǎolùn - to have an in-depth discussion 細節 xìjié - details 素有 sùyǒu - to be known for; to be noted for 民族情懷 mínzú qínghuái - national sentiment 堅持 jiānchí - to persist in; to adhere to 九二共識 Jiǔ Èr Gòngshí - 1992 Consensus (which is both sides of the strait belong to one China, and work together to strive for national unification) 反對 fǎnduì - to oppose 台獨 Táidú - Taiwan independence 致力振興中華 zhìlì zhènxīng Zhōnghuá - dedicated to revitalizing China 邁向共同振興中華之路 màixiàng gòngtóng zhènxīng Zhōnghuá zhī lù - stride towards the common rejuvenation of China 同屬中華民族 tóng shǔ Zhōnghuá mínzú - both belong to the Chinese nation 炎黃子孫 yán huáng zǐ sūn - descendants of Yan and Huang (i.e., the Chinese people) 反正 fǎnzhèng - anyway; in any case 海峽兩岸 Hǎixiá liǎng'àn - both sides of the Taiwan Strait 均 jūn - both; all 一個中國原則 yīgè Zhōngguó yuánzé - One China principle 共識 gòngshí - consensus 以...為最大目標 yǐ...wéi zuìdà mùbiāo - take... as the greatest goal 確保人民福祉 quèbǎo rénmín fúzhì - ensure the well-being of the people 總而言之 zǒng'ér yánzhī - in conclusion; to sum up

The US government has sent troops to Taiwan, just a few kilometers from mainland China, while also selling billions of dollars of weapons and military equipment. Is Washington preparing for war? Ben Norton analyzes the geopolitical situation. VIDEO: https://youtube.com/watch?v=sWWABuHjSvU After Ukraine, US readies ‘transnational kill chain' for Taiwan proxy war: https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2024/03/01/ukraine-us-kill-chain-taiwan-war Topics 0:00 Intro 2:15 US sends troops to Taiwan 4:39 US general threatens war on China 5:28 Nuclear weapons 7:03 US once had nukes in Taiwan 10:22 US "arms Taiwan to the teeth" 13:27 US military surrounds China 16:22 Pentagon's "kill chain for the Pacific" 18:23 Elon Musk's role 19:19 US military interoperability with Taiwan 20:57 Washington threatens Chinese sovereignty 22:58 US communiqués recognizing One China policy 27:46 US violates agreements 29:28 Parallels to Ukraine 31:48 Outro

The “One-China” policy assumes Taiwan to be a runaway province. The people of Taiwan, however, see their country as sovereign, and their reasons have merit. Original Article: Is Taiwan a De Facto Sovereign Nation or a Province of the PRC?

The “One-China” policy assumes Taiwan to be a runaway province. The people of Taiwan, however, see their country as sovereign, and their reasons have merit. Original Article: Is Taiwan a De Facto Sovereign Nation or a Province of the PRC?

The “One-China” policy assumes Taiwan to be a runaway province. The people of Taiwan, however, see their country as sovereign, and their reasons have merit. Original Article: Is Taiwan a De Facto Sovereign Nation or a Province of the PRC?

The “One-China” policy assumes Taiwan to be a runaway province. The people of Taiwan, however, see their country as sovereign, and their reasons have merit. Narrated by Millian Quinteros.

[SEGMENT 1-1] Biden almost trips again Joe Biden is showcasing that newfound youth the Left keeps touting. So he's a man about town. And we've become use to what happens when Biden is seen publicly. Biden didn't disappoint. Watch as he trips twice going up the stairs. https://twitter.com/RNCResearch/status/1760026442698522740 We've all tripped up a time or two. But our trips are few and far between. And there is almost always a valid reason. We don't pay attention, or something like what happened to me recently when a man on a motorized skateboard tripped as his dog dragged him towards my well-behaved dog. The man took a solid fall, and turnabout being fair play, he barked at his dog. Those trip ups and others like them are expected, and thus easily overlooked. A trip up the stairs once a year, forgivable. One in five tries? Why the big deal over much ado about nothing...supposedly? Before you dismiss this event, understand the bigger picture. Biden mini-tripped. Not once, but twice. An he did this knowing that he is being watched. At a time when Biden has been coached to be more aware and at his most vigilant for obvious reasons. All eyes on him, so his mind tells him, "Don't trip!". However, tripping is in his head, but not like a heckler. Biden now trips, because, well...he just trips. Imagine being in a negotiation with a world leader, and he mentally trips. What trouble could he get us into? Perhaps a proxy war with Russia? Guess what, America. That's what Biden actually did with Russia. And what about when Biden told China that he believes in the One China policy. Tripping is in his nature. Biden can't help but make rookie mistakes. Walking, talking, thinking, even pooping creates a tripping danger. No matter what he is doing, Biden's brain is muddled. And it has been for years. If the Left's strategy is to show Biden publicly, they should get used to his trip ups. Old Man Strategy I reported Biden's campaign wants to limit his on-feet activities and show him seated. Sort of like how Democrats treated Franklin Delanor Roosevelt. They showed him standing, though he could barely stand and rode around in a wheelchair. While Biden could use a wheelchair, Democrats would never let that happen. But their deception is no less scandalous than FDR's. The New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/10/us/politics/biden-white-house-aides.html on the cocoon set up by Team Biden. The campaign wants to insulate Biden from public embarrassment. This includes the move to take Biden up the short stairs while boarding the presidential aircraft. But they went further after Biden did the "louie" on stage at the Air Force Academy. According to the Times, "Now, there is a Secret Service agent positioned at the bottom of the stairs when he disembarks." So Dr. Jill takes Biden up 2-3 steps on to stages. Then when Biden completes his activity, either Dr. Jill or another Biden handler retrieves the old demented clown. And they think they are hiding this? [SEGMENT 1-2] Plan B Fresh off https://theblacksphere.net/2024/02/biden-trips-on-stairs-again/ again, the new and unimproved Joe Biden was met by a gaggle of reporters as he prepared to face more stairs. As Biden said not long ago about his abilities, "Watch me." And America obliged. We are watching. Moreover, finally the press corps is watching. In a recent Biden sighting, one reporter asked the geriatric, "You're going to California. Is this about coming up with a Plan B for 2024 — does Gavin need to standby?" https://twitter.com/RNCResearch/status/1760009471101735249 Clearly at this press gaggle, Biden should have let his teleprompter sunglasses do the talking. He wears those sunglasses often, because he's told they make him look cool. But this time, Biden didn't trust the message being displayed in his Google glasses, and decided to go it alone with his response. His answer to the pesky reporter? Biden answered the question with a question: "Are you ready?" Mind blown! How profound was that? Are you ready? I put that response up there with "eloquent and clean", Biden's historic comments about Barack Obama. But Biden wasn't done. He eloquently as ever continued his response: "Well I'm looking for— I'm looking at you. We're looking at you." Since there was no Bidenspeak interpreter on hand, we must leave you to interpret this as you wish. Continuing, the reporters waited for Biden to deliver on his question. The anticipation of what would the man described as essentially too old and stupid to prosecute for crimes gave reporters their answer. Biden channeled his inner Shakespeare and added: "Wai whoa whoa whoa whoa whoa whoa..." Maybe Biden should not use a teleprompter from now on, given that inspiring message. One social media commenter noted the sunglasses. Such confidence and clarity! Also he's so cool with those glasses! NOT In addressing the "Well I'm at you" statement by Biden, one person who commented on the video suspected, Biden was told to go to one specific reporter in the front row who would asked the softball question Biden prepped for. Instead, Biden got derailed by the question from a reporter at the back, then Biden went off the rails. Another video commenter explained, It's like he had practiced a "we're looking at you, Republicans" line, and then completely forgot what/how/where/why he was supposed to say it. When the Media attacks Biden has been under fire from his previously trustworthy and fawning press. Up until recently, the press has given Biden a pass. However, in his latest appearances, Biden has been called to task over his age and polling. Dozens of videos now exist of reporters confronting Biden on his age and cognitive ability. Reporters have every right to ask these questions of any head of state, but particularly Biden. Check out the video below, and judge Biden's mental state for yourself: Here are five straight minutes that show exactly why the special counsel noted Biden's diminished mental fitness https://t.co/u1ToosAKyz — RNC Research (@RNCResearch) https://twitter.com/RNCResearch/status/1756551610308702692?ref_src=twsrc%5Etfw I've stated openly and often that Democrats have https://theblacksphere.net/2024/02/joe-biden-gone-by-the-end-of-feb/. They selected him for the coup of Trump in 2020, in spite of Biden being a horrible choice. However, look at who was left. Well over a dozen candidates, and the elites who run America chose the defective and corrupt Joe Biden to serve as their flunky. Sadly for them, Joe Biden is too demented to represent them. The elites want candidates they can control, but the candidate must be able to play the part. Biden's acting days are over. Send in the clowns I believe Democrats have already selected Gavin Newsom as heir-apparent to the throne. But like Biden, Newsom https://theblacksphere.net/2023/11/gavin-newsom-admits-clean-up-his-act/. And he faces headwinds, because Sista Girl Harris won't give it up easily. I know, consider the irony of Harris not giving anything up for political gain. Psst. Since Biden won't last much longer, the Democrats should prepare America and the world for their sh*t show. On the other side of the aisle however, things are looking good for Trump. Goldman Sachs CEO as well as a Silicon Valley billionaire have essentially warned Democrats to reconsider Trump. And stop underestimating the MAGA movement. In a sign of the shift in the black vote, Snoop Dogg https://r.search.yahoo.com/_ylt=AwrjfQcx6dVl7rAC.K9XNyoA;_ylu=Y29sbwNncTEEcG9zAzIEdnRpZAMEc2VjA3Ny/RV=2/RE=1709727282/RO=10/RU=https%3a%2f%2fwww.huffpost.com%2fentry%2fsnoop-dogg-donald-trump-love-and-respect_n_65b62718e4b077c17ab57ae8/RK=2/RS=6.yvpkqgVS7ITf_GTBQ4u1qNJL0-, and recently kissed the ring. Snoop said he has no problem with Trump; pretty much a ringing endorsement. Red flags wave everywhere, for Democrats as do white flags. Former anti-Trumpers recognize the Democrats for who they are. Abusers. And in the case of Biden, elder abusers. [SEGMENT 1-3] The Age Old Question Joe Biden is old and senile and Democrats hate that American know it. They hate that American citizens are discussing Biden's old age. How dare we question if the person in charge of the country is too old. But what of his senility? Apparently Democrats can't multitask. So for now, they are just concerned about his age. So for now, let's focus on Democrats not wanting to discuss obvious albatross. Biden is really f'g old, and not chronologically. Biden big problem is how he handles his age. Answer: like an old fogey. And if you're thinking, "Marlarkey!", then you're on the right track. Biden is at least 20 years older than his chronological age; and that's being generous. Biden looks like death eating a cracker. I've been critical of Biden's age, and for all the right reasons. I would have been critical of anybody in charge of the nation who acts like Biden. The most amazing part of all of this is that Democrats don't seem to mind that a complete idiot is in charge of the country. Worse, a few of them want 4 more years of this clown. Well, 4 more years of the people who control Biden. Aiding the Elderly Democrats to the rescue of the geriatric. Rep. Debbie Dingell (D-Mich.) said Monday she is “sick and tired” of the discussion about Biden's age. And in the spirit of Trump Derangement Syndrome, Dingell declared that she has no problem with Biden running the country from the cuckoo's nest, as long as Trump is not reelected for his rightful second term. So what polling shows that Biden's age registers as a top concern among 2024 v

Diplomats, policy-makers and experts gathered at the Brussels Indo-Pacific Dialogue, hosted by our partners at the Center for Security, Diplomacy and Strategy.Participants shared their insights on the key issues that make this moment arguably the most consequential since World War II: conflicts in Ukraine and the Middle East, trade wars, supply chains, economic security, artificial intelligence, and more. To better understand what's at stake, CSDS-Asia Matters' Andrew Peaple traveled to Brussels to speak with several panelists. Highlights include Ambassador Caroline Millar of Australia explaining how she sees the strategic partnership with the European Union, beyond NATO and other alliances; Taiwan's representative to the EU, Roy Chun Lee, talked about Europe's approach to the One China policy and trade security; Han-koo Yeo, a former trade minister of South Korea, shared his views on globalization and inter-reliance. Andrew also spoke with Charles Edel from the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Alan Chong from the Rajaratnam School of International Studies in Singapore, Anit Mukherjee from the India Institute at King's College London, and Cheng Ting-Fang, Chief Tech Correspondent for Nikkei Asia.

Let's talk about Biden, Taiwan, and One China.... --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/beau-of-the-fifth-column/message Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/beau-of-the-fifth-column/support

On December 30th  there was a debate held between Taiwan's three presidential candidates Lai Ching-te (賴清德), the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) nominee Hou Yu-ih (侯友宜), the Kuomintang (KMT) nominee and Ko Wen-je (柯文哲), the Taiwan People's Party (TPP) nominee. The three candidates started with eight minutes each to present their candidacy, that was followed by a media question answer session, and then in the second half each candidate had a chance to question each other. I sat down and spoke with political commentator Courtney Donovan Smith who shared his thoughts and observations about the debate.   Related Links: https://talkingtaiwan.com/taiwan-presidential-debate-2024-political-analyst-courtney-donovan-smiths-insights-on-the-upcoming-election-ep-270/   Here's a little preview of what we talked about in this podcast episode: ·       How candidates were doing at the polls at the time of this interview was recorded (December 30, 2023) ·       How undecided voters could influence the outcome of the presidential election ·       How Courtney calculates the Taiwan News Poll of Polls ·       How the presidential candidates performed in the first policy forum in comparison to the presidential debate ·       The 60-70% of what was covered during the debate was related to China ·       The second issue covered during the debate was properties owned by the three candidates ·       Little time was spent on domestic issues like Taiwan's low birth rate, and energy ·       Each candidate's position on China and how they would handle relations with China ·       Hou You-yi, Ko Wen-je and Lai Ching-te's take on the 1992 Consensus ·       How from China's point of view, the 1992 Consenus includes acceptance of the One China principle ·       How Hou You-yi wants to bring back the cross strait services pact ·       Courtney's opinion of the cross strait services pact ·       How Ko Wen-je wants to pass the cross strait oversight bill ·       During the debate Ko Wen-je claimed that the Sunflower Movement was a protest against black box political dealings and not a protest of the services trade pact, when it in fact was a protest about both black box political dealings and the services trade pact ·       Each of the presidential candidate's position on national defense spending ·       Each of the presidential candidate's position on extending or shortening military service ·       The candidate's policies on housing, death penalty and energy and nuclear power plants in Taiwan ·       How Taiwan's energy reserves are a matter of national security ·       If younger voters care more about domestic issues or the China issue ·       Courtney's thoughts on watching Taiwan Plus' broadcast of the debate with simultaneous English translation ·       How Hou You-yi spoke some Taiwanese during the policy forum, debate ·       The Kuomintang's strategy behind picking Jaw--- as the vice presidential candidate ·       How the KMT put Han Kuo-yu in the number one slot on their party list, which indicated that he is probably their candidate for the legislative speaker   Related Links: https://talkingtaiwan.com/taiwan-presidential-debate-2024-political-analyst-courtney-donovan-smiths-insights-on-the-upcoming-election-ep-270/

Live from STUDIO G- in the heart of America- I'm STEVE GRUBER- saying the things you wish you could -every day-  fighting for you from the Foxhole of Freedom and defending this great nation-- this is THE STEVE GRUBER SHOW!   Here are 3 big things you need to know right now—   Number One— Both Republican and Democrat members of Congress are announcing they will not be seeking re-election next year—what will it mean— well some are more important than others—   Number Two— And while some are getting out—Joe Manchin wants in—he wants to run for President on the No Labels ticket—as he claims to be middle of the road—   Number Three— Well it has been another hard hitting week—we have seen brutal dictators get treated like Royalty by an American President—in an American city that looked like it was mainland China—   That's right while senile Joe Biden was slurring his way through another bunch of word salad—Chinese Dictator Xi—sat with a gleam in his eye watching the whole spectacle unfold—he must feel joy when he sits in a front row seat for such weakness—   He'd already made the declaration that Taiwan is his for the taking and the One China policy will continue to be the policy they will follow—and he warned that a war between America and China—would most likely erupt over the Island of Taiwan if the U-S tries to prevent it being over run by Communists—   Then Joe Biden frittered away the American dominance with Artificial Intelligence on the battlefield—agreeing to limit what we develop and use—of course Xi made the same promises—but you cannot trust a communist—that is a fact—and it is always a fact—   You cannot trust those that look you in the eye and lie—because they know they can and they will never be held to account—because they've always lied, you know like the time they told England that Hong Kong would enjoy self rule for another 50 years—through at least 2047—of course that was ripped out years ago—and yet China just smiles and tells the west—they will be good from now on—   China is at a strategic disadvantage right now when it comes to AI technology on the battlefield—and Joe Biden just surrendered that strategic advanatage—in return for nothing at all—not one single thing—   Then of course he capitulated to the Green New Deal Nazis that demand absolute adherence to an environmental policy that will destroy our electric grid and our energy sector—America is getting screwed on this raw deal too—BUT senile Joe was cheerleading this disaster just yesterday—   And while he is trying to pretend to be in charge and act as the leader of the free world—he looks ever more the cartoon he has become—someone that nobody, no honest person actually takes seriously—   The old man even admitted there are people who could take the job of being President right now—and get on with it—BUT he was not at all clear what it was he meant by this rambling admission—   And this leads us back to the terrible polling numbers that came out this week—that are even worse than the ones from last week that were awful—   The SS Biden is taking on water—and is listing badly—and even those that have invested all they can including their honesty and their integrity and their souls—are floundering too as the ship sinks and they cannot seem to find a life raft—   And you can find this everywhere—not just CNN and MSNBC, where they should be investing in Kleenex by the truckload—because right now its all over but the crying—BUT I mean listen to what is being said everywhere—even where people are not paying much attention—    And other threats include states deciding to invoke actual law and order—in defiance of the “anything goes” attitude when it comes to committing crimes—ones that everyone sees and knows is going on—   Yeah the border is a real sticky problem for the left— I mean, like I said, every honest person knows how bad it is—and continuing to peddle the idea that its all going fine—is a lost cause and one that insults the intelligence of the American voters—even those that once counted themselves as Biden supporters—   You know it really is one example after another of how bad every one of these people are—I mean you have mumbling Joe at the top—and Antony Blinken who is devoid of intellect—and he makes Janet Yellin look even worse—because she is devoid of a pulse most of the time—   I mean seriously where do they find these people?   And to top it all off is the Holy War being fought inside the Democrat ranks by those on both sides of the Gaza War—  

This week's show features stories from NHK Japan, Radio Deutsche-Welle, and France 24. http://youthspeaksout.net/swr231117.mp3   (29:00)        From JAPAN- President Biden met with President Xi Jinping at the APEC conference in San Francisco, agreeing to keeping lines of communication open, start discussions on AI, and to crack down on the trade in Fentanyl- Biden added that the US is committed to the One China policy, Xi told Biden to stop arming Taiwan. Iran dismissed allegations of involvement in attacks on the US military stationed in Syria and Iraq. The Washington Post reported that the Ukrainian military played a key role in blowing up the Nord Stream pipeline last year.        From GERMANY-  An interview with Omer Bartov, professor of holocaust and genocide studies at Brown University. Omer discusses what genocide is, and whether the world is witnessing the first stages of genocide and crimes against humanity on the part of the IDF and Hamas fighters now. He also rejects the notion that criticizing or protesting against the Israeli government is a form of anti-semitism.        From FRANCE- An edition of Perspective, with Dutch citizen Dr. Lex Takkenberg, the senior advisor on the Question of Palestine at the Arab Renaissance for Democracy and Development. He talks about the protection hospitals are supposed to receive under international law. He says there is no credible evidence that the hospitals in Gaza have been used as military headquarters for Hamas. And that the purpose of the Israeli attacks on their hospitals is to cause panic and in effect a forced displacement of 1.5 million Palestinians. Then press reviews on the return to British politics of David Cameron, just appointed Foreign Secretary by PM Sunak, and the Israeli attacks on Palestinian hospitals. Available in 3 forms- (new) HIGHEST QUALITY (160kb)(33MB), broadcast quality (13MB), and quickdownload or streaming form (6MB) (28:59) Links at outfarpress.com/shortwave.shtml PODCAST!!!- https://feed.podbean.com/outFarpress/feed.xml  (160kb Highest Quality) Website Page- 

As a follow up to last week's episode featuring my interview with General Yu, I invited Taipei Times columnist Michael Turton back on to Talking Taiwan to talk about the 1992 Consensus, a term that General Yu mentioned, and in the lead up to Taiwan's presidential elections in January, the Kuomintang presidential candidate Hou Yi-ih brought it up. In the Related Links section below, we'll share Michael's Taipei Times article about the Kuomintang presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih's support of the 1992 Consensus. Related Links: https://talkingtaiwan.com/michael-turton-tapei-times-columnist-talks-about-the-1992-consensus-ep-257/   Here's a little preview of what we talked about in this podcast episode:   ·       The meeting in Hong Kong in 1992 between the Kuomintang (KMT) and People's Republic of China (PRC) from which the term 1992 Consensus came ·        According to the KMT the two sides agreed that Taiwan was a part of China, but agreed to disagree on what China Taiwan was a part of ·       China insists that the One China principle means the People's Republic of China ·       How Ma Ying-jeou, as Minister of Justice said that the People's Republic of China wouldn't accept any of the Kuomintang's rational proposals, but later a president he said there was an agreement ·       How the KMT and PRC met throughout the 1990s until 1999 when President Lee Teng-hui described the relationship between Taiwan and China as state-to-state ·       The phrase 1992 Consensus doesn't appear in the PRC until around 1997 ·       The phrase 1992 Consensus became popular in 2000 around the time of Taiwan's presidential election, which was a three-way race between Chen Shui-bian, Lien Chan and James Soong ·       How the KMT have tried to use the 1992 Consensus to put a cage around the Democratic Progressive Party's foreign policy ·       The 1992 Consensus was an agreement reached between the unelected parties of two authoritarian states ·       After martial law was lifted in Taiwan it was replaced by something the KMT passed called the National Security Law, and pro-democracy dissidents were still jailed in Taiwan ·       In the 1990s there was a shift in the people of Taiwan's sense of identity as Taiwanese and a growing confidence in democracy ·       How western writers in the 1950s and 60s thought that the KMT would be marginalized as Taiwan democratized ·       How the KMT used the 1992 Consensus to cage Chen Shui-bian's foreign policy ·       How the KMT took the Republic of China out of the United Nations when recognition was switched from the Republic of China to the People's Republic of China as the representative of China ·       How the PRC has set rules about the usage of the term “1992 Consensus” in its media ·       A MAC (Mainland Affairs Council) poll from October 2022 had a 80% rejecting the 1992 Consensus ·       A Taiwan Public Opinion Foundation poll last year showed that 67% of people reject the 1992 Consensus ·       How the term 1992 Consensus disappeared during President Tsai Ing-wen's administration ·       Why the KMT's presidential candidate Hou Yu-ih brought up the 1992 Consensus ·       How it's important to have balance so that one political party doesn't too big or corrupt in Taiwan Related Links: https://talkingtaiwan.com/michael-turton-tapei-times-columnist-talks-about-the-1992-consensus-ep-257/

Eliot returns with a debrief from his trip to Taiwan and Japan. He and Eric discuss the coming Presidential election in Taiwan, the disingenuous nature of much of our discourse about the Taiwan issue that results from our "One China" policy, the reason it is wrong to think of China as a "pacing threat," the dangers of a blockade rather than an invasion of Taiwan, the things that Taiwan and the US need to do in order to deter China, and how Eliot and Eric grade the Biden team's approach to China overall. Shield of the Republic is a Bulwark podcast co-sponsored by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.

(0:00) Bestie intros!: Bad conference lunches, hair fluffers, and focus groups (12:36) Zuck vs. Elon cage match (15:50) Ukraine / Russia updates: underwhelming counteroffensive, reported peace deal rejection (33:25) Blinken's China visit, Biden's "dictator" gaffe, Taiwan's future (51:49) RFK Jr's Rogan appearance, big pharma's impact on media via ad spend, COVID origins (1:09:59) Secondary market for depressed startup shares heats up (1:16:36) Ford to receive $9.2B federal loan to build out three battery factories, industrial policy to on-shore US supply chain Follow the besties: https://twitter.com/chamath https://linktr.ee/calacanis https://twitter.com/DavidSacks https://twitter.com/friedberg https://twitter.com/altcap Follow the pod: https://twitter.com/theallinpod https://linktr.ee/allinpodcast Intro Music Credit: https://rb.gy/tppkzl https://twitter.com/yung_spielburg Intro Video Credit: https://twitter.com/TheZachEffect Referenced in the show: https://www.thegatewaypundit.com/2023/06/biden-regime-quietly-drop-5-charges-against-sbf https://twitter.com/Dexerto/status/1671971832809791509 https://thefederalist.com/2023/06/20/heres-the-truth-about-ukraines-failing-counteroffensive-and-the-peace-that-could-have-been https://www.cnn.com/2023/06/22/politics/ukraine-counteroffensive-western-assessment/index.html https://twitter.com/aaronjmate/status/1670514363634176000 https://apnews.com/article/us-army-ukraine-russia-ammunition-war-75a9ca2e3be09578c65f1198ba5b72e5 https://apnews.com/article/ukraine-war-us-munitions-stockpiles-0d38850603f4264b7568d63d6e7e3d93 https://www.cnn.com/2023/02/17/politics/us-weapons-factories-ukraine-ammunition/index.html https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/2023/04/08/ukraine-ammunition-shortage-shells-ration https://twitter.com/davidsacks/status/1671628570714845184 https://www.npr.org/2023/06/19/1183053024/profound-differences-remain-us-and-china-beijing-blinken https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/white-house/us-senior-officials-caught-guard-biden-calling-xi-dictator-rcna90398 https://twitter.com/chamath/status/1671806525029986304 https://www.wsj.com/articles/beijing-plans-a-new-training-facility-in-cuba-raising-prospect-of-chinese-troops-on-americas-doorstep-e17fd5d1 https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2023/06/05/asia-pacific/politics-diplomacy-asia-pacific/taiwan-2024-presidential-election-candidates https://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-12210999/We-not-support-independence-Taiwan-Blinken-stresses-U-S-commitment-One-China-policy.html https://twitter.com/shellenberger/status/1671162870422454272 https://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-funded-scientist-among-three-chinese-researchers-who-fell-ill-amid-early-covid-19-outbreak-3f919567 https://mediaengagement.org/research/ad-spending-on-primetime-news-coronavirus https://news.gallup.com/poll/165893/majority-believe-jfk-killed-conspiracy.aspx https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2023-06-22/startup-shares-selling-for-61-off-attract-venture-capital-hedge-funds https://pitchbook.com/news/articles/tiger-global-secondaries-direct-stakes-sales https://www.bloomberg.com/graphics/2023-ford-ev-battery-plant-funding-biden-green-technology

①Chinese Defense Minister stresses one-China principle on the Taiwan question and elaborates on China's Global Security Initative at the 20th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore. (00:56) ②The Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership has come into full implementation after taking effect in the Philippines. What's the significance? (14:30) ③India's railway minister says an error in the electronic signaling system caused the fatal train derailment on Friday. What are the latest? (26:00) ④Iran, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Oman will form a joint navy alliance for security protection in the Persian Gulf. (38:20) ⑤Oil prices have jumped after Saudi Arabia announced it would cut production by another one million barrels per day. (46:00)

Chinese Defense Minister Li Shangfu has delivered a speech at the 20th Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore, stressing the one-China principle on the Taiwan question.

Taiwan's status in the world has never been clear and neither has the United States' position on the issue. In this Congressional Dish, via footage from the C-SPAN archive dating back into the 1960s, we examine the history of Taiwan since World War II in order to see the dramatic shift in Taiwan policy that is happening in Congress - and in law - right now. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the show notes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd272-what-is-taiwan Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD259: CHIPS: A State Subsidization of Industry CD187: Combating China Taiwan History and Background “In Focus: Taiwan: Political and Security Issues” [IF10275]. Susan V. Lawrence and Caitlin Campbell. Updated Mar 31, 2023. Congressional Research Service. “Taiwan taps on United Nations' door, 50 years after departure.” Erin Hale. Oct 25, 2021. Aljazeera. “China must 'face reality' of Taiwan's independence: Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen.” Stacy Chen. Jan 16, 2020. ABC News. “Taiwan weighs options after diplomatic allies switch allegiance.” Randy Mulyanto. Sep 26, 2019. Aljazeera. U.S.-Taiwan Relationship Past “The Taiwan Relations Act” [Pub. L. 96–8, § 2, Apr. 10, 1979, 93 Stat. 14.] “22 U.S. Code § 3301 - Congressional findings and declaration of policy.” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Current “China moves warships after US hosts Taiwan's Tsai.” Rupert Wingfield-Hayes. Apr 6, 2023. BBC News. “Speaker Pelosi's Taiwan Visit: Implications for the Indo-Pacific.” Jude Blanchette et al. Aug 15, 2022. Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Pelosi in Taiwan: Signal or historic mistake?” Aug 4, 2022. DW News. “China threatens 'targeted military operations' as Pelosi arrives in Taiwan.” News Wires. Feb 8, 2022. France 24. “Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan would be 'ill-conceived' and 'reckless.'” Dheepthika Laurent. Feb 8, 2022. France 24. Presidential Drawdown Authority “Use of Presidential Drawdown Authority for Military Assistance for Ukraine.” Apr 19, 2023. U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. U.S. China Relationship “America, China and a Crisis of Trust.” Thomas L. Friedman. Apr 14, 2023. The New York Times. Laws H.R.7776: James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 Full Text Outline of Taiwan Provisions TITLE X - GENERAL PROVISIONS Subtitle G - Other Matters Sec. 1088: National Tabletop Exercise By the end of 2023, the Secretary of Defense is to assess the viability of our domestic critical infrastructure to identify chokepoints and the ability of our armed forces to respond to a contingency involving Taiwan, including our armed forces' ability to respond to attacks on our infrastructure. TITLE XII - MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS Subtitle E - Matters Relating to the Indo-Pacific Region Sec. 1263: Statement of Policy on Taiwan “It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the security of thepeople of Taiwan.” Fait accompli is defined as, “the resort to force by the People's Republic of China to invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.” Sec. 1264: Sense of Congress on Joint Exercises with Taiwan Congress wants the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command to carry out joint military exercises with Taiwan in “multiple warfare domains” and practice using “secure communications between the forces of the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign partners” Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in 2024. RIMPAC is a multinational maritime exercise, now the world's largest, that has happened 28 times since 1971. The last one took place in and around Hawaii and Southern California in the summer of 2022. 26 countries, including the US, participated. TITLE LV - FOREIGN AFFAIRS MATTERS Subtitle A - Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act PART 1 - IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ENHANCED DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN Sec. 5502: Modernizing Taiwan's Security Capabilities to Deter and, if necessary, Defeat Aggression by the People's Republic of China Grants: Expands the purpose of the State Department's Foreign Military Financing Program to “provide assistance including equipment, training, and other support, to build the civilian and defensive military capabilities of Taiwan” Authorizes the State Department to spend up to $100 million per year for 10 years to maintain a stockpile of munitions and other weapons (authorized by Sec. 5503). Any amounts that are not obligated and used in one year can be carried over into the next year (which essentially makes this a $1 billion authorization that expires in 2032). The stockpile money is only authorized if the State Department certifies every year that Taiwan has increased its defense spending (requirement is easily waived by the Secretary of State). Authorizes $2 billion per year for the Foreign Military Financing grants each year for the next 5 years (total $10 billion in grants). The money is expressly allowed to be used to purchase weapons and “defense services” that are “not sold by the United States Government” (= sold by the private sector). No more than 15% of the weapons for Taiwan purchased via the Foreign Military Financing Program can be purchased from within Taiwan Loans: Also authorizes the Secretary of State to directly loan Taiwan up to $2 billion. The loans must be paid back within 12 years and must include interest. The Secretary of State is also authorized to guarantee commercial loans up to$2 billion each (which can not be used to pay off other debts). Loans guaranteed by the US must be paid back in 12 years. Sec. 5504: International Military Education and Training Cooperation with Taiwan Requires the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to create a military training program with Taiwan by authorizing the Secretary of State to train Taiwan through the International Military Education and Training Program. The purposes of the training include enhancements of interoperability between the US and Taiwan and the training of “future leaders of Taiwan”. The training itself can include “full scale military exercises” and “an enduring rotational United States military presence” Sec. 5505: Additional Authorities to Support Taiwan Authorizes the President to drawdown weapons from the stocks of the Defense Department, use Defense Department services, and provide military education and training to Taiwan, the value of which will be capped at $1 billion per year The President is also given the “emergency authority” to transfer weapons and services in “immediate assistance” to Taiwan specifically valued at up to $25 million per fiscal year. Sec. 5512: Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations “The Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations.” “The increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People's Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan” “As set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained.” The US should continue to support Taiwanese defense forces by “supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support an asymmetric strategy.” Support should also include “Exchanges between defense officials and officers of the US and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act.” PART 3 - INCLUSION OF TAIWAN IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Sec. 5516: Findings “Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati, have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China” “Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health Assembly, the decision making body of the World Health Organization, as an observer annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has increasingly resisted Taiwan's participation in the WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.” “United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 does not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people at the United Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to represent the people of Taiwan.” Sec. 5518: Strategy to Support Taiwan's Meaningful Participation in International Organizations By the end of Summer 2023, the Secretary of State must create a classified strategy for getting Taiwan included in 20 international organizations. The strategy will be a response to “growing pressure from the PRC on foreign governments, international organizations, commercial actors, and civil society organizations to comply with its ‘One-China Principle' with respect to Taiwan.” PART 4 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS Sec. 5525: Sense of Congress on Expanding United States Economic Relations with Taiwan “Taiwan is now the United States 10th largest goods trading partner, 13th largest export market, 13th largest source of imports, and a key destination for United States agricultural exports.” Audio Sources Evaluating U.S.-China Policy in the Era of Strategic Competition February 9, 2023 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Witnesses: Wendy Sherman, Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State Ely Ratner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense Clips 17:40 Wendy Sherman: We remain committed to our long standing One China Policy and oppose any unilateral changes to the cross-strait status quo. Our policy has not changed. What has changed is Beijing's growing coercion. So we will keep assisting Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability. 41:30 Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL): I want to get a little broader because I think it's important to understand sort of the strategic vision behind our tactics on everything that we do. So if we go back to the late 80s, early 90s, end of the Cold War, and the gamble at the time was, if we created this international economic order, led by the US and the West, built on this global commitment to free trade, that this notion of that this trade and commerce would bind nations together via trade, via commerce and international interest and economic interest, that it would lead to more wealth and prosperity, that it would lead to democracy and freedom, basically domestic changes in many countries, and that it would ultimately ensure peace. The famous saying now seems silly, that no two countries with McDonald's have ever gone to war. That's obviously no longer the case. But the point being is that was the notion behind it. It was what the then Director General of the WTO called a "world without walls," rules-based international order. Others call it globalization. And basically, our foreign policy has been built around that, even though it's an economic theory it basically, is what we have built our foreign policy on. I think it's now fair to say that we admitted China to the World Trade Organization, Russia as well, I think it's now fair to say that while wealth certainly increased, particularly in China through its export driven economy, massive, historic, unprecedented amount of economic growth in that regard, I don't think we can say either China or Russia are more democratic. In fact, they're more autocratic. I don't think we can say that they're more peaceful. Russia has invaded Ukraine now twice, and the Chinese are conducting live fire drills off the coast of Taiwan. So I think it's fair to say that gamble failed. And we have now to enter -- and I think the President actually hinted at some of that in his speech the other night -- we're now entering a new era. What is that new era? What is our vision now for that world, in which not just the global international order and World Without Walls did not pacify or buy nations, but in fact, have now placed us into situations where autocracies, through a joint communique, are openly signaling that we need to reject Western visions of democracy and the like. So, before we can talk about what we're going to do, we have to understand what our strategic vision is. What is the strategic vision of this administration on what the new order of the world is? The Future of War: Is the Pentagon Prepared to Deter and Defeat America's Adversaries? February 7, 2023 House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies, and Innovation Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Chris Brose, Author Rear Admiral Upper Half Mark Montgomery (Ret.), Senior Director, Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, Foundation for Defense of Democracies Peter Singer, Strategist at New America and Managing Partner of Useful Fiction LLC Clips 1:16:30 Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery: We don't have weapons stowed in Taiwan. In the last National Defense Authorization Act you authorized up to $300 million a year to be appropriated for Taiwan-specific munitions. The appropriators, which happened about seven days later, appropriated $0. In fact, almost all of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, which you all pushed through the NDAA, ended up not being appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act that passed eight days later. 30:10 Chris Brose: Nothing you do in this Congress will make larger numbers of traditional ships, aircraft and other platforms materialized over the next several years. It is possible, however, to generate an arsenal of alternative military capabilities that could be delivered to U.S. forces in large enough quantities within the next few years to make a decisive difference. Those decisions could all be taken by this Congress. The goal would be to rapidly field what I have referred to as a "moneyball military," one that is achievable, affordable and capable of winning. Such a military would be composed not of small quantities of large, exquisite, expensive things, but rather by large quantities of smaller, lower cost, more autonomous consumable things, and most importantly, the digital means of integrating them. These kinds of alternative capabilities exist now, or could be rapidly matured and fielded in massive quantities within the window of maximum danger. You could set this in motion in the next two years. The goal would be more about defense than offense, more about countering power projection than projecting power ourselves. It would be to demonstrate that the United States, together with our allies and partners, could do to a Chinese invasion or a Chinese offensive what the Ukrainians, with our support, have thus far been able to do to their Russian invaders: degrade and deny the ability of a great power to accomplish its objectives through violence, and in so doing to prevent that future war from ever happening. After all, this is all about deterrence. All of this is possible. We have sufficient money, technology, authorities, and we still have enough time. If we are serious, if we make better decisions now, we can push this looming period of vulnerability further into the future. The Pressing Threat of the Chinese Communist Party to U.S. National Defense February 7, 2023 House Armed Services Committee Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., USN (Ret.), Former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Dr. Melanie W. Sisson, Foreign Policy Fellow, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology Clips 28:15 Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL): China is the most challenging national security threat America has faced in 30 years. If we fail to acknowledge that and take immediate action to deter it, the next 30 years could be devastating for our nation. Under President Xi, the Chinese Communist Party has nearly tripled its defense spending in the last decade alone. The PLA has gone from an obsolete force barely capable of defending its borders to a modern fighting force capable of winning regional conflicts. The CCP now controls the largest army and navy in the world, with a goal of having them fully integrated and modernized by 2027. The CCP is rapidly expanding its nuclear capability; they have doubled their number of warheads in two years. We estimated it would take them a decade to do that. We also were just informed by the DOD [that] the CCP now has more ICBM launchers than the United States. The CCP is starting to outpace us on new battlefields as well. They have leapfrogged us on hypersonic technology, they are fielding what we are still developing. They are making advances in AI and quantum computing that we struggle to keep pace with. Finally, their rapid advances in space were one of the primary motivations for us establishing a Space Force. The CCP is not building these new and advanced military capabilities for self defense. In recent years, the CCP has used its military to push out its borders, to threaten our allies in the region, and to gain footholds on new continents. In violation of international law, the CCP has built new and commandeered existing islands in the South China Sea, where it has deployed stealth fighters, bombers and missiles. It continues to intimidate and coerce Taiwan, most recently by surrounding the island with naval forces and launching endless fighter sorties across its centerline. In recent years, the CCP has also established a space tracking facility in South America to monitor U.S, satellites, as well as an overseas naval base miles from our own on the strategically vital Horn of Africa. These are just a few destabilizing actions taken by the CCP. They speak nothing of the CCPs Belt and Road debt trap diplomacy, it's illegal harvesting of personal data and intellectual property, it's ongoing human rights abuses, and its advanced espionage efforts, the latter of which came into full focus for all Americans last week when the Biden administration allowed a CCP spy balloon to traverse some of our nation's most sensitive military sites. Make no mistake, that balloon was intentionally lost as a calculated show of force. 44:15 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: Since 1979, the United States has adopted a constellation of official positions, together known as the One China policy, that allow us to acknowledge but not to accept China's perspective that there is one China and that Taiwan is part of China. Under the One China policy, the United States has developed robust unofficial relations with the government and people of Taiwan consistent with our interest in preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. US policy is guided by an interest in ensuring cross-strait disputes are resolved peacefully and in a manner that reflects the will of Taiwan's people. This has required the United States to deter Taiwan from declaring independence, and also to deter the CCP from attempting unification by force. The 40 year success of the strategy of dual deterrence rests upon the unwillingness of the United States to provide either an unconditional commitment to Taipei that it will come to its defense militarily, or an unconditional commitment to Beijing that we will not. The U.S. national security interest in the status of Taiwan remains that the CCP and the people of Taiwan resolve the island's political status peacefully. Dual deterrence therefore remains U.S. strategy, reinforced by U.S. declaratory policy which is to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by either side. 45:28 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: The modernization of the PLA has changed the regional military balance and significantly enough that the United States no longer can be confident that we would decisively defeat every type of PLA use of force in the Taiwan Strait. This fact, however, does not necessitate that the US abandon the strategy of dual deterrence and it doesn't mean that the United States should seek to reconstitute its prior degree of dominance. Posturing the U.S. military to convince the CCP that the PLA could not succeed in any and every contingency over Taiwan is infeasible in the near term and likely beyond. The PLA is advances are considerable and ongoing, geography works in its favor, and history demonstrates that it's far easier to arrive at an overconfident assessment of relative capability than it is to arrive at an accurate one. Attempting to demonstrate superiority for all contingencies would require a commitment of forces that would inhibit the United States from behaving like the global power that it is with global interests to which its military must also attend. This posture, moreover, is not necessary for dual deterrence to extend its 40 year record of success. We can instead encourage the government of Taiwan to adopt a defense concept that forces the PLA into sub-optimal strategies and increases the battle damage Beijing would have to anticipate and accept. 46:45 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: U.S. military superiority in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean allows us to threaten the maritime shipping upon which China depends for access to energy, global markets, and supply chains. The inevitable damage a use of force would cause to the global economy and the imposition of sanctions and restricted access to critical inputs needed to sustain China's economic development and the quality of life of its people, moreover, would certainly compound China's losses. 1:04:50 Adm. Harry B. Harris: We're going to share the crown jewel of America's military technology, the nuclear submarine and the nuclear reactors, with another country and that's Australia. We have not done that with any other country, except for the UK, back in the late 50s, and into the 60s. So here we have the two countries with with that capability, the United States and the UK, and we're going to share that with Australia. It's significant. But it's only going to going to be significant over the long term if we follow through. So it's a decade long process. You know, some people the CNO, Chief of Naval Operations, has said it could be 30 years before we see an Australian nuclear submarine underway in the Indian Ocean. I said that if we put our hearts and minds to it, and our resources to it, and by ours, I mean the United States', the UK's and Australia's, we can do this faster than that. I mean we put a man on the moon and eight years, and we developed a COVID vaccine in one year. We can do this, but we're going to have to put our shoulders to the task for Australia, which has a tremendous military. For them to have the long reach of a nuclear submarine force would be dramatic. It would help us dramatically. It would change the balance of power in the Indian Ocean, and it will make Australia a Bluewater navy. They are our key ally in that part of the world and I'm all for it. 1:32:05 Adm. Harry B. Harris: I think this issue of strategic clarity versus strategic ambiguity is critical, and we have been well served, I'll be the first to say that, by the policy of strategic ambiguity with Taiwan over the past 44 years, but I think the time for ambiguity is over. I think we have to be as clear about our intent with regard to what would happen if the PRC invades Taiwan as the PRC is clear in its intent that it's ultimately going to seize Taiwan if need. 1:41:25 Adm. Harry B. Harris: I used to talk about during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, almost every branch of the U.S. government understood that the Soviet Union was the threat. You know, I used to joke even a park ranger, Smokey Bear, would tell you that the Soviets were the bad guys. We didn't have that comprehensive unified view of the PRC. You know, State Department looked at as in negotiation, DOD look at it as a military operation, Commerce looked at it as a trading partner, and Treasury looked at it as a lender. So we didn't have this unified view across the government. But I think now we are getting to that unified view and I think the Congress has done a lot to get us in that position. 1:49:45 Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): We have the capability to block the transmission of information from the balloon back to China, don't we? Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr.: We do. Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): And in this type of an environment do you think it's probably likely that we did that? Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr.: I would only guess, but I think General van Herk said that -- Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): Well you can't see any reason why we wouldn't do that, right? U.S.-Taiwan Relations March 14, 2014 House Foreign Affairs Committee Witnesses: Kin Moy, [Former] Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State Clips 7:20 [Former] Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY): Taiwan is a flourishing multiparty democracy of over 20 million people with a vibrant free market economy. It is a leading trade partner of the United States alongside much bigger countries like Brazil and India. Over the past 60 years, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has undergone dramatic changes, but Taiwan's development into a robust and lively democracy underpins the strong U.S.-Taiwan friendship we enjoy today. 14:00 Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA): I think that it's important that we provide Taiwan the tools to defend itself, but Taiwan needs to act as well. Taiwan spends less than $11 billion on its defense, less than 1/5 per capita what we in America do, and God blessed us with the Pacific Ocean separating us from China. Taiwan has only the Taiwan Strait. On a percentage of GDP basis, Taiwan spends roughly half what we do. So we should be willing to sell them the tools and they should be willing to spend the money to buy those tools. 1:11:50 Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX): I think Chris Smith raised the issue of a One China policy. Does it not bother you that that exists, that there are statements that people have made, high level officials, that said they they agreed on one China policy? Does the administration not view that as a problem? Kin Moy: Our one China policy is one that has existed for several decades now. Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX): Okay. Well, I take that as a no, but let me follow up with what Jerry Connolly said. So you haven't sold submarines yet, you don't take Beijing into account. People around the world watch us. Words and actions have consequences. Would you agree that y'all would be okay with a one Russia policy when it comes to Crimea and the Ukraine? Is that akin to the same kind of ideology? Kin Moy: Well, I can't speak to those issues. But again, we are obligated to provide those defense materials and services to Taiwan and we have been through several administrations, I think very vigilant in terms of providing that. U.S.-China Relations May 15, 2008 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Witnesses: Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations Harry Harding, Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University, 1995-2009 Clips 1:46:42 Richard N. Haass: The bottom line is China is not yet a military competitor, much less a military peer. Interestingly, I think Chinese leaders understand this. And they understand just how much their country requires decades of external stability so that they can continue to focus their energies and their attention on economic growth and political evolution. China is an emerging country, but in no way is it a revolutionary threat to world order as we know it. 1:47:20 Richard N. Haass: We alone cannot bring about a successful us Chinese relationship. What the Chinese do and say will count just as much. They will need to begin to exercise restraint and patience on Taiwan. There can be no shortcuts, no use of force. We, at the same time, must meet our obligations to assist Taiwan with its defense. We can also help by discouraging statements and actions by Taiwan's leaders that would be viewed as provocative or worse. 2:03:47 Harry Harding: Now with the support and encouragement of the United States, China has now become a member of virtually all the international regimes for which it is qualified. And therefore the process of integration is basically over, not entirely, but it's largely completed. And so the issue, as Bob Zoellick rightly suggested, is no longer securing China's membership, but encouraging it to be something more, what he called a "responsible stakeholder." So this means not only honoring the rules and norms of the system, but also enforcing them when others violate them, and assisting those who wish to join the system but who lack the capacity to do so. It means, in other words, not simply passive membership, but active participation. It means accepting the burdens and responsibilities of being a major power with a stake in international peace and stability, rather than simply being a free rider on the efforts of others. Now, China's reacted to the concept of responsible stakeholding with some ambivalence. On the one hand, it appreciates that the United States is thereby seeking a positive relationship with China. It suggests that we can accept and even welcome the rise of Chinese power and Beijing's growing role in the world. It certainly is seen by the Chinese as preferable to the Bush administration's earlier idea that China would be a strategic competitor of the United States, as was expressed during the campaign of 2000 and in the early months of 2001. However, Beijing also perceives, largely correctly, that America's more accommodative posture as expressed in this concept is conditional. China will be expected to honor international norms and respect international organizations that it did not create and it may sometimes question. And even more worrying from Beijing's perspective is the prospect that it's the United States that is reserving the right to be the judge as to whether Chinese behavior on particular issues is sufficiently responsible or not. Taiwanese Security August 4, 1999 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Witnesses: David “Mike” M. Lampton, Founding Director, Chinese Studies Program, Nixon Center Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State Caspar W. Weinberger, Former Secretary, Department of Defense James Woolsey, Former Director, CIA Clips 9:00 Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE): Taiwan security, in my view, flows from its democratic form of government's growing economic, cultural and political contacts with the mainland and, ultimately, the United States' abiding commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. In my opinion, we should concentrate on strengthening those areas rather than spend time pre-authorizing the sales of weapon systems, some of which don't even exist yet. 20:10 Stanley Roth: There are three pillars of the [Clinton] administration's policy. First, the administration's commitment to a One China policy is unchanged. Regardless of the position of the parties, we have not changed our policy. The President has said that both publicly and privately. Second, we believe that the best means to resolve these issues is by direct dialogue between the parties themselves. We have taken every opportunity, including on my own trip to Beijing last week with Ken Lieberthal from the NSC, to urge the PRC to continue this dialogue. It strikes us that it's precisely when times are difficult that you need to dialogue, and to cancel it because of disagreements would be a mistake. China has not yet indicated whether or not these talks will continue in the Fall, as had been previously anticipated, but they put out a lot of hints suggesting that it wouldn't take place, and we are urging them to continue with this dialogue. Third point that is integral to our position. We have stressed again, at every opportunity, the importance of a peaceful resolution of this issue and the President has made that absolutely clear, as did Secretary Albright in her meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Tong in Singapore last week, as did Ken Leiberthal and I in our meetings in Beijing. But China can have no doubts about what the United States' position is, with respect to peaceful resolution of this issue. 1:29:15 Caspar Weinberger: So I don't think that we should be hampered by or felt that we are in any way bound by what is said by the communique, nor should we accept the argument that the communique sets the policy of the United States. 1:32:50 Caspar Weinberger: There are two separate states now, with a state-to-state relationship, and that the unification which was before emphasized, they repeated again in the statement of Mr. Koo, the head of their Trans- Strait Negotiating Committee, that the unification might come when China itself, the mainland, changes, but that that has not been the case and it is not now the case. 1:41:15 David “Mike” Lampton: Once both the mainland and Taiwan are in the WTO, each will have obligations to conduct its economic relations with the other according to international norms and in more efficient ways than now possible. 1:45:20 James Woolsey: The disestablishment of large, state-owned enterprises in China over the long run will bring some economic freedoms, I believe, that will quite possibly help change China and Chinese society and make it more conducive over time to political freedoms as well. But in the short run, the unemployment from the disestablishment of those enterprises can lead to substantial instability. U.S.-Taiwan Relations February 7, 1996 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Witness: Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State Clips 16:45 Winston Lord: The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 forms the basis of US policy regarding the security of Taiwan. Its premise is that an adequate defense in Taiwan is conducive to maintaining peace and security while differences remain between Taiwan and the PRC. I'm going to quote a few sections here because this is a very important statement of our policy. Section two B states, "It is the policy of the United States to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area, and of grave concern to the United States. To provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character, and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the socioeconomic system of the people on Taiwan." Section three of the TRA also provides that the "United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self defense capability." 18:00 Winston Lord: The key elements of the US policy toward the Taiwan question are expressed in the three joint communiques with the PRC as follows. The United States recognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China. The US acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan as part of China. In 1982, the US assured the PRC that it has no intention of pursuing a policy of two Chinas, or one China, one Taiwan. Within this context, the people the US will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The US has consistently held that the resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter to be worked out peacefully by the Chinese themselves. A sole and abiding concern is that any resolution be peaceful. 19:30 Winston Lord: The U.S. government made reciprocal statements concerning our intentions with respect to arms sales to Taiwan, that we did not intend to increase the quantity or quality of arms supplied, and in fact intended gradually to reduce the sales. At the time the joint communique was signed, we made it clear to all parties concerned that our tensions were premised on the PRC's continued adherence to a policy of striving for peaceful reunification with Taiwan. 21:30 Winston Lord: The basic inventory of equipment which Taiwan has or will have in its possession will, in our view, be sufficient to deter any major military action against Taiwan. While arms sales policy aims to enhance the self defense capability of Taiwan, it also seeks to reinforce stability in the region. We will not provide Taiwan with capabilities that might provoke an arms race with the PRC or other countries in the region. 21:55 Winston Lord: Decisions on the release of arms made without proper consideration of the long term impact. both on the situation in the Taiwan Strait and on the region as a whole, would be dangerous and irresponsible. If armed conflict were actually breakout in the Taiwan Strait, the impact on Taiwan, the PRC, and indeed the region, would be extremely serious. The peaceful, stable environment that has prevailed in the Taiwan Strait since the establishment of our current policy in 1979 has promoted progress and prosperity on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The benefits to Taiwan and the PRC have been obvious and I outline these in my statement. All of these achievements would be immediately put at risk in the event of conflict in the Strait. Conflict would also be costly to the United States and to our friends and allies in the region. Any confrontation between the PRC and Taiwan, however limited in scale or scope, would destabilize the military balance in East Asia and constrict the commerce and shipping, which is the economic lifeblood of the region. It would force other countries in the region to reevaluate their own defense policies, possibly fueling an arms race with unforeseeable consequences. It would seriously affect the tens of thousands of Americans who live and work in Taiwan and the PRC. Relations between the US and the PRC would suffer damage regardless of the specific action chosen by the President, in consultation with Congress. For all these reasons, we are firmly determined to maintain a balanced policy, which is best designed to avoid conflict in the area. Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)

The US has been increasingly treating Taiwan like a sovereign nation with whom diplomatic relationships and alliances can be formed, in violation of its longstanding One-China policy that has kept the peace for decades. And I just think it's worth noting that the western media who've lately been condoning these moves became outraged at Donald Trump just a few years ago for doing the same thing to a far lesser degree. Reading by Tim Foley.

Why do the United States and China care so much about Taiwan? Former faculty fellow in National Security at the United States Department of Defense, Dr. Michael Beckley answers this as he joins Abby for a lesson on the One-China policy. Dr. Beckley illustrates a timeline of the United States' conditional yet tumultuous relationship with China. He also reveals the reason why the United States has a commitment to militarily support Taiwan in times of crisis. Later, Dr. Beckley provides insight into the future of the One-China policy. Keep up with Abby after class on Twitter: @AbbyHornacek Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This week on Sinica, something different: Kaiser asks over a dozen scholars of various facets of China studies to talk about their work and make some recommendations! You'll hear from a variety of scholars, from MA students to tenured professors, talking about a bewildering range of fascinating work they're doing. Enjoy!3:00 – Kristin Shi-Kupfer — recommendations: this essay (in Chinese) by Teng Biao on Chinese Trump supporters; Han Rongbin's work on digital society; and Yang Guobin's work on digital expression on the internet in China.7:48 – Lev Nachman — recommendation: Ian Rowen, One China, Many Taiwans: The Geopolitics of Cross-Strait Tourism; and the city of Taichung, and especially its night market food on Yizhong Street and the Fang Chia Night market.9:27 – Lin Zhang — recommendation: Victor Seow, Carbon Technocracy: Energy Regimes in Modern East Asia; and Gary Gertle, American Crucible: Race and Nation in the 20th Century15:32 – Maura Dykstra — recommendation: Richard von Glahn's contribution to the Oxford History of Modern China about registration in imperial China19:00 – Jonathan Elkobi — a Rand Corporation study on economic cooperation between Israel and China; the fusion band Snarky Puppy22:22 – Seiji Shirane — Seediq Bale (Warriors of the Rainbow) and Lust, Caution25:18 – Zhu Qian — Rebecca Karl, Staging the World: Chinese Nationalism at the Turn of the 20th Century, and two films: Hou Hsiao-hsien's A City of Sadness and Jia Zhangke's A Touch of Sin31:23– Fabio Lanza — Sarah Mellors Rodriguez, Reproductive Realities in Modern China: Birth Control and Abortion, 1911–2021; and Leopoldina Fortunati, The Arcane of Reproduction: Housework, Prostitution, Labor and Capital by Leopoldina Fortunati 33:04 – Catherine Tsai —:Hiroko Matsuda's The Liminality of the Japanese Empire34:46– Lena Kaufmann — Technology and Gender: Fabrics of Power in Late Imperial China and other works by Francesca Bray39:05 – Josh Freeman — Works of Uyghur poetry by Ghojimuhemmed Muhemmed, Ekhmetjan Osman, Tahir Hamut Izgil, Perhat Tursun, Dilkhumar Imin, Abide Abbas Nesrin, Erkan Qadir, and Muyesser Abdul'ehed Hendan.41:32 – Susan McCarthy — Joanna Handlin Smith, The Art of Doing Good: Charity in Late Ming China49:18 – Brian DeMare — William Hinton, Fanshen50:47 – Juliet Lu — Maria Repnikova, Chinese Soft Power, and Samuel L. Jackson reading Adam Mansbach's Go the F--k to Sleep 58:29 – Sabina Knight — Wu Ming-Yi, The Man with the Compound Eyes, translated by Darryl SterkA complete transcript of this podcast is available at TheChinaProject.comSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

One China, Many Taiwans: The Geopolitics of Cross-Strait Tourism (Cornell UP, 2023) shows how tourism performs and transforms territory. In 2008, as the People's Republic of China pointed over a thousand missiles across the Taiwan Strait, it sent millions of tourists in the same direction with the encouragement of Taiwan's politicians and businesspeople. Contrary to the PRC's efforts to use tourism to incorporate Taiwan into an imaginary “One China,” tourism aggravated tensions between the two polities, polarized Taiwanese society, and pushed Taiwanese popular sentiment farther toward support for national self-determination. Consequently, Taiwan was performed as a part of China for Chinese group tourists versus experienced as a place of everyday life. Taiwan's national identity grew increasingly plural, such that not just one or two, but many Taiwans coexisted, even as it faced an existential military threat. Ian Rowen's treatment of tourism as a political technology provides a new theoretical lens for social scientists to examine the impacts of tourism in the region and worldwide. Ian Rowen is Associate Professor at National Taiwan Normal University. He is the editor of Transitions in Taiwan. Follow him on Twitter @iirowen. Li-Ping Chen is Postdoctoral Scholar and Teaching Fellow in the East Asian Studies Center at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

One China, Many Taiwans: The Geopolitics of Cross-Strait Tourism (Cornell UP, 2023) shows how tourism performs and transforms territory. In 2008, as the People's Republic of China pointed over a thousand missiles across the Taiwan Strait, it sent millions of tourists in the same direction with the encouragement of Taiwan's politicians and businesspeople. Contrary to the PRC's efforts to use tourism to incorporate Taiwan into an imaginary “One China,” tourism aggravated tensions between the two polities, polarized Taiwanese society, and pushed Taiwanese popular sentiment farther toward support for national self-determination. Consequently, Taiwan was performed as a part of China for Chinese group tourists versus experienced as a place of everyday life. Taiwan's national identity grew increasingly plural, such that not just one or two, but many Taiwans coexisted, even as it faced an existential military threat. Ian Rowen's treatment of tourism as a political technology provides a new theoretical lens for social scientists to examine the impacts of tourism in the region and worldwide. Ian Rowen is Associate Professor at National Taiwan Normal University. He is the editor of Transitions in Taiwan. Follow him on Twitter @iirowen. Li-Ping Chen is Postdoctoral Scholar and Teaching Fellow in the East Asian Studies Center at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies

One China, Many Taiwans: The Geopolitics of Cross-Strait Tourism (Cornell UP, 2023) shows how tourism performs and transforms territory. In 2008, as the People's Republic of China pointed over a thousand missiles across the Taiwan Strait, it sent millions of tourists in the same direction with the encouragement of Taiwan's politicians and businesspeople. Contrary to the PRC's efforts to use tourism to incorporate Taiwan into an imaginary “One China,” tourism aggravated tensions between the two polities, polarized Taiwanese society, and pushed Taiwanese popular sentiment farther toward support for national self-determination. Consequently, Taiwan was performed as a part of China for Chinese group tourists versus experienced as a place of everyday life. Taiwan's national identity grew increasingly plural, such that not just one or two, but many Taiwans coexisted, even as it faced an existential military threat. Ian Rowen's treatment of tourism as a political technology provides a new theoretical lens for social scientists to examine the impacts of tourism in the region and worldwide. Ian Rowen is Associate Professor at National Taiwan Normal University. He is the editor of Transitions in Taiwan. Follow him on Twitter @iirowen. Li-Ping Chen is Postdoctoral Scholar and Teaching Fellow in the East Asian Studies Center at the University of Southern California. Her research interests include literary translingualism, diaspora, and nativism in Sinophone, inter-Asian, and transpacific contexts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/anthropology

Chris Li, director of research of the Asia-Pacific Initiative and fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, leads the conversation on U.S. strategy in East Asia. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to today's session of the Winter/Spring 2023 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR.  Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic, if you would like to share it with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.  We're delighted to have Chris Li with us to discuss U.S. strategy in East Asia. Mr. Li is director of research of the Asia-Pacific Initiative, and a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, where he focuses on U.S.-China relations, Asia-Pacific security, and technology competition. Previously, he was research assistant to Graham Allison in the Avoiding Great Power War Project, and coordinator of the China Working Group, where he contributed to the China Cyber Policy Initiative and the Technology and Public Purpose Project, led by former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter.  Chris, thanks very much for being with us today. I thought we could begin with you giving us your insights and analysis of the Biden administration's foreign policy strategy in East Asia, specifically vis-à-vis China.  LI: Great. Well, first of all, thanks, Irina, for the invitation. I'm really looking forward to the conversation and also to all the questions from members of the audience and, in particular, all the students on this seminar. So I thought I'd start very briefly with just an overview of how the Biden administration's strategy in the Indo-Pacific has shaped up over the last two years, two and a half years. What are the key pillars? And essentially, now that we're about halfway through the first term—or, you know, if there is a second term—but President Biden's first term, where things are going to go moving forward?  So as many you are probably familiar, Secretary of State Tony Blinken laid out essentially the core tenets of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, of which China, of course, is a focal centerpiece. And he did so in his speech last summer at the Asia Society, where he essentially described the relationship between the U.S. and China as competitive where it should be, cooperative where it can be, and adversarial where it must be. So sort of three different pillars: competition, cooperation, a sort of balance between the two. And in terms of the actual tenets of the strategy, the framing was three pillars—invest, align, and complete.  And so briefly, just what that meant according to Secretary Blinken was really investing in sources of American strength at home. Renewing, for example, investment in technology, investment in STEM education, infrastructure, and many of the policies that actually became known as Build Back Better, a lot of the domestic spending packages that President Biden proposed, and some of which has been passed. So that first pillar was invest sort of in order to o compete with China, we need to first renew our sources of American strength and compete from a position of strength.  The second element was “align.” And in this—in this pillar, I think this is where the Biden administration has really distinguished itself from the Trump administration. Many folks say, well, the Biden administration's China policy or its Asia policy is really just Trump 2.0 but with a little bit—you know, with essentially a nicer tone to it. But I think there is a difference here. And I think the Biden administration's approach has really focused on aligning with both traditional security partners—our allies, our alliances with countries like the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines—but also invigorating those nontraditional partnerships, with India, for example.   I think another part of this strategy, another part of this dimension, has also been reinvigorating U.S. presence and U.S. leadership, really, in multilateral organizations. Not only, for example, taking the Quad and reestablishing some of the leader-level summits, the ministerials, proposing, for example, a COVID cooperation regime among new members of the Quad, but also establishing newer frameworks. So, for example, as many of you have read about, I'm sure, AUKUS, this trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. when it comes to sharing of nuclear submarine technology. That's been a new proposed policy. And I think we're about to see an update from the administration in the next couple of weeks.  And even with elements of the region that have been unappreciated and perhaps under-focused on. For example, the Solomon Islands was the focal point of some attention last year, and you've seen the administration propose the Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative, which seeks to establish greater cooperation among some of the Pacific Island nations. And there was actually a summit hosted by President Biden last fall with leaders of the Pacific Island countries. So that alignment piece I think has really been significant as a cornerstone of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy.  The third element, of course, competition, I think is the most evident. And we've seen this from some of the executive orders on semiconductors, the restrictions on advanced chips, to elements of trade, to even sort of advocacy for human rights and greater promotion of democracy. You saw the Summit for Democracy, which has been a pillar of the administration's foreign policy agenda. So that's basically what they've done in the last two and a half years.  Now, in terms of where that's actually brought us, I think I'll make four observations. The first is that, unlike the Biden—unlike the Trump administration, where most of the policy pronouncements about the People's Republic of China had some tinge of inducing change in China—that was the phrase that Secretary Pompeo used in a speech on China policy—I think the Biden administration largely has said: The assumption and the premise of all of our policy toward China is based on the idea that the U.S. government does not seek fundamentally to change the Chinese government, the Chinese regime, the leadership, the administration, the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.  So that is both a markedly important difference, but it's also a part of the strategy that I believe remains ambiguous. And here, the problem is, you know, invest, align, and compete, competitive coexistence, where does that all actually take us? And I think this is where analysts in the strategic community and think tank world have said, well, it's great to invest, of course. You know, there's bipartisan support. Alignment with partners and allies is, of course, a pretty uncontroversial, for the most part, approach. And competition is, I think, largely a consensus view in Washington, D.C. But where does this actually take us?  You know, for all of its criticisms, the Trump administration did propose a specific end state or an end objective. And I think the Biden administration has just sort of said, well, it's about coexisting. It's about just assuming to manage the relationship. I think there are, of course, valid merits to that approach. And on an intellectual level, the idea is that because this is not necessarily a Cold War 2.0, in the words of the Biden administration, we're not going to have an end state that is ala the Cold War—in essence a sort of victory or demise, you know, the triumph of capitalism over communism, et cetera. In fact, it's going to be a persistent and sustained rivalry and competition. And in order to harness a strategy, we essentially need to manage that competition.   So I think that's—it's an intellectually coherent idea, but I think one of the ambiguities surrounding and one of the criticisms that has been proposed is that there is no clear end state. So we compete, we invest, we align, but to what end? Do we just keep—does the administration continue to tighten up and enhance alliances with partners and allies, and then to what end? What happens next? And sort of where does this lead us—leave us in ten years from now? So I think that's the first comment I'll make about the approach to the Indo-Pacific.  The second is that one of the tenets, of course, as I describe, is this compartmentalization of compete, cooperate. In essence, you know, we will compete—we, being the United States—with China on issues of technology, issues of economics, but we will also cooperate on areas of shared concern—climate change, nonproliferation. I think what you've seen is that while the Biden administration has proposed this idea, we can split—we can cooperate on one hand and also compete on the other—the People's Republic of China, the Chinese government, has largely rejected that approach.   Where you've seen statements from senior officials in China that have said, essentially, we will not cooperate with you, the United States, until you first cease all of the behavior, all of the negative policies that we don't like. In essence, if you will continue to sell arms to Taiwan, if you continue, the United States, to restrict semiconductors, to crackdown on espionage, to conduct military exercises in the region, then forget about any potential cooperation on climate, or forget about any cooperation on global health, et cetera.   So in essence, being able to tie the two compartments together has prevented a lot of what the Biden administration has sought to achieve. And we've seen that very clearly with Special Envoy John Kerry and his relentless efforts to conduct climate diplomacy. And I think largely—for example, last summer in the aftermath of Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, you saw a lot of those collaborative efforts essentially derailed. That's the second comment I'll make, which is while this approach, again, logically to most Americans would seem sound, it's actually met a lot of resistance because the Chinese reaction to it is not necessarily the same.  The third is I think we've seen increasingly, even though there has been an increased alignment since the Trump administration with allies and partners, there's still a degree of hedging among countries in the region. And that makes sense because from the perspectives of many of those leaders of countries in the region, the United States is a democratic country. We have an election coming up in 2024. And there's no guarantee that the next president, if President Biden is no longer the president in 2024 or even in 2028, will continue this policy.   And I think all of you, as observers of American politics, know the degree to which American politics has become largely one that is dysfunctional, is almost schizophrenic in a way. And so one would imagine that if you are a leader of a country in the Asian-Pacific region, to support the Biden administration's engagement, but also to maintain a degree of strategic autonomy, as this is often called. And so what I think we'll continue to see and what will be interesting to watch is how middle powers, how other countries resident in the region approach the United States in terms of—(inaudible). I think India will be key to watch, for example. Its defense relationship with the United States has increased over the years, but yet it still has close interests with respect to China.  The final comment I'll make is that on the military dimension I think this is another area of concern, where the Biden administration has said that one of its priorities is creating guardrails, constructing guardrails to manage the potential escalation in the event of an accident, or a miscommunication, miscalculation that could quickly spiral into a crisis. And we needn't—we need not look farther than the 2001 Hainan incident to think of an example, which was a collision between a(n) EP-3 aircraft and a Chinese intelligence plane. And that led to a diplomatic standoff.  And so I think the United States government is very keen on creating dialogue between militaries, risk reduction mechanisms, crisis management mechanisms. But I think they've encountered resistance, again, from the People's Republic of China, because the perspective there is that much of the U.S. behavior in the region militarily is invalid, is illegitimate. You know, the Chinese government opposes, for example, U.S. transits through the Taiwan Strait. So the idea therefore that they would engage and essentially deconflict and manage risk is sort of legitimizing American presence there militarily. And so we've encountered that obstacle as well.  So I think going forward on all four elements, we're going to continue to see adjustment. And I think, as students, as researchers, I think these are four areas where there's fertile room for discussion, for debate, for analysis, for looking at history. And I look forward to a conversation. Hopefully, many of you have ideas as well because there's no monopoly on wisdom and there are many creative proposals to be discussed. So I look forward to questions. I'll stop there.  FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Thank you, Chris. That was great. Now we're going to go to all of you.  (Gives queuing instructions.)  Our first written question comes from Grace Wheeler. I believe a graduate student at the University of West Florida. Kissinger proposed the future of China-U.S. relations be one of coevolution instead of confrontation. Is it still realistically possible for the future of China-U.S. relations to be one of cooperation instead of confrontation?  LI: So terrific question. Thank you for the question. It's a very interesting idea. And I think Henry Kissinger, who I know has long been involved with the Council on Foreign Relations, has produced through his many decades,strategic frameworks and new ways of thinking about cardinal challenges to geopolitics. I have not yet actually understood or at least examined specifically what the concrete pillars of coevolution entail. My understanding on a general level is that it means, essentially, the United States and the People's Republic of China adjust and sort of mutually change their policies to accommodate each other. So a sort of mutual accommodation over time to adjust interests in a way that prevent conflict.  I think on the face—of course, that sounds—that sounds very alluring. That sounds like a terrific idea. I think the problem has always been what would actually this look like in implementation? So for example, on the issue of Taiwan, this is an issue where the Chinese government has said: There is no room for compromise. You know, the refrain that they repeat is: Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. It is part of sovereignty. And there is no room for compromise. This is a red line. So if that's the case, there's not really, in my view, much room for evolution on this issue, for example. And it's an intractable problem.  And so I don't necessarily know how to apply the Kissinger framework to specific examples. And, but, you know, I do think it's something worth considering. And, you know, I would encourage you and others on this call to think about, for example, how that framework might actually be adapted. So I think it's an interesting idea, but I would—I think the devil's in the details. And essentially, to think about how this would be applied to specific issues—South China Sea, human rights, trade—would be the key to unpacking this concept.  I think the second part of your question was, is cooperation possible? And again, I think, as I stated in my remarks, the Biden administration publicly says—publicly asserts that they do seek to maintain a space for cooperation in climate, in nonproliferation, in global health security. I think, again, what we've encountered is that the Chinese government's view is that unless the United States ceases behavior that it deems detrimental to its own interests, it will not pursue any discussion of cooperation.   And so I think that's the problem we're facing. And so I think there are going to be discussions going forward on, well, given that, how do we then balance the need for cooperation on climate, in pandemics, with, for example, also concerns about security, concerns about military activity, concerns about Taiwan, et cetera? And I think this is the daily stuff of, of course, the conversations among the Biden administration and senior leadership. So personally, my view, is I hope cooperation is possible, of course. I think there are shared issues, shared vital interests, between the two countries and, frankly, among the global community, that require the U.S. and China to be able to work out issues. But I'm personally not optimistic that under this current framework, this paradigm, there will be a significant space open for cooperation.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. Going next to Hamza Siddiqui, a raised hand.   Q: Thank you. Hi. I'm Hamza Siddiqui, a student from Minnesota State University, Mankato.   And I actually had two questions. The first was: What kind of role does the U.S. envision Southeast Asian states—especially like the Philippines and Vietnam—playing in their U.S. strategy when it comes to Asia-Pacific security issues, specifically? And the second is that for the last few years there's been some discussion about Japan and South Korea being formally invited to join the Five Eyes alliance. And I wanted to get your take on that. What do you think are the chances that a formal invitation would be extended to them? Thank you.  LI: Great. Thank you for the question. Two terrific questions.  So, first, on the role of countries in Southeast Asia, I think that under the Biden administration they have continued to play an increasing degree of importance. So you've seen, for example, even in the Philippines, which you cited, I think just last month Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made a visit there. And in the aftermath of the visit, he announced a new basing agreement. I haven't reviewed the details specifically, and I'm not a Philippines expert, but in short my understanding is that there is going to be renewed American presence—expanded American presence, actually, in the region.   And the Philippines, just based on their geostrategic location, is incredibly important in the Indo-Pacific region. So I think that the administration is very active in enhancing cooperation on the defense element, but also on the political and economic side as well. So with the Quad, for example, in India, you've seen cooperation on elements of economics as well, and technology. I think there's an initiative about digital cooperation too. So I think the answer is increasingly an important role.   On Japan and Korea, there have, of course, been discussions over the years about expanding the Five Eyes intelligence alliance to other countries in Asia as well. My assessment is that that's probably unlikely to occur in a formal way in the near term. But I could be wrong. And that assessment is primarily based on the fact that the countries that currently are part of the Five Eyes agreement share certain elements of linguistic convergence. They all speak English. There are certain longstanding historical ties that those countries have. And I think that to necessarily expand—or, to expand that existing framework would probably require a degree of bureaucratic sort of rearrangement that might be quite difficult, or quite challenging, or present obstacles.  I think what you will see, though, is enhanced security cooperation, for sure. And we've seen that even with Japan, for example, announcing changes to its military, its self-defense force, and increased defense spending as well in the region. So I think that is a trend that will continue.  FASKIANOS: Next question I'm taking from Sarah Godek, who is a graduate student at the University of Michigan.   What do guardrails look like, from a Chinese perspective? Thinking how China's foreign ministry has consistently put out lists of demands for the U.S. side, I'm wondering how guardrails are formulated by Wang Yi and others.  LI: Great. Thanks for the question.  So I guess I'll step back first and talk about what guardrails, in my view, actually entail. So I think the idea here is that in the event of a crisis—and, most of the time, crises are not planned. (Laughs.) Most of the time, crises, you know, occur as a result of an accident. For example, like the 2001 incident. But an accidental collision in the South China Sea between two vessels, the collision accidentally of two planes operating in close proximity. And as Chinese and American forces operate in closer proximity and increasing frequency, we do have that risk.   So I think, again, the idea of a guardrail that essentially, in the military domain, which is what I'm speaking about, entails a mechanism in place such that in the event of an accident or a crisis, there are ways based on that mechanism to diffuse that crisis, or at least sort of stabilize things before the political leadership can work out a solution. In essence, to prevent escalation because of a lack of dialogue. And I think for those of you who've studied history, you know that many wars, many conflicts have occurred not because one power, one state decides to launch a war. That has occurred. But oftentimes, because there is an accident, an accidental collision. And I think many wars have occurred this way.  So the idea of a guardrail therefore, in the military domain, is to create, for example, channels of communication that could be used in the event of a conflict. I think the easiest parallel to imagine is the U.S. and the Soviet Union, where there were hotlines, for example, between Moscow and between Washington, D.C. during that era, where the seniormost national security aides of the presidents could directly reach out to each other in the event of a crisis.   In the China context, what has been difficult is some of those channels exist. For example, the National Security Council Coordinator for Asia Kurt Campbell has said publicly: We have hotlines. The problem is that when the Americans pick up the phone and call, no one picks up on the other side. And in short, you know, having just the structure, the infrastructure, is insufficient if those infrastructure are not being used by the other side.   I think with respect to the U.S.-China context, probably, again, as I mentioned earlier, the largest obstacle is the fact that guardrails help the United States—or, in the Chinese perspective—from the Chinese perspective, any of these guardrails would essentially allow the U.S. to operate with greater confidence that, in the event of an accident, we will be able to control escalation. And from the Chinese perspective, they argue that because the United States fundamentally shouldn't be operating in the Taiwan Strait anyway, therefore by constructing that guardrail, by, for example, having dialogue to manage that risk, it would be legitimizing an illegitimate presence in the first place.   So that's always been perennially the problem. And I think the argument that the United States has made is that, well, sure, that may be your position. But it is in your interest as well not to have an accident spiral into a conflict. And so I think we've seen not a lot of progress on this front. I think, for example, in the aftermath of Speaker Pelosi's visit, there—you know, a lot of the defense cooperation ties were suspended.   But the last comment I'll make is that that doesn't necessarily mean that all dialogue has been stayed. There are still active channels between the United States and China. We have embassies in each other's countries. From public remarks, it seems like during moments of enhanced tension there are still ways for both governments to communicate with each other. So I think the good news is that it's not completely like the two countries aren't speaking to each other, but I think that there are not as many channels for reducing risk, managing potential crises, in the military sphere that exist today, that probably should exist.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Michael Long. Let's see. You need to unmute yourself.  LI: It looks like he's dropped off.  FASKIANOS: It looks like he put down his hand. OK. So let's go next to Conor O'Hara.  Q: Hi. My name is Conor O'Hara. And I'm a graduate student at the Pepperdine University School of Public Policy.  In one of my classes, titled America's Role in the World, we often talk about how America really does not have a comprehensive understanding of China. Not only China's military and state department, but really China as a society. How can Americans change that? And where does America need to focus its efforts in understanding China? And then also, one other thing I think of, is, you know, where does that understanding begin? You know, how early in someone's education or really within, say, the United States State Department do we need to focus our efforts on building an understanding? Thank you.  LI: Great. Well, thanks for the question. It's a great question. Very hard challenge as well.  I think that's absolutely true. I think the degree of understanding of China—of actually most countries—(laughs)—around the world—among senior U.S. foreign policy practitioners, I think, is insufficient. I think particularly with respect to China, and also Asia broadly, much of the diplomatic corps, the military establishment, intelligence officers, many of those people have essentially cut their teeth over the last twenty-five years focusing on the Middle East and counterterrorism. And that makes sense because the United States was engaged in two wars in that region.  But going back farther, many of the national security professionals before that generation were focused on the Soviet Union, obviously because of the Cold War. And so really, you're absolutely correct that the number of people in the United States government who have deep China expertise academically or even professionally on the ground, or even have the linguistic ability to, you know, speak Mandarin, or other countries—or, languages of other countries in East Asia, I think is absolutely limited. I think the State Department, of course, has—as well as the intelligence community, as well as the Department of Defense—has tried to over the last few years reorient and rebalance priorities and resources there. But I think it's still—my understanding, today it's still limited. And I think there's a lot of work to be done.  I think your question on how do you understand China as a society, I think with any country, number one, of course, is history. You know, every country's politics, its policy, its government is informed by its history of, you know, modern history but also history going back farther. And I think China is no exception. In fact, Chinese society, and even the Communist Party of China, is deeply, I think, entrenched in a historical understanding of its role in the world, of how it interacts compared with its people, its citizens, its foreign conflicts. And so I think, number one is to understand the history of modern China. And I think anyone who seeks to be involved in discussions and research and debate on China does need to understand that history.  I think the second point is linguistics is actually quite important. Being able to speak the language, read the language, understand the language is important. Because so much of what is written—so much of our knowledge as, you know, American think tank researchers, is based on publicly available information in China. And a lot of that primarily is in Mandarin. So most speeches that the senior leadership of China deliver are actually in Mandarin. And some of them are translated, but not all of them. A lot of the documents that they issue, a lot of academics who write about—academics in China who write about foreign policy and international relations, write in Mandarin.  And so I think that an ability to be able to read in the original text is quite important. And in fact, you know, a lot of the nuances, and specifically in the Communist Party's ideology, how it sees itself, its role in the world, a lot of that really is best captured and best understood in its original language. Some of the—you know, the ideology, the campaigns of propaganda, et cetera.  And I think the last part of your question was how early. I am not an education scholar. (Laughs.) I don't study education or developmental psychology. But, you know, I imagine, you know, as with anything, linguistics, language, is best learned—or, most easily learned early on. But I think that does not mean that, you know, someone who's in college or graduate school can't begin to learn in a different language. So I'd answer your question like that.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Lucksika Udomsrisumran, a graduate student at New York University.  What is the implication of the Biden administration's three pillars of the Indo-Pacific strategy on the Mekong and the South China Sea? Which pillars do you see these two issues in, from the Biden administration's point of view?  LI: OK. I think, if I'm understanding the question correctly about South China Sea, you know, I think in general the South China Sea probably would most easily fall into the competition category. There are obviously not only the United States and China, but other countries in the region, including the Philippines, for example, are claimants to the South China Sea. And so I think there's always been some disagreement and some tensions in that region.  I think that that has largely been—the U.S. response or U.S. policy in South China Sea is just essentially, from the military perspective, has been to—you know, the slogan is, or the line is, to fly, sail, operate, et cetera—I'm not quoting that correctly—(laughs)—but essentially to operate wherever international law permits. And so that means Freedom of Navigation Operations, et cetera, in the South China Sea. I think that, of course, raises objections from other governments, mainly China, in the region.   So I would say that probably belongs in the competition category. And we spoke about earlier the idea of managing some of the risk that occurs or that emerges when the PLA Navy and the United States Navy operate in close proximity in that region. So from that perspective, if you're talking about risk reduction and crisis management, that actually could fall into collaboration or cooperation. But I think primarily it's competition.   FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Joan Kaufman. And, Joan, I know you wrote your question, but if you could ask it that would be great.  Q: Yes, will. Yes, certainly. Hi, Chris. Really great to see you here during this talk.  LI: Yeah, likewise.  Q: A proud Schwarzman Scholar.  I wanted to ask you a question about Ukraine and China's, you know, kind of difficult position in the middle almost, you know, as sort of seemingly allied with Russia, or certainly not criticizing Russia. And then just putting forth this twelve-point peace plan last week for—and offering to broker peace negotiations and a ceasefire for Ukraine. You know, there's no love lost in Washington for China on, you know, how it has positioned itself on this issue. And, you know, frankly, given China's own kind of preoccupation with sovereignty over the years, how do you see the whole thing? And what comments might you make on that?  LI: Right. Well, first of all, thanks so much, Joan, for joining. And very grateful for all of—all that you've done for the Schwarzman Scholars Program over the past. I appreciate your time very much.  The Ukraine problem is an incredibly important one. And I think absolutely China is involved. And it's a very complicated position that it's trying to occupy here, with both supporting its security partner, Russia, but also not directly being involved in the conflict because of U.S. opposition and opposition from NATO. So I think it's—obviously, China is playing a very delicate balancing role here.  I think a couple points. So the first is that I think my view is that, for the Chinese leadership, Ukraine—or, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a deeply uncomfortable geopolitical situation, where there is essentially not a—there's no good outcome, really, because, as you mentioned, Ukraine is a country with which China has diplomatic recognition. It recognizes it. It has an embassy there. And the Chinese foreign ministry, Chinese foreign policy, has long very much supported the concept of sovereignty, and being able to determine your own future as a country. And I think, in fact, that's been one of the pillars and one of the objections to many American actions in the past. So on one hand, it says: We support sovereignty of every country, of which Ukraine is a country that is recognized by China.  And on the other hand, though, Russia, of course, which has had long complaints and issues with NATO expansion, is a partner of China. And so it's obviously supporting Russia. It has alignment of interests between Russia and China in many ways, in many dimensions, including objections to, for example, U.S. presence in Europe, U.S. presence in Asia. So it's a delicate balancing act. And I think from what we've seen, there hasn't been sort of a clear one-sided answer, where you've seen both statements, you know, proposing peace and saying that, you know, all sides should deescalate. But on the other hand, the U.S. government, the Biden administration, is now publicly stating that they are concerned about China potentially lending support to Russia.  So, you know, in short, I think it's very difficult to really understand what exactly is going on in the minds of the Chinese leadership. But I think that we'll continue to see sort of this awkward back and forth and trying—this purported balancing act between both sides. But I think, you know, largely—my assessment is that it's not going to go very clearly in one direction or the other.  I think the other comment I would make is that I think, from Beijing's perspective, the clear analogy here is one for Taiwan. Because—and this has been something that has been discussed in the think tank community very extensively. But the expectation I think among many in Washington was that Ukraine would not be able to put up much resistance. In short, this would be a very, very easy victory for Putin. And I think that was a—you know, not a universal consensus, but many people believed that, in short, Russia with all of its military might, would have no issues subjugating Ukraine very quickly.  I think people have largely found that to be, you know, a strategic failure on Russia's part. And so today, you know, one year after the invasion, Ukraine is still sovereign, is still standing, is still strong. And so I think—from that perspective, I think this—the war in Ukraine must give many of the leaders in China pause when it comes to thinking about a Taiwan continency, especially using force against Taiwan. Because, again, I think the degree of support, both militarily, politically, economically, for the resistance that Ukraine has shown against Russia among NATO members, among other Western countries, I think has been deeply surprising to many observers how robust that support has been. And I think that if you're sitting in Beijing and thinking about what a potential response to a Taiwan contingency might be, that would absolutely inform your calculus.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Lindsey McCormack, a graduate student at Baruch College.  How is the Biden administration's compete, cooperate, limited adversarial approach playing out with climate policy? What are you seeing right now in terms of the Chinese government's approach to energy security and climate?  LI: Yeah. It's a great question. Thanks for the question.  You know, we mentioned earlier, you know, I think the Biden administration's approach has been, you know, despite all of the disagreements between the United States and the Chinese government, there should be room for cooperation on climate because, as the Biden administration says, the climate is an existential risk to all of humanity. It's an issue of shared concern. So it's one that is not defined by any given country or constrained to one set of borders. I think it's largely not been very successful, in short, because China has not seemed to display much interest in cooperating on climate with the United States. And, again, China has largely coupled cooperation, linked cooperation in climate—or, on climate to other issues.  And so, you know, I think it's been reported that at several of the meetings between Secretary Blinken, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, and their Chinese counterparts, the Chinese officials had essentially given the American officials a list saying: Here are the twenty-something things that we object to. Why don't you stop all of these, correct all of your mistakes—so to speak—and then we'll talk about what we can do next. And so I think, again, that—you know, that, to me, indicates that this framework of compartmentalizing cooperation and competition has some flaws, because the idea that you can simply compartmentalize and say: We're going to cooperate at full capacity on climate, but we're not going to—you know, but we'll compete on technology, it just—it actually doesn't work in this situation.  I think the other comment I'll make is that what the Biden administration has done is—which I think has been effective—is reframed the notion of cooperation. Where, in the past, cooperation was sort of viewed as a favor that the Chinese government did to the Americans, to the American government. That if we—if the United States, you know, offered certain inducements or there were strong elements of the relationship, then China would cooperate and that would be a favor.   And I think the Biden administration has reframed that approach, where cooperation is now presented not as a favor that any country does to another, but rather sort of is shared here. And that this is something of concern to China, to the United States, to other countries, and so all major countries need to play their part, and step up their game, to take on. I think, unfortunately, it hasn't been extremely successful. But I think that there—I hope that there will be future progress made in this area.  FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to go next to Jeremiah Ostriker, who has raised—a raised hand, and also written your question. But you can ask it yourself. And you have to accept the unmute prompt. Is that happening? All right. I think I might have to read it.  Q: Am I unmuted now?  FASKIANOS: Oh, you are. Fantastic.  Q: OK. First, I'll say who I am. I am a retired professor from Princeton University and Columbia University and was an administrative provost at Princeton.  And our China policies have puzzled me. I have visited China many times. And I have wondered—I'll quote my questions now—I have wondered why we are as negative towards China as we have been. So specifically, does the U.S. foreign policy establishment need enemies to justify its existence? Is it looking around the world for enemies? And why should we care if other countries choose to govern themselves in ways which are antithetical to the way that we choose to govern ourselves? And, finally, why not cooperate with all countries on projects of common interest, regardless of other issues?  LI: Great. Well, first of all, thank you for the question—or, three questions, which are all extremely important. I'll do my best to answer, but these are very difficult questions, and I think they touch on a more philosophical understanding of what is American foreign policy for, what is the purpose of America's role in the world, et cetera. But I'll try to do my best.  I think on the first part, does the United States need enemies, is it looking to make enemies? I think if you asked any—and these are, of course, my own assessments. I think if you asked any administration official, whether in this current administration or in previous administrations—Republican or Democrat—I don't think anyone would answer “yes.” I think the argument that has been made across administrations in a bipartisan fashion is that foreign policy is fundamentally about defending American interests and American values. In essence, being able to support the American way of life, which obviously is not necessarily one clearly defined entity. (Laughs.)  But I think, therefore, all of our policy toward China is sort of geared at maintaining, or securing, defending U.S. interests in the region. And where the argument about your question comes into play is that I think a lot of—the Biden administration, the Trump administration, the Obama administration would argue that many of the concerns that the United States has with China are not fundamentally only about internal issues, where this is a question of how they govern themselves. But they touch upon issues of shared concern. They touch upon issues that actually affect U.S. interests.   And so, for example, the South China Sea is, again—is a space that is—contains much trade. There are many different countries in the region that access the South China Sea. So it's not necessarily just an issue—and, again, this is Secretary Blinken's position that he made clear—it's not just an issue specific to China. It does touch upon global trade, global economics, global rules, and global order. And I think this is the term that has been often used, sort of this liberal international rules-based order.   And while that's sort of an amorphous concept, in essence what I think the term implies is the idea that there are certain standards and rules by which different countries operate that allow for the orderly and for the peaceful and the secure exchange of goods, of ideas, of people, of—so that each country is secure. And I think this—again, this broader concept is why I think successive U.S. administrations have focused on China policy, because I think some of, in their view, China's behaviors impinge on U.S. interests in the region.   I think the second question is why should we care about how other countries govern themselves? I think in a way, the answer the Biden administration—this current administration has given to that question is: The U.S. government under President Biden is not trying to fundamentally change the Chinese system of governance. And I think you've seen Jake Sullivan and Tony Blinken say that publicly, that they are not seeking the collapse or the fundamental change in the Communist Party's rule of China. So I think in that sense, they have made that—they have made that response. I think, again, where there are issues—there are tensions, is when actions that the Chinese government take then touch upon U.S. interests. And I think we see that in Taiwan. We see that with economics. We see that with trade, et cetera.   And then finally, why not cooperate with every country in the world? I think obviously in an ideal world, that would be the case. All countries would be able to only cooperate, and all concerns shared among different nations would be addressed. I think unfortunately one of the problems that we're seeing now is that large major powers, like China and Russia, have very different worldviews. They see a world that is very different in its structure, and its architecture, and its organization, than the one that the U.S. sees. And I think that's what's led to a lot of tension.  FASKIANOS: So we have a written question from Julius Haferkorn, a student at California State University and Tübingen University, in Germany.  Ever since the escalation of the Ukraine war, there are discussions about the risk that, should Russia be successful with its invasion, China might use this as a template in regards to Taiwan. In your opinion, is this a realistic scenario?  LI: Great. Thanks for the question.  I think there are definitely analogies to be drawn between Ukraine and Taiwan, but I think there are also significant differences. The first is the relationship between Russia and Ukraine is one of two sovereign nations that the United States and international community recognizes. I think with Taiwan, what has—going back to our history question—Taiwan is a very complicated issue, even with regard to U.S. policies. The United States does not recognize Taiwan formally as an independent country. The United States actually does not take a position on the status of Taiwan. Briefly, the One China Policy, as articulated in the three communiques, the three joint communiques, essentially says that the United States government acknowledges the Chinese position that there is one China, and Taiwan is part of China, et cetera, et cetera.  And that word “acknowledge” is pretty key, because in essential its strategic ambiguity. It's saying, we acknowledge that the PRC government says this. We don't challenge that position. But we don't necessarily recognize or completely accept. And, obviously, the Mandarin version of the text is slightly different. It uses a term that is closer to “recognize.” But that ambiguity, in a way, permitted normalization and led to the democratization of Taiwan, China's economic growth and miracle, its anti-poverty campaign. So in essence, it's worked—this model has worked for the last forty-something years.  But I think that does mean that the situation across the Taiwan Strait is very different, because here the United States does not recognize two countries on both sides of the strait. Rather, it has this ambiguity, this policy of ambiguity. And in short, the only U.S. criterion for resolution of issues across the Taiwan Strait is peace. So all of the documents that the U.S. has articulated over successive administrations essentially boil down to: As long as the resolution of issues between Taiwan and the PRC and mainland China are peaceful, then the United States is not involved. That the only thing that the United States opposes is a forceful resolution—use of military force, use of coercion. And that's what is problematic.  I think what you've seen increasingly over the last few years is a sort of—it's not a formal shift away from that policy, but definitely slowly edging away from that policy. Now, any administration official will always deny that there are any changes to our One China Policy. And I think that's always been the refrain: Our One China Policy has not changed. But you've actually seen within that One China Policy framework adjustments, accommodations—or, not accommodations—but adjustments, recalibrations. And the way that the successive U.S. administrations defend that or justify it, is because it is our—it is the American One China Policy. Therefore, we can define what that One China Policy actually means.  But you have seen, in essence, greater increased relations and exchanges between officials in Taiwan, officials in the United States. I think it was publicly reported just a couple weeks ago that some of the senior national security officials in Taipei visited the United States. Secretary Pompeo at the end of his tenure as secretary of state changed some of the previous restrictions on—that were self-imposed restrictions—on interactions between the government in Taiwan and the government in the United States. So we're seeing some changes here. And I think that has led to—or, that is one element that has led to some of the tensions across the Taiwan Strait.   Obviously, from Beijing's perspective, it sees that as the U.S. sliding away from its commitments. Now, on the other hand, Beijing, of course, has also started to change its policy, despite claiming that its policy is exactly the same. You've seen greater military incursions in Taiwan's air defense identification zone, with planes, fighter jets, that are essentially flying around the island. You've seen greater geoeconomic coercion targeted at Taiwan in terms of sanctions. So you've seen essentially changes on all sides.  And so the final point I'll leave here—I'll leave with you is that the refrain that the United States government articulates of opposing any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, to me, is actually quite ambiguous. Because there's never been a status quo that has truly existed. It's always been a dynamic equilibrium between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington, D.C. Where Beijing is seeking to move Taiwan toward unification. Taiwan, at least under its current leadership, under Tsai Ing-wen, is obviously seeking, in a way, to move from at least—at least to move toward de facto or maintain de facto independence. Whether it's moving toward de jure is a topic of debate. And then the United States, of course, is enhancing its relationship with Taiwan.  So there's never been a static status quo between the three sides. It's always been a dynamic, evolving and changing equilibrium. Which is why the concept of opposing unilateral changes to the status quo, in my view, is almost paradoxical, because there has never been a status quo in the first place.  FASKIANOS: There has been some talk that Kevin McCarthy, the speaker of the House, is planning a trip to Taiwan. Given what happened with Speaker Pelosi, is that a—what do you think of that musing, to go to Taiwan, to actually do that?  LI: Mhm, yes. I think that's obviously been reported on. I think it's an area of close attention from everyone watching this space. I haven't seen any reports. All I can say is based on what I've seen reported in the media. And it seems like, based on—because of domestic preoccupations, that trip, whether it happens or not, is right now, at the moment, on the back burner. But I think that if he were to go, I think it would certainly precipitate a quite significant response from China. And I think whether that would be larger or smaller than what happened after Speaker Pelosi's visit, I think is something that is uncertain now.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. We'll go next to Autumn Hauge.  Q: Hi. I'm Autumn Hauge. I'm a student at Minnesota State University, Mankato.  So my question is, since a focus of the Biden administration's foreign policy is the relationship between the United States and China, and another focus is to invest and grow a presence in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically looking at the relationship between the United States and the Micronesian country of the Republic of Palau, whose government has openly shared their support for Taiwan, do you think that the United States' long history with the Republic of Palau, and their connection to their support—the Republic of Palau's support to Taiwan, halters the ability for the U.S. to grow a positive relation with China? Thank you.  LI: Great. Thanks for the question. It's a great question.  I am not an expert on Palau or its politics. I do know that Palau has enhanced its exchanges, it relationship with Taipei, over the last few years. I think we saw Palau's president, I think, visit Taipei. I think the U.S. ambassador to Palau actually visited Taipei. And there have been increasing—during COVID, there was a discussion of a travel bubble between Taiwan and Palau. So there's definitely been increasing exchange.  I think in general this has always been a key obstacle to U.S.-China relations, which is any country that still recognizes the Republic of China—that is the formal name of the government currently in Taiwan—I think presents a significant issue. Because for the PRC, recognition of the One China—what they call the One China Principle, the idea that there is one China, Taiwan is part of that China, and the legitimate government of China is the People's Republic of China, is a precondition for any diplomatic normalization with Beijing. And so I think certainly, you know, there are a small handful of countries that still recognize the ROC, but I think that they—you know, for those countries and their relationships with the PRC, of course, that's a significant hindrance.  In what you've seen in the U.S. government in the past few years is that for countries that derecognize Taipei and sort of switch recognition to Beijing, the PRC, there's been discussion—I think, there have been several bills introduced, in essence, to punish those countries. I don't necessarily think that those bills have ended up becoming law, but I think there is, given the current political dynamics, the sort of views on China in Washington, D.C., there is this sense that the U.S. needs to support countries that still recognize Taiwan, the ROC, and be able to provide support so that they don't feel pressured to switch their recognition.  My personal view is that I think that that is, on the whole, relatively insignificant. I won't say that it's completely not significant, but I think that in general issues around the Taiwan Strait, cross-strait relations, I think military issues, I think political issues related to exchanges between Taiwan and Beijing, I think those issues are much more important and much more critical to driving changes in the relationship across the Taiwan Strait.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to try and sneak in one last question from Wim Wiewel, who's a student at Portland State University.   Given your pessimism about cooperation combined with competition, what do you think is the long-term future for U.S.-China relations?  LI: OK. Well, thanks for the question. I'm not sure that I can provide a satisfying answer. And, in fact, I don't have the answer. You know, I think if anyone had the answer, then they should immediately tell the Biden administration that they've solved the problem.  Even though I am pessimistic about this current framework, just because of its demonstrated effects, I still think that in general the likelihood of a real war, which I think people have floated now—you know, Professor Graham Allison, who I used to work for, wrote a book called Destined for War? I still believe that the probability of all-out great-power conflict in a kinetic way, a military way, is still relatively low. I think that there are significant differences today compared to the era during World War I and World War II era.   I think that the degree of economic interdependence between China and not only the United States but the rest of the world, I think is a significant gamechanger in how countries position themselves vis-à-vis China. I think Europe is the great example here of how there are many countries that invest, have business relationships, have trade with China. And so therefore, their policy on China has been a little bit more calibrated than what the United States has been doing.   And so on the whole, I think most people still recognize that any great-power war between the United States and China would be utterly catastrophic. And I think that despite all the tensions that exist today, I think that that recognition, that consensus is pretty universally held, that a great-power war between the U.S. and China would be extremely bad. I think that is—that is probably something that is understood by Republican administrations, Democratic administrations, folks in Beijing, folks around the world, in the region. And so I think that, hopefully, that idea, that despite disagreements, despite political tensions, the need to prevent all-out global conflict is quite important, is a vital interest, I think, hopefully, to me, provides some optimism. And hopefully we'll be able to continue to carry our relationship with China through.  And I'm hopeful especially that all of you students, researchers, who hope to study, and write about, and even perhaps participate in American foreign policy, will continue to think. Because so much of the future of the U.S.-China relationship and U.S. foreign policy is going to be determined by your generation. So with that, I guess this would be a perfect place to stop. And I thank you for the question.   FASKIANOS: Absolutely. Well, Chris, this has been fantastic. I apologize to all of you. We had many more—many questions in the written part and raised hands. And I'm sorry that we could not get to all of them. We'll just have to have you back and continue to cover this issue. So we really appreciate your insights, Chris Li. So thank you again.  The next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, March 22, at 1:00 p.m. (EDT). Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly will lead a conversation on U.S. relations with South America. And in the meantime, please do learn more about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/careers. You can follow us at @CFR_academic, and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. And I'm sure you can also go to the Belfer Center for additional analysis by Chris Li. So I encourage you to go there as well.  Thank you all, again, for being with us, and we look forward to continuing the conversation on March 22. So thank you, all. Thanks, Chris.  LI: Thank you.  (END) 

Live from the No Panic Zone—I'm Steve Gruber—I am America's Voice— Always Delivering an Equitable Diverse and Inclusive Broadcast— using only Environmentally just topics that maintain maximum sustainable, socially correct and earth friendly conversations— and for the record no animals were harmed in the production of this program! But it's still early!   Here are three big things you need to know right now—   ONE— China continues to demand the return of the remains of its high tech spy balloon that Joe Biden finally roasted over the Atlantic off from Myrtle Beach—   TWO— For the second time in just a week—a Republican politician is murdered in New Jersey—both shot dead—like an execution in broad daylight—   THREE— Its Free for All Friday—and that means—we are going to rifle through as much sound as possible and discuss it all—   The biggest part of the conversation is the reaction to the state of the Union—the Twitter hearings and the weaponization of the government targeting political enemies—while silencing others—   And then there is the irrational push to keep the Covid panic fear alive—because they just cannot seem to let it go—  

Live from the No Panic Zone—I'm Steve Gruber—I am America's Voice— Always Delivering an Equitable Diverse and Inclusive Broadcast— using only Environmentally just topics that maintain maximum sustainable, socially correct and earth friendly conversations— and for the record no animals were harmed in the production of this program! But it's still early!   Here are three big things you need to know right now—   ONE— China has met its match in red America—as a giant North Dakota plant allegedly for milling corn has been stopped permanently—while the crowd chants   TWO— The New York Times says Joe Biden should not run for President again—and that was before the State of the Union—Socialist manifesto that he slimed America with last night—   THREE— Joe Biden gave the socialist manifesto for America while patting himself on the back—over and over again

After Russia's invasion of Ukraine, observers anxiously watched China's reactions as many feared a similar conflict would break out in the Taiwan Strait. In recent years, it appears China has been increasingly determined to enforce its One-China policy, first against Hong Kong and now against Taiwan. From afar, the United States is caught between deterring China from an all-out military conflict and supporting a democratic Taiwan.  A few months ago, President Joe Biden broke away from America's traditionally ambiguous stance and said the US would defend Taiwan if China attacks. However, Eurasia Group Foundation's annual survey found that the number of Americans who support US intervention to help Taiwan is waning. So, how likely is it that a conflict between China and Taiwan breaks out? Is it possible for the US to navigate conflicting interests without resorting to involving itself in another war? In this episode, EGF senior fellow Mark Hannah sits down with Bonnie Glaser of the German Marshall Fund to discuss the state of US-China relations and the future of Taiwan.  Bonnie Glaser is the managing director of the Indo-Pacific program at the German Marshall Fund. Glaser has worked at the intersection of Asia-Pacific geopolitics and US policy for more than three decades.  To listen to more episodes or learn more about None Of The Above, go to www.noneoftheabovepodcast.org. To learn more about the Eurasia Group Foundation, please visit www.egfound.org and subscribe to our newsletter.

Jake Velazquez and Dan Carney return to the show. They talk about how much they love Xi Jinping and One China, as well as Canada's euthanasia clinics and smoking spice.Thanks to Dan and Jake for coming back on the show together. Check them out on previous episodes and down below at their links.Dan is on Instagram @danmancarney and will be playing shows in Florida coming up this month, so follow him for more info on that. Jake is on Instagram also @jakevcomedy.As always, find Michael Good on Instagram @michael_good1125 and on Twitter @agoodmichaelThis podcast was produced by Paxton Fleming, you can find him on Instagram @yaboypax 

Chinese Communist Party leader Xi Jinping is now the country's most powerful ruler in decades. Surrounded by loyalists, where will he lead the nation? Markets may hold the answer. Hong Kong stocks are plummeting to new lows, alongside China's currency. New concerns arise over Taiwan. Chinese army officials who had helped monitor the island have been promoted to top positions. Those involved in hacking into the Chinese communist regime's TV network to counter its propaganda faced deadly consequences. Canada's pick for an Oscar brings the story to the big screen. Deterring a war with China demands cooperation. An expert says our leadership needs to shift their approach. ⭕️Watch in-depth videos based on Truth & Tradition at Epoch TV

A new law, known as the CHIPS Act, provides over $50 billion to existing, profitable companies to fund new semiconductor production facilities in the United States. In this episode, we examine why Congress decided to gift these companies our tax money now and explore the geopolitical implications of this funding decision. Beyond semiconductors, the law provides further corporate welfare for the creation of things that many of us tax payers likely support. This law is complicated; let's get nuanced. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the show notes on our website at https://www.congressionaldish.com/cd259-chips-a-state-subsidization-of-industry Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD230: Pacific Deterrence Initiative CD218: Minerals are the New Oil CD215: COVID-19 Testimony CD205: Nuclear Waste Storage CD187: Combating China CD186: National Endowment for Democracy CD128: Crisis in Puerto Rico Semiconductor Industry “Pass the CHIPS Act of 2022 Fact Sheet.” July 2022. Semiconductor Industry Association. “Global Semiconductor Incentives.” February 2022. Semiconductor Industry Association. “2021 State of the U.S. Semiconductor Industry.” September 2021. Semiconductor Industry Association. Taiwan Bansari Mayur Kamdar and Medha Singh. Aug 2, 2022. “Chip stocks slip as Taiwan tensions mount.” Reuters. Karen M. Sutter. Mar 7, 2022. “U.S.-Taiwan Trade Relations” [IF10256]. Congressional Research Service. Yimou Lee, Norihiko Shirouzu and David Lague. Dec 27, 2021. “T-DAY: The Battle for Taiwan.” Reuters. PRISM Program Derek B. Johnson. Aug 27, 2018. “Court case puts PRISM back in the spotlight.” FCW. Wealthy Shareholders Juliana Kaplan and Andy Kiersz. Oct 19, 2021. “The wealthiest Americans now own almost all of the stock market — 89% to be exact.” Insider. National Endowment for Democracy “Board of Directors.” National Endowment for Democracy. National Science Foundation Directorate Mitch Ambrose. Mar 17, 2022. “NSF Stands Up Directorate for Technology, Innovation, and Partnerships.” American Institute of Physics. “Chairwoman Johnson and Ranking Member Lucas Welcome NSF Director Panchanathan's Announcement of New Directorate Aligned with Bipartisan Committee Proposal.” Mar 17, 2022. House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology. Fusion Research “Nuclear Fission and Fusion.” Diffen. “Client Profile: Commonwealth Fusion Systems: Summary.” Open Secrets. “Client Profile: Commonwealth Fusion Systems: Lobbyists.” Open Secrets. “Barton Gordon: Partner. K&L Gates. American Exception Book Aaron Good. 2022. American Exception: Empire and the Deep State. Skyhorse Publishing. The Law H.R. 4346: CHIPS Act of 2022 / Research and Development, Competition, and Innovation Act / Supreme Court Security Funding Act of 2022 GovTrack Overview Congressional Budget Office: Estimated Budgetary Effects of H.R. 4346 Bills Later Added to the CHIPS Act S. 3740: Micro Act of 2022 The one hearing H.R. 4863: Partnerships for Energy Security and Innovation Act S. 1359: Partnerships for Energy Security and Innovation Act of 2021 Audio Sources President Biden on Taiwan Sept 18, 2022 60 Minutes Scott Pelley: What should Chinese President Xi know about your commitment to Taiwan? President Joe Biden: We agree with what we signed on to a long time ago, that there's a One China policy and Taiwan makes their own judgments about their independence. We are not moving, we're not encouraging their being independent. That's their decision. Scott Pelley: But would US forces defend the island? President Joe Biden: Yes, if in fact, there was an unprecedented attack. Scott Pelley: [overdub] After our interview, a White House official told us US policy has not changed. Officially, the US will not say whether American forces would defend Taiwan. But the Commander in Chief had a view of his own. [interview] So unlike Ukraine, to be clear, sir, US forces, US men and women would defend Taiwan in the event of a Chinese invasion? President Joe Biden: Yes. Senator Bernie Sanders' Senate Session Speech Jul 27, 2022 Jen's Highlighted PDF The Future of U.S. Policy on Taiwan Dec 8, 2021 Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs 30:45 Sen. James Risch (R-ID): A unilateral change in the status quo regarding Taiwan would not only threaten the security and liberty of 23 million Taiwanese, but also significantly damage vital US interests and alliances in the Indo Pacific. We would lose a model of democracy at a time of creeping authoritarianism. It would give China a platform in the first island chain to dominate the Western Pacific and threaten, indeed, US homeland. The consequences for Japan security, and therefore, the US-Japan alliance, are hard to overstate. Semiconductor supply chains would fall into China's hands, and it would emboldened China in other territorial disputes, including with India, and in the South China Sea. Fostering a New Era of Fusion Energy Research and Technology Development November 17, 2021 House Committee on Science, Space, and Technology, Subcommittee on Energy Witnesses: Dr. Troy Carter, Director, Plasma Science and Technology Institute, University of California, Los Angeles and Chair, Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee Long Range Planning Subcommittee Dr. Tammy Ma, Program Element Leader for High Energy Density Science, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory Dr. Robert Mumgaard, CEO, Commonwealth Fusion Systems Dr. Kathryn McCarthy, Director, U.S. ITER Project Office Dr. Steven Cowley, Director, Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory Clips Robert Mumgaard: However, from where I sit, I see three reasons why I'm very optimistic the US can create a definitive lead in this new industry. First, the growth of the private sector. Over $2.4 billion in private capital has been invested in the fusion companies that now number nearly 30. This is a similar amount of capital as in all the nuclear fission small modular reactor companies. This is coming from a large range of investors across venture capitalists, to university endowments, to large energy companies. And they're putting capital at risk in fusion because they understand that the world needs a fundamentally new source of clean energy if we are going to meet our decarbonization goals. And these companies are highly ambitious, with a recent survey stating that 84% of them believe that fusion will be on the grid in the 2030s or earlier. Robert Mumgaard: We will proceed with the commercialization of our first fusion pilot plant called ARC. We hope to have that online in the early 2030s. Robert Mumgaard: The second reason I'm optimistic is that the public program has produced a consensus plan. Detailed in the National Academies and FESAC (Fusion Energy Sciences Advisory Committee) Recommendations is a transition of the public funded program towards the US developing commercial energy. We need to stop some activities and transition to others. But the researchers are enthusiastic and they are ready. We have a new generation of leaders at national laboratories and universities hungry to develop that technology. And that plan has been authorized but has not yet been implemented. Robert Mumgaard: And we're not alone. The other companies like TAE and General Fusion, Helion, Tokamak Energy, are looking at similar timeframes and experiencing similar growth. All these companies are looking to see which governments are going to be the best partners. And unfortunately, we are already seeing defections, with a major facility that could have been built in the US, instead being built in the UK. It'd be much better if the US public program leveraged the private sector, aligning with the technical goals and timelines to keep it happening here. Robert Mumgaard: The third reason I'm hopeful is the movement towards public private partnerships and we know that when the public and private sectors work together and recognize what each side is good at, we create vibrant ecosystems. We saw this in commercial space, with NASA and SpaceX. We saw it even more recently with the COVID-19 vaccine Supply Chain Integrity October 1, 2020 Senate Committee on Armed Services, Subcommittee on Readiness and Management Support Watch on CSPAN Witness: Ellen M. Lord, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Sustainment 1:22:10 Ellen Lord: I believe there may well be a lot of this, frankly: not continuing to engage with these Chinese companies on sensitive issues, but in turn, developing industrial bases here that makes us not reliant on that back and forth. There's quite a bit of discussion within the inner agency right now about constraining Chinese involvement from everything from investments to specific commodities. But again, I think one of the areas where we could have the most impact on China broadly, is reshoring microelectronics. And right now, my team is working very closely across DOD, as well as the inner agency to come up with a very specific recommendation for some public-private partnerships in order to develop the capability here domestically. We at DOD are only about 1% of the overall microelectronics market, however, we have some critical needs. Attorney General Barr's Remarks on China Policy at the Gerald R. Ford Presidential Museum July 16, 2020 15:20 Attorney General Bill Barr: “Made in China 2025” is the latest iteration of the PRC's state-led, mercantilist economic model. For American companies in the global marketplace, free and fair competition with China has long been a fantasy. To tilt the playing field to its advantage, China's communist government has perfected a wide array of predatory and often unlawful tactics: currency manipulation, tariffs, quotas, state-led strategic investment and acquisitions, theft and forced transfer of intellectual property, state subsidies, dumping, cyberattacks, and industrial espionage. Cover Art Design by Only Child Imaginations Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)

US President Joe Biden has again said the US would defend Taiwan in the event of an attack by China. Asked in a CBS interview if US troops would defend the island, Mr Biden said: "Yes, if in fact, there was an unprecedented attack." The remarks prompted the White House to clarify that the official US policy - which doesn't commit to military action on Taiwan - had not changed. Beijing said it "deplores and firmly opposes" Mr Biden's pledge of action. The foreign ministry said it had lodged "stern representations" with Washington over the remarks, broadcast in a CBS 60 Minutes interview on Sunday. Taiwan is a self-ruled island off the coast of eastern China that Beijing claims as part of its territory. Washington has always walked a diplomatic tightrope over the issue. On the one hand it adheres to the One China policy, a cornerstone of its relationship with Beijing. Under this policy, the US acknowledges that there is only one Chinese government, and has formal ties with Beijing rather than Taiwan. But it also maintains close relations with Taiwan and sells arms to it under the Taiwan Relations Act, which states that the US must provide the island with the means to defend itself.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

This past week, House Speaker Nancy Pelosi made a stop in Taiwan during her trip to Asia, a controversial move both domestically and abroad. While there were Democrats and Republicans alike who applauded Speaker Pelosi for standing up for Taiwan's independence and democracy, China viewed the move as a strike against their sovereignty and "One China" policy. FOX News Senior Foreign Affairs Correspondent Greg Palkot explains the military and diplomatic consequences of the trip, and why there was so much pushback from the White House. He also provides an in-depth look at the Chinese Military exercises being launched in response to Speaker Pelosi's visit.   Senate Democrats, led by Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer and Senator Joe Manchin, announced the Inflation Reduction Act last week—a package consisting of climate change, healthcare, drug pricing, and tax measures. The bill will impose new taxes on the vast majority of Americans, but there is confusion as to whether the measure violates President Biden's pledge to not raise taxes on households with annual incomes under $400,000. Many claim the bill will not remedy high inflation plaguing the country but will instead worsen it. Senior Policy Analyst on Tax Policy at the Heritage Foundation Preston Brashers joins the Rundown to break down how the Democrats' spending package and economy-wide taxes will affect inflation rates across the board from consumer prices to employee wages. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In this week's episode, we discuss Nancy Pelosi's recent visit to Taiwan. Nancy says she supports Taiwan's democracy while the white house says the exact opposite supporting the "One-China" policy. We discuss the real motives of her visit which may or may not have to do with insider trading. We also discuss the Alex Jones trial where his lawyer "accidentally" sends years' worth of texts to the opposing lawyer completely undermining their entire argument.    Subscribe and leave a 5-star review! ----more---- Our website https://redpillrevolution.co   Protect your family and support the Red Pill Revolution Podcast with Affordable Life Insurance. This is attached to my license and not a third-party ad!   Go to https://agents.ethoslife.com/invite/3504a now!   Currently available in AZ, MI, MO, LA, NC, OH, IN, TN, WV Email redpillrevolt@protonmail.com if you would like to sign up in a different state   Leave a donation, sign up for our weekly podcast companion newsletter, and follow along with all things Red Pill Revolution by going to our new website: https://redpillrevolution.co    Full Transcription   Welcome to the revolution. Hello and welcome to red pill revolution. My name is Austin Adams, and this is episode number 38 of the red pill revolution podcast. And man O man, it has been an interesting, interesting last week or so we have inched our way closer and closer to what could potentially be a catastrophic disaster for basically the entire world. Uh, basically what's happened recently is Nancy Pelosi has took it upon herself to check on her stock investments.  allegedly, uh, basically going over to Taiwan. And causing what is a international catastrophe with China then Boeing up to the United States and all sorts of craziness. In other news, Alex Jones was accused of perjury after his Sandy hook. Parents' lawyer obtained his test tax messages from his own lawyer. Uh, so that's gonna be something interesting to talk about. I guess Alex Jones is currently, uh, going through legal proceedings regarding, uh, defamation trial or some type of, uh, civil lawsuit regarding the Sandy hook shooting and saying that it did not happen. So we will discuss that, but really today's conversation. Uh, conversation's going to be going over a lot about Nancy Pelosi starting an international incident, and we'll find out why, what China said and everything in between. So stick around on today's episode, number 38 of the red pill revolution podcast. Again, thank you so much for joining. Welcome to red pill revolution. My name is Austin Adams. Red pill revolution started out with me realizing everything that I knew, everything that I believed, everything I interpreted about my life is through the lens of the information I was spoon fed as a child, religion, politics, history, conspiracies, Hollywood medicine, money, food, all of it, everything we know was tactfully written to influence your decisions and your view on reality by those in power. Now I'm on a mission, a mission to retrain and reeducate myself to find the true reality of what is behind that curtain. And I'm taking your ass with me. Welcome to the revolution. All right. Thank you guys so much for joining me again. Episode number 38 of the red pill revolution podcast. And the very first thing that we are going to touch on is the Alex Jones trial. All right. It says this article that I have in front of me right here, it says Alex Jones is accused of perjury after Sandy hook parents' lawyer obtains his text messages and what could be the worst blunder ever by any lawyer at all ever  which quite atrocious move on your lawyer's part to basically completely, uh, send every little piece of evidence they could to the. Opposing team's lawyer.  literally the worst thing you could possibly do. So we'll read through this a little bit, this article here about it, and then we will watch the clip of Alex Jones basically caught with his pants down. I have my own opinions on this. I have my own opinions about Alex Jones. Um, but whatever you believe about it, this is pretty hilarious. So what this article goes on to. Is that the lawyer representing Sandy hook parents in Alex Jones' damages trial said Wednesday, that Jones' lawyer sent him years worth of text messages and emails from Jones's phone. It goes on to say that Jones who was repeatedly says, has repeatedly lied, that the Sandy hook shooting was a hoax has already been found liable in defamation cases, brought by families of the victims. The Texas jury in the damages trial will determine how much Jones owes victims' parents after publicly making false claims. What they're saying, uh, 12 days ago, your lawyer messed up and sent me an entire digital copy of your entire cell phone with every text message you've sent for the last two years. That is how I know you lied to me. When you said you didn't have text messages about Sandy hook. And that is the attorney mark Bankston, who is the attorney for the Sandy hook victim's family. And this was on Wednesday, uh, today. And, uh, so it goes ahead and says that worth noting judge Maya, Guerra gamble of the Travis county district court, who is presiding over the case, told jurors the contents of Jones' phone were not properly turned over when it should have. Okay. Well, if you watch this clip of Alex Jones is the judge on this case. It's like pretty apparent that this judge is just wants nothing to do with Alex Jones is fed up with his trial is a little agitated by anything and everything that he does. . So let's go ahead and watch this clip here, because again, it's, you know, I have my own thoughts about Alex Jones. You know, like everybody, uh, says he's got this crazy demeanor about a lot of things. He's been right about several, several things. This is not one of them, in my opinion. Um, this Sandy hook situation is quite atrocious. Just like all of the other mass shootings that we've seen is horrible, horrific. Um, And again, the way that Alex Jones went about it. I I've said this before about shootings. I've said this before about the conspiracy world that comes up when you talk about these, uh, these shootings in these schools. And I, I just don't, I think it's off the mark. I don't think that there's crisis actors. And I don't think that, you know, people are going on the stage and, you know, if anything, that's so many loose ends that it, it is just so unprobable. And so sloppy of, of an idea that, you know, to actually implement that there would be so many people who would have to be in on it, that it would just make it such a difficult situation to follow through on. And, and again, there would be so many people who would know what happened there would, it's just a mess. So I, I just don't think that's the likely, the likelihood is there. I don't think that there's a bunch of actors in this situation. I don't think that's what's going on. I do think, however, you. You wanna put on your tin foil hat for a minute, that there is federal agents who are on chatboards with people who are saying horrible, horrific things with these, you know, young people who are in terrible frames of mind who may or may not, uh, talk to them in these types of situations. And there's a lot less loose ends that way. Um, but anyways, let's go ahead and watch Alex Jones, uh, get caught with his pants down here.  every text message he's ever sent over the last several years, being given to a lawyer  this is just worst case scenario, right? Like if you're on a, if you're on trial, you know, for literally anything. Let alone a trial that's getting watched by hundreds of thousands, if not millions and millions of people. And literally the enemy standing across from you in the courtroom has every piece of evidence has every little flirt TA just text message you sent to your wife has every little, you know, bad day that you had every little, uh, I don't know, uh, name that you called a friend that you don't want them to know about. I mean, literally every little dirty secret in those text messages and worst case scenario, it gets sent to the opposite team's lawyer. All right. So  just, uh, I, I, it just horrific situation and, and I guess it raises a lot of questions, right? Like he, the, the lawyer actually goes on to say that your lawyer didn't even. Stop us from bringing this to court, right? Like your lawyer didn't even attempt to write his wrong. And literally in any situation as a lawyer, how are you not checking the recipients of your text message that you're sending everybody or, or every text message ever that somebody's ever sent that you are defending? I dunno, it just seems like a crazy, crazy happenstance to find yourself in. If you're one of the most controversial figures ever, literally one of the first people ever to get banned on all social medias before even Trump got there, you know, is quite impressive if you ask me, but alright, here's the clip. We'll go ahead and watch it. And, uh, I think it's just about a minute or so, so we'll see what, what it, what goes on on it. Here we go. So you did get my text messages and it said you didn't nice trick. It's just  yes. Mr. Jones. Oh, indeed. You didn't give this text message to him. He doesn't, you don't know where this came from. Do you know where I got this? No. This lawyer sounds like an evil villain  because yes, Mr. Jones, indeed, I do have these text messages. , it's every evil villain of every animation ever. I'm just gonna restart that for you. So you can actually listen to this beautiful evil villain laugh by this lawyer. Once he feels like he has Alex in the corner. I can't imagine how excited this lawyer was to actually get this trial, especially in a time where I don't know if there's been any other specific time in history where court cases have been so publicized and, uh, you know, just so in the public eye as the last six months or so even. Um, but anyways, listen for this beautiful, beautiful Disney villain laugh by this lawyer. So you did get my text messages and they said you didn't nice trick. That's just not . Yes. Mr. Jones. Oh, indeed. You didn't give this text message to him. You don't, you don't know where this came from. Do you know where I got this? No. Mr. Jones, did you know that 12 days ago, 12 days ago, your attorneys messed up and sent me an entire digital copy of your entire cell phone with every text message you've sent for the past two years. And when informed. Did not take any steps to identify it as privileged or protect it in any way. And as of two days ago, it fell free and clear into my possession. And that is how I know you lied to me. When you said you didn't have text message about saying, okay. Did you know that? I see, I told you the truth. This is your Perry Mason moment. I gave them my phone and Mr. Jones, you need to answer the question? No. Did you notice? No, I don't know this happened, but I mean, I told you I gave him the phone over. Just that, just answer the question you said in your deposition, you searched your phone. You. And that's where we really, you can start to see the judge just like rolling her eyes about the whole situation. She's just so fed up with having to actually sit here and do this trial. You know, she, she goes on, if you listen for her, you'll hear just the irritation and agitation in her voice. As she's speaking to somebody, you know, being Alex Jones on this trial. And then she actually directs it a little bit at the other lawyer because she probably feels the need to balance out her frustration  for the public eye's sake. Um, but you just listen for how frustrated and how like agitated. She sounds with Alex Jones. You said you pulled down the text, did the service function for Sandy hook? That's what you said, Mr. Jones. Correct. And I had several, several different phones with this number, but I did. Yeah, well, of course. I mean, that's why you got it. No, Mr. Jones. That's not why I have my lawyer sent it to you. But I'm hiding it. Okay. Mr. Jones, Mr. Jones, that just answer questions. There's no question, Mr. Bankson also only asks questions. Sure. Mr. Jones, in discovery, you were asked, do you have Sandy hook, text messages on your phone? And you said that under oath, cause you not didn't you. I, if I was mistaken, I was mistaken, but you, you got the messages right there. You know what perjury is, right. I just wanna make sure, you know, before we go any further, you know what it is? Yes, I do. I mean, I, I'm not a tech guy. I told you, I gave in my testimony, the phone to the lawyers before, whatever. And, and so you've got my phone, but we didn't give it to you now, Mr. Jones, one more time. And please remember if you need to assert fifth amendment, you can, I need to know that you can do that, but you testified, so you did. He goes on to say, if you need to assert the fifth amendment, you can, like the other team's lawyer is telling him, maybe you should be quiet at this point is hilarious. Like how many times has that happened in court? Like, Hey, if you don't wanna go to jail for perjury, maybe just maybe just sit this one out. Maybe just say you don't know  so again, I, I find this to be interesting. I, I think that it's, uh, what a horrible position to find yourself in. I, if you're in any courtroom at all the actual other team's lawyer and what is he gonna do with this? Right. I mean, I'm, I don't know what type of, you know, there is client attorney privilege and there's, this does raise questions about whether or not Alex Jones gets some ability to say that there's like some type of mistrial, but I guess, because it's a civil case and not a. You know, some type of, um, actual, what is it called? I don't know, whatever the other type of case, it's a civil case. So the actual ability to, uh, call it a mistrial or whatever, doesn't actually come into play here. Uh, so interesting. But he may be actually able to go after this lawyer, from what I understand for doing that, because he literally just killed his entire case, right? The, the lawyer has a responsibility to do his best to defend him regardless of the situation. And part of that probably does not have to do with sending the other team's lawyer.  every text message you ever sent ever.  over the last two years. Um, so unfortunate for Alex Jones. Uh, it'll be interesting to see what comes of that trial. You know, who see, who, who knows how much money they'll actually get out of him for that. It seems like, you know, just looking at the. Uh, the judge in that case, Alex Jones is gonna lose . So it'll be interesting to see how much money actually comes of that for those parents. But I don't know something to watch. It's I, I bet you, it's probably the most entertaining trial. Uh, Alex Jones is far more, well, you call him what you want, but he is far more entertaining than any of the other trials that we've seen, whether it's Kyle written house, whether it is, uh, you know, um, pirates of the Caribbean trial, that's been going on Amber herd and Johnny Depp, you know, but Alex Jones is far more entertaining, so at least, you know, gives us some good comedy. All right. Now on the backs of that, we are going to start discussing the Nancy Pelosi, China, America. Situation. But before I do that, the first thing I need you to do is go ahead and hit that subscribe button for me. Um, if you have not already, I would appreciate it. So, so much more than, you know, whether you're driving, sitting at home with your house, with headphones on cleaning, whatever the hell you're doing, there's nothing else that you could do at this very, very moment to get a sliver sliver of good karma. And you can do that right now by just tap, tap, tap that subscribe button. 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Check out the website, subscribe five star review. That's all I got. Thank you very much. All right now. What we're gonna be discussing is Nancy Pelosi throwing the very first punch in what could cause a domino effect into a potential world war. As we saw her go on a trip to Taiwan this week, over the last couple of days, she was in Taiwan taking 90 million of taxpayer money to be escorted with unbelievable military presence to get there. Now, the reason that she went was obscure, she wouldn't tell people why she was actually going to Taiwan, but. Some people have some theories and I have my own, and we will discuss those as well. But let me go ahead and read this article for you, because it will give us some context. We'll look at some of the timelines of what actually went on here. Uh, and I, and I think it's important to note what's gonna be happening moving forward, because basically where we're at now is that the us is going to keep Naval assets really close to Taiwan. As China begins to ramp up their own Naval deployments and military actions and exercises, which I, I think is like, kind of weird, right? Like what is an, what is a military exer like live fire drills? What's that doing? I don't know. Um, but let's go ahead and we'll read this article and see what they have to say about Nancy Pelosi. Um, so what it goes on to say is that Nancy Pelosi went to Taiwan. In high ranking, Chinese officials issues, a new threat over Pelosi's expected visit to Taiwan. That was the very first article surrounding it. The next one goes on to say that that Taiwan is going to be keeping their military, or I'm sorry, their military assets, uh, in ready formation as this situation unfolds. So when she went to Taiwan, there's, there's a few different situations surrounding this. We'll look at what the white house has to say about it. Well, look what Nancy Pelosi's own Twitter account has to say about it, which is completely contradictory. Uh, but, um, it goes on to say that according to the us Navy, the us Ronald Reagan, USS anti M USS Higgins, USS triple E, and a guided missile cruiser are in the vicinity of Taiwan and overstaying. After her movement reports also indicate that the two us Naval submarines are also operating in this area. And so it says the movement of war us warships to the east of Taiwan comes as China announced it was moving Naval assets near Taiwan ahead of targeted military drills and missile tests. In addition to various Naval war movements, two Chinese aircraft carriers left their port as speaker Pelosi arrived in Taiwan. The two aircraft carriers, uh, are expected to move towards the region. The ships are accompanied by type 0 75 amphibious assault ships. All right. So basically what that's saying is that the us is not going anywhere right now, right? The us is going to stand their ground in Taiwan, which is also contradictory basically to what, uh, the white house said, which will watch again here. Some of the situations that unfolded there and what the white house speaker actually, you know, had to say about it. Um, but China is going to begin a set of unprecedented live fire drills off of the Taiwan coast as a result of this. Okay. It goes on to say that this is from, this is from the guardian. It says China is to begin a series of unprecedented live fire drills that would effectively blockade the islands of Taiwan just hours after the departure of us house speaker Nancy Pelosi, whose controversial visit this week has sparked fears of a crisis in the Taiwan. Straight Taiwan is characterized the drills, which will last until Sunday afternoon and will include missile tests and other military operations as close as nine miles to Taiwan's coastline. As a violation of international law ahead of the drill, it says 27 Chinese war planes had enter its air defense zone. Pelosi arrived in Taipei on Tuesday night, under intense global scrutiny and was met by the foreign minister and the us representatives in Taiwan.  she addressed Taiwan's parliament on Wednesday before having public and private meetings with the president, our delegation came to Taiwan to make unequivocally clear. We will not abandon Taiwan. And we are proud of our enduring friendship. Pelosi said, which again goes completely against what the Weis house had to say about this with their one China policy and believing that Taiwan is its own, you know, sovereign nation. No, , that's what the white house said. They believe that, you know, basically that it's a part of China, which is what we'll see here in this video. So let's go ahead and see what. The white house had to say about this. We'll see what the text messages were said by Nancy Pelosi. And actually let's go right into that here, which is Nancy Pelosi's tweets, not text messages, sorry.  Nancy Pelosi's tweets. So Nancy Pelosi tweeted by traveling to Taiwan. We honor our commitment to democracy, reaffirming that the freedoms of Taiwan and all democracies must be respected. And that was directly from Nancy Pelosi's Twitter account. During this now Nancy Pelosi actually posted what seemed to be a hype video around her, her trip to Taiwan, which I feel is hilarious. Even like, listen to the music of this. And I'll kind of talk you through it if you're just listening here. Um, and then we will walk through the article together. So you hear this uplifting music as they show her landing and walking next to some Taiwanese people. She's speaking on a couch, waving her fist around as people wave their heads as a, in a yes. Motion. just like the music kills me on this. You know, just how, how, you know, she went to stock media.com and typed in make people like me. So I guess you could receive some type of honor as a result of this, you know, that hasn't been given to other people. Um, I don't know. It's, it's really quite interesting to just, you gotta see this video, go to Nancy Pelosi's Twitter account. It's hill Larry to see just the, the vibe and the feel of this video here. They're taking selfies together. Oh, the good thing she's wearing a mask. She might start a world war, but Nancy Pelosi is at least wearing a mask in her hype video who cares about the, the fighter jet scrambled to run after her. At least she has her mask on Oh, it's so funny to see the world politics on this stage. It's like, I'm surprised this woman even wants to travel to Taiwan at this point. Um, I don't know. So let let's go over the timeline here. We'll, we'll look at something here, which, you know, in a minute, what we'll look at is the difference between the way the media has addressed. You know, the headlines that have come out of this for Nancy Pelosi doing this, you know, very, um, what people say about it is somewhat aggressive act, uh, uh, and foreign policy against some of the things that we have said we would follow in the past, including our own white house. I don't know what this, this guy is not the curly headed lady, but the man, um, I don't know what his title is, but he says some, some stuff about what the us policy is about this, and it goes completely against it. But let's look at the timeline here of what actually went down, what actually happened and see how China responded. Let's just jump into it. So it says. Footage uploaded by civilians in China. So this was breaking news is they started to show China, basically throwing a bunch of military assets on the border of Taiwan, right? The immediately close vicinity of a city directly across from Taiwan. And it says that footage uploaded by civilians in China show, large military movements of troops and equipment. And speaker Pelosi is expected to arrive in Taiwan shortly. The large military movements have occurred on major highways and railways throughout the Chinese Providence of Fujian. Um, this was at 1:01 AM Pacific time and it says commercial fights have been abruptly canceled from airports in several cities, um, in the Fujian Providence. And this was, uh, due to regional traffic control and did not elaborate further for the actual cause of that 1 0 7. Um, the mayor of Ziman, I don't know if I'm pronouncing any of these cities, right? So my apologies has called on citizens to donate blood without detailing. Why at one 11 Pacific time photos coming in the military movements. One 14, the Chinese aircraft carrier is reportedly moving towards Taiwan in additional ship in Chan. Don was reported to have left Sanya Naval base on yesterday. 1 21. They continue to talk about the USS Ronald Reagan is on course towards Taiwan reports, estimated that the shift could arrive in Taiwan in the next six hours. And then we start to see us military aircraft departing Japan and heading towards Taiwan from, uh, air force based. OK, Okinawa, um, 1 37. You start to basically what ends up happening here is a bunch of military aircraft, a bunch of tanks, a bunch of all this military equipment is being shown as traveling all across China, to get over to the streets of Z to show Chinese, uh, military equipment. There's all these videos of all these people we're posting about it now. It started to say how Nancy Pelosi is gonna basically take a long way around to get there. You know, obviously because she understands what she is doing. And again, we'll talk about why people think she's actually doing what she's doing, which has to do with more. So her stock investments, as opposed to, you know, maybe us foreign policy, as we see the white house distance themselves from her. And, uh, let's go see. So at 4:57 AM Pacific time, that's 7:57 AM the morning of this happening. Multiple Taiwanese government websites went down, right? All they got shut down, which included the actual taiwan.gov website. So. From there, we start to see her travel. Now, if you were following this at all, you'd understand that there there's something called the flight radar 20 four.com, which is where you can follow military aircraft follow any type of aircraft that has any type of radar system that you can track through air traffic control. And there was over 300,000 people following this single plane of Nancy Pelosi, just praying to see it.  go down. You know, we've seen all of these, you know, hilarious comments about this. You know, people are just saying like, you know, just keep her, we don't, we don't want her anyways, if you want to, you know, shoot her down. Oh, no, we're so sad about it.  uh, I'll, I'll hold my opinion on it. Um, but there was some pretty hilarious comments. If you start to look at these things, um, but everybody was watching this 300,000 people across the world were watching her plane. I imagine be sitting in that aircraft and, and wondering what's gonna actually happen. I don't know it, it would be if you're Nancy Pelosi and you're all dressed up in your suit and ready to go take on, you know, Taiwan foreign policy or show your support for them. And you're just wondering if at any moment your aircraft could be shut down. Now I would wonder, you know, why they wouldn't turn off their radar. Um, so you know, what is more likely to me is that that was probably some type of, you know, if they're spending 90 million for her to be there, they're probably sending a couple planes and making one as a decoy. Um, but imagine being the, the pilot on that plane too, like, you didn't even ask for this, right? You're not going to check on your billion dollar stock investments in Taiwan. You're just flying planes, wherever your command tells you to fly them.  and all of a sudden you have to fly Nancy Pelosi through enemy territory to Taiwan. Wondering if at any moment you're gonna get shot down. For Nancy Pelosi to go check on her stock investments. Which again, we'll talk about here in a minute.  at 7:01 AM. China closed the Taiwan straight for commercial air tra air traffic control. Um, and then they started to scramble, uh, 7 21, which was 20 minutes later. Taiwan started to scramble fighter jets to intercept Chinese or, uh, aircraft heading towards the country. All right. Now, Nancy Pelosi later released a state.  and, uh, this beautiful picture of her with her hands up, you know, if you recall her rubbing her fist together and just so excited to clap for Joe Biden, um, but it kind of look like one of those situations, she's quite the awkward character. Um, it says our congressional delegations visit to Taiwan honors America's unwavering commitment to support Taiwan's vibrant democracy. Our visit is a part of broader trip to the end of Pacific, including Singapore, Malaysia, South Korea, and Japan focused on mutual security, economic partnership, and democratic governance. Our discussions with Taiwan leadership will focus on reaffirming our support for our partner and our, and on promoting our shared interests. It's interesting that she calls them her partner. Our partner, right? Our partner.  not, not the United States partner. All of, all of ours, uh, all of our partners, um, which again, the white house begins to distance themselves from her as a result of this. Uh, but it says our discussions with Taiwan leadership will focus on reaffirming our support for our partner in on promoting our shared interest, including advancing free and open endo Pacific region. Uh, America's solidarity with the 23 million people of Taiwan is more important today than ever as the world faces a choice between autocracy and democracy. Our visit is one of several congressional delegations to Taiwan in no way, contradicts longstanding United States policy guided by Taiwan relations active 1979, us China joint and the six assurances. The United States continues to oppose unilateral efforts to change the status quo. Now things started to escalate here and what we've seen as a result of all of this, uh, you know, basically the very next, you know, several, several hours later, the China's military started to announce that it was going to launch targeted military operations to counter speaker Pelosi's visits, Taiwan, the military added it would resolutely, defend territorial integrity and national sovereignty. And they didn't say where they were aiming that at. They didn't say specifically in Taiwan, they didn't know anything specific about it just said that they're willing and able to conduct targeted military operations. Now they go on to seemingly say that they're going to be doing live fire drills. And again, this is my question is like, what does a live fire drill? What does that look like? Why would you, how does that, are you just like flexing your muscles before a fist fight? Like what, what is the point of that? Right? They showed the actual tra air traffic zones, like the, the fight areas that are gonna be sectioned off as a result of this. But who knows what's gonna come of this? I think this is the very beginning of what's gonna escalate. Uh, I, I just don't see that this saber rattling doesn't turn into something more, but we will see here in just a moment, you know, very shortly, just a few minutes here, we'll see how the white house responds to this, including what, uh, Pentagon press secretary John Kirby said about it. Um, China summon the us ambassador in China over speakers, uh, visit to Taiwan. China says it will carry out targeted military operations in response to the visit. And then the Pentagon press secretary John Kirby says that speaker Pelosi has a right to visit Taiwan. He adds that the United States believes China will ramp up military activity around Taiwan in the coming days. And then also said that they support the one China policy and will continue to support speaker Pelosi's trip. They basically say that like, yeah, she can do whatever she. Okay then let her do it. If she wants to go to Taiwan to check on her investment portfolio with microchips, then maybe she shouldn't be using $90 million of taxpayer money to do so. Maybe she should fly Delta.  like, see if the Delta airliner gets shot down, not a, you know, billion dollar, uh, you know, F 35 as a result of a dog fight that that came of this. So let's go ahead and watch this video. And then we'll talk about some of the, the preceding statements by the people in China, as well as the United States. But here is the Pentagon press, secretary, John Kirby, and his statements regarding this trip now on Taiwan. Cause I know that's on, uh, everybody's mind today. I wanna reaffirm that the speaker has not confirmed any travel plans and it is for the speaker to do so. And her staff. So we won't be commenting or speculating about, um, the, the stops on her trip. We have been clear from the very beginning that she will make her own decisions. And that Congress is an independent branch of government. Our constitution embeds a separation of powers. This is well known to the PRC, given our more than four decades of diplomatic relations, the speaker has the right to visit Taiwan and a speaker of the house has visited Taiwan before, without incident, as have many members of Congress, including this year, the world has seen the United States government be very clear that nothing has changed. Nothing has changed about our one China policy, which is of course guided by the Taiwan relations act. The three joint us PRC communicates in the six assurances. We have said, we have repeatedly said that we oppose any unilateral changes to the status quo. From either side, we have said that we do not support Taiwan, independence. And we have said that we expect cross straight differences to be resolved by peaceful needs. We have communicated this directly to the PRC at the highest levels. If you don't support Taiwan independence, then why is the speaker of the house going on to Twitter, supporting Taiwan independence? I just don't get how we can have such a disconnect between the third, second, third in line for the presidency. If Joe Biden dies tomorrow of old age COVID cancer or falls up the stairs, walking to get onto his plane, who's gonna take the presidency. Well, it's Kamala Harris and then it's Nancy Pelosi, who, again, we might have to worry about dying of old age at the same time, but if she's going on to these world stages and she is showing on Twitter, literally on Twitter. Saying that she supports Taiwan's democracy. We will have to choose between an and a democracy. We are showing our support of the democratic state. She's literally saying that she supports Taiwan's independence in almost every tweet that she talked about on this. And then he comes out here and, and it's all has to do with this gaslighting. Right? And he, you know, they've been gaslighting the American people for three years, and now they believe that they can not only Gaslight the people, they can Gaslight the Chinese government into thinking that, you know, we're not, we're not doing anything over here. We, we have nothing to do with our third in line for the president of the United States, making a direct attempt at threatening the sovereignty of a, some nation. You believe to be yours. It's it's it's I don't even know what to describe it as, but it's almost. As insulted as I feel when they Gaslight me, the Chinese government has to be like, yeah, what are you saying? I'm looking at Twitter right now. And Nancy Pelosi is saying that she supports the democracy of Taiwan. How do we misconstrue this? Because this man is 700 positions below Nancy Pelosi. He is not even close to this. And by the way, what the hell are these positions? Like the press secretary, the Pentagon press sec, the white house, press secretary, the Pentagon press. Secretary. What is this position for? What is this man doing besides literally getting paid to lie? About everything and read from a book, like how, how do you even get do for when you go through the interview process to be a press secretary, do they make you read Dr. Seuss allowed to people and see how convincing you can read Dr. Like, what is the process to become in this position? How much money do they get paid to literally just stand up there, sift through pieces of paper and lie about every single thing that they're talking about at all times. I don't know. It just seems like such a ridiculous position. Why don't you have the president of the United States speak to us? Oh, because then you'd have to find somebody and put somebody in that position who has the ability to form sentences. Right. That might be a problem anyways. So let's, let's watch the rest of this, but again, how I, I just don't see how you can have such conflicting conversations surrounding this. How, how the, the Pentagon press secretary can come out and say that we support the one China policy. We believe Taiwan is a part of China. And at the same time, the third, second, third in line for the presidency is going to Taiwan and saying she supports their democracy. I don't know, including as recently as last week and the phone call between president Biden and president she, the national security advisor, the secretaries of state and defense, the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff have also made this very clear to Beijing in a half a dozen recent high level conversations put simply there is no reason. For Beijing to turn a potential visit consistent with longstanding us policy into some sort of crisis or conflict, or use it as a pretext to increase aggressive military activity in or around the Taiwan straight. There's no reason to turn this into anything. There's no reason at all. That's why we sent 26 F 30 fives. I'm making that up. However many fighter jets they sent surrounding her aircraft. However many huge ass military assets, $90 million of taxpayer money is what was expected to come of this trip to ensure her security so that she could go again. And again, we'll look at this article, but check on her stock investments, 90 million, if you believe. It's just so baffling to me that they can even say that. Why, why, why do you guys have a problem with this what's wrong? We didn't do anything. We didn't do anything. It's like a six year old with a cookie in their mouth telling, you know, telling you they didn't grab the cookie off the counter. Right. And they got chocolate all over their face. Why are you up so upset? We didn't eat the cookie. It's so stupid. And yet over the weekend, even before speaker Pelosi arrived in the region, China conducted a live fire exercise. China appears to be positioning itself to potentially take further steps in the coming days. and perhaps over longer time horizons. Now, these potential steps from China could include military provocations, such as firing missiles in the Taiwan straight or around Taiwan operations that break historical norms such as large scale air entry into Taiwan's air defense identification, zone ages. I think you all know that acronym, air, or Naval activities that cross the median line and military exercises that could be highly publicized. This could also include actions in the diplomatic and economic space such as further spurious legal claims by Beijing's public assertions last month, or I'm sorry, like Beijing's, uh, public assertions last month at the Taiwan Strait is not an international waterway. Some of these actions would continue concerning trend lines, uh, that we've seen in recent years, but some could be of a different scope and scale. The last time Beijing fired missiles into the Taiwan Strait was 1995 and 1996. After Beijing reacted provocatively to Taiwan's president's visit, uh, to deliver and address at his Alamo mater. I wanna contrast this now between the United States and China, we and countries around the world, believe escalation serves no one Beijing's actions could have unintended consequences that only serve to increase tensions. Meanwhile, our actions are not threatening and they break no new ground, nothing about this potential visit potential visit, which oh, by the way, has precedent would change the status quo and the world should reject any PRC effort to use it to do so we will not take the bait or engage in SA rattling. At the same time, we will not be intimidated. We will keep operating in the seas and the skies of the Western Pacific as we have for decades. We will continue to support cross straight peace, stability, support, Taiwan of course, defend a free and open endo Pacific. And we're still gonna seek to maintain lines of communication with Beijing. All of that is important. And all of that, all of it is preserving the status quo. We expect to see Beijing continue to use inflammatory rhetoric and disinformation in the coming days. United States by contrast will with transparency will. I am absolutely 100% positive. The United States will act with transparency as always as shown over the last three years. oh man. Gosh, this man, at least he's better than, uh, the other woman, the white house, press secretary at convincing people and holding a straight face and being able to finish a sentence. You know, at least it's not as insulting when this man lies to our face. I don't know it. It's it's funny. We're gonna read through all of the tweets that Nancy Pelosi had here. I have him pulled up, so we got 20 seconds left in this. I'll I'll give you the rest of the clip here and then we'll, we'll walk through those end up here. We'll answer your questions. We'll give you the facts. We are also committed to keeping open lines of communication with Beijing. As I said, this is what the world expects of, not just the United States, but of China. And we encourage Beijing to keep that commitment as well. One of the main things that he said there was that we continue to support the one China policy, right? The one China policy is the fact that China believes that they own Taiwan, right? That's the major overlying theme of the one China policy. Now, as Nancy Pelosi says on the backs of that, and the very first tweet that we see about this, well, maybe the second one, she says the United States  the United States continues to oppose unilateral efforts to change the status quo. Our visits is one of several congressional delegations to Taiwan and it in no way contradicts longstanding United States policy guided by the Taiwan relations act in 1979, she goes on to say that our delegations visit to Taiwan honors America's unwavering commitment to supporting Taiwan's vibrant democracy. Our discussions with Taiwan leadership reaffirm our support for our partner and promote our shared interest, including advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific region. Her very next, uh, tweet says by traveling to Taiwan, we honor our commitment to democracy. If you recall, China is not a democracy reaffirming that their freedoms of Taiwan and all democracies must be respected. The next tweet says our visit reiterates that America stands with Taiwan, a robust, vibrant democracy in our important partner in the endo Pacific. And this, this picture that she's in here outside. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8 other people all in masks. And they're all in like black suits and she's in like a pink suit in the middle that like, somebody dressed her in , but they're all in masks, which again, you're outside. What are you doing? And even if you're inside, what are you doing? The very next post says, I like how she's like following a timeline here. Well, obviously she's not tweeting these. I would be highly, very, very surprised if Nancy Pelosi was actually on Twitter or knew how to use it in her age, but, um, in the recent days. Yeah. And she kind of moves on from the Taiwan situation. Uh, let's see if she has anymore here. Nope. She moves on. So, um, the last one that she said was, uh, about 17 hours ago and it said our delegation had the distinct privilege of meeting with the president of Taiwan. We discussed how America and Taiwan can deepen our economic ties. And by that she means her investments in longstanding chip companies.  we discussed how America and Taiwan can deepen our economic ties, further strengthen our security partnerships and defend our shared democratic values. Nancy, how do you plan on defending our shared democratic values? When the Pentagon says that they do not support your trip, that they have nothing to do with your trip, that you are going on this trip alone and they won't tell us why. And speaking of why let's jump into some of the theories allegedly as to why Nancy Pelosi actually went to Taiwan now to be fully transparent. This is not from any legitimate article, but several people online. Who are going to give their opinions as to why they believe that Nancy Pelosi is actually in Taiwan. All right. Now, an interesting situation that occurred was recently Nancy Pelosi actually sold, I believe about 50% or her not her. Of course not her. She would never trade stocks with insider information. It was her husband. He has nothing to do with her. They never share information. They don't talk about things that could potentially make them money. Of course they wouldn't do that. Her husband sold about half of their shares of the Envidia stock. All right. So, um, the first thing that says it's probably something to do with the millions that she just invested into Envidia uh, TSMC is the world's premier provider of Silicon wafer. Their clientele includes apple AMD, Invidia, et cetera. Invidia's particular in particular just realized they bought too much capacity for TM. TMC S's, uh, process nodes. The crash of crypto is to blame for that. The crash of crypto just saw demand for Nvidia GPS plummet. They ordered way too many chips expecting crypto to stay strong. Now as to why she's going there, TSMC will not change the existing deal for the chips. With Nvidia. This puts Invidia in a bad position because demand is now low and supply is going to be enormous. She owns a ton of Invidia stock and that stock price will plummet. If supply isn't reduced in some way, she's probably trying to go to Taiwan to get TSMC, to play ball. She could threaten them directly by holding up the chips act in Congress, costing TSMC, billions TSMC is set to receive money in the aforementioned act to subsidize the construction of a silicone fab in Arizona. It's literally a matter of national security that they build that fab. Otherwise when China sees as Taiwan and they will eventually China will control the best processors on the planet. Uninhibited even Intel is years behind TSM C's design Nancy probably just doesn't wanna lose millions on a bad buy. And she just is throwing her weight around threatening national security to make a few dollars. No Nancy Pelosi would not, not overcome her integrity would not, would not put her reputation on the line to make money. She makes $200,000 a year as the speaker of the house or something like that. Right? That's, that's more than enough to, to house herself in a $10 billion house or whatever the house she lives in.  uh, somebody asks on that thread do, should I buy TSMC stock now before China's takeover and somebody responds and says, China's seizing Taiwan as a matter of when. And they will control a good portion of the computer chip supply. It's one of the easiest annexes in the Asian region, but they won't invade before the us builds its own steady supply of chips because of political fallout, which would last for a duration of half a presidency until the public loses interest in Asians. I didn't say that , um, somebody said that she sold her position in Nvidia. Somebody responded by saying that she sold less than half of it, still 6.5 million position that she's in right now, which is approximately one 20th, maybe not 1 21 16th, one 17th of the total cost of the military tax hours that were spent for her to ensure her own safety, going to Taiwan in the first place. Maybe we can cut a deal with Nancy, like, Hey, don't go to Taiwan and start a world war. And maybe let's just, let's give her like a $2 million, you know, check as a result. And then she doesn't have to go play these little games and, and, you know, potentially cause the deaths of tens of millions of people, somebody else went on the same, speaking on the same subject about the chips, which seems to be a theme regarding this visit. They said that she is going to Taiwan to make a deal about TSMC. TSMC is quite literally a key part of Taiwan's defense strategy. There really isn't much competition with TSMC on the bleeding edge of chip production. And the few people that can compete are still behind them. If they were knocked out of the tech industry would be set back a decade. At least even if competitors Samsung could speed up their development and create a competing node, TSMC represents a huge percentage of the market that, um, that them going down would absolutely cripple tech markets. The other dominance of TSMC and the complete reliance on TSMC by the global tech industry is why Europe United States and China are all investing so heavily in ship. Taiwan, isn't stupid. They know they can't stand up to China and they fight TSM. C's dominance is their defense strategy. Taiwan has made the west so helplessly dependent on them and the west can't afford to let China invade. Pelosi is there to make a deal. I have no doubt. She will line her own pockets in the process, but let's not get ourselves here. Pelosi does not give a shit about the United States. You think she gives a fuck about Taiwan. This person says she will coddle them like the rest of the west until the very moment the us chip fabs can complete can compete and don't need TSMC anymore. The second Taiwan is no longer an integral part of the economy. You can bet your ass. People like Pelosi. Won't give the AODA of a fuck about them anymore.  that was beautifully written. Thank you so much. Um, Again, somebody else said, should I invest in their stock? What happens if the stock value in China captures Taiwan? Um, somebody else said that it's being kept down by the China threats, providing how stupid ball street is insanely undervalued stock. Nothing will happen to TSMC. The tech they use comes from ASML in Europe. If they can rebuild it somewhere else, it can be rebuilt somewhere else in the world. The chip act is supposed, uh, supposed to pay for them to build a plant in Texas. Supposedly Taiwan doesn't want to do it because they don't wanna lose their bargaining chip against China. Interesting. Very interesting. So there you have it. That is the theories behind why Nancy Pelosi is actually going there because she wouldn't tell anybody Nancy Pelosi would not disclose why she was going to Taiwan besides her tweets that make it seem like she's doing it for foreign policy, which is obviously according to most sources and by most sources, I mean, a bunch of random people on the internet  has nothing to do with it. Um, so take it with a grain of salt, but that's what they're saying. All right now, one thing I do find interesting regarding this whole thing is the difference in the way that they headlines reacted to the, to Nancy Pelosi, going to Taiwan and Donald Trump specifically just taking a phone call from Taiwan's president Nancy Pelosi, literally met with Taiwan's president and Donald Trump took a phone call and got just obliterated for doing so. So let's read the headlines. It says Nancy Pelosi tells this is both from the same article or from the same writer from the guardian. And it says that Nancy Pelosi tells president Cy us will not abandon Taiwan. That is the statement made by the guardian about her visit. Okay. Now what they said. When Trump specifically. So if you like recall the way that Trump was treated in the media, it's quite comical to look at the variations compared to that his presidency and no, right. He was just like, you know what I'm saying? It was, it was just the way the media treated him in the headlines was like everything that he did was a national crisis. Every phone call, literally every phone call he took was an atrocious act of self, you know, uh, self help and, and not for our country, you know, everything he did was horrific. So Nancy Pelosi goes to meet the president and the headline is Nancy Pelosi tells president SI us will not abandon Taiwan. The other headline is that Nancy Pelosi's, Nancy Pelosi pledges us solidarity with Taiwan. Okay. Those are your two headlines by the guardian for Nancy Pelosi. Okay. Now. The headlines for Donald Trump. When he specifically just took a phone call, all he did was take a phone call, nothing crazy. The headline was Trump's phone call with Taiwan, president risks, China's wrath risks. China's wrath for taking a phone call, not for flying a plane there with a bunch of military assets to protect him along with all of these aircraft carriers and you know, all of these missiles on top of those beautiful carriers and F 30 fives following in pursuit. And no, none of that just took a phone call. Now let's just read the first little couple sentences here. It says Donald Trump looked to have sparked a potentially damaging diplomatic role with China. On Friday, after speaking to Taiwanese president on the telephone and they move experts, would an expert said would anger Beijing, the call first reported by the TA a times and confirmed by the new financial times is thought to be the first between the leader of the island and us president or president elect since ties between America and Taiwan were severed in 1979 at Beijing's behest. The us closes embassy in Taiwan, a democratically ruled island, which Beijing, Beijing considers a breakaway Providence in the late 1970s. Following the historic re reapproach between Beijing and Washington, that stemmed from Richard Nixon's 1972 trip to China since then the us adhered to the so-called one China principle, which officially considers the independently governed island part of the same single Chinese nation as the mainland. Trump's transition team said Cy, who was elected Taiwan's first female president in January had congratulated the billionaire tycoon on his recent victory. So they start to fear monger. They say that it's gonna be against that just for taking a phone call  now Nancy Pelosi goes there. And all of a sudden the guardian believes that she's doing the right thing, right? that they say that China cannot stop other world leaders. Visiting Taiwan says Nancy Pelosi, right? Singing the praises from the mountain tops. And when Trump takes a phone call, he's dealing with the wrath of China. Wild. All right. And then the last thing that we will talk about here, something that is not in the news, as much as it should be currently is that Paul Pelosi Nancy Pelosi's husband is to be arraigned on DUI charges in Napa county. Paul Pelosi husband, the speaker of the house, Nancy Pelosi is scheduled to be arraigned at eight 30 on Wednesday today in Napa county superior court. According to a press release from the Napa county district attorney's office, the DA's office filed charges after Pelosi was arrested for allegedly driving under the influence on May 28th, Pelosi was reportedly in a car accident. The night he was arrested, the charges include driving under the influence of alcohol con causing injury and driving with a zero, uh, 0.08 blood percent blood alcohol level or higher. According to California pen code 1977. Defendants may appear through their attorney for misdemeanor DUI cases, meaning they don't need to be present in the courtroom unless a judicial officer orders. It Pelosi has not been ordered according to the DA's office at arraignment, a judicial officer nor, uh, notifies the defendant of the crimes they have been charged with. Then a formal reading of the complaint can be waived da LA, then the defendant and their counselor can enter a plea. The case may then be continued to another date after a plea charge. Is set in the jury trial. Now it's interesting that he even got charged in this case that he's even going to court and that anybody ever found out about it. I would think if you're Nancy Pelosi and you have the ability to get 90 million to be, you know, your, your fleet of vehicles that you get to take with you to show that you're a thug against the Chinese government, that you know, maybe our own government wouldn't go after your husband for a DUI. Oh, and here's another article showing his mugshot, which is absolutely atrocious. Looks like a, um, methed out author.  it says that mugshot from Paul Pelosi husband, the speaker of the house, Nancy Pelosi has been released at the night of the arrest on suspicion of driving under the influence. Last month, Pelosi was arrested on May 28th by the California highway patrol for driving under the influence of alcohol, um, under the suspicion of D a DUI. So I've heard people say that maybe this is, you know, some type of. You know, uh, some, some silly people have reported that. I dunno. It's interesting that at the same time, as she's flying millions of dollars of us tax dollars in military assets to Taiwan, her husband's in court over a DUI for running into somebody. Now, I don't believe this is the first time he's dealt with this. Uh, I've heard, I don't know, maybe I'm wrong, but I've heard that Pelosi's husband has been in this type of trouble before. And he's 82 years old. What are you doing? Getting a DUI at 82.  like, let, like you're getting drunk enough to be over the limit at 82 years old. And then also driving your vehicle. Like, was he like hanging out with the homies at the local bar? I don't know, but here here's what I think. I, I think we're getting into some really iffy waters with this whole worldwide conflict situation between Ukraine and Russia. Right. We haven't seen as much Saab rattling from Russia recently with the United States, but now China entering the arena. We've kind of been waiting on this. We've been looking out for this situation. China has now entered the chat, right? China is now Sabre rattling, not just at Taiwan, but at us leadership in governmental officials. So this is where it starts to get iffy. And if China enters the conversation and Russia's pissed off at us, because we were throwing our buddies in Ukraine, all of the missiles we could find to kill their own citizens. Mm. Things could get squirrly. Right. Uh, again, I've, I've talked about this analogy a bunch, but if you were in a bar and your buddy was in a fight and all of a sudden the guy that he's fighting, his buddy throws him a knife. You're probably gonna throw him a gun. Right. If you have the ability to right. It's like this weird consequence of events, when you're funding the oppositions. Uh, you know, ability to fight against a world superpower. Eventually they're gonna come for you. Right? And now that we have China and Russia entering into this worldwide global arena at the same time, things are just gonna get weirder and weirder. So we're gonna have to see where this goes. I'm not super posi. You know, I'm not super, uh, optimistic that this doesn't go in a direction that doesn't have to lead to some sort of war conflict for the first time between world super powers since you know, 1942. Uh, but hopefully that's not the case, but it's definitely a concern right now. You know, we see all of this weirdness going on, all of the things leading up to this and within a year of presidency, not only does Russia, Ukraine, Russia invade Ukraine, and China's saber raddling at Nancy Pelosi, visiting Taiwan. Again, we're gonna have to see where it goes, but it it's, it's, it's quite concerning. And that's what I got for you today. I hope they gave you an update on Nancy Pelosi. Now, one thing that I would like to do in the future, I'm going to get back to some deep dives. I'm going to get away from all of the political rhetoric that we've been talking about over the last several episodes. We'll include some of the recent events and things like that. But I am going to get back to our roots, which is talking about.  all of the craziness that is going on behind the curtain. Right. I think the next episode, or at least in the very new future, I would like to talk about some of the, the food aspects. Right? You see all of the bugs, they're trying to get you to eat. you see, um, you know, all of this things about seed oils coming out and all of the things that are government in our, you know, uh, worldwide, um, multinational corporations are pushing on us as a, a culture. You see bill gates buying all the farmland, you see China buying all the farmland, you see all of these fad diets coming into play, and, and that have all of these, you know, chemicals and grossness involved. And then in the very near future, we're gonna start bringing on some guests. I'm gonna start doing some interviews with people that I find interesting on topics that I find to be interesting. Um, so head over to red pill, revolution.co. Check out the website. Let me know what you think. Head over to red pill revolution, doac.com. You'll get the full podcast companion, which I guess I should have mentioned earlier. Um, but head over to red pill revolution, doac.com and you'll get the full podcast companion. I'll include all of the articles, all of the videos, all of the topic, videos, all of everything that I got from this episode, you will get directly to your email, including the full audio podcast, including the full video podcast, right to your email every single week for free for now red pill revolution, dots.com. Subscribe, leave a five star review. I appreciate you so much. I hope you have a great week and welcome to the revolution. Thank you so much.  

Join Jim and Greg as they breathe a big sigh of relief that Eric Schmitt will be the GOP nominee for U.S. Senate in Missouri - and also that Eric Greitens won't be. They also wince as the pro-life side takes a drubbing in Kansas but aren't convinced there's been a sea change in the midterms. And they try to sort out America's paradoxical "One China Policy."Please visit our great sponsors:NetChoicehttps://NetChoice.org/2992Join us in telling Congress to stop rising prices and reject progressive tech regulations like S.2992

Join Jim and Greg as they breathe a big sigh of relief that Eric Schmitt will be the GOP nominee for U.S. Senate in Missouri – and also that Eric Greitens won’t be. They also wince as the pro-life side takes a drubbing in Kansas but aren’t convinced there’s been a sea change in the […]

In this episode, Mosh looks at the two biggest international stories going into your Tuesday: The US strike on the leader of al Qaeda, and House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's controversial visit to Taiwan.  First, we dive into the killing of Ayman al-Zawahiri, a key 9/11 plotter and the man who took over al Qaeda after Osama bin Laden. With Zawahiri's death, all of the top plotters behind the worst terror attack on US soil are now either dead or captured. I discuss what his killing means, the future of the war on terror vs. al Qaeda and ISIS, and the stunning detail that he was living in Kabul, Afghanistan safe house, very close to the Taliban defense ministry.  Next, we look into the implications of Nancy Pelosi's trip to Taiwan this week, now that it has been officially confirmed. China is ratcheting up threats while the White House reiterates that the Chinese shouldn't turn this visit into a crisis. I answer some of your questions including: Why Pelosi is making the trip, what the Chinese are so worried about, and provide a breakdown of  “One China” (the policy that lets us maintain different relations with Taiwan and China).  – Please remember to subscribe to the podcast and leave us a review. – Mosheh Oinounou (@mosheh) is an Emmy and Murrow award-winning journalist. He has 20 years of experience at networks including Fox News, Bloomberg Television and CBS News, where he was the executive producer of the CBS Evening News and launched the network's 24 hour news channel. He founded the @mosheh Instagram news account in 2020 and the Mo News podcast and newsletter in 2022. Follow Mo News on all platforms: Newsletter: https://monews.bulletin.com/ Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/mosheh/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/mosheh Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/MoshehNews Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/moshehnews Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Tim Dillon has on Andrew Schulz to discuss One China, taking risks, Andrew running for president, why Tim should stop worrying about an economic collapse, if Ben Shapiro made Game of Thrones, Trump dunking on Elon, why you shouldn't place faith in institutions, being happy for other's success, and how politicians create fake narratives the public buys into. Andrew's special can be bought here: https://theandrewschulz.com/ Bonus episodes every week: ▶▶ https://www.patreon.com/thetimdillonshow ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ SUPPORT OUR SPONSORS: HELIX BED ▶▶ https://www.helixsleep.com/timd for 200 dollars off Mattress orders and two free pillows WATCHES ▶▶ for 20% off go to https://www.vincerocollective.com/timdillon