Podcasts about Americas Quarterly

For decades, it has been a trope of foreign policy commentary in the United States that Washington does not pay enough attention to its own hemisphere. But the Trump administration seems to be bucking this trend—though not exactly in the way those complaining about neglect might have wanted. President Donald Trump's campaign spent a lot of time focusing on immigration and fentanyl coming from Latin America. And in the early months of his administration, Trump has focused to a surprising degree not just on Mexico and Central America but also on the Panama Canal and Canada and Greenland. There's even been talk of America's so-called sphere of influence in the Western Hemisphere.  Brian Winter, one of the best chroniclers and analysts of Latin America and the longtime editor of Americas Quarterly, was one of the few people who anticipated this focus—as he did in an essay for Foreign Affairs a few weeks before Trump's inauguration. As Trump unleashes a whirlwind of confrontational policies across the globe—his sweeping tariffs being just the latest example—Latin American leaders are developing their own approach to this challenge. And in Winter's view, they may be surprisingly well positioned to weather the storm better than their counterparts anywhere else. He spoke with Dan Kurtz-Phelan on April 8 about how leaders everywhere from Argentina and Brazil to Mexico and Central America are navigating this new reality—and also about whether Latin America's long tradition of strongman leadership has now come to the United States. You can find sources, transcripts, and more episodes of The Foreign Affairs Interview at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/podcasts/foreign-affairs-interview.

Venezuela is a tough place to be a journalist. Our guest this episode, Tony Frangie Mawad wrote last year about the possibility of an opposition victory that would upend the regime of President Nicolás Maduro in the country's July elections. But even though the opposition candidate won the vote, Maduro held on to power, and this year has cracked down further on his opponents and an already-weakened media.Fangie Mawad is an independent journalist and political analyst, based in Caracas, Venezuela.  He writes the Substack Venezuela Weekly, where he keeps a close eye on developments both at home, and in the Venezuelan diaspora.  He's written for international news outlets including Bloomberg, The Economist, and Americas Quarterly, and was an editor for the Caracas Chronicles.Making Peace Visible producer Andrea Muraskin spoke with Tony about what it's like to work in an authoritarian context, where journalists are often censored and threatened, and sometimes arrested. As you'll hear, it helps to have a sense of humor, and a long view of history.  This interview was recorded on March 24. Things may have shifted in Venezuela by the time you hear it.  LEARN MOREtonyfrangie.comVenezuela Weekly (English edition)El Chiguire Bipolar - "The Bipolar Capybara" Venezuelan satire website ABOUT THE SHOW The Making Peace Visible podcast is hosted by Jamil Simon and produced by Andrea Muraskin. Our associate producer is Faith McClure. Learn more at makingpeacevisible.orgSupport our work Connect on social:Instagram @makingpeacevisibleLinkedIn @makingpeacevisibleBluesky @makingpeacevisible.bsky.social We want to learn more about our listeners. Take this 3-minute survey to help us improve the show!

Hablamos en Nueva York con el director de "Americas Quarterly" y ex corresponsal en Brasil, Brian Winter; en Lima con el analista político Gonzalo Banda, y en Ciudad de México con Marcela Nochebuena, periodista de "Animal Político"

Tune in now to hear everything about El Salvador and its current crime management!This week Dominic has Juan David Rojas on The International Risk Podcast. They discuss Bukele's crime mitigation in El Salvador, and dive into authoritarianism, Bukele's popularity, gangs and violence, how international gangs operate, amongst others. Juan David Rojas is a Columnist at Compact and a Consultant. He is a subject matter expert on Latin America, where he provides advice and analysis on political, economic, foreign policy, energy and security topics. Juan is a columnist at Compact Magazine and has his work featured in American Affairs, Americas Quarterly the Journal of Latin American Geography, NACLA, the American Conservative, and Southern Command's Dialogo-Americas.The International Risk Podcast is a must-listen for senior executives, board members, and risk advisors. This weekly podcast dives deep into international relations, emerging risks, and strategic opportunities. Hosted by Dominic Bowen, Head of Strategic Advisory at one of Europe's top risk consulting firms, the podcast brings together global experts to share insights and actionable strategies.Dominic's 20+ years of experience managing complex operations in high-risk environments, combined with his role as a public speaker and university lecturer, make him uniquely positioned to guide these conversations. From conflict zones to corporate boardrooms, he explores the risks shaping our world and how organisations can navigate them.The International Risk Podcast – Reducing risk by increasing knowledge.Follow us on LinkedIn for all our great updates.Tell us what you liked!

Hablamos en Nueva York con Brian Winter, director de Americas Quarterly" y autor del artículo en "Foreign Affairs" titulado "América Latina está a punto de convertirse en una prioridad para la política exterior de Estados Unidos"

Hablamos en Ciudad de México con la especialista en América Latina, la politóloga Karolina Gilas de la UNAM; en Washington D.C. con nuestra compañera la periodista Dori Toribio, y en Nueva York con Brian Winter de "Americas Quarterly"

Estrategas de Goldman Sachs advirtieron que la renta variable estadounidense probablemente no mantendrá su desempeño superior al promedio; Petróleo sube tras escalada en Medio Oriente; Lula cancela viaje a Rusia tras accidente; y John Otis de Americas Quarterly nos habla sobre el problema del hambre en América Latina.Más de Bloomberg en EspañolNewsletter Cinco cosas: https://trib.al/WIwfnT0Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/company/bloomberg-en-espanol/Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/BloombergEspanolWhatsApp: https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VaFVFoWKAwEg9Fdhml1lTikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@bloombergenespanolX: https://twitter.com/BBGenEspanolProducción: Eduardo ThomsonSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Passadas quase três semanas desde que o Conselho Nacional Eleitoral proclamou Nicolás Maduro presidente reeleito, o mundo ainda aguarda pelos boletins de urna que comprovem o resultado. A oposição venezuelana e grande parte da comunidade internacional não reconhecem a reeleição de Maduro e o acusam de fraude – e as evidências de que a eleição foi manipulada abundam. Até aqui, a posição da diplomacia brasileira é de diálogo com as partes, e de cobrança pela apresentação das atas eleitorais. Nesta quinta-feira (15), Lula reforçou a posição de que Maduro “deve uma explicação” ao mundo e sugeriu a realização de novas eleições, sob o escrutínio de órgãos fiscalizadores externos – ideia rejeitada tanto pelo regime quanto pela oposição. Para explicar a posição brasileira diante do impasse venezuelano, Natuza Nery entrevista Brian Winter, analista político e editor-chefe da revista Americas Quarterly.

Para el editor de Americas Quarterly, Brian Winter, la aparición de Kamala Harris en el panorama electoral de Estados Unidos arroja una sombra de dudas sobre lo que hasta no hace mucho era una importante ventaja de Donald Trump. ¿Puede la vicepresidenta imponerse en los comicios? Oppenheimer Presenta se emite todos los domingos a las 9 p.m., hora de Miami. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

Biden recibe muestras de apoyo a que siga en la carrera presidencial; el mercado está atento a un nuevo discurso de Powell; y hablamos con Brian Winter, analista político y editor en jefe de Americas Quarterly, de por qué Lula está frustrado con el banco central y el mercado. Para suscribirse al newsletter Cinco Cosas: https://www.bloomberg.com/account/newsletters/five-things-spanish?sref=IHf7eRWLMás de Bloomberg en Español:Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/BloombergEspanolWhatsApp: https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VaFVFoWKAwEg9Fdhml1lTikTok: https://vm.tiktok.com/ZGeuw69Ao/X: https://twitter.com/BBGenEspanolProducción: Eduardo Thomson (@ethomson1)See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

A participação desastrosa do presidente dos EUA no debate com Donald Trump, há uma semana, acendeu o sinal de alerta nos bastidores do Partido Democrata. Desde então crescem as dúvidas sobre a viabilidade da candidatura de Biden, de 81 anos – houve até manifestação pública de parlamentares democratas para que o partido substituísse o nome do atual presidente na corrida eleitoral. Nesta quarta-feira (3), a pressão cresceu: o jornal The New York Times publicou que o presidente admitiu conversas com aliados para avaliar se mantém ou não sua tentativa de reeleição. Biden, por sua vez, reafirmou que segue no jogo, e recebeu o apoio de governadores de seu partido. Neste episódio, Natuza Nery conversa com dois jornalistas que falam diretamente dos EUA. De dentro da Casa Branca, a correspondente da Globo em Washington, Raquel Krähenbühl, narra o clima tenso em torno da candidatura de Biden. De Nova York, Brian Winter, editor-chefe da revista Americas Quarterly, explica por que as dúvidas sobre as condições físicas e mentais de Biden deixaram de ser eleitorais e se tornaram também pauta de segurança nacional.

This week on ‘The Stack', we speak with the editor in chief of ‘Garden & Gun', a magazine celebrating the American South. We also discuss the Mexican elections with Brian Winter from ‘Americas Quarterly' and talk to Liz Schaffer from ‘Lodestars Anthology' about the publication's new book, ‘Slow Travel Britain'.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Um a um, Donald Trump desbanca seus concorrentes para ser o candidato do Partido Republicano nas eleições presidenciais dos Estados Unidos, em 5 de novembro. O ex-presidente reúne forças para tentar voltar à Casa Branca, e uma integrante desta campanha tem ganhado destaque: Susie Wiles. Com uma atuação que durante quatro décadas se manteve no anonimato, hoje ela começa a atrair os holofotes. Com discrição, a autointitulada “organizadora do caos” já havia participado de outras duas campanhas de Trump. Agora, é a mais poderosa e influente conselheira da campanha republicana. Para falar sobre Wiles, Natuza Nery recebe Maurício Moura, doutor em economia e gestão política e professor na Universidade George Washington, nos EUA. Conversa também com Brian Winter, editor-chefe da revista Americas Quarterly.

In the past few weeks, China's relations with Latin America and the Caribbean have been making headlines. Newsweek published an exclusive story about plans to create a Chinese-run special economic zone on the island of Antigua that will have a port, a dedicated airline, its own customs and immigration procedures, and be able to issue passports. An international crypto services zone will offer opportunities to participate in cryptocurrency operations from mining to dealing.The Americas Quarterly reported that China has expressed interest in building a port complex near the Strait of Magellan at the southern tip of South America, which is considered the most important natural passage between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. From there, according to the Americas Quarterly, Beijing could grow its presence in the region and also project influence in Antarctica.And in late April, China held the first China-Latin American and Caribbean States Space Cooperation Forum, which opened with a congratulatory letter from Xi Jinping applauding the high-level space cooperation partnership in which he emphasized the benefits of marrying China's mature space technology with the unique geographic advantage of the countries in the Latin America and Caribbean region.To discuss Chinese interests in and strategy toward the Latin America and Caribbean region–known as the LAC–host Bonnie Glaser is joined by Leland Lazarus. He is the Associate Director of National Security at Florida International University's Jack D. Gordon Institute of Public Policy and an expert on China-Latin America relations. He formerly served as the Special Assistant and Speechwriter to the Commander of US Southern Command and as a State Department Foreign Service Officer, with postings in Barbados and China.  Timestamps[02:30] China's Interest in LAC Countries[04:44] Implementation of BRI in LAC Countries[07:23] China's Investment in Energy Development[09:39] Huawei's Penetration into LAC Countries[11:57] Role of Perú in Beijing's Regional Strategy[14:56] China-LAC Cooperation in Space[20:56] Receptivity of China to LAC Countries[25:30] How should the US compete against China in LAC? 

Es increíble que dos dirigentes políticos que anduvieorn tan cerca como fusionados hoy tomen caminos tan extremos como los que anunciaron ayer los partidos Alianza País y Opción democrática. Fusionados en las pasadas elecciones, Alianza País tuvo un acuerdo parcial con el PRM que llevó a Manuel Matos como candidato a senador por San Juan de la Maguana. Si usted parte de eso PRM y AP no han estado tan lejos. Opción Democrática que se separa de Alianza País en el 2022 luego de una fusión forzada por la ley electoral en el 2019 firmó un acuerdo ayer con el PLD, el viejo partido de su lideresa Minou Tavárez. Si usted ve la foto es una vuelta casa. Ambas alianzas son puntuales. José Horacion Rodriguez el diputado de OD por el distrito Nacional está excluido aunque es innegable que esta decisión le afectará para bien o para mal. Juntarse con Alianza País fortalece el discurso anticorrupción de Lusi Abinader que irá en la boleta de esa organización. Juntarse con el PLD le da fuerza de masas a Opción democrática que tiene buenos candidatos locales y una militancia muy joven. La política no es sólo asunto de números y el país y el gobierno no viven solos. Esta semana Wilma Tamayo nos compartía una publicación de la revista Americas Quarterly en la que se presenta al presidente Abinader como una figura que se opone a la tendencia regional que observa debilidad electoral de los partidos gobernantes. La publicación analiza lo que llama el secreto de Abinader para contar con el 70 por ciento de aprobación que ellos citan aunque por aquí se habla de 60. Las principales razones indicadas por Americas Quartely tienen que ver con la economía y las secundarias tienen que ver con la lucha contra la corrupción y la promoción de la transparencia en el Estado. La tercera y no lo dice tal cual es una mirada de largo plazo que no se si es compartida por la mayoría de su partido pero si por una parte importante de su entorno. Por eso algunas candidaturas que nadie entiende o quiere entender.

Philipp Blom in conversation with Oliver Stuenkel THE GLOBAL SOUTH AND THE FUTURE OF WORLD ORDER In a restless, multipolar world order, South America's great powers — Brazil, Argentina, Colombia — are claiming a stronger voice and more agency in global politics. Their strategic position and their political alliances mean that international arrangements need to be readjusted or entirely rethought. Their stance on issues as diverse as Russia's war on Ukraine and Decarbonization are less and less aligned to the interests of the USA or the EU and more open towards China, India, and Russia, while the size of their economies, internal and external migration, as well as organized crime, armed conflicts and political instability make them a volatile and increasingly crucial factor of the international order. How will South America's influence evolve, and which interests will South American countries prioritize as the international order is creaking under the strains of multiple crises? Oliver Stuenkel is a Professor at the School of International Relations at Fundação Getulio Vargas (FGV) in São Paulo. He is also a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC and a columnist for Estado de São Paulo and Americas Quarterly. His research focuses on geopolitics and global order, Brazilian foreign policy, Latin American politics and emerging powers. He is the author of several books about geopolitics, including The BRICS and the Future of Global Order (Lexington) and the Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers Are Remaking Global Order (Polity). Philipp Blom was born in Hamburg in 1970. After living and working in Oxford, London, and Paris, he is now based in Vienna. His historical works, essays, and novels have been translated into 16 languages and have received numerous awards, including a scholarship at the Getty Research Institute in Los Angeles and the German Non-Fiction Book Prize. Blom is also a prolific radio journalist and public speaker. The discussion series Dialogues for Tomorrow critically examines the present from multiple perspectives in order to create a better understanding of tomorrow. Together with the Bruno Kreisky Forum and the Institute for Human Sciences (IWM), the University of Applied Arts Vienna hosts experts from different disciplines to discuss future challenges.

Neste papo vamos conversar com Oliver Stuenkel, analista político, professor na Escola de Relações Internacionais da Fundação Getúlio Vargas (FGV) em São Paulo, pesquisador no Carnegie Endowment em Washington (EUA) e colunista do Estadão e da revista Americas Quarterly.

Hablamos con Juan Pappier de Human Rights Watch, con Brian Winter de "Americas Quarterly" y con nuestro compañero Jorge Espinosa

On January 1, 2023, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was sworn in as president of Brazil. A week later, insurrectionists in Brazil stormed government buildings, including the president's palace, the Supreme Federal Court, and the National Congress building to violently disrupt the democratic transition of power and challenge the results of the election. Lula, however, remained undeterred and forged ahead. It's been roughly 150 days since those events, and Lawfare Legal Fellow Saraphin Dhanani sat down with Brian Winter, Editor-in-Chief of Americas Quarterly and a journalist with over a decade of experience living and reporting across Latin America, to discuss how Lula has fared in his first 100 days in office, his vision for reviving Brazil's place in the world, and the political forces he's up against. Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Brian Winter, vice president of policy at Americas Society and Council of the Americas and editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly, leads the conversation on U.S. relations with South America. CASA: Welcome to today's session of the Winter/Spring 2023 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Maria Casa, director of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Thank you all for joining us. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/Academic, if you would like to share it with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have Brian Winter with us to discuss U.S. relations with South America. Mr. Winter is the vice president of policy for the America Society and Council of the Americas and editor in chief of Americas Quarterly. An influential political analyst, he has followed South America for more than twenty years and has served as a correspondent for Reuters in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. Mr. Winter is the author of several books including Why Soccer Matters, a New York Times bestseller he wrote with the Brazilian soccer legend Pelé. He is a regular contributor to television and radio and host of the Americas Quarterly podcast. Welcome, Brian. Thank you very much for being with us. WINTER: Thank you, Maria. Thanks for the invitation. CASA: Can you begin with a general overview of current U.S. relations with South American countries? WINTER: I can try and actually, as a matter of fact, today is an extremely fortuitous day to be doing this and let me tell you why. A couple of weeks ago on February 10, Brazil's new president, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, made a one-day trip to Washington. He met with President Biden while he was here. He brought his foreign minister with him as well as his chief foreign policy adviser, his finance minister, a couple other members of his Cabinet. One of the biggest sort of concrete results of this trip that Lula made up here was a U.S. donation to the Amazon Fund of $50 million. That is million with an M. Well, today, Lula leaves for China with about half of his Cabinet and a delegation of approximately two hundred and thirty leaders from Brazil's private sector in what Brazilian media are calling the biggest foreign delegation ever to leave Brazil for another country. They will be in China for six days and there is a whole roster of deals on the table ranging from financing to infrastructure to education, environmental, and so on. So the point I'm trying to get across here is one of clear asymmetry and it really reflects kind of the new moment for U.S. relations with South America overall. As Maria mentioned, I started my career in the region as a reporter a little more than twenty years ago. I was in Argentina for four years. I was in Mexico for one year and Brazil for five, and in the course of that relatively short period of time we've seen kind of the power balance in how we think about Latin America but specifically South America. We've seen a significant change in how we think about that region. Back the early 2000s, certainly, during the 1990s, these were the final years of the so-called Washington Consensus, a period characterized by kind of the unipolar moment that came with the end of the Cold War, a certain consensus not only around democracy but around a certain set of liberalizing economic policies as well, and that ran its course. But really, it was around 2003 when everything started to change for a variety of reasons. The biggest one is the one that I've already referenced, which is the growth of China as a trading partner for the region. China had always had a presence in Latin America. In fact, for the magazine that I run, Americas Quarterly, we ran a piece two years ago about the Chinese presence in Mexico going all the way back to the 1600s when they operated barber shops and other sort of forms of commerce. But what's happened over the last twenty years is really remarkable. In numbers, Chinese trade with Latin America and the Caribbean overall went from 18 billion (dollars) in 2002 to a stunning 450 billion (dollars) in 2021. China is now the largest trading partner for Brazil, Chile, Peru, and Uruguay, and for South America as a whole if you take all those countries in the aggregate China now outranks the United States. When you look at Latin America, by the way, that includes Mexico. If you take that grouping then the U.S. is still the number-one trading partner but, again, that's almost entirely because of that relationship—that trading relationship as a result of the former NAFTA and now USMCA. Along with that big growth in Chinese trade have come other changes. We've had a lot of talk in the U.S. media in recent days about the twentieth anniversary of the Iraq war. That was something—and I was living in Argentina at the time and you could really feel how that even then carried a cost for the U.S. reputation in some of these countries. I think that with the failure of the—the failures of the war over time I think that that only accentuated the view that—not only a long-standing view that the U.S. was an unwelcome, meddling, and in many cases imperialist presence but it also accelerated this narrative that the United States was in relative decline. More recent years we've seen kind of other things contribute to this diminished reputation of the United States and throughout many countries in the region—everything ranging from not just the election of Donald Trump, who, of course, was not popular in most of the region; but also specific decisions that were made by his government, such as the withdrawal from the TPP—the Trans-Pacific Partnership—that, of course, is the trade deal that was negotiated under the Obama administration that included several Latin American countries, including Chile and Peru—but also the weaponization of tariffs; and, you know, Trump's repeated threats to even cut off Mexican imports. They did—those threats did have the effect of kind of forcing, first, President Peña Nieto in Mexico and then his successor, Andrés Manuel Lόpez Obrador, to cooperate with initiatives like management of migration policy. So in the short term, they, quote/unquote, “worked” but in the longer term it showed Mexico as well as other countries in the region that the U.S. was not a particularly reliable partner. Some of you may be listening to all this and thinking, well, this sounds like the viewpoints espoused by governments in the region that are leftist and have never really cared for the United States in the first place. But another interesting thing about this latest trend and the way that things have changed over the last ten years is that this desire to forge a middle path between China and the United States as their strategic competition escalates is shared by leaders across the ideological spectrum. South American countries in particular are not unlike the United States when it seems like virtually everything is polarized, and yet in this area and specifically the need—the perceived need to have closer relations with—I'm sorry, closer relations with China while maintaining a civil relationship but not siding too much with United States, some of the most enthusiastic proponents of that view in recent years have actually been governments on the center right and right such as Sebastián Piñera, the former president of Chile, Iván Duque, the former president of Colombia, Guillermo Lasso, the current president of Ecuador, who has worked extensively with China, and even Jair Bolsonaro, who was until recently the right-wing president of Brazil, ended up essentially going along with Beijing and allowing Huawei to participate in the recent auction of 5G mobile communications technology there. And so what we end up with as a result is a policy in many countries across the region that some are calling active nonalignment, the idea that governments in the region, regardless of their ideological stripe, need to seek an equidistant or middle path between Washington and Beijing, essentially taking advantage of their relative distance from not only potential conflicts between the U.S. and China but also looking at what's happening in Ukraine right now and saying, look, we need to maintain our independence, not side too strongly with either of these emerging blocs, and see if we can benefit from this by selling our commodities to everybody, keeping in mind that these are economies, especially in South America, that rely extremely heavily on the sale of commodities exports to drive their economic growth. So, you know, in conclusion for these initial remarks that is a huge change in the course of a generation. We've gone in a little more than twenty years from this assumption that most Latin American countries are in the U.S. sphere of influence, to use a very outdated term, which I detest, that they were part of our, quote/unquote, “backyard” to an increasing realization in DC, and I think people are still getting their heads around that, that automatic support, automatic alignment, can no longer be expected whether it is in Mexico, Guatemala, Panama, and then on down into South America, which I know is our focus today, governments like Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, another country where we've seen a lot of change on this front even in the last couple years and, again, not just because there's a leftist president in Colombia now because his predecessor, who I've already mentioned, Iván Duque, was one of the main people pushing this change. So that's a lot to digest. I'm happy to take any questions and hear from you. So thank you. CASA: Thanks, Brian, for that comprehensive introduction. Now let's open it up to questions. (Gives queuing instructions.) Our first question is a written question and it comes from Andrea Cuervo Prados, who is an adjunct instructor at Dickinson State University, and asks, what is your perspective regarding the new leftist president of Colombia and U.S. relations? What is the risk that Colombia could turn into another Venezuela? WINTER: Right. It's a good question. I think that we are still figuring out exactly what Gustavo—not only who Gustavo Petro is but what his ambitions are for both Colombia and for his relationships with the rest of the region and the rest of the world. There is some distance between what he has said he wants to do and what he may be able to do. This is a president who, you know, talks in these grand sweeping terms but ultimately has to get things through congress, and to just cite a result or an example of this that doesn't directly have to do with Colombia's foreign relationships, he said—he gave a very dramatic speech at the UN General Assembly last September in which he talked about the need to legalize narcotics across the board, including cocaine. But then—it was a speech that generated a lot of attention in capitals all over the world and all over the region. But then in ensuing weeks when he was pressed on this he didn't really have a lot of detail and admitted that it was not something that Colombia could do unilaterally, which is all to say that, again, there's this gap where I think it's important to pay careful attention to the gap between the rhetoric and what's actually possible with Petro. I don't personally—you know, the question of could X country become another Venezuela it's a question that people have been asking all over Latin America for the last ten years. I think—I understand why people ask it because what happened in Venezuela was so awful and dramatic, not only with the country becoming a full-fledged dictatorship that represses political opposition but also the humanitarian crisis that has forced some 7 million people or about a quarter of the country's population to leave the country. But, look, Petro is Colombia's first president on the left and I don't think it necessarily follows that—in fact, I'm certain that it doesn't follow that every person on the left wants to go down the path of Venezuela. So I suppose I'm a little more optimistic not only that Petro is a pragmatist in areas like the economy—for example, his finance minister is a quite pragmatic figure, a Columbia University professor who is well respected by markets—and I'm also somewhat optimistic about Colombian institutions and their ability to stand in the way of any truly radical change. CASA: Thank you. Our next question comes from Morton Holbrook, who is an adjunct professor at Kentucky Wesleyan College. Morton? Q: Hello. Yes, I'm here. Morton Holbrook, Kentucky Wesleyan College. University of Louisville also. Thanks for your really interesting comments, especially about China's relationship with Latin and South America. Can I turn north a little bit to Russia? Considering particularly the Brazilian president's upcoming visit to China do you think he might want to go to Russia, too? Bearing in mind that the International Criminal Court just issued an arrest warrant for President Putin, how might that affect Latin American relations with Russia? Do you think some of them might now have second thoughts about Russia or inviting Putin to visit their countries? Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, Venezuela have all signed the ICC statute promising to cooperate in the carrying out of arrest warrants. Thank you. WINTER: That's a great question and one that is—I can tell you is very front of mind for Brazilian officials and I think others around the region right now. I was just in Brazil two weeks ago working on our—our next issue of Americas Quarterly will be on Brazil's foreign policy and what it means for the rest of Latin America. This is a question that's very front and center. Brazil's foreign minister did say in the last couple of days—he did explicitly almost word for word repeat what you just said, which is that Brazil is a signatory to that treaty. That would seem to eliminate any possibility of Vladimir Putin visiting Brazil. I'm not sure that that was really on his list of things to do anyway. But it was not only a practical signal but a diplomatic one as well. Lula's position on Russia and the Ukraine war has been inconsistent. He said during his campaign last year that Zelensky and Putin bear equal responsibility for the conflict. My understanding is that after that statement, you know, nobody wants to contradict the boss openly and sometimes not even in private. My sense personally based on conversations with others in Brasilia is that at the very least his foreign policy team regretted that he made that statement. Brazil has, in other form, condemned the Russian invasion. Other governments including Chile, Argentina, Colombia, and others have done the same. However, these are countries that, like most of the Global South, are firmly opposed to any sanctions and so their position, again, ends up being I suppose you could call it nuanced. They believe it's important in part because of their own experience as nations to condemn invasions of one country by another. I, personally, think that it's fair to think of what Putin is doing is a kind of imperialist aggression, which these are countries that have certainly objected to that when it's the U.S. over the last, you know, 200-plus years and so you would think that it would be in their DNA to do so in the Ukrainian case as well, and in fairness most of them have. I would just add that, you know, the Brazilian position, I think, though, gets influenced also by two other things. One is, again, this notion of nonalignment. Most people talk about nonalignment in Brazil and Argentina, in Chile and Colombia, and they think about the U.S.-China relationship, as I noted during my introductory remarks. But they also think of it as a helpful guide to thinking about the conflict, the war in Ukraine, as well for reasons that are not firmly rooted in morals or values, let's say, but in interests as, you know, foreign policy often is. To say it in a different way, I had a conversation a couple of years ago with former Brazilian President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, who I helped him write his memoir in English back in 2006. He was president during the 1990s, and in talking with him about the China question he said, we have to take advantage of our greatest strategic asset, which is that Brazil is far. (Laughs.) And to just unpack that a little bit, I think the meaning of that is clear to all of you. But these are countries that really see an opportunity right now just by virtue of their geographic distance from these conflict zones to avoid being dragged in and also to potentially, at some level, benefit from it through strategic superpower competition for their support as well as through higher prices for some of the commodities that they produce. There's one added element in the case of Brazil, which is that Lula, I'm told by people close to him, sees himself as almost a Nelson Mandela-type figure. He's back now for his third term in the presidency twenty years after he was president the first time. Of course, I'm sure people on this call know that he went through some real struggles in the intervening years including nearly two years in prison over—on corruption charges that were later thrown out and, you know, he may see his presidency as an opportunity to kind of write the last chapter or two in his biography, and there's talk that he wants a Nobel Peace Prize and that he sees potentially helping negotiate a peace deal for the Ukraine war as the best opportunity to do that. I actually think that that idea, which is—tends to be dismissed in Washington as well as in European capitals, I personally think that idea is not as crazy as some people here in Washington think. But maybe I can go into that a little bit later if anybody wants. CASA: Thank you. Next, we have two written questions from the same university that we can take together. They're from Marisa Perez and Trevor Collier, who are undergraduate students at Lewis University. They would like to know what world leaders such as the United States can do to prevent deforestation of the Amazon rainforest and how they can do so without compromising Brazil's sovereignty. WINTER: Well, it's a really great question, in part because it mentions an issue that Americans don't often think about, which is precisely the sensitivity on the sovereignty issue. Brazil, and specifically not only Brazil's military but Brazil's foreign policy establishment, have a long-standing concern that is part of their doctrine, I suppose you could say, that is concerned always about the possibility of territorial loss and about foreigners gaining influence or, in some cases, even control over the Amazon. And I have to say, you know, this is another one of those ideas that I think—I wish we were all together in a room. This Zoom is kind of the next best thing. I could see your faces that way. But sometimes when I talk about this I see people kind of roll their eyes as if it was some sort of imagined conspiracy. But the truth is that as recently as 2019 when the—the first year of Jair Bolsonaro's government when the fires in the Amazon really became a huge controversy, driven in large part by social media and tweets from people like Justin Bieber and Cher, who, to be clear, were, I think, justifiably and quite heroically shining light on what was happening there. In the midst of all that Emmanuel Macron actually proposed that perhaps some sort of international force in the Amazon was necessary, that that deployment of that would be a good idea if Brazil was not capable of taking care of the Amazon itself. That proposal was disastrous because it just reinforced this long-standing fear that so much of the establishment in Brazil has always had, and it's true that Bolsonaro was on the right but you, certainly, in conversations, I think, with people across the ideological spectrum this is something that people think about. So OK. So back to the original question, how can the U.S. help. Well, the U.S. could help by providing both logistical and financial resources beyond the $50 million, which is, you know, the equivalent of about seven seconds of what we're spending in terms of supporting Ukraine right now. I don't know—Norway is the biggest sponsor of the Amazon Fund. I don't have that number in front of me but I think that their contribution is upwards of at least a billion dollars, probably more. Ultimately, though, I do believe that the Amazon is a local challenge and I know that can be unsatisfying to hear in forums like this where we're sort of designed—you know, this is a CFR event. We're supposed to be thinking of ways that the international community can get involved. But it's going to be a big challenge. The good news is that Brazil has shown that it is capable of getting its hands around this problem before. During Lula's first terms in office from 2003 to 2010 his government was able to reduce the level of deforestation by upwards of 75 percent. It was a very dramatic difference in a very short period of time. This was done through a variety of means, both things like satellite monitoring and new technology that let the authorities follow this in real time. They were also able to step up environmental enforcement agencies like IBAMA, whose inspectors are necessary. It's necessary to have them on the ground in order to, you know, stop—actually stop illegal loggers from setting the fires that are the main driver of deforestation. They were also able to build political consensus around the need to reduce deforestation during those years. I don't think it's going to be—in fact, I'm certain it will not be as “easy,” quote/unquote, this time around. A lot has changed. The upwards of 60 percent increase that we saw in deforestation during the Bolsonaro years had the support, unfortunately, in my view, of local populations who believe essentially that slashing and burning will lead their day-to-day economic lives to improve. In the election that happened in October where Lula won and Bolsonaro lost but by a very small margin—the closest margin in Brazil's modern democratic history—the strongest support nationally for Bolsonaro was in areas that have seen the most illegal deforestation over the last four years and what that tells you is that, again, these are local populations that believe that this will lead to greater wealth and greater well-being for all of them, this being deforestation. So that's a big challenge for Lula with a—you know, at a time when resources are fairly scarce. It's not like it was during his first presidency when all of this increase in Chinese trade was really boosting the amount of money in Brazil's coffers. So he's going to have to figure out a way to dedicate financial resources as well as convince local populations that this is in their interest to do it. It's not going to be an easy road. CASA: Our next question comes from Mike Nelson, an affiliate adjunct professor at Georgetown University. Mike? Q: Thank you very much for an outstanding overview of what's going on in U.S. relations to South America. I study international technology policy and data governance but my question is about corruption. You mentioned corruption in Brazil but it's a problem throughout South America, and my three-part question, is it getting worse or better; are there any countries who have really done the right thing and have taken serious measures to address it; and how can the internet and some of the technologies for citizen journalism help expose corruption and make leaders less likely to dip into the public fund? WINTER: OK. Yeah. No, great questions, and reflective of if you look at opinion polling and remember that these are countries that many of them have been dealing with rising crime, rising homicide levels, economic stagnation, the pandemic, which hit Latin America by many measures harder than in any other region in the world at one point—I haven't seen updated numbers on this but it was fairly consistently throughout the pandemic Latin America, which is about 8 percent of the world's population, was accounting for about 30 percent of the world's confirmed COVID deaths. Anyway, amid all of that, and the economic stagnation that has been such a problem over the last ten years, in a lot of countries and in public opinion surveys, the thing that people identified as the number-one problem in their country is corruption. That was not always true. If you look back at public polling twenty years ago, people tended to identify kind of more, what's the word, basic needs—think, like, unemployment, hunger, misery, which often is kind of asked as a separate—that's one of the boxes you can check. Twenty years ago, those were the issues. And as the region became more middle class, especially in the 2000s because of this China-driven economic growth that described during my introduction, a lot of people were able to move beyond their basic needs and focus on essentially what was happening to the money that they paid in taxes, keeping in mind that many people were paying taxes for the first time. Some of it surely was also driven by these things, as you mentioned, mobile phones that not only things like videos of people carrying suitcases of cash, but also the attention that was given to big corruption scandals. Previously in a lot of countries, governments were able to make pacts with newspapers and TV channels, and kind of tamp things down a little bit, and lower the temperature. In an era of Facebook and Twitter, that was no longer as easy for them to do. All of this culminated in several corruption scandals at once in the mid-2010s, the most emblematic of which was the so-called Lava Jato, or car wash, scandal, which originated in Brazil, but eventually had franchises, if you will, in almost a dozen countries throughout Latin America and the world. That story is complicated. Politicians all over the region went to jail. Business leaders did too. Lula was one of them. That was the case that put him in jail. In intervening years, we've discovered that there were abuses and procedural violations, both things on behalf of the prosecutors and the judge involved, who the Brazilian Supreme Court decided, I think in 2021, they ruled—maybe it was earlier than that—that the judge overseeing Lula's conviction had not been—or, rather, it's easier to say—had been partial in his rulings. And so that's left us in a place today where populations are still angry about corruption, as I mentioned, but it is no longer driving conversation in most countries, like it did before. I still believe—and you can probably tell, this is something I've thought about a lot over the years and continue to watch. The first question you asked, in some ways, is the most important one. Is corruption getting worse or better? It's impossible to know for sure. My hypothesis is actually corruption is about the same, and may in fact be getting better, which flies in the face of all of these headlines that we've seen. But to me, the operative question over these last ten years or so has been, you know, not why—I've heard people say, well, why are these—why are these countries so corrupt? And to me, the real question is, why are we suddenly seeing these cases of corruption? Because I think it speaks to not only the technological changes that I referenced, but also the improvement—(audio break)—these are countries many of which transitioned from dictatorship to democracy in the 1980s and early 1990s. And therefore, it really took a generation for independent prosecutors to show up, to have the training and political support that they needed to go after some very powerful people. So, in sum, I am a believer in the story of rule of law improving in many countries in Latin America. I would recognize, again, that it's a very complex story, in part because of some of the problems around not just Lava Jato but in other countries, such as Peru and Guatemala. But progress is rarely linear. (Laughs.) And I still think that this is something that is likely to get better with time. CASA: Our next question is a written one from Mary Beth Altier at New York University. She asks: What role do you think misinformation and disinformation play in citizens' perceptions of the U.S. versus China and Russia in Latin America? What could the U.S. do better from a strategic communications perspective, if anything? And then—I can repeat this other question later, which is kind of a follow up. So you think— WINTER: Yeah, maybe. Well, that first one—that first one is worthy of a book. All of these are—these are great questions. They're difficult to answer in pithy fashion in three minutes. I am continually impressed by the quality of Russian propaganda in Latin America. Those guys are really good. You look at RT en Español—(changes pronunciation)—RT en Español—it has one of the biggest social media followings of any “media company,” quote/unquote, in the region. Even people who I know are—who I know to not be pro-Russia, let's put it that way, I see sharing content and videos from RT, which, of course, is just as pure a propaganda arm as you can get of the Russian government. But also, you know, have a whole network of sites that are more subtle and that push very sophisticated and sometimes, you know, not particularly obvious narratives that are designed to undermine the United States or promote the views of China and Russia. I would recognize at the same time that—I referenced this during my introduction remarks, sometimes the United States does not need any help with it comes to undermining its reputation in the region. I mentioned some of the, quote/unquote “own goals” that we've seen over the last five to ten, even twenty years, going all the way back to the Iraq War. As far as actively pushing back, all I can say is this: You know, I think that they're—on the one hand, I think there are concrete steps that are being used. We're still trying to get our heads around this problem to fight misinformation. But I was just in a different forum this morning where I was asked, what—how can the U.S. help the cause of democracy in Latin America. And my answer to that is that the best thing the United States can do to help democracy in Latin America is to get its own house in order, to move past the polarization, the misinformation, and the scorched earth politics that have put our own democracy at risk over the last several years, and try to, you know, recapture some of the consensus, at least around basic democratic rules of the game and how we hold elections that characterized most of the previous two-hundred-plus years of our history. Because I do think that while—you know, look, I lived ten years in Latin America. I know that people roll their eyes at the notion of the United States as being kind of the shining city on the hill. And I understand why. And that was always true, in part because of the long history of U.S. intervention in Latin America often showing, you know, some of our worst behaviors. On the other hand, as a Brazil specialist, I've seen how some of the tactics and even some of the same people that were behind our own democratic decay of the last five years, some of those same tactics were repackaged and exported to open arms in Brazil. So I do think that it makes a difference on the ground in places like Brazil, potentially, and other countries as well, when a strong democratic example is being set in the United States. And I think that's the most powerful thing we can do. Some of the other stuff, like what's happening on RT and Telesur and some of these other outlets is relatively outside our control. CASA: We have a complementary question from— WINTER: There was a second part of that question. CASA: Oh, no, you did end up answering, I think, what could the U.S. do better from a strategic communications perspective. I think you kind of covered that. We have another question from Gursimran Padda, a student at Stony Brook University, who asks: Does China's strategy of gaining influence in Latin America differ from its tactics in Africa? And if so, why? WINTER: Gosh, all these great questions. China—I have to start from the beginning. I am not an African specialist. But I can tell you kind of the narrative of what happened in Africa through Latin American eyes, if that makes any sense, because this is a conversation I've had a lot over the years. The perception is that China went into some of these countries in sub-Saharan Africa, and engaged in infrastructure projects and other things that had abusive terms. In many cases, China imported its own labor to do some of these projects. They also engaged in some predatory lending practices. And that was all—essentially the takeaway from actions like that in places like Buenos Aires, Bogota, certainly Brasilia, was that the Chinese would not be allowed to come and engage in those same behaviors in Latin America. And I think, in practice, it seems that the Chinese have realized that. There have been examples, such as the construction of a dam in Ecuador, where the terms ended up being perceived as something of a debt trap. But my sense—again, and this is not so much my sense; it's repeating what I've heard in numerous conversations about this subject with leaders across the ideological spectrum and throughout the region—is that they understand the risks involved in working with China, in part because of the experience throughout parts of sub-Saharan Africa. And they're determined to not let those things happen in their home countries. You know, I know that that's a view that, in places like where I am today—I'm on in the road in Washington, participated in this other conference this morning. That's why my Zoom background is not quite as put together as it sometimes is, by the way. I know people roll their eyes at that notion here, and are constantly warning—you know, kind of wagging their finger a little bit at governments throughout South America, and saying that they need to be eyes wide open about the risks of engagement with the Chinese. The problem is that here in the U.S., I think they're underestimating, in some cases, the sophistication of foreign ministries and trade ministries in places like Peru and Chile when they make those comments. Which is to say, I think that there's something both visually and in terms of the context a bit paternalistic about it, that everybody picks up on and tends to make people in the region justifiably crazy. (Laughs.) And then, the other part is that the U.S. is not really offering much in the way of alternatives. We're at a pretty unique moment in the history of the United States right now where we have both parties—the Republican and Democratic Parties—are pretty much closed to the idea of new free trade deals. That, in my lifetime, has never happened before. I mentioned the fact that Trump dropped out of TPP. Well, Joe Biden has not picked that back up. I think there are domestic political reasons that explain that, but what it means in practice for our relationships with governments in Latin America is that Washington doesn't have a whole lot to offer. Because, unlike the Chinese, we can't just order our companies to go invest someplace. That's not how our economy works. It is very much how the Chinese economy works, where they can decide to make these decisions. They are not necessarily for a short-term economic payoff, but for medium-term reasons, or even decisions that have very little to do with dollars and cents or ROI, return on investment, and everything to do with geopolitics. So wanting to have beachheads in terms of, say, ports in places like El Salvador. So, you know, again, without that—without trade and without that ability to kind of dictate investment, there's not a lot that's left in Washington's toolkit for counteracting this kind of influence. CASA: Our next question comes from Daniel Izquierdo, an undergraduate student at the U.S. Military Academy at West Point. Daniel. Q: Good afternoon, sir, ma'am. Thank you for taking the time. I just had a quick question on the increasing tensions between China and the U.S., and how that will kind of develop itself in Latin and South America. So given the strategic interests of Latin and South America, and the persistent political unrest, along with increasing tensions between China and the U.S., what do you believe the likelihood to be of proxy conflicts or foreign meddling, similar to what occurred during the Cold War, occurring in the region? And if not, how do you foresee the U.S. and China competing for influence in the region? WINTER: So another very good question. Thank you for that. Look, I think some of this ground we've covered already, but I would say that, you know, you're the first to mention—I had not previously mentioned this idea of a new cold war. And this—you know, this is another reason why so many countries across the ideological spectrum are opting for this policy of nonalignment. Essentially because they believe that the first Cold War went badly, very badly, for Latin America. It resulted in all kinds of traumas, from the wars in Central America during the 1980s to U.S. support for coups in places like Chile, to, you know, Cuban meddling in places like Bolivia and elsewhere around the region during those years, which led to the rise of guerrilla movements like the FARC, that ended up killing very high numbers of people. And so essentially, you know, not to be glib about it, but the reaction that today's generation has is: We want no part of this. Because it didn't go well for us the first time. I think there are obvious differences between a conflict between the U.S. and the Soviet Union back in the 1950s and 1960s, and this strategic competition between Washington and Beijing, that thankfully has not quite reached those heights, at least not yet, here in the twenty-first century. But I have to tell you, and again this is based on conversations I'm having all the time, the fear is real. The perception is that the world may be headed back to that kind of conflict, being driven not only by what's happening in the Ukraine but the increasing speculation of potential war over Taiwan. So this, again, as far as—as far as how it could play out in practice, I think it's still early. I think it remains to be seen. Right now there is—you know, there are clear cases where I think the Chinese are, as I alluded to in my previous answer, making investments not for economic reasons but for strategic ones, with a long-term horizon I mind. Things like the, quote/unquote, “space base” that they've established in Argentina, which really is deserving of the full air quotes when we say the phrase “space base.” I think everyone senses that—you know, that that conflict—or, that competition, if you will, is likely to define the next twenty to thirty years. And I think there's a determination in most countries, it makes a lot of sense to me personally, that they don't want their countries used again as a chessboard amid that larger conflict. CASA: Our next question comes from Damien Odunze. He's assistant professor at Delta State University who writes: Ideas in the long run change the world. Do you think a closer educational collaboration between U.S. universities and those in Latin and South America could help shape and strengthen liberal democratic values in those countries? WINTER: What an interesting question. Look, let me talk first about kind of the—that equation today. There's already quite a lot of connectivity, especially at the—at, you know, not a word I love to use, but at the elite level, the elites in government and business and U.S. education systems. Which is an unnecessarily wordy way of saying that a large percentage of people in South America come from the elite classes and get educated at universities and sometimes even at high schools in the United States. That is one reason why, again, many of these governments are likely to at least forge a middle path between China and the United States, rather than going full-fledged in the direction of China. I think there's a cultural affinity, family ties, cultural ties, educational ties, and other things that are probably kind of the strongest connection that the U.S. has with a lot of these countries right now. As to whether a strengthening of those educational ties would improve dedication and the strength of democracy, whew. It could, but I watched with dismay as poll after poll suggests that younger generations, not just in the United States but across the Western world, are less committed in theory to both democracy and democratic institutions than their predecessors. And so I wonder just—I don't have an answer to this—but I wonder if even, quote/unquote, “even” within the United States, if we're properly instilling an appreciation for democracy in today's generations, which then raises the question of whether we'd be able to do so amongst the youth of other countries as well. I'm not sure. I think this is another area where, you know, in the U.S. we have some work to do at home before we start thinking about what's possible in other countries. CASA: Our next question comes from Mary Meyer McAleese, who is a professor of political science at Eckerd College in Florida. Mary. Q: Yes. Good afternoon and thank you for this opportunity. I have, well, two questions. I hope they're quick. The first one is, what do you think the effect will be on Latin America or South America with regard to the failure of the Silicon Valley Bank? I read that a lot of Latin American businesses have had investments in that bank, so I wonder if you could say a bit more about the banking situation and the longer-term effects there. And also, gender violence, of course, is a horrible problem all around the world, but especially in Latin and South America. What do you think the United States and the Americas Society could do to support groups in the region that are fighting against gender violence? Thank you. WINTER: Well, thank you for both questions. Both very good questions. There's been a lot of talk about SVB and possible effects in Latin America. What I've heard from people who are far more knowledgeable about the financial—excuse me—the financial system than I am, is that as long as it does not spread and become a more systemic risk, it should not pose much of an issue for Latin America. In part because—and this is another area where just like—where we were talking about the courts having, I think, been engaged in a thirty-year long process of improvement—I think the same can be said of banking and financial systems around most of Latin America. My first job was covering the financial crisis that Argentina went through back in 2001 and 2002. Which, for the uninitiated, that saw five presidents in two weeks, a freeze of bank deposits, and a 70 percent devaluation of the currency. It was quite a traumatic thing to be a part of. And during those years, we saw similar—well, not quite as bad—but at least thematically similar crises in Brazil, Colombia, and elsewhere, following other crises in the 1990s. Which is all to say, Latin America has been curiously quiet this time around in terms of financial contagion. The economies aren't doing well, for the most part, but at least we're not talking about a financial meltdown. And that is because of lessons learned. These are banking systems that now have stricter capital requirements than they did in the past. And the macroeconomic fundamentals, generally speaking, are better than they were twenty years ago. Argentina, of course, is kind of in trouble again with an inflation rate that just passed 100 percent. And that's terrible. But again, the depth—(laughs)—everything's relative. And the depth of just financial devastation is, thankfully, nothing compared to what it was when I was there twenty-plus years ago. So, you know, we'll see. If the bank run spreads and we start seeing other banks come in trouble here in the U.S., then my sense is that, with the whole Credit Suisse thing, and we're not out of the woods yet. But if it stays more or less contained, then the consensus, at least so far, is that Latin America should be fine. Your question about femicide is an excellent one. It has driven the political discussion in Brazil in recent years. It's something that President Lula has spoken movingly about. It has also been, on the other end in Mexico, the feminist movement that has had femicides as one of the main areas of concern, has been one of the most effective opposition groups to President López Obrador, who has often been, sadly in my view, dismissive of the seriousness of that problem. As far as what the United States can do to help, or even what my own organization can do, I think that in a lot of cases these are—you know, like a lot of problems—there are things that the international community can do to help. And certainly, I see things from a journalist's perspective, even though I'm more analyst than journalist these days. I think that shining light on these problems, using vehicles like—platforms like Americas Quarterly, which is the small publication about Latin American politics that I run, that's, you know, my own insufficient contribution to looking at his problem. But it's certainly one—I mean, we look at the numbers in places like Brazil. I don't have those numbers on my fingertips, but it is just an incredibly serious problem, and one that deserves more attention. CASA: Thank you, Brian. We have so many other questions. I'm really sorry, though, we have to cut off now. We're at the hour. But this has been a very interesting discussion. And you've covered an enormous amount of ground. Thank you to all of you participating for your great questions. I hope you will follow Brian on Twitter at @BrazilBrian. The next Academic Webinar will take place on Wednesday, March 29, at 1:00 Eastern Time. Renee Hobbs, professor of communication studies at the University of Rhode Island, will lead a conversation on media literacy and propaganda. In the meantime, I encourage you to learn about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/Careers. Follow at @CFR_Academic on Twitter and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. Thank you, again, for joining us today, and we look forward to you tuning in again for our webinar on March 29. Bye. WINTER: Bye. Thank you. (END)

Chris Li, director of research of the Asia-Pacific Initiative and fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, leads the conversation on U.S. strategy in East Asia. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to today's session of the Winter/Spring 2023 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR.  Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic, if you would like to share it with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.  We're delighted to have Chris Li with us to discuss U.S. strategy in East Asia. Mr. Li is director of research of the Asia-Pacific Initiative, and a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, where he focuses on U.S.-China relations, Asia-Pacific security, and technology competition. Previously, he was research assistant to Graham Allison in the Avoiding Great Power War Project, and coordinator of the China Working Group, where he contributed to the China Cyber Policy Initiative and the Technology and Public Purpose Project, led by former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter.  Chris, thanks very much for being with us today. I thought we could begin with you giving us your insights and analysis of the Biden administration's foreign policy strategy in East Asia, specifically vis-à-vis China.  LI: Great. Well, first of all, thanks, Irina, for the invitation. I'm really looking forward to the conversation and also to all the questions from members of the audience and, in particular, all the students on this seminar. So I thought I'd start very briefly with just an overview of how the Biden administration's strategy in the Indo-Pacific has shaped up over the last two years, two and a half years. What are the key pillars? And essentially, now that we're about halfway through the first term—or, you know, if there is a second term—but President Biden's first term, where things are going to go moving forward?  So as many you are probably familiar, Secretary of State Tony Blinken laid out essentially the core tenets of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, of which China, of course, is a focal centerpiece. And he did so in his speech last summer at the Asia Society, where he essentially described the relationship between the U.S. and China as competitive where it should be, cooperative where it can be, and adversarial where it must be. So sort of three different pillars: competition, cooperation, a sort of balance between the two. And in terms of the actual tenets of the strategy, the framing was three pillars—invest, align, and complete.  And so briefly, just what that meant according to Secretary Blinken was really investing in sources of American strength at home. Renewing, for example, investment in technology, investment in STEM education, infrastructure, and many of the policies that actually became known as Build Back Better, a lot of the domestic spending packages that President Biden proposed, and some of which has been passed. So that first pillar was invest sort of in order to o compete with China, we need to first renew our sources of American strength and compete from a position of strength.  The second element was “align.” And in this—in this pillar, I think this is where the Biden administration has really distinguished itself from the Trump administration. Many folks say, well, the Biden administration's China policy or its Asia policy is really just Trump 2.0 but with a little bit—you know, with essentially a nicer tone to it. But I think there is a difference here. And I think the Biden administration's approach has really focused on aligning with both traditional security partners—our allies, our alliances with countries like the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines—but also invigorating those nontraditional partnerships, with India, for example.   I think another part of this strategy, another part of this dimension, has also been reinvigorating U.S. presence and U.S. leadership, really, in multilateral organizations. Not only, for example, taking the Quad and reestablishing some of the leader-level summits, the ministerials, proposing, for example, a COVID cooperation regime among new members of the Quad, but also establishing newer frameworks. So, for example, as many of you have read about, I'm sure, AUKUS, this trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. when it comes to sharing of nuclear submarine technology. That's been a new proposed policy. And I think we're about to see an update from the administration in the next couple of weeks.  And even with elements of the region that have been unappreciated and perhaps under-focused on. For example, the Solomon Islands was the focal point of some attention last year, and you've seen the administration propose the Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative, which seeks to establish greater cooperation among some of the Pacific Island nations. And there was actually a summit hosted by President Biden last fall with leaders of the Pacific Island countries. So that alignment piece I think has really been significant as a cornerstone of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy.  The third element, of course, competition, I think is the most evident. And we've seen this from some of the executive orders on semiconductors, the restrictions on advanced chips, to elements of trade, to even sort of advocacy for human rights and greater promotion of democracy. You saw the Summit for Democracy, which has been a pillar of the administration's foreign policy agenda. So that's basically what they've done in the last two and a half years.  Now, in terms of where that's actually brought us, I think I'll make four observations. The first is that, unlike the Biden—unlike the Trump administration, where most of the policy pronouncements about the People's Republic of China had some tinge of inducing change in China—that was the phrase that Secretary Pompeo used in a speech on China policy—I think the Biden administration largely has said: The assumption and the premise of all of our policy toward China is based on the idea that the U.S. government does not seek fundamentally to change the Chinese government, the Chinese regime, the leadership, the administration, the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.  So that is both a markedly important difference, but it's also a part of the strategy that I believe remains ambiguous. And here, the problem is, you know, invest, align, and compete, competitive coexistence, where does that all actually take us? And I think this is where analysts in the strategic community and think tank world have said, well, it's great to invest, of course. You know, there's bipartisan support. Alignment with partners and allies is, of course, a pretty uncontroversial, for the most part, approach. And competition is, I think, largely a consensus view in Washington, D.C. But where does this actually take us?  You know, for all of its criticisms, the Trump administration did propose a specific end state or an end objective. And I think the Biden administration has just sort of said, well, it's about coexisting. It's about just assuming to manage the relationship. I think there are, of course, valid merits to that approach. And on an intellectual level, the idea is that because this is not necessarily a Cold War 2.0, in the words of the Biden administration, we're not going to have an end state that is ala the Cold War—in essence a sort of victory or demise, you know, the triumph of capitalism over communism, et cetera. In fact, it's going to be a persistent and sustained rivalry and competition. And in order to harness a strategy, we essentially need to manage that competition.   So I think that's—it's an intellectually coherent idea, but I think one of the ambiguities surrounding and one of the criticisms that has been proposed is that there is no clear end state. So we compete, we invest, we align, but to what end? Do we just keep—does the administration continue to tighten up and enhance alliances with partners and allies, and then to what end? What happens next? And sort of where does this lead us—leave us in ten years from now? So I think that's the first comment I'll make about the approach to the Indo-Pacific.  The second is that one of the tenets, of course, as I describe, is this compartmentalization of compete, cooperate. In essence, you know, we will compete—we, being the United States—with China on issues of technology, issues of economics, but we will also cooperate on areas of shared concern—climate change, nonproliferation. I think what you've seen is that while the Biden administration has proposed this idea, we can split—we can cooperate on one hand and also compete on the other—the People's Republic of China, the Chinese government, has largely rejected that approach.   Where you've seen statements from senior officials in China that have said, essentially, we will not cooperate with you, the United States, until you first cease all of the behavior, all of the negative policies that we don't like. In essence, if you will continue to sell arms to Taiwan, if you continue, the United States, to restrict semiconductors, to crackdown on espionage, to conduct military exercises in the region, then forget about any potential cooperation on climate, or forget about any cooperation on global health, et cetera.   So in essence, being able to tie the two compartments together has prevented a lot of what the Biden administration has sought to achieve. And we've seen that very clearly with Special Envoy John Kerry and his relentless efforts to conduct climate diplomacy. And I think largely—for example, last summer in the aftermath of Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, you saw a lot of those collaborative efforts essentially derailed. That's the second comment I'll make, which is while this approach, again, logically to most Americans would seem sound, it's actually met a lot of resistance because the Chinese reaction to it is not necessarily the same.  The third is I think we've seen increasingly, even though there has been an increased alignment since the Trump administration with allies and partners, there's still a degree of hedging among countries in the region. And that makes sense because from the perspectives of many of those leaders of countries in the region, the United States is a democratic country. We have an election coming up in 2024. And there's no guarantee that the next president, if President Biden is no longer the president in 2024 or even in 2028, will continue this policy.   And I think all of you, as observers of American politics, know the degree to which American politics has become largely one that is dysfunctional, is almost schizophrenic in a way. And so one would imagine that if you are a leader of a country in the Asian-Pacific region, to support the Biden administration's engagement, but also to maintain a degree of strategic autonomy, as this is often called. And so what I think we'll continue to see and what will be interesting to watch is how middle powers, how other countries resident in the region approach the United States in terms of—(inaudible). I think India will be key to watch, for example. Its defense relationship with the United States has increased over the years, but yet it still has close interests with respect to China.  The final comment I'll make is that on the military dimension I think this is another area of concern, where the Biden administration has said that one of its priorities is creating guardrails, constructing guardrails to manage the potential escalation in the event of an accident, or a miscommunication, miscalculation that could quickly spiral into a crisis. And we needn't—we need not look farther than the 2001 Hainan incident to think of an example, which was a collision between a(n) EP-3 aircraft and a Chinese intelligence plane. And that led to a diplomatic standoff.  And so I think the United States government is very keen on creating dialogue between militaries, risk reduction mechanisms, crisis management mechanisms. But I think they've encountered resistance, again, from the People's Republic of China, because the perspective there is that much of the U.S. behavior in the region militarily is invalid, is illegitimate. You know, the Chinese government opposes, for example, U.S. transits through the Taiwan Strait. So the idea therefore that they would engage and essentially deconflict and manage risk is sort of legitimizing American presence there militarily. And so we've encountered that obstacle as well.  So I think going forward on all four elements, we're going to continue to see adjustment. And I think, as students, as researchers, I think these are four areas where there's fertile room for discussion, for debate, for analysis, for looking at history. And I look forward to a conversation. Hopefully, many of you have ideas as well because there's no monopoly on wisdom and there are many creative proposals to be discussed. So I look forward to questions. I'll stop there.  FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Thank you, Chris. That was great. Now we're going to go to all of you.  (Gives queuing instructions.)  Our first written question comes from Grace Wheeler. I believe a graduate student at the University of West Florida. Kissinger proposed the future of China-U.S. relations be one of coevolution instead of confrontation. Is it still realistically possible for the future of China-U.S. relations to be one of cooperation instead of confrontation?  LI: So terrific question. Thank you for the question. It's a very interesting idea. And I think Henry Kissinger, who I know has long been involved with the Council on Foreign Relations, has produced through his many decades,strategic frameworks and new ways of thinking about cardinal challenges to geopolitics. I have not yet actually understood or at least examined specifically what the concrete pillars of coevolution entail. My understanding on a general level is that it means, essentially, the United States and the People's Republic of China adjust and sort of mutually change their policies to accommodate each other. So a sort of mutual accommodation over time to adjust interests in a way that prevent conflict.  I think on the face—of course, that sounds—that sounds very alluring. That sounds like a terrific idea. I think the problem has always been what would actually this look like in implementation? So for example, on the issue of Taiwan, this is an issue where the Chinese government has said: There is no room for compromise. You know, the refrain that they repeat is: Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. It is part of sovereignty. And there is no room for compromise. This is a red line. So if that's the case, there's not really, in my view, much room for evolution on this issue, for example. And it's an intractable problem.  And so I don't necessarily know how to apply the Kissinger framework to specific examples. And, but, you know, I do think it's something worth considering. And, you know, I would encourage you and others on this call to think about, for example, how that framework might actually be adapted. So I think it's an interesting idea, but I would—I think the devil's in the details. And essentially, to think about how this would be applied to specific issues—South China Sea, human rights, trade—would be the key to unpacking this concept.  I think the second part of your question was, is cooperation possible? And again, I think, as I stated in my remarks, the Biden administration publicly says—publicly asserts that they do seek to maintain a space for cooperation in climate, in nonproliferation, in global health security. I think, again, what we've encountered is that the Chinese government's view is that unless the United States ceases behavior that it deems detrimental to its own interests, it will not pursue any discussion of cooperation.   And so I think that's the problem we're facing. And so I think there are going to be discussions going forward on, well, given that, how do we then balance the need for cooperation on climate, in pandemics, with, for example, also concerns about security, concerns about military activity, concerns about Taiwan, et cetera? And I think this is the daily stuff of, of course, the conversations among the Biden administration and senior leadership. So personally, my view, is I hope cooperation is possible, of course. I think there are shared issues, shared vital interests, between the two countries and, frankly, among the global community, that require the U.S. and China to be able to work out issues. But I'm personally not optimistic that under this current framework, this paradigm, there will be a significant space open for cooperation.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. Going next to Hamza Siddiqui, a raised hand.   Q: Thank you. Hi. I'm Hamza Siddiqui, a student from Minnesota State University, Mankato.   And I actually had two questions. The first was: What kind of role does the U.S. envision Southeast Asian states—especially like the Philippines and Vietnam—playing in their U.S. strategy when it comes to Asia-Pacific security issues, specifically? And the second is that for the last few years there's been some discussion about Japan and South Korea being formally invited to join the Five Eyes alliance. And I wanted to get your take on that. What do you think are the chances that a formal invitation would be extended to them? Thank you.  LI: Great. Thank you for the question. Two terrific questions.  So, first, on the role of countries in Southeast Asia, I think that under the Biden administration they have continued to play an increasing degree of importance. So you've seen, for example, even in the Philippines, which you cited, I think just last month Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made a visit there. And in the aftermath of the visit, he announced a new basing agreement. I haven't reviewed the details specifically, and I'm not a Philippines expert, but in short my understanding is that there is going to be renewed American presence—expanded American presence, actually, in the region.   And the Philippines, just based on their geostrategic location, is incredibly important in the Indo-Pacific region. So I think that the administration is very active in enhancing cooperation on the defense element, but also on the political and economic side as well. So with the Quad, for example, in India, you've seen cooperation on elements of economics as well, and technology. I think there's an initiative about digital cooperation too. So I think the answer is increasingly an important role.   On Japan and Korea, there have, of course, been discussions over the years about expanding the Five Eyes intelligence alliance to other countries in Asia as well. My assessment is that that's probably unlikely to occur in a formal way in the near term. But I could be wrong. And that assessment is primarily based on the fact that the countries that currently are part of the Five Eyes agreement share certain elements of linguistic convergence. They all speak English. There are certain longstanding historical ties that those countries have. And I think that to necessarily expand—or, to expand that existing framework would probably require a degree of bureaucratic sort of rearrangement that might be quite difficult, or quite challenging, or present obstacles.  I think what you will see, though, is enhanced security cooperation, for sure. And we've seen that even with Japan, for example, announcing changes to its military, its self-defense force, and increased defense spending as well in the region. So I think that is a trend that will continue.  FASKIANOS: Next question I'm taking from Sarah Godek, who is a graduate student at the University of Michigan.   What do guardrails look like, from a Chinese perspective? Thinking how China's foreign ministry has consistently put out lists of demands for the U.S. side, I'm wondering how guardrails are formulated by Wang Yi and others.  LI: Great. Thanks for the question.  So I guess I'll step back first and talk about what guardrails, in my view, actually entail. So I think the idea here is that in the event of a crisis—and, most of the time, crises are not planned. (Laughs.) Most of the time, crises, you know, occur as a result of an accident. For example, like the 2001 incident. But an accidental collision in the South China Sea between two vessels, the collision accidentally of two planes operating in close proximity. And as Chinese and American forces operate in closer proximity and increasing frequency, we do have that risk.   So I think, again, the idea of a guardrail that essentially, in the military domain, which is what I'm speaking about, entails a mechanism in place such that in the event of an accident or a crisis, there are ways based on that mechanism to diffuse that crisis, or at least sort of stabilize things before the political leadership can work out a solution. In essence, to prevent escalation because of a lack of dialogue. And I think for those of you who've studied history, you know that many wars, many conflicts have occurred not because one power, one state decides to launch a war. That has occurred. But oftentimes, because there is an accident, an accidental collision. And I think many wars have occurred this way.  So the idea of a guardrail therefore, in the military domain, is to create, for example, channels of communication that could be used in the event of a conflict. I think the easiest parallel to imagine is the U.S. and the Soviet Union, where there were hotlines, for example, between Moscow and between Washington, D.C. during that era, where the seniormost national security aides of the presidents could directly reach out to each other in the event of a crisis.   In the China context, what has been difficult is some of those channels exist. For example, the National Security Council Coordinator for Asia Kurt Campbell has said publicly: We have hotlines. The problem is that when the Americans pick up the phone and call, no one picks up on the other side. And in short, you know, having just the structure, the infrastructure, is insufficient if those infrastructure are not being used by the other side.   I think with respect to the U.S.-China context, probably, again, as I mentioned earlier, the largest obstacle is the fact that guardrails help the United States—or, in the Chinese perspective—from the Chinese perspective, any of these guardrails would essentially allow the U.S. to operate with greater confidence that, in the event of an accident, we will be able to control escalation. And from the Chinese perspective, they argue that because the United States fundamentally shouldn't be operating in the Taiwan Strait anyway, therefore by constructing that guardrail, by, for example, having dialogue to manage that risk, it would be legitimizing an illegitimate presence in the first place.   So that's always been perennially the problem. And I think the argument that the United States has made is that, well, sure, that may be your position. But it is in your interest as well not to have an accident spiral into a conflict. And so I think we've seen not a lot of progress on this front. I think, for example, in the aftermath of Speaker Pelosi's visit, there—you know, a lot of the defense cooperation ties were suspended.   But the last comment I'll make is that that doesn't necessarily mean that all dialogue has been stayed. There are still active channels between the United States and China. We have embassies in each other's countries. From public remarks, it seems like during moments of enhanced tension there are still ways for both governments to communicate with each other. So I think the good news is that it's not completely like the two countries aren't speaking to each other, but I think that there are not as many channels for reducing risk, managing potential crises, in the military sphere that exist today, that probably should exist.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Michael Long. Let's see. You need to unmute yourself.  LI: It looks like he's dropped off.  FASKIANOS: It looks like he put down his hand. OK. So let's go next to Conor O'Hara.  Q: Hi. My name is Conor O'Hara. And I'm a graduate student at the Pepperdine University School of Public Policy.  In one of my classes, titled America's Role in the World, we often talk about how America really does not have a comprehensive understanding of China. Not only China's military and state department, but really China as a society. How can Americans change that? And where does America need to focus its efforts in understanding China? And then also, one other thing I think of, is, you know, where does that understanding begin? You know, how early in someone's education or really within, say, the United States State Department do we need to focus our efforts on building an understanding? Thank you.  LI: Great. Well, thanks for the question. It's a great question. Very hard challenge as well.  I think that's absolutely true. I think the degree of understanding of China—of actually most countries—(laughs)—around the world—among senior U.S. foreign policy practitioners, I think, is insufficient. I think particularly with respect to China, and also Asia broadly, much of the diplomatic corps, the military establishment, intelligence officers, many of those people have essentially cut their teeth over the last twenty-five years focusing on the Middle East and counterterrorism. And that makes sense because the United States was engaged in two wars in that region.  But going back farther, many of the national security professionals before that generation were focused on the Soviet Union, obviously because of the Cold War. And so really, you're absolutely correct that the number of people in the United States government who have deep China expertise academically or even professionally on the ground, or even have the linguistic ability to, you know, speak Mandarin, or other countries—or, languages of other countries in East Asia, I think is absolutely limited. I think the State Department, of course, has—as well as the intelligence community, as well as the Department of Defense—has tried to over the last few years reorient and rebalance priorities and resources there. But I think it's still—my understanding, today it's still limited. And I think there's a lot of work to be done.  I think your question on how do you understand China as a society, I think with any country, number one, of course, is history. You know, every country's politics, its policy, its government is informed by its history of, you know, modern history but also history going back farther. And I think China is no exception. In fact, Chinese society, and even the Communist Party of China, is deeply, I think, entrenched in a historical understanding of its role in the world, of how it interacts compared with its people, its citizens, its foreign conflicts. And so I think, number one is to understand the history of modern China. And I think anyone who seeks to be involved in discussions and research and debate on China does need to understand that history.  I think the second point is linguistics is actually quite important. Being able to speak the language, read the language, understand the language is important. Because so much of what is written—so much of our knowledge as, you know, American think tank researchers, is based on publicly available information in China. And a lot of that primarily is in Mandarin. So most speeches that the senior leadership of China deliver are actually in Mandarin. And some of them are translated, but not all of them. A lot of the documents that they issue, a lot of academics who write about—academics in China who write about foreign policy and international relations, write in Mandarin.  And so I think that an ability to be able to read in the original text is quite important. And in fact, you know, a lot of the nuances, and specifically in the Communist Party's ideology, how it sees itself, its role in the world, a lot of that really is best captured and best understood in its original language. Some of the—you know, the ideology, the campaigns of propaganda, et cetera.  And I think the last part of your question was how early. I am not an education scholar. (Laughs.) I don't study education or developmental psychology. But, you know, I imagine, you know, as with anything, linguistics, language, is best learned—or, most easily learned early on. But I think that does not mean that, you know, someone who's in college or graduate school can't begin to learn in a different language. So I'd answer your question like that.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Lucksika Udomsrisumran, a graduate student at New York University.  What is the implication of the Biden administration's three pillars of the Indo-Pacific strategy on the Mekong and the South China Sea? Which pillars do you see these two issues in, from the Biden administration's point of view?  LI: OK. I think, if I'm understanding the question correctly about South China Sea, you know, I think in general the South China Sea probably would most easily fall into the competition category. There are obviously not only the United States and China, but other countries in the region, including the Philippines, for example, are claimants to the South China Sea. And so I think there's always been some disagreement and some tensions in that region.  I think that that has largely been—the U.S. response or U.S. policy in South China Sea is just essentially, from the military perspective, has been to—you know, the slogan is, or the line is, to fly, sail, operate, et cetera—I'm not quoting that correctly—(laughs)—but essentially to operate wherever international law permits. And so that means Freedom of Navigation Operations, et cetera, in the South China Sea. I think that, of course, raises objections from other governments, mainly China, in the region.   So I would say that probably belongs in the competition category. And we spoke about earlier the idea of managing some of the risk that occurs or that emerges when the PLA Navy and the United States Navy operate in close proximity in that region. So from that perspective, if you're talking about risk reduction and crisis management, that actually could fall into collaboration or cooperation. But I think primarily it's competition.   FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Joan Kaufman. And, Joan, I know you wrote your question, but if you could ask it that would be great.  Q: Yes, will. Yes, certainly. Hi, Chris. Really great to see you here during this talk.  LI: Yeah, likewise.  Q: A proud Schwarzman Scholar.  I wanted to ask you a question about Ukraine and China's, you know, kind of difficult position in the middle almost, you know, as sort of seemingly allied with Russia, or certainly not criticizing Russia. And then just putting forth this twelve-point peace plan last week for—and offering to broker peace negotiations and a ceasefire for Ukraine. You know, there's no love lost in Washington for China on, you know, how it has positioned itself on this issue. And, you know, frankly, given China's own kind of preoccupation with sovereignty over the years, how do you see the whole thing? And what comments might you make on that?  LI: Right. Well, first of all, thanks so much, Joan, for joining. And very grateful for all of—all that you've done for the Schwarzman Scholars Program over the past. I appreciate your time very much.  The Ukraine problem is an incredibly important one. And I think absolutely China is involved. And it's a very complicated position that it's trying to occupy here, with both supporting its security partner, Russia, but also not directly being involved in the conflict because of U.S. opposition and opposition from NATO. So I think it's—obviously, China is playing a very delicate balancing role here.  I think a couple points. So the first is that I think my view is that, for the Chinese leadership, Ukraine—or, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a deeply uncomfortable geopolitical situation, where there is essentially not a—there's no good outcome, really, because, as you mentioned, Ukraine is a country with which China has diplomatic recognition. It recognizes it. It has an embassy there. And the Chinese foreign ministry, Chinese foreign policy, has long very much supported the concept of sovereignty, and being able to determine your own future as a country. And I think, in fact, that's been one of the pillars and one of the objections to many American actions in the past. So on one hand, it says: We support sovereignty of every country, of which Ukraine is a country that is recognized by China.  And on the other hand, though, Russia, of course, which has had long complaints and issues with NATO expansion, is a partner of China. And so it's obviously supporting Russia. It has alignment of interests between Russia and China in many ways, in many dimensions, including objections to, for example, U.S. presence in Europe, U.S. presence in Asia. So it's a delicate balancing act. And I think from what we've seen, there hasn't been sort of a clear one-sided answer, where you've seen both statements, you know, proposing peace and saying that, you know, all sides should deescalate. But on the other hand, the U.S. government, the Biden administration, is now publicly stating that they are concerned about China potentially lending support to Russia.  So, you know, in short, I think it's very difficult to really understand what exactly is going on in the minds of the Chinese leadership. But I think that we'll continue to see sort of this awkward back and forth and trying—this purported balancing act between both sides. But I think, you know, largely—my assessment is that it's not going to go very clearly in one direction or the other.  I think the other comment I would make is that I think, from Beijing's perspective, the clear analogy here is one for Taiwan. Because—and this has been something that has been discussed in the think tank community very extensively. But the expectation I think among many in Washington was that Ukraine would not be able to put up much resistance. In short, this would be a very, very easy victory for Putin. And I think that was a—you know, not a universal consensus, but many people believed that, in short, Russia with all of its military might, would have no issues subjugating Ukraine very quickly.  I think people have largely found that to be, you know, a strategic failure on Russia's part. And so today, you know, one year after the invasion, Ukraine is still sovereign, is still standing, is still strong. And so I think—from that perspective, I think this—the war in Ukraine must give many of the leaders in China pause when it comes to thinking about a Taiwan continency, especially using force against Taiwan. Because, again, I think the degree of support, both militarily, politically, economically, for the resistance that Ukraine has shown against Russia among NATO members, among other Western countries, I think has been deeply surprising to many observers how robust that support has been. And I think that if you're sitting in Beijing and thinking about what a potential response to a Taiwan contingency might be, that would absolutely inform your calculus.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Lindsey McCormack, a graduate student at Baruch College.  How is the Biden administration's compete, cooperate, limited adversarial approach playing out with climate policy? What are you seeing right now in terms of the Chinese government's approach to energy security and climate?  LI: Yeah. It's a great question. Thanks for the question.  You know, we mentioned earlier, you know, I think the Biden administration's approach has been, you know, despite all of the disagreements between the United States and the Chinese government, there should be room for cooperation on climate because, as the Biden administration says, the climate is an existential risk to all of humanity. It's an issue of shared concern. So it's one that is not defined by any given country or constrained to one set of borders. I think it's largely not been very successful, in short, because China has not seemed to display much interest in cooperating on climate with the United States. And, again, China has largely coupled cooperation, linked cooperation in climate—or, on climate to other issues.  And so, you know, I think it's been reported that at several of the meetings between Secretary Blinken, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, and their Chinese counterparts, the Chinese officials had essentially given the American officials a list saying: Here are the twenty-something things that we object to. Why don't you stop all of these, correct all of your mistakes—so to speak—and then we'll talk about what we can do next. And so I think, again, that—you know, that, to me, indicates that this framework of compartmentalizing cooperation and competition has some flaws, because the idea that you can simply compartmentalize and say: We're going to cooperate at full capacity on climate, but we're not going to—you know, but we'll compete on technology, it just—it actually doesn't work in this situation.  I think the other comment I'll make is that what the Biden administration has done is—which I think has been effective—is reframed the notion of cooperation. Where, in the past, cooperation was sort of viewed as a favor that the Chinese government did to the Americans, to the American government. That if we—if the United States, you know, offered certain inducements or there were strong elements of the relationship, then China would cooperate and that would be a favor.   And I think the Biden administration has reframed that approach, where cooperation is now presented not as a favor that any country does to another, but rather sort of is shared here. And that this is something of concern to China, to the United States, to other countries, and so all major countries need to play their part, and step up their game, to take on. I think, unfortunately, it hasn't been extremely successful. But I think that there—I hope that there will be future progress made in this area.  FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to go next to Jeremiah Ostriker, who has raised—a raised hand, and also written your question. But you can ask it yourself. And you have to accept the unmute prompt. Is that happening? All right. I think I might have to read it.  Q: Am I unmuted now?  FASKIANOS: Oh, you are. Fantastic.  Q: OK. First, I'll say who I am. I am a retired professor from Princeton University and Columbia University and was an administrative provost at Princeton.  And our China policies have puzzled me. I have visited China many times. And I have wondered—I'll quote my questions now—I have wondered why we are as negative towards China as we have been. So specifically, does the U.S. foreign policy establishment need enemies to justify its existence? Is it looking around the world for enemies? And why should we care if other countries choose to govern themselves in ways which are antithetical to the way that we choose to govern ourselves? And, finally, why not cooperate with all countries on projects of common interest, regardless of other issues?  LI: Great. Well, first of all, thank you for the question—or, three questions, which are all extremely important. I'll do my best to answer, but these are very difficult questions, and I think they touch on a more philosophical understanding of what is American foreign policy for, what is the purpose of America's role in the world, et cetera. But I'll try to do my best.  I think on the first part, does the United States need enemies, is it looking to make enemies? I think if you asked any—and these are, of course, my own assessments. I think if you asked any administration official, whether in this current administration or in previous administrations—Republican or Democrat—I don't think anyone would answer “yes.” I think the argument that has been made across administrations in a bipartisan fashion is that foreign policy is fundamentally about defending American interests and American values. In essence, being able to support the American way of life, which obviously is not necessarily one clearly defined entity. (Laughs.)  But I think, therefore, all of our policy toward China is sort of geared at maintaining, or securing, defending U.S. interests in the region. And where the argument about your question comes into play is that I think a lot of—the Biden administration, the Trump administration, the Obama administration would argue that many of the concerns that the United States has with China are not fundamentally only about internal issues, where this is a question of how they govern themselves. But they touch upon issues of shared concern. They touch upon issues that actually affect U.S. interests.   And so, for example, the South China Sea is, again—is a space that is—contains much trade. There are many different countries in the region that access the South China Sea. So it's not necessarily just an issue—and, again, this is Secretary Blinken's position that he made clear—it's not just an issue specific to China. It does touch upon global trade, global economics, global rules, and global order. And I think this is the term that has been often used, sort of this liberal international rules-based order.   And while that's sort of an amorphous concept, in essence what I think the term implies is the idea that there are certain standards and rules by which different countries operate that allow for the orderly and for the peaceful and the secure exchange of goods, of ideas, of people, of—so that each country is secure. And I think this—again, this broader concept is why I think successive U.S. administrations have focused on China policy, because I think some of, in their view, China's behaviors impinge on U.S. interests in the region.   I think the second question is why should we care about how other countries govern themselves? I think in a way, the answer the Biden administration—this current administration has given to that question is: The U.S. government under President Biden is not trying to fundamentally change the Chinese system of governance. And I think you've seen Jake Sullivan and Tony Blinken say that publicly, that they are not seeking the collapse or the fundamental change in the Communist Party's rule of China. So I think in that sense, they have made that—they have made that response. I think, again, where there are issues—there are tensions, is when actions that the Chinese government take then touch upon U.S. interests. And I think we see that in Taiwan. We see that with economics. We see that with trade, et cetera.   And then finally, why not cooperate with every country in the world? I think obviously in an ideal world, that would be the case. All countries would be able to only cooperate, and all concerns shared among different nations would be addressed. I think unfortunately one of the problems that we're seeing now is that large major powers, like China and Russia, have very different worldviews. They see a world that is very different in its structure, and its architecture, and its organization, than the one that the U.S. sees. And I think that's what's led to a lot of tension.  FASKIANOS: So we have a written question from Julius Haferkorn, a student at California State University and Tübingen University, in Germany.  Ever since the escalation of the Ukraine war, there are discussions about the risk that, should Russia be successful with its invasion, China might use this as a template in regards to Taiwan. In your opinion, is this a realistic scenario?  LI: Great. Thanks for the question.  I think there are definitely analogies to be drawn between Ukraine and Taiwan, but I think there are also significant differences. The first is the relationship between Russia and Ukraine is one of two sovereign nations that the United States and international community recognizes. I think with Taiwan, what has—going back to our history question—Taiwan is a very complicated issue, even with regard to U.S. policies. The United States does not recognize Taiwan formally as an independent country. The United States actually does not take a position on the status of Taiwan. Briefly, the One China Policy, as articulated in the three communiques, the three joint communiques, essentially says that the United States government acknowledges the Chinese position that there is one China, and Taiwan is part of China, et cetera, et cetera.  And that word “acknowledge” is pretty key, because in essential its strategic ambiguity. It's saying, we acknowledge that the PRC government says this. We don't challenge that position. But we don't necessarily recognize or completely accept. And, obviously, the Mandarin version of the text is slightly different. It uses a term that is closer to “recognize.” But that ambiguity, in a way, permitted normalization and led to the democratization of Taiwan, China's economic growth and miracle, its anti-poverty campaign. So in essence, it's worked—this model has worked for the last forty-something years.  But I think that does mean that the situation across the Taiwan Strait is very different, because here the United States does not recognize two countries on both sides of the strait. Rather, it has this ambiguity, this policy of ambiguity. And in short, the only U.S. criterion for resolution of issues across the Taiwan Strait is peace. So all of the documents that the U.S. has articulated over successive administrations essentially boil down to: As long as the resolution of issues between Taiwan and the PRC and mainland China are peaceful, then the United States is not involved. That the only thing that the United States opposes is a forceful resolution—use of military force, use of coercion. And that's what is problematic.  I think what you've seen increasingly over the last few years is a sort of—it's not a formal shift away from that policy, but definitely slowly edging away from that policy. Now, any administration official will always deny that there are any changes to our One China Policy. And I think that's always been the refrain: Our One China Policy has not changed. But you've actually seen within that One China Policy framework adjustments, accommodations—or, not accommodations—but adjustments, recalibrations. And the way that the successive U.S. administrations defend that or justify it, is because it is our—it is the American One China Policy. Therefore, we can define what that One China Policy actually means.  But you have seen, in essence, greater increased relations and exchanges between officials in Taiwan, officials in the United States. I think it was publicly reported just a couple weeks ago that some of the senior national security officials in Taipei visited the United States. Secretary Pompeo at the end of his tenure as secretary of state changed some of the previous restrictions on—that were self-imposed restrictions—on interactions between the government in Taiwan and the government in the United States. So we're seeing some changes here. And I think that has led to—or, that is one element that has led to some of the tensions across the Taiwan Strait.   Obviously, from Beijing's perspective, it sees that as the U.S. sliding away from its commitments. Now, on the other hand, Beijing, of course, has also started to change its policy, despite claiming that its policy is exactly the same. You've seen greater military incursions in Taiwan's air defense identification zone, with planes, fighter jets, that are essentially flying around the island. You've seen greater geoeconomic coercion targeted at Taiwan in terms of sanctions. So you've seen essentially changes on all sides.  And so the final point I'll leave here—I'll leave with you is that the refrain that the United States government articulates of opposing any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, to me, is actually quite ambiguous. Because there's never been a status quo that has truly existed. It's always been a dynamic equilibrium between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington, D.C. Where Beijing is seeking to move Taiwan toward unification. Taiwan, at least under its current leadership, under Tsai Ing-wen, is obviously seeking, in a way, to move from at least—at least to move toward de facto or maintain de facto independence. Whether it's moving toward de jure is a topic of debate. And then the United States, of course, is enhancing its relationship with Taiwan.  So there's never been a static status quo between the three sides. It's always been a dynamic, evolving and changing equilibrium. Which is why the concept of opposing unilateral changes to the status quo, in my view, is almost paradoxical, because there has never been a status quo in the first place.  FASKIANOS: There has been some talk that Kevin McCarthy, the speaker of the House, is planning a trip to Taiwan. Given what happened with Speaker Pelosi, is that a—what do you think of that musing, to go to Taiwan, to actually do that?  LI: Mhm, yes. I think that's obviously been reported on. I think it's an area of close attention from everyone watching this space. I haven't seen any reports. All I can say is based on what I've seen reported in the media. And it seems like, based on—because of domestic preoccupations, that trip, whether it happens or not, is right now, at the moment, on the back burner. But I think that if he were to go, I think it would certainly precipitate a quite significant response from China. And I think whether that would be larger or smaller than what happened after Speaker Pelosi's visit, I think is something that is uncertain now.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. We'll go next to Autumn Hauge.  Q: Hi. I'm Autumn Hauge. I'm a student at Minnesota State University, Mankato.  So my question is, since a focus of the Biden administration's foreign policy is the relationship between the United States and China, and another focus is to invest and grow a presence in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically looking at the relationship between the United States and the Micronesian country of the Republic of Palau, whose government has openly shared their support for Taiwan, do you think that the United States' long history with the Republic of Palau, and their connection to their support—the Republic of Palau's support to Taiwan, halters the ability for the U.S. to grow a positive relation with China? Thank you.  LI: Great. Thanks for the question. It's a great question.  I am not an expert on Palau or its politics. I do know that Palau has enhanced its exchanges, it relationship with Taipei, over the last few years. I think we saw Palau's president, I think, visit Taipei. I think the U.S. ambassador to Palau actually visited Taipei. And there have been increasing—during COVID, there was a discussion of a travel bubble between Taiwan and Palau. So there's definitely been increasing exchange.  I think in general this has always been a key obstacle to U.S.-China relations, which is any country that still recognizes the Republic of China—that is the formal name of the government currently in Taiwan—I think presents a significant issue. Because for the PRC, recognition of the One China—what they call the One China Principle, the idea that there is one China, Taiwan is part of that China, and the legitimate government of China is the People's Republic of China, is a precondition for any diplomatic normalization with Beijing. And so I think certainly, you know, there are a small handful of countries that still recognize the ROC, but I think that they—you know, for those countries and their relationships with the PRC, of course, that's a significant hindrance.  In what you've seen in the U.S. government in the past few years is that for countries that derecognize Taipei and sort of switch recognition to Beijing, the PRC, there's been discussion—I think, there have been several bills introduced, in essence, to punish those countries. I don't necessarily think that those bills have ended up becoming law, but I think there is, given the current political dynamics, the sort of views on China in Washington, D.C., there is this sense that the U.S. needs to support countries that still recognize Taiwan, the ROC, and be able to provide support so that they don't feel pressured to switch their recognition.  My personal view is that I think that that is, on the whole, relatively insignificant. I won't say that it's completely not significant, but I think that in general issues around the Taiwan Strait, cross-strait relations, I think military issues, I think political issues related to exchanges between Taiwan and Beijing, I think those issues are much more important and much more critical to driving changes in the relationship across the Taiwan Strait.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to try and sneak in one last question from Wim Wiewel, who's a student at Portland State University.   Given your pessimism about cooperation combined with competition, what do you think is the long-term future for U.S.-China relations?  LI: OK. Well, thanks for the question. I'm not sure that I can provide a satisfying answer. And, in fact, I don't have the answer. You know, I think if anyone had the answer, then they should immediately tell the Biden administration that they've solved the problem.  Even though I am pessimistic about this current framework, just because of its demonstrated effects, I still think that in general the likelihood of a real war, which I think people have floated now—you know, Professor Graham Allison, who I used to work for, wrote a book called Destined for War? I still believe that the probability of all-out great-power conflict in a kinetic way, a military way, is still relatively low. I think that there are significant differences today compared to the era during World War I and World War II era.   I think that the degree of economic interdependence between China and not only the United States but the rest of the world, I think is a significant gamechanger in how countries position themselves vis-à-vis China. I think Europe is the great example here of how there are many countries that invest, have business relationships, have trade with China. And so therefore, their policy on China has been a little bit more calibrated than what the United States has been doing.   And so on the whole, I think most people still recognize that any great-power war between the United States and China would be utterly catastrophic. And I think that despite all the tensions that exist today, I think that that recognition, that consensus is pretty universally held, that a great-power war between the U.S. and China would be extremely bad. I think that is—that is probably something that is understood by Republican administrations, Democratic administrations, folks in Beijing, folks around the world, in the region. And so I think that, hopefully, that idea, that despite disagreements, despite political tensions, the need to prevent all-out global conflict is quite important, is a vital interest, I think, hopefully, to me, provides some optimism. And hopefully we'll be able to continue to carry our relationship with China through.  And I'm hopeful especially that all of you students, researchers, who hope to study, and write about, and even perhaps participate in American foreign policy, will continue to think. Because so much of the future of the U.S.-China relationship and U.S. foreign policy is going to be determined by your generation. So with that, I guess this would be a perfect place to stop. And I thank you for the question.   FASKIANOS: Absolutely. Well, Chris, this has been fantastic. I apologize to all of you. We had many more—many questions in the written part and raised hands. And I'm sorry that we could not get to all of them. We'll just have to have you back and continue to cover this issue. So we really appreciate your insights, Chris Li. So thank you again.  The next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, March 22, at 1:00 p.m. (EDT). Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly will lead a conversation on U.S. relations with South America. And in the meantime, please do learn more about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/careers. You can follow us at @CFR_academic, and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. And I'm sure you can also go to the Belfer Center for additional analysis by Chris Li. So I encourage you to go there as well.  Thank you all, again, for being with us, and we look forward to continuing the conversation on March 22. So thank you, all. Thanks, Chris.  LI: Thank you.  (END) 

The annual war authorization (NDAA) is an excellent opportunity to examine our military's roles and goals in the world. In this episode, learn about how much of our tax money Congress provided the Defense Department, including how much of that money is classified, how much more money was dedicated to war than was requested, and what they are authorized to use the money for. This episode also examines our Foreign Military Financing programs with a deep dive into a new partner country: Ecuador. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the shownotes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd269-ndaa-2023-plan-ecuador Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD244: Keeping Ukraine CD243: Target Nicaragua CD230: Pacific Deterrence Initiative CD229: Target Belarus CD218: Minerals are the New Oil CD191: The “Democracies” Of Elliott Abrams CD187: Combating China CD176: Target Venezuela: Regime Change in Progress CD172: The Illegal Bombing of Syria CD147: Controlling Puerto Rico CD128: Crisis in Puerto Rico CD108: Regime Change CD102: The World Trade Organization: COOL? World Trade System “IMF vs. WTO vs. World Bank: What's the Difference?” James McWhinney. Oct 10, 2021. Investopedia. The Profiteers: Bechtel and the Men Who Built the World. Sally Denton. Simon and Schuster: 2017. Littoral Combat Ships “The Pentagon Saw a Warship Boondoggle. Congress Saw Jobs.” Eric Lipton. Feb 4, 2023. The New York Times. “BAE Systems: Summary.” Open Secrets. Foreign Military Sales Program “Written Testimony of Assistant Secretary of State Jessica Lewis before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee at a hearing on the ‘Future of Security Sector Assistance.'” March 10, 2022. Senate Foreign Relations Committee. Ecuador “Ecuador - Modern history.” Encyclopedia Britannica. “Ecuador Tried to Curb Drilling and Protect the Amazon. The Opposite Happened.” Catrin Einhorn and Manuela Andreoni. Updated Jan 20, 2023. The New York Times. “Ecuador: An Overview,” [IF11218]. June S. Beittel and Rachel L. Martin. Sep 9, 2022. Congressional Research Service. “Ecuador: In Brief,” [R44294]. June S. Beittel. Updated Feb 13, 2018. Congressional Research Service. “Ecuador's 2017 Elections,” [IF10581] June S. Beittel. Updated April 20, 2017. Congressional Research Services. Debt Default “Ecuador's Debt Default: Exposing a Gap in the Global Financial Architecture.” Sarah Anderson and Neil Watkins. 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BNamericas. “USTDA Expands Climate Portfolio in Ecuador.” May 27, 2022. U.S. Trade and Development Agency. “Ecuador's controversial and costliest hydropower project prompts energy rethink.” Richard Jiménez and Allen Panchana. Dec 16, 2021. Diálogo Chino. “Ecuador's Power Grid Gets a Massive Makeover.” Frank Dougherty. Mar 1, 2021. Power. Fishing “China fishing fleet defied U.S. in standoff on the high seas.” Joshua Goodman. Nov 2, 2022. Chattanooga Times Free Press. “Report to Congress: National 5-year Strategy for Combating Illegal, Unreported, and Unregulated Fishing (2022-2026).” October 2022. U.S. Interagency Working Group on IUU Fishing. “United States Launches Public-Private Partnership In Peru And Ecuador To Promote Sustainable, Profitable Fishing Practices.” Oct 7, 2022. U.S. Agency for International Development. “US Coast Guard Conducts High Seas Boarding for First Time in the South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organization Convention Area.” U.S. Coast Guard. Oct 5, 2022. Diálogo Americas. “Walmart, Whole Foods, and Slave-Labor Shrimp.” Adam Chandler. Dec 16, 2015. The Atlantic. South Pacific Regional Fisheries Management Organisation (SPRFMO) Cutter Ships 22 USC Sec. 2321j, Update “Coast Guard Cutter Procurement: Background and Issues for Congress,” [R42567]. Ronald O'Rourke. Updated August 30, 2022. Congressional Research Service. Julian Assange “How Julian Assange became an unwelcome guest in Ecuador's embassy.” Luke Harding et al. May 15, 2018. The Guardian. “Ecuador Expels U.S. Ambassador Over WikiLeaks Cable.” Simon Romero. Apr 5, 2011. The New York Times. Chevron Case “Controversial activist Steven Donziger is a folk hero to the left, a fraud to Big Oil.” Zack Budryk. Dec 27, 2022. The Hill. Venezuela “Ecuador: Lasso Calls for Increased Pressure on Venezuela.” Apr 14, 2021. teleSUR. China Trade Deal “Ecuador reaches trade deal with China, aims to increase exports, Lasso says.” Jan 3, 2023. Reuters. “On the Ecuador-China Debt Deal: Q&A with Augusto de la Torre.” Sep 23, 2022. The Dialogue. “Ecuador sees trade deal with China at end of year, debt talks to begin.” Alexandra Valencia. Feb 5, 2022. Reuters. Business Reforms “Will Ecuador's Business Reforms Attract Investment?” Ramiro Crespo. Mar 3, 2022. Latin American Advisor. U.S. Ecuador Partnership “Why Ecuador's president announced his re-election plans in Washington.” Isabel Chriboga. Dec 22, 2022. The Atlantic Council. “USMCA as a Framework: New Talks Between U.S., Ecuador, Uruguay.” Jim Wiesemeyer. Dec 21, 2022. AgWeb. “US seeks to bolster Ecuador ties as China expands regional role.” Dec 19, 2022. Al Jazeera. “As China's influence grows, Biden needs to supercharge trade with Ecuador.” Isabel Chiriboga. Dec 19, 2022. The Atlantic Council. “The United States and Ecuador to Explore Expanding the Protocol on Trade Rules and Transparency under the Trade and Investment Council (TIC).” Nov 1, 2022. Office of the United States Trade Representative. “A delegation of U.S. senators visits Ecuador.” Oct 19, 2022. U.S. Embassy & Consulate in Ecuador. Referendum “Guillermo Lasso Searches for a Breakthrough.” Sebastián Hurtado. Dec 19, 2022. Americas Quarterly. State Enterprise Resignation “Ecuador President Guillermo Lasso asks heads of all state firms to resign.” Jan 18, 2023. Buenos Aires Times. Lithium Triangle “Why the U.S. Inflation Reduction Act Could Benefit Both Mining and Energy in Latin America.” John Price. Aug 22, 2022. Americas Market Intelligence. Colombia “Latin America's New Left Meets Davos.” Catherine Osborn. Jan 20, 2023. Foreign Policy. “How Colombia plans to keep its oil and coal in the ground.” María Paula Rubiano A. Nov 16, 2022. BBC. “Colombia: Background and U.S. Relations.” June S. Beittel. Updated December 16, 2021. Congressional Research Service. Tax Reform “In Colombia, Passing Tax Reform Was the Easy Part.” Ricardo Ávila. Nov 23, 2022. Americas Quarterly. “U.S. Government Must Take Urgent Action on Colombia's Tax Reform Bill.” Cesar Vence and Megan Bridges. Oct 26, 2022. U.S. Chamber of Commerce. “Letter from ACT et. al. to Sec. Janet Yellen, Sec. Gina Raimondo, and Hon. Katherine Tai.” U.S. Chamber of Commerce. Relationship with U.S. “Does glyphosate cause cancer?” Cancer Treatment Centers of America. Jul 8, 2021. City of Hope. “Colombian Intelligence Unit Used U.S. Equipment to Spy on Politicians, Journalists.” Kejal Vyas. May 4, 2020. The Wall Street Journal. “Exposure to glyphosate-based herbicides and risk for non-Hodgkin lymphoma: A meta-analysis and supporting evidence.” Luoping Zhang et al. Mutation Research/Reviews in Mutation Research Vol. 781, July–September 2019, pp. 186-206. “Colombia to use drones to fumigate coca leaf with herbicide.” Jun 26, 2018. Syria “Everyone Is Denouncing the Syrian Rebels Now Slaughtering Kurds. But Didn't the U.S. Once Support Some of Them?” Mehdi Hasan. Oct 26, 2019. The Intercept. “U.S. Relations With Syria: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet.” Jan 20, 2021. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs. “Behind the Sudden Death of a $1 Billion Secret C.I.A. War in Syria.” Mark Mazzetti et al. Aug 2, 2017. The New York Times. “Arms Airlift to Syria Rebels Expands, With Aid From C.I.A.” C. J. Chivers and Eric Schmitt. Mar 24, 2013. The New York Times. Government Funding “House Passes 2023 Government Funding Legislation.” Dec 23, 2022. House Appropriations Committee Democrats. “Division C - Department of Defense Appropriations Act, 2023.” Senate Appropriations Committee. Jen's highlighted version “Division K - Department of State, Foreign Operations, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2023.” Senate Appropriations Committee. Laws H.R.2617 - Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023 H.R.7776 - James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 Jen's highlighted version Bills H.R. 8711 - United States-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022 S. 3591 - United States-Ecuador Partnership Act of 2022 Audio Sources A conversation with General Laura J. Richardson on security across the Americas January 19, 2023 The Atlantic Council Clips 17:51 Gen. Laura Richardson: The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) that has been ongoing for the last over a decade in this region, 21 of 31 countries have signed on to this Belt and Road Initiative. I could take Argentina last January, the most recent signatory on to the Belt and Road Initiative, and $23 billion in infrastructure projects that signatory and signing on to that. But again, 21 of 31 countries. There are 25 countries that actually have infrastructure projects by the PRC. Four that aren't signatories of the BRI, but they do actually have projects within their countries. But not just that. Deepwater ports in 17 countries. I mean, this is critical infrastructure that's being invested in. I have the most space enabling infrastructure in the Western Hemisphere in Latin America and the Caribbean. And I just caused question, you know, why? Why is all of this critical infrastructure being invested in so heavily? In terms of telecommunications, 5G, I've got five countries with the 5G backbone in this region. I've got 24 countries with the PRC Huawei 3G-4G. Five countries have the Huawei backbone infrastructure. If I had to guess, they'll probably be offered a discount to upgrade and stay within the same PRC network. And so very, very concerning as we work with our countries. 20:00 Gen. Laura Richardson: What I'm starting to see as well is that this economy...the economy impacts to these partner nations is affecting their ability to buy equipment. And you know, as I work with our partner nations, and they invest in U.S. equipment, which is the best equipment, I must say I am a little biased, but it is the best equipment, they also buy into the supply chain of spare parts, and all those kinds of things that help to sustain this piece of equipment over many, many years. So in terms of the investment that they're getting, and that equipment to be able to stay operational, and the readiness of it, is very, very important. But now these partner nations, due to the impacts of their economy, are starting to look at the financing that goes along with it. Not necessarily the quality of the equipment, but who has the best finance deal because they can't afford it so much up front. 24:15 Gen. Laura Richardson: This region, why this region matters, with all of its rich resources and rare earth elements. You've got the lithium triangle which is needed for technology today. 60% of the world's lithium is in the lithium triangle: Argentina Bolivia, Chile. You just have the largest oil reserves -- light, sweet, crude -- discovered off of Guyana over a year ago. You have Venezuela's resources as well with oil, copper, gold. China gets 36% of its food source from this region. We have the Amazon, lungs of the world. We have 31% of the world's freshwater in this region too. I mean, it's just off the chart. 28:10 Gen. Laura Richardson: You know, you gotta question, why are they investing so heavily everywhere else across the planet? I worry about these dual-use state-owned enterprises that pop up from the PRC, and I worry about the dual use capability being able to flip them around and use them for military use. 33:30 Interviewer: Russia can't have the ability to provide many of these countries with resupply or new weapons. I mean, they're struggling to supply themselves, in many cases, for Ukraine. So is that presenting an opportunity for maybe the US to slide in? Gen. Laura Richardson: It is, absolutely and we're taking advantage of that, I'd like to say. So, we are working with those countries that have the Russian equipment to either donate or switch it out for United States equipment. or you Interviewer: Are countries taking the....? Gen. Laura Richardson: They are, yeah. 45:25 Gen. Laura Richardson: National Guard State Partnership Program is huge. We have the largest National Guard State Partnership Program. It has come up a couple of times with Ukraine. Ukraine has the State Partnership Program with California. How do we initially start our great coordination with Ukraine? It was leveraged to the National Guard State Partnership Program that California had. But I have the largest out of any of the CoCOMMs. I have 24 state partnership programs utilize those to the nth degree in terms of another lever. 48:25 Gen. Laura Richardson: Just yesterday I had a zoom call with the U.S. Ambassadors from Argentina and Chile and then also the strategy officer from Levant and then also the VP for Global Operations from Albermarle for lithium, to talk about the lithium triangle in Argentina, Bolivia and Chile and the companies, how they're doing and what they see in terms of challenges and things like that in the lithium business and then the aggressiveness or the influence and coercion from the PRC. House Session June 15, 2022 Clips Rep. Jackie Speier (D-CA): The GAO found that the LCS had experienced engine failure in 10 of the 11 deployments reviewed. Rep. Jackie Speier (D-CA): One major reason for the excessive costs of LCS: contractors. Unlike other ships where sailors do the maintenance, LCS relies almost exclusively on contractors who own and control the technical data needed to maintain and repair. Rep. Jackie Speier (D-CA): Our top priority and national defense strategy is China and Russia. We can't waste scarce funds on costly LCS when there are more capable platforms like destroyers, attack submarines, and the new constellation class frigate. A review of the President's Fiscal Year 2023 funding request and budget justification for the Navy and Marine Corps May 25, 2022 Senate Appropriations Committee, Subcommittee on Defense Watch full hearing on YouTube Witnesses: Carlos Del Toro, Secretary, United States Navy Admiral Michael M. Gilday, Chief of Naval Operations General David H. Berger, Commandant of the Marine Corps Clips Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS): I think the christening was just a few years ago...maybe three or so. So the fact that we christened the ship one year and a few years later we're decommissioning troubles me. Sen. Jerry Moran (R-KS): Are there not other uses, if there's something missing from this class of ships, that we would avoid decommissioning? Adm. Michael Gilday: We need a capable, lethal, ready Navy more than we need a larger Navy that's less capable, less lethal, and less ready. And so, unfortunately the Littoral combat ships that we have, while the mechanical issues were a factor, a bigger factor was was the lack of sufficient warfighting capability against a peer competitor in China. Adm. Michael Gilday: And so we refuse to put an additional dollar against that system that wouldn't match the Chinese undersea threat. Adm. Michael Gilday: In terms of what are the options going forward with these ships, I would offer to the subcommittee that we should consider offering these ships to other countries that would be able to use them effectively. There are countries in South America, as an example, as you pointed out, that would be able to use these ships that have small crews. Secretary of State Antony J. Blinken and Secretary ofDefense Lloyd J. Austin III Remarks to Traveling Press April 25, 2022 China's Role in Latin America and the Caribbean March 31, 2022 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Watch full hearing on YouTube Witnesses: Kerri Hannan, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Public Diplomacy, Policy, Planning, and Coordination, Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State Peter Natiello, Senior Deputy Assistant Administrator, Latin America and Caribbean Bureau, U.S. Agency for International Development Andrew M. Herscowitz, Chief Development Officer, U.S. International Development Finance Corporation Margaret Myers, Director of the Asia & Latin America Program, Inter-American Dialogue Evan Ellis, Senior Associate, Center for Strategic and International Studies Clips 24:20 Sen. Tim Kaine (D-VA): Ecuador for example, nearly 20 years ago, former President Rafael Correa promised modernization for Ecuador, embracing Chinese loans and infrastructure projects in exchange for its oil. Fast forward to today. Ecuador now lives with the Chinese financed and built dam that's not fully operational despite being opened in 2016. The Coca Codo Sinclair Dam required over 7000 repairs, it sits right next to an active volcano, and erosion continues to damage the dam. The dam also caused an oil spill in 2020 that has impacted indigenous communities living downstream. And all that's on top of the billions of dollars that Ecuador still owes China. 56:40 Peter Natiello: One example that I could provide is work that we've done in Ecuador, with Ecuadorian journalists, to investigate, to analyze and to report on the issue of illegal and unregulated fishing off Ecuador's coast. And we do that because we want to ensure that Ecuadorian citizens have fact-based information upon which they can make decisions about China and countries like China, and whether they want their country working with them. 1:23:45 Sen. Ed Markey (D-MA): There are 86 million tons of identified lithium resources on the planet. On the planet. 49 million of the 86 million are in the Golden Triangle. That's Argentina, Bolivia, Chile. So what's our plan? 1:54:10 Evan Ellis: In security engagement, the PRC is a significant provider of military goods to the region including fighters, transport aircraft, and radars for Venezuela; helicopters and armored vehicles for Bolivia; and military trucks for Ecuador. 2:00:00 Margaret Myers: Ecuador is perhaps the best example here of a country that has begun to come to terms with the challenges associated with doing business with or interacting from a financial or investment perspective with China. And one need only travel the road from the airport to Quito where every day there are a lot of accidents because of challenges with the actual engineering of that road to know why many Ecuadorians feel this way. Examining U.S. Security Cooperation and Assistance March 10, 2022 Senate Committee on Foreign Relations Watch Full Hearing on YouTube Witnesses: Jessica Lewis, Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State Mara Elizabeth Karlin, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy, Plans and Capabilities, U.S. Department of Defense Clips 1:23:17 Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT): According to one study, the DoD manages 48 of the 50 new security assistance programs that were created after the 9/11 attacks and out of the 170 existing security assistance programs today, DOD manages 87, a whopping 81% of those programs. That is a fundamental transition from the way in which we used to manage security assistance. And my worry is that it takes out of the equation the people who have the clearest and most important visibility on the ground as to the impact of that security assistance and those transfers. Sen. Chris Murphy: We just spent $87 billion in military assistance over 20 years in Afghanistan. And the army that we supported went up in smoke overnight. That is an extraordinary waste of U.S. taxpayer dollars, and it mirrors a smaller but similar investment we made from 2003 to 2014 in the Iraqi military, who disintegrated when they faced the prospect of a fight against ISIS. Clearly, there is something very wrong with the way in which we are flowing military assistance to partner countries, especially in complicated war zones. You've got a minute and 10 seconds, so maybe you can just preview some lessons that we have learned, or the process by which we are going to learn lessons from all of the money that we have wasted in Iraq and Afghanistan. Jessica Lewis: Senator, I'll be brief so that Dr. Karlin can jump in as well. I think we do need to learn lessons. We need to make sure, as I was just saying to Senator Cardin, that when we provide security assistance, we also look not just at train and equip, but we look at other things like how the Ministries of Defense operate? Is their security sector governant? Are we creating an infrastructure that's going to actually work? Mara Elizabeth Karlin: Thank you for raising this issue, Senator. And I can assure you that the Department of Defense is in the process of commissioning a study on this exact issue. I will just say in line with Assistant Secretary Lewis, it is really important that when we look at these efforts, we spend time assessing political will and we do not take an Excel spreadsheet approach to building partner militaries that misses the higher order issues that are deeply relevant to security sector governance, that will fundamentally show us the extent to which we can ultimately be successful or not with a partner. Thank you. Sen. Chris Murphy (D-CT): You know, in Iraq, last time I was there, we were spending four times as much money on security assistance as we were on non-security assistance. And what Afghanistan taught us amongst many things, is that if you have a fundamentally corrupt government, then all the money you're flowing into the military is likely wasted in the end because that government can't stand and thus the military can't stand. So it also speaks to rebalancing the way in which we put money into conflict zones, to not think that military assistance alone does the job. You got to be building sustainable governments that serve the public interests in order to make your security assistance matter and be effective. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. National Security Challenges and U.S. Military Activity in North and South America March 8, 2022 House Armed Services Committee Watch full hearing on YouTube Witnesses: Melissa G. Dalton, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Homeland Defense and Hemispheric Affairs Office of the Secretary of Defense General Laura Richardson, USA, Commander, U.S. Southern Command General Glen D. VanHerck, USAF, Commander, U.S. Northern Command and North American Aerospace Defense Command Clips 17:30 General Laura Richardson: Colombia, for example, our strongest partner in the region, exports security by training other Latin American militaries to counter transnational threats. 1:20:00 General Laura Richardson: If I look at what PRC (People's Republic of China) is investing in the [SOUTHCOM] AOR (Area of Responsibility), over a five year period of 2017 to 2021: $72 billion. It's off the charts. And I can read a couple of the projects. The most concerning projects that I have are the $6 billion in projects specifically near the Panama Canal. And I look at the strategic lines of communication: Panama Canal and the Strait of Magellan. But just to highlight a couple of the projects. The nuclear power plant in Argentina: $7.9 billion. The highway in Jamaica: $5.6 billion. The energy refinery in Cuba, $5 billion. The highway in Peru: $4 billion. Energy dam in Argentina: $4 billion, the Metro in Colombia: $3.9 billion. The freight railway in Argentina: $3 billion. These are not small projects that they're putting in this region. This region is rich in resources, and the Chinese don't go there to invest, they go there to extract. All of these projects are done with Chinese labor with host nation countries'. U.S. Policy on Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean November 30, 2021 Senate Foreign Affairs Committee Watch full hearing on YouTube Witnesses: Brian A. Nichols, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, U.S. Department of State Todd D. Robinson, Assistant Secretary of State for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs, U.S. Department of State Clips 1:47:15 Sen. Ted Cruz (R-TX): I'd like to start with Mexico. I am increasingly concerned that the Mexican government is engaged in a systematic campaign to undermine American companies, and especially American energy companies that have invested in our shared prosperity and in the future of the Mexican people and economy. Over the past five months, Mexican regulators have shut down three privately owned fuel storage terminals. Among those they shut down a fuel terminal and Tuxpan, which is run by an American company based in Texas, and which transports fuel on ships owned by American companies. This is a pattern of sustained discrimination against American companies. And I worry that the Mexican government's ultimate aim is to roll back the country's historic 2013 energy sector liberalisation reforms in favor of Mexico's mismanaged and failing state-owned energy companies. The only way the Mexican government is going to slow and reverse their campaign is if the United States Government conveys clearly and candidly that their efforts pose a serious threat to our relationship and to our shared economic interests. 2:01:50 Sen. Cory Booker (D-NJ): Mr. Nichols, can you can you just be a little more specific about the tactics of the GEC? What are some of the specific activities they're doing? And what more would you like to see them do? Brian A. Nichols: The Global Engagement Center both measures public opinion and social media trends throughout the world. They actively work to counter false messages from our strategic competitors. And they prepare media products or talking points that our embassies and consulates around the hemisphere can use to combat disinformation. I think they do a great job. Obviously, it's a huge task. So the the resources that they have to bring to bear to this limit, somewhat, the ability to accomplish those goals, but I think they're doing vital, vital work. 2:13:30 Todd D. Robinson: We are, INL (International Narcotics and Law Enforcement) are working very closely with the Haitian National Police, the new Director General, we are going to send in advisors. When I was there two weeks ago, I arrived with -- they'd asked for greater ability to get police around the city -- I showed up with 19 new vehicles, 200 new protective vests for the police. The 19 was the first installment of a total of 60 that we're going to deliver to the Haitian National Police. We're gonna get advisors down there to work with the new SWAT team to start taking back the areas that have been taken from ordinary Haitians. But it's going to be a process and it's going to take some time. Sen. Bob Menendez: Well, first of all, is the Haitian National Police actually an institution capable of delivering the type of security that Hatians deserve? Todd D. Robinson: We believe it is. It's an institution that we have worked with in the past. There was a small brief moment where Haitians actually acknowledged that the Haitian National Police had gotten better and was more professional. Our goal, our long term goal is to try to bring it back to that Sen. Bob Menendez: How much time before we get security on the ground? Todd D. Robinson: I can't say exactly but we are working as fast as we can. Sen. Bob Menendez: Months, years? Todd D. Robinson: Well, I would hope we could do it in less than months. But we're working as fast as we can. Global Challenges and U.S. National Security Strategy January 25, 2018 Senate Committee on Armed Services Watch the full hearing on YouTube Witnesses: Dr. Henry A. Kissinger, Chairman of Kissinger Associates and Former Secretary of State Dr. George P. Shultz, Thomas W. and Susan B. Ford Distinguished Fellow, Hoover Institution, Stanford University and Former Secretary of State Richard L. Armitage, President, Armitage International and Former Deputy Secretary of State Clips Dr. George Shultz: Small platforms will carry a very destructive power. Then you can put these small platforms on drones. And drones can be manufactured easily, and you can have a great many of them inexpensively. So then you can have a swarm armed with lethal equipment. Any fixed target is a real target. So an airfield where our Air Force stores planes is a very vulnerable target. A ship at anchor is a vulnerable target. So you've got to think about that in terms of how you deploy. And in terms of the drones, while such a system cannot be jammed, it would only serve to get a drone—talking about getting a drone to the area of where its target is, but that sure could hit a specific target. At that point, the optical systems guided by artificial intelligence could use on-board, multi-spectral imaging to find a target and guide the weapons. It is exactly that autonomy that makes the technologic convergence a threat today. Because such drones will require no external input other than the signature of the designed target, they will not be vulnerable to jamming. Not requiring human intervention, the autonomous platforms will also be able to operate in very large numbers. Dr. George Shultz: I think there's a great lesson here for what we do in NATO to contain Russia because you can deploy these things in boxes so you don't even know what they are and on trucks and train people to unload quickly and fire. So it's a huge deterrent capability that is available, and it's inexpensive enough so that we can expect our allies to pitch in and get them for themselves. Dr. George Shultz: The creative use of swarms of autonomous drones to augment current forces would strongly and relatively cheaply reinforce NATO, as I said, that deterrence. If NATO assists frontline states in fielding large numbers of inexpensive autonomous drones that are pre-packaged in standard 20-foot containers, the weapons can be stored in sites across the countries under the control of reserve forces. If the weapons are pre-packaged and stored, the national forces can quickly deploy the weapons to delay a Russian advance. So what's happening is you have small, cheap, and highly lethal replacing large, expensive platforms. And this change is coming about with great rapidity, and it is massively important to take it into account in anything that you are thinking about doing. Foreign Military Sales: Process and Policy June 15, 2017 House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade Watch the full hearing on YouTube Witnesses: Tina Kaidanow, Acting Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, U.S. Department of State Vice Admiral Joseph Rixey, Director, U.S. Defense Security Cooperation Agency Clips 14:40 Tina Kaidanow: Arms Transfers constitute an element of foreign policy. We therefore take into account foreign policy considerations as we contemplate each arms transfer or sale, including specifically, the appropriateness of the transfer in responding to U.S and recipient security needs; the degree to which the transfer supports U.S. strategic foreign policy and defense interests through increased access and influence; allied burden sharing and interoperability; consistency with U.S. interests regarding regional stability; the degree of protection afforded by the recipient company to our sensitive technology; the risk that significant change in the political or security situation of the recipient country could lead to inappropriate end use or transfer; and the likelihood that the recipient would use the arms to commit human rights abuses or serious violations of international humanitarian law, or retransfer the arms to those who would commit such abuses. As a second key point, arms transfers support the U.S. Defense industrial base and they reduce the cost of procurement for our own U.S. military. Purchases made through the Foreign Military Sales, known as the FMS, system often can be combined with our Defense Department orders to reduce unit costs. Beyond this, the US defense industry directly employs over 1.7 million people across our nation. 20:20 Vice Admiral Joseph Rixey: FMS is the government-to-government process through which the U.S. government purchases defense articles, training, and services on behalf of foreign governments, authorized in the Arms Export Control Act. FMS is a long standing security cooperation program that supports partner and regional security, enhances military-to-military cooperation, enables interoperability and develops and maintains international relationships. Through the FMS process, the US government determines whether or not the sale is of mutual benefit to us and the partner, whether the technology can and will be protected, and whether the transfer is consistent with U.S. conventional arms transfer policy. The FMS system is actually a set of systems in which the Department of State, Department of Defense, and Congress play critical roles. The Department of Defense in particular executes a number of different processes including the management of the FMS case lifecycle which is overseen by DSCA (Defense Security Cooperation Agency). Technology transfer reviews, overseen by the Defense Technology Security Administration, and the management of the Defense Acquisition and Logistics Systems, overseen by the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, and the military departments. This process, or a version of it, also serves us well, in the DoD Title X Building Partnership Capacity arena, where the process of building a case, validating a requirement and exercising our U.S. acquisition system to deliver capability is modeled on the FMS system. I want to say clearly that overall the system is performing very well. The United States continues to remain the provider of choice for our international partners, with 1,700 new cases implemented in Fiscal Year 2016 alone. These new cases, combined with adjustments to existing programs, equated to more than $33 billion in sales last year. This included over $25 billion in cases funded by our partner nations' own funds and approximately $8 billion in cases funded by DOD Title X program or Department of State's Appropriations. Most FMS cases move through the process relatively quickly. But some may move more slowly as we engage in deliberate review to ensure that the necessary arms transfer criteria are met. Cover Art Design by Only Child Imaginations Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)

In the early 2000s, economic growth exploded in South America—and the citizens of Brazil, Peru, Chile and elsewhere enjoyed increasing prosperity. But over the last decade, the churn of the world economy has made it hard for leaders across the region to meet their people's raised expectations.  Guest: Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly, former foreign correspondent for Reuters in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. If you enjoy this show, please consider signing up for Slate Plus. Slate Plus members get benefits like zero ads on any Slate podcast, bonus episodes of shows like Slow Burn and Amicus—and you'll be supporting the work we do here on What Next. Sign up now at slate.com/whatnextplus to help support our work. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In the early 2000s, economic growth exploded in South America—and the citizens of Brazil, Peru, Chile and elsewhere enjoyed increasing prosperity. But over the last decade, the churn of the world economy has made it hard for leaders across the region to meet their people's raised expectations.  Guest: Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly, former foreign correspondent for Reuters in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. If you enjoy this show, please consider signing up for Slate Plus. Slate Plus members get benefits like zero ads on any Slate podcast, bonus episodes of shows like Slow Burn and Amicus—and you'll be supporting the work we do here on What Next. Sign up now at slate.com/whatnextplus to help support our work. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In the early 2000s, economic growth exploded in South America—and the citizens of Brazil, Peru, Chile and elsewhere enjoyed increasing prosperity. But over the last decade, the churn of the world economy has made it hard for leaders across the region to meet their people's raised expectations.  Guest: Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly, former foreign correspondent for Reuters in Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. If you enjoy this show, please consider signing up for Slate Plus. Slate Plus members get benefits like zero ads on any Slate podcast, bonus episodes of shows like Slow Burn and Amicus—and you'll be supporting the work we do here on What Next. Sign up now at slate.com/whatnextplus to help support our work. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Arrancamos el año hablando de la insurrección en Brazil y sobre las consecuencias de la gringa y el desastre en el nombramiento de Kevin McCarthy como speaker of da house. Entrevistamos a Brian Winter, editor en jefe de Americas Quarterly sobre lo que pasó en Brasilia y el rol de Bolsonaro. Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/pueblopeople Y por aquí le llegan al resto: https://linktr.ee/pueblopeople Creado por Oswaldo Graziani y Raúl Stolk

I was so pleased to invite Oliver back into the Virtual Studio to discuss the Brazilian Presidential run off. That second round resulted in a narrow victory for the former President Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, known as Lula over the current President Jair Bolsonaro. This podcast explores the Lula's Presidential victory, and Bolsonaro's loss, and then looks at the consequences for Brazilian democracy, the effort to save the Amazon Rainforest and then the possible impact of Lula's return to the Presidency beyond Brazil Oliver is an associate professor of international relations at Getulio Vargas Foundation (FGV) in Sao Paulo. There, with several colleagues, he launched a new School of International Relations. He is also a non-resident scholar at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace in Washington DC, a non-resident Fellow at the Global Public Policy Institute (GPPi) in Berlin, and a columnist for Estado de São Paulo and Americas Quarterly. Oliver has written extensively on the politics of the rising powers, including The BRICS and the Future of the Global Order and his most recent book from Polity, Post-Western World: How Emerging Powers are Remaking the Global Order. He is a frequent commentator on Brazilian politics as well the Hemisphere. He contributes extensively to journals and the media in Brazil and across the region. Oliver provides real insights into Brazil's immediate politics and the consequences for Brazil of Lula's win and Bolsonaro's loss. Please join Oliver in this effort to really ‘dive deep' into Brazil and its politics.

On October 30, Brazilians elected Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva as their next president. Within minutes, world leaders, including President Biden and Secretary Blinken, offered official congratulations. For Lulu supporters, the atmosphere was celebratory but tense, as many wondered if Lulu's opponent, incumbent Jair Bolsonaro—who once said the election would end either in his death, arrest, or victory—would accept the legitimate results of the election. To talk through that election and its aftermath, Lawfare managing editor Tyler McBrien sat down with Brian Winter, editor in chief of Americas Quarterly and a journalist with over a decade living and reporting across Latin America. They discussed whether warnings of an election crisis were alarmist or not, what's next for Bolsonaro and his movement, and what to watch for during Lulu's first 100 days.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva's victory in Brazil's presidential election is part of a larger leftward shift in Latin American politics in recent years that stretches from Mexico to Chile. On Deep Dish, Brazilian students share some of the issues facing their country as they went to the polls and the challenges the new president will face. Plus, expert Yannik John discusses what the world should expect from this new wave of Latin American leaders and whether this leftward shift represents a new “pink tide”.   Reading List: Latin America's Second Pink Tide Looks Very Different from the First, Oliver Stuenkel, Americas Quarterly, July 18, 2022  Pink Tide 2.0? The same trap awaits, Yannik John, Global Americans, September 22, 2022    This episode is sponsored by UL Solutions.  

Sobre el discurso de Bolsonaro hablamos con Brian Winter de "Americas Quarterly". Para saber cómo viven en estos días en Kiev llamamos a la profesora universitaria Olga Tarnovska. Y Dori Toribio nos habló de Estados Unidos

De las elecciones brasileñas hablamos con Brian Winter de "Americas Quarterly". De la victoria de Felipe González, con Montserrat Domínguez, directora de Contenidos de la Cadena SER. Y de fútbol, con Carolina Castellanos de RCN Radio

On October 2, Brazil held its general elections, leading to a run-off between candidates Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva and Jair Bolsonaro scheduled for October 30. Brian Winter, the editor-in-chief of the publication Americas Quarterly, joins me today to discuss the two candidates, their individual approaches to their campaign, and how the election results reflect … Continue reading Brazil’s Vote: 2022 Elections

Del Brasil hablamos con Brian Winter de "Americas Quarterly" y Henrique Gomes Batista de "O Globo". De Venezuela y EE. UU., con Roberto Deniz de "ArmandoInfo". Y de Boric y la izquierda, con Carlos Malamud del Real Instituto Elcano

In just under a week, on October 2, Brazil will hold the first round of its general election, which will determine the country's next president. To talk through all things Brazilian politics, Lawfare managing editor Tyler McBrien sat down with Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and a journalist with over a decade of experience living and reporting across Latin America. They discussed the leading candidates, Jair Bolsonaro and Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, the potential election crisis, and what's at stake as Brazilians head to the polls on Sunday. Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/lawfare. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Colombia's Gustavo Petro will take office on August 7 with a lot on his plate. The country's first ever leftist president has promised substantial reforms to Colombia's economy and society. Polls show Colombians are optimistic and expectations are high. How much will it be possible to achieve? How pragmatic will a Petro government be and what are his odds of success? In this episode of the Americas Quarterly podcast, journalist Mariana Palau discusses the incoming government's situation in Congress, as well as plans for the economy and peace in Colombia. Palau is a reporter with BluRadio and a Master of Public Policy candidate at Oxford University's Blavatnik School of Government.

No te pierdas esta entrevista tan enriquecedora. Veremos como el arte y la cultura fomenta el avance en un país. Vanessa ha representado a nuestro país con su pasión. Su trabajo ha aparecido en Revista Brando #Argentina, The Clinic #Chile, El Malpensante #Colombia, Vice #México, Americas Quarterly #usa y El Faro #Salvador

Brian Winter, editor de Americas Quarterly, y Ryan Berg, del Centro de Estudios Estratégicos Internacionales, hablan sobre la Cumbre de las Américas y responden si será una oportunidad perdida para EE.UU. y América Latina. Para conocer sobre cómo CNN protege la privacidad de su audiencia, visite CNN.com/privacidad

Entering the second half of his six-year term, Andrés Manuel López Obrador's presidency has taken a contentious turn. What's behind the Mexican president's recent war of words with the media and other critics? Arturo Sarukhan, a former Mexican ambassador to the U.S. and career diplomat for more than 20 years, joins AQ to discuss the key issues driving Mexico's current political debate. Guests: Arturo Sarukhan is an international consultant based in Washington, D.C. A board member of the Americas Society, he is the former Mexican ambassador to the U.S. (2007-13) and a career diplomat for more than 20 years. He served as Mexican consul general in New York and chief of policy planning at the Mexican foreign ministry, among other posts. Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental reading: Mexico's Energy Reform: 3 Risks to Investors by Ana Lilia Moreno (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/mexicos-energy-reform-3-risks-to-investors)

It's been six months since Pedro Castillo was sworn in as Peru's president. But despite the threat of impeachment and a crisis in the mining sector, he has yet to offer a clear view of how he wants to govern. Andrea Moncada, a Peruvian journalist, analyst and contributing columnist to AQ, joins the podcast to examine Castillo's political isolation and uncomfortable relationship with power thus far. Guests: Andrea Moncada, a contributing columnist to Americas Quarterly, is a Peruvian journalist and political analyst currently based in the UK. Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental reading: Pedro Castillo Isn't Out of Danger by Andrea Moncada (https://americasquarterly.org/article/a-reprieve-not-a-release-for-pedro-castillo/)

Latin America's transition away from oil and gas is well underway, with green energy investments bearing fruit in countries including Colombia, Uruguay, Argentina and Brazil. The region has a chance to be a leader, although unpredictable politics and this year's elections may get in the way, energy analyst Luisa Palacios says. Guests: -Luisa Palacios is a senior research scholar at Columbia University's Center on Global Energy Policy. -Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental reading: "The Huge Risk Facing Latin American Oil Companies" by Luisa Palacios and Francisco Monaldi (https://americasquarterly.org/article/the-huge-risk-facing-latin-american-oil-companies/)

Join the authors for a book launch and discussion of "Coup: A Story of Violence and Resistance in Bolivia." In three dramatic weeks in October and November 2019, the fourteen years of progressive change that Evo Morales' pink tide government had worked to implement in Bolivia and beyond came to a screeching halt. President Morales was forced to resign after protests against his re-election to a fourth term in allegedly fraudulent elections erupted among the urban middle classes, anti-indigenous racists, and prominent conservative politicians. Join Linda Farthing and Thomas Becker in conversation as they discuss the story of this year of upheaval in Bolivia, providing a critical analysis of the 14 years of the MAS government that preceded it as well as the MAS return to power in 2020. The will relate personal accounts and commentary from women and men on the streets, leaders in social movements, members of the MAS party and government, survivors of Áñez's abuses, and intellectuals. Buy the book from Haymarket: https://www.haymarketbooks.org/books/1745-coup Speakers: Linda Farthing is a journalist and independent scholar who reported and commented from Bolivia during the 2019-2020 coup for The Guardian, The Economist, Al Jazeera, Americas Quarterly, NPR and the BBC. She is the co-author of three books on Bolivia. Thomas Becker is an activist, attorney, and academic who has worked on human rights issues in Bolivia for over 15 years. He spent much of 2019-2020 in Bolivia investigating abuses carried out after the 2019 coup for Harvard Law School. Watch the live event recording: https://youtu.be/2yv34EDD_pQ Buy books from Haymarket: www.haymarketbooks.org Follow us on Soundcloud: soundcloud.com/haymarketbooks

With a month to go before the November 14 vote, Argentina's legislative election has already turned the ruling coalition upside down and thrown a wrench into ongoing talks with the IMF. What is the government's strategy? And what should investors know about the election? Bloomberg's Carolina Millán joins the podcast to break down the stakes of the election. Guests: Carolina Millán is the Buenos Aires bureau chief for Bloomberg Brendan O'Boyle is the senior editor of Americas Quarterly

El periodista y analista político Brian Winter explica por qué el populismo y el autoritarismo pueden coincidir, pero no son exactamente lo mismo. El director de la revista Americas Quarterly apunta directamente a un líder latinoamericano que, según su opinión, tiene tendencias autoritarias. Te contamos de quién se trata y qué significa para el país que gobierna.Para conocer sobre cómo CNN protege la privacidad de su audiencia, visite CNN.com/privacidad

Over the years Latin America has seen more than its share of coups, dictators, autocrats, and stolen elections. Why hasn't liberal democracy developed deeper roots in Latin America? Why do many Latins seemingly embrace “strong man” rather than democratic solutions to their social, economic, and political problems? Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly and a journalist who has covered the region for twenty years, has some answers—but also lots of worries.

O Manhattan Connection desta quarta-feira (11/8) conversa com Leo Montesanto, fundador da Coffee Mais, e Marcelo Leite, jornalista e escritor. Sob o comando de Caio Blinder e Lucas Mendes. Em pauta na edição, Leo Montesanto, produtor de café e campeão mundial de qualidade de café no Cup of Excellence 2018, fala sobre a produção de café no Brasil. Já Marcelo Leite comenta sobre seu novo livro, Psiconautas: viagens com a ciência psicodélica, e debate quanto ao uso de drogas, como LSD e psilocibina de cogumelos, no tratamento de doenças como a depressão. A atração também conta com participação especial de Brian Winter editor-chefe da revista Americas Quarterly, e de Felipe Nunes, professor de Ciência Política na UFMG e diretor da Quaest.

Over a month after Peru's presidential runoff election, Pedro Castillo is expected to be officially confirmed as the country's president-elect in the coming days, just in time to take office on July 28. In recent weeks, the former teacher and union leader has sent mixed signals about the kind of government he'll lead, some of which have encouraged investors and critics. Law professor and journalist Andrés Calderón joins AQ's Brendan O'Boyle to discuss what we've learned about Castillo and what he can expect to face early in his term. Guests: - Andrés Calderón is chair of the academic law department at the Universidad del Pacifico and is a columnist at El Comercio. - Brendan O'Boyle is Americas Quarterly's senior editor. Supplemental Reading: "What to Expect from Pedro Castillo" by Andrea Moncada. (https://americasquarterly.org/article/what-to-expect-from-pedro-castillo/) "The “Shadowy Figure” Behind Peru's Likely Next President" by Brendan O'Boyle. (https://americasquarterly.org/article/the-shadowy-figure-behind-perus-likely-next-president/)

A congressional inquiry, a slow vaccine rollout and renewed threat of impeachment have put Jair Bolsonaro under intense pressure. But Brazil's president could still rebound thanks to support in Congress and a potential economic recovery, says Patrícia Campos Mello. The acclaimed journalist says Bolsonaro's fate will hinge on complicated set of factors, including the performance of his likely 2022 election opponent, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva. Guests: - Patrícia Campos Mello is an award-winning reporter and columnist at leading Brazilian newspaper Folha de S. Paulo. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental Reading: "Bolsonaro's Turmoil Could Be the Amazon's Gain," by Oliver Stuenkel. (https://americasquarterly.org/article/bolsonaros-turmoil-could-be-the-amazons-gain/)

Nesta quarta-feira (23/6), Lucas Mendes e Caio Blinder conversam no Manhattan Connection com Paulo Hartung, ex-governador do Espírito Santo e presidente da Ibá (Indústria Brasileira de Árvores), e com o senador Antonio Anastasia. Na pauta do Manhattan, a possibilidade de uma terceira opção para as eleições 2022, fugindo da disputa entre Lula e Bolsonaro. O programa conta também com as participações especiais de Brian Winter, editor-chefe da revista Americas Quarterly, e de Eduardo Mufarej, empresário fundador do Renova BR e da Good Karma​.

Nesta quarta-feira (16/6), o Manhattan Connection recebe Brian Winter, editor-chefe da revista Americas Quarterly; Marcia Cavallari, CEO do Ipec (Inteligência em Pesquisa e Consultoria), e Marcos Ferrari, Presidente-Executivo da Conexis Brasil Digital, ex-secretário de Assuntos Econômicos do Ministério do Planejamento e ex-secretário adjunto de Política Econômica do Ministério da Fazenda. O programa ainda conta com a participação especial de Eduardo Mufarej, empresário fundador do Renova BR. Dentre diversos temas, o Manhattan coloca em pauta o universo das pesquisas, com ênfase nas pesquisas políticas, seus cenários e tendências, um dos ramos em que Márcia, que também foi CEO do Ibope, atua há 39 anos. O programa também fala sobre a tecnologia 5G no Brasil e o que se pode esperar desta aplicação de conhecimento científico, assunto que Ferrari tem domínio.

Illegal and unregulated economies are helping drive a spike in deforestation of the Amazon. Is an economic model possible that keeps the forest standing and provides sustainable opportunities for locals? That's the question AQ poses in its latest special report, and it's the topic of this new conversation between Editor-in-chief Brian Winter, Managing Editor Cecilia Tornaghi, and special guest Denis Minev, a CEO and investor from Manaus, Brazil. Guests: - Denis Minev is the CEO of Bemol and an angel investor in sustainable Amazon projects. -Cecilia Tornaghi is the managing editor of Americas Quarterly. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental Reading: "The Case for Sustainable Development in the Amazon" a special report. (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/new-aq-the-case-for-sustainable-development-in-the-amazon/) "The Amazon's Big Cities Need Green Jobs Too. It's a Challenge" by Monica Prestes. (https://americasquarterly.org/article/the-amazons-big-cities-need-green-jobs-too-its-a-challenge/)

A edição desta quarta-feira (2/6) do Manhattan Connection terá Brian Winter, editor-chefe da revista Americas Quarterly, o jornalista Raul Juste Lores e Eduardo Mufarej, empresário e fundador da Renova Brasil. O programa conta também com a participação especial do publicitário Nizan Guanaes na bancada. Entre os assuntos que serão abordados estão a conjuntura política, perspectiva de renovação da política brasileira, além do futuro das cidades e qualidade da vida urbana. Apresentado por Caio Blinder e Lucas Mendes

The results of Chile's constitutional convention election shook markets and left many wondering what it all meant for the country just as a presidential campaign begins to heat up. Many are hopeful, while others, like this week's guest, Patricio Navia, have concerns. The political scientist joins AQ's Brian Winter to discuss possible pitfalls of the new constitution, and why he is still optimistic about Chile's long-term future. Guests: - Patricio Navia is a contributing columnist for Americas Quarterly, professor of liberal studies at NYU and professor of political science at Diego Portales University in Chile. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental Reading: "Chile’s Big Gamble Just Got Riskier" by Patricio Navia (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/chiles-big-gamble-just-got-riskier/) "Chile’s Riots: Frustration at the Gate of the Promised Land" by Patricio Navia (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/chiles-riots-frustration-at-the-gate-of-the-promised-land/) "Trapped: What If Chile Ends Up Like Argentina?" by Eduardo Levy Yeyati (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/trapped-what-if-chile-ends-up-like-argentina/)

Kids in Latin America have lost an average of 158 days of face-to-face schooling, with more students out of the classroom than any other region in the world. In Argentina, the debate over when to send kids back to school has gone all the way to the Supreme Court, further polarizing a country reeling from a second wave and the worst inflation in 18 months. Economist Eduardo Levy Yeyati joins the podcast to discuss what’s at stake and give an update on politics and the economy in an election year. Guests: - Eduardo Levy Yeyati is the dean of the School of Government of Universidad Torcuato Di Tella and a nonresident senior fellow at The Brookings Institution. He is a member of the editorial board of Americas Quarterly. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental Reading: "Back to the 1960s? Education May Be Latin America’s Most Lasting Scar from COVID-19" by Nora Lustig, Guido Neidhöfer and Mariano Tommasi. (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/back-to-the-1960s-education-may-be-latin-americas-most-lasting-scar-from-covid-19/) "Changing Argentina’s Inertia: Is it Possible?" by Eduardo Levy Yeyati. (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/changing-argentinas-inertia-is-it-possible/)

Cuba’s political regime took a step into unknown territory on April 16, when Raúl Castro announced he was stepping down as head of the ruling party. The change comes as the government faces headwinds from an economic crisis worsened by the pandemic, an artist-led protest movement, and a new administration in the U.S. But how much will things really change? Political scientist Javier Corrales joins the AQ Podcast to look ahead at what’s to come. Guests: - Javier Corrales is a professor of political science at Amherst College and a member of the editorial board of Americas Quarterly. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental Reading: "Cuba’s Racial Reckoning, and What It Means for Biden" by Javier Corrales. (https://americasquarterly.org/article/cubas-racial-reckoning-and-what-it-means-for-biden/)

What’s driving an outbreak of violence on Venezuela’s border with Colombia? What does it say about Nicolás Maduro, who appears stronger than he was six months ago despite a worrying second wave and few vaccines in sight? The International Crisis Group’s Phil Gunson joins the AQ Podcast from Caracas to weigh in on the complex panorama. Guests: - Phil Gunson is the Caracas-based senior analyst at the International Crisis Group. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly.

On April 11, Peruvians will head to the polls to elect their fifth president in less than four years. An unpopular, crowded field of candidates adds to the election’s unpredictability. Could the country’s unstable politics finally catch up to its long-resilient economy? Peruvian political analyst Andrea Moncada joins AQ’s Brian Winter to preview the vote – and the risks it entails. Guests: - Andrea Moncada is a political analyst and coordinator of the opinion section of El Comercio. She also teaches politics and international relations at ESAN University in Lima. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental Reading: "Meet the Candidates: Peru" (https://americasquarterly.org/article/meet-the-candidates-peru/)

A surge in migrants at the US-Mexico border has become the first big test for President Joe Biden's migration policy. It's also giving new urgency to a $4 billion aid package that he has proposed to tackle the root causes of migration from Central America. But just "throwing money at problems does not solve them," says former Costa Rican President Luis Guillermo Solís, citing problems on the ground such as corruption and democratic backsliding. On this week's episode of the AQ Podcast, Solís offers his ideas on how Washington can work with regional leaders and ensure efforts don't come up short. Guests: - President Luis Guillermo Solís is a former president of Costa Rica and the interim director of the Kimberly Green Latin American and Caribbean Center at Florida International University. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental Reading: "Can More U.S. Money Really Help Central America’s Northern Triangle?" By Luis Guillermo Solís (https://americasquarterly.org/article/can-more-u-s-money-really-help-central-americas-northern-triangle/) "It’s Not Just El Salvador. Democracies Are Weakening Across Central America." By Patricio Navia and Lucas Perelló (https://americasquarterly.org/article/the-bigger-reason-to-worry-about-nayib-bukele-and-el-salvador/) "The Pandemic’s Big Winner? Organized Crime" an AQ special report (https://americasquarterly.org/article/new-aq-the-pandemics-big-winner-transnational-crime/)

O mandato presidencial de Donald Trump, nos Estados Unidos, foi marcado pelo afastamento de Washington da relação com a América Latina. A exceção ficou por conta da agressividade contra países considerados “inimigos”, como Cuba e Venezuela. O resultado dessa política foi o agravamento das condições econômicas desses dois países em razão do embargo econômico. Com o início do governo Joe Biden, existe a expectativa de uma reaproximação que fortaleça as relações comerciais e pautas de interesse comum como, por exemplo, as questões climáticas e de direitos humanos. O relaxamento das proibições à imigração indica essa direção. Mas como fica o caso do Brasil, cujo presidente teve um alinhamento automático a Trump nas pautas que agora estão sendo revisadas? Biden já sinalizou que deverá ter um tratamento que fortaleça a democracia em todos os seus aspectos, o que inclui temas que não são necessariamente de interesse do atual governo brasileiro. Na entrevista ao Brasil Latino, o editor-chefe do Americas Quarterly, Brian Winter, faz uma análise das perspectivas das relações entre os Estados Unidos e a América Latina. Brasil Latino O Brasil Latino vai ao ar toda segunda-feira, às 17h, pela Rádio USP FM 93,7Mhz (São Paulo) e Rádio USP FM 107,9 (Ribeirão Preto). As edições do programa estão disponibilizadas em @brlatino, nos podcasts do Jornal da USP (jornal.usp.br) e nos agregadores de áudio como Spotify, iTunes e Deezer. . 

"Nos hemos acostumbrado en ver a Chile en muchas cosas a lo largo de los últimos 30 años", señala Brian Winter de Americas Quarterly. Acerca del proyecto "Tara Ocean" conversamos con la investigadora Camila Fernández. Conduce Paula Molina.

Colombia reported some good news in 2020: The country’s homicide rate was its lowest in nearly five decades. But continued violence in rural communities – and a pandemic that is emboldening organized crime – has darkened the mood for many. Veteran foreign correspondent John Otis joins the podcast from Bogotá to break down what’s happening in the countryside and the implications for President Duque – and the coming contest to name his successor. Guests: - John Otis reports from Bogotá for NPR and The Wall Street Journal and is a consultant for the Committee to Protect Journalists. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental Reading: "School’s Out in Most of Latin America. Gangs Are Thrilled." by John Otis (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/schools-out-in-latin-america-gangs-are-thrilled/) "The Urgent Need to Reform Colombia’s Security Policies" by Juan Pappier (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/the-urgent-need-to-reform-colombias-security-policies/)

There are 16 candidates in Ecuador’s presidential election scheduled for Feb. 7, but polls suggest voters aren’t too excited about any of them. Whoever they settle on will have to work overtime to manage a country battered by a pandemic and a fiscal crisis. Political analyst Sebastián Hurtado joins the podcast to assess the country’s outlook and the leading presidential candidates, including a protégé of Former President Rafael Correa, the “incumbent” candidate who’s never been president, and the “outsider” who could surprise everyone. Guests: - Sebastián Hurtado is the co-founder and CEO of Prófitas, a political risk consultancy based in Quito. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental Reading: "Meet the Candidates: Ecuador" (https://americasquarterly.org/article/meet-the-candidates-ecuador/) "Who Is Andrés Arauz, Rafael Correa’s Pick to Lead Ecuador?" by Brendan O'Boyle (https://americasquarterly.org/article/andres-arauz-correa-proxy-or-new-leadership-for-ecuador/)

After a year like 2020, no one can confidently predict what the next 12 months will bring Latin America. What's clear, however, is that 2021 may be as transformative for the region as 2020 - for better or worse. The Council on Foreign Relation's Shannon O'Neil joins AQ's Brian Winter to preview the developments to watch in the new year, including the challenges of vaccine distribution, the questions looming over this year's critical elections, and the potential for collaboration with a new administration in Washington. Guests: -Shannon O’Neil is vice president and senior fellow for Latin America at the Council on Foreign Relations. -Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental Reading: "A Less Apocalyptic Case for Latin America," by Brian Winter (https://americasquarterly.org/article/a-less-apocalyptic-case-for-latin-america/)

In this interview, human rights attorney, author, and activist Dr. Thiago Amparo explains recent examples of violence against Black Brazilians and places those events in the context of Brazil's history and modern social and political reality. Dr. Amparo's most recent English-language writing may be found in Critical Essays on Human Rights Criticism, edited by Andras Sajo and Renata Uitz, and in various newspapers including Americas Quarterly.

When Luis Arce swore in as Bolivia's president a month ago, he confronted a dizzying host of challenges: a public health emergency, a polarized electorate, and an economy crippled by the pandemic. But Arce's first weeks in office have left many cautiously optimistic, including journalist Raúl Peñaranda, who sees the emergence of a "minimalistic" government that's less vengeful than he expected. On this week's podcast, Peñaranda discusses Arce's first month, the return of Evo Morales, the encouraging judicial reforms on the horizon, and the challenges of vaccine distribution and getting kids back in school. Guests: -Raúl Peñaranda is a Bolivian journalist and director of the news portal Brújula Digital. -Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental Reading: "Will Luis Arce Rebuild Bolivia’s Broken Judiciary?" (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/will-luis-arce-rebuild-bolivias-broken-judiciary/)

The arrest – and return – of General Salvador Cienfuegos by U.S. authorities were both surprising developments in what has already turned out to be an unpredictable U.S.-Mexico relationship under Presidents Donald Trump and Andrés Manuel López Obrador. But a “reevaluation of the Mexican approach” is likely in store when the Joe Biden administration takes over, says the Wilson Center’s Duncan Wood. Guests: -Duncan Wood is director of the Mexico Institute at the Wilson Center. -Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental Reading: "Latin America’s Militaries Are Back. What Does it Mean?" (https://www.americasquarterly.org/fulltextarticle/new-aq-latin-americas-militaries-are-back-what-does-it-mean/)

Joe Biden - not Donald Trump - will be the next U.S. president. What does that mean for Trump's biggest fan in South America, Jair Bolsonaro? How might a Biden victory change Brazil's relationship with China? AQ columnist Oliver Stuenkel joins editor-in-chief Brian Winter to break down what life after Trump could really mean for the Brazilian president and his base. Guests: -Oliver Stuenkel is a contributing columnist for Americas Quarterly and teaches international relations at the Getulio Vargas Foundation in São Paulo. -Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental Reading: "Why a Trump Defeat Would Be a Disaster for Bolsonaro" by Oliver Stuenkel (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/why-a-trump-defeat-would-be-a-disaster-for-bolsonaro/) "Joe Biden Answers 10 Questions on Latin America" (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/updated-2020-candidates-answer-10-questions-on-latin-america/)

Los resultados de las votaciones indican que el próximo presidente de Estados Unidos será Joe Biden. Sin embargo, Donald Trump denunció, sin pruebas, que hubo fraude en su contra y anunció acciones legales. ¿Tiene posibilidades de revertir los resultados o es un show mediático? Juan Carlos López, presentador y director político sénior de CNN en Español, y Brian Winter, editor en jefe de Americas Quarterly, evalúan qué pasará en EE.UU. y América Latina después de las elecciones presidenciales de Estados Unidos. Y más adelante, una entrevista con el abogado constitucionalista Juan Carlos Planas. Para conocer sobre cómo CNN protege la privacidad de su audiencia, visite CNN.com/privacidad

What happens when you bring a journalist to the show? The guest doesn't only want to answer questions, she interviewed me [show host] as well. Welcome to a special episode of The Social Change Career Podcast with Kara Andrade and Catalina Rojas. In Episode 12 of Season 7 Kara Andrade tells the story of how her family immigrated from Guatemala to the U.S; growing up in the U.S; becoming a journalist and now juggling work while finishing a PhD. Kara Andrade has more than 15 years of experience working in the United States and Latin America as a bilingual journalist, entrepreneur and multimedia producer for a variety of leading media organizations including Al Jazeera America, Americas Quarterly, Associated Press, Christian Science Monitor, CNN, France 24, Global Post, The Huffington Post, National Public Radio, The New York Times and others. She consulted as a trainer and coordinator for the Astraea Foundation, the U.S. Institute of Peace, U.S. State Department, the World Bank and others.  Kara is an Ashoka Fellow and currently is the Program Director at the International Center for Journalists.  Don't miss the episode of the two Latinas talking about the challenges of being a women in academia; what it means to be a journalist and social change maker these days.    Check out previous seasons & episodes of our Award-Winning Social Change Career Podcast.  *Episode recorded on October 24th , 2020 ** While in the recording it says Episode 11 its actually Episode 12.  Oops. Key Links: Kara Andrade's Linkedin Kara Andrade's website Ashoka   Related Topics ***COVID-19*** PCDN.global wants to be there for our community in these trying times.  Please join for free EVERY THURSDAY at noon EST PCDN Impact Career Chats.  Learn from some of the world leader innovators about advancing your career of impact.  Connect with other professionals.   PCDN Coaching Services. We love to help you because of your commitment to change. Helping the world is a tough business.  So let us help you so you continue your mission. Book a 15 minute free consult.   Need career advice? Need it now? Join PCDN Career Helping Line. Go ask your questions, help answer others and participate in fruitful discussion to advance your social change career.   Almost 20k individuals and organizations already receive this amazing resource to keep them up to date and ready to put their passion into action. Subscribe to new and improved Daily or Weekly Newsletter   This episode was brought to you thanks to the Rotary Peace Fellowship: Are you an existing or emerging peace leader looking to take your career to the next level? You might be eligible to receive full funding to pursue a MA or professional certificate in peace & conflict studies. Learn more about Rotary Peace Fellowships at www.rotary.org/peace-fellowships        

Chileans voted overwhelmingly to embark on what will be a long, expensive and imperfect journey to a new constitution. Despite the challenges, there's plenty of reason for optimism, says author and journalist Paula Schmidt. AQ's Brian Winter spoke with Schmidt about what we can expect next, the new constitution's potential to help close Chile's gender gap, and the marginalized community that Schmidt fears is being left out of the process. Guests: -Paula Schmidt is a journalist, a columnist in the digital newspaper El Líbero, and a professor at Chile’s Universidad de Los Andes. -Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Supplemental Reading: "The Politics of Chile’s New Constitution" by Patricio Navia (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/the-politics-of-chiles-new-constitution/)

The early days of the pandemic saw Argentines rally around their new president, Alberto Fernández. But “those days are over,” says pollster Alejandro Catterberg, who points to a resurgence in polarization as COVID cases spread and the economy sinks deeper into recession. That’s bad news for the half of the country that wants to move past the divisive politics of former Presidents Mauricio Macri and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner, said Catterberg, who spoke to AQ’s Brian Winter from Buenos Aires. Guests: - Alejandro Catterberg is founder and director of Poliarquía Consultores, an Argentine polling firm. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Background Reading: "After the Default: Argentina’s Unsustainable '20/80' Economy" by Eduardo Levy Yeyati(https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/after-the-default-argentinas-unsustainable-20-80-economy/)

Amid a pandemic and ongoing food shortages, politics isn't exactly the top priority for many Venezuelans. But fresh divisions within the country's opposition are likely to have significant repercussions on how the coalition engages with the Nicolas Maduro regime. On this week's podcast, AQ's Brian Winter spoke to the Washington Post's Ana Vanessa Herrero about the opposition's changing dynamics and diverging plans. Guests: - Ana Vanessa Herrero is a correspondent for the Washington Post based in Caracas, Venezuela. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly.

The situation in Brazil "feels pretty bad right now," says Arminio Fraga, a policy expert and former central bank chief. But on the podcast this week, Fraga sees reason for a nuanced discussion. He spoke to AQ's Brian Winter about the government's big pandemic spending, how to strengthen Brazil's health care system, and why he considers himself a "progressive liberal type." Guests: - Arminio Fraga is the chair of the Institute for Health Policy Studies (IEPS)and a former president of Brazil’s central bank. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Background reading: "Despite Troubles, Brazil’s SUS Health System Can Be a Model for Latin America," by Arminio Fraga, Miguel Lago and Rudi Rocha (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/5-big-ideas-universal-health/)

"The countries of the hemisphere are at an inflection point," writes Juan S. Gonzalez, a former special advisor to Vice President Joe Biden, in a new op-ed for AQ. Gonzalez spoke to AQ's Brian Winter about how a Biden administration might lead the region in confronting challenges like COVID-19, climate change and democratic instability, with insight into how Biden might engage Nicolás Maduro and why the presidential contender sees Colombia as the "keystone to the region." Guests: - Juan S. Gonzalez is a principal at JSG Strategy and a former special advisor to Vice President Joe Biden. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Background Reading: "Joe Biden and the Future of the Americas," by Juan S. Gonzalez (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/joe-biden-and-the-future-of-the-americas/) "Miller Versus Biden: Competing U.S. Doctrines for Latin America," by Russell Crandall (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/miller-versus-biden-competing-u-s-doctrines-for-latin-america/) "The Incredible Unknown Bond between Joe Biden and Brazil’s Dilma Rousseff," by Brian Winter (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/the-incredible-unknown-bond-between-joe-biden-and-brazils-dilma-rousseff/)

Colombia has seen relative success controlling the outbreak of COVID-19, providing a needed boost in citizens’ confidence in President Iván Duque. But that could be changing. This week, AQ‘s Editor-in-chief Brian Winter speaks with political analyst Laura Gil about his initial response, recent slip-ups, and why Colombia’s fragile peace process is “on life support.” Guests: - Laura Gil leads the consultancy Diálogos y Estrategias, and is director of the political analysis site La Línea del Medio. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Background reading: "Colombia Needs to Think Bigger to Escape Crisis," by Luis Fernando Mejía(https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/colombias-way-out-of-the-crisis/) "What Colombia’s Record Says About COVID-19 Testing," by Luis Guillermo Plata (https://americasquarterly.org/article/what-colombias-covid-strategy-says-about-testing/) "Trump, Venezuela and the ELN: The Geopolitics of Peace in Colombia," by BY Karen Arteaga Garzón, Gwen Burnyeat, Andrei Gómez-Suárez and Germán Otálora Gallego (https://americasquarterly.org/article/trump-venezuela-and-the-eln-the-geopolitics-of-peace-in-colombia/)

Jeanine Áñez ascended to Bolivia's presidency on a promise to hold elections that could move the country out of a bitter political crisis. Seven months later, uncertainty lingers over when voters will choose a new government. To get some clarity on the state of things, AQ's Editor-in-chief Brian Winter speaks with award-winning journalist Raúl Peñaranda. Guests: - Raúl Peñaranda is the director of the Bolivian news portal Brújula Digital, recipient of the coveted Maria Moors Cabot prize and a Nieman fellowship at Harvard University. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Background reading: "Four Urgent Questions on Bolivia’s Election," by Brendan O'Boyle (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/four-urgent-questions-on-bolivias-election/) "The Cost of Delayed Votes in Chile, Bolivia and Beyond," by Leonie Rauls and Emilie Sweigart (https://www.americasquarterly.org/article/the-cost-of-delayed-votes-in-chile-bolivia-and-beyond/) "

One week before George Floyd was killed in Minneapolis, a young black man was fatally assaulted by police outside his home in a small town in southwestern Colombia.Anderson Arboleda, 19, was chased by two police officers for breaking the pandemic curfew in the town of Puerto Tejada on May 20, his mother Claudia Ximena Arboleda said. When the officers caught up to him, they beat him over the head with batons and doused him in pepper spray. He died the next morning in a local hospital. Arboleda, like many teenagers, loved eating, listening to music and hanging out with friends. And, according to human rights advocates, he died the way too many young black Colombians do: at the hands of the police. But it wasn’t until after a video of Floyd’s killing in Minneapolis went viral that Arboleda’s death became mainstream news in Colombia. “It was strange for us seeing how these two stories went viral. The news media were doing special reports about George Floyd before they said anything about Anderson and the type of things that go on in our own country all the time.”Alí Bantú Ashanti, attorney and director, Justicia Racial“It was strange for us seeing how these two stories went viral,” said Alí Bantú Ashanti, an attorney in Bogotá who directs Justicia Racial, a human rights group. “The news media were doing special reports about George Floyd before they said anything about Anderson and the type of things that go on in our own country all the time.” While the history of police violence is different in every country, one common denominator across the Americas is officers’ disproportionate targeting of young black men. Floyd’s killing — and the protests it ignited worldwide — have given new life to debates over racial profiling in Colombia and Brazil.Related: In France, the killing of George Floyd evokes the memory of Adama TraoréIn Colombia, young Afro Colombians face harassment from the police every day, Bantú Ashanti said. But their marginalization is wide-reaching. Afro Colombians have less access to health care and higher education and are more likely to live in poverty than the rest of the population. “Colombia is particular in the way that racism has always been denied,” Bantú Ashanti said. “When we point this out, mainstream society says that we’re being resentful and that we’re calling out an issue that doesn’t exist.”This is likely a legacy of the deep historical roots of colonialism and enslavement across the continent. While the United States institutionalized discrimination through Jim Crow laws that lasted until the 1960s, former Spanish and Portuguese colonies never formally legalized it. “That kind of overt legal separation segregation did not occur in the modern Latin American republics. What you have instead in their case are ideas that tended to downplay discrimination and segregation.”Jerome Branche, a Latin American literature professor, University of Pittsburgh“That kind of overt legal separation segregation did not occur in the modern Latin American republics,” said Jerome Branche, a Latin American literature professor at the University of Pittsburgh who focuses on racialized modernity. “What you have instead in their case are ideas that tended to downplay discrimination and segregation.”For example, in mainstream Brazil, it has long been believed that people of all races have equal access to opportunities. It’s a notion known as “racial democracy,” which for Paula Barreto, a sociologist at Federal University of Bahia in northern Brazil, has always has been and continues to be a myth.Related: How one protester's death by Colombian riot police polarized the movement“Yes, we have color lines, we have racial segregation and we have racial inequalities,” Barreto said. “We have more black people concentrated in poor neighborhoods where the police are used to killing people.”This is despite the work of Brazil’s modern black rights movement. In recent years, the Black Coalition for Rights has successfully campaigned against reversing affirmative action policies and against bills seeking to give the police more protections, as Americas Quarterly has reported.But still, the recent protests in the US have helped bring attention to Brazil’s issue of racialized policing, Barreto said. Numerous statistics show about 3 of every 4 people killed by the police are black men. Barreto hopes the newly revived debate will inspire the country to do more for the civil rights of Afro Brazilians, she said.“The American opinion and the international opinion about Brazil, in general, is important for Brazilians,” Barreto said. “Brazilians don’t want to see themselves as racists, and they don’t want to see their country associated with homicides of the black population.”

Scenes of rioting and police brutality in the U.S. are a reminder of the deepening crisis across the Americas. Pressures on civil liberties are already high across the region, with fears that leaders may be using the pandemic as a pretext for harsh policies. To discuss the state of human rights in the Americas at this tense time, AQ's Editor-in-chief Brian Winter speaks to Human Rights Watch's José Miguel Vivanco. Guests: José Miguel Vivanco is the Americas director at Human Rights Watch. Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly.

As it tears through Latin America, the coronavirus has highlighted both the impact of smart governance, as well as the toll of the region’s inequality. On the Americas Quarterly Podcast, Editor-in-chief Brian Winter speaks to doctors on the frontlines of the crisis about what they’re seeing, what they’ve learned about prevention, and how they envision a more equitable healthcare system. Guests: Dr. Enrique Boloña is the director of the intensive care unit at Clínica Guayaquil. Dr. David Acuña is an emergency room doctor at Hospital Clínico de la Universidad Católica and at Hospital Sótero del Río in Santiago, Chile. Dr. Sidney Klajner is a surgeon and president of Hospital Israelita Albert Einstein in São Paulo, Brazil. Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly.

The resignation of Brazil's popular Justice Minister Sérgio Moro shook Brazilian politics on April 24, but its ripples are still being felt. Political analyst Thomas Traumann joins AQ's Brian Winter to discuss the behind-the-scenes maneuvering that may have led to Moro's demise. They'll also assess the likelihood of impeachment and the future of Finance Minister Paulo Guedes, whose motivations for staying on the job seem less clear than they did a month ago. Guests: - Thomas Traumann is a Rio de Janeiro-based political analyst and author of O Pior Emprego do Mundo (“The Worst Job in the World”), a book about Brazilian finance ministers. - Brian Winter is the editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly. Background reading: "The Key to Bolsonaro’s Survival," by Brian Winter (https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/key-bolsonaro%27s-survival)

Recent elections in Latin America have brought about abrupt shifts in government in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, while unexpected upheavals in Bolivia and Ecuador have reversed their respective political status quo and challenged the rule of law. Reaction everywhere is mixed; there has been violent social upheaval in Chile, muted protest amidst populist upheaval in Brazil, grave economic worry in Argentina, stymied reform in Colombia, government by prosecution and shutdown in Peru, creeping authoritarianism in Mexico, and increasing influence by militaries on regimes across the region. These developments occur amidst increasing great power interest in the region. China is using its “sharp power” to dominate foreign direct investment and infrastructure in order to supplant U.S. influence in the region. Russia, meanwhile, throws economic lifelines to Venezuela, securing its illicit revenue streams and gaining a disruptive military and economic presence in the Western Hemisphere. What is at the roots of these developments, and what do, or should, they mean for U.S. policy in the region?Featuring: -- Ryan Berg, Ph.D., Research Fellow in Foreign & Defense Policy, The American Enterprise Institute; Adjunct Professor is International Relations, The Catholic University of America-- Brian Winter, Editor In Chief, Americas Quarterly, and Vice-President for Policy, The Américas Society/Council of the Americas-- Moderator: James Dunlop, Of Counsel, Jones Day

Recent elections in Latin America have brought about abrupt shifts in government in Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, and Mexico, while unexpected upheavals in Bolivia and Ecuador have reversed their respective political status quo and challenged the rule of law. Reaction everywhere is mixed; there has been violent social upheaval in Chile, muted protest amidst populist upheaval in Brazil, grave economic worry in Argentina, stymied reform in Colombia, government by prosecution and shutdown in Peru, creeping authoritarianism in Mexico, and increasing influence by militaries on regimes across the region. These developments occur amidst increasing great power interest in the region. China is using its “sharp power” to dominate foreign direct investment and infrastructure in order to supplant U.S. influence in the region. Russia, meanwhile, throws economic lifelines to Venezuela, securing its illicit revenue streams and gaining a disruptive military and economic presence in the Western Hemisphere. What is at the roots of these developments, and what do, or should, they mean for U.S. policy in the region?Featuring: -- Ryan Berg, Ph.D., Research Fellow in Foreign & Defense Policy, The American Enterprise Institute; Adjunct Professor is International Relations, The Catholic University of America-- Brian Winter, Editor In Chief, Americas Quarterly, and Vice-President for Policy, The Américas Society/Council of the Americas-- Moderator: James Dunlop, Of Counsel, Jones Day

Polls show Chile wants to replace its dictatorship-era constitution. But is a new constitution what’s best for Chile? Patricio Navia, an AQ columnist and political scientist at NYU, says it’s not. In the inaugural episode of the Americas Quarterly Podcast, Navia joins AQ Editor-in-chief Brian Winter to talk about the risks of starting from scratch. The Americas Quarterly Podcast is a new production of Americas Quarterly. For more information, check out AmericasQuarterly.org Background reading 1. Chile’s Riots: Frustration at the Gate of the Promised Land, by Patricio Navia https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/chiles-riots-frustration-gate-promised-land 2. Trapped: What If Chile Ends Up Like Argentina? by Eduardo Levy Yeyati (https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/trapped-what-if-chile-ends-argentina) 3. Chile Is About to Make a Huge Mistake, by Patricio Navia (https://www.americasquarterly.org/content/chile-about-make-huge-mistake)

We speak to Filip Niedenthal, editor in chief of Polish ‘Vogue’, who also recently launched the first issue of ‘Vogue Polska Man’. Plus: we meet Brian Winter, editor in chief of 'Americas Quarterly'.

Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales, was pushed out of office this month after attempting to secure an unprecedented fourth term. Now, the country is consumed by a power vacuum and the economy is facing challenges. How did Bolivia get here, and how can it rebound? Guest: Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly.  Slate Plus members get bonus segments and ad-free podcast feeds. Sign up now. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Bolivia’s first indigenous president, Evo Morales, was pushed out of office this month after attempting to secure an unprecedented fourth term. Now, the country is consumed by a power vacuum and the economy is facing challenges. How did Bolivia get here, and how can it rebound? Guest: Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly.  Slate Plus members get bonus segments and ad-free podcast feeds. Sign up now. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On the podcast: The editor in chief of Americas Quarterly explains why investigators are now under scrutiny in Brazil’s largest corruption inquiry. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Only a few years ago, Guatemala was making historic gains in its fight against corruption and human rights abuse. Since then, the country has suffered a severe backlash. A “pact of the corrupt” in Guatemala’s ruling elite keeps pushing legislation that would terminate trials and investigations for war crimes and corruption. A U.S.-backed UN prosecutorial body, the CICIG, has been weakened. High-court rulings are being ignored. Things have gotten so bad that the U.S. government has suspended military aid. And today, Guatemala has incredibly surpassed Mexico as the number-one nationality of undocumented migrants being apprehended at the U.S.-Mexico border. As a new presidential election looms, Adam talks about the situation with WOLA Senior Fellow Jo-Marie Burt, just returned from one of her frequent visits to the country. See more of Jo-Marie’s recent analysis at: The Open Society Justice Initiative’s International Justice Monitor. “Why War Criminals Could Walk Free in Guatemala,” at Americas Quarterly on March 12, 2019.

I spoke with Professor Rodrigo Zeidan of New York University, Shanghai. He has just published Economics of Global Business (MIT Press, 2018), a great book with innovative real-world macroeconomic analyses of timely policy issues, with case studies and examples from more than fifty countries. The book is particularly suitable for use as an introduction to macroeconomics for business students. If you are looking for something accessible that covers also the most contemporary topics (inequality, climate change, migration, sustainability, austerity, financial crisis…), go and buy it. It is a beautiful book written having in mind students with no previous education in economics. It is original in its style, in the selection of themes and in the approach to policy making. The book is divided into two parts and 15 chapters. The preface starts with an amazing personal story of his infancy. After presenting analytical foundations, modeling tools, and theoretical perspectives, Economics of Global Business goes a step further than most other texts, with a practical look at the local and multinational tradeoffs facing economic policymakers in more than fifty countries. Topics range from income equality and the financial crisis to GDP, inflation and unemployment, and, notably, one of the first macroeconomic examinations of climate change. Written by a globetrotting economist who teaches and consults on three continents, Economics of Global Business aims not for definitive answers but rather to provide a better understanding of the context-dependent rationales, constraints, and consequences of economic policy decisions. The book covers long-run and short-run growth (with examples from the United States, China, the European Union, South Korea, Japan, Latin America, Africa, Australia, and Vietnam); financial crises and central banks; monetary and fiscal policies; government budgets; currency regimes; climate change and macroeconomics; income inequality; and globalization. All chapters rely on recent and historical examples of economic policy in action. Rodrigo Zeidan is an Associate Professor of Practice of Business and Finance at New York University Shanghai and a Visiting Professor at Brazil's Fundação Dom Cabral and Copenhagen Business School. His more recent research focuses on Sustainable Finance, alongside issues in Corporate Finance and Development Economics. Alongside his article in Nature Sustainability, his research has been published in the Journal of Corporate Finance, Harvard Business Review, Journal of Business Ethics and Journal of Environmental Management, among others. Rodrigo has written extensively for media outlets, including the The New York Times, World Economic Forum, Bloomberg, Americas Quarterly and Financial Times. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices