Podcasts about one china policy

The year 2025 marks the 10th anniversary of China's Digital Silk Road, which has become an increasingly crucial component of Xi Jinping's flagship foreign policy project: the Belt and Road Initiative. Over the past decade, China has massively expanded its digital infrastructure investment across the globe. Accompanying the investment has been the diffusion of China's digital governance norms and standards in recipient states. Countries in the Indo-Pacific have been at the forefront of this stretching Chinese digital influence landscape. The conflation between digital development cooperation and digital governance norms adoption has far-reaching implications that need to be better understood and addressed. To discuss the issue, Michael Caster joins host Bonnie Glaser. Caster is the Head of Global China Programmeat ARTICLE 19, an NGO that advances freedom of opinion and expression. His organization has published two reports examining China's Digital Silk Road. Timestamps[00:00] Start[01:30] Understanding China's Digital Silk Road [05:57] China's Digital Governance Norms[10:16] China's Digital Footprints Abroad[16:07] Attractiveness of Chinese Digital Solutions[18:56] Role of High-Tech Companies in Digital Governance[21:44] Assessing the Effectiveness of China's Digital Governance[23:14] State-Driven Surveillance and Censorship[27:39] China's BeiDou Navigation System [31:09] How should governments respond to these normative shifts? 

In this exclusive podcast, Retd. Major Ganesh Amgain breaks down critical global events, including the Russia-Ukraine War, its causes, and its impact on the world. We discuss Trump vs. Biden's foreign policies, the Israel-Palestine history, and the Iran Nuclear Deal to understand how these issues shape international relations. As tensions rise, could we be heading toward World War 3? We also explore the role of NATO in global conflicts, the influence of BRICS and the United Nations, and the strategies behind North Korea's military stance. The One China Policy and its impact on Taiwan and global stability are analyzed in depth. But what about Nepal? Is our country merely a playground for global politics? With rising American interest in Nepal, how does our small nation navigate between superpowers like the US, China, and India? From World War 2's long-term effects to the geopolitics of Nepal, this conversation sheds light on the challenges small nations face in international relations. How do global powers influence small nations, and can Nepal remain neutral in future conflicts? Don't miss this deep dive into global dominance, security strategies, and Nepal's uncertain future.

The State Department has deleted a key phrase about its stance over Taiwan, and China is outraged. Today, we will discuss a bit of historical context for why China is so upset and what it could mean for the One China policy and US-Chinese relations going forward.-----⭐ SPONSOR: Good Ranchers Did you know that over 85% of grass-fed beef is imported? Good Ranchers fixes that problem.

Dr. Shao-cheng (Michael) Sun is an Associate Professor at the Citadel. He is a veteran of the Taiwanese army, retiring as a full colonel.   Dr. Sun is the author of “Hedging China Threat: US-Taiwan Relations Since 1949.“ His research interests are East Asian security and politics, U.S.-China relations, and U.S. security policy in Asia. He teaches East Asian Affairs and International Politics. He explained the importance of the Taiwan Relations Act between the US and Taiwan, and the One-China Policy, which the US has supported since the Carter Administration.  Is it feasible to turn Taiwan into a relationship similar to Hong Kong's in the 1997 Agreement, which is different from the Taiwanese situation?  If there were an armed conflict in the Taiwan Strait, it could radically upend the economic systems around the world, create physical devastation, plus a simulated war exercise showed the US Navy would suffer severe losses.

在最新一期的中文"月底回顾及听众信箱"播客中，哈德逊研究所中国中心主任余茂春分析基辛格博士的童年生活，成就和影响，以及2024年历史性的台湾选举，中国的一个中国原则和美国的一个中国政策之间的根本区别。 [English]Title: The life of Dr. Henry Kissinger; Taiwan's historic elections; and One-China Principle vs. One-China PolicyDescription: In the latest Chinese language review episode of the key issues discussed in Hudson Institute's weekly China Insider podcast, Miles Yu analyzes the childhood, accomplishments, legacy of Dr. Henry Kissinger, and the historic 2024 Taiwan elections, the fundamental differences between China's One-China Principle and America's One-China Policy.   

Listen as Dr. Eric Hyer, retired professor of political science and Coordinator of Asian Studies at the David M. Kennedy Center for International Studies at Brigham Young University, discusses his time studying in Taiwan, experience with the foreign service, research regarding Chinese border disputes, and thoughts on political leadership in China.    How does the One China Policy maintain peace on both sides of the Taiwan Strait? How can the U.S. avoid war with China amid rising tensions and worsening relations? How does President Xi Jinping's leadership of the Chinese Communist Party compare with Chairman Mao Zedong? Learn all this, and more, in this episode of In the Interest of National Security.  

Ask anyone in Washington and they'll tell you, in varying levels of panic, that China is a threat to the United States. Some will say it's the greatest threat ever or, in military-speak, the "pacing threat." So who is right? And if China is a challenge or even a threat, to its neighbors if not America directly, then how does the Biden Administration rationally deal with that? We asked longtime China security studies expert Michael Swaine to join us this week to talk about current U.S. policy and whether or not it is going in the wrong direction. He tells us that the saber-rattling on both sides of the political aisle is risking a "radical deterrence" effect — in other words, there is a way to do positive deterrence that avoids war, not "radical deterrence," which drives you closer to real conflict. In the first segment, Kelley and Dan hash out their favorite headlines of the week, including Zelensky's visit to Washington, Biden's signing of defense security assurances for Bahrain (and possibly for Saudi soon, too), and Canadian accusations that the Indian government is linked to the assassination of a Sikh independence activist in British Columbia in June.More from Michael Swaine: How to Break the Impasse in U.S.-China Crisis Communication, United States Institute of Peace,7/26/23A Restraint Approach to U.S.–China Relations: Reversing the Slide Toward Crisis and Conflict,  with Andrew Bacevich, the Quincy Institute, 4/18/23The Worrisome Erosion of the One China Policy, The National Interest, 2/27/23A Restraint Recipe for America's Asian Alliances and Security Partnerships, with Sarang Shidore, Quincy Institute, 11/18/22 This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit crashingthewarparty.substack.com

In this episode of This Week Explained, Tiana and Kervin discuss the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict and Poland's decision to prioritize domestic issues. They delve into the recent conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia, which quickly reached a peace deal, and explore the implications of the situation. The hosts also touch on recent coups in African nations and the potential breakaway of three countries from the ECOWAS. Finally, they tackle the escalating tensions between China and Taiwan, with China sending a record number of planes towards the island this year. Tune in for insightful analysis on these major global events.----------------------Get your discount on a brand new BlendJet2 by going to our link: https://zen.ai/analytics12subscribe and follow us: https://linktr.ee/AucoinAnalyticsMilitary Influencers Conference: https://militaryinfluencer.com/---------------------Disclaimer:The views and opinions expressed on the podcast 'This Week Explained' are those of the hosts and guests and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of any organization or entity. The information provided on the podcast is for general informational purposes only and should not be considered professional advice or a substitute for independent research and analysis. Each individual listener should research and identify their own opinions based on facts and logic before making any decisions based on the information provided on the podcast. The podcast hosts and guests are not responsible for any actions taken by individuals based on the information provided on the podcast.

Sikyong Penpa Tsering delivers the keynote address on ‘Weaponization of the One China Policy,' a two-day seminar organised by Foundation for Non-Violent Alternatives at India International Centre, New Delhi on 1 August 2023.

Kevin Magee is the former Australian Representative in Taipei, having effectively served as an Australian ambassador, but under the complicated dynamics of the "One China Policy". ICRT's Trevor Tortomasi chats with Mr. Magee about his work as an Australian diplomat in Taiwan, China, Russia, and Saudi Arabia, and the fascinating situations and people he has encountered in his decades in the foreign service. Thanks for listening!

Sometimes episodes just naturally find that perfect opposite pairing of subject matter and personality...and this episode of the Happy Hour is NO EXCEPTION. Perpetually unengaged Michael joins newly engaged Anna to discuss a few serious things (like Sweden's new pathway to joining Nato) and a few not so serious things (the World Map depicted in the upcoming movie Barbie). And to be clear, the Barbie movie is super, SUPER serious--just not the geopolitical implications of the crayon map supposedly supporting the controversial One China Policy.

As the US tries to halt the slide in relations with China, Beijing's determination to "reunify" Taiwan with the mainland is still the sticking point. Taiwan's foreign minister, Joseph Wu, talks to DW's Tim Sebastian from Taipei.

Friday Focus provides listeners with a focused, half-hour masterclass on the big issues, events and trends driving the news and current events. The show features Janice Gross Stein, the founding director of the Munk School of Global Affairs and bestselling author, in conversation with Rudyard Griffiths, Chair and moderator of the Munk Debates. The following is a sample of the Munk Debates' weekly current affairs podcast, Friday Focus.   On this week's edition of the Friday Focus podcast, Janice and Rudyard start the show with a discussion of what Henry Kissinger thinks about the world as he marks his 100th birthday. Are Kissinger's warnings about the risks of war between China and the U.S. over Taiwan credible? And, is there still an agreement on his pioneering “One China Policy” as a means to manage growing tensions over Taiwan? On the back half of the show, exclusively for Munk donors, the conversation turns to next week's Munk Debate on AI. What are the issues that Rudyard and Janice expect to see explored at the debate? How existential is the risk of AI and, more importantly, how should humankind be thinking about existential threats more generally in an age of machine intelligence? This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue. More information at www.munkdebates.com.

On today's show Andrew and Bill begin with reports that Secretary of State Anthony Blinken may visit China sometime "in the coming weeks." Topics include: The State Department's preliminary trip this past weekend, benefits of continued communication, risks of communication as a reward in itself, and why it's important that Blinken visit before others in the cabinet. Then: The Shangri-La Dialogue and the PRC's controversial tactics in the South China Sea, and reactions to National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan articulating the One China Policy and why the U.S. remains committed to it. From there: Desertification and China's attempts to curb it, a question about economic stimulus, and a listener's follow-up to last week's Microsoft conversation. At the end: Traveling to China, CCP membership, and a new drilling project that caught the world's attention.

[01:50] Switzerland's Policy toward China Today[03:48] Changes in Swiss-Chinese Relations[06:03] Switzerland's 2021 China Strategy[08:17] Areas of Economic Cooperation[11:05] Switzerland's Relationship with Taiwan[14:45] Switzerland's One China Policy[17:32] Contending with Human Rights Issues[18:55] Huawei's Presence in Switzerland[20:56] China's Influence in Switzerland[23:42] Forecast of Swiss-Chinese Relations

Quincy Institute director of East Asia, Michael D. Swaine explains how to manage the rise in China's power and influence through a restrained grand strategy, rather than through confrontation and primacy. He discusses Chinese diplomacy on the global stage, the problem with Washington's current strategy to contain and confront Beijing, how to alleviate the security dilemma, managing US alliances and altering US force posture in East Asia, and handling the problem of Taiwan, among other topics. Show NotesMichael D. Swaine bioMichael D. Swaine and Andrew Bacevich, “A Restraint Approach to U.S.-China Relations: Reversing the Slide Toward Crisis and Conflict,” Quincy Institute paper no. 11, April 18, 2023.Michael D. Swaine, “The Worrisome Erosion of the One China Policy,” The National Interest, February 27, 2023.Michael D. Swaine, “What the U.S. Gets Wrong About Taiwan and Deterrence,” The Diplomat, January 23, 2023. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Taiwan's status in the world has never been clear and neither has the United States' position on the issue. In this Congressional Dish, via footage from the C-SPAN archive dating back into the 1960s, we examine the history of Taiwan since World War II in order to see the dramatic shift in Taiwan policy that is happening in Congress - and in law - right now. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the show notes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd272-what-is-taiwan Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD259: CHIPS: A State Subsidization of Industry CD187: Combating China Taiwan History and Background “In Focus: Taiwan: Political and Security Issues” [IF10275]. Susan V. Lawrence and Caitlin Campbell. Updated Mar 31, 2023. Congressional Research Service. “Taiwan taps on United Nations' door, 50 years after departure.” Erin Hale. Oct 25, 2021. Aljazeera. “China must 'face reality' of Taiwan's independence: Taiwanese President Tsai Ing-wen.” Stacy Chen. Jan 16, 2020. ABC News. “Taiwan weighs options after diplomatic allies switch allegiance.” Randy Mulyanto. Sep 26, 2019. Aljazeera. U.S.-Taiwan Relationship Past “The Taiwan Relations Act” [Pub. L. 96–8, § 2, Apr. 10, 1979, 93 Stat. 14.] “22 U.S. Code § 3301 - Congressional findings and declaration of policy.” Cornell Law School Legal Information Institute. Current “China moves warships after US hosts Taiwan's Tsai.” Rupert Wingfield-Hayes. Apr 6, 2023. BBC News. “Speaker Pelosi's Taiwan Visit: Implications for the Indo-Pacific.” Jude Blanchette et al. Aug 15, 2022. Center for Strategic and International Studies. "Pelosi in Taiwan: Signal or historic mistake?” Aug 4, 2022. DW News. “China threatens 'targeted military operations' as Pelosi arrives in Taiwan.” News Wires. Feb 8, 2022. France 24. “Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan would be 'ill-conceived' and 'reckless.'” Dheepthika Laurent. Feb 8, 2022. France 24. Presidential Drawdown Authority “Use of Presidential Drawdown Authority for Military Assistance for Ukraine.” Apr 19, 2023. U.S. Department of State Bureau of Political-Military Affairs. U.S. China Relationship “America, China and a Crisis of Trust.” Thomas L. Friedman. Apr 14, 2023. The New York Times. Laws H.R.7776: James M. Inhofe National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2023 Full Text Outline of Taiwan Provisions TITLE X - GENERAL PROVISIONS Subtitle G - Other Matters Sec. 1088: National Tabletop Exercise By the end of 2023, the Secretary of Defense is to assess the viability of our domestic critical infrastructure to identify chokepoints and the ability of our armed forces to respond to a contingency involving Taiwan, including our armed forces' ability to respond to attacks on our infrastructure. TITLE XII - MATTERS RELATING TO FOREIGN NATIONS Subtitle E - Matters Relating to the Indo-Pacific Region Sec. 1263: Statement of Policy on Taiwan “It shall be the policy of the United States to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist a fait accompli that would jeopardize the security of thepeople of Taiwan.” Fait accompli is defined as, “the resort to force by the People's Republic of China to invade and seize control of Taiwan before the United States can respond effectively.” Sec. 1264: Sense of Congress on Joint Exercises with Taiwan Congress wants the Commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command to carry out joint military exercises with Taiwan in “multiple warfare domains” and practice using “secure communications between the forces of the United States, Taiwan, and other foreign partners” Taiwan should be invited to participate in the Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) exercise in 2024. RIMPAC is a multinational maritime exercise, now the world's largest, that has happened 28 times since 1971. The last one took place in and around Hawaii and Southern California in the summer of 2022. 26 countries, including the US, participated. TITLE LV - FOREIGN AFFAIRS MATTERS Subtitle A - Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act PART 1 - IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ENHANCED DEFENSE PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND TAIWAN Sec. 5502: Modernizing Taiwan's Security Capabilities to Deter and, if necessary, Defeat Aggression by the People's Republic of China Grants: Expands the purpose of the State Department's Foreign Military Financing Program to “provide assistance including equipment, training, and other support, to build the civilian and defensive military capabilities of Taiwan” Authorizes the State Department to spend up to $100 million per year for 10 years to maintain a stockpile of munitions and other weapons (authorized by Sec. 5503). Any amounts that are not obligated and used in one year can be carried over into the next year (which essentially makes this a $1 billion authorization that expires in 2032). The stockpile money is only authorized if the State Department certifies every year that Taiwan has increased its defense spending (requirement is easily waived by the Secretary of State). Authorizes $2 billion per year for the Foreign Military Financing grants each year for the next 5 years (total $10 billion in grants). The money is expressly allowed to be used to purchase weapons and “defense services” that are “not sold by the United States Government” (= sold by the private sector). No more than 15% of the weapons for Taiwan purchased via the Foreign Military Financing Program can be purchased from within Taiwan Loans: Also authorizes the Secretary of State to directly loan Taiwan up to $2 billion. The loans must be paid back within 12 years and must include interest. The Secretary of State is also authorized to guarantee commercial loans up to$2 billion each (which can not be used to pay off other debts). Loans guaranteed by the US must be paid back in 12 years. Sec. 5504: International Military Education and Training Cooperation with Taiwan Requires the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense to create a military training program with Taiwan by authorizing the Secretary of State to train Taiwan through the International Military Education and Training Program. The purposes of the training include enhancements of interoperability between the US and Taiwan and the training of “future leaders of Taiwan”. The training itself can include “full scale military exercises” and “an enduring rotational United States military presence” Sec. 5505: Additional Authorities to Support Taiwan Authorizes the President to drawdown weapons from the stocks of the Defense Department, use Defense Department services, and provide military education and training to Taiwan, the value of which will be capped at $1 billion per year The President is also given the “emergency authority” to transfer weapons and services in “immediate assistance” to Taiwan specifically valued at up to $25 million per fiscal year. Sec. 5512: Sense of Congress on Taiwan Defense Relations “The Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances provided by the United States to Taiwan in July 1982 are the foundation for United States-Taiwan relations.” “The increasingly coercive and aggressive behavior of the People's Republic of China toward Taiwan is contrary to the expectation of the peaceful resolution of the future of Taiwan” “As set forth in the Taiwan Relations Act, the capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan should be maintained.” The US should continue to support Taiwanese defense forces by “supporting acquisition by Taiwan of defense articles and services through foreign military sales, direct commercial sales, and industrial cooperation, with an emphasis on capabilities that support an asymmetric strategy.” Support should also include “Exchanges between defense officials and officers of the US and Taiwan at the strategic, policy, and functional levels, consistent with the Taiwan Travel Act.” PART 3 - INCLUSION OF TAIWAN IN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS Sec. 5516: Findings “Since 2016, the Gambia, Sao Tome and Principe, Panama, the Dominican Republic, Burkina Faso, El Salvador, the Solomon Islands, and Kiribati, have severed diplomatic relations with Taiwan in favor of diplomatic relations with China” “Taiwan was invited to participate in the World Health Assembly, the decision making body of the World Health Organization, as an observer annually between 2009 and 2016. Since the 2016 election of President Tsai, the PRC has increasingly resisted Taiwan's participation in the WHA. Taiwan was not invited to attend the WHA in 2017, 2018, 2019, 2020, or 2021.” “United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2758 does not address the issue of representation of Taiwan and its people at the United Nations, nor does it give the PRC the right to represent the people of Taiwan.” Sec. 5518: Strategy to Support Taiwan's Meaningful Participation in International Organizations By the end of Summer 2023, the Secretary of State must create a classified strategy for getting Taiwan included in 20 international organizations. The strategy will be a response to “growing pressure from the PRC on foreign governments, international organizations, commercial actors, and civil society organizations to comply with its ‘One-China Principle' with respect to Taiwan.” PART 4 - MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS Sec. 5525: Sense of Congress on Expanding United States Economic Relations with Taiwan “Taiwan is now the United States 10th largest goods trading partner, 13th largest export market, 13th largest source of imports, and a key destination for United States agricultural exports.” Audio Sources Evaluating U.S.-China Policy in the Era of Strategic Competition February 9, 2023 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Witnesses: Wendy Sherman, Deputy Secretary of State, U.S. Department of State Ely Ratner, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Indo-Pacific Security Affairs, U.S. Department of Defense Clips 17:40 Wendy Sherman: We remain committed to our long standing One China Policy and oppose any unilateral changes to the cross-strait status quo. Our policy has not changed. What has changed is Beijing's growing coercion. So we will keep assisting Taiwan in maintaining a sufficient self-defense capability. 41:30 Sen. Marco Rubio (R-FL): I want to get a little broader because I think it's important to understand sort of the strategic vision behind our tactics on everything that we do. So if we go back to the late 80s, early 90s, end of the Cold War, and the gamble at the time was, if we created this international economic order, led by the US and the West, built on this global commitment to free trade, that this notion of that this trade and commerce would bind nations together via trade, via commerce and international interest and economic interest, that it would lead to more wealth and prosperity, that it would lead to democracy and freedom, basically domestic changes in many countries, and that it would ultimately ensure peace. The famous saying now seems silly, that no two countries with McDonald's have ever gone to war. That's obviously no longer the case. But the point being is that was the notion behind it. It was what the then Director General of the WTO called a "world without walls," rules-based international order. Others call it globalization. And basically, our foreign policy has been built around that, even though it's an economic theory it basically, is what we have built our foreign policy on. I think it's now fair to say that we admitted China to the World Trade Organization, Russia as well, I think it's now fair to say that while wealth certainly increased, particularly in China through its export driven economy, massive, historic, unprecedented amount of economic growth in that regard, I don't think we can say either China or Russia are more democratic. In fact, they're more autocratic. I don't think we can say that they're more peaceful. Russia has invaded Ukraine now twice, and the Chinese are conducting live fire drills off the coast of Taiwan. So I think it's fair to say that gamble failed. And we have now to enter -- and I think the President actually hinted at some of that in his speech the other night -- we're now entering a new era. What is that new era? What is our vision now for that world, in which not just the global international order and World Without Walls did not pacify or buy nations, but in fact, have now placed us into situations where autocracies, through a joint communique, are openly signaling that we need to reject Western visions of democracy and the like. So, before we can talk about what we're going to do, we have to understand what our strategic vision is. What is the strategic vision of this administration on what the new order of the world is? The Future of War: Is the Pentagon Prepared to Deter and Defeat America's Adversaries? February 7, 2023 House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Cyber, Information Technologies, and Innovation Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Chris Brose, Author Rear Admiral Upper Half Mark Montgomery (Ret.), Senior Director, Center on Cyber and Technology Innovation, Foundation for Defense of Democracies Peter Singer, Strategist at New America and Managing Partner of Useful Fiction LLC Clips 1:16:30 Rear Adm. Mark Montgomery: We don't have weapons stowed in Taiwan. In the last National Defense Authorization Act you authorized up to $300 million a year to be appropriated for Taiwan-specific munitions. The appropriators, which happened about seven days later, appropriated $0. In fact, almost all of the Taiwan Enhanced Resilience Act, which you all pushed through the NDAA, ended up not being appropriated in the Consolidated Appropriations Act that passed eight days later. 30:10 Chris Brose: Nothing you do in this Congress will make larger numbers of traditional ships, aircraft and other platforms materialized over the next several years. It is possible, however, to generate an arsenal of alternative military capabilities that could be delivered to U.S. forces in large enough quantities within the next few years to make a decisive difference. Those decisions could all be taken by this Congress. The goal would be to rapidly field what I have referred to as a "moneyball military," one that is achievable, affordable and capable of winning. Such a military would be composed not of small quantities of large, exquisite, expensive things, but rather by large quantities of smaller, lower cost, more autonomous consumable things, and most importantly, the digital means of integrating them. These kinds of alternative capabilities exist now, or could be rapidly matured and fielded in massive quantities within the window of maximum danger. You could set this in motion in the next two years. The goal would be more about defense than offense, more about countering power projection than projecting power ourselves. It would be to demonstrate that the United States, together with our allies and partners, could do to a Chinese invasion or a Chinese offensive what the Ukrainians, with our support, have thus far been able to do to their Russian invaders: degrade and deny the ability of a great power to accomplish its objectives through violence, and in so doing to prevent that future war from ever happening. After all, this is all about deterrence. All of this is possible. We have sufficient money, technology, authorities, and we still have enough time. If we are serious, if we make better decisions now, we can push this looming period of vulnerability further into the future. The Pressing Threat of the Chinese Communist Party to U.S. National Defense February 7, 2023 House Armed Services Committee Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Admiral Harry B. Harris Jr., USN (Ret.), Former Commander, U.S. Pacific Command Dr. Melanie W. Sisson, Foreign Policy Fellow, Strobe Talbott Center for Security, Strategy, and Technology Clips 28:15 Rep. Mike Rogers (R-AL): China is the most challenging national security threat America has faced in 30 years. If we fail to acknowledge that and take immediate action to deter it, the next 30 years could be devastating for our nation. Under President Xi, the Chinese Communist Party has nearly tripled its defense spending in the last decade alone. The PLA has gone from an obsolete force barely capable of defending its borders to a modern fighting force capable of winning regional conflicts. The CCP now controls the largest army and navy in the world, with a goal of having them fully integrated and modernized by 2027. The CCP is rapidly expanding its nuclear capability; they have doubled their number of warheads in two years. We estimated it would take them a decade to do that. We also were just informed by the DOD [that] the CCP now has more ICBM launchers than the United States. The CCP is starting to outpace us on new battlefields as well. They have leapfrogged us on hypersonic technology, they are fielding what we are still developing. They are making advances in AI and quantum computing that we struggle to keep pace with. Finally, their rapid advances in space were one of the primary motivations for us establishing a Space Force. The CCP is not building these new and advanced military capabilities for self defense. In recent years, the CCP has used its military to push out its borders, to threaten our allies in the region, and to gain footholds on new continents. In violation of international law, the CCP has built new and commandeered existing islands in the South China Sea, where it has deployed stealth fighters, bombers and missiles. It continues to intimidate and coerce Taiwan, most recently by surrounding the island with naval forces and launching endless fighter sorties across its centerline. In recent years, the CCP has also established a space tracking facility in South America to monitor U.S, satellites, as well as an overseas naval base miles from our own on the strategically vital Horn of Africa. These are just a few destabilizing actions taken by the CCP. They speak nothing of the CCPs Belt and Road debt trap diplomacy, it's illegal harvesting of personal data and intellectual property, it's ongoing human rights abuses, and its advanced espionage efforts, the latter of which came into full focus for all Americans last week when the Biden administration allowed a CCP spy balloon to traverse some of our nation's most sensitive military sites. Make no mistake, that balloon was intentionally lost as a calculated show of force. 44:15 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: Since 1979, the United States has adopted a constellation of official positions, together known as the One China policy, that allow us to acknowledge but not to accept China's perspective that there is one China and that Taiwan is part of China. Under the One China policy, the United States has developed robust unofficial relations with the government and people of Taiwan consistent with our interest in preserving peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. US policy is guided by an interest in ensuring cross-strait disputes are resolved peacefully and in a manner that reflects the will of Taiwan's people. This has required the United States to deter Taiwan from declaring independence, and also to deter the CCP from attempting unification by force. The 40 year success of the strategy of dual deterrence rests upon the unwillingness of the United States to provide either an unconditional commitment to Taipei that it will come to its defense militarily, or an unconditional commitment to Beijing that we will not. The U.S. national security interest in the status of Taiwan remains that the CCP and the people of Taiwan resolve the island's political status peacefully. Dual deterrence therefore remains U.S. strategy, reinforced by U.S. declaratory policy which is to oppose unilateral changes to the status quo by either side. 45:28 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: The modernization of the PLA has changed the regional military balance and significantly enough that the United States no longer can be confident that we would decisively defeat every type of PLA use of force in the Taiwan Strait. This fact, however, does not necessitate that the US abandon the strategy of dual deterrence and it doesn't mean that the United States should seek to reconstitute its prior degree of dominance. Posturing the U.S. military to convince the CCP that the PLA could not succeed in any and every contingency over Taiwan is infeasible in the near term and likely beyond. The PLA is advances are considerable and ongoing, geography works in its favor, and history demonstrates that it's far easier to arrive at an overconfident assessment of relative capability than it is to arrive at an accurate one. Attempting to demonstrate superiority for all contingencies would require a commitment of forces that would inhibit the United States from behaving like the global power that it is with global interests to which its military must also attend. This posture, moreover, is not necessary for dual deterrence to extend its 40 year record of success. We can instead encourage the government of Taiwan to adopt a defense concept that forces the PLA into sub-optimal strategies and increases the battle damage Beijing would have to anticipate and accept. 46:45 Dr. Melanie W. Sisson: U.S. military superiority in the Persian Gulf and Indian Ocean allows us to threaten the maritime shipping upon which China depends for access to energy, global markets, and supply chains. The inevitable damage a use of force would cause to the global economy and the imposition of sanctions and restricted access to critical inputs needed to sustain China's economic development and the quality of life of its people, moreover, would certainly compound China's losses. 1:04:50 Adm. Harry B. Harris: We're going to share the crown jewel of America's military technology, the nuclear submarine and the nuclear reactors, with another country and that's Australia. We have not done that with any other country, except for the UK, back in the late 50s, and into the 60s. So here we have the two countries with with that capability, the United States and the UK, and we're going to share that with Australia. It's significant. But it's only going to going to be significant over the long term if we follow through. So it's a decade long process. You know, some people the CNO, Chief of Naval Operations, has said it could be 30 years before we see an Australian nuclear submarine underway in the Indian Ocean. I said that if we put our hearts and minds to it, and our resources to it, and by ours, I mean the United States', the UK's and Australia's, we can do this faster than that. I mean we put a man on the moon and eight years, and we developed a COVID vaccine in one year. We can do this, but we're going to have to put our shoulders to the task for Australia, which has a tremendous military. For them to have the long reach of a nuclear submarine force would be dramatic. It would help us dramatically. It would change the balance of power in the Indian Ocean, and it will make Australia a Bluewater navy. They are our key ally in that part of the world and I'm all for it. 1:32:05 Adm. Harry B. Harris: I think this issue of strategic clarity versus strategic ambiguity is critical, and we have been well served, I'll be the first to say that, by the policy of strategic ambiguity with Taiwan over the past 44 years, but I think the time for ambiguity is over. I think we have to be as clear about our intent with regard to what would happen if the PRC invades Taiwan as the PRC is clear in its intent that it's ultimately going to seize Taiwan if need. 1:41:25 Adm. Harry B. Harris: I used to talk about during the Cold War with the Soviet Union, almost every branch of the U.S. government understood that the Soviet Union was the threat. You know, I used to joke even a park ranger, Smokey Bear, would tell you that the Soviets were the bad guys. We didn't have that comprehensive unified view of the PRC. You know, State Department looked at as in negotiation, DOD look at it as a military operation, Commerce looked at it as a trading partner, and Treasury looked at it as a lender. So we didn't have this unified view across the government. But I think now we are getting to that unified view and I think the Congress has done a lot to get us in that position. 1:49:45 Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): We have the capability to block the transmission of information from the balloon back to China, don't we? Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr.: We do. Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): And in this type of an environment do you think it's probably likely that we did that? Adm. Harry B. Harris Jr.: I would only guess, but I think General van Herk said that -- Rep. Matt Gaetz (R-FL): Well you can't see any reason why we wouldn't do that, right? U.S.-Taiwan Relations March 14, 2014 House Foreign Affairs Committee Witnesses: Kin Moy, [Former] Deputy Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State Clips 7:20 [Former] Rep. Eliot Engel (D-NY): Taiwan is a flourishing multiparty democracy of over 20 million people with a vibrant free market economy. It is a leading trade partner of the United States alongside much bigger countries like Brazil and India. Over the past 60 years, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has undergone dramatic changes, but Taiwan's development into a robust and lively democracy underpins the strong U.S.-Taiwan friendship we enjoy today. 14:00 Rep. Brad Sherman (D-CA): I think that it's important that we provide Taiwan the tools to defend itself, but Taiwan needs to act as well. Taiwan spends less than $11 billion on its defense, less than 1/5 per capita what we in America do, and God blessed us with the Pacific Ocean separating us from China. Taiwan has only the Taiwan Strait. On a percentage of GDP basis, Taiwan spends roughly half what we do. So we should be willing to sell them the tools and they should be willing to spend the money to buy those tools. 1:11:50 Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX): I think Chris Smith raised the issue of a One China policy. Does it not bother you that that exists, that there are statements that people have made, high level officials, that said they they agreed on one China policy? Does the administration not view that as a problem? Kin Moy: Our one China policy is one that has existed for several decades now. Rep. Randy Weber (R-TX): Okay. Well, I take that as a no, but let me follow up with what Jerry Connolly said. So you haven't sold submarines yet, you don't take Beijing into account. People around the world watch us. Words and actions have consequences. Would you agree that y'all would be okay with a one Russia policy when it comes to Crimea and the Ukraine? Is that akin to the same kind of ideology? Kin Moy: Well, I can't speak to those issues. But again, we are obligated to provide those defense materials and services to Taiwan and we have been through several administrations, I think very vigilant in terms of providing that. U.S.-China Relations May 15, 2008 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Witnesses: Richard N. Haass, President, Council on Foreign Relations Harry Harding, Professor of International Affairs, George Washington University, 1995-2009 Clips 1:46:42 Richard N. Haass: The bottom line is China is not yet a military competitor, much less a military peer. Interestingly, I think Chinese leaders understand this. And they understand just how much their country requires decades of external stability so that they can continue to focus their energies and their attention on economic growth and political evolution. China is an emerging country, but in no way is it a revolutionary threat to world order as we know it. 1:47:20 Richard N. Haass: We alone cannot bring about a successful us Chinese relationship. What the Chinese do and say will count just as much. They will need to begin to exercise restraint and patience on Taiwan. There can be no shortcuts, no use of force. We, at the same time, must meet our obligations to assist Taiwan with its defense. We can also help by discouraging statements and actions by Taiwan's leaders that would be viewed as provocative or worse. 2:03:47 Harry Harding: Now with the support and encouragement of the United States, China has now become a member of virtually all the international regimes for which it is qualified. And therefore the process of integration is basically over, not entirely, but it's largely completed. And so the issue, as Bob Zoellick rightly suggested, is no longer securing China's membership, but encouraging it to be something more, what he called a "responsible stakeholder." So this means not only honoring the rules and norms of the system, but also enforcing them when others violate them, and assisting those who wish to join the system but who lack the capacity to do so. It means, in other words, not simply passive membership, but active participation. It means accepting the burdens and responsibilities of being a major power with a stake in international peace and stability, rather than simply being a free rider on the efforts of others. Now, China's reacted to the concept of responsible stakeholding with some ambivalence. On the one hand, it appreciates that the United States is thereby seeking a positive relationship with China. It suggests that we can accept and even welcome the rise of Chinese power and Beijing's growing role in the world. It certainly is seen by the Chinese as preferable to the Bush administration's earlier idea that China would be a strategic competitor of the United States, as was expressed during the campaign of 2000 and in the early months of 2001. However, Beijing also perceives, largely correctly, that America's more accommodative posture as expressed in this concept is conditional. China will be expected to honor international norms and respect international organizations that it did not create and it may sometimes question. And even more worrying from Beijing's perspective is the prospect that it's the United States that is reserving the right to be the judge as to whether Chinese behavior on particular issues is sufficiently responsible or not. Taiwanese Security August 4, 1999 Senate Foreign Relations Committee Witnesses: David “Mike” M. Lampton, Founding Director, Chinese Studies Program, Nixon Center Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary, East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State Caspar W. Weinberger, Former Secretary, Department of Defense James Woolsey, Former Director, CIA Clips 9:00 Sen. Joe Biden (D-DE): Taiwan security, in my view, flows from its democratic form of government's growing economic, cultural and political contacts with the mainland and, ultimately, the United States' abiding commitment to a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan question. In my opinion, we should concentrate on strengthening those areas rather than spend time pre-authorizing the sales of weapon systems, some of which don't even exist yet. 20:10 Stanley Roth: There are three pillars of the [Clinton] administration's policy. First, the administration's commitment to a One China policy is unchanged. Regardless of the position of the parties, we have not changed our policy. The President has said that both publicly and privately. Second, we believe that the best means to resolve these issues is by direct dialogue between the parties themselves. We have taken every opportunity, including on my own trip to Beijing last week with Ken Lieberthal from the NSC, to urge the PRC to continue this dialogue. It strikes us that it's precisely when times are difficult that you need to dialogue, and to cancel it because of disagreements would be a mistake. China has not yet indicated whether or not these talks will continue in the Fall, as had been previously anticipated, but they put out a lot of hints suggesting that it wouldn't take place, and we are urging them to continue with this dialogue. Third point that is integral to our position. We have stressed again, at every opportunity, the importance of a peaceful resolution of this issue and the President has made that absolutely clear, as did Secretary Albright in her meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Tong in Singapore last week, as did Ken Leiberthal and I in our meetings in Beijing. But China can have no doubts about what the United States' position is, with respect to peaceful resolution of this issue. 1:29:15 Caspar Weinberger: So I don't think that we should be hampered by or felt that we are in any way bound by what is said by the communique, nor should we accept the argument that the communique sets the policy of the United States. 1:32:50 Caspar Weinberger: There are two separate states now, with a state-to-state relationship, and that the unification which was before emphasized, they repeated again in the statement of Mr. Koo, the head of their Trans- Strait Negotiating Committee, that the unification might come when China itself, the mainland, changes, but that that has not been the case and it is not now the case. 1:41:15 David “Mike” Lampton: Once both the mainland and Taiwan are in the WTO, each will have obligations to conduct its economic relations with the other according to international norms and in more efficient ways than now possible. 1:45:20 James Woolsey: The disestablishment of large, state-owned enterprises in China over the long run will bring some economic freedoms, I believe, that will quite possibly help change China and Chinese society and make it more conducive over time to political freedoms as well. But in the short run, the unemployment from the disestablishment of those enterprises can lead to substantial instability. U.S.-Taiwan Relations February 7, 1996 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Subcommittee on East Asian and Pacific Affairs Witness: Winston Lord, Assistant Secretary of East Asian and Pacific Affairs, U.S. Department of State Clips 16:45 Winston Lord: The Taiwan Relations Act of 1979 forms the basis of US policy regarding the security of Taiwan. Its premise is that an adequate defense in Taiwan is conducive to maintaining peace and security while differences remain between Taiwan and the PRC. I'm going to quote a few sections here because this is a very important statement of our policy. Section two B states, "It is the policy of the United States to consider any effort to determine the future of Taiwan by other than peaceful means, including by boycotts or embargoes, a threat to the peace and security of the Western Pacific area, and of grave concern to the United States. To provide Taiwan with arms of a defensive character, and to maintain the capacity of the United States to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the security or the socioeconomic system of the people on Taiwan." Section three of the TRA also provides that the "United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self defense capability." 18:00 Winston Lord: The key elements of the US policy toward the Taiwan question are expressed in the three joint communiques with the PRC as follows. The United States recognizes the government of the PRC as the sole legal government of China. The US acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan as part of China. In 1982, the US assured the PRC that it has no intention of pursuing a policy of two Chinas, or one China, one Taiwan. Within this context, the people the US will maintain cultural, commercial and other unofficial relations with the people of Taiwan. The US has consistently held that the resolution of the Taiwan issue is a matter to be worked out peacefully by the Chinese themselves. A sole and abiding concern is that any resolution be peaceful. 19:30 Winston Lord: The U.S. government made reciprocal statements concerning our intentions with respect to arms sales to Taiwan, that we did not intend to increase the quantity or quality of arms supplied, and in fact intended gradually to reduce the sales. At the time the joint communique was signed, we made it clear to all parties concerned that our tensions were premised on the PRC's continued adherence to a policy of striving for peaceful reunification with Taiwan. 21:30 Winston Lord: The basic inventory of equipment which Taiwan has or will have in its possession will, in our view, be sufficient to deter any major military action against Taiwan. While arms sales policy aims to enhance the self defense capability of Taiwan, it also seeks to reinforce stability in the region. We will not provide Taiwan with capabilities that might provoke an arms race with the PRC or other countries in the region. 21:55 Winston Lord: Decisions on the release of arms made without proper consideration of the long term impact. both on the situation in the Taiwan Strait and on the region as a whole, would be dangerous and irresponsible. If armed conflict were actually breakout in the Taiwan Strait, the impact on Taiwan, the PRC, and indeed the region, would be extremely serious. The peaceful, stable environment that has prevailed in the Taiwan Strait since the establishment of our current policy in 1979 has promoted progress and prosperity on both sides of the Taiwan Strait. The benefits to Taiwan and the PRC have been obvious and I outline these in my statement. All of these achievements would be immediately put at risk in the event of conflict in the Strait. Conflict would also be costly to the United States and to our friends and allies in the region. Any confrontation between the PRC and Taiwan, however limited in scale or scope, would destabilize the military balance in East Asia and constrict the commerce and shipping, which is the economic lifeblood of the region. It would force other countries in the region to reevaluate their own defense policies, possibly fueling an arms race with unforeseeable consequences. It would seriously affect the tens of thousands of Americans who live and work in Taiwan and the PRC. Relations between the US and the PRC would suffer damage regardless of the specific action chosen by the President, in consultation with Congress. For all these reasons, we are firmly determined to maintain a balanced policy, which is best designed to avoid conflict in the area. Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)

The US has been increasingly treating Taiwan like a sovereign nation with whom diplomatic relationships and alliances can be formed, in violation of its longstanding One-China policy that has kept the peace for decades. And I just think it's worth noting that the western media who've lately been condoning these moves became outraged at Donald Trump just a few years ago for doing the same thing to a far lesser degree. Reading by Tim Foley.

While China has claimed that 160 countries reaffirmed commitment to its one-China principle following the visit to Taiwan by US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi, India said Friday its own "relevant policies are well known and consistent" and don't require a reiteration. Breaking its silence on the Taiwan issue, and as China intensifies its military drills, the government expressed concern over the rising Cross-Strait tensions and called for restraint and for avoiding any attempt to unilaterally change the status quo. While India follows a one-China policy, and has only unofficial ties with Taiwan, it stopped reiterating the same in bilateral documents with China well over a decade ago and following differences with Beijing over issues related to Jammu and Kashmir and Arunachal Pradesh."Like many other countries, India too is concerned at recent developments. We urge the exercise of restraint, avoidance of unilateral actions to change status quo, de-escalation of tensions and efforts to maintain peace and stability in the region," said MEA spokesperson Arindam Bagchi, responding to media queries about India's position.Explore More at - www.argumentativeindians.comDISCLAIMER:We invite thought leaders from across the ideological spectrum. The guests in our sessions express their independent views and opinions. Argumentative Indians does not profess to subscribe, agree or endorse the same or be in anyway responsible for the stance, words and comments of our guests.

Why do the United States and China care so much about Taiwan? Former faculty fellow in National Security at the United States Department of Defense, Dr. Michael Beckley answers this as he joins Abby for a lesson on the One-China policy. Dr. Beckley illustrates a timeline of the United States' conditional yet tumultuous relationship with China. He also reveals the reason why the United States has a commitment to militarily support Taiwan in times of crisis. Later, Dr. Beckley provides insight into the future of the One-China policy. Keep up with Abby after class on Twitter: @AbbyHornacek Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Chris Li, director of research of the Asia-Pacific Initiative and fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, leads the conversation on U.S. strategy in East Asia. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to today's session of the Winter/Spring 2023 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR.  Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic, if you would like to share it with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.  We're delighted to have Chris Li with us to discuss U.S. strategy in East Asia. Mr. Li is director of research of the Asia-Pacific Initiative, and a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, where he focuses on U.S.-China relations, Asia-Pacific security, and technology competition. Previously, he was research assistant to Graham Allison in the Avoiding Great Power War Project, and coordinator of the China Working Group, where he contributed to the China Cyber Policy Initiative and the Technology and Public Purpose Project, led by former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter.  Chris, thanks very much for being with us today. I thought we could begin with you giving us your insights and analysis of the Biden administration's foreign policy strategy in East Asia, specifically vis-à-vis China.  LI: Great. Well, first of all, thanks, Irina, for the invitation. I'm really looking forward to the conversation and also to all the questions from members of the audience and, in particular, all the students on this seminar. So I thought I'd start very briefly with just an overview of how the Biden administration's strategy in the Indo-Pacific has shaped up over the last two years, two and a half years. What are the key pillars? And essentially, now that we're about halfway through the first term—or, you know, if there is a second term—but President Biden's first term, where things are going to go moving forward?  So as many you are probably familiar, Secretary of State Tony Blinken laid out essentially the core tenets of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, of which China, of course, is a focal centerpiece. And he did so in his speech last summer at the Asia Society, where he essentially described the relationship between the U.S. and China as competitive where it should be, cooperative where it can be, and adversarial where it must be. So sort of three different pillars: competition, cooperation, a sort of balance between the two. And in terms of the actual tenets of the strategy, the framing was three pillars—invest, align, and complete.  And so briefly, just what that meant according to Secretary Blinken was really investing in sources of American strength at home. Renewing, for example, investment in technology, investment in STEM education, infrastructure, and many of the policies that actually became known as Build Back Better, a lot of the domestic spending packages that President Biden proposed, and some of which has been passed. So that first pillar was invest sort of in order to o compete with China, we need to first renew our sources of American strength and compete from a position of strength.  The second element was “align.” And in this—in this pillar, I think this is where the Biden administration has really distinguished itself from the Trump administration. Many folks say, well, the Biden administration's China policy or its Asia policy is really just Trump 2.0 but with a little bit—you know, with essentially a nicer tone to it. But I think there is a difference here. And I think the Biden administration's approach has really focused on aligning with both traditional security partners—our allies, our alliances with countries like the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines—but also invigorating those nontraditional partnerships, with India, for example.   I think another part of this strategy, another part of this dimension, has also been reinvigorating U.S. presence and U.S. leadership, really, in multilateral organizations. Not only, for example, taking the Quad and reestablishing some of the leader-level summits, the ministerials, proposing, for example, a COVID cooperation regime among new members of the Quad, but also establishing newer frameworks. So, for example, as many of you have read about, I'm sure, AUKUS, this trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. when it comes to sharing of nuclear submarine technology. That's been a new proposed policy. And I think we're about to see an update from the administration in the next couple of weeks.  And even with elements of the region that have been unappreciated and perhaps under-focused on. For example, the Solomon Islands was the focal point of some attention last year, and you've seen the administration propose the Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative, which seeks to establish greater cooperation among some of the Pacific Island nations. And there was actually a summit hosted by President Biden last fall with leaders of the Pacific Island countries. So that alignment piece I think has really been significant as a cornerstone of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy.  The third element, of course, competition, I think is the most evident. And we've seen this from some of the executive orders on semiconductors, the restrictions on advanced chips, to elements of trade, to even sort of advocacy for human rights and greater promotion of democracy. You saw the Summit for Democracy, which has been a pillar of the administration's foreign policy agenda. So that's basically what they've done in the last two and a half years.  Now, in terms of where that's actually brought us, I think I'll make four observations. The first is that, unlike the Biden—unlike the Trump administration, where most of the policy pronouncements about the People's Republic of China had some tinge of inducing change in China—that was the phrase that Secretary Pompeo used in a speech on China policy—I think the Biden administration largely has said: The assumption and the premise of all of our policy toward China is based on the idea that the U.S. government does not seek fundamentally to change the Chinese government, the Chinese regime, the leadership, the administration, the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.  So that is both a markedly important difference, but it's also a part of the strategy that I believe remains ambiguous. And here, the problem is, you know, invest, align, and compete, competitive coexistence, where does that all actually take us? And I think this is where analysts in the strategic community and think tank world have said, well, it's great to invest, of course. You know, there's bipartisan support. Alignment with partners and allies is, of course, a pretty uncontroversial, for the most part, approach. And competition is, I think, largely a consensus view in Washington, D.C. But where does this actually take us?  You know, for all of its criticisms, the Trump administration did propose a specific end state or an end objective. And I think the Biden administration has just sort of said, well, it's about coexisting. It's about just assuming to manage the relationship. I think there are, of course, valid merits to that approach. And on an intellectual level, the idea is that because this is not necessarily a Cold War 2.0, in the words of the Biden administration, we're not going to have an end state that is ala the Cold War—in essence a sort of victory or demise, you know, the triumph of capitalism over communism, et cetera. In fact, it's going to be a persistent and sustained rivalry and competition. And in order to harness a strategy, we essentially need to manage that competition.   So I think that's—it's an intellectually coherent idea, but I think one of the ambiguities surrounding and one of the criticisms that has been proposed is that there is no clear end state. So we compete, we invest, we align, but to what end? Do we just keep—does the administration continue to tighten up and enhance alliances with partners and allies, and then to what end? What happens next? And sort of where does this lead us—leave us in ten years from now? So I think that's the first comment I'll make about the approach to the Indo-Pacific.  The second is that one of the tenets, of course, as I describe, is this compartmentalization of compete, cooperate. In essence, you know, we will compete—we, being the United States—with China on issues of technology, issues of economics, but we will also cooperate on areas of shared concern—climate change, nonproliferation. I think what you've seen is that while the Biden administration has proposed this idea, we can split—we can cooperate on one hand and also compete on the other—the People's Republic of China, the Chinese government, has largely rejected that approach.   Where you've seen statements from senior officials in China that have said, essentially, we will not cooperate with you, the United States, until you first cease all of the behavior, all of the negative policies that we don't like. In essence, if you will continue to sell arms to Taiwan, if you continue, the United States, to restrict semiconductors, to crackdown on espionage, to conduct military exercises in the region, then forget about any potential cooperation on climate, or forget about any cooperation on global health, et cetera.   So in essence, being able to tie the two compartments together has prevented a lot of what the Biden administration has sought to achieve. And we've seen that very clearly with Special Envoy John Kerry and his relentless efforts to conduct climate diplomacy. And I think largely—for example, last summer in the aftermath of Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, you saw a lot of those collaborative efforts essentially derailed. That's the second comment I'll make, which is while this approach, again, logically to most Americans would seem sound, it's actually met a lot of resistance because the Chinese reaction to it is not necessarily the same.  The third is I think we've seen increasingly, even though there has been an increased alignment since the Trump administration with allies and partners, there's still a degree of hedging among countries in the region. And that makes sense because from the perspectives of many of those leaders of countries in the region, the United States is a democratic country. We have an election coming up in 2024. And there's no guarantee that the next president, if President Biden is no longer the president in 2024 or even in 2028, will continue this policy.   And I think all of you, as observers of American politics, know the degree to which American politics has become largely one that is dysfunctional, is almost schizophrenic in a way. And so one would imagine that if you are a leader of a country in the Asian-Pacific region, to support the Biden administration's engagement, but also to maintain a degree of strategic autonomy, as this is often called. And so what I think we'll continue to see and what will be interesting to watch is how middle powers, how other countries resident in the region approach the United States in terms of—(inaudible). I think India will be key to watch, for example. Its defense relationship with the United States has increased over the years, but yet it still has close interests with respect to China.  The final comment I'll make is that on the military dimension I think this is another area of concern, where the Biden administration has said that one of its priorities is creating guardrails, constructing guardrails to manage the potential escalation in the event of an accident, or a miscommunication, miscalculation that could quickly spiral into a crisis. And we needn't—we need not look farther than the 2001 Hainan incident to think of an example, which was a collision between a(n) EP-3 aircraft and a Chinese intelligence plane. And that led to a diplomatic standoff.  And so I think the United States government is very keen on creating dialogue between militaries, risk reduction mechanisms, crisis management mechanisms. But I think they've encountered resistance, again, from the People's Republic of China, because the perspective there is that much of the U.S. behavior in the region militarily is invalid, is illegitimate. You know, the Chinese government opposes, for example, U.S. transits through the Taiwan Strait. So the idea therefore that they would engage and essentially deconflict and manage risk is sort of legitimizing American presence there militarily. And so we've encountered that obstacle as well.  So I think going forward on all four elements, we're going to continue to see adjustment. And I think, as students, as researchers, I think these are four areas where there's fertile room for discussion, for debate, for analysis, for looking at history. And I look forward to a conversation. Hopefully, many of you have ideas as well because there's no monopoly on wisdom and there are many creative proposals to be discussed. So I look forward to questions. I'll stop there.  FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Thank you, Chris. That was great. Now we're going to go to all of you.  (Gives queuing instructions.)  Our first written question comes from Grace Wheeler. I believe a graduate student at the University of West Florida. Kissinger proposed the future of China-U.S. relations be one of coevolution instead of confrontation. Is it still realistically possible for the future of China-U.S. relations to be one of cooperation instead of confrontation?  LI: So terrific question. Thank you for the question. It's a very interesting idea. And I think Henry Kissinger, who I know has long been involved with the Council on Foreign Relations, has produced through his many decades,strategic frameworks and new ways of thinking about cardinal challenges to geopolitics. I have not yet actually understood or at least examined specifically what the concrete pillars of coevolution entail. My understanding on a general level is that it means, essentially, the United States and the People's Republic of China adjust and sort of mutually change their policies to accommodate each other. So a sort of mutual accommodation over time to adjust interests in a way that prevent conflict.  I think on the face—of course, that sounds—that sounds very alluring. That sounds like a terrific idea. I think the problem has always been what would actually this look like in implementation? So for example, on the issue of Taiwan, this is an issue where the Chinese government has said: There is no room for compromise. You know, the refrain that they repeat is: Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. It is part of sovereignty. And there is no room for compromise. This is a red line. So if that's the case, there's not really, in my view, much room for evolution on this issue, for example. And it's an intractable problem.  And so I don't necessarily know how to apply the Kissinger framework to specific examples. And, but, you know, I do think it's something worth considering. And, you know, I would encourage you and others on this call to think about, for example, how that framework might actually be adapted. So I think it's an interesting idea, but I would—I think the devil's in the details. And essentially, to think about how this would be applied to specific issues—South China Sea, human rights, trade—would be the key to unpacking this concept.  I think the second part of your question was, is cooperation possible? And again, I think, as I stated in my remarks, the Biden administration publicly says—publicly asserts that they do seek to maintain a space for cooperation in climate, in nonproliferation, in global health security. I think, again, what we've encountered is that the Chinese government's view is that unless the United States ceases behavior that it deems detrimental to its own interests, it will not pursue any discussion of cooperation.   And so I think that's the problem we're facing. And so I think there are going to be discussions going forward on, well, given that, how do we then balance the need for cooperation on climate, in pandemics, with, for example, also concerns about security, concerns about military activity, concerns about Taiwan, et cetera? And I think this is the daily stuff of, of course, the conversations among the Biden administration and senior leadership. So personally, my view, is I hope cooperation is possible, of course. I think there are shared issues, shared vital interests, between the two countries and, frankly, among the global community, that require the U.S. and China to be able to work out issues. But I'm personally not optimistic that under this current framework, this paradigm, there will be a significant space open for cooperation.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. Going next to Hamza Siddiqui, a raised hand.   Q: Thank you. Hi. I'm Hamza Siddiqui, a student from Minnesota State University, Mankato.   And I actually had two questions. The first was: What kind of role does the U.S. envision Southeast Asian states—especially like the Philippines and Vietnam—playing in their U.S. strategy when it comes to Asia-Pacific security issues, specifically? And the second is that for the last few years there's been some discussion about Japan and South Korea being formally invited to join the Five Eyes alliance. And I wanted to get your take on that. What do you think are the chances that a formal invitation would be extended to them? Thank you.  LI: Great. Thank you for the question. Two terrific questions.  So, first, on the role of countries in Southeast Asia, I think that under the Biden administration they have continued to play an increasing degree of importance. So you've seen, for example, even in the Philippines, which you cited, I think just last month Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made a visit there. And in the aftermath of the visit, he announced a new basing agreement. I haven't reviewed the details specifically, and I'm not a Philippines expert, but in short my understanding is that there is going to be renewed American presence—expanded American presence, actually, in the region.   And the Philippines, just based on their geostrategic location, is incredibly important in the Indo-Pacific region. So I think that the administration is very active in enhancing cooperation on the defense element, but also on the political and economic side as well. So with the Quad, for example, in India, you've seen cooperation on elements of economics as well, and technology. I think there's an initiative about digital cooperation too. So I think the answer is increasingly an important role.   On Japan and Korea, there have, of course, been discussions over the years about expanding the Five Eyes intelligence alliance to other countries in Asia as well. My assessment is that that's probably unlikely to occur in a formal way in the near term. But I could be wrong. And that assessment is primarily based on the fact that the countries that currently are part of the Five Eyes agreement share certain elements of linguistic convergence. They all speak English. There are certain longstanding historical ties that those countries have. And I think that to necessarily expand—or, to expand that existing framework would probably require a degree of bureaucratic sort of rearrangement that might be quite difficult, or quite challenging, or present obstacles.  I think what you will see, though, is enhanced security cooperation, for sure. And we've seen that even with Japan, for example, announcing changes to its military, its self-defense force, and increased defense spending as well in the region. So I think that is a trend that will continue.  FASKIANOS: Next question I'm taking from Sarah Godek, who is a graduate student at the University of Michigan.   What do guardrails look like, from a Chinese perspective? Thinking how China's foreign ministry has consistently put out lists of demands for the U.S. side, I'm wondering how guardrails are formulated by Wang Yi and others.  LI: Great. Thanks for the question.  So I guess I'll step back first and talk about what guardrails, in my view, actually entail. So I think the idea here is that in the event of a crisis—and, most of the time, crises are not planned. (Laughs.) Most of the time, crises, you know, occur as a result of an accident. For example, like the 2001 incident. But an accidental collision in the South China Sea between two vessels, the collision accidentally of two planes operating in close proximity. And as Chinese and American forces operate in closer proximity and increasing frequency, we do have that risk.   So I think, again, the idea of a guardrail that essentially, in the military domain, which is what I'm speaking about, entails a mechanism in place such that in the event of an accident or a crisis, there are ways based on that mechanism to diffuse that crisis, or at least sort of stabilize things before the political leadership can work out a solution. In essence, to prevent escalation because of a lack of dialogue. And I think for those of you who've studied history, you know that many wars, many conflicts have occurred not because one power, one state decides to launch a war. That has occurred. But oftentimes, because there is an accident, an accidental collision. And I think many wars have occurred this way.  So the idea of a guardrail therefore, in the military domain, is to create, for example, channels of communication that could be used in the event of a conflict. I think the easiest parallel to imagine is the U.S. and the Soviet Union, where there were hotlines, for example, between Moscow and between Washington, D.C. during that era, where the seniormost national security aides of the presidents could directly reach out to each other in the event of a crisis.   In the China context, what has been difficult is some of those channels exist. For example, the National Security Council Coordinator for Asia Kurt Campbell has said publicly: We have hotlines. The problem is that when the Americans pick up the phone and call, no one picks up on the other side. And in short, you know, having just the structure, the infrastructure, is insufficient if those infrastructure are not being used by the other side.   I think with respect to the U.S.-China context, probably, again, as I mentioned earlier, the largest obstacle is the fact that guardrails help the United States—or, in the Chinese perspective—from the Chinese perspective, any of these guardrails would essentially allow the U.S. to operate with greater confidence that, in the event of an accident, we will be able to control escalation. And from the Chinese perspective, they argue that because the United States fundamentally shouldn't be operating in the Taiwan Strait anyway, therefore by constructing that guardrail, by, for example, having dialogue to manage that risk, it would be legitimizing an illegitimate presence in the first place.   So that's always been perennially the problem. And I think the argument that the United States has made is that, well, sure, that may be your position. But it is in your interest as well not to have an accident spiral into a conflict. And so I think we've seen not a lot of progress on this front. I think, for example, in the aftermath of Speaker Pelosi's visit, there—you know, a lot of the defense cooperation ties were suspended.   But the last comment I'll make is that that doesn't necessarily mean that all dialogue has been stayed. There are still active channels between the United States and China. We have embassies in each other's countries. From public remarks, it seems like during moments of enhanced tension there are still ways for both governments to communicate with each other. So I think the good news is that it's not completely like the two countries aren't speaking to each other, but I think that there are not as many channels for reducing risk, managing potential crises, in the military sphere that exist today, that probably should exist.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Michael Long. Let's see. You need to unmute yourself.  LI: It looks like he's dropped off.  FASKIANOS: It looks like he put down his hand. OK. So let's go next to Conor O'Hara.  Q: Hi. My name is Conor O'Hara. And I'm a graduate student at the Pepperdine University School of Public Policy.  In one of my classes, titled America's Role in the World, we often talk about how America really does not have a comprehensive understanding of China. Not only China's military and state department, but really China as a society. How can Americans change that? And where does America need to focus its efforts in understanding China? And then also, one other thing I think of, is, you know, where does that understanding begin? You know, how early in someone's education or really within, say, the United States State Department do we need to focus our efforts on building an understanding? Thank you.  LI: Great. Well, thanks for the question. It's a great question. Very hard challenge as well.  I think that's absolutely true. I think the degree of understanding of China—of actually most countries—(laughs)—around the world—among senior U.S. foreign policy practitioners, I think, is insufficient. I think particularly with respect to China, and also Asia broadly, much of the diplomatic corps, the military establishment, intelligence officers, many of those people have essentially cut their teeth over the last twenty-five years focusing on the Middle East and counterterrorism. And that makes sense because the United States was engaged in two wars in that region.  But going back farther, many of the national security professionals before that generation were focused on the Soviet Union, obviously because of the Cold War. And so really, you're absolutely correct that the number of people in the United States government who have deep China expertise academically or even professionally on the ground, or even have the linguistic ability to, you know, speak Mandarin, or other countries—or, languages of other countries in East Asia, I think is absolutely limited. I think the State Department, of course, has—as well as the intelligence community, as well as the Department of Defense—has tried to over the last few years reorient and rebalance priorities and resources there. But I think it's still—my understanding, today it's still limited. And I think there's a lot of work to be done.  I think your question on how do you understand China as a society, I think with any country, number one, of course, is history. You know, every country's politics, its policy, its government is informed by its history of, you know, modern history but also history going back farther. And I think China is no exception. In fact, Chinese society, and even the Communist Party of China, is deeply, I think, entrenched in a historical understanding of its role in the world, of how it interacts compared with its people, its citizens, its foreign conflicts. And so I think, number one is to understand the history of modern China. And I think anyone who seeks to be involved in discussions and research and debate on China does need to understand that history.  I think the second point is linguistics is actually quite important. Being able to speak the language, read the language, understand the language is important. Because so much of what is written—so much of our knowledge as, you know, American think tank researchers, is based on publicly available information in China. And a lot of that primarily is in Mandarin. So most speeches that the senior leadership of China deliver are actually in Mandarin. And some of them are translated, but not all of them. A lot of the documents that they issue, a lot of academics who write about—academics in China who write about foreign policy and international relations, write in Mandarin.  And so I think that an ability to be able to read in the original text is quite important. And in fact, you know, a lot of the nuances, and specifically in the Communist Party's ideology, how it sees itself, its role in the world, a lot of that really is best captured and best understood in its original language. Some of the—you know, the ideology, the campaigns of propaganda, et cetera.  And I think the last part of your question was how early. I am not an education scholar. (Laughs.) I don't study education or developmental psychology. But, you know, I imagine, you know, as with anything, linguistics, language, is best learned—or, most easily learned early on. But I think that does not mean that, you know, someone who's in college or graduate school can't begin to learn in a different language. So I'd answer your question like that.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Lucksika Udomsrisumran, a graduate student at New York University.  What is the implication of the Biden administration's three pillars of the Indo-Pacific strategy on the Mekong and the South China Sea? Which pillars do you see these two issues in, from the Biden administration's point of view?  LI: OK. I think, if I'm understanding the question correctly about South China Sea, you know, I think in general the South China Sea probably would most easily fall into the competition category. There are obviously not only the United States and China, but other countries in the region, including the Philippines, for example, are claimants to the South China Sea. And so I think there's always been some disagreement and some tensions in that region.  I think that that has largely been—the U.S. response or U.S. policy in South China Sea is just essentially, from the military perspective, has been to—you know, the slogan is, or the line is, to fly, sail, operate, et cetera—I'm not quoting that correctly—(laughs)—but essentially to operate wherever international law permits. And so that means Freedom of Navigation Operations, et cetera, in the South China Sea. I think that, of course, raises objections from other governments, mainly China, in the region.   So I would say that probably belongs in the competition category. And we spoke about earlier the idea of managing some of the risk that occurs or that emerges when the PLA Navy and the United States Navy operate in close proximity in that region. So from that perspective, if you're talking about risk reduction and crisis management, that actually could fall into collaboration or cooperation. But I think primarily it's competition.   FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Joan Kaufman. And, Joan, I know you wrote your question, but if you could ask it that would be great.  Q: Yes, will. Yes, certainly. Hi, Chris. Really great to see you here during this talk.  LI: Yeah, likewise.  Q: A proud Schwarzman Scholar.  I wanted to ask you a question about Ukraine and China's, you know, kind of difficult position in the middle almost, you know, as sort of seemingly allied with Russia, or certainly not criticizing Russia. And then just putting forth this twelve-point peace plan last week for—and offering to broker peace negotiations and a ceasefire for Ukraine. You know, there's no love lost in Washington for China on, you know, how it has positioned itself on this issue. And, you know, frankly, given China's own kind of preoccupation with sovereignty over the years, how do you see the whole thing? And what comments might you make on that?  LI: Right. Well, first of all, thanks so much, Joan, for joining. And very grateful for all of—all that you've done for the Schwarzman Scholars Program over the past. I appreciate your time very much.  The Ukraine problem is an incredibly important one. And I think absolutely China is involved. And it's a very complicated position that it's trying to occupy here, with both supporting its security partner, Russia, but also not directly being involved in the conflict because of U.S. opposition and opposition from NATO. So I think it's—obviously, China is playing a very delicate balancing role here.  I think a couple points. So the first is that I think my view is that, for the Chinese leadership, Ukraine—or, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a deeply uncomfortable geopolitical situation, where there is essentially not a—there's no good outcome, really, because, as you mentioned, Ukraine is a country with which China has diplomatic recognition. It recognizes it. It has an embassy there. And the Chinese foreign ministry, Chinese foreign policy, has long very much supported the concept of sovereignty, and being able to determine your own future as a country. And I think, in fact, that's been one of the pillars and one of the objections to many American actions in the past. So on one hand, it says: We support sovereignty of every country, of which Ukraine is a country that is recognized by China.  And on the other hand, though, Russia, of course, which has had long complaints and issues with NATO expansion, is a partner of China. And so it's obviously supporting Russia. It has alignment of interests between Russia and China in many ways, in many dimensions, including objections to, for example, U.S. presence in Europe, U.S. presence in Asia. So it's a delicate balancing act. And I think from what we've seen, there hasn't been sort of a clear one-sided answer, where you've seen both statements, you know, proposing peace and saying that, you know, all sides should deescalate. But on the other hand, the U.S. government, the Biden administration, is now publicly stating that they are concerned about China potentially lending support to Russia.  So, you know, in short, I think it's very difficult to really understand what exactly is going on in the minds of the Chinese leadership. But I think that we'll continue to see sort of this awkward back and forth and trying—this purported balancing act between both sides. But I think, you know, largely—my assessment is that it's not going to go very clearly in one direction or the other.  I think the other comment I would make is that I think, from Beijing's perspective, the clear analogy here is one for Taiwan. Because—and this has been something that has been discussed in the think tank community very extensively. But the expectation I think among many in Washington was that Ukraine would not be able to put up much resistance. In short, this would be a very, very easy victory for Putin. And I think that was a—you know, not a universal consensus, but many people believed that, in short, Russia with all of its military might, would have no issues subjugating Ukraine very quickly.  I think people have largely found that to be, you know, a strategic failure on Russia's part. And so today, you know, one year after the invasion, Ukraine is still sovereign, is still standing, is still strong. And so I think—from that perspective, I think this—the war in Ukraine must give many of the leaders in China pause when it comes to thinking about a Taiwan continency, especially using force against Taiwan. Because, again, I think the degree of support, both militarily, politically, economically, for the resistance that Ukraine has shown against Russia among NATO members, among other Western countries, I think has been deeply surprising to many observers how robust that support has been. And I think that if you're sitting in Beijing and thinking about what a potential response to a Taiwan contingency might be, that would absolutely inform your calculus.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Lindsey McCormack, a graduate student at Baruch College.  How is the Biden administration's compete, cooperate, limited adversarial approach playing out with climate policy? What are you seeing right now in terms of the Chinese government's approach to energy security and climate?  LI: Yeah. It's a great question. Thanks for the question.  You know, we mentioned earlier, you know, I think the Biden administration's approach has been, you know, despite all of the disagreements between the United States and the Chinese government, there should be room for cooperation on climate because, as the Biden administration says, the climate is an existential risk to all of humanity. It's an issue of shared concern. So it's one that is not defined by any given country or constrained to one set of borders. I think it's largely not been very successful, in short, because China has not seemed to display much interest in cooperating on climate with the United States. And, again, China has largely coupled cooperation, linked cooperation in climate—or, on climate to other issues.  And so, you know, I think it's been reported that at several of the meetings between Secretary Blinken, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, and their Chinese counterparts, the Chinese officials had essentially given the American officials a list saying: Here are the twenty-something things that we object to. Why don't you stop all of these, correct all of your mistakes—so to speak—and then we'll talk about what we can do next. And so I think, again, that—you know, that, to me, indicates that this framework of compartmentalizing cooperation and competition has some flaws, because the idea that you can simply compartmentalize and say: We're going to cooperate at full capacity on climate, but we're not going to—you know, but we'll compete on technology, it just—it actually doesn't work in this situation.  I think the other comment I'll make is that what the Biden administration has done is—which I think has been effective—is reframed the notion of cooperation. Where, in the past, cooperation was sort of viewed as a favor that the Chinese government did to the Americans, to the American government. That if we—if the United States, you know, offered certain inducements or there were strong elements of the relationship, then China would cooperate and that would be a favor.   And I think the Biden administration has reframed that approach, where cooperation is now presented not as a favor that any country does to another, but rather sort of is shared here. And that this is something of concern to China, to the United States, to other countries, and so all major countries need to play their part, and step up their game, to take on. I think, unfortunately, it hasn't been extremely successful. But I think that there—I hope that there will be future progress made in this area.  FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to go next to Jeremiah Ostriker, who has raised—a raised hand, and also written your question. But you can ask it yourself. And you have to accept the unmute prompt. Is that happening? All right. I think I might have to read it.  Q: Am I unmuted now?  FASKIANOS: Oh, you are. Fantastic.  Q: OK. First, I'll say who I am. I am a retired professor from Princeton University and Columbia University and was an administrative provost at Princeton.  And our China policies have puzzled me. I have visited China many times. And I have wondered—I'll quote my questions now—I have wondered why we are as negative towards China as we have been. So specifically, does the U.S. foreign policy establishment need enemies to justify its existence? Is it looking around the world for enemies? And why should we care if other countries choose to govern themselves in ways which are antithetical to the way that we choose to govern ourselves? And, finally, why not cooperate with all countries on projects of common interest, regardless of other issues?  LI: Great. Well, first of all, thank you for the question—or, three questions, which are all extremely important. I'll do my best to answer, but these are very difficult questions, and I think they touch on a more philosophical understanding of what is American foreign policy for, what is the purpose of America's role in the world, et cetera. But I'll try to do my best.  I think on the first part, does the United States need enemies, is it looking to make enemies? I think if you asked any—and these are, of course, my own assessments. I think if you asked any administration official, whether in this current administration or in previous administrations—Republican or Democrat—I don't think anyone would answer “yes.” I think the argument that has been made across administrations in a bipartisan fashion is that foreign policy is fundamentally about defending American interests and American values. In essence, being able to support the American way of life, which obviously is not necessarily one clearly defined entity. (Laughs.)  But I think, therefore, all of our policy toward China is sort of geared at maintaining, or securing, defending U.S. interests in the region. And where the argument about your question comes into play is that I think a lot of—the Biden administration, the Trump administration, the Obama administration would argue that many of the concerns that the United States has with China are not fundamentally only about internal issues, where this is a question of how they govern themselves. But they touch upon issues of shared concern. They touch upon issues that actually affect U.S. interests.   And so, for example, the South China Sea is, again—is a space that is—contains much trade. There are many different countries in the region that access the South China Sea. So it's not necessarily just an issue—and, again, this is Secretary Blinken's position that he made clear—it's not just an issue specific to China. It does touch upon global trade, global economics, global rules, and global order. And I think this is the term that has been often used, sort of this liberal international rules-based order.   And while that's sort of an amorphous concept, in essence what I think the term implies is the idea that there are certain standards and rules by which different countries operate that allow for the orderly and for the peaceful and the secure exchange of goods, of ideas, of people, of—so that each country is secure. And I think this—again, this broader concept is why I think successive U.S. administrations have focused on China policy, because I think some of, in their view, China's behaviors impinge on U.S. interests in the region.   I think the second question is why should we care about how other countries govern themselves? I think in a way, the answer the Biden administration—this current administration has given to that question is: The U.S. government under President Biden is not trying to fundamentally change the Chinese system of governance. And I think you've seen Jake Sullivan and Tony Blinken say that publicly, that they are not seeking the collapse or the fundamental change in the Communist Party's rule of China. So I think in that sense, they have made that—they have made that response. I think, again, where there are issues—there are tensions, is when actions that the Chinese government take then touch upon U.S. interests. And I think we see that in Taiwan. We see that with economics. We see that with trade, et cetera.   And then finally, why not cooperate with every country in the world? I think obviously in an ideal world, that would be the case. All countries would be able to only cooperate, and all concerns shared among different nations would be addressed. I think unfortunately one of the problems that we're seeing now is that large major powers, like China and Russia, have very different worldviews. They see a world that is very different in its structure, and its architecture, and its organization, than the one that the U.S. sees. And I think that's what's led to a lot of tension.  FASKIANOS: So we have a written question from Julius Haferkorn, a student at California State University and Tübingen University, in Germany.  Ever since the escalation of the Ukraine war, there are discussions about the risk that, should Russia be successful with its invasion, China might use this as a template in regards to Taiwan. In your opinion, is this a realistic scenario?  LI: Great. Thanks for the question.  I think there are definitely analogies to be drawn between Ukraine and Taiwan, but I think there are also significant differences. The first is the relationship between Russia and Ukraine is one of two sovereign nations that the United States and international community recognizes. I think with Taiwan, what has—going back to our history question—Taiwan is a very complicated issue, even with regard to U.S. policies. The United States does not recognize Taiwan formally as an independent country. The United States actually does not take a position on the status of Taiwan. Briefly, the One China Policy, as articulated in the three communiques, the three joint communiques, essentially says that the United States government acknowledges the Chinese position that there is one China, and Taiwan is part of China, et cetera, et cetera.  And that word “acknowledge” is pretty key, because in essential its strategic ambiguity. It's saying, we acknowledge that the PRC government says this. We don't challenge that position. But we don't necessarily recognize or completely accept. And, obviously, the Mandarin version of the text is slightly different. It uses a term that is closer to “recognize.” But that ambiguity, in a way, permitted normalization and led to the democratization of Taiwan, China's economic growth and miracle, its anti-poverty campaign. So in essence, it's worked—this model has worked for the last forty-something years.  But I think that does mean that the situation across the Taiwan Strait is very different, because here the United States does not recognize two countries on both sides of the strait. Rather, it has this ambiguity, this policy of ambiguity. And in short, the only U.S. criterion for resolution of issues across the Taiwan Strait is peace. So all of the documents that the U.S. has articulated over successive administrations essentially boil down to: As long as the resolution of issues between Taiwan and the PRC and mainland China are peaceful, then the United States is not involved. That the only thing that the United States opposes is a forceful resolution—use of military force, use of coercion. And that's what is problematic.  I think what you've seen increasingly over the last few years is a sort of—it's not a formal shift away from that policy, but definitely slowly edging away from that policy. Now, any administration official will always deny that there are any changes to our One China Policy. And I think that's always been the refrain: Our One China Policy has not changed. But you've actually seen within that One China Policy framework adjustments, accommodations—or, not accommodations—but adjustments, recalibrations. And the way that the successive U.S. administrations defend that or justify it, is because it is our—it is the American One China Policy. Therefore, we can define what that One China Policy actually means.  But you have seen, in essence, greater increased relations and exchanges between officials in Taiwan, officials in the United States. I think it was publicly reported just a couple weeks ago that some of the senior national security officials in Taipei visited the United States. Secretary Pompeo at the end of his tenure as secretary of state changed some of the previous restrictions on—that were self-imposed restrictions—on interactions between the government in Taiwan and the government in the United States. So we're seeing some changes here. And I think that has led to—or, that is one element that has led to some of the tensions across the Taiwan Strait.   Obviously, from Beijing's perspective, it sees that as the U.S. sliding away from its commitments. Now, on the other hand, Beijing, of course, has also started to change its policy, despite claiming that its policy is exactly the same. You've seen greater military incursions in Taiwan's air defense identification zone, with planes, fighter jets, that are essentially flying around the island. You've seen greater geoeconomic coercion targeted at Taiwan in terms of sanctions. So you've seen essentially changes on all sides.  And so the final point I'll leave here—I'll leave with you is that the refrain that the United States government articulates of opposing any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, to me, is actually quite ambiguous. Because there's never been a status quo that has truly existed. It's always been a dynamic equilibrium between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington, D.C. Where Beijing is seeking to move Taiwan toward unification. Taiwan, at least under its current leadership, under Tsai Ing-wen, is obviously seeking, in a way, to move from at least—at least to move toward de facto or maintain de facto independence. Whether it's moving toward de jure is a topic of debate. And then the United States, of course, is enhancing its relationship with Taiwan.  So there's never been a static status quo between the three sides. It's always been a dynamic, evolving and changing equilibrium. Which is why the concept of opposing unilateral changes to the status quo, in my view, is almost paradoxical, because there has never been a status quo in the first place.  FASKIANOS: There has been some talk that Kevin McCarthy, the speaker of the House, is planning a trip to Taiwan. Given what happened with Speaker Pelosi, is that a—what do you think of that musing, to go to Taiwan, to actually do that?  LI: Mhm, yes. I think that's obviously been reported on. I think it's an area of close attention from everyone watching this space. I haven't seen any reports. All I can say is based on what I've seen reported in the media. And it seems like, based on—because of domestic preoccupations, that trip, whether it happens or not, is right now, at the moment, on the back burner. But I think that if he were to go, I think it would certainly precipitate a quite significant response from China. And I think whether that would be larger or smaller than what happened after Speaker Pelosi's visit, I think is something that is uncertain now.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. We'll go next to Autumn Hauge.  Q: Hi. I'm Autumn Hauge. I'm a student at Minnesota State University, Mankato.  So my question is, since a focus of the Biden administration's foreign policy is the relationship between the United States and China, and another focus is to invest and grow a presence in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically looking at the relationship between the United States and the Micronesian country of the Republic of Palau, whose government has openly shared their support for Taiwan, do you think that the United States' long history with the Republic of Palau, and their connection to their support—the Republic of Palau's support to Taiwan, halters the ability for the U.S. to grow a positive relation with China? Thank you.  LI: Great. Thanks for the question. It's a great question.  I am not an expert on Palau or its politics. I do know that Palau has enhanced its exchanges, it relationship with Taipei, over the last few years. I think we saw Palau's president, I think, visit Taipei. I think the U.S. ambassador to Palau actually visited Taipei. And there have been increasing—during COVID, there was a discussion of a travel bubble between Taiwan and Palau. So there's definitely been increasing exchange.  I think in general this has always been a key obstacle to U.S.-China relations, which is any country that still recognizes the Republic of China—that is the formal name of the government currently in Taiwan—I think presents a significant issue. Because for the PRC, recognition of the One China—what they call the One China Principle, the idea that there is one China, Taiwan is part of that China, and the legitimate government of China is the People's Republic of China, is a precondition for any diplomatic normalization with Beijing. And so I think certainly, you know, there are a small handful of countries that still recognize the ROC, but I think that they—you know, for those countries and their relationships with the PRC, of course, that's a significant hindrance.  In what you've seen in the U.S. government in the past few years is that for countries that derecognize Taipei and sort of switch recognition to Beijing, the PRC, there's been discussion—I think, there have been several bills introduced, in essence, to punish those countries. I don't necessarily think that those bills have ended up becoming law, but I think there is, given the current political dynamics, the sort of views on China in Washington, D.C., there is this sense that the U.S. needs to support countries that still recognize Taiwan, the ROC, and be able to provide support so that they don't feel pressured to switch their recognition.  My personal view is that I think that that is, on the whole, relatively insignificant. I won't say that it's completely not significant, but I think that in general issues around the Taiwan Strait, cross-strait relations, I think military issues, I think political issues related to exchanges between Taiwan and Beijing, I think those issues are much more important and much more critical to driving changes in the relationship across the Taiwan Strait.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to try and sneak in one last question from Wim Wiewel, who's a student at Portland State University.   Given your pessimism about cooperation combined with competition, what do you think is the long-term future for U.S.-China relations?  LI: OK. Well, thanks for the question. I'm not sure that I can provide a satisfying answer. And, in fact, I don't have the answer. You know, I think if anyone had the answer, then they should immediately tell the Biden administration that they've solved the problem.  Even though I am pessimistic about this current framework, just because of its demonstrated effects, I still think that in general the likelihood of a real war, which I think people have floated now—you know, Professor Graham Allison, who I used to work for, wrote a book called Destined for War? I still believe that the probability of all-out great-power conflict in a kinetic way, a military way, is still relatively low. I think that there are significant differences today compared to the era during World War I and World War II era.   I think that the degree of economic interdependence between China and not only the United States but the rest of the world, I think is a significant gamechanger in how countries position themselves vis-à-vis China. I think Europe is the great example here of how there are many countries that invest, have business relationships, have trade with China. And so therefore, their policy on China has been a little bit more calibrated than what the United States has been doing.   And so on the whole, I think most people still recognize that any great-power war between the United States and China would be utterly catastrophic. And I think that despite all the tensions that exist today, I think that that recognition, that consensus is pretty universally held, that a great-power war between the U.S. and China would be extremely bad. I think that is—that is probably something that is understood by Republican administrations, Democratic administrations, folks in Beijing, folks around the world, in the region. And so I think that, hopefully, that idea, that despite disagreements, despite political tensions, the need to prevent all-out global conflict is quite important, is a vital interest, I think, hopefully, to me, provides some optimism. And hopefully we'll be able to continue to carry our relationship with China through.  And I'm hopeful especially that all of you students, researchers, who hope to study, and write about, and even perhaps participate in American foreign policy, will continue to think. Because so much of the future of the U.S.-China relationship and U.S. foreign policy is going to be determined by your generation. So with that, I guess this would be a perfect place to stop. And I thank you for the question.   FASKIANOS: Absolutely. Well, Chris, this has been fantastic. I apologize to all of you. We had many more—many questions in the written part and raised hands. And I'm sorry that we could not get to all of them. We'll just have to have you back and continue to cover this issue. So we really appreciate your insights, Chris Li. So thank you again.  The next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, March 22, at 1:00 p.m. (EDT). Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly will lead a conversation on U.S. relations with South America. And in the meantime, please do learn more about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/careers. You can follow us at @CFR_academic, and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. And I'm sure you can also go to the Belfer Center for additional analysis by Chris Li. So I encourage you to go there as well.  Thank you all, again, for being with us, and we look forward to continuing the conversation on March 22. So thank you, all. Thanks, Chris.  LI: Thank you.  (END) 

Dr. Cindy Banyai of Dr. Cindy Speaks takes a look at the news for Monday, January 30, 2023. Today she talks about the deadly mosque bombing Pakistan, another Trump grand jury looking into the payments to Stormy Daniels, and Florida finally takes steps toward having more guns everywhere with the filing of the open carry bill. Dr. Banyai (doctorate in Asia Pacific Studies 2010) also takes a deep dive on Taiwan and the One China and why provoking China with a political stunt is the wrong move for democracy and our economy. 

The Rich Zeoli Show- Hour 1: On Sunday, Pennsylvania State Senator and Republican candidate for Governor conceded to Governor-elect Josh Shapiro. Shapiro won 56.3% of the total vote, while Mastriano won 41.9% of the total vote. According to reports, Philadelphia is preparing for the arrival of dozens of undocumented migrants—city officials expect the migrants will be bused from Del Rio, Texas in the coming days. On Monday, President Joe Biden met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Bali, Indonesia ahead of a G20 intergovernmental summit to discuss global economics. While addressing members of the press following the meeting, Biden affirmed that America's “One China Policy” has not changed and said, he believes, there is no “imminent” Chinese invasion of Taiwan. President Xi did not speak with any foreign journalists. Rich hates his producers: Matt didn't like “Yellowstone” and Daniel, despite earning a bartending license, does not know the difference between seltzer and hard seltzer.

3:05pm- On Sunday, Pennsylvania State Senator and Republican candidate for Governor conceded to Governor-elect Josh Shapiro. Shapiro won 56.3% of the total vote, while Mastriano won 41.9% of the total vote. 3:10pm- According to reports, Philadelphia is preparing for the arrival of dozens of undocumented migrants—city officials expect the migrants will be bused from Del Rio, Texas in the coming days. 3:35pm- On Monday, President Joe Biden met with Chinese leader Xi Jinping in Bali, Indonesia ahead of a G20 intergovernmental summit to discuss global economics. While addressing members of the press following the meeting, Biden affirmed that America's “One China Policy” has not changed and said, he believes, there is no “imminent” Chinese invasion of Taiwan. President Xi did not speak with any foreign journalists. 3:45pm- Rich hates his producers: Matt didn't like “Yellowstone” and Daniel, despite earning a bartending license, does not know the difference between seltzer and hard seltzer. 4:05pm- With over 93% of the vote counted, Democrat Katie Hobbs leads Republican Kari Lake—50.5% of the total to 49.5%. But the election was nearly one-week ago, why is Arizona still counting? How has chaos become an acceptable routine every election cycle? To suggest there needs to be alterations in the way votes are tabulated is not synonymous with claims of election fraud despite what many Democrats claim. While on CNN, Ana Navarro claimed that Governor Ron DeSantis “gamed the system” in Florida—why isn't she being accused of embracing election fraud? 4:35pm- Assuming projections are correct, and Republicans take control of the House of Representatives, will there be investigations into Hunter Biden and the Biden family's business interactions with foreign corporations in China and Ukraine? Democrats are already condemning any Congressional investigation—aren't they being inconsistent considering how frequently they investigated Donald Trump and his administration? 4:50pm- Will Kevin McCarthy be the next Speaker of the House? According to ABC's John Karl, McCarthy is no longer a “lock” to win speakership. Meanwhile, Congressman Jamie Raskin (D-MD) warned that Republicans may select former President Donald Trump to serve as Speaker of the House—pointing out that the speaker does not necessarily need to be a member of Congress. 5:00pm- Ryan Manion—Author of the book, “The Knock at the Door: Three Gold Star Families Bonded by Grief and Purpose”— joins The Rich Zeoli Show to discuss her work serving as President of the Travis Manion Foundation. Learn more about the Travis Manion Foundation at: https://www.travismanion.org 5:15pm- Following the financial collapse of FTX, a now bankrupt Bahamas-based cryptocurrency company, U.S. officials are expected to begin an investigation into potential criminal liability over how its investor capital was spent. According to The Wall Street Journal, FTX founder Sam Bankman-Fried was the 2nd largest Democrat political donor after George Soros. 5:40pm- Justin Hart—Executive Consultant & Chief Data Analyst of RationalGround.com—joins The Rich Zeoli Show to discuss his new book, “Gone Viral: How COVID Drove the World Insane.” During the height of the COVID-19 pandemic Hart worked alongside Florida Governor Ron DeSantis and health care policy experts at Stanford University's Hoover Institution attempting to develop data-driven decisions. In the book, Hart uses data to demonstrate how children were “irreversibly damaged” educationally via over-the-top lockdown policies that resulted in remote learning for prolonged periods of time. 6:05pm- In his opening remarks from Indonesia, following his meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping, President Joe Biden discussed cooperation to meet climate goals—despite China's continued, rapid expansion of coal mines. 6:25pm- An internal Republican battle between Florida Governor Ron DeSantis and former President Donald Trump seems to already be in high-gear. Will this rivalry fracture the political party? 6:40pm- Dakota Wood—Senior Research Fellow for Defense Programs at The Heritage Foundation—joins the show to discuss President Joe Biden's meeting with Chinese leader Xi Jinping. Wood explains that, despite the 3-hour meeting, Biden ignored topics like the origins of COVID-19, the enslavement of Uyghur Muslims in the Xinjiang region of northwest China, and intellectual property theft. Meanwhile, President Xi reiterated that Taiwanese independence is a red line for Beijing. What will it take to deter China from seizing Taiwan? 6:55pm- Who Won Social Media? + Zeoli's Final Thought

As democratic support for Taiwan increases, so has Beijing's message to the world about its “One China principle” and the myth of a global consensus regarding the sovereignty of Taiwan. The truth is, every country - including Taiwan - has its own “One China policy”. And that policy (according to each country) is not the same as the principle (according to the PRC).It can be confusing. In a fight about international discourse on Taiwan, Beijing's diplomats and ambassadors are proactively trying to confuse the world. And this confusion is increasingly challenging for Taiwan's participation in global affairs and organizations. It's also challenging for different countries' own One China policy. Beijing insists that its “principle” should be adhered to by every country in the world. The end goal is for the world to confuse Beijing's' “principle” with an actual international law. The PRC would later use international law to say: exactly, this is our internal affairs and we can do whatever we want to do. No such international law exists. The UN resolution 2758 doesn't say that Taiwan is a part of China (despite what China says in its recent white paper.) The One China principle is PRC's principle only - not international law. And each country has (and should) clarify their own positions on Taiwan's sovereignty. China's “trying to say to the international society, to create a confusion that Taiwan belongs to China. So when China either sends out military aircrafts or flight jets around Taiwan, it's China's international affairs that other countries should not interfere with,” says Dr. Chen Yu-Jie. Dr. CHEN offers a solution. It's very important that all countries, including Taiwan, that don't agree with the One China principle to speak up, says Dr. Chen. “It's important that countries should voice out their different opinions, because international law depends on international practice. So if countries don't object to something that's being said, in the long run when it becomes a practice it might become a norm.” Our guest today is Yu-Jie CHEN, a key legal expert on international law and diplomacy in the context of China-Taiwan relations. CHEN has a JSD from the New York University School of Law. She is an assistant research professor at Taiwan's prestigious Academia Sinica. In addition to publishing and academic journals in the US, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the UK, CHEN also writes op-eds and takes part in public facing discussions.  Articles mentioned in this episode include:  “I'm Taiwanese and I Want to Thank Nancy Pelosi”, op-ed by Yu-Jie CHEN (New York Times, August 5, 2022): https://www.nytimes.com/2022/08/05/opinion/taiwan-china-pelosi-democracy.html““One China” Contention in China–Taiwan Relations: Law, Politics and Identity”, scholarly paper by Yu-Jie CHEN (China Quarterly, September 27, 2022): https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/china-quarterly/article/abs/one-china-contention-in-chinataiwan-relations-law-politics-and-identity/3D4369ACBC0E9062F2FB9462D8961763#“China Is Using a UN Resolution to Further Its Claim Over Taiwan” by Madoka Fukuda (The Diplomat, August 26. 2022): https://thediplomat.com/2022/08/china-is-using-a-un-resolution-to-further-its-claim-over-taiwan/China white paper on Taiwan: https://english.news.cn/20220810/df9d3b8702154b34bbf1d451b99bf64a/c.htmlToday's host is JR Wu, a former journalist with two decades of media experience in the US and Asia. She has led news bureaus for Reuters and Dow Jones.Support the show by donating on patreon.com/taiwanEPISODE CREDITProducer, Host / Emily Y. Wu @emilyywuResearch / Min Chao @wordsfromtaiwanProduction Assistant / Gerald WilliamsA Ghost Island Media production / @ghostislandmewww.ghostisland.mediaSupport the show: https://patreon.com/TaiwanSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

China's Communist Party is deep into preparations for its 20th party Congress that begins October 16th in Beijing, where expert observers are expecting President Xi Jinping to be confirmed for an unprecedented third five-year term. Xi is also expected to announce his new leadership team that will execute on the party's agenda.  And it's safe to say that near or at the top of that Agenda is the issue of Taiwan. For context: When it comes to US policy, Washington's official stance is that Taiwan is in fact, part of China and that if reunification occurs, it must be through a peaceful reunification.  Beijing, meanwhile, sees Taiwan as a breakaway province that must be reunified, and has not rule out use of force to do so.   Washington is bolstering Taiwanese defenses in the event that Beijing grows impatient and makes the strategic decision to reunify the island by force. So, diplomatically, the US recognizes one Chinese government yet Washington treats Taiwan like an independent nation when it comes to diplomatic engagement and military support.  That's the reason why China took such offense to House Speaker Nancy Pelosi's recent visit to Taipei. Today's guest agrees that the U.S.' One China Policy presents a complicated engagement strategy.  How did we get here?  And what is the likelihood that the world's two most powerful nations could come to blows over Taiwan? Ambassador Joe DeTrani has focued much of his career on China.  He is not only a former Special Envoy for Six Party Talks with North Korea, he is also a former director of East Asia Operations at the CIA. In this episode, Cipher Brief COO Brad Christian sits down with Ambassador DeTrani to unpack the US' One China Policy.

Bro History The Taiwan Lobby Today we talk about the impact of foreign governments on US policy and Think Tanks. Specifically, how the Taiwan lobby paved the way for Pelosi's trip this summer. We also discuss the origins of the “One China Policy”. Check out this article: https://responsiblestatecraft.org/2022/08/04/how-the-taiwan-lobby-helped-pave-the-way-for-pelosis-trip/ Support on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/brohistory #254 The Taiwan Lobby szamotah

On August 2, US Congresswoman Nancy Pelosi visited Taiwan despite strong reservations expressed by China. In this episode, Megha Pardhi and Manoj Kewalramani discuss the significance of this visit, the difference between the One China Principle and One China Policy, and India's position on Taiwan.Read Takshashila Intelligence Estimate - Scenarios for Cross-Strait Tensions: An Indian Interests Assessment Visit https://school.takshashila.org.in/gcppto find out more about public policy courses at The Takshashila Institution.You can follow Megha Pardhi on twitter: https://twitter.com/pardhimegha21You can follow Manoj Kewalramani on twitter: https://twitter.com/theChinaDudeCheck out Takshashila's courses: https://school.takshashila.org.in/You can listen to this show and other awesome shows on the IVM Podcasts app on Android: https://ivm.today/android or iOS: https://ivm.today/ios, or any other podcast app.You can check out our website at https://shows.ivmpodcasts.com/featuredDo follow IVM Podcasts on social media.We are @IVMPodcasts on Facebook, Twitter, & Instagram.https://twitter.com/IVMPodcastshttps://www.instagram.com/ivmpodcasts/?hl=enhttps://www.facebook.com/ivmpodcasts/Follow the show across platforms:Spotify, Google Podcasts, Apple Podcasts, JioSaavn, Gaana, Amazon MusicDo share the word with you folks!

Tensions between China and America are at a new, dangerous high following Nancy Pelosi's recent visit to Taiwan in her capacity as Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives. The trip was seen in Beijing as an affront to the longstanding “One China” policy which asserts that Taiwan is part of China operating under its own system of governance. In retaliation, China immediately launched large-scale military drills around Taiwan and halted cooperation with the U.S. on military matters and the global fight against climate change. The American response has been to renew its support for Taiwan's right of self-defence and signal that more U.S. navy ships will be transiting the Taiwan strait in the months to come. What is the world to make of this crisis? Is it the opening act of a larger conflict between Beijing and Washington that could lead to war? Are there ways to defuse China-US tensions and re-establish relations between the world's two superpowers to address common issues and concerns from climate change to the global economy to security in South Asia?  For a Chinese perspective on the state and future of Taiwan, China-US relations and the prospects for armed conflict the Munk Dialogues welcomed Professor Victor Gao, Vice President of the Center for China and Globalisation. He is a prominent Chinese lawyer, former investment banker and served as English language translator to the paramount leader of the People's Republic of China, Deng Xiaoping. He is the Chair Professor of Soochow University. QUOTES: Taiwan is part of China and the People's Republic of China is the sole legal representative of China. So as far as China is concerned, this is a frontal attack on the one thing that matters the most to China. That is China's sovereignty and territorial integrity.  The host of the Munk Dialogues  is Rudyard Griffiths - @rudyardg.   Tweet your comments about this episode to @munkdebate or comment on our Facebook page https://www.facebook.com/munkdebates/ To sign up for a weekly email reminder for this podcast, send an email to podcast@munkdebates.com.   To support civil and substantive debate on the big questions of the day, consider becoming a Munk Member at https://munkdebates.com/membership Members receive access to our 10+ year library of great debates in HD video, a free Munk Debates book, newsletter and ticketing privileges at our live events. This podcast is a project of the Munk Debates, a Canadian charitable organization dedicated to fostering civil and substantive public dialogue - https://munkdebates.com/ Producer: Marissa Ramnanan  Editor: Adam Karch  

US House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi's visit to Taiwan in early August inflamed tensions with China and put Taiwan, and its implications for regional stability, in the spotlight. In response to Pelosi's visit, China conducted extensive military drills around Taiwan, which included firing ballistic missiles over the country. A potential invasion of Taiwan by China would have broad international security ramifications, as the United States and its allies could be drawn into conflict. Any conflict would also cause major disruptions to trade and transportation throughout the region. On the day of Pelosi's meeting with Taiwan president Tsai Ing-wen, Indonesia's Ministry of Foreign Affairs released a statement expressing concern at increasing great power rivalry, calling for the maintenance of peace and stability. The statement also noted Indonesia's continuing respect of the "One China Policy", whereby foreign countries acknowledge but do not recognise that China considers Taiwan to be a part of China. What interests does Indonesia have with Taiwan and China? How would Indonesia respond in the event of armed conflict between the two? In this week's Talking Indonesia podcast, Dr Dave McRae chats with Ratih Kabinawa, a PhD Candidate in International Relations and Asian Studies at the University of Western Australia, who is writing her thesis on Taiwan's Southeast Asia foreign policy. In 2022, the Talking Indonesia podcast is co-hosted by Dr Jemma Purdey from Monash University, Dr Dave McRae from the Centre for Indonesian Law, Islam and Society at the University of Melbourne, Dr Jacqui Baker from Murdoch University, and Tito Ambyo. Look out for a new Talking Indonesia podcast every fortnight. Photo credit: ANTARA FOTO/REUTERS/Ann Wang

Recorded on August 4th 2022. Check out my YouTube channels "Vaush & The Vaush Pit" for live streams and other content.

Nancy Pelosi has repeatedly stated, "America stands with Taiwan." But the State Department claims to still abide by the One China Policy. What's going on here? Plus, Kansas struck down a pro-life amendment in a disappointing post-Roe vote on abortion laws. And Demi Lovato announces she is a woman again ... maybe? Today's Sponsors: With dozens of comfort innovations, Tommy John keeps you feeling super confident AND super cool — from lounging at home to summertime fun. Go to https://TommyJohn.com/WHY for 20% off your first order. Raycon's Everyday Earbuds look, feel, and sound better than ever. Plus, they give you eight hours of playtime and a 32-hour battery life. Go to https://BuyRaycon.com/WHY for 15% off. Go to https://BlazeSocks.com and use promo code SaraSocks to get 20% off TheBlaze's limited-edition patriotic socks. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Join Jim and Greg as they breathe a big sigh of relief that Eric Schmitt will be the GOP nominee for U.S. Senate in Missouri - and also that Eric Greitens won't be. They also wince as the pro-life side takes a drubbing in Kansas but aren't convinced there's been a sea change in the midterms. And they try to sort out America's paradoxical "One China Policy."Please visit our great sponsors:NetChoicehttps://NetChoice.org/2992Join us in telling Congress to stop rising prices and reject progressive tech regulations like S.2992

Read on for today's agenda below prepared by David (thank you very much). - Retired US Diplomat to 5 different nations  David Hunter shares his knowledge, passion, interest, and experience.1) Did  Ukraine Use  Home-Made Drones to Attack Russian Navy High-Command HQ in Crimea?:  Last week, --on Russia's Navy Day, no less ---Ukraine launched a drone that destroyed the Headquarters of Russian Navy Black Sea Fleet  in Sevastopol, Crimea, injuring several.  Could this be considered a strike on Russian 'sovereign territory', since Russia claims it annexed the Crimea into Russia?  What is the significance of this action?2) Was former Russian Deputy Prime Minister,Anatoly Chubais Poisoned by Putin?:  Minister Chubais, who resigned as Moscow's diplomatic special envoy to international organizations this March in protest over Putin's invasion of Ukraine, last weekend suddenly developed numbness in his arms and leg, and is now in an ICU at an Italian hospital.  His residence was just inspected by Italian security teams wearing hazmat suits.   Do they think he was  attacked with poison?  3)  Is Russia Using A Ukrainian Nuclear Power Plant as Base to Strike Ukraine Troops?:  The Russians took over the world's largest nuclear power plant, with 6 nuclear reactors at Zaporizhia, Ukraine in March.  Recently, they have been using it as base for launching missile strikes into Ukraine, knowing Ukrainian troops will not strike back because it could release nuclear radiation across Ukraine.  It's using a nuclear plant as a defense shield.  Is that legal?    4) Why did  French President Macron Warmly Embrace Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman?  This last Thursday,  President Macron greeted the Saudi Crown Prince in  a formal red carpet arrival ceremony for dinner  at the  Presidential residence  where Macron shook hands warmly and exchanged hugs with the Crown Prince.  The Crown Prince had ordered the brutal murder of Jamal Kashoggi in Turkey at the Saudi consulate  a few years ago.  So why is President Macron now hugging him?      5)  New Yemen-Saudi Truce Agreement:  Was the Four month Truce in Saudis nine year war in Yemen  just a  trick to win Biden's Approval? :  US Pres. Biden has been pressuring Saudi Arabia to end it's genocidal war in Yemen.  Suddenly, the Saudi Crown Prince decided his puppet Yemen President Hadi should resign, and a truce begins.  That was just before Biden made his Presidential trip to Saudi Arabia.  Is there a connection?6)  Pres. Biden is Offering To Exchange Russian Arms Dealer Victor Bout For Two US Hostages:   Secretary of State Blinken announced publicly an offer is on the table to get two US citizens released from Russian prison: One,   Paul Whelan, was sentenced for 'espionage' after a  Russian  handed him an memory stick with supposed military secrets,  and two,   basketball star Britney Griner, who was arrested for 0.7 grams of hash oil.  Are they  guilty, or just pawns in Putin's human chess game? 7)  US House Speaker Nancy Pelosi Visits Taiwan:  The Speaker had announced her plan to visit the Chinese region called Taiwan.   The Chinese Communist government claims it is part of mainland China, so her trip to endorse democracy supporters there is a violation of the One China Policy.   They threaten to take strong action against Taiwan for allowing this visit.  What do you think will happen?

A note from Talking Taiwan host Felicia Lin:   In June I spoke with Gerrit van der Wees about an article that he wrote about U.S. President Biden's remarks about Taiwan when he was in Tokyo in May.   Just last week, Gerrit wrote a very timely article about the controversy over the U.S. House of Representatives Speaker Nancy Pelosi's plans to visit Taiwan.  In April Pelosi had planned to visit Taiwan as part of a tour to the Indo Pacific region but had to cancel because she contracted COVID-19.   Last week Pelosi left with a delegation for Asia, but made no mention of visiting Taiwan. There had been speculation that the Chinese would attack if U.S. fighter jets escorted Pelosi's plane into Taiwan, and in a phone conversation with U.S. president Joe Biden, Chinese president Xi Jinping warned Biden against “playing with fire” over Taiwan.   In his piece for the Taipei Times, Gerrit stated that it is essential that Pelosi stands her ground and pushes through with her plan to visit Taiwan. We'll share Gerrit's Taipei Times article and a few others about this situation on our website for this episode.   In my interview with Gerrit I asked him to explain in detail what the Taiwan Relations Act is, and what it tells us about the relationship between the U.S. and Taiwan. We also talked about the so-called U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity, how his work on the Taiwan Communique evolved from 1980 to 2016, and his thoughts on the war in Ukraine, and how it relates to China and Taiwan.   About Gerrit van der Wees   Gerrit van der Wees is a former Dutch diplomat. From 1980 through 2016, he served as chief-editor of “Taiwan Communiqué.” Also, from 2005 through 2016 he was liaison for the Senate and the State Department at FAPA-HQ.  He currently teaches the History of Taiwan at George Mason University and Current issues in East Asia at George Washington University's Elliott School for International Affairs.   This episode of Talking Taiwan has been sponsored by NATWA, the North America Taiwanese Women's Association.   NATWA was founded in 1988, and its mission is:   to evoke a sense of self-esteem and enhance women's dignity, to oppose gender discrimination and promote gender equality, to fully develop women's potential and encourage their participation in public affairs, to contribute to the advancement of human rights and democratic development in Taiwan, to reach out and work with women's organizations worldwide to promote peace for all.   To learn more about NATWA visit their website: www.natwa.com     Here's a little preview of what we talked about in this podcast episode:   U.S. President Joe Biden's remarks on the U.S.'s willingness to help defend Taiwan The Taiwan Relations Act, the document that contains US commitments to (help) defend Taiwan, and its first two clauses How U.S. Secretary of State Anthony Blinken referred to the second clause of the Taiwan Relations Act in a speech he made at the end of May What the second clause of the Taiwan Relations Act says and means The background of the Taiwan Relations Act How Harvey Feldman of the East Asia Pacific desk of the U.S. State Department was involved in initially drafting the Taiwan Policy Act How in 1979 the U.S. Congress started drafting the Taiwan Relations Act which had security clauses and a human rights clause embedded within it How Senator Ted Kennedy, Senator Claiborne Pell, and Congressman Jim Leach were instrumental in drafting the Taiwan Relations Act and getting it passed in April 1979 The establishment of the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT) in January 1979 Mark Chen's (陳唐山) work with Senators and Congressmen to ensure that the Taiwan Relations Act took into consideration the native Taiwanese perspective The Taiwan Communique and why it was established How news from and about Taiwan while under martial law was obtained, communicated and printed in the Taiwan Communique How dangwai (outside party) magazines: Měilì dǎo aka Formosa Magazine (美麗島) and Bāshí niándài aka 1980s (8十年代) were sources of information for the Taiwan Communique How the George Washington University library has a complete collection of dangwai magazines from Taiwan The censorship of postal mail that was received in and sent out from Taiwan during the martial law era After the Taiwan democratized in the early 1990s the focus of the Taiwan Communique shifted to working to gain more international recognition for Taiwan What the “One China Policy” means from the perspective of the U.S. and China How the “One China Policy” which was based on the 1970s, a time in which Beijing and Taipei that claimed to be the government of China How things have changed since the 1970s, which requires an adjustment in policy to reflect current times What makes the Taiwan Relations Act so unique How Taiwan meets all the requirements of a nation state according to the Montevideo Convention of 1933 How Montevideo Convention states that the existence of an independent state does not depend on the recognition of other states When the United States of America declared independence in 1776 there were no other countries that recognized the new government in Washington D.C. for two years For the first 25 years of the United States of America it was only recognized by seven countries The Taiwan Travel Act Why the U.S. policy of strategic ambiguity toward Taiwan is not a policy How the term “strategic ambiguity” dates back to the mid-1990s Robert Suettinger's 2003 book, Beyond Tiananmen Gerrit's thoughts on the war in Ukraine and what China is taking away from the situation Gerrit's observations on how the war in Ukraine has impacted the people of Taiwan Things that Taiwan need to reconsider about its military strategy   Related Links: To view all related links for this article, click link below: https://talkingtaiwan.com/gerrit-van-der-wees-the-past-and-present-state-of-u-s-taiwan-relations-ep-199/  

In this episode, we interview Sir Mark Lowcock, the former United Nations Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator, about the possibility of the world's second famine in the 21st century. We discuss the factors driving the current food crisis and what steps nations can take now to avoid millions of people starving by next year. Lowcock is currently a Visiting Professor in Practice at the Department of International Development at the London School of Economics and a Distinguished Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC. He is the author of Relief Chief: A Manifesto for Saving Lives in Dire Times. We then discuss all the developments from the last week with China: the Biden-Xi call, Pelosi's potential trip to Taiwan, and the passage of the CHIPs Act in Congress. We discuss the significance of these events and what they mean for US relations with China.Also, on the show, we talk about Europe's energy crisis and the latest developments as the continent struggles to prepare for winter.Topics Discussed in this EpisodeUS-China Relations - 04:00European Energy Crisis - 29:00Interview with Sir Mark Lowcock - 41:50Articles and Resources Mentioned in EpisodeUS-China RelationsCooperation with China: Challenges and opportunities (The Atlantic Council)What Does the Pelosi Taiwan Uproar Mean for U.S. China Policy? (Foreign Policy)What Is the U.S. “One China” Policy, and Why Does it Matter? (CSIS)America takes on China with a giant microchips bill (The Economist)European Energy Crisis: Winter is Coming Part DeuxEurope's gas crisis is here (Vox)Europe's Race to Secure New Energy Sources Is on a Knife's Edge (NYT)France's nuclear plants are going down for repairs (The Economist)What Are the Kremlin's Calculations in Its Gas War With Europe? (Carnegie Foundation)Interview with Sir Mark LowcockRelief Chief: A Manifesto for Saving Lives in Dire TimesWhat's in the Ukraine Grain Deal for Russia? (Carnegie Foundation)Follow UsShow Website: www.kelloggsglobalpolitics.comShow Twitter: @GlobalKelloggShow YouTube:Anita's Twitter: https://twitter.com/arkelloggAnita's Website:https://www.anitakellogg.com/Anita's email: anita@kelloggsglobalpolitics.comRyan's email: ryan@kelloggsglobalpolitics.com

Today we explore the One China Policy. We do a deep dive into how it got started, the history behind China and Taiwan's contentious relationship, and how the United States continues to thread the needle of diplomacy between the two. Articles Mentioned: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-38285354 https://www.us-taiwan.org/resources/faq-the-united-states-one-china-policy-is-not-the-same-as-the-prc-one-china-principle/ https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_US_arms_sales_to_Taiwan https://www.cnn.com/2020/09/17/politics/us-taiwan-arms-sale/index.html https://www.csis.org/blogs/new-perspectives-asia/how-biden-building-trumps-legacy-taiwan Follow us on Instagram @The_Amber_and_Joe_Show Follow us on Twitter @TheAmberandJoe1 Listen to our podcast on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, Anchor and Google Podcasts! Linktree: https://linktr.ee/theamberandjoeshow

This week on the Sinica Podcast, Shelley Rigger of Davidson College returns to the show to talk Taiwan. She's joined by Simona Grano, a sinologist and Taiwan specialist at the University of Zürich. They talk about President Joe Biden's recent "gaffes" that call into question the longstanding, unofficial U.S. policy of "strategic ambiguity," talk about how Taiwan has been impacted by the Ukraine War, and much more.4:59: – What did Joe Biden's latest "gaffe" on Taiwan actually signify?10:06 – Did "strategic ambiguity" serve its intended purpose?16:23 – The mood in Taiwan20:51 – The impact of the Ukraine War on thinking in Beijing and in Taipei34:12 – European countries navigating relationships with Taiwan43:54 – The "One China Principle" versus the "One China Policy"47:20 – Are bilateral trade agreements enough for Taiwan?50:27 – Ethnicity, nationality, and the Taiwan issue59:00 – Making sense of the PRC claim to TaiwanA complete transcript of this podcast is available at SupChina.com.Recommendations:Simona: Orphan of Asia, a novel by Wu Zhuoliu; and the show Orange is the New BlackShelley: Occupied, a Norwegian thriller series on NetflixKaiser: Meizhong.report, a Chinese-language resource from the Carter Center's U.S.-China Perception Monitor, covering official, media, and social media commentary on U.S.-China relationsSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In this episode, Alex brushes on the fact that there have been 215 "mass shootings" in 2022 alone, the US needs policy not thoughts and prayers. Then discusses Monkeypox and the “Monkeypox paradox” as he calls it. Basically, this disease that is not very transmissible, and has a vaccine, grabbed the world's attention when it hit the West. However, it has been a problem in Africa for decades and there has been no coverage of it. Finally, Alex focuses the majority of the episode on America's policy towards China and Taiwan. It is called Strategic Ambiguity. He goes over the history of “the One China Policy”, how the U.S. still sends arms and aid to Taiwan, and why it may be time to move from Strategic Ambiguity to Strategic Clarity. Alex argues that since there is no clarity between the United States and China involving Taiwan, the game of chicken is getting more costly and worrying. He thinks the U.S. must define how they would respond to a Chinese invasion of Taiwan and work towards getting input from Taipei as well. 

In this episode of By Any Means Necessary, hosts Sean Blackmon and Jacquie Luqman are joined by Ken Hammond, professor of East Asian and Global History at New Mexico State University and an activist with the organization Pivot to Peace to discuss the anniversary of the Shanghai Communique, which established relations between the United States and China and the One-China Policy, how the split between China and the Soviet Union contributed to the Communique and how it affected the socialist movement in the US, how the US relationship with China has changed over the last fifty years as China has stuck to its socialist development and not bowed down to US hegemony, and how China fits into the current crisis over NATO aggression in Eastern Europe and Russia's conflict with Ukraine.In the second segment, Sean and Jacquie are joined by Tiandra Robinson, Communications Workers of America Campaign Assistant to discuss the victory and continuing struggle of call center workers for adequate healthcare coverage and higher wages, the partnership between the federal government and private contractor Maximus to provide assistance to people enrolling in healthcare in the Affordable Care Act marketplace, and the importance of this labor struggle in the context of increased labor activism in the US.Later in the show, Sean and Jacquie are joined by Eleanor Goldfield, Eleanor Goldfield, a creative activist, journalist, co-host of Project Censored, and the filmmaker behind the documentary “Hard Road of Hope” to discuss what anti-imperialism means in the current moment and the propagandization behind blaming Russia as the aggressor in the Ukraine crisis despite NATO's aggression, the racism in the coverage and exceptionalization of the coverage of Ukraine by the mainstream corporate media as it ignores scores of victims of US imperialism, censorship of positions that do not line up with the interests of Washington and the ruling class by social media and the mainstream corporate media's toeing of Washington's line, and the importance of anti-imperialists having courage in our convictions.

In this segment of By Any Means Necessary, hosts Sean Blackmon and Jacquie Luqman are joined by Ken Hammond, professor of East Asian and Global History at New Mexico State University and an activist with the organization Pivot to Peace to discuss the anniversary of the Shanghai Communique, which established relations between the United States and China and the One-China Policy, how the split between China and the Soviet Union contributed to the Communique and how it affected the socialist movement in the US, how the US relationship with China has changed over the last fifty years as China has stuck to its socialist development and not bowed down to US hegemony, and how China fits into the current crisis over NATO aggression in Eastern Europe and Russia's invasion of Ukraine.

Retired Army Lt. General Keith Kellogg, former National Security Council chief of staff under President Trump and Co-Chairman of the Center for American Security at America First Policy Institute, discusses the Biden Administration's international policy towards China specifically looking into China's behavior post-Olympics. Kellogg comments that China cracking down on Taiwan should be a concern to everyone, saying that most people a few years ago also said “Hong Kong will be fine”. The General comments that America needs to make a statement and challenge the status quo, saying that we're moving away from the “One China policy”, and acknowledge now that there is a “Two China policy, and we're going to support Taiwan as an independent country”, and the “rest of the world should support them too and their democratically elected leadership”.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

By 1793, The War of (or in) the Vendee region (in France) exploded into a major counter revolution/insurrection against the French Revolution.  With the European war also going bad, the Committee of Public Safety took drastic measures to stop the insurrections.  In the fall of 1793, the former Queen Marie Antoinette  met the same fate as her husband had nine months earlier.  Public opinion of the Jacobins began to turn against them and by the summer of 1794, one of its chief architects and voices, Maximilien Robespierre, was executed by the guillotine.  These same few years are also noted for the infamous Reign of Terror. President Richard Nixon visited China in February 1972.  The first American President to visit the Peoples Republic of China.  His meetings with Mao Zedong led to the Shanghai Communique.  That document, among many things, created the One China Policy concept.  Nixon also tried unsuccessfully to gain concessions or agreements with Chairman Mao on the Vietnam War. By 1973, the culture revolution had permeated every level of the nation.  Apathy and indifference set in causing, at least partially, shortages and rationing of critical items.  

In this episode of the ChinaPower Podcast, US Representative Ami Bera joins us to discuss Congress' view of China's growing power. Rep. Bera explains that China has been an issue of bipartisan agreement in the US House of Representatives, Senate, and the Biden administration. Specifically, he says there is bipartisan support for Taiwan, the One China Policy, and the Taiwan Relations Act, and notes that there are more varying opinions on issues such as cooperating with China on climate change. Rep. Bera also examines how Congress views Afghanistan, the South China Sea, and Taiwan, and justifies the need to increase Taiwan's participation in the international community. He argues that the best way for the US to compete with China is to invest domestically, specifically on issues related to infrastructure and immigration. Lastly, Rep. Bera describes a potential rocky future in US-China relations and explains that healthy competition between the two nations could improve both countries.  

Episode Notes:Today, we're going to talk about US-China relations, the upcoming Sixth Plenum , Xi Jinping, and what we might expect for the next year heading into the 2022 20th Party Congress among other topics. I'm really pleased that our first guest for the Sinocism Podcast is Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy China strategies Group, senior fellow at the Center for Strategic International Studies and former senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. 4:45 on US-China relations - I think their assessment is that it's working. In other words, by maintaining that sort of very strict line, they've gotten Madam Meng of Huawei fame home. They've gotten the trade discussions going again. They've got the US saying, "Well, we might lengthen the timeline for you to implement phase one." In other words, it's working from their perspective.13:30 on the 6th Plenum - The first I think is that, it would represent, I think the net evolution in what I call Xi Jinping's further development of his leadership supremacy. And, I use those terms very deliberately because often times, the shorthand we see in describing this as references to Xi's consolidation of power. Well, in my mind that took place very early on in his tenure. 30:00 on the economy and heading towards the 2022 20th Party Congress - Equally important in my mind is how little the leadership and the economic technocrats seem to be rattled by that fact. In other words, we're not seeing the stimulus wave. We're not seeing monetary policy adjustments in a significant way. There's a lot of study as she goes. And, that could change. We've got the central economic work conference, obviously in December, which will give us a sense of how they're thinking about next year. But like so many other things, I think we as watchers and the investment community and others, we're slow to sometimes break with old narratives. One of which is you must welcome a party Congress with very high growth. And every signal coming out of the leadership is that, they're not playing that game anymore. I think that's fairly strong.37:00 On US-China relations - I think if you're a senior US policymaker, your working assumption has to be that China's more likely to get it right than to get it wrong, even if they only get it 30% right or 40%, something like that…Chris Johnson:Xi is here and will be here for the foreseeable future. And therefore there won't be any change in the policies largely that he's articulated.Links: More about Chris Johnson and his China Strategies Group here.Transcript:Bill Bishop:Today, we're going to talk about US-China relations, the upcoming Sixth Plenum , Xi Jinping, and what we might expect for the next year heading into the 2022 20th Party Congress among other topics. I'm really pleased that our first guest for the Sinocism Podcast is Chris Johnson, CEO of Consultancy, China strategies Group, senior fellow at the center for strategic international studies and former senior China analyst at the Central Intelligence Agency. Welcome, Chris.Chris Johnson:Great to be here, Bill.Bill Bishop:Chris, welcome. I think today, what I really like to start out with is just an overview where you see the state of US-China relations and how the new administration, I mean it's 10 months now or thereabouts, but how the new administration is doing and how the Xi Jinping administration is reacting.Chris Johnson:Great. Yeah. Well, it's obviously a unique time in US-China relations. I guess, if I had to characterize it in a phrase, I would say, things are a bit of a mess. I think, if we start, it's useful to start at a sort of high order level and then work our way down in terms of thinking about the relationship. So I think at the highest order, one of the things that strikes me is that arguably for the first time, since normalization of relations, really, we're in this strange position where I think both countries, both leaders and perhaps increasingly, even both peoples, aren't overly keen to engage with one another.Chris Johnson:I think, we've had times in the past during the last several decades where maybe one side or the other was feeling that way, but not both. And the sense that I get in terms of the leader to leader view is, both Xi Jinping and President Biden are kind of looking at each other and saying, "I've got a lot going on at home. I'm very focused on what's happening domestically. I know the other guys out there and I need to pay attention to what he's doing, and right now it's all just his. But, if I can kind of keep him at arm's length, that's okay with me." And I think we're kind of seeing that really on both sides of the fence.Chris Johnson:I think for Xi Jinping, it's a little more intense in that it's hard to see where the good outcomes are for him and trying to lean in toward the relationship and so on, because he's kind of getting what he wants to some degree without doing. So, as to your question about how the administration is doing, I think to be fair, I think we have to say probably about as well as they could given both the domestic constraints, what we might call China's own attitudes and approach toward the relationship right now.Chris Johnson:On the domestic side, by constraints, I mean, the administration from my perspective seems to have an almost neurologically fearful stance of being seen as weak on China. Obviously that comes out of four years of the Trump administration and its approach toward China, stories and tales and recreations of history about how engagement was a failure and how the Obama administration was somehow a main sort of group that failed to understand the reality of the relationship and therefore blew it and a lot of those people are back now. And I think that contributes to this fear. And I think the practical impact of that is that, it's inhibited the administration from doing what I think they need to do, which is to have sort of an objective racking and stacking of what they believe China's global ambitions actually are. And then I think critically beyond that, which of those ambitions the US can live with, because in my assessment, we're going to have to live with at least some of them.Chris Johnson:And then to be fair to the administration, I think that same needed exercise has been hamstrung by China's own approach, which at least so far, I think we could probably characterize as an unflinching resistance that the US must adjust it's as they like to call it hostile attitude, if progress is going to be made. And, it's my sense that there's really little chance of progress of China's unwilling to move off of that stance. But at the same time, I think their assessment is that it's working. In other words, by maintaining that sort of very strict line, they've gotten Madam Meng of Huawei fame home. They've gotten the trade discussions going again. They've got the US saying, "Well, we might lengthen the timeline for you to implement phase one." In other words, it's working from their perspective.Bill Bishop:And, they presented two lists to Deputy Secretary of State Sherman. And, it certainly seems like there are some of the things on that list that are being worked through. To follow up though, what do you think the administration is doing around Taiwan? Because it seems like over the last couple of weeks, we've had quite a push from Secretary of State Lincoln and others on Taiwan and sort of whether or not it's giving them, returning them to the UN or in a seat or at least giving them more participation in UN bodies. What do you think is driving that and what do you think realistically, the administration believes the outcome's going to be because it certainly seems to be touching the most sensitive point on the Chinese side?Chris Johnson:Yeah. Well, my sense of it is that, regardless of the administration's intention, and I'm not entirely sure what the intention is, the results in Beijing are the same, which is to say that there would be a perception there that the US is unilaterally making a change to what they see as the cornerstone of the bilateral relationship, which is the US adherence to the One China Policy. And, if you're sitting in Beijing's shoes and you're hearing, you're seeing things in the press, you're hearing the president himself say, "Well, we will defend Taiwan." Oops. We didn't mean to say that, but it wasn't, but I didn't misspeak, and these sort of things, and a lot of that has to do with the domestic. Look, the Chinese have never doubted that the US would probably mount some kind of a defense. So, it's not really that issue if the Chinese were to attack. It's the accumulation of what they see as salami slicing erosion of the US commitment to the One China Policy.Chris Johnson:And so in my mind, the only relevant element here is not really the motivations, but what's going on in Xi Jinping's mind. Can he see all of this activity and basically respond by making the appropriate judgment about this erosion in the One China Policy and then quietly taking the appropriate adjustments on war planning and on other things? Or does he feel that with the accumulation of these things, whether it's the debate over whether or not to break with strategic ambiguity, changing the name of Taiwan's defacto embassy in Washington, all these sort things, does he feel that he needs to do something demonstrative now to kind of reset the balance, which was really the motivation behind their military exercises in 1995, '96, for example, when [inaudible 00:07:53] came to the United States?Bill Bishop:And of course back then, they had far less capability as they do now. I mean, certainly, I've heard different things and looked at different reports, but it does sound like the PLA has advanced quite rapidly around in areas that they would be able to bring to bear, to deal with Taiwan from their perspective. And that the US, I think is ... One of the things I worry about is just that there's certainly in some quarters in DC, it seems like there's a belief in the US military power that may not be fully rooted in the new realities of the sort of PLA modernization campaign that really has, I think, dramatically accelerated and did much more efficient under Xi Jinping.Chris Johnson:Yeah, definitely. And primarily to the degree, there's been a chief innovation under Xi's leadership. They've finally taken the steps to address what we might call the software issues. In other words, the technology, the hardware, the shiny kit has been being developed since that '95, '96 period. And they've got some very interesting and capable systems now. But the software, the ability to actually conduct joint operations, these sort of things was always a fall down point for them. And then massive restructuring of the PLAs force structure, much along the lines of sort of Goldwater-Nichols that Xi launched early in his tenure is now bearing a lot of fruit and making them more capable from that sort of software side of things as well.Bill Bishop:And that restructuring, that was something that the PLA or that they talked about doing before but had never, no other leader had been able to push it through.Chris Johnson:Correct.Chris Johnson:Even Deng Xiaoping, who himself tried to do sort of a similar restructuring in the aftermath of Tiananmen and in the aftermath of the Yang period.Bill Bishop:That's interesting. I remember we talked when she convened the second Gutian meeting with all the generals that look clearly in retrospect was the kickoff to I think, a massive corruption crackdown inside the PLA.Chris Johnson:No. I call it political shock and awe which was the twin aspect of force restructuring and the anti-corruption campaign in the military, which basically the back of the PLAs political power in the system from my perspective.Bill Bishop:Interesting. So, well now moving on to politics, we have the Sixth Plenum. That starts in on the 8th of November, I believe. Can you talk a bit about why those plenums are important and what might be especially interesting about this one? Because, one of the things that we keep hearing about, and certainly there are rumors, but there's also, I think, some certainly the way they describe the agenda for the plenum in the official Xinhua release a couple weeks ago. It sure sounds like they're going to push through a third historical resolution.Chris Johnson:Yeah. No, my sense is that's a forgotten conclusion pretty much at this point. To your first question about why plenums are important. In my mind, I think they're employing both mechanically and substantively. Mechanically, having one once a year, since the reform and opening period started really, and really per the requirement in the party's constitution, that happened once a year. That has been fundamental, I think, to signaling both domestic audiences and international audiences that things in China are relatively stable. So, just look at the brouhaha that that occurred, for example, in this current central committee cycle that we're in the 19th central committee where Xi Jinping snuck in effectively an extra plenum early in the process in early 2018 to get the changes to the constitution about term limits put out there, which then meant they had to advance the third plenum from its normal position in that fall, after a party Congress to the usual second plenum, which manages the national people's Congress changes, personnel changes and so on.Chris Johnson:And then, a perception that the fourth plenum therefore had been delayed because it was more than a year before it actually took place. And you'll recall as well. And we talked a about it at the time, all the speculation. Oh, this means Xi Jinping's in trouble and so on and so forth, non-sense from my point of view. So, that's the mechanical aspect.Chris Johnson:Substantively, obviously I think they're important because outside of the political work report that the sitting party general secretary delivers at the five yearly party congresses, the decision documents as they're usually called that come out of the plenums really reflect the most authoritative venue for the party leadership to signal their priorities, their preoccupations and the policies, of course. And of course, there have been some very important plenums in the party's history, most notably the third plenum of the 11th central committee, which at least the official version is that's when reform and opening was launched. There's a lot of debate about whether that's true or not.Chris Johnson:But, turning to the upcoming six plenum, I think they have made it, as I said, a moment ago, pretty clear that there will be a history resolution. Obviously, there's only been two previous ones in the history of the party. One in 1945 and the other by Mao Zedong and the other in 1981 from Deng Xiaoping, largely closing the book on the mount period, and the culture revolution and so on. So from my perspective, if they do do it this time and I think they will, it it's important for several reasons. The first I think is that, it would represent, I think the net evolution in what I call Xi Jinping's further development of his leadership supremacy. And, I use those terms very deliberately because often times, the shorthand we see in describing this as references to Xi's consolidation of power. Well, in my mind that took place very early on in his tenure.Chris Johnson:I think, he's been there for a good long while. And so, this is just about further articulating his leadership supremacy. And indeed I think, his genius really from the beginning was to frame the party's history in these three distinct eras, each roughly 30 years from the founding of the PRC to Mao's death, Deng's reform, an opening period, and now Xi Jinping's so-called new era. And in fact, I think his signature political achievement, among many political achievements that he's had, has been to canonize that framing these three epics under the banner of Xi Jinping thought with on Chinese characteristics for the new era, so long I can never remember. Let's just call it Xi Thought for shorthand. Yes. And I think, he used it to both effectively erase his two immediate predecessors Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao from history, which is important and also simultaneously to vault past Deng Xiaoping in the pantheon of ideology by getting the autonomous thought. And of course, the next iteration will be to truncate Xi Jinping thought for horribly long name.Bill Bishop:Well, and there are multiple variants. There's thought on diplomacy. There's thought on economics. There's thought on law. Chris Johnson:All of that. And I think, the other thing is this ideological crowning, obviously, the significance of it lies in the codification and probably the legitimization then of the sum of all of his actions and pronouncements since he came to power and the equating of those developments and those statements with the party's line. And as you and I have discussed many times, to criticize Xi now then is not just to attack the man, but to attack the party itself. That's very dangerous. And if you're going to do it, you better get it right.Bill Bishop:To that point, isn't that part of his political genius, because he must have, that must have been by design, right?Chris Johnson:Oh, absolutely. It was completely by design and there was a reason I think why Xi, amongst recent leaders, was the one who, if you spoke to people for example, in the party, the central committee department for party history research, they would say when he was vice president leader in training, he actually cared about party history. Jiang and Hu didn't really care, or at least it wasn't a priority for them. It was very meaningful for Xi Jinping, I think for those reasons. And so, this new history resolution, I think, is important in helping him continue this process toward the next revolution, which is to truncate Xi Jinping thought.Chris Johnson:I think, in terms of the substance of a new resolution, it's my sense that there's a tension, not just in Xi's mind, but perhaps in the leadership circles of the people who are working on this thing, between a desire to make that document, only celebratory and forward looking, in other words, why the new era is so amazing versus a desire to tidy up, if you will, some of the bits from history that he doesn't like with criticism, which of course in a very similar fashion to say, Deng Xiaoping 1981 when criticizing the excesses of the cultural revolution. So in my mind, there's two aspects where that criticism could come to the fore, which are very valuable. The first is, will he do in effect to Deng what Deng did to Mao, which is to criticize the excesses of Deng Xiaoping's reform and opening policies.Bill Bishop:Which would be including criticizing then at least indirectly Hu and Jiang who are still alive.Chris Johnson:Well, we'll come back to that in a minute because I think it's a separate animal, but on the reform and opening piece, it very much relates obviously to common prosperity, to the new development concept. I'm seeing right over the last several months, but I think there's a separate aspect from that kind of economic excesses. There is this line. It was a very fascinating. You never want to put too much emphasis on one piece of propaganda, but I believe it was the 24th of September, People's Daily had their latest iteration in the Xi Jinping thought question and answer series. And, it was about kind of party leadership and so on and so forth. And there was a fascinating line in there in my mind, which was the quote was especially after the 18th party Congress in view of quote, the neglect dilution and weakening of the party's leadership for a period of time.Chris Johnson:Now, what period of time is he talking about? He's talking about the tenures of Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao. So once again, further re-raising them from history, boosting his own stature and creating a justification for him to certainly rule for a third term. And, who knows beyond that?Bill Bishop:And, having a historical resolution, the third one then really does create the third era, right?Chris Johnson:No. It formalizes the kickoff, if you will, of that new era. Yeah.Bill Bishop:And that's why, I struggle with sort of lots of the rumors. Xi's weak. Xi's up or he's down or there's the latest one is he won't travel abroad because he is worried about a coup. "Hey, it's Chinese politics." Maybe it's true, but it seems a little bit of a stretch to me. But, I look at, again, back to his ... You hear lots of things. And certainly, when I was in Beijing and sort of the, probably not now but back then, the Beijing chattering class. He was never the smart guy. He was always kind of slow. And yet, here we are. And here he is. And so I think, he may not be the best educated of Chinese leaders in some formal perspective, but he certainly seems to be as politically savvy as Deng or Mao.Bill Bishop:I mean, he certainly seems to have surpassed Jiang and Hu, but I think one of the things too, back to this question of, is he weak or will he be around? What's going to happen to the 20th plenum? One of the things I go back to is, when he got, Xi Jinping fought and appended, whatever you want behind it, it's a 19 party congress. Doesn't that basically mean though, that as long as Xi's alive, he's kind of the man? [crosstalk 00:20:16] Even, if someone else has the job title, unless the party changes his line and gets rid of Xi's thought, which seems like it would be extremely difficult for a whole bunch of reasons, ultimately as long as he's breathing, isn't he caught up kind of running the show.Chris Johnson:Yes.Bill Bishop:Or, is that too simplistic?Chris Johnson:Very much the case. And in fact, again, his interest in not just Chinese communist party history, but the communist movements history, you can have no Khruschev secret speech. If you do these sort of things, at least while he's alive, to your point. And I think, that's a very important aspect of what he's trying to do here. He's creating the conditions for him to be able to engage in, to steal Barry Naughton’s term for the economy, grand steer edge of the entire system, and I think, that's a very, very important aspect. And just to your point on the intellectual stuff, because I think it's important, there's a difference between book smarts and political street fighting skills. And probably, his education was disrupted. So probably, he may not be God's gift to intellect, but there's no question in my mind that from a political acumen point of view, he's a genius, a tactical genius.Bill Bishop:And, if you think about what his primary book education was when he was in his most formative years, it was Mao thought.Chris Johnson:Yeah. No, definitely. And, I just want to come back to that too, because I think it's so important on what could be the meaning, if you will, of this new history resolution, which is that Xi Jinping clearly has a problem with the period of the nineties and what I actually like to call the early naughties in both of their-Bill Bishop:Otherwise known as the Go-Go Years..Chris Johnson:and being naughty. Yeah. The wild west days. And I think, he feels also that the period in the run up to when he took power ahead of the party Congress in 2012, he in many ways saw that as the period of maximum danger for the party. And so, this will be criticized. There's no way in my mind there won’t be some mention of our friends Bo Xilai,and the characters that were purged at that time, maybe not specifically, but in the sideline propaganda and so on, I'm sure will come up.Bill Bishop:So, because one thing when you talked about the resolution, I mean, and what will be in it and sort of how do you balance the sort of criticism or judgment on the past 30 years with forward looking, I found it interesting in yesterday's People's Daily. I had it in the newsletter yesterday, was that very long piece by the sort of the pen name for the People's Daily theory department on Chinese style modernization, which was very forward looking, but also very global looking in terms of talking about how China has created this new style modernization and how it can be a sort of applicable to other countries. And so, tying that back a little bit to your earlier comment about sort of trying to understand, as you said, the administration's rack and stack, how do we sort of go through what we think they're global, the PRCs global ambitions are and what can we live with what we can, what do you think their global ambitions are?Chris Johnson:Well, there are a series of them in their region, certainly, and we can talk. There's endless debate about whether it extends globally and if so, on what timeline, but they certainly want to be seen as a major superpower. No question. I often like to say that their goal in the region certainly, and I think increasingly globally, is that they want countries when a country is thinking of doing something significant in terms of its policies, the leadership and Xi Jinping himself would like that country's leadership to think about how Xi Jinping's going to react to this in the same moment that they think about how will the US react to this? That's what they're after.Chris Johnson:And in my mind, as to whether it is a desire to subvert the rules based global international order and so on, I'm much more skeptical, I think, than a lot of our colleagues on that in part, because implicit in that is this notion of them sitting around in the Politburo meetings, stroking long beards and looking 50 years into the future. They have an inbox too, and they're not infallible nor are they press the end all the time. And, I just think that, it's too much of a teleological view, from my point of view, but that's certainly one of them.Chris Johnson:And I think, this ties to the history resolution bill, because, Xi, in my mind, needs or wants kind of three things from that. The first is, he too needs to create a justification for staying in power. The reality is, no one can stop what he's trying to do next year, or at least that's my opinion, but what they can do is build leverage for the horse trading for all the other positions that will be in play. If he can be criticized, as someone I spoke to about this situation put it to me, even Mao had to launch the cultural revolution to take control over the party again. In other words, even someone of his stature had to do that.Chris Johnson:Second, and it touches on what we were just discussing is his obsession with China breaking through the middle income trap to further prove the legitimacy of the country. And that means breaking from the old economic model. And third, also relevant to our comments just now is, he sees all of this as intimately bound to what we might call the global narrative competition with the US. In other words, if he can be seen as breaking through the middle income trap, doing a better job than the west on income and equality and so on, he sees that paying tremendous dividends for elevating China system.Bill Bishop:At least so for on dealing with COVID. It's paid dividends.Chris Johnson:Absolutely. Yeah. And, indeed further legitimizing the notion that they have found some third way between capitalism and socialism that not just works for them, but increasingly could be exportable.Bill Bishop:Right. So, it's not like everyone has to become a Marxist, Leninist exactly country, or people's dictatorship, but we have this China, this China solution, I think they call it. And certainly, one thing that's interesting too, I think is, and it hasn't gotten a lot of attention yet in more mainstream media, is this global development initiative that she announced at his speech to the UN in September, which now he is regularly bringing up in his calls with developing countries.Bill Bishop:And, it looks to me like it's effectively taking, it's a way of packaging up their lessons from the poverty alleviation campaign that they declared victory in early this year, and trying to take that global. And quite honestly, the world needs more positive development and if China's offering something that's reasonably attractive in the US or Europe isn't, then how can the US criticize these countries for signing onto it?Chris Johnson:No. I'm mean, increasingly, we always want to say, "Well, nobody wants to sign on to their model" or "It doesn't work in other places", but increasingly, what's the narrative that they're touting? One of it is, "Hey, we brought X hundred million people out of poverty." That's very attractive to some other countries. We have a system that works. We have a system that is tolerant of various and sundry approaches, doesn't insist that you change your governance structure or that you support human rights or avoid graft, and things like this. It's very attractive. But the global development initiative, I think in my mind, increasingly, it's sort of an agglomeration of the BRI aspects. And then, there's been so much attention of recent weeks about, particularly Wang Huning's dream weaving of cultural hegemony and all of these sort of//.Bill Bishop:I think people are a bit overindexing a bit on Wang Huning. [crosstalk 00:28:22] important.Chris Johnson:I know they are. I mean, the line I like to use is they're confusing the musician with the conductor.Bill Bishop:Okay. Oh, so you must be up to date on Xi Jinping thought on music. That's good.Chris Johnson:Exactly. Eventually.Bill Bishop:So, I mean, back to the plenum, moving forward from the next year to the 20th party Congress. I mean, normally, the year before a party Congress is a very, very politically sensitive and difficult year where you have the entire system is geared towards the party Congress and basically one not screwing up. And two, anticipating where the people or persons making the decisions on promotions want you to go in terms of policies. And so, in some way, usually it kind of freezes the system. Is there some risk of a fairly difficult year with China? Because, you've got clearly the economy is, I don't want to say struggling, but it's clearly not doing as well as they hoped.Bill Bishop:They seem to continue to be pushed pretty hard on the third tough battle of reducing financial risks. And specifically, I think evergrande is the poster child of that right now. But, what do you think she believes needs to happen over the next year? And what do you think that means for sort of the stuff, a lot of investors feel worried about around real estate, common prosperity? I mean, it just feels like for the first time in a while, things on the economic side at least look a little bit rickety right now.Chris Johnson:No. I agree with that general assessment. Equally important in my mind is how little the leadership and the economic technocrats seem to be rattled by that fact. In other words, we're not seeing the stimulus wave. We're not seeing monetary policy adjustments in a significant way. There's a lot of study as she goes. And, that could change. We've got the central economic work conference, obviously in December, which will give us a sense of how they're thinking about next year. But like so many other things, I think we as watchers and the investment community and others, we're slow to sometimes break with old narratives. One of which is you must welcome a party Congress with very high growth. And every signal coming out of the leadership is that, they're not playing that game anymore. I think that's fairly strong.Chris Johnson:This also comes back to the issue though of what I mentioned earlier about the politics. It's been quite striking to me given what a momentous occasion is happening next year, how little in the analysis of the crackdowns, the tech lash, these sort of things, property sector, how little attention's being paid to the political dimension. So for example, if you look at sort of this issue that I raised a moment ago of the danger for Xi is not someone's going to stop him or unseat him, but this issue of ... I think, my sense is he views the model of the changeover next year as being the ninth party Congress where I believe there was something like 80% turnover in the central committee.Bill Bishop:This was the 1969 during the middle of the cultural revolution.Chris Johnson:Yeah, in the midst of cultural revolution.Bill Bishop:And, the eighth party Congress was not five years before it was. There was quite a gap.Chris Johnson:Yeah. Huge gap. Yeah. And so, if he would like to sweep away that kind of level of changeover, that means getting rid of a lot of the dead wood of the other constituent groups, let's call them. And I think, his ability to do that is closely tied to whether they can criticize and what are the KPIs that he has put out for himself for this current term, and you just raised them. It's poverty alleviation, environmental improvement, and "guarding against financial risk". I think, we can say on the first two, he's done very well. On the third, it's a bit of a disaster.Chris Johnson:So the message, and I'm told that this was sort of some of the discussion on the margins of Beidaihe this year was that, you've got a year or arguably eight months because of the way the system does these things to get that grade on financial risk from a C-, D+ to an A, and poor Liu He in the role of having to figure out how to make that happen operationally. And I think to your point, oftentimes, we do get that paralysis as everybody's kind of looking over their shoulder. But if anything, I think these guys are more inclined to show they're overfulfilling the plan, if you will, in terms of representation and implementation. So, the risk in my mind is not that the various crackdowns will calm down or smooth out, it's that in their zeal to look like they're doing what the boss wants them to do to hopefully be promoted, they might badly over correct. And that I think, has applications for how they handle Evergrande and many of the other associated crackdowns.Bill Bishop:That's an interesting point. And, one of the things I wonder about because it just seems like she has been quite skillful at finding opportunity and what looks like messes. And, if we're looking at an evaluation in the last 30 years, sort of the historical resolution idea, certainly there's a lot to criticize about the economic model. I mean, they criticize it on a regular basis in terms of trying to transition the new development concept. It's an effectively saying the old model doesn't work anymore. And, one of the biggest problems we created was this massive debt problem for China. Is there a cynical way of looking at it and saying, "Okay, if we have this, we being sort of see the top of the party, we have a fair amount of confidence because we've done a lot, so much work on hardening the system and the stability maintenance system that we can tolerate more stress than people think"?Bill Bishop:And, by letting these things get really stressed, does that help remove some of the dead wood in terms of sort of surfacing officials who might be promotable to actually look like they were somehow culpable for some of the decisions that led to things like ever grand or some of these other messes, and then that clears the way for other personnel moves?Chris Johnson:I think, that's certainly part of it. I think, that might be adopting to sort of micro of a frame on it. I think where it's important is, from the perspective of, again, this is Xi's political genius, from my perspective, is the layering of these narratives in the buildup toward a major change or a major development. So, why in the depths of the trade war? Did you start talking about a new long march? And hardship and sacrifice and all of these things, they're preparing the ground. In some reason, why are they maintaining a COVID zero approach? There's lots of reasons. But one of the reasons in my mind is if indeed you feel you must fundamentally break with that old, dirty economic model, which was largely export led, and you want dual circulation to work and you want these things, why not keep the border closed and force the system to transition because it must?Chris Johnson:So, there's a number of these things where I think, again, I don't like to claim that it's all some master plan, but I think there's a lot of thought that's gone into some of these things.Bill Bishop:But clearly, things like the energy crisis, I mean, they clearly have ... There are a lot of moving parts that can blow up pretty quickly. And so I think, to your earlier point, the politics are always in command in China. I think they're more in command now, but it does just feel like the risks or the downside risks on the economy are greater than they've been in a while.Chris Johnson:Yeah. I mean, my sense is, again, what do the officials and particularly the economic technocrats see as the greatest risk? I think they think the great as risk is overdoing it, not underdoing it at this stage.Bill Bishop:Interesting. So, well, thanks. Anything else you want to talk about?Chris Johnson:No, I think I kind of covered the waterfront. I mean, I guess in summation, I would just say and it maybe kind of comes back nicely to US-China relationship and so on. Discussing what we've just been discussing, I think if you're a senior US policymaker, your working assumption has to be that China's more likely to get it right than to get it wrong, even if they only get it 30% right or 40%, something like that.Chris Johnson:Xi is here and will be here for the foreseeable future. And therefore there won't be any change in the policies largely that he's articulated. And if we have those as our working assumptions, I think we will find ourselves framing a better policy. And I guess, if it doesn't go that way, you could be "pleasantly surprised" or whatever you want to say. But is it really a pleasant surprise if you have a leadership crisis in China?Chris Johnson:I mean, this is another thing I think just in conclusion that I find very striking in the absence of information. And I think, one of the challenges for us as watchers, when a collective leadership system like we had before goes away, each one of those collective, all seven or nine, depending on the timeframe of the standing committee members, they all had coteries under them and so on and so forth. In other words, there was a lot of places to tap in to get insight and compare notes. And so, with Xi Jinping, it's a very small circle, clearly. Even Kurt Campbell and other US officials have discussed their frustration with not being able to get in the inner circle.Chris Johnson:And therefore, people just find themselves going to these memes such as, well, they're will inevitably be a succession crisis when Xi Jinping leaves the scene. In my mind, the biggest opportunity for a massive succession crisis in the history of the PRC was Mao's death. And yet, they managed to find a way largely through Deng Xiaoping. But I think in general, because there was a collective understanding that this whole thing's going to unravel if we don't get it together, China's not so worried about that, nor am I worried about an imminent invasion of Taiwan, but that's probably another podcast.Bill Bishop:That was a whole different podcast. And so ... No. Well, look, thank you so much. It's really great as always to talk to you. And, I do hope I can get you back on as a guest at some point.Chris Johnson:Always glad to do so. Anytime, Bill. And, your newsletter in my mind is the best thing out there in terms of keeping me up to speed and subsequently informed every day.Bill Bishop:Thank you. I didn't pay him to say that just to be clear. But, great. Thank you, Chris. Get full access to Sinocism at sinocism.com/subscribe

Liệu việc Đài Loan kiên cường kháng cự, tăng cường phòng thủ và liên kết đồng minh có làm suy suyển quyết tâm thống nhất đất nước của Chủ tịch Trung Quốc Tập Cận Bình?

The United States, the People's Republic of China, and Taiwan have danced on the knife's edge of war for more than seventy years. A work of sweeping historical vision, A World of Turmoil offers five case studies of critical moments in these relationships: the end of World War II and the start of the Long Cold War; the almost-nuclear war over the Quemoy Islands in 1954–55; the détente, deceptions, and denials surrounding the 1972 Shanghai Communiqué; the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1995–96; and the rise of postcolonial nationalism in contemporary Taiwan. In the book, Hartnett explores how each country's communication style structured these events and reveals that leaders in all three nations have fallen back on crippling stereotypes and self-serving denials in their diplomacy. The first study of its kind, this provocative book merges history, rhetorical criticism, and advocacy in a tour de force of international scholarship. By mapping the history of miscommunication between the United States, China, and Taiwan, A World of Turmoil shows where and how these entwined relationships have gone wrong, clearing the way for renewed dialogue, enhanced trust, and new understandings. Stephen J. Hartnett is a professor in the communication department at the University of Colorado Denver. He served as the 2017 president of the National Communication Association, and is the co-founder and coorganizer of the Biennial Conference on Communication, Media, and Governance in the Age of Globalization, and the Shenzhen Forum on Communication Innovation, New Media, and Digital Journalism.Stephen's book A World of Turmoil: The United States, China, and Taiwan in the Long Cold War is available at msupress.org and other fine booksellers. You can connect with the press on Facebook and @msupress on Twitter, where you can also find me @kurtmilb.The MSU Press podcast is a joint production of MSU Press and the College of Arts & Letters at Michigan State University. Thanks to the team at MSU Press for helping to produce this podcast. Our theme music is “Coffee” by Cambo. Michigan State University occupies the ancestral, traditional, and contemporary Lands of the Anishinaabeg – Three Fires Confederacy of Ojibwe, Odawa and Potawatomi people. The University resides on Land ceded in the 1819 Treaty of Saginaw.Thank you all so much for listening, and never give up books.

Lithuania has certainly not been shy about bucking the status quo in terms of relations with Beijing. Whether it be committing to a fight for freedom “from Belarus to Taiwan”, a withdrawal from the 17+1 format, or a resolution on the Uyghur situation in China, the small Baltic nations has been eager to make its voice heard. As of late, this has been most vocally displayed in terms of tighter ties with Taiwan. This culminated in the summer, with the announcement that Taiwan is opening its representative office in Vilnius and will utilize its name, Taiwan, rather than other nomenclature typically utilized to placate the One China Policy. Of course, this has been met with fiery criticism from prominent Chinese diplomats and state media outlets, warning of dire consequences. In the latest episode, we sit down with two experts on both international relations and economics to assess Lithuania's trajectory as of late as well as the potential for China's punishment. This Month's Guests: Konstantinas Andrijauskas, Associate Professor of Asian Studies and International Politics at Vilnius University Vilém Semerák, Senior Lecturer, Institute of Economic Studies at Charles University in Prague. Economic Researcher, CERGE-EI. Show Notes: Taiwan, Lithuania, and a Small Country's Big Challenge to Beijing Taiwan and Lithuania's Ties Grow Tighter China, Russia can cooperate to punish Lithuania: Global Times editorial Taiwan visit shows Czech Republic can resist China retaliation

The One China Policy is rarely reported on accurately... but there is a reason for that

The Olympics approach. The IOC needs an army and business people say no. One more week of the same. Subscribe https://link.chtbl.com/2fBCyWGa Leave a question or comment at https://www.speakpipe.com/VelociPodcast

Bắc Kinh luôn nói rằng chỉ có một nước Trung Hoa và hòn đảo nổi dậy Đài Loan là một phần của Trung Quốc. Hoa Kỳ công nhận chính sách đó nhưng có vẻ bắt đầu lo không thể ngăn Trung Quốc xâm lược Đài Loan bằng vũ lực.

04/12/2021 US"One China Policy" Drive CCP Crazy

And just how likely is an invasion?Tensions over Taiwan have recently escalated from tough talk to increased military activity, most notably with China showcasing its growing military strength in a clear display of the power it could bring to bear on the island it sees as a breakaway province.China has long made reunification with Taiwan one of its long-term goals, ideally without the need for the use of force - but with sentiment in Taiwan increasingly turning towards independence, US-China relations deteriorating, and the ‘One China Policy' seemingly under threat, there is concern that rather than continue to exert cultural, diplomatic and economic pressure to achieve that aim, it may instead turn to its growing military might to take the island by force.Such a concern might have been unthinkable not too long ago - but we will take a look at the Chinese military advancements that mean even US officials are now warning that China could take Taiwan militarily in the next six years.Intelligence Fusion's assessment is based on our day-to-day monitoring of the security landscape in Taiwan. If you'd like to take a closer look at the intelligence that supports our analysis, get access to a 14-day free trial: https://hubs.ly/H0nk-FG0Enjoyed this episode of The Insight? Here's some more content you might like:- How to use threat intelligence as a security consultant: https://hubs.ly/H0GHlcW0- How to conduct an effective route threat assessment: https://hubs.ly/H0HvhkW0And don't forget to like, share and subscribe. ☑️

In contrast to the outgoing Trump Administration, there are disturbing signs that the new Biden Administration in the US will revert to the unsuccessful appeasement strategy of eight years of the earlier Obama presidency. While Barack Obama pontificated, looked professorial and twiddled his thumbs, China essentially captured the South China Sea. Given a Biden administration full of rehabilitated Obama-era relics, it is likely China will feel emboldened.A signal indication of this likely U-turn was the fact that the very word “Indo-Pacific” was omitted by Biden in a major policy speech, reverting to the old and tired “Asia Pacific”. This was duly noted by the Chinese mouthpiece Global Times, and surely seen as a dog-whistle by Beijing’s America-watchers.The consequences of abetting Chinese hubris are unclear at the moment, but a forced annexation of Taiwan is certainly not off the table. Nor is a physical invasion of Japan’s Senkaku islands. And a massive Himalayan attack on India in Ladakh or anywhere along the Line of Actual Control is entirely possible. It is in this context that a series of moves by incumbent Foreign Secretary Mike Pompeo needs to be evaluated. The fact is that, despite what the usual suspects say, there have been significant wins in Trump’s foreign policy. Just three: unlike his predecessors, he didn’t go to war; Israel has signed peace agreements with several neighbors; and he pushed back, hard, against China. One could legitimately question the downsides of exiting the Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Paris accord on climate change, or the Iran nuclear treaty; but none of them is an unequivocal error. And one could suggest that by pushing back on European allies, Trump has forced them to be more responsible. The hard line against China, however, is the most important, and it is tempting to think that there is a bipartisan consensus in the US that China has become Enemy No. 1, no ifs, thens and buts. But if you consider the Obama legacy (for example, an ex-aide at UC San Diego is practically a spokesperson for China), and how many of them are in the Biden Administration, there is reason to worry.There is, for example, with John Kerry back in the Cabinet, the possibility that, in the zeal to get back in the good graces of the global-warming mafiosi, Biden will bend over backwards to appease China. I would be saddened, but not amazed if he even accepts the 9-dash line in the South China Sea as China’s territorial waters!The 9-dash line, for which China makes highly dubious ‘historical’ claims using some old maps, in effect suggests that the entire South China Sea belongs to China. In reality, there has been no time in history when China dominated that sea, and it is a major economic lifeline, as a great deal of gloabal trade passes through it via the Straits of Malacca. The rest of the world cannot sit by and allow China to deny FON (freedom of navigation) in these open seas. Thus the importance of the single-minded steps taken by Pompeo. For instance, he recently said the following regarding the Wuhan Virus (aka COVID-19):Wuhan Virus: CCP covered it up. CCP disappeared the doctors who knew. CCP still refuses to let the world in to see what it wrought. CCP lied about where the virus came from. CCP closed travel inside China and allowed the world to suffer. America invents vaccines for the world. Every human being can see this contrast.This was followed up by a fact sheet from the US State Department that squarely puts the blame for the virus on the Wuhan Institute of Virology, brushing aside the usual obfuscation about the “wet market” and so on:(https://www.state.gov/fact-sheet-activity-at-the-wuhan-institute-of-virology/). It stops just short of directly accusing the lab of having engineered the virus. The charade continues, however. A belated WHO fact-finding team found obstacles placed in its way, according to a January 5 report by CNN. The World Health Organization said that China has blocked the arrival of a team investigating the origins of the coronavirus pandemic, in a rare rebuke from the UN agency.On Taiwan, Pompeo, without necessarily violating the US’ long-standing “One China Policy”, eased restrictions on contacts between Taiwanese officials and American diplomats. That is only fair because China has a history of not abiding by the treaties or agreements it has signed, for instance the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Seas (UNCLOS). When the binding court of arbitration ruled in 2015 that China had violated the Philippines’ territorial integrity in the Scarborough Shoal, China simply ignored it. The arbitrator also found no merit to China’s ‘historical’ claim, based on some doubtful old maps, to the infamous “9-dash line” as its territorial boundary (which means almost the entire South China Sea). This too was ignored. Unilateral adherence by other signatories to treaties China signed is pointless, because China does not live up to its obligations: another instance is India’s concession by Vajpayee on Tibet. A good case can be made for India to abandon its own “One China” policy, considering China has no obvious “One India” policy: the latter interferes in J&K, questions Sikkim, and of course squats on Aksai Chin. There have been several other strong indications of US displeasure with China on human rights issues and trade, including over human rights violations in Chinese-occupied Tibet (CoT). Sanctions have been slapped on exports of Chinese-occupied Xinjiang (CoX) products such as cotton, based on systematic allegations of slave labor, forced sterilization, and denial of religious freedoms to Uighurs. The latest is the strong and unusually blunt statement on January 19th — that is, the very last day of the Trump administration — from the State Department accusing China of genocide. “I believe this genocide is ongoing, and that we are witnessing the systematic attempt to destroy Uighurs by the Chinese party-state,” Secretary of State Mike Pompeo said in a statement, adding that Chinese officials were “engaged in the forced assimilation and eventual erasure of a vulnerable ethnic and religious minority group.”The January 5 crackdown on protesters in Hong Kong against Chinese usurpation of democratic rights in that territory had also attracted Pompeo’s wrath.But the strategic South China Sea probably remains the most contentious issue, as Beijing builds up its military muscle and treats the sea as its inland lake, threatening freedom of navigation. It has long been obvious that China will attempt serious mischief. I said the following as far back as 1998 in “The Danger from China” https://www.rediff.com/news/1998/jun/15rajeev.htm:China is attempting to establish the South China Sea (the name has 'China' in it and so it must be China's private lake, you see) and its potential mineral (natural gas and oil deposits) as its own private property. The activities around the Spratly Islands, Mischief Reef, the Paracel Islands etc are well-known -- China simply walked in and grabbed these, paying no attention to prior Vietnamese, Malaysian, Taiwanese and Filipino claims, for instance.Thus the welcome decision by Pompeo on January 15th to impose travel bans and trade sanctions on violators. Says the report from the AP, reprinted in The Hindu:In its waning days, the Trump administration put in place travel bans on an unspecified number of Chinese officials and their families for what it said were violations of international standards regarding the freedom of navigation in those waters.The administration also said it was adding China’s state oil company, the China National Offshore Oil Corporation, to a list of companies with which U.S. citizens are banned from doing business…“The United States stands with Southeast Asian claimant states seeking to defend their sovereign rights and interests, consistent with international law,” Mr. Pompeo said.“We will continue to act until we see Beijing cease its coercive behaviour in the South China Sea.” This is as much a warning to China to behave as it is to the Biden administration to not attempt grandstanding and appeasement. After all, we are still experiencing massive human suffering and economic loss wrought by the Chinese-origin virus. There is a limit to how much forbearance the rest of the world can muster. I did go further in my 1998 predictions about Chinese misbehavior. Obviously I got the dates wrong, but my concerns may not be that far off the mark.My forecast is that, if unchecked, there will be continued Chinese military adventurism in Asia. I predict that by 2003, the Chinese will cross the Ussuri River and attack Russian Siberia, citing flimsy historical claims; impoverished Russians will have no way of defending themselves.Further, I suspect China will either threaten to, or actually conduct, an atmospheric nuclear blast over Japan by 2005, with the clear threat of frying all their transistors -- and thus infrastructure -- with an electromagnetic pulse. America will stand by, powerless, and its nuclear umbrella for Japan will turn out to be a fiction.China will almost definitely attack Taiwan by 2002; I wonder if it makes sense for India to befriend Taiwan, and perhaps even offer it certain nuclear components, including blueprints and enriched uranium, returning China's favour vis a vis Pakistan. The chances of China attacking India over Arunachal Pradesh have perhaps receded a little after India's clear indication that it will deploy nuclear missiles. The Chinese understand belligerence -- they practice it and respect it.I am no expert at global strategy, so I am quoting people who are: Caspar Weinberger, formerly US secretary of state, projected the Taiwan scenario to happen in 1998; the Economist suggests the Japan scenario. Well, okay, I made up the Siberia scenario myself: it stands to reason.As a confirmed China-hawk, I predicted doom:A couple of years ago, I read a review of a hugely successful Taiwanese book called Yellow Peril, in which a series of altercations between Taiwan and China end up in a few nuclear bombs being exchanged. I think the PRC attacks Taiwan, which retaliates with an atom bomb; Russian and American nukes enter the picture somehow. The final scene is yet another sorry exodus of Chinese -- by boat towards Australia, and by land over the Silk Road towards Central Asia. In the end, that is the issue, isn't it -- lebensraum?I really hope that Chinese belligerence does not lead to such a scenario. Even though China has come a long way economically and militarily, it shouldn’t overplay its hand. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com

01/09/2021 Washington: "One-China" Policy Dead

Pompeo Announced Withdraw the Restriction U.S. Taiwan Official Contact Level, Officially Terminate the U.S. "One China" Policy, What Big Action Will Happen? How Will Xi Teletabbies React ?

主持人：陳揮文 飛碟晚餐陳揮文時間，2020-1111，週三 ◎節目內容大綱： 第一段： 一，美媒開始事實查核 台要等到哪年 二，「守門人」重現江湖 拜川普所賜 三，美選弊端？ 川沒證據只空口白話 四，切斷SNG 美媒受不了川無的放矢 五，不甩通烏門 美媒推特臉書超嚴格 六，若美媒黑拜如黑韓 拜還能贏3%？ 七，若台事實查核 韓應不會輸到19% 八，韓不幫被80？ 第一時間火速聲援 九，封城秀吉？ 韓市府兵推綠媒亂黑 十，選舉勝負一回事 毀滅式手法惡劣 第二段： 一，美政權交接前 經濟繁榮跟誰對話 二，跟外交部談經貿 就是要打假球？ 三，TIFA從1994至今 台美都不想簽？ 四，川政權剩70天 談判價值意義何在 五，大內宣？ 民進黨要支持者幫分享 六，拜上川下 學者：台美軍售回不去 七，歐規川不隨 如何得知川規拜隨？ 八，美陸戰隊來台授課？ 美嚴詞否認 九，五角大廈：shot down, inaccurate 十，海軍大內宣 換來一句 One-China Policy 第三段： 每日一句2020-1111 蘇：豬若會講話一定覺得煩死了 狗吠火車2020-1111-281-3專訪變走人 周玉蔻訪蔡詩萍 一言不和蔡走人 美通訊投票弊端？ 周蔡各持己見 蔡詩萍：愚不愚蠢 聽眾會聽出來 飛碟電台全球叩應專線 02-2363-9955 ▶ Android https://reurl.cc/j78ZKm ▶ iOS https://reurl.cc/ZOG3LA ▶ 飛碟聯播網 http://bit.ly/2Pz4Qmo ▶ 飛碟晚餐陳揮文時間 http://bit.ly/2JOoLMg ▶ 飛碟聯播網FB粉絲團 https://www.facebook.com/ufonetwork921/ ▶ 網路線上收聽 http://www.uforadio.com.tw/stream/stream.html ▶ Podcast SoundOn : https://bit.ly/30Ia8Ti Apple Podcasts : https://apple.co/3jFpP6x Spotify : https://spoti.fi/2CPzneD Google 播客：https://bit.ly/3gCTb3G

Watch the video-friendly edition: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8KXpA6aqxt0 -- At the conclusion of the Chinese Civil War (1927 - 1949) in which the Republic of China led by then Chairman Chiang Kai-shek (Chiang Chung-cheng) was along with the remnants of his Nationalist Government and Army defeated and forced during "The Great Retreat" to relocate to the island of Taiwan by the victorious forces of the Chinese Communist Party led by then Chairman Mao Zedong (Mao Tse-tung) and his People's Liberation Army (PLA) which was the paramilitary wing of the CCP (and is now the official army of Modern China). The latter would establish itself at the end of the war as the sovereign ruler of mainland China and the former despite ambitions to restore its former territorial holdings, would go on to accept and adapt to its new reality, which to this day has been in defiance to the political prerogatives of Mao and his successors who to this day have been determined to finish off what to them is at most an illegitimate rump state that is from the perspective of policymakers in Beijing as now really nothing more than a "renegade province." What initially was under Chiang & his son a continuation of the political system of the mainland ROC (i.e. a de jure unitary parliamentary republic which in practice was de facto an autocratic, military dictatorship) would increasingly go following the end of the latter's tenure as President to develop as an increasingly distinct polity from that of its mainland counterpart with a younger population of native Taiwanese who despite being ethnically of Han stock, due to political & cultural factors, identify as being of their own nation and separate from the Chinese nation-state despite inheriting from Chiang and his ilk the claimed status of being the sovereign of mainland China, which to this day in 2020 has not been reformed or abolished. Even though millions of anti-Communist Chinese mainlanders fled along with the ROC and its armed forces in the mid 20th century, the younger generations of Taiwan have been favoring localization of the state and favor a brand of Taiwanese Nationalism which opts for a society more akin to the Western-style democratic states. Despite Taiwan having its own independent government and alternate political system as previously mentioned since 1949 (and never being de jure administered by the PRC), Beijing with its "One China Policy" is in no mood (for reasons I explained in this segment and will expound upon more in the future) to tolerate the existence of an ethnically Han Chinese polity that stands as a viable alternative to the PRC and its rise as one of the preeminent contemporary great powers. What further complicates this situation is the United States and its relationship with Taiwan, which much to the chagrin of Beijing, due to the geostrategic location and its history with the ROC, Washington has vowed through informal diplomatic agreements (see: Taiwan Relations Act) to come to the defense of Taipei and has especially under the current Administration of President Trump been increasingly expanding its commercial and military support of Taipei in spite of the constant ire of Beijing. Taiwan which under its current President, Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) stands in 2020 at a pivotal juncture following the re-election of Tsai in January, who is a staunch advocate of Taiwanese Independence and is collaborating with the Trump Admin. to resist escalating pressure from China to restore control of the island state by any & all means it can muster. What will happen next? -- CONNECT: @TJC: http://twitter.com/TJC @GetNuanced: http://twitter.com/GetNuanced Map: http://shorturl.at/zFNR8 Store: http://www.PeachiLabs.com/ Website: http://www.GetNuanced.com/ -- Thanks for listening! --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/getnuanced/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/getnuanced/support

How should India face China? 2 Options to be explored - Unilateral & Multilateral What are the three aggressive strategies that India Should take? 1. Review our stand on ONE CHINA POLICY 2. Strategy in Malacca Strait against China 3. Multilateral alliance with strong countries I have discussed in detail. Follow us on Twitter @thempspodcast Instagram - @thempspodcast Facebook - https://www.facebook.com/The-MPs-Podcast Post your valuable comments. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/thempstamilpodcast/message

This episode examines China’s engagement with Nepal and the trajectory of the China-Nepal bilateral relationship. Our guest, Mr. Gaurab Shumsher Thapa analyzes the impact of Xi Jinping’s 2019 visit to Nepal as well as China’s evolving political, security, and strategic interests in Nepal. Mr. Thapa explains the Nepalese government’s support of the “One-China Policy” and the importance of Nepal’s foreign policy of non-alignment. He also discusses China’s growing investment in Nepal and the ways in which China’s Belt and Road Initiative may improve the two countries’ economic relations in the future and promote the development of Nepal. Mr. Gaurab Shumsher Thapa is the president and managing director of the Nepal Forum of International Relations Studies (Nepal FIRST). Mr. Thapa is a member of the Nepal Council of World Affairs and a regular opinion writer for Asia Times.

Rep. Brad Wenstrup (@RepBradWenstrup) (R-OH) is a doctor, Army Reserve officer, and Iraq War veteran who sits on the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. I had Rep. Wenstrup on the podcast to discuss his views on  what he describes as an emerging new cold war with Communist China, and the weaponization and hyper-politicization of our national security and intelligence apparatus. What We Discussed The CCP’s tightening of the noose on Hong Kong Whether America should ditch the One-China Policy and recognize Taiwan Long-term fiscal dangers as a consequence of the coronavirus The railroading of General Flynn and Russiagate/Spygate Weaponization and hyper-politicization of the national security and intelligence apparatus, and whether it should be reformed The state of the FISA court and FBI Thanks for Listening! Check out other episodes, show notes and transcripts at benweingarten.com/bigideas. Subscribe, rate and review: iTunes | Stitcher | Google | YouTube Follow Ben: Web | Newsletter | Twitter | Facebook | LinkedIn Advertising & Sponsorship Inquiries: E-mail us. ___________ Backed Vibes (clean) Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com) Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 3.0 License http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/

China wants to invade Taiwan, which is practically a guarantee of World War III. We sit down with Ian Easton of the Project 2049 Research Institute to discuss the Chinese Communist Party's ultimate plan for the One China Policy, and how the United States would and should respond.

With a new administration in the White House, maintaining what is perhaps the country’s most crucial bilateral relationship remains a critical issue. Members of a high-level Task Force on U.S.-China Policy discuss their expert recommendations for the Trump administration. Speakers include Winston Lord, Former U.S. Ambassador to China and Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Orville Schell, Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at Asia Society; and Susan L. Shirk, Chair of the 21st Century China Center and Research Professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego. Series: "American Politics" [Public Affairs] [Show ID: 31952]

With a new administration in the White House, maintaining what is perhaps the country’s most crucial bilateral relationship remains a critical issue. Members of a high-level Task Force on U.S.-China Policy discuss their expert recommendations for the Trump administration. Speakers include Winston Lord, Former U.S. Ambassador to China and Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Orville Schell, Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at Asia Society; and Susan L. Shirk, Chair of the 21st Century China Center and Research Professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego. Series: "American Politics" [Public Affairs] [Show ID: 31952]

With a new administration in the White House, maintaining what is perhaps the country’s most crucial bilateral relationship remains a critical issue. Members of a high-level Task Force on U.S.-China Policy discuss their expert recommendations for the Trump administration. Speakers include Winston Lord, Former U.S. Ambassador to China and Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Orville Schell, Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at Asia Society; and Susan L. Shirk, Chair of the 21st Century China Center and Research Professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego. Series: "American Politics" [Public Affairs] [Show ID: 31952]

With a new administration in the White House, maintaining what is perhaps the country’s most crucial bilateral relationship remains a critical issue. Members of a high-level Task Force on U.S.-China Policy discuss their expert recommendations for the Trump administration. Speakers include Winston Lord, Former U.S. Ambassador to China and Former Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs; Orville Schell, Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at Asia Society; and Susan L. Shirk, Chair of the 21st Century China Center and Research Professor at the School of Global Policy and Strategy at UC San Diego. Series: "American Politics" [Public Affairs] [Show ID: 31952]

  Kevin Rudd served twice as Australian Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister and is currently the President of The Asia Society Policy Institute. He offers his perspective on the strangely confrontational phone conversation between President Donald Trump and Mr. Rudd’s successor as Prime Minister Malcomb Turnbull. He also discusses Trump’s exit from the Trans-Pacific Partnership, what this means for the other partner nations including Australia, and what a new Pacific trade bloc with China might look like. We talk about Trump’s Florida holiday with Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, his sudden embrace of the "One China Policy," and a wide range of security issues from a Nuclear North Korea to China’s man-made islands in the South China Sea. Plus how to throw a boomerang. To learn more about The Asia Society, visit www.asiasociety.org. You can visit Kevin Rudd’s website at www.KevinRudd.com and follow him on Twitter at @MrKRudd. Today's podcast is sponsored by GoDaddy. Visit www.GoDaddy.com and enter our promo code "KICK30" to get 30% off a new domain. Please subscribe to Kickass News on iTunes and take a moment to take our listener survey at www.podsurvey.com/KICK. And support the show by donating at www.gofundme.com/kickassnews. Visit www.kickassnews.com for more fun stuff.

ORLY-EP0143A - 3rd Week Of Donald Welcome to ORLYRADIO #143 recorded Friday February 10th, 2017 - where we dismantle the current events for your edutainment through mostly rational conversations that make you go ‘Oh Really’! I’m your host Andy Cowen, with my usual suspects, Stephen Griffith, Amber Biesecker, Fred Sims, Daniel Atherton, and JP.Audience Feedback From Previous Shows: We make mistakes. Please, if you find one, pause the podcast, and send us a note. orlyradiopodcast@gmail.com or phone it in 470-222-6759 Thank you to our Patreon Supporters!Donald DavisMelissa G.HenryDaniel DuncanDan SmithOrly Radio has Partnered with EpicProgress.com to do a daily damage report. It will be in this RSS feed so stay tuned and let us know how you like it. It is on the liberal side, but what else would a Daily opposition report be these days?Thanks to those Daily reports that frees up the show to deal with the larger issues. Trump has backpedaled on the One China Policy. Everything will continue to go through Beijing. This is perhaps his only rational foreign policy move to date. http://www.cnn.com/2017/02/10/asia/one-china-policy-explainer/The burden of being the leader of the free world is a tough job. So tough that the sitting president may not be able to stand it. http://www.politico.com/story/2017/02/donald-trump-challenges-governing-presidency-234879The 4th Estate, journalism, has had it’s up and down during the race to the whitehouse. It looks like Rupert Murdoch and company are feeling a little put out by journalists actually trying to do their jobs. They have been a little too critical of Donald and may be asked to reign it in over at the Wall Street Journal, and I would imagine a great many other Murdoch companies. http://www.politico.com/media/story/2017/02/gerry-baker-wall-street-journal-trump-newsroom-tensions-004928Public Policy Polling releases data showing that the Trump and policies are disliked, but are evenly divided on whether to impeach him http://www.publicpolicypolling.com/main/2017/02/americans-now-evenly-divided-on-impeaching-trump.htmlA poll indicates that 51% of Trump supporters polled believe the Bowling Green Massacre is legithttp://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/americas/donald-trump-supporters-bowling-green-massacre-real-kellyanne-conway-misspoke-masterminds-white-a7573701.htmlFederal agents conduct immigration enforcement raids in at least six stateshttps://www.washingtonpost.com/national/federal-agents-conduct-sweeping-immigration-enforcement-raids-in-at-least-6-states/2017/02/10/4b9f443a-efc8-11e6-b4ff-ac2cf509efe5_story.htmlAnd Finally, Donald Trump may have an unpresidented move up his sleeve. https://www.facebook.com/newsandguts/posts/212215372516772If you’ve enjoyed what we do here and would like to help us out, there are a few ways.You can donate to the show through www.Patreon.com/orlyradio and get early access to full show content.Make the Algorithm work for us by reviewing us on iTunes to boost our ranking.Use your Words and tell someone about us.And of course, engage us! Send us an message on the social medias or the electronic mails @ ORLYRADIOPODCAST@gmail.com or if you are the more talkative sort 470-222-ORLY (6759) is always ready to take your call or text. And if you don’t like what we’ve done here this evening, you can contact the National Suicide Prevention Hotline at 1-800-273-8255, available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. The Lifeline provides free and confidential support for people in distress, prevention and crisis resources for you or your loved ones, and best practices for professionals.Thank you for choosing us to waste your valuable time on! This has been ORLYRADIO, Part of The Random Acts Company. This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 3.0 United States License, including the music Rocket and Pamgaea created by Kevin MacLeod (www.incompetech.com)

Trump has agreed to honour ‘one China’ policy. This is a complete U-turn and the consensus is that it would help stabilise risk sentiment. Matt Brown, Independent Market Strategist, believes Trump’s phone call with China’s Xi with help ease tensions somewhat, however, it is still too early to rule out trade wars/currency wars with China. Brown also sheds light on the stellar China data released earlier today. Other key topics discussed in the segment are - Oanda FX sentiment, Italian banks, Outlook for US indices and Broker Recommendations. #Trump, #China, #US, #politics, #oneChinapolicy, #trading, #markets, #investing, #equities, #stocks, #indices, #forex, #currencies, #macro, #fundamentals, #technicals

South Africa's opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), now sees the ruling African National Congress (ANC) party's close ties to China as a vulnerability that the DA aims to exploit. Evidence of this new strategy came in December when the DA mayor of Pretoria, Solly Msimanga, made an independent trip to Taiwan, sparking immediate outrage from the Chinese government, the South African foreign ministry and the ANC who all decried it as a violation of SA's commitment to the "One China Policy." Independent Johanessburg-based journalist Ufreida Ho has been following the political drama set off by Msimanga's Taiwan visit and how China is fast becoming a divisive political issue in South African politics. Join the discussion. Do you think Msimanga was right to challenge Zuma by going to Taiwan or was it inappropriate for a local mayor to venture into international politics to make a point back home? Tell us what you think. Facebook: www.facebook.com/ChinaAfricaProject. Twitter: @eolander | @stadenesque

On today's episode of Loud & Clear, Brian Becker is joined by Anoa Changa, Editor at Large at the Progressive Army and host of the radio show The Way with Anoa, and by Walter Smolarek, producer of Loud & Clear.The electoral college convenes today after an intense period of Russia bashing. There is a well publicized effort to deny Donald Trump the number of 270 electors needed to take the presidency.Donald Trump’s phone call with Taiwan’s president violated a bedrock principle of U.S.-China relations, the "One China Policy", which Trump went on to say the U.S. is not bound by. Are these the opening moves in an escalation of U.S. hostility towards the country? David Ewing, chair of the San Francisco chapter of the US-China Peoples Friendship Association, joins the show. The number of people killed in Syria’s five year war is often cited as now being over 400,000, but can such numbers be independently verified, and how many of the dead are soldiers, civilians and opposition fighters? Sharmine Narwani, commentator of Middle East geopolitics, talks about how reported casualty numbers play a role in the forming public opinion on the war.