Podcasts about state tony blinken

1)Trump Proposes US Owning the Gaza Strip?: Last week Trump said in a meeting with Israel's PM at White House that he would take over Gaza from Israel, and redevelop it as a luxury resort. He explained the Palestinians would first be removed, but would be offered beautiful homes in Egypt and Jordan. Some claim this would be ethnic cleansing of Gaza? Is that true?2) Secretary of State Rubio Proposes El Salvador Prison Should Hold US Illegal Migrants?: Last week, on a trip to El Salvador, Rubio met with President of El Salvador, who offered to hold thousands of US illegal migrants, even US citizen criminals, inside his El Salvador mega-prison. Rubio welcomed the offer. What do you think?3)President Trump Issued Executive Order (EO) Sanctioning the International Criminal Court: Trump imposed financial and banking sanctions on the ICC and it's staff, including anyone who has connections to that court's operations, after declaring a US 'national emergency'. Why is he doing this?4)President Trump Revokes Security Clearances for former Secretary of State Tony Blinken and former President Joe Biden: In the last few days, Trump revoked the security clearance privileges usually granted to high level former US officials, specifically banning Blinken and Biden. Why did he do this?

Tucker Carlson has been at the center of significant controversy following his recent accusations against the Joe Biden administration. During the latest episode of his podcast, "The Tucker Carlson Show," Carlson made the sensational claim that the Biden administration attempted to assassinate Russian President Vladimir Putin. He stated, "The Biden administration did, they tried to kill Putin," which he described as "insane" and "demented." Carlson also suggested that this alleged attempt was part of a broader strategy to start World War III and sow chaos, citing former US Secretary of State Tony Blinken as an example of someone pushing for a real war.This assertion has sparked widespread criticism and controversy, as it lacks any concrete evidence to support it. Carlson's comments were made during a conversation with American writer and journalist Matt Taibbi, and they have further intensified the debate around Carlson's influence on media and politics.The Kremlin has reacted to Carlson's claim, with spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stating that Russian special services are constantly taking necessary measures to ensure Putin's safety. The Biden administration has not yet responded to these accusations.Carlson's recent remarks are part of a larger pattern of criticism against US military aid to Ukraine and his echoing of Kremlin talking points. He has also faced criticism for his previous statements, including describing Ukraine as "not a democracy" but rather a "tyranny" in American terms.In addition to these controversies, Carlson is also involved in new media ventures. He and former White House adviser Neil Patel are working to establish a new media company, which may utilize Twitter as its backbone. The company aims to raise hundreds of millions of dollars to fund its operations, with plans to offer extended content behind a paywall.Carlson's career has been marked by significant changes, including his ousting from Fox News in 2023 due to the network's legal issues related to the broadcast of false claims about electoral fraud in the 2020 US presidential election.Overall, Tucker Carlson's recent statements have reignited discussions about his influence on media and politics, highlighting the divisive nature of his commentary and the ongoing debates surrounding his role in public discourse.Thank you for listening to the Tucker Carlson news tracker podcast. Please subscribe for more updates and in-depth analysis.

Is there any progress with the hostage situation with Hamas? Welcome to Inside the Epicenter with Joel Rosenberg, where today we delve into the pivotal moments shaping Israel's future. In this episode, we explore the intense negotiations between Israel and Hamas over hostage releases and the burgeoning peace talks with Saudi Arabia. Host Joel Rosenberg brings you the latest updates, including President Biden's communication with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu and Secretary of State Tony Blinken's crucial visit to Israel. We'll also examine a fascinating new poll revealing American perceptions of Israel's war efforts and the Iranian threat. What breakthroughs could be on the horizon? Stay with us for an insightful analysis of these critical developments. (00:03) Hope grows for hostage deal and regional peace.(04:46) Saudi-Israeli prospects improve amid US optimism, poll.(06:22) 80% of Americans support Israel in the Hamas conflict.(09:55) Most Americans believe Iran is a significant threat.(13:49) Context shapes opinions on Israel's ceasefire policies.   Learn more about The Joshua Fund. Make a tax-deductible donation. The Joshua Fund Stock provided by DimmySad/Pond5 Verse of the Day: Isaiah chapter 61:12. The spirit of the sovereign Lord is on me because the Lord has anointed me to proclaim good news to the poor. He has sent me to bind up the brokenhearted, to proclaim freedom for the captives, and release from darkness. Prayer Request:Pray that God would give leadership in Israel the wisdom to negotiate well with Hamas and also to make the best of the opportunity for peace talks with Saudi Arabia. Related Episodes:Tal Heinrich - Hope Amidst Ongoing Threats #210Israeli Recounts CHILLING Oct. 7 Survival Story #199Fighting for Freedom: Inside the Israeli Hostage Crisis with Calev Myers #186Special Update: Israel at War #127 Discover more Christian podcasts at lifeaudio.com and inquire about advertising opportunities at lifeaudio.com/contact-us.

MISSION, Texas - U.S. Sen. John Cornyn says the U.S. is “almost” coming close to a trade war with Mexico due that country's failure to comply with an international water treaty. Speaking at a press conference held at the Mission Event Center, Cornyn said the Texas agricultural industry is facing an “existential crisis” because Mexico has not released water under the 1944 U.S.-Mexico water sharing treaty. “We've tried everything from diplomacy to threatening the withhold financing from Mexico, and we're not done yet. Unfortunately, the current administration has said that if we push too hard on Mexico to release the water that they're obligated to do under the 1944 treaty that they may push back,” Cornyn said. “But the fact of the matter is, as we have heard, Mexico continues to use that water to grow its own agriculture industry and then export that into the United States.” Cornyn said Mexico is keeping back water owed to the United States and using it to develop its own agricultural industry. He said it is then exporting that product to the United States. “You don't need to be a rocket scientist to figure out what that's going to mean to production agriculture here in the Rio Grande Valley,” Cornyn said. “But we're not going to let that happen. We're going to continue to push back on Mexico until they do the right thing, which is to release water they are obligated to under that 1944 treaty.” Cornyn said Mexico “routinely” holds back water it is supposed to provide the U.S. In the current cycle, he said, the hope was that the Biden Administration, and specifically Secretary of State Tony Blinken, could negotiate with the Mexican authorities. “Basically, they came away empty handed,” said Cornyn, referring to the Biden Administration. “As you heard today, their response was, ‘well, we don't want to push too hard, because Mexico might push back'. But the fact of the matter is, this is an existential threat to agriculture in the Rio Grande Valley.” With farmers, ranchers, and irrigation district managers from South Texas joining him for a roundtable discussion, Cornyn said: “We can't take no for an answer. We don't intend to take no for an answer. We're not looking to pick a fight. But we're not going to run away from the fight. We're going to use every tool in the toolbox.” One of those tools, Cornyn said, was withholding foreign aid to Mexico. “It remains to be seen whether that be necessary. Our goal really is to get Mexico's attention.” Cornyn said he hoped the incoming Sheinbaum Administration will be more receptive to the United States. “You've heard from some of the descriptions, Mexico has the routinely withheld water that it is obligated to provide under this treaty since 1944. It never really quite came home to me until I heard the explanation here how much Mexico, by withholding the water, can advantage their own domestic agriculture sector and then export it to the United States while withholding the water necessary for the United States to be able to grow those same products here in South Texas. “So, it seems to be that we're coming very close to almost a trade war with Mexico. We have long standing treaties, with NAFTA, the US-Mexico-Canada trade agreement. What we will insist upon is reciprocity. We will treat Mexico exactly the way we expect to be treated, and we expect that they will treat us the way we expect to be treated. That means with respect and putting them to the legal obligations contained in that 1944 treaty.”Go to www.riograndeguardian.com to read the latest border news stories and watch the latest news videos.

The legendary Roger Stone is with me today to discuss The stock market lost nearly $3 trillion dollars today as NASDAQ is down a historic 1,000 points. It's economic freefall as the world braces for a recession and the U.S. job market tanks. Trump accurately predicted this years ago as Americans continue to deal with the consequences of one of the worst administrations in U.S. history. Secretary of State Tony Blinken is bracing for impact as Hezbollah prepares an attack against Israel. The debate about debates rages on and Kamala still has not given a press conference weeks after Biden has stepped down. Roger Stone methodically breaks down where we are because of this administration, where we were when Trump was in office and how to beat Kamala come November. Featuring: Roger Stone Host | The Stone Zone Political Consultant | Lobbyist -- Available Now! Watch my documentary Front Row Joes or gift it to a friend at the links below. Front Row Joes https://frontrowjoes.movie/ Watch episode one of Front Row Joes now: https://watch.salemnow.com/series/zffpDnKocxu3-trumps-front-row-joes -- Sponsors: 4Patriots Get a FREE solar panel when you purchase the Patriot Power Generator 2000X. Just goto https://4patriots.com/SPICER Bishop Gold Secure your financial future starting now! Call 844-984-1616 or visit https://bishopgoldgroup.com/SEAN for a FREE investor's guide so you can begin your journey with precious metals investing! -- Subscribe and ring the bell for new videos: https://youtube.com/seanmspicer?sub_confirmation=1 Listen to the full audio show on all platforms: Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-sean-spicer-show/id1701280578 Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/32od2cKHBAjhMBd9XntcUd iHeart: https://www.iheart.com/podcast/269-the-sean-spicer-show-120471641/ Become a part of The Sean Spicer Show community: https://www.seanspicer.com/ Follow The Sean Spicer Show on social media: Facebook: https://facebook.com/seanspicershow Twitter: https://twitter.com/seanspicershow Instagram: https://instagram.com/seanspicershow Stay in touch with Sean on social media: Facebook: https://facebook.com/seanmspicer Twitter: https://twitter.com/seanspicer Instagram: https://instagram.com/seanmspicer/ #politics #news #theseanspicershow #seanspicer #conservativemedia #podcast Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Ben and Tommy discuss reports that a temporary ceasefire and hostage release deal between Israel and Hamas may be imminent, that Saudi Arabia has decided to normalize relations with Israel, and that the ICC may issue an arrest warrant for Israeli PM Bibi Netanyahu. They also hear from campus protestors in New York, discuss leaked intelligence reports about whether Putin ordered opposition leader Alexei Navalny's death, Tucker Carlson's interview with a far-right ultranationalist close with Putin, Secretary of State Tony Blinken's trip to China, why an Iranian rapper got a death sentence, major leadership changes in Scotland, and a dramatic reading care of Scotland. Then Tommy speaks to John McDermott, Chief Africa Correspondent for the Economist about South Africa's upcoming election, waning western influence in the western Sahel, and the 30th anniversary of the Rwandan genocide.

Before Russia's Vladimir Putin invaded Ukraine, he met with Chinese dictator Xi Jinping in Beijing. Before Israel was invaded, Iranian and Palestinian leaders did the same.  And after Venezuela's Nicholas Maduro returned from meeting Xi in China's capital, he announced that he would invade Guyana – an as-yet unfulfilled threat or, more to the point, an unexecuted order.  Could yet another invasion loom after Secretary of State Tony Blinken's current visit with Xi in Beijing?  Actually, the Chinese Communist Party has already illegally inserted into this country multiple divisions-worth of unaccompanied, fighting-age men, apparently personnel of the People's Liberation Army. If the CCP regards Blinken and Joe Biden, who have allowed this invasion, to be – like Xi's aforementioned interlocutors – its “controlled assets,” our home front may soon be the locus of the next act of strategic arson by Xi Jinping.  God help us. This is Frank Gaffney.

This is Frank Gaffney with the Secure Freedom Minute.  Yesterday, President Biden and Secretary of State Tony Blinken threatened that if Israel does not change its operations in Gaza, U.S. policy towards supporting the Jewish State will change. Translation: Unless Benjamin Netanyahu's government saves Hamas, America will no longer resupply the weapons required to defeat it.  The Biden administration is also reportedly conducting a four-pronged campaign to overthrow the Israeli government.  What is now in distinct prospect is an American-driven defeat of an allied nation that will make Team Biden's betrayal and destruction of Afghanistan pale by comparison. While the Israelis are hoping to secure further U.S. help with expanded humanitarian assistance that principally props up Hamas, their enemies –and ours – now foresee that they will surely be able eventually, if not soon, to drive the Jews “from the river to the sea.” Biden's Afghanistan 2.0 must be repudiated now.  This is Frank Gaffney.

Secretary of State Tony Blinken visits Israel as Gaza bracies for famine. Donald Trump is ready to take Truth Social public — and it's not just his diehard supporters who want to buy stock. And the Justice Department hits Apple with an antitrust lawsuit for monopolizing the smartphone market.Want more comprehensive analysis of the most important news of the day, plus a little fun? Subscribe to the Up First newsletter.Today's episode of Up First was edited by Mark Katkov, Julia Redpath, Alice Woelfle and Ben Adler. It was produced by Ziad Buchh, Ben Abrams and Taylor Haney. We get engineering support from Stacey Abbott. And our technical director is Zac Coleman.Learn more about sponsor message choices: podcastchoices.com/adchoicesNPR Privacy Policy

The UN Security Council is expected to debate a resolution today offered by Algeria that would demand an immediate ceasefire in Gaza. The Biden administration has signaled it will veto such an initiative. That's the good news. The bad news is that the United States will reportedly offer an alternative calling for a temporary ceasefire and oppose an Israeli ground offensive against Hamas' last stronghold in Rafah. Like King Solomon's Biblical ruling, it would split the difference, but kill the proverbial baby by ensuring Israel's defeat. There is, of course, another option. As former Canadian Prime Minister Stephen Harper recently pointed out, Hamas could surrender. In fact, on December 20th, Secretary of State Tony Blinken actually called for Hamas to do so, observing: “This is over tomorrow if Hamas does that.”  The U.S. must ensure Hamas surrenders, not Israel.  This is Frank Gaffney.

Secretary of State Tony Blinken has asked the U.S. State Department to conduct a review and present policy options on possible recognition of a Palestinian state after the war in Gaza. Blessing Israel does not mean we must condone everything she does or does not do. Cursing her, in part, would involve siding with her […]

Secretary of State Tony Blinken has asked the U.S. State Department to conduct a review and present policy options on possible recognition of a Palestinian state after the war in Gaza. Blessing Israel does not mean we must condone everything she does or does not do. Cursing her, in part, would involve siding with her […]

Secretary of State Tony Blinken has asked the U.S. State Department to conduct a review and present policy options on possible recognition of a Palestinian state after the war in Gaza. Blessing Israel does not mean we must condone everything she does or does not do. Cursing her, in part, would involve siding with her […]

Support independent, progressive news coverage from TYT. Support independent, progressive news coverage from TYT. Scoop: Israel to tell Secretary of State Tony Blinken that Palestinians can't return to north Gaza without a hostage deal. N.H. attorney general accuses DNC of voter suppression over primary fight. Nation's largest single-family home landlord to pay $3.7 million in California rent-gouging case. Boeing supplier ignored warnings of “excessive amount of defects,” former employees allege. HOST: Ana Kasparian (@AnaKasparian) SUBSCRIBE on YOUTUBE: ☞ https://www.youtube.com/user/theyoungturks FACEBOOK: ☞ https://www.facebook.com/theyoungturks TWITTER: ☞ https://www.twitter.com/theyoungturks INSTAGRAM: ☞ https://www.instagram.com/theyoungturks TIKTOK: ☞ https://www.tiktok.com/@theyoungturks

Max Blumenthal: (TheGrayZone) - What the IDF Did on ChristmasJoin investigative journalist Max Blumenthal and me as we peel back the layers of one of the most contentious issues in modern geopolitics: the Israeli Defense Forces' alleged human rights violations against Palestinians. Max, with his sharp analytical skills, unveils the chilling realities of Gaza, including accounts of torture and claims of organ theft, that stir a profound reaction internationally. Our candid conversation probes into the heart of these accusations, the difficulties faced in reporting such incidents, and the psychological impact they have on all involved—from the Palestinian community to the Israeli soldiers caught in the cycle of violence. These narratives weave a complex tapestry of suffering and societal perceptions that are rarely brought to light.The discussion takes an even darker turn as we examine the targeting of journalists in Gaza, an issue that has captured global headlines and elicited responses from political figures such as U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken. This episode does not shy away from hard truths, dissecting the intertwining of U.S.-Israel relations and the military strategies that shape the conflict. From scrutinizing the most recent military deals to interpreting Prime Minister Netanyahu's strategic maneuvers, we lay bare the multifaceted nature of warfare and diplomacy. Closing on a note of international jurisprudence, we explore South Africa's unprecedented steps toward seeking justice at the International Court of Justice, presenting a glimmer of hope for accountability amidst the turmoil.#Gaza #HumanRights #israel #hamas #netanyahu #warcrimes #thegrayzone #MaxBlumenthal #JudgingFreedomSee Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Coming off a disastrous Middle East trip, at which he was shunned at every stop, Biden's Secretary of State Tony Blinken returned to a "dissent" memo signed by numerous State Department officials opposing current US policy. With poll numbers sagging for Biden - and even worse for Kamala - what's Team Biden's next move? All out war?

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is on a collision course with its Western and Middle Eastern allies after vigorously defending Hamas, declaring it to be a "liberation movement" rather than a terrorist organisation. The statement also appears to have ended more than a year of rapprochement efforts with Israel. To the rapturous applause of his parliamentary deputies, Erdogan delivered an impassioned defence of Hamas despite the group killing more than 1,400 Israelis earlier this month."Hamas Is not a terrorist organisation but a liberation group, a group of Mujahideen that is fighting to protect its soil and its citizens," bellowed Erdogan to a standing ovation from his deputies.Erdogan went on to accuse Israel of suffering from "mental illness" for its ongoing bombardment of Gaza, which has claimed over 7,000 lives, accusing the West of ignoring human rights in Gaza because its "Muslim blood being spilled".Erdogan's use of the Islamic phrase "mujahideen," meaning spiritual resistance, is seen as unprecedented by a country's leader, says Ilam Uzgel, an analyst for the Turkish news portal Kisa Dalga."To praise Hamas to define Hamas as a mujahideen, whereas all over the world, even those who support the Palestinians in the West and the Western societies, they put a distance against Hamas and they are critical of Hamas, and they dislike Hamas," Uzgel says.Strong tiesErdogan, who is religiously conservative, has always maintained good ties with Hamas.In July, he met with the political leader of Hamas, Ismail Haniyeh. But in the initial phases of Israel's Gaza assault, Erdogan held back from his usual fiery rhetoric against Israel despite growing condemnation by many opposition parties.Erdogan initially wanted to play a mediating role in the conflict, but the Turkish president's shift in rhetoric came with the realisation his overtures were being spurned."We've noticed that Secretary (of State) Tony Blinken is not passing by Turkey, going to Turkey, or really having an intense conversation with his Turkish counterpart," says Asli Aydintasbas of the Washington-based Brookings Institution."Even though Turkey is clearly a country that has a very close relationship with Hamas leadership and can play a role in terms of releasing of hostages. President Erdogan does not like to be ignored."Support rallyWith Erdogan's overtures to mediate in the conflict ignored, no regional foreign minister has visited since the outbreak of the conflict, the Turkish leader is now seen to be seeking to reap gains domestically.Erdogan has a significant religious political base. The Turkish leader has called for a mass rally in support of Gaza for Saturday, 28 October, where he is expected to ramp up his rhetoric in support of Hamas. But Erdogan may be making a severe miscalculation."I'm not sure if it may please the Turkish audience," warns UzgeI. "I think it was a mistake, a political mistake, that it would not bring Erdogan any votes, any sympathy, domestically or externally in the region and in Erdogan ties with the United States and Israel in the future. Israeli PM eyes visit to Turkey as rapprochement efforts continue"Hamas is not liked in the Middle East either. And the Saudis don't like it, the Egyptians don't like it, so there are no regimes that like Hamas except Iran and Qatar. So probably he will pay a price for this.A recent Turkish opinion poll found the majority of Turks want the country to remain neutral in the conflict. Turkey is grappling with soaring inflation and a cost of living crisis.Erdogan has been looking to Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates for financial support. That financial support could dry up if Riyadh and UAE become uneasy over Erdogan's pro-Hamas stance.End to rapprochement?At the same time, Turkey's rapprochement with Israel appears over, with Israel strongly condemning Erdogan's Hamas stance.While Israeli-Turkish relations have a long history of managing highs and lows, this latest crisis could be different."Well, we know Israel and Turkey have managed in the past to overcome such low points in their relations," says Gallia Lindenstrauss, an analyst at the Institute for National Security Studies in Tel Aviv."And we have had basically continuous relations since 1949, when Turkey recognised the state of Israel."Since this is the second normalisation attempt that basically lasted less than a year or two, I think it will have a long-term effect. And next time around, when one of the parties will want to repair relations, thaere will be very strong criticism, saying we've tried this route, it doesn't work."For now, Turkey's Western allies have largely ignored Erdogan's outbursts.Israel has confined itself to a brief statement of condemnation, as international efforts appear to try and contain the deepening crisis in Gaza, with the hope Erdogan confines himself to just angry rhetoric.

US President Joe Biden has met with Palestinian Authority President Abbas.   Biden says on social media he assured him that the US is working with partners in the region to ensure humanitarian supplies reach civilians in Gaza and to prevent the conflict from widening.  US Correspondent Richard Arnold told Mike Hosking that US Secretary of State Tony Blinken was in Egypt, seeking to open that border to those who hold international passports at the very least.  LISTEN ABOVE See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Rundown -    Intro with Troubadour Dave Gunders - 00:35   "Ain't No Way You're Coming Home" by Dave Gunders - 13:36   Rabbi Bruce Dollin - 19:39   When Jews experience problems and boy do we have problems with Hamas now, it is helpful to know what a wise Rabbi, well versed in the Torah, has to say. We have that here.   For nearly three decades, Bruce Dollin was Senior Rabbi at the legendary Hebrew Educational Alliance in Denver. Rabbi Dollin provides valuable knowledge, advice and predictions in the aftermath of last Saturday's bloodthirsty attack by Hamas on Israel.   Rabbi Dollin explains how Colorado's community can best respond. There was an outpouring of love and support last Monday night at Denver's Temple Emanuel and Rabbi Dollin recalls what moved that crowd to give Denver Mayor Mike Johnston a standing ovation.   The long simmering nature of the Hamas - Israel conflict is explained with the wise Rabbi providing many Mosaic Law references to proper Jewish responses during dire wartime circumstances. Jewish law demands certain prayers and procedures when captives are taken.   Discussed are the Amalek and their Jew-hating allies unalterably opposed to Jewish people existing in Israel, or anywhere. The charter of Hamas boldly states its Jew hatred and Israel can no longer tolerate this terror group next door – or anywhere. The roles of Iran, Qatar and Russia are also considered.   The performances this week of President Joe Biden and Secretary of State Tony Blinken are reviewed, and praised. The complicated Bibi Netanyahu situation is analyzed – including memories of the infamous Iran Nuke Deal and Netanyahu's forceful Biden-boycotted 2015 Capitol speech in opposition.   The world is significantly changed given the barbarity and severity of the Hamas attack on the Jewish State of Israel. Rabbi Dollin is confident that Israel and her allies will beat back these enemies. Rabbi Dollin knows Israel.   Rabbi Dollin has long fought anti-Israel indoctrination on college campuses. Dollin organized a memorable protest in 2002 at Colorado College against Hanan Ashrawi, an advocate of terror against Israel. College campus anti-Jew hatred remains problematic for Israel now.   https://www.nytimes.com/2002/08/30/us/invitation-to-palestinian-draws-protest-at-colorado-college.html   The significance of the (10/7) day of Hamas' shameful ambush (Shabbat/Simchat Torah) gets analyzed. Fascists cannot abide human freedom, the type embodied by Torah and the Jewish people. Jews value life here on Earth. Israelis must now fight back, through their tears.   Troubadour Dave Gunders has a rare sad song appropriate for this week titled "Ain't No Way You're Coming Home." Ominous current situation is reviewed. Ain't no way to sugarcoat it. We've got the blues. https://music.youtube.com/watch?v=9tkJZPVyGTA

During an appearance on ABC's This Week with Jonathan Karl, Secretary of State Tony Blinken explicitly said that the US would not oppose Ukraine using US-supplied longer-range missiles to attack deep inside Russian territory, a move that Moscow has previously called a "red line" which would make the United States a direct party to the conflict. Reading by Tim Foley.

US Secretary of State Tony Blinken tweeted in celebration of Pakistan's preparations for "free and fair elections" on Wednesday, a week after it was revealed that the US pressured Pakistan to oust its popular democratically elected prime minister Imran Khan last year. Reading by Tim Foley.

In this episode of The P.A.S. Report Podcast, Professor Nick Giordano dons his detective hat to crack the case of the scandalous “White House cocaine gate.” It's a real whodunnit. Is it the sneaky Secretary of Treasury Janet Yellen or the mischievous Secretary of State Tony Blinken? Or could it possibly be the President himself? This is a whodunnit. But hold on tight, because this wild mystery unravels a more significant problem: our institutions are like a bunch of wannabe magicians, constantly pulling cover-ups out of their hats as they try to “fundamentally transform the United States of America.”   More Information If you enjoyed this episode and found it useful, please give The P.A.S. Report Podcast a 5-star rating and take 30 seconds to write a review. Make sure to hit the follow button so you never miss an episode. Please share this episode on social media and with your family and friends. Support The P.A.S. Report Podcast by Visiting Our Advertisers Stock up on all your survival needs and visit 4Patriots. 4Patriots champions freedom and self-reliance. Use code PAS to get 10% off your order. Protect your money from the out-of-control Washington D.C. spending. Visit Goldco today to get the Gold IRA Kit Americans are using to protect their retirement savings. Goldco is offering up to $10,000 in bonus silver when opening a qualified IRA account, just for being a P.A.S. Report listener. Visit Goldco at https://goldco.com/pasreport Don't forget to visit https://pasreport.com. *PA Strategies, LLC. may earn advertising revenue or a small commission for promoting products or when you make a purchase through any affiliate links on this website and within this post.

Fresh from his pathetic impersonation of a representative of America's vital national interests in Beijing last week, Secretary of State Tony Blinken appeared on Sunday morning TV shows to comment on tumultuous events in Russia over the last few days. His message was: The Biden administration is “focused on Ukraine.”  In fact, Blinken slavishly adhered to what was clearly his main authorized talking point by repeating it ludicrously. No wonder his international interlocutors – and most especially the Chinese Communist ones – treat him with such contempt.  If Team Biden has nothing to say about the import of the short-lived, but portentous, Russian mutiny besides “Look over there, folks,” at least our countrymen and women ought to be encouraged to “focus” on the fresh evidence that President Biden has personally taken money from Chinese intelligence officers – and repeatedly lied about it.  Joe must go. This is Frank Gaffney.

Today's episode covers: Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to the US, Trump's interview on Fox News about the Mar-a-Lago document indictment, new details about Trump's real estate deal with the Saudis in Oman, Secretary of State Tony Blinken's visit to China, how Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu is still meddling with Israel's courts and inflaming relations with the US, the latest from Ukraine, reports that Russia tried to assassinate a CIA informant on US soil, Facebook's stifling of free speech in Vietnam, and why it's been a rough week for Boris Johnson and Liz Truss. For a closed-captioned version of this episode, click here. For a transcript of this episode, please email transcripts@crooked.com and include the name of the podcast.

The take-away from Secretary of State Tony Blinken's visit to Beijing this week, including its seven-hour struggle session with China's top diplomat, is pretty clear: Pax Americana has now been replaced with Post-America. That's the cumulative effect of Obama-Biden's three terms pursuing the “fundamental transformation of the United States of America.” The globalists are now in charge, particularly those “with Chinese characteristics.” They are steadily eroding U.S. sovereignty by the relentless pursuit of so-called “global stability,” “global governance,” “global health,” “global digital IDs,” and “global taxes.” Throw in the end of the dollar as the world's reserve currency and the dismantling of our constitutional republic at home and you have a post-American world. No one has given Joe Biden a mandate to effect such an ominous transformation. The question is: Will it become irreversible before he is finally removed from office?   This is Frank Gaffney.

Secretary of State Tony Blinken's Juneteenth trip to Beijing has been lowballed as basically a social call to re-open a bilateral “dialogue” with little of substance expected to come of it.  Translation: Something is up. It could be that Blinken's prostrating kow-tow to Xi Jinping will simply permit Joe Biden to do the same with the Chinese dictator in the next few months. This will be trumpeted as a victory for diplomacy and a boost to Biden's reelection bid. Here's a thought-experiment: What if this meeting instead tees up an enormous strategic defeat in response to the Chinese dictating to the hapless Blinken that they're going to seize Taiwan before November 2024 – but will guarantee U.S. access to the island's advanced chip-manufacturing if we don't interfere?  Of course, that guarantee would be worthless. But it may be an “offer” Joe won't refuse. This is Frank Gaffney.

The tradition of representatives of vassal states “kow-towing” by prostrating themselves before China emperors long predated its practice by the likes of Henry Kissinger and Bill Clinton. But it seems certain to be on display during Secretary of State Tony Blinken's current mission to Beijing, delayed by what Joe Biden calls “the silly balloon.” What would be truly silly – if it weren't so dangerous – is the proposition that visits by a man of Blinken's exceedingly limited abilities, a track record of appeasement in office and a personal history as a member of the Chinese Communist Party's “captured” American elite would do other than reinforce Emperor Xi Jinping's conviction that he can get away with murder, literally. Far from making violent conflict with the CCP less likely, Team Biden's insistence on such kow-towing “engagement” undermines our chances of deterring it. This is Frank Gaffney.

Who coined that term anyway? It's true, there have been insults and lots of them. Why? Secretary of State Tony Blinken will visit China this weekend and Susan Thornton, Senior Fellow at Yale University Law School's Paul Tsai China Center and former US diplomat, joins us with her perspective on the complexities of China's diplomacy today.  

This week's guest on Who's Counting? with Cleta Mitchell is West Virginia Secretary of State Mac Warner, who has called on the US Secretary of State Tony Blinken to resign […]

This week's guest on Who's Counting? with Cleta Mitchell is West Virginia Secretary of State Mac Warner, who has called on the US Secretary of State Tony Blinken to resign […]

On today's episode of Human Events Daily, Jack Posobiec rakes Secretary of State Anthony Blinken over the coals as his lies to congress emerge and scandals continue to mount. Next, Poso lays down the law in response to a recent TikTok challenge to commit Grand Theft Auto for internet clout and what the nation's response should be to this growing criminal culture. Finally, Jack shares his experience across the pond as Poland has risen to be one of the safest countries in the world. All this and more ahead on Human Events Daily!Here's your Daily dose of Human Events with @JackPosobiec Save up to 65% on MyPillow products by going to MyPillow.com/POSO and use code POSO Get $200 in FREE SURVIVAL GEAR from ‘My Patriot Supply' with every 3-month supply kit ordered when you go to www.mypatriotsupply.com. 

Chris Li, director of research of the Asia-Pacific Initiative and fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs at Harvard University, leads the conversation on U.S. strategy in East Asia. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to today's session of the Winter/Spring 2023 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR.  Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic, if you would like to share it with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy.  We're delighted to have Chris Li with us to discuss U.S. strategy in East Asia. Mr. Li is director of research of the Asia-Pacific Initiative, and a fellow at the Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs, where he focuses on U.S.-China relations, Asia-Pacific security, and technology competition. Previously, he was research assistant to Graham Allison in the Avoiding Great Power War Project, and coordinator of the China Working Group, where he contributed to the China Cyber Policy Initiative and the Technology and Public Purpose Project, led by former Secretary of Defense Ash Carter.  Chris, thanks very much for being with us today. I thought we could begin with you giving us your insights and analysis of the Biden administration's foreign policy strategy in East Asia, specifically vis-à-vis China.  LI: Great. Well, first of all, thanks, Irina, for the invitation. I'm really looking forward to the conversation and also to all the questions from members of the audience and, in particular, all the students on this seminar. So I thought I'd start very briefly with just an overview of how the Biden administration's strategy in the Indo-Pacific has shaped up over the last two years, two and a half years. What are the key pillars? And essentially, now that we're about halfway through the first term—or, you know, if there is a second term—but President Biden's first term, where things are going to go moving forward?  So as many you are probably familiar, Secretary of State Tony Blinken laid out essentially the core tenets of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy, of which China, of course, is a focal centerpiece. And he did so in his speech last summer at the Asia Society, where he essentially described the relationship between the U.S. and China as competitive where it should be, cooperative where it can be, and adversarial where it must be. So sort of three different pillars: competition, cooperation, a sort of balance between the two. And in terms of the actual tenets of the strategy, the framing was three pillars—invest, align, and complete.  And so briefly, just what that meant according to Secretary Blinken was really investing in sources of American strength at home. Renewing, for example, investment in technology, investment in STEM education, infrastructure, and many of the policies that actually became known as Build Back Better, a lot of the domestic spending packages that President Biden proposed, and some of which has been passed. So that first pillar was invest sort of in order to o compete with China, we need to first renew our sources of American strength and compete from a position of strength.  The second element was “align.” And in this—in this pillar, I think this is where the Biden administration has really distinguished itself from the Trump administration. Many folks say, well, the Biden administration's China policy or its Asia policy is really just Trump 2.0 but with a little bit—you know, with essentially a nicer tone to it. But I think there is a difference here. And I think the Biden administration's approach has really focused on aligning with both traditional security partners—our allies, our alliances with countries like the Republic of Korea, Japan, the Philippines—but also invigorating those nontraditional partnerships, with India, for example.   I think another part of this strategy, another part of this dimension, has also been reinvigorating U.S. presence and U.S. leadership, really, in multilateral organizations. Not only, for example, taking the Quad and reestablishing some of the leader-level summits, the ministerials, proposing, for example, a COVID cooperation regime among new members of the Quad, but also establishing newer frameworks. So, for example, as many of you have read about, I'm sure, AUKUS, this trilateral security pact between Australia, the United Kingdom and the U.S. when it comes to sharing of nuclear submarine technology. That's been a new proposed policy. And I think we're about to see an update from the administration in the next couple of weeks.  And even with elements of the region that have been unappreciated and perhaps under-focused on. For example, the Solomon Islands was the focal point of some attention last year, and you've seen the administration propose the Partners in the Blue Pacific Initiative, which seeks to establish greater cooperation among some of the Pacific Island nations. And there was actually a summit hosted by President Biden last fall with leaders of the Pacific Island countries. So that alignment piece I think has really been significant as a cornerstone of the Biden administration's Indo-Pacific strategy.  The third element, of course, competition, I think is the most evident. And we've seen this from some of the executive orders on semiconductors, the restrictions on advanced chips, to elements of trade, to even sort of advocacy for human rights and greater promotion of democracy. You saw the Summit for Democracy, which has been a pillar of the administration's foreign policy agenda. So that's basically what they've done in the last two and a half years.  Now, in terms of where that's actually brought us, I think I'll make four observations. The first is that, unlike the Biden—unlike the Trump administration, where most of the policy pronouncements about the People's Republic of China had some tinge of inducing change in China—that was the phrase that Secretary Pompeo used in a speech on China policy—I think the Biden administration largely has said: The assumption and the premise of all of our policy toward China is based on the idea that the U.S. government does not seek fundamentally to change the Chinese government, the Chinese regime, the leadership, the administration, the rule of the Chinese Communist Party.  So that is both a markedly important difference, but it's also a part of the strategy that I believe remains ambiguous. And here, the problem is, you know, invest, align, and compete, competitive coexistence, where does that all actually take us? And I think this is where analysts in the strategic community and think tank world have said, well, it's great to invest, of course. You know, there's bipartisan support. Alignment with partners and allies is, of course, a pretty uncontroversial, for the most part, approach. And competition is, I think, largely a consensus view in Washington, D.C. But where does this actually take us?  You know, for all of its criticisms, the Trump administration did propose a specific end state or an end objective. And I think the Biden administration has just sort of said, well, it's about coexisting. It's about just assuming to manage the relationship. I think there are, of course, valid merits to that approach. And on an intellectual level, the idea is that because this is not necessarily a Cold War 2.0, in the words of the Biden administration, we're not going to have an end state that is ala the Cold War—in essence a sort of victory or demise, you know, the triumph of capitalism over communism, et cetera. In fact, it's going to be a persistent and sustained rivalry and competition. And in order to harness a strategy, we essentially need to manage that competition.   So I think that's—it's an intellectually coherent idea, but I think one of the ambiguities surrounding and one of the criticisms that has been proposed is that there is no clear end state. So we compete, we invest, we align, but to what end? Do we just keep—does the administration continue to tighten up and enhance alliances with partners and allies, and then to what end? What happens next? And sort of where does this lead us—leave us in ten years from now? So I think that's the first comment I'll make about the approach to the Indo-Pacific.  The second is that one of the tenets, of course, as I describe, is this compartmentalization of compete, cooperate. In essence, you know, we will compete—we, being the United States—with China on issues of technology, issues of economics, but we will also cooperate on areas of shared concern—climate change, nonproliferation. I think what you've seen is that while the Biden administration has proposed this idea, we can split—we can cooperate on one hand and also compete on the other—the People's Republic of China, the Chinese government, has largely rejected that approach.   Where you've seen statements from senior officials in China that have said, essentially, we will not cooperate with you, the United States, until you first cease all of the behavior, all of the negative policies that we don't like. In essence, if you will continue to sell arms to Taiwan, if you continue, the United States, to restrict semiconductors, to crackdown on espionage, to conduct military exercises in the region, then forget about any potential cooperation on climate, or forget about any cooperation on global health, et cetera.   So in essence, being able to tie the two compartments together has prevented a lot of what the Biden administration has sought to achieve. And we've seen that very clearly with Special Envoy John Kerry and his relentless efforts to conduct climate diplomacy. And I think largely—for example, last summer in the aftermath of Speaker Pelosi's visit to Taiwan, you saw a lot of those collaborative efforts essentially derailed. That's the second comment I'll make, which is while this approach, again, logically to most Americans would seem sound, it's actually met a lot of resistance because the Chinese reaction to it is not necessarily the same.  The third is I think we've seen increasingly, even though there has been an increased alignment since the Trump administration with allies and partners, there's still a degree of hedging among countries in the region. And that makes sense because from the perspectives of many of those leaders of countries in the region, the United States is a democratic country. We have an election coming up in 2024. And there's no guarantee that the next president, if President Biden is no longer the president in 2024 or even in 2028, will continue this policy.   And I think all of you, as observers of American politics, know the degree to which American politics has become largely one that is dysfunctional, is almost schizophrenic in a way. And so one would imagine that if you are a leader of a country in the Asian-Pacific region, to support the Biden administration's engagement, but also to maintain a degree of strategic autonomy, as this is often called. And so what I think we'll continue to see and what will be interesting to watch is how middle powers, how other countries resident in the region approach the United States in terms of—(inaudible). I think India will be key to watch, for example. Its defense relationship with the United States has increased over the years, but yet it still has close interests with respect to China.  The final comment I'll make is that on the military dimension I think this is another area of concern, where the Biden administration has said that one of its priorities is creating guardrails, constructing guardrails to manage the potential escalation in the event of an accident, or a miscommunication, miscalculation that could quickly spiral into a crisis. And we needn't—we need not look farther than the 2001 Hainan incident to think of an example, which was a collision between a(n) EP-3 aircraft and a Chinese intelligence plane. And that led to a diplomatic standoff.  And so I think the United States government is very keen on creating dialogue between militaries, risk reduction mechanisms, crisis management mechanisms. But I think they've encountered resistance, again, from the People's Republic of China, because the perspective there is that much of the U.S. behavior in the region militarily is invalid, is illegitimate. You know, the Chinese government opposes, for example, U.S. transits through the Taiwan Strait. So the idea therefore that they would engage and essentially deconflict and manage risk is sort of legitimizing American presence there militarily. And so we've encountered that obstacle as well.  So I think going forward on all four elements, we're going to continue to see adjustment. And I think, as students, as researchers, I think these are four areas where there's fertile room for discussion, for debate, for analysis, for looking at history. And I look forward to a conversation. Hopefully, many of you have ideas as well because there's no monopoly on wisdom and there are many creative proposals to be discussed. So I look forward to questions. I'll stop there.  FASKIANOS: Fantastic. Thank you, Chris. That was great. Now we're going to go to all of you.  (Gives queuing instructions.)  Our first written question comes from Grace Wheeler. I believe a graduate student at the University of West Florida. Kissinger proposed the future of China-U.S. relations be one of coevolution instead of confrontation. Is it still realistically possible for the future of China-U.S. relations to be one of cooperation instead of confrontation?  LI: So terrific question. Thank you for the question. It's a very interesting idea. And I think Henry Kissinger, who I know has long been involved with the Council on Foreign Relations, has produced through his many decades,strategic frameworks and new ways of thinking about cardinal challenges to geopolitics. I have not yet actually understood or at least examined specifically what the concrete pillars of coevolution entail. My understanding on a general level is that it means, essentially, the United States and the People's Republic of China adjust and sort of mutually change their policies to accommodate each other. So a sort of mutual accommodation over time to adjust interests in a way that prevent conflict.  I think on the face—of course, that sounds—that sounds very alluring. That sounds like a terrific idea. I think the problem has always been what would actually this look like in implementation? So for example, on the issue of Taiwan, this is an issue where the Chinese government has said: There is no room for compromise. You know, the refrain that they repeat is: Taiwan is an inalienable part of Chinese territory. It is part of sovereignty. And there is no room for compromise. This is a red line. So if that's the case, there's not really, in my view, much room for evolution on this issue, for example. And it's an intractable problem.  And so I don't necessarily know how to apply the Kissinger framework to specific examples. And, but, you know, I do think it's something worth considering. And, you know, I would encourage you and others on this call to think about, for example, how that framework might actually be adapted. So I think it's an interesting idea, but I would—I think the devil's in the details. And essentially, to think about how this would be applied to specific issues—South China Sea, human rights, trade—would be the key to unpacking this concept.  I think the second part of your question was, is cooperation possible? And again, I think, as I stated in my remarks, the Biden administration publicly says—publicly asserts that they do seek to maintain a space for cooperation in climate, in nonproliferation, in global health security. I think, again, what we've encountered is that the Chinese government's view is that unless the United States ceases behavior that it deems detrimental to its own interests, it will not pursue any discussion of cooperation.   And so I think that's the problem we're facing. And so I think there are going to be discussions going forward on, well, given that, how do we then balance the need for cooperation on climate, in pandemics, with, for example, also concerns about security, concerns about military activity, concerns about Taiwan, et cetera? And I think this is the daily stuff of, of course, the conversations among the Biden administration and senior leadership. So personally, my view, is I hope cooperation is possible, of course. I think there are shared issues, shared vital interests, between the two countries and, frankly, among the global community, that require the U.S. and China to be able to work out issues. But I'm personally not optimistic that under this current framework, this paradigm, there will be a significant space open for cooperation.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. Going next to Hamza Siddiqui, a raised hand.   Q: Thank you. Hi. I'm Hamza Siddiqui, a student from Minnesota State University, Mankato.   And I actually had two questions. The first was: What kind of role does the U.S. envision Southeast Asian states—especially like the Philippines and Vietnam—playing in their U.S. strategy when it comes to Asia-Pacific security issues, specifically? And the second is that for the last few years there's been some discussion about Japan and South Korea being formally invited to join the Five Eyes alliance. And I wanted to get your take on that. What do you think are the chances that a formal invitation would be extended to them? Thank you.  LI: Great. Thank you for the question. Two terrific questions.  So, first, on the role of countries in Southeast Asia, I think that under the Biden administration they have continued to play an increasing degree of importance. So you've seen, for example, even in the Philippines, which you cited, I think just last month Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin made a visit there. And in the aftermath of the visit, he announced a new basing agreement. I haven't reviewed the details specifically, and I'm not a Philippines expert, but in short my understanding is that there is going to be renewed American presence—expanded American presence, actually, in the region.   And the Philippines, just based on their geostrategic location, is incredibly important in the Indo-Pacific region. So I think that the administration is very active in enhancing cooperation on the defense element, but also on the political and economic side as well. So with the Quad, for example, in India, you've seen cooperation on elements of economics as well, and technology. I think there's an initiative about digital cooperation too. So I think the answer is increasingly an important role.   On Japan and Korea, there have, of course, been discussions over the years about expanding the Five Eyes intelligence alliance to other countries in Asia as well. My assessment is that that's probably unlikely to occur in a formal way in the near term. But I could be wrong. And that assessment is primarily based on the fact that the countries that currently are part of the Five Eyes agreement share certain elements of linguistic convergence. They all speak English. There are certain longstanding historical ties that those countries have. And I think that to necessarily expand—or, to expand that existing framework would probably require a degree of bureaucratic sort of rearrangement that might be quite difficult, or quite challenging, or present obstacles.  I think what you will see, though, is enhanced security cooperation, for sure. And we've seen that even with Japan, for example, announcing changes to its military, its self-defense force, and increased defense spending as well in the region. So I think that is a trend that will continue.  FASKIANOS: Next question I'm taking from Sarah Godek, who is a graduate student at the University of Michigan.   What do guardrails look like, from a Chinese perspective? Thinking how China's foreign ministry has consistently put out lists of demands for the U.S. side, I'm wondering how guardrails are formulated by Wang Yi and others.  LI: Great. Thanks for the question.  So I guess I'll step back first and talk about what guardrails, in my view, actually entail. So I think the idea here is that in the event of a crisis—and, most of the time, crises are not planned. (Laughs.) Most of the time, crises, you know, occur as a result of an accident. For example, like the 2001 incident. But an accidental collision in the South China Sea between two vessels, the collision accidentally of two planes operating in close proximity. And as Chinese and American forces operate in closer proximity and increasing frequency, we do have that risk.   So I think, again, the idea of a guardrail that essentially, in the military domain, which is what I'm speaking about, entails a mechanism in place such that in the event of an accident or a crisis, there are ways based on that mechanism to diffuse that crisis, or at least sort of stabilize things before the political leadership can work out a solution. In essence, to prevent escalation because of a lack of dialogue. And I think for those of you who've studied history, you know that many wars, many conflicts have occurred not because one power, one state decides to launch a war. That has occurred. But oftentimes, because there is an accident, an accidental collision. And I think many wars have occurred this way.  So the idea of a guardrail therefore, in the military domain, is to create, for example, channels of communication that could be used in the event of a conflict. I think the easiest parallel to imagine is the U.S. and the Soviet Union, where there were hotlines, for example, between Moscow and between Washington, D.C. during that era, where the seniormost national security aides of the presidents could directly reach out to each other in the event of a crisis.   In the China context, what has been difficult is some of those channels exist. For example, the National Security Council Coordinator for Asia Kurt Campbell has said publicly: We have hotlines. The problem is that when the Americans pick up the phone and call, no one picks up on the other side. And in short, you know, having just the structure, the infrastructure, is insufficient if those infrastructure are not being used by the other side.   I think with respect to the U.S.-China context, probably, again, as I mentioned earlier, the largest obstacle is the fact that guardrails help the United States—or, in the Chinese perspective—from the Chinese perspective, any of these guardrails would essentially allow the U.S. to operate with greater confidence that, in the event of an accident, we will be able to control escalation. And from the Chinese perspective, they argue that because the United States fundamentally shouldn't be operating in the Taiwan Strait anyway, therefore by constructing that guardrail, by, for example, having dialogue to manage that risk, it would be legitimizing an illegitimate presence in the first place.   So that's always been perennially the problem. And I think the argument that the United States has made is that, well, sure, that may be your position. But it is in your interest as well not to have an accident spiral into a conflict. And so I think we've seen not a lot of progress on this front. I think, for example, in the aftermath of Speaker Pelosi's visit, there—you know, a lot of the defense cooperation ties were suspended.   But the last comment I'll make is that that doesn't necessarily mean that all dialogue has been stayed. There are still active channels between the United States and China. We have embassies in each other's countries. From public remarks, it seems like during moments of enhanced tension there are still ways for both governments to communicate with each other. So I think the good news is that it's not completely like the two countries aren't speaking to each other, but I think that there are not as many channels for reducing risk, managing potential crises, in the military sphere that exist today, that probably should exist.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Michael Long. Let's see. You need to unmute yourself.  LI: It looks like he's dropped off.  FASKIANOS: It looks like he put down his hand. OK. So let's go next to Conor O'Hara.  Q: Hi. My name is Conor O'Hara. And I'm a graduate student at the Pepperdine University School of Public Policy.  In one of my classes, titled America's Role in the World, we often talk about how America really does not have a comprehensive understanding of China. Not only China's military and state department, but really China as a society. How can Americans change that? And where does America need to focus its efforts in understanding China? And then also, one other thing I think of, is, you know, where does that understanding begin? You know, how early in someone's education or really within, say, the United States State Department do we need to focus our efforts on building an understanding? Thank you.  LI: Great. Well, thanks for the question. It's a great question. Very hard challenge as well.  I think that's absolutely true. I think the degree of understanding of China—of actually most countries—(laughs)—around the world—among senior U.S. foreign policy practitioners, I think, is insufficient. I think particularly with respect to China, and also Asia broadly, much of the diplomatic corps, the military establishment, intelligence officers, many of those people have essentially cut their teeth over the last twenty-five years focusing on the Middle East and counterterrorism. And that makes sense because the United States was engaged in two wars in that region.  But going back farther, many of the national security professionals before that generation were focused on the Soviet Union, obviously because of the Cold War. And so really, you're absolutely correct that the number of people in the United States government who have deep China expertise academically or even professionally on the ground, or even have the linguistic ability to, you know, speak Mandarin, or other countries—or, languages of other countries in East Asia, I think is absolutely limited. I think the State Department, of course, has—as well as the intelligence community, as well as the Department of Defense—has tried to over the last few years reorient and rebalance priorities and resources there. But I think it's still—my understanding, today it's still limited. And I think there's a lot of work to be done.  I think your question on how do you understand China as a society, I think with any country, number one, of course, is history. You know, every country's politics, its policy, its government is informed by its history of, you know, modern history but also history going back farther. And I think China is no exception. In fact, Chinese society, and even the Communist Party of China, is deeply, I think, entrenched in a historical understanding of its role in the world, of how it interacts compared with its people, its citizens, its foreign conflicts. And so I think, number one is to understand the history of modern China. And I think anyone who seeks to be involved in discussions and research and debate on China does need to understand that history.  I think the second point is linguistics is actually quite important. Being able to speak the language, read the language, understand the language is important. Because so much of what is written—so much of our knowledge as, you know, American think tank researchers, is based on publicly available information in China. And a lot of that primarily is in Mandarin. So most speeches that the senior leadership of China deliver are actually in Mandarin. And some of them are translated, but not all of them. A lot of the documents that they issue, a lot of academics who write about—academics in China who write about foreign policy and international relations, write in Mandarin.  And so I think that an ability to be able to read in the original text is quite important. And in fact, you know, a lot of the nuances, and specifically in the Communist Party's ideology, how it sees itself, its role in the world, a lot of that really is best captured and best understood in its original language. Some of the—you know, the ideology, the campaigns of propaganda, et cetera.  And I think the last part of your question was how early. I am not an education scholar. (Laughs.) I don't study education or developmental psychology. But, you know, I imagine, you know, as with anything, linguistics, language, is best learned—or, most easily learned early on. But I think that does not mean that, you know, someone who's in college or graduate school can't begin to learn in a different language. So I'd answer your question like that.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next written question from Lucksika Udomsrisumran, a graduate student at New York University.  What is the implication of the Biden administration's three pillars of the Indo-Pacific strategy on the Mekong and the South China Sea? Which pillars do you see these two issues in, from the Biden administration's point of view?  LI: OK. I think, if I'm understanding the question correctly about South China Sea, you know, I think in general the South China Sea probably would most easily fall into the competition category. There are obviously not only the United States and China, but other countries in the region, including the Philippines, for example, are claimants to the South China Sea. And so I think there's always been some disagreement and some tensions in that region.  I think that that has largely been—the U.S. response or U.S. policy in South China Sea is just essentially, from the military perspective, has been to—you know, the slogan is, or the line is, to fly, sail, operate, et cetera—I'm not quoting that correctly—(laughs)—but essentially to operate wherever international law permits. And so that means Freedom of Navigation Operations, et cetera, in the South China Sea. I think that, of course, raises objections from other governments, mainly China, in the region.   So I would say that probably belongs in the competition category. And we spoke about earlier the idea of managing some of the risk that occurs or that emerges when the PLA Navy and the United States Navy operate in close proximity in that region. So from that perspective, if you're talking about risk reduction and crisis management, that actually could fall into collaboration or cooperation. But I think primarily it's competition.   FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Joan Kaufman. And, Joan, I know you wrote your question, but if you could ask it that would be great.  Q: Yes, will. Yes, certainly. Hi, Chris. Really great to see you here during this talk.  LI: Yeah, likewise.  Q: A proud Schwarzman Scholar.  I wanted to ask you a question about Ukraine and China's, you know, kind of difficult position in the middle almost, you know, as sort of seemingly allied with Russia, or certainly not criticizing Russia. And then just putting forth this twelve-point peace plan last week for—and offering to broker peace negotiations and a ceasefire for Ukraine. You know, there's no love lost in Washington for China on, you know, how it has positioned itself on this issue. And, you know, frankly, given China's own kind of preoccupation with sovereignty over the years, how do you see the whole thing? And what comments might you make on that?  LI: Right. Well, first of all, thanks so much, Joan, for joining. And very grateful for all of—all that you've done for the Schwarzman Scholars Program over the past. I appreciate your time very much.  The Ukraine problem is an incredibly important one. And I think absolutely China is involved. And it's a very complicated position that it's trying to occupy here, with both supporting its security partner, Russia, but also not directly being involved in the conflict because of U.S. opposition and opposition from NATO. So I think it's—obviously, China is playing a very delicate balancing role here.  I think a couple points. So the first is that I think my view is that, for the Chinese leadership, Ukraine—or, the Russian invasion of Ukraine is a deeply uncomfortable geopolitical situation, where there is essentially not a—there's no good outcome, really, because, as you mentioned, Ukraine is a country with which China has diplomatic recognition. It recognizes it. It has an embassy there. And the Chinese foreign ministry, Chinese foreign policy, has long very much supported the concept of sovereignty, and being able to determine your own future as a country. And I think, in fact, that's been one of the pillars and one of the objections to many American actions in the past. So on one hand, it says: We support sovereignty of every country, of which Ukraine is a country that is recognized by China.  And on the other hand, though, Russia, of course, which has had long complaints and issues with NATO expansion, is a partner of China. And so it's obviously supporting Russia. It has alignment of interests between Russia and China in many ways, in many dimensions, including objections to, for example, U.S. presence in Europe, U.S. presence in Asia. So it's a delicate balancing act. And I think from what we've seen, there hasn't been sort of a clear one-sided answer, where you've seen both statements, you know, proposing peace and saying that, you know, all sides should deescalate. But on the other hand, the U.S. government, the Biden administration, is now publicly stating that they are concerned about China potentially lending support to Russia.  So, you know, in short, I think it's very difficult to really understand what exactly is going on in the minds of the Chinese leadership. But I think that we'll continue to see sort of this awkward back and forth and trying—this purported balancing act between both sides. But I think, you know, largely—my assessment is that it's not going to go very clearly in one direction or the other.  I think the other comment I would make is that I think, from Beijing's perspective, the clear analogy here is one for Taiwan. Because—and this has been something that has been discussed in the think tank community very extensively. But the expectation I think among many in Washington was that Ukraine would not be able to put up much resistance. In short, this would be a very, very easy victory for Putin. And I think that was a—you know, not a universal consensus, but many people believed that, in short, Russia with all of its military might, would have no issues subjugating Ukraine very quickly.  I think people have largely found that to be, you know, a strategic failure on Russia's part. And so today, you know, one year after the invasion, Ukraine is still sovereign, is still standing, is still strong. And so I think—from that perspective, I think this—the war in Ukraine must give many of the leaders in China pause when it comes to thinking about a Taiwan continency, especially using force against Taiwan. Because, again, I think the degree of support, both militarily, politically, economically, for the resistance that Ukraine has shown against Russia among NATO members, among other Western countries, I think has been deeply surprising to many observers how robust that support has been. And I think that if you're sitting in Beijing and thinking about what a potential response to a Taiwan contingency might be, that would absolutely inform your calculus.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Lindsey McCormack, a graduate student at Baruch College.  How is the Biden administration's compete, cooperate, limited adversarial approach playing out with climate policy? What are you seeing right now in terms of the Chinese government's approach to energy security and climate?  LI: Yeah. It's a great question. Thanks for the question.  You know, we mentioned earlier, you know, I think the Biden administration's approach has been, you know, despite all of the disagreements between the United States and the Chinese government, there should be room for cooperation on climate because, as the Biden administration says, the climate is an existential risk to all of humanity. It's an issue of shared concern. So it's one that is not defined by any given country or constrained to one set of borders. I think it's largely not been very successful, in short, because China has not seemed to display much interest in cooperating on climate with the United States. And, again, China has largely coupled cooperation, linked cooperation in climate—or, on climate to other issues.  And so, you know, I think it's been reported that at several of the meetings between Secretary Blinken, National Security Adviser Jake Sullivan, and their Chinese counterparts, the Chinese officials had essentially given the American officials a list saying: Here are the twenty-something things that we object to. Why don't you stop all of these, correct all of your mistakes—so to speak—and then we'll talk about what we can do next. And so I think, again, that—you know, that, to me, indicates that this framework of compartmentalizing cooperation and competition has some flaws, because the idea that you can simply compartmentalize and say: We're going to cooperate at full capacity on climate, but we're not going to—you know, but we'll compete on technology, it just—it actually doesn't work in this situation.  I think the other comment I'll make is that what the Biden administration has done is—which I think has been effective—is reframed the notion of cooperation. Where, in the past, cooperation was sort of viewed as a favor that the Chinese government did to the Americans, to the American government. That if we—if the United States, you know, offered certain inducements or there were strong elements of the relationship, then China would cooperate and that would be a favor.   And I think the Biden administration has reframed that approach, where cooperation is now presented not as a favor that any country does to another, but rather sort of is shared here. And that this is something of concern to China, to the United States, to other countries, and so all major countries need to play their part, and step up their game, to take on. I think, unfortunately, it hasn't been extremely successful. But I think that there—I hope that there will be future progress made in this area.  FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to go next to Jeremiah Ostriker, who has raised—a raised hand, and also written your question. But you can ask it yourself. And you have to accept the unmute prompt. Is that happening? All right. I think I might have to read it.  Q: Am I unmuted now?  FASKIANOS: Oh, you are. Fantastic.  Q: OK. First, I'll say who I am. I am a retired professor from Princeton University and Columbia University and was an administrative provost at Princeton.  And our China policies have puzzled me. I have visited China many times. And I have wondered—I'll quote my questions now—I have wondered why we are as negative towards China as we have been. So specifically, does the U.S. foreign policy establishment need enemies to justify its existence? Is it looking around the world for enemies? And why should we care if other countries choose to govern themselves in ways which are antithetical to the way that we choose to govern ourselves? And, finally, why not cooperate with all countries on projects of common interest, regardless of other issues?  LI: Great. Well, first of all, thank you for the question—or, three questions, which are all extremely important. I'll do my best to answer, but these are very difficult questions, and I think they touch on a more philosophical understanding of what is American foreign policy for, what is the purpose of America's role in the world, et cetera. But I'll try to do my best.  I think on the first part, does the United States need enemies, is it looking to make enemies? I think if you asked any—and these are, of course, my own assessments. I think if you asked any administration official, whether in this current administration or in previous administrations—Republican or Democrat—I don't think anyone would answer “yes.” I think the argument that has been made across administrations in a bipartisan fashion is that foreign policy is fundamentally about defending American interests and American values. In essence, being able to support the American way of life, which obviously is not necessarily one clearly defined entity. (Laughs.)  But I think, therefore, all of our policy toward China is sort of geared at maintaining, or securing, defending U.S. interests in the region. And where the argument about your question comes into play is that I think a lot of—the Biden administration, the Trump administration, the Obama administration would argue that many of the concerns that the United States has with China are not fundamentally only about internal issues, where this is a question of how they govern themselves. But they touch upon issues of shared concern. They touch upon issues that actually affect U.S. interests.   And so, for example, the South China Sea is, again—is a space that is—contains much trade. There are many different countries in the region that access the South China Sea. So it's not necessarily just an issue—and, again, this is Secretary Blinken's position that he made clear—it's not just an issue specific to China. It does touch upon global trade, global economics, global rules, and global order. And I think this is the term that has been often used, sort of this liberal international rules-based order.   And while that's sort of an amorphous concept, in essence what I think the term implies is the idea that there are certain standards and rules by which different countries operate that allow for the orderly and for the peaceful and the secure exchange of goods, of ideas, of people, of—so that each country is secure. And I think this—again, this broader concept is why I think successive U.S. administrations have focused on China policy, because I think some of, in their view, China's behaviors impinge on U.S. interests in the region.   I think the second question is why should we care about how other countries govern themselves? I think in a way, the answer the Biden administration—this current administration has given to that question is: The U.S. government under President Biden is not trying to fundamentally change the Chinese system of governance. And I think you've seen Jake Sullivan and Tony Blinken say that publicly, that they are not seeking the collapse or the fundamental change in the Communist Party's rule of China. So I think in that sense, they have made that—they have made that response. I think, again, where there are issues—there are tensions, is when actions that the Chinese government take then touch upon U.S. interests. And I think we see that in Taiwan. We see that with economics. We see that with trade, et cetera.   And then finally, why not cooperate with every country in the world? I think obviously in an ideal world, that would be the case. All countries would be able to only cooperate, and all concerns shared among different nations would be addressed. I think unfortunately one of the problems that we're seeing now is that large major powers, like China and Russia, have very different worldviews. They see a world that is very different in its structure, and its architecture, and its organization, than the one that the U.S. sees. And I think that's what's led to a lot of tension.  FASKIANOS: So we have a written question from Julius Haferkorn, a student at California State University and Tübingen University, in Germany.  Ever since the escalation of the Ukraine war, there are discussions about the risk that, should Russia be successful with its invasion, China might use this as a template in regards to Taiwan. In your opinion, is this a realistic scenario?  LI: Great. Thanks for the question.  I think there are definitely analogies to be drawn between Ukraine and Taiwan, but I think there are also significant differences. The first is the relationship between Russia and Ukraine is one of two sovereign nations that the United States and international community recognizes. I think with Taiwan, what has—going back to our history question—Taiwan is a very complicated issue, even with regard to U.S. policies. The United States does not recognize Taiwan formally as an independent country. The United States actually does not take a position on the status of Taiwan. Briefly, the One China Policy, as articulated in the three communiques, the three joint communiques, essentially says that the United States government acknowledges the Chinese position that there is one China, and Taiwan is part of China, et cetera, et cetera.  And that word “acknowledge” is pretty key, because in essential its strategic ambiguity. It's saying, we acknowledge that the PRC government says this. We don't challenge that position. But we don't necessarily recognize or completely accept. And, obviously, the Mandarin version of the text is slightly different. It uses a term that is closer to “recognize.” But that ambiguity, in a way, permitted normalization and led to the democratization of Taiwan, China's economic growth and miracle, its anti-poverty campaign. So in essence, it's worked—this model has worked for the last forty-something years.  But I think that does mean that the situation across the Taiwan Strait is very different, because here the United States does not recognize two countries on both sides of the strait. Rather, it has this ambiguity, this policy of ambiguity. And in short, the only U.S. criterion for resolution of issues across the Taiwan Strait is peace. So all of the documents that the U.S. has articulated over successive administrations essentially boil down to: As long as the resolution of issues between Taiwan and the PRC and mainland China are peaceful, then the United States is not involved. That the only thing that the United States opposes is a forceful resolution—use of military force, use of coercion. And that's what is problematic.  I think what you've seen increasingly over the last few years is a sort of—it's not a formal shift away from that policy, but definitely slowly edging away from that policy. Now, any administration official will always deny that there are any changes to our One China Policy. And I think that's always been the refrain: Our One China Policy has not changed. But you've actually seen within that One China Policy framework adjustments, accommodations—or, not accommodations—but adjustments, recalibrations. And the way that the successive U.S. administrations defend that or justify it, is because it is our—it is the American One China Policy. Therefore, we can define what that One China Policy actually means.  But you have seen, in essence, greater increased relations and exchanges between officials in Taiwan, officials in the United States. I think it was publicly reported just a couple weeks ago that some of the senior national security officials in Taipei visited the United States. Secretary Pompeo at the end of his tenure as secretary of state changed some of the previous restrictions on—that were self-imposed restrictions—on interactions between the government in Taiwan and the government in the United States. So we're seeing some changes here. And I think that has led to—or, that is one element that has led to some of the tensions across the Taiwan Strait.   Obviously, from Beijing's perspective, it sees that as the U.S. sliding away from its commitments. Now, on the other hand, Beijing, of course, has also started to change its policy, despite claiming that its policy is exactly the same. You've seen greater military incursions in Taiwan's air defense identification zone, with planes, fighter jets, that are essentially flying around the island. You've seen greater geoeconomic coercion targeted at Taiwan in terms of sanctions. So you've seen essentially changes on all sides.  And so the final point I'll leave here—I'll leave with you is that the refrain that the United States government articulates of opposing any unilateral changes to the status quo by either side, to me, is actually quite ambiguous. Because there's never been a status quo that has truly existed. It's always been a dynamic equilibrium between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington, D.C. Where Beijing is seeking to move Taiwan toward unification. Taiwan, at least under its current leadership, under Tsai Ing-wen, is obviously seeking, in a way, to move from at least—at least to move toward de facto or maintain de facto independence. Whether it's moving toward de jure is a topic of debate. And then the United States, of course, is enhancing its relationship with Taiwan.  So there's never been a static status quo between the three sides. It's always been a dynamic, evolving and changing equilibrium. Which is why the concept of opposing unilateral changes to the status quo, in my view, is almost paradoxical, because there has never been a status quo in the first place.  FASKIANOS: There has been some talk that Kevin McCarthy, the speaker of the House, is planning a trip to Taiwan. Given what happened with Speaker Pelosi, is that a—what do you think of that musing, to go to Taiwan, to actually do that?  LI: Mhm, yes. I think that's obviously been reported on. I think it's an area of close attention from everyone watching this space. I haven't seen any reports. All I can say is based on what I've seen reported in the media. And it seems like, based on—because of domestic preoccupations, that trip, whether it happens or not, is right now, at the moment, on the back burner. But I think that if he were to go, I think it would certainly precipitate a quite significant response from China. And I think whether that would be larger or smaller than what happened after Speaker Pelosi's visit, I think is something that is uncertain now.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. We'll go next to Autumn Hauge.  Q: Hi. I'm Autumn Hauge. I'm a student at Minnesota State University, Mankato.  So my question is, since a focus of the Biden administration's foreign policy is the relationship between the United States and China, and another focus is to invest and grow a presence in the Indo-Pacific region, specifically looking at the relationship between the United States and the Micronesian country of the Republic of Palau, whose government has openly shared their support for Taiwan, do you think that the United States' long history with the Republic of Palau, and their connection to their support—the Republic of Palau's support to Taiwan, halters the ability for the U.S. to grow a positive relation with China? Thank you.  LI: Great. Thanks for the question. It's a great question.  I am not an expert on Palau or its politics. I do know that Palau has enhanced its exchanges, it relationship with Taipei, over the last few years. I think we saw Palau's president, I think, visit Taipei. I think the U.S. ambassador to Palau actually visited Taipei. And there have been increasing—during COVID, there was a discussion of a travel bubble between Taiwan and Palau. So there's definitely been increasing exchange.  I think in general this has always been a key obstacle to U.S.-China relations, which is any country that still recognizes the Republic of China—that is the formal name of the government currently in Taiwan—I think presents a significant issue. Because for the PRC, recognition of the One China—what they call the One China Principle, the idea that there is one China, Taiwan is part of that China, and the legitimate government of China is the People's Republic of China, is a precondition for any diplomatic normalization with Beijing. And so I think certainly, you know, there are a small handful of countries that still recognize the ROC, but I think that they—you know, for those countries and their relationships with the PRC, of course, that's a significant hindrance.  In what you've seen in the U.S. government in the past few years is that for countries that derecognize Taipei and sort of switch recognition to Beijing, the PRC, there's been discussion—I think, there have been several bills introduced, in essence, to punish those countries. I don't necessarily think that those bills have ended up becoming law, but I think there is, given the current political dynamics, the sort of views on China in Washington, D.C., there is this sense that the U.S. needs to support countries that still recognize Taiwan, the ROC, and be able to provide support so that they don't feel pressured to switch their recognition.  My personal view is that I think that that is, on the whole, relatively insignificant. I won't say that it's completely not significant, but I think that in general issues around the Taiwan Strait, cross-strait relations, I think military issues, I think political issues related to exchanges between Taiwan and Beijing, I think those issues are much more important and much more critical to driving changes in the relationship across the Taiwan Strait.  FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to try and sneak in one last question from Wim Wiewel, who's a student at Portland State University.   Given your pessimism about cooperation combined with competition, what do you think is the long-term future for U.S.-China relations?  LI: OK. Well, thanks for the question. I'm not sure that I can provide a satisfying answer. And, in fact, I don't have the answer. You know, I think if anyone had the answer, then they should immediately tell the Biden administration that they've solved the problem.  Even though I am pessimistic about this current framework, just because of its demonstrated effects, I still think that in general the likelihood of a real war, which I think people have floated now—you know, Professor Graham Allison, who I used to work for, wrote a book called Destined for War? I still believe that the probability of all-out great-power conflict in a kinetic way, a military way, is still relatively low. I think that there are significant differences today compared to the era during World War I and World War II era.   I think that the degree of economic interdependence between China and not only the United States but the rest of the world, I think is a significant gamechanger in how countries position themselves vis-à-vis China. I think Europe is the great example here of how there are many countries that invest, have business relationships, have trade with China. And so therefore, their policy on China has been a little bit more calibrated than what the United States has been doing.   And so on the whole, I think most people still recognize that any great-power war between the United States and China would be utterly catastrophic. And I think that despite all the tensions that exist today, I think that that recognition, that consensus is pretty universally held, that a great-power war between the U.S. and China would be extremely bad. I think that is—that is probably something that is understood by Republican administrations, Democratic administrations, folks in Beijing, folks around the world, in the region. And so I think that, hopefully, that idea, that despite disagreements, despite political tensions, the need to prevent all-out global conflict is quite important, is a vital interest, I think, hopefully, to me, provides some optimism. And hopefully we'll be able to continue to carry our relationship with China through.  And I'm hopeful especially that all of you students, researchers, who hope to study, and write about, and even perhaps participate in American foreign policy, will continue to think. Because so much of the future of the U.S.-China relationship and U.S. foreign policy is going to be determined by your generation. So with that, I guess this would be a perfect place to stop. And I thank you for the question.   FASKIANOS: Absolutely. Well, Chris, this has been fantastic. I apologize to all of you. We had many more—many questions in the written part and raised hands. And I'm sorry that we could not get to all of them. We'll just have to have you back and continue to cover this issue. So we really appreciate your insights, Chris Li. So thank you again.  The next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, March 22, at 1:00 p.m. (EDT). Brian Winter, editor-in-chief of Americas Quarterly will lead a conversation on U.S. relations with South America. And in the meantime, please do learn more about CFR paid internships for students and fellowships for professors at CFR.org/careers. You can follow us at @CFR_academic, and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. And I'm sure you can also go to the Belfer Center for additional analysis by Chris Li. So I encourage you to go there as well.  Thank you all, again, for being with us, and we look forward to continuing the conversation on March 22. So thank you, all. Thanks, Chris.  LI: Thank you.  (END) 

On today's Episode of the Steak for Breakfast Podcast, we're covering:    Dueling President's Day narratives as 45 and 46 take aim to control the news cycle Secretary of State Tony Blinken faces off with the CCP in a disastrous trip to Germany An end to the Project Veritas as you know it, and a new beginning for James O'Keefe   Guests:   Jim Nelles: (@Jim6555) Supply Chain Expert, Economist   Read Jim's Latest: https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/restoring-america/fairness-justice/urban-decay-chicagos-refusal-to-prosecute-crime-leaves-law-enforcement-in-the-lurch   Kimberly Guilfoyle: (@kimguilfoyle) Conservative Commentator, Show Host   Rumble Channel: https://rumble.com/user/KimberlyGuilfoyle   Subscribe to the show, rate it and leave a review on iTunes and Spotify before you download, listen, like follow and SHARE Steak for Breakfast content!   Steak for Breakfast:    website: https://steakforbreakfastpodcast.com   Steak for Substack: https://steakforbreakfastpodcast.substack.com   linktree: https://linktr.ee/steakforbreakfastpodcast   MyPillow: Promo Code: STEAK at checkout  Website: https://mystore.com/steak Website: https://www.mypillow.com/steak  Via the Phone: 800-658-8045    My Patriot Cigar Co. Enter Promo Code: STEAK  http://mypatriotcigars.com/usa/steak   Farmer Bill's Premium Beef Jerky: Use Promo Code: STEAK at checkout  Farmer Bill's Provisions   

Air Date 2/10/2023 Today, we take a look at the recent rise in tensions in the wake of Israel electing what may be their most right-wing government to date. Literal fascists are now in the governing coalition, violence is rising and reforms are being considered to effectively remove judicial review from the governing process all while the US continues to give its support. Be part of the show! Leave us a message or text at 202-999-3991 or email Jay@BestOfTheLeft.com  Transcript BestOfTheLeft.com/Support (Get AD FREE Shows and Bonus Content) Join our Discord community! OUR AFFILIATE LINKS: ExpressVPN.com/BestOfTheLeft GET INTERNET PRIVACY WITH EXPRESS VPN! BestOfTheLeft.com/Libro SUPPORT INDIE BOOKSHOPS, GET YOUR AUDIOBOOK FROM LIBRO! SHOW NOTES Ch. 1: A look at the violence and unrest in the West Bank - All In with Chris Hayes - Air Date 2-2-23 A look at the violence and unrest in the West Bank. Ch. 2: Israel and the Progressives - Against the Grain - Air Date 1-25-23 Why do so many people who see themselves as progressive nonetheless support the state of Israel, considered an apartheid state for its treatment of the native Palestinian population? Ch. 3: Diana Buttu & Gideon Levy: Israel's New Far-Right Gov't Entrenches Apartheid System with US Support - Democracy Now! - Air Date 1-5-23 Far-right Israeli politician Itamar Ben-Gvir's Tuesday visit to the Al-Aqsa Mosque in occupied East Jerusalem is being roundly condemned across the Middle East. Ben-Gvir is a key part of Benjamin Netanyahu's new far-right government Ch. 4: Protests in Israel over proposed judicial reform Part 1 - The Current - Air Date 1-19-23 Proposed judicial reform in Israel has prompted thousands to take to the streets in protest. We talk to Dahlia Scheindlin and Diana Buttu, a lawyer and former adviser to the negotiating team of the Palestine Liberation Organization. Ch. 5: "An Intolerable Situation": Rashid Khalidi & Orly Noy on Israeli Colonialism & Escalating Violence - Democracy Now! - Air Date 1-30-23 U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken is in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories amid an alarming rise in violence, with Israel killing at least 35 Palestinians since the beginning of January. Ch. 6: An Escalating Cycle of Violence in Israel and Palestine - Global Dispatches - Air Date 2-1-23 We are in the midst of an escalating cycle of violence in Israel and Palestine. On Thursday, January 26 Israeli forces killed at least 9 people in a raid in the Jenin refugee camp in the West Bank. Ch. 7: Protests in Israel over proposed judicial reform Part 2 - The Current - Air Date 1-19-23 MEMBERS-ONLY BONUS CLIP(S) Ch. 8: Republicans feign anti-Semitism standard to eject Rep. Omar from committee - Alex Wagner Tonight - Air Date 2-3-23 House Republicans use a tweet by Rep. Ilhan Omar containing anti-Semitic tropes as an excuse to remove her from the Foreign Affairs Committee, Alex notes when Republican leaders were not only untroubled by anti-Semitic tropes but perpetuated by them. Ch. 9: Israel and the Progressives Part 2 - Against the Grain - Air Date 1-25-23 FINAL COMMENTS Ch. 10: Final comments to wrap up MUSIC (Blue Dot Sessions): Opening Theme: Loving Acoustic Instrumental by John Douglas Orr  Voicemail Music: Low Key Lost Feeling Electro by Alex Stinnent Activism Music: This Fickle World by Theo Bard (https://theobard.bandcamp.com/track/this-fickle-world) Closing Music: Upbeat Laid Back Indie Rock by Alex Stinnent   Produced by Jay! Tomlinson Visit us at BestOfTheLeft.com Listen Anywhere! BestOfTheLeft.com/Listen Listen Anywhere! Follow at Twitter.com/BestOfTheLeft Like at Facebook.com/BestOfTheLeft Contact me directly at Jay@BestOfTheLeft.com

Jeremy Loffredo discusses his recent article in The Grayzone (1/23/23), US Africa Leaders Summit promises more exploitation for Africa, record profits for US mining firms. Recent deals between US Secretary of State Tony Blinken and African heads of state promise eye-popping profits for US mining multinationals and fewer protections for African laborers “toiling in subhuman conditions” to drive the digital revolution.

On January 28th, the Chinese Communist Party sent a spy balloon into our airspace. It took President Biden until February 1st to order that it be shot down, which finally occurred on February 4th after its surveillance mission was complete. This episode offers two notable insights: First, the balloon is kaput, but not the rest of the CCP's comprehensive efforts to steal our secrets, including via: satellites, cyber techniques and countless human “collectors,” both spies as well as students, businessmen and tourists. Second, the Biden administration concealed from the American people the balloon's presence in the interest of having Secretary of State Tony Blinken travel to Beijing for meetings meant to promote the idea that the Chinese Communists are partners, not a threat. The CCP actually is America's mortal enemy. We cannot safely obscure that reality, or fail to defend ourselves against it. This is Frank Gaffney.

US Secretary of State Tony Blinken has recently discussed the two-state solution with the new right-wing government of Israel. The belated discussion is bound to yield no solution since the Israeli government plans a de facto annexation of territories in the West Bank. Violence and tensions will worsen between Israel and the Palestinians. And violence leads to more violence.Two questions arise: President Biden supports the two-state solution. Is he making any moves toward that goal? And the Arab states that normalised with Israel could they have pushed for the two-state solution in return for normalisation? Dr. Atef Abdel Gawad discussed these questions and others with a group of distinguished guests and experts : From Michigan the co-founder of Jewish Voice for Peace-Detroit Attorney Barbara Harvey, and the political analyst Dr. Abdalmajid Katranji, from Washington "Journalist Dan Raviv who is analyst, and a former Correspondent at CBS News then i24News. Dr. Jamal Nazzal, who is currently the representative of Fatih, joined us to share his comments and outlook on the ongoing Palestinian-Israeli conflict. The episode was broadcast on February 3, 2023 US Arab Radio can be heard on wnzk 690 AM, WDMV 700 AM, and WPAT 930 AM. Please visit: www.facebook.com/USArabRadio/ Web site : arabradio.us/ Online Radio: www.radio.net/s/usarabradio Twitter : twitter.com/USArabRadio Instagram : www.instagram.com/usarabradio/ Youtube : US Arab Radio

“When the balloon goes up” is military slang for the start of a shooting war. The Chinese Communist Party has literally sent a very large balloon up to collect intelligence over sensitive sites in the continental United States and the Biden administration's refusal to shoot it down invites actual hostilities.   Presumably, a determination to avoid any unpleasantness on the eve of Secretary of State Tony Blinken's visit to Beijing next week contributed to Team Biden's latest act of submissiveness. But it will only reinforce the CCP's calculation that it can behave aggressively against us with impunity.   Unfortunately, as a powerful Committee on the Present Danger: China webinar yesterday made clear, the Chinese Communists are already at pre-kinetic war with America. Their serial appeasement by our “captured” leadership elites only intensifies the likelihood of that war becoming a violent one.   This is Frank Gaffney.

After days of bloodshed between Israelis and Palestinians, and reported Israeli airstrikes in Iran, Secretary of State Tony Blinken became the latest high-ranking American official to travel to Israel. As Nick Schifrin reports, Blinken is trying to keep a lid on further bloodshed and coordinate U.S.-Israeli cooperation on Iran. PBS NewsHour is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders

After days of bloodshed between Israelis and Palestinians, and reported Israeli airstrikes in Iran, Secretary of State Tony Blinken became the latest high-ranking American official to travel to Israel. As Nick Schifrin reports, Blinken is trying to keep a lid on further bloodshed and coordinate U.S.-Israeli cooperation on Iran. PBS NewsHour is supported by - https://www.pbs.org/newshour/about/funders

Sign up for the Catholic Identity Conference LIVESTREAM: https://remnantnewspaper.com/web/index.php/cic-livestream-video-on-demand-registration Get the #ResistFrancis tee! https://shop.remnantnewspaper.com/index.php/remnant-shop/remnant-shop/remnant-apparel/resistfrancis-t-shirt-detail In this episode of The Remnant Underground, Michael Matt takes a hard look at the downward spiral of President Biden's foreign policy, specifically his funding of the war in Ukraine. With Putin threatening nukes and engaging in massive wargames, we'd better find out what's going on here. And why are we funding that war? On the floor of the United Nations last week, U.S. Secretary of State Tony Blinken told us exactly why when he said that President Putin must be stopped because he is “shredding the international order” that “we have sworn to defend.” And who was sitting just behind Blinken when he made this stunning admission? Victoria Nuland, of course, President Obama's Secretary of State for European Affairs, who lead the regime change in Ukraine in 2014.  And just like that, everything becomes clear. Plus, 90-year-old Cardinal Joseph Zen is in prison awaiting trial, facing a life sentence for opposing persecution of Christians in Communist China. And is Pope Francis condemning this outrageous persecution of one of his own cardinals? Don't be silly! Meanwhile, as Francis cancels traditional Catholics worldwide, another diocese announces that it is closing three-quarters of its churches. Yep, Catholics got the message: Religious services are 'non-essential'!  Thanks, Francis! Finally, Michael announces a major press conference to be held this coming Saturday that will formalize resistance to Francis and proclaim the Kingship of Christ in the face of Francis's attempt to appease his Globalist masters by canceling Christianity.  Listen to Michael Matt's podcasts: SPOTIFY: https://open.spotify.com/show/1AdkCDFfR736CqcGw2Uvd0 APPLE: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-michael-j-matt-show/id1563298989 GOOGLE: https://podcasts.google.com/feed/aHR0cHM6Ly9yZW1uYW50LXR2LmNvbS9mZWVkLz9jY XROYW1lPXRoZS1taWNoYWVsLWotbWF0dC1zaG93 If you'd like to contribute to RTV's expansion, please consider a donation: https://remnantnewspaper.com/web/index.php/donate-today Stay Connected to RTV: Subscribe to The Remnant Newspaper, print and/or digital versions available: https://remnantnewspaper.com/web/index.php/subscribe-today Subscribe to Remnant TV's independent platform: https://remnant-tv.com/user Sign up for Michael Matt's Weekly E-Letter: https://remnantnewspaper.com/web/index.php/subscribe-today/free-remnant-updates

In our latest episode, we break down Kim Jong Un's missile launch over Japan just days after VP Kamala visited the DMZ. We hear from President Brandon, John Fetterman, and Secretary of State Tony Blinken explains why the Nordstream pipeline was bombed. All this, plus the “fastest two minutes in politics” from our D.C. correspondent, Phillip A. Flood.

While US neocons and mainstream media continue to inexplicably blame Russia for blowing up its own pipeline, US officials continue to signal their motive and the benefit they see from the sabotage. On Friday, US Secretary of State Tony Blinken said at a press conference that blowing up the pipeline presented a "tremendous opportunity" to finally end Europe's dependence on Russian energy imports. Also today: Guess who's personal fortune doubled during Covid?

This is Frank Gaffney with the Secure Freedom Minute. Last week, Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and his Chinese counterpart, Gen. Wei Fenghe, held an “emergency meeting” in Singapore. Evidently, it went pretty much as have other conversations between senior Biden officials like Secretary of State Tony Blinken and National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan, which is to say the Americans were rhetorically mauled by their truculent interlocutors. The problem wasn't simply that Defense Minister Wei declared that his country won't hesitate to go to war over Taiwan. The truth, evidently unacknowledged by either minister, is that China has actually been engaged in “unrestricted warfare” against us for over two decades. When an enemy makes a point of directly threatening you, it is advisable to prepare for conflict. Unfortunately, Team Biden is, instead, signaling a lack of resolve – and, worse yet, encouraging American investors actually to underwrite the Chinese threat. This is Frank Gaffney.

This is Frank Gaffney with the Secure Freedom Minute. Memorial Day is dedicated to honoring the sacrifice of those who served and died so that the rest of us might enjoy the blessings of liberty. If the Chinese Communist Party has its way, though, this one might be our last. That ominous possibility was a takeaway from a webinar last week featuring members of the Committee on the Present Danger: China discussing evidence that the CCP is now actively mobilizing for war. Particularly chilling is a videotape reportedly of a high-level planning session in China's Guangdong Province indicating Chinese leaders are preparing to attack, not just Taiwan, but apparently us – and plan to do so within months. Some are questioning the credibility of this video. Others, like Secretary of State Tony Blinken, act like it doesn't exist. That's malfeasant, and it will inevitably invite Chinese Communist aggression, to our mortal peril.  This is Frank Gaffney.

7:04-NEWS 7:10-NPR sets up a "snitch hotline" for violations of their mask guidelines  7:25- Another spin-off "Yellowstone" is coming  7:30-Biological female skateboarder speaks out against Red Bull for allowing a transgender female to compete who ended up winning the competition.  7:45- CUT SHEET | The Late Show With Stephen Colbert welcomes Secretary of State Tony Blinken on the show | Biden's weird analogy for Sweden and Finland wanting to join NATO | Pelosi says she's happy with Biden's response to the formula shortage | FDA Commissioner says it will be a few weeks before the supply is back up | Senator Gillibrand blames corporate greed for the baby formula shortage |  Photo: Getty Images

6:04-NEWS 6:10-Voting against $40 billion in aid to Ukraine doesn't mean you're pro-Russia  6:40-Is an elephant a person?  6:51-Netflix scraps woke projects  7:04-NEWS 7:10-NPR sets up a "snitch hotline" for violations to their mask guidelines  7:25- Another spin-off "Yellowstone" is coming  7:30-Biological female skateboarder speaks out against Red Bull for allowing transgender a female who ended up winning the competition.  7:45- CUT SHEET | The Late Show With Stephen Colbert welcomes Secretary of State Tony Blinken on the show | Biden's weird analogy for Sweden and Finland wanting to join NATO | Pelosi says she's happy with Biden's response to the formula shortage | FDA Commissioner says it will be a few weeks before the supply is back up | Senator Gillibrand blames corporate greed for the baby formula shortage |  8:07-People are getting monkey-pox  8:23-NEWS 8:35-Biden Administration and other governments are preparing to enter a "Global Pandemic" treaty with the World Health Organization.  9:04-NEWS 9:08- Update on the U.S. Senate race in Pennsylvania for a Republican nominee  9:12-Senator Tom Massie is the lone vote against a censorship bill   9:42-CUT SHEET | All 50 states have surpassed an average of $4/gallon of gas | CNN's feature on the insane gas price rises | Interior Secretary won't say if gas prices are too high when asked during hearing | She also couldn't explain the decision to shut down oil production | Expect gas prices to go up more | Pelosi believes abortion is a kitchen table issue  9:55-Final Thoughts 

Joy Reid leads this edition of The ReidOut by critiquing the GOP embrace of authoritarianism. Then, she and her guest analyze Elon Musk reaching a deal to buy Twitter for $44 billion. Next we turn to Secretary of State Tony Blinken and Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin making a strong show of support for Ukraine. They took a train from Poland to meet with Ukrainian President Zelenskyy in Kyiv over the weekend where they pledged hundreds of millions of dollars in new aid for the country. Then Joy and her guests discuss the 2,300 text messages, as reported by CNN, sent and received by Donald Trump's White House Chief of Staff Mark Meadows between Election Day 2020 and President Biden's inauguration--including an apparently incriminating text from Marjorie Taylor Greene. All this and more in this edition of The ReidOut on MSNBC.

On today's Breitbart News Daily podcast, we begin by getting you caught up on all the news from the weekend, but especially the fallout from Pres. Joe Biden's announcement that he'll be lifting the Title 42 border restrictions that were designed to protect us from coronavirus. Even someone Democrats think this move is nuts. Also in the opening, another radical position from Judge Ketanji Brown Jackson has been revealed, former Alaska Governor Sarah Palin (R) is running for Congress, Secretary of State Tony Blinken is hanging out with U2's Bono, Ukraine seems to have the upper hand over Russia in the ongoing war (for now), more evidence a recession may be coming, and much more. We have two guests on today's podcast - first, it's Oliver Lane, Breitbart's London Bureau Chief, who breaks down the landslide victory of Viktor Orban in the Hungarian elections that took place over the weekend. And then, fan favorite and Fox News personality and Washington Times Opinion Editor, Charlie Hurt, joins to give his take on all of the news of the day.

Richard Grenell, former director of National Intelligence under President Trump comments on the recent noticeable absence of Secretary of State Tony Blinken on the world stage and the media's portrayal of President Biden's strong foreign policy decisions while in reality his actions are the result of Congress forcing his hand. Grenell comments that the media is complicit in keeping up this appearance of Biden's presidency being successful, commenting that America “has a crisis”, when it comes to unbiased journalism, that there are “too many outlets that just parrot the ruling party”.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.