Podcasts about jabhat

Syrian rebel commanders have admitted that the US military helped them overthrow the government of Bashar al-Assad. NATO member Turkey and Israel played a key role as well. Ben Norton reviews the evidence. VIDEO: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qicLi6kqt7M Topics 0:00 Intro 0:41 US troops occupy Syria's oil & wheat fields 2:56 US military oversaw Syrian rebel assault 6:22 Turkey backed Syrian rebel operation 6:48 Israel helped Syrian rebels 8:06 US military funded Syrian rebels 10:54 Rebranded Al-Qaeda takes over Syria 12:19 USA & Turkey carve up Syria 13:05 Israel colonizes Syrian land 14:31 Jake Sullivan: "AQ is on our side in Syria" 15:15 CIA armed & trained Syrian rebels 16:18 Jabhat al-Nusra rebrands as HTS 17:20 US diplomats meet with HTS leader al-Jolani 19:12 Western media whitewashes Al-Qaeda 2.0 21:05 Outro

Last week marked a historic turning point in Syria. Rebel forces seized control of the nation, toppling the regime of Bashar al-Assad and ending his family's brutal 50-year stranglehold on power. For decades, the Assad dynasty ruled through unimaginable violence—launching chemical attacks on civilians, silencing dissent with mass imprisonment and torture, and presiding over a civil war that killed an estimated 600,000 people and drove 13 million into exile. In cities across the world, jubilant Syrians have celebrated the regime's downfall, having deemed it to be one of the world's most oppressive dictatorships. But not everyone is celebrating. Or at least, some people are saying there is reason for caution. That's because the coalition of rebel forces taking control of Syria now is led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, or HTS, a militant Islamist organization which originated as an offshoot of al-Qaeda. Its leader is a Saudi-born Syrian who calls himself Abu Mohammad al-Jolani. A 21-year-old al-Jolani left Syria for Iraq in 2003 to join al-Qaeda and fight against America. There, he was captured by the U.S. and put into Bucca jail, which housed some of the most notorious al-Qaeda prisoners. But since emerging on the world stage in the last week, al-Jolani has indicated that he is a reformed man, leading a moderated organization. He insists his al-Qaeda days and their methods—the detentions and torture and forced conversions—are over, and HTS is not going to persecute religious and ethnic minorities. But is it… true?  Few people in the West might know that answer as well as journalist Theo Padnos. In October 2012, Padnos ventured from Turkey into Syria to report on the Syrian Civil War. There, he was captured by HTS (then known as Jabhat al-Nusra) and held captive for nearly two years.  Throughout his captivity, Padnos endured relentless torture at the hands of his captors. He was savagely beaten until unconscious, given electric shocks, and forced into severe stress positions for hours at a time. All of this is to say nothing of the psychological torment inflicted on him. Today, he joins Michael Moynihan to discuss his harrowing experience, the psychology of jihadists, and what the future of Syria will look like under the leadership of his former captors. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Syrian government was overthrown, and Salafi-jihadist rebels led by a rebranded version of Al-Qaeda called Hay'at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) took power in Damascus. US President Biden and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu boasted of helping topple Bashar al-Assad. NATO member Turkey played a key role as well. Ben Norton explains how the West dealt a major blow to the Axis of Resistance and Iran. VIDEO: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=D8pZgwOdIuA Al-Qaeda-linked ‘rebels' in Syria say they ‘love Israel'. USA gave them billions in weapons & support: https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2024/12/06/al-qaeda-rebels-syria-israel-usa/ US troops are occupying Syria's oil fields. Congress refuses to withdraw them: https://geopoliticaleconomy.com/2023/12/12/us-troops-occupy-syria-oil-congress-withdraw/ Topics 0:00 Syrian government is overthrown 3:17 Al-Qaeda leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani 4:39 AQ rebrands: Jabhat al-Nusra to Jabhat Fatah al-Sham to HTS 6:16 Western media whitewashed Osama bin Laden 7:53 Jake Sullivan: "AQ is on our side in Syria" 8:49 CIA spends billions arming Salafi-jihadists 10:06 Diplomat says HTS is US "asset" 11:33 HTS' medieval rule in Syria 12:44 Libya: where NATO brought back slavery 15:40 (CLIP) Biden takes credit for overthrowing Assad 16:58 Syrian Al-Qaeda got US weapons 17:24 Turkey backed Syrian assault 17:50 Ukraine's role in Syria 18:30 Israel boasts of Syria regime change 19:12 (CLIP) Netanyahu: Israel helped topple Assad 19:26 Israel supported Syrian rebels 20:38 Syrian rebels say they "love Israel" 22:09 Israel seizes more Syrian territory 23:15 Axis of Resistance is weakened 25:15 Syria's territorial integrity 26:41 US military occupies Syria's oil fields 27:19 (CLIP) Trump boasts: I took Syria's oil 27:46 Congress backs US military occupation of Syria 28:33 US starved Syria of oil revenue 29:43 Western sanctions suffocated Syria's economy 32:42 Inflation in Syria 33:35 This is not about "authoritarianism" 36:08 US strategy to collapse Syrian state 37:30 (CLIP) US official outlines Syria regime-change plan 39:46 Will Syria's borders be changed? 41:41 Iran: the ultimate US target 42:45 (CLIP) Wesley Clark: US planned to topple 7 governments 43:38 US collapsed 6 of 7 states on regime-change list 44:34 Will US war on Iran be next? 46:24 Outro

//The Wire//2300Z November 29, 2024////ROUTINE////BLUF: WAR IN SYRIA ESCALATES AMID MAJOR REBEL OFFENSIVE. CYBER INCIDENTS CONTINUE IN EUROPE. CEASEFIRE LARGELY HOLDING IN LEBANON, DESPITE BOTH PARTIES CLAIMING VIOLATIONS.// -----BEGIN TEARLINE------International Events-Russia: As part of a general summit on security topics in Kazakhstan, Russian President Vladimir Putin made a few interesting remarks regarding Donald Trump. Speaking off-the-cuff, Putin made direct references to Trump's safety in the context of his multiple assassination attempts, saying: “By the way, in my view, even now he's not safe. Yes, why? The United States history has seen various developments. But he is a clever and cautious man, I should hope he realizes all that”.Europe: Danish authorities clarify details regarding a nationwide IT outage yesterday, which reportedly began as a small outage before expanding to include rail, cellular networks, and other telecoms infrastructure which were all affected and offline for hours. AC: This could be related to the initial reports of a similar outage in the Netherlands yesterday; either the initial reports of outages in the Netherlands were incorrect or the outages were minor in scale to those of Denmark, which were more substantial. Separately, this afternoon a large-scale cyber incident appeared to strike Russia, with many banking services and financial institutions reporting service interruptions. Russian airline companies also reported similar interruptions to ticketing and booking systems.Georgia: Significant escalations of ongoing domestic tensions emerged overnight as the Prime Minister announced a cessation of Georgia's bid to join the European Union. This announcement reignited unrest among Georgians along two major perspectives: those who support a more pro-EU, pro-West future for Georgia, and those who wish to pivot away from the EU in favor of Russia.Lebanon: The ceasefire largely appears to be holding for the moment. However, over the past 24 hours, both sides have claimed the other violated the ceasefire, with limited skirmishes taking place in the border regions of Lebanon. AC: Of course, the general idea of a ceasefire is for both belligerents to stop shooting at each other completely, which has not happened. However, both sides have reduced the intensity of combat operations to largely consist of isolated ambushes (from Hezbollah) and airstrikes (from Israel). Considering the tradition of the region, a reduction in combat intensity (if not an outright cessation of hostilities) might be the best anyone can hope for at the present moment.Syria: A significant escalation of the war is underway as fighting reaches Aleppo once again. Syrian “rebel” groups have advanced into the city, conducting a large scale offensive (which began a few days ago) toward Aleppo from Idlib. AC: The war in Syria, largely forgotten over the past few years following the 2020 ceasefire agreement, has remained an extremely complex conflict. Over the past few months, one of the many factions at play in the region, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (which evolved from the Jabhat al-Nusra group) has made significant territorial gains, which may now include the fall of Aleppo.-HomeFront-USA: This morning employees of the Amazon corporation conducted a labor strike, with employees from around 20 different countries participating. Most of the grievances appear to be centered around wage increases and demanding Amazon to allow workers to unionize. AC: It's not yet clear as to how this will affect logistics around the world considering that Amazon is not just a retailer of consumer goods, but also a very large provider of data and web services.-----END TEARLINE-----Analyst Comments: The IT issues experienced throughout Europe over the past few weeks (some minor, some substantial) are quite interesting in the context of the two cable-cut

Jerome Drevon is a Senior Analyst in Jihad and Modern Conflict at the International Crisis Group, where he undertakes research and analysis on Islamist militancy across regions. In episode 41 of Tahrir Podcast, we discussed his most recent book, “From Jihad to Politics: How Syrian Jihadis Embraced Politics,” (Oxford University Press 2024) which looks at why and how jihadis were able to take over the Syrian armed opposition, as well as why these very groups ultimately rejected domination by al-Qaeda (AQ) and the Islamic State (IS) and embraced a different action plan. The book builds on years of impressive field research, including multiple trips to northwest Syria, and interviews with the main leaders of the armed opposition, especially Ahrar al-Sham and Jabhat al-Nusra/Nusra Front–now called Hayatt Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), including an interview with Abu Muhammad al-Jolani. Episode on YouTube: https://youtu.be/dS5ZLqDFJfw Drevon's book (open access): https://t.co/uK4JfaAUVn Streaming everywhere! https://linktr.ee/TahrirPodcast Reach out! TahrirPodcast@gmail.com Support us on Patreon for as low as $2 per month ($20 per year)! https://www.patreon.com/TahrirPodcast

Rena netjes vertelde ons haar ervaringen in Syrië en hoe Nieuwsuur volledig de plank missloeg. Zij was op bezoek bij Jabhat al-Shamiyah waar zij gastvrij is ontvangen en zelfs een escorte meekreeg. Luister hoe de Syrische NGO geleden heeft onder de onjuiste berichtgeving door de Nederlandse media. U hoort ook fragmenten van beschietingen, Rena was daar heel dichtbij: Rena onder vuur! Hosts: Anaïs Cortez- Reina & NineG Music Techniek: NineG Music https://www.dossierjihadisten.nl/

In the fall of 2012, Theo Padnos, who grew up in Woodstock, Vermont, was working as a freelance journalist in Turkey. He made a fateful decision to trust two men who promised to arrange safe passage for him into Syria, where he hoped to report on the civil war that began a year earlier. It was a catastrophically bad decision. His supposed helpers turned out to be working with Jabhat al-Nusra, the main affiliate of al-Qaida in Syria. Upon entering Syria, he was beaten and kidnaped. He spent the next two years in secret prisons being tortured by his captors. One of the ways he consoled himself was to write an allegorical novel set in Vermont. During his captivity, other journalists captured in Syria, including James Foley and Steven Sotloff, were executed. Others, like Austin Tice, disappeared. Padnos was lucky: In August 2014, he was released after the government of Qatar paid millions in ransom. Padnos first wrote about his ordeal in 2014 in an article in the New York Times Magazine, and he is the subject of a documentary, Theo Who Lived. He has a new book about his ordeal, Blindfold: A Memoir of Capture, Torture, and Enlightenment. The New York Times says it “lays bare the human condition at its extremes. There is depravity and resilience, rage and revelation, and, ultimately, a triumph of the human spirit.” Padnos sees parallels between the mindset of his al-Qaida captors and the pro-Trump insurrectionists who stormed the U.S. Capitol in January. “What if they set up their own little government, what would it be like to live inside it?” Padnos asks of the insurrectionists. He warns that the U.S. "started down the road…to have a similar outcome as Syria is having now.”

Four years ago, when Donald Trump was elected President, many of you were shocked. Many wondered, “Where did we go wrong?” Today, I interview author and journalist Max Blumenthal about his book Management of Savagery. Max painstakingly details the foreign policy decisions made during the cold war in the 1970s, and maps the ripple effects of these decisions that has lead us to this path of regime change wars, empire, Islamophobia and bloodstained episodes of blowback.Excerpt from Management of SavageryIsrael’s ISIS ConnectionWhile Washington’s Gulf-funded think tank experts spun out public relations for the allies of Al Qaeda, ISIS found defenders in Israel. At the Likud Party-linked Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, its director Efraim Inbar promoted the IslamicState in Syria as a boon to Israel’s strategic deterrence. In an op-ed entitled “The Destruction of Islamic State Is a Strategic Mistake,” Inbar argued, “The West should seek the further weakening of Islamic State, but not its destruction.”Instead, he insisted, it should exploit ISIS as a “useful tool” in the fight against Israel’s true enemy, Iran and its proxy, Hezbollah, which operates on Israeli frontiers from southern Lebanon. “A weak IS is, counterintuitively, preferable to a destroyed IS,” Inbar concluded. Inbar went on to argue for prolonging the conflict in Syria for as long as possible on the grounds that extended sectarian bloodshed would produce “positive change.”As bracing as it might have been, Inbar’s argument provided a perfect distillation of the Israeli government’s position on the Syrian civil war. “In Syria, if the choice is between Iran and the Islamic State, I choose the Islamic State,” Israel’s former defense minister, Moshe Ya’alon, bluntly stated in 2016. Eager to see an Iranian ally weakened from within and without, the Israeli army occasionally bombed in support of the rebels operating around the southern city of Quneitra and attacked Damascus several times.The end goal of the Israelis was to establish a buffer zone between itself and Hezbollah, with Sunni Islamists, including Al Qaeda affiliates, acting as its proxies. A rebel commander revealed to the US news outlet Al-Monitor,“The battle to capture Quneitra on Sept. 27 [2014] was preceded by coordination and communications between Abu Dardaa, a leader of Jabhat al-Nusra [Al Qaeda], and the Israeli army to pave the way for the attack.” Benjamin Netanyahu greeting injured Rebel FighterThe Israeli military-intelligence apparatus even funded its own unit of the Free Syrian Army, the Golan Knights. “Israel stood by our side in a heroic way,” Moatasem al-Golani, a spokesman for the Golan Knights, told the Wall Street Journal,“We wouldn’t have survived without Israel’s assistance.” In 2016, Israel established a liaison unit to support the efforts of the rebels in southern Syria, according to journalist Nour Samaha, “facilitating cross-border travel for residents into Israel, regular deliveries of food, clothing, construction equipment and educational materials, airstrikes on pro-government positions and the establishment of an Israeli-backed opposition faction in rebel-held southern Syria.”When journalist Bryan Bender visited top Israeli military officials in the occupied Golan Heights, he heard unapologetic arguments for supporting Al Qaeda and ISIS against the Syrian government, Iran and Hezbollah. “If I can be frank, the radical axis headed by Iran is more risky than the global jihad one,” said Army Brigadier General Ram Yavne, the head of the IDF’s Strategic Division. “It is much more knowledgeable, stronger, with a bigger arsenal.” When Bender asked another Israeli official if the United States should allow ISIS to maintain its caliphate in eastern Syria, he replied, “Why not?”While Israeli military honchos took satisfaction from the bloodshed of Syria’s civil war, ISIS commanders tiptoed around the Israeli military. During a public forum in Israel, the ever-candid former minister of defense, Ya’alon, revealed that an ISIS cell operating alongside the rebels in southern Syria had accidentally launched a mortar into Israeli-controlled territory. “On most occasions, firing comes from regions under the control of the regime,” Ya’alon commented. “But once the firing came from ISIS positions—and it immediately apologized.”Pushed by Israeli media to clarify his statement about ISIS formally apologizing to Israel—an open admission of an Israeli backchannel to the jihadists—Ya’alon refused further comment.In Washington, meanwhile, top officials in the Obama administration, including Hillary Clinton, kept their complaints about the channels of state support to ISIS and other jihadist rebel factions confined to private discussions. There was a lot to lose in venting their frustrations in public, including the massive donations their own political operations received from the very same sources.When Hillary Clinton left the State Department in late 2013, she immediately joined the board of the Clinton Foundation. The New York-based nonprofit touted its charitable good works around the world, from making AIDS medication more affordable to “working toward a world where more girls and women can achieve full participation in all aspects of life.” At the same time, the Clinton Foundation raked in between $10 and $25 million from the government of Saudi Arabia, and as much as $5 million from a front group called “Friends of Saudi Arabia.” Tens of millions more flowed into the Clinton foundation coffers from Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates.All along, Clinton knew that the major donors to her family’s vehicle for charity and influence peddling—a key platform for her forthcoming presidential campaign—were propping up ISIS and Al Qaeda in Syria. In a 2014 email to her longtime political confidant John Podesta, Clinton singled out Qatar and Saudi Arabia as the principal benefactors of the Islamic State. “While this military/para-military operation is moving forward,” she wrote, citing Western and US intelligence sources, “we need to use our diplomatic and more traditional intelligence assets to bring pressure on the governments of Qatar and Saudi Arabia, which are providing clandestine financial and logistic support to ISIL and other radical Sunni groups in the region.”Vice President Joseph Biden was even more explicit. Discussing the challenges facing America in Syria, he stated, “Our biggest problem is our allies.” Singling out Turkey and Saudi Arabia, Biden complained at Harvard’s Kennedy School of Government in October 2014, “They were so determined to take down Assad and essentially have a proxy Sunni–Shia war; what did they do? They poured hundreds of millions of dollars and thousands of tons of weapons into anyone who would fight against Assad. Except that the people who were being supplied were Al-Nusra and Al Qaeda and the extremist elements of jihadis coming from other parts of the world.”Biden’s candid comments were immediately labeled as a “gaffe” by the Washington Post’s Adam Taylor, who grumbled about the “worrying habit of lumping al-Qaeda’s al-Nusra Front in with Islamic State.” For daring to give credence to what was already widely known, Biden was forced to embark on the equivalent of an international apology tour the same month, issuing “a formal clarification” to Turkey’s Erdoğan and thanking Saudi Arabia’s foreign minister for his country’s supposed cooperation in the fight against ISIS. After Biden’s pathetic retreat, scarcely anyone in Washington, whether in government, the world of think tank experts, or in the press corps, dared to openly confront America’s core Middle Eastern allies for their backing of Al Qaeda and ISIS.Besides Saudi Arabia and Qatar, there was ample evidence that Turkey was taking a lead role in fueling Islamist militancy in Syria’s north. A leaked 2015 report from the Turkish Gendarmerie General Command found that lorries filled with heavy weapons had been sent by the Turkish intelligence services to resupply al-Nusra. “The trucks were carrying weapons and supplies to the al-Qaeda terror organization,” the report read. The government of Turkish president Erdoğan promptly banned all media coverage of the scandal and placed the soldiers who carried out the searches on trial for espionage.A twenty-nine-year-old Lebanese American named Serena Shim had been reporting on these developments on the Turkish border for Press TV, the Iranian government’s English language channel. She was among the first correspondents to cover the transfer of arms from the Incirlik US air base in Turkey to insurgents in Syria. Her sister, Fatmeh, told local media in her hometown of Detroit, Michigan, that Shim “caught [Turkish intelligence] bringing ISIS high-ranked members into Syria from Turkey into camps, which are supposed to be Syrian refugee camps.” Shim began to fear for her life, complaining that Turkish intelligence considered her a spy. “I’m hoping that nothing is going to happen, that it’s going to blow over,” she told Press TV, the Iranian network, on October 18.Turkey-backed FSA capture the city of Afrin in Syria.One day later, Shim died in a car accident. The story of her death was buried, with no acknowledgement from Reporters Without Borders or the Committee to Protect Journalists. American media scarcely covered it at all. Press TV said the car that she died in and its driver had disappeared. Her family never accepted the official version of events and has pressed in vain for an investigation….If you enjoyed this excerpt:Max Blumenthal is the host of the show Moderate Rebels and also the editor of The Gray Zone. Get full access to Historic.ly at historicly.substack.com/subscribe

Despite the recent support for Turkey's policies in northern Syria by the U.S., Russian Today (RT) is reporting that Turkey is giving American anti-aircraft weapons to the al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (formerly Jabhat al-Nusra). Listen to Clarion Project's Editor Meira Svirsky and Clarion's Arab Affairs Analyst and Shillman Fellow Ran Meir discuss these and other developments having to do with the U.S. in the Middle East.

Bashir Mohammad came to Istanbul, Turkey as a Syrian refugee. He’d defected from Jabhat al-Nusra an offshoot of Al Qaeda. He was broken and traumatised after witnessing his fellow muslims torturing and killing other muslims. Whilst in Turkey his wife fell sick and he turned to a relative who had once sent him videos of radical Islamic preachers for help. The relative was now living in Canada and shocked Bashir by confessing that he’d become a Christian! He asked Bashir to put the phone next to his wife’s ear so he could pray for her. At first Bashir refused but finally he became so desperate to help her that he gave in. His wife’s health improved. Suddenly Bashir was willing to entertain a sacrilegious thought. He asked his cousin to recommend a Christian preacher who could tell him more about the religion. Fortunately Eimad Brim, a missionary with an evangelical group based in Jordan called the Good Shepherd agreed to meet with him. Eimad Brim risked his life to bring the Gospel to Bashir Mohammad a former terrorist who now meets with other Christians to pray and worship a God who changed his life forever.Everyday disciples like Eimad and Ananias risk everything to share the Gospel. People like this need our support and prayers but they aren’t superheroes. While we don’t risk our lives in sharing the Gospel with others, sometimes it takes a lot of guts. We need to draw on stories like Ananias’ and Bashir’s, and be willing to give our time and risk our reputation to share the Gospel with others. (Source: https://www.nytimes.com/2017/03/24/world/middleeast/the-jihadi-who- turned-to-jesus.html). DBQuestionsWhy was Ananias willing to visit Saul?How can we be supporting our brothers and sisters who risk everything to share the Gospel with others?PrayerGod of Grace, thank you so much for the courage of Ananias and people like him who take risks to share the Gospel. Help us to see people in our ‘frontlines’ who need to hear about you. Please help to follow your lead when you send us. Amen!


Il Parlamento Europeo boccia la direttiva sul copyrightStamane, giovedì 5 luglio, il Parlamento Europeo in seduta plenaria a Strasburgo ha respinto la nuova direttiva sul copyright, la serie di regole per aggiornare le leggi sulla tutela del diritto d’autore in Europa, in seguito al vivace dibattito degli ultimi mesi hanno prevalso i dubbi sulle certezze dei promotori. Le nuove normative saranno cosi riviste a settembre, quando saranno rinegoziate fra Parlamento, Commissione e Consiglio europeo. La battaglia non è dunque finita. Per fortuna, perché gli effetti saranno cruciali per tutti gli utenti di Internet in Europa e oltre . La direttiva respinta intendeva aggiornare le regole sul diritto d’autore nell’Unione Europea, ferme al 2001. Alcuni articoli sono scritti in modo vago e potrebbero dare adito a interpretazioni da parte degli stati membri; lo scontro era soprattutto su due articoli, l’11 e il 13. Per la maggioranza potrebbero avere conseguenze pericolose per la libera circolazione delle informazioni , mentre per altri sono la soluzione adeguata per tutelare i produttori dei contenuti.Salisbury: la saga-farsa del Novichok continuaSabato 30 giugno, un uomo e una donna di nazionalita' britannica hanno perso i sensi nella cittadina britannica di Amesbury, a 12 km da Salisbury. L'uomo,Charlie Rowley, sulla quarantina, era un noto tossicodipendente da eroina.Tuttavia, ad informare della vicenda, le autorita' ci hanno pensato solo ieri, mercoledi' 4 luglio. Mentre il neo appuntato Capo delle Operazioni speciali Anti Terrorismo Neil Basu mostra un po' di cautela, a fare un immediato collegamento con la vicenda di Sergey e Yulia Skripal ci pensano sia il laboratorio militare di Porton Down, a pochi chilometri dall’accaduto, e che parla subito del gas Novichok, sia la stampa britannica mainstream, sia le autorita' governative, nella persona del Ministro dell'interno Sajid Javid , che si è espresso in questi termini: "la vicenda segue il barbaro attacco di Salisbury". L'ex ambasciatore britannico, Craig Murray, ironizza: “Tutto questo avviene proprio in un momento in cui i media sono costretti a mostrare, loro malgrado, in occasione dei mondiali, che la Russia è un paese interessante e civile come tanti altri”. Normale insomma.L’ex presidente dell’Ecuador, Rafael Correa, incriminato per sequestro di persona.Il procuratore generale di Ecuador ha spiccato un mandato di cattura per l’arresto di Rafael Correa, ex presidente dal 2007 al 2017, chiedendo l’intervento dell’Interpol. Accusa: associazione criminale e sequestro di un avversario politico. Correa, che vive ora in Belgio con la famiglia, respinge le accuse definendole una farsa. Correa diede rifugio, nella sua ambasciata di Londra, a Julian Assange. Il suo successore, Lenin Moreno, ha appena siglato un patto di sicurezza con gli Stati Uniti. E ha definito Assange un hacker, restringendo le sue libertà. Per ora non lo ha consegnato alla polizia inglese, consapevole della probabile protesta popolare in Ecuador e nel mondo interoSiria: l’esercito di Bashar avanza. Iran e Austria dialogano. Continua l'avanzata dell'esercito siriano, che ieri, mercoledi' 4 luglio, ha inflitto una pesante sconfitta nei confronti di Jabhat al-Nusra nel territorio ad est di Daraa. I terroristi hanno sofferto perdite in termine di combattenti uccisi, rifugi ed equipaggiamenti distrutti. Nel frattempo, in quel di Vienna, nell'ambito di una conferenza stampa congiunta col Cancelliere austriaco Sebastian Kurz, Il presidente iraniano Hassan Rouhani ha ribadito"Teheran sara' al fianco della Siria fino alla completa eliminazione del terrorismo. Il futuro della Siria sarà deciso dal popolo siriano. L'Iran, "assieme a Russia e Turchia" ha continuato Rouhani, continuera' gli sforzi diplomatici dei colloqui di Astana' per trovare una soluzione alla crisi". Il presidente iraniano ha inoltre sottolineato come Daesh ed altre organizzazioni teroristiche siano state sconfitte nonostante il supporto dato loro da USA ed Israele. La soluzione alla crisi siriana era proprio al centro dei colloqui di ieri fra Austria ed Iran. USA: invasione militare del Venezuela? La Associated Press ha rivelato ieri, mercoledi' 4 luglio, presunte dichiarazioni del presidente americano Donald Trump rilasciate nell'agosto dell'anno scorso circa una invasione militare del Venezuela. La rivelazione, non casualmente fatta filtrare con grande ritardo, è tuttavia anonima. Secondo l'agenzia sia l'allora Segretario di stato Rex Tillerson, che il consulente per la sicurezza McMaster, partecipanti all'incontro segreto alla Casa Bianca, sarebbe stati d’accordo nel fermare il progetto. Eppure dichiarazioni pubbliche successive dello stesso Tillerson, compiacenti verso un colpo di Stato militare a Caracas, dimostrarono esattamente il contrario. Il nuovo segretario di stato Mike Pompeo, sta collocato su questa lunghezza d’onda. A maggio di quest'anno, infatti ha discusso con la Colombia del presidente Santos - neo entrata in cooperazione con laNATO - l'ipotesi di un fronte comune contro il Venezuela di Maduro. La casa Bianca si rifiuta di commentare le indiscrezioni. Mentre il portavoce del consiglio Nazionale per la Sicurezza ribadisce che gli USA considereranno tutte opzioni per restaurare democrazia e stabilita' in Venezuela.

Il Parlamento Europeo boccia la direttiva sul copyrightStamane, giovedì 5 luglio, il Parlamento Europeo in seduta plenaria a Strasburgo ha respinto la nuova direttiva sul copyright, la serie di regole per aggiornare le leggi sulla tutela del diritto d’autore in Europa, in seguito al vivace dibattito degli ultimi mesi hanno prevalso i dubbi sulle certezze dei promotori. Le nuove normative saranno cosi riviste a settembre, quando saranno rinegoziate fra Parlamento, Commissione e Consiglio europeo. La battaglia non è dunque finita. Per fortuna, perché gli effetti saranno cruciali per tutti gli utenti di Internet in Europa e oltre . La direttiva respinta intendeva aggiornare le regole sul diritto d’autore nell’Unione Europea, ferme al 2001. Alcuni articoli sono scritti in modo vago e potrebbero dare adito a interpretazioni da parte degli stati membri; lo scontro era soprattutto su due articoli, l’11 e il 13. Per la maggioranza potrebbero avere conseguenze pericolose per la libera circolazione delle informazioni , mentre per altri sono la soluzione adeguata per tutelare i produttori dei contenuti.Salisbury: la saga-farsa del Novichok continuaSabato 30 giugno, un uomo e una donna di nazionalita' britannica hanno perso i sensi nella cittadina britannica di Amesbury, a 12 km da Salisbury. L'uomo,Charlie Rowley, sulla quarantina, era un noto tossicodipendente da eroina.Tuttavia, ad informare della vicenda, le autorita' ci hanno pensato solo ieri, mercoledi' 4 luglio. Mentre il neo appuntato Capo delle Operazioni speciali Anti Terrorismo Neil Basu mostra un po' di cautela, a fare un immediato collegamento con la vicenda di Sergey e Yulia Skripal ci pensano sia il laboratorio militare di Porton Down, a pochi chilometri dall’accaduto, e che parla subito del gas Novichok, sia la stampa britannica mainstream, sia le autorita' governative, nella persona del Ministro dell'interno Sajid Javid , che si è espresso in questi termini: "la vicenda segue il barbaro attacco di Salisbury". L'ex ambasciatore britannico, Craig Murray, ironizza: “Tutto questo avviene proprio in un momento in cui i media sono costretti a mostrare, loro malgrado, in occasione dei mondiali, che la Russia è un paese interessante e civile come tanti altri”. Normale insomma.L’ex presidente dell’Ecuador, Rafael Correa, incriminato per sequestro di persona.Il procuratore generale di Ecuador ha spiccato un mandato di cattura per l’arresto di Rafael Correa, ex presidente dal 2007 al 2017, chiedendo l’intervento dell’Interpol. Accusa: associazione criminale e sequestro di un avversario politico. Correa, che vive ora in Belgio con la famiglia, respinge le accuse definendole una farsa. Correa diede rifugio, nella sua ambasciata di Londra, a Julian Assange. Il suo successore, Lenin Moreno, ha appena siglato un patto di sicurezza con gli Stati Uniti. E ha definito Assange un hacker, restringendo le sue libertà. Per ora non lo ha consegnato alla polizia inglese, consapevole della probabile protesta popolare in Ecuador e nel mondo interoSiria: l’esercito di Bashar avanza. Iran e Austria dialogano. Continua l'avanzata dell'esercito siriano, che ieri, mercoledi' 4 luglio, ha inflitto una pesante sconfitta nei confronti di Jabhat al-Nusra nel territorio ad est di Daraa. I terroristi hanno sofferto perdite in termine di combattenti uccisi, rifugi ed equipaggiamenti distrutti. Nel frattempo, in quel di Vienna, nell'ambito di una conferenza stampa congiunta col Cancelliere austriaco Sebastian Kurz, Il presidente iraniano Hassan Rouhani ha ribadito"Teheran sara' al fianco della Siria fino alla completa eliminazione del terrorismo. Il futuro della Siria sarà deciso dal popolo siriano. L'Iran, "assieme a Russia e Turchia" ha continuato Rouhani, continuera' gli sforzi diplomatici dei colloqui di Astana' per trovare una soluzione alla crisi". Il presidente iraniano ha inoltre sottolineato come Daesh ed altre organizzazioni teroristiche siano state sconfitte nonostante il supporto dato loro da USA ed Israele. La soluzione alla crisi siriana era proprio al centro dei colloqui di ieri fra Austria ed Iran. USA: invasione militare del Venezuela? La Associated Press ha rivelato ieri, mercoledi' 4 luglio, presunte dichiarazioni del presidente americano Donald Trump rilasciate nell'agosto dell'anno scorso circa una invasione militare del Venezuela. La rivelazione, non casualmente fatta filtrare con grande ritardo, è tuttavia anonima. Secondo l'agenzia sia l'allora Segretario di stato Rex Tillerson, che il consulente per la sicurezza McMaster, partecipanti all'incontro segreto alla Casa Bianca, sarebbe stati d’accordo nel fermare il progetto. Eppure dichiarazioni pubbliche successive dello stesso Tillerson, compiacenti verso un colpo di Stato militare a Caracas, dimostrarono esattamente il contrario. Il nuovo segretario di stato Mike Pompeo, sta collocato su questa lunghezza d’onda. A maggio di quest'anno, infatti ha discusso con la Colombia del presidente Santos - neo entrata in cooperazione con laNATO - l'ipotesi di un fronte comune contro il Venezuela di Maduro. La casa Bianca si rifiuta di commentare le indiscrezioni. Mentre il portavoce del consiglio Nazionale per la Sicurezza ribadisce che gli USA considereranno tutte opzioni per restaurare democrazia e stabilita' in Venezuela.

Italia propone, Europa incerta "Si è conclusa la riunione informale sul tema migrazione a Bruxelles e rientriamo a Roma decisamente soddisfatti. Abbiamo impresso la giusta direzione al dibattito in corso. Ci rivediamo giovedì al Consiglio Europeo." Questo il tweet del primo Ministro italiano Giuseppe Conte a seguito del summit straordinario sulle politiche migratorie di 16 leaders europei svoltosi ieri domenica 24 giugno. "Qualora possibile vogliamo trovare soluzioni europee" ha dichiarato la cancelliera tedesca "se non siamo tutti insieme, dobbiamo radunare coloro che sono interessati a uno sforzo comune e stringeremo accordi bilaterali o trilaterali. Non possiamo sempre aspettare di essere tutti e 28 d'accordo". Presenti fra gli altri i paesi in prima linea sul fronte sbarchi, ovvero Italia, Grecia e Spagna. Chiaramente, sono diverse le motivazioni che soggiaciono sotto le azioni politiche dei rispettivi paesi: dallo scongiurare spaccature interne come nel caso della coalizione di governo tedesca, al rifiuto di accettare quote migratorie, come nel caso dell'Ungheria che, non a caso, ha boicottato l'incontro di ieri. Ma e' altrettanto chiaro che la linea assertiva di Conte si sta facendo strada e sta trovando consenso. La Francia di Macron, che da ex potenza coloniale riscuote l'85% delle riserve monetarie di molti paesi africani, dovra' mettere da parte l'ipocrisia. I dieci punti stilati dal neo premier italiano sottolineano una volta di piu' l'urgenza di superare gli accordi di Dublino, che gettano tutta la responsabilita' sul primo paese di arrivo dei profughi, e di iniziare le politiche di accoglienza e distribuzione con hotspots direttamente nei paesi interessati, soprattutto in Africa ma non solo. Sul piatto delle riforme, anche gli accordi di Schengen. Pronta nuova provocazione in Siria... L'organizzazione terroristica Jabhat al-Nusra starebbe preparando una provocazione antirussa in Siria, insieme all'agenzia di stampa di un Paese mediorientale. La notizia e' stata resa nota dal Centro russo per la riconciliazione in Siria, informato a riguardo dagli abitanti di Idlib. Le immagini dei tagliagole impegnati nel salvataggio dei civili e nella ricostruzione delle infrastrutture, in realta' gia' distrutte nel corso di precendenti combattimenti, servirebbero a diffondere la falsa notizia di un attacco dell'aviazione russa e siriana in provincia di Idlib. "Impossibile prevenire simili provocazioni", afferma il presidente siriano, Bashar al-Assad ai microfoni dell'emittente russa Ntv. "Non hanno nulla a che vedere con la realta', sono frutto della loro immaginazione e dell'immaginazione dei loro mass media", spiega il leader siriano. Chi siano "loro", poi, lo dice chiaramente: “Il progetto della guerra in Siria e' stato sviluppato da alcuni Paesi occidentali, in primis dagli Stati Uniti, dalla Francia e dal Regno Unito". Damasco non permettera' che questi Paesi contribuiscano alla ricostruzione del Paese. "Quando gli Stati europei parlano di aiuti, in realta' stanno cercando nuove fonti di guadagno", spiega Assad. Intanto, pero', non abbassa la guardia: “I terroristi gia' sconfitti di Daesh e di Jabhat al-Nusra potrebbero tornare con un nuovo nome, poiche' l'Occidente se ne serve per raggiungere i suoi scopi". Di questo è convinto il presidente siriano. … E in Transnistria Con 64 voti favorevoli, 14 contrari e 83 astensioni , l'Assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite ha adottato, venerdi' 22 giugno, la risoluzione proposta dalla Moldova sul ritiro del contingente russo dalla Transnistria. Mentre Bucarest ha accolto con favore l'esito del voto, Mosca teme che la "mossa propagandistica" del governo di Chisinau possa ostacolare il gia' fragile processo di riconciliazione tra Moldova e Transnistria. Non solo. Rischia di danneggiare seriamente anche i rapporti tra Mosca e Chisinau, aggiunge il presidente moldavo, Igor Dodon, che vede nel documento un tentativo deliberato di esacerbare la situazione. Ma il premier moldavo, Pavel Filip, non arretra di un solo passo: “Continueremo a sollevare la questione all'Onu finche' l'ultimo soldato russo non avra' abbandonato la Transnistria". Paese che si e' pronunciato contro il ritiro delle truppe russe. La loro presenza, infatti, e' regolata da trattati, al fine di garantire la pace e la sicurezza sul territorio. Aumenta la produzione petrolifera I Paesi Opec+ hanno concordato di aumentare la produzione petrolifera. Nel precedente accordo datato dicembre 2016, nell'ottica di un aumento del prezzo del greggio, si era ridotta l'estrazione di 1,8 milioni di barili al giorno. Tuttavia, anche a causa della politica statunitense nei confronti dell'Iran e del Venezuela, in 18 mesi la produzione petrolifera è calata di 2,8 milioni di barili al giorno, provocando cosi' un aumento dei prezzi giudicato eccessivo. Russia e Arabia Saudita, all'incontro di sabato scorso a Vienna, per evitare una destabilizzazone del mercato, hanno così proposto di ritornare ai limiti di riferimento, aumentando la produzione di 1 milione di barili al giorno a partire dal 1° luglio. Gli effetti dell'incontro gia' si fanno sentire, tanto che lunedi' il prezzo del greggio ha registrato una prima flessione. Gli esperti russi, intanto, annunciano la comparsa di una nuova organizzazione con la partecipazione di Mosca, la quale, come fa sapere il ministro saudita Khalid Al-Falih, e' gia' stata invitata a unirsi all'Opec come membro associato. Avanzano gli yemeniti sui sauditi Un nuovo lancio di missili Burkan H2 da parte del movimento yemenita Ansar Allah ha colto di sorpresa i cieli sopra Ryihad, nella notte di domenica 24 giugno, provocando, secondo l'emittente yemenita Al Masirah, danni materiali a diversi siti governativi, compreso il Ministero della Difesa saudita. Nel frattempo, in seguito all'offensiva saudita di larga scala lanciata il 13 giugno, l'esercito yemenita, assieme agli Houthi di Ansar Allah, ha ripreso il controllo dell'aeroporto della provincia orientale di Houdeidah ed e'riuscito ad allestire in poco tempo migliaia di esemplari di droni a produzione locale, piccoli, veloci e senza pilota. Nel confronto a terra del 21 giugno, sono riuscite a tenere testa alla controparte nemica facendo uso di vecchi fucili britannici lunghi 1.20m ed uccidendo 18 soldati.Ma sabato 23 giugno e' stato il porto sul mar Rosso ad essere protagonista di un feroce attacco della coalizione a guida occidentale-saudita, con la benedizione del Segretario di Stato americano Mike Pompeo e la presenza in loco di servizi segreti francesi, come rivela Le Figaro. Mentre i britannici, dalle Nazioni unite, chiedono, come parte del "processo di pace", la rimozione delle forze di Ansar Allah dal territorio. Come osservano alcuni analisti, a preoccupare l'Occidente non e' tanto l'influenza iraniana su Sanaa, quanto l'idea di uno Yemen genuinamente indipendente - che e' quello che gli houthi rappresentano - nonche' i crescenti investimenti cinesi nel petrolio yemenita. San Pietroburgo: la magia delle vele scarlatte

Italia propone, Europa incerta "Si è conclusa la riunione informale sul tema migrazione a Bruxelles e rientriamo a Roma decisamente soddisfatti. Abbiamo impresso la giusta direzione al dibattito in corso. Ci rivediamo giovedì al Consiglio Europeo." Questo il tweet del primo Ministro italiano Giuseppe Conte a seguito del summit straordinario sulle politiche migratorie di 16 leaders europei svoltosi ieri domenica 24 giugno. "Qualora possibile vogliamo trovare soluzioni europee" ha dichiarato la cancelliera tedesca "se non siamo tutti insieme, dobbiamo radunare coloro che sono interessati a uno sforzo comune e stringeremo accordi bilaterali o trilaterali. Non possiamo sempre aspettare di essere tutti e 28 d'accordo". Presenti fra gli altri i paesi in prima linea sul fronte sbarchi, ovvero Italia, Grecia e Spagna. Chiaramente, sono diverse le motivazioni che soggiaciono sotto le azioni politiche dei rispettivi paesi: dallo scongiurare spaccature interne come nel caso della coalizione di governo tedesca, al rifiuto di accettare quote migratorie, come nel caso dell'Ungheria che, non a caso, ha boicottato l'incontro di ieri. Ma e' altrettanto chiaro che la linea assertiva di Conte si sta facendo strada e sta trovando consenso. La Francia di Macron, che da ex potenza coloniale riscuote l'85% delle riserve monetarie di molti paesi africani, dovra' mettere da parte l'ipocrisia. I dieci punti stilati dal neo premier italiano sottolineano una volta di piu' l'urgenza di superare gli accordi di Dublino, che gettano tutta la responsabilita' sul primo paese di arrivo dei profughi, e di iniziare le politiche di accoglienza e distribuzione con hotspots direttamente nei paesi interessati, soprattutto in Africa ma non solo. Sul piatto delle riforme, anche gli accordi di Schengen. Pronta nuova provocazione in Siria... L'organizzazione terroristica Jabhat al-Nusra starebbe preparando una provocazione antirussa in Siria, insieme all'agenzia di stampa di un Paese mediorientale. La notizia e' stata resa nota dal Centro russo per la riconciliazione in Siria, informato a riguardo dagli abitanti di Idlib. Le immagini dei tagliagole impegnati nel salvataggio dei civili e nella ricostruzione delle infrastrutture, in realta' gia' distrutte nel corso di precendenti combattimenti, servirebbero a diffondere la falsa notizia di un attacco dell'aviazione russa e siriana in provincia di Idlib. "Impossibile prevenire simili provocazioni", afferma il presidente siriano, Bashar al-Assad ai microfoni dell'emittente russa Ntv. "Non hanno nulla a che vedere con la realta', sono frutto della loro immaginazione e dell'immaginazione dei loro mass media", spiega il leader siriano. Chi siano "loro", poi, lo dice chiaramente: “Il progetto della guerra in Siria e' stato sviluppato da alcuni Paesi occidentali, in primis dagli Stati Uniti, dalla Francia e dal Regno Unito". Damasco non permettera' che questi Paesi contribuiscano alla ricostruzione del Paese. "Quando gli Stati europei parlano di aiuti, in realta' stanno cercando nuove fonti di guadagno", spiega Assad. Intanto, pero', non abbassa la guardia: “I terroristi gia' sconfitti di Daesh e di Jabhat al-Nusra potrebbero tornare con un nuovo nome, poiche' l'Occidente se ne serve per raggiungere i suoi scopi". Di questo è convinto il presidente siriano. … E in Transnistria Con 64 voti favorevoli, 14 contrari e 83 astensioni , l'Assemblea generale delle Nazioni Unite ha adottato, venerdi' 22 giugno, la risoluzione proposta dalla Moldova sul ritiro del contingente russo dalla Transnistria. Mentre Bucarest ha accolto con favore l'esito del voto, Mosca teme che la "mossa propagandistica" del governo di Chisinau possa ostacolare il gia' fragile processo di riconciliazione tra Moldova e Transnistria. Non solo. Rischia di danneggiare seriamente anche i rapporti tra Mosca e Chisinau, aggiunge il presidente moldavo, Igor Dodon, che vede nel documento un tentativo deliberato di esacerbare la situazione. Ma il premier moldavo, Pavel Filip, non arretra di un solo passo: “Continueremo a sollevare la questione all'Onu finche' l'ultimo soldato russo non avra' abbandonato la Transnistria". Paese che si e' pronunciato contro il ritiro delle truppe russe. La loro presenza, infatti, e' regolata da trattati, al fine di garantire la pace e la sicurezza sul territorio. Aumenta la produzione petrolifera I Paesi Opec+ hanno concordato di aumentare la produzione petrolifera. Nel precedente accordo datato dicembre 2016, nell'ottica di un aumento del prezzo del greggio, si era ridotta l'estrazione di 1,8 milioni di barili al giorno. Tuttavia, anche a causa della politica statunitense nei confronti dell'Iran e del Venezuela, in 18 mesi la produzione petrolifera è calata di 2,8 milioni di barili al giorno, provocando cosi' un aumento dei prezzi giudicato eccessivo. Russia e Arabia Saudita, all'incontro di sabato scorso a Vienna, per evitare una destabilizzazone del mercato, hanno così proposto di ritornare ai limiti di riferimento, aumentando la produzione di 1 milione di barili al giorno a partire dal 1° luglio. Gli effetti dell'incontro gia' si fanno sentire, tanto che lunedi' il prezzo del greggio ha registrato una prima flessione. Gli esperti russi, intanto, annunciano la comparsa di una nuova organizzazione con la partecipazione di Mosca, la quale, come fa sapere il ministro saudita Khalid Al-Falih, e' gia' stata invitata a unirsi all'Opec come membro associato. Avanzano gli yemeniti sui sauditi Un nuovo lancio di missili Burkan H2 da parte del movimento yemenita Ansar Allah ha colto di sorpresa i cieli sopra Ryihad, nella notte di domenica 24 giugno, provocando, secondo l'emittente yemenita Al Masirah, danni materiali a diversi siti governativi, compreso il Ministero della Difesa saudita. Nel frattempo, in seguito all'offensiva saudita di larga scala lanciata il 13 giugno, l'esercito yemenita, assieme agli Houthi di Ansar Allah, ha ripreso il controllo dell'aeroporto della provincia orientale di Houdeidah ed e'riuscito ad allestire in poco tempo migliaia di esemplari di droni a produzione locale, piccoli, veloci e senza pilota. Nel confronto a terra del 21 giugno, sono riuscite a tenere testa alla controparte nemica facendo uso di vecchi fucili britannici lunghi 1.20m ed uccidendo 18 soldati.Ma sabato 23 giugno e' stato il porto sul mar Rosso ad essere protagonista di un feroce attacco della coalizione a guida occidentale-saudita, con la benedizione del Segretario di Stato americano Mike Pompeo e la presenza in loco di servizi segreti francesi, come rivela Le Figaro. Mentre i britannici, dalle Nazioni unite, chiedono, come parte del "processo di pace", la rimozione delle forze di Ansar Allah dal territorio. Come osservano alcuni analisti, a preoccupare l'Occidente non e' tanto l'influenza iraniana su Sanaa, quanto l'idea di uno Yemen genuinamente indipendente - che e' quello che gli houthi rappresentano - nonche' i crescenti investimenti cinesi nel petrolio yemenita. San Pietroburgo: la magia delle vele scarlatte

Information obtained from Wikipedia and the Official Matthew Schrier website. Matthew B. Schrier is a Jewish American (former) photographer who escaped from al Qaeda. Schrier is from Deer Park, New York, and attended Hofstra University, where he was an English major who also studied film production. He entered Syria with the help of the Free Syrian Army. Schrier captured images of FSA rebels fighting forces of the Syrian president Bashar al-Assad. In late December 2012, Schrier was captured by Jabhat al-Nusra, the Al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria. He was among a collection of kidnapped American journalists held by Syrian jihadis. He strategically converted to Islam in March 2013 as a survival tactic to get better treatment, a tactic that ended up working.  In July 2013 Schrier became the first westerner to ever escape from al Qaeda.  His story has been covered by multiple media outlets and publications such as: National Geographic, 60 Minutes, the New York Times, FOX News, and CNN. Since returning home, Matthew has devoted himself to working with the US Military to educate American troops about survival after capture by extremists. His book "The Dawn Prayer (Or How to Survive in a Secret Syrian Terrorist Prison): A Memoir" was released April 2018. www.matthewschrier.com --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/themichaelcalderinshow/message

The downing of a Russian warplane over Syria is further proof, if any were still needed, that news of the end of the protracted war there is premature. It also underscores the changing nature of the conflict, and its turn in a dangerous new direction. It's been confirmed, Major Roman Filipov's Su-25 fighter was brought down by a MANPAD, or portable anti-aircraft missile system, reportedly fired by members of Jabhat al-Nusra. It's a sophisticated piece of equipment not easily gotten, so just where it came from, and how al-Nusra ended up with it are the burning questions of the moment. John Helmer is a long-time, Moscow-based journalist, author, and essayist whose website, Dances with Bears is the only Russian-based news bureau “independent of single national or commercial ties.” He's also a former political science professor who's served as an advisor to governments on three continents, and regularly lectures on Russian topics. Helmer's book titles include: ‘Uncovering Russia,' ‘Urbanman: The Psychology of Urban Survival,' ‘Bringing the War Home: The American Soldier in Vietnam and After,' and ‘Drugs and Minority Oppression', among others. John Helmer in the first half. And; the Victoria Film Festival continues this week through Sunday, when it will feature Canadian director, Stephen Campanelli's 'Indian Horse'. The full-length feature recently took the Calgary Film Festival's Audience Award for Narrative Feature, and was named the People's Choice winner at last year's Vancouver International Film Festival. It's an adaptation of the Richard Wagamese's widely acclaimed novel about Ojibway boy, Saul Indian Horse's abduction into Canada's residential school system. Campanelli is a long-time Hollywood camera operator, working within legendary actor/director and producer, Clint Eastwood's rarefied filmmaking circle. Among others, he's collaborated with Eastwood on the films: 'Million Dollar Baby'. 'Gran Torino', 'Sully', and their latest, and 21st collaboration, '15:17 to Paris'. Indian Horse is his second film in the director's chair, following 2015's 'Momentum'. Stephen Campanelli and breaking the tormented silence of Canada's residential school survivors. And; Victoria-based greentrepreneur and horticulturalist extraordinaire, Christina Nikolic will be here at the bottom of the hour with the Left Coast Events Bulletin bringing us up to speed with some of the good things going on in and around our town in the coming week. But first, John Helmer and the deadly consequences of America's anti-Russia campaigns. Chris Cook hosts Gorilla Radio, airing live every Thursday between 11-Noon Pacific Time. In Victoria at 101.9FM, and on the internet at: http://cfuv.uvic.ca.  He also serves as a contributing editor to the web news site, http://www.pacificfreepress.com. Check out the GR blog at: http://gorillaradioblog.blogspot.ca/

In this episode, we seek to gain a better understanding of what drives certain young Muslim men living in Western societies to risk it all in traveling to Syria to fight the Assad regime. I talk with Amer Deghayes, a Libyan born British foreign fighter who traveled to Syria in 2013, ultimately ending up with the jihadist rebel group Jabhat al Nusra. We cover a lot of ground, including the reasons that compelled him to fight, his role in the conflict now, and his assessment of the reality in Idlib province today. Please support this podcast by contributing here: www.patreon.com/channeltherage

Kamran Bokhari and Jacob L. Shapiro discuss where IS came from, the history and politics of radical Islam, and what happens if IS is defeated in Raqqa. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0 TRANSCRIPT: JS: Hello, my name is Jacob Shapiro, I'm broadcasting today from Avignon, in the south of France. I'm joined by Kamran Bokhari, who I believe is in Washington, D.C. Is that right Kamran? KB: Yes I am. JS: I'm joined by Kamran Bokhari who is our senior analyst and who focuses on the Middle East, and we're going to be talking a little bit about ISIS. Thanks for joining us Kamran. KB: Pleasure to be here. JS: So, Kamran, I thought instead of talking about every single battle and every single report that seems to indicate ISIS is imminently falling, we might take a broader look at the subject for our listeners. So, how about we just start with a rather broad question – tell me about how ISIS started. How did ISIS come to be in the middle of Syria and Iraq? KB: Well if you recall, Jacob, this happened in the wake of regime change, or regime collapse, in Iraq, when the United States invaded Iraq in 2003, toppled the Saddam government and has since been unable to form a viable state. And it was not just the lack of a state, but it also brought to the fore forces that were until then very much contained under the autocratic leadership of the Baathist regime. And so what we had was the disenfranchisement of the Sunnis, the rise of the Shiites and of course the rise of the Kurds, in the form of regional autonomy. ISIS did not exist, in fact, there were hardly any Islamist groups of any shade in Iraq, but in war, especially when you have the sectarian problem in the Middle East where the Sunnis and the Shia are struggling with one another – yes, the Sunni government came down, but it's not like the Shiites were able to establish their own government. There was a window of opportunity in which the founders of ISIS, particularly Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who founded what used to be called al-Qaida in Iraq, laid the foundation for ISIS. And as the years rolled on, ISIS continued to gain strength from the conflict that was brewing. It was a complex conflict. There were Shiites fighting Shiites, Shiites fighting Sunnis, Sunnis fighting Kurds and Sunnis fighting the United States. So in that complex warlike scenario, that's where we find the birth of ISIS. JS: Yes, well, as usual in the Middle East, everybody is fighting everybody and it's all complicated. But so there's a lot there to unpack. So how about we start with this: You mentioned that the original name of ISIS was al-Qaida in Iraq and you also said that ISIS began, or really, its generation point came in 2003 after the U.S. invasion of Iraq. How about we go back a little step further, and can you talk about the relationship between al-Qaida and between ISIS and what the relationship was and how it's developed? KB: If we go back to the aftermath of 9/11 and after the United States invaded Afghanistan and destroyed the infrastructure of al-Qaida, disrupted its operations, forcing al-Qaida, the original organization, to disperse and relocate largely in northwestern Pakistan. Al-Qaida had basically very little power projection capability at that point. I'm talking between 2001 and 2003. And at that point in time, it seemed like al-Qaida's purpose for staging the 9/11 attacks, which was to bait the United States into militarily acting in a very large way in the Middle East, in the heart of the Muslim world, that didn't succeed. The United States sent in a small force, largely special operations forces and intelligence operatives and later NATO forces came in, but originally it was Afghan forces on the ground who toppled the Taliban regime. That didn't produce the kind of effect that al-Qaida was hoping for. But then when the United States invaded Iraq, that was an opportunity. But al-Qaida didn't have any horses in this race. Al-Qaida could not reach Iraq. But Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who ran his own jihadist training camp in Afghanistan pre-9/11, was able to make his way from Afghanistan between 2001, and by the time the United States invaded Iraq in the spring of 2003, he had set up his shop in the Sunni areas in northern Iraq. And he was able to take advantage of that vacuum that was created with the fall of the Saddam regime and he began an insurgency. But at that point in time his group used to be called something like Jama'at al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and it wasn't even called al-Qaida. But this individual and this outfit were on the ground, al-Qaida was at a distance. Both needed each other. Zarqawi's outfit was not getting the kind of coverage or the kind of support, financially or otherwise, because it was an unknown quantity. Al-Qaida was a brand at the time and therefore it was a marriage of convenience. Bin Laden and Zawahiri and al-Qaida, the original organization, or what was left of it, did not have the ability to act in Iraq. These guys were acting, so they formed an alliance and Zarqawi became the leader of what became the al-Qaida branch in Iraq. And that's sort of where these guys started to work together. Operationally, Zarqawi was his own guy, he didn't have to report on a daily basis, he did what he thought was right and he was essentially following strategic guidance from Bin Laden and the top leadership, to the extent that he cared to do that. But it was an arrangement that worked for a while. But effectively, Zarqawi became more and more powerful and at one point, he didn't really need to report back. He never rebelled, in his lifetime, he was killed in 2006, and by that time his group was institutionalized to the point where his successors were able to take the group to the next level. And as the years rolled on, until the United States in 2007-2008 were able to get the Sunnis to turn against Zarqawi and his al-Qaida in Iraq, these guys had put down quite a bit of roots inside the country. And therefore, I think that's where the foundation was laid. Now, everything that's happened since is sort of building upon this foundation. JS: Well if I can – I'll stop you there and I'll just say, one of the interesting things that you're saying is that Zarqawi wasn't in Iraq. But you also said that one of al-Qaida's original goals was to draw the United States into the Middle East. Another of al-Qaida's goals was to try and demonstrate to much of the Islamic world, especially the Arab world, that all of these secular dictatorships, or dictatorships that had been propped up by the West, had no legitimacy. They thought if they could bring the United States in and if they could show the people of the Middle East that their regimes had no legitimacy that there would be some kind of popular revolt. So they didn't – they weren't able to bring the United States into the Middle East right away, but the fact that Zarqawi was able to get himself to Iraq and found there a very fertile ground for recruits indicates that perhaps Bin Laden, and al-Qaida in general, had a much better assessment of the level of discontent in that part of the world than anybody else. Would you agree with that characterization? KB: I would, but I would also say that this wasn't sort of – this was one of those things that they, al-Qaida, the original organization led by Bin Laden, intended to do, but had it not been for Zarqawi and his efforts and his ability to implant himself in Iraq at a time when the United States was going to war in that country, I don't think we would've come this far. So there's a bit of luck if you think from al-Qaida's point of view. Now obviously, ever since, al-Qaida has taken sort of the backseat, and now ISIS as we know it, or the Islamic State, it's essentially a different organization. It has its roots in al-Qaida, in many ways it took al-Qaida's original view and ideas and really operationalized them in a way that al-Qaida could not because of the lack of capability and the fact that Bin Laden and his top associates traded away day-to-day operational control for physical security of the leadership of the movement, they thought if the leadership was killed then al-Qaida would collapse, and therefore, the price was that you allow these groups to operate on their own. Now they didn't think that al-Qaida in Iraq would become not just an independent organization but one that would eclipse al-Qaida itself. JS: That's true, too, but you made another interesting point that I want to take you back to, which is that you mentioned that Zarqawi was the right man in the right place at the right time. That's an important point because when we're dealing with geopolitics and especially when we're dealing with state actors, the role of the individual, generally speaking, is not that important. We put less emphasis on the individual. Maybe with a sub-state actor it has a little bit of difference. But I guess the question I would pose to you then, is, was it really Zarqawi that was that special or was there going to be a Zarqawi anyway? And was the situation going to mushroom into that anyway, or did it really require someone who had that connection to al-Qaida, who had that experience, who had that training, who had that world view, who knew how to operationalize it, who knew how to put it together, to go to Iraq and to take advantage of the situation? Or would it have been, when the United States went in and when things started going wrong in Iraq, that this kind of movement would've sort of organically sprouted up anyway? KB: I think that this was bound to happen. If it was not Zarqawi it could've been someone else, because in reality, Zarqawi the personality could only do so much unless the ground realities allowed for it, and there were enabling factors, the disenfranchisement of the Sunnis, created a lot of leaders. Back in the day, I'm talking 2003 to 2005-6 I remember that Zarqawi was just one of many militia leaders, one of many factions. At the time, the group had yet to distinguish itself. So there were no shortage of outfits and organizations. I think probably what did make a bit of a difference was the fact that this individual had experience in running training camps, in running an organization going back to the late '90s and I think that experience came in handy. But it's not that Zarqawi was so important to all of this. Now, the insurgency may have taken a different route, but the fact that there is a Shiite-Sunni struggle going on at the time, that didn't require Zarqawi. That was going on independent of any personality per se. And so I think that the ground was fertile. It required an individual and an outfit that had the experience. If you fast-forward just a little bit to 2012, and when the Syrian uprising morphed into a full-scale civil war, again it was Zarqawi's outfit – because of its experience – that was able to take advantage of the vacuum that was created in eastern Syria and was able to take over places like Raqqa and Deir el-Zour and the oil fields. And it became the biggest militia and really eclipsed the rebels who started the war. So I think there's something to be said about institutionalization. I'm not a big fan of personalities, I think that there were many others, and the fact that Zarqawi only lived for three years as the leader and we are now in year 14 of this entity, says a lot. I mean, there are a lot of leaders who had come by and taken over the same group and really moved on, so you know, there's institutionalization and there are ground realities that sustain these type of entities. JS: I want to talk about the sectarian part of all this and I also want to fast forward to the present day, but before we do that I want to ask you one more question that goes back a little bit and sets the stage, which is that, so we have now identified that there was a fertile ground there for recruitment for Zarqawi and for these other heads of militias to recruit for al-Qaida, to recruit for the general mission and this may be an impossible question for you to answer, but we specialize in impossible questions, so when do you think this moment in the Muslim world started happening? When did the discontent get to such an extent that people were so upset that they would be open to this kind of ideology? When did it start to move away from secular nationalism or any of the other things that were peoples' identifying political ideology, particularly Arab nationalism too – when did it go from that to Islam being one of the major things, and this radical version of Islam being something that could be used as a tool to create these organizations? KB: I think if I had to put my finger on a date, I would say right after the 1967 Arab-Israeli War, in which Egypt, Syria and Jordan suffered a major defeat at the hands of Israel. And I think that was sort of the turning point. But having said that, I will also point out that these are not, sort of, on-and-off switches. Things are taking shape in parallel. So a new movement is operating parallel to an older movement and at some point the new movement overtakes the pre-existing movement, in terms of its popular appeal. I think that the crisis essentially allowed, the devastating defeat of the Arab states really allowed for the Islamists to come out and say, what have the secularists given to this region, to the people of this region, to the Arabs, to the Muslims? And they were able to really craft a narrative, or take an existing narrative to the next level and say, it is because we have left the ideas that made us great in the past. We have abandoned that, that has led us to this kind of lull, and if we were to go back to Islam, then this region can regain its lost glory. I think that's the really turning point, but groups, if you were to measure Islamism in the form of groups, I would say that by the mid-'70s, these groups had started to come out, and I think by the end of the 1970s, Islamism had exploded onto the scene. We had the revolution in Iran, albeit a Shiite Islamist regime took over from the monarchy of the shah, but nonetheless, it had a real impact, a psychological impact on the majority Sunni Islamists. There was also the taking over of the Kaaba in 1979 in November by radical Salafis trying to overthrow the Saudi regime, and then I think that really the incubator that really took Islamism to the next level, was the war against the Soviets in Afghanistan that allowed for different Islamists from different parts of the Arab Muslim world to come together and have a shared experience for a decade and really become battle hardened and not just ideologically advance themselves, but acquire capabilities that make political change a bit more, if you will, realizable. JS: Would you say that though – I mean, yes, so Afghanistan was that ground where they all met, but I'm struck by the fact that most of the examples you use are Arab. Would you describe radical Islam and this particular strain of jihadism as an Arab phenomenon or a Muslim phenomenon? KB: I would say it's an Arab phenomenon. One of the things to note is that Egypt is the cradle of all ideologies that have spread across the Arab Muslim world. Secularism in the Arab world began in Egypt. Islamism, in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood ideology, began in Egypt. Jihadism, what later was made transnational by al-Qaida and more recently by ISIS, has its roots in Egypt. So definitely it is – and then of course the Salafism of Saudi Arabia and its input into the making of this broader phenomenon. So yes, there is no doubt that it is an Arab ideology at its core, at its root. That doesn't mean that it doesn't take other shapes, though the Chechens have Islamism in a different direction and have emerged as leaders, for lack of a better term, in the Caucasus region. We have Central Asian jihadists, Southeast Asia has their own jihadists. But really, jihadism and the entire Islamist project is very much Arab at its core. JS: It also seems to be very Sunni. So you brought up Iran a little earlier, but I guess we could talk about Hezbollah and I guess we could talk about some of these groups, but how do you account for the fact that the majority of these groups are Sunni? Is there something within Sunni Islam or within their particular interpretation of Sunni Islam that leads to this kind of ideology? Is it really just that the political and geographic circumstances in countries that were Sunni and were Arab were bad enough and were the right mix of things that it really wasn't anything embedded within Sunni Islam itself? It was just that there was a situation in those countries and Sunni Islam was the religion that they practiced and therefore that was how it got manifested? So how do you – and I know we're going to talk about sectarianism a little more because it's so important, especially for the rise of ISIS, particularly in Iraq, but how do you account for the fact that most of these groups when we talk about them are all Sunni? KB: So I think that the easy way to understand this is simply that Sunnis have always been the majority sect in Islam. And the overwhelming majority. Even today, there aren't real good, if you will, we don't have a reliable census that we can say – OK, you know what, this is how many percentage of Shiites and Sunnis per country. But it's fair to say, I would say, that a good 80 percent of the Arab Muslim world is Sunni. Therefore, you know, the ideology of jihadism or any other ideology that came before, has always been dominated by the Sunnis. And so it's demography, it's sectarian demography, but it's also geography. If you look at the history of the expansion of Islam, and how over time, it gets factionalized and geography imposes its limits, and creates problems and leads to the rise of new regimes and new ideas, it becomes very clear that it's not something inherent in Sunni Islam, necessarily. Yes, there is this crisis of what does it mean to be a Muslim in the here and now in a collective sense. And the Muslim world has not seen, has not really come far beyond the old imperial age, that for the rest of the world, is now a good – you know it's in its second century, that was 200 years ago that the rest of the world, or the Western world in particular, really left the imperial form of governance for a modern nation-state based on a secular order and a commitment to self-determination and democracy. I think that evolution has not occurred in the Muslim world and therefore there is this crisis. But I don't think it's necessarily something in Sunni Islam. If Shiites had been the majority, in a counterfactual reality, I think we'd be facing the same problems. JS: I think I agree with you, but I'll play devil's advocate for a second, which is to say that I think you're right generally and this is not so much a Muslim issue especially in the Middle East, but it goes beyond the Middle East. But Iran is the Islamic Republic, right? You talked about the Iranian Revolution and Iran is really the center of Shiite Islam in the world. And we could say that there is a much more mature political, or at least a much more mature idea, about what the relationship is supposed to be between politics and between religion in Iran. It's not necessarily all settled. There are obviously large disagreements within Iran itself, but we might say that Turkey is another example that is fighting through this right now. It's not stable, but there's a much, much more mature sense of what that relationship is between politics and religion. So how do you account for a country like Iran, which went through its own turmoil and it has its own pressure, or a country like Turkey, which is currently doing it right now, how do you account for those countries developing the way they're developing versus the Arab world, which is essentially cannibalizing itself right now? KB: So there are a number of factors with it. The first one is that Sunni Islam has been preoccupied for, you know, over a millennia with orthodoxy. Orthodoxy has been its obsession. What are the boundaries of justifiable behavior and thought? That's what Sunni Islam – and I think that there is a certain logic here, that if you are the majority, you're not worried about existential issues. You're worried about the, you know, legitimacy, authenticity in terms of religious ideas. And so I think that is something that the Sunnis have been preoccupied for a very long time. And, therefore, they were not open to experimentation, for a lack of a better term, or to, you know, what the noted Iranian philosopher Abdolkarim Soroush will call “extra-religious ideas,” in other words moving beyond the religious text and borrowing from other civilizations. Not to say that that did not happen, but I think that by and large, that kind of borrowing or attempt to borrow from other civilizations and advance your social and political discourse, that's something that the Shiites were much more open to from the very beginning. I mean, for them, it wasn't the orthodoxy. It was much more about the sect itself. Being a minority, you know, issues of survival, that force you to innovate and force you to look beyond, if you will, your own belief. And so I think that the Shiites have had a head start in social, political and economic development. And keep in mind, it's not just Shiites. It's the idea that, we have to keep in mind that there is Iran. Persian nationalism is also at play here. So it's the interplay between the Persian ethno-linguistic civilization that flourished for a very long time, predating Islam. So, I think that when we look at Iran, its Islamism – the Islamic Republic – is a blend of a lot of ideas that are not necessarily Islamic in origin. So I think that's why you have Iran looking very different and far more healthy than the Arab world. And jumping over to Turkey, I think Turkey – although a Sunni power – does not come from the orthodox core, i.e. Arab core of Islam. I mean, the Turks came from Central Asia. And they went from Central Asia to Anatolia (modern-day Turkey) and they set up shop over there. And before they did that, I'd like to add, they were in Europe (in Eastern Europe) and they were a European power well before they became a Middle Eastern power. And the Islam that is practiced over in Turkey is very different, or at least was very different. There has been a lot of blending and spillover of Salafism and these jihadi ideas and Islamic ideas, even in Turkey. But by and large, Turkey has had a different trajectory. And then, of course, secularism. And here I don't mean just Atatürk – Mustafa Kemal – the founder of the modern Republic. He didn't come out of nowhere. What he instituted, the Westernization of Turkey, the Europeanization of the Ottoman Empire and the building of the Turkish Republic along European lines, that didn't happen all of a sudden. It was built on the reforms that Sultan Mahmud II, (the Ottoman Emperor in the early 19th century), something he began and borrowed from Europe. So, you have very different trajectories here. And, of course, the geography of this region – I mean anybody who controls the Anatolian plateau, and anybody who is headquartered in Persia, is very secure. It's a strategic location from which you can build civilizations. The Arab world, if you go back to history, the Arabs really lost power and leadership of Islam, I would say, by the late 800s, mid-800s. They had lost the leadership of Islam because Turkic and Persianate dominions began to emerge and challenge the Arabs for leadership over Islam. And I'm not talking Shiite Islam, I'm talking Sunni Islam. JS: This is all interesting, and we're going a little bit over time, but I think it's worth it because this is an interesting conversation. I'd also just like to point out to our listeners that we didn't exactly plan this little divergence in the conversation. You can already see one of the reasons we appreciate Kamran, because he's a veritable encyclopedia for everything that has happened in the Muslim world ever. But one thing I want to ask you that is based on that, I want to take it a little away from what we were talking about before and then come back to ISIS to finish it of, is that I'm currently in southern France for some meetings, and for some conferences and for some other things, and obviously one of the main issues here and throughout most of Europe is the migration issue. You have, I wouldn't say a large number, it's a large enough number that the European Union is not able to organize itself to bring them in, in absolute terms it's not a huge number. But there are Muslim immigrants to Europe who are looking to find a place to live and to start a new life. And one of the concerns, especially here, especially in other places in Europe, is that they won't be able to assimilate, that they'll want to have their own culture, their own sense of law, and what is right and wrong, and that this presents a major challenge for the nation-states of Europe. Because how do they integrate them in? They don't want to just turn them away, but they don't want to lose the basic facts of their national identity. So you're talking about especially Sunni Islam and about the concern with orthodoxy and all these other things. I know that for instance in Jewish religion there is a rule in the religious text that is the law of the land is the law. It's supposed to supersede religious law. So, I've thrown a bunch of different issues at you off the cuff when I bring all those things up, what do you think about the migration crisis in general, and what do the things that we've talked about relating to Islam here say about the ability of Muslims who are coming to Europe or who are coming to the United States to assimilate? Do you think that Islam presents a major optical for them, or do you view those Muslims as any other group that has emigrated from one place to another and has to go through certain growing pains but will eventually assimilate? KB: I think it's a bit of the latter. But there are concerns, and I do have concerns that there are issues. And it's not because of Islam. Islam is what you make of it, if we are to borrow from Reza Aslan, the prominent author of the book on Jesus recently, and he now has a show on CNN. But really, I do think that Islam inherently is not something that prevents assimilation. I mean, we've seen this before, and I've just talked about how Persians and Turkic peoples and others, Chechens, took Islam in their own direction. I think that that's very much possible. But the question is, what is the geopolitics that we're dealing with when we talk about migration from the Middle East, particularly Syria, to Europe? In places like France, particularly, where there is sort of this if you will pre-existing strong, secular tendency and this desire by French people to have those who come to their country embrace that secularism with the same fervor. I think that's going to create some problems, and then of course, economic issues. So, there will be a lot of Syrian refugees for whom these issues are not really important. Because for them the first thing is, how do I get my family to safety? How can I escape war, get to a place where we're not going to be killed, and then of course, we have opportunities of livelihood. But I think that while they do that, a good chunk of them are still concerned about losing their religion in the process. And when that happens, and then you have this overarching, if you will, dynamic of ISIS and political Islam that these people can't ignore, then you're looking at a real recipe for conflict in these countries. And therefore, I think that the European states are justified in their fear. I don't buy the idea that this has something to do with religion, but I think that it's the geopolitical expression of religion that is the problem, and how immigrants are going to be welcomed or not, and how they see secularism. We say that there has to be moderation on the part of those who come from these areas, there has to be Islamist moderation. But I think at the same time that that's only possible if the European states also have a role to play in this. If they expect that these people will just say, oh you know what, I'm French now, and that's the way to go, I don't think that's going to happen. So there has to be a bit of give and take on both sides. And that give and take in the current geopolitical climate is really not possible where you're having terrorist attacks, there's the ISIS threat that's not going away, and economies are not doing well, there's not enough money to go around, and people are worried about losing their jobs to immigrants. And so in this atmosphere I think we're looking more at conflict rather than the ability to assimilate. JS: I'm afraid I agree with all of that. But to get us out of here, the question, and I'll take us back, we started all of this by talking about ISIS, and we sort of wandered around the Islamic world, even stepped our foot a little bit into Europe. I think one of the points we wanted to make in this podcast was that there's a lot of talk about the Islamic State is about to collapse. People have been saying the Islamic State is about to collapse for well over a year, a year and a half now. It's true that the Islamic State is facing a lot of pressure, a lot more pressure than it has previously on a lot of its borders. But I think the issue that you're really driving at here is that this isn't about one group, and it isn't just about a group in a particular state. It's really about a broader phenomenon, and it's a game of Whack-a-Mole. Sure, you might be able to hit the Islamic State and you might even be able to dislodge them out of Raqqa. It'll take a lot of casualties, but maybe you'll be able to get rid of the caliphate in that way. But the general ground, the fertile ground that Zarqawi came to after 2001 and was able to build this group into what it is today, I think what you're saying is that the ground is still fertile. The basic problems that we're talking about have not been resolved and perhaps have even been exacerbated because there's even less opportunity than there was before. Is that an accurate characterization of what you think? KB: Absolutely. I totally agree with you Jacob. I think that what we have to keep in mind is that we've been here before. So the predecessor organizations of ISIS, or IS, they were defeated at one point in time. But then they came back. And I'll give you a very clear example. In 2008, a large segment of Iraqi Sunnis had turned their guns away from fighting U.S. soldiers to fighting al-Qaida in Iraq, the predecessor to ISIS. And that group had been weakened. It wasn't completely uprooted, but it had been sufficiently weakened, and we saw respite. If you go back to between 2008 and 2011, the frequency of bombings had dropped, and things were looking better. But this group came out of the woodwork in 2011 when the United States left Iraq and the Shiite-dominated government basically double-crossed the Sunnis. They did not want to share power with the Sunnis fearing that the Sunnis had decades of experience, and if we let our guard down, it'll only be a matter of time before this Shiite-dominated republic falls, even before it's taking root. And so, that allowed for ISIS to come out. And then, on top of that, you had the Syrian civil war emerge and that created far more time and space for ISIS. And so, I think moving forward, if ISIS at the time, the predecessor of ISIS, which was muck weaker, much smaller, was able to revive itself in very difficult circumstances, I think that now they have far more opportunity to revive themselves, because that war that was confined to Iraq is now expanded. It's in Yemen, it's spilling over into Turkey, we see it playing out in Egypt and North Africa, and Syria is a mess. So, I think that maybe ISIS will be decimated as we know it today. Maybe the remnants of ISIS will form a new group that will eclipse ISIS of today, some other organization. We mustn't forget that al-Qaida is still there in Syria. And it's changed a few names, it used to be Jabhat al-Nusra, then Jabhat Fatah al-Sham, and now they have a new coalition in Idlib. There are plenty of forces to take this caliphate project and take it to the next level, because the underlying political problems are still there, Shiite-Sunni conflict is still there, both in Syria and Iraq and the wider region, Iran and Saudi Arabia are at each other's throats, and there is no viable political-economic model that we're seeing in the Arab world. So, this hollowing out of the Arab world that you've written about, I mean that is not going away. And I suspect that the problem that we're dealing with, which we today call ISIS, will be with us, but with a different name in the years to come. JS: Well, thanks Kamran, and thanks for staying overtime a little bit with us to talk about this issue. I know it's a complicated one, and it's a really important one. So, I'm glad we were able to talk about it in some depth. Once again, I'm Jacob Shapiro, I'm the director of analysis for Geopolitical Futures. I was just talking with Kamran Bokhari, he is a senior analyst at Geopolitical Futures. We'll be doing another podcast next week. Please feel free to send us feedback on these podcasts by emailing us at comments@geopoliticalfutures.com, and for analysis on how ISIS is going to develop, and how all the things we have talked about are going to develop over time, you can check out our analysis in GeopoliticalFutures.com. Thanks.

Daveed Gartenstein-Ross discusses the recent developments of Jabhat al-Nusra (JN) to Jabhat Fateh al-Sham (JFS), its break from al-Qaeda (AQ), and what it all means.

Barak Mendelsohn comes on the show to discuss his new book, The al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of al-Qaeda and Its Consequences. Some of the topics covered include: How organizations expand Why AQ decided to branch out and the strategy behind that decision AQ’s choices on where to expand Case studies on AQ’s different branches. Links The al-Qaeda Franchise: The Expansion of al-Qaeda and Its Consequences: Barak Mendelsohn Amazon.com Barak Mendelsohn (@BarakMendelsohn) | Twitter Barak Mendelsohn | Haverford College Barak Mendelsohn | Foreign Policy Research Institute Thanks to Haakon Jahr, TankThoughts, and Raihan Kadir for supporting the show! If you’d like to support the podcast please check out the show’s Patreon page! The podcast is produced by Karl Morand. If you have feedback you can email podcast@jihadology.net, or find us on Twitter: @JihadPod. You can subscribe to the show in iTunes, Stitcher, or with our RSS feed.

A new report by the Pulitzer-winning veteran journalist Seymour Hersh says the Joint Chiefs of Staff has indirectly supported Bashar al-Assad in an effort to help him defeat jihadist groups. Hersh reports the Joint Chiefs sent intelligence via Russia, Germany and Israel on the understanding it would be transmitted to help Assad push back Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State. Hersh also claims the military even undermined a U.S. effort to arm Syrian rebels in a bid to prove it was serious about helping Assad fight their common enemies. Hersh says the Joint Chiefsâ?? maneuvering was rooted in several concerns, including the U.S. arming of unvetted Syrian rebels with jihadist ties, a belief the administration was overly focused on confronting Assadâ??s ally in Moscow, and anger the White House was unwilling to challenge Turkey and Saudi Arabia over their support of extremist groups in Syria.

Charles Lister comes back on the show for an in-depth discussion on jihadism in Syria. Some of the topics covered include: Islamism and jihadism in Syria prior to the 2011 uprising The entrance and evolution of Jabhat al-Nusra, Ahrar al-Sham, and Jaysh al-Islam into what became the Syrian war Why foreign fighters came into the Syrian conflict Why the Islamic State of Iraq decided to enter the war in April 2013 and what it was up to prior to the fitness in January 2014 What the growth of ISIS and later IS meant for the other extreme factions – JN, Ahrar, and JI. Links: The Syrian Jihad | Hurst Publishers Brookings Doha Center | Brookings Institution Charles Lister (@Charles_Lister) | Twitter This episode also features an updated #SocialMedia segment, covering postings from November 11-20. Thanks to Haakon Jahr and Raihan Kadir for supporting the podcast. You can support the show, and get some cool rewards, by checking out the show’s Patreon page. The podcast is produced by Karl Morand. If you have feedback you can email podcast@jihadology.net, or find us on Twitter: @JihadPod.

Will McCants comes on the show to talk about jihadi governance. The conversation is based on a chapter in his new book The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State. Aaron and Will discussed numerous cases of jihadi groups attempts to govern, including the Islamic State of Iraq, al-Shabab, AQAP, AQIM, Jabhat al-Nusra, and the Islamic State. This episode also features a Primary Sources segment covering releases from August 14-September 19 and a #SocialMedia segment on postings from October 7-13. Links: The ISIS Apocalypse: The History, Strategy, and Doomsday Vision of the Islamic State: William McCants William McCants | Brookings Institution Will McCants (@will_mccants) | Twitter Thanks to Raihan Kadir and Kaspars Gasuns for supporting the podcast. If you’d like to support the show check out our Patreon page! You can help the podcast and get rewards like access to bonus content, being thanked in the show notes, and more. The podcast is produced by Karl Morand. If you have feedback you can email podcast@jihadology.net, or find us on Twitter: @JihadPod.

Thomas Joscelyn comes on the show to talk about the so-called “Khurasan group.” Some of the topics covered include: Why the group came into being and when its members arrived in Syria Who are the key players and what are their backgrounds What they’ve been up to in Syria and how they relate to Jabhat al-Nusra What this group of individuals can tell us about al-Qaeda’s strategy Links: Thomas Joscelyn (@thomasjoscelyn) | Twitter The Long War Journal | A Project of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies Thomas Joscelyn | Foundation for Defense of Democracies If you’re a fan of the show please consider supporting it on Patreon!! Your support helps cover the costs associated with producing the show. The podcast is produced by Karl Morand. If you have feedback you can email podcast@jihadology.net, or find us on Twitter: @JihadPod.

North Caucasus Caucus comes on the show to talk about his recent research trip to Turkey. He and Aaron discussed the evolution of Turkish governmental policy towards jihadis, Turks’ role in jihadi groups and IS in Syria and Turkey, Turkey’s arrest campaign against Jabhat al-Nusra and IS, and more. This episode also features a #SocialMedia segment covering jihadi social media posts from August 17th to August 31st. We’re working on a special series on the state of Jihadi Studies, and we need some help from listeners. We’ve conducted interviews with many of the top scholars in the field, and we need some people to volunteer to help transcribe the interviews. If you’re interested in helping please email podcast@jihadology.net Thanks! The podcast is produced by Karl Morand. If you have feedback you can email podcast@jihadology.net, or find us on Twitter: @JihadPod.

This week on “Unauthorized Disclosure,” Patrick Strickland, who is an independent journalist and contributor to The Electronic Intifada and Al Jazeera English, talks to us from Beirut, Lebanon. He discusses his reporting on the Yarmouk refugee camp in Syria, a Palestinian refugee camp which has been under siege. He talks to us about the Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp in Lebanon. Strickland also describes how ISIS and Jabhat al Nusra are taking over some of these camps with Palestinian refugees. In the second half, during the discussion part of the show, hosts Rania Khalek and Kevin Gosztola highlight the refugee crisis in Europe and, separately, how President Barack Obama’s administration has fought to continue detaining refugee mothers and children from Central America. We also talk about North Dakota becoming the first state, where drones can be weaponized with tear gas or tasers, the FBI setting up a cell phone surveillance system in New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina, and the latest appalling aspects of the Obama administration’s effort to keep a gravely ill Guantanamo prisoner detained indefinitely.

Charles Lister comes on the show to discuss a wide range of topics related to the current situation in Syria: The background and evolution of Jaysh al-Fatah What Jaysh al-Fatah has meant to rebel and Jabhat al-Nusra victories in Syria The recent formation of a Jaysh al-Fatah branch in the south and what the southern front in the war currently looks like How the regime, Iran, and Hizballah have reacted to the changing military dynamics on the ground The recent fighting between the Kurds and the Islamic State in northern al-Raqqah governorate Links: Charles Lister (@Charles_Lister) on Twitter Aaron Y. Zelin (@azelin) on Twitter Charles’ forthcoming book “The Syrian Jihad: Al-Qaeda, the Islamic State and the Evolution of an Insurgency,” which comes out on September 24 The show is produced by Karl Morand. If you have any feedback you can email podcast@jihadology.net or find us on Twitter: @JihadPod

Vahid Brown and Don Rassler‘s Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012 (Oxford University Press, 2013) is a meticulously researched and remarkably detailed exposition of the Haqqani network's growth and ongoing importance among Pakistani militant organizations. Beginning with an expansive history of the Haqqani family's background, and subsequent emergence as a critical lynchpin in the Pakistani – and by extension US – anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan, the book goes on to cover the Haqqanis' present operations, including its involvement in attacks on NATO, Indian, and government forces in Afghanistan. By shedding light on a group that, while sometimes mentioned in news media, is largely unknown to non-specialists, Fountainhead of Jihad is a major scholarly contribution to the subject of South Asian extremism. The book is in large part based on fascinating primary source material, much of it gleaned from seized documents contained in the US military's HARMONY database, and media produced by the Haqqanis and other militant actors. Those interested in Pakistani intelligence's relationship to extremism, the past and future of militancy in South Asia, and  terrorist modus operandi more generally, will all benefit from a close reading of Fountainhead of Jihad. After reading the book, I also believe that some familiarity with the Haqqani network is a prerequisite to understand the emergence and continued existence of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. While insurgency rages on in Syria and Iraq, and attention on South Asian terrorism has waned somewhat, I have little doubt that the Haqqanis will continue to be a key actor in the “Great Game” between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India long after the demise of ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusrah, and other more recent additions to the Sunni militant scene. Among both scholars and practitioners, the counter-terrorism community would be well advised to have a thorough understanding of the Haqqanis, and I suspect there is no better source to acquire this understanding from than Fountainhead of Jihad.

Vahid Brown and Don Rassler‘s Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012 (Oxford University Press, 2013) is a meticulously researched and remarkably detailed exposition of the Haqqani network’s growth and ongoing importance among Pakistani militant organizations. Beginning with an expansive history of the Haqqani family’s background, and subsequent emergence as a critical lynchpin in the Pakistani – and by extension US – anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan, the book goes on to cover the Haqqanis’ present operations, including its involvement in attacks on NATO, Indian, and government forces in Afghanistan. By shedding light on a group that, while sometimes mentioned in news media, is largely unknown to non-specialists, Fountainhead of Jihad is a major scholarly contribution to the subject of South Asian extremism. The book is in large part based on fascinating primary source material, much of it gleaned from seized documents contained in the US military’s HARMONY database, and media produced by the Haqqanis and other militant actors. Those interested in Pakistani intelligence’s relationship to extremism, the past and future of militancy in South Asia, and  terrorist modus operandi more generally, will all benefit from a close reading of Fountainhead of Jihad. After reading the book, I also believe that some familiarity with the Haqqani network is a prerequisite to understand the emergence and continued existence of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. While insurgency rages on in Syria and Iraq, and attention on South Asian terrorism has waned somewhat, I have little doubt that the Haqqanis will continue to be a key actor in the “Great Game” between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India long after the demise of ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusrah, and other more recent additions to the Sunni militant scene. Among both scholars and practitioners, the counter-terrorism community would be well advised to have a thorough understanding of the Haqqanis, and I suspect there is no better source to acquire this understanding from than Fountainhead of Jihad. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Vahid Brown and Don Rassler‘s Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012 (Oxford University Press, 2013) is a meticulously researched and remarkably detailed exposition of the Haqqani network’s growth and ongoing importance among Pakistani militant organizations. Beginning with an expansive history of the Haqqani family’s background, and subsequent emergence as a critical lynchpin in the Pakistani – and by extension US – anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan, the book goes on to cover the Haqqanis’ present operations, including its involvement in attacks on NATO, Indian, and government forces in Afghanistan. By shedding light on a group that, while sometimes mentioned in news media, is largely unknown to non-specialists, Fountainhead of Jihad is a major scholarly contribution to the subject of South Asian extremism. The book is in large part based on fascinating primary source material, much of it gleaned from seized documents contained in the US military’s HARMONY database, and media produced by the Haqqanis and other militant actors. Those interested in Pakistani intelligence’s relationship to extremism, the past and future of militancy in South Asia, and  terrorist modus operandi more generally, will all benefit from a close reading of Fountainhead of Jihad. After reading the book, I also believe that some familiarity with the Haqqani network is a prerequisite to understand the emergence and continued existence of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. While insurgency rages on in Syria and Iraq, and attention on South Asian terrorism has waned somewhat, I have little doubt that the Haqqanis will continue to be a key actor in the “Great Game” between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India long after the demise of ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusrah, and other more recent additions to the Sunni militant scene. Among both scholars and practitioners, the counter-terrorism community would be well advised to have a thorough understanding of the Haqqanis, and I suspect there is no better source to acquire this understanding from than Fountainhead of Jihad. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Vahid Brown and Don Rassler‘s Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012 (Oxford University Press, 2013) is a meticulously researched and remarkably detailed exposition of the Haqqani network’s growth and ongoing importance among Pakistani militant organizations. Beginning with an expansive history of the Haqqani family’s background, and subsequent emergence as a critical lynchpin in the Pakistani – and by extension US – anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan, the book goes on to cover the Haqqanis’ present operations, including its involvement in attacks on NATO, Indian, and government forces in Afghanistan. By shedding light on a group that, while sometimes mentioned in news media, is largely unknown to non-specialists, Fountainhead of Jihad is a major scholarly contribution to the subject of South Asian extremism. The book is in large part based on fascinating primary source material, much of it gleaned from seized documents contained in the US military’s HARMONY database, and media produced by the Haqqanis and other militant actors. Those interested in Pakistani intelligence’s relationship to extremism, the past and future of militancy in South Asia, and  terrorist modus operandi more generally, will all benefit from a close reading of Fountainhead of Jihad. After reading the book, I also believe that some familiarity with the Haqqani network is a prerequisite to understand the emergence and continued existence of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. While insurgency rages on in Syria and Iraq, and attention on South Asian terrorism has waned somewhat, I have little doubt that the Haqqanis will continue to be a key actor in the “Great Game” between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India long after the demise of ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusrah, and other more recent additions to the Sunni militant scene. Among both scholars and practitioners, the counter-terrorism community would be well advised to have a thorough understanding of the Haqqanis, and I suspect there is no better source to acquire this understanding from than Fountainhead of Jihad. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Vahid Brown and Don Rassler‘s Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012 (Oxford University Press, 2013) is a meticulously researched and remarkably detailed exposition of the Haqqani network’s growth and ongoing importance among Pakistani militant organizations. Beginning with an expansive history of the Haqqani family’s background, and subsequent emergence as a critical lynchpin in the Pakistani – and by extension US – anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan, the book goes on to cover the Haqqanis’ present operations, including its involvement in attacks on NATO, Indian, and government forces in Afghanistan. By shedding light on a group that, while sometimes mentioned in news media, is largely unknown to non-specialists, Fountainhead of Jihad is a major scholarly contribution to the subject of South Asian extremism. The book is in large part based on fascinating primary source material, much of it gleaned from seized documents contained in the US military’s HARMONY database, and media produced by the Haqqanis and other militant actors. Those interested in Pakistani intelligence’s relationship to extremism, the past and future of militancy in South Asia, and  terrorist modus operandi more generally, will all benefit from a close reading of Fountainhead of Jihad. After reading the book, I also believe that some familiarity with the Haqqani network is a prerequisite to understand the emergence and continued existence of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. While insurgency rages on in Syria and Iraq, and attention on South Asian terrorism has waned somewhat, I have little doubt that the Haqqanis will continue to be a key actor in the “Great Game” between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India long after the demise of ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusrah, and other more recent additions to the Sunni militant scene. Among both scholars and practitioners, the counter-terrorism community would be well advised to have a thorough understanding of the Haqqanis, and I suspect there is no better source to acquire this understanding from than Fountainhead of Jihad. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Vahid Brown and Don Rassler‘s Fountainhead of Jihad: The Haqqani Nexus, 1973-2012 (Oxford University Press, 2013) is a meticulously researched and remarkably detailed exposition of the Haqqani network’s growth and ongoing importance among Pakistani militant organizations. Beginning with an expansive history of the Haqqani family’s background, and subsequent emergence as a critical lynchpin in the Pakistani – and by extension US – anti-Soviet efforts in Afghanistan, the book goes on to cover the Haqqanis’ present operations, including its involvement in attacks on NATO, Indian, and government forces in Afghanistan. By shedding light on a group that, while sometimes mentioned in news media, is largely unknown to non-specialists, Fountainhead of Jihad is a major scholarly contribution to the subject of South Asian extremism. The book is in large part based on fascinating primary source material, much of it gleaned from seized documents contained in the US military’s HARMONY database, and media produced by the Haqqanis and other militant actors. Those interested in Pakistani intelligence’s relationship to extremism, the past and future of militancy in South Asia, and  terrorist modus operandi more generally, will all benefit from a close reading of Fountainhead of Jihad. After reading the book, I also believe that some familiarity with the Haqqani network is a prerequisite to understand the emergence and continued existence of Al-Qaeda and its affiliates. While insurgency rages on in Syria and Iraq, and attention on South Asian terrorism has waned somewhat, I have little doubt that the Haqqanis will continue to be a key actor in the “Great Game” between Afghanistan, Pakistan and India long after the demise of ISIL, Jabhat al-Nusrah, and other more recent additions to the Sunni militant scene. Among both scholars and practitioners, the counter-terrorism community would be well advised to have a thorough understanding of the Haqqanis, and I suspect there is no better source to acquire this understanding from than Fountainhead of Jihad. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

December 19-2013 (2:06)

December 19-2013 (2:06)

By Phil Greaves; Global Research, July 13, 2013 Recent reports within mainstream media are pushing the theory that divisions are forming within the various camps of opposition militants in Syria, while also making attempts to highlight the disparity between the supposed “moderate” rebel forces of the “FSA” – which does not exist beyond a small cadre of defectors with no autonomy inside Syria – and the Al Qaeda affiliated militia of Jabhat al Nusra, (JaN) or the Islamic state of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS), while also whitewashing the presence of the larger Salafist brigades that fight alongside them, predominantly Ahrar al-Sham (SIF). To comprehend these alleged divisions, it is fundamental to understand what exactly the “FSA”, or “Supreme Military Council” consists of. In short, these Western-backed outfits and the oft-referenced “spokesmen” that carry them hold no value inside Syria, or any amount of authority among the plethora of militia fighting on the ground. This has been the case since day one of the Syrian crisis. The “FSA” was a retroactive PR stunt implemented by the West and the GCC to uphold a facade of “moderation”, and bolster the false image of militants fighting for “freedom and democracy”. In reality, the FSA represents a branding exercise; enabling foreign powers to rally behind disparate groups of militants – often led by extremists – to undertake their desired use and mask the true identity of what are, by western legal standards, “terrorists”. When the media refer to the “FSA”, at best it is lazy journalism, at worst it is disingenuous and designed to mislead the reader – otherwise known as propaganda. Yet the “FSA”, or “SMC” seem to have a new lease of life within the media. Furthermore, General Salim Idriss has been at the forefront of recent media campaigns to persuade foreign powers to increase military aid to the rebels (including a photo-op with renowned peace advocate John McCain); rebels that Idriss, nor any other commander in the “SMC” or “FSA” have any control over. I posited the theory in early May that the US and its GCC partners (now minus the deposed Qatari Emir) were attempting to marginalize the very militants they fomented, sponsored and armed in order to build a new “moderate” force under their control that is agreeable to the public, and the many European and American Parliamentarians and Congressman that have expressed concern about the “rising” influence of radicals among the militants they are indirectly supporting. Recent attempts to purport divisions could be construed as part of this “re-branding” policy. In a Reuters report titled “New front opens in Syria as rebels say Al Qaeda attack means war” we learn that a “Commander” from the Supreme Military Council was assassinated by ISIS’ Emir: Sheikh Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi. Whether this is even true remains to be seen; several prominent analysts have cast doubt on the report, claiming it may be a psy-op on the FSA’s behalf; presumably in order to marginalize Baghdadi and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham militants that follow him. These artificial divisions bear hallmarks to recent reports and recent analysis covering the supposed “split” between the Syrian wing of Al Qaeda, otherwise known as Jabhat al Nusra (JaN), and the Iraqi wing of Al Qaeda, otherwise known as the Islamic state of Iraq (ISI). When Baghdadi, the Emir of ISI retroactively announced the “merger” of these groups and declared the militia should now be addressed as the Islamic State of Iraq and al Sham, a spat broke out between him and Jabhat al-Nusra Emir Abu Mohammed al-Jolani. The following analysis and reports covering the dispute were blown out of all proportion and have continued in this vain ever since. Again, actual divisions on the ground between ISI and JaN were minimal and did not affect either tactical, nor ideological cooperation and kinship. ISI and JaN are one and the same, in both a tactical and ideological sense, there are slight differences in their outlook for a possible future Syria, but crucially, both the tactical relationship and core ideologies remain untouched and unified. Furthermore, JaN was concieved through ISI funding and logistic cooperation. Journalists and analysts suggesting these groups are separate do not understand their mutual ideology, or they are being purposefully misleading to suit an agenda – that agenda seems to be to highlight ISI as the “bad rebels”, this could be to allow space for the “good rebels” under JaN’s leadership – which are predominantly led by Syrians and not foreigners, therefore more likely to win “hearts and minds” – to join the “moderate” brigades under the SMC command. The first paragraph of the Reuters report fulfills the false narrative that the “FSA” represents a larger force than that of “Islamists”: (NB: Reuters lazy wording not mine.) Rivalries have been growing between the Free Syrian Army (FSA) and the Islamists, whose smaller but more effective forces control most of the rebel-held parts of northern Syria more than two years after pro-democracy protests became an uprising. One has to wonder how the supposed “Islamists” which, according to Reuters are a smaller force than the “FSA” can possibly hold more territory than the Western-backed moderates. Again, Reuters is pushing a false narrative upon its readers to uphold the image that the majority of “rebels” fighting inside Syria are moderate secularists under the command of the “FSA”, or “Supreme Military Council”. The truth of the matter has always been that Jabhat al Nusra – who are one and the same as Al Qaeda in Iraq with slightly different outlooks for their respective homelands – along with the more populist, and larger in number Salafi militia, such as Ahrar al-Sham, who operate under the umbrella group the Syrian Islamic Front (SIF), represent the vast majority of opposition fighters in Syria. These groups have close links, and it is likely that fighters often interchange depending on expertise, experience and geographical requirements. Since the onset they have cooperated closely with logistics and paramilitary operations. Supposed “secular” opposition forces in Syria simply do not exist; under the “FSA” command or anywhere else. There are many smaller groups that espouse an inclusive, and indeed, moderate outlook for a future Syria. These groups have in the majority been rampant with criminality, infighting, and a lack of funds. Leaving disillusioned fighters with the option of joining the better organised and funded Salafi brigades; which have consistently received funding and arms from both state and non-state actors in the Gulf. The “FSA” commander quoted in the Reuters piece claims: “we are going to wipe the floor with them”. Presumably this is aimed at Baghdadi and his fellow ideologues, or as Reuters labels them: “Islamists”. Again, we are supposed to buy the theory that the FSA is in a position to strike anyone militarily inside Syria – let alone a commander of one of the strongest opposition groups operating. At this moment in time, the “FSA” as a fighting force could possibly be at its weakest since its artificial inception. Recent reports have suggested there are up to 6,000 foreign militants fighting against the government in Syria. It is likely that the vast majority of foreigners have joined the more radical outfits such as ISIS, for the same reasons as mentioned above, but can also be explained by the public sectarian tone being applied to the conflict, and calls to the regions Sunni community to engage in “Holy War” against the Syrian state from influential clerics such as Yusuf Qaradawi. Recent political developments also shed light on the “re-branding” of the Syrian opposition. The Emir of Qatar’s unexpected departure from the throne – to be replaced by his son – may have been an indicator as to Qatar’s failures in leading the Syrian insurgency. It is common knowledge that Saudi Arabia have been given the “Syria File”. A fact that is portrayed with no irony by western analysts; who manage to conveniently whitewash exactly which state actor is delegating the “files” – could it be “Mother”? This handing over of the baton was solidified with the departure of SNC Prime Minister Ghassan Hitto – a Muslim Brotherhood member chosen by Qatar in attempts to consolidate the Muslim Brotherhood’s hold on the SNC. Hitto was replaced by Ahmed al-Jarba, an influential tribal figure with close links to the Saudi Monarchy. Reports on the ground in Syria have also suggested that the rebels weapons flow – including such basics as ammunition – have come to an almost standstill. And several rebel commanders have relayed their frustration at the lack of promised US weapons. Recent developments in the US Congress have also given Obama the back-door he was looking for, at least to buy himself more time until a more suitable fighting force is able to undertake the task at hand – if such force ever materializes. Direct US arms supplies – or, to be precise; the official funding for arms supplies – have been blocked by Congress until the administration can determine exactly which rebel groups it intends to arm, and what exactly the administration intends to achieve from what seem to be futile efforts to validate the now almost two-year covert policy of arming the rebels, and achieving nothing but bloodshed and destruction – of course, it would be ridiculous to suggest that was the plan? US allies in the region will undoubtedly be working under their own terms with regard to their destructive policies in Syria, to some extent. Contrary to the Saud monarchies renewed efforts to wrest control of the insurgency; recent developments on the ground, along with Russia’s steadfast support and mass public opinion against supporting the extremist dominated rebels; the Syrian Army have kept the insurgency at bay whilst they choose their strategic victories. Homs is about to become the latest “rebel stronghold” to fall, as rebels announced this morning another “tactical retreat”. One imagines the rebel siege being laid upon 2 million civilians – a war-crime that Western “diplomats” seem reluctant to “intervene” on, or indeed make any mention of – in government controlled Western Aleppo will be the Syrian military’s next priority. The Saudis through their new puppet al-Jarba have promised a huge influx of “game-changing” weapons, but without a massive influx of military hardware, and indeed, trained fighters to use them, it appears the trajectory of the conflict will remain in the Syrian military’s favour. What the various actors supporting the insurgency are willing to do to change that trajectory in the short-term, if anything substantial, remains to be seen. There are at least three interested and powerful parties whose objectives can be served by allowing the Syrian conflict to drag on for years to come; yet none of them necessarily want to see Assad fall. Phil Greaves is a UK based writer/analyst, focusing on UK/US Foreign Policy and conflict analysis in the Middle East post WWII. http://notthemsmdotcom.wordpress.com.

welcome to Syria The Truth, our episode title for today is: Qatar: US Proxy in America’s Terror War in Syria By Phil Greaves. Global Research, July 01, 2013 A recent report in the New York Times (NYT) claims, through trusted “sources”, that Qatar began weapons shipments to opposition militants in Syria at the same time they “increased” support for Al Qaeda linked militants fighting Colonel Gaddafi in Libya in 2011. Gaddafi was ousted (murdered) in October 2011; one must assume that any “increase” in Qatari efforts to arm the militants in Libya were delivered long in advance of Gaddafi’s ouster, meaning the synonymous shipments to “rebels” in Syria also commenced well before October 2011. This information again sheds further light on a timeline of events in Syria that have been purposefully obscured within mainstream media to suit certain actors agendas, and to enable the false and misleading narrative of “Assad killing peaceful protesters” to become dominant in the discourse surrounding the Syrian conflict. As was revealed earlier this year – known by many for much longer – it has been Qatar at the forefront of efforts to arm and fund the insurgency in Syria. As the resilience of the Assad regime and the Syrian Army prolonged the Syrian conflict far beyond the timeframe the backers of the insurgency foresaw; more and more evidence has become available as to the exact nature of this US-led proxy-war, and the ideologies of the militants fighting it. In turn, timelines have constantly been altered, misinformed and manipulated to suit the desired narratives of actors who claim to be on the side of “freedom and democracy”. In sum, previous to the aforementioned NYT article, there had been no reports – in mainstream press at least – of any arms shipments or covert state activity against Syria before “early 2012″. Now that timeline has once again been revised, to at least the same time of an “increase” of Qatari covert policy in Libya; which would have necessarily come before the fall of Gaddafi in October 2011. The latest “revelation” in the NYT seems to be an intentional leak, designed to pass responsibility for the extremist dominated insurgency currently destroying Syria, onto Qatar’s doorstep. Considering the timing of this report, and several others in recent mainstream media that have pointed the finger at Qatar being the main sponsor of the Syrian insurgency, it also begs the question: was there more to the Qatari Emir’s, Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al Thani (and his trusted and longtime Foreign Minister Hamad bin Jassim Al Thani’s) recent departure and handover of power to his son Tamim than meets the eye? A slap on the wrist from the US for Qatar’s destructive foreign policy maybe? Who knows, it seems most knowledgable Middle East analysts really have no clue as to why the Emir chose to suddenly step down and relinquish power. If there is one message coming from this unprecedented handover in the Western press it is this: “what goes on in Qatar, stays in Qatar”. The NYT cites a “Western diplomat” (anonymous of course) who states that Qatar: “punch immensely above their weight,… They keep everyone off-balance by not being in anyone’s pocket… Their influence comes partly from being unpredictable,” Again, this seems to be a desired caveat to remove culpability from Western actors, and is highly likely the same “source” that provided the leak on Qatar’s covert actions. What is counterintuitive to the theory that Qatar acts of its own accord in such instance; is the fact that Qatar’s military and intelligence apparatus is entirely built and run by the United States. Qatar and the US have held an intimate relationship on all things military since the early 90′s. Qatar is also the Forward Operations center of the US Central Command (CENTCOM), and the US Combined Air Operation Center (CAOC). The US enjoys the luxury of the use of three airbases in the tiny nation of Qatar, one of which (Al Udeid) is the prime location of Qatari arms flights to Syria. Considering this close military relationship; it would be foolish to believe the United States would be unaware of Qatari covert activity, particularly when one also considers the broad and global spying and SIGINT powers we now all know the Pentagon, and US government have at their disposal. It should also be noted that Doha acts as a primary base in the region for US diplomacy, as the Taliban can happily attest to. Furthermore – as covered extensively in a previous article – once Gulf covert arms shipments to Syrian “rebels” became public knowledge, the Obama administration made distinct efforts in the media to portray the CIA as the key “coordinator” and oversight of the shipments to allay concerns of weapons ending up in the “wrong hands”. The US, through the CIA has been using its logistic, diplomatic, and military power to bypass international laws and help to organise a multi-national covert arms supply chain to “rebels” in Syria. Furthermore, in a recent interview for The National Interest given by renowned former US National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, – a declared advocate of the US policy of arming Osama Bin-Laden and fellow ideologues in the Afghan-Soviet war of the 80′s – went as far as to openly admit the joint US-Saudi-Qatari policy of orchestrating the Syrian crisis, but refrained from revealing an explicit timeline: (my emphasis) In late 2011 there are outbreaks in Syria produced by a drought and abetted by two well-known autocracies in the Middle East: Qatar and Saudi Arabia. He [Obama] all of a sudden announces that Assad has to go—without, apparently, any real preparation for making that happen. Then in the spring of 2012, the election year here, the CIA under General Petraeus, according to The New York Times of March 24th of this year, a very revealing article, mounts a large-scale effort to assist the Qataris and the Saudis and link them somehow with the Turks in that effort. Was this a strategic position? Yet contrary to this long-revealed policy, the NYT claims: “The United States has little leverage over Qatar on the Syria issue because it needs the Qataris’ help on other fronts.” For the NYT to claim the US has no control of arms shipments from a key ally is disingenuous at best, outright propaganda at worst. Moreover, the CIA has been in direct “consultation” with Qatar on arms shipments, and who exactly those arms should be sent to, (vetted “moderates” of course!!) as Qatari officials stated in this Reuters article from May this year: (my emphasis) “There’s an operations room in the Emir’s diwan (office complex), with representatives from every ministry sitting in that room, deciding how much money to allocate for Syria’s aid,” the Qatari official said. There’s a lot of consultation with the CIA, and they help Qatar with buying and moving the weapons into Syria, but just as consultants,” Are we seriously supposed to believe that Qatar, a tiny resource-rich nation that is totally dependent on US militarism and diplomatic protection is acting of its own accord, without any US assistance, right under the US military’s nose? The NYT report goes on to state: (my emphasis) “Qatar’s covert efforts to back the Syrian rebels began at the same time that it was increasing its support for opposition fighters in Libya trying to overthrow the government of Col. Muammar el-Qaddafi…The Obama administration quietly blessed the shipments to Libya of machine guns, automatic rifles, mortars and ammunition, but American officials later grew concerned as evidence grew that Qatar was giving the weapons to Islamic militants there.” The Obama administration was fully aware of who Qatar were arming, and sending special forces to fight alongside in Libya. It was exactly the same variety of militants and extremist ideologues that are currently waging war upon the Syrian State. Islamic radicals had used Benghazi as a base since the very start of the Libyan “revolution”, and the US knew they formed the core of the militia Qatar were shipping arms to in efforts to oust Gaddafi. The Obama administration’s concern of MANPADS falling into the “wrong hands” (a la Afghanistan) is belied by Obama’s tacit approval of his Gulf allies’ policy of allowing tonnes of arms, explosives and military materiel to extremist dominated militia. A few MANPADS simply increases the likelihood of blowback upon a civilian target, and the consequent exposure; which is the Obama administration’s major concern. As the NYT report states, one of the shipments of MANPADS that has entered Syria, came from the very same former Gaddafi stockpiles of Eastern bloc weapons looted by Qatari backed militants in Libya. In summary, the current media leaks on arms shipments to Syria can be construed as the Obama administration attempting to build plausible deniability. The constant revision of the Syrian timeline also points to the retroactive smoke-screen being applied to US-led covert policies that have already been exposed. Indeed, this tactic of using client states to gain deniability of US aggression is nothing new. The policy has provided the United States with the ultimate get-out-clause through decades of subversion and aggression upon sovereign nations. If – as is the current trajectory in Syria – the militants that the United States ad its clients foment, fund and arm, become an uncontrollable monster and fail to achieve the desired short-term objectives; the US can simply disassociate and point the finger to one of its lesser allies, on this occasion, that finger seems to point directly at the former Emir of Qatar. One wonders if in twenty years time US “diplomats” will portray the same vacant regret for their role in the creation of Jabhat al Nusra and fellow ideologues; as they do now for their role in the creation of Al Qaeda itself. As the United States continues its divisive and destructive policies to desperately cling to hegemony; the mantra of “lessons have been learned” is more hollow than ever. Phil Greaves is a UK based writer/analyst, focusing on UK/US Foreign Policy and conflict analysis in the Middle East post WWII. Thats All every body, thanks for listening. Goodnight and goodbye

December 14-2-12 (2:12)

December 14-2-12 (2:12)