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2 episodes with operationally
2 episodes with operationally
2 episodes with operationally
2 episodes with operationally
Vendor channel consolidation, specifically through peer and family-owned acquisitions, is driving a fundamental shift in the operational landscape for MSPs. This episode analyzes the case of NetSciences, an MSP based in New Mexico, which was acquired by Qual IT—a family-owned operator with over two decades in the space. The MSP market now includes multiple buyer categories: peer acquisitions, roll-ups, and private equity (PE) players, each with distinct approaches to valuation, integration, and operational continuity. The transition of NetSciences to Qual IT illustrates that smaller MSPs increasingly face decisions about optimal sale pathways. According to Joshua Liberman, roll-up buyers and PE investors often introduce rapid shifts in deal terms and operational models, with PE offers described as subject to abrupt valuation changes (drops up to 67% noted by Liberman), creating a higher risk profile for sellers seeking stability and legacy preservation. By contrast, the peer acquisition model (as executed through platforms such as ASCII's peer-to-peer review process) is allowing some MSPs to complete sales with greater continuity and cultural alignment, though post-sale integration often defaults to the acquirer's systems and standards rather than blending best practices. Secondary developments reinforcing this shift include persistent market focus on monthly recurring revenue (MRR) metrics and the operational tradeoffs of pursuing high MRR percentages. Liberman maintained a 50–60% MRR intentionally, arguing that chasing 80%+ MRR metrics can distort business health and does not universally suit all MSP models. Discussion of cybersecurity underscores the need to reposition technical services as business outcomes—security is described as foundational, permeating every operational and client decision, yet is often misunderstood or negotiated away to the detriment of risk posture. Operationally, these trends imply that MSPs must be highly selective about both client and acquirer fit, balancing growth trajectories against risk aggregation and cultural alignment. Attempts to homogenize client environments and enforce consistent security baselines are necessary but limit scale and acquisition appeal. Failure to assess how integration will shift toolsets, processes, and staff autonomy can result in loss of operational maturity and control post-sale. Additionally, the unchecked adoption of tools such as AI—without oversight or documented process—exemplifies emerging areas of governance risk that technology leaders cannot overlook. Supported by: ScalePadTimeZest Sign up for the SMB Online Conference: www.smbonlineconference.com
The core structural shift highlighted in this episode is the commoditization of AI model platforms and concurrent consolidation at the vendor and platform layer, forcing Managed Service Providers (MSPs) to move their value proposition above reselling models to orchestrating, governing, and verifying AI outputs. The discussion references the rising concentration and valuation of platforms such as NinjaOne—a founder-led, profitable RMM platform with a $12.3 billion valuation and 70% year-over-year growth—and Pax8 building business toolkits that draw more operational functions onto their rails. At the same time, major AI developers like OpenAI are entering the channel more directly by launching partner programs aimed at MSPs and consultants. The most consequential development is the confirmed shift from reselling AI models to managing their outputs and risks. Glean surveyed 6,000 digital workers and found that while AI delivers approximately 11 hours of weekly time savings, nearly 6.4 hours are reclaimed by “bot sitting”—the human intervention required to supply context, verify, and correct AI outputs. This hidden labor raises a risk scenario: two-thirds of workers admit to releasing unchecked AI outputs, and Ivanti found that only 42% of IT environments actually have a named owner for each AI agent, despite 85% claiming so—a 43-point gap in accountability. Asana and Deloitte further reinforce the issue, reporting frequent cost overruns and unmanaged autonomous AI deployments among enterprise and SMB environments. Supporting developments underscore this governance and accountability gap. TechCrunch cited that ChatGPT's AI market share has dropped below 50% as the field becomes more interchangeable and less differentiated by underlying model. Vendors such as Anthropic and OpenAI, recognizing model commoditization, are seeking revenue through high-volume partner channels, blurring the lines between vendor and channel competitor. According to Asana, more than 80% of UK IT leaders encountered unplanned AI costs, and over half reported business harm from autonomous AI actions, shifting operational and liability risks squarely onto MSPs and IT service providers. Operationally, these trends compel MSPs to take explicit ownership of the orchestration and governance layer, rather than relying on tool reselling. The transcript advises mapping every AI-driven decision or output that reaches client endpoints and identifying who verifies these outputs before customer exposure. Failing to address these governance blanks does not avoid work but shifts it to unbilled, post-incident cleanup, often with financial, legal, or compliance consequences. Effective MSPs will need to price, document, and regularly review their verification, orchestration, and risk assumption, positioning these as standalone, billable services to manage risk and maintain margin as AI platforms commoditize and vendor dependencies rise. 00:00 Bigger Platforms, Unwatched AI 03:44 The Vendor Walks Into the Channel 05:56 Govern It or Absorb It 08:52 Why Do We Care? Supported by: ScalePad Sign up for the SMB Online Conference: www.smbonlineconference.com
A pronounced infrastructure dependence on third-party AI models has emerged across the MSP ecosystem, largely due to the rapid adoption and integration of AI-powered features within vendor products. This structural shift is increasingly opaque, as providers are sold features rather than transparent access to underlying models, leaving MSPs exposed to changes in technologies and policies enacted upstream by vendors or regulators. The episode highlights how this dependency extends to delivery teams and end clients, with operational continuity tightly linked to decisions and actions outside the MSP's direct control. The most consequential development referenced is Anthropic's release and rapid withdrawal of its Fable 5 AI model following a directive from the U.S. Commerce Department, which ordered a cutoff of model access to foreign nationals within 72 hours of public launch. According to published benchmarks, Fable 5 surpassed GPT 5.5 in performance, but the government-mandated suspension exposed how quickly model access can be rescinded. The policy move immediately impacted any MSP or client with offshore or nearshore staff relying on AI features invisibly powered by that model. Further supporting the central theme, companies such as PAX8, Enforcer, and CloudRadio are embedding AI capabilities into platforms used by MSPs to manage Microsoft 365 environments, automate ticketing, and support scalable client operations. In parallel, vendors like Proofpoint are integrating compliance solutions directly with AI model APIs, further entwining risk management tools with the same core AI infrastructures. A Netrio survey cited in the episode found that while 82% of mid-market IT leaders have AI in production, only 26% report organization-wide governance, highlighting an accountability and visibility gap. Operationally, MSPs face heightened contract and vendor risk. Most lack an accurate inventory of which AI models underpin their services and how rapidly these dependencies can be affected by regulatory directives or vendor shifts. The discussion underscores the need for explicit procurement protocols, delivery mapping, and outage runbooks that account for opaque model dependencies. As clients seek greater transparency and contractual assurances regarding model use and continuity, MSPs who anticipate and document these dependencies may be positioned to reduce exposure and establish clearer accountability. 00:00 Switched Off 03:19 Painted Over 05:20 Govern or Absorb 08:41 Why Do We Care? Supported by: Pax8 Sign up for the SMB Online Conference: www.smbonlineconference.com
Last time we spoke about the One Hundred Regiment Offensive. During Phase Three of the One Hundred Regiment Offensive, CCP forces in the Taihang/Jizhong area emphasized strongpoint attacks and transportation warfare. Rather than trying to defeat Japanese units head-on, they used tactics such as night raids and ambushes to disrupt Japanese supply routes and communications. The underlying goal was to make Japanese logistics unstable, weakening their ability to maintain control and conduct effective operations. After CCP successes, the Japanese responded with large-scale "mopping-up" operations beginning October 6. As the Eighth Route Army continued resisting, it adopted flexible methods to counter the Japanese sweeps, especially rapid repositioning and targeted ambushes. One notable action described involves an ambush of a Japanese convoy that caused substantial enemy losses, demonstrating how disrupting enemy mobility could blunt the effectiveness of larger Japanese operations. Overall, the situation remained fluid, with both sides continually adapting their tactics in an ongoing contest for control across occupied North China. #205 The Hubei-Henan Campaign of 1940-1941 Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. By 1940, the war had settled into a grueling stalemate, with Japanese troops occupying vast swathes of central China, including parts of Hubei, but facing persistent Chinese guerrilla and conventional resistance that prevented total consolidation. In the aftermath of the Battle of Zaoyang in the summer of 1940, Japanese forces had secured the key cities of Yichang and Shashi along the middle reaches of the Yangtze River. Yet Chinese Nationalist troops of the Fifth War Area retained firm control over the vital territories east and west of the Xiang River. Their defensive lines formed a broad arc stretching from the southwest of Yuan'an through Jingmen, north of Zhongxiang, and the rugged foothills of the Dahong Mountains, extending northwest to Suixian. These positions straddled both banks of the Xiang River, anchored on the right by the Wudang Mountains and on the left by the Tongbai range. Working in close coordination with guerrilla detachments operating in the southeast, Chinese units repeatedly harassed the Japanese garrisons that had pushed into Yichang. The constant pressure on the enemy's flanks left the Japanese forces in Yichang and Shashi dangerously exposed and hemmed in, unable to expand or consolidate their gains. To the Japanese high command, this situation had become an intolerable thorn that demanded immediate removal. Under Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, the Chinese Nationalist government faced severe strains as the war with Japan escalated. Its problems were not only military, but also political and economic. Deep ideological and territorial rivalries with the CCP meant that efforts to present a single front were constantly undermined. Although the two sides officially formed a United Front in 1937, earlier violence and competition, such as the 1927 Shanghai Massacre and the CCP's Long March of 1934 – 1935 had left distrust and strategic differences in place. As a result, Nationalist resistance was harder to coordinate than it would have been under full unity. Meanwhile, the CCP strengthened its position in northern China by expanding rural strongholds. Through land reforms and the use of guerrilla warfare, the communists were able to win local support and apply pressure to Japanese forces in ways that often did not require large, conventional armies. This strategy also drew influence and manpower away from the Nationalists' more traditional, state-centered military structure. Economically, the Nationalists were squeezed from multiple directions. The loss of China's coastal industrial regions to Japanese occupation forced the government to rely heavily on the interior, with Chongqing becoming a key base. That geographic shift left the administration more vulnerable to shortages of critical supplies, especially raw materials, fuel, and modern weapons. On top of wartime disruption, the global Great Depression intensified fiscal and logistical difficulties, limiting how quickly and effectively the Nationalists could mobilize resources for large-scale operations. By late November 1940, these weaknesses intersected with renewed Japanese pressure. Japanese commanders were also concerned about the possibility of a major Nationalist push, particularly fears of a counteroffensive by the Thirty-first Army Group under General Tang Enbo. Determined to break the stalemate, the Japanese launched a major offensive in late November 1940. Preparations had begun in earnest early that month. Engineers repaired and expanded highways and bridges, constructed new defensive works and airfields, and stockpiled vast quantities of rations, ammunition, steel-hulled boats, and rubber rafts in the Zhongxiang area. Five regiments were concentrated near Zhongxiang, while additional troops east and west of the Xiang River brought the total strength to more than three divisions. Along the Suixian–Xiangyang Highway, Japanese forces were reinforced to divisional strength, supported by increased artillery and tank detachments. These meticulous measures left no doubt that the enemy was ready for a large-scale operation. By 23 November the Japanese had completed their deployments and moved into assault positions. The Japanese forces assigned to the Central Hubei Operation were placed under the overall command of Lieutenant General Waichirō Sonobe, who directed the campaign from his headquarters in Wuhan. Sonobe's 11th Army drew on a broad mix of formations, combining units from the 3rd, 4th, 15th, 17th, 39th, and 40th Divisions. The offensive backbone for the thrust into central Hubei province was reinforced by the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, which helped supply the infantry strength needed for sustained fighting across difficult ground. In practice, this multi-division structure reflected the 11th Army's key mission in the region, acting as the main Japanese formation after the earlier Battle of Zaoyang and it emphasized coordinated divisional advances supported by attached brigades and specialized elements, including limited armored capabilities. In terms of manpower, the Japanese force is commonly estimated at roughly 40,000 to 50,000 troops. This strength included several infantry regiments and artillery batteries, along with only limited armored elements rather than a fully armored formation. Because the operation depended on finding and exploiting opportunities quickly, it was supported by aerial reconnaissance and bombing carried out by the 3rd Air Brigade operating in central China. Infantry units formed the majority of the fighting power, while artillery was used to provide suppressive fire during advances. Air support, meanwhile, was intended to help identify and target Chinese positions—particularly along important riverine and rail corridors, where disruptions could slow resistance and complicate Chinese reinforcement or retreat. To manage the operation across varied terrain and combat tasks, Sonobe's command used smaller combined formation often described as task forces, that could operate with some flexibility. Among them were the Kayashima Force, commanded by Major General Koichi Kayashima of the 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, consisting of the entire brigade reinforced by elements of the 40th Division. The Muragami Force, under Lieutenant General Keisaku Muragami, commander of the 39th Division, which included the full division plus supporting non-infantry units. The Hirabayashi Force, led by Lieutenant General Morito Hirabayashi of the 17th Division, formed from detachments of the 17th and 15th Divisions.The Kitana Force, commanded by Lieutenant General Kenzo Kitana of the 4th Division, incorporating portions of the 4th Division and the Kususe Armored Force. These four groups were deployed in parallel around Tangyang, Jingmen, Zhongxiang, and north of Jingshan. The Hanjima Force, commanded by Lieutenant General Fusataro Hanjima of the 3rd Division, positioned near Suixian along the Xiangyang–Hua Highway. This task-force approach helped tailor combat power to specific mission profiles—such as flanking movements, raids, or pressure on Chinese defensive lines—while keeping the overall campaign plan under a unified command. Equipment choices also reflected the tactical environment of Hubei. The Japanese units made use of Type 95 Ha-Go light tanks for reconnaissance and for anti-infantry roles, typically best suited to the reconnaissance, pursuit, and screening functions that were available even with constrained armor numbers. For fire support, the force relied on conventional artillery, including 75mm Type 90 guns for field engagements and 105mm howitzers for heavier bombardment where stronger explosive impact was needed. Together, these assets were intended to allow Japanese formations to maneuver around Chinese positions and apply pressure in rugged landscapes where rivers, roads, and rail lines often determined the rhythm of battle. Logistics were a decisive factor in whether the operation could sustain momentum. Sonobe's army depended heavily on existing transportation infrastructure, particularly rail lines radiating from the Wuhan hub toward forward areas such as Suizhou and Zaoyang. These routes were critical for moving ammunition, replacements, and other supplies closer to the front as the Japanese advanced. The campaign also used river transport along the Yangtze River, including motorized barges and steamers, to deliver supplies to units operating near waterways. However, reliance on these corridors came with risks: Chinese interdiction raids could disrupt shipments, forcing convoys to be escorted and increasing the time and resources required to keep the forward units supplied. Overall, this dependence on both rail and fluvial networks highlighted a central operational challenge, maintaining secure access to transportation arteries in contested territory so that the Japanese could keep fighting effectively rather than stalling as supplies dwindled. The Central Hubei Operation was driven by an intelligence assessment that Chinese troop movements were signaling preparations for a Nationalist counteroffensive. Acting on that interpretation, the Japanese began tightening plans and positioning forces early in the final days of November 1940. On 23 November 1940, the Japanese 11th Army under Lieutenant General Waichirō Sonobe began organizing for the offensive in central Hubei. In order to conduct a coordinated advance across the Han River, the army arranged its forces into five groups, each tasked with moving in a way that supported the broader pincer-style pressure on Chinese positions. The approach also reflected lessons drawn from the earlier Zaoyang–Yichang campaign earlier in 1940, when Japanese divisions had been able to cross the Han River at multiple points, such as Dangyang, Jiukouzhen, and Shayangzhen—to help secure access toward Yichang and the Yangtze route. Logistics were built around infrastructure the Japanese had already established during prior operations. The Hankou hub supported the 11th Army through arrangements that included munitions storage, medical facilities, and transport coordination. Supplies and reinforcements were moved using truck convoys and river crossings, while forward depots—such as those at Shayangzhen northwest of Hankou—provided additional capacity, including freight handling and field hospitals. Because the area was not secure, these supply points were also guarded against threats from guerrilla activity, which could disrupt communications and threaten personnel and equipment. Operationally, the offensive used limited artillery and air support, reflecting Japanese constraints and directives aimed at keeping the campaign short and avoiding commitments that could stretch units beyond their logistical reach. Instead of trying to grind down Chinese defenses through prolonged bombardment, the plan prioritized speed, reconnaissance, and focused disruption. Japanese intelligence preparation relied heavily on aerial reconnaissance over the Han River valley to locate Chinese positions and infer where resistance would likely concentrate. That information enabled Japanese units to coordinate select maneuvers, including converging pressure from different directions. Where river transport mattered, coordination with naval or riverine elements supported movement and resupply, with overall oversight connected to the China Expeditionary Army. Anticipating the coming assault, the Chinese Fifth War Area headquarters acted swiftly on instructions from the National Military Council. Orders were issued to the River West Army Group (30th and 77th Corps), the Right Army Group (44th and 67th Corps), and the Central Army Group (41st and 45th Corps) to employ a flexible defensive strategy: hold key positions firmly while committing the main strength to strike the enemy's outer flanks at the decisive moment. The 59th Corps was directed to advance toward the Xiangfan area, ready to reinforce operations on either bank of the river as the situation developed. As commander of the Fifth War Area, Li Zongren arranged the defense to meet a likely Japanese thrust along the Han River, particularly in the approaches to Wuhan and Yichang, following the wider stalemate that settled in after the 1938 fall of Wuhan. The Fifth War Area could draw on roughly 300,000 troops, though many units were understrength, and the overall readiness varied by locality. Among the formations Li Zongren placed in the most sensitive sectors was the 31st Army Group under General Tang Enbo, which Japanese planners had identified as a potential threat to Japanese intentions in the region. In keeping with the terrain and the limits on manpower, Li's defensive design relied heavily on natural barriers—most importantly the Han River itself—and on the defensibility of rugged ground. Forces were arrayed to hold or contest riverbank positions, supported by fortifications, trenches, and smaller auxiliary elements. Divisions such as the 44th were positioned with an eye toward slowing an enemy crossing and forcing the Japanese to fight for difficult approaches rather than moving rapidly. At the same time, irregular forces and prepared defensive works were used to complicate Japanese reconnaissance and to make it harder for the attacker to coordinate a clean operational flow. Strategically, Li Zongren leaned on elastic defense rather than attempting to win decisive battles at fixed lines. Regular units were supported by guerrilla-style harassment intended to strike Japanese vulnerabilities, especially supply and transportation, between forward bases and the front. Local operations, including actions coming from areas such as Xinyang, were designed to disrupt Japanese logistics in periods when the Nationalists were still managing shortages of ammunition and medical supplies. Militias in the inter-mountainous regions further reinforced this approach: instead of seeking costly frontal engagements, they concentrated on disruption, delaying movements, and making Japanese operations slower and more expensive. At dawn on 25 November the Japanese offensive began, with columns advancing along multiple axes. On the western Xiangyang front, more than 1,000 troops from Tangyang and over 3,000 from Jingmen struck Hengdian and Yanzhimiao, shattering the positions of the Chinese 30th Corps. Simultaneously, a column moving from Zhujiafu toward Tunglinling split into several detachments and drove deep northward into Liangshuijing, Xiajiazi, and Kuaihuopu. By nightfall the River West Army Group had regrouped along the line from Hengdian through Yanzhimiao to Kuaihuopu. On 26 November the Japanese reached Xianzhu. The following day they assaulted Liuhouji and Lijiatang in a day-long battle that ended in stalemate. At dusk the 30th Corps launched a powerful counterattack; the 27th and 31st Divisions dispatched raiding parties into the enemy's rear. Unable to withstand the pressure, the Japanese fell back toward Jingmen and Zhongxiang, pursued by Chinese forces that inflicted heavy losses. Along the Jingmen–Zhongxiang Highway the Japanese massed more than 3,000 troops to attack Changshoutian and Wangjiatian, encircling Changjiachi and Shahetian. The Chinese 149th Division withdrew in good order to the stronger Wangjiahe–Wulongguan line. On 26 November enemy strength grew to 4,000–5,000. One column advanced on Sanligang while the main body assaulted Peizhai, Wangjiahe, and Yunanmen. Fighting continued until dark without decisive result. On 27 November the main force of the 44th Corps counterattacked from Wangjiahe, converging with the 67th Corps advancing from the northwest. The coordinated assault inflicted severe casualties, yet the Japanese continued to fight stubbornly. On the Suixian front, more than 2,000 Japanese troops reached Liangshuikou on the morning of 25 November and launched a violent attack against the 123rd Division at Lishan. Two additional columns, each exceeding 1,000 men, pushed westward toward Hoyuantian and Qingmingpu; their numbers swelled steadily as darkness fell. On 26 November fierce combat raged against the 124th and 127th Divisions at Jinjishan and Qingmingpu. A separate force of 700–800 men advanced from Xihe via Langhetian to Tangjiafan. After clashing with the 41st Corps, the Japanese near Qingmingpu linked up with those at Jinjishan and moved toward Hoyuantian on 27 November. That night the detachment at Tangjiafan reached the vicinity of Huantan Zhen, confronting the 125th Division. Recognizing that the enemy had become dangerously dispersed, the War Area Command ordered its units to hold critical localities while the main forces exploited the mountainous terrain for ambushes. The tactic proved effective. Heavy fighting continued until 28 November, when the Japanese, unable to achieve their objectives, began a general withdrawal. Chinese forces west of Xiangyang immediately took up the pursuit. The enemy opposing the Right Army Group was routed and retreated along several routes. In the Suixian sector, Japanese units at Hoyuantian and Huantan Zhen were caught in converging attacks by the Central Army Group, driven back to high ground, and encircled. In a desperate attempt to relieve the trapped forces, the Japanese rushed 1,500–1,600 infantry and cavalry troops from Suixian and Yingshan through Shangshitian and Shatian in a flanking maneuver—only to be ambushed once more. Covered by aircraft and armor, the enemy withdrew toward Suixian and Xihe as Chinese troops pressed forward along the line from Chunchuan to Anchu, Lishan, and Gaocheng. By 30 November all Chinese Army Groups had restored their original positions. The Central Hubei Operation produced uneven battlefield outcomes, particularly in reported casualties. Japanese accounts describe relatively limited losses, just 132 killed and 445 wounded attributed to advantages in air superiority, artillery, and armored support, even though the advance was complicated by difficult terrain. At the same time, Japanese forces faced persistent Chinese counterattacks along the Han River, which contributed to localized pressure and eventual withdrawal. The Japanese reported 6,439 Chinese killed and 474 captured, but the evidence base is uncertain and the language of reporting suggests possible exaggeration or propaganda. Conversely, Chinese-era estimates reportedly placed Japanese losses at roughly 5,000 killed and 7,000–8,000 wounded, illustrating a substantial gap between competing narratives. Some alternate reconstructions suggest total Chinese casualties in the range of 20,000–30,000, depending on whether wounded and missing personnel are included. However, because wartime reporting was fragmented and inconsistent, there is no fully verifiable casualty ledger for all units involved. Despite these tolls, the operation did not appear to achieve a decisive Chinese destruction of Japan's intended target force. The Chinese Fifth War Area, including elements associated with the 31st Army Group under Tang Enbo, suffered attrition but generally avoided annihilation. No major command-level losses are indicated in the surviving accounts, and unit formations were not described as collapsing permanently. On the material side, Japan reportedly seized rifles and supplies from positions that Chinese forces had encircled or abandoned in the short term, but overall equipment losses for either side were described as limited, consistent with the operation's restricted intensity. Strategically, the operation offered Japan short-term tactical advantages—notably through localized envelopments and the temporary pressure of combined-arms support—but it failed to translate these gains into a sustained strategic result. The fighting also strained Japanese logistics in central China, especially given that the offensive was not followed by major reinforcements. At the same time, it exposed continuing vulnerabilities in rugged terrain where Chinese guerrilla activity and organized counteraction could offset superior firepower. Ultimately, the Central Hubei Operation produced no net territorial gains. By the end of the week, Japanese troops had returned to positions that did not fundamentally alter control in central Hubei. Local clashes may have disturbed formations and disrupted movement temporarily, but the campaign did not create durable forward bases, did not change administrative control meaningfully, and did not permanently disrupt key supply corridors. The territorial status quo largely persisted: Chinese Fifth War Area forces maintained positions north of the Yangtze River, and there was no widespread abandonment of strongholds sufficient to indicate a strategic collapse. In the months following the Japanese repulse in central Hubei in November 1940, enemy forces remained largely immobilized across the Jing-Xiang plains, their earlier ambitions checked by determined Chinese resistance. Seeking to regain momentum and draw Chinese strength away from other theaters, the Japanese high command prepared a massive offensive into southern Henan in late January 1941. By the end of the month they had concentrated an imposing array of seven infantry divisions, one independent cavalry brigade, three independent armored regiments, and one independent artillery regiment. In all, more than 150,000 infantrymen, over 8,000 cavalry, 550 artillery pieces, 300 tanks, and 200 armored cars stood ready. Over a hundred aircraft were massed at forward bases in Anyang, Xinxiang, Huaiyang, and Xinyang. From early January onward, ammunition and equipment had been laboriously shipped up the Yangtze and moved inland to Xinyang, while Japanese reconnaissance planes repeatedly overflew Chinese rear areas. Additional troops were concentrated in southern Henan itself. On 20 January, as a preliminary move to pin down Chinese forces and facilitate the main effort in central Henan, the Japanese 18th Independent Mixed Brigade, together with elements of the 39th and 4th Divisions, launched a limited attack against the Chinese 29th and 33rd Army Groups. The principal assault, however, began on 24 January under the overall command of Lieutenant General Katsuichiro Enbu. The Japanese organized their southern Henan forces into three powerful columns: The Left Flank Force, built around the entire 3rd Division reinforced by the 8th Regiment of the 4th Division and the Mizuno Armored Unit, commanded by Lieutenant General Fusataro Hanjima of the 3rd Division. The Central Force, centered on the 17th Division (less one regiment) and strengthened by the 67th Regiment of the 15th Division and the Yoshimatsu Armored Unit, commanded by Lieutenant General Amaya of the 40th Division. The Right Flank Force, formed around the main body of the 40th Division, also under Lieutenant General Amaya. In support of this main thrust, Japanese forces in northern Anhui and eastern Henan—principally the 4th Cavalry Brigade with the Hirabayashi Tank Regiment—advanced westward from Haozhou toward Woyang. The Ouda Regiment of the 21st Division pushed west from Suzhou, while the Uguchi and Kobayashi Regiments of the 35th Division, accompanied by engineer, cavalry, artillery, and tank units, moved from Kaifeng, Tongxu, and Zhuxian Zhen along the north bank of the Yellow River and through the flooded areas toward Zhengzhou. These supporting columns were intended to tie down Chinese reserves and prevent reinforcement of the southern front. The National Military Council in Chongqing correctly assessed the enemy's intention: to drive north along the Beiping-Hankou Railway with their main strength, force a decisive battle against the Chinese field armies, and rely on the northern Anhui–eastern Henan forces to strike westward in coordination. Accordingly, the Council instructed the Fifth War Area to avoid a costly frontal engagement. Instead, a small portion of its troops would offer delaying resistance along the railway, while the main force would maneuver to the enemy's flanks and rear, severing communications and launching devastating counterattacks. In compliance, the Fifth War Area left only a single division near Xiping on the Beiping-Hankou line. The bulk of its strength—carefully concealed in depth on both sides of the enemy's expected axis of advance—remained highly mobile, ready to strike the Japanese flanks or rear the moment the enemy divided his forces or pushed toward Runan, Yancheng, or Wuyang. This elastic strategy proved decisive. At dawn on 25 January the Japanese southern Henan forces advanced in three columns. The Left Flank Force moved along the line from Xiaolindian to Gucheng and Chashan. The Central Force struck northward from the Minggang area. The Right Flank Force crossed the Huai River between Huaijiao Zhen and Chengyang under heavy air support. Japanese planes bombed Chinese positions relentlessly. True to plan, Chinese units employed only light screening forces to harass the enemy with ambushes and flank attacks, preserving their main strength for the decisive moment. By 26 January the Japanese had reached the line from Piyang to Gaoyi, Xingtian, and Queshan. On the 27th they pressed on to Chunshui, Shahetian, and Zhumadian. At this point Chinese mobile forces sprang into action. The 13th Corps of the 31st Army Group swung northward toward Xiangheguan, while the main body of the 85th Corps moved toward Shangcai to begin an enveloping maneuver. The 68th Corps of the 11th Army Group struck the enemy rear south of Xiangheguan; the 55th Corps advanced from Tanghe to Piyang; and the 59th Corps of the 33rd Army Group pushed toward Nanyang. On 29 January the 13th Corps attacked the Japanese Left Flank Force near Jieguanting and Xiaoshidian south of Wuyang, while the 85th Corps struck the Right Flank Force around Runan, southeast of Shangcai. The enemy's Central Force, advancing along and west of the railway, found the Chinese positions already evacuated and failed to trap any major units. The Japanese columns on the extreme flanks suffered over 3,000 casualties and lost six tanks in the fighting around Jieguanting. By 31 January the enemy, desperate to rescue his exposed flank columns, reordered his forces. The Central Force executed turning movements on both sides: elements of the 15th Division swung right from Suiping through Shangcai to converge with troops moving north from Runan against the 85th Corps, while the main body of the 17th Division split into two columns and advanced from Suiping through Xiping toward Wuyang. Simultaneously, the main force of the 3rd Division and part of the 4th Division also converged on Wuyang, hoping to link with the 17th Division and crush the 13th Corps near Jieguanting and Xiaoshidian. Before the trap could close, however, the Chinese 13th and 85th Corps withdrew in good order to the area north of Ye Xian, between Yancheng and Shangshui, and north of the Sha River. When the Japanese broke through at Wuyang and Shangcai they found no major Chinese forces to destroy. Meanwhile, Chinese troops from western Henan, the 59th, 55th, and 68th Corps, advanced from Tanghe, Piyang, and points north to strike the enemy rear at Wuyang. On 29 January the 84th Corps and local guerrillas in western Anhui recaptured Chengyang and continued the pursuit. The Japanese, having failed to concentrate superior strength or control the battlefield, now found themselves isolated. Their rear communications were severed, and they were under constant pressure from the 68th, 55th, and 59th Corps. After days of exhausting combat the enemy began to withdraw southward on the night of 2 February. Leaving only rear guards at Wuyang and Baoanzhai to tie down the 13th Corps, the main body of the 3rd Division moved from Fangcheng toward Nanyang and Zhenping. The 13th Corps immediately counterattacked, recaptured Baoanzhai and Wuyang, and pursued the enemy toward Fangcheng. On the night of 2 February, as the Japanese main force approached Nanyang, the 17th Division together with elements of the 15th and 4th Divisions had already pushed south from Wuyang via Xiangheguan toward Piyang, hoping to link with forces moving east from Nanyang and trap the Chinese 68th, 55th, and 29th Corps. Fierce resistance by the 68th Corps near Xiangheguan inflicted heavy losses and forced the enemy to abandon large quantities of supplies. Further south, the 29th Corps exacted still greater casualties around Piyang. On the night of 7 February the trapped Japanese column split: part retreated along the Tanghe–Piyang highway, while the main body withdrew along the Tongbo–Xinyang highway toward Xinyang, leaving many dead behind. The Chinese 85th Corps pursued southeastward, while elements of the 13th, 29th, 55th, and 59th Corps harried the enemy toward Xinyang. By the time the fighting ended, all Chinese units had regained their original positions. In coordination with the southern Henan offensive, the Japanese forces in northern Anhui and eastern Henan advanced westward in four columns on the morning of 25 January. The Ouda Regiment of the 21st Division struck west from Suzhou. The 4th Cavalry Brigade, reinforced by the Hirabayashi Tank Regiment, split into three routes from Bozhou to attack Woyang, Shanheji, and Shuangqiao, clashing bitterly with a Chinese cavalry division near Shizihe and Niqiuji. The Uguchi Regiment of the 35th Division advanced through the flooded areas from Tongxu and Zhuxian Zhen, while the Kobayashi Regiment moved westward along the north bank of the Yellow River near Zhengzhou. Japanese aircraft intensified their bombing of Chinese cities and front-line positions, including Zhoujiakou, Zhengzhou, Yancheng, Ye Xian, Xiangcheng, Wuyang, and Luoyang. On 29 January one enemy column reached Santaiji and suffered heavy losses under Chinese attack. Threatened on the left by forces near Huaiyang, two Chinese corps withdrew temporarily to the line from Fuyang to Taihe and Jieshou. On 5 February the Japanese captured Taihe and Jieshou, but a Chinese counterattack on the morning of 6 February regained both towns, forcing the enemy to retreat northeastward. The Battle of Southern Henan, which opened on 25 January and concluded on 10 February after seventeen days of continuous fighting, ended in a clear Chinese victory. Japanese casualties exceeded 9,000; when the enemy withdrew from Nanyang more than 300 military vehicles were left burning on the battlefield. Large quantities of arms, ammunition, and supplies fell into Chinese hands. Chinese losses were significantly lighter. The enemy had hoped to force a decisive battle along the railway and shatter the Chinese armies of the Fifth War Area. Instead, skillful Chinese maneuver, timely flank attacks, and relentless pressure on the enemy's rear and communications had turned the Japanese offensive into a costly failure. The victory not only preserved the integrity of the central Chinese front but also demonstrated once again the effectiveness of elastic defense and mobile counteroffensive tactics against a numerically superior but overextended foe. In the wake of their costly repulse in central Hubei the previous November and the even more humiliating defeat in Southern Henan between late January and early February 1941, the Japanese sought once more to regain the initiative in the spring of 1941. Their target was western Hubei, where Chinese forces continued to deny them freedom of movement along the middle Yangtze. The entire Japanese 13th Division garrisoned the Yichang salient. Its regiments were deployed in a defensive arc: the 65th Regiment and the 19th Artillery Regiment held positions east of the city at Longchuanpu, Tumenya, and Yaqueling; the 104th Regiment guarded the northwest approaches; and the 17th Cavalry Regiment patrolled the Yangchalu–Baishanao sector. On the west bank of the Yangtze, the 58th Regiment had constructed strong bridgehead fortifications between Chaojialing and Shangwulongkou, ready to support any renewed thrust westward. Facing this entrenched enemy was the Chinese 26th Corps, entrusted with the critical mission of river defense on the west bank of the Yangtze opposite Yichang. The corps commander had organized his forces into three sectors. The 41st Division held the right zone, anchoring its line from Mujiatian and Tanjiataizi northward to the vicinity of Fanjiah u. The 32nd Division defended the left zone, stretching from Mujiatian through Ceyang to Xiangzikou. The 44th Division remained in corps reserve near Caojiafan, poised to reinforce either flank or exploit opportunities for counterattack. On 6 March 1941 the Japanese struck. Having quietly reinforced their forces west of Yichang to more than three regiments, supported by cavalry and artillery, they opened the assault at 5:30 a.m. with a violent artillery barrage, followed immediately by infantry advances under cover of air strikes. Chinese security positions at Tanjiataizi and Chaojiadian were overrun. The enemy then hurled itself against the main line at Changgangling. Simultaneously, 600 to 700 Japanese troops, backed by planes and guns, assaulted Fanjiah u. After hours of bitter fighting both localities fell. On the morning of 7 March, Japanese aircraft again spearheaded the attack, enabling the capture of positions at Qianjiatai and Wujiaba. The enemy pressed on toward Qianjiachong and Yutaishan but was thrown back. Meanwhile, the force that had taken Fanjiah u clashed fiercely with the Chinese 44th Division around Taipingqiao; although the division was eventually compelled to withdraw to the eastern end of the bridge under relentless air attack, it continued to resist stubbornly. When the enemy seized Hut zeye from the direction of Fanjiah u, the 32nd Division fell back in good order to the line from Tunziqiao to Tuyanzhong, where it beat off further assaults. By this stage the Japanese had driven themselves into a dangerously narrow salient, exposed on both flanks. Seizing the moment, the River Defense Force reorganized its lines. The 103rd Division of the 8th Corps relieved the sector from Mujiatang through Yingzishan to Chaotianguan, while the 26th Corps consolidated new positions at Yutaishan, Pijiashan, Qingshuiba, Guangongling, and Xiaopingshanba. The plan was clear: hold the enemy east of this line, then launch a converging counterstroke to destroy the invaders and restore the original front. On 8 March two guerrilla columns from the 41st Division struck at Changgangling and Fanjiayuan, while another detachment hit the enemy east of Pifengjian. More than 2,000 Japanese troops assaulted the 44th Division's positions from Gaolingpo and Dajiaobian toward Wanghuzizhong; determined resistance by the 44th Division, supported by elements of the 41st, brought the attack to a standstill. Later that day the enemy managed to penetrate the 32nd Division's line at Tianwangshi, forcing Chinese troops to fight a delaying action along the outskirts of the Shibai Fortress from Mingjiachong to Heitangou. Dawn on 9 March brought renewed Chinese initiative. The 103rd Division occupied the line from Tutiling to Shizinao and advanced in several columns against the enemy. A portion of the 44th Division waged a grim holding action on the high ground flanking Guojiaba, suffering heavy losses but buying time for the main body to launch a powerful flank attack against the Japanese at Taipingqiao and Xianglingkou. By dusk Chinese forces had captured the enemy strongpoints at Dujiaoba and Dajiaobian along the highway, annihilating numerous enemy troops. The 32nd Division threw its main strength against the area northwest of Dajiaobian; heavy fighting raged around Wanghuzizhong into the afternoon until enemy reinforcements were driven off. The 41st Division, meanwhile, executed effective flank attacks that yielded significant gains. On 10 March the 103rd Division recaptured the high ground at Xiawulongkou and north of Tianzipo, while guerrillas of the 41st Division continued to harass the enemy through every gap in his lines. When positions at Hongshipo and Lungtanping held by the 44th Division were breached, the division withdrew to the western heights of Bomuping and faced the enemy anew. At dawn on 11 March, after suffering severe casualties, the Japanese resorted to smoke screens and began withdrawing eastward along several routes. Chinese pursuit forces swiftly retook Xianglingkou, Guojiaba, Guangongling, Tianwangshi, and Dajiaobian. By 12 March the enemy had fallen back to a defensive line running from east of Taipingqiao to Hu z'ai and Huangnikeng. On 13 March Chinese units launched general counterattacks. Unable to withstand the pressure, the Japanese retreated to their original positions. The eight-day engagement thus ended exactly where it had begun. The battle had been fought with only a portion of the available Chinese forces, yet it proved decisive. The Japanese, who had hoped to crack the river defenses and resume their westward drive, instead suffered 4,000 to 5,000 casualties. The swift and skillful Chinese counteroffensive not only restored the front but left the enemy shaken and apprehensive. Their design to push deeper into western Hubei was decisively thwarted, buying precious time for the broader Chinese war effort in the Yangtze theater and demonstrating once again that determined defense, timely reinforcement, and aggressive counteraction could blunt even the most carefully prepared Japanese offensive. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In November 1940, a Central Hubei Operation using five task forces attempted to exploit Chinese dispersal but achieved no territorial gains despite local successes. A larger January 1941 offensive into southern Henan deployed 150,000+ troops but again failed strategically. Despite Japanese tactical advantages and superior firepower, logistical constraints and rugged terrain favored mobile Chinese resistance. Both campaigns ended with Japanese withdrawals and restored Chinese positions, demonstrating that determined defense and timely counteraction could blunt large-scale Japanese operations.
A central structural mechanism highlighted in this episode is the exposure and amplification of technical and organizational weaknesses by enterprise AI initiatives, particularly as organizations pursue rapid AI adoption without adequate investment in data and process fundamentals. The episode draws on findings from an MIT Media Lab report, which found that 95% of enterprise AI pilots had no measurable impact on profit and loss, despite $30–40 billion in investment. Michael Privat, representing the healthcare technology firm Availability, discusses the consequences for organizations that apply “thin” AI overlays on top of unaddressed legacy data infrastructure and processes. The most consequential data point centers on AI's amplifying effect. According to the MIT Media Lab report cited by Michael Privat, 74–75% of companies expect revenue growth from AI, but only 20% are realizing gains. The root cause identified is not AI itself, but foundational failures: organizations use pilots as procurement exercises rather than outcome-driven initiatives and neglect to address data consistency and process integrity. Pilot projects, in many cases, simply accelerate the visibility and scale of existing dysfunctions rather than creating new value. Further evidence is provided through discussion of operational methodologies and organizational approaches. Michael Privat details a shift from pre-AI process benchmarks, such as DORA metrics focused on predictability and velocity, toward new models that account for AI's speed and amplification risks. He points to increasing investments in engineering capacity—in particular, tripling headcount in India—while emphasizing that efficiency gains from AI only materialize where discipline, standardization, and solid engineering “plumbing” is already in place. Both the need for audit trails and rigorous governance, especially in regulated sectors like healthcare, are flagged as structural safety requirements rather than optional layers. Operationally, the implications for MSPs and IT leaders include the risk of exposing latent deficiencies when implementing AI-driven offerings, particularly when layering automation and analytics atop fragmented or inconsistent infrastructure. Key areas of impact are the need for robust governance frameworks—especially with agentic AI, where dynamic system behaviors require ongoing accountability and auditability—and the risk that AI investments made without process and data “spring cleaning” can actually accelerate failure modes. For IT service providers, the material risks are in unexamined process debt, tool misalignment, and the temptation to prioritize velocity over resilience, ultimately increasing operational and contractual exposure. Supported by:NerdioScalePad
The structural shift highlighted in this episode is a move from simple AI enablement to a managed service model centered on agent governance, enforcement, and workflow automation within IT environments. The episode identifies unmanaged AI agents as a source of escalating risk, citing vendors like Scalepad shifting from remote monitoring to SaaS and AI usage discovery, and referencing research and audits from SNCC and Verizon that identify tangible security flaws and unapproved AI activity within organizations. Managed service providers are increasingly positioned as the operational layer that defines and enforces governance over automation systems, rather than simply deploying AI tools. The primary evidence for this shift is found in audit findings and market reports. SNCC's audit of 4,000 AI agent skills showed over a third had at least one security flaw, while Verizon's data cited by The Register noted a fourfold increase in employees using unauthorized generative AI, with 28% of data loss prevention violations involving code or proprietary data submitted to AI platforms. Gartner, as reported by The Register, predicts 40% of organizations will demote or remove AI agents due to failed governance efforts—attributing the problem to all-or-nothing approaches that lead to operational and compliance failures. Secondary developments reinforce the move toward operationalized governance. Scalepad and Watchguard are bringing AI and SaaS governance capabilities to the MSP channel, with product releases focused on real-time discovery, policy enforcement, and automation control. Incidents like Anthropic's leak of its full source code for Claude Code, exposing permission and sandboxing details, illustrate how transparency in AI agent operations can also create attack vectors—emphasizing the need for robust operational controls and ongoing auditability. The market is shifting to sell "coherence"—packaging identity, permissions, and workflow automation—rather than just technological capability. Operationally, the consequences for MSPs include increased responsibility for defining and enforcing permission boundaries, approval rules, and evidence collection. Failure to address agent governance will expose providers to operational ambiguity, unpriced liability, and recurring support burdens. The guidance is to move beyond AI enablement projects and toward agent operation retainers that include clear workflows, permission maps, execution logs, and contractual clarity on responsibility and incident management. MSPs that cannot prove and control agent behavior risk inheriting the complexity and fallout from system failures or misuse. 00:00 Shadow AI Surge 05:01 Context Is Infrastructure 07:46 Agent Control Plane 11:16 Why Do We Care? Supported by: JumpCloud TimeZest
The episode reveals a growing governance gap as the central structural shift in the IT services sector, driven by accelerated AI adoption and increasing automation. Companies such as OpenAI, Anthropic, Veeam, and Auvik are reframing their market positions around the operational risks and requirements introduced by AI agents, data automation, and new service delivery models. This evolution is underscored by the rising number of AI agents—projected by IDC to reach 2.3 billion by 2030—operating largely outside of current oversight and frequently with excessive or inappropriate permissions. The principal development discussed is Veeam's announcement of its Data AI Command Platform. According to Dave Sobel and Rich Freeman, this platform is intended to address data-centric failures beyond traditional ransomware or accidental deletion. Veeam's platform is designed to handle issues such as AI-generated data hallucinations, inappropriate data exposure, and policy enforcement failures. The platform's architecture builds on the acquisition of Security AI, combining data security posture management with backup, compliance, and governance capabilities, although, as of now, key remediation features are only available for Microsoft 365, with further expansion expected over the coming months. Supporting developments include Auvik's expansion of automated network management based on a large historical dataset and the simultaneous entrance of OpenAI and Anthropic into direct services for mid-market clients, backed by billions in private capital from entities such as Goldman Sachs and Blackstone. Both companies now embed applied AI engineers at client sites, bypassing traditional channel partners. Channel operator feedback, reflected in research by Techisle and discussions at vendor conferences, indicates a lack of MSP readiness and a slow response to developing governance and compliance services, despite evidence from end-user data pointing to significant unmet demand and risk exposure. Operationally, MSPs face a growing liability trap where the speed and delegation of decisions to AI systems increase the potential for unnoticed errors or breaches. There is a disconnect between customer demand for governance, compliance, and data controls, and the preparedness of MSPs to deliver those services. This exposes providers to heightened contractual, operational, and reputational risk, particularly as vendors and large AI companies move directly into the mid-market service delivery space. Practical safeguards, clear accountability frameworks, and objective benchmarks for automation and governance effectiveness will be required to mitigate exposure and support safe, durable service offerings. Supported by: CometBackup HaloPSA Moovila
Arrow Exploration CEO Marshall Abbott joined Steve Darling from Proactive to discuss the company's strong first-quarter 2026 financial and operational results, highlighting continued production growth, rising revenues, and ongoing drilling success across its Colombian assets. Abbott said Arrow delivered average corporate production of 4,715 barrels of oil equivalent per day during the quarter, reflecting the company's continued operational momentum and development progress. The stronger production profile helped drive total oil and natural gas revenue, net of royalties, to $23.5 million for the three months ended March 31, 2026, representing a 21% increase compared with the same period in 2025. The company also reported significant growth in profitability and cash generation. Adjusted EBITDA reached $14.1 million during the quarter, up 22% from approximately $11.5 million reported in the first quarter of 2025. Arrow also achieved strong realized corporate oil operating netbacks of $41.05 per barrel, underscoring the efficiency and profitability of its production base. Abbott noted that Arrow generated operating cash flow of $13.6 million during the quarter and ended Q1 2026 with a solid cash position of $14.2 million. The company additionally reported net income of $5.2 million, reflecting continued financial strength as it advances development activities across its portfolio. Operationally, Arrow continued to expand activity within the Mateguafa Attic field located on the Tapir Block in Colombia. During the quarter, the company successfully drilled three additional development wells in the Mateguafa Attic area, supporting ongoing production growth and reservoir development objectives. Abbott also provided an update regarding the company's ongoing discussions with Colombian authorities surrounding the extension of the Tapir Block license. He said the company continues to engage constructively with regulators and believes it is well-positioned to secure the extension after satisfying all relevant technical and operational requirements. Arrow indicated it will continue updating the market as discussions progress. In addition, the company recently spud the IC-2 well at its Icaco field, which management expects to place on production within the coming weeks. Following IC-2, Arrow plans to continue drilling additional development wells at Icaco while also carrying out recompletion work on several Mateguafa Attic wells during the second quarter of 2026. Abbott emphasized that the company remains focused on disciplined operational execution, maintaining strong cash flow generation, and expanding production through continued development drilling across its core Colombian assets. #proactiveinvestors #arrowexplorationinc #aim #axl #tsxv #axl #ColombiaEnergy #MarshallAbbott #Mateguafa #LlanosBasin #ColombiaOil #OilProduction #OilAndGas #EnergyNews #ColombiaEnergy #OilProduction #EnergyStocks #Drilling #NaturalGas #OperationalUpdate #CashFlow
RC Fornax CFO Rob Shepherd joined Steve Darling from Proactive to discuss the company's unaudited interim results for the six months ended 28 February 2026, highlighting improving revenue momentum, growing order conversion, and increasing visibility into the second half of the financial year. The company reported revenue of £2.2 million for H1 FY26, compared with a restated £2.5 million in H1 FY25. Management emphasized that revenue during the period was 40% ahead of H2 FY25 revenue of £1.6 million, reflecting accelerating pipeline conversion and strengthening customer demand. RC Fornax also achieved an average month-on-month revenue increase of 26% during the reporting period, demonstrating growing operational momentum. A significant component of the company's strategy continues to center on expanding higher-value outcome-based services. These services represented 72% of the company's revenue mix during H1 FY26, compared with 52% in the comparable prior-year period. Management noted that the increase aligns closely with the strategic objectives outlined at the time of the company's IPO and supports efforts to build a more scalable, higher-margin business model. Gross profit for the period remained steady at approximately £0.7 million, while gross margin improved to 31% from 27% a year earlier. According to the company, the stronger margin performance reflects a more favorable delivery mix and improving operational leverage as revenue growth continues. The company also strengthened its financial position during the period, ending February 2026 with cash of £1.8 million, compared with £0.9 million at 31 August 2025. The improved balance sheet follows the successful completion of a £2.1 million net equity fundraise in December 2025, providing additional financial flexibility to support strategic growth initiatives. Operationally, RC Fornax secured £4.1 million in new orders, including contracts subject to final agreement, and extensions during the first half of FY26. Management described the performance as clear evidence of pipeline conversion and growing customer engagement. Among the key developments was a contract award from a UK public sector space client, representing meaningful diversification beyond the company's traditional Ministry of Defence-focused activities. The company also announced unconditional acceptance by the Aurora Engineering Partnership as a Specialist Provider on the Evolve Engineering Delivery Partnership Provider Network, a major UK defence engineering framework expected to create additional long-term opportunities. Reeves noted that development of the company's SME Procure platform continues to progress on schedule, with commercialisation targeted during FY26. Management believes the platform could become an additional growth driver as the company expands its broader defence and engineering services ecosystem. #proactiveinvestors #rcfornaxplc #aim #rcfx #DefenceIndustry #Engineering #UKDefence #Aerospace #DefenceTechnology #FinancialResults #GrowthStrategy #PublicSector #TechnologyServices
Investor Fuel Real Estate Investing Mastermind - Audio Version
In this episode, Jeffery Raju of Stonehill Capital shares insights on building financial infrastructure for private equity and venture capital funds, emphasizing strategies for operational success, investor confidence, and scalable growth. He discusses operational challenges fund managers face, the importance of proactive portfolio management, and how automation and AI are shaping the future of fund operations. Professional Real Estate Investors - How we can help you: Investor Fuel Mastermind: Learn more about the Investor Fuel Mastermind, including 100% deal financing, massive discounts from vendors and sponsors you're already using, our world class community of over 150 members, and SO much more here: http://www.investorfuel.com/apply Investor Machine Marketing Partnership: Are you looking for consistent, high quality lead generation? Investor Machine is America's #1 lead generation service professional investors. Investor Machine provides true 'white glove' support to help you build the perfect marketing plan, then we'll execute it for you…talking and working together on an ongoing basis to help you hit YOUR goals! Learn more here: http://www.investormachine.com Coaching with Mike Hambright: Interested in 1 on 1 coaching with Mike Hambright? Mike coaches entrepreneurs looking to level up, build coaching or service based businesses (Mike runs multiple 7 and 8 figure a year businesses), building a coaching program and more. Learn more here: https://investorfuel.com/coachingwithmike Attend a Vacation/Mastermind Retreat with Mike Hambright: Interested in joining a "mini-mastermind" with Mike and his private clients on an upcoming "Retreat", either at locations like Cabo San Lucas, Napa, Park City ski trip, Yellowstone, or even at Mike's East Texas "Big H Ranch"? Learn more here: http://www.investorfuel.com/retreat Property Insurance: Join the largest and most investor friendly property insurance provider in 2 minutes. Free to join, and insure all your flips and rentals within minutes! There is NO easier insurance provider on the planet (turn insurance on or off in 1 minute without talking to anyone!), and there's no 15-30% agent mark up through this platform! Register here: https://myinvestorinsurance.com/ New Real Estate Investors - How we can work together: Investor Fuel Club (Coaching and Deal Partner Community): Looking to kickstart your real estate investing career? Join our one of a kind Coaching Community, Investor Fuel Club, where you'll get trained by some of the best real estate investors in America, and partner with them on deals! You don't need $ for deals…we'll partner with you and hold your hand along the way! Learn More here: http://www.investorfuel.com/club —--------------------
Interview with Gary Lohman, COO & VP Exploration, and Patrick J. Cruickshank, President & CEO of Thistle ResourcesRecording date: 20th May 2026Thistle Resources Inc., a recently listed explorer on the TSX Venture Exchange, is positioning itself at the crossroads of rising demand for gold and critical minerals through a diversified portfolio in Canada's Bathurst Mining Camp. The company controls five projects, with a strategic focus on three key assets: the Middle River Gold deposit, a large volcanogenic massive sulfide (VMS) target, and the high-grade Brunswick Antimony project. This multi-commodity approach reduces reliance on a single resource while offering multiple pathways for value creation.The flagship Middle River Gold project demonstrates strong scale potential. It hosts two distinct zones: a near-surface system extending to 130 meters depth with approximately 7 kilometers of mineralized folding—largely untested—and a deeper zone at 400 meters that exhibits one of the strongest geophysical conductive responses recorded in the region. Early drilling has confirmed consistent gold mineralization, while advanced surveys by two independent geophysical firms have significantly improved targeting confidence. The company is aiming to define a resource of up to 2 million ounces through systematic drilling.Equally compelling is the Brunswick Antimony project, որտեղ exceptionally high-grade mineralization occurs at surface, including antimony exceeding 10%, along with significant silver and gold values. Located near historic producing mines, the project benefits from existing infrastructure and growing geopolitical interest in securing non-Chinese sources of critical minerals. Antimony prices have surged in recent years, enhancing the project's economic potential even at modest scale.Operationally, Thistle benefits from a favorable jurisdiction with rapid permitting, strong infrastructure, and low drilling costs of roughly CAD 100 per meter. Fully funded for two years and equipped with active drill programs through 2026, the company is well positioned to advance its assets. With multiple catalysts ahead and exposure to both precious and critical minerals, Thistle represents a diversified exploration opportunity in a proven mining district.View Thistle Resources' company profile: https://www.cruxinvestor.com/companies/thistle-resourcesSign up for Crux Investor: https://cruxinvestor.com
Security operations for MSPs are undergoing a structural shift from simply deploying additional tools to establishing a liability-focused accountability model, where the ability to provide operational evidence of controls is becoming as critical as the tools themselves. This shift is catalyzed by corporate insurance, procurement, and third-party verification structures—such as those cited by WatchGuard, Assurix, and the NIST AI cybersecurity overlays—demanding verifiable security outcomes and alignment with external standards, rather than relying on provider assertions alone. Survey data referenced from Cybersmart and Beta News reveals that 75% of MSPs experienced at least one breach in the past year, while 54% endured multiple incidents; concurrently, SMB buyers state security is a top priority, but only 13% of microbusinesses operate proactively. According to WatchGuard's global survey of 842 professionals, 94% of clients using dedicated MSPs feel adequately protected, yet 58% indicate intent to change providers within three years—highlighting a disconnect between perceived and delivered value. The emergence of Assurixs' live MSP Trustmark, based on 64 operational controls, further formalizes evidence requirements as market prerequisites. These dynamics are reinforced by shifts in insurer behavior and regulatory alignment. Huntress and Acrisure are collectively rolling out a cyber insurance package contingent on adoption of Huntress's managed detection and response, explicitly tying coverage eligibility to verifiable provider-side controls. The maturing of NIST's AI cybersecurity overlays introduces new standardized control checklists likely to become operational requirements. Additionally, reports from Omdia and MSP Channel Insights note that vendor ecosystems are now rewarded for integrating security as an outcome with automation and multi-tenant integration—reflecting market demand for reliable, defensible evidence of controls. For MSPs and IT leaders, these developments drive the need to restructure contracts to clearly delineate evidence obligations, manage liability exposure, and price evidence production as a formal deliverable rather than as unreimbursed support. Failing to do so risks absorbing unfunded post-incident evidence work, margin erosion, and loss of control over the security value conversation. Operationally, maintaining live accreditations, standing up a formal evidence management function, and explicitly excluding unmanaged SaaS, identity, and AI workflows from baseline service tiers are becoming necessary to maintain profitability and accountability. 00:00 Breach, Then Switch 04:52 SaaS Blind Spot 07:16 Prove or Pay 10:24 Why Do We Care? Supported by: Zero Networks HaloPSA
Snail Games USA Chief Financial Officer Heidy Chow joined Steve Darling from Proactive to discuss the company's financial results for the first quarter ended March 31, 2026, highlighting strong revenue growth and a return to profitability. Snail USA reported net revenue of $27.3 million for the quarter, representing a 35.7% increase compared to $20.1 million in the same period last year. The growth was primarily driven by stronger contributions from ASA and Bellwright, which added approximately $4.2 million and $2.1 million in revenue respectively, along with a $2.5 million increase in deferred revenue recognized during the quarter. These gains were partially offset by lower revenue from ARK Mobile and ASE. The company also delivered a significant improvement in profitability. EBITDA increased 173.3% to $2.4 million compared to a loss of $3.2 million in the prior-year quarter. Net income rose to $2.1 million versus a net loss of $1.9 million a year earlier. Management attributed the improved bottom line primarily to the $7.2 million increase in net revenue and a reduction in operating expenses, partially offset by higher taxes and increased cost of revenues. Operationally, total units sold climbed 42.6% to 2.2 million units, up from 1.5 million in the comparable period last year. The increase was largely driven by continued strength across the ARK: Survival Evolved franchise. Looking ahead, Snail USA expects its revenue mix to continue evolving alongside the planned launches of several new titles, including For the Stars, Nine Yin Sutra Immortal, and Nine Yin Sutra Wushu. The company also noted that multiple gaming events are scheduled throughout 2026, where additional updates on upcoming titles are expected to be shared. #proactiveinvestors #snail #nasdaq #snal #SnailInc #Gaming #VideoGames #ARKSurvivalEvolved #GameDevelopment #Entertainment #Esports #TechStocks #GamingIndustry
Retailers have spent 25 years trying to make in-store picking profitable. Most are still struggling because fulfillment is managed as an afterthought. In this episode, Top Retail Expert Vinny O'Brien sits down with Xavier Pym, Partnerships Development Manager at Vusion and Kristofer Browall, Head of Solution Sales at StrongPoint, to bridge the gap between digital strategy and operational reality. Discussion Highlights: - The Design Conflict - Direction Over Data - The Human Factor - The Connected Advantage Stop managing the store as a side project. Start building a real-time fulfillment engine.
Retailers have spent 25 years trying to make in-store picking profitable. Most are still struggling because fulfillment is managed as an afterthought. In this episode, Top Retail Expert Vinny O'Brien sits down with Xavier Pym, Partnerships Development Manager at Vusion and Kristofer Browall, Head of Solution Sales at StrongPoint, to bridge the gap between digital strategy and operational reality. Discussion Highlights: - The Design Conflict - Direction Over Data - The Human Factor - The Connected Advantage Stop managing the store as a side project. Start building a real-time fulfillment engine.
The episode reveals a structural shift in the technology landscape: artificial intelligence is becoming a new layer of managed consumption, with measurable impact on infrastructure, contract terms, and operational accountability. This shift is illustrated by leading technology platforms explicitly metering AI usage through compute tokens, storage footprints, and local model deployments. Companies such as Alphabet, Amazon, Microsoft, and Google are integrating AI not only as features but as quantifiable workload layers, leading to economic and governance questions regarding who controls consumption and who assumes the risk of overage or misuse. The most consequential development discussed is the rapid, capital-intensive scaling of AI infrastructure by leading hyperscalers. Alphabet raised its 2026 capital expenditure guidance to a possible $190 billion; Amazon's AWS revenues rose 28% year-over-year to $37.6 billion, with quarterly capital expenditures reaching $44.2 billion— both moves directly tied to AI infrastructure investments. At the same time, endpoint and storage vendors, such as Apple and Backblaze, are experiencing elevated demand from AI workloads. On the software side, companies like Anthropic are explicitly raising API rate limits and deploying features to formalize the measurement and orchestration of AI-driven processes. Supporting developments include the migration of management and control functions into enterprise platforms and endpoint environments. Microsoft Agent 365 is now broadly available, offering admins centralized policy controls over AI agents across cloud and local machines, with integration into Intune for granular restriction and monitoring. Google's Chrome browser now automatically downloads 4GB Gemini Nano models to support local AI functions, raising new operational considerations around storage, policy management, and user approval. These developments anchor the thesis that AI is no longer a passive toolset but a consumption and policy domain that requires active oversight. Operationally, MSPs and IT service providers face heightened exposure to contract and governance risk. The presence of invisible AI consumption— in the form of storage expansion, token overages, unauthorized agent actions, or degraded endpoint performance— requires explicit clauses in client agreements and new monitoring capabilities. Providers unable to demonstrate control over AI usage, policy enforcement, and exception handling may inherit both support burdens and unresolved liability. The practical implication is clear: future margins and contract viability will increasingly depend on the ability to meter, document, and govern AI-related activities, rather than simply enabling client access. 00:00 AI Infrastructure Surge 04:17 Control Layer Wins 06:41 MSP Liability Shift 10:50 Why Do We Care? Supported by: ScalePad CometBackup Moovila
Alvopetro Energy CEO Corey Ruttan joined Steve Darling from Proactive to provide a comprehensive operational update, highlighting solid April production and Q1 results, thanks to the ongoing development progress in Brazil, and improving natural gas pricing under the company's long-term sales agreement. Alvopetro reported April sales volumes of 3,133 barrels of oil equivalent per day (boepd), driven primarily by its Brazilian operations. Production in Brazil averaged 2,953 boepd, including natural gas output of 16.7 million cubic feet per day, as well as 155 barrels per day of natural gas liquids from condensate and a modest 9 barrels per day of oil. Canadian assets contributed an additional 180 barrels per day of oil production during the month. Operationally, the company continues to advance development at its Murucututu Field, where drilling of the 183-D1 well has now commenced. This well follows the success of the 183-D4 well and is targeting the Caruaçu Formation, a key reservoir for future growth. Alvopetro has secured all required environmental permits for the program and has also initiated construction of the 183-G drilling pad, which will support ongoing and future development drilling, particularly targeting updip potential in the Caruaçu trend. In Canada, Alvopetro has also been active, completing the drilling of two additional wells during the quarter. The company now has seven producing wells in the country, delivering average output of approximately 193 barrels of oil per day, further contributing to its diversified production base. On the commercial front, Alvopetro is benefiting from favorable pricing adjustments under its long-term gas sales agreement. Based on current operating metrics and an exchange rate of 5.00 BRL to USD as of April 30, 2026, the company expects a weighted average realized natural gas price of approximately $11.31 per Mcf for the May through July period. Looking further ahead, forecast pricing based on forward Brent crude and Henry Hub benchmarks suggests an increase to approximately $13.06 per Mcf for the August through October 2026 period. Ruttan noted that while realized prices will ultimately depend on currency fluctuations and commodity benchmarks, the current pricing trajectory provides strong support for cash flow generation. Combined with ongoing drilling success and infrastructure expansion in Brazil, Alvopetro remains well positioned to continue executing its growth strategy and enhancing shareholder value. #proactiveinvestors #alvopetroenergyltd #tsxv #alv #otcqx #alvof #OilAndGas #BrazilNaturalGas #EnergyProduction #ReservesUpdate #NaturalGas #BrazilEnergy #OilAndGas #ProductionUpdate #DrillingProgram #EnergyMarkets #Boepd #NaturalGasLiquids #EnergyDevelopment #Infrastructure #CommodityPrices #CashFlow #Upstream #EnergyGrowth
The dominant structural shift addressed is the move of platform vendors away from competing on feature sets toward controlling the governance and billing layer that underpins managed services. This is evident in moves by Microsoft, AWS, and Kaseya, specifically with Microsoft's new licensing tier combining per-seat fees with consumption-based AI add-ons, AWS redefining managed services around agents, and Kaseya introducing action-based pricing for IT management. Analysts noted that these developments collectively place a consumption meter on previously flat-rate services, reconfiguring how MSPs and IT providers will be billed and held accountable. Primary evidence for this shift includes data from Omdia's channel media report and tracked M&A activity within the MSP sector. The report counted 169 MSP acquisitions in 2025, mirroring prior years' activity, yet identified that one acquirer—Evergreen Services Group—accounted for 47 deals, illustrating a concentration in acquisition strategies. Notably, 69% of publicly announced deals involved private equity, with the remainder pursued by independent operators. The North American channel media landscape saw significant contraction, with titles dropping from 29 to 18, despite stability in the global outlet count—attributed to both industry consolidation and AI-driven changes in content discovery. Supporting developments include growing use of AI in content production, leading to declining traffic for B2B publications as audiences increasingly access information through automated tools rather than direct visits. The rise of engagement-focused business models and shifts in acquisition criteria—such as Evergreen targeting founder-led MSPs—underscore evolving buyer strategies. Additionally, platform vendors are restructuring their product and pricing models around agent-driven and action-based billing, while shifting their external positioning to emphasize AI, intelligence, and cyber resilience. Operationally, MSPs and IT leaders face increased pricing and margin variability driven by emerging consumption-based licensing and AI service models. The historical per-user, per-month bundle is at risk as vendors experiment with new billing constructs, exposing providers to cost unpredictability and complicating client contracts. Providers lacking internal engineering or acquisition frameworks may be especially exposed, while consolidation and vendor dependency raise governance and accountability stakes. MSPs pursuing higher margin services, such as compliance or cyber resilience offerings, must prepare for new cost structures and intensifying pressure from both customers and vendors regarding efficiency, pricing, and service outcomes.Supported by: Zero Networks Moovila Upcoming event: The Pivotal Point of IT: Building Services for the AI-First Era Date: May 13 at 1p.m. EDT Register: https://go.acronis.com/davesobelaiera
Interview with Arturo Préstamo Elizondo, Executive Chairman & CEO of Santacruz Silver Mining Ltd.Our previous interview: https://www.cruxinvestor.com/posts/santacruz-silver-mining-tsxvscz-record-results-and-2026-growth-outlook-9889Recording date: 6th May 2026Santacruz Silver Mining is positioning itself as a significantly undervalued player in the global silver sector, according to CEO Arturo Préstamo Elizondo, who argues the company trades at a steep discount to peers across multiple financial metrics. With an enterprise value of about $1 billion, Santacruz is valued at roughly $45 per silver equivalent ounce—far below the peer average of $180—and at around 6x EV/EBITDA compared to 15–20x for comparable companies. Management attributes this gap to temporary factors, including limited trading history on major exchanges, the lingering impact of a 2025 flooding incident at its Bolivar mine, and perceived geopolitical risks tied to its Bolivian operations.Despite these concerns, the company delivered strong financial results in 2025, reporting $326.4 million in revenue, $104.6 million in EBITDA, and $79.1 million in operating cash flow. It also strengthened its balance sheet by eliminating debt and ending the year with $66.7 million in cash. Operationally, Santacruz is advancing key recovery and growth initiatives. The Bolivar mine is on track to resume full silver production by Q3 2026 as dewatering progresses, restoring access to high-grade zones. Meanwhile, infrastructure upgrades at the Zimapán mine are expected to improve throughput and reduce costs.Looking ahead, Santacruz is focused on organic growth, including a new milling facility at San Lucas and development of the Soracaya mine, targeted for late 2026. The company is also enhancing operational efficiency through real-time monitoring systems and may consider share buybacks if its valuation remains depressed. Management believes that upcoming catalysts—such as a planned Toronto Stock Exchange uplisting and potential regulatory reforms in Bolivia—could help close the valuation gap while highlighting the strength of its diversified, multi-mine portfolio.View Santacruz Silver Mining's company profile: https://www.cruxinvestor.com/companies/santacruz-silver-miningSign up for Crux Investor: https://cruxinvestor.com
ng mines in Mexico. Production reflected stable operations at Campo Morado and the continued ramp-up of underground mining and processing activities at Tahuehueto. The company is also engaged in ongoing metallurgical testing to improve recovery rates and future payability for their 5 metals, and 3 concentrates; with an emphasis on gold and silver recoveries. 2025 Highlights Transformational Operational Growth: Tonnes mined and milled increased 53% and 51%, respectively, to 1.01 million tonnes, reflecting higher throughput and improved operational stability across both Campo Morado and Tahuehueto. Strong Multi-Metal Production Growth: Increase throughput resulted in significant growth across key metals, with silver production up 69%, zinc up 72%, lead up 53%, andcopper up 37% compared to 2024. As a result, Luca achieved revised guidance for all metals produced, including payable silver production above the top end of revised guidance. Strategic Investment in Mine Development: Sustaining capital expenditures increased to $27.3 million as the Company accelerated underground development and exploration programs designed to improve mine sequencing, access higher-grade zones, and support long-term production reliability. Strong Financial Performance: Revenue increased 103% to $176.8 million from $87.2 million in 2024, whileAdjusted EBITDA increased 226% to $46.0 million, compared to $14.1 millionin 2024, driven by higher production levels and stronger realized precious metal prices. Significant Balance Sheet Improvement: The Company reduced loans payable from $17.0 million at December 31, 2024 to $3.3 million at December 31, 2025, representing a reduction of more than 80% during the year. As of the date of this MD&A, outstanding loans payable have been further reduced to $1.4 million. Exploration Programs Reinitiated to Support Resource Growth: During 2025, the Company reinitiated exploration activities across its projects for the first time in more than a decade. To date, approximately 30,140 metres of exploration drilling have been completed, improving geological understanding of the deposits, identifying additional mineralized zones, and supporting potential resource expansion. These exploration programs represent an important step towards unlocking additional value within the Company's asset portfolio and establishing a pipeline of future growth opportunities Q1 2026 Operational and Financial Results Update: During the first quarter of 2026, the Company completed approximately 10,058 metres of drilling. Exploration activities were primarily focused on near-mine and resource expansion targets, achieving the objectives of extending mine life and improving production flexibility at the Company's operating assets. Operationally the company was on strong footing, with solid operating performance and strong silver production in a favorable price environment. The Company remained focused on operational improvements at both mines, with particular emphasis on Campo Morado which is moving into an expansion study towards a technical report in the second half of 2026. That company announced on March 9th the appointment of Nick Shakesby as Chief Operating Officer (“COO”), effective April 1, 2026. Luca has also strengthened its technical team to advance and execute on optimization and growth initiatives, including the Campo Morado Expansion. As of March 31, 2026, Luca's cash position increased to approximately $36.4 million, compared to $25.5 million at year-end 2025. The increase was primarily driven by strong operating cash flow, supplemented by approximately $2.1 million in proceeds from warrant and option exercises and net realized gains of approximately $3.6 million from silver call options. These options were implemented to re-establish exposure to silver prices in light of the silver stream at Tahuehueto. As previously disclosed in the Company's Q4/25 financial results, debt has been reduced to approximately $1.4 million, with the remaining balance expected to be fully repaid by mid-2026. Click here to follow the latest news from Luca Mining If you have any question for Dan regarding Luca Mining, then please email those into me at Shad@kereport.com. In full disclosure Shad is a shareholder of Luca Mining at the time of this recording and may choose to buy or sell shares at any time. For more market commentary & interview summaries, subscribe to our Substacks: The KE Report: https://kereport.substack.com/ Shad's resource market commentary: https://excelsiorprosperity.substack.com/ Investment disclaimer: This content is for informational and educational purposes only and does not constitute investment advice, an offer, or a solicitation to buy or sell any security. Investing in equities and commodities involves risk, including the possible loss of principal. Do your own research and consult a licensed financial advisor before making any investment decisions. Guests and hosts may own shares in companies mentioned, and companies profiled may be sponsors of the KE Report.
The structural shift facing MSPs is the rapid movement from the traditional “model era” to the “orchestration era,” driven by accelerated adoption of artificial intelligence (AI) and changing vendor enablement programs. This transition is fueled by companies such as Salesforce and technology directions from hyperscalers, with emerging research from the Futurum Group indicating that AI is not only enabling automation but also redefining service delivery models and expanding the roles required from channel partners. Vendors are continually accelerating product and service updates—cited as multiple releases per year—which is shortening adoption cycles and pressuring MSPs to adapt at a speed not previously required. Primary evidence centers on the introduction of the “Frontier partner” concept, which refers to AI-first, outcome-driven service organizations moving beyond hours-for-dollars into models focused on deep technical co-development with clients. According to research referenced by Tiffani Bova, 85% of MSPs expect AI consulting to be a top growth driver. However, there is a documented gap between expectation and execution, with adoption lagging despite broad anticipation. The episode highlights that small businesses may adopt AI more quickly than large enterprises due to operational flexibility, but both MSPs and clients face substantial risk if internal skills, governance, and data practices do not keep pace. Supporting developments include ongoing commoditization of standardized IT support, as self-healing technologies and direct vendor intervention decrease the margins associated with legacy break-fix and support models. The episode also points to the increasing importance of data quality, governance, and sovereignty as core requirements for realizing value from AI tools. New operational hazards arise around energy consumption for compute, increased complexity from multi-vendor agent orchestration, and persistent risks linked to security governance as clients independently adopt AI solutions—sometimes beyond the reach of MSP controls. Operationally, these shifts increase vendor dependency and drive up the need for continual skills renewal within MSP organizations. Pricing for traditional services faces compression, placing more emphasis on adding value layers such as data orchestration, AI-driven workflow optimization, and governance consulting. Service providers are exposed to heightened contract risk when AI outcomes diverge from human oversight, and are required to implement new governance practices to manage data quality and security concerns. The key risk is that lagging adaptation could convert opportunity into obsolescence, particularly as both vendors and clients accelerate their pace of change. Supported by: ScalePadZero Networks
A structural shift is underway in the managed services sector as venture capital firms move beyond traditional software and vendor investments to fund MSPs directly. This change is exemplified by investments from firms like Andreessen Horowitz, General Catalyst, and Thrive Capital into MSP-specific companies such as Treeline, Titan, and SHIELD. The driving mechanism is the perceived profit potential at the intersection of advanced AI technology and service delivery, with investors targeting AI-native operational models rather than standard rollups or inorganic growth strategies. The episode's primary evidence centers on Andreessen Horowitz's $25 million investment in Treeline, marking its entry alongside previously funded firms Titan (with $74 million from General Catalyst) and SHIELD (over $200 million from Thrive and ZBS Partners). According to Speaker A, Treeline employs proprietary AI-driven service desk automation and reports resolving 98% of help desk requests with AI, altering the economics and labor requirements for traditional MSPs. Unlike rollups, Treeline is focused on organic growth, leveraging targeted acquisitions primarily for talent rather than client base expansion. Supporting developments include the parallel strategies of Titan and SHIELD, which also integrate Silicon Valley AI expertise and homegrown tooling to drive operational efficiency. While these companies currently deploy AI internally for service automation, Treeline distinguishes itself by offering customer-facing AI-powered MDR and compliance services immediately. All three firms reflect the shift towards vertically integrated models where software, service automation, and client-facing solutions are developed and deployed in-house, creating potential competitive pressure for both traditional MSPs and larger private equity-backed consolidators. Operationally, these developments introduce risks around increased pricing pressure, labor model disruption, and a potential skills gap for MSPs reliant on off-the-shelf tooling. The focus on organic growth and deliberate scaling by new entrants like Treeline signals that the transition for incumbents is not immediate, but the need for MSPs to evaluate their AI adoption strategy is acute. Relationships alone are unlikely to differentiate providers in the long term; practical safeguards must include closing operational efficiency gaps, building internal AI capability, and considering cooperative models to maintain autonomy while reducing risk of margin erosion or client loss. Supported by: Zero NetworksCometBackup
The central structural shift examined is the widening disconnect between the vendor-driven narrative of rapid AI monetization and the operational reality faced by MSPs, as exposed by recent research from GTIA and CompTIA. Despite pervasive messaging from technology vendors that AI features are ready for seamless integration and immediate profitability, survey data indicates that most MSPs remain in early adoption stages, lack tangible processes to operationalize AI, and are stymied by workforce and workflow constraints. Supporting evidence is drawn from CompTIA's data showing that 70% of businesses are still in early AI adoption stages, and only 55% of MSPs expect to turn a profit on AI initiatives in the near term—up from 34%, but well below vendor promises. The majority of current AI activity remains at the individual user level rather than embedded in business-wide workflows, restricting quantifiable ROI and limiting the visibility of productivity gains. Both Speaker B and Speaker C emphasized that most MSPs do not yet have the organizational capability or maturity to move beyond experimentation to operational deployment and monetization. Related developments further illustrate this operational gap. Research cited by Speaker B highlights that only a subset of larger MSPs with more resources have been able to achieve early success with AI, while most are still grappling with process integration, pricing strategies, and talent acquisition. Both GTIA and CompTIA reports suggest that optimism among firms about AI's potential is running ahead of genuine structural change, with workforce shortages, undefined internal governance, and difficulties in business model adaptation acting as durable barriers. Market sentiment remains positive, but actual organizational transition lags significantly, especially among smaller MSPs. Operationally, this environment introduces heightened risk for MSPs who overcommit on vendor promises without aligning internal processes, workforce strategy, and governance. Dependencies on vendor-supplied AI tools expose firms to pricing uncertainty and potential margin compression, especially as clients begin questioning the value proposition when human roles are replaced by automation. Without formalized internal AI governance and skill development, most MSPs face mounting challenges in demonstrating measurable ROI, adapting delivery models, and sustaining service margins. The implication for decision-makers is the need for prudent, phased adoption—prioritizing internal process maturity and realistic expectations over rapid adoption in response to vendor pressure. Supported by: CometBackUpTimeZest
Ariana Resources PLC (AIM:AAU, ASX:AA2, FRA:4A6) managing director Kerim Sener talked with Proactive's Stephen Gunnion about the company's 2025 results, funding position, and progress across its key gold projects, including Dokwe and Tavşan. Sener outlined a “very pleasing end to the year,” highlighting a stronger cash position following an investment from Xinhai, leaving the company with approximately £5.4 million in cash. He explained that Ariana is now “adequately provided for through the duration of the coming year and the feasibility study on Dokwe,” positioning the company to advance one of its most important growth assets. The discussion also addressed the reported shift from profit to loss, which Sener clarified was “a paper treatment only,” driven by a non-cash accounting adjustment related to the valuation of its investment in Zenit. Operationally, the Dokwe project continues to deliver encouraging exploration results. Sener pointed to strong drilling intercepts, including “4m at about 17g per ton of gold,” which demonstrate newly identified extensions of mineralisation and support the potential for a future resource upgrade. Further drilling and metallurgical work are planned in the coming months. Meanwhile, the Tavşan mine has entered production and is expected to begin contributing dividend flow during the year, supporting Ariana Resources PLC's broader growth strategy. Sener also emphasised that the company is “very well funded through the course of this year,” with additional financial and technical backing from Xinhai helping to advance feasibility work. For more videos like this, visit Proactive's YouTube channel, like this video, subscribe to the channel, and enable notifications so you never miss an update. #ArianaResources #GoldExploration #MiningStocks #DokweProject #GoldDrilling #TavsanMine #ASX #LSE #MiningNews #ResourceInvesting #GoldMining #ExplorationUpdate #SmallCapStocks #InvestorNews
The dominant structural shift highlighted is the movement of value from AI-driven features to the ownership and governance of the control plane—specifically, entities that set boundaries, maintain proof, and keep automated workflows within defined limits. This shift is evidenced by workforce polling from Quinnipiac University, business formation trends tracked by the Bank of America Institute and Census Bureau data, and product launches from vendors like TeamViewer and KnowBefore. These developments underscore a growing reliance on automation where traditional human oversight is minimized, and technology increasingly assumes direct control over work execution. The episode details workforce sentiment, citing a Quinnipiac University poll where only 15% of respondents expressed willingness to work for an AI boss, and 70% anticipated AI would reduce job opportunities. Bank of America Institute data notes a 15% year-over-year increase in high propensity businesses—those likely to launch—while businesses planning to hire have fallen by 4%. TeamViewer has introduced TIA Reporting, which generates dashboards via natural language prompts, reducing specialist requirements. KnowBefore's ADA Orchestration automates security awareness scheduling and execution, reportedly shortening setup times from hours to seconds. These examples show how vendors are deploying AI tools that replace specific manual oversight with algorithmic management. Supporting developments reinforce the governance gap. According to a CIO Dive report, 96% of C-suite leaders expect productivity gains from AI, yet 77% of employees report increased workloads, signaling misalignment between leadership intent and actual outcomes. Tech Bullion reveals 60% of organizations have AI integrated in at least one core function, with 65% using generative AI regularly, but fewer than a quarter have operationalized ethical AI frameworks. The Verge covers enhancements to Anthropics' tools that embed guardrails where organizational controls are lacking. Additional survey data from TechCrunch shows that usage of AI is growing while trust in its outputs remains weak; only 24% of respondents trust AI most of the time. Operationally, the implication is clear for MSPs and IT leaders: as organizations reduce human oversight and delegate more work to automation, the auditability, accountability, and control of automated workflows become direct contractual risk. Control layers—such as logging, exception handling, approval thresholds—must be productized and priced, not treated as informal advisory work. Liability for automation failures must be clearly assigned and managed through contractual terms, with automation incident response separated from standard support. Without enforceable governance and evidence of control, MSPs risk absorbing unpaid remediation work as clients expect both automation benefits and assurance of outcome. 00:00 Bossless Workforce 03:22 AI, No Guardrails 05:45 Govern or Absorb 08:41 Why Do We Care? Supported by: Nerdio HaloPSA
Arrow Exploration CEO Marshall Abbott joined Steve Darling from Proactive to provide an operational update and share results from the company's 2025 year-end reserves evaluation conducted by Boury Global Energy Consultants. The report highlights steady operational performance, with a significant portion of Arrow's annual production successfully replaced through its 2025 drilling campaign. Management noted that the evaluation incorporates conservative oil price assumptions, which impact both valuation metrics and reserves classification. A key factor in the reserves outlook is the status of the Tapir block contract in Colombia. The 1P reserves assume the contract expires in May 2028, while 2P and 3P reserves reflect the potential granting of one and two additional five-year extension periods, respectively. Arrow said it continues to engage with regulators and remains confident that these extensions will be approved. Operationally, continued success at the Mateguafa Attic field is driving both production and reserve growth. The recently drilled Mateguafa 11 (M-11) well reached a total measured depth of 11,455 feet and encountered oil-bearing sands in the C7 and C9 Carbonera formations. The well intersected 18 feet of net pay in the C7 zone and 30 feet in the C9 zone. The company plans to perforate and initially produce from the C7 formation, with first production expected in the coming weeks. Notably, M-11 encountered these zones at structurally higher positions than previous wells, extending the known Mateguafa Attic structure to the south and opening additional development opportunities. Building on this success, Arrow plans to drill a horizontal development well, M-12Hz, targeting the C9 formation, with spudding expected by the end of March. Following this, the drilling rig will move to the Icaco pad to test the Icaco 1 exploration well. Arrow reported current corporate production of approximately 5,325 barrels of oil equivalent per day, with further increases anticipated as M-11 comes online. Overall, the company sees continued upside across its Colombian asset base, supported by ongoing drilling success, expanding resource potential, and positive discussions regarding the Tapir license #proactiveinvestors #arrowexplorationinc #aim #axl #tsxv #axl #ColombiaEnergy #MarshallAbbott #Mateguafa #LlanosBasin #ColombiaOil #OilProduction #HorizontalDrilling #UpstreamOil #EnergyDevelopment #CarboneraFormation #OperationalUpdate #OilAndGas #ProductionGrowth #EnergyInvesting
The episode reveals a structural shift in the managed services market, where the value proposition for MSPs and IT service providers is moving away from “running the tools” to delivering governance, risk management, and outcome-driven services. This shift is catalyzed by the increasing commoditization of tool-centric operations, as platforms and vendors such as Microsoft (Autopatch), Atera (autonomous agents), Summit Holdings (MSP as a service), and Ruest (RoboRoosty AI Workflow Builder) push standardized automation, workflow tools, and backend service packaging into the market. Cisco's Global State of Security report underscores this trend, identifying tool maintenance and fragmentation as primary sources of inefficiency. Evidence from Cisco shows 59% of security leaders pointing to tool maintenance as the chief inefficiency, with 78% citing tool dispersion and lack of integration. For MSPs, this results in growing unbillable labor spent on connecting systems, onboarding, retraining, and managing exceptions. The report indicates that the cost to deliver services is escalating faster than the value captured in contracts, exposing a margin squeeze and highlighting the risk that unmanaged operational complexity poses to profitability. Secondary developments reinforce the structural shift. Atera's no-ticket operational model and Microsoft's implementation of security updates through Intune and Autopatch transfer control and cadence of IT operations upstream, leaving MSPs responsible for policy exceptions and business risk translation rather than day-to-day execution. Summit Holdings' “MSP as a service” and D&H's expansion into enablement and training further commoditize backend functions, reducing differentiation for providers who fail to retain independent client intelligence and risk management. Operationally, the implications for MSPs and IT leaders are clear: dependency on vendor platforms and wholesale backend solutions increases, making risk ownership and client-specific intelligence the remaining sources of defensible value. Providers unable to price or document governance and exception management risk seeing margins erode as they absorb unbillable labor and liability. Future operational strategy will require clear mapping of tools to billable outcomes, explicit governance layers, and careful evaluation of which client insights remain uniquely held versus replicated across standardized platforms. Three things to know today 00:00 Tools vs Outcomes 02:50 Delivery Gets Packaged 05:17 Defaults Have Costs 07:42 Why Do We Care? Supported by: TimeZest Small Biz Thoughts Community
A structural shift is occurring in the managed IT services landscape as AI capabilities are rapidly embedded across enterprise applications, with oversight and risk management functions increasingly separated out and monetized as add-on services. Vendors, including Microsoft and OpenAI, are deploying AI agents in essential tools such as Outlook, Teams, and Excel, then selling governance, security, and compliance capabilities as additional paid layers. The core mechanism is the transfer of operational and liability risk downstream to IT service providers and their clients, while ownership of the control plane and margin on risk mitigation remain with the vendors. The episode highlights consequential findings regarding AI reliability and adoption. A Nature Medicine study found that OpenAI's ChatGPT Health underestimated emergency severity in 51.6% of cases, prompting concerns about overreliance on AI for critical decisions. Additionally, Confluent's UK executive survey indicated that 62% of organizations are already shifting decision-making to AI, but only 7% have a company-wide AI strategy, and fewer than half of executives and employees agree on actual daily AI usage. Most leaders receive little formal AI training yet are second-guessing their own judgment in favor of AI output. Further reinforcing the governance gap, Microsoft is launching Agent 365 and new enterprise security tiers, while OpenAI's acquisition of Promptfoo signals a focus on AI reliability testing and compliance monitoring. Funding for GRC platforms like IntelliGRC demonstrates capital flowing into third-party oversight solutions. The recurring pattern is vendors first pushing broad agent adoption, then introducing and monetizing governance as a discrete add-on, often outside the default package. Operationally, MSPs and IT leaders face increased liability exposure if they rely on vendor-native governance without independent audit or measurement capability. The absence of industry-standard reliability metrics for AI, combined with the perception and usage gaps inside organizations, calls for MSPs to lead in auditing, documenting, and independently measuring AI usage and performance. Failing to proactively manage these controls can result in silent risk absorption and unfavorable positioning as vendors bundle compliance and pass residual risk downstream to service providers. Three things to know today 00:00 AI vs. Judgment 02:35 Agents vs. Oversight 04:04 AI Reliability Gap 05:15 Why Do We Care? Supported by: ScalePad
What separates elite contractors from the rest?In this episode of Built-In, Scott Winstead sits down with FMI Partner Scott Kimpland to unpack the fundamentals behind operational excellence in construction. From disciplined project selection and bid-day cost accuracy to labor productivity tracking and process compliance, Scott shares practical insights drawn from decades advising top-performing firms.They discuss why chasing revenue can backfire, how two bad projects can erase a year's profit, and why labor—not overhead—is the number leaders must obsess over. If you want to protect margin, improve field performance and build a culture of continuous improvement, this episode is for you.
The episode centers on a structural governance gap within the managed services industry as it attempts to address mental health using relationship-driven models typical of event and community management. This approach is exemplified by the launch of MSPWell, a not-for-profit mental wellness initiative incorporated in Ontario, Canada, targeting participants in the IT channel. The initiative operates as a live community—particularly via Discord—without formalized clinical oversight or published operational guardrails such as moderation standards, crisis escalation protocols, or sponsor influence controls. Evidence for an urgent governance concern is provided by industry data and operational decisions. According to MSPWell, burnout affects significant percentages of the workforce—citing an 82% burnout risk from a Mercer report and 66% from separate research. Despite the recurrence of staffing challenges in the MSP industry, MSPWell's infrastructure is underway with participation at industry events and vendor sponsorship, but formal governance documentation remains incomplete. The initiative explicitly confirms the absence of licensed mental health professionals in published leadership or advisory roles, positioning its support as peer-led. Supporting developments highlight how rapid community launch and sponsor-driven funding amplify risks when core protections are missing. Early coverage focused on recognizable names and event presence, while Dave Sobel emphasizes that, in mental health-adjacent contexts, moderation, privacy, and escalation protocols are not only differentiators but essential safeguards. At present, MSPWell's Discord community operates without visible guidelines or documented procedures, which exposes participants to predictable failure modes such as oversharing, privacy breaches, and harmful peer advice. Operationally, MSPs and IT service providers face heightened liability when participating in or supporting such initiatives without robust controls. Dave Sobel advises operators to request moderation, crisis, and data retention policies before endorsing participation, to treat involvement as networking rather than clinical support, and to monitor for the integration of licensed professionals into governance. The absence of enforceable governance exposes both individuals and sponsoring vendors to reputational and legal risk, and sets problematic precedent for future wellness platforms in the industry. 00:00 MSPWell Builds Mental-Health Platform on Sponsor-Funded Community Model 03:21 Guardrails, Guidelines, and Moderation 06:15 The Consequences 08:09 Why Do We Care? & What to Consider Supported by: TimeZest
The episode centers on the federal government's evolving approach to AI vendor governance, underscored by the recent directive from President Donald Trump for federal agencies to halt the use of Anthropic's AI technology. This shift follows the Pentagon's termination of its relationship with Anthropic over the company's refusal to relax contract restrictions around citizen data and autonomous weapons, ultimately resulting in Anthropic being designated as a “supply chain risk” by Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth. For MSPs and IT providers serving federal and SLED clients, this designation functions as an immediate procurement barrier rather than a negotiable label, directly impacting vendor eligibility and contract continuity. Contextually, 70% of federal agencies are reassessing their use of AI tools amid fluid regulations and heightened concerns around transparency and accountability, according to recent reports. The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) has launched the AI Agent Standards Initiative, but enforcement is several years away, with only a request for information planned by March 2026. In parallel, a diplomatic initiative led by Secretary of State Marco Rubio opposes international regulations on foreign data handling, though this stance does not supersede foreign law, creating a complex compliance landscape, especially for multinationals. Meanwhile, the U.S. Supreme Court's refusal to hear an AI copyright case reaffirms the lack of copyright protection for purely AI-generated works. The episode also discusses OpenAI's agreement with the Pentagon, described by CEO Sam Altman as "rushed," and criticized for permitting domestic surveillance under flexible legal interpretations. Public and employee backlash prompted OpenAI to revise contract terms, but critics argue essential permission structures remain. Anthropic's rollout of an AI migration feature during this period is flagged as a compliance event, raising risk when transferring data histories across vendor boundaries without audit or logging. Notably, consumer responses to AI vendor practices—evidenced by surges in Claude signups and ChatGPT uninstalls—are now influencing enterprise technology procurement as values-based purchasing enters the operational conversation for service providers. Operationally, the lack of a stable legislative or regulatory framework means MSPs and their clients face rapidly shifting governance through contract terms and procurement policy rather than law. The episode cautions that vendor selection cannot be guided by assumptions of ethical safeguards in provider policies or by default transitions to alternative vendors such as OpenAI, whose legal standing remains unsettled. Key recommendations include auditing client environments for exposure to designated supply chain risks, refraining from rigid vendor integrations, updating contractual IP language in light of the absence of AI copyright, and maintaining ongoing awareness of governance developments. Multi-vendor strategies and adaptable compliance positions are identified as essential risk mitigation practices in an environment marked by administrative fiat and reactive vendor positions. Three things to know today 00:00 Anthropic Blacklisted After Rejecting Pentagon's Autonomous Weapons Data Demands 04:58 OpenAI Wins Federal AI Contract Anthropic Refused, Then Rewrites It Under Pressure 07:38 Anthropic Outages Hit as Claude Sign-Ups Quadruple, ChatGPT Uninstalls Surge 295% Supported by: ScalePadSmall Biz Thoughts Community
Interview with Joseph Ovsenek, President & CEO of P2 Gold Inc.Our previous interview: https://www.cruxinvestor.com/posts/p2-gold-tsxvpgld-all-known-questions-answered-february-2026-9351Recording date: 1st March 2026P2 Gold Inc. is entering a milestone-driven phase as it advances its Gabbs Project in Nevada through drilling, feasibility work, and permitting. The company's stated objective is to complete a feasibility study by the end of 2026 and position the project for potential construction in 2027.Gabbs is located in Nevada, one of the most established gold-producing jurisdictions globally. The state offers regulatory predictability, developed infrastructure, and a long history of mine development. For investors, jurisdictional stability remains a central consideration, particularly at a time when permitting delays and regulatory changes have affected projects in other regions.Operationally, 2026 is expected to deliver several key catalysts. The company has expanded its drill program to approximately 25,000–30,000 metres, supporting both infill and step-out objectives. Results to date have been reported as consistent with expectations, and the data will feed into an updated mineral resource estimate anticipated by the end of summer 2026. This updated resource will underpin the feasibility study.The 2025 Preliminary Economic Assessment outlined a 9 million tonne per year operation producing roughly 110,000 ounces of gold and 33 million pounds of copper annually over a 14-year mine life. Management is currently evaluating increasing throughput to 12 million tonnes per year. If supported by resource growth and economic analysis, this could lift annual gold production toward 150,000 ounces, with copper output potentially rising to 45–50 million pounds per year.Permitting is recognized as the project's critical path. The company has filed its Mining Plan of Operations with the U.S. Bureau of Land Management and has initiated baseline environmental studies in advance of final requirements. This proactive approach is intended to reduce schedule risk and align permitting timelines with feasibility completion.From a valuation perspective, P2 Gold's market capitalization of approximately C$225–250 million reflects its status as a mid-stage developer. Successful delivery of a feasibility study, continued de-risking, and measurable permitting progress may support valuation reassessment, particularly given the limited number of advanced-stage development projects of comparable scale in Nevada.Investors evaluating P2 Gold should monitor the delivery of the updated resource estimate, feasibility cost assumptions relative to prevailing gold and copper prices, and permitting progress. As the project transitions from development toward construction readiness, execution against stated milestones will be central to investment performance.Overall, P2 Gold's investment case rests on advancing a scalable Nevada gold-copper project through defined technical and regulatory milestones within a supportive commodity environment.View P2 Gold's company profile: https://www.cruxinvestor.com/companies/p2-goldSign up for Crux Investor: https://cruxinvestor.com
Nine years ago, Tiffany Casica helped a close friend buy his first condo. He was young and eager to invest, and today he owns several properties and still texts her about the next deal. That first transaction didn't just close a sale; it clarified the kind of real estate professional she intended to become.Raised in Bridgeport on Chicago's south side, Tiffany describes her brand with a simple phrase: “Everyone's got a guy for everything.” That mindset became her strategic advantage. She built a trusted network across industries, from inspectors and attorneys to stagers and pest control specialists, so when a client faces a problem, she already has the solution lined up.Before entering real estate full time, Tiffany worked as a paralegal handling transactions, which gave her a working knowledge of contracts, timelines, and risk management. Buying a home is emotional, but it is also technical and highly regulated. She combines empathy with structure, explaining, “I've always just been that hand holder,” especially during moments when clients feel overwhelmed.Her growth strategy is disciplined and clear. One hundred percent of her business is referral-based, with no paid ads or purchased leads. “It's important that my referral source is from another client who has worked with me, who has vetted me,” she says, a model that demands consistent performance because every deal impacts the next introduction.Tiffany operates across Chicago and the western suburbs, two markets with very different dynamics. In the suburbs, limited inventory means buyers often compete against four to eight offers, while city properties require precise pricing and positioning. Rather than restrict herself geographically, she adapts to her clients' goals, explaining, “I learned the area in which my clients want to buy or sell in because at the end of the day, I'm serving my client.”Her daily routine reflects that level of commitment. She begins with meditation and prayer, prepares breakfast for her five-and-a-half-year-old son, and fits in yoga before a schedule packed with showings, inspections, and appraisals. She jokes about living on pretzels and string cheese in her car, but the underlying message is clear: service requires stamina.Operationally, she multiplies her effectiveness through relationships. Her husband, an engineer with more than 20 years of experience, is now training as a home inspector, which adds technical depth when inspection reports reveal issues like mold or structural concerns. In one high-stress situation involving a bat in a client's fireplace hours before a brokers open, she called her cousin who owns a pest control company and resolved the issue quickly, preserving the listing and the timeline.The “Miss Concierge” label is not marketing language; it represents a system built on trusted resources and strong industry relationships. Tiffany views other brokers as teammates rather than competitors and protects referral partnerships by acting transparently. That reputation reinforces her referral engine and positions her as a reliable collaborator in complex transactions.For professionals entering real estate today, her advice centers on identity and integrity. “Be yourself. I think integrity matters more than anything,” she says, encouraging new agents to identify their strengths and specialize, whether that is marketing, serving elderly clients, or guiding first-time buyers. She continues investing in staging education and consistently hires professional stagers because she believes buyers need to feel the home immediately to justify top-dollar offers.What ultimately differentiates Tiffany is relational depth across generations. An 82-year-old client who downsized still stays in touch, while a 24-year-old investor calls about his next acquisition, illustrating that trust scales when service is consistent. She does not avoid difficult conversations either, noting, “I would rather have that tough conversation with you early on than set you up for failure down the road,” a philosophy that protects clients' time, money, and expectations.Tiffany is proud of her production, but she is equally proud of being a present wife and mother while running a demanding practice. “I'm really good at making people feel special,” she says, and in a referral-driven business, that skill becomes a durable competitive advantage.
Kodal Minerals PLC (AIM:KOD) CEO Bernard Aylward talked with Proactive's Stephen Gunnion about the company's latest operational progress at the Bougouni Lithium Project in Mali, ongoing shipments to China, and the newly announced arbitration process relating to a US$15 million payment connected to a 2024 agreement with the Mali government. Aylward explained that Kodal entered arbitration following discussions with joint venture partner Hainan Mining Co. Ltd regarding an indemnity claim under the existing financing agreement. He stated that the parties hold “diametrically opposed views” and said the company is comfortable allowing a third party to reach a decision while discussions continue during the arbitration process. Despite the dispute, Aylward emphasised that the underlying partnership remains strong, with both parties committed to advancing Bougouni, including planning for stage two development and a significant 2026 work programme involving drilling and engineering studies. Operationally, Bougouni is performing well. The company recently completed its second shipment, receiving an initial 95% payment of just under US$24 million for nearly 20,000 tonnes of spodumene concentrate. A third shipment is anticipated in late March or early April. Aylward stressed, “We're selling into a very high price, lithium market, and our product is in strong demand,” noting that Hainan Mining is keen to secure as much product as possible. He added that mining, processing, and logistics are progressing smoothly, with product being transported to port, shipped to China, and generating revenue. For more updates on Kodal Minerals PLC and other resource sector developments, visit Proactive's YouTube channel, give this video a like, subscribe to the channel, and enable notifications so you don't miss future content. #KodalMinerals #BernardAylward #BougouniLithium #LithiumMarket #MaliMining #Spodumene #LithiumPrices #MiningNews #ResourceStocks #HainanMining #BatteryMetals #ProactiveInvestors
Episode Overview:In this episode, Alex Rawlings speaks with Richard Fitzgerald of CapitalSpring, a private equity firm specializing in foodservice and multi-location consumer businesses. Richard shares insights into CapitalSpring's differentiated, sector-focused approach, how they've scaled over 20 years, and the recent $1B+ exit to Bain Capital. He also unpacks their latest fundraising success in a tough market and the importance of specialization in today's crowded PE landscape.Timestamps & Key Topics:00:00 – Introduction Overview of CapitalSpring's focus and two key topics: fundraising success and a $1B+ exit.00:54 – Richard's Background From investment banking to founding CapitalSpring in 2005 with a sector-specialist mindset.03:19 – Why Multi-Location Businesses? Opportunities found on Main Street—resilient, everyday consumer services often overlooked in PE.04:43 – Starting Small, Scaling Big CapitalSpring began with $3M; now 300 investments and $4B deployed across 100+ brands.06:30 – Specialization as a Differentiator Why generalist firms struggle, and how deep focus wins deals without being the highest bidder.08:55 – $1B+ Exit: Sizzling Platter to Bain Capital Growth from 400 to 800+ locations across multiple brands and markets, despite COVID headwinds.14:03 – Key Learning: Labor-Light Models Pandemic emphasized the value of operational efficiency and low labor reliance in QSR investments.15:27 – Fund VII: First Close Success How CapitalSpring raised in a tough market by showcasing portfolio resilience and a hybrid debt/equity model.17:44 – Hybrid Capital Strategy Flexibility to invest via debt, equity, or both—offering solutions to founders and mitigating risk for LPs.20:04 – Book Recommendation: Give and Take by Adam Grant The power of relationships in PE—not just financial modeling.21:57 – Connect with Richard Email: rfitzgerald@capitalspring.com | LinkedIn & website via CapitalSpring.Top Takeaways:Specialization is key in today's competitive PE environment.Hybrid investing (debt + equity) offers flexibility and downside protection.Operationally light, multi-unit businesses prove resilient—even in crises.Long-term success in PE depends on relationships, not just technical skills.Raw Selection partners with Private Equity firms and their portfolio companies to secure exceptional executive talent. We focus on de-risking executive recruitment through meticulous search and selection processes, ensuring top-tier performance and long-term success.
“Serosanguineous Drainage in Modern Wound Care: Clinical Meaning, Operational Strategy, and Market Implications” isn't about basic definitions. It's about interpretation, precision, and performance.Clinically, serosanguineous drainage represents the delicate balance between inflammation and early tissue repair — a transitional phase where vigilance determines trajectory. Too much? Red flag. Too little? Also a question. Context is everything.Operationally, it drives decision-making. Dressing selection. Change frequency. Documentation standards. Supply chain forecasting. When clinicians interpret drainage correctly, outcomes improve and unnecessary costs drop. That's not theory — that's workflow intelligence.From a market standpoint, the conversation expands further. Advanced dressings, data-driven wound assessment tools, remote monitoring, and value-based reimbursement models all hinge on accurate interpretation of wound exudate characteristics. What looks like a minor clinical detail becomes a measurable performance metric in an outcomes-driven healthcare economy.In other words: drainage isn't just fluid — it's data.The future of wound care belongs to organizations that treat every clinical indicator as both a healing marker and a strategic lever.#WoundCareInnovation #HealthcareStrategy #ClinicalLeadership #ValueBasedCare #MedicalTechnology #HealthEconomics #AdvancedWoundCare #HealthcareOperations #MedTechInsights #QualityImprovement #EvidenceBasedPractice #HealthcareTrends
“Serosanguineous Drainage in Modern Wound Care: Clinical Meaning, Operational Strategy, and Market Implications” isn't about basic definitions. It's about interpretation, precision, and performance.Clinically, serosanguineous drainage represents the delicate balance between inflammation and early tissue repair — a transitional phase where vigilance determines trajectory. Too much? Red flag. Too little? Also a question. Context is everything.Operationally, it drives decision-making. Dressing selection. Change frequency. Documentation standards. Supply chain forecasting. When clinicians interpret drainage correctly, outcomes improve and unnecessary costs drop. That's not theory — that's workflow intelligence.From a market standpoint, the conversation expands further. Advanced dressings, data-driven wound assessment tools, remote monitoring, and value-based reimbursement models all hinge on accurate interpretation of wound exudate characteristics. What looks like a minor clinical detail becomes a measurable performance metric in an outcomes-driven healthcare economy.In other words: drainage isn't just fluid — it's data.The future of wound care belongs to organizations that treat every clinical indicator as both a healing marker and a strategic lever.#WoundCareInnovation #HealthcareStrategy #ClinicalLeadership #ValueBasedCare #MedicalTechnology #HealthEconomics #AdvancedWoundCare #HealthcareOperations #MedTechInsights #QualityImprovement #EvidenceBasedPractice #HealthcareTrends
EnWave Corporation CEO Brent Charleton joined Steve Darling from Proactive to discuss the company's financial results for the first quarter ended December 31, 2025, highlighting revenue growth, rising royalties, and improved margins compared to the same period last year. The company reported higher Q1 revenue year-over-year, driven primarily by large-scale machine sales and increased royalty income. During the quarter, EnWave commissioned one large-scale machine and completed the fabrication of two additional large-scale machines under contract, contributing to the revenue uplift. Charleton noted that royalties—excluding exclusivity payments—increased by 18% compared to the same quarter in the prior year. Total reported royalty revenue for Q1 2026 rose 12% year-over-year. The growth was attributed to a combination of factors, including an expanding base of royalty partners, increased product sales, higher partner production volumes, and exclusivity payments recognized during the quarter. Profitability metrics also improved meaningfully. Gross margin for Q1 2026 reached 37%, up from 29% in the three months ended Q1 2025. Management attributed the margin expansion to a stronger contribution from higher-margin royalty revenue as well as the production mix of large-scale machines at various stages of fabrication and commissioning. Operationally, the quarter included several strategic milestones, with EnWave signing new contracts across multiple jurisdictions, including North Queensland, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States. The company said these agreements further expand its global footprint and reinforce demand for its proprietary dehydration technology platform. #proactiveinvestors #enwavecorporation #tsxv #enw #EarningsReport #RevenueGrowth #RoyaltyRevenue #MarginExpansion #DehydrationTechnology #FoodTech #IndustrialInnovation #MachineSales #GlobalExpansion #AustraliaBusiness #NewZealandBusiness #USBusiness #TechCommercialization #ManufacturingGrowth #IPLicensing #OperationalMilestones
The Voyager and Super Voyager trains are one of the least loved on Britain's railway. But why is that? Operationally and mechanically, they are robust, reliable and capable. And they're super quick too! Reasons for their unloved status may include their interiors and their underfloor engines. Opinions will always differ on such things. Where opinions differ far less is that their interiors are tatty and tired. Well, that's about to change. On 10 February we were invited to the launch of the first refurbished Voyager at Alstom's Derby Litchurch Lane site. And we rather like it. It's functional rather than fancy, but actually, that's exactly what is needed right now. We spoke to Managing Director of CrossCountry Trains, Shiona Rolfe, had a good look round the train inside to check out the new features and came away looking forward to seeing the first of these refurbished Voyagers in service as soon as possible!Membership: If you want to see even more from Green Signals, including exclusive content, become a member and support the channel further too.YouTube -https://www.youtube.com/@GreenSignals/joinPatreon -https://www.patreon.com/GreenSignalsGreen Signals: Website -http://www.greensignals.orgMerchandise - http://greensignals.etsy.comNewsletter -http://www.greensignals.org/#mailing-listFollow: X (Twitter) -https://twitter.com/greensignallers LinkedIn -https://www.linkedin.com/company/green-signals-productions-ltdImportant Notes:The views and opinions expressed by any guests or interviewees on this channel / podcast are strictly their own and should not be assumed to reflect those of the hosts, the management or the Directors of Green Signals.The Green Signals podcast should not be considered professional advice, and listeners should consult appropriate and qualified professionals for advice tailored to their specific needs.The Green Signals podcast and YouTube channel is provided ‘as is' and none of Green Signals Productions Limited, its Directors, hosts or management are liable for any damages in any form arising from the use of or reliance on any advertisement, product, service mentioned or any discussion about any matter.None of Green Signals Productions Limited, its Directors, its hosts or its management are responsible for any third party advertiser content, claims or representations. The views, opinions or claims of any advertiser or commercial third party that may from time to time appear on, or be referenced by us, in any of our podcast shows or videos should not be taken to reflect our own views or opinions in any way.
Hello, hello — and welcome back to Greedy Bitch, the podcast for groomers who are done apologizing for wanting more. I'm your host, River Lee — founder of The Savvy Groomer — and today's episode is perfectly timed for February. Because it's the month of love… and I want to talk about who you're actually in a relationship with in your business. Not your partner. Not your dog. Your clients. Because here's the thing no one tells groomers early enough: You can be booked solid. You can be making money. You can look “successful” from the outside. …and still quietly dread your day-to-day life. And most of the time, that doesn't come from grooming itself. It comes from the relationships you've built your business on. So today, we're talking about: Fling clients Ideal clients And soulmate clients And how falling in love with your clients doesn't mean being softer, nicer, or more accommodating. It means building a business that actually loves you back. Let's talk about fling clients. And before anyone feels called out, I want to be very clear: Most groomers did not choose fling clients on purpose. We were taught to accept them. Early in our careers, the message was: Say yes. Take what you can get. Be grateful for every client. And in the beginning, that makes sense. You're building. You're learning. You're trying to survive. But somewhere along the way, temporary clients became the foundation of permanent businesses. And that's where things start to hurt. Fling clients are the clients who: Book once and disappear Only show up when they're desperate Don't read your policies Don't remember your boundaries And don't feel invested in you They're not bad people. They're just not committed. Here are a few grooming-specific examples — and I want you to notice how your body reacts as I say them. The once-a-year doodle. They promise they'll be on a schedule… but you don't hear from them again until the dog is matted and they're panicking. The “can you squeeze me in?” client. Not because of an emergency — but because they waited too long and now it's suddenly your problem. The client who disappears the moment you enforce a boundary. You correct pickup time. You enforce a matting policy. You raise prices. And suddenly? Gone. These are fling clients. And here's the part most groomers don't realize until they're exhausted: Fling clients are expensive. Financially, they: Create gaps in your schedule Require re-education every visit Take more time than they're priced for Emotionally, they: Keep you on edge Create resentment Require constant mental energy Operationally, they: Create chaos Make staffing harder Make income unpredictable And the sneakiest part? You start reshaping your business around them. You loosen policies. You over-explain. You hesitate to raise prices. You make exceptions “just this once.” That's not love. That's survival mode. Fling clients are not the problem — expecting commitment from them is. Now let's talk about ideal clients. These are the clients most groomers think they want. They show up. They pay. They're polite. They mostly follow the rules. They're… fine. Ideal clients feel safe. They don't cause drama. They don't stress you out the way fling clients do. But here's the truth that doesn't get said enough: Ideal clients often represent a comfort ceiling. They keep your business running — but not necessarily growing. You still remind them. You still explain policies. You still manage expectations. Let's compare this for a moment. An ideal client: Asks questions about price Occasionally forgets policies Needs reminders Refers people similar to them A soulmate client: Accepts pricing without debate Respects systems Follows policies automatically Refers people who already trust you Ideal clients keep you busy. Soulmate clients make things easier. This is why so many grooming businesses plateau. They're not failing. They're not doing anything wrong. They've just built a business around “good enough.” And if you've ever thought: “I should be happier than I am with this…” That's usually why. Let's clear something up right now. Soulmate clients do not magically find you because you're nice, talented, or have good vibes. That idea keeps groomers waiting instead of building. Soulmate clients are created through systems. Clear messaging. Strong onboarding. Consistent policies. And follow-through. Soulmate clients don't require convincing. They trust your expertise. They understand how your business works. Every boundary you hold does two things: It repels a fling client… and signals safety to a soulmate client. People who value professionalism are attracted to structure. People who want exceptions are repelled by it. That's not a flaw. That's a filter. Soulmate clients: Respect your time Trust your recommendations Follow your systems Refer people just like them And here's the part I really want you to hear: You don't need more clients. You need better-aligned ones. When groomers shift toward soulmate clients, we see: Smaller schedules Higher income Better retention Less burnout More predictability Business stops feeling chaotic and starts feeling calm. And that's not luck. That's alignment. If you're listening and thinking, “Why does this feel so hard for me?” Here's the truth: No one taught us this. Most groomers were trained in: Safety. Technique. Breed patterns. Not client alignment. Not onboarding. Not de-alignment. So when things feel messy, we internalize it. We think: “I'm bad with people.” “I hate clients.” “This is just how grooming is.” No. You're not bad at clients. You're under-supported. Client alignment is a business skill, not a personality trait. And skills can be learned. Practiced. Refined. When you stop blaming yourself and start building systems, everything changes. If this episode hit close to home, that discomfort isn't failure. It's awareness. Most groomers didn't intentionally build businesses that drain them. It happened slowly. Quietly. One “yes” at a time. And once you see the difference between fling clients, ideal clients, and soulmate clients — you can't unsee it. Falling in love with your clients doesn't mean overgiving. It means alignment. Clarity. Respect. And that doesn't happen by accident. That's why I created the Business Workshop Library. Inside, you'll find on-demand workshops like: Identifying & Attracting Your Soulmate Clients Onboarding Clients & Dealing With Difficult Clients Once-A-Year Clients and whether they belong in your business at all ✨ It's $200 for the year ✨ Or $50 a month You can watch at your own pace, revisit when needed, and apply what you learn to your real business. And if you're looking for ongoing support instead of one-off fixes, that's exactly what the Savvy Groomer Circle is for. Inside the Circle, you get continued education, monthly Q&As, real-time conversations, and support as you actively implement boundaries, policies, and systems in your business — not just think about them. And for those of you who want deeper access and closer support, the Inner Circle gives you just that — including direct access to me so you're never figuring this out alone. You can learn more and join at savvygroomer.com/membership If you're ready to stop building your business around flings and start intentionally creating alignment, you'll find the Business Workshop Library at savvygroomer.com/gwg As always — stay savvy, stay greedy, and never apologize for wanting more.
This episode continues our two-part series on the law firm merger decision. In Part 1, Steve and Daniel explored how to determine whether merging is the right move. In Part 2, the focus turns to execution and what actually makes a law firm merger succeed. On this episode of Great Practice, Great Life, Steve Riley is joined by Molly Sasso, Christie Guerrero, Jay Henderlite, and Atticus Practice Advisor Daniel Struna for a candid breakdown of a successful law firm merger in action. Using their Jacksonville-based family law firm as a case study, they walk through the deliberate process that transformed three solo practices into a unified 25-person firm led by three board-certified partners. The conversation centers on the execution details most law firm mergers overlook. The group explains how a year-long pre-announcement period, guided by structured conversations and predetermined questions, created clarity and trust before anything became official. They share how they navigated a retiring partner's evolving exit timeline, designed C-suite leadership roles aligned with each partner's strengths, and built compensation structures that properly credited non-billable leadership work. They also address power dynamics early, including how two long-standing partners intentionally integrated a third without creating an outsider dynamic. Operationally, the episode highlights the systems and behaviors that supported the merger long term, including their "don't make me care" empowerment philosophy, processing emotional reactions with a practice advisor before taking action, and using multiple partner retreats to resolve compensation, workload, and decision-making expectations transparently. A recurring theme is that the preparation required for a law firm merger often strengthens a firm even if the deal never closes. This episode is essential listening for firm owners considering a law firm merger or scaling with intention. It shows that successful mergers are not about speed or chemistry alone, but about alignment, structure, and doing the work before problems arise. In this episode, you will hear: Real-world case study on merging two family law practices into one scalable firm Defining executive leadership roles to speed decisions and reduce friction Timeline and strategy from early merger talks to public launch Leading two teams through cultural and operational integration Aligning partner compensation to reward leadership beyond billable hours Building a firm culture that empowers staff while maintaining accountability Why having a practice advisor was critical to merger success Subscribe & Review Never miss an episode. Subscribe on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or YouTube. ⭐Like what you hear? A quick review helps more people find the show.⭐ If there's a topic you would like us to cover on an upcoming episode, please email us at steve.riley@atticusadvantage.com. Supporting Resources: Sasso Guerrero & Henderlite https://familylawyerjax.com/ Molly Sasso https://familylawyerjax.com/attorneys/about-mollysasso/ Christie Guerrero https://familylawyerjax.com/attorneys/about-christie-guerrero/ Jay Henderlite https://familylawyerjax.com/attorneys/jay-henderlite/ Split Happens Podcast https://familylawyerjax.com/category/split-happens/ Sasso Guerrero & Henderlite Social Accounts: Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/SGHLaw Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/sghfamlaw/ YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@sgh_law Daniel Struna, Practice Advisor & Attorney: https://atticusadvantage.com/team/daniel-struna/ Episode 168: Should We Merge? Part 1: The 3 Biggest Mistakes with Daniel Struna https://atticusadvantage.com/podcast/should-we-merge-part-1 Workbook: Should We Merge? https://atticusadvantage.com/worksheets/should-we-merge/ Workshop: The Path to a Great Practice & Great Life https://atticusadvantage.com/workshops/the-path-to-a-great-practice-great-life/ My Great Life Focus https://mygreatlifefocus.com/ Team Leader Certification Program (Code TLC500 for $500 off) https://atticusadvantage.com/law-firm-team-leader-certification/ Curious about growing your own law firm or getting support on how to do a succesful merger? Contact Atticus to see whether our law firm coaching can help you strengthen attorney success, refine your law firm business strategy, and build a practice that actually supports your life. This podcast for lawyers is part of our broader legal podcast library, offering practical insights on how to grow a law firm through stronger law firm leadership, law firm pricing and management, smarter marketing, intentional hiring, efficient operations, healthy law firm culture, and sustainable profitability, all while addressing law firm burnout and the realities of modern practice. You can also sign up for our newsletter to get practical insights on how to grow a law firm: from law firm leadership and management to marketing, hiring, operations, culture, and profitability, so you can build a Great Practice and a Great Life.
Japan's Top Business Interviews Podcast By Dale Carnegie Training Tokyo, Japan
"If you trust people, your life is very nice." "The bringing people together with one common objective needs to be carefully thought out and defining the processes very carefully needs to be thought out and don't imagine that the process will be figured out by the people themselves." "They are looking for a leader who is responsible, who can make the decision." "Be transparent." Brief Bio Armel Cahierre is a French-trained engineer who built a multi-country career across R&D, turnaround management, consulting, private equity-adjacent deal work, and consumer retail. After early technical work in Japan (including R&D exposure through Thomson during Japan's 1980s electronics peak), he returned to Europe for an MBA at INSEAD and moved into industrial leadership roles, taking on high-responsibility turnaround assignments in his late 20s across France, Italy, Germany, and Switzerland. He later helped open a European office for a US firm pioneering semantic analysis for qualitative market research, working with major global brands. That experience led to entrepreneurship in eyewear (ski goggles and sunglasses), a subsequent exit to an Italian group, and executive-level work tied to licensing and Western European markets. After a period in California doing pre- and post-M&A consulting (including carve-outs linked to the Vivendi break-up), he returned to Japan, became President of Paris Miki, and later pivoted after a Cerberus transaction collapsed on the day of the Lehman shock. He then founded B4F in Japan, building a members-only, online flash-sales model that sources only through official brand channels and emphasises simplicity of operations, trust, and process discipline. Armel Cahierre's leadership story, is less a straight line than a sequence of deliberately chosen reinventions anchored by one constant: clarity of purpose and an intolerance for unnecessary complexity. As Founder and President of B4F, he operates a members-only flash sales platform focused primarily on fashion and lifestyle brands, with time-limited sales and controlled visibility designed to protect brand equity. The proposition is simple for customers and brands alike: members access discounts without prices being exposed to the wider web, and brands clear excess inventory without training the mass market to wait for markdowns. Operationally, the model leans toward discipline—no grey market sourcing, no parallel imports, and minimal exposure to foreign exchange or customs friction by buying and selling in yen. That preference for simple systems was shaped long before e-commerce. Early in his management career, Cahierre was sent into difficult turnaround situations and learned that the fastest route to recovery often begins with information-sharing and dignity. In one formative case, he arrived at a unionised boiler manufacturer with a catastrophic defect cycle and discovered frontline employees had never been told the company's true position. Once he made the economics and the problem visible, alignment followed—less because of charisma, more because people could finally see the same "game board". In Japan, he argues, the same outcomes are possible, but the route is slower and more socially coded. Ideas rarely appear instantly in open forum; trust must be earned, roles must be read correctly, and influence may sit away from formal hierarchy. Where some foreign leaders push targets and individual incentives, he sees higher leverage in process: process KPIs, well-defined routines, and a shared understanding of "how work is done"—a philosophy that maps cleanly onto kaizen, consensus-building, and the reality that nemawashi often precedes the formal ringi-sho. He also warns against confusing "culture" with "excuses": claims that "Japan can't do X" frequently hide uncertainty avoidance, fear of accountability, or simple inertia rather than any immutable national constraint. On technology, Cahierre is pragmatic and a little provocative. If AI is framed as replacing white-collar work, the CEO should not imagine immunity. The agenda, in his view, is training and judgement: equip teams to use AI well (as companies should have done with Excel and PowerPoint years ago), understand where it accelerates work, and retain human decision intelligence where context, responsibility, and ethics matter. Q&A Summary What makes leadership in Japan unique? Cahierre frames Japan's leadership challenge as less about "mystical difference" and more about how alignment is formed. Teams often respond best to clearly defined processes and shared routines, rather than blunt target pressure. Consensus is frequently built informally first—akin to nemawashi—before decisions become visible through formal approval mechanics (the ringi-sho mindset), meaning leaders must manage the unseen steps, not just the outcome. Why do global executives struggle? He sees many global leaders bringing a KPI-and-bonus playbook that freezes people rather than mobilising them. When targets are pushed without an equally clear process map, staff can become defensive, quiet, and risk-minimising—especially in environments where standing out carries social cost. He also calls out a "guru layer" of advice that over-indexes on etiquette and language theatre while ignoring business fundamentals. Is Japan truly risk-averse? His view is more nuanced: behaviour can look risk-averse, but it often reflects uncertainty avoidance and accountability anxiety. Autonomy can feel like exposure. The leader's job is to reduce ambiguity with system clarity, make responsibility safe, and remove the fear that initiative will be punished. What leadership style actually works? He advocates clarity-first leadership: leaders must know why they are in Japan, be able to "cover" for head office rather than hiding behind it, and set simple, easy-to-grasp goals. The style is firm on direction, generous on trust, and disciplined on processes. Praise is handled carefully: group praise in public is often safer, with individual recognition delivered in ways that do not isolate the person. How can technology help? Technology (including AI) is framed as a productivity multiplier when paired with training. Cahierre argues organisations underinvest in capability-building, then pay the price in wasted hours. AI can support decision intelligence, scenario work, and even "digital twins" of operations if used thoughtfully—but banning it is usually counterproductive, especially when younger workers adopt it as a learning partner rather than a shortcut. Does language proficiency matter? Language and cultural literacy help, but Cahierre's sharper point is that leaders should not let "Japan is different" become a shield for poor execution. Credibility is built more through transparency, consistency, and the ability to explain goals and trade-offs than through performative cultural fluency. What's the ultimate leadership lesson? He returns to trust as a strategic choice. Trust creates speed, openness, and a healthier workplace, even if it occasionally leads to disappointment. Distrust creates paralysis. In Japan especially, he argues that trust must be paired with a simple system: clear rules, clear processes, and a leader willing to be transparent about risks without being ruled by worry. Author Credentials Dr. Greg Story, Ph.D. in Japanese Decision-Making, is President of Dale Carnegie Tokyo Training and Adjunct Professor at Griffith University. He is a two-time winner of the Dale Carnegie "One Carnegie Award" (2018, 2021) and recipient of the Griffith University Business School Outstanding Alumnus Award (2012). As a Dale Carnegie Master Trainer, Greg is certified to deliver globally across all leadership, communication, sales, and presentation programs, including Leadership Training for Results. He has written several books, including three best-sellers — Japan Business Mastery, Japan Sales Mastery, and Japan Presentations Mastery — along with Japan Leadership Mastery and How to Stop Wasting Money on Training. His works have also been translated into Japanese, including Za Eigyō (ザ営業), Purezen no Tatsujin (プレゼンの達人), Torēningu de Okane o Muda ni Suru no wa Yamemashō (トレーニングでお金を無駄にするのはやめましょう), and Gendaiban "Hito o Ugokasu" Rīdā (現代版「人を動かす」リーダー). In addition to his books, Greg publishes daily blogs on LinkedIn, Facebook, and Twitter, offering practical insights on leadership, communication, and Japanese business culture. He is also the host of six weekly podcasts, including The Leadership Japan Series, The Sales Japan Series, The Presentations Japan Series, Japan Business Mastery, and Japan's Top Business Interviews. On YouTube, he produces three weekly shows — The Cutting Edge Japan Business Show, Japan Business Mastery, and Japan's Top Business Interviews — which have become leading resources for executives seeking strategies for success in Japan.
Interview with Pascal Hamelin, President & CEO of Abcourt Mines Inc.Our previous interview: https://www.cruxinvestor.com/posts/abcourt-mines-tsxvabi-gold-producer-ready-to-restart-sleeping-giant-mine-7160Recording date: 15th September 2025Abcourt Mines (TSXV:ABI) has successfully completed its first gold pour at the Sleeping Giant Mine in Quebec, marking a critical transition from development company to gold producer. Speaking at the Denver Gold Forum, President and CEO Pascal Hamelin outlined an aggressive production scaling strategy designed to capitalize on favorable gold market conditions.The company plans to ramp production from zero to 30,000 ounces annually within 18 months, following a detailed preliminary assessment released in 2023. This production target represents only 45% of the mill's total capacity, providing significant room for future expansion to potentially 60,000-70,000 ounces annually. The scalability provides multiple expansion avenues as the company develops additional mining fronts within the existing operation.Operationally, Abcourt maintains a strong cost structure with all-in sustaining costs projected at $1,600 USD per ounce and monthly operating costs of approximately $4 million. At current gold prices exceeding $3,600 per ounce, this creates substantial margins and positions the company for rapid cash flow generation.Beyond the Sleeping Giant operation, Abcourt has identified significant exploration potential at its Flordin project. The 2024 discovery exposed a vein measuring 300 meters long by over 10 meters wide, with drilling confirming continuity to 400 meters depth. Geophysical surveys suggest the vein could extend up to 2 kilometers in length, with management projecting a four to five-year timeline to operational status.The company maintains a portfolio of 15 projects within trucking distance of the Sleeping Giant mill, enabling potential infrastructure sharing and operational synergies. With plans for eventual share buybacks rather than dividends to optimize tax efficiency for shareholders, Abcourt appears positioned to benefit from sustained precious metals strength while building a scalable production platform in Quebec's mining-friendly jurisdiction.View Abcourt Mines' company profile: https://www.cruxinvestor.com/companies/abcourt-mines-incSign up for Crux Investor: https://cruxinvestor.com
Interview with Arturo Préstamo Elizondo, Executive Chairman & CEO of Santacruz Silver Mining Ltd.Our previous interview: https://www.cruxinvestor.com/posts/santacruz-silver-tsxvscz-q1-revenue-hits-70m-as-turnaround-plan-delivers-results-7297Recording date: 11th September 2025Santacruz Silver Mining represents a compelling investment opportunity for investors seeking exposure to a financially disciplined silver producer with strong fundamentals and clear growth catalysts. The company has successfully completed a strategic financial restructuring that positions it as one of the cleanest balance sheet stories in the precious metals sector.The company's financial transformation is remarkable. Santacruz has completely eliminated its acquisition-related debt obligations, paying off the final $15 million of its Glencore asset acquisition ahead of schedule while securing an additional $40 million in savings through an acceleration clause execution. This achievement has resulted in a pristine balance sheet with no streaming agreements, no royalties, and minimal debt beyond a strategically structured $20 million promissory note in Bolivia that carries a negative implied interest rate.Operationally, Santacruz demonstrates impressive resilience and diversification through its portfolio of four producing mines and one ore sourcing company spanning Mexico and Bolivia. The company generates over 7 million ounces of pure silver annually alongside significant zinc credits, with management projecting $90-120 million in annual free cash flow. This operational strength was evidenced when recent flooding at two Bolivian veins was immediately offset by San Lucas trading operations, which sourced replacement ore from third-party miners to maintain full mill capacity utilization.The investment thesis is strengthened by favorable currency dynamics in Bolivia, where 80-85% of operational costs are denominated in Bolivianos. The recent devaluation of the Boliviano creates ongoing cost advantages that directly improve all-in sustained cash costs and enhance profit margins, particularly beneficial in the current rising silver price environment.Santacruz's primary growth catalyst centers on the advanced Soracaya brownfield project, which management characterizes as "advanced organic growth." This asset features existing 43-101 resource reporting and previous development work by Glencore, with full permitting expected within 7-10 months. Once operational, Soracaya will contribute an additional 4 million ounces of annual silver production - representing approximately a 60% increase in output - funded entirely through internal cash generation without equity dilution.The company's resource base offers exceptional longevity and expansion potential. Current reserves and resources provide approximately 12 years of mine life in Bolivia alone, supported by vein systems that allow for both deeper development and strike length extension. Notably, the Porco mine represents the longest continuously producing mine in the Americas with 500 years of non-stop operation, while other assets have maintained production for over 200 years, demonstrating the sustainability of these geological systems.From a valuation perspective, Santacruz appears attractively positioned with an enterprise value approximately six to seven times projected EBITDA of $110-120 million, trading at a discount to many precious metals peers. This valuation gap, combined with the company's strong cash generation capabilities and strategic flexibility for acquisitive growth, presents multiple pathways for value creation.The macro environment further supports the investment case, as silver benefits from dual demand drivers spanning both industrial applications and monetary hedge demand. Industrial consumption continues expanding through renewable energy infrastructure and electronics manufacturing, while supply constraints from primary silver operations create additional price support.For investors seeking exposure to a well-managed silver producer with proven operational capabilities, clean financials, and clear growth visibility, Santacruz Silver offers a compelling risk-adjusted opportunity in the current precious metals landscape.View Santacruz Silver Mining's company mining: https://www.cruxinvestor.com/companies/santacruz-silver-miningSign up for Crux Investor: https://cruxinvestor.com
Interview with Keith Boyle, CEO of New Found Gold Corp.Our previous interview: https://www.cruxinvestor.com/posts/new-found-gold-tsxvnfg-all-known-questions-answered-august-2025-7640Recording date: 26th August 2025New Found Gold has secured significant additional backing from Eric Sprott, who invested an additional $20 million through a private placement expected to close by the end of August. This investment increases Sprott's ownership from 19% to 23%, officially making him a "control person" following shareholder approval at the company's recent annual general meeting. Combined with the $63 million bought deal completed in May, New Found Gold now has substantial financing to execute its development plans through next year.The company has also strengthened its board with the addition of Tamara Brown, a seasoned mining executive with experience at Superior Gold and Orla Mining, and currently with Oberon Capital. CEO Keith Boyle emphasized Brown's strategic thinking abilities and comprehensive understanding of mining operations, capital markets, and investor relations, describing her diverse background as valuable for advancing the company toward production.Operationally, New Found Gold remains laser-focused on achieving cash flow as quickly as possible from its high-grade deposit. The company is currently conducting resource upgrade drilling, which was temporarily paused due to regional fire risks but has since resumed following recent rainfall. Parallel efforts include advancing permitting activities and baseline environmental work in preparation for submitting their environmental assessment application early next year.The development timeline positions 2025 as the key permitting and financing year, with early construction work planned, leading to full construction beginning in 2027. Management reports strong institutional support for this accelerated development strategy, with over 10% of shares represented at the recent shareholder meeting and positive feedback from both existing and prospective institutional investors. The strategic shift from exploration to rapid development continues to resonate well with stakeholders who support the company's focus on near-term cash generation.—View New Found Gold's company pprofile: https://www.cruxinvestor.com/companies/new-found-goldSign up for Crux Investor: https://cruxinvestor.com
The Zone with Jason Anderson, Sterling Holmes & Producer Dylan Michaels talk about the mess that has been created in Cincinnati this offseason as the Bengals decided to pay 2 WRs in the same off-season, leaving their defensive line options in question!See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Last time we spoke about China's preparations for War. In December 1936, the tension in China reached a boiling point as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek was captured by his own commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on fighting communists instead of the encroaching Japanese forces, the generals sought a unified response to Japanese aggression. After being held in Xi'an, Chiang reluctantly agreed to collaborate with the Chinese Communist Party, marking a significant shift in strategy against Japan. Amidst the rising chaos, Chiang's government reviewed historical military strategies and prepared for a prolonged conflict. However, they faced challenges, including inadequate supplies and a lack of modern equipment compared to the Japanese. By 1937, China was ill-prepared for war, with Chiang later expressing regret about their military readiness. Despite these setbacks, the alliance formed with the communists laid a foundation for a united Chinese front against the brutalities of the Sino-Japanese War that would follow. #153 Japan Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So in the last episode we talked about how China was preparing itself for war, now its time for Japan. Since Japan's invasion of North China, Japanese field armies had promoted a series of autonomous zones in northern China. Officers from the Kwantung Army, skeptical of China's capacity to modernize, believed that the vast region would inevitably fragment into regional factions. This policy effectively maintained a weak and divided China, which served Japan's to defend Manchukuo. However many Japanese military leaders frequently pointed to the threat posed by the KMT's five-year plan, initiated in 1933 with assistance from German military advisors, aimed at modernizing and expanding the national army. To counter what they perceived as a Chinese threat, the field armies advocated for a preemptive war to dismantle Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Any attempt by Tokyo to alter the military's China policy faced vigorous opposition from the Kwantung Army, which, in February 1937, pushed for intensified covert actions to expel the KMT from northern China and supported a preemptive war to secure strategic areas for future operations against the Soviet Union. At a March meeting in Tokyo, staff officers from the China Garrison and Kwantung armies insisted that any concessions to China would be a grave mistake and would likely yield only temporary outcomes. In early spring 1937, Prince Konoe Fumimaro inherited a China policy fraught with competing views, however, there was consensus that China must not distract the empire from its preparations against the USSR. The end goal was clear, but the means to achieve it remained uncertain. The cabinet's approval of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" in August 1936 indicated a need for stability as the army and navy reconfigured Japan's war machine. The challenge lay in aligning long-term strategic goals with practical short-term interests in northern China without upsetting the existing balance of power. Expanding demands propelled the army's contingency planning, which had traditionally focused on safeguarding Japanese interests and the approximately 13,000 Japanese citizens residing in the region. Tokyo typically responded to serious incidents by deploying troops from homeland garrisons to address localized emergencies and then withdrawing them. However, by the mid-1930s, the growing Soviet threat to Manchukuo rendered this doctrine obsolete. Incidents in northern China gained strategic importance as they diverted resources from the Kwantung Army's preparations against the Soviet Union. Disruptions in northern China hindered access to essential raw materials necessary for army modernization and rearmament, while hostile Chinese forces threatened the Kwantung Army's strategic left flank in the event of war with the Soviets. With these considerations in mind, the army revised its operational war plans, assuming that northern China would serve as Japan's strategic rear area for operations against the USSR. In 1911 Japan's plan for general war mandated thirteen divisions to occupy southern Manchuria, capture Beijing, and subsequently occupy Zhejiang and Fujian. Limited contingency operations in northern China required two divisions to secure rail communications from Beijing to the coast. In the weeks following the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the General Staff in Tokyo drafted plans to counter a Sino-Soviet alliance, anticipating a 2 month campaign involving 15-16 divisions, with the majority engaged against the Soviet Red Army. 2 divisions were designated to secure northern China, while smaller units would monitor the Inner Mongolian front to protect Japan's western flank in Manchuria. After further refinement, the General Staff identified three contingencies for China in early 1932: maintaining the traditional mission of safeguarding Japanese interests and citizens with a standard two-division force; ensuring a secure line of communication between the Chinese capital and the sea with the China Garrison Army, which consisted of approximately 1,700 officers and men, reinforced by one division; and, in a worst-case scenario of all-out war, deploying three divisions to reinforce the Kwantung Army, along with 7 additional divisions and 3 cavalry brigades to suppress resistance in northern China and the Shandong Peninsula, while two additional divisions secured key areas in central China. Between 1932-1936, China received less attention as the General Staff focused on the Soviet military buildup in the Far East. Anxiety, stemming from the Soviet buildup in the Far East, was a pervasive concern reflected in the draft rearmament plan submitted to the throne on May 21, 1936, as part of the national budget formulation process. The army proposed countering the Soviet threat by enhancing Japanese strategic mobility in Manchukuo through the renovation and expansion of airfields, ports, roads, and rail infrastructure, and by constructing army air force arsenals, storage depots, and medical facilities. The positioning of Japanese divisions in eastern Manchuria suggested their wartime objectives, with the Kwantung Army relying on a mobile independent mixed brigade composed of armored car and mounted cavalry units stationed in Gongzhuling, central Manchuria, as its immediate response force for contingencies in northern China. Major units were not concentrated in western Manchuria, where they would be expected to deploy before any planned invasion of northern China. Nevertheless, General Staff planners remained vigilant regarding developments in China, where the resurgence of nationalism, Communist movements advancing north of the Yellow River in February 1936, and the spread of anti-Japanese sentiments across northern China raised the specter of limited military operations escalating into full-scale warfare. China's improving military capabilities would likely hinder Japanese forces from accomplishing their objectives. For example, around Shanghai, Chinese defenses were bolstered by extensive, in-depth, and permanent fortifications. In mid-September 1936, the General Staff in Tokyo issued orders to preempt significant outbreaks in northern China by repositioning a division in Manchukuo closer to the boundary. If hostilities broke out, the China Garrison Army, supported by Kwantung Army units, would launch punitive operations against Chinese forces as necessary. Higher headquarters expected local commanders to act swiftly and decisively, employing rapid maneuvers and shock tactics to address outbreaks with minimal force. Given that no alternative responses were considered, Japanese operational planning for northern China relied on an all-or-nothing approach to force deployment, even for minor incidents. Yet, the senior leadership of the army remained deeply divided over its China policy. Influenced by Ishiwara, the General Staff wanted to avoid military actions that could lead to a full-scale war with China, focusing instead on advancing the army's extensive rearmament and modernization program. In contrast, a majority of high-ranking officers in the Army Ministry and General Staff, particularly within the 2nd Operations Section and the Kwantung Army, favored forceful action against China, believing it necessary to quell rising anti-Japanese sentiments. Drawing from past experiences, these officers anticipated that the Chinese would quickly capitulate once hostilities commenced. This lack of a unified military strategy reflected broader disagreements among the army's leadership regarding operations in China. While operational planning called for the permanent occupation of large regions in northern and central China, the General Staff aimed to contain outbreaks to maintain focus on Soviet threats. There was a clear absence of long-term operational planning; instead, the army concentrated on initial battles while relegating planning for prolonged combat operations to contingent circumstances. In summary, the Japanese army preferred to avoid military force to address Chinese issues whenever feasible but was equally unwilling to concede to Chinese demands. Since 1914, Tosui Koryo or “Principles of Command” had served as the foundational doctrine for senior Japanese army commanders and staff officers engaged in combined arms warfare at the corps and army levels. The advent of new weapons, tactics, and organizational changes during World War I compelled all major military forces to reassess their existing military doctrines across strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions. In response, Japan modified the Principles of Command to blend its traditional post-Russo-Japanese War focus on the intangible factors in battle with the newest concepts of modern total war. A revision in 1918 recognized the significance of “recent great advances in materiel” for total warfare, yet it maintained that ultimate victory in battle relied on dedication, patriotism, and selfless service. In the 1920s, the General Staff's Operations Section, led by Major General Araki Sadao, who would become the leader of the Kodoha faction, had produced the most significant and impactful revision of the Principles. A staunch anti-communist and ideologue who valued the intangible elements of combat, Araki appointed Lieutenant Colonel Obata Toshishiro and Captain Suzuki Yorimichi as the principal authors of the manual's rewrite. Obata, a Soviet expert, was strongly influenced by German General Count Alfred von Schlieffen's classic theories of a “war of annihilation,” while Suzuki, the top graduate of the thirtieth Staff College class, shared Araki's focus on “spiritual” or intangible advantages in warfare. Both men were brilliant yet arrogant, working in secrecy to create a doctrine based on what Leonard Humphreys describes as “intense spiritual training” and bayonet-led assaults to counter the opponent's material superiority. The latest version of the Principles of Command preserved the operational concept of rapid Japanese mobile offensive operations, aiming to induce a decisive battle or “kaisen” early in the campaign. It reaffirmed the sokusen sokketsu or “rapid victory' principle of rapid warfare. Attaining these goals relied exclusively on offensive action, with the army expecting commanders at all levels to press forward, defeat enemy units, and capture key territories. The troops were indoctrinated with a spirit of aggression and trained to anticipate certain victory. The emphasis on offensive action was so pronounced that Araki eliminated terms like surrender, retreat, and defense from the manual, believing they negatively affected troop morale. This aggressive mindset also infused the Sento Koryo or “Principles of Operations”, first published in 1929 as a handbook for combined arms warfare tailored for division and regimental commanders. The manual emphasized hand-to-hand combat as the culminating stage of battle, a principle regarded as unchanging in Japanese military doctrine since 1910. Senior commanders were expected to demonstrate initiative in skillfully maneuvering their units to encircle the enemy, setting the stage for climactic assaults with cold steel. Infantry was deemed the primary maneuver force, supported by artillery. To complement rapid infantry advances, the army developed light and mobile artillery. Operationally, encirclement and night attacks were vital components of victory, and even outnumbered units were expected to aggressively envelop enemy flanks. In assaults against fortified positions, units would advance under the cover of darkness, avoiding enemy artillery fire and positioning themselves for dawn attacks that combined firepower with shock action to overwhelm enemy defenses. In encounters with opposing forces, commanders would maneuver to flank the enemy, surround their units, and destroy them. If forced onto the defensive, commanders were expected to seize opportunities for decisive counterattacks to regain the initiative. These high-level operational doctrines were distilled into tactical guidelines in the January 1928 edition of the Infantry Manual or “Hohei Soten”, which saw a provisional revision in May 1937 . Both editions opened with identical introductions emphasizing the necessity for a rapid victory through the overpowering and destruction of enemy forces. Infantry was identified as the primary arm in combined arms warfare, and soldiers were taught to rely on cold steel as fundamental to their attacking spirit. The 1928 Infantry Manual underscored the commander's role in instilling a faith in certain victory or “hissho shinnen”, drawing from the glorious traditions of Japanese military history. The 1928 infantry tactics employed an extended skirmish line with four paces between soldiers. Individual initiative in combat was generally discouraged, except under exceptional circumstances, as success relied on concentrating firepower and manpower on narrow frontages to overwhelm defenders. An infantry company would create a skirmish line featuring two light machine gun squads and four rifle squads, preparing for a bayonet-driven breakthrough of enemy defenses. For the final assault, the infantry company would line up along a 150-yard front, likely facing casualties of up to 50% while breaching the enemy's main defensive line. Historical analysis reveals the shortcomings of these tactics. During World War I, armies constructed extensive, multi-layered defenses, trenches, pillboxes, and strong points, each independent yet all covered by artillery. If assaulting infantry suffered heavy losses breaching the first line, how could they successfully prosecute their assault against multiple defense lines? The 1937 revision elaborated on new tactics to overcome entrenched Soviet defenses, drafted in anticipation of arms and equipment that were either in development or production but not yet available for deployment. This became official doctrine in 1940, but as early as summer 1937, units from the China Garrison Army were field-testing these new tactics. The provisional manual adopted combat team tactics, forming an umbrella-like skirmish formation. This involved a light machine gun team at the forefront with two ammunition bearers flanking it to the rear. Behind the machine gun team were riflemen arranged in a column formation, maintaining six paces between each. The light machine gun provided cover fire as the formation closed in on the enemy for hand-to-hand combat. Increased firepower expanded the assault front to 200 yards. The combination of wider dispersion and night movement aimed to reduce losses from enemy artillery fire while the infantry advanced through successive lines of resistance. Commanders at the platoon level were responsible for leading the final assault into enemy lines, with increased tactical responsibility shifting from platoon to squad leaders, allowing for greater initiative from junior officers and non-commissioned officers. This emphasis on broader dispersal and fluidity on the battlefield required frontline infantry to exhibit aggressiveness and initiative. Contrary to popular belief, the Japanese military did not solely rely on the bayonet or an offensive spirit during engagements with Chinese forces. They effectively employed superior firepower and modern equipment within their combined arms framework, using heavy weapons and artillery to soften enemy positions before launching infantry attacks. Without such firepower, unsupported infantry attacks would have struggled to achieve their objectives. In January 1937, the Imperial Japanese Army consisted of approximately 247,000 officers and men, organized in a structure comprising seventeen standing infantry divisions, four tank regiments, and fifty-four air squadrons equipped with a total of 549 aircraft. The China Garrison Army and the Taiwan Garrison Army each included two infantry regiments, while a separate independent mixed brigade was stationed in Manchuria. Two divisions were permanently based in Korea, with four more assigned on a rotating basis to the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo. The remainder of the forces were stationed in the Japanese home islands. A substantial pool of reservists and partially trained replacements was available to mobilize, enabling the expansion of peacetime units to their wartime strength as needed. Conscription provided the primary source of enlisted manpower for the army, though a handful of young men volunteered for active duty. For conscription purposes, Japan was divided into divisional areas, which were further subdivided into regimental districts responsible for conscription, mobilization, individual activations, and veteran affairs within their jurisdictions. Typically, conscripts served with the regiment associated with their region or prefecture. However, the Imperial Guards regiments in Tokyo selected conscripts from across the nation, as did the Seventh Infantry Division, which recruited from the sparsely populated Hokkaido area and from regular army units stationed in Korea, China, and Taiwan. Draftees from Okinawa Prefecture usually served with Kyushu-based regiments. All males reaching the age of 20 underwent an army-administered pre-induction physical examination conducted between December 1 and January 30 of the following year. This evaluation classified potential conscripts into three categories: A “suitable for active duty”, B1, and B2, while others were deemed unfit for the demands of military life. In 1935, 29.7% of those examined received A classifications, while 41.2% were graded as B1 or B2. Among the 742,422 individuals eligible for conscription in 1937, approximately 170,000 were drafted, amounting to 22.9% of the cohort; this figure had remained relatively consistent since the post-Russo-Japanese War years. Within the conscripted group, 153,000 men were classified as A and an additional 17,000 as B. Conscripts served for two years of active duty, with variations based on their military specialty and any prior civilian military training. After their discharge, they were subject to a lengthy reserve obligation. In total, 470,635 individuals fell into the B category, being otherwise fit for service but excess to the army's active personnel needs. These men were assigned to the First Replacement Pool, where they underwent around 120 days of basic military training, primarily focused on small arms usage and fundamental tactics. Regular officers and NCOs led the training in their respective regimental districts. Following their initial training, the army called these replacements and reservists to active duty annually for several days of refresher training. Army leaders regarded discipline as the cornerstone of military effectiveness. Basic training emphasized the necessity of unquestioning obedience to orders at all levels. Subsequent training focused on fieldcraft, such as utilizing terrain strategically to surprise or encircle the enemy. However, training exercises often lacked diversity due to the limited maneuver areas available in Japan, leading to predictable solutions to field problems. The training regimen was rigorous, merging strict formal discipline and regulated corporal punishment with harsh informal sanctions and unregulated violence from leaders to instill unwavering compliance to orders. As an undergrad taking a course specifically on the Pacific War, it was this variable my professor argued contributed the most to the atrocities performed by the Japanese during WW2. He often described it as a giant pecking order of abuse. The most senior commanders abused, often physically their subordinates, who abused theirs, going through the ranks to the common grunts who had no one else but civilians and the enemy to peck at so to speak. Of course there were a large number of other variables at play, but to understand that you outta join my Patreon Account over at the www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel , where I made a fan favorite episode on “why the Japanese army performed so many atrocities”. In there I basically hit a big 10 reason list, well in depth, I highly recommend it! As the concept of the “Imperial Army” and the cult of the emperor gained prominence, appeals to imperial symbols and authority bolstered this unquestioning obedience to superiors, who were seen as the conduits of the emperor's will. It was during this period that the term kogun or “imperial army” gained favor over kokugun or “national army”, reflecting a deliberate effort by military authorities to forge a direct connection between the military and the imperial throne. The 1937 Japanese infantry division was structured as a square formation, with a peacetime strength established at approximately 12,000 officers and men organized into two brigades, each comprising about 4,000 personnel, formed from two infantry regiments, about 2,000 men each. The division included a field artillery regiment, an engineer regiment, and a transport battalion as organic units. Each infantry regiment was composed of three battalions, approximately 600 men each, which contained three rifle companies, 160 men each and a weapons platoon. A rifle company consisted of three rifle platoons and one light machine gun platoon. Regiments also included infantry assault gun platoons, and battalions contained a heavy machine gun company. Upon mobilization, a fourth infantry company augmented each battalion, along with reserve fillers, nearly 5,000 personnel assigned as transport and service troops, raising the authorized wartime strength of an infantry division to over 25,000 officers and men. Reforms implemented in 1922 reduced personnel numbers in favor of new and improved weapons and equipment. Among these advancements, the 75 mm Type 90 field artillery piece, which boasted increased range and accuracy, was integrated into the forces in 1930, along with the 105 mm Type 10 howitzer and 75 mm pack mountain artillery which could be disassembled for transport using pack animals. These became standard artillery components for divisions. The emphasis on light, mobile, and smaller-caliber field artillery enabled swift deployment during fast-moving engagements. By minimizing the size of the baggage train, infantry and artillery units could quickly set up off the march formation and maneuver around enemy flanks. Army leaders further streamlined road march formations by eliminating the fourth artillery battery from each regiment, thus sacrificing some firepower for enhanced speed and mobility. Heavier artillery pieces were still used in set-piece battles where mobility was less critical. In a typical 1936 division, the field artillery regiment, equipped with Type 90 field artillery or lighter Type 94 mountain artillery, had thirty-six guns. Training focused on quality rather than quantity, reflecting the conservative doctrine of “one-round-one-hit”. Live-fire training was infrequent due to the scarcity of artillery firing ranges in Japan. Ammunition stockpiles were inadequate for anticipated operational needs; government arsenals produced over 111,000 artillery shells in 1936, which was fewer than one-tenth of the quantities specified in wartime consumption tables. Similar industrial shortcomings also hampered advancements in motorization and armor. Motorization proved costly and relied on foreign supply, presenting challenges given the inferior road networks in Manchuria, northern China, and the Soviet Far East. Military estimates suggested a need for 250,000 trucks to fully motorize the army, a goal beyond the capabilities of the nascent Japanese automotive industry, which produced fewer than 1,000 cars annually until 1933. Japanese tanks, described as “handcrafted, beautifully polished, and hoarded” by Alvin Coox, suffered from shortages similar to heavy artillery and ammunition. The army prioritized light weighing ten tons or less and medium tanks sixteen tons or less due to the necessity of deploying armor overseas, size and weight were crucial for loading and unloading from transport ships. Smaller tanks were also more suitable for the terrains of northern China and Manchuria, as they could traverse unbridged rivers using pontoons or ferries. The Japanese industrial base, however, struggled to mass-produce tanks; by 1939, factories were producing an average of only twenty-eight tanks of all models per month. Consequently, in 1937, foot soldiers remained as reliant on animal transport for mobility as their ancestors had been during the Russo-Japanese War. Despite enjoying technological and material superiority over disorganized Chinese forces, these deficiencies in heavy artillery, armor, and vehicles would prove catastrophic against more formidable opponents. Another significant factor constraining Japanese industry's capacity to produce tanks, trucks, and artillery was the 1936 decision to expand the army's air wing and homeland air defense network. This policy diverted resources, capital, and technology away from the army's ground forces. The nascent Japanese Army Air Force or “JAAF” aimed to support ground operations through reconnaissance, bombing enemy bases, and achieving air superiority. However, direct support for ground operations was limited, and Japanese military planners did not anticipate that aerial bombardment could supplement or replace artillery bombardments. The expanded air arm's strategic mission centered on executing preemptive air strikes against Soviet air bases in the Far East to thwart potential air attacks on Japan. By the mid-1930s, the army had approximately 650 aircraft, roughly 450 of which were operational. The JAAF emphasized rigorous training that prioritized quality over quantity, producing only about 750 pilots annually up until December 1941. Basic flight skills were developed through this training, while specialized tactical instruction was deferred to newly established pilot units. According to logistics doctrine, Japanese maneuver units typically operated within a 120 to 180-mile radius of a railhead to facilitate resupply and reinforcement. A field train transport unit was responsible for moving supplies daily from the railhead to a division control point for distribution. The division established a field depot to manage the transfer of supplies from field transport to company and lower-echelon units. At the depot, transport troops would hand over supplies to a combat train that ferried ammunition, rations, and equipment directly to frontline units. Horse-drawn wagons and pack animals were the primary means of transportation. Each wartime division included a transport battalion, which varied in size from approximately 2,200 to 3,700 personnel, depending on the type of division supported. The division typically carried enough supplies for one day. Upon mobilization, the logistical framework was reinforced with the addition of an ordnance unit, a field hospital, a sanitation unit, and additional field and combat trains. The size of the transport regiment grew from around 1,500 officers and men with over 300 horses to nearly 3,500 troops and more than 2,600 animals. In the battalion, one company generally transported small-arms ammunition while two companies handled artillery shells and two others carried rations; this arrangement was flexible based on operational needs. Pack horses and dray horses were assigned to each company to carry or tow infantry assault artillery, mortars, artillery ammunition, and rations. Infantry soldiers carried minimal rations, approximately two and a half pounds, primarily rice, along with tinned condiments and salt. Consequently, the field train included a field kitchen stocked with fresh vegetables, rice or bread, soy sauce, and pickles. Each evening, a forward echelon train distributed supplies received from the field transport unit to the combat unit's bivouac area. When combat seemed imminent, a section of the transport battalion would move forward to deliver essential combat supplies, ordnance, equipment, medical supplies, directly to frontline units. These units would also handle resupply, medical evacuation, and repair of ordnance and equipment once fighting commenced. On the evening of September 18, 1936, the fifth anniversary of the Manchurian Incident, Chinese troops from the Twenty-Ninth Army clashed with Japanese soldiers from the Seventh Company's rear-guard medical unit at Fengtai. When a Japanese officer arrived on horseback, a Chinese soldier struck his horse, prompting the Chinese troops to retreat to their barracks. Major Ichiki Kiyonao, the battalion commander, ordered an emergency assembly, surrounded the Chinese encampment, and demanded that Chinese authorities surrender the aggressors immediately. To defuse the situation, Major General Kawabe Masakazu, the brigade commander and Ichiki's superior, instructed Regimental Commander Mutaguchi to resolve the incident swiftly. Mutaguchi negotiated an agreement that required the Chinese to apologize, punish those responsible, withdraw from the vicinity of the Japanese barracks, and maintain a distance of two miles. Although Mutaguchi and Ichiki wanted to disarm the Chinese forces, they ultimately complied with Kawabe's wishes and allowed the Chinese to retain their weapons “in the spirit of Bushido.” Later, the Chinese claimed the Japanese had refrained from disarming them due to their fear of the strength and influence of the 29th Army. This insult infuriated Mutaguchi, who vowed not to make any further concessions and promised to eliminate the anti-Japanese provocateurs decisively if another incident occurred. He warned his officers against allowing an “overly tolerant attitude toward the Chinese” to undermine the prestige of the imperial army and emphasized the need for swift, decisive action to prevent such incidents in the future. Tensions were further exacerbated by large-scale Japanese field exercises conducted from late October to early November. These maneuvers, the largest ever executed by Japanese forces in China, mobilized about 6,700 active-duty and reserve troops for a series of complex battle drills, night maneuvers, and tactical field problems. During these exercises, Japanese troops were quartered in Chinese homes. Although local residents were compensated for any damage caused, the exercises nonetheless heightened tensions between the two sides. The fallout from the Suiyuan Fiasco in December 1936, coupled with a tumultuous summer and fall, led to rising anti-Japanese sentiment and prompted Tokyo to caution the Kawabe brigade against actions that might escalate the already precarious situation. In March 1937, during the annual personnel assignments, Ishiwara was promoted to major general and appointed chief of the 1st Department Operations of the General Staff. However, Army Vice Minister Umezu, a hardliner regarding China and a rival of Ishiwara, successfully maneuvered the Hayashi cabinet into approving the command choices for army and navy ministers, overriding Ishiwara's proposals. General Sugiyama Hajime, another hawk on China, replaced the terminally ill General Nakamura Kotaro as army minister shortly after Nakamura's appointment and remained in that position until June 1938. Lieutenant General Imai Kiyoshi, army vice chief of staff and an Ishiwara supporter, was also battling a terminal illness that rendered him largely ineffective during his short five-month tenure from March to August 1937. Imai was expected to play a crucial role in high command because the army chief of staff, Prince Kan'in, had been appointed in 1931 as a figurehead due to internal factions preventing agreement on a candidate. Ishiwara further complicated his conciliatory approach by selecting Colonel Muto Akira, a known hardliner who believed force was the only means to resolve the Japan-China conflict, for the vital position of chief of Operations Section within the General Staff. From Kwantung Army headquarters, Commanding General Ueda Kenkichi and his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki, advocated for a preemptive war against China to serve the Kwantung Army's interests. In contrast, the China Garrison Army, under Lieutenant General Tashiro and his chief of staff, adopted a more moderate stance, aligning with central headquarters' policy of restraint. The China Garrison Army estimated the 29th Army to consist of 15,000–16,000 troops, with its main strength centered around Peking and an additional 10,000 troops in the surrounding area. Starting in spring 1937, Japanese units began observing tactical indicators suggesting that the Chinese were preparing for war. These indicators included increased guard presence at Peking's gates in June, bolstering units near the Marco Polo Bridge to over two battalions, preparing new fighting positions, digging trenches and constructing concrete pillboxes near the Marco Polo Bridge, infiltrating agents into Japanese maneuver areas for intelligence on night tactical exercises, and heightened strictness among Chinese railroad guards evident since late June. Nevertheless, the Japanese commanders did not view China as a formidable opponent. They believed that Chinese armies would quickly disintegrate due to what they perceived as a lack of fighting spirit and ineffective leadership. By 1937, Japan's national policy was shifting away from the persistent and aggressive efforts of field armies to undermine Chinese political authority in northern China toward a more conciliatory stance. This shift resulted in increased tensions between field armies and the General Staff in Tokyo, leading to substantial fractures among senior officers regarding the “solution” to their so-called China problem. Those tensions broke the camels back that year. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese grossly underestimated their enemy and their own logistical capabilities. There was to say “too many cooks in the kitchen” of the Japanese military and competing visions ultimately were leading Japan and China into an official full blown war. Japan assumed they could bully China until it was so fragmented it would be a simple matter of grabbing the pieces it liked, that was not to be the case at all.
Serving SMB mid-market customers is one thing, but when you go upstream to enterprise sales, everything changes: go-to-market strategy, the sales process, how you structure deals, even how you define customer value. Today's guest, Andrew Casey, has helped scale four SaaS companies: ServiceNow, WalkMe, Lacework, and his current company, Amplitude. At ServiceNow, he worked closely with Snowflake's Mike Scarpelli and Coatue's David Schneider, and he was instrumental in establishing the company's deal desk to support its sales motion. As an operationally focused CFO, he shares a wealth of knowledge on the importance of staying close to the customer, structuring deals that work for both sides, establishing transparency in usage-based pricing, aligning incentives and strategy in sales, the pros and cons of multi-year deals, the problem with auto-renewals and what to do instead, and how to adapt your go-to-market strategy when moving from SMB mid-market to enterprise.—LINKS:Andrew Casey on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/andrew-casey-6b14875/Amplitude: https://amplitude.comServiceNow: https://www.servicenow.comCJ on X (@cjgustafson222): https://x.com/cjgustafson222Mostly metrics: http://mostlymetrics.comRELATED EPISODES:Gaining Strategic Advantage in Vertical SaaS With Guidewire's CFO, Jeff Cooper"Steal Your Boss's Job”: Calendly CFO John McCauley on Leadership, Ownership & GrowthThe Largest Software IPO Ever: How Snowflake Still Left Money on the Table —TIMESTAMPS:(00:00) Preview and Intro(02:40) Sponsor – Tropic | NetSuite | Planful | Tabs(08:45) Becoming an Operationally Focused CFO(11:50) Staying Close to the Customer as a CFO(16:37) Sponsor – Rippling Spend | Pulley | MUFG(20:34) Running Towards a Challenging Market at ServiceNow(24:15) How He Established the Deal Desk at ServiceNow(26:13) Structuring a Deal That Works for Both Sides(29:08) Transparency in Usage-Based Pricing(32:39) A Client's “Budget Problem”: Cash or Expense Issue(36:42) Lessons From Building Out the Deal Desk at ServiceNow(40:53) Pros and Cons of Multi-Year Deals(43:57) Auto-Renewals: Do This Instead(46:10) Adapting the Go-to-Market Strategy for Enterprise Sales(55:33) Selling to CIOs Whose Jobs Are at Stake(58:18) What Defines “Enterprise”(59:43) The Most Important Thing To Get Right in Enterprise Sales(1:01:01) Lessons From Andrew's Background in Corporate Finance(1:03:12) The Story of How Andrew Got His Job at ServiceNow(1:07:57) Long-Ass Lightning Round: A Big Mistake(1:10:31) Advice to Younger Self(1:11:17) Finance Software Stack(1:14:47) Craziest Expense Story—SPONSORS:Tropic is an intelligent spend management solution that consolidates your spend data and processes into one unified offering, enabling insights and decisive action. Take control of your spend with intelligent spend management at tropicapp.io/mostlymetrics.NetSuite is an AI-powered business management suite, encompassing ERP/Financials, CRM, and ecommerce for more than 41,000 customers. If you're looking for an ERP, head to https://netsuite.com/metrics and get the CFO's Guide to AI and Machine Learning.Planful's financial planning software can transform your FP&A function. Built for speed, accuracy, and confidence, you'll be planning your way to success and have time left over to actually put it to work. Find out more at www.planful.com/metrics.Tabs is a platform that brings all of your revenue-facing data and workflows - billing, AR, payments, rev rec, and reporting - onto a single system so you can automate and be more flexible. Find out more at: tabs.inc/metrics.Rippling Spend is a spend management software that gives you complete visibility and automated policy controls across every type of spend, saving you time and money. Get a demo to see how much time your org would save at rippling.com/metrics.Pulley is the cap table management platform built for CFOs and finance leaders who need reliable, audit-ready data and intuitive workflows, without the hidden fees or unreliable support. Switch in as little as 5 days and get 25% off your first year: pulley.com/mostlymetrics.MUFG is a global banking powerhouse that provides comprehensive banking services for VC-backed, PE-backed, and public companies with revenues starting at $40M. Accelerate your growth trajectory. Contact group head Bob Blee at bblee@us.mufg.jp to find out more.#SMBtoEnterprise, #gotomarketstrategy #scalingSaaS #dealdesk #ServiceNow Get full access to Mostly metrics at www.mostlymetrics.com/subscribe
Real Estate Investing With Jay Conner, The Private Money Authority
In the ever-changing world of real estate investing, asset classes rise and fall with shifting markets. Yet, according to real estate veteran Kevin Bupp, one asset continuously proves its value, resilience, and scalability: mobile home parks. On a recent episode of the Raising Private Money podcast with Jay Conner, The Private Money Authority, Kevin Bupp shared his extensive experience, including raising over $250 million in private capital, and revealed what makes mobile home parks a standout investment opportunity.The Unexpected Journey to Mobile Home ParksKevin Bupp's real estate journey began at age 19. Like many, he poured his energy into single-family rentals, building an impressive portfolio of 22 properties by his mid-20s. He tasted success but also felt the sting of the 2008 market crash, when he lost nearly everything.Reflecting on that pivotal period, Kevin noted how inefficiencies in managing scattered single-family rentals, compounded by the inefficiency of technology at the time, exposed his business to excessive risk. The crash forced him to reevaluate, rebuild smarter, and ultimately, seek out asset classes offering not just cash flow and efficiency, but also resilience. This search led Kevin to mobile home parks.Why Mobile Home Parks Offer Superior Investment Benefits Recession ResistanceOne of the central appeals of mobile home parks is their stability during economic downturns. Historically, demand for affordable housing rises when the economy struggles. Mobile home parks cater directly to this need, providing low-cost living options that are in constant demand, regardless of market cycles.As Kevin explained, even during periods when single-family home rents fell, mobile home parks remained relatively stable. Residents of these communities rarely leave; replacing or moving a mobile home is expensive, creating natural “stickiness” and consistent occupancy for park owners. Operational Efficiency & ScalabilityUnlike single-family rentals spread across a wide geographic area, each with its operational quirks, a well-managed mobile home park can comprise dozens or even hundreds of income-producing units on one property. Kevin cited his company's experience, scaling from a 34-lot park to properties holding over 700 sites, allowing rapid expansion without proportional increases in overhead.Operationally, many residents in mobile home parks own their homes and simply rent the lots, reducing maintenance costs and management headaches for the investor. This model allows investors to focus on the land and common infrastructure, not individual unit repairs. Barriers to Entry and Limited CompetitionMunicipalities often resist the development of new mobile home parks due to lingering social stigma and zoning challenges. This makes existing parks more valuable over time, insulating owners from the risk of market oversupply. As Kevin put it, many parks were built decades ago and are still held by the original owners. Buying these properties often means acquiring from “mom and pop” operators, frequently below market value. Attractive Financing and Creative Purchasing OptionsKevin detailed how long-term relationships with owners and a reputation for fair, reliable purchases lead to creative financing opportunities, including owner financing with favorable terms, further improving margins and investor returns.The Role of Private Money and Building Investor RelationshipsA core theme of Kevin's discussion was raising and leveraging private capital to fuel growth. He emphasized the importance of sharing real results transparently, whether in networking groups, social media, or his podcast, as a magnet for investor interest. Kevin's approach is simple: prove success, speak openly about your business, an
"I got in a lot of trouble and so I will never forget my attending said you will never keep the lights on if you practice like that."This episode is with Dr. Lauren Hughes who is a primary care pediatrician in Kansas City.In this episode we talk about:- Having kids in residency and how this might have been the worst time to have kids but there's also no good time- Having a baby intern year and then having twins in March 2020, a few months before she was going to finish residency and start her own practice- Her breastfeeding story and how it inspired her to get extra training in lactation medicine- Being a physician and caring for a child with a rare disease (her son has MCAD where he is missing an enzyme that converts fat to sugar)- The inspiration behind opening her own direct primary care practice- Operationally what it looks like to run a direct care practice and how this differs from a concierge practice- How she got started on social media and what she uses it for today- and so much more! Connect with Moms of Medicine:- Instagram @moms_of_medicine- Momsofmedicine@gmail.comConnect with Dr. Hughes:- Instagram @bloomdpc- drlaurenhughes.com
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