Podcasts about economically

Canada is hosting the FIFA World Cup for the very first time along with Mexico and the United States. With a record number of nations participating some experts believe host cities will receive a large economic boost. Host Rick Zamperin speaks with Tyeshia Redden, an Assistant Professor of Urban Planning at the University of Toronto.

If you're a proper supporter of the Caribbean Cricket Podcast you know Shane! Machel and Shane got together to look at the financial prognosis of West Indies cricket and discuss if and how West Indies can get out of their financial woes. This will undoubtedly cause some consternation and cuss outs. Join the discussion below. As ever please leave a rating, review, comment and follow the Caribbean Cricket Podcast. No other channel keeps it as real as we do on the Caribbean Cricket Podcast. If you'd like to support the Caribbean Cricket Podcast you can become a patron for as little as £2/$2 a month here - https://www.patreon.com/Caribcricket If you would like to read some high quality articles on West Indies cricket - please subscribe to our brand new site - ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠Caribbean Cricket News on CounterPress • West Indies Cricket independent news⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

This episode examines the first round of Colombia's presidential election, which took place on May 31, 2026, and previews the June 21st runoff between two starkly different candidates. Gimena Sánchez-Garzoli, WOLA's director for Colombia and the Andes, provides deep insight into the candidates, voter concerns, and the election's implications for U.S.-Colombia relations.  The first round produced some surprises. While human rights activist and senator Iván Cepeda advanced as expected with 40.9% of the vote, the first-place finisher was criminal defense lawyer and political outsider Abelardo de la Espriella with 43.7%. Taken together, right-of-center candidates already exceed 50%, suggesting challenging math for Cepeda in the runoff.  Sánchez-Garzoli notes that despite fears of political violence—given the assassination of candidate Miguel Uribe Turbay in the past year and Colombia's deteriorating security situation—election day proceeded peacefully.  The candidates represent fundamentally different visions for Colombia. De la Espriella, a wealthy lawyer who once advised the AUC paramilitary group during peace talks and has represented controversial figures, proposes an "iron fist" security approach. His platform includes ending peace negotiations, building ten mega-prisons, mass detentions, aggressive coca eradication, and legalizing firearms ownership. Economically, he embraces Argentina's Milei-style deregulation and reviving the fossil fuel sector. He has also proposed withdrawing Colombia from the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and United Nations human rights bodies.  Cepeda, by contrast, is a philosopher and longtime human rights advocate whose father, a Communist Party senator, was assassinated during the systematic elimination of the Patriotic Union party. Known for his measured, intellectual style, Cepeda was instrumental in Colombia's 2016 Peace Accord and would continue President Gustavo Petro's approach—advancing agrarian reform, pursuing negotiations with armed groups through "total peace," and transitioning away from extractive economic models.  Voter concerns centered overwhelmingly on security and the economy. Sánchez-Garzoli explains that while Petro's ambitions of addressing centuries of inequality in just a few years proved unrealistic, the security situation has genuinely deteriorated.  U.S.-Colombia relations under either candidate promise turbulence, though of different kinds. President Trump publicly endorsed de la Espriella while labeling Cepeda a "radical leftist Marxist." De la Espriella has expressed interest in joining Trump's "Shield of the Americas" security initiative and implementing a "Plan Colombia 2.0," while Cepeda has condemned the U.S. "boat strikes" and other military interventions as violations of Latin American sovereignty and international law.  Looking toward the June 21 runoff, Sánchez-Garzoli warns that Colombia remains fragile and at risk of violence, particularly given President Petro's claims of fraud and the close expected margin. The choices of centrist voters remain uncertain, and it is hard to predict an outcome. 

Interview with Paul Clarke, CEO, CanCambria EnergyRecording date: 14th May 2026CanCambria Energy, a Canadian exploration and production company, is advancing a large-scale natural gas project in Hungary aimed at addressing Europe's growing energy security concerns. As the European Union moves to eliminate reliance on Russian gas by the end of 2027, Hungary—currently importing up to 80% of its supply—faces a significant supply gap. CanCambria's Kiskunhalas concession offers a potential domestic solution.The company has identified approximately 750 billion cubic feet of recoverable natural gas within a deep tight gas formation, alongside 25 million barrels of oil in shallower conventional reservoirs. Its land position spans 247,000 acres, supported by modern 3D seismic data that has significantly reduced exploration risk and improved well targeting compared to earlier drilling efforts.Economically, the project is highly attractive under European gas pricing conditions. Individual wells cost between $15 million and $18 million but can generate over $20 million in revenue within the first year at $10/MMBtu gas prices—well below current European levels of $14–15/MMBtu. Over their lifespan, wells are expected to yield $35–50 million in after-tax netbacks, with a breakeven price near $4/MMBtu, providing a strong margin of safety.To accelerate development, CanCambria is finalizing a joint venture to fund its initial wells, with drilling expected to begin in late 2026 or early 2027. The project is designed to reach cash-flow positivity within the first few wells and scale to significant production levels.In addition to deep gas, shallower oil targets offer quicker, lower-cost returns, enhancing overall project flexibility. With favorable fiscal terms, existing infrastructure access, and strong market demand, CanCambria is positioning itself as a key contributor to Europe's transition toward more secure and diversified energy supplies.Sign up for Crux Investor: https://cruxinvestor.com

Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted.    #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists."  Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr.  Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940. 

Why is common sense disappearing from America's major cities? Kennedy is joined by Jimmy Failla for a deep dive into the crumbling infrastructure and questionable leadership in Los Angeles and Seattle.  The duo breaks down the real-world consequences of progressive policies, specifically exploring why Alexandria Ocasio-Cortez's (AOC) "Tax the Rich" strategy is backfiring and driving wealth—and stability—out of blue states.  Jimmy also shares one of the most important lessons he's shared with his son Lincoln, the art of the heckle. Kennedy Now Available on YouTube: ⁠ ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://link.podtrac.com/kstw_yt⁠ Follow on TikTok: ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://www.tiktok.com/@kennedy_foxnews⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠ Join Kennedy for Happy Hour on Fridays! ⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠https://youtube.com/playlist?list=PLWlNiiSXX4BNUbXM5X8KkYbDepFgUIVZj⁠⁠⁠⁠⁠  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

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Welcome to RealAg Radio with your host Lyndsey Smith! Today’s Agronomic Monday episode of the show is brought to you by Nutrien eKonomics! 00:00 - Coming up... 01:58 - Shane Strydhorst of Pulse Canada on balancing P-K-S when margins are tight 15:49 - TJ Poehlman of the University of Guelph-Ridgetown on seasonal sprayer prep 25:58... Read More

Welcome to RealAg Radio with your host Lyndsey Smith! Today’s Agronomic Monday episode of the show is brought to you by Nutrien eKonomics! 00:00 - Coming up... 01:58 - Shane Strydhorst of Pulse Canada on balancing P-K-S when margins are tight 15:49 - TJ Poehlman of the University of Guelph-Ridgetown on seasonal sprayer prep 25:58... Read More

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John 10:10-11 (HCSB) A thief comes only to steal and to kill and to destroy. I have come so that they may have life and have it in abundance. 11 I am the good shepherd. The good shepherd lays down his life for the sheep.

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Vineyard Wind sues GE Renewables to block a walkout over $300M in withheld payments and defective blades. Plus Ørsted posts a $262M quarterly loss and shakes up its board. Sign up now for Uptime Tech News, our weekly newsletter on all things wind technology. This episode is sponsored by Weather Guard Lightning Tech. Learn more about Weather Guard’s StrikeTape Wind Turbine LPS retrofit. Follow the show on YouTube, Linkedin and visit Weather Guard on the web. And subscribe to Rosemary’s “Engineering with Rosie” YouTube channel here. Have a question we can answer on the show? Email us! Uptime316 Matthew Stead: [00:00:00] The Uptime Wind Energy Podcast brought to you by Strike Tape, protecting thousands of wind turbines from lightning damage worldwide. Visit strike tape.com And now your hosts. Allen Hall: Welcome to the Uptime Wind Energy Podcast. I’m your host Allen Hall, and I’m here with Matthew Stead and Rosemary Barnes who are in Australia. Before we get too far into this episode, I would like to mention that the UK US relationship has been very tense recently, as you have seen in the, in the news articles and on television. But there was one good news piece that just happened, which is the band Oasis just got inducted into the Rock and Roll Hall of Fame. So that is trying to mend those relationships, bring the UK and US back together. In at least a musical sense. So I know Rosemary was watching that closely as the votes were counted. But, [00:01:00] uh, everybody in the UK is super thrilled about it as they should be. And all us Oasis fans can’t wait for the induction ceremony. In fact, we’re planning to go to Cleveland. They’ll go watch it if we can. We shall see now onto more important information this week. Vineyard, wind and GE are not getting along. And if you have been paying attention for the last two years, you would’ve noticed that there’s been a couple of tense moments. Well, uh, that wind project is a little bit up in the air because vineyard wind has filed suit against GE renewables to stop the turbine maker from walking away after GE sent a termination notice. Over a $300 million ish, uh, disagreement in unpaid bills. At the center of this dispute are defective blades, of course, that, uh, broke off in 2024 and caused a number of problems, uh, for GE and vineyard Wind is particularly a delay in the [00:02:00] project and ge having to fix pull blades off of turbines that were already installed and I think they ended up sending those back to France. Reading the lawsuit, it seems like GE did not repair those blades. They replaced those blades because, uh, they may not have been able to repair them or maybe is the amount of time it’s gonna take to repair them. You can repair almost anything made out of. Composite. Uh, but this is a big problem because, uh, if GE does walk away and they’re talking about walking away from this project at the end of April, vineyard, wind believes that the turbines are not ready to be operated, and they don’t have a way to operate those turbines. They don’t have the knowledge or the people because the people belong to GE that need to make some of these turbines operate. Even there’s even some question about if all the turbines are operating at the required [00:03:00]handover requirements. This is unique because I don’t think I’ve ever seen a wind turbine manufacturer leave before a wind site is finished. It must have happened before, but. It does put both sides in quite a pinch. Right.  Rosemary Barnes: Can I just jump, jump back to, to something that you said, um, that you can repair almost anything when it comes to composites? I would say that that doesn’t necessarily apply if your design was insufficient in the first place. And I mean the design for manufacturing in this case, I think that the, like computer model design worked fine, but obviously it was not as easy to manufacture or as possible to manufacture. With the correct quality as what they expected. It can’t have been so simple to just, just repair. That’s, um, that’s what I want to say. Like it, it’s obvious to me that if it was possible to repair, that would’ve been much easier than what they’ve ended up with, which I think is pretty foreseeable. Or most [00:04:00] engineers would probably have foreseen that if you, you know, put blades out there that, um, don’t meet your. Standard, um, quality control acceptance criteria that, you know, the consequence of that would be that it would be more likely to fail. So yeah, I think you can repair nearly anything on a standard blade that is possible to make correctly. But if you’ve got big quality problems, then it’s not, it’s, it’s not easy and it’s possibly not possible to, you know, just get, um, just get onto that in repair.  Matthew Stead: I, I think you’re both right. Because it all comes down to economics. So I think Alan’s statement, you know, things can be repaired. It just comes back to economics, doesn’t it?  Rosemary Barnes: U usually, yes. And like for your average, like if you’ve got a wind farm and you’ve got a blade with a big, a big repair, or you know, like a big defect right on the main laminate, that’s gonna require, you know, like a huge repair, taking the blade down and keeping it down for, you know, like three months while you rebuild like 20 meters [00:05:00] of laminate. Yes, that would be technically possible, but you wouldn’t because it would be so expensive. So us usually, like in 99% of cases, that would be it. That it’s not actually impossible to repair. It’s just very hard. But, you know, in these really huge blades and, you know, um, bearing in mind that I don’t, I don’t know the specific quality problems that they face, but, you know, just from my knowledge of composites, you can say what the challenging areas would be, but you know, a really big blade is gonna have a really thick laminate and, um, composites don’t like to have really thick laminates. When they cure, it’s usually an, an exothermic reaction, puts off heat, you know, like the temperature is changing and um, it works fine for thin laminates, but when it’s really thick you can get hot spots and cold spots and maybe it’s hard to get the resin to go all the way through evenly. But you know, imagine if you’ve got a really thick laminate and there’s a chunk of it that just didn’t get any resin in it. How are you gonna repair that? Like, I wouldn’t say impossible. I’m sure if the fate of the human race depended on it, then you would, you would make it work. But it’s [00:06:00] certainly very close to impossible.  Matthew Stead: Economically, it does not make sense.  Rosemary Barnes: You would probably have to make a few inventions. Along the way to be able to make it work as well. I think,  Allen Hall: I think I should read part of, and I don’t like reading these lawsuits, but this is informative in a sense that it provides some relative background as to what Vineyard Wind is thinking in some of the contract details that are involved here. So in June 4th, 2021, this is directly from the lawsuit, uh, vineyard Wind entered into A TSA with GE renewables in which. GE Renewables agreed to design, manufacture supply, install commission, and test the wind turbine generators for the vineyard wind project at a contract price of more than $1.3 billion. There you go. On the same day as an integral part of the commercial agreement, the parties entered into an SMA, uh, by which GE renewables agreed to maintain and service that wind turbine [00:07:00]generators for the first five years. Of operations of the project and guarantee that all wind turbine generators will operate at a 97% of production availability. Uh, this guarantee is central, is a central component of the commercial viability of the Vineyard Wind Project. So I would say so, right. Uh, at present, all of the wind turbine generators on the project have been installed. However, the wind turbine generators are not yet fully operational and are. Able to reduce power at only levels well below those intended under the contracts fundamental to the project’s commitment to Massachusetts to achieve full commercial operation. The project requires repair, commissioning, and maintenance of GE renewables, 62 proprietary wind turbine generators, and their component parts work that only GE renewables knows how to perform. So it sounds like Vineyard Wind has a five-year contract that GE ISS gonna operate these [00:08:00] turbines, and if they leave in a couple of weeks, vineyard wind really doesn’t have a backup plan. They may have. Were planning on a plan five years down the road where they could operate ’em, but to operate those turbines immediately when they haven’t, at least as. Indicated here may not be fully commissioned to providing the right amount of availability. That’s a huge problem for Vineyard. Huge.  Rosemary Barnes: It’s interesting to me that they’ve decided to withhold some money that I think everyone agrees that they owe that money to ge. But then there’s a dispute because Vineyard when says that GE owes them money for some other stuff That sounds like GE disputes. Um, it’s like if you have a problem. With your landlord, they always tell you, don’t, don’t withhold rent, because then they can, you know, that’s, that’s their out of the contract. Right? So it seems weird, like it’s a relatively small amount compared to what vineyard wind is risking. So. It seems to me like, are they, is this a mistake from them? Are they giving ge an out from this contract that’s gonna be [00:09:00] really hard for them to meet? It might be that GE knows what it would cost to entirely fix the wind farm and have it producing the way that it should. But, you know, let’s say in a worst case scenario, that means remaking every single blade in the um, in the wind farm. At the, at the French factory, you know, like that could be your, your worst case scenario. GE knows that that’s gonna cost more than what they’re ever gonna pay over the five years of, um, you know, the, uh, of missing the availability guarantee. So then it is worth, for them, the cost effective thing to do is to just walk away and they’re kind of, the amount that they’ll have to pay is limited. If I’m thinking fairness, it’s so unfair that vineyard wind would be stuck with this wind farm that they can’t really get to do anything. But if I think about how I see these disputes work out in the smaller versions of them that I’ve seen, it seems like vineyard wind actually probably is the one more likely to come out with a bad outcome from the way that they’re [00:10:00] choosing to play this right. Uh, because they, they risk not being able to operate at all. And they have potentially, like, I’m not a lawyer, I don’t, I don’t know about, you know, how likely it is that the 300 million, that their withholding will be enough for GE to walk away with without having to pay anything for, um, you know, not operating, uh, correctly over the next five years. But, um, you know, it just seems like it’s not so much money compared to the billions that are at stake. To risk that they will be left unable to operate the wind farm at all. You know, it’s just, uh, I don’t know. It seems risky.  Allen Hall: Let’s start with the kickoff of what happened and what vineyard wind is alleging happened from these, their perspective on it. It does provide some insight into all the things we talked about on the podcast for the last two years. We, we saw bits and pieces of it. According to vineyard wind, uh, GE Renewable [00:11:00] claims that it is owed quote amounts due unquote for milestone payments is, is contrary in in language to the TSA, so the turbine supply agreement put simply vineyard wind owes nothing to GE renewables because the TSA turbine supply agreement allows vineyard wind to withhold amounts. The project engineer determines that GE Renewable owes vineyard wind from milestone payments otherwise due under the contract. So what they’re saying is GE owes is a bunch of money. Yes, we do owe GE renewables money, but it’s in Vineyard Wind’s favor. So why would they send GE money? Um, those set off amounts are substantial because GE renewables caused catastrophic injury to vineyard wind by installing 68 defective blades on 24. Wind turbine generators resulting in two years of delay and over a billion dollars of damages. In July, 2024, one of the GE renewable offshore blades collapsed and fell into the waters off Nantucket resuscitating a massive environmental cleanup and requiring a six month [00:12:00] construction hiatus during which GE Renewable performed a root cause analysis, concluding that 68 of the 72 GE renewable. Blades installed at the project, nearly all manufactured by GE Renewable in Gaspay Canada, and they say nearly all, not all, nearly all were also defected because they were inadequately bonded together, the original blades were so poorly made that they were beyond repair. Indeed, the federal government required GE renewable to remove all the blades and to replace all gas bay blades with others manufactured at a different facility in Sherbrook, France. So that’s really the kickoff to all of this disagreement was the quality issues from Gas Bay. Uh, vineyard Wind goes on to say that GE Renewables and, and their CEO, Scott Straza, basically admitted to, uh, a, a serious, um. Overlook or quality issue? Quality escape, something of the [00:13:00] sort, uh, in some of the statements, which I, I remember him talking about  Rosemary Barnes: allegedly, in your opinion. Allen Hall: Well, and Scott Streek did say it. In fact, here’s, here’s what Scott Streek did say. Streek, uh, acknowledged that the blade failure and said, quote, we have identified a material deviation or a manufacturing deviation. In one of our factories that through the inspection or quality assurance process we should have identified. Because of that, we’re going to use our existing data and reinspect all of the blades that we have made for offshore wind and for context in this factory in Gus Bay, Canada, where the material deviation existed. That’s a quote. What happens now,  Rosemary Barnes: obviously I’ve never worked on anything that’s, this is the biggest example of, um, a, you know, a blade quality problem, a serial issue probably that’s ever happened in the wind industry. I’ve never worked on something this big, but I have worked on probably half a dozen small, small versions that are quite similar. Um. To this, but just on a, you know, a much, much smaller scale. And I will say that it never [00:14:00] feels fair what the owner of the wind farm, like, what the outcome is, never feels fair to the owner of the wind farm. Like when you’ve got a serial defect in, um, in play it like, and everyone suffers. It costs, it’s gonna cost the, um, you know, the manufacturer a lot of money. But I think that proportionally it is. Affects the owners more in nearly every case. It’s just there are some contractual things that you don’t end up with outcomes that feel, feel fair to anybody that, um, you know, would take a casual look at it. So I don’t think that an outcome that feels fair is probably likely for, for vineyard wind. Um, and I guess it all just comes down to whether or not GE agree that they owe that 800 million or whatever the figure is. Um, or if a court finds that they owe it. Because surely the contract doesn’t say that Vineyard wins engineer at any time can just, or project manager can at any time decide [00:15:00] that, um, GE owes the money and so they don’t have to pay. That obviously wouldn’t be a very, um, nice contract for GE to sign. So there’s gotta be some more nuance to it other than. That our project manager says, you owe us money so we’re not paying. And then, you know, you have to continue. Like, I, it’s probably impossible for us to, without, um, you know, having access to all of, all of the documents and the legal degree to understand it. Probably, probably hard for us to Yeah. Come up with a, a reasonable conclusion.  Allen Hall: It does make you think, usually the progression is dispute. Whatever contractually is obligated in the beginning happens. And so if there’s someone who decides what pot of money goes where, that, that’s usually the first step. Second step is usually arbitration in the us. I’d be surprised if they haven’t gone through at least an attempt at arbitration. And then once arbitration breaks down, then you go into the courts, which is clearly where they’re at now you’re, you’re at the highest level that you can be in terms of legal proceedings to try to sort this matter out. And I’m sure both sides. Do not want to be in front of a [00:16:00] courtroom if they can avoid it. So there’s a much more to come about this. I, I think the other operators, uh, GEs this is, is this GEs only? Yeah. This is GEs only wind farm offshore in the us So this is it. But I would imagine that the other, uh, operators in offshore wind in the US or. Being very careful word through contracts and how this is proceeding.  Rosemary Barnes: That’s something else I think about this case is that it’s going to be like the GE are the ones who have more at stake in terms of reputational harm. I would’ve thought then. Um, so. Yeah, that’s obviously a consideration that they’ve, they’ve gotta have, it isn’t, regardless of where the facts are, it’s not a good look. Right. Um, to be seen, to be walking away from a wind farm. And it probably would make other people considering big expensive GE wind farms to be like, oh, you know, are we actually gonna get across the line with this? Or is there a risk that they just, you know, throw a tantrum towards the end and threaten to walk away and we have to renegotiate [00:17:00] everything. So, um, I guess that there’s a, yeah, there’s always just the perception. Is as important in a lot of ways to what the actual facts are.  Matthew Stead: The thing I find is, um, I mean this is largely a legal thing, isn’t it? You know, we, we’ve agreed that it’s, with the lawyers, it’s a largely a legal thing. The, the sort of topic that I’m interested in is, um, like the example of you buy a car, you know, you buy a Toyota, um, you expect to be able to maintain it. You expect to be able to run it and get a serviced by a Toyota, you don’t expect in the first year to take your Toyota to Ford and get them to fix it in the first year. The bigger issue is the turbine supplier agreement does not actually allow the turbine to be operated without the OEM, so no one knows. No one knows how to run it. So for me, it’s a massive industry challenge, access of data, access of how to run a turbine. If the OEM is no longer there, so I think hopefully [00:18:00] this can have rama bigger ramifications for the industry that operators and owners can actually run the assets they own.  Rosemary Barnes: Well, there are companies that will come in and pull out your control system of your, you know, your turbine. If it, you know, if you, um, if you don’t wanna work with them anymore or if the company went bankrupt, then there are companies that will rip it out and put a new one in. It’s not, not saying that that’s like an easy, cost effective thing to do and probably not gonna get the same, um, performance as, as you originally did. But that’s what happens if you are, um, you know, your turbine manufacturer goes bankrupt and they just don’t exist to support anymore. Sometimes people have to resort to literally pulling out the whole control system and starting again. Not easy. When it’s something as big and new as this one obviously  Matthew Stead: isn’t the better answer that when you buy something, you actually buy the information to actually run it. Rosemary Barnes: I don’t fully agree [00:19:00] though, because. It’s like, um, o often what you say, oh, you know, like this would be good. Like the one common thing is people say, oh, you know, like it’s planned obsolescence. People, engineers plan design things to fail so that you’ll need to replace them. And I think that that does, that does happen again in like consumer, consumer products. Like, um, yeah, like your, your battery isn’t really designed to last for 10 years in your, your phone the same way that it is in an electric car. Um, more than 10 years in the case of an electric car. Um. But it’s not. It’s not what happens in industrial scale equipment. You are mostly worried about getting the price point right. And if you want something to last longer, if you want something that anybody can come in and fix it easily, it costs more to engineer like that and usually like a a lot more. So it’s not just people like evil engineers or evil. Um. Evil management at these, at these companies.  Allen Hall: I already get to evil engineers. Rosemary Barnes: No, people think it is. People think it’s evil. Engineers like purposely designing bad products to [00:20:00] um, make money, which I actually do think that they do with consumer products. Some of the time. Um, but when it comes to like industrial equipment, I, I don’t think that that’s the main, the main thing that planned obsolescence is not, is not a major factor here. It’s about trying to get the price point competitive to make sales. And if you want to get better engineering, you, you will, you will pay for it.  Matthew Stead: I got a call with someone today that, which is on this topic. So, you know, we, we are a sensor company and, um, we pro we provide results, okay? So if we actually provided the raw data that we measure, it actually allows people, other people to reverse engineer our products. So we don’t generally provide the raw data, so we provide the end outcome. Because it means that people can’t copy what we do. It means we can actually charge a lower price. So actually there’s a lot of logic to, you know, having, you know, [00:21:00] all these ways of engineering a product to, you know, give a better outcome to the end customer. Allen Hall: I know Rosie doesn’t like Elon Musk, but this one of the things that Elon Musk did with Tesla at least, I don’t know about the other companies that he runs, but with Tesla, they went off and. Made patents, right? So they applied for a bunch of patents and received them and then just made them open use. And the reason they did that was so somebody couldn’t jump the patent line, create a patent about some car related electric thing, and prohibit Tesla from doing. And so Tesla has always had the need to create patents that cost them, I’m sure, a, a pretty penny, just so they can avoid. Patent conflicts and lawsuits going forward. And it’s sort of the same thing, right? That the evil engineer bit, that’s the evil engineer bit I, that I don’t like is that when you get these crazy patent things happening out there that are just there to collect money and not do any of the work,  Rosemary Barnes: and some of the patents are. Absolutely crazy. Like when you do a patent search and it’s like you’re [00:22:00] reading the language and like it sounds like they’ve just patented the concept of a wheel, you know? And then you’ve gotta try and figure out like what’s actually going on. Yeah. In  Matthew Stead: our world, someone has a patent around the Doppler shift. Allen Hall: How can you have a patent on Doppler shift? That’s crazy.  Matthew Stead: It’s fundamental physical. You know, there’s a shift in frequency of a sound, um,  Allen Hall: based on speed  Matthew Stead: and yes, sound comes from a blade and there’s a doppler shift.  Allen Hall: That’s real. I, I, I guess, uh, see, that’s, that’s, that’s the craziness of that. See, you should have thought about. The idiots that were gonna do that and then write a patent about Doppler shift.  Rosemary Barnes: It’s really annoying because it’s like, you know that it’s not gonna be, I mean, a lot of them you are like 99% sure it’s not gonna be possible for them to defend that if it gets challenged. But it’s like, to what extent do we trust that, you know? Um, so you still usually end up steering around it anyway, but it, it really gets in the way of elegant engineering solutions. All these. Bizaro patents that are out there like clogging up [00:23:00] the design landscape.  Allen Hall: That happened recently. Right? Rosa? You had and I were talking about a particular patent. I thought had it existed and it did at one point exist and I. Rosie said, I don’t, I don’t see it anymore. So I did some search on it. Yeah, it got pulled off. Uh, the list of valid patents. It was a lightning related thing.  Rosemary Barnes: And you were complaining that it was so obvious that they should never have been able to patent it, but yeah, and somebody obviously said, said something at some. I don’t think patents are not the best way to protect an idea anyway. Right? Like nobody, if you, if you’ve got a new technology idea and you’re relying on a patent to protect other people from copying it, it’s not the best idea. I do work with a lot of small inventors who are like, oh, I’ve got a patent application, and they think it means something, that it doesn’t. They think, oh, you know, patent was approved. That means it works. It means it’s a good idea. It doesn’t mean any of those things for like small, outside of big companies. I, I think it’s super rare that you would get more. You would get a positive return [00:24:00] on. On filing and maintaining a patent in all the countries that, um, are relevant  Allen Hall: as wind energy professionals, staying informed is crucial, and let’s face it difficult. That’s why the Uptime podcast recommends PES Wind Magazine. PES Wind offers a diverse range of in-depth articles and expert insights that dive into the most pressing issues facing our energy future. Whether you’re an industry veteran or new to wind, PES Wind has the high quality content you need. Don’t miss out. Visit PES wind.com today. Sted posted a net loss of 1.7 billion Danish groner, roughly $262 million for the third quarter, as the cost of battling us anti win policies continues to mount the CEO. Rasmus abo, uh, says the company is about. One year into a turnaround plan, uh, that’s set to [00:25:00] run through beginning of 2028, and that the medicine is starting to work. Uh, one major strategic change. Ted will enter partnerships on new projects far earlier, and so it will never again, uh, be forced into damaging late stage divestments The company maintained its full year EBITDA and, uh, guidance of, of, of. 24 to 27 billion Danish kroner. That’s a good bit of money. And the sale of a 50% stake in the horn, C3 to Apollo Global Management for a billion dollars is already under. Well, at least in progress, but there’s a lot more behind the scenes here. Sted had an basically an investor meeting and a shareholder meeting, and, uh, they have three new board members. They let go of, if I remember correctly, three board members that were [00:26:00] employees that they just, uh, had reductions in forces that happen to affect board members, which is very odd. Very, very odd in my. Humble opinion, having watched number of boards for a long time, usually don’t remove board members in that fashion, but there does seem to be a, a, a more emphasis on the board to help, uh, the CEO of stead get through some of these tumultuous times and maybe a little bit of concern about the, the, the way the board was constructed to get or sit back into profitability sooner rather than later. This is a big deal up in Denmark. Of course, stead is the power company for Denmark. This has implications worldwide, though, uh, what stead does everybody else follows. And the one thing that, uh, that was sort of in dispute before the shareholder meeting was EOR at one point, was. At least contemplating a board seat. And then right [00:27:00] before the meeting they backed off and said, no, it’s fine. We don’t want a board seat. Maybe they had some sense of what the changes were gonna be made to the board, so they felt better about it. But orsa is not out of the rough seas at the moment. There’s a couple more years of, of growing pains and learning some lessons that they wish they didn’t have to learn. I guess that’s the way I would look at it. What implications does this have on the greater offshore wind community? Is stead taking basically a step back and, and trying to focus. Herding offshore wind, or is it just other, another companies are gonna step into that, that space that Sted may have previously occupied? Matthew Stead: I think what you’re talking about, um, Alan, is, is all logical. I mean, you know, you can’t have everything. So, um, as in you can’t, you know, getting late to a project and expect it to go well, um, spreading risk is a good thing, you know, so the whole, you know, [00:28:00] doing it fast. Doing it cheap and doing it well. Um, you, you, you can’t have all of those things at once. So actually what they’re talking about, I think is entirely logical. Um, so yeah, I think if they can lead the way that way and, and you know, I’ve come from, um, some other industries like construction and they, they spread the risk across multiple. Organizations that know what they’re doing. So the idea of joint ventures where you get the best of both worlds makes complete sense to me. Allen Hall: Do they start making different decisions on projects based upon their financial stake at the moment? A And more importantly, when they start looking for offshore wind projects, are they likely to hook up with Vestas? Because I, I think that’s where this is all going.  Matthew Stead: Pick a horse.  Allen Hall: Yeah, they’re gonna pick a horse. I, I mean, that’s the best, best way to think about it. They’re gonna pick a horse and gonna stick with them. Instead of having, uh, a lot of options and playing one against the other, I could see alignment happening, uh, versus being the [00:29:00] one offshore, of course. And or instead being a big player. There is, is that the combo that’s gonna push the industry forward? Rosemary Barnes: Yeah, maybe. I mean, I think it’s more similar to what Chinese manufacturers are doing, a lot more vertical integration. You can, um, yeah, save, save a lot of money by doing that. It is. Uh, you know, not always ideal from other points of view. And it might be nice to have a, you know, a thriving technology ecosystem of, you know, different manufacturers competing with each other and, you know, making better products. So, um, yeah, I don’t know, uh, have sit on the fence on this one for what’s good. I do feel really bad for osted though, like in terms of the, the. Shocks that they’ve had over the last couple of years. I, I don’t think most people would’ve foreseen that it would be so risky to try and expand into the US like everybody. A few years ago, everybody thought that that was the next big profitable frontier in offshore wind. And [00:30:00] I don’t think that many people would’ve foreseen things going the way that they did.  Allen Hall: Is it the result of large industrial projects take time and that in that timeframe, five, 10 years, that the world changes so much? You can’t. Accurately predict what the outcome will be and or it just got caught up in it.  Rosemary Barnes: Yeah, I think that’s actually one of the themes you guys have read, um, how big things get Done Right by Ben. Um, that’s one of the things that he mentions that the quicker that you can do the execution phase of your project, like spend plenty of time planning it, but when you’re actually committed, work super fast because the longer that you’re working, the more your chance of a, a black swan. Um, a Black Swan event be, you know, a government that turns out to, you know, want to, you know, tear up contracts and you know, do all these other unprecedented stuff. You know, if you’ve got projects that take 10 or more years to build, then there’s just like a lot more risk of something like that happening. And I think that, um, you know, like in some ways that’s just one of the inherent weaknesses of [00:31:00] wind energy in general, but offshore wind especially is that it does actually take a long time to get through all of the things that you need to do to. Um, to complete a project. And so it’s just, yeah, a lot more chance for, you know, the government will change two or three times probably in, um, you know, during a project. How many wars can start, how many, you know, pandemics. Can there be you? Like, the longer that you’re going, you might think none of those things could be predicted and that can’t, but you can predict that those sorts of big things happen. And the longer that you, um, are exposed and the more of them that you’re probably gonna face. And I think that, yeah, like something like a solar farm is much quicker to roll out. Um, battery projects are much quicker to roll out. So it’s just like that, those are benefits of those technologies compared to wind. You just have to kind of accept that that’s one of the weaknesses of this, this industry that we’re in. Allen Hall: Is it a benefit to have solar because it can deploy very quickly, or, or is it just [00:32:00] smarter to have. More wind turbines of smaller megawatt outputs because you can manufacture ’em at scale quicker, and so the economies of scale don’t really matter so much. This is an argument we’ve been making for months now, that when you start selecting a single turbine, which doesn’t have any history, and it’s a big one, and it takes a long time to produce, you are really setting up yourself to fall into that window where something can go wrong. Versus just stamping out two or three megawatt turbines and going like crazy. It just seems so much less risky.  Rosemary Barnes: I think that I definitely agree with you for onshore and then for offshore. Probably also, like I don’t think it’s necessarily go for a smaller turbine. It’s just don’t go for the brand new one. Like that’s why I don’t understand how many people are like so obsessed with this, you know, small, small amount of improvement that they get from the very biggest. Turbine, but I don’t think that they realize the amount of technical risk. And I think that it gets, it’s getting [00:33:00] more and more like the, um, technology increment is getting more and more the bigger that we go. It’s not that like, oh, we’re learning how to do this, this, well, it’s, it’s the opposite that, you know, like every, um, increment up in size as an exponentially more like larger number of problems, technical problems that have to be solved. And, um, I think that, yeah, that’s. That’s something people don’t factor in. Allen Hall: Is it the gold rush problem where the miners were trying to hit that pocket of gold and spending all their time trying to find this gold, find this gold. In the meantime, a lot of them obviously broke, and the people that made money in the gold rush or the stores that sold the pickaxes, if you, you making a pickaxes, you have a customer page, you can just sell those things in. Levi’s, be the other one, right? So they’re selling genes of pickaxes to the miners. Guess who won in that battle, right? Levi’s.  Rosemary Barnes: But what’s the analogy with win two of the pickax manufacturers,  Allen Hall: the people that make the two megawatt machines? In my opinion, that’s gonna be who the pickaxes are because you don’t have to think about it. If [00:34:00] you can talk to operators of the United States today and you say, what turbine would you like to buy over again? And they will almost all tell you, GE one point fives. Almost all of them. And you go, yeah. Oh, okay. I understand it because it’s a machine. It’s pretty simple. But it does work. And it is, it is a true warhorse turbine. And some of the vested ones are the same. Simpson Siemens turbines are very similar, right? Uh, but in today’s world, when we’re talking about 15, 20 megawatt turbines, I just think, man, you gotta be careful doing that just because of the time it takes to develop it and produce it, and. Work at all the kinks? Uh, Rosemary, I think you’re right about that.  Rosemary Barnes: I think the issue is that, um, when you’re deciding whether to develop a project or not, it really depends a lot on what the spreadsheet tells you your return is going to be. And, um, you know, a bigger turbine with, uh, you know, like larger output over its lifetime, longer lifetime. Those are all gonna give you really good. Spreadsheet numbers, but what’s not in the spreadsheet [00:35:00] is, oh, you know, you’ve actually increased your risk of having to wait two years while they replace every single blade in this, um, in this wind farm. Oh, by the way, yeah, you’re gonna be dealing with, um, you know, twice as many repairs and your, um, downtime is not gonna be 2%, it’s gonna be 3.5% or, or something. You know, those, those sorts of things, I don’t think, uh, adequately captured in the, the spreadsheets whe say when you, whether you should or shouldn’t develop a new project.  Matthew Stead: So, so the evil engineering should be making decisions, not the evil lawyers.  Allen Hall: The financial people always make the decisions, right? The insurance companies make the decisions.  Rosemary Barnes: Don’t think there’s a lot of engineering into, um, input in the, the very first stages. But I also think that if you put in the reality, like most engineers, I think are a little bit pessimistic because our job is to see what problems exist at, you know, and then solve them ideally. Um, but at least part of it, like our brains are wired to look for problems, right? That’s, um, that’s a necessary part of the job, in my opinion. But if you were, you know, like pessimistic in your assumptions in the [00:36:00] spreadsheet, you would probably the majority of the time say, don’t make this project. The return is not very good. Allen Hall: Well, that would be a smart move, right? Yeah.  Rosemary Barnes: Yeah. So I don’t actually think you probably should have too many engineers in in involved.  Matthew Stead: Yeah. But what is the CEO incentivized by is the, yeah, so it, it comes back to, you know, what, what, what drives the project And it’s not just engineering.  Allen Hall: That wraps up another episode of the Uptime Wind Energy Podcast. If today’s discussion sparked any questions or ideas, we’d love to hear from you. Reach out to us on LinkedIn and don’t forget to subscribe. So if you never miss an episode and if you found value in today’s conversation, please leave us a review. It really helps. For Rosie and Matthew, I am Allen Hall and we’ll see you next week on the Uptime Wind Energy [00:37:00] Podcast.

This week on Coffee Time Wednesday Nicolas breaks down what would actually happen if the Corn Belt set aside 10% of its acres for conservation. Using over 40 sources, he walks through the county level economics of lost grain sales, higher commodity prices, hunting revenue, and CRP payments. The math might surprise you. hokseynativeseeds.com (for all your CRP, native mixes, butterfly wildflower patches, hunting habitat mixes, and more!) BirdHunterSupply.com (to give back to conservation while purchasing your bird hunting supplies)

Political analyst Steve Roberts gives his thoughts.

On the April 10, 2026, broadcast of The Tara Show, the first hour highlights a series of geopolitical and local ironies, starting with the argument that China, not Iran, is the true victor of the recent conflict—a strategic shift allegedly overlooked by President Trump. The show also examines the controversial decision by the administration to "rubberstamp" Iran's authority to collect shipping tolls, further complicating regional dynamics. Closer to home, the program notes the "total irony" of a Greenville City patrol vehicle speeding in poor conditions, while closing with a critical look at the turbulent and often flawed global transition toward AI integration in everyday life.

How did Dorene find an effective way to not overpack her suitcase for a trip?

Guest Amaroq Weiss is the Senior Wolf Advocate with the Center for Biological Diversity. A biologist and former attorney, she has worked on wolf recovery and conservation advocacy at the state and federal levels across the country for nearly 30 years. The Center for Biological Diversity is a national, nonprofit conservation organization with more than 1.8 million members and online activists dedicated to protecting endangered species and wild places. Summary This episode features Amaroq Weiss, senior wolf advocate for the Center for Biological Diversity, in a wide-ranging conversation about wolf conservation, public perception, and coexistence. Weiss traces her path from a childhood fascination with wildlife to a career blending science, law, and advocacy, shaped by influential books and mentorship. The discussion centers on the persistent vilification of wolves, rooted in cultural narratives imported from Europe and reinforced by modern media and political interests. Weiss argues that wolf hatred is largely learned—and therefore reversible—emphasizing that most Americans actually support wolf protections. She explains how wolves are often scapegoats for broader tensions around government regulation, while misconceptions about their behavior fuel fear. Ecologically, wolves function as keystone species, regulating prey populations, promoting biodiversity, and even helping control disease. Economically, they contribute to tourism and can reduce costly deer-vehicle collisions. To avoid conflicts with livestock and enable coexistence, Weiss outlines a range of effective non-lethal strategies—such as removing attractants, using guard animals, and modifying ranching practices. The episode also explores the ethical and intrinsic value of wolves, beyond their economic and ecological value. Weiss urges listeners to challenge misinformation, advocate for science-based policy, and recognize wolves as sentient beings with a right to exist. Ultimately, she frames conservation as a long-term, multi-generational effort requiring shifts in both mindset and behavior. The Essential Point The core of Amaroq's argument is that our conflict with wolves is less about the animals themselves and more about legacy beliefs and practices that can be changed through education, policy, and a willingness to coexist. Social Media & Referenced www.biologicaldiversity.org https://www.facebook.com/CenterforBioDiv https://waleslit.com/authors/amaroq-weiss/ Of Wolves and Men by Barry Lopez Wolf Wars by Hank Fisher Lone Wolf by Adam Weymouth 60 Minutes: The Wolves of Yellowstone

Ken Johnson and Seth Law reflect on the 2026 RSA Conference and BSidesSF, noting an industry-wide "awakening" regarding the high costs and engineering complexities of operationalizing AI security tools. A major focus is the recent "supply chain attack hell," specifically the compromise of the Axios HTTP client through dual-account breaches that allowed attackers to bypass legitimate OIDC deploy setups via a misconfigured NPM CLI. The malware used was particularly evasive, deleting itself and replacing its package.json with a clean version post-execution. The hosts also discuss the emergence of the "Agentic Development Lifecycle" (ADLC), where engineering teams are increasingly "committing on time" rather than features, creating a volume of code that traditional security gates cannot manage. They debate Thomas Ptacek's thesis that AI agents will soon "supplant" human vulnerability research for common bug classes, shifting the human role toward high-level governance and "context infusion". Economically, they highlight how Anthropic's security announcements contributed to nearly half a trillion dollars in market value loss for traditional security firms, as investors increasingly bet on frontier models to consume established security domains.

Advancements in electrolysis technology are making green hydrogen a more economically viable alternative to fossil fuels. Water electrolysis, powered by renewable energy, offers an emissions-free method for hydrogen production, but high costs and efficiency challenges have limited its adoption. Innovations like cobalt-cerium metal-organic frameworks and selectively permeable membranes are reducing costs and improving efficiency. Global electrolyzer capacity is expected to reach 520 gigawatts by 2030, with materials chemistry playing a crucial role in the economic feasibility of green hydrogen.Learn more on this news by visiting us at: https://greyjournal.net/news/ Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

16. Trump's Ties to Russia and Epstein. Guest: Craig Unger. Craig Unger explores Donald Trump's continued favorable rhetoric toward Vladimir Putin. He discusses how the Iran war benefits Russia economically and mentions potential vulnerabilities related to the Jeffrey Epstein files and Russian intelligence.,, (16)1945 DOJ

Christchurch locals say the city is prospering and heading in the right direction, on the back of an ASB report finding Canterbury is the best place to be in the country economically. But there's concern the good times won't last, with rising fuel prices and they worry about how the economy will be affected by the war in the Middle East. Anna Sargent reports.

Zach Lahn is a first-time political candidate running in the 2026 Republican primary for Governor of Iowa. Never having held elected office, he launched his campaign from his family farm, positioning himself as a self-funded outsider independent of party leadership and corporate donors. His candidacy is rooted in a belief that Iowa needs leadership grounded in rural life rather than professional politics. Lahn's platform is socially conservative and economically populist, with a strong focus on agriculture and land ownership. He opposes foreign and corporate control of Iowa farmland and advocates for family farms over large agribusiness monopolies. Economically, he is critical of corporate consolidation and globalism, supporting antitrust action and policies that favor small businesses. On social issues, Lahn is anti-abortion, opposes gender-affirming medical procedures for minors, and emphasizes traditional family structures and parental control in education. He also runs on a tough-on-crime platform, with a focus on fentanyl trafficking and strong support for law enforcement. Shawn Ryan Show Sponsors: Get 30% off your first subscription order at https://armra.com/srs with code SRS. Find your forever cookware @hexclad and get 10% off at https://hexclad.com/srs! #hexcladpartner Go to https://helixsleep.com/srs for 20% off sitewide. Go to https://shopbeam.com/SRS, use code SRS. With my code SRS, you can grab Dream for 50% off. Zach Lahn Links: Web - https://zachlahn.com FB - https://www.facebook.com/ZachLahn X - https://x.com/ZachLahn Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

The Iran war is adding impetus to reconciliation efforts between Armenia and Azerbaijan, as the region seeks to position itself as a new trade corridor between Europe and energy-rich central Asia, with the conflict highlighting Europe's energy dependency on the volatile Middle East. Addressing the European Parliament earlier this month, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan declared that, with the Iranian conflict on its border, efforts would be stepped up to realise a trade route with Azerbaijan.  The United States-brokered TRIPP project, negotiated by United States President Donald Trump last August, is seen as key to reconciling the two countries, after decades of conflict over the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave.  With both Armenia and Azerbaijan bordering Iran, the conflict is providing a powerful impetus for cooperation. “This war in Iran has fostered much more of a localised regional identity where, despite the wars and the conflicts of the last several decades, Armenia, Turkey, and Azerbaijan are actually banding together,” said Richard Giragosiyan, director of the Regional Studies Center, a think tank based in the Armenian capital, Yerevan. “Now is the one opportunity for consolidating regional connectivity in terms of trade and transport." Life after ruin: Aghdam's fragile rebirth after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict 'The Trump Road' Pashinyan and Azerbaijan's President Ilham Aliyev signed the TRIPP agreement as part of a peace deal, committing to unimpeded connectivity between mainland Azerbaijan and the exclave of Nakhchivan, via Armenian territory. The new trade route is expected to become part of what is dubbed the “Middle Corridor”, linking energy-rich Central Asian countries to Europe via Turkey. Tehran strongly opposes the initiative, as the corridor offers an alternative to transiting through Iran to Central Asia. However, the Iran war has further curtailed Tehran's diminishing influence in the Caucasus. “We also shouldn't forget the benefits of the Iran war,” said Turkey analyst Atilla Yesilada of the New York-based Global Source Partners consultancy. “They [Ankara] want a weak Iran so that they can expand their footprint in the South Caucasus against Iran.” Yesilada says the fallout from the Iran war underscores the importance of the TRIPP agreement – or, as it's sometimes dubbed in Turkey, the “Trump Road" – which is key to Ankara's economic goals.  “We get the Trump Road because nobody would want to traverse Iran under these conditions,” explains Yesilada, “And you get [a] not immediate but gradual, but permanent, development boost from trade and investment along that route.” US takes lead in Caucasus peace deal as France is pushed aside A new route for Europe The Middle Corridor is seen as an opportunity for Europe to diversify in terms of energy supply from the volatile Middle East. “The most obvious security lesson [from the Iran war] is diversity,” said Tatiana Mitrova, a research fellow at the Center on Global Energy Policy at New York's Columbia University. "The real jewel is Turkmenistan's gas, the third largest [supply] in terms of the world's resources. I believe that there will be a lot of discussions about the middle corridor both in the region and in Europe.” However, Mitrova remains cautious about the project's viability, saying: "Economically it's not attractive – too many risks and too low margins.” The Caucasus is sandwiched between Russia's war in Ukraine and the Iran conflict, raising questions over how secure any new energy route to Europe would be. These come alongside reservations over the viability of the billions of euros of investment needed, at a time when Europe is seeking to transition away from fossil fuels.  “The problem with the Brussels policy is they don't want to invest in hydrocarbons, they don't invest in gas,” said Farid Shafiyev, chairman of the Baku-based Center of Analysis of International Relations. Frenchman convicted for spying in Azerbaijan, sentenced to ten years Opportunity for peace However, Shafiyev argues that, in addition to providing an alternative energy supply for Europe, there is an opportunity to build on the current momentum for peace.  “There is some hostility remaining... but overall, the feeling [is] we don't want any new war and conflict in the South Caucasus. And indeed, [there is] a sort of window of opportunity to bring this alternative route, including for energy and gas." Interdependency in trade, and with it economic prosperity, is seen as key to strengthening the rapprochement between Armenia, Azerbaijan and their Turkish neighbours. It's a rapprochement that could also be vital to resisting any future threat from Russia, which is seeking to reassert itself in the region. However, such threats of renewed instability could also prove a major obstacle to any large-scale infrastructure investment by Europe.

15. Sadanand Dhume Headline: India's Strategic Neutrality in the BRICS Grouping Dhume analyzes India's unique position, balancing relationships with the U.S. and Israel against energy needs. He describes BRICS as an economically underperforming and politically fractured group with deep-seated internal rivalries. (15)1865 KOLKAATA

Mexico City is Mexico's most important city. Today the greater metropolitan area is home to 23 million people, over 17% of the country's entire population. Economically, it is the powerhouse - contributing a quarter of Mexico's GDP. All of the biggest companies are based there. The place is also famously built on top of a lakebed. A sinking lakebed. Sinking maybe an overall average of 35 to 50 centimeters per year. In this video, we look at Mexico City's land subsidence issues and how they came about.

Mexico City is Mexico's most important city. Today the greater metropolitan area is home to 23 million people, over 17% of the country's entire population. Economically, it is the powerhouse - contributing a quarter of Mexico's GDP. All of the biggest companies are based there. The place is also famously built on top of a lakebed. A sinking lakebed. Sinking maybe an overall average of 35 to 50 centimeters per year. In this video, we look at Mexico City's land subsidence issues and how they came about.

In episode 316 of Absolute AppSec, hosts Ken Johnson and Seth Law participate in a crossover with Kurt Hendle and Cameron Walters from the Coffee, Chaos, and ProdSec podcast to discuss the radical transformation of security roles in an AI-driven landscape. The guests share origin stories rooted in gaming and "mischievous" curiosity, which evolved into deep careers in security architecture and engineering. The primary discussion centers on the industry's shift toward an "Agentic Development Lifecycle" (ADLC), where the sheer volume of AI-generated code renders traditional manual review gates obsolete. This acceleration risks a "rubber stamp" culture where developers approve fixes in seconds rather than minutes, potentially leading to a mountain of technical debt. Consequently, the role of security is shifting from manual bug finding to high-level governance and "context infusion," requiring practitioners to manage AI agents that automate complex tasks. Economically, the group highlights how frontier model announcements have caused massive market volatility, wiping billions from traditional security stocks. Ultimately, they conclude that while older "primitive" tools are failing, professionals who lean into AI as a "superpower" for governance and oversight will be essential for navigating this new, non-deterministic reality.

Two weeks into the US-Israeli war on Iran, Darren uses Robert Pape's cost-benefit framework to assess where things stand. The tactical achievements are real — two-thirds of Iran's missile launchers destroyed, its navy sunk, its leadership decapitated — but the probability of converting those gains into durable strategic outcomes is low, and the costs are mounting fast. On the military side, interceptor stocks are being depleted at unsustainable rates, and missile defence assets may be being redeployed from South Korea in a move that achieves what Chinese coercion could not. Economically, Iran's effective closure of the Strait of Hormuz has triggered what may be the largest oil supply disruption in history, with cascading effects through gas, fertiliser, and food markets arriving at the worst possible moment in the agricultural calendar. Strategically, Russia is profiting, China is learning, Gulf allies are furious, and the non-proliferation incentive structure has been inverted. Darren assesses the range of plausible outcomes — from a painful but temporary shock to a nuclear-armed Iran within eighteen months — and examines the factors that will determine how the war ends, including US-Israel divergence, Trump's contradictory signals, and Iran's determination to ensure this is the last time it is attacked. He closes with an observation about weaponised interdependence: that a sanctioned middle power with cheap drones and a narrow strait has exposed the gap between America's capacity to destroy and its capacity to control. Australia in the World is written, hosted, and produced by Darren Lim, with research and editing this episode by Hannah Nelson and theme music composed by Rory Stenning. Relevant links Robert Pape, Bombing to win (1996): https://www.goodreads.com/book/show/761594.Bombing_to_Win Caitlin Talmadge, “Closing Time: Assessing Possible Outcomes of U.S.-Iranian Conflict in the Strait of Hormuz,” International Security, 33(1), summer 2008: 82-11: http://www.caitlintalmadge.com/uploads/8/5/4/1/85419560/closing_time.pdf Caitlin Talmadge, "The Hormuz Minefield", Foreign Affairs, 13 March 2026: https://www.foreignaffairs.com/iran/hormuz-minefield Vali Nasr, "Iran is playing a long game", Financial Times, 13 March: https://www.ft.com/content/93b7b65d-074b-4e8b-807f-5c27c7362213 Matthew Continetti, "Iran Can't Hold the World Hostage", Wall Street Journal, 13 March: https://www.wsj.com/opinion/free-expression/iran-cant-hold-the-world-hostage-05f595a4 Greg Brew, "The global oil crisis is even worse than it looks" (interview), Vox, 11 March: https://www.vox.com/politics/482142/oil-gas-prices-iran-war-inflation B.A. Friedman, "Orphaned Tactics", Fire for Effect Substack, 9 March: https://bafriedman.substack.com/p/orphaned-tactics Danny Citrinowicz, thread on tactical success masking strategic failure, X/Twitter, 14 March: https://x.com/citrinowicz/status/2032786358930972854 Ezra Klein, "I Asked a Former Trump Official to Justify This War" (interview with Nadia Schadlow), New York Times, 10 March: https://www.nytimes.com/2026/03/10/opinion/ezra-klein-podcast-nadia-schadlow.html Foreign Policy Live debate: Matthew Kroenig vs Trita Parsi, Foreign Policy, 12 March: https://foreignpolicy.com/2026/03/12/kroenig-parsi-debate-war-in-iran/ Shelby Talcott, “Israel is running critically low on interceptors, US officials say”, Semafor, 15 March: https://www.semafor.com/article/03/14/2026/israel-is-running-critically-low-on-interceptors-us-officials-say Gideon Rachman, "Simon Gass on Iran" (interview), The Rachman Review podcast, 12 March: https://www.ft.com/content/cba7352f-aac0-4a6a-8919-c0597bc94c43 Rory Johnston and Nader Itayim, Oil Ground Up podcast, 13 March: https://open.spotify.com/episode/7uPA9g5dWIYcvGH6vSSpEh Tracy Alloway and Joe Weisenthal, "Oil markets" and "Fertiliser" episodes, Odd Lots podcast, 13–14 March: https://www.bloomberg.com/oddlots China Talk podcast, "Second Breakfast: Iran", 14 March: https://www.chinatalk.media/p/iran-war-with-shashank Jake Sullivan and John Finer, interview with Danny Citrinowicz, The Long Game podcast, 12 March: https://staytuned.substack.com/p/america-doesnt-understand-iran-and Economist Intelligence podcast, " Lone goals: will US-Israel war aims diverge?", 13 March: https://www.economist.com/podcasts/2026/03/13/lone-goals-will-us-israel-war-aims-diverge

Good morning from Pharma Daily: the podcast that brings you the most important developments in the pharmaceutical and biotech world. Today, we delve into a series of significant advancements and strategic shifts currently shaping the landscape of these industries.To start, let's discuss a remarkable development in therapeutic treatments. UCB's Bimzelx has demonstrated superior efficacy over AbbVie's Skyrizi in treating psoriatic arthritis, as revealed by a head-to-head phase 3b clinical trial. This finding not only extends UCB's winning streak in psoriasis treatment but also positions Bimzelx as a competitive alternative in the immunology sector. The implications of this are profound, potentially influencing prescribing patterns and improving patient outcomes by offering an effective alternative for those with psoriatic conditions.In manufacturing news, Eli Lilly is making waves with its substantial $3 billion investment aimed at enhancing the global supply chain for Orforglipron, their oral GLP-1 receptor agonist. This move highlights a growing demand for GLP-1 therapies, crucial for managing type 2 diabetes and obesity. The strategic focus on oral therapies reflects a broader industry trend towards improving patient compliance compared to injectable alternatives, underscoring the importance of such innovative treatments in addressing widespread health issues. Additionally, Eli Lilly's commitment to investing $500 million into South Korea's biopharmaceutical sector signals the country's rising status as a hub for biopharmaceutical innovation and development, likely fostering collaborations and expediting novel therapeutics' development.Economically, there's compelling evidence of the impact public funding has on scientific advancement. A recent report by United for Medical Research revealed that National Institutes of Health (NIH) grants generated $94.15 billion in economic activity in 2025, supporting nearly 391,000 jobs. This underscores the dual role of public funding in advancing biomedical research and stimulating economic growth.On the regulatory front, Sandoz is making a strategic move to establish a standalone unit dedicated to biosimilars. As we enter what Sandoz describes as a 'golden decade' of patent expirations, this realignment reflects anticipation of expansion opportunities within the biosimilars market. Such preparations suggest increased competition and potentially more affordable biologic therapy options as major drugs lose patent protection.Technological advancements are further shaping industry operations. BD's partnership with Sinteco to automate pharmacy logistics in Europe is part of a broader push to integrate robotics into healthcare processes. This aligns with digital transformation trends across the sector aimed at improving efficiency and reducing human error. Meanwhile, Medtronic's former diabetes division Minimed has achieved European approval for its 780G insulin pump system, which integrates with Abbott's continuous glucose monitor (CGM). This approval is noteworthy for enhancing diabetes management through automation of insulin delivery based on real-time glucose monitoring, representing a significant step forward in closed-loop systems.A notable technological initiative comes from ARPA-H with their program focused on developing wearable biosensors under the Delphi initiative. These sensors aim to enhance personal health monitoring capabilities across various devices, aligning with trends towards personalized medicine and digital health technologies.Despite these positive strides, challenges persist. The closure of F5 Therapeutics highlights early-stage biotech struggles amid competitive pressures. Regulatory setbacks also continue to pose challenges; Novo Nordisk recently received an FDA warning letter following inspection issues at its U.S. headquarters.Collectively, these trends reflect an industry resiliently pursuSupport the show

Last time we spoke about the end of the battle of khalkin gol. In the summer of 1939, the Nomonhan Incident escalated into a major border conflict between Soviet-Mongolian forces and Japan's Kwantung Army along the Halha River. Despite Japanese successes in July, Zhukov launched a decisive offensive on August 20. Under cover of darkness, Soviet troops crossed the river, unleashing over 200 bombers and intense artillery barrages that devastated Japanese positions. Zhukov's northern, central, and southern forces encircled General Komatsubara's 23rd Division, supported by Manchukuoan units. Fierce fighting ensued: the southern flank collapsed under Colonel Potapov's armor, while the northern Fui Heights held briefly before falling to relentless assaults, including flame-throwing tanks. Failed Japanese counterattacks on August 24 resulted in heavy losses, with regiments shattered by superior Soviet firepower and tactics. By August 25, encircled pockets were systematically eliminated, leading to the annihilation of the Japanese 6th Army. The defeat, coinciding with the Hitler-Stalin Pact, forced Japan to negotiate a ceasefire on September 15-16, redrawing borders. Zhukov's victory exposed Japanese weaknesses in mechanized warfare, influencing future strategies and deterring further northern expansion.   #192 The Soviet–Japanese Neutrality Pact Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Despite the fact this technically will go into future events, I thought it was important we talk about a key moment in Sino history. Even though the battle of changkufeng and khalkin gol were not part of the second sino-Japanese war, their outcomes certainly would affect it.  Policymaking by the Soviet Union alone was not the primary factor in ending Moscow's diplomatic isolation in the late 1930s. After the Munich Conference signaled the failure of the popular front/united front approach, Neville Chamberlain, Adolf Hitler, and Poland's Józef Beck unintentionally strengthened Joseph Stalin's position in early 1939. Once the strategic cards were in his hands, Stalin capitalized on them. His handling of negotiations with Britain and France, as well as with Germany, from April to August was deft and effective. The spring and summer negotiations among the European powers are well documented and have been examined from many angles. In May 1939, while Stalin seemed to have the upper hand in Europe, yet before Hitler had signaled that a German–Soviet agreement might be possible, the Nomonhan incident erupted, a conflict initiated and escalated by the Kwantung Army. For a few months, the prospect of a Soviet–Japanese war revived concerns in Moscow about a two-front conflict. Reviewing Soviet talks with Britain, France, and Germany in the spring and summer of 1939 from an East Asian perspective sheds fresh light on the events that led to the German–Soviet Nonaggression Pact and, more broadly, to the outbreak of World War II. The second week of May marked the start of fighting at Nomonhan, during which negotiations between Germany and the USSR barely advanced beyond mutual scrutiny. Moscow signaled that an understanding with Nazi Germany might be possible. Notably, on May 4, the removal of Maksim Litvinov as foreign commissar and his replacement by Vyacheslav Molotov suggested a shift in approach. Litvinov, an urbane diplomat of Jewish origin and married to an Englishwoman, had been the leading Soviet proponent of the united-front policy and a steadfast critic of Nazi Germany. If a settlement with Hitler was sought, Litvinov was an unsuitable figure to lead the effort. Molotov, though with limited international experience, carried weight as chairman of the Council of Ministers and, more importantly, as one of Stalin's closest lieutenants. This personnel change seemed to accomplish its aim in Berlin, where the press was instructed on May 5 to halt polemical attacks on the Soviet Union and Bolshevism. On the same day, Karl Schnurre, head of the German Foreign Ministry's East European trade section, told Soviet chargé d'affaires Georgi Astakhov that Skoda, the German-controlled Czech arms manufacturer, would honor existing arms contracts with Russia. Astakhov asked whether, with Litvinov's departure, Germany might resume negotiations for a trade treaty Berlin had halted months earlier. By May 17, during discussions with Schnurre, Astakhov asserted that "there were no conflicts in foreign policy between Germany and the Soviet Union and that there was no reason for enmity between the two countries," and that Britain and France's negotiations appeared unpromising. The next day, Ribbentrop personally instructed Schulenburg to green-light trade talks. Molotov, however, insisted that a "political basis" for economic negotiations had to be established first. Suspicion remained high on both sides. Stalin feared Berlin might use reports of German–Soviet talks to destabilize a potential triple alliance with Britain and France; Hitler feared Stalin might use such reports to entice Tokyo away from an anti-German pact. The attempt to form a tripartite military alliance among Germany, Italy, and Japan foundered over divergent aims: Berlin targeted Britain and France; Tokyo aimed at the Soviet Union. Yet talks persisted through August 1939, with Japanese efforts to draw Germany into an anti-Soviet alignment continually reported to Moscow by Richard Sorge. Hitler and Mussolini, frustrated by Japanese objections, first concluded the bilateral Pact of Steel on May 22. The next day, Hitler, addressing his generals, stressed the inevitability of war with Poland and warned that opposition from Britain would be crushed militarily. He then hinted that Russia might "prove disinterested in the destruction of Poland," suggesting closer ties with Japan if Moscow opposed Germany. The exchange was quickly leaked to the press. Five days later, the first pitched battle of the Nomonhan campaign began. Although Hitler's timing with the Yamagata detachment's foray was coincidental, Moscow may have found the coincidence ominous. Despite the inducement of Molotov's call for a political basis before economic talks, Hitler and Ribbentrop did not immediately respond. On June 14, Astakhov signaled to Parvan Draganov, Bulgaria's ambassador in Berlin, that the USSR faced three options: ally with Britain and France, continue inconclusive talks with them, or align with Germany, the latter being closest to Soviet desires. Draganov relayed to the German Foreign Ministry that Moscow preferred a non-aggression agreement if Germany would pledge not to attack the Soviet Union. Two days later, Schulenburg told Astakhov that Germany recognized the link between economic and political relations and was prepared for far-reaching talks, a view echoed by Ribbentrop. The situation remained tangled: the Soviets pursued overt talks with Britain and France, while Stalin sought to maximize Soviet leverage. Chamberlain's stance toward Moscow remained wary but recognized a "psychological value" to an Anglo–Soviet rapprochement, tempered by his insistence on a hard bargain. American ambassador William C. Bullitt urged London to avoid the appearance of pursuing the Soviets, a view that resonated with Chamberlain's own distrust. Public confidence in a real Anglo–Soviet alliance remained low. By July 19, cabinet minutes show Chamberlain could not quite believe a genuine Russia–Germany alliance was possible, though he recognized the necessity of negotiations with Moscow to deter Hitler and to mollify an increasingly skeptical British public. Despite reservations, both sides kept the talks alive. Stalin's own bargaining style, with swift Soviet replies but frequent questions and demands, often produced delays. Molotov pressed on questions such as whether Britain and France would pledge to defend the Baltic states, intervene if Japan attacked the USSR, or join in opposing Germany if Hitler pressured Poland or Romania. These considerations were not trivial; they produced extended deliberations. On July 23, Molotov demanded that plans for coordinated military action among the three powers be fleshed out before a political pact. Britain and France accepted most political terms, and an Anglo-French military mission arrived in Moscow on August 11. The British commander, Admiral Sir Reginald Plunket-Ernle-Erle-Drax, conducted staff talks but could not conclude a military agreement. The French counterpart, General Joseph Doumenc, could sign but not bind his government. By then, Hitler had set August 26 as the date for war with Poland. With that looming, Hitler pressed for Soviet neutrality, or closer cooperation. In July and August, secret German–Soviet negotiations favored the Germans, who pressed for a rapid settlement and made most concessions. Yet Stalin benefited from keeping the British and French engaged, creating leverage against Hitler and safeguarding a potential Anglo–Soviet option as a fallback. To lengthen the talks and avoid immediate resolution, Moscow emphasized the Polish issue. Voroshilov demanded the Red Army be allowed to operate through Polish territory to defend Poland, a demand Warsaw would never accept. Moscow even floated a provocative plan: if Britain and France could compel Poland to permit Baltic State naval operations, the Western fleets would occupy Baltic ports, an idea that would have been militarily perilous and diplomatically explosive. Despite this, Stalin sought an agreement with Germany. Through Richard Sorge's intelligence, Moscow knew Tokyo aimed to avoid large-scale war with the USSR, and Moscow pressed for a German–Soviet settlement, including a nonaggression pact and measures to influence Japan to ease Sino–Japanese tensions. On August 16, Ribbentrop instructed Schulenburg to urge Molotov and Stalin toward a nonaggression pact and to coordinate with Japan. Stalin signaled willingness, and August 23–24 saw the drafting of the pact and the collapse of the Soviet and Japanese resistance elsewhere. That night, in a memorandum of Ribbentrop's staff, seven topics were summarized, with Soviet–Japanese relations and Molotov's insistence that Berlin demonstrate good faith standing out. Ribbentrop reiterated his willingness to influence Japan for a more favorable Soviet–Japanese relationship, and Stalin's reply indicated a path toward a détente in the East alongside the European agreement: "M. Stalin replied that the Soviet Union indeed desired an improvement in its relations with Japan, but that there were limits to its patience with regard to Japanese provocations. If Japan desired war she could have it. The Soviet Union was not afraid of it and was prepared for it. If Japan desired peace—so much the better! M. Stalin considered the assistance of Germany in bringing about an improvement in Soviet-Japanese relations as useful, but he did not want the Japanese to get the impression that the initiative in this direction had been taken by the Soviet Union."  Second, the assertion that the Soviet Union was prepared for and unafraid of war with Japan is an overstatement, though Stalin certainly had grounds for optimism regarding the battlefield situation and the broader East Asian strategic balance. It is notable that, despite the USSR's immediate diplomatic and military gains against Japan, Stalin remained anxious to conceal from Tokyo any peace initiative that originated in Moscow. That stance suggests that Tokyo or Hsinking might read such openness as a sign of Soviet weakness or confidence overextended. The Japanese danger, it would seem, did not disappear from Stalin's mind. Even at the height of his diplomatic coup, Stalin was determined not to burn bridges prematurely. On August 21, while he urged Hitler to send Ribbentrop to Moscow, he did not sever talks with Britain and France. Voroshilov requested a temporary postponement on the grounds that Soviet delegation officers were needed for autumn maneuvers. It was not until August 25, after Britain reiterated its resolve to stand by Poland despite the German–Soviet pact, that Stalin sent the Anglo–French military mission home. Fortified by the nonaggression pact, which he hoped would deter Britain and France from action, Hitler unleashed his army on Poland on September 1. Two days later, as Zhukov's First Army Group was completing its operations at Nomonhan, Hitler faced a setback when Britain and France declared war. Hitler had hoped to finish Poland quickly in 1939 and avoid fighting Britain and France until 1940. World War II in Europe had begun. The Soviet–Japanese conflict at Nomonhan was not the sole, nor even the principal, factor prompting Stalin to conclude an alliance with Hitler. Standing aside from a European war that could fracture the major capitalist powers might have been reason enough. Yet the conflict with Japan in the East was also a factor in Stalin's calculations, a dimension that has received relatively little attention in standard accounts of the outbreak of the war. This East Asian focus seeks to clarify the record without proposing a revolutionary reinterpretation of Soviet foreign policy; rather, it adds an important piece often overlooked in the "origins of the Second World War" puzzle, helping to reduce the overall confusion. The German–Soviet agreement provided for the Soviet occupation of the eastern half of Poland soon after Germany's invasion. On September 3, just forty-eight hours after the invasion and on the day Britain and France declared war, Ribbentrop urged Moscow to invade Poland from the east. Yet, for two more weeks, Poland's eastern frontier remained inviolate; Soviet divisions waited at the border, as most Polish forces were engaged against Germany. The German inquiries about the timing of the Soviet invasion continued, but the Red Army did not move. This inactivity is often attributed to Stalin's caution and suspicion, but that caution extended beyond Europe. Throughout early September, sporadic ground and air combat continued at Nomonhan, including significant activity by Kwantung Army forces on September 8–9, and large-scale air engagements on September 1–2, 4–5, and 14–15. Not until September 15 was the Molotov–Togo cease-fire arrangement finalized, to take effect on September 16. The very next morning, September 17, the Red Army crossed the Polish frontier into a country collapsed at its feet. It appears that Stalin wanted to ensure that fighting on his eastern flank had concluded before engaging in Western battles, avoiding a two-front war. Through such policies, Stalin avoided the disaster of a two-front war. Each principal in the 1939 diplomatic maneuvering pursued distinct objectives. The British sought an arrangement with the USSR that would deter Hitler from attacking Poland and, if deterred, bind Moscow to the Anglo–French alliance. Hitler sought an alliance with the USSR to deter Britain and France from aiding Poland and, if they did aid Poland, to secure Soviet neutrality. Japan sought a military alliance with Germany against the USSR, or failing that, stronger Anti-Comintern ties. Stalin aimed for an outcome in which Germany would fight the Western democracies, leaving him freedom to operate in both the West and East; failing that, he sought military reassurance from Britain and France in case he had to confront Germany. Of the four, only Stalin achieved his primary objective. Hitler secured his secondary objective; the British and Japanese failed to realize theirs. Stalin won the diplomatic contest in 1939. Yet, as diplomats gave way to generals, the display of German military power in Poland and in Western Europe soon eclipsed Stalin's diplomatic triumph. By playing Germany against Britain and France, Stalin gained leverage and a potential fallback, but at the cost of unleashing a devastating European war. As with the aftermath of the Portsmouth Treaty in 1905, Russo-Japanese relations improved rapidly after hostilities ceased at Nomonhan. The Molotov–Togo agreement of September 15 and the local truces arranged around Nomonhan on September 19 were observed scrupulously by both sides. On October 27, the two nations settled another long-standing dispute by agreeing to mutual release of fishing boats detained on charges of illegal fishing in each other's territorial waters. On November 6, the USSR appointed Konstantin Smetanin as ambassador to Tokyo, replacing the previous fourteen-month tenure of a chargé d'affaires. Smetanin's first meeting with the new Japanese foreign minister, Nomura Kichisaburö, in November 1939 attracted broad, favorable coverage in the Japanese press. In a break with routine diplomatic practice, Nomura delivered a draft proposal for a new fisheries agreement and a memo outlining the functioning of the joint border commission to be established in the Nomonhan area before Smetanin presented his credentials. On December 31, an agreement finalizing Manchukuo's payment to the USSR for the sale of the Chinese Eastern Railway was reached, and the Soviet–Japanese Fisheries Convention was renewed for 1940. In due course, the boundary near Nomonhan was formally redefined. A November 1939 agreement between Molotov and Togo established a mixed border commission representing the four parties to the dispute. After protracted negotiations, the border commission completed its redemarcation on June 14, 1941, with new border markers erected in August 1941. The resulting boundary largely followed the Soviet–MPR position, lying ten to twelve miles east of the Halha River. With that, the Nomonhan incident was officially closed.  Kwantung Army and Red Army leaders alike sought to "teach a lesson" to their foe at Nomonhan. The refrain recurs in documents and memoirs from both sides, "we must teach them a lesson." The incident provided lessons for both sides, but not all were well learned. For the Red Army, the lessons of Nomonhan intertwined with the laurels of victory, gratifying but sometimes distracting. Georgy Zhukov grasped the experience of modern warfare that summer, gaining more than a raised profile: command experience, confidence, and a set of hallmarks he would employ later. He demonstrated the ability to grasp complex strategic problems quickly, decisive crisis leadership, meticulous attention to logistics and deception, patience in building superior strength before striking at the enemy's weakest point, and the coordination of massed artillery, tanks, mechanized infantry, and tactical air power in large-scale double envelopment. These capabilities informed his actions at Moscow, Stalingrad, Kursk, and ultimately Berlin. It is tempting to wonder how Zhukov might have fared in the crucial autumn and winter of 1941 without Nomonhan, or whether he would have been entrusted with the Moscow front in 1941 had he not distinguished himself at Nomonhan. Yet the Soviet High Command overlooked an important lesson. Despite Zhukov's successes with independent tank formations and mechanized infantry, the command misapplied Spanish Civil War-era experience by disbanding armored divisions and redistributing tanks to infantry units to serve as support. It was not until after Germany demonstrated tank warfare in 1940 that the Soviets began reconstituting armored divisions and corps, a process still incomplete when the 1941 invasion began. The Red Army's performance at Nomonhan went largely unseen in the West. Western intelligence and military establishments largely believed the Red Army was fundamentally rotten, a view reinforced by the battlefield's remoteness and by both sides' reluctance to publicize the defeat. The Polish crisis and the outbreak of war in Europe drew attention away from Nomonhan, and the later Finnish Winter War reinforced negative Western judgments of Soviet military capability. U.S. military attaché Raymond Faymonville observed that the Soviets, anticipating a quick victory over Finland, relied on hastily summoned reserves ill-suited for winter fighting—an assessment that led some to judge the Red Army by its performance at Nomonhan. Even in Washington, this view persisted; Hitler reportedly called the Red Army "a paralytic on crutches" after Finland and then ordered invasion planning in 1941. Defeat can be a stronger teacher than victory. Because Nomonhan was a limited war, Japan's defeat was likewise limited, and its impact on Tokyo did not immediately recalibrate Japanese assessments. Yet Nomonhan did force Japan to revise its estimation of Soviet strength: the Imperial Army abandoned its strategic Plan Eight-B and adopted a more defensive posture toward the Soviet Union. An official inquiry into the debacle, submitted November 29, 1939, recognized Soviet superiority in materiel and firepower and urged Japan to bolster its own capabilities. The Kwantung Army's leadership, chastened, returned to the frontier with a more realistic sense of capability, even as the Army Ministry and AGS failed to translate lessons into policy. The enduring tendency toward gekokujo, the dominance of local and mid-level officers over central authority, remained persistent, and Tokyo did not fully purge it after Nomonhan. The Kwantung Army's operatives who helped drive the Nomonhan episode resurfaced in key posts at Imperial General Headquarters, contributing to Japan's 1941 decision to go to war. The defeat of the Kwantung Army at Nomonhan, together with the Stalin–Hitler pact and the outbreak of war in Europe, triggered a reorientation of Japanese strategy and foreign policy. The new government, led by the politically inexperienced and cautious General Abe Nobuyuki, pursued a conservative foreign policy. Chiang Kai-shek's retreat to Chongqing left the Chinese war at a stalemate: the Japanese Expeditionary Army could still inflict defeats on Chinese nationalist forces, but it had no viable path to a decisive victory. China remained Japan's principal focus. Still, the option of cutting Soviet aid to China and of moving north into Outer Mongolia and Siberia was discredited in Tokyo by the August 1939 double defeat. Northward expansion never again regained its ascendancy, though it briefly resurfaced in mid-1941 after Germany's invasion of the Soviet Union. Germany's alliance with the USSR during Nomonhan was viewed by Tokyo as a betrayal, cooling German–Japanese relations. Japan also stepped back from its confrontation with Britain over Tientsin. Tokyo recognized that the European war represented a momentous development that could reshape East Asia, as World War I had reshaped it before. The short-lived Abe government (September–December 1939) and its successor under Admiral Yonai Mitsumasa (December 1939–July 1940) adopted a cautious wait-and-see attitude toward the European war. That stance shifted in the summer of 1940, however, after Germany's successes in the West. With Germany's conquest of France and the Low Countries and Britain's fight for survival, Tokyo reassessed the global balance of power. Less than a year after Zhukov had effectively blocked further Japanese expansion northward, Hitler's victories seemed to open a southern expansion path. The prospect of seizing the resource-rich colonies in Southeast Asia, Dutch, French, and British and, more importantly, resolving the China problem in Japan's favor, tempted many in Tokyo. If Western aid to Chiang Kai-shek, channeled through Hong Kong, French Indochina, and Burma could be cut off, some in Tokyo believed Chiang might abandon resistance. If not, Japan could launch new operations against Chiang from Indochina and Burma, effectively turning China's southern flank. To facilitate a southward advance, Japan sought closer alignment with Germany and the USSR. Foreign Minister Yosuke Matsuoka brought Japan into the Tripartite Pact with Germany and Italy, in the hope of neutralizing the United States, and concluded a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union to secure calm in the north. Because of the European military situation, only the United States could check Japan's southward expansion. President Franklin D. Roosevelt appeared determined to do so and confident that he could. If the Manchurian incident and the Stimson Doctrine strained U.S.–Japanese relations, and the China War and U.S. aid to Chiang Kai-shek deepened mutual resentment, it was Japan's decision to press south against French, British, and Dutch colonies, and Roosevelt's resolve to prevent such a move, that put the two nations on a collision course. The dust had barely settled on the Mongolian plains following the Nomonhan ceasefire when the ripples of that distant conflict began to reshape the broader theater of the Second Sino-Japanese War. The defeat at Nomonhan in August 1939, coupled with the shocking revelation of the German-Soviet Nonaggression Pact, delivered a profound strategic blow to Japan's imperial ambitions. No longer could Tokyo entertain serious notions of a "northern advance" into Soviet territory, a strategy that had long tantalized military planners as a means to secure resources and buffer against communism. Instead, the Kwantung Army's humiliation exposed glaring deficiencies in Japanese mechanized warfare, logistics, and intelligence, forcing a pivot southward. This reorientation not only cooled tensions with the Soviet Union but also allowed Japan to redirect its military focus toward the protracted stalemate in China. As we transition from the border clashes of the north to the heartland tensions in central China, it's essential to trace how these events propelled Japan toward the brink of a major offensive in Hunan Province, setting the stage for what would become a critical confrontation. In the immediate aftermath of Nomonhan, Japan's military high command grappled with the implications of their setback. The Kwantung Army, once a symbol of unchecked aggression, was compelled to adopt a defensive posture along the Manchurian-Soviet border. The ceasefire agreement, formalized on September 15-16, 1939, effectively neutralized the northern front, freeing up significant resources and manpower that had been tied down in the escalating border skirmishes. This was no small relief; the Nomonhan campaign had drained Japanese forces, with estimates of over 18,000 casualties and the near-total annihilation of the 23rd Division. The psychological impact was equally severe, shattering the myth of Japanese invincibility against a modern, mechanized opponent. Georgy Zhukov's masterful use of combined arms—tanks, artillery, and air power—highlighted Japan's vulnerabilities, prompting internal reviews that urged reforms in tank production, artillery doctrine, and supply chains. Yet, these lessons were slow to implement, and in the short term, the primary benefit was the opportunity to consolidate efforts elsewhere. For Japan, "elsewhere" meant China, where the war had devolved into a grinding attrition since the fall of Wuhan in October 1938. The capture of Wuhan, a major transportation hub and temporary capital of the Nationalist government under Chiang Kai-shek, had been hailed as a turning point. Japanese forces, under the command of General Shunroku Hata, had pushed deep into central China, aiming to decapitate Chinese resistance. However, Chiang's strategic retreat to Chongqing transformed the conflict into a war of endurance. Nationalist forces, bolstered by guerrilla tactics and international aid, harassed Japanese supply lines and prevented a decisive knockout blow. By mid-1939, Japan controlled vast swaths of eastern and northern China, including key cities like Beijing, Shanghai, and Nanjing, but the cost was immense: stretched logistics, mounting casualties, and an inability to fully pacify occupied territories. The Nomonhan defeat exacerbated these issues by underscoring the limits of Japan's military overextension. With the northern threat abated, Tokyo's Army General Staff saw an opening to intensify operations in China, hoping to force Chiang to the negotiating table before global events further complicated the picture. The diplomatic fallout from Nomonhan and the Hitler-Stalin Pact further influenced this shift. Japan's betrayal by Germany, its nominal ally under the Anti-Comintern Pact—fostered distrust and isolation. Tokyo's flirtations with a full Axis alliance stalled, as the pact with Moscow revealed Hitler's willingness to prioritize European gains over Asian solidarity. This isolation prompted Japan to reassess its priorities, emphasizing self-reliance in China while eyeing opportunistic expansions elsewhere. Domestically, the Hiranuma cabinet collapsed in August 1939 amid the diplomatic shock, paving the way for the more cautious Abe Nobuyuki government. Abe's administration, though short-lived, signaled a temporary de-escalation in aggressive posturing, but the underlying imperative to resolve the "China Incident" persisted. Japanese strategists believed that capturing additional strategic points in central China could sever Chiang's lifelines, particularly the routes funneling aid from the Soviet Union and the West via Burma and Indochina. The seismic shifts triggered by Nomonhan compelled Japan to fundamentally readjust its China policy and war plans, marking a pivotal transition from overambitious northern dreams to a more focused, albeit desperate, campaign in the south. With the Kwantung Army's defeat fresh in mind, Tokyo's Imperial General Headquarters initiated a comprehensive strategic review in late August 1939. The once-dominant "Northern Advance" doctrine, which envisioned rapid conquests into Siberia for resources like oil and minerals, was officially shelved. In its place emerged a "Southern Advance" framework, prioritizing the consolidation of gains in China and potential expansions into Southeast Asia. This pivot was not merely tactical; it reflected a profound policy recalibration aimed at ending the quagmire in China, where two years of war had yielded territorial control but no decisive victory over Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists. Central to this readjustment was a renewed emphasis on economic and military self-sufficiency. The Nomonhan debacle had exposed Japan's vulnerabilities in mechanized warfare, leading to urgent reforms in industrial production. Tank manufacturing was ramped up, with designs influenced by observed Soviet models, and artillery stockpiles were bolstered to match the firepower discrepancies seen on the Mongolian steppes. Logistically, the Army General Staff prioritized streamlining supply lines in China, recognizing that prolonged engagements demanded better resource allocation. Politically, the Abe Nobuyuki cabinet, installed in September 1939, adopted a "wait-and-see" approach toward Europe but aggressively pursued diplomatic maneuvers to isolate China. Efforts to negotiate with Wang Jingwei's puppet regime in Nanjing intensified, aiming to undermine Chiang's legitimacy and splinter Chinese resistance. Japan also pressured Vichy France for concessions in Indochina, seeking to choke off aid routes to Chongqing. War plans evolved accordingly, shifting from broad-front offensives to targeted strikes designed to disrupt Chinese command and supply networks. The China Expeditionary Army, under General Yasuji Okamura, was restructured to emphasize mobility and combined arms operations, drawing partial lessons from Zhukov's tactics. Intelligence operations were enhanced, with greater focus on infiltrating Nationalist strongholds in central provinces. By early September, plans coalesced around a major push into Hunan Province, a vital crossroads linking northern and southern China. Hunan's river systems and rail lines made it a linchpin for Chinese logistics, funneling men and materiel to the front lines. Japanese strategists identified key urban centers in the region as critical objectives, believing their capture could sever Chiang's western supply corridors and force a strategic retreat. This readjustment was not without internal friction. Hardliners in the military lamented the abandonment of northern ambitions, but the reality of Soviet strength—and the neutrality pacts that followed—left little room for debate. Economically, Japan ramped up exploitation of occupied Chinese territories, extracting coal, iron, and rice to fuel the war machine. Diplomatically, Tokyo sought to mend fences with the Soviets through the 1941 Neutrality Pact, ensuring northern security while eyes turned south. Yet, these changes brewed tension with the United States, whose embargoes on scrap metal and oil threatened to cripple Japan's ambitions. As autumn approached, the stage was set for a bold gambit in central China. Japanese divisions massed along the Yangtze River, poised to strike at the heart of Hunan's defenses. Intelligence reports hinted at Chinese preparations, with Xue Yue's forces fortifying positions around a major provincial hub. The air thickened with anticipation of a clash that could tip the balance in the interminable war—a test of Japan's revamped strategies against a resilient foe determined to hold the line. What unfolded would reveal whether Tokyo's post-Nomonhan pivot could deliver the breakthrough so desperately needed, or if it would merely prolong the bloody stalemate. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In 1939, the Nomonhan Incident saw Soviet forces under Georgy Zhukov decisively defeat Japan's Kwantung Army at Khalkin Gol, exposing Japanese weaknesses in mechanized warfare. This setback, coupled with the Hitler-Stalin Nonaggression Pact, shattered Japan's northern expansion plans and prompted a strategic pivot southward. Diplomatic maneuvers involving Stalin, Hitler, Britain, France, and Japan reshaped alliances, leading to the Soviet-Japanese Neutrality Pact in 1941. Japan refocused on China, intensifying operations in Hunan Province to isolate Chiang Kai-shek.   

FULL STREAM### March 5: AI at War and the Domestic Impact (13)1905 BAKUHeadline: AI Goes to War as High Gas Prices Hit the AmericanPublic (14)Summary: On day six, the discussion centers on the unprecedented role of Artificial Intelligence in the conflict. Reports indicate the Trumpadministration is employing Anthropic's Claude AI for intelligence processing, target selection, and simulations. This technological integration is coupled with sophisticated information warfare, including the AI-driven manipulation of satellite imagery to manufacture or conceal bomb damage. Economically, the war is impacting American consumers as gas prices rise by 18 cents in some regions, threatening to become a major issue in the upcoming midterms. While European allies like the UK show hesitation in deploying naval assets, the US domestic political climate remains rancorous. Despite the conflict, strong jobs data and a recent spurt in consumer activity suggest the US economy remains resilient, even as the "monotone of war" dominates the Pentagon's media briefings. (15)Guest(s): Jim McTague (Author), Simon Constable (Financial Journalist), Alan Tonelson (RealityChek). (16)

Richard Epstein of the Hoover Institution argues the proposed retroactive billionaire wealth tax is unconstitutional, economically damaging, and likely to drive wealth out of California despite strong union support.1885 SAN DIEGO

David Daoud and Bill Roggio explain Hezbollah is downplaying Gaza ties to avoid dragging Lebanon into war, prioritizing the rehabilitation of its image among the economically weary Shiite population in Lebanon.1836 BEIRUT

From tariff-funded refunds to tough talk with allies, trade has once again become a central theme of Donald Trump's White House. One year into Trump's second mandate, economist Gerald Friedman walks RFI through the reality behind the rhetoric and looks to how the administration may ultimately be judged. One year after Donald Trump returned to the White House, his second administration has wasted little time putting trade at the forefront of policy. Tariffs, the US president insists, are delivering an economic renaissance. Inflation has supposedly all but vanished. The stock market is booming. Trillions of dollars are said to be pouring into the Treasury, with the promise of tariff-funded cheques soon landing in American letterboxes. Critics, Trump has declared, are "fools". Strip away the slogans, however, and the picture looks far less flattering. According to Gerald Friedman, professor of economics at the University of Massachusetts Amherst, Trump's tariff-driven revival is built on shaky foundations – economically incoherent, politically vindictive and geopolitically destabilising. EU readies response to new US tariffs, France braces for fallout The numbers don't add up From an economist's perspective, Friedman says, Trump's claims barely survive contact with reality. “Almost nothing” in the president's upbeat assessment is true. Yes, the stock market is high, but only because a small group of technology giants dominates the indices. Remove them, and the wider market is essentially flat. The idea that tariffs are generating vast new revenues is equally illusory. Tariffs face an unavoidable contradiction: set them high enough to block imports and they raise little money; set them low enough to generate revenue and they fail to protect domestic industry. Either way, the notion that they are filling federal coffers with “trillions” is "fantasy". Friedman notes that “virtually no economists outside of those being paid through Donald Trump … support his tariff regime”, particularly given its random and unsystematic application. What is billed as strategic economic policy looks more like improvisation. Trump's first 100 days: Trade, diplomacy and walking the transatlantic tightrope Illusion of tariff-funded cheques The administration's proposal to issue tariff-funded “refunds” – between $1,000 and $2,000 per household in early 2026 – has clear populist appeal. Economically, Friedman argues, it makes little sense. The US already runs a federal deficit of roughly $1.7 trillion a year, around 6 per cent of GDP. Washington does not need tariffs to send out cheques; it can simply borrow more. The real question is whether it should, particularly after extending large tax cuts for the wealthy that continue to inflate the deficit. There is a deeper irony. Tariffs, Friedman points out, already constitute “the biggest tax increase as a share of GDP that this country has had since the early 1990s”, adding roughly $1,500 a year to household costs through higher prices. Refunding some of that money would merely hand back what had just been taken – while leaving the underlying economic damage untouched. Inflation, eggs and everyday living Trump has repeatedly pointed to falling egg prices as proof that inflation is under control. Friedman underlines that egg prices surged because of bird flu, not economic policy, and fell as the outbreak eased. They are down by about half, not by the 85 per cent the president boasts about – “one of the smaller lies”, as Friedman puts it. Elsewhere, tariffs are doing exactly what economists expect: pushing prices up. Imports such as coffee and bananas cannot realistically be replaced by domestic production. Taxing them feeds directly into the cost of living. Households are paying more, not less. The impact does not stop at consumer prices. Retaliation and uncertainty are quietly undermining export industries. China has cut back on US soybean imports, hurting farmers. Canada is actively reducing its reliance on the US market, deepening ties with Europe and China. Even sectors untouched by tariffs are suffering. Higher education – one of America's largest export earners – is losing foreign students as visas tighten and the country's tourism has also slumped. The combined effect, Friedman warns, is “higher prices and a reduction in employment and wages… ultimately, devastating to the US economy”. Europe's 'Truman Show' moment: is it time to walk off Trump's set? Gunboat diplomacy, with grudges attached For Friedman, Trump's economic policy cannot be separated from his personality. Tariffs have become instruments of pressure and punishment, often driven by personal vendettas rather than strategic calculation. Hostility towards Canada's former prime minister Justin Trudeau, for example, owed as much to personal dislike as to trade policy. This is where economics merges with geopolitics. The US, Friedman argues, is drifting away from the postwar, rules-based order it once championed towards something far older and harsher – “pre-1940”, rather than merely pre-1945. Trade policy is wielded like a weapon, diplomacy reduced to threat and coercion. “Nobody wants to be the one who sticks his head up,” to speak out, Friedman says. Corporate leaders and officials see what happens to dissenters and keep their heads down for fear of investigations, legal costs and political retaliation.  Occupy Wall Street protestors clash with police outside New York Stock Exchange A symptom of deeper failures None of this, Friedman stresses, emerged from nowhere. Echoing arguments made by Greek economist and former left-wing finance minister Yanis Varoufakis, he sees Trump as both cause and symptom. Decades of rising inequality, deindustrialisation and attacks on unions hollowed out large parts of the working class, particularly in the US and Europe. The 2008 financial crisis was explosive. Banks were rescued, executives kept their bonuses, and almost nobody went to jail. The lesson, Friedman says, was clear: the powerful play by different rules. Regions once loyal to centre-left parties – coal country in West Virginia, manufacturing towns across the Midwest – became some of Trump's strongest supporters. Trump did not invent these grievances, but he has channelled them into a politics driven less by repair than by ego and confrontation. Trump says Venezuela's Maduro captured in 'large scale' US strike Judging Trump in 2026 So how should Trump's second presidency be judged as it heads into 2026? Friedman offers a stark metric. Ignore the rhetoric and watch the behaviour of those with real power. Do Republican lawmakers rediscover a spine? Do corporate leaders decide that long-term stability matters more than short-term fear? If they do not, the outlook is bleak. “It's not only the America First agenda,” Friedman says, “it's Trump's personal, ego-driven agenda.” Protests may continue to swell, but without resistance from political and economic elites, the consequences will stretch far beyond the US. In 2026, the results will be difficult to spin away. Tariffs promise strength and sovereignty. What they are delivering, Friedman argues, is higher prices, weaker alliances and a dangerous slide towards a world the US once helped consign to history.

Economically, we’re doing well! The stock market is looking good; unemployment is down (4.4%); and consumer spending is up. So why aren’t people feeling more prosperous? Gen Z, aged around 18–28, is being criticized for being the laziest workforce ever, transactional and unmotivated, claiming they’re not failing at work, rather, work is failing them. Podcaster and hundred-millionaire businessman Patrick Bet-David is using his platform to school the younger generation on why communism is not the answer, and that they must embrace capitalism. If you insist on being poor, you will be. If you want to be rich, do what rich people do. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

What if 2026 is not just another year — but a divine turning point on multiple fronts?!In this episode of our ongoing series of Prophetic Words for 2026, Robert is joined by Jes Pichardo who releases a timely prophecy for 2026 that speaks directly to the economy, the Church, and a coming move of the Holy Spirit. You'll hear about a significant financial shift – including insight into the housing market, car prices, and what appears to be a strong buyers market. Beyond economics, this prophetic word declares that 2026 will be marked by church restoration and a fresh outpouring of fire. After a year of exposure, God is bringing justice, healing, and restoration to faithful leaders. This revival prophecy echoes themes of the next great awakening, surpassing even historic moves like the Jesus People Movement and the Brownsville Revival. A true end time revival is coming, marked by the fire of God, and a tangible outpouring of the Holy Spirit.Jes also shares how mysteries of God revealed will define this season. A deep prophetic revelation is unfolding, including insight into the Godhead, and a growing hunger in the Body of Christ. Perhaps most powerfully, Jes reveals how a supernatural mass deliverance movement is about to break out. We are entering a season where freedom in the Holy Spirit will touch cities, families, and individuals. From addiction deliverance to streets transformed by the power of God – this is a fulfillment of the promise that where the Spirit of the Lord is there is FREEDOM.This charismatic prophetic teaching and prophetic interview brings together the voices of Jes Pichardo and Robert Hotchkin to equip, encourage, and prepare you for what's ahead.

Migration: Assimilation Crisis and the Collapse of Western Civilization — Gaius & Germanicus — Gaius and Germanicus analyze the destabilizing strain generated by mass migration flows from the economically depressed Global South to the wealthy industrialized North, documenting escalating violence in Australia, social unrest throughout Europe, and institutional strain within the United States. Gaius highlights the new American "Emperor Trump's" political mandate to enforce border security and immigration restrictions, contrasting this with the "woke elite's" previous advocacy for polyglot multicultural societies without national identity boundaries or assimilationist expectations. Germanicus argues that successful historical migration requires genuine desire for cultural assimilation into host societies, citing the Roman-era Franks and Visigoths who adopted Roman culture, language, and institutional frameworks, thereby integrating into Roman civilization. Germanicus contrasts these assimilationist populations with groups like the Vandals and contemporary observant Sunni Muslim communities, who systematically resist cultural integration and instead establish cohesive, ethnically and religiously homogeneous societies paralleling their original homelands. Germanicus warns that Europe is reaching a "boiling point" due to systemic resistance to assimilation, surging crime rates, and political backlash against uncontrolled immigration, comparing this civilizational instability to the circumstances precipitating the destruction of the Western Roman Empire by non-assimilating tribal invasions that progressively fragmented Roman institutional coherence and territorial control. 1775 BOUDICA RALLIES

The Federal Reserve cut interest rates last week, but it also increased its forecast for 2026 GDP, from 1.9% to 2.1%, hardly a rate that would necessitate a long string of further cuts. Multiple forces are pulling the economy in different directions, so the 10-year treasury yield will likely continue to move in the same wide band it's been in since 2023. Recent local elections have tilted strongly in favour of Democrats, and Trump's approval ratings are low. It is possible next year's mid-term elections go strongly in the Democrats' favour, and the administration has less power than it does now. With economically-sensitive stock market indices like mid and small caps, the Dow Jones Industrials and the S&P 500 equal-weighted index all breaking to new highs, it's difficult to be pessimistic.This episode is presented by Mark Matthews, Head of Research Asia at Julius Baer.

How Sustainable Wood Helps Mitigate the Impact of Climate ChangeSustainable wood refers to the use of mass timber, which involves smaller pieces of wood that are dried and glued together in a perpendicular, crosswise pattern to form large slabs. This process can incorporate a closed-loop system that repurposes wood, promoting a circular practice that minimizes wood waste and reduces landfill usage, transportation needs, and carbon emissions. Additionally, the wood retains the carbon absorbed by trees during their growth, storing it in the floors and walls of buildings. As infrastructure demands increase, sustainable wood offers an environmentally friendly solution to meet these needs.Why the Construction Industry Needs Sustainable WoodSustainable wood, particularly through the use of mass timber, is gaining recognition as a critical climate solution in the construction industry. Traditional building materials like concrete and steel are carbon-intensive to produce, responsible for nearly 8% of global carbon emissions. In contrast, mass timber is derived from a renewable resource: trees. Through responsible forest management, trees can be harvested and replanted in a sustainable cycle, allowing forests to continue absorbing carbon dioxide. The wood used in mass timber stores this carbon long after the trees are cut down, effectively sequestering it in the walls, floors, and structures of buildings for decades or even centuries. This makes sustainable wood not only a viable building material but also a carbon sink, helping reduce the overall carbon footprint of new construction.The production of mass timber involves using smaller, fast-growing trees that are often thinned from forests to maintain ecological health. These pieces of wood are dried and glued in layers, forming large, strong panels that can be used for walls, floors, and even entire building frames. This technique reduces waste by making use of smaller trees or leftover wood that might otherwise be discarded. Additionally, mass timber is much lighter than steel and concrete, reducing the energy needed for transportation and lowering emissions from construction sites. The process can also incorporate repurposed or recycled wood in a closed-loop system, further contributing to the circular economy and minimizing waste.The climate benefits of sustainable wood go beyond carbon storage. Timber construction has a much lower embodied carbon than steel and concrete, which require energy-intensive processes to extract and manufacture. By substituting these materials with mass timber, builders can reduce carbon emissions by up to 70%. In regions where sustainable forestry practices are employed, this approach also supports local ecosystems by preventing deforestation, protecting biodiversity, and encouraging the regeneration of forests. Importantly, mass timber's design allows for prefabrication, which reduces construction time and waste, making it not only a greener option but also an economically competitive one.As cities and communities around the world grapple with the need for affordable housing while also addressing climate change, sustainable wood provides a promising solution. By scaling up the use of mass timber in mid- and high-rise buildings, the construction sector can reduce its reliance on carbon-heavy materials, sequester large amounts of carbon, and promote sustainable forest management practices. This integration of environmental, economic, and social benefits positions sustainable wood as a key player in the transition toward a low-carbon future.The Future of Sustainable Wood: Making Construction Faster and Greener Sustainable wood, especially when derived through the use of mass timber, offers a range of environmental, economic, and structural advantages over traditional building materials. From a structural standpoint, mass timber is both strong and lightweight, making it a highly versatile material. It has a high strength-to-weight ratio, allowing it to be used in large, multi-story buildings while reducing the overall load on foundations and minimizing transportation costs. Additionally, mass timber is more fire-resistant than many people realize; when exposed to fire, the outer layer of the wood chars and insulates the inner core, slowing down the spread of fire and maintaining the building's integrity for longer than some steel structures. This combination of strength, fire resistance, and flexibility gives mass timber a competitive edge in construction.Economically, sustainable wood offers cost-saving opportunities through faster construction times and less material waste. Mass timber panels can be prefabricated off-site, reducing the time spent on construction and the labor costs associated with traditional methods. This efficiency not only lowers the overall cost of building but also minimizes disruption in urban areas. Furthermore, the use of repurposed or recycled wood supports a circular economy, where resources are reused rather than discarded, reducing the environmental impact and fostering a more sustainable construction industry. As demand for sustainable and affordable housing rises, mass timber presents a compelling, eco-friendly alternative to conventional building practices.One of the most significant benefits is its ability to sequester carbon. Trees naturally absorb carbon dioxide from the atmosphere as they grow, and this carbon remains stored in the wood even after it's used in construction. By utilizing wood in buildings, the carbon is locked away for the lifespan of the structure, helping to reduce overall greenhouse gas emissions. In contrast, materials like concrete and steel release large amounts of carbon during their production, contributing to climate change. This makes mass timber a powerful tool in the fight against global warming, especially when paired with sustainable forestry practices.Sustainable Wood SkepticismDespite its many advantages, the use of sustainable wood and mass timber as a building material does have some drawbacks and criticisms. One primary concern is the reliance on sustainable forestry practices. If forests are not properly managed, large-scale timber harvesting can lead to deforestation, habitat destruction, and biodiversity loss. The success of mass timber as a climate solution depends on responsible sourcing, including replanting trees to maintain the carbon-absorbing benefits of forests. Unsustainable logging practices or overharvesting could negate the environmental benefits of mass timber by releasing more carbon into the atmosphere and harming ecosystems.Another challenge is the perception of wood's durability and fire safety. While mass timber is engineered to be fire-resistant, some critics remain concerned about its performance in large-scale buildings. Public perception and regulatory hurdles can be barriers to adoption, as many building codes and fire safety standards are based on traditional materials like concrete and steel. These regulations may need to be updated to reflect the true performance of mass timber, but in the meantime, they can slow down its widespread use in urban construction.Additionally, there are economic concerns, particularly regarding initial costs. While mass timber can reduce construction time and labor costs, the price of sustainably sourced wood can be higher than that of conventional materials, especially if demand outstrips supply. The infrastructure for large-scale mass timber production is still developing, and until it reaches full maturity, the material may remain more expensive and less accessible than concrete or steel, limiting its adoption in some markets. Over time, these challenges may be addressed, but they highlight the need for careful planning, regulation, and investment in the mass timber industry.Who is Our Guest?Dr. Paul Mayencourt is a researcher and educator at studying low-carbon design solutions in architecture. He does much of his work in the Wood Lab at the University of California, Berkeley between the Department of Architecture and the Department of Environmental Science, Policy, and Management. Dr. Mayencourt specializes in mass timber, structural design, and structural optimization. ResourcesUC Berkeley: Forest to frame: Paul Mayencourt bridges forest management and sustainable constructionAmerican Wood Council: Mass TimberUC Berkeley: Continuing Berkeley's legacy in forest productsVox: The hottest new thing in sustainable building is, uh, woodSeattle Business Magazine: Cross-laminated Timber: the Future of Building?Further ReadingUrban Machine: https://urbanmachine.build/Hardware to Save a Planet: Podcast with Co-Founder of Urban MachineWashington Post: Forget the log cabin. Wood buildings are climbing skyward — with pluses for the planet.Swedish Wood: A global solution for a locally active industryDalberg: A Forest Economy for the Future: Generating social and economic dividends from more sustainable, circular sourcesFor a transcript, please visit https://climatebreak.org/sustainable-wood-from-mass-timber-with-dr-paul-mayencourt/

Establishing the Capital and the Rise of Political Division — Nathaniel Philbrick — Washington selected the Potomac River as the location for the new national capital, believing it would economically connect Western and Eastern commercial interests, despite claims of obvious self-interest regarding Mount Vernon's proximity. As Washington worked deliberately to unite the fractured nation through personal tours and diplomatic engagement, political divisions paradoxically hardened and crystallized; Thomas Jefferson and James Madison organized systematic opposition during a "northern tour," strategically recruiting Philip Freneau to attack the Washingtonadministration. Philbrick notes the historical irony that James Monroe, formerly a critic of Washington, later adopted Washington's touring methodology to heal national divisions during his own presidency. Philbrickconcludes that despite Washington's profound contradictions as a slaveholder and politician, his aspirational effort to create a functioning American Union remains his enduring historical legacy. 1700

The King vs. Grubby Politics — Gregory Copley — Copley highlights the pervasive economic pessimism and political instability characterizing the United Kingdom under Prime Minister Starmer's governance, which has adopted economically contractionary fiscal policies and welfare constraints. Copley contrasts the government's questionable political tactics with King Charles III's robust, positive institutional influence through diplomatic engagements and constitutional authority. Copley notes that the monarch possesses reserve powers to prorogue (suspend) parliament if the constitutional structure is threatened by governmental overreach, providing ultimate constitutional safeguard against executive abuse transcending democratic checks. 1910 WINDSOR

H.E. Lawrence Wong, prime minister & minister for finance, Republic of Singapore, discusses adapting economically and politically to a future likely defined not by convergence, but by strategic decoupling and regional realignment with Bloomberg's John Micklethwait at the 2025 Bloomberg New Economy Forum in Singapore.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

GDP Script/ Top Stories for October 23rd Publish Date: October 23rd PRE-ROLL: From the BG AD Group Studio Welcome to the Gwinnett Daily Post Podcast. Today is Thursday, October 23rd and Happy birthday to Weird Al Yankovich I’m Peyton Spurlock and here are your top stories presented by KIA Mall of Georgia. 'Fall back' — Daylight Saving Time ends Nov. 2 Gwinnett Tech hosts inaugural Gryphon Gratitude Breakfast Georgians react to Instagram 'PG-13' rating policy Plus, Leah McGrath from Ingles Markets on sweet tooths All of this and more is coming up on the Gwinnett Daily Post podcast, and if you are looking for community news, we encourage you to listen daily and subscribe! Break 1: Ingles Markets 6 STORY 1: 'Fall back' — Daylight Saving Time ends Nov. 2 Like it or not, it’s that time again—Daylight Saving Time ends on Nov. 2, and we “fall back” an hour. Darker evenings, groggy mornings, and maybe an extra cup of coffee (or three). But does this time shift really matter anymore? Dr. Jason Delaney, an economics professor at Georgia Gwinnett College, doesn’t think so. “It was about saving energy back when lighting and heating were inefficient, and air conditioning didn’t exist. That’s not the world we live in now,” he said. “Economically, the impact is minimal.” Psychologist Dr. David Ludden sees it differently: “It messes with your body. We’re not built to adjust quickly—our sleep cycles rely on light cues.” His advice? Get outside in natural light or use bright indoor lights during the day to help reset your internal clock. So, while the time change might feel like a relic of the past, it still throws us off—at least for a little while. STORY 2: Gwinnett Tech hosts inaugural Gryphon Gratitude Breakfast On Oct. 15, Gwinnett Tech Foundation hosted its first-ever Gryphon Gratitude Breakfast, and the room was packed—150 donors, students, and community partners all gathered to celebrate the life-changing power of giving. It wasn’t just about handshakes and thank-yous. Students stood up and shared raw, personal stories—how scholarships kept them in school, how the Foundation gave them a shot at a future they almost gave up on. “Every donation has a face,” said Darcie Johnson, the Foundation’s executive director. “You’re not just giving money—you’re changing lives.” The event wrapped with a challenge: “Fuel Your Purpose.” A reminder to give, to act, to make it count. STORY 3: Georgians react to Instagram 'PG-13' rating policy   Meta’s new “PG-13” filter for Instagram? Let’s just say Georgians aren’t exactly buying it. The company claims the filter will block posts with strong language, risky stunts, or content promoting harmful behaviors—like drug paraphernalia. Sounds good on paper, right? But critics are calling it a PR stunt, not a real solution. Sharon Winkler, who lost her 17-year-old son Alex to suicide in 2017, isn’t convinced. “This feels like another empty promise to make parents feel safe,” she said. Counselor Laura Ladefian agrees. “Filters won’t fix the algorithms that make these platforms addictive,” she said. “It’s like putting a Band-Aid on a broken arm.” We have opportunities for sponsors to get great engagement on these shows. Call 770.874.3200 for more info. We’ll be right back Break 2: 07.14.22 KIA MOG STORY 4: State names Suwanee an 'exceptional' main street city  Suwanee’s got some bragging rights—officially. The Georgia Department of Community Affairs just named it one of the state’s newest Georgia Exceptional Main Street (GEMS) communities. Canton snagged the other spot, but let’s focus on Suwanee for a second. Why the honor? It’s all about their downtown. Public spaces, smart planning, and a vibe that mixes charm with progress. Earning GEMS status isn’t easy. Cities have to prove they’re not just growing economically but also keeping their unique character intact. Suwanee nailed it. STORY 5: AMC brings first new Dolby Experience to Gwinnett since 2017 Big news for movie lovers in Gwinnett—Dolby Cinema is back after an eight-year hiatus. This past weekend, AMC unveiled its brand-new Dolby Cinema at the AMC Dine-In Webb Gin 11 on Scenic Highway in unincorporated Lawrenceville. It’s the first Dolby Experience in the county since 2017, and honestly? It’s a game-changer. Think ultra-vivid colors, insane brightness, and sound so immersive it feels like it’s crawling up your spine. Dolby Vision and Dolby Atmos combine to make every scene hit harder—like you’re in the movie, not just watching it. This upgrade came after three months of renovations, and AMC isn’t stopping here. They’re planning 40 more Dolby locations nationwide, aiming for over 200 total. For now, though, Gwinnett’s got something to brag about. Break 3: And now here is Leah McGrath from Ingles Markets on sweet tooths Break 4: We’ll have closing comments after this Break 5: Ingles Markets 6 Signoff – Thanks again for hanging out with us on today’s Gwinnett Daily Post Podcast. If you enjoy these shows, we encourage you to check out our other offerings, like the Cherokee Tribune Ledger Podcast, the Marietta Daily Journal, or the Community Podcast for Rockdale Newton and Morgan Counties. Read more about all our stories and get other great content at www.gwinnettdailypost.com Did you know over 50% of Americans listen to podcasts weekly? Giving you important news about our community and telling great stories are what we do. Make sure you join us for our next episode and be sure to share this podcast on social media with your friends and family. Add us to your Alexa Flash Briefing or your Google Home Briefing and be sure to like, follow, and subscribe wherever you get your podcasts. Produced by the BG Podcast Network Show Sponsors: www.ingles-markets.com www.kiamallofga.com See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

China's Military Purge Signals Deep Crisis of Confidence in Xi Jinping. Charles Burton and Gordon Chang discuss how China expelled eight senior generals, signaling a severe internal crisis and lack of confidence in Xi Jinping's leadership, potentially orchestrated by his adversaries. This turmoil suggests foreign governments should interact carefully with Xi. Economically, figures show industrial production outpacing consumption, and proposals for mandated municipal consumption goals reflect a state struggling to maintain prosperity, leading to pervasive gloom among the people. 1879

China's Military Purge Signals Deep Crisis of Confidence in Xi Jinping. Charles Burton and Gordon Chang discuss how China expelled eight senior generals, signaling a severe internal crisis and lack of confidence in Xi Jinping's leadership, potentially orchestrated by his adversaries. This turmoil suggests foreign governments should interact carefully with Xi. Economically, figures show industrial production outpacing consumption, and proposals for mandated municipal consumption goals reflect a state struggling to maintain prosperity, leading to pervasive gloom among the people. 1925

SHOW  10-20-25 1965 GAZA POWS  CBS EYE ON THE WORLD WITH JOHN BATCHELOR THE SHOW BEGINS IN THE DOUBTS ABOUT THE GAZA CEASEFIRE... FIRST HOUR 9-915 Regional Powers React to Tenuous Gaza Ceasefire and Hostage Deal. Bill Roggio and Husain Haqqani discuss how the Gaza agreement is viewed regionally as a tenuous ceasefire and hostage deal, not a path to peace. Saudi Arabia was displeased, seeking a long-term Palestinian state solution. Egypt supported the quiet to prevent domestic instability and refugee influx. Conversely, Qatar and Turkey championed the ceasefire because they are invested in Hamas and want its political and military structure to survive. 915-930 Regional Powers React to Tenuous Gaza Ceasefire and Hostage Deal. Bill Roggio and Husain Haqqani discuss how the Gaza agreement is viewed regionally as a tenuous ceasefire and hostage deal, not a path to peace. Saudi Arabia was displeased, seeking a long-term Palestinian state solution. Egypt supported the quiet to prevent domestic instability and refugee influx. Conversely, Qatar and Turkey championed the ceasefire because they are invested in Hamas and want its political and military structure to survive. 930-945 China's Military Purge Signals Deep Crisis of Confidence in Xi Jinping. Charles Burton and Gordon Chang discuss how China expelled eight senior generals, signaling a severe internal crisis and lack of confidence in Xi Jinping's leadership, potentially orchestrated by his adversaries. This turmoil suggests foreign governments should interact carefully with Xi. Economically, figures show industrial production outpacing consumption, and proposals for mandated municipal consumption goals reflect a state struggling to maintain prosperity, leading to pervasive gloom among the people. 945-1000 China's Military Purge Signals Deep Crisis of Confidence in Xi Jinping. Charles Burton and Gordon Chang discuss how China expelled eight senior generals, signaling a severe internal crisis and lack of confidence in Xi Jinping's leadership, potentially orchestrated by his adversaries. This turmoil suggests foreign governments should interact carefully with Xi. Economically, figures show industrial production outpacing consumption, and proposals for mandated municipal consumption goals reflect a state struggling to maintain prosperity, leading to pervasive gloom among the people. SECOND HOUR 10-1015 US-Ukraine Summit Yields No Tomahawk Commitment; Focus on Attrition. John Hardie and Bill Roggio discuss how reports suggest President Trump pressed Zelensky to agree to a ceasefire based on Russian territorial demands, though no commitment was made on providing Tomahawk missiles. Tomahawks would provide Ukraine with a highly useful long-range strike capability but would not be a "wonder weapon." With Russia holding a material advantage, Ukraine's best strategy is exhausting Russia's offensive potential by inflicting disproportionate attrition, independent of Trump's softening support. 1015-1030 US-Ukraine Summit Yields No Tomahawk Commitment; Focus on Attrition. John Hardie and Bill Roggio discuss how reports suggest President Trump pressed Zelensky to agree to a ceasefire based on Russian territorial demands, though no commitment was made on providing Tomahawk missiles. Tomahawks would provide Ukraine with a highly useful long-range strike capability but would not be a "wonder weapon." With Russia holding a material advantage, Ukraine's best strategy is exhausting Russia's offensive potential by inflicting disproportionate attrition, independent of Trump's softening support. 1030-1045 Gaza Ceasefire Interrupted by Violence; Hamas Reasserts Dominance. David Daoud and Bill Roggio discuss how the Gaza ceasefire was violated when Hamas killed Israeli soldiers, prompting Israeli retaliation to reinforce red lines without restarting the conflict entirely. Hamas is deliberately slowing the return of dead hostages to stabilize the ceasefire internationally. In Gaza, Hamas immediately began cracking down on rivals to reassert its dominance and prevent others from filling the power vacuum left by IDF withdrawals, signaling it remains the top power. 1045-1100 Gaza Ceasefire Interrupted by Violence; Hamas Reasserts Dominance. David Daoud and Bill Roggio discuss how the Gaza ceasefire was violated when Hamas killed Israeli soldiers, prompting Israeli retaliation to reinforce red lines without restarting the conflict entirely. Hamas is deliberately slowing the return of dead hostages to stabilize the ceasefire internationally. In Gaza, Hamas immediately began cracking down on rivals to reassert its dominance and prevent others from filling the power vacuum left by IDF withdrawals, signaling it remains the top power. THIRD HOUR 1100-1115 Houthis Maintain Threat Despite Gaza Ceasefire; New Military Chief Named. Bridget Toomey and Bill Roggio discuss how the Houthis have paused attacks in line with the Gaza ceasefire but remain capable and intent on striking Israel or the Red Sea if fighting resumes. They announced the death of strategic planner and Chief of Staff Muhammad al-Ghamari, who was killed by Israel. His replacement, Yusef al-Madani, is believed to have close ties and training with Iran. The Houthi core mission, driven by perpetual animosity toward America and Israel, remains unchanged. 1115-1130 Tomahawk Missile Threat Puts Pressure on Putin's Air Defenses. Rebecca Grant and Gordon Chang discuss how Russia is highly anxious about the possible deployment of US Tomahawk land-attack missiles to Ukraine. Tomahawks, with a 1,600-mile range, can fly low and strike over 60 Russian air bases and critical energy targets. Experts say the weapon presents an "almost unsolvable air defense problem" for Russia because Putin lacks sufficient air defense systems, like the S-400, to protect such a wide area. 1130-1145 US Pressure on Venezuela/Colombia Narco-States Splits Latin American Left. Ernesto Araújo and Alejandro Peña Esclusa discuss how the US military is ramping up pressure on narco-terrorism gangs operating out of Venezuela and Colombia, causing nervousness in the Maduro regime. Trump openly attacked Maduro's key ally, Colombian President Petro, calling him an accomplice and threatening to cut aid and raise tariffs. The Venezuelan opposition is heartened, believing Maduro's fall will expose deep drug-related corruption linking members of the São Paulo Forum across the continent. 1145-1200 US Pressure on Venezuela/Colombia Narco-States Splits Latin American Left. Ernesto Araújo and Alejandro Peña Esclusa discuss how the US military is ramping up pressure on narco-terrorism gangs operating out of Venezuela and Colombia, causing nervousness in the Maduro regime. Trump openly attacked Maduro's key ally, Colombian President Petro, calling him an accomplice and threatening to cut aid and raise tariffs. The Venezuelan opposition is heartened, believing Maduro's fall will expose deep drug-related corruption linking members of the São Paulo Forum across the continent. FOURTH HOUR 12-1215 China Dominates Ukraine's Drone Supply Chain Despite Export Controls. Jack Burnham discusses how Ukraine's survival relies on its ability to produce up to 200,000 FPV drones monthly. However, 97% of Ukrainian drone producers source primary components, including rare earths for engines and chips, from China. Despite China imposing export controls on finished drones, smaller components are circumvented and supplied to both Ukraine and Russia. Finding alternative, self-reliant supply chains, potentially through US allies like Taiwan, is crucial for Kyiv. 1215-1230 China's Economic Woes and Rare Earth Export Controls Raise Global Alarms. Elaine Dezenski discusses how the US Treasury Secretary remarked that China's worrying economic fundamentals—including high debt and youth unemployment—are leading Beijing to use tactics like rare earth export controls to undermine the global economy. China acts as a "non-market player" using subsidies and forced labor, which corrodes the free market. Experts suggest the US must acknowledge these non-market practices and push for transparency and adherence to new, strict global trade rules. 1230-1245 Iran Trash-Talks Trump; Nuclear Ambitions Become More Overt. Jonathan Sayeh and Bill Roggio discuss how Iran's Supreme Leader publicly rejected Trump's appeals for negotiations, a move primarily aimed at boosting domestic morale following regional setbacks. However, a top nuclear scientist overtly claimed Iran has the capacity to build a nuclear bomb, suggesting weaponization ambitions are becoming less covert. Tehran views its regional position as a lose-lose scenario but uses the Gaza ceasefire as a critical breathing room opportunity to rearm its weakened proxies. 1245-100 AM Hamas Cracks Down on Rival Clans in Gaza Post-Ceasefire. Ahmad Sharawi and Bill Roggio discuss how following the Gaza ceasefire, Hamas cracked down on rival clans and militias, like the Dughmush clan, to reassert its dominance. Hamas labeled the Dughmush clan, known for smuggling and past criminal activity, as Israeli collaborators. Anti-Hamas groups, including former PA security forces, are vastly outnumbered and less capable than Hamas, which remains the strongest faction in Gaza and uses these executions to deter future competition.

Rachel Louise Ensign, economics reporter with The Wall Street Journal, explains the economic forces keeping Americans stuck in their homes and jobs, and how it impacts daily life.

Read more insights from Morgan Stanley.----- Transcript ----- Political developments in Japan and France have brought more volatility to sovereign debt markets. Our Global Economist Arunima Sinha highlights the risks investors need to watch out for.Arunima Sinha: Welcome to Thoughts on the Market. I'm Arunima Sinha, from Morgan Stanley's Global and U.S. Economics teams.Today, I'm going to talk about sovereign debt outlooks and elections around the world.It's Wednesday, October 15th at 10am in New York.Last week we wrote about the deterioration of sovereign debt and fiscal outlooks; and right on cue, real life served up a scenario. Elections in Japan and another political upheaval in France drove a reaction in long-end interest rates with fiscal outlooks becoming part of the political narrative. Though markets have largely stabilized now, the volatility should keep the topic of debt and fiscal outlooks on stage.In Japan, the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, the LDP, elected Sanae Takaichi as its new leader in something of a surprise to markets. Takaichi's election sets the stage for the first female prime minister of Japan since the cabinet system was established in 1885.That outcome is not assured, however. And recent news suggests that the final decision is a few weeks away. The landmark movement in Japanese post-war politics, in some ways further solidifies the changing tides in the Japanese political economy. Markets have positioned for Takaichi to further the reflation trade in Japan and further support the nominal growth revival.The Japanese curve twists steepened sharply as Tokyo markets reopened with the long-end selling off by 14 basis points amid intensifying fiscal concerns and the unwinding of pre-election flattener positions. Specifically, expectations appear to be aligning for a more activist fiscal agenda – relief measures against inflation, bolstered investment in economic security and supply chains, and stepped-up commitments to food security.Our strategists expect that sectors poised to benefit will include high tech exporters, defense and security names, and infrastructure and energy firms, as capital is likely to rotate towards these areas. Though, as our economists cautioned, the lack of a clear legislative maturity may hamper efforts for outright reorientation of fiscal policy.Meanwhile, we expect the implications for monetary policy to be limited. Our reading is that Taikaichi Sanae is not strongly opposed to Bank of Japan Governor Ueda's cautious stance reducing expectations for near term hikes. But we also reiterate that a hike late this year remains a possibility, particularly as the yen weakens.Economically, our baseline call has been supported by the election outcome given we did not expect the BoJ to raise rates in the near future. Indeed, market expectations of an increase in interest rates have been priced out for the next meeting.France is the other economy that saw long-end rates react to political shifts since we published our debt sustainability analysis. PM Lecornu's resignation was far quicker than markets expected, especially given the fact that he was only in office for a matter of weeks.A clear majority in the current parliament remains elusive pointing to continued gridlock, and ultimately snap elections remain a possibility for the next weeks or months. At the heart of the political uncertainty is division about how to proceed with fiscal consolidation against a moving target of widening deficits.The lack of fiscal consolidation in France has been a topic for many years. Though the ECB provides an implicit backstop against disruptive widening of OAT spreads through the TPI, our Europe economists view the activation of TPI as unlikely. As the spread widening has been driven by concerns around France's fiscal sustainability, a factor that is likely seen as reflecting fundamentals.In our rather mechanical projections on debt, we highlighted markets would ultimately determine what is and is not sustainable. These political events are the type of catalyst to watch for.So far, the risks have been contained, but we have a clear message that complacency could become costly at any time. With the deterioration in debt and fiscal fundamentals, we suspect there will be more risks ahead.Thanks for listening. If you enjoy the show, please leave us a review wherever you listen and share Thoughts on the Market with a friend or colleague today.

Today's Headlines: A ceasefire in Gaza officially took effect after Israel's security cabinet approved the deal brokered in Egypt — Israel and Hamas agreed on mutual pullbacks and a hostage-prisoner swap, while aid groups are already mobilizing for Gaza. Meanwhile, Trump's longtime nemesis, New York AG Letitia James, has been indicted for allegedly fudging a mortgage document to help her niece buy a house — federal prosecutors previously passed on the case, and James insists it's a paperwork mistake, not a crime. In Chicago, a judge just blocked the Trump administration from sending in the National Guard for its immigration crackdown — which, if history is any guide, will only make Trump want to do it more. At the Pentagon, nearly 300 employees are under investigation for online comments about Charlie Kirk after his death — part of Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth's new “don't speak ill of Charlie” policy. Also confirmed by the Senate: the same NOAA chief who presided over Trump's infamous “Sharpiegate” hurricane stunt. So… good luck getting accurate forecasts, ladies — the pressure's in your barometer breasts now. Economically speaking, it's a spooky season — Moody's says 22 states are either in or near recession thanks to tariffs, federal job cuts, and immigration slowdowns (sound familiar?), while cocoa prices have doubled and candy inflation is up 8%. Guess no one's getting those full sized bars this Halloween. Overseas, the U.S. just bailed out Argentina with $20 billion after its libertarian president Milei crashed the economy. In return, China's buying Argentina's soybeans instead of ours, screwing over Iowa farmers — so Trump's now considering a $10–14 billion bailout for them, too. And finally, Pope Leo dropped his first major document as pontiff, urging compassion for migrants and reminding Catholics that “the poor are part of our family.” In a world full of Stephen Millers, be a Pope Leo. Resources/Articles mentioned in this episode: CNN: Israel and Hamas agree to first phase of Gaza ceasefire plan NYT: What Are the Charges in Letitia James's Indictment? Axios: Judge blocks Trump's deployment of National Guard to Chicago WaPo: Hegseth's hunt for Charlie Kirk critics spans nearly 300 investigations NYT: Senate Confirms Neil Jacobs, ‘Sharpiegate' Meteorologist, to Lead NOAA Axios: 22 states are in a recession or close to it, new analysis finds Axios: Halloween scare: Candy costs are soaring Axios: The U.S. bought Argentine pesos, Bessent says WSJ: Trump Explores Bailout of at Least $10 Billion for U.S. Farmers Axios: Pope Leo's first encyclical: Faith means defending migrants Morning Announcements is produced by Sami Sage and edited by Grace Hernandez-Johnson Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices