Area of the continent of Africa that is south of the Sahara Desert
We decided to rerelease this episode to make sure it gets the listenership it deserves.Andela, Jumia, Flutterwave - these are just a few of the African tech startups now worth over a billion US dollars. Foreign money is flowing in. Some people are getting rich. We ask our three contributors whether these tech startups will create significant employment on the continent. Maya Horgan Famodu is a Nigerian-American venture capitalist. She is the founder and managing director of Ingressive Capital. The $10 million venture capital firm targets early-stage tech startups across Sub-Saharan Africa. Gabriel Curtis is the former minister in charge of investments and public-private partnerships in Conakry, Guinea.Samba Bathily is a Malian entrepreneur specializing in sustainable clean energy and solar solutions. He founded Africa Development Solutions (ADS) and partnered with Akon the American-Senegalese hip-hop artist on the Akon Lighting Africa Initiative.The Limitless podcast is made possible with a grant from the U.S. Department of State and the Seenfire Foundation. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Welcome to another episode of Ideas Untrapped. My guest today is Charlie Robertson, who is the chief economist of Renaissance Capital - a global investment bank - and in this episode we talked about the subject of Charlie's new book, "The Time-Travelling Economist''. The book explores the connection between education, electricity, and fertility to economic development. The thrust of the book's argument is that no poor country can escape poverty without education, and that electricity is an important factor for investors looking to build businesses. It also explains that a low fertility rate helps to increase household savings. Charlie argues, with a lot of data and historical parallels, that countries need at least a 70-80% adult literacy rate (defined as being able to read and write four sentences in any language) and cheap electricity (an average of 300 - 500 kWh per capita) in order to industrialize and grow their economies rapidly. Small(er) families (3 children per woman) mean households are able to save more money, which can improve domestic investments by lowering interest rates - otherwise countries may repeatedly stumble into debt crises. We also discussed how increasing education can lead to higher domestic wages, but that this is usually offset by a large increase in the working-age population - and other interesting implications of Charlie's argument.TRANSCRIPTTobi;The usual place I would start with is what inspired you to write it. You mentioned in the book that it was an IMF paper that sort of started your curiosity about the relationship between education, electricity, fertility, and economic development. Generally. So, what was the Eureka moment?Charlie;Yeah, the eureka moment actually came in Kenya, um, because I'd already done a lot of work showing how important education was. It's the most important, no country escapes poverty without education. So I'd already made that clear and there wasn't much debate about that. Perhaps there was a debate about why some countries have gone faster than others, but there wasn't much debate about that. The second thing I was very clear on was electricity, which kept on coming up in meetings across Sub-Saharan Africa, Pakistan, [at] a number of countries, people kept on talking about the importance of electricity. But the eureka moment came when somebody pointed out to me that Kenya, where I was at the time, couldn't afford to build huge excess capacity of electricity, which I was arguing you need to have. You need to have too much electricity, so that it's cheap and it's reliable.And then investors come in and say, "great! I've got cheap educated labour, and I've got cheap reliable electricity. I've got the human capital and the power I need, that then enables me to invest and build a business here." And the question then was, well, why was it so expensive in Kenya but so cheap in China? Why was the cost of borrowing so high in Nigeria but so cheap in Morocco or Mauritius? And when I was trying to work out where did the savings come from in China, uh, well I was looking globally, but China's the best example of economic success and development success we've seen in the last 50 years. Over half the answer came from this IMF paper saying, actually it came from their low fertility rate. That's over half of the rise in household savings, which are massive in China, came about because the fertility rate had fallen so dramatically.And I then thought, could this possibly be true for other countries as well? Could this help explain why interest rates are so high in Nigeria or Kenya and so low elsewhere? And the answer is yes. So this book, The Time Travelling Economist is bringing all of these three things together - the fertility rate, the education rate, and electricity - to say not just how countries develop, cause I think I've answered that, but when they develop. Because once we know those three factors are key, we can then work out the when. Not just in the past [of] countries, but also in the future. Um, so that's where this came from.Tobi;I mean, we're going to be talking about each of those factors over the course of this conversation, but another question...some would say boring question, but I know how development economists and economists generally always try to defend their turf, you know, around issues like these. So, has anybody like taking you to task on the causal link between these three factors and development? And how would you defend yourself against that were it to be asked?Charlie;I haven't found anyone yet who's argued successfully against these points. Um, the closest criticism I get, and just to say, you know, this book came about off the back of three key reports I did in 2017 on education, 2018 on electricity, and 2019 on fertility and savings. So I've now been talking about these ideas for three to five years. The book only came out in July, 2022, bringing them all together. But in five years I haven't had pushback other than people ask, "is it not correlated?" You know, "is it not perhaps economic growth leads fertility declines or boosts savings?" And I think I show really clearly in the data that "no." Um, the fertility declines give us the growth. You don't get growth without adult literacy of at least 40%, you certainly don't get industrialization until literacy is at 70 to 80.So, you know, I'm looking at the data and I think it's pretty crystal clear that you've gotta get these other things right first before your economy can take off. And I can't find any counter-examples. Except, I mean there's the inevitable few, those countries like Qatar or Kuwait with huge amounts of energy exports per capita or diamonds in Botswana's case. And there you don't have to get everything right before you get wealthier because you just happen to be lucky to have huge amounts of energy exports per person and a very small population. But they are a bit of an exception. I think you could probably argue that they do grow first before they get everything else right. But for the vast majority of the planet and all countries in history, it's the other way around. You gotta get education, power, fertility rates in the right place to take off.Tobi;So I mean, getting into the weeds, let's look at education first. Before your book, personally for me, and I should say what I really like about your book is, it's well written, it's an interesting read. It comes across as a bit less analytical, which is what you get from the standard development literature, you know, and I think that's partly because you are writing about a lot of the countries that you have also worked in and interacted with a lot of these factors. So it really gives it a first-hand experience kind of narrative. So I like that very much. So prior to your book, if someone were to ask me about the relationship between education and economic development or catch-up growth, generally, the reference usually goes to Studwell's big claim, Joe Studwell, that: Yeah. You don't really need a super high level of education metrics for a country to industrialize because the standard explanation is that how a relatively poor country starts industrializing is from the low-skill, uh, labour-intensive, low-skill manufacturing jobs, that you don't need a high level of education and skill for you to be able to do that.So what I wanna work out here is what is the transmission mechanism between adult literacy and industrialization the way you've, like, clearly analyzed in your book?Charlie;Well, thank you very much for saying it was nicely written, I appreciate that. I wanted to try and make it as accessible as possible. Yeah, I think Joe Studwell's books are really good and I think he's right that you don't need a high level of education to do that first step out of rural poverty, subsistence farming into a textile mill. I think what's interesting is how many people writing about development forget how important just adult literacy actually is, because we've taken [it] so much for granted. So Adam Smith, who wrote The Wealth of Nations, the father of economics back in the 18th century in Scotland, he didn't make a big deal about adult literacy driving growth. And more recently, you know, people like Dani Rodrik have echoed exactly that saying you don't need any great education to work in a textile mill. You just need to be dextrous with your fingers. Which is almost exactly actually what Adam Smith said 250 years ago. And I was sympathetic to that, but I then kept on seeing in the data, well, first of all, I found this theory written in the sixties that said that no country has industrialized even to that first basic level of textiles without adult literacy being about 70 to 80% of the population. Which means basically all adults, all men, plus well over half the female population as well. And this was the theory written in the sixties and when I looked at the data, it was proven right and I couldn't quite understand why - if you just need dextrous fingers to work in a textile mill, why would there be that link? And I ended up talking to a guy who ran Levi's factories in Asia in the 1980s and he said, “Charlie, just think about it.”You've got this box of Levi's jeans coming down the conveyor belt. Do you put that box onto the truck labelled United States or that truck labelled Europe for export? And if you can't read and write, you won't even get that right. So the adult literacy thing I think is overlooked. People are focusing on secondary school, high school education, how much [many] university graduates a country needs and they do need graduates too. But until you get to that 70 to 80% adult literacy, textile mills don't go to a country. And we can see that they did go to China in the nineties when they got to adult literacy of 70%. They are in Southeast Asia. They're in Bangladesh since education hit about 70 to 80% in the last 10 to 15 years. But they're not big in sub-Saharan Africa, or at least in parts of Nigeria or the Sahel or West Africa because the education levels still aren't there yet. So, you know, I looked as far back as I could go to the 19th century and even the first non-European country to take off, Japan, had an adult literacy rate of about 70% by 1900 and 20 years later, they had a thriving textile industry. The education always comes first. And Korea copied that Japan model in the 1950s and sixties, Taiwan, Hong Kong, all the rest [of] Southeast Asia's followed. Now, South Asia's doing it and luckily it's spreading across Africa too. But the adult literacy is the first essential step.Tobi;One possible objection. And I haven't seen this anywhere, but I couldn't really get it out of my mind while I was reading that part of the book is that some will argue that increasing education also increases domestic wages and that is really a problem for industrializing. And, if I recall, one particular point that the anonymous economic historian on Twitter, Pseudoerasmus, made particularly about Asia, is they were able to combine a very high adult literacy rate - a measure which you use is completion of secondary education…Charlie;Yeah.Tobi;With very unusually low domestic wages. What role do wages play in your analysis?Charlie;I think that's the norm actually. It connects to the fertility thing. And I'm not sure if you want to jump there just yet, but what tends to happen when you've educated your population is that the fertility rate drops a lot. And when that happens, the number of people who have to stay at home looking after 5, 6, 7 children goes down a lot too. Women can go into the workforce and of course cause you've got the education, right? Those women are educated so they can join the industrial workforce as well. So very roughly, if we say there's a hundred people in Nigeria, 50 kids and 50 adults, let's say 25 of the adults have to be staying at home to look after 50 kids, you're talking 25% of the population can go out and work of the overall population. You go to Asia today and it's more like 70% adults, say 30% of kids.So you need maybe 15% of adults to stay at home. And you end up with something like 85% of the whole population can go out to work instead of 25%. Now, the consequence of that is a massive rise in the working-age population. And I think that that keeps industrial wages low for a few generations, in fact. Or at least three decades. Probably 40 years, where the education's come through, the fertility rates come down, you've got this huge excess supply of labour, which is then joining the industrial workforce and getting jobs. But because there keeps on being more people joining that workforce, it keeps wages relatively low. Now, what eventually happens then after a few decades is that that big increase in the workforce stops increasing as fast. We've seen this in China in the last 20 years. So, 20 years ago China's per capita GDP was about fifteen hundred dollars, $1,500.Whereas now, now the population has stopped growing. Working age population's shrinking. It's gone up to over $11,500. It's gone up tenfold. So the big reward for industrialization comes later. And we had this in Europe of course in the 19th century, you know, wages were pretty awful and industrial working was pretty awful experience in the 19th century. I mean it paid slightly better than rural subsistence farming, which is why people came to the cities. But London was a horrible place for the vast majority of people. And the industrial workhouses were terrible places as well. And that lasted for generations. It's only when that big population, kind of, boom stories started to shift that labour eventually got any bargaining power. Cause when there was too much labour coming into the market, they had no bargaining power with the factory owners. It wasn't until the 1870s that the trade unions became legal in, say, the United States. Because up till then, you know, "you join a union, I fire you," you know, could be what the factory owner would say in the United States, cause there's always gonna be another person I can employ. But once the workforce starts to gain a bit of bargaining power, cause it's not expanding quite so fast, then finally wages start to pick up. So I think what's happened in Asia is pretty normal and will probably be the experience that we've seen across Africa as well.Tobi;Inevitably this will take us into what it means to be educated, really. Because a lot of countries, I mean it's pretty much standard - they say, Oh yeah, we want invest in education. Um, we know it is important for human capital. We know how important it is to have an educated population and all that. You talked about some data challenges also for some countries in your book. So what I wanna ask here is what exactly does it mean to be educated in the sense that you are talking about in the book?Charlie;Yeah, this is a really fair question. Why am I talking about adult literacy? The definition is can you read and write four sentences in any language? Sentences like "farming is hard work." So it's not a very high threshold and I wouldn't argue, I don't think you would, that it's highly educated. It's just educated enough to put that box of jeans onto the right truck when it's going to America or Europe. But all that's doing then is taking your country's per capita GDP from your per person kind of wealth from say $500 a year, a thousand dollars a year to the kind of two, $3,000 a year level. It doesn't mean you've got the education levels you need to get to the $10,000 per capita GDP level growth or 20 or 50 or even a hundred. Um, to get to the 10,000 level, I think you probably need very good secondary school education as well.And to get to the $20,000 per capital GDP level, you're talking a lot of graduates coming out of university and you need to have that education then spreading throughout the population, both broadening and deeper education as well. And that is a process that takes decades. I mean I focused quite a bit on Korea because it was one of the most successful models and then China came along and did it even faster. But what Korea prioritized in the 1950s was getting that adult literacy rate from 35% or so, too low even to grow sustainably, to about 90% they said by 1960. So in about 10 or 15 years they got it from 35 to 90 and that was enough then to have textile mills do really well in the 1960s and they became a manufacturing country, an industrialized country by the early 1970s.But already then the government said, right, we need more engineers, we need graduates coming out of university to do heavy industry, to do cars, shipbuilding. But Korea had no cars or shipbuilding at the time, nothing significant. So they were changing the university focus from, kind of, the arts or law towards engineering and the sciences before they had the economic sectors that they were trying to promote. And then about 10 to 20 years later, all these graduates were then in the economy and ready to start up companies like Deawoo, Hyundai, Kia, Samsung. And they started small obviously in the 1980s and early nineties. But this kind of sequential thinking about it meant that Korea kept on having the right human capital at every stage of development. So my book's trying to focus on, you know, why hasn't Pakistan got all the textile factories?Why does Bangladesh have them? Why doesn't Nigeria have them? Why does Vietnam have them? And this is saying first you've gotta get that sequencing right of everybody ideally being literate, everybody having had school up to 11 years old and come out with a good standard of education. On the quality issue you just raised, the problem here is a couple of things. So I mean firstly people sometimes just make up the data and say, yes, my population is literate when it's not. But secondly, when you try and kind of shoehorn a hundred kids into one class to say, you know, they're all going to school now, but you've only got one teacher, you are not coming out with a good education at all. You might not even be coming out literate at all. So that, you know, I'm also trying to warn that governments can't do this on the cheap. Or not completely. They have to take it seriously and say, look, we actually need to make sure everyone really is coming out able to read and write. It's not just trying to tick a box to say everyone's at school.Tobi;Hopefully, we'll circle back to policy questions around this later. Let's talk briefly about electricity, which as you say, once you start investigating these factors, then you start teasing out what's what for each country. And the way you introduce that is [that] there are some countries with very high adult literacy rates but still weren't getting the benefits - like [the] Philippines, which was your example in the book. And it turns out what was missing in that particular case was electricity generation. But first I want you to make one distinction for me quite quickly. Cause it's funny, I was reading David Pilling's brief coverage of your book in the FT and he talked about the fertility part being controversial and I wonder that people miss the obvious controversy in electricity, but we'll get to that. So, now, is it really about investment in electricity that is often missing in countries that can't quite manage to get it right or the way their electricity market is structured? I know you are quite familiar with Nigeria and it's really a big, big, big debate that we've been having for, I don't know, like 20 years. So, some people will say you need very large upfront investment, possibly by the government, in generating capacity transmission, machinery and co. We argue, oh no, you really need to restructure the electricity market first. People have to pay for what they use. You need to restructure the tariff system, blah blah blah, blah, blah. What are your thoughts?Charlie;Um, big issues. And there is a debate. There're so many debates about this actually. There's the debate about whether you need a big national grid, big national generation and distribution companies or whether you can have localized electricity. Um, you are getting a couple of points though that I think it's easier to say some answers to. And one of them was to do with getting people to actually pay their bills. Certainly a problem in Nigeria, apparently, you know, discos will say that because there hasn't been good metering and despite privatization that those meters have not been rolled out. I know the government's promising to roll it out to all 10 million account holders now, but because there hasn't been metering, you can't charge necessarily the fair price for the amount of electricity people have used. So then people don't wanna pay. So then the discos are losing money, then they can't pay the generators and this then becomes a problem.And I think there is a case to say that if the generators can sell some power directly to some big companies, that could be one way around part of the problem. So in a place like Lagos, very similar to the Philippines in the 20th century, good educated population just held back by a lack of cheap reliable power. You know, I think if Lagos could have its own electricity story, it would be a phenomenally successful economy. It should be over the next three or four decades. So there is a case about how you structure this. But I found two or three things interesting when I was looking into this issue in 2018. And the first was just clarifying that it really is electricity that people need more than say transport infrastructure. You know, this is a survey the world bank had done and the only countries where they've said transport infrastructure was the bigger problem was countries where there wasn't an electricity problem because there's so much of it.So countries, where there's a load of electricity, say yes we need more transport infrastructure, but everybody else says we have to have the electricity first. So then it's a question of how do you roll that out in a way that makes money and supports development? And there is a... I think, a problem at the moment with well-meaning policies from people like the United Nations or the African Development Bank saying everybody should have access to electricity. But my point in the book is, and Adam Smith said the same thing in the 18th century, you want your infrastructure to be making money not losing money. You need to make sure that if you're going to supply people with a road or a bridge or electricity, that they can pay for it. And if you start building stuff that loses you money because people can't pay their bills, then you'll end up with an uneconomic electricity system which can't function properly and can't give industry what it needs.And what I try to emphasize in this is that every country from America and France in the 1920s to Turkey in the 1960s or seventies to Korea in the 1970s, every country has said, okay, let's make sure we've got electricity for industry first. Profitable, makes money, and then households over time? Yeah, okay, we'll connect them over time, but only when they can start affording to pay for electricity. It's not another subsidy that governments can't afford, we just can't do that. [This] is what every other country's done. But at the moment I do see this pressure for electricity systems to try and roll out universal access and so, in places like Kenya that's putting the whole electricity system under financial pressure because it's hurting their profits. And if you're trying to roll out cheap electricity to households, well how do you pay for that?Well, government subsidies partly, but the other way to pay for it is to make industry pay a high price. But if you're making industry pay a high price industry won't come. They'll go to Asia; where they get a low price for electricity. They're not going to go to somewhere that's got a high price. Cause no company's gonna say, I just wanna subsidize households getting electricity. Companies are coming to build stuff in countries because they'll make a good profit from doing so. So I think you've raised a number of issues there, you know, is localized electricity good, and so on? You know, what should you be prioritizing first - industry or households? And there's a whole host of issues. But I hope I've answered that.Tobi;Actually, that's the controversy I was referring to at the beginning of that question because the background that is, it'll be a very, very tough sell in the current political climate, for example in Nigeria, for any person aspiring to public office to make this argument that you have to power industry first. What it's going to sound like is: you are just trying to prioritize the rich and trying to exclude some people from what, like you said, has come to be framed as a universal basic right. You talk to a lot of small businesses, even individuals, like you mentioned with the World Bank Survey, the importance of electricity is so paramount on everybody's mind that if there's stable electricity, I can start X and Y businesses. I could make money and, I mean, no one needs the government for anything else. Just give us electricity.Charlie;Yeah.Tobi;So my point is practically… thinking about this practically, how do you think a sensible government that is not trying to bankrupt itself prematurely can manage this situation?Charlie;Well, I think it's hard work. Um, how did the Koreans do it in the sixties or the seventies or the eighties? They gave you no right to protest - military government. How did the communists do so well at getting this industry first, households later? How did they get it right in China or Russia? Same thing. You've got no rights to protest. "Your interests don't matter, we're thinking 10 to 20 years ahead how to make our country better off and how to make everyone better off. So you suffer now because we are gonna prioritize business." So that is one model. I'm not recommending it, I'm just saying it is a model that can be done. The other way is to allow it to be done by the private sector. And if you let the private sector roll out electricity, they will not supply electricity to people who won't pay their bills.And that is the story that you saw in western Europe, it's the story you saw in the States, and to some extent you're seeing actually in Kenya. There's quite an interesting company there called M-KOPA. And M-KOPA will sell you, well, they'll lend you, they'll lease you, a solar panel, a little one that you can put on your - actually, a friend of mine was showing it to me the other day in Uganda...they put it on the straw roof of the mud hut and that solar panel, you pay a monthly fee and after about 18 months you've paid for the panel, you've also got energy during that time enough to supply a mobile phone and so on, lights a little bit, and then it's yours and that's effectively privatizing that rural distribution story. But I think the difficulty is that politicians find it really hard to do this.And part of what I'm writing about in the book is how really hard it is for governments in a country with no savings, big population growth, to constantly meet all of the different demands. With huge population growth you're having to build new schools all the time, you have to hire even more teachers all the time. You've got population pressure, maybe, causing clashes over agricultural land like the Fulani herdsman in Central Nigeria, Northern Nigeria as well. And all of these pressures are on you all of the time. And there's constant demand to spend more on bridges, on hospitals, on education, on security. And what you can't afford to be doing is making a loss. And so I think what politicians need to do is say, we've gotta sequence this right. The same thing as with education. It's no good having a million university graduates if a country isn't literate enough to have an industrial base, you've gotta have the literacy first.And equally, it's no good having electricity rolled out to every household when there are no factories for people to go and get the jobs they need to be able to pay the electricity bill. And it's not easy. I, I totally understand it's not an easy situation for anyone to be in. The difficulty is [that] because it's not easy, too many political leaders will take what appears to be the easy option of saying, "I tell you what, let's just go and borrow a load of dollars offshore. Nigeria's going to go and issue a lot of dollar debt and we'll use that to try and sort these problems out." Kenya's done the same, Ghana's done the same, Pakistan's done the same. And the risk then is that you end up in default situations. So that feeds into one of the other chapters in the book as well.But I think it's very difficult. I think realistically governments need to say, what can we do here? And this is how long it's going to take. And it's going to be not a five-year story, it's going be a 20-year story, a 30-year story to get it right. And people, sadly, need to be patient, which is hard; when for generations people have been waiting for things to get much, much better and little progress has been made, relatively little progress has been made compared to Asia and that causes a lot of political frustration. I think.Tobi;I mean, speaking about Asia and I mean your point about taking away the right to protest, I think Africa and Nigeria sort of missed that window when we had military governments everywhere. So, uh, let me give you one experience I've had in trying to discuss your book with friends. So I get two reactions to the fertility section.It's almost automatic, you know, when you discuss fertility being at a certain level and I try to, you know, successfully argue your point, you get two strands of reactions in my experience, one goes immediately to the China issue - the one-child policy; that, "oh, so are you trying to say we should do what China did?" The other slightly more technical objection I get goes to the relationship between population growth and economic growth that is quite pervasive in the growth literature. Did you also experience that while writing the book and debating with colleagues?Charlie;Now I'll take each point in turn. Um, the China one-child policy story helps explain this massive rise in Chinese savings and then their very strong growth. What I'm trying to show in the book, of course, is that every rich country has seen a fertility decline. And what I'm arguing is probably the right sort of level for countries to aim for is about two to three kids on average. I don't care if people have five kids or one kid, it's just as a country the average of two to three kids is consistent with a very high, well, a big jump in the level of sayings. And with those savings, you can then industrialize and grow, and grow fast. Um, China I think actually made a mistake. I think China got it wrong by going for the one-child policy because they kind of turbocharged that story, that story that every rich country has got, of lower fertility, it took a really long time in Europe. I mean it took a really, really long time in Europe and that's why Europe had the slowest growth of any industrial revolution. It was done faster by the communism [they had] in Russia and they did faster growth and we've done even faster in China. But the consequence of this one-child policy and what the Chinese have discovered is it's bloody hard to get the fertility rate back up again once you've had one kid. I was talking to a Chinese professor on a plane back from Asia once and she was saying all of her friends, they can't get married, they can't stay married. They get married and they can't stay married because they're all used to being a one-child kind of princess or prince in the family who gets everything they want and then they try married life and they discover as you might well know, that you never get everything you want in a marriage, and you have to compromise.And it's certainly created a problem now that China can't get the kids, they can't raise the fertility level and it's not just China that's discovered that once you've got a low fertility rate, too low, I think of one, you have a problem raising it. Again, Italy's had the same problem, Iran, uh, Russia. So I think China did it too fast. And you certainly don't need to do it and loads of other countries show you that just aiming for that two to three kids figure really helps your economy and gets you onto the path to being middle-income and then a rich country. So I don't think you need to do the China one child. No. Um, the second issue, the population growth versus economic growth. What I show, what we did in this was we looked back at every country's growth rate since 1960 and I compared the per capita GDP growth, the per personal growth of an economy, it's the best way to measure how well an economy itself is really doing. And I compared that growth rate against the share of adults to kids that I was talking to you about a little earlier.Tobi;Yeah.Charlie;And where it's 50-50 roughly, between adults and kids, per capita GDP grows at 1% and that was the story of Asia in the sixties and seventies. It's still the story for a good number of countries including Nigeria today. So per capita GDP growth is about 1% when half your population can't work because they're kids. But once you get two-thirds of the population being adults, your average per capita growth in lower-income countries by half of America's wealth level, so not even lower-income, lower or middle-income countries, your per capita growth, and it averages three to 5% a year. So the structure of your population tells you what your per capita GDP growth is. So it's just... I can't see that there's any other way to explain this than you've gotta get that fertility rate down first before you can start to get the high per capita GDP growth. Um, and it's connected to the savings, of course; cause once you've got two kids instead of six, you're saving money in the bank, the bank starts to have more cash to lend out. There's more money for lending for investment. The government can borrow more cheaply so it can build infrastructure, roads and rail, electricity and cheap electricity cause interest rates are low cause the savings are high because most families are able to put some money aside at the end of the week. But that doesn't happen when 50% of the population are kids. They're not earning any money, they're not saving anything and the poor parents are trying to manage to feed five, six kids on average. You know, they've got nothing left at the end of the week to put into a bank.So the bank's got no cash. So interest rates are really high cause there's no money in the bank. Um, so money's really expensive. So the government can't afford to invest in infrastructure and if it does build electricity it has to charge a lot of money cause it's having to pay a lot of interest on the debt it's taken on. So to me, I've yet to find someone demolish the argument and uh, you know, it could happen.Tobi;Yeah.Charlie;But so far it seems you've got to get the fertility rate down first if you want to get fast growth. Now if you don't want to grow at three, four, 5% a year, you could do it really slowly like Europe did and you grow at say, one and a half, two, eventually, you get from European farming in 1800 to factories that are producing not great stuff by 1900, a hundred years later. But when I'm looking at Nigeria today, I don't want Nigeria to be waiting a hundred years to be doing what Europe took a hundred years to do. I also don't think the Chinese model of it taking 30 years, 20, 30 years but then having a population problem of being too old, I don't think that's the right solution either. But there's somewhere in between. At the moment though, Nigeria's on that long growth story, it's not yet ready for the faster growth storyTobi;On the China question, um, thinking about your answer there, is extremely low fertility or what they say "fertility below the replacement rate" a feature of the kind of explosive growth 30, 35, 40-year trajectory that we've seen in Asia. Because if you look at Korea, Korea even have worse demographic numbers than China and there was no draconian population policy, but it's kind of gone through this explosive growth phase that is even faster and bigger than China's.Charlie;Well, it's been going on for longer. So what the Koreans got right was they raised their adult literacy rate to, you know, they said about 90% by 1960. China, despite being communist and communists tend to say they really appreciate education, didn't get to over 70% literacy until 1990, sometime in the early 1990s, which is 25, 35 years later than Korea. Uh, so Korea was already booming in 1970 at a time when China was having the catastrophic mistakes of the cultural revolution and really bad growth and people feared mass famine. Well many, many did die in China in the sixties. So what I would argue is that Korea had a slower fertility decline and the growth rates were not as fast as China's but they've been growing for 50, 60 years already. So Korea's two to three times richer than China is today. But as you say, they're so ageing that they're gonna be the oldest country in the world by 2030.And what's gonna get interesting then, and I can't really answer this in the book cause we haven't seen it yet, but what's interesting about Korea and we're going to have to watch it carefully, is that you are going to end up with, not 70% adults and 30% kids, it'll be less and less working-age adults, maybe 60%, I dunno maybe eventually 50% and it'll be 50% kids and old age pensioners who can't work. And my guess is that Korean growth is going to slow back to about the 1% per capita growth that Nigeria's got at the moment because Korea's going to be too old. You know, and that's not something that I think people should be thinking about or worrying about. [People should be thinking about] Pakistan, East Africa, Southern Africa, West Africa at the moment. It's [Korea is] just not a...you know, that's a problem to worry about in 50, 60 years. But it is going to be interesting to watch what does happen to growth in really old countries. Um, can pensioners actually still do work? You know, maybe they end up retiring at 70 or 75 or 80, I dunno. It's gonna be quite interesting to see.Tobi;So I mean the question then is, uh, for countries that have fertility rates that are higher than what you described in the book.Charlie;Yeah.Tobi;It then becomes how do we get it to the point where domestic savings start going up, interest rate for the domestic investment environment then benefits from that virtuous cycle. You talked about access to uh, reproductive interventions like contraception, also education, which takes us to where we started this conversation from, especially the education of women and girls, generally. I was taking a look at David Le Bris recently where he was talking about equality between siblings and inequality between siblings and how it affects the overall capital formation, whether it's physical capital or human capital in the society. So my question then is, do you see individual sort of personalized household decision-making affecting this more or it is sort of a national policy thing?Charlie;When it's something as important as family, you know, the individual decisions matter a huge amount. And as I said earlier, I've got no issues with anyone doing what they choose to do. But that big family story, I was just talking to a former minister, actually, of a... former finance minister of a country and he's got five kids, he's saying that he's been able to help fund them go to university, but he can't afford to help them buy a house cause he just hasn't got the cash. And I thought that was a really interesting example of even in a wealthier country, you know, it still matters how big that family is. You know, when I looked into this on how do you get the fertility rate down and there's been quite a lot written about it. I don't have a magic or a single answer, but the theories are first: girls if they're staying at school until they're 18, versus girls who leave school at 13. If you leave school at 13, perhaps you have your first kid at 14, maybe a second kid at 17, third kid at 20. But if you stay at school until you're 18, perhaps the first kid's at 20. So already you've reduced the fertility rate by two just by keeping girls at school. And the key figure, but just kind of remind, well tell people is the key figure is at about three to four kids per woman on average, the banking system has got deposits cash in it of about 35% of GDP, at four to five kids, it's around 30, 25 to 30. At five to six kids, which is where Nigeria is, it's about 20% of GDP. Um, so 20, 30, you know, these sort of levels. If you get to two to three kids though, if you get it below three kids, it more than doubles to about 60% of GDP.That's when banks suddenly have loads of cash. When banks have got loads of cash, there's loads of lending, suddenly access to finance isn't a problem anymore. So how do you get it below three kids? So you educate girls, there's an incentive when women are educated for them to work cause they can start to make decent money in a textile factory that you can't do unless you've got that literacy. Um, the government just telling people that low fertility is a good thing is shown to have some success. From Indonesia to India, these kinds of government campaigns suggesting lower fertility rates have made a difference. The third thing, which really surprised me cause it's such a strong correlation, is [to] stop kids [from] dying. And I was pretty upset, actually, to see the numbers where, for Nigeria, you've got a 10% chance, just over a 10% chance of dying before the age of five because you're born in Nigeria. And when I was comparing that to Covid - which the world spent, what, trillions trying to fight - with a fatality rate of about one or 2%, you think of those with more than a 10% chance of dying just before the age of five in Nigeria. Anyway, it's kind of shockingly high, but when you have such a high chance of losing a child, you tend to have more children and the correlation is really quite strong. So, if you can try and address infant, [and] young child mortality rates, which doesn't cost that much, you can see countries with Nigeria's wealth level that have a mortality rate of not over 10%, but five or even 3%. And usually, countries with such a low mortality rate then have a much lower fertility rate as well. So, people tend to have less kids when they are more confident that all their kids are going to survive childhood. So, some investment in basic healthcare for children, education of girls, contraception availability, yes it does help, and government information campaigns. You put those things together and then you get a country like Bangladesh. Bangladesh which had the same population as Nigeria about 15 years ago. But today Nigeria's got tens of millions more. But Bangladesh is growing as fast as India. Bangladesh's per capita GDP is over $2,000. And it keeps on growing at six, seven, 8% every year. Because they have on average two kids per woman, they've got savings, they don't have much foreign debt because they don't need to borrow dollars from abroad to fund their growth, because they've got their own savings, because the fertility rate is low. Muslim Bangladesh: tremendous success story over the last two or three decades.Tobi;You sort of made allowances for countries that can't quite get their savings right up to the levels where they can get the desired domestic savings and really positively affect their investment environment in a big way. And you talked about debt in the book, which would be familiar to anybody that's been in the new cycle about Nigeria currently, which is that government revenue has collapsed. Debt servicing is rapidly approaching a hundred percent of what the government can collect. And it's only a matter of time before we are talking about a debt crisis. But, like you said, a debt crisis is, like, unavoidable if you're trying to grow and you don't have to requisite domestic savings to sort of mitigate that. But this inevitably brings in the question of debt restructuring which, again, some would also argue does not help you grow. So, in terms of just the sheer macroeconomics management of this, how do you go about it?Charlie;It's tough. The book's arguing, obviously, that a whole chunk of this stuff is really long term. You got to get the education right. So, you've got to have enough teachers and that takes, well, at best Korea did it in 15, 20 years. But even if you've got the education, then you've got to get the fertility rate down. And that takes at best 10 years to get it down by about two kids per woman. Nigeria's at 5.3 kids or so at the moment. It needs to be below three to have the local savings. So, we're talking at least 15 years, even if every priority was made today to try and improve education, do all this reproductive education and so on. So, the governments then have the choice of what do you do? I mean, if you're going to wait 15 years, you can grow at 1% a year per person. But you'll find the population is getting pretty cross because you've got all these other countries in the world growing at three, four, 5% per person every year. You know, why is my country growing at one [percent]? So, the politicians then...[it] becomes so attractive to go out and borrow and, you know, every country, not every single one, but the vast majority of debt defaults in the second half of the 20th century were in high fertility countries. The fertility rate I think was around, on average, five - five kids per woman was the average fertility rate in countries that defaulted in the second half of the 20th century. Wherever they were in the world. A lot of them were in Latin America in the debt crisis of 1980s. So firstly, debt crises are really common in high fertility countries because governments say I want to speed up my growth and they borrow when the markets let them.And we've certainly seen that in Africa in the last 10 years too. And then they borrow too much and then they go into default and then they can lose maybe a decade. And that is what happened in Latin America in the 1980s. But the alternative is to only grow at 1% a year. And yeah, you can avoid debt default. I'm not saying every high fertility country defaults. I'm saying almost all the countries that have defaulted are high fertility. So, you can settle for the low growth but if you don't want to settle for the low growth, the debt becomes a very attractive way to try and get faster growth. But it causes a problem. I end up finding roughly two other ways that you can try.Tobi;Okay.Charlie;And grow faster. Is it okay to jump on to those?Tobi;Yeah, go ahead please.Charlie;Yeah. First is to try and bring in as much foreign investment as you can. Cause you haven't got enough local savings, you don't want to take on too much debt cause eventually you'll default. So, you can try and make yourself very attractive for foreign investors. Foreign direct investors. The only problem with that model is that those foreign direct investors do also want their cheap electricity and the good infrastructure that unfortunately high fertility countries haven't got the money to pay for. So, it's difficult to get in a lot of foreign direct investment. Foreign direct investment in China, I was just reading a really good book by David Lubin, who's the chief economist of Citi for Emerging Markets and he did a book called Dance of the Trillions. Highly recommend, it's brilliant on emerging markets. And he says FDI suddenly started in China in the 1990s. Now, I know why. My book is explaining why I think, which is you finally had a literate population, 70% literacy and you also had the low fertility rate. So, you had the high savings, you had the good infrastructure. But the FDI didn't come 10 years before into China. It only really picked up in the 1990s. So, the point of then is, I mean yeah, try and get some [FDI] if you can, but the last option that I can see other than to just, perhaps, try to go full Stalinist, kind of communist, take control of every part of the economy. But even that still education and low fertility really helps... Um, the last option which any country can do is to run a current account surplus, I think. Have a currency level that's so cheap that you are running a trade surplus. A current account surplus, which is obviously trade plus services and remittances and so on.If you've got a surplus on that current account, you are bringing dollars into the economy and those dollars help reduce interest rates. And Nigeria saw that actually in 2005, six, seven and eight when the oil price was booming. Nigeria had that flood of dollars coming into the economy. Interest rates were really low below inflation and investment was relatively cheap and easy to finance. Now it's a problem to manage when it's a commodity-driven boom because commodities then bust. So, all that flood of money that came in suddenly disappeared again, you know, once the oil price collapsed there wasn't that current account surplus anymore. But if you run a cheap currency policy to make sure you always run a current account surplus, then that helps give you that supply of savings that you can then use to start investing. So that seems to me one of the few ways that a low-income country that's got not enough local savings, doesn't want to wait forever until its fertility rate's down [and] low enough to build the domestic savings, this is one way that looks sustainable that can bring in some foreign cash to help support growth.Tobi;But one minor aside on FDI and you can really correct me here if I'm wrong, wouldn't that really be a bit unstable? Because if you have loads of FDI, if other indicators are really working in your favour and at the slightest hint of a crisis, all that money then flows out.Charlie;Yeah. Well, I'll just differentiate between foreign direct investment and foreign portfolio investment. And, again, David Lubin's book is very good on this because the Washington consensus, which is this set of policies that were drawn up by policy makers around 1989, 1990, it said countries should welcome foreign direct investment. Building factories that it's pretty hard to move out of the country, that that should be welcomed. But when the original guys who drew up the Washington Consensus wrote down the kind of 10 principles, they weren't that keen on foreign portfolio investment. This is the hot money that will include a lot of my investors who will come in and buy shares in companies in the Nigerian Stock Exchange and might come in and buy bonds. And I think it's fair to say that that money can leave in times of trouble and doesn't really support...isn't necessarily as supportive [of growth] and that money we count on the capital account because it is foreign capital.What I was talking about on the current account surplus was obviously the trade surplus, the remittances, the services and so on. So, I think it's more debatable. I think a number of countries have restricted foreign portfolio flows into equity market or the bond market. And if they've got other things going for them, like a low fertility rate, they can kind of get away with that. Um, what I'm highlighting is that for some countries they just don't have that choice. And when America was short of capital in the 19th century, it was British capital that went over and built their railways, that bought all the shares in their infrastructure companies. The Brits owned America for much of the 19th century and then the French actually owned most of Russia. Uh, the railways and the ports and some of the industry, the coal mines [were] very significantly owned by French investors, portfolio funds, and portfolio guys are there to make money as well. You know, they're there to make profit and if you're making good profit, five, 10% a year or whatever sitting in Nigerian equity market, people will stay, and it won't leave. They'll be happy to stay there for many, many years as people are and have been doing in India, actually, since India's education fertility and electricity numbers have all come together in the last 10 years in a really good way. Foreign portfolio guys are saying, "Hey, we wanna put our money into the Indian stock market too." And Indian shares are pretty expensive right now because of that. But the money doesn't want to leave. It'll leave when policy mistakes are made but fundamentally doesn't want to leave. However, I don't deny that there is a reasonable argument you can make to say we're going to choose foreign direct investment, we're going to be more restrictive on foreign portfolio investment. Because that can be more volatile. It can leave quicker. And I wouldn't argue with that. Well, I mean we could debate it, but I think it's harder to prove that you must have foreign portfolio investments to thrive. I think the current account surplus is a better policy choice because it's in your control. Foreign portfolio investors and what they do, that's not in your control.Tobi;One question that stayed with me throughout your book, which is a bit silent in the book itself, maybe it's implied, you can tell me, is that it's really difficult to find a country at any particular point where all these three factors align at the same time. Where you have the requisite adult literacy rate, electricity and fertility, they rarely align at the same point in time in the history of any one country. Because your book did not really distinguish between any particular political preference or institutional arrangements, which I like that, but what institutional arrangement favours the consistency for all these factors to sort of come together, uh, in the economic history basically of a country. Because we know that political leaders tend to favour what benefits their ambition at any particular point in time, you know? And a lot of these things are investments that do pay off in the long run, you know? Like we talked about on savings, a lot of political leaders would want to borrow a lot of money and then leave the debt crisis to the next administration.Charlie;Yeah. Yeah. Happens a lot.Tobi;Yeah. You know, and so many other things, whether you are investing in electricity or education or whatever, they don't really want to do the hard work. They want to do the easy stuff and just leave it to the next guy.So, what institutional arrangements have you found in your observation and study of this that favours the patient consistent build-up to the alignment of these three factors?Charlie;I think it's really, um, it's kind of interesting actually because in each chapter I try and say which countries are at the right place for industrialization, education, which countries are at the right place for electricity, and which countries are at the right place for fertility. Perhaps I didn't properly bring that together in one chapter at the end to say, "so, who's the fast growth story?" But right now, the countries that have brought them together are Vietnam, India, Philippines, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and I think those five countries, Morocco actually six, um, those six countries should be the countries that will show the really good growth for the next 30 to 40 years. Um it's going to be great. And I'm then trying to highlight who's closest to joining them on a 10 year view. Um, Pakistan and Egypt both got big debt problems right now, but five to 10 years they could be joining that group as well and Ghana and actually Kenya and I would argue southern Nigeria could be, could be there in the 2030s.Um, so I am trying to say when they come together. The question you are asking, though, about institutions or perhaps leadership and so on, I think is a really important one because I guess this book in lots of ways is an argument against Why Nations Fail, which was a really interesting book; and [it] said it is all about institutions and the right institutions and that's why if you walk a kilometre across the US border into Mexico, things are run so very differently. It's got to be the institutions, that book argues, that makes the difference between a country succeeding or not. And what I'm arguing is that I don't think that's true. I think you appear to have the good institutions when everything else is running well and you appear to have the terrible institutions when you don't have the education or you don't have the electricity or you don't have the low fertility or worst of all, you haven't got any of them.So, a country that hasn't got any of them, like Niger, Chad, Somalia, you know, these are countries in a terrible place. But I'm saying that they can't have good institutions cause there's no money in the economy, there are not enough educated people in the economy. There's just no way that you're going to get a good setup in those countries. And actually, even at the beginning when, at the first 10 years or so, when you've got these things all coming together, you still don't think the institutions are good. You know, you go to India today, people don't think, "wow, this is a brilliantly run civil service. It's so uncorrupt[ed]." Such wonderful institutions everywhere. They don't say that. They don't say that about Philippines' Duterte, the president who's been just recently retired, by people who were worried the institutions found it difficult to control his populism. And yet Philippines boomed under Duterte, and India's boomed under Modi and countries like Korea boomed even with a level of corruption that means in the last 10 years we've seen four presidents go to jail for corruption.Um, so I argue that the better institutions come afterwards and that's why four presidents have gone to jail in Korea because they're now getting the institutions better. And I read a really good book about why democracies die by some American academics about three or four years ago now. I recommend it. And they pointed out that Latin America, across Latin America, they just copied the American institutions. They said, look, what's working in the Americas is North America. It's United States, they've got it right. Let's copy their institutions, we'll put them into my country, be it Venezuela, Brazil, Argentina, whoever. And then they discovered that actually if the human capital is not as advanced, people will undermine the institutions. And you arguably saw Trump try it in the United States itself, but the human capital and the rest of the place was good enough to stop him from going too far.This is all debatable stuff, but you know, this is... So, I think the institutions do work when everything else has been working for some time and before then it's very hard to argue that the institutions work or can make a huge difference. I think the fundamental economic reality of are you growing at 1% a year or three to 5% a year per capita? That isn't about the institutions. Having said all of that? I think there's no doubt that you can have, if you're lucky, very lucky, really good leadership. A leader like Lee Kuan Yew in Singapore, who has got vision, understands or is lucky, but he prioritized education and all the rest, who gets it right and takes the country onto a new path. When I think of some of the most obvious successes, a lot of them are small Singapore, Hong Kong, even Taiwan really.And maybe it's just tougher to do it in a country the size of Nigeria with over 200 million people or, or uh, India with over a billion, which is why it took India so long or Brazil. But I remember even the French president, Charles de Gaulle, I think in the sixties or seventies said, "how is it possible to govern a country with 350 types of cheese?".Um, and in India you'd say, "how can you govern a country of over a billion people with that many different dialects, different customs, different local cultures?" Um, and it is hard, but once you get these fundamentals of education, electricity and fertility right, suddenly, it looks like you can govern well. So, I want to think there is a role for good leadership, um, and it can make a difference and it does help. I just think history's telling us over the last 300 years that we can't count on luck and that lucky guy who happens to be the right leader to come in, sometimes woman who can come in, and push reform in the right way. What we can count on is that if you get the education, electricity and fertility numbers right, you will get out of poverty, you will get better off and your kids will have a much, much better future and your grandchildren even more so.So, I think that's probably one area [where] my book differs from many in the last 10, 15 years is saying, "I don't think it is so much about the things that we all like to pay attention to [like] who's going to win the next election and what are their different policies going to be?" And you know, most of the time I'm arguing it doesn't really make as much difference as we'd like to think.Tobi;Now, another point that came in the later chapters in the book, which I found interesting, and which is quite also a bit of a political issue right now, surrounds migration. Uh, a lot of Nigerians are leaving, I mean it's become even a social media trend and meme - "who is...Charlie;The Japa trend.Tobi;Who is leaving next, uh, yeah, yeah, Japa. So, like, who is leaving next, you know? Right. But you argued in the book that as countries grow richer, there will be more migration not less because what you often hear is that the reason why people are living is because the country is so bad and they're looking for a way to make better lives for themselves, which is true anyway. So, and that the way to really stop this migration wave is if you can improve the domestic economy and then suddenly you see a drop, but you are saying no, um, we are actually going to see more migration as countries grow richer. Now, how do you suppose that this can be resolved with the current, should I say, political environment in Europe and to some extent in America that is increasingly seeing migration from poorer countries as a problem, right? Is it a case of as countries grow richer, then the migration demographic just, sort of, changes to more educated people leaving and less tension and political rancour about migration?Charlie;Um, I doubt, I mean, I doubt that these political problems about immigration in Europe and The States are going to disappear. Cause we've seen election results just in the last two, three weeks in Italy with the far right becoming dominant, in Sweden as well. Where they took in a huge amount of, I think, it was Syrian refugees and before that Somalian refugees. Um, and you're trying to integrate people coming from a country with very low adult literacy into, particularly in Somalia's case, into a country like Sweden, which had a hundred percent, nearly a hundred percent adult literacy already by 1900. That's an integration process that takes generations. As America's still struggling 150 years after civil war, still struggling to manage integration. So, I think that political problem is going to carry on, but it is going to get more acute for Europe, um, and eventually United States because Europe is this aging old continent that hasn't got enough people.I was in Germany two weeks ago and there, there was a surprising number of industrialists saying "we must have a much more open border situation." I said, well, you know, that'll be really interesting to see if you do that because the backlash that we're seeing elsewhere says there is a limit to what countries politics seem ready to accept. And, I think, I even think the Brexit vote was about that. It was about the East European migration into the UK, which had the most open approach to east European countries from Poland and Hungary and Czech coming to the UK. Every other country in Europe kept in a border, well, restrictions, but the UK didn't. And I think that backfired on the UK when it had a Brexit vote that said, "oh, we have too many Polish people eating sausage in our supermarkets. And I, I, yeah, I mean really people cared.I don't understand it. I love the variety obviously, but while I don't understand, while I don't feel the same, [some] people do. So, I think that's the political problem. And even educated people who are needed by the economy might find it hard to integrate, say, beyond the bigger urban centres. I was really shocked when I was writing the book and I was looking at what happens when you've got an educated population but a high fertility rate. What happens across history is people leave. Cause there aren't enough jobs at home. Cause the fertility rate's so high, there's thousands, millions of people coming into the workforce. The savings aren't there to help create the jobs. So, they leave and it's the Philippines, you know, in the 20th century, it's Pakistanis now, where a number of people are well educated, not everyone sadly. But 150 years ago, it was Ireland, and it was Norway, and they were sending their excess population to America, and it caused huge controversy.There was, you know, rioting between, kind of, the Italian immigrants and the Irish immigrants in New York. T
Episode #192This episode discusses the current state of Christian persecution around the world today. Ryan discusses the Open Doors 2023 World Watch List with Interim CEO Lisa Pierce and Wybo Nicolai, Founder of the World Watch List. Persecution ranges from barbaric violence and imprisonment to advanced technological surveillance and discrimination. On this episode:Incredible testimonies of how God's is moving miraculously among the persecutedChina's redefining of human rightsChina's use of advanced technology to monitor and restrict ChristiansChina's persecuting of citizens for accessing online Christian material years priorHow China is repurposing Covid-19 apps to target ChristiansNorth Korea's new "Anti-reactionary thought law" and multi-generational imprisonmentBarbaric persecution of violence and imprisonment around the worldHow Open Doors develops the World Watch ListEgyptian state persecution those who convert from Islam to ChristianityChristians denied education or employment for their belief in ChristDestabilization of Sub-Saharan Africa through extreme violence of Islamic militantsNigerian extreme militants have conducting raids on Christian communitiesLink to Open Doors 2023 World Watch List_________________________Submit a question or topic for the podcast:Visit ryanshoward.com/contact to let Ryan know what you want to hear about on the show, any questions or struggles you have, or what you think needs to be covered.Follow Ryan on Instagram @ryanshowardVisit ryanshoward.com/freedownload to download 21 Days to a Spirit-Led Life and JUMP START your journey today.
Conversations surrounding transfer pricing practices rarely span to include the myriad regulations throughout Africa. However, across the continent, there are vast distinctions between countries that are thriving under new international tax rules and others that are struggling to keep up. Lolade Ososami, a partner and head of the tax team at Udo Udoma & Belo-Osagie, says that transfer pricing has grown and evolved in Africa over the last decade. When the OECD released the BEPS action plans in 2018, it had a huge impact on tax practitioners, particularly in Nigeria. Zach Pouga, a partner in the International Tax Group at Ernst & Young, encounters transfer pricing in nearly every aspect of his work. He frequently deals with BEPS 2.0, Pillar One and Pillar Two when advising his clients regarding their presence in Africa, as well as helping governments across Africa understand the complexity of new tax rules. In this episode of the GILTI Conscience podcast, Lolade and Zach join our hosts to dive into the evolving world of international tax throughout Africa. From how U.S. multinationals operating in Africa approach transfer pricing to how Africa-based companies and regional governments are branching out, Lolade and Zach explore the complexities of transfer pricing and international tax.
Isabelle Hau, the first executive director of the Stanford Transforming Learning Accelerator, joins us on the podcast today. Isabelle founded and led the U.S. education practice at Omidyar Network and, in 2020, spun off Imaginable Futures, a global philanthropic investment firm that supports organizations across public, private, and social sectors in Brazil, Sub-Saharan Africa, and the United States. Isabelle was born and raised in the South of France to a deeply loving family. Coming from humble beginnings, she benefitted greatly from France's universal preschool system. In her early years, Isabelle gained confidence in her own vision when a kindergarten teacher encouraged her to take on a leadership role in a school play. Looking back, Isabelle fondly remembers her early childhood educators for their support and belief in her abilities which helped her grow into herself. Their nurturing outlook has inspired Isabelle in her adult career, prioritizing a value-driven vision in her own investment enterprises. In my discussion with Isabelle today, she brings us through her journey from southern France to Silicon Valley and how she achieved her goal of blending the scale of a for-profit company with the heart and values of a non-profit in order to make a mission-driven impact in the education sphere. In this episode, you'll hear: Isabelle's experience with the education system in France compared to the U.S. What inspired Isabelle to seek out investment opportunities The benefits of allowing children to be children for as long as developmentally necessary Supporting Resources: You can connect with Isabelle Hau on Twitter at @Volcoucou and on Linkedin *** EPISODE CREDITS: If you like this podcast and are thinking of creating your own, consider talking to my producer, Emerald City Productions. They helped me grow and produce the podcast you are listening to right now. Find out more at https://emeraldcitypro.com.
The last several decades have seen a mass consolidation of wealth among a few, the rest of the world left to various degrees of dispossession. On top of this, the revolutionary movements that characterized much of the 19th and 20th centuries have generally disappeared or retreated, reform being the name of the game for most progressives. In spite of this, revolutionary movements and events have actually increased in the last few decades. This seeming contradiction is one of the animating ideas of the new essay anthology Revolutionary Rehearsals in the Neoliberal Age: Struggling to Be Born? (Haymarket Books, 2021). A sort of spiritual sequel to the 1987 collection Revolutionary Rehearsals, this book contains several essays on revolutionary movements of the neoliberal era, bookended by more theoretical chapters on the nature of social and political movements. International in scope, the essays start with struggles in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War and end with the Arab uprisings in Egypt. In between are essays on South and Sub-Saharan Africa, Indonesia, Bolivia, Argentina and Latin American Pink Tide movements. The bookending essays deal with theoretical questions; the nature of political movements, contexts in which those movements arise and how change can actually be brought about. Grounded in the reality of our dire political situation but animated by the hope that change is always nevertheless a real possibility, the essays here will provide excellent starting points for activists to think critically about their own situations and how they might rise to meet them. Gareth Dale is Associate Head of the Department of Social and Political Sciences at Brunel University in London. His recent books include Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left and Reconstructing Karl Polanyi: Excavation and Critique. Colin Barker was a lifelong activist and author. His many publications included Revolutionary Rehearsals (1987) and Marxism and Social Movements. Neil Davidson was a lecturer in sociology and political science. His many publications included How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions? and Discovering the Scottish Revolution. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
The last several decades have seen a mass consolidation of wealth among a few, the rest of the world left to various degrees of dispossession. On top of this, the revolutionary movements that characterized much of the 19th and 20th centuries have generally disappeared or retreated, reform being the name of the game for most progressives. In spite of this, revolutionary movements and events have actually increased in the last few decades. This seeming contradiction is one of the animating ideas of the new essay anthology Revolutionary Rehearsals in the Neoliberal Age: Struggling to Be Born? (Haymarket Books, 2021). A sort of spiritual sequel to the 1987 collection Revolutionary Rehearsals, this book contains several essays on revolutionary movements of the neoliberal era, bookended by more theoretical chapters on the nature of social and political movements. International in scope, the essays start with struggles in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War and end with the Arab uprisings in Egypt. In between are essays on South and Sub-Saharan Africa, Indonesia, Bolivia, Argentina and Latin American Pink Tide movements. The bookending essays deal with theoretical questions; the nature of political movements, contexts in which those movements arise and how change can actually be brought about. Grounded in the reality of our dire political situation but animated by the hope that change is always nevertheless a real possibility, the essays here will provide excellent starting points for activists to think critically about their own situations and how they might rise to meet them. Gareth Dale is Associate Head of the Department of Social and Political Sciences at Brunel University in London. His recent books include Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left and Reconstructing Karl Polanyi: Excavation and Critique. Colin Barker was a lifelong activist and author. His many publications included Revolutionary Rehearsals (1987) and Marxism and Social Movements. Neil Davidson was a lecturer in sociology and political science. His many publications included How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions? and Discovering the Scottish Revolution. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/intellectual-history
Happy New Year! Welcome to the January episode of AfriCan Geopardy. In this episode, we had an insightful conversation with Ms Cynthia Chigwnya, the AfriCan Union Youth Ambassador for Southern Africa. We discussed her aspirations, the challenges of executing her role, the success stories and what can be done differently. Ms Cynthia Chigwenya is a Political Researcher and currently serves as the African Union's Youth Ambassador for Southern Africa, advocating for the adoption and implementation of National Action Plans on Youth, Peace and Security (YPS) in SADC. She promoted YPS priorities at the expert discussion on 'Key Outcomes of the 2022 EU-AU Summit,' spoke at the 6th-anniversary of UN Resolution 2250, and recommended the AU's Peace and Security Council to proactively partner with youth in tackling insurgencies in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique. Cynthia works as a Programme Coordinator for Political Dialogue in Sub-Saharan Africa at Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, a German political foundation. She previously held research positions in the South African Parliament and the National Genocide. This is an episode not to be missed, especially if you are keen to learn more about how youths contribute to peace and security on the AfriCan continent and their challenges. Thank you for listening.
The last several decades have seen a mass consolidation of wealth among a few, the rest of the world left to various degrees of dispossession. On top of this, the revolutionary movements that characterized much of the 19th and 20th centuries have generally disappeared or retreated, reform being the name of the game for most progressives. In spite of this, revolutionary movements and events have actually increased in the last few decades. This seeming contradiction is one of the animating ideas of the new essay anthology Revolutionary Rehearsals in the Neoliberal Age: Struggling to Be Born? (Haymarket Books, 2021). A sort of spiritual sequel to the 1987 collection Revolutionary Rehearsals, this book contains several essays on revolutionary movements of the neoliberal era, bookended by more theoretical chapters on the nature of social and political movements. International in scope, the essays start with struggles in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War and end with the Arab uprisings in Egypt. In between are essays on South and Sub-Saharan Africa, Indonesia, Bolivia, Argentina and Latin American Pink Tide movements. The bookending essays deal with theoretical questions; the nature of political movements, contexts in which those movements arise and how change can actually be brought about. Grounded in the reality of our dire political situation but animated by the hope that change is always nevertheless a real possibility, the essays here will provide excellent starting points for activists to think critically about their own situations and how they might rise to meet them. Gareth Dale is Associate Head of the Department of Social and Political Sciences at Brunel University in London. His recent books include Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left and Reconstructing Karl Polanyi: Excavation and Critique. Colin Barker was a lifelong activist and author. His many publications included Revolutionary Rehearsals (1987) and Marxism and Social Movements. Neil Davidson was a lecturer in sociology and political science. His many publications included How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions? and Discovering the Scottish Revolution. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/sociology
The last several decades have seen a mass consolidation of wealth among a few, the rest of the world left to various degrees of dispossession. On top of this, the revolutionary movements that characterized much of the 19th and 20th centuries have generally disappeared or retreated, reform being the name of the game for most progressives. In spite of this, revolutionary movements and events have actually increased in the last few decades. This seeming contradiction is one of the animating ideas of the new essay anthology Revolutionary Rehearsals in the Neoliberal Age: Struggling to Be Born? (Haymarket Books, 2021). A sort of spiritual sequel to the 1987 collection Revolutionary Rehearsals, this book contains several essays on revolutionary movements of the neoliberal era, bookended by more theoretical chapters on the nature of social and political movements. International in scope, the essays start with struggles in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War and end with the Arab uprisings in Egypt. In between are essays on South and Sub-Saharan Africa, Indonesia, Bolivia, Argentina and Latin American Pink Tide movements. The bookending essays deal with theoretical questions; the nature of political movements, contexts in which those movements arise and how change can actually be brought about. Grounded in the reality of our dire political situation but animated by the hope that change is always nevertheless a real possibility, the essays here will provide excellent starting points for activists to think critically about their own situations and how they might rise to meet them. Gareth Dale is Associate Head of the Department of Social and Political Sciences at Brunel University in London. His recent books include Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left and Reconstructing Karl Polanyi: Excavation and Critique. Colin Barker was a lifelong activist and author. His many publications included Revolutionary Rehearsals (1987) and Marxism and Social Movements. Neil Davidson was a lecturer in sociology and political science. His many publications included How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions? and Discovering the Scottish Revolution. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/critical-theory
The last several decades have seen a mass consolidation of wealth among a few, the rest of the world left to various degrees of dispossession. On top of this, the revolutionary movements that characterized much of the 19th and 20th centuries have generally disappeared or retreated, reform being the name of the game for most progressives. In spite of this, revolutionary movements and events have actually increased in the last few decades. This seeming contradiction is one of the animating ideas of the new essay anthology Revolutionary Rehearsals in the Neoliberal Age: Struggling to Be Born? (Haymarket Books, 2021). A sort of spiritual sequel to the 1987 collection Revolutionary Rehearsals, this book contains several essays on revolutionary movements of the neoliberal era, bookended by more theoretical chapters on the nature of social and political movements. International in scope, the essays start with struggles in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War and end with the Arab uprisings in Egypt. In between are essays on South and Sub-Saharan Africa, Indonesia, Bolivia, Argentina and Latin American Pink Tide movements. The bookending essays deal with theoretical questions; the nature of political movements, contexts in which those movements arise and how change can actually be brought about. Grounded in the reality of our dire political situation but animated by the hope that change is always nevertheless a real possibility, the essays here will provide excellent starting points for activists to think critically about their own situations and how they might rise to meet them. Gareth Dale is Associate Head of the Department of Social and Political Sciences at Brunel University in London. His recent books include Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left and Reconstructing Karl Polanyi: Excavation and Critique. Colin Barker was a lifelong activist and author. His many publications included Revolutionary Rehearsals (1987) and Marxism and Social Movements. Neil Davidson was a lecturer in sociology and political science. His many publications included How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions? and Discovering the Scottish Revolution. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs
The last several decades have seen a mass consolidation of wealth among a few, the rest of the world left to various degrees of dispossession. On top of this, the revolutionary movements that characterized much of the 19th and 20th centuries have generally disappeared or retreated, reform being the name of the game for most progressives. In spite of this, revolutionary movements and events have actually increased in the last few decades. This seeming contradiction is one of the animating ideas of the new essay anthology Revolutionary Rehearsals in the Neoliberal Age: Struggling to Be Born? (Haymarket Books, 2021). A sort of spiritual sequel to the 1987 collection Revolutionary Rehearsals, this book contains several essays on revolutionary movements of the neoliberal era, bookended by more theoretical chapters on the nature of social and political movements. International in scope, the essays start with struggles in Eastern Europe at the end of the Cold War and end with the Arab uprisings in Egypt. In between are essays on South and Sub-Saharan Africa, Indonesia, Bolivia, Argentina and Latin American Pink Tide movements. The bookending essays deal with theoretical questions; the nature of political movements, contexts in which those movements arise and how change can actually be brought about. Grounded in the reality of our dire political situation but animated by the hope that change is always nevertheless a real possibility, the essays here will provide excellent starting points for activists to think critically about their own situations and how they might rise to meet them. Gareth Dale is Associate Head of the Department of Social and Political Sciences at Brunel University in London. His recent books include Karl Polanyi: A Life on the Left and Reconstructing Karl Polanyi: Excavation and Critique. Colin Barker was a lifelong activist and author. His many publications included Revolutionary Rehearsals (1987) and Marxism and Social Movements. Neil Davidson was a lecturer in sociology and political science. His many publications included How Revolutionary Were the Bourgeois Revolutions? and Discovering the Scottish Revolution. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/politics-and-polemics
What trends and events are expected to shape the economies of sub-Saharan Africa in 2023? We discuss inflation, interest rates, elections and more. Thea Fourie, Associate Director, Sub-Saharan Africa Economics, S&P Global Market Intelligence https://experts.ihsmarkit.com/experts/fourie-thea
This week, Adrian is joined by William Adoasi. He is a British-Ghanaian entrepreneur, TEDx speaker, philanthropist, vocalist and Fashion designer who is the founder and CEO of the innovative watch brand Vitae London.He has an illustrative CV including being featured as one of Forbes' 25 Leading Black British Business People To Follow. He has also been mentored by Billionaire Business Magnate Richard Branson. In addition, he was selected as a 2016 Virgin StartUp ambassador.Vitae London watches have been sold in over 30 countries and have provided over 5,000 educational resources to underprivileged children across Sub-Saharan Africa.Special thanks to Tevin from 1000 Voices UKSHOW NOTESwww.thesoundofaccra.com/williamTALKING POINTSIntroVitae LondonWilliam's upbringingWhy WatchesDifferent types of watchesWhy not?Richard Branson and Virgin Being endorsed by Richard Branson & VirginTaking risksWhat a sales career can do for your business Vitae Pop Ups Giving Back Inspiration behind Vitae's watches Not being content Entitlement Creep What The Sound of Accra is to William Final thoughtsCONNECT WITH WILLIAM Instagram TwitterCONNECT WITH VITAE LONDONWebsiteInstagramTwitterWEBSITEwww.thesoundofaccra.comOUR SOCIALSYouTubeInstagramTwitterFacebookLinkedinHonam Naturals A Toronto based skincare brand for all skin types. Organic, sustainable & vegan inspired by Ghana.Support the showLISTEN TO MORE EPISODES BELOWhttps://linktr.ee/thesoundofaccrapod
The Biden administration pledged $55 billion for food security, climate crisis and trade partnerships, in addition to a new agreement with the African Continental Free Trade Area that will give US companies access to 1.3 billion people and a market valued at $3.4 trillion. The summit is the first of its kind since 2014 under then-president Barack Obama. Meanwhile, China has been holding the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation every three years since 2000, widely seen as an essential means of advancing Chinese diplomatic and commercial interests. For nearly two decades, Beijing has ploughed funds into African infrastructure and supplied the continent with affordable consumer goods, ranging from mobile phones and solar panels to plastics. Until now, Sub-Saharan Africa has always been a low foreign-relations priority for the US, accounting for just 1.2 percent of its total two-way trade. However, western leaders have sharply criticised what they see as Beijing's reluctance to address the heavy debt burden facing many African countries. Beijing's ambassador to Washington rejected the idea ahead of the summit, citing a report that African countries owe three times more debt to Western institutions while noting that Chinese-built hospitals, highways, airports and stadiums are “everywhere” in Africa. Can Washington close the gap? As the US-China rivalry sucks the global economy and international relations into its orbit, the gap between Washington and Beijing's footprint on the African continent is stark. China-Africa trade accounts for $254 billion – four times that of US-Africa, which stands at $64.3 billion. China is also the largest provider of foreign direct investment – double the level of US FDI – and supports hundreds of thousands of African jobs. Beijing formalized commercial engagement with Africa in 2013 with the Belt and Road Initiative, a well-resourced effort to build political influence and grow commercial relationships throughout the developing world through Chinese infrastructure lending, construction and resource extraction. A survey conducted earlier this year found that 76 percent of Africans aged 18-24 view China as a positive influence on their lives, compared with 72 percent for the US – further evidence that China is winning the battle for the hearts and minds of Africans. That is something US observers are starting to take note of. Released in August, the Biden administration's US-Africa strategy document highlights that with one of the world's fastest-growing populations, largest free-trade areas by geographical area and most diverse set of ecosystems, African governments, institutions, and people “will play a critical role in solving global challenges”. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/jb-muwonge/message
On "EWTN News Nightly" tonight: With Republicans set to take control of the House in January, the GOP will chair all House committees. Congressman James Comer is heading up the oversight panel and plans to dig deep into the Biden family business. President Biden still maintains he knew nothing about his son's business dealings when he was Vice President. Mike Davis from the Internet Accountability Project, joins to share his reaction to this. Biden announced his plan to visit Sub-Saharan Africa, stressing that he is serious about increasing US attention on the continent. Meanwhile, a court has struck down a measure to expand euthanasia laws in the Netherlands. Activists wanted to make it legal for non-medical professionals to perform assisted suicide procedures. Author and Chairman of the Discovery Institute's Center on Human Exceptionalism, Wesley Smith, joins to share his reaction to the Dutch court's decision and whether he thinks the country's euthanasia activists will let this go. Finally this evening, Pope Francis is inviting the faithful to have a "more humble Christmas" this year. Following the suggestion, the Santa Sophia Cathedral in Rome called for new and concrete support to the populations afflicted by the war. Theologian who is helping with the fundraising, Natalia Karfut, joins to tell us more about this initiative and why she wanted to be involved. Don't miss out on the latest news and analysis from a Catholic perspective. Get EWTN News Nightly delivered to your email: https://ewtn.com/enn
One small step for Mikkel Vestergaard Frandsen, one giant leap for mankind. So goes the story of several of the entrepreneur, philanthropist, and humanitarian's pursuits over the past three decades. At present the founder and CEO of Sceye, a company building stratospheric platforms to help prevent human trafficking and monitor climate change, Vestergaard has a long history in developing catalytic products that have quite literally revolutionized the humanitarian and public health landscapes. Through his eponymous material science company Vestergaard, he developed PermaNet, a screen designed to kill mosquitoes by contact, which has more than halved the global prevalence of malaria, and ZeroFly, a storage bag that protects agricultural commodities against insect infestation, mold growth, oxidation, and rancidity. With LifeStraw, he created a product that filters contaminated water, which has eradicated Guinea worm disease from South Asia and all but eradicated it from Sub-Saharan Africa. Imbuing a values-driven approach into everything he does, Vestergaard is driven by the desire to close the gap between those who have and those who don't.On the episode, Vestergaard talks with Andrew about the values of equity he was raised with in Scandinavia, the importance of maintaining rigor and commitment over time, and why doing good and doing business aren't mutually exclusive.Special thanks to our Season 6 sponsor, L'ÉCOLE, School of Jewelry Arts.Mikkel Vestergaard Frandsen[02:55] Sceye[39:03] PermaNet[45:27] LifeStraw
In this episode of Moody's Talks – Emerging Markets Decoded, David Rogovic of the Sovereign team and Mik Kabeya of the Financial Institutions team join host Scott Phillips to discuss credit dynamics in Africa amid the US-Africa Leaders Summit in Washington DC. Plus, Matt Pirnie, Head of Ratings at GCR Ratings joins as a special guest to discuss the biggest risks and potential bright spots facing corporate issuers in Sub-Saharan Africa.
Steven Adjei is no stranger to entrepreneurship. Coming from a family of entrepreneurs in a region built on entrepreneurs, Steven quickly realized that a life in his chosen profession of pharmacy, wasn't for him. He had much bigger aspirations. Near the end of business school, the idea for BlueCloud Health came into view.Today, they “provide new ethical, sustainable and profitable healthcare investment opportunities in Sub-Saharan Africa.” But the journey to success was fraught with life altering challenges for Steven. Here about the decade of darkness on this episode of Turning Point. #entrepreneur #business #innovation #startup
Paul Bauman discusses the inaugural Global Sustainability Lecture series, "A Strategy for Improving Rural Water Supply Development in Sub-Saharan Africa." Though 98% of the available freshwater in the world is groundwater, groundwater resources are not easily available in much of the world, where subsurface water is the only option. Today, more than 400 million people in sub-Saharan Africa live in water insecurity, meaning they lack reasonable access to either sufficient quantities of water or water of acceptable quality. For rural populations, a direct consequence of water insecurity is food insecurity. In the Horn of Africa alone, more than 60% of the population is food insecure, with more than 20 million people approaching famine conditions. In this conversation with host Andrew Geary, Paul highlights how water impacts all 17 of the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals. He outlines the impact of two billion people living with water stress and how it could reach over five billion in the next ten years. Paul also shares why every geoscientist needs to be aware of this crisis, how it impacts their work, and what actions to take to address the issue. This is an inspiring, humbling, and necessary conversation. Listen to the full archive at https://seg.org/podcast. RELATED LINKS * Listen to Paul's lecture (https://seg.org/Education/Lectures/Distinguished-Lectures/2023-Global-Sustainability-Lecturer-Bauman) * Learn more about Paul's Geoscientists without Borders projects: Uganda (https://seg.org/About-SEG/Geoscientists-Without-Borders/Projects/detail/uganda-1); Kenya (https://seg.org/About-SEG/Geoscientists-Without-Borders/Projects/detail/kenya-2) * Discover ReliefWeb (https://reliefweb.int/) * Donate to GWB (https://seg.org/About-SEG/Geoscientists-Without-Borders/Donate) * Explore Paul's website (https://www.paulbaumangeophysics.com/) BIOGRAPHY Since the early 1990s, Paul has directed water exploration programs in some of the most water-stressed locations on the planet, including Yemen, post-tsunami Aceh Province in Indonesia, refugee camps, and conflict-affected areas in East Africa and Bangladesh, and drought-affected areas of Southern Africa. Paul has a B.Sc.E. in Geological Engineering from Princeton University and an M.Sc. in Earth Sciences from the University of Waterloo. He is a principal geophysicist at BGC Engineering in Calgary, where he directs the Near-Surface Geophysics group. Paul was the 2020/2021 CSEG Distinguished Lecturer, and received the 2021 award for Applied Hydrogeology from the International Association of Hydrogeologists (IAH). Some of his geophysical projects have been featured in movies, and television documentaries, including the National Geographic Television special Finding Atlantis, two NOVA documentaries (Ancient Refuge in the Holy Land and Holocaust Escape Tunnel), Discovery Network's Finding Escobar's Millions, Finding Water which documented a water program in the Kakuma Refugee Camp, and the Holocaust documentaries The Good Nazi and They Fought Back. CREDITS SEG produces Seismic Soundoff to benefit its members and the scientific community and to inform the public about the value of geophysics. Please leave a 5-star rating on Apple Podcasts and Spotify to show your support for the show. It takes less than five seconds to leave a 5-star rating and is the number one action you can take to show appreciation for this free resource. And follow the podcast on the app to be notified when each new episode is released. Original music created by Zach Bridges. Andrew Geary hosted, edited, edited, and produced this episode at 51 features, LLC. Thank you to the SEG podcast team: Jennifer Cobb, Kathy Gamble, and Ally McGinnis.
And it could be paired with other renewable sources to ensure a reliable energy supply, says Carnegie Mellon researcher Paulina Jaramillo. Learn more at https://www.yaleclimateconnections.org/
In August, the White House unveiled a new strategy for Sub-Saharan Africa focused on promoting open societies, democracy and security, while increasing U.S. efforts to help Africa combat Covid-19 and adapt to climate change. Meanwhile, the U.S. remains active in the crises in the Horn of Africa, including the peace process in Ethiopia, resolving the political impasse in Sudan and countering Al-Shabaab in Somalia. Yet, America's role has also shifted amid a changing world, especially as Washington increasingly engages with other regional powers, including in the Middle East, about Horn of Africa affairs.This week on The Horn, Alan speaks with Molly Phee, U.S. assistant secretary of state for African affairs, about how the Biden administration envisions partnership with African countries and Africa's role on the global stage. They talk about the administration's approach to great-power competition in relation to Africa, as well as the increasing role of regional powers, including from the Gulf. They then discuss the Ethiopia peace process, the role of Eritrea, and U.S. efforts to broker a new political deal in Sudan. They also examine whether the U.S. supports eventual political talks with Al-Shabaab in Somalia, what to do about South Sudan, U.S.-Kenya relations, and the continued and controversial use of U.S. sanctions as a diplomatic lever. Phee then previews the upcoming U.S.-Africa summit next week in Washington. For more in-depth analysis of some of the topics discussed in this episode, make sure to check out our Africa program page. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Jackline Lidubwi, Project Lead at Internews Kenya, joins Anna Kompanek, Director for CIPE's Global Programs, to talk about inclusion of persons with disabilities, specifically those in developing countries. Jackline Lidubwi is a multi-award winning disability media activist, media trainer, and journalist with 20 years of experience in disability reporting. She leads the Inclusive Media Project across Sub-Saharan Africa at Internews. Lidubwi discusses her current project at Internews with Kompanek and its focuses on barriers that persons with disabilities face, advances in technologies and their potential for inclusion, and more.
During this episode, you will learn about;[00:30] Episode intro and a quick bio of the guest [02:02] Steven's background, what he does, and what he's up to [04:18] What inspired Steven to pursue pharmaceutical and his transition to entrepreneurship [05:56] About BlueCloud Health and the four main things they offer [18:18] Why Steven feels he was destined to be an entrepreneur from a young age [09:31] The leap from Ghana to the UK and what captivated it[10:25] Steve's lessons from a young age on being a self-starter[11:42] Steve's transition to entrepreneurship and the difficulties that he encountered [15:39] Renewed fire: How Steven went from 11 years bankruptcy to restoration in a month[18:33] How Steven is balancing working in the pharmaceutical, running his company, and authoring [20:21] Steven's book, Pay The Price and what it has for entrepreneurs [28:25] Golden takeaways from Steven that you can start implementing today[31:01] How to reach out and connect with Steven[31:56] Steven's next leap and what God's calling him to do[32:51] Ending the show and call to action Notable Quotes It's not enough to have the gifts; you've to invest in your gift and be knowledgeable to thrive.Balance means different things at different times.God allows things to happen to you so that you can have a testimony.When you get the person, purpose, and passion right, it's easier to go through the formative period, where many entrepreneurs fail.Most entrepreneurs fail in the formative stage because the honeymoon phase is not nailed down correctly.The honeymoon phase is crucial because it gives you the roots, strength, and competence to go through pain.God always reminded people of their honeymoon phase in the bible, the place he called them from.The future of development is in entrepreneurship. Resources MentionedPay The Price: Creating Ethical Entrepreneurial Success Through Passion, Pain, and Purpose by Steve Adjei: https://www.amazon.com/Pay-Price-Creating-Ethical-Entrepreneurial-ebook/dp/B0BB5PVNW4 Connect With us:Steven Adjei Website | https://www.stevenadjei.com/LinkedIn| https://www.linkedin.com/in/steven-n-adjei-0827a51b/Facebook| https://www.facebook.com/PayThePriceBookInstagram| https://www.instagram.com/stevennadjei/ Rachel ScottWebsite| https://rachelgscott.com/Website| http://the5leaps.com/Instagram| https://www.instagram.com/iamrachelgscott/Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/iamrachelgscott
Edward Glaeser is the chair of the Harvard department of economics, and the author of the best books and papers about cities (including Survival of the City and Triumph of the City).He explains why:* Cities are resilient to terrorism, remote work, & pandemics,* Silicon Valley may collapse but the Sunbelt will prosper, * Opioids show UBI is not a solution to AI* & much more!Watch on YouTube. Listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or any other podcast platform. Read the full transcript here.Follow me on Twitter for updates on future episodes.If you enjoy this episode, I would be super grateful if you shared it. Post it on Twitter, send it to your friends & group chats, and throw it up wherever else people might find it. Can't exaggerate how much it helps a small podcast like mine.A huge thanks to Graham Bessellieu for editing this podcast and Mia Aiyana for producing its transcript.Timestamps(0:00:00) - Mars, Terrorism, & Capitals (0:06:32) - Decline, Population Collapse, & Young Men (0:14:44) - Urban Education (0:18:35) - Georgism, Robert Moses, & Too Much Democracy? (0:25:29) - Opioids, Automation, & UBI (0:29:57) - Remote Work, Taxation, & Metaverse (0:42:29) - Past & Future of Silicon Valley (0:48:56) - Housing Reform (0:52:32) - Europe's Stagnation, Mumbai's Safety, & Climate ChangeTranscriptMars, Terrorism, & CapitalsDwarkesh Patel 0:00:00Okay, today, I have the pleasure of speaking with Professor Edward Glaeser, who is the chair of the Harvard Department of Economics, and author of some of the best books and papers about cities. Professor Glazer, thanks for coming on The Lunar Society.Edward Glaeser 0:00:25Oh, thank you so much for having me on! Especially given that The Lunar Society pays homage to one of my favorite moments in urban innovation in Birmingham during the 18th century.Dwarkesh Patel 0:00:26Oh wow, I didn't even catch that theme, but that's a great title. My first question is, What advice would you give to Elon Musk about building the first cities on Mars?Edward Glaeser 0:00:35[laughs] That's a great question. I think that demand for urbanism in Mars is going to be relatively limited. Cities are always shaped by the transportation costs that are dominant in the era in which they're created. That both determines the micro-shape of the city and determines its macro future. So cities on Mars are, of course, going to be limited by the likely prohibitive cost of traveling back and forth to the mother planet. But we also have to understand what cars people are going to be using on Mars. I assume these are all going to be Teslas, and everyone is going to be driving around in some appropriate Tesla on Mars. So it's going to be a very car-oriented living experience. I think the best strategy would be to create a fairly flexible plan, much like the 1811 grid plan in New York, that allows entrepreneurs to change land use over time and put a few bets on what's necessary for infrastructure and then just let the city evolve organically. Usually, the best way is to put more trust in individual initiative than central planning–– at least in terms of micromanaging what goes where. Dwarkesh Patel 0:01:58Gotcha. Now, since 9/11, many terrorist groups have obviously intended to cause harm to cities. But by and large, at least in Western countries, they haven't managed to kill off thousands of people like they were able to do during 9/11. What explains this? Do you think cities are just more resilient to these kinds of attacks than we would have otherwise thought? Or are the terrorists just not being creative enough?Edward Glaeser 0:02:20I don't know. There's also the question of what the objectives are. Even for the 9/11 terrorists, their end game was not to kill urbanites in America. It was to effect change in Saudi Arabia or in the Middle East more generally. We've also protected our cities better. If you think about it, two things go on simultaneously when you collect economic activity in one place in terms of defense: one of which is they become targets–– and of course, that's what we saw on 9/11; it's hard to think of a symbol that's clearer than those twin towers. But at the same time, they're also a defensible space. The origin of the urban agglomeration and use for cities and towns was the fact that they could be walled settlements. Those walls that brought together people collectively for defense are the ultimate reason why these towns came about. The walls provided protection.I think the same thing has been playing out with cities over the past 20 years. Just as New York was a target, it was also a place where post-2001, the city ramped up its anti-terrorism efforts. They put together a massive group as London had previously done. The cameras that implemented congestion pricing in London were the same cameras that used against the Irish terrorists. So both effects went on. I think we've been fortunate and that we've shown the strength of cities in terms of protecting themselves.Dwarkesh Patel 0:03:52If you look throughout ancient world history, there are so many examples of empires that are basically synonymous with their capital cities (ex. Rome or Athens, or Sparta). But today, you would never think of America as the ‘Washingtonian Empire.' What is the explanation for why the capital city has become much less salient in terms of the overall nation? Is there a Coasian answer here?Edward Glaeser 0:04:20There are specific things that went on with English offshoot colonies where in many cases, because they recognized the tendency of the capital city to attract lots of excess goodies that had been taken from elsewhere in the country, they located the capital city in a remote place. It's actually part of the story of the Hamilton musical in The Room Where it Happens. Part of the deal was about moving the capital of the US to a relatively remote Virginia location rather than having it be in Philadelphia, New York. That was partially to reflect the fact that the South needed to be protected against all of the extra assets going to New York and Philadelphia.So, whether or not this is Canberra or Ottawa, you see all of these English offshoot places without their capitals in the big metropoles. Whereas traditionally, what's happened in these places that have been around for centuries, is that even if the capital didn't start off as the largest city, it became the largest city because centuries of French leaders thought their business was to take wealth from elsewhere in France and make Paris great. I think the French Empire was as synonymous with Paris as most of those ancient empires were with their capital city. I guess the question I could throw back to you is, what are places where this is not true? Moscow, St. Peter's, and Beijing are examples. Do we think that Beijing is less synonymous with China than the Roman Empire is with Rome? Maybe a little–– possibly just because China is so big and Beijing is a relatively small share of the overall population of China. But it's more so certainly than Washington, D.C. is with the U.S. Decline, Population Collapse, & Young MenDwarkesh Patel 0:06:32That's a really interesting answer. Once a city goes through a period of decline (maybe an important industry moved out, or maybe it's had a sequence of bad governance), are you inclined to bet that there will be some sort of renewal, or do you think that things will continue to get worse? In other words, are you a momentum trader, or are you a reversion to the mean trader when it comes to cities?Edward Glaeser 0:06:54I can tell you different answers for different outcomes. For housing prices, I can tell you exactly what we know statistically about this, which is at higher frequencies, let's say one year, housing prices show wickedly large levels of momentum. For five years or more, they show very significant levels of mean reversion. It's a short-term cycle in housing prices followed by decline. Population just shows enormous persistence on the downside. So what happens is you typically will have an economic shock. Detroit used to be the most productive place on the planet in 1950, but a bunch of shocks occurred in transportation technology which made it no longer such a great place to make cars for the world. It takes a century for the city to respond in terms of its population because the housing is sticky. The housing remains there. So between the 50s and 60s, the population declines a little bit, and prices drop. They drop sufficiently far that you're not going to build a lot of new housing, but people are going to still stay in the houses. They're not going to become vacant. So, the people are still there because the houses are still there. During the 60s to 70s, the population drops a little bit further and prices kind of stay constant, but still it's not enough to build new housing. So the declines are incredibly persistent, and growth is less so. So on the boom side, you have a boom over a 10-year period that's likely to mean revert and it's not nearly as persistent because it doesn't have this sticky housing element to it. In terms of GDP per capita, it's much more of a random walk there in terms of the straight income stuff. It's the population that's really persistent, which is, in fact, the reality of a persistent economy.Dwarkesh Patel 0:08:44Interesting. Why don't Americans move as much as they used to a century ago? So you have a paper from 2018 titled Jobs in the Heartland, where you talk about how there's increasing divergence between the unemployment rates between different parts of America. Why don't Americans just move to places where there are better economic circumstances? Edward Glaeser 0:09:04I want to highlight one point here, which is that you said “unemployment rate”, and I want to replace that with non-employment rate. That's partially what we're seeing now. It looks like America's labor force couldn't be better in terms of the low levels of unemployment, but what's happened over the last 50 years is there has been a very large rise in the share of prime-age men who are not in the labor force. So they've stopped looking for work, and those guys are miserable. It's not that those guys are somehow rather productive and happy,–– this is a very bad outcome for prime-age men. I'm separating men from women, not to say that the female labor markets aren't just as important, just as fascinating, just as critical. But labor force participation means something different for many women than it does for men. There are many women who are not in the labor force who are doing things that are enormously productive socially, like caring for their children and caring for their families.I wish it were symmetric across the genders. It just isn't true. I mean, there just are very few men not in the labor force who are doing anything much other than watching television. It's just a very different thing. So yes, there are big differences in the non-employment rate. There are some parts of America where, for much of the past decade, one in four prime-age men have been jobless. It's an enormous gap. The question is, why don't they get out?I think the answer is really twofold: one of which is the nature of how housing markets have frozen up. Historically, the differences in housing costs in the US weren't that huge across places. Most parts of America had some kind of affordable housing, and it was relatively easy to put up. At the dawn of the 20th century, these were kit helms sold by Sears and Roebuck that sprung up by the thousand. You bought the kit from Sears and Roebuck, and you just built it yourself. After World War II, it was mass-produced homes in places like Levittown.For most of the last 50 years, in places like coastal California or the East Coast, building has just become far more difficult. With the decline of mass-produced housing, it's become far more expensive, and it becomes harder and harder for relatively low-income people to find opportunities in places that have high levels of income, and high levels of opportunity. That's partially why there's not just a general decline in mobility, there's a decline in directed mobility for the poor. Historically, poor people moved from poor areas to rich areas. That's pretty much stopped. In part, that's because rich areas just have very, very expensive housing. The other thing is the rising importance of the informal safety net.So if you think about most particularly prime-aged men, they're not receiving significant handouts from the government except if they're on disability. But they will typically have some form of income, some form of housing that's being provided for them by someone other than themselves. A third of them are living in their parent's homes. That informal safety net is usually very place dependent. Let's say you're living in Eastern Kentucky; it's not like your parents were going to buy you a condo in San Francisco. You can still have your own bedroom, but you can't go anywhere else and still get that level of support. And so that's, I think, another reason why we're increasingly stuck in place.The third you mentioned, is that a third of the non-employed population of young men or is that a third of all young men? Non-employed is a third of non-employed prime aged men. So that's 25 to 54. There are a lot of 45 year olds who are living on their parents' couches or in their old bedroom. It's a fairly remarkable thing.Dwarkesh Patel 0:12:49Now, we'll get to housing in just a second, but first, I want to ask you: If the fertility trends in East Asia and many other places continue, what will the impact on cities be if the average age gets much older and the possible eventuality of depopulation?Edward Glaeser 0:12:53That's a really interesting question.The basic age fact on cities is that within the bracket of the sort of high-income or middle-income, for prime-aged parents, cities tend to be relatively bad for them. Once you're in the sort of high end of the upper middle class, the distrust of our public school systems, merited or not, means that that group tends to leave. You have plenty of parents with kids who are lower income, and then you have groups who are part of a demographic barbell that like cities. So this is partially about people who don't feel like they need the extra space and partially because if they're young, they're looking to find prospective mates of various forms.Cities are good for that. Urban proximity works well in the dating market. And they've got time on their hands to enjoy the tremendous amenities and consumption advantages that cities have. For older people, it's less about finding a mate typically, but the urban consumption amenity still has value. The ability to go to museums, the ability to go to concerts, and those sorts of activities continue to draw people in.Going forward, I would have continued to expect the barbell dimension to persist until we actually get around to solving our urban schools and declining population levels. If anything, I would have thought that COVID skews you a bit younger because older people are more anxious and remember that cities can also bring pandemics. They remember that it can be a nice thing to have a suburban home if you have to shelter in place. So that might lead some people who would have otherwise relocated to a dense urban core to move out, to stay out.Urban EducationDwarkesh Patel 0:14:44You just mentioned urban schools, and I'm curious because you've written about how urban schools are one of the reasons people who have children might not want to stay in cities. I'm curious why it's the case that American cities have some of the best colleges in the world, but for some reason, their K-to-12 is significantly worse, or it can be worse than the K-to-12 in other parts of the country. Why is it that the colleges are much better in cities, but K to 12 is worse? Edward Glaeser 0:15:19So it's interesting. It's not as if, I don't think there's ever been an Englishman who felt like they had to leave London to get better schools for the kids, or a Frenchman who thought they needed to leave Paris. It's not like there's something that's intrinsic to cities, but I've always thought it's a reflection of the fact that instead of allowing all of the competition and entrepreneurship that thrives in cities and that makes cities great, in the case of K to 12 public education, that's vanished.And your example of colleges is exactly right. I'm in this industry; I'm a participant in this industry and let me tell you, this industry is pretty competitive. Whether or not we're competing for the best students, at our level we go through an annual exercise of trying to make sure we get Ph.D. students to come to our program instead of our competitors, whether it's by hiring faculty members or attracting undergraduates, we occupy a highly competitive industry where we are constantly aware of what we need to do to make ourselves better. It doesn't mean that we're great along every dimension, but at least we're trying. K through 12 education has a local monopoly.So it's like you take the great urban food, leisure and hospitality, and food industries, and instead of having in New York City by a hyper-competitive world where you constantly have entry, you say, “You know what? We're going to have one publicly managed canteen and it's going to provide all the food in New York City and we're not going to allow any competitors or the competitors are going to have to pay a totally different thing.” That canteen is probably going to serve pretty crappy food. That's in some sense what happens when you have a large-scale public monopoly that replaces private competition.Dwarkesh Patel 0:16:50But isn't that also true of rural schools? Why are urban schools often worse? Edward Glaeser 0:17:46There's much more competition in suburban schools. So in terms of the suburban schools, typically there are lots of suburbs, and people are competing amongst them. The other thing that's actually important is (I don't want to over exaggerate this, but I think it is something that we need to think a little bit about) the role of public sector unions and particularly teachers unions in these cases. In the case of a suburban school district, the teachers union is no more empowered on the management side than they would be in the private sector.Dwarkesh Patel 0:17:30So in a normal private sector, you've got a large company, you've got a union, and they're arguing with each other. It's a level playing field. It's all kind of reasonable. I'm not saying management has done awful things, and that unions have done foolish things. I'm not saying that either are perfect, but it's kind of well-matched. It's matched that way in the suburbs as well. You've got highly empowered parents who are highly focused on their kids and they're not dominated.It's not like the teachers union dominates elections in Westchester County. Whereas if you go into a big city school district, you have two things going on. One of which is the teachers tend to be highly involved politically and quite capable of influencing management essentially, because they are an electoral force to be reckoned with, not just by the direct votes, but also with their campaign spending. On top of this, you're talking about a larger group of disparate parents, many of whom have lots of challenges to face and it becomes much harder for them to organize effectively on the other side. So for those reasons, big urban schools can do great things and many individual teachers can be fantastic, but it's an ongoing challenge. Georgism, Robert Moses, & Too Much Democracy?Dwarkesh Patel 0:18:35What is your opinion on Georgism? Do cities need a land value tax? Would it be better if all the other taxes are replaced by one?Edward Glaeser 0:18:41Okay. So Henry George, I don't know any economist who doesn't think that a land value tax is an attractive idea. The basic idea is we're going to tax land rather than taxing real estate values. And you would probably implement this in practice by evaluating the real estate and then subtracting the cost of construction, (at least for anything that was built up, meaning you'd form some value of the structures and you just subtract it).The attractive thing from most of our perspectives is it doesn't create the same disincentive to build that a real estate tax does. Real estate tax says, “Oh, you know what? I might want to keep this thing as a parking lot for a couple of years so I don't have to pay taxes on it.”If it were a land value tax, you're going to pay the same tax, whether or not it's a parking lot or whether or not you're going to put a high rise on it, so you might as well put the high rise on it and we could use the space. So I think by and large, that's a perfectly sensible idea. I'd like to see more places using land value taxes or using land value taxes in exchange for property taxes.Where George got it wrong is the idea that a land value tax is going to solve all the problems of society or all the problems of cities. That is ludicrously not true.One could make an argument that in those places that just have a property tax, you could replace it with a land value tax with little loss, but at the national level, it's not a particularly progressive tax in lots of ways. It would be hard to figure out how to fund all the things you want to fund, especially since there are lots of things that we do that are not very land intensive. I think George was imagining a world in which pretty much all value-creating enterprises had a lot of land engaged. So it's a good idea, yes. A panacea, no. Dwarkesh Patel 0:20:20No, that's a good point. I mean, Google's offices in San Francisco are probably generating more value than you would surmise just from the quantity of land they have there. Do American cities need more great builders like Robert Moses?Edward Glaeser 0:20:36Robert Caro's The Power Broker is one of the great biographies of the past 100 years, unquestionably. The only biography that I think is clearly better is Robert Caro's biography of Lyndon Baines Johnson, right? I mean, it's Caro is truly amazing. That being said, I would not exactly call it a fair and balanced view of Robert. I mean, it is true that Robert Moses was high handed, and it is true that there are things that he did that were terrible, that you never want to do again. But on the other hand, the man got stuff built. I mean, I think of myself as a child growing up in New York City, and whether or not it was the public pool that I swam in or the parks that I played in, or the roads that I traveled on, they were all delivered by Robert Moses. There's got to be a middle ground, which is, no, we're not going to run roughshod over the neighborhood as Robert Moses did, but we're still going to build stuff. We're still going to deliver new infrastructure and we're not going to do it for 10 times more than every other country in the world does it.Dwarkesh Patel 0:21:37We're actually going to have sensible procurement policies that bring in things at a reasonable cost, and I think we need to balance a little bit back towards Robert Moses in order to have slightly more empowered builders who actually are able to deliver American cities the infrastructure they need at an affordable cost. Dwarkesh Patel 0:21:57Do we have too much democracy at the local level? You wrote a paper in 2017 titled The Political Economy of Transportation Investments and one of the points you make there is that the local costs are much more salient to people for new construction than the public benefits, and the benefits to newcomers would be. Does that mean we have too much federalism? Should we just have far less power at the city level and not universally? There are lots of good things that local control does.Edward Glaeser 0:22:25I do think we have too much local ability to say no to new housing projects. So that's a particular case that I'm focused on. I think it's exactly right that the near neighbors to a project internalize all of the extra noise and perhaps extra traffic that they're going to have due to this project. They probably overestimate it because they are engaging in a bit of status quo bias and they think the present is great and can't imagine any change.By contrast, none of the people who would benefit from the new project are able to vote. All of the families that would love to move into this neighborhood are being zoned out by the insiders who get a say. I think the goal is to make sure that we have more ability to speak for outsiders. Cities at their best, are places where outsiders can find opportunities. That's part of what's so great about them. It's a tragic thing that we make that so hard. Now I'm not sure exactly that I'm claiming that I want less democracy, but I do want more limitations on how much regulations localities can do. So I think there are certain limitations on local power that I think are fine.I would prefer to call this not a limitation on local democracy, but an increase in the protection of individual rights or the individual rights of landowners to do what they want with their land. Which in effect, is a limit on democracy. But the Bill of Rights is a limit on democracy! The Bill of Rights says that they don't care if 51% of your voters want to take away your right to free assembly. They're not allowed to do that. So in some sense, what I'm just arguing for is more property owners' rights so that they can actually allow more housing in their building.In terms of transportation projects, it's a little bit dicier because here the builder is the government itself. I think the question is you want everyone to have a voice. You don't want every neighborhood to have a veto over every potential housing project or potential transportation project. So you need something that is done more at the state level with representation from the locality, but without the localities getting the ultimate sayDwarkesh Patel 0:24:33I wonder if that paper implies that I should be shorting highly educated areas, at least in terms of real estate. One of the things you mentioned in the paper was that highly educated areas that had much higher opposition were able to foment much more opposition. Edward Glaeser 0:24:49Okay. So here's the real estate strategy, which I have heard that actually there are buyers who do this. You take an area that has historically been very pro-housing. So it's got lots of housing, and it's affordable right now because supply is good. But lots of educated people have moved in. Which means that going forward, they're going to build much less, which means that going forward, they're likely to become much more expensive. So you should, in fact, buy options on that stuff rather than shorting it. You should short if you have a security that is related to the population level in that community. You should short that because the population growth is going to go down, but the prices are likely to go up. Opioids, Automation, & UBIDwarkesh Patel 0:25:29So you wrote a paper last year on the opioid epidemic. One of the points that you made there was that the opioid epidemic could be explained just by the demand side stuff about social isolation and joblessness. I wonder how this analysis makes you think about mass-scale automation in the future. What impact do you think that would have? Assume it's paired with universal basic income or something like that. Do you think it would cause a tremendous increase in opioid abuse?Edward Glaeser 0:26:03I would have phrased it slightly differently–– which is as opposed to the work of two amazing economists, Anne Case and Angus Deaton, who really emphasized the role of deaths of despair; we are much more focused on the supply side. WIth the demand side, meaning just the way that we handled the distribution of large-scale pain relieving medicines, we tell a story where every 30 to 50 years, someone comes up with the same sort of idea, which is we know that human beings love opioids in different forms. We also know they're highly addicted and lead to a terrible cycle. So all of a sudden comes along this innovator says, you know what? I've got a new opioid and it's safe. You don't have to worry about getting addicted to this one. It's magical.It won't work. 100 years ago, that thing was called heroin. 200 years ago, that thing was called morphine. 300 years ago, that thing was called Meldonium. We have these new drugs which have come in, and they've never been safe. But in our case, it was OxyContin and the magic of the time relief was supposed to make it safe, and it wasn't safe.Dwarkesh Patel 0:27:30There's a lot of great work that just shows that the patterns of opioid use was related to the places that just had a lot of pain 30 years ago. Those places came with a lot of tendency to prescribe various things for pain. So when opioids came in, when OxyContin came in, those were the places that got addicted most. Now it's also true that there are links between these economic issues. There are links with joblessness, and I basically do believe that things that create joblessness are pretty terrible and are actually much worse than income inequality. I push back against the universal basic income advocates who I think are basically engaging in a materialist fallacy of thinking that a human being's life is shaped by their take home pay or their unearned pay. I think for most people, a job is much more than that. A job is a sense of purpose. A job is a sense of social connection. When you look at human misery and opioid use, you look at the difference between high-income earners, mid-income earners. There are differences, but they're small. You then look at the difference between low-income earners and the jobless, then unhappiness spikes enormously, misery spikes enormously, family breakups spike enormously. So things like universal basic income, which the negative income tax experimented on in the 1970s, are the closest thing we have for its large-scale experiments in this area, which had very large effects on joblessness by just giving people money. They feel quite dangerous to me because they feel like they're going to play into rising joblessness in America, which feels like a path for its misery. I want to just quickly deviate and some of the UBI advocates have brought together UBI in the US and UBI in the developing world. So UBI in the developing world, basically means that you give poor farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa fairly modest amounts of money. This is a totally sensible strategy.These people are not about to live life permanently not working. They're darn poor. It's very efficient relative to other ways of giving. I am in no sense pushing back on UBI with modest amounts of money in the poorest parts of the world. By all means, it's been deemed to be effective. It's just a very different thing if you're saying I'm going to give $100 to a poor Congolese farmer, or I'm going to give $10,000 to a long-term jobless person in Eastern Kentucky. You're not buying a PS5 for $100 in Congo.Remote Work, Taxation, & MetaverseDwarkesh Patel 0:29:57I want to ask you about remote work. You write in The Survival of the City, that improvements in information technology can lead to more demand for face-to-face contact because FaceTime complements time spent communicating electronically. I'm curious, what distinguishes situations where FaceTime substitutes for in-person contact from situations where it complements FaceTime complements virtual contact?Edward Glaeser 0:30:25So there's not a universal rule on this. I wrote a paper based on this in the 1990s about face-to-face contact complements or substitutes for electronic contacts. It was really based on a lot of anxiety in the 1970s that the information technology of their day, the fax machine, the personal computer was going to make face-to-face contact in the cities that enable that contact obsolete. That discussion has reappeared amazingly in the past two and a half years because of Zoom, and all of those questions still resonate. I think in the short run, typically these things are substitutes.Typically you don't necessarily need to meet some person who's your long-term contact. You can actually just telephone them, or you can connect with them electronically. In the long run, they seem to be much more likely to be complements, in part because these technologies change our world. The story that I tell over the last 40 years is that, yes, there were some face-to-face contacts that were made unnecessary because of electronic interactions. But it's not just that cities did well over the past 40 years–– business travel went through the roof over the past 40 years. You'd think that that would have been made unnecessary by all these electronic interactions, but I think what just happened was that these new technologies and globalization created a more interconnected world, a world in which knowledge was more important, and we become smart by interacting with people face-to-face. This world became more knowledge and information intensive and more complicated, and as things get more complicated, it's easier for ideas to get lost in translation. So we have these wonderful cues for communicating comprehension or confusion that are lost when we're not in the same room with one another. So I think over the longer time, they tend to complements, and over the shorter term, they tend to be substitutes.One of the things I think was helpful in my earlier work on this was looking at the history of information technology innovations. I think probably the first one is the book. It's hard to imagine an innovation that did more to flatten distance. Now you can read stuff that people are saying hundreds of miles away. Yet there's not a shred of evidence that the book led to less urbanization in Europe or to less connection. It helped create a totally different world in which people were passionate about ideas and wanted to talk to each other. They wanted to talk to each other about their books.Flash forward 350 years when we have the telephone. Telephones started being used more in cities, and they were used mostly by people who were going to meet face-to-face. There's no evidence that this has created a decline in the demand for face-to-face contact or a decline in the demand for cities. So I think if we look at Zoom, which unquestionably has allowed a certain amount of long-distance contact, that's very, very useful. In the short run, it certainly poses a threat to urban office markets. My guess is in the long run; it's probably going to be likely to be neutral at worst for face-to-face contact in the cities that enable that contact. Dwarkesh Patel 0:33:37I think that my podcast has been a great example for me about this. I mean, right now we're talking virtually. So maybe, in a way it's substituted, and perhaps I would have interviewed in person without the podcast. However, in another way, I've also met so many people that I've interviewed on the podcast or who have just connected with me because of the podcast in person. The amount of in-person interactions I've had because of a virtual podcast is a great anecdote to what you're talking about, so that makes total sense.Edward Glaeser 0:34:05Absolutely.Dwarkesh Patel 0:34:06Why do even the best software engineers in India or in Europe make so much less when they're working remotely from those locations than remote engineers working in America make? I mean, why don't employers just pay them more until the price discrepancy goes away?Edward Glaeser 0:34:23That's interesting. I don't fully know the answer to that question. I would suspect some of it just has to do with the nature of supply and demand. There are some things that are just very hard to be done remotely. Either because you have very precise informational needs that you have that are easier to communicate to people who are nearby or the person who's nearby has evolved in ways in terms of their mind that they actually know exactly what you want and they have exactly the product that you need. So even though the remote call center worker and the local one may be totally equivalent on raw programming talent, you may still end up in equilibrium and be willing to pay a lot more to the local one just because, right?So there's a slightly differentiated skill the local one has, and look, there's just a lot of competition for the remote ones, so the price is going to be pretty low. There's not that much supply of the one guy who's down the hall and knows exactly what you're looking for. So that guy gets much higher wages, just because he can offer you something that no one else can exactly reproduce.Dwarkesh Patel 0:35:27Let me clarify my question. Even remote engineers in America will make more than remote engineers in Europe or in India. If somebody is working remotely but he just happens to live in the US, is that just because they can communicate in English in the same way? Edward Glaeser 0:35:54I would take the same stance. I would say that they're likely to have just skills that are somewhat idiosyncratic and are valued in the US context.Dwarkesh Patel 0:35:56Are you optimistic about the ability of the metaverse and VR to be able to better puncture whatever makes in-person contact so valuable?Edward Glaeser 0:36:19No, I do not think the metaverse is going to change very much. I do think that there will be a lot of hours spent on various forms of gaming over the next 20 years, but I don't think it ultimately poses much of a threat to real-world interactions. In some sense, we saw this with the teenage world over the last three years. We saw a lot of America spend an awful lot of time, 15, 16-year-olds, 17-year-olds, gaming and connecting entirely virtually during the whole time of the pandemic lockdowns.Every single person that I've seen in that cohort, when you allowed them to interact with real members of their group live, leaped at the opportunity. They leaped at the opportunity of meeting and actually hanging out with real people until three o'clock in the morning and arguing over whatever it is–– whether or not it's football or Kant. I think particularly for the young, living life live just beats the alternative.Dwarkesh Patel 0:37:05That sounds like a very Harvard scenario, having to argue over football or Kant, those two topics. [laughs] Are you predicting lower taxes over the coming decades in places like California and New York, specifically because of how remote work sets a sort of maximum bar of how much you can tax highly productive people before they will just leave? Edward Glaeser 0:37:29This is a great question. It's a central issue of our day. Here's how I think about it. In part, it's why I wrote my recent book, Survival of the City. It's because I was worried about this. Two things happened simultaneously. One, as you correctly say, Zoom has made it easier to connect anywhere. I don't think that Zoom is going to cause our tech startup currently in Silicon Valley to say, oh, you know what? We're just going to go home to our Orange County suburban homes and never meet live again. I think that's a low-probability event.But what seems to be a perfectly high probability event is saying, “Oh, we can Zoom with our VCs, we can Zoom with our lawyers. Why don't we just relocate to Austin, Texas, not pay taxes, or relocate to Boulder, Colorado, so we can have beautiful scenery, or relocate to Honolulu so we can surf?” That seems like we've made the ability for smart people to relocate much easier, even if they're going to keep on seeing each other in the office three or four days a week. That collides with this very fervent desire to deal with festering social inequities at the local level. Be this limited upward mobility for poorer people, be this high housing costs, be this the rise of mass incarceration and police brutality towards particularly minority groups. There's this progressive urge which runs up against the fact that the rich guys can run away.If your model, which says, “Oh, the local governments are going to realize the rich guys can run away, so they will seamlessly lower tax rates in order to make sure that they attract those people,” that's running up against the fact that there's a whole lot of energy on the progressive side, which says, “No! Massachusetts just passed a millionaire's tax. For the first time ever, we have the possibility to have a progressive tax, which feels extraordinarily dangerous given this time period.”I think we may need to see a bunch of errors in this area before we start getting things right. We went through a lot of pain in the 1970s as cities first tried to deal with their progressive goals and rich people and companies ran away, and it wasn't until the 1980s that people started realizing this was the path to local bankruptcy and that we had real city limits on what the locality could do.Dwarkesh Patel 0:39:44You cited research on the survival of the city, which said that firms like Microsoft were much less willing to hire new people once they went online because of the pandemic. What do you make of the theory that this is similar to when industrialization first hit and we hadn't figured out exactly how to make the most use of it to be most productive, but over the long run, somebody will do to remote work what Henry Ford did to the factory floor and in fact, just make it much more effective and efficient than in-person contact just because we'll have better ways of interacting with people through remote work, since we'll have better systems?Dwarkesh Patel 0:40:17It's entirely possible. I never like betting against the ingenuity of humanity. On the other hand, you need a lot of technology to override 5 million years of evolution. We have evolved to be an in-person species, not just because we're productive and learn a lot face-to-face, but also because we just like it. A world of hyper-efficient remote work where you basically are puttering around your apartment doing things very quickly and getting things done, doesn't sound particularly joyful to me.Workplaces are not just places of productivity; they're also places of pleasure, particularly at the high end. Remember in 2019 and earlier, Google, and Yahoo, the companies that should have had the biggest capacity to do remote stuff, weren't sending their workers home; they were building these paradises for high-skilled workers, stuffed with foosball tables and free snacks and whatever else they had in these giant campuses in the Google lex. So they were certainly betting on the power of face-to-face and creativity rather than on the ability of remote work to make everything work. I think the most reasonable view, let's say that of Nick Bloom of Stanford, is that for those types of workers, 20% of your week being hybrid, maybe 40%, seems quite possible.That seems like a thing, particularly for workers who have families who really value that degree of flexibility. But fully remote, I guess that's a pretty niche thing. There's some jobs like call center workers where you could imagine it being the norm, but in part, that's just because it's just hard to learn the same amount remotely that you do face-to-face. This came out both in the earlier Bloom study on remote call center workers in China and on more recent work by Natalia Emmanuel and Emma Harrington. Both studies found the same thing, which is in these call centers, are plenty productive when they're remote, but the probability of being promoted drops by 50%.The entrepreneur may make it very efficient to do things in the short run remotely, but they're going to turn off this tendency that we have to be able to learn things from people around us, which is just much harder to duplicate remotely.Past & Future of Silicon ValleyDwarkesh Patel 0:42:29Now, I'm curious why Silicon Valley became the hub of technology. You wrote a paper in 2018 about where pioneer and non-pioneer firms locate. So, I was hoping you had insight on this. Does it stand for it? Is it where Fairchild Semiconductor is located? What is the explanation?Edward Glaeser 0:42:48So, we take it as being earlier. It is Stanford. I traced through this, I think in Triumph. Yeah, it was a company called Federal Telegraph Company that was founded by a guy called Cyril Frank Elwell, who was a radio pioneer, and he was tapped by his teacher to head this radio company. The story was, as I remember it, there'd been this local genius in San Francisco who had attracted all these investors and was going to do this wireless telegraphy company. Then he died in a freak carriage accident.These investors wanted to find someone else, and they went to Stanford's nearby factory and asked, who should we hire? It was this guy Elwell who founded Federal Telegraph. Federal Telegraph then licensed, I think Danish technology which was originally the Poulsen Telegraph Company. They then hired some fairly bright people like Lee DeForest and they did incredibly well in World War I off of federal Navy contracts, off of Navy contracts. They then did things like providing jobs for people like the young Fred Terman, whose father was a Stanford scientist. Now, Fred Terman then plays an outsized role in this story because he goes to MIT, studies engineering there, and then comes back to become Dean of Stanford's engineering program.He really played an outsized role in setting up the Stanford Industrial Park which attracting Fairchild Semiconductor. Then there's this sort of random thing about how the Fairchild Semiconductor attracts these people and then repels them because you have this brilliant guy Shockley, right? He's both brilliant and sort of personally abhorrent and manages to attract brilliant people and then repel all of them. So they all end up dispersing themselves into different companies, and they create this incredibly creative ecosystem that is the heart of Silicon Valley.In its day, it had this combination of really smart people and really entrepreneurial ethos, which just made it very, very healthy. I think the thing that many of us worry about is that Silicon Valley more recently, feels much more like it's a one-industry town, which is dangerous. It feels more like it's a bunch of industrial behemoths rather than a bunch of smart and scrappy startups. That's a recipe that feels much more like Detroit in the 1950s than it does like Silicon Valley in the 1960s.Dwarkesh Patel 0:45:52Speaking of startups, what does your study of cities imply about where tech startups should locate and what kind of organization in person or otherwise they should have? I think there's a lot to like about in person, certainly. Relying too much on remote feels quite dangerous if you're a scrappy startup. But I like a lot the Sunbelt smart cities.I sort of have a two-factor model of economic growth, which is it's about education, and it's about having governments that are pro-business. If you think about sort of the US, there's a lot of heterogeneity in this. If you think about the US versus other countries, it's heterogeneity. So the US has historically been better at being pro-business than, let's say, the Northern European social democracies, but the Northern European social democracies are great on the education front.So places like Sweden and the Netherlands, and Germany are also very successful places because they have enough education to counter the fact that they may not necessarily be as pro-business as the US is. Within the US, you also have this balance, whereas places like Massachusetts, and California are certainly much less pro-business, but they're pretty well-educated. Other parts of the country may be more pro-business, but they're less so. The real secret sauce is finding those places that are both highly educated and pro-business.So those are places like Charlotte and Austin and even Atlanta, places in the Sun Belt that have attracted lots of skilled people. They've done very, very well during COVID. I mean, Austin, by most dimensions, is the superstar of the COVID era in terms of just attracting people. So I think you had to wait for the real estate prices to come down a bit in Austin, but those are the places that I would be looking at. Dwarkesh Patel 0:47:46I don't know if you know, but I live in Austin, actually.Edward Glaeser 0:47:50I did not know that. [laughs]Dwarkesh Patel 0:47:54Well, actually, I'm surprised about what you said about education because you write in the paper, “general knowledge measured as average years of schooling is not a strong determinant of the survival of a pioneer firm, but relatedness of knowledge between past and present activities is.” So I'm surprised that you think education is a strong determinant for pioneer firms.Edward Glaeser 0:48:15No, I'm a big human capital determinist. So I tend to believe that individuals, cities, and nations rise and fall based on their skill levels. Certainly, if you look over the last 40 or 50 years, skills are very predictive of which cities (particularly colder cities) manage to do well versus poorly. If you ask yourself why Detroit and Seattle look different, more than 50% of Seattle's adults have college degrees, and maybe 14, 15% of Detroit's adults do.That's just a huge, huge gap. Certainly, when we think about your punitive startup, you're going to be looking for talent, right? You're going to be looking to hire talent, and having lots of educated people around you is going to be helpful for that.Housing ReformDwarkesh Patel 0:48:56Let's talk about housing. Houston has basically very little to no zoning. Why is it not more of interesting today? Nobody goes to Houston for tourism.Edward Glaeser 0:49:07I have. [laughs] I have, in fact, gone to Houston for tourism. Although part of it, I admit, was to look at the housing and to go to the woodlands and look at that. Interesting has a lot to do with age in this country. So the more that a city has… Boston is good for tourism just because it's been around for a long time, and it hasn't changed all that much. So it has this sort of historical thing. Houston's a new place, not just in the sense that the chronological age is lower but also in the sense that it's just grown so much, and it's dominated by new stuff, right?That new stuff tends to be more homogenous. It tends to have less history on it. I think those are things that make new cities typically less interesting than older cities. As witnessed by the fact that Rome, Jerusalem, London, are great tourist capitals of the world because they've just accreted all this interesting stuff over the millennium. So I think that's part of it. I'm not sure that if we look at more highly zoned new cities, we're so confident that they're all that more interesting.I don't want to be particularly disparaging any one city. So I'm not going to choose that, but there's actually a bunch that's pretty interesting in Houston, and I'm not sure that I would say that it's any less interesting than any comparably aged city in the country.Dwarkesh Patel 0:50:35Yeah. I'm visiting Houston later this month. I asked my friend there, should I stay here longer? I mean, is there anything interesting to do here? And then he responds, “Well, it's the fourth biggest city in the country, so no.”Dwarkesh Patel 0:50:47Many people, including many economists, have said that we should drastically increase US population through immigration to a figure like 1 billion. Do you think that our cities could accommodate that? We have the infrastructure, and I mean, let's say we reformed housing over a decade or so. Could we accommodate such a large influx of people? Edward Glaeser 0:51:24A billion people in a decade? I love the vision. Basically, in my heart, I'm an open borders person, right? I mean, it's a moral thing. I don't really like the idea that I get to enjoy the privileges of being an American and think that I'm going to deny that opportunity to anyone else. So I love this vision. A billion people over 10 years is an unimaginably large amount of people over a relatively short period of time. I'd love to give it a shot. I mean, it's certainly not as if there's any long-term reason why you couldn't do it.I mean, goodness knows we've got more than enough space in this country. It would be exciting to do that. But it would require a lot of reform in the housing space and require a fair amount of reform in the infrastructure space as well to be able to do this at some kind of large scale affordability.Dwarkesh Patel 0:52:05What does the evidence show about public libraries? Do they matter?Dwarkesh Patel 0:52:09My friend Eric Kleinberg has written a great book about… I think it's called Palaces for the People about all the different functions that libraries have played. I've never seen anything statistically or systematically about this, but you're not going to get a scholar to speak against books. It's not a possible thing.Europe's Stagnation, Mumbai's Safety, & Climate Change Dwarkesh Patel 0:52:32Why do European cities seem so much more similar to what they look like decades or even centuries ago than American cities, even American cities that are old, obviously not as old as European cities, but they seem to change much more over time. Edward Glaeser 0:52:46Lower population growth, much tougher zoning, much tougher historic preservation. All three of these things are going on. So it's very difficult to build in European cities. There's a lot of attention to caring about history. It's often part of the nationalist narrative. You often have huge amounts of national dollars going to preserve local stuff and relatively lower levels of population growth.An extreme example of this is Warsaw, where central Warsaw is completely destroyed during World War II, and they built it up to look exactly like it looked before the bombing. So this is a national choice, which is unlikely that we would necessarily make here in the US. Dwarkesh Patel 0:53:27Yeah. I was in Mumbai earlier this year, and I visited Dharavi, which is the biggest slum in Asia. And it's a pretty safe place for a slum. Why are slums in different countries? Why do they often have different levels of how safe they are? What is the reason?Edward Glaeser 0:53:45I, too, have been in Dharavi and felt perfectly safe. It's like walking around Belgravia and London in terms of it. I think my model of Dharavi is the same model as Jane Jacobs's model of Greenwich Village in 1960, which is this is just a well-functioning community.People have eyes on the street. If you're a stranger in these areas, they're going to be looking at you, and it's a community that just functions. There are lots of low-income communities throughout the world that have this. It requires a certain amount of permanence. So if the community is too much in flux, it becomes hard to enforce these norms and hard to enforce these sort of community rules. It's really helpful if there aren't either a massive number of guns floating around or an unbelievably lucrative narcotics trade, which is in the area. Those are both things that make things incredibly hard. Furthermore, US drug policy has partially been responsible for creating violence in some of the poor parts of Latin American cities.Dwarkesh Patel 0:54:43Maybe you don't play video games enough to know the answer to this question. But I'm curious, is there any video game, any strategic video game like Civilization or Europa that you feel does a good job representing the economics of cities? Edward Glaeser 0:55:07No, I will say that when I was in graduate school, I spent a few hours playing something called Sim City. I did think that was very fun. But I'm not going to claim that I think that it got it right. That was probably my largest engagement with city-building video games.Dwarkesh Patel 0:55:12What would you say we understand least about how cities work? Edward Glaeser 0:55:18I'm going to say the largest unsolved problem in cities is what the heck we're going to do about climate change and the cities of the developing world. This is the thing I do not feel like I have any answer for in terms of how it is that we're going to stop Manila or Mumbai from being leveled by some water-related climate event that we haven't yet foreseen.We think that we're going to spend tens of billions of dollars to protect New York and Miami, and that's going to happen; but the thing I don't understand and something we really need to need to invest in terms of knowledge creation is what are we going to do with the low-lying cities of the developing world to make them safe. Dwarkesh Patel 0:55:54Okay. Your most recent book is Survival of the City. And before that Triumph of the City, both of which I highly recommend to readers. Professor Glaeser, thank you so much for coming on the podcast. This was very interesting.Edward Glaeser 0:56:05I enjoyed this a lot. Thank you so much for having me on. I had a great deal of fun. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit www.dwarkeshpatel.com
Patti Boulaye is a singer, author, actress, public speaker, lecturer, painter, show producer, wife, proud mother of two children and grandmother to a cherished grandson and granddaughter. In January 2016 Patti was awarded an OBE (Officer of the Most Excellent Order of The British Empire) in Her Majesty The Queen's Birthday Honours List for her charity work in the UK & Sub-Saharan Africa. 2017 marked the 46th Anniversary of Patti's West End debut in the musical “Hair”. 2017 also saw Patti awarded a Visiting Teaching Fellowship at Middlesex University Business School Faculty of Professional & Social Sciences.Patti is famous for her singing and stage appearances, but little is known about her charitable work. For over 30 years she has supported many charities in the UK. Her philanthropic experience came in handy when she launched her charity Support For Africa (SFA) at the Royal Albert Hall with 3000 Gospel Singers and Stars of stage and screen. SFA has built 5 healthcare clinics and a school in Africa. Patti was on HM The Queen's Golden Jubilee Creative Committee, for which she organised and lead her 5000 Gospel Singers down The Mall.In October 2018 Patti was awarded an Honorary Doctorate Degree for services to The Arts and Education by the Joint Council of Churches. In the same month, she appeared in the BBCTV series “Celebrity Master Chef”. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Remittances Are Powering Crypto Markets In Sub-Saharan Africa Not many people have seen the power of Bitcoin impact an entire portion of a continent as closely as Ray Youssef, CEO of Paxful. In this episode, Ian Andrews (Chief Marketing Officer, Chainalysis) has a mind blowing and heartstring pulling conversation with the man who is trying to provide basic human rights to over 1 Billion citizens and unite the global south using the magic of Bitcoin. Ray discusses why peer-to-peer marketplaces are providing alternative payment options and explains the difficulty in moving money around countries in Africa and why he believes Bitcoin is still the best technology to bank the underbanked. Minute-by-minute episode breakdown (3:05) – Ray's journey from launching successful startups to MMA and then eventually finding his way into crypto (7:39) – The early understanding that banking the unbank was a great use case for Bitcoin and cryptocurrency (10:07) Why the difficulty in movement of funds in countries like Nigeria made it ripe for crypto adoption (17:05) – Why education is so crucial to the success of Bitcoin in Africa which has a history of falling victim to scams connected to cryptocurrency (26:25) –Lightning Network and the technology pushing Bitcoin into more mainstream adoption and fixing broken civilizations (29:55) - The state of crypto regulation in Nigeria and Africa compared to the Western Countries Related resources Check out more resources provided by Chainalysis that perfectly complement this episode of the Public Key. Blog: Post FTX Market Updates Press Release: Paxful Becomes Africa Bitcoin Conference Major Sponsor Article: Bitcoin Ekasi Launches Financial Education Center In South Africa Video: Bitcoin Amsterdam: Emerging Markets & Bitcoin Panel Articles: Ray Youssef's Bitcoin Magazine Articles Article: Bringing Clean Water To Communities That Need It With Bitcoin Twitter: Chainalysis Company Twitter Page Speakers on today's episode Ian Andrews * Host * (Chief Marketing Officer, Chainalysis) https://www.linkedin.com/in/ianhandrews Ray Youssef (Chief Executive Officer, Paxful) https://twitter.com/raypaxful This website may contain links to third-party sites that are not under the control of Chainalysis, Inc. or its affiliates (collectively “Chainalysis”). Access to such information does not imply association with, endorsement of, approval of, or recommendation by Chainalysis of the site or its operators, and Chainalysis is not responsible for the products, services, or other content hosted therein. Our podcasts are for informational purposes only, and are not intended to provide legal, tax, financial, or investment advice. Listeners should consult their own advisors before making these types of decisions. Chainalysis has no responsibility or liability for any decision made or any other acts or omissions in connection with your use of this material. Chainalysis does not guarantee or warrant the accuracy, completeness, timeliness, suitability or validity of the information in any particular podcast and will not be responsible for any claim attributable to errors, omissions, or other inaccuracies of any part of such material. Unless stated otherwise, reference to any specific product or entity does not constitute an endorsement or recommendation by Chainalysis. The views expressed by guests are their own and their appearance on the program does not imply an endorsement of them or any entity they represent. Views and opinions expressed by Chainalysis employees are those of the employees and do not necessarily reflect the views of the company.
A story can only travel as far as it is told. Without people to share them, an audience to hear, and a platform to deliver, stories about who we are and where we come from can get lost forever. Jocelyne Muhutu- Remy joins us in the boardroom as Spotify's Managing Director for Sub-Saharan Africa, leading the enablement of stories from podcasters and musicians that are shared and experienced across the continent. In today's conversation, we dig deep into the link between our heritage and the narratives we tell and are told about Africa, as well as the emerging technologies at the helm of our tech-savvy culture. Jocelyne brings her 20+ years of experience in media distribution and extensive immersion across Africa to highlight where we came from and where we are going as a land of stories, and how to tell each of ours unapologetically. Find out more about her work through her LinkedIn profile here. --- Join us in creating social impact through a cup of tea by visiting www.nepalteacollective.com Support our podcast further by subscribing to our Patreon Page here: https://www.patreon.com/boardroombanter?fan_landing=true