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Last time we spoke about the climax of the battle of Changkufeng. A 7–10 August clash near Changkufeng and Hill 52 saw a brutal, multi-front Soviet push against Japanese positions in the Changkufeng–Hill 52 complex and adjacent areas. The Korea Army and Imperial forces rapidly reinforced with artillery, long-range 15 cm and other pieces, to relieve pressure. By 7–8 August, Soviet assault waves, supported by tanks and aircraft, intensified but Japanese defenses, including engineers, machine-gun fire, and concentrated artillery, prevented a decisive breakthrough at key positions like Noguchi Hill and the Changkufeng spine.  By 9–10 August, continued Japanese counterfire, improved artillery neutralization, and renewed defenses kept Hill 52 and Changkufeng in Japanese control, though at heavy cost. The frontline exhaustion and looming strategic concerns prompted calls for intensified replacements and potential diplomatic considerations. It seemed like the battle was coming to an end.   #184 The Lake Khasan Truce Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The casualties were atrocious for both sides, yet they continued to mobilize more forces to the conflict area. While the Russians appeared uninterested in all-out war, they were not rushing to settle the crisis through diplomacy and, at the front, were launching "reckless" counterattacks at inconvenient locations, presumably to occupy positions useful for bargaining. The local Soviet military, having ceded the hills at the outset, must also have been anxious about its prestige. The Kwantung Army's potential threat to the flank undoubtedly made the Russians nervous. Although the leading echelon of the 104th Division did not reach Hunchun until the evening of 13 August, Japanese intelligence heard that the Red Army Headquarters staff at Khabarovsk had detected movements of Kwantung Army elements around 10 August and had been compelled to take countermeasures: they reinforced positions along the eastern and northern Manchurian frontiers, concentrated the air force, ordered move-up preparations by ground forces in the Blagoveshchensk district, and commandeered most of the motor vehicles in the Amur Province. By shifting its main strength to the eastern front, the Kwantung Army exerted, as intended, a silent pressure. The covert objective was to restrain and divert the Russians and to assist Japanese diplomacy, not to provoke war. Nevertheless, an American correspondent who visited the Changkufeng area in mid-August privately reported that the Kwantung Army was massing large numbers of troops near the border and expected further trouble.  Toward its weak neighbor in Korea the Kwantung Army rendered every support. Apart from its major demonstration in eastern Manchuria, the Kwantung Army promptly sent whatever reinforcements of artillery, engineers, and other units that Seoul had desired. Being also intimately involved in anti-Soviet military preparations, the Kwantung Army understandably wanted the latest and most authentic information on Russian Army theory and practice. The Changkufeng Incident furnished such a firsthand opportunity, and the professional observers sent from Hsinking were well received at the front. Military classmate ties contributed to the working relationships between the armies. As one division officer put it, the teams from the Kwantung Army came as "friends," not only to study the battlefield by their respective branches of service but also to assist the front-line forces; "the Kwantung Army was increasingly helpful to us in settling the incident." Foreign Minister Ugaki felt that the pressure of troop movements in Manchuria played a major part in the Russians' eventual decision to conclude a cease-fire. From Inada's viewpoint, it had been a "fine and useful demonstration against the Soviet Union." Pinned at Changkufeng, the Russians did not or could not choose to react elsewhere, too. Army General Staff officers believed that clear and consistent operational guidance furnished by Tokyo produced good results, although the fighting had been very hard for the front-line Japanese troops because of the insistence on exclusive defense, the curbs on interference by the Kwantung Army, and the prohibition on the use of aircraft. It had been close, however. Only by conscious efforts at restraint had the small war at Changkufeng been kept from spilling over into neighboring areas. Escalation of combat in early August had caused the Japanese government to try to break the diplomatic impasse while localizing the conflict. On 2 August Premier Konoe assured the Emperor that he intended to leave matters for diplomacy and to suspend military operations as soon as possible, an approach with which the government concurred. The Changkufeng dispute had been accorded priority, preceding overall settlements and the creation of joint commissions to redefine the borders. On the 3rd, after coordinating with the military, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised Shigemitsu that the front-line situation had become "extremely critical" and that a quick suspension of fighting action should be proposed. Soviet and Japanese troops should be pulled back to the setup as of 30 July.  In the midst of the Changkufeng Incident, the USSR intensified harassing tactics against the last Japanese consulates located within the Soviet Union. Forty-eight hour ultimatums to quit the country were delivered to the consuls at Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk on 3 and 4 August, respectively. Although the Japanese government warned that it might retaliate, the Russians were unyielding. The foreign ambassadors, Mamoru Shigemitsu and Maxim Litvinov met on August 4th, whereupon Shigemitsu argued, the best procedure would be to suspend military operations on both sides and to restore the status quo. Litvinov in a long manner explained the stance of the USSR as Shigemitsu put it "the Soviet side had a disposition to cease fighting, provided that conditions were satisfactory."  The Russians were stalling at the very time the Red Army was bending every effort to retake Changkufeng. Coordination between the Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministers produced cease-fire conditions which were rushed to the Japanese ambassador on 6 August. Two alternate lines were proposed, to which both armies would pull back. After the creation of a buffer zone, discussions could begin concerning delineation of boundaries in the region of the incident. The Hunchun pact could be the basis for deliberations, demarcation to be effected by joint investigations on the spot in consultation with documents in the possession of Manchukuo and the USSR; the Japanese would serve only as observers. Shigemitsu conferred once more with Litvinov for three and a half hours on 7 August, but no progress was made. Litvinov insisted that a clash could be averted only if Japanese forces pulled However Litvinov's positive reaction to the idea of a demarcation commission was seen as a good sign.  On August the 10th, both sides seemed to have reached a similar conclusion that a cease-fire needed to rapidly be implemented. At 11pm that night Litvinov called the embassy, asking for Shigemitus to see him as fast as possible. Shigemitsu arrived around midnight whereupon Litvinov showed him a draft of a final accord: 1. Japanese and Soviet forces shall cease all military activities on 11 August at noon local time. Instructions to that effect are to be issued immediately by the governments of the USSR and Japan.  2. Japanese as well as Soviet troops shall remain on those lines which they occupied at midnight local time on 10 August.  3. For redemarcation of the portion of frontier in dispute, there shall be created a mixed commission of two representatives from the USSR and two representatives from the Japanese-Manchurian side, with an umpire selected by agreement of both parties from among citizens of a third state.  4. The commission for redemarcation shall work on the basis of agreements and maps bearing the signatures of plenipotentiary representatives of Russia and China. Shigemitsu agreed to the inclusion of a Japanese commissioner on the Manchukuoan delegation, but he could not assent to the addition of a neutral umpire. Moscow received the news of the truce with gratification mingled with surprise. Few realized that the USSR had taken the step of appeasing or at least saving face for the Japanese even after Shigemitsu had pleaded for and won a cease-fire. The world was told by the Russians only that specific overtures for cessation of hostilities had originated with the Soviet authorities. In general, it was not difficult to guess why the Russian government, distracted by the European political scene and apprehensive about a two-front war, agreed to a cease-fire at Changkufeng.  The slowness of communication across the many miles between Moscow and Tokyo did nothing to alleviate nervousness in the Japanese capital during the night of 10–11 August. Ugaki wrote in his diary that, "after ten days of tension, the struggle between the Japanese and Soviet armies on the USSR–Manchukuo border had reached the decisive brink". Complicating the situation was the fact that, late on 10 August, the president of Domei News Agency conveyed to Konoe a message from one of his Moscow correspondents. Purporting to sum up Shigemitsu's latest outlook, the report stated that success in the negotiations seemed unlikely. The contents of the message were transmitted to Ugaki and Itagaki. Consequently, Konoe and his associates spent a fearful and depressed night. Shigemitsu's own report, sent by telegram, arrived frustratingly slowly.  After definite information had been received from Shigemitsu, Harada happily called Kazami Akira, the prime minister's chief secretary, and Konoe himself. "Until the accord was implemented," Kazami had said, "we would have to be on the alert all day today." Konoe and Kazami seemed "a little relaxed anyhow." Inada had finally retired past midnight on 10–11 August, "agreement or no agreement. I must have been dozing from fatigue when the jangle of the phone got me up. It was a message saying that a truce had been concluded the preceding midnight. Just as I had been expecting, I said to myself, but I felt empty inside, as if it were an anticlimax." The call had to have been an unofficial communication, perhaps the latest Domei news, since the records showed that definitive word from the embassy in Moscow did not reach Tokyo until after 10:00. Attache Doi's report to the Army General Staff came at about 11:00. This was extremely late in terms of getting Japanese troops to cease operations at 13:00 Tokyo time (or noon on the spot); a tardy imperial order might undo the Moscow accord. Complicating this matter of split-second timing was the fact that the first official telegram from Shigemitsu referred to unilateral Japanese withdrawal by one kilometer. At the Japanese high command level, there was agitated discussion when initial word of these arrangements arrived. Inada speculated that on 10 August the Russians had staged persistent close-quarter assaults against Changkufeng and seized the southern edge eventually, although repulsed at all other points. Moscow may have agreed to a truce at that midnight because they expected that the crest of Changkufeng would be in their hands by then and that a fait accompli would have been achieved. Some officers argued that the Russian forces were suffering "quite badly and this caused the authorities' agreeability to a cease-fire." Most exasperating, however, was the provision stipulating a one-sided military withdrawal. Admittedly, such action had been under discussion by the Army General Staff itself, particularly after Terada's sobering appeal of 10 August. It was another matter to have a Japanese withdrawal dictated by the USSR while Russian troops did not have to budge. Initial puzzlement and chagrin began to yield to rationalization. The Japanese side seemed to have made a concession in the negotiations, but there must have been significance to the phrase which said, "the line occupied by Japanese forces has been taken into due consideration." Japanese troops had presumably advanced to the edge of the frontier, while Russian soldiers had not come even close. Thus, it must have been necessary to have the Japanese units withdraw first, to fix the boundaries, since it had been the Japanese who had done the greater advancing. One Japanese office remarked "A pull-back was a pull-back, no matter how you looked at things—and we were the ones who had to do it. But the atmosphere in the command had been far from optimistic on 10 August; so we decided that it was unnecessary to complain about this issue and we approved the agreement in general. Both the senior and junior staff levels seemed to be quite relieved." The 11th of August had been an awkward day to conduct liaison between the Foreign Ministry, the Army, and the Throne, since the Emperor was leaving Hayama to visit naval installations in the Yokosuka area and the navy air unit in Chiba from morning. By the time a conclusive report on the cease-fire could be conveyed to the monarch, he was aboard the destroyer Natsugumo at Kisarazu. Naval wireless facilities in Tokyo had to be used to transmit coded messages to Admiral Yonai, the Navy Minister, for delivery to the Emperor. This was done shortly before 14:45 According to Yonai, the Emperor "was very pleased and relieved when I reported to him… about the conclusion of the truce accord." The appropriate Imperial order was approved promptly. But not until 15:00, two hours after cease-fire time at Changkufeng, did word of Imperial sanction reach the high command.  Japanese soldiers in the lines recalled nothing special on 11 August. "We didn't hear about the truce till the last minute," said one, "and we had become so inured to enemy artillery we hardly noticed any 'last salute.' From Tokyo, on 11 August, it was reported that the Japanese side had suspended operations promptly at noon, as agreed, but that sporadic bursts of fire had continued to come from the Soviet side. Colonel Grebennik, when asked after the war whether the combat did end at noon, replied petulantly: "Yes, but not quite so. The fighting actually ceased at 12:05." According to him, the tardiness was the Japanese side's fault.  The Japanese press told readers that "the cease-fire bugle has sounded—the frontier is cheerful now, 14 days after the shooting began." All was quiet in the area of Changkufeng, where the sounds of firing ceased at noon "as if erased." The most intense period of stillness lasted only a few minutes and was followed by the excited chattering of soldiers, audible on both sides. Korea Army Headquarters spoke of the "lifting of dark clouds [and] return of the rays of peace." In Hongui, a Japanese combat officer told a Japanese correspondent: "Suddenly we noticed the insects making noise; the soldiers were delighted. Once the fighting stopped, Japanese national flags were hoisted here and there along our front. … After the Russians observed what we had done, they broke out red flags also, at various points in their trenches." Some Japanese soldiers were given cookies by Soviet medical corpsmen. At Hill 52, an infantryman remembered, the Japanese and the Russians were facing each other, 50 meters apart, that afternoon. "We just lay there and stared at each other for two hours, waiting grimly. But it was well past cease-fire now, and those same Russians finally started to wave at us. Later that day, when Soviet troops came to salvage their KO'd tanks, we 'chatted' in sign language." After the cease-fire, Ichimoto, whose battalion had seen the most difficult fighting, stuck his head above the trench and waved hello to some Soviet officers. "They waved back. It gave me an odd sensation, for during the furious struggle I had considered them to be barbarians. Now I was surprised to see that they were civilized after all!" A rifleman at Changkufeng remembered swapping watches with an unarmed Russian across the peak. The Japanese front-line troops stayed in their positions confronting the Russians and conducted preparations for further combat while cleaning up the battlefield. Soviet troops also remained deployed as of the time of the cease-fire and vigorously carried out their own construction. The day after the cease-fire went into effect, Suetaka escorted an American reporter to the front. At Changkufeng:  "carpenters were making wooden receptacles for the ashes of the Japanese dead. Funeral pyres still were smoldering. . . . From our vantage point the lieutenant general pointed out long lines of Soviet trucks coming up in clouds of dust [which] apparently were made deliberately in an effort to conceal the trucks' movements, [probably designed] to haul supplies from the front. Soviet boats were pushing across [Khasan] . . . and Soviet soldiers were towing smashed tanks back from no-man'sland. On the Japanese side there was a pronounced holiday spirit. Soldiers, emerging from dugouts, were drying white undershirts on near-by brush and bathing in the Tumen River. The soldiers were laughing heartily. A few were trying to ride a Korean donkey near Changkufeng's scarred slope. The general pointed out three Soviet tanks behind the Japanese advance lines east of Changkufeng. He said the Russians had hauled back seventy others [on the night of 11 August]. . . . The writer was shown a barbed wire fence immediately behind a wrecked village on the west slope of Changkufeng which the general said the Soviet troops built at the beginning of the fighting. Possiet Bay also was pointed out, clearly visible across the swamp." Soviet losses for what became known as the battle of Lake Khasan for the Russians and the Changkufeng incident for the Japanese, totaled 792 killed or missing and 3,279 wounded or sick, according to Soviet records. The Japanese claimed to have destroyed or immobilized 96 enemy tanks and 30 guns. Soviet armored losses were significant, with dozens of tanks knocked out or destroyed and hundreds of "tank troops" becoming casualties. Japanese casualties, as revealed by secret Army General Staff statistics, were 1,439 casualties, 526 killed or missing, 913 wounded; the Soviets claimed Japanese losses of 3,100, with 600 killed and 2,500 wounded. The Soviets concluded that these losses were due in part to poor communications infrastructure and roads, as well as the loss of unit coherence caused by weak organization, headquarters, commanders, and a lack of combat-support units. The faults in the Soviet army and leadership at Khasan were blamed on the incompetence of Blyukher. In addition to leading the troops into action at Khasan, Blyukher was also supposed to oversee the trans-Baikal Military District's and the Far Eastern fronts' move to combat readiness, using an administrative apparatus that delivered army group, army, and corps-level instructions to the 40th Rifle Division by accident. On 22 October, he was arrested by the NKVD and is thought to have been tortured to death. At 15:35 on 11 August, in the Hill 52 sector, high-ranking military delegates bearing a white flag emerged from the Soviet lines and proceeded to Akahage Hill, about 100 meters from the Japanese positions. Cho, as right sector chief, was notified. He sent three lieutenants to converse with the Russians; they learned that the Soviets wanted the Japanese to designate a time and place for a conference. This word was conveyed to Suetaka, who had already dispatched Lieutenant Kozuki to the heights east of Shachaofeng to contact the Russians. Around 4:20, the commander canceled Kozuki's mission and instructed Cho to reply that the delegation ought to convene near the peak of Changkufeng at 18:00 Cho set out promptly with several subordinates; they reached the Changkufeng crest a little before 6. The Russians then said they wanted to meet the Japanese near the Crestline southeast of Changkufeng, the excuse being that the peak was too far for them to go and that they could not arrive by the designated time. Cho took his team to the location requested by the Russians. There, the Japanese found 13 Soviet soldiers and a heavy machine gun on guard, but the Russian delegates had not arrived, although it was 6:18. The irked Japanese clocked a further delay of two minutes before the Russian truce chief, Gen. Grigory M. Shtern, rode up on horseback with a party of eight. Both delegations saluted, the chiefs and team members identified themselves, and all shook hands. The Soviet team was made up of Corps General 3rd rank Shtern, 38, chief of staff, Far East area army; Brigade Commissar Semenovsky political major general, 37 or 38; Colonel Fedotev, 42; and Major Wabilev, about 30. Interpreting for the Russians was Alexei Kim. In Colonel Cho's opinion, "It was always necessary to take the initiative in dealing with the Soviets. So, even in such matters as shaking hands or conversing, he always did things first." During the exchange of greetings, Cho teased Shtern about his bandaged forehead. "A Japanese artillery shell got you, didn't it?" he asked. But Cho began formal discussions on a more dignified note: "Cho: It is very much to be regretted that the Japanese and Soviet armies had to get involved in combat around Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I laud the consummation of the Mos­cow accord on the part of both governments. And, I must say, your forces were quite brave and patriotic. Shtern: I agree with you. The Japanese Army, too, was courageous and strong." Negotiations would go on at the local level and diplomatic level for many days. In Tokyo, on the morning of 13 August, Ugaki had gone to the Meiji shrine to "report" on the cease-fire and to express his gratitude. At 10:00, when received in Imperial audience, he discussed the Changkufeng Incident. "I humbly regret to have troubled Your Majesty so unduly in connection with an unimportant affair on the Soviet-Manchurian frontier" at a time when the monarch was confronted by grave national problems. A long and winding road lay ahead before the incident as a whole was settled, but a good start had been made and "we are going to be even more careful in handling matters, although the Soviet regime  consists of devious, vicious scoundrels." Recognition of the Japanese Army's performance was accorded by the highest authorities in the homeland. As soon as the fighting ceased, Kan'in transmitted a message of appreciation. The day after the cease-fire, the command in North Korea issued a generous communique: "We pay homage to the Japanese for defending themselves against 100 planes, 200 tanks, and 60 pieces of heavy artillery. Our admiration for the bravery of both armies is of the highest." At 14:00 on the 15th, Kan'in was received in audience and reported on the settlement of the crisis. Said the Emperor: "We are gratified by the fact that, during this incident at Changkufeng, Our officers and men achieved their mission fully and manifested prudence and forbearance while confronting difficult circumstances with small forces. Our profound condolences to the casualties. Convey this message to the officers and men." A wire was dispatched promptly to Nakamura. With Imperial use of the wording "Changkufeng Incident," the nomenclature for the affair was fixed in Japan. When the cabinet met on 16 August, the decision was reached officially. After the Changkufeng affair, Japanese officers claimed that the Soviets had dispatched tactical experts "to ascertain why their elite Far Eastern forces had not been able to achieve satisfactory results. They realize the urgency of this investigation in preparation for any great war." Specifically, the AGS heard that on the day of the cease-fire, Blyukher had sent an investigative team of commissars under Romanovsky to the scene. Japanese experts on the USSR speculated that the experience at Changkufeng ought indeed to have impressed the Red Army: "Our forces did seize the hill and hold it. After comparing the strengths involved ... the Russians may well have had to modify their estimates." According to one Japanese commentator, improvements in political leadership were judged imperative by the USSR, gainsaying claims that the Soviet Army had been strengthened through the purge of alleged Japanese tools. Soviet authorities would conclude "As a test of doctrine, the fighting had confirmed the correctness of the basic principles embodied in the 1936 Field Service Regulations." The Soviet infantry had paid dearly for this, as well as for the deficiencies in tactical training. Defense Commissar Voroshilov admitted, "We were not sufficiently quick in our tactics, and particularly in joint operations in dealing the enemy a concentrated blow." In the view of historian Mackintosh: "The Soviet success at Lake Khasan was bought at the cost of heavy casualties and exposed serious defects in the mobilization machinery and the training of troops. There can be little doubt that these factors checked to some extent the Soviet Government's overoptimistic estimate of its own military strength and cast doubt on the effectiveness of its policy of expansion in all fields of military organization". Writing a year and a half after Changkufeng, an Mainichi reporter observed that the greatest harvest from the incident was tangible Japanese experience in determining the fighting strength of the Russians. Purchased with blood, this knowledge could provide valuable evidence for future combat operations. It was a question whether Changkufeng really possessed such strategic significance as was claimed for it, but the Soviet policy of bluff could be interpreted as substantiating the weakness of the defenses of Vladivostok. "The Russians used all kinds of new weapons at Changkufeng and tipped their whole hand. But although mechanization of the Red Army had attained high levels with respect to quantity, their weaknesses in technique and quality were laid bare." Imaoka observed that since the Changkufeng Incident marked the first time that the Japanese and Soviet armies engaged each other in combat involving large strategic elements, divisional and above, Russian fighting strength was studied with keen interest. The Japanese did not rate the capacity of the officers or Soviet quality, in general, as especially high. Still, the Russians did possess quantitative abundance, and Japanese losses had been heavy because the enemy had fired masses of ammunition against fixed targets. Suetaka seemed to have comprehended the scope of tangible Soviet strength in equipment and materiel, as shown by his comment: "I felt deeply that if the gap in manpower went beyond limits, it would be inevitable for our casualties to increase tremendously; this might even cause us danger in specific local areas." Few Japanese officers saw anything new in Soviet tactical methods, although considerations of mass were ever-present. Not only intelligence experts but the whole army worked on ways of coping with Soviet forces that would have the numerical advantage by 3:1. Most awesome was the "fantastic abundance" of hostile materiel, although the Russians could not deploy to surround the Japanese because of the geography. An AGS expert on the USSR summed it up: "We learned that Soviet strength was up to expectations, whereas Japanese arms and equipment had to be improved and reinforced." Worded in a multiplicity of ways, the Japanese conclusion was that patient imperial forces had won a great victory by defending the contested border with flesh vs. steel and by limiting the Changkufeng Incident, till the end, against enemy hordes supported exclusively by planes and tanks. Japanese infantrymen admit that the combat soldiers did not savor their disadvantages. "All our materiel was inferior in quality and particularly in quantity. We had the impression that whereas we relied on muscle power, the enemy used engines. This rendered our fighting particularly hard, but we had full confidence in our spiritual strength [i.e., superiority]."  Nevertheless, the Japanese mode of tactical operation, asserted Iwasaki, the Korea Army senior staff officer, was "the worst possible: fighting with hands tied." This meant that the Russians could fight "to their hearts' content," committing tanks and planes, and striking from all directions. A front-line infantry commander commented: "One's troops ought to be provided meaningful reasons for fighting and for dying happily. It is cruel to ask officers and men to meet masses of steel and to shed their blood without visible cause, and apparently because of inadequate combat preparations." The cease-fire agreement was concluded "at just the right time," General Morimoto admitted. A secret report prepared by AGS analysts sheds light on the larger question of what the army thought it had learned about itself and the Soviet enemy: "In studying Changkufeng, one ought to bear a number of cautions in mind: (1) The incident broke out when we were concentrating on the holy war against China; severe limitations on combat operations were imposed by the necessity to adhere to a policy of nonenlargement. (2) Apparently, the enemy also adopted a policy of localization while continuously attempting to recapture the high ground in the Changkufeng area. (3) Our forces employed units which were on Phase-1 alert from beginning to end; in terms of quality, the personnel were excellent—mainly active-duty types, from key men down. But our numbers were far inferior, and our organization and equipment were not of the best. In addition, we committed no planes or tanks, whereas the enemy used plenty. (4) The 19th Division was thorough, rigorous, and realistic in its combat training prior to the engagement. (5) Battlefield terrain seriously limited the enemy's attacks, especially tank action. But while the Tumen restricted assaults against our flanks and rear, it hampered our own services of supply, notably the provision of position construction materials." The Japanese learned few or erroneous lessons from the Changkufeng affair; the Kwantung Army, for example, was convinced that everything had been handled badly in 1938 by the Korea Army and the high command. When a dispute arose in 1939 at Nomonhan on another border lying between Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo, the staff in Hsinking fostered escalating measures. The USSR, however, learned in 1937 and 1938 that the Japanese Army seemed to respect only force.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Changkufeng incident or battle of Lake Khasan clash saw a fierce Soviet push against Japanese positions around Changkufeng and Hill 52. The cease-fire ended the incident, but not the conflict. Despite the brutal lessons learned by both sides, a much larger conflict would explode the next year that would alter both nations throughout WW2.   

Totally unfiltered and slightly inappropriate talk with Rylie.

Last time we spoke about the second Russian Counter Offensive over the Heights. Night operations opened the action: scouts moved in darkness, wires were cut, and Hill 52 fell before dawn, followed by Shachaofeng as dawn pressed the front. The Russians responded with a heavy counterattack, tanks, aircraft, and sustained artillery, yet the Japanese adapted quickly, shifting guns and reinforcing sectors to hold the crest. By 3–5 August, Japanese and Soviet forces fought in a fragmented front across multiple sectors: Hill 52, Changkufeng, Shachaofeng, the lake. Japanese commanders coordinated between infantry, engineers, and mountain artillery, while seeking long-range support from Kwantung Army. Soviet artillery sought to disrupt lines of communication and press from the Crestline with massed tanks and air strikes. Despite intense bombardments and repeated tank assaults, Japanese regimental guns, antitank teams, and close-quarters defense bore the brunt of the defense, inflicting heavy Soviet losses. Yet in the end the Japanese had yet again repelled the enemy from the heights.   #183 The end was near for Changkufeng Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. While the front-line fighting raged on 6 August, Tokyo moved to supply the 19th Division with the coveted long-range artillery and antiaircraft support. In the evening, the Korea Army officially learned from the AGS that, by Imperial order, the Kwantung Army would add the strength already informally approved: four 7.5-centimeter field guns, two 15-centimeter cannons, two 10-centimeter railway guns, and two 7.5-centimeter antiaircraft guns. The North China Area Army would also provide mobile antiaircraft units. The Korea Army estimated that the field and heavy artillery reinforcements would reach the town of Tumen on 7–8 August. The new guns were expected to ease the division's pressure in due course. The fighting continued on the 7th. The 75th Infantry observed that, despite the Russians' vigorous attacks aimed at capturing Hill 52 and Changkufeng on 6 August, they failed at both objectives and were repelled with heavy losses. Because of the Soviets' ignominious defeat at Changkufeng, they seemed determined to seize Hill 52 on 7 August. Most of the shallow and isolated Japanese positions at Hill 52 had been shattered by bombardments. Some men retrieved Japanese corpses still piled atop one another; the wounded were to proceed to the rear by themselves. Many had not eaten since the morning of 6 August, yet morale remained high. It was decided to knock out the Soviets' advancing tanks under the cover of darkness, employing infantry and engineers. At 03:00, these elements moved against the armor 150 meters behind the Russian wire, killed some advancing infantry, and destroyed two tanks. The infantry platoon leader, Warrant Officer Kanaoka, jumped aboard a tank, pried open the turret, and fought with his blade as blood dripped from the blade. The eastern sky brightened as he stood there smiling and holding his bloodied sword; at that moment, Private First Class Kimura exploded a grenade inside the tank, which promptly blew up. The assault force returned safely at dawn. At dawn, from heavy-weapon positions 200–300 meters in front, the Soviets opened fire, exploiting gaps between the smashed armor. Since 04:00, sixty Russian tanks had been moving south on the far side of Khasan. By daybreak, more than ten machines could be seen in the dip northeast of Hill 52, with several dozen other tanks newly active along Hill 29 Crestline as infantry deployed in gullies. At 05:30, Russian artillery began firing from all directions. In addition to shelling from Gaho, Hill 29, and Maanshan, the Soviets directed flank fire against Hill 52, using two rapid-fire guns 700 meters northeast and three mountain guns on the slope of Changkufeng. As the works at Hill 52 were progressively pulverized, K. Sato dispatched reinforcements from the 76th Regiment there. Near 11:00, the Russian barrage intensified and became more accurate; positions were destroyed one by one, and casualties rose. A new apex of fury occurred between 13:30 and 14:30, when a pall of smoke blanketed the region, producing a ghastly impression. Russian planes bombed and strafed Hill 52 from 11:00; a raid by twelve bombers against the western slope at 13:30 was particularly fierce, though many bombs fell harmlessly into the Tumen. The Russian lines were built up gradually, and all types of Soviet weapons were employed. From 14:30, about 100 Russians approached, led by four tanks, and penetrated the defense positions. Close-quarter counterattacks were launched by elements of three Japanese infantry companies, a machine-gun platoon, and an engineer platoon. One officer recalled "It was tough and costly fighting. Men were overrun by tanks, some losing limbs." Nine engineers linked up with the infantry, placing explosives under tank turrets and blowing up two machines. During the crisis, with tanks and infantry overrunning his lines. From the right wing, in the Eleventh Company sector, the Japanese fought fiercely against Soviet heavy weapons and infantry who had advanced to point-blank range. Master Sergeant Suzuki, acting company commander, on his own initiative ordered the main force to counterattack. Through coordinated action, the Japanese knocked out four tanks that had penetrated their positions. Two enemy battalions that had "come close bravely" were nearly wiped out. Total Soviet strength committed in this sector amounted to three battalions and forty tanks. Japanese losses on the Hill 52 front were heavy indeed: seventy-four had been killed and eighty-five wounded, one hundred fifty-nine out of three hundred twenty-eight men in action. The remnants of one infantry company were commanded by a superior private; sergeants led two other infantry and two machine-gun companies. Seven of thirteen heavy weapons were inoperable.  Meanwhile 9th Company elements defended Noguchi Hill, 800 meters southeast of Changkufeng. By 05:00 on 7 August, Soviet troops facing the hill numbered 200 infantry, five tanks, and two rapid-fire guns. From positions set up the previous night along the lake, the Russians opened fire at dawn while 50 soldiers moved to attack with the tanks in support. Captain Noguchi's men poured fire on the enemy and inflicted heavy losses. But the Russians, who possessed superior supporting fire, fought their way forward until, after 40 minutes, they got within 70 meters. The Soviet tanks disappeared into a dead angle near the lakeshore. When the fog lifted at 06:00, the Russians on the southeast slope of Changkufeng fired down at Noguchi Hill with four heavy machine guns. Seven tanks, advancing anew from the gully northeast of Hill 52, came as close as 80 to 200 meters, deployed to encircle, and opened fire. By now, eight Japanese had been killed and five wounded; most of the light machine guns and grenade dischargers had been crippled and all three heavy weapons were out of action. The Russians attacked again at 08:00, hurling grenades and shouting. A dozen tanks operated in support of two infantry companies. The Japanese responded with grenades; yellow and black smoke masked the heights, and the scene was extremely impressive. Desperate hand-to-hand combat raged along the sector for a half-hour until the Soviets fell back after suffering enormous losses.  At 10:40, the Russians assaulted with infantry from the southeast front and from the Changkufeng direction, aided by tanks from the zone between. Captain Noguchi sortied with his remnant, charged the Russians, and drove them off. In this fighting, however, he was shot in the chest and most of his subordinates were killed or wounded. Somehow the captain stayed on his feet. He and six survivors threw grenades at the Russians, who were now behind the Japanese, and then he led a last charge back to the highest positions. Once the enemy had been evicted, Captain Noguchi collapsed. Only three or four soldiers were in fighting condition. The captain begged them to report to Sato, but, refusing to abandon him, the men managed to help him down to the rear. It was 11:30. Captain Noguchi's unit, which had fought bravely since the first combat on 6 August, had been destroyed. Of 78 officers and men, 40 lay killed and another 31 wounded. The hill had been lost. Meanwhile, Soviet bombardment of the Hill 52 district had been heavy, and phone contact with the regiment was severed. Suddenly, the indomitable Captain Noguchi appeared at headquarters, and the regiment finally learned that the foe had penetrated the defenses. The bleeding captain pleaded for a counterattack and kept trying to return to the fight; K. Sato had to restrain him by ordering him to leave for the rear. It was true that the position Captain Noguchi had occupied was the key point connecting Hill 52 and Changkufeng. But Sato reasoned that if they held solidly to the latter hills, their defenses would never be in danger, and it would be easy to retake Noguchi Hill at any time by concentrating fire from all the high ground and by employing artillery, once strength could be spared. Around sunset, however, Sato received an order from the brigade, and a report came from Changkufeng that "our troops' brave fighting has tied us over the crisis." Reassured, Sato proceeded to Hill 52, cheered on Kojima and the soldiers, and examined the condition of the wounded and the heaped-up corpses.  The 75th Infantry estimated that there had been 900 Russian casualties in the right sector and that more than ten tanks and three heavy machine guns had been put out of action. The regiment itself had lost four officers killed and had four wounded. In the entire right sector which included 1,332 men in action, 140 had been killed and 180 wounded. Seven soldiers of the 75th Infantry were also listed as missing in action but presumed dead. Total casualties including the missing, as a percentage of those listed as engaged, amounted to 25 percent for the right sector unit. On the 7th, the unit had lost 19 machine guns and 11 grenade dischargers. As of 18:00 on 7 August, Japanese intelligence estimated that the Russians had committed a grand total of 25 infantry battalions, up six from 6 August, 80 artillery pieces, up 10, and 200 tanks . Situation maps showed one Soviet infantry battalion east of Changkufeng, another north of Hill 52, armor and infantry in unknown strength east of that hill, and artillery positions from northeast to southeast of Khasan. On the 7th, spotters also observed seven large steamers entering Posyet and Khansi, as well as one 10,000-ton vessel at Yangomudy. At least 200 or 300 enemy soldiers in the Karanchin sector were working to strengthen positions. Units moving south from Novokievsk included 350 trucks, 60 tanks, and 400 troops. Heading north from the region of the battlefield were 100 trucks and 150 horsemen. Meanwhile, on the front in eastern Manchuria, elements of the Kwantung Army's 8th Division had forcibly ousted a small party of Soviet border trespassers. The "punch" had gone out of the Russians in the Hill 52 sector after their thorough defeat on 6 and 7 August, but they continued to build up firepower, deploying heavy weapons and artillery observation posts. The bombardments grew more accurate; even regiment and brigade headquarters lost their last dead angles. By daylight on the 8th, two Soviet infantry battalions plus tanks were deployed on the Hill 52 front. Their main forces were distributed along a line 800 meters from the Japanese, and snipers and machine gunners held positions 200 to 300 meters away. "Each time they detected movement, they sniped at us and interfered with our observation." From 09:00, the Japanese sustained scattered artillery fire. At 13:30 there was a bombing raid by 15 planes, but no casualties were incurred. Soviet guns pounded Hill 52 around 18:30, and the Japanese suffered four or five casualties, but morale was generally high, and they sought to strengthen and repair their positions throughout the night. On the Changkufeng front, which had drawn rather serious attention, Russian heavy guns opened slow fire after 05:00 from east of Khasan and from Maanshan. Through the night of 7–8 August, Soviet infantry had assembled near the lake crossing. Russian troop strength increased beyond one-and-a-half battalions. The defenders ran out of grenades and had to resort to rocks, but by 10:00 the Soviet assault waves began to weaken after five hours of fierce resistance. Supporting the Japanese lines had been barrages by grenade launchers, flank fire by a heavy-machine-gun platoon at Chiangchunfeng, and supported by the mountain artillery. Around 10:30, the attackers fled to Khasan. The battlefield quieted, but enemy snipers dug foxholes 300 meters away and kept up persistent fire, and infantry mounted repeated attacks in varying strength.    Since morning, the mountain gun and the two battalion guns at Fangchuanting had engaged infantry and machine guns that appeared on the middle of the Changkufeng crest as well as in the Hill 52 area. The timely fire from these guns caused severe losses, especially to Russian observation posts. But Lieutenant Maeoka, who commanded the mountain platoon from Changkufeng, was wounded badly at 10:30. The mountain battalion also fired at targets in the Changkufeng sector from the Korean side of the Tumen. At 13:20, the Russians pressed new attacks against Changkufeng from three sides, using a total of two companies and three tanks. Although they got close and attacked persistently, they were driven off each time; these afternoon efforts were not very vigorous. Fighters strafed at low altitude and more than ten bombers attacked near 15:00, igniting fires in the village of Fangchuanting. The raids by planes and guns caused frequent cuts in signal lines again. At 06:50 on the 8th, Soviet forces in the left sector resumed their efforts until they were pinned down at 100 meters and had to dig in. Excepting spotter posts, everyone must enter shelters from warning till all-clear. Meanwhile, T. Sato estimated that although enemy attacks were aimed mainly against Changkufeng, there existed some danger that hostile forces would cross the Tumen near Yangkuanping and launch a sudden attack against our left rear, as actions in that area had become pronounced. He accordingly issued an order at 17:00: all of us, superiors as well as subordinates, must overcome exhaustion, make nighttime guardings rigorous, and leave the foe not the slightest opening between friendly battalions or from the shores of the Tumen River.  Suetaka estimated in the morning of the 8th that the Russians were trying to generate propaganda advantageous to them at home and abroad by staking their honor and seizing Changkufeng quickly. From the standpoint of overall political tactics, it was imperative to thwart their intentions. The enemy relied consistently on elements that remained on the Crestline southeast of Changkufeng and served as a base; they must be deprived of that attack base. If his assault plans were to be successful, the 37th Brigade would require reinforcement. The first battalion-size elements of Cho's infantry were arriving. As an initial step, Hanyu's battalion should cross the Tumen and join the brigade, while the main body of the regiment, due that afternoon, should be ready to enter the lines. The division chief of staff issued an order in the name of Suetaka, stipulating that the division would secure its positions while adhering to the great policy of nonexpansion. At 22:30 Morimoto speculated that the Russians were hoping for the good fortune of retaking Changkufeng. Strict guard measures were enjoined. Eventually, before midnight, Suetaka met Cho at Seikaku station. To implement Suetaka's request that the Russian foothold southeast of Changkufeng be wiped out soon, Morimoto decided in the morning to employ the new battalion from Cho's regiment. But since Hanyu's unit was delayed by enemy fire, Morimoto had to turn to the reserve 76th Regiment. At 16:00 Okido was told to prepare an attack, using one infantry battalion and an engineer squad. The mission was to take advantage of darkness to expel the foe remaining on Changkufeng, secure the heights in concert with the elements on the hill, and smash any serious attack at night. At 17:00 Okido issued his detailed order. Enemy elements were located near the cliff close to the northern top of Changkufeng. Apparently hostile bases existed in scattered fashion on the southern slopes as well, as well as a rather large base on the middle of Akahage "Red Bald" Hill, formerly held by Captain Noguchi's company. The regiment was to drive those forces north of Hill 52. The 3rd Battalion commander, Major Hashimoto Seishiro, was to direct both companies' assaults, and, once the foe had been ousted, secure the locations until dawn, after which he would return to the reserve unit.  On the 8th, at 19:30, Hashimoto proceeded with his battalion staff to the foot of Changkufeng and conferred with Major Sato and Captain Shimomura, the majors commanding the units with which he was to cooperate. The assault units moved out from Chiangchunfeng, but their timing was thrown off by a half-hour of artillery checking fire from northeast of the lake. At 20:50, Captain Iwai's 10th Company, supported by a machine-gun platoon, attacked the rock corner on the east side of Changkufeng. After cutting down Soviet sentries, the Japanese rushed in; 40–50 Russian soldiers retreated toward Akahage. On that hill there had been only 20–30 Soviet troops to begin with, but their strength had been built up to two companies plus tanks and infantry guns. The Russians laid down violent small-arms fire, causing 17 Japanese casualties in a short period, after which 30–40 enemy soldiers sought to counterattack. The Japanese drove back this effort, readied their own offensive, and continued to launch close assaults against the heavy-machine-gun nest at the rock corner. Simultaneously, Captain Shidara's 7th Company jumped off with five attached demolition engineers. The 1st Platoon broke through the entanglements and cut down lookouts while the 2nd Platoon proceeded to mop up footholds on the north side—about ten Russian soldiers who dotted the slope at four locations. In the process, the company ran into the positions Iwai had been attacking. Terrain and enemy fire dictated a detour south of the ridgeline. Shidara's men moved up behind Iwai on the right, joining Hashimoto's command. The battalion commander consolidated his lines and directed reconnaissance preparatory to an attack against Akahage. Hours passed; Okido, at the command post, decided it might be wiser to wait till daybreak and call for artillery support. Hashimoto then issued his own instructions from the eastern salient, cautioning his men to dig in well. Near 04:00 the redeployments were completed, but construction did not progress due to the rocky terrain; soldiers were barely able to scoop knee-high firing trenches by daybreak. Total Russian losses on the 8th were estimated to exceed 1,500. More than 100 tanks were claimed publicly, and it was "confirmed" that since the 1st, six planes had been shot down, two of which had fallen behind Japanese lines. In Tokyo, the war ministry and the Gaimusho denied categorically that the Russians had retaken Changkufeng. Soviet troops had attempted to rush positions 600 feet from the crest at 1400 hours; after two and a half hours of furious hand-to-hand fighting, they were beaten off with presumably heavy casualties on both sides. Soviet tanks were reported moving north from Posyet Bay, though it remained unclear whether this indicated withdrawal or strategic movement. Right sector casualties were relatively light on 8 August: eight killed and 41 wounded, the 75th Infantry suffering five and 38 of these respectively. Officer casualties were proportionately high: two wounded in the 75th Regiment, one in the 76th Regiment, and a fourth in the mountain artillery. Personnel rosters of the 75th Regiment, as of 30 July and 8 August, showed a reduction from 1,403 to 826, down 41 percent. The cumulative effect of Japanese losses and the scale of Soviet commitment troubled the Korea Army. Suetaka reported Japanese casualties as: through 2 August, 45 killed, 120 wounded; from 3-5 August, 25 killed, 60 wounded; since 6 August, killed unknown, 200 wounded. Remarkably, the same casualty totals were released publicly by the war ministry on the night of the 8th. Throughout 9 August at 15:20 the Japanese were hit by a very intense barrage from Hill 29. The mountain gun was damaged by shellfire and had to be moved to the foot of Fangchuanting. Tanaka had ordered his artillery to conduct long-range artillery neutralization and communications-cutoff fire, and short-range neutralization as well as checking fire. The accuracy of our artillery elements had improved, and the power of our guns had been enhanced greatly. On the left, from 05:30, T. Sato dispatched an antitank platoon, under cover of mist, to finish off immobilized Soviet tanks whose main armament was still operational and which had done some severe firing the day before. As the day wore on, spirits rose, for the men heard the roar of friendly 15-cm cannon laying down mighty neutralization fire against enemy artillery. Near 14:15, Russian troops were detected creeping forward in the woods 400 meters away on the right. Supporting mountain artillery wiped out this threat in short order. Suetaka decided to move his division headquarters to Seikaku and his combat command post to the Matsu'otsuho message center. Anxiety about the Wuchiatzu sector to the north had diminished greatly; in addition, the entire strength of the division had already been brought to the front. Lastly, dealings with the Seoul and Tokyo levels had by now become rather secondary in importance. Suetaka could discern the steady, disturbing exhaustion of his front-line troops. On the other hand, newly arrived Cho was raring to go. After receiving authorization from Suetaka, Cho allowed Nakajima's battalion to cross the river at Matsu'otsuho but kept Osuga's battalion on the Korean bank as division reserve. Since Tanaka had surmised that the Russians' intention was to direct their main offensive effort against the Japanese right wing, it seemed best to transfer the mountain guns to strengthen the right sector positions. The brigade order of 17:30 endorsed Tanaka's shift of defensive emphasis, particularly with regard to the artillery and the new elements from Cho's regiment. Morimoto added that the core of the Soviet assault force southeast of Changkufeng amounted to two infantry battalions. T. Sato accordingly ordered Obo's battalion to integrate its heavy firepower and deliver swift fire in timely fashion. Soon afterward, Obo discerned a massed battalion of Russian infantry, who had been hauled up by trucks, on the northeastern skirt of Changkufeng. He unleashed every available weapon, organic and attached, at 19:30. The Soviets seemed taken completely by surprise; they showed extreme bewilderment and dispersed in an instant. The right sector unit estimated that on 9 August it had caused 450 casualties, stopped five tanks, and knocked out one light artillery piece and seven heavy machine guns. Japanese casualties in the right sector had amounted to 28 killed and 43 wounded. Ammunition expenditures were considerably higher than on the 8th.  During the night of 9–10 August, the 74th Infantry reinforcements crossed the Tumen steadily. In the early hours, Okido concluded that Soviet attack designs had been frustrated for the time being. The Hill 52 front was relatively calm. Soviet automatic weapons and riflemen were still deployed 200 to 300 meters from Japanese positions, where they sniped selectively. Russian artillery was quiet, apparently as the result of the movement of the main Japanese artillery force to the right wing and the arrival of long-range guns. The 75th Regiment command post at Fangchuanting was the focal point of Japanese artillery activity. Firing began at 07:10, when four battalion guns engaged and smashed two Soviet mountain pieces.  As for Soviet ground assaults, one company attacked at Changkufeng as early as 05:20 under cover of fog but was driven off after 40 minutes. The Russians struck again from three directions in formidable strength between 09:00 and 10:00. Morimoto, growing concerned about the danger of irruptions through gaps between Changkufeng and Shachaofeng, sent elements of Nakajima's battalion to Chiangchunfeng. Since the right wing of the Russians atop Changkufeng was spilling onto the western slopes, at 10:30 Nakajima had his heavy machine guns and battalion guns lay down strong fire from the peak of Chiangchunfeng. Meanwhile, heavy weapons from the left sector were also contributing to the repulse of the morning assaults. A battalion of Soviet infantry attacked Changkufeng all afternoon. Fierce gunfire by the 75th Regiment at 14:00 routed troops massing on the slopes facing the red flag. Considerable losses were inflicted on 75 Russians sighted northeast of Hill 52. An enemy company on the Khasan shore and another two east of Akahage Hill were attempting to occupy positions from which to strike Fangchuanting with the support of two rapid-fire guns. By 17:00 the Russians had been repulsed by the energetic fire of Japanese small arms, battalion guns, and artillery. Soviet forces dispersed toward the lakeshore and Hill 52, leaving many corpses behind. The last important firing by Japanese battalion guns at Fangchuanting on the 10th was a mission against the eastern slopes of Changkufeng at 18:00. Thereafter, the battle zone grew still.  In the left sector, T. Sato concluded that, to secure Changkufeng, it would be best to reinforce flank fire instead of concentrating on the direct attack or defense of the Changkufeng district. He therefore made arrangements with Okido to borrow one machine-gun platoon and assign it to Obo. As of 05:30, enemy troops were still holding a line 300 meters from the positions of Obo's right battalion and 800 to 1,000 meters ahead of Takenouchi's left battalion. Shortly afterward, good news was received at the left sector command post: the last battalion of the 73rd Regiment was to have left Nanam at 16:00 on 9 August and would arrive in the near future. On the right wing of the left sector, the Russians facing Kadokura's company began to operate energetically from 09:00, advancing in two lines, 150 meters apart, with a total strength of one company: two platoons up, one platoon back. They were supported by forces on the high ground north of Khasan and on Akahage. Kadokura waited for the enemy to close to 200 meters before ordering his men to open fire; particularly effective was the flanking fire by the machine-gun company and by elements of Okuda's company. Many heavy artillery shells were hitting the Japanese lines now, but defensive fire pinned down the attacking infantry for a while, 100 meters from the breastworks. Then 30 or 40 Soviet soldiers, covered by firepower, worked forward as close as 30 meters, hurling grenades and giving every indication of mounting a charge. The Japanese responded with grenades. At the same time, the left-flank squad of Kadokura's company was being annihilated. Thus encouraged, Russian assault troops plunged close, whereupon Kadokura assembled his available men, a dozen or so, from the command teams and runners—and grappled with the foe at point-blank range. An ammunition man joined in the melee and broke up the Soviet assault by expert use of hand grenades. The second echelon gradually fell back around 10:30, in the face of heavy fire laid down by the machine guns and Okuda's company. The Russians appeared to be adjusting their deployment but made no further efforts to close. At Changkufeng, meanwhile, two or three enemy companies were approaching the crest. Left sector raiding fire caused the Russians to flee. Japanese casualties in the old right sector had been nine killed and 22 wounded on 10 August. It was estimated that Soviet casualties amounted to 600 killed or wounded, with five heavy machine guns knocked out. By this time, the Soviets had committed their maximum infantry and artillery strength: 27 battalions and 100 guns, the same as on 9 August but up 17 battalions and 60 units since 3 August. Higher headquarters reported no tanks at the front, though 75th Infantry situation maps indicated some Soviet armor still faced Hill 52 sector. Although Japanese officers insisted that Changkufeng Hill remained in Japanese possession, they acknowledged increased casualties due to the accuracy of Soviet shelling. Losses were not as severe as might have been expected because the enemy did not time their charges with their bombardments; Japanese troops lay in trenches and met the attackers with grenades. Every combat unit of the 19th Division had been committed. Nevertheless, the maimed and the fresh battalions had amounted to a combined maximum strength of only 12 infantry battalions and 37 artillery pieces, primarily 75-mm mountain guns, without armor or aircraft. These forces had to cope with 27 enemy infantry battalions and 100 artillery pieces, including many long-range guns, as well as sizable tank and aerial units. Every echelon, regiment, division, and army, had voiced the need for troop replacements and reinforcements.  By evening of 10 August, the situation had deteriorated to the point that the division chief of staff sent Seoul a very long and painful message that ended with: "There is danger of radical change in combat situation in few days if matters go on. It is estimated that this division has only one or two days left in which it can retain definite freedom of action,initiative to advance or retreat. Even if overall situation should develop to our advantage in next three or four days, we ought to be patient from broader standpoint, and be satisfied with our achievement, that Japanese Army has manifested its strength against enemy till now. While we do retain freedom of action, it would be appropriate to solve incident now through speedy diplomatic negotiations. Such measures are entirely up to Korea Army and high command but, so far as division is concerned, there is no other way except of course to make desperate efforts to maintain occupation line for sake of mission. Please take these matters into sympathetic consideration and conduct appropriate measures urgently". I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Night raids and artillery opened the fight, with Hill 52 and Changkufeng changing hands amid intense Soviet tank and air assaults. Japanese forces, aided by engineers, infantry, and mountain guns, mounted tenacious defense, repelling repeated Soviet breakthroughs though suffering heavy casualties. By August 10, Japanese divisions faced mounting exhaustion and warnings of potential strategic shifts, while both sides suffered substantial casualties and material losses.

Join David and Alex as they explore the landscape of fantasy football, with David celebrating his recent championship win. He shares the strategic insights and key moments that led to his success, while Alex questiones his self-proclaimed expertise. They discuss the Texans' impressive season and the crushing defeat of the Ags. With a blend of humor, thoughtful analysis, and friendly rivalry, this episode offers a deep dive into the world of sports fandom and the thrill of competition. Pull up a chair and join the conversation!

Last time we spoke about the Russian Counter Offensive over the Heights. On the Manchurian frontier, a Japanese plan hatched in the hush before dawn: strike at Hill 52, seize the summit, and bargain only if fate demanded. Colonel Sato chose Nakano's 75th Regiment, delivering five fearless captains to lead the charge, with Nakajima rising like a bright spark among them. Under a cloak of night, scouts threaded the cold air, and at 2:15 a.m. wires fell away, revealing a path through darkness. By dawn, a pale light brushed the crest; Hill 52 yielded, then Shachaofeng did, as dawn's demands pressed forward. The Russians responded with a thunder of tanks, planes, and relentless artillery. Yet the Japanese braced, shifting guns, moving reinforcements, and pressing a discipline born of training and resolve. The battlefield fractured into sectors, Hill 52, Shachaofeng, the lake, each demanding courage and cunning. Night winds carried the buzz of flares, the hiss of shells, and the stubborn clang of rifles meeting armor. The Russians tried to reweave their strength, but Japanese firepower and tenacious assaults kept the line from bending. By nightfall, a quiet resolve settled over the hills; the cost was steep, but the crest remained in Japanese hands.   #182 The Second Russian Counteroffensive over the heights Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The Japanese retained their hard won positions despite fierce Russian counterattacks. For the Japanese command structure at the front, 3 August was of prime importance. Suetaka concluded that he could not merely direct the fighting around Changkufeng nor abandon Kyonghun, given his need to manage relations with Korea Army Headquarters and central authorities, as well as the special characteristics of these battles and his grave concerns about the Wuchiatzu front to the north. By 5 p.m., the newly arrived 37th Brigade commander, Morimoto Nobuki, was assigned control of all sectors from Hill 52 and Changkufeng to Shachaofeng, establishing his command post at the former site of the 75th Regiment at Chiangchunfeng. The Japanese estimated losses from the Soviet counterattacks on 2–3 August as follows: Hill 52-Changkufeng, at least 300 Soviet casualties and four tanks; Shachaofeng, about 300 casualties and several tanks, plus several heavy machine guns knocked out. By 17:00 on 3 August, Russian strength committed to the front and immediate rear was assessed at ten infantry battalions, 40 artillery pieces, and 80 tanks. Japanese casualties on the 2nd and 3rd totaled 16 killed and 25 wounded. Suetaka judged the Soviet bombardments on 3 August powerful, but their infantry assaults were not particularly bold, likely due to their heavy losses on the 2nd. Even though morale was not high, there were signs of reinforcements from elite units, including armor and large artillery formations. Suetaka concluded the Russians would again attempt to retake the Shachaofeng sector and positions around Changkufeng. During the night of 3–4 August, the 75th Infantry, still on alert against resumed enemy counterattacks, intensified security and worked energetically to strengthen defenses. K. Sato remained at Chiangchunfeng to complete the turnover to the 37th Brigade and to brief Morimoto. The regiment established its new command post for the right sector at the foot of Fangchuanting. Throughout the night, Soviet vehicles with blinking lights were observed moving south along the high ground east of Khasan, and a new buildup of mechanized forces and artillery appeared in the area. At 05:30, 36 tanks were seen advancing to Hill 29, followed by the apparent withdrawal of 50–60 Russian horsemen into the same area. At 07:00 on 04 August, Soviet artillery began a bombardment. Although there was a lull around noon, by 14:00 intensity peaked, described as "like millions of lightning bolts striking at once." After another quiet spell, enemy guns renewed their tempo at 19:30, targeting Hill 52 and Changkufeng. The Russians' artillery was not precisely zeroed in; "many of the shells plopped into the Tumen, which delighted us considerably." Beginning on the 4th, Soviet artillery sought to cut lines of communication by bombarding the river crossing site, disrupting daytime supply. Japanese artillery records add: "Until today, this battalion had been fired on only by field artillery; now 122-mm. howitzers went into action against us. We sustained no losses, since the points of impact were 100 meters off. Apparently, the Russians conducted firing for effect from the outset, using data provided by the field artillery in advance." Around midnight, Ichimoto, the old commander of the 1st Infantry Battalion, arrived at the 75th Regiment Headquarters to resume command. He was "itching to fight." K. Sato described the casualties in detail, but "he didn't look beaten at all." "To the contrary, the colonel was strong and in excellent spirits. Yet while he wasn't pessimistic, one could not call him optimistic." At the battalion site, about 100 men were in operational condition out of an original 400. Some soldiers were hauling ammunition, rations, and position materiel; others were cremating the dead, since corpses would rot in the August heat. Japanese casualties on 4 August were light: the 75th Infantry lost five killed and three wounded; among attached engineers, the platoon leader and two men were wounded. Ammunition expenditure was very low. The Japanese press noted that although the Russians had been reported retreating behind the lake to the northeast, investigation showed a redeployment forward from south of Changkufeng. An American observer in Tokyo stated that "the best information obtainable is that the Russians now occupy the lower slopes of Changkufeng, while the Japanese still occupy the heights." From this period dates a series of pleas from the 19th Division for the dispatch of long-range artillery from the Kwantung Army. Suetaka believed that the addition of long-range artillery was necessary and feasible. As Kitano predicted, Suetaka submitted his recommendation at 05:00 on 5 August for the attention of the Korea Army commander and the AGS deputy. As dawn approached on 5 August, the Korea Army received Suetaka's request. A message was dispatched to the vice minister of war and the AGS deputy, and an inquiry was sent to Hsinking. The note detailed Soviet artillery on the Changkufeng front, eight to ten batteries of field and mountain guns, including 10-cm cannons and two or three 15-cm howitzers, and described how these long-range pieces kept up a slow fire beyond Japanese firing range. Overnight, Soviet traffic pressed along the high ground east of Khasan, and by 06:30 the horizon brimmed with new threat: 48 tanks concentrated near Hill 29, with fresh artillery deployed once the Russians realized their own guns were receiving scant challenge from the Japanese. Movement across the lake suggested continued armor in play; at dawn, 10 to 15 tanks lingered on the Crestline, while closer still, six Russian tanks prowled near the southern edge of Khasan. By 03:00, Changkufeng came under bombardment again. K. Sato urged the mountain artillery to answer dawn with counterfire against the high ground east of Khasan and against Hill 29. Between 05:00 and 05:40, the artillery struck armor concentrations, knocked out two tanks, and forced the rest toward the east of Hill 29. Observation posts were neutralized, and cavalry was driven north. At the same hour, the Soviet barrage against the Japanese rear intensified, targeting lines of communication across the Tumen. The Sozan link failed by day, and telephone lines to the artillery battalion were severed, though signalmen managed to restore communications. The river crossings, Fangchuanting, Hill 52, and Shachaofeng bore the brunt of the shelling, with 15-cm blasts jolting the frontline. "From today enemy shellfire was coned and grew increasingly accurate, until every area along our front was deprived of its dead angles and our casualties mounted." The Hill 52 zone endured a slow siege, but tank fire from the eastern heights remained severe. Noguchi's company, positioned south of Changkufeng, found itself trapped in crossfire from positions across the lake. Suetaka, his front-line subordinates, and their worries about artillery superiority pressed onward. He did what he could with the resources at hand, and, in the morning, shifted a two-15-cm howitzer battery from Kyonghun to the sector opposite Changkufeng, a modest increment in reach but a needed one. At 10:00, Suetaka ordered replenishment of frontline strength. He calculated the enemy's power and their own limits: the Russians had deployed three or four infantry battalions, around 120–130 tanks, 50–60 armored cars, about 1,000 mounted troops, and three or four artillery battalions. Yet he found a glimmer in their morale; "the morale of our own units has risen, as we have been dealing grievous blows to the foe on occasion and have been steadily breaking hostile intentions." By 5 August, he noted, fifty enemy tanks had already fallen. Morimoto watched the ominous lull that threatened another attritional test and warned that the situation demanded constant vigilance. "Even if the front seems quiet, we must tighten security, reinforce positions, and not give the foe even the slightest advantage to exploit." The 5th saw only four Japanese soldiers wounded, three from the 75th and one from the mountain artillery, while ammunition usage remained low. Anti-aircraft guns west of Sozan drove off two aircraft that appeared over Changkufeng at 11:45, triggering a counterbarrage from the northeast of Khasan. A few Soviet planes skimmed over Hill 52 and Changkufeng in the afternoon, but their flights felt more like reconnaissance than threat. Across the line, the Russians continued to probe the east side. Northeast of Khasan, waves of infantry and trucks, dozens at a time, slipped south, while roughly 20 tanks began their own southern march. The Russians worked to erect new positions along the Khansi heights. In the meantime, conversations in Moscow pressed toward a decision, with intelligence predicting that a breakthrough would come by noon on the 5th. Around midnight on 5 August, Morimoto observed that the Russians' forward elements seemed to have been pulled back and the front lay quiet. He ordered vigilant guard duties, stressing that crossing the border, trespassing, and fomenting trouble were prohibited by all units and even by scouts. Meanwhile, the Japanese had been preparing for night attacks and consolidating positions. Throughout the foggy night, mechanized units moved on the Crestline east of Khasan. At daybreak, a platoon leader north of Changkufeng reported tanks heading toward Hill 29, estimating the total force at about 70 tanks and 50 troop-laden trucks. Japanese observers at Hill 52 detected new artillery positions on both sides of Hill 29 and 40 tanks on the Crestline south of the hill. By 07:00, the high ground was covered by no fewer than 100 tanks, with 8 or 9 infantry battalions deployed ahead and behind. As early as 03:00, K. Sato had urged his artillery liaison officer to ensure friendly guns fired at daybreak against the Hill 29 sector to thwart the enemy's intentions in advance. When morning fog lifted a bit at 06:00, Kamimori's mountain artillery battalion "hit the tanks very well," and front-line officers spotted shell impacts, though visibility improved only until 10:00, when mist again hampered observation. By 07:00, Soviet guns began firing from near Hill 29, triggering a duel in which the Japanese outranged them. Around 09:00, as the fog lifted from the higher crest of Changkufeng, Japanese gunners added their fire against the 40 Russian tanks near Hill 29. From Fangchuanting, the lone Japanese mountain piece also engaged armor and troop-laden trucks around Hill 29. As time wore on, the Soviet artillery showed its power, and Hill 52 became a beehive of shelling. From 11:00 onward the defenders began to suffer more and more casualties, with works shattered in succession. Flank fire from Gaho and heavy guns from Maanshan took a toll. The 100 tanks deployed on the Crestline north and south of Hill 29 delivered furious low-trajectory fire, gradually turning the front walls of our firing trenches into something resembling a saw. Russian shellfire pounded defenses at Hill 52, Noguchi Hill, and Changkufeng. Between 02:00 and 05:00 the Russian shells had been dispersed; now they concentrated their bombardment. They even struck the rear headquarters of the 37th Brigade and the 75th Regiment. The crossings at Sozan and Matsu'otsuho took heavy hits, and Sato worried that friendly batteries would become exposed to counter-battery fire if they opened up too soon. A peak of intensity arrived near 13:30 as the Soviet ground assault began. Now 30 Soviet aircraft bombed Changkufeng, Fangchuanting, and Hill 52, and Russian tanks moved toward Hill 52, with infantry 300–400 meters behind. To blunt the assault, Hirahara ordered ammunition caches and instructed troops not to open fire prematurely. The Soviet infantry and tanks pressed to a line about 900 meters from the Japanese, paused briefly, then continued. By 14:00, the advance resumed, led by three battalions and 50 tanks. Lieutenant Saito, commanding the 3rd Battalion's antitank battery, waited until tanks were 800 meters away and then opened fire with his three pieces. In a furious exchange between 13:50 and 14:30, as armor closed to 300 meters, the Japanese stopped 14 tanks and seriously damaged others in the rear. One antitank squad leader, a corporal, would later receive a posthumous citation for destroying more than ten tanks. Several tanks fled into a dip near Khasan; some Soviet troops were reportedly crushed by their own tanks in the melee. Supporting Saito's fire were Hisatsune's regimental guns and the captured antitank gun at Changkufeng, which the Japanese used to engage armor along the lake's slopes. Noguchi's unit fired battalion guns against the tanks while the attached mountain pieces bombarded the Russians despite intense counterbattery fire. At Hill 52, liaison lieutenant Fuji'uchi observed the shelling and coordinated infantry–artillery actions with a platoon leader, never flinching even after being buried in trenches three times by shell blasts; he was killed near 14:00. Captain Shiozawa, the mountain battery commander, took charge of directing fire and also was also slain. The Russians' assault pushed forward; 16 tanks followed behind the vanguard, moving along the Crestline behind Hill 52, and joined the tanks in firing but did not advance further. To the rear, a large force moved along the lake north of Hill 52 until checked by fire from Noguchi's positions. A dozen Russian tanks converged southwest of Khasan at 16:00. Master Sergeant Kobayashi, acting platoon leader of the engineers, proposed a close-quarter demolition attack since Japanese antitank strength was limited. After approval from Hirahara, at around 16:30 he and 13 men crept forward 300 meters undetected. Twenty meters from the tanks, Kobayashi urged his men: "One man, one tank! Unto death for us all!" The assault wrecked six to eight (or possibly ten) of the 12 enemy tanks and killed many crew members inside and outside the vehicles, but Kobayashi and seven of his men were killed; only one soldier, Kabasawa, survived to perform a posthumous rescue of a fallen comrade. Of the 60 Russian tanks and at least four battalions that rushed to Hill 52, only one tank charged into the hill positions. At 17:30, this machine reached within 150 meters of the 11th Company lines but was destroyed by armor-piercing heavy machine-gun fire. Back at the 75th Regiment command post, K. Sato received reports from the line units, but hostile fire cut communications with Hill 52 in the afternoon. His antitank guns were increasingly inoperable, and casualties mounted. He reinforced Hill 52 first with heavy machine guns and then with an infantry company. North of Hill 52, Noguchi had been in position with an infantry platoon, a machine-gun platoon, and the battalion gun battery. By 09:30, enemy bombardment forced him to pull back temporarily to the lower Scattered Pines area to avoid needless casualties. At Akahage or "Red Bald" Hill, Noguchi left only lookouts. Around 16:00, about two enemy companies were observed moving toward Changkufeng. Noguchi redirected fire to meet the threat. The Japanese, pinned by infantry and four tanks approaching within 150 meters, endured infantry guns and other tanks in a protracted exchange. Shelling continued until sundown. Casualties mounted; the machine-gun platoon leader, Master Sergeant Harayama, fell with 20 of his men. "It was a hard battle, but we retained our positions, and the enemy advance toward Changkufeng was checked." After sunset there were occasional fire exchanges; tanks remained visible burning. Soviet troops attempting to breach barriers faced hand-grenade assaults. A great deal of noise signaled casualties being evacuated and tanks salvaged behind enemy lines, but no fresh assaults followed. The effective barrage by the 2nd Mountain Artillery Battalion helped deter further attempts.  Around 13:30 the advance began. Soviet ground troops laid down a barrage of field, heavy, and mountain gunfire against Hill 52, Noguchi Hill, and Fangchuanting until sunset. Casualties were heaviest between 15:00 and 17:00. Soviet cutoff fire against the Tumen crossings continued even after the sun went down. Japanese close-support artillery attracted instantaneous counterbattery fire. Enemy planes also seemed to be bombing in quest of the artillery sites. On the sector defended by T. Sato, throughout the night of 5-6 August, Russian movements had been frequent on the Kozando-Paksikori road and east of Khasan, trucks and tanks making round trips. The roar of engines and rumbling of vehicles were especially pronounced on the lake heights. Headlights shone brightly, causing Japanese lookouts to speculate that the Russians were putting on a demonstration to suggest that their main offensive effort was being aimed against Hill 52. Nevertheless, the left sector unit was ready for an enemy dawn assault, which did materialize around 06:00. One or two Soviet battalions struck forward, encountered a torrent of fire at 300 meters, and fled, leaving 30 bodies behind. Near 09:00 the left sector experienced a fierce series of bombardments; all of the men except lookouts took cover in trenches. The Soviet guns thundered unrelentingly, apparently in preparation for an offensive. At 14:30 several dozen bombers struck. Simultaneously, a wave of 60 tanks moved forward, followed by three battalions of infantry. Major Obo, battalion commander on the right wing, had his heavy machine guns, battalion guns, and line companies engage the foot soldiers, while antitank and regimental guns concentrated against armor. The tanks fanned out and approached within 700 meters, stopping to fire on occasion in "mobile pillbox" fashion. Despite unrelenting enemy tank and artillery shelling, the Japanese regimental guns, and the rapid-fire pieces in particular, shifted position and laid down raiding fire. In conjunction with heavy weapons belonging to Takenouchi's battalion, Obo's men succeeded in stopping 20 tanks. The rest of the armored group continued to push forward. The Russian infantry had pressed on another 200 meters behind the tanks, but eventually they lost momentum 400 meters from the Japanese positions. Having managed to separate the tanks from the infantry, the Japanese units staged close-in assaults in concert with heavy weapons and smashed ten more tanks. Thirty machines had been immobilized by now after a furious struggle lasting five hours. Although Lieutenant Ikue was killed by machine-gun fire, his mountain artillery platoon, emplaced at Shachaofeng, rendered yeoman service, stopping 20 tanks. The forward elements of Soviet infantry, still firing from 400 meters behind the tanks, had apparently abandoned the attack. Second-line forces seemed to have pulled far back, northeast of the lake.   Several dozen Soviet bombers struck Takenouchi's left-wing battalion around 14:30 and lost one plane to machine-gun fire. At the same time, 50 Soviet tanks closed to 800 meters. Engaging this armored formation were battalion guns, heavy field artillery, and mountain artillery attached to the sector unit, as well as heavy weapons firing from the neighboring battalion. In succession the tanks were knocked out, perhaps 20 in all. Under cover of artillery and bombing, a battalion of Soviet infantry, who had been advancing behind the tanks, got as close as 30 or 40 meters before being checked by guns firing from the Nanpozan area and by the vigorous resistance of the defenders. The enemy withdrew 600 meters and began to dig in. T. Sato noted at 19:00 that, although the Russians on the right and left sectors seemed to have sustained considerable losses, they apparently were "planning something at point-blank range in front of our positions." The 73rd Infantry would therefore cope with a twilight or night attack by the one battalion and several tanks immediately facing it. On 06:08, immediately after large-scale air attacks involving four-engine bombers between noon and 14:00, enemy barrages began. Enemy artillery positions, 6,000–7,000 meters away, were not engaged by the Japanese since their gunners were trained only at 1,000 meters. Longer ranges were ineffective, would betray the guns, and would waste ammunition. Near 16:00 50 tanks appeared at 3,000 meters, and infantry could also be seen, wearing high boots and marching around the lake. Although the Russians may have closed to 200 or 300 meters, Tominaga received no impression that their foot soldiers were particularly aggressive. Soviet armored tactics were poor: some tanks were moving, some stopped, but they did their firing from rises, which made them easy targets. Perhaps it was because of the terrain, undulating and swampy. Without armor-piercing rounds, the Japanese guns could not penetrate the heaviest armor, so they aimed at the treads or at the belly when the tank was on a rise. Tominaga's weapons were aided by rapid-fire pieces and machine guns and by the 15-cm howitzers from across the river. Of the ten targets which came within effective range, Tominaga's battery claimed five light tanks. Major Takenouchi remembered a tank-led Soviet attack that day on Takenouchi's sector. The enemy infantry deployed in good order four kilometers from the defenses. As the formations drew closer, the Japanese counted more than 40 tanks and 3,000 ground troops. The commander knew he had a serious problem, for there were only 20 antitank shells for the rapid-fire guns. When the Russians got within 4,000 meters, the Japanese opened fire with all available heavy weapons. The attackers hit the ground and continued to advance in creeping formation, although the terrain consisted of paddy fields. All the Japanese could see were Russians, wearing reddish-purple trousers and carrying rifles, deployed every 200 meters behind the front lines and apparently exhorting the soldiers. These must have been the "enforcers." The Japanese let the tanks close to 800 meters before opening fire with their precious antitank ammunition. Both the lead and the last tanks were knocked out, but there were by now only four or five shells left, and the firing had to be stopped. Fortunately for the Japanese, the tanks never again advanced, perhaps because of the wet terrain. The Soviet infantry, however, pressed forward tenaciously all day and wormed their way close to the front edge of the barbed wire under cover of artillery and machine guns. Throughout the day, pleas for reinforcement were made frequently by the two Japanese line companies, but the battalion had no reserves, only the few soldiers in the command team. Requests were met with the reply to "hold on for a while; help is coming." Luckily, there was no close-quarter fighting by the time night fell, but the Russians did lay down concerted machine-gun fire after dark. When dawn broke without a Soviet assault, Major Takenouchi surmised that the barrage of machine-gun fire laid down by Russian infantry the evening before must have been intended to cover disengagement from the lines or to check a Japanese attack. Now, in daylight, Russian assault troops which had closed to the entanglements the day before had pulled back to a distance of 400 or 500 meters and could be seen constructing positions. At 19:10 Morimoto warned that while the Soviet offensive had bogged down, "all units are to be wary of attacks after twilight and are to crush them in good time." Ito, in charge at Changkufeng, was consequently alert, although regimental headquarters did not particularly share his concern. Ito had only two infantry squads from the 6th Company and Hisatsune's regimental gun battery, 121 men in all. A little after 20:00, Ito received a report from lookouts that enemy troops were advancing onto the southern skirt. At 20:30 two Soviet companies attacked the advanced lines, hurling grenades. One Japanese squad was almost wiped out; "they died heroic deaths, leaping into a hostile force which outnumbered them 20:1." Immediately, the Russians surged toward the main Japanese positions farther up the hill, while other strong elements sought to encircle the crest on the left. Accompanying the Soviet troops were "wardens." From north, east, and south the Japanese defenses were being overrun, and the regimental guns were in jeopardy. Wounded men fell back and down the hill, one by one. Lieutenant Hisatsune personally sought to repulse the Russians. Taking his command team, a dozen men under a master sergeant, and the two regimental gun squads which possessed only captured rifles, he led a desperate charge at 21:10. With fixed bayonets, the Japanese rushed forward, yelling loudly and hurling rocks, since there were not enough grenades. The Russians retreated in confusion, pursued by the Japanese. Hisatsune cut down several Russians, was wounded badly by grenades, but plunged into the enemy one last time before meeting a "matchlessly heroic death" at 21:40. Almost all of the noncoms and soldiers fell with him. Suddenly, at 21:20, Ito's antitank squad leader staggered to the 75th Regiment command post at Fangchuanting, his face mangled. "Changkufeng is in danger! Avenge us!" Nishimura and the reinforcements had to run 1,200 meters to reach the hill. Major Ichimoto also worked desperately to retrieve men from logistical chores; somehow he assembled 45. Grabbing every grenade available at the command post, Ichimoto ran with his men to the relief of Changkufeng. Next, Regimental Aide Suko sent 10 soldiers, the last being headquarters clerks and runners. When 16 men from the 2nd Company turned up, having delivered their supplies, Suko rushed them out, also. At regimental headquarters there now remained only a dozen soldiers and one heavy machine gun. By then, the Russians had climbed up and across Changkufeng peak and were pushing halfway down the Japanese slope of the hill. Enemy machine guns fired fiercely, but it was mainly grenades that felled Murakoshi's unit; although few were killed, half of the lead platoon was wounded. Murakoshi, struck by a grenade fragment, tied a cloth around his knee and kept on running. Clinging to Changkufeng, Ito now had little more than 50 men left—only seven of his own soldiers, the rest gunners. The latter had lost their pieces, however, and had never been armed with rifles in the first place. The survivors had to use stones, picks, and shovels to grapple with the foe in the trenches.  A little before 22:00, the 17-man contingent under Nishimura arrived. Ten minutes later, Ichimoto rushed up with his 45 men, bunched closely. The survivors, inferior to the reinforcements in numbers, were heartened immensely. Soon afterward, at 22:30, the regimental warrant officer, Nishizawa, caught up with another dozen soldiers, and Murakoshi brought 16 more at 23:00. Wild fighting ensued, furious grenade exchanges, the crisscrossing of fire, and shouts and flashes. Ichimoto remembered that by the time he arrived, the last remnants of Ito's company were fighting hand-to-hand in the trenches on the north side in utter darkness. Thirty meters from the peak, he and Nishimura scouted the situation. Then, having combined the 120 reinforcements into one line, Ichimoto drew his sword and led the charge. In the constant flashes, shapes could be discerned rather well. The Russian machine guns were firing "crazily," all tracers, probably to warn away their own troops. But the firing was very high, sometimes ten meters over the heads of the Japanese, perhaps because of the darkness, the 40-degree slope near the crest, and the angle of the guns. Much of the fire was considerably lower, but the Japanese had only to observe the roots of the tracer fire and stay down, ducking behind boulders. The Soviets had been committing new troops steadily, and a considerable amount of heavy weapons had been emplaced. Near midnight the Russians were driven south, down the cliff, but most of the Japanese had been killed or wounded, and ammunition was exhausted. The mere dozen unscathed survivors were pushed back, but Master Sergeant Isobe and his platoon from Inokuma's company reached the crest in the nick of time at 02:00. With this reinforcement, Ichimoto led a new charge and again drove the enemy below the cliff.  At 22:50 P.M., Inokuma set out with only 49 men, crossed the border, and headed for the enemy's rear. First to be encountered, probably at 01:00, were several dozen Soviet soldiers, armed with machine guns, who were surprised and almost destroyed, abandoning more than 20 corpses. Inokuma veered north along Khasan, cutting down Russian phone lines on the way. The Japanese detected no evidence of enemy retreat. Instead, voices and the sound of oars on the lake could be heard from the eastern foot of Changkufeng, perhaps they came from Soviet reinforcements. Inokuma decided that the best course would be to plunge ahead and take the Russians by surprise. On his own initiative, he began his new operation, although by now he had lost permanent touch with the assault teams. At 02:00, Inokuma's unit broke silently through the "imperfect" lines of barbed wire and charged through another enemy force of company size which was equipped with machine guns. Next, Inokuma directed an attack against a concentration just behind the company location, a unit estimated to number two battalions massing west of the Khasan crossing. The Russians were "stunned" by the assault. According to Akaishizawa, the enemy were killing their own men by wild firing. A portion fled north, leaving over 30 bodies behind. At the same time, the foe called down fire from all areas, causing very heavy Japanese casualties. Inokuma charged, managed to scatter the foe, and seized the cliff. By now he had only a half-dozen men left. His own sword had been shattered and his pistol ammunition exhausted; he picked up a Russian rifle and bayoneted several enemy soldiers. Now the Soviet troops, who had fallen back once, were approaching again from the right rear. Inokuma charged once more, shouting. The Russians retreated to the foot of the heights on the northeast. Daybreak was near. Already hit several times, Inokuma sought to resume the attack, this time from the rear of hostile forces desperately engaging Ichimoto's elements on Changkufeng crest. Akaishizawa said his last orders were, "Ito is just ahead. Charge on!" Although he had only a few soldiers left, Inokuma was trying to move forward when a bullet or a grenade fragment struck him in the head, and he died at 03:00. Sergeant Okumura, although wounded seriously, had remained with Inokuma to the last and defended the positions that had been reached. He saw to it that Inokuma's corpse was recovered first and next struggled to evacuate the wounded. Only then did he withdraw. Around 07:00, Okumura got back to Fangchuanting with one unscathed and two badly wounded soldiers. A day later, the seriously injured but indestructible M. Saito appeared at the regiment command post, somehow dragging a rifle and light machine gun with his one good arm, for "we were always trained to respect our weapons." It was estimated that, during the fighting throughout 6 August, the Russians lost 1,500 killed and wounded as well as 40 tanks knocked out in K. Sato's right sector alone. Japanese casualties were heavy on the 6th. The 75th Infantry lost three officers; 44 enlisted men were killed and 85 wounded. In the engineer platoon seven were killed and five wounded out of 19 men. The 54 killed and 90 wounded in the right sector amounted to 17 percent of the 843 men available. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Japanese leadership under Colonel Sato assigned Nakano's 75th Regiment for a dawn assault, seizing Hill 52 and Shachaofeng despite fierce Soviet counterattacks,tanks, aircraft, and heavy artillery. Across the front, sustained bombardment, shifting fire, and nocturnal maneuvers characterize the period. Yet the crest endured, losses mounting but resolve unbroken, until the sun dipped and the hillside remained stubbornly Japanese

In this episode of Volatility Views on the Options Insider Radio Network, Mark Longo and Dr. Russell Rhoads dive into the shifting landscape of volatility as the final full trading week of 2025 comes to a close. While much of the market is heading into holiday "hibernation," geopolitical tensions are lighting up the commodity space. The team breaks down why Energy CVOL is pinning the needle to the upside while Treasury and FX volatility are being "taken to the woodshed." Key Topics Covered: The Venezuela "Brouhaha": How intensified pressure and crude embargoes are reviving Energy CVOL (WTI) and driving it to weekly highs. Commodity Volatility Split: A deep dive into the aggregate CVOL levels for Metals, Ags, and the broader Commodities complex vs. the dying volatility in Fixed Income. The VIX Term Structure: Analyzing the current curve and what the "post-Fed" environment means for the remainder of 2025. Vol Products in Focus: Performance updates and trade analysis for SVXY, UVXY, and VIX futures. Looking Ahead to 2026: Anticipated market movers and volatility catalysts for the new year. Listener Mailbag: Russell and Mark answer your questions regarding volatility products and specific trading strategies.  

In dieser Folge ist Marc Joss zu Gast – der Mann, der Switcher durch harte Zeiten geführt und wieder aufgebaut hat. Wir sprechen darüber, wie Marc bei Switcher angefangen hat, wie es zur ersten Insolvenz kam und was danach passieren musste, damit Switcher wieder zu neuem Glanz findet.Du hörst außerdem, warum Marc den ersten Laden in Winterthur eröffnet hat – ausgerechnet im Zeitalter des Online-Shoppings – und wie man stationäre Läden smart mit E-Commerce verknüpft. Marc erzählt auch, wie er ganz alleine einen Online-Shop aufgebaut hat, warum Newsletter noch immer brutal effektiv sind und wie saisonale Produkte (vor allem Masken während Corona) die Umsätze explodieren ließen.Themen in der Folge Wie Marc bei Switcher anfing Switchers erste Insolvenz Wie Marc Switcher wieder aufgebaut hat Was in den letzten 5 Jahren passiert ist, seit Marc die Führung übernommen hat Erste Ladeneröffnung in Winterthur – warum das Sinn machte Wie Marc alleine einen Online-Shop aufgebaut hat Warum Newsletter immer noch eine sehr erfolgreiche Marketing-Strategie ist Wie saisonale Produkte (Masken in der Corona-Zeit) Umsätze explodieren ließen Warum man nicht alle Aufgaben ins Ausland outsourcen kann Wie es dazu kam und warum im digitalen Zeitalter von Onlineshopping der erste Laden eröffnet wurde Wie man stationäre Läden mit E-Commerce verlinken kann Warum Internationalisierung einfacher denn je ist Warum Stillstand in der Unternehmerwelt unmöglich ist4 konkrete Tipps von Marc Joss Bau dir Systeme, bevor du skaliert bist Mach Nachhaltigkeit pragmatisch, nicht dogmatisch Entscheide schneller Bleib nah am ProduktGast-LinksWebsite: http://www.switcher.comLinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/marcjoss/Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/switcherland.chInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/marcjoss_switcher/TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@switcherlandPodcast-LinksInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/mach_dis_ding/Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/MachdisDingLinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/42767306/admin/Podcast Werbepartner Relai ist die einfachste Bitcoin App in Europa, gemacht in der Schweiz. Mit Relai kannst du per Banküberweisung oder Dauerauftrag Bitcoin kaufen und bekommst es direkt in deine eigene Wallet. Ich persönlich investiere seit März 2021 wöchentlich via Relai in Bitcoin und bin mit der Rendite mehr als zufrieden. Du willst auch in Bitcoin investieren? Dann mach es mit Relai, und mit dem Code MACHDISDING sparst du 0.1% Gebühren. quitt – quitt Business erledigt für neu gegründete AGs, GmbHs und Vereine die Anstellung ihrer ersten Mitarbeiter sowie die gesamte Lohnbuchhaltung. Weitere Infos unter: www.quitt.business Across Advisory GmbH – melde Dich jetzt im Oktober, November oder Dezember bei Marco Kratzer und seinem Team und lass Dir Deinen Abschluss im Wert von CHF 500.- kostenlos analysieren. Schau jetzt, ob Du noch ein Einsparungspotential hast. Melde Dich jetzt unter: https://calendly.com/across-advisory/kostenloses-erstgesprach-bei-marco-kratzer

In this episode of Volatility Views on the Options Insider Radio Network, Mark Longo and Dr. Russell Rhoads dive into the shifting landscape of volatility as the final full trading week of 2025 comes to a close. While much of the market is heading into holiday "hibernation," geopolitical tensions are lighting up the commodity space. The team breaks down why Energy CVOL is pinning the needle to the upside while Treasury and FX volatility are being "taken to the woodshed." Key Topics Covered: The Venezuela "Brouhaha": How intensified pressure and crude embargoes are reviving Energy CVOL (WTI) and driving it to weekly highs. Commodity Volatility Split: A deep dive into the aggregate CVOL levels for Metals, Ags, and the broader Commodities complex vs. the dying volatility in Fixed Income. The VIX Term Structure: Analyzing the current curve and what the "post-Fed" environment means for the remainder of 2025. Vol Products in Focus: Performance updates and trade analysis for SVXY, UVXY, and VIX futures. Looking Ahead to 2026: Anticipated market movers and volatility catalysts for the new year. Listener Mailbag: Russell and Mark answer your questions regarding volatility products and specific trading strategies.  

A healthy 47-year-old man from New Jersey suddenly died after delayed allergic reactions to red meat; it was later confirmed to be caused by alpha-gal syndrome (AGS), marking the first documented fatality linked to tick-driven mammalian meat allergy His symptoms began hours after eating beef following a recent camping trip, during which he sustained 12 to 13 suspected lone star tick bites — exposure to this tick is now known to trigger the immune sensitization that leads to AGS AGS occurs when the lone star tick introduces the alpha-gal sugar molecule into the bloodstream, causing the body to form antibodies and react severely, sometimes fatally, upon future consumption of mammalian meat or byproducts Cases of AGS are rising explosively across the United States, with documented diagnoses climbing from 12 in 2009 to more than 110,000 by 2022; estimates suggest over 450,000 Americans may be affected Experts warn that expanding tick ranges, misdiagnoses, and lack of awareness among healthcare providers are fueling this hidden public health threat, emphasizing the urgent need for preventive tick-bite strategies and proper tick removal techniques

Next year is huge for gubernatorial races, but don't take your eye off the 30 state attorneys general races set for 2026. Increasingly, AGs play an outsized role in state policymaking, multistate investigations, and federal activity. Beyond that, more of them are ascending to higher office including governor, Congress, and federal cabinet positions. In the eight 2024 gubernatorial races, three AGs (plus one former) ran and won the governorship in Washington, North Carolina, West Virginia, and New Hampshire.  To get a read on the landscape ahead, Maggie Mick hosted two recent conversations with executives Sean Rankin and Adam Piper respectively for the Democratic Attorneys General Association (DAGA) and Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA).

Table of Contents: How Schools Are Brainwashing White Kids to Self-Loathe While Dividing Races and Demonizing Whites AI Is Being Used By Wicked People To Lure Away Your Children! Why Have Many Bird & Animal and Insect Species Mostly Disappeared? Plus many Comments About This Is the USA under the curse of God right now? Is President Trump really so concerned about the flow of drugs ‘poisoning Americans,' when he just pardoned a notorious drug trafficker and warp speeds harmful pharmaceuticals? Words are one thing, actions are another… let’s examine the Trump record on the poisonous drugs harming Americans, both legal and illegal–It starts with his chief of staff and all around devil; Susie Wiles New Gates-Funded Microneedle Patch Implant Installs Both mRNA and Quantum Dot Markings Into the Body–Planned for deployment during the next plandemic — a biological “vaccine” passport controlling who can shop, dine, or travel! GLOBAL BOMBSHELL: Scientists Discover Proof That The Majority Of The Global Human Population Has Already Been Secretly Implanted With Self-Replicating Nanotech Designed To Be A Tracking / Control System Under A 6G Planetary AI Dictatorship! Some Clarity and How to Purchase on the Anti-Nanotech Devices Johnson's protocols to eradicate parasties and detox the body, dissolve gallstones, and cleanse and defat the liver DYSTOPIAN”: WHO–Gates Unveils Plan for Global Digital ID, AI Surveillance, & Planetary Jab Tracking Super Creepy ‘The World Ahead 2026' Magazine Cover Published By The Economist Shows They Expect War, Pestilence And Financial Collapse Next Year China just approved a $37 million deployment of humanoid robots to patrol its borders — robots that don't sleep, don't hesitate, and don't question orders! UNLABELED CLONED MEAT And The Global Food TAKEOVER: They’re Killing Your Right To REAL FOOD!! Mutant meat enters Canada’s food supply… and shocked Americans get a nasty surprise Campbell’s Franken Soup plus admission about ANOTHER shocking practice resurfaces after executive fired over sickening soup claims & that they illegally dumped wastewater more than 5,400 times from April 2018 to December 2024, breaking federal water pollution laws.  Outrage builds as ‘Franken-milk’ made in labs prepares to hit US grocery shelves Tick Tock: It’s Only a Matter of Time Before Dangerous Tick-Disease Research Causes a Disaster-If It Hasn’t Already Alpha-gal syndrome (AGS) has been intentionally engineered into the tick population (just like Lyme disease) to stop the consumption of red meat and is a serious, potentially life-threatening allergy to alpha-gal that can develop after a tick bite! Good tick repellants without DEET CDC confirms oil of lemon & eucalyptus as effective as DEET Mild Silver Protein Therapy: Doctor’s Desk Reference Dosage Guidelines for Lyme Disease PDF: Emergency Freedom Alerts 12-8-25 Click Here To Play The Part 2 Audio Source

In today's intense episode, Tara unpacks Arctic Frost — the alleged Democrat plan to dismantle the Republican Party from the inside out. ❄️⚠️ Tara walks through accusations of secret spying operations, weaponized warrants, compromised judges, lawfare targeting conservatives, and why Trump supporters believe the FBI and DOJ are preparing a long-game assault.

This week and next week's episodes on 2026 attorneys general races are rebroadcasts of recent MultiState client webinars.  Next year is huge for gubernatorial races, but don't take your eye off the 30 state attorneys general races set for 2026. Increasingly, AGs play an outsized role in state policymaking, multistate investigations, and federal activity. Beyond that, more of them are ascending to higher office including governor, Congress, and federal cabinet positions. In the eight 2024 gubernatorial races, three AGs (plus one former) ran and won the governorship in Washington, North Carolina, West Virginia, and New Hampshire. To get a read on the landscape ahead, MultiState's Maggie Mick will host two upcoming conversations with executives Sean Rankin and Adam Piper respectively for the Democratic Attorneys General Association (DAGA) and Republican Attorneys General Association (RAGA).

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In our latest Subject to Talent podcast, Jack Quarles, Head of Advisory at Brightfield, joins David Clevenger, AGS head of sourcing and advisory, to discuss the evolving procurement landscape. In this episode, they dive into why traditional procurement processes often fall short and examine advancements in AI and automation are redefining how organizations work smarter.

Last time we spoke about the beginning of a conflict between the USSR and Japan. In the frost-hardened dawns by the Chaun and Tumen, two powers eye a ridge called Changkufeng, each seeing a prize and fearing a trap. On the Soviet side, weary front-line troops tighten their grip, while Moscow's diplomats coaxed restraint through Seoul and Harbin.  As July unfolds, Tokyo's generals push a dangerous idea: seize the hill with a surprise strike, then bargain for peace. Seoul's 19th Division is readied in secret, trains loaded with men and horses, movement masked, prayers whispered to avoid widening the rift. Japanese scouts in white Hanbok disguise, peering at trenches, wire, and watchful Russians. Russian border guards appear as shadows, counters slipping into place, yet both sides hold their fire. On July 29, a skirmish erupts: a platoon crosses a shallow line, clashes flare, and bodies and banners ripple in the cold air.    #178 Night Attacks and Diplomatic Strains: The Lake Khasan Conflict Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. A second troop train was scheduled to depart Agochi for Nanam on the night of 29 July, carrying back the initial elements of the 75th Infantry. At Haigan, regimental commander Sato was pulling on his boots at 16:00 when the division informed him that fighting had broken out near Shachaofeng since 15:00 and that the Russians were assembling forces in that area. Suetaka ordered Sato's 3rd Battalion, which had not been slated to leave until the following night, to proceed to Kucheng; the remainder of the regiment was to assemble at Agochi. After consulting with Division Staff Officer Saito at Agochi, Sato returned to Haigan with the conclusion that "overall developments did not warrant optimism, it was imperative to prepare to move the entire regiment to the battlefield." One of Sato's first actions was to telephone a recommendation to the division that he be allowed to occupy Hill 52, which commanded the approaches to Changkufeng from south of Khasan. Suetaka approved, and at 17:30, Yamada's company was ordered to proceed to Shikai along with Hirahara's battalion. Meanwhile, Suzuki's 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, which had been among the last units ordered to leave, had finished loading at Agochi by about 15:00. Sato recommended to Suetaka that a portion of Suzuki's regiment be attached to him; this was why Suetaka decided to transfer one of the two batteries to the 75th Infantry. The rest of the heavy artillery concentrated at Kyonghun. Suetaka's orders, issued at 18:20, called for Sato to have two of his battalions, the 1st and 3rd, cross the Tumen as soon as possible, with engineer support. Attached was Narukawa's heavy battery. Sato's mission was twofold: to assist Senda and to watch the enemy in the Changkufeng area. Sato arrived at 21:15 in Shikai. There, he assembled a number of his officers, including Yamada, and explained his plan: the 1st Company plus machine guns were to cross the Tumen from Sozan ahead of the other units, occupy Hill 52 with an element, and concentrate the main body at the foot of Fangchuanting to await Hirahara's battalion. A portion of the 19th Engineers would go to Sozan to assist the 1st Company with its river crossing. Amid heavy rain and darkness, the various units set out at 22:15. The platoon sent to Hill 52 arrived before dawn on the 30th, the rest of the forces somewhat later, though Sato had intended to move everybody across the river by the early hours. On the 29th the engineer regiment commander, Kobayashi, had also arrived at Shikai. He ordered Captain Tomura to handle the crossing in the vicinity of Sozan, as well as preparations for a future offensive with the main body. When Kobayashi reached Kucheng, he learned from Hirahara not only about the front-line situation but also about Sato's important plans: "The K. Sato force is going to cross the river tonight, 29–30 July. A night attack will be launched against Changkufeng on the night of 30–31 July." Kobayashi issued orders to his two commanders to assist the crossing by Nakano's infantry unit, 1st Battalion, 75th Regiment at Matsu'otsuho and Sozan, and, in addition, to cooperate with the position attack by Nakano and help in the assault at Hill 52. Most of these young officers, such as Seutaka dishing out orders were performing what the Japanese termed "dokudan senko" or "arbitrary or independent action". Japanese operational regulations actually contained a section dealing with dokudan senko, by which initiative, not imperiousness, was meant. Two elements were involved: control but encouragement of self-reliant thinking. This subject became important in training officers, all of whom, including such infantry experts as Suetaka, were well acquainted with the requirements. Combat missions were stipulated in operations orders, but, if these were not realistic, initiative was to come into play, though only when there was no time to contact superiors. By the same token, commanders had to be ready to assume full responsibility if matters turned out adversely. "We were disciples of the 'Moltke' system of AGS control, with dual authority vis-à-vis the local forces and the chief of staff."  The Korea Army's version of events on 29 July, there was no mention of any report received from the division prior to 17:30. Details did not reach Seoul, in the form of printed divisional intelligence reports and operational orders, until 1 August. The late afternoon report from Kyonghun provided the Korea Army authorities with little solid information, but Seoul had to notify higher headquarters immediately. Kitano sent messages to Tokyo and Hsinking at 19:15. The command and Kwantung Army were told that, in addition to Senda's assault party, 40 Japanese soldiers were deployed west of Changkufeng and at Yangkuanping. The division's main forces had begun the rail pullback from the 28th, leaving behind only two infantry battalions and a mountain artillery battalion for the time being. At 21:20 on 29 July, Korea Army Headquarters received the text of Suetaka's full report, which concluded: "With a view toward a possible emergency, the division suspended movement back of the 75th Regiment and is making necessary arrangements to have them advance instead. The latest affair derives sheerly from the enemy's unlawful challenge. It is my firm belief that the nature of this incident differs completely from the one at Changkufeng and should be handled separately. At present, since communication with the forward lines is not good, Lieutenant Colonel Senda (who is at the front) has been entrusted with command, but I assume entire responsibility for the consequences." Instead of boarding their trains at Agochi, Sato's regiment and supporting engineers moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen as soon as possible. Suetaka called Sato's 2nd Battalion to Kyonghun as divisional reserve. Subsequent dispatches claimed that: (1) Senda's unit, which had driven off intruders in the Shachaofeng area once, was engaged against new Soviet forces (sent at 18:20, 29th);  (2) Senda's unit had expelled trespassers, and a combat situation had developed near Shachaofeng (22:00, 29th);  (3) fighting was going on in the vicinity of Shachaofeng (06:40, 30th).  Korea Army Headquarters, however, obtained no more important communication concerning the events of 29 July than a report, sent that evening by Suetaka, that revealed his concern about a possible Soviet attack in the Wuchiatzu sector near the neck of the long Changkufeng appendix.  After the clash at Shachaofeng, a general officer, Morimoto, happened to be visiting Colonels Okido and Tanaka in Nanam. Both of them were said to be of the pronounced opinion that no troubles ought to be provoked with the USSR while the critical Hankow operation lay ahead; yet Suetaka apparently had some intention of striking at the Soviet intruders, using the 75th Regiment. They urged that this policy not be adopted and that Suetaka be approached directly; the channel through Y. Nakamura, the division chief of staff, was hopeless. Although in agreement, General Morimoto declined to approach Suetaka; since the latter seemed to have made up his mind, it would be inappropriate to "meddle" with his command. Suetaka was functioning as an operations chief at that time. Apart from the mobilization staff officer, who was not enthusiastic about aggressive action, the only other officer who may have affected the decisionmaking process was the Hunchun OSS chief, Maj. Tanaka Tetsujiro, a positive type who shared Suetaka's views and was probably with him on the 29th as well as 30th. Although developments at Suetaka's command post were known more as the result of silence than of elucidation, we possessed considerable information about thinking at the Korea Army level: "Suetaka contacted us only after his men had driven out the enemy near Shachaofeng. Till then, the front had been relatively quiet and we were of the opinion all or most of the deployed forces were on their way home. We at Seoul had no foreknowledge of or connection with the 29 July affair. Reports came in; we never sent specific orders. Triggered by the affray at Shachaofeng, the division attacked on its own initiative. It was our understanding that very small Japanese forces had been committed to evict a dozen enemy scouts and that, when a platoon of ours got atop the hill, they observed surprisingly huge hostile concentrations to the rear. This was probably why the platoon pulied back, although much has been made of the desire to obey the nonaggravation policy to the letter. We at Seoul felt that this was a troublesome matter—that our side had done something unnecessary. When the division finally made its report, the army had to reach some decision. There were two irreconcilable ways of looking at things. We might condemn what had been done, and the division ought to be ordered to pull out promptly, having arbitrarily and intolerably acted against the known facts that Imperial sanction for use of force had been withheld and Tokyo had directed evacuation of the moved-up units. The opposing, eventually predominant view was that the division commander's course of action ought to be approved. Perusal of small-scale maps of the locale indicated a clear violation of the frontier, something not proved in the case of Changkufeng. We shared the division commander's interpretation. His BGU had its mission, and he was acting with foresight to solve matters positively and on his own, since he was the man closest to the problem. General Nakamura felt that the latest development was inevitable; our units did not cross the Tumen until the Soviets attacked us in force. Therefore, the division's actions were approved and a report was rendered promptly to Tokyo. It could be said that our outlook served to "cover" the division commander, in a way. But if IGHQ had ordered us to desist, we would have".  Nakamura added: "I was of the opinion the only solution was to drive the Soviet troops outside Manchukuoan territory; therefore, I approved the action by the division." Such sanction had been granted on the basis of information supplied to Seoul by Suetaka on the evening of 29 July, again post facto. At 01:20 on the 30th, Nakamura wired Suetaka a message characterized by gracious phrasing that suggested his grave concern: "One ought to be satisfied with expelling from Manchurian territory the enemy attacking our unit on the . . . heights southwest of Shachaofeng. It is necessary to keep watch on the enemy for the time being, after having pulled back to the heights mentioned above, but we desire that matters be handled carefully to avoid enlargement; in case the foe has already pulled back south of Shachaofeng . . . he need not be attacked." Nakamura also sent a wire to the AGS chief, the War Minister, and the Kwantung Army commander. After conveying the information received from Suetaka, Nakamura continued: "In spite of the fact that our troops have been patient and cautious . . . this latest incident [near Shachaofeng] started with Soviet forces' arrogant border trespassing and . . . unlawful challenge. Therefore, I am convinced that this affair must be dealt with separately from the incident at Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to handle matters so that the incident will not spread and shall make it my fundamental principle to be satisfied with evicting from Manchurian territory the hostile forces confronting us. The Korea Army chief of staff is being dispatched quickly to handle the incident".  The Korea Army, "painfully slow to act," says a Kwantung Army major, was merely the intermediary link, the executor of Tokyo's desires. In the case of remote Shachaofeng, there was an inevitable gap between on-the-spot occurrences and AGS reactions. By then, Arisue, Kotani, and Arao, Inada's observers, had returned to Japan—an important fact, given the "Moltke" system of staff control. Nevertheless, their return must have exerted significant effects on central operational thinking. Kotani remembered that his AGS subsection had given him a welcome-home party on the night of 29 July when an emergency phone call was received from the duty officer. "It was about the clash at Shachaofeng. The festivities came to an abrupt end and I headed for the office. From then till the cease-fire on 11 August, I remained at the AGS night and day." Since the 19th Division had furnished higher headquarters with minimal information, Tokyo, like Seoul, had only a few ostensible facts to act upon. But this had been the first combat test for the Korea Army, which needed all the encouragement and assistance possible. Although Japanese field armies, notably the Kwantung Army, were notorious for insubordination, one could not overemphasize the fact that the Korea Army was meek and tractable. If Nakamura had concluded that Suetaka acted properly (which reports from Seoul indicated), the AGS could hardly demur. It would have been unrealistic to think that Tokyo, although cautious, was "softer" about the Russian problem than front-line forces. There had been no concern over time lags; details were Seoul's province. Reaction took time at every level of the chain of command. Decision making in the Japanese Army had been a many-layered process. The Army general staff had been of the opinion that initial guidance ought to have been provided to the Korea Army soon, particularly since there had been evidence of failure to convey intentions promptly to the front and no high command staff officer remained to direct matters. After hearing from Seoul twice about the Shachaofeng affair, the responsible Army general staff officers conferred at length. Stress had been laid on the indivisibility of the Shachaofeng and Changkufeng incidents. It had also been evident that further information was required. On that basis, a "handling policy for the Shachaofeng Incident" was drafted, and Tada notified the Korea and Kwantung armies accordingly on 30 July. Nakamura had received the telegram at 16:50 and had its contents retransmitted to Kitano, then at Kyonghun: "Shachaofeng Incident is progressing along lines of our policy, leave things to local units, which have been adhering to the principle of nonenlargement. Have them report on front-line situation without fail."  The Army general staff and the Korea Army were calling for prudence, but the division, well down the rungs of the ladder of command, was initiating actions that jeopardized the government's basic policy. Earlier quibbling about restraints on "unit-size" elements crossing into Manchuria had been abandoned after the firefight near Shachaofeng on 29 July. At 15:30, Takenouchi's battalion, part of the 76th Regiment, had been directed to assist Senda near Yangkuanping; at 18:20 Suetaka was ordering the 75th Regiment to head for the Kucheng sector and be ready to assault the Russians in the Changkufeng area. Support was to be provided by Kobayashi's engineers, by Iwano's transportation men, and by Suzuki's heavy guns. Of particular interest had been Suetaka's acceptance of Sato's recommendation that elements be sent to occupy Hill 52, a measure linked with a possible Japanese attack against Changkufeng.   Sato had decided by evening that the new situation required rapid deployment of his forces across the river. At Shikai, he conducted a briefing of his officers. Suetaka's orders conveyed orally by staff officers had stipulated: "The division will take steps to secure the border line immediately, even if the situation undergoes change. The Sato unit will advance immediately to the left shore, reinforce Senda's unit, and maintain a strict watch on the enemy in the Changkufeng area." Around 23:20, the last elements ordered forward arrived at Shikai station. Sato instructed only his headquarters and the Ito company to get off. The rest of the troop train primarily the 1st [Nakano's] Battalion was to move on to Hongui. From there, the soldiers proceeded to the Tumen near Sozan. With his staff and Ito's company, Sato trudged in silence through the mud from Shikai to the shore at Matsu'otsuho, starting at 00:30 and reaching the crossing site at 03:00. Reconnaissance had proved satisfactory, Sato remembered.  At the crossings, the hardworking engineers rowed his 1st and 3rd battalions across, company by company. Near dawn, around 04:30, he traversed the river. The movement had been completed in about an hour. When Sato's infantry finally got across, they proceeded to the skirt of Fangchuanting and assembled in secrecy. Not until about 08:00 did the regimental headquarters, Ito's company, and Hirahara's battalion reach Hill 147, already held by Noguchi's company west of Changkufeng. By then, plans had fallen behind schedule by at least several hours because of difficulties in train movement forward. Sato also remembered torrential rains; other officers mentioned darkness. Members of Nakano's battalion pinpointed a shortage of engineer boats from Kucheng. Engineers rowed some boats downstream during the night, but six of them were kept at Matsu'otsuho. This left only three boats for moving the 400 men of the 1st Battalion, the unit slated to storm Changkufeng, across the river at Sozan. Sato had wanted all of his troops across well before dawn on the 30th. A division staff officer rightly thought that Suetaka had already advised Sato, in secret, to "attack at an opportune time," and that the night of 29–30 July had been intended for the surprise assault. "Perhaps there was not enough time for all the attack preparations." Kobayashi's engineers admitted problems in moving boats to Sozan: "Although the water level had gone up because of daily rains recently, there were still many shallows and the current was irregular. Not only was it hard to move downstream, but dense fog also complicated the work. Nevertheless, the units at both sites were able to accomplish the river-crossing operation approximately as scheduled".  Meanwhile, after reconnoitering Soviet defenses along the Manchurian bank, Suzuki, commander of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, crossed the Kyonghun Bridge on 30 July with his 1st Battery and established positions on the edge of Shuiliufeng Hill. Once Captain Narukawa was attached to the 75th Infantry on 29 July, he dispatched his 2nd Battery by train to Shikai that night. Although firing sites had been surveyed northwest of Sho-Sozan, the battery had to traverse two weak, narrow bridges in the darkness. With two 15-centimeter howitzers to haul, plus five caissons and wagons, the unit faced tense moments. The gun sites themselves were worrisome: they were scarcely masked from observation from Changkufeng, and the single road to them from the unloading station ran through a paddy area and was similarly exposed. By 1200 hours on 30 July, Sato exerted operational control over the following units: his own forces, Nakano's battalion east of Fangchuanting; Hirahara's reinforced battalion west of Chiangchunfeng; a platoon from Nakajima's infantry company on Hill 52; and Noguchi's company on Hill 147; and from other forces, Senda's 2nd (Kanda) BGU Company; two reinforced companies from Takenouchi's battalion of Okido's 76th Regiment near Shachaofeng; and a 75-mm half-battery from the 25th Mountain Artillery on the Manchurian side with Sato. On the Korean shore, another half-battery comprising two 15-centimeter howitzers from Narukawa's unit of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery was in place. The 19th Engineers operated near the crossing sites, though one platoon remained at Fangchuanting. Sato said, "We were now deployed at last, to cope with any situation." His command post was set in foxholes on open ground at Chiangchunfeng, a central hill that offered excellent observation and control over actions around Changkufeng to the east and Shachaofeng to the north. Not content with suspending the pullout of units and deploying additional combat troops across the Tumen, Suetaka decided to recall division headquarters, mountain artillery, cavalry, signal, medical, and veterinary personnel from Nanam. At dawn on 30 July, Nanam issued orders for Colonel Tanaka to move 500 men and 300 horses to Agochi by rail; most of the increment came from Tanaka's horse-drawn 25th Mountain Artillery. The colonel reached the Korean side of the Tumen at 05:00 on 31 July. The preceding emergency measures were being implemented by Suetaka, even as he received Nakamura's calming telegram of 30 July enjoining nonexpansion. Changkufeng Hill was not even mentioned. Nakamura's concern was typified by Kitano flying to the front. At 10:00 on 30 July, Kitano sent the division chief of staff a cautious follow-up cable: "Based on the consistent policy for handling the Changkufeng Incident and on the army commander's earlier telegram, kindly take steps to ensure careful action in connection with the affair in the Shachaofeng vicinity lest there be enlargement." At 13:45, Nakamura transmitted another restraining message to Suetaka: "The division is to secure … Chiangchunfeng and … the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, using present front-line units. Unless there is an enemy attack, however, resort to force will depend on separate orders." Several hours later, at 16:50, Nakamura received instructions from Tada: the Shachaofeng case was being left to the local forces, who were pursuing the desired policy of nonenlargement, but prompt reporting was desired. At 19:30, the retransmitted message was received by Kitano, already at the front with Suetaka at Kyonghun. After his units had crossed the Tumen on 30 July, Sato Kotoku ordered a strict watch and directed preparations for an assault based on the plans. He conferred with Senda at Chiangchunfeng and observed the enemy. Even after dawn, the frontline commanders who had crossed the river remained uncertain about when the attack would be staged. While Sato's force conducted reconnaissance to prepare for a daytime offensive, orders arrived around 08:00 indicating, "We intend a night attack, so conceal your activities." Daytime movements were prohibited. Sato then explained the impression he had derived from Senda and the intelligence on which he based his estimates: " Exploiting the impasse in diplomatic negotiation, the enemy side had steadily reinforced front-line offensive strength and trespassed anew near Shachaofeng. They now had a battalion and a half of infantry plus 20 artillery pieces in the area, some south of Shachaofeng and the others at four positions immediately east of Lake Khasan. At least a dozen (maybe 20) tanks were deployed in the sector opposite us. About 300 well-armed, active Russian troops were at Changkufeng. I decided that an attack ought to be staged that night. First of all, we were going to chill the insolent enemy by a courageous night assault—a method characteristic of the Imperial Army. Then all kinds of fire power were to be combined in a surprise attack against the positions. Our intention was to jo lt the Russians, demonstrate the true strength of our combat fire, and, by a combination of night and dawn attacks, cut down losses which our left-flank units would have incurred if a night assault alone were staged. We had considered two plans—a night attack against Changkufeng by the 3rd Battalion from the north, or by the 1st Battalion from the south. On 30 July, I decided to execute the second plan, using my 1st (Nakano's) Battalion, to avoid simultaneous involvement around Shachaofeng where the foe was by now alerted."  The Japanese Army ordinarily favored surprise assaults without supporting guns, since firepower was regarded as secondary in close combat and artillery was in short supply. According to the regimental journal, telephone contacts from the morning of the 30th indicated that the division commander shared the same line of thinking as Sato. By noon, Suetaka made his stance explicit. A phone call from Kucheng conveyed to Sato the gist of a critical division order: first, a detailed briefing on Soviet troop concentrations and dispositions, firing positions, troops, and armor south of Shachaofeng; entanglements and forces at Changkufeng; large concentrations behind west of Khasan; tanks and ground formations moving north of the lake; a heavy concentration near the lake to the northwest; one confirmed and two suspected positions along the eastern shore and another with artillery far to the south. Then the order stated that K. Sato's forces, including the Takenouchi battalion from the 76th Infantry, one mountain artillery platoon, and one engineer platoon were to strengthen their positions and, at the same time, promptly evict from Manchurian territory the intruding and advancing enemy. However, pursuit must not be pushed too far lest the border be crossed. Shortly after noon, Suetaka issued another order to form a new force under Senda, who was to strengthen border security along the Shuiliufeng–Hunchun line. As with Sato, Senda was to eject the intruding and advancing enemy from Manchurian soil but not pursue them across the border. By midafternoon, Sato knew not only what he wanted to do but also Suetaka's intentions. At 15:30, he assembled all subordinate officers at Chiangchunfeng and dictated minute attack instructions. Intelligence indicated that the enemy continued to fortify points of importance along the Changkufeng–Shachaofeng line. Sato's plan was to annihilate hostile elements that had crossed the border north and south of Changkufeng. His concept went beyond a frontal assault. While Nakano's battalion would jump off south of Changkufeng, one reinforced company, Takeshita's 10th was to attack north. Since the sun rose at about 05:00, Sato intended to wipe out the enemy during three hours of darkness. Another battalion, Hirahara's 3rd would be held in reserve, with Ito's 6th Company ready to launch a night attack against Changkufeng from the northwest if necessary. Small forces deployed southeast at Hill 52 were to block the arrival of Soviet reinforcements around the southern shores of Khasan. Only after Changkufeng was secured and fire swept the high ground south of Shachaofeng would a reinforced battalion, Takenouchi's 1st from the 76th Regiment undertake a dawn assault to clear the Russians from that sector. An engineer platoon would assist both the night and dawn assault battalions with obstacle clearing. There would be no artillery support until dawn, when the available guns were to provide maximum coverage. Notably, even the movement of a single antitank gun warranted mention. Sato concluded the attack order by directing that each unit mask its intentions after sunset. Takenouchi was to act to check the enemy as soon as the sun went down. In connection with the dawn barrage against the enemy southwest of Shachaofeng, key personnel were to study the best way to exploit sudden fire described as gale and lightning. They were also to be ready to destroy enemy tanks. A green star shell would be fired to signal the success of the night attack. The code words were shojiki "honesty" and ydmo "bravery". At midnight, the regiment commander would be at the northwest foot of Chiangchunfeng. The order stressed typical night-attack precautions: secrecy and concealment, avoidance of confusion, antitank defense, and flare signaling of success. Sato added his own flair with his daily motto as code words and the reference to "whirlwind" fire. Impending action times were explicitly set when the order was issued at 15:30 on the 30th, more than ten hours before the 1st Battalion was to jump off. The key to success in a night assault lay in an absolute prohibition on firing by their side, and bold, courageous charging. Sato reminded his men that life is granted again after death. Nakano then assembled his company commanders east of Fangchuanting and issued his battalion order at 18:30. A few hours after Sato's briefing of the assault commanders, Suetaka arrived at the 75th Regiment command post. This visit late on 30 July is central to allegations that Sato, not Suetaka, conceived and executed the night attack on his own initiative. Divisional orders giving Sato his core mission had already been conveyed by telephone. After 16:00, Suetaka boarded a motorboat at Kucheng and went to the Manchurian side to verify front-line conditions. Soviet snipers south of Yangkuanping fired several shots, but his craft reached the Matsu'otsuho landing and proceeded to Chiangchunfeng to meet Sato. Sato described the situation: "frontline enemy forces had been reinforced steadily and had begun a vigorous offensive. The foe was provoking us, and the matter had grown very serious. I had already issued orders at 15:30 to take the initiative and deal the enemy a smashing blow." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, Russia and Japan lock eyes over Changkufeng. Diplomats urge restraint, yet Tokyo's generals push a bold gamble: seize a hill with a surprise strike and bargain later. Japanese divisions, engineers, and artillery edge toward the border, while Soviet sentries brace for a confrontation that could widen the war. 

A look back at the first 6 episodes of the podcast. I tried to make the audio a little better than it was way back then, and although I think the attempt was semi-successful, I'm not a miracle worker. I hope you enjoy the flashback.

A coalition of state attorneys general has launched a dedicated AI Task Force aimed at coordinating investigations, enforcement, and regulatory strategy across jurisdictions in an era of rapidly evolving generative AI risks. For legal, compliance, and product teams, this development underscores the urgent need to prepare for multi-state scrutiny of AI use in marketing, privacy, and consumer protection—especially as AGs work together and adopt shared frameworks. Hosted by Simone Roach. Based on a blog post by Paul L. Singer, Beth Bolen Chun, Abigail Stempson, and Andrea deLorimier.

In this episode we dive into the strange and fascinating world of Alpha-gal syndrome (AGS), the delayed meat allergy that can appear after a tick bite. We talk through what AGS actually is, how ticks (lone star, blacklegged and western blacklegged ticks) introduce it into the body, and why some people develop an allergic reaction hours after eating red meat. You will hear about the symptoms people notice most often and the practical steps you can take to protect yourself from this unusual tickborne illness.Citations: A Review of Alpha-Gal Syndrome for the Infectious Diseases Practitioner - PMCAbout Alpha-gal Syndrome | Alpha-gal Syndrome | CDCPreventing Tick Bites | Ticks | CDCWhat You Need to Know about PermethrinWhat to Do After a Tick Bite | Ticks | CDCRepellents: Protection against Mosquitoes, Ticks and Other Arthropods | US EPALegal:This podcast is for informational and educational purposes only and should not be taken as medical advice, diagnosis, or treatment. Nothing in this episode should be used to make decisions about your health without consulting a licensed physician or qualified healthcare professional. If you have questions about symptoms, allergies, prevention strategies, or medical conditions, please speak directly with your healthcare provider.All views expressed in this podcast are my own and do not represent the views of any current or past employers, academic institutions, or professional organizations. This podcast does not establish a clinician–patient relationship, and the use of the information discussed is at your own risk. If you are experiencing a medical emergency or severe allergic reaction, please seek immediate medical attention.

State attorneys general from Florida, Texas, Iowa, Nebraska, and Montana are investigating recycling groups like the U.S. Plastics Pact and GreenBlue Institute, alleging their sustainability goals may amount to antitrust and consumer protection violations. The AGs warn that these environmental organizations could be coordinating to restrict plastic output and mislead consumers on recyclability, potentially functioning as a “group boycott” in violation of state and federal law. This matters for ESG teams, trade associations, and legal/compliance groups: sustainability collaborations can trigger antitrust scrutiny—even among nonprofits—and joint environmental goals may need to be evaluated for competitive risk. Hosted by Simone Roach. Based on a blog post by Paul L. Singer, Abigail Stempson, Beth Bolen Chun, and Andrea deLorimier.

States are rapidly expanding kids' privacy and safety rules beyond COPPA, introducing age-appropriate design codes, new social media requirements, and California's groundbreaking Digital Age Assurance Act. With regulators, AGs, and global authorities increasing scrutiny, companies now face a fast-evolving patchwork that affects data practices, product design, and risk management. Hosted by Simone Roach. Based on a blog post by Laura Riposo VanDruff and Alysa Z. Hutnik.

Pennsylvania Attorney General Dave Sunday announced a $750,000 settlement with American Mint LLC over its negative option subscription practices — marking the company's second major enforcement action following a 2005 Assurance of Voluntary Compliance. The case underscores how state AGs continue to use UDAP authority to address deceptive subscription practices, even without specific auto-renewal laws on the books. For legal, compliance, and marketing teams, this settlement highlights the importance of clear, conspicuous disclosures, express consent, and accessible cancellation methods — and serves as a reminder that legacy agreements and practices remain enforceable decades later. Hosted by Simone Roach. Based on a blog post by Paul L. Singer, Abigail Stempson, Beth Bolen Chun, and Andrea deLorimier.

In Part One of our two-part series on the NAAG Fall Consumer Protection Conference, we cover key takeaways from the Attorneys General panel and a discussion on price transparency featuring Kelley Drye's Beth Chun. Hear insights from state AGs on enforcement priorities, compliance expectations, and the growing focus on transparent pricing laws nationwide. Hosted by Simone Roach. Based on a blog post by Paul L. Singer, Abigail Stempson, Beth Bolen Chun, and Andrea deLorimier.

Last time we spoke about the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict. The border between Soviet Manchuria and Japanese-occupied territories emerges not as a single line but as a mosaic of contested spaces, marks, and memories. A sequence of incidents, skirmishes along the Chaun and Tumen rivers, reconnaissance sorties, and the complex diplomacy of Moscow, Tokyo, and peripheral actors to trace how risk escalated from routine patrols to calibrated leverage. On the ground, terrain functioned as both obstacle and argument: ridges like Changkufeng Hill shaping sightlines, river valleys shaping decisions, and markers weathered by snow, wind, and drift. In command tents, officers translated terrain into doctrine: contingency plans, supply routes, and the precarious calculus of restraint versus escalation. Both nations sought to establish firmer defensive barriers against the other. Inevitably they were destined to clash, but how large that clash would become, nobody knew.   #176 The Changkufeng Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we broke down a general history of the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict and how it escalated significantly by 1938. Colonel Inada Masazum serving as chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March of 1938 would play a significant role in this story. When the Japanese command's attention was drawn to the area of Changkufeng, consideration was given to the ownership and importance of the disputed high ground. Inada and his operations section turned to an appraisal of the geography. The officers had been impressed by the strategic importance of the Tumen, which served to cut off the hill country from North Korea. In the Changkufeng area, the river was a muddy 600 to 800 meters wide and three to five meters deep. Japanese engineers had described rowing across the stream as "rather difficult."  Russian roads on the left bank were very good, according to Japanese intelligence. Heavy vehicles moved easily; the Maanshan section comprised the Russians' main line of communications in the rear. To haul up troops and materiel, the Russians were obliged to use trucks and ships, for there were no railways apart from a four-kilometer line between the harbor and town of Novokievsk. Near Changkufeng, hardly any roadways were suitable for vehicular traffic. On the right, or Korean, bank of the Tumen, there were only three roads suitable for vehicular traffic, but even these routes became impassable after a day or two of rain. In the sector between Hill 52 to the south and Shachaofeng to the north, the most pronounced eminences were Chiangchunfeng and the humps of Changkufeng. Rocky peaks were characteristically shaped like inverted T's, which meant many dead angles against the crests. The gentle slopes would allow tanks to move but would restrict their speed, as would the ponds and marshes. In general, the terrain was treeless and afforded little cover against aircraft. Against ground observation or fire, corn fields and tall miscanthus grass could provide some shielding. Between Chiangchunfeng and the Tumen, which would have to serve as the main route of Japanese supply, the terrain was particularly sandy and hilly. This rendered foot movement difficult but would reduce the effectiveness of enemy bombs and shells. The high ground east of Khasan afforded bases for fire support directed against the Changkufeng region. Plains characterized the rest of the area on the Soviet side, but occasional streams and swamps could interfere with movement of tanks and trucks. The only towns or villages were Novokievsk, Posyet, Yangomudy, and Khansi. At Kozando there were a dozen houses; at Paksikori, a few. The right bank was farmed mainly by Koreans, whose scattered cottages might have some value for billeting but offered none for cover. On the left bank, the largest hamlets were Fangchuanting, with a population of 480 dwelling in 73 huts, and Yangkuanping, where there were 39 cottages. Shachaofeng was uninhabited. Japanese occupation of Changkufeng would enable observation of the plain stretching east from Posyet Bay, although intelligence made no mention of Soviet naval bases, submarine pens, or airstrips in the immediate area of Posyet, either in existence or being built in 1938. As Inada knew, the Japanese Navy judged that Posyet Bay might have another use, as a site for Japanese landing operations in the event of war. In Russian hands, the high ground would endanger the Korean railway. This line, which started from Najin in northeastern Korea, linked up with the vital system in Manchuria at the town of Tumen and provided a short cut, if not a lifeline, between Japan and the Kwantung Army and Manchuria from across the Sea of Japan. Even from relatively low Changkufeng, six or seven miles of track were exposed to Soviet observation between Hongui and Shikai stations. The port of Najin, with its fortress zone, lay 11 miles southwest; Unggi lay even nearer. It was not the danger of Japanese shelling of Vladivostok, at an incredible range of 80 miles that was at stake but the more realistic hypothesis of Russian shelling of the rail line, and Russian screening of the Soviet side of the border. Hills and questions were thought to have two sides. It was the consensus of Japanese that Changkufeng Hill's potential value to the Russians far outweighed its possible benefits to them, or at least that the Japanese had more to lose if the Russians took the high ground by the Tumen. Inada nurtured few illusions concerning the intrinsic value of the heights. Despite the fact that the high command always had good reasons for quiescence in the north, Inada believed that the latest border difficulty could not be overlooked. By mid-July 1938 Inada's thoughts crystallized. The Japanese would conduct a limited reconnaissance in force known as iryoku teisatsu in the strategic sense. Whereas, at the tactical schoolbook level, this might mean the dispatch of small forces into enemy territory to seek local combat intelligence, at the Imperial General Headquarters level the concept was far more sweeping. There would also be useful evidence of mobilization and other buildup procedures. The affair at Changkufeng was merely a welcome coincidence, something started by the Russians but liable to Japanese exploration. Inada had no intention of seizing territory, of becoming involved in a war of attrition at a remote and minor spot, or of provoking hostilities against the USSR. The Russians would comprehend the nature of the problem, too. If they were interested in interfering seriously with the Japanese, there were numberless better locations to cause trouble along the Manchurian front; those were the places to watch. The cramped Changkufeng sector, described as "narrow like a cat's brow," could too readily be pinched off from Hunchun to render it of strategic value to either side. The bog land to the north interfered with the use of armored forces, while artillery sited on the heights along the Tumen in Korea could as easily control the area as batteries emplaced east of the lake. It was Inada's professional opinion that the Russians could commit three or four infantry divisions there at most, with no mechanized corps—no heavy tanks, in particular. No decisive battle could be waged, although, once the Russians became involved, they might have to cling to the hill out of a sense of honor. The military action would be meaningless even if the Japanese let the Russians have the heights. For their part, the Japanese would ostensibly be fighting to secure the boundary and to hold Changkufeng peak, beyond which they would not move a step onto Soviet soil. There would be no pursuit operations. Troop commitment would be limited to about one division without tank support. Japanese Air Force intervention would be forbidden. Matters would be directed entirely by Imperial General Headquarters working through the Korea Army chain of command and carried out by the local forces. Calm, clear, and dispassionate overall estimates and instructions would be based on materials available only in Tokyo. The command would not allow the Kwantung Army to touch the affair. Inada foresaw that the Japanese government might also seek a settlement through diplomacy. Although border demarcation was desirable and should be sought, the command would not insist on it, nor would it demand permanent occupation of Changkufeng summit. As soon as reconnaissance objectives had been achieved, the local forces would be withdrawn. As Inada described it "In the process, we would have taught the Russians some respect and given them a lesson concerning their repeated, high-handed provocations and intrusions. If a show of force sufficed to facilitate the negotiations and cause the Russians to back down, so much the better; the affair would be over and my point proved." The instrument for carrying out Inada's strategic design appeared to be ideal, the 19th Division, strenuously trained and high-spirited. It could be expected to perform very well if unleashed within defined limits. Colonel Suetaka was just the commander to direct local operations. Since he had been pleading to fight in China, an operation at Changkufeng might prove to be an excellent "safety valve." His staff was full of experienced, fierce warriors eager for battle. Until recently, the Korea Army commanding general had wisely kept the aggressive division away from Changkufeng Hill, but now Imperial general headquarters had its own overriding ideas and needs. How could the Japanese ensure that any military action would remain limited if the Russians chose to respond with vigor? Naturally, one infantry division, without armor or air support, could not withstand all of the Soviet forces in the maritime province. Inada answered that the mission to be assigned the 19th Division was merely the recapture of Changkufeng crest. If the Japanese side had to break off the operation, evacuation would be effected voluntarily and resolutely on Imperial general headquarters responsibility, without considerations of "face." At worst, the Japanese might lose one division, but the affair would be terminated at the Tumen River without fail. "Even so, we ought to be able to prove our theory as well as demonstrate our true strength to the Russians." In case the Soviets opted for more than limited war, the Japanese were still not so overextended in China that they could not alter their strategic disposition of troops. Although the Kwantung Army's six divisions were outnumbered four to one and the Japanese were not desirous of a war at that moment, the first-class forces in Manchuria could make an excellent showing. In addition, the high command possessed armor, heavy artillery, fighters, and bombers, held in check in Manchuria and Korea, as well as reserves in the homeland. There was also the 104th Division, under tight Imperial general headquarters control, in strategic reserve in southern Manchuria. Inada recalled "How would the Russians react? That was the answer I sought. Victory in China depended on it." By mid-July, the high command, at Inada's urging, had worked out a plan titled, "Imperial General headqaurters Essentials for Dealing with the Changkufeng Incident." Tada's telegram of 14 July to Koiso described succinctly the just-decided policy: the central authorities concurred with the Korea Army's opinion regarding the Changkufeng affair, then in embryo. Considering that Changkufeng Hill posed a direct threat to the frontier of Korea, Imperial General headqaurters would immediately urge the foreign ministry to lodge a stern protest. Next day, Tojo sent a telegram stating the Japanese policy of employing diplomacy; whether the Russians should be evicted by force required cautious deliberation in case the USSR did not withdraw voluntarily. On the basis of the guidance received from Imperial General headqaurters, the Korea Army drew up its own plan, "Essentials for Local Direction of the Changkufeng Incident," on 15 July. Intelligence officer Tsuchiya Sakae was sent promptly to the front from Seoul. At the same time, military authorities allowed the press to release news that Soviet troops were constructing positions inside Manchurian territory in an "obvious provocation." The government of Manchukuo was demanding an immediate withdrawal. Even then, those Japanese most closely connected with the handling of the Changkufeng Incident were not in agreement that everybody at command level was as ardent a proponent of reconnaissance in force as Inada claimed to be. Some thought that most, if not all, of his subordinates, youthful and vigorous, were in favor of the notion; others denied the existence of such an idea. Inada remained clear-cut in his own assertions. Everything done by the local Soviet forces, he insisted, must have been effected with the permission of Moscow; it was customary for the USSR not to abandon what it had once started. The Japanese Army never really thought that the Soviet Union would withdraw just as the result of diplomatic approaches. Therefore, from the outset, preparations were made to deal the Russians one decisive blow. Inada had recommended his plan, with its clear restrictions, to his colleagues and superiors; the scheme, he says, was approved 14 July "all the way up the chain of command, through the Army general staff and the ministry of war, with unexpected ease." The only real opposition, Inada recalled, came from the navy, whose staff advised the army operations staff, in all sincerity, to give up the idea of strategic reconnaissance. Inada adhered to his opinion stubbornly. He never forgot the grave look on the face of Captain Kusaka, the UN operations section chief, as the latter gave in reluctantly. The navy view was that the Changkufeng affair typified the army's aggressive policies as opposed to relative passivity on the part of the navy. Like Kusaka, Japanese Navy interviewees shared the fear that Changkufeng might prove to be the most dangerous military confrontation ever to occur between the USSR and Japan. In view of navy objections, one wonders where Inada could have drawn support for his concept of reconnaissance in force. If one accepts the comments contained in a letter from a navy ministry captain, Takagi Sokichi, to Baron Harada Kumao at the beginning of August, in the army and in a portion of the navy there existed "shallow-minded fellows who are apt to take a firm stand in the blind belief that the USSR would not really rise against us, neglecting the fact that the Russians had foreseen our weak points." Takagi also had violent things to say about "white-livered" Gaimusho elements that were playing up to the army. Although Takagi's remarks, expressed in confidence, were sharp, cautious injunctions were being delivered by the high command to the new Korea Army commander, General Nakamura Kotaro, who was about to leave for Seoul to replace Koiso. Nakamura's attitude was crucial for the course and outcome of the Changkufeng Incident. More of a desk soldier than a warrior, he characteristic ally displayed a wariness that was reinforced by the guidance provided him. This personal quality assumes even greater significance if one believes that the Russians may have initiated the Changkufeng Incident by exploiting the special opportunities afforded them by the routine replacement of the Korea Army commander, the temporary absence from Moscow of Ambassador Shigemitsu Mamoru, and the geographical as well as subjective gap between the Kwantung and Korea armies that was exposed during the Lyushkov affair. At 10:00 on 15 July Nakamura was designated army commander by the Emperor at the palace. Soon afterward, he was briefed by Imperial General headquarters officers. Hashimoto, the operations bureau chief, recalled that when he saw Nakamura off on 17 July, Hashimoto stressed prudence, limitation of any military action, and diplomatic solution of the problem. The new commanding general, Inada asserted, promised full cooperation. There was no mention, at this level, of Inada's concept of reconnaissance in force. When Nakamura reached Seoul, he found an Imperial order from Tokyo dated 16 July awaiting him. This important document stipulated that he could concentrate units under his command in Korea near the border against the trespassing Soviet forces in the Changkufeng area. Resort to force, however, was dependent upon further orders. This message was followed by a wire from Kan'in, the Army general staff chief. The Imperial order, it was explained, had been designed to support diplomatic negotiations. Simultaneous approval was granted for concentrating forces to respond swiftly in case the situation deteriorated. As for implementation of the Imperial order, discretion should be exercised in line with the opinion expressed earlier by Korea Army Headquarters. Negotiations were to be conducted in Moscow and Harbin, the location of a Soviet consulate in Manchukuo. Meanwhile, the command was dispatching two officers for purposes of liaison: Lt. Colonel Arisue Yadoru in Operations and Major Kotani Etsuo a specialist in Soviet intelligence. Inada advised Arisue that, apart from liaison flights inside the frontiers, particular care should be exercised with regard to actions that might lead to air combat. Nevertheless, although Inada stated that the Imperial order called for "a sort of military demonstration," he admitted that it meant preparatory action for an attack. The Korea Army senior staff officer, Iwasaki, recalled hearing nothing about secret intentions. Nakamura briefed his staff about the need for restraint, especially during this key period of the Wuhan operation. Koiso had disposed of speculation that he had issued an order to concentrate the 19th Division before Nakamura arrived, although he and Nakamura did have the opportunity to confer in Seoul before he departed for Japan. The Imperial order of 16 July, in response to Koiso's inquiry received in Tokyo on 14 July, had arrived in Seoul addressed to Nakamura; thereupon, the Korea Army chief of staff, Kitano, had the message conveyed to the division. By 21 July Koiso was back in Tokyo where, the day afterward, he advised the war minister, Itagaki, "to act prudently with respect to the Changkufeng problem." Why did the high command dispatch two field-grade liaison officers to Korea from the outset of the Changkufeng Incident? The Korea Army lacked operations staff. Its commander had been allotted prime responsibility, within the chain of command, for defense of northeastern Korea. At the beginning, the highest-ranking staff officer at the front was a major. Since there were no fundamental differences of opinion between the command and the forces in Korea, it was proper to send experts from Tokyo to assist. Imperial General headqaurters would observe the situation carefully, devise measures on the basis of the overall view, and issue orders which the Korea Army would implement through ordinary channels. It had not been the type of incident which required the army commander to go to the front to direct. This was the Korea Army's first test, and political as well as diplomatic problems were involved that the army in the field should not or could not handle. If Tokyo had left decisions to the division and its regiments, the latter would have been held to account, which was not proper. Imperial General headquarters had to assume responsibility and reassure local commanders of its full support. Imaoka Yutaka explained that operational guidance by Imperial General headquarters and line operations conducted by the 19th Division formed the core of the affair; the Korea Army, placed between, was "shadowy." Koiso had not been enthusiastic; this set the mood among the staff. Nakamura, who arrived with a thorough comprehension of AGS thinking, was basically passive. The Korea Army staff, in general, included no "wild boars."    There was an urgent need to monitor developments. Not only was the Korea Army unfamiliar with handling this type of incident, but many hitches occurred. There had been no practice in emergency transmission of coded wires between the Korea Army and Tokyo. Now telegram after telegram had to be sent; most were deciphered incorrectly and many were not decoded at all. Another problem centered on the lack of knowledge in Tokyo about the situation on the spot, which only visual observation could rectify. As a result, the two Army general staff experts, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Korea on 16 July. Kotani recalled that he was to collect intelligence and assist the local authorities. One of the first duties that he and Arisue performed was to disseminate the principle that use of force required a prior Imperial order. Also on 16 July, Japanese newspapers reported that the USSR was still concentrating troops, that the Manchukuoan government was watching intently, "decisive punitive measures" were being contemplated by the Japanese-Manchukuoan authorities, and there were signs of a worsening of the crisis. Despite good reasons for this gloomy appraisal, the Japanese press had not yet given the incident page-one treatment. More alarming news was being disseminated abroad. Domei, the official Japanese news agency, reported that the situation would probably become worse unless Soviet troops were withdrawn. The position of the Japanese government impressed foreign correspondents as unusually firm. Informants characterized the Changkufeng Incident as the most serious affair since the clash on the Amur River in 1937. Irked by the Korea Army's timidity and eager for first-hand information, the Kwantung Army dispatched two observers to the front: from Intelligence, Ogoshi Kenji, and from Operations, Tsuji Masanobu. If you listen to my pacific war week by week podcast or echoes of war, you know I highlight Tsuji Masanobu as one of the most evil Japanese officers of WW2. No other way to describe this guy, he was a shithead. In his memoirs, Tsuji asserted that he and Ogoshi climbed Changkufeng Hill, discerned Soviet soldiers digging across the peak in Manchurian territory, and concluded that "probably even Tokyo could not overlook such a clear-cut case of invasion." Although his account aligned with the general thrust, Ogoshi contended that Tsuji could not have accompanied him. According to sources with the 19th Division, when Koiso learned that Tsuji and Ogoshi were disparaging the Korea Army's ability to defend Changkufeng, he ordered "those spies" ousted. Ogoshi replied that the army staff was not angry, but Koiso did become furious and ordered Ogoshi "arrested for trespassing." Ogoshi surmised that Koiso's concern was that emotional outsiders such as Tsuji could provoke trouble, perhaps even war, if they visited Changkufeng. This view was widely shared. Inada stated that he made a practice of keeping away to maintain the degree of detachment and impartiality required of high command authorities. One sidelight to the "fraternal" visit to the Changkufeng area by observers from Hsinking was provided by Lt. Colonel Katakura Tadashi, chief of the Kwantung Army's 4th Section, which handled Manchukuo affairs, primarily political direction. When Katakura visited the Operations Section, Tsuji and Ogoshi told him that an intrusion had been confirmed and that the Kwantung Army staff was studying ways to evict the Soviets. Katakura consulted Maj. General Ishiwara Kanji, acting chief of staff, who was already in possession of the draft of an operations order calling for offensive preparations by the Kwantung Army against the Russians at Changkufeng. Katakura asked for reconsideration of the order. This was not a matter to be handled solely by the operations staff. Borders and international affairs were involved; hence the 4th Section, along with the Manchukuoan government, the Gaimusho, and other agencies, were concerned. Field observers were expressing exaggerated personal opinions based on having seen Soviet sentries on a hilltop. If the matter fell within the Korea Army's defensive prerogative, that army ought to handle it. Apparently the Kwantung Army commander and Ishiwara agreed with Katakura, for the draft order was not approved. The so-called private message dispatched by a Kwantung Army staff officer just before Koiso's departure may have been provoked by this rejection of direct participation by forces under Kwantung Army command. Staff officers in Tokyo believed that Hsinking could not see the forest for the trees. In the high command's view, the Kwantung Army's deliberate escalation of a negligible frontier incident undoubtedly stemmed from a failure to grasp the strategic requirements of national defense—pursuit of the campaign in China, the nurturance of Manchukuo, and the buildup of operational readiness for the ultimate solution of the Soviet problem. The high command felt obliged to remind the Kwantung Army that, in dealing with the Changkufeng Incident, the central authorities pressed for a Russian pullback through diplomacy. Consequently, the Korea Army had been instructed to be ready to concentrate troops near Changkufeng as a "background." Meanwhile, it remained the Imperial will that utmost prudence be exercised. The Kwantung Army commander accordingly issued cautious instructions to subordinate units, especially those on the eastern border. The high command's injunctions did not end the discontent and recrimination at the lower levels of Kwantung Army Headquarters, nor did they quiet the concern felt in Tokyo. A former war minister told Baron Harada repeatedly in late July that the Kwantung Army was "no good," while the superintendent of police added that the Kwantung Army was embarrassing Foreign Minister Ugaki. Nevertheless, the Kwantung Army did exert self-restraint. For its part, the Korea Army naïvely sought to achieve entente with an antagonist who considered the case nonnegotiable. First, the government of Manchukuo was asked to lodge a formal protest with the USSR. The commissioner for foreign affairs at Harbin phoned V. V. Kuznetzov, the acting consul, on the night of 14 July and saw him on the 18th. Basing its contentions on maps, the Haensing regime demanded Soviet withdrawal from Changkufeng. The Japanese government was lodging similar protests within the framework of Japanese-Manchukuoan joint defense agreements. On the spot, the situation inflamed. During the afternoon of 15 July, a Japanese military police patrol from Korea reconnoitered at the foot of Hill 52, southeast of Changkufeng. The party came under Soviet gunfire and was driven back, abandoning the body of Corp. Matsushima Shakuni. Japanese sources claimed that a Russian ambush had been set inside Manchuria. The Russian side insisted that it was the Soviet frontier that had been violated by thirty meters. Kuzma Grebennik, the colonel commanding the 59th BGU, which covered the Posyet sector, asserted that Matsushima's effects included a notebook containing reconnaissance results and a camera with film of Soviet-claimed terrain, particularly Changkufeng Hill. According to Maj. Gilfan Batarshin, a subordinate of Grebennik, two Russian border guards from Podgornaya opened fire when the Japanese fled after being challenged. Japanese protests to the USSR about the death of Matsushima and the taking of his body were added to the negotiations concerning the disputed border and the alleged trespassing. Charge Nishi Haruhiko lodged a vigorous complaint in Moscow on 15 July but was answered by a counterprotest. Ambassador Shigemitsu underwent an identical experience during a conversation with Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov on 20 July. Shigemitsu retorted that the murder tended to exacerbate the negotiations. In his memoirs, he stated that the killing of Matsushima provoked the local Japanese border garrison unit. The shooting occurred as the Soviet military buildup continued, according to Japanese sources. Mechanized units were reported moving in the direction of Kyonghun from Barabash and Posyet Bay. Biplanes were reconnoitering the Hunchun Valley, within Manchurian territory, from the afternoon of 16 July. To the local Japanese authorities, it seemed that the Russians were adopting a challenging attitude. Although the Japanese-Manchukuoan side remained willing to negotiate—that is, to take no forceful actions if the Russians would withdraw, the latter appeared not to share such an intention. The Soviets were not only misinterpreting the Hunchun treaty to their advantage but were encroaching beyond what they claimed to be the line; they "lacked sincerity." Decisive use of force might have been imperative to secure the Manchurian border, which was Japan's legal responsibility. As far north as Tungning on the eastern Manchurian frontier, two Soviet ground divisions and considerable numbers of tanks and aircraft were reported massed in full view. At Changkufeng, Russian soldiers fortified the crest. Mountain guns were now seen with muzzles pointed toward Manchuria, and Japanese intelligence estimated that Soviet troop strength near Changkufeng had grown to 120 or 130 by the evening of 18 July. As Sawamoto Rikichiro, an Imperial aide, noted in his diary, "It would seem that settlement of the affair had become increasingly difficult." Korea Army staff officer Tsuchiya sent two emissaries bearing the notice to the Soviet border. The pair, "blazing with patriotic ardor,"set out on 18 July, carrying a message in one hand and a white flag in the other. From Kyonghun came the report the next day that there had been an urgent, well-attended Soviet staff meeting at BGU Headquarters in Novokievsk all night, and that the Russian side had been discomfited by the Japanese request, which had been transmitted to higher authorities. Still, the emissaries did not return, while a stream of reports indicated a Soviet buildup along a dozen frontier sectors. Russian authorities had reportedly forced the natives to evacuate an area twenty miles behind their borders. From Japanese observation posts, Soviet convoys of men, guns, and horses could be sighted moving toward Novokievsk after being unloaded from transports originating at Vladivostok. Japanese Army Intelligence reported that on 18 July a regimental-size force had arrived at Novokievsk; artillery displacements forward were particularly visible by night east of Khasan. A confidential Gaimusho message indicated that Soviet truck movements between Posyet, Novokievsk, and the front had increased since the 20th. Russian intrusions, kidnappings, and sniping incidents were reported along the Manchurian borders, from Manchouli on the west to Suifenho on the east, between 18 and 25 July. Aircraft on daytime reconnaissance were detected as far as three miles inside Manchurian territory in the Hunchun area. Although the Japanese asserted that their forbearance was being tested, Izvestiya charged "Japanese militarists" with manufacturing an affair at Ussuri as well as at Changkufeng. The Japanese themselves received reports from the Changkufeng front that by 20 July the Soviets had 250 soldiers, armed with field pieces, trench mortars, howitzers, and light and heavy machine guns, on the southern slopes. The Russians were putting up tents capable of holding 40 men each; officers could be observed for the first time. On the evening of the 20th, the Soviets lobbed illuminating shells toward Manchurian territory. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Inada Masazum, studying maps and mud, saw Changkufeng Hill as a prize with peril, a test of nerve rather than a conquest. Tokyo's orders pulsed through Seoul and Harbin: guard, probe, and deter, but avoid full-scale war. Across the border, Soviet units pressed closer, lights and tents flickering on the hillside. The sea within sight whispered of strategy, diplomacy, and a warning: a single misstep could redraw Asia. And so the standoff waited, patient as winter.

Something on your mind? Erica & Jules would love to hear from you! In this episode, Erica interviews Debbie and Candice of Two Alpha Gals. These "gals" are about the sweetest nicest smartest kindest women around. And they both happen to have Alpha-Gal Syndrome. This means they both can't have mammalian meat - like beef or pork - or animal by-products like dairy or gelatin. Heck, they can't even have red algae (not because it's a meat, but you'll have to listen to the episode to find out why). We met the two gals at the FAACT Summit and we got to know them a little better and asked them about their new foundation, and what it's really like to live with AGS! "We're using our journey with alpha-gal syndrome to seek new and exciting ways to live with our diagnosis without sacrificing JOY. " - Two Alpha GalsRESOURCESTwo Alpha GalsAlpha Gal FoundationCDC - Alpha Gal Contact/Follow Jules & Erica Find us on IG @CeliacandTheBeast & @gfJules Follow us on FB @gfJules & @CeliacandTheBeast Threads @CeliacandTheBeast & @gfJules Email us at support@gfJules.com Find more articles, recipes & info at gfJules.com & celiacandthebeast.com Thanks for listening! Be sure to subscribe!**some links may be affiliate links; purchasing through these links will not cost you more, but will help to fund the podcast you ❤️

Unbeaten Texas A&M is really, really looking forward to this Saturday’s “cupcake” college football game against struggling 1-10 FCS member Samford.  The Southern Conference Bulldogs from Birmingham, Alabama should be a much tastier morsel than last week’s early delivery from the SEC bakery in Columbia, South Carolina. The 3-6 South Carolina Cream Puffs (I mean, Gamecocks) were supposed to show-up in College Station on Saturday and bow down to the mighty 10-0 Aggies.  The folks in Las Vegas established the Aggies as a 17 ½ point home favorite and expected Texas A&M to cruise an 11th straight victory in 2025. I noticed that Coach Mike Elko’s name was scrolling along the bottom of ABC’s television coverage during the game on Saturday.  The A&M football coach had just signed a six-year contract extension worth more than $11 million per season after guiding the Ags to a sterling 10-0 start in 2025. Ever heard of the term “Battered Aggie Syndrome”? Texas A&M fans have a tendency to become overly excited about their football team.  Sadly, the past few decades have seen the fast-starting Aggies fade coming down the home stretch of nearly every football season. The Aggies have never won the SEC title since joining the league in 2012.  They have never appeared in the BCS nor College Football Playoffs. Texas A&M’s last national championship came in 1939. After years of football disappointment, a significant portion of the Texas A&M football fan base coined the phrase “Battered Aggie Syndrome”. They get excited early in the season and become depressed as the team falters late. It’s much the same as Peanuts character Charlie Brown after Lucy pulls the football away from him just before he gets to kick it. You know what’s going to happen to good ol’ Chuck every time. This year’s Texas A&M football team came into Saturday’s game 10-0.  The coach had just received a very expensive six-year contract extension (another story for another day). What could possibly go wrong? Plenty. South Carolina showed-up and played their finest first half of the football season. Texas A&M served the visiting team a first half assortment of tasty football-flavored turnovers such as two interceptions and a timely fumble recovery.  South Carolina played nearly flawlessly during the opening first two quarters and took full advantage of A&M’s generous Texas-sized home field hospitality. The gracious Aggies allowed their Carolina visitors to jump to a shocking 30-3 halftime lead.  Many in the Texas A&M’s crowd of more than 100,000 suddenly wondered why they didn’t wear their sad “Battered Aggie Syndrome” T-shirts to this football game. Texas A&M’s now wealthier football coach Mike Elko looked in shock as he departed Kyle Field for the locker room after the first half ended. Meanwhile, Coach Shane Beamer may have dropped a few hints at halftime that his South Carolina Gamecocks team should reciprocate some of that generous Texas hospitality during the second half of play. The Gamecocks listened and switched places with the Aggies in the second half. Texas A&M rolled-off 28 straight points to beat South Carolina 31-30 to complete the biggest comeback in school history. Carolina coach Shane Beamer is still employed as I write this on Monday, November 17.  The coach would be due nearly $28 million if South Carolina’s athletics boosters felt the desire to make Coach Beamer the 12th FBS coach fired this football season. The SEC Bakery offers a variety of pastries available this Saturday Check out this list of “Who made this schedule?” for some SEC teams this weekend: Texas A&M (11-0) hosts FCS Samford (1-10) Georgia (9-1) tackles American Athletic Conference member UNC-Charlotte (1-9) Alabama (8-2) is at home for FCS Eastern Illinois (4-7) LSU (6-4) plays host to Sunbelt Conference Western Kentucky (8-2)* South Carolina (3-7) is home for the Sunbelt’s Coastal Carolina (6-4)* *This game was EXPECTED to be an easy home contest but may not turn out to be The 11th game of the season has become “cupcake” week in the SEC after the league started playing a 12-game schedule.  Many teams want their final game of season to end with a historic rivalry contest. Next week’s final week of the SEC regular season features grudge matches such as Alabama vs. Auburn, Georgia taking on Georgia Tech, Ole Miss at Mississippi State, and Texas hosting Texas A&M. That leaves lonely Week #11 available for non-conference action. The reason Samford, Eastern Illinois, and the others accept invitations to play in in such games is to collect +/- $1 million in financial guarantees just for showing up. There were a few other close calls last weekend involving some top teams In addition to Texas A&M’s good fortune in the second half against South Carolina, a few other top-rated teams were fortunate to come out on top. Ole Miss (now 10-1) trailed “coachless” Florida 24-20 heading into the fourth quarter in Oxford Saturday night.  The Rebels scored two fourth quarter touchdowns to escape with a 34-24 win over a tough group of 3-7 Florida Gators. Georgia Tech (now 10-1) was on the verge of losing to 1-10 Boston College last Saturday in Beantown.  A short field goal with 11 seconds remaining lifted the Yellow Jackets to a 34-32 win over BC and kept Georgia Tech’s College Football Playoff hopes alive. Meanwhile, the 8-2 Michigan Wolverines nearly became an upset victim on Saturday, too.  Big Blue turned the ball over three times to the Northwestern Wildcats (now 5-5), but a field goal on the game’s final play lifted Michigan to a 24-22 win.  Michigan visits 4-7 Maryland this week before hosting archrival 10-0 Ohio State on the Saturday after Thanksgiving. It’s time to check out the brand new SwampSwamiSports.com College Football Top 25 rankings for the week ending Saturday, November 15, 2025: The post FBS Top 25 + The SEC Bakery Reopens this Saturday! appeared first on SwampSwamiSports.com.

Last December, the OpenAI business put forward a plan to completely sideline its nonprofit board. But two state attorneys general have now blocked that effort and kept that board very much alive and kicking.The for-profit's trouble was that the entire operation was founded on the premise of — and legally pledged to — the purpose of ensuring that “artificial general intelligence benefits all of humanity.” So to get its restructure past regulators, the business entity has had to agree to 20 serious requirements designed to ensure it continues to serve that goal.Attorney Tyler Whitmer, as part of his work with Legal Advocates for Safe Science and Technology, has been a vocal critic of OpenAI's original restructure plan. In today's conversation, he lays out all the changes and whether they will ultimately matter.Full transcript, video, and links to learn more: https://80k.info/tw2 After months of public pressure and scrutiny from the attorneys general (AGs) of California and Delaware, the December proposal itself was sidelined — and what replaced it is far more complex and goes a fair way towards protecting the original mission:The nonprofit's charitable purpose — “ensure that artificial general intelligence benefits all of humanity” — now legally controls all safety and security decisions at the company. The four people appointed to the new Safety and Security Committee can block model releases worth tens of billions.The AGs retain ongoing oversight, meeting quarterly with staff and requiring advance notice of any changes that might undermine their authority.OpenAI's original charter, including the remarkable “stop and assist” commitment, remains binding.But significant concessions were made. The nonprofit lost exclusive control of AGI once developed — Microsoft can commercialise it through 2032. And transforming from complete control to this hybrid model represents, as Tyler puts it, “a bad deal compared to what OpenAI should have been.”The real question now: will the Safety and Security Committee use its powers? It currently has four part-time volunteer members and no permanent staff, yet they're expected to oversee a company racing to build AGI while managing commercial pressures in the hundreds of billions.Tyler calls on OpenAI to prove they're serious about following the agreement:Hire management for the SSC.Add more independent directors with AI safety expertise.Maximise transparency about mission compliance."There's a real opportunity for this to go well. A lot … depends on the boards, so I really hope that they … step into this role … and do a great job. … I will hope for the best and prepare for the worst, and stay vigilant throughout."Chapters:We're hiring (00:00:00)Cold open (00:00:40)Tyler Whitmer is back to explain the latest OpenAI developments (00:01:46)The original radical plan (00:02:39)What the AGs forced on the for-profit (00:05:47)Scrappy resistance probably worked (00:37:24)The Safety and Security Committee has teeth — will it use them? (00:41:48)Overall, is this a good deal or a bad deal? (00:52:06)The nonprofit and PBC boards are almost the same. Is that good or bad or what? (01:13:29)Board members' “independence” (01:19:40)Could the deal still be challenged? (01:25:32)Will the deal satisfy OpenAI investors? (01:31:41)The SSC and philanthropy need serious staff (01:33:13)Outside advocacy on this issue, and the impact of LASST (01:38:09)What to track to tell if it's working out (01:44:28)This episode was recorded on November 4, 2025.Video editing: Milo McGuire, Dominic Armstrong, and Simon MonsourAudio engineering: Milo McGuire, Simon Monsour, and Dominic ArmstrongMusic: CORBITCoordination, transcriptions, and web: Katy Moore

I ran across a thought-provoking post from Chrissy LeMaire asking if we should reconsider SQL Server HA. The post actually asks if you've considered not using it. The default from Chrissy, for most installations, is to use standalone SQL Servers. This isn't to say she's against HA solutions (FCIs or AGs), but that they often cause problems and might not be needed. It's an interesting position to consider. For a long time, I avoided SQL Server clusters as they were hard to setup with a lot of complexity, hardware requirements, etc., and didn't really provide enough benefits over using log shipping with a second server for me.  These days I have clients with mostly AGs, and they seem to run fine. That being said, Chrissy notes that after she left a job, a network outages caused a bunch of downtime. I could see there being downtime, as the old database mirroring (and the it-will-never-die replication) needed a working network. If you have network issues, you better know how to manage your HA technology's issues. Read the rest of Do You Really Need HA?

We really enjoyed hearing all of your questions for our annual Ask Us Anything episode. There was one question that kept coming up: what might a different world look like? The broken incentives behind social media, and now AI, have done so much damage to our society, but what is the alternative? How can we blaze a different path?In this episode, Tristan Harris and Aza Raskin set out to answer those questions by imagining what a world with humane technology might look like—one where we recognized the harms of social media early and embarked on a whole of society effort to fix them.This alternative history serves to show that there are narrow pathways to a better future, if we have the imagination and the courage to make them a reality.Your Undivided Attention is produced by the Center for Humane Technology. Follow us on X: @HumaneTech_. You can find a full transcript, key takeaways, and much more on our Substack.RECOMMENDED MEDIADopamine Nation by Anna LembkeThe Anxious Generation by Jon HaidtMore information on Donella MeadowsFurther reading on the Kids Online Safety ActFurther reading on the lawsuit filed by state AGs against MetaRECOMMENDED YUA EPISODESFuture-proofing Democracy In the Age of AI with Audrey TangJonathan Haidt On How to Solve the Teen Mental Health CrisisAI Is Moving Fast. We Need Laws that Will Too. Hosted by Simplecast, an AdsWizz company. See pcm.adswizz.com for information about our collection and use of personal data for advertising.

Kimberly Atkins Stohr hosts #SistersInLaw to analyze the power of the president to impose tariffs, its upcoming review by the SCOTUS after challenges by small businesses and numerous states, and the argument for leaving that power in the domain of Congress.  Then, the #Sisters explain the effects of the government shutdown on SNAP benefits, discuss the suit by 25 states over their suspension, and the role AGs play in pushing back against the Federal Government.  They also look at the growing legal war on same-sex marriages ignited by Texas, and whether those rights are at risk going forward. Get the brand new ReSIStance T-Shirt & Mini Tote at politicon.com/merch Additional #SistersInLaw Shows & Content Are Here! Check out Jill's Politicon YouTube Show: Just The Facts Check out Kim's Newsletter: The Gavel  Books & Upcoming Tour Events From The #Sisters Joyce's new book, Giving Up Is Unforgivable, is now available for pre-order!  Not only that, for a limited time, you have the exclusive opportunity to order a signed copy here!  Also, don't miss her upcoming book tour!  You can buy tickets on her Substack. Pre-order Barb's new book, The Fix!  So, don't wait!  You can also get Barb's first book, Attack From Within, here, now in paperback!  Make sure you don't miss her ongoing tour!  You can buy tickets at barbaramcquade.com for all upcoming shows. Add the #Sisters & your other favorite Politicon podcast hosts on Bluesky Get your #SistersInLaw MERCH at politicon.com/merch WEBSITE & TRANSCRIPT Email: SISTERSINLAW@POLITICON.COM or Thread to @sistersInLaw.podcast Get text updates from #SistersInLaw and Politicon.  Support This Week's Sponsors Factor:  Eat smart at FactorMeals.com/sil50off and use code sil50off to get 50% off your first box, plus Free Breakfast for 1 Year! Lola Blankets: Get 35% off your entire order at Lolablankets.com by using code SISTERS at checkout. Gusto: Gusto is your all-in-one online payroll and benefits software built for small businesses.  It's remote-friendly and incredibly easy to use.  Try Gusto today at gusto.com/SISTERS and get three months free when you run your first payroll! Thrive Causemetics: Effortlessly complete your perfect autumn look. Go to thrivecausemetics.com/sisters for an exclusive offer of 20% off your first order. Get More From The #SistersInLaw Joyce Vance: Bluesky | Twitter | University of Alabama Law | Civil Discourse Substack | MSNBC | Author of “Giving Up Is Unforgiveable” Jill Wine-Banks: Bluesky | Twitter | Facebook | Website | Author of The Watergate Girl: My Fight For Truth & Justice Against A Criminal President | Just The Facts YouTube Kimberly Atkins Stohr: Bluesky | Twitter | Boston Globe | WBUR | The Gavel Newsletter | Justice By Design Podcast Barb McQuade: Bluesky | Twitter | University of Michigan Law | Just Security | MSNBC | Attack From Within: How Disinformation Is Sabotaging America

Talking spanking with Hugh Jas.

Last month, the "Billing Boys"—Chris Jones and Phil Rodgers—joined the GeriPal podcast to demystify medical billing and coding in palliative care. This month, we're back with part two, shifting the focus to geriatrics. While billing and coding may not be the most exciting topic, they're essential for ensuring fair reimbursement for the complex care we provide and for supporting the work of our interprofessional teams, many of whom can't bill directly for their services. When we underbill or leave money on the table, we not only shortchange ourselves but also devalue the critical role of geriatrics in the healthcare system. This time, we're joined by experts Peter Hollmann, Ken Koncilja, and Audrey Chun to dive into key questions: Why does billing matter, and who does it benefit? What's the difference between CPT, E&M, and ICD-10 codes (if you need a refresher, check out our chat with the Billing Boys here)? We explore how to think about billing for complexity versus time, and unpack new and impactful codes like the Cognitive Assessment and Care Plan Services code (99483), advance care planning (ACP) billing codes, and G2211, which acknowledges the added work of managing patients with chronic conditions. We also highlight the new APCM G-codes for 2025, a set of HCPCS codes that could provide substantial financial support for interdisciplinary teams in geriatrics. Finally, we discuss the advocacy behind these codes. The American Geriatrics Society (AGS) plays a vital role on the AMA's RUC committee, helping to improve reimbursement for the complex care of older adults. Tune in to this week's GeriPal podcast for expert advice, practical strategies, and insights that will help you optimize your billing practices and sustain the future of geriatrics! Here are some of the resources we also talked about: The physician fee schedule look up tool Wwere you can find out CMS expected charge based off where you practice AGS's annual coding update Geriatrics at Your Fingertips, which has a one-pager on billing Medicare Claims Processing Manual

Nineteen Democratic attorneys general, led by California AG Rob Bonta, are urging the CFPB not to reduce its supervision of key consumer finance sectors, including auto lending, debt collection, and money transfers. The AGs warn that raising the thresholds for “larger participant” oversight would leave millions of consumers unprotected and weaken the CFPB's enforcement reach. The letter signals states' continued commitment to fill potential gaps in federal oversight through coordinated enforcement. Hosted by Simone Roach. Based on a blog post by Paul L. Singer, Beth Bolen Chun, Abigail Stempson, and Darby B. Hobbs

States have become more and more active in using their consumer protection statutes to initiate investigations and lawsuits against Chinese companies. These investigations and efforts have centered on concerns about so-called white labeling of consumer products to hide the country of origin and concerns about data privacy and security. This webinar will feature the Attorneys General of Nebraska and Alaska—two AGs who have taken a leading interest in this emerging area. They will discuss the growing role of state consumer protection laws in addressing foreign-backed corporate misconduct and what the future may hold for this important area of enforcement. Featuring: Hon. Mike Hilgers, Attorney General, Nebraska Hon. Stephen Cox, Attorney General, Alaska (Moderator) O.H. Skinner, III, Executive Director, Alliance For Consumers

Sixteen Republican state attorneys general, led by Montana AG Austin Knudsen, have launched an investigation into four major tech companies over allegedly deceptive renewable energy claims. The AGs argue that using unbundled renewable energy certificates (RECs) to claim 100% renewable power may mislead consumers and distort the energy market. This episode breaks down how the probe reflects ongoing scrutiny of Big Tech, state-level divergence from the FTC's Green Guides, and broader political debates around fossil fuels, emissions, and the electric grid. Hosted by Simone Roach. Based on a blog post by Paul L. Singer, Beth Bolen Chun, Abigail Stempson, and Andrea deLorimier

Just before leaving office, former Missouri AG Andrew Bailey withdrew a proposed rule that would have barred social media companies from requiring users to rely solely on in-house content moderation. The rule drew strong opposition from industry and policy groups who warned of data security risks, First Amendment violations, and technical impracticalities. While the withdrawal pauses the effort for now, it leaves open the possibility that future AGs—or other states—could revisit similar proposals. Hosted by Simone Roach. Based on a blog post by Paul L. Singer, Abigail Stempson, Beth Bolen Chun, and Zach Cihlar

We need to build a red-state insurance policy. I explain how we are losing America in terms of economy, security from Islam, and foreign policy, even under GOP control. Despite Hamas' repeated violations of the ceasefire, we continue to expend more time and treasure promoting the welfare of Gaza and restraining Israel. Also, Con Inc. is becoming a "white-pill mechanism" to tamp down the angst of the Republican voters so that they avoid seeking solutions outside the party or in primaries. Next, we're joined by Rep. Chip Roy (R-Texas), who discusses why he is running for Texas attorney general. We go through the security threats to Texas: street crime from Soros prosecutors, illegal immigrants, Sharia law, and communist terrorism. The state AG stands at the nexus of enforcement against all that is destroying the state. Chip feels that we need red-state AGs to push the envelope on behalf of the people when the land and people of red states are threatened rather than getting caught up in legal sophistry. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Did you know that a tick bite could lead to a food allergy?  Join Food Sleuth Radio host and Registered Dietitian, Melinda Hemmelgarn for her conversation with Sharon Forsyth, conservationist and patient advocate for the alpha-gal syndrome community. Forsyth created Alpha-gal Information.org, a comprehensive informational resource on AGS. She discusses how to avoid tick bites and the challenges of living with alpha-gal food allergy (also known as mammalian meat allergy).Related Websites: https://alphagalaction.org/

In late August, the Attorney General Alliance hosted its Chair's Initiative in Girdwood, Alaska, marking the final event under former Alaska Attorney General Treg Taylor's leadership. The conference brought together attorneys general, cybersecurity experts, and industry leaders to discuss evolving digital threats and strategies for public-private collaboration. Key themes included strengthening national defenses through cross-sector partnerships, harmonizing fragmented privacy laws, and leveraging AI responsibly—both to address risks like deepfakes and to build safer, more transparent systems. For companies navigating cybersecurity and consumer protection challenges, the Initiative underscored the central role state AGs will continue to play in shaping digital policy. Hosted by Simone Roach. Based on a blog post by Paul Singer, Abby Stempson, Beth Chun, and Andrea deLorimier.

I answer some listener questions and talk spanking with Rylie.

Americans don't talk about state attorney generals very much. Technically it's “attorneys general”—like “sisters-in-law” instead of “sister-in-laws”—but don't get hung up on the wording. It's what AGs actually do that matters so much.A state attorney general is basically the top legal expert in their state; they're also known as The People's Lawyers because they fight for us, their constituents, against bad actors who don't have our best interests in mind. That can mean prosecuting companies that are polluting waterways or landlords who are illegally raising rent prices or banks that are selling people's private data. Sometimes state AGs band together on lawsuits, like a recent case against Purdue Pharma for aggressively pushing medications like OxyContin and contributing to the opioid crisis we're facing in this country.Unfortunately, we also have a lot of examples of the harm that a corrupt or extremist attorney general can do. (Ken Paxton, for example) But the good news is, we the people have the power to elect them. In all but seven states (AK, HI, NH, NJ, WY, TN, & ME), voters choose their AG at the ballot box. Most attorneys general are up for election in 2026 or 2028, and in one pivotal state, Virginia, voters will get to elect a new attorney general in just a couple of months.This November, Jay Jones—a lawyer and former member of the Virginia House of Delegates—will square off against the current Virginia Attorney General, Jason Miyares. Miyares is a Republican and a supporter of Donald Trump, campaigning for him and supporting his policies.If you live in Virginia, be sure you come to the polls in November prepared to vote for attorney general. And if you don't live in Virginia, chances are you'll have the chance to vote for your own AG very soon! It's not just about rejecting extremism. It's about choosing a “People's Lawyer” who actually works for the people.For a transcript of this episode, please email comms@redwine.blue. You can learn more about us at www.redwine.blue or follow us on social media! Twitter: @TheSWPpod and @RedWineBlueUSA Instagram: @RedWineBlueUSA Facebook: @RedWineBlueUSA YouTube: @RedWineBlueUSA

Americans don't talk about state attorney generals very much. Technically it's “attorneys general”—like “sisters-in-law” instead of “sister-in-laws”—but don't get hung up on the wording. It's what AGs actually do that matters so much.A state attorney general is basically the top legal expert in their state; they're also known as The People's Lawyers because they fight for us, their constituents, against bad actors who don't have our best interests in mind. That can mean prosecuting companies that are polluting waterways or landlords who are illegally raising rent prices or banks that are selling people's private data. Sometimes state AGs band together on lawsuits, like a recent case against Purdue Pharma for aggressively pushing medications like OxyContin and contributing to the opioid crisis we're facing in this country. The company settled for $7.4 billion dollars just this past January, which means billions of dollars that can now be put back into treatment and prevention programs. It's a great example of how an attorney general can have a real positive impact on the people of their state.Unfortunately, we also have a lot of examples of the harm that a corrupt or extremist attorney general can do. (Ken Paxton, for example) But the good news is, we the people have the power to elect them. In all but seven states (AK, HI, NH, NJ, WY, TN, & ME), voters choose their AG at the ballot box. Most attorneys general are up for election in 2026 or 2028, and in one pivotal state, Virginia, voters will get to elect a new attorney general in just a couple of months.This November, Jay Jones—a lawyer and former member of the Virginia House of Delegates—will square off against the current Virginia Attorney General, Jason Miyares. Miyares is a Republican and a supporter of Donald Trump, campaigning for him and supporting his policies.If you live in Virginia, be sure you come to the polls in November prepared to vote for attorney general. And if you don't live in Virginia, chances are you'll have the chance to vote for your own AG very soon! It's not just about rejecting extremism. It's about choosing a “People's Lawyer” who actually works for the people.

Many of you reading this likely have an Availability Group (AG) set up on at least one database in your organization. Maybe not most, but many of you as this has proven to be a technology that many people like for HA/DR, upgrades, and probably other uses. As the technology has evolved from it's SQL Server 2012 debut, it has improved in many ways. This might be one of the few features that has received regular attention from the developers in Redmond across multiple versions. That's not to imply this is a foolproof or bug-free feature. Numerous people have had issues with the various types of AGs. From setup to performance to scale, I've seen many people post questions and search for answers on how to get their system running smoothly and reduce any late-night calls. Read the rest of Pushing the Limits of AGs

State attorneys general are turning up the heat on Big Tech. Last week, 27 AGs filed an amicus brief urging the Eleventh Circuit to uphold Florida's law restricting social media access for children, framing the measure as content-neutral and necessary to protect youth mental health. Days later, 44 AGs sent a joint NAAG letter to leading AI companies warning them to safeguard children from exploitation and inappropriate content, making clear they will use every enforcement tool available. For legal, compliance, and marketing teams, these actions underscore the growing regulatory focus on online platforms, addictive features, and AI-driven risks. Companies in the tech, digital media, and AI sectors should expect heightened scrutiny and prepare for aggressive, coordinated enforcement. Hosted by Simone Roach. Based on a blog post by Paul L. Singer, Abigail Stempson, Beth Bolen Chun and Andrea deLorimier.

At age 16, Peyton Owen decided to take her alpha-gal diagnosis and use it as a force for good. Our very own TAG Teen Contributor is sharing some exciting updates full of new projects for the alpha-gal community! Last year Peyton jumped into the advocacy space by getting involved with the FARE Teen Advisory Group, which led to an amazing collaboration with K-12 Allergies and the launching of the AGS Gift Bags Project. Peyton shares what inspired her to get involved in advocacy work, her experience as a CFAAR Ambassador, researching colleges, travel tips, and so much more! You won't want to miss this one, so tune in now!Visit Peyton's Corner to read more about her journey with AGS and her exciting advocacy updates.To learn more about FARE"s Teen Advisory Group and ways you can get involved visit: https://www.foodallergy.org/resources/teen-advisory-group

Questions Louis answered in this episode:Why Louis started App Growth SummitThe moment AGS's ‘community first' format revealed the gap in existing event cultureWhat are mobile marketers missing in custom product page strategy?Where does AI actually help and where does it actively dull critical thinking?Why do marketers keep separating teams and failing to optimize collaboration?How can retargeting go beyond surface-level re-engagement to real value?What separates high-ROI event vendors from the time-wasters?How does AGS build authentic community, and what's the actual ROI of belonging?What advice does Louis give first-time sponsors and networkers who want more than a sales lead?Why do so many marketers waste the opportunity of an event, and how is AGS structured to avoid this?Where is the industry headed, and what does Louis see as the next phase?Timestamp:(0:00) – Intro, Louis's journey from music to mobile marketing(2:45) – First AGS event: origin story, first sponsors, finding the ‘sweet spot'(4:23) – The ‘community not scale' thesis: AGS's unique approach(7:20) – Venue selection, why environment shapes event outcomes(9:33) – Industry blindspots: custom product pages, marketing-product silos(11:00) – Getting CPPs right: landing page principles, offer-matching, creative basics(14:00) – AI's role: when it elevates, when it destroys value(23:00) – Maximizing events: actionable networking, why ‘closing deals' is a dead-end(30:35) – AGS global: favorite cities, the meaning of event #100(36:10) – Rapid fire: first thing at an event, dream speakers, live shows, Austin food, travel recs(39:40) – Closing: next AGS events, community calls to actionQuotes:(11:33) – “ If you match your creative and the offer to the campaign, you're going to get way more conversions.”(14:15) – “AI is more ‘A' than ‘I' right now…It's a supercharged research tool, but it's not going to replace real creative strategy anytime soon.”(24:12) – “If you want ROI from an event, don't cluster with your coworkers. Talk to people you don't know, open doors, and don't expect a deal by Friday.”Mentioned in this episode:App Growth Summit (appgrowthsummit.com)App Growth Snacks newsletterLouis on Linkedin

We recently wrote about the August 15th D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals decision in the lawsuit brought by the labor unions representing CFPB employees against Acting Director Russell Vought. The unions sought injunctive relief in response to what they described as an attempted “shutdown” of the Bureau. In a 2–1 ruling, the Court of Appeals vacated a preliminary injunction issued by the District Court. That injunction had temporarily blocked the CFPB from carrying out a reduction-in-force (“RIF”) that would have left the Bureau with only about 200 employees to carry out its statutory responsibilities. Today, our Consumer Finance Monitor podcast takes a deep dive into this critical decision and its implications. Alan Kaplinsky (founder and former practice group leader, now Senior Counsel in our Consumer Financial Services Group) joins Joseph Schuster (a partner in the Group) for a wide-ranging conversation covering: The majority opinion by Judge Katsos The dissenting opinion by Judge Pillard The plaintiffs' options for further review — and why the odds may be at least 50–50 that the full D.C. Circuit (with 11 judges, 7 appointed by Democratic presidents) will grant en banc review Why plaintiffs might choose to continue litigating in the District Court as the CFPB implements the RIF and scales back activities to only those that are statutorily mandated How the CFPB's sharply reduced budget (cut nearly in half by the “Big Beautiful Bill”) shapes the Bureau's future functions What the CFPB could look like once litigation ends and “the dust settles” The impact of the just-released semiannual regulatory agenda The current status of the complaint portal What's happening with the CFPB's supervision and enforcement efforts How the DOJ and FTC are approaching consumer financial services issues Whether state attorneys general are stepping up enforcement to fill the gap left by a diminished CFPB This is a must-listen episode for anyone following the future of the CFPB, the role of other federal agencies, and the actions of state AGs in regulating consumer financial services.

On a prior podcast we talked with Todd Semla and Mike Steinman about the update to the AGS Beers Criteria of potentially inappropriate medications in older adults (Todd and Mike co-chair the AGS Beers Criteria Panel).  One of the questions that came up was - well if we should probably think twice or avoid that medication, what should we do instead? Today we talk with Todd and Mike about their new recommendations of alternative treatments to the AGS Beers Criteria, published recently in JAGS, and also presented at the 2025 AGS conference in Chicago (and available on demand online). We had a lot of fun at the start of the podcast talking about the appropriate analogy for how clinicians should use the AGS Beers Criteria.  In our last podcast, the analogy was a stop sign. You should come to a stop before you prescribe or refill a medication on the Beers list, look around at alternatives, and consider how to proceed.  You might in the end decide to proceed, as there are certainly situations in which it does make sense to start or continue a medication on the Beers list. Today's analogy had somewhat higher stakes, involving a driver, a pothole in the road, and a cyclist on the side who you'd hit if you swerved.  Really upping the anti!!! The podcast is framed around a case Eric crafted of a patient with most of the medications and conditions on the Beers list. We used this as a springboard to discuss the following issues (with links to prior GeriPal podcasts): Insomnia (Doxepin is an alternative, trazodone and melatonin are not?!?) Diabetes management  PPI for GERD Treatments for pain, including NSAIDS, COX2, and gabapentinoids Cannabis Deprescribing,org - terrific Canadian website (no tariff to use) And I hope that the prescribing landscape is indeed getting better (thanks to Kai on guitar)! -Alex Smith  

Today's Headlines: House Republicans are flipping the Epstein story, subpoenaing the Clintons, former AGs, and ex-FBI chiefs — but skipping the guy who gave Epstein his sweetheart plea deal, Alex Acosta. A NYT look inside Epstein's NYC mansion turned up creepy art, hidden cameras, and celeb pics with everyone from Bill Gates to Donald and Melania. The Trump team's also dusting off the “Russia hoax” playbook, launching a grand jury probe into Obama's handling of the 2016 election interference investigation. In other Epstein distraction news, Trump popped up on the White House roof and joked about nukes. He also made himself head of the 2028 LA Olympics task force (with a side of anti-trans comments). The State Department floated visa bonds up to $15K while the FBI says 2024 had the second-highest hate crime numbers ever. Lastly, Palantir got a $10B Army contract and Elon Musk's xAI scored $200M from the Pentagon. Resources/Articles mentioned in this episode: NBC News: House committee subpoenas the Clintons and several top former DOJ officials for testimony about Jeffrey Epstein NY Times: Inside Jeffrey Epstein's Manhattan Townhouse: Birthday Letters, First Edition ‘Lolita' and More Axios: Trump "happy to hear" DOJ launched grand jury probe of Obama officials ABC News: Trump takes unusual stroll on White House roof CNN: Trump says he wants strong testing to keep transgender athletes out of women's sports at 2028 Olympics AP News: State Department may require visa applicants to post bond of up to $15,000 to enter the US Axios: Hate crimes hit second largest record in 2024: FBI Axios: Palantir's $10 billion Army contract continues its D.C. win streak Axios: Musk's xAI announces $200 million contract with Pentagon Morning Announcements is produced by Sami Sage and edited by Grace Hernandez-Johnson Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The House subpoenas Bill & Hillary Clinton, ex-AGs, and FBI directors in a revived Epstein probe. PBD and the crew break down who might flip, why Loretta Lynch and Eric Holder matter, and what this means for justice, immunity deals, and Ghislaine Maxwell's silence.