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Last time we spoke about the beginning of a conflict between the USSR and Japan. In the frost-hardened dawns by the Chaun and Tumen, two powers eye a ridge called Changkufeng, each seeing a prize and fearing a trap. On the Soviet side, weary front-line troops tighten their grip, while Moscow's diplomats coaxed restraint through Seoul and Harbin.  As July unfolds, Tokyo's generals push a dangerous idea: seize the hill with a surprise strike, then bargain for peace. Seoul's 19th Division is readied in secret, trains loaded with men and horses, movement masked, prayers whispered to avoid widening the rift. Japanese scouts in white Hanbok disguise, peering at trenches, wire, and watchful Russians. Russian border guards appear as shadows, counters slipping into place, yet both sides hold their fire. On July 29, a skirmish erupts: a platoon crosses a shallow line, clashes flare, and bodies and banners ripple in the cold air.    #178 Night Attacks and Diplomatic Strains: The Lake Khasan Conflict Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. A second troop train was scheduled to depart Agochi for Nanam on the night of 29 July, carrying back the initial elements of the 75th Infantry. At Haigan, regimental commander Sato was pulling on his boots at 16:00 when the division informed him that fighting had broken out near Shachaofeng since 15:00 and that the Russians were assembling forces in that area. Suetaka ordered Sato's 3rd Battalion, which had not been slated to leave until the following night, to proceed to Kucheng; the remainder of the regiment was to assemble at Agochi. After consulting with Division Staff Officer Saito at Agochi, Sato returned to Haigan with the conclusion that "overall developments did not warrant optimism, it was imperative to prepare to move the entire regiment to the battlefield." One of Sato's first actions was to telephone a recommendation to the division that he be allowed to occupy Hill 52, which commanded the approaches to Changkufeng from south of Khasan. Suetaka approved, and at 17:30, Yamada's company was ordered to proceed to Shikai along with Hirahara's battalion. Meanwhile, Suzuki's 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, which had been among the last units ordered to leave, had finished loading at Agochi by about 15:00. Sato recommended to Suetaka that a portion of Suzuki's regiment be attached to him; this was why Suetaka decided to transfer one of the two batteries to the 75th Infantry. The rest of the heavy artillery concentrated at Kyonghun. Suetaka's orders, issued at 18:20, called for Sato to have two of his battalions, the 1st and 3rd, cross the Tumen as soon as possible, with engineer support. Attached was Narukawa's heavy battery. Sato's mission was twofold: to assist Senda and to watch the enemy in the Changkufeng area. Sato arrived at 21:15 in Shikai. There, he assembled a number of his officers, including Yamada, and explained his plan: the 1st Company plus machine guns were to cross the Tumen from Sozan ahead of the other units, occupy Hill 52 with an element, and concentrate the main body at the foot of Fangchuanting to await Hirahara's battalion. A portion of the 19th Engineers would go to Sozan to assist the 1st Company with its river crossing. Amid heavy rain and darkness, the various units set out at 22:15. The platoon sent to Hill 52 arrived before dawn on the 30th, the rest of the forces somewhat later, though Sato had intended to move everybody across the river by the early hours. On the 29th the engineer regiment commander, Kobayashi, had also arrived at Shikai. He ordered Captain Tomura to handle the crossing in the vicinity of Sozan, as well as preparations for a future offensive with the main body. When Kobayashi reached Kucheng, he learned from Hirahara not only about the front-line situation but also about Sato's important plans: "The K. Sato force is going to cross the river tonight, 29–30 July. A night attack will be launched against Changkufeng on the night of 30–31 July." Kobayashi issued orders to his two commanders to assist the crossing by Nakano's infantry unit, 1st Battalion, 75th Regiment at Matsu'otsuho and Sozan, and, in addition, to cooperate with the position attack by Nakano and help in the assault at Hill 52. Most of these young officers, such as Seutaka dishing out orders were performing what the Japanese termed "dokudan senko" or "arbitrary or independent action". Japanese operational regulations actually contained a section dealing with dokudan senko, by which initiative, not imperiousness, was meant. Two elements were involved: control but encouragement of self-reliant thinking. This subject became important in training officers, all of whom, including such infantry experts as Suetaka, were well acquainted with the requirements. Combat missions were stipulated in operations orders, but, if these were not realistic, initiative was to come into play, though only when there was no time to contact superiors. By the same token, commanders had to be ready to assume full responsibility if matters turned out adversely. "We were disciples of the 'Moltke' system of AGS control, with dual authority vis-à-vis the local forces and the chief of staff."  The Korea Army's version of events on 29 July, there was no mention of any report received from the division prior to 17:30. Details did not reach Seoul, in the form of printed divisional intelligence reports and operational orders, until 1 August. The late afternoon report from Kyonghun provided the Korea Army authorities with little solid information, but Seoul had to notify higher headquarters immediately. Kitano sent messages to Tokyo and Hsinking at 19:15. The command and Kwantung Army were told that, in addition to Senda's assault party, 40 Japanese soldiers were deployed west of Changkufeng and at Yangkuanping. The division's main forces had begun the rail pullback from the 28th, leaving behind only two infantry battalions and a mountain artillery battalion for the time being. At 21:20 on 29 July, Korea Army Headquarters received the text of Suetaka's full report, which concluded: "With a view toward a possible emergency, the division suspended movement back of the 75th Regiment and is making necessary arrangements to have them advance instead. The latest affair derives sheerly from the enemy's unlawful challenge. It is my firm belief that the nature of this incident differs completely from the one at Changkufeng and should be handled separately. At present, since communication with the forward lines is not good, Lieutenant Colonel Senda (who is at the front) has been entrusted with command, but I assume entire responsibility for the consequences." Instead of boarding their trains at Agochi, Sato's regiment and supporting engineers moved to the Manchurian side of the Tumen as soon as possible. Suetaka called Sato's 2nd Battalion to Kyonghun as divisional reserve. Subsequent dispatches claimed that: (1) Senda's unit, which had driven off intruders in the Shachaofeng area once, was engaged against new Soviet forces (sent at 18:20, 29th);  (2) Senda's unit had expelled trespassers, and a combat situation had developed near Shachaofeng (22:00, 29th);  (3) fighting was going on in the vicinity of Shachaofeng (06:40, 30th).  Korea Army Headquarters, however, obtained no more important communication concerning the events of 29 July than a report, sent that evening by Suetaka, that revealed his concern about a possible Soviet attack in the Wuchiatzu sector near the neck of the long Changkufeng appendix.  After the clash at Shachaofeng, a general officer, Morimoto, happened to be visiting Colonels Okido and Tanaka in Nanam. Both of them were said to be of the pronounced opinion that no troubles ought to be provoked with the USSR while the critical Hankow operation lay ahead; yet Suetaka apparently had some intention of striking at the Soviet intruders, using the 75th Regiment. They urged that this policy not be adopted and that Suetaka be approached directly; the channel through Y. Nakamura, the division chief of staff, was hopeless. Although in agreement, General Morimoto declined to approach Suetaka; since the latter seemed to have made up his mind, it would be inappropriate to "meddle" with his command. Suetaka was functioning as an operations chief at that time. Apart from the mobilization staff officer, who was not enthusiastic about aggressive action, the only other officer who may have affected the decisionmaking process was the Hunchun OSS chief, Maj. Tanaka Tetsujiro, a positive type who shared Suetaka's views and was probably with him on the 29th as well as 30th. Although developments at Suetaka's command post were known more as the result of silence than of elucidation, we possessed considerable information about thinking at the Korea Army level: "Suetaka contacted us only after his men had driven out the enemy near Shachaofeng. Till then, the front had been relatively quiet and we were of the opinion all or most of the deployed forces were on their way home. We at Seoul had no foreknowledge of or connection with the 29 July affair. Reports came in; we never sent specific orders. Triggered by the affray at Shachaofeng, the division attacked on its own initiative. It was our understanding that very small Japanese forces had been committed to evict a dozen enemy scouts and that, when a platoon of ours got atop the hill, they observed surprisingly huge hostile concentrations to the rear. This was probably why the platoon pulied back, although much has been made of the desire to obey the nonaggravation policy to the letter. We at Seoul felt that this was a troublesome matter—that our side had done something unnecessary. When the division finally made its report, the army had to reach some decision. There were two irreconcilable ways of looking at things. We might condemn what had been done, and the division ought to be ordered to pull out promptly, having arbitrarily and intolerably acted against the known facts that Imperial sanction for use of force had been withheld and Tokyo had directed evacuation of the moved-up units. The opposing, eventually predominant view was that the division commander's course of action ought to be approved. Perusal of small-scale maps of the locale indicated a clear violation of the frontier, something not proved in the case of Changkufeng. We shared the division commander's interpretation. His BGU had its mission, and he was acting with foresight to solve matters positively and on his own, since he was the man closest to the problem. General Nakamura felt that the latest development was inevitable; our units did not cross the Tumen until the Soviets attacked us in force. Therefore, the division's actions were approved and a report was rendered promptly to Tokyo. It could be said that our outlook served to "cover" the division commander, in a way. But if IGHQ had ordered us to desist, we would have".  Nakamura added: "I was of the opinion the only solution was to drive the Soviet troops outside Manchukuoan territory; therefore, I approved the action by the division." Such sanction had been granted on the basis of information supplied to Seoul by Suetaka on the evening of 29 July, again post facto. At 01:20 on the 30th, Nakamura wired Suetaka a message characterized by gracious phrasing that suggested his grave concern: "One ought to be satisfied with expelling from Manchurian territory the enemy attacking our unit on the . . . heights southwest of Shachaofeng. It is necessary to keep watch on the enemy for the time being, after having pulled back to the heights mentioned above, but we desire that matters be handled carefully to avoid enlargement; in case the foe has already pulled back south of Shachaofeng . . . he need not be attacked." Nakamura also sent a wire to the AGS chief, the War Minister, and the Kwantung Army commander. After conveying the information received from Suetaka, Nakamura continued: "In spite of the fact that our troops have been patient and cautious . . . this latest incident [near Shachaofeng] started with Soviet forces' arrogant border trespassing and . . . unlawful challenge. Therefore, I am convinced that this affair must be dealt with separately from the incident at Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I shall endeavor to handle matters so that the incident will not spread and shall make it my fundamental principle to be satisfied with evicting from Manchurian territory the hostile forces confronting us. The Korea Army chief of staff is being dispatched quickly to handle the incident".  The Korea Army, "painfully slow to act," says a Kwantung Army major, was merely the intermediary link, the executor of Tokyo's desires. In the case of remote Shachaofeng, there was an inevitable gap between on-the-spot occurrences and AGS reactions. By then, Arisue, Kotani, and Arao, Inada's observers, had returned to Japan—an important fact, given the "Moltke" system of staff control. Nevertheless, their return must have exerted significant effects on central operational thinking. Kotani remembered that his AGS subsection had given him a welcome-home party on the night of 29 July when an emergency phone call was received from the duty officer. "It was about the clash at Shachaofeng. The festivities came to an abrupt end and I headed for the office. From then till the cease-fire on 11 August, I remained at the AGS night and day." Since the 19th Division had furnished higher headquarters with minimal information, Tokyo, like Seoul, had only a few ostensible facts to act upon. But this had been the first combat test for the Korea Army, which needed all the encouragement and assistance possible. Although Japanese field armies, notably the Kwantung Army, were notorious for insubordination, one could not overemphasize the fact that the Korea Army was meek and tractable. If Nakamura had concluded that Suetaka acted properly (which reports from Seoul indicated), the AGS could hardly demur. It would have been unrealistic to think that Tokyo, although cautious, was "softer" about the Russian problem than front-line forces. There had been no concern over time lags; details were Seoul's province. Reaction took time at every level of the chain of command. Decision making in the Japanese Army had been a many-layered process. The Army general staff had been of the opinion that initial guidance ought to have been provided to the Korea Army soon, particularly since there had been evidence of failure to convey intentions promptly to the front and no high command staff officer remained to direct matters. After hearing from Seoul twice about the Shachaofeng affair, the responsible Army general staff officers conferred at length. Stress had been laid on the indivisibility of the Shachaofeng and Changkufeng incidents. It had also been evident that further information was required. On that basis, a "handling policy for the Shachaofeng Incident" was drafted, and Tada notified the Korea and Kwantung armies accordingly on 30 July. Nakamura had received the telegram at 16:50 and had its contents retransmitted to Kitano, then at Kyonghun: "Shachaofeng Incident is progressing along lines of our policy, leave things to local units, which have been adhering to the principle of nonenlargement. Have them report on front-line situation without fail."  The Army general staff and the Korea Army were calling for prudence, but the division, well down the rungs of the ladder of command, was initiating actions that jeopardized the government's basic policy. Earlier quibbling about restraints on "unit-size" elements crossing into Manchuria had been abandoned after the firefight near Shachaofeng on 29 July. At 15:30, Takenouchi's battalion, part of the 76th Regiment, had been directed to assist Senda near Yangkuanping; at 18:20 Suetaka was ordering the 75th Regiment to head for the Kucheng sector and be ready to assault the Russians in the Changkufeng area. Support was to be provided by Kobayashi's engineers, by Iwano's transportation men, and by Suzuki's heavy guns. Of particular interest had been Suetaka's acceptance of Sato's recommendation that elements be sent to occupy Hill 52, a measure linked with a possible Japanese attack against Changkufeng.   Sato had decided by evening that the new situation required rapid deployment of his forces across the river. At Shikai, he conducted a briefing of his officers. Suetaka's orders conveyed orally by staff officers had stipulated: "The division will take steps to secure the border line immediately, even if the situation undergoes change. The Sato unit will advance immediately to the left shore, reinforce Senda's unit, and maintain a strict watch on the enemy in the Changkufeng area." Around 23:20, the last elements ordered forward arrived at Shikai station. Sato instructed only his headquarters and the Ito company to get off. The rest of the troop train primarily the 1st [Nakano's] Battalion was to move on to Hongui. From there, the soldiers proceeded to the Tumen near Sozan. With his staff and Ito's company, Sato trudged in silence through the mud from Shikai to the shore at Matsu'otsuho, starting at 00:30 and reaching the crossing site at 03:00. Reconnaissance had proved satisfactory, Sato remembered.  At the crossings, the hardworking engineers rowed his 1st and 3rd battalions across, company by company. Near dawn, around 04:30, he traversed the river. The movement had been completed in about an hour. When Sato's infantry finally got across, they proceeded to the skirt of Fangchuanting and assembled in secrecy. Not until about 08:00 did the regimental headquarters, Ito's company, and Hirahara's battalion reach Hill 147, already held by Noguchi's company west of Changkufeng. By then, plans had fallen behind schedule by at least several hours because of difficulties in train movement forward. Sato also remembered torrential rains; other officers mentioned darkness. Members of Nakano's battalion pinpointed a shortage of engineer boats from Kucheng. Engineers rowed some boats downstream during the night, but six of them were kept at Matsu'otsuho. This left only three boats for moving the 400 men of the 1st Battalion, the unit slated to storm Changkufeng, across the river at Sozan. Sato had wanted all of his troops across well before dawn on the 30th. A division staff officer rightly thought that Suetaka had already advised Sato, in secret, to "attack at an opportune time," and that the night of 29–30 July had been intended for the surprise assault. "Perhaps there was not enough time for all the attack preparations." Kobayashi's engineers admitted problems in moving boats to Sozan: "Although the water level had gone up because of daily rains recently, there were still many shallows and the current was irregular. Not only was it hard to move downstream, but dense fog also complicated the work. Nevertheless, the units at both sites were able to accomplish the river-crossing operation approximately as scheduled".  Meanwhile, after reconnoitering Soviet defenses along the Manchurian bank, Suzuki, commander of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment, crossed the Kyonghun Bridge on 30 July with his 1st Battery and established positions on the edge of Shuiliufeng Hill. Once Captain Narukawa was attached to the 75th Infantry on 29 July, he dispatched his 2nd Battery by train to Shikai that night. Although firing sites had been surveyed northwest of Sho-Sozan, the battery had to traverse two weak, narrow bridges in the darkness. With two 15-centimeter howitzers to haul, plus five caissons and wagons, the unit faced tense moments. The gun sites themselves were worrisome: they were scarcely masked from observation from Changkufeng, and the single road to them from the unloading station ran through a paddy area and was similarly exposed. By 1200 hours on 30 July, Sato exerted operational control over the following units: his own forces, Nakano's battalion east of Fangchuanting; Hirahara's reinforced battalion west of Chiangchunfeng; a platoon from Nakajima's infantry company on Hill 52; and Noguchi's company on Hill 147; and from other forces, Senda's 2nd (Kanda) BGU Company; two reinforced companies from Takenouchi's battalion of Okido's 76th Regiment near Shachaofeng; and a 75-mm half-battery from the 25th Mountain Artillery on the Manchurian side with Sato. On the Korean shore, another half-battery comprising two 15-centimeter howitzers from Narukawa's unit of the 15th Heavy Field Artillery was in place. The 19th Engineers operated near the crossing sites, though one platoon remained at Fangchuanting. Sato said, "We were now deployed at last, to cope with any situation." His command post was set in foxholes on open ground at Chiangchunfeng, a central hill that offered excellent observation and control over actions around Changkufeng to the east and Shachaofeng to the north. Not content with suspending the pullout of units and deploying additional combat troops across the Tumen, Suetaka decided to recall division headquarters, mountain artillery, cavalry, signal, medical, and veterinary personnel from Nanam. At dawn on 30 July, Nanam issued orders for Colonel Tanaka to move 500 men and 300 horses to Agochi by rail; most of the increment came from Tanaka's horse-drawn 25th Mountain Artillery. The colonel reached the Korean side of the Tumen at 05:00 on 31 July. The preceding emergency measures were being implemented by Suetaka, even as he received Nakamura's calming telegram of 30 July enjoining nonexpansion. Changkufeng Hill was not even mentioned. Nakamura's concern was typified by Kitano flying to the front. At 10:00 on 30 July, Kitano sent the division chief of staff a cautious follow-up cable: "Based on the consistent policy for handling the Changkufeng Incident and on the army commander's earlier telegram, kindly take steps to ensure careful action in connection with the affair in the Shachaofeng vicinity lest there be enlargement." At 13:45, Nakamura transmitted another restraining message to Suetaka: "The division is to secure … Chiangchunfeng and … the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, using present front-line units. Unless there is an enemy attack, however, resort to force will depend on separate orders." Several hours later, at 16:50, Nakamura received instructions from Tada: the Shachaofeng case was being left to the local forces, who were pursuing the desired policy of nonenlargement, but prompt reporting was desired. At 19:30, the retransmitted message was received by Kitano, already at the front with Suetaka at Kyonghun. After his units had crossed the Tumen on 30 July, Sato Kotoku ordered a strict watch and directed preparations for an assault based on the plans. He conferred with Senda at Chiangchunfeng and observed the enemy. Even after dawn, the frontline commanders who had crossed the river remained uncertain about when the attack would be staged. While Sato's force conducted reconnaissance to prepare for a daytime offensive, orders arrived around 08:00 indicating, "We intend a night attack, so conceal your activities." Daytime movements were prohibited. Sato then explained the impression he had derived from Senda and the intelligence on which he based his estimates: " Exploiting the impasse in diplomatic negotiation, the enemy side had steadily reinforced front-line offensive strength and trespassed anew near Shachaofeng. They now had a battalion and a half of infantry plus 20 artillery pieces in the area, some south of Shachaofeng and the others at four positions immediately east of Lake Khasan. At least a dozen (maybe 20) tanks were deployed in the sector opposite us. About 300 well-armed, active Russian troops were at Changkufeng. I decided that an attack ought to be staged that night. First of all, we were going to chill the insolent enemy by a courageous night assault—a method characteristic of the Imperial Army. Then all kinds of fire power were to be combined in a surprise attack against the positions. Our intention was to jo lt the Russians, demonstrate the true strength of our combat fire, and, by a combination of night and dawn attacks, cut down losses which our left-flank units would have incurred if a night assault alone were staged. We had considered two plans—a night attack against Changkufeng by the 3rd Battalion from the north, or by the 1st Battalion from the south. On 30 July, I decided to execute the second plan, using my 1st (Nakano's) Battalion, to avoid simultaneous involvement around Shachaofeng where the foe was by now alerted."  The Japanese Army ordinarily favored surprise assaults without supporting guns, since firepower was regarded as secondary in close combat and artillery was in short supply. According to the regimental journal, telephone contacts from the morning of the 30th indicated that the division commander shared the same line of thinking as Sato. By noon, Suetaka made his stance explicit. A phone call from Kucheng conveyed to Sato the gist of a critical division order: first, a detailed briefing on Soviet troop concentrations and dispositions, firing positions, troops, and armor south of Shachaofeng; entanglements and forces at Changkufeng; large concentrations behind west of Khasan; tanks and ground formations moving north of the lake; a heavy concentration near the lake to the northwest; one confirmed and two suspected positions along the eastern shore and another with artillery far to the south. Then the order stated that K. Sato's forces, including the Takenouchi battalion from the 76th Infantry, one mountain artillery platoon, and one engineer platoon were to strengthen their positions and, at the same time, promptly evict from Manchurian territory the intruding and advancing enemy. However, pursuit must not be pushed too far lest the border be crossed. Shortly after noon, Suetaka issued another order to form a new force under Senda, who was to strengthen border security along the Shuiliufeng–Hunchun line. As with Sato, Senda was to eject the intruding and advancing enemy from Manchurian soil but not pursue them across the border. By midafternoon, Sato knew not only what he wanted to do but also Suetaka's intentions. At 15:30, he assembled all subordinate officers at Chiangchunfeng and dictated minute attack instructions. Intelligence indicated that the enemy continued to fortify points of importance along the Changkufeng–Shachaofeng line. Sato's plan was to annihilate hostile elements that had crossed the border north and south of Changkufeng. His concept went beyond a frontal assault. While Nakano's battalion would jump off south of Changkufeng, one reinforced company, Takeshita's 10th was to attack north. Since the sun rose at about 05:00, Sato intended to wipe out the enemy during three hours of darkness. Another battalion, Hirahara's 3rd would be held in reserve, with Ito's 6th Company ready to launch a night attack against Changkufeng from the northwest if necessary. Small forces deployed southeast at Hill 52 were to block the arrival of Soviet reinforcements around the southern shores of Khasan. Only after Changkufeng was secured and fire swept the high ground south of Shachaofeng would a reinforced battalion, Takenouchi's 1st from the 76th Regiment undertake a dawn assault to clear the Russians from that sector. An engineer platoon would assist both the night and dawn assault battalions with obstacle clearing. There would be no artillery support until dawn, when the available guns were to provide maximum coverage. Notably, even the movement of a single antitank gun warranted mention. Sato concluded the attack order by directing that each unit mask its intentions after sunset. Takenouchi was to act to check the enemy as soon as the sun went down. In connection with the dawn barrage against the enemy southwest of Shachaofeng, key personnel were to study the best way to exploit sudden fire described as gale and lightning. They were also to be ready to destroy enemy tanks. A green star shell would be fired to signal the success of the night attack. The code words were shojiki "honesty" and ydmo "bravery". At midnight, the regiment commander would be at the northwest foot of Chiangchunfeng. The order stressed typical night-attack precautions: secrecy and concealment, avoidance of confusion, antitank defense, and flare signaling of success. Sato added his own flair with his daily motto as code words and the reference to "whirlwind" fire. Impending action times were explicitly set when the order was issued at 15:30 on the 30th, more than ten hours before the 1st Battalion was to jump off. The key to success in a night assault lay in an absolute prohibition on firing by their side, and bold, courageous charging. Sato reminded his men that life is granted again after death. Nakano then assembled his company commanders east of Fangchuanting and issued his battalion order at 18:30. A few hours after Sato's briefing of the assault commanders, Suetaka arrived at the 75th Regiment command post. This visit late on 30 July is central to allegations that Sato, not Suetaka, conceived and executed the night attack on his own initiative. Divisional orders giving Sato his core mission had already been conveyed by telephone. After 16:00, Suetaka boarded a motorboat at Kucheng and went to the Manchurian side to verify front-line conditions. Soviet snipers south of Yangkuanping fired several shots, but his craft reached the Matsu'otsuho landing and proceeded to Chiangchunfeng to meet Sato. Sato described the situation: "frontline enemy forces had been reinforced steadily and had begun a vigorous offensive. The foe was provoking us, and the matter had grown very serious. I had already issued orders at 15:30 to take the initiative and deal the enemy a smashing blow." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On a frost-bitten dawn by the Chaun and Tumen, Russia and Japan lock eyes over Changkufeng. Diplomats urge restraint, yet Tokyo's generals push a bold gamble: seize a hill with a surprise strike and bargain later. Japanese divisions, engineers, and artillery edge toward the border, while Soviet sentries brace for a confrontation that could widen the war. 

Last time we spoke about the Changkufeng Incident. In a frost-bitten dawn along the Chaun and Tumen rivers, a border notched with memory becomes the stage for a quiet duel of will. On one side, Japanese officers led by Inada Masazum study maps, mud, and the hill known as Changkufeng, weighing ground it offers and the risk of war. They glimpse a prize, high ground that could shield lines to Korea—yet they sense peril in every ridge, every scent of winter wind. Across the line, Soviet forces tighten their grip on the crest, their eyes fixed on the same hill, their tents and vehicles creeping closer to the border. The air hums with cautious diplomacy: Moscow's orders pulse through Seoul and Harbin, urging restraint, probing, deterring, but never inviting full-scale conflict. Yet every patrol, every reconnaissance, seems to tilt the balance toward escalation.   #177 The point of no return for the USSR and Japan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Days passed and the local emissaries had not been released by the Russians. Domei reported from Seoul that the authorities were growing worried; the "brazen" actions of Soviet front-line forces infuriated the Manchurians and Japanese. From Seoul, too, came ominous news that villagers were preparing to evacuate because they feared fighting would soon begin in the Changkufeng area. While diplomatic activity continued in Moscow without effect, the Tokyo press continued to report intense military activity throughout the Soviet Far East—the greatest massing of troops in months, with planes, armored cars, and motorized equipment choking the Trans-Siberian railway. The press was dominated by commentary about the danger of war. One enterprising Tokyo publisher ran advertisements under the heading: "The Manchukuo-Soviet Border Situation Is Urgent—Ours Is the Only Detailed Map of the Soviet Far East: Newspaper-size, in seven clear colors, offset printed, only 50 sen." Although the Manchukuoan foreign office issued a statement on 20 July about the dire consequences the Soviets were inviting, it is probable that the next Russian actions, of a conciliatory nature, were reached independently. Either Moscow had taken almost a week to make the decision, or the diplomatic conversations there had had an effect. Local Japanese authorities reported inactivity on the Changkufeng front from the morning of 23 July. On the next day, word was received that the USSR proposed to return the two emissaries as "trespassers." At midday on 26 July, the Russians released the blindfolded agents at a border site along the Novokievsk road. After completing the formalities, the Japanese asked the Russians for a reply concerning local settlement of the incident. According to Japanese sources, the "flustered" Colonel Grebennik answered: "My assignment today was merely to turn over the envoys. As for any request about the Changkufeng Incident, our guard commander must have asked for instructions from the central government. I think this is the type of matter which must be answered by the authorities at Moscow through diplomatic channels." Grebennik's postwar recollection does not differ appreciably from the Japanese version. Soviet sources mention a second effort by the Japanese military to deliver a message under more forceful circumstances. On 23 July a Soviet border unit drove off a four-man party. Russian cavalry, sent to investigate, discovered that the Japanese had pulled down a telegraph pole, severed lines 100–150 meters inside Soviet territory, absconded with wire, and left behind a white flag and a letter. Undated, unsigned, and written in Korean, the message struck Grebennik as being substantively the same as the communication delivered formally by the emissaries on 18 July. Japanese materials make no reference to a second, informal effort by local forces, but there is little reason to doubt that such an attempt, perhaps unauthorized, was made. Although Japanese efforts at low-level negotiations came to naught, two observations emerged from the local authorities and the press. First, on-the-spot negotiations had broken down; it had been difficult even to reclaim the emissaries, and the Russians in the Posyet region were using various pretexts to refer matters to diplomatic echelons. Second, the Russians had released the men. Some interpreted this as the first evidence of Soviet sincerity; possibly, the USSR would even return Matsushima's body as a step toward settlement. Other Japanese observers on the scene warned the public that it was imperative to stay on guard: "All depends on how diplomacy proceeds and how the front-line troops behave." Yet the excitement in the Japanese press began to abate. It is difficult to ascertain the nature of the decision-making process on the Russian side after the Japanese attempted local negotiations. The Soviets contend that nothing special had been undertaken before the Japanese provoked matters at the end of July. Grebennik, however, admits that after receiving the two Japanese communications, "we started to prepare against an attack on us in the Lake Khasan area." He and a group of officers went to Changkufeng Hill and sent as many border guards there as possible. Although he personally observed Japanese troops and instructed his officers to do the same, he denied categorically that the Russians constructed trenches and fortifications. Only the observation of Manchurian territory was intensified while instructions were awaited from higher headquarters. For its part, the Korea Army was carrying out Imperial general headquarters first instructions while pursuing a wait-and-see policy. On 16 July, Korea Army Headquarters wired an important operations order to Suetaka. With a view toward a possible attack against intruders in the Khasan area, the army planned to make preparations. The division commander was to alert stipulated units for emergency dispatch and send key personnel to the Kyonghun sector to undertake preparations for an attack. Lt. Col. Senda Sadasue, BGU commander of the 76th Infantry Regiment, was to reconnoiter, reinforce nearby districts, and be ready for emergencies. Particular care was enjoined not to irritate the Soviet side. Maj. Gen. Yokoyama Shinpei, the Hunchun garrison commander, was to maintain close contact with the BGU and take every precaution in guarding the frontiers. Like Senda, Yokoyama was warned against irritating the Russians. Korea Army Headquarters also dispatched staff to the front and had them begin preparations, envisaging an offensive. Upon receipt of the army order, Suetaka issued implementing instructions from his Nanam headquarters at 4:30 A.M. on the 17th. The following units were to prepare for immediate alert: the 38th Infantry Brigade Headquarters, 75th Infantry Regiment, 27th Cavalry Regiment, 5th Antiaircraft Regiment, and 19th Engineer Regiment. The same instructions applied to the next units, except that elements organic to the division were designated: the 76th Infantry Regiment, 25th Mountain Artillery Regiment, and 15th Heavy Field Artillery Regiment. Another order enjoined utmost care not to irritate the Russians; Japanese actions were to be masked. Next came a directive to the forces of Senda and K. Sato. The former comprised mainly the 76th Infantry BGU and a cavalry platoon. The latter was built around the 75th Infantry Regiment, the Kucheng garrison unit, another cavalry platoon, two mountain artillery and one heavy field artillery battalion, and the 19th Engineers. Suetaka's idea about a solution to the border troubles had become concrete and aggressive. From the night of July 17, concentration would be accomplished gradually. The exact timing of the attack would be determined by subsequent orders; in Senda's area, there was no such restriction regarding "counteraction brought on by enemy attack." Division signal and intendant officers would conduct reconnaissance related to communications, billeting, food, and supplies. Sato and his subordinates were to reconnoiter personally. Having ordered the division to begin concentration and to stand by, Korea Army Headquarters was prepared the next morning, July 17, to direct the movement. Nevertheless, there was concern in Seoul that Suetaka's advance elements might cross the Tumen River into Manchurian territory, which could result in a clash with Soviet troops. Such an outcome might run counter to the principle established by Imperial general headquarters. Consequently, it was decided that "movement east of the river would therefore have to be forbidden in the Korea Army's implementing order." Nakamura transmitted his operational instructions to Suetaka at 6:00 on July 17: "No great change in latest situation around Lake Khasan. Soviet forces are still occupying Changkufeng area. Diplomaticlevel negotiations on part of central authorities and Manchukuoan government do not appear to have progressed. Considering various circumstances and with view to preparations, this army will concentrate elements of 19th Division between Shikai, Kyonghun, Agochi." Restrictions stipulated that the division commander would transport the units by rail and motor vehicle and concentrate them in the waiting zone in secret. Movement was to begin on the night of July 17 and to be completed the next day. Further orders, however, must govern unit advance east of the Tumen as well as use of force. The remainder of the division was to stay ready to move out. Troops were to carry rations for about two weeks.   Late that day, Suetaka received an order by phone for his subordinates in line with Seoul's instructions. Senda would handle the concentration of elements assembling at Kyonghun, and Sato would do the same for the main units arriving at Agochi. A communications net was to be set up quickly. Caution was to be exercised not to undertake provocative actions against the opposite bank of the Tumen, even for reconnaissance. The division would dispatch two trains from Hoeryong and four from Nanam. At 11:58 pm on 18 July, the first train left Hoeryong for Agochi. Concentration of units was completed by dawn. By that time, the Japanese had dispatched to the border 3,236 men and 743 horses. Past midnight on 20 July, Division Chief of Staff Nakamura wired headquarters that the division was ready to take any action required, having completed the alert process by 11 pm. Japanese scouting of the Changkufeng sector began in earnest after mid-July. Although the affair had seemed amenable to settlement, Sato took steps for an emergency from around the 14th. His thoughts centered on readiness for an attack against Changkufeng, which simultaneously required reconnaissance for the assault and preparation to pull the regiment back quickly to Hoeryong if a withdrawal was ordered. After arriving at Haigan on 18 July, Sato set out with several engineers. At Kucheng, the officers donned white Korean clothing, presumably the disguise directed by the division—and boarded native oxcarts for a leisurely journey southward along the Korean bank of the Tumen across from Changkufeng. The seemingly innocent "farmers" studied the river for crossing sites and Changkufeng Hill for the extent of enemy activity. On the hill's western slope, in Manchurian territory, three rows of Russian entanglements could be observed 300 feet below the crest. Only a handful of soldiers were visible, probably a platoon, certainly not more than a company. Infantry Captain Yamada Teizo conducted secret reconnaissance of the entire Changkufeng-Hill 52 sector for 314 hours in the afternoon of 18 July. Even after intense scanning through powerful binoculars, he could detect no more than 19 lookouts and six horsemen; camouflage work had been completed that day, and there were ten separate covered trench or base points. Barbed wire, under camouflage, extended about four meters in depth, yet even Yamada's trained eye could not determine whether there was one line of stakes or two. He jotted down what he could see and compared his information with that learned from local police. Artillery Colonel R. Tanaka shared the view that the Soviets had intruded. When he went reconnoitering along the Korean bank, he observed Russian soldiers entrenched around the hilltop, easily visible through binoculars at a range of two kilometers. Trenches had been dug 20 to 30 meters below the crest on the western slope. Eventually, there were three rows of barbed wire, the first just below the trenches and the lowest 100 meters under the summit. Tanaka estimated Soviet strength at two companies (about 200 men). Suetaka's intelligence officer, Sasai, recalls seeing barbed wire after Japanese units deployed to the front on 18–19 July; he had surmised then that the entanglements were being prepared out of fear of a Japanese assault.   To obtain first-hand information, the Gaimusho ordered a section chief, Miura Kazu'ichi, to the spot. Between 23 July and the cease-fire in August, Miura collected data at Kyonghun and transmitted reports from the consulate at Hunchun. On 28 July he visited Sozan on the Korean bank. He observed Soviet soldiers on the western slopes of Changkufeng, digging trenches and driving stakes. These actions were clearly on Manchukuoan territory even according to Soviet maps. Miura insisted that he saw no friendly troops on territory claimed by the Russians and observed no provocative actions by the Japanese. These statements are supported by a map drawn for him in early August by Division Staff Officer Saito Toshio, a sketch Miura retained as late as 1947. Miura's testimony is tempered by his assertion that he saw a red flag flying near the top of Changkufeng Hill. This contention conflicts with all evidence, as Russian lawyers at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East argued, it is improbable that a Soviet frontier post, highly interested in camouflage, would have hoisted a pennon so large that it could be seen from Sozan. Russian sources are unanimous in stating that no flag was put up until 6 August and that no trenches or entanglements were established by Soviet border guards in July, at least prior to the 29th. The two Army General staff consultants, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Seoul on 16 July, the day Korea Army Headquarters was ordering an alert for the 19th Division "with a view toward a possible attack against enemy intruders." Inada dispatched them mainly to inspect the frontline situation; but he had not fully decided on reconnaissance in force. At Shikai, Arisue and Kotani donned Korean garb and traveled by oxcart on the Korean side of the Tumen, reconnoitering opposite the Shachaofeng sector. Kotani was convinced that hostile possession of Changkufeng posed a serious threat to the Korean railway. He agreed with the division's estimate that, if the Japanese did decide to seize Changkufeng, it ought not to be too difficult. Arisue, as senior observer, dispatched messages from Kyonghun to Tokyo detailing their analysis and recommendations. Meanwhile, in Tokyo, on 17 July the central military authorities received a cable from the Japanese envoy in Moscow, Colonel Doi Akio, reporting that prospects for a diplomatic settlement were nil. The USSR was taking a hard line because Japan was deeply involved in China, though there were domestic considerations as well. The Russians, however, showed no intention of using the border incident to provoke war. It would be best for Japan to seize Changkufeng quickly and then press forward with parleys. Meanwhile, Japan should conduct an intensive domestic and external propaganda campaign. There was mounting pressure in the high command that negotiations, conducted "unaided," would miss an opportunity. Based on reports from Arisue and Kotani, that army seemed to be contemplating an unimaginative, ponderous plan: an infantry battalion would cross the Tumen west of Changkufeng and attack frontally, while two more battalions would cross south of Kyonghun to drive along the river and assault Changkufeng from the north. Inada sent a telegram on 17 July to Arisue for "reference." Prospects had diminished that Soviet troops would withdraw as a result of negotiation. As for the attack ideas Arisue mentioned, Inada believed it necessary to prepare to retake Changkufeng with a night attack using small forces. To avoid widening the crisis, the best plan was a limited, surprise attack using ground units. The notion of a surprise attack drew on the Kwantung Army's extensive combat experience in Manchuria since 1931.  The next morning, after the forward concentration of troops was completed, Suetaka went to the front. From Kucheng, he observed the Changkufeng district and decided on concrete plans for use of force. Meanwhile, Nakamura was curbing any hawkish courses at the front. As high-command sources privately conceded later, the younger officers in Tokyo sometimes seemed to think the commander was doing too good a job; there was covert sentiment that it might be preferable if someone in the chain of command acted independently before the opportunity slipped away. This is significant in light of the usual complaints by responsible central authorities about gekokujo—insubordination—by local commands. An important report influencing the high command's view arrived from Kwantung Army Intelligence on 19 July: according to agents in Khabarovsk, the USSR would not let the Changkufeng incident develop into war; Russians also believed there would be no large-scale Soviet intrusion into their territory. By 19 July, the Tokyo operations staff was considering the best method to restore control of the lost hill by force, since Seoul appeared to maintain its laissez-faire stance. On 18 July, Arisue and Kotani were instructed by Imperial General headquarters to assist the Korea Army and the 19th Division regarding the Changkufeng Incident. What the Army general staff operations officers sought was an Imperial General headquarters order, requiring Imperial sanction, that would instruct the Korea Army to evict the Russian troops from Changkufeng the way the Kwantung Army would, using units already under Nakamura's command. The sense was that the affair could be handled locally, but if the USSR sought to escalate the incident, it might be prudent for that to occur before the Hankow operation began. The IGHQ and War Ministry coordinated the drafting of an IGHQ order on 19–20 July: "We deem it advisable to eradicate Soviet challenges . . . by promptly delivering blow on this occasion against unit which crossed border at Changkufeng. That unit is in disadvantageous spot strategically and tactically; thus, probability is scant that dispute would enlarge, and we are investigating countermeasures in any case. Careless expansion of situation is definitely not desired. We would like you people also to conduct studies concerning mode of assault employing smallest strength possible for surprise attack against limited objective. Kindly learn general atmosphere here [Tokyo] from [Operations] Major Arao Okikatsu." The 20th of July proved to be a hectic day in Korea, and even more so in Tokyo. The division had informed the Korea Army that it was finally "ready to go," a message received in Seoul in the early hours. Then Arisue received a wire from Inada presenting limited-attack plans and noting that Arao was on the way. By that day, Japanese intelligence judged there were 400 Soviet troops and two or three mountain guns south of Paksikori. Russian positions at Changkufeng had been reinforced, but no aggressive intentions could be detected. Soviet ground elements, as well as materiel, appeared to be moving from Vladivostok and Slavyanka toward Posyet. Suetaka headed back to the front. Sato told him that it was absolutely necessary to occupy Chiangchunfeng Hill across the Tumen in Manchurian territory. Upon reaching the Wuchiatzu sector and inspecting the situation, Suetaka agreed to send a small unit to Chiangchunfeng on his own authority.  Colonel Sato Kotoku had ordered one company to move across the Tumen toward Chiangchunfeng on 21 July, a maneuver that did not escape the Russians' notice. On 24 July, the same day another Japanese unit occupied Shangchiaoshan Hill, Marshal Blyukher ordered the 40th Rifle Division, stationed in the Posyet area to be placed on combat readiness, with a force of regulars assigned to back the Soviet border guards; two reinforced rifle battalions were detached as a reserve. According to Japanese records, Russian border patrols began appearing around Huichungyuan, Yangkuanping, and Shachaofeng from 26 July, but no serious incidents were reported at that stage. At about 9:30 am on 29 July, Captain Kanda, the 2nd Company commander of Lieutenant Colonel Senda's 76th Border Garrison Unit, was observing the Shachaofeng area from his Kucheng cantonments. Through his glasses, Kanda observed four or five Soviet soldiers engaged in construction on high ground on the west side of Shachaofeng. Kanda notified Senda, who was at BGU Headquarters inspecting the forward areas. Senda transmitted the information to Suetaka. Deciding to cross the Tumen for a closer look, Senda set off with Kanda. A little after 11 am, they reached Chiangchunfeng Hill, where the men from Captain Noguchi's company were already located. Senda verified, to his own satisfaction, that as many as 10 enemy infantrymen had "violated the border" to a depth of 350 meters, "even by the Soviets' contention", and were starting construction 1,000 meters south of Shachaofeng. Senda decided to oust the Russian force "promptly and resolutely," in light of the basic mission assigned his unit. He telephoned Suetaka, who was in Kyonghun, and supplied the intelligence and the recommendation. Subordinates recalled Suetaka's initial reaction when the BGU reported a Soviet intrusion about a mile and a half north of Changkufeng. "The arrogant Russians were making fools of the Japanese, or were trying to. At stake was not a trifling hill and a few invaders, but the honor of the Imperial Army. In the face of this insult, the general became furious. He insisted upon smashing the enemy right away."  Kanda phoned 2nd Lieutenant Sakuma, who was still at Kucheng, and told him to bring his 25-man platoon across the river by 2 pm Sakuma crossed by boat and arrived at 1:30. Kanda set out from Chiangchunfeng at 2:20, took over Sakuma's unit, bore east, and approached within 700 meters of the enemy. He ordered the men not to fire unless fired upon, and to withdraw quickly after routing the Russians. It is said that the Japanese troops were fired upon as they advanced in deployed formation but did not respond at first. In a valley, casualties were incurred and the Japanese finally returned fire. Sakuma's 1st Squad leader took a light machine gun and pinned down the Russians facing him. Sakuma himself pressed forward with his other two squads, taking advantage of the slope to envelop the enemy from the right. At the same time, he sent a patrol to the high ground on the left to cover the platoon's flank. Thanks to the 1st Squad's frontal assault, the Russians had no chance to worry about their wings, and Sakuma moved forward to a point only 30 meters from the foe's rear. Kanda was now 50 meters from the Russians. When the enemy light machine gun let up, he ordered a charge and, in the lead, personally cut down one of the foe. Sakuma also rushed the Soviets, but when about to bring down his saber he was stabbed in the face while another Russian struck him in the shoulder. Grappling with this assailant, Sakuma felled him. Other Japanese attackers sabered two more Russians and shot the rest. By 3:10 pm the eight enemy "trespassers" had been annihilated. The covering patrol reported that five Soviet horsemen, with a light machine gun, were galloping up from Khasan. Sakuma had his platoon fire grenade dischargers, which smashed the enemy. Seventy more Russian soldiers now came, attacking from northwest of the lake and supported by fire from the east side. Using light machine guns and grenade dischargers, Sakuma checked them. Meanwhile, Miyashita's platoon, part of Noguchi's company, had departed from Chiangchunfeng at 2:20 pm and swung right until it reached the crestline between Changkufeng and Kanda's company. One squad faced 200 Russians on Changkufeng; the other faced the enemy south of Shachaofeng. Soviet forces opened intense machine-gun fire from Changkufeng and from the high ground east of the lake. After 20 minutes, Kanda's unit charged, two or three Russians fled, and Miyashita's platoon shot one down. Senda, who had gone with Miyashita, directed the platoon's movements and proceeded north, under fire, to Kanda's unit. Once the Russians had been cleared out, Senda forbade pursuit across the boundary and gradually withdrew his forces to the heights line 800 meters southwest. It was 4:30 then. By 5 pm Soviet reinforcements, apparently brought up from the Changkufeng and Paksikori sectors, advanced anew. With 80 men in the front lines, the enemy pushed across the border to a depth of at least 500 meters, according to the Japanese, and began to establish positions. Several tanks and many troops could be observed in the rear. Senda had Noguchi's company hold Chiangchunfeng. Kanda's unit, reinforced by 33 men from Kucheng, was to occupy the heights southwest of Shachaofeng, while Imagawa's company of the 76th Regiment was to occupy other high ground to the west. Senda then reported the situation to Suetaka in Kyonghun and asked for reinforcements. In Seoul, Army headquarters understood the developments reported by Suetaka as a response to the hostile border violation, and about 20 men of the Kucheng BGU under Lt. Sakuma drove the enemy out between 2:30 and 3 pm. Afterward, Sakuma pulled back to high ground two kilometers south of Yangkuanping to avoid trouble and was now observing the foe. Although Seoul had heard nothing about Japanese losses, Corp. Akaishizawa Kunihiko personally observed that Kanda had been wounded in the face by a grenade and bandaged, that Sakuma had been bayoneted twice and also bandaged, and that the dead lay on the grass, covered with raincoats. According to Suetaka "the enemy who had crossed the border south of Shachaofeng suffered losses and pulled back once as a result of our attack at about 2:30 pm". By about 4:30, Suetaka continued, the Russians had built up their strength and attacked the platoon on the heights southwest of Shachaofeng. Behind the Russian counterattack, there were now several tanks. Earlier, Suetaka noted ominously that several rounds of artillery had been fired from the Changkufeng area; "therefore, we reinforced our units too, between 5 and 6 pm., and both sides are confronting each other." Details as to the fate of Sakuma's platoon are not given, but it is now admitted that casualties were incurred on both sides. The Korea Army Headquarters consequently reported to Tokyo in the evening that, according to information from the division, 20 Japanese had driven out the Russians near Shachaofeng; 25 men from Senda's unit were occupying the heights 600 meters west of Changkufeng; and another 16 men were deployed in ambush at Yangkuanping. Such an enumeration would have tended to suggest that only a few dozen Japanese were across the Tumen on the 29th. But a review of the numbers of combat troops committed and the reinforcements sent by Senda reveals that Japanese strength across the river was in the hundreds by nightfall. In Moscow, Tass reported that on 29 July detachments of Japanese-Manchukuoan intruders had attempted to seize high ground apparently located 0.5 miles north of a Russian position. The assailants had been "completely repelled from Soviet territory, as a result of measures taken by Russian frontier guards," and instructions had been sent to the embassy in Tokyo to protest strongly. Walter Duranty, the veteran American correspondent in Moscow, heard that the Japanese press had published reports, likely intended for internal consumption, that hours of furious fighting had occurred at the points in question. Since the dispatches were unsubstantiated and "failed to gain credence anywhere outside Japan," Duranty claimed this may have forced the Japanese to translate into action their boast of "applying force" unless their demands were satisfied. "Now, it appears, they have applied force, unsuccessfully." The Soviet communiqué on the Shachaofeng affair, despite its firm tone, appeared unostentatiously in the following day's Pravda and Izvestiya under the headline, "Japanese Militarists Continue Their Provocation." The Japanese Embassy in Moscow heard nothing about the Shachaofeng affray until the morning of the 30th, when a wire was received from the Gaimusho that ten Russian soldiers had occupied a position northwest of Changkufeng and had begun trench work until ejected by frontier guards. Since the Russian communiqué spoke of afternoon fighting, American correspondents concluded that Soviet troops must have counterattacked and driven off the Japanese. No additional information was available to the public in Moscow on the 30th, perhaps because it was a holiday. Nevertheless, in the afternoon, Stalin's colleague Kaganovich addressed an immense crowd in Moscow on "Railroad Day" and at the conclusion of a long, vigorous speech said:  "The Soviet Union is prepared to meet all enemies, east or west." It certainly was not a fighting speech and there is no reason to suppose the Soviet will abandon its firm peace policy unless Japan deliberately forced the issue. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Diplomacy flickered as Moscow pressed restraint and Tokyo whispered calculated bravado. As July wore on, both sides massed troops, built trenches, and sent scouts across the river. A tense, hidden war unfolded, skirmishes, patrols, and small advances, until a fleeting moment when force collided with restraint, and the hill's future hung in the frost.

Last time we spoke about the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict. The border between Soviet Manchuria and Japanese-occupied territories emerges not as a single line but as a mosaic of contested spaces, marks, and memories. A sequence of incidents, skirmishes along the Chaun and Tumen rivers, reconnaissance sorties, and the complex diplomacy of Moscow, Tokyo, and peripheral actors to trace how risk escalated from routine patrols to calibrated leverage. On the ground, terrain functioned as both obstacle and argument: ridges like Changkufeng Hill shaping sightlines, river valleys shaping decisions, and markers weathered by snow, wind, and drift. In command tents, officers translated terrain into doctrine: contingency plans, supply routes, and the precarious calculus of restraint versus escalation. Both nations sought to establish firmer defensive barriers against the other. Inevitably they were destined to clash, but how large that clash would become, nobody knew.   #176 The Changkufeng Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the last episode we broke down a general history of the Soviet-Japanese Border Conflict and how it escalated significantly by 1938. Colonel Inada Masazum serving as chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March of 1938 would play a significant role in this story. When the Japanese command's attention was drawn to the area of Changkufeng, consideration was given to the ownership and importance of the disputed high ground. Inada and his operations section turned to an appraisal of the geography. The officers had been impressed by the strategic importance of the Tumen, which served to cut off the hill country from North Korea. In the Changkufeng area, the river was a muddy 600 to 800 meters wide and three to five meters deep. Japanese engineers had described rowing across the stream as "rather difficult."  Russian roads on the left bank were very good, according to Japanese intelligence. Heavy vehicles moved easily; the Maanshan section comprised the Russians' main line of communications in the rear. To haul up troops and materiel, the Russians were obliged to use trucks and ships, for there were no railways apart from a four-kilometer line between the harbor and town of Novokievsk. Near Changkufeng, hardly any roadways were suitable for vehicular traffic. On the right, or Korean, bank of the Tumen, there were only three roads suitable for vehicular traffic, but even these routes became impassable after a day or two of rain. In the sector between Hill 52 to the south and Shachaofeng to the north, the most pronounced eminences were Chiangchunfeng and the humps of Changkufeng. Rocky peaks were characteristically shaped like inverted T's, which meant many dead angles against the crests. The gentle slopes would allow tanks to move but would restrict their speed, as would the ponds and marshes. In general, the terrain was treeless and afforded little cover against aircraft. Against ground observation or fire, corn fields and tall miscanthus grass could provide some shielding. Between Chiangchunfeng and the Tumen, which would have to serve as the main route of Japanese supply, the terrain was particularly sandy and hilly. This rendered foot movement difficult but would reduce the effectiveness of enemy bombs and shells. The high ground east of Khasan afforded bases for fire support directed against the Changkufeng region. Plains characterized the rest of the area on the Soviet side, but occasional streams and swamps could interfere with movement of tanks and trucks. The only towns or villages were Novokievsk, Posyet, Yangomudy, and Khansi. At Kozando there were a dozen houses; at Paksikori, a few. The right bank was farmed mainly by Koreans, whose scattered cottages might have some value for billeting but offered none for cover. On the left bank, the largest hamlets were Fangchuanting, with a population of 480 dwelling in 73 huts, and Yangkuanping, where there were 39 cottages. Shachaofeng was uninhabited. Japanese occupation of Changkufeng would enable observation of the plain stretching east from Posyet Bay, although intelligence made no mention of Soviet naval bases, submarine pens, or airstrips in the immediate area of Posyet, either in existence or being built in 1938. As Inada knew, the Japanese Navy judged that Posyet Bay might have another use, as a site for Japanese landing operations in the event of war. In Russian hands, the high ground would endanger the Korean railway. This line, which started from Najin in northeastern Korea, linked up with the vital system in Manchuria at the town of Tumen and provided a short cut, if not a lifeline, between Japan and the Kwantung Army and Manchuria from across the Sea of Japan. Even from relatively low Changkufeng, six or seven miles of track were exposed to Soviet observation between Hongui and Shikai stations. The port of Najin, with its fortress zone, lay 11 miles southwest; Unggi lay even nearer. It was not the danger of Japanese shelling of Vladivostok, at an incredible range of 80 miles that was at stake but the more realistic hypothesis of Russian shelling of the rail line, and Russian screening of the Soviet side of the border. Hills and questions were thought to have two sides. It was the consensus of Japanese that Changkufeng Hill's potential value to the Russians far outweighed its possible benefits to them, or at least that the Japanese had more to lose if the Russians took the high ground by the Tumen. Inada nurtured few illusions concerning the intrinsic value of the heights. Despite the fact that the high command always had good reasons for quiescence in the north, Inada believed that the latest border difficulty could not be overlooked. By mid-July 1938 Inada's thoughts crystallized. The Japanese would conduct a limited reconnaissance in force known as iryoku teisatsu in the strategic sense. Whereas, at the tactical schoolbook level, this might mean the dispatch of small forces into enemy territory to seek local combat intelligence, at the Imperial General Headquarters level the concept was far more sweeping. There would also be useful evidence of mobilization and other buildup procedures. The affair at Changkufeng was merely a welcome coincidence, something started by the Russians but liable to Japanese exploration. Inada had no intention of seizing territory, of becoming involved in a war of attrition at a remote and minor spot, or of provoking hostilities against the USSR. The Russians would comprehend the nature of the problem, too. If they were interested in interfering seriously with the Japanese, there were numberless better locations to cause trouble along the Manchurian front; those were the places to watch. The cramped Changkufeng sector, described as "narrow like a cat's brow," could too readily be pinched off from Hunchun to render it of strategic value to either side. The bog land to the north interfered with the use of armored forces, while artillery sited on the heights along the Tumen in Korea could as easily control the area as batteries emplaced east of the lake. It was Inada's professional opinion that the Russians could commit three or four infantry divisions there at most, with no mechanized corps—no heavy tanks, in particular. No decisive battle could be waged, although, once the Russians became involved, they might have to cling to the hill out of a sense of honor. The military action would be meaningless even if the Japanese let the Russians have the heights. For their part, the Japanese would ostensibly be fighting to secure the boundary and to hold Changkufeng peak, beyond which they would not move a step onto Soviet soil. There would be no pursuit operations. Troop commitment would be limited to about one division without tank support. Japanese Air Force intervention would be forbidden. Matters would be directed entirely by Imperial General Headquarters working through the Korea Army chain of command and carried out by the local forces. Calm, clear, and dispassionate overall estimates and instructions would be based on materials available only in Tokyo. The command would not allow the Kwantung Army to touch the affair. Inada foresaw that the Japanese government might also seek a settlement through diplomacy. Although border demarcation was desirable and should be sought, the command would not insist on it, nor would it demand permanent occupation of Changkufeng summit. As soon as reconnaissance objectives had been achieved, the local forces would be withdrawn. As Inada described it "In the process, we would have taught the Russians some respect and given them a lesson concerning their repeated, high-handed provocations and intrusions. If a show of force sufficed to facilitate the negotiations and cause the Russians to back down, so much the better; the affair would be over and my point proved." The instrument for carrying out Inada's strategic design appeared to be ideal, the 19th Division, strenuously trained and high-spirited. It could be expected to perform very well if unleashed within defined limits. Colonel Suetaka was just the commander to direct local operations. Since he had been pleading to fight in China, an operation at Changkufeng might prove to be an excellent "safety valve." His staff was full of experienced, fierce warriors eager for battle. Until recently, the Korea Army commanding general had wisely kept the aggressive division away from Changkufeng Hill, but now Imperial general headquarters had its own overriding ideas and needs. How could the Japanese ensure that any military action would remain limited if the Russians chose to respond with vigor? Naturally, one infantry division, without armor or air support, could not withstand all of the Soviet forces in the maritime province. Inada answered that the mission to be assigned the 19th Division was merely the recapture of Changkufeng crest. If the Japanese side had to break off the operation, evacuation would be effected voluntarily and resolutely on Imperial general headquarters responsibility, without considerations of "face." At worst, the Japanese might lose one division, but the affair would be terminated at the Tumen River without fail. "Even so, we ought to be able to prove our theory as well as demonstrate our true strength to the Russians." In case the Soviets opted for more than limited war, the Japanese were still not so overextended in China that they could not alter their strategic disposition of troops. Although the Kwantung Army's six divisions were outnumbered four to one and the Japanese were not desirous of a war at that moment, the first-class forces in Manchuria could make an excellent showing. In addition, the high command possessed armor, heavy artillery, fighters, and bombers, held in check in Manchuria and Korea, as well as reserves in the homeland. There was also the 104th Division, under tight Imperial general headquarters control, in strategic reserve in southern Manchuria. Inada recalled "How would the Russians react? That was the answer I sought. Victory in China depended on it." By mid-July, the high command, at Inada's urging, had worked out a plan titled, "Imperial General headqaurters Essentials for Dealing with the Changkufeng Incident." Tada's telegram of 14 July to Koiso described succinctly the just-decided policy: the central authorities concurred with the Korea Army's opinion regarding the Changkufeng affair, then in embryo. Considering that Changkufeng Hill posed a direct threat to the frontier of Korea, Imperial General headqaurters would immediately urge the foreign ministry to lodge a stern protest. Next day, Tojo sent a telegram stating the Japanese policy of employing diplomacy; whether the Russians should be evicted by force required cautious deliberation in case the USSR did not withdraw voluntarily. On the basis of the guidance received from Imperial General headqaurters, the Korea Army drew up its own plan, "Essentials for Local Direction of the Changkufeng Incident," on 15 July. Intelligence officer Tsuchiya Sakae was sent promptly to the front from Seoul. At the same time, military authorities allowed the press to release news that Soviet troops were constructing positions inside Manchurian territory in an "obvious provocation." The government of Manchukuo was demanding an immediate withdrawal. Even then, those Japanese most closely connected with the handling of the Changkufeng Incident were not in agreement that everybody at command level was as ardent a proponent of reconnaissance in force as Inada claimed to be. Some thought that most, if not all, of his subordinates, youthful and vigorous, were in favor of the notion; others denied the existence of such an idea. Inada remained clear-cut in his own assertions. Everything done by the local Soviet forces, he insisted, must have been effected with the permission of Moscow; it was customary for the USSR not to abandon what it had once started. The Japanese Army never really thought that the Soviet Union would withdraw just as the result of diplomatic approaches. Therefore, from the outset, preparations were made to deal the Russians one decisive blow. Inada had recommended his plan, with its clear restrictions, to his colleagues and superiors; the scheme, he says, was approved 14 July "all the way up the chain of command, through the Army general staff and the ministry of war, with unexpected ease." The only real opposition, Inada recalled, came from the navy, whose staff advised the army operations staff, in all sincerity, to give up the idea of strategic reconnaissance. Inada adhered to his opinion stubbornly. He never forgot the grave look on the face of Captain Kusaka, the UN operations section chief, as the latter gave in reluctantly. The navy view was that the Changkufeng affair typified the army's aggressive policies as opposed to relative passivity on the part of the navy. Like Kusaka, Japanese Navy interviewees shared the fear that Changkufeng might prove to be the most dangerous military confrontation ever to occur between the USSR and Japan. In view of navy objections, one wonders where Inada could have drawn support for his concept of reconnaissance in force. If one accepts the comments contained in a letter from a navy ministry captain, Takagi Sokichi, to Baron Harada Kumao at the beginning of August, in the army and in a portion of the navy there existed "shallow-minded fellows who are apt to take a firm stand in the blind belief that the USSR would not really rise against us, neglecting the fact that the Russians had foreseen our weak points." Takagi also had violent things to say about "white-livered" Gaimusho elements that were playing up to the army. Although Takagi's remarks, expressed in confidence, were sharp, cautious injunctions were being delivered by the high command to the new Korea Army commander, General Nakamura Kotaro, who was about to leave for Seoul to replace Koiso. Nakamura's attitude was crucial for the course and outcome of the Changkufeng Incident. More of a desk soldier than a warrior, he characteristic ally displayed a wariness that was reinforced by the guidance provided him. This personal quality assumes even greater significance if one believes that the Russians may have initiated the Changkufeng Incident by exploiting the special opportunities afforded them by the routine replacement of the Korea Army commander, the temporary absence from Moscow of Ambassador Shigemitsu Mamoru, and the geographical as well as subjective gap between the Kwantung and Korea armies that was exposed during the Lyushkov affair. At 10:00 on 15 July Nakamura was designated army commander by the Emperor at the palace. Soon afterward, he was briefed by Imperial General headquarters officers. Hashimoto, the operations bureau chief, recalled that when he saw Nakamura off on 17 July, Hashimoto stressed prudence, limitation of any military action, and diplomatic solution of the problem. The new commanding general, Inada asserted, promised full cooperation. There was no mention, at this level, of Inada's concept of reconnaissance in force. When Nakamura reached Seoul, he found an Imperial order from Tokyo dated 16 July awaiting him. This important document stipulated that he could concentrate units under his command in Korea near the border against the trespassing Soviet forces in the Changkufeng area. Resort to force, however, was dependent upon further orders. This message was followed by a wire from Kan'in, the Army general staff chief. The Imperial order, it was explained, had been designed to support diplomatic negotiations. Simultaneous approval was granted for concentrating forces to respond swiftly in case the situation deteriorated. As for implementation of the Imperial order, discretion should be exercised in line with the opinion expressed earlier by Korea Army Headquarters. Negotiations were to be conducted in Moscow and Harbin, the location of a Soviet consulate in Manchukuo. Meanwhile, the command was dispatching two officers for purposes of liaison: Lt. Colonel Arisue Yadoru in Operations and Major Kotani Etsuo a specialist in Soviet intelligence. Inada advised Arisue that, apart from liaison flights inside the frontiers, particular care should be exercised with regard to actions that might lead to air combat. Nevertheless, although Inada stated that the Imperial order called for "a sort of military demonstration," he admitted that it meant preparatory action for an attack. The Korea Army senior staff officer, Iwasaki, recalled hearing nothing about secret intentions. Nakamura briefed his staff about the need for restraint, especially during this key period of the Wuhan operation. Koiso had disposed of speculation that he had issued an order to concentrate the 19th Division before Nakamura arrived, although he and Nakamura did have the opportunity to confer in Seoul before he departed for Japan. The Imperial order of 16 July, in response to Koiso's inquiry received in Tokyo on 14 July, had arrived in Seoul addressed to Nakamura; thereupon, the Korea Army chief of staff, Kitano, had the message conveyed to the division. By 21 July Koiso was back in Tokyo where, the day afterward, he advised the war minister, Itagaki, "to act prudently with respect to the Changkufeng problem." Why did the high command dispatch two field-grade liaison officers to Korea from the outset of the Changkufeng Incident? The Korea Army lacked operations staff. Its commander had been allotted prime responsibility, within the chain of command, for defense of northeastern Korea. At the beginning, the highest-ranking staff officer at the front was a major. Since there were no fundamental differences of opinion between the command and the forces in Korea, it was proper to send experts from Tokyo to assist. Imperial General headqaurters would observe the situation carefully, devise measures on the basis of the overall view, and issue orders which the Korea Army would implement through ordinary channels. It had not been the type of incident which required the army commander to go to the front to direct. This was the Korea Army's first test, and political as well as diplomatic problems were involved that the army in the field should not or could not handle. If Tokyo had left decisions to the division and its regiments, the latter would have been held to account, which was not proper. Imperial General headquarters had to assume responsibility and reassure local commanders of its full support. Imaoka Yutaka explained that operational guidance by Imperial General headquarters and line operations conducted by the 19th Division formed the core of the affair; the Korea Army, placed between, was "shadowy." Koiso had not been enthusiastic; this set the mood among the staff. Nakamura, who arrived with a thorough comprehension of AGS thinking, was basically passive. The Korea Army staff, in general, included no "wild boars."    There was an urgent need to monitor developments. Not only was the Korea Army unfamiliar with handling this type of incident, but many hitches occurred. There had been no practice in emergency transmission of coded wires between the Korea Army and Tokyo. Now telegram after telegram had to be sent; most were deciphered incorrectly and many were not decoded at all. Another problem centered on the lack of knowledge in Tokyo about the situation on the spot, which only visual observation could rectify. As a result, the two Army general staff experts, Arisue and Kotani, arrived in Korea on 16 July. Kotani recalled that he was to collect intelligence and assist the local authorities. One of the first duties that he and Arisue performed was to disseminate the principle that use of force required a prior Imperial order. Also on 16 July, Japanese newspapers reported that the USSR was still concentrating troops, that the Manchukuoan government was watching intently, "decisive punitive measures" were being contemplated by the Japanese-Manchukuoan authorities, and there were signs of a worsening of the crisis. Despite good reasons for this gloomy appraisal, the Japanese press had not yet given the incident page-one treatment. More alarming news was being disseminated abroad. Domei, the official Japanese news agency, reported that the situation would probably become worse unless Soviet troops were withdrawn. The position of the Japanese government impressed foreign correspondents as unusually firm. Informants characterized the Changkufeng Incident as the most serious affair since the clash on the Amur River in 1937. Irked by the Korea Army's timidity and eager for first-hand information, the Kwantung Army dispatched two observers to the front: from Intelligence, Ogoshi Kenji, and from Operations, Tsuji Masanobu. If you listen to my pacific war week by week podcast or echoes of war, you know I highlight Tsuji Masanobu as one of the most evil Japanese officers of WW2. No other way to describe this guy, he was a shithead. In his memoirs, Tsuji asserted that he and Ogoshi climbed Changkufeng Hill, discerned Soviet soldiers digging across the peak in Manchurian territory, and concluded that "probably even Tokyo could not overlook such a clear-cut case of invasion." Although his account aligned with the general thrust, Ogoshi contended that Tsuji could not have accompanied him. According to sources with the 19th Division, when Koiso learned that Tsuji and Ogoshi were disparaging the Korea Army's ability to defend Changkufeng, he ordered "those spies" ousted. Ogoshi replied that the army staff was not angry, but Koiso did become furious and ordered Ogoshi "arrested for trespassing." Ogoshi surmised that Koiso's concern was that emotional outsiders such as Tsuji could provoke trouble, perhaps even war, if they visited Changkufeng. This view was widely shared. Inada stated that he made a practice of keeping away to maintain the degree of detachment and impartiality required of high command authorities. One sidelight to the "fraternal" visit to the Changkufeng area by observers from Hsinking was provided by Lt. Colonel Katakura Tadashi, chief of the Kwantung Army's 4th Section, which handled Manchukuo affairs, primarily political direction. When Katakura visited the Operations Section, Tsuji and Ogoshi told him that an intrusion had been confirmed and that the Kwantung Army staff was studying ways to evict the Soviets. Katakura consulted Maj. General Ishiwara Kanji, acting chief of staff, who was already in possession of the draft of an operations order calling for offensive preparations by the Kwantung Army against the Russians at Changkufeng. Katakura asked for reconsideration of the order. This was not a matter to be handled solely by the operations staff. Borders and international affairs were involved; hence the 4th Section, along with the Manchukuoan government, the Gaimusho, and other agencies, were concerned. Field observers were expressing exaggerated personal opinions based on having seen Soviet sentries on a hilltop. If the matter fell within the Korea Army's defensive prerogative, that army ought to handle it. Apparently the Kwantung Army commander and Ishiwara agreed with Katakura, for the draft order was not approved. The so-called private message dispatched by a Kwantung Army staff officer just before Koiso's departure may have been provoked by this rejection of direct participation by forces under Kwantung Army command. Staff officers in Tokyo believed that Hsinking could not see the forest for the trees. In the high command's view, the Kwantung Army's deliberate escalation of a negligible frontier incident undoubtedly stemmed from a failure to grasp the strategic requirements of national defense—pursuit of the campaign in China, the nurturance of Manchukuo, and the buildup of operational readiness for the ultimate solution of the Soviet problem. The high command felt obliged to remind the Kwantung Army that, in dealing with the Changkufeng Incident, the central authorities pressed for a Russian pullback through diplomacy. Consequently, the Korea Army had been instructed to be ready to concentrate troops near Changkufeng as a "background." Meanwhile, it remained the Imperial will that utmost prudence be exercised. The Kwantung Army commander accordingly issued cautious instructions to subordinate units, especially those on the eastern border. The high command's injunctions did not end the discontent and recrimination at the lower levels of Kwantung Army Headquarters, nor did they quiet the concern felt in Tokyo. A former war minister told Baron Harada repeatedly in late July that the Kwantung Army was "no good," while the superintendent of police added that the Kwantung Army was embarrassing Foreign Minister Ugaki. Nevertheless, the Kwantung Army did exert self-restraint. For its part, the Korea Army naïvely sought to achieve entente with an antagonist who considered the case nonnegotiable. First, the government of Manchukuo was asked to lodge a formal protest with the USSR. The commissioner for foreign affairs at Harbin phoned V. V. Kuznetzov, the acting consul, on the night of 14 July and saw him on the 18th. Basing its contentions on maps, the Haensing regime demanded Soviet withdrawal from Changkufeng. The Japanese government was lodging similar protests within the framework of Japanese-Manchukuoan joint defense agreements. On the spot, the situation inflamed. During the afternoon of 15 July, a Japanese military police patrol from Korea reconnoitered at the foot of Hill 52, southeast of Changkufeng. The party came under Soviet gunfire and was driven back, abandoning the body of Corp. Matsushima Shakuni. Japanese sources claimed that a Russian ambush had been set inside Manchuria. The Russian side insisted that it was the Soviet frontier that had been violated by thirty meters. Kuzma Grebennik, the colonel commanding the 59th BGU, which covered the Posyet sector, asserted that Matsushima's effects included a notebook containing reconnaissance results and a camera with film of Soviet-claimed terrain, particularly Changkufeng Hill. According to Maj. Gilfan Batarshin, a subordinate of Grebennik, two Russian border guards from Podgornaya opened fire when the Japanese fled after being challenged. Japanese protests to the USSR about the death of Matsushima and the taking of his body were added to the negotiations concerning the disputed border and the alleged trespassing. Charge Nishi Haruhiko lodged a vigorous complaint in Moscow on 15 July but was answered by a counterprotest. Ambassador Shigemitsu underwent an identical experience during a conversation with Foreign Commissar Maxim Litvinov on 20 July. Shigemitsu retorted that the murder tended to exacerbate the negotiations. In his memoirs, he stated that the killing of Matsushima provoked the local Japanese border garrison unit. The shooting occurred as the Soviet military buildup continued, according to Japanese sources. Mechanized units were reported moving in the direction of Kyonghun from Barabash and Posyet Bay. Biplanes were reconnoitering the Hunchun Valley, within Manchurian territory, from the afternoon of 16 July. To the local Japanese authorities, it seemed that the Russians were adopting a challenging attitude. Although the Japanese-Manchukuoan side remained willing to negotiate—that is, to take no forceful actions if the Russians would withdraw, the latter appeared not to share such an intention. The Soviets were not only misinterpreting the Hunchun treaty to their advantage but were encroaching beyond what they claimed to be the line; they "lacked sincerity." Decisive use of force might have been imperative to secure the Manchurian border, which was Japan's legal responsibility. As far north as Tungning on the eastern Manchurian frontier, two Soviet ground divisions and considerable numbers of tanks and aircraft were reported massed in full view. At Changkufeng, Russian soldiers fortified the crest. Mountain guns were now seen with muzzles pointed toward Manchuria, and Japanese intelligence estimated that Soviet troop strength near Changkufeng had grown to 120 or 130 by the evening of 18 July. As Sawamoto Rikichiro, an Imperial aide, noted in his diary, "It would seem that settlement of the affair had become increasingly difficult." Korea Army staff officer Tsuchiya sent two emissaries bearing the notice to the Soviet border. The pair, "blazing with patriotic ardor,"set out on 18 July, carrying a message in one hand and a white flag in the other. From Kyonghun came the report the next day that there had been an urgent, well-attended Soviet staff meeting at BGU Headquarters in Novokievsk all night, and that the Russian side had been discomfited by the Japanese request, which had been transmitted to higher authorities. Still, the emissaries did not return, while a stream of reports indicated a Soviet buildup along a dozen frontier sectors. Russian authorities had reportedly forced the natives to evacuate an area twenty miles behind their borders. From Japanese observation posts, Soviet convoys of men, guns, and horses could be sighted moving toward Novokievsk after being unloaded from transports originating at Vladivostok. Japanese Army Intelligence reported that on 18 July a regimental-size force had arrived at Novokievsk; artillery displacements forward were particularly visible by night east of Khasan. A confidential Gaimusho message indicated that Soviet truck movements between Posyet, Novokievsk, and the front had increased since the 20th. Russian intrusions, kidnappings, and sniping incidents were reported along the Manchurian borders, from Manchouli on the west to Suifenho on the east, between 18 and 25 July. Aircraft on daytime reconnaissance were detected as far as three miles inside Manchurian territory in the Hunchun area. Although the Japanese asserted that their forbearance was being tested, Izvestiya charged "Japanese militarists" with manufacturing an affair at Ussuri as well as at Changkufeng. The Japanese themselves received reports from the Changkufeng front that by 20 July the Soviets had 250 soldiers, armed with field pieces, trench mortars, howitzers, and light and heavy machine guns, on the southern slopes. The Russians were putting up tents capable of holding 40 men each; officers could be observed for the first time. On the evening of the 20th, the Soviets lobbed illuminating shells toward Manchurian territory. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Inada Masazum, studying maps and mud, saw Changkufeng Hill as a prize with peril, a test of nerve rather than a conquest. Tokyo's orders pulsed through Seoul and Harbin: guard, probe, and deter, but avoid full-scale war. Across the border, Soviet units pressed closer, lights and tents flickering on the hillside. The sea within sight whispered of strategy, diplomacy, and a warning: a single misstep could redraw Asia. And so the standoff waited, patient as winter.

On the April 4 Friday LIVE at 10 a.m. CT from the Ron Hull Studio at Nebraska Public Media, host Genevieve Randall has lively conversations and live performances from: The Wildwoods; poet Chaun Ballard; Madeline Reddel; and Brad Colerick.

On the April 4 Friday LIVE at 10 a.m. CT from the Ron Hull Studio at Nebraska Public Media, host Genevieve Randall has lively conversations and live performances from: The Wildwoods; poet Chaun Ballard; Madeline Reddel; and Brad Colerick.

In this week's episode of You Don't Know What You Don't Know, Kamal sits down with Chuan Liu, the creator of Levels of Grandeur, to discuss her remarkable journey from childhood immigration to the United States to navigating the trials of entrepreneurship in the midst of the COVID-19 pandemic.Chuan opens up about the birth of her syrup business and how the desire to create something meaningful with her brother kept her pushing through the most challenging times. Despite the difficult circumstances of the pandemic, Chuan worked harder than ever before, illustrating the drive and resilience that is crucial in entrepreneurship.Family support is a theme that runs throughout Chuan's story. She emphasizes the importance of having a solid support system and how her family's involvement was pivotal in helping her grow her business. From there, Chuan shares how the unexpected exposure from reality TV helped elevate her brand and opened up new doors for her business.Throughout the conversation, Chuan reflects on the power of community and how integral it is to both personal and business growth. She also shares the important lessons she's learned from her entrepreneurial journey, particularly from the classic book The Giving Tree, which taught her the value of unconditional love and nurturing relationships.As she looks back, Chuan also touches on the challenges of transitioning from B2B to B2C and the strategic planning that came with that shift. Her story is a testament to the immigrant experience in America and the continuous learning process that comes with entrepreneurship, complete with its ups and downs.Key Takeaways from this Episode:Family support is a foundation of entrepreneurial success.Reality TV can be an unexpected catalyst for brand growth.The Giving Tree teaches valuable lessons about love and relationships.Entrepreneurship is a journey of constant learning and adaptation.Chuan's experiences embody the challenges and rewards of being an immigrant entrepreneur in the U.S.Tune in to this inspiring episode for insights on building a meaningful business and embracing personal growth through every challenge life throws your way!Follow Chaun here:https://www.instagram.com/liuserville/https://www.levelsofgrandeur.com/Follow the show here:https://www.instagram.com/sublimekamal/https://www.instagram.com/sublimedoughnuts/This show is brought to you by The Hopecast Networkhttps://www.instagram.com/hopecastnetwork/

„Nepoddávat se lži, manipulaci a klamu, nechat si čisté vnímání. Nenechat si zotročit mysl, nenechat se zhypnotizovat. Je důležité si toto uvědomovat a hlídat zvíře v sobě, protože pokud se hraje programově na nejnižší, hrubé struny, v lidech se ozývá zvíře nenávisti,“ říká režisér Igor Chaun v rozhovoru pro pořad Kupředu do minulosti. 3. díl, 03.01.2025, www.RadioUniversum.cz

„Od poznání skutečné vyšší existence, vše oživující, inteligentní a laskavé síly, kterou nazýváme Bůh, nejvyšší Otec na nebesích, mám něco, čemu říkám 'světlo na horizontu'. A já, i kdybych se fakt plazil, vidím před sebou hory, vidím cestu, ale tam Slunce nezapadá,“ říká režisér Igor Chaun v rozhovoru pro pořad Kupředu do minulosti. 27.12.2024, www.RadioUniversum.cz

Tradice zahájení vánoční besídky kultovním bangerem Flight of the Conchords byla dodržena, a tak „Too Many Dicks on the Dance Floor“ vyprovodilo hned šestici čelistních bohatýrů na marné cestě za hledáním jakéhokoli kréda. Kde nic není, ani Chaun nebere!

Tradice zahájení vánoční besídky kultovním bangerem Flight of the Conchords byla dodržena, a tak „Too Many Dicks on the Dance Floor“ vyprovodilo hned šestici čelistních bohatýrů na marné cestě za hledáním jakéhokoli kréda. Kde nic není, ani Chaun nebere!Všechny díly podcastu Čelisti můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.

„Když nevíš, tak zjednoduš. Když nevíš, tak to rozděl na podstatné a nepodstatné, a to i fakticky ve výkonu dne, ve výkonu úkolů, a prostě si připomeň existenci Boží, existenci duchovního světa, existenci jisté ohraničenosti,“ říká režisér a dokumentarista Igor Chaun. 1. díl, 20.12.2024, www.RadioUniversum.cz

Today I sit with Ashley Hurwitz and Ra'Chaun Rogers of Lawful Evil Comics to speak about their newest offering Pyre: Burial at Sea. A continuance into the Lawful Evil Universe as the character Lily or Succubabe as she is known and her origin as a Demigod born into a lineage that tends to continue old traditions and more accustomed to power, but Lily is more unconventional and sees the world as her playground. In fact, in this series her first contact with humanity after escaping her realm takes us to a period in the High seas when the world was surrounded by Pirates. Amidst all the debauchery, violence, and death, Lily chooses to adapt and play along concealing her true power. That is if her Father an Eldritch God seeks her out first. Support this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/the-faqs-project-hosted-by-james-grandmaster-faqs-boyce/donations

Becoming A Celebrity Nail Tech, Moving to LA, Nail Sets Going Viral, Safe To Say w Chaun Legend

Today I sit with Ra'Chaun Rogers to talk about his Vigilante tale Dark Spider live on Kickstarter. The first thing you will realize although branded as a street level hero is that the expansion of antagonists Jamal Jones has to deal with thread a vast level of difficulty even for him to bear. In issue 1 Jamal comes face to face with a Villain who seems to understand Dark Spider, but yet he cant understand why he goes from the hunter to the hunted. The book lends a mixture of Violence, Drama, and the thorough realness of an NSFW book for mature readers especially as a superhero tale but a must read nonetheless.Support this podcast at — https://redcircle.com/the-faqs-project-hosted-by-james-grandmaster-faqs-boyce/donations

Today's poem is My Father and I Drive to St. Louis for His Mother's Funeral and the Wildflowers by Chaun Ballard.The Slowdown is your daily poetry ritual. In this episode, Major writes… “Current global conflicts and discussions of borders spotlight the privilege of mobility. An American passport admits entry into 184 countries. Yet, even movement within the United States, for some people, is unsafe. Race and other identity markers, even today, circumscribe where people can travel and live with ease.” Celebrate the power of poems with a gift to The Slowdown today. Every donation makes a difference: https://tinyurl.com/rjm4synp

As the chill of winter sets in, we're heating things up with Coach Clem, the tactical mastermind behind BSM Red Knights' D-line and a crowd favorite at the Down the Alley Summit. Get ready to unwrap this festive episode where we share hearty tales of sneaking Christmas gifts past inquisitive toddlers and the unexpected life lessons gleaned from family Uno showdowns. Coach Clem isn't just about the X's and O's; he's here to remind us all of the joy and nostalgia that come from disconnecting and diving into a good old-fashioned board game during the holiday season.Lacrosse enthusiasts, you're in for a treat as we reacquaint you with Coach Clem's journey and the incredible talent he's cultivated on the field. Picture the thrill of navigating the logistical mazes of coaching, as we did at Champlain Park, and the bonds forged through friendly rivalries with coaches like Rob Horn. We'll also dissect the artistry of lacrosse defense, shedding light on the unsung heroes off-ball and those indispensable goalkeepers. The episode is a playbook of insights on balancing innovative defensive schemes with the bedrock of fundamentals, all while navigating the evolving landscape of coaching networking and sharing strategies at summits like the IMLCA.Don't miss our candid chat about the evolving dynamics of sportsmanship, including the hotly debated topic of sharing film in the lacrosse community. It's not just about having the film—it's about dissecting it to craft winning strategies. Join us as we reminisce about the growth and camaraderie that flourish within the lacrosse coaching network. And for those times when I hang up my coach's whistle, I'll share my transition to being the best spectator and dad on the sidelines, reveling in the pure delight of sports documentaries and books, and even dishing out a family movie pick and top-notch food spots for fellow lacrosse road warriors.Support the show

„Stupňuje se to: Covid, Ukrajina, Izrael, jako kdyby nám nějaký velký temný dramaturg za oponou házel jednu událost za druhou – cukrátka – abychom si cucali bonbony hrůzy, bonbony děsu. A to způsobuje, že většinová společnost má tendenci semknout se jako stádo napadených oveček, a začít poštěkávat proti odlišným lidem,“ říká režisér Igor Chaun v rozhovoru pro pořad Kupředu do minulosti. 3. díl, 24.11.2023, www.RadioUniversum.cz

„Když se na tebe bude valit vlna, když se na tebe bude valit atomový výbuch, budou tě zatýkat, ty musíš mít takovou sílu, že řekneš: Můžete mě zdánlivě zotročit, můžete mi dát pouta na ruce, můžete mi třeba vzít i život, tento život, toto tělo, ale já se nezpronevěřím Bohu, já se nezpronevěřím pravdě, já se nezpronevěřím víře v to lepší v lidech,“ říká režisér Igor Chaun. 2. díl, 17.11.2023, www.RadioUniversum.cz

„Někteří lidé mají tendenci si zjednodušovat vnímání. Ono je to pohodlné. A když do tebe horem dolem bude mainstream hustit, že tohle je zločinec, že tohle je proruský troll, že to je dezolát, tak to méně odolná část společnosti přijme za své. Ne všichni mají sílu držet si vnitřně názor, skutečně hledat informace, co ten, který člověk říká,“ říká režisér Igor Chaun v rozhovoru pro pořad Kupředu do minulosti. 1. díl, 10.11.2023, www.RadioUniversum.cz

Recorded by Chaun Webster for Poem-a-Day, a series produced by the Academy of American Poets. Published on October 12, 2023. www.poets.org

In this episode, we dig into ways schools can advance equity by expanding "whole child" services that are available to students at sites. Dr. Chaun Powell, Senior Chief of Student Services for the Alameda County Office of Education, helps identify key approaches for maximizing funding sources for these services -- with a particular focus on behavioral and mental health supports -- and seizing new opportunities to partner with other agencies that serve children. California is in the throes of rolling out major initiatives that create greater access for students to a range of vital services  to better support all areas of children's  development and learning, including the:California Community Schools Partnership ProgramCalifornia's Children and Youth Behavioral Health InitiativeExtended Learning Opportunities Program, andFamily First Prevention Services Act.These initiatives present a new era of possibility for school districts and county offices to blend and braid funding to increase and sustain services. Chaun leads us through this new landscape of programs and policies that promote interagency collaboration. With insight and curiosity, she helps to explore questions around innovative funding, strengthening collaboration across systems, and centering equity.Other ResourcesStatewide Multi-Payer School-Linked Fee Schedule overview video"Improving Student Wellness With A Multi-Tiered System of Support," WestEd AudioCast featuring Santa Clara COEAbout Our Guest Dr. Chaun Powell, Senior Chief of Student Services, Alameda COE, is  a licensed clinical social worker (LCSW), school social worker, educational leader, writer and adjunct faculty member at San José State University & California State University East Bay.  Her unique background in education, community based work and child welfare helps her bring a cross systems lens and experience to serving children, youth and families in schools and the community.  Her work has included the development of policy and spearheading and implementing School Based Health & Wellness, Attendance and Behavior Response Initiatives at the school site, district, county and state levels. Prior to joining Alameda COE, she served as a site level Dean of Students, and as Executive Director, Youth Health & Wellness for Santa Clara COE, where she also led a statewide Professional Learning Network for educators on school-based billing.  About our hostJason Willis serves as  Director of Strategic Resource Planning and Implementation for WestEd, and he is a former chief business official in several California school districtsAbout our seriesBudgeting for Educational Equity is presented by the California Association of School Business Official (CASBO) and WestEd. We are grateful to the Sobrato Family Foundation for additional support. 

Mica ist wieder mit ihrem Heißluftballon in Jorvik gelandet & braucht unsere Hilfe. Außerdem gibt es zwei neue magische Pferde und auch Chaun der Kobold ist wieder da.

„Neexistuje nespravedlnost. Všechno, co se děje, je nějaké vyvažování určitých sil, určitých energií. Tak jako ani sopka nevybuchne bez toho, aby se nahromadilo někde nějaké zemské magma, tak nějaký konflikt nevznikne, když se cosi nenahromadí. A stejně tak v našich lidských životech někdy máme pocit, že jsme si to zasloužili,“ říká režisér Igor Chaun v rozhovoru pro pořad Kupředu do minulosti. 3. díl, 27.12.2022, www.RadioUniversum.cz

„Vlastně je smutné, že teď už musíme hovořit o odvaze, po třiatřiceti letech, když chceme jenom říct, co si myslíme. Vždyť my tady nevybízíme k žádnému terorismu. Naopak, my tady vybízíme k míru, vybízíme k pochopení, k naslouchání různým názorovým proudům… Já mám někdy chuť říct, že schvaluji invazi jenom proto, že to nesmím říct,“ říká režisér Igor Chaun. 2. díl, 20.12.2022, www.RadioUniversum.cz

„Nacházím se ve stavu přiznání sobě samému, že s tímto typem politického systému, s tímto typem voleb je něco zásadně špatného, zásadně překonaného. Konečně přiznání sobě samému, že tenhle systém je, zdá se, skoro nereformovatelný, a zároveň obrovská touha a naděje, pardon, že to řeknu, po lepších zítřcích,“ říká režisér Igor Chaun v rozhovoru pro pořad Kupředu do minulosti. 1. díl, 13.12.2022, www.RadioUniversum.cz

Hostem Press klubu Frekvence 1 byla jedna z výrazných studentských tváří událostí 17. listopadu 1989 Igor Chaun. Režisér mimo jiné komentoval aktuální dění v české společnosti. Poslechněte si záznam rozhovoru.

On the Nov. 11 program, Genevieve Randall and guests have lively conversations about: Jackie Allen and Hans Sturm's performance in Grand Island; Dan Mirvish's new film; Philip Daniel's Union College concert; UNK's world affairs conference; American Outsider Artist Rodney Bode's exhibition in Norfolk; and, The Nebraska Storytelling Festival in Lincoln. Also, poetry from Chaun Ballard and a preview of a performance of "Carmina Burana" in Omaha.

On the Nov. 11 program, Genevieve Randall and guests have lively conversations about: Jackie Allen and Hans Sturm's performance in Grand Island; Dan Mirvish's new film; Philip Daniel's Union College concert; UNK's world affairs conference; American Outsider Artist Rodney Bode's exhibition in Norfolk; and, The Nebraska Storytelling Festival in Lincoln. Also, poetry from Chaun Ballard and a preview of a performance of "Carmina Burana" in Omaha.

Barbara Schuler-Rozzi chamina onn per onn plirs tschient kilometers tras la Svizra. Adina cun la finamira d'arrivar en in lieu che ha per ella ina impurtanza persunala: Ina giada enfin tar la figlia u il figl, ina giada en il lieu nua ch'ella ha vivì. Adina cun ella il chaun Boriz. L'ultima viandada ha la dunna da 58 onns fatg da Bravuogn enfin a Flüeli en il chantun Sursilvania – 200 kilometers e passa 10'000 meters differenza d'autezza. Sco che la patruna d'ina scrinaria e presidenta dals scrinaris grischuns taidla sin ses chaun e co ch'il siberian husky discurra cun ella, raquinta Barbara Schuler-Rozzi en il Profil.

How many of you can say you launched a business, and knew how to brand yourself at the age of 12? That has to be the biggest flex… In 2021, Chaun Collins relaunched his self-titled shoe brand right off the heels of a tragic moment that he refused to let derail his success. Tune in to watch Chaun break down the basics of good business and the key to launching your own successful shoe brand. Black Brands Discussed on the Episode:HanifaChaun CollinsFear of God EssentialsFollow us: @GotThisInBlack on Instagram and TwitterEmail us: gothisinblack@gmail.com

Candy & Chaun Black Love is never giving up on one another and being transparency! I love BLACK LOVE!

Candy & Chaun Black Love is never giving up on one another and being transparency! I love BLACK LOVE!

We've all been messing around with someone we shouldn't be and caught feelings.... or do some of us know better? Do you even know what a sneaky link is?? We didn't know so we invited a few dope individuals out to discuss it. Tune in to find out what we think.... --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/latoya-wells/message

We get to sit down long time friend Chaun Sims.  Black Belt Jiu Jitsu and a guy that likes to hunt! We get talking about everything on this one. Chuan is a great guy and has tons of knowledge.  Hope you all enjoy this one!  @papachaugo81

Chaun MacQueen oversees CE - Clean Energy. Bright Futures., a clean energy and career-connected education program at the Bonneville Environmental Foundation (BEF). She offers innovation and creative thinking in scaling the impact of CE's work throughout the U.S.  Chaun has over 25 years of experience designing and managing environmental education and social impact programs in the U.S. and abroad for diverse audiences. In September 2021 (and also in 2015 and in 2008), BEF's CE program was selected for a Green Power Leadership Award for Leadership in Green Power Education, presented by Center for Resource Solutions and EPA.  CE began in 2002, originally called Solar 4R Schools, and they're celebrating 20 years this year! Prior to working for BEF, Chaun worked as a Senior Analyst at The Cadmus Group, Inc. where she implemented and evaluated energy education programs and conducted process evaluations of utility energy efficiency programs in various states in the U.S. Chaun served as Program Director for Community Energy Project in Portland for nine years, where she managed energy education, water conservation and environmental health education, direct service, and professional training programs. She also has experience with stakeholder engagement, coalition building and startup of new social and environmental impact initiatives both stateside and abroad. Chaun has an M.S. in environmental studies from the University of Oregon and she graduated from the State University of New York College of Environmental Science and Forestry with a B.S in Natural Resource Management and Environment & Forest Biology. She also served as a community forestry Peace Corps Volunteer in Far-western Nepal (1997-1999).Quotables“The only way that innovation happens is by doing projects.” – Gregg Fraley“I want to stay in my lane, but I don't want to be stovepiped, either.” – Amy Simpkins“These young people are going to help you remember why what you're doing is so cool.” – Chaun MacQueen “Bringing it [knowledge of the energy grid] all more into the forefront and saying no it's not boring and it's not solved science and it's not all figured out. This is very interesting, very cool, and ripe for innovation.” – Amy Simpkins“My niece and nephew are going to have to think about car purchase in terms of kilowatt hours, not miles per gallon.” – Chaun MacQueen“Energy literacy is changing and appreciation of not just energy but all the roles of the people doing it.” - Chaun MacQueen“Those kids are one strategic plan away from joining you in the field already.” – Chaun MacQueenIf you enjoyed the conversation, please share the episode with other innovators. Leave us a positive review and subscribe to Power Flow on Apple podcasts, Spotify, or wherever you listen to podcasts. Check out our awesome merch! And hey, we're new, so you can even apply to be a sponsor or a guest.You can follow Power Flow Podcast on LinkedIn, Instagram, Twitter, Facebook, and Tik Tok. Thank you for listening. See you at the whiteboard!

Scénárista a režisér Igor Chaun se otřel i téma stárnoucího muže. Naznačil, že se mění, do hry jdou hormony a chce ještě dokázat něco velkého. A to se týká také Putina. I když jeho počínání Chaun nechápe. Zachovat by se podle něho měla individualita každého národa. Host Press klubu také čeká na vyjádření minulé i současné vlády k protiústavnímu jednání.

Sandro Simonet cumbatta tranter las portas da slalom per la lingia ideala e per la cursa perfetga. La stagiun passada ha el procurà per ina gronda surpraisa. En il slalom da la cuppa mundiala da Chamonix ha el fatg il zap da posiziun 30 sin il podest ed è daventà terz. Uss entschaiva ina stagiun olimpica e la finamira è clera: dapli constanza, dosar il risico e terminar dapli cursas – e quai en inequipa svizra fitg ferma. Forza, chatta il profi da skis tranter auter en la natira e cun ses chauns. En il «Profil» raquinta il Surmiran dentant er da ses rituals avant ina cursa e pertge chel nè quasi mai gnervus avant ina cursa.

Throughout his life he was heavily influenced by his mother Donna who sang professionally as a gospel singer which explains why Chaun's gravitation to the entertainment industry was seemingly inevitable. During the span of his career he's had a 6 year stent of performing for Cirque Du Soleil, graced the stage worldwide as a Chippendales dancer, and recently can be seen in the inaugural season of HBO Max's reality tv dating show FBoy Island. He also recently modeled with Naomi Campbell in the latest campaign for Bottega Veneta which was shot by world renowned photographer David LaChapelle.” --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/steven-cuoco0/message Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/steven-cuoco0/support

Hostem Press klubu Frekvence 1 byl režisér Igor Chaun. V rozhovoru mimo jiné zavzpomínal na listopadové události roku 1989 a promluvil také o aktuální situaci v Česku.

This podcast provides some deeper insights into our new publication by Solovyeva et al. (2021) dealing with Arctic Geese in the Eastern Russian Arctic. It provides a showcase for the 'New Digital Arctic' as the myriad changes in the Arctic land-, sea- and coastal-scape are unfolding so fast with devastating outcomes (Krupnik and Crowell 2020). This research shows a more nuanced range and distribution pattern for these two species - Tundra Bean Geese & Greater White-fronted Geese - during moult and brood-rearing than previously known for flyway delineations, nesting and summer range maps etc. This was possible by using Machine Learning and many Open Access GIS data ("Big Data"). Based on the first-time online release of 24 years of field data in very remote areas like rivers of Yakutia, Chaun research station, Chukotka and Northern Kamchatka it presents the best-available public and digital information on the topic, added by GBIF.org data as well as compiled and geo-referenced (Russian) literature data for a good model assessment. This podcast emphasizes the experience and suggestions for data sharing in polar regions and elsehere, as stated by D. Carlson for the International Polar Year (IPY; Carlson 2011) making open access approaches a best-professional practice, if not already mandatory by many funders, e.g.Huettmann et al. (2011), Huettmann and Ickert-Bod (2017) for examples. An application is provided how it can affect better management and protection, e.g. for Climate Change forecast and conservation (Spiridonov et al. 2012). This research raises the question why so many data repositories are either empty, locked behind passwords, or underused, and it shows that Open Access and Open Source in 'The Cloud' can provide a generic progress tfor everybody. Here we provide a workflow and baseline across international researchers to achieve such outcomes with ISO-complian metadata to actually understand the data sets, model inference and outcome. References and background readings Carlson, D. A (2011) Lesson in sharing. Nature 469: 293. https://doi.org/10.1038/469293a Huettmann, F. (ed) (2012) Protection of the Three Poles, Springer Tokyo, Japan, p. 337 Huettmann F, Yu Artukhin, O. Gilg, and G. Humphries (2011) Predictions of 27 Arctic pelagic seabird distributions using public environmental variables, assessed with colony data: a first digital IPY and GBIF open access synthesis platform. Marine Biodiversity 41: 141-179 DOI 10.1007/s12526-011-0083-2 Huettmann F and S. Ickert-Bond (2017). On Open Access, data mining and plant conservation in the Circumpolar North with an online data example of the Herbarium, University of Alaska Museum of the North Arctic Science. http://www. nrcresearchpress.com/toc/as/0/ja Krupnik I. and A. L. Crowell (2020) Arctic Crashes: People and Animals in the Changing North. Smithsonian Institutional Press. Washington D.C. Solovyeva D. I. Bysykatova-Harmey. S L. Vartanyan, A. Kondratyev F. Huettmann (2021) Modeling Eastern Russian High Arctic Geese (Anser fabalis, A. albifrons) during moult and brood rearing in the ‘New Digital Arctic. Scientific Reports.https://www.nature.com/articles/s41598-021-01595-7 Spiridonov V., M. Gavrilo, Y. Krasnov, A. Makarov, N. Nikolaeva, L. Sergienko, A. Popov and E. Krasnova (2012). Chapter 8 Toward the New Role of Marine and Coastal Protected Areas in the Arctic: The Russian Case. in F. Huettrmann (ed) Protection of the Three Poles. Springer New York. pp. 171 – 201. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/falk-huettmann/support

Jared and Danielle along with special guest comedian Shawn Pelofsky sit down with the latest eliminated contestants. First, F Boy Greg reminisces on his favorite memories from the island, what the reaction to him being on the show is like, as well as confessing his love (or lust let's be real) for a new lady in his life. Then, F Boy Welcome talks about why he chose Sarah, his past open relationships and answers the burning question: who from the cast eats the most eggs? Lastly, Nice Guy Chaun discusses his Chippendales background, what Nice Guy Grotto was really like, and of course, reveals how many eggs per day he eats.   Stream new episodes of FBOY ISLAND and FBOY ISLAND: The Podcast on HBO Max.  See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Chaun Powell '99 takes a trip Down to the River and discusses his switch from Kenston to Hawken and how important of a roll playing football was in his time as a high school student. Chaun and I talk about the responsibilities of being a captain, as a senior, and 12th man, as a sophomore, on special teams. There is no Ask Coach segment this episode.

We all have a type. Well most of us do. But what we wanted to know is are you your types type? You know.... you might be looking for them but are they looking for you? We invited VīB out to help us figure it out and in the process we also discovered what that dreaded damn that's crazy... lol text means lol. Get ready for a great episode with a nice surprise at the end!  --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/latoya-wells/message

Ranním Hostem na Frekvenci 1 byl režisér Igor Chaun. Jak pandemie ovlivnila český film? Proč mu připadá, že se někteří lidé po covidu cítí lépe? Proč se zajímá o problematiku psychopatů v politice? A na jaké zajímavé projekty se nyní soustředí? Poslechněte si celý rozhovor.

Celebrity Nail Artist and American Influencer Award nominee Chaun Legend shares his journey from Philadelphia to Hollywood and how social media was a game changer in his career. Chaun also shares some of his nail secrets!

@musicsoulliveshowcase would like you to meet our 2020 #showcase Music Director @chauneliotThis video content is an #exclusiveinterview for our audience to get acquainted with the Music Soul Live Showcase and a peek at what's to come on 12/19

When word gets out that a leprechaun has taken up residence in the Serota Forest, the city goes wild as people rush to capture it for its fabled pot of gold. Of course, there's a reason such adventures are left to the licensed professionals, and now it's up to the staff at Heroic Endeavors to make sure none of the would-be leprechaun hunters gets hurt. Get the Syrinscape app with 10 SoundSets for free at https://syrinscape.com/?DaTPod (https://syrinscape.com/?DaTPod) Heroic Endeavors is a Dragons and Things Pathfinder 2e Adventure from the mind of GM Jim Rodehaver. Experience the epic tale Fridays, LIVE on Twitch at http://www.twitch.tv/thedatnetwork (http://www.twitch.tv/thedatnetwork) and join us on Patreon at http://www.patreon.com/datdragonshow (http://www.patreon.com/datdragonshow) where you can help influence the story, gain access to additional lore and loot, and help add more episodes to the season! Thank you so much for checking out our show! Join the DaT Discord https://discord.gg/3d9p6nx (https://discord.gg/3d9p6nx) Explore Evil JimJam's World, Val'Druen, on World Anvil https://www.worldanvil.com/w/datdragonshow (https://www.worldanvil.com/w/datdragonshow) Shop DaT Gear https://wictheseries.com/apparel/ (https://wictheseries.com/apparel/) Support this podcast

P-Mac and Ted go Down the Alley with the staff from BSM, one of the top programs in the state of MN. They talk everything from their program, to club, food, BBQ, recruiting and more! This is a MUST LISTEN episode for our listeners! This episode is also on Youtube for our first time ever!

Since the COVID-19 outbreak, healthcare provider systems across the nation have experienced shortages in personal protective equipment and other essential products to keep frontline workers protected and to keep the virus at bay. Due to these realities, what have been the lessons learned to better arm our healthcare heroes moving forward?  Our next guest is perfectly positioned to answer these vexing questions. In this episode, Premier (https://www.premierinc.com/), joins us to talk about his team’s work and how they're solving these massive and systemic problems. Premier is a healthcare improvement company uniting an alliance of approximately 4,000 U.S. hospitals and health systems and more than 175,000 other providers and organizations to transform healthcare.  Chaun leads the COVID-19 disaster response team for Premier, which went into action in January to respond to the global crisis. Chuan and his team have been diligently working to help inform the CDC, FEMA, Secretary Azar, and the White House task force on the challenges in front of us and how best to counteract them. Join Chaun and me to find out how Premier is working to meet our healthcare providers' needs to battle the Coronavirus and beyond. Episode Highlights: The mission of Premier’s disaster response team What it means to diversifying supply chain both onshore, nearshore, and offshore Why is it critical to have innovators working alongside large organizations like Premier as well as federal agencies About Our Guest: Chaun Powell is the Group Vice President of Strategic Supplier Engagement with 15 years of experience in sales, marketing, national accounts, business and corporate development, and GPO negotiation. As the Group Vice President of Strategic Supplier Engagement at Premier, Powell is responsible for providing leadership, strategy and execution to supply chain services consisting of product planning, contract management, negotiation, field liaison and member engagement; leading strategic engagements and developing of business plans for all suppliers of the surgical services and med/surg distribution service lines; and positioning Premier, supply chain services and strategic supplier engagement with strategic suppliers, their expanded organizations, leadership and the overall healthcare industry.    Links Supporting This Episode: Premier website: (https://www.premierinc.com/) Chaun Powell’s LinkedIn page: (https://www.linkedin.com/in/chaun-powell-722996) Join our online community: (https://www.passionatepioneers.com/) Subscribe to newsletter: (https://forms.gle/4XjvmqWxaaNe21PX6) Guest nomination form: (https://docs.google.com/forms/d/e/1FAIpQLScqk_H_a79gCRsBLynkGp7JbdtFRWynTvPVV9ntOdEpExjQIQ/viewform) Support this podcast

Today's episode feature Shea Layne Skin Care which is a business that sells handmade skincare products. Our products are great for all skin care complexions. Their goal is to end dry skin that may suffer from eczema. All of the their products are created with shea butter and care free. In today's episode, Chaun and Courtney discussed Shea Layne products, ways to maintain healthy skin and how to intertwine the too to practice self-care. Chaun's Bio: I was born in Chicago on the south side on October 25. I grew up as a army brat where I lived in Arizona, Kansas, and Germany. I travel to many cities over my lifetime as I like to travel. I am a mother of three boys 11,12 and 20. I’m the owner of Shea Layne Skincare where I create handmade natural skincare products Chaun's Contact Information: FB and IG: Shealayneskincare Chaun McDonald www.shealayneskincare.com Events: http://onesun3flowers.eventbrite.com Black History Gear: https://onesun3flowers.com/collections/woke Want to advertise with us? Email us at onesun3flowers@gmail.com If you're looking for a tribe to continue to connect with please find us on ourpodcastpageinstagram.com/onesun3flowerspodcast or visit our company page instagram.com/onesun3flowers. To keep discussing today's topic and other topics discussed on the podcast, join our Facebook group at OneSun3Flowers . Our store is open and selling shirts to empower women, girls and the entire tribe. Shoponesun3flowers.myshopify.com to grab a new tee. If you have questions or would like to discuss podcast sponsorship, email us at onesun3flowers@gmail.com The hashtag for the podcast is #onesun3flowerspodcast. Make sure to follow us on social media: Twitter: twitter.com/onesun3flowers Instagram:instagram.com/onesun3flowerspodcast Facebook: facebook.com/onesun3flowers Book, Flowering Yourself: bit.ly/flowering_yourself

In this episode we'll visit with Chaun Ballard and his chapbook, Flight. Chaun has appeared in issues 66 and 60 of Rattle, and several times in Poets Respond. Raised in St. Louis, Missouri, and San Bernardino, California, Chaun Ballard is the co-host of the Blue Doors Poetry Retreat in Galaxidi, Greece, an affiliate editor for Alaska Quarterly Review, a Callaloo fellow, and a graduate of the MFA Program at the University of Alaska Anchorage. Chaun Ballard’s chapbook, Flight, is the winner of the 2018 Sunken Garden Poetry Prize and is published by Tupelo Press. His poems have appeared or are forthcoming in Columbia Poetry Review, Frontier Poetry, Hayden’s Ferry Review, Lunch Ticket, Narrative Magazine, Pittsburgh Poetry Review, Rattle, Spoon River Poetry Review, The New York Times, Tupelo Quarterly, and other literary magazines. His work has received nominations for both Best of the Net and a Pushcart Prize. For more information, visit: https://chaunballard.com/ Warm-up Poem "Roll Call for Michael Brown" by Jason McCall https://www.rattle.com/roll-call-for-michael-brown-by-jason-mccall/

Join Jen, Will, Jess, Ray and Andrew on the 137th episode for a wonderful round of feedback from Chaun, Sarah, Will and Gerry. We received a mysterious message from #CampLapin. Will and Jen each brought a Scream at Your Phone list (or two). Mr Fuzzy likes to play!Roll a random character to Play-Along with the Fallout Roundtable:Fallout 76:https://tinyurl.com/F76GeneratorASA Let's Play: Join Pat and his adventures with Ford through the Capitol Wasteland of Fallout 3http://www.buzzsprout.com/139361Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/asapodcastingFallout Feed Friends List:tinyurl.com/FFFriendsListFallout 4:https://tinyurl.com/Fallout4GeneratorFallout New Vegas:https://tinyurl.com/NewVegasGeneratorContact Radioactive Rebecca to join in the Fallout Terminal Velocity Project:falloutterminalvelocity@outlook.com T-Shirts!: https://www.etsy.com/shop/ASAPodcastingAmazon: http://amzn.to/1cylrSKEmail: thefalloutfeed@gmail.comWeb: http://www.asapodcasting.com/#/the-fallout-feed/Twitter: https://twitter.com/TheFalloutFeedFB: facebook.com/groups/askyrimaddictpodcastTwitch: twitch.tv/asapodcastingInstaGram: @asapodcasting #theFalloutFeed Support the show (http://patreon.com/asapodcasting)

Welcome to the 77th edition of the Fallout Feed Roundtable. Its the 5th episode of season 8. We are the show who compares and contrasts Fallout experiences through a lively Roundtable discussion by playing through the same quests with characters who have been randomly assigned drastically different attributes. Welcome Everyone!Join Craig, Clint, Pat, Jess, Ray and Andrew for a look at Cold Case, Personal Matters, Earth Mover, Mistaken Identity and Someone to Talk To in Fallout 76. We play Scream at your Phone Follower edition, hear some Fallout Terminal Velocity from Mawrk and some previously missed Feedback from Chaun. Featuring another hilarious dive into the Iguana Bits from Jess and James.Roll a random character to Play-Along with the Fallout Roundtable:Fallout 76 Random Character Generatorhttps://tinyurl.com/F76GeneratorFallout Feed Friends List of Gamer Tags:https://tinyurl.com/FFFriendsListPatreon:https://www.patreon.com/asapodcastingT-Shirts!:https://www.etsy.com/shop/ASAPodcastingContact the show:thefalloutfeed@gmail.comWebsite:http://www.asapodcasting.com/#/the-fallout-feed/Twitter: @thefalloutfeedFB: facebook.com/groups/askyrimaddictpodcastTwitch: twitch.tv/asapodcastingForum: ASAPodcasting.Proboards.comSupport the show (http://patreon.com/asapodcasting)

The founder of Denim & Blazers, Chaun Vanterpool, takes time to introduce herself and her reason for starting Denim & Blazers. --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app

Meet Chaun Horton, drummer, based in Los Angeles, CA. Chaun is originally from upstate New York and from a very early age, he's been immersed in music. He was surrounded by music in his church and along with his dad, who is an organ player, he came to love and let MUSIC to be a part of his life. Chaun has toured, recorded and played with a long list of artists and his ability to dominate different styles allows him to constantly work with different artists and exponents of various genres of music. ___________________________________________________ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/chaun.horton.3 Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/chaun_d_horton/ ___________________________________________________ Musicians Talk Music Podcast: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/musicians-talk-music/ Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/musicianstalkmusic/ Twitter: https://twitter.com/Musicianstalk_ Host: Omar Martinez Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/omarcito000/ 2019 --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/musicians-talk-music/support

Six Creative Writers discuss Writing and Literary Genres: Memoir, Historical Fiction, Fantasy, Poetry and Fiction. Cinthia Ritchie (2:33-12:21), Dolls Behaving Badly and a forthcoming memoir coming this fall; historical fiction author Stephanie Marie Thornton (12:44-22:01), American Princess: A Novel of First Daughter Alice Roosevelt; poet Chaun Ballard (22:17-38:50), Flight; poet Stephen D. Bolen (39:17-51:00), a novel in progress called Tracing Grace); fantasy author Kellie Doherty (51:12-60:28), Sunkissed Feathers & Severed Ties; and poet Tara Ballard (60:42-74:51), House of the Night Watch) together for readings and a multi genre craft talk. Discussion and Q & A follow the readings (1:15-1:37).

In today's episode I had the honor of speaking with the fabulous Chaun Vaughn in our girl chat series!!! Chaun is The Heart Forward Leadership Expert and feels that in today's business world, there are too many leaders stuck in the traditional style leadership model, which is proving to be unproductive and ineffective for the workforce. This is why she spends her days promoting a Heart Forward Leadership style. ​Chaun's goal for newly appointed and aspiring leaders, is to equip them with Heart Forward strategies that will Reduce employee turnover Foster employee buy-in that drives engagement Promote a multi-generational culture Cultivate a pipeline of successful leaders Chaun believes that "Every great leader knows that the value of your success can only be seen through the success of your team." Chaun is a proud graduate of Southern University in Baton Rouge, Louisiana and received her Bachelors of Science degree in Human Nutrition-Dietetics. She has been in leadership roles for over 15 years within the nutrition industry which has led to her love for leadership training and speaking. She is the author of Being Heart Forward, An Others Centered Leadership Guide and Workbook, which touches on four Heart Forward principles every leader should utilize to be successful. Because of her leadership push within the community of women leaders, she was awarded the VIP Woman of the Year from the National Association for Professional Women, she received a certificate of Congressional Recognition, designating February 13th, Chaun's birthday, as Heart Forward Day in the 18th District in Texas among many other accolades. Chaun’s mission is to help create a leadership change that will not only propel the team to success, but the leader as well. "Let's change leadership one heart at a time!" Chaun simply put is a super woman with a long list of acclaims to confirm that.  But even with all of the success that Chaun has encountered in her journey, she shares some very intimate moments with us about what it really took for her to get there. She shares her timeline very transparently with us and I was so encouraged and inspired after speaking with her for today's episode! So sit back and relax as you listen to today's interview and be sure to let Chaun know you found her from the show! As always, if you enjoy today's episode, be sure to let me know what you think in the comments! Think this episode was bomb.com and pin worthy?  Share it with your friends!!!  

Confessions Of A Melanated Queen Welcomes Chaun McDonald, owner of NZuri Means Beautiful! Here is my confession today…. I am enamored with people who build their own paths! Today we meet with owner of Nzuri Means Beautiful, Chaun McDonald. Her handmade body products are made with love and natural ingredients. I am a huge fan of her bath bombs! They are relaxing, soothing, and healthy for your skin. On today's show, Chaun explores all of her products with us and she shared how she got started, as well as some of her plans for the future. --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/confessions-of-a-melanated-queen/support

Photographer, Wellness Blogger, and Mental Health Advocate, Moriah Chauné, shares her experiences working through a creative business while navigating her mental wellness.

Christopher Chaun was born and raised in Boston. His story is one of embracing the journey, patience in waiting for the right time and opportunity, and learning through tough times. His luxury line of bow ties has ended up on celebrities like Beyonce, actor Kal Pen and many more. Not bad for a man whose day job is cleaning his church. Chris' voice is one of persistence, creativity and faith. Pebbles, Chris and VOICES Producer Leroy Irvin Follow Chris' journey on Instagram HERE

Poet and graphic designer Chaun Webster draws from an interest in the work of sign in graffiti, the layering of collage, and the visuality of text. These methods are used in Webster's work to investigate race – specifically the instability of blackness and black subjectivities, geography, memory, and the body. Correspondingly much of these investigations engage the question of absence, how to archive what is missing from the landscape particularly as a number of communities watch in real time, neighborhoods once populated with familiar presences, dissolve in the vernacular of redevelopment and its attendant colonial logic.

Привет! Welcome to The Mike Show because this week's show is all about RUSSIA! St. Petersburg specifically... Hear stories from Mike about the history of Russia and his experiences living there for two years, as well as our favorite can't-miss historical sights, good food to eat, and an interview with our friend Chaun about when she and her little family lived in St. Petersburg for a summer! Email us at letsgolundbergs@gmail.com

We are back with another dope episode of Blvckbroadway podcast. This week we're joined by two young EnTRAPenures involved in some truly interesting and creative endeavors. Tune in and listen up as Chaun @chaunthebarber Tucker of @Greauxph Soaps & Skincare products and Brandon Copeland @Kheperawellness yoga give us the story on how they found their niche in these unique fields and how they're bring health and wellness to the trap. Tune in and Turn up! --- Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/blcvkbroadway/support

Singer Songwriter Chaun Tate brings his unique style of writing to the forefront with his latest tune "Special Lady"