Podcasts about russification

Ukrainians have resisted Russia's aggression for years. Since the full-scale invasion of their country in 2022, Ukrainian women in particular have taken on important roles on the frontlines, in civil society, and at home. Gražina Bielousova's research examines how Ukrainian leftist feminists advocate for their causes at home and abroad, facing distinct challenges as they attempt to defend their country. The Ukrainian case is also distinct from Latvia and Lithuania, whose organizing takes on different shapes for the same cause. Bielousova joins Ben Gardner-Gill to explain these interactions and discuss the ongoing process of decolonization in Baltic Studies.Transcript Ben Gardner-Gill: Hello, and welcome to Baltic Ways. I'm your co-host, Ben Gardner-Gill. Today we're talking with Gražina Belousova. Gražina is a feminist scholar of race, religion, and gender in post-Soviet Europe. She earned her PhD from Duke University in 2022. Currently, she is a postdoctoral scholar at Vilnius University's Institute of International Relations and Political Science and a researcher at Vytautas Magnus University.Her current research project focuses on leftist feminisms in East Europe in light of Russia's war against Ukraine, which will culminate in her first book, What's Left of Feminism in East Europe.Gražina, welcome to Baltic Ways.Gražina Belousova: Thank you so much for having me, Ben.BGG: So let's kick off by just hearing a little bit more about your background. I know you finished your PhD pretty recently. Could you tell us a little bit more about how you got into academia, sort of your research interests, and what you're working on at the moment?GB: Right. Yes, I just defended my PhD in 2022. It's hard to believe that it's been nearly three years now. In my PhD, I focused on historical matters. My PhD was in religion and cultural anthropology. And one of the things that I found missing when I was trying to theorize the part of the world that I call home and that most of the world calls Eastern Europe—I realized that I was lacking a solid theory that would bridge economics, anthropology, and religious studies.I wanted to understand how religious difference, especially perceived religious difference, played a role in creating the space that we call Eastern Europe today. And that took me to 18th and 19th century travel writings by Western travelers, oftentimes who were on an official mission, to the edges or to the depths of the Russian Empire.So I've read a lot of ambassadors' letters. I've read a lot of dispatches from St. Petersburg and Moscow, trying to understand how Westerners thought about that religious difference and how that thinking structured their understanding of what this place was and why it was different. What I tried to argue is actually that perceived religious difference was at the root of thinking of Eastern Europe as something different.Now, when I chose to embark on that topic, I had to put another topic aside, which was the question of very contemporary matters, the question of leftist political thought and feminism. At that point, it felt to me more pertinent to write the kind of theory that I felt was missing. When I was given the opportunity to pursue a postdoctoral position at Vilnius University Institute of International Relations and Political Science, I pitched this idea to them.And we very quickly pulled together the application. And the next thing I knew, I was embarking on a project on leftist feminisms in Eastern Europe in light of the war in Ukraine. So, the path was windy, but here I am today, knees and elbows deep, in the project on leftist feminism.BGG: Wonderful. I mean, a windy path is going to be familiar to so many people listening.So, no surprise and no surprise as well that the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has really impacted your work and your life as it has for many of us. So tell us a little bit more about that.Over the last three years, we've been watching and seeing the horrors in Ukraine. From your perspective, from your academic work, what are some of the main things that you're looking at?GB: One of the things that I'm particularly interested in is the way that groups that are on the edges of society, on the margins of society, such as leftists, such as feminists, and especially leftist feminists—when the two come together and try to articulate their social and political vision and explain to themselves and to their fellow compatriots and oftentimes foreign donors, in my case, also Western leftist feminists, their relevance, how they're trying to articulate their position.War has a penchant for heightening nationalist tendencies. And this is not some kind of particular Eastern European pathology. War anywhere is going to produce these results. That is normal. People defend themselves and articulate themselves on the basis on which they're being attacked, on the basis on which they're being bombed.So this is what we are seeing in Ukraine. Leftism in Eastern Europe, because of the Soviet past, is often associated with Soviet nostalgia. Feminism, on the other hand, is oftentimes seen as something antithetical to national identity, something that is imported from the West, and something that either has no relevance or can be dangerous, especially when questions of national unity, questions of national defense come about.That is one of the reasons why I embarked on this journey, and this is one of the reasons why Ukraine had to be part of this picture. Because while the other countries that I'm looking at—Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Moldova—experience the threat of invasion, Ukraine is under attack.And one of the things that I'm finding is that Ukrainian leftist feminists are incredibly resourceful and incredibly gifted at articulating their relevance.One of the things that I'm going to say that stems from that understanding of leftist feminism that's erroneous, but that's pervasive, is that Ukrainian leftist feminists do not debate the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. What is in question is the way things are happening under the conditions of war.The questions of most vulnerable people—so questions of what happens with people with disabilities, questions of what happens to single mothers, questions of what happens to the elderly people who are maybe unable to evacuate, questions of what happens to the working class people—all of these things are at the forefront of their minds. They're trying to be the advocates of their pleas to the larger society, while at the same time trying to articulate Ukraine's right to self-defense to Western leftist feminists.BGG: So they have both this tension, maybe tension is the wrong word, tell me if it isn't, but they have this tension internally where they're trying to advocate for what they see as justice or what is right with a domestic audience who, understandably, may be more frequently focused on what's happening at the front lines.And then there's also this international question, the foreign audience for these Ukrainian leftist feminists, who have a very different perspective on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. And I specifically use that verbiage instead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine because they're going to think about it very differently.So let's split those out a little bit, and I want to start with the domestic. You talked about the advocacy of these leftist feminists for the most marginalized groups in society, for those who are most vulnerable.In your view, where have they been most successful, perhaps? Where have they seen actual progress happen from their advocacy?GB: One of the things that immediately comes to mind, and many of my interlocutors were directly involved with, is the nurses' movement–the unionization and self-organization of the nurses.There is a movement called Be Like Nina, referring to one of the nurses seen as a pioneer of resisting exploitation. And, of course, under the conditions of war, the labor of nurses is incredibly valuable and needed, but not always appropriately compensated. This is what we can call essential labor, especially when we talk about the front lines, where people are wounded.Many of them are wounded very badly on a daily basis. However, there are other things that are happening in the background as well. While a lot of the resources are pulled to the front, there are people who are experiencing regular daily struggles with their health. And the nurses are being stretched very thin.And this was something that was really amazing to me. This was really one of the very few instances where I saw academics who are leftist feminists actually touching the ground with their ideas: where they got involved with helping the nurses organize, but not taking the center stage, where they acted as support, as a resource, but not overtaking the movement, rather creating the conditions under which nurses themselves could articulate what it was that they needed, what their goals were.And that was incredibly impressive to me because healthcare is severely underfunded across the whole region, and to achieve such tangible goals as wage increases and regulations that empower nurses to do their job was truly impressive. With every conversation with a woman—because I specifically talk only to women—I just felt sheer amazement, because this is so contrary to so many imaginations of what civil society, self-organization, or networks are like in Eastern Europe.This is so contrary to what some have called ‘uncivil' society. What is happening is really self-organization and civil society at its best, organized by women who are oftentimes stretched very thin, not just at work, but also at home, women whose husbands are potentially on the front lines.So to me, I really cannot think of anything else that, in terms of real life impact and in terms of transforming people's lives, has been grander (I'm going to go for that word) than this.BGG: That's remarkable, and thank you for bringing that. I had very little idea of this progress and this happening.So you use the term civil society, which I think is quite apt, and Western conceptions of civil society in the region that we call Eastern Europe can be highly misguided. Let's just put it like that. I think back to a webinar that the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies (AABS) hosted on Ukrainian civil society, democratization, responses to the war, and we have this comparative Ukrainian and Baltic perspective, where we looked at how Ukrainian civil society was responding.We looked at how Baltic civil society was responding, and you're doing something similar in your research here. You're looking at Latvia and Lithuania as two of the other case studies, in addition to Poland, Moldova, and, of course, Ukraine. One thing that I think we can all observe just from watching the news, let alone being in the countries as well, is that civil society across the region has had this really robust response in the last few years.So could you speak a little bit more to that in the comparative cases outside of Ukraine that you're looking at in your research, especially Latvia and Lithuania?GB: For sure. I think that in order to theorize civil society and the region in general, we need better theory than has been used often to talk about civil society at large.Here, for example, I'm thinking about Emily Channel Justice and her work and the way that she articulates the notion of self-organization. The way that she thinks about Ukraine, especially in the context of Maidan. The way that it left a self-organization, but that can be applied also to any form of civil society, regardless of ideology, is really a network of decentralized, self-organized people's groups.If you were to look for some kind of central organizing pattern, or some kind of centralized way of doing things, most likely you're not going to find it because it's based on personal network, connections, and localized issues. And I think that's definitely something that I'm seeing in Ukraine.One of the things that I'm seeing in Lithuania and Latvia is that it's going to differ slightly because there are going to be more central organizing figures. If we talk about organizing support for Ukraine, one of the things that we're going to see is that people are going to point to nationwide initiatives.Right now in Lithuania, there is an initiative called Radarum, which is a play on words, on radar and on darom, which is a Lithuanian word for let's do it. And it's a nationwide initiative to collect funds to purchase drones and anti-drone equipment for Ukraine. And there are particular faces that we associate with this initiative.National television is running ads for it. So there's a little bit more of a centralized sense to it. But once again, I would say that this is the mainstream way of organizing civil society, which, of course, with Westernization, has taken on some of the patterns that are similar to the West.If we look towards the left, we're going to see very much that it is self-organized, small groups of people who take different initiatives, such as raising funds for medical care, such as raising funds for queer people in Ukraine. So the more mainstream we go, the more patterns that are akin to those that we see in the West we're going to see.That is also going to be true in Latvia. The further left we go, the more organic, grassroots, self-organized cells of people we're going to find who participate in smaller, less visible initiatives. So that's probably the best way that I can explain the difference.BGG: Got it. We see this distinction of centralization and decentralization.One could consider these different types of movements organic in their own ways, but different in different ways. When one thinks of leftist organizing, which has a long and rich history, organic is sort of one of the key words.It's perpetual, and these society-wide initiatives, like what's currently going on in Lithuania, that we've seen across other countries over the last few years, are maybe a little bit less frequent and less common. So there's an important distinction there.So I want to pivot to the international dimension of how the Ukrainian leftist feminists are talking, especially with Western counterparts. And by Western, we mean Western Europe. We mean American and Canadian. We mean Western, as in not Eastern Europe. So could you talk a little bit about the challenges they're facing there?I think I alluded to it earlier. You alluded to it earlier, but could you dive a little bit more into that discourse, that dialogue between the Ukrainians and their counterparts?GB: This is the main point of contention. What does it mean to be leftist? How much does local experience shape being leftist?What is the relationship of the left to the national question? And I think this is where we are seeing the real tension. Underlying this tension, of course, is the question of Russia. Let me try to unpack this. And I'm going to start from the other end than I listed, which is with the question of Russia.Eastern European in general, and Ukrainian in particular, leftist feminists have a very different understanding as to what Russia is in terms of geopolitics than the Western counterparts are going to have. This stems from very different histories. Western leftism—especially the new wave of leftism that arose in the sixties and the seventies—in many ways has redefined itself not just through the questions of class, which I would argue were lost to some extent. They lost their centrality.And they redefined themselves through the anti-colonial, anti-racist struggle. And that struggle was particularly important because after the fall of the formal colonial system, the colonial patterns of economic exploitation, of social exploitation, of brain drain still very much persisted. And naming that and defining themselves against Western neoimperialism or neocolonialism in the Global South was one of the most defining features of the Left, both in the Global South and in the West. Now, Russia at that time had positioned itself as the ally of the colonized countries. And some of it was pure show, and some of it was actual money, resources, and help that were sent, for example, to Angola. And that made a real difference. Whether that was genuine concern for the colonized people or whether that was an ideological tool is a matter of debate.Whatever it was, it had a profound impact on the way that Western leftists relate to Russia. They continue to see Russia out of that tradition, in many ways, as an ally against Western capitalism and imperialism. Their empire, against which they define themselves, continues to be in the West, and oftentimes is seen as centered on the United States.The empire against which we define ourselves in Eastern Europe is Russia, because Russia was the colonizing power in a very real sense in the region. It was our empire that subjugated us. It was the colonial power that engaged in just about every single practice in which any colonial power engages in the region.For us, if we think outside of ourselves, Russia continues to be the colonial power in the way that it relates to Central Asia, in the way that it relates to the indigenous people of Siberia, in the way that it continues to conduct business. So both the left in the West and the left in the East continue to define themselves against the empire, but disagree on who the empire is.The fundamental difference is the question of Russia. Because of the way that Western leftists, and particularly Western leftist feminists, have been taught to see the world, the way that they have been habituated to see the world, they're unable to see Russia as an aggressor. They're unable to change their narrative about how NATO might act.And of course, the criticisms of continued Western abuses of power, especially when they center on the United States—such as Afghanistan or such as Iraq, but also here in the European context, intra-European context, Serbia is another context in which that comes up—are highly debatable questions, but they're seen a certain way. They're understood in a certain way by Western leftists. And because of Russia's criticism of the West, Western leftists see it as a natural ally, or at least as an equally guilty party.BGG: That's a really great explanation. I think the way that you've laid that out makes a lot of sense.It also harkens back to where I want to bring this, which is the debate that has been going on in Baltic studies and other academic fields, especially those focusing on the region, about thinking about Baltic history in particular as a colonial history and thinking about what it means to decolonize Baltic studies as a field, to decolonize our academic thinking. There have been a lot of discussions.I know that we were in the same room at the AABS panel at Yale last year on that fantastic panel about decolonization. Where do you think this leads with regard to your research specifically? There's already this trend in this field. I get the sense that you are an advocate and moving forward in land seeking for the field as a whole to move in that direction.What do you think the next steps are? What paths do you think could be taken? What do people need to be thinking about that they may not already be thinking about?GB: Well, I think for me, the key question when we are talking about Baltic studies and decolonization is what is it that we talk about when we talk about decolonizing Baltic studies or Baltic countries?Because I think sometimes we're talking about four different things. We are talking about the question of colonialism and coloniality. That's one. We are talking about imperialism, Russian imperialism, and Russian imperiality. We are talking about Russification and what it means to de-Russify. And we are also talking about Sovietization and what it means to de-Sovietize.And I would argue that while these four concepts are very much interrelated, they have very different agendas. So, I think it's a question of definitions. How do we define what our agenda is? Which of the four do we have in mind when we talk about decolonizing Baltic countries, Baltic studies, or anything else?And I would say that each of the four has its place and is significant. But the flip side of that, especially if we stay with the question of decolonization, is the question of Western theory, practice, and scholarship as it relates to Baltic studies. Because if we go back to the early questions in the conversation of what is civil society and whether there is a civil society, Baltic countries and the region as a whole are pathologized.Because the concept of what civil society is, or is not, was based on Western understandings and Western practices. And it rendered civil society in the region invisible. In what ways does the production of scholarship and knowledge about the region continue to be based in very unequal power relationships, in such a way that it continues to pathologize the region?And these are very uncomfortable questions, because much like, you know, in the late eighteenth century when the Lithuanian Polish Commonwealth was divided between the three powers, we're facing the same question: Who is our ally? Because we have learned that Russia is definitely not, but the West is also a problematic ally.This is where I think the question of what it means to center the study of the region in the theory, in the practice, in the questions that actually originate from the ground up, are so important. And I'm not ditching all Western scholarship out the window. That would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater.But I'm saying, what does it mean to balance? What does it mean to center? What does it mean to change the parameters of the conversation?BGG: Those are some weighty questions. I think they're good questions that the field is, I would say not even starting to engage with, but is engaging with, which is really excellent, but it's a long path.As anyone who is a scholar of decolonization will tell you, it doesn't happen overnight. It doesn't happen over a decade. It's sort of a continuous process. So, I think that is where we're going to have to leave it, knowing that there is so much more we could have talked about. But, Gražina, thank you so much.This has been a fascinating conversation. Thank you for joining Baltic Ways.GB: Thank you so much for having me, Ben. It's been a privilege.BGG: Thank you for listening to this episode of Baltic Ways, a co-production of the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies and the Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI). A note that the views expressed in this and every Baltic Ways episode do not necessarily reflect those of AABS or FPRI.To ensure you catch the next episode of Baltic Ways, make sure you're subscribed to your podcast feed or wherever you get your shows. Thanks so much, and we'll see you next time. Get full access to FPRI Insights at fpriinsights.substack.com/subscribe

Ukrainians have resisted Russia's aggression for years. Since the full-scale invasion of their country in 2022, Ukrainian women in particular have taken on important roles on the frontlines, in civil society, and at home. Gražina Bielousova's research examines how Ukrainian leftist feminists advocate for their causes at home and abroad, facing distinct sets of challenges as they attempt to defend their country. The Ukrainian case is also distinct in comparison to Latvia and Lithuania, whose organizing takes on different shapes for the same cause. Bielousova joins Ben Gardner-Gill to explain these interactions and discuss the ongoing process of decolonization in Baltic Studies.TranscriptBen Gardner-Gill: Hello, and welcome to Baltic Ways. I'm your co-host, Ben Gardner-Gill. Today we're talking with Gražina Belousova. Gražina is a feminist scholar of race, religion, and gender in post-Soviet Europe. She earned her PhD from Duke University in 2022. Currently, she is a postdoctoral scholar at Vilnius University's Institute of International Relations and Political Science and a researcher at Vytautas Magnus University.Her current research project focuses on leftist feminisms in East Europe in light of Russia's war against Ukraine, which will culminate in her first book, What's Left of Feminism in East Europe.Gražina, welcome to Baltic Ways.Gražina Belousova: Thank you so much for having me, Ben.BGG: So let's kick off by just hearing a little bit more about your background. I know you finished your PhD pretty recently. Could you tell us a little bit more about how you got into academia, sort of your research interests, and what you're working on at the moment?GB: Right. Yes, I just defended my PhD in 2022. It's hard to believe that it's been nearly three years now. In my PhD, I focused on historical matters. My PhD was in religion and cultural anthropology. And one of the things that I found missing when I was trying to theorize the part of the world that I call home and that most of the world calls Eastern Europe—I realized that I was lacking a solid theory that would bridge economics, anthropology, and religious studies.I wanted to understand how religious difference, especially perceived religious difference, played a role in creating the space that we call Eastern Europe today. And that took me to 18th and 19th century travel writings by Western travelers, oftentimes who were on an official mission, to the edges or to the depths of the Russian Empire.So I've read a lot of ambassadors' letters. I've read a lot of dispatches from St. Petersburg and Moscow, trying to understand how Westerners thought about that religious difference and how that thinking structured their understanding of what this place was and why it was different. What I tried to argue is actually that perceived religious difference was at the root of thinking of Eastern Europe as something different.Now, when I chose to embark on that topic, I had to put another topic aside, which was the question of very contemporary matters, the question of leftist political thought and feminism. At that point, it felt to me more pertinent to write the kind of theory that I felt was missing. When I was given the opportunity to pursue a postdoctoral position at Vilnius University Institute of International Relations and Political Science, I pitched this idea to them.And we very quickly pulled together the application. And the next thing I knew, I was embarking on a project on leftist feminisms in Eastern Europe in light of the war in Ukraine. So, the path was windy, but here I am today, knees and elbows deep, in the project on leftist feminism.BGG: Wonderful. I mean, a windy path is going to be familiar to so many people listening.So, no surprise and no surprise as well that the full-scale Russian invasion of Ukraine has really impacted your work and your life as it has for many of us. So tell us a little bit more about that.Over the last three years, we've been watching and seeing the horrors in Ukraine. From your perspective, from your academic work, what are some of the main things that you're looking at?GB: One of the things that I'm particularly interested in is the way that groups that are on the edges of society, on the margins of society, such as leftists, such as feminists, and especially leftist feminists—when the two come together and try to articulate their social and political vision and explain to themselves and to their fellow compatriots and oftentimes foreign donors, in my case, also Western leftist feminists, their relevance, how they're trying to articulate their position.War has a penchant for heightening nationalist tendencies. And this is not some kind of particular Eastern European pathology. War anywhere is going to produce these results. That is normal. People defend themselves and articulate themselves on the basis on which they're being attacked, on the basis on which they're being bombed.So this is what we are seeing in Ukraine. Leftism in Eastern Europe, because of the Soviet past, is often associated with Soviet nostalgia. Feminism, on the other hand, is oftentimes seen as something antithetical to national identity, something that is imported from the West, and something that either has no relevance or can be dangerous, especially when questions of national unity, questions of national defense come about.That is one of the reasons why I embarked on this journey, and this is one of the reasons why Ukraine had to be part of this picture. Because while the other countries that I'm looking at—Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, and Moldova—experience the threat of invasion, Ukraine is under attack.And one of the things that I'm finding is that Ukrainian leftist feminists are incredibly resourceful and incredibly gifted at articulating their relevance.One of the things that I'm going to say that stems from that understanding of leftist feminism that's erroneous, but that's pervasive, is that Ukrainian leftist feminists do not debate the legitimacy of the Ukrainian state. What is in question is the way things are happening under the conditions of war.The questions of most vulnerable people—so questions of what happens with people with disabilities, questions of what happens to single mothers, questions of what happens to the elderly people who are maybe unable to evacuate, questions of what happens to the working class people—all of these things are at the forefront of their minds. They're trying to be the advocates of their pleas to the larger society, while at the same time trying to articulate Ukraine's right to self-defense to Western leftist feminists.BGG: So they have both this tension, maybe tension is the wrong word, tell me if it isn't, but they have this tension internally where they're trying to advocate for what they see as justice or what is right with a domestic audience who, understandably, may be more frequently focused on what's happening at the front lines.And then there's also this international question, the foreign audience for these Ukrainian leftist feminists, who have a very different perspective on the Russia-Ukraine conflict. And I specifically use that verbiage instead of Russia's invasion of Ukraine because they're going to think about it very differently.So let's split those out a little bit, and I want to start with the domestic. You talked about the advocacy of these leftist feminists for the most marginalized groups in society, for those who are most vulnerable.In your view, where have they been most successful, perhaps? Where have they seen actual progress happen from their advocacy?GB: One of the things that immediately comes to mind, and many of my interlocutors were directly involved with, is the nurses' movement–the unionization and self-organization of the nurses.There is a movement called Be Like Nina, referring to one of the nurses seen as a pioneer of resisting exploitation. And, of course, under the conditions of war, the labor of nurses is incredibly valuable and needed, but not always appropriately compensated. This is what we can call essential labor, especially when we talk about the front lines, where people are wounded.Many of them are wounded very badly on a daily basis. However, there are other things that are happening in the background as well. While a lot of the resources are pulled to the front, there are people who are experiencing regular daily struggles with their health. And the nurses are being stretched very thin.And this was something that was really amazing to me. This was really one of the very few instances where I saw academics who are leftist feminists actually touching the ground with their ideas: where they got involved with helping the nurses organize, but not taking the center stage, where they acted as support, as a resource, but not overtaking the movement, rather creating the conditions under which nurses themselves could articulate what it was that they needed, what their goals were.And that was incredibly impressive to me because healthcare is severely underfunded across the whole region, and to achieve such tangible goals as wage increases and regulations that empower nurses to do their job was truly impressive. With every conversation with a woman—because I specifically talk only to women—I just felt sheer amazement, because this is so contrary to so many imaginations of what civil society, self-organization, or networks are like in Eastern Europe.This is so contrary to what some have called ‘uncivil' society. What is happening is really self-organization and civil society at its best, organized by women who are oftentimes stretched very thin, not just at work, but also at home, women whose husbands are potentially on the front lines.So to me, I really cannot think of anything else that, in terms of real life impact and in terms of transforming people's lives, has been grander (I'm going to go for that word) than this.BGG: That's remarkable, and thank you for bringing that. I had very little idea of this progress and this happening.So you use the term civil society, which I think is quite apt, and Western conceptions of civil society in the region that we call Eastern Europe can be highly misguided. Let's just put it like that. I think back to a webinar that the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies (AABS) hosted on Ukrainian civil society, democratization, responses to the war, and we have this comparative Ukrainian and Baltic perspective, where we looked at how Ukrainian civil society was responding.We looked at how Baltic civil society was responding, and you're doing something similar in your research here. You're looking at Latvia and Lithuania as two of the other case studies, in addition to Poland, Moldova, and, of course, Ukraine. One thing that I think we can all observe just from watching the news, let alone being in the countries as well, is that civil society across the region has had this really robust response in the last few years.So could you speak a little bit more to that in the comparative cases outside of Ukraine that you're looking at in your research, especially Latvia and Lithuania?GB: For sure. I think that in order to theorize civil society and the region in general, we need better theory than has been used often to talk about civil society at large.Here, for example, I'm thinking about Emily Channel Justice and her work and the way that she articulates the notion of self-organization. The way that she thinks about Ukraine, especially in the context of Maidan. The way that it left a self-organization, but that can be applied also to any form of civil society, regardless of ideology, is really a network of decentralized, self-organized people's groups.If you were to look for some kind of central organizing pattern, or some kind of centralized way of doing things, most likely you're not going to find it because it's based on personal network, connections, and localized issues. And I think that's definitely something that I'm seeing in Ukraine.One of the things that I'm seeing in Lithuania and Latvia is that it's going to differ slightly because there are going to be more central organizing figures. If we talk about organizing support for Ukraine, one of the things that we're going to see is that people are going to point to nationwide initiatives.Right now in Lithuania, there is an initiative called Radarum, which is a play on words, on radar and on darom, which is a Lithuanian word for let's do it. And it's a nationwide initiative to collect funds to purchase drones and anti-drone equipment for Ukraine. And there are particular faces that we associate with this initiative.National television is running ads for it. So there's a little bit more of a centralized sense to it. But once again, I would say that this is the mainstream way of organizing civil society, which, of course, with Westernization, has taken on some of the patterns that are similar to the West.If we look towards the left, we're going to see very much that it is self-organized, small groups of people who take different initiatives, such as raising funds for medical care, such as raising funds for queer people in Ukraine. So the more mainstream we go, the more patterns that are akin to those that we see in the West we're going to see.That is also going to be true in Latvia. The further left we go, the more organic, grassroots, self-organized cells of people we're going to find who participate in smaller, less visible initiatives. So that's probably the best way that I can explain the difference.BGG: Got it. We see this distinction of centralization and decentralization.One could consider these different types of movements organic in their own ways, but different in different ways. When one thinks of leftist organizing, which has a long and rich history, organic is sort of one of the key words.It's perpetual, and these society-wide initiatives, like what's currently going on in Lithuania, that we've seen across other countries over the last few years, are maybe a little bit less frequent and less common. So there's an important distinction there.So I want to pivot to the international dimension of how the Ukrainian leftist feminists are talking, especially with Western counterparts. And by Western, we mean Western Europe. We mean American and Canadian. We mean Western, as in not Eastern Europe. So could you talk a little bit about the challenges they're facing there?I think I alluded to it earlier, and you alluded to it earlier, but could you dive a little bit more into that discourse, that dialogue between the Ukrainians and their counterparts?GB: This is the main point of contention. What does it mean to be leftist? How much does local experience shape being leftist?What is the relationship of the left to the national question? And I think this is where we are seeing the real tension. Underlying this tension, of course, is the question of Russia. Let me try to unpack this. And I'm going to start from the other end than I listed, which is with the question of Russia.Eastern European in general, and Ukrainian in particular, leftist feminists have a very different understanding as to what Russia is in terms of geopolitics than the Western counterparts are going to have. This stems from very different histories. Western leftism—especially the new wave of leftism that arose in the sixties and the seventies—in many ways has redefined itself not just through the questions of class, which I would argue were lost to some extent. They lost their centrality.And they redefined themselves through the anti-colonial, anti-racist struggle. And that struggle was particularly important because after the fall of the formal colonial system, the colonial patterns of economic exploitation, of social exploitation, of brain drain still very much persisted. And naming that and defining themselves against Western neoimperialism or neocolonialism in the Global South was one of the most defining features of the Left, both in the Global South and in the West. Now, Russia at that time had positioned itself as the ally of the colonized countries. And some of it was pure show, and some of it was actual money, resources, and help that were sent, for example, to Angola. And that made a real difference. Whether that was genuine concern for the colonized people or whether that was an ideological tool is a matter of debate.Whatever it was, it had a profound impact on the way that Western leftists relate to Russia. They continue to see Russia out of that tradition, in many ways, as an ally against Western capitalism and imperialism. Their empire, against which they define themselves, continues to be in the West, and oftentimes is seen as centered on the United States.The empire against which we define ourselves in Eastern Europe is Russia, because Russia was the colonizing power in a very real sense in the region. It was our empire that subjugated us. It was the colonial power that engaged in just about every single practice in which any colonial power engages in the region.For us, if we think outside of ourselves, Russia continues to be the colonial power in the way that it relates to Central Asia, in the way that it relates to the indigenous people of Siberia, in the way that it continues to conduct business. So both the left in the West and the left in the East continue to define themselves against the empire, but disagree on who the empire is.The fundamental difference is the question of Russia. Because of the way that Western leftists, and particularly Western leftist feminists, have been taught to see the world, the way that they have been habituated to see the world, they're unable to see Russia as an aggressor. They're unable to change their narrative about how NATO might act.And of course, the criticisms of continued Western abuses of power, especially when they center on the United States—such as Afghanistan or such as Iraq, but also here in the European context, intra-European context, Serbia is another context in which that comes up—are highly debatable questions, but they're seen a certain way. They're understood in a certain way by Western leftists. And because of Russia's criticism of the West, Western leftists see it as a natural ally, or at least as an equally guilty party.BGG: That's a really great explanation. I think the way that you've laid that out makes a lot of sense.It also harkens back to where I want to bring this, which is the debate that has been going on in Baltic studies and other academic fields, especially those focusing on the region, about thinking about Baltic history in particular as a colonial history and thinking about what it means to decolonize Baltic studies as a field, to decolonize our academic thinking. There have been a lot of discussions.I know that we were in the same room at the AABS panel at Yale last year on that fantastic panel about decolonization. Where do you think this leads with regard to your research specifically? There's already this trend in this field. I get the sense that you are an advocate and moving forward in land seeking for the field as a whole to move in that direction.What do you think the next steps are? What paths do you think could be taken? What do people need to be thinking about that they may not already be thinking about?GB: Well, I think for me, the key question when we are talking about Baltic studies and decolonization is what is it that we talk about when we talk about decolonizing Baltic studies or Baltic countries?Because I think sometimes we're talking about four different things. We are talking about the question of colonialism and coloniality. That's one. We are talking about imperialism, Russian imperialism, and Russian imperiality. We are talking about Russification and what it means to de-Russify. And we are also talking about Sovietization and what it means to de-Sovietize.And I would argue that while these four concepts are very much interrelated, they have very different agendas. So, I think it's a question of definitions. How do we define what our agenda is? Which of the four do we have in mind when we talk about decolonizing Baltic countries, Baltic studies, or anything else?And I would say that each of the four has its place and is significant. But the flip side of that, especially if we stay with the question of decolonization, is the question of Western theory, practice, and scholarship as it relates to Baltic studies. Because if we go back to the early questions in the conversation of what is civil society and whether there is a civil society, Baltic countries and the region as a whole are pathologized.Because the concept of what civil society is, or is not, was based on Western understandings and Western practices. And it rendered civil society in the region invisible. In what ways does the production of scholarship and knowledge about the region continue to be based in very unequal power relationships, in such a way that it continues to pathologize the region?And these are very uncomfortable questions, because much like, you know, in the late eighteenth century when the Lithuanian Polish Commonwealth was divided between the three powers, we're facing the same question: Who is our ally? Because we have learned that Russia is definitely not, but the West is also a problematic ally.This is where I think the question of what it means to center the study of the region in the theory, in the practice, in the questions that actually originate from the ground up, rather than are solely important. And I'm not ditching all Western scholarship out the window. That would be throwing the baby out with the bathwater.But I'm saying, what does it mean to balance? What does it mean to center? What does it mean to change the parameters of the conversation?BGG: Those are some weighty questions. I think they're good questions that the field is, I would say not even starting to engage with, but is engaging with, which is really excellent, but it's a long path.As anyone who is a scholar of decolonization will tell you, it doesn't happen overnight. It doesn't happen over a decade. It's sort of a continuous process. So, I think that is where we're going to have to leave it, knowing that there is so much more we could have talked about. But, Gražina, thank you so much.This has been a fascinating conversation. Thank you for joining Baltic Ways.GB: Thank you so much for having me, Ben. It's been a privilege.To ensure you catch the next episode of Baltic Ways, make sure you're subscribed to your podcast feed or wherever you get your shows. Thanks so much, and we'll see you next time.(Image: Facebook | Феміністична майстерня)Baltic Ways is a podcast from the Association for the Advancement of Baltic Studies, produced in partnership with the Baltic Initiative at the Foreign Policy Research Institute. The views and opinions expressed in this podcast are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of AABS or FPRI. This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fpribalticinitiative.substack.com

Nearly three years since Putin's full scale invasion of Ukraine, Russia controls much of eastern and southern Ukraine. Nikolay Petrov explains how and why the Kremlin pushes for the “Russification” of the occupied territories.

Russia currently occupies about 18 percent of Ukraine's territory. Yet reliable information about what life is like there is hard to come by, since there is no longer any access for Ukrainian media. Nevertheless, various Ukrainian initiatives aim to shed light on what is happening in the occupied territories. The picture they paint is one of violent repression, propaganda and forced Russification. FRANCE 24's correspondent Gulliver Cragg reports.

Biden calls for Trump to be "locked up" (1:00-6:00). One thing leads to another (7:00-18:00). I have no reluctance (18:00-35:00). Tim Walz missed the memo (35:00-40:00). Great journalism from CBS and Nora O'Donnell (42:00-47:00). Newsweek's hot takes (47:00-50:00). Here come the hit pieces (50:00-60:00). Nuzzi out at New York Magazine, trust in media hits new low, Central Park Five sue Trump (50:00-1:17:00).Zig responds to copout accusation by disrespectful producer and 538 has 51 / 49 on odds to win and the value of early voting data (1:17:00-1:30:00). The continued Russification of the NFL - Guardian Caps (1:30:00-2:00:00). Could LA DA release the Menendez brothers? (2:00:00-2:20:00).Become a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-death-of-journalism--5691723/support.

2024-08-20 | 2024, and Russia's history is once more turning on the Kursk region. This is the campaign that broke Putin – that showed the world the hollowness and impotence of the Russian army, the lunacy of his invasion of Ukraine and the toxic propaganda that sustains his regime. We are now in the second week of Ukraine's offensive within Russia, and there is no sign of a military response from Putin that has any chance of dislodging the Ukrainian forces. There are Georgians and Belarussians said to be among the troops, emphasising the anti-imperial character of the fightback against Russia.  @SiliconWafers  ---------- In early 1941, spies and diplomats started to warn Joseph Stalin, dictator of the Soviet Union, that that the Nazis were about to strike. Reports that it was Hitler's intention to rip up the non-aggression pact between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany were received with increasing frequency and urgency. Stalin, apparently ignored them, believing them that the Germans would not choose to fight on two fronts, and any invasion would only come after they had defeated France. Soviet intelligence purportedly named the exact, or almost exact, date of the invasion no fewer than 47 times in the 10 days before “Operation Barbarossa” went into effect. Fast forward to 2024, and it seems that Putin may have been warned of Ukraine's incursion into Kursk days before it began, but again ignored the warnings. We examined the possible reasons why in the previous episode, but the historical parallels are interesting, nonetheless. The historical ironies accumulate. The battle of Kursk in the summer of 1943 was a critical turning point in World War II, an encounter that both sides knew would reshape the war. The adversaries were at the peak of their respective military powers. More than three million men and eight thousand tanks met in the heart of the Soviet territory. Defeat ended German hopes of restoring their position on the Eastern Front and put the Red Army on the road to Berlin. From there, Stalin went on to take Berlin, and place his brutal imprint on the post war order in Central and Eastern Europe. Many ancient states in Europe came under the dominance of The Soviet Union, and a process of political Russification extinguished their independence and hopes of democratic development. ---------- Sources and recommended reading: https://kyivindependent.com/syrskyi-kursk-economist/ https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-war-latest-ukraine-captures-92-settlements-in-russias-kursk-oblast-kyiv-claims/ https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-allegedly-hits-3rd-bridge/ https://kyivindependent.com/10-days-of-kursk-from-first-shot-to-capture-of-sudzha/ https://kyivindependent.com/mick-ryan-on-ukraines-kursk-offensive-high-risk-high-return/ https://kyivindependent.com/ukraine-established-military-administration-in-russias-kursk-oblast/ ---------- SUPPORT THE CHANNEL: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurtain https://www.patreon.com/siliconcurtain ---------- TRUSTED CHARITIES ON THE GROUND: Save Ukraine https://www.saveukraineua.org/ Superhumans - Hospital for war traumas https://superhumans.com/en/ UNBROKEN - Treatment. Prosthesis. Rehabilitation for Ukrainians in Ukraine https://unbroken.org.ua/ Come Back Alive https://savelife.in.ua/en/ Chefs For Ukraine - World Central Kitchen https://wck.org/relief/activation-chefs-for-ukraine UNITED24 - An initiative of President Zelenskyy https://u24.gov.ua/ Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation https://prytulafoundation.org NGO “Herojam Slava” https://heroiamslava.org/ kharpp - Reconstruction project supporting communities in Kharkiv and Przemyśl https://kharpp.com/ NOR DOG Animal Rescue https://www.nor-dog.org/home/ ---------- PLATFORMS: Twitter: https://twitter.com/CurtainSilicon Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/siliconcurtain/ Podcast: https://open.spotify.com/show/4thRZj6NO7y93zG11JMtqm Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/finkjonathan/ Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/siliconcurtain ---------- Welcome to the Silicon Curtain podcast. Please like and subscribe if you like the content we produce. It will really help to increase the popularity of our content in YouTube's algorithm. Our material is now being made available on popular podcasting platforms as well, such as Spotify and Apple Podcasts.

Ecoutez La revue de presse internationale avec La rédaction de RTL du 21 juin 2024.

Taras Byk's special mission is the breakup of the Russian Federation, a project that doesn't seem so far-fetched after the Prigozhin mutiny, and Putin's endless aggression that is exhausting Russia's military and economic reserves. Taras is a civil society activist and political strategist, who believes that Ukraine's Maidan Revolution, in which he participated, saved not only Ukraine but also Europe. Today we will be discussing the threat from a resurgent Russia, and the history of imperial expansion that sits behind it. Can Ukraine's stand for freedom and struggle against renewed Russification of its peoples hold the line in Europe between freedom and authoritarianism, between the rule of law and unimaginable barbarism. Can Ukraine's experience even help revitalise the idea of democracy and help us to become more resilience in the face of creeping nepotism, corruption, oligarchy, and aggressive autocrats? ---------- Taras Byk is a manager at Wooden Horse Strategies, LLC, a governmental-relations, and strategic communications firm based in Kyiv. ---------- LINKS: https://www.linkedin.com/in/taras-byk-09bb305/ ---------- ARTICLES: https://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/ukrainealert/is-putins-russia-heading-for-collapse-like-its-czarist-and-soviet-predecessors/ https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/podcasts/6527f6aaefe26/2023/10/26/7425908/ https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QScdSVMz83A&t=2s ---------- SUPPORT THE CHANNEL: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/siliconcurtain https://www.patreon.com/siliconcurtain ---------- TRUSTED CHARITIES ON THE GROUND: Save Ukraine https://www.saveukraineua.org/ Superhumans - Hospital for war traumas https://superhumans.com/en/ UNBROKEN - Treatment. Prosthesis. Rehabilitation for Ukrainians in Ukraine https://unbroken.org.ua/ Come Back Alive https://savelife.in.ua/en/ Chefs For Ukraine - World Central Kitchen https://wck.org/relief/activation-chefs-for-ukraine UNITED24 - An initiative of President Zelenskyy https://u24.gov.ua/ Serhiy Prytula Charity Foundation https://prytulafoundation.org NGO “Herojam Slava” https://heroiamslava.org/ kharpp - Reconstruction project supporting communities in Kharkiv and Przemyśl https://kharpp.com/ NOR DOG Animal Rescue https://www.nor-dog.org/home/ ---------- PLATFORMS: Twitter: https://twitter.com/CurtainSilicon Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/siliconcurtain/ Podcast: https://open.spotify.com/show/4thRZj6NO7y93zG11JMtqm Linkedin: https://www.linkedin.com/in/finkjonathan/ Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/siliconcurtain ---------- Welcome to the Silicon Curtain podcast. Please like and subscribe if you like the content we produce. It will really help to increase the popularity of our content in YouTube's algorithm. Our material is now being made available on popular podcasting platforms as well, such as Spotify and Apple Podcasts.

Keir Starmer has rolled up his sleeves, taken off his tie and headed to Essex to unveil his six first steps for government. Is Starmer looking for Blairite comparisons? Is there the same enthusiasm for change as there was in 1997? And what are the hard questions Labour still needs to answer, but won't?Later we speak with Lewis in Tblisi ahead of another critical day of protests by those fighting the Russification of democracy in Georgia. And the big reveal today comes from Jon. Right at the end. Don't miss it!Editor: Tom HughesProducer: Laura FitzPatrickField Producer: Gabriel RadusSocial Media Editor: Georgia FoxwellVideo Production: Shane Fennelly, Rory Symon & Arvind BadewalYou can listen to this episode on Alexa - just say "Alexa, ask Global Player to play The News Agents"!The News Agents is brought to you by HSBC UK - https://www.hsbc.co.uk/https://store.global.com/collections/the-news-agentsJon's brand-new book, Strangeland: How Britain Stopped Making Sense, will be available on 26th September 2024. To pre-order a copy or buy a ticket to Jon's tour, please click this link: lnk.to/StrangelandsBook.Unlock priority booking for Jon's tour with the presale code NEWSPRIORITY. General sale booking opens at midday on 17th May.

Welcome to a slightly new format for the Edition podcast! Each week we will be talking about the magazine – as per usual – but trying to give a little more insight into the process behind putting The Spectator to bed each week. On the podcast this week: plan Bibi In the early hours of Friday morning, Benjamin Netanyahu leaked his ‘Day after Hamas' plan for post-war Gaza. But the plan is not a plan, writes Anshel Pfeffer – it is just a set of vague principles that do not stand up to the slightest scrutiny. Its sole purpose is rather to keep the ministers of Netanyahu's fragile cabinet together to ensure his political survival. Joining the podcast is former National Security advisor to Netanyahu and former head of the Israeli Professor Uzi Arad, to discuss Bibi's self-interested survival strategy. (03:08) Also this week: Lara and Will discuss some of their favourite pieces from the magazine. Including Richard Bratby's arts lead on the composer you should take far more seriously and Ysenda Maxtone Graham's piece on the ‘sad clappies'. Then: why Latvia is expelling its Russian speakers. New rules mean that ethnic Russians, many of whom have lived in Latvia for their entire lives, have been told they need to learn Latvian or face deportation. In the magazine, Lukas Degutis, The Spectator's editorial manager, interviews people affected by the illiberal policy, as well as the politicians defending the change as part of de-Russification of the Baltic states. We spoke to Lukas and Inga Springe, investigative journalist at Re:Baltica who has been across this story on the derussification of the Baltic. (22:16) And finally: why don't we have more time, and when we do, why do we waste it? This is the central question of a new book by Gary S. Cross, titled: Free Time: The History of an Elusive Ideal. We thought this was the perfect question to ask our own Wiki Man columnist Rory Sutherland, who had some fascinating things to say about free time and how best to spend it. (34:39) Hosted by Lara Prendergast and William Moore.  Produced by Oscar Edmondson.  If there are any areas of the magazine that you are particularly interested in or any questions you have for Will and Lara, please email: podcast@spectator.co.uk. We will try and answer as many as we can in next week's episode. 

Welcome to a slightly new format for the Edition podcast! Each week we will be talking about the magazine – as per usual – but trying to give a little more insight into the process behind putting The Spectator to bed each week. On the podcast this week: plan Bibi In the early hours of Friday morning, Benjamin Netanyahu leaked his ‘Day after Hamas' plan for post-war Gaza. But the plan is not a plan, writes Anshel Pfeffer – it is just a set of vague principles that do not stand up to the slightest scrutiny. Its sole purpose is rather to keep the ministers of Netanyahu's fragile cabinet together to ensure his political survival. Joining the podcast is former National Security advisor to Netanyahu and former head of the Israeli Professor Uzi Arad, to discuss Bibi's self-interested survival strategy. (03:08) Also this week: Lara and Will discuss some of their favourite pieces from the magazine. Including Richard Bratby's arts lead on the composer you should take far more seriously and Ysenda Maxtone Graham's piece on the ‘sad clappies'.  Then: why Latvia is expelling its Russian speakers. New rules mean that ethnic Russians, many of whom have lived in Latvia for their entire lives, have been told they need to learn Latvian or face deportation. In the magazine, Lukas Degutis, The Spectator's editorial manager, interviews people affected by the illiberal policy, as well as the politicians defending the change as part of de-Russification of the Baltic states. We spoke to Lukas and Inga Springe, investigative journalist at Re:Baltica who has been across this story on the derussification of the Baltic. (22:16) And finally: why don't we have more time, and when we do, why do we waste it? This is the central question of a new book by Gary S. Cross, titled: Free Time: The History of an Elusive Ideal. We thought this was the perfect question to ask our own Wiki Man columnist Rory Sutherland, who had some fascinating things to say about free time and how best to spend it. (34:39) Hosted by Lara Prendergast and William Moore.  Produced by Oscar Edmondson.  If there are any areas of the magazine that you are particularly interested in or any questions you have for Will and Lara, please email: podcast@spectator.co.uk. We will try and answer as many as we can in next week's episode. 

durée : 00:58:35 - Cultures Monde - par : Julie Gacon, Mélanie Chalandon - De Donetsk à Marioupol, comment le processus de "russification" et d'intégration à la fédération de Russie se met-il en place dans les territoires ukrainiens occupés ? - invités : Ioulia Shukan Spécialiste de l'Ukraine, maîtresse de conférences en études slaves à l'Université Paris Nanterre et chercheuse à l'Institut des Sciences sociales du Politique et associée au Centre d'études des mondes russe, caucasien et centre-européen ; Paul Gogo Journaliste à Moscou et auteur du livre Opération Spéciale, aux Éditions du Rocher, 2024; Sylvain Tronchet Journaliste, correspondant de Radio France à Moscou

Ukrainians living in Russian occupied territories are facing a myriad of threats, from torture and deportation to the Russification of their communities. On this episode of The Eastern Front, Giselle, Dalibor, and Iulia welcome Karolina Hird, the Russia deputy team lead and Evans Hanson fellow at the Institute for the Study of War, to discuss her recent report, "The Kremlin's Occupation Playbook: Coerced Russification and Ethnic Cleansing in Occupied Ukraine." What tactics has Russia used in its attempts to erase Ukrainian identity? Does the Ukrainian government have a plan in place to reintegrate the Russian-occupied territories? Show notes: Sign up for The Eastern Front‘s bi-weekly newsletter here and follow us on X here. "The Kremlin's Occupation Playbook: Coerced Russification and Ethnic Cleansing in Occupied Ukraine" by Karolina Hird. "The Torture Camp on Paradise Street" by Stanislav Aseyev.

Fisher's treatment of the history of Finland, in the context of its relations with Russia, was released in 1899—at the start of the first attempted wave of Russification. At this time, it seems, many Finns regarded it as a misunderstanding. A mistake. Not a contrivance of Nicholas II, but a villainy emanating instead, fen-sucked, from the sinister Russian state machinery—the fief of a myopic and obdurate cadre of supremacists and absolutists. Men like the rabid anti-semite Konstantin Pobedonostsev who, by the camera's harsh testimony, seems to have died long before he stopped coming in to work, and like Ivan Goremykin who in an ironic twist of fate would not so very much later – after 1906 – have to stretch his mind to try to contend with the obscenity of constitutional monarchy at home. Men who all nursed a bitter grudge at the perceived slight to their omnipotence called Finland. The long-standing arrangements and understandings between Finland and the Tsars had up to this time, for the better part of a century, served both parties very well. And would undoubtedly have stood Russia in good stead into the twentieth century. Every Tsar reaffirmed a solemn pledge to maintain the Fundamental Laws underpinning the constitutional order, to uphold Alexander I's promise to respect "their religion, their laws, their liberties and their rights." Every Tsar honored it—until Nicholas II. In return, Finland turned its back on Sweden to stand at Russia's side bringing with it a domain which was loyal, orderly and industrious and soon enough became highly educated and prosperous too. Regardless of the shocks and reversals the Empire encountered, the Grand Duchy was unwavering so far as imperial internal security went, producing never "...a conspirator or an agitator against Russia. It provided instead generals for her armies and admirals for her fleet." Subversion and coercion efforts against the Finnish state would be abruptly halted in the immediate aftermath of the bitter defeat meted out by Japan in 1905; Saint Petersburg had unrest aplenty across its vast and ethnically diverse extent without manufacturing more. These efforts would resume. Finland would be driven to, at the first opportunity, declare independence in 1917. The events of the twentieth century would be profoundly influenced by the collapse of Russo-Finnish cooperation, by the Winter War and by Finland's politics and diplomatic efforts during the Cold War. While the impact of some of these developments may be seen as broadly beneficial to Europe, much of it was to the critical detriment of the prevailing political orders in Russia. Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Fisher's treatment of the history of Finland, in the context of its relations with Russia, was released in 1899—at the start of the first attempted wave of Russification. At this time, it seems, many Finns regarded it as a misunderstanding. A mistake. Not a contrivance of Nicholas II, but a villainy emanating instead, fen-sucked, from the sinister Russian state machinery—the fief of a myopic and obdurate cadre of supremacists and absolutists. Men like the rabid anti-semite Konstantin Pobedonostsev who, by the camera's harsh testimony, seems to have died long before he stopped coming in to work, and like Ivan Goremykin who in an ironic twist of fate would not so very much later – after 1906 – have to stretch his mind to try to contend with the obscenity of constitutional monarchy at home. Men who all nursed a bitter grudge at the perceived slight to their omnipotence called Finland. The long-standing arrangements and understandings between Finland and the Tsars had up to this time, for the better part of a century, served both parties very well. And would undoubtedly have stood Russia in good stead into the twentieth century. Every Tsar reaffirmed a solemn pledge to maintain the Fundamental Laws underpinning the constitutional order, to uphold Alexander I's promise to respect "their religion, their laws, their liberties and their rights." Every Tsar honored it—until Nicholas II. In return, Finland turned its back on Sweden to stand at Russia's side bringing with it a domain which was loyal, orderly and industrious and soon enough became highly educated and prosperous too. Regardless of the shocks and reversals the Empire encountered, the Grand Duchy was unwavering so far as imperial internal security went, producing never "...a conspirator or an agitator against Russia. It provided instead generals for her armies and admirals for her fleet." Subversion and coercion efforts against the Finnish state would be abruptly halted in the immediate aftermath of the bitter defeat meted out by Japan in 1905; Saint Petersburg had unrest aplenty across its vast and ethnically diverse extent without manufacturing more. These efforts would resume. Finland would be driven to, at the first opportunity, declare independence in 1917. The events of the twentieth century would be profoundly influenced by the collapse of Russo-Finnish cooperation, by the Winter War and by Finland's politics and diplomatic efforts during the Cold War. While the impact of some of these developments may be seen as broadly beneficial to Europe, much of it was to the critical detriment of the prevailing political orders in Russia. Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Fisher's treatment of the history of Finland, in the context of its relations with Russia, was released in 1899—at the start of the first attempted wave of Russification. At this time, it seems, many Finns regarded it as a misunderstanding. A mistake. Not a contrivance of Nicholas II, but a villainy emanating instead, fen-sucked, from the sinister Russian state machinery—the fief of a myopic and obdurate cadre of supremacists and absolutists. Men like the rabid anti-semite Konstantin Pobedonostsev who, by the camera's harsh testimony, seems to have died long before he stopped coming in to work, and like Ivan Goremykin who in an ironic twist of fate would not so very much later – after 1906 – have to stretch his mind to try to contend with the obscenity of constitutional monarchy at home. Men who all nursed a bitter grudge at the perceived slight to their omnipotence called Finland. The long-standing arrangements and understandings between Finland and the Tsars had up to this time, for the better part of a century, served both parties very well. And would undoubtedly have stood Russia in good stead into the twentieth century. Every Tsar reaffirmed a solemn pledge to maintain the Fundamental Laws underpinning the constitutional order, to uphold Alexander I's promise to respect "their religion, their laws, their liberties and their rights." Every Tsar honored it—until Nicholas II. In return, Finland turned its back on Sweden to stand at Russia's side bringing with it a domain which was loyal, orderly and industrious and soon enough became highly educated and prosperous too. Regardless of the shocks and reversals the Empire encountered, the Grand Duchy was unwavering so far as imperial internal security went, producing never "...a conspirator or an agitator against Russia. It provided instead generals for her armies and admirals for her fleet." Subversion and coercion efforts against the Finnish state would be abruptly halted in the immediate aftermath of the bitter defeat meted out by Japan in 1905; Saint Petersburg had unrest aplenty across its vast and ethnically diverse extent without manufacturing more. These efforts would resume. Finland would be driven to, at the first opportunity, declare independence in 1917. The events of the twentieth century would be profoundly influenced by the collapse of Russo-Finnish cooperation, by the Winter War and by Finland's politics and diplomatic efforts during the Cold War. While the impact of some of these developments may be seen as broadly beneficial to Europe, much of it was to the critical detriment of the prevailing political orders in Russia. Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Fisher's treatment of the history of Finland, in the context of its relations with Russia, was released in 1899—at the start of the first attempted wave of Russification. At this time, it seems, many Finns regarded it as a misunderstanding. A mistake. Not a contrivance of Nicholas II, but a villainy emanating instead, fen-sucked, from the sinister Russian state machinery—the fief of a myopic and obdurate cadre of supremacists and absolutists. Men like the rabid anti-semite Konstantin Pobedonostsev who, by the camera's harsh testimony, seems to have died long before he stopped coming in to work, and like Ivan Goremykin who in an ironic twist of fate would not so very much later – after 1906 – have to stretch his mind to try to contend with the obscenity of constitutional monarchy at home. Men who all nursed a bitter grudge at the perceived slight to their omnipotence called Finland. The long-standing arrangements and understandings between Finland and the Tsars had up to this time, for the better part of a century, served both parties very well. And would undoubtedly have stood Russia in good stead into the twentieth century. Every Tsar reaffirmed a solemn pledge to maintain the Fundamental Laws underpinning the constitutional order, to uphold Alexander I's promise to respect "their religion, their laws, their liberties and their rights." Every Tsar honored it—until Nicholas II. In return, Finland turned its back on Sweden to stand at Russia's side bringing with it a domain which was loyal, orderly and industrious and soon enough became highly educated and prosperous too. Regardless of the shocks and reversals the Empire encountered, the Grand Duchy was unwavering so far as imperial internal security went, producing never "...a conspirator or an agitator against Russia. It provided instead generals for her armies and admirals for her fleet." Subversion and coercion efforts against the Finnish state would be abruptly halted in the immediate aftermath of the bitter defeat meted out by Japan in 1905; Saint Petersburg had unrest aplenty across its vast and ethnically diverse extent without manufacturing more. These efforts would resume. Finland would be driven to, at the first opportunity, declare independence in 1917. The events of the twentieth century would be profoundly influenced by the collapse of Russo-Finnish cooperation, by the Winter War and by Finland's politics and diplomatic efforts during the Cold War. While the impact of some of these developments may be seen as broadly beneficial to Europe, much of it was to the critical detriment of the prevailing political orders in Russia. Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Fisher's treatment of the history of Finland, in the context of its relations with Russia, was released in 1899—at the start of the first attempted wave of Russification. At this time, it seems, many Finns regarded it as a misunderstanding. A mistake. Not a contrivance of Nicholas II, but a villainy emanating instead, fen-sucked, from the sinister Russian state machinery—the fief of a myopic and obdurate cadre of supremacists and absolutists. Men like the rabid anti-semite Konstantin Pobedonostsev who, by the camera's harsh testimony, seems to have died long before he stopped coming in to work, and like Ivan Goremykin who in an ironic twist of fate would not so very much later – after 1906 – have to stretch his mind to try to contend with the obscenity of constitutional monarchy at home. Men who all nursed a bitter grudge at the perceived slight to their omnipotence called Finland. The long-standing arrangements and understandings between Finland and the Tsars had up to this time, for the better part of a century, served both parties very well. And would undoubtedly have stood Russia in good stead into the twentieth century. Every Tsar reaffirmed a solemn pledge to maintain the Fundamental Laws underpinning the constitutional order, to uphold Alexander I's promise to respect "their religion, their laws, their liberties and their rights." Every Tsar honored it—until Nicholas II. In return, Finland turned its back on Sweden to stand at Russia's side bringing with it a domain which was loyal, orderly and industrious and soon enough became highly educated and prosperous too. Regardless of the shocks and reversals the Empire encountered, the Grand Duchy was unwavering so far as imperial internal security went, producing never "...a conspirator or an agitator against Russia. It provided instead generals for her armies and admirals for her fleet." Subversion and coercion efforts against the Finnish state would be abruptly halted in the immediate aftermath of the bitter defeat meted out by Japan in 1905; Saint Petersburg had unrest aplenty across its vast and ethnically diverse extent without manufacturing more. These efforts would resume. Finland would be driven to, at the first opportunity, declare independence in 1917. The events of the twentieth century would be profoundly influenced by the collapse of Russo-Finnish cooperation, by the Winter War and by Finland's politics and diplomatic efforts during the Cold War. While the impact of some of these developments may be seen as broadly beneficial to Europe, much of it was to the critical detriment of the prevailing political orders in Russia. Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Fisher's treatment of the history of Finland, in the context of its relations with Russia, was released in 1899—at the start of the first attempted wave of Russification. At this time, it seems, many Finns regarded it as a misunderstanding. A mistake. Not a contrivance of Nicholas II, but a villainy emanating instead, fen-sucked, from the sinister Russian state machinery—the fief of a myopic and obdurate cadre of supremacists and absolutists. Men like the rabid anti-semite Konstantin Pobedonostsev who, by the camera's harsh testimony, seems to have died long before he stopped coming in to work, and like Ivan Goremykin who in an ironic twist of fate would not so very much later – after 1906 – have to stretch his mind to try to contend with the obscenity of constitutional monarchy at home. Men who all nursed a bitter grudge at the perceived slight to their omnipotence called Finland. The long-standing arrangements and understandings between Finland and the Tsars had up to this time, for the better part of a century, served both parties very well. And would undoubtedly have stood Russia in good stead into the twentieth century. Every Tsar reaffirmed a solemn pledge to maintain the Fundamental Laws underpinning the constitutional order, to uphold Alexander I's promise to respect "their religion, their laws, their liberties and their rights." Every Tsar honored it—until Nicholas II. In return, Finland turned its back on Sweden to stand at Russia's side bringing with it a domain which was loyal, orderly and industrious and soon enough became highly educated and prosperous too. Regardless of the shocks and reversals the Empire encountered, the Grand Duchy was unwavering so far as imperial internal security went, producing never "...a conspirator or an agitator against Russia. It provided instead generals for her armies and admirals for her fleet." Subversion and coercion efforts against the Finnish state would be abruptly halted in the immediate aftermath of the bitter defeat meted out by Japan in 1905; Saint Petersburg had unrest aplenty across its vast and ethnically diverse extent without manufacturing more. These efforts would resume. Finland would be driven to, at the first opportunity, declare independence in 1917. The events of the twentieth century would be profoundly influenced by the collapse of Russo-Finnish cooperation, by the Winter War and by Finland's politics and diplomatic efforts during the Cold War. While the impact of some of these developments may be seen as broadly beneficial to Europe, much of it was to the critical detriment of the prevailing political orders in Russia. Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Fisher's treatment of the history of Finland, in the context of its relations with Russia, was released in 1899—at the start of the first attempted wave of Russification. At this time, it seems, many Finns regarded it as a misunderstanding. A mistake. Not a contrivance of Nicholas II, but a villainy emanating instead, fen-sucked, from the sinister Russian state machinery—the fief of a myopic and obdurate cadre of supremacists and absolutists. Men like the rabid anti-semite Konstantin Pobedonostsev who, by the camera's harsh testimony, seems to have died long before he stopped coming in to work, and like Ivan Goremykin who in an ironic twist of fate would not so very much later – after 1906 – have to stretch his mind to try to contend with the obscenity of constitutional monarchy at home. Men who all nursed a bitter grudge at the perceived slight to their omnipotence called Finland. The long-standing arrangements and understandings between Finland and the Tsars had up to this time, for the better part of a century, served both parties very well. And would undoubtedly have stood Russia in good stead into the twentieth century. Every Tsar reaffirmed a solemn pledge to maintain the Fundamental Laws underpinning the constitutional order, to uphold Alexander I's promise to respect "their religion, their laws, their liberties and their rights." Every Tsar honored it—until Nicholas II. In return, Finland turned its back on Sweden to stand at Russia's side bringing with it a domain which was loyal, orderly and industrious and soon enough became highly educated and prosperous too. Regardless of the shocks and reversals the Empire encountered, the Grand Duchy was unwavering so far as imperial internal security went, producing never "...a conspirator or an agitator against Russia. It provided instead generals for her armies and admirals for her fleet." Subversion and coercion efforts against the Finnish state would be abruptly halted in the immediate aftermath of the bitter defeat meted out by Japan in 1905; Saint Petersburg had unrest aplenty across its vast and ethnically diverse extent without manufacturing more. These efforts would resume. Finland would be driven to, at the first opportunity, declare independence in 1917. The events of the twentieth century would be profoundly influenced by the collapse of Russo-Finnish cooperation, by the Winter War and by Finland's politics and diplomatic efforts during the Cold War. While the impact of some of these developments may be seen as broadly beneficial to Europe, much of it was to the critical detriment of the prevailing political orders in Russia. Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Fears are growing of a conflict between Azerbaijan and Armenia as Baku ratchets up its rhetoric against Yerevan, reiterating calls for a corridor through Armenian territory. The move comes as Azerbaijani forces prepare joint military exercises with Turkey, which backs the idea of the passage. Turkish and Azerbaijani forces are to hold three days of military exercises next week across Azerbaijan and Nakhchivan, an Azeri enclave that borders Turkey.Baku and Ankara are calling for a 40km corridor through Armenia to connect the Azeri territories. The passage, dubbed the Zangezur corridor, would also create a land route between Turkey and Azerbaijan, a long-term goal of the two allies."God willing, we will implement the Zangezur corridor as soon as possible and thereby make our land road and railroad connection with friendly and brotherly Azerbaijan uninterrupted over Nakhchivan," said Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan at a ceremony with his Azerbaijani counterpart Ilhan Aliyev in Nakhchivan last month.Yerevan is strongly opposed to the corridor, but Baku insists it will not use force to achieve its goal."Azerbaijan doesn't have any military goals or objectives on the sovereign territory of the Republic of Armenia," said Hikmet Hajiyev, a foreign policy advisor to Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in a recent interview with Reuters news agency.But the Turkish-Azerbaijani military exercise is interpreted as a strategy to put pressure on Yerevan, suggesting a conflict could be looming."Turkey does not necessarily want a militarised solution, but the nature of the relationship between Azerbaijan and Turkey and between President Aliyev and President Erdogan is more or less a blank cheque," said Asli Aydintasbas, an analyst with the US-based Brookings Institution.She believes that the Turkish government would prefer to establish a trade route by peaceful means, "but if Azerbaijan chooses to do it through military means, it does seem like it can count on Turkish support".Nagorno-KarabakhThe prospect of conflict comes as Yerevan is still reeling from Azerbaijan recapturing the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh enclave held by ethnic Armenians.Despite over 100,000 residents fleeing to Armenia, Yerevan is trying to secure a peace agreement with Baku, which the Armenian government sees as vital to its long-term goal of breaking away from Russian influence."You know, the economy's moving in the right direction. The Western pivot is moving in the right direction. Democratisation is moving in the right direction. The only thing interfering with that is the threat of war," says Armenian political analyst Eric Hacopian."So you take away the threat of war, all of this becomes easier, and any kind of a peaceful situation will quicken and hasten the de-Russification of Armenian politics, economy and other things – and by the way, it has broad popular support."However an opportunity for a peace deal between Azerbaijan and Armenia brokered by the European Union at a summit in Spain this month fell victim to diplomatic infighting between EU leaders and Turkey."The Azeris said that Turkey ought to be in the talks. The Germans and the French said Turkey cannot be in the talks," says Soli Ozel, professor of international relations at Istanbul's Kadir Has University."You really wonder which world they're living in. I would have expected that the Europeans, particularly the French, would work with Turkey and get Azerbaijan and Armenia out of the orbit of Russia." Can Turkey tip the balance of power in the Caucasus conflict?Russian tacticsSince the failed EU peace effort, Baku has been hardening its stance against Yerevan. Azerbaijan's Foreign Ministry accused Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan of undermining the peace process with "aggressive rhetoric".Baku's harsh language comes after Russian President Vladimir Putin invited Azerbaijan President Aliyev to a regional summit in Kyrgyzstan. Experts suspect Putin is using centuries-old Russian diplomatic tactics to maintain hegemony in the region. West looks on as Turkey-Russia relations deepen following Sochi summit"Russia was always playing on these contradictions and mutual dissatisfaction," says Russian expert Tatiana Mitrova, a visiting professor at the Paris School of International Affairs."It is a typical divide-and-rule policy starting from Czarist Russia before the Soviet Union, so it has very, very long historical roots. Moreover, I would say my impression is that these days Moscow would do everything to create instability everywhere."US 'distracted'With growing international turmoil, Baku could be eyeing an opportunity to pursue its agenda."Washington is too distracted right now to think about the Caucasus," predicts analyst Aydintasbas, noting the ongoing war in Ukraine, domestic political turmoil and the conflict between Israel and Hamas."The US has long prided itself on being able to chew gum and walk, but at this moment, the geopolitical pressures, whether it's Taiwan or Ukraine or the Middle East, are so crushing that there is a sense that they do not have the bandwidth to deal with other regional issues."Baku insists it is not seeking another conflict with Armenia. But analysts warn Armenia's pro-Western government would likely be at risk if it suffered a further military defeat to a Turkey-backed Azerbaijan attack.And Putin would probably welcome such an outcome as he seeks to maintain his grip on the Caucasus.

Show Notes Episode Summary Yewleea has a conversation with Rory Finnin, Ph.D, Professor of Ukrainian Studies at the University of Cambridge and a Fellow of Robinson College, Cambridge. He launched the Cambridge Ukrainian Studies programme in 2008. He is also co-organiser of the Disinformation and Media Literacy Special Interest Group at the University of Cambridge. In 2015 he won a Teaching Award for Outstanding Lecturer from the Cambridge University Students' Union (CUSU), the representative body for all students at the University. Rory and Yewleea spend today's Brief talking about russian imperialism, the failure of the West to recognize russia for the death cult that it is, and what we can do to prevent something like the War in Ukraine from ever happening again. Yewleea's article "Why is the West So Eager to Consume Russian Propaganda?" Yewleea's article "What Are the Pillars of Russification?" Buy Rory's book Blood of Others and the book he co-authored with Alexander Etkind, et al Remembering Katyn Linnea and Yewleaa will be back tomorrow to bring you the latest Brief. Have you listened to our sister podcast, FAQ-U: Ukraine Explained? Hosted by our own Yewleea and produced for Svidomi Media, FAQ-U explores popular misconceptions about Ukraine. Help Our Podcast: Rate, Review, and Give Feedback. This podcast is brand new, and every review helps others find it. If you enjoy the podcast, we'd (obviously) love a 5-star review! If we haven't quite earned your 5-star review, reach out and let us know at social@borlingon.media so we can continue to grow and improve! Thank you! Support Our Work and Receive Benefits. For just $10/month, paid subscribers on Substack receive an ad-free podcast, along with the Written Brief. Founding Members get to go behind the scenes and see how we produce the podcast. Subscribe here: substack.com/@borlingonmedia. Learn More Listen to our sister podcast we co-produce with Ukrainian media company, Svidomi Media, called FAQ-U: Ukraine Explained on Apple, Spotify, and Google Podcasts. Follow Linnea and Yewleea on social media.   Copyright 2023, Borlingon Media Group, LLC. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Phishing for Zimbra credentials. PlayCrypt ransomware described. The Cuba ransomware group adopts new tools. #NoFilter. Cyber criminals threaten security researchers. Our guest is Kevin Paige from Uptycs with thoughts on the Blackhat conference. Eric Goldstein, Executive Assistant Director at CISA joins us discussing next steps on the Secure by Design journey. And Russian disinformation takes on "Anglo-Saxonia." For links to all of today's stories check out our CyberWire daily news briefing: https://thecyberwire.com/newsletters/daily-briefing/12/158 Selected reading. Mass-spreading campaign targeting Zimbra users (We Live Security) PlayCrypt Ransomware Group Wreaks Havoc in Campaign Against Managed Service Providers (Adlumin SaaS Security) Cuba Ransomware Deploys New Tools: Targets Critical Infrastructure Sector in the U.S. and IT Integrator in Latin America (BlackBerry) NoFilter Attack: Sneaky Privilege Escalation Method Bypasses Windows Security (The Hacker News) Cyber security researchers become target of criminal hackers (Financial Times) Britain plotting to assassinate pro-Russian leaders in Africa, says Moscow (The Telegraph)  Ukraine at D+540: Russification and disinformation. (CyberWire) 

Upon the death (or departure?) of Russia's Alexander I in 1825, an unusual power struggle developed between his two surviving brothers. The eldest, Constantine, declined the opportunity to take power, leaving Nicholas, the youngest son of Paul I, the only legitimate candidate. The delay, and apparent passing over of the next in line, prompted an uprising called the Decembrist Revolt, and while Nicholas successfully put it down, the rebellion likely heightened his more autocratic impulses, including the creation of an extensive secret police force whose job was to blot out any and all who might plot against his authority. His efforts to control all facets of his subjects' lives led to horrifying outcomes. Russian Jews, in particular, were forced into military conscription, and Jewish children were often sent by the state to schools far away from their families and communities, where they could be indoctrinated in an effort at Russification. Strongly opposed to civil liberties and popular revolution, he engaged with Europe largely to back monarchs against their people. After Russia's military incompetence was revealed in the Crimean War, Nicholas died after a 30 year reign when he refused medical treatment for pneumonia. Contemporaries described it as "passive suicide," and a close aid wrote soon after, "The main failing of the reign of Nicholas Pavlovich was that it was all a mistake." Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

How can the challenges faced by minoritized languages of the Russian Federation and their speaker communities be understood through the lens of Russia's colonial expansion? In this newest episode, Leonid Motz (RECET) talks to Dr. Jeremy Bradley (University of Vienna), exploring the historical and social transformation of minority language use and study in Russia and the threats of Russification and assimilation. How do communities overcome the considerable obstacles posed by the present-day Russian state to maintain and revitalize their languages successfully? Jeremy Bradley is a postdoctoral researcher at the University of Vienna's Department of Finno-Ugrian Studies. His research interests include linguistic convergence in the Volga-Kama Region, corpus building, and the creation of didactic and reference materials for low-resource languages.

Support us on patreon and we will make more content: https://www.patreon.com/posts/rwa-russian-of-82101138 (audio version of the pod) Or you can do it here: https://russianswithattitude.gumroad.com/l/RWApodcast Timecodes 00:01:30 - Russian colonization of North America 00:14:00 - Alexander Baranov: The Russian Pizarro 00:16:00 - Merchant Feuds 00:18:30 - Russian-Tlingit War 00:24:30 - Saint Innocent & Russification of the natives 00:30:30 - The Church of the Ascension & Sheldon Jackson 00:35:30 - Alternative timeline of Russian colonialism 00:42:50 - Fort Ross in California 00:48:25 - Novoarkhangelsk & Alaska Purchase

Last week, a law being pushed through the Georgian Parliament modelled on Russian legislation designed to curtail freedom of speech and stifle dissent was prevented through the pressure of public protest. The so-called 'foreign agents' law would require some organisations to list themselves as receiving funds from abroad, essentially flagging them as a threat to the state and society. Russia should pay attention – public protest can force change, if carried out on an appropriate scale and pursued with vigour. But the struggle against creeping authoritarianism and Russification has not been won, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova, and Central Asia are all a focus of Moscow's desire to influence and control the political narrative in its near-abroad (ex-colonial space). But what happens when power in Moscow centre weakens? When people no longer fear the power and threat of Muscovy? ~~~~~ Aleksandar Djokic has a PhD in political science from RUDN Moscow. He is former assistant professor at RUDN Moscow, as well as being a Political analyst. In his journalistic career he writes as a Columnist at Bloomberg Adria and has also written for Novaya Gazeta Europe. Aleksandar has also acted as an Election Observer at Transparency International Serbia. ~~~~~ Links: https://twitter.com/polidemitolog https://rs.bloombergadria.com/a/39/aleksandar-dokic-politikolog-i-naucni-istrazivac/ ~~~~~

Dans le conflit qui oppose la Russie à l'Ukraine, des centaines de milliers d'enfants ukrainiens auraient été envoyés en territoires russes, et ce, à travers un système bien huilé par lequel Moscou facilite leur arrivée et leur assimilation. Le père de famille Yuriy Lazechko, qui a mené un combat kafkaïen pour retrouver ses enfants, nous raconte la mécanique de cette pratique. Invitée : Magdaline Boutros, journaliste Équipe :Philippe Papineau, animateur Magdaline Boutros, journaliste Xavier Kronström Richard, réalisateur Marie-Ève Brassard, recherchiste Olena Bilyakova, traductriceAlexis Elina, composition musicale originale Pour joindre l'équipe du balado : balado@ledevoir.com

For the past three months, Peru has been in a state of political turmoil. With one impeached president – Pedro Castillo – in prison and his successor Dina Boluarte managing a tense nation, non-stop protests have rocked the nation.In the midst of this, establishment media – news outlets mostly owned and controlled by Peru's elite – are at odds with many of the protesters, adding fuel to a raging fire of discontent.Contributors:Simeon Tegel - Peru-based journalistJonathan Castro - editor, La EncerronaJacqueline Fowks - Peru specialist, Reporters Without BordersCecilia Valenzuela - news editor, CaretasOn our radar:For the rescuers still trying to find survivors under the earthquake rubble in Turkey and Syria, social media – through messages posted by victims on Youtube, Twitter and Instagram – has helped save lives. But the Turkish government has been riled by some of the online content. A lot of this is criticism of the state's response to the earthquake, some of which is genuinely false information. Producer Meenakshi Ravi looks into the details of the story.Belarus: Dissidents in exile:For nearly 30 years, Belarus has been ruled by Alexander Lukashenko. Criticism of his autocratic government and its close relationship with the Kremlin comes at a high cost, although some Belarusians in exile still speak out. Producer Johanna Hoes reports on those outside the country who are still getting stories of corruption, repression and forced Russification out.Contributors:Margarita Levchuk - opera singer and political satiristJan Rudzik - blogger, Post+ RudzikYuliana Shemetovets -hacktivist, Cyber Partisans CollectiveSubscribe to our channel http://bit.ly/AJSubscribeFollow us on Twitter https://twitter.com/AJEnglishFind us on Facebook https://www.facebook.com/aljazeeraCheck our website: http://www.aljazeera.com/Check out our Instagram page: https://www.instagram.com/aljazeeraenglish/@AljazeeraEnglish#Aljazeeraenglish#News

Shutting down the internet is a powerful digital weapon used by autocrats the world over. It's currently being used by Putin in his war against Ukraine. In the past 10 months, Russia has also managed to block nearly 3,000 news websites and make civilians in occupied parts of the country pay for SIM cards with Rubels. So how can the rest of the world help restore some sense of interconnectedness in a country under such intense “Russification”?

durée : 00:02:04 - Un monde d'avance - Vladimir Poutine a signé officiellement le décret d'annexion des quatre provinces du sud de l'Ukraine à la Russie après la tenue de pseudo referendums d'auto-détermination. À la suite de ce fait accompli, quelle pourrait-être la prochaine étape pour le chef du Kremlin ?

In the very last episode of Stories of The Eastern West as you knew it, we're taking you to Estonia, 1989. A group of people there made 2 million others hold hands and create a human chain of unprecedented size and significance. The Baltic countries had a truly turbulent 20th century. They went from regaining their independence to losing it to the USSR and becoming subject to a ruthless policy of Russification. Unsurprisingly, they needed something big to jump on the bandwagon of the 1989 peaceful revolutions that liberated several countries from the USSR's influence.  What they came up with was a human chain linking Tallinn with Riga and Vilnius. This huge event is something hard to wrap one's head around nowadays when we think about the scanty means of communication the organisers had.  Our producer Wojciech went to Estonia and got a chance to talk to several people who co-organised or participated in the event. How was it at all possible? Why wasn't it thwarted by the communist regime? How do people remember such a defining moment in their lives over 30 years later? Further listening KAIE / our episode from our mini-series The Final Curtain about ‘The Singing Revolution' that Adam mentions in the show Further reading The Longest Unbroken Human Chain In History / an article on estonianworld.com All the human chains in one place / an article on wikipedia.org Further watching The Inimitable Baltic Way / a Lithuanian documentary Thanks Ivi Gubinska, Reet Villig, Eve Sildnik, Andres Tarand and Lukas Hioo for taking the time to discuss this incredible event with us. Keiu Telve and Maia-Liisa Anton for connecting us with Baltic Way participants and their thoughtful discussions about the meaning of the event.  Credits Written & produced by Wojciech OleksiakEdited by Adam Zulawski & Nitzan ReisnerHosted by Nitzan Reisner & Adam ZulawskiScoring & sound design by Wojciech Oleksiak

There are hundreds of monuments to the poet and painter Taras Shevchenko not just in Ukraine but all over the world. It is hard to overstate the importance of Shevchenko for most Ukrainians. For them he is not just the national poet who breathed new life into the Ukrainian language but a symbol of their country's independence. His words kept the national spirit alive during the decades of forced Russification in the 19th Century and they found renewed resonance during the 2014 Maidan uprising. But Shevchenko's work is less well known beyond eastern Europe. To remedy this Bridget Kendall is joined by Ukrainian writers and literary scholars Olha Poliukhovych from the National University of Kyiv - Mohyla Academy and Mykhailo Nazarenko from Taras Shevchenko Kyiv National University, and by professor of Slavonic studies at Vienna University Michael Moser. The reader is Ivantiy Novak. (Photo: A monument to Taras Shevchenko by Igor Grechanyk in Kyiv, Ukraine. Credit: Sergii Kharchenko/NurPhoto/Corbis/Getty Images)

Ben and Tommy answer your questions about the Labour Party's leadership, Brexit and the UK's refugee policies, “Russification” in Ukraine, Latin America, the risk from and rise of China, Yemen, Sri Lanka, climate change, favorite simple pleasures, pet peeves, favorite places to visit, and book recommendations. Crooked Coffee is now available at crooked.com/coffee!

Day 110.Today, we discuss the latest updates from across Ukraine and Europe, look at how much money Russia has made from selling fossil fuels this year and discuss the history behind the policy of Russification in the occupied regions of southern Ukraine.Contributors: David Knowles (Host)Dominic Nicholls (Defence & Security Editor)Rachel Millard (Energy Correspondent)Daniel Capurro (Senior Reporter & History Correspondent)See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Episode 90:This week we're continuing Russia in Revolution An Empire in Crisis 1890 - 1928 by S. A. Smith[Part 1]Introduction[Part 2 - This Week]1. Roots of Revolution, 1880s–1905 - 00:38Autocracy and Orthodoxy - 21:23Popular Religion - 33:17[Part 3 - 4?]1. Roots of Revolution, 1880s–1905[Part 5 - 7?]2. From Reform to War, 1906–1917[Part 8 - 10?]3. From February to October 1917[Part 11 - 14?]4. Civil War and Bolshevik Power[Part 15 - 17?]5. War Communism[Part 18 - 20?]6. The New Economic Policy: Politics and the Economy[Part 21 - 24?]7. The New Economic Policy: Society and Culture[Part 25?]ConclusionFigures:1) Nicholas II, Alexandra, and their family. - 21:31Footnotes:1) 00:58Orlando Figes, A People's Tragedy: The Russian Revolution, 1891–1924 (London: Jonathan Cape, 1996).2) 05:08V. O. Kliuchevsky, A History of Russia, vol. 1 (London: J. M. Dent, 1911), 2.3) 07:13D. C. B. Lieven, Towards the Flame: Empire, War and the End of Tsarist Russia (London: Allen Lane, 2015), 9.4) 08:05Cited in Paul Kennedy, Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987), 177.5) 13:02Lieven, Towards the Flame, 85.6) 14:07http://demoscope.ru/weekly/ssp/rus_lan_97.php7) 14:38Jane Burbank and Mark von Hagen (eds), Russian Empire: Space, People, Power, 1700–1930 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2007); John W. Slocum, ‘Who, and When, Were the Inorodtsy? The Evolution of the Category of “Aliens” in Imperial Russia', Russian Review, 57:2 (1998), 173–90.8) 15:05Theodore Weeks, Nation and State in Late Imperial Russia: Nationalism and Russification on the Western Frontier, 1863–1914 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1996); Alexei Miller, ‘The Empire and Nation in the Imagination of Russian Nationalism', in A. Miller and A. J. Rieber (eds), Imperial Rule (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2004), 9–22.9) 15:37Robert D. Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Empire in Russia and Central Asia (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006).10) 17:26Paul Werth, At the Margins of Orthodoxy: Mission, Governance, and Confessional Politics in Russia's Volga-Kama Region, 1827–1905 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2002).11) 18:11Alexander Morrison, Russian Rule in Samarkand, 1868–1910: A Comparison with British India (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008).12) 18:38Robert Geraci, Window on the East: National and Imperial Identities in Late-Imperial Russia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001).13) 19:13Charles Steinwedel, ‘To Make a Difference: The Category of Ethnicity in Late Imperial Russian Politics, 1861–1917', in D. L. Hoffmann and Yanni Kotsonis (eds), Russian Modernity: Politics, Knowledge, Practices (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 67–86.14) 19:49Andreas Kappeler, The Russian Empire: A Multiethnic History (Harlow: Pearson, 2001); Willard Sunderland, ‘The Ministry of Asiatic Russia: The Colonial Office That Never Was But Might Have Been', Slavic Review, 60:1 (2010), 120–50.15) 20:04Geoffrey Hosking, Russia: People and Empire (London: Fontana, 1998).16) 21:19Miller, ‘The Empire and Nation', 9–22.17) 21:48Dominic Lieven, Nicholas II: Emperor of All the Russias (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1989).18) 22:25http://www.angelfire.com/pa/ImperialRussian/royalty/russia/rfl.html19) 25:04Abraham Ascher, The Revolution of 1905, vol. 2: Authority Restored (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 222.20) 25:09Richard Pipes, Russia under the Old Regime (New York: Penguin, 1977).21) 26:36Peter Waldron, ‘States of Emergency: Autocracy and Extraordinary Legislation, 1881–1917', Revolutionary Russia, 8:1 (1995), 1–25.22) 26:56Waldron, ‘States of Emergency', 24.23) 27:26Neil Weissman, ‘Regular Police in Tsarist Russia, 1900–1914', Russian Review, 44:1 (1985), 45–68 ( 49).24) 27:47Jonathan W. Daly, The Watchful State: Security Police and Opposition in Russia, 1906–1917 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2004), 5–6. Daly, incidentally, gives a higher figure—100,000—than Weissman for the number of police of all kinds in 1900.25) 28:14Figes, People's Tragedy, 46.26) 28:50T. Emmons and W. S. Vucinich (eds), The Zemstvo in Russia: An Experiment in Local Self-Government (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982), 215.27) 30:25Hans Rogger, Russia in the Age of Modernisation and Revolution, 1881–1917 (London: Longman, 1983), 72.28) 31:18J. S. Curtiss, The Russian Church and the Soviet State (Boston: Little, Brown, 1953), 10.29) 32:09Gregory L. Freeze, ‘Handmaiden of the State? The Orthodox Church in Imperial Russia Reconsidered', Journal of Ecclesiastical History, 36 (1985), 82–102.30) 32:46Simon Dixon, ‘The Orthodox Church and the Workers of St Petersburg, 1880–1914', in Hugh McLeod, European Religion in the Age of Great Cities, 1830–1930 (London: Routledge, 1995), 119–41.31) 33:49Vera Shevzov, Russian Orthodoxy on the Eve of Revolution (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004).32) 35:23A. K. Baiburin, ‘Poliarnosti v rituale (tverdoe i miagkoe)', Poliarnost' v kul'ture: Almanakh ‘Kanun' 2 (1996), 157–65.33) 36:28Vera Shevzov, ‘Chapels and the Ecclesial World of Pre-revolutionary Peasants', Slavic Review, 55:3 (1996), 585–613.34) 37:00Chris J. Chulos, Converging Worlds: Religion and Community in Peasant Russia, 1861–1917 (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2003), 159.35) 37:59J. S. Curtiss, Church and State in Russia: the Last Years of the Empire, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1965), 118.36) 38:46David G. Rowley, ‘ “Redeemer Empire”: Russian Millenarianism', American Historical Review, 104 (1999), 1582–602.37) 39:18James H. Billington, The Icon and the Axe: An Interpretive History of Russian Culture (New York: Vintage Books, 1970), 514.38) 40:18Nadieszda Kizenko, A Prodigal Saint: Father John Kronstadt and the Russian People (University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2000), 271.39) 40:34Sergei Fomin (comp.), Rossiia pered vtorym prishestviem: prorochestva russkikh sviatykh (Moscow: Sviato-Troitskaia Sergieva Lavra, 1993). This is a compendium of prophecies of doom about the fate of Russia by saints, monks, nuns, priests, theologians, and a sprinking of lay writers, including Dostoevsky, V. V. Rozanov, and Lev Tikhomirov.

Et signe sans doute que Moscou compte s'installer durablement dans l'est et le sud de l'Ukraine, une opération de russification est en cours dans les villes qui ont été conquises.

This podcast explores how Ukraine and Korea both struggled to exist under the USSR and Empire of Japan as part of #ProjectUkraine ➡️ This podcast explains the tumultuous history of Ukraine during 1917-1923 when the War of Ukrainian Independence occurred. The new Soviet Union, White Russian Army, Poland and Germany all fought to take control over Ukraine. The Central Rada in Kyiv fought a rival Bolshevik government in Kharkov, but ultimately Ukraine was forced to join the Soviet Union as the SSR. ➡️ This podcast explains the tumultuous history of Korea during 1870-1910 when the powers of the Russian Empire, Qing Dynasty and Empire of Japan fought to control the nation. This led to the First Sino-Japanese War of 1894-1895, Russo-Japanese War of 1904-1905 and ultimately the annexation of Korea in 1910. ➡️ This podcast explains the tragic history of Ukraine during 1923-1941 whereupon initial Ukrainization under the Korenizatsiya gradually became Russification under Joseph Stalin. Stalin forced collectivization upon Ukraine, leading to the terrible Holodomor and an attempt to destroy Ukrainian culture, language, identity and its existence as a state. ➡️ This podcast explains the tragic history of Korea during 1910-1941 whereupon the Empire of Japan colonized and exploited Korea. While the Empire of Japan promoted some Korean culture, language and education, this eventually was replaced with rigid assimilation until Korea broke free of Japan at the end of WW2.   ➡️ To donate to the Babyn Yar Holocaust Memorial Centre⤵️: https://donation.babynyar.org/en/

Thomas and John discuss the war rhetoric of Vlod 'the Impaler' Zelensky, the ramifications of the Ukraine conflict for global geopolitics, and the de-Russification of Chelsea FC

In this episode, we learn what modernity did for Estonia, which was to allow it to get a small glimpse of the outside world with Finnish television broadcasts being picked up in Northern Estonia and also Radio broadcasts that came in from the west. We also learned about the Letter of 40 that spelled out clearly the years of Russification that Estonia had to endure.

In this episode, we learn more about student protest groups, who were really the lifeblood for retaining Estonian dignity and culture. We mostly cover the third wave of Russification which put Estonians as a minority in the cities.

Photo: No known restrictions on publication.The New John Batchelor ShowCBS Audio Network@Batchelorshow1/2:  "Iran is more than Persia." @ProfBShaffer @FDDhttps://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/04/28/iran-is-more-than-persia/ Introduction: Why Ethnicity in Iran Is Important For most of the Soviet period, the West tended to refer to Soviet citizens as the “Russians” and assumed that the regime’s efforts to Russify non-Russian citizens across the Soviet Union were successful. Not until the mid-1980s, when protests emerged during Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, did it become clear that ethno-nationalism was a politically potent force in the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and 15 new countries emerged, there was no denying that the Russification of the Soviet ethnic minorities had been a myth. Several times in recent decades, policymakers have had to play catch-up when central governments have weakened and ethnic and other communal cleavages took center stage. This was true amid the Soviet breakup, the Yugoslav Wars, and the Syrian civil war. There may be a similar blind spot regarding Iran’s multiethnic composition and regime stability. Iran is a multiethnic country; Persians comprise less than half of Iran’s population. Overwhelming majorities of non-Persian groups inhabit most of Iran’s border provinces, in contrast to Iran’s Persian-dominated center. Moreover, over 40 percent of the population of Iran lacks fluency in the Persian language. Ethnic cleavages and dissatisfaction pose growing challenges to the rule of the regime in Iran. When they overlap with poverty and lower levels of government services and infrastructure, these challenges become more severe. Iran’s ethnic minorities inhabit the state’s poorest provinces. The country’s growing environmental challenges, including widening water shortages, hit the ethnic minority provinces harder than the Persian center. The growing importance of the border provinces in anti-regime activity was evident during the last major round of anti-regime protests in Iran, which began in December 2017 and surged again in late 2019. The demonstrations started in the country’s provincial cities and were more intense in the minority-heavy provinces than in the Persian heartland. Technological changes, including widespread access to foreign television and social media in minority languages, have strengthened identity trends in Iran. Large percentages of Iran’s ethnic minorities regularly watch foreign television broadcasts in their native languages instead of regime television, which often depicts ethnic minorities with derogatory stereotypes. Ethnic groups in Iran are also exposed via social media to the wave of identity politics in the United States and Europe. This, too, may contribute to increased opposition to the regime, particularly among Iran’s youth. Previous generations in Iran had, by and large, submitted to the notion that ethnic minorities are inferior to the great Persian nation. But Iran’s minorities increasingly reject this idea, while Persian nationalism appears to be growing among Persians dissatisfied with the religious calling of the Islamic Republic. Since late 2017, the anti-regime activity of several ethnic groups entered a new stage, featuring increased armed attacks on army, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and government installations. Among Iran’s minorities, the Kurds, Ahwaz, and Baluch have active paramilitary groups. Most of the violent anti-regime activity in Iran takes place in their home regions: Sistan-Baluchistan, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and West Azerbaijan. Iran’s border areas populated by Kurds and the Baluch endure regular threats to the regime’s forces. Ahwazi groups periodically conduct anti-regime attacks in Khuzestan but do not run a constant insurgency like the Kurds and Baluch do. A critical variable in assessing the potential ethnic threat to the regime is the attitude of Iran’s Azerbaijanis, because of their large numbers, wealth, and perceived status as a mainstay of the regime. A major turning point for this group took place last autumn in response to Iran’s support for Yerevan during Armenia’s war with Azerbaijan. Iranian Azerbaijanis observed Iranian trucks moving Russian arms and supplies to Armenia. The Iranian government arrested dozens of Azerbaijanis for protesting Tehran’s support for Armenia. Amidst rising Azerbaijani opposition, the regime’s policy of backing Armenia may no longer be sustainable. But the Azerbaijani challenge is not the only one. Ethnic minorities form a majority in several strategic locations in Iran. For instance, Khuzestan province, which is the center of Iran’s oil production and home to several important ports and a major road juncture, has a majority-Ahwaz population. Khuzestan is an unstable province, and sustained anti-regime activity there could affect Iran’s ability to produce, export, and transit oil and natural gas. In addition, Iran’s strategic Chabahar Port is located in Sistan-Baluchistan, a perennially unstable province populated almost entirely by Baluch. India invested heavily in Chabahar Port, which represents New Delhi’s attempt to counter China’s infrastructure projects in neighboring Pakistan. The shared non-Persian ethnic groups that straddle much of Iran’s borders, especially Baluch, Kurds, and Azerbaijanis, strongly impact Iran’s foreign policy with most neighboring states. These ethnic groups are a major challenge in the volatile security situation on Iran’s borders with Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan. In recent years, Iran’s ethnic minorities have shown organizational ability on the ground. In an all-out regime crisis, revolts in several minority provinces in Iran could mount a significant challenge to the central government.

Photo: Some Iranians are not Persians. Mar Elias (Eliya), the Nestorian bishop of the Urmia [home of John Batchelor's ancestors] plain village of Geogtapa, c. 1831.The New John Batchelor ShowCBS Audio Network@Batchelorshow2/2:  "Iran is more than Persia." @ProfBShaffer @FDDhttps://www.fdd.org/analysis/2021/04/28/iran-is-more-than-persia/ Introduction: Why Ethnicity in Iran Is Important For most of the Soviet period, the West tended to refer to Soviet citizens as the “Russians” and assumed that the regime’s efforts to Russify non-Russian citizens across the Soviet Union were successful. Not until the mid-1980s, when protests emerged during Mikhail Gorbachev’s reforms, did it become clear that ethno-nationalism was a politically potent force in the Soviet Union. When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991 and 15 new countries emerged, there was no denying that the Russification of the Soviet ethnic minorities had been a myth. Several times in recent decades, policymakers have had to play catch-up when central governments have weakened and ethnic and other communal cleavages took center stage. This was true amid the Soviet breakup, the Yugoslav Wars, and the Syrian civil war. There may be a similar blind spot regarding Iran’s multiethnic composition and regime stability. Iran is a multiethnic country; Persians comprise less than half of Iran’s population. Overwhelming majorities of non-Persian groups inhabit most of Iran’s border provinces, in contrast to Iran’s Persian-dominated center. Moreover, over 40 percent of the population of Iran lacks fluency in the Persian language. Ethnic cleavages and dissatisfaction pose growing challenges to the rule of the regime in Iran. When they overlap with poverty and lower levels of government services and infrastructure, these challenges become more severe. Iran’s ethnic minorities inhabit the state’s poorest provinces. The country’s growing environmental challenges, including widening water shortages, hit the ethnic minority provinces harder than the Persian center. The growing importance of the border provinces in anti-regime activity was evident during the last major round of anti-regime protests in Iran, which began in December 2017 and surged again in late 2019. The demonstrations started in the country’s provincial cities and were more intense in the minority-heavy provinces than in the Persian heartland. Technological changes, including widespread access to foreign television and social media in minority languages, have strengthened identity trends in Iran. Large percentages of Iran’s ethnic minorities regularly watch foreign television broadcasts in their native languages instead of regime television, which often depicts ethnic minorities with derogatory stereotypes. Ethnic groups in Iran are also exposed via social media to the wave of identity politics in the United States and Europe. This, too, may contribute to increased opposition to the regime, particularly among Iran’s youth. Previous generations in Iran had, by and large, submitted to the notion that ethnic minorities are inferior to the great Persian nation. But Iran’s minorities increasingly reject this idea, while Persian nationalism appears to be growing among Persians dissatisfied with the religious calling of the Islamic Republic. Since late 2017, the anti-regime activity of several ethnic groups entered a new stage, featuring increased armed attacks on army, Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), and government installations. Among Iran’s minorities, the Kurds, Ahwaz, and Baluch have active paramilitary groups. Most of the violent anti-regime activity in Iran takes place in their home regions: Sistan-Baluchistan, Khuzestan, Kurdistan, Kermanshah, and West Azerbaijan. Iran’s border areas populated by Kurds and the Baluch endure regular threats to the regime’s forces. Ahwazi groups periodically conduct anti-regime attacks in Khuzestan but do not run a constant insurgency like the Kurds and Baluch do. A critical variable in assessing the potential ethnic threat to the regime is the attitude of Iran’s Azerbaijanis, because of their large numbers, wealth, and perceived status as a mainstay of the regime. A major turning point for this group took place last autumn in response to Iran’s support for Yerevan during Armenia’s war with Azerbaijan. Iranian Azerbaijanis observed Iranian trucks moving Russian arms and supplies to Armenia. The Iranian government arrested dozens of Azerbaijanis for protesting Tehran’s support for Armenia. Amidst rising Azerbaijani opposition, the regime’s policy of backing Armenia may no longer be sustainable. But the Azerbaijani challenge is not the only one. Ethnic minorities form a majority in several strategic locations in Iran. For instance, Khuzestan province, which is the center of Iran’s oil production and home to several important ports and a major road juncture, has a majority-Ahwaz population. Khuzestan is an unstable province, and sustained anti-regime activity there could affect Iran’s ability to produce, export, and transit oil and natural gas. In addition, Iran’s strategic Chabahar Port is located in Sistan-Baluchistan, a perennially unstable province populated almost entirely by Baluch. India invested heavily in Chabahar Port, which represents New Delhi’s attempt to counter China’s infrastructure projects in neighboring Pakistan. The shared non-Persian ethnic groups that straddle much of Iran’s borders, especially Baluch, Kurds, and Azerbaijanis, strongly impact Iran’s foreign policy with most neighboring states. These ethnic groups are a major challenge in the volatile security situation on Iran’s borders with Iraq, Turkey, and Pakistan. In recent years, Iran’s ethnic minorities have shown organizational ability on the ground. In an all-out regime crisis, revolts in several minority provinces in Iran could mount a significant challenge to the central government.

In this episode we cover the period of Russification. This is a period in which the Russian language was forced upon the Estonian people through education and government. We also go on to learn how the Russian railway system brought positive results to Estonia's economy.

In this episode, we take a look at two of the most important events which have shaped modern Belarus and the contemporary Belarusian identity: the experience of the Second World War and the fall of the Soviet Union. The level of devastation that Belarus experienced during the war was an important element in shaping Belarus during the Soviet period. In the late 1980s and early 1990s the Belarusian National Front emerged hoping to capitalize on the fall of the Soviet Union, hoping to build a new Belarusian state. Yet, the level of Russification and Sovietization of the society remained strong factors, ultimately helping Lukashenka come to power.Hosted by: Adam ReichardtGuest Speaker: David R. Marples, a Canadian historian and Distinguished University Professor at the Department of History & Classics, University of Alberta. He specializes in history and contemporary politics of BelarusBackground Readings:David R. Marples, Our Glorious Past: Lukashenka's Belarus and the Great Patriotic War, Columbia University Press, Sep 1, 2014. Brian Bennett, The Last Dictatorship in Europe. Belarus under Lukashenko, Hurst & Company, London, 2011. David R. Marples, Understanding Ukraine and Belarus: A Memoir. E-International Relations, 2020. ****This podcast is financed by Solidarity Fund PL within the framework of the Polish development cooperation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland and the grant titled: “In Solidarity with Belarus”. The podcast expresses exclusively the views of the speakers and cannot be identified with the official stance of the Solidarity Fund PL nor the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Poland.

In this episode we look into a really interesting period of Estonian History that isn't really discussed much today. I am referring to a period of time that Estonians sought out a better life in desperate ways. Many fled to Russia looking for the promised land and others converted to the Russian Orthodox religion in hope that the Tsar would look more favorably on the Estonians. This will be the end of season 1 of the Book History of Estonia. I look forward to picking the Timeline up again in a not too distant future.

Cultural geographer and linguist Bella Jordan returns to the SlavX studio to discuss languages, indigenous peoples of the former Russian Empire, and the process of "de-Russification" that is the tendency now of many societies in the post-Soviet space. ABOUT THE GUEST: A native of Sakha (Yakutia), an ethnic republic located in northeast Siberia, Bella grew up in a multicultural and multilinguial environment that inspired her interest in different cultures and traditions. She began to study Germanic languages quite early and got a Bachelor's degree in English Philology from Yakutsk State University in 1986. In 1987-91 she studied Linguistics and Text Stylistics at the Moscow Institute of Foreign Languages after Moris Torez (now Moscow Lingusitics University). Afterwards she worked as an official translator for the government of Sakha (Yakutia) and was instrumental in translating important documents and treaties into English and participated in the rough diamonds trade negotiations between the local government and DeBeers. In 1995 Bella began Master's program at the University of Texas at Austin in the Geography department and defended her doctoral dissertaion in 2002. The focus of her PhD was the ethnogenesis of the Sakha (Yakut) people and creation of their homeland since the 14th century. Currently Dr. Jordan teaches Geography of the Former Soviet Union; Northern Lands and Cultures; Regions and Cultures of Europe; Russian Society, Economics and Politics, Advanced Russian Language course "Advanced Comprehension and Composition"; Business Russian; Cultural Geography of Russia; Religion in Eastern Europe and Russia; and the graduate seminar "Geopolitics and Nation-Building in Central Asia". NOTE: Episode recorded on September 20th, 2019 at the University of Texas at Austin. CREDITS Co-Producer: Matthew Orr (Connect: facebook.com/orrrmatthew) Hosts/Associate Producers: Lera Toropin & Katya Yegorov-Crate Music Producer: Charlie Harper (Connect: facebook.com/charlie.harper.1485 Instagram: @charlieharpermusic Visit him on the web: www.charlieharpermusic.com) Executive Producer & Creator: Michelle Daniel (Connect: facebook.com/mdanielgeraci Instagram: @michelledaniel86) www.msdaniel.com Follow The Slavic Connexion on Instagram: @slavxradio, Twitter: @SlavXRadio, and on Facebook: facebook.com/slavxradio . Visit www.slavxradio.com for more episodes and information. Special Guest: Bella Jordan.

About the Lecture: Belarus can't find a way out of geopolitical turbulence. In contrast to neighboring Ukraine, Russian meddling here is mostly done through soft power. But the Belarusian society is growing more resilient in the face of the Kremlin's narratives. Confronting Russian revanchism, Belarusians embrace their pre-soviet history, like a heritage of Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Rzeczpospolita. Before Presidential elections next year, and Population census this fall, a discussion about identity and national ideology is intensifying. What can the West do about it? About the Speaker: Franak Viačorka is the Vice President of the Digital Communication Network. He concurrently works as the consultant for U.S. Agency for Global Media, and he is the Creative Director of RFE/RL Belarus Service. Mr. Viačorka is a frequent speaker and advocate for democracy and personal freedom in post-Soviet countries. An expert in Russian disinformation, he recently published research on the Kremlin-backed media, Russian Orthodox church, and think-tanks as the Kremlin's “soft-power." Mr. Viačorka has earned degrees from American University in Washington D.C. and Warsaw University in Poland, and he has also studied at Georgetown University and European Humanities University.

After a bit of satire on Putin's war against Ukraine, Fr. Anthony has a long discussion with Fr. Paul Koroluk, a priest of the UOC-KP (the largest, though canonically-unrecognized, Orthodox Church in Ukraine).  We share a vision of Ukraine and Ukrainian Orthodoxy that we hope will allow for a more sympathetic (or at least objective) understanding of Ukraine, Ukrainian Orthodoxy, and Ukrainian aspirations.