1850s military conflict
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Host Hazel Baker and Westminster guide Philip Scott record in Soho Square, tracing its shift from Middlesex countryside and royal hunting ground—where “Soho!” was cried—to a late-1600s development originally called King Square for Charles II, whose weathered statue remains after being moved and later returned. They highlight residents and landmarks, including Mary Seacole's blue plaque and her Crimean War work after being refused by Florence Nightingale's nurses: she built the British Hotel, treated soldiers and went to battlefields, later publishing her 1857 autobiography and receiving a benefit concert. They discuss Seacole's rediscovery from the 1980s and her statue near Parliament, the square's 1925 mock-Tudor gardener's hut and tunnel myth, Huguenot immigration and the French-language Protestant church, Theresa Cornelis and Casanova, and trivia about entertainer Danny La Rue, buried near Seacole. The episode ends promoting a Soho walking tour.
The subject today comes out of the Crimean war (1853-1856).I talked to Professor Donald Rayfield, Emeritus Professor of Russian and Georgian history at Queen Mary University of London, about the war itself and in particular what happened to those taken prisoner. Surprisingly life could be pretty good!
To follow on from last week, we start with some thoughts about Mogami frigates and why none of them will ever be built in Australia. The simple fact is that WA companies do not have the necessary experience - and building some landing craft for the Army will not get them there. Secondly, in an outrageous oversight during the bidding process, no one was asked by Defence to provide a single line of costings on how the ships will be constructed in Australia.Then some history of the Crimean War and the inability of British commander Lord Raglan to understand that the world had changed and that the enemy was different from what he was used to. This is appropriate remembering that just a fortnight ago, the retiring head of INDOPACOM USN Admiral Sam Paparo told Congress that the industrial base was not producing SSNs fast enough.All sorts of fissures are occurring in the Middle East with formerly close ally Saudi Arabia denying the US access to military bases for the short lived Project Freedom. One wonders if at some point the US and Israel might also experience a rupture.In our region, North Asia is nervously waiting for the Trump-Xi summit next week. No one knows what might happen - and this is the world we now inhabit. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
In this episode of the Explaining History Podcast, we explore a little‑known but revealing corner of Russian history: the military press during the reign of Alexander II.After the humiliating defeat in the Crimean War, it was clear that Russia's army – and the autocracy that sustained it – needed fundamental change. Alexander II, who came to power as the war dragged on, embarked on a series of "Great Reforms", most famously the emancipation of the serfs in 1861. But reform was always a balancing act between modernisation and the preservation of autocratic power.Nowhere were these tensions sharper than in the military press. Historian E. Willis Brooks, in an essay from the collection *Reforming the Tsar's Army*, examines how War Minister D. A. Milyutin used newspapers and journals to communicate new ideas to officers and conscripts – while struggling to control the very voices he had unleashed.Publications like *Ruski Invalid* (The Russian Veteran) and *Voyeny Sbornik* (Military Review) were meant to be loyal instruments of state policy. But as they sought readers and relevance, their editors – some of them former utopian socialists – began to clash with government censors and even the Tsar's ministers. The result was a chaotic, semi‑autonomous press that both advanced reform and exposed its contradictions.We look at the founding of new military journals, the explosion in readership, and the uneasy partnership between Milyutin and his old radical acquaintance Colonel Pisarevskii, who was given the extraordinary task of running a government newspaper as a capitalist enterprise. Their struggle over "official" and "unofficial" opinions reveals the limits of censorship – even in an autocracy.Topics covered:- The Crimean War and Russia's military humiliation- Alexander II's Great Reforms- War Minister D. A. Milyutin- The military press: *Ruski Invalid*, *Voyeny Sbornik*- Censorship and the "epoch of sensorial terror"- The experiment of semi‑commercial government journalism- Pisarevskii, utopian socialism, and the dangers of editorial independence- How state‑led reform struggles with public communicationIf you enjoy the podcast, please consider supporting us – we are migrating from Patreon to Substack. Details in the show notes.Explaining History helps you understand the 20th Century through critical conversations and expert interviews. We connect the past to the present. If you enjoy the show, please subscribe and share.▸ Support the Show & Get Exclusive ContentBecome a Patron: patreon.com/explaininghistory▸ Join the Community & Continue the ConversationFacebook Group: facebook.com/groups/ExplainingHistoryPodcastSubstack: theexplaininghistorypodcast.substack.com▸ Read Articles & Go DeeperWebsite: explaininghistory.org Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
The Story of Fabulous French Chefs Part Four brings together five extraordinary figures in French gastronomy — François Vatel, Marie Antoine Carême, Alexis Benoit Soyer, Urbain Dubois and Raymond Oliver. Five centuries of French culinary history, from a seventeenth century maître d'hôtel whose story became one of the most dramatic in the history of French food, to the pioneering television chef who brought French gastronomy into living rooms across France in the 1950s.We begin with François Vatel — responsible for feeding two thousand guests over three days at one of the most elaborate banquets in French history, whose story ends in tragedy. From there we move to Marie Antoine Carême — born into poverty, abandoned at ten, who went on to cook for Napoleon, Tsar Alexander I and the Prince Regent of England, invented the chef's toque and codified French cuisine into a system professional kitchens still use today. The king of chefs and the chef of kings.The second half covers Alexis Benoit Soyer — the Frenchman who redesigned the Reform Club kitchen, fed thousands during the Irish Famine and followed Florence Nightingale to the Crimean War. Urbain Dubois — who developed the style of service most of the world still uses today. And Raymond Oliver — the chef who brought French gastronomy to television before anyone knew what a television chef was supposed to look like.Part Four is the most varied and most surprising instalment of the series yet. Go back and find Parts One, Two and Three for more — and search Fabulously Delicious on Spotify and Apple Podcasts for the full catalogue.Send us Fan MailSupport the showMy book Paris: A Fabulous Food Guide to the World's Most Delicious City is your ultimate companion. This is a new 2026 update for the book and you'll find hand-picked recommendations for the best boulangeries, patisseries, wine bars, cafés, and restaurants that truly capture the flavor of Paris. You can order it online at andrewpriorfabulously.com For those who want to take things further, why not come cook with me here in Montmorillon, in the heart of France's Vienne region? Combine hands-on French cooking classes with exploring charming markets, tasting regional specialties, and soaking up the slow, beautiful pace of French countryside life. Find all the details at andrewpriorfabulously.comYou can help keep the show thriving by becoming a paid subscriber on substack where you'll also get fabulous extra content. Every contribution makes a huge difference. Join here at Substack , Merci beaucoup!Newsletter Youtube Instagram Facebook ...
The Crimean War really does sound the advance warning of the death knell for the Concert of Europe. If only anyone knew that...Western Civ 2.0
Here I quickly cover Russian history from Peter the Great, through Catherine the Great, and then down to the beginning of the Crimean War. Western Civ 2.0
This is part 2 of 3 on Tolstoy's 2nd Sevastopol Sketch, which focuses on May of 1855 and declares the ineffable value of Truth as hero.I'm presenting this episode after covering Austerlitz, a conflict symbolic of the vain pursuits of rulers. Further, similar to the result of Austerlitz, the Crimean War was a extraordinary humiliation for Russia that forced societal change. This sketch also contains memorable depictions of death amidst armed conflict.This story places the reader 6 months into the 11-month siege where “the Angel of Death hovers over all. “ This includes the 4.5 mile-long defensive line made of trenches with 8 major bastions. Notably, the Crimean War marks one of the rare times in the 19th century where France, England & Ottomans where allies. The War is also notable for advances in technology by the victors, including in naval artillery and how it was documented using telegraphs and photos. Florence Nightingale also gained recognition for her approach to nursing. This sketch focuses on a handful of fictional low-ranking officers. The climax is an artillery shell landing between two, where time slows down. Tolstoy brings you into their souls.The book begins with an introduction then focuses on the lead, Mikhailov, who is unmarried and noted not to own land. He is physically awkward and simple, but still “a man of worth.” He is thinking of a letter from a friend and day-dreams how his macabre reality can be a ladder for advancement. He realizes how many men he knew perished and how many he will meet who will meet the same end. He is lamenting transferring to Crimea. Mikhailov walks to the main boulevard an encounters his fellows - a small group imbued with basic decency as well as vice. In describing their hierarchy, it is pointed out how in any walk-of-life, there is someone higher – a so-called aristocrat. The various characters profiled include: Kalugin - an adjunct depicted as having a Gentleman's demeanor; Prince Galstin - who holds the highest rank among this group; and Col. Neferdoff and Calvary Captain Praskukhin, who share the designation as two of the “122 men of the world” who volunteered from retirement. The group commiserates about their war stories and complaints. In describing the superficial natures of these men, Tolstoy paraphrases the first chapter of Ecclesiastes, similar to how he did when Andrei was lying on his back at Austerlitz. In a narrator's voice, Tolstoy cries out:Vanity! vanity! Vanity everywhere, even on the brink of the grave, and among men ready to die for the highest convictions. Vanity! It must be a … peculiar malady of our century…Why did Homer and Shakespeare talk of love, of glory, of suffering, while the literature of our age is nothing but an endless narrative of aspiring elitists and vanity?Mikhailov, before his assignment, travels to his apartment and realizes his next trip to bastion would be his 13th. He felt he would be killed but would vacillate and fathom: “if I make it…..I will be promoted.” All the men had similar forebodings. Mikhailov then writes a farewell note to his father. His servant of 12 years, Nikita, was inebriated and prepared his Master. This included dressing Mikhailov and putting together a bundle of cheese and vodka. Mikhailov insults Nikita yet an affection is portrayed and both share a poignant goodbye.The other men went to Prince Galtsin's quarters, where he has multiple servants and a piano. The men have tea and crackers and discuss tales of heroic actions and the latest updates on casualties. Prince Galstin then sat at his piano and Praskukhin sings along. The men know what lies ahead and make the best of their situation.As they leave for their posts, they notice the bombs overhead, with Kalugin observing how the “real work of the night has begun.” Tolstoy has the men to regard the visual of artillery fire as a celestial show.A Cossack soldier arrives and mentions how reinforcements are needed to replace the many killed. Kalugin follows the Cossack but Prince Galtsin doesn't have to and walks the streets, where the cannon and rifle fire are palpable. He passes wounded soldiers, many carried on stretchers, others supported by the arms of a comrade. He was able to question one of them. The wounded met the onrush of a contingent of the Ottomans, yelling Allah! Nearly all of this unit were killed and the Ottomans took a valuable position.Galtsin was shocked and was nearly arguing with the man, hoping the hear that the enemy was repulsed. Others join in to relay the reality and Galtsin feels ashamed for impugning the man. He follows the wounded to a vast hall serving as a triage center, where after being looked at, some would get transported to a hospital and others to a chapel serving as a morgue. Tolstoy then takes us to the Horror inside.
Alexis Benoit Soyer was born in a small town in northern France in 1810, and by the time he died in London in 1858 he had changed the way Britain thought about food forever. He redesigned the kitchen of one of London's most prestigious private members clubs from scratch, invented cooking technology that had never existed before, fed thousands of starving people during one of the worst humanitarian disasters of the nineteenth century, and transformed the way armies ate in the field. He was famous in his lifetime — celebrated, eccentric, larger than life in every possible way. And today, almost nobody knows his name. This is his story.We're going back to the beginning — Meaux in northern France, the Protestant family, the seminary he was expelled from at eleven for sounding the bells in the middle of the night, and the journey to Paris that set everything in motion. From there we follow Soyer to London, where his arrival at the Reform Club in 1837 changed the course of British food history. His revolutionary kitchen design, his extraordinary banquets, his cookbooks written specifically for the poor as well as the privileged, and the way he used his fame and his skills to address the social issues of his time in ways that most chefs of his era simply didn't think to do.The centrepiece of this episode is the Irish Famine — and Soyer's response to it. In 1847 he travelled to Dublin, set up soup kitchens capable of feeding thousands of people a day, and developed recipes specifically designed to provide maximum nutrition from minimum resources. It is one of the most remarkable acts of humanitarian cooking in history, and it sits alongside his work in the Crimean War — where he followed Florence Nightingale to the front, redesigned the field kitchens that were making soldiers sick, and invented portable cooking equipment that the British army used for the next century.This is a revisited episode — updated, expanded and brought back because the story of Alexis Soyer deserves to be heard by as many people as possible. He is one of the most important figures in the history of French and British food culture, and one of the most unjustly forgotten. By the time this episode is over, you will understand exactly why he matters — anSend us Fan MailSupport the showMy book Paris: A Fabulous Food Guide to the World's Most Delicious City is your ultimate companion. This is a new 2026 update for the book and you'll find hand-picked recommendations for the best boulangeries, patisseries, wine bars, cafés, and restaurants that truly capture the flavor of Paris. You can order it online at andrewpriorfabulously.com For those who want to take things further, why not come cook with me here in Montmorillon, in the heart of France's Vienne region? Combine hands-on French cooking classes with exploring charming markets, tasting regional specialties, and soaking up the slow, beautiful pace of French countryside life. Find all the details at andrewpriorfabulously.comYou can help keep the show thriving by becoming a paid subscriber on substack where you'll also get fabulous extra content. Every contribution makes a huge difference. Join here at Substack , Merci beaucoup!Newsletter Youtube Instagram Facebook ...
This Women in History Mini-Series episode with Dr. Victoria Bateman explores the groundbreaking contributions of Florence Nightingale, highlighting her use of data and statistics to revolutionize healthcare and public health during the 19th century. Discover how her innovative use of data visualization and her perseverance against gender biases transformed modern nursing and public health policy.Chapters00:00 Introduction to Florence Nightingale's Legacy02:21 The Crimean War and Nightingale's Impact05:18 Data Collection and Analysis in Healthcare07:18 Overcoming Gender Bias in Medicine09:23 Innovations in Data Visualization11:59 Nightingale's Lasting Influence and ConclusionFollow Breaking Math on Substack (https://breakingmath.substack.com/) Twitter (https://x.com/breakingmathpod) Instagram (https://www.instagram.com/breakingmathmedia/) Bluesky (https://bsky.app/profile/breakingmath.bsky.social) Website (https://www.breakingmath.io/) YouTube (https://www.youtube.com/@BreakingMathPod) Follow Victoria on Website (http://www.vnbateman.com/)Instagram (https://www.instagram.com/women.wealth.power/) Twitter (https://x.com/vnbateman) Bluesky (https://bsky.app/profile/vnbateman.bsky.social) Follow Autumn on Twitter (https://x.com/1autumn_leaf) Bluesky (https://bsky.app/profile/1autumnleaf.bsky.social) Instagram (https://www.instagram.com/1autumnleaf/) Substack (https://substack.com/@1autumnleaf) TikTok (https://www.tiktok.com/@1autumn_leaf_)
The development of the Russian military's strategic thought is an understudied and thus misunderstood subject in the West. Strategy in Russia encompasses the broader context of foreign and domestic policy as well as the military's ties to the country's leadership. The military's strategic thought is closely linked to Russia's existence as a state and explains patterns of Russian confrontation. In Russian Military Thought: The Evolution of Strategy Since the Crimean War (Georgetown UP, 2025), the renowned scholar Gudrun Persson offers novel insights into Russian military thought on doctrine and strategy, from the Crimean War to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Persson dismantles the simplistic notion that Russian military thought is "backward," instead presenting a deeper analysis of the drivers that influence the changes in Russian military strategy. Through archival research based on Russian language sources, Persson offers a multidisciplinary perspective, drawing on theoretical insights from history and political science that enable her to make a nuanced, qualitative analysis. This book will be essential reading for practitioners, scholars, and students who seek to understand the mind-set of the current Russian leadership and the constraints that shape Russia's future possibilities.Gudrun Persson is an associate professor of Slavic studies at Stockholm University. She is the author of Learning from Foreign Wars: Russian Military Thinking 1859–1873 and a member of the Swedish Royal Academy of War Sciences, Chatham House, and the Swedish Writers' Union.Stephen Satkiewicz is an independent scholar with research areas spanning Civilizational Sciences, Social Complexity, Big History, Historical Sociology, Military History, War Studies, International Relations, Geopolitics, and Russian and East European history. He is currently the Book Review Editor for Comparative Civilizations Review. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
The development of the Russian military's strategic thought is an understudied and thus misunderstood subject in the West. Strategy in Russia encompasses the broader context of foreign and domestic policy as well as the military's ties to the country's leadership. The military's strategic thought is closely linked to Russia's existence as a state and explains patterns of Russian confrontation. In Russian Military Thought: The Evolution of Strategy Since the Crimean War (Georgetown UP, 2025), the renowned scholar Gudrun Persson offers novel insights into Russian military thought on doctrine and strategy, from the Crimean War to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Persson dismantles the simplistic notion that Russian military thought is "backward," instead presenting a deeper analysis of the drivers that influence the changes in Russian military strategy. Through archival research based on Russian language sources, Persson offers a multidisciplinary perspective, drawing on theoretical insights from history and political science that enable her to make a nuanced, qualitative analysis. This book will be essential reading for practitioners, scholars, and students who seek to understand the mind-set of the current Russian leadership and the constraints that shape Russia's future possibilities.Gudrun Persson is an associate professor of Slavic studies at Stockholm University. She is the author of Learning from Foreign Wars: Russian Military Thinking 1859–1873 and a member of the Swedish Royal Academy of War Sciences, Chatham House, and the Swedish Writers' Union.Stephen Satkiewicz is an independent scholar with research areas spanning Civilizational Sciences, Social Complexity, Big History, Historical Sociology, Military History, War Studies, International Relations, Geopolitics, and Russian and East European history. He is currently the Book Review Editor for Comparative Civilizations Review. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history
The development of the Russian military's strategic thought is an understudied and thus misunderstood subject in the West. Strategy in Russia encompasses the broader context of foreign and domestic policy as well as the military's ties to the country's leadership. The military's strategic thought is closely linked to Russia's existence as a state and explains patterns of Russian confrontation. In Russian Military Thought: The Evolution of Strategy Since the Crimean War (Georgetown UP, 2025), the renowned scholar Gudrun Persson offers novel insights into Russian military thought on doctrine and strategy, from the Crimean War to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Persson dismantles the simplistic notion that Russian military thought is "backward," instead presenting a deeper analysis of the drivers that influence the changes in Russian military strategy. Through archival research based on Russian language sources, Persson offers a multidisciplinary perspective, drawing on theoretical insights from history and political science that enable her to make a nuanced, qualitative analysis. This book will be essential reading for practitioners, scholars, and students who seek to understand the mind-set of the current Russian leadership and the constraints that shape Russia's future possibilities.Gudrun Persson is an associate professor of Slavic studies at Stockholm University. She is the author of Learning from Foreign Wars: Russian Military Thinking 1859–1873 and a member of the Swedish Royal Academy of War Sciences, Chatham House, and the Swedish Writers' Union.Stephen Satkiewicz is an independent scholar with research areas spanning Civilizational Sciences, Social Complexity, Big History, Historical Sociology, Military History, War Studies, International Relations, Geopolitics, and Russian and East European history. He is currently the Book Review Editor for Comparative Civilizations Review. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies
The development of the Russian military's strategic thought is an understudied and thus misunderstood subject in the West. Strategy in Russia encompasses the broader context of foreign and domestic policy as well as the military's ties to the country's leadership. The military's strategic thought is closely linked to Russia's existence as a state and explains patterns of Russian confrontation. In Russian Military Thought: The Evolution of Strategy Since the Crimean War (Georgetown UP, 2025), the renowned scholar Gudrun Persson offers novel insights into Russian military thought on doctrine and strategy, from the Crimean War to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Persson dismantles the simplistic notion that Russian military thought is "backward," instead presenting a deeper analysis of the drivers that influence the changes in Russian military strategy. Through archival research based on Russian language sources, Persson offers a multidisciplinary perspective, drawing on theoretical insights from history and political science that enable her to make a nuanced, qualitative analysis. This book will be essential reading for practitioners, scholars, and students who seek to understand the mind-set of the current Russian leadership and the constraints that shape Russia's future possibilities.Gudrun Persson is an associate professor of Slavic studies at Stockholm University. She is the author of Learning from Foreign Wars: Russian Military Thinking 1859–1873 and a member of the Swedish Royal Academy of War Sciences, Chatham House, and the Swedish Writers' Union.Stephen Satkiewicz is an independent scholar with research areas spanning Civilizational Sciences, Social Complexity, Big History, Historical Sociology, Military History, War Studies, International Relations, Geopolitics, and Russian and East European history. He is currently the Book Review Editor for Comparative Civilizations Review. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/eastern-european-studies
The development of the Russian military's strategic thought is an understudied and thus misunderstood subject in the West. Strategy in Russia encompasses the broader context of foreign and domestic policy as well as the military's ties to the country's leadership. The military's strategic thought is closely linked to Russia's existence as a state and explains patterns of Russian confrontation. In Russian Military Thought: The Evolution of Strategy Since the Crimean War (Georgetown UP, 2025), the renowned scholar Gudrun Persson offers novel insights into Russian military thought on doctrine and strategy, from the Crimean War to Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine. Persson dismantles the simplistic notion that Russian military thought is "backward," instead presenting a deeper analysis of the drivers that influence the changes in Russian military strategy. Through archival research based on Russian language sources, Persson offers a multidisciplinary perspective, drawing on theoretical insights from history and political science that enable her to make a nuanced, qualitative analysis. This book will be essential reading for practitioners, scholars, and students who seek to understand the mind-set of the current Russian leadership and the constraints that shape Russia's future possibilities.Gudrun Persson is an associate professor of Slavic studies at Stockholm University. She is the author of Learning from Foreign Wars: Russian Military Thinking 1859–1873 and a member of the Swedish Royal Academy of War Sciences, Chatham House, and the Swedish Writers' Union.Stephen Satkiewicz is an independent scholar with research areas spanning Civilizational Sciences, Social Complexity, Big History, Historical Sociology, Military History, War Studies, International Relations, Geopolitics, and Russian and East European history. He is currently the Book Review Editor for Comparative Civilizations Review. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
This project is approaching the final chapter of Book I, a critical juncture with Napoleon victorious and holding the greatest reputation man can bestow. Even after Napoleon suffered a string of defeats years later, his reputation was colossal when Tolstoy wrote War &Peace. Many readers coming to this book do not realize Napoleon is something of a dark force utilized to portray how to view those who send others to die for a ruler's vain ambitions. In this regard, it is important to recall how Tolstoy was influenced the Bible book of Ecclesiastes, which comments on vainglorious ambitions as well as the meaningless of everything without an appreciation of the Transcendent. Tolstoy is reaching to you from another age, highlighting how you can recognize War's profane nature compared to what is above. Tolstoy recognizes how calls to war are a siren's song as well as how easy it is to get young men to answer, usually via a small bounty or appeal to patriotism.Acknowledging the idiosyncratic pacifist Tolstoy became, his work still recognizes how a defensive war is more justified than the type of conflict at Austerlitz. Further, Tolstoy was exceptionally critical of his own government, which makes War & Peace so relevant in our times. In this spirit, I bring up the following story:Upon Russia's mass invasion of Ukraine in early 2022, Aleksei Nikitin, a regular citizen from Moscow, tried to make a difference and stood up to power.Aleksei recognized crossing his neighbors' border and unleashing the largest land invasion since the Second World War is the type of aggression Tolstoy condemned. Aleksei brought Tolstoy into his public protest by writing an excerpt on a poster-board from the 1894 essay “On Patriotism.” It read:“Patriotism is the abdication of human dignity, reason and conscience and a slavish submission to those in power. Patriotism is slavery.”It was a controversial sentiment then and remains so. This essay described Tolstoy's conception of patriotism -- in that militaristic age -- as a vulgar sentiment used by governments to justify their war machines. He argued it is opposite to what he took out of the Bible, namely Christian brotherhood. Aleksei's use of the essay speaks to what Tolstoy has Andrei grasp as Andrei views the senselessness of a red-haired Russian artilleryman squaring off against a French attacker – both Christians struggling over a mop as if it was the Holy Grail. Tolstoy was speaking to the baseness of what he witnessed, as a soldier on campaigns in Chechnya and being on the losing side of the Crimean War.Tolstoy points out that men mercilessly hacking one another have a great deal more in common with one other – than the men of supposedly higher status, who sent them to die. Tolstoy described, in another part of the essay:"It is even impossible to imagine, how and for what, Russian and German workmen, peacefully and conjointly working on the frontiers or in the capitals, should clash. And much less easily can one imagine animosity between some Kazan peasant who supplies Germans with wheat, and a German who supplies the peasant with scythes and machines. It is the same between French, German, and Italian workmen."Aleksei Nikitin was arrested and the Moscow police statement on the proceeding was carefully worded and likely came from their Intelligence Service:“This writer's (Tolstoy's) works and articles were harshly critical of the ruling (Czarist) regime, including justifying violence against the government. Therefore, the actions of Citizen Nikitin should be interpreted as a call to overthrow the existing authorities and also to follow the ideology of Tolstoy.”This was a revealing acknowledgement that the philosophy of Tolstoy is threat to a system throwing countless men into their War Machine. Nevertheless, the Russian government succeeded in stunting that portion of citizenry who were in line with the ideals of Tolstoy. Once the internal dissension was suppressed, the Russian leader found it prudent to create, a “Tolstoy Peace Prize.”Over his career, Tolstoy brought out how such aggression brings out an ever-lasting hatred by those affected. Some of such work involves Chechnya. One of Tolstoy's first short stories, “The Raid,” from 1853, explored amidst the Chechen landscape -- what motivates man to kill his fellow. Further, one of final works, “Hadji Murad,” tells the story of brutal campaigns against Chechnya, which involved the burning of villages, fields, and livestock. Tolstoy took to heart how raids would leave the helpless crying in despair;He recognized, how such aggression promotes a natural resistance, like many Chechens have demonstrated for generations; and like the overwhelming majority of Ukrainians have capably demonstrated in our times.
This week, we're going full gothic horror romance with Guillermo del Toro's Frankenstein. Cullen goes down a Crimean War rabbit hole, Hannah can't stand this version of Victor Frankenstein, and Tish reminds us of Mary Shelley's emotional depth and genius. Check out Tish on Instagram, TikTok and Substack (@TalesWithTish). AND be sure to grab her book, “Ebony, Blood, and Snow,” from wherever you buy books online or request it at your local library! Referenced in this episode: Frankenstein Is Actually About Being a Woman - Final Girl Digital ==================================== Watch Us on YouTube! Follow Our Adventures on Social Media: @notmyfantasypod Instagram TikTok Research & Writing by Cullen Callaghan. This episode was edited by Hannah Sylvester. Cover Art by William Callaghan Intro Music: "The Quest" by Scott Little.
The continuation is from the previous episode, The Sebastapol Sketches, about the 1850s Crimean War and the Tolstoy stories set there. Because so much has been happening, it's a ramblling look at a lot of possibilities and how the generational model might make sense of it all. As such, there's not a lot here for further investigation besides the previous podcast episodes and a few tweets of mine.... On the other hand, it is an an unusually long episode, so be ready for that. Previously these were in the episode notes, but they aren't linking now. I'll try to delete them if I can't figure out why... https://x.com/generationalize/status/1496006671851986948?s=20 https://twitter.com/generationalize/status/1496139226659840018?s=21 https://twitter.com/generationalize/status/1496016572112158724?s=21 https://twitter.com/generationalize/status/1496006671851986948?s=21 https://twitter.com/generationalize/status/1495223269225484290?s=21 https://twitter.com/generationalize/status/1492255773237284864?s=21
You can send a text, include contact info to get a response. For the Ottoman empire the French Revolution to Waterloo have a definte arc, and it isn't pretty, and there is some coverage up to the Crimean War.The start of the Revolution coincides with the Rule of Selim 3rd in 1789. And he was a reformer as was his father, he was raised to appreciate the West. The end of this period will see the 2nd Serbian Revolution, which will end with limited autonomy for Serbia, and the subsequent political fragmentation of the Ottoman empire. The Ottoman empire is not a state like any other in Europe. It's not merely that it is ruled by Moslems. It is also has a traditional culture. Traditional in this case can be heard as code for backward. And it is true the Ottoman Empire was far from the Technological frontier. And the institutional frontier. It surprising because like many traditional societies it had been at or near the frontier in the past.
Ever wondered why wine lists feel so intimidating? Or whether that £7 bottle is actually any good? Tom Gilbey—blind tasting expert, social media sensation, and author of the new book Thirsty—joins us to demystify the world of wine with warmth, wit, and zero pretension. In this episode, Tom shares how a freezing ice bath video accidentally launched his viral wine education journey, why his family's wine dynasty dates back to the Crimean War (complete with some questionable marketing tactics), and the surprising story of Iron Maiden's drummer's very expensive taste in Bordeaux. You'll discover: The truth about wine pricing and when you're really just paying for the name Why South Africa and Portugal are the wine regions to watch right now How to actually taste wine in a restaurant without feeling awkward What "corked" wine really means (and why wet cardboard is involved) Tom's comfort food obsession: chicken, ham, and tarragon pie with a buttery Chardonnay Why natural wine divides opinion—and why that's actually fine The rise of English wine that rivals £80 white Burgundy Tom also reveals his biggest barbecue disaster, his sweet tooth weakness that keeps him running marathons, and why fermented grape juice should simply be there to make us laugh. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Preview for later today. John Hardie and Bill Roggio of the Foundation for Defense of Democracies explain Vladimir Putin remains committed to making Ukraine a vassal state, rejecting land for peace deals while demanding demilitarization and the end of NATO aspirations.1855 CRIMEAN WAR
Wales has known more than it's fair share of warfare and while images of bows and blades might come to mind when you picture Cymru on the field of battle, we've also been in a fair few scraps that were equally as bloody but much more modern. Hit play and listen to the part that the Welsh played in the Crimean War.The Patreon is poppin' off so why don't you pop over there and place yourself amongst its members.
The Charge of the Light Brigade is a famous poem about a lesser famous military action during the Crimean War. Tune in today for a rare SYSK walk through wartime history.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
What happens when a town disappears—but the dead are left behind? This episode begins with a familiar American disaster: Centralia, Pennsylvania, the coal town that has been burning underground since 1962. Most people know the story of the smoke, the buckling roads, and the evacuation. Far fewer know what happened after the living left—when the cemeteries remained, sitting directly above an active underground fire. We explore how burial grounds like the Assumption of the Blessed Virgin Mary Cemetery slowly began to shift. Headstones tilted. Graves rotated. Steam vented from the soil. Over decades, officials were forced to make an unthinkable series of decisions: which graves to exhume, which to leave behind, and how to negotiate with families when the ground itself could no longer be trusted to stay still. Some remains were relocated. Many were not. And today, the fire still burns beneath them—possibly for centuries to come. It's not a ghost story. There are no apparitions or legends. And somehow, that makes it worse. In the second half of the episode, we turn to a very different kind of quiet revolution: Florence Nightingale, the woman often reduced to a single image—the “Lady with the Lamp.” We dig past the myth to uncover her real legacy as a pioneer of sanitation, hospital reform, and statistical analysis. From filthy Crimean War hospitals to the invention of the coxcomb chart, Nightingale used data, discipline, and relentless attention to detail to save lives—and permanently change modern medicine. Along the way: strange facts about snow, burning earth, shifting assumptions about permanence, and the unsettling realization that even the most basic promises—like the ground holding still—can fail. Because sometimes the oddest stories aren't about what rises from the grave…They're about what refuses to stay buried. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Access over 120+ Ad-Free episodes of Calm History by becoming a Silk+ Member (FREE for a limited time!). Marley Spoon: Get up to 25 FREE meals at https://marleyspoon.com/offer/silk ********************** Access over 120+ Ad-Free episodes of Calm History by becoming a Silk+ Member (FREE for a limited time!) and enjoy over 600 total episodes from these relaxing podcasts: … Continue reading Florence Nightingale: The Crimean War & The Birth of Nursing | Bedtime Sleep Stories about History
The 365 Days of Astronomy, the daily podcast of the International Year of Astronomy 2009
Hosted by Chris Beckett & Shane Ludtke, two amateur astronomers in Saskatchewan. actualastronomy@gmail.com This month in episode 516 we talk about the many things to see in the night sky including, carbon stars, double stars, 24P Schaumasse is a Comet that just cracks 8th magnitude making it visible in binoculars. We also detail how people can explore Jupiter through a telescope followed by many NGC and Messier Objects you can see in the winter sky. Jan 1 - Struve 627 in Orion Colorful Double Star Primary Star (A component): Yellow, golden-yellow, pale orange, or sometimes just white. Companion Star (B component): Bluish, blue-green, lilac, or pale green. Jan 2 - 40 Harmonia at opposition a large S-type (silicate) asteroid located in the inner region of the Main Asteroid Belt between Mars and Jupiter. Discovery: It was discovered on March 31, 1856, by German-French astronomer Hermann Goldschmidt. Naming: It is named after Harmonia, the Greek goddess of harmony and peace, to mark the end of the Crimean War. Size: It has a mean diameter of approximately 111.3 kilometers (69.1 miles), making it larger than 99% of all known asteroids. Orbit: Harmonia orbits the Sun every 3.42 years (approx. 1,250 days) with a relatively low eccentricity of 0.046, meaning its path is nearly circular. Rotation: It completes one full rotation on its axis every 8.91 hours Jan 3 - Full Moon - Quadrantid Meteors ZHR = 120 in Evening for NA observers - Moon interferes They are named after Quadrans Muralis, a 19th-century constellation that is no longer officially recognized. Constellation Origin: Lalande created the constellation to honor the mural quadrant, a large wall-mounted scientific instrument he and his nephew used at the observatory of l'École Militaire in Paris to measure star positions. Location: It was situated in the northern sky between the modern constellations of Boötes, Draco, and Hercules, near the "handle" of the Big Dipper (Ursa Major). Decline: In 1922, the International Astronomical Union (IAU) omitted Quadrans Muralis when it formalized the official list of 88 modern constellations, reassigning its stars to neighboring constellations Jan 5 - Sig Orionis colorful double star Sigma Orionis AB: This is the brightest component of the system and is a very close binary that appears as one star in most amateur telescopes. It is actually a triple system itself (Aa, Ab, and B). The primary stars (Aa and Ab) are highly massive, very hot blue stars that orbit each other every 143 days. The outer component (B) orbits the inner pair every 157 years. Sigma Orionis C, D, and E: These are additional companion stars that are farther from the AB pair and can be observed with small-to-medium sized telescopes, making the system appear as a beautiful quartet or quintuple system. Component D is magnitude 6.62 and is about 13 arcseconds from the AB pair. Component E is magnitude 6.66 and is approximately 41 arcseconds away. This star is notable as the prototype of the rare "helium-rich" stars. Jan 6 - Regulus 0.5-degrees South of Moon Jan 8 - 24P Schaumasse Comet just cracks 8th magnitude, at Mag. 7.9 it is firmly a Bino comet Jan 10 - Last Quarter - Jupiter at Opposition - mag. -2.5, 46 arc seconds in Gemini GRS looks nice and Orange/Red NEB and SEB are prominent How to best observe? Powers/Filters/Bino viewers Book rec. Jupiter and How to Observe It by John McAnally - NGC 1851 well placed but I'd need to dig a trench to see it - Carbon Star RV Monoceros Jan 11 -Follow Arcturus into daylight this week - M79, M42, M43, M78 well placed Jan 12 - Lunar Curtis X visible Jan 14 - Antares 0.6-degrees N of Moon - not for us - NGC's 1807 and 1817 well placed Jan 15 - NGC 1514 well placed Jan 17 - NGC 2169 well placed Jan 18 - New Moon Jan 23 Saturn, Neptune 4-degrees S of Moon - 44 Nysa at Opposition M=8.8 Largest and brightest of Nysian Family of Asteroids It was discovered by Hermann Goldschmidt on May 27, 1857, and named after the mythical land of Nysa in Greek mythology - M3, M5 well placed Jan 26 - First quarter - Lunar Straight Wall - Eyes of Clavius Jan 28 - Jeweled Handle on Moon Jan 31 - Jupiter 4-degrees S of Moon - Crater Baily We've added a new way to donate to 365 Days of Astronomy to support editing, hosting, and production costs. Just visit: https://www.patreon.com/365DaysOfAstronomy and donate as much as you can! Share the podcast with your friends and send the Patreon link to them too! Every bit helps! Thank you! ------------------------------------ Do go visit http://www.redbubble.com/people/CosmoQuestX/shop for cool Astronomy Cast and CosmoQuest t-shirts, coffee mugs and other awesomeness! http://cosmoquest.org/Donate This show is made possible through your donations. Thank you! (Haven't donated? It's not too late! Just click!) ------------------------------------ The 365 Days of Astronomy Podcast is produced by the Planetary Science Institute. http://www.psi.edu Visit us on the web at 365DaysOfAstronomy.org or email us at info@365DaysOfAstronomy.org.
Episode 253 - The order of Battle for Isandlwana and Nyezane as ‘ukuni' Wood Heads North Three separate British columns are inside Zululand and things are hotting up — and not just because of the steamy summer temperatures. In the last few episodes I've concentrated on General Chelmsford' and Colonel Glynn's operations in the centre, second Column, as they made their way over the Mzinyathi River across from Rorke's Drift - the centre of the British Invasion of Zululand. This episode we'll wrap up what was going on in other sectors, further south near the coast, and further north near the Ncome - Blood River, and along the high ground there towards the Phongola River. The First column under Colonel Charles Pearson had entered Zululand across the lower Thukela on the 12th January and was lumbering towards Eshowe, en route to meet up with Chelmsford's Column Two near Ondini prior to the final assault on King Cetshwayo kaMpande's headquarters. When the main Zulu army had set off from the ritual jumping off point of kwaNodwengu near Ondini on the afternoon of Friday 17th January 1879 destination, Rorkes Drift, a smaller Zulu force marched off simultaneously. They went in the opposite direction, south west — heading to intercept Colonel Pearson. The uMxhapho ibutho, who were young and motivated, along with the older men of the uDlambedlu and izinGulubu regiments. During the march south towards the Thukela they would meet up with reinforcements. These were small local groups, the iNsukamngeni, the iQwa, uDududu, iNdabkawombe and few other even smaller entities mustered along the coast. The total size of this force was about 6000 led by seventy year-old isikhulu Godide, chief of the Ntuli —and commander of the uDlambedlu regiment. He was also the elder brother of Mavumengwana who as you know, was second in command of the main Zulu army marching towards Chelmsford. Alongside Godide were high ranking coastal chiefs Mantshiya kaMshandu of the Nzuzu, and the older Mbilwane kaMhlanganiso who was induna of the kwaGingingdlovu ikhanda. Other important commanders who joined were Masegwane kaSopigwasi — who happened to be an inceku or counsellor of the king. Phalane, a royal induna, was monitoring events in this second army. Colonel Charles Pearson's Number one column included 4 750 men 384 wagons and 24 carts. Pearson not been in action since the Crimean War ended in 1856, spending time in St George Grenada, then various other postings until he was selected as one of the special service officers in South Africa. Despite his lack of recent combat experience, Pearson had the difficult task of leading the largest column over the greatest distance. He was ordered to cross the lower drift of the Thukela, then establish a base at the evacuated Norwegian mission station in Eshowe 60 kilometers further on. We'll come back to what happened to Pearson's column and the battle of Nyezane in Episode 254 because first we need to swing further north, past Chelmsford and Dartnell and Glynn, and Durnford, and to the Ncome River where the British left column had been very busy. Colonel Evelyn Wood was tasked with an attack on the Zulu in a wide arc from the Ncome or Blood River, all the way along the escarpment to the Phongola River. Wood was stationed at Utrecht and had dispatched a garrison of two companies of infantry to Luneberg, a German mission and farming community further East, closer to the disputed border with the Zulu Kingdom. It was positioned strategically near the eNtombe River, a key crossing point for supplies. There the British established Fort Clery first to guard the settlers then to protect the vulnerable line of communication for Colonel Wood's column as it advanced into Zululand. The amaQulusi lived here, and the action provoked the amaQulusini regiment to mobilize and march up to the enormous flat topped Hlobane Mountain.Unlike some of the other commanders, Wood was a veteran of multiple conflicts.
Ukraine Peace Plans, Concessions, and the Impact on US Alliances — Bill Roggio, Husain Haqqani — Bill Roggiosuggests Ukraine is losing militarily and must accept difficult territorial and military concessions to ensure state survival, predicting that proposed peace deals will ultimately collapse. Ambassador Haqqani emphasizes that U.S. abandonment of allies, exemplified in Afghanistan and Iraq, creates an international perception that America cannot be relied upon. Russia's prevailing would constitute a victory for the "axis of aggressors," including China, Iran, and North Korea, fundamentally weakening U.S. global influence. 1855 CRIMEAN WAR, SCOTS FUSILIER GUARDS
SUPPORT THE SHOW ON PATREON: https://www.patreon.com/lionsledbydonkeys Towards the end of the Crimean War the Russians invade the Ottoman Empire, coming up against the Fortress City of Kars. Command of the Ottoman forces fall to an old drunk, British man who may or may not be the bastard child of Prince Edward, all of the Turkish officers under him are actually Hungarian, and one American catholic. Sources: Winifred Baumgart. The Crimean War: 1853-1856 Raugh Harold. The Victorians at War: 1815-1914 Humphrey Sandwith. The Siege of Kars 1856 William Edward David Allen, Paul Muratoff. Caucasian Battlefields: The History of the Wars of the Turco-Caucasian Border 1828-1921
What happened this weekend? Did America stand up to the monarchy, or did they turn out for anarchy? Andrew Malcolm and I reach way back to the Crimean War for a couple of reasons today, as well as the Battle of Rorke's Drift (IYKYK), and more. We dissect the Protection Racket Media's coverage of the No Kings rallies, and scoff at the idea that this has any significance other than a check box on the way to a Democrat retreat on the Schumer Shutdown.
Ever wonder how cats went from desert hunters to divine house gods? In this episode of For the Love of History, host TK digs her claws into the fascinating history of cats — from their mysterious beginnings in the Fertile Crescent to their worship in ancient Egypt and beyond. Meet Bastet, the Egyptian goddess of cats who went from lioness warrior to goddess of home, music, and pleasure. Sail down the Nile to the ancient city of Bubastis, where people once threw wild festivals in her honor (think: ancient Coachella with more fur and fewer rules). Then, follow the whiskers east to Japan to meet Maneki Neko, the lucky cat statue that isn't Chinese at all, but a beloved Japanese symbol of prosperity with a legend that began during the Edo period. You'll also meet Crimean Tom, a war hero tabby who saved lives during the Crimean War, and Tomiu, the first-named cat in recorded history — a fur baby so loved that she received her own limestone sarcophagus. Whether you're a lifelong cat devotee or just tolerate your feline overlord's 3 a.m. zoomies, this episode will convince you that cats have always been — quite literally — divine. You'll Learn: When and where cats were first domesticated (hint: not Egypt!) Why Bastet ruled ancient Egypt as both warrior and nurturer The real history behind Japan's beckoning Maneki Neko The heroic and heartwarming tales of real-life historical cats As Carl Van Vechten wrote in The Tiger in the House, “I do not wonder that some people love cats. I am only surprised that all people do not love cats.” After this episode, you might just agree.
My fellow pro-growth/progress/abundance Up Wingers,For most of history, stagnation — not growth — was the rule. To explain why prosperity so often stalls, economist Carl Benedikt Frey offers a sweeping tour through a millennium of innovation and upheaval, showing how societies either harness — or are undone by — waves of technological change. His message is sobering: an AI revolution is no guarantee of a new age of progress.Today on Faster, Please! — The Podcast, I talk with Frey about why societies midjudge their trajectory and what it takes to reignite lasting growth.Frey is a professor of AI and Work at the Oxford Internet Institute and a fellow of Mansfield College, University of Oxford. He is the director of the Future of Work Programme and Oxford Martin Citi Fellow at the Oxford Martin School.He is the author of several books, including the brand new one, How Progress Ends: Technology, Innovation, and the Fate of Nations.In This Episode* The end of progress? (1:28)* A history of Chinese innovation (8:26)* Global competitive intensity (11:41)* Competitive problems in the US (15:50)* Lagging European progress (22:19)* AI & labor (25:46)Below is a lightly edited transcript of our conversation. The end of progress? (1:28). . . once you exploit a technology, the processes that aid that run into diminishing returns, you have a lot of incumbents, you have some vested interests around established technologies, and you need something new to revive growth.Pethokoukis: Since 2020, we've seen the emergence of generative AI, mRNA vaccines, reusable rockets that have returned America to space, we're seeing this ongoing nuclear renaissance including advanced technologies, maybe even fusion, geothermal, the expansion of solar — there seems to be a lot cooking. Is worrying about the end of progress a bit too preemptive?Frey: Well in a way, it's always a bit too preemptive to worry about the future: You don't know what's going to come. But let me put it this way: If you had told me back in 1995 — and if I was a little bit older then — that computers and the internet would lead to a decade streak of productivity growth and then peter out, I would probably have thought you nuts because it's hard to think about anything that is more consequential. Computers have essentially given people the world's store of knowledge basically in their pockets. The internet has enabled us to connect inventors and scientists around the world. There are few tools that aided the research process more. There should hardly be any technology that has done more to boost scientific discovery, and yet we don't see it.We don't see it in the aggregate productivity statistics, so that petered out after a decade. Research productivity is in decline. Measures of breakthrough innovation is in decline. So it's always good to be optimistic, I guess, and I agree with you that, when you say AI and when you read about many of the things that are happening now, it's very, very exciting, but I remain somewhat skeptical that we are actually going to see that leading to a huge revival of economic growth.I would just be surprised if we don't see any upsurge at all, to be clear, but we do have global productivity stagnation right now. It's not just Europe, it's not just Britain. The US is not doing too well either over the past two decades or so. China's productivity is probably in the negative territory or stagnant, by more optimistic measures, and so we're having a growth problem.If tech progress were inevitable, why have predictions from the '90s, and certainly earlier decades like the '50s and '60s, about transformative breakthroughs and really fast economic growth by now, consistently failed to materialize? How does your thesis account for why those visions of rapid growth and progress have fallen short?I'm not sure if my thesis explains why those expectations didn't materialize, but I'm hopeful that I do provide some framework for thinking about why we've often seen historically rapid growth spurts followed by stagnation and even decline. The story I'm telling is not rocket science, exactly. It's basically built on the simple intuitions that once you exploit a technology, the processes that aid that run into diminishing returns, you have a lot of incumbents, you have some vested interests around established technologies, and you need something new to revive growth.So for example, the Soviet Union actually did reasonably well in terms of economic growth. A lot of it, or most of it, was centered on heavy industry, I should say. So people didn't necessarily see the benefits in their pockets, but the economy grew rapidly for about four decades or so, then growth petered out, and eventually it collapsed. So for exploiting mass-production technologies, the Soviet system worked reasonably well. Soviet bureaucrats could hold factory managers accountable by benchmarking performance across factories.But that became much harder when something new was needed because when something is new, what's the benchmark? How do you benchmark against that? And more broadly, when something is new, you need to explore, and you need to explore often different technological trajectories. So in the Soviet system, if you were an aircraft engineer and you wanted to develop your prototype, you could go to the red arm and ask for funding. If they turned you down, you maybe had two or three other options. If they turned you down, your idea would die with you.Conversely, in the US back in '99, Bessemer Venture declined to invest in Google, which seemed like a bad idea with the benefit of hindsight, but it also illustrates that Google was no safe bet at the time. Yahoo and Alta Vista we're dominating search. You need somebody to invest in order to know if something is going to catch on, and in a more decentralized system, you can have more people taking different bets and you can explore more technological trajectories. That is one of the reasons why the US ended up leading the computer revolutions to which Soviet contributions were basically none.Going back to your question, why didn't those dreams materialize? I think we've made it harder to explore. Part of the reason is protective regulation. Part of the reason is lobbying by incumbents. Part of the reason is, I think, a revolving door between institutions like the US patent office and incumbents where we see in the data that examiners tend to grant large firms some patents that are of low quality and then get lucrative jobs at those places. That's creating barriers to entry. That's not good for new startups and inventors entering the marketplace. I think that is one of the reasons that we haven't seen some of those dreams materialize.A history of Chinese innovation (8:26)So while Chinese bureaucracy enabled scale, Chinese bureaucracy did not really permit much in terms of decentralized exploration, which European fragmentation aided . . .I wonder if your analysis of pre-industrial China, if there's any lessons you can draw about modern China as far as the way in which bad governance can undermine innovation and progress?Pre-industrial China has a long history. China was the technology leader during the Song and Tang dynasties. It had a meritocratic civil service. It was building infrastructure on scales that were unimaginable in Europe at the time, and yet it didn't have an industrial revolution. So while Chinese bureaucracy enabled scale, Chinese bureaucracy did not really permit much in terms of decentralized exploration, which European fragmentation aided, and because there was lots of social status attached to becoming a bureaucrat and passing the civil service examination, if Galileo was born in China, he would probably become a bureaucrat rather than a scientist, and I think that's part of the reason too.But China mostly did well when the state was strong rather than weak. A strong state was underpinned by intensive political competition, and once China had unified and there were fewer peer competitors, you see that the center begins to fade. They struggle to tax local elites in order to keep the peace. People begin to erect monopolies in their local markets and collide with guilds to protect production and their crafts from competition.So during the Qing dynasty, China begins to decline, whereas we see the opposite happening in Europe. European fragmentation aids exploration and innovation, but it doesn't necessarily aid scaling, and so that is something that Europe needs to come to terms with at a later stage when the industrial revolution starts to take off. And even before that, market integration played an important role in terms of undermining the guilds in Europe, and so part of the reason why the guilds persist longer in China is the distance is so much longer between cities and so the guilds are less exposed to competition. In the end, Europe ends up overtaking China, in large part because vested interests are undercut by governments, but also because of investments in things that spur market integration.Global competitive intensity (11:41)Back in the 2000s, people predicted that China would become more like the United States, now it looks like the United States is becoming more like China.This is a great McKinsey kind of way of looking at the world: The notion that what drives innovation is sort of maximum competitive intensity. You were talking about the competitive intensity in both Europe and in China when it was not so centralized. You were talking about the competitive intensity of a fragmented Europe.Do you think that the current level of competitive intensity between the United States and China —and I really wish I could add Europe in there. Plenty of white papers, I know, have been written about Europe's competitive state and its in innovativeness, and I hope those white papers are helpful and someone reads them, but it seems to be that the real competition is between United States and China.Do you not think that that competitive intensity will sort of keep those countries progressing despite any of the barriers that might pop up and that you've already mentioned a little bit? Isn't that a more powerful tailwind than any of the headwinds that you've mentioned?It could be, I think, if people learn the right lessons from history, at least that's a key argument of the book. Right now, what I'm seeing is the United States moving more towards protectionist with protective tariffs. Right now, what I see is a move towards, we could even say crony capitalism with tariff exemptions that some larger firms that are better-connected to the president are able to navigate, but certainly not challengers. You're seeing the United States embracing things like golden shares in Intel, and perhaps even extending that to a range of companies. Back in the 2000s, people predicted that China would become more like the United States, now it looks like the United States is becoming more like China.And China today is having similar problems and on, I would argue, an even greater scale. Growth used to be the key objective in China, and so for local governments, provincial governments competing on such targets, it was fairly easy to benchmark and measure and hold provincial governors accountable, and they would be promoted inside the Communist Party based on meeting growth targets. Now, we have prioritized common prosperity, more national security-oriented concerns.And so in China, most progress has been driven by private firms and foreign-invested firms. State-owned enterprise has generally been a drag on innovation and productivity. What you're seeing, though, as China is shifting more towards political objectives, it's harder to mobilize private enterprise, where the yard sticks are market share and profitability, for political goals. That means that China is increasingly relying more again on state-owned enterprises, which, again, have been a drag on innovation.So, in principle, I agree with you that historically you did see Russian defeat to Napoleon leading to this Stein-Hardenberg Reforms, and the abolishment of Gilded restrictions, and a more competitive marketplace for both goods and ideas. You saw that Russian losses in the Crimean War led to the of abolition of serfdom, and so there are many times in history where defeat, in particular, led to striking reforms, but right now, the competition itself doesn't seem to lead to the kinds of reforms I would've hoped to see in response.Competitive problems in the US (15:50)I think what antitrust does is, at the very least, it provides a tool that means that businesses are thinking twice before engaging in anti-competitive behavior.I certainly wrote enough pieces and talked to enough people over the past decade who have been worried about competition in the United States, and the story went something like this: that you had these big tech companies — Google, and Meta, Facebook and Microsoft — that these were companies were what they would call “forever companies,” that they had such dominance in their core businesses, and they were throwing off so much cash that these were unbeatable companies, and this was going to be bad for America. People who made that argument just could not imagine how any other companies could threaten their dominance. And yet, at the time, I pointed out that it seemed to me that these companies were constantly in fear that they were one technological advance from being in trouble.And then lo and behold, that's exactly what happened. And while in AI, certainly, Google's super important, and Meta Facebook are super important, so are OpenAI, and so is Anthropic, and there are other companies.So the point here, after my little soliloquy, is can we overstate these problems, at least in the United States, when it seems like it is still possible to create a new technology that breaks the apparent stranglehold of these incumbents? Google search does not look quite as solid a business as it did in 2022.Can we overstate the competitive problems of the United States, or is what you're saying more forward-looking, that perhaps we overstated the competitive problems in the past, but now, due to these tariffs, and executives having to travel to the White House and give the president gifts, that that creates a stage for the kind of competitive problems that we should really worry about?I'm very happy to support the notion that technological changes can lead to unpredictable outcomes that incumbents may struggle to predict and respond to. Even if they predict it, they struggle to act upon it because doing so often undermines the existing business model.So if you take Google, where the transformer was actually conceived, the seven people behind it, I think, have since left the company. One of the reasons that they probably didn't launch anything like ChatGPT was probably for the fear of cannibalizing search. So I think the most important mechanisms for dislodging incumbents are dramatic shifts in technology.None of the legacy media companies ended up leading social media. None of the legacy retailers ended up leading e-commerce. None of the automobile leaders are leading in EVs. None of the bicycle companies, which all went into automobile, so many of them, ended up leading. So there is a pattern there.At the same time, I think you do have to worry that there are anti-competitive practices going on that makes it harder, and that are costly. The revolving door between the USPTO and companies is one example of that. We also have a reasonable amount of evidence on killer acquisitions whereby firms buy up a competitor just to shut it down. Those things are happening. I think you need to have tools that allow you to combat that, and I think more broadly, the United States has a long history of fairly vigorous antitrust policy. I think it'd be a hard pressed to suggest that that has been a tremendous drag on American business or American dynamism. So if you don't think, for example, that American antitrust policy has contributed to innovation and dynamism, at the very least, you can't really say either that it's been a huge drag on it.In Japan, for example, in its postwar history, antitrust was extremely lax. In the United States, it was very vigorous, and it was very vigorous throughout the computer revolution as well, which it wasn't at all in Japan. If you take the lawsuit against IBM, for example, you can debate this. To what extent did it force it to unbundle hardware and software, and would Microsoft been the company it is today without that? I think AT&T, it's both the breakup and it's deregulation, as well, but I think by basically all accounts, that was a good idea, particularly at the time when the National Science Foundation released ARPANET into the world.I think what antitrust does is, at the very least, it provides a tool that means that businesses are thinking twice before engaging in anti-competitive behavior. There's always a risk of antitrust being heavily politicized, and that's always been a bad idea, but at the same time, I think having tools on the books that allows you to check monopolies and steer their investments more towards the innovation rather than anti-competitive practices, I think is, broadly speaking, a good thing. I think in the European Union, you often hear that competition policy is a drag on productivity. I think it's the least of Europe's problem.Lagging European progress (22:19)If you take the postwar period, at least Europe catches up in most key industries, and actually lead in some of them. . . but doesn't do the same in digital. The question in my mind is: Why is that?Let's talk about Europe as we sort of finish up. We don't have to write How Progress Ends, it seems like progress has ended, so maybe we want to think about how progress restarts, and is the problem in Europe, is it institutions or is it the revealed preference of Europeans, that they're getting what they want? That they don't value progress and dynamism, that it is a cultural preference that is manifested in institutions? And if that's the case — you can tell me if that's not the case, I kind of feel like it might be the case — how do you restart progress in Europe since it seems to have already ended?The most puzzling thing to me is not that Europe is less dynamic than the United States — that's not very puzzling at all — but that it hasn't even managed to catch up in digital. If you take the postwar period, at least Europe catches up in most key industries, and actually lead in some of them. So in a way, take automobiles, electrical machinery, chemicals, pharmaceuticals, nobody would say that Europe is behind in those industries, or at least not for long. Europe has very robust catchup growth in the post-war period, but doesn't do the same in digital. The question in my mind is: Why is that?I think part of the reason is that the returns to innovation, the returns to scaling in Europe are relatively muted by a fragmented market in services, in particular. The IMF estimates that if you take all trade barriers on services inside the European Union and you add them up, it's something like 110 percent tariffs. Trump Liberation Day tariffs, essentially, imposed within European Union. That means that European firms in digital and in services don't have a harmonized market to scale into, the way the United States and China has. I think that's by far the biggest reason.On top of that, there are well-intentioned regulations like the GDPR that, by any account, has been a drag on innovation, and particularly been harmful for startups, whereas larger firms that find it easier to manage compliance costs have essentially managed to offset those costs by capturing a larger share of the market. I think the AI Act is going in the same direction there, ad so you have more hurdles, you have greater costs of innovating because of those regulatory barriers. And then the return to innovation is more capped by having a smaller, fragmented market.I don't think that culture or European lust for leisure rather than work is the key reason. I think there's some of that, but if you look at the most dynamic places in Europe, it tends to be the Scandinavian countries and, being from Sweden myself, I can tell you that most people you will encounter there are not workaholics.AI & labor (25:46)I think AI at the moment has a real resilience problem. It's very good that things where there's a lot of precedent, it doesn't do very well where precedence is thin.As I finish up, let me ask you: Like a lot of economists who think about technology, you've thought about how AI will affect jobs — given what we've seen in the past few years, would it be your guess that, if we were to look at the labor force participation rates of the United States and other rich countries 10 years from now, that we will look at those employment numbers and think, “Wow, we can really see the impact of AI on those numbers”? Will it be extraordinarily evident, or would it be not as much?Unless there's very significant progress in AI, I don't think so. I think AI at the moment has a real resilience problem. It's very good that things where there's a lot of precedent, it doesn't do very well where precedence is thin. So in most activities where the world is changing, and the world is changing every day, you can't really rely on AI to reliably do work for you.An example of that, most people know of AlphaGo beating the world champion back in 2016. Few people will know that, back in 2023, human amateurs, using standard laptops, exposing the best Go programs to new positions that they would not have encountered in training, actually beat the best Go programs quite easily. So even in a domain where basically the problem is solved, where we already achieved super-human intelligence, you cannot really know how well these tools perform when circumstances change, and I think that that's really a problem. So unless we solve that, I don't think it's going to have an impact that will mean that labor force participation is going to be significantly lower 10 years from now.That said, I do think it's going to have a very significant impact on white collar work, and people's income and sense of status. I think of generative AI, in particular, as a tool that reduces barriers to entry in professional services. I often compare it to what happened with Uber and taxi services. With the arrival of GPS technology, knowing the name of every street in New York City was no longer a particularly valuable skill, and then with a platform matching supply and demand, anybody could essentially get into their car who has a driver's license and top up their incomes on the side. As a result of that, incumbent drivers faced more competition, they took a pay cut of around 10 percent.Obviously, a key difference with professional services is that they're traded. So I think it's very likely that, as generative AI reduces the productivity differential between people in, let's say the US and the Philippines in financial modeling, in paralegal work, in accounting, in a host of professional services, more of those activities will shift abroad, and I think many knowledge workers that had envisioned prosperous careers may feel a sense of loss of status and income as a consequence, and I do think that's quite significant.On sale everywhere The Conservative Futurist: How To Create the Sci-Fi World We Were PromisedFaster, Please! is a reader-supported publication. To receive new posts and support my work, consider becoming a free or paid subscriber. This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit fasterplease.substack.com/subscribe
As promised in part 1 we started the podcast by talking about some of Napoleon III's many mistresses. Women like Harriet Howard, the Brighton bootmaker's daughter, Virginia de Castiglione, sent by the Italians to seduce and spy on him (and welcomed with open arms!), Marguerite Bellanger and Louise de Mercy-Argenteau. His wife hated his infidelities but at least in the case of Louise she took comfort that she was a proper aristocrat!Moving on from the scandalous we talked about Napoleon III's solid achievements. Not least his success in the Crimean War which led to an alliance with the British and bringing France in from the diplomatic cold. And domestically the economy thrived and Paris was rebuilt.The great tragedy of Napoleon III's reign was that he was up against Bismark. Suffering from various illnesses (bladder stones in particular) his judgement was possibly affected. And Bismark tricks him into declaring war - with predictable results. His son survived him and oddly ended up fighting with the British Army in South Africa. If you don't know the story this alone makes the podcast more than worth the time.If you enjoy this podcast on France's second Empire - its scandals, triumphs, and collapses - then please follow Subject to Change, share it with a friend who loves history, and leave a review telling me what struck you most.If you click here you can text me with feedback. Or email russellhogg@proton.me if you want a response
Trade between belligerents during wartime should not occur. After all, exchanged goods might help enemies secure the upper hand on the battlefield. Yet as history shows, states rarely choose either war or trade. In fact, they frequently engage in both at the same time. To explain why states trade with their enemies, in Trade in War: Economic Cooperation across Enemy Lines (Cornell UP, 2025) Dr. Mariya Grinberg examines the wartime commercial policies of major powers during the Crimean War, the two World Wars, and several post-1989 wars. She shows that in the face of two competing imperatives—preventing an enemy from increasing its military capabilities, and maintaining its own long-term security through economic exchange—states at war tailor wartime commercial policies around a product's characteristics and war expectations. If a product's conversion time into military capabilities exceeds the war's expected length, then trade in the product can occur, since the product will not have time to affect battlefield outcomes. If a state cannot afford to jeopardize the revenue provided by the traded product, trade in it can also occur. Dr. Grinberg's findings reveal that economic cooperation can thrive even in the most hostile of times—and that interstate conflict might not be as easily deterred by high levels of economic interdependence as is commonly believed. Trade in War compels us to recognize that economic ties between states may be insufficient to stave off war. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. You can find Miranda's interviews on New Books with Miranda Melcher, wherever you get your podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
Trade between belligerents during wartime should not occur. After all, exchanged goods might help enemies secure the upper hand on the battlefield. Yet as history shows, states rarely choose either war or trade. In fact, they frequently engage in both at the same time. To explain why states trade with their enemies, in Trade in War: Economic Cooperation across Enemy Lines (Cornell UP, 2025) Dr. Mariya Grinberg examines the wartime commercial policies of major powers during the Crimean War, the two World Wars, and several post-1989 wars. She shows that in the face of two competing imperatives—preventing an enemy from increasing its military capabilities, and maintaining its own long-term security through economic exchange—states at war tailor wartime commercial policies around a product's characteristics and war expectations. If a product's conversion time into military capabilities exceeds the war's expected length, then trade in the product can occur, since the product will not have time to affect battlefield outcomes. If a state cannot afford to jeopardize the revenue provided by the traded product, trade in it can also occur. Dr. Grinberg's findings reveal that economic cooperation can thrive even in the most hostile of times—and that interstate conflict might not be as easily deterred by high levels of economic interdependence as is commonly believed. Trade in War compels us to recognize that economic ties between states may be insufficient to stave off war. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. You can find Miranda's interviews on New Books with Miranda Melcher, wherever you get your podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history
Trade between belligerents during wartime should not occur. After all, exchanged goods might help enemies secure the upper hand on the battlefield. Yet as history shows, states rarely choose either war or trade. In fact, they frequently engage in both at the same time. To explain why states trade with their enemies, in Trade in War: Economic Cooperation across Enemy Lines (Cornell UP, 2025) Dr. Mariya Grinberg examines the wartime commercial policies of major powers during the Crimean War, the two World Wars, and several post-1989 wars. She shows that in the face of two competing imperatives—preventing an enemy from increasing its military capabilities, and maintaining its own long-term security through economic exchange—states at war tailor wartime commercial policies around a product's characteristics and war expectations. If a product's conversion time into military capabilities exceeds the war's expected length, then trade in the product can occur, since the product will not have time to affect battlefield outcomes. If a state cannot afford to jeopardize the revenue provided by the traded product, trade in it can also occur. Dr. Grinberg's findings reveal that economic cooperation can thrive even in the most hostile of times—and that interstate conflict might not be as easily deterred by high levels of economic interdependence as is commonly believed. Trade in War compels us to recognize that economic ties between states may be insufficient to stave off war. This interview was conducted by Dr. Miranda Melcher whose book focuses on post-conflict military integration, understanding treaty negotiation and implementation in civil war contexts, with qualitative analysis of the Angolan and Mozambican civil wars. You can find Miranda's interviews on New Books with Miranda Melcher, wherever you get your podcasts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/german-studies
Mary Seacole (1805-1881) was a 19th century healer who was ahead of her time. This self taught nurse used her own money to sail across the world and set up shelter for wounded Crimean War soldiers. This month, we’re bringing back some of our favorite Womanica episodes you might have missed! We’ll be talking about Pink Collar Workers: women who revolutionized jobs that have traditionally been called "women's work." Through their lives, they created a more just and humane world for us today. History classes can get a bad rap, and sometimes for good reason. When we were students, we couldn’t help wondering... where were all the ladies at? Why were so many incredible stories missing from the typical curriculum? Enter, Womanica. On this Wonder Media Network podcast we explore the lives of inspiring women in history you may not know about, but definitely should. Every weekday, listeners explore the trials, tragedies, and triumphs of groundbreaking women throughout history who have dramatically shaped the world around us. In each 5 minute episode, we’ll dive into the story behind one woman listeners may or may not know–but definitely should. These diverse women from across space and time are grouped into easily accessible and engaging monthly themes like Educators, Villains, Indigenous Storytellers, Activists, and many more. Womanica is hosted by WMN co-founder and award-winning journalist Jenny Kaplan. The bite-sized episodes pack painstakingly researched content into fun, entertaining, and addictive daily adventures. Womanica was created by Liz Kaplan and Jenny Kaplan, executive produced by Jenny Kaplan, and produced by Grace Lynch, Maddy Foley, Brittany Martinez, Edie Allard, Carmen Borca-Carrillo, Taylor Williamson, Sara Schleede, Paloma Moreno Jimenez, Luci Jones, Abbey Delk, Adrien Behn, Alyia Yates, Vanessa Handy, Melia Agudelo, and Joia Putnoi. Special thanks to Shira Atkins. Follow Wonder Media Network: Website Instagram Twitter See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Pre-order our new book: Short History of Ancient Rome Revered as a heroine, and mythologised as ‘the Lady with the Lamp', Florence Nightingale has gone down in history as the founder of modern nursing. She battled ill-health and the prejudices of her age to leave an indelible mark on the world, and yet her memory is laden with misconception and half-truths. So, how did Florence Nightingale, the superintendent of a hellish incubator of disease in the Crimean War, become synonymous with kindness and compassion? Why was she one of the most celebrated figures of her age? And what did she achieve after illness cut short her nursing career? This is a Short History Of Florence Nightingale. A Noiser Production, hosted by John Hopkins. With thanks to Hannah Amos, the Collections Manager at the Florence Nightingale Museum in London. Written by Edward White | Produced by Kate Simants | Assistant Producer: Nicole Edmunds | Production Assistant: Chris McDonald | Exec produced by Katrina Hughes | Sound supervisor: Tom Pink | Sound design by Oliver Sanders | Assembly edit by Dorry Macaulay, Rob Plummer | Compositions by Oliver Baines, Dorry Macaulay, Tom Pink | Mix & mastering: Cody Reynolds-Shaw | Fact check by Sean Coleman Get every episode of Short History Of... a week early with Noiser+. You'll also get ad-free listening, bonus material and early access to shows across the Noiser podcast network. Click the subscription banner at the top of the feed to get started. Or go to noiser.com/subscriptions Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Preview: Alaska Summit. Ambassador John Bolton recommends Kyiv follow Chou Enlai proverb in China Civil War with Nationalists: Fight fight fight, talk talk talk. More later. 1855 CRIMEAN WAR
This episode forms part of a new strand of our podcast: Seapower Past and Present which explores seapower as it is understood and practised in the modern world whilst offering a historical perspective on the themes we explore. Each episode is chosen according to a theme or a location – a hotspot in the modern world where seapower has a major influence on geopolitics. So if you enjoy this episode do please seek out others in this strand – you will shortly be able to find episodes on economic warfare, critical national infrastructure, how technology is changing the nature of warfare at sea; and on hugely significant locations in the modern maritime world – the Black Sea, South China Sea, Middle East and Arctic.To make this series come alive we've teamed up with the Royal Navy Strategic Studies centre. In each episode you will hear from at least one historian and from at least one practitioner, a member of the armed forces who has direct first hand, personal experience of the topic being discussed.This episode explores how seapower has been exercised in the Black Sea. To find out more Dr Sam Willis spoke with Basil Germond, Professor of International Security in the Department of Politics, Philosophy and Religion and Co-Director of the University research institute Security Lancaster. Commander Caroline Tucket provides a fascinating legal perspective on seapower in the Black Sea, in particular looking at the imposition of sanctions and the legal status of the wreck of the Russian warship Moskva, sunk in 2022. A serving naval officer, Caroline is also a member of Navy Legal. To provide an historical perspective Professor Andrew Lambert explores the history of naval operations in the Black Sea during the Crimean War (1835-6). Andrew Lambert is Laughton Professor of Naval History in the Department of War Studies at King's College, London. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
COME SEE US LIVE OCT 4TH IN GLASGOW: https://www.eventbrite.co.uk/e/lions-led-by-donkeys-podcast-live-in-glasgow-4th-october-2025-tickets-1501072671769 SUPPORT THE SHOW ON PATREON: https://www.patreon.com/lionsledbydonkeys In this episode, Joe, Nate, and Tom discuss a lesser-known battle in the Crimean War in which the British attempt to capture a city on the Kamchatka Peninsula after getting massively lost at sea (in an era where this wasn't supposed to happen) and getting waylaid when the King of Hawai'i invited them to the barbecue. We are not making any of this up. Sources: JR Stone. RJ Crampton. 'A Disastrous Affair': The Franco-British Attack on Petropavlovsk. https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/polar-record/article/abs/disastrous-affair-the-francobritish-attack-on-petropavlovsk-1854/D765F9B46DA8B5A0C6D55460466220A6Mark N Lardas. Petropavlosk: The Crimean War's Forgotten Battle. https://warfarehistorynetwork.com/article/petropavlovsk-the-crimean-wars-forgotten-battle/ John Stephens. The Crimean War in the Far East. Modern Asian Studies. Vol. 3. No. 3 (1969)
PREVIEW: UKRAINE: Colleague John Hardie underlines that Russia makes little advance for large casualties in the summer campaign season. More to come. 1855 CRIMEAN WAR
The Charge of the Light Brigade was a military action undertaken by British light cavalry against Russian forces during the Battle of Balaclava in the Crimean War, resulting in many casualties to the cavalry. On 25 October 1854, the Light Brigade, led by Lord Cardigan, mounted a frontal assault against a Russian artillery battery which was well-prepared with excellent fields of defensive fire. The charge was the result of a misunderstood order from the commander-in-chief, Lord Raglan, who had intended the Light Brigade to attack a different objective for which light cavalry was better suited, to prevent the Russians from removing captured guns from overrun Turkish positions. The Light Brigade made its charge under withering direct fire and reached its target, scattering some of the gunners, but was forced to retreat immediately.
Preview Colleague Judy Dempsey of Carnegie in Berlin comments on the general EU citizenry in support of Ukraine or, like the Americans, drifting away? More later. 1855 CRIMEAN WAR
Preview: Colleague John Hardie reports that POTUS grows restless and impatient with Putin's games around the negotiating table. More later. 1855 CRIMEAN WAR
The logistics of waste in war. Marching around Sevastopol. A million-man mistake. Miscommunication on the battlefield. A ceasefire in Ukraine might be the beginning of the end of the war. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Medal of Honor Monday: Wayne Caron. Deep dive into history and the Crimean War. How it started. It was the first photographed war. Religious wars in the Middle East. The Russians marching to Constantinople and trying to take Sevastopol.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
REVIEWING WAR START AT WAR'S END: 3/8: The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History. by Serhii Plokhy (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Russo-Ukrainian-War-Return-History/dp/1324051191 Despite repeated warnings from the White House, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shocked the world. Why did Putin start the war―and why has it unfolded in previously unimaginable ways? Ukrainians have resisted a superior military; the West has united, while Russia grows increasingly isolated. Serhii Plokhy, a leading historian of Ukraine and the Cold War, offers a definitive account of this conflict, its origins, course, and the already apparent and possible future consequences. Though the current war began eight years before the all-out assault―on February 27, 2014, when Russian armed forces seized the building of the Crimean parliament―the roots of this conflict can be traced back even earlier, to post-Soviet tensions and imperial collapse in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Providing a broad historical context and an examination of Ukraine and Russia's ideas and cultures, as well as domestic and international politics, Plokhy reveals that while this new Cold War was not inevitable, it was predictable. Ukraine, Plokhy argues, has remained central to Russia's idea of itself even as Ukrainians have followed a radically different path. In a new international environment defined by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the disintegration of the post–Cold War international order, and a resurgence of populist nationalism, Ukraine is now more than ever the most volatile fault line between authoritarianism and democratic Europe. 1855 Crimean War
REVIEWING WAR START AT WAR'S END: 5/8: The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History. by Serhii Plokhy (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Russo-Ukrainian-War-Return-History/dp/1324051191 Despite repeated warnings from the White House, Russia's invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 shocked the world. Why did Putin start the war―and why has it unfolded in previously unimaginable ways? Ukrainians have resisted a superior military; the West has united, while Russia grows increasingly isolated. Serhii Plokhy, a leading historian of Ukraine and the Cold War, offers a definitive account of this conflict, its origins, course, and the already apparent and possible future consequences. Though the current war began eight years before the all-out assault―on February 27, 2014, when Russian armed forces seized the building of the Crimean parliament―the roots of this conflict can be traced back even earlier, to post-Soviet tensions and imperial collapse in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Providing a broad historical context and an examination of Ukraine and Russia's ideas and cultures, as well as domestic and international politics, Plokhy reveals that while this new Cold War was not inevitable, it was predictable. Ukraine, Plokhy argues, has remained central to Russia's idea of itself even as Ukrainians have followed a radically different path. In a new international environment defined by the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the disintegration of the post–Cold War international order, and a resurgence of populist nationalism, Ukraine is now more than ever the most volatile fault line between authoritarianism and democratic Europe. 1855 Crimean War