Podcasts about east bengal

In this episode of the Blood Brothers Podcast, Dilly Hussain speaks with the prominent Bangladeshi academic, author, and former chairman of the department of International Relations at Dhaka University, Professor Shahiduz Zaman. Topics of discussion include: The Islamic history and heritage of Bengal from the Bengal Sultanate to the Mughal Empire. The betrayal and land-loss of East Bengal's Muslims during partition. Why did India intervene in Bangladesh's liberation war in 1971? Is Pakistan to blame for anything that led to the end of East Pakistan?  Islamic brotherhood with Pakistan and Hindu hostility from India. Pakistan, China, the U.S., ISI and Myanmar. Shaping a new foreign policy for Bangladesh with considerations for a nuclear deterrence pact with Pakistan. FOLLOW 5PILLARS ON:  Website: https://5pillarsuk.com YouTube: https://youtube.com/@5Pillars Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/5pillarsuk Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/5pillarsnews Twitter: https://x.com/5Pillarsuk Telegram: https://t.me/s/news5Pillars TikTok: https://www.tiktok.com/@5pillarsnews

This week we talk about student protests, curfews, and East Pakistan.We also discuss Sheikh Hasina, Myanmar, and authoritarians.Recommended Book: The Identity Trap by Yascha MounkTranscriptBangladesh is a country of about 170 million people, those people living in an area a little smaller than the US state of Illinois, a hair over 57,000 square miles.It shares a smallish southeastern border with Myanmar, and its entire southern border runs up against the Bay of Bengal, which is part of the Indian Ocean, but it's surrounded to the west, north, and most of its eastern border by India, which nearly entirely encompasses Bangladesh due to the nature of its historical formation.Back in 1905, a previously somewhat sprawling administrative region called Bengal, which has a lot history of human occupation and development, and which for the past several hundred years leading up to that point had been colonized by various Europeans, was carved-out by the British as a separate province, newly designated Eastern Bengal and Assam, at the urging of local Muslim aristocrats who were playing ball with then-governing British leaders, the lot of them having worked together to make the region one of the most profitable in British India, boasting the highest gross domestic product, and the highest per-capita income on the subcontinent, at the time.This division separated Bengal from its Hindu-dominated neighboring provinces, including nearby, and booming Calcutta, which was pissed at this development because it allowed the British to invest more directly and lavishly in an area that was already doing pretty well for itself, without risking some of that money overflowing into nearby, Hindu areas, like, for instance, Calcutta.This division also allowed local Muslim leaders to attain more political power, in part because of all that investment, but also because it freed them up to form an array of political interest groups that, because of the nature of this provincial division, allowed them to focus on the needs of Muslim citizens, and to counter the influence of remaining local Hindu landowners, and other such folks who have previously wielded an outsized portion of that power; these leaders were redistributing power in the region to Muslims over Hindus, basically, in contrast to how things worked, previously.In 1935, the British government promised to grant the Bengalese government limited provincial autonomy as part of a larger effort to set the subcontinent out on its own path, leading up to the grand decolonization effort that European nations would undergo following WWII, and though there was a significant effort to make Bengal its own country in 1946, post-war and just before the partition of British India, that effort proved futile, and those in charge of doing the carving-up instead divided the country into areas that are basically aligned with modern day India and modern day Pakistan, but two-thirds of Bengal were given to Pakistan, while one-third was given to India.This meant that a portion of Pakistan, the most populous portion, though with a smaller land area, was separated from the remainder of the country by Indian territory, and the logic of dividing things in this way was that the British wanted to basically delineate Hindu areas from Muslim areas, and while large, spread-out groups of Muslims lived roughly within the borders of modern day Pakistan, a large, more densely crowded group of Muslims lived in Bengal, hence the otherwise nonsensical-seeming decision to break a country up into two pieces in this way.Frictions developed between mainland Pakistan and the portion of Pakistan, formally Bengal, that was initially called East Bengal, and then renamed East Pakistan in 1955, almost immediately. There was a movement to get the Bengali language officially recognized as a state language, alongside Urdu, which was promoted as the exclusive federal language of Pakistan, early on, and a list of six demands were presented to the Pakistani government by East Pakistan-based politicians, all of which aimed to get the region equal representation in what they felt was a West Pakistan-biased system, despite the fact that, again, East Pakistan, formally Bengal, was the most populous part of the country, and they had the most thriving economy, as well, bringing in most of the country's income.These demands led to what's become known as the Six Points Movement, which in turn, just a few years later, kicked off the Bangladesh War of Independence, which was exactly what it sounds like: an effort by folks in East Pakistan to achieve independence from the larger government of Pakistan, which had in recent years been taken over by a military junta which, like the previous government, didn't give as much political power to Easy Pakistanis.That junta, in late March of 1971, launched a military operation called Operation Searchlight that was meant to take out separatists in East Pakistan—but in practice this meant they swooped in and started targeting academics, members of the local intelligentsia, and people of Hindu faith, alongside members of the rabble-rousing groups that were petitioning for more power in this smaller-by-landmass, but larger by population and income, segment of the country.Operation Searchlight sparked the aforementioned Bangladesh War of Independence, and nine months later, the military government's efforts during this conflict were deemed to be genocidal because of how they targeted ethnic Bengalis, killing somewhere between 300,000 and 3 million of them, while also intentionally and systematically raping hundreds of thousands of Bengali women, the soldiers who committed these acts doing so with the formal go-ahead from their government—they were told to do so, basically.These atrocities eventually pulled India into the conflict, in part because millions of Bengalis were fleeing across their border to escape the genocide, and in part because the genocide was occurring, to begin with, and that sparked the 1971 Indo-Pakistani War, which eventually led to an end to that genocide when Pakistan's government surrendered at the tail-end of 1971.That victory led to, formerly Bengal, then East Pakistan, now Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan. It also concretized India's military dominance in the region, and Pakistan, what remained of it, lost more than half its population, much of its economic base, and suffered a long period of embarrassment that left it questioning the basis of its militant, braggadocios approach to both nationalism and foreign policy; it was previously a well-respected and feared military force, but it became a somewhat eyes-downcast entity in the region for a while, lots of reforms eventually helping it shore-up its economy, but remnants of this period still percolate in its internal politics and government operation, to this day, including its antagonism toward India, and its support of local jihadist groups, which the government uses as a counterbalance against India and other local power structures, which it can no longer face head-on.What I'd like to talk about today is a swirl of new tumult in modern day Bangladesh, and what this moderate uproar might mean for the country's future.—Modern Bangladesh is surrounded by conflict.Myanmar's military government is in the midst of a civil war, following the recent overthrow of its democratically elected civilian government, and the subsequent rise and loose collaboration between rebel groups in various parts of the country.India is booming, and is broadly considered to be the next big power player on the world stage, though it's already a regional titan. It also continues to scuffle with Pakistan to its northwest, and with China along its shared borders, which are located just a short distance north of Bangladesh.Bangladesh's coast, along the Bay of Bengal, has long underperformed economically, despite being surrounded by some of the most impactful producers of goods in the world, and this coastline, including the one occupied by Bangladesh, has become incredibly unpredictable in recent years: regularly flooding, entire villages being swept out to sea, and freshwater sources increasingly tainted by those incursions of salt water.This area already has a lot going on, in other words, and many of those goings on seem primed for amplification in the coming years, as global power structures and economic tangles continue to flex and break and rearrange, and as the climate continues to behave in increasingly distressing ways; there's a political and military realignment happening in this part of the world, but geopolitics and global economics are also swirling and rearranging in all sorts of unpredictable ways.All of which serves as context for a recent series of protests that arose around Bangladesh beginning in July of 2024.These protests were held by mostly students who were not fans of a quota scheme that was originally implemented by the government in the wake of that 1971 war with Pakistan, this system abolished in 2018, but which was reimplemented by the country's High Court shortly before the protests began.And this system basically promised that 30% of all government jobs would go to the descendants of people who fought in that war against Pakistan, for independence, alongside some jobs for minority groups, folks from traditionally underrepresented districts, and people who are disabled—though mostly it was meant to honor the descendants of those veterans.The protesting students were pissed about this reimplementation because the country's economy isn't great at the moment, and unemployment is rife; the jobs that are available are not paying much, and are not terribly secure. About 18 million young people are currently unemployed in Bangladesh.Government jobs, in contrast, tend to provide some level of consistency and predictability, pay relatively well, and tend to stick around—folks in such jobs aren't worried about being fired or their jobs disappearing, because of their very nature. So the best jobs, by that standard, are government jobs, and nearly a third of those jobs have been promised to people who, in many cases, just happened to be born to the right parents or grandparents; and notably, the majority of folks with families who fought in that conflict, are also supporters of the current, authoritarian Bangladeshi government—so part of the criticism here is that these quotas offer a means of giving cushy, reliable jobs to supporters of the current regime, without seeming like that's what they're doing.These peaceful student protests were met with heavy resistance and violence by the government, which deployed police and soldiers who shot at protestors and shut down universities and the internet in the country, and that led to more protests, including by non-students, who were also met with at times deadly force.About 150 people have been confirmed killed, so far, though that's the government's figure, and other, independent counts have tallied more than 200 dead. Hundreds of protestors were also arrested and curfews were implemented.The Supreme Court responded to the initial protests by reducing the quota in late July, to the point that about 5% of government jobs would go to descendants of those veterans, which in practice meant about 93% of all government jobs would be divvied-out in a normal way, hiring people based on who's the best candidate.Protests largely ceased after that announcement, and the government restored internet services 11 days after shutting it down across the country. Social media platforms like WhatsApp and TikTok remain restricted, however, as these services were used to promote and organize protests.Curfews have also been relaxed somewhat, though police are reportedly sweeping through schools and cities, grabbing people who were recorded at protests, arresting thousands of them, including at least half a dozen students who led the initial protests that kicked everything off.Protest leaders are now demanding that the remaining curfews be lifted, that those who were arrested are released, charges against them dropped, and that the leaders responsible for the heavy-handed response should resign.Some protestors have also called for the country's Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina, to step down, as she initially called the students traitors, though she later backtracked and said she didn't want them to be harmed.Hasina is the longest-serving Prime Minister in Bangladeshi history, having initially stepped into the position in 1996, then stepping back into the role in 2009—she's held the office ever since.She's generally considered to be an authoritarian, and has been accused of fixing elections, extrajudicial killings, and the imprisonment, or worse, of politicians and journalists who challenge her in any way.She is, given all that, then, perhaps not surprisingly blaming these protests not on the students—not any longer, at least—but instead on opposition political parties who she says are attempting to challenge her rule, and thus, the wellbeing of the country as a whole.Given that this is a relatively well-established authoritarian regime, there's a nonzero chance those who are in charge of these protests will take the win with the quota system, even though it wasn't fully removed, and step back from these other, more substantial demands that are unlikely to be met, short of perhaps a token resignation here and there by lower-run government officials who take the bullet for those higher up.Outside demands for impartial investigations into who caused what are likewise unlikely to move forward, and the government has made it pretty clear it intends to double-down on the "it's the political opposition doing this to us, and you" narrative, which could help them justify further clamping-down on these groups, even to the point of more imprisonments and killings, but bare-minimum, in such a way that it makes dislodging the current ruling party even more difficult in the future.It's possible that tumult elsewhere around the world, including in Bangladesh's own backyard, might encourage overreaction, not under reaction, from those in charge, as Myanmar's military government is having a lot of trouble with rebels, these days, and while it's not impossible that the prime minister will give in to more moderate demands, publicly apologizing for the violent response and firing some of her higher-level ministers, her government's history hints that things are more likely to tilt in the other direction, at least for the foreseeable future, and at least if the protestors fail to scale-up their operations to incorporate more of the country's population than they have, thus far.At the moment, then, things have calmed a bit in terms of protests and government responses to those protests in Bangladesh. But there are elements to this story that have made things even more volatile than they already were, and because of how uncertain so many variables in the region are right now, there's a chance we'll see this, or connected movements and storylines, bubble back up at some point in the near-future.Show Noteshttps://www.washingtonpost.com/world/interactive/2024/bay-of-bengal-climate-change/https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sheikh_Hasinahttps://www.reuters.com/world/asia-pacific/bangladesh-protests-quelled-anger-discontent-remain-2024-07-26/https://www.theguardian.com/world/article/2024/jul/26/bangladesh-student-protests-mass-movement-against-dictatorhttps://apnews.com/article/bangladesh-campus-violence-hasina-bc513b6d68cf5b94cfd898f3c7f153d2https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/bangladesh-student-group-vows-to-resume-protests-if-demands-not-met/article68456310.ecehttps://www.aljazeera.com/news/2024/7/25/bangladesh-minister-defends-govt-response-to-protests-amid-calls-for-probehttps://www.aljazeera.com/program/newsfeed/2024/7/24/bangladeshs-deadly-protests-explainedhttps://www.britannica.com/topic/largest-U-S-state-by-areahttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bangladeshhttps://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo-Pakistani_war_of_1971 This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit letsknowthings.substack.com/subscribe

Hoy está en IslaFutbol, Mario Rivera, ex Entrenador de la Selección de Brunei. Con una trayectoria destacada en clubes top de España como Celta, Atlético de Madrid, Alcorcón y Leganés, Mario ha logrado récords impresionantes en su carrera, incluyendo su paso por el East Bengal en India y su histórico desempeño con la Selección de Brunei. En este episodio, Mario nos cuenta su historia en el mundo del fútbol, su experiencia en Brunei, y sobre como es este país tan desconocido para muchos y los retos y diferencias culturales que tuvo que superar. Las claves para ser un entrenador de elite y además, comparte anécdotas y reflexiones que nos os podéis perder. ¿Cómo es entrenar a una selección? ¿Como lidiar con una cultura diferente? ¿Jugar partidos en Ramadán? ¡No os perdáis este nuevo episodio!! No os olvidéis seguirnos en nuestras redes sociales para estar atento a las novedades: ⁠⁠⁠https://linktr.ee/islafutbol⁠⁠⁠ Podéis seguir a nuestro invitado en sus redes sociales: Mario Rivera: Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/mariosoccer19/ Twitter (X) https://x.com/marioriverasoy Intro del podcast hecha por: Megomin

Welcome to the Instant Trivia podcast episode 893, where we ask the best trivia on the Internet. Round 1. Category: hollywoodspeak 1: The popular films of this genre can be known as "oaters" or "horse operas". westerns. 2: Also known as a "tenpercenter", a good one of these can open doors in Tinseltown. agent. 3: Erica Kane could tell you it's the dramatic form known as a "sudser" in Hollywood. soap opera. 4: In the lingo of Variety, a "diskery" is a company that produces these. records. 5: This TV network is "The Eye Web". CBS. Round 2. Category: east on the map 1: This nation was once a province known as East Pakistan and before that, East Bengal. Bangladesh. 2: East Cape is the easternmost mainland point on this island, the world's second largest. New Guinea. 3: Walter Ulbricht had his fingers in this country's strudel for over 20 years. East Germany. 4: This city with a 2-word name grew around Michigan State University. East Lansing. 5: As a geopolitical term it was coined in 1902 by U.S. Naval Officer Alfred Mahan to describe an Asian-African area. the Middle East. Round 3. Category: art for art's sake! 1: Dentist Byron McKeeby of Cedar Rapids, Iowa was immortalized in this 1930 painting along with the artist's sister. American Gothic. 2: In David's 1801 painting "Napoleon at the Great St. Bernard Pass", the general is crossing this mountain range. the Alps. 3: The crushing foot used in this TV show's opening is from Bronzino's 1545 painting, "An Allegory with Venus and Cupid". Monty Python's Flying Circus. 4: Titian portrayed Ariadne and this god of wine falling in love at first sight. Dionysus (or Bacchus). 5: Title of the 15th century work depicting the Virgin Mary and the angel Gabriel thought to be da Vinci's first completed work. The Annunciation. Round 4. Category: jeopardy! 101 1: From beautiful downtown Culver City, it's the name of the studios where "Jeopardy!" is taped. Sony Pictures Studios. 2: He was the host of the first version of "Jeopardy!" in the '60s. Art Fleming. 3: Of $183,000, $283,000 or $383,000, it's closest to the highest amount you can win in one regular game. $283,000. 4: Including Final Jeopardy!, it's the total number of possible questions in one game. 61. 5: Frequent viewers know my hometown of Sudbury is in this Canadian province. Ontario. Round 5. Category: montreal expose 1: The Basilique Notre-Dame has one of the largest ones of these in North America; it weighs 12 tons. bell. 2: A bagpiper at Ogilvy's Department Store plays to announce this hour. noon. 3: Since 1984 over 37 million people have seen performances by this circus headquartered in Montreal. Cirque du Soleil. 4: Each summer Montreal hosts a Juste Pour Rire Festival, called "Just for" these in English. Laughs. 5: A street in Mount Royal Park is named for this great American landscape artist who designed NYC's Central Park. (Frederick Law) Olmsted. Thanks for listening! Come back tomorrow for more exciting trivia! Special thanks to https://blog.feedspot.com/trivia_podcasts/

Today's episode is on Hijra in 19th-century India. Listen to learn about who these 19th-century Hijra were, how they structured their society, and their resistance in the face of British colonial oppression. Check out our website, where you can find out everything there is to know about Queer as Fact.  If you enjoy our content, consider supporting us on Patreon, checking out our merch, and following us on Twitter, Tumblr and Facebook. [Image: A Hijra and her companions in East Bengal, 1860s]

Anubhav Roda has expertise in Sports Consulting, Commercial, Strategy etc. He's had over a decade of experience working in the sports industry especially Indian football. In this episode, he joins host Siju to share his journey & experiences. We discuss the value of Indian football in the world of marketing, is it marketable globally? Football's popularity against Cricket. Anubhav was also part of the U-17 FIFA Men's World Cup & he's also played a key role in player management. He was known for the big-fee signing of the Costa Rican footballer to East Bengal. He talks about all that and more.   We appreciate your support!

Anubhav Roda has expertise in Sports Consulting, Commercial, Strategy etc. He's had over a decade of experience working in the sports industry especially Indian football. In this episode, he joins host Siju to share his journey & experiences. We discuss the value of Indian football in the world of marketing, is it marketable globally? Football's popularity against Cricket. Anubhav was also part of the U-17 FIFA Men's World Cup & he's also played a key role in player management. He was known for the big-fee signing of the Costa Rican footballer to East Bengal. He talks about all that and more.   We appreciate your support!

Respected Indian broadcaster Anant Tyagi joins Paul to discuss the state of play in the Indian Super League ahead of the much anticipated playoffs over the next month. Despite a late stumble are Mumbai City still the team to beat? Tyagi also explains why Bengaluru FC are the story of the year and what needs to be done to breath live back into East Bengal after another disappointing season.

Bangladesh has transformed tremendously in the last twenty-five years. Average incomes have more than quadrupled, and many of its human development indicators have improved alongside. It has also become an export powerhouse with its garment industry, and generally a shining example of development - though things are far from perfect. Five decades ago, when Bangladesh became an independent country, many were not hopeful about its chances of development. So how did Bangladesh turn its story around? Well, it turns out the history of its transformation is longer than credited - and the process is more complex than what is cleanly presented.I could not think of a better person to help me unpack the Bangladeshi miracle than Dr. Akhtar Mahmood. He is an economist and was a lead private sector specialist for the World Bank Group - where he worked in various parts of the world for three decades on privatization, state enterprise reforms, investment climate, competitiveness, and more broadly private sector development. He has written some excellent books (see embedded links), and his column for the Dhaka Tribune is one of my wisest sources of economic development commentary.TranscriptTobi;Welcome to the show Akhtar Mahmood. It's a pleasure talking to you. I am very fascinated and curious about Bangladesh, and you are my number one option for such a journey. It's a pleasure, personally, for me to be having these conversations. I've been reading your column for about a year now with the Dhaka Tribune, and I've learned so much. They are very perceptive, and I'm going to be putting up links to some of my favourites in the show notes for this episode. Welcome once again, and thank you so much for doing this.Akhtar;Thank you very much for having me. Thanks, Tobi.Tobi;There's so much that I want to talk to you about, as you'd imagine, but let me start right at the end, which is now. There has been a lot of attention on Bangladesh, recently, at least in my own orbit, there have been two quite detailed and interesting columns in the Financial Times about Bangladesh. There is also Stefan Dercon's book, which used Bangladesh as a positive case for what he was describing about the development process. But also, there's the issue of what's going on right now with the global economy. First, it started with COVID and how the economy suddenly stopped, and all the reverberation that comes with that - the supply chain, and now, a lot of countries are going through a sort of sovereign debt crisis and Bangladesh, again, is in the spotlight. So, I just want you to give me an overview, and how this, sort of, blends with countries that put so much into development…you know, in terms of policy, in terms of the things they are doing right, in terms of investment and attracting investment, and the exposure to these sorts of global economic risks and volatility. [This is] because, usually, what you get in Western discourse is that a lot of countries are victims of some of these risks because of some of the wrong policy decisions they make. But in the case of Bangladesh, at least to my knowledge, nothing like that is going on. And yet, it is usually talked about as a very exposed country in that regard. I know you wrote a column recently about this. So I just want you to give me a brief [insight]—is there anything to worry about? How do countries that are trying to get rich, that are trying to do things right, how do they usually manage these sorts of global risks?Akhtar;Right? I think, inevitably, we'll have to go a bit into the history of how we came here. But since you started with the current situation, let me briefly comment on that, and then maybe I'll go to the history. Right now, yes, like most other countries, we are facing challenges, but I think there has been a bit of hype about how serious the challenge is, in terms of the risk of a debt default, the risk of foreign exchange reserves going down very sharply. And I think there is a bit of the Sri Lanka effect, and then also the Pakistan effect, as people are trying to put Bangladesh in the same bracket, which I think is very, very misplaced. I think the IMF has made it clear, [not only] in its latest country report, which came out in March 2022 but also in many recent statements, that Bangladesh has both a solvency situation and a liquidity situation. As you know [that] the solvency is typically measured by the external debt to GDP ratio, one of the ratios is external debt by GDP and the liquidity is measured by debt service requirements - the external debt service requirements by the export earnings ratio. And there are these certain thresholds, and if you go beyond that, it's considered a bit risky. Bangladesh on both these accounts is much below the threshold. So there's already a lot of headroom in the sense that even if things get worse over the next few months and maybe a year or two, Bangladesh would still be able to manage the situation. So I just wanted to make that clear at the beginning. Now, that doesn't mean that there aren't other issues in Bangladesh, issues which have been brewing for quite some time. For example, many of us are concerned with the efficiency of public expenditures. We know of projects where there have been cost overruns. Some of it may be for genuine reasons, some of it may be related to corruption, which sadly still remains a serious problem in Bangladesh. I feel that I've written about it, and you may have read some of these articles about the spectre of rising cronyism, which, again, is not surprising; when an economy grows as fast as Bangladesh's has, there are certain people who become economically powerful. And at some stage they acquire political power as well, and then you start seeing the problem of cronyism. So we have that, we have a serious problem in the banking sector with a lot of non-performing loans. I'm not suggesting that we don't have serious problems, we do. But there is a disconnect between the typical headlines and where the real problems lie in Bangladesh.  Now, this may be a good moment to bring up a little bit of history, and I can go deeper into it. The Bangladesh economy has certain resilience. And I just want to comment on that. One which is not discussed much, because the story often is about garments and remittances, is the transformation that has happened in the rural areas. It started with agriculture, it actually started with rice production, which is the most important crop in Bangladesh. And then it expanded into other crops, and then even non-farm activities in the rural areas, we can go into the details of this later. But agriculture provides a certain resilience. And we saw that again during COVID. Because the agricultural activities in Bangladesh were not affected that much by COVID, and that was a big benefit. The other is the unleashing of an entrepreneurial spirit in Bangladesh. And this spirit has been unleashed across the board, so it's not just some large conglomerates or some large government manufacturers who have become entrepreneurial. This is something which has happened across the board, from small farmers to large conglomerates. And that, I think, is a big asset for the country. Because we don't have natural resources; unlike Nigeria, we don't have natural resources. In some ways, it's actually a good thing. Because then we are forced to use other assets and latent entrepreneurship… you know, Albert Hirschman, the famous economist, wrote a book in 1956, which is a classic, on the strategy of economic development, and he made a very interesting comment. He said, in developing countries, you have a lot of latent resources. In developed countries, the task is how to allocate the resources you have; how to best allocate them. In developing countries, it is about bringing out the latent resources you have; and entrepreneurship is one of the latent resources developing countries have, but many countries have not been able to bring that out and make use of it. Bangladesh has, and that gives a certain resilience to the economy. So yes, the shocks are going to affect us, especially because our major industry, in fact, is export-oriented, which is garments. So that is affected by the shocks, but unlike commodity prices, export earnings don't fluctuate that much. And the industry has proven to be resilient over the years.Tobi;Yeah, I'm glad you touched on history because, really, that's where I wanted to start. But I just want to get the pulse of the moment and how to make sense of all the headlines that we're seeing around. So usually, and I'll refer to the two pieces I've read in the FT [Financial Times] recently that I referenced in my first question. The development trajectory of Bangladesh is usually dated as something that started around 1990. But Bangladesh became an independent country two decades before that. So my question then is: that intervening period before that sort of consensus about the takeoff point, what were the things that were brewing in the background that culminated in that takeoff? I know a lot of things went down, and just to mention that one of the reasons I'm very interested in Bangladesh is that it sort of defies some of the seductive examples of development and progress - the Asian tigers, you know, so to speak - where things seem to be very clear, the prescriptions are very precise, you need to do this and do this. Bangladesh seems like a regular country - like Nigeria, with its history, its complexities, its problems like every other country in the world, but that has also managed, despite a situation that has seemed hopeless, at first, to people who look at these things in terms of hard boundaries - that has emerged as this fantastic example of economic growth and development. So what were the major things that happened before 1990 that sort of made this takeoff possible?Akhtar;Now, one may debate on whether 1990 is the point of the takeoff. In any case, it's very difficult to pinpoint. But anyway, it's good. So 1990, twenty years after independence and also a transition to democratic rule after fifteen years or so of military or quasi military rule. So that's another reason people take that as a counterpoint. But it's a good counterpoint to start discussing these things. Professor Stefan Dercon, whom I think you had on your show recently, who wrote this book Gambling on Development; he has been saying that actually, in some ways, it's a Bangladesh experience which may be more relevant for many developing countries than the East Asian [experience]. And one of the reasons he mentions is, I think, what you just alluded to - that there is a certain messiness, and yet Bangladesh developed. So countries which think that they are also in a somewhat messy situation, or whatever dimensions, say in governance or other dimensions - whether it's possible for them to develop. And that's why the Bangladesh example may be more relevant and encouraging than the East Asian, where one common characteristic has been the strong capabilities of the state. In China, it has been there for hundreds or more,  thousands of years. In East Asia, yes, I'm sure they also have that but they certainly acquired that quite fast. So how do you develop in a country context where the state capacity, the governance quality are not that great, and then you have many other problems as well. So you're right. In that sense, Bangladesh may be very relevant. I think I'd like to first start with, um, even deeper history, because if you look at the region which now constitutes Bangladesh, it used to be part of a province in British India. So it was East Bengal, and then you had West Bengal and then together it was Bengal. Now there was a time in history when Bengal including East Bengal was supposed to be reasonably rich, perhaps the richest province in [the] whole of India before the British came. But if we go back to the beginning of the twentieth century, East Bengal was actually quite backward economically and in many other ways. And if you look at the political discourse in the first half of the twentieth century, before the British left, the political and intellectual discourse in what is now Bangladesh, you'll see there's a lot of talk about peasants being exploited. We were a very peasant dominated economy and society. In many ways we still are, although there has been a lot of urbanisation and industrial activity. At that time it was very much peasant dominated, and the theme which dominated the discourse was exploitation of the peasants. And the aspiration that the leaders whether political or intellectual had is how can we improve the conditions of the poor people. And that sort of got ingrained in the minds of the leaders, and that continued during the time when we were a part of Pakistan. Because you may have heard that there was a lot of disparity and there was a lot of discriminatory treatment by the Pakistani establishment. So that theme was there. When we became independent in ‘71, you could think of the political leadership, you could think of the professional leadership, the bureaucracy, the intellectuals, the media, this theme of doing something for the poor, was actually very strong. So right at the beginning, and, I heard somewhere that our first prime minister, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, was asked by a foreign journalist: what is the number one problem of your country? And he said, I actually have two number one problems. One is food security, and one is population. And we need to take care of that. So right from the beginning, even in the midst of all the turmoil in the first few years, and all the challenges of relief and rehabilitation, work had started on ensuring agricultural growth and food security. And we were fortunate that the HYV rice, the high yielding variety of rice, had been introduced just before independence, so we had something to work with. So that was very important. And there was a strong program to bring down the rate of growth of [the] population and we succeeded on both counts. So by the time we come to 1990, agriculture is taking off. Rice production had taken off significantly, farmers were diversifying into other crops. And we had started to see the beginnings of a rural non farm sector. So agriculture and non agriculture together. And, Bangladeshis had been going out as migrants, and they're sending back remittances, most of it going into the rural areas. So there was a vibrancy in the rural area by the time you come to 1990. Secondly, sometime in the late 70s, the government decided that not only should we move away from the early talk about socialism, [but] towards a more private sector-oriented or market-oriented economy. They also understood that industry has to grow to absorb the surplus labour in agriculture, and export orientation has to grow, because the market in Bangladesh is simply not large enough. So there was an early emphasis on exports. And of course, fortuitously, you know, the South Koreans were running out of their garment quota, so they wanted to relocate some of the production to Bangladesh, but we were ready to take advantage because by then the government and let's say the elite of the class had decided that we need to industrialise and the major driver of industrialization is going to be exports. And then throughout the 80s, we saw the takeoff of the garment industry. The third thing which happened was the liberalisation of policies, mostly in the 80s. So, privatisation was done, the banking sector was open to the private sector. The agricultural input market, which was previously dominated by the government, was gradually liberalised and towards the late 80s, there was a significant liberalisation of that. And finally, as remittances started coming in, our foreign exchange constraint was relaxed. So that also gave government some comfort that we can decontrol certain things. And we can allow industry to move ahead without too many controls. So all these things coming together sort of created the context in which we entered the 1990s. So a lot of the preconditions - the population growth rate had fallen significantly by the time it came to the 1990s, agricultural growth had taken off, industry was taking off, especially the labour intensive garments, which is export-oriented, that industry was taking off.Tobi;That was such a loaded answer, which has preempted some of my further questions. But let me quickly make one digression on agriculture, because over the past seven years or so, in Nigeria, there's been this debate. There's been a huge debate about agriculture, the current administration sort of prioritised agriculture and a lot of resources (capital) was allocated to that sector. And there's been challenges and there's been critics, sometimes I've found myself on the critic's side of things. Now, what I want to know from you is that,the link between agriculture, especially investment and the agricultural productivity that is necessary for the vibrance of that particular sector, how was the Bangladeshi experience? How did Bangladesh achieve food security, especially in terms of improving yield and productivity?Akhtar;Right, so a few things. Firstly, as I said, the high yielding variety of rice had been introduced in the late 60s, and then just after independence, government continued, but more vigorously with a model of… it was more [of a] public sector driven model, where the public sector would import the major inputs. One is irrigation equipment, because this rice needed irrigation, and the other was fertiliser. So, they're imported by the public sector, then they're distributed by the public sector going all the way to the farmers. Maybe at the last mile, there were some private traders who act as dealers on behalf of the government. So, the government took that responsibility. Later on, as I said, in the 80s, they started liberalising it. We'll come to that later. Second is, there's been quite a bit of investment in agricultural research. Now the HYV rice came from abroad, but as it was being applied in Bangladeshi farms, in many cases, we realised that there was some adaptation needed, because the conditions were not always well suited for this variety. The crop conditions varied even within Bangladesh, even though it's a small country, lots of variation. Later on, for example, salinity became a problem, because a lot of water was coming from the Bay of Bengal into Bangladesh. So there are all kinds of problems - there's flooding also. There were many areas where after floods, the waters don't recede that fast, so they remain underwater for a long time. So the agricultural scientists in Bangladesh, and they were all in the public sector, they came up with innovations to come up with rice varieties and later other varieties like maize varieties or vegetables, which are better suited to the conditions in Bangladesh. And then the public sector effort was also complemented, supplemented by NGO efforts. You may have heard about BRAC [Bangladesh Rural Advancement Committee], which is the largest NGO in the world, and we often talk about their activities in the health sector, in education, in microfinance. They were actually doing a lot of work in the economic sphere as well. R&D in agriculture was one of the things that we're doing, in collaboration with the government often, so there was R&D. Another thing happened, which I forgot to mention, when I mentioned sort of the run up to the 90s. In the 80s, the government started a massive program to build rural roads, connecting the rural areas to the small towns and the small towns to the bigger towns. So,a huge rural road network was built starting from the late 80s. And it continued into the 90s, which broadened the markets of the farmers. So in all of this, the core player was the small farmer. As I said, Bangladesh is a peasant, small farmer dominated economy, so it is remarkable that these farmers were willing to innovate, they were willing to move away from what their parents and grandparents had done for many, many years, and adopt these new varieties. So the combination of the government with some NGOs and the farmers, I think that created the basis for productivity improvements in agriculture. And that was sustained because the market was sustained. There were lots of public policies. And at some point, when the government thought the public sector delivery model was not working that well, they allowed the private sector to come in.Tobi;I don't want to infer anything, but from your answer, I can tell what Nigeria is doing wrong, but maybe we'll get to that later. So let's talk about the conditions, which you've also sort of answered for me but I want to know if there is more. Dercon in his book, I'm talking about Professor Stefan Dercon, talked about elite consensus that sort of becomes the bedrock of deciding to pursue economic development. So this broad consensus amongst the Bangladeshi political elites to improve the conditions of the poor, and, which, I'm speculating sort of enabled an ecosystem of policy consistency, even if there are deviations at the margins, how did it emerge? And how was it sustained?Akhtar;Okay, as I had mentioned to Professor Dercon ‘cause I also had a conversation with him for our Bangladeshi group. And I said that – and, he agreed that, it's really difficult to define if there was an elite consensus because it's not that the elite are sitting in a room discussing and bargaining and one day they come out and say, okay, here is an agreement, we have agreed on these three things, it doesn't happen. And there is a bit of tautology in his book as well. And he agreed with that, that in his country chapters, he says, these countries had an elite bargain. And then he says, Okay, this is how the countries grew. And if they have grown, therefore, they must have had a bargain. So there's a bit of tautology there. But coming back to this, I think, I started giving you a flavour of that when I brought in history, even before the British left and how in East Bengal, there was this deeply ingrained feeling that something has to be done for the poor people. And then just after independence in ‘74, we had a big famine. And that sort of strengthened this feeling amongst Bangladeshis. And you know, you mentioned the word elite and it's a bit difficult to define the elite. I would say that it's a broader… I'm talking about people who can influence policy, both the formulation and the quality of implementation. There are a lot of people in the bureaucracy who may not, in that sense, be called part of the elite, but they do have some authority. Now, most of these people, they actually are not too far away from the poor people of Bangladesh. Many of them still have very strong connections with their villages. They go back regularly. They know what the conditions are there. And in a densely populated country like Bangladesh, you see poverty all around you. So all these things, I think, have ingrained in the minds of the elite, however you define it, this commitment to doing something to safeguard the interests of the poor, but that is the security side - food security, [to] address the vulnerability. But somewhere down the line, people started recognizing that Bangladeshis also have an entrepreneurial potential. And there was a feeling that we should try and help unleash that potential. So, as I said, it's difficult to pinpoint a particular period where there has been a consensus but in a subtle way, there has been this consensus that to achieve food security, to help take advantage of the latent entrepreneurship of Bangladeshis, we should be focusing a lot on growth and more generally on development. And that has survived the transitions in administrations, from one government to another, that common element has been there.Tobi;It's not exactly a push back, and I should note that there is a lot more; there's vastly a lot more to Bangladesh than Dercon's book. So, and I don't want to be caught in debating his book. But, why I find that particular line of thought relevant is that, from what you have described, it's amazing to me, so maybe you can help me understand the difference. Now, how a country can set out to do some of these things; invest in agriculture, agricultural R&D, and all these other support programs with big macro effects. Whereas a Nigeria can set out to do those same things and then you find divergent outcomes in their implementation, particularly the inability to execute. You know? There's always a plan. We want to improve the lot of the poor. We want to invest in agriculture. We want to improve productivity. We want to build infrastructure, you know, this, that, they are always so nice and interesting. But the difference is always at the end of the day, countries often don't do these things, right, they never stay true to these things. And of course, we can talk about various reasons why it fell astray - corruption, state capacity, and all that. But what I… which you mentioned in your last sentence [is] how policies survive, even though there are political transitions, election cycles come and go, the particular direction that policy goes, survives this transition, I think that's really what I'm trying to get at.Akhtar;Okay, so I don't know that much about Nigeria. Now, people say that the fact that you have natural resources may have been in some ways a curse, I don't know if it's true or not, but certainly, that sometimes gives governments a sense of complacency and therefore, even if they start on a certain course, they may not have the discipline to stay that course. Now Bangladesh, we never had the advantage of having natural resources. Nowadays, certain things have improved, you know, foreign exchange reserves have been at comfortable levels for several years. So, that may induce a certain degree of complacency, but for a long time, the government knew that we were operating with very narrow degrees of freedom. So that was the context in which Bangladesh had to operate. Which also meant that we were somewhat dependent on donors and that certainly imposed an additional set of disciplines on Bangladesh. But later on, I may come and comment on exactly the kind of relationships I think existed between donors and Bangladesh. But maybe the best way to answer your question would be to say a little bit about the way in which policies have evolved in Bangladesh. And in a sense, it's a bit of a “muddling through” process. And I wrote a blog for the Brookings Institute a year ago, where I said that Bangladesh did it, alluding to that famous song of Frank Sinatra - “I did it my way.” So what was that “my way?” We all know that the Bangladeshi Government has never been tremendously competent, there's always been corruption problems as well. So the way it has happened is the following. Things happened in the economy, let's say agricultural productivity is improving. But then it hits certain constraints, and the economic actors, or people acting on behalf of the actors; like academics, donors, journalists, will bring up those issues. And they will probably say that, “here are ten things which need to be done.” Now what the governments in Bangladesh have done, successive governments, [is] they have responded to that, not by doing all the ten things. No. They may have picked up two or three things. And they may have done a little bit. Why a little bit? Because they were risk averse. They wanted to test out what would happen in the market, how the market players respond. [As the government], if I do just three or four things and not everything, and then see the response…and here comes the entrepreneurial side - the response was usually quite good, and when the response was good, the government felt encouraged. And then the government said “okay, let's do a few more of the things that were demanded.” The other thing which happened was, as the response came, newer constraints were revealed, or constraints which were not binding before became binding. For example, initially when the agricultural growth was not that great, when production wasn't that huge, the fact that we did not have a good rural road network connecting the rural areas to broader markets wasn't that big a constraint, because you're not producing enough to go out in a big market. When you started producing a lot of marketable surplus, you needed a broader market. And that's when you started feeling the constraint. And people started talking about the need to build up the rural road network. And to the credit of the government, they responded. So, this is what I call the sort of back and forth, policy dynamics - things happen in the economy, government notices it or it is brought to their notice, they react not in a grand way, just doing a little bit here and there;nd then the market responds, may be much more than in many other countries, because of the entrepreneurial spirit, and then the government responds. And that process has gone on uninterrupted throughout the last fifty years. And so, once you accumulate, even if these are modest steps, once you accumulate all of that, you'll see a tremendous result. And that's what we're seeing here. So, what it means is countries – the governments don't have to be very competent, they just have to pick the signals. So, you know, you have this phrase called “picking the winners” and a lot of people say, no, governments should not be in the business of picking winners. I say, in Bangladesh, that what the government just does is pick signals. They've picked signals from the private sector, from the farmers, and they have acted accordingly. And I think the accumulation of all these, the synergies created by all these is, I think, what has made the difference.Tobi;That's interesting. So, generally, the usual story with development is structural transformation. That is, for you to grow rich, the economy has to transform from a largely agrarian, low productivity economy to preferably an industrial high productivity economy. And, I mean, to an extent, we've seen the same process also in Bangladesh. Manufacturing, particularly the garment industry, is eighty or so percent of exports and employment is largely created also in that industry. Now, what I want to ask you is, the role of foreign direct investments in that cannot be understated. You talked about South Korea earlier, and how it played a role in that. For South Korea, so many other scholars would cite the role of Japan in kickstarting the South Korean garment industry; garment and textile industry itself. So, my question then is, is there a link here? I mean, also in your columns, I've read about the role of Samsung, and the electronics industry in Vietnam. Right. So the role of FDI in development, and especially getting industrialization started, what are the favourable conditions? To what degree is it external and internal? I guess that would be my question.Akhtar;Okay. Well, you use the term kickstarting, because in Bangladesh, in the garment industry, a foreign investor helped kickstart that industry, but didn't do much beyond that. So, Bangladesh's Government has been largely domestic…[it is] a case of domestic entrepreneurship leading the sector to the heights that it has achieved now. Yes, we have some Export Processing Zones where we have a number of foreign invested garment factories, but the bulk of it is domestic entrepreneurship. But you're right. The initial thrust came from this partnership with Daewoothe IU. It was a five year partnership. Daewoo trained Bangladeshis, (they) took them to their plants in Korea, trained them. They obviously had the market connections and market knowledge, all that was very useful. But what many people don't know is that the Bangladeshi partner actually quit that agreement just one year into that five year period. So after one year, he thought that he had learned everything that needed to be learned. Now, if he hadn't done that, I believe Daewoo had other plans of coming into other sectors, which we may have lost. But then we did end up with this vibrant mostly domestic-owned garment industry. But foreign investment had a role in jumpstarting that. If you go a little beyond industry, think about sectors which facilitate industry. The entire mobile phone development in Bangladesh, which is also remarkable, was foreign investment led. So, foreign investment played a major role there. So, I agree that foreign investment can play an important role in kickstarting industries, and that is something very important now that we want to diversify our exports, make them more sophisticated, we can come to that subject later. Now, you asked me about what are the conditions which are conducive for foreign investment. And this is where I would say that in Bangladesh, the conditions are still not that conducive. In the case of garments in the late 70s, it was the exhaustion of the South Korean quota of garments, which was the major inducement for them to come in. But also, as I said, the new government, which came into power in ‘75 was talking a lot about export promotion. So, that was there. But the most important constraint that Bangladesh faces, and it's true of many other countries, is policy and regulatory uncertainty. So, Bangladesh often says that we have got a policy regime which is very friendly to foreign investors. And that may well be true. But the execution has problems. And there are a lot of case by case decisions which are taken, which affect the foreign investors adversely. And that creates uncertainty. And those stories are told to other prospective investors. And when they hear those stories, they get discouraged. And the World Bank where I used to work, in fact, the last unit that I worked on, they did a survey of CEOs of multinational corporations just a few years ago, asking them about what are the factors which are very important for you when you decide to invest or not invest in a country, and policy and regulatory uncertainty was top of the list. So that is where Bangladesh still has got a lot of work to do. It is attractive in many other ways - very large domestic market, relatively cheap labour, the labour is quite fast at learning, a lot of good things there. But I think the policy environment, particularly the implementation, the certainty, that has to be ensured.Tobi;I have a further question, particularly on that point, and referencing another one of your columns, I think I'll just stick to your columns today for all my questions. For example, in Nigeria, I'll give you an example. In Nigeria, recently, foreign airlines are threatening to quit. Over the past three, four years, foreign investment (FDI) has plummeted. It's barely a billion dollars, currently, one of the lowest even in Africa. And of course, a lot of these things you mentioned are the problems that investors and business people talk about - policy uncertainty, especially around the control of the exchange rates and inability of companies to repatriate their capital, and to fund their operating expenses, and so forth. So, I mean, that's one constraint. But one distinction you made is like the types of FDI. There are different categories of FDI; market-seeking FDI, natural resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking [FDI]. And the reason I'm asking this is that there seems to be one problem, which, to my mind, Bangladesh has solved, it's not perfect, that Nigeria is struggling with, which is this inertia to get things started, you know, once you start on a journey, you can muddle through, but the inertia to get that process going is still something that Nigeria struggles with, in my opinion. So, now talking about FDI, if I were a policymaker today talking to you; advise me, what kind of FDI should I prioritise in trying to lure investors into my country, for them to create jobs and [create] a nest of high productivity manufacturing industry? So is it market seeking? Is it natural resources seeking? Is it efficiency seeking? Which one is the best in terms of the necessary incentives for sustainability?Akhtar;Okay, so one of the articles, not as part of the regular column, I think, but I wrote for the same newspaper a few years ago, was titled “investment for what?” So that's a question the governments have to ask. Because everyone talks about attracting FDI. It's a mantra all over the developing world. But governments need to ask why exactly do we want FDI? How is it aligned with our development aspirations and development programs? I wanted to just emphasise that because often governments just go blindly trying to attract foreign investors. And whoever comes in, we welcome that. That's not necessarily a good strategy always. For example, in Bangladesh, if we now have a lot of foreign investors coming in, to make jeans and T-shirts, using the same technology as before, we don't really need that, we can't afford to give our scarce land and utility and other things to do things which our domestic entrepreneurs have become reasonably good at doing. So it has to be something new that comes in. Now, at the same time, we also have to recognize that the foreign investors also have their own interest and their own calculations. So we have to come to a balance between the two as well. Now, it's difficult to say a priori that we prefer market-seeking or efficiency-seeking. On a natural resource, it's a slightly different issue if you have natural resources, and if you don't have the capacity to develop them yourself, you may need foreign investors. And obviously, we all know why foreign investors are often very attracted to that. But let me confine my answer to the choice between market-seeking and efficiency-seeking. Now, let's take the case of Bangladesh. We are now talking about diversifying our exports. And we are talking about going into more sophisticated products like electronics. If that is our objective, we may want to target some people who come and make electronics. Now they may come for two reasons. Bangladesh has a huge market, our per capita income may not be that high, but our total economy size is actually pretty large. We are amongst the top 40 economies in the world. And if you look at the size in the purchasing power parity terms, we're actually in the top 30. That's a very large economy. So, naturally foreign investors would come in looking at the market as well. But if our objective in this sector is to make a breakthrough in the global value chains, and not just serve the domestic market, then we'd like to have foreign investors come in with an efficiency-seeking objective that, in Bangladesh, we can make these things more efficiently, at lower cost, than in other places. So that Bangladesh then can ride on the backs of the foreign investors, who know the markets, who have the brand recognition and show the world that things can be made efficiently in Bangladesh. And, then once we have shown that with the help of foreign investors, maybe Bangladeshi entrepreneurs can also start doing it. So here you see I give you an example, where you have a strategic objective, and you attract foreign investors of a particular type. Now, there are also many needs in the domestic market. Bangladesh needs to develop a very good logistics system. And we may need foreign investors to come in and invest there, but will be more market-seeking. I mentioned the case of mobile telephones, that was not an export-oriented industry, although it may have facilitated exports, that was domestic market-oriented. And we encouraged foreign investors to come in, who were obviously coming in as market-seeking investors. So the answer would vary depending on the sector or the activity. But that brings me back to my first point, the government should have a clearer idea of what is the role of foreign investment in implementing the various dimensions of your development strategy. And accordingly, you're going to target efficiency-seeking investors in some cases, and market-oriented investors in other cases.Tobi;So, now, from a policy perspective, because really, that's what's sort of dominating this conversation. One thing that keeps coming up is the role of government, the strategy it pursues, you know, this, that. But inevitably, that leads to the question of what… in terms of economic development, what role does the government play by itself? Now, China, and, of course, other East Asian economies are very, very popular in the development discourse and these are largely autocratic governance. Right. And, to an extent the gospel of state-led development has travelled far and wide, sometimes in contrast to what is generally called the neoliberal or the Washington Consensus-type policies. But at the same time, at the nexus of all this is the role of markets, how the economy is regulated, liberalisation. How does a government approach regulation and policymaking generally, with the right incentives for the government to take the lead in areas where, maybe because of access to market or not seeing the prospect of returns, private actors are reluctant? And also at the other end, this sort of control, excessive control, that you see in so many developing countries, like Nigeria, and so many others in Africa, where government sees itself as the primary player in the economy, right? What is the balance? What is the heuristic generally, in trying to, [or] should I say, make policy and regulations to encourage economic development, and, of course, your Bangladeshi experience of that?Akhtar;Okay. So, when you say state-led, there are many ways you can define that. One is the direct participation of the state in productive activities. And in China, that is still pronounced, there are different models of state-owned enterprises, including public private partnerships, but the state plays a dominant, or at least an important direct role in the production of activities. That's one thing. The other is playing a direct role, not in production, but in things that facilitate production. So I had mentioned the case of research and development in the agricultural sector of Bangladesh, which was there right from the beginning. It was largely a private sector activity, but that was meant to facilitate productive activities by the private sector, in this case, thousands and thousands of farmers. So, the whole spectrum of things that the government does and, of course, there is the whole regulatory function of the government. And I think in choosing the balance, and the balance itself may shift over time as the economy develops. And I give an example of that, again, from the agricultural sector of Bangladesh, how the government moved away from the direct import and distribution of agricultural inputs, giving more and more space to the private sector over time. So initially, in the 70s, maybe that was the right thing to do. And then later on, the right thing to do was to withdraw and create space for the private sector. So the balance, (a) has to be thought of carefully, in terms of the capacity of the government, that's very important. And, again, if I [could] mention Stefan Dercon, he talks about the self awareness of [the] government. Are governments aware of what they can do and what they cannot do? And that answer would vary by country. Often governments make the mistake of thinking that they can do a lot of things, and therefore they; (a) go into productive activities themselves directly, and (b) also controlling too much the activities of the private sector. Controlling is not that easy. It requires a lot of skills, and many governments actually don't have the skills of doing that. The thing that may have happened in Bangladesh is the government has been more or less self aware, not always, but more or less self aware of what they can do and what they cannot do. And that has led to a certain division of labour between the government and the private sector, and the NGOs. With that division of labour also changing over time. That's very important. So the government needs to be aware of where its capacities are, and they need to also have some faith that the private sector, if given the opportunity, can come and do certain things. Because governments often say, okay, but if we don't intervene, the private sector is not going to come in. Or we have a big factory, if we close it down, then a lot of people will lose their jobs, and the private sector will not be forthcoming to create jobs for them. If you want, I can give you a good example of that kind of thinking. In Bangladesh, we had the world's largest jute mill called the Adamjee Jute Mill, and it was bleeding like hell, and every year the government had to subsidise. So there was lots of debate on whether the factory should be (a) privatised, and there was no taker, then the question is whether it should be closed down. Then, about 20 years ago, exactly 20 years ago, a very bold decision was taken to actually close down the factory. It was a controversial decision. About 26,000 workers lost their jobs. Some of them were ghost workers, maybe 20,000. Now the story of what happened after that is very interesting. That land was converted into an export processing zone. And now the latest figures are that about 65 to 70,000 jobs have been created there. So you had lost about 20 [thousand jobs] and you have created so many. These are all private sector firms, they're all export oriented firms, the government doesn't need to subsidise them. So you can see once given the opportunity what the private sector can come and do. So you don't have to hold on to a loss making enterprise just because you're worried about job losses.Tobi;Let me sort of ask you a big picture question on this particular point, which is the role of democracy in development, generally. Democracies have been taking a beating recently, so maybe you can speak up for it, somewhat. Do you think democracy has some kind of unique weakness in terms of trying to engineer economic development, particularly because of elections? I mean, to cite the example of the jute mill you mentioned, some regime that is sensitive, maybe in an election year, or maybe that wants to appeal to a particular constituency, or, maybe workers Union or something might actually kick the can down the road. An example is (fuel) petrol subsidy in Nigeria, which the bill keeps increasing, but I mean, each government promises to remove it or reduce it, and then kicks it to the next government because nobody wants to annoy the workers union, nobody wants to lose votes, the party wants to remain in power, you know, and these incentives that are common in democracies. So, do you think this makes democracies weak in a way, in trying to develop the national economy? Because a lot of people will say that's why China has developed much faster than India, for example. What's your take?Akhtar;Okay, let me start by giving you an anecdote. So this is from about I think it was 2008 or so, 2007 maybe. Bangladesh then had a quasi military government, it was called a caretaker government, whose major responsibility was to conduct free and fair elections. So they were in power for about two years. And I was actually working in Bangladesh at that time. And we had, I think we had a natural disaster, or maybe we had floods. So conditions were pretty bad. And one of the… well, they were called advisors, but they were de facto ministers, who was having to deal with this problem of getting food to poor people, dealing with rising prices [and] all that; he said to me, “I can feel a certain handicap being part of this kind of government.” What is the handicap? Right now what I need a lot is information from the grassroots, I need to know what is happening in different parts of the country, and I need that information very fast. I need it right now, about what's happening earlier today, or what has happened yesterday. Fortunately, I have some connections in the NGO world, this gentleman was an academic. I'm getting some information. But if this was a political campaign, I would rely on my political network, my workers, my small town leaders, and within a few hours, I'll be getting information from all over the country on what the conditions are. Now, why do I mention this anecdote? Because in a democratic system, your feedback mechanisms may work very well. Yes, there can also be a lot of noise. But otherwise, the feedback which is very, very important for government, they need to know what's going on throughout the country with different groups of people, with different localities etc. That is something that autocratic governments lack. Yes, information flows, flows from lower level bureaucrats, but I'm sure they are modified on their way. Because, the boss often doesn't want to hear certain things. It may happen in political democratic setups, but generally, the flow of information is much better for politicians. Now, how they act upon that information is another issue, but that's very important. Secondly, politicians operating within a democratic setup, (a) they develop a lot of empathy, because of their interactions with people, [b] they also get a good idea of what the trade-offs can be. And these are very, very important in decision making. So those are the good sides of democracy. Now, yes, in democracy, you also need to cater to your political constituencies, and that may lead to certain decisions, which technocrats may feel are sub optimal. But that is the price you pay for democracy. Compared to the gains for having a democratic system, that is sometimes a small price to pay, although sometimes that can get out of hand. But if it gets out of hand, it's usually where you may in name have a democracy system, but in practice, you don't. So the kinds of disciplines that democracy imposes on the government are lacking there. So that is my answer. Now, as you can see, implicit in my answer was some definition of democracy. It's not just about electoral politics. It's not just about having regular elections and free and fair elections. It is the monitoring mechanism. Are governments picking the signals, are they getting the information? How wide is the information that they're getting? That's a very important characteristic of development.Tobi;So another one of my sort of big picture questions to you, and in this case, using the Bangladeshi experience and example, is, in the last couple of years, there has been this big debate in development over, oh, do you prioritise the big things or the small things you can measure? You were with the World Bank, I'm sure you have some familiarity with the so-called empirical revolution and how it has sort of taken over the field of development economics where, yeah, there is a lot more preference in terms of international aid funding for interventions, things that you can measure. So, the RCTs, or, whether it is conditional cash transfers, and all these things – and the atmosphere with which this debate happens sometimes, personally, I find it frustrating because it makes it seem like a zero-sum kind of thing. Like, you can either have one or the other. You either pursue growth, or you forego that and choose to do all these small scale, local and domestic interventions. But Bangladesh, like you mentioned, the issue of BRAC and also people like Naomi and co. have written about – Naomi Hussein [that] Bangladesh managed both. There was a sort of productive combination of both frameworks, that is, the role of non governmental organisations who were able to provide some support for the rural communities. And of course, there was the big macro policies that were explicitly designed to pursue economic growth, get businesses going, create jobs, you know, and all the other things that happen in the private sector. So, my question would be, how did that sort of synergy happen in Bangladesh? How was that cooperation, so to speak… I mean, you talked about the role of BRAC in R&D and agriculture, you know, how did that happen? How did, perhaps, it wasn't intended, but in practice, how does it work?Akhtar;Okay. Let me start by recounting something I heard Abhijit Banerjee, the Nobel laureate, who got a Nobel prize for his work on RCTs, said something about the rationale for going into RCTs. And he's saying that the kinds of interventions that we talk about in the context of RCTs, they're not the only interventions that bring about development. In fact, the most profound development impact may come from other kinds of interventions and policies, and other factors. But his point was that, let's say, as a development practitioner, we are not able to influence these big things. So I'm going to focus on the things that we can influence. So I'm doing a project here, a project there, and we can change the parameters of the project in certain ways that we achieve the most significant impact. And how do we change the parameters or what parameters we choose or how do we design the project? That's where randomised control trials can give us very useful insights. And we can get more bang for the buck from the development expenditures in those kinds of projects. Now, he never said that that's all about development. There are many other things that need to be done. And governments, in their collective wisdom, may have a better idea of what those things can be. And that's different from a particular project team trying to do a project. They won't have all that knowledge, which can lead them to think about much bigger things, but governments can; not perfectly, but governments can. Or large organisations like BRAC can within certain spheres of operation. So, yes, I agree with you that this is a false dichotomy, that you either completely forget about RCTs or you get completely immersed into RCTs. So, one has to find the right places where the randomised control trials, which are after all an instrument, one of the tools in your toolbox… which is the best time and place to deploy it. I would say in Bangladesh, yes, the scope for applying them is more than the actual application so far, which means that we have a scope to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of public spending by using these techniques judiciously in certain areas. Now, coming back to, I think you mentioned the question of BRAC in the context of R&D, but also BRAC has played an important role in market development through their social enterprise world. So, as I said before that the part of BRAC's work which is not discussed much is the work on the economic sphere. So what happened there? I'll just give one or two examples. I think giving concrete examples is the best way to illustrate this. So, they got into, let's say, they got into dairy [farming]. Actually, the way BRAC started most of these activities was from a livelihood concern. They wanted to create livelihood opportunities for the poor people in the rural areas of Bangladesh. So they said, okay, we have dairy farmers whose incomes are limited, we want to do something to help enhance their inputs [output]. So they came up with certain small interventions, which helped improve the productivity of their dairy farming, and they ended up with more production, then they had a problem. Now, milk is not something that you can preserve for a long time, you need to have some cold storage facilities, some refrigeration facilities, and that was lacking. So a lot of these increased output was actually being wasted. That led BRAC to start thinking about what else it needs to do. So then it went into refrigeration plants. So, they set up refrigeration plants, where the dairy farmers would come from adjoining villages and store their milk. And that led to other things also down the road. So there are many examples of BRAC where they went into a certain activity, they went into poultry, for example, and then discovered that there isn't a good supply of day old chicks, which is an important ingredient in poultry. So they went into that. And the interesting thing is, in many cases, BRAC was the first one to go into that, later the private sector came in and came in in a big way. And when they did, BRAC withdrew. Because BRAC thought, okay, we have played the role of a pioneer, we have catalysed the entry of private enterprises, we can now withdraw and attend to certain other things. So what's going on here? What's going on here is, you have value chains, which are underdeveloped - there are gaps in the value chain. And one aspect of development is to make the value chains more complete. And here you have an actor, BRAC, which has entered the market… [enters] one part of the market, trying to do something, discovering that there is not much it can do unless it intervenes in other parts of the value chain. Well, it can do something but the impact will not be that great, so then it intervenes. But at one point, it realises that other players who are better at scaling this up have entered the field so let me withdraw. So judicious entry, and judicious withdrawal. And that is also true of the government. It's also true of BRAC. I think that's the kind of dynamics of development which is very important. And somewhere there, yes, you may have some trials, which may be randomised control trials, it may be just informally observing from your own experience of what is working, what is not working, but this idea of learning by doing, learning by doing, the government has done it in Bangladesh, BRAC and other BRAC-type institutions have done it. The private sector is also doing it.Tobi;The last of my big-picture questions to you is– Another dichotomy that I have observed is the business cycle concerns of an economy and policy and these sorts of other long-run development growth policies. For example, in Nigeria, it's a common refrain that we had growth in some years, but we never really had development. Income didn't grow as fast as GDP, and growth has been cyclical, it's not sustained. And some of the issues that really plague governments and policymakers is that even in trying to make policies that are tolerant and favourable to long-run growth, there are short term issues that you have to deal with [like] foreign exchange policy, inflation, and sometimes I've heard people say that, Oh, as a developing country, you have a lot more tolerance for inflation than developed economies. I think you'll have to tell me whether that's true or not. Because inflation does not happen in a vacuum, it affects the purchasing power of people, poor people even more so. Right. So how do policymakers in growing countries manage these tensions in terms of – and, I'm working my way through your book with Gustav Ranis on this – how policymakers mine through these everyday concerns of the economy, versus the long-term prospects and the projects you are trying to put forth as a government?Akhtar;Okay. Well, since you alluded to that book, I will first briefly mention the main theme of the book, and then come to this specific [question]. The main theme of the book, which we illustrated through a comparative study of East Asian countries and Latin American countries, [was that] we talked about the East Asian pattern of government behaviour and the Latin American pattern of government behaviour. And the period covered was from the mid 60s to the mid 80s so things may have changed after that. And in any case, it's difficult to talk about (a) East Asian pattern, and (b) Latin American pattern. But what we were talking about is that during the course of a business cycle, or terms of trade cycle, as your terms of trade improve, your foreign exchange reserves go on increasing, obviously, growth accelerates. The question is what does a government do when things are good? Do they let growth accelerate according to some normal – “normal trajectory”, or they get excited, and they try to push growth beyond the “normal trajectory”-- making it higher than what the good times normally would make it? So, in the “Latin American” scenario, when things were good, growth was happening, government wanted to have more of it. So they went for expansionary fiscal policies, expansionary monetary policies to push growth beyond what the natural trajectory is. And then inevitably, because we are talking of cycles, inevitably a time came, where things started going down. And conditions were not as conducive as before. At that time, what the East Asian countries did– but first– they never tried to artificially push growth above the natural level. When the downturn came, they allowed the growth to fall. So they went for contractionary policies, they allowed the growth to fall. But in the Latin American scenario, having pushed growth beyond the natural path, it's almost like being intoxicated, you could not get rid of that habit. So, you try to artificially maintain growth even though the signs were all pointing downwards. And then the time came when things just crashed. And you fell into a deep crisis. Whereas the East Asians, they had their ups and downs, but they didn't have a serious crisis at that time. They had later, but not at that time. So that was the main thing about how you conduct your policies during the upturn, and then also during the downturn. Now, coming back to the specific situation like the one we observe now, when there are many economic challenges facing countries, and what can governments do to ensure that the course on which they had been before the crisis started, or the challenges started, and hopefully it was a course of development, how can they stay on that course as best as they can? First is, governments should look for existing inefficiencies. For example, in your public expenditures, there may be a lot of inefficiencies, and if you can identify those and get rid of those [inefficiencies], then you can bring things under control in the context of the challenges without sacrificing growth. Most developing countries, including Bangladesh, do have inefficiencies in their public expenditures. So the question is, do you target those inefficiencies and curtail them? Or, do you target those parts of expenditures which are actually very useful? So that's number one. And that's why we often have this phrase, “don't let a crisis go to waste.” Because a crisis can often focus attention better than good times can. And a crisis can also create the political and social consensus to take some tough decisions. So that's one thing. Second is the importance of social protection. And we must remember that for people at the margin, and in our kind of countries, Nigeria, Bangladesh, a lot of people are still at the margin. Even a small shock which takes them below the threshold is not a temporary damage that after some time they can come back [from], often it's a permanent damage. They have to sell off their productive assets, which means even when things start improving, their conditions won't improve. So that's why it's very, very important to have good social protection systems in place.Third, coming back to a point I made earlier, it's very important to have good monitoring systems. ‘Cause we really want to know what's going on, how the lives of different people across the country is being affected by the tough conditions in which you are, without that your policies will be suboptimal. So that monitoring is very, very important. And it's very important to engage different stakeholders in society. And for two reasons. One is part of the monitoring, because economists, business people, journalists, and others, would know a lot beyond what the government knows and it's important to tap into that knowledge, but also to build consensus about some of the tough decisions that need to be taken. So, at the end of the day, it is a lot about governance. It's a governance challenge that countries face when they're facing an economic challenge.Tobi;My final question to you, I have a couple of other questions, but… from a policy-making perspective, how do you then make knowledge count? Because from everything you have talked about, the role of knowledge… which takes me back to where we started, you know, talking about agriculture. The role of knowledge is actually very important. But you have situations where you can have knowledgeable people in government, world class economists, and the government itself might be making policies that are clearly wrong, which means there's a disconnect somewhere. And I mean, in Bangladesh, it's often talked about how there is a policy knowledge ecosystem that informs the public and shapes their accountability and expectations, and also informs policymakers at the other end of that spectrum. How does a country build and nurture that? Especially, how does knowledge of, whether it is knowledge of economics, whether it is knowledge of society and other programs, how it transmits to the key decision makers, and influence some of the actions or policies, or regulations, that are taken? How does that happen?Akhtar;Okay, so you mentioned the sort of the ecosystem linking policy and knowledge in Bangladesh. We have an ecosystem, I wouldn't say it always functions very well. And we do have many instances where people in government feel that the

A Bengali diaspora in Australia celebrated the spirit of football at Sydney's Grandville Centre while the world watched the world cup in Qatar. The Mohun Bagan and East Bengal football clubs are both supporting this IFA (Indian Football Association) shield tournament for the first team in Australia. Those who attended the event included Parramatta Mayor Donna Davis, Cumberland Council Mayor Suman Saha and Shadow Minister for Sports Julia Finn.

Vivek joins Neeraj to talk about the win away at East Bengal and predicts the upcoming home games.

Ian, Dave and Ben return this week for a long chat with Yeovil Town FC's newest Director and Shareholder Stuart Robins.Enjoy!PS. Apologies if the sound is a bit iffy with Ian's mic. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

The latest guest on the Bred A Blue podcast is the only player to come through the ranks at Everton and win a full Scottish international cap! Danny Fox has recently hung up his boots after a 500-game career that took him to Celtic, Burnley, Southampton and East Bengal, amongst other locations. In Bred A Blue, he reveals how he became a part of the Tartan Army and reflects on the unique experience of playing in an Old Firm game. “It's like an out of body experience,” he says. Fox joined Everton from Liverpool as a young boy and as a lifelong Evertonian, he dreamed of playing for the First Team. Although it nearly happened, he never quite made it. “I was on the bench against Aston Villa and when I was warming up, I was willing David Moyes to put me on, but he didn't,” he says. After the tears and trauma of being released as an 18-year-old, Fox was determined to prove Everton wrong and when he finally got to play in the Premier League with Burnley and Southampton he viewed it as redemption. In a thoroughly entertaining podcast, Fox also speaks about his teenage loan spell with Scottish part-timers Stranraer, when a players trip to Benidorm really helped him grow up, and the difficulties of playing in India during the COVID-19 pandemic.

This is reading of a selection of Ma's poems for meditation and contemplation. Sri Brahmajna Ma (21 February 1880 – 5 November 1934) was an Indian advaitin saint from East Bengal. What little is known about her reveals her as an illumined soul who was established in non-dual realization. Like Ramana Maharshi, she had no guru, but attained enlightenment through her own efforts at self-inquiry. Art image: Dan Hillier

The big issues facing football around the world, as seen by three international leaders in developing the game. Leaders in Conversation is a series that puts you in the room, fly-on-the-wall style, for discussions between the most influential leaders in sports and media. Our latest episode features James Johnson, CEO of Football Australia, Laura Georges, Secretary General at the French Football Federation and Robbie Fowler, the former England and Liverpool player, in an on-stage session led by Dubai Eye 103.8 host Chris McHardy. This discussion, titled ‘Football Development around the World', was recorded in mid-March, as part of the Leaders Sport Business Summit Abu Dhabi.James Johnson is the CEO of Football Australia, the country due to co-host the 2023 FIFA Women's World Cup. Prior to joining Football Australia in January 2020, Johnson held senior roles across the world of football, such as Director of International Relationships and Development at the Asian Football Confederation, and Head of Professional Football at FIFA. An esteemed former player for the French national team, Laura Georges is now Secretary-General of the French Football Federation, the current men's World Champions, and one of the national federations at the forefront of progressing the women's game. Committed to the promotion of women's football, Georges served as ambassador of the FIFA Women's World Cup 2019 in France and has overseen the development of the women's refereeing plan. Robbie Fowler is a former player and current manager, best known for his time with Liverpool between 1993 and 2001. To date, he remains Liverpool's top scorer in the Premier League and is the eighth top scorer in Premier League history. Following his time in the UK, Fowler played in Australia and Thailand and has since transitioned into management, where he most recently managed East Bengal of the Indian Super League.In this fascinating and wide-ranging discussion, the panel discuss, among many other topics, the possibility of biennial World Cup; what works and what doesn't in different markets across the world when it comes to coaching and talent pathways; and how the development of technology is changing football, for better and for worse.

Can subalterns speak? Now an iconic question from a prominent postcolonial studies scholar Gayatri Spivak, the question interrogates the in-built assumption about the locatable agency in an individual. Postcolonial studies have grappled with the question of legibility and limitations of archives. In her pathbreaking work, An Empire of Touch: Women's Political Labor and the Fabrication of East Bengal (Columbia UP, 2019), Poulomi Saha disrupts the binaries of nation/individual and agency/silence by arguing that women's labor is a political one that articulate their relational aspirations through the tactile. In this contemporary moment with neoliberalism's co-optation of ethnonationalism and an increasing disciplinary turn towards ethnicity as culture, Saha emphasizes the urgency of postcolonialism to prioritize political project in literary critiques and understand the connections between global capital and intimate, material life of women's labor. The book is divided into three parts: “Reading the Body Politic,” “The Fetish of Nationalism,” and “International Basket Case.” In the first section, Saha provides a theoretical framework through her reading of Pritilata Waddedar's body to disrupt the individualistic idea of agency and signify gendered refusal. In the second part, Saha brings Tagore's understanding of fetish to rethink non-sovereignty as not a loss but rather an enthrallment that allowed women to express their attachment to desh (home). In the third part, Saha problematizes the power of a name by analyzing the production of discourses around birangona (war heroines) and connect the devaluation of clothes to the larger history of development where women's labor simultaneously turned into an object of empowerment and erasure. Saha's rich and insightful book will be an important read for scholars who are interested in development, history of labor, and feminist theories. Poulomi Saha is assistant professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley. Her first book, An Empire of Touch, was awarded the 2020 Harry Levin Prize for Outstanding First Book from the American Comparative Literature Association. Da In Ann Choi is a PhD student at UCLA in the Gender Studies department. Her research interests include care labor and migration, reproductive justice, social movement, citizenship theory, and critical empire studies. She can be reached at dainachoi@g.ucla.edu. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

Can subalterns speak? Now an iconic question from a prominent postcolonial studies scholar Gayatri Spivak, the question interrogates the in-built assumption about the locatable agency in an individual. Postcolonial studies have grappled with the question of legibility and limitations of archives. In her pathbreaking work, An Empire of Touch: Women's Political Labor and the Fabrication of East Bengal (Columbia UP, 2019), Poulomi Saha disrupts the binaries of nation/individual and agency/silence by arguing that women's labor is a political one that articulate their relational aspirations through the tactile. In this contemporary moment with neoliberalism's co-optation of ethnonationalism and an increasing disciplinary turn towards ethnicity as culture, Saha emphasizes the urgency of postcolonialism to prioritize political project in literary critiques and understand the connections between global capital and intimate, material life of women's labor. The book is divided into three parts: “Reading the Body Politic,” “The Fetish of Nationalism,” and “International Basket Case.” In the first section, Saha provides a theoretical framework through her reading of Pritilata Waddedar's body to disrupt the individualistic idea of agency and signify gendered refusal. In the second part, Saha brings Tagore's understanding of fetish to rethink non-sovereignty as not a loss but rather an enthrallment that allowed women to express their attachment to desh (home). In the third part, Saha problematizes the power of a name by analyzing the production of discourses around birangona (war heroines) and connect the devaluation of clothes to the larger history of development where women's labor simultaneously turned into an object of empowerment and erasure. Saha's rich and insightful book will be an important read for scholars who are interested in development, history of labor, and feminist theories. Poulomi Saha is assistant professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley. Her first book, An Empire of Touch, was awarded the 2020 Harry Levin Prize for Outstanding First Book from the American Comparative Literature Association. Da In Ann Choi is a PhD student at UCLA in the Gender Studies department. Her research interests include care labor and migration, reproductive justice, social movement, citizenship theory, and critical empire studies. She can be reached at dainachoi@g.ucla.edu. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

Can subalterns speak? Now an iconic question from a prominent postcolonial studies scholar Gayatri Spivak, the question interrogates the in-built assumption about the locatable agency in an individual. Postcolonial studies have grappled with the question of legibility and limitations of archives. In her pathbreaking work, An Empire of Touch: Women's Political Labor and the Fabrication of East Bengal (Columbia UP, 2019), Poulomi Saha disrupts the binaries of nation/individual and agency/silence by arguing that women's labor is a political one that articulate their relational aspirations through the tactile. In this contemporary moment with neoliberalism's co-optation of ethnonationalism and an increasing disciplinary turn towards ethnicity as culture, Saha emphasizes the urgency of postcolonialism to prioritize political project in literary critiques and understand the connections between global capital and intimate, material life of women's labor. The book is divided into three parts: “Reading the Body Politic,” “The Fetish of Nationalism,” and “International Basket Case.” In the first section, Saha provides a theoretical framework through her reading of Pritilata Waddedar's body to disrupt the individualistic idea of agency and signify gendered refusal. In the second part, Saha brings Tagore's understanding of fetish to rethink non-sovereignty as not a loss but rather an enthrallment that allowed women to express their attachment to desh (home). In the third part, Saha problematizes the power of a name by analyzing the production of discourses around birangona (war heroines) and connect the devaluation of clothes to the larger history of development where women's labor simultaneously turned into an object of empowerment and erasure. Saha's rich and insightful book will be an important read for scholars who are interested in development, history of labor, and feminist theories. Poulomi Saha is associate professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley. Her first book, An Empire of Touch, was awarded the 2020 Harry Levin Prize for Outstanding First Book from the American Comparative Literature Association. Da In Ann Choi is a PhD student at UCLA in the Gender Studies department. Her research interests include care labor and migration, reproductive justice, social movement, citizenship theory, and critical empire studies. She can be reached at dainachoi@g.ucla.edu. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/gender-studies

Can subalterns speak? Now an iconic question from a prominent postcolonial studies scholar Gayatri Spivak, the question interrogates the in-built assumption about the locatable agency in an individual. Postcolonial studies have grappled with the question of legibility and limitations of archives. In her pathbreaking work, An Empire of Touch: Women's Political Labor and the Fabrication of East Bengal (Columbia UP, 2019), Poulomi Saha disrupts the binaries of nation/individual and agency/silence by arguing that women's labor is a political one that articulate their relational aspirations through the tactile. In this contemporary moment with neoliberalism's co-optation of ethnonationalism and an increasing disciplinary turn towards ethnicity as culture, Saha emphasizes the urgency of postcolonialism to prioritize political project in literary critiques and understand the connections between global capital and intimate, material life of women's labor. The book is divided into three parts: “Reading the Body Politic,” “The Fetish of Nationalism,” and “International Basket Case.” In the first section, Saha provides a theoretical framework through her reading of Pritilata Waddedar's body to disrupt the individualistic idea of agency and signify gendered refusal. In the second part, Saha brings Tagore's understanding of fetish to rethink non-sovereignty as not a loss but rather an enthrallment that allowed women to express their attachment to desh (home). In the third part, Saha problematizes the power of a name by analyzing the production of discourses around birangona (war heroines) and connect the devaluation of clothes to the larger history of development where women's labor simultaneously turned into an object of empowerment and erasure. Saha's rich and insightful book will be an important read for scholars who are interested in development, history of labor, and feminist theories. Poulomi Saha is assistant professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley. Her first book, An Empire of Touch, was awarded the 2020 Harry Levin Prize for Outstanding First Book from the American Comparative Literature Association. Da In Ann Choi is a PhD student at UCLA in the Gender Studies department. Her research interests include care labor and migration, reproductive justice, social movement, citizenship theory, and critical empire studies. She can be reached at dainachoi@g.ucla.edu. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/critical-theory

Can subalterns speak? Now an iconic question from a prominent postcolonial studies scholar Gayatri Spivak, the question interrogates the in-built assumption about the locatable agency in an individual. Postcolonial studies have grappled with the question of legibility and limitations of archives. In her pathbreaking work, An Empire of Touch: Women's Political Labor and the Fabrication of East Bengal (Columbia UP, 2019), Poulomi Saha disrupts the binaries of nation/individual and agency/silence by arguing that women's labor is a political one that articulate their relational aspirations through the tactile. In this contemporary moment with neoliberalism's co-optation of ethnonationalism and an increasing disciplinary turn towards ethnicity as culture, Saha emphasizes the urgency of postcolonialism to prioritize political project in literary critiques and understand the connections between global capital and intimate, material life of women's labor. The book is divided into three parts: “Reading the Body Politic,” “The Fetish of Nationalism,” and “International Basket Case.” In the first section, Saha provides a theoretical framework through her reading of Pritilata Waddedar's body to disrupt the individualistic idea of agency and signify gendered refusal. In the second part, Saha brings Tagore's understanding of fetish to rethink non-sovereignty as not a loss but rather an enthrallment that allowed women to express their attachment to desh (home). In the third part, Saha problematizes the power of a name by analyzing the production of discourses around birangona (war heroines) and connect the devaluation of clothes to the larger history of development where women's labor simultaneously turned into an object of empowerment and erasure. Saha's rich and insightful book will be an important read for scholars who are interested in development, history of labor, and feminist theories. Poulomi Saha is assistant professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley. Her first book, An Empire of Touch, was awarded the 2020 Harry Levin Prize for Outstanding First Book from the American Comparative Literature Association. Da In Ann Choi is a PhD student at UCLA in the Gender Studies department. Her research interests include care labor and migration, reproductive justice, social movement, citizenship theory, and critical empire studies. She can be reached at dainachoi@g.ucla.edu. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/south-asian-studies

Can subalterns speak? Now an iconic question from a prominent postcolonial studies scholar Gayatri Spivak, the question interrogates the in-built assumption about the locatable agency in an individual. Postcolonial studies have grappled with the question of legibility and limitations of archives. In her pathbreaking work, An Empire of Touch: Women's Political Labor and the Fabrication of East Bengal (Columbia UP, 2019), Poulomi Saha disrupts the binaries of nation/individual and agency/silence by arguing that women's labor is a political one that articulate their relational aspirations through the tactile. In this contemporary moment with neoliberalism's co-optation of ethnonationalism and an increasing disciplinary turn towards ethnicity as culture, Saha emphasizes the urgency of postcolonialism to prioritize political project in literary critiques and understand the connections between global capital and intimate, material life of women's labor. The book is divided into three parts: “Reading the Body Politic,” “The Fetish of Nationalism,” and “International Basket Case.” In the first section, Saha provides a theoretical framework through her reading of Pritilata Waddedar's body to disrupt the individualistic idea of agency and signify gendered refusal. In the second part, Saha brings Tagore's understanding of fetish to rethink non-sovereignty as not a loss but rather an enthrallment that allowed women to express their attachment to desh (home). In the third part, Saha problematizes the power of a name by analyzing the production of discourses around birangona (war heroines) and connect the devaluation of clothes to the larger history of development where women's labor simultaneously turned into an object of empowerment and erasure. Saha's rich and insightful book will be an important read for scholars who are interested in development, history of labor, and feminist theories. Poulomi Saha is assistant professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley. Her first book, An Empire of Touch, was awarded the 2020 Harry Levin Prize for Outstanding First Book from the American Comparative Literature Association. Da In Ann Choi is a PhD student at UCLA in the Gender Studies department. Her research interests include care labor and migration, reproductive justice, social movement, citizenship theory, and critical empire studies. She can be reached at dainachoi@g.ucla.edu. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Can subalterns speak? Now an iconic question from a prominent postcolonial studies scholar Gayatri Spivak, the question interrogates the in-built assumption about the locatable agency in an individual. Postcolonial studies have grappled with the question of legibility and limitations of archives. In her pathbreaking work, An Empire of Touch: Women's Political Labor and the Fabrication of East Bengal (Columbia UP, 2019), Poulomi Saha disrupts the binaries of nation/individual and agency/silence by arguing that women's labor is a political one that articulate their relational aspirations through the tactile. In this contemporary moment with neoliberalism's co-optation of ethnonationalism and an increasing disciplinary turn towards ethnicity as culture, Saha emphasizes the urgency of postcolonialism to prioritize political project in literary critiques and understand the connections between global capital and intimate, material life of women's labor. The book is divided into three parts: “Reading the Body Politic,” “The Fetish of Nationalism,” and “International Basket Case.” In the first section, Saha provides a theoretical framework through her reading of Pritilata Waddedar's body to disrupt the individualistic idea of agency and signify gendered refusal. In the second part, Saha brings Tagore's understanding of fetish to rethink non-sovereignty as not a loss but rather an enthrallment that allowed women to express their attachment to desh (home). In the third part, Saha problematizes the power of a name by analyzing the production of discourses around birangona (war heroines) and connect the devaluation of clothes to the larger history of development where women's labor simultaneously turned into an object of empowerment and erasure. Saha's rich and insightful book will be an important read for scholars who are interested in development, history of labor, and feminist theories. Poulomi Saha is assistant professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley. Her first book, An Empire of Touch, was awarded the 2020 Harry Levin Prize for Outstanding First Book from the American Comparative Literature Association. Da In Ann Choi is a PhD student at UCLA in the Gender Studies department. Her research interests include care labor and migration, reproductive justice, social movement, citizenship theory, and critical empire studies. She can be reached at dainachoi@g.ucla.edu. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Can subalterns speak? Now an iconic question from a prominent postcolonial studies scholar Gayatri Spivak, the question interrogates the in-built assumption about the locatable agency in an individual. Postcolonial studies have grappled with the question of legibility and limitations of archives. In her pathbreaking work, An Empire of Touch: Women's Political Labor and the Fabrication of East Bengal (Columbia UP, 2019), Poulomi Saha disrupts the binaries of nation/individual and agency/silence by arguing that women's labor is a political one that articulate their relational aspirations through the tactile. In this contemporary moment with neoliberalism's co-optation of ethnonationalism and an increasing disciplinary turn towards ethnicity as culture, Saha emphasizes the urgency of postcolonialism to prioritize political project in literary critiques and understand the connections between global capital and intimate, material life of women's labor. The book is divided into three parts: “Reading the Body Politic,” “The Fetish of Nationalism,” and “International Basket Case.” In the first section, Saha provides a theoretical framework through her reading of Pritilata Waddedar's body to disrupt the individualistic idea of agency and signify gendered refusal. In the second part, Saha brings Tagore's understanding of fetish to rethink non-sovereignty as not a loss but rather an enthrallment that allowed women to express their attachment to desh (home). In the third part, Saha problematizes the power of a name by analyzing the production of discourses around birangona (war heroines) and connect the devaluation of clothes to the larger history of development where women's labor simultaneously turned into an object of empowerment and erasure. Saha's rich and insightful book will be an important read for scholars who are interested in development, history of labor, and feminist theories. Poulomi Saha is associate professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley. Her first book, An Empire of Touch, was awarded the 2020 Harry Levin Prize for Outstanding First Book from the American Comparative Literature Association. Da In Ann Choi is a PhD student at UCLA in the Gender Studies department. Her research interests include care labor and migration, reproductive justice, social movement, citizenship theory, and critical empire studies. She can be reached at dainachoi@g.ucla.edu.

Welcome to the Instant Trivia podcast episode 371, where we ask the best trivia on the Internet. Round 1. Category: "Bell"S And "Whistle"S 1: To enter a pool of water....tummy first. Bellyflop. 2: Sailors wore these pants long before they became fashionable in the 1960s. Bell-bottoms. 3: They supply the weight in Olympic weightlifting. Barbells. 4: They're employees who go public with stories of their employers' wrongdoing. Whistleblowers. 5: Common name for deadly nighshade, a plant that's poisonous in all its parts. Belladonna. Round 2. Category: Remakes 1: Neil Simon has recreated this 1965 play for the 21st century; he did it once before in 1986 for female stars. The Odd Couple. 2: In 1957 a recreation of this ship made a recreation of its 17th century trip from England to Massachusetts. Mayflower. 3: In 2000 Hasbro gave this dot-gobbling '80s arcade star a new 3-D look for a PC game. Pac-Man. 4: Released in 2002, "Today's New International Version" is a non-gender specific translation of this. the Bible. 5: A 1997 TV remake of this 1957 film featured Tony Danza as Juror No. 7. 12 Angry Men. Round 3. Category: National Coats Of Arms 1: This country's coat of arms is framed by the Pillars of Hercules, which are topped by crowns. Spain. 2: Canada's coat of arms contains depictions of a Scottish unicorn, gold fleur-de-lis and sprig of these leaves. a maple leaf. 3: A banner reading "The Love of Liberty Brought Us Here" tops this West African nation's coat of arms. Liberia. 4: This country's coat of arms dates back to the 13th century, when an ax and the crown of St. Olaf were added to a lion. Norway. 5: The white lion with a double tail on its coat of arms was granted to Bohemia in the 1100s. the Czech Republic. Round 4. Category: Asia 1: Indonesians call this third-largest island in the world Kalimantan, or "River of Diamonds". Borneo. 2: Go Ba Soup, a specialty of this country, makes a sizzling sound when poured over deep-fried rice patties. China. 3: The 2 houses of this large country's parliament are the Lok Sabha and the Rajya Sabha. India. 4: Most of this country's people live in hamlets called kampongs but about a million reside in Kuala Lumpur. Malaysia. 5: Sometimes this country is referred to as East Bengal. Bangladesh. Round 5. Category: A Trashery Of Ogden Nashery 1: "The cow is of the bovine ilk; one end is moo the other" this. Milk. 2: Nash coined the word "Cleopatricide" in his quatrain about this snake. Asp. 3: In "Reflections on Ice-Breaking", he wrote that "Candy is dandy but" this "is quicker". Liquor. 4: "God in his wisdom made" this insect "and then forgot to tell us why". Fly. 5: In his poem "The Baby", Nash remarked, "A bit of" this "is always walcum". Talcum. Thanks for listening! Come back tomorrow for more exciting trivia!

Today Nicole is joined by noted Amazing Race superfan Poulomi Saha to discuss Amazing Race 33 Episode 7 (Gently Down the Stream) , while our faithful host and executive producer Karen Tongson recuperates from Covid.  We watch the teams try Casu Marzu in Corsica, count metal fish together under the water, fake-almost-drown thanks to editing, and MORE. Tune in!  Poulomi Saha (@poulomiqsaha)  is  an Assistant Professor of English at the University of California, Berkeley, where she teaches courses in postcolonial studies, gender and sexuality theory, and ethnic American literature. She is also the  author  of the award-winning book, An Empire of Touch: Women's Political Labor & The Fabrication of East Bengal.

After continuous chasing, host Siju finally sits down with former India international turned Coach - Renedy Singh. He is one of the most underrated legends of Indian football who's not often spoken about but a thorough gentleman of the sport. Recently with his stint at East Bengal, he made all the right noise & earned appreciation from across. We talk about that and much more insights into this Legend. Tune in & enjoy!

After continuous chasing, host Siju finally sits down with former India international turned Coach - Renedy Singh. He is one of the most underrated legends of Indian football who's not often spoken about but a thorough gentleman of the sport. Recently with his stint at East Bengal, he made all the right noise & earned appreciation from across. We talk about that and much more insights into this Legend. Tune in & enjoy!

This is reading of a selection of Ma's poems for meditation and contemplation. Sri Brahmajna Ma (21 February 1880 – 5 November 1934) was an Indian advaitin saint from East Bengal. What little is known about her reveals her as an illumined soul who was established in non-dual realization. Like Ramana Maharshi, she had no guru, but attained enlightenment through her own efforts at self-inquiry.

50 years on from the Liberation War that gave birth to Bangladesh, De Montfort University's Dr. Fatima Rajina lends us her expertise on a nation and diaspora still scarred from one of the worst genocides in history. We start at the partition, when East Bengal became East Pakistan, chart the rise and hope brought by Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the Awami League's newly won independent state, and the struggles and many coups and counter-coups that have so far marked a young country. /// SHOW NOTES /// /// CREDITS /// Hosts: Aarjan /// Ruairi Guest: Fatima Rajina Production: Connor Music: Cardio /// Khiyo - Amar Shonar Bangla

The 50 anniversary of Bangladesh's liberation takes place on December 16. Much has been written about the Indian role and Delhi's assistance to the Mukti Bahini.  Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, who served in India's mission in Bangladesh soon after liberation, has provided a riveting, insider account of Delhi's preparations for a free Bangladesh – by no means an agreed goal within the Indian establishment in the early part of March 1971 – in his new book “India and the Bangladesh Liberation War”.  But the Pakistani massacre in Dhaka on March 25 and subsequent attacks by the Pakistani Army in East Bengal convinced everyone in the Indian establishment that Bangladesh was an idea whose time had come.   Guest: Chandrashekhar Dasgupta, former Indian Foreign Service (IFS) officer, who was India's ambassador to China (1993-1996) and the European Union (1996-2000).  Host: Amit Baruah, Senior Associate Editor, The Hindu 

Atisha was born in the year 982 AD in East Bengal. He was one of the major figures in the spread of 11th-century Mahayana and Vajrayana Buddhism in Asia and inspired Buddhist thought from Tibet to Sumatra. He is recognised as one of the greatest figures of classical Buddhism. Atisha's chief disciple, Dromtön, was the founder of the Kadam school, one of the New Translation schools of Tibetan Buddhism, later supplanted by the Gelug tradition in the 14th century, adopting its teachings and absorbing its monasteries.

In this episode, our 2Gs, the Gourmands & Geeks Sadaf and Archit are traveling to Bangladesh (virtually) with renowned author Dina Begum, who is passionate about highlighting the recipes and food traditions of Bangladesh. In this episode they discuss: -How is Bangladeshi cuisine different from Indian and Pakistani cuisine? -How is East Bengal cuisine different from West Bengal cuisine?-How do people view Bangladeshi food in London?-Is Bangladeshi food eaten in courses?-What is the role of red meat and seafood in Bangladeshi cuisine?So sit back, relax and fasten your seat belt, because you'll be flying with our 2Gs to Bangladesh to explore its food, tradition, and culture. Welcome aboard. Important links to geek out more:Dina's Website | Instagram | TwitterArticle: How to cook like a Bangladeshi at home by Dina BegumArticle: How to eat like a Bangladeshi in London by Dina BegumArticle: Bhortas Are Anything But Basic by Dina BegumYou can follow Sadaf Hussain & Archit Puri on their Instagram handle:@sadaf_hussain @thehustlinggluttonYou can listen to this show and other awesome shows on the IVM Podcasts app on Android: https://ivm.today/android or iOS: https://ivm.today/ios, or any other podcast app.You can check out our website at https://shows.ivmpodcasts.com/featuredhttps://shows.ivmpodcasts.com/featured

Sri Brahmajna Ma (21 February 1880 – 5 November 1934) was an Indian advaitin saint from East Bengal. What little is known about her reveals her as an illumined soul who was established in non-dual realization. Like Ramana Maharshi, she had no guru, but attained enlightenment through her own efforts at self-inquiry.

On October 9, 1950, JN Mandal sent his resignation to the then Pakistan Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan, writing how the sense of utter frustration at failing at his life-long mission to uplift the backward Hindu masses of East Bengal had led him to feel compelled to tender his resignation from the cabinet. In his resignation letter, the Dalit leader JN Mandal has penned in much details on why he decided to not only quit from the Pakistan government but also return back to India years after agreeing to the idea of partition of country and separation of Pakistan from British India. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/bharatpodcast/message

While excellent newsletters on specific themes within public policy already exist, this thought letter is about frameworks, mental models, and key ideas that will hopefully help you think about any public policy problem in imaginative ways.Audio narration by Ad-Auris.  India Policy Watch #1: Satyam Eva Jayate?  Insights on burning policy issues in India- RSJWe often talk about truth, disinformation and radically networked societies in this newsletter. Our interest in these issues is often on account of news stories around us. But that’s not all. We find there’s a more fundamental shift on the understanding of truth that’s underway in societies around the world. That is what fascinates us about truth. Now, truth or its nature is the basis of all philosophy from the time Socrates started asking questions of fellow Athenians at the public square many centuries ago. Yet we come back to the question of truth and certainty again and again over the course of our history. Not because attaining the truth is an epistemological necessity for our race. That it might be. Instead understanding the nature of truth is important to control it. And those who control the truth control power. Not only for the present but far into the future. So what’s the point of this random discourse on truth at the start? Truth Is The First CasualtyThere were a few news stories over the past couple of weeks that made me wonder about where we are on truth in India today. First, the kerfuffle between Twitter and the Indian government. A lot of commentary on this topic conflate two issues - one, Twitter not complying (yet) to certain parts of the new IT intermediary guidelines and two, Twitter tagging certain tweets by BJP spokespersons on the Congress ‘toolkit’ case as manipulated media. The first point is of limited interest to me. There are new guidelines and they must be followed if you want to be treated as an intermediary in India. Others have complied and Twitter has been lax. The second point is interesting. Twitter claims it has a global policy on tagging certain tweets as manipulated media and that’s what it followed in the Congress ‘toolkit’ case too. This claim has been attacked by many. Some have questioned Twitter’s commitment to free speech and alleged it suppresses right wing handles more than others. I haven’t seen any credible data to support this so I don’t know. But, more importantly, invoking freedom of speech argument here betrays a poor understanding of the concept. Free speech is a right of the citizens that has to be protected from the state which holds a legitimate monopoly on violence (Weber). Suppression of free speech is an issue only when the state is involved. Private entities don’t have that monopoly on violence. If they suppress free speech on their platform, well, there are other platforms. The other attack on Twitter is more credible. Who is Twitter to arbitrate on truth? How does Twitter know what’s the truth? These questions are closely linked to the other news story about a viral video involving an attack on a Muslim man in Ghaziabad. The UP police filed an FIR against Twitter and Mohammed Zubair among others for creating communal divide and intending to disrupt public peace. Zubair is the co-founder of AltNews, a fake news busting media outlet. Zubair and AltNews had done the forensic work debunking the Congress toolkit document on Twitter. It is possible that work could have been the reason for Twitter to have tagged certain tweets as manipulated. Now AltNews was being accused by the state for spreading fake news. Life has came full circle in two weeks for Zubair. Why has the question of truth become so fraught in our lives? Why are we inundated with versions of truth on social media each with its compelling argument and logic? Have we lost objectivity while looking for balance while reporting on truth? These are tough questions. I have no answers. Easy or otherwise. But since we have come so far with piece, like Crime Master Gogo, we need to go back with some takeaways. Truth And TruthfulnessWe live in times where we are suspicious of every claim of truth. We look for who is making the claim, we investigate it, we check on their politics and we debunk the claim if there’s even a whiff of their allegiance to the other side of the political divide from us. This is now the norm.Of course this has always been the case in politics. Political parties are formed on the basis of the belief among the members that theirs is the right path. That the party knows the truth that will lead the society or the nation to the lofty goals set out in the constitution. Politics has always been about '“our truth” versus “their truth”. It is a contestation on versions of truth.This we lived with. But the problem of our times is how deeply politics has pervaded every sphere. There’s not even a sliver of convergence on truths in any subject these days because politics cannot countenance it. No inch can be yielded to “their truth” anywhere. So, the effort on all sides is to bury the others in an avalanche of lies. The more tenuous your truth, the greater the desire to fight with an arsenal of lies. Bernard Williams, the great analytical British philosopher, wrote about this in his last book, Truth and Truthfulness (2002). For Williams, truth is a cultural value to be defended against the onslaught of lies. The accuracy and the sincerity with which we identify and then speak the truth across all social forms is worthy of a good fight. Else, we lose everything. I have excerpted from the first couple of pages of the book below. Williams had presaged the current times of the widespread suspicion of truth even before the advent of social media: “Two currents of ideas are very prominent in modern thought and culture. On the one hand, there is an intense commitment to truthfulness - or, at any rate, a pervasive suspiciousness, a readiness against being fooled, an eagerness to see through appearances to the real structures and motives that lie behind them. Always familiar in politics, it stretches to historical understanding, to the social sciences, and even to interpretations of discoveries and research in the natural sciences.Together with this demand for truthfulness, however, or (to put it less positively) this reflex against deceptiveness, there is an equally pervasive suspicion about truth itself: whether there is such a thing; if there is, whether it can be more than relative or subjective or something of that kind; altogether, whether we should bother about it, in carrying on our activities or in giving an account of them. These two things, the devotion to truthfulness and the suspicion directed to the idea of truth, are connected to one another. The desire for truthfulness drives a process of criticism which weakens the assurance that there is any secure of unqualifiedly stateable truth. Suspicion fastens, for instance, on history. Accounts which have been offered as telling the truth about the past often turn out to be biased, ideological, or self-serving. But attempts to replace these distortions with “the truth” may once more encounter the same kind of objection, and then the question arises, whether any historical account can aim to be, simply true: whether objective truth, or truth at all, can honestly (or, as we naturally put it, truthfully) be regarded as the aim of our inquiries into the past. Similar arguments, if not quite the same, have run their course in other fields. But if truth cannot be the aim of our inquiries, then it must surely be more honest or truthful to stop pretending that it is, and to accept that.We can see how the demand for truthfulness and the rejection of truth can go together. However, this does not mean that they can happily co-exist or that the situation is stable. If you do not really believe in the existence of truth, what is the passion for truthfulness a passion for? Or - as we might also put it - in pursuing truthfulness, what are you supposedly being true to? This is not an abstract difficulty or just a paradox. It has consequences for real politics, and it signals a danger that our intellectual activities, particularly in the humanities may tear themselves to pieces.…. My question is: how can we address this situation? Can the notions of truth and truthfulness be intellectually stabilised, in such a way that what we understand about truth and our chances of arriving at it can be made to fit with our need for truthfulness? I believe this to be a basic problem for present-day philosophy.” Pluralism, Balance And ObjectivityThe other challenge to truth has come from a total lack of understanding of the concept of value pluralism among the media. The construct, popularised by Isaiah Berlin, allows for two or more incommensurable values to be held at the same time by a polity each of which may be true and still be at odds with one another. For Berlin, these differences are unlike a titanic battle between the right and the wrong; instead they are about accepting contradictions and differences in values which then deliver diversity and strength to a society. The media has distorted the notion of pluralism to some kind of an elusive ‘balance’ in its coverage of any issue. Both sides must be represented is a common refrain. The role of the media is to unearth truth through objectivity. Balance doesn’t help in that. That the earth is round is a truth objectively established. Of course, there are ‘flat earthers’ still who think otherwise. The role of media is not to give air time to both in in the interest of pluralism or balance. That’s lazy journalism and an invitation to untruths of every stripe to be concocted to crowd out the truth. This is what has happened. Social media platforms have accentuated this generation of untruths. Over time these turn into ‘versions of truths’ which get quoted by mainstream media aiming for a balance by presenting both sides of the story. It is a systematic perversion of truth. We All Have Our Truths NowThere’s also the failure of liberalism to defend stoutly the core values it stands for in the past decade. It has been attacked from the outside by those with conventional suspicion of the liberals. But liberal ideas have withered under the attack from within from the supporters of relativism, moral scepticism and extreme identity politics. The reverence of relativism among the liberals has meant there’s no objective truth for them anymore. Everything is true in its context. Therefore, everything is false too. This ambiguity has meant everyone can claim their own truth based on some kind of a lived experience. Nothing is sacred in general anymore because everything can be questioned. Simultaneously, everything is sacred in particular because there’s a never ending contest to be purer than the next person. It is difficult to even define a truth in these circumstances. Forget defending it. This absence of a rigid commitment to an ideology by the liberals would lead to moral panic, anarchy and philistinism as Leo Strauss had warned. This is where we seem to have arrived.Lastly, there’s a vast majority who watch this battle of different versions of truth from the sidelines. They think of themselves as the audience. They aren’t. It is they who are being played in the arena. Yet, often, they know the truth and they see through the game. But they remain onlookers, reluctant to take sides and ever willing to be taken in by what’s unfolding in front of them. When truth is no longer valuable, it is they who end up paying the highest price. Like Ramdhari Singh Dinkar wrote:समर शेष है, नहीं पाप का भागी केवल व्याघ्र,जो तटस्थ हैं, समय लिखेगा उनका भी अपराध।Translation: This war over truth is eternal. Your adversary isn’t alone in the wrong. Those on the sidelines, unwilling to take a stand are culpable too. In time, they will face a reckoning. India Policy Watch #2: When Federating Units are ExtinguishableInsights on burning policy issues in India— Pranay KotasthaneMany reports of restoration of J&K’s statehood came out this week. In what appeared to be a step towards restoration, the PM and HM met leaders of significant political parties of the J&K Union Territory. And so it appears that a former state in the Indian Union — reduced to a UT a couple of years ago — might soon become a state again, albeit a truncated one, and on terms different from the ones before August 2019. Any issue involving J&K is a Pandora’s Box. So, for a moment, keep the particularities of J&K aside and consider this question: what does the Indian government’s flip-flop story tell us about the nature of federalism in India? Before answering this question, let’s take a detour to our western neighbour. As in many other areas, it teaches us what not to do. The One Unit ProgrammeThe four provinces of Pakistan as we know today didn’t exist between 14th October 1955 and 1 July 1970. These provinces, along with erstwhile princely states, were merged together into a single unit: the One Unit called West Pakistan. The primary reason was to create parity between the eastern and western wings of the country. East Bengal was renamed East Pakistan and the whole of its western wing became West Pakistan. Provincial governments of Sindh, NWFP, Balochistan, and West Punjab were dismissed and these units were relegated to being merely divisions of the province of West Pakistan.The One Unit of West Pakistan (1955–1970). Source: modified from wikimediaIn 1954, the then Prime Minister of Pakistan, Mohammad Ali Bogra, is believed to have expressed this hope:There will be no Bengalis, no Punjabis, no Sindhis, no Pathans, no Balochis, no Bahawalpuris, no Khairpuris. The disappearance of these groups will strengthen the integrity of Pakistan.We know how that turned out.Now, look at this from a federalism angle. Most federations have a centripetal bias meaning that the union is stronger than the states. But if provincial governments can be dismissed with the ease as it was done in Pakistan, can that system even be called a federal one?Perhaps not. I came across a key differentiation between federalism and decentralisation that sheds some light on this question in A Review of Indian Fiscal Federalism by Dr Govinda Rao:A federal system is the one in which the entire set of powers — legislative, fiscal and regulatory — are divided in the Constitution or conventions between different levels of government. There is a measure of permanency in the assignments and in particular, the powers given to lower level governments cannot be extinguished by higher level governments (Breton, 2000). Thus, checks and balances to safeguard the system is an inherent part of the federal system whereas, decentralisation does not necessarily entail that. In other words, all federal systems are decentralized whereas all decentralized systems are not federal. The Constitution and other institutions set up to ensure checks and balances and safeguard the domains of different levels of government are inherent components of a federal system.Seen from this lens, the Pakistani system was decentralised but not federal.What about the Indian system?Article 3 of the Indian constitution permits the Parliament to, by law:(a) form a new State by separation of territory from any State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any territory to a part of any State;(b) increase the area of any State;(c) diminish the area of any State;(d) alter the boundaries of any State;(e) alter the name of any State;At the same time, the ‘basic structure doctrine’ recognises Federalism as one of the basic and hence unalterable components of the Indian constitution. So, in all likelihood, if the Indian union were to embark on a One-Unit or Four-Units programme of its own, the Supreme Court would come in its way. In other words, the ‘measure of permanency of the Indian federation’ rests on the role of the judiciary.What about the J&K Reorganisation Act?Now, we return to the central question. Does J&K’s conversion into a UT go against the basic structure doctrine? I’m not competent to analyse the legal aspects of this question. As it stands, several cases are pending before the Supreme Court which argue that the act was unconstitutional because it goes against the basic structure doctrine. Even after two years, the Court hasn’t made a decision yet.From a non-legal perspective, it does seem to me that the J&K reorganisation goes against the spirit of federalism. This is perhaps the first time a full-fledged state of the Indian union has been converted into a union territory. This is an important distinction because the powers that J&K enjoyed as a state were in one fell swoop ‘extinguished’ by the Indian government. A notification in Oct 2020 allowing non-residents to own immovable property in the union territory illustrates this point further. This was not allowed under J&K’s pre-independence State Subject Laws. Many border states and regions in India still have such restrictions. Even beyond India, it is not unusual for peripheries of nation-states to be accorded special status, as a quid pro quo for accepting a higher sovereign. The undoing of this arrangement with J&K by a union government rule militates against ‘permanency in assignments of powers’ to lower levels of governments, a key requirement of federal systems.In sum, even if we keep the specifics of J&K aside, India took a step back on the issue of federalism on August 5, 2019. The move towards reversing some of the damage caused is welcome and much-needed. Pakistan should warn us about the costs of sacrificing federalism at the altar of national integration.Other good articles on the One Unit scheme:Formation of One Unit, The NewsFlashback: One Unit: a dark chapter in our history, DawnIndia Policy Watch #3: Phrases that Should Fall into DisuseInsights on burning policy issues in India— Pranay KotasthaneWords have meanings. They indicate the quality of a nation’s policy discourse. With this idea in mind, we are compiling a running list of words and phrases that should disappear from India’s public discourse. Here’s the first instalment.Haves and Have-nots. You would have come across this phrase in many policy discussions. It is easy to present every policy problem as an eternal class struggle between the ‘haves and the have-nots’. And yet, this understanding is misplaced. A speaker at an event I attended a few years ago said that ‘there is no such thing as haves vs have-nots. Instead, there are haves and want-to-haves’. A lightbulb went off in my head.The underlying story behind the haves/have-nots formulation is a zero-sum one. The implicit causality is that the haves have it because the have-nots don’t. The haves are the villains merely because they are successful, rich, or privileged. Structured this way, only one kind of policy recommendation can surface — take things away from the haves and distribute them to the have-nots. The alternate formulation of haves and want-to-haves has a positive sum game at its core. It acknowledges that individuals from both groups are united by the same purpose — to make their lives better off. It doesn’t vilify the haves. The policy recommendations derived from this perspective focus on the ways to increase opportunities for the want-to-haves. A language of confrontation is replaced by a language of competition.Centre/Central GovernmentThe DMK government in Tamil Nadu has raised this issue in recent times. And they are right. ‘Centre’ and ‘Central government’ are terms that are not mentioned even once in the Indian constitution. Not only is it inaccurate to call the union government as the central government, this formulation implicitly assumes that Delhi and the Union government are at the centre while other Indian places and state governments are at the periphery. Given that the Indian constitution explicitly devolves certain powers to states, there is no scope for a government that can claim centrality over the others. This is what well-known constitutional expert Subhash C Kashyap has to say on the matter:“From the point of the usage of the words, 'centre' indicates a point in the middle of a circle, whereas 'Union' is the whole circle. In India, the relationship between the so-called 'Centre' and States, as per the Constitution, is actually a relationship between the whole and its parts. The relation between the whole and its parts is definitely different from the relation between a centre and its periphery”.Population Bomb/Population Explosion.It is a national pastime to blame overpopulation for India’s problems. Maybe, population was a problem in the last decades of the Raj and the early years of the Republic. But those Malthusian concerns have long become irrelevant. India’s total fertility rate has dropped from six in 1950s to near replacement levels of 2.2 in 2020. This decline has happened across religions and regions in India. Note what the Population Foundation of India says:“Religion has little to do with fertility levels. Muslim dominated countries like Indonesia and Bangladesh, have out-performed India in terms of falling birth rates.  Even within India, the fertility rates among Muslims in Kerala is lower than the fertility rates among Hindus in Bihar. States like Kerala, Tamil Nadu, and Andhra Pradesh have proven that it is not religion that matters.  What has made the difference is education, employment opportunities and accessibility of contraceptives. In neighbouring Sri Lanka, fertility rates were stabilised by simply increasing the age at marriage, a move that was made more effective by ensuring girls were educated.”In fact, we might soon have the problem of a falling working-age population. By 2035, the dependency ratio — the proportion of working-age population to non-working age population — is expected to peak. So, we should get rid of Malthusian notions of overpopulation from our public discourse. Blame undergovernance, not overpopulation, as my colleague Nitin Pai says.HomeWorkReading and listening recommendations on public policy matters[Article] “Don't Give Up on Truth” in the Persuasion: Yascha Mounk and Jonathan Rauch discuss the dangers of disinformation, the limits on robust debate, and why truth is fundamental to preserving democracies around the world. [Article] The Population Foundation of India has a note on Lessons for India as China calls off two-child policy. Again, a case of a neighbour helpfully reminding India of the mistakes it should avoid.[Interview] The News Minute speaks to Subhash Kashyap on the differences between ‘centre’ and ‘union’.[Podcast] On Puliyabaazi, Saurabh and Pranay discuss China’s three-child policy, rising petrol prices in India, and implications of the economic and social disparities between India’s southern and northern states. Get on the email list at publicpolicy.substack.com

Huge episode for the Snobs this week as Indian Super League and National team star Robin Singh joins us. Robin talks about his career with such illustrious teams as East Bengal, Delhi Dynamos, ATK and of course the national team. From going to Adriano's house for lunch to playing with John Arne Riise, Florent Malouda and Roberto Carlos, Robin is never short of a good story! An incredible career and an incredible guy Robin's insight's into the game are truly behind the scenes stuff.

In this episode of An Incredible Talk Show, host Sid Shukla catches up with Dudu to discuss his journey, Indian football, I-League vs ISL, racism in football and a lot more. Dudu has been an established striker in Indian Football, having represented the likes of East Bengal, Mohun Bagan and Salgaocar in the I-League, as well as FC Goa and Chennaiyin FC in the ISL. He started his professional career in football with SC Goa at the age of 16, been the league's top scorer and is the only player to start his professional career in India and make it to the leagues in Malaysia, Poland, Hungary, Finland and Sweden.

Harmanjot Khabra talks about his career in Bengaluru FC, East Bengal, Chennaiyin FC and much more. Unlike his on field persona, the footballer is a hoot and a half!   #indianfootball #football #letsfootball #isl #indiansuperleague #india #heroisl #kbfc #keralablasters #kerala #soccer #manjappada #ileague #backtheblue #bluetigers #bengalurufc #atk #keralafootball #indianfootballteam #fcgoa #footballindia #eastbengal #sunilchhetri #kolkata #heroileague #mohunbagan #fifa #jamshedpurfc #fanbannapadega #bhfyp #FCGoa, #Gaurs #Gaurarmy #Goa #Goanfootball #JamshedpurFC #JFC #OwenCoyle #Coyle #JamKeKhel #GKFC #GokulamKerala #RGPFC #RoundglassPunjab, #Md Sporting

The Muhammad Avatāra: Salvation History, Translation, and the Making of Bengali Islam (Oxford University Press, 2021) reveals the powerful role of vernacular translation in the Islamization of Bengal.Its focus is on examines the magnificent seventeenth-century Nabīvaṃśa of SaiyadSultān, who lived in Arakanese-controlled Chittagong to affirm the power of vernacular translation in the Islamization of Bengal.  Drawing upon the Arabo-Persian Tales of the Prophets genre, the Nabīvaṃśa ("The Lineage of the Prophet") retells the life of the Prophet Muhammad for the first time to Bengalis in their mother-tongue. Saiyad Sultān lived in Arakanese-controlled Chittagong,in a period when Gauṛiya Vaiṣṇava missionary activity was at its zenith. This book delineates the challenges faced by the author in articulating the pre-eminence of Islam and its Arabian prophet in a place land where multiple religious affiliations were common, and when GauṛīyaVaiṣṇava missionary activity was at its zenith. Sultān played a pioneering role in setting into motion various lexical, literary, performative, theological, and, ultimately, ideological processes that led to the establishment of a distinctively Bengali Islam in East Bengal, while yet shaping a distinctively Bengali Islam. At the heart of this transformation of a people and their culture lay the persuasiveness of translation to refresh salvation history for a people on a new Islamic frontier. The Nabīvaṃśa not only kindled a veritable translation movement of Arabo-Persian Islamic literature into Bangla, but established the grammar of creative translation that was to become canonical for this regional tradition. This text-critical study lays bare the sophisticated strategies of translation used by a prominent early modern Muslim Bengali intellectual to invite others to his faith. Raj Balkaran is a scholar, educator, consultant, and life coach. For information see rajbalkaran.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The Muhammad Avatāra: Salvation History, Translation, and the Making of Bengali Islam (Oxford University Press, 2021) reveals the powerful role of vernacular translation in the Islamization of Bengal.Its focus is on examines the magnificent seventeenth-century Nabīvaṃśa of SaiyadSultān, who lived in Arakanese-controlled Chittagong to affirm the power of vernacular translation in the Islamization of Bengal.  Drawing upon the Arabo-Persian Tales of the Prophets genre, the Nabīvaṃśa ("The Lineage of the Prophet") retells the life of the Prophet Muhammad for the first time to Bengalis in their mother-tongue. Saiyad Sultān lived in Arakanese-controlled Chittagong,in a period when Gauṛiya Vaiṣṇava missionary activity was at its zenith. This book delineates the challenges faced by the author in articulating the pre-eminence of Islam and its Arabian prophet in a place land where multiple religious affiliations were common, and when GauṛīyaVaiṣṇava missionary activity was at its zenith. Sultān played a pioneering role in setting into motion various lexical, literary, performative, theological, and, ultimately, ideological processes that led to the establishment of a distinctively Bengali Islam in East Bengal, while yet shaping a distinctively Bengali Islam. At the heart of this transformation of a people and their culture lay the persuasiveness of translation to refresh salvation history for a people on a new Islamic frontier. The Nabīvaṃśa not only kindled a veritable translation movement of Arabo-Persian Islamic literature into Bangla, but established the grammar of creative translation that was to become canonical for this regional tradition. This text-critical study lays bare the sophisticated strategies of translation used by a prominent early modern Muslim Bengali intellectual to invite others to his faith. Raj Balkaran is a scholar, educator, consultant, and life coach. For information see rajbalkaran.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

The Muhammad Avatāra: Salvation History, Translation, and the Making of Bengali Islam (Oxford University Press, 2021) reveals the powerful role of vernacular translation in the Islamization of Bengal.Its focus is on examines the magnificent seventeenth-century Nabīvaṃśa of SaiyadSultān, who lived in Arakanese-controlled Chittagong to affirm the power of vernacular translation in the Islamization of Bengal.  Drawing upon the Arabo-Persian Tales of the Prophets genre, the Nabīvaṃśa ("The Lineage of the Prophet") retells the life of the Prophet Muhammad for the first time to Bengalis in their mother-tongue. Saiyad Sultān lived in Arakanese-controlled Chittagong,in a period when Gauṛiya Vaiṣṇava missionary activity was at its zenith. This book delineates the challenges faced by the author in articulating the pre-eminence of Islam and its Arabian prophet in a place land where multiple religious affiliations were common, and when GauṛīyaVaiṣṇava missionary activity was at its zenith. Sultān played a pioneering role in setting into motion various lexical, literary, performative, theological, and, ultimately, ideological processes that led to the establishment of a distinctively Bengali Islam in East Bengal, while yet shaping a distinctively Bengali Islam. At the heart of this transformation of a people and their culture lay the persuasiveness of translation to refresh salvation history for a people on a new Islamic frontier. The Nabīvaṃśa not only kindled a veritable translation movement of Arabo-Persian Islamic literature into Bangla, but established the grammar of creative translation that was to become canonical for this regional tradition. This text-critical study lays bare the sophisticated strategies of translation used by a prominent early modern Muslim Bengali intellectual to invite others to his faith. Raj Balkaran is a scholar, educator, consultant, and life coach. For information see rajbalkaran.com.

The Muhammad Avatāra: Salvation History, Translation, and the Making of Bengali Islam (Oxford University Press, 2021) reveals the powerful role of vernacular translation in the Islamization of Bengal.Its focus is on examines the magnificent seventeenth-century Nabīvaṃśa of SaiyadSultān, who lived in Arakanese-controlled Chittagong to affirm the power of vernacular translation in the Islamization of Bengal.  Drawing upon the Arabo-Persian Tales of the Prophets genre, the Nabīvaṃśa ("The Lineage of the Prophet") retells the life of the Prophet Muhammad for the first time to Bengalis in their mother-tongue. Saiyad Sultān lived in Arakanese-controlled Chittagong,in a period when Gauṛiya Vaiṣṇava missionary activity was at its zenith. This book delineates the challenges faced by the author in articulating the pre-eminence of Islam and its Arabian prophet in a place land where multiple religious affiliations were common, and when GauṛīyaVaiṣṇava missionary activity was at its zenith. Sultān played a pioneering role in setting into motion various lexical, literary, performative, theological, and, ultimately, ideological processes that led to the establishment of a distinctively Bengali Islam in East Bengal, while yet shaping a distinctively Bengali Islam. At the heart of this transformation of a people and their culture lay the persuasiveness of translation to refresh salvation history for a people on a new Islamic frontier. The Nabīvaṃśa not only kindled a veritable translation movement of Arabo-Persian Islamic literature into Bangla, but established the grammar of creative translation that was to become canonical for this regional tradition. This text-critical study lays bare the sophisticated strategies of translation used by a prominent early modern Muslim Bengali intellectual to invite others to his faith. Raj Balkaran is a scholar, educator, consultant, and life coach. For information see rajbalkaran.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/south-asian-studies

The Muhammad Avatāra: Salvation History, Translation, and the Making of Bengali Islam (Oxford University Press, 2021) reveals the powerful role of vernacular translation in the Islamization of Bengal.Its focus is on examines the magnificent seventeenth-century Nabīvaṃśa of SaiyadSultān, who lived in Arakanese-controlled Chittagong to affirm the power of vernacular translation in the Islamization of Bengal.  Drawing upon the Arabo-Persian Tales of the Prophets genre, the Nabīvaṃśa ("The Lineage of the Prophet") retells the life of the Prophet Muhammad for the first time to Bengalis in their mother-tongue. Saiyad Sultān lived in Arakanese-controlled Chittagong,in a period when Gauṛiya Vaiṣṇava missionary activity was at its zenith. This book delineates the challenges faced by the author in articulating the pre-eminence of Islam and its Arabian prophet in a place land where multiple religious affiliations were common, and when GauṛīyaVaiṣṇava missionary activity was at its zenith. Sultān played a pioneering role in setting into motion various lexical, literary, performative, theological, and, ultimately, ideological processes that led to the establishment of a distinctively Bengali Islam in East Bengal, while yet shaping a distinctively Bengali Islam. At the heart of this transformation of a people and their culture lay the persuasiveness of translation to refresh salvation history for a people on a new Islamic frontier. The Nabīvaṃśa not only kindled a veritable translation movement of Arabo-Persian Islamic literature into Bangla, but established the grammar of creative translation that was to become canonical for this regional tradition. This text-critical study lays bare the sophisticated strategies of translation used by a prominent early modern Muslim Bengali intellectual to invite others to his faith. Raj Balkaran is a scholar, educator, consultant, and life coach. For information see rajbalkaran.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/indian-religions

The Muhammad Avatāra: Salvation History, Translation, and the Making of Bengali Islam (Oxford University Press, 2021) reveals the powerful role of vernacular translation in the Islamization of Bengal.Its focus is on examines the magnificent seventeenth-century Nabīvaṃśa of SaiyadSultān, who lived in Arakanese-controlled Chittagong to affirm the power of vernacular translation in the Islamization of Bengal.  Drawing upon the Arabo-Persian Tales of the Prophets genre, the Nabīvaṃśa ("The Lineage of the Prophet") retells the life of the Prophet Muhammad for the first time to Bengalis in their mother-tongue. Saiyad Sultān lived in Arakanese-controlled Chittagong,in a period when Gauṛiya Vaiṣṇava missionary activity was at its zenith. This book delineates the challenges faced by the author in articulating the pre-eminence of Islam and its Arabian prophet in a place land where multiple religious affiliations were common, and when GauṛīyaVaiṣṇava missionary activity was at its zenith. Sultān played a pioneering role in setting into motion various lexical, literary, performative, theological, and, ultimately, ideological processes that led to the establishment of a distinctively Bengali Islam in East Bengal, while yet shaping a distinctively Bengali Islam. At the heart of this transformation of a people and their culture lay the persuasiveness of translation to refresh salvation history for a people on a new Islamic frontier. The Nabīvaṃśa not only kindled a veritable translation movement of Arabo-Persian Islamic literature into Bangla, but established the grammar of creative translation that was to become canonical for this regional tradition. This text-critical study lays bare the sophisticated strategies of translation used by a prominent early modern Muslim Bengali intellectual to invite others to his faith. Raj Balkaran is a scholar, educator, consultant, and life coach. For information see rajbalkaran.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

The Muhammad Avatāra: Salvation History, Translation, and the Making of Bengali Islam (Oxford University Press, 2021) reveals the powerful role of vernacular translation in the Islamization of Bengal.Its focus is on examines the magnificent seventeenth-century Nabīvaṃśa of SaiyadSultān, who lived in Arakanese-controlled Chittagong to affirm the power of vernacular translation in the Islamization of Bengal.  Drawing upon the Arabo-Persian Tales of the Prophets genre, the Nabīvaṃśa ("The Lineage of the Prophet") retells the life of the Prophet Muhammad for the first time to Bengalis in their mother-tongue. Saiyad Sultān lived in Arakanese-controlled Chittagong,in a period when Gauṛiya Vaiṣṇava missionary activity was at its zenith. This book delineates the challenges faced by the author in articulating the pre-eminence of Islam and its Arabian prophet in a place land where multiple religious affiliations were common, and when GauṛīyaVaiṣṇava missionary activity was at its zenith. Sultān played a pioneering role in setting into motion various lexical, literary, performative, theological, and, ultimately, ideological processes that led to the establishment of a distinctively Bengali Islam in East Bengal, while yet shaping a distinctively Bengali Islam. At the heart of this transformation of a people and their culture lay the persuasiveness of translation to refresh salvation history for a people on a new Islamic frontier. The Nabīvaṃśa not only kindled a veritable translation movement of Arabo-Persian Islamic literature into Bangla, but established the grammar of creative translation that was to become canonical for this regional tradition. This text-critical study lays bare the sophisticated strategies of translation used by a prominent early modern Muslim Bengali intellectual to invite others to his faith. Raj Balkaran is a scholar, educator, consultant, and life coach. For information see rajbalkaran.com. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/islamic-studies

In part two, we focus on Chennaiyin FC, Kerala Blasters, East Bengal and Odisha FC. Then, there is the team of the years, most impressive and unimpressive events of the season and conversation on the national team! All things you don't want to miss.#indianfootball #football #letsfootball #isl #indiansuperleague #india #heroisl #kbfc #keralablasters #kerala #soccer #manjappada #ileague #backtheblue #bluetigers #bengalurufc #atk #keralafootball #indianfootballteam #fcgoa #footballindia #eastbengal #sunilchhetri #kolkata #heroileague #mohunbagan #fifa #jamshedpurfc #fanbannapadega #bhfyp #FCGoa, #Gaurs #Gaurarmy #Goa #Goanfootball #JamshedpurFC #JFC #OwenCoyle #Coyle #JamKeKhel #GKFC #GokulamKerala #RGPFC #RoundglassPunjab, #Md Sporting

Scott and Paul return and discuss the poor off-field behavior of East Bengal coach Robbie Fowler, plus discuss the issue of players 'giving back' after the twitter debate between Jay Bothroyd and Keisuke Honda about whether the Japanese superstar should return to the J.League. Plus we hear from respected Japanese commentator Ben Mabley on why, at age 54, Kazuyoshi Miura continues to play professional football and the cultural peculiarities of Japan that facilitate it.

About Franky BarretoFranky is an ex-professional footballer with an enviable track record.  He has represented top clubs in India for 12 years, including Salgaocar Sports Club, East Bengal Club, Churchill Bros Sports Club, and Vasco Sports Club. He has represented the Indian National team (between 1996-99) in the Nehru Gold Cup, SAFF Cup, Asian Games as well as for Goa University team, Goa State U-21 team, Goa State senior team, and Bengal State senior team on several occasions. His proudest achievement as a footballer was scoring a free-kick goal from 35 yards in the U21 finals against Bengal which Goa won 2-0 in 1993. His other proud moment was captaining Salgaocar in the 1997 Federation cup that won the championship in Kolkata defeating East Bengal in the finals.  This stunning Golden goal victory silenced more than 105,000 East Bengal supporters at the stadiumNow based in Dubai, Franky is working with the Association of Indian Football Coaches (AIFC and has helped groom over 45 young Indian Coaches.  Franky's love for the game is in his blood and one can see him play football three times a week. His unique skills are still evident. He spends the rest of his time with his wife and two children.Introduction to episodeIn this episode, we talk to former Indian football star and captain Franky Barreto. Franky is the recipient of the prestigious Kerkar Award and has played with some of the top Indian football clubs. He has also represented India in the Nehru Gold Cup, the SAFF cup and Asian Games and he works closely with the AIFC in grooming young Indian coaches.  In the episode, we delve into Franky's illustrious career as a football captain and now coach.Show highlights“Taking football as a career, especially in India, it's a gamble” - Franky Barreto“I was never thinking of becoming a football player, but growing up I definitely liked watching Maradonna, Franco Baresi, Paolo Maldini, I really enjoyed watching them play”. - Franky Barreto“I attribute my success to hard work, commitment and the support from my family” - Franky Barreto“Dare to dream big, be ambitious, and work hard, if you are destined you will definitely achieve success” - Franky BarretoUseful LinksLinkedin profile: https://www.linkedin.com/in/franky-barreto-60b38a26/?originalSubdomain=aeAIFC: https://www.facebook.com/watch/?v=219178529009182Articles featured inhttps://www.goal.com/en-ae/news/happy-for-east-bengal-making-it-to-the-isl-franky-barreto/1u5c1r9r1u7ep18r2jyywqxlhdhttps://gulfnews.com/sport/uae-sport/former-india-skipper-franky-barreto-hails-restart-of-german-bundesliga-1.71494500

"Stories of Bengali Hindus " is a group of Descendants of Hindu survivors from East Bengal who have made it a mission to tell the forgotten stories of Bengali Hindus that our liberal/communist intelligentsia and our education system tried to hide from us. I talk to them about the history of Bengali Hindus, the atrocities committed against them in the name of religion, how Bangladesh government discriminates against them, and the need to preserve Bengali Hindu culture.