Podcast appearances and mentions of jody freeman

In this Convo of Flanigan's Eco-Logic, Ted speaks with Professor Michael Gerrard from Columbia University. He is the founder and faculty director of the groundbreaking Sabin Center for Climate Change Law, and one of the foremost environmental lawyers in the nation. Michael is an advocate, litigator, teacher, and scholar who has pioneered cutting-edge legal tools and strategies for addressing climate change. He writes and teaches courses on environmental law, climate change law, and energy regulation. He was the chair of the faculty of Columbia University's renowned Earth Institute from 2015 to 2018 and now holds a joint appointment to the faculty of its successor, the Columbia Climate School.He and Ted discuss his background, growing up in Charleston, West Virginia in an immensely polluted area, which led to his interest in studying and protecting the environment. He moved to New York City to attend Columbia University, and has been there ever since. He started his career in journalism, later deciding to become an environmental lawyer, and then shifted to writing books and entered the world of academia. Before joining the Columbia Law School faculty in 2009, Michael practiced law in New York for three decades, most recently as the partner in charge of the New York office of Arnold & Porter. As an environmental lawyer, he tried numerous cases and argued many appeals in federal and state courts and administrative tribunals. He also handled the environmental aspects of diverse transactions and development projects and provided regulatory compliance advice to an array of clients in the private and public sectors. Several publications rated him the leading environmental lawyer in New York and one of the leaders in the world.He has also written or edited 14 books, including Global Climate Change and U.S. Law, the first and leading work in its field (co-edited with Jody Freeman and Michael Burger), and Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the United States (co-edited with John Dernbach). His 12-volume Environmental Law Practice Guide and four-volume Brownfields Law and Practice each received the Association of American Publishers' Best Law Book of the Year award.He highlights some of his most impressionable career cases, and shares that he is currently leading a legal effort to sue the Governor for New York, Kathy Hochul, for indefinitely pausing the rollout of congestion pricing in New York City. He also shares with Ted his work with the government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands on the legal issues caused by rising sea levels that threaten the island nation.

Jesse is on vacation until August, so this is a special, Rob-only summer episode of Shift Key.Over the past few weeks, the U.S. Supreme Court has profoundly changed how the federal government does its day-to-day work. In a series of landmark rulings, the high court sharply curtailed the ability of government agencies — including the Environmental Protection Agency — to write and enforce rules and regulations.That will change how the federal government oversees the products we buy, the air we breathe, and the water we drink. But it could also alter how the government regulates heat-trapping greenhouse gas pollution.But how, exactly, will these new rulings affect climate law? And is there an upside to the deregulatory revolution? This week, Rob holds a roundtable with two environmental law experts about what the high court's rulings mean for America's decarbonization project — and whether the court just inadvertently made the country's already burdensome permitting process even worse. They are Jody Freeman, a Harvard law professor and former Obama administration lawyer, and Nicholas Bagley, a University of Michigan law professor.This episode of Shift Key is hosted by Robinson Meyer, the founding executive editor of Heatmap.Mentioned: This year's four big decisions: Loper Bright, Corner Post, Jarkesy, Ohio v. EPAThe Supreme Court Is Slowly Breaking the EPAHow the Supreme Court Just Changed Climate Law, According to 9 LawyersThe Big Winners of This Supreme Court Term, by Nicholas Bagley Other important cases to know: • Massachusetts v. EPA established that the agency could regulate greenhouse gas pollution• West Virginia v. EPA codified “the major questions doctrine”--This episode of Shift Key is sponsored by …Watershed's climate data engine helps companies measure and reduce their emissions, turning the data they already have into an audit-ready carbon footprint backed by the latest climate science. Get the sustainability data you need in weeks, not months. Learn more at watershed.com.As a global leader in PV and ESS solutions, Sungrow invests heavily in research and development, constantly pushing the boundaries of solar and battery inverter technology. Discover why Sungrow is the essential component of the clean energy transition by visiting sungrowpower.com.Music for Shift Key is by Adam Kromelow. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

California has had a pivotal role in creating US clean car and clean air regulations under multiple administrations. In this episode, EELP Founding Director and Harvard Law Professor, Jody Freeman, speaks with Mary Nichols, former Chair of the California Air Resources Board and California's Secretary for Natural Resources, as well as former Assistant Administrator for EPA's Office of Air and Radiation. They discuss California's role in driving car and air emissions regulation, how automakers and market forces have evolved since the 1970s, and what may happen in the coming years under either election outcome. Transcript: http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Jody-and-Mary-episode-95.pdf

In April, the Environmental Protection Agency passed four new rules to reduce pollution from fossil fuel-fired power plants. One of the new rules requires many new gas and existing coal power plants to control 90 percent of their carbon pollution if they plan to operate beyond 2039. The other three rules specifically target coal, requiring the industry to clean up various parts of the value chain including toxic metal emissions from power generation, wastewater pollution, and coal ash management. And while the Biden Administration and other proponents consider the new rules a step in the right direction, opponents argue they will undermine the reliability of energy systems.    So, how will the EPA's new regulations impact the energy industry? What makes these standards different from previous attempts to regulate energy emissions? And how might opponents try to overturn them? This week host Bill Loveless talks with Jody Freeman about the technicalities of the new EPA power plant rules, and the legal avenues opponents might pursue to overturn them. Jody is the Archibald Cox professor of law and the founding director of the Harvard Law School Environmental & Energy Law Program. From 2009-2010, she served as a counselor for energy and climate change in the Obama White House. Jody has also previously served on the Advisory Council of the Electric Power Research Institute and as an independent director of ConocoPhillips.

A Supreme Court Poised to Gut the Administrative State | Should Bitter, Angry Justices in the Thrall of Billionaires and Corporate Power Decide What We Eat, Breath, How Long We Live and What Kind of World We Live in? | Testing US Foreign Policy Assumptions on the Brink of a Wider War in the Middle East backgroundbriefing.org/donate twitter.com/ianmastersmedia facebook.com/ianmastersmedia

The second half of the Global Stocktake panel chaired by David Sandalow is here. Laurence Tubiana, Sue Biniaz, Paul Ekins, Jody Freeman, Ian Parry, Richard Newell, Mandy Rambharos, Patrick Chandler, and David Simpson join to discuss the biggest successes and failures since the Paris Climate agreement, what the priorities for combatting climate change should be, and more. This material is distributed by TRG Advisory Services, LLC on behalf of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in the U.S.. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The second half of the Global Stocktake panel chaired by David Sandalow is here. Laurence Tubiana, Sue Biniaz, Paul Ekins, Jody Freeman, Ian Parry, Richard Newell, Mandy Rambharos, Patrick Chandler, and David Simpson join to discuss the biggest successes and failures since the Paris Climate agreement, what the priorities for combatting climate change should be, and more. This material is distributed by TRG Advisory Services, LLC on behalf of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in the U.S.. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The second half of the Global Stocktake panel chaired by David Sandalow is here. Laurence Tubiana, Sue Biniaz, Paul Ekins, Jody Freeman, Ian Parry, Richard Newell, Mandy Rambharos, Patrick Chandler, and David Simpson join to discuss the biggest successes and failures since the Paris Climate agreement, what the priorities for combatting climate change should be, and more. This material is distributed by TRG Advisory Services, LLC on behalf of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in the U.S.. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

The latest panel from the Road to COP 28 is here, featuring an incredible panel of guests chaired by David Sandalow. Laurence Tubiana, Sue Biniaz, Paul Ekins, Jody Freeman, Ian Parry, Richard Newell, Mandy Rambharos, and more join for a discussion on the global stocktake and its implications. Additionally, Allison Agsten sits down with the UAE Chief Climate Negotiator for COP27 and COP28, Hana AlHashimi, to get her perspective on the upcoming summit. With COP 28 beginning this week, tune in for this critical and timely episode. This material is distributed by TRG Advisory Services, LLC on behalf of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in the U.S.. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The latest panel from the Road to COP 28 is here, featuring an incredible panel of guests chaired by David Sandalow. Laurence Tubiana, Sue Biniaz, Paul Ekins, Jody Freeman, Ian Parry, Richard Newell, Mandy Rambharos, and more join for a discussion on the global stocktake and its implications. Additionally, Allison Agsten sits down with the UAE Chief Climate Negotiator for COP27 and COP28, Hana AlHashimi, to get her perspective on the upcoming summit. With COP 28 beginning this week, tune in for this critical and timely episode. This material is distributed by TRG Advisory Services, LLC on behalf of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in the U.S.. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The latest panel from the Road to COP 28 is here, featuring an incredible panel of guests chaired by David Sandalow. Laurence Tubiana, Sue Biniaz, Paul Ekins, Jody Freeman, Ian Parry, Richard Newell, Mandy Rambharos, and more join for a discussion on the global stocktake and its implications. Additionally, Allison Agsten sits down with the UAE Chief Climate Negotiator for COP27 and COP28, Hana AlHashimi, to get her perspective on the upcoming summit. With COP 28 beginning this week, tune in for this critical and timely episode. This material is distributed by TRG Advisory Services, LLC on behalf of the Embassy of the United Arab Emirates in the U.S.. Additional information is available at the Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

Harvard Law Professor and EELP's founding director Jody Freeman, speaks with Andy Mergen, director of Harvard Law's Emmett Environmental Law and Policy Clinic, about a case the US Supreme Court will hear this fall, Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo, in which petitioners have asked the Court to overrule the Chevron doctrine — a legal doctrine that governs when a court should defer to an agency's interpretation of a law. The case arises under the Magnuson–Stevens Fishery Conservation and Management Act, which authorizes requiring commercial fishing vessels to carry onboard observers, but the statute doesn't specify that the fishermen should pay for those observers. Jody and Andy talk about how the Supreme Court might cabin or overrule the Chevron doctrine, and what the case might mean for other environmental regulations and federal regulation more broadly. Transcript: http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/CleanLaw-88-transcript-8-23-2023.pdf Quotes: "The Chevron case involved a reading by the Environmental Protection Agency in the Reagan administration that was actually helpful to business, and allowed them some flexibility in updating facilities without having to get new permits under the Clean Air Act. Those were the facts of Chevron. It was viewed as a flexibility-enhancing interpretation, a deregulatory, business-friendly interpretation." –Jody Freeman [6:00] "I think that the folks who are advancing an anti-administrative state agenda are just worried that Congress has created a pretty robust environmental statutory regime, a pretty robust human health and safety regime, and the agencies are proceeding in good faith to implement Congress's goals there. I think that at this point in the game, folks who are anti-regulatory would rather detooth the professional staff in those agencies rather than abide by what really does appear to be a neutral doctrine on its face." –Andy Mergen [29:20] "This is a profoundly important tool for the lower courts, to get their handle on issues that they're confronting every day from agencies. It's a really, really important framework for promoting stability and rule of law values. I think we would lose a lot if we were overturning Chevron."  –Andy Mergen [48:10] "Even if you overturn Chevron, you can't avoid the fundamental problem, which is that Congress is giving agencies a job to do, and they need to have some flexibility interpreting their mandates" –Jody Freeman [53:55]

Welcome to my new Series "Can you talk real quick?" This is a short, efficiently produced conversation with an expert who will let me record a quick chat to help us all better understand an issue in the news or our lives as well as connect with each other around something that might be unfolding in real time.    Stand Up is a daily podcast that I book,host,edit, post and promote new episodes with brilliant guests every day. Please subscribe now for as little as 5$ and gain access to a community of over 700 awesome, curious, kind, funny, brilliant, generous souls NPR: "A Montana judge on Monday sided with young environmental activists who said state agencies were violating their constitutional right to a clean and healthful environment by permitting fossil fuel development without considering its effect on the climate. The ruling following a first-of-its- kind trial in the U.S. adds to a small number of legal decisions around the world that have established a government duty to protect citizens from climate change.   District Court Judge Kathy Seeley found the policy the state uses in evaluating requests for fossil fuel permits — which does not allow agencies to evaluate the effects of greenhouse gas emissions — is unconstitutional." I reached out to the founder and faculty director of the groundbreaking Sabin Center for Climate Change Law and one of the foremost environmental lawyers in the nation, Michael Gerrard is an advocate, litigator, teacher, and scholar who has pioneered cutting-edge legal tools and strategies for addressing climate change. He writes and teaches courses on environmental law, climate change law, and energy regulation. He was the chair of the faculty of Columbia University's renowned Earth Institute from 2015 to 2018.  For three decades, before joining the Columbia Law School faculty in 2009, Gerrard practiced law in New York, most recently as the partner in charge of the New York office of Arnold & Porter, where he remains senior counsel. As an environmental lawyer, he tried numerous cases and argued many appeals in federal and state courts and administrative tribunals. He also handled the environmental aspects of diverse transactions and development projects and provided regulatory compliance advice to an array of clients in the private and public sectors. Several publications rated him the leading environmental lawyer in New York and one of the leaders in the world. A prolific author, he has written or edited 14 books, including Global Climate Change and U.S. Law, the first and leading work in its field (co-edited with Jody Freeman and Michael Burger), and Legal Pathways to Deep Decarbonization in the United States (co-edited with John Dernbach). His 12-volume Environmental Law Practice Guide and four-volume Brownfields Law and Practice each received the Association of American Publishers' Best Law Book of the Year award. Gerrard is the former chair of the American Bar Association's 10,000-member Section of Environment, Energy, and Resources. He has also chaired the New York City Bar Association's Executive Committee and the New York State Bar Association's environmental law section. He has served on the executive committees of the boards of the Environmental Law Institute and the American College of Environmental Lawyers.  Gerrard also has taught courses at Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne, and the University of Malta. He has lectured on environmental law in Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Costa Rica, Denmark, France, Great Britain, India, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malta, the Marshall Islands, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Vatican City, and throughout the United States. He has worked with the government of the Republic of the Marshall Islands on the legal issues caused by rising sea levels that threaten the island nation. Follow Professor Gerrard on Twitter Pete on Tik Tok Pete on YouTube  Pete on Twitter Pete On Instagram Pete Personal FB page Stand Up with Pete FB page All things Jon Carroll  Follow and Support Pete Coe

Climate activists, including Khrizia Velacruz (center) of Oil & Gas Action Network, disrupt a June event in San Francisco featuring Jody Freeman, a board member of ConocoPhillips, the company behind the massive Willow Project oil drilling venture in Alaska. Photo by Erick Parker, courtesy of Climate Defiance. Over the past year, there have been a growing number of non-violent disruptive actions by climate activists across the US and beyond against politicians, business leaders, lawyers, etc who are linked to, or seen as, supporters of fossil fuel projects. We've seen activists shut down highways, throw soup and mashed potatoes at works of art, glue themselves to museum walls, blockade the White House Correspondents dinner, shut down Senator Joe Manchin's keynote address, and more. Direct action, of course, isn't a new thing. It has been around for as long movements for justice have been around. But what's new here is that in the climate arena at least, these actions are increasingly being led by young activists, many of whom are frustrated with the slow pace of climate action and are willing to put their bodies on the line in defense of the living world and their future. But are these disruptive tactics actually working? What role do they play within the greater environmental movement? To discuss these questions and more, Earth Island Journal editor and Terra Verde host Maureen Nandini Mitra talks with Khrizia Velacruz, a climate activist and an organizer with Oil & Gas Action Network, a group that focuses on strengthening alliances across the climate and environmental justice movement and building grassroots power. (Our other guest, Rylee Haught, the West Virginia-based cofounder of the youth-led direct action group, Climate Defiance, was, unfortunately, unable to connect during the live recording of this show.) The post Why Young Activists are Resorting to Disruptive Climate Action – June 30, 2023 appeared first on KPFA.

Harvard Law School Professor and EELP's Founding Director Jody Freeman, who is also an independent director of ConocoPhillips, speaks with Harvard Law School Professor Richard Lazarus and University of Wisconsin-Madison Professor of Law Steph Tai about the US Supreme Court's recent decision in Sackett v. EPA. They discuss how the Court's reliance on a dictionary definition of waters will drastically limit Clean Water Act protections: severely shrinking what qualifies as covered wetlands and streams, and as a result, enfeebling the federal government's ability to protect the larger water bodies the act still clearly covers. With a deep dive into the history of the Clean Water Act, the Supreme Court's prior decisions, and the science of watersheds, they put into context how the Sackett decision flies in the face of what Congress intended when it passed this landmark legislation. Quotes: “[I]f the Court uses a continuous surface water connection test, which is what they're moving towards, to traditional navigable waters required for wetlands, more than 50% of wetlands in some watersheds would no longer be protected by the Clean Water Act. With respect to streams: Ephemeral and intermittent streams would not be jurisdictional waters and thus more than 90% of stream length, in some watersheds, would no longer be protected by the Clean Water Act.” —Steph Tai [6:50] “… [W]e don't have to guess what the purpose of the Clean Water Act is, it's the very first section of the act, section 101, it says its purpose is to preserve the biological, physical, and chemical integrity of the nation's waters. That is the purpose of the statute. And unfortunately, what the court is done here, it's made it impossible to do that both to those waters that are now no longer covered themselves, which are important, and because their connection to the waters the court says are covered. So all sets of those waters will no longer be effectively protected by the statute. And when Congress did this in 1972, they did it deliberately. They deliberately decided we needed a national law, a comprehensive law. They deliberately defined the term navigable waters to mean waters of the United States as a broad term, and the accompanying legislative history said, we're doing that deliberately. We want to tap into the full scope of Congress's power under the Commerce Clause. So, they were intentionally not making this depend on traditional notions of navigability. And that's been the sort of the settled law. And now the court has turned back the clock.” —Richard Lazarus [13:45] “I felt a sense of disappointment there wasn't a dissent that really took the majority to task and chimed in about the danger of the Thomas-Gorsuch approach and view of the Commerce Clause... [L]urking here in the Thomas-Gorsuch concurrence is a very radical view of the Commerce Clause and what Congress can do and what it means for environmental law more generally.”  —Jody Freeman [42:50] “There is a real tone and tenor and attitude of real disdain for the enterprise of the agencies in these cases. For the job the government has been given by Congress in these statutes, a sense of the government is the enemy. The government imposes and impinges on liberty. There's a line in the Alito opinion, Richard, that says the Clean Water Act is a ‘potent weapon' and it has ‘crushing' consequences. Not, ‘there's a mission.' Congress gave the agency a mission to protect the waters of the United States.” —Jody Freeman [55:08] Transcript: http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/CleanLaw-86-final.pdf

EELP's Founding Director Jody Freeman, who is also an independent director of ConocoPhillips, and EELP's executive director, Carrie Jenks speak again with Jay Duffy, litigation director at Clean Air Task Force, and Kevin Poloncarz, a partner at the law firm Covington and Burling. Jody, Jay, and Kevin recently joined CleanLaw to discuss the Supreme Court's decision about the Obama Administration's Clean Power Plan, and now, with Carrie, talk about EPA's recently proposed greenhouse gas regulation for the power sector and their views on how EPA's approaches were shaped by both the Supreme Court's decision, West Virginia v. EPA, and Congress's enactment of the Inflation Reduction Act. Transcript available here http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Transcript-83-Power-Sector-Rule-Jody-Jay-Kevin-Carrie.pdf

Harvard Law Professor and EELP's Founding Director Jody Freeman, who is also an independent director of ConocoPhillips, speaks with Chet France, a former senior executive at EPA who oversaw the first national greenhouse gas standards for cars and trucks in US history. Jody and Chet analyze EPA's most recent proposal to update greenhouse gas emission standards for light-duty and medium-duty vehicles and discuss how the implementation of those standards might be impacted by subsidies and incentives in the infrastructure bill and the Inflation Reduction Act and future litigation. Mentioned links: Episode 65, Clean Car Rules with Jody Freeman and Chet France https://soundcloud.com/user-995691545/65clean-car-rules-with-jody-freeman-and-chet-france?si=db9f227fa1424e34a1a30e322212c7e1&utm_source=clipboard&utm_medium=text&utm_campaign=social_sharing EDF Joins Dozens of Other Leaders to Defend EPA's Clean Car Standards in Court: https://www.edf.org/media/edf-joins-dozens-other-leaders-defend-epas-clean-car-standards-court Transcript: http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/CleanLaw-81-Journey-to-the-electrification-of-the-transportation-sector.pdf

The Climate Bill Biden Signed Into Law Today is a Major Victory | The US Fought Two Wars To Protect the Saudi Regime, Now They Are Allied With Russia and China | An Update on the COP 27 Climate Talks Underway and an Alternative Approach to the Fight Against Climate Change backgroundbriefing.org/donate twitter.com/ianmastersmedia facebook.com/ianmastersmedia

Professor Jody Freeman speaks with Greg Dotson, an associate professor at the University of Oregon School of Law and recent Democratic chief counsel to the Senate Committee on Environment and Public Works. Jody and Greg discuss the climate and clean energy provisions in the Inflation Reduction Act and the potential implications for clean energy development and addressing climate change. For a transcript of this episode click here http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Jody-and-Greg-Dotson-IRA.pdf CleanLaw Production Team: Robin Just, Andy Dolph, Sara Levy, and Hannah Perls

The Climate Bill Biden Signed Into Law Today is a Major Victory | Did Trump Lose His Get-Out-Of-Jail Bargaining Chip With the Seizure of the Documents? | Did Trump's Lawyers Get Hold of Sensitive Software to Undermine Elections in the Name of Protecting Them? backgroundbriefing.org/donate twitter.com/ianmastersmedia facebook.com/ianmastersmedia

Professors Jody Freeman and Richard Lazarus and EELP Executive Director Carrie Jenks discuss the Supreme Court's decision in West Virginia v. EPA. They break down the majority decision, concurrence, and dissent, and discuss how the major questions doctrine could affect EPA regulations addressing greenhouse gases and other key regulatory priorities for the Biden administration. For a transcript of this episode see here: http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Jody-Richard-Carrie-WV-v-EPA-part-1.pdf CleanLaw Production Team: Robin Just, Andy Dolph, and Sara Levy

Jody Freeman of Grove Hill has been named to Southern New Hampshire University's Winter 2022 President's List. Full-time undergraduate students who have earned a minimum grade-point average of 3.700 and above are named to the President's List. Southern New Hampshire University (SNHU) is a private, nonprofit institution with an 89-year history of educating traditionalaged students and working adults. SNHU offers approximately 200 accredited undergraduate, graduate and certificate programs, available online and on its 300-acre campus in Manchester, NH.Article Link

Harvard Law professors Jody Freeman and Richard Lazarus discuss the Supreme Court case West Virginia v. EPA. The Court's decision in this case will address the scope of EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from the power sector, potentially impacting future EPA rules. For a transcript of this episode see here http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Jody-and-Richard-WV-v-EPA-transcript.pdf CleanLaw Production Team: Robin Just, Andy Dolph, and Sara Levy

Jody Freeman, the Archibald Cox professor of law and director of the Environmental and Energy Law Program at Harvard University, leads the conversation on global climate policy. FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the Winter/Spring 2022 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record, and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We're delighted to have Jody Freeman with us to talk about global climate policy. Professor Freeman is the Archibald Cox professor of law, founding director of the Environmental and Energy Law Program, and a leading scholar of administrative and environmental law at Harvard University. From 2009 to 2010, Professor Freeman served as counselor for energy and climate change in the Obama administration. She is a fellow of the American College of Environmental Lawyers, a member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, as well as a member of CFR. She also serves as an independent director on the board of ConocoPhillips, which is an oil and gas producer. Professor Freeman has been recognized as the second most-cited scholar in public law in the nation and has written extensively on climate change, environmental regulation, and executive power. So, Professor Freeman, thanks very much for being with us today. We just saw the release of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the IPCC, Sixth Assessment Report, that was quite pessimistic about the outlook on the future. Can you talk a little bit about that report and connect it to what we are going to see the effects on climate policy and what we need to be doing to really remediate what's happening in the world? FREEMAN: Well, thank you very much for having me. It couldn't be a more important or interesting moment to be having this conversation, and mostly I look forward to you, students, posing some questions and us having some back and forth. So, Irina, I will be as brief as I can in trying to really encapsulate what's going on now to set the stage for the discussion that I hope we will have. First, as you noted, the IPCC, which of course is the UN-established organization that since 1988 has put out periodic assessments of the science of climate change and their consensus-based assessments written by about six—about two hundred scientists from about sixty countries, so to give you a sense of the authority of the documents they've put out. This assessment was quite bleak, and really—I can read a couple of the top line conclusions to you, but the essential message is that climate change is accelerating. It has already been wreaking havoc and doing significant damage to human health, environment, and ecosystems. It is already causing and will cause increasingly devastating wildfires, historic droughts, landslides, floods, and more intense hurricanes. The long list of things that you all are witnessing around the world—think of the Australian fires, the California fires, the historic flooding we've seen here in the United States. The report basically says this will get worse if we continue without significant reductions in greenhouse gas emissions soon, beginning immediately, and cutting them quite drastically. There are many conclusions here about the need to accelerate the pace of our efforts, the need for the governments of the world to do more than they have pledged to do under the Paris Agreement, which we can talk about, which is the international climate agreement that the overwhelming majority of the world's countries have pledged, have made commitments to. And the U.S. has renewed its commitment to the Paris Agreement under the Biden administration saying that it will achieve 50 to 52 percent of emissions reductions here in the United States below 2005-levels by 2030. So a very significant upping of the U.S. commitment recently at the Conference of the Parties last year in Glasgow, Scotland. That agreement is the prevailing international agreement, but this report says it's not enough. Even if the countries of the world were to meet their pledges—and that's an open question—what the report essentially says is we need to do more, and so there's a consensus on the science. I don't think there can be reasonable disagreement about the science of climate change at this point. There is significant evidence that it is already happening, already changing the world's—the patterns that we have seen in, again, weather patterns, storms, floods, droughts, heat waves, and it is already threatening communities. The question now is, how do we close this gap between what the report—what the IPCC report is telling us is happening, the risks that the report is warning us about—how do we close the gap between that and what the governments of the world have agreed to do under the Paris Agreement? And I want to note just two other contextual developments here that make this problem even more challenging. One is what I think you're all very conscious of now, as we all think about daily, the war in Ukraine, and the fact that that is scrambling in the geopolitics of energy. Russia, as one of the world's top three suppliers of oil and gas, produces about 40 percent of Europe's natural gas, and now there are sanctions that the U.S. has imposed, and that other countries have announced they will gradually phase in, against Russian oil and gas supplies. The price of gas, as you may all have noticed the United States, is sky high. That's not just because of the war in Ukraine, but it hasn't helped. And attention has moved to what this war means not just for the devastating human consequences, but also what is it doing to the—how to encapsulate this—to the power relationships among the world's nations that are anchored in oil and gas, and how is it shifting the relative power of the oil-producing countries vis-à-vis each other. That conversation about how we're going to produce enough oil and gas to meet Europe's needs in the absence of or in the presence of sanctions against Russia, where are we going to get the extra supply from? In some sense, that conversation about the short-term need for what is admittedly fossil energy has edged out, has moved out of the main frame of the climate policy discussion temporarily. And the concern among communities, institutions, organizations, people who care deeply about climate change at the moment is, that edging to the side of the climate discussion is the wrong direction to go, is an unhelpful event. And especially in the United States where we now are looking at the dynamics in Congress to see if major climate investments will be part of a legislative package that the Biden administration has been advancing— the Build Back Better package—as the discussion is focused on Ukraine, the short-term need for oil and gas, who will produce and meet the extra demand, that conversation, the worry is it's not helping climate policy move forward in the United States. And as you all know, the Build Back Better bill has essentially been shelved, and there are ongoing discussions about which pieces of it might move forward. As time passes and we get to the United States' midterm elections, which are upon us very soon in the fall, the question is, will anything significant in terms of additional climate investments and climate policy come from the United States Congress? Or are they essentially done with the pieces they put into the big infrastructure bill that, as you know, was passed this past fall? The bipartisan infrastructure bill contained significant investments in things like electric vehicle infrastructure, grid investments, and other things that are beneficial for our climate policy. But as you all know, this is not nearly enough, and nothing regulatory went into the Infrastructure Act, and just to be clear about that, there was nothing in the bill that passed Congress in November that operated—that went through a process called budget reconciliation. This really was passed as a budgeting mechanism. Nothing in there regulates industry greenhouse gas emissions, and that's because regulation can't go in a budget bill. And what this means is, in the United States we are challenged now to put in place the policies necessary for us to meet our commitment to Paris, and the main vehicle left right now, if Congress remains fairly inactive, is using existing law like the Clean Air Act by which the Obama—listen to me, the Obama administration. I'm remembering my time in the Obama—the Biden administration can use existing law to regulate sector by sector by sector the greenhouse gas emissions that come from the power sector, that come from the transportation sector, that come from the oil and gas sector. That's what the Biden administration is right now doing. They're issuing regulations through agencies like the EPA to try to reduce greenhouse gas emissions across the economy on a sectoral and piecemeal basis. And what this all means is that a war is raging in the Ukraine that is refocusing attention on the need for short-term fossil fuels, while a longer-term discussion is happening about how to wean the world off fossil energy, and this dynamic is a very challenging, complicated dynamic in which to have both of those conversations simultaneously. The only thing I'd mention, before now turning to your questions, in addition, is that there is no small irony in the fact that this report that Irina cited, the new installment of the IPCC scientific assessment was issued essentially the day before the Supreme Court of the United States heard argument in a really important climate case in which what's at stake is the EPA—the Environmental Protection Agency's authority to set far-reaching standards to reduce our emissions from the power sector. And by all indications, the Supreme Court is poised to restrict the EPA's ability to set standards that would really force quite forward-leaning change, quite aggressive, ambitious change—speedier, deeper reductions from the electric power sector. It looks like the Court may well constrain the agency, and I can talk more about that for those who are legal eagles and want to know more. But the fact that that argument was heard the day after this report as sort of the juxtaposition of those two things was quite striking. So let me leave it there with these sort of broad observations about what's happening and turn to you all and see if we can dive deeper into some of these dynamics. FASKIANOS: Thanks a lot for that overview. You can all either raise your hand to ask your question, or you can write it in the Q&A box. So I'm going to first go to Babak Salimitari. Q: I had a question regarding the Paris climate accord. This is a non-binding agreement in which it seems like the United States is the only country going above and beyond to limit emissions and pollution and whatnot, but we're also the ones suffering the most. You have, like Germany building coal plants. China and India are extremely dirty, filthy countries, to put it bluntly. They admit they destroy environmental places, not just in their own country, but all over the world. But we're the one paying six bucks for gas. Oil is like a hundred dollars a barrel. FREEMAN: Yeah. Q: Things are getting very expensive and very annoying. So what's the point of this agreement if we're not reaping any benefits from it? FREEMAN: Yeah, I hear the question and—but let me add some perspective here. First of all, the ones suffering the most, it's not us. There are really serious consequences from warming temperatures for countries around the world that are already being inundated because their low-lying coastal populations are at risk. And they're much more vulnerable because we can afford adaptation measures, we can afford to respond to disasters, and we can afford to invest in resilience or adaptation, whereas many parts of the developing world cannot. They will be swamped. There will be massive migrations. There will be flooding, heat wave and tremendous suffering, and there already are some of these effects around the world. So I just add that perspective because I'm not sure it's quite right that we're the only ones or the ones who are suffering the most currently or that we will be in the future. We're actually, in the United States, fairly well-positioned, even if some of the worst risks we anticipate befall us. We're just a rich country compared to the rest of the world. I also would just comment that prices for gasoline are sky high here, and I understand that this is, as you say, annoying and quite difficult for folks who, you know, must purchase gas to get to work or must purchase gas in order to move around, they don't have an option. But I will say that in many parts of the world gas prices are much higher, and they're much higher in places like Europe and Canada and elsewhere because the governments have chosen to reflect in the price of gasoline more of the harms caused by burning fuel. In other words, they're internalizing the cost that otherwise people have to bear in terms of health consequences from burning gas, climate consequences, et cetera. So this is all me just saying gas may seem really high and I understand it, but actually many countries choose to impose high gas prices really as a signal to populations about the cost of being dependent on these fuels. But the point of your question, I think, is what's the value of the Paris Agreement? It's not binding, and why are we bothering to commit to do so much? And I will say we're not the only country to make a significant commitment. The EU countries have made significant commitments, even China. To put it in perspective, China's commitment to level off emissions by a deadline is important. There are very significant pledges that have gone toward this agreement, and the fact that they're nonbinding, I just want to shed a little light on that. You can say, well, it doesn't matter because nobody can force these countries to deliver on their pledges, and there is some truth to that. There's no grand international body presiding over this that comes knocking on the door of the world governments to say, you know, you said you'd pledge to reduce your emissions by X and you're not even close, so we're going to penalize you. There's no such international enforcement system. But it turns out that the format of the Paris Agreement—which is to make a pledge and then to periodically every five years have to do what's called a “stock take,” where the world countries come together and take stock of where they are in the progress—there are mechanisms to hold each other to account, that's the theory of the agreement; and that there are regular meetings of the parties called Conferences of the Parties that are meant to be the vehicle for forcing a kind of truing-up and disclosure of how far countries have come. Now that's an imperfect system, I will concede to you, but it is a big improvement over prior international climate regimes, which purported to be binding. But, for example, the Kyoto Protocol, the prior agreement to the Paris Agreement, only bound the world's developed nations, meaning the rich countries of the world, and the developing world, which was fast overtaking the developed world in the amount of emissions being produced—so think of China, think of India, Brazil, et cetera—they weren't part of the agreement. They had no obligation. So, while Kyoto was binding, it was binding on not the entire world, and it's not the even—who were soon to be the largest emitters, including China. So Paris is an inclusive agreement. China's in it. India's in it. Brazil's in it. Every country that's a significant share of the world's emissions is committed, so the inclusiveness of it is thought to be an important advance. Your question is still important. The proof is in the pudding. Are these countries going to come anywhere close to delivering on their pledges? But I guess what I would suggest is, we need an international vehicle in order to continue to press forward. And if the U.S. is in a leadership position in that international agreement, that's better for our chances than if the U.S. is not. The strongest position to be in is the U.S. and China together. When the Paris Agreement was signed, Obama and Xi combined forces and both supported it. China has now backed off. President Xi did not show up in Glasgow for the meeting personally, whereas the Biden—President Biden did. So now we're seeing a bit of a different approach. It's a very long answer, but that's because how these agreements work—their value, why they're an improvement or not over the prior—is actually quite complicated. FASKIANOS: Now the war in Ukraine and how China's going to align with Putin. FREEMAN: Yeah, I mean, this is really interesting—and I don't know if any of the students have a question about that—but everything is speculative right now. For example—I mean, in terms of how this will come out for China and China's relationship with the other powers of the world. China's in a very delicate position, and it may turn out that its alliance with Russia, depending on how that plays out, will leave it in a position of trying to look for opportunities build back relationships with the rest of the world, and it might turn out that climate policy is an opportunity to re-establish itself. And so we can't see how this will evolve, but a situation that looks at the moment like China's aligned with the bad actor—Russia in this case—may actually open up opportunities in the future for it to readjust its behavior, and climate may be one of those opportunities. Historically, the United States and China, even when tense relationships existed over trade policy and other things, cooperated on climate. It became an opportunity, especially in the Obama years when I was in the White House. We had a lot of good agreements with China around climate policy, both bilaterally and multilaterally. It was sort of an area—it was a bright spot of relations. That may turn back around and come back following this conflict. FASKIANOS: A written question from, let's see, Jackie Vazquez, who's in undergraduate school at Lewis University in Illinois, asking: Is there any possibility for all countries to come together to make a global movement to combat climate change? Would that even make a difference? FREEMAN: I think that the Paris Agreement is meant to be at least an instrument of a global movement to address climate change. But I think if you're talking about a political movement, that is people, not negotiators, representing governments, but populations and communities—I think we're seeing some of that. I mean, I think this generation, your generation, has really given voice to a real need for climate action faster. And I give a lot of credit to young people. I say this—it makes me feel 150 years old when I say this—but I think this generation, at least in the United States, it's taken the form of something called the Sunrise Movement and other youth movements. Of course, Greta Thunberg is the most famous young person putting a face on climate change, insisting that the older generations have let you all down, and I think there's something to that. I can understand your frustration, and I would feel the same way if I were younger that the people with the power have not taken the steps necessary when they should have taken the steps to mitigate a global problem. And I think that we're seeing movements all around the world; youth action all around the world. The problem comes in translating that political enthusiasm and political energy into policy, into laws and rules and requirements and incentives and subsidies and investments and inducements to change the trajectory to require over time—and quicker than—than many in industry want—require reductions faster, to translate it into investments from the private sector, because we need trillions of dollars of investments in low carbon technologies, in innovation. Translating that energy into real political action is the challenge. And I guess the one thing I'd say to you all is you have to vote. You have to put into power the people who support these policies, and you know, the youth vote is tremendously and increasingly important. So, in addition to activism, which is—which is critical, you want to vote in state, local, national elections at every opportunity. FASKIANOS: Earlier on, you talked about how the Supreme Court case is going to restrict the EPA trying to regulate. So there's a question from Nathaniel Lowell, who's at Skidmore College: Could you talk a little bit more about that Supreme Court decision, what that means for the Biden administration efforts to push forward within an act of Congress? You know, and what can be done? Because that's pretty significant, and certainly just putting in executive orders, the next administration could just roll back on those—roll those executive orders back. FREEMAN: Yeah. So here's what I'd say. First of all, I'm speculating a bit when I say the Court seems poised to restrict EPA's authority. I think most observers think that's what we got from oral argument. You know, we watched the oral argument, which is when the counsel for both sides—in this case, it was the government represented by the Solicitor General of the United States—that's how the government is represented in the Supreme Court—and the challengers from the state of West Virginia and about seventeen other states, Republican-led states, along with the coal and mining industry on the other side, arguing this case to the justices. And you know, you can listen to these arguments, by the way. You can go to SupremeCourt.gov and click on the audio portion of these oral arguments. It's fascinating. So I highly recommend and you can read the transcripts. And what we heard from the argument were the questions of the justices, the back and forth as the advocates were stating their positions, and basically, the petitioners in this case—that is, the mining industry, coal industry and the Republican-led states, including West Virginia—are basically saying the Environmental Protection Agency is overreaching. It's stretching its authority under the Clean Air Act too far, and the courts should read the language of the Clean Air Act narrowly and limit what they can do. And the government, the Biden administration, and the power sector petitioners—sorry, the power sector respondents—these are legal terms of art, but this describes who's on what side in the case—the power sector itself, this is the industry being regulated by these standards; this is the coal and natural gas plants across the country. The owners of the utilities that own these plants, they're the ones who are going to be regulated and required to cut their carbon pollution, and yet they are on the side of the Biden administration because they want to preserve EPA's power to set standards. They don't want this to be a free for all in which they get sued in a bunch of different lawsuits. They want a coherent, consistent, implementable, realistic, cost-effective set of standards, and they're prepared to make reductions. They want this done in an orderly fashion, and they don't want the Supreme Court making a mess of things by, for example, restricting the EPA so much that the agency won't take into account the reality of the power sector and how it works and allow them to average emissions—cut average emissions across their fleets; trade where it makes economic sense to trade emissions allowances. The industry wants all these flexibilities, and they're worried that the Court will be on too much of a mission to cut the agency's power, which will make the rules less economically sensible for the industry. So I hope that was an understandable explanation of what's at stake and how unusual it is that the industry being regulated is on the side of the government in this case, supporting the idea that the EPA has the authority to do this, and the consequences of the case here are quite significant. Because if the Court limits EPA, the bottom line is the standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions from coal and natural gas plants won't be as stringent as they could have been. They won't move as quickly as they could have moved, and the cuts won't be as deep as they could have been. And that's a loss—that's a loss of a tool we would have in our toolbox to cut emissions from the sector in our economy that is the second largest sector in terms of its emissions. So we want a robust program to control those, and Congress didn't pass one. And Congress doesn't look like it's passing one, so this is our second-best strategy. And if the Court crimps EPA so much that it limits the stringency, it's like losing some ability that you thought you had to constrain your domestic emissions, which means it's harder to fulfill our Paris pledge. That's the bottom line. The last thing I'll say—again, kind of a nerdy point, but for those of you who think about law and are interested in law—the Court should never have taken this case. You know, when—when people are unhappy with the decision in a lower court they can appeal to the Supreme Court. They ask the Court to grant review. Our Constitution requires that the Court only take cases where there is demonstrable harm or injury. You can't go to the Supreme Court and say, you know, I'm not injured, but I really care about this, can you—can you help me out? You have to be injured. In this case there is, actually, currently no rule regulating anybody in the power sector, no federal rule, because the prior administration's rule way back in the Obama days never went into effect. It was caught in litigation, and it was challenged in court. It never went into effect. And the Trump administration came in and repealed that and put out its own rule, which was a very minimal rule that did almost nothing to reduce emissions, and that got challenged and struck down by the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals. So, as a result, the bottom line people, there is no current federal rule regulating the power sector. Why would the Supreme Court take a case from West Virginia and other states and the coal industry complaining about something when nobody is being asked to do anything? There's no harm. So it's very unusual that the Court granted review in a case like that, and that is why many of us think they're eager to do something that will constrain the EPA's authority. I hope that made sense to folks. FASKIANOS: That was really helpful to clarify and give context to what's going on. Thank you for that. So Terron Adlam has written a question, but also has a hand up. So just ask it yourself and give us your university. FREEMAN: You know, I see my former chancellor, Chancellor Carnesale from UCLA where I started my career. I'm just thrilled to see his name there. That's great. Q: Hi there. FREEMAN: Hi. Q: Hi. So my question is, do you see any possibility of change of behavior of humans, especially during the global warfare/pandemic? I mean, ice caps are melting. Greenhouse gases are rising so much that—can we go past the differences, you think? FREEMAN: Yeah, I mean it's very interesting you say that Terron. I do think we talk an awful lot about how we need to require industry to do things and that's, of course, terribly important—you know, the auto makers and the oil and gas companies and the power plants and steel companies and how we do agriculture around the world. But in the end, there's demand for energy and we are the demand. I'm sitting here on Zoom consuming a bunch of electricity. I got professional lights that you can't see that are consuming a bunch of electricity. My phone is charging next to me consuming a bunch of electricity. And you know, I'm probably going to—well, I drive a Tesla—I'm lucky enough to have a Tesla, so I won't be consuming gas later. But my point is just we all pull on energy, and you know, no one of us can transform the situation. We can't accomplish the energy transition all by ourselves. But we can start thinking about the decisions we make, and we can start thinking about those implications and consequences. Your generation—I mean, I have a niece and nephew in their twenties, and I hear a lot about how nobody really wants a car anymore, apparently. I'm shocked at this, but there are generational shifts in how people think about consumption. Do you need your own vehicle or can you do ridesharing? Are we going to see ourselves in a world in the next fifteen, twenty years with autonomous vehicles that are electric vehicles, that we essentially share, at least in concentrated urban settings? These kinds of transformations, I think, are in part being driven by the demand from your generation. Likewise, I think as you build wealth—you guys will build wealth over time, right? You're getting an education, right, and that education is directly connected to your earning power. You will build wealth over time as a result of becoming educated, and when you build wealth, you'll have a decision about where to invest that wealth. And we see increasingly, social action investors, social commitments being made through people's investment decisions, and they say we want to put our wealth into these kinds of stocks, these kinds of companies, these kinds of enterprises and not over here in these other ones. And I think that is another kind of behavior—where you put your capital is going to be another kind of decision that can help spark change. So, from the lowest level, most local decision about what you consume and how you consume it to bigger decisions later in life about where you put your money, I think there's a lot of opportunity for you to make really consequential decisions. But I'm not somebody who believes that all of this will be fine if people just stop consuming energy because we all depend on energy, and we can't stop consuming energy. For some of us, we can make decisions about where we want to get it from. Some of us live in jurisdictions where we can choose, quote/unquote, “to pay a little more” to be assured of getting more renewable energy as the provider. Not all of us can do that, and so, really, you need your governments to act. This is the kind of problem at the kind of scale where all of our individual activity can't possibly be enough. I would say we have to do all of it. FASKIANOS: Well, I am going to go to Al Carnesale, your— FREEMAN: Oh! FASKIANOS: —your former chancellor. FREEMAN: My former chancellor! FASKIANOS: Your former chancellor and a CFR member. So, Al, over to you. Q: So we—since we traded places, I left Harvard to come to UCLA, you left UCLA to come to Harvard. FREEMAN: Yes! Q: Congratulations. So here's my question is about nuclear power. For a number of years environmental groups have been opposed to nuclear power largely because of the waste problem. And then they—in light of climate change, they sort of changed their view and became reluctant supporters. And then came Fukushima and they again opposed nuclear power. Now, as we look ahead with the additional problems you've been talking about that may stymie some of our plans to deal with climate change, where do you think we might be headed on the nuclear problem? FREEMAN: You know, it's interesting—well thank you and it's just delightful to hear from you and see your—see you again. Here's what I'd say. There's a domestic conversation about nuclear and there's a global conversation about nuclear. And of course, as you know, many countries in the world have made a big bet on nuclear. France has always been dependent on nuclear power, for example. China is investing heavily in nuclear power along with every other kind of energy because of their tremendous need as the population grows, and as they, you know, grow into the middle class. So there's a lot of opportunity for nuclear to be built, especially updated sort of smaller more modular reactors, the next generation of reactors all around the world, and I think we're going to see a lot of nuclear deployment. I don't expect to see it in the United States, and the reason I don't think we're going to see it is the legacy you've cited, which is this historical discomfort with nuclear, and the ambivalence that is felt in this country about nuclear and the sort of unwillingness to tolerate the risks that are perceived from nuclear. We haven't solved our long range—our long-term radioactive waste problem. You know, we never decided on Yucca Mountain or anywhere else to put the radioactive waste, so it's being stored on site for—in large measure. And I think there's still kind of a very local NIMBYism, a bad reaction to the idea of nuclear power. The challenge for us in the U.S. is right now nuclear provides about 20 percent of our electricity, and as these facilities are retired, where are we going to get that share of our electricity from? Will it be more renewable energy supported by natural gas for baseload? These are the questions if we lose even this relatively small share of nuclear that we have. The only other comment I'd make—and you may well know far more about this than me—but from my understanding of the cost comparison now, nuclear power, at least in the United States, is just far too expensive to build and not cost-competitive with the alternatives. Natural gas has been cheap because of hydraulic fracturing and horizontal drilling. There's sort of abundant natural gas reserves released from shale. It outcompetes coal, and renewables have dropped so much in cost that they are extremely cost-competitive, so I don't think nuclear competes in the American market, at least, this is what the experts have said to me. FASKIANOS: Al, given your expertise in this field, do you want to add anything? Q: It's not to add anything, it's to agree, largely. I think the catch is, how caught up are you in climate change? Because natural gas may be better than coal, but it's not better than nuclear. But it would have to be government-subsidized, which basically in France it's a national security consideration. So it would have to be subsidized as we subsidize many other things. FREEMAN: Right. Q: But I don't see it happening. I think—I was actually on the President's blue-ribbon commission, who tried to come up with a strategy for what to do about the waste. FREEMAN: Yeah. Q: And the strategy said it had to go someplace where the people agreed to take it. FREEMAN: Yeah. Q: And that's not—that's not happening. So I think your conclusion is right, but it is a tension for those of us who are concerned about climate change. FREEMAN: Yeah, it is a tension. And I think you rightly point out the evolution in thinking in the environmental community about this that initially opposed then, sort of, wait a minute, this is a zero-carbon source of energy and we should be for it. And you know, I—this is—for the students, you know, I always say to my students you can't be against everything. You have to be for something. You can't say, well, fossil energy, a disaster; nuclear energy, we're not interested in that, that's too risky et cetera, and all we want is wind and sun, when, at least currently without storage capacity, wind and sun alone without some support—this is in the electricity sector—wind and sun alone without some baseload support to regularly supply the energy when the wind isn't blowing and the sun isn't shining, you need something else. And that's what Chancellor Carnesale and I are talking about. What is that baseload? Is it going to be natural gas? Is going to be nuclear, et cetera? So you have to be for something, people, is the upshot of this exchange. FASKIANOS: Thank you. So I'm going to go next—there are two written questions from Kai Corpuz and Natalie Simonian, and they're both undergrads at Lewis University. I think they must either—must be focused at Lewis University or both taking the same course. Really talking about wealthy nations helping developing countries. Developing countries are not equipped with the funds to push for a green future. How are they supposed to participate in this? And you know, what is—what are the wealthy nations' obligation to help assist developing economies in dealing with climate change? FREEMAN: Yes, I mean it's a really good question. And of course, the developed world has an obligation to assist the developing world through technology transfer, with financial support. If the developed world wants other countries that have not had a chance to get as far in developing their economies yet, if they want their cooperation to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, they're going to have to make a contribution to support these countries in all these ways—financing, tech transfer, help with adaptation and resilience. And that commitment is part of the Paris Agreement, but it is true that the pledges that governments have made so far to produce annually billions of dollars for the developing world have not materialized to the level that was promised. So we are behind on that, and this is a significant problem. There is a very legitimate equity claim being made here, which is that the developed world has enjoyed economic growth. GDP has risen. We've all achieved a level of wealth and middle class. I mean, I'm talking on average for the developed world, obviously not everyone. We have tremendous income inequality in this country and around the world, but relatively speaking, our societies have evolved and become richer because of industrialization. We've already produced all our greenhouse gas emissions to achieve this level of prosperity, and the notion that now countries that haven't gotten there yet should just reduce their emissions to their own economic disbenefit, I think everyone agrees that is not a legitimate position to take without offering assistance and support. So I think the leading countries of the world understand this and agree to this. The question is, how do you operationalize this? How do you best support and help the developing world? Where are the investments best made? How do we make sure the governments of the world are held to their commitments and produce the money they promised to produce? And that is an integral part of the Paris Agreement process. So, you know, I don't want to suggest this is an easy problem, but I do agree the question is absolutely the correct way to think about this, which is we do have to help the countries of the world if we expect for us to achieve our climate mitigation and adaptation goals. FASKIANOS: Thank you, I'm going to go next to a raised hand from Sally Eun Ji Son, I believe at Columbia. Q: Oh, yeah. Hello. My name is Sally. I'm currently at Stanford engineering and an incoming PhD student at Columbia in the Political Science Department. And sort of relevant—related to, like, how different countries are in different stages, what I've noticed, as someone between Gen Z and Millennial—what I've noticed is that I, as an individual, like to take environmentally-conscious decisions. Yet, there's some—there's sort of this, like—a debate going on, like your action will not do anything to the Earth, your action will not do anything to climate change. And when I sort of encounter those debates, how should I navigate myself? Like, should I say it's maybe not a direct environmental effect, but it could be a symbolic effect, political effect? Sort of, like, how do I navigate that individuals could also have power or, like, have a stance or position in shaping climate policy around the world? FREEMAN: Well, first of all, I applaud you for engaging in those debates, and you know, sometimes when we come up against viewpoints that we don't agree with, we run away because we're not interested in engaging. And I would just encourage you all to engage, and I mean in the most respectful way. I'll get to the heart of your question, but it just gives me this opportunity to make this one pitch to you. So allow me—indulge me in making this one pitch to you about engaging in the way you're suggesting. You know, my law students what I ask them to do is in the classroom if they hear something they disagree with, sometimes very strongly, I ask them to put it at its highest—in other words, make it the best version of that argument before you criticize it. So, if somebody didn't make the best version of their argument and it's easy to take them down, actually elevate it and say, I think—I think what you're saying is this, and then what I'm hearing is this and give it the best, most legitimate form you can, and then engage with it on the merits, not them as a person. You don't attack them as a person, but say here's where I think differently. Here's my perspective on these issues. So just the idea that you're prepared to go back and forth on this, I think, is very laudable, and I encourage you to do it in that very respectful way. And you may not convince people of your point of view, but you may give them something to think about. And so what I'd say is—a little bit following on my earlier comment—that individual action can be impactful cumulatively, of course it can. If an entire community makes a decision to compete in their consumption of energy—you know there are these competitions among neighborhoods to be more energy-efficient. You know, you get this little notice in the mail that says your home is good compared to your neighbors, and your home is—in some communities this works. It actually promotes competition. In other communities it annoys them. It really depends on the politics of the community. But the point of this is just to say, communities are just—it's just a cumulative set of individual actions, right? So I do think there's something to changing individual behavior, and if lots of people do that, that makes a difference. So I don't accept the idea that nothing you do matters, so don't do anything. I mean, that argument is a recipe for never doing anything about anything. That is a large problem—because your share is necessarily small, so why should you change, and that, to me, is an excuse for inaction and apathy so that can't be the right argument. But you can accept that individuals alone, even aggregated behavior alone, can't change the world's energy systems, that the scope and scale of that challenge—that's a hundred-year challenge that requires the governments of the world to lead. So you can talk about the individual difference you can make, but that's not enough, right? And all of these things have to be done at the same time, and they fit together. You know, local, national—state level, national, global, this all must be done at the same time. That's the scope and scale of this problem. It's a really—climate is a really hard problem because the world's energy system is important for everything from our economic prosperity to our national security, and you can't transform the world's energy system overnight without affecting—first of all, you can't transform it overnight no matter what you do. But even as we transition, we have to think about national security implications, which is what the Ukraine war makes us do. There are geopolitical implications to how energy moves around the world, and who has energy power around the world. And as we shift to a different energy profile, those the power dynamics will shift, and we need to think about that. You know, we need to make sure that the United States has an energy policy that is strategically in our interest, and you can't think about climate without thinking about that. Likewise, you can't think about climate change without thinking about economic development and—and the flourishing—the ability of societies to flourish. So—and you can't think about it without thinking about equality and equity and justice. So it's a really hard problem, but that's why it's so fascinating to learn about. FASKIANOS: Thank you, the next question is from Chaney Howard, who is a senior honors international business major at Howard University. Going back to the war on Ukraine, how do you feel the argument for infrastructure development can be introduced into this conversation as new strategies and allegiance pledges are emerging? FREEMAN: I'm not sure I fully understand that. Can we have a little bit of clarification? FASIKANOS: All right, Chaney, are you able to unmute yourself to clarify, because I can't divine from the written question. Q: Can you hear me now? FREEMAN: Yes, excellent. Q: OK, perfect. So my question is really surrounding ways that the conversation can be a little bit more direct. So you mentioned how there needs to be a development of infrastructure for overall environmental, like, sustainability, and you were talking about electric cars— FREEMAN: Right. Q: —and just kind of having that conversation with global powers. And so I'm curious how you think—now that we're in this transitional period and some of the nations that are supporting Ukraine are working to develop new strategies and new partnerships, what are ways that we can encourage the government and then the global commerce centers to kind of establish those new strategies for environmental sustainability? FREEMAN: So I'm not a 100 percent sure how Ukraine fits there. But let me talk more generally about this idea of infrastructure and investment because I think what the IPCC report that we were talking about that's projecting climate-related risks and saying what's necessary to do in order to avoid them and what the Paris Agreement represents and what I think the current conversation around what's necessary tells us—the strong message from all of these vehicles and processes and meetings, the strong message is we need massive investment from the private sector and government combined in partnership into what the new energy system of the globe has to look like. Meaning, you have to build the power plants of the future. You have to support commercial-scale renewable power. You have to build the charging infrastructure to electrify the transportation fleet to the extent possible. You have to build a modern grid, not just in this country but all around the world, that is capable of supporting the level of electrification that we need. Because to move sectors like transportation off oil and gas, you're going to need—off oil, rather—transportation is mostly dependent on oil—you're going to need to power them differently, and right now we're thinking of mostly powering cars and many trucks from electricity, which means fortifying the nation's and the globe's grids. All of that is infrastructure. All of that requires investment. And there are massive R&D investments, you can imagine, necessary in the low carbon technology of the future. Hydrogen—eventually producing green hydrogen as a fuel source. There are techniques for removing carbon from—direct air capture. Carbon from the atmosphere, things like direct air capture. Or, you know, other carbon removal technologies, they're controversial but they may be necessary. Carbon capture and sequestration, putting it underground, carbon dioxide underground—again, controversial. But if any of these future low-carbon technologies or remediation techniques are going to succeed, they will require trillions of dollars of investments. So, the kind of level of investment that people are talking about—I'll just give you an example. At the latest COP meeting, the Conference of the Parties, meeting in Glasgow, Scotland, which is—these meetings are part of the international process of updating and checking in on the Paris Agreement. The world's biggest companies and financial institutions came together, and 5,200 businesses pledged to meet net-zero carbon emissions by 2050 and 450 banks, insurers and investors representing $130 trillion in assets. Those are the assets they invest, which is 40 percent of the world's private capital. And I'm giving you all these numbers because I want to impress you with the scale of the commitments you're seeing from the private sector, from banks and lenders, investors and businesses. They committed to making their portfolios climate neutral by 2050. My point is there is a lot of activity in the private sector, both committing to net-zero goals themselves and also committing to investing capital, big money, trillions of dollars—up to $9 trillion annually is what is projected to be needed, that's $105 trillion over thirty years. That's how much money we need to put into the infrastructure you're talking about, the new—next generation energy infrastructure. All of the things I've discussed—the future of power plants, the future of transportation, new breakthrough technologies, new remediation techniques, new resilience—all of this requires massive investment. And the governments of the world and the private sector are nowhere near what they need to do combined to pull off what amounts to a moon-shot kind of level of investment. So this is a long answer, but it's a way of saying the infrastructure we're talking about in a really concrete way is the energy system of the future, and it's going to require a massive level of investment. FASKIANOS: Thank you. We're going to go next to William Naeger, who is a law student at Washburn University. Q: Hi. Yeah, like she said, I'm at Washburn Law School. I'm wondering if your impression is that these kinds of issues will continue to mainly be governed internationally by COP or the Paris Agreement? Or, if over time, as it becomes more and more extreme, whether it will just become one factor in, like, national security and trade agreements and migration issues and kind of just run through everything else that we do already? FREEMAN: Well, I think this is very astute of you, because, in fact, I think climate change as a global challenge has actually come into the mainstream of all of these other fields. I do think that it is part of the discussion around national security. I do think that climate is part of the discussion around trade and that it will become more embedded and more central to these other domains over time. And I think that—people talk a lot about how we could pair climate commitments of countries with trade measures that countries— the trade relationships that countries have with each other. And people talk, for example, about eventually having countries pledge to reduce their emissions, and if they don't reduce them, they may suffer a border tariff on goods that are produced in countries that don't have climate policies, that impose costs for greenhouse gas emissions. So they'll have to—there'll be a tariff or a border tax on goods that are basically being produced and sold cheaper because they're not subject to carbon constraints. That's a merging of climate and trade policy that we may well see over time. Likewise, I think we're learning to talk. We're not there yet entirely, but we're learning to talk about national security and climate together. Climate is really a national security issue. And you saw the Department of Defense and its reports and testimony to Congress from members of the military who are frequently called on to testify about the impact of climate change on the—they will acknowledge that climate change is a threat multiplier for the military and it's a national security issue. Likewise, when we talk about the Ukraine conflict, the war, and we talk about the need to supply the world with oil and gas in times like this when one of the largest suppliers is engaged in very bad action and being sanctioned for it, how do we meet those short-term energy needs but stay on path with our climate goals? That's a very hard thing to do. You have to be able to talk about the short-term, the medium-term, the long-term all at the same time. So I think your question is very smart in the sense that you understand that climate has to become embedded in all of these other fields and conversations, and I think that's already happening. The Biden administration, I think, to its credit has announced what it calls a whole of government approach to climate, and I think it's trying to do basically what you're talking about, which is say the entire federal government that the Biden administration runs, right, say to all the agencies across federal government—from financial regulators like the Securities and Exchange Commission, which makes sure that markets are open and transparent and investors have the right information—even the financial regulators are saying, listen, companies, if you want to trade on this exchange, you better disclose your climate-related risks so investors can make decisions that are appropriate. That's bringing climate into financial regulation. And so the Biden administration has basically said this issue should appear and be relevant to all the things we do. And so I think we're seeing what you're talking about happening to a greater extent, more and more. FASKIANOS: So, Jody, we're at the end of our time. There are a lot of questions that we could not get to, and I apologize for that. Just to sum up, what do you think we all should be doing at the individual level to do our part to affect change and to help with the climate change crisis? FREEMAN: Well, like anybody who's had media training I'm going to not answer your question and say what I want to say anyway, which is— FASKIANOS: Perfect. (Laughs.) FREEMAN: —yeah—because I actually think I've talked a little bit about what we can all do and why it makes sense to take individual action. But what I think I would say, rather, is just I know that there is a lot of reason for pessimism, and I really understand it. And I certainly sometimes feel it myself. I mean, you know, you guys have been through a very, very tough time—a global pandemic, which has been just an awful experience, scary, and disorienting. And you're doing it while you're trying to go to school and live young lives, and that's been hugely disruptive. You now see this war in Ukraine, which is deeply, deeply upsetting, a horrific assault on the Ukrainian population, and you're living at a time when you think climate change is a major challenge that, perhaps, the governments of the world aren't up to. And you see a divided country and, in fact, divisions all around the world and threats to democracy, and restrictions on voting rights. I see what you see, and I can see why you would be upset and worried. But I also want to suggest to you that things are also changing, and there are lots of opportunities for good things to happen. And there's a tremendous amount of innovation and creativity on all kinds of low carbon technologies. There are innovations all the time that open up possibilities. Just look at what's happened with solar power and wind power, renewable power over time. The costs have dropped. The potential for wind and solar has increased exponentially. That's a very hopeful thing. So technology change is very promising. There's a possibility to affect politics in a positive direction. I encourage you to affect politics—this sort of answers your question, Irina. So affect politics in a positive direction, be active, be engaged, because you can effect change by—through activism and through voting. And I also encourage you to pursue professions where you can make a mark. I mean, you can make a difference by engaging with these issues from whatever professional occupation you choose. You can engage with one or another aspect of these challenges of climate, energy, national security. So I have reason for optimism. I think, as frustrating as it is to say, well, the Paris Agreement isn't enough, there's another way to look at it, which is there is an international agreement on climate change. It does have a level of ambition that is an initial step and can be built upon, if we can keep the structure together, if the U.S. continues to lead and look for partners in leading along with the EU. Maybe China will come back to the fold eventually. In other words, things change. Stay tuned, be engaged, and stay optimistic because I, frankly, think there is tremendous opportunity for your generation to engage with these issues in a really constructive and transformative way. And that is where I would leave it. FASKIANOS: Thank you so much, and I'm glad you left it there. It was a perfect way to end this webinar, and thanks to everybody for joining. You should follow Jody Freeman on Twitter at @JodyFreemanHLS, so go there to see what she continues to say. Our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, April 6, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Time. We'll focus on China, India, and the narratives of great powers. And in the meantime, I encourage you to follow us at @CFR_academic and, of course, go to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. So thank you again, and thank you, Professor Freeman. (END)

Rose Gottemoeller, the Steven C. Házy lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation in Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and research fellow at the Hoover Institution, leads a conversation on international security and cooperation. FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the Winter/Spring 2022 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record, and the video and transcript will be available on our website at CFR.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted and honored to have Rose Gottemoeller with us today to talk about international security and cooperation. Rose Gottemoeller is the Steve C. Házy lecturer at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and its Center for International Security and Cooperation. She is also a fellow at the Hoover Institution. From 2016 to 2019, she served as the deputy secretary-general (DSG) of NATO, where she advanced NATO's adaptation to the new security challenges in Europe and the fight against terrorism. And before that, she served as the undersecretary for arms control and international security at the State Department. In 2009 and 2010, she was the assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification, and compliance, during which time she served as chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russian Federation. So, Rose Gottemoeller, thank you very much for being with us. I can't think of anybody better to have this conversation with us than you. When we planned this webinar, we knew it was the sixtieth anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but what we did not know was Russia would invade Ukraine and that there would be a war going on. So perhaps you can put this in context, talk about the lessons learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis, and where we are now, given what's going on in Ukraine. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you so much, Irina. And it's wonderful to be with you, and with everyone who was able to join us today from across the country. I know there are many impressive institutions who are dialing in, and I really appreciate the chance to have a conversation with you and look forward to talking with the students and hearing what your questions are as well. Let me indeed begin talking today about the Cuban Missile Crisis, which happened sixty years ago this coming October. It was a time—I was a fourth grader at the time. And I remember, I was going to a Catholic school in Dearborn, Michigan. And the nuns said to us: You really must get home quickly tonight, children, there might be a nuclear war. You need to be with your parents. None of us knew exactly what was going on, but we knew that nuclear war was a really bad thing. We'd been through many drills, hiding under our desks or out in the hallway with our head between our knees. I have to tell you, even as a third grader, during one of those drills I thought to myself: If we get hit by a nuclear weapon, putting my head between my knees is not going to help one bit. So even as a third grader, I knew that nuclear weapons were weapons of mass destruction. So, we did manage to solve that crisis, with a secret deal, as it turned out. President Kennedy agreed quietly to withdraw intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Turkey. Never made public, until much later. And Khrushchev agreed to withdraw what were equivalent missiles from Cuba. And we got back to the negotiating table. In fact, the Cuban Missile Crisis dealt not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but other countries around the world, what I call a short, sharp shock. We recognized how devastating would be the effect of nuclear war, and we decided we really did need to talk together about how we were going to control and limit those risks. So, it led to a blossoming of negotiations on all kinds of limitations and controls. First, the Limited Test Ban Treaty. It was a test ban on nuclear testing in the atmosphere that was very quickly agreed after the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy gave an important speech at American University in June of 1963, when he said we really must control this most dangerous of weapons. And he proposed at that time a test ban treaty limiting testing in the atmosphere. And that was agreed rather quickly. It's amazing to me, as an arms control negotiator, that that treaty was then agreed by August of that very year. So record time. The U.K. also joined in those negotiations. But one thing that's very interesting, the Limited Test Ban was the first, I would say also, environmental arms control treaty. It was inspired by the fact that countries around the world and publics around the world were recognizing that testing in the atmosphere was producing a lot of strontium-90 and other radioactive pollutants that were getting into the food supply. Again, I remember from that period my own mother saying, “We've got to be worried about the milk we're drinking because it's got strontium-90 in it from testing in the atmosphere.” So even then, there were some environmental pushes that led to, I think, in part the quick negotiation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. After that, we went to the step of controlling tests also under the sea and underground, starting with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, that did not enter into force until the early 1990s. It was a long negotiation, but it was negotiated through that period of the 1960s into the 1970s. We also negotiated what has been the foundational document of the nonproliferation regime: the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). That was negotiated through the late 1960s and entered into force in 1972. It did basically designate five nuclear weapon states. These days they are U.S., U.K., France, China, and Russia. But at that time, those nuclear weapon states were the only states that would be permitted to possess nuclear weapons. All other states around the world would give up their right to nuclear weapons. But there was a grand bargain there. The nuclear weapon states agreed to proceed with total nuclear disarmament, under Article 6 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and in return for which the non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT would, again, not build their own weapons. They would prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. And everyone would work to promote peaceful uses of the atom, whether in nuclear energy, or agriculture, manufacturing, mining industry, et cetera, promoting—or medical uses as well—promoting peaceful uses of the atom. So those are what are called the three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses. So that was agreed in 1972. And working in that multilateral way was important, but there was also an impetus given in this commitment to disarmament for the United States and the Soviet Union to get together and to begin to negotiate bilaterally the two together on limiting their nuclear weapons. We built up a tremendous nuclear arsenal during the Cold War years. At the time that we were beginning to talk to the Soviets about limiting nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon delivery systems, missiles and bombers, submarines—at that time, in the late 1960s, we had about 32,000 nuclear warheads, if you can imagine that. And the Soviets built up their stockpile to be about 40,000 nuclear warheads. So there were tremendous numbers of nuclear weapons being held in storage, but there were also tremendous numbers that were deployed. So we worked steadily from that period, the 1970s into the 1980s, to try to limit nuclear weapons. Didn't work so well. There are various reasons why. Most specifically, I think, we were just driving harder and harder with more effective missiles to deploy more warheads on those missiles. And so, by the time we got into the 1980s, we had about 12,000 warheads deployed on missiles and deployed or designated for deployment on bombers. The Soviets the same, about 12,000. Now, remember those numbers I gave you, 32,000 total, 40,000 total in the USSR. We held a lot of weapons in storage, not on top of missiles, not on top of delivery vehicles, as we called them. They were just held in storage. But we also then had 12,000 deployed on missiles and pointed at each other in a very high-readiness state. So we had got through the 1970s and 1980s not blowing each other up, but we also didn't have much success limiting those systems because there was this technological jump ahead, being able to put more warheads on individual missile systems. So, that's when Reagan and Gorbachev entered the scene. In the mid-1980s they got together. Reagan had not been very easy on the USSR when he came into office. He declared the USSR the “evil empire.” And he drove hard military modernization that included some nuclear modernization as well. The sclerotic Soviet leadership at that time, they were dying off one by one. First it was Brezhnev, then it was Andropov, then there was a third fellow. They all went very, very quickly. And Gorbachev took over in the mid-1980s. And he and Reagan actually then got together and began to talk about how they might reduce—not try to limit, because limit wasn't good enough. The technology was always pushing ahead. But how could we actually begin to reduce nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and the missiles we put them on? So that was the negotiations that began in the 1980s for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and also the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which finally entered into force in 1994. And that treaty, once again, took the number of deployed warheads on both sides down from 12,000 deployed warheads on each side to 6,000 deployed warheads on each side. If you think about one of these warheads, a single warhead is enough to destroy a city. It's nothing like what we're seeing in Ukraine today. Sadly, such horrible destruction and the really barbaric attacks on civilian targets like this maternity hospital yesterday. I'm just heartbroken about this, as I'm sure many of you are. But that was a big bomb that was really directed at a single facility and was very destructive. But if you can imagine a nuclear weapon, that could really pulverize—pulverize—the center of a city. And that's what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, when the United States was the only country to use nuclear weapons in wartime. And that is what has led to this nuclear taboo that has been pretty clear, because it was recognized these are weapons of mass destruction. They completely pulverize, and many, many lives lost. And those who are left living, as it was said at the time of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would envy the dead because of the severity of their injuries. So, people were recognizing that we had too many deployed warheads. We had 12,000 pointed at each other on a high state of alert. So getting them down to 6,000 on each side was important. That was the goal of the START treaty. Then in the early 2000s, in 2002, President Bush and President—believe it or not—Putin at that time decided in the Moscow Treaty on a further reduction. That took us down to 2,200 deployed warheads on both sides. And then the treaty that I worked on negotiating, the New START treaty in 2009 and 2010, took us down to 1,550 deployed warheads on both the U.S. and Russian sides. So 12,000 down to 1,550. That's a pretty good disarmament record. And it all sprang from that short, sharp shock of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Now, sixty years later, it's a tragedy, but we seem to be facing another crisis on par with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Vladimir Putin has been rattling the nuclear saber. We are very concerned, not necessarily about a big nuclear exchange between the United States and the Russian Federation, but about some smaller strike, perhaps use of a nuclear weapon on Ukrainian territory, perhaps a so-called demonstration strike, where Russia would launch a nuclear explosion over the Black Sea, for example, just to prove that they're willing to do it. And so, at the moment, we are facing these nuclear threats out of the Kremlin with a lot of concern, but also very serious attitude about how we sustain and maintain nuclear deterrence at this moment of supreme crisis in Ukraine, and ensure that we continue to deter Russia from taking these disastrous actions with weapons of mass destruction. But also think about ways—how can we go forward from here to preserve what we have achieved in these sixty years since the Cuban Missile Crisis. This great foundation of big nuclear international regimes that we have been able to put in place—such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, that means the only country that has tested nuclear weapons in this century is North Korea. There is a taboo against nuclear testing that is strongly held, the taboo against nuclear use has held since Hiroshima and Nagasaki over seventy-five years ago. And now, we are looking at ensuring that we sustain and maintain the Nonproliferation Treaty regime so that we do not see a lot of new nuclear weapon states emerging across the globe. Just one thing I forgot to mention—President Kennedy spoke quite a bit about these things. I think the Cuban Missile Crisis really for him personally was a big shock, and really provoked his thinking quite a bit—but he said, “We need this Nonproliferation Treaty because otherwise we're going to end up with twenty, twenty-five nuclear weapon states around the world. And that will be hugely destabilizing.” So the Nonproliferation Treaty regime, although we pay attention to the rogue states, the DPRKs [Democratic People's Republic of Koreas], the Irans, of course. It looks like we may be now returning to the Iran nuclear deal. I certainly hope so. We also need Iranian oil at this moment, which is another matter. But we have a couple of nuclear rogues out there. But, in general, we have prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons, thanks to the Nonproliferation Treaty regime. We need to do everything we can at this moment to preserve and protect these important big regimes. And that goes not only for nuclear, but also the so-called other weapons of mass destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention bans the use of chemicals in wartime. Not only chemical weapons, that is chemical designed to be used as weapons, but also what we've been seeing in Syria, the use of chlorine gas in wartime. That is forbidden by the Chemical Weapons Convention as well. So we need these big regimes to continue—the Biological Weapons Convention, the same. So I really wanted to stress this point as we get to our discussion period, because it's going to take a lot of attention and effort if Russia is now turning its back on playing a responsible role in the international community. If Russia is turning into a very big pariah state, as I argued yesterday in a piece in Foreign Affairs, we need to figure out what we are going to do, losing Russia as a partner. Because Russia has actually been a great player in negotiating all these treaties and agreements. But if Russia is turning its back on a responsible role in the international community, then the United States has to look for other partners. I would argue that we should be really approaching Beijing. They are, after all, a nuclear weapon state under the Nonproliferation Treaty. And historically they have been a rather responsible nuclear weapon state under the Nonproliferation Treaty, joining in efforts to advance the goals of nuclear disarmament. So it's hard, because at the moment, as you know, Beijing and Washington have been at great odds over any number of issues—Taiwan, trade and investment, human rights with the Uyghurs. So many issues we've been at odds over. But I think the moment has come where we need to think about how we are going to preserve these weapons of mass destruction regimes, the nuclear regimes, the testing—the ban against nuclear testing. How are we going to preserve it in the face of Russia as a pariah state? And that means, I think, we must partner with China. So those are my remarks to begin with. I see we have a few questions already. And I'm really looking forward to our discussion. Irina, back over to you. FASKIANOS: Rose, thank you very much. So let's start with a raised hand from Babak Salimitari. And please state your institution and unmute yourself. Q: Good morning. My name is Babak Salimitari. I'm a third-year economics major at University of California, Irvine. And my question really pertains with NATO as a force for international security. I was looking at the list of countries that were not paying the 2 percent of their necessary GDP for defense. And these are some rich countries, like Norway, and the Netherlands, and Germany. These aren't poor, third-world countries. I don't understand why they don't pay their fair share. So when you were in NATO, what did you tell these people? GOTTEMOELLER: That's a very good question, Babak. And, honestly, it's been great for me to watch now with this otherwise terrible crisis in Ukraine—it's been great for me to watch that countries who were very resistant of paying their 2 percent of GDP are now stepping forward and saying they are ready to do so. And Germany is the prime example. President Trump was very insistent on this matter, and very much threatening dire action by the United States, including that the United States would fail to honor its so-called Article 5 commitments to NATO, which that is—under the founding document of NATO, the so-called Washington Treaty of 1949, Article 5 states that if a single country in the NATO alliance is attacked, then all countries must—and it asks for help, there's that important point too—if it asks for help then other NATO countries are obliged to come to its assistance in defending it. So President Trump was threatening that the United States would not fulfill its Article 5 commitments. He was very tough on this matter. I was the deputy secretary-general at NATO during the years of the Trump presidency. My boss and I, Jens Stoltenberg and I, always welcomed President Trump's pressure on these matters, because every single U.S. president, again, since Jack Kennedy—I'll go back to him. There's a great—now in the public domain—a great report of a National Security Council meeting where John Kennedy says, “I am tired of these NATO European freeloaders. We spend all the money on defense; they take our defenses and don't build up their own. And they're freeloading, they're freeriding on us.” So every single U.S. president has raised this issue with the allies. But it was Donald Trump who got them to really sit up and take notice in the first instance. So President—I'm sorry—Secretary-General Stoltenberg and I always supported his efforts, although we were not supportive of his drawing any question about U.S. obligations with regard to Article 5. But we supported his efforts to push the allies on paying 2 percent of GDP. A number of them did step up during the Trump years, and so more were paying 2 percent of GDP now with this crisis. Unfortunately, again, it's taken a dire crisis in Ukraine. But we see even Germany stepping up. Just one final word on Germany. At the time, when I was DSG, they kept saying, well 2 percent of our GDP, we are the most enormous economy in Europe. And if we spend 2 percent of GDP, then other countries are going to start worrying about casting back to the past and remembering Nazi Germany, and thinking about the big military buildup in the 1930s. So we don't want that to happen. So that was very deeply ingrained in the political elites in Berlin. But now, we're seeing that 180-degree switch just in the last ten days. I think it's remarkable. But I welcome it, for one, that they are now willing to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to take the next question, a written question, from Caleb Kahila, undergraduate student at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater. One issue that I don't hear much about is the actions of individuals involved in nuclear weapons. An example is Abdul Qadeer Khan, who leads the Pakistani nuclear program but is also believed to have given nuclear information to Iran, North Korea, among others. With examples like Khan, should the international community take the issue of individual nuclear proliferation more seriously? GOTTEMOELLER: That is a great question. And indeed, certain individuals have had a profoundly malignant effect on nuclear nonproliferation. It is worthwhile to note that the Nonproliferation Treaty—the membership is very wide, but there are a few outliers. And India and Pakistan are both outliers. And I think for some weird reason, Khan felt justified in being an outlier to share nuclear weapons information with a number of countries, including also Libya, as I understand. So there was this notion I think that he had, almost an ideological notion—he's dead now—but an ideological notion of producing an Islamic bomb to counter both the Indians, their mortal enemies, but also to ensure that the rest of the world did not mess with Pakistan, and also did not mess with the rest of the Muslim world, the Islamic world. So it was, I think, very clear that this one malignant individual had an enormous deleterious effect on the nonproliferation regime. We have been able to, I think, place constraints and dial back in many ways from some of his export activities, including when the Libyans were willing to give up their weapons of mass destruction programs. But you're absolutely right that it necessary to pay attention to individuals—powerful individuals, they have to be—who have that kind of access. And luckily, they are fairly rare. But we have to pay attention to the individuals who could make a very big problem for the nonproliferation regime. I do worry nowadays about the North Koreans, about the DPRK. The trouble is, they are themselves bent on acquiring nuclear bombs. And if they give away their fissile material, for example. One of the big barriers to getting a bomb is you need a significant amount of either highly enriched uranium or plutonium. And it's rather difficult to acquire. So if the DPRK were going to get into this business of giving away their expertise, the next question would be, well, how about some fissile material to back that up? And I dare say, they'd rather keep all their fissile material for themselves. But that's a very good question, Caleb. Thank you for that. FASKIANOS: I'm going to go next Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome at Brooklyn College. Q: Thank you very much. Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome. And I teach political science at Brooklyn College. And I have two issues that are kind of bothering me. One is, what are the chances that Russia will turn its back on the NPT in totality, and on other weapons regimes in this war? And then, besides an alliance with China, what are the other options for the U.S.? The second thing is, would Russia have been so bold to invade Ukraine if Ukraine hadn't destroyed its weapons—it's nuclear weapons and joined the NPT? I remember a Mearsheimer article in Foreign Affairs, I think, where he was giving a very unpopular view at that time that nuclear—destroying nuclear weapons in the Ukraine was a bad idea, because there was a need to kind of have a defense against Russia's potential invasion of the Ukraine. This was in the 1990s. And now it seems like he was right. So I'm just wondering what you think of these two issues. GOTTEMOELLER: Very good questions, Dr. Okome. And very difficult ones. But let me start on your first question. I argued yesterday in my Foreign Affairs article that I don't think it's so much that Russia would actually leave the regimes. I don't believe that they would turn their backs on the regimes by leaving them. What I believe, though, is that they will just prove to be not the good partner they have been historically. Historically they have really been, as I put it in the article, a giant of the nonproliferation regime, always looking for solutions for problems. Helping to drive forward top priorities, not only in the Nonproliferation Treaty but in what I call the wider regime, which includes these other treaties and agreements, including our bilateral treaties, the New START treaty is currently still in force, thank God. So I do worry that now they would instead turn to a more negative role, perhaps a wrecker role, in trying to stymie decision making in the regime implementation bodies, and trying to be mischievous in the way they interact with the rest of the regime members. And for that reason, I think we will need to have strong leadership. And the United States will need allies. And so that is why I have been emphasizing looking to China as a possible ally in what will be a very difficult, very difficult time going forward. But I do feel very sure that we must have as a top objective, a top priority preserving these regimes and agreements. Your second question, let me say a few words about the so-called Budapest Memorandum. I was involved in negotiating it. I worked for President Clinton in the 1990s. I was convinced at the time, I remain convinced, that what the Budapest Memorandum bought Ukraine was thirty years of peace and stability to build itself up as an independent and sovereign nation. We, in the Clinton administration, argued to Ukraine at the time that if they tried to hang on to the nuclear weapons that were left on their territory after the breakup of the Soviet Union, that they would end up in an immediate conflict with Russia that would be destabilizing and would not allow their fragile, young democracy to take root. And I still believe that very strongly. For those of you who don't remember those years, when the Soviet Union broke apart, over a thousand warheads were left on Ukrainian territory, over a thousand warheads were left on Kazakh territory, Kazakhstan, and approximately a hundred warheads were left in Belarus. So there—and there were strategic delivery vehicles. There were intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) deployed in all three countries, and there were bombers deployed in Ukraine. So there were weapon systems that needed to be destroyed and eliminated. And in this case, we got the Ukrainians to agree to join the Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. Their warheads were returned to Russia for down-blending to low-enriched uranium, which was then used in—(laughs)—it's ironic—but it was used for power plant fuel for the nuclear power plants in Ukraine. I do want to stress that at that time there was a very cooperative negotiation going on. And our assumption working—it was with the Russians and the Ukrainians and the Americans together. We were all working on this problem together in good faith. And it was a very, very positive effort overall. I still believe that Ukraine would have been caught immediately in the maelstrom of conflict with Russia if they had tried somehow to hang onto those weapons. And technically, it would not have been easy, because the command and control of all those missiles was in Moscow. It was not in Ukraine. They would have had to try to guillotine themselves from the command-and-control system in Moscow and build up a command-and-control system in Ukraine for these nuclear weapon systems. And it was our judgment, it remains my judgment, that it would have been very destructive for the young Ukrainian state, the young Ukrainian democracy to try to hang on to them. And I do think that they have taken shape as an independent power, not entirely healthy economically but, before this terrible crisis, their economy was growing. And so I do think that what we are seeing today, with the brave—very brave defense of Ukraine by the Ukrainian public, and its armed forces, and first and foremost its president—that was all born out of the thirty years that the Ukrainians got to build up their country as an independent and sovereign state. And, again, they would not have had that if they had insisted in the 1990s on holding onto nuclear weapons. FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to take a written question from Michael Strmiska, who is associate professor of world history at Orange County Community College in New York State. I'm going to shorten it. In essence, the Biden administration has said they will not impose a no-fly zone, as have other nations. And then we recently saw the Polish fighter jets via the U.S. to Ukraine. They have declined on that. So at what point do you think—there's been a lot of talk that either one of those will trigger a nuclear war. And in his question he says: Putin says “nuke” and we run and hide. If the death toll in Ukraine approaches the levels of the Holocaust, do you think the calculus will change? And do you think that this—that would trigger nuclear war? GOTTEMOELLER: Well, it's a complex question, Dr. Strmiska. Let me—let me try to give you my point of view on it. I'll just say, first of all, that I don't think we're running and hiding at all. We have sustained—and when I say “we” I'm still talking as if I'm NATO DSG. (Laughs.) But what I mean is the United States and its NATO allies have been providing a steady stream of military assistance to Ukraine, and a steady stream of humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, and also to the countries bordering Ukraine—Moldova, Hungary, Poland—that are—that are sheltering refugees from Ukraine. So we are really, I think, continuing to support them in, so far, pretty amazing ways. I have been talking to some military experts this morning, retired military officers here in the United States. And they think Putin and the Russians may be running out of ammo. We'll see to it that the Ukrainians do not run out of ammo. And so we are doing a lot to help them. And in terms of the deterrence messaging that's gone on, I've actually been rather admiring of the way that the administration has been clear about, and firm, about the dangers of rattling the nuclear saber, but also has been very clear that we are not taking steps ourselves to up the readiness of our nuclear forces, nor will we do so. They, the White House and the Department of Defense (DOD), basically postponed an ICBM test this week to ensure that there was no hint of a message that we, ourselves, are escalating. But we've been very firm and clear that nuclear use of any kind would be crossing, for us, a redline that is significant. So now let me get to your question about the no-fly zone, because I think this is—this is a complex question. It's turned into this kind of cause célèbre in the media, the press. You're watching the twenty-four-hour news cycle. All of us are, like, glued to our televisions right now, it's so horrible what is unfolding before us in Ukraine. So everybody's saying, no-fly zone, no-fly zone, no-fly zone. But when you look at it, the Russians aren't actually flying aircraft very much in Ukraine. These missiles are being delivered from Russian territory, from Belarusian territory, from ships in the Black Sea, and some now from Ukrainian territory in Donetsk and Luhansk in the eastern part of the country. But the vast majority—yesterday, the count was over 670 missiles. The vast majority of them have come from Russia. The Ukrainians don't need a no-fly zone right now. They need missile defenses. And so some of the actions that have been taken, for example, by the—by the U.K. government, for example, to get into their hands some handheld capability—now, these are not going to go after those big missiles, like the terrible explosion at the maternity hospital yesterday. That was caused by a very big missile. But some—they can be useful to defend their skies against some smaller—some smaller projectiles. And I think that's going to be important, those kinds of steps. I wish there were a way to get the Ukrainians the Israeli Iron Dome system. That's the best missile defense system around for short- to medium-range missiles. But I have my doubts that—(laughs)—the Israelis are going to want to get involved in this thing. But that's the point. This is not an air superiority problem at the moment. It is a problem of missile attacks. And so we need to do, I think, what we can to, again, get some help to the—to the Ukrainians. But we've got to be clear in our own mind what kind of help they really need. We'll see. This could change. And the Russians are upping their activity, so it may turn into more of an air battle than it has been up to this point. But I think it's really good to think harder about what the actual threat to Ukraine is today, rather than just being so fixated on a no-fly zone. FASKIANOS: Thank you. That's an important clarification. Let's go now to Kazi Sazid, who has raised his hand. Q: Hello. So I'm a political science student at CUNY Hunter College, just right next to CFR, actually. So my question is, we've seen in the past in how geopolitics and geopolitical biases obscures if not manipulates the reality of certain threats to international security and cooperation. One example is Nixon destabilizing the Allende government because there's a fear that socialism triumphed the narrative that socialism can only happen through dictatorships basically falls flat. So my question is, what avenues and mechanisms are available to ensure that security situations are not sensationalized to the point where people believe it is a bigger threat than it truly is? Sorry if that's a loaded question. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, it's a good question because it points to the information/misinformation space. And I think we've all been thinking about that a lot right now. And the United States and its NATO allies I think in the run up to the invasion actually were doing a pretty good job controlling the information space by, for example, undoing these false-flag operations that the Russians were trying to launch in the run-up to the invasion. They were actually apparently on the cusp of trying to replace the Zelenskyy government with their own puppet government. All of this was outed by some very astute use of intelligence by, again, the U.S. and the U.K., and getting it out into the information space. So in the run-up to the invasion, we were actually winning the misinformation war. Nowadays, I'm a little concerned about a couple of things. First, I'm concerned—well, there's so much to talk about here, but let me—let me just give it a shot, Kazi. We have to be concerned about the fact that Vladimir Putin is closed up in his bubble with his small cohort and is not getting sources of information that may cause him to think twice about what he's doing. And that is of concern when you're trying to deter the man, when you're trying to ensure that he knows that there will be a firm response. I don't think he had any idea—and maybe even today doesn't have any idea—at the strong pushback and the very capable pushback he's getting from the Ukrainian armed forces. They are defending their country well. And the Ukrainian public is joining in on that effort. Putin, in his bubble, just did not realize that. And now I'm not sure he's getting the information that would really help him to understand the situation that his armed forces are in right now. If, as my military experts conveyed this morning, they're beginning to run low on missiles, they're beginning to run low on ammunition, it's going to be a problem. They're going to start doing worse, rather than being able to pick up the pace, as we were talking about a moment ago, and as many people expect. So that's number one problem, is how is that deterrence messaging thing working with the Kremlin right now? The second thing I'd point to, though, is how do we reach the Russian people? Everybody takes note of the fact that all the—the internet backbone is closing down now in Ukraine. Harder and harder for Russians who are interested to get independent news that is not the product of state TV and state radio, state propaganda outlets. So how to get that message across is one that is really, really important. But I note at the same time, there was a poll that came out yesterday that was so interesting to me. It said, 58 percent of Russians support the war. And they say, well, that's pretty good. 58 percent of Russians support the war? But then when you think about it, there were a lot of “I don't knows” in that—in that poll as well. And when people don't want to say publicly what they really think they may say “I don't know,” or “I don't have an opinion on this matter.” Fifty-eight percent, when you juxtapose it against the support for the invasion of Crimea in 2014, is extraordinarily low. There was over 90 percent support for the invasion of Crimea in 2014. And now we're looking at 58 percent against the war—no, I'm sorry—it's 58 percent support the war. Sorry about that. And then a bunch of “I don't knows” in there, or “I don't want to comment” in there. So I think that there is an issue here about trying to talk directly to the Russian people. And the president has discussed that already in public. And I think we need to do better about figuring out how to reach the Russian people, especially now that social media's being shut down, other, I would say, more open forms of internet communications are being—are being shut down. We need to figure out how to message the Russian people as well. And finally, I'm not sure I'm actually answering your question, but I think—I think it's time that we start pivoting. We, the United States and NATO, to a more positive overall message of global leadership. That this is about our values and this is about what we want the world to be like in the years going forward. Let's talk about what we would need to support an independent Ukraine, no matter what. And let's talk about how we see the necessity of democratic principles and the rule of law being reenergized, restrengthened by this terrible crisis. I think we need to get a message out there about how we have a positive agenda, and we will push to pursue it, come what may. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Our next question is from Susie Risk, a first-year economics student at West Virginia University. Do you believe economic sanctions from the West on Russia is a viable way to slow Russia's advance on Ukraine? From my understanding they are mostly affecting civilians in the country, not those attacking Ukraine. And what are the other ways states like the U.S. could affect Russia in a nonviolent way? GOTTEMOELLER: I actually think the coherence of these sanctions across the board have turned them into a powerful instrument to both convey to the Kremlin, to the Russian government, and to the Russian people that they are on the wrong course. The coherence of them—there aren't any workarounds left. And in fact, even in the case of the Europeans, for example, saying that they can only cut back partially on their purchases of Russian oil because they cannot—they can't do without Russian oil and gas at the moment, but they say they're going to cut by 65 percent by the end of the year. OK, that's great, but what I'm hearing is, again, this status of the Russian Federation now as being the invader, being the country that has taken these wrong steps and is so deserving of these coherent sanctions across the board, that it is leading—like, the insurance industry—to think twice about insuring tankers that are picking up Russian oil. And so it's leading to ports messaging that they will not offload Russian oil. So despite the fact that they are still selling oil, the overall behavior of the Russian Federation and the way it is now wrapped in this coherent sanctions regime, is leading, I think, to a situation where, yeah, sure, they're going to continue to put some oil through—gas and oil through the pipelines into Europe. And they, I think, may be more likely to continue pushing that, rather than trying to turn the tap on and off, as they've done historically to try to pressure the Europeans. I think they'll be wanting to sell their gas and oil. But I think increasingly, on the stock market and in other settings, they are going to have a harder and harder time pushing oil sales, gas and oil sales. So you see this coherent sanctions regime as having knock-on effects that I think will have an even greater effect on the Russian economy, even on the Russian oil economy. FASKIANOS: It's been pretty amazing to watch the sanctions both from governments and from private—as you said—private companies and social media companies pulling out. Starbucks, Coca-Cola, and all of that, to try to—and the ruble has devalued. I think it is pretty much devalued to the very bottom. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, that's a great—that's a great point too, Irina. And particularly mentioning the sanctions against the central bank have had a profound effect. Russian rating has gone to junk—it's gone below junk bond status now, and so they're not rated anymore by the big rating companies. So it's had a profound effect on the Russian economy overall. And so, I'm wondering about—they've got very good technocrats running their banking system. That was always, I think, one of the things Putin was very proud about in coming out of the 2014 invasion of Crimea with a lot of sanctions slapped on him. He basically turned his country inward and said we are going to be more self-sufficient now and you, the bankers, you do what you can to ensure that we have lots of reserves, a rainy-day fund, that we are protected from shocks in future. Well, what happened in sanctioning the central bank is 70 percent of that rainy-day fund is held in Western financial institutions, and those now have placed blocks on the Russians getting their hands on their—on their financial reserves. So I think those steps have been coherent and very strong and have led to this really tanking of the Russian economy. FASKIANOS: Right. And with the sanctions now affecting the oligarchs and the well-to-do in Russia, that also could bring pressure on Putin—assuming they can get close enough to him—because, as you said, he is very much in a bubble that probably has been exacerbated by the two-year pandemic that we all have been living through. I'm going to go next to Nancy Gallagher, with a raised hand. Nancy, over to you. There we go. Q: I'd love to go back to the history that you started with briefly as a way of thinking about the future. And you've spent your entire career, basically, thinking about what mix of toughness and cooperation is appropriate for our relations with Russia or the Soviet Union at any given time. And even during the worst periods that you talked about, there was still some tacit cooperation that was going on to make sure—or to try to reduce the risks of a nuclear war that neither side really wanted. So it's never been 100 percent confrontation. And I'm just wondering, as you think about our relationship with Russia now, whether you've essentially written Russia off for the indefinite future or if you think that we should be continuing to think about ways of simultaneously being as tough as we need to right now, but also not completely closing the door on cooperation either to keep the risks of escalation under control now or to improve the prospects for reengagement with Russia in the future. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you for that question, Nancy, and thank you so much for joining this call. The other half of my Foreign Affairs piece yesterday talked about this and really stressed, as strongly as I could, that we need to do everything we can to keep Russia at the nuclear, both arms control and also nonproliferation regime tables, that we need to do everything—for one thing, Russia, as I mentioned, has been a giant of these regimes. They are really very good diplomats and negotiators who work these issues, and they can help to find solutions. They have helped to find solutions throughout the fifty years since we began seriously negotiating bilaterally in the Strategic Arms Limitation agreement of the 1970s, agreed in 1972. From that time forward to the present day, fifty years we've had this great relationship at the negotiating table. We haven't agreed by any means at every step of the way, and sometimes we've been in negative territory, but we've always slowly and steadily driven forward on nuclear disarmament objectives. So I think we need to do everything we can to preserve that, and I am hopeful that we can do so. Even in the depths of this horrendous crisis, the Russians have been continuing—although with some issues coming up in recent days over sanctions—but they've been continuing to try to resuscitate the Iran nuclear deal. And I've got my fingers and toes crossed that, in fact, we will resuscitate the Iran nuclear deal. Now, the Russians maybe were reluctant at the moment because I think the United States is seeing the potential for Iranian oil to start to flow again, which would help with this cutoff that we've embraced of our purchases of Russian oil and gas. So there's a whole bunch of issues there. But the point I wanted to make is, despite this severe disagreement and a really dire crisis over Ukraine, in this particular case we've been able to continue to work together more or less positively, and that has been the history of this. Nuclear weapons are an existential threat to our survival and to the survival of Russia, clearly, but also to humankind. If we suddenly have a massive nuclear exchange, the effect on humankind overall is going to be dire. So for that reason, that existential threat has continued to place us together at the negotiating table to try to find solutions here. So I do hope that we can work our way through this and find ourselves back at the table with the Russians before too long to negotiate a replacement for the New START Treaty, which goes out of force in 2026, and to work on other issues, such as a replacement for the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which we withdrew from after Russian violations in 2019. But I think there are actually some good proposals on the table about how we return to constraints on intermediate-range ground-launched missiles. The Russians initiated some of those. Again, they are good diplomats and they are good policymakers in this realm, so I would hate to do without them. But what spurred my concern in the first place and what led to the article was this message that Dmitry Medvedev put out two weeks ago when he said, well, maybe we ought to, just withdraw from the New START Treaty and maybe we ought to just kick the embassies out of Moscow and hang—kick all the diplomats out and hang big padlocks on the embassies. Maybe we don't need the world was his message, and that's what alarmed me, so that's why I was talking about the worst case. But I do hope we can keep the Russians at the table. FASKIANOS: And just to pick up, Doru Tsaganea, an associate professor at the Metropolitan College of New York, has a question about China. And there have been reports that Xi asked Putin to hold off the invasion until after the Olympics in Beijing. There seems to be alliance between China and Russia, and now some—maybe China coming back can be—I mean, the way to bring—to give Putin an off ramp is via China. You just wrote this article in Foreign Affairs about—and you've mentioned how we can leverage—really get China in the mix to help give Putin an off ramp. Can you talk a little bit more about that dynamic? GOTTEMOELLER: Yes. Again, I started thinking about this—well, I was thinking about it during their appearance together at the Olympics—at the Olympics opening ceremony. Doesn't that seem like twenty years ago now? February 4, it was. FASKIANOS: It does. (Laughs.) GOTTEMOELLER: But, clearly, they have a joint agenda. They'll be working together on some things. But I was actually—at the time, I was actually quite positively impressed that what they did talk about—the one thing they talked about in the arms-control realm was beginning to put in place constraints on ground-launched intermediate-range missiles not only in Europe, but also in Asia. And I thought, wow, now that's interesting. If there's going to be, you know, generally Eurasian constraints on ground-launched intermediate range missiles, that's a really interesting development. And so I came away from February 4, rather positively impressed that we might be able to do something with both Russia and China in that regard. But fast forward to the 24 of February and the invasion of Ukraine, and here in—just a few days after that terrible day, the foreign minister of Ukraine, Mr. Kuleba, phoned his counterpart in Beijing and asked for facilitation again of diplomacy with Russia. And at least from the readouts of that meeting, slightly less forward-leaning on the Chinese side but not contradicting anything Kuleba said, the Chinese seemed to indicate a willingness to facilitate diplomacy. It does—I don't know what's going on behind the scenes. In diplomacy, it's always better if you don't know what's going on behind the scenes—(laughs)—if it is quiet diplomacy, if it's not out in public, if it's not this—one of the reasons why I was pretty—well, we all hoped against hope regarding no invasion. But, the Russians seemed to be in bad faith from December on because they kept playing at megaphone diplomacy—putting out their proposals to the public and the press, and even leaking U.S. answers in some cases. So they were clearly not playing a proper diplomatic game, which is quiet diplomacy behind the scenes trying to make quiet progress. So I hope that this Chinese facilitation has begun. I have no hint of it at the moment, but I certainly think that it could be—it could be a productive way to begin to develop some new off ramp. We've tried a lot off ramps with Putin and it hasn't worked, but maybe the Chinese can help us develop another way of approaching this matter. Finally, I will just take note of the fact that there are other facilitators in the game. For example, President Erdoğan of Turkey has been very active, and today there is a meeting between the foreign ministers of—again, Kuleba, foreign minister of Ukraine, and Foreign Minister Lavrov of Russia in Turkey. I, for one, I haven't seen any reports of it. You may have seen reports of the outcome, Irina, but I think that that—that kind of facilitation is important, and I hope it will continue. We all want to see diplomacy taking precedence over the bombing of innocent civilians in Ukraine. FASKIANOS: Right. There are a lot more questions, and I—we can't get to them. I apologize. But I don't want to—and we are at the end of our time, but I just want to give you an opportunity and give the students to hear your thoughts on public service. You've devoted your—mostly your entire career to it. You're now teaching. You have a lecturer spot at Stanford, so you're clearly working with students. And what you would say about public service. GOTTEMOELLER: I was so privileged to have the opportunity to serve both President Clinton and President Obama. I think if you can in your career do a stint of public service it will be absolutely a wonderful experience for you. Now, sometimes bureaucracies can be pretty frustrating, but it's worth—it's worth the price of admission, I would say, to begin to operate inside that system, to begin to figure out how to make progress, and it is the way you put ideas into action. You know, from the outside I can write all the op-eds I want to, and, yeah, some of them may get picked up by somebody inside the government. But when you're working inside the government, you can really put ideas into action from the lowest levels, even if you have a chance to be an intern at the State Department or in one of the other agencies of government, you can begin to get a flavor for this. But you might be surprised that they're asking for your opinion because you all at the, I would say, less-old—(laughs)—end of the spectrum have a lot of good new ideas about how the world should work going forward. And particularly I think this problem I talked about, how to communicate now directly with the Russian people, for example, you've got the skills and savvy to help people inside government to understand how to—how to do that effectively. So you've got some special skills, I think, that are much needed at the present time. So I would not shy away from some time in government. People often ask me, well, won't I get trapped there? I think your generation will not get trapped there just because you already think about the world of work differently. You're not going to be a lifer in any organization. You don't want to start in the State Department and work there for forty years. You'll be working, in—maybe in Silicon Valley; and then you go work for Capitol Hill, the Congress; then you may go into government for a little while, the executive branch; and then back to—back to the corporate world. So I know that you'll be thinking quite differently about how to build your careers, but don't shy away from public service. It's a very good experience and it's where you can make a difference. FASKIANOS: Well, with that, Rose Gottemoeller, thank you very much for being with us today and for sharing your expertise and analysis. We really appreciate it. And giving us a historical context, which is so valuable to understanding where we are today. You can follow Rose on Twitter at @gottemoeller. Our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, March 23, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Time. Jody Freeman at Harvard University will talk about global climate policy. We will send out the link to this discussion—the video, transcript—as well as the link to Rose's Foreign Affairs article so you can read it if you didn't have a chance. It was in yesterday's background. And I encourage you to follow us on Twitter at @CFR_academic, and go to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. So thank you all again and thank you, Rose. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you. Thanks for a great discussion. (END)

Our founding director Jody Freeman speaks with Chet France, who served as a senior executive at EPA and led the development of vehicle pollution standards at the agency, including overseeing, during the Obama administration, the first national greenhouse gas standards for cars and trucks. They talk about the development of the clean car rules, the stalled progress under the Trump administration, and the Biden administration's renewal and strengthening of the original standards. With President Biden's ambitious goals for electric vehicles, the major auto companies' pledges to produce an all-electric fleet, Congress's funding of charging infrastructure, and the new EPA standards, Jody and Chet discuss how we are at a potentially transformational moment in the history of the Clean Air Act, the auto industry, and climate change. A transcript of this episode is available here http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/Jody-and-Chet-Transcript.pdf CleanLaw Production Team: Robin Just, Andy Dolph, and Sara Levy

Jody Freeman, the Archibald Cox Professor of Law at Harvard Law School, and founder of the school’s Environmental and Energy Law Program, offered both a sharp rebuke of the Trump Administration’s climate policies and a hopeful outlook for the Biden Administration’s clean energy agenda in the newest episode of “Environmental Insights: Discussions on Policy and Practice from the Harvard Environmental Economics Program,” a podcast produced by the Harvard Environmental Economics Program. Read a transcription here: https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/publication/jody-freeman-podcast-transcription.pdf

For millions of Americans the climate crisis is a reality affecting their lives every day. Now, with the massive Covid relief package through Congress, the next challenge for the Biden administration is an immense infrastructure and climate bill. But in the meantime, the President has already begun implementing his agenda. In this episode, Nia-Malika Henderson is joined by climate policy expert and Harvard Law professor Jody Freeman to explain the new administration’s bold policies, political tension, and ambitious goals.  To learn more about how CNN protects listener privacy, visit cnn.com/privacy

The Enemy Within the House of Representatives | The Spectacular Fall of U.S. Power and Influence Around the World | Biden's Bold Climate Initiatives as a Win-Win, Creating Jobs While Saving the Planet backgroundbriefing.org/donate twitter.com/ianmastersmedia facebook.com/ianmastersmedia

KCRW’s Warren Olney talks with Harvard law professor Jody Freeman and Princeton international affairs professor Michael Oppenheimer about Biden’s climate plans and what it means to reach “net zero” by 2050. Then Brown University politics professor Corey Brettschneider warns that phony claims of election fraud are dangerous to democracy.

KCRW’s Warren Olney talks with Harvard law professor Jody Freeman and Princeton international affairs professor Michael Oppenheimer about Biden’s climate plans and what it means to reach “net zero” by 2050. Then Brown University politics professor Corey Brettschneider warns that phony claims of election fraud are dangerous to democracy.

KCRW’s Warren Olney talks with Harvard law professor Jody Freeman and Princeton international affairs professor Michael Oppenheimer about Biden’s climate plans and what it means to reach “net zero” by 2050. Then Brown University politics professor Corey Brettschneider warns that phony claims of election fraud are dangerous to democracy.

Biden's Signal that Climate Change is a National Security Issue | Is the Pullout From the Open Skies Treaty Trump's Parting Gift to Putin? | Could Biden Set a New Course With Russia? backgroundbriefing.org/donate twitter.com/ianmastersmedia facebook.com/ianmastersmedia

In this bonus episode, we share just a little bit of The EPA at 50, an online event sponsored by the O’Neill School of Public and Environmental Affairs and the Integrated Program in the Environment here at IU. It featured host Janet McCabe, Gina McCarthy, Jim Barnes, and Jody Freeman. The program is edited for time, but you can find the full recording on the O’Neill School Youtube channel. Also, coming up on December 2, we have a Facebook live show on the topic of spiritual ecology. This one is at 10 a.m. ET, and you can RSVP by going to our Facebook page. Do you also have questions? Do you have answers? Because we want to know! You can email us at itcpod@indiana.edu or message us on your preferred social media @thisclimatepod.

The priority for many Democratic voters in the most recent election cycle was removing President Donald Trump from the White House. This was clear after a crowded primary field coalesced around Joe Biden. But the world is a different place than it was in March and because the election cycle was dominated by the ongoing pandemic and economic crisis, it was difficult for other issues to gain traction. But for younger voters, environmental justice and climate policy are a top priority. Climate change has animated a generation of voters, many of whom spent months making calls and texts to swing states, even though Joe Biden was not their first choice nominee. These voters are paying close attention to who Biden appoints to his cabinet and to lead agencies as a means to gauge how seriously he’ll be taking their top issue. Throughout his time in office, President Trump aggressively went after more than 100 environmental rules aimed at protecting the integrity of water, land, and air.  While President-elect Biden will have the ability to issue executive orders at his disposal, there’s a division within his own party about how aggressive he should be on the issue. Coral Davenport, energy and environmental policy reporter at The New York Times, Jody Freeman, law professor Harvard University and former counselor for energy and climate change in the Obama White House, and Waleed Shahid, spokesperson for the Justice Democrats describe how the Biden administration might proceed with pursuing climate change policy in a hyperpolarized political landscape. As part of our continuing series with the freshman members of the 117th Congress, host Amy Walter spoke with Democratic Congresswoman-elect Marilyn Strickland from Washington and Republican Congresswoman-elect Ashley Hinson from Iowa. They both share what they’re hoping to accomplish in their first term and how they plan on working through partisan gridlock. You can hear extended conversations with the newest members of congress here.

Joe Biden says he will immediately re-join the Paris agreement on climate change, which Donald Trump withdrew from. Donald Trump has also repealed many of President Obama’s environmental laws. In the meantime, cities and States across the US have been taking their own action on the environment and climate change, irrespective of what’s been happening in Washington. President-elect Biden has said that climate change is the number one issue for humanity and for him. But will he be able to change much? Carlos Watson and Ritula Shah (standing in for Katty Kay this week) speak to Wisconsin’s Lieutenant Governor, Mandela Barnes, about what his state has been doing and what obstacles it faces. They’ll also be speaking to Jody Freeman, professor of environmental law at Harvard, who was an advisor to the Obama administration, about the difficulties Biden could have getting his climate agenda passed. Also taking part will be the mayor of Carmel, Indiana, Jim Brainard, who describes how being a Republican does not conflict with taking action on climate change. Production team: Editor, Penny Murphy. Producers: John Murphy, Luke Radcliff, Maeve McGoran, Iyore Odighizuwa, Jonelle Awomoyi

The priority for many Democratic voters in the most recent election cycle was removing President Donald Trump from the White House. This was clear after a crowded primary field coalesced around Joe Biden. But the world is a different place than it was in March and because the election cycle was dominated by the ongoing pandemic and economic crisis, it was difficult for other issues to gain traction. But for younger voters, environmental justice and climate policy are a top priority. Climate change has animated a generation of voters, many of whom spent months making calls and texts to swing states, even though Joe Biden was not their first choice nominee. These voters are paying close attention to who Biden appoints to his cabinet and to lead agencies as a means to gauge how seriously he’ll be taking their top issue. Throughout his time in office, President Trump aggressively went after more than 100 environmental rules aimed at protecting the integrity of water, land, and air.  While President-elect Biden will have the ability to issue executive orders at his disposal, there’s division within his own party about how aggressive he should be on the issue. Coral Davenport, energy and environmental policy reporter at The New York Times, Jody Freeman, law professor at Harvard University and former counselor for energy and climate change in the Obama White House, and Waleed Shahid, spokesperson for the Justice Democrats describe how the Biden administration might proceed with pursuing climate change policy in a hyperpolarized political landscape. As part of our continuing series with the freshman members of the 117th Congress, host Amy Walter spoke with Democratic Congresswoman-elect Marilyn Strickland from Washington and Republican Congresswoman-elect Ashley Hinson from Iowa. They both share what they’re hoping to accomplish in their first term and how they plan on working through partisan gridlock. You can hear extended conversations with the newest members of congress here.

The priority for many Democratic voters in the most recent election cycle was removing President Donald Trump from the White House. This was clear after a crowded primary field coalesced around Joe Biden. But the world is a different place than it was in March and because the election cycle was dominated by the ongoing pandemic and economic crisis, it was difficult for other issues to gain traction. But for younger voters, environmental justice and climate policy are a top priority. Climate change has animated a generation of voters, many of whom spent months making calls and texts to swing states, even though Joe Biden was not their first choice nominee. These voters are paying close attention to who Biden appoints to his cabinet and to lead agencies as a means to gauge how seriously he’ll be taking their top issue. Throughout his time in office, President Trump aggressively went after more than 100 environmental rules aimed at protecting the integrity of water, land, and air.  While President-elect Biden will have the ability to issue executive orders at his disposal, there’s a division within his own party about how aggressive he should be on the issue. Coral Davenport, energy and environmental policy reporter at The New York Times, Jody Freeman, law professor Harvard University and former counselor for energy and climate change in the Obama White House, and Waleed Shahid, spokesperson for the Justice Democrats describe how the Biden administration might proceed with pursuing climate change policy in a hyperpolarized political landscape. As part of our continuing series with the freshman members of the 117th Congress, host Amy Walter spoke with Democratic Congresswoman-elect Marilyn Strickland from Washington and Republican Congresswoman-elect Ashley Hinson from Iowa. They both share what they’re hoping to accomplish in their first term and how they plan on working through partisan gridlock. You can hear extended conversations with the newest members of congress here.

President-Elect Biden ran as a moderate Democrat, but he also campaigned on an aggressive climate platform. How much of that agenda he can pursue could rest on who controls the US Senate, pending results of two runoff elections in Georgia.  We unpack this with Jody Freeman, law professor at Harvard. Before that she worked for the Obama EPA, where she helped write fuel-efficiency regulations for cars, which were later rolled back under President Trump.  Biden has pledged to re-join the Paris Climate accord. Though the agreement is non-binding, Freeman says it will be a significant step.

Steve wraps up his conversation with Jody Freeman, a professor of law and director of the environmental and energy law program at Harvard Law School. In part one Steve and Jody covered Climate Change in relation to the Election, but in part two they talk about what the confirmation of Amy Coney Barrett to the Supreme Court means for Climate Change.

What will the results of the Presidential Election mean for climate change? This week, Steve discusses that and more with Jody Freeman, professor of law and director of the environmental and energy law program at Harvard Law School.

In this week's episode, guest host Sue Tierney talks with Jody Freeman and Jeffrey Holmstead. Freeman is a professor at who specializes in administrative law and environmental law at Harvard, founded their Environmental and Energy Law Program, and established the Harvard Law School’s first environmental law clinic. Holmstead is an attorney at the Houston-based law firm Bracewell LLP and a former assistant administrator of the US Environmental Protection Agency; he is also a member of the president's council at Resources for the Future. Tierney, Freeman, and Holmstead discuss past "shenanigans" in presidential transitions; how a new or sitting president will prioritize goals in office, particularly during a troubling pandemic and highly unstable economy; the need for congressional action to make headway on climate change; and more. This episode continues our month-long spin-off series, “Big Decisions: The Future of US Environmental and Energy Policy.” For this series—which will air in our same Resources Radio time slot every Tuesday in October—RFF Board of Directors Chair Sue Tierney and RFF President Richard G. Newell share guest-hosting duties and talk with leading decisionmakers, analysts, researchers, and reporters about the big decisions that will impact US environmental and energy policy in the years to come. References and recommendations: "This Is the Story of a Happy Marriage" by Ann Patchett; https://www.harpercollins.com/products/this-is-the-story-of-a-happy-marriage-ann-patchett "Chernobyl" miniseries; https://www.hbo.com/chernobyl "The Rule of Five" by Richard J. Lazarus; https://www.hup.harvard.edu/catalog.php?isbn=9780674238121 "Borgen" TV series; https://www.netflix.com/title/70302482 "Schitt's Creek" sitcom; https://www.netflix.com/title/80036165 "Watchmen" TV series; https://www.hbo.com/watchmen

In this episode Alex Griswold, a research associate at the Harvard University Center for the Environment, interviews Professor Jody Freeman, our founding director. They talk about the Trump era environmental rollbacks that are most troubling to Jody, and why she is still optimistic that we can do better. Full transcript of this episode available here http://eelp.law.harvard.edu/wp-content/uploads/CleanLaw-40-Jody-Alex-rollbacks-and-optimism.pdf

The Falling Out between the Adelsons and the Netanyahus; The Looming War Between Trump and California Over Fuel Efficiency; The Latest Chapter in the Brexit Drama backgroundbriefing.org/donate twitter.com/ianmastersmedia facebook.com/ianmastersmedia

The Trump administration recently rolled out the affordable clean energy (ACE) rule. Critics say it basically does nothing to prevent climate change at a time when global warming is turning into an existential crisis. Our guest is Jody Freeman, a professor at Harvard Law School and founder of the school's environmental and energy law program. She served in the Obama White House as counselor for energy and climate change.   

Evelyn and Hannah talk to Professor Jody Freeman, the Archibald Cox Professor of Law and the founding director of the Harvard Law School Environmental and Energy Law Program, about her career in academia and government, being at the forefront of environmental law and policy development, and cooking magazines.

As of Friday’s inauguration, we can now say ‘President Donald Trump’, and that new status could have far-reaching implications for the environment. While campaigning, Trump said he would make some big changes to environmental regulations, including spearheading an overhaul of the Environmental Protection Agency. That sounds like a big claim. But what exactly can Donald Trump do when it comes to the country’s environmental laws and rules? That is, what does he actually have the power to do as President? We put that question to Jody Freeman, the founding director of Harvard’s Environmental Law Program. 

On December 7, 2016, President-elect Trump chose Oklahoma Attorney General Scott Pruitt as his nominee to head the Environment Protection Agency, better known as the EPA. Some have said that Pruitt is a climate change denier and an advocate against the EPA’s activist agenda, while Trump himself has said, “Scott Pruitt will be a powerful advocate for that mission while promoting jobs, safety, and opportunity.” In this episode of Lawyer 2 Lawyer, host Bob Ambrogi joins Jody Freeman, the Archibald Cox Professor of Law and the founding director of the Harvard Law School Environmental Law and Policy Program, and Representative Bob Inglis, executive director of republicEn, as they take a look at the future of the EPA under President-elect Trump's pick, Scott Pruitt, and how Pruitt will impact regulation and the mission of the EPA. Jody Freeman is the Archibald Cox Professor of Law and the founding director of the Harvard Law School Environmental Law and Policy Program. Professor Freeman served in the White House as Counselor for Energy and Climate Change in 2009-10, where she was the architect of the president’s historic agreement with the auto industry to double fuel efficiency standards, launching the administration’s greenhouse gas program under the Clean Air Act. Representative Bob Inglis is executive director of republicEn, an organization educating the country about free-enterprise solutions to climate change.  Bob was also the U.S. Representative for South Carolina's 4th Congressional District from 1993 to 1999 and again from 2005 to 2011. Special thanks to our sponsor, Clio.

Our panel briefly discusses current developments in Climate Change related to the Clean Air Act, the Clean Power Plan, and future developments prior to the 2015 Paris meetings on Global Climate Change. The discussion focused on current events related to Global Climate Change and US Law discussed extensively in Michael B. Gerrard and Jody Freeman’s book, Global Climate Change and U.S. Law, Second Edition. You can buy the book at www.shopaba.org

This seminar was given by Jody Freeman of Harvard Law School on February 25, 2014 as part of the Regulatory Policy Program’s seminar series.