1982–1984 General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union
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2 episodes with andropov
2 episodes with andropov
2 episodes with andropov
3 episodes with andropov
3 episodes with andropov
2 episodes with andropov
2 episodes with andropov
4 episodes with andropov
3 episodes with andropov
Sergey Radchenko's book, To Run the World: The Kremlin's Bid for Global Power, is a masterwork! In my mind, it's in pole position for best book of 2025. Sergey takes you into the mind of Soviet and Chinese leaders as they wrestle for global power and recognition, leaving you amused, inspired, and horrified by the small-mindedness of the people who had the power to start World War III. We get amazing vignettes like Liu Shaoqi making fun of the Americans for eating ice cream in trenches, Khrushchev pinning red stars on Eisenhower's grandkids, and Brezhnev and Andropov offering to dig up dirt on senators to help save Nixon from Watergate. Sergey earns your trust in this book, acknowledging what we can and can't know. He leaves you with a new lens to understand the Cold War and the new US-China rivalry — namely, the overwhelming preoccupation with global prestige by Cold War leaders. In this interview, we discuss… Why legitimacy matters in international politics, Stalin's colonial ambitions and Truman's strategy of containment, Sino-Soviet relations during the Stalin era and beyond, The history of nuclear blackmail, starting with the 1956 Suez crisis, Why Khrushchev couldn't save the Soviet economy. Co-hosting today is Jon Sine of the Cogitations substack. Outro music: Виталий Марков "Главное, ребята, сердцем не стареть" (YouTube Link) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Sergey Radchenko's book, To Run the World: The Kremlin's Bid for Global Power, is a masterwork! In my mind, it's in pole position for best book of 2025. Sergey takes you into the mind of Soviet and Chinese leaders as they wrestle for global power and recognition, leaving you amused, inspired, and horrified by the small-mindedness of the people who had the power to start World War III. We get amazing vignettes like Liu Shaoqi making fun of the Americans for eating ice cream in trenches, Khrushchev pinning red stars on Eisenhower's grandkids, and Brezhnev and Andropov offering to dig up dirt on senators to help save Nixon from Watergate. Sergey earns your trust in this book, acknowledging what we can and can't know. He leaves you with a new lens to understand the Cold War and the new US-China rivalry — namely, the overwhelming preoccupation with global prestige by Cold War leaders. In this interview, we discuss… Why legitimacy matters in international politics, Stalin's colonial ambitions and Truman's strategy of containment, Sino-Soviet relations during the Stalin era and beyond, The history of nuclear blackmail, starting with the 1956 Suez crisis, Why Khrushchev couldn't save the Soviet economy. Co-hosting today is Jon Sine of the Cogitations substack. Outro music: Виталий Марков "Главное, ребята, сердцем не стареть" (YouTube Link) Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
St. Valentine; Public Lands; Farming; Public Schools; U.S.S.R.; Andropov
Special TV Documentary Project; Ultimate Resource by Simon; Wing Bean; Sir Samuel White Baker; Andropov; God's Protection
Dallas Strippers; Trial Judges; J.B. Saunders; Treasury Bills; Andropov; H.L. Hunt with RJR
In power for nearly a quarter century, Vladimir Putin, 71, is a modern-day tsar -- an autocrat largely unaccountable to his people -- except he has no known successor. Whether the Russian president rules for another week or another decade, there will come a time when he's gone. Who might replace him is a mystery. Also unclear is how Putin might be replaced: by a violent coup? Some legal way under the Russian constitution? In this episode, Liana Fix of the Council on Foreign Relations and Maria Snegovaya of the Center for Strategic & International Studies use the Soviet past as a guide to understanding possible scenarios under which a successor may emerge -- and what new leadership in the Kremlin means for Russia, Europe, and the United States.
Očekávaly se od něj velké změny po dlouholeté stagnaci, ve skutečnosti prakticky nic nestihl. Jmenoval se Jurij Vladimirovič Andropov. Bývalý šéf obávané tajné policie KGB nastoupil do čela sovětských komunistů po smrti Leonida Iljiče Brežněva v roce 1982. O půldruhého roku později ale zemřel.
Očekávaly se od něj velké změny po dlouholeté stagnaci, ve skutečnosti prakticky nic nestihl. Jmenoval se Jurij Vladimirovič Andropov. Bývalý šéf obávané tajné policie KGB nastoupil do čela sovětských komunistů po smrti Leonida Iljiče Brežněva v roce 1982. O půldruhého roku později ale zemřel.Všechny díly podcastu Portréty můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.
Forty years ago in January 1984, our 40th President delivered an address to the nation and other countries on the status of US-Soviet relations. Things weren't too rosy then – recall that Andropov was still in power, unapologetic about the massacre of KAL 007, or anything else. Until Gorbachev came into office in March 1985, […]
Forty years ago in January 1984, our 40th President delivered an address to the nation and other countries on the status of US-Soviet relations. Things weren't too rosy then – recall that Andropov was still in power, unapologetic about the massacre of KAL 007, or anything else. Until Gorbachev came into office in March 1985, that's early in his second term as president, working with the Soviets was no day at the beach.
So just imagine. You're the president, it's late in December 1983. You've delivered your evil empire speech in March putting the Soviets on notice… you've learned by detailed intelligence reports that the communists and Fidel Castro are expanding their efforts in the Caribbean along with infiltrating the island of Grenada….you've announced your Strategic Defense Initiative in March which was renamed Star Wars by the press, you've sent forces into Lebanon as part of a multinational peacekeeping force which became a target of terrorists killing 270 marines in their barracks as they slept, you've watched the war in the middle east escalate exponentially with bad actors getting involved from every angle, you've watched Soviet leader Andropov continue to advance the Brezhnev doctrine and …you've learned how the Soviets shot down Korean airliner 007 killing all passengers aboard…now those are just the high notes. SO..if you were president, and had to draft a message for the new year….where would you start?? Let's begin by listening to our 40th president, the eternal optimist who knew how to make lemonade out of lemons. But always the responsible citizen, he begins by cautioning Americans about drunk driving on New Years eve then moves on. Let's listen to a bit.
In this episode we look back at the moment it was clear the Cold War was essentially over. The story actually begins in 1985, when Mikhail Gorbachev is elevated to power after a succession of elderly, Communist leaders, all of whom went back to the early days of the Soviet Union. Leonid Brezhnev had been a hard line, old school, Communist leader, that had been in power throughout the Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter, and early Reagan Years. He had presided over the Soviet Union's military rise as a Super Power but also had seen the nation's economy become weak. He, however, was not, and when he took power as part of a team in the 1960's he had consolidated his position and was clearly the man in charge in the Kremlin for most of his 18 years as General Secretary. Brezhnev died in November 1982 and would be succeeded by Yuri Andropov , the former head of the KGB, for just over 15 months, before dying at age 69. Andropov would then be succeeded by Constantine Chernenko who would serve for even less time passing away just 13 months after being named General Secretary. It was then that the protege of Andropov would emerge, and at age 53,it was clear Mikhail Gorbachev was not going to die anytime soon. On the other side of the ball, was Ronald Reagan, a career anticommunist often ridiculed for his unwillingness to work with his Soviet Counterparts. An unfair charge given that all of them had died about once a year since Reagan had been elected. When Reagan and Gorbachev finally met they had an instant chemistry and thus forged a warm relationship that helped turn the corner on what had been an icy , untrusting , mutual existence between the United States and the Soviet Union since the end of the Second World War. What Reagan and his CIA Advisor William Casey had figured out was that the Soviet Union, while militarily strong, was a dying nation inside its borders and they pushed them to the bargaining table. In Gorbachev, they finally found a Soviet Leader, who was more concerned about the future of his people than the future of it's revolutionary global desires. We will look back in this episode at the relationships that both Reagan and Bush had with Gorbachev, and the circumstances that led to this meeting in Malta on the heels of the fall of the Berlin Wall, when Gorbachev was trying to negotiate a way to save his struggling nation. This episode was produced over one year ago, and is dedicated in memory to CBS News Correspondent Bill Plante, who died at that time we were producing this episode, and who also produced for CBS News one of the historic reports we used for this podcast. Questions or comments at , Randalrgw1@aol.com , https://twitter.com/randal_wallace , and http://www.randalwallace.com/Please Leave us a review at wherever you get your podcastsThanks for listening!!
Jesper har tappat allt självförtroende och Olle är inte sen på att kalla det för frontallobsdemens. Mats har grävt djupt, eller jag halvdjupt, i NHL-draften och Olle har överraskande ett segment om damernas VM-äventyr. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
durée : 00:59:17 - Les Nuits de France Culture - par : Albane Penaranda - Par Alexandre Adler - Réalisation Brigitte Bouvier
In November of 1982, at the height of the Cold War, Samantha Smith, a 10-year-old girl from Manchester, Maine, wrote to the Soviet leader Yuri Andropov and asked him if he was going to wage a nuclear war against the U.S. When an unprecedented response from Andropov arrived, and Samantha received an invitation to visit the USSR, she and her family embarked on a journey that brought the two warring nations closer together. We speak with author Lena Nelson who was born in the Soviet Union and has spent the past 15 years researching and documenting the story of Samantha Smith and creating an archive at https://www.samanthasmith.info/. Lena reveals how Samantha Smith's journey in the summer of 1983 helped melt the hearts of the Soviets and thaw the ice of the Cold War. We talk about the interviews she conducted in both the US and Russia with key players in the events of those days and tell the story of this unprecedented moment in history. Lena's book America's Youngest Ambassador: The Cold War Story of Samantha Smith's Lasting Message of Peace is available via this link https://uk.bookshop.org/a/1549/9781684750207 Cold War history is disappearing; however, a simple monthly donation will keep this podcast on the air. You'll become part of our community and get a sought-after CWC coaster as a thank you and you'll bask in the warm glow of knowing you are helping to preserve Cold War history. Just go to https://coldwarconversations.com/donate/ If a monthly contribution is not your cup of tea, We also welcome one-off donations via the same link. US Listeners can find details of our book giveaway here https://coldwarconversations.com/giveaway/ Episode extras including videos and photos https://coldwarconversations.com/episode293/ Support the project! https://coldwarconversations.com/donate/ Follow us on Twitter https://twitter.com/ColdWarPod Facebook https://www.facebook.com/groups/coldwarpod/ Instagram https://www.instagram.com/coldwarconversations/ Youtube https://youtube.com/@ColdWarConversations Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
En 1983, las posturas agresivas de Reagan, la paranoia de Andropov de un primer ataque nuclear, y la mala inteligencia de las señales casi acaban con el mundo. Al menos dos veces.Capitulo completo aqui: https://www.patreon.com/posts/bonus-19-able-80493302Tess en Twitter: https://twitter.com/Reilaouo en Insta: https://www.instagram.com/space_dovahkiin/PATREON: https://www.patreon.com/intervencionesgringaspodcastOTRAS REDES: https://beacons.ai/intervencionesgringaspodcast/CORREO: intervencionesgringaspodcast@gmail.com
Four decades ago, a Maine fifth grader named Samantha Smith, who was worried about nuclear war, wrote a letter to Soviet leader Yuri Andropov. Her post script, in neat schoolgirl block letters – “Please write back” – eventually worked its charm: Mr. Andropov invited her on a free trip to the USSR to see, he said, that “everybody in the Soviet Union stands for peace and friendship among nations.” Also, today's stories, including: NATO has quietly taken the step of putting its strategic headquarters on what military officials there describe as “war fighting” footing. A violent standoff between supporters of former Prime Minister Imran Khan and Pakistani authorities has put pressure on the country's legal system. What would justice look like to each side? As the culture wars drift further into the education realm, they're spawning questions fundamentally tied to American democracy. Join the Monitor's Clara Germani and Ali Martin for today's Christian Science Monitor Daily.
Vladimir Putinin tie Leningradin kujilta tyranniksi. Putinin mukaan hänen nuorena takapihojen jengeissä viettämänsä aika oli hänen elämänsä onnellisinta. Omien sanojensa mukaan siellä pärjäsi ajatuksella ”jos tappelu on väistämätön, on iskettävä ensin”. Putinin idoli oli Neuvostoliiton “James Bond”, vakooja Juri Drozdov. Vladimir Putinin unelma täyttyi kesällä 1975, kun Putin astui KGB:n palvelukseen. Putin kasvoi ja kehittyi Juri Andropovin siipien suojassa, kuten muutkin hänen KGB:n ajoilta tutut kaverinsakin. Andropov oli mies, joka kehitti viime vuosikymmenten vaarallisimman vainoharhan, jonka mukaan Yhdysvallat ja Nato suunnittelivat massiivista yllätysiskua ydinaseilla, joka tuhoaisi Neuvostoliiton. Andropov valjasti vuonna 1981 KGB:n etsimään ympäri maailmaa todisteita ydiniskun suunnittelusta osoittaakseen harhojensa todenperäisyyden. Venäjän ja Kremlin keisari tuntuu kavereineen edelleen etsivän todisteita Andropovin vainoharhan todenperäisyydelle. Asiantuntijana toimittaja-tietokirjailija Hannu Pesonen. Toimittajana Raimo Tyykiluoto.
O resumo das principais notícias de 1984, pela voz de Luciana Leiderfarb, jornalista e coordenadora de Livros da Revista do Expresso. O texto é de José Cardoso, a edição do áudio pertence a João Martins e a sonoplastia a João Luís Amorim. A coordenação é de Mónica Balsemão e Joana Beleza. See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Tension mounts as Reagan's aggression deepens Andropov's paranoia. Surely, an attack from the West is imminent! Meet Oleg Gordievsky and Rainier Rupp, two spies whose loyalties aren't what they seem. These super secret agents scour the earth for signs of impending doom, but they have no idea that they're about to be embroiled in utter disaster. Produced by FilmNation and Pacific Electric Picture Co. in association with Gilded Audio. Correction: This episode incorrectly states that Operation Barbarossa began the Soviet Union's entanglement with World War II. Operation Barbarossa brought the fighting to Soviet soil. However, the Soviets had long been colluding with Nazi Germany, and the Soviet Red Army had themselves invaded Poland, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, and Finland prior to Operation Barbarossa. We regret the error, not least because this falsity is a particular piece of propaganda emanating from Putin's Kremlin.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: 9/26 is Petrov Day, published by Lizka on September 25, 2022 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Today is September 26th, Petrov Day, celebrated to honor the deed of Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov on September 26th, 1983. Wherever you are, whatever you're doing, take a minute to not destroy the world. The story begins on September 1st, 1983, when Soviet jet interceptors shot down a Korean Air Lines civilian airliner after the aircraft crossed into Soviet airspace and then, for reasons still unknown, failed to respond to radio hails. 269 passengers and crew died, including US Congressman Lawrence McDonald. Ronald Reagan called it "barbarism", "inhuman brutality", "a crime against humanity that must never be forgotten". Note that this was already a very, very poor time for US/USSR relations. Andropov, the ailing Soviet leader, was half-convinced the US was planning a first strike. The KGB sent a flash message to its operatives warning them to prepare for possible nuclear war. On September 26th, 1983, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov was the officer on duty when the warning system reported a US missile launch. Petrov kept calm, suspecting a computer error. Then the system reported another US missile launch. And another, and another, and another. What had actually happened, investigators later determined, was sunlight on high-altitude clouds aligning with the satellite view on a US missile base. In the command post there were beeping signals, flashing lights, and officers screaming at people to remain calm. According to several accounts I've read, there was a large flashing screen from the automated computer system saying simply "START" (presumably in Russian). Afterward, when investigators asked Petrov why he hadn't written everything down in the logbook, Petrov replied,"Because I had a phone in one hand and the intercom in the other, and I don't have a third hand." The policy of the Soviet Union called for launch on warning. The Soviet Union's land radar could not detect missiles over the horizon, and waiting for positive identification would limit the response time to minutes. Petrov's report would be relayed to his military superiors, who would decide whether to start a nuclear war. Petrov decided that, all else being equal, he would prefer not to destroy the world. He sent messages declaring the launch detection a false alarm, based solely on his personal belief that the US did not seem likely to start an attack using only five missiles. Petrov was first congratulated, then extensively interrogated, then reprimanded for failing to follow procedure. He resigned in poor health from the military several months later. According to Wikipedia, he is spending his retirement in relative poverty in the town of Fryazino, on a pension of $200/month. In 2004, the Association of World Citizens gave Petrov a trophy and $1000. There is also a movie scheduled for release in 2008, entitled The Red Button and the Man Who Saved the World. Maybe someday, the names of people who decide not to start nuclear wars will be as well known as the name of Britney Spears. Looking forward to such a time, when humankind has grown a little wiser, let us celebrate, in this moment, Petrov Day. You can read more about Petrov here. The original post was written by Eliezer Yudkowsky in 2007. I got permission to cross-post it in full (and am doing this a few hours early, depending on where you are). Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
John Zmirak. Mikhail Gorbachev: The Anti-Biden, Euthanasia in Universal Health Care, Mini Documentary- IVERMECTIN: THE TRUTH, and more. The Eric Metaxas Show John Zmirak Sep 02 2022 John Zmirak comments on the passing of Mikhail Gorbachev, focusing on his legacy; euthanasia in Canada, the default cost-saving healthcare solution; and several other hard-hitting articles posted at Stream.org. John Zmirak- https://stream.org/author/johnzmirak/ The Eric Metaxas Show- https://metaxastalk.com/podcasts/ Mini Documentary- IVERMECTIN: THE TRUTH Watch this presentation free at- https://www.bitchute.com/video/AU1fhYmEybl3/ PlandemicSeriesOfficial https://rumble.com/user/PlandemicSeriesOfficial ------------------------------------------------------------------------- May Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev Rest in Peace. He Was the Anti-Biden By JOHN ZMIRAK Published on August 31, 2022 John Zmirak When I heard that he'd died, I found my eyes welling with tears. I realized that Mikhail Gorbachev had made an enormous difference to my life, to all of our lives. He enriched them immeasurably, at the cost of ruining his own. “Greater love hath no man,” I thought, and said a quick, fervent prayer for his soul. Here was a man who grew up in the heart of the godless, authoritarian Soviet system, and rose to its top. Who believed in the ideals which it had taught him, even as his family had suffered under Stalin. He survived the viciously Machiavellian world of Soviet politics, and rose to supreme power over one of the world's two superpowers. But once he held that power, unlike each of his predecessors, Gorbachev didn't spend his time and energy clinging to it for its own sake. (Rent the black comedy The Death of Stalin for a truthful, satirical look at the internal hatreds and rivalries that plagued the Soviet system.) Nor did he grasp at the power his nation wielded to dominate others, throughout eastern Europe and much of the Third World. Imagining a Humane Socialism. Of Course it Proved Imaginary Instead, Mikhail Gorbachev looked honestly at the poisonous effects that Marxist socialism was having on his Russian homeland, and the satellite states it commanded. He saw the vast economic irrationalities, the deep corruption, the paranoid fear of openness and new ideas. And he believed he could change things, could return the vast socialist empire to the humanistic ideals that lay so deeply buried at its origins. Gorbachev read the Utopian poetry of the young Marx and sought to recover that vision and make it real. He dismantled much of the apparatus of oppression that held the Soviet empire together, and encouraged his fellow Communist leaders in the East to do the same. Of course he failed. Socialism isn't really humanistic after all, but subhumanist. It gets the human species wrong, and even our phylum, mistaking our mammalian kind for some kind of social insect, like a termite. (Just so, secular libertarians propose a political system perfectly suited for lizards who breed by hooking up briefly and randomly, then abandon their eggs in the sand.) He Wouldn't Punish His People Many, many political leaders over millennia have dared greatly and failed, pointed their nations to dreams that turned out to be mere fantasies. Typically, such leaders prodigally poured out the lives of their helpless subjects, in vast schemes of conquest or impossible reforms. When their programs failed, they stormed at and punished their citizens for “failing” them, for not living up to the grandeur of their visions. So Hitler in his bunker cursed the Germans for proving “unworthy” of him, and Mao at the hapless Chinese who insisted on starving to death in their tens of millions. So did Hillary Clinton and her party, who raged that the American people stabbed them in the back with their votes in 2016. From the Brink of Nuclear War to Peace Talks with Reagan Not Gorbachev. He doggedly tried to implement his new, impossible “socialism with a human face,” and mostly resisted the massive pressure of the men all around him to resort to deadly force when it kept failing. He emerged from a Soviet elite so angst-ridden and panicky that it came within a hairsbreadth of launching a pre-emptive nuclear strike in 1983 that would have killed hundreds of millions — you and me included. (See the sobering history book 1983: Reagan, Andropov, and a World on the Brink to see how close we came.) But Gorbachev, attaining power, was willing to negotiate honestly with the same President Reagan, pulling both powers back from their previous war footing, and seeking genuine arms control and a lasting peace. He Wouldn't Send in the Tanks In 1989, when Communist governments started collapsing all over Europe, Gorbachev could have sent in his troops. In fact, millions of Russians today still think he should have, for the sake of preserving not Communism, but Russian power. But Gorbachev wouldn't. Against his wishes and in the ruins of his own socialist dreams, he allowed the people of East Germany to answer Reagan's call and “tear down this Wall!” Again in 1991, after a coup attempt by hardline Communists that almost claimed his life, Gorbachev again did not use what power he still had to crush his enemies, such as Boris Yeltsin. In a series of moves that got him widely despised by Russians as a weakling, he permitted the Soviet system to vote itself out of existence. Then went on to a life of relative obscurity, his conscience clean. Please Support The Stream: Equipping Christians to Think Clearly About the Political, Economic, and Moral Issues of Our Day. Contrast that with how the rulers of China behaved in 1989, when democracy protests swept their country. They crushed it with tanks and drowned it in blood. Perversely, that seemed to win the respect of Western leaders, who went right on doing business as usual with their regime. We Took Full, Ruthless Advantage of Russian Weakness Toward Russia, our leaders behaved like Machiavellian strategists. We took full advantage of Russia's collapse to violate our promises, and push our NATO alliance right up to its borders — as if the Russians were some conquered, rum-soaked tribe of American Indians whose hunting grounds we coveted. Western advisors like Jeffrey Sachs flew over to Russia, and help set up a system that let old Communist apparatchiks steal most of the country's wealth. We crowed about our “unipolar” moment of unchallenged American power, even as Russians saw their life expectancies plummet, and China rearmed much faster than Hitler in the 30s. Joe Biden, Our Putin Today, our own oligarchy is clinging to power much more ruthlessly than Gorbachev ever did. The Biden regime, unlike Gorbachev's, is holding political purge trials and raiding opponents' homes. Instead of releasing political prisoners as Gorbachev did, Biden is collecting more of them. He's going on TV denouncing his rivals as “fascists,” sounding for all the world like a North Korean propaganda broadcast. Perversely, we might see Biden as the mirror image, anti-Gorbachev. One came up in a system of tyranny and injustice, rose to power honestly, then peacefully dismantled it. The other clawed his way to the top of a once-just, once-free system, and is leading its transformation into a failing one-party state. As I found myself observing, when I first heard the news of his passing: Prayers please for Gorbachev, and for America's delivery from a new evil empire. John Zmirak is a senior editor at The Stream and author or co-author of ten books, including The Politically Incorrect Guide to Immigration and The Politically Incorrect Guide to Catholicism. He is co-author with Jason Jones of “God, Guns, & the Government.”
TESTO DELL'ARTICOLO ➜ www.bastabugie.it/it/articoli.php?id=7128TUTTI I FALLIMENTI DI GORBACIOV di Stefano MagniGli articoli e gli editoriali sulla morte di Gorbaciov, in questi due giorni dopo la sua morte, sono tutti più o meno celebrativi. L'ultimo presidente sovietico fu l'uomo che pose fine alla guerra fredda, dunque viene ricordato soprattutto per il suo ruolo di pace. Ma non si comprende come mai in patria, sia in Russia che nelle altre repubbliche ex sovietiche, sia ricordato con estrema ostilità. Benché rispettato dal nuovo regime, Putin stesso gli ha reso omaggio, non ha ottenuto funerali di Stato. È una figura, ormai storica, divisiva e impopolare. Perché?Si fa presto ad affermare che Gorbaciov sia odiato dai nostalgici dell'Urss, che con Putin sono tornati in auge. Certamente, questa fu l'opposizione più visibile ed anche più violenta. Nel periodo dal 1985 al 1989, il Kgb era ben consapevole dei limiti economici, militari e strutturali dell'Unione Sovietica. Fu il Kgb a incoraggiare la promozione di Gorbaciov a Segretario Generale, dopo la morte di Chernenko, approvata poi dal Comitato Centrale con voto unanime. Gorbaciov era già uomo di fiducia di Andropov, storico direttore del Kgb e poi segretario generale dell'Urss dal 1982 al 1984. Gorbaciov venne selezionato perché relativamente "giovane" (54 anni nel 1985) e aperto di mente, ma fedele al sistema comunista. Il Kgb stesso promosse e in un certo senso incoraggiò l'abbandono dei regimi dell'Est europeo, con quella che venne informalmente chiamata la "dottrina Sinatra": ciascuno per la sua strada. Tuttavia, l'atmosfera cambiò repentinamente quando nei regimi ex comunisti le elezioni vennero vinte da partiti non comunisti, a partire dalla Polonia.Esercito e Kgb si coalizzarono per impedire che la disgregazione del blocco orientale divenisse disgregazione anche della stessa Urss. E pretesero che Gorbaciov imponesse l'ordine alle repubbliche secessioniste, anche proclamando lo stato d'emergenza. Il segretario generale usò la forza (contro Kazakistan, Georgia, Azerbaigian, Lituania e Lettonia), ma rifiutò il cambio di passo preteso da militari e servizi. Fu questo rifiuto che portò al tentativo di golpe contro di lui, nell'agosto del 1991. Il resto è noto: il golpe fallì, Gorbaciov ottenne una vittoria apparente, ma di fatto aveva già perso il potere. Eltsin, il presidente della Repubblica Socialista Federativa Russa, si oppose in prima persona ai militari e divenne lui il leader politico carismatico della nuova stagione russa che portò alla disgregazione dell'Urss. Dopo il collasso sovietico, esercito, ex servizi segreti, burocrazia statale, non perdonarono mai a Gorbaciov di aver causato il "crollo" dell'impero, di essersi lasciato sfuggire di mano il processo di riforme e decentramento che loro stessi avevano avviato.LE REPRESSIONI FINITE NEL SANGUENelle repubbliche ex sovietiche, al contrario, non perdonano a Gorbaciov quelle ultime repressioni della stagione di sangue del 1986-91, volte a tenere assieme un'Urss in piena frammentazione. In Kazakistan ricordano gli oltre 200 morti civili del massacro di Alma Ata del dicembre 1986. Quando Gorbaciov sostituì il segretario generale locale Dinmukhamed Kunaev con il russo Gennadij Kolbin, i kazaki inscenarono proteste che vennero schiacciate con la forza delle armi. Gli armeni non perdonano a Gorbaciov di aver permesso (o non ostacolato abbastanza) i primi massacri compiuti dagli azeri nel Nagorno Karabakh nel 1988 e 1989. Gli azeri, al contrario, non dimenticheranno mai il massacro di Baku, il "gennaio nero" del 1990, quando le forze regolare e le truppe speciali del KGB entrarono nella capitale azera per stroncare sul nascere il locale Fronte Popolare (indipendentista e anti-armeno), uccidendo da 130 a 170 persone, in gran parte civili, fra il 19 e il 20 gennaio. I lituani non dimenticano la "domenica di sangue", culmine di tre giorni di intervento militare sovietico (11-13 gennaio 1991) contro la repubblica baltica, dopo la sua proclamazione di indipendenza. Mentre il mondo era distratto dalla Guerra del Golfo, che sta appena iniziando, i sovietici nella notte fra il sabato 12 e la domenica 13 gennaio 1991, tentarono di occupare la capitale lituana, a partire dalla conquista della sede della televisione. La folla inerme oppose resistenza, vi furono meno morti rispetto ai precedenti massacri (14 le vittime), ma fu comunque traumatico, il tutto ripreso quasi in diretta dai media locali e internazionali. Contemporaneamente, e per lo stesso motivo, i carri sovietici entravano anche a Riga, ma dopo dieci giorni di confronto fra manifestanti (protetti da numerose barricate in cemento) ed esercito, l'Armata si ritirò. Non prima di aver fatto altri 6 morti, fra cui due poliziotti lettoni.I DISSIDENTI RUSSISe nelle repubbliche ex sovietiche vedono in Gorbaciov l'ultimo dei dittatori occupanti, non meno repressivo dei suoi predecessori, anche i dissidenti russi tendono a considerarlo come uno storico bluff. Significativa la reazione di Kasparov, campione di scacchi e poi dissidente: al momento della morte dell'ultimo leader sovietico ha twittato "Come giovane campione del mondo sovietico e beneficiario della perestrojka e della glasnost, ho spinto ogni muro della repressione per testare i limiti improvvisamente mutevoli. Era un periodo di confusione e di opportunità. Il tentativo di Gorbaciov di creare un 'socialismo dal volto umano' fallì, e grazie a Dio". Le pagine più drammatiche di denuncia, le scrisse un altro dissidente, Vladimir Bukovskij, nel suo Gli Archivi Segreti di Mosca: "Per quanto ci affannassimo a spiegare che il sistema sovietico non era una monarchia e che il segretario generale non era uno zar, chi in quel momento non avrebbe comunque augurato il successo al nuovo zar-riformatore? Delle centinaia di migliaia di politici, giornalisti e accademici, solo un minuscolo gruppetto conservò una sufficiente lucidità per non cedere alla seduzione, e un gruppo ancor più sparuto di esprimere apertamente i suoi dubbi".La repressione del dissenso interno non finì affatto con l'ascesa al potere di Gorbaciov. Come documenta Bukovskij, dai files presi negli archivi del Cremlino, ancora nel 1987, il KGB organizzava campagne per arrestare i dissidenti, far fallire le iniziative a favore dei diritti umani, impedire l'ingresso di intellettuali e attivisti stranieri. Il tutto era ordinato da Chebrikov, direttore dei servizi segreti, con il pieno appoggio di Gorbaciov. Nella sua monumentale opera Gulag, la storica Anne Applebaum, ci ricorda come gli ultimi campi di concentramento vennero chiusi nel 1992, l'anno dopo la fine dell'Urss. "Tipica di quel periodo è la vicenda di Bohdan Klimchak - scrive la Applebaum - un tecnico ucraino arrestato per aver tentato di lasciare l'Unione Sovietica. Nel 1978, temendo di essere arrestato con l'accusa di nazionalismo ucraino, aveva varcato la frontiera sovietica con l'Iran e chiesto asilo politico, ma gli iraniani lo avevano rimandato indietro. Nell'aprile 1990 era ancora detenuto nella prigione di Perm. Un gruppo di congressisti americani riuscì a fargli visita e scoprì che, in pratica, a Perm la situazione rimaneva immutata. I prigionieri si lamentavano ancora per il freddo che dovevano patire e venivano rinchiusi nelle celle di rigore per 'reati' come il rifiuto di allacciare l'ultimo bottone dell'uniforme".LE MALDESTRE RIFORME ECONOMICHETuttavia fu un altro prigioniero politico ucraino, Anatolij Marchenko, che determinò un primo grande cambiamento nel sistema concentrazionario sovietico. Per protesta contro le orribili condizioni degli internati nei campi, intraprese lo sciopero della fame e fu lasciato morire l'8 dicembre 1986. La vicenda fece scalpore anche all'estero e Gorbaciov si decise ad approvare un'amnistia generale. Non fu, appunto, la fine del sistema dei campi in quanto tale (che come abbiamo visto chiuse solo nel 1992), ma la fine del Gulag come metodo statale repressivo. Il Kgb accettò, sia secondo la Applebaum, che secondo voci dissidenti come quella di Bukovskij, perché l'amnistia ormai "costava" poco al regime. Non si doveva fare alcuna retromarcia ideologica: i prigionieri, graziati, dovevano comunque firmare delle dichiarazioni di pentimento. E giunti alla fine degli anni Ottanta, la dissidenza, ridotta allo stremo, non era considerata più un pericolo per il regime, come si legge dai documenti di allora.I dissidenti sono, appunto, una minoranza. La maggioranza dei russi ha pessimi ricordi di Gorbaciov per le sue maldestre riforme economiche. "Mi trovai ben presto - ricorda l'allora ambasciatore Sergio Romano al Corriere - ad osservare criticamente gli avvenimenti. Rimproveravo a Mikhail Sergeevic (Gorbaciov, ndr) di non avere un vero programma economico. Va bene concedere più libertà: tutti erano giustamente contenti. Ma cosa fare del sistema di produzione collettivo? Lui parlò della creazione di una 'industria sociale': ma non spiegò mai in cosa consistesse".Gli anni di Gorbaciov furono anni di ristrettezze. E anche di proibizionismo dell'alcool, che aggiunse ulteriore disperazione ad uno scenario lugubre di suo, con code per il pane e razionamenti. Particolarmente catastrofica fu la "riforma monetaria" del 22 gennaio 1991. A sorpresa, nottetempo, per stroncare i proventi del lavoro nero e del contrabbando, vennero confiscate tutte le banconote da 50 e 100 rubli. La procedura di sequestro permise di ritirare dalla circolazione 14 miliardi di rubli in contanti, ma bruciò i risparmi di decine di milioni di sovietici, soprattutto quelli più benestanti.
Jason tells the life story of Mikhail Gorbachev. Read the essay here: https://historywiththeszilagyis.org/hwts129 Find us on Twitter:The Network: @BQNpodcasts. The Show: @SzilagyiHistory.Chrissie: @TheGoddessLivia. Jason: @JasonDarkElf.Join us in the BQN Collective on Facebook. Send topic suggestions via Twitter. History with the Szilagyis is supported by our patrons: Susan Capuzzi-De ClerckEd ChinevereLaura DullKris HillPlease visit patreon.com/historywiththeszilagyis The BQN Podcast Collective is brought to you by our listeners. Special thanks to these patrons on Patreon whose generous contributions help to produce this podcast and the many others on our network! AnonymousTim CooperChrissie De Clerck-SzilagyiThad HaitPeter HongMahendran RadhakrishnanJim McMahonJoe MignoneGreg MolumbyJustin OserTom Van ScotterCarl WondersYou can join this illustrious list by becoming a patron here: https://www.patreon.com/BQN
Unseren geneigten Zuhörer*innen dürfte bewusst sein, dass sich unsere Redakteure Michi und Moritz trotz der Überschrift höchstwahrscheinlich nicht mit aktueller Entwicklung von Bevölkerungsgruppen beschäftigen, sondern mal wieder mit irgendwelchen bereits verstorbenen Personen. Die Rede ist von den beiden sowjetischen Staatsoberhäuptern Andropov und Chernenko, die ganz im Sinne der damals vorherrschenden Gerontokratie erst im gesetzten Alter ihr Amt angetreten haben. Dass man vorher mal beim zuständigen Hausarzt nach Tauglichkeit gefragt hätte, steht auf in einem anderen Zettel. Wir wünschen viel Spaß beim Zuhören.
Unseren geneigten Zuhörer*innen dürfte bewusst sein, dass sich unsere Redakteure Michi und Moritz trotz der Überschrift höchstwahrscheinlich nicht mit aktueller Entwicklung von Bevölkerungsgruppen beschäftigen, sondern mal wieder mit irgendwelchen bereits verstorbenen Personen. Die Rede ist von den beiden sowjetischen Staatsoberhäuptern Andropov und Chernenko, die ganz im Sinne der damals vorherrschenden Gerontokratie erst im gesetzten Alter ihr Amt angetreten haben. Dass man vorher mal beim zuständigen Hausarzt nach Tauglichkeit gefragt hätte, steht auf in einem anderen Zettel. Wir wünschen viel Spaß beim Zuhören.
In certi momenti la Storia può prendere una piega inaspettata per effetto delle azioni di “signori nessuno”, uomini sconosciuti che si sono ritrovati per puro caso al centro di eventi molto più grandi di loro. È partendo da tale considerazione che raccontiamo le vicende avvenute il 26 settembre del 1983, giorno in cui, in un bunker segreto di Mosca, un oscuro ufficiale sovietico di nome Stanislav Petrov si ritrovò a valutare in pochi minuti il presunto lancio di cinque testate nucleari statunitensi verso l'Unione Sovietica. Se avesse seguito la procedura “ordinaria” e segnalato tempestivamente l'allarme ai suoi superiori, l'offensiva russa avrebbe innescato una reazione a catena impossibile da fermare e in pochi minuti il mondo sarebbe probabilmente precipitato nel baratro di un conflitto nucleare. Il tutto, in un anno nel quale le tensioni della guerra fredda tornavano a essere altissime, rinfocolate dai recenti cambi nella leadership sovietica e in quella americana. In questa puntata racconteremo il clima che si respirava nelle ultime fasi del confronto tra Stati Uniti e Unione Sovietica e di come la Storia chiamò in causa Petrov, sulle cui spalle ricadde, per quale istante, il destino del mondo.
durée : 00:59:17 - Les Nuits de France Culture - Histoire et Histoires - Histoires d'espionnage soviétique 8/8 : Partie 9- Andropov, le KGB au pouvoir, Partie 10- La chute du mur, le chant du cygne du KGB (1ère diffusion : 31/08/2000 et 01/09/2000)
On September 1st, 1983, a South Korean commercial airliner inexplicably drifted 200 miles off course into restricted Soviet airspace. In response, a Soviet fighter plane intercepted the aircraft, fired two missiles, and shot it down, killing all 269 people on board. In this standalone episode, we examine one of the most enduring outrages of the Cold War, a mystery that baffled investigators and inflamed political animus for more than a decade. SOURCES: Degani, Asaf. Taming HAL: Designing Interfaces Beyond 2001. Westad, Odd Arne. The Cold War: A World History. 2017. Service, Robert. The End of the Cold War. 2015. Downing, Taylor. 1983: Reagan, Andropov, And A World On The Brink. 2018. Dobbs, Michael. Down With Big Brother. 1997. Hersh, Seymour. The Target Is Destroyed. 1986. Dallin, Alexander. Black Box: KAL 007 and the Superpowers. 1985. https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/public/digitallibrary/dailydiary/1982-09.pdf Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
TESTO DELL'ARTICOLO ➜ www.bastabugie.it/it/articoli.php?id=7000LA METAMORFOSI DELLA SINISTRA ITALIANA: DALL'UNIONE SOVIETICA... ALLA NATO di Antonio SocciLe Metamorfosi di Ovidio? Nulla rispetto alle metamorfosi dei comunisti italici, comprese le più recenti con le quali sono diventati "pasdaran" dell'ortodossia atlantica, severi censori del pacifismo e predicatori umanitari.E questo senza mai riconoscere l'errore di essere stati comunisti al tempo dell'Urss di Breznev e Andropov. Anzi ritengono di avere tutti i titoli per dare lezioni oggi di atlantismo e umanitarismo.Prendiamo l'editoriale (sul "Corriere della sera" di venerdì) di Walter Veltroni, il quale è una persona gentile, intelligente e piacevole, ma in quel pezzo ha cucinato un confuso minestrone in cui riesce a cantare le lodi del Nord Vietnam comunista che combatteva contro "l'invasione straniera" degli Usa e - al tempo stesso - le lodi dei soldati Usa che sbarcarono in Italia e in Normandia per combattere contro il nazifascismo (non furono due "invasioni" per la libertà?).Un inno combattente in cui Veltroni rinfaccia (senza nominarli) a Santoro e compagni il passato, ma dimenticando il suo. E il suo non è il passato di uno qualsiasi: Veltroni - iscrittosi alla Fgci nel 1970 - è stato poi uno dei dirigenti nazionali del Partito Comunista Italiano quando ancora c'era l'Urss e il blocco comunista (la vicenda degli euromissili e di Comiso è degli anni '80 e Veltroni c'era).Il Pci era un "partito fratello" di quel Pcus da cui vengono Putin e la classe dirigente russa di oggi. Quel Pcus a cui obbediva il Pci togliattiano, a lungo finanziato da Mosca (per capire quando finirono i finanziamenti bisogna leggere "Oro da Mosca" di Valerio Riva e non solo "L'oro di Mosca" di Gianni Cervetti).Da chi è stato parte della storia comunista ci si aspetta una riflessione vera sulla classe dirigente post-comunista che oggi governa a Mosca e sulle macerie lasciate dal comunismo.IL PCI E GLI ORRORI DELL'URSSPrima di tuonare per tutto un editoriale contro la presunta "indifferenza" che Veltroni imputa a chi non condivide le sue attuali idee "atlantiste" sull'Ucraina, dovrebbe spiegarci quanto fu "indifferente" il suo Pci nei confronti degli orrori dell'Urss e regimi compagni.Negli anni Settanta, quando lui era un militante comunista, già sapevamo tutto, già era uscito "Arcipelago Gulag" e sull'Unità e poi su Rinascita, nel febbraio ‘74, Giorgio Napolitano, a nome del Pci, scriveva che l'espulsione del dissidente Solzenicyn era "la soluzione migliore "perché lo scrittore aveva "finito per assumere un atteggiamento di ‘sfida' allo Stato sovietico e alle sue leggi" e "non c'è dubbio che questo atteggiamento - al di là delle stesse tesi ideologiche e dei già aberranti giudizi politici di Solzenicyn - avesse suscitato larghissima riprovazione nell'URSS".Napolitano, che allora si scagliava contro "l'antisovietismo", è il simbolo autorevole del passaggio dal Pci filosovietico (lui fu dirigente del Pci al tempo di Togliatti) all'atlantismo più zelante.Ma senza mai fare autocritiche. Nella sua "autobiografia politica" del 2005 intitolata "Dal Pci al socialismo europeo" neanche cita mai Solzenicyn.Carlo Ripa di Meana, nel 2008, alla morte dello scrittore russo, su "Critica sociale", in un articolo intitolato "Solzenicyn e il silenzio del Quirinale", scriveva:"Avevo sommessamente suggerito, qualche mese fa, al Presidente della Repubblica Giorgio Napolitano, che nel 1974, allora responsabile della cultura del PCI, su l'Unità, aveva rumorosamente applaudito all'esilio comminato a Solzenicyn che, va ricordato, aveva già passato otto anni nel Gulag nell'immediato dopoguerra, che in una prossima occasione, o in forma privata o nel corso di una visita di Stato, chiedesse un incontro a Solzenicyn, ormai molto in là con gli anni e malato, per chiudere una pagina nera. Così non è stato. In questi ultimi giorni, mentre in tutto il mondo si sono ascoltate voci di statisti, di rimpianto e di riconoscenza per la grandezza di quest'uomo e della sua vita, da Roma-Quirinale è venuto un silenzio arido, privo di umanità".WALTER VELTRONIVeltroni nel 2008 era il segretario del Pd: si espresse mai sulla vicenda? È sicuro che la storia dei post-comunisti - di cui è parte - oggi legittimi i suoi moniti umanitari sulla presunta "indifferenza" altrui?Oltretutto è un'accusa inaccettabile perché chi si oppone all'invio di armi, come i cattolici, lo fa perché vuole la pace per gli ucraini e lo fa dando loro ogni possibile aiuto umanitario (del resto bisogna anche non essere indifferenti ai costi pesantissimi che i bellicisti vorrebbero imporre agli italiani).Quando si ha un tale passato comunista certamente si può evolvere e cambiare, ma bisognerebbe almeno evitare di andare a fare prediche agli altri sull'indifferenza, l'Occidente e la libertà.Il "Corriere della sera", che oggi è guidato da giornalisti che vengono dall'"Unità", a cominciare dal direttore, si distingue per fanatismo occidentalista. Talleyrand - che di cambi di casacca era esperto - consigliava: "Surtout pas trop de zèle".Anche perché si rischia il cortocircuito. Un intellettuale progressista francese, Robert Redeker, di recente ha osservato:"La simpatia degli europei è legittimamente attratta dall'Ucraina e dalla sua resistenza all'invasione, mentre questa resistenza esprime tutto ciò che gli europei hanno rifiutato negli ultimi decenni, quella cultura alla moda ridicolizzata e che l'istruzione scolastica ha cercato di distruggere: il sentimento della nazione, l'amore per la patria, della terra, il senso del sacrificio militare, la difesa dei confini, la sovranità e la libertà".È questa anche la contraddizione dei post-comunisti italici. Sono passati dall'apologia del cosmopolitismo apolide all'esaltazione del nazionalismo ucraino. Ma il nazionalismo non è lo spirito nazionale, come la polmonite non è il polmone. Il nazionalista impone la sua patria sulle altre. Il patriota ama tutte le patrie.È legittimo e nobile che gli ucraini si difendano dall'invasore. Ma non si può esaltare quel nazionalismo ucraino che dal 2014 ha combattuto le regioni russofone. Somiglia al nazionalismo russo che oggi nega l'Ucraina. Patrie, non nazionalismi.
Wenger is solo and reviews Taylor Downing's history of a crucial year in the Cold War. MrsWenger.com Allinadream.us ManagingExpectationsPodcast.com
Rose Gottemoeller, the Steven C. Házy lecturer at the Center for International Security and Cooperation in Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and research fellow at the Hoover Institution, leads a conversation on international security and cooperation. FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the Winter/Spring 2022 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record, and the video and transcript will be available on our website at CFR.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted and honored to have Rose Gottemoeller with us today to talk about international security and cooperation. Rose Gottemoeller is the Steve C. Házy lecturer at Stanford University's Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies and its Center for International Security and Cooperation. She is also a fellow at the Hoover Institution. From 2016 to 2019, she served as the deputy secretary-general (DSG) of NATO, where she advanced NATO's adaptation to the new security challenges in Europe and the fight against terrorism. And before that, she served as the undersecretary for arms control and international security at the State Department. In 2009 and 2010, she was the assistant secretary of state for arms control, verification, and compliance, during which time she served as chief U.S. negotiator of the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty with the Russian Federation. So, Rose Gottemoeller, thank you very much for being with us. I can't think of anybody better to have this conversation with us than you. When we planned this webinar, we knew it was the sixtieth anniversary of the Cuban Missile Crisis, but what we did not know was Russia would invade Ukraine and that there would be a war going on. So perhaps you can put this in context, talk about the lessons learned from the Cuban Missile Crisis, and where we are now, given what's going on in Ukraine. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you so much, Irina. And it's wonderful to be with you, and with everyone who was able to join us today from across the country. I know there are many impressive institutions who are dialing in, and I really appreciate the chance to have a conversation with you and look forward to talking with the students and hearing what your questions are as well. Let me indeed begin talking today about the Cuban Missile Crisis, which happened sixty years ago this coming October. It was a time—I was a fourth grader at the time. And I remember, I was going to a Catholic school in Dearborn, Michigan. And the nuns said to us: You really must get home quickly tonight, children, there might be a nuclear war. You need to be with your parents. None of us knew exactly what was going on, but we knew that nuclear war was a really bad thing. We'd been through many drills, hiding under our desks or out in the hallway with our head between our knees. I have to tell you, even as a third grader, during one of those drills I thought to myself: If we get hit by a nuclear weapon, putting my head between my knees is not going to help one bit. So even as a third grader, I knew that nuclear weapons were weapons of mass destruction. So, we did manage to solve that crisis, with a secret deal, as it turned out. President Kennedy agreed quietly to withdraw intermediate-range nuclear missiles from Turkey. Never made public, until much later. And Khrushchev agreed to withdraw what were equivalent missiles from Cuba. And we got back to the negotiating table. In fact, the Cuban Missile Crisis dealt not only the United States and the Soviet Union, but other countries around the world, what I call a short, sharp shock. We recognized how devastating would be the effect of nuclear war, and we decided we really did need to talk together about how we were going to control and limit those risks. So, it led to a blossoming of negotiations on all kinds of limitations and controls. First, the Limited Test Ban Treaty. It was a test ban on nuclear testing in the atmosphere that was very quickly agreed after the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy gave an important speech at American University in June of 1963, when he said we really must control this most dangerous of weapons. And he proposed at that time a test ban treaty limiting testing in the atmosphere. And that was agreed rather quickly. It's amazing to me, as an arms control negotiator, that that treaty was then agreed by August of that very year. So record time. The U.K. also joined in those negotiations. But one thing that's very interesting, the Limited Test Ban was the first, I would say also, environmental arms control treaty. It was inspired by the fact that countries around the world and publics around the world were recognizing that testing in the atmosphere was producing a lot of strontium-90 and other radioactive pollutants that were getting into the food supply. Again, I remember from that period my own mother saying, “We've got to be worried about the milk we're drinking because it's got strontium-90 in it from testing in the atmosphere.” So even then, there were some environmental pushes that led to, I think, in part the quick negotiation of the Limited Test Ban Treaty. After that, we went to the step of controlling tests also under the sea and underground, starting with the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, that did not enter into force until the early 1990s. It was a long negotiation, but it was negotiated through that period of the 1960s into the 1970s. We also negotiated what has been the foundational document of the nonproliferation regime: the [Nuclear] Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). That was negotiated through the late 1960s and entered into force in 1972. It did basically designate five nuclear weapon states. These days they are U.S., U.K., France, China, and Russia. But at that time, those nuclear weapon states were the only states that would be permitted to possess nuclear weapons. All other states around the world would give up their right to nuclear weapons. But there was a grand bargain there. The nuclear weapon states agreed to proceed with total nuclear disarmament, under Article 6 of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty, and in return for which the non-nuclear weapon states under the NPT would, again, not build their own weapons. They would prevent proliferation of nuclear weapons. And everyone would work to promote peaceful uses of the atom, whether in nuclear energy, or agriculture, manufacturing, mining industry, et cetera, promoting—or medical uses as well—promoting peaceful uses of the atom. So those are what are called the three pillars of the NPT: disarmament, nonproliferation, and peaceful uses. So that was agreed in 1972. And working in that multilateral way was important, but there was also an impetus given in this commitment to disarmament for the United States and the Soviet Union to get together and to begin to negotiate bilaterally the two together on limiting their nuclear weapons. We built up a tremendous nuclear arsenal during the Cold War years. At the time that we were beginning to talk to the Soviets about limiting nuclear weapons and nuclear weapon delivery systems, missiles and bombers, submarines—at that time, in the late 1960s, we had about 32,000 nuclear warheads, if you can imagine that. And the Soviets built up their stockpile to be about 40,000 nuclear warheads. So there were tremendous numbers of nuclear weapons being held in storage, but there were also tremendous numbers that were deployed. So we worked steadily from that period, the 1970s into the 1980s, to try to limit nuclear weapons. Didn't work so well. There are various reasons why. Most specifically, I think, we were just driving harder and harder with more effective missiles to deploy more warheads on those missiles. And so, by the time we got into the 1980s, we had about 12,000 warheads deployed on missiles and deployed or designated for deployment on bombers. The Soviets the same, about 12,000. Now, remember those numbers I gave you, 32,000 total, 40,000 total in the USSR. We held a lot of weapons in storage, not on top of missiles, not on top of delivery vehicles, as we called them. They were just held in storage. But we also then had 12,000 deployed on missiles and pointed at each other in a very high-readiness state. So we had got through the 1970s and 1980s not blowing each other up, but we also didn't have much success limiting those systems because there was this technological jump ahead, being able to put more warheads on individual missile systems. So, that's when Reagan and Gorbachev entered the scene. In the mid-1980s they got together. Reagan had not been very easy on the USSR when he came into office. He declared the USSR the “evil empire.” And he drove hard military modernization that included some nuclear modernization as well. The sclerotic Soviet leadership at that time, they were dying off one by one. First it was Brezhnev, then it was Andropov, then there was a third fellow. They all went very, very quickly. And Gorbachev took over in the mid-1980s. And he and Reagan actually then got together and began to talk about how they might reduce—not try to limit, because limit wasn't good enough. The technology was always pushing ahead. But how could we actually begin to reduce nuclear weapons and their delivery systems, and the missiles we put them on? So that was the negotiations that began in the 1980s for the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty and also the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, which finally entered into force in 1994. And that treaty, once again, took the number of deployed warheads on both sides down from 12,000 deployed warheads on each side to 6,000 deployed warheads on each side. If you think about one of these warheads, a single warhead is enough to destroy a city. It's nothing like what we're seeing in Ukraine today. Sadly, such horrible destruction and the really barbaric attacks on civilian targets like this maternity hospital yesterday. I'm just heartbroken about this, as I'm sure many of you are. But that was a big bomb that was really directed at a single facility and was very destructive. But if you can imagine a nuclear weapon, that could really pulverize—pulverize—the center of a city. And that's what happened in Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, when the United States was the only country to use nuclear weapons in wartime. And that is what has led to this nuclear taboo that has been pretty clear, because it was recognized these are weapons of mass destruction. They completely pulverize, and many, many lives lost. And those who are left living, as it was said at the time of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, would envy the dead because of the severity of their injuries. So, people were recognizing that we had too many deployed warheads. We had 12,000 pointed at each other on a high state of alert. So getting them down to 6,000 on each side was important. That was the goal of the START treaty. Then in the early 2000s, in 2002, President Bush and President—believe it or not—Putin at that time decided in the Moscow Treaty on a further reduction. That took us down to 2,200 deployed warheads on both sides. And then the treaty that I worked on negotiating, the New START treaty in 2009 and 2010, took us down to 1,550 deployed warheads on both the U.S. and Russian sides. So 12,000 down to 1,550. That's a pretty good disarmament record. And it all sprang from that short, sharp shock of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Now, sixty years later, it's a tragedy, but we seem to be facing another crisis on par with the Cuban Missile Crisis. Vladimir Putin has been rattling the nuclear saber. We are very concerned, not necessarily about a big nuclear exchange between the United States and the Russian Federation, but about some smaller strike, perhaps use of a nuclear weapon on Ukrainian territory, perhaps a so-called demonstration strike, where Russia would launch a nuclear explosion over the Black Sea, for example, just to prove that they're willing to do it. And so, at the moment, we are facing these nuclear threats out of the Kremlin with a lot of concern, but also very serious attitude about how we sustain and maintain nuclear deterrence at this moment of supreme crisis in Ukraine, and ensure that we continue to deter Russia from taking these disastrous actions with weapons of mass destruction. But also think about ways—how can we go forward from here to preserve what we have achieved in these sixty years since the Cuban Missile Crisis. This great foundation of big nuclear international regimes that we have been able to put in place—such as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, that means the only country that has tested nuclear weapons in this century is North Korea. There is a taboo against nuclear testing that is strongly held, the taboo against nuclear use has held since Hiroshima and Nagasaki over seventy-five years ago. And now, we are looking at ensuring that we sustain and maintain the Nonproliferation Treaty regime so that we do not see a lot of new nuclear weapon states emerging across the globe. Just one thing I forgot to mention—President Kennedy spoke quite a bit about these things. I think the Cuban Missile Crisis really for him personally was a big shock, and really provoked his thinking quite a bit—but he said, “We need this Nonproliferation Treaty because otherwise we're going to end up with twenty, twenty-five nuclear weapon states around the world. And that will be hugely destabilizing.” So the Nonproliferation Treaty regime, although we pay attention to the rogue states, the DPRKs [Democratic People's Republic of Koreas], the Irans, of course. It looks like we may be now returning to the Iran nuclear deal. I certainly hope so. We also need Iranian oil at this moment, which is another matter. But we have a couple of nuclear rogues out there. But, in general, we have prevented the proliferation of nuclear weapons, thanks to the Nonproliferation Treaty regime. We need to do everything we can at this moment to preserve and protect these important big regimes. And that goes not only for nuclear, but also the so-called other weapons of mass destruction. The Chemical Weapons Convention bans the use of chemicals in wartime. Not only chemical weapons, that is chemical designed to be used as weapons, but also what we've been seeing in Syria, the use of chlorine gas in wartime. That is forbidden by the Chemical Weapons Convention as well. So we need these big regimes to continue—the Biological Weapons Convention, the same. So I really wanted to stress this point as we get to our discussion period, because it's going to take a lot of attention and effort if Russia is now turning its back on playing a responsible role in the international community. If Russia is turning into a very big pariah state, as I argued yesterday in a piece in Foreign Affairs, we need to figure out what we are going to do, losing Russia as a partner. Because Russia has actually been a great player in negotiating all these treaties and agreements. But if Russia is turning its back on a responsible role in the international community, then the United States has to look for other partners. I would argue that we should be really approaching Beijing. They are, after all, a nuclear weapon state under the Nonproliferation Treaty. And historically they have been a rather responsible nuclear weapon state under the Nonproliferation Treaty, joining in efforts to advance the goals of nuclear disarmament. So it's hard, because at the moment, as you know, Beijing and Washington have been at great odds over any number of issues—Taiwan, trade and investment, human rights with the Uyghurs. So many issues we've been at odds over. But I think the moment has come where we need to think about how we are going to preserve these weapons of mass destruction regimes, the nuclear regimes, the testing—the ban against nuclear testing. How are we going to preserve it in the face of Russia as a pariah state? And that means, I think, we must partner with China. So those are my remarks to begin with. I see we have a few questions already. And I'm really looking forward to our discussion. Irina, back over to you. FASKIANOS: Rose, thank you very much. So let's start with a raised hand from Babak Salimitari. And please state your institution and unmute yourself. Q: Good morning. My name is Babak Salimitari. I'm a third-year economics major at University of California, Irvine. And my question really pertains with NATO as a force for international security. I was looking at the list of countries that were not paying the 2 percent of their necessary GDP for defense. And these are some rich countries, like Norway, and the Netherlands, and Germany. These aren't poor, third-world countries. I don't understand why they don't pay their fair share. So when you were in NATO, what did you tell these people? GOTTEMOELLER: That's a very good question, Babak. And, honestly, it's been great for me to watch now with this otherwise terrible crisis in Ukraine—it's been great for me to watch that countries who were very resistant of paying their 2 percent of GDP are now stepping forward and saying they are ready to do so. And Germany is the prime example. President Trump was very insistent on this matter, and very much threatening dire action by the United States, including that the United States would fail to honor its so-called Article 5 commitments to NATO, which that is—under the founding document of NATO, the so-called Washington Treaty of 1949, Article 5 states that if a single country in the NATO alliance is attacked, then all countries must—and it asks for help, there's that important point too—if it asks for help then other NATO countries are obliged to come to its assistance in defending it. So President Trump was threatening that the United States would not fulfill its Article 5 commitments. He was very tough on this matter. I was the deputy secretary-general at NATO during the years of the Trump presidency. My boss and I, Jens Stoltenberg and I, always welcomed President Trump's pressure on these matters, because every single U.S. president, again, since Jack Kennedy—I'll go back to him. There's a great—now in the public domain—a great report of a National Security Council meeting where John Kennedy says, “I am tired of these NATO European freeloaders. We spend all the money on defense; they take our defenses and don't build up their own. And they're freeloading, they're freeriding on us.” So every single U.S. president has raised this issue with the allies. But it was Donald Trump who got them to really sit up and take notice in the first instance. So President—I'm sorry—Secretary-General Stoltenberg and I always supported his efforts, although we were not supportive of his drawing any question about U.S. obligations with regard to Article 5. But we supported his efforts to push the allies on paying 2 percent of GDP. A number of them did step up during the Trump years, and so more were paying 2 percent of GDP now with this crisis. Unfortunately, again, it's taken a dire crisis in Ukraine. But we see even Germany stepping up. Just one final word on Germany. At the time, when I was DSG, they kept saying, well 2 percent of our GDP, we are the most enormous economy in Europe. And if we spend 2 percent of GDP, then other countries are going to start worrying about casting back to the past and remembering Nazi Germany, and thinking about the big military buildup in the 1930s. So we don't want that to happen. So that was very deeply ingrained in the political elites in Berlin. But now, we're seeing that 180-degree switch just in the last ten days. I think it's remarkable. But I welcome it, for one, that they are now willing to spend 2 percent of GDP on defense. FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to take the next question, a written question, from Caleb Kahila, undergraduate student at the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater. One issue that I don't hear much about is the actions of individuals involved in nuclear weapons. An example is Abdul Qadeer Khan, who leads the Pakistani nuclear program but is also believed to have given nuclear information to Iran, North Korea, among others. With examples like Khan, should the international community take the issue of individual nuclear proliferation more seriously? GOTTEMOELLER: That is a great question. And indeed, certain individuals have had a profoundly malignant effect on nuclear nonproliferation. It is worthwhile to note that the Nonproliferation Treaty—the membership is very wide, but there are a few outliers. And India and Pakistan are both outliers. And I think for some weird reason, Khan felt justified in being an outlier to share nuclear weapons information with a number of countries, including also Libya, as I understand. So there was this notion I think that he had, almost an ideological notion—he's dead now—but an ideological notion of producing an Islamic bomb to counter both the Indians, their mortal enemies, but also to ensure that the rest of the world did not mess with Pakistan, and also did not mess with the rest of the Muslim world, the Islamic world. So it was, I think, very clear that this one malignant individual had an enormous deleterious effect on the nonproliferation regime. We have been able to, I think, place constraints and dial back in many ways from some of his export activities, including when the Libyans were willing to give up their weapons of mass destruction programs. But you're absolutely right that it necessary to pay attention to individuals—powerful individuals, they have to be—who have that kind of access. And luckily, they are fairly rare. But we have to pay attention to the individuals who could make a very big problem for the nonproliferation regime. I do worry nowadays about the North Koreans, about the DPRK. The trouble is, they are themselves bent on acquiring nuclear bombs. And if they give away their fissile material, for example. One of the big barriers to getting a bomb is you need a significant amount of either highly enriched uranium or plutonium. And it's rather difficult to acquire. So if the DPRK were going to get into this business of giving away their expertise, the next question would be, well, how about some fissile material to back that up? And I dare say, they'd rather keep all their fissile material for themselves. But that's a very good question, Caleb. Thank you for that. FASKIANOS: I'm going to go next Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome at Brooklyn College. Q: Thank you very much. Mojúbàolú Olúfúnké Okome. And I teach political science at Brooklyn College. And I have two issues that are kind of bothering me. One is, what are the chances that Russia will turn its back on the NPT in totality, and on other weapons regimes in this war? And then, besides an alliance with China, what are the other options for the U.S.? The second thing is, would Russia have been so bold to invade Ukraine if Ukraine hadn't destroyed its weapons—it's nuclear weapons and joined the NPT? I remember a Mearsheimer article in Foreign Affairs, I think, where he was giving a very unpopular view at that time that nuclear—destroying nuclear weapons in the Ukraine was a bad idea, because there was a need to kind of have a defense against Russia's potential invasion of the Ukraine. This was in the 1990s. And now it seems like he was right. So I'm just wondering what you think of these two issues. GOTTEMOELLER: Very good questions, Dr. Okome. And very difficult ones. But let me start on your first question. I argued yesterday in my Foreign Affairs article that I don't think it's so much that Russia would actually leave the regimes. I don't believe that they would turn their backs on the regimes by leaving them. What I believe, though, is that they will just prove to be not the good partner they have been historically. Historically they have really been, as I put it in the article, a giant of the nonproliferation regime, always looking for solutions for problems. Helping to drive forward top priorities, not only in the Nonproliferation Treaty but in what I call the wider regime, which includes these other treaties and agreements, including our bilateral treaties, the New START treaty is currently still in force, thank God. So I do worry that now they would instead turn to a more negative role, perhaps a wrecker role, in trying to stymie decision making in the regime implementation bodies, and trying to be mischievous in the way they interact with the rest of the regime members. And for that reason, I think we will need to have strong leadership. And the United States will need allies. And so that is why I have been emphasizing looking to China as a possible ally in what will be a very difficult, very difficult time going forward. But I do feel very sure that we must have as a top objective, a top priority preserving these regimes and agreements. Your second question, let me say a few words about the so-called Budapest Memorandum. I was involved in negotiating it. I worked for President Clinton in the 1990s. I was convinced at the time, I remain convinced, that what the Budapest Memorandum bought Ukraine was thirty years of peace and stability to build itself up as an independent and sovereign nation. We, in the Clinton administration, argued to Ukraine at the time that if they tried to hang on to the nuclear weapons that were left on their territory after the breakup of the Soviet Union, that they would end up in an immediate conflict with Russia that would be destabilizing and would not allow their fragile, young democracy to take root. And I still believe that very strongly. For those of you who don't remember those years, when the Soviet Union broke apart, over a thousand warheads were left on Ukrainian territory, over a thousand warheads were left on Kazakh territory, Kazakhstan, and approximately a hundred warheads were left in Belarus. So there—and there were strategic delivery vehicles. There were intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) deployed in all three countries, and there were bombers deployed in Ukraine. So there were weapon systems that needed to be destroyed and eliminated. And in this case, we got the Ukrainians to agree to join the Nonproliferation Treaty as a non-nuclear weapon state. Their warheads were returned to Russia for down-blending to low-enriched uranium, which was then used in—(laughs)—it's ironic—but it was used for power plant fuel for the nuclear power plants in Ukraine. I do want to stress that at that time there was a very cooperative negotiation going on. And our assumption working—it was with the Russians and the Ukrainians and the Americans together. We were all working on this problem together in good faith. And it was a very, very positive effort overall. I still believe that Ukraine would have been caught immediately in the maelstrom of conflict with Russia if they had tried somehow to hang onto those weapons. And technically, it would not have been easy, because the command and control of all those missiles was in Moscow. It was not in Ukraine. They would have had to try to guillotine themselves from the command-and-control system in Moscow and build up a command-and-control system in Ukraine for these nuclear weapon systems. And it was our judgment, it remains my judgment, that it would have been very destructive for the young Ukrainian state, the young Ukrainian democracy to try to hang on to them. And I do think that they have taken shape as an independent power, not entirely healthy economically but, before this terrible crisis, their economy was growing. And so I do think that what we are seeing today, with the brave—very brave defense of Ukraine by the Ukrainian public, and its armed forces, and first and foremost its president—that was all born out of the thirty years that the Ukrainians got to build up their country as an independent and sovereign state. And, again, they would not have had that if they had insisted in the 1990s on holding onto nuclear weapons. FASKIANOS: Great. I'm going to take a written question from Michael Strmiska, who is associate professor of world history at Orange County Community College in New York State. I'm going to shorten it. In essence, the Biden administration has said they will not impose a no-fly zone, as have other nations. And then we recently saw the Polish fighter jets via the U.S. to Ukraine. They have declined on that. So at what point do you think—there's been a lot of talk that either one of those will trigger a nuclear war. And in his question he says: Putin says “nuke” and we run and hide. If the death toll in Ukraine approaches the levels of the Holocaust, do you think the calculus will change? And do you think that this—that would trigger nuclear war? GOTTEMOELLER: Well, it's a complex question, Dr. Strmiska. Let me—let me try to give you my point of view on it. I'll just say, first of all, that I don't think we're running and hiding at all. We have sustained—and when I say “we” I'm still talking as if I'm NATO DSG. (Laughs.) But what I mean is the United States and its NATO allies have been providing a steady stream of military assistance to Ukraine, and a steady stream of humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, and also to the countries bordering Ukraine—Moldova, Hungary, Poland—that are—that are sheltering refugees from Ukraine. So we are really, I think, continuing to support them in, so far, pretty amazing ways. I have been talking to some military experts this morning, retired military officers here in the United States. And they think Putin and the Russians may be running out of ammo. We'll see to it that the Ukrainians do not run out of ammo. And so we are doing a lot to help them. And in terms of the deterrence messaging that's gone on, I've actually been rather admiring of the way that the administration has been clear about, and firm, about the dangers of rattling the nuclear saber, but also has been very clear that we are not taking steps ourselves to up the readiness of our nuclear forces, nor will we do so. They, the White House and the Department of Defense (DOD), basically postponed an ICBM test this week to ensure that there was no hint of a message that we, ourselves, are escalating. But we've been very firm and clear that nuclear use of any kind would be crossing, for us, a redline that is significant. So now let me get to your question about the no-fly zone, because I think this is—this is a complex question. It's turned into this kind of cause célèbre in the media, the press. You're watching the twenty-four-hour news cycle. All of us are, like, glued to our televisions right now, it's so horrible what is unfolding before us in Ukraine. So everybody's saying, no-fly zone, no-fly zone, no-fly zone. But when you look at it, the Russians aren't actually flying aircraft very much in Ukraine. These missiles are being delivered from Russian territory, from Belarusian territory, from ships in the Black Sea, and some now from Ukrainian territory in Donetsk and Luhansk in the eastern part of the country. But the vast majority—yesterday, the count was over 670 missiles. The vast majority of them have come from Russia. The Ukrainians don't need a no-fly zone right now. They need missile defenses. And so some of the actions that have been taken, for example, by the—by the U.K. government, for example, to get into their hands some handheld capability—now, these are not going to go after those big missiles, like the terrible explosion at the maternity hospital yesterday. That was caused by a very big missile. But some—they can be useful to defend their skies against some smaller—some smaller projectiles. And I think that's going to be important, those kinds of steps. I wish there were a way to get the Ukrainians the Israeli Iron Dome system. That's the best missile defense system around for short- to medium-range missiles. But I have my doubts that—(laughs)—the Israelis are going to want to get involved in this thing. But that's the point. This is not an air superiority problem at the moment. It is a problem of missile attacks. And so we need to do, I think, what we can to, again, get some help to the—to the Ukrainians. But we've got to be clear in our own mind what kind of help they really need. We'll see. This could change. And the Russians are upping their activity, so it may turn into more of an air battle than it has been up to this point. But I think it's really good to think harder about what the actual threat to Ukraine is today, rather than just being so fixated on a no-fly zone. FASKIANOS: Thank you. That's an important clarification. Let's go now to Kazi Sazid, who has raised his hand. Q: Hello. So I'm a political science student at CUNY Hunter College, just right next to CFR, actually. So my question is, we've seen in the past in how geopolitics and geopolitical biases obscures if not manipulates the reality of certain threats to international security and cooperation. One example is Nixon destabilizing the Allende government because there's a fear that socialism triumphed the narrative that socialism can only happen through dictatorships basically falls flat. So my question is, what avenues and mechanisms are available to ensure that security situations are not sensationalized to the point where people believe it is a bigger threat than it truly is? Sorry if that's a loaded question. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, it's a good question because it points to the information/misinformation space. And I think we've all been thinking about that a lot right now. And the United States and its NATO allies I think in the run up to the invasion actually were doing a pretty good job controlling the information space by, for example, undoing these false-flag operations that the Russians were trying to launch in the run-up to the invasion. They were actually apparently on the cusp of trying to replace the Zelenskyy government with their own puppet government. All of this was outed by some very astute use of intelligence by, again, the U.S. and the U.K., and getting it out into the information space. So in the run-up to the invasion, we were actually winning the misinformation war. Nowadays, I'm a little concerned about a couple of things. First, I'm concerned—well, there's so much to talk about here, but let me—let me just give it a shot, Kazi. We have to be concerned about the fact that Vladimir Putin is closed up in his bubble with his small cohort and is not getting sources of information that may cause him to think twice about what he's doing. And that is of concern when you're trying to deter the man, when you're trying to ensure that he knows that there will be a firm response. I don't think he had any idea—and maybe even today doesn't have any idea—at the strong pushback and the very capable pushback he's getting from the Ukrainian armed forces. They are defending their country well. And the Ukrainian public is joining in on that effort. Putin, in his bubble, just did not realize that. And now I'm not sure he's getting the information that would really help him to understand the situation that his armed forces are in right now. If, as my military experts conveyed this morning, they're beginning to run low on missiles, they're beginning to run low on ammunition, it's going to be a problem. They're going to start doing worse, rather than being able to pick up the pace, as we were talking about a moment ago, and as many people expect. So that's number one problem, is how is that deterrence messaging thing working with the Kremlin right now? The second thing I'd point to, though, is how do we reach the Russian people? Everybody takes note of the fact that all the—the internet backbone is closing down now in Ukraine. Harder and harder for Russians who are interested to get independent news that is not the product of state TV and state radio, state propaganda outlets. So how to get that message across is one that is really, really important. But I note at the same time, there was a poll that came out yesterday that was so interesting to me. It said, 58 percent of Russians support the war. And they say, well, that's pretty good. 58 percent of Russians support the war? But then when you think about it, there were a lot of “I don't knows” in that—in that poll as well. And when people don't want to say publicly what they really think they may say “I don't know,” or “I don't have an opinion on this matter.” Fifty-eight percent, when you juxtapose it against the support for the invasion of Crimea in 2014, is extraordinarily low. There was over 90 percent support for the invasion of Crimea in 2014. And now we're looking at 58 percent against the war—no, I'm sorry—it's 58 percent support the war. Sorry about that. And then a bunch of “I don't knows” in there, or “I don't want to comment” in there. So I think that there is an issue here about trying to talk directly to the Russian people. And the president has discussed that already in public. And I think we need to do better about figuring out how to reach the Russian people, especially now that social media's being shut down, other, I would say, more open forms of internet communications are being—are being shut down. We need to figure out how to message the Russian people as well. And finally, I'm not sure I'm actually answering your question, but I think—I think it's time that we start pivoting. We, the United States and NATO, to a more positive overall message of global leadership. That this is about our values and this is about what we want the world to be like in the years going forward. Let's talk about what we would need to support an independent Ukraine, no matter what. And let's talk about how we see the necessity of democratic principles and the rule of law being reenergized, restrengthened by this terrible crisis. I think we need to get a message out there about how we have a positive agenda, and we will push to pursue it, come what may. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Our next question is from Susie Risk, a first-year economics student at West Virginia University. Do you believe economic sanctions from the West on Russia is a viable way to slow Russia's advance on Ukraine? From my understanding they are mostly affecting civilians in the country, not those attacking Ukraine. And what are the other ways states like the U.S. could affect Russia in a nonviolent way? GOTTEMOELLER: I actually think the coherence of these sanctions across the board have turned them into a powerful instrument to both convey to the Kremlin, to the Russian government, and to the Russian people that they are on the wrong course. The coherence of them—there aren't any workarounds left. And in fact, even in the case of the Europeans, for example, saying that they can only cut back partially on their purchases of Russian oil because they cannot—they can't do without Russian oil and gas at the moment, but they say they're going to cut by 65 percent by the end of the year. OK, that's great, but what I'm hearing is, again, this status of the Russian Federation now as being the invader, being the country that has taken these wrong steps and is so deserving of these coherent sanctions across the board, that it is leading—like, the insurance industry—to think twice about insuring tankers that are picking up Russian oil. And so it's leading to ports messaging that they will not offload Russian oil. So despite the fact that they are still selling oil, the overall behavior of the Russian Federation and the way it is now wrapped in this coherent sanctions regime, is leading, I think, to a situation where, yeah, sure, they're going to continue to put some oil through—gas and oil through the pipelines into Europe. And they, I think, may be more likely to continue pushing that, rather than trying to turn the tap on and off, as they've done historically to try to pressure the Europeans. I think they'll be wanting to sell their gas and oil. But I think increasingly, on the stock market and in other settings, they are going to have a harder and harder time pushing oil sales, gas and oil sales. So you see this coherent sanctions regime as having knock-on effects that I think will have an even greater effect on the Russian economy, even on the Russian oil economy. FASKIANOS: It's been pretty amazing to watch the sanctions both from governments and from private—as you said—private companies and social media companies pulling out. Starbucks, Coca-Cola, and all of that, to try to—and the ruble has devalued. I think it is pretty much devalued to the very bottom. GOTTEMOELLER: Well, that's a great—that's a great point too, Irina. And particularly mentioning the sanctions against the central bank have had a profound effect. Russian rating has gone to junk—it's gone below junk bond status now, and so they're not rated anymore by the big rating companies. So it's had a profound effect on the Russian economy overall. And so, I'm wondering about—they've got very good technocrats running their banking system. That was always, I think, one of the things Putin was very proud about in coming out of the 2014 invasion of Crimea with a lot of sanctions slapped on him. He basically turned his country inward and said we are going to be more self-sufficient now and you, the bankers, you do what you can to ensure that we have lots of reserves, a rainy-day fund, that we are protected from shocks in future. Well, what happened in sanctioning the central bank is 70 percent of that rainy-day fund is held in Western financial institutions, and those now have placed blocks on the Russians getting their hands on their—on their financial reserves. So I think those steps have been coherent and very strong and have led to this really tanking of the Russian economy. FASKIANOS: Right. And with the sanctions now affecting the oligarchs and the well-to-do in Russia, that also could bring pressure on Putin—assuming they can get close enough to him—because, as you said, he is very much in a bubble that probably has been exacerbated by the two-year pandemic that we all have been living through. I'm going to go next to Nancy Gallagher, with a raised hand. Nancy, over to you. There we go. Q: I'd love to go back to the history that you started with briefly as a way of thinking about the future. And you've spent your entire career, basically, thinking about what mix of toughness and cooperation is appropriate for our relations with Russia or the Soviet Union at any given time. And even during the worst periods that you talked about, there was still some tacit cooperation that was going on to make sure—or to try to reduce the risks of a nuclear war that neither side really wanted. So it's never been 100 percent confrontation. And I'm just wondering, as you think about our relationship with Russia now, whether you've essentially written Russia off for the indefinite future or if you think that we should be continuing to think about ways of simultaneously being as tough as we need to right now, but also not completely closing the door on cooperation either to keep the risks of escalation under control now or to improve the prospects for reengagement with Russia in the future. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you for that question, Nancy, and thank you so much for joining this call. The other half of my Foreign Affairs piece yesterday talked about this and really stressed, as strongly as I could, that we need to do everything we can to keep Russia at the nuclear, both arms control and also nonproliferation regime tables, that we need to do everything—for one thing, Russia, as I mentioned, has been a giant of these regimes. They are really very good diplomats and negotiators who work these issues, and they can help to find solutions. They have helped to find solutions throughout the fifty years since we began seriously negotiating bilaterally in the Strategic Arms Limitation agreement of the 1970s, agreed in 1972. From that time forward to the present day, fifty years we've had this great relationship at the negotiating table. We haven't agreed by any means at every step of the way, and sometimes we've been in negative territory, but we've always slowly and steadily driven forward on nuclear disarmament objectives. So I think we need to do everything we can to preserve that, and I am hopeful that we can do so. Even in the depths of this horrendous crisis, the Russians have been continuing—although with some issues coming up in recent days over sanctions—but they've been continuing to try to resuscitate the Iran nuclear deal. And I've got my fingers and toes crossed that, in fact, we will resuscitate the Iran nuclear deal. Now, the Russians maybe were reluctant at the moment because I think the United States is seeing the potential for Iranian oil to start to flow again, which would help with this cutoff that we've embraced of our purchases of Russian oil and gas. So there's a whole bunch of issues there. But the point I wanted to make is, despite this severe disagreement and a really dire crisis over Ukraine, in this particular case we've been able to continue to work together more or less positively, and that has been the history of this. Nuclear weapons are an existential threat to our survival and to the survival of Russia, clearly, but also to humankind. If we suddenly have a massive nuclear exchange, the effect on humankind overall is going to be dire. So for that reason, that existential threat has continued to place us together at the negotiating table to try to find solutions here. So I do hope that we can work our way through this and find ourselves back at the table with the Russians before too long to negotiate a replacement for the New START Treaty, which goes out of force in 2026, and to work on other issues, such as a replacement for the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces Treaty, which we withdrew from after Russian violations in 2019. But I think there are actually some good proposals on the table about how we return to constraints on intermediate-range ground-launched missiles. The Russians initiated some of those. Again, they are good diplomats and they are good policymakers in this realm, so I would hate to do without them. But what spurred my concern in the first place and what led to the article was this message that Dmitry Medvedev put out two weeks ago when he said, well, maybe we ought to, just withdraw from the New START Treaty and maybe we ought to just kick the embassies out of Moscow and hang—kick all the diplomats out and hang big padlocks on the embassies. Maybe we don't need the world was his message, and that's what alarmed me, so that's why I was talking about the worst case. But I do hope we can keep the Russians at the table. FASKIANOS: And just to pick up, Doru Tsaganea, an associate professor at the Metropolitan College of New York, has a question about China. And there have been reports that Xi asked Putin to hold off the invasion until after the Olympics in Beijing. There seems to be alliance between China and Russia, and now some—maybe China coming back can be—I mean, the way to bring—to give Putin an off ramp is via China. You just wrote this article in Foreign Affairs about—and you've mentioned how we can leverage—really get China in the mix to help give Putin an off ramp. Can you talk a little bit more about that dynamic? GOTTEMOELLER: Yes. Again, I started thinking about this—well, I was thinking about it during their appearance together at the Olympics—at the Olympics opening ceremony. Doesn't that seem like twenty years ago now? February 4, it was. FASKIANOS: It does. (Laughs.) GOTTEMOELLER: But, clearly, they have a joint agenda. They'll be working together on some things. But I was actually—at the time, I was actually quite positively impressed that what they did talk about—the one thing they talked about in the arms-control realm was beginning to put in place constraints on ground-launched intermediate-range missiles not only in Europe, but also in Asia. And I thought, wow, now that's interesting. If there's going to be, you know, generally Eurasian constraints on ground-launched intermediate range missiles, that's a really interesting development. And so I came away from February 4, rather positively impressed that we might be able to do something with both Russia and China in that regard. But fast forward to the 24 of February and the invasion of Ukraine, and here in—just a few days after that terrible day, the foreign minister of Ukraine, Mr. Kuleba, phoned his counterpart in Beijing and asked for facilitation again of diplomacy with Russia. And at least from the readouts of that meeting, slightly less forward-leaning on the Chinese side but not contradicting anything Kuleba said, the Chinese seemed to indicate a willingness to facilitate diplomacy. It does—I don't know what's going on behind the scenes. In diplomacy, it's always better if you don't know what's going on behind the scenes—(laughs)—if it is quiet diplomacy, if it's not out in public, if it's not this—one of the reasons why I was pretty—well, we all hoped against hope regarding no invasion. But, the Russians seemed to be in bad faith from December on because they kept playing at megaphone diplomacy—putting out their proposals to the public and the press, and even leaking U.S. answers in some cases. So they were clearly not playing a proper diplomatic game, which is quiet diplomacy behind the scenes trying to make quiet progress. So I hope that this Chinese facilitation has begun. I have no hint of it at the moment, but I certainly think that it could be—it could be a productive way to begin to develop some new off ramp. We've tried a lot off ramps with Putin and it hasn't worked, but maybe the Chinese can help us develop another way of approaching this matter. Finally, I will just take note of the fact that there are other facilitators in the game. For example, President Erdoğan of Turkey has been very active, and today there is a meeting between the foreign ministers of—again, Kuleba, foreign minister of Ukraine, and Foreign Minister Lavrov of Russia in Turkey. I, for one, I haven't seen any reports of it. You may have seen reports of the outcome, Irina, but I think that that—that kind of facilitation is important, and I hope it will continue. We all want to see diplomacy taking precedence over the bombing of innocent civilians in Ukraine. FASKIANOS: Right. There are a lot more questions, and I—we can't get to them. I apologize. But I don't want to—and we are at the end of our time, but I just want to give you an opportunity and give the students to hear your thoughts on public service. You've devoted your—mostly your entire career to it. You're now teaching. You have a lecturer spot at Stanford, so you're clearly working with students. And what you would say about public service. GOTTEMOELLER: I was so privileged to have the opportunity to serve both President Clinton and President Obama. I think if you can in your career do a stint of public service it will be absolutely a wonderful experience for you. Now, sometimes bureaucracies can be pretty frustrating, but it's worth—it's worth the price of admission, I would say, to begin to operate inside that system, to begin to figure out how to make progress, and it is the way you put ideas into action. You know, from the outside I can write all the op-eds I want to, and, yeah, some of them may get picked up by somebody inside the government. But when you're working inside the government, you can really put ideas into action from the lowest levels, even if you have a chance to be an intern at the State Department or in one of the other agencies of government, you can begin to get a flavor for this. But you might be surprised that they're asking for your opinion because you all at the, I would say, less-old—(laughs)—end of the spectrum have a lot of good new ideas about how the world should work going forward. And particularly I think this problem I talked about, how to communicate now directly with the Russian people, for example, you've got the skills and savvy to help people inside government to understand how to—how to do that effectively. So you've got some special skills, I think, that are much needed at the present time. So I would not shy away from some time in government. People often ask me, well, won't I get trapped there? I think your generation will not get trapped there just because you already think about the world of work differently. You're not going to be a lifer in any organization. You don't want to start in the State Department and work there for forty years. You'll be working, in—maybe in Silicon Valley; and then you go work for Capitol Hill, the Congress; then you may go into government for a little while, the executive branch; and then back to—back to the corporate world. So I know that you'll be thinking quite differently about how to build your careers, but don't shy away from public service. It's a very good experience and it's where you can make a difference. FASKIANOS: Well, with that, Rose Gottemoeller, thank you very much for being with us today and for sharing your expertise and analysis. We really appreciate it. And giving us a historical context, which is so valuable to understanding where we are today. You can follow Rose on Twitter at @gottemoeller. Our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, March 23, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Time. Jody Freeman at Harvard University will talk about global climate policy. We will send out the link to this discussion—the video, transcript—as well as the link to Rose's Foreign Affairs article so you can read it if you didn't have a chance. It was in yesterday's background. And I encourage you to follow us on Twitter at @CFR_academic, and go to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research and analysis on global issues. So thank you all again and thank you, Rose. GOTTEMOELLER: Thank you. Thanks for a great discussion. (END)
Connor, Christian and Donald sit down to discuss the collapse of the Soviet Union. They begin by situating the economic and political problems of the system, such as the siege economy and the centralization/decentralization dichotomies which led to the general malaise of the late Brezhnev period. They continue by discussing the rise of Andropov and Gorbachev, and what reforms they tried to implement: bans on alcohol and the opening of political discussion, and how those reforms ended up backfiring. They follow up by discuss the Five Year Plan of 86-90, the two stages of economic reforms and their adverse effects, the coalition that appears which pushes for the dismantling of the Soviet Union, the rise of Boris Yeltsin and his association to Russian nationalism and the failed coup and how it signaled the transition of sovereignty and the end of the USSR. They also discuss what happened after the collapse, including shock therapy, the 1993 bombing of the parliament and the legacy of the USSR's collapse in Russia's present political system and economical situation, before finishing with an evaluation of all attempts to reform the Soviet Union. References: The Russian Revolution 1917-1932 - Sheila Fitzpatrick Revolution from Above: The Demise of the Soviet System - David M. Kotz Inside Gorbachev's Kremlin: The Memoirs of Yegor Ligachev - Yegor Ligachev Soviet Baby Boomers: An Oral History of Russia's Cold War Generation - Donald J. Raleigh Everything was Forever, Until it was No More: The Last Soviet Generation - Alexei Yurchak
Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: 9/26 is Petrov Day, published by Eliezer Yudkowsky on the LessWrong. Today is September 26th, Petrov Day, celebrated to honor the deed of Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov on September 26th, 1983. Wherever you are, whatever you're doing, take a minute to not destroy the world. The story begins on September 1st, 1983, when Soviet jet interceptors shot down a Korean Air Lines civilian airliner after the aircraft crossed into Soviet airspace and then, for reasons still unknown, failed to respond to radio hails. 269 passengers and crew died, including US Congressman Lawrence McDonald. Ronald Reagan called it "barbarism", "inhuman brutality", "a crime against humanity that must never be forgotten". Note that this was already a very, very poor time for US/USSR relations. Andropov, the ailing Soviet leader, was half-convinced the US was planning a first strike. The KGB sent a flash message to its operatives warning them to prepare for possible nuclear war. On September 26th, 1983, Lieutenant Colonel Stanislav Yevgrafovich Petrov was the officer on duty when the warning system reported a US missile launch. Petrov kept calm, suspecting a computer error. Then the system reported another US missile launch. And another, and another, and another. What had actually happened, investigators later determined, was sunlight on high-altitude clouds aligning with the satellite view on a US missile base. In the command post there were beeping signals, flashing lights, and officers screaming at people to remain calm. According to several accounts I've read, there was a large flashing screen from the automated computer system saying simply "START" (presumably in Russian). Afterward, when investigators asked Petrov why he hadn't written everything down in the logbook, Petrov replied,"Because I had a phone in one hand and the intercom in the other, and I don't have a third hand." The policy of the Soviet Union called for launch on warning. The Soviet Union's land radar could not detect missiles over the horizon, and waiting for positive identification would limit the response time to minutes. Petrov's report would be relayed to his military superiors, who would decide whether to start a nuclear war. Petrov decided that, all else being equal, he would prefer not to destroy the world. He sent messages declaring the launch detection a false alarm, based solely on his personal belief that the US did not seem likely to start an attack using only five missiles. Petrov was first congratulated, then extensively interrogated, then reprimanded for failing to follow procedure. He resigned in poor health from the military several months later. According to Wikipedia, he is spending his retirement in relative poverty in the town of Fryazino, on a pension of $200/month. In 2004, the Association of World Citizens gave Petrov a trophy and $1000. There is also a movie scheduled for release in 2008, entitled The Red Button and the Man Who Saved the World. Maybe someday, the names of people who decide not to start nuclear wars will be as well known as the name of Britney Spears. Looking forward to such a time, when humankind has grown a little wiser, let us celebrate, in this moment, Petrov Day. Thanks for listening. to help us out with the nonlinear library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.
Death of Yuri Andropov (14 Feb 1984) (Tues 1200GMT). Andropov succeeded Brezhnev as General Secretary of the Communist Party. Radio Moscow shortwave broadcast. Recorded by Ian Holder. Part of the Shortwave Transmissions project, documenting and reimagining the sounds of shortwave radio - find out more and see the whole project at https://citiesandmemory.com/shortwave
•Fake History• Der Kalte Krieg eskaliert: die Wahrheit über die Tschernobyl-Katastrophe, 9/11 und den verhinderten 3. Weltkrieg. Marcus Longinus hat noch ein paar Stories in petto, um die Psychologin Dr. Adler zu überraschen. // Von Robert Weber / Regie: Annette Kurth / WDR 2021 / www.wdr.de/k/hoerspiel-newsletter
Today in history: Lisa 'Left Eye' Lopes dies. Samantha Smith recieves letter from Yuri V. Andropov. U.S. declares war on Spain. United Nations organized. First person executed via guillotine.
Tom and Don chat about this year's unique Ramadan experience and how we are handling quarantine so far. We talk Ad Astra and Islam and Andropov and several other questions from the audience. Mentioned: The Crusades Through Arab Eyes by Amin Maalouf, Hamza Yusuf (Foundations of Islam Series available on YouTube at the Islam on Demand channel, Vision of Islam CD Series, Life of the Prophet Muhammad all available on YouTube), Abdul Hakim Murad's reading list (https://www.acommonword.com/docs/TJ%20Winter%20Booklist.pdf), Yasir Qadhi, Nouman Ali Khan (available on YouTube at Bayyinah Institute channel) and The Destruction of the Soviet Economic System: An Insider's History Book by Michael Ellman and Vladimir Kontorovich. Intro music by auntie004. Outro: Paavoharju - Musta Katu.
Andropov's CuckooA dying man recounts the story of the most amazing person he has ever met, a brilliant, Soviet linguist whom he calls Youriko. It is a tale of love, daring-do, spies and danger set in Japan, Germany, Turkey, the USA, Canada and the UK, but mostly in the Soviet Union of the Seventies.Two girls, born thousands of miles apart in Kazakhstan and Japan just after World War II, meet and are like peas in a pod. They also get on like sisters and keep n touch for the rest of their lives.However, one wants to help her battle-scarred country and the other wants to leave hers for the West. They dream up a daring, dangerous plan to achieve both goals, which Andropov, the chief of the Soviet KGB, is told about. He dubs it Operation Youriko and it is set in motion, but does it have even the remotest chance of success?Andropov's Cuckoo is based on a ‘true story' related to the author by one of the protagonists.https://smarturl.it/Andropov-bounty?IQid=spreakercmd
durée : 01:00:00 - Les Nuits de France Culture - Par Alexandre Adler - Réalisation Brigitte Bouvier
Join Benny Adams as he breaks down episode 7 of Treadstone! Ready for more of the Bourne universe? Then prepare yourself for THE TREADSTONE AFTERBUZZ TV AFTER SHOW PODCAST, where we’ll be discussing the USA Network’s new action series. Set in the same universe as the iconic Bourne series of films, Treadstone tells the story of the fictional CIA black ops program with the same name, and the activation of their sleeper agents all over the world. Strap yourself in, prepare for the action, and tune in on AfterBuzz TV today! A look at five families living in a protected Southern California enclave, and the real-life housewives who reside in one of the wealthiest planned communities in the country. They may live in the lap of luxury, but life isn't always perfect for the women who reside in one of the wealthiest enclaves of the U.S. They continue to focus on living large; plastic surgery, working out, shopping, drinking, dancing, and dining out top their agendas. Ladies come and go through the show's run, with entrepreneur Vicki Gunvalson having been a series regular for each season. Other ladies who have been featured for multiple seasons include Tamra Judge -- previously known as Tamra Barney -- and Heather Dubrow. --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app
"Sono certa che i russi, come gli americani, non vogliono la guerra", disse Samantha Smith. A 10 anni, questa scolaretta americana divenne un'attivista per la pace tra gli Stati Uniti e l'Unione Sovietica durante la guerra fredda. La sua lettera al Segretario Generale dell'Unione Sovietica, Yuri Andropov e la sua susseguente visita negli URSS, portarono all'attenuarsi delle tensioni tra le due nazioni avversarie.
O Cuco de AndropovUma História de Amor, Intrigas e a KGBporOwen JonesTraduzido por Nelson Leonel De BenedettiUm moribundo narra a história da pessoa mais incrível que ele já conheceu, uma brilhante linguista soviética que ele chama de Youriko. É um conto de amor, ousadia, espiões e perigos ambientados no Japão, Alemanha, Turquia, EUA, Canadá e Reino Unido, mas principalmente na União Soviética dos anos 70.Duas garotas, nascidas a milhares de quilômetros de distância no Cazaquistão e no Japão logo após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, se encontram e são como ervilhas em uma vagem. Elas também se comportam como irmãs e mantêm contato pelo resto de suas vidas.No entanto, uma quer ajudar seu país marcado pela batalha e a outra quer deixar o dela e ir para o Ocidente. Elas sonham com um plano ousado e perigoso para alcançar os dois objetivos, sobre os quais Andropov, o chefe da KGB soviética, é informado. Ele o chama de Operação Youriko e ela é posta em movimento, mas tem a mais remota chance de sucesso?O Cuco de Andropov é baseado em uma "história verdadeira" relatada ao autor por uma das protagonistas.Disponível em: http://smarturl.it/cucodeandropov?IQid=spreaker
O Cuco de Andropov O Cuco de Andropov Uma História de Amor, Intrigas e a KGB por Owen Jones Traduzido por Nelson Leonel De Benedetti Um moribundo narra a história da pessoa mais incrível que ele já conheceu, uma brilhante linguista soviética que ele chama de Youriko. É um conto de amor, ousadia, espiões e perigos ambientados no Japão, Alemanha, Turquia, EUA, Canadá e Reino Unido, mas principalmente na União Soviética dos anos 70. Duas garotas, nascidas a milhares de quilômetros de distância no Cazaquistão e no Japão logo após a Segunda Guerra Mundial, se encontram e são como ervilhas em uma vagem. Elas também se comportam como irmãs e mantêm contato pelo resto de suas vidas. No entanto, uma quer ajudar seu país marcado pela batalha e a outra quer deixar o dela e ir para o Ocidente. Elas sonham com um plano ousado e perigoso para alcançar os dois objetivos, sobre os quais Andropov, o chefe da KGB soviética, é informado. Ele o chama de Operação Youriko e ela é posta em movimento, mas tem a mais remota chance de sucesso? O Cuco de Andropov é baseado em uma "história verdadeira" relatada ao autor por uma das protagonistas. Disponível em: Amazon Apple iTunes Barnes & Noble Kobo Scribd
Andropov's Cuckoo - AudiobookAndropov's CuckooA Tale of Love, Intrigue and the KGBbyOwen JonesNarrated byWilliam James HillA dying man recounts the story of the most amazing person he has ever met: a brilliant Soviet linguist, whom he knew as Youriko. It is a tale of love, daring-do, spies, and danger set in Japan, Germany, Turkey, the USA, Canada, and the UK, but mostly in the Soviet Union of the 70s.Two girls, born thousands of miles apart in Kazakhstan and Japan just after World War II, meet and are like peas in a pod. They also get on like sisters and keep n touch for the rest of their lives.However, one wants to help her battle-scarred country and the other wants to leave hers for the West. They dream up a daring, dangerous plan to achieve both goals, which Andropov, the chief of the Soviet KGB, is told about. He dubs it "Operation Youriko", and it is set in motion, but does it have even the remotest chance of success?Andropov's Cuckoo is based on a true story related to the author by one of the protagonists.Free Audiobook Link:http://smarturl.it/Andropov-bounty?IQid=MPS
A dying man recounts the story of the most amazing person he has ever met: a brilliant Soviet linguist, whom he knew as Youriko. It is a tale of love, daring-do, spies, and danger set in Japan, Germany, Turkey, the USA, Canada, and the UK, but mostly in the Soviet Union of the 70's.
This is a review of the multi-faceted novel 'Andropov's Cuckoo', which is a political thriller - romance set in the Soviet Union of the 1970's
“We have so many things to show you” DDOS attacks, New Famine, New youtube gun shows, Norwegian football player, 1983: Reagan, Andropov, and a World on the Brink wrap-up, Deadpool-2, The World the flesh and the Devil.
American Greed Factory-Episode 294: The Fear Boner effect Crackle TV you never wanted to see, 1983: Reagan, Andropov, and a World on the Brink, Video game war scenario, this is rock bottom, weird houses, sexy models kits, Italian crime Drama Gomorrah
DEMOCRATS AND RUSSIANS It's July 2018 and the mainstream media has been on fire for over 18 months with allegations that President Trump "colluded" with the Russians to win the 2016 Presidential election. So far, we have seen very little in the way of evidence that Trump or any member of his campaign had anything more than a conversation with the occaisional Russian. Still, whatever "new information" the media learns, they feverishly connect dots which have no business being connected. As a student of politics and history, I have found the behavior of the media as well as Democrats to be appalling. What I hope to do for you in this podcast is to give you some idea of the history that exists between Democrats and Russians. At the end of this podcast, my hope is you will understand why I am appalled at the current behavior of the Mainstream Media and the Democrat Party. The Russian Hoax by Gregg Jarrett This story begins in Russia, with the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917. The Bolshevik takeover of Russia was the first successful Marxist revolution and it sent shock waves around the world, particularly in Western countries. European and American intellectuals were swept up in the excitement of revolutionary change and what it could mean for the future of the world. Violence and Terror in the Russian Revolution Remember, in 1917, Marxism had never been attempted as a governing philosophy. Russia would be its first laboratory. The intelligentsia had a rooting interest, hoping for its success. The early days of the Russian Revolution under the leadership of Vladimir Lenin were bloody in the extreme. Anyone opposing the new Bolshevik government under Lenin was deemed a "counter-revolutionary" and typically met horribly cruel deaths, often by starvation. Although Lenin died in 1924, he was succeeded by Joseph Stalin, who was even worse. Execution by Hunger: The Hidden Holocaust by Miron Dolot While this was going on in Russia, in the United States, fear was growing. It was fear of the "Red Menace" or the "Red Scare." Many Americans feared a Marxist revolution would come to America. New immigrants from Europe, particularly Eastern Europe and Italy were often receptive to leftist propaganda. The leftists, however, never really gained a foothold because the rise of organized labor blunted the revolutionary fervor. In short, American businesses adapted. Still, on university campuses around the U.S., the cutting edge of political thought centered on the great collectivist experiment going on in Russia. To bring Americans a bird's eye view of what was happening in Russia, the New York Times assigned a journalist named Walter Duranty to cover the progress of the Russian Revolution. Duranty filed news accounts accentuating the positive and to his everlasting discredit, all but ignoring the negative. The trouble was, the negative Duranty either played down or ignored entirely was so monstrous, it was clear he was acting as a propaganda tool for Stalin. Crimes of the Bolsheviks Duranty ignored the deliberate and intentional starvation of as many as 11 million Kulak peasant farmers, an atrocity rivalling the Nazi Holocaust of European Jewry in its immensity. The New York Times still displays Duranty's Pulitzer Prize in its headquarters offices in New York City. The prize was awarded before it was learned that Duranty was a fraud. Duranty's reports from Russia were followed closely by academics, who were excited to know of the revolutionary progress and successes. Although viewed with hostility in the halls of American government as a subversive ideology, antagonism toward Russian Marxism faded completely when the United States found itself allied with Russia after Hitler declared war on the United States in December 1941. Who was Walter Duranty? At that moment, many of those left wing university intellectuals as well as others who were just plain, old, pro-Russian Marxists, found their way into the US government in various roles to help defeat Nazism. Immediately after the defeat of Nazi Germany, the US found itself with tons of pro-Russian Marxists all throughout the institutions of government, placed there by the FDR and Truman Administrations. These were people who were favorably disposed toward Stalinist Russia and many of them were current or former members of the Communist Party of the United States. Others were recruited as spies. But all of them were Democrats. Almost immediately after the war ended, Russia and the United States became Cold War enemies. In 1948, a former American communist and spy for Russia, Whittaker Chambers, revealed that a vast network of Russian spies existed in the United States. Richard Nixon, a California Congressman at the time, listened to what Chambers had to say and what he said was explosive. Chambers accused a Truman Administration official in the State Department, Alger Hiss, of being a Soviet Russian spy. The accusation mattered a great deal because Hiss accompanied FDR to his meeting with Stalin and Churchill at Yalta, where the construct of post-war Europe was being discussed and decided. Truman also appointed Hiss to draft the UN Charter. The accusation that a Soviet Russian spy was that close to the President of the United States caused a political earthquake, resulting in an avalanche of cries of partisanship and character assassination directed at both Chambers and Nixon. Knowing this was political dynamite, Democrats began to line up in defense of Alger Hiss's loyalty to the United States. Among those Democrats attesting to Hiss's loyalty were two sitting Supreme Court Justices, one past Democrat Presidential candidate and one future Presidential candidate, Adlai Stevenson. The Democrats went to the mat for Hiss, sealing Nixon's reputation as one of the worst and most cynical villains in US political history for condemning an "innocent man" as a disloyal American. Except, there was one problem. IT WAS ALL TRUE! Hiss was indeed a spy for Russia. Although the question of his guilt remained unsettled and was debated for decades, after the fall of the USSR, old KGB documents revealed Alger Hiss was indeed a spy for Russia. The damage to the Democratic Party did not end there. Subsequent to the Hiss Affair, Senator Joseph McCarthy held hearings in 1954, accusing many dozens of State Department officals along with many prominent people in business and entertainment of being Communists, loyal to Russia. Although McCarthy did accuse many people later shown to be totally innocent of any disloyalty, while holding leftist or even Marxist political views, those same KGB documents, made available in the mid-1990s, also confirmed that dozens and dozens of those he accused, all of whom were Democrats, were indeed spying for Russia. The Venona Secrets US News & World Report: Declassified Docs reveal KGB Spies in US Even to this day, the news media refuses to tell the entire truth about Hiss or McCarthy. To this day, despite the existence of incontrovertible evidence of Hiss's guilt, Democrats playing on the ignorance of Americans, continue to defend Alger Hiss and condemn Whittaker Chambers, Richard Nixon and Joseph McCarthy, who were guilty of only zealously defending the United States, showing great courage and patriotism. Blacklisted by History by M. Stanton Evans Witness by Whittaker Chambers At this juncture, it is fair to point out that the Democratic Party is not pro-Russian, per se. What I hope I am making clear here is that the Democratic Party has been a home for those harboring pro-Russian sentiments. From the 1920s through the 1950s, those sentiments were clearly ideological. But in 1960, America elected a vehemently anti-communist and therefore, anti-Russian President, John F Kennedy, who was a Democrat. He was a true profile in courage, especially during the Cuban Missile Crisis. So, it's rather ironic that his assassin, Lee Harvey Oswald, a former Marine, who turned Communist, defected to Russia, marrying a Russian woman, returning to the United States, where he murdered President Kennedy. It now seems almost like COSMIC KARMA for the Democratic Party. As we moved through the 60s, 70s and 80s, left wing, pro-Russian, pro-Soviet extremism became prevalent on both college campuses and in the media. For example, during the 1960s, much of campus rioting was instigated by pro-Russian groups aligning themselves with the Democratic Party. This also carried on through the 1970s. Political parties in the US, which at least tangentially aligned themselves with the Democratic Party had Russian sponsors and were aligned with the policies of the Soviet Union. One example: The Socialist Workers Party, which got its orders directly from Moscow. Russian involvement with Democrats became more pronounced during the 1980s under President Reagan. While Reagan was President, Russian sponsored movements like "No Nukes" came to fruition. It argued in favor of the Russian position regarding the placement of Pershing II nuclear missiles in Western Europe. Also, the burgeoning environmental movement was secretly funded by Russian interests as a way to keep the US out of the market as a supplier of oil and natural gas, two commodities Russia needs and depends on greatly. Then, of course, there was Ted Kennedy's appeal to Yuri Andropov, the leader of the USSR at the time. Kennedy was hoping to enlist Andropov's cooperation in defeating Reagan in the 1984 election. Kennedy's outreach was an act of treachery, but Reagan won re-election easily, taking 49 of 50 states. All of this was done to undermine the power and influence of the United States and in every case, found its most vocal support in the Democrat Party. Soviet Influence on Peace Movement Newsweek: Putin is Funding Green Groups to discredit natural gas Russian-funded environmental group gave millions to anti-fracking groups It should disturb every American when a foreign power, be it friend or foe, attempts to insinuate themselves into our electoral process, but it should not be altogether unexpected. The United States is the greatest and most powerful country in the world. We should be prepared for others to interfere in our elections. But before they can interfere in our elections, we should take note of how they are interfering in our political system in other ways as I have outlined here. Russian interference didn't begin in 2016 and it won't end in 2018. Questions regarding Bill and Hillary Clinton's relationship with Russians remain unanswered. The approval of a deal sending 20% of America's uranium ore and the timing of a $150 million "contribution" to the Clinton Foundation, along with vast sums for speeches given in Russia, deserve as much or more attention than the strained effort to find collusion between the Trump campaign and Russians. If links exist, let us see the evidence. But if we are left with only our suspicions in the absence of evidence, then we ought to have the courage to leave those suspicions wanting. The Democratic Party for nearly 100 years has never been so ferociously anti-Russian as they are now. It is obvious that their ferocity is fueled by political expediency more than it is by a search for the truth. Just as it was for Walter Duranty. Just as it was for Alger Hiss. Just as it was for Ted Kennedy.
Today we're talking to Francesca Akhtar who holds a BA Hons in American Studies with 1st class honours from Canterbury Christ Christ Church University in Kent, and a Masters degree in US history & Politics from the Institute of the Americas, University College London. Her main research interests are US Cold War foreign policy, intelligence history and defence. Francesca has written a dissertation entitled “The most dangerous Soviet-American confrontation since the Cuban Missile Crisis?” An analysis of the origins, nature and impact of the Able Archer 83 incident . I am delighted to welcome Francesca Akhtar to Cold War Conversations. Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/coldwarpod)
Guten Morgen, Brasilien! Com um atraso de quase um mês, estamos no ar com o programa do começo de novembro. E falaremos de um dos assuntos que mais move paixões no globo: a Revolução Russa, a famosa Revolução de Outubro, que fez 100 anos no começo de novembro (precisão nunca foi o forte do comunismo). E não é um tema apenas de História: a Revolução Russa está presente hoje, com um século de idade, de uma forma quase tangível. O novo mundo (e o novo homem) criados por Lenin, Stalin e Trotsky, o revolucionário que não revolucionou, são completamente ignorados pela historiografia brasileira, que conhece a Revolução e apenas "imagina" o que aconteceu depois. Como foi a experiência comunista, o que mudou na vida das pessoas, como foi a implantação de um sistema de governo, Estado e até de conhecimento, metafísica e de relacionamentos humanos completamente novo. O universitário (e o professor universitário) brasileiro médio nunca ouviu falar nem sequer do Gulag. Não lembra o nome do líder soviético que sucedeu Stalin (que dirá saber quem são Brezhnev, Andropov, Chernenko – ou nomes importantíssimos, como Beria, Malenkov e Zhukov como conhecemos os nomes de Goebbels, Himmler ou Mengele. No Brasil, acredita-se que a Nomenklatura era a chamada da escola, a Cheka uma rave erótica, o Comintern um prédio com interior bonito e o Holodomor um reino d'O Senhor dos Anéis. Há muitos historiadores que estão sendo lidos às escondidas dos professores de História (quase como a literatura samizdat pós-Revolução Russa), mas falaremos também de uma outra questão: como o simbolismo, o imaginário criado pela Revolução Russa foi criado, como está presente até hoje, como sobreviveu relativamente incólume à queda do Muro de Berlim, como move paixões em países afastados da Cortina de Ferro sem grandes prejuízos. Os comunistas (e aqui você entenderá por que chamá-los de comunistas, e não de "socialistas", como se faz em uma leitura porca de Karl Marx) foram mestres da lingüística e do imaginário. Por que não usar a lingüística para analisar a Revolução Russa de volta? A Revolução Russa é o maior exemplo no mundo de fracasso vendido como sucesso absoluto, como fosse vantajoso defender a maior tirania do mundo só porque ela está com 70% off na Black Friday. O que é mais ou menos o que Pol-Pot deixou vivo de seu país. Afinal, não podemos também de deixar de falar também dos outros países que foram dominados pelos Bolcheviques. A produção é de Filipe Trielli e David Mazzuca Neto na Panela Produtora, com produção visual de Gustavo Finger da Agência Pier. Guten Morgen, Brasilien!
En 1983, la petite américaine Samantha Smith, âgée de 11 ans, écrit une lettre au président soviétique Youri Andropov dans laquelle elle lui demande pourquoi il cherche à conquérir le monde. En pleine guerre froide, en juillet 1983, la petite Samantha va s'envoler vers Moscou, en compagnie de ses parents, à l'invitation du président Andropov. Dès lors, le monde entier va se passionner pour le voyage de cette jeune ambassadrice de la paix en URSS. Karine Prémont, politologue à l'Université de Sherbrooke, nous raconte l'histoire de Samantha Smith, la petite ambassadrice au destin tragique.
Guten Morgen, Brasilien! Continuando o tema de nosso último episódio, vamos entender a movimentação militar de Vladimir Putin - afinal, por que um presidente que já foi chefe da KGB - e, portanto, deveria representar a esquerda - tem tanto receio de Hillary Clinton, a candidata de esquerda na disputa pela Casa Branca, preferindo - e talvez interferindo nas eleições - pelo candidato republicano, Donald Trump? Para entender a mente de Vladimir Putin, e pelo menos conseguir captar algo de suas ambições, além de entender um pouco como a Rússia funciona, com conceitos, valores, princípios, ambições e métodos completamente alienígenas aos analistas e a mídia do Ocidente. O primeiro chefe da KGB a subir ao supremo poder na Rússia foi Yuri Andropov, que na União Soviética foi responsável por aprofundar a espionagem, a subversão e a desinformação no estrangeiro e também por reintroduzir na União Soviética o anti-semitismo, fora de moda desde o enfrentamento com o nazismo. Para tal, Andropov não apenas fez propaganda: armou milícias islâmicas, como os movimentos do "nacionalismo palestino" com o objetivo de assassinar judeus, minando o poder do grande aliado da América na região. A propaganda "anti-colonialista", que culpava a Europa e, sobretudo, a Inglaterra pelos males do Oriente Médio e da África, foi firmemente comprada pelos soviéticos, que espalharam tal visão de mundo para a esquerda mundial - inclusive para o Brasil, que trata tal interpretação da História como a única Verdade Revelada. Com ela, também veio o terrorismo islâmico, que por mera coincidência nunca atinge a Rússia: pela interpretação que aprendemos na escola, parece que a "interferência americana" no Oriente Médio, que era nula, deixou os muçulmanos revoltados, que então, um dia, do nada, pegaram em armas e saíram seqüestrando aviões e vestindo coletes suicidas para matar ocidentais. Neste episódio do Guten Morgen, você aprenderá uma visão da história que vai contra a doutrina estabelecida em nossas escolas, e vamos pinçar alguns fatos desconhecidos daquilo que nossas escolas nunca ensinaram: o que fazia a KGB? Como se iniciou o terrorismo islâmico? Por que fatos com conseqüências gigantes ainda hoje, como a Guerra do Afeganistão, ocorreram? Quem eram os atores envolvidos? Com isso conseguiremos voltar ao presente para olhar para alguém como o ex-chefe da KGB que tomou o poder de Boris Ieltsin, Vladimir Putin, com olhos muito mais claros. Ele e seu mentor, Aleksandr Dugin, têm uma visão de reestabelecimento da "Mãe Rússia" como principal potência mundial, plano que bate de frente com o projeto da candidata Democrata Hillary Clinton, com suas interferências regionais, dissolução de fronteiras nacionais e promoção de causas progressistas, naquilo que é chamado no Primeiro Mundo de "globalismo" (algo completamente avesso à globalização, como explicamos em nosso episódio sobre George Soros). Apesar de ambos serem firmemente contrários ao conservadorismo americano, com seu projeto de governo enxuto, de instituições locais e de valores tradicionais e religiosos como guia da sociedade, e não do Estado como dirigente, com o confronto de visões - e de histórico - entre o modelo geopolítico de Vladimir Putin e de Hillary Clinton poderemos entender por que Putin prefere, neste momento, um republicano na Casa Branca, e quais serão as conseqüências geopolíticas, em países como Ucrânia e Síria, no caso da eleição de cada um dos disputantes pelo cargo que já foi o mais poderoso do mundo. A produção é de Filipe Trielli e de David Mazzuca Neto, no estúdio Panela Produtora. Guten Morgen, Brasilien!
Dems mad at Putin,When do the Mothers of ISIS speak?,Teddy Kennedy and Andropov.
During the era of stagnation, the USSR was ruled by three men, Leonid Brezhnev, Yuri Andropov and Konstantin Chernenko.
Greetings, Comrades! In this episode, we talk about the death of Brezhnev and how that brought two old, sick men into power that they probably should never have had in the first place. And how they tried to take alcohol away from the USSR citizens. All of this went about as well as you could imagine. Today's featured image, however, is a drawing that we received from the talented and beautiful Diona Nikitenko. It's truly amazing, and you can use that for whatever you'd like. This is Yuri Andropov, the first of our old men. He who started the anti-alcohol campaign. Constantine Chernenko, the other old man – even older and sicker than Andropov. Good that he really didn't do anything. The poster, mentioned on the show: It says “Schoolchildren who drink, study worse than those who don't.”, followed by some statistics. Look at the age of the kids depicted – and if THEY need an anti-alcohol poster, then think about the general state of alcohol... Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/theeasternborder. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.
The period of Soviet history between Nikita Khrushchev’s fall from power in 1964, and the arrival of Mikhail Gorbachev as premier in 1985, has often been seen as a period of economic, social and political stagnation in the USSR. For the vast majority of this twenty year time frame, the USSR was governed by one man, Leonid Brezhnev. As such, the Brezhnev era has earned a reputation for being a flat-line in the development of the socialist experiment. However, this view is far from universal. To discuss the nature of Brezhnev’s rule in Russia, and particularly the extent to which it might be considered as period of stagnation, I am joined by John Keep, the emeritus professor of Russian history at the University Toronto. Since retiring in 1988, he has co-written a retrospective on Stalininsm, and has also produced a fantastic overview of the Soviet Period in his “A History of the Soviet Union 1945-1991: The Last of the Empires” which is recommended core reading for the study of the USSR.
Today’s episode is the second of a two part programme with Dr Martin McCauley, formerly a senior lecturer in Russian and European history at the University of London. Dr McCauley has a long standing interest in the Soviet Union, having conducted research there in the late 1950s. He is the author of a wide range of books on the Soviet Union, including The Khruschev Era, and the excellent, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union. In this programme I discuss the issues of historical approaches and methods with Dr McCauley and try to find out a bit more about how he came to his conclusions on the Soviet Union. This is a fascinating insight into how pastiches of a country are built up over time.
Today’s episode is the first of a two part programme with Dr Martin McCauley, formerly a senior lecturer in Russian and European history at the University of London. Dr McCauley has a long standing interest in the Soviet Union, having conducted research there in the late 1950s. He is the author of a wide range of books on the Soviet Union, including The Khruschev Era, and the excellent, Rise and Fall of the Soviet Union. This first programme is taken from a lecture given at Guiseley School to Sixth Form students in March of 2014. In the lecture, Dr McCauley looks at the origins of the Marxist-Leninist ideology, and how successive leaders of the union tried and failed to reform the system over a period of some 70 years. He also takes some time to explore the reasons for the collapse of the Union, and makes some interesting points about the clan-like system of political patronage in operation in the USSR.
Hello and welcome to andallthat.co.uk’s new podcast series: Meet the Historians. Over the course of this first series I will be talking to a number of historians who have written about the Soviet Union and finding out a bit more about their historical methods and approaches. I will also be exploring their interpretations of key topics such as Stalin’s wartime leadership, the effectiveness of Khrushchev’s de-Stalinisation programme and the reasons for the breakup of the USSR. The series will be available to download here as a podcast, via the iTunes store, or on our website at www.andallthat.co.uk/meetthehistorians Today I am joined by Bill Taubman who is the emeritus Bertrand Snell Professor of Political Science at Amherst College in Massachusetts. Professor Taubman has written a number of books on the Soviet Union, including: 'Stalin’s American Policy,' and the critically acclaimed: 'Khrushchev, The Man and his Era.' He is also working on a biography of another Soviet politician in the Khrushchev mould, Mikhail Gorbachev. Feedback and comments on this series would be very welcome.
Tuntud teleajakirjaniku ja kirjaniku Leonid Mletšini raamat annab võib-olla et tänapäeva Venemaa ajaloo ühe kõige mõistatuslikuma tegelase, Juri Vladimirovitš Andropovi täieliku eluloo. Viisteist aastat juhtis ta KGBd ja viisteist kuud kogu riiki. Vaidlused Andropovi üle pole vaibunud tänini. Kes ta oli? Kas reformaator, kes ei jõudnud Venemaa saatust muuta, või julm diktaator, kelle ravimatu haigus päästis riigi tema võimu alt? (Leonid Mletšin. ANDROPOV. Toimetab Küllo Arjakas.)
After Brezhnev's death, two more Soviet leaders would die in quick succession which would lead to the ascension of Mikhail Gorbachev.
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