Podcasts about Black Sea

He was the brother of the Apostle Peter, from Bethsaida on the shore of Lake Gennesaret. Andrew left his fisherman's trade to become a disciple of St John the Baptist. Soon after the Forerunner had baptized Jesus, he said to Andrew and his other disciple John the Theologian, "Behold the Lamb of God!" At this, both disciples followed after Jesus. After conversing with Christ, Andrew hurried home and told his brother Simon Peter, "We have found the Messiah." For being the first to recognize Jesus as the Christ, St Andrew is called the First-Called.   After Pentecost, Andrew was appointed to preach the Gospel around the Black Sea and in Thrace and Macedonia, traveling as far as Lazica in the Caucasus. According to Slavic tradition his travels took him even further, into the land that was later to be called Russia.   In later travels the Apostle preached throughout Asia Minor with St John the Theologian, then traveled to Mesopotamia, then back to Sinope on the Black Sea, and finally to Patras in the Peloponnese, where he soon established a large community of Christians. One of his converts was Maximilla, the wife of Aegeates, the Proconsul of that region. Aegeates was so angered by his wife's conversion that he had the Apostle arrested and crucified head downwards on a cross in the shape of an "X." The holy Apostle rejoiced to be allowed to suffer the same death as his Master.   The holy relics of St Andrew, after various travels, were returned to Patras in 1964, where they are now venerated.   In the West, St Andrew is venerated as the patron of Scotland: in the Middle Ages, more than eight hundred churches in Scotland were dedicated to him.

He was the brother of the Apostle Peter, from Bethsaida on the shore of Lake Gennesaret. Andrew left his fisherman's trade to become a disciple of St John the Baptist. Soon after the Forerunner had baptized Jesus, he said to Andrew and his other disciple John the Theologian, "Behold the Lamb of God!" At this, both disciples followed after Jesus. After conversing with Christ, Andrew hurried home and told his brother Simon Peter, "We have found the Messiah." For being the first to recognize Jesus as the Christ, St Andrew is called the First-Called.   After Pentecost, Andrew was appointed to preach the Gospel around the Black Sea and in Thrace and Macedonia, traveling as far as Lazica in the Caucasus. According to Slavic tradition his travels took him even further, into the land that was later to be called Russia.   In later travels the Apostle preached throughout Asia Minor with St John the Theologian, then traveled to Mesopotamia, then back to Sinope on the Black Sea, and finally to Patras in the Peloponnese, where he soon established a large community of Christians. One of his converts was Maximilla, the wife of Aegeates, the Proconsul of that region. Aegeates was so angered by his wife's conversion that he had the Apostle arrested and crucified head downwards on a cross in the shape of an "X." The holy Apostle rejoiced to be allowed to suffer the same death as his Master.   The holy relics of St Andrew, after various travels, were returned to Patras in 1964, where they are now venerated.   In the West, St Andrew is venerated as the patron of Scotland: in the Middle Ages, more than eight hundred churches in Scotland were dedicated to him.

On COI #194, Kyle Anzalone breaks down the growing tensions in Eastern Europe. The US is simulating nuclear war with Russia, conducting war games in Latvia, and deploying warships to the Black Sea. Meanwhile, Ukraine is engaging in military build-ups/drills on its borders with Belarus and the separatist Donbas region. NATO head Jens Stoltenberg said Russia building up forces within Russia was unexplained and unprovoked and Biden warned Russia about violating Ukrainian sovereignty.  Kyle discusses CIA Director William Burns' recent trip to Russia. Burns confronted Russia over the fictional 'Havana Syndrome.' While Burns' visit to Moscow sparked hope for diplomacy, threatening Russia the fake illness suggests his visit was less than successful. Kyle updates Julian Assane's imprisonment. Assange has been held in a UK maximum security prison for over a year. He has experienced psychological torture from the prison authorities.   Odysee Rumble  Donate LBRY Credits bTTEiLoteVdMbLS7YqDVSZyjEY1eMgW7CP Donate Bitcoin 36PP4kT28jjUZcL44dXDonFwrVVDHntsrk Donate Bitcoin Cash Qp6gznu4xm97cj7j9vqepqxcfuctq2exvvqu7aamz6 Patreon Subscribe Star YouTube Facebook  Twitter  MeWe Apple Podcast  Amazon Music Google Podcasts Spotify iHeart Radio Support Our Sponsor Visit Paloma Verde and use code PEACE for 25% off our CBD

On COI #194, Kyle Anzalone breaks down the growing tensions in Eastern Europe. The US is simulating nuclear war with Russia, conducting war games in Latvia, and deploying warships to the Black Sea. Meanwhile, Ukraine is engaging in military build-ups/drills on its borders with Belarus and the separatist Donbas region. NATO head Jens Stoltenberg said Russia building up forces within Russia was unexplained and unprovoked and Biden warned Russia about violating Ukrainian sovereignty.  Kyle discusses CIA Director William Burns' recent trip to Russia. Burns confronted Russia over the fictional 'Havana Syndrome.' While Burns' visit to Moscow sparked hope for diplomacy, threatening Russia the fake illness suggests his visit was less than successful. Kyle updates Julian Assane's imprisonment. Assange has been held in a UK maximum security prison for over a year. He has experienced psychological torture from the prison authorities.   Odysee Rumble  Donate LBRY Credits bTTEiLoteVdMbLS7YqDVSZyjEY1eMgW7CP Donate Bitcoin 36PP4kT28jjUZcL44dXDonFwrVVDHntsrk Donate Bitcoin Cash Qp6gznu4xm97cj7j9vqepqxcfuctq2exvvqu7aamz6 Patreon Subscribe Star YouTube Facebook  Twitter  MeWe Apple Podcast  Amazon Music Google Podcasts Spotify iHeart Radio Support Our Sponsor Visit Paloma Verde and use code PEACE for 25% off our CBD

He was instructed in the Faith of Christ by St Peter himself, and may be the Clement mentioned by the Apostle Paul as a fellow-worker in Philippians 4:3. He was consecrated Bishop of Rome about the year 91; some traditions call him the first Bishop of Rome, others the third after Sts Linus and Anacletus. (This is not necessarily inconsistent: in the Apostolic age, the offices of Elder and Bishop were not strictly distinguished, and the three bishops may have served at the same time or by turns.) He is the author of the Epistle of Clement, which was so highly esteemed in the early Church that it is often found in early versions of the New Testament. The holy Bishop effected countless conversions in Rome, even bringing the Prefect Sisinius and his wife Theodora to the Faith after miraculously healing them of blindness. The bishop's success so angered the Emperor Trajan that he had Clement exiled to the Crimea, on the far eastern frontier of the Empire. There the holy bishop continued to work wonders of evangelism, founding seventy-five churches in one year and bringing countless pagans to faith in Christ. Finally, to put a stop to the Saint's work, the Governor of the region had him cruelly tortured, then thrown into the Black Sea with an anchor around his neck.   More than 700 years later, in 860, St Cyril (commemorated May 11) arrived in the Crimea, sent by St Photius, Patriarch of Constantinople. He found the relics of St Clement faithfully preserved there and brought part of them back to Constantinople.

00.00.40: Introduction00.04.30: Thank you to our new patrons: Jerry Jenkins; Russ Barratt: and Marcus Bone00.08.05: World of Gaming: Vaesen - Mythic Britain and Ireland and Seasons of Mystery; Dragonmeet 00.24.14: Workshop wonders: Salamanx Surveyor; Coriolis Reloaded - Combat Overhaul; and Cold War Goes Hot00.54.29: Feature - The Problem with Prep - GM prep for Forbidden Lands (the older piece on adventure site creation is here)01.23.33: Next time and goodbyeEffekt is brought to you by Fictionsuit and RPG Gods. Music is by Stars in a Black Sea, used with kind permission of Free League Publishing.Like what we do? Put our brand on your face! (and elsewhere) Buy pdfs via our DriveThru Affiliate link Leave a review on iTunes or Podchaser Find our Actual Play recordings on effektap Find essay transcripts and other stuff on Matthew's, and Dave's blogs ★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

Former CIA officer accused of spying for Qatar in new report; US invites Taiwan to 'Summit for Democracy' and draws sharp rebuke from Beijing; Wall Street Journal report outlines major law enforcement success using surveillance on encrypted messaging service; Apple files lawsuit against NSO Group; Russia accuses US of practicing nuclear strike against Russia while Ukraine conducts air strike practice on simulated Black Sea targets; China attempts to shore up relations among ASEAN in nuclear talks; Ethiopia's PM takes command of combat operations.  

Mithridates or Mithradates VI Eupator (Greek: Μιθραδάτης;[2] 135–63 BC) was ruler of the Hellenistic Kingdom of Pontus in northern Anatolia from 120 to 63 BC, and one of the Roman Republic's most formidable and determined opponents. He was an effective, ambitious and ruthless ruler who sought to dominate Asia Minor and the Black Sea region, waging several hard-fought but ultimately unsuccessful wars (the Mithridatic Wars) to break Roman dominion over Asia and the Hellenic world.[3] He has been called the greatest ruler of the Kingdom of Pontus.[4] After his death he became known as Mithridates the Great; due to his affinity for poison he has also been called "The Poison King". Our theme song was written and performed by Anna Bosnick. If you'd like to support the show on a per episode basis, you can find our Patreon page here.  Be sure to check our website for more details.

A.M. Edition for Nov. 23. The U.S. has warned allies that Russia's buildup of military assets on its border with Ukraine may be a precursor to an invasion. But Russia has rebutted that accusation and accused the U.S. of destabilizing the region. WSJ's Nancy Youssef saw those tensions first-hand during her recent trip through the Black Sea on a U.S. destroyer. Peter Granitz hosts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Photo: No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow #Londinium90AD: Gaius and Germanicus watch NATO poke the Russian Bear in the Black Sea & What is to be done?  Michael Vlahos. https://londondaily.com/hms-defender-russian-jets-and-ships-shadow-british-warship

North East of Greece would be a land seen as wild and untamed stretching from the modern-day nation of Hungary to the Ukraine, and then to the Black Sea and Aegean. The Greeks would view the people that inhabited these lands as barbarians, much the same way they did to other cultures that differed from theirs. Though these people that they would call the Thracians, seemed that much more uncivilised compared to the other barbarians they had encountered.Although the Greeks would call them Thracian, a united people they were not. these people would be a lose collection of tribes with a shared common culture. Herodotus would say of the Thracians; “If they could all be united under one ruler and think the same way, they would, in my opinion, be the most invincible and strongest of all nations. But that is impossible; it will never happen, since their weakness I that they are incapable of uniting and agreeing.”The Thracians would be a result of earlier Neolithic cultures that had formed in the Balkans thousands of years earlier. The Thracian identity that would come to describe their shared culture would be a result of these indigenous Balkan cultures interacting with the numerous Indo-European migrations that would take place as the Bronze Age developed.Thrace would enter into the Greeks memory as far back as the Trojan War through Homers epic poem the Iliad. Though it wouldn't be until the 7th and 6th centuries where Thrace would truly enter the Greek periphery. Greek colonies would begin to dot the Thracian coast lines, where trade of goods and ideas would take place in both times of peace and times of tension. Support the show (https://www.patreon.com/castingthroughancientgreece)

On COI #189, Kyle Anzalone and Connor Freeman – writer at the Libertarian Institute – talk about increasing tensions in Eastern Europe and the Persian Gulf. Kyle covers the refugee crisis on the border shared by Poland and Belarus. Washington and their European allies have accused Minsk of “orchestrating” the dire humanitarian situation. But the refugees are attempting to reach Europe, fleeing countries such as Yemen, Iraq, and Syria which have been largely destroyed by America's post 9/11 wars. Kyle breaks down the news on the refugees' mistreatment. He also reports on the European Union preparing new sanctions on Belarus. Poland is buying more American arms as well, including 300 used MRAPs and 250 Abrams tanks. Connor details the hawks' plans for regime change in Minsk, including the National Endowment for Democracy's involvement in Belarus. Kyle further reports on escalations in the Black Sea region. The U.S. has accused Moscow of a massive troop buildup in western Russia aimed at Ukraine. Moscow denies the accusations, pointing to the increasing U.S./NATO presence in the region as the source of instability. NATO is hyping the alleged Russian threat, saying they “stand” with Ukraine. A German regulator has temporarily suspended the license for Nord Stream 2 and Kiev is pushing for more U.S. sanctions to block the pipeline Connor then covers the latest news on the soon to resume JCPOA talks, including the Iranians' potential economic benefits that could result from significant sanctions relief. Connor argues U.S., Israel, and their allied Gulf dictatorships are fomenting instability, including openly preparing for war. Odysee Rumble  Donate LBRY Credits bTTEiLoteVdMbLS7YqDVSZyjEY1eMgW7CP Donate Bitcoin 36PP4kT28jjUZcL44dXDonFwrVVDHntsrk Donate Bitcoin Cash Qp6gznu4xm97cj7j9vqepqxcfuctq2exvvqu7aamz6 Patreon Subscribe Star YouTube Facebook  Twitter  MeWe Apple Podcast  Amazon Music Google Podcasts Spotify iHeart Radio Support Our Sponsor Visit Paloma Verde and use code PEACE for 25% off our CBD  

On COI #189, Kyle Anzalone and Connor Freeman – writer at the Libertarian Institute – talk about increasing tensions in Eastern Europe and the Persian Gulf. Kyle covers the refugee crisis on the border shared by Poland and Belarus. Washington and their European allies have accused Minsk of “orchestrating” the dire humanitarian situation. But the refugees are attempting to reach Europe, fleeing countries such as Yemen, Iraq, and Syria which have been largely destroyed by America's post 9/11 wars. Kyle breaks down the news on the refugees' mistreatment. He also reports on the European Union preparing new sanctions on Belarus. Poland is buying more American arms as well, including 300 used MRAPs and 250 Abrams tanks. Connor details the hawks' plans for regime change in Minsk, including the National Endowment for Democracy's involvement in Belarus. Kyle further reports on escalations in the Black Sea region. The U.S. has accused Moscow of a massive troop buildup in western Russia aimed at Ukraine. Moscow denies the accusations, pointing to the increasing U.S./NATO presence in the region as the source of instability. NATO is hyping the alleged Russian threat, saying they “stand” with Ukraine. A German regulator has temporarily suspended the license for Nord Stream 2 and Kiev is pushing for more U.S. sanctions to block the pipeline Connor then covers the latest news on the soon to resume JCPOA talks, including the Iranians' potential economic benefits that could result from significant sanctions relief. Connor argues U.S., Israel, and their allied Gulf dictatorships are fomenting instability, including openly preparing for war. Odysee Rumble  Donate LBRY Credits bTTEiLoteVdMbLS7YqDVSZyjEY1eMgW7CP Donate Bitcoin 36PP4kT28jjUZcL44dXDonFwrVVDHntsrk Donate Bitcoin Cash Qp6gznu4xm97cj7j9vqepqxcfuctq2exvvqu7aamz6 Patreon Subscribe Star YouTube Facebook  Twitter  MeWe Apple Podcast  Amazon Music Google Podcasts Spotify iHeart Radio Support Our Sponsor Visit Paloma Verde and use code PEACE for 25% off our CBD  

Scott is joined by Antiwar.com's Dave DeCamp for a rapid fire review of what's been happening around the world. They start with Russia where the U.S. has told its European allies an invasion of Ukraine could be imminent. DeCamp explains that, if there's any truth to the Russian troop movements within Russia, it's likely a response to NATO military activity in the Black Sea region. Next they discuss Iraq. The Iraqi Prime Minister was apparently the target of a drone attack that plenty of hawks were quickly, and baselessly, blaming on Iran. Then they talk about Yemen, where the war appears to have become a bloody stalemate with neither side likely to give in. Finally they discuss China and how the war drums in Washington are beating for Taiwan.  Discussed on the show: Antiwar.com News Dave DeCamp is the assistant news editor of Antiwar.com. Follow him on Twitter @decampdave. This episode of the Scott Horton Show is sponsored by: The War State and Why The Vietnam War?, by Mike Swanson; Tom Woods' Liberty Classroom; ExpandDesigns.com/Scott; EasyShip; Dröm; Free Range Feeder; Thc Hemp Spot; Green Mill Supercritical; Bug-A-Salt; Lorenzotti Coffee and Listen and Think Audio. Shop Libertarian Institute merch or donate to the show through Patreon, PayPal or Bitcoin: 1DZBZNJrxUhQhEzgDh7k8JXHXRjYu5tZiG.

Scott is joined by Antiwar.com's Dave DeCamp for a rapid fire review of what's been happening around the world. They start with Russia where the U.S. has told its European allies an invasion of Ukraine could be imminent. DeCamp explains that, if there's any truth to the Russian troop movements within Russia, it's likely a response to NATO military activity in the Black Sea region. Next they discuss Iraq. The Iraqi Prime Minister was apparently the target of a drone attack that plenty of hawks were quickly, and baselessly, blaming on Iran. Then they talk about Yemen, where the war appears to have become a bloody stalemate with neither side likely to give in. Finally they discuss China and how the war drums in Washington are beating for Taiwan.  Discussed on the show: Antiwar.com News Dave DeCamp is the assistant news editor of Antiwar.com. Follow him on Twitter @decampdave. This episode of the Scott Horton Show is sponsored by: The War State and Why The Vietnam War?, by Mike Swanson; Tom Woods' Liberty Classroom; ExpandDesigns.com/Scott; EasyShip; Dröm; Free Range Feeder; Thc Hemp Spot; Green Mill Supercritical; Bug-A-Salt; Lorenzotti Coffee and Listen and Think Audio. Shop Libertarian Institute merch or donate to the show through Patreon, PayPal or Bitcoin: 1DZBZNJrxUhQhEzgDh7k8JXHXRjYu5tZiG.

The Pandora Papers, a massive data leak connecting individuals to offshore accounts and tax havens, shined a light on the shadow world where celebrities, politicians, dictators and drug traffickers hide their money. In the second installment of our three-part series on Putin's Russia, investigative journalist Luke Harding explores a trail of documents and properties linked to Vladimir Putin's inner circle, which show how “Putin and the people around him became fantastically rich, even more rich once he became president.”   Then, we go inside “Putin's Palace,” a secretive and sprawling luxury complex on the Black Sea allegedly owned by the Russian president. Images of the palace were exposed in a documentary released by Alexei Navalny's organization, the Anti-Corruption Foundation. But who is Navalny really, and what politics does he embody? For that, we turn to Jan Matti Dollbaum, Morvan Lallouet, and Ben Noble, co-authors of “Navalny: Putin's Nemesis, Russia's Future?”   Guests:   Luke Harding, author and journalist, The Guardian Jan Matti Dollbaum, postdoctoral researcher, Bremen University Morvan Lallouet, PhD candidate, University of Kent Ben Noble, associate professor, University College London   Hosts:   Ray Suarez, co-host, WorldAffairs   If you appreciate this episode and want to support the work we do, please consider making a donation to World Affairs. We cannot do this work without your help. Thank you.

Photo: No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow NATO provokes Russia in the Black Sea & What is to be done?  H.J. Mackinder, International Relations. #FriendsofHistoryDebatingSociety https://www.msn.com/en-gb/news/world/putin-says-no-need-to-escalate-black-sea-tensions-with-nato-rejects-snap-drills/ar-AAQHcZ9#image=1

Photo: Black Sea, by Niko Pirosmani (Georgian: ნიკო ფიროსმანი), simply referred to as Nikala (ნიკალა) (1862–1918).  One of the most revered Georgian artists, Pirosmani was a Georgian naïve painter who posthumously rose to prominence. Relatively poor for most of his life, he worked a variety of ordinary jobs. His rustic, everyday scenes are celebrated today for their depiction of the Georgia of Pirosmani's lifetime, and he has become one of the country's most beloved artistic figures. @Batchelorshow #Londinium90AD: Romans on the Danube, 90AD, just like Americans on the Black Sea, 2021 AD. Michael Vlahos. #FriendsofHistoryDebatingSociety https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/putin-says-us-support-of-ukraine-drone-use-risks-escalation/ar-AAQFaD5

The Centers for Disease Control published a study last week that experts say falsely claims that vaccine immunity is superior to natural immunity in those who've recovered from COVID. YouTube canceled SkyWatchTV! Please follow us on Rumble: www.rumble.com/skywatchtv 5) Russia's Ministry of Defense warns against US military buildup in Black Sea; 4) CDC touts flawed study; 3) Italian newspaper reports that only 2.9% of Italy's official death toll actually died of COVID; 2) Israeli airstrike Monday injures two Syrian soldiers; 1) Spanish man claims he's the last man on Earth and posting TikTok videos from the year 2027.

In this episode, learn from Grace Blacksea on prepping for the end of 2021, looking ahead to 2022 and building communityWhat we chat about in this episode?-How building a community can enhance your business model both for impact + income-Why leadership is essential to building a community online-How to create authentic engagement within your community + why it's important to prioritize connection.About Grace:Grace Blacksea is the Founder + CEO of Quench Collective, an online community + education platform for modern leaders & entrepreneurs. As a time and business strategist, she helps women uplevel their systems, strategy, and mindset so they design their business around their life...not the other way around.Connect with Grace:IG: https://www.instagram.com/quench.collective/Join us at the next Fill Up Your Cup Friday, every Friday at 9:00 AM PT. Sign up via the link in our bio or on our website!TAKE THE QUIZ: https://bit.ly/ProductivityPersonalityQuizI hope these tips help! Keep in touch! Leave me a message at hollymariehaynes.com or instagram.com/holly_marie_haynes

00.00.40: Introduction00.02.54: World of Gaming - Paizo's Pathfinder Nexus - ttrpg going digital?; Troubleshooters (in UK) and T2000 arriving; its the 40th anniversary of Call of Cthulhu; our weekend away. 00.38.34: Feature - Interview with GamesQuest CEO, Nigel Matthews01.28.52: Next time and goodbyeEffekt is brought to you by Fictionsuit and RPG Gods. Music is by Stars in a Black Sea, used with kind permission of Free League Publishing.Like what we do? Put our brand on your face! (and elsewhere) Buy pdfs via our DriveThru Affiliate link Leave a review on iTunes or Podchaser Find our Actual Play recordings on effektap Find essay transcripts and other stuff on Matthew's, and Dave's blogs ★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

Gary Flowers, host of “The Gary Flowers Show” on radio station Rejoice WREJ-AM 990, and Dr. Emmit Riley, Political Scientist and Assistant Professor of Africana Studies at DePauw University join us to discuss election results. Democrats have lost Virginia and New Jersey is too close to call as two reliably blue states send a powerful midterm message to the incumbent party. The Biden administration has failed to deliver on campaign promises and the loss of both houses in the midterm elections seems likely.Bob Schlehuber, co-host of Political Misfits, joins us to discuss Ethiopia. The Ethiopian conflict grows ever more fraught with tension as nearby nations experience coups and instability. Bob Schlehuber reports from the scene of the tense conflict.Dr. Yolandra Hancock, board-certified pediatrician and obesity medicine specialist, joins us to discuss covid. The CDC has signed off on covid vaccines for 5-11 year olds, and the government is expected to start giving them the injections sooner rather than later. Also, diet and exercise are major factors in the severity of covid symptoms, but the US has thus failed to address the infection from this angle.Martin Sieff, senior fellow at the American University in Moscow, joins us to discuss relations between Russia and the US. Biden's team of neocon Russophobes have increased tension with Russia to an unprecedented level. Also, the US sends more warships to the Black Sea and the situation in the Balkans is at a dangerous point.Laith Marouf, broadcaster and journalist based in Beirut, joins us to discuss Iran. In today's PressTV article, Iran's Islamic Revolution Guards Corps, (IRGC) released news footage of a confrontation that took place October 25 "against an American act of piracy targeting an Iranian fuel shipment."Dr. Linwood Tauheed, associate professor of economics at the University of Missouri- Kansas City, joins us to discuss the supply chain crisis. The world's largest shipping company is enjoying record profits as a result of the supply chain crisis. Also, we discuss a trucker's view of the problem and why he believes that it will not end soon. George Koo, journalist, social activist, and international business consultant, joins us to discuss China. Some US sinophobes seem to be pushing for a disastrous war with China that would likely destroy the world economy and expose humankind to an extinction-level crisis. China argues that they will decide when and if to use force for reunification with Taiwan.Dr. Francis Boyle, human rights lawyer and professor of international law at the University of Illinois College of Law, joins us to discuss US foreign policy. The US is "writing bad checks" by implying that it will defend Taiwan and Ukraine, though it has neither the capacity nor likely the inclination to defend either. Meanwhile, US structural difficulties create a potential internal implosion as supply chain woes, cultural and social disagreements, and an inherently unstable financialized economy create extreme political instability.

Launched in 2016, the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) is a valuable project for strengthening trade, infrastructure, energy, and political cooperation among 12 countries bordering the Adriatic Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea. The initiative, which seeks to grow north south interconnectedness, is a force multiplier that bolsters security in Europe and strengthens transatlantic […]

USIP's Donald Jensen looks at what Defense Secretary Lloyd Austin's recent trip to several countries along the Black Sea means for U.S. policy, saying, “We are looking at the region in its entirety … and Romania, Ukraine and Georgia are key players in the broader effort to curb Russian influence in the region.”

Launched in 2016, the Three Seas Initiative (3SI) is a valuable project for strengthening trade, infrastructure, energy, and political cooperation among 12 countries bordering the Adriatic Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Black Sea. The initiative, which seeks to grow north south interconnectedness, is a force multiplier that bolsters security in Europe and strengthens transatlantic trade ties by marrying private capital with some of the most dynamic and growing economies, while also helping to stymie Chinese and Russian efforts to make inroads in the region.Latvia is a strong supporter of 3SI and will host the Three Seas Summit and Business Forum in Riga in June 2022. Please join us for a conversation with Latvian Minister of Foreign Affairs Edgars Rinkēvičs on Latvia's goals for the initiative, 3SI's importance to broader transatlantic security, why the business community should take notice, and what the U.S. and Latvia can do to ensure its long-term success. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Wheat pulled higher by surging corn; Egypt buys Black Sea wheat; Australia harvest delays.

00.00.40: Introduction00.02.56: World of Gaming - Unionizing at Paizo, with a diversion into the price of RPGs and the end of Degenisis; my FreeRPG day haul; Tales from the Loop boardgame on the way; Twilight 2000 and Putrescence Regnant fulfilling now; Dave on Band of Badgers; TOR starter set expected in January; Kalymba Kickstarter; War Stories version 0.5 playtest version coming out to those on the Facebook playtest group.00.48.11: Feature - Matthew's postcard from Essen, featuring Dicebreaker01.11.05: Next time and goodbyeEffekt is brought to you by Fictionsuit and RPG Gods. Music is by Stars in a Black Sea, used with kind permission of Free League Publishing.Like what we do? Put our brand on your face! (and elsewhere) Buy pdfs via our DriveThru Affiliate link Leave a review on iTunes or Podchaser Find our Actual Play recordings on effektap Find essay transcripts and other stuff on Matthew's, and Dave's blogs ★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss the republic that emerged from the union of the Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 14th Century. At first this was a personal union, similar to that of James I and VI in Britain, but this was formalised in 1569 into a vast republic, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Kings and princes from across Europe would compete for parliament to elect them King and Grand Duke, and the greatest power lay with the parliaments. When the system worked well, the Commonwealth was a powerhouse, and it was their leader Jan Sobieski who relieved the siege of Vienna in 1683, defeating the Ottomans. Its neighbours exploited its parliament's need for unanimity, though, and this contributed to its downfall. Austria, Russia and Prussia divided its territory between them from 1772, before the new, smaller states only emerged in the 20th Century. The image above is Jan III Sobieski (1629-1696), King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania, at the Battle of Vienna 1683, by Marcello Bacciarelli (1731-1818) With Robert Frost The Burnett Fletcher Chair of History at the University of Aberdeen Katarzyna Kosior Lecturer in Early Modern History at Northumbria University And Norman Davies Professor Emeritus in History and Honorary Fellow of St Antony's College, University of Oxford Producer: Simon Tillotson

Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss the republic that emerged from the union of the Kingdom of Poland and Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the 14th Century. At first this was a personal union, similar to that of James I and VI in Britain, but this was formalised in 1569 into a vast republic, stretching from the Baltic to the Black Sea. Kings and princes from across Europe would compete for parliament to elect them King and Grand Duke, and the greatest power lay with the parliaments. When the system worked well, the Commonwealth was a powerhouse, and it was their leader Jan Sobieski who relieved the siege of Vienna in 1683, defeating the Ottomans. Its neighbours exploited its parliament's need for unanimity, though, and this contributed to its downfall. Austria, Russia and Prussia divided its territory between them from 1772, before the new, smaller states only emerged in the 20th Century. The image above is Jan III Sobieski (1629-1696), King of Poland and Grand Duke of Lithuania, at the Battle of Vienna 1683, by Marcello Bacciarelli (1731-1818) With Robert Frost The Burnett Fletcher Chair of History at the University of Aberdeen Katarzyna Kosior Lecturer in Early Modern History at Northumbria University And Norman Davies Professor Emeritus in History and Honorary Fellow of St Antony's College, University of Oxford Producer: Simon Tillotson

00.00.40: Introduction00.03.15: Thank you to our new patron: Dystopia Matt00.04.45: World of Gaming - Dystopia Matt's Fearsome Wilderness coming to Year Zero; Free RPG Day; Aegean kickstarter; Black Rose Manor from Three Eyed Goat, The One Ring PDFs delivered.00.37.59: Feature - What Dave has learned about game design01.04.39: Essen and goodbyeEffekt is brought to you by Fictionsuit and RPG Gods. Music is by Stars in a Black Sea, used with kind permission of Free League Publishing.Like what we do? Put our brand on your face! (and elsewhere) Buy pdfs via our DriveThru Affiliate link Leave a review on iTunes or Podchaser Find our Actual Play recordings on effektap Find essay transcripts and other stuff on Matthew's, and Dave's blogs ★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

Merry Rinat is the Administrator for the EpheONE asset-backed Christian cryptocurrency project. Merry has 30+ years of customer service experience. Communication is her top priority and she believes that a company's integrity is shown best by how they treat their associates and their customers. Merry is a wife, and mother of 5 adult children. Her greatest joy is to encourage and strengthen the Body of Christ onward to maturity and fullness. Mary Hasz is a prophetic artist who releases onto canvas the pictures the Lord gives her. She fights for the freedom of all people, not constrained by religious doctrine but moving in the power of God. Mary carries a message of hope, teaching on the power of the blood of Jesus and on the keys to overcoming. She invites everyone onto the playground of heaven to be like little children before a very, very good Father. Mary and her husband, Rich, have five grown children and live in Moravian Falls, North Carolina. TOPICS:- Positioning your hearts and minds- Crypto has value and it builds- How EpheONE is different- Concepts of assets backed by what you own- EpheOne is owned by all taken owners- EpheOne has four hard assets- Fractional buying tokens- How to buy EpheONE - Accessing the support team- Pancake Swap and Metamask wallet GOLDEN NUGGETS:1) EpheONE enables people of faith to do kingdom exploits with the resources that God is going to put in their hands. EpheONE positions the heart and mind to be able to receive as the investments are increasing.2) If you have the supply and demand of crypto and add a brick and mortar business behind these profitable tokens, then you take that profit and put that into the liquidity, and the value of that token will go up even more in value.3) The four hard assets given by God were a clothing line. A video game that teaches kingdom and bible basics. A food preservation and water filtration company that will give to the ones who are in need of water and it will also have a retail side, The fourth is a real estate investment, that the token holders will have dividends every month in crypto to hold on to or to sell.4) All profits with EpheONE goes back into the tokens to drive the value up so the taken holders can do the kingdom things that are on their scrolls to do.5) We are looking at a property on the Black Sea with a World Trade Center on the bottom floor for vacation rental property. We will begin with one property and the token holders will benefit from the profit on the rental. 6) Faith and Word tokens are limited and will be used as reward tokens inside the video game to level up and to earn from inside the game when they do well. Even if you don't play the game you will profit from the supply and demand for these tokens.7) The Yahweh token is the currency for the video game. The gamers will buy Yahweh tokens before they can play the paid version.8) EpheONE token is the core token. There are many with the option to make more. When money is made from assets, it will go back into the EpheONE token. QUOTES:- Let go of your fear of cryptocurrencies.- God changed my view of cryptocurrencies.- EpheONE is appointed and anointed by God.- No other crypto is backed by hard assets.- EpheONE is a name everyone will know.- The clothing line designs were given by God in dreams and visions.- EpheONE on Telegram offers step by step guides and has a support team.- MetaMask is a wallet to hold your cryptocurrencies. Be sure to make copies and keep your wallet address plus your 12 seed phrase recovery words in a safe place.- The wealth of the wicked is laid up for the righteous. THE WHY: Mary HaszEpheONE is a kingdom business. I wanted to get involved with it because my spirit resonated with it. The prices are still outstanding. Go buy a percentage or whole tokens. EpheONE has become my mission to tell everyone about this phenomenal opportunity. Out of the abundance of the heart the mouth speaks. We shift from the poverty spirit by listening to the Holy Spirit's whisper. Dare to believe and present yourself to the Lord and say here I am. I open my hands for the opportunities that resonate with me that are available. Give God a place to breathe on and bless your businesses and investments that are available for you on your scroll by asking and listening to him. LINKS:- Learn more about EpheONE:http://EpheONE.com - Join the Quantum Capacity Business Challenge:http://SpiritCenteredBusiness.com/challengeSpirit realm Activations for your Business: https://spiritcenteredbusiness.com/coaching- Join the SCB Tribe:http://facebook.com/groups/scbtribe- Design your Leveraged, Scalable & Sustainable business model from Heaven's blueprint and bring the Transformation in the world you and your business were destined to create. Schedule a FREE Discovery call with Bralynn:http://Bralynn.appointlet.com/s/discovery

The Astronomy, Technology, and Space Science News Podcast.SpaceTime Series 24 Episode 113*Cosmic impact that destroyed a cityA new study claims the ancient bronze age Jordan Valley city of Tall el-Hammam was destroyed by an asteroid impact. In the same way that the biblical story of Noah's flood could have originated in accounts of the ancient Mediterranean Sea's inundation of the Black Sea -- was this the basis for the biblical story of Sodom and Gomorrah?*TESS finds its smallest planet yetNASA's TESS -- Transiting Exoplanet Survey Satellite has discovered its smallest world so far – a planet between the sizes of Mars and Earth.*NASA's new mission to monitor the EarthNASA has successfully launched the latest Landsat 9 environmental Earth observation satellite designed to monitor changes on the Earth's surface.*The Science ReportFruit and veggies may be the key to preventing your child becoming a grumpy teen.Palaeontologists discover the earliest known Ankylosaur.Archaeologists unearth a vast second temple period quarry in Jerusalem.Alex on Tech looks at Europe's decision to standardize the USB-C.For more SpaceTime and show links: https://linktr.ee/biteszHQ If you love this podcast, please get someone else to listen too. Thank you…https://bitesz.com

(For Educational Purposes Only. The Creator owns their content.) "Are there any biblical references to territories in what is today the country of Russia? The author's answer is yes, but Ezekiel's reference to Rosh and Meshech is not one of them. In a thoroughly documented discussion, the author describes the Uratrians, Manneans, Cimmerians, and Scythians. Three of these northern foes of Israel are referred to by Jeremiah (in 51:27), the Cimmerians by Ezekiel (38:6). "...with the exception of Egypt," writes the author, "almost all of Israel's enemies came from the north, though from the viewpoint of a modern map, many of these came ultimately from the east." The Urartians occupied what is now Soviet Armenia, southeastern Turkey, and northwestern Iran. The Manneans lived south of Lake Urmia, between Urartu and Assyria. The Cimmerians first appeared in the steppes north of the Caucasus, then crossed the Caucasus, and eventually invaded Asia Minor. The Scythians were nomadic tribes from the Russian steppes, some of whom settled in the Ukraine north of the Black Sea, others east of the Caspian. But what of Rosh, Messhech, and other names in Ezekiel 38:2? Is Rosh, Russia and Meshech Moscow? Rosh cannot possibly be related to Russia, insists the author. Nor can the terms Gog and Magog, no proposed identification for which has yet to win universal consent. Meshech and Tubal, on the other hand, have been located for certain - in central and eastern Anatolia."

Thomas Graham, distinguished fellow at CFR, leads a conversation on constraining Putin's Russia. FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the CFR Fall 2021 Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today's meeting is on the record, and the video and transcript will be available on our website CFR.org/academic if you would like to share it with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have Thomas Graham with us to talk about Putin's Russia. Mr. Graham is a distinguished fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and a senior advisor at Kissinger Associates, where he focuses on Russian and Eurasian affairs. He is cofounder of the Russian, East European, and Eurasian studies program at Yale University, and is also a research fellow at the MacMillan Center at Yale. He previously served as special assistant to President George W. Bush and senior director for Russia on the National Security Council staff from 2004 to 2007, and director for Russian affairs from 2002 to 2004. His résumé is very distinguished. I will just also say that he is a U.S. diplomat who served two tours of duty in Moscow, where he worked on political affairs. So, Mr. Graham, thanks very much for being with us today. I thought you could get us started by talking about the primary interests at stake in U.S.-Russia relations. GRAHAM: Great. Thank you very much, Irina, for that introduction, and it's a real pleasure to be with all of you here today. I want to start with three broad points that will frame the rest of our discussion. The first is that the problem that the United States faces is not simply with Putin; it is with Russia more generally speaking. The last seven years of very difficult, challenging adversarial relationship is really not an aberration in the history of the relationship between our two countries. In fact, from the moment the United States emerged as a major power on the global stage at the very end of the nineteenth century, we have had a rivalry with Russia. And the issues that divide us today are the ones that divided us 125, 150 years ago: We have opposing worldviews. We have different geopolitical interests. And clearly, we have different systems of values that inform our domestic political systems. This rivalry has intensified, ebbed and flowed during the twentieth century. But the effort we made at partnership after the breakup of the Soviet Union up until 2014, marked by the eruption of the crisis in Ukraine, is really the aberration in the history of relations between our two countries and one that was founded very much on the fact that Russia endured a period of strategic weakness. So the issue we have to deal with Russia and how we're going to deal with Russia well into the future, even after Putin departs—which he will, obviously, at some point, if only for biological reasons. The second point that I would make is that Russia is not going to go away. We hear a lot in the public debate in the United States about Russian decline, about the population/demographic problems it has, about its stagnating economy, and so forth. None of this is necessarily untrue, but I think it tends to exaggerate the problems that Russia faces. It ignores the problems that all other major countries face—including China, the United States, and many major European countries—but it also overlooks the very great strengths that Russia has had for decades that are going to make it a player and an important player on the global stage, nuclear weapons to begin with. We should never forget that Russia remains the only country that can destroy the United States as a functioning society in thirty minutes. Russia has the largest natural endowment of any country in the world, a country that can pretend to self-sufficiency and, in fact, is better placed than most other countries to deal with a breakdown in globalization in the decades to come if that, indeed, happens. It has a veto on the U.N. Security Council, which makes it an important player on issues of importance to the United States, and it has a talented population that has fostered a scientific community that, for example, is capable of taking advances in technology and developing the military applications from them. Just look at the strength that Russia exhibits in cyberspace, for example—again, a major challenge for the United States. So Russia is going to continue to be a challenge. One other thing that I should have mentioned here is that the Russian state throughout history and Putin's Russia today has demonstrated a keen ability to mobilize the resources of their own society for state purposes. So even if in relative terms they may be weaker and weakening vis-à-vis China and the United States, in some ways that political will, that ability to mobilize, allows Russia to play a much larger role than mere indicators of its economic size and population size would suggest. Now, Russia clashes with the United States across a whole range of issues, and as I said that is going to continue for some time. And this brings me to my third point: How we should think about American foreign policy, what our guidelines should be in dealing with Russia. And here there are three, I think, key elements to this. First, the United States needs to preserve strategic stability. We need to have that nuclear balance between us (sic) and the United States. This is an existential question. And as I already mentioned, Russia does have a tremendous nuclear capability. Second, the United States should seek to manage its competition with Russia responsibly. We want to avoid or reduce the risk of a direct military conflict that could escalate to the nuclear level. This is—also, I think, recognizes that the United States is not going to be able to compel Russia to capitulate on issues that are of interest to us, nor are we going to be able to radically change the way they think about their own national interests. So it's a competitive relationship and we need to manage that responsibly. And finally, given the complex world that we live in today—the very real transnational challenges we face: climate change, pandemic diseases, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction—the United States should seek, to the extent possible, ways to cooperate with Russia in dealing with these issues. We should recognize that Russia is not necessarily the only player nor necessarily the most important player in dealing with these challenges, but it does have a role to play along with other major powers in handling these transnational issues. So those, I think, are three sort of broad points that help set the stage for our discussion. Now let me turn sort of very briefly to the questions about U.S. policy. How do we deal with this Russia? What are sort of—the way we should think about American foreign policy? And here the point I would make is that we should think of the policy in terms of what I would call the three Ds: defense, deterrence, and dialogue. Now, defense and deterrence in many ways go together. If you have a very good defense, if you demonstrate an ability and willingness to defend your interests effectively and deliberately, then you tend to deter another power. They have less reason to want to attack you. But if deterrence fails, you very much need to be able to defend yourself—to disrupt Russian operations in cyberspace, for example, or disrupt military operations by the Russians that you find problematic in some way. So defense and deterrence go together, and we need to think about that. Now, you build these elements on a number of other things that we're all familiar with. A strong military—strong, capable military—is, obviously, an element of both defense and deterrence, and something that we have managed quite well in the past and I imagine will manage quite well going into the future. Cyber defenses are also an important element of constraining Russia on the global stage. Now, here the United States really has much room for improvement. We built our internet, our cyberspace largely for the accessibility, the ability to pass information from one entity to another, and we spent much less attention to the security of that system. As cyberspace has become more important to our socioeconomic and political lives, we really need to devote much more attention to cybersecurity, hardening our commuter—computer networks, for example, making sure we have strong passwords and so forth, something that I think we now recognize but we need to put a much greater effort into doing that. Third area of defense and deterrence is strong alliances. When we're thinking about Russia, this is clearly the transatlantic community, NATO, our relations with our other European partners. And here, we need to develop the types of military/defense cooperation that we need to demonstrate quite clearly that the United States, along with the rest of the NATO allies, is ready and prepared to meet its Article 5 guarantees to collective security should the Russians do something that is untoward in our neighborhood. And then, finally, and I think of increasing importance, is the question of national unity. National unity, national resilience, has really become a key element in defense and deterrence at this point. We need to demonstrate to the Russians that we have sufficient national unity to clearly identify what our interests are and pursue them on the international stage. One of Putin's close colleagues several years ago said that what Putin is doing is messing with the Americans' minds, and certainly we've seen that over the past several years. Putin hasn't sowed the discord in the United States, but he certainly has tried to exploit it for Russian purposes. And this is something that he's going to concentrate on in the future, in part because he recognizes the dangers of military confrontation with the United States. So great-power competition, from the Kremlin's standpoint, is going to move very, very quickly from the kinetic realm to the cyber realm, and we need to be able to deal with that. So building national unity at home, overcoming our polarization, is really perhaps one of the key steps in constraining Russia on the global stage. And then, finally, some very brief words about dialogue. We tend to downplay this in our national discussion. Many believe that diplomatic relations are—should not be branded as a reward for bad behavior. But I think if you look at this objectively, you'll see that diplomatic relations are very important as a way of defending and advancing our national concerns. It's a way that we can convey clearly to the Russians what our expectations are, what our goals are, what our redlines are, and the responses that we're capable of taking if Russia crosses them. At the same time, we can learn from the Russians what their goals are, what their motivations are, what their redlines are, and we can factor that into our own policy. This is a major element of managing the competition between our two countries responsibly. You'll see that we have begun to engage in negotiations and diplomacy with the Russians much more under President Biden than we did under President Trump. We've already launched strategic stability talks with the aim of coming up with a new concept of strategic stability that's adequate to the strategic environment of the present day and the near future. We've engaged in cybersecurity talks, which my understanding is have, in fact, had some success over the past several weeks. Where we, I think, have lagged is in the discussion of regional issues—Europe, Ukraine, the Middle East, for example. These are areas where there is still potential for conflict, and the United States and Russia ought to be sitting down and talking about these issues on a regular basis. So three Ds—defense, deterrence, and diplomacy or dialogue—are the ways that we should be thinking about our relationship with Russia. And obviously, we'll need to adjust each of these three elements to the specific issue at hand, whether it be in Europe, whether it be in the nuclear realm, cyberspace, and so forth. Now, with that as a way—by way of introduction, I am very pleased to entertain your questions. FASKIANOS: Tom, thanks very much for that terrific overview and analysis. We're going to go to all of you now for your questions. You can either raise your hand by clicking on the icon, and I will call on you, and you can tell us what institution you are with; or you can type your question in the Q&A box, although if you want to ask it you can raise your hand. We encourage that. And if you're typing your question, please let us know what college or university you're with. So I'm going to take the first raised-hand question from Babak Salimitari. And unmute yourself. Q: Can you guys hear me? GRAHAM: Yes. FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: Hello. I'm a third-year UCI student, economics. I have a question. I'm going to sound a bit like Sean Hannity here, so please forgive me, but I have a question about that Nord Stream 2 pipeline that you constantly hear on the news, and it just doesn't make that much sense for me of why this pipeline was allowed to be completed into the heart of Europe considering Russia's strength with natural gases and the leverage that they have over Europe with that pipeline. Why was that allowed to be completed? GRAHAM: Well, I think from the standpoint of the Biden administration this was a matter of what we call alliance management. Germany is clearly a key ally for the United States in Europe, and the Germans were very committed to the completion of that pipeline, starting with Chancellor Angela Merkel down through I think both the leading political parties and the German business community. So I think they made the decision for that. But let me step back because I'd like to challenge a lot of the assumptions about the Nord Stream 2 project here in the United States, which I think misconceive it, misframe the question, and tend to exaggerate the dangers that is poses. The first point that I would make is that Europe now and in the future will have and need Russian gas. It's taken a substantial amount in the past—in the past decades, and even as it moves forward towards a green revolution it will continue to take considerable amounts of Russian gas. It can't do without that gas. So the Nord Stream 2 pipeline, contrary to what you hear in the United States or at the U.S. Congress, I don't think poses an additional threat to Europe's energy security, no larger than the threat that was posed before that pipeline was completed. The Europeans, I think are aware of the problems that that poses, and they've taken steps over the past several years to integrate the gas—the gas distribution network in Europe, to build facilities to import liquified natural gas, all as a way of eroding the leverage that Gazprom might have had over energy markets in Europe. And that has been quite successful over the past—over the past several years. Now, I think, you know, the other issue that comes up in the discussion in the United States is Ukraine, because Nord Stream 2 clearly provides Russia with a way to import the gas into Europe and bypass Ukraine at the—at the same time. And Ukraine is going to suffer a significant loss in budgetary revenue because of the decline in transit fees that it gets from the transportation of Russian gas across its territory. You know, that is a problem, but there are ways of dealing with that: by helping Ukraine fill the budgetary gap, by helping Ukraine transition away from a reliance on gas to other forms of energy, of helping Ukraine develop the green-energy resources that will make it a much more important partner in the European energy equation than it is now. And then finally, you know, it strikes me as somewhat wrongheaded for Ukraine to put itself in a position where it is reliant on a country that is clearly a belligerent for a significant part of its federal revenue. So we need to think hard with the Ukrainians about how they deal with this issue, how they wean themselves off Russian transit fees, and then I think we have a situation where we can help Ukraine, we can manage the energy-security situation in Europe, we can reduce any leverage that Russia might have, and that Nord Stream 2 really doesn't pose a significant risk to the United States or our European allies over the long run. FASKIANOS: Thank you. We're going to take the next question from the written queue from Kenneth Mayers, who's at St Francis—sorry, that just popped away; oh, sorry—St. Francis College. Thinking beyond this triangular framework, what pathways and possibilities can be envisioned for a more positive dimension of working together in mutually, even globally, beneficial ways? GRAHAM: What triangular relationship are we talking about? FASKIANOS: His—thinking beyond this triangular framework and— GRAHAM: Oh, OK. So I think it's defense, deterrence, and diplomacy is the— FASKIANOS: Correct. GRAHAM: OK. Can you repeat the final part of the question, then? FASKIANOS: What pathways and possibilities can be envisioned for a more positive dimension of working together in mutually beneficial ways? GRAHAM: Well, there are a number of areas in which we can work together beneficially. If you think about proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, for example, the United States and Russia over the past two decades have played a major role in both securing weapons that were located in Russia, but also in securing highly-enriched uranium that was in Soviet-designed reactors throughout the former Soviet space. We have taken a lead together in setting down rules and procedures that reduce the risk of nuclear material—fissile material getting into the hands of terrorist organizations. And we have played a role together in trying to constrain the Iranian nuclear program. Russia played an instrumental role in the conclusion of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action that we signed in 2015 that the Trump administration walked away with, but they will continue to play a role in constraining Iranians' nuclear ambitions going forward. And we've also worked in a cooperative fashion in dealing with the North Korean nuclear program. So there are areas in nonproliferation where the two countries can work together. On climate change, I mean, I think the big challenge for the United States is actually persuading Russia that climate change is a significant threat to their own security. They're slowly beginning to change that view, but as they come around to recognizing that they have to deal with climate change there are a number of areas where the two countries can cooperate. One of the things that climate is doing is melting the permafrost. That is destabilizing the foundation of much of Russia's energy infrastructure in areas where gas and oil are extracted for export abroad. The United States has dome technologies that the Russians might find of interest in stabilizing that infrastructure. They suffer from problems of Siberian fires—peat-bog fires, forest fires—an area that, obviously, is of concern to the United States as well. And there may be room for cooperation there, two. And then, finally, you know, the United States and Russia have two of the leading scientific communities in the entire world. We ought to be working together on ways that we can help mitigate the consequences of climate change going forward. So I see an array of areas where the two countries could cooperate, but that will depend on good diplomacy in Washington and a receptivity on the part of the Russians which we haven't seen quite yet. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Let's go next to Jeffrey Ko. You can unmute yourself. Thank you. Q: Hi. So I'm Jeffrey Ko. I'm an international relations master's student at Carnegie Mellon. And my question has to deal with these private military forces, and especially the Wagner Group. And so I would like to know, you know, how does this play into our security strategy regarding Russia in countries that have seen proxy warfare? And how does this—how difficult will it be to engage with Russia either diplomatically or militarily on the use of these gray-zone tactics, and specifically utilizing the Wagner Group as an informal branch of Russia's military? GRAHAM: Well, look, I mean, I do think that we need, one, to sit down and have a discussion with Russia about the use of these private military forces, particularly the Wagner firm, which has played a significant role in a number of conflicts across the globe in the Middle East, Africa, and in Latin America. But we also ought to help the countries that are of interest to us deal with the problems that the Wagner Group causes. You know, the United States had to deal with the Wagner Group in Syria during the Syrian civil war. You know, despite the fact that we had a deconfliction exercise with the Russians at that point, tried to prevent military conflicts between our two militaries operating in close proximity, when the Wagner forces violated those strictures and actually began to attack a U.S. facility, we had no hesitation about using the force that we had to basically obliterate that enemy. And the Wagner Group suffered casualties numbering in the hundreds, one to two hundred. I think the Russians got the message about that, that you don't—you don't mess with the United States military, certainly not while using a private military company like Wagner. You know, in places like Libya, where Wagner is quite active, I think the United States needs a major diplomatic effort to try to defuse the Libyan crisis. And part of the solution to that would be negotiating an agreement that calls for the withdrawal of all foreign military forces and certainly private military groups from Libyan territory, and lean on the Russians to carry that through. In any event, you know, this is not going to be an easy issue to resolve. I think we deal with this by—country by country, and we focus our attention on those countries where our national interests are greatest. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Jill Dougherty, who's at Georgetown University. The Putin administration appears to be hardening its control of Russia's society with the purpose of keeping Putin in power at least until 2036. Most recent example is the Duma elections that just took place. Will this crackdown domestically affect or damage U.S.-Russia relations? GRAHAM: Thank you, Jill. Always a good question and always a difficult question to answer. You know, I think the issue here is the extent to which the Biden administration wants to make the domestic political situation in Russia a key item on its agenda with Russia over the next—over the next few years. You know, my impression from the conversations I've had with people in the administration—in and around the administration is that President Biden is not going to focus on this. You know, his focus really is going to be China, and what he wants to do is maintain something of a status quo in the relationship with Russia. You will notice that the second round of sanctions that the United States levied with regard to the poisoning of Alexei Navalny, something that was mandated by U.S. law, were actually quite mild—much less extreme, much less punitive than the legislation allowed—I think a signal that the Biden administration was not going to let domestic political issues in Russia overwhelm the agenda that the United States has, which is going to be focused on strategic stability, cyber issues, and so forth. So my immediate reaction is that the Duma election is really not going to have a dramatic impact on the state of the relationship between our two countries. We accept the fact that Russia is an authoritarian system. It is becoming more authoritarian. We will continue to try to find ways to support those elements of civil society we can, but always being careful not to do it in ways that causes the Russian government to crack down even harder on those individuals. This is a very sort of difficult needle to thread for the United States, but I think that's the way we'll go and you won't see this as a major impediment to the improvement of relations—which, as we all know, are at a very low level at this point in any event. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. Let's go next to Sujay Utkarsh. Q: Hi, yeah. Can you hear me? GRAHAM: Yes. FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: Awesome. So, regarding the issue about cyber warfare, I was wondering if you can go into more detail about what advantages the Russians have in cyberspace and what the United States can do to compete with those advantages. GRAHAM: A good question and a difficult question for people outside the government to answer, since we're not privy to all the information about Russian cyber capabilities nor are we privy to the information about American cyber capabilities. Both countries cloak those programs in a great deal of secrecy. You know, it seemed to me that one of the advantages that perhaps Russia has is that it's a much more closed society than the United States. Now, I'm thinking simply in terms of the way societies can be disrupted through cyberspace. We're a much more open society. It's easier to access our internet. We are—just as I mentioned before, we are a polarized society right now. That allows Russia many avenues into our domestic political system in order to exacerbate the tensions between various elements in our society. The United States can't reply in the same way in dealing with Russia. You know, second, Russia, in building its own internet, its own cyberspace, has paid much more attention to security than the United States has. So, you know, I would presume that its computer systems are somewhat harder to penetrate than American systems are at this point, although another factor to take into account here is that much of the initial effort in building up cyberspace—the Web, the computer networks—in Russia was built with American technology. You know, the Googles, the Intels, and others played an instrumental role in providing those types of—that type of equipment to the Russians. So I wouldn't exaggerate how much stronger they are there. And then, finally, I think what is probably one of the strengths, if you want to call it that, is that Russia is probably a little more risk-prone in using its cyber tools than the United States is at this point, in part because we think as a society we're more vulnerable. And that does give Russia a slight advantage. That said, this shouldn't be a problem that's beyond the capability of the United States to manage if we put our minds to it. We have done a lot more over the past several years. We are getting better at this. And I think we'll continue to improve in time and with the appropriate programs, the appropriate education of American society. FASKIANOS: Thank you. The next question is a written one from Kim-Leigh Tursi, a third-year undergraduate at Temple University. Where do you see Russia in relation to the rise of China, and how does that affect how the U.S. might approach foreign policy toward Russia? GRAHAM: Well, you know, that's an important question, obviously one that a lot of people have focused on recently. You know, Russia and China have developed a very close working strategic relationship over the—over the past several years, but I think we should note that the Russian effort to rebuild its relations with China go back to the late Soviet period to overcome the disadvantages that then the Soviet Union felt they had because of the poor relationship with China and the ability of the United States to exploit that relationship to Moscow's detriment. So relations have been improving for the past twenty-five, thirty years; obviously, a dramatic acceleration in that improvement after 2014 and the breakdown in relations between Russia and the West. Now, there are a number of reasons for this alignment at this point. One, the two countries do share at a very general level a basic view of for—a basic dislike of what they see as American ambitions to dominate the global—the global security and economic environment. They don't like what they consider to be American hegemonic goals. Second, the economies seem to be complementary at this point. Russia does have a wealth of natural resources that the Chinese need to fuel their robust economic growth. You have similar domestic political systems. And all of this, I think, is reinforced by what appears to be a very good personal relationship between President Putin and President Xi Jinping. These two leaders have met dozens of times over the past five to seven years and have maintained, I think, very robust contact even during the—during the pandemic. So there are very good strategic reasons why these two countries enjoy good relations. They are going to step those up in the near term. The Russians are continuing to provide the Chinese with significant sophisticated military equipment. They've also undertaken to help the Chinese build an early warning system for ballistic missiles, and when that's completed it will make China only the third country in the world to have such a system along with Russia and the United States. Now, I would argue that this strategic alignment does pose something of a challenge to the United States. If you look at American foreign policy or American foreign policy tradition, one of the principles that has guided the United States since the end of the nineteenth century, certainly throughout the twentieth century, was that we needed to prevent the—any hostile country or coalition of hostile countries from dominating areas of great strategic importance, principally Europe, East Asia, and more recently the Middle East. A Russian-Chinese strategic alignment certainly increases the chances of China dominating East Asia. Depending on how close that relationship grows, it also could have significant impact on Europe and the way Europe relates to this Russian-Chinese bloc, and therefore to the United States as a whole. So we should have an interest in trying to sort of attenuate the relationship between the two countries. At a minimum, we shouldn't be pursuing a set of policies that would push Russia closer to China. Second, I think we ought to try to normalize our diplomatic relationship with the Russians. Not that we're necessarily going to agree on a—on a range of issues at this point, but we need to give the Russians a sense that they have other strategic options than China going forward—something that would, I think, enhance their bargaining position with the Chinese going forward and would complicate China's own strategic calculus, which would be to our advantage. I think we also should play on Russia's concerns about strategic autonomy, this idea that Russia needs to be an independent great power on the global stage, that it doesn't want to be the junior partner or overly dependent on any one country as a way, again, of attenuating the tie with China. The one thing that I don't think we can do is drive a wedge between those two countries, in part because of the strategic reasons that I've mentioned already that bring these two countries together. And any very crude, I think, effort to do that will actually be counterproductive. Both Beijing and Moscow will see through that, quite clearly, and that will only lead to a closing of the ranks between those two countries, which as I said is a strategic challenge for the United States going forward. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Holli Semetko, who's at Emory University. Polarization is something we must overcome, as you said, but those of us working on social media have some evidence to suggest that social media has fostered political polarization in the U.S. Yuri Milner, a Russian Israeli entrepreneur, invested in an early round of Facebook funding with help from VTB, a Russian state-controlled bank, as well as his investment in Jared Kushner's real estate firm. What is the level of FDI from Russia in the U.S. and do you see it as a threat to national security? GRAHAM: Well, look, I mean, the actual level of Russian FDI in the United States is quite small. You know, you have some few, I think, good examples of it—the one that you've mentioned with Yuri Milner, for example. There was some investment in a steel factory some years ago. But by and large, there hasn't been a significant amount of Russian foreign direct investment in the United States. I think our growing concerns about Russia have made us even more leery of allowing Russian investment, particularly in sectors that we consider critical to American national security. So I'm not deeply concerned about that going forward. I think we probably face a much greater challenge from the Chinese in that regard. Of course, you've seen efforts by the United States to deal more harshly or look more closely at Chinese investment in the United States over the past several years. Let me just make one sort of final point on social media since it's come up. You know, Russia is a problem. We need to pay attention to Russia in that space. But again, I don't think that we should exaggerate Russia's influence, nor should we focus simply on Russia as the problem in this area. There is a major problem with disinformation in social media in the United States, much of that propagated by sources within the United States, but there are a host of other countries that also will try to affect U.S. public opinion through their intrusions into American social media. You know, given our concerns about First Amendment rights, freedom of speech and so forth, you know, I think we have problems in sort of really clamping down on this. But what we need to do, certainly, is better educate the American public about how to deal with the information that crosses their electronic devices day in and day out. Americans need to be aware of how they can be manipulated, and they need to understand and know where they can go to find reliable information. Again, given the political polarization in our country today, this is a very real challenge and difficult one. But I think if we think long term about this problem, the key really is educating the American public. An educated American public is going to be the best defense against foreign countries, other hostile forces trying to use social media to undermine our national unity and exacerbate the politics of our country. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Eoin Wilson-Manion, who's raised his hand. Q: Hello. Can you hear me now? GRAHAM: Yes. FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: Awesome. Well, thank you. I just wanted to ask if you could touch a little bit more on Russia's presence in Syria and what that means for U.S. interests in Syria and I guess the larger Middle East. I'm Eoin from Carnegie Mellon University. Thanks very much. GRAHAM: Well, you know, the Russians entered Syria in 2015 militarily largely to save Assad from what they thought was imminent overthrow by what they considered a radical Islamic force, a group of terrorists that they thought would challenge Russian interests not only in Syria but would fuel extremist forces inside Russia itself, particularly in the North Caucasus but farther afield than that—even into Moscow, into areas that were Muslim-dominated inside Russia itself. So they had very good national security reasons for going in. Those ran—I mean, the Russian presence in Syria clearly has run counter to what the United States was trying to do at that point since we clearly aligned against Assad in favor of what we considered moderate reformist forces that were seeking a more sort of democratic future for Syria as part of this broader Arab Spring at that time. So there was a clear conflict at that point. You know, subsequently and in parallel with its continued presence in Syria, the Russians have extended their diplomatic—their diplomatic effort to other countries in the region. Russia enjoys a fairly robust diplomatic relationship with Israel, for example, that has been grounded in counterterrorism cooperation, for example. They have a sort of strange relationship, largely positive, with Turkey that they have pursued over the past several years. We know of the ties that they've had in Tehran, in Iran for some time. They have reached out to the Saudis and the Saudis have bought some military equipment from them. We see them in Egypt and Libya, for example. So they're a growing presence, a growing diplomatic presence in the Middle East, and this does pose some problems for the United States. From the middle of the 1970s onward, one of the basic thrusts of American foreign policy was to limit the role the Russians played in the Middle East. We sidelined them in the negotiations between the Arabs and the Israelis in the 1970s and in the 1980s. We limited their diplomatic contacts to countries that we considered critical partners and allies in that part of the world. Now I think the geopolitical situation has changed. Our own interest in the Middle East has diminished over time, in part because of the fracking revolution here in the United States. Gas and oil, we've got close to being independent in that area. We're not as dependent on the Middle East as we once were for energy sources. And also, as, you know, the Biden administration has been clear, we do want to pivot away from the Middle East and Europe to focus more of our energies on what we see as the rising and continuing strategic challenge posed by China. So I think that means that going forward the United States is going to have to deal with Russia in a different fashion in the Middle East than in the past. We're going to have to recognize them as a continuing presence. We're not going to be able to push them out, in part because we're not prepared to devote the resources to it. We have countries that are still important to us—Saudi Arabia, Israel for example—that do want a Russian presence in the Middle East. And so what we ought to do, it seems to me, is to begin that discussion about how we're going to manage the rivalry in the Middle East. Now, it's not all simply competition. There are areas for cooperation. We can cooperate in dealing with Iran, for example, the Iran nuclear dossier, as we have had in the past. Neither country has an interest in Iran developing nuclear weapons. Second, I think the two countries also would like to see a Middle East that's not dominated by a single regional power. So despite the fact that the Russians have worked together quite closely with the Iranians in Syria, they don't share Iranian ambitions elsewhere in the Middle East. And if you look at the diplomatic ties that the Russians have nurtured over the past with Turkey, with Israel, Saudi Arabia for example, none of these are friends of Iran, to put it mildly. So we can talk, I think, to the Russians of how our—you know, we can conduct ourselves so as to foster the development of a regional equilibrium in the Middle East that tends to stabilize that region, makes it less of a threat to either country, less of a threat to America's European allies, and use this as a basis for, again, sort of not escalating the tension in the region but moderating it in some ways that works to the long-term advantage of the United States. FASKIANOS: Next question from Michael Strmiska, who's a professor at Orange County Community College in New York state. Do you see any hope of persuading Russia to abandon its occupation of Crimea in the near term? Or do you think this is like the occupation of the Baltic states of Lithuania, Latvia, and Estonia after World War II, where a very long timespan was needed before any liberation was realistically possible? GRAHAM: Well, I guess my answer to those two questions would be yes and no, or no and yes. On Crimea, you know, I see no sort of near-term scenario that would lead to the Russians agreeing to the return of Crimea to Ukraine. Quite the contrary, Russia has taken steps since 2014 they continue at this point to further integrate Crimea into the Russian Federation politically, economically, socially, and so forth. The Russians have also built up their military presence in Crimea as a way of enhancing their domination or their influence in the greater Black Sea region. So I see no set of circumstances that would change that, certainly not in the—in the near term. And I think, you know, the Ukrainian effort to focus attention on Crimea is not going to, in fact, gain a great deal of traction with Europe nor with the United States going forward, though we will maintain the principled position of not recognizing Russia's incorporation or annexation of Crimea. You know, I don't think that the Crimean and Baltic situations are necessarily analogous. You know, in the Baltic states there was a significant indigenous element, governments in exile, that supported the independence of those countries. There was a fulcrum that the United States or a lever that the United States could use over time to continue pressure on the Soviets that eventually led to the independence of those countries as the Soviet Union broke down and ultimately collapsed at the end of the 1980s into 1991. I don't see any significant indigenous element in Crimea nor a movement of inhabitants of Crimea outside Crimea that wants Crimea to be returned to Ukraine. I think we need to remember that a significant part of the population in Ukraine is Russian military, retired Russian military, that feels quite comfortable in—within the Russian Federation at this point. So if I were being quite frank about this, although I think the United States should maintain its principled position and not recognize annexation of Crimea, I don't see anything over the long term, barring the collapse of Russia itself, that will change that situation and see Ukraine (sic; Crimea) reincorporated into the Ukrainian state. FASKIANOS: So there are a couple questions in the chat about Russia's economy: What is their economy like today? And what are the effects of the sanctions? And from Steve Shinkel at the Naval War College: How do you assess the tie between Russia's economy and being able to continue to modernize its military and ensure a stable economy? And will economic factors and Russia's demographic challenges be a future constraining factor? So if you could— GRAHAM: Yeah. No, no, just take the economy. Obviously, a big issue, and it will be a constraining factor. I mean, the Russian economy is stagnating and it has for some—for some time. They enjoyed—the Russian economy enjoyed a very rapid period of growth during President Putin's first presidential—two presidential terms in the 2000s, but since the financial crisis of 2008 and 2009 Russia has run into very difficult economic times. In fact, it's never really recovered from that crisis. If you look at the past ten years, barely any growth in the Russian economy at all. If you look at the impact that that has had on Russians themselves, there's basically been no growth in real disposable income; rather, a decline over the past six or seven years. I think the Russians recognize that. The question is whether they can come up with a set of policies that actually will reverse that and that lead to a more robustly growing economy. Now, what the Kremlin has tried to do is not so much reform the economy—which I think is necessary if they're going to enjoy robust economic growth—as much as professionalize the economy; that is—that is, bring in a younger sort of cadre who are well educated, many of them educated in the West, who understand how modern economies function and can keep the economy stable at least at the macro level. And this is one of the reasons that Western sanctions have not had nearly the impact on Russian behavior that many had hoped for or anticipated back in 2014 when we began to turn repeatedly to this tool in response to Russian activities and operations against Ukraine. You know, it has had some impact. I think the IMF would say that it's probably taken a percentage point off—or, not a percentage point, but a tenth of a percentage point off of Russia's GDP growth over the past several years. That certainly hasn't been enough to change Russian behavior. But it hasn't been more, in fact, because the governors of the—of the central bank have dealt quite adeptly with that, and maintain said Russian macroeconomic stability and some sort of foundation for the economy to grow going forward. I imagine that's going to continue into the—into the future as well. So it is a constraining factor. Then I would end with what I—with a point that I made in my introduction. Russia does have a tremendous ability to mobilize its resources for state purposes, to extract what it needs from society at large to modernize the military, to maintain certainly Russia's defenses and also some capability to project power abroad. So I wouldn't write them off because of that. I think it's going—still going to be a serious power, but not nearly as great a challenge to the United States as if it, in fact, solved its demographic problems, its economic problems, and had a robustly growing economy, greater resources that it could devote to a whole range of things that would improve its standing on the global stage vis-à-vis the United States and vis-à-vis China. FASKIANOS: Well, with that we are at the end of our time. And I apologize to everybody. We had over twenty written questions still pending and raised hands. I'm sorry we couldn't get to all of you, but we do try to end on time. So, Thomas Graham, thank you very much for sharing your insights and analysis with us today. We appreciate it. And to all of you for your terrific questions and comments, we appreciate it. Our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday, October 6, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern Time. And we will focus on the Indo-Pacific with Dhruva Jaishankar, who is the executive director of the Observer Research Foundation America and nonresident fellow at the Lowy Institute. And in the meantime, I encourage you to follow CFR at @CFR_Academic and visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for new research and analysis on global issues. So, Tom, thank you very much. GRAHAM: Thank you. Good luck to all of you. (END)

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“Ket Buqa Noyan kept attacking left and right with all zeal. Some encouraged him to flee, but he refused to listen and said, “Death is inevitable. It is better to die with a good name than to flee in disgrace. In the end, someone from this army, old or young, will reach the court and report that Ket Buqa, not wanting to return in shame, gave his life in battle. The padishah should not grieve over lost Mongol soldiers. Let him imagine that his soldiers' wives have not been pregnant for a year and the mares of their herds have not folded. [...]The life or death of servants like us is irrelevant.” Although the soldiers left him, he continued to struggle in battle like a thousand men. In the end his horse faltered, and he was captured. [...] After that, Ket Buqa was taken before Quduz with his hands bound. “Despicable man,” said Quduz, “you have shed so much blood wrongfully, ended the lives of champions and dignitaries with false assurances, and overthrown ancient dynasties with broken promises. Now you have finally fallen into a snare yourself.”[...]     “If I am killed by your hand,” said Ket Buqa, “I consider it to be God's act, not yours. Be not deceived by this event for one moment, for when the news of my death reaches Hülägü Khan, the ocean of his wrath will boil over, and from Azerbaijan to the gates of Egypt will quake with the hooves of Mongol horses. They will take the sands of Egypt from there in their horses' nose bags. Hülägü Khan has three hundred thousand renowned horsemen like Ket Buqa. You may take one of them away.”       So the great Ilkhanid vizier and historian Rashid al-Din records the heroic, and certainly greatly dramatized, account of Kitbuqa Noyan's final stand at the battle of Ayn Jalut in September 1260. This was the famous Mongol defeat at the newly established, and rather fragile, Mamluk Sultanate of Egypt. The Mongols however, did not see it as an irreversible cataclysm, but the defeat of a small force which would soon be avenged, for Heaven demanded nothing less. The  defeat of the Mongols at Ayn Jalut in 1260 was not the end of the war between the Mongols and the Mamluks, and over the next 50 years Hulegu's successors, the Ilkhans, tried repeatedly to avenge their losses only to be halted by the Mamluks' valiant resistance.  Here, we will look at the efforts by the Mongol Ilkhanate to bring their horses to the Nile. I'm your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.       First, we should note that for anyone wishing to read more about the war between the Mongols and the Mamluks, the most detailed work on the subject can be found in Reuven Amitai-Preiss' Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-Ilkhanid War, released in 1995. No other work details the entire conflict and its sources so fully, and is an absolute must read for anyone desiring the most effective overview on the subject possible.       With the death of Grand Khan Mongke in 1259, the Mongol Empire was irrevocably broken: while Hulegu and his successors stayed on good terms with his brother Khubilai, the nominal Great Khan, Hulegu was independent, ruler of  vast domain stretching from Anatolia to the Amu Darya, known as the Ilkhanate. Hulegu's cousins in the neighbouring Golden Horde, Chagatai Khanate and the Neguderis were almost immediately antagonistic to the Ilkhans, who found themselves defending their distant frontiers from all three, in addition to internal revolts. For the Ilkhans, the Mamluks were but one frontier amongst several, one they could turn to only when the threat from the other Khanates was low. More often than not, this simple fact prevented any great Ilkhanid invasion of the Mamluk state.   For the Mamluks though, their border with the Ilkhanate along the Euphrates river was of utmost importance. In the aftermath of Ayn Jalut, the Mamluk Sultan Qutuz was assassinated by the energetic Baybars, who had fought alongside Qutuz against Kitbuqa. We introduced Baybars back in episode 30 of this podcast. While much credit can be given to Qutuz and the quality of the Mamluk soldiery for the victory at Ayn Jalut, the reason for continued Mamluk successes against the Mongols can be attributed to Baybars. A Qipchaq from the great Eurasian steppe, as a young boy Baybars had been sold into slavery to the Ayybuid Sultan of Egypt. There, Baybars was converted to Islam and received extensive training in all matter of military affairs. An excellent soldier, coupled with  immense ambition, endurance and drive, Baybars understood clearly the danger the Mongols posed, and set up his entire kingdom to defend against them.    The new Sultan greatly expanded the Mamluk regiments, encouraging good relations with the Golden Horde, Genoese and Byzantine Empire to keep up the flow of Turkic slave soldiers from the Eurasian steppe, over the Mediterranean to the ports of Egypt. He established a sophisticated intelligence network to inform him on the Ilkhanate and spread misinformation within it, supported by a system of signal towers, messenger pigeons, improved roads, bridges and relay stations to rapidly send messages. This was the barid, which served as the Mamluks' answer to the Mongol yam system. Its riders reported directly to the Mamluk Sultan.  Frontier fortifications along the Euphrates River like al-Bira and al-Rahba were strengthened, and they served as the first line of defence when the armies of the Ilkhanate advanced. When messengers raced down from Syria to Egypt with news of a Mongol assault,  Baybars would immediately march with an army from Cairo to meet them head on. More often than not, the Mongol attack party would return to the Ilkhanate rather than face Baybars head on. His swift reaction kept border officials loyal, feeling their Sultan would soon be there to assist them, or to punish defections. Rather than face the Mongols in battle, garrisons of cities in Syria past the Euphrates border were ordered to withdraw and regrouped at designated locations during invasions, facing the Mongols with united forces or awaiting the Sultan.  Baybars would not allow the Mongols to overrun his empire piecemeal, as they had the Khwarezmian Empire some forty years prior.   Baybars cultivated relations with bedouin nomads across Syria, who provided valuable auxiliaries, intelligence and also to keep them from allying with the Mongols.  Finally, he strengthed his position domestically, controlling the economy and  appointing his own Caliphs to legitimize himself, presenting himself as the defender of Islam. Baybars prepared his entire kingdom for Mongol attacks, a highly effective system the Ilkhanate struggled against. For the Ilkhans, the theater with the Mamluks was a sideshow, one to attack only when other frontiers were secured. The Mamluk Sultanate itself had no hope of conquering the Ilkhanate or seriously threatening it, so the various Ilkhans felt no great rush to overwhelm the Mamluks. In contrast, for the Mamluks the Ilkhanid border was of utmost importance: Baybars had to levy almost entirety of the Mamluk army to repel the Mongols, and thus not even a single defeat could be afforded for it would allow the Mongols to overrun Egypt, and the remainder of the Islamic west. Thus did Baybars finetune a system that proved remarkably successful at defending against the house of Hulegu, although it demanded great personal ability on the part of the monarch, and Baybars' successors struggled to compare to his vision.    Soon after Ayn Jalut in September 1260, a Mongol force of about 6,000 returned to Syria that December. Commanded by Baydar, an officer of Kitbuqa who had escaped Qutuz and Baybars' great advance earlier that year, it was a serious threat. At that time Sultan Baybars had not tightened his hold over Syria, attacks by the Crusader states had wrought further confusion, and some of Qutuz's loyalists had rebelled against Baybars' rule, one of whom even declared himself sultan. There is implication in the Mamluk sources that the attack was not launched on Hulegu's order, but Baydar's own initiative to avenge Kitbuqa. As his army marched, they found that the garrisons of Syria had retreated before them. Placing a governor in Aleppo and other major cities, as the Mongols neared Homs they found the combined garrisons of Homs, Hama and Aleppo had retreated there and rallied before them. Greatly outnumbering the Syrian forces, perhaps 6,000 troops under Baydar to 1,400 under the Syrians, Baydar was ultimately defeated in battle, the Syrians aided by thick fog and the timely flanking of local Bedouin. Coincidentally, it was fought near the grave of Khalid ibn al-Walid, the great commander of the early Islamic conquests and victor at Yarmouk, which earned it double the symbolic value. This first battle of Homs, as it was to become known, strengthened the feeling that the Mongols were not invincible. The Mongol army outnumbered the Mamluk garrisons, and keenly demonstrated the importance of unified defense rather than each garrison hiding behind city walls. For many Mamluk writers, it was the first battle of Homs that stood as the great victory over the Mongols, rather than Ayn Jalut. It was also the last major Mongol offensive into Syria in the 1260s.    Hulegu spent the next years fighting with Berke Khan of the Golden Horde over the valuable territory of Azerbaijan, which Berke believed belonged to the house of Jochi. With Hulegu's death in February 1265, he was succeeded by his son Abaqa, who was distracted by Jochid attacks and the efforts of setting up a new empire. By then, the most entrenched Sultan Baybars could solidify his defences, and turn to the isolated Crusader strongholds. By this time, little remained of the former Crusader Kingdoms, baring some coastal cities like Antioch, Tripoli and Acre and a few inland fortresses like Krak des Chevaliers and Montfort. The Crusader States had shown neutrality to the Mongols, or even joined them such as the County of Tripoli in 1260 after the Mongols entered Syria. Their neutrality or allegiance to the Mongols, in addition to the possibility of them acting as a foothold to further European troops, meant that the Mamluks would unleash bloody vengeance on them whenever the opportunity arose. From February to April 1265 in the immediate aftermath of Hulegu's  death, Baybars conquered Caesarea, Haifa, Arsuf, Galilee and raided Cilician Armenia, the vassals of the Ilkhanate. In 1268 Baybars took Antioch, and in 1270-71 when Abaqa was fighting with Chagatayid and Neguderi armies in the far east, Baybars took the fortresses of Krak des Chevaliers and Montfort, and planned to attack Tripoli, another Ilkhanid vassal. Though it remains popular in some circles to portray the Mamluk conquest of the Crusader holdouts as titanic clashes, they were side affairs, undertaken by the Mamluks whenever the Ilkhans were occupied.  Such was the slow and humiliating coup de grace which ended the Crusader states.   The Mamluks' ending of the Crusader kingdoms certainly served them strategically, for it was the most effective way to prevent any link up between European and Mongol forces. Hulegu and his successors sent letters to the Kings and Popes of Europe, encouraging them to take up crusade against the Mamluks and together defeat them, offering to return Jerusalem and other holy sites back into Christian hands, but this almost always fell on deaf ears or were greeted with empty promises. Louis IX's highly organized crusades had resulted in utter debacles at Mansura in 1250 and Tunis in 1270, which dampened whatever minor enthusiasm for crusade was left in Europe. Few European monarchs ever seriously took up Mongol offers at military alliances, with two exceptions. King James I of Aragon found himself the most motivated by the Il-Khan Abaqa's requests, encouraged by the promises of the Ilkhanate's logistical and military support once they reached the mainland. James made his preparations, and launched a fleet in September 1269. An unexpected storm scattered the fleet, and only two of James' bastard children made it to Acre, who stayed only briefly, accomplishing little there before departing. This was soon followed by the arrival of prince Edward of England, the future King Edward I, at Acre in May 1271 with a small force, and Abaqa sent an army under Samaghar, the Mongol commander in Rum, to assist him: but Samaghar's force withdrew with the arrival of Baybars. Edward's troops performed poorly on their own minor raids, and set sail for England in September 1272.    One of the commanders who took part in Samaghar's raid was Mu'in al-Din Sulaiman, better known as the Pervane, from sahib pervana, the keeper of the seals, though it literally means “butterfly.” The Pervane was the dominant figure of the rump state of the Seljuqs of Rum: when the previous Mongol installed Seljuq Sultan, Kilij Arlan IV, had challenged the Pervane, he succeeded in getting Abaqa to execute the Sultan and instate Arslan's young son, a toddler enthroned as Ghiyath al-Din Kaykhusraw III. Thus did the Pervane, in coordination with Samaghar Noyan, act as the master of Anatolia. Essentially co-governors, Samaghar and the Pervane had a stable relationship, enriching themselves along the way. But when Abaqa appointed his younger brother Ejei to oversee the Pervana and Samaghar. The Pervane chafed under the increased financial burden and supervision, and asked Abaqa to recall his brother, claiming Ejei was in cooperation with Baybars. Abaqa promised to recall him, but delayed. In his frustration, the Pervane himself  reached out to Baybars. The Sultan's curiosity was piqued, but didn't commit; by the time his response reached the Pervane in 1274, Ejei and Samaghar had been replaced by Toqa Noyan, and the Pervane didn't respond. Under Toqa Noyan, Mongol pressure was even greater in Anatolia, and the Pervane's powers were more limited than ever.    What followed was a terrible mess of political machinations. The Pervane got Toqa Noyan removed, Ejei was reinstated, the Pervane's efforts to remove Ejei again frustrated Abaqa, who removed Ejei, killed some of his followers and reinstated the Pervane and Toqa Noyan. In November 1275, the Mongols besieged al-Bira, but Baybars had learned of it in advance allegedly due to contacts with the Pervane. After this, the Pervane was careful to rebuild trust with Abaqa, bringing him the Seljuq Sultan's sister to wed. At the same time, with or without the Pervane's support a group of Rumi amirs met with Baybars in July 1276, urging him to attack. Judging there was enough support in Rum for him he agreed, and Baybars mobilized his army over winter 1276, setting out in February 1277.   As Baybars sped up the Levantine coast, the Pervane rapidly lost control of Rum as various Turkmen rebelled and a new Mongol army under Tudawan cracked down on the amirs who had contacted Baybars. In Syria, Baybars sent a diversionary force from Aleppo over the Euphrates, while his main army entered Anatolia in early April. After pushing off a Mongol advance force of 3,000 in the Taurus Mountains, news reaches Baybars that Tudawun was camped close by on a plain near the town of Abulustayn (Elbistan) and set out for them, the armies meeting on the 15th of April 1277.   Tudawan's army was about 14,000 Mongols, Turk and heavily armoured Georgian cavalry was joined by an army of Rumi troops similar size under the Pervane, but Tudawan distrusted them, and kept them away from his lines. Tudawan's scouts had failed to judge the size of the Mamluk army, which he believed to be smaller and lacking Baybars. In reality, the Mamluks outnumbered the Mongols by a few thousand. As the Mamluks entered the plain at the narrow end they were unable to properly form up, and their centre was positioned before their left wing.  The Mongol left flank began the battle, sending arrows into the Mamluk standard bearers in the centre before charging them. The Mamluk centre buckled under the charge, and the more exposed Mamluk left wing was similarly pounded by the Mongol right.   The situation was critical for the Mamluks: likely at this stage, their bedouin irregulars fled. Baybars sent in his reserve, the garrison of Hama, to reinforce his left, and succeeded in forcing back the Mongols. A brief respite allowed the Mamluks to better deploy their lines, and counterattack. The Mongols fought fiercely, but the greater number of the Mamluks made the difference. Gradually forced back over the course of the day, their horses exhausted and unable to access remounts, the Mongols dismounted, signalling they were fighting to the death. With great struggle, the Mamluks defeated them and killed their commanders. The Rumi army took little part in the battle and dispersed, the Pervane escaping, with one of his sons captured by Baybars. The next day the Mamluk Sultan marched for Kayseri, reaching it on April 20th.   Baybars ordered the Pervane and the Seljuq Sultan to him, but the Pervane held out in his own castle. Both realized that Baybars would not be able to hold this position, deep in enemy territory, supplies low and the rest of his kingdom unprotected while a furious Abaqa rallied his army. 5 days after entering Kayseri, Baybars was en route back to Syria and though his vanguard deserted to the Mongols, by June he was in Damascus. Abaqa arrived in Rum too late to catch Baybars, and in his fury was only narrowly persuaded out of massacring everything between Kayseri and Erzerum, while the summer heat kept him from invading Syria. He was able to catch the Pervane though, and put him to death: allegedly, his flesh was eaten by Abaqa and the senior Mongols.   Thus ended one of Baybars' most skillfully executed campaigns: lightning quick and devastating, creating a terrible mess for the Ilkhanate, though in itself brought no strategic gain or shift in the status quo. It was a great shock when the Lion of Egypt suddenly died at the beginning of July 1277 soon after his return. Baybars had hoped to establish a dynasty: he was seamlessly succeeded by his older son, named al-Sa'id Berke. The new Sultan quickly antagonized the Mamluk emirs through his efforts to limit their powers, and was forced to abdicate in favour of his younger brother, the 7 year old Sulamish. The boy was nothing but a puppet, and his guardian, one of the late Baybars' Mamluks named Qalawun, soon forced the boy out and took power himself in November 1279.  Like Berke, Qalawun had been taken from the Qipchap steppe and sold as a Mamluk. He had loyally served Baybars and proven himself an able commander, though something of a schemer. Though Qalawun's line came to dominate the Mamluk Sultanate for essentially the next century, initially Qalawun faced stiff opposition in attempting to assert his authority.    This disruption in the Sultanate was a golden opportunity for Abaqa, who decided it was time to press the Mamluk frontier. To this, he decided to put his younger brother Mongke-Temur to the task. Prince Mongke-Temur first  raided Syria in November 1280 with King Lewon III of Armenian Cilicia, Bohemond VII of Tripoli and a contingent of Knights Hospitaller. In September 1281, Mongke-Temur returned again, a large force of perhaps 40-50,000 Mongols, Armenians under Lewon III, Georgians, Franks and troops from Seljuq Rum. Abaqa initially followed with another army, but may have been forced to hold due to rumours of an attack by the Golden Horde at Derbent.   The Mongol invasion provided a common enemy to unite the Mamluk factions fighting for power, and under Qalawun they advanced, reinforced by Syrian garrisons and bedouins. They reached Homs a few days before the Mongols in late October, giving Qalawun's troops a chance to dig in and rest on the plain north of the city. Their preparations were improved as a Mongol defector informed them of Mongke-Temur's battle plan. Most of the Mongol army was to be placed in the center with the right wing also strong, intending to overpower the Mamluk left and centre where the Sultan's banners would be. Qalawun thus reinforced his left wing, and positioned himself on a hill behind the vanguard to oversee the battle and act as reserve.    Marching through the night, the Mongols arrived early on the 29th of October, 1281. It was a massive front, over 24 kilometres in length due to the size of both armies. The wings of both forces, so far apart, had little knowledge of what was occurring on the other side. While tired from the night march, the Mongols were eager: the battle was initiated when the Mongol right under Alinaq charged forth. The Mamluk left and part of their centre crumpled  and routed under the onslaught. Alinaq continued his pursuit, and here Mongke-Temur's inexperience and the scale of the battlefield began to tell. Proper communication with the command seemingly absent, Alinaq pursued the fleeing Mamluks off the battlefield, as far as the Lake of Homs where they dismounted to rest, evidently anticipating the rest of the army would soon arrive.   A similar charge by the Mongol left wing lacked the numbers of the Mongol right, so the Mamluk right and centre were able to hold and counterattack. Qalawun's actual role in this counterattack isn't clear: some sources have him personally lead the attack, while in others he kept his position hidden, not even raising his banners so as to avoid Mongol arrows. The Mamluks pushed back the Mongol right and the bedouin came around to hit the Mongol flank. The Mongol right fell back to the centre, which under Mongke-Temur was being held in reserve. In the resulting confusion, perhaps thrown by his horse, Mongke-Temur was injured and unable to command. Most of the Mongols then dismounted to make a final stand around the prince, and ultimately routed under the Mamluk assault.    The Mamluks chased the fleeing Mongols right to the border with the Ilkhanate, many drowning in the Euphrates or dying in the desert: so deadly was this rout that  Mamluk authors said more Mongols were killed in flight than in the actual battle. Qalawun and a small guard remained on the battlefield: they were forced to hide their banners and stay silent when the Mongol right wing finally returned to the battlefield, too late to turn the tide. It seems it was able to take an orderly retreat back into the Ilkhanate.       Abaqa was furious at this loss, and intended to return the next year, but died in April 1282. As we have covered in our previous episodes, Abaqa's successors were not blessed with his same longevity or stability, and until 1295 the Ilkhanate saw a succession of short lived monarchs and infighting, internal revolts and renewed attacks by the Golden Horde. Though the succeeding Ilkhans continued to demand Mamluk submission, send threatening letters and continue to attempt an alliance with European powers, nothing materialized beyond border raids and skirmishes in both directions. For the time being, the immediate Mongol threat to the Mamluks had ended, and Sultan Qalawun turned to the remaining Frankish strongholds, all possible beachheads for European armies coming to assist the Ilkhans. Armenian Cilicia was pillaged, remaining inland Crusader strongholds were taken, and in April 1289 the Mongols' vassal Tripoli fell. After the death of Abaqa's son Arghun Il-Khan in March 1291, the Mamluks used the resulting distraction in the Ilkhanate to take the final major Frankish city in the Holy Land, Acre, leaving them with but miniscule holdings which fell in the following years. So ended 200 years of Crusader Kingdoms.       Following Qalawun's death in 1290, he was succeeded by his son al-Ashraf Khalil. A fearsome military commander, it was he who led the push to seize Acre and the final Crusader holdings of note. Yet he did not long to enjoy the throne, and was assassinated in the last days of 1293 due to his efforts to curb the power of the existing Mamluk emirs. With his assassination, the Mamluks entered a period of political instability over the Sultanate. Initially his younger brother al-Nasir Muhammad was placed on the throne, still a child and without any real power. After a year as Sultan he was forced out by his guardian and regent, a Mamluk named, of all things, Kitbuqa. Apparently of Mongol origin, he had been taken captive by the Mamluks at the first battle of Homs in 1260, and made in turn a Mamluk, that is, a slave soldier. Kitbuqa's reign as Sultan was not particularly notable, mostly marked by intense political infighting and machinations. There was, however, a large body of Oirats who deserted the Ilkhanate to join the Mamluks Sultanate. Kitbuqa's generous treatment of this body of nomadic troops, with whom it appeared he shared kinship, angered a number of the other Mamluk emirs and undermined his power. He was soon forced to flee as one of al-Ashraf Khalil's assassins, the Emir Lajin, seized power. When Lajin was murdered in 1299, al-Ashraf Khalil's young brother al-Nasir Muhammad was recalled to take the throne. Only 14 years old, al-Nasir Muhammad had no real power and was still a puppet for the emirs competing for power.   In comparison, 1295 saw the beginning of the reign of the powerful Ghazan Khan, son of Arghun. Ghazan, as we have covered, was not the first Muslim Ilkhan but by his reign a majority of the Mongols within the Ilkhanate had converted, and made the Ilkhanate an Islamic state. Ghazan consolidated his position early on, executing a number of potential challengers to the throne and restabilizing the  Ilkhanid economy, though you can listen to our episode dedicated to Ghazan for more on the internal matters of his reign. While Ghazan was a Muslim, this did not change Ilkhanid policy to the Mamluk. He continued to send letters to western Europe urging them to land an army behind enemy lines. In late 1298, while Mamluk armies ravaged the Ilkhan's vassal Cilician Armenia, the na'ib of Damascus, Sayf al-Din Qibjaq and a few other top Mamluks deserted to the Ilkhanate during a particularly violent stretch within the Sultanate. Fearing for their lives, they inform Ghazan of Sultan Lajin and his vice-Sultan Manketamur's purges and unstable positions. Then in summer 1299 a Mamluk raid into the Ilkhanate sacked Mardin, violating Muslim women and descretating a mosque during Ramadan. Ghazan was thus able to easily obtain a fatwa against the Mamluks for this, presenting himself not as an invader, but a holy warrior coming to avenge atrocities against Islam to encourage dissent among Mamluk ranks. Indeed, the ruler of Hama, a top Mamluk ally, believed the accusations.        By December 1299, Ghazan and his army of Mongols, Georgians and Armenians under their King Het'um II, had crossed the Euphrates. By then, Sultan Lajin had been replaced by a al-Nasir Muhammad who was nearly toppled by the Oirat refugees to the Sultanate. Ghazan bypassed Aleppo and Hama, and hunted for the Mamluk army. While encamped on the edge of the Syrian desert, Ghazan learned the Mamluks were gathering at Homs, where they had defeated Mongke-Temur 18 years prior. Rather than fall into their trap, Ghazan chose to outflank them, crossing the Syrian desert and coming out onto a stream some 16 kilometres north of Homs on the 22nd of December. To the Mamluks, it appeared that Ghazan was retreating, and advanced out of their favourable position to pursue. In a reverse of the 2nd Battle of Homs, now the Mamluks were forced to cross the desert, exhausting themselves to reach Ghazan early the next morning, while his own troops rested, quenched their thirst and formed up. Crucially, the Ilkhanid army was under the firm control of Ghazan and his commander Qutlugh-Shah, while the young al-Nasir Muhammad could not control his senior emirs.        On the morning of December 23rd, 1299, the Mamluks found Ghazan's army was drawn up. Ghazan commanded the centre, while his general Qutlugh-Shah commanded the right.  Qutlugh-Shah's beating of  war drums made the Mamluks believe Ghazan to be located there, and to him they charged, forcing the Mongol right back. Ghazan led the counterattack against them, and Qutlugh-Shah rallied what forces he could and rejoined the Il-Khan. From 11 a.m until nightfall, the battle raged, but finally the Mamluks broke and fled.  Ghazan pursued them past Homs before encamping, not wishing to be drawn into a false retreat in the dark. Homs surrendered without a fight and Ghazan took the Sultan's treasure, distributing it among his nokod, keeping for himself a sword, the title deeds to the Mamluk Sultanate and the muster roll of its army. Next Ghazan marched onto Damascus, which also surrendered without a fight, though its citadel held out. It seems almost the entire Mamluk garrison of Syria had retreated, perhaps recalled to defend the capital. Mongol raiding parties were making it as far as Gaza, with one source reporting they even entered Jerusalem, and the Sultanate seemed poised to fall.       But on February 5th, 1300, Ghazan withdrew from Damascus, returning to the Ilkhanate. Qutlugh-Shah had been left to take the Citadel of Damascus, but he soon followed the Il-Khan. By the end of May, the Mamluks had retaken Syria. Exactly why Ghazan withdrew is unclear: possibly reports of a Neguderi invasion in the east of his realm demanded his attention, or he feared there would not be sufficient pasturage for his large army to make the trip to Egypt: the Mamluks were known to burn grassland and destroy supply depots on the routes they suspected the Mongols to take.  Likely he was unaware of how dire the situation really was for the Mamluks, and suspected further armed resistance along the route would make the already treacherous crossing over the Sinai even harder on his army. Whatever the reason, Ghazan had lost the greatest chance to destroy the Mamluks. Ghazan did cross the Euphrates at the end of December 1300, reaching as far as Aleppo, but heavy rains rendered military operations untenable. In 1303 Ghazan ordered Qutlugh-Shah back into Syria, but he was defeated at Marj al-Suffar near Damascus in April. Ghazan's death the next year, only 34 years old, prevented his next assault. His brother and successor, Oljeitu, ordered the final Ilkhanid attack on the Sultanate, an embarrassing effort in winter 1312 which saw the army retreat not from the Royal Mamluks, but the stiff resistance of ordinary townsfolk. Oljeitu's son, Abu Sa'id, ultimately organized peace with the Mamluks in the early 1320s, ending the sixty years of warfare between the Mongols and the Mamluks. The Ilkhanate did not long outlive this treaty. Abu Sa'id death in 1335 without an heir saw the Ilkhanate torn apart by regional commanders -the Jalayirids, Chobanids, Muzaffarids and Injuids, among others- who appointed their own puppet Khans or abandoned the pretense entirely.       For the Mamluks, they were unable to take advantage of the Ilkhanate's disintegration as when al-Nasir Muhammad died in 1341, they entered their own period of anarchy: 8 of al-Nasir's children and 4 of his grandsons would in turn become Sultan between 1341 and 1382, a period which culminated in the rise of the Circassian Burji Mamluk Dynasty. Whereas the Sultans from Qutuz, Baybars through Qalawun and his descendants were men of Qipchaq-Cuman or even Mongol origin,  over the late thirteenth and first half of the fourteenth century a growing number of the Mamluks were sourced no longer from the Qipchaq steppe, but Circassia, a region along the Black Sea's northeastern coastline. With the end of the Qalawunid Dynasty, Mamluks of Circassian origin took power and established their own dynasty. The Bahri and Burji distinction refers to the parts of Cairo each Mamluk garrison had been based. It was this Mamluk dynasty who would face the wrath of Temur-i-lang at the beginning of the fifteenth century.       These post-Ilkhanid events will be the topic for a forthcoming episode, so be sure to subscribe to the Kings and Generals podcast to follow for that. If you enjoyed this and would like to help us continue bringing you great content, please consider supporting us on patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. This episode was researched and written by our series historian, Jack Wilson.  I'm your host David, and we'll catch you on the next one. 

The cyber-physical world is now a raging battleground—who do you have on the digital frontline? As cyber attacks on industrial operations and critical infrastructures continue to rise, so do the devastating real-world impacts. Criminals are no longer simply stealing data; their goal is to disrupt and control core operations. This translates into what is now known as the cyber-physical world. From influencing the flow of oil and the functions of machinery to manipulating the navigation of vessels, the risk to OT environments is vast. Host Ian Bramson explores the question of how you can fight back on this new and ever-changing battleground. Listen as top industry experts George Daglas, Chief Operating Officer at Obrela; Dimitris Strevinas, Chief Technology Officer at Obrela; Christos Kapodistrias, IT Manager at Neptune Lines; and Grigoris Floutsakos, Data Protection Officer at WIND Hellas, provide key insights, including how you can move beyond fear-driven tactics to safeguard your organization.About the GuestsObrela Security Industries is a global cybersecurity service provider. Addressing an emerging demand, Obrela offers an 'umbrella' of end-to-end security services under which clients can enjoy peace of mind and focus on their business. Founded in 2009 and headquartered in London, Obrela leverages sophisticated real time risk management technology to dynamically protect its clients by identifying, analyzing, predicting and preventing cybersecurity threats. Obrela's mission statement ‘We Keep Your Business in Business' underpins the company's commitment to a better prepared, more secure corporate world.Neptune Lines Shipping and Managing Enterprises SA is a leading finished vehicle logistics provider, offering transportation and shipping solutions to manufacturers and shippers of cars and high & heavy cargoes. Through their modern fleet of Pure Car & Truck Carrier (PCTC) vessels and their expansive agency network and operational expertise, they provide short sea transportation solutions to almost 19 countries and more than 30 key ports, focusing on the Mediterranean, North Europe and the Black Sea.WIND is one of the largest telecommunications companies in Greece. Since their establishment in 1992, until today, they have continuously invested in technology, providing complete mobile, fixed, internet and television solutions to our customers.ABS Group (www.abs-group.com) provides data-driven risk and reliability solutions, including industrial cybersecurity services, to help clients reduce risk and confirm the safety, integrity, quality and efficiency of their critical assets and operations. ABS Group has over 50 years of risk management and safety experience and was recently named one of America's Best Consulting Firms of 2021 by Forbes. Headquartered in Spring, Texas, ABS Group operates with more than 1,000 professionals in over 20 countries serving the marine and offshore, oil, gas and chemical, government and industrial sectors. ABS Group is a subsidiary of ABS, one of the world's leading marine and offshore classification societies. Produced by Brittney Warrick and Daniel Fischer, Digital Communications at ABS Group

Our guest today was The Naval Commander of the Oliver Hazard Perry Class Guided Missile Frigate. It was a DREAM career. One that he aspired to and worked tirelessly for his entire life. They were deployed in The Black Sea during the 2014 Sochi Olympics directly off the coast of Russia. They were so close to shore, they could see the Olympic Torch - as well as some other Russian "assets" who were clearly interested in their presence there. In one minute he was living his dream. And in literally the next minute his entire life changed - and his entire identity went with it. Until he re-created himself. His name is Dennis Volpe and he's going to share his amazing story of crisis and resilience. More about Dennis: Website: https://dennis-volpe.com LinkedIn Business Page: https://www.linkedin.com/company/leadership-research-institute LinkedIn Personal Page: https://www.linkedin.com/in/djvolpe/ Additional link Dennis wants to share: https://dennis-volpe.com/severn-river-leadership-group/ ---- https://christopherdorris.com/tough-talks-resilience-with-dennis-volpe/ --- If you enjoyed this content and you are not getting notifications of new posts, then I invite you to sign up to my list. Please also share this with the people in your world that would also dig this post and benefit from it. --- https://christopherdorris.com/lists --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/mental-toughness-podcasts/message

Alice and Leslie tackle salt in this episode.  From its origins to how its harvested to all the weird superstitions and health myths surrounding it, this topic has it all!

00.00.40: Introduction. Arggghh! An interloper!00.06.16: World of Gaming: Dee Sanction Adventures; Drakar Och Demoner; Into the Odd; Avatar delays?00.33.52: Composer in the Hamam: Andreas Lundström, Soundcloud, Sweden Rolls Patreon 01.27.37: GoodbyeEffekt is brought to you by Fictionsuit and RPG Gods. Music is by Stars in a Black Sea, used with kind permission of Free League Publishing.Like what we do? Put our brand on your face! (and elsewhere) Buy pdfs via our DriveThru Affiliate link Leave a review on iTunes or Podchaser Find our Actual Play recordings on effektap Find essay transcripts and other stuff on Matthew's, and Dave's blogs ★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

Dr. Siobhán Hearne joins Katya to talk about her new book, Policing Prostitution: Regulating the Lower Classes in Late Imperial Russia, a social history of prostitution in last decades of the Russian Empire. Dr. Hearne uses archival research conducted in Moscow, St Petersburg, Arkhangelsk, Riga, Vilnius, Minsk, Kyiv and Tartu to examine how prostitution and its regulation functioned in different parts of the empire. We hope you enjoy! ABOUT THE GUEST https://research.ncl.ac.uk/eerrg/people/Siobhan%20Hearne.jpg Dr. Siobhán Hearne is a historian of gender and sexuality in the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. She currently holds a Leverhulme Early Career Fellowship in the School of Modern Languages and Cultures at Durham University. She earned her PhD from the University of Nottingham in 2017, and has completed postdoctoral research in Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania since. Dr. Hearne uses sexuality as a lens to examine the relationship between ordinary people and the the Russian Imperial/Soviet state. Her new book Policing Prostitution: Regulating the Lower Classes in Late Imperial Russia (Oxford University Press, 2021) is a social history of prostitution in the final decades of the Russian Empire and draws extensively on materials produced by lower-class people. https://global.oup.com/academic/product/policing-prostitution-9780198837916?cc=us&lang=en& Her current project looks at Imperial Russia's military and explores the impact of human and medical sciences on military masculinities. She is also one of the editors of Peripheral Histories, a collaborative digital history project exploring ‘peripheral' spaces in the Russian Empire, Soviet Union, and post-Soviet world https://www.peripheralhistories.co.uk. Dr. Hearne's other works include: “Prosecuting procurement in the Russian Empire” (2020) https://dro.dur.ac.uk/28713/; “Liberation and Authoritarianism in the Early Soviet Campaign to ‘Struggle with Prostitution' in The Fate of the Bolshevik Revolution Illiberal Liberation, 1917-41 (2020) https://www.bloomsbury.com/us/fate-of-the-bolshevik-revolution-9781350117907; “To denounce or defend? public participation in the policing of prostitution in late Imperial Russia” (2018) https://dro.dur.ac.uk/27307/; “Sex on the Front : prostitution and venereal disease in Russia's First World War” (2017) https://dro.dur.ac.uk/27306/; “The 'black spot' on the Crimea : venereal diseases in the Black Sea fleet in the 1920s” (2017) https://dro.dur.ac.uk/27311/. Some English-language works on prostitution in the Russian Empire: Andrew A. Gentes on Sakhalin https://muse.jhu.edu/article/559826/pdf; Keely Stauter-Halsted on Poland https://www.cornellpress.cornell.edu/book/9780801454196/the-devils-chain/#bookTabs=1; Yulia Uryadova on the Ferghana Valley https://www.journals.uchicago.edu/doi/abs/10.1086/SHAD30010097; Dan Healey on same-sex male prostitution https://www.cambridge.org/core/journals/slavic-review/article/abs/masculine-purity-and-gentlemens-mischief-sexual-exchange-and-prostitution-between-russian-men-18611941/30CD22517A4CEBE83F7D12C5EF9D910F; Philippa Hetherington on the ‘traffic in women' https://www.proquest.com/docview/1558123277?pq-origsite=gscholar&fromopenview=true. Producer's Note: This episode was recorded on August 10th, 2021 via Zoom. CREDITS Producer: Kathryn Yegorov-Crate Associate Producer: Lera Toropin Associate Producer: Cullan Bendig Assistant Producer: Zach Johnson Executive Assistant: Katherine Birch Editing and Sound Design: Michelle Daniel, Charlie Harper Music Producer: Charlie Harper (Connect: facebook.com/charlie.harper.1485 Instagram: @charlieharpermusic) www.charlieharpermusic.com (Main Theme by Charlie Harper and additional background music by Charlie Harper, Michelle Daniel Trio, Blue Dot Sessions, ) Executive Producer & Creator: Michelle Daniel (Connect: facebook.com/mdanielgeraci Instagram: @michelledaniel86) www.msdaniel.com DISCLAIMER: Texas Podcast Network is brought to you by The University of Texas at Austin. Podcasts are produced by faculty members and staffers at UT Austin who work with University Communications to craft content that adheres to journalistic best practices. The University of Texas at Austin offers these podcasts at no charge. Podcasts appearing on the network and this webpage represent the views of the hosts, not of The University of Texas at Austin. https://files.fireside.fm/file/fireside-uploads/images/9/9a59b135-7876-4254-b600-3839b3aa3ab1/P1EKcswq.png Special Guest: Siobhán Hearne.

Headphones at the ready as audio-guru Steven Wilson talks to What Do You Call That Noise? The XTC Podcast about his stereo mixes and 5.1 surround versions of XTC classics. Quizzed by three Marks – Fisher, Reed and Smotroff – the Porcupine Tree musician takes a deep dive into Drums and Wires, Black Sea, Skylarking, Oranges and Lemons and Nonsuch– not forgetting the Dukes of Stratosphear. In a fascinating conversation, Wilson also reflects on his remixing work for Tears for Fears, Yes, King Crimson and Jethro Tull. This episode's drink recommendation comes from Marianna Silva. Further reading in The XTC Bumper Book of Fun for Boys and Girls and What Do You Call That Noise? An XTC Discovery Book available from https://www.xtclimelight.com  If you've enjoyed the XTC Podcast, please show your support at https://www.patreon.com/markfisher Thanks to the Pink Things, Humble Daisies and Knights in Shining Karma who've done the same.★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

Join today's conversation on leaders and their power and responsibility in showing up for the people they serve. How will you build trust? Why does community matter? And what will your legacy as a leader be when you show up courageously? Meet our guest, Grace Blacksea, Founder of Quench Collective, community and education for modern leaders and entrepreneurs. For more info on Quench Collective or to join the free Friday Fill Up Your Cup calls with Grace, visit quench-collective.com --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/coffeeonleadership/message

00.00.40: Introduction00.04.08: Thank you to our new Patrons:  Stevan Radojevic and Jason QueerAF00.05.38: World of Gaming: Steve Perrin; Success for Book and Beasts and Bloodmarch; SLA industries Kickstarter00.26.06: In Defence of Power-gamers01.10.49: Next episode and GoodbyeEffekt is brought to you by Fictionsuit and RPG Gods. Music is by Stars in a Black Sea, used with kind permission of Free League Publishing.Like what we do? Put our brand on your face! (and elsewhere) Buy pdfs via our DriveThru Affiliate link Leave a review on iTunes or Podchaser Find our Actual Play recordings on effektap Find essay transcripts and other stuff on Matthew's, and Dave's blogs ★ Support this podcast on Patreon ★

1452: Mehmed builds a new fortress on the Bosporus that would not only strangle Constantinople of supplies but change the dynamics of trade in the Black Sea for centuries to come Song: Darkbloom by We Came As Romans- Singlewww.warandconquest.comwarandconquestpcast@gmail.comhttps://www.youtube.com/channel/UCdUOD52RBg1BBm_zndE-DdAhttps://www.patreon.com/warandconquesthttps://www.facebook.com/warandconquestpcast https://www.instagram.com/warandconquestpcast/https://twitter.com/warandconquest1Venmo: @Warand Conquesthttps://www.twitch.tv/theproslayer7

On COI #145 Connor Freeman, writer at The Libertarian Institute, returns to the show to discuss recent attacks on ships near the Persian Gulf. The first attack saw two drones hit a cargo ship, killing two. The US, UK, and Israel have pointed the finger at Iran, claiming to have evidence. However, the governments have yet to present any, and Iran is denying the charges.  The second attack was alleged to be an attempted hijacking. Again, Iran was blamed with no evidence yet presented. The attack was thwarted after the crew disabled the ship. The timing of the incident raises suspicions of a possible false flag to fuel tensions between Washington and Tehran. Kyle and Connor break down the motives of the possible actors, including Israel and Iran.  Connor explains how the slow American policy shift in favor of Taiwanese independence has put the US on a collision course with China. Along with increased diplomatic ties with the island, the US has ramped up military support. This week, Biden announced his first weapons sale to Taiwan – $750 million in Howitzers and guided-munitions kits. Under Biden, the US has sailed a warship through the Taiwan Strait seven times, moves repeatedly condemned by Beijing.  As the US steps up support for Taiwan in the East China Sea, the Pentagon is carrying out massive war games with several allied countries in the region, including its largest amphibious military drills in 40 years. US allies India, Germany, the UK, France and Japan have also deployed military ships to the South China Sea.  Connor breaks down how the US continues to destroy its relationship with Russia. War games in the Black Sea paired with this week's removal of 24 Russian diplomats surely undermines any good will produced from recent arms control talks. Some American hawks are noticing that Russia and China have adopted closer ties in recent years. Connor argues this is unlikely to change without a less aggressive American foreign policy.  Odysee Rumble  Donate LBRY Credits bTTEiLoteVdMbLS7YqDVSZyjEY1eMgW7CP Donate Bitcoin 36PP4kT28jjUZcL44dXDonFwrVVDHntsrk Donate Bitcoin Cash Qp6gznu4xm97cj7j9vqepqxcfuctq2exvvqu7aamz6 Patreon Subscribe Star YouTube Facebook  Twitter  MeWe Apple Podcast  Amazon Music Google Podcasts Spotify Support Our Sponsor Visit Paloma Verde and use code PEACE for 25% off our CBD

On COI #145 Connor Freeman, writer at The Libertarian Institute, returns to the show to discuss recent attacks on ships near the Persian Gulf. The first attack saw two drones hit a cargo ship, killing two. The US, UK, and Israel have pointed the finger at Iran, claiming to have evidence. However, the governments have yet to present any, and Iran is denying the charges.  The second attack was alleged to be an attempted hijacking. Again, Iran was blamed with no evidence yet presented. The attack was thwarted after the crew disabled the ship. The timing of the incident raises suspicions of a possible false flag to fuel tensions between Washington and Tehran. Kyle and Connor break down the motives of the possible actors, including Israel and Iran.  Connor explains how the slow American policy shift in favor of Taiwanese independence has put the US on a collision course with China. Along with increased diplomatic ties with the island, the US has ramped up military support. This week, Biden announced his first weapons sale to Taiwan – $750 million in Howitzers and guided-munitions kits. Under Biden, the US has sailed a warship through the Taiwan Strait seven times, moves repeatedly condemned by Beijing.  As the US steps up support for Taiwan in the East China Sea, the Pentagon is carrying out massive war games with several allied countries in the region, including its largest amphibious military drills in 40 years. US allies India, Germany, the UK, France and Japan have also deployed military ships to the South China Sea.  Connor breaks down how the US continues to destroy its relationship with Russia. War games in the Black Sea paired with this week's removal of 24 Russian diplomats surely undermines any good will produced from recent arms control talks. Some American hawks are noticing that Russia and China have adopted closer ties in recent years. Connor argues this is unlikely to change without a less aggressive American foreign policy.  Odysee Rumble  Donate LBRY Credits bTTEiLoteVdMbLS7YqDVSZyjEY1eMgW7CP Donate Bitcoin 36PP4kT28jjUZcL44dXDonFwrVVDHntsrk Donate Bitcoin Cash Qp6gznu4xm97cj7j9vqepqxcfuctq2exvvqu7aamz6 Patreon Subscribe Star YouTube Facebook  Twitter  MeWe Apple Podcast  Amazon Music Google Podcasts Spotify Support Our Sponsor Visit Paloma Verde and use code PEACE for 25% off our CBD

Dan, Rob, and Cooper talk about the complicated Scot who is often regarded as the father of the US Navy -- John Paul Jones. From helping the U.S. win independence to fighting Turks in the Black Sea on behalf of Catherine the Great, JPJ lived an action-packed 45 years mostly on water or inside the warm embrace of a European woman.

Photo: Warship Kaiser on which Kaiser Wilhelm II of Germany went to Istanbul.  Abdullah Frères. . CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor CBS Audio Network @Batchelorshow 2/2: Warship diplomacy in the Black Sea. @AnatolLieven @QuincyInst https://usrussiaaccord.org/anatol-lieven-shots-fired-as-brits-enter-black-sea-and-russian-ire/ https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/06/23/russia-claims-warship-has-fired-warning-shots-deter-british/ https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/vladimir-putin-warns-of-unpredictable-incidents-as-u-k-denies-russia-fired-on-warship/ar-AALlZ98 https://3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2021/06/can-joe-biden-get-real-about-russia.html https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/belarus-leader-stop-migrants-heading-eu-78442993

Photo: Thomas Ender: steamship Marianne in a storm on the Black Sea. CBS Eye on the World with John Batchelor CBS Audio Network @Batchelorshow 1/2: Warship diplomacy in the Black Sea. @AnatolLieven @QuincyInst https://usrussiaaccord.org/anatol-lieven-shots-fired-as-brits-enter-black-sea-and-russian-ire/ https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2021/06/23/russia-claims-warship-has-fired-warning-shots-deter-british/ https://www.msn.com/en-us/news/world/vladimir-putin-warns-of-unpredictable-incidents-as-u-k-denies-russia-fired-on-warship/ar-AALlZ98 https://3quarksdaily.com/3quarksdaily/2021/06/can-joe-biden-get-real-about-russia.html https://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/belarus-leader-stop-migrants-heading-eu-78442993