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Last time we spoke about the Great Tokyo Air Raid. Amidst fierce battles, Liversedge's forces captured key hills but faced relentless Japanese machine-gun fire. Despite heavy casualties, the Marines advanced, securing strategic positions. General Kuribayashi recognized their struggle, while the Japanese counterattacks faltered. After 19 grueling days, the last pockets of resistance fell, marking a costly victory for the Americans. Amid the fierce battle of Iwo Jima, General LeMay shifted tactics, launching incendiary raids on Tokyo. On March 9, 1945, 334 B-29s unleashed destruction, igniting widespread fires and devastating neighborhoods. The attack shattered Japanese morale, while LeMay's strategy proved effective, paving the way for further offensives in the Pacific. On March 3, three brigades attacked Meiktila, facing fierce resistance. Tanks overwhelmed Japanese forces, resulting in heavy casualties. As Cowan fortified defenses, Japanese counterattacks intensified. Meanwhile, in Mandalay, British-Indian troops advanced, capturing key positions. Amidst confusion and conflicting orders, the Allies pressed forward, striving for victory in Burma. This episode is the Fall of Mandalay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We are first picking up this week with the men fighting over northern Luzon. By March 5, General Clarkson's 33rd Division had advanced to Agoo and Pago while gradually pushing the enemy along Route 11. Meanwhile, Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla force was carrying out limited offensives in the Laoag, Cervantes, and San Fernando regions. Coming into Salacsac Pass from the west, the Villa Verde Trail twists up the wooded western slopes of a steep-sided height known to the 32nd Division as Hill 502. Another peak, bare crested, forming part of the same hill mass and named Hill 503, centers 250 yards northeast of the crest of Hill 502, while a similar distance to the southeast is Hill 504. Winding along the southern slopes of Hills 502 and 504, the trail continues eastward through a low saddle about 500 yards long, climbing again up the forested northwestern side of Hill 505. After crossing that hill, the trail follows a twisting course 600 yards--as the crow flies--eastward, hugging the densely wooded northern slopes of Hills 506A and 506B. Off the northeast corner of Hill 506B the trail turns south for 1000 yards--again a straight-line distance--and traverses the east side of the noses of Hill 507, designated from north to south A, B, C and D. Turning sharply east again near Hill 507D, the trail continues east another 700 yards and then enters a deep wooded saddle between Hill 508 on the south and Hill 515 to the north. After passing through this saddle, which is about 250 yards long east to west, the trail goes on eastward, dominated on the north by Hills 516 and 525. Roughly 1250 yards beyond the saddle the trail twists across the northern slopes of Hill 526, which lying about 500 yards southeast of Hill 525, marks the eastern limits of the Salacsac Pass area. A mile and a quarter of less rugged but still forested and difficult terrain lies between Hill 526 and barrio Imugan, in turn two and a quarter miles west of Santa Fe.  Meanwhile General Mullins' 25th Division had successfully taken control of Puncan and Digdig. Due to this unexpectedly swift progress, General Swift instructed Mullins to continue advancing toward Putlan while the 1st Battalion, 127th Regiment fought for control of Hill 502, which was secured on March 7. In response, Mullins dispatched the 161st Regiment to attack the high ground west of Route 5, the 27th Regiment to advance along and east of the highway, and the 35th Regiment to execute a wide envelopment to the east. Since this last flank approach to Putlan was completely undefended, the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment quickly occupied Putlan on March 8. The following day, the 27th Regiment also arrived in the area and began clearing Japanese stragglers from the ravines east of Route 5 near the barrio, a task that would not be finished until March 15. Finally, despite facing rough terrain and light resistance, the 161st Regiment reached Putlan on March 10, successfully securing the high ground to the west. To the north, as the 1st Battalion, 127th Regiment struggled to make significant progress eastward after capturing Hill 502, Gill decided to send the 3rd Battalion, 127th Regiment to outflank the Salacsac Pass defenses from the south.  Although the extremely rough, precipitous mountain country of the Salacsac Pass area, averaging 4500 feet above sea level, was covered by dense rainforest, from Hill 506B to Hill 526, there was sufficient open ground throughout to provide the defender with excellent observation. It was not too difficult for the Japanese to find positions whence they could cover with fire every square foot of the Villa Verde Trail through the pass area. The twisting of the trail also provided defense opportunities, for in a given 1000 yards of straight-line distance through the pass, the trail might actually cover a ground distance of 3000 yards. Whatever its shortcomings in other fields, the Japanese Army always had a feel for terrain, exploiting to the full every advantage the ground offered. Thus, as it moved up, the 2nd Tank Division set to work to establish a system of mutually supporting defensive positions in order to control every twist of the Villa Verde Trail and every fold in the ground throughout the pass area. Every knoll and hillock on or near the trail was the site of at least one machine gun emplacement; every wooded draw providing a route for outflanking a position was zeroed in for artillery or mortars. The cave, natural or man-made, came to characterize the defenses. Artillery was employed in quantity and quality not often encountered in engagements against the Japanese, who, as usual, made excellent use of their light and medium mortars. Finally, the 2nd Tank Division was overstocked in automatic weapons, evidently having available many more than the 32nd Division could bring to bear. To the west, following recent successes in patrols, Clarkson opted to establish a new "secure line" stretching from Aringay southeast through Pugo to Route 11 at Twin Peaks. Consequently, patrols quickly secured Aringay and Caba without facing any opposition, then advanced east along the trails to Pugo and Galiano, and north to Bauang, where they continued to encounter minimal enemy presence. As a result of these movements, the Hayashi Detachment was ultimately withdrawn to bolster the main defenses at Sablan, enabling Volckman's 121st Regiment to enter San Fernando on March 14. Additionally, elements of the 19th Division began arriving in the Cervantes area from Baguio and successfully expelled the guerrilla company from the town in early March. The Filipinos recaptured Cervantes on March 13 but soon found themselves targeted by Japanese artillery positioned on elevated ground. Meanwhile, looking south, by March 5, General Patrick's 6th Division had commenced unsuccessful assaults on Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, while General Hoffman's 2nd Cavalry Brigade struggled to advance toward the Antipolo area. Recognizing that the success of his attack required a concentration of forces along a narrower front, General Griswold decided to focus on the Noguchi Force and the left flank of the Kobayashi Force, as the northern area was heavily fortified. He retained only one battalion as an infantry reserve and directed the remainder of his available forces, all of which were understrength, to push eastward. Alongside the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 103rd Regiment reached Taytay on March 7 to serve as the 1st Cavalry Division Reserve, signaling the upcoming relief of the cavalrymen in preparation for their redeployment to southern Luzon. By March 10, General Wing's 43rd Division had been replaced in the Clark Field area by the 38th Division and was en route to the eastern front.  The 38th Division pushed on into the untracked, ill-explored, and worse-mapped wilderness of the central Zambales Range, its progress slowed more by supply problems than Japanese resistance. In early April the division noted that the last vestiges of any controlled defensive effort had disappeared. Unknown to 11th Corps General Tsukada, on April 6, had given up and had ordered his remaining forces to disperse and continue operations, if possible, as guerrillas. For the Japanese remnants, it was a case of sauve qui peut. Some tried to escape to Luzon's west coast, whence 38th Division troops were already patrolling inland; others tried to make their way north through the mountains, only to be cut down by American patrols working southward from Camp O'Donnell. The 38th Division had killed about 8000 of the scattering Japanese by the time it was relieved by units of the 6th Division on May 3. The losses of the 38th totaled approximately 100 men killed and 500 wounded. The 6th Division, elements of which remained in the Kembu area until June 25, limited its operations to patrolling and setting up trail blocks along Japanese routes of escape. Troops of the 38th Division ultimately returned to the region and remained there until the end of the war. Insofar as US forces were concerned, the mop-up period under 11th Corps control was even more costly than had been the 14th Corps' offensive period. From February 21 to the end of June the various elements of 11th Corps committed to action against the Kembu Group lost approximately 550 men killed and 2200 wounded. The Kembu Group, during the same period, lost 12500 killed or dead from starvation and disease. By the end of the war the original 30000 troops of the Kembu Group were reduced to approximately 1500 sorry survivors, about 1000 of them Army personnel. Another 500 had already been taken prisoner. As a result, General Tsukada ordered his remaining troops to scatter and operate as guerrillas. Meanwhile, Griswold resumed his eastern offensive on March 8. In the south, bolstered by artillery and mortars, the battered 2nd Cavalry Brigade continued to advance slowly under heavy artillery fire, reaching a point 440 yards short of Antipolo along Route 60A and overcoming the enemy cave defenses at Benchmark 11. By March 11, patrols had entered Antipolo, discovering the town was devastated and deserted, yet still under the threat of Japanese artillery and mortars positioned in the hills to the north and northeast. Simultaneously, the 1st Cavalry Brigade made significant strides to the north, also coming within 440 yards of Antipolo while clearing Benchmark 9 Hill and Hills 520 and 740. Abandoning the Montalban-San Mateo area, Patrick instructed the 1st and 20th Regiments to advance toward Mounts Baytangan and Yabang. Facing unexpectedly light resistance, the 1st Regiment advanced a mile and a half east by March 11 and secured Benchmark 8 Hill to the south despite encountering stubborn opposition. Recognizing the need to capitalize on this success, Patrick then ordered the 20th Regiment to move through the 1st and attack north toward Wawa Dam while the latter continued its eastward assault. On March 11, the 103rd Regiment took over from the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and quickly began planning to outflank General Noguchi's defenses located southeast of Antipolo. However, due to concerns over American advances, General Yokoyama ordered the Noguchi Force to retreat to secondary defensive positions while preparing for a three-pronged counterattack set for March 12. The primary effort involved four reserve battalions from the Kobayashi Force, which launched an attack southward from Mount Mataba toward Marikina but were quickly halted by intense air and artillery fire, falling far short of their target. Additionally, the 182nd Independent Battalion attempted a counterattack toward Benchmark 8 but was unsuccessful, while the majority of the Kawashima Force advanced south from the Ipo Dam area to assault the rear installations of the 6th Division west of the Marikina River, where they were easily repelled by March 15. During this so-called counterattack, Griswold continued his offensive, with the 103rd Regiment swiftly advancing through the deserted Antipolo to Benchmark 7 Hill, and the 20th Regiment moving over a mile north to secure a position on a grassy ridge less than a mile southeast of Mount Mataba's summit. On March 14, the 1st Regiment resumed its eastern assault, successfully advancing north to a bare peak about a mile southwest of Mount Baytangan, despite facing strong resistance that caused heavy casualties, including the loss of General Patrick, who was succeeded by Brigadier-General Charles Hurdis as commander of the 6th Division. Simultaneously, Wing initiated a coordinated offensive with two regiments toward Mounts Yabang, Caymayuman, and Tanauan, aiming to flank the Shimbu Group's left. Although the 103rd and 179th Regiments achieved significant progress that day, Noguchi's determined defenders managed to maintain control of Benchmark 7. Looking further south, Griswold was preparing to launch a two-pronged offensive in southern Luzon. General Swing's 511th Parachute Regiment and the 187th Glider Regiment were set to advance towards Lipa from the north and northwest, while the 158th Regiment gathered near Nasugbu to attack southeast along Route 17 toward Balayan Bay. In response, Colonel Fujishige's Fuji Force had established several small positions in the area to prevent American forces from flanking the Shimbu Group's main defenses by rounding the eastern shore of Laguna de Bay. Swing's offensive commenced on March 7, with the 187th Glider Regiment descending the steep southern slopes of Tagaytay Ridge to the northern shore of Lake Taal, ultimately stopping at a hill two miles west of Tanauan due to strong resistance. The 511th Parachute Regiment moved out from Real, reaching within a mile of Santo Tomas while launching unsuccessful frontal assaults on Mount Bijiang. Meanwhile, the 158th Regiment advanced from Nasugbu, quickly securing Balayan before pushing eastward with little opposition toward Batangas, which fell on March 11. On its eastward path, the regiment bypassed significant elements of the 2nd Surface Raiding Base Force on the Calumpan Peninsula, necessitating that a battalion clear that area by March 16. At the same time, other units of the 158th Regiment encountered robust Japanese defenses blocking Route 417 at Mount Macolod, where their advance came to a halt. Concurrently, General Eichelberger continued his offensive against the central islands of the Visayan Passages, with reinforced companies from the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment successfully landing on Romblon and Simara islands on March 11 and 12, respectively. Most importantly for Eichelberger, he was about to initiate his Visayas Campaign. To disrupt Japanese communication lines across the South China Sea, the 8th Army needed to quickly capture airfields that would allow the Allied Air Forces to project land-based air power over the waters west of the Philippines more effectively than from Clark Field or Mindoro. Consequently, the first target chosen was Palawan, which was defended by only two reinforced companies from the 102nd Division. Additionally, MacArthur's strategy included the eventual reoccupation of the East Indies, starting with the capture of Japanese-controlled oil resources in northern Borneo as soon as land-based air support was available. The Zamboanga Peninsula and the Sulu Archipelago were identified as the second targets, although these areas were defended by stronger garrisons from the 54th and 55th Independent Mixed Brigades. Despite this, Eichelberger tasked Major-General Jens Doe's 41st Division with executing these invasions. For the Palawan invasion, codenamed Operation Victor III, Brigadier-General Harold Haney was appointed to lead a force primarily composed of the 186th Regiment, which would be transported to the island by Admiral Fechteler's Task Group 78.2. The convoy departed from Mindoro on February 26, escorted by Rear-Admiral Ralph Riggs' cruisers and destroyers. Following a naval bombardment, Haney's Palawan Force successfully landed at Puerto Princesa on February 28 without encountering any opposition. They quickly secured the town and the two airstrips to the east, advancing to the western and southern shores of the harbor by late afternoon to establish a defensive perimeter. As the first day progressed, it became clear to the American troops that the Japanese troops would not put up a fight at Puerto Princesa and had withdrawn into the hills to the northwest. More disturbing was the revelation of a massacre of approximately 140 American prisoners of war the previous December. The presence of a passing Allied convoy made the alarmed Japanese believe that an invasion was imminent and had herded their prisoners into air-raid shelters, subsequently setting the shelters afire and shooting prisoners who tried to escape. Only 11 American prisoners of war miraculously survived immolation and escaped the shooting. Sheltered by natives until the Americans landed, they emerged during the battle to tell their horrifying tale, which only hardened American resolve to end Japanese rule over the island. By March 1, the 186th Regiment had successfully taken control of Irahuan and Tagburos. In the following week, American forces would eliminate two or three heavily defended strongholds located ten miles north-northwest of Puerto Princesa, where the enemy garrison was ultimately defeated. The Palawan Force also conducted reconnaissance of several offshore islets, discovering no Japanese presence on some and swiftly clearing others. However, due to the poorly compacted soil, the new airfield on the island would not be operational until March 20, which was too late for any aircraft based in Palawan to assist with the Zamboanga landings. Consequently, on March 8, two reinforced companies from the 21st Regiment were flown to the airstrip at Dipolog, which had been secured by Colonel Hipolito Garma's guerrilla 105th Division. On the same day, sixteen Marine Corsairs arrived to provide air support for the invasion of Zamboanga, codenamed Operation Victor IV. For this operation, Doe assigned the remainder of his division, which was to be transported by Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's Task Group 78.1. After three days of pre-assault bombardments and minesweeping, the convoy finally set sail southward and entered Basilan Strait from the west early on March 10. Troops from the 162nd Regiment landed almost without opposition around 09:15 near barrio San Mateo and quickly secured Wolfe Field, while the 163rd Regiment was also landing. Doe's two regiments then began to advance inland, facing minimal resistance as they established a night perimeter. With the Japanese having withdrawn, the 162nd and 163rd Regiments easily secured Zamboanga City, San Roque Airfield, and the rest of the coastal plain by dusk on March 11, with one company extending further to Caldera Bay to the west. To drive the Japanese forces from the elevated positions overlooking the airfield, Doe dispatched the 162nd Regiment towards Mount Capisan and the 163rd Regiment towards Mount Pulungbata. Additionally, the guerrilla 121st Regiment was tasked with blocking the east coast road in the Belong area. Supported by continuous artillery fire and close air support from Marine Corps planes, the two regiments of the 41st Division faced arduous tasks. General Hojo's troops held excellent defenses in depth across a front 5 miles wide, some portions of the line being 3 miles deep. All installations were protected by barbed wire; abandoned ground was thoroughly booby-trapped; mine fields, some of them of the remote-control type, abounded; and at least initially the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade had an ample supply of automatic weapons and mortars. While Japanese morale on the Zamboanga Peninsula was not on a par with that of 14th Area Army troops on Luzon, most of the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade and attached units had sufficient spirit to put up a strong fight as long as they held prepared positions, and Hojo was able to find men to conduct harassing counterattacks night after night. Finally, the terrain through which the 41st Division had to attack was rough and overgrown, giving way on the north to the rain forests of the partially unexplored mountain range forming the backbone of the Zamboanga Peninsula. Only poor trails existed in most of the area held by the Japanese, and the 41st Division had to limit its advance to the pace of bulldozers, which laboriously constructed supply and evacuation roads. Once the American troops entered the peninsula's foothills, tanks could not operate off the bulldozed roads. The next day, the 186th Regiment was deployed to relieve the fatigued 163rd Regiment on the eastern front. By the end of the month, it had expanded the front eastward and northward against diminishing resistance, ultimately forcing Hojo's forces to retreat into the rugged interior of the peninsula. For now, however, we will shift our focus from the Philippines to Burma to continue our coverage of the Chinese-British-Indian offensives. As we last observed, General Stopford's 33rd Corps was aggressively advancing into Mandalay against a weakened 15th Army, while General Cowan's 17th Indian Division had successfully captured Meiktila and was preparing to withstand the combined assaults of the 18th and 49th Divisions. Cowan's forces conducted a robust defense, managing to delay the arrival of the 49th Division until March 18 and successfully repelling General Naka's initial attacks on Meiktila's main airfield. Furthermore, with the reserve 5th Indian Division moving closer to the front in preparation for an advance towards Rangoon, General Slim decided to airlift the 9th Brigade to reinforce Cowan's troops, which landed on Meiktila's main airfield under enemy fire between March 15 and 17. Due to the slow progress on this front and General Katamura's preoccupation with the battles along the Irrawaddy, he was unable to manage the southern units simultaneously. Consequently, General Kimura decided to assign the 33rd Army to take over the fighting in Meiktila. General Honda promptly moved to Hlaingdet, where he was tasked with overseeing the 18th, 49th, and 53rd Divisions. On March 18, he ordered the 18th Division to secure the northern line of Meiktila and neutralize enemy airfields. He instructed the 49th Division to advance along the Pyawbwe-Meiktila road and directed the 53rd Division to regroup near Pyawbwe. However, on that same day, Cowan launched a counterattack by sending two tank-infantry columns to disrupt Japanese preparations along the Mahlaing road and in the villages of Kandaingbauk and Shawbyugan. They faced heavy resistance at Shawbyugan and ultimately had to withdraw. The relentless air assaults also compelled the Japanese to operate primarily at night, limiting their ability to respond with similar force to British offensives. On the night of March 20, Naka decided to initiate a significant attack on Meiktila's main airfield. However, with the 119th Regiment delayed at Shawbyugan, the 55th Regiment had to proceed alone, supported by some tanks, against the defenses of the 99th Brigade around Kyigon. Heavy artillery and mortar fire ultimately disrupted their assault. Meanwhile, as the 49th Division was consolidating its forces to the southeast, Cowan opted to send two tank-infantry columns to eliminate enemy concentrations at Nyaungbintha and Kinlu. Although the initial sweeps met little resistance, the 48th Brigade encountered strong Japanese positions at Shwepadaing on March 21. The next day, Cowan dispatched two tank-infantry columns to secure the Shwepadaing and Tamongan regions, but the British-Indian forces still struggled to eliminate the enemy defenders. That night, Lieutenant-General Takehara Saburo initiated his first significant assault, with the majority of the 106th Regiment targeting the defensive positions of the 48th Brigade in southeastern Meiktila. Despite the fierce and relentless attacks from the Japanese throughout the night, they were ultimately repelled by artillery and machine-gun fire, suffering heavy casualties. On March 23, Cowan sent another tank-infantry column to chase the retreating Japanese forces; however, the reformed 169th Regiment at Kinde successfully defended against this advance. Meanwhile, on the night of March 24, Naka launched another major offensive with the 55th and 119th Regiments, managing to capture Meiktila's main airfield. In response, Cowan quickly dispatched a tank-infantry column to clear the Mandalay road, successfully securing the area northeast of Kyigon by March 26. At this time, Honda had relocated his headquarters to Thazi to better coordinate the battle, although his troops had already suffered significant losses. For the next three days, Cowan's tanks and infantry continued to advance along the Mandalay road while the 63rd and 99th Brigades worked to eliminate Naka's artillery units south of Myindawgan Lake. By mid-March, Stopford's relentless pressure had forced the 31st and 33rd Divisions to retreat in chaos. On March 20, organized resistance in Mandalay was finally shattered as the 2nd British Division linked up with the 19th Indian Division. Consequently, the beleaguered Japanese units had no option but to withdraw in disarray towards the Shan Hills to the east. Following the collapse of the 15th Army front, the 33rd Army received orders on March 28 to hold its current positions only long enough to facilitate the withdrawal of the 15th Army. Consequently, while Cowan's units cleared the region north of Meiktila, Honda halted all offensive actions and promptly directed the 18th Division to secure the Thazi-Hlaingdet area. Additionally, the weakened 214th Regiment was tasked with moving to Yozon to support the withdrawal of the 33rd Division, while the 49th and 53rd Divisions were assigned to contain Meiktila to the south. As the battles for Mandalay and Meiktila unfolded, the reinforced 7th Indian Division at Nyaungu faced several intense assaults from General Yamamoto's 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade throughout March, ultimately advancing to Taungtha and clearing the route to Meiktila by the month's end. Meanwhile, in northern Burma, the 36th British Division advanced toward Mogok, which fell on March 19, while the 50th Chinese Division approached the Hsipaw area. Interestingly, the Japanese abandoned Hsipaw without resistance but launched a fierce counterattack between March 17 and 20. Ultimately, General Matsuyama had no option but to prepare for a withdrawal south toward Lawksawk and Laihka. At this stage, the 38th Chinese Division resumed its advance to Hsipaw; however, facing strong opposition along the route, they did not arrive until March 24, when the entire Burma Road was finally secured. General Sultan believed this was his final maneuver and recommended relocating the Chinese forces back to the Myitkyina area for air transport back to China, except for those needed to secure the Lashio-Hsipaw region. Additionally, the 36th Division continued its eastward push and eventually linked up with the 50th Division in the Kyaukme area by the end of the month before being reassigned to Slim's 14th Army. Looking south, the 74th Indian Brigade and West African forces advanced toward Kolan, while the 26th Indian Division established a new beachhead in the Letpan-Mae region. The 154th Regiment maintained its position near the Dalet River, preventing the remainder of the 82nd West African Division from joining the offensive. On March 23, General Miyazaki decided to launch an attack on Kolan. Although the assault achieved moderate success, Miyazaki soon recognized that he was outnumbered and opted to begin a final withdrawal toward the An Pass, completing this by the end of the month.   Meanwhile, on March 17, the 121st Regiment sent its 3rd Battalion to engage the enemy in the Sabyin area and hold their position along the Tanlwe River for as long as possible. Despite strong resistance from the Japanese, British-Indian forces managed to cross the Tanlwe by March 27 and successfully captured Hill 815 two days later. By March 30, the 22nd East African Brigade had also reached Letpan when High Command decided to relieve the units of the 26th Division and return them to India. In a related development, tensions were rising in French Indochina, where the local government refused to permit a Japanese defense of the colony. By early March, Japanese forces began redeploying around the main French garrison towns in Indochina. The Japanese envoy in Saigon Ambassador Shunichi Matsumoto declared to Governor Admiral Jean Decoux that since an Allied landing in Indochina was inevitable, Tokyo command wished to put into place a "common defence" of Indochina. Decoux however resisted stating that this would be a catalyst for an Allied invasion but suggested that Japanese control would be accepted if they actually invaded. This was not enough and Tsuchihashi accused Decoux of playing for time. On 9 March, after more stalling by Decoux, Tsuchihashi delivered an ultimatum for French troops to disarm. Decoux sent a messenger to Matsumoto urging further negotiations but the message arrived at the wrong building. Tsuchihashi, assuming that Decoux had rejected the ultimatum, immediately ordered commencement of the coup. The 11th R.I.C. (régiment d'infanterie coloniale) based at the Martin de Pallieres barracks in Saigon were surrounded and disarmed after their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Moreau, was arrested. In Hue there was sporadic fighting; the Garde Indochinoise, who provided security for the résident supérieur, fought for 19 hours against the Japanese before their barracks was overrun and destroyed. Three hundred men, one third of them French, managed to elude the Japanese and escape to the A Sầu Valley. However, over the next three days, they succumbed to hunger, disease and betrayals - many surrendered while others fought their way into Laos where only a handful survived. Meanwhile, General Eugène Mordant led opposition by the garrison of Hanoi for several hours but was forced to capitulate, with 292 dead on the French side and 212 Japanese. An attempt to disarm a Vietnamese garrison ended badly for the Japanese when 600 of them marched into Quảng Ngãi. The Vietnamese nationalists had been armed with automatic weapons supplied by the OSS parachuted nearby at Kontum. The Japanese had been led to believe that these men would readily defect but the Vietnamese ambushed the Japanese. Losing only three killed and seventeen wounded they inflicted 143 killed and another 205 wounded on the Japanese before they too were overcome. A much larger force of Japanese came the next day but they found the garrison empty. In Annam and Cochinchina only token resistance was offered and most garrisons, small as they were, surrendered. Further north the French had the sympathy of many indigenous peoples. Several hundred Laotians volunteered to be armed as guerrillas against the Japanese; French officers organized them into detachments but turned away those they did not have weapons for. In Haiphong the Japanese assaulted the Bouet barracks: headquarters of Colonel Henry Lapierre's 1st Tonkin Brigade. Using heavy mortar and machine gun fire, one position was taken after another before the barracks fell and Lapierre ordered a ceasefire. Lapierre refused to sign surrender messages for the remaining garrisons in the area. Codebooks had also been burnt which meant the Japanese then had to deal with the other garrisons by force. In Laos, Vientiane, Thakhek and Luang Prabang were taken by the Japanese without much resistance. In Cambodia the Japanese with 8,000 men seized Phnom Penh and all major towns in the same manner. All French personnel in the cities on both regions were either interned or in some cases executed. The Japanese strikes at the French in the Northern Frontier in general saw the heaviest fighting. One of the first places they needed to take and where they amassed the 22nd division was at Lang Son, a strategic fort near the Chinese border. The defences of Lang Son consisted of a series of fort complexes built by the French to defend against a Chinese invasion. The main fortress was the Fort Brière de l'Isle. Inside was a French garrison of nearly 4000 men, many of them Tonkinese, with units of the French Foreign Legion. Once the Japanese had cut off all communications to the forts they invited General Émile Lemonnier, the commander of the border region, to a banquet at the headquarters of the Japanese 22nd Division. Lemonnier declined to attend the event, but allowed some of his staff to go in his place. They were then taken prisoner and soon after the Japanese bombarded Fort Brière de l'Isle, attacking with infantry and tanks. The small forts outside had to defend themselves in isolation; they did so for a time, proving impenetrable, and the Japanese were repelled with some loss. They tried again the next day and succeeded in taking the outer positions. Finally, the main fortress of Brière de l'Isle was overrun after heavy fighting. Lemonnier was subsequently taken prisoner himself and ordered by a Japanese general to sign a document formally surrendering the forces under his command. Lemonnier refused to sign the documents. As a result, the Japanese took him outside where they forced him to dig a grave along with French Resident-superior (Résident-général) Camille Auphelle. Lemonnier again was ordered to sign the surrender documents and again refused. The Japanese subsequently beheaded him. The Japanese then machine-gunned some of the prisoners and either beheaded or bayoneted the wounded survivors. Lang Son experienced particularly intense fighting, with the 22nd Division relentlessly assaulting the 4,000-strong garrison for two days until the main fortress was captured. The Japanese then advanced further north to the border town of Dong Dang, which fell by March 15. The battle of Lạng Sơn cost the French heavy casualties and their force on the border was effectively destroyed. European losses were 544 killed, of which 387 had been executed after capture. In addition 1,832 Tonkinese colonial troops were killed (including 103 who were executed) while another 1,000 were taken prisoner. On 12 March planes of the US Fourteenth Air Force flying in support of the French, mistook a column of Tonkinese prisoners for Japanese and bombed and strafed them. Reportedly between 400 and 600 of the prisoners were killed or wounded.  Nonetheless, the coup was highly successful, with the Japanese subsequently encouraging declarations of independence from traditional rulers in various regions. On 11 March 1945, Emperor Bảo Đại was permitted to announce the Vietnamese "independence"; this declaration had been prepared by Yokoyama Seiko, Minister for Economic Affairs of the Japanese diplomatic mission in Indochina and later advisor to Bao Dai. Bảo Đại complied in Vietnam where they set up a puppet government headed by Tran Trong Kim and which collaborated with the Japanese. King Norodom Sihanouk also obeyed, but the Japanese did not trust the Francophile monarch. Nationalist leader Son Ngoc Thanh, who had been exiled in Japan and was considered a more trustworthy ally than Sihanouk, returned to Cambodia and became Minister of foreign affairs in May and then Prime Minister in August. In Laos however, King Sisavang Vong of Luang Phrabang, who favoured French rule, refused to declare independence, finding himself at odds with his Prime Minister, Prince Phetsarath Ratanavongsa, but eventually acceded on 8 April. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. March 1945, saw US forces advance in Luzon, overcoming Japanese defenses through strategic maneuvers, while guerrilla activities intensified amid challenging terrain and heavy resistance. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian forces advanced against Japanese troops, capturing key locations and in French Indochina the Japanese unleashed a brutal coup d'etat ushering in independence movements.

Here's an AI-generated podcast based on this essay (courtesy Google's NotebookLM): always entertaining and appealing. Full disclosure: Parts of this essay were also written by AI, and edited.The entire sorry spat with the Canadians, the tit-for-tat expulsions of diplomats and a virtual breakdown of ties leads to a good question. Are the Americans behind it (and if so why?), because for all practical purposes, Canada takes the lead from its Five Eyes friends and mentors? Several commentators have suggested that this is so. Trudeau is not a serious politician, as he demonstrated in this photograph in blackface acting allegedly as an “Indian potentate”.But the Deep State is deadly serious. They have meddled in country after country, leading to the utter misery of their populations. I can, off the top of my head, count several: Salvador Allende's Chile, Patrice Lumumba's Congo, Saddam Hussein's Iraq, Muammar Ghaddafi's Libya, Bashar Assad's Syria, not to mention Sihanouk's Cambodia. We have to make a distinction between the US public in general and the Deep State. The nation as a whole still believes in the noble ideals of the American Revolution, and American individuals are among the most engaging in the world; however, the Deep State is self-aggrandizing, and now poses a potent danger to the US itself as well as others. Alas, it is taking its eye off its real foe, China, with what probably will be disastrous consequences.  The Khalistani threat is a significant concern for India because it appears that the Deep State is applying pressure through proxies. Since it likes to stick to simple playbooks, we have some recent and nerve-racking precedents: Ukraine https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/trudeau-is-us-deep-states-zelensky-2-0-why-india-should-fight-canadas-diplomatic-war-with-all-its-might-13827294.html) and Bangladesh https://rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/p/ep-134-the-geo-political-fallout.So what exactly is in store for India after the new POTUS is chosen, which is just two weeks away? US betting markets are suggesting that Donald Trump will win, but it's likely that Kamala Harris will emerge as POTUS. I was among the few in India who predicted a Trump win in 2016; admittedly I predicted a Trump win in 2020, and I do believe there were um… irregularities. I think in 2024 Trump would win if it were a fair fight, but it is not.But I fear the vote will be rigged and lopsided, partly because of the vast numbers of illegal aliens who will be, or already have been, allowed to vote (by mail). Every day, I hear of strange practices in swing states, as in this tweet. There is room for a lot of irregularities.On the other hand, the Indian-American voter (“desi”), apparently, will continue to vote for the Democratic Party, with some reason: there is racism in the Republican rank and file; but then let us remember that anti-black racism in the US South had Democratic roots: George Wallace and Bull Connor and “Jim Crow”. The Republicans had their “Southern Strategy” too, to inflame racial tensions. The racism Indian-Americans, particularly Hindus, face today is more subtle, but I doubt that the indentured labor and Green Card hell will get any better with Kamala Harris as President. I suspect 100+ year waits for a Green Card will continue. A Harris presidency could introduce several challenges for India across various domains, including economics, foreign policy, terrorism, and military affairs. It is appropriate to consider historical contexts, especially the stances of previous Democratic administrations and notable figures. In particular, Bill Clinton, Madeleine Albright and Robin Raphel come to mind: they were especially offensive to India and India's interests. The Biden Amendment, and Bill Clinton/Hillary Clinton's efforts delayed India's cryogenic rocket engine and thus its space program by 19 years. https://www.rediff.com/news/column/who-killed-the-isros-cryogenic-engine/20131118.htmOne of the most vivid historical examples is that of Japan's economy. After a dream run in the 1960s and 1970s, when they seriously threatened American supremacy in trade based on their high-quality and low-priced products, the Japanese were felled by the Plaza Accord of 1985, which forced the yen to appreciate significantly against the dollar.The net result was that Japanese products lost their competitive pricing edge. Furthermore, it led to an interest rate cut by the Japanese central bank, which created an enormous asset bubble. The bursting of that bubble led to a Lost Decade in the 1990s, and the nation has not yet recovered from that shock. One could say that the reserve currency status of the dollar was used to bludgeon the Japanese economy to death.Having observed this closely, China took special care to do two things: one, to infiltrate the US establishment, and two, to lull them into a false sense of security. Captains of industry were perfectly happy, with their short-term personal incentives, to move production to China for increased profits. Wall Street was quite willing to finance China, too. Politicians were willing to suspend disbelief, and to pursue the fantasy that a prosperous China would be somehow like America, only with East Asian features. Wrong. China is a threat now. But the Deep State learned from that mistake: they will not let another competitor thrive. The possible economic rise of India is something that will be opposed tooth and nail. In the background there is the possible collapse of the US dollar as the reserve currency (i.e. dedollarization), because of ballooning US debt and falling competitiveness, and the emergence of mechanisms other than Bretton Woods and the SWIFT network (e.g. the proposed blockchain-based, decentralized BRICS currency called UNIT).Besides, the Deep State has a clear goal for India: be a supine supplier of raw materials, including people; and a market for American goods, in particular weapons. Ideally India will be ruled by the Congress party, which, through incompetence or intent, steadily impoverished India: see how nominal per capita income collapsed under that regime until the reforms of 1991 (data from tradingeconomics and macrotrends). The massive devaluations along the way also hurt the GDP statistics, with only modest gains in trade. Another future that the Deep State has in mind for India could well be balkanization: just like the Soviet Union was unraveled, it may assiduously pursue the unwinding of the Indian State through secession, “sub-national diplomacy” and so forth. The value of India as a hedge against a rampaging China does not seem to occur to Democrats; in this context Trump in his presidency was much more positive towards India.Chances are that a Harris presidency will cost India dear,  in all sorts of ways:Foreign Policy Challenges1. Kashmir, Khalistan and Regional Dynamics: Harris has previously expressed support for Kashmiri separatism and criticized India's actions in the region. This stance could complicate U.S.-India relations, especially if she seeks to engage with groups advocating Kashmiri secession. The persistent support for Khalistan, including its poster boy Gurpatwant Singh Pannun who keeps warning of blowing up Indian planes, shows the Democrats have invested in this policy.2. Alignment with Anti-India Elements: Her connections with leftist factions within the Democratic Party, which have historically taken a hard stance against India, may result in policies that are less favorable to Indian interests. The influence of figures like Pramila Jayapal could further strain relations.3. Balancing Act with China: While the U.S. aims to counter Chinese influence in Asia, Harris's approach may involve a nuanced engagement with China that could leave India feeling sidelined in strategic discussions. Barack Obama, if you remember, unilaterally ceded to China the task of overseeing the so-called “South Asia”. Harris may well be content with a condominium arrangement with China: see https://www.firstpost.com/opinion/shadow-warrior-a-us-china-condominium-dividing-up-the-world-between-themselves-12464262.html 4. Foreign Policy Independence: An India that acts in its own national interests is anathema to many in the US establishment. The clear Indian message that the Ukraine war and perhaps even the Gaza war are unfortunate events, but that they are peripheral to Indian interests, did not sit well with the Biden administration. In a sense, just as Biden pushed Russia into China's arms, he may well be doing the same with India: the recently announced patrolling agreement between India and China may also be a signal to the Harris camp.Terrorism and Security Concerns1. Counterterrorism Cooperation: A shift towards prioritizing “human rights” may affect U.S.-India counterterrorism cooperation, as can already be seen in the case of Khalistanis. If Harris's administration emphasizes civil liberties over security measures, it could limit joint operations aimed at combating terrorism emanating especially from Pakistan..2. Support for Separatist Movements and Secession: Increased U.S. support for groups that advocate for self-determination in regions like Kashmir might embolden separatist movements within India (see Sonam Wangchuk in Ladakh, and the alleged Christian Zo nation that Sheikh Hasina said the US wanted to carve out of India, Bangladesh and Myanmar), posing a significant internal security challenge.Military Affairs1. Defense Collaborations: Although military ties have strengthened under previous administrations, a Harris presidency might introduce hesitancy in defense collaborations due to her potential focus on alleged human rights issues within India's military operations. This is a double-edged sword because it could also induce more self-reliance, as well as defense exports, by India. 2. Historical Precedents: The historical context of U.S. military interventions in South Asia, such as the deployment of the Seventh Fleet during the Bangladesh Liberation War in 1971, raises concerns about how a Harris administration might respond to regional conflicts involving India. 3. Strategic Partnerships: Any perceived shift in U.S. commitment to India as a strategic partner could embolden adversarial nations like China and Pakistan, thereby destabilizing the region further. This, at a time when China is vastly outspending all its neighbors in Asia in its military budget (data from CSIS).Economic Implications1. Increased Scrutiny on “Human Rights”: Harris's administration may adopt a more critical stance towards India's human rights record, particularly concerning alleged violations of minority rights and alleged mistreatment of dissent, although there is reason to believe this is mostly a convenient stick to beat India with rather than a real concern: we see how the real human rights violations of Hindus in Bangladesh raise no alarms. This scrutiny could have economic repercussions, such as reduced foreign investment from companies concerned about reputational risks associated with human rights violations, and possible sanctions based on the likes of the USCIRF's (US Council on International Religious Freedom) report.2. Shift in Trade Policies: Historical Democratic administrations have often prioritized labor rights and environmental standards in trade agreements. If Harris follows this trend, India might face stricter trade conditions that could hinder its export-driven sectors.3. Focus on Domestic Issues: Harris's potential prioritization of domestic issues over international relations may lead to a diminished focus on strengthening economic ties with India, which could stall ongoing initiatives aimed at boosting bilateral trade and investment.Social Issues1.  Anti-Hindu feeling: There has been a demonstrable increase in antipathy shown towards Hindus in the US, with a number of incidents of desecration of Hindu temples, especially by Khalistanis, as well as economic crimes such as robberies of jewelry shops. The temperature online as well as in legacy media has also risen, with offensive memes being bandied about. A notable example was the New York Times' cartoon when India did its Mars landing. And you don't get more Democrat-leaning than the New York Times.In summary, while Kamala Harris's presidency may not drastically alter the trajectory of U.S.-India relations established under previous administrations, given a convergence of major geo-political interests, it could introduce significant challenges stemming from her focus on so-called “human rights” and alignment with anti-India factions within her party. These factors could negatively influence economic ties, foreign policy dynamics, counterterrorism efforts, and military collaborations between the two nations. Four more years of tension: revival of terrorist attacks in Kashmir, the chances of CAA-like riots regarding the Waqf issue, economic warfare, a slow genocide of Hindus in Bangladesh. It's enough to make one nostalgic for the Trump era: yes, he talked about tariffs and Harley-Davidson, but he didn't go to war, and he identified China as enemy number one. 2000 words, 23 October 2024 This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com/subscribe

It's an EmMajority Report Thursday! Emma speaks with Noah Kulwin and Brendan James to discuss the most recent season of the Blowback podcast. Then, she speaks with Ross Barkan, contributing writer at New York Magazine and columnist at Crain's New York, to discuss his recent piece published in The Nation entitled "Is Eric Adams's Luck About to Run Out?" First, Emma runs through updates on Israel's attacks on civilians in Lebanon, the UN General Assembly's overwhelming vote to end Israel's military presence in Gaza and the West Bank, reporting on Biden's weapons transfers, the uncommitted movement, the teamsters' lack of a presidential endorsement, swing state polling, New York State's Democratic Party problem, the Fed, Russian offensives in Ukraine, Beshear's conversion therapy ban, and dropping overdose rates in the US, before parsing a little more thoroughly through the developing story of Israel's en-masse attack of Lebanese citizens (Hezbollah or not) via the use of rigged communications technologies. Emma is then joined by Noah Kulwin and Brendan James as they outline why they chose Cambodia for the focus of the fifth season of Blowback, unpacking its role as a central (and emblematic) node in the constellation of US intervention in Southeast Asia during the Cold War. Expanding on this, Kulwin and James dive into the complex cast of characters that dominate this season, first tackling the Nixon-Kissinger paring that set the blueprint for the entire thing, first sabotaging Vietnam peace negotiations in 1968 to help ensure a GOP victory, before centering a strategy of “Peace with Honor,” by which Nixon meant a shift to more expansive bombing campaigns, and immediately expanding said campaign by pushing Cambodian Royal Norodom Sihanouk to embrace a US carpet bombing campaign on his country (not war, totally not war), all while hiding the entire campaign behind a dual reporting system, separate books, and direct, behind-the-scenes communications between the White House and relevant parties. Shifting focus to Cambodia, Noah and Brendan parse through the Khmer Rouge's origins as an auxiliary, socialist-aligned force with the North Vietnamese (the basis for Nixon's carpet bombing), only to help launch a full-scale Civil War in the wake of the US-backed deposition of Sihanouk by South Vietnam in 1970, resulting in years of bloodshed (increased by ongoing US bombings) that saw the Khmer Rouge gain more and more territory and power, until the formerly-small-guerilla movement successfully sacked the capital city of Phnom Penh, launching five years of forced labor, full-scale genocide and the extermination of ethnic minorities, refugee crises, mass executions and more under the rule of Pol Pot. Continuing, James and Kulwin move into the breakdown of Cambodian society under the brutal regime of Pol Pot and expanding conflict as the Khmer Rouge turned against the North Vietnamese government that had supported them (in part due to the Khmer Rouge's budding relationship with the US and the West), resulting in said government launching a full-scale invasion of Cambodia, getting rid of Pol Pot and establishing a friendly regime, all to the condemnation of the West that had been peacefully watching Cambodians die for nearly a decade. After briefly expanding on the mythology tying the Khmer Rouge's rule to the greater Soviet movement and the obvious failures of said narrative when you look into who was actually supporting the regime, Emma, Brendan and Noah jump to the modern period, unpacking the symbiotic nature of a fully-capitalist Cold War between the US and China, and what that has meant for Cambodian development over the last decade, wrapping up the interview by running through the final figures on the mass deaths from US carpet bombing (100-150k), the US-backed Civil War (300-500k), and the following Cambodian Genocide (1.7m). Ross Barkan and Emma then dive right into the overwhelming cloud of corruption around NYC Mayor Eric Adams, including FOUR federal investigations ranging from domestic to foreign corruption, and the correlating complete incompetence of his governance, with Barkan comparing his administration to a Tammany Hall that didn't actually deliver anything to the people. After briefly expanding on the role an overwhelmingly unpopular New York Democratic Party is having on races up and down the ballot, Ross and Emma tackle the particulars of Adams' corrupt relationship with the NYPD and its deadly impact. And in the Fun Half: Emma is joined by Brandon Sutton and Matt Binder as they unpack North Carolina GOP Gubernatorial Nominee Mark Robinson's odd sermon on the ability to take and make life with one's genitalia, JD Vance's continuing commitment to racist conspiracy, and Ryan Grim's cathartic shutdown of Matt Walsh's absurd anti-Haitian bigotry. Kimmy from Kentucky on the misconceptions about her state and the value of people without college degrees, and M from Florida on Tim Pool, plus, your calls and IMs!   Check out Blowback here: https://blowback.show/ Check out Ross' piece in The Nation here: https://www.thenation.com/article/politics/eric-adams-corruption-challenges/ TICKETS FOR MAJORITY REPORT ELECTION NIGHT LIVE SHOW HERE!: https://www.eventbrite.com/e/the-majority-report-with-sam-seder-election-night-coverage-live-show-tickets-1010883639177 Call your Senators at 202-224-3121 and urge them to tell Sen. Schumer NOT to bring Sen. bill 4127 to the floor! Go to https://www.whitehouse.gov/contact/ and, in the space to contact the Vice President, voice support for FTC Chair Lina Khan and for Palestine! 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Kambodża, tajemnicza kraina o bogatej historii, przyciąga uwagę jak magnes. Zaglądając się w przeszłość tego kraju, odkrywamy fascynujący świat, gdzie imperium Khmerów rozkwitało niczym kwiat lotosu, świadcząc o potędze i kreatywności starożytnych społeczeństw. Następnie, przemierzając mroczne korytarze kolonializmu, dostrzegamy strugę zmian, jaką pozostawili za sobą kolonizatorzy, przekształcając Kambodżę we francuski protektorat. Dalej, widzimy ostrożny taniec króla Sihanouka, który przez lata starał się zachować neutralność i nie zwaśnić z żadną ze stron Zimnej Wojny. Wreszcie, na scenie pojawia się tragiczny dramat Czerwonych Khmerów i Pol Pota, przynosząc wieści, które zszokowały świat. Historia Kambodży to fascynujące połączenie chwały i tragedii, pełne życiowych lekcji, które powinniśmy cenić i zrozumieć. Dlatego dziś zapraszam was na podróż przez wieki. Odkryjemy fascynującą historię Kambodży w tym kompleksowym, wielowątkowym odcinku podcastu historycznego. Przeniesiemy się od czasów potężnego Imperium Khmerów, dalej przez wpływ francuskiego protektoratu, aż po współczesność. Zanurzymy się w życie króla Sihanouka, Lon Nola i niesławne rządy Czerwonych Khmerów pod wodzą Pol Pota. Wspólnie zobaczymy, jak te wydarzenia ukształtowały Kambodżę i jej mieszkańców oraz jak wpłynęły na jej dziedzictwo kulturowe. Uwagi: 1/ Odcinek nie zawiera trudnych w odbiorze opisów ani wizerunków czy fotografii. Wszystko jest przyjazne dla młodszych pasjonatów historii. 2/ To nie odcinek o samym Pol Pocie i Czerwonych Khmerach – to odcinek, w którym wychodzę z odległych wieków i tłumaczę, jak splot wydarzeń poskutkował latami 1975-1979. Tylko tak możemy zrozumieć i zaangażować się w historię kraju Khmerów. Dziękuję moim Patronom: https://pastebin.com/zyswBWcy Jeśli Ci się podoba -dołącz :) https://patronite.pl/podcasthistoryczny Muzyka/Music by - Whitesand; Kupno/buy: https://whitesand.bandcamp.com Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/artist/3GXunV3wsCpSdKp0L5tcNH YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCe96JG5gdgSRtmqStx0isXA Whitesand songs: Adventure Begins https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yj7g27GDVrY Kingdom https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EFWo5hl4h3g Brand New World https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=udZdqsrMLoo Airborne https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bdNULFOawlU Humanity https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SwEK59aLXj4 Eternity https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=X5c83Uixoj8 Spaceman https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i27sSTYnKdo Voidbringer https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=0TfL_8uu270 The Way of Kings https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=dJJ75n1yAV4 Adamantine https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cVsQ8Ly6xfs Last of It's Kind https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=wqjAr_UmhUs Into the Unknown https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=F4eAAYSaqmo Legend of the Sword https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=62j6VWu-9VI Legends Anthem https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JSAcPWYbwPI The Giant https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cKrrFQ1j4Qs Unbreakable https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZRLpr_v714Q Undiscovered https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KbmJPgXkljU Fallen Leaves of Old https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NwZK4dITPw0 Worth Fighting For https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=e6Gx7V7mDsg Worthy https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=bQE4_fazzys Ancient Mastery https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vBn-QfxrelU Legends https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=yMOz5Ssd6EE Open Music Revolution (www.openmusicrevolution.com) Zrodla: https://pastebin.com/ZEdzwQKG TT: https://twitter.com/sadowski_rafal IG: https://www.instagram.com/rafal_sadowskii 0:00 Wstęp 8:18 Podziękowanie dla Patronów 10:20 Rozpoczęcie opowieści – preludium 16:24 Kolonializm i Industrializm – dwie siły, które ukształtowały nowożytność 22:53 Rewolucja przemysłowa 26:51 Rewolucja przemysłowa zasila Nowy Imperializm 30:33 Karabin Maxim 32:13 Medycyna kolonialna 33:50 Czarne aspekty kolonizacji w XIX i XX wieku 39:31 Zagadka 45:20 Kambodża – początek 47:40 Khmerowie – ludność Kambodży 53:40 Francuski Protektorat 59:13 Kolonialna Gospodarka Kambodży 1:02:51 Zew Nacjonalizmu 1:07:18 II WŚ, Francja i Kambodża 1:14:38 Podsumowanie – od antyku, do 1945 1:17:25 Sihanouk i początek walki o niepodległość. Khmer Issarak, Viet Minh. 1:27:20 Sihanouk i próby pogodzenia sprzecznych interesów 1:32:28 Jakim władcą był Sihanouk? 1:40:48 Lewica w Kambodży 1:46:43 Paryska Grupa Studencka 1:53:42 Poznajcie Pol Pota 1:59:23 Powrót Pol Pota do Kambodży 2:03:05 Dlaczego Czerwoni Khmerzy walczyli z Sihanoukiem? 2:06:19 1970, Lon Nol i Zamach stanu 2:11:06 Bombardowanie dywanowe Kambodży 2:17:21 Podsumowanie – Kambodża od antyku, do przedednia Czerwonych Khmerów 2:21:49 Poglądy Czerwonych Khmerów 2:29:05 Czerwoni Khmerzy wkraczają do Phnom Penh 2:32:19 Pola Śmierci 2:35:17 Choeung Ek 2:39:25 Rok Zero, Okulary 2:43:47 Życie codzienne pod rządami Pol Pota 2:48:29 Tarcia wewnątrz partii 2:51:32 Wewnętrzna czystka: Tuol Sleng 2:56:18 Upadek Czerwonych Khmerów 3:03:09 Ostatnie dni Pol Pota 3:06:42 Ostatni rozdział historii 3:13:49 Zakończenie

How does the "Vietnam War" begin? How did the Communist Party of Kampuchea (CPK) get its name? Why did Sihanouk start making so many movies in the 1960's? Time Period Covered 1964 - 1967 In this episode, Lachlan revisits Vietnam as LBJ wages war upon the North and the Viet Cong. Pol Pot leaves the jungle to visit Hanoi, and Beijing, and changes the direction of Khmer Communism. Meanwhile, in Cambodia, Sihanouk begins losing his magic touch as various quarters become less enamoured with his policies. The Cambodian Civil War approaches, as the war in Vietnam begins to spread. Sources Philip Short Pol Pot: History of a Nightmare David Chandler The Tragedy of Cambodian History & Brother Number One Ben Kiernan How Pol Pot Came to Power Milton Osbourne Sihanouk Steve Heder Cambodian Communism and the Vietnamese Model Edward Miller The Vietnam War Mark Atwood Lawrence A Concise History of the Vietnam War Democratic Kampuchea Livre Noir

Mord, Folter, Zwangsarbeit – in Kambodscha steht dafür ein Name: Pol Pot. Der Anführer der Roten Khmer ist heute weltweit ein Synonym für Schreckensherrschaft und Völkermord. Die Roten Khmer wollen in Kambodscha eine neue Gesellschaft mit neuen Menschen erschaffen. Zum Aufstieg verholfen hat ihnen Prinz Norodom Sihanouk - und Bomben der USA. Geschätzt 2 Millionen Menschen sterben in den knapp vier Jahren des Terrorregimes an Hunger, Krankheit, Zwangsarbeit, Folter und Mord. Autorin: Andrea Kath Von Andrea Kath.

Who was Nuon Chea? What does Buddhism have to do with Khmer Rouge ideology? Why did Sihanouk sever ties with the United States?   Time Period Covered 1963 - 1965 In this episode we explore the impact of the fateful year of 1963 in Cambodia, as well as the circumstances that the new Cambodian communist leadership were dealing with in the Vietnamese jungle. We also look at the difference between two influential future leaders of Democratic Kampuchea; Khieu Samphan and Nuon Chea, as they play quite different roles for the organisation. This episode also explores the relationship between Theravada Buddhist language, grammar and thought and the way this was utilised by the Khmer Rouge to transplant communist ideas into Cambodian minds. Finally, the episode concludes by explaining the reasons surrounding Sihanouk's distancing from the US and eventual cutting off of US aid and relations between the two countries. Sources Philip Short Pol Pot: History of a Nightmare David Chandler The Tragedy of Cambodian History & Brother Number One Ben Kiernan How Pol Pot Came to Power Milton Osbourne Sihanouk Steve Heder Cambodian Communism and the Vietnamese Model Norodom Sihanouk My War with the CIA Show Content https://www.shadowsofutopia.com/dramatis-personae.html 

Một bên chấp nhận là « tai, mắt » của Bắc Kinh trong ASEAN để đối lấy viện trợ và đầu tư, còn bên kia thì đã trông thấy Cam Bốt là một mảnh đất màu mỡ để cho các doanh nghiệp Trung Quốc khai thác và xem Phnom Penh như một công cụ hữu ích cả về chính trị lẫn chiến lược. Barthélémy Courmont, giám đốc nghiên cứu Viện Quan Hệ Quốc Tế và Chiến Lược IRIS, phân tích về chiến lược trong hơn nửa thế kỷ Bắc Kinh giữ Phnom Penh trong quỹ đạo. Ngày 02/09/2022 bộ Quốc Phòng Cam Bốt « chân thành cảm ơn » Trung Quốc cấp cho Phnom Penh 150 chiếc xe để đưa đón các phái đoàn chính thức đến dự thượng đỉnh ASEAN và ASEAN+ vào tháng 11 sắp tới. Đây là dấu hiệu mới nhất cho thấy, Trung Quốc không chỉ là nhà đầu tư và tài trợ quan trọng nhất tại Cam Bốt mà còn can thiệp vào đời sống chính trị tại quốc gia Đông Nam Á này. Ngay từ những năm 1990, sau hiệp định Paris, Cam Bốt hội nhập trở lại với thế giới, rồi chính thức trở thành thành viên Hiệp Hội Đông Nam Á, Trung Quốc đã mau mắn tận dụng thời cơ, bắt rễ vào quốc gia với 15 triệu dân này. Công nghiệp dệt may, ngành du lịch, ngành khai thác đá quý, lâm sản, khai thác dầu hỏa, những công trình kiến trúc tại Phnom Penh, xa lộ, hải cảng, sân bay… Nơi nào cũng có vốn đầu tư của Trung Quốc. Từ 2016, Con Đường Tơ Lụa Mới kết nối Hoa Lục với phần còn lại của thế giới chính thức có một chặng dừng ở Xứ Chùa Tháp. Chủ tịch Tập Cận Bình đã sang tận Phnom Penh với gần 20 dự án đầu tư, trong số đó có nhiều dự án chung quanh thành phố cảng Sihanoukville, nhìn ra Vịnh Thái Lan. Trung Quốc giờ đây là nhà đầu tư số 1 tại Xứ Chùa Tháp và đã thay thế Nhật Bản để trở thành nhà tài trợ lớn nhất cho Cam Bốt.   Trả lời RFI tiếng Việt, giáo sư Courmont, đại học Công Giáo Lille, kiêm giám đốc nghiên cứu Viện Quan Hệ Quốc Tế và Chiến Lược IRIS nhắc lại bang giao của trục Bắc Kinh –Phnom Penh gần như không thay đổi với thời gian và trải qua nhiều chế độ cầm quyền nhiều thế hệ lãnh đạo ở Cam Bốt Barthélémy Courmont : « Từ lâu Trung Quốc đã quan tâm đến Cam Bốt. Ngay từ thập niên 1960 hai quốc gia này đã có một mối quan hệ mật thiết. Vua Sihanouk từng có những liên hệ cá nhân rất tốt với Mao Trạch Đông và Chu Ân Lai. Mọi người còn nhớ rằng khi bị lật đổ sau một cuộc đảo chính năm 1970 Sihanouk đã sang Trung Quốc tị nạn. Mối thâm giao này đã được duy trì ngay cả dưới chế độ Khmer Đỏ. Mãi cho đến chiến tranh biên giới Việt-Trung năm 1979 (…) khi mà Trung Quốc thua cuộc và chính quyền Cam Bốt được đặt dưới sự yểm trợ của chính quyền Hà Nội. Trong thập niên 1980, bang giao giữa Bắc Kinh với Phnom Penh nguội lạnh. Nhưng tình huống thay đổi hẳn kể từ sau hiệp định Paris 1991 và nhất là trong suốt thập niên 1990 Đảng Nhân Dân Cam Bốt lên cầm quyền, Sihanouk trở về nước sau nhiều năm lưu vong, với cương vị quốc vương Cam Bốt ông nắm giữ quyền lực một cách tượng trưng. Trung Quốc vận động để Cam Bốt vào ASEAN 1999 là một cột mốc quan trọng khác, khi quốc gia này Đông Nam Á này gia nhập ASEAN nhờ Bắc Kinh đã vận động ráo riết. Trung Quốc đã dẫn dắt Cam Bốt trong suốt quá tình tái sinh. Giáo sư Courmont giải thích : Barthélémy Courmont : « Trong suốt thập niên 1990 Cam Bốt là một trong những nước nghèo, một trong những nền kinh tế kém phát triển nhất trên thế giới. Nhiều thách thức to lớn về mặt kinh tế cũng như là xã hội chờ đợi quốc gia Đông Nam Á này. Trong suốt khoảng thời gian đó Trung Quốc đã tăng cường hiện diện tại Xứ Chùa Tháp với những phương tiện đang có trong tay, nghĩa là các doanh nghiệp Trung Quốc đã dựa vào cộng đồng người Hoa ở Cam Bốt chiếm khoảng 15 % dân số tại quốc gia Đông Nam Á này. Xu hướng này càng gia tăng trong kể từ 25-30 năm nay. Trung Quốc càng lúc càng hiện diện trên lãnh thổ Cam Bốt ». Hun Sen, loa phóng thanh của Bắc Kinh Trong chiến lược giữ Cam Bốt trong quỹ đạo, Trung Quốc đã sớm trông thấy một điểm tựa vững chắc là thủ tướng Hun Sen : Dù là người của Hà Nội, nhưng ông này đã càng lúc càng ngả về phía Bắc Kinh. Ông trở thành « cổng vào » Cam Bốt của các doanh nhân và các nhà đầu tư Trung Quốc. Hun Sen đã bật đèn xanh cho rất nhiều các dự án đầu tư lớn của Trung Quốc. Chẳng hạn như hồi năm 2000 khi khám phá một giếng dầu ngoài khơi Phnom Penh đã gạt đối tác truyền thống là Singapore để nhường phần cho tập đoàn dầu khí quốc gia Trung Quốc. Nhưng Bắc Kinh còn nhìn xa hơn cả những lợi ích kinh tế. Năm 2009 vài ngày sau quyết định trục xuất 20 người Duy Ngô Nhĩ sang Trung Quốc, Phnom Penh ký với Bắc Kinh 14 thỏa thuận hợp tác kinh tế, trị giá 850 triệu đô la. Giáo sư Barthélémy Courmont, đại học Lille giải thích về sự « liên kết » của chính quyền Hun Sen với Bắc Kinh về nhiều mặt, từ kinh tế, đến chính trị, chiến lược : Barthélémy Courmont : « Phần lớn các công trình kiến trúc tại thủ đô Phnom Penh các tòa nhà của chính phủ, các cơ quan chính thức của Nhà nước đều do các tập đoàn Trung Quốc xây dựng. Tôi muốn nói đến trụ sở Quốc Hội, phủ thủ tướng… Qua đó chúng ta thấy mức độ rất chặt chẽ trong liên hệ giữa ông Hun Sen với Trung Quốc. Bắc Kinh dựa vào thủ tướng Hun Sen, một nhà lãnh đạo chuyên chế, tập trung quyền lực trong tay, để bắt rễ vào Cam Bốt. Đổi lại chính quyền Phnom Penh trong tay Hun Sen tán đồng lập trường của Trung Quốc trên nhiều hồ sơ như là tranh chấp chủ quyền ở Biển Đông giữa Bắc Kinh với nhiều thành viên ASEAN (Philippines, hay Việt Nam). Một cách tự động Cam Bốt luôn tán đồng và ủng hộ quan điểm của Trung Quốc. Hệ quả kèm theo là lập trường của Phnom Penh luôn trái ngược lại với những lợi ích của ASEAN trong vấn đề Biển Đông, đặc biệt là đi ngược lại với những lợi ích của Việt Nam ». Đấy mới chỉ là một thí dụ cụ thể về hậu quả từ việc Trung Quốc dùng đầu tư và mua chuộc Cam Bốt. Barthélémy Courmont : «Sự gần gũi đó giữa Trung Quốc với Cam Bốt khiến ASEAN rất khó tìm được một tiếng nói chung trong chiến lược đối ngoại với Bắc Kinh. Chẳng hạn như trên vấn đề cùng khai thác các dự án trên sông Mekong. Tuy nhiên quan trọng hơn cả, như vừa nói là trên vấn đề tranh chấp chủ quyền ở Biển Đông. Trên tất cả những hồ sơ có liên quan đến Trung Quốc, ASEAN hoàn toàn bất lực để tìm ra đồng thuận, do Phnom Penh luôn bảo vệ quyền lợi của Bắc Kinh, đứng về phía Trung Quốc ». Ream, « thêm một bước nữa » trong chiến lược thâu tóm Đông Nam Á Về quân sự và chiến lược, mọi chú ý đang dồn về căn cứ hải quân Ream, cách thành phố cảng Sihanoukville chưa đầy 30 km về phía nam. Đầu tháng 6/2022 Cam Bốt và Trung Quốc chính thức khởi động chương trình « nâng cấp » căn cử hải quân này. Truyền thông Hoa Kỳ báo động Bắc Kinh sẽ được « độc quyền » sử dụng một phần căn cứ ngay bên bờ Vịnh Thái Lan, một phương tiện để Trung Quốc tiếp cận dễ dàng hơn các đảo đá đang tranh chấp với các láng giềng Đông Nam Á ở Biển Đông. Cho dù những thông tin chính xác về mức độ đầu tư của Trung Quốc tại căn cứ quân sự này còn được giữ bí mật nhưng giám đốc nghiên cứu Viện Quan Hệ Quốc Tế và Chiến Lược của Pháp, Barthélémy Courmont giải thích về tầm mức quan trọng về mặt chiến lược và an ninh đối với Trung Quốc : Barthélémy Courmont : « Đây sẽ là căn cứ quân sự thứ nhì của Trung Quốc ngoài lãnh thổ, sau căn cứ thường trực tại Djibouti. Đây sẽ là một biểu tượng rất quan trọng, bởi vì sẽ là lần đầu tiên Trung Quốc đặt căn cứ hải quân trên lãnh thổ của một thành viên của ASEAN, tăng cường hiện diện quân sự trong khu vực, bên cạnh những căn cứ đã bồi đắp ở Hoàng Sa và Trường Sa. Do vậy cả về mặt biểu tượng lẫn thực chất, theo tôi, căn cứ Ream sẽ có tầm cỡ quan trọng còn hơn cả so với căn cứ đã hoạt động tại Djibouti, bởi đây sẽ là một căn cứ hoạt động ngay giữa lòng ASEAN, sát cạnh cửa ngõ Trung Quốc. Sự gần gũi về địa lý với Trung Quốc này khiến khả năng các nước Đông Nam Á cưỡng lại sức mạnh và ý muốn của Bắc Kinh sẽ lại càng hạn hẹp hơn nữa. Hiện diện ở Ream, Trung Quốc rồi đây sẽ có thể áp đặt quan điểm với một số thành viên ASEAN, mở rộng thêm nữa ảnh hưởng với Cam Bốt ». Nhưng một lần nữa giới phân tích nhắc lại, hợp tác quân sự song phương « không mới chỉ bắt đầu từ hôm qua ». : năm 1997 ông Hun Sen đã ký với thủ tướng Lý Bằng một thỏa thuận hợp tác nhờ Trung Quốc giúp đào tạo cảnh sát. Cùng năm Bắc Kinh đã viện trợ cho Phnom Penh 116 xe vận tải quân sự 70 xe jeep tổng trị giá 2,8 triệu đô la. Trong một bài nghiên cứu đăng trên The Conversation ngày 02/03/2021, hai chuyên gia Pháp về địa chính trị và quan hệ quốc tế, Emmanuel Véron và Emmanuel Lincot nêu bật một chi tiết : ba thành phố du lịch nổi tiếng của Cam Bốt bao quanh căn cứ hải quân Ream, phần lớn các cơ sở hạ tầng tại cả ba địa điểm du lịch đó, (khách sạn, song bài, hàng quán, sân golf, bến tàu…)  do các nhà thầu Trung Quốc xây dựng, và chủ yếu là để phục vụ du khách Trung Quốc. Đây là những công dân Trung Quốc đông hơn người bản địa. Tiêu biểu nhất cho thấy vốn của Trung Quốc đã « đổ bộ » đến khu vực này là dự án xây dựng khu nghỉ mát ở Dara Sakor, tỉnh Koh Kong, trải rộng trên 90 km bờ biển Cam Bốt. Để kết luận giáo sư Courmont nhìn nhận, không hay ho gì khi chấp nhận làm chư hầu cho Trung Quốc để đổi lấy viện trợ và đầu tư nhưng xét cho cùng, ông Hun Sen khi một khi đã chọn cai trị đất nước với một bàn tay sắt và để duy trì chiếc ghế quyền lực, thì Phnom Penh có sự lựa chọn nào khác hay không ? Barthélémy Courmont : « Cam Bốt là một quốc gia tương đối bị cô lập trên trường quốc tế. Phương Tây lên án Hun Sen, đàn áp đối lập, giải thể các đảng phái chính trị chống đối ông ta. Trong cuộc bầu cử 2018 đảng Nhân Dân Cam Bốt và liên minh đã kiểm soát toàn bộ Quốc Hội. Mỹ và Liên Âu đã ban hành các biện pháp trừng phạt Cam Bốt. Về kinh tế, quốc gia Đông Nam Á này dù đã phát triển trong hơn 20 năm qua, dù có tỷ lệ tăng trưởng cao nhất trong khu vực, nhưng Cam Bốt vẫn là một nước nghèo với những nhu cầu vô cùng to lớn về cơ sở hạ tầng. Bị Âu, Mỹ tẩy chay, Phnom Penh không có nhiều sự chọn lựa nào khác ngoại trừ Trung Quốc. Nhật Bản vốn là một trong những nhà đầu tư nhiều vào Xứ Chùa Tháp nhưng khác với Bắc Kinh, Tokyo lung túng vì chính sách đàn áp đối lập của Hun Sen. Trong điều kiện đó, Trung Quốc là đối tác quan trọng nhất đầu tư vào Cam Bốt ». Tựa như Lào, Sri Lanka, Cam Bốt cũng đứng trước nguy cơ sa bẫy nợ Trung Quốc bởi vì Bắc Kinh luôn áp dụng một công thức : đầu tư vào một số chính khách ở những nơi Trung Quốc muốn bắt rễ vào. Đấy là những cửa ngõ để thực hiện các mục tiêu chính trị và chiến lược lâu dài.    

Nhận được lời kêu cứu gửi về toà soạn, nhà báo Kong Arey cùng 2 đồng nghiệp bắt tay điều tra một casino trá hình ở Sihanouk và nhận ra không phải 12 nghìn lao động bên trong đều là nạn nhân.

The Khmer Rouge launch their revolution against Sihanouk… until Sihanouk himself is stabbed in the back. America's action in Vietnam escalates, spilling over the border with catastrophic consequences. The enigmatic Pol Pot will emerge from the bloodshed to become the most powerful man in the land. At the outset of ‘Year Zero', the true horror will begin... A Noiser production, written by Dan Smith. This is Part 3 of 4. For ad-free listening, exclusive content and early access to new episodes, join Noiser+, now available on Apple Podcasts. All shows are also available for free. If you're listening on Apple Podcasts, press the ‘+' icon to follow the show for free. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

durée : 00:46:43 - Circuit Bleu : Côté Saveur - France Bleu Cotentin

How did Pol Pot become leader of the Khmer Rouge?   What did prominent communists like Khieu Samphan do in Sihanouk's Cambodia? Were there limits to Sihanouk's power and tightrope act?   Time Period Covered 1960-1963 We begin with a reflection on how Cambodian history can permeate even seemingly mundane spaces, before looking in on a secret communist seminar led by the new leader of the Khmer Rouge. This episode functions as a revisit of some loose ends left as the Cambodian communists began taking their own steps toward having an independent movement from the Vietnamese, as well as how the roles in that party began taking shape. We learn about the mysterious death of Tuo Samouth, as well as the circumstances that precede the vitally important year of 1963. Apologies for some audio hiccups, this one was recorded in a different location.    Sources Philip Short Pol Pot: History of a Nightmare David Chandler The Tragedy of Cambodian History, Brother Number One, A History of Cambodia Ben Kiernan How Pol Pot Came to Power Milton Osbourne Sihanouk Elizabeth Becker When the War was Over Norodom Sihanouk My War with the CIA Show Content https://www.shadowsofutopia.com/dramatis-personae.html Support https://www.shadowsofutopia.com/support.html

Join our hosts for fake pink G&Ts and a hilarious good time with this week's guest!

Ce sera bientôt l'heure des bilans cinéma de 2021. Évidemment, il y aura les tops des meilleurs films dans la plupart des journaux, une analyse - voire des prospectives - autour de la situation des salles provoquée par le Covid qui s'incruste encore plus que les masque FFP sur les visages. Et puis, probablement aussi un coup d'œil sur les sujets qui se sont tout autant installés de films en films. Sur ce podium-là, c'est peut-être bien la gentrification qui grimpera sur la première marche. De Gagarine à Candyman ou In The heights, l'embourgeoisement galopant des quartiers est devenu une toile de fond tendue sur les écrans.C'est encore plus le cas pour le cinéma asiatique qui s'est pleinement emparé de la question, de la Chine à Taïwan ou au Cambodge avec White Building. Le premier film de fiction de Kevich Neang s'attache à cet authentique bâtiment de Phnom Penh, qui a abrité l'histoire du pays depuis les années 60 : résidence pour fonctionnaires d'état sous Sihanouk, réquisitionnée par les Khmers Rouge, équivalent local des HLM, puis objet de spéculation immobilière avant sa destruction en 2017. Neang, qui y a grandi avant que l'appartement familial soit évacué avant que l'immeuble ne soit rasé, accompagne dans ses couloirs un trio de potes vingtenaires qui rêvent de prendre leur envol.Du coup, White Building, ça parle de destruction ou de construction ?Un peu des deux, et ce dès l'introduction : sidérant plan au drone de ce bâtiment en décrépitude, mais on devine bientôt à quel point il regorge encore de vies. Ou dans le principe de suivre en parallèle, les espoirs cette bande et les négociations avant démolition de l'immeuble.White Building navigue entre les deux comme à travers une double géographie, architecturale et humaine. Mais aussi à travers les cinémas, ce film flirtant avec celui de Jia Zhang Ke (Still life, Au delà des montagnes...), l'un des meilleurs observateurs de la société chinoise dont il prolonge l'immersion documentaire, auquel Neang ajoute la part rêveuse d'un Apitchapong Weerasethakul (Uncle Boonmee, Tropical malady...) lors de déambulations hypnotiques.Car le temps est un acteur à part entière de White Building, qui tente de freiner par son récit narcotique la rapidité avec laquelle, non pas un bâtiment, mais une génération, voire la métropole cambodgienne se transforme. L'atmosphère contemplative devenant du coup une inattendue forme de militantisme, une décélération luttant comme elle le peut contre une accélération économique.Aujourd'hui, on ne sait pas encore vraiment ce qui va se dresser à la place du White Building, les derniers échos parlent d'un casino d'une vingtaine d'étages construit par une compagnie chinoise. Avec ce film-là, Neang a pris de l'avance sur un beau chantier, renforçant les fondations d'un cinéma qui se préoccuperait de la cohabitation entre l'écosystème du capitalisme galopant et celui à échelle humaine.Sortie le 22 décembre Voir Acast.com/privacy pour les informations sur la vie privée et l'opt-out.

Donald, Connor, Christian and Rudy sit down for a discussion on Cambodia throughout the Democratic Kampuchea period under Pol Pot (75-79) and the People's Republic of Kampuchea period under Heng Samrin (79-89). We talk about the ideological and material origins of Pol Pot's faction within the Communist Party of Kampuchea, and clarify its relationship to the other pro-Vietnamese factions in the CPK. We discuss what the material conditions were in '75 when the CPK takes power, the events during the Pol Pot period including city evacuations, ethnic repression, party purges and the relationships of production in the countryside. We follow with talking about how the DK's aggressive border policies led to the Vietnamese invasion in '79 and the PRK period. We also discuss the PRK period, and how it ended up restoring capitalist relationships and paving the way for the return of Sihanouk and the current form of the Cambodian state. Primary References:Red Brotherhood at War: Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos since 1975 - Grant Evans & Kelvin Rowley The Pol Pot Regime: Race, Power, and Genocide in Cambodia under the Khmer Rouge, 1975-79 - Ben Kiernan The People's Republic of Kampuchea, 1979-1989: The Revolution After Pol Pot - Margaret Slocomb Cambodia, 1975-1982 - Michael Vickery Secondary references:Kampuchea: Politics, Economics and Society - Michael Vickery What Went Wrong with the Pol Pot Regime - F.G. Kampuchea: The Revolution Rescued - Irwin Silber

31 Tháng 10 Là Ngày Gì? Hôm Nay Là Ngày Halloween SỰ KIỆN 2003 – Mahathir bin Mohamad từ chức Thủ tướng Malaysia sau 22 năm nắm quyền, thay thế ông là Phó Thủ tướng Abdullah bin Ahmad Badawi 1961 – Di hài của Stalin bị đưa ra khỏi Lăng Lenin để an táng tại Nghĩa trang tường Điện Kremli. 2020 - Sân bay Berlin Brandenburg mở cửa 2011 - Dân số toàn cầu đạt 7 tỷ người. Ngày này được Liên Hiệp Quốc công nhận là Ngày của Bảy Tỷ . Ngày lễ và kỷ niệm Lễ Halloween Sinh 1887 - Tưởng Giới Thạch, nhà lãnh đạo Trung Hoa Quốc Dân, cựu Chủ tịch nước Trung Hoa Dân quốc (m. năm 1975) 1892 - Alexander Alekhine, tuyển thủ cờ vua Nga (m. năm 1946) 1998 - Marcus Rashford, cầu thủ bóng đá Anh. Rashford thi đấu ở vị trí tiền đạo cho câu lạc bộ bóng đá Manchester United và Đội tuyển bóng đá quốc gia Anh. Là cầu thủ Manchester United từ khi mới chỉ 17 tuổi, anh ghi bàn trong trận ra mắt đội một tại giải Premier League vào tháng 2 năm 2016 1922 - Vua Norodom Sihanouk của Campuchia. Ông từng là vua của Campuchia trong nhiều giai đoạn cho đến ngày thoái vị để nhường ngôi cho quốc vương Norodom Sihamoni. Sihanouk là con trai của cựu quốc vương Norodom Suramarit và vương hậu Sisowath Kossamak. Mất 2016 – Phạm Bằng, NSƯT người Việt Nam. Ông nổi tiếng qua nhiều vai hài trong chương trình Gặp nhau cuối tuần của VTV3 2020 - Sean Connery, dien viên Anh. Ông được biết đến nhiều nhất với tư cách là diễn viên đầu tiên thể hiện nhân vật James Bond trong phim. Ông đã tham gia bảy phần của bộ phim. Ông đã nhận được giải thưởng thành tựu trọn đời ở Mỹ với Danh dự Trung tâm Kennedy vào năm 1999. Connery đã được phong tước Hiệp sĩ cho các đóng góp trong phim chính kịch. Chương trình "Hôm nay ngày gì" hiện đã có mặt trên Youtube, Facebook và Spotify: - Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/aweekmedia#chulalongkorn - Youtube: https://www.youtube.com/c/AWeekTV - Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/6rC4CgZNV6tJpX2RIcbK0J - Apple Podcast: https://podcasts.apple.com/.../h%C3%B4m-nay.../id1586073418 #aweektv #31thang10 #Stalin #Brandenburg #Halloween #Rashford #Sihanouk Các video đều thuộc quyền sở hữu của Adwell jsc (adwell.vn) , mọi hành động sử dụng lại nội dung của chúng tôi đều không được phép. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/aweek-tv/message

Un hombre mediocre rodeado de hombres mediocres. Para Jean-Claude Pomonti, periodista de Le Monde, Pol Pot, cuyo nombre real fue Saloth Sar, no era el monstruo que la gente esperaba encontrar. Tení­a un lado encantador y afable; aunque, de hecho, era cruel, señala el prí­ncipe Sihanouk. Un verdadero nacionalista que tení­a una personalidad perversa y realmente malvada, El Hermano Número Uno mantuvo un aire de misterio durante toda su vida, como si se hubiese querido asegurar el respeto de sus enemigos y hasta de sus amigos, a los que no vacilaba en traicionar o incluso en ejecutar, como fue el caso de Son Sen, su antiguo ministro. Exceptuando una entrevista con la televisión yugoslava en 1978 y otra con Nate Thayer, un periodista norteamericano autorizado a seguir su juicio ante un tribunal popular en 1997 (¿juicio real o simulacro?) del cual ofrecemos aquí­ largos fragmentos, Pol Pot siempre escondió sus actividades, sus intenciones y sus ambiciones. De ahí­ el gran interés de este programa que rememora su vida entera, desde su nacimiento en 1925 en la provincia de Kompong Thom, hasta su muerte, anunciada el 15 de abril de 1998.

How does the Communist Party of Kampuchea form? How does Saloth Sar become a married man and teacher? What are the consequences of Sihanouk's neutral foreign policy? Time Period Covered 1955-1960 As peace broke out over Cambodia in the wake of the First Indochina War, the fledgling communist movement had to learn to survive in a newly independent country under the rule of Prince Norodom Sihanouk. Numbers dwindling and unable to openly resist the government, the ‘revolutionary organisation', as they began calling themselves, found an avenue for recruits in the schools of Phnom Penh. The man who would become Pol Pot became a teacher. Meanwhile, in an attempt to navigate a neutral path for Cambodia in the Cold War era, Sihanouk opens relations with China as well as the United States. This agenda will have consequences, as the CIA begins trying to undermine his government and even seek his removal. The resulting “Bangkok Plot”, a series of conspiracies against him, will be explained. The Khmer Rouge, as Sihanouk had begun calling the communists in his country, will also meet to discuss a new kind of organisation - the Communist Party of Kampuchea. Saloth Sar, Nuon Chea and Ieng Sary will all find themselves in high-ranking positions as the seeds of their revolution are sewn. Sources Philip Short Pol Pot: History of a Nightmare David Chandler The Tragedy of Cambodian History, Brother Number One Ben Kiernan How Pol Pot Came to Power Milton Osbourne Sihanouk Elizabeth Becker When the War was Over Norodom Sihanouk My War with the CIA Peter Froberg Idling Song for an Approaching Storm Craig Etcheson Overview of Hierarchy of Democratic Kampuchea Show Content https://www.shadowsofutopia.com/dramatis-personae.html

How does the First Indochina War end? What do the Geneva Accords mean for Cambodia? Who wins the 1955 Cambodian general election? Time Period Covered December 1953 – July 1955 Cambodia faces Viet Minh assaults around the country as the First Indochina War comes to its climax, but the French will suffer their most stunning defeat at Dien Bien Phu. World powers will convene to find a solution to the conflict. The resulting ‘peace’ will marginalise the Cambodian communist movement at the expense of the Vietnamese one, and Sihanouk will create a new political movement.   Google Maps View of Dien Bien PhuSupport the show Sources Philip Short Pol Pot: History of a Nightmare David Chandler The Tragedy of Cambodian HistoryBen Kiernan How Pol Pot Came to Power Milton Osbourne Sihanouk Christopher Goscha Vietnam: A New History

How does Cambodia become independent in November 1953? What lessons does a young Pol Pot learn in the jungle with the Viet Minh? Time Period Covered January – December 1953 This episode explains the actions of King Sihanouk that one French General declared was ‘that of a madman, but a madman of genius’. Almost out of the blue the Cambodian king will claim independence for his country and end almost a century of French colonial rule. Meanwhile, the First Indochina War will bring its ruin [...]

Who are the Khmer Issarak? How did Pol Pot get to Paris? Time Period Covered 1945-1950 This episode introduces the vitally important era in Cambodian history in the aftermath of the Second World War. Cambodian politics is born as Sihanouk seeks to balance his ambitions with a returning French power and anti-colonial movements like the Viet Minh and Issarak present a formidable response in the countryside. Meanwhile, a young Pol Pot heads to Paris, an environment which will see his path towar [...]

Who are the Khmer Issarak? How did Pol Pot get to Paris? Time Period Covered 1945-1950 This episode introduces the vitally important era in Cambodian history in the aftermath of the Second World War. Cambodian politics is born as Sihanouk seeks to balance his ambitions with a returning French power and anti-colonial movements like the Viet Minh and Issarak present a formidable response in the countryside. Meanwhile, a young Pol Pot heads to Paris, an environment which will see his path towar [...]

durée : 00:58:47 - Une vie, une oeuvre - par : Alain Lewkowicz - Norodom Sihanouk est l’exemple du prince incarnant son peuple au-dessus de la mêlée, avec une persévérance toujours intacte. Qui était donc le premier chef d’Etat du Cambodge indépendant, allié puis victime des Khmers rouges ? - réalisation : Ghislaine David

Cambodia celebrates the 7th anniversary of King Norodom Sihanouk's death on October 15, 2019. The ceremony was held at the Royal Palace and the Statues near the Independence Monument in Phnom Penh. - កាលពី​​ថ្ងៃទី​១៥​តុលាម្សិលមិញនេះ កម្ពុជា បានរៀបចំព្រះ​រាជពិធី​រម្លឹក​ខួប​យាង​ចូល​ទិវង្គត គម្រប់ ៧​ឆ្នាំ របស់​សម្តេចព្រះ នរោត្តម សីហនុ។ ព្រះរាជពិធី ត្រូវបានប្រារព្ធឡើង ​នៅ​ព្រះបរមរាជវាំង និង​នៅ​ព្រះ​បរម​រូប នៅជិតវិមានឯករាជ្យ​ ក្នុងរាជធានីភ្នំពេញ​​។

In 1975, the Communist Party Khmer Rouge came to power in Cambodia, and began a series of measures to eliminate their perceived internal opponents and to transform their country into an agrarian-based, communist society. Pol Pot, the leader of the Khmer Rouge, tried to cleanse Cambodian society along racial, social, religious and political lines. They would eventually be overthrown by a foreign army, but only after they had killed 1.5 to 3 million people.

A Level Revision

The work of sociologist Norbert Elias has had a renaissance in recent times, with Steven Pinker, among others, using it to argue that interpersonal violence has declined globally as states have expanded and subdued restless populations. In Violence and the Civilising Process in Cambodia (Cambridge University Press, 2015), Roderic Broadhurst and his co-authors Thierry and Brigette Bouhours bring the declinist thesis to Southeast Asia. Coupling Elias's approach with criminological theory, Broadhurst and the Bouhours argue that Cambodia's experience over a 150 years is broadly consistent with what Elias found in Europe: that by monopolising force, generating chains of interdependence, and sensitising people to violence, states have an overall civilising effect. This is a startling and counterintuitive finding for a country whose name was not so long ago synonymous with genocide. But, Broadhurst and co-authors explain, the civilizing process is not linear. Asia like Europe has had its decivilising periods, and it might yet have some more. The overall trend, nevertheless, is away from violence and towards civility. Roderic Broadhurst joins New Books in Southeast Asian Studies to talk about state violence versus interpersonal violence, French colonial administration, postcolonialism and modernity, Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen and authoritarianism, and the challenges of doing historical sociology across multiple regime types and periods. You may also be interested in: Astrid Noren-Nilsson, Cambodia's Second Kingdom: Nation, Imagination, and Democracy Abram de Swaan, The Killing Compartments: The Mentality of Mass Murder Nick Cheesman is a fellow at the College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University. He can be reached at nick.cheesman@anu.edu.au.

The work of sociologist Norbert Elias has had a renaissance in recent times, with Steven Pinker, among others, using it to argue that interpersonal violence has declined globally as states have expanded and subdued restless populations. In Violence and the Civilising Process in Cambodia (Cambridge University Press, 2015), Roderic Broadhurst and his co-authors Thierry and Brigette Bouhours bring the declinist thesis to Southeast Asia. Coupling Elias’s approach with criminological theory, Broadhurst and the Bouhours argue that Cambodia’s experience over a 150 years is broadly consistent with what Elias found in Europe: that by monopolising force, generating chains of interdependence, and sensitising people to violence, states have an overall civilising effect. This is a startling and counterintuitive finding for a country whose name was not so long ago synonymous with genocide. But, Broadhurst and co-authors explain, the civilizing process is not linear. Asia like Europe has had its decivilising periods, and it might yet have some more. The overall trend, nevertheless, is away from violence and towards civility. Roderic Broadhurst joins New Books in Southeast Asian Studies to talk about state violence versus interpersonal violence, French colonial administration, postcolonialism and modernity, Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen and authoritarianism, and the challenges of doing historical sociology across multiple regime types and periods. You may also be interested in: Astrid Noren-Nilsson, Cambodia’s Second Kingdom: Nation, Imagination, and Democracy Abram de Swaan, The Killing Compartments: The Mentality of Mass Murder Nick Cheesman is a fellow at the College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University. He can be reached at nick.cheesman@anu.edu.au. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The work of sociologist Norbert Elias has had a renaissance in recent times, with Steven Pinker, among others, using it to argue that interpersonal violence has declined globally as states have expanded and subdued restless populations. In Violence and the Civilising Process in Cambodia (Cambridge University Press, 2015), Roderic Broadhurst and his co-authors Thierry and Brigette Bouhours bring the declinist thesis to Southeast Asia. Coupling Elias’s approach with criminological theory, Broadhurst and the Bouhours argue that Cambodia’s experience over a 150 years is broadly consistent with what Elias found in Europe: that by monopolising force, generating chains of interdependence, and sensitising people to violence, states have an overall civilising effect. This is a startling and counterintuitive finding for a country whose name was not so long ago synonymous with genocide. But, Broadhurst and co-authors explain, the civilizing process is not linear. Asia like Europe has had its decivilising periods, and it might yet have some more. The overall trend, nevertheless, is away from violence and towards civility. Roderic Broadhurst joins New Books in Southeast Asian Studies to talk about state violence versus interpersonal violence, French colonial administration, postcolonialism and modernity, Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen and authoritarianism, and the challenges of doing historical sociology across multiple regime types and periods. You may also be interested in: Astrid Noren-Nilsson, Cambodia’s Second Kingdom: Nation, Imagination, and Democracy Abram de Swaan, The Killing Compartments: The Mentality of Mass Murder Nick Cheesman is a fellow at the College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University. He can be reached at nick.cheesman@anu.edu.au. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The work of sociologist Norbert Elias has had a renaissance in recent times, with Steven Pinker, among others, using it to argue that interpersonal violence has declined globally as states have expanded and subdued restless populations. In Violence and the Civilising Process in Cambodia (Cambridge University Press, 2015), Roderic Broadhurst and his co-authors Thierry and Brigette Bouhours bring the declinist thesis to Southeast Asia. Coupling Elias’s approach with criminological theory, Broadhurst and the Bouhours argue that Cambodia’s experience over a 150 years is broadly consistent with what Elias found in Europe: that by monopolising force, generating chains of interdependence, and sensitising people to violence, states have an overall civilising effect. This is a startling and counterintuitive finding for a country whose name was not so long ago synonymous with genocide. But, Broadhurst and co-authors explain, the civilizing process is not linear. Asia like Europe has had its decivilising periods, and it might yet have some more. The overall trend, nevertheless, is away from violence and towards civility. Roderic Broadhurst joins New Books in Southeast Asian Studies to talk about state violence versus interpersonal violence, French colonial administration, postcolonialism and modernity, Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen and authoritarianism, and the challenges of doing historical sociology across multiple regime types and periods. You may also be interested in: Astrid Noren-Nilsson, Cambodia’s Second Kingdom: Nation, Imagination, and Democracy Abram de Swaan, The Killing Compartments: The Mentality of Mass Murder Nick Cheesman is a fellow at the College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University. He can be reached at nick.cheesman@anu.edu.au. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The work of sociologist Norbert Elias has had a renaissance in recent times, with Steven Pinker, among others, using it to argue that interpersonal violence has declined globally as states have expanded and subdued restless populations. In Violence and the Civilising Process in Cambodia (Cambridge University Press, 2015), Roderic Broadhurst and his co-authors Thierry and Brigette Bouhours bring the declinist thesis to Southeast Asia. Coupling Elias’s approach with criminological theory, Broadhurst and the Bouhours argue that Cambodia’s experience over a 150 years is broadly consistent with what Elias found in Europe: that by monopolising force, generating chains of interdependence, and sensitising people to violence, states have an overall civilising effect. This is a startling and counterintuitive finding for a country whose name was not so long ago synonymous with genocide. But, Broadhurst and co-authors explain, the civilizing process is not linear. Asia like Europe has had its decivilising periods, and it might yet have some more. The overall trend, nevertheless, is away from violence and towards civility. Roderic Broadhurst joins New Books in Southeast Asian Studies to talk about state violence versus interpersonal violence, French colonial administration, postcolonialism and modernity, Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen and authoritarianism, and the challenges of doing historical sociology across multiple regime types and periods. You may also be interested in: Astrid Noren-Nilsson, Cambodia’s Second Kingdom: Nation, Imagination, and Democracy Abram de Swaan, The Killing Compartments: The Mentality of Mass Murder Nick Cheesman is a fellow at the College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University. He can be reached at nick.cheesman@anu.edu.au. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

The work of sociologist Norbert Elias has had a renaissance in recent times, with Steven Pinker, among others, using it to argue that interpersonal violence has declined globally as states have expanded and subdued restless populations. In Violence and the Civilising Process in Cambodia (Cambridge University Press, 2015), Roderic Broadhurst and his co-authors Thierry and Brigette Bouhours bring the declinist thesis to Southeast Asia. Coupling Elias’s approach with criminological theory, Broadhurst and the Bouhours argue that Cambodia’s experience over a 150 years is broadly consistent with what Elias found in Europe: that by monopolising force, generating chains of interdependence, and sensitising people to violence, states have an overall civilising effect. This is a startling and counterintuitive finding for a country whose name was not so long ago synonymous with genocide. But, Broadhurst and co-authors explain, the civilizing process is not linear. Asia like Europe has had its decivilising periods, and it might yet have some more. The overall trend, nevertheless, is away from violence and towards civility. Roderic Broadhurst joins New Books in Southeast Asian Studies to talk about state violence versus interpersonal violence, French colonial administration, postcolonialism and modernity, Sihanouk and the Khmer Rouge, Hun Sen and authoritarianism, and the challenges of doing historical sociology across multiple regime types and periods. You may also be interested in: Astrid Noren-Nilsson, Cambodia’s Second Kingdom: Nation, Imagination, and Democracy Abram de Swaan, The Killing Compartments: The Mentality of Mass Murder Nick Cheesman is a fellow at the College of Asia and the Pacific, Australian National University. He can be reached at nick.cheesman@anu.edu.au. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Pol Pot loi Demokraattiseksi Kamputseaksi kutsutun mielivaltaisen murhaamisen helvetin. Hän hallitsi Kambodzaa vain neljä vuotta, mutta onnistui tuona lyhyenä aikana murhaamaan 2 miljoonaa viatonta ihmistä, kolmanneksen maan väestöstä. Sissiliike, joka muodostui Pol Potin ympärille, koostui yhteiskunnan kaikkein sivistymättömimmistä kerroksista ja sai nimekseen maanalaisen kommunistisen vastarintaliikkeen tavoin "Punaiset khmerit" Pol Potin korkeintaan 5.000 miehen huonosti organisoitu ja varusteltu rosvojoukkio kasvoi hiljalleen ja huomaamatta 70.000 miehen armeijaksi. 1975 kuningas Sihanouk syrjäytettiin. Väkijoukot riemuitsivat kaduilla Pol Potin joukkojen marssiessa pääkaupunki Phnom Penhiin. Seuraavina päivinä Phnom Penhissä ei enää riemuittu. Pol Pot aloitti koko maan läpäisevät sosialistiset reformit ja alkoi toteuttaa kommunismin eri tyylisuuntia yhdistelemällä omaa mielipuolista agraaristalinistista ideologiansa. Pol Pot käytti hyväkseen khmerien kansallista perinnettä, täydellisestä alistamisesta ylimmän johdon tahtoon, ryhtyessään toteuttamaan kansallista ja etnistä puhdistusohjelmaansa. Punaisten Khmerien yksilöllisyyden tuhoamiseen tähtäävä hallinto saa Stalinin Neuvostoliiton kuulostamaan paratiisilta maan päällä. Pol Pot nollasi ajanlaskun, lakkautti rahatalouden ja poltti kansalaisten henkilöpaperit. Älymystöön kohdistui säälimätön, summittainen vaino ja terrori. Pol Potin uudessa uljaassa maailmassa ihmisiä kidutettiin niin pitkään että ihmiset kirjallisesti pakon edessä tunnustivat jotain sellaista mikä johti uusiin pidätyksiin. Jos kiduttaja ei onnistunut tehtävässään, häntä epäiltiin sabotaasista. Tuhansia poliitikkoja ja byrokraatteja tapettiin. Monet muut kuolivat nälkään, sairauksiin tai teloituksiin. Kuolemanrangaistuksen arvoisiksi rikkeiksi luettiin muun muassa liian löysästi työskentely, elinolosuhteista valittaminen, ruoan varastaminen, jalokivien käyttö, seksisuhteeseen ryhtyminen, sukulaisten tai ystävien kuolemien sureminen, uskonnollisten tunteiden esittäminen, vieraan kielen osaaminen ja silmälasien käyttö. Kamputsean päätöntä menoa ja Pol Potin edesottamuksia pohtii populismiin perehtynyt, Israelin Ystävät ry:n toiminnanjohtaja ja Shalom-lehden päätoimittaja Ilkka Vakkuri. Toimittajana Raimo Tyykiluoto. Kuva: DCCAM, EPA

Kingdom of the Holy Sun

NORODOM SIHANOUK raccontato da Marilia Albanese