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The Pacific War - week by week
- 173 - Pacific War Podcast - Fall of Mandalay - March 11 - 18 - , 1945

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 11, 2025 46:02


Last time we spoke about the Great Tokyo Air Raid. Amidst fierce battles, Liversedge's forces captured key hills but faced relentless Japanese machine-gun fire. Despite heavy casualties, the Marines advanced, securing strategic positions. General Kuribayashi recognized their struggle, while the Japanese counterattacks faltered. After 19 grueling days, the last pockets of resistance fell, marking a costly victory for the Americans. Amid the fierce battle of Iwo Jima, General LeMay shifted tactics, launching incendiary raids on Tokyo. On March 9, 1945, 334 B-29s unleashed destruction, igniting widespread fires and devastating neighborhoods. The attack shattered Japanese morale, while LeMay's strategy proved effective, paving the way for further offensives in the Pacific. On March 3, three brigades attacked Meiktila, facing fierce resistance. Tanks overwhelmed Japanese forces, resulting in heavy casualties. As Cowan fortified defenses, Japanese counterattacks intensified. Meanwhile, in Mandalay, British-Indian troops advanced, capturing key positions. Amidst confusion and conflicting orders, the Allies pressed forward, striving for victory in Burma. This episode is the Fall of Mandalay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We are first picking up this week with the men fighting over northern Luzon. By March 5, General Clarkson's 33rd Division had advanced to Agoo and Pago while gradually pushing the enemy along Route 11. Meanwhile, Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla force was carrying out limited offensives in the Laoag, Cervantes, and San Fernando regions. Coming into Salacsac Pass from the west, the Villa Verde Trail twists up the wooded western slopes of a steep-sided height known to the 32nd Division as Hill 502. Another peak, bare crested, forming part of the same hill mass and named Hill 503, centers 250 yards northeast of the crest of Hill 502, while a similar distance to the southeast is Hill 504. Winding along the southern slopes of Hills 502 and 504, the trail continues eastward through a low saddle about 500 yards long, climbing again up the forested northwestern side of Hill 505. After crossing that hill, the trail follows a twisting course 600 yards--as the crow flies--eastward, hugging the densely wooded northern slopes of Hills 506A and 506B. Off the northeast corner of Hill 506B the trail turns south for 1000 yards--again a straight-line distance--and traverses the east side of the noses of Hill 507, designated from north to south A, B, C and D. Turning sharply east again near Hill 507D, the trail continues east another 700 yards and then enters a deep wooded saddle between Hill 508 on the south and Hill 515 to the north. After passing through this saddle, which is about 250 yards long east to west, the trail goes on eastward, dominated on the north by Hills 516 and 525. Roughly 1250 yards beyond the saddle the trail twists across the northern slopes of Hill 526, which lying about 500 yards southeast of Hill 525, marks the eastern limits of the Salacsac Pass area. A mile and a quarter of less rugged but still forested and difficult terrain lies between Hill 526 and barrio Imugan, in turn two and a quarter miles west of Santa Fe.  Meanwhile General Mullins' 25th Division had successfully taken control of Puncan and Digdig. Due to this unexpectedly swift progress, General Swift instructed Mullins to continue advancing toward Putlan while the 1st Battalion, 127th Regiment fought for control of Hill 502, which was secured on March 7. In response, Mullins dispatched the 161st Regiment to attack the high ground west of Route 5, the 27th Regiment to advance along and east of the highway, and the 35th Regiment to execute a wide envelopment to the east. Since this last flank approach to Putlan was completely undefended, the 1st Battalion, 35th Regiment quickly occupied Putlan on March 8. The following day, the 27th Regiment also arrived in the area and began clearing Japanese stragglers from the ravines east of Route 5 near the barrio, a task that would not be finished until March 15. Finally, despite facing rough terrain and light resistance, the 161st Regiment reached Putlan on March 10, successfully securing the high ground to the west. To the north, as the 1st Battalion, 127th Regiment struggled to make significant progress eastward after capturing Hill 502, Gill decided to send the 3rd Battalion, 127th Regiment to outflank the Salacsac Pass defenses from the south.  Although the extremely rough, precipitous mountain country of the Salacsac Pass area, averaging 4500 feet above sea level, was covered by dense rainforest, from Hill 506B to Hill 526, there was sufficient open ground throughout to provide the defender with excellent observation. It was not too difficult for the Japanese to find positions whence they could cover with fire every square foot of the Villa Verde Trail through the pass area. The twisting of the trail also provided defense opportunities, for in a given 1000 yards of straight-line distance through the pass, the trail might actually cover a ground distance of 3000 yards. Whatever its shortcomings in other fields, the Japanese Army always had a feel for terrain, exploiting to the full every advantage the ground offered. Thus, as it moved up, the 2nd Tank Division set to work to establish a system of mutually supporting defensive positions in order to control every twist of the Villa Verde Trail and every fold in the ground throughout the pass area. Every knoll and hillock on or near the trail was the site of at least one machine gun emplacement; every wooded draw providing a route for outflanking a position was zeroed in for artillery or mortars. The cave, natural or man-made, came to characterize the defenses. Artillery was employed in quantity and quality not often encountered in engagements against the Japanese, who, as usual, made excellent use of their light and medium mortars. Finally, the 2nd Tank Division was overstocked in automatic weapons, evidently having available many more than the 32nd Division could bring to bear. To the west, following recent successes in patrols, Clarkson opted to establish a new "secure line" stretching from Aringay southeast through Pugo to Route 11 at Twin Peaks. Consequently, patrols quickly secured Aringay and Caba without facing any opposition, then advanced east along the trails to Pugo and Galiano, and north to Bauang, where they continued to encounter minimal enemy presence. As a result of these movements, the Hayashi Detachment was ultimately withdrawn to bolster the main defenses at Sablan, enabling Volckman's 121st Regiment to enter San Fernando on March 14. Additionally, elements of the 19th Division began arriving in the Cervantes area from Baguio and successfully expelled the guerrilla company from the town in early March. The Filipinos recaptured Cervantes on March 13 but soon found themselves targeted by Japanese artillery positioned on elevated ground. Meanwhile, looking south, by March 5, General Patrick's 6th Division had commenced unsuccessful assaults on Mounts Pacawagan and Mataba, while General Hoffman's 2nd Cavalry Brigade struggled to advance toward the Antipolo area. Recognizing that the success of his attack required a concentration of forces along a narrower front, General Griswold decided to focus on the Noguchi Force and the left flank of the Kobayashi Force, as the northern area was heavily fortified. He retained only one battalion as an infantry reserve and directed the remainder of his available forces, all of which were understrength, to push eastward. Alongside the deployment of the 1st Cavalry Brigade, the 103rd Regiment reached Taytay on March 7 to serve as the 1st Cavalry Division Reserve, signaling the upcoming relief of the cavalrymen in preparation for their redeployment to southern Luzon. By March 10, General Wing's 43rd Division had been replaced in the Clark Field area by the 38th Division and was en route to the eastern front.  The 38th Division pushed on into the untracked, ill-explored, and worse-mapped wilderness of the central Zambales Range, its progress slowed more by supply problems than Japanese resistance. In early April the division noted that the last vestiges of any controlled defensive effort had disappeared. Unknown to 11th Corps General Tsukada, on April 6, had given up and had ordered his remaining forces to disperse and continue operations, if possible, as guerrillas. For the Japanese remnants, it was a case of sauve qui peut. Some tried to escape to Luzon's west coast, whence 38th Division troops were already patrolling inland; others tried to make their way north through the mountains, only to be cut down by American patrols working southward from Camp O'Donnell. The 38th Division had killed about 8000 of the scattering Japanese by the time it was relieved by units of the 6th Division on May 3. The losses of the 38th totaled approximately 100 men killed and 500 wounded. The 6th Division, elements of which remained in the Kembu area until June 25, limited its operations to patrolling and setting up trail blocks along Japanese routes of escape. Troops of the 38th Division ultimately returned to the region and remained there until the end of the war. Insofar as US forces were concerned, the mop-up period under 11th Corps control was even more costly than had been the 14th Corps' offensive period. From February 21 to the end of June the various elements of 11th Corps committed to action against the Kembu Group lost approximately 550 men killed and 2200 wounded. The Kembu Group, during the same period, lost 12500 killed or dead from starvation and disease. By the end of the war the original 30000 troops of the Kembu Group were reduced to approximately 1500 sorry survivors, about 1000 of them Army personnel. Another 500 had already been taken prisoner. As a result, General Tsukada ordered his remaining troops to scatter and operate as guerrillas. Meanwhile, Griswold resumed his eastern offensive on March 8. In the south, bolstered by artillery and mortars, the battered 2nd Cavalry Brigade continued to advance slowly under heavy artillery fire, reaching a point 440 yards short of Antipolo along Route 60A and overcoming the enemy cave defenses at Benchmark 11. By March 11, patrols had entered Antipolo, discovering the town was devastated and deserted, yet still under the threat of Japanese artillery and mortars positioned in the hills to the north and northeast. Simultaneously, the 1st Cavalry Brigade made significant strides to the north, also coming within 440 yards of Antipolo while clearing Benchmark 9 Hill and Hills 520 and 740. Abandoning the Montalban-San Mateo area, Patrick instructed the 1st and 20th Regiments to advance toward Mounts Baytangan and Yabang. Facing unexpectedly light resistance, the 1st Regiment advanced a mile and a half east by March 11 and secured Benchmark 8 Hill to the south despite encountering stubborn opposition. Recognizing the need to capitalize on this success, Patrick then ordered the 20th Regiment to move through the 1st and attack north toward Wawa Dam while the latter continued its eastward assault. On March 11, the 103rd Regiment took over from the 2nd Cavalry Brigade and quickly began planning to outflank General Noguchi's defenses located southeast of Antipolo. However, due to concerns over American advances, General Yokoyama ordered the Noguchi Force to retreat to secondary defensive positions while preparing for a three-pronged counterattack set for March 12. The primary effort involved four reserve battalions from the Kobayashi Force, which launched an attack southward from Mount Mataba toward Marikina but were quickly halted by intense air and artillery fire, falling far short of their target. Additionally, the 182nd Independent Battalion attempted a counterattack toward Benchmark 8 but was unsuccessful, while the majority of the Kawashima Force advanced south from the Ipo Dam area to assault the rear installations of the 6th Division west of the Marikina River, where they were easily repelled by March 15. During this so-called counterattack, Griswold continued his offensive, with the 103rd Regiment swiftly advancing through the deserted Antipolo to Benchmark 7 Hill, and the 20th Regiment moving over a mile north to secure a position on a grassy ridge less than a mile southeast of Mount Mataba's summit. On March 14, the 1st Regiment resumed its eastern assault, successfully advancing north to a bare peak about a mile southwest of Mount Baytangan, despite facing strong resistance that caused heavy casualties, including the loss of General Patrick, who was succeeded by Brigadier-General Charles Hurdis as commander of the 6th Division. Simultaneously, Wing initiated a coordinated offensive with two regiments toward Mounts Yabang, Caymayuman, and Tanauan, aiming to flank the Shimbu Group's left. Although the 103rd and 179th Regiments achieved significant progress that day, Noguchi's determined defenders managed to maintain control of Benchmark 7. Looking further south, Griswold was preparing to launch a two-pronged offensive in southern Luzon. General Swing's 511th Parachute Regiment and the 187th Glider Regiment were set to advance towards Lipa from the north and northwest, while the 158th Regiment gathered near Nasugbu to attack southeast along Route 17 toward Balayan Bay. In response, Colonel Fujishige's Fuji Force had established several small positions in the area to prevent American forces from flanking the Shimbu Group's main defenses by rounding the eastern shore of Laguna de Bay. Swing's offensive commenced on March 7, with the 187th Glider Regiment descending the steep southern slopes of Tagaytay Ridge to the northern shore of Lake Taal, ultimately stopping at a hill two miles west of Tanauan due to strong resistance. The 511th Parachute Regiment moved out from Real, reaching within a mile of Santo Tomas while launching unsuccessful frontal assaults on Mount Bijiang. Meanwhile, the 158th Regiment advanced from Nasugbu, quickly securing Balayan before pushing eastward with little opposition toward Batangas, which fell on March 11. On its eastward path, the regiment bypassed significant elements of the 2nd Surface Raiding Base Force on the Calumpan Peninsula, necessitating that a battalion clear that area by March 16. At the same time, other units of the 158th Regiment encountered robust Japanese defenses blocking Route 417 at Mount Macolod, where their advance came to a halt. Concurrently, General Eichelberger continued his offensive against the central islands of the Visayan Passages, with reinforced companies from the 1st Battalion, 19th Regiment successfully landing on Romblon and Simara islands on March 11 and 12, respectively. Most importantly for Eichelberger, he was about to initiate his Visayas Campaign. To disrupt Japanese communication lines across the South China Sea, the 8th Army needed to quickly capture airfields that would allow the Allied Air Forces to project land-based air power over the waters west of the Philippines more effectively than from Clark Field or Mindoro. Consequently, the first target chosen was Palawan, which was defended by only two reinforced companies from the 102nd Division. Additionally, MacArthur's strategy included the eventual reoccupation of the East Indies, starting with the capture of Japanese-controlled oil resources in northern Borneo as soon as land-based air support was available. The Zamboanga Peninsula and the Sulu Archipelago were identified as the second targets, although these areas were defended by stronger garrisons from the 54th and 55th Independent Mixed Brigades. Despite this, Eichelberger tasked Major-General Jens Doe's 41st Division with executing these invasions. For the Palawan invasion, codenamed Operation Victor III, Brigadier-General Harold Haney was appointed to lead a force primarily composed of the 186th Regiment, which would be transported to the island by Admiral Fechteler's Task Group 78.2. The convoy departed from Mindoro on February 26, escorted by Rear-Admiral Ralph Riggs' cruisers and destroyers. Following a naval bombardment, Haney's Palawan Force successfully landed at Puerto Princesa on February 28 without encountering any opposition. They quickly secured the town and the two airstrips to the east, advancing to the western and southern shores of the harbor by late afternoon to establish a defensive perimeter. As the first day progressed, it became clear to the American troops that the Japanese troops would not put up a fight at Puerto Princesa and had withdrawn into the hills to the northwest. More disturbing was the revelation of a massacre of approximately 140 American prisoners of war the previous December. The presence of a passing Allied convoy made the alarmed Japanese believe that an invasion was imminent and had herded their prisoners into air-raid shelters, subsequently setting the shelters afire and shooting prisoners who tried to escape. Only 11 American prisoners of war miraculously survived immolation and escaped the shooting. Sheltered by natives until the Americans landed, they emerged during the battle to tell their horrifying tale, which only hardened American resolve to end Japanese rule over the island. By March 1, the 186th Regiment had successfully taken control of Irahuan and Tagburos. In the following week, American forces would eliminate two or three heavily defended strongholds located ten miles north-northwest of Puerto Princesa, where the enemy garrison was ultimately defeated. The Palawan Force also conducted reconnaissance of several offshore islets, discovering no Japanese presence on some and swiftly clearing others. However, due to the poorly compacted soil, the new airfield on the island would not be operational until March 20, which was too late for any aircraft based in Palawan to assist with the Zamboanga landings. Consequently, on March 8, two reinforced companies from the 21st Regiment were flown to the airstrip at Dipolog, which had been secured by Colonel Hipolito Garma's guerrilla 105th Division. On the same day, sixteen Marine Corsairs arrived to provide air support for the invasion of Zamboanga, codenamed Operation Victor IV. For this operation, Doe assigned the remainder of his division, which was to be transported by Rear-Admiral Forrest Royal's Task Group 78.1. After three days of pre-assault bombardments and minesweeping, the convoy finally set sail southward and entered Basilan Strait from the west early on March 10. Troops from the 162nd Regiment landed almost without opposition around 09:15 near barrio San Mateo and quickly secured Wolfe Field, while the 163rd Regiment was also landing. Doe's two regiments then began to advance inland, facing minimal resistance as they established a night perimeter. With the Japanese having withdrawn, the 162nd and 163rd Regiments easily secured Zamboanga City, San Roque Airfield, and the rest of the coastal plain by dusk on March 11, with one company extending further to Caldera Bay to the west. To drive the Japanese forces from the elevated positions overlooking the airfield, Doe dispatched the 162nd Regiment towards Mount Capisan and the 163rd Regiment towards Mount Pulungbata. Additionally, the guerrilla 121st Regiment was tasked with blocking the east coast road in the Belong area. Supported by continuous artillery fire and close air support from Marine Corps planes, the two regiments of the 41st Division faced arduous tasks. General Hojo's troops held excellent defenses in depth across a front 5 miles wide, some portions of the line being 3 miles deep. All installations were protected by barbed wire; abandoned ground was thoroughly booby-trapped; mine fields, some of them of the remote-control type, abounded; and at least initially the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade had an ample supply of automatic weapons and mortars. While Japanese morale on the Zamboanga Peninsula was not on a par with that of 14th Area Army troops on Luzon, most of the 54th Independent Mixed Brigade and attached units had sufficient spirit to put up a strong fight as long as they held prepared positions, and Hojo was able to find men to conduct harassing counterattacks night after night. Finally, the terrain through which the 41st Division had to attack was rough and overgrown, giving way on the north to the rain forests of the partially unexplored mountain range forming the backbone of the Zamboanga Peninsula. Only poor trails existed in most of the area held by the Japanese, and the 41st Division had to limit its advance to the pace of bulldozers, which laboriously constructed supply and evacuation roads. Once the American troops entered the peninsula's foothills, tanks could not operate off the bulldozed roads. The next day, the 186th Regiment was deployed to relieve the fatigued 163rd Regiment on the eastern front. By the end of the month, it had expanded the front eastward and northward against diminishing resistance, ultimately forcing Hojo's forces to retreat into the rugged interior of the peninsula. For now, however, we will shift our focus from the Philippines to Burma to continue our coverage of the Chinese-British-Indian offensives. As we last observed, General Stopford's 33rd Corps was aggressively advancing into Mandalay against a weakened 15th Army, while General Cowan's 17th Indian Division had successfully captured Meiktila and was preparing to withstand the combined assaults of the 18th and 49th Divisions. Cowan's forces conducted a robust defense, managing to delay the arrival of the 49th Division until March 18 and successfully repelling General Naka's initial attacks on Meiktila's main airfield. Furthermore, with the reserve 5th Indian Division moving closer to the front in preparation for an advance towards Rangoon, General Slim decided to airlift the 9th Brigade to reinforce Cowan's troops, which landed on Meiktila's main airfield under enemy fire between March 15 and 17. Due to the slow progress on this front and General Katamura's preoccupation with the battles along the Irrawaddy, he was unable to manage the southern units simultaneously. Consequently, General Kimura decided to assign the 33rd Army to take over the fighting in Meiktila. General Honda promptly moved to Hlaingdet, where he was tasked with overseeing the 18th, 49th, and 53rd Divisions. On March 18, he ordered the 18th Division to secure the northern line of Meiktila and neutralize enemy airfields. He instructed the 49th Division to advance along the Pyawbwe-Meiktila road and directed the 53rd Division to regroup near Pyawbwe. However, on that same day, Cowan launched a counterattack by sending two tank-infantry columns to disrupt Japanese preparations along the Mahlaing road and in the villages of Kandaingbauk and Shawbyugan. They faced heavy resistance at Shawbyugan and ultimately had to withdraw. The relentless air assaults also compelled the Japanese to operate primarily at night, limiting their ability to respond with similar force to British offensives. On the night of March 20, Naka decided to initiate a significant attack on Meiktila's main airfield. However, with the 119th Regiment delayed at Shawbyugan, the 55th Regiment had to proceed alone, supported by some tanks, against the defenses of the 99th Brigade around Kyigon. Heavy artillery and mortar fire ultimately disrupted their assault. Meanwhile, as the 49th Division was consolidating its forces to the southeast, Cowan opted to send two tank-infantry columns to eliminate enemy concentrations at Nyaungbintha and Kinlu. Although the initial sweeps met little resistance, the 48th Brigade encountered strong Japanese positions at Shwepadaing on March 21. The next day, Cowan dispatched two tank-infantry columns to secure the Shwepadaing and Tamongan regions, but the British-Indian forces still struggled to eliminate the enemy defenders. That night, Lieutenant-General Takehara Saburo initiated his first significant assault, with the majority of the 106th Regiment targeting the defensive positions of the 48th Brigade in southeastern Meiktila. Despite the fierce and relentless attacks from the Japanese throughout the night, they were ultimately repelled by artillery and machine-gun fire, suffering heavy casualties. On March 23, Cowan sent another tank-infantry column to chase the retreating Japanese forces; however, the reformed 169th Regiment at Kinde successfully defended against this advance. Meanwhile, on the night of March 24, Naka launched another major offensive with the 55th and 119th Regiments, managing to capture Meiktila's main airfield. In response, Cowan quickly dispatched a tank-infantry column to clear the Mandalay road, successfully securing the area northeast of Kyigon by March 26. At this time, Honda had relocated his headquarters to Thazi to better coordinate the battle, although his troops had already suffered significant losses. For the next three days, Cowan's tanks and infantry continued to advance along the Mandalay road while the 63rd and 99th Brigades worked to eliminate Naka's artillery units south of Myindawgan Lake. By mid-March, Stopford's relentless pressure had forced the 31st and 33rd Divisions to retreat in chaos. On March 20, organized resistance in Mandalay was finally shattered as the 2nd British Division linked up with the 19th Indian Division. Consequently, the beleaguered Japanese units had no option but to withdraw in disarray towards the Shan Hills to the east. Following the collapse of the 15th Army front, the 33rd Army received orders on March 28 to hold its current positions only long enough to facilitate the withdrawal of the 15th Army. Consequently, while Cowan's units cleared the region north of Meiktila, Honda halted all offensive actions and promptly directed the 18th Division to secure the Thazi-Hlaingdet area. Additionally, the weakened 214th Regiment was tasked with moving to Yozon to support the withdrawal of the 33rd Division, while the 49th and 53rd Divisions were assigned to contain Meiktila to the south. As the battles for Mandalay and Meiktila unfolded, the reinforced 7th Indian Division at Nyaungu faced several intense assaults from General Yamamoto's 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade throughout March, ultimately advancing to Taungtha and clearing the route to Meiktila by the month's end. Meanwhile, in northern Burma, the 36th British Division advanced toward Mogok, which fell on March 19, while the 50th Chinese Division approached the Hsipaw area. Interestingly, the Japanese abandoned Hsipaw without resistance but launched a fierce counterattack between March 17 and 20. Ultimately, General Matsuyama had no option but to prepare for a withdrawal south toward Lawksawk and Laihka. At this stage, the 38th Chinese Division resumed its advance to Hsipaw; however, facing strong opposition along the route, they did not arrive until March 24, when the entire Burma Road was finally secured. General Sultan believed this was his final maneuver and recommended relocating the Chinese forces back to the Myitkyina area for air transport back to China, except for those needed to secure the Lashio-Hsipaw region. Additionally, the 36th Division continued its eastward push and eventually linked up with the 50th Division in the Kyaukme area by the end of the month before being reassigned to Slim's 14th Army. Looking south, the 74th Indian Brigade and West African forces advanced toward Kolan, while the 26th Indian Division established a new beachhead in the Letpan-Mae region. The 154th Regiment maintained its position near the Dalet River, preventing the remainder of the 82nd West African Division from joining the offensive. On March 23, General Miyazaki decided to launch an attack on Kolan. Although the assault achieved moderate success, Miyazaki soon recognized that he was outnumbered and opted to begin a final withdrawal toward the An Pass, completing this by the end of the month.   Meanwhile, on March 17, the 121st Regiment sent its 3rd Battalion to engage the enemy in the Sabyin area and hold their position along the Tanlwe River for as long as possible. Despite strong resistance from the Japanese, British-Indian forces managed to cross the Tanlwe by March 27 and successfully captured Hill 815 two days later. By March 30, the 22nd East African Brigade had also reached Letpan when High Command decided to relieve the units of the 26th Division and return them to India. In a related development, tensions were rising in French Indochina, where the local government refused to permit a Japanese defense of the colony. By early March, Japanese forces began redeploying around the main French garrison towns in Indochina. The Japanese envoy in Saigon Ambassador Shunichi Matsumoto declared to Governor Admiral Jean Decoux that since an Allied landing in Indochina was inevitable, Tokyo command wished to put into place a "common defence" of Indochina. Decoux however resisted stating that this would be a catalyst for an Allied invasion but suggested that Japanese control would be accepted if they actually invaded. This was not enough and Tsuchihashi accused Decoux of playing for time. On 9 March, after more stalling by Decoux, Tsuchihashi delivered an ultimatum for French troops to disarm. Decoux sent a messenger to Matsumoto urging further negotiations but the message arrived at the wrong building. Tsuchihashi, assuming that Decoux had rejected the ultimatum, immediately ordered commencement of the coup. The 11th R.I.C. (régiment d'infanterie coloniale) based at the Martin de Pallieres barracks in Saigon were surrounded and disarmed after their commanding officer, Lieutenant-Colonel Moreau, was arrested. In Hue there was sporadic fighting; the Garde Indochinoise, who provided security for the résident supérieur, fought for 19 hours against the Japanese before their barracks was overrun and destroyed. Three hundred men, one third of them French, managed to elude the Japanese and escape to the A Sầu Valley. However, over the next three days, they succumbed to hunger, disease and betrayals - many surrendered while others fought their way into Laos where only a handful survived. Meanwhile, General Eugène Mordant led opposition by the garrison of Hanoi for several hours but was forced to capitulate, with 292 dead on the French side and 212 Japanese. An attempt to disarm a Vietnamese garrison ended badly for the Japanese when 600 of them marched into Quảng Ngãi. The Vietnamese nationalists had been armed with automatic weapons supplied by the OSS parachuted nearby at Kontum. The Japanese had been led to believe that these men would readily defect but the Vietnamese ambushed the Japanese. Losing only three killed and seventeen wounded they inflicted 143 killed and another 205 wounded on the Japanese before they too were overcome. A much larger force of Japanese came the next day but they found the garrison empty. In Annam and Cochinchina only token resistance was offered and most garrisons, small as they were, surrendered. Further north the French had the sympathy of many indigenous peoples. Several hundred Laotians volunteered to be armed as guerrillas against the Japanese; French officers organized them into detachments but turned away those they did not have weapons for. In Haiphong the Japanese assaulted the Bouet barracks: headquarters of Colonel Henry Lapierre's 1st Tonkin Brigade. Using heavy mortar and machine gun fire, one position was taken after another before the barracks fell and Lapierre ordered a ceasefire. Lapierre refused to sign surrender messages for the remaining garrisons in the area. Codebooks had also been burnt which meant the Japanese then had to deal with the other garrisons by force. In Laos, Vientiane, Thakhek and Luang Prabang were taken by the Japanese without much resistance. In Cambodia the Japanese with 8,000 men seized Phnom Penh and all major towns in the same manner. All French personnel in the cities on both regions were either interned or in some cases executed. The Japanese strikes at the French in the Northern Frontier in general saw the heaviest fighting. One of the first places they needed to take and where they amassed the 22nd division was at Lang Son, a strategic fort near the Chinese border. The defences of Lang Son consisted of a series of fort complexes built by the French to defend against a Chinese invasion. The main fortress was the Fort Brière de l'Isle. Inside was a French garrison of nearly 4000 men, many of them Tonkinese, with units of the French Foreign Legion. Once the Japanese had cut off all communications to the forts they invited General Émile Lemonnier, the commander of the border region, to a banquet at the headquarters of the Japanese 22nd Division. Lemonnier declined to attend the event, but allowed some of his staff to go in his place. They were then taken prisoner and soon after the Japanese bombarded Fort Brière de l'Isle, attacking with infantry and tanks. The small forts outside had to defend themselves in isolation; they did so for a time, proving impenetrable, and the Japanese were repelled with some loss. They tried again the next day and succeeded in taking the outer positions. Finally, the main fortress of Brière de l'Isle was overrun after heavy fighting. Lemonnier was subsequently taken prisoner himself and ordered by a Japanese general to sign a document formally surrendering the forces under his command. Lemonnier refused to sign the documents. As a result, the Japanese took him outside where they forced him to dig a grave along with French Resident-superior (Résident-général) Camille Auphelle. Lemonnier again was ordered to sign the surrender documents and again refused. The Japanese subsequently beheaded him. The Japanese then machine-gunned some of the prisoners and either beheaded or bayoneted the wounded survivors. Lang Son experienced particularly intense fighting, with the 22nd Division relentlessly assaulting the 4,000-strong garrison for two days until the main fortress was captured. The Japanese then advanced further north to the border town of Dong Dang, which fell by March 15. The battle of Lạng Sơn cost the French heavy casualties and their force on the border was effectively destroyed. European losses were 544 killed, of which 387 had been executed after capture. In addition 1,832 Tonkinese colonial troops were killed (including 103 who were executed) while another 1,000 were taken prisoner. On 12 March planes of the US Fourteenth Air Force flying in support of the French, mistook a column of Tonkinese prisoners for Japanese and bombed and strafed them. Reportedly between 400 and 600 of the prisoners were killed or wounded.  Nonetheless, the coup was highly successful, with the Japanese subsequently encouraging declarations of independence from traditional rulers in various regions. On 11 March 1945, Emperor Bảo Đại was permitted to announce the Vietnamese "independence"; this declaration had been prepared by Yokoyama Seiko, Minister for Economic Affairs of the Japanese diplomatic mission in Indochina and later advisor to Bao Dai. Bảo Đại complied in Vietnam where they set up a puppet government headed by Tran Trong Kim and which collaborated with the Japanese. King Norodom Sihanouk also obeyed, but the Japanese did not trust the Francophile monarch. Nationalist leader Son Ngoc Thanh, who had been exiled in Japan and was considered a more trustworthy ally than Sihanouk, returned to Cambodia and became Minister of foreign affairs in May and then Prime Minister in August. In Laos however, King Sisavang Vong of Luang Phrabang, who favoured French rule, refused to declare independence, finding himself at odds with his Prime Minister, Prince Phetsarath Ratanavongsa, but eventually acceded on 8 April. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. March 1945, saw US forces advance in Luzon, overcoming Japanese defenses through strategic maneuvers, while guerrilla activities intensified amid challenging terrain and heavy resistance. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian forces advanced against Japanese troops, capturing key locations and in French Indochina the Japanese unleashed a brutal coup d'etat ushering in independence movements.

New Books Network
Bertil Lintner, "The Golden Land Ablaze: Coups, Insurgents and the State in Myanmar" (Oxford UP, 2024)

New Books Network

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 13, 2025 48:14


Four years ago, on Feb. 1 2021, the Burmese military overthrew the fledgling democratic government in the Southeast Asian country of Burma, officially known as Myanmar. That sparked a civil war that continues today–with neither the military junta nor the various rebel groups coming closer to victory. How did the country get here? Veteran Asia journalist Bertil Lintner tackles the country's history since independence, including the military's long involvement in the country's politics, in his book The Golden Land Ablaze: Coups, Insurgents and the State in Myanmar (Hurst: 2024). He joins today to talk about Burma's history, the role of the military, China's involvement in the country, and prospects for the civil war going forward. Bertil Lintner is an acclaimed journalist and expert on contemporary Southeast Asia, especially Myanmar. Formerly the Far Eastern Economic Review's Burma correspondent, he is now a full-time correspondent with the Asia Pacific Media Services and writes regularly for Asia Times, The Irrawaddy and other regional and international websites and publications. Lintner has written 25 books on Asian politics and history, including Outrage: Burma's Struggle for Democracy (Review Publishing: 1989); Great Game East: India, China and the Struggle for Asia's Most Volatile Frontier (Yale University Press: 2015); and The Costliest Pearl: China's Struggle for India's Ocean (Hurst: 2019). You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of The Golden Land Ablaze. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at @nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

New Books in History
Bertil Lintner, "The Golden Land Ablaze: Coups, Insurgents and the State in Myanmar" (Oxford UP, 2024)

New Books in History

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 13, 2025 48:14


Four years ago, on Feb. 1 2021, the Burmese military overthrew the fledgling democratic government in the Southeast Asian country of Burma, officially known as Myanmar. That sparked a civil war that continues today–with neither the military junta nor the various rebel groups coming closer to victory. How did the country get here? Veteran Asia journalist Bertil Lintner tackles the country's history since independence, including the military's long involvement in the country's politics, in his book The Golden Land Ablaze: Coups, Insurgents and the State in Myanmar (Hurst: 2024). He joins today to talk about Burma's history, the role of the military, China's involvement in the country, and prospects for the civil war going forward. Bertil Lintner is an acclaimed journalist and expert on contemporary Southeast Asia, especially Myanmar. Formerly the Far Eastern Economic Review's Burma correspondent, he is now a full-time correspondent with the Asia Pacific Media Services and writes regularly for Asia Times, The Irrawaddy and other regional and international websites and publications. Lintner has written 25 books on Asian politics and history, including Outrage: Burma's Struggle for Democracy (Review Publishing: 1989); Great Game East: India, China and the Struggle for Asia's Most Volatile Frontier (Yale University Press: 2015); and The Costliest Pearl: China's Struggle for India's Ocean (Hurst: 2019). You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of The Golden Land Ablaze. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at @nickrigordon. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

In Conversation: An OUP Podcast
Bertil Lintner, "The Golden Land Ablaze: Coups, Insurgents and the State in Myanmar" (Oxford UP, 2024)

In Conversation: An OUP Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 13, 2025 48:14


Four years ago, on Feb. 1 2021, the Burmese military overthrew the fledgling democratic government in the Southeast Asian country of Burma, officially known as Myanmar. That sparked a civil war that continues today–with neither the military junta nor the various rebel groups coming closer to victory. How did the country get here? Veteran Asia journalist Bertil Lintner tackles the country's history since independence, including the military's long involvement in the country's politics, in his book The Golden Land Ablaze: Coups, Insurgents and the State in Myanmar (Hurst: 2024). He joins today to talk about Burma's history, the role of the military, China's involvement in the country, and prospects for the civil war going forward. Bertil Lintner is an acclaimed journalist and expert on contemporary Southeast Asia, especially Myanmar. Formerly the Far Eastern Economic Review's Burma correspondent, he is now a full-time correspondent with the Asia Pacific Media Services and writes regularly for Asia Times, The Irrawaddy and other regional and international websites and publications. Lintner has written 25 books on Asian politics and history, including Outrage: Burma's Struggle for Democracy (Review Publishing: 1989); Great Game East: India, China and the Struggle for Asia's Most Volatile Frontier (Yale University Press: 2015); and The Costliest Pearl: China's Struggle for India's Ocean (Hurst: 2019). You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of The Golden Land Ablaze. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at @nickrigordon.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 169 - Pacific War Podcast - Liberation of Bataan and Corregidor - February 11 - 18 - , 1945

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 11, 2025 46:02


Last time we spoke about the battle of Manila. In early February, General Iwanaka's 2nd Tank Division faced encirclement as American forces advanced. General Griswold's 14th Corps captured Clark Field, while the 8th Cavalry liberated 4,000 internees at Santo Tomas University. Amid fierce fighting, Japanese defenses crumbled, and by February 9, American troops secured key districts in Manila. Despite heavy resistance, they pressed on, clearing areas and establishing a foothold across the Pasig River. In the wake of Pearl Ridge's capture, Australian brigades advanced through Bougainville, engaging Japanese forces along the Jaba and Tavera rivers. Brigadier Monaghan's troops secured strategic positions, while the 2/8th Commandos aided local guerrillas. In January, significant battles unfolded at Tsimba Ridge, where fierce resistance led to an encirclement of Japanese troops. Meanwhile, in Burma, Allied forces executed deceptive maneuvers and launched offensives, as General Aung San's Burma National Army prepared to switch sides, signaling a shift in the war's momentum. This episode is the Liberation of Bataan and Corregidor Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we previously noted, General Griswold had three divisions stationed in Manila, which had achieved significant advancements by February 10. Estimating the strength of the Americans in the Manila area at little more than a regiment, General Yokoyama apparently felt that he had a good opportunity to cut off and isolate the Allied force. Conversely, he was also interested in getting the Manila Naval Defense Force out of the city quickly, either by opening a line of retreat or by having Iwabuchi co-ordinate a breakthrough effort with a Shimbu Group counterattack, scheduled for the night of February 16. Not knowing how far the situation in Manila had deteriorated--communications were faulty and Admiral Iwabuchi had supplied Yokoyama with little information--Yokoyama at first directed the Manila Naval Defense Force to hold fast. The question of a general withdrawal, he told Iwabuchi, would be held in abeyance pending the outcome of the counterattack. There is no indication that the Shimbu Group commander intended to reinforce or retake Manila. Rather, his primary interest was to gain time for the Shimbu Group to strengthen its defenses north and northeast of the city and to move more supplies out of the city to its mountain strongholds, simultaneously creating a good opportunity for the Manila Naval Defense Force to withdraw intact. However, the commander of the Shimbu Group was simultaneously orchestrating a large-scale, coordinated raid on northern Manila, intending to weaken the enemy's offensive capability by targeting their vulnerable eastern flank before they could solidify their positions. Therefore, on the night of February 16, the majority of the 31st Regiment was set to assault Caloocan Airfield, while three provisional battalions of the Kobayashi Force would attack Quezon, Banlat Airfield, and the surrounding areas of Rosario. This meant that Iwabuchi's forces would need to withstand the unyielding American assaults for another week before receiving support. Meanwhile, Griswold was strategizing to cut off the last remaining routes for withdrawal and reinforcement available to Iwabuchi. To achieve this, the 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments were tasked with advancing southwest toward Manila Bay to make contact with the 11th Airborne Division, effectively encircling the city. Thus, Griswold continued his offensive on February 11, with Company E of the 129th Regiment successfully clearing Provisor Island without resistance and further establishing a presence on the mainland, west across Estero Provisor. Other elements of the 37th Division were gradually advancing across the Estero de Paco despite heavy enemy fire, while the 5th Cavalry made limited progress at Nielson Field. The 8th Cavalry pushed nearly to the Estero de Paco along the division boundary against scattered opposition, the 511th Parachute Regiment advanced north toward Libertad Avenue, and the 187th Glider Regiment secured the southeast corner and southern runway of Nichols Field. The next day, to complete the encirclement of Manila, the 5th Cavalry swiftly advanced across Nielson Field, facing sporadic rifle fire, and successfully connected with the 511th at Libertad Avenue before reaching the shores of Manila Bay. Simultaneously, the 12th Cavalry Regiment relieved the 8th and rapidly moved westward to establish contact with the 5th at Villarruel Street. Further south, following intense artillery and air bombardment, the 187th and 188th Glider Regiments finally breached the Japanese defenses at Nichols Field. The attack was preceded by artillery and mortar concentrations and by an air strike executed by Marine Corps SBD's from the Lingayen Gulf fields, support that succeeded in knocking out many Japanese artillery positions. The 2d Battalion, 187th Infantry, attacked generally east from the northwest corner of the field; the 188th Infantry and the 1st Battalion, 187th Infantry, drove in from the south and southeast. By dusk the two regiments had cleared most of the field and finished mopping up the next day. The field was, however, by no means ready to receive Allied Air Force planes. Runways and taxiways were heavily mined, the runways were pitted by air and artillery bombardments, and the field was still subjected to intermittent artillery and mortar fire from the Fort McKinley area. With the seizure of Nichols Field, the 11th Airborne Division substantially completed its share in the battle for Manila. Since its landing at Nasugbu the division had suffered over 900 casualties. Of this number the 511th Infantry lost approximately 70 men killed and 240 wounded; the 187th and 188th Infantry Regiments had together lost about 100 men killed and 510 wounded, the vast majority in the action at Nichols Field. The division and its air and artillery support had killed perhaps 3,000 Japanese in the metropolitan area, destroying the 3d Naval Battalion and isolating the Abe Battalion. From then on the division's activities in the Manila area would be directed toward securing the Cavite region, destroying the Abe Battalion, and, in co-operation with the 1st Cavalry Division, assuring the severance of the Manila Naval Defense Force's routes of escape and reinforcement by clearing Fort McKinley and environs.  Meanwhile, at ZigZag Pass, General Chase's 38th Division had begun to make headway against the strong defenses of the Nagayoshi Detachment, with the 152nd and 149th Regiments set to launch a coordinated attack from the east and west on February 12. It wasn't until the afternoon of February 13 that the 149th and 152nd made their first brief contact from their respective sides of ZigZag. The 149th then captured the last organized Japanese stronghold on February 14, and the following day both regiments completed their mopping-up operations. Nearly 2,400 Japanese soldiers were killed at the pass during this battle, though about 300 men under Colonel Nagayoshi managed to escape south into Bataan. The 38th Division and the 34th Regiment, in turn, suffered around 1,400 casualties, including 250 killed. Meanwhile, General Brush's 40th Division continued its offensive against the Kembu Group. By February 12, the 185th Regiment had successfully secured Snake Hill North with minimal resistance, while also capturing Hills 810 and 1000. Meanwhile, the 160th Regiment made significant advances against Snake Hill West and Scattered Trees Ridge. The 108th Regiment, after neutralizing the Japanese strongholds on the hill, began attacking the remnants of the Eguchi and Yanagimoto Detachments at Hill 7. On February 15, the 185th captured Hill 1500, coinciding with the 160th clearing Snake Hill West and preparing to advance toward Object Hill. The next day, Hill 7 fell to the 108th, while the 160th reached the summit of Object Hill and broke through Scattered Trees Ridge. By February 20, the 160th had cleared the rest of Object Hill and established a foothold on Sacobia Ridge. Whatever the costs, the 40th Division's advances to February 20 marked the end of the Kembu Group as a threat to 6th Army and 14th Corps. Clark Field, Route 3, and the army and corps right were now secure beyond all shadow of doubt. The Kembu Group had defended its ground well since January 24, when 14th Corps had first gained contact, and had inflicted nearly 1500 casualties upon 14th Corps units--roughly 285 men killed and 1180 wounded--but had itself lost around 10000 men killed. The 20000 troops General Tsukada still commanded were hardly in good shape. Supplies of all kinds were dwindling rapidly, morale was cracking, and centralized control was breaking down. The only defenses still intact were those held by the naval 13th and 17th Combat Sectors, and those had been heavily damaged by air and artillery bombardments. Troops of the 6th Army would continue to fight the Kembu Group, but after February 20 operations in the Kembu area were essentially mop-ups. 11th Corps, not 14th, would be in charge of the final mop-up operations in the Kembu area. Under General Hall's leadership, the 40th Division resumed the mop-up operation on February 23, but was replaced by elements of the 43rd Division just five days later. In the following ten days, this division would ultimately eliminate General Tsukada's last defensive position, pushing the Kembu Group further into the Zambales Range. Back in Manila, on February 13, chaos erupted as Iwabuchi's forces prepared for their final stand in the Filipino capital. After February 12th the 14th Corps troops found themselves in a steady war of attrition. Street-to-street, building-to-building, and room-to-room fighting characterized each day's activity. Progress was sometimes measured only in feet; many days saw no progress at all. The fighting became really "dirty." The Japanese, looking forward only to death, started committing all sorts of excesses, both against the city itself and against Filipinos unlucky enough to remain under Japanese control. As time went on, Japanese command disintegrated. Then, viciousness became uncontrolled and uncontrollable; horror mounted upon horror. The men of the 37th Division and the 1st Cavalry Division witnessed the rape, sack, pillage, and destruction of a large part of Manila and became reluctant parties to much of the destruction. Although the 14th Corps placed heavy dependence upon artillery, tank, tank destroyer, mortar, and bazooka fire for all advances, cleaning out individual buildings ultimately fell to individual riflemen. To accomplish this work, the infantry brought to fruition a system initiated north of the Pasig River. Small units worked their way from one building to the next, usually trying to secure the roof and top floor first, often by coming through the upper floors of an adjoining structure. Using stairways as axes of advance, lines of supply, and routes of evacuation, troops then began working their way down through the building. For the most part, squads broke up into small assault teams, one holding entrances and perhaps the ground floor--when that was where entrance had been gained--while the other fought through the building. In many cases, where the Japanese blocked stairways and corridors, the American troops found it necessary to chop or blow holes through walls and floors. Under such circumstances, hand grenades, flame throwers, and demolitions usually proved requisites to progress. In response to the encirclement of Manila, Yokoyama concluded that the situation in the city was irreparable and ordered Iwabuchi to relocate to Fort McKinley and begin withdrawing his troops immediately, without waiting for the Shimbu Group's counterattack. However, Iwabuchi did not receive this order until two days later, by which time he and his troops were determined to fight to the death, taking as many enemies with them as possible. The 129th Regiment made an unsuccessful attempt to assault the New Police Station and the Manila Club. Meanwhile, the 148th Regiment reached Taft Avenue but could not launch an attack on the Philippine General Hospital and the University of the Philippines. The 5th and 12th Cavalry Regiments turned north, taking two days to fight through the Pasay suburb to Vito Cruz Street. On February 14, although the 148th Regiment struggled to make any headway against Iwabuchi's strong defenses, the 129th, supported by tanks, managed to break through to the Manila Club and the New Police Station. However, the Japanese quickly regrouped at the latter location and began throwing hand grenades from the second floor, forcing the Americans to retreat. Simultaneously, a battalion-sized guerrilla force led by Major John Vanderpool was dispatched to contain the Abe Provisional Battalion at Mabato Point, while elements of the 11th Airborne Division and the 1st Cavalry Division began clearing the routes to Fort McKinley. On February 15 and 16, the 129th conducted probing attacks on the New Police Station, the shoe factory, and Santa Teresita College, while tanks and artillery maintained consistent fire on all buildings still held by the Japanese. The 3rd Battalion of the 148th Regiment reached Manila Bay via Herran Street and then turned to assault the hospital from the south, while the 2nd Battalion made limited progress against the main hospital structures. The 12th Cavalry successfully entered La Salle University and the Japanese Club, and the 5th Cavalry pushed through Harrison Park, clearing Rizal Stadium, with the entire area being secured by February 18. In the early hours of February 16, Yokoyama initiated his limited offensive, with the 31st Regiment advancing toward Novaliches while General Kobayashi's three battalions attacked Marikina.The 112th Cavalry RCT, which had replaced the 12th Cavalry along the 1st Cavalry Division's line of communications, broke up the northern wing's counterattack between 15 and 18 February. In the Novaliches-Novaliches Dam area, and in a series of skirmishes further west and northwest, the 112th Cavalry RCT dispatched some 300 Japanese, losing only 2 men killed and 32 wounded. Un-co-ordinated from the start, the northern counterattack turned into a shambles, and the northern attack force withdrew in a disorganized manner before it accomplished anything. The Kobayashi Force's effort was turned back on the morning of the 16th, when American artillery caught this southern wing as it attempted to cross the Marikina River. During the next three days all Japanese attacks were piecemeal in nature and were thrown back with little difficulty by the 7th and 8th Cavalry Regiments, operating east and northeast of Manila. By 19 February, when the southern counterattack force also withdrew, the 2d Cavalry Brigade and support artillery had killed about 650 Japanese in the area west of the Marikina from Novaliches Dam south to the Pasig. The brigade lost about 15 men killed and 50 wounded. Consequently, Yokoyama's only achievement was the escape of the remnants of the 3rd and 4th Naval Battalions from the Fort McKinley area, which was later occupied by American forces. Additionally, from February 15 to 20, the 511th Parachute Regiment thoroughly searched the Cavite Peninsula and the adjacent mainland but encountered only a few Japanese stragglers. Meanwhile, to secure the Bataan Peninsula, Hall divided his forces into two groups: East Force and South Force. The East Force, consisting of the recently arrived 1st Regiment and led by Brigadier-General William Spence, was tasked with advancing down the east coast to divert Japanese attention from the Mariveles landing, which was to be executed by Chase's 151st Regiment. Accordingly, the 151st Regiment boarded Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3 vessels at Olongapo just as the 1st Regiment was passing through Orani and beginning its southward advance, reaching Pilar by the end of February 14. The following day, after conducting minesweeping and bombardment operations—during which the destroyers La Vallette and Radford were unfortunately disabled by mines—Struble successfully landed the 151st at Mariveles under machine-gun and rifle fire. The Americans found no Japanese forces before sunset, but during the night, they had to fend off a counterattack by approximately 100 enemy troops. During the night of 15-16 February an estimated 300 Japanese attacked the 1st Infantry's perimeter near Orion, but the U.S. regiment, losing 11 killed and 15 wounded, beat off the Japanese and killed 80 of them in a melee of confused, sometimes hand-to-hand fighting. The incident marked the end of organized Japanese resistance in southern Bataan. The 151st spent the following days securing the Mariveles area while simultaneously sending patrols northward along both sides of the Bataan Peninsula. They connected with the 1st Regiment at Limay on February 18. By February 21, the Americans had advanced across Bataan to Bagac, encountering only abandoned defensive positions and a few Japanese stragglers. However, Nagayoshi's remaining 1,000 troops managed to take refuge in the jungled slopes of Mount Natib, where elements of the 38th Division, the 6th Division, and Filipino guerrillas systematically hunted them down. While Bataan was being cleared, Generals MacArthur and Krueger were also planning the invasion of Corregidor Island. The assault plan involved Colonel George Jones' 503rd Parachute Regiment airdropping onto the island, supported by a nearly simultaneous shore-to-shore operation conducted by the reinforced 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment, from the recently secured Mariveles.  The decision to employ paratroopers to make the principal assault against an objective of Corregidor's size and terrain merits attention. Shaped like a tadpole, with its bulbous head pointing west toward the South China Sea, Corregidor is but three and a half miles long and one and a half miles across at its point of greatest width. The prospective cost of amphibious assault was, indeed, one of the chief factors that led to a decision to use paratroopers. Planners saw the obvious risks in sending parachute troops against such a small and rough target, but in view of the GHQ SWPA estimate that the Japanese garrison numbered only 850 men, the cost of the airborne operation promised to be less than that involved in an amphibious attack. Krueger intended to land almost 3,000 troops on Corregidor on 16 February, over 2,000 of them by parachute. Another 1,000 men or more would come in by parachute or landing craft the next day. Planners hoped that such preponderant strength, combined with intensive air and naval bombardment, might render the seizure of the island nearly bloodless. An equally important (if not even more decisive) factor leading to the decision to employ paratroops was the desire to achieve surprise. GHQ SWPA and Sixth Army planners hoped that the Japanese on Corregidor would judge that no one in his right mind would even consider dropping a regiment of parachutists on such a target. The defenses, the planners thought, would probably be oriented entirely toward amphibious attack. The attack was scheduled for February 16, with paratroopers set to land on a parade ground and a golf course at Topside. They would then immediately assault Malinta Hill before the Japanese garrison could recover from the shock of the preparatory air and naval bombardment and the surprise of the parachute drop, with the amphibious troops launching their attack two hours after the paratroopers began jumping. Although Corregidor had been under attack by Allied Air Forces since January 22, General Kenney's forces intensified their assaults at the start of February. By February 16, the 5th and 13th Air Force planes had dropped approximately 3,125 tons of bombs on the island. Naval bombardment also commenced on February 13, in conjunction with the bombardment and minesweeping in preparation for the capture of Mariveles. On the morning of February 16, air and surface forces conducted their final preliminary bombardment before the paradrop. Launching from Mindoro, the 317th Troop Carrier Group transported the first wave of the 503rd Parachute Regiment in two columns of C-47s, swiftly dropping them over Corregidor at 08:30. Encountering only sporadic Japanese rifle and machine-gun fire, the paratroopers successfully secured the Topside drop zones by 09:45. However, approximately 25% of the paratroopers were injured, and many others failed to land on Topside. One unexpected blessing resulted from the scattered drop of paratroopers in the 0830 lift. Captain Itagaki, having been informed that landing craft were assembling off Mariveles, had hurried with a small guard to an observation post near Breakwater Point, obviously more concerned with the imminent amphibious assault than with the possibility that paratroopers might drop out of the C-47's already in sight of Corregidor. Suddenly, his attention was rudely diverted as twenty-five to thirty paratroopers who had been blown over the cliffs near the point began pelting down around the observation post. Fired on by the Japanese, the small American group quickly assembled and attacked. In the ensuing skirmish eight Japanese, including Captain Itagaki, were killed. Effective control among the Japanese units, already rendered practically impossible by the destruction of the communications center during the preassault air and naval bombardment, now ceased altogether. Leaderless, the remaining Japanese were no longer capable of coordinated offensive or defensive efforts. Each group would fight on its own from isolated and widely separated strongpoints. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment departed Mariveles Harbor on 25 LCMs and made their way to the western end of Corregidor, landing on the south beach at 10:28. Contrary to expectations, the first four waves faced no opposition as they came ashore. However, as the fifth wave arrived, Japanese machine-guns opened fire from Ramsay Ravine, Breakwater Point, and the cliffs at San Jose Point. Despite this, Companies K and L advanced quickly and established a strong position on top of Malinta Hill by 11:00. This ensured total surprise, as the paradrop effectively drew Japanese attention away from the amphibious craft approaching Corregidor. At 12:40, the second wave of the 503rd began to land successfully on the drop zones, facing only limited fire from Japanese automatic weapons. With these reinforcements, the paratroopers were positioned to secure the remainder of Topside by the end of the day. However, during the night, the infantrymen would need to fend off a series of small but determined Japanese counterattacks along the northern side of Malinta Hill. For eight consecutive days leading up to February 23, the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment successfully defended against relentless banzai charges, mortar assaults, and a suicide squad of soldiers equipped with explosives, resulting in approximately 300 Japanese casualties. On the afternoon of 17 February the 1st Battalion, 503d Infantry, and other reinforcements reached Bottomside by landing craft. Japanese rifle and machine gun fire, most of which passed overhead, "expedited" the movement ashore, and the battalion soon joined the rest of the regiment on Topside. The troops already on Topside had spent the day expanding their hold, systematically reducing the first of the many Japanese bunkers, pillboxes, and underground defenses they were to encounter, and had developed a pattern for the destruction of the Japanese installations. First, aircraft or naval fire support ships--the air arm using napalm extensively--were called upon to strike positions accessible to these types of bombardment; then the infantry attacked almost as the last shell or bomb burst. When this method failed, the 503d's own 75-mm. pack howitzers and lesser weapons were brought forward for direct fire. Next, having stationed men with submachine guns and rifles at advantageous points to cover approaches to a Japanese position, infantry assault teams moved forward behind white phosphorus hand grenades and the extremely close support of flame thrower teams. To avoid backflash and assure the deepest possible penetration of cave defenses, flame thrower operators often projected their fuel unignited, and then used white phosphorus grenades to fire it. If the Japanese within the caves still could not be induced to give up the fight, engineer demolition experts blocked the cave entrances. One Japanese tactic was both advantageous and disadvantageous to the 503d Infantry. Each night small groups of Japanese would attempt to reoccupy positions cleared during the previous day. To the 503d, this often meant some dirty, repetitive work, and additional casualties. On the other hand, the Japanese sometimes reoccupied tactically indefensible positions that proved easy to take out. The 503d Infantry seems to have been happy to let the Japanese occasionally return to such positions, secure in the knowledge that the only result would be more Japanese killed at no cost to the attackers. The only way to keep the Japanese from reoccupying less vulnerable positions was to stop night infiltration, a process that in turn required the blocking of the underground passageways that abounded on Topside. By these methods Japanese casualties began to mount rapidly. On the 17th, for example, over 300 Japanese were killed; nearly 775 were killed the next day. In the same two days Rock Force's casualties were approximately 30 killed and 110 wounded. The Japanese resistance at Topside finally crumbled two days later after the Americans effectively repelled a fierce counterattack. The last significant opposition, concentrated at Wheeler Point, concluded with a small-scale banzai charge on the morning of February 23. By the end of that day, the 503rd had largely cleared the western section of Corregidor. Following intense air and naval bombardments, the paratroopers launched a final assault on the eastern end of the island on February 24, systematically destroying several strongholds over the next two days. Shortly after 1100 on 26 February the Japanese on Corregidor executed their final, suicidal tour de force, blowing an underground arsenal at Monkey Point amid scenes of carnage on both sides. As the dust from terrific explosions settled, a hollow appeared where a small knoll had previously stood. Debris had flown as far as Topside where one man, almost a mile from the explosion, was injured by flying rock. Other debris hit a destroyer 2,000 yards offshore. A medium tank was hurled 50 yards through the air, most of its crew killed. Bits and pieces of American and Japanese troops splattered the ground; rock slides buried alive other men of both forces. Over 200 Japanese were killed outright, while Rock Force lost some 50 men killed and 150 wounded. This explosion signified the end of organized resistance on Corregidor, and by 16:00, elements of the 503rd Parachute Regiment had reached the island's eastern tip. Mopping-up operations continued until March 2, when Hall and Jones determined that the island was secure. Ultimately, by the conclusion of the battle, the Americans had suffered approximately 215 killed and 790 wounded, while the Japanese losses were estimated at 5,200 killed and 20 captured. On February 17, in Manila, the 129th Regiment secured the damaged shoe factory and cleared several buildings along the south bank of the Pasig River before being relieved by the 145th Regiment. During 17 February, with the aid of support fires from the 1st Battalion, now on the south side of Herran Street, the 2d Battalion smashed its way into the two most easterly of the hospital's four wings and overran the last resistance in the Nurses' Dormitory and the Science Building. The advance might have gone faster had it not been necessary to evacuate patients and other Filipino civilians from the hospital. By dusk over 2,000 civilians had come out of the buildings; the 148th Infantry conducted 5,000 more to safety that night. At the end of the 17th the 148th had overcome almost all opposition except that at the Medical School and in a small group of buildings facing Padre Faura Street at the northwestern corner of the hospital grounds. The next day, the 145th cleared Santa Teresita College but could not establish a presence inside the New Police Station. Meanwhile, the 148th consolidated its gains before being relieved by the 5th Cavalry. The 11th Airborne Division began besieging the Abe Provisional Battalion at Mabato Point, ultimately destroying this unit by February 23. On February 19, the 5th Cavalry launched an assault on and cleared the Medical School and Assumption College, while the 1st Squadron of the 12th Cavalry advanced north along the bay, facing strong opposition, and successfully reached Padre Faura Street. At the same time, the police station and San Pablo Church underwent intense artillery and tank bombardment, with the church eventually falling to the 145th by nightfall. After further artillery and tank fire nearly leveled the police station, American forces secured its ruins on February 20. The 145th also began attacking City Hall and the General Post Office, making minimal progress in the initial days. Supported by heavy bombardment, the 5th Cavalry managed to capture Rizal Hall and the Administration Building but was eventually forced to withdraw after the Japanese detonated significant explosives. The 12th Cavalry overcame the last resistance at the High Commissioner's residence and pressed onward to San Luis Street. The next day, the 12th swiftly entered the Manila Hotel and successfully took control of the area after a fierce battle. Meanwhile, the 5th Cavalry captured the Administration Building with minimal resistance, but they did not secure Rizal Hall and University Hall until February 24. During this time, the 145th Regiment continued its assault on City Hall and the General Post Office, which ultimately fell by February 22. As a result, Griswold's forces had effectively confined the remnants of Iwabuchi's troops to Intramuros, the South Port Area, and the Philippine Commonwealth Government buildings at the southeastern edge of the Walled City, leaving behind a trail of destroyed and damaged public and private structures. The fall of Manila was imminent; however, we must now shift our focus away from the Philippines to cover the Burma offensives. As we last reported, by mid-February, General Messervy's 4th Corps had successfully established a bridgehead over the Irrawaddy River at Nyaungu, while General Stopford's 33rd Corps continued to advance towards Mandalay, with the 19th Indian Division moving toward Madaya by the end of the month. Concerned about the bridgehead established by the 20th Indian Division, General Kimura decided to withdraw the main force of the 18th Division, which was engaged with the 36th British Division at Myitson. Consequently, after leaving the 114th Regiment at Mongmit, General Naka began relocating the majority of his division to Hsumhsai and then to Mandalay. In addition to the 18th Division, Kimura assigned the Kanjo Force to the 15th Army, further instructing General Katamura to prepare a general offensive aimed at destroying Stopford's bridgeheads while the reinforced 31st Division continued its counterattacks against the 20th Division. As attention turned to Nyaungu, a flurry of activity ensued to transport supplies to the 255th Indian Tank Brigade and the 48th and 63rd Indian Motorized Brigades across the river using boats and barges. General Cowan devised a plan for these units to gather at Mahlaing, capture the Thabutkon airstrip, where the air-transportable 99th Indian Brigade would land, and ultimately encircle and take Meiktila. With all his units successfully across by February 21, Cowan launched his advance towards Meiktila, quickly taking Seywa and Ngathayauk with minimal resistance. The following day, British-Indian forces attacked Taungtha from two fronts, with the southern group facing some opposition at the village of Oyin. Despite the Japanese putting up fierce and determined resistance, they were ultimately overwhelmed by the superior firepower of the British tanks. Upon realizing this new threat to his rear, Kimura halted his previous offensive and swiftly redirected the 53rd Division to Taungtha to block the enemy's advance towards Meiktila. Meanwhile, to bolster Kimura's focus on Mandalay, the 2nd British Division crossed the Irrawaddy near Ngazun on the night of February 24, encountering heavy opposition but managing to secure a bridgehead two days later. Nonetheless, by February 24, the 48th Brigade reached Taungtha ahead of Kimura's reinforcements and captured the town with light resistance. In the afternoon, the 63rd Brigade and the tanks moved through and continued towards Mahlaing, arriving on February 25. The next day, the Mahlaing area was completely cleared, and the Thabutkon airstrip was successfully captured. Realizing the seriousness of the situation, Kimura quickly dispatched the 18th and 49th Divisions along with the remaining forces of the 53rd Division towards Meiktila,  but only the 1st Battalion, 168th Regiment under Colonel Yoshida would arrive in time. At Meiktila, Major-General Kasuya Tomekichi, commander of No. 2 Field Transport, which had responsibility for all the transport units supporting the 15th and 33rd Armies, was put in charge of the defense of the town. Kasuya had approximately 2500 administrative and line of communications troops available, and another 2000 from various Japanese Army Air Force units, including the 52nd and 84th Airfield Battalions and the 36th Anti-Aircraft Battalion. The administrative and line of communications troops were hastily organized into three emergency infantry companies and a mobile reserve force. Any hospital patient who could walk or shoot was sent out to man a bunker. Kasuya set up a western and eastern sector for the defense of the town, with the dividing line being Meiktila's northern and southern artificial lakes. The troops in Meiktila hurriedly prepared bunkers throughout the town and laid mines and booby traps along the approaches. Kasuya opened up the ordnance depots around the town and ensured that all units were well supplied with medium and light machine-guns, and had plenty of ammunition. Cowan quickly began airlifting troops from the 99th Brigade to Thabutkon on February 27, with the operation expected to conclude by March 2. During the airlift, armored car patrols advanced along the main road to Meiktila, where they encountered a formidable Japanese roadblock that the 63rd Brigade later destroyed. That evening, advance patrols observed fires in Meiktila as the Japanese started to destroy their supply depots. The Battle for Meiktila was imminent; however, while General Slim's 14th Army continued its Extended Capital offensive, new developments were also occurring in northern and southern Burma. In the north, the 36th Division finally secured Myitson following the withdrawal of the 18th Division and began moving toward Mongmit. The 50th Chinese Division, bolstered by the 1st Chinese Separate Regiment, crossed the Myitnge River at Namtu but encountered fierce resistance, with the 113th Regiment launching nine separate counterattacks before relinquishing the bridgehead. Meanwhile, the 30th Chinese Division advanced toward Lashio, supported by Kachin guerrillas. However, General Wedemeyer and the Generalissimo decided to withdraw all Chinese-American troops back to China once Lashio was captured, allowing them to prepare for a potential offensive toward Canton and Hong Kong. In the south, the 82nd West African Division continued its push toward An, facing strong opposition from General Koba's forces at the Dalet River, while the 63rd Indian Brigade readied for an amphibious assault on Ruywa. Additionally, with a robust garrison in the Tamandu sector, General Miyazaki planned to gather his remaining units at An and launch a counteroffensive to eliminate all enemy forces west of the pass. Before he could proceed, the 53rd successfully landed at Ruywa on February 16 with minimal opposition. In the following days, British-Indian forces quickly secured the area. By February 22, the 2nd West African Brigade had also arrived at the beachhead and immediately began a swift advance eastward toward An, while the 74th Indian Brigade was being deployed. The 74th then launched an attack toward Tamandu and, on February 28, began assaulting the main defenses of the 111th Regiment. However, upon learning of the enemy's approach to Meiktila, General Sakurai ordered the 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade to attack the Nyaungu bridgehead after some earlier probing attacks had failed. He also instructed Miyazaki to send the Koba Detachment, primarily composed of the 154th Regiment, to reinforce Yenangyaung. Consequently, facing less resistance in the north, Dalet would ultimately fall to the West Africans by the end of the month. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In Manila, General Yokoyama planned a counterattack to isolate Allied forces, but chaos ensued as American troops advanced. Fierce street fighting within Manila led to significant casualties, marking a brutal struggle for control. Paratroopers launched a surprise assault on Corregidor, overwhelming Japanese defenses, but taking significant losses in the process. Despite injuries and challenges, they secured the island, leading to significant enemy casualties and the end of organized resistance.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 168 - Pacific War Podcast - the Battle of Manila - February 4th - February 11 - , 1945

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 4, 2025 46:02


Last time we spoke about the return to Bataan. In late January, the 43rd Division secured the Rosario region, while the 25th and 6th Divisions eliminated enemy detachments and advanced towards Manila. General Krueger received reinforcements and planned a coordinated attack. On January 28, an assault began, with guerrillas aiding American forces in capturing strategic locations. A daring raid freed 522 POWs, while MacArthur planned further landings to cut off Japanese retreat. By January's end, American forces were poised for a final offensive, pushing closer to victory in Luzon. The ZigZag Pass became a fierce battleground, where Colonel Nagayoshi's well-camouflaged defenses faced relentless assaults from American forces. Despite challenges, the 129th and 20th Regiments made strategic gains, while the 35th Regiment maneuvered through treacherous terrain. Meanwhile, paratroopers from the 511th struggled with scattered landings but secured key positions. As the fighting intensified, the Allies prepared for a decisive invasion of Iwo Jima, aiming to establish a stronghold for future operations against Japan. This episode is the Battle of Manila Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we last observed, by February 3, General Iwanaka's 2nd Tank Division was fending off assaults from the 6th and 25th Divisions in the San Jose area but was on the verge of being encircled. Meanwhile, General Griswold's 14th Corps had successfully taken control of Clark Field and was reorganizing for a final offensive against the Kembu Group. General Hall's 11th Corps had landed on the Bataan Peninsula and was engaged in combat with the Nagayoshi Detachment at ZigZag Pass. Additionally, General Swing's 11th Airborne Division had landed at Nasugbu and had successfully captured Tagaytay Ridge in preparation for an advance toward Manila from the south. The 37th and 1st Cavalry Divisions were advancing on Manila from the north, with the latter's two Flying Columns reaching the outskirts of the Filipino capital. At this stage, the capital was defended by Admiral Iwabuchi's Manila Naval Defense Force, which had consolidated its forces into three primary operational sectors: the Northern Force, led by Colonel Noguchi Katsuzo, responsible for Intramuros on the south bank and all areas of the city north of the Pasig; the Central Force, commanded by Iwabuchi himself, encompassing all of metropolitan Manila south of the Pasig River and extending inland to Guadalupe; and the Southern Force, under Captain Furuse Takesue, covering the Nichols Field and Fort McKinley sectors, as well as the Hagonoy Isthmus. Iwabuchi intended for the Noguchi Force to retreat to Intramuros after disabling the Pasig bridges, while other units carried out extensive demolitions of military infrastructure, including the port area, bridges, transportation systems, water supply, and electrical installations. However, since the Japanese did not anticipate the Americans' arrival for another two weeks, they were ill-prepared to execute these missions or launch any significant counterattacks. Recognizing that the cavalry units were twelve hours ahead of the 148th Regiment, Griswold authorized General Mudge to enter the city. Consequently, late in the afternoon, the 8th Cavalry's Flying Column encountered minimal resistance as it crossed the city limits and advanced towards the gates of Santo Tomas University, where nearly 4,000 American and Allied civilian internees were being held, facing severe shortages of food and medical supplies. Upon their arrival at Santo Tomas, the advance elements of the 8th Cavalry, a medium of the 44th Tank Battalion serving as a battering ram, broke through the gates of the campus wall. Inside, the Japanese Army guards--most of them Formosans--put up little fight and within a few minutes some 3500 internees were liberated amid scenes of pathos and joy none of the participating American troops will ever forget. But in another building away from the internees' main quarters some sixty Japanese under Lt. Col. Hayashi Toshio, the camp commander, held as hostages another 275 internees, mostly women and children. Hayashi demanded a guarantee for safe conduct from the ground for himself and his men before he would release the internees. General Chase, who had come into the university campus about an hour after the 8th Cavalry entered, had to accept the Japanese conditions. In the end, Hayashi obtained permission to lead his unit out with what arms they could carry in exchange for the release of the Allied internees held as hostages. They were then taken by the Americans to the outskirts of Manila early on February 5 and released. Meanwhile, Hayashi was subsequently killed in action. While General Chase worked to secure the release of the internees, Troop G of the 8th Cavalry continued its march south towards the Pasig River but was ultimately compelled to retreat due to heavy fire from the Far Eastern University. Meanwhile, frustrated with the slow progress of General Jones' 38th Division, Hall ordered the 34th Regiment to move past the 152nd and press the attack eastward. Unfortunately, Colonel William Jenna's enveloping assault with the 1st Battalion also failed to penetrate Colonel Nagayoshi's robust defenses. As a result, Jenna opted to deploy his entire regiment in a coordinated three-pronged attack, which commenced on February 4. Initially, the attack, supported by the 1st Battalion of the 152nd Regiment, showed promise; however, due to ongoing strong resistance, including intense mortar and artillery fire, the 34th Regiment had to relinquish much of the territory it had captured by dusk. To the north, the 149th Regiment resumed its advance along the bypass trail and successfully made contact with patrols from the 40th Division near Dinalupihan by the end of February 4, having already reached the town. Looking northeast, with enemy armored units at Muñoz and Lupao effectively contained, the 161st Regiment successfully established roadblocks on Route 8 southeast of San Isidro. Most notably, the 1st Regiment entered San Jose in the morning with little resistance and quickly secured the area, thereby completely isolating the majority of the 2nd Tank Division before it could receive orders to withdraw. As a result, the 6th and 25th Divisions were able to methodically eliminate the enemy's isolated strongholds at their convenience. Further south, by the end of the day, the 8th Cavalry liberated 4,000 internees at Santo Tomas; Troop F also secured Malacañan Palace; the 2nd Squadron, 5th Cavalry advanced toward Quezon Bridge but faced strong resistance at Far Eastern University, where the enemy successfully destroyed the bridge before retreating; and the 148th Regiment entered Manila, moving south through the Tondo and Santa Cruz Districts to reach the northwest corner of Old Bilibid Prison, where they freed 800 prisoners of war and 530 civilian internees. Finally, to the south, the 2nd Battalion, 511th Parachute Regiment departed from Tagaytay Ridge along Route 17, swiftly passing through Imus and Zapote to secure the Las Piñas River bridge. The 1st Battalion followed in the late afternoon but was ultimately halted by mortar and artillery fire at Parañaque. On February 5, the paratroopers managed to cross the Parañaque and began advancing north along Route 1, engaging in house-to-house and pillbox-to-pillbox combat as they moved 2,000 yards north over the next two days. Simultaneously, the majority of the 145th Regiment commenced operations in the densely populated Tondo District along the bay, while other units advanced into the San Nicolas and Binondo Districts to combat the fires ignited by Noguchi's demolitions. Throughout February 5 the 37th Division's men had heard and observed Japanese demolitions in the area along and just north of the Pasig in the Binondo and San Nicolas Districts as well as in the North Port Area, on the 145th's right front. The Northern Force was firing and blowing up military stores and installations all through the area and, as these tasks were completed, was withdrawing south across the river. Insofar as 14th Corps observers could ascertain, there was no wanton destruction, and in all probability the fires resulting from the demolitions would have been confined to the North Port Area and the river banks had not an unseasonable change in the wind about 20:30 driven the flames north and west. The 37th Division, fearing that the flames would spread into residential districts, gathered all available demolitions and started destroying frame buildings in the path of the fire. The extent of these demolitions cannot be ascertained--although it is known that the work of destruction continued for nearly 24 hours--and is an academic point at best since the demolitions proved largely ineffectual in stopping the spread of the flames. The conflagration ran north from the river to Azcarraga Street and across that thoroughfare into the North Port Area and Tondo District. The flames were finally brought under control late on February 6 along the general line of Azcarraga Street, but only after the wind again changed direction. The 148th Regiment fought its way to the Santa Cruz District but was unable to reach the bridges before they were destroyed. The 5th and 8th Cavalry Regiments cleared the eastern part of the city north of the Pasig with minimal resistance, and the 7th Cavalry secured the Novaliches Dam and the Balara Water Filters, which were found intact but rigged for demolition. To the northwest, the battle for ZigZag Pass continued. Dissatisfied with his progress, Hall had previously informed Jones that the exhibition of his division was the worst he had ever seen--a rather severe indictment of an entire division, as only the 152nd Regiment had yet seen any real action on Luzon. Furthermore, the 152nd was a green unit that had been in combat scarcely 48 hours by February 2. Nevertheless, as he believed that the 152nd had at most encountered only an outpost line of resistance, that the principal Japanese defenses lay a mile or so east of the horseshoe, and that the 152nd had found "nothing that an outfit ready to go forward could not overcome quickly", Hall assumed direct control over the 34th Regiment for the main assault and left only the 152nd under Jones' command, which was to follow the 34th through the ZigZag to mop up bypassed pockets of Japanese resistance. Yet the fighting at the horseshoe on February 3 and 4 was equally disappointing, costing the 34th some 41 men killed, 131 wounded, and 6 missing while on the same days the 152nd lost 4 men killed, 48 wounded, and 1 missing. The 34th had extended the front a little to the north of the horseshoe and a bit east of the eastern leg, but neither the 34th nor the 152nd had made any substantial gains beyond the point the 152nd had reached on February 2. The Japanese still held strong positions north of the horseshoe and they still controlled the northeastern corner and about half the eastern leg. The 34th's greatest contribution during the two days, perhaps, was to have helped convince Hall that the Japanese had strong defenses throughout the ZigZag area and that the regiment had indeed reached a Japanese main line of resistance. It had not been until evening on February 4 that Hall was convinced that the 34th and 152nd Regiments had encountered a well-defended Japanese line. Hall instructed Jones to launch an eastward attack with all available forces. Although the initial phase of the attack was promising, the 2nd Battalion of the 34th Regiment became trapped and had to retreat. After sustaining significant casualties, Jenna ordered the 1st Battalion to fall back as well and halted the 3rd Battalion's advance. This left the 152nd Regiment, which achieved considerable progress and cleared much of the northern and central sections of the ridge; however, its 1st Battalion was ultimately ambushed at close range and forced to retreat in chaos during the night. The following day, due to heavy losses, the 34th Regiment was withdrawn from combat, and the reserve 151st Regiment was deployed to support the 152nd. The 2nd Battalion of the latter was also pulled back from the southeastern corner of the horseshoe as artillery focused on Nagayoshi's defenses. Nevertheless, at noon, Hall called for another assault, prompting Jones to reluctantly advance the 152nd Regiment, with only its 3rd Battalion making significant headway against the northeast corner of the horseshoe. Hall had already made his decision; he relieved Jones and appointed Brigadier-General Roy Easley to take temporary command, with General Chase scheduled to arrive on February 7 to lead the 38th Division. Looking westward, after a week of securing previously held areas, General Brush had positioned the 185th Regiment in the north and the 108th Regiment in the south, while the 160th Regiment maintained its positions at Storm King Mountain in preparation for a renewed assault on the Kembu Group. However, before the divisional attack could resume, the 160th Regiment became engaged in a fierce battle for McSevney Point, which was finally secured by dusk on February 8. After fending off several banzai-style counterattacks, the Americans learned on February 10 that the Takaya Detachment had retreated. Meanwhile, the 185th began its advance toward Snake Hill North on February 7, taking three days of intense fighting to capture half the ground leading to this objective. The 108th also moved westward on February 8, making slow progress as it cleared the paths to the Japanese hill strongholds. Further northwest, the 6th and 25th Divisions were conducting mop-up operations in the San Jose sector. By February 6, the 20th Regiment's pressure on Muñoz had resulted in the destruction of nearly 35 tanks, although another 20 remained operational. The next morning, Colonel Ida finally attempted to escape via Route 5; however, the entire Japanese column was successfully destroyed while the 20th Regiment secured Muñoz. At Lupao, the 35th Regiment continued to push the Japanese garrison into an increasingly confined area. As a result, on the night of February 7, the defenders attempted to flee, with five tanks successfully breaking through the 35th's perimeter. The dismounted Japanese forces in the town dispersed, and by noon on February 8, the 35th had taken control of Lupao with minimal resistance. Meanwhile, the Japanese garrison at San Isidro had retreated before the 161st Regiment could capture the town on February 6. The 63rd Regiment successfully took Rizal on February 7, while the 20th Regiment secured Bongabon and cleared the route to Cabanatuan on February 8. Strong patrols were then dispatched toward Dingalen and Baler Bays, which were found deserted by February 12. Back in Manila on February 7, the 37th Division assumed control of the eastern part of the city, while cavalry units advanced beyond the city limits to clear the suburbs east of the San Juan River, with the 8th Cavalry pushing toward San Juan del Monte despite heavy resistance. Most notably, under a strong artillery barrage, the 148th Regiment crossed the Pasig River in assault boats, facing intense machine-gun, mortar, and artillery fire. Despite this fierce opposition, two battalions managed to assemble in the Malacañan Gardens area by the end of the day. Further south, the 511th Parachute and the reinforced 188th Glider Regiment launched an unsuccessful coordinated attack on Nichols Field. Over the next two days, the 511th secured a narrow strip of land between the Parañaque River and the western runway of the airfield, overrunning some defenses at the northwest corner, while the 188th struggled to gain ground in the south and southeast. On ZigZag, Chase managed to deploy three regiments for his initial assaults, with the 151st and 152nd Regiments attacking from the west, while the 149th Regiment advanced from the east. The 5th Air Force initiated an extensive bombing and strafing campaign against the pass, and corps and division artillery increased their support fire. Despite this, the Japanese stubbornly held their ground, and it wasn't until the evening of February 8 that the 151st and 152nd Regiments overcame the last significant defenses near the horseshoe area. On that day, the 7th Cavalry captured San Juan Reservoir, and the 8th Cavalry successfully attacked San Juan del Monte, completing the area's reduction as the defenders retreated toward Montalban. The 145th Regiment launched a final assault on the Tondo District pocket, which would be completely eliminated the following day, while the 148th Regiment cleared the Pandacan District with minimal resistance. The 129th Regiment crossed the Pasig River in the afternoon and moved west toward Provisor Island but was halted by heavy fire at the Estero de Tonque. On February 9, the 8th Cavalry secured El Deposito, an underground reservoir supplied by artesian wells, and advanced south to reach the north bank of the Pasig River. The 148th Regiment began clearing the Paco District but failed to eliminate a strongpoint at Paco Railroad Station and the nearby Concordia College and Paco School buildings. Meanwhile, Company G of the 129th Regiment managed to cross to Provisor and entered the boiler plant, only to be quickly repelled by a Japanese counterattack. After an improvised evacuation overnight, tith close support--so close that the fifteen survivors had to keep prone--from the 2nd Battalion's mortars, Company G's isolated group hung on for the rest of the day while the battalion made plans to evacuate them so that artillery could again strike the island. After dark Company G's commander, Captain George West, swam across the Estero de Tonque dragging an engineer assault boat behind him. Although wounded, he shuttled his troops back to the east bank in the dim light of flames from burning buildings on and south of the island. When a count was taken about midnight, Company G totaled 17 casualties--6 men killed, 5 wounded, and 6 missing--among the 18 men, including Captain West, who had reached Provisor Island during the previous eighteen hours. Despite facing strong resistance, Company E successfully crossed and captured the eastern half of the boiler plant. The Americans gradually cleared the remainder of the boiler house, but every attempt to venture outside drew fire from all available Japanese weapons in range of Provisor Island. At the same time, the 148th Regiment finally secured the Paco District after the enemy abandoned their stronghold during the night, allowing the Americans to gain control of the east bank of the Estero de Paco. The 1st Battalion of the 129th Regiment advanced to both this estero and the Estero de Tonque. The 8th Cavalry crossed the Pasig, establishing a bridgehead about 1,000 yards deep in the Philippine Racing Club area, while the 5th Cavalry moved south alongside the 8th, encountering only scattered resistance as they also crossed the Pasig at Makati. Swing's forces consolidated their gains and established a solid line from the northwest corner to the southwest corner of Nichols Field, eliminating the last Japanese resistance on the western side, while elements of the 511th Parachute Regiment advanced along Route 1 nearly a mile beyond the field's northwest corner. On this day, the 11th Airborne Division came under the control of the 14th Corps, with Griswold ordering Swing to maintain pressure on Nichols Field without launching a general assault toward Manila. Now, however, it was time to leave the Philippines and shift focus to Bougainville to cover the ongoing Australian offensive. Following the capture of Pearl Ridge, Brigadier Stevenson's 11th Brigade assumed control of the central and northern sectors, while General Bridgeford's 3rd Division focused its efforts in the Jaba River region to prepare for an offensive southward. By the end of December, the 15th Battalion had landed in the Tavera River area, and the 47th Battalion launched an attack up the Jaba River to disrupt enemy forces. In the first week of January, Brigadier Monaghan redeployed his troops, with the 42nd Battalion and 2/8th Commando Squadron taking over from the 47th to enable its movement down the coast to support the 15th Battalion. As a result, the Australians swiftly occupied the mouth of the Adele River and secured the Tavera area. By January 12, the 47th Battalion had advanced to the mouth of the Hupai River; however, with the Japanese seemingly reinforcing the Kupon-Nigitan-Mendai area on the Australian flank, Monaghan decided to slow his advance while the 2/8th Commandos conducted reconnaissance toward the Pagana River. With no threats emerging, the 42nd Battalion relieved the 47th on January 17 and advanced unopposed to Mawaraka. In the subsequent days, a long-range patrol from the New Guinea Battalion landed by sea and moved forward to Motupena Point, where they caught a Japanese listening post by surprise. While Monaghan awaited relief from Brigadier Field's 7th Brigade in late January, patrols ventured deep into the Sisiruai area and continued to scout beyond Mawaraka. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Commandos moved to Sovele Mission and patrolled the mountains toward Kieta, occasionally assisting the Kapikavi people in their guerrilla warfare against the Japanese. While the 11th Brigade concentrated in its northern operations, patrols generally guided by native police were sent out for from 1 day to 6 days to probe forward through the bush. The 11th Battery relieved the 10th and it replaced its short 25-pounders with long 25-pounders, with their greater range, in order to support these deep patrols more effectively; from posts on Pearl Ridge and Keenan's Ridge observers directed the bombardment of the Japanese positions on the slopes beyond. The firing of the guns, far below at the foot of the Laruma escarpment, could not be heard at Pearl Ridge and the only warning that the Japanese had was the brief whistle of the approaching shells. Partly as a result of the skilful guidance of the native police the patrols killed many Japanese and suffered relatively small losses. The 26th Battalion, the first to do a tour of duty here, suffered its first death in action on January 7 when a patrol led by Lieutenant Davis met an enemy patrol. Private Smith died of wounds and three corporals were wounded as a result, so the hill where the clash occurred was then named Smith's Hill. As the 26th Battalion advanced toward Smith's Hill, Stevenson had assembled Lieutenant-Colonel Joseph Kelly's 31st/51st Battalion at Sipaai by January 7. The strategy involved moving towards Soraken Harbour through extensive inland patrols designed to drive the enemy back to the coastal area, where they could be decisively defeated. Consequently, the main contingent of the 31st/51st began its advance along the coastal route, while a long-range patrol headed inland via Totokei towards Lalum. By January 16, the Australians reached Rakussia without any issues; however, in the following days, they would need to fight their way to Puto, as the flanking force was also advancing towards Kunamatoro. On January 21, the 31st/51st launched an assault on Tsimba Ridge, where the Japanese had set up their primary defensive positions. The determined defenders successfully repelled several attacks over the next few days, prompting the Australians to attempt an outflanking maneuver on January 25, with a company moving inland to cross the Genga River and attack Tsimba from the north. For the next six days, the Japanese launched strong counterattacks against this bridgehead but suffered significant losses. Ultimately, after a heavy artillery bombardment on February 6, the Australians were able to advance to the western end of the northern side of Tsimba, completely encircling the Japanese forces. The following day, the defenders counterattacked but were pushed back, yet they stubbornly held onto their remaining position at the western tip of the ridge. After an air and mortar assault, Tsimba was finally cleared on February 9, as the Japanese retreated towards the harbour during the night. In the subsequent two weeks, the Australians secured Lalum and the Gillman River, while another flanking force took control of Kunamatoro. On February 22, the 31st/51st Battalion was relieved by the 26th Battalion. Subsequently, the 55th/53rd Battalion took over at Pearl Ridge, where it continued to advance along the Numa Numa trail to engage the majority of the 81st Regiment. The nature of the deep patrols may be illustrated by drawing on the report of the one which killed the largest number of Japanese (26 confirmed kills). Lieutenant Goodwin and 10 infantrymen of the 55th/53rd, with an artillery observer (Lieutenant Ford) and his team, a native police boy and 2 native scouts, set out on March 2 to gain topographical information and information about the enemy, and find suitable supply-dropping points. They were out for 5 days. On the first morning they saw signs of a Japanese patrol of 3 some 45 minutes ahead of them and traced their movements. The Australians moved 5400 yards that day. Next morning near the Numa Numa trail one of the natives reported that Japanese were nearby. Goodwin detailed 3 men to block the track and led 3 others in from the side to deal with the enemy. They crept stealthily forward and found 6 Japanese in a lean-to. Goodwin gave each man a target and all 6 of the enemy were killed. While Goodwin was examining the bodies there was a burst of fire from a ridge overlooking them. The Australians withdrew to dead ground, circled the enemy and marched on into his territory, the Japanese fire continuing for 15 minutes after they had gone. They travelled 7600 yards that day. The 4th was spent reconnoitring the area they had then reached. Next day they had moved some 5000 yards on the return journey when scouts reported Japanese round the junction of their native pad and a creek that lay ahead. Goodwin moved the patrol to a ridge overlooking the Japanese and sent 3 men to cover the track to the west. After killing 15 Japanese and throwing 15 grenades into the area, the patrol then moved 700 yards and bivouacked for the night. Next day—the 6th—6 hours of marching brought them back to their starting point.  Meanwhile, in the south, Field initiated his own offensive by deploying the 61st Battalion to capture the Kupon-Nigitan-Mosina area, which was successfully taken by February 9. Concurrently, the 25th Battalion advanced along the Tavera despite facing strong resistance, eventually connecting with the 61st Battalion in the Mendai-Sisiruai area. The 9th Battalion also progressed along the Hupai, successfully occupying Makotowa by the end of January and then embarking on a challenging march toward Mosigetta, which was captured on February 16. The following day, a company from the 61st Battalion linked up with the 9th Battalion from the north. Additionally, after quickly securing the Sovele area, the 2/8th Commandos began reconnoitering the Sisiruai-Birosi area on February 2. By February 13, they had established a new base at Opai and discovered that the gardens north of the Puriata River were free of enemy forces. Furthermore, a detached company of the 25th Battalion traveled by barge from Motupena Point to Toko and began pushing inland toward Barara, with the remainder of the battalion expected to arrive shortly to support this advance. However, it is now time to shift focus from Bougainville to the ongoing Burma offensives. Initially, in the north, General Matsuyama's 56th Division began its retreat towards Hsenwi and Lashio, successfully breaching the roadblocks established by the 114th Regiment in late January. Meanwhile, the Mars Task Force struggled to dislodge the determined defenders at Namhpakka. Despite capturing Hpa-pen and executing a clever encirclement against Loikang in early February, they managed to take the ridge only after the Japanese had already completed their withdrawal to Hsenwi on February 4. The 56th Division then focused its efforts on the Lashio region, while the 4th, 55th, and 168th Regiments returned to their original divisions, with the 168th specifically tasked with defending Meiktila. On that same day, the first official convoy from the India-Burma Theater reached Kunming via the Ledo Road, which would later be renamed the Stilwell Road in honor of the individual who initiated this ambitious endeavor. Meanwhile, on February 1, General Festing's 36th Division attempted to cross the Shweli River at Myitson but was met with heavy small arms fire from the Japanese. As a result, the British opted to mislead the enemy, stationing the 72nd Brigade, which included the 114th Regiment, on a small island while the 26th Brigade crossed downstream on February 8, successfully capturing Myitson two days later. In the following days, the 26th Brigade fortified its positions; however, General Naka decided to go on the offensive, deploying his 56th Regiment in increments as it advanced north from Mongmit. Consequently, the 114th and 56th Regiments launched a series of intense counterattacks against the 26th Brigade's foothold, effectively containing the British-Indian forces, although they were unable to push them back across the river. Simultaneously, the Chinese 1st Provisional Tank Group, leading the 30th Chinese Division southward, fought its way to Hsenwi on February 19. The 50th Chinese Division, which crossed the Shweli River without opposition, reached the significant nonferrous Bawdwin mines on February 20. Meanwhile, General Slim continued his Extended Capital offensive, with General Stopford's 33rd Corps advancing towards Mandalay, while General Messervy's 4th Corps quietly maneuvered through the Myittha valley toward the Irrawaddy River in the Chauk-Pakokku region. In early February, Stopford made persistent and determined attempts from the north to seize Mandalay, reinforcing the perception that this was Slim's primary focus. By February 12, General Gracey's 20th Indian Division had also arrived at Allagappa, where the 80th Brigade promptly began crossing the Irrawaddy. In the following days, the British-Indian forces would need to defend this bridgehead against fierce counterattacks from the 33rd Division. Additionally, negotiations began to persuade General Aung San's Burma National Army to join the Allies.  In Burma, one man above all others could see the writing on the wall for the Japanese. The Allies received news on January 1 that the Burmese military leader General Aung San and his Burma National Army (BNA) would be prepared to switch sides. An operation by Special Operations Executive (SOE) – codenamed Nation – was launched to liaise with the BNA and the leadership of another group, the Anti-Fascist Organization (AFO), and so facilitate this delicate transfer of loyalties. The first parachute drop of agents was to Toungoo on January 27 and comprised an all-Burma force. It reported that the BNA – or significant parts of it – was ready to turn, but that the AFO needed arming. A team parachuted into Burma on March 20 reported that action by the BNA would begin in a week.  At the same time, General Evans' 7th Indian Division was advancing toward the Irrawaddy, aiming to cross the river at Nyaungu. Comprehensive deception tactics, known as Operation Cloak, were implemented to disguise the Nyaungu crossings. The 28th East African Brigade feigned a southward movement to reclaim the Chauk and Yenangyaung oilfields, and dummy parachute drops were carried out east of Chauk to support this ruse. The 114th Indian Brigade also exerted significant pressure on Pakokku to create the impression that crossings were planned there as well. While the 33rd Indian Brigade stealthily approached Nyaungu via Kanhla, the 48th and 63rd Brigades of the 17th Indian Division, reorganized as motorized units, departed from Imphal and began their descent down the Myitha valley. Worried about the enemy buildup near Nyaungu and Pakokkku, General Tanaka opted to send one battalion from the 215th Regiment to bolster defenses in Nyaungu and Pagan. From February 10 to 12, the 114th Brigade successfully captured Pakokku, while the 28th Brigade took control of Seikpyu. Although the 114th Brigade managed to fend off strong enemy counterattacks, elements of the 153rd Regiment recaptured Seikpyu after several days of intense fighting. On the morning of February 14, the 2nd Battalion of the South Lancashire Regiment crossed the Irrawaddy, landing on a beach a mile northeast of Nyaungu and quickly securing the high ground above, followed shortly by the rest of the 33rd Brigade. The next day, the 89th Indian Brigade began crossing the river, with Evans' forces advancing outward and successfully clearing the Nyaungu area by the end of February 16. Meanwhile, to the south, General Christison's 15th Corps continued its offensive in Arakan in early February. General Wood's 25th Indian Division repelled fierce counterattacks from the 154th Regiment, while General Stockwell's 82nd West African Division pursued the retreating Japanese forces. General Lomax's 26th Indian Division chose to bypass the enemy stronghold at Yanbauk Chaung to the northeast, moving swiftly through Sane and engaging some delaying forces at Namudwe. Additionally, due to the perceived weakness in the boundary between the 28th and 15th Armies, General Sakurai had to send the Kanjo Force, centered around the 112th Regiment, to reinforce Yenangyaung. At this point, most of the 2nd Division had also been dispatched to Saigon to stage a coup against the French government in Indochina, leaving Sakurai with only the depleted 49th Division and 16th Regiment in reserve. By 1944, with the war going against the Japanese after defeats in Burma and the Philippines, they then feared an Allied offensive in French Indochina. The Japanese were already suspicious of the French; the liberation of Paris in August 1944 raised further doubts as to where the loyalties of the colonial administration lay. The Vichy regime by this time had ceased to exist, but its colonial administration was still in place in Indochina, though Admiral Jean Decoux had recognized and contacted the Provisional Government of the French Republic led by Charles de Gaulle. Decoux got a cold response from de Gaulle and was stripped of his powers as governor general but was ordered to maintain his post with orders to deceive the Japanese. Instead Decoux's army commander General Eugène Mordant secretly became the Provisional Government's delegate and the head of all resistance and underground activities in Indochina. Following the South China Sea Raid in January 1945, six US navy pilots were shot down but were picked up by French military authorities and housed in the central prison of Saigon for safe keeping. The French refused to give the Americans up and when the Japanese prepared to storm the prison the men were smuggled out. The Japanese then demanded their surrender but Decoux refused, so Lieutenant-General Tsuchihashi Yuitsu, the Japanese commander of the 38th Army, decided to begin preparations for a coup against the French colonial administration in Indochina. As a result, he chose to send the Kamui Detachment, centered around the 55th Cavalry Regiment, to Letpadan to bolster his reserve forces, which also welcomed the arrival of the Sakura Detachment in Prome. Meanwhile, Lomax's troops successfully captured Ramree village on February 8, forcing the Japanese defenders to retreat chaotically to the mainland. The remainder of the month was spent clearing the rest of the island. Consequently, Stockwell was instructed to bypass Kangaw and initiate an advance toward An. However, by February 15, the 154th Regiment had started to withdraw to positions west and north of the Dalet River, while the Matsu Detachment hurried toward Tamandu, the next target for an amphibious assault. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Manila was just kicking up. Over 4000 internees at Santo Tomas had been rescued and hard earned victories were being won over the formidable ZigZag Pass. Meanwhile the efforts on Bougainville continued against fierce and stubborn Japanese resistance.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 161 - Pacific War Podcast - Third Arakan Offensive - December 17 - 24 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 17, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the invasion of Mindoro. Ormoc fell on December the 10th. The 149th Regiment cleared the airstrip at Buri, while the Japanese launched a desperate attack on airfields, only to be repelled by American forces. Amid chaotic battles, the Japanese attempted maritime reinforcements, but their vessels were met with devastating American fire, sinking transports and crippling their efforts. By December 13, the American advance continued through heavy resistance, leading to intense skirmishes, showcasing bravery and the struggles faced on both sides during the conflict. On December 14, US troops of the 2d Squadron, 7th Cavalry, advanced against stubborn Japanese defenses near Limon. While under fire, they strategically pushed forward, capturing enemy positions and equipment. Despite heavy artillery, Troop G utilized flamethrowers and close combat, overcoming formidable foxholes, helping to secure vital ground. Meanwhile, Admiral Nimitz prepared for future invasions, and General MacArthur postponed operations to protect his forces. The successful landings on Mindoro marked a pivotal moment, signaling the approaching assault on Luzon. This episode is the Third Arakan Offensive  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we left off last week, General Bruce's 77th Division had effectively advanced to Linao and Cogon, securing Ormoc. Meanwhile, General Sibert's 10th Corps had pushed the weary Japanese forces in the north back to the Lonoy area, with both divisions preparing to continue their assaults through the Ormoc Valley toward Valencia, in line with General Krueger's strategy. To address the emerging situation, the 68th Brigade was mobilizing to support the 1st Division, while the 5th and 77th Regiments were making their way to Huaton to participate in a counteroffensive against Ormoc; however, only the 77th Regiment would reach its destination in time. Concurrently, the isolated 16th Division in the central Leyte mountains was gradually withdrawing from the Burauen front, losing strength with each passing day, and the 26th Division was gathering north of Talisanyan to prepare for the final retreat to Ormoc. On December 16, with the port secured, Bruce's forces were poised for the next stage of their advance north along the Ormoc corridor. Given that his patrols reported minimal enemy resistance west of Highway 2, Bruce aimed to encircle the Japanese forces from the east with the 306th and 307th Regiments, while the 305th would advance along the highway. Following this plan, the 305th Regiment quickly eliminated the remaining enemy positions in Cogon and proceeded 400 yards north of the road junction toward Tambuco. Meanwhile, the 307th swiftly moved through the neighborhoods of Jalubon, Liloan, Bao, and Catayom to San Jose, where they encountered and defeated two platoons of paratroopers. The 306th Regiment also advanced to Jalubon but then shifted north toward Tipic to bypass Huaton and directly assault Valencia. Looking north, while the 126th and 127th Regiments fought bravely against an enemy that restricted the division's progress to just a few dozen yards each day, the 12th Cavalry Regiment continued its advance toward Lonoy. Ultimately, the successful American assault on December 16 left the Japanese defenses exposed, prompting General Suzuki to alter his offensive strategy once more, immediately directing his forces to conduct a delaying action to facilitate a final retreat toward Libongao. Meanwhile, Bruce intensified his attack on December 17. As a result, the 305th Regiment encountered stiff resistance while attempting to reach Tambuco. The Japanese had constructed defensive positions along Highway 2 in the southern part of Ormoc Valley. At the road junction of Highway 2 with the road to Liloan were many trenches three to four feet deep and parallel to the highway. Trenches had also been dug along the sides of a machine gun emplacement that occupied a slight elevation commanding Highway 2 both to the north and to the south. On both sides of the road from Cogon to Catayom foxholes lined Highway 2, in the ditches and under the shacks. Some of these positions were dug on a slant and were six to seven feet deep. At Tambuco the foxholes extended along the highway for 400 yards, with machine gun emplacements on the sides of the foxholes. Other positions along Highway 2 consisted of poorly integrated foxholes and machine guns that covered the road. The field artillery pieces between Tambuco and Catayom were placed along the highway, with the exception of a 75-mm. gun that guarded a bridge and was well concealed inside a roadside shack. At 0830 on 17 December the 305th Infantry moved out along Highway 2. At 1000 the 1st Battalion reported that it was advancing at the rate of 100 yards every ten minutes against light opposition. By 1145 the 305th Infantry was fighting through Tambuco. At a road junction just north of Tambuco, it eliminated some enemy resistance and the advance slowed down. The regiment moved forward to a point about 300 yards north of the road junction and established its night perimeter, which extended 300 yards to the northeast along the Tambuco-Dolores road in order to forestall any Japanese counterattacks from that direction. On the same day the 306th Infantry pushed its attack northeast at 0800. The advancing troops almost immediately encountered Japanese who, apparently taken by surprise, were unable to offer organized resistance. At 1040, when the forward elements were 1,000 yards southwest of Cabulihan, the opposition stiffened and the regimental commander therefore committed the 3d Battalion on the left of the 2d Battalion. The advance continued. As the regiment neared Highway 2, resistance became more intense. The 306th Infantry encountered the Japanese who were fleeing northwest from the assault of the 305th Infantry and the heavy artillery that accompanied it. (Unknown to the Americans, General Suzuki and his staff were among the retreating Japanese. Suzuki succeeded in escaping to Libongao, where he established a new headquarters for the 35th Army.) At 1440 the 306th Infantry reached Highway 2 between Catayom and Cabulihan and proceeded north toward Cabulihan, its objective. Advance elements of the 3d Battalion reached the outskirts of the town but withdrew three or four hundred yards to take advantage of more commanding terrain. After combat patrols had cleared the area, the 306th Infantry established its night perimeter five hundred yards south of Cabulihan at 1600.  General Bruce had ordered the 307th Infantry to remain in San Jose until further notice. Since the guerrilla forces had reported a large number of Japanese in the area, General Bruce had made arrangements to soften the sector with an aerial bombardment and artillery fire before the infantry attack. In response to Bruce's request, fifteen P-40's from the V Fighter Command had been made available by General Whitehead for an air strike against the Valencia area. The 155-mm. guns of the 226th Field Artillery Battalion at Daro began firing on Valencia and the airstrip on the morning of 17 December and hit a Japanese ammunition dump. At 1245 the artillery fire was halted for the air strike, and for fifty minutes the area was bombed and strafed. With the conclusion of the air attack, at 1335, the artillery began anew to pound the area. "The medium artillery . . . reached out from Ormoc and the 'Long Toms' . . . from Daro joined in the fighting." In the meantime the 902d Field Artillery Battalion moved forward to a point from which it could support the advance of the 307th Infantry. At 1415 the artillery fire stopped and the 307th Infantry moved out astride the San Jose-Valencia road toward Valencia. Though the artillery fire and aerial bombardment had driven some of the Japanese from the area, a strong well-equipped force, including a number of paratroopers, remained to oppose the 307th Infantry. The regiment pushed forward, however, and at 1640 its leading elements were on the southwestern edge of the airstrip and within 1,000 yards of Valencia. The 307th Infantry formed its night perimeter on the edge of the airfield and made preparations to continue the attack on 18 December. During 17 December, despite the disorganization of the Japanese forces, Colonel Imahori of the 12th Independent Infantry Regiment tried to reach Ormoc, but he was unsuccessful. A few enemy artillery shells landed in the Ormoc area but that was all. General Bruce wrote later: "The men got a laugh because the General's latrine, unoccupied, was struck. He wished about that time that he had remained up front which he had reached by landing in a cub plane on an unimproved jungle road." The following morning, as supplies and ammunition for the 306th and 307th Regiments were running dangerously low, Bruce dispatched an armored column through the 305th's lines, which bypassed enemy strongholds and successfully delivered supplies to both regiments. The 305th Regiment then faced minimal resistance as it advanced toward Huaton, with its 3rd Battalion decisively eliminating all enemy opposition along the Dolores road. Simultaneously, the 306th Regiment steadily pushed toward Valencia, successfully reaching the southern edge of the town, while the 307th secured the airstrip without any resistance. As General Gill directed his forces northward, the 126th Regiment successfully seized a ridge east of the road, advancing closer to the main enemy defensive line located north of Lonoy. On the morning of December 19, the 126th launched another offensive, overrunning numerous enemy positions and advancing 200 yards before being replaced by fresh troops the following day. Meanwhile, the 12th Cavalry encountered only light and sporadic resistance in its efforts to secure Lonoy, although its 2nd Squadron faced tougher opposition while assaulting a knoll southeast of the barrio. To the south, following the fall of Valencia, the 5th Regiment reached Libongao just as Bruce prepared to press forward in the northern campaign. Thus, the 307th Regiment steadily advanced north along Highway 2, engaging an advanced battalion from the Takahashi Detachment, while the 306th moved successfully northwest across the terrain to a position 300 yards south of the Palompon road. On this day, Suzuki received news of the enemy's invasion of Mindoro, along with General Yamashita's orders to conduct a strategic delay on Leyte. In response, he commanded all his forces to begin a gradual withdrawal towards Palompon, leaving Libongao for Matag-ob. On December 20, the 306th Regiment reached the Palompon road and dispatched its 1st Battalion west towards the Togbong River, while the 3rd Battalion turned east towards Highway 2. At the same time, the 307th Regiment launched an assault on the Libongao positions and successfully defeated the 5th Regiment, compelling the Takahashi Detachment to retreat towards Matag-ob, where they established Suzuki's final delaying position. Additionally, as the exhausted 126th Regiment was relieved, the 12th Cavalry began moving south from Lonoy to intercept the enemy's retreat route at Kananga. On December 21, as the 1st and 102nd Divisions began their withdrawal towards Palompon, the 12th Cavalry successfully captured Kananga and established contact with patrols from the 77th Division. Consequently, Highway 2 was finally open from Ormoc to Pinamopoan, and the Ormoc Valley, where the Japanese had fiercely resisted the American advance, was now firmly under the control of the 6th Army. General Mudge, commanding general of the 1st Cavalry Division, said of the 12th Cavalry: “As a result of the stout-hearted efforts of the 12th Cavalry Regiment, elements of the Division are within 2500 yards of making contact with forward elements of the 77th Division. Considering the fact that the regiment has been reduced to 50% strength by the rigors and deprivations of 40 days in the mountains, the display of courage, stamina, and drive on the part of the 12th Cavalry is a credit to the best traditions of the United States Cavalry.” However, we must now shift our focus from the Philippines to Burma to follow the progress of Operation Capital.  Previously, while General Sultan's offensive in the north was advancing well, General Slim's eastern push, led by General Rees' 19th Indian Division, encountered less resistance than anticipated. This indicated that the enemy was rapidly retreating to stronger defensive positions behind the Irrawaddy River. As a result, Slim's strategy to encircle General Katamura's 15th Army on the Shwebo Plain was compromised, necessitating a significant adjustment to his offensive. His forces, stretched from Tamu, were at risk of counterattack while attempting to cross one of the most formidable river barriers. Therefore, Slim aimed to find a way to not only cross his troops over the Irrawaddy without major issues or interference but also to gain the decisive advantage needed to engage the Japanese on his terms, targeting them where their defenses were weakest. In just a few days, Slim and his team devised a new strategy known as Operation Extended Capital. The objective was to convince the Japanese that nothing had altered and that the 14th Army's advance was still primarily directed toward Mandalay, with its two corps crossing the Irrawaddy to the northwest of the city. The core of Slim's revised plan involved General Stopford's 33rd Corps, which, bolstered by the 19th Division and the 268th Tank Brigade, would maintain its planned crossing of the Irrawaddy north of Mandalay. Meanwhile, General Messervy's restructured 4th Corps would tactically cross the river much farther south in Pakokku, allowing them to launch attacks on Meiktila and Thazi, crucial points along General Kimura's communication lines that supported both the 33rd and 15th Armies. The towns of Meiktila and Thazi represented ground that was vital to the enemy defense, a concept 14th Army had first learned painfully in Arakan. The railway and main road from Rangoon ran through Meiktila before bending north on their way to Mandalay, and the town formed a natural location for supply and ammunition dumps, airfields and hospitals. If Slim could cut off both Honda and Katamura's corps from this vital logistical center, the Japanese ability to resist General Stopford's inexorable pressure in the north around Mandalay would be fatally weakened. Slim recognized that without Meiktila, Kimura could not hope to sustain a prolonged battle for Mandalay. Indeed, it might even prove to be the decisive act in the destruction of the whole of Kimura's army. Thus, the northern advance by 33rd Corps would be a deception to hide the decisive strike by 4th Corps to the south. If Slim could attract the greatest possible number of enemy divisions towards the northern crossing points (where, after all, Kimura expected him to strike), he could minimize opposition to the real focus of his attack in the south. This would provide Slim with, as he put it, ‘not only the major battle I desired, but the chance to repeat our old hammer and anvil tactics: 33rd Corps the hammer from the north against the anvil of 4th Corps at Meiktila – and the Japanese between.' Simultaneously, a new offensive was gearing up in the south. Unable to execute Operation Dracula, an intended amphibious assault on Rangoon, Admiral Mountbatten was resolved to initiate an offensive in the Arakan region. Codenamed Operation Romulus, it aimed for General Christison's 15th Corps to again attack Akyab, marking the third attempt to regain Arakan since the war began. Christison's strategy involved a three-pronged attack into northern Arakan, with Major-General George Wood's 25th Indian Division advancing on the right along the coast, Major-General George Bruce's 82nd West African Division in the center within the valley of the Mayu river, and Major-General Frederick Loftus-Tottenham's 81st West African Division on the left in the Kaladan river valley. Expecting heightened Japanese resistance along the Donbaik-Rathedaung-Myohaung line, Christison suggested that while his three frontline divisions engaged the Japanese forces with aggressive attacks, Brigadier Peter Young's 3rd Commando Brigade would land in the Japanese rear on the Myebon peninsula, followed closely by Major-General Cyril Lomax's 26th Indian Division, in a bid to finally capture Akyab. Facing them was General Sakurai's 28th Army, which included the Sakura Detachment, organized around three infantry battalions from the 55th Division along with the 55th Reconnaissance Regiment, stationed along the Godusara-Buthidaung-Kindaung line and the Kaladan Valley. Lieutenant-General Miyazaki Shigesaburo's 54th Division was responsible for defending the remainder of the Mayu Peninsula and the coastal area extending to Taungup. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Sakuma Ryozo's diminished 55th Division occupied the Irrawaddy Delta region, and Major-General Yamamoto Tsunoru's 72nd Independent Mixed Brigade was positioned near the oilfields at Yenangyaung. Additionally, the Katsu Force, centered around the 153rd Regiment, was near Yenangyaung, while the Rangoon Defense Unit, which included the Rangoon Anti-Aircraft Unit and various logistical elements, was tasked with protecting Burma's primary port. Sakurai's strategy, known as Operation Kan, entailed a defensive stance on the Mayu Peninsula and Yenangyaung, along with safeguarding the southwestern coast near Bassein against potential amphibious assaults. As the defenders slowed the enemy's progress towards their fortified positions, the 54th Division would be promptly sent to launch a counteroffensive. Depending on the nature of the attack, units from the 55th Division and Katsu Force would also participate in this counterattack. If a significant battle erupted near Rangoon, the reserve 2nd and 49th Divisions would be deployed without delay. Meanwhile, with the 26th Division being withdrawn for rest, the 25th Division preparing to move towards Rathedaung, and the 82nd Division advancing into the Kalapanzin Valley, the 81st Division was dispatched on October 1 to progress through the Mowdok Mountain Range toward Kyauktaw. As they moved southward across challenging and nearly impassable terrain, the West Africans expected to capture Mowdok by October 18, effectively eliminating the last Japanese forces from Indian territory before progressing through the Kaladan Valley. The 55th Reconnaissance Regiment stationed at Paletwa endured multiple assaults until early November, at which point they received orders to retreat to the Kaladan line. On December 15 the Japanese launched a strong attack with artillery support against the 6th (West African) Brigade. Private Kweku Pong, number two on a Bren, was wounded and separated from his section. Well armed with 12 magazines, he engaged the Japanese with short bursts for hours as they searched for him, until he eventually lost consciousness from loss of blood. Havildar Umrao Singh's gun section of the 30th Mountain Regiment was supporting the brigade when it was overrun and his officer badly wounded. With two other men he defended the position with rifles, bayonets and grenades until they were rushed and he defended it by swinging a rammer until borne down and bayoneted. The Japanese were eventually driven off when both men were found; Singh was awarded a VC and Pong an MM. Slim never changed his view that Africans would be ‘lost' without British guidance; but he probably never heard of Kweku Pong, who found himself alone, badly wounded in the middle of the night with Japanese rampaging through the bush around him and a battle going on behind. No white man was there to tell him what to do, no African NCO nor any other African for that matter. Nobody would have blamed him for lying doggo, but instead he showed considerable courage and good tactical sense. For this action, the 5th Gold Coast Regiment was awarded the unique honor ‘Tinma'.  Meanwhile, by late November, Wood had sent the 51st Indian Brigade to assist the African offensive in the Kalapanzin Valley. After successfully completing this mission, the 25th and 82nd Divisions launched their assault on Buthidaung on December 12. Wood's strategy involved a series of coordinated moves, with units leapfrogging one another, while the pace of the advance depended on how fast the sappers could repair the routes for the subsequent vehicles. Significantly outnumbered, Major-General Sakurai Tokutaro's troops were ultimately forced to evacuate Buthidaung on December 14. In response to the escalating enemy pressure in both the Kaladan and Mayu regions, the 28th Army ordered the Matsu Detachment, consisting of three battalions from the 54th Division, to take over control of the Kaladan front, while Major-General Koba Tomotoki's forces advanced toward Tinma. However, Loftus-Tottenham wisely decided to outflank this position, compelling the recently arrived detachment to withdraw, while other African units successfully made their way to Kyauktaw by the month's end. At the same time, the 53rd Indian Brigade progressed along the Kalapanzin River, and the 82nd Division managed to overcome strong resistance at Kindaung village in late December. On the night of December 21, the 6th Oxfordshire and Buckinghamshire Light Regiment undertook a night march exceeding 20 miles to capture Donbaik, which was taken without resistance. It was only at this point that the remains of the Valentine tanks and crews lost two years prior were discovered. The Sakura Detachment, having reached its limit, had no option but to retreat towards Myohaung, where they would be supported by the Matsu Detachment during their final withdrawal to Prome. With no opposition encountered, the two West African divisions successfully made contact on January 4, resulting in the complete clearance of the Kalapanzin valley. Meanwhile, looking north, Slim had initiated Operation Extended Capital on December 19. In line with this, Stopford instructed the 19th Division to advance along the west bank of the Irrawaddy to launch an attack on Shwebo from the east, while the 2nd British Division, having crossed the Chindwin at Kalewa, approached Shwebo from the west. After capturing Shwebo, the 19th Division was to pivot eastward to secure bridgeheads across the Irrawaddy north of Mandalay, while the 2nd Division continued south towards the Irrawaddy bend near Sagaing. Slim aimed to create the impression that the entire 14th Army was advancing on Mandalay by associating the 19th Division with the 4th Corps. Additionally, the 20th Indian Division was tasked with crossing the Chindwin at Kalewa and moving downstream to capture Monywa. Meanwhile, Messervy was organizing his dispersed divisions to commence their advance down the Gangaw valley, from Tamu to Pakokku. In the lead would be the Lushai Brigade and the 28th East African Brigade, tasked with clearing the enemy from Gangaw and subsequently advancing to Pakokku. The tour de force of deceptions against the Japanese would aid the crossing of the Irrawaddy. Slim's intention behind the plan, known as Cloak, was to conceal the main crossing until the last possible moment by persuading the Japanese to believe that the force preparing to move down the Gangaw valley to cross the river near Pakokku and seize Meiktila was merely making a feint to distract attention from the attack on Mandalay by 33rd Corps from the north. Until now 14th Army's commanders had been reluctant to use any but the simplest signals deceptions, but now they were enthusiastic even to the detriment of operational communications. Thus, three schemes were adopted: Pippin, which covered the withdrawal of the 5th Indian and 11th East African Divisions; Stencil, which created a dummy 4th Corps Headquarters that appeared to control formations under 33rd Corps; and Cloak, which was designed to give a false impression of the forces operating – that the forcing of the Irrawaddy would take place away from the real main effort, and that any movement the Japanese saw in the Gangaw valley was itself only a diversion. There is no doubt the speed the advance into central Burma achieved was in no small measure due to this deception scheme, which also used political channels, displays and deception devices dropped by Mosquitos and Beaufighters. Following them, the 7th Indian Division aimed to capture Pakokku, secure the west bank of the Irrawaddy, and establish a bridgehead across the river. Once this bridgehead was established, the 17th Indian Division and the 255th Tank Brigade would cross the Irrawaddy and race towards Meiktila. However, before initiating this advance, Messervy needed to enhance the pathway through the valley to facilitate the movement of his artillery and armored units. The Lushai Brigade, already forward, also needed artillery support before launching their assault on Gangaw. Therefore, while Messervy's engineers promptly began upgrading the road and track south of Kalemyo, only Stopford's units would engage in combat in late December. Moving swiftly, the advance elements of the 2nd Division, along with the tanks from the 254th Brigade, passed through Pyingaing on December 23 and continued towards Paga, successfully overcoming several rearguard positions held by elements of the retreating 33rd Division, which eventually reached Monywa in early January. At the same time, the 19th Division captured Wuntho and began its advance southward towards Shwebo. In the meantime, Messervy's engineers worked diligently for two weeks to prepare the track, and by the end of the month, his field artillery was en route to Gangaw. The 28th East African Brigade departed Imphal on December 22, followed by the 7th Division four days later. However, in the northeast, Sultan continued his northern offensive with minimal success. With the Ledo Road now extended from Kamaing to connect with the Myitkyina-Bhamo road, the 112th and 113th Chinese Regiments received orders to eliminate the Japanese rear guards along the final segment of the road to China. In the period between the split of the CBI Theater in October 1944 and the fall of Bhamo on 15 December, the Ledo Road engineers under General Pick brought the survey of the Ledo Road from a point just below and east of Kamaing, 211 miles from Ledo, to a juncture with the Myitkyina-Bhamo road. The Ledo Road was to bypass Myitkyina, for there was no point to running heavy traffic through an inhabited place, and Myitkyina's supply needs could be served by an access road. Metaling and grading were complete almost to Mogaung. The Mogaung River had been bridged near Kamaing, and a temporary bridge placed across the Irrawaddy. Tonnage carried on the road for use within Burma was steadily rising. In early October it had carried 275 tons a day; by the latter part of the month the rate was twice that. Immediately after Bhamo's capture, the advance headquarters of the road engineers was moved to that town. A combat supply road was made from Mogaung, below Myitkyina, to a point just ten miles west of Namhkam. The 113th Regiment advanced up the valley along the established road from Panghkam, while the 112th proceeded through the hills. The primary assault was to be led by the 30th Chinese Division, with its 90th Regiment advancing straight along the road toward Namhkam, while the 88th and 89th Regiments executed a shallow envelopment to the south of the road. Although conditions were favorable for a rapid advance into the Shweli valley, the commander of the 90th Regiment hesitated, causing delays along the flanks, as they formed the center of the Chinese line. Concurrently, Sultan ordered the Mars Task Force to embark on a challenging march through the hill country to the Mong Wi area, aiming to cut off the Burma Road near Hosi and effectively encircle the enemy 33rd Army. The 50th Chinese Division, which had been following the 36th British Division down the Railway Corridor, was set to occupy the vacated positions at Tonkwa and Si-u. Its objective was to cross the Shweli near Molo and proceed southeast to capture Lashio. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Amidst fierce battles, General Bruce's troops advanced against Japanese forces in Leyte, securing key positions and paving the way for further assaults amid strategic retreats. In a strategic deception, Slim's forces advanced on multiple fronts, aiming to outmaneuver the Japanese, ultimately leading to decisive victories in Burma and weakening enemy defenses.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 158 - Pacific War Podcast - Operation Capital - November 25 - December 3 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 26, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about Fall of Peleliu. As American forces pressed down the Ormoc Valley, General Kataoka launched a counterattack with limited success, and Colonel Hettinger's 128th Regiment clashed at Breakneck Ridge but couldn't capture Corkscrew Ridge. Meanwhile, Japanese troops fortified defenses, resulting in intense fighting along Kilay and Shoestring Ridges. By November 23, the Americans had solidified their positions around Limon, disrupting Japanese supply lines and forcing a shift in enemy tactics. Simultaneously, Colonel Nakagawa's last forces on Peleliu fought desperately. As American flamethrowers targeted enemy caves, Nakagawa, with only a few soldiers remaining, chose an honorable death, marking the brutal end of the battle. American forces eventually secured Peleliu after extensive losses. Hidden Japanese troops would later survive in caves until 1947, finally surrendering. Lastly China's Operation Ichi-Go saw brutal losses as Japanese forces captured Guilin and Liuzhou, killing civilians and decimating Chinese forces.  This episode is Operation Capital Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  By the end of November, General Gill's 32nd Division had successfully secured the Limon area and was prepared to advance south toward Ormoc. However, they first needed to clear enemy forces from Kilay Ridge. At the same time, General Arnold's 7th Division had strengthened its position on Shoestring Ridge and was preparing to attack the rear of General Yamagata's 26th Division, which was moving east to participate in an offensive against the Burauen airstrips. In the north, Colonel Clifford's 1st Battalion had been under heavy pressure in recent days. With the arrival of the 2nd Battalion, 184th Regiment, however, he was now ready to go on the offensive. On December 1, following intense preparations, the Americans launched an attack on the Japanese-held knolls at the southeastern end of the ridge. They captured the first knoll easily but were halted by intense fire on the second. The next day, Colonel Hettinger's 2nd Battalion continued the assault, this time overcoming all resistance and securing Kilay Ridge for the Americans. Clifford's relieved battalion had suffered 26 killed, 2 missing, and 101 wounded, yet estimated Japanese casualties at 900. Meanwhile, by November 30, General Cunningham's 112th Cavalry Regiment had advanced to a ridge roughly 2,500 yards east of Highway 2 and about 5,000 yards southeast of Limon. Here, they encountered a heavily fortified enemy force that held its ground. Unable to dislodge them, Cunningham sent Troop A northwest on December 2 to connect with the 126th Regiment at the Leyte River. Meeting no resistance, the 1st Squadron also began moving northwest, while Cunningham's 2nd Squadron continued its attempts to take the Japanese-held ridge without success. Facing south, Arnold planned to advance northward with two regiments side-by-side, but his offensive would be postponed until the 17th Regiment arrived on December 3. The next day, patrols were sent forward in preparation for a full assault, reaching as far north as Balogo. Meanwhile, the Japanese were finalizing their own Burauen offensive, codenamed Operation Wa, set to launch on December 5. However, the plan was already faltering: by the end of November, the 16th Division was reduced to only 2,000 men, and the 26th Division was still moving slowly to its assembly point. In response, the recently arrived 3rd Battalion of the 77th Regiment, brought to Ipil by landing barges, was promptly sent to support Yamagata. The 68th Brigade, expected to arrive shortly, was to secure the Albuera sector, blocking any enemy advance toward Ormoc. Additionally, General Tominaga planned to airdrop two regiments from the 2nd Raiding Brigade onto the Burauen airstrips to coordinate with the ground attack. Meanwhile, the Imahori Detachment, pushed out of Daro in late November, remained on standby for action in the Ormoc sector as it retreated toward Dolores. At sea, Admiral Okawachi had deployed the seventh convoy of Operation TA, organized into three echelons to transport supplies and equipment. The first group, consisting of three submarines and one subchaser, departed Manila on November 28 and reached Ipil two days later, successfully unloading cargo but losing one submarine grounded at Masbate. The second group of two submarines left Manila on November 30, unloading at Palompon the next day, although both were later destroyed in a nighttime destroyer sweep. On December 1, a third group of three transports, T-9, T-140 and T-159 and two destroyers,  Take and Kuwa, under the command of Lieutenant-Commander Yamashita Masamichi, departed Manila, reaching Ormoc the next day, where they were attacked by a separate destroyer division during the night. The convoy, under Lieutenant-Commander Yamashita Masamichi, was docked at Ormoc City when it was engaged at 00:09 on December 3 by three ships of Destroyer Division 120 under the command of Commander John C. Zahm. The American destroyers attacked the transports as they were unloading but came under heavy attack from Yokosuka P1Y "Frances" bombers, shore batteries, submarines that were known to be in the harbor, and the Japanese destroyers. As a result, Kuwa was sunk and Commander Yamashita was killed. Take also attacked Cooper with torpedoes and escaped, though with some damage. Cooper finally sank at about 00:15 with the loss of 191 lives (168 sailors were rescued from the water on December 4 by Consolidated PBY Catalina flying boats). At 00:33, the two surviving US destroyers were then ordered to leave the bay, and the victorious Japanese successfully resupplied Ormoc Bay once more. This phase of the Battle of Ormoc Bay has gone down in history as the only naval engagement during the war in which the enemy brought to bear every type of weapon: naval gunnery, naval torpedoes, air attack, submarine attack, shore gunnery, and mines. Meanwhile, as the Battle of Leyte continued, Generals MacArthur and Krueger were preparing the crucial invasion of Luzon. On October 3, the Joint Chiefs of Staff approved MacArthur's Operation Musketeer III over a possible invasion of Formosa, which would have required moving along extended and vulnerable supply lines. However, naval commanders feared an Allied convoy navigating the narrow waters of the central Visayas would be vulnerable to heavy air attacks from numerous nearby enemy airfields. This concern prompted the Americans to plan a preliminary operation, codenamed Love. One option involved securing positions in Aparri to provide fighter cover for supply ships, which could then take a safer route around northern Luzon through open seas. MacArthur, however, favored capturing Mindoro to establish airfields that would protect naval convoys en route to Luzon. Although enemy air attacks posed a risk during the initial invasion and resupply of forces on Mindoro, the establishment of these airfields would give the Allies a shorter, safer route to Lingayen Gulf with improved air protection and reduced exposure to the unpredictable typhoon season compared to the northern Luzon route. The Mindoro operation was scheduled for December 5, followed by a large-scale invasion of Luzon with landings at Lingayen Gulf on December 20, anticipating that the airfields on Mindoro would be operational by then. For Operation Love III, Krueger organized the Western Visayan Task Force, which included the 19th Regiment and the 503rd Parachute Regiment, under the command of Brigadier-General William Dunckel. The initial plan involved a combined airborne and amphibious landing on December 5 to secure the San Jose area near the southwest coast, facilitating the immediate use of its airstrips to support the Luzon operations and counter the numerous enemy airfields on the peninsula. However, delays in the development of airfields on Leyte and the ongoing need for air support for Leyte ground forces led to significant changes in the original Mindoro plan. Consequently, the airborne phase was canceled, and arrangements were made for the parachute regiment to be transported by sea. Ultimately, the prolonged development of airfields on Leyte, resulting in insufficient air support, combined with the urgent need to rehabilitate essential naval units, led to a ten-day postponement of the Mindoro operation to December 15. This delay impacted the Leyte campaign significantly, allowing the released shipping to be utilized for an amphibious assault on Ormoc. As a result, on November 23, General Bruce's 77th Division landed on Leyte in the rear areas of the 24th Corps and was readied for this new assault. Krueger decided to deploy this division for a major push to expedite the conclusion of the Leyte campaign. However, we must now shift our focus from the Philippines to recent developments in New Britain. Following the initial landings at Jacquinot Bay, the 6th Brigade was fully assembled at Cutarp by December 16. Their mission was to halt the Japanese forces from moving westward from Wide Bay and to conduct patrols toward Milim. At the same time, the 13th Brigade was tasked with safeguarding Jacquinot Bay against potential enemy advances from the north or south. To the north, the 36th Battalion was positioned at Cape Hoskins, with two of its companies deployed to Bialla Plantation by December 6 to patrol towards the Balima River and counter any Japanese offensives from Ea Ea. Under this increasing pressure, the enemy was compelled to retreat, leaving the Ea Ea-Ulamona region clear. Due to this unexpected withdrawal and the challenges of beaching barges at Bialla, General Ramsay decided to permit the 36th Battalion to advance toward Ea Ea. After leaving a small detachment at Cape Hoskins, the Australians landed unopposed at Ea Ea on January 13, while a New Guinea company similarly landed on Lolobau Island. To the south, half of the 14th/32nd Battalion successfully landed at Sumpun on December 28, moving closer to the Japanese buildup at the northern end of Henry Reid Bay. By January 7, the rest of the battalion had gathered at Sumpun, and by the end of January, they conducted an amphibious operation to set up a new base at Milim. At the same time, the 6th Brigade also started moving into the Kiep-Milim area, completing this transition by February 11. However, we will now shift our focus away from New Britain and turn our attention to Burma to discuss the continuation of Operation Capital. As previously noted, by the end of November, General Slim's 14th Army had effectively chased the retreating Japanese troops to the Chindwin River, while General Festing's 36th Division advanced to Pinwe, tightening the noose around General Katamura's 15th Army from the north. To the east, General Li Hong's 38th Division had successfully encircled Bhamo, and General Li Tao's 22nd Division along with Colonel Easterbrooke's 475th Regiment were progressing along the Bhamo-Myitson road. On the Salween front, General Wei's Y-Force captured Longling and Mangshi, the key targets of his offensive. However, amid the intense fighting at Mangshi, the 53rd Army executed a broad flanking maneuver through the mountains towards the Chefang Pass, where General Matsuyama's 56th Division was establishing new positions. Fortunately for Matsuyama, the Yoshida Force, anticipating this movement, launched a successful counterattack south of Kongjiazhai, effectively stalling the enemy advance long enough for the withdrawing Japanese forces to regroup. Meanwhile, Wei had dispatched the 71st Army to advance along the Burma Road and the 6th Army to break through Mengga, launching a rapid assault on the hastily prepared Japanese defenses on November 24. The 2nd Army chose to bypass these defenses, continuing south towards Wanding. Despite fierce resistance from the defenders, the determined Chinese forces made significant progress in the following days, ultimately compelling the outnumbered Japanese to withdraw to Wanding on November 28. In response, General Matsui's 113th Regiment established a delaying position at Zhefang, successfully repelling enemy attacks until December 1, which provided crucial time for the retreating forces to regroup at Wanding. By that time, however, Wei's divisions were significantly weakened, lacking 170,000 men from their required strength due to a lack of replacements. As a result, the Chinese command decided to postpone their offensive for thirty days while they awaited additional supplies and reinforcements, as well as a decisive victory at Bhamo that would enable Wei to connect with General Sultan's forces. Meanwhile, while the 30th Division advanced towards Namhkam, the 38th Division had been persistently assaulting Colonel Hara's garrison in the final two weeks of November.  On 15 November, the 113th Regiment attacked and took the outpost positions south of Bhamo and, although the defenders were successful in twice retaking them, on the 17th the positions were finally relinquished. The enemy force brought increasing pressure on the Bhamo outpost positions on all sides while completing preparations for a general attack on the main core of resistance. In the enemy's preparation for the general attack, concentrations of artillery fire and air bombardment caused severe damage. Planes flying out of Myitkyina, averaged 200 sorties a day between the middle of November and 4 December. Every building in Bhamo was destroyed and all defensive positions were badly damaged. Early in the air bombardment period, fire destroyed most of the rations and food supplies began to run dangerously low. Despite the heavy bombardment, the Garrison continued to fight calmly and effectively. Meanwhile, north of Bhamo, where the Chinese had not moved closer to the city than the containing detachment the 113th had left opposite the Japanese outpost at Subbawng, the 114th was making more progress. That regiment bypassed the Subbawng position on 21 November and moved two miles west along the south bank of the Taping River into Shwekyina. Outflanked, the Japanese quickly abandoned Subbawng and the rest of the 114th came up to mop up the Shwekyina area, freeing advance elements of the 114th to move directly south through the outlying villages on Bhamo. On 28 November the 114th was pressing on the main northern defenses of Bhamo. In this period of 21-28 November the division commander, General Li, did not alter the mission he had given the 113th of entering Bhamo, but by his attention to the 114th he seemed to give tacit recognition to the altered state of affairs. The first Chinese attack on Bhamo itself was given the mission of driving right into the city. Made on the south by the Chinese 113th Regiment, the attack received heavy air support from the 10th Air Force. It succeeded in moving up to the main Japanese defenses in its sector, but no farther. American liaison officers with the 113th reported that the regimental commander was not accepting their advice to coordinate the different elements of the Allied force under his command or supporting him into an artillery-infantry-air team, and that he was halting the several portions of his attack as soon as the Japanese made their presence known. However, the 113th's commander might well have argued that he and his men faced the most formidable Japanese position yet encountered in Burma. Aerial photography, prisoner of war interrogation, and patrolling revealed that the Japanese had been working on Bhamo since the spring of 1944. They had divided the town into three self-contained fortress areas and a headquarters area. Each fortress area was placed on higher ground that commanded good fields of fire. Japanese automatic weapons well emplaced in strong bunkers covered fields of sharpened bamboo stakes which in turn were stiffened with barbed wire. Anti-tank ditches closed the gaps between the lagoons that covered so much of the Japanese front. Within the Japanese positions deep dugouts protected aid stations, headquarters, and communications centers. The hastily improvised defenses of Myitkyina were nothing like this elaborate and scientific fortification. Manned by some 1200 Japanese under Colonel Hara and provisioned to hold out until mid-January 1945, Bhamo was not something to be overrun by infantry assault. Although the Chinese managed to destroy several enemy outposts beyond the fortress town, they were unable to penetrate the formidable defenses established by the fierce Japanese troops. After a significant air and artillery bombardment, the 113th Regiment launched another attack at the beginning of December but once again failed to achieve a breakthrough. In contrast the 114th's aggressive commander had been most successful in the early days of December. With less than half the air support given the 113th and with no help from the 155-mm. howitzers, he had broken into the northern defenses and held his gains. The decision to give the 114th first call on artillery support posed a problem in human relations as well as tactics. This was the first time the 38th Division had ever engaged in the attack of a fortified town. All its experience had been in jungle war. Faced with this new situation, the 113th Regiment's commander seemed to have been at a loss to know what to do. The 114th, on the contrary, had gone ahead with conspicuous success on its own, and now was being asked to attempt close coordination with artillery and air support. Its commander hesitated for a day, then agreed to try an attack along the lines suggested by the Americans. The tactics developed by the 114th Regiment by 9 December took full advantage of the capabilities of air and artillery support. Since the blast of aerial bombardment had stripped the Japanese northern defenses of camouflage and tree cover it was possible for aerial observers to adjust on individual bunkers. So it became practice to attempt the occupation of one small area at a time. First, there would be an artillery preparation. Two 155-mm. howitzers firing from positions at right angles to the direction of attack would attempt to neutralize bunkers in an area roughly 100 by 300 yards. Thanks to the small margin of error in deflection, the Chinese infantry could approach very close to await the lifting of fire. The 105's would lay down smoke and high explosive on the flanks and rear of the selected enemy positions. Aerial observers would adjust the 155's on individual positions. When it was believed that all Japanese positions had been silenced the Chinese infantry would assault across the last thirty-five yards with bayonet and grenade. As casualties increased, Hara's garrison continually weakened under relentless assaults, with the outnumbered soldiers bracing themselves to fight to the last man in defense of Bhamo. Determined to prevent the Bhamo Garrison from meeting the same fate as the Lameng and Tengchong Garrisons, General Honda ordered Colonel Yamazaki Shiro's reinforced 55th Regiment to advance towards Namyu and execute a surprise counterattack to assist Hara's beleaguered troops. Departing from Namhkam on the night of December 5, the Yamazaki Detachment stealthily made their way to Namyu, where the 90th Regiment had recently established its primary position atop Hill 5338. Additionally, General Naka's 18th Division was instructed to support this initiative, with Lieutenant-Colonel Fujimura Yoshiaki's 56th Regiment ordered to move through Tonkwa to join the attack. Due to the enemy's successful Ichi-Go offensive, General Wedemeyer and Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek made the decision to withdraw the elite 22nd and 38th Divisions from Burma. They planned to deploy these divisions to defend Kunming as part of the Alpha Plan. Not even the most optimistic Chinese could for the moment interpret that the Japanese thrust was confined to the American air bases in China, and no one on the Allied side could feel really sure where the 11th Army would halt, though the summer uniforms worn by the Japanese suggested to American observers that the Japanese might be outrunning their supply lines. Theater headquarters thus concluded that Chongqing and Kunming were under direct, immediate threat. In response, having adopted the code name Alpha, Wedemeyer first presented a detailed plan to the Generalissimo on November 21. This plan was divided into several phases. The period to December 31 was set for Phase I of ALPHA, in which the Chinese forces in contact with the Japanese in south and southeast China would try to slow their advance. The Americans would assist in demolitions, help plan prepared positions, and give the maximum of air support. American officers would fill liaison and advisory roles with the Chinese Army down through division level. Other Americans would work closely with the operations, intelligence, and supply officers of higher Chinese headquarters. Plainly, the mission of Phase I was to win time within which to complete a concentration for defense of Kunming. In Phase II, Chinese forces would be placed across the principal avenues of approach to Kunming while a central reserve would be built up around Kunming itself. To guarantee the availability of dependable Chinese troops two divisions of the Chinese Army in India would be flown in from Burma, together with the 53rd Army from the Salween front. About 87500 troops would be brought to the Kunming area from less menaced sectors of China.  As a result, although Sultan was able to keep the 38th Division and intended to send the 14th Division back to China, General Liao was instructed on December 5 to ready the 22nd Division for airlift to China, with Colonel Easterbrooke's 475th Regiment assigned to relieve them north of Tonkwa. However, before this relief could occur, the Fujimura column attacked Tonkwa on December 8 and effectively pushed back the Chinese garrison. The Japanese continued their assault northward the next morning, but this time, Chinese-American forces were able to stop the enemy's progress. In the following days, Japanese patrols further tested American positions, and sporadic artillery and mortar fire harassed soldiers in their foxholes, but no significant assault took place. While the Chinese withdrew on December 12, American patrols discovered the enemy's apparent assembly areas, leading to artillery fire directed at them. Meanwhile, following a heavy artillery bombardment, the Yamazaki Detachment surprised the 90th Regiment on  December 9th. The battalion received a heavy bombardment followed by a Japanese attack which penetrated its lines and isolated its 1st and 2d Companies. This was bad enough, but worse followed the next morning. Colonel Yamazaki massed three battalions in column to the east of the road, and, attacking on a narrow front, broke clean through by leap-frogging one battalion over another as soon as the attack lost momentum. The third Japanese battalion overran the 2d Artillery Battery, 30th Division, and captured four cannon and 100 animals. The battery commander died at his post.  Despite this setback, the Chinese remained undeterred, exhibiting a fighting spirit that surprised the Japanese. The 88th Regiment swung its forces toward the Japanese penetration, which was on a narrow front, and since the terrain was hilly in the extreme the Japanese could see Chinese reinforcements converging on the battle site. So vigorously did the Chinese counterattack that one lone Chinese soldier fought his way almost into the trench that held Colonel Yamazaki and the 33d Army liaison officer, Colonel Tsuji. Writing in his diary, Tsuji remarked: "This was the first experience in my long military life that a Chinese soldier charged Japanese forces all alone." The Chinese, comprising as they did three regiments of a good division, could not be indefinitely withstood by the four Japanese battalions. Destroying the four pack howitzers they had captured, the Japanese sought only to hold their positions until the Bhamo garrison could escape. Facing intense pressure from a numerically superior enemy, Yamazaki managed to fend off Chinese counterattacks over the subsequent days, striving to create a favorable moment for the Bhamo Garrison to withdraw. By December 14, with the 114th Regiment advancing into central Bhamo, Hara's remaining 900 soldiers destroyed all their artillery and focused their efforts on the southern front. As night fell, they desperately climbed the steep 50-foot banks of the Irrawaddy and charged the Chinese lines at daybreak. Utilizing the cover of early morning fog, Hara's men successfully penetrated the Chinese positions and began their final retreat towards Namhkam. Once the garrison was safe, the Japanese term for "success" was relayed to the waiting Yamazaki Detachment, which subsequently began to disengage, having suffered 150 fatalities and 300 injuries. The Bhamo Garrison, on the other hand, sustained approximately 310 killed and 300 wounded since the onset of the Allied offensive, with about 870 of the original 1,180 men surviving. At this point, only 50 miles remained between Sultan's forces and Y-Force. Meanwhile, the Fujimura column attacked again on December 13. The Japanese activity had apparently been preparation for attack, and on the morning of the 13th men checked their weapons with care and looked to the arranging of their ammunition in convenient spots. The American positions had the advantage of excellent fields of fire across open paddy fields. Looking toward the south and the west, the men of the 475th could see the dark green mass of leaves, trunks, and brush making the jungle that hid the Japanese assembly areas and, farther back, the Japanese gun positions. Following a ten-minute preparation, the Japanese attacked one American flank at 0600 and the other at 0610. The 475th's fire power met the Japanese as soon as they were clearly defined targets, and stopped the attacks within an hour. At one point a Japanese force of about a platoon tried to cover the open space by a concerted rush only to be cut down with thirty or forty casualties. There were no further Japanese attacks that day. The following morning, the 14th, the Japanese repeated their tactics of the 13th, and that effort too was beaten off, at the cost of several men killed. The 475th's entry into combat had the result on the men noted by observers in many previous wars, for they now spent hours digging themselves in more deeply and improving their positions. The 3d Battalion to the north near Mo-hlaing was subject only to artillery fire. That the Japanese at one point were actually within small arms range of the 2d Battalion while apparently not capable of doing more than shelling the 3d with their infantry guns suggested that the 3d might be able to take in reverse the Japanese pocket that pressed on the 2d Battalion. After two days of fierce combat, Easterbrooke's troops ultimately prevailed, launching a robust counteroffensive on December 15 that secured the Tonkwa area. Following these minor operations, both sides experienced a week of skirmishes around the American perimeter defenses until the final Japanese withdrawal, as the Bhamo Garrison had already been liberated. By the end of the battle, the 475th had lost 15 men killed, while an estimated 220 Japanese casualties were inflicted. Following these developments, Honda reorganized his forces, instructing the 56th Division, along with the attached Yamazaki Detachment, to defend the Wanding-Namhkam sector. He also dispatched the Yoshida Force and the 4th Regiment to reserve positions in Hsenwi while retaining the 18th Division at Mongmit. To the west, after the captures of Kalemyo on November 14 and Kalewa on November 28, General Tanaka's 33rd Division was compelled to establish new positions in the Shwegyin-Mutaik sector. In response, Slim directed the 4th Corps to cross the Chindwin River and seize Pinlebu. The 268th Indian Brigade was dispatched across the river at Sittaung, followed by Major-General Thomas “Pete” Rees' 19th Indian Division on December 4. Meanwhile, the 11th East African Division fought fiercely to expand the bridgehead at Kalewa. For the crossing a ‘Chindwin Navy' was formed, with two wooden gunboats mounting a Bofors and two Oerlikon cannons and two pairs of Browning machine-guns. They were built at Kalewa and named Pamela, after Mountbatten's youngest daughter, and Una, after Slim's. Thus Slim became the only general to have designed, built, christened, launched and commissioned ships for the Royal Navy. Their task was to protect the Inland Waterways Transport's lighters, barges and launches, built by Fourteenth Army's Chief Engineer, Brigadier Bill Hasted, who felled forests to create them and for which outboard motors were flown in. The IEME recovered MV Ontario, patched, caulked and repainted her. In due course IWT craft carried some 38000 tons of stores. The task of establishing a firm bridgehead across the Chindwin was accomplished by the East Africans clearing a series of Japanese positions along either side of Myittha river gorge on December 2 after recce by the Sea Reconnaissance Unit (SRU).  As the bridgehead was expanded, bridging equipment for what, at 1154 feet, would be the longest floating bridge in the world was assembled and constructed in sections on the Myittha and floated down to the Chindwin and completed in just 28 working hours between December 7 and 10. Meanwhile Brigadier Mackenzie's 32nd Indian Brigade completed its three-day crossing of the Chindwin at Mawlaik using only two rafts named ‘Horrible Charlie' and ‘Stinking Henry'. Unbeknownst to the British and Indian forces, Katamura had already set his withdrawal to the Irrawaddy River in motion, ordering the beleaguered 15th and 53rd Divisions on December 1 to fall back to Kyauk Myaung and Kyaukse, respectively. On December 4, the 33rd Division began its gradual retreat toward Monywa, leaving the 213th Regiment behind as a rear guard to monitor the enemy in the Shwegyin-Mutaik sector. The 31st Division, now under Lieutenant-General Kawata Tsuchitaro, would cover the retreat from its positions at Kambalu and Shwebo. Consequently, Rees, acting on Slim's orders to take risks for speed, made swift progress through the challenging Zibyu Range, with his advance elements connecting with the 36th Division at Banmauk on December 16. After a lengthy pause regarding the Pinwe situation, Festing's patrols entered the towns of Indaw and Katha without opposition on December 10. From these locations, the 26th and 72nd Indian Brigades were set to move towards Kunchaung, while the 29th Indian Brigade continued its advance along the road to Takaung. Throughout this period, Japanese resistance was significantly less fierce than anticipated. Consequently, just days into the operation, Slim realized that his original strategy to encircle Katamura's 15th Army on the Shwebo Plain in front of the Irrawaddy would be ineffective. If the Japanese were indeed planning to fight from behind the river, the 14th Army would be extended from Tamu and exposed to counterattacks at a critical moment while attempting to cross one of the most daunting river obstacles. A revised strategy was therefore necessary, but Slim had only one card left to play for this situation. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General MacArthur was now preparing a massive invasion of Luzon. Amidst ongoing air attacks, plans shifted to secure Mindoro for air support. Meanwhile, in Burma, Chinese and Japanese forces clashed over Bhamo, with the Japanese garrison ultimately escaping. It seemed everywhere things were going badly for the Japanese, how much longer would they hold out?

Life, Death, and Taxonomy
Episode 352 – Irrawaddy Dolphin: Spy Hopper

Life, Death, and Taxonomy

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 13, 2024 38:34


“…and today we're talking about a little ocean hopping spy. But more on that later.” A dolphin dipping in deep abyss must allow the sun to have its kiss When scouting schools of succulent fish a trick ensures they will not miss. What vantage a high place can be! What new things can you see? […]

PacMam Podcast
Marine Mammal Highlight 59: Irrawaddy dolphin!

PacMam Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 4, 2024 51:58


Join Pacific Mammal Research (PacMam) scientists to learn about different marine mammals each episode! We discuss a little about the biology, behavior and fun facts about each species. Have fun and learn about marine mammals with PacMam! Donate today: https://donorbox.org/donatetopacmamwww.pacmam.org This week: Irrawaddy dolphin Presenters: Cindy Elliser, Katrina MacIver Music by Josh Burns Sources: https://www.marinebio.org/species/irrawaddy-dolphins/orcaella-brevirostris/#:~:text=Irrawaddy%20dolphins%2C%20Orcaella%20brevirostris%2C%20are,sub%2Dtropical%20Indo%2DPacific. https://www.riverdolphins.org/river-dolphins-worldwide/irrawaddy-dolphin/ New Research • Habitat modeling in Thailand Jackson Ricketts et al 2020 - https://repository.library.noaa.gov/view/noaa/28594 • Long term population and distribution dynamic in Inodonesia and effects of coastal development, Kreb et al. 2020 - https://www.frontiersin.org/journals/marine-science/articles/10.3389/fmars.2020.533197/full • ID habitat characteristics and crucial areas Peter et al. 2016 - https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-26161-4_15 • Surviving ware and crowded world – in largest brackish water lagoon, Acharyya et al 2023 - https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s11852-023-00982-8 • Demographic collapse and low genetic diversity in Mekong river, Krutzen et al 2018- https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0189200

Oops, Your Culture's Showing!
52: Myanmar: From A Zat Pwe To Mandalay

Oops, Your Culture's Showing!

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 24, 2024 44:15 Transcription Available


Are Burma and Myanmar the same place? How long does a zat pwe last? Why are only foreigners allowed into a certain garage in Mandalay? In this episode, Dean and Tom travel along Myanmar's central river, the Irrawaddy, to answer these very questions, all the while observing Buddhist temples and pagodas, holding hands with new friends, and donning a mustachioed purple t-shirt. They also seek to build bridges across a river of differences - and despite Producer Torin having just mixed river metaphors while writing this description, he (foolishly) continues his literary journey for one more sentence. In closing: Join us for this episode's journey to and through Myanmar; you won't soon forget it. ***Subscribe to Dean's Substack here for all of Dean's CultureQuizzes, “Culture's Consequences” articles, and much more!*** Have a cultural question or episode idea? Reach out on X/Twitter & Facebook (@OopsCultureShow) or by email at oopscultureshow@gmail.com. Hosts: Dean Foster & Tom Peterson Audio Production: Tom Peterson & Torin Peterson Music: “Little Idea” – Bensound.com

Insight Myanmar
Caught in the Crossfire

Insight Myanmar

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 4, 2024 62:20


Episode #273: The 4th International Conference on Burma/Myanmar Studies (ICBMS), hosted by Chiang Mai University in August 2024, brought together over 800 scholars, activists, and experts to discuss Myanmar's political, social, and economic challenges, including the impact of the 2021 coup. Insight Myanmar Podcast was given exclusive access to cover the event, where we recorded brief interviews with a number of guests and covering a wide range of diverse topics. These interviews are being presented in a special, four-part series, of which this episode is the first. Guests include: Aung Zaw, founder and editor of The Irrawaddy. He has dedicated his career to independent journalism since the 1988 uprising, facing significant threats and intimidation from the Burmese regime, while remaining committed to democracy, press freedom, and exposing the truth about Myanmar's situation. Dr. Mar Mar Gyi, a Burmese anthropologist and filmmaker. She focuses on gender issues and the overlooked roles of women in Myanmar's history, emphasizing that feminist movements have deep local roots, and that Burmese women historically enjoyed significant rights that have been eroded by colonialism, nationalism, and militarism. Katie Julian, an education expert deeply involved in Myanmar's higher education system. She focuses on developing curriculum and training programs in non-state and ethnic-run sectors, emphasizing locally relevant materials and skills-based learning; she remains hopeful post-coup due to the resilience of Burmese educators and the emergence of informal education structures in IDP camps. Amy, a law graduate and activist. She has spent three years working on gender-based violence and child abuse cases, collaborating with NGOs to support human rights defenders and is now building networks in Thailand and Myanmar to provide legal aid and raise awareness about human rights issues in post-coup Burma. Sitthu, a law student and member of the Civil Disobedience Movement. He focuses on human rights research and believes in using law as a tool to address ethnic divides and expose Myanmar's human rights violations to both regional and global audiences, advocating for inclusive and just legal frameworks in the face of military oppression.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 150 - Pacific War Podcast - Fall of Angaur 3 - October 10 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 1, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the ongoing battles of Peleliu, Angular and Operation Ichi-Go. On September 23, Colonel Venable's regiment struggled to breach Lake Salome's defenses, leading to tactical changes and propaganda attempts to force Japanese surrender, which ultimately failed. The American command underestimated Japanese resolve, resulting in heavy bombardments and a strategic advance. By September 26, American forces had divided Peleliu and isolated Japanese defenders, facing fierce resistance but making significant progress. On September 27, 1944, Company F secured two ridges in Peleliu but struggled with Japanese forces entrenched in caves, halting progress. Despite controlling the northern shore, Marines faced persistent underground resistance from skilled Japanese miners. Meanwhile, the 5th Marines captured Hill 3, Ngesebus Island, and Radar Hill. In October, Japanese offensives continued against minimal resistance. This episode is the Japanese Triumph in China Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In our previous episode, General Mueller's infantry on Angaur had driven Major Goto's isolated forces into the Romauldo Pocket by October 1. After this victory, it was decided to shift away from costly full-scale infantry assaults. Instead, tanks, mortars, and artillery were deployed to target the remaining enemy positions directly. On 6 October artillery and mortars undertook an especially heavy bombardment. From 0700 to 1030, 155-mm. howitzers fired at especially chosen targets, including a suspected Japanese observation post, while 105-mm. howitzers, 4.2-inch mortars, 81-mm. mortars, and 60-mm. mortars laid concentrations on the flanks and rear of the remaining Japanese-held area to prevent any Japanese from escaping. At 1030 the artillery and mortars switched to smoke shells to blanket the Japanese area and at 1035 these weapons ceased fire. Following the bombardment, two companies were dispatched to feint attacks on the Japanese flanks, aiming to force them out of their fortified positions. The defenders, deceived by the ruse, were then subjected to another intense artillery and mortar barrage, which inflicted significant casualties. Additionally, in the afternoon, a major concrete and steel emplacement, likely serving as Goto's command post, was uncovered and destroyed by direct fire. With the enemy defenses considerably weakened, infantry operations resumed, focusing on sniper teams, small patrols, ambushes, and booby traps to encircle the remaining Japanese forces and cut off their supply and escape routes. Over the next few days, the Americans also rescued 183 captive natives during the final stages of their assault.  The Japanese had under their control in the final pocket a number of Angaur natives, three of whom had managed to make their way into the 322nd Regiment lines after a surrender broadcast on October 1. These related stories of hardships suffered in caves where the Japanese had kept them closely guarded and also told the 322nd that more natives were being held in the northwest pocket. First attempts by native volunteers to lead some of the others out were unsuccessful; but on October 8,137 more natives made their way out of the pocket to an area where elements of Company B, 306th Engineers, were working. The next day, three native volunteers led 90 more out of the pocket. About 1/5 of the total of 183 natives rescued from the Japanese needed extensive medical attention and all the rest were suffering from malnutrition. The healthier ones rebuilt their own village and some were ultimately used as labor on various projects at Angaur. On October 13, a coordinated attack was launched, with the 1st Battalion advancing from the west and the 2nd Battalion pushing from the north and northeast. Despite fierce resistance, by October 18 the Americans had successfully compressed the remaining Japanese into a pocket approximately 100 yards long and 50 yards wide. The following night, Major Goto was killed, and by October 21, the last pockets of resistance were eliminated. The engagement ended two days later when the Americans realized they had eliminated nearly all the Japanese troops, with only a few stragglers remaining. By the conclusion of the Battle of Angaur, approximately 1,300 Japanese soldiers had been killed, and 45 were captured. The Americans, on the other hand, suffered 264 men killed and 1,355 wounded, primarily from the 322nd Regiment. To be more specific the 321st Infantry's part in the operation had cost that regiment 26 men killed and 135 wounded. The 322d Infantry, which fought longer and against stiffer opposition, lost 211 men killed and 772 wounded.  Despite the heavy losses, capturing Angaur proved crucial in securing the Palaus and removing the island group as a threat to Allied lines of communication across the western Pacific toward the Philippines. Airdrome construction on Angaur was begun on 20 September, F plus 3, by the 1884th and 1887th Engineer Aviation Battalions. The first plane, a C-47, landed on the field on F plus 28, 15 October. Four days later two 6,000-foot landing strips were completed and work on taxiways, gasoline storage, and other air-base installations was well along. Air-base construction on Angaur presented difficult problems. There was available no conveniently located Japanese airfield which the Allies could repair, improve, and expand. Instead, the work had to begin at the beginning. Jungle had to be cut away, swamps filled, and rough terrain leveled. There was no hope that an airstrip could be prepared in three or four days as had been the case on many other islands in the Pacific. The completion of two 6,000-foot runways by 19 October, F plus 32, represented a considerable accomplishment. In defending Angaur, the Japanese lost a well-equipped, highly trained, and well-led infantry battalion. While this force might have been more effectively deployed elsewhere in the Palaus, it succeeded in its mission of delaying the American advance.  Meanwhile, General Ishii of the 32nd Division decided to reinforce the limited Japanese presence in Morotai to hinder the development of an enemy airbase capable of supporting an assault on the Philippines. Consequently, three temporary raiding detachments from the 10th Expeditionary Unit and the 211th and 212th Regiments were formed, with the 210th Regiment preparing a battalion as a follow-up force. On the night of September 26, Ishii's reinforcements began their movement to Morotai in barges, with two detachments successfully landing near Tilai and the other near Cape Posiposi despite interference from Allied PT boats. Enemy patrols around the island's perimeter blocked the use of coastal tracks, forcing the reinforcements to navigate through dense jungle. As the concealed Japanese raiders made their way toward Major Kawashima's main force in the Pilowo-Sabatai River area, the 3rd Battalion of the 210th Regiment landed in the Boesoboeso sector on October 9. The raiding detachments finally joined up with the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit on October 20. Without waiting for the 210th battalion, Kawashima initiated a series of new infiltration raids, some of which reached the airfield itself. Although these reinforcements created some disruptions by harassing Allied outposts, they did not significantly impact the situation at Morotai. This was due to high disease rates among the reinforcements and the inability to deliver enough supplies through the Allied air and naval blockade. General Anami decided more decisive action was needed to prevent the enemy from utilizing their airbase effectively. He instructed Ishii to deploy as much force as possible to Morotai to destroy the enemy. In response, Ishii planned to send additional reinforcements, including the main forces of the 210th and 211th Regiments and the 18th Shipping Engineers. By November 16, approximately 1,900 troops successfully landed south of Wadjaboela, with Colonel Kisou Ouchi taking command of all Japanese forces on Morotai. Raiding activities intensified in December, but with the new year, American torpedo boats further tightened the blockade, making it impossible for the 32nd Division to supply the ammunition and rations needed for a major offensive. Unable to dislodge the enemy from Morotai, the Japanese eventually had to withdraw to the center of the island, where they remained until the end of the war. The most notable Japanese response to the Allied landing was a series of frequent but mostly ineffective air raids. The first raid occurred on September 16 when a solitary enemy aircraft dropped three bombs on the Red Beach area, causing no damage. Between September 15, 1944, and February 1, 1945, General Sudo's 7th Air Division conducted 82 raids on Morotai, involving 179 sorties. The initial 54 raids caused minimal damage, with only twelve Allied soldiers wounded by October 4. However, the later raids resulted in 42 Allied aircraft destroyed, 33 damaged, 19 men killed, and 99 wounded. Despite these efforts, Morotai was successfully developed into a crucial base for the return to the Philippines. In Bougainville, with General Griswold's 14th Corps initially slated for the Leyte invasion, efforts were made to replace it with the Australian 2nd Corps. Although Griswold's corps would not participate in the October 20 operation, advance elements of General Savige's headquarters landed on October 6 to facilitate the transition. By mid-November, the 7th Brigade had relieved the 129th and 145th Regiments, and on November 22, Savige officially took command of Allied operations on Bougainville. By December 12, the replacement of American frontline troops by Australians was complete, and with only a few service personnel remaining, all American troops had departed by February 1, 1945. Despite having 30,000 men—though always short on heavy equipment and shipping—Savige's forces were considered sufficient to continue monitoring the Japanese and defending the perimeter around the airfields from any potential counterattacks. However, General Blamey disagreed with this approach and preferred a more aggressive strategy. He wanted his troops to actively seek out and destroy the enemy by patrolling deep into Japanese-held territory, targeting supply areas and bases to starve and eventually annihilate the Japanese garrisons. This shift in strategy signaled the start of a new offensive phase in the Bougainville Campaign. At the same time, attention shifts to North Burma, where the Allied campaign continued after the victories at Myitkyina and Mogaung. However, the strained relationship between General Stilwell and Chiang Kai-Shek was approaching its breaking point. Confronted with the impending loss of Guilin, Stilwell persuaded President Roosevelt to issue an ultimatum to Chiang, threatening to cut off American aid to China unless Stilwell was given full command of all forces in China. Chiang, perceiving this as an attempt to dominate China, countered by demanding Stilwell's immediate replacement and welcoming any other qualified American general. As a result, on October 19, Stilwell was recalled and replaced by Major-General Albert Wedemeyer by the end of the month. The China-Burma-India Theater was then reorganized: Lieutenant-General Daniel Sultan took over the India-Burma Theater, while Wedemeyer assumed command of the newly established China Theater. However, Wedemeyer would only serve as chief of staff to Chiang, not taking effective command of the Chinese forces. Thus, no American officer would be held accountable for the loss of eastern China. Nonetheless, this represented another significant diplomatic victory for Chiang Kai-Shek, though it would be his last for many years. However, it also marked the end of his relationship with Roosevelt, who had previously championed China's and the Generalissimo's interests. Meanwhile, upon taking command, Wedemeyer faced open dissent among the Chinese Nationalists, with local commanders in eastern China on the verge of insurrection against Chiang's regime, as he had refused to supply arms to those defending against the Japanese advance in Operation Ichi-Go.  There were many detailed reports that the east China commanders bitterly resented the Generalissimo's failure to support them. When Hengyang fell on August 8, Chinese claiming to be emissaries of these men presented to American authority a plan for a separatist regime and pleaded for American support. Unknown to the Americans, Chinese making identical representations had been negotiating with the Japanese since the winter of 1943-44. Intelligence reports were received at US headquarters to the effect that the Generalissimo's attitude toward the east China campaign reflected an understanding between him and the Japanese under which they would leave him undisturbed in southwest China if he in turn would not interfere while they took the airfields that presented so obvious a menace to the Japanese homeland. In 1951 a group of senior Japanese staff officers of China Expeditionary Army were interrogated on the question of Sino-Japanese relations in 1944. They denied that there had been any understanding between the Japanese and the Chinese Central Government. Two of them, Lt. Cols. Yoshimasa Okada and Yoshio Fukuyama, stated that an agreement was reached between the Japanese 23rd Army at Canton and the local Chinese commander, General Yu Hanmou, in February 1944 under which General Yu agreed not to disturb Canton when the Japanese marched north from it. Yu kept his word, according to Okada, even though the Generalissimo was ordering him to attack Canton. The Japanese officers agreed among themselves that there had been extensive contact with dissident Nationalist commanders in southeast China, and stated that through many channels they had sought to inform the Chinese that the east China drive offered no threat to them, but only to the US airfields. One of Wedemeyer's key objectives was to prevent China from fragmenting into warring factions. Additionally, he observed that air transport was delivering supplies to China at unprecedented rates, with 35,131 tons arriving in October 1944—four times the amount sent to support Stilwell in October 1943. The strength of the Allied forces in northern Burma and the weakened state of the Japanese meant that time was on Wedemeyer's side; each day China remained an active belligerent bolstered the prospect of significant American supplies soon being available. Consequently, his mission involved continuing support for General Chennault's 14th Air Force, General LeMay's 20th Bomber Command, and air transport over the Hump; further training and advising the Y-Force in Yunnan and the Z-Force in eastern China; and assisting the Generalissimo with military operations against the Japanese.  Speaking of Chennault's 14th air force, by November 1944, they now had an average strength of 398 fighters, 97 medium bombers, and 47 heavy bombers. In that same month the Fourteenth received 13,578 tons of supplies flown in over the Hump, of which 9,357 tons were gas and oil. From the Kunming airfields, the China Wing of the ATC flew these supplies to Chennault's forward fields, this intratheater transport being of course a charge on Hump tonnage. The apparent crisis in east China made it seem advisable to use all available Chinese trucks for concentrating the Chinese for the defense of Kunming; the quartermaster truck companies of the SOS were not by themselves enough to support the Fourteenth Air Force. These resources of air power, unimpressive in contrast to what Allied commanders had in Europe or the Pacific, but a good deal more than the Japanese had in China, were divided among two composite wings--the 68th and 69th--the 312th Fighter Wing, the Chinese-American Composite Wing (CACW), and the 308th Bombardment Group (H). An example of Chennault's flexibility, the 68th Wing had three fighter squadrons assigned, with bombers attached as the mission required. The 69th had four fighter squadrons and three medium squadrons. With headquarters at Kunming, it was shifting its attention from the campaign in Burma to the defense of Kunming against a Japanese attack from the south or southeast. The Chinese-American Composite Wing, headquarters at Peishiyi, had two fighter groups and one bombardment group. The 312th had two fighter groups (50 P-47's, 60 P-51's, and 6 P-61's), a total of five squadrons, protecting the B-29 fields at Cheng-tu. After the air effort and the attempts to move tonnage to the airfields and to the troops, the remaining US project in China was liaison with and training and observation of Chinese troops. On the Salween front, liaison and technical advice was given in the forward areas, while troop training continued in the rear. In east China, the reluctance of the Chinese to attempt a stand after Hengyang's fall on August 8 led to the withdrawal of almost all the Americans who had tried since January 1, 1944 to train a second 30 Divisions in east China. The so-called Z-Force Operations Staff that remained comprised an observer group with the headquarters of the Chinese 9th War Area and a liaison team of 28 under Col. Harwood C. Bowman in the city of Liuchow. This handful of Americans, in the first months of Wedemeyer's command, sought to give technical aid to the Chinese defenders of Guangxi while sending a flow of information back to theater headquarters in Chongqing. They provided air-ground liaison, supervised demolitions, helped distribute the 500 tons of munitions flown into east China in late October 1944, and helped with administrative and logistical matters. The remaining 625 men of Z-FOS, including the headquarters, were in Kunming, their future mission dependent on Wedemeyer's estimate of the situation. While these events were unfolding, Allied forces in northern Burma were preparing to launch an offensive with six divisions to eliminate the remaining Japanese presence in the region and establish a new supply route to China. Following the capture of Myitkyina and Mogaung, efforts were underway to organize two new Chinese armies, while experienced Chinese divisions continued their rigorous training in anticipation of resuming their advance southward. As the new commander of the Northern Combat Area Command and the Chinese Army in India, Sultan had the New First Army, under General Sun Liren, included the 30th and 38th Divisions. The 38th Division had been engaged since 30 October 1943, and had previously taken a creditable part in the First Burma Campaign of 1942. The division had been trained, re-equipped, and brought up to strength at Ramgarh Training Center in Bihar Province, India. Its sister division, the 30th, was also Ramgarh-trained. Its 88th and 89th Regiments had fought at Myitkyina. There was also New Sixth Army consisting of the 14th, 22nd, and 50th Divisions, commanded by General Liao Yaoxiang. The 22nd Division had fought in the First Burma Campaign, then been rebuilt at Ramgarh. It had been in action since January 1944. Lastly there was General Festing's 36th Division, and the recently-formed 5332nd Provisional Brigade at his disposal.  Current plans called for brigading the 1st Chinese Separate Infantry Regiment, which had been trained at Ramgarh in long-range penetration tactics, with two American regiments, the 475th Infantry and the 124th Cavalry. The combined unit would be the equivalent of a division, but would have the designation 5332d Brigade (Provisional). To carry out the project, the 5332d Brigade (Provisional), known later as MARS Task Force, was activated 26 July 1944. Brig. Gen. Thomas S. Arms assumed command the same day. The activating order provided for most of the brigade's subordinate units to be attached to it as they arrived in India or were activated--as of 26 July the brigade was still very much in the preparatory stage. Thus, the 475th Infantry Regiment (Long Range Penetration Regiment, Special), Lt. Col. William L. Osborne, was not activated until 5 August 1944. It included many survivors of the original American experiment in long-range penetration tactics--GALAHAD, or "Merrill's Marauders." Its companion regiment, the 124th Cavalry (Texas National Guard), Col. Milo H. Matteson, arrived in India on 30 August 1944. It did not reach the brigade's training area until 27 October. Also attached were the 612th Field Artillery Battalion (Pack), Maj. John W. Read, and six quartermaster pack troops. In mid-August 1944 the training area which had been set up about ten miles north of Myitkyina on the west bank of the Irrawaddy began receiving members of the 475th Infantry Regiment. The area was designated Camp Robert W. Landis in honor of the first member of GALAHAD to be killed in action. Unit after unit started moving into Camp Landis as the 5332d began to put on flesh and assume the likeness of a pair of regimental combat teams. Another battalion of pack artillery, the 613th under Lt. Col. James F. Donovan, the 18th Veterinary Evacuation Hospital, the 44th Portable Surgical Hospital, the 1st Chinese Separate Infantry Regiment, Col. Lin Kuan-hsiang, arrived during the fall. Unfortunately, after overseeing the 5332nd's organization and training, Arms was injured in a motor accident and was succeeded by Brigadier-General John Willey on October 31. In support of Operation Capital, it was agreed that Sultan's forces would advance through the Katha-Bhamo area towards Kunchaung, Sikaw, and Namhkam in mid-October, followed by a southern advance to the Mogok-Mongmit-Lashio line in coordination with General Slim's push towards Mandalay. Sultan planned a three-pronged attack south from Myitkyina into Japanese-held territory in northern Burma. The British 36th Division and the Chinese 50th Division would advance south along the Railway Corridor to secure the Katha-Indaw area; the Chinese 22nd Division would move southeast to capture the Broadway airstrip northeast of Katha and establish a bridgehead over the Irrawaddy at Shwegu; and the Chinese 38th Division, followed by the 30th Division, would move south from Mogaung to secure the Bhamo-Mansi area. By the end of August, Festing's forces had followed the 53rd Division to Pinbaw, then advanced cautiously until they secured Nanma in September. The British moved out on 15 October. At first, contact was light, but by the time they reached Mawlu on 31 October Japanese posts were stronger and closer together and their artillery and mortar fire was progressively heavier. However, at Mawlu the 36th was eighty miles south of Mogaung and very near the great bend of the Irrawaddy which was the goal for 15 December. The Japanese stiffened at Mawlu, and the 1st Battalion, Royal Scots Fusiliers, met artillery, mortar, and machine gun fire that took thirteen casualties. By evening the town was occupied. Road conditions were very bad, for the ground was still wet, and vehicles had trouble moving. After occupying Mawlu the division paused until 9 November. There were brushes with Japanese, snipings, patrol actions, but no heavy fighting. Festing used the lull to bring up the 72d Brigade, and so make his advance one of brigades in line, with the 72d on the east, the 29th on the west. The 72d would make the main effort. Moving down a dry-weather road parallel to the railway tracks, elements of the 72d Brigade on 10 November met stubborn resistance a few miles northwest of a railway station called Pinwe. It came from a cluster of bunkers, which together with heavy artillery fire and the identification of Japanese from a number of units all pointed to one conclusion for the 36th--it had met the Japanese main line of resistance in this area centering on Pinwe. The Pinwe area was well adapted to defense. Farther north the 36th had fought its way over rice fields, but here the bush made an impenetrable screen on either side of the jungle tracks. Flanking movements were so difficult that they were judged to be impossible. Frontal attacks after artillery and air preparations became the order of the day. The Japanese lines at Pinwe were held by the 119th Regiment, 53d Division. Pinwe was the hardest fighting the 53d had encountered, and the 119th received a diploma of merit for its work there. At night their infiltration parties harassed the British rear areas and sought to destroy their artillery. On one occasion, they thrust so deftly into the British positions as to cut off two companies of infantry, which had to be withdrawn at night. The fighting resolved itself into British attempts at prying the Japanese out of their strongpoints, while maintaining a close guard against Japanese raiding parties. In these days the 72d Infantry Brigade, which had been trying to force its way over the stream covering the principal Japanese positions, took heavy casualties and had to be relieved by the 29th Infantry Brigade. On 25 November the British did put a company across the stream, but found they could not reinforce or supply it. The 53d Division was also ordered to execute limited but bold attacks to its front. To relieve the pressure on the 53d Division, the 15th Division was directed to attack the right flank and rear of the enemy 36th Division along the Meza River. Although the attacks of the 15th Division and the counterattacks of the 53d failed to destroy the enemy, they were successful in checking the offensive of the 36th and enabled the 53d Division to hold the line for approximately three weeks. The order to the 53d showed the DiVision commanders the caliber and determination of the new Army commander and the 53d's success in holding bolstered the sagging combat spirit of the entire 15th Army. Pressure on the 53d Division increased as the weeks went by; and when enemy elements infiltrated into the gap between the 53d and 15th Divisions in late November, the 15th Army finally ordered the 53d to withdraw to Katha and the sector north of Tigyaing. The 15th Division was ordered to withdraw its right wing to maintain contact with the revised battle line of the 53d Division. The 15th Army finally issued orders to the 53d and 15th Divisions directing the commencement of the withdrawal movement to the Irrawaddy River line on 1 December. The 33d Division was directed to withdraw on 4 December, giving the Division additional time for disposal of munitions in its area. From positions in the Kamaing area, far behind the outposts held by the 36th Division in the Railway Corridor, the 22d began its march on 15 October. It was to move southeast toward Mogaung, but bypassing the town to save ten miles, then toward Pinbaw, then Hopin. As the march got under way it appeared that the long rest after combat had left troops and animals in poor condition. The troops were traveling as light as possible, but fatigue was evident when after three days the division reached Hopin. Predawn departures were ordered to keep to a minimum the time spent marching under the full sun, and a day of rest was spent at Hopin. At Hopin the division turned east, to take a route that would sorely test the marching powers of its troops, for the chosen trail led over the ridge that marked the eastern boundary of the Railway Corridor, down into a plain formed by a tributary of the Irrawaddy, where the old Chindit airstrip BROADWAY was located, and up again over a hill mass overlooking the Irrawaddy valley. On 26 October the division reached the airstrip, twenty-seven miles southeast of Hopin. General Liao Yueh-shang, commanding the New Sixth Army, of which the 22d Division was part, flew in to BROADWAY, and gave the division detailed orders for the final move to the Irrawaddy. The division was formed into two columns. On the west, the 64th Regiment was directed to take Shwegugale, which lay on the south bank downstream from Shwegu. The 65th and 66th were to move off as one column, then to split into combat teams just north of the Irrawaddy and cross on a broad front. Kachin irregulars and patrols reported there were no Japanese ahead, and after a three-day rest the division resumed its advance. On 3 November the division occupied the north bank of the Irrawaddy without opposition. The troops rested while commanders studied maps and waited for rubber boats and outboard motors to be airdropped. Three days later the 64th Regiment crossed the Irrawaddy and took Shwegugale against light opposition. Next day the 65th Regiment took Shwegu, and the division had its first objectives. Meanwhile, after the unsuccessful Dan offensive, General Honda reorganized the 33rd Army. The 56th Division resumed defending Longling and Mangshi, while the 18th Division took over the defense of Namhkam. Although the Yoshida Force and the Bhamo Garrison remained with the 33rd Army, the 2nd Division was reassigned to the area army and began relocating to the Pyinmana-Toungoo area by the end of October to be available for operations in central Burma. Unbeknownst to Honda, he was soon to encounter the full force of Sultan's renewed offensive. Major-General Li Hong's 38th Division had departed from Myitkyina on October 15, advancing cautiously along the road to Bhamo with minimal contact until October 28. On that date, they encountered Japanese patrols two miles north of the Taping River, which were quickly dispatched. At Myothit was the Japanese outpost line of resistance; the Chinese patrols speedily found that the Japanese meant to defend it. Strong Japanese positions were seen on the south bank, and the commander of the 38th Division, General Li Huang, saw that he would have to force a defended river line unless he could turn the Japanese position. General Li decided to use the 112th and 114th Regiments, which had been the main body of the 38th, as an enveloping force. Since they were some seven miles to the north the 112th and 114th were out of contact with the Japanese and well placed to make a wide swing to the east. The two regiments began their march through the hills, while the 113th made a show of activity around Myothit to keep the Japanese attention focused there. Once again envelopment proved its worth. The Japanese were too few to defend a long line, and the enveloping force was able to cross the Taping at an unguarded bridge upstream, go around the right end of the Japanese outpost line of resistance, and emerge on the Bhamo plain on 10 November. Pressing on west toward Bhamo, the enveloping force met a strong entrenched Japanese force at Momauk, which is eight miles east of Bhamo and is the point at which the Myitkyina-Bhamo road swings to the west for the last stretch into Bhamo. Here there was savage fighting between the 114th Regiment and the Japanese defenders. Heavily outnumbered, the Japanese outpost at Momauk was driven into the main defenses at Bhamo. The appearance of its survivors, some without rifles, others without shoes, depressed the Bhamo garrison. Hara's forces endured significant losses as they conducted a delaying action at Momauk, with the remaining reconnaissance units joining the defense of Bhamo by November 16. Meanwhile, the 113th Regiment moved west along the south bank of the Taping River and approached Bhamo from the north. However, instead of directly attacking the town, the 113th Regiment repositioned south and southeast of Bhamo. Concurrently, the 114th Regiment advanced west from Momauk to encircle the town from the north, creating a loose encirclement around the Japanese outposts in the Bhamo suburbs. This maneuver allowed the 112th Regiment to bypass the confrontation entirely and continue south towards Namhkam. By early November, Japanese patrols had also detected the presence of the 22nd Division in the region between Bhamo and Katha, apparently moving towards Mandalay. Fearing that this force might sever the Mandalay-Lashio rail line by advancing through Mongmit, Honda's staff decided to keep the 55th Regiment stationed at Namhkam and reassign the rest of General Naka's 18th Division to Mongmit to prevent the effective separation of the 15th and 33rd Armies. While the 64th Regiment remained to secure the crossing area, the 22nd Division advanced towards Man Tha along the main road south from the Japanese stronghold of Bhamo, which was captured without incident on November 14. Continuing along the Bhamo-Myitson road, the Si-u area was secured by late November, with Colonel Ernest Easterbrook's 475th Regiment also moving there after bypassing Bhamo successfully. Meanwhile, after a period of recovery due to heavy losses in September, General Wei's Y-Force was preparing to resume its Salween offensive. On October 29, Lieutenant-General Huang Jie assaulted  Longling, defended by the 146th Regiment's main force with artillery support up to 1,700 rounds and 30-40 air sorties per day carried out by 37 P-40s of the 14th Air Force. Elements of the 200th Division attacked from the south and west, targeting positions behind Colonel Imaoka's defenses, while two divisions of the 71st Army exerted heavy pressure from the north. With many positions being devastated and numerous defenders killed or wounded, General Matsuyama ordered the 146th to retreat from Longling to Mangshi on November 3. Although the Japanese managed a midnight withdrawal, the Chinese succeeded in capturing their main objective. The Japanese respite, however, unsettled the Americans, who promptly urged Chiang to continue the offensive. Following the Generalissimo's orders to advance on November 9, Wei directed the newly arrived 53rd Army through the hills north of the Burma Road to Chefang, while the 2nd and 6th Armies moved south towards Mangshi, and the 71st Army proceeded down the road itself. Against the expected offensive, the 56th Division consolidated its defense around Mangshih with eight infantry and two artillery battalions on an established defense perimeter. The Yoshida Force, which was under the direct command of the Army at Wanting, was assigned the missions of protecting the rear of the 56th Division with its main force in the area north of Chefang and the 3d Battal- ion in the Menka area. At the same time, the 3d Battalion of the 146th Infantry Regiment was moved from Mangshih to join the Yoshida Force. A detachment of about 100 replacement troops was assigned to hold Chefang Pass. Although the 56th Division continued to be optimistic about its chances of holding against the expected Chinese attack, Army Headquarters took a less hopeful view. The Division was ordered to conduct a flexible holding operation north of Wanting and not cling too tenaciously to Mangshih. After a strong Chinese offensive on November 19, and following Colonel Tsuji's insistence, Matsuyama had no choice but to withdraw during the night to the Chefang Pass. General Matsuyama was strongly in favor of conducting a holding action in the Mangshi area and merely directed a partial withdrawal of his forces to be effected on November 22, 23 and 24. Col. Tsuji, of the 33rd Army headquarters, was present at the 56th Division headquarters and warned the chief of staff against over-optimism. Tsuji stressed the point that, once the withdrawal had been decided upon, the Division should withdraw simultaneously from the entire line to the south of Chefang Pass, preferably on the eve of the general attack or on the following night, at the latest. However, Col. Kawamichi, the Division chief of staff, would not change the order because it had already been passed down to the subordinate units. Subsequently, following an inspection of the front lines and an observation of enemy activity on the 18th, Tsuji came to the conclusion that the enemy would launch a general attack at dawn on the 19th or early on the 20th. He bluntly advised General Matsuyama to change his division order and at his insistence the order was changed to a withdrawal at midnight on November 19 to Chefang Pass. At dawn of the 19th, the Chinese launched a heavy attack in an attempt to envelop the entire line, just as Tsuji had predicted. All frontline units held in their prepared positions and inflicted heavy losses. Throughout the day they were able to check the enemy, but with the tremendous forces arrayed against the Division it is probable that many of the positions would have been overrun the following day. The Division, however, succeeded in withdrawing from the entire line at midnight on November 19.As a result, the strategic Mangshi airfield fell to Wei, enabling him to land supplies rather than relying solely on airdrops.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Despite the heavy losses, capturing Angaur proved crucial in securing the Palaus and removing the island group as a threat to Allied lines of communication across the western Pacific toward the Philippines. General MacArthur was getting closer to his ultimate goa

The Pacific War - week by week
- 149 - Pacific War Podcast - Japanese Triumph in China 26 - October 4 - , 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 24, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the battles for Peleliu and Angaur. Following the amphibious assaults on Peleliu and Anguar, US Marines under General Rupertus intensified their offensive. On September 17, Colonel Hanneken's 7th Marines advanced in Peleliu's southern sector, as the 1st and 5th Marines pushed north, confronting the fortified Umurbrogol Mountains, where Colonel Nakagawa's defenses stalled their progress. Despite reaching key positions by mid-morning, intense Japanese counterattacks continued, causing heavy casualties. On September 18, the 7th Marines, aided by armor, resumed their slow advance, securing the southern part of Peleliu by day's end. Meanwhile, the 1st and 5th Marines faced brutal combat in the central ridges, suffering significant losses. By September 21, the capture of nearby Ulithi Atoll provided a strategic base for future operations. Despite securing important positions, the Marines encountered severe resistance in the Umurbrogol Mountains, leading to high casualties and necessitating reinforcements. By September 23, the Americans secured footholds on Peleliu and Anguar, yet fierce fighting persisted in Nakagawa's fortified positions. This episode is the Japanese Triumph in China Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  This week we are picking up back over on Peleliu and Anguar where the Japanese are still providing stiff resistance. On September 23, Colonel Venable's 322nd Regiment had made little progress breaking into the Lake Salome bowl. With their commanding officer severely injured, a change in tactics was imminent. On the morning of September 24, propaganda broadcasts over a public address system were used to try and persuade the remaining Japanese to surrender. However, only two Japanese soldiers surrendered, reporting that over 300 defenders remained in the bowl under Major Goto. This accurate estimate was disregarded by the American command, who believed only about 150 defenders remained. Following this failed attempt, all available artillery bombarded the bowl in preparation for an attack from the north, altering the appearance of the bowl's interior and rims to aid the upcoming assault. Back at Peleliu, after heavy bombardment, Colonel Dark's 321st Regiment resumed its advance north along the coast on September 24, despite continued harassment from Japanese fire from the central ridges. By noon, they had secured the trail-road junction south of Garekoru. Some troops explored the trail to the east, encountering heavy resistance, while Company G advanced rapidly north through Garekoru, reaching the O-4 Line. Behind them, Dark's 3rd Battalion and Colonel Hanneken's 3rd Battalion also pushed northwards. Further east, the 7th Marines pressed against Colonel Nakagawa's main defenses on the Umurbrogol Mountains. By nightfall, having successfully resisted Japanese counterattacks on O-4, General Rupertus' northward drive had proven to be a significant success. He next planned to cut across the island on September 25 through the eastern trail to completely isolate the Japanese forces in the Umurbrogol ridges. At 07:00, Dark's troops began moving eastward, with Company E successfully reaching the edge of East Road against light opposition. They halted in front of Hill B, which dominated the eastern area. However, the 3rd Battalion encountered heavier resistance from pillboxes and emplacements protected by steep walls and sheer cliffs guarding the northern approaches to the Umurbrogol defense system, making little progress. Meanwhile, to the north, a strong tank-infantry patrol advanced about 1,200 yards, killing 30 Japanese and destroying four pillboxes and two large supply dumps before reaching the O-5 Line. The weak resistance encountered by the patrol suggested that remaining Japanese strength was concentrated in the Umurbrogol Pocket. Thus, at 10:30, Rupertus decided to commit the 5th Marines for a drive to the northern tip of Peleliu. Rapidly relieved by the 1st Marines on eastern Peleliu. Orders to move to the western portion of Peleliu found the 5th Marines in static positions on Eastern Peleliu, where the regimental mission had been to prevent enemy counterlandings. The 1st Battalion was deployed in the vicinity of the radio direction finding station near Ngardololok, the 2d Battalion was holding the islands north of the northeastern peninsula, while the 3d Battalion, less one company, occupied defensive positions along Purple Beach. The 1st Marines completed the relief of the 5th shortly after noon and assumed command of the 5th Marines sector at that time. In order to expedite movement of the regiment to the West Road, the battalions moved out on trucks at 1300, with 1/5 in the lead, followed by 3/5 and 2/5.  By 1600, the 5th Marines had executed the passage of the lines, and the regiment passed through Phase Line O-4 near Garekoru. As 1/5 continued its advance up the West Road, it encountered erratic resistance from what appeared to be Japanese holdouts. The level terrain was devoid of the dense jungle growth abounding elsewhere on Peleliu and offered ideal conditions for the movement of tanks and LVT flamethrowers accompanying the advance battalion. Aside from occasional Japanese sniper and mortar fire, the advance continued for about 500 yards without interruption to Road Junction 15, where the West and East Roads met. This vital point was defended by a small Japanese force, which had installed itself on a ridge dominating the road forks. Around 1700, as the Marines approached this point, the enemy opened fire, which served only to delay the Marines. When the firefight ended the Japanese had lost 20 killed. The battalion continued its advance for another 100 yards and seized the Japanese radio station, whose towers the forward elements of RCT 321 had spotted on the previous day. Having secured this objective, the battalion established night defenses north of the radio station from the beach to the high ground east of the West Road. Upon reaching Road Junction 15 in the wake of the advance of 1/5, the 3d Battalion pivoted to the southeast and headed down East Road, where it established night defenses on the road and along the western slopes of Hill 80. The latter hill, in itself an isolated terrain feature, owed its importance to its location, for it was the only link separating the Kamilianlul ridges to the south from the Amiangal ridges, which formed the northernmost hill mass on Peleliu.   Throughout the evening and night, the forward elements at the radio station were continuously and heavily attacked and bombed but managed to hold against the enemy onslaught. Meanwhile, at Angaur, after a heavy and prolonged artillery bombardment, the 3rd Battalion, 322nd Regiment pushed forward to launch its assault from the north. Finding no route south over the cliffs, they assembled near the northern end of the Milwaukee Railroad for an attack west the following day. At 07:30 on September 26, the infantry launched their assault on Lake Salome, quickly taking control of the eastern rim with minimal resistance. Facing increasing enemy fire, the Americans made their way down the eastern rim to the bowl floor. However, by the end of the day, they were halted by Goto's positions on the northern cliffs and "The Island," a gap between an overgrown coral mound and the eastern rim. To the south, the 2nd Battalion supported the attack by advancing north, capturing the southeast rim and clearing out several enemy cave positions.  Back over on Peleliu the Marines had a very rough night full of Japanese infiltrator harassment. In fact our old friend Eugene Sledge wrote about the night of September 25th and what his unit of K Company, 3rd battalion, 5th marines went through. The Japanese who had come across the road in front of me were probably members of what the enemy called a “close-quarter combat unit.” The enemy soldier shot by Sam was not dressed or equipped like their typical infantryman. Rather he wore only tropical khaki shorts, short-sleeved shirt, and tabi footwear (splittoed, rubber-soled canvas shoes). He carried only his bayonet. Why he entered our line where he did may have been pure accident, or he may have had an eye on our mortar. His comrade angled off toward the right near a machine gun on our flank. Mortars and machine guns were favorite targets for infiltrators on the front lines. To the rear, they went after heavy mortars, communications, and artillery. Before Company K moved out, I went down the road to the next company to see what had happened during the night. I learned that those blood-chilling screams had come from the Japanese I had seen run to the right. He had jumped into a foxhole where he met an alert Marine. In the ensuing struggle each had lost his weapon. The desperate Marine had jammed his forefinger into his enemy's eye socket and killed him. Such was the physical horror and brutish reality of war for us. The 1/5 spent the early hours of 26 September in consolidating its positions around the radio station and preparing for continuation of its attack later in the day to the northern tip of Peleliu. Shortly after 0600, 3/5 jumped off for an attack against Hill 80 with Company K on the left and Company I on the right. The attack carried the hill and by 0830 the assault force reached a swamp bordering the east coast of Peleliu. This advance of the 3d Battalion was of major importance because it effectively cut the island in two. Late in the afternoon most of the battalion moved back from Hill 80 to a reserve position near the junction of East and West Roads. The unit's southern flank extended south from the junction along East Road to Hill 80, where Company I was stationed for the night. Between Company I, 5th Marines, and the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, at Hill B, lay a gap approximately 1,800 yards long through which only the 321st Infantry's Neal Task Force had passed. In this gap lay 1,500-yard-long Kamilianlul Mountain, held by an unknown number of Japanese and as yet not even reconnoitered by American units. The 5th Marines consolidated their positions and resumed their assault. The 1st Battalion, 5th Marines, ran into stiff opposition from the Amiangal ridges dominating northern Peleliu. The northern portion of the L-shaped hill system consisted of ridges running generally from northeast to southwest for about 1,000 yards; the southern leg extended from northwest to southeast. The southern leg of the ridges was not continuous but broken into four separate hills or knobs, designated from northwest to southeast as Hill 1, Hill 2, Hill 3, and Radar Hill, so named because it had at one time served as an enemy radar installation. These four knobs were to gain ill repute as Hill Row. The entire Amiangal ridge system was held in strength by the Japanese, particularly the portion paralleling the route of advance of 1/5. This part contained some of the most elaborate caves and tunnels on Peleliu. The battalion had barely started out along the West Road when the enemy in and on Hill 1 opened up on the Marines with 37mm and 75mm guns as well as automatic weapons and mortars. This curtain of fire from the Amiangal ridges was reinforced by heavy fire from Ngesebus Island. All forward movement soon halted. Attacking eastward from the West Road, Company B assaulted the second knob, Hill 2, but also encountered opposition. Through sheer determination the company was able to gain a firm foothold on the hill by early afternoon. This accomplishment in effect served to outflank the Japanese on Hill 1, but Japanese resistance on the last mentioned hill continued throughout the day. An attempt by Company C to seize all of Hill 1 during the remaining hours of daylight was unsuccessful, and continuation of the assault had to await the following day. During the bitter fighting in which 1/5 engaged during the night of 25-26 September and for most of the following day, 2/5 remained stationary on the southern flank of the regiment. At 1600 on 26 September, when it had become apparent that 1/5 could make no further progress, 2/5 was ordered to attack. The battalion advanced northward through the left wing of 1/5, carefully bypassing embattled Hill 1. In the course of its advance, the battalion drew heavy fire from Japanese emplacements in the plain, from the ridges on its right, as well as from Ngesebus. Enemy mortars proved especially troublesome. As a result of the heavy fire, Company F lost four of its supporting tanks before it had advanced very far beyond Hill 1. Attempts by the artillery to give all possible support to the battalion were largely ineffectual. "We fired frequent missions throughout the day on these mortars; the reported effect was that the mortars were neutralized while we fired but that they were not destroyed. The enemy apparently withdrew into the caves during the period of our fire." As evening approached, the 5th Marines occupied a jagged front line. The 1st Battalion, though out of contact with the 2d, was tied in with the 3d on the right. The mission of the 3d Battalion was to support either the 1st or 2d Battalion in the event of a major Japanese counterattack. Further progress of the 2d Battalion was impeded by a large antitank ditch, which blocked the approach to the remnants of the Peleliu phosphate plant. The Japanese had converted the reinforced concrete foundation of the otherwise demolished structure into a major defensive installation. Exposed to the enemy fire from Ngesebus Island and plunging fire from caves and defensive positions from the hills, 2/5 found itself in a very unenviable situation. Further south, after some necessary adjustments, Dark's forces assaulted Hill B with two battalions. Initially repelled, Dark then sent a task force led by Captain George Neal to attack from the north. After a complex maneuver north and then south, the Neal Task Force attacked Hill B just as other elements of the 321st fought their way to the top through challenging terrain. The hill eventually fell to the Americans, completing the isolation of the Umurbrogol Pocket. By the end of the day, the island was divided in two places, leaving Nakagawa's determined defenders isolated in two major pockets. On September 27, with the Umurbrogol Pocket now contained, the 5th Marines continued their operations against Amiangal Mountain. At the same time, the 1st Battalion, 321st Regiment advanced north from the Hill B area to close the long gap along East Road up to Hill 80. Dark's infantrymen secured Kamilianlul Mountain with minimal resistance and then moved towards the Marines' road junction.  The 2d Battalion was to find progress extremely rough for the remainder of the day. First, the erstwhile phosphate plant, which the Japanese had turned into a blockhouse, had to be secured in an area that bristled with snipers. The problem confronting Colonel Harris was a formidable one. The blockhouse in front of 2/5 could not be taken until the antitank ditch blocking the approaches to it had been seized. This was a job that the infantry could not tackle without armored support. The regimental commander decided to utilize all arms available in reducing these obstacles. First of all, Colonel Harris called naval gunfire and artillery in on Ngesebus and any other targets suspected of harboring artillery or mortar positions. A medium tank, equipped with a bulldozer blade, was pressed into service to level the antitank ditch, and filled it by 0830. A LVT flamethrower then was able to come within effective range of the Japanese fortification. Moments later, when the flame and smoke had cleared, all resistance from this stronghold had ceased and more than 60 dead Japanese remained in the rubble. While this action was in progress, patrols from Company E seized a small, weakly defended ridge abutting the road from the east. The 2d Battalion thereafter resumed its advance northward along the road as well as over the adjacent ridge. Company F, at the head of the column, soon found itself embroiled in some of the most bitter and frustrating action of the entire campaign. Aside from receiving heavy Japanese artillery and mortar fire, the company faced a series of pillboxes and field fortifications on level ground, and layer upon layer of caves in the hillsides. Even though they were not aware of it at the time, the men of the 5th Marines had come upon the most skillfully constructed defenses on Peleliu. The Japanese Army had utilized all of the many natural caves possessing tactical value, adapting them for the emplacement of heavier weapons with great ingenuity. On the other hand, Japanese naval troops had preferred to construct their own caves with the help of the 214th Naval Construction Battalion, composed of men who had been professional miners and tunnel workers in civilian life. Since most of these Navy caves were located near the northern end of Peleliu, they proved a serious obstacle to the advance of the 5th Marines. Eugene Sledge faced these obstacles and saw firsthand the effectiveness of flamethrowers. Here is a passage from him: Burgin's order to us to continue firing into the opening interrupted my musings. We kept up a steady fire into the pillbox to keep the Japanese pinned down while the flamethrower came up, carried by Corporal Womack from Mississippi. He was a brave, good-natured guy and popular with the troops, but he was one of the fiercest-looking Marines I ever saw. He was big and husky with a fiery red beard well powdered with white coral dust. He reminded me of some wild Viking. I was glad we were on the same side. Stooped under the heavy tanks on his back, Womack approached the pillbox with his assistant just out of the line of our fire. When they got about fifteen yards from the target, we ceased firing. The assistant reached up and turned a valve on the flamethrower. Womack then aimed the nozzle at the opening made by the 75mm gun. He pressed the trigger. With a whoooooooosh the flame leaped at the opening. Some muffled screams, then all quiet. Even the stoic Japanese couldn't suppress the agony of death by fire and suffocation. But they were no more likely to surrender to us than we would have been to them had we ever been confronted with the possibility of surrender. In fighting the Japanese, surrender was not one of our options.  Sheer courage and heroism in themselves proved inadequate for the task. In the course of the morning of 27 September, Company F seized the two ridges forming the northwestern anchor of the Amiangal system and established observation posts on the crests. But this did not solve the problem of what to do about the Japanese occupying the caves about half way up the hill. Marine casualties mounted steadily, and evacuation of the wounded became more and more difficult. Since the cave openings completely dominated the road leading past the northernmost ridge of Peleliu, the advance of the entire 2d Battalion ground to a halt. The first tank attempting to squeeze through the narrow gap between the hill and the northwestern shore was hit, and the Marines occupying the crest of the hill were powerless to cope with the caves underneath. Although the Americans now controlled the northern shore and blocked further enemy reinforcements, skilled Japanese miners continued their resistance underground. What the Marines did not know was that they were facing the most comprehensive cave system on Peleliu which was the underground home of the Japanese naval construction units who were, luckily for the Marines, better miners than infantrymen. The Japanese Army had utilized all of the many natural caves possessing tactical value, adapting them for the emplacement of heavier weapons with great ingenuity. On the other hand, Japanese naval troops had preferred to construct their own caves with the help of the 214th Naval Construction Battalion, composed of men who had been professional miners and tunnel workers in civilian life. Since most of these Navy caves were located near the northern end of Peleliu, they proved a serious obstacle to the advance of the 5th Marines. In the end, it would take weeks for the Marines to finally quash all resistance on Akarakoro Point, then only by blasting closed all the tunnel entrances, sealing the Japanese defenders inside to their fate. To the south, Harris' 1st Battalion pressed on with their attack on the mountain's southern leg, successfully capturing Hill 1. Meanwhile, the 322nd Regiment resumed its assault on the Lake Salome bowl, fighting to secure the base of the north rim but encountering less resistance in the south as most Japanese defenders had been evacuated towards Romauldo. The following day, despite a successful enemy mortar barrage that initially forced a temporary withdrawal and reorganization, the Americans cleared the entire bowl floor of Japanese troops, isolating Goto's remaining forces in the Romauldo area. This progress enabled the 322nd to launch a final coordinated attack on October 1, with its three battalions trapping the enemy in the Romauldo Pocket, though they were unable to penetrate Goto's final defenses. On September 28 at Peleliu, while Dark's 1st Battalion engaged Japanese infiltrators while mopping up the Kamilianlul Mountain area, Harris' 1st and 2nd Battalions continued their assault on Amiangal and successfully captured Hill 3. This action isolated the remaining Japanese forces at Radar Hill. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion, 5th Marines executed a successful landing on Ngesebus Island with minimal resistance after a comprehensive artillery, air, and naval bombardment.  The curtain on the drama of Ngesebus opened on the morning of September 28, when the massed fire of five artillery battalions from Peleliu, as well as heavy fire from warships and aircraft, blanketed the island. Near the northwestern shore of Peleliu, an impressive gathering of high-ranking officers had assembled to witness the operation. The group included such notables as Admiral Fort, and Generals Julian C. Smith, Geiger, Rupertus, Mueller, Oliver P. Smith, and Bell. The weather was cool and cloudy and interspersed with frequent rain squalls. For the Corsair pilots of VMF-114, air support for the Ngesebus landings represented a very interesting and original assignment. The operation marked the beginning of combat work for the squadron, which had reached Peleliu only two days earlier. At 06:30, the Corsairs hit the airstrip on Ngesebus with 500-pound bombs and strafed the entire island as well as Kongauru to the northeast. "Strafing runs were made just a few feet off the deck and a hail of lead laid all over the island." At 08:40, 20 Corsairs preceded the landing craft and gave the island another heavy strafing. In the course of this attack, Japanese mortar positions were spotted and one especially prominent square blockhouse with an iron door was fired on and neutralized. Whenever aircraft were not directly over the island, the artillery on Peleliu and naval guns offshore gave Ngesebus a heavy going over, starting at 07:00 and concluding at 09:05. Both quick and delay fuzes were used. Observers reported that the island was completely covered with fire. In the course of the preliminary bombardment, naval gunfire ships pounded the northern portion of Ngesebus and continued to fire on that part of the island throughout the landing. The Marines advanced inland, swiftly securing the airstrip and the eastern portion of Ngesebus. One platoon then landed on Kongauru and Murphy islands to secure them against light opposition. However, the attack to the northwest encountered strong resistance from Japanese forces entrenched in caves and dugouts, prompting the deployment of tanks to support the Marine assault. By 5:00 PM, nearly all of Ngesebus was under American control, with only a few hundred yards at the extreme northwestern tip remaining in Japanese hands and some caves on the ridges still needing to be cleared.  The 3d Battalion spent a relatively quiet night on Ngesebus. On the morning of 29 September, Companies I and K resumed the attack. Progress was normal until the two companies had nearly reached the northern tip of Ngesebus, when a 75mm gun opened up at point blank range. The Marines quickly destroyed this weapon and went on to overcome the rest of the resistance on the island. At 1500, 29 September, Ngesebus was declared secure. An hour later, 2/321 relieved the Marines and completed mopping up. Having accomplished the mission on the island, 3/5 returned to Peleliu. The battalion had secured the island at a cost of 15 killed and 33 wounded. In return, the Marines killed or captured 470 Japanese. Infantrymen of 2/321 were to account for another hundred of the enemy during the ensuing mop-up. Eugene Sledge wrote this about the final capture of Ngesebus: The next morning, again with the help of tanks and am-tracs, our battalion took most of the remainder of Ngesebus. Our casualties were remarkably low for the number of Japanese we killed.* In midafternoon we learned that an army unit would relieve us shortly and complete the job on the northern end of Ngesebus. Our mortar section halted to await orders and dispersed among some open bushes. In our midst was the wreckage of a Japanese heavy machine gun and the remains of the squad that had been wiped out by Company K. The squad members had been killed in the exact positions to be occupied by such a squad “according to the book.” At first glance the dead gunner appeared about to fire his deadly weapon. He still sat bolt upright in the proper firing position behind the breech of his machine gun. Even in death his eyes stared widely along the gun sights. Despite the vacant look of his dilated pupils, I couldn't believe he was dead. Cold chills ran along my spine. Gooseflesh tickled my back. It seemed as though he was looking through me into all eternity, that at any instant he would raise his hands—which rested in a relaxed manner on his thighs—grip the handles on the breech, and press the thumb trigger. The bright shiny brass slugs in the strip clip appeared as ready as the gunner, anxious to speed out, to kill, and to maim more of the “American devils.” But he would rot, and they would corrode. Neither he nor his ammo could do any more for the emperor.  The rest of the 5th Marines continued their operations on September 29, launching a full-scale assault on Radar Hill using flamethrowers, bazookas, and demolition charges, finally capturing the position by the morning of September 30. Following the completion of operations in northern Peleliu, the 5th Marines were relieved by the 321st Regiment. However, as the Army troops took over, the remaining Japanese, who had been hiding underground, reoccupied some positions, requiring two additional days of fighting to fully secure northern Peleliu. Nonetheless, the Japanese presence in Peleliu had now been reduced to Nakagawa's Umurbrogol Pocket, so Peleliu was officially secured. Total losses during this battle so far included 843 killed, 3845 wounded and 356 missing of the 1st Marine Division; 46 killed, 226 wounded and 7 missing from the 321st Regiment; and an estimated 9076 Japanese dead plus 180 prisoners of war. Yet that is all for today with Peleliu and Anguar as we now need to travel to China where the Japanese are still carrying out Operation Ichi-Go in an effort to capture Guilin and Liuzhou. As we last observed, General Yokoyama's 11th Army had taken control of Lingling Airdrome and Quanzhou by September 14. Following this, they reorganized their units in preparation for resuming their offensive in October. Meanwhile, the 34th Division was deployed towards Changning, and the 37th Division moved to capture Shaoyang, which fell by the end of the month. The 23rd Army also made final preparations for their offensive in early September. General Tanaka directed the Kawakami Raiding Unit in a wide flanking maneuver along the Zhukeng-Huaiji road towards Wuzhou, while the 23rd Independent Mixed Brigade embarked on a long march north to Guiping. On September 13, the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade and the 22nd and 104th Divisions began their main advance towards Wuzhou. However, the Kawakami Raiding Unit successfully captured Wuzhou on September 22 and seized the Danzhuzhen airfield six days later. Each unit then continued its advance westward to Guiping, which fell to the 23rd Brigade on October 11. So far, Tanaka's forces had encountered little to no resistance, but this was about to change. After the war, in discussing the performance of the Chinese divisions supposed to defend Guilin and Liuzhou, the political situation in east China, and the attitudes of the east China commanders, Marshal Hata remarked that in his opinion Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi had kept their forces out of serious fighting in order to conserve them "for the future." At the time, there were rumors that these men were planning a coup against Chiang Kai-Shek. Chinese resistance was light, but with its supply situation improved the 14th Air Force again did its best on the Salween as well as in east China. In all September the force dropped 1897.6 tons of bombs and fired 1281382 rounds of machine-gun ammunition, some of the latter of course at aerial targets. In early September, Japanese fighter reinforcements from the homeland also entered combat. The Japanese were pleased at the performance of the latemodel fighters with one of the air regiments they sent to China. Thanks to the air cover thus supplied, for the first time in the east China campaign they found themselves able to move supplies regularly on the Xiang Jiang, which paralleled their line of advance, and so thought their prospects "brightened."  At the beginning of the month, Yokoyama renewed his offensive, with the 58th Division successfully taking Xing'An and the 34th Division capturing Changning. The 37th Division was then deployed to Dao, and the 34th Division was sent to Xing'An in preparation for the final push toward Guilin. On October 20, this attack commenced as Yokoyama directed the 216th Regiment to advance to Lehecun, the 58th Division to assault the area north of Guilin, the 40th Division to move to Gaoshangzhen, the 13th Division to advance to Quanhuicun, and the 3rd Division to push toward Fuchuan. With minimal resistance from the retreating Japanese forces, most of these movements were completed by the end of the month. The 3rd Division pushed further to Pingle, while the 37th Division occupied Gongchengzhen and Yanshan to approach Guilin from the south. On November 3, the 3rd Division captured Lipu and began preparations for the advance towards Liuzhen, encircling Guilin and opening the route to Liuzhen. Meanwhile, on October 22, Tanaka ordered the reinforced 23rd Brigade to continue its advance toward Guigang, with the 104th and 22nd Divisions pushing toward Wuxuan. Their progress, previously unopposed, was now challenged by the Chinese 46th and 64th Armies, which launched daily attacks against Guiping with substantial air support. As a result, the 22nd Division was redirected to counter the Chinese forces, successfully forcing their withdrawal by October 29. Following this victory, the 23rd Brigade captured Guigang on November 3, and the 104th Division seized Wuxuan the following day. This allowed Tanaka's forces to begin a northern pursuit to support Yokoyama's assaults on Guilin and Liuzhen. After the third Anshan strike, General LeMay began implementing reforms within the 20th Bomber Command. These changes included reorganizing the command, enhancing the logistics system, adjusting target priorities, and improving coordination with Pacific operations. As a result, the frequency of missions increased each month, with each mission becoming more substantial and effective. Concurrently, following the successful completion of the newly renamed Isley Field on Saipan, the 73rd Bombardment Wing was redirected to the Marianas instead of the CBI Theater. There, it would join Major-General Haywood Hansell's 21st Bomber Command, tasked with executing high-altitude, daylight precision attacks to cripple Japan's aircraft industry.  The XXI Bomber Command arrived on Saipan on October 12, 1944, and from the start General Hansell was beset by a host of serious command problems, the worst of which were continued teething problems with the B-29, tardy delivery of aircraft, aircrews untrained in high altitude formation flying, primitive airfield conditions, lack of an air service command for logistical support, no repair depots, a total absence of target intelligence, stubborn internal resistance to daylight operations by his sole combat wing, subordinates in the XXI Bomber Command who lobbied for his removal, and Hansell's inferiority in rank in dealing with other AAF commanders in the theater. Furthermore, Hansell was soon prohibited from flying combat missions with his command, possibly because of limited knowledge of the atomic bomb or the perception that he knew the existence of Ultra. As plans for a sustained bomber offensive against Honshu progressed, the strategic focus of Operation Matterhorn diminished. The 20th Bomber Command shifted to flying missions in direct support of other Pacific operations, with target priorities moving from coke ovens to the aircraft industry. In preparation for the upcoming invasion of the Philippines, the command was tasked with two closely spaced maximum missions against Okayama in Formosa, totaling 170 sorties, along with very-long-range reconnaissance missions. Yet now we have to travel over to the India-Burma theater. As the advance towards the Chindwin continued and the resilient 33rd Division finally crossed the river in late November, General Katamura was finalizing his plans for a withdrawal to the Mandalay sector, scheduled for December. This decision was driven by the intense pressure the British 36th Division was putting on General Takeda's defensive positions at Pinwe, forcing the defenders to prepare for a final retreat by the end of November. Meanwhile, General Slim was preparing for Operation Capital. He planned to stretch airpower to its limits to move four and two-thirds divisions across the Chindwin, along with two tank brigades. After establishing bridgeheads at Sittang, Mawlaik, and Kalewa, he intended to cross the Chindwin and confront General Kimura's forces between the Chindwin and the Irrawaddy. The 4th Corps, now under the experienced General Messervy, would break out from the Sittang bridgehead, advance east through the mountains, capture Pinlebu, and then approach the Shwebo plain from the north. Simultaneously, General Stopford's 33rd Corps would move from Kalewa, following the Chindwin southeast to Yeu and Monywa. Once the Japanese forces were pushed onto the open plain, Slim planned to exploit his overwhelming advantage in airpower and tanks to decisively defeat them, anticipating that the enemy would fiercely defend Mandalay. The combination of the defeats at Kohima, Imphal, Mogaung and Myitkyina meant that by the autumn of 1944, Kimura's role was reduced to defending southern Burma as the northern flank of their new ‘South-East Asia defense zone'. With few reinforcements or supplies to look forward to, Kimura had grim prospects. On paper he had ten divisions (2nd, 15th, 18th, 31st, 33rd, 49th, 53rd, 54th, 55th, & 56th), though this was really seven, since little remained of the three divisions that had been devastated at Kohima-Imphal. He also had the dubious support of Bose's INA and Aung San's seven-battalion Burma National Army, but the civilian population was increasingly going over to the side of the likely winners. Unexpectedly, Kimura received 30000 fresh troops in the period June–October, but his problem was more commissariat than raw numbers, since he was rapidly running out of supplies. Even those he had (45000 tons of food, 500 lorries and 2000 pack animals) were difficult to get to the front, and Kimura was painfully aware that the situation could only get worse. The South-East Asia zone was slowly being throttled by the Allied naval blockade, all approaches to Rangoon were mined, and in 1944 total Japanese shipping losses amounted to 2.3 million tons. Even those ships that ran the blockade would proceed no farther than Penang in Malaya. Kimura chose to deploy smaller units to delay the British-Indian forces while the main body of the 15th Army retreated across the Irrawaddy River. His strategy was to launch a counterattack once the British crossed the river, aiming to replicate a reverse Imphal by wearing down the British-Indian forces through attrition and then destroying them during their retreat in the May 1945 monsoon. Meanwhile, Admiral Mountbatten was also seeking a victory of his own. On November 8, he ordered an assault on Japanese positions in Arakan, with a deadline set for the end of January. This operation was assigned to General Christison's 15th Corps.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The fighting on Peleliu and Angaur raged asAmerican forces struggled against resilient Japanese defenses. Significant advances were made, including the isolation of the Umurbrogol Pocket and the capture of Ngesebus Island. Despite heavy casualties, Peleliu was eventually secured, leaving a small pocket of Japanese resistance.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 143 - Pacific War Podcast - Fall of Myitkyina 12 - August 19, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 13, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about the fall of Guam and actions in New Guinea. General Shepherd's Marines had secured the Orote Peninsula, while General Turnage's Marines pushed the Japanese northwards. General Bruce's 77th Division prepared for an eastward assault, and engineers attempted, but failed, to build a supply road to Yona. Geiger's offensive began on July 31, with Marines quickly capturing Agaña and advancing despite dense jungle and resistance. The 77th Division faced tough terrain but liberated 2,000 Guamanians. The push north continued, facing logistical challenges and mined roads. By August 7th, coordinated attacks cleared key areas, culminating in the defeat of remaining Japanese forces by August 11. Guam was back in American hands although scattered Japanese forces continued guerrilla warfare until the war's conclusion. Thus the Marianas campaign had finally come to a conclusion, and now the allies were adding more bass of operation to hit the Japanese home islands.  This episode is the Fall of Myitkyina Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  This week we are diving back over to the northern Burma front. Despite holding Myitkyina through a rainy, muddy summer-long siege, by late July, the Japanese had been gradually cornered into a small perimeter, cut off from all supply lines and running short on ammunition. The situation worsened due to a leadership crisis, between the two Japanese leaders was a matter of semantics. Colonel Maruyama of the 114th Regiment who was in charge of the defense of the city, interpreted his orders to “facilitate the future operations of 33rd Army ‘by securing the vital areas in the vicinity of Myitkyina',” as a call to defend the city street-by-street, house-by-house. When General Minakami of the 56th Division arrived, he pointed out that all Maruyama had to do to satisfy his orders was simply to continue to deny the Allies access to the Ledo-Kamaing road. Minakami thus found himself in a rather difficult position in regard to the command of the Myitkyina Garrison. Maruyama had conducted an excellent defense, was fully familiar with the situation and, because of his position as former commander, exercised considerable authority. Shortly after Minakami's assumption of command, General Honda asked how long Myitkyina could stand. Minakami replied that the garrison might be able to hold out for as long as two months. A few days later, Honda was surprised to receive a second message stating, "The Myitkyina Garrison finds it difficult to hold with the poor defense facilities and meager supplies of ammunition." The Army staff concluded that the first message was undoubtedly Minakami's personal opinion as it reflected his determined character and that the second message incorporated the views of Maruyama who was more cognizant of the actual situation. In order that there should be no doubt as to the importance of holding Myitkyina, Honda sent the following message, "Maj. Gen. Minakami will defend Myitkyina to the death” — a message sent with deep regret and sadness according to the staff officers who wrote and dispatched the order. Heavy casualties had reduced the Japanese forces from around 3,000 to fewer than 1,500, further weakening the garrison's defensive capabilities. This number included the heavily wounded and hospital patients, who could only be evacuated by drifting down the Irrawaddy River on rafts, often intercepted by the unforgiving Kachin Levies. On July 24, eight rafts and a boat laden with Japanese were attacked on the Irrawaddy by Kachins of the OSS Detachment 101. Twenty-four Japanese were killed, two captured, and then it was learned these were hospital patients fleeing Myitkyina. Three more Japanese seized by friendly Burmans revealed that hospital patients were being evacuated by the simple expedient of letting them drift down the river on rafts. As these fierce defenders began to falter, General Wessels felt ready to launch his final push. Reinforced by the 149th and 90th Regiments, the American-Chinese forces made daily gains of several hundred yards during the last days of July, though at a significant cost. As the Japanese-held area shrank, counterattacks became less dynamic, captured positions were less fortified, and many Japanese dead were found to be severely wounded men returned to the line. Unbeknownst to the Americans, the desperate defenders had requested a withdrawal to the east by the end of the month. Though Minakami had intended to fight to the last, he ultimately agreed to preserve his men's lives. On the night of August 1, the Japanese began their escape, crossing the Irrawaddy east of the town. Weighing the many evidences that control of the situation was rapidly passing into their hands, Wessels and his colleagues drafted a new plan of attack. It included an ingenious device, credited to General Pan Yu-kun of the 50th Division. A raiding party, formed into fifteen heavily armed sections, was organized and briefed on infiltrating Japanese lines facing the 50th Division. Having made its way through the Japanese lines in darkness, it was to remain hidden until 0430 when the 50th would assault while the raiders spread confusion behind the Japanese lines. Meanwhile, air reconnaissance revealed many rafts moored against the Irrawaddy within the Japanese lines. "At 0300 hours (3 August), when the moon went down and rain and thunder set in, the raiding party of the 50th Division moved out. The approach was detected only once and some shots were fired at the raiders, who hit the ground. The Chinese did not return fire however, and after laying low for a while, moved out again quietly and cautiously." While the raiders created confusion behind Japanese lines, the 50th Division launched a full attack, quickly overwhelming the remaining enemy positions and capturing 187 prisoners, thus securing Myitkyina for the Chinese. However, about 800 Japanese managed to escape eastward and later rejoined their allies. Minakami was not among them. As the 3rd of August meandered on in a haze of gunfire, blood and rain, Minakami went to sit with his back against a tree. There came the sound of a pistol shot. Japanese officers nearby sprinted to the scene. The general's orderly was in tears. They found Minakami's body erect against the tree trunk, facing northeast, towards Japan. The ten-week siege resulted in approximately 3,000 Japanese killed or captured; 972 Chinese killed, 3,184 wounded, and 188 evacuated due to illness; and 272 Americans killed, 955 wounded, and 980 evacuated sick. Overall, the total American-Chinese casualties in 1944 amounted to 13,618 Chinese and 1,327 American casualties. A week later, the Galahad Unit, reduced to only 130 combat-effective men from the original 2,997, was disbanded. The fall of Myitkyina was General Stilwell's greatest victory, earning him a promotion to full general on August 1, two days before the city fell. The attack was costly in terms of suffering and losses, but the Mogaung-Myitkyina area was a significant prize. It allowed Ledo Road builders and American transport planes to move to Myitkyina and enabled ground forces to link up with other Chinese forces in neighboring Yunnan. As the fighting moved further south down the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys, it became safer for transports to use the lower, more southerly routes to China. This, in turn, increased Hump deliveries to China from 13,686 tons in May to 18,235 tons in June and 25,454 tons in July.  While the Allies celebrated victories in northern Burma, the situation in China was dire as the Ichi-Go offensive resulted in many Chinese casualties. By August 1, General Yokoyama had amassed 110,000 troops around Hengyang, equipped with five heavy artillery pieces, fifty mountain artillery pieces, and 40,000 shells. Conversely, General Fang's resilient defenders had dwindled to 3,000 exhausted troops, with their defenses largely destroyed. General Xue Yue's reinforcements had failed to reach Hengyang, leaving the Chinese forces to rely on the 46th Army to launch an attack along the railway. On August 4, Yokoyama initiated his main offensive. The 68th and 116th Divisions launched a significant assault from the south and southwest, while the 58th Division quietly positioned itself near the enemy's northern defenses. Initially, progress was slow. However, by August 5, Yokoyama's forces had captured Yoping and School Hill. The next day, the 116th Division secured part of the city's defenses. On August 6, the 58th Division breached the city walls from the north, forcing Fang to redeploy troops to counter this new threat. Intense street fighting broke out on August 7 as the defenders valiantly tried to repel the Japanese attacks. By nightfall, the 68th Division had overrun the southern defenses and entered part of the Walled City. Gradually, enemy troops began to surrender, and before dawn on August 8, after 48 days of fierce resistance, Fang was compelled to surrender. Following the capture of Hengyang, Yokoyama declared the successful completion of the initial phase of Operation Togo and promptly began preparations for the subsequent offensive. In this phase, the Japanese reported casualties of over 3860 killed, 8327 wounded, and 7099 sick, with an estimated Chinese casualty count exceeding 100,000, including 8400 killed and 5000 captured in Hengyang alone. To spearhead the next stage of Operation Togo targeting Guilin and Liuzhou, General Okamura Yasuji's 6th Area Army was established on August 25, comprising the 11th, 23rd, and 34th Armies, along with the 27th, 40th, 64th, and 68th Divisions, alongside additional support units. This allowed General Hata to focus on countering potential American landings on the Chinese coast while Okamura directed the offensives in eastern China. Ahead of this operation, Lieutenant-General Tanaka Hisakazu of the 23rd Army initiated a preliminary offensive in late June, positioning the 23rd Independent Mixed Brigade in the northeastern sector of the Luichow Peninsula, advancing the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade to the Tanjiang River, securing the Jiangmen area with the 22nd Division, and capturing the Qingyuan sector with the 104th Division. By late August, Yokoyama had deployed six divisions along the Shuangfeng-Leiyang line, poised to eliminate the enemy in the district west of Hengyang. On August 29, he launched the offensive, with over 100,000 troops advancing southwest amidst heavy artillery bombardment. Intense ground and aerial combat ensued, resulting in the loss of 10 Japanese planes and 15 enemy aircraft. Despite fierce resistance from Chinese defenders over three days, their entire line collapsed on September 1, prompting a retreat towards Shaoyang, Qiyang, and Jiahe. However, the Japanese advanced relentlessly, covering nearly 100 kilometers in the following days without pause. By September 5, both Qiyang and Huochangpingzhen had fallen, followed by the seizure of Lingling Airdrome on September 8 by the 3rd Division. Progressing along a north-south axis, Japanese forces secured Shaoyang and Changning, while the 58th Division captured Dongan on the same day. With initial objectives achieved, Yokoyama ordered further pursuit, with the 3rd and 54th Divisions converging in the Quanzhou area by September 14. Meanwhile, Tanaka prepared for his offensive, with the bulk of the 104th Division moving towards Taipingzhen, and a raiding unit conducting a wide envelopment maneuver along the Zhukeng-Huaiji road towards Wuzhou by September 6. Subsequently, the 23rd Brigade began its northward march from Suixi. However, Tanaka's offensive wouldn't commence for a couple of weeks. Turning to the broader context of the Pacific War, General Stilwell celebrated a major victory with the fall of Myitkyina, while General Slim's successful defense against Operation U-Go further bolstered Allied morale in the CBI Theater. In Thailand, Prime Minister Phibun's regime faced a significant crisis as Japan struggled to meet the country's essential import needs, leading to inflation, rationing, shortages, black markets, smuggling, corruption, and profiteering. The anti-Japanese Free Thai underground movement, spearheaded by Regent Pridi Banomyong, infiltrated the government, stoking public discontent against both the Japanese occupiers and Phibun's administration. As a result, following the downfall of the Tojo government, Phibun found himself compelled to step down in late July. For his part, Phibun also was thinking of ways, he claims, to prepare to turn against the Japanese. Part of these preparations included proposals to move the capital to remote Phetchabun, north of Bangkok, and construct a “Buddhist City,” a sort of center for world Buddhism, near Saraburi—both grandiose projects in typically extravagant Phibun style. Moving to the isolated, mountain-ringed Phetchabun, Phibun later argued, would facilitate a Thai uprising against the Japanese. Yet on July 18, the Tojo government in Japan resigned, and only six days later the Thai National Assembly turned down both government bills and forced the resignation of Phibun as prime minister. The deputies in the assembly voted against these plans motivated in part by the fall of Tojo, who was closely associated in their minds with Phibun, in part by their feeling that the war was turning against Japan, and in part by their feeling that Phibun was too closely identified with an authoritarian past that must now be buried for the sake of improving relations with the Allies.  Politician Khuang Aphaiwong then assumed his position as Prime Minister on August 1. Serving as a compromise candidate, he navigated between Phibun's supporters and the opposition while maintaining cooperation with the Japanese and safeguarding Free Thai members who had collaborated with the Allies. Meanwhile, in China, the success of Operation Ichi-Go led to another leadership crisis. Despite the initial rejection of Stilwell commanding troops in China in 1942, the effective Japanese offensive posed a threat of defeat to the Chinese Government, reigniting the debate over command authority. This was especially significant as Chinese troops under Stilwell's command were achieving significant victories in northern Burma. However, Stilwell's vocal criticism of Chiang Kai-Shek's corrupt regime and incompetent generals strained their relationship. Chiang favored General Chennault, who proposed that with a monthly allocation of 10,000 tons for operations in northern China, his 14th Air Force could halt the Japanese offensive. Despite his strained relationship with Chennault, Stilwell redirected Hump allocations to increase the 14th Air Force's allocation to 8,425 tons, although he couldn't secure an additional 1,500 tons from the Matterhorn allocation. Chennault's aircraft managed to disrupt the Japanese advance, but failed to halt it completely. In late June, Stilwell faced criticism when Vice-President Henry Wallace visited Chongqing. While Wallace persuaded Chiang to allow a small American observer mission into Communist territory, he also recommended Stilwell's recall due to his perceived lack of diplomacy and strained relations with the Chinese leadership. Nonetheless, Stilwell maintained the backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and President Roosevelt eventually nominated him to lead the China Theater, on the condition that he make every effort to avoid upsetting the Generalissimo. In July, the President attempted to persuade Chiang to accept this arrangement, but the Generalissimo employed various diplomatic maneuvers to reject the proposal, agreeing "in principle" only after an unspecified period for his forces to adjust. He also requested the presence of a presidential representative to facilitate smooth relations between himself and Stilwell. Major-General Patrick Hurley was appointed to this role and arrived in China in August. Concurrently, the Dixie Mission arrived in Yan'an, where over the following months, American observers assessed Communist society, military tactics, and guerrilla operations, issuing reports that commended them and suggested increased collaboration. Following the fall of Hengyang, tensions escalated in China, with rumors swirling about potential coup plans involving Marshall Li Zhongren and General Xue Yue against the Generalissimo. Meanwhile, Chennault urged Stilwell to divert Hump airlift capacity to supply ground forces in eastern China, a move opposed by Chiang, who feared supporting potential insurgents with lend-lease equipment. Stilwell, anticipating his imminent assumption of leadership in the China Theater, refrained from challenging Chiang's stance. With significant developments looming, the intensifying rift between Stilwell and Chiang foreshadowed the downfall of one of them. Elsewhere in the South Pacific, General MacArthur's troops had finished their final offensive in New Guinea and were preparing to return to the Philippines by way of an intermediate stop at Halmahera Island. To the east, Rabaul was completely surrounded, enduring heavy bombardment from Allied air forces. Meanwhile, on Bougainville, the remaining forces of the 17th Army had retreated to the island's southern region, unable to launch further counterattacks. The living conditions of the Japanese soldiers, never good under the best of circumstances, became increasingly desperate. Added to the dangers that forward troops always faced, such as contact with large American combat patrols, was the growing specter of starvation. Sealed off from regular supplies from New Ireland or New Britain, General Hyakutake's army had to depend entirely on its own laborers to acquire food. The normal rice ration of 750 grams of rice for each soldier was cut in April 1944 to 250 grams, and beginning in September there was no rice ration. A large portion of the available army and naval personnel had to be put to work growing food. Allied pilots took delight in dropping napalm on these garden plots whenever possible. The native workers who had been impressed into service were the first to defect, but soon many soldiers also just walked away from their units, taking the chance of surviving in the jungle on what could be gathered. After the failure of the March attack, morale in most units became deplorably low. There were instances, normally unimagined in the Japanese army, of open insubordination and even mutiny. Although General Hyakutake dreamed of a midsummer offensive, it became obvious that no operations as large as that smashed in March could be undertaken for months, if ever. Thus, almost as if by agreement, both sides adopted a defensive posture that minimized the conflict in the no-man's-land between them. In the Central Pacific, significant progress had been made over the past year, marked by the complete capture of the Gilbert, Marshall, and Mariana Islands, strengthening the Allied presence and providing a launching point for future offensives into the heart of the Japanese Empire. The next target for Admiral Nimitz was the Palaus, to be invaded concurrently with Halmahera. However, the architect of this southwestern advance was not Admiral Spruance, who had been overseeing operations with the 5th Fleet. Instead, it was Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet, known as the "Department of Dirty Tricks," that had been strategizing the next moves from Hawaii. Now, Admiral Halsey was set to assume command of the Pacific Fleet, leading the charge to the Palaus and the Philippines. This rotation in leadership between Halsey's 3rd Fleet and Spruance's 5th Fleet was orchestrated by Nimitz to maintain operational tempo and confuse the Japanese. The alternating command structure allowed for continuous planning of future operations while the active fleet conducted current ones. However, Tokyo was apprehensive about a potential invasion of the Philippines and sought to bolster its defenses. Following the surrender of the US Army Forces in the Philippines, the 14th Army, led by Lieutenant-General Tanaka Shizuichi, worked to establish military administration, secure cooperation from civilian institutions, and quell guerrilla groups across the countryside. Despite their endeavors, their control over certain regions, particularly in the Visayas and Mindanao, remained fragile. Allied submarines and aircraft from Australia and New Guinea also delivered supplies like signal equipment, weapons, explosives, propaganda materials, and counterfeit currency to support the guerrilla forces, further impeding Japanese efforts. Additionally, with the deteriorating situation in the South and Central Pacific, more troops were redirected from the Philippines' garrison to other areas, weakening the 14th Army, now commanded by Lieutenant-General Kuroda Shigenori since May 19, 1943. Undermanned and stretched thin, the Japanese halted their suppression operations in August, hoping that the imminent declaration of independence by the Second Philippine Republic would lead guerrillas to surrender. However, this strategy backfired, as the guerrillas only grew stronger during the pause. Consequently, Kuroda restarted intensive suppression operations in 1944, but guerrilla activities escalated in anticipation of the imminent liberation by American forces. As a result, the guerrillas gained strength in the following months, providing valuable intelligence to MacArthur's forces in preparation for their eventual return. Given this context, it was evident that the 14th Army would be ill-equipped to withstand an American invasion under the current circumstances. Due to its crucial strategic location bridging Japan and the southern region rich in natural resources, Japan couldn't risk losing the Philippines. It served as their primary rear base supporting the main defense perimeter. The Philippines were also to play the role of a rear base of operations–an assembly and staging area for troops and supplies and a concentration area for air reserves, to support operations at any threatened point on the main defense perimeter from the Marianas south to Western New Guinea and the Banda Sea area. To implement these plans, IGHQ in October 1943 directed the 14th Army to complete the establishment of the necessary base facilities by the spring of 1944. Major emphasis in this program was laid upon the construction of air bases. The Army alone planned to build or improve 30 fields in addition to 13 already in operational use or partially completed. The Navy projected 21 fields and seaplane bases to be ready for operational use by the end of 1944, expanding its total number of Philippine bases to 33. Line of communications and other rear­ area base installations were also to be expanded and improved. Of the 30 Army airfields projected in October 1943, six had been generally completed by May 1944, and 24 under construction. Of the 21 projected Navy fields, 15 were still incomplete by then. Consequently, in early 1944, the decision was made to strengthen the garrison in the Philippines. Initially, this involved reorganizing and expanding existing garrison units to establish four new independent mixed brigades. These brigades were primarily tasked with suppressing guerrilla activity, while infantry divisions were assigned to defend against potential enemy landings. However, despite the estimation that at least seven divisions were necessary for the defense of Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao, only the 16th Division was available. Additionally, it was deemed crucial to bolster air strength with at least two air divisions, anticipating Allied invasions in Halmahera and Palau before advancing to the Philippines. Plans were formulated in March to deploy reinforcements within eight months. In mid-May, General Terauchi relocated his headquarters to Manila to oversee operations more closely. Concurrently, efforts were made to transport the 30th Division to Mindanao and bring the 4th Air Army to Manila. Furthermore, the Philippines were reinforced with the 2nd and 4th Air Divisions, the latter being tasked with constructing 30 new airfields. In June, approximately 20,000 inexperienced replacements were transported to the Philippines to bolster the recently-formed independent mixed brigades, filling them up to division strength. Subsequently, in July, the 100th, 102nd, 103rd, and 105th Divisions were activated, along with the establishment of the 54th and 55th Independent Mixed Brigades. It's ironic that despite this reinforcement, the main Japanese forces were as inexperienced as the Philippine Army during MacArthur's defense. Nonetheless, Terauchi was resolute in further fortifying the Philippines to prevent its fall, unlike MacArthur's situation. By mid-July, the reinforced 58th Independent Mixed Brigade arrived at Lingayen. Later that month, the 14th Army underwent reorganization into the 14th Area Army, with units directly under its command tasked with defending the northern Philippines. Meanwhile, the 35th Army, led by Lieutenant-General Suzuki Sosaki, was established under the 14th Area Army to defend Mindanao and the Visayas. Additionally, Tokyo finalized plans for decisive battle operations, codenamed Sho-Go, covering the Philippines-Formosa-Ryukyus-Japan-Kuriles area. This determined the disposition of Army and Navy air forces across the Pacific, with the Philippines receiving the reorganized 1st and 2nd Air Fleets and the 4th Air Army. The Philippine garrison was strengthened to a total of nine divisions and four brigades, with the 1st Division at Shanghai and the 68th Independent Brigade at Formosa designated as general reserves. Defenses and fortifications were constructed at Luzon in preparation for the decisive battle there.  Known as the Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 84,  issued on 1 August, this fixed the new tactical grouping of naval forces for the Sho-Go Operations. Almost the entire surface combat strength of the Fleet was included in a Task Force placed under the overall command of the First Mobile Fleet Commander, Vice­Adm. Ozawa Jisaburo. This force was broken down into three tactical groups: (1) the Task Force Main Body, directly commanded by Vice­Adm. Ozawa and consisting of most of the Third Fleet (carrier forces): (2) the First Striking Force, commanded by Vice Adm. Kurita Takeo and made up of the Second Fleet with part of the 10th Destroyer Squadron attached: (3) the Second Striking Force, commanded by Vice Adm. Shima Kiyohide and composed of the Fifth Fleet plus two destroyer divisions and the battleships Fuso and Yamashiro. The First Striking Force would be stationed at Lingga Anchorage, while the Task Force Main Body and the Second Striking Force would be stationed in the western part of the Inland Sea. However, if an enemy attack was expected, the First Striking Force would advance from Lingga Anchorage to Brunei, Coron or Guimaras while the Task Force Main Body and the Second Striking Force remained in the Inland Sea and prepared to attack the north flank of the enemy task force. During August, the Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters also took action to give the Combined Fleet more unified operational control of naval forces in order to facilitate the execution of the Sho-Go plans. On 9 August the General Escort Command and units assigned to naval stations were placed under operational command of the Combined Fleet, and on 21 August the China Area Fleet was similarly placed under Combined Fleet command. On 10 August the 1st Carrier Division, reorganized around two newly-commissioned regular carriers, was added to the Task Force Main Body. Vice Adm. Ozawa, Task Force Commander, meanwhile set 15 October as the target date for completion of the reorganization and training of the 3d and 4th Carrier Division air groups. Concurrently with these preparations, steps were taken to strengthen the antiaircraft armament of combat units. Accordingly, the Japanese sought to deploy the 8th and 26th Divisions, the 2nd Tank Division, and the 61st Independent Mixed Brigade to the Luzon region for a decisive battle. However, enemy submarines posed a constant threat. Since February, they had been patrolling the South China Sea, targeting the Hi Convoys supplying Japanese territories in Southeast Asia and Japan itself. During these engagements, Admiral Ijuin was killed aboard the patrol boat Iki. Between August 18 and 25, Admiral Kajioka's Hi-71 convoy, carrying the 26th Division, was attacked by six American submarines. The escort carrier Taiyo, destroyers Yunagi and Asakaze, two oilers, four transports, and three kaibokans were sunk, with 7420 soldiers of the 26th Division lost. The submarine Harder was the only American vessel sunk in retaliation. Kajioka's Hi-72 convoy, returning from Luzon, was also attacked, resulting in the sinking of his flagship, the kaibokan Hirato, and the loss of the destroyer Shikinami, three transports, and one oiler. Despite these setbacks, advance units of the 8th Division, 2nd Tank Division, and 61st Independent Mixed Brigade successfully reached the Philippines in September. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After months the siege of Myitkyina had finally ended. The Japanese had held out as long as they could, but lack of supplies and rather terrible leadership lost them the fight. Meanwhile, in China, Japanese offensives intensified, challenging Chinese defenses and leadership. It seemed war was coming to the Philippines, where the Japanese prepared to fight to the death.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 131 - Pacific War - Siege of Myitkyina, May 21-28, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later May 21, 2024 49:38


Last time we spoke about the battle of Wakde. Operation Tornado, the amphibious assault of Wakde island faced many logistical challenges, but not as much Japanese resistance. The landing at Arare was a large success, seeing the allies secure a beachhead before advancing inland. Through a combination of air, naval and ground attacks, the smaller Japanese force was pushed back. Likewise the islands of Liki and Niroemoar were taken with relative ease as well. Over in the Burma-India theater, the battle for Kohima was gradually seeing the Japanese fail to meet their objectives. Without ammunition or provision supplies flowing to them, the Japanese at Kohima had no hope of holding back the allies. Thus the Japanese were beginning to fall back and now were setting up a defense to stop the allies from entering central Burma. Meanwhile a siege was being erected against Myitkyina. This episode is the Siege of Myitkyina  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last time we saw General Stilwell had managed to seize the Myitkyina airstrip. Now allied forces were gradually securing northern Burma, pushing further towards Mogaung. The Japanese 18th Division were absolutely battered and barely holding on around Kamaing. However when the American-Chinese forces seized Myitkyina's airstrip, they had failed to quickly attack the main town, which the Japanese were reinforcing heavily. Now they were being attacked from both ends. This prompted General Stilwell to dispatch General Boatner with the task force to try and turn things around. Simultaneously, Stilwell had just received word of the Chindits abandonment of the Blackpool stronghold, outraged by this he ordered them to advance northwards to support the attack on Mogaung. Three brigades, the 111th, 14th and the 3rd West Africans were to advance north to support Calvert's 77th Brigade to take Mogaung. The Chindits were incredulous. Nonetheless, Lentaigne, pressed by Stilwell, sought to have his 3rd West Africans, the 14th and 111th Brigades squeeze the Japanese along the western flanks of the Mogaung valley, in which Mogaung occupied the lowest point of an inverted triangle, with the other two points being Kamaing on the top left and Myitkyina on the top right. With any luck, his three brigades could capture Kamaing, which occupied an enviable place on the Mogaung River. The 111th Brigade was to move north-east and operate in the Pahok-Sahmaw area, destroying dumps and blocking enemy movement. Thebattered men of the 111th Brigade struggled to cope with the march north, to the hills east of Lakhren and west of Mogaung. Conditions were appalling on the three-day march to Lakhren village. From there, the best approach to Mogaung would be identified. They were making for a waterlogged, mosquito-infested area north east of the Lake. This area was also alive with Japanese units. They were required to support 77th Brigade's attack on Mogaung, by pushing from the west as Calvert's command advanced from the south-east. However, 111th Brigade was spent after Blackpool and many men were forced to return to Lakhren village. There was also a new task for 14th Brigade – the capture of Taungni. With the casualties evacuated, 14th Brigade abandoned the Kyunsalai Pass and headed north towards Mogaung. The steamy swamps continued to take their toll within the ranks of the York and Lancaster columns. Dysentery was rife. Animals collapsed and were shot where they dropped. They reached Mokso on June 25. This much-used rallying point, consisting of four huts, was a sea of mud and detritus, decorated with black clouds of flies. Rations were being consumed rapidly in an area devoid of drop zones. Brigadier Brodie, 14th Brigade's Commander, responded to the extreme circumstances. His men, despite their dangerously poor condition, were still expected to harass the Japanese along the railway and support 77th Brigade's assault on Mogaung. He formed his columns into “Light Battle Groups”, free of heavy weapons and the wounded and sick, now lying together in the mud. Meanwhile, some Nigerian units were now struggling on the road to Lakhren along the reailway, as were the York and Lancaster sick – around 300 in all, 200 of whom were dangerously ill. On May 25th, the same day the Chindits had quit Blackpool, Stilwell ordered the Morris Force to seize Waingmaw, across the river from Myitkyina. Unfortunately, the Japanese had entrenched themselves at the town and enjoyed the luxury of a natural moat after heavy rains flooded the fields on the approaches to the town. Morrisforce was not a proper brigade, having only two columns of troops, to which a third from the 111th Brigade had been added 1,500 troops in total. It had been conceived to harass the Japanese on jungle areas. Now, they were up against fortified positions. The result was a bloodbath. Morrisforce then began to rapidly deplete in strength. By July 14th, it was to consist of exactly three platoons, roughly 120 men. On May 31st, Boatner then launched his first coordinated attack against Myitkyina seeing the 42nd regiment reach the Waingmaw ferry road. Built up twelve feet above the neighboring paddy fields, the road gave the Japanese a magnificent defensive position, which they exploited cleverly. The Chinese recoiled from this natural fortification but were able to beat off a Japanese counterattack. The 150th Regiment reached the riverbank and drew up in an arc about a sawmill in which the Japanese had a strongpoint. Meanwhile Colonel Hunter's 2nd battalion reinforced with engineers advanced to Radhapur where they were heavily counterattacked by the 114th Regiment. The next day, the inexperienced 236th Engineer Battalion was sent against Namkwi. The motive behind the 236th's attack was to contain the Japanese in the Namkwi area and introduce the battalion to combat under relatively easy conditions. One company of the 236th did succeed in entering Namkwi but instead of promptly consolidating to meet the inevitable Japanese counterattack fell out for a break. The Japanese counterattacked and drove the unwary engineers right back out of the village. Both the engineers and the 2600 replacements of the Galahad Unit that had recently arrived lacked adequate experience fighting the Japanese and as such suffered badly when fighting against them. Colonel Hunter's veteran Marauders, however, had suffered ample casualties and thus needed these green replacements in order to continue existing as a fighting force. Boatner tossed a last ditch effort on June 3rd, but his Chinese forces had suffered 320 casualties and their ammunition was running low. While he waited for supplies to build up, he used his green american troops to give them some experience, the Chinese meanwhile tunneled towards the Japanese still suffering heavy casualties. This allowed more Japanese troops to break through and reinforce Myitkyina, with a huge relief force of the 52rd Division soon on its way. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Matsuyama Yuzo of the depleted 56th Division was facing a deadly offensive of his own on the Yunnan front. After a series of negotiations between Chiang Kai-Shek and the Americans, it had been agreed, General Wei Lihuang's Y Force would cross the Salween River to attack the Tengchong and Longling areas. This would effectively allow the allies to link the Ledo Road with China, bypassing the heavy Japanese concentration along the Burma Road. Although the Americans had supplied the Y Force with artillery and ammunition, the Chinese had failed to bring the Y Force divisions up to strength, and many questioned their training. Regardless, General Wei planned to have elements of the 20th army group cross the Salween at several points before initiating a full assault against Tengchong once reinforcements had been ferried through. Further south, elements of the 11th Army Group would also cross the Salween to launch attacks on Pingda and Longling.  On the night of May 11th, the Chinese forces began to cross the Salween River against little Japanese resistance, since Matsuyama had decided not to defend the crossing sites, instead placing his main line of resistance along the ridge line some 10 miles west. The 198th Division was able to assemble in front of the Mamien Pass; the 36th division was successfully ferried through Mengka; the brand new 39th Division managed to secure the Hueijen bridge and the 76th and 88th Divisions were converging on Pingda for the attack. On May 12th, the 198th were making good progress against the Mamien Pass as the 36th had surrounded the Japanese outposts in the eastern end of the Tiantouzhai pass. However Colonel Kurashige Yasuyoshi had his 148th regiment launched two surprise night counterattacks. All that night, the Japanese quietly filtered down from a nearby ridge and assembled near the Chinese position. Attacking at dawn, they surprised the Chinese and almost wiped them out before aid came. When darkness came, the 36th were at their bivouac. That night, the Japanese attacked vigorously, overrunning the division command post and causing the flustered 36th Division to fall back to the Salween. At dawn, the 53rd Army commander, Maj. Gen. Chou Fu-cheng, pushed a regiment across the Salween and restored the situation by attacking the Japanese flank. General Chou was an aggressive and tenacious fighter, whom his Manchurian soldiers had nicknamed Old Board-Back, and who had the reputation of never having yielded an inch to the Japanese. But even Chou could not immediately restore the morale of the 36th Division, which for some weeks took no further part in the Ta-tang-tzu fighting, and the rest of the 53rd Army had to bear the burden of clearing the pass. In response to this, Lt General Zhou Fucheng of the 53rd Army pushed the 116th and 130th Divisions across the river to resume the advance towards Tiantouzhai. At the Mamien pass, the 592nd and 594th Regiments began clearing out the Japanese strongpoints while the 593rd Regiment moved west over mountain byways to emerge into the Shweli valley by the 16th, securing the western end of the pass and forcing Kurashige's men to withdraw into the fortified village of Shangzhaigongfang. To the south, the New 39th would be able to secure Hemushu by the 17th. Yet the Japanese under Colonel Matsui Hideji soon recovered from the initial surprise of the Chinese offensive and the 1st battalion, 113th regiment drove the Chinese from Hung-mu-shu. The Japanese exploited their success and pushed the entire New 39th Division back against the Salween. Further south, the 76th Division met outposts of the 1st battalion, 146th regiment and forced them back to the heights overlooking Ping-ka. Meanwhile the 88th Division from the north was fighting through a series of fortified villages as it headed south to join the 76th Division. By the 16th, thirteen villages were occupied in the area northeast of Ping-ka, but the Japanese, as they withdrew, received reinforcements. Strengthened by the 2nd battalion, 113th regiment, the Japanese did not attack the Chinese who were pursuing them, but moved south and hit the Chinese 228th Regiment south and west of Ping-ka.  Sensing the imminent danger from the north,  Matsuyama redirected the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 113th Regiment to reinforce Shangzhaigongfang, where Kurashige would continue to resist staunchly. Reports from the American liaison teams were not cheerful. Americans observing the Kaolikung Range actions found that Japanese fire was accurate and economical, and that the enemy's use of camouflage and concealment approached perfection. The Japanese revealed no disposition to surrender though they were heavily outnumbered, often surrounded, and had neither air support nor air supply. On the other hand, the Americans reported that the Chinese endlessly wasted manpower and ammunition in costly frontal attacks. They reported that relations with the Chinese were not always as friendly as had been hoped, and they believed there would have to be better cooperation between Chinese and Americans if the Japanese were to be defeated. The Chinese were described as merely tolerating the Americans' presence and as paying little attention to their advice. The liaison personnel freely admitted their own shortcomings, and by their reports suggested that patience was the most important quality for a liaison officer to cultivate when dealing with the Chinese. Matsuyama ha spread his forces widely, over a near 60 mile sector, thus he would be unable to perform mobile operations and was gradually shifting to a defense of the Kaolikung mountain range by the 20th. This allowed the 53rd Army to continue their advance and the New 39th to retake Hemushu. By late May, with the 198th Division apparently contained on the north, Kurashige then rushed with the 113th Regiment to reinforce the Tiantouzhai front, where they successfully stopped the 53rd Army on its tracks. Yet on June 1st, the 54th Army, emerged in the Shweli valley from Ta-tang-tzu pass to join the 593rd Regiment from the Ma-mien pass. Next day the Chinese occupied Chieh-tou village and began patrolling the Shweli valley. They took the advice of Y Force officers and donned Burmese clothes. So disguised, they found it easy to enter Japanese-held villages. When taken by surprise, the Japanese were willing to abandon many of their outer defenses. With TNT charges dropped by the 27th Troop Carrier's C-47's when the weather cleared, the 198th Division also blew up the last pillboxes at Chai-kung-tang on June 13th. When the last shots had been fired and the Chinese farmer boys of the 54th Army reported the area secure, there was bewilderment at finding only 75 Japanese bodies in defenses that must have been manned by at least 300 men, and shock and nausea when the Japanese kitchens revealed how the defenders had been able to prolong their stay. Pitiful and ghastly evidence showed that the Japanese had resorted to cannibalism when their rations failed. On June 14th the Japanese further quit Chiao-tou-chieh, leaving many stores to the 2nd Reserve and 36th Divisions. In the end, the Kurashige Detachment would pull back to Watien while the Inose Battalion retreated towards Kutungchieh. General Wei then ordered the 71st Army to cross the Salween, just below the Huitung Bridge to attack Longling while a containing force attacked the strong Japanese harrison at Lameng. 20,000 troops of the 71st would cross the river by June 5th. At this time the 76th division left a regiment to besiege Pinga while the bulk pushed on to attack Matsuyama's HQ at Mangshi, while the 9th Division crossed the Salween, cutting off Pingda's line of communication. On June 4th, the new 28th Division attacked Lameng and forced Major Kanemitsu Keijirous garrison to retreat into the Mount Song fortress where they would hold out for several months. While the New 28th held down Kanemitsu, the 87th Division continued towards Longling, joining up with the 88th on June 8th to begin a siege of the main Japanese position on the Yunnan front. The Japanese still held onto the Burma Road east of Lung-ling, but as of June 7th the 87th Division had covered about two thirds of the distance along the Burma Road from the river to Lung-ling. The Chinese had to deal with small Japanese tanks, which had some moral effect but failed to halt the Chinese advance. Indeed, the latter had been fairly swift, for the Chinese had surprised the Japanese, and had been able to ease their supply problems by the capture of some Japanese rice depots.  To meet the new crisis, Matsuyama dispatched the 1st battalion, 119th regiment to stop the 2nd army at Xiangdaxiang and then attack Longling from the south. Matsuyama ordered Colonel Matsui Hideji to immediately relieve Longling from the north; and for the Yamazaki Composite Group to keep the Mangshi-Longling road open. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Song Xilian, had been making some progress against Longling's two outer heights, the stout defenders would manage to repel the uncoordinated Chinese assaults for about a week. Four days of un-coordinated infantry attacks, with little artillery support, failed to carry the three mountains inside Lung-ling, and there was nothing to show for the heavy drain on the 71st Army's ammunition stocks. This gave more time for Matsuyama's reinforcements to arrive by June 14th. On the 15th Matsui launched a heavy attack, in coordination with the besieged defenders, successfully defeating the 71st Army and consequently driving the Chinese from the vicinity of Longling. The Japanese had thus been able to drive back 10000 Chinese effectives by an attack with only 1500.  Repeated attempts by American liaison personnel with the 71st Army to learn how a small Japanese garrison could drive back a Chinese army group only brought embarrassed smiles from Chinese officers. The Chinese finally related on June 25th that the 261st Regiment had bolted, and that the commanding general of the 87th Division had attempted suicide. When fuller details of the fighting around Longling were available, anger and annoyance spread from Y Force to the Generalissimo himself. Y Force personnel considered the Chinese decision to withdraw from Longling inexcusable because the 11th Army Group had sent forward no reinforcements to meet the initial Japanese counterattacks. Of 21 battalions in the Longling vicinity on June 14th, only 9 took part in the fighting. In describing the defensive attitude of the 259th Regiment, as an example of the conduct that had cost the chance of a speedy breakthrough into Burma, one American liaison officer wrote: "From the time that we crossed the river until we reached Longling, the regimental commander continually had his troops in the rear digging emplacements and trenches in the fear that they would have to retreat." Yet that is it for the Yunnan battle for now as we need to head over to the Kamaing area. General Tanaka's 18th Division were withdrawing with the 22nd and 38th division in hot pursuit. To the south the Seton Roadblock was being held by 112th Regiment, threatening to thwart Tanaka's plans. Coming to their aid, General Sun sent his 113th and 114th Regiments to descend upon Lawa, where General Aida began an unauthorized retreat on June 4th. The abandonment of Lawa severely affected the defense of Kamaing, thus General Aida was relieved of command and replaced with Colonel Imaoka Soshiro. Colonel Shoshiro immediately began to dig in at Lagawng. Meanwhile the bulk of the 55th and 56th regiments were holding onto the Nanyaseik area as General Liao's 65th regiment cut their withdrawal route off on June 1st. While the rest of the 22nd Division were applying pressure from the north, the heavily outnumbered Japanese had no choice but to quickly cut a trail southeast, finally withdrawing on june 7th. Their retreat was chaotic, both regiments lost contact with each other and with their subordinate units as they made separate ways towards Kamaing. It would only be the 3rd battalion, 56th regiment who would arrive at Kamaing by June 10th, most of the others would reach Lakatkawng in late june. While retreating, their artillery units were intercepted by the pursuing Chinese and the artillerymen chose to die with their guns. While the 22nd Division and 149th Regiment thus pushed towards Kamaing, General Sun had also sent the 113th Regiment to take Zigyun and the 114th Regiment to advance southwards and support the Chindit assault on Mogaung. The Chinese were able to encircle Kamaing from the west, north and east as the 149th Regiment then moving across the fields and into Kamaing to take the settlement on June 16th,  pushing Tanaka's battle-weary troops to the hills south and west of Kamaing. Meanwhile Brigadier Calbert was able to reach the Mogaung area by the start of June. 12 miles from Mogaung, Calvert's forward troops began to run into Japanese patrols and snipers. Despite taking losses, the 3/6th Gurkhas led by Colonel Claude Rome, who in his previous incarnation had been overlord of “Broadway,” pushed on, seizing the western heights overlooking Mogaung on May 31. On June 1st, Calvert's South Staffords linked up with Rome and the Gurkhas at the village of Loihinche. Other elements of the brigade reached the southern foothills of the heights, three miles south of the town, on June 2 and went straight into the fray. That same day, the Lancashire Fusiliers and the South Staffords also attacked Lakum (held by some ordnance troops and a field hospital). The leading force of Fusiliers was soon pinned down by heavy fire, the impasse only broken when a Bren gunner in the leading rifle section went wild, and ran “straight up the hill, firing from the hip and screaming curses at the Japanese.” Softening up the Japanese with airstrikes from Air Commando Mustangs, troops of the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers and 1st South Staffordshires attacked and wrested Lakum village away from Japanese and occupied the summit of the range of hills overlooking the city, to the northwest.  Calvert decided he would need to build a base akin to White City, where he could collect supplies and build an airstrip to take out the wounded. Calvert fixed his eye on the village of Lakum, occupying a strategic spot on the eastern foothills of the heights overlooking the Mogaung plain. Upon capturing the village, the Chindits would also find substantial ammunition, a field hospital and buildings which had obviously hosted several Japanese headquarters. The country leading up to Lakum, however, was hard stuff. It was in the midst of thick jungle intersected by deep ravines. The path proved difficult to follow as it sometimes wound along a ridge and sometimes went straight up or straight down. The place was a defender's paradise. “A handful of resolute men could hold successive hill-tops for hours against a large force such as ours overburdened with mules and heavy stores,”. In response to the new threat, Colonel Okada Hakuji rushed over with some units of his 128th Regiment to protect Mogaung, leaving his 1st Battalion to face the rapidly-approaching 114th Regiment and immediately recalling his 3rd Battalion from Seton. Alongside this General Honda ordered General Takeda to turn back from Myitkyina and instead secure the Moguang-Kameing area. Thus the chance to lift the siege of Myitkyina was lost. By June 3rd, the Chindits had built a new airstrip near the Tapaw Ferry, allowing airdrops of supplies and equipment to spill in. Calvert was now ready to launch his attack.  Early on June 8th, the 1st South Staffords set off to secure the Pinhmi. The village was defended by elements of 3rd battalion, 128th regiment who were also protecting some ammunition dumps in the area. The Staffords routed the Japanese and destroyed the dumps, clearing the way to the bridge. By now it was afternoon, and they stepped aside to let the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers move on to capture the 150-foot-long bridge. All seemed well until a hail of gunfire shattered the silence, tearing into the Fusiliers. Two companies were pinned down in the ditch while another was in the jungle further down. At about 6 pm, Calvert arrived at the front to confer with Major David Monteith of the attacking company. It was decided that two platoons, under the cover of a mortar barrage would dash across the bridge and secure the other bank. Calvert's mind went to the 4.2” mortars. He intended to use them to deadly effect now. Two platoons of Fusiliers moved in on the bridge, with one platoon attempting to move along the ditch, only to struggle against the thick, waist-high grass, as the second slipped off the road into the jungle. The mortars, about 60 yards behind them, began firing, slowly at first, but then as fast as the men could drop bombs into the tubes. The men, with fixed bayonets, charged across the bridge. The Japanese waited until the British were halfway across before opening fire. Tracers filled that little space, bullets tearing into flesh. The Chindits toppled left and right. Some crawled in their bellies, trying to get just far enough to throw their grenades upon the enemy positions. By 6.15, it was all over, the retreat was called. Calvert summoned US airstrikes. Mustangs swooped in, bombing and machine-gunning the enemy emplacements, but one Mustang mistakenly bombed a group of Fusiliers unloading mules. Because of the unexpected opposition, Calvert would instead direct his forces to ford the Wettauk Chaung and take Mahaung and Ywathitgale, which successfully fell on June 9. The following morning, a Gurkha company attacked towards Kyaingyi and the railway to create the impression that the main attack would come from this direction while the bulk of the 3/6th Gurkhas made a wide right flank advance to attack the bridge from the rear. At dawn on the 10th, Shaw's Gurkhas moved forward, waist deep in marsh water and mud. The bridge assault party was under the command of Captain Michael Allmand, a one-time cavalryman commissioned into the Indian Army in 1942 after escaping from Singapore. Allmand moved his men forward warily. The approaches to the bridge were narrow with the road up on a high embankment with swampy, tree-heavy low-ground flanking both sides. Coming in from the marsh, the Gurkhas set upon the bunkers at the bridge with grenades and small-arms fire, but the Japanese held their ground. At 10 am, they tried again, shooting and hurling grenades from amid waist-deep mud of the Wettauk. Allmand, who was close to shore charged. Throwing grenades to scatter the enemy, he closed in to kill three with his kukri. Rallied by his heroism, the Gurkhas rushed the remaining defenders, capturing the bridge. About 35 Japanese were killed at the bridge and the Gurkhas captured one medium machinegun and two light machineguns. In return, Chindit casualties in the encirclement and capture of the Pinhmi Bridge came to about 130 killed and wounded. By mid-afternoon, Calvert had deployed two battalions up on the Mogaung-Pinhmi Road, while a third occupied the bridge area. Conquering the brigade saw the Chindits suffer 130 casualties, while Okada's troops had also suffered heavy casualties, yet they had successfully delayed the Chindit advance for four days, which allowed Takeda to bring the bulk of his forces back into Mogaung. Knowing full well that the Japanese had been able to reinforce Mogaung, Calvert decided to wait for the arrival of the Chinese troops that Stilwell had sent to reinforce him; but in the meantime, he launched a successful attack against the courthouse on June 11, followed by a failed advance towards the river. To secure his right flank, Calvert had decided to send a company of South Staffords under a new replacement officer, Major “Archie” Wavell Jr, son of the venerable Viceroy, to secure the area between the road and the Mogaung River. The Staffords made good headway, but near the river, they came under heavy fire from entrenched Japanese. Wavell was hit in the wrist, the bullet almost taking the hand off; and he was then pulled out of the line and walked back to the field hospital near Gurkha village, clutching onto his hand, which was now hanging on by a sinew. That night, the surgeons at Gurkha Village were to remove the hand entirely. Wavell Jr's war was over. In the end, the Staffords also had to pull back towards the road after the loss of their commanding officer. By June 15th,  the Chinese had still not appeared, thus the Chindits ultimately had to withdraw to Pinhmi.  Back over at Myitkyina artillery was arriving by air. Two batteries plus one platoon of 75-mm. howitzers; two 105-mm., and two 155-mm. howitzers, were landed. All except two pieces with GALAHAD were kept under headquarters control. During the siege they fired 600 tons of ammunition, very rarely with massed fire. Boatner renewed his offensive on June 13th, sending almost all his forces to attack the town from all directions. The American-Chinese forces would struggle to make much progress against General Minakami's defenses. Utilizing a system of night attack and daylight defense, heavy casualties were consequently inflicted on the enemy and large supplies of weapons and ammunition were captured and used in the defense of the city. On June 12th the Japanese hit a platoon of K Company, New GALAHAD, so hard that the company broke and re-formed on the L Company line. The portion of the Japanese thrust that hit the perimeter next to the river made most of the men "take off," but two stayed in place and repelled the Japanese with an automatic rifle and a machine gun. To the west of this little break the Japanese worked their way in close but were stopped by grenades and small arms fire. As a result of the attacks, however, the 3rd Galahad Battalion had cut the Maingna ferry road and reached the Irrawaddy north of Myitkyina by June 17th, with the 150th and 88th Regiments also gaining up to 200 yards. The allies needed to capture the Myitkyina-Mogaung-Sumprabum road junction; but for such few gains, Boatner had lost many men and thus had to stop his attacks on June 18th. Stilwell ordered the end of all infantry attacks. Boatner replied that he would stop attacking Japanese positions until ". . . our troops are steadied and a favorable opportunity presents itself." There was reason for the troops to need steadying. A and B companies, 209th Engineers, were cut off from their main body by infiltrating Japanese. Trying to close in on them, Company C and Headquarters and Service Companies were in turn halted by Japanese. The condition of A and B Companies became critical during June 14th, for they had only one meal with them. Two of their men managed to work their way back to the block on the Sumprabum Road with news of their plight, but enemy small arms fire prevented airdrops. The isolated companies finally made their way back in small groups to the rest of the battalion over 15 and 16 June. The 3rd Battalion of GALAHAD reported trouble in effecting reorganization and enforcing orders. The Americans were not alone in their problems. Two companies of the Chinese 2/42nd which had made a small penetration into the Japanese lines on 14 June were wiped out by counterattack that night. These setbacks emphasized the nature of the Myitkyina fighting. The Allies held a ring of battalion and regimental strongpoints enclosing a similar Japanese system. Though the Allied strongpoints were close enough for the troops in one to sortie to the aid of another should that be needed, they were not so close that interlocking fire could be put down to close the gaps. Consequently, there was plenty of room for maneuver and ambush, and the inexperienced engineers and New GALAHAD troops often suffered at the hands of General Minakami's veterans. On the other hand, the Myitkyina Garrison did not emerge entirely unscathed, as they too suffered heavily, losing approximately 1000 men during the month of June alone. But that is all for today with the CBI theater as we now need to head over to New Guinea to start the Battle of Lone Tree Hill. After the fall of Wakde, General Tagami had sent Colonel Yoshino Naoyasu's 223rd Regiment to cross the Tor River inland to attack Arare while Colonel Matsuyama Soemon's 224th Regiment attacked the Toem area from the other side. In the meantime, General Doe's 163rd Regiment patrolled across Tementoe Creek and the Tor River, encountering heavy Japanese resistance at Maffin but successfully repelling some enemy counterattacks. While the 163rd strengthened its defenses on the Tor and at Arare, Doe would also see the arrival of Colonel Prugh Herndon's 158th Regiment on May 21. General Krueger's plan was to use this regiment in a vigorous overland drive toward Sarmi, aimed at throwing the enemy into the defensive and therefore securing the Wakde area. This decision was based upon scanty and incomplete information concerning Japanese strength and dispositions. The Japanese had no intention of abandoning Sarmi and the two airstrips between the town and the Tor without a desperate struggle.  The Americans were also finalizing their plans for an operation against Biak, codenamed Hurricane. General Fuller's plan was to land the 186th Regiment in the Bosnek area at 7:45 on May 27th to secure the Green Beaches and its two jetties. Once the two jetties were secured, LCI's bearing the 162nd Infantry, supporting troops, and the task force reserve were to move inshore and unload. LST's were also to move to the jetties when the beach area surrounding them had been cleared by the 186th Infantry. LCM's bearing artillery, tanks, and engineering equipment were to move to the beaches as soon as channels through the coral were found or made, or to the jetties in waves following the 186th Infantry's assault companies. As soon as it reorganized ashore, the 162nd Infantry was to advance rapidly west along the coast from Bosnek to seize the three airdromes. This drive was to be supported by eight tanks of the 603rd Tank Company and the 146th Field Artillery Battalion. The fields were to be repaired quickly to accommodate one fighter group and then expanded to receive an additional fighter group, a heavy bomber group, a reconnaissance group, a night fighter squadron, and one photo reconnaissance squadron. Mokmer Drome was to be the first field developed. Brigadier-General Edwin Patrick would also replace Doe in command of the Tornado Task Force, as the latter would resume its duties as assistant commander of the 41st Division. Admiral Fechteler's Task Force 77 was to provide naval support and cover the assault shipping. Naval fire support was to begin at H minus 45 minutes, 6:30. From that time until H Hour, cruisers and destroyers were to expend 400 rounds of 8-inch, 1,000 rounds of 6-inch, 3,740 rounds of 5-inch, and 1,000 rounds of 4.7-inch ammunition on targets in the airfield area west of the landing beaches. After H Hour the cruisers were to continue intermittent fire on the airfields, bombard targets of opportunity, and respond to calls for support from the forces ashore. Because there were many known or suspected Japanese gun emplacements along the south shore of Biak, counterbattery fire was to take precedence over all other types of fire. Bombardment of the landing beaches was also to begin at H minus 45 minutes. Five destroyers were to bombard the beaches and adjacent areas until H minus 30 minutes, when they were to move westward to join the cruisers firing on the airfield area. Then four other destroyers were to continue beach bombardment until H minus 3 minutes. Total ammunition allowance for beach bombardment was 4,900 rounds of 5-inch and 4.7-inch shells, while 40-mm. and 20-mm. ammunition was to be expended at the discretion of individual ship commanders. Rocket and automatic weapons fire from three rocket-equipped LCI's and two SC's was to provide close support for the assault waves. This fire was to begin at H minus 5 minutes and was to last until H Hour or until the initial wave was safely ashore. Meanwhile General Kenney would toss 52 B-24's to bomb the beaches just before the landings. Additionally, medium bombers and fighters from 5th Air Force would cover the force from the air; and from May 17th onwards, the bombings on Biak's airfields would increase sharply in violence to soften up its defenses. As elsewhere along the absolute defense zone perimeter, primary emphasis was laid upon the construction of airfields. Between December 1943 and the enemy invasion of Hollandia in April 1944, two of three projected fields on southern Biak were completed and put into operational use by planes of the Navy's 23rd Air Flotilla. Their usefulness ended almost immediately, however, when the enemy's vastly superior air forces began operating from Hollandia bases. As in the Wakde-Sarmi sector, the concentration of effort on airfield construction until the Hollandia invasion resulted in dangerously delaying the preparation of ground defenses against enemy amphibious attack. In the five weeks which elapsed between the Hollandia and Biak invasions, the Biak garrison forces, under able leadership and by dint of desperate effort, succeeded in organizing a system of strong cave positions, which proved highly effective after the enemy landing. However, time, equipment and manpower were so short that defensive preparations could not entirely be completed. Some 15-cm naval guns, brought to Biak immediately after the Hollandia invasion to strengthen the coast defenses, were still unmounted when the island was attacked. On May 23rd, the 158th advanced west from the Tor River Bridgehead. The advance of Company L met increasingly strong resistance. Japanese defenses were centered around three small, brush-bordered lakes near the beach about 1,800 yards west of the Tor. The rest of the 3rd Battalion, 158th Infantry, across the Tor before 1130, quickly moved forward to assist Company L, which had been pinned down along the main coastal track west of the lakes by Japanese machine gun and rifle fire. Company K pushed up to the left flank of Company L, while Company I moved toward L's rear. With the aid of mortar fire from the 81-mm. weapons of Company M, Companies K and L were able to push gradually forward during the afternoon, advancing on a front about 400 yards wide. Finding that the attack was not progressing as rapidly as he had expected, Colonel Herndon ordered his 1st Battalion across the Tor. The 1st Battalion did not start moving until 1400 and could not get far enough forward to join the attack before dark. Tanks would probably have been of great help to the 3rd Battalion, but by the time the mediums of the 1st Platoon, 603rd Tank Company, moved across the Tor, the forward infantry troops had already halted for the night. In the end, Companies L and K would dig in for the night across the main coastal track about 400 yards east of Maffin.  The following morning, after an ineffective mortar and artillery bombardment, Herndon resumed the attack. Despite the lack of extended artillery support, Companies K and L moved out as planned at 7:30. Company L, on the right, advanced along the beach encountering only scattered rifle fire but Company K, on the main road, had hardly started when Japanese machine gun and rifle fire from concealed positions in a wooded area on the left front halted its advance. Unable to gain any ground, Company K called for tank support. Two tanks, together with a flamethrower detachment from Company B of the 27th Engineers, arrived at Company K's lines about 1000. With the flamethrowers and tanks blasting the way, the infantrymen overran the Japanese defenses, killing ten of the enemy and capturing two machine guns. The remainder of the Japanese force, probably originally some forty men strong, disappeared into the jungle south of the road, whence scattered rifle fire continued to harass Company K. Company L reached the outskirts of Maffin No. 1 about 1400. The movement had been slow, not as a result of Japanese opposition but because the battalion commander did not believe it prudent for Company L to advance far beyond Company K. Despite the return of two companies, most of Colonel Kato's engineers would have to withdraw behind the Tirfoam River against such heavy firepower. Captain Saito's reconnaissance unit, meanwhile, retreated to the jungles south of Maffin alongside one engineer company, which was under Kato himself.  Over the Tirfoam River, however, the Americans were again stopped by the tenacious engineers, which again forced Herndon to request tank support. As the tanks moved into position elements of the Right Sector Force, comprising Captain Saito's men of the 1st Battalion, 224th Infantry and an engineer company, charged out of the jungle. The Japanese were under Colonel Kato, Right Sector Force commander, who was killed as he personally led a small detachment against the American tanks. The enemy was quickly thrown back with heavy losses by the combined fire of the four tanks and Company L's riflemen and machine gunners. However, under cover of their infantry attack, the Japanese had dragged a 37-mm. anti-tank gun forward out of the jungle. As the enemy infantrymen withdrew to the southwest after the death of Colonel Kato, the anti-tank gun opened fire. It was soon destroyed and its crew killed, but not before three of the American tanks had been so damaged that they had to be withdrawn for repairs. Facing such heavy resistance, Herndon then sent his 1st Battalion to carry out a deep envelopment to the south across the Tirfoam, yet these troops would similarly be unable to break through by nightfall. After killing 28 men and wounded 75 others, Kato's force allowed Tagami to dispatch the 2nd Battalion, 223rd Regiment to reinforce the Ilier Mountains line. On the morning of May 25, Major Matsuoka Yasake also arrived there with an infantry company to assume command of the remainder of Kato's forces. Meanwnhile Yoshino had crossed the Tor River, 3 days behind schedule and to the east, Matsyuama was assembling on the right bank of the Tementoe River. Herndon relieved his 1st Battalion with the 3rd and then pushed west with the 2nd Battalion following behind them. The next objective for the 158th was Long Tree Hill. Lone Tree Hill, known to the Japanese as Mt. Ilier,  had been named for a single tree which was depicted on its crest by the map then employed by the Americans. Actually, the hill's coral mass was covered with dense rainforest and jungle undergrowth. Lone Tree Hill was about 175 feet high, 1200 yards long north to south, and 1100 yards wide east to west. The north side dropped steeply to a rocky shore on Maffin Bay. The hill's eastern slope was fronted by a short, violently twisting stream which was promptly dubbed the "Snaky River" by the 158th Regiment. The main road curved away from the beach to pass south of the Snaky River and Lone Tree Hill through a narrow defile. The southern side of this defile was formed by two noses of Mt. Saksin , a terrain feature about 100 feet higher than Lone Tree Hill. The more westerly of these noses was named "Hill 225", known to the Japanese as Mt. Sento after its height in feet. No name was given to the eastern ridge line, which pointed toward Lone Tree Hill from the southeast. There was a small native village at the eastern entrance to the defile and another at the pass's western outlet. Mt. Saksin was a name given to an indefinitely outlined hill mass which forms the northern extremity of the Irier Mountains, extending inland from the coast at Lone Tree Hill. The name Saksin was specifically applied to a prominent peak about 2,000 yards due south of Lone Tree. On or about May 23rd General Tagami had moved his headquarters into the Mt. Saksin area, apparently on the southwest side of the central peak.  Herndon forces continued the advance through the abandoned enemy positions, albeit without tank support, for they could not cross the fragile Tirfoam bridge. In the afternoon, the Americans were finally halted below the southernmost bend of the Snaky River, subjected to heavy machine-gun fire and an intermittent artillery bombardment. General Patrick, who had succeeded to the command of the TORNADO Task Force during the morning, was informed of the opposition encountered by the 1st Battalion. He ordered the advance stopped for the night and instructed the 158th Infantry to remain well east of the Snaky River so that American artillery could register on the native village and the defile without endangering the forward troops. Harassed by a few artillery shells, which by now had been recognized as originating from Japanese 70-mm. or 75-mm. weapons, the 1st Battalion pulled back about 500 yards east of the Snaky. A perimeter was set up with the battalion's left resting on the road and its right on the beach. The 2nd Battalion established a series of company perimeters back along the road to the east. Casualties for the day had been 22 men killed and 26 wounded, almost all in the 1st Battalion, while about 50 Japanese had been killed. When the attack orders for the day had been issued, it had been hoped that the 1st Battalion could reach the top of Lone Tree Hill before nightfall. Since the unexpectedly strong enemy opposition had prevented the realization of this hope, plans were made to continue the advance westward on the 26th. The ultimate objective was the east bank of the Woske River, 2,000 yards west of Lone Tree Hill, and the intermediate objective was the native village at the eastern entrance to the defile. The advance was to be preceded by naval shelling of the northern slopes of Lone Tree Hill from 6:30 to 7:00. A fifteen-minute artillery preparation was also to precede the advance, and the infantry was to start moving at 8:45. The next morning, naval fire started ten minutes late. Two destroyers lying offshore shelled the northern slopes of Lone Tree Hill and the Maffin Bay area, firing on known or suspected enemy defensive positions and assembly points. After a twenty-minute bombardment the two support vessels withdrew. Artillery fire did not begin until 8:30. The time lag gave the Japanese ample opportunity to prepare for the infantry attack which had been heralded by the destroyer fire. The artillery, aiming its shells into the defile and against the eastern slopes of Lone Tree Hill, ceased firing about 8:45. A few moments later the 1st Battalion, 158th Infantry, Company B again leading, started moving westward. The infantry's line of departure was nearly 1,000 yards east of the village at the southeast foot of Lone Tree Hill, and the advance had to be slow because the road ran through heavily jungled terrain. The enemy therefore had sufficient time to reoccupy positions in the defile and on Lone Tree Hill which might have been vacated during the American artillery barrage. The value of both the naval and artillery bombardment had been lost. Herndon's 1st Battalion moved once again against Lone Tree Hill. Company B moved forward to the point at which it had been held up the previous afternoon and was again stopped--this time by fire from the southeastern corner of Lone Tree Hill. Company D's heavy machine guns were brought up to spray a densely wooded area in front of the point rifle platoon. The fire dispersed the Japanese riflemen, and Company B moved forward again. Less than 100 yards of ground had been gained when the company again encountered machine gun and mortar fire originating in the native village. Company A, initially off the road to the right rear of Company B, turned north to the mouth of the Snaky River. One platoon crossed at the river mouth at 1030 but was quickly forced back to the east bank by Japanese machine gun fire from the rocky beach below the north face of Lone Tree Hill. Artillery support was called for, supplied, and proved successful in stopping the enemy fire, and about 1:50 all Company A crossed the Snaky. Orders were to move down the west side of that stream to establish contact with Company B and to send one platoon up the eastern slope of Lone Tree Hill to probe enemy positions. Other efforts were meanwhile being made to scatter the Japanese opposing Company B. Company E moved up to the left flank of Company B and on the south side of the main road. The combined efforts of the two rifle companies proved insufficient to dislodge the Japanese from their positions at the eastern entrance to the defile, and the enemy fire forced the American units to seek cover. Company F was therefore ordered to pass through B's left flank and proceed to Hill 225 to take the Japanese positions from the rear. Company F's attack could not be started before dark and Company A, moving up the west side of the Snaky, was unable to relieve much of the pressure on Company B. Finally, Company A was forced for a second time to withdraw to the east bank of the river as a result of enemy fire from Lone Tree Hill. Tanks would have been of great help to Company B, but the bridge over the Tirfoam could not bear their weight, and the road west of the stream was in such disrepair that tanks probably could not have negotiated it. Only Company A would manage to cross the Snaky River through much effort, yet it would be unable to relieve the pressure from Company B's front and would have to retreat by the end of the day. To prevent further casualties from being inflicted by Japanese patrols, which were expected to roam around the flanks of the forward elements during the night, a semicircular perimeter was ultimately established. Although Herndon's attacks on May 26th had been completely unsuccessful, the 158th Regiment had located and probed some of the principal Japanese defenses in the area and could now be ready to launch a more effective assault.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Vinegar Joe was experiencing some major setbacks, but it looked like Myitkyina was as good as his. However the American officers' reports of how difficult the going was for the Chinese was quite disheartening. Over in New Guinea, the allies were yet again faced with a great obstacle, now in the form of One Tree Hill.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 130 - Pacific War - Battle of Wakde, May 14-21, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later May 14, 2024 48:13


Last time we spoke about the Japanese defeats at Imphal and Kohima. General Mutaguchi's Operation U-Go was gradually falling apart. General Yamauchi faced defeat afte defeat and was forced to dig in around Sendgmai and Kanglatongbi. The allies then began tossing large counteroffensives while Mutaguchi was forced to change targets for Bishenpur, only to be repelled again. The allies' anvil-hammer strategy proved very effective, the Japanese lost their momentum and now the allies were seizing it. The battle for Kohima was fierce, seeing the Japanese struggle to seize key features upon it. Despite many victories in Kohima, it did not seem like the Japanese would be able to seize the entire area. Within the China theater, Operation Kogo saw the Japanese push into Luoyang, earning enormous victories over the Chinese forces. Out in the Pacific, the British eastern fleet launched a successful airstrike against Surabaya, gaining valuable experience despite minimal Japanese response. This episode is the Battle of Wakde Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A new mission was afoot, Operation Tornado, the amphibious assault of Wakde Island. The nucleus of the force that would hit Wakde was to be General Doe's 163rd regiment of the 41st division. The war planners devoted a lot of time to the selection of a landing beach for Tornado. However the island was too small and her beaches were too limited to permit the landing of a reinforced regiment. Furthermore a landing on Wake would most likely be met by hidden Japanese artillery on the mainland. Thus to stop such a thing from occurring they would have to perform a landing against the mainland to eliminate artillery positions.  It was decided that a landing at Toem, on the mainland directly opposite Wakde, would not be sensible. There the landing craft and cargo ships would be subjected to small-caliber fire from Wakde. In such restricted waters the enemy could place enfilade fire on the ships, but in more open waters to the west naval fire support ships and amphibious vessels would have freedom of movement and could maneuver to neutralize both Wakde and the Toem area while the TORNADO Task Force moved ashore and set up its artillery. After consideration of all these factors, it was finally decided that the initial beachhead would be at Arare, a native settlement on the coast about three miles west of Toem and four and one-half miles southwest of Wakde Island. Additionally, the Allied Air Forces desired that radar warning stations be established in the Wakde area. For this purpose, Liki and Niroemoar Islands, about fifteen miles off Sarmi, were to be seized. As such the Tornado Task Force was going to begin landing on the mainland opposite of Wakde island at Arare on May 17th. The next day the 1st Battalion, 163rd Infantry would assault Wakde island, covered not only by the task force artillery but also by the Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai and by naval fire support ships. After all of that, on the 19th, Liki and Niroemoar islands would be captured where radar stations would be constructed. Furthermore, in reserve would be the 128th and 158th Regiments, ready to reinforce Doe's troops if needed.  Admiral Fechteler's Task Force 77 was going to take charge of the operations against Wakde and Biak, with Captain Noble's Eastern Attack Group providing fire support for Operation Tornado. Captain Noble divided his fire support ships into three groups: Fire Support Group A two heavy cruisers and four destroyers, Fire Support Group B three light cruisers and six destroyers, and Fire Support Group C, ten destroyers. These ships would  begin firing on assigned targets at H minus 45 minutes and would continue bombardment until H minus 3. The bulk of the D Day fire was to be aimed at Sawar and Maffin Dromes, west of the landing beach. No resistance was expected at the beach and a light bombardment to be directed on it was purely precautionary. Some fire support ships were assigned counterbattery missions and others were to aim their shells at Wakde and Insoemanai Islands. Other ships assigned to participate in the landing phase were 3 submarine chasers, 2 destroyer-escorts, 4 minesweepers, 2 rocket-equipped submarine chasers, and 3 rocket-equipped LCIs. Rocket fire was to begin at H minus 3 minutes and was to be directed principally against the beachhead area. At H minus 1, all fire on the beach was to cease and the landing craft were to make their final dash to the shore. After the landing, the fire support ships were to shift bombardment to targets on the beach flanks and were to be prepared to deliver call fire upon request from the troops ashore. The landing on Insoemanai was to be supported by two LCI”G”s and two destroyers. Throughout the night of 17-18 May, cruisers and destroyers were to bombard Wakde and on the morning of the 18th they and the rocket-equipped vessels were to support the assault on that island. On the 19th a few destroyers were to support the landings on Liki and Niroemoar Islands. Admiral Crutchley's cruisers would shell the mainland around Sarmi and Sawar, while Admiral Berkey's cruisers would hit Wakde Island. On top of that, General Kenney's 5th Air Force would hit the Wakde-Sarmi area alongside other targets along New Guinea's northern coast. Special attention was given to enemy fields east of the Vogelkop Peninsula and on Biak Island. Japanese waterborne supply and reinforcement movements in the Geelvink Bay area were to be stopped insofar as weather, time, and the availability of aircraft permitted it. Insofar as range, weather, and time permitted, Australian bombers, aided by a Dutch squadron of B-25s, were to neutralize enemy air bases on the Arafura Sea islands and on other islands of the Indies southwest of the Vogelkop. On D minus 1 Fifth Air Force bombers were to attempt detonation of possible land mines on the mainland beach and subsurfaces mines in the waters surrounding Wakde. On the morning of D Day there was to be additional bombing west of the landing area, but there was to be no bombing or strafing of the beach immediately before the assault. Fighters were to be on air alert, weather permitting, over the Wakde area from first light to dusk on D Day. During part of the day A-20s would also be on alert over the area and were to strike Wakde. Such daily cover was to continue until aircraft could use the Wakde strip. To face this onslaught was a signal IJA company, the Japanese 9th Company of the 224th Infantry Regiment, reinforced with a mountain artillery platoon and a few mortar and both light and heavy machine-gun squads from other 224th Regiment units. The strength of this combat force was about 280 men. They would be assisted by the IJN's 91st Guard Unit of about 150 men and a battery of the 53rd Field Antiaircraft Artillery Battalion, most of whose weapons had long since been demolished by the air attacks. Alongside miscellaneous airdrome engineers and other service personnel, both Army and Navy over on Insoemoear Island, this brought the total of Japanese strength on the island to nearly 800 troops. This was all the result of General Tagami's decision to concentrate the bulk of his division in the Maffin Bay-Sawar sector, leaving the coastal stretch east of the Tor River and opposite of Wakde pretty much unguarded. A series of untoward circumstances emerged which hampered the loading process. LSTs on which the Task Force units at Aitape were to be loaded were some eight hours late reaching the staging point. When these vessels finally reached Aitape, adverse surf conditions and congestion on the shore prevented their beaching until late in the afternoon of May 13th, and loading was delayed another twelve hours. There was also some trouble about units scheduled to take part in the Wakde operation. The Shore Battalion, 533rd EBSR, an important element of the Task Force, did not arrive at Aitape until the afternoon of May 12th. The battalion and its equipment could not be unloaded from the ships which had brought it to BLUE Beach from eastern New Guinea and be reloaded on LSTs of the Wakde convoy in time for the departure of the task force from Aitape, scheduled for no later than midnight on May 14th. In view of these logistic difficulties, General Doe was therefore forced to drive his troops to the limit of their endurance in order to get the loading finished on time. He solved the problem of the Shore Battalion, 533rd EBSR by substituting for that unit the Shore Battalion, 593rd EBSR, which was already stationed at Aitape. Finally at 1am on the 15th, Noble's ships departed Aitape, stopping at Hollandia to load the remainder of the task force, before assembling off Arare and Wakde by dawn of the 17th. The fire support ships successfully bombarded the Japanese targets against little resistance while as Troops aboard the assault ships arose early, ate the breakfast quickly, and by 5:30 began loading on their assigned landing craft. The sea remained calm and the rain gave way to the sun shortly after dawn. Men of the 3d Battalion, 163d Infantry, transferred from the APA's which had brought them from Aitape to the eight LCVP's of the first wave. The beach was clearly visible and its limits had been marked by colored smoke grenades dropped by cruiser-based seaplanes of the fire support units. Meeting zero opposition, the first American troops would hit the shore at 7:15, with succeeding waves rapidly arriving behind them. The 3rd Battalion then fanned out along the shore and quickly secured the Arare beachhead area, just as the remaining units were being brought to shore. Upon landing, Doe's 2nd Battalion passed through the 3rd and immediately moved eastward towards Tementoe Creek, successfully securing Toem against no opposition by 9:30.  There, the 1st Battalion assembled for the assault on Wakde while Company E was transported from the mainland to Insoemanai Island, where the Americans would successfully establish a Provisional Groupment of heavy weapons to support the next day's assault. Within a few hours after the mainland beachhead had been secured, the Tornado Task Force was ready to execute the second phase of the D Day plan, the capture of Insoemanai Island, a little over 3,500 yards offshore. At about 10:45, under cover of fire from two destroyers and two rocket-equipped LCIs, a platoon of Company E, 163rd Infantry, was transported from the mainland to Insoemanai. There was no opposition to this maneuver and the islet proved to be unoccupied. Four LCMs, an LCVP, and two LCSs immediately took the rest of the company and the Provisional Groupment of heavy weapons to Insoemanai. The landing of the force was rendered difficult only by the fact that a coral fringing reef made it necessary for the troops to wade ashore from about seventy-five yards out. The mortars and machine guns of the Provisional Groupment were quickly set up and began firing on Wakde. The Japanese at Wakde responding to their first bombardments with machine-gun and mortar fire, which was the only noticeable resistance of this day. At the same time, elements of the 3rd Battalion had moved west to the Tor River, successfully reaching it during the afternoon. Thus, by the end of the day, the Americans had landed a total of 7000 men and had successfully secured a firm beachhead between the Tementoe and Tor Rivers at the cost of only 2 killed and 11 wounded.  Once he received news of the landings, General Tagami ordered all his forces to prepare a counterattack to try and destroy the allied beachhead. He also ordered the Matsuyama Detachment, who were advancing towards Hollandia, to turn back to Toem as quickly as possible so they could launch and attack against the enemy from the east. Yet before the Japanese could begin their advances, General Doe's amphibious assault began. Shore-based artillery, the Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai, and some of the naval fire support ships unleashed harassing fire on Wakde throughout the night. 36 A-20s of General Kenney's Fifth Air Force bombed and strafed the Japanese defenses beginning at 7:15am on the 15th. Naval bombardment lasted until 8:57 when the gunfire was aimed at the proposed landing beach on the southern shore of Wakde, and was then to be lifted to the northern side of the island. The 191st Field Artillery Group fired for twenty-three minutes on Wakde, and this bombardment was supplemented by 20-mm. and 40-mm. weapons aboard naval support vessels upon completion of the latters' fire from heavier weapons. The Provisional Groupment on Insoemanai joined in. In addition, rocket-equipped LCIs threw 850 4.5-inch rockets on the island. Noble's warships expending a total of 400 rounds of 6-inch and 1950 rounds of 5-inch ammunition against Wakde's defenses.  The Japanese had constructed many defensive positions on Wakde. There were about a hundred bunkers of various sizes and constructions. Some were made of coconut logs and dirt, others utilized cement in sacks, and a few contained concrete or lumps of coarse coral. There were many foxholes and slit trenches, and the Japanese had improved some of the bomb craters to make defensive positions. There were at least two well-constructed concrete air raid shelters and the Japanese were prepared to use the few coral caves on the eastern shore for both defense and storage. Many of the defensive positions were well camouflaged, and some were dug deep into the ground to present a low silhouette. Coconut trees toppled by pre-assault bombardments added more natural camouflage and protection to the enemy's defensive positions. The majority of the many bunkers were mutually supporting, but, on the other hand, some had been built with no apparent relationship to others. Some of the bunkers, most of the field and anti-aircraft gun positions, the airstrip, and many buildings had been severely damaged or destroyed by carrier-based aircraft during their attacks on the Wakde-Sarmi area in support of the Hollandia operation. By 9am, the first wave of LCVPS were surging forward under Japanese rifle and machine gun fire at around 300 yards range. They hit the beaches at Wakde at 9:10am. For the next 15 minutes, three rifle companies and two Sherman tanks landed against increasing fire from Japanese machine-guns and rifles in hidden positions on the flanks of the beachhead. Despite the resistance, the beachhead was quickly organized and the Americans soon began to expand the perimeter in all directions. The two tanks, with Companies B and F, started moving west to widen the initial hold. Company C struck north toward the airstrip and Company A pushed to the southeast along the small peninsula to destroy a troublesome machine gun nest on the little knoll. After destroying an enemy bunker, Company A cleared the eastern peninsula by 10:45 while Companies B and F, after meeting initial heavy resistance on the west flank, found that most opposition collapsed once the ruins of prewar plantation houses had been cleared by hand grenades and rifle fire. The two companies thereupon left the beach and swung north toward the airfield. Company C then encountered strong resistance in its drive up the center of the island, laboriously clearing a group of bunkers by 10:15 but then calling for tank support to destroy a second group in front of the airfield. At the same time, Companies B and F swung north towards the airfield, reaching its southern edge at 10:30 and then pushing eastwards. Just before 11:30  the tanks joined the infantry unit, which had now pushed halfway from the beach to the airstrip. With this added strength Company C reduced each bunker in a series of separate actions which included 75-mm. fire from the tanks, lobbing hand grenades into the bunkers' fire ports, and killing with rifle fire all Japanese who showed themselves. With Company B's aid and the continued support of the two tanks, Company C was able to push on to the airstrip. In the northeast corner of the island the Japanese forces maintained a fierce defense, and Companies B, C, and F were subjected to considerable small arms, machine gun, and mortar fire originating from positions at the eastern end of the airstrip. Movement eastward along the south side of the strip was slow, even though Companies B and F had been reinforced by Company D's heavy machine guns, which had arrived on Wakde from Insoemanai late in the morning. In the meantime, Company A was sent to aid in the mop up of the plantation houses, before turning northwest to clear the western end of Wakde. Company A pushed along the beach road and down a dispersal lane running off the southwest side of the strip. About 1245 the advance was held up by three Japanese bunkers on the right flank. Tank 75-mm. fire, delivered from as close as 20 yards, soon eliminated the Japanese defenders. Small groups of Japanese, originally hiding in foxholes behind the three pillboxes, attempted to assault the tanks with hand grenades and bayonets. Company A's automatic riflemen quickly dispersed or killed these men, and the unit pushed on around the west end of the airstrip. Little opposition was encountered in this movement and the company reached the north shore of Wakde Island about 1:30pm. Major Wing of the 1st battalion, decided to await the arrival of two more tanks from the mainland and the redisposition of Company D's weapons before attacking what promised to be the strongest Japanese defenses on Wakde. The two additional tanks were to be used wherever opposition proved heaviest, while the heavy weapons of Company D were to be equally divided between Companies B and F. Meanwhile Company C attempted to advance across the strip in support of Company A, but their movement would be delayed due to the ferocious enemy resistance. At 3:45, Company A finally restarted the drive eastwards while Companies B and F kept pushing along the airfield. Company A rapidly moved forward from the western end of the strip, passed through Company C at the halfway point, and pushed cautiously eastward. Movement after passing Company C was slowed by increasingly heavy machine gun and mortar fire from the northeast section of the island. At 6:00, when Major Wing ordered his men to dig in for the night, Company A had not quite reached the northeastern corner of the airfield. Meanwhile, south of the strip Company B had scarcely started its attack when fire from hidden Japanese machine guns held up the advance. Company F was immediately pulled out of its reserve role and committed to action on B's right flank. Two tanks were moved forward to Company B's front at the same time. Despite their best efforts and even with the tank support, Companies B and F were unable to progress more than 300 yards east of the lines of departure. Major Wing decided that since dusk was approaching it would be useless to continue the attack. The two companies were therefore halted and instructed to take up night defensive positions. Company A had set up its night perimeter about 100 yards short of the northeast corner of the airdrome. Company B was on the south side of the strip about 450 yards from the eastern end, and Company F was on B's right. Company C was pulled back to the southern side of the field and extended Company F's line to the southeast beach at the base of the small peninsula. The battalion command post was about 400 yards behind the lines of Company F. There was no connection across the strip between Companies A and B. The former was in a dangerously exposed position. However, Japanese fire against the company perimeter ceased before dark, and the Japanese did not attack. The night was fairly uneventful except at around 2:30 am on the 19th a small group of Japanese attacked a command post, defended by elements of Company D, and a half-hour fire fight raged in the darkness. Twelve Japanese were killed while three Americans, all of D Company, were wounded. This night battle did not delay the next day's attack which started, after an artillery and mortar preparation of one hour's duration, at 9:15am. Company C was the first unit under way on the 19th. Two tanks were assigned to the 3rd Platoon and one to the 2nd. The 3rd Platoon was on the left, the 2nd on the right, and the 1st and Weapons Platoons were in support. The 3rd Platoon pushed eastward up a slight rise, harassed by light rifle fire from the front and left flank. Once on top of the rise the platoon met heavy Japanese fire from behind fallen coconut trees and from a number of bunkers, bomb craters, and demolished buildings to the east. The 75-mm. guns of the tanks methodically destroyed each enemy position, and the few enemy that escaped from the bunkers were cut down by 3rd Platoon riflemen. The 2nd Platoon, followed by the rest of C Company, moved on toward the eastern beaches, and was slowed only by heavy brush near the shore. Upon turning north at the beach the company found that the Japanese had converted a number of small coral caves into minor strong points. These were slowly cleared by riflemen, tank fire, and flame throwers as the company pushed on. Meanwhile, Company B, moving east along the south edge of the airstrip, had also encountered many Japanese defensive positions. Progress was at a snail's pace. Company F, in reserve during the early part of the drive, was thrown into the fight on B's right flank about 11:30 and two tanks were sent from Company C's front to support Company B. The latter, with its zone of responsibility now nearly halved, was able to concentrate its forces for more effective operations. A rifle platoon was assigned to each tank and the remaining rifle platoon was in support. Some Japanese were found hidden in wrecks of aircraft, some of which covered bunkers, and others were in foxholes in heavy brush. This brush was difficult for soldiers afoot to penetrate but the tanks, spraying every likely hiding place with machine gun fire, rapidly broke paths through it. The advance, even with the tank support, was slow, because it was necessary to comb every square foot of ground for Japanese riflemen. It was not until 1400 that Company B reached the southeast corner of the strip. On B's right, Company F and one tank encountered similar opposition but managed to keep abreast of Companies B and C. During the late afternoon, Companies C and F turned north, while Company A advanced northeast to join up with Company B. At this point the eastern end of the field had been cleared out, the Japanese resistance began to collapse as remaining defenders formed a small triangle perimeter by 6pm. Meanwhile Liki and Niroemoar were captured by Companies E and I on the 19th. The two companies had been transported to the objectives by two APD's and two LCT's, protected by DD's. The islands proved to be unoccupied by the Japanese and the Fifth Air Force radar detachments were immediately set up. The only casualty was the native chieftain of Liki, who was wounded by the pre assault naval bombardment. Detachments of the 163d Infantry were left on both islands to protect the radar installations. The morning of the 20th, suddenly opened up with a banzai charge performed by 37 Japanese, who had slipped through Company C's lines during the night against engineer units at the beachhead. The attack began at7:30, leaving36 dead and 1 wounded Japanese, the latter was taken prisoner. At 9:00 Companies A, C, and F started patrolling in the northeast pocket. A few Japanese were killed, others were buried by demolition charges in coral caves along the northeast shore, and many committed suicide. During the afternoon Major Wing's men moved back to the mainland and turned over control of Wakde Island to the Allied Air Forces. The 836th Engineer Aviation Battalion began repairing the western end of the Wakde airdrome, with the strip being declared operational on May 21st. The first planes landed on the island that afternoon, two days ahead of schedule. Within a few more days the Wakde strip was sufficiently repaired and enlarged to furnish the needed base from which bombers could support the Biak operation on May 27 and Admiral Nimitz' advance to the Marianas in mid-June. The final count of Japanese casualties on Wakde was 759 killed and 4 captured, with an additional 50 being killed on the mainland. In turn, the Americans only lost 43 killed and 139 wounded. That is all for today on this front as we now need to cross over to the India-Burma front. Last time, we saw the forces of General Stopford managed to retake Kohima Ridge in mid May, tossing General Sato's 31st Division onto the defense. Stopford reorganized his forces for a final push. The 5th brigade led by Brigadier Michael West prepared to launch  coordinated set-piece attacks against the remaining Japanese positions atop Naga Hill. An attack was made by the Cameron Highlanders on Hunter's Hill on the night of May 15th, but it was hurled back. After this bulldozers were sent to cut a track up Naga Hill to allow tanks to support an infantry assault. On the 19th, Brigadier West launched another attack, but this time terrible weather hindered them, allowing the Worcesters to only seize 9 bunkers before being halted by enemy fire, coming from a group of bunkers on the reverse slope. After this, General Messervy of the 7th division was given responsibility for taking Naga Hill. On May 23rd, he brought with him Brigadier Loftus-Tottenham's 33rd brigade. This switch allowed General Grover to concentrate the remainder of his tired division for an attack on the Japanese positions on Aradura Spur. On the other side, Sato was exhorting his men to “You will fight to the death. When you are killed you will fight on with your spirit.” Yet Sato knew full well he lacked the ammunition and provisions necesary to hold Kohima, he would have to withdraw in short order.  Two sets of attacks were unleashed upon the Japanse, first on Japanese defences around Point 5120, known also as Church Knoll and Hunter's Hill by Messervy's 7th Indian Division on the left of the battlefield, and then of Aradura Spur by Grover's 2nd Division on the right. The 4/15th Punjab suffered a bloody reverse in these assaults, losing 18 officers and 443 casualties for not a single metre of ground in return. No combination of attacks from the air, artillery strikes, tanks, flame-throwers, infantry or mortars could dislodge Sato's men. On the Aradura Spur, Grover ordered simultaneous assaults to take place on 27th and 28th of May. On the right the Royal Scots and Norfolks were to attack the north-east end of Aradura Spur, while 6th Brigade were to take the south-west, where their objectives were named 'Matthew', 'Mark', 'Luke' and 'John'. When launched, however, 6th Brigade's attack on the 28th failed miserably. The weather was poor, the terrain atrocious and the morale of the exhausted 2nd Division the lowest it had been since its arrival. The attack by the Norfolks and the Royal Scots on the north-west spur met the same fate as the luckless 6th Brigade. The Norfolks were now down to 14 officers and 366 men, many exhausted and ill and, despite the remarkable leadership of Lt. Col. Robert Scott and above-average morale, the Japanese positions looked typically impervious to anything other than a direct tank round into each bunker, which of course was not possible in the steep, jungle-matted hillsides. Along with the intantry attacks, Naga Hill was heavily attacked by Hurricane bombers during the 24th and 25th, but the Japanese remained firmly entrenched and resolutely immovable.  The only major result of these attacks would be more casualties and a further drop in morale for the British-Indian troops. Sato's was alianted from the HQ of 15th Army, but had no doubt that it was Mutaguchi's abject failure to send supplies through the mountains that had forced him to undertake the kind of passive defense in which his division was now engaged. On May 29th, Sato thus reported that his position was hopeless, and that he reserved the right to act on his own initiative and withdraw when he felt that it was necessary to do so, in order to save what remained of his battered division from inevitable destruction. Later that day he signaled Mutaguchi: “We have fought for two months with the utmost courage, and have reached the limits of human fortitude. Our swords are broken and our arrows spent. Shedding bitter tears, I now leave Kohima.” Apoplectic with rage and astonished at his subordinate's blatant disobedience, Mutaguchi ordered Sato to stay where he was. Sato ignored him and on receipt of Mutaguchi's threat to court-martial him, replied defiantly: “Do as you please. I will bring you down with me.” The angry exchange continued, with Sato the following day sending a final angry message to Mutaguchi in which he declared: “The tactical ability of the 15th Army staff lies below that of cadets.” Sato then ordered his staff to close down the radio sets, in a final act of defiance. During the back and forth screamfest, Sato had requested Mutaguchi permis him to withdraw to a position that would allowed the 31st division to finally receive supplies, Mutaguchi simply refused and demanded he hold on another 10 days. Sato could simply not keep letting his men down, he made plans to withdraw for May 31st. The Miyazaki detachment was given the task of covering the retreat for the 31st division. On May 27th, the 4/1st Gurkhas under the newly appointed 27-year-old Lieutenant-Colonel Derek Horsford, managed to capture the Gun Spur at the extreme eastern edge of Naga Hill via a night infiltration that took the Japanese entirely by surprise. This further allowed tanks to approach the Japanese positions and, by June 1st, an attack by the Queen's discovered that the Japanese were withdrawing. Grover then thrusted his troops from the newly captured Naga Hill south-east across a valley to cut off General Miyazuki's rearguard and the 124th regiment around the Aradura Spur from the road to Imphal just behind it. Recognizing the inevitable, Miyazaki then had to withdraw from Aradura on the night of June 4, planning to conduct further delaying actions at Viswema in protection of Sato's withdrawal. Yet that is it for the battle of Kohima as we now need to travel north to see how General Vinegar Joe's offensive is going. Last time we saw General Merrill's Marauders take the Myitkyina airstrip and prepare for a siege of Myitkyina. The Chinese forces of Generals Sun and Liao were pushing the 18th division towards the Kamaing area. As for the Chindits, Major Master's 111th Brigade contuined to repel numerous Japanese attacks against the Blackpool Stronghold, without the assistance of his floater Brigades. The Japanese artillery continued to take a killing toll on the camp with their near continuous fire. They had been reinforced with even heavier 155mm guns, which together with enemy mortars positions on a ridge 1,000 yards ahead, began to pummel them. Meanwhile allied aircraft were unable to supply them adequately because of the monsoons, and General Takeda's 53rd Division was furiously approaching to crush them. On May 16th Japanese troops penetrated the defenses and a counter-attack failed to eject them. Now many positions within the perimeter came under persistent sniper fire. Shelling that evening heralded another attack. It was beaten back, leaving 50 Japanese dead. This was followed by a night attack involving two companies. This was repulsed, the enemy losing another 70 men. Master's estimated his Brigade had killed about 800 Japanese, they had also suffered 200 casualties during the last few days. Luckily for them, however, the impending threat to Myitkyina and Kamaing, forced General Honda to redirect the 3rd Battalion, 114th Regiment to reinforce the Myitkyina garrison while the 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment continued north to reinforce General Tanaka.  At this point Masters wanted to withdraw deeper into the jungle, from where they could ambush the advancing Japanese and set up a new stronghold with the help of 14th Brigade and West Africans, who were probing the jungle ridges east of them. He signaled Lentaigne asking for permission to abandon the block at his discretion. But Lentaigne's authority had become reduced. He was forced to take the message to Stilwell, who having been thwarted at Myitkyina, had allowed the Hyde to his Jekyll to emerge. In scathing language, he called the British “a bunch of lily-livered Limey popinjays.” Lentaigne then let his Irish temper get the better of him, and a fierce argument erupted at Stilwell's headquarters. Then on May 22nd, General Takeda's 53rd Division reached the stronghold. They unleashed an all-out assault, the Cameronians of 90th Column, who held the southern perimeter, were being forced back, inch by inch, as the Chindit artillery engaged the Japanese assaulters over open sights. Soon the airstrip was in enemy hands, prompting the Bofors 40mm AA gunners to lower their quadruple barrels and blaze away at the enemy troops. The pyrotechnics took on a fantastic quality as night fell. At dawn on the 23rd, the Japanese withdrew to just beyond the airstrip, as 10 Japanese fighters swept in to strafe and bomb the British. Their attack proved almost leisurely compared to the artillery and infantry strikes. When the fighters departed, the Japanese artillery and machineguns resumed. Masters called for a supply drop of ammunition as the previous night's expenditure had been massive, but necessary. Eight RAF Dakotas appeared that afternoon, in light rain, low, just over the hills, twisting and turning over the forested peaks. Nearing Blackpool, they straightened out and flew level. Doors opened, parachutes streamed and crates of supplies came from the sky. A storm of fire erupted from the Japanese positions. The heavy AA guns joined in, the boom-boom-booms of their heavy fire becoming rhythmic in the distance. The wing of a Dakota vanished and plane fell like a twirling leaf, crashing into the jungle across from the “Deep.” Two other planes in their haste to evade fire nearly crossed streams; their payloads hurled far and wide, most of falling into Japanese hands. In all, four Dakotas were shot down. The defenders only managed to get a half an aircraft's load of ammunition. Despite this the Chindits continued to resist the furious Japanese assaults; but before dawn on May 24th, the Japanese would finally overrun a hillock known as the Pimple, held by Harper's 3/9th Gurkhas. Harper mounted an immediate counterattack. Harper's Gurkhas struggled to dislodge the Japanese from the “pimple,” but failed. The defenders threw machine-gun fire and hurled mortar bombs towards the hillock with little apparent effect. The failed counterattack would only see the Japanese secure the Silly Point positions and advance rapidly east and south as the defenses progressively collapsed before them.  By May 25, Masters was forced to withdraw while his forces still had enough ammunition to defend themselves. There were 90 men that could not walk without help and another 30-40 that could not walk at all. A doctor summoned Masters to a group of 40-50 disheveled men, many wounded, but still standing, carrying stretchers from the Main Dressing Station. They were now on the evacuation path, now largely devoid of fighting troops. None of the walking wounded would look Masters in the eye. The stretchers and litters were also full of men with horrific wounds; 19 in all. To Masters' distress, the doctor said there were another 30 such cases ahead who could be saved if they were evacuated. He had given the 19 here full doses of morphine and said, under the thundering noise of the rain, that the men had no chance. It dawned on Masters that the doctor was suggesting that these men be put out of their misery. Master's said “Very well. I don't want them to see any Japanese,” The dotor cried “Do you think I want to do it?” But Masters was already seeking a way out. “Get the stretcher bearers on at once” he snapped. As he went back up the ridge towards what was left of the camp, he heard the carbine shots going off one by one along the line of casualties. He pressed his hands on his ears to blot out the sound, but couldn't. Masters and his subordinate commanders decided to withdraw in stages, with the forward line of defenders leapfrogging over a second line of the defenders covering them from a defensive position, known as a layback. This second line, were in turn, then to be covered by the troops now behind them, allowing them to leapfrog to the next covering position, a formula which could be repeated for as long as possible, and as long as the ground permitted it. The Chindits would have to begin a long and difficult hill climb away from Blackpool,  towards the rallying point of Mokso Sakan. Luckily for them, Takeda decided not to pursue them, as he had been redirected to reinforce Myitkyina instead. The victory was very costly, however, as the 128th Regiment lost about 400 men; but at last the Mogaung-Indaw route had been reopened after a three month's blockade. On May 29th, the survivors of the 111th Brigade would finally reach Mokso Sakan, bringing with them 2000 men whom required immediate hospitalization. In the end, the Blackpool Stronghold, desired by Lentaigne and Stilwell, had been a costly endeavor for the Chindits. Meanwhile, over with the 22nd Division, a failed envelopment maneuver by Task Force Purple, consisting of elements of the 149th regiment and former Galahad evacess, prompting Liao on the 19th to send the 65th regiment to aid the 64th regiments right flank and cut a trail south towards the Mogaung valley. The chinese hastily advanced to Chishidu, pushing the Japanese 1st company, 56th regiment over to Nanyaseik. Further east, Tanaka's right flank in the Mogaung valley was beginning to crumble against the 38th divisions offensive. This prompted Tanaka to reinforce the 1st battalion, 55th regiment with the 146 regiment. Tanaka ordered Major General Aida Shunji, commander of the 18th infantry group to block the Chinese advance in the mountainous region north of Kamaing. Despite this, General Sun had sent his 114th regiment hooking west behind the Japanese strongpoints, soon they would link up with the 113th to clear the Japanese from West Wala, Maran and Sharaw. Simultaneously, the 112th regiment managed to secure Warang on the 20th. Thus despite all his efforts, Tanaka's right flank was going to collapse. At this point, the 18th Division's daily ration of staple food was only 100 grams of rice the regular quantity being 860 grams and there was no supply of auxiliary rations. Moreover, as the supply of ammunition was cut off, the use of ammunition was limited to only four rounds per day and, as there was no gasoline, vehicles could not be used. Cases of malaria and malnutrition occurred successively and the number of men to one company dropped to about 30. As an extreme case, there was even a company of about 15 men led by a sergeant. About this time, the officers of the 18th Division also learned that there was no chance of the Japanese counter offensive in the Hukawng Valley on which so many hopes had been staked, for the U operation was failing "miserably." Their morale began to sag, and in Tanaka's later opinion this realization marked the "turning point" for his division.  In order to deliver a killing blow, Sun elected to dispatch the 112th regiment wide around the Japanse eastern flank to cut the Kamain Road south of Seton, while the 114th regiment advanced down the Kumon Range towards Tumbonghka and Mogaung. The 112th managed to slip past the Aida Detachment whom were holding a position at the village of Lawa and would emerge out of the jungle in the rear of Tanaka's lines on the 25th. The Chinese crossed the Mogaung river by the 26th and captured a supply center at Seton. The Chinese captured 35 Japanese trucks, a jeep, a sedan, 8 warehouses of food and ammunition, 100 horses, 4 pieces of artillery, a workshop, and a motor pool. They then set up a roadblock, prompting Tanaka to strip his divisional HQ and other servicable units to get a force together to hit the 112th as quickly as possible. At the same time Tanaka ordered the 4th regiment to hit the roadblock from the north while the recently arrived 2nd battalion, 146th regiment would hit them from the south. Tanaka also ordered his engineers to cut a secret escape route running from the Noidaw Bum to the Bumrawng Bum via Noidawyang. Takeda's 53rd division had just reached Mogaung as they dispatched a depleted 3rd battalion, 128th regiment towards Seton to relive Myitkyina. Seeing the enemy positions emerge at Chishidu and Seton, Tanaka finally decided to withdraw his division to the Kamaing area on the 28th, while his engineers vigerously were constructing fortifications. The Aida detachment would secure Lawa on the right flank, while the 55th and 56th regiments concentrated in the vicinity of Nanyaseik to cover the withdrawal of rear echlon units to Kamaing. Over at the Seton roadblock, the 112th regiment repeled relentless Japanese attacks, throuhg flood weather.  Meanwhile, Myitkyina was seeing its first two days of siege. The 150th regiment were halted by heavy enemy fire at the railroad yards, suffering 671 casualties on May 20th. K Force took the suburban village of Charpate, north-northwest of Myitkyina, and the 88th Regiment extended its lines south to the railway tracks, which in this area run northwest before turning south to Mogaung. Unfortunately, K Force did not occupy a small height which dominated Charpate. M Force took the little settlement of Namkwi without opposition, in order to shield the Allies against any Japanese attempt to relieve Myitkyina by an attack from Mogaung. General Merrill's forces were now so placed that Japanese reinforcements could reach Myitkyina only from across the Irrawaddy River to the east or along the Myitkyina-Mankrin or Myltkyina-Radhapur roads from the north. The Allied troops were disposed in a semicircle covering all approaches from the northwest, west, southwest, and south. So far, enemy activity was slight in this area. Even at the airfield the continual sniping did not prevent the planes from landing with an ever increasing amount of supplies. If General Merrill retained these positions, he could make a coordinated attack on Myitkyina. For this purpose he was forming a Myitkyina Task Force, which involved reshuffling of all the units under his command. H and K Forces were dissolved; the Marauder battalions were once more combined under Colonel Hunter; and the Chinese regiments operated as separate units.The opportunity to swiftly overrung Myitkyina emerged, as many troops under Major General Minakami Genzo were rushing through enemy gaps during the night to reinforce the battered 114th regiment. On May 30th, Minakami took command over the 3000 man garrison and ordered Myitkyina be held for atleast 3 months to keep the allies from advancing south into central Burma. On the allied side, Merrill suffered a heart attack and had to be evacuated. Colonel John McCammon assumed commander of the Myitkyina Task Force. McCammon immediately ordered Colonel Hunter's 3rd battalion to seize the auxiliary airstrip north of Myitkyina, but the Marauders would be halted by stiff Japanese defenses. Gaps were numerous through which the Japanese could work their way into Myitkyina, and Minakami set up a regular ferry service across the Irrawaddy by which supplies and individual replacements could be brought in. The terrain was excellent for defense. The roads lay high above the surrounding rice paddies, and each was therefore an earthwall making a first-rate obstacle. Clumps of trees were all about, and there were plenty of houses on the outskirts of town which the Japanese used to advantage. The northern part of the Japanese perimeter was well shielded by a crescent-shaped depression which the monsoon rains quickly turned into a swamp. In effect, the Allies and the Japanese were committed to position warfare. Though the operation was called a siege, the Japanese received a steady trickle of supplies and replacements until Mogaung fell. Colonel Hunter and his men would be forced to withdraw back to Charpate the following day. At 10pm on the night of May 23rd a battalion of Japanese launched an attack on Charpate from the rise northeast of the town. Beach's force had been depleted by sickness, and some of his men were out on patrol. The Japanese attack penetrated the 3rd Battalion's position early in the action. From the south 75-mm artillery supported the battalion's defense. The Marauders, fighting stubbornly, repelled the attack, but they suffered severe casualties. On the morning of May 24th at 9:335, the 3rd Battalion had to face still another attack. The fight was going badly when Hunter ordered Beach to break contact with the enemy and move to the railroad, 22 miles to the south. The Japanese occupied Charpate and held it in force as soon as the 3rd Battalion withdrew. McCammon had also ordered the 88th and 89th regiments to attack Myitkyina, but the Chinese barely advanced that day. Two days later the Japanese, supported by mortar fire, attacked Namkwi heavily, and the 2nd Battalion pulled back to a ridge about halfway to Myitkyina. The Japanese then occupied Namkwi and fortified it strongly. They had now taken over two of the towns on the main approaches to Myitkyina. Depressed by these defeats, McCammon was relieved of his command and Stilwell replaced him with General Boatner on May 30. Stilwell was becoming desperate, resorting to sending reinforcements of any kind, with two engineer battalions and a group of replacements and evacuees of Galahad arriving between May 26 and June 1.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landings against Wakde, while perhaps a bit overkill, saw the allies yet again showcase the prowess in amphibious assaults. Over in the Burma-India theater, the battle for Kohima was gradually becoming an allied victory and Vinegar Joe's first big foray against Myitkyina was painful but looked promising.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 128 - Pacific War - Drive for Myitkyina , April 30 - May 7, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 30, 2024 46:02


Last time we spoke about Operation Reckless, Operation Persecution and the Japanese retreat in New Britain. General Douglas MacArthur unleashed his two amphibious assaults, opening up the Western New Guinea Campaign. Both Operation Reckless and Persecution achieved complete surprise upon the Japanese. Múltiple Japanese units already performing withdrawals were caught into a chaotic new flight when the allies landed and began seizing key territory such as Hollandia and Aitape. The Japanese commanders fell into disarray leaving some to seize command and order further withdrawals in the face of hopeless battles. Yet again, forces already used to retreating through rough terrain without adequate provisions, were hitting the jungle track. Morale was all but collapsing in New Guinea. Over on New Britain matters were similar as the Japanese continued to retreat under heavy pressure from American patrols. Competent commanders would lose their lives beside their men in another hopeless battle.  This episode is the Drive for Myitkyina Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Operation Reckless and Persecution were tremendous successes. There was very little opposition for the men advancing upon Hollandia, the Japanese simply did not even attempt to defend their well developed defenses there. The drive towards Hollandia's airfields was led by the 1st Battalion, 186th regiment. From Leimok Hill to Brinkman's Plantation, they did encounter opposition, but it was scattered and uncoordinated. Colonel Oliver Newman was very cautious, he believed thousands of Japanese were still around the airfields. Just before they came across the airfields, they found large, undefended Japanese supply dumps. This would be one of many Japanese supply dumps captured through the following days, as General Eichelberger recalled “There were more than six hundred supply dumps. There were clothing dumps as high as houses. There were ammunition dumps everywhere. There were pyramids of canned goods and tarpaulin-covered hills of rice which looked like Ohio haystacks. There were saki and beer. There were tons and tons of quinine and other medical supplies, which, as a result of our landing, never reached the Japanese troops at the front. I believe Hollandia was the richest prize—supply wise—taken during the Pacific War”. These types of discoveries indicated the Japanese were extremely desperate. By May 4th, Major General William Gill's 32nd Division had just arrived at Aitape to relieve the 163rd regiment, who were earmarked to take part in the next amphibious assault. The terrain, alongside the weather was dreadful at Hollandia, making it impossible to provide the needed airfields suitable for heavy bombers without some legendary engineer work. General MacArthur considered it necessary to seize and develop new heavy bomber airfields in the Wakde-Sarmi-Biak region in order to neutralize enemy bases in the western Caroline. To be honest given the track records of these amphibious assaults in causing absolute mayhem for Japanese commanders, forcing them to keep on running, it was a great idea to keep the pace up. With the knowledge General Tagami's 36th Division was still in the region and that the enemy might still seek to reinforce that said area before the allies could land there, MacArthur initially planned to send the full 41st Division against Wakde-Sarmi on May 15th, once the Hollandia fields were ready to support the amphibious assault. However supply congestion at Hollandia's beaches was thwarting such designs. Admiral Barbey proposed that D Day be postponed until May 21 and gave two reasons for the postponement. First, tides would be higher in the Wakde area on the 21st than on the 15th. Second, postponement would allow orderly and complete preparations to be made. Congestion was severe at the Hollandia beaches, where the bulk of the 41st Division was to stage. Lack of lighterage and beach space, combined with an inadequate road net, hampered unloading of equipment, supplies, and troops which were pouring into the Hollandia area. The arrival of such supplies and units, some of which had to be reloaded for Wakde-Sarmi, seriously interfered with mounting the 41st Division. As such, General Krueger decided that the operation could be started no earlier than the 16th but that unless important strategic considerations dictated otherwise, the 21st would be much preferable. Additionally, a number of engineer and air force organizations were scheduled to arrive at Hollandia on the 12th, either for employment there or to be staged for Wakde-Sarmi. The shipping bringing these units to Hollandia was needed to support the Wakde phase of the new operation, which could not begin until the vessels were reloaded. As beach congestion at Hollandia remained a major problem, this reloading could not be accomplished quickly. It was therefore proposed that the Wakde landings be postponed at least another day to the 17th. Although MacArthur initially approved the proposed delay, new aerial photography of the coastal area from Sarmi eastward to Wakde indicated the ground conditions of the region were not suited for heavy bomber airstrips. Thus MacArthur decided that the Sarmi portion of the operation should be axed and instead they would focus on Wakde Island slated for D-day May 17th. 10 days after the capture of Wakde, or as soon as the airfields were repaired, the allies would next hit Biak, where more suitable airstrip sites were known to exist. General Doe thus prepared the Wakde Landings, Codenamed Operation Tornado while General Fuller's remaining regiments were expected to seize the airdrome areas on Biak. Over on the other side, General Anami planned to send the 36th division over to perform an immediate counterattack against Hollandia, but was denied. General Adachi over to the east had more freedom to act. The 18th Army had found itself cut off from all provisions and supplies, thus deprived of every possibility of rejoining the 2nd Area Army west of Hollandia, for the crucial defense of Western New Guinea. Because of this Adachi reasoned the best move for his 55,000 troops was to perform some quick actions before their strength was sapped out. Thus on April 26th, Adachi ordered the 20th, 41st and 51st Divisions to prepare a counterattack against the enemy beachhead at Aitape. Adachi hoped such a bold action against his enemy's rear might force a major diversion of the enemy eastwards, in turn hampering their drive against Western New Guinea.  Now back in mid-February the Japanese were adjusting their forces in the Central Pacific. They had established the 31st Army in Saipan, formed around the 52nd and 29th Division, led by Lt General Obata Hideyoshi. The bulk of the 52nd division, led by Lt General Mugikura Shunzaburo had landed in Truk mid-February, Lt General Takashina Takesi's 29th Division meanwhile were still in the progress of traveling to the Marianas, escorted by the destroyers Kishinami, Asashimo and Okinami. The bulk of the division departed Busan on February 24; but the convoy would be torpedoed some 200 km south of Okidaitōjima by the submarine Trout on February 28. The 18th Regiment, led by Colonel Monma Kentaro suffered 1657 deaths, including its commanding officer, and 570 wounded. Because of this the 18th regiment was landed at Saipan to recover; 50th regiment was diverted to land at Tinian under the command of Colonel Ogata Keiji and the 38th regiment was sent to Guam on March 4th. Allied submarine interceptions of these troop movements was no mere coincidence. The submarine activities were frequently guided by 'Magic' intelligence relating to ship movements which was collected by intercepting and decrypting encoded radio transmissions. The IJN routinely broadcast the location and intended route of convoys under its protection, and decrypting these messages allowed Allied naval commanders to alert submarines in the vicinity of convoys. The submarine commanders were free to plan their interception and attack where conditions were most favorable. The IJN's faulty anti-submarine doctrine also contributed to Japan's shipping losses. The Navy had placed a low priority on protecting merchant shipping from submarine attack before and during the early years of the war and convoys were not routinely assembled until 1943. Vast swathes of Japanese shipping was being sunk in early 1944. There were two large reasons for this. Number 1) obviously the IJN was greatly diminished and thus allied submarines were operating further into enemy territory. Number 2) fixing the torpedo issue, yes those pesky Mark 14s/15s were now hitting hard and providing enormous results. In response to this emerging crisis, the Japanese established the Grand Escort Fleet Headquarters, under the overall command of Admiral Oikawa Koshiro, to coordinate convoys and implement a standard doctrine. The first order of business was to increase the average size of Japanese convoys from 5 ships to "large" convoys of 10 to 20 ship in order to assign more escort ships to protect against enemy submarine activity. To further reinforce the Central Pacific, the Japanese also created nine expeditionary units from the forces of the 1st and 7th Kwantung and 8th Korean Armies. They also decided to assign the 14th and 43rd Divisions of Lieutenant-Generals Inoue Sadae and Saito Yoshitsugu to General Obata's command, designated Truk Sector Group. To support them, the IJN decided to combine the 4th Fleet and the 14th Air Fleet on March 4th to form the Central Pacific Area Fleet, under Admiral Nagumo. Between March-April, the 31st Army was assigned the priority for shipping, so Nagumo would send a total of eleven large convoys collectively known as the Matsu Fleet to bring said reinforcements to the Central Pacific. Though the deadly American submarines would hunt relentlessly to prevent these reinforcements, they would only be able to sink the light cruiser Tatsuta, the destroyer Asanagi, six transports and one submarine chaser, so the Matsu Fleet was considered as largely successful.  By mid-April the success of the Matsu Fleet allowed the IJN to allocate more shipping to the 2nd Area Army. Thus the Take-Ichi convoy was formed to carry the 32nd division of Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio and the bulk of the 35th division to Western New Guinea. The large convoy consisting of 15 transports was escorted by an unusually strong force under Admiral Kajioka consisting of minelayer Shirataka; destroyers Asakaze, Shiratsuyu, Fujinami and Kuri; Mikura-class escort ship Kurahashi; Type D escort ships No. 20 and No. 22; gunboats Ataka and Uji; minesweepers No. 22 and No. 101; and submarine chasers No. 37, No. 38 and Tama Maru No. 7. They departed Shanghai on April 17th enroute for Manila. Unbeknownst to the Japanese allied code breakers were decrypting their radio signals and managed to figure out the convoys departure and arrival points. The Submarine Jack was given the coordinates and intercepted Kajioak's convoy around nightfall of April 26th. Jack fired 19 torpedoes from long range, managing to sink the 5425-ton freighter SS Yoshida Maru No. 1, which was carrying the entire 210th Regiment of the 32nd Division. 3000 soldiers and their commander Colonel Koike Yasumasa all drowned with the ship. Its moments like these I always find myself taking a step back. Thousands of men fighting on all these islands in the Pacific, absolute carnage in places like New Guinea, Guadalcanal, later on Peleliu….one submarine and woosh, a regiment gone. The allied submarine campaign during the Pacific War, did a lion's share of work, horrifying work. War is a horrible thing.  The remaining convoy ships continued to Manila, arriving there on April 29th. Upon reaching Manila, however, Lieutenant-General Ishii Yoshio learned that his 32nd Division was reassigned to the 2nd Army to further reinforce western New Guinea, so a new convoy of eight transports would resume the journey to New Guinea on May 1st, carrying the bulk of the 32nd and 35th Divisions. You can bet after hearing what happened to the 210th regiment on the Yoshida Maru, these men were dreading to sail again. They had every reason to feel that dread, as the American intelligence operators figured out the convoys departure and arrival information again. They pinpointed the convoys route, speed, daily noon positions, everything. This time the submarine Gurnard intercepted Kajioka's convoy in the Celebes Sea on May 6. Gurnard's captain, Commander Herb Andrew  submerged his boat and made a cautious approach to avoid detection by aircraft. He reached a firing position 4 hours later and fired 6 torpedoes at 2 transports. Only 1 of these torpedoes struck its mark, and a 2nd salvo missed its intended targets but hit another transport. Andrews then turned his boat and fired further torpedoes from Gurnard's stern torpedo tubes which hit a 3rd transport. One of the Japanese destroyers then counterattacked Gurnard and forced Andrews to break off his attack. The destroyer was traveling at too great a speed for its detection gear to function, however, and did not damage the submarine, despite dropping approximately 100 depth charges. Two hours later, Gurnard rose to periscope depth and found that a major effort to rescue troops and equipment from the torpedoed transports was under way. That night, the submarine also torpedoed one of the crippled transports which was still afloat. In the end, its attack successfully sank transports Aden Maru (5,825 tons) and Taijima Maru (6,995 tons) as well as the cargo ship Tenshinzan Maru (6,886 tons). Although the Japanese rescue effort was relatively successful, 1290 troops were killed, The 4th Independent Mountain Artillery Regiment was completely destroyed and much of their equipment was lost.   Due to these heavy losses, the Take-Ichi convoy finally docked at Halmahera on May 9th, where the remnants of the 32nd and 35th Divisions were ultimately unloaded. General Ikeda's 35th division, including the 219th regiment from Palau were shipped over to Sorong, with the 219th left to guard the St.Andrew Strait Islands. General Ishii's 32nd division, was retained at Halmahera to garrison the island. The terrible loss of the Take-Ichi convoy forced the Japanese leadership to acknowledge it was no longer possible to reinforce Western New Guinea, thus General Anami would have to fight with what he had on hand. Alongisde this, IJA General HQ decided to pull back the perimeter of the absolute defense zone in the southern area to a line extending from Sorong to Halmahera, with units at Geelvink Bay, Biak and Manokwari ordered to hold out as long as possible to delay the enemy advance. Anami did not like the orders one bit, as he belived the forward line should be aggressively defended to secure the valuable land holding air bases between Palau and Western New Guinea. What Anami was not aware of, was that the IJN combined fleet were preparing for the famed decisive naval battle in the area. This was part of Admiral Toyoda's Operation A-Go. Under the plans elaborated by the Combined Fleet, the First Mobile Fleet, and the First Air Fleet were assigned the principal roles in the projected battle. The former assembled its surface strength at Tawitawi in the Sulu Archipelago on May 16th, while the land-based units of the First Air Fleet continued to be widely deployed in the Marianas and Carolines to take advantage of any tactical opportunity that might arise. Tawitawi was chosen as the main staging point for the First Mobile Fleet because of its proximity to both the refueling facilities of Balikpapan and the sea area which the Navy High Command expected to be the scene of the decisive battle.  It was also safely beyond the range of enemy land-based air power and afforded greater security against Allied intelligence than other anchorages in the Philippines. Orders are orders, thus Anami ordered General Teshima to hold onto Geelvink Bay at all costs while also contuining to secure the Sarmi area as a lifeline for the 18th Army who were being cut off from east of Hollandia. While Admiral Ozawa's 1st Mobile Fleet assembled its at Tawi Tawi for Operation A-Go and Admiral Kakuta's 1st Air Fleet deployed its land-based units in the Marianas and Carolines, Admirals King, Nimitz and Spruance had also been planning their invasion of the Marianas, aiming to secure Saipan, Tinian and Guam as advance air and naval bases to allow striking of the Philippines, Formosa and Okinawa. After the landings at Hollandia and Aitape, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 realized there was very little opposition and he still had plenty of strength to continue operating. Thus Nimitz decided to carry out a preventive strike against Truk, to ensure that the Japanese would not be able to build up their air power before the Marianas invasion scheduled for June.  Intelligence reports indicated that the Japanese had been rebuilding their strength at Truk. Indeed Truk's air garrison had grown enough to be a concern again. By late March, 30 flyable Zero fighters had been pieced together from aircraft destroyed during the February raids. Additionally, aircraft were being withdrawn from bypassed bases in the Marshalls and sent to Truk. By April, the Japanese had 104 flyable aircraft at Truk: 6 G4M twin-engine bombers, 12 D4Y1s dive bombers/reconnaissance bombers, 13 B5N or B6N torpedo bombers, 55 Zero fighters, 10 J1N1 night fighters, and 8 floatplanes used for observation and reconnaissance. Moen No. 1 airfield housed the G4Ms and 20 Zero, while Eten had the rest of the Zeros and all the night fighters. The single-engine bombers, the D4Y1s, B5Ns, and B6Ns, were all at Param, with the floatplanes at Dublon. There were another 63 unserviceable aircraft scattered throughout Truk's airfields. Admiral Spruance's 5th fleet would also conduct a bombardment of the Satawa and Ponape islands. On its return from Hollandia, Task Force 58 traveled to Truk, arriving shortly before dawn on April 30th and immediately tossed a fighter sweep consisting of 84 Hellcats. 5 Nakajima bombers from Param were aloft doing a dawn sweep, something that had become routine since February. Truk's radar detected the inbound US aircraft when they were 30 minutes out, shortly before the scout's interrupted radio report. The warning gave the Japanese ample time to launch air cover. Before the US fighters arrived, Moen No. 1 had scrambled 20 Zeros, Eten another 29, and Param its remaining eight Nakajima bombers. Yet the 57 Japanese aircraft were brushed aside, nearly 25 Zeros were shot down at the cost of 2 Hellcats. Just like we saw in February, Task Force 58 began staggering air strikes throughout the day. The carriers launched full deckloads seeing fighters, dive bombers and torpedo bombers continously over Truk for the entire day. Task Force 58 performed 2,200 bomber sorties, 467 of which were flown by fighters carrying bombs. In all, US Navy aircraft dropped 748 tons of bombs during the two-day operation. The Hino Maru No. 2, a 1,500-ton cargo ship and auxiliary gunboat, was hit and heavily damaged by a bomb by an Avenger from USS Cabot during the attack's first day. It sank four days later on May 4. The Sapporo Maru, a 600-ton auxiliary provision stores ship, was bombed on April 30 and sank north of Fefan. The 300-ton auxiliary minelayer Minsei Maru and 20 other craft were also destroyed in the harbor during the two days of raids. While a small haul when compared to February's results, these losses further reduced the number of vessels remaining in Truk Atoll. This increased the difficulty of moving supplies and personnel between the different islands in the lagoon, further decreasing Truk's usefulness as an outpost. Additionally, the Japanese submarine I-174 was detected 20 miles south of the atoll on May 1. Aircraft from the light carrier Monterey teamed up with the destroyers MacDonough and Stephen Potter to sink the submarine. Whether the submarine was fleeing Truk or heading back to it after a patrol is not known. Its loss contributed to the decision to abandon Truk as a submarine base later in 1944. The Japanese losing 23 auxiliary vessels and one submarine, but this time the American bombers also targeted Truk's shore facilities, giving special attention to the airfields on Moen and Eten, the Dublon naval headquarters and oil storage tanks, and Fefen's docks warehouses and ammo dumps.  On the morning of May 1st, the Japanese attempted several straggling strikes against the American carriers, but none managed to cause any damage. The largest attack against the US fleet contained 8 bombers, D4Y1 dive bombers, and Nakajima torpedo bombers which survived the first day's attack. They found Task Group 58.2 and Task Group 58.3 at 8:15am, making a series of attacks against aircraft carriers in both groups. Met by heavy antiaircraft fire, they were shot down, most before they could drop their torpedoes or bombs. Only one came close enough to drop a bomb, which fell near the Lexington but caused no damage. Task Force 58 contuined to pound Truk throughout the day before finally retiring towards Majuro during the night. Based on interpretation of post-strike aerial photography, US intelligence estimated 40 percent of the buildings on Dublon, 80 percent of those on Eten, 75 percent of those at Moen, 20 percent of the buildings on Fefan, 15 percent of those on Param, and 80 percent at Ulalu were destroyed during the airstrikes of April 30 and May 1. Roughly 423 buildings and six hangars were destroyed, 44 others were damaged, 59 Japanese aircraft were shot down, a further 60 were destroyed on the ground, 36 were left damaged, and only 12 were still flyable. All of this cost Mitscher 35 aircraft, with another 33 damaged. Furthermore, half the airmen shot down were rescued by planes or by submarines.  Thus the threat posed by Truk was yet again neutralized. After this, Admiral Montgomery's carrier group Task Force 58 was given orders to hit Minami Torishima and Wake Island for mid May. Leaving Majuro on May 15th, Montgomery assemled his forces about 420 miles southeast of Marcus Island on the17th. On the 19th, light carrier San Jacinto hunted for enemy picket boats north and west of Minami Torishima. At 7:28am a Avenger of VT-9 and a Hellcat of VF-9 found and attacked an enemy trawler 475 miles north of Marcus Island. They dropped their bombs and strafed it with machine gun fire. No direct bomb hits were obtained but the target was well covered with machine gun fire. The Japanese trawler was left dead in the water and down by the stern, with a 1/4 miles oil slick and debris behind it. No personnel were visible on the boat. Meanwhile fleet carriers Wasp and Essex launched a predawn fighter sweep. A flight of 4 night fighters launched at 5am from the Wasp on an intruder mission over Marcus Island, but the Essex had to cancel its flight of night fighters. At 11:15, another air attack commenced. Aircraft dove through antiaircraft bursts with bomb blasts occuring all over the island. At one time the entire island was completely smothered by smoke and dust, but the Anti-aircraft fire contuined undiminished. After the planes left, explosions and fires continued on Marcus Island for some time. They managed to inflict a moderate amount of damage to buildings, shot down one G4M and sunktwo small boats; ut the defenders' anti-aircraft fire was ferocious, successfully shooting down 4 American planes and damaging another 69. On May 21st, San Jacinto rejoined the group and also reported sinking one sampan. Montgomery's carriers then launched a series of composite carrier strikes against Wake on May 23, further damaging many installations there and sinking a slugger and three barges, at the cost of only one plane. But that is all for carrier actions today as we now need to jump oer to the Burma front. General Stilwell was contuining his offensive, with the 22nd division advancing south towards Inkangahtawng. General Lioa's 65th Regiment plus the 3rd Battalion, 66th regiment were advancing down the Kamaing road when they ran into Japanese resistance north and west of Inkangahtawng. The 64th regiment was kept behind to guard the Japanese flank until May 3rd, while the rest of the 22nd Division awaited better weather to perform a coordinated attack against the town. But this was Burma, and Burma is going to Burma. There was an outbreak of monsoons that quickly prevented the effective use of tanks and made supply movement over the Ledo Road a nightmare. By June about one inch of rain fell daily. Though supply convoys could still move from Ledo to Shingbwiyang, the combat trail from Shingbwiyang south was very difficult. The road was graded to Tingkawk Sakan known also as mile post 164 and metaled almost to Mile Post 138. However, rainfall had blocked the road over the flats north of Tingkawk Sakan. At the end of June the situation was unchanged. The Japanese stand at Kamaing and the heavy rains immobilized the survey party and the road trace. As the flood waters rose in the valley, they effectively barred armor from moving south to Mogaung or Myitkyina. Thus on May 3rd, the 64th avaned east across the Kamaing Road to try and cut the trail 500 yards south of the Hwelon Hka. The next day presented clearer skies, so the Chinese troops initiated their attack. Once Inkangahtawn fell, the 22nd Division would hold the area for several weeks while the first elements of Lt General Pen Yukun's 50th Division arrived to the front to reinforce them. To the east, General Sun's 114th regiment were engaging General Tanaka's 55th regiment along the Lahkraw Hka. To break the stalemate along the Lahkraw Hka, the Chinese 114th Regiment had to clear away the Japanese observation posts in the hills. The 1st battalion, 114th on the regiment's east flank cut around the flank of the 55th Regiment on April 28th, while the 2nd battalion, 114th pushed the same Japanese unit back a few hundred yards. This bending process continued during the next two days, and the 114th Regiment was well south of the enveloped Japanese flank and within half a mile of Wala. The 1st and 2nd Battalions of the 114th then began moving straight south, leaving behind them pockets of determined Japanese who held up the 3rd battalion, 114th. The Chinese managed to envelope the Japanese, pushing them all the way to Wala. The 113th Regiment also came back into line at the end of April to put frontal pressure on the Japanese positions along the Lahkraw Hka and Tigrawm Hka while the 112th Regiment held its salient without attempting to move. Though the Japanese managed to stabilize their lines on the creeks east and west of Wala, a company of the 114th would cross the Nawngmi Hka on May 6th, thus starting the advance southwards again. Two days later, the 114th's advance became general, while on the east, at Stilwell's order, the 112th began to gather its companies to take Warong.  On the 9th, the 114th Regiment finally took East Wala and Hlagyi and subsequently linked with the 112th Regiment pushing south towards Warong. The 114th's penetration, driving deeper into the Japanese lines, began to approach the 112th's outposts just north of Manpin. By the 12th the 114th and 112th Regiments were able to maintain communications, with very few Japanese between them. The 114th's penetration further weakened the position of the Japanese facing the 113th Regiment, which in turn began to roll up slowly from east to west as its 1st and 2nd Battalions pressed on to Wala and Maran. Between the 28-30th, Merrills End Run Force began the long grueling advance upon Ritpong. K Force moved out on 28 April; H Force, on 30 April. The so-called trail over the pass was more nearly a route used by the Kachins; in some places there was no path. Twenty pack animals slipped and fell off the narrow, muddy way. It was a grueling march for men who had already marched 500 miles and fought several battles, most of the time on K ration. Before End Rrun Force reached Ritpong, it had only one contact with the Japanese. A few of the enemy were flushed from cover by the 1/88th, but it was feared the Japanese held Ritpong in strength. On May 5th, the Japanese 2nd Battalion, 114th Infantry Regiment made contact with the K Force at Ritpong, 16 miles northwest of Nsopsup, and a four day battle ensued. The Battalion was forced to withdraw to Tingkrukawng, about eight miles to the southeast. There, after several skirmishes, contact with the enemy was lost for a period of five days. On the 5th, when the leading elements of K Force were a mile from Ritpong, Colonel Kinnison began an envelopment to hit the village from north and south. The 3rd Battalion managed to cut its way through the woods and place itself across the southern approaches to Ritpong on the 6th. Meanwhile, the 89th Regiment tried to take Ritpong from the north but failed. Next day an American reinforced company attacked Ritpong from the south but was stalled by a machine gun nest. Merrills Marauders would block the trail to the south, while the 80th Regiment contuined to hit their enemy positions. As the Chinese captured Ritpong on the 9th, M Force had had one skirmish with Japanese, routed them, and begun to cut its own paths. The march was fatiguing in the extreme; fully half the animals died of exhaustion or fell into the gorges. The men were farther harassed by fevers and dysentery, but they were only two days behind H and K Forces To the south, General Lentaigne's Chindits were contuining Operation Thursday. Yet under the overall direction of Stilwell, the Chindits were no longer a “special force”, now they were line infantry tasked with the traditional role of advancing and seizing well defended objectives, for which they did not have the training nor equipment to do effectively. Brigadiers Brodie and Ricketts men covered the general Chindit movement heading north. The plan called for closure of Aberdeen, Broadway and White City before the Monsoon broke. It was now the turn of 14 Brigade to play a major role. The new Block near Hopin would cut the road and rail link to the town of Mogaung. Meanwhile Major Masters' 111th Brigade began to establish the Blackpool Stronghold on May 5. The site was occupied on the night of May 5/6, and Masters spent the entirety of the following day setting up defenses. What he should have done was immediately attack the Japanese-held village of Namkwin just ahead of his positions. Instead, he busied himself with preparing the stronghold. It was a critical mistake, and says much about the lack of enterprise from the brigade. Blackpool Block was finally established on May 7th, with the King's Own's 46 Column the first to arrive at the site. They came under fire as they dug in. For the next 5 nights they would be attacked by a railway unit based out of Pinbaw. The railway unit was using 105mm guns firing from up the valley, while troops from Pinbaw attacked for the next five nights, held at bay by the rifles and machine guns of the King's own Rifles, and the mortars, which Masters had gathered from the battalions and wielded as single battery of eight. Despite the strong defense, in one section of the northern line nicknamed the “Deep”  which was the tip of the “boar's nose,” the Japanese were as close as 10 to 20 yards from the wire. Enemy snipers took shots at anything that moved while the King's own snipers and Bren gunners occupied hidden places among the shattered trees, firing whenever they saw the target, after which a cry would resound amid the quiet that followed: “got him!” The Japanese brought up a single 75mm artillery piece from Pinbaw, with which they shelled the camp, blasting the airstrip with impunity and setting the gliders and Dakotas on fire, until May 13 when Masters came into possession of three airlifted 25-pdr guns, allowing him to hit back. Overhead Cochran's Air Commandos mounted sortie after sortie against the Japanese positions but it was clear they could not maintain the ante. The dark clouds of the monsoon were gathering in strength. After the successful establishment of Blackpool, Brigadier Calvert's 77th brigade began advancing north towards Mogaung on the 8th. The night night, White City was abandoned as Brigadiers Broddie and Ricketts marched north to defend Blackpool. On May 11th, Lt General Takeda launched an attack against White City, but was surprised to find it abandoned. It then advanced to the then-abandoned Broadway and onwards to the Namkwin area, where the Blackpool stronghold was located. Having rushed through empty Broadway and White City, the 53rd Division thus tore into the zone in strength. Takeda Kaoru's 53rd Division began pursuing Broddie and Ricketts forces. For the next few days Master's troops continued to repel increasingly stronger and stronger Japanese attacks. Masters quote “Where in the name of God were the floater brigades? White City had been evacuated 13 days earlier and 14th Brigade was supposed to come straight up here. My brigade had marched 140 route miles in 14 days to establish this block. Surely those bloody nitwits could cover 120 route miles in 13 days? Where the hell were they? Where were the West Africans?… 20 bloody battalions, 40 flaming columns of Chindit bullshit sat on their arses and drank eat and wondered how we were getting on.” In mid-May, the 3rd Battalion, 114th Regiment and 2nd Battalion, 146th Regiment tried to break through towards Kamaing and Myitkyina to reinforce Tanaka's spent defenders and would join in on the attacks against Blackpool. The 2nd Battalion, 2nd Field Artillery Regiment would also support their attacks. The Japanese continued their efforts to quickly crush Blackpool Block. A Company-strength attack on May 14 was backed by artillery support. It was repulsed, the Japanese losing 60 killed. They returned the following morning, when another 50 were killed. Air strikes were called in to further punish the enemy. Then the monsoon took hold and air support and supply became more difficult – Lalaghat and Hailakandi were fair weather fields. The Japanese also retaliated through a single heavy mortar, firing 60lb bombs, note in comparison, Chindit's standard 81mm mortar fired a 10lb bombs. Delayed by the outbreak of the monsoons on May 15, the brigades of Brodie and Ricketts had managed to secure the vital Kyunsalai Pass, but they failed to get close enough to provide significant support for the stronghold. At the same time, the flooding of the Namyin river would leave Calvert's 77th Brigade unable to aid Masters in the defense of Blackpool; and Morris Force, which had successfully cut the Myitkyina road, was too far to the east to come into the stronghold's assistance. The monsoons had also hampered the airdrop of supplies, so the Chindits would have to make their five days' rations last up to 14 days. Meanwhile, proceeding from Ritpong, K Force feinted towards the Japanese supply point at Nsopzup in order to attract the Japanese attention while H Force advanced directly to Myitkyina.  On the 12th, Colonel Henry Kinnison's Marauders engaged the 2nd Battalion, 114th Regiment, near Tingkrukawng. The Japanese at Tingkrukawng were strong enough to pin both of K force's combat teams to the ground and then to halt the Chinese when they were committed. Attempts to envelop the Japanese failed. Since H Force was proceeding unmolested, Merrill told Kinnison to withdraw. K Force then picked up H's trail and followed it to Myitkyina. While K Force was fighting at Tingkrukawng, H Force kept on to a river just south of the village of Namkwi on the Mogaung-Myitkyina railroad and about two miles from the principal Myitkyina airstrip that lay almost due west of Myitkyina itself. Despite the several brushes with the Japanese, Kachin informants were sure that the Myitkyina garrison was not on the alert. To ensure surprise, before Colonel Hunter and his force bivouacked for the night of the 16th they rounded up the local Burmans and kept them under careful watch. Kinnison would reach Hkumchet by the 17th, where the Colonel had to be evacuated because he had contracted a deadly mite typhus, dying shortly after with shocking speed. In all, 149 men contracted this little-known scourge. While M Force was about to reach Arang, H Force began an attack of Pamati and the Myitkyina airstrip on the 17th. The 150th Regiment was ordered to take the airstrip, while GALAHAD personnel took the Irrawaddy ferry terminal at Pamati. The other airstrip, north of the town, was left alone for the present. The attack went like a service school demonstration, for though the Japanese knew Myitkyina was in danger, the actual assault was a complete surprise. Colonel Maruyama, the Japanese commander, had two understrength battalions of the 114th Regiment in the town of Myitkyina and in its little suburb of Sitapur. There were 100 more men of the 15th Airfield Battalion on the north and south airstrips, 318 men from labor and service units on various details in Myitkyina, and 320 patients in a military hospital. Perhaps 700 able-bodied Japanese were present when the battle began. They took the Japanese by complete surprise and subsequently securing both positions.  As soon as Hunter considered his hold on the major airstrip secure, he sent the prearranged code signal, “Merchant of Venice”, which meant the process of supply and reinforcement could begin. Consequently, some reinforcements began to be flown into the airstrip, though to the disappointment of General Merrill most of these were engineers and anti-aircraft instead of the needed infantry.  Back at his HQ, Stilwell was exultant. The brilliant seizure of the Myitkyina airstrip was the height of his career and the grand climax of the North Burma Campaign, as his forces had driven 500 miles into Burma and won engagements against seven Japanese regiments in the last six months. Stilwell's triumph also came right on time, as American planners in Washington were beginning to adopt the British position suggesting an end to offensive action in north Burma. Stilwell's bold stroke at Myitkyina would instead see the Americans issue a directive encouraging Admiral Mountbatten's command to exploit the opening of the Ledo Road and to secure enough of north Burma to protect the Allied hold on China's lifeline.   After the capture of the airstrip, Hunter immediately sent two battalions of the 150th Regiment to take Myitkyina. One battalion of the Chinese 89th Regiment, which had arrived from Ledo, would defend the air strip while two battalions of the 150th Regiment attacked Myitkyina. The other battalion of the 150th Regiment would be in reserve at the strip. They would encounter the 114th Regiment HQ and its 1st Battalion. As early as 1700 on 17 May Colonel Maruyama had also brought the 3rd Company, 148th Regiment, 56th Division, in across the Irrawaddy to reinforce Myitkyina. Following the wrong road, however, they went to Sitapur instead, where they were ambushed by the Japanese. On encountering Japanese rifle fire, they lost direction completely and engaged in fighting among themselves. Furthermore, some Marauders would continue toward Zigyun to secure the ferry crossing south of the city. On May 18, as more Chinese battalions were flown to reinforce the Chindits, the 150th again moved against Myitkyina; but repeating the mishap of the day before, the Chinese became confused, fought among themselves, and ultimately drove themselves right back out of the town. Nonetheless, the Siege of Myitkyina had just begun. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invasion of Hollandia and Aitape was such quick successes it allowed the Americans to bombard further islands. The Take-Ichi convoy improved the transportation of troops, but it also came at a horrifying cost. The loss of such shipping was yet again the paint on the wall for the Empire of Japan. Despite this the IJN was fully committed to forcing a decisive naval victory. 

LA BIBLIOTECA DE LA HISTORIA
Érase una vez el Este II - #3. En el nombre del Padre

LA BIBLIOTECA DE LA HISTORIA

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 13, 2024 46:49


LA BIBLIOTECA DE LA HISTORIA presenta la SEGUNDA PARTE de la audioserie titulada "Érase una vez el Este". En esta ocasión viajamos al sudeste asiático, concretamente a Myanmar, más conocida como Birmania. Este es el tercer capítulo titulado "En el nombre del Padre". Como ya sabéis los seguidores de LA BIBLIOTECA DE LA HISTORIA que escuchasteis la primera parte ambientada en el conflicto entre Rusia y Ucrania, esta serie o audioserie en la que se mezclan la realidad y la ficción, consiste en una serie de programas en los que escucharéis como se habla de hechos reales que han sucedido en los últimos años y también en fechas recientes en parte del sudeste asiático, y concretamente en los territorios de Birmania y sus alrededores. Como digo, es una audioserie muy conectada con la actualidad en los momentos en la que estamos presentándola. Y este proyecto de "Érase una vez el Este" que continúa con esta segunda serie, es idea como ya sabéis de dos grandes amigos de LA BIBLIOTECA DE LA HISTORIA, como son Juan Lamas, malagueño, historiador, escritor y guionista, y Verónica, barcelonesa, licenciada en administración y finanzas, actriz y cantante amateur y gran apasionada por la historia. Ellos son los artífices de esto y les agradezco su trabajo. *En este programa tenemos el placer de contar con la voz de el amigo Doc Salvaje del podcast Relatos Salvajes interpretando a Gheorghi Úralov y Bibiana interpretando Natasha. Os dejo con el tercer capítulo titulado "En el nombre del Padre". Sinopsis: Los seres humanos a veces nos parecemos demasiado a las hormigas, constantes y trabajadores. Granito a granito excavamos durante años inmensas obras que sirven para mejorar la vida de los demás. Obviamente no todos somos así. La mayoría vegetamos.. Simplemente sobrevivimos. Comemos y vamos al baño. Inspiramos y expiramos. Nacemos y morimos, sin pretender dejar nada detrás. Y luego, hay un tercer tipo de persona. El destructor. Aquellos que se dedican a romper todo lo que los demás tratan de construir y lo hacen sin causa, de forma gratuita. Para muchos además, toda pretensión humana de cambiar el mundo es inútil, pues creen en la existencia de entes sobrenaturales que nos superan. Sin la amistad de esos entes, no podemos progresar. Hoy en nuestra historia, la tercera parte y final sobre Myanmar, hablaremos indirectamente de esos tres tipos de personas y del destino que a cada uno de nosotros se nos asignó en el Gran Circo del mundo. Este es un Podcast producido y dirigido por Gerión de Contestania, miembro del grupo "Divulgadores de la Historia". Somos un podcast perteneciente al sello iVoox Originals. Enlace a la web de "Divulgadores de la Historia": https://divulgadoresdelahistoria.wordpress.com/ Canal de YouTube de LA BIBLIOTECA DE LA HISTORIA: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCfHTOD0Z_yC-McS71OhfHIA Correo electrónico: labibliotecadelahistoria@gmail.com *Si te ha gustado el programa dale al "Like", ya que con esto ayudarás a darnos más visibilidad. También puedes dejar tu comentario, decirnos en que hemos fallado o errado y también puedes sugerir un tema para que sea tratado en un futuro programa de LA BIBLIOTECA DE LA HISTORIA. Gracias. Música del audio: -Entrada: Epic Victory by Akashic Records . License by Jamendo. -Voz entrada: http://www.locutordigital.es/ -Relato: Music with License by Jamendo. -Noticias: -AFP: 'Profit from the coup': Myanmar ethnic rebels welcome pro-democracy fighters https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4NMkHHXYuzg&t=37s -AFP: El poder de los videntes birmanos. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1syuP88meDg -Karen Army: KAREN ARMY KNU KNLA KNDO https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UuMmo18QlXY -Canal 26. La matanza de civiles en Birmania. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vexy2mssTL4 -AFP: Los nats, figuras míticas de Birmania que adoran las fiestas. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lLT-sProaMU -Al Jazeera English: Myanmar fighting Military losing ground to alliance of armed groups. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cjnrxjT56yM&t=42s -RTVE. BIRMANIA-MYANMAR: La JUNTA MILITAR INDULTA a SAN SUU KYI y libera a 7.000 PRESOS POLÍTICOS https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Cnptqf72Ru8 -EP. Papa Francisco: el primer Sumo Pontífice en visitar Birmania https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cDD7zWwuab8 -AFP. Templos birmanos Disneyficados. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ENmiFBIdm9U&t=75s -CGTN. Tropas disparan contra asistentes a funeral de manifestante en Myanmar. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QC6OC8vagHI -EFE. Unos 30.000 monjes reciben donaciones tras la Cuaresma budista en Birmania. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=teEis5VZ4S8 Música: -Blackmore's Night - Way To Mandalay. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XW9GEgHgnZs -Bono & Gavin Friday - In The Name Of The Father (1993) https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Gvx-Z3lD4eA -tomb安息日 chinese suicidal black metal: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=1LbcWd6nxjo -Rok Nardin Where is Your God Now. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=grFQygwA27k - LD KYAW Sate. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uW9B94Syx5U -LAST DAYS OF BEETHOVEN White Doves playthrough. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zbYRF857s6Y -Darkest Tears From My Heart င တ ႔ရ ႕မနက ဖန Our Tomorrow. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=u1LEOxbTolY -Chinese folk song Look toward Beijing on the Grassland. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JnNhRt2ob3M -Cypher MYANMAR HIP HOP SONG https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=nserqxhy0TQ -Amedeo Lodi-fe: Carly Comando, Everyday. On Piano better quality. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VzGSIT4g0no -Carlos Gardel Uruguay Tierra Hermana Tango. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=VTXpu-TA7Y8 -Fuji by Yoitrax. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=mimEqGBexBM -Waters of Irrawaddy. Beyond Rangoon by Hans Zimmer. https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2w7KLtBqaEQ Redes Sociales: -Twitter: LABIBLIOTECADE3 -Facebook: Gerión De Contestania Muchísimas gracias por escuchar LA BIBLIOTECA DE LA HISTORIA y hasta la semana que viene. Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals

Radio NUG for Myanmar Spring
" Chilli Yield Is Good, But The Irrawaddy Chilli Farmers Are Facing Difficulties Because They Cannot Export To The Market" ( Voice Of Agricultural Farmers) Loot Lat Nway Oo

Radio NUG for Myanmar Spring

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 27, 2024


"Chilli yield is good, but the Irrawaddy chilli farmers are facing difficulties because they cannot export to the market" (Voice of Agricultural Farmers) Loot Lat Nway Oo.This item has files of the following types: Archive BitTorrent, Item Tile, Metadata, PNG, Spectrogram, VBR MP3

The Pacific War - week by week
- 113 - Pacific War - The Battle for Shaggy Ridge , January 16-23, 1944

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 16, 2024 40:17


Last time we spoke about the landing at Saidor and continuation of advances upon New Guinea and New Britain. Operation Michaelmas was a huge success, isolating countless Japanese and threatening those trying to retreat further north. Taking advantage of the new front on New Guinea, the Australians began pushing more so upon the features across Shaggy Ridge and towards Sio. General Adachi frantically shifted units around in an effort to plug up the multiple advancing allied units, but in the end there was little to be done as the Japanese were pushed further and further north. Features were taken upon Shaggy Ridge and Sio fell nearly uncontested. Over in New Britain, General Rupertus triumphed over the Airdrome and his Marines were expanding their perimeters. Katayama made a bold attack against an enemy he overestimated at it certainly did not pan out for his men at suicide creek. This episode is The battle for Shaggy Ridge Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A while back I covered the start of the Chinese-Indian offensive into the Hukawng Valley and Arakan regions. When I did so it was almost entirely from the allied viewpoint, but what of the IJA war planners? The Burma campaign has been arguably a complete disaster for the allies, the Japanese steamrolled all the way through, claiming vast amounts of territory and key cities and ports, so what really did they need to do but garrison it all? After Wingate unleashed operation Longcloth, the relatively idle Japanese raised the idea of potentially attacking India. Lt General Mutaguchi Renya, the victor of the Singapore campaign in 1942 was made a commander in Burma and wargamed the possibility of attacking India to try and earn support from his superiors at Tokyo General HQ. It was his belief, they could brush past the British in Assam and reach the gateway into India, and he expected the Indians to rise up and greet them with open arms. A lot of money and effort had been spent on Subhas Chandra Bose and his Indian National Army. The fall of India would be an absolutely devastating blow to the British Empire in Asia and in 1942 there was even the belief the Japanese could link up with their German allies in the middle east. But that was 1942, before Stalingrad and Kursk, 1944 was a very very different geopolitical situation. This however did not stop Mutaguchi from continuing his plans to invade India. Lt General Hanaya Tadashi, commanding the Arakan front was given the task of convincing the British that the counterattack in Arakan was the appearance of the main army earmarked to conquer India, thus leading General Slim to send up reserves from Imphal. The operation was codenamed HA-GO and it was intended to be a fent to mask the real attack upon Imphal designated Operation U-GO. Now let me dig a bit deeper into how this all came about. Until now, General Stilwell had been able to build much of the Ledo Road practically unmolested. Yet by early August, General Kawabe Mazakazu's Burma Area Army was preparing for a counter offensive. Kawabe actually did not trust Mutaguchi and suspected the man was harboring megalomaniac designs to invade India, which he was 100% right about. The “counter offensive” was really just the beginnings of Operation U-GO and it had been sold to Tokyo HQ as a pre-emptive strike to disable the 14th Army and make it unable to invade Burma. Thus General Mutaguchi's 15th Army was given the task of destroying any hostile elements in the Imphal region and to establish a strong defensive line. From December 22nd to the 26th, Mutaguchi held a conference pushing for the possibility of launching Operation U-GO and developed detailed missions for each division which would participate by means of a war game. At the same time Kawabe sold the operation HA-GO the diversionary attack in Arakan, with Lt General Hanaya Tadashi's 55th Division earmarked to pin down as many of the enemy's units as possible and to draw the British reserves away from the main offensive.  When General Christisons offensive kicked off, this forced Kawabe to reinforce Hanaya with the 54th division, and this in turn established the 29th Army under the command of General Sakurai on January 6th. The 29th Army was under the overall command of the Burma Area Army, and its HQ was initially situated in Moulmein. It was assigned to defend the coastal region of Arakan and the lower Irrawaddy valley and consisted at first of the 55th Division in Arakan, the 54th Division in reserve in Prome, and various garrison units including the 24th Independent Mixed Brigade in Moulmein. It also controlled the 11th Shipping Detachment of Major-General Suzuki Gisaburo, consisting of the 11th Shipping Engineer Regiment and the 3rd Sea Transport Battalion. It had roughly 1,105 men, 85 large landing barges, 54 small landing barges, 47 motored sampans, two armored boats, 10 fishing boats, one messenger boat and one speed boat. The 11th Shipping Detachment was stationed at Taungup and its main supply depot was at Prome. Meanwhile after the capture of Maungdaw, the 5th Indian division of Major General Harold Briggs was ordered to attack the main Japanese defenses at Razabil. Razabil's defenses were quite formidable, it dominating the crossroads and road linking Maungdaw with the Tunnels and Buthidaung located 3 miles eastwards, forming the 15th Indian Corps immediate objective following Maungdaw's capture. It was dubbed by its Japanese commander “The Golden Fortress of the Mayu Range”. It was centered on the railway tunnels running through the Mayu Range and at Point 551 to the east with a further forward position at Point 1301. These powerful defenses, built carefully exploiting the rugged mountainous terrain, were tunneled deep into the hills and consisted of bunkers, trenches and other fire positions located amidst dense jungle and camouflaged with customary Japanese skill. The main outworks at Letwedet to the east and at Razabil to the west of the Mayu Range were major fortresses in their own right, requiring careful reduction before the main position could be tackled. With both bastions in direct line of sight from the Tunnels, accurate supporting artillery could be called down with ease, moreover, adding to the problems already facing troops assaulting trenches and bunkers dug into the hillsides invulnerable to all but direct hits by medium artillery. The offensive against Razabil was codenamed Operation Jonathan, but it would be delayed until the corps artillery became available. At the same time the 7th Indian division seized the initiative on January 18th and launched an attack against the 55th division's position between Letwedet and Htindaw. The 9th company, 143rd infantry regiment was defending a hill east of Htindaw and stood their ground against repeated attacks until January 24th. The Japanese strongpoints were well dug in on the tops of narrow ridges. On January 26th, Major General Briggs ordered the 161st brigade, with support in the form of Lee-Grant tanks, artillery and aerial bombardment to attack the Tortoise defended by 1st battalion, 143rd regiment in the Razabil area. The Tortoise was a horseshoe defensive position that dominated the highway. It was an elaborate system of bunkers, trenches and all the typical Japanese goodies. For the boys in Burma it would be the first time for most to face such a thing, as Slim wrote in his memories “This was the first time we had assaulted an elaborate, carefully prepared position that the Japanese meant to hold to the last."   The attack opened up with 12 Vultee Vengeance dive bombers of the 3rd Tactical air force, 12 Mitchell medium bombers and 16 Liberator heavy bombers of the Strategic air force followed up by even more dive bombers. It was a visually spectacular event and to those observing from the ground looked devastating. However little to no damage was inflicted on the strongly constructed Japanese defenses burrowed so deeply into the hillsides. Similarly the mountain artillery regiment and batter from a field regiment did little damage with their bombardment as well. The Japanese had simply pulled back 1000 yards during the bombardments and by the time the allies surged forward came back to man their positions. When the Indians began their assault, the fire coming down the steep and jungle clad hillsides was absolutely devastating. The Lee-Grant tanks fired from the valley floor and managed to destroy all the identified bunkers, but the exposed Indian troops suffered massive casualties. It was virtually impossible to keep the defenders heads down long enough to advance even 50 yards towards the summit. Things got even worse when the men reached the defensive lines for the Lee-Grant tanks had to lift their fire lest they hit their own men. By the end of the day, only a toehold had been secured over the lower slopes of Razabil ridge.  The assault carried on for 3 more days, with intense tank and artillery fire from different directions supporting the infantry as closely as possible. The only immediate effect of the bombardment and indirect fire by 25 pounders and 3.7 howitzers was to destroy the vegetation over the hillsides, thus exposing more and more of the Japanese defensive works. During the intense battle, the Lee-Grant medium tank proved itself a real solution in providing effective covering fire for infantry and soon new techniques were evolving. The Japanese defenses were mainly built over the summit of steep, thick, jungle covered hills and the Lee-Grants provided fire support from positions in the paddy fields below them. Their 75mm guns effectively destroyed or at the least neutralized bunker positions. A procedure was quickly developed for providing cover during the last stages of infantry assaults. Tanks would use high explosive shells to clear the vegetation, than delayed action high explosive shells to break up the front of visible bunkers, then armor piercing shells to enable the infantry to advance close behind the creeping barrage as shrapnel was not flying everywhere. All combined this showed the potential of armor vehicles in jungle warfare, when most claimed they had little practical use in such climats. Despite such developments, the casualties were mounting, little progress was being made. On January 28th, the 123rd brigade attacked Japanese positions on the secondary hill of Wrencat and its smaller neighbor hill Wrenkitten, probably the best hill names I have read on this podcast as of yet haha. These were located on the lower western foothills of the Mayu range. They were extremely steep, cone shaped features with fortified circular trenches around their heads, bunkers, and bamboo jungle. Firing from positions on the valley floor the Lee-Grants and 5.5 inch artillery were able to destroy the bunkers and switch to armor piercing rounds to perform creeping barrages for the infantry. Despite the tank and artillery support, the Japanese were throwing a ton of mortar, grenade and machine gun fire. An officer of the 123rd brigade involved in the fight had this to say 'It appears from our experience that consolidation on the objective which normally consists of a series of deeply constructed bunkers connected one with the other is extremely difficult in the very limited time that the enemy allow.' The failures against the Tortoise and Wrencat, prompted General Christison to call off the attack against Razabil by January30th. Christison regrouped his corps artillery and tanks to instead support the 7th divisions assault against Buthidaung and Letwedet.   Meanwhile further to the north, General Tanaka had brought 6300 men of the 55th and 56th regiments to the Hukawng valley by early January. He wanted to counterattack in strength, but General Mutaguchi believed he could not spare additional motor transport units to give the necessary logistical support to the 18th division since preparations were already going on for operation U-GO. Thus, Tanaka ordered his men to perform a delaying action down the Hukawng valley with the primary objective of holding Kamaing, the ridge line separating Hukawng valley from Mogaung valley. Tanaka weighed his orders and the looming monsoon season that hit the area in May or June. Against Tanaka, Stilwell sought to continue his offensive after successfully taking Yupbang Ga. Stilwell now looked towards Taihpa Ga and convinced both General Wingate and Admiral Mountbatten to unleash the Galahad long penetration unit into the Hukawng valley.   On January 4, 1944, Frank Merrill abruptly relieved a disappointed Brink. Despite having a background with cavalry, like Brink, Merrill understood the Japanese strength, but unlike Brink he respected the chain of command. General Sun met with Stilwell and and it was agreed the bulk of the 114th regiment should swing widely around Tanaka's left flank while the 113th regiment wheeled to the south to hit Tanaka's front along the Tanai Hka. Further north the 2nd battalion ,112th regiment would also advance east across the Tarung Hka to secure Warang Ga; the 65th regiment would continue their advance towards Taro, fording the Tanai river by January 9th; south of Kantau, the 3rd battalion, 114th regiment ran into two Japanese companies. The jungle made it difficult for the Chinese forces to organize themselves. The battalion split into 4 fragments and no two of them were in contact. The supporting 6th battery could not fire until fields of fire were cut and while that was being carried out, the Japanese companies performed infiltration maneuvers and quickly surrounded the battery. Fighting for their guns and lives between the 9th and 11th of January the Chinese cannoneers managed to save both. The battalion was nearly wiped out from these Japanese tactics, but thankfully on January 12th, the regimental HQ arrived and reformed the battalion to launch a concerted attack that managed to gradually push back the Japanese. 3 days later the 2nd battalion arrived allowing the 114th regiment to force a crossing of the Sanip Hka by January 16th.   Meanwhile the 1st battalion, 113th regiment forded the Tarung river near Yupbang Ga and sent patrols north to occupy Tabawng GA on January 13th. From there they advanced southeast to Kaduja Ga then to Brangbram Hka where they formed a line extending to the junction with the Tanai bank by mid january. On January 21st, the Chinese broke through the Japanese lines north of Brangbram Hka and made it to Ningru Ha less than one mile downstream from Taihpa Ga. Simultaneously, the battered 112th regiment swung wide going north east to Warang Ga. By the end of January the 113th continued their advance upon Taihpa Ga where they would meet stronger Japanese resistance. They began fighting within 1,500 yards of Taihpa Ga. Artillery support, the 4th and 5th Batteries, was then brought up. The next 1,000 yards between the 113th regiment and Taihpa Ga took two days to cross; then they spent a week in what was called "preparations for attack." General Sun's men were now approaching the Japanese strongpoint in the area, and Japanese resistance was more freely offered, with heavy shelling by 75- and 150-mm. pieces. At Taihpa Ga, the Kamaing Road crossed the Tanai on a long gravel bar which bullock carts could use quite well. At this point was the village itself, a humble collection of bashas, long since burnt out. About 800 yards upstream was a ferry across a stretch of fairly deep water. The Japanese used this ferry to bring supplies across the Tanai, rather than the vulnerable and easily spotted gravel bar. Here they had their strongpoint, well prepared and stubbornly defended.   Further to the west, the 65th regiment advance was much slower than expected for Stilwell.  Upon reaching the Hukawng Valley, the 65th's commander, despite means more than ample for his mission, contracted the same lethargy that had hastened the demise of the 112th Regiment. Stilwell was greatly frustrated by the delay a few more weeks with Colonel Fu, so he ordered Colonel Liao to relieve him. Stilwell wrote in his diary "Told Liao this included division commanders unless they watched their step. Also that Fu really should be shot. Liao took it OK though it shook him up." On January 22, General Sun was told about this affair, but the news softened somewhat by the presentation of a silk banner for the victory at Yupbang Ga, a dramatic contrast of the respective awards for lethargy and vigor. Having made his point, and hoping that he had given the Chinese a healthy shock, Stilwell restored Fu to his command by January 26. Fu's later performance in combat was rated as excellent.   The Chinese managed to encircle the passive 3rd battalion, 55th regiment on January 23rd, and by the 25th the last Japanese pockets were wiped out. On the 26th the Chinese reached Ahawk Hka and on the 28th crossed the Taro river and occupied Taro on the 30th. This effectively cut behind Tanaka's flank. The bulk of the 112th now was close enough to the 113th to aid them so Sun began an attack against Taihpa Ga on the 30th. The Japanese held on stubbornly for days and would quietly withdrew on the night of February 4th. Tanaka concluded the loss of the Taro plain meant "the failure of the whole division in its operations along the Tanai". Thus Tanaka decided there was no point in continuing the fighting there. Over at Sanip, Sun ordered the 3rd battalion, 114th regiment to rest. However Stilwell thought this was close to disobedience of his orders,  because he wanted Sun to move quickly and cut behind the 18th Division. On January 13, he had spoken very bluntly to Sun, asking him what orders he gave the 114th Regiment and if there had been any word from Chongqing to slow the operation. Stilwell told Sun that if he could not exercise the commands that Peanut had given him, he would resign and report the whole affair to the US Government. "Regardless of what anyone else may say, I assure you that my report will be fully believed in Washington." General Sun was confronted with the prospect that Chinese lethargy in north Burma might mean withdrawal of all US help from China. Stilwell, Sun was told, had been alone in his fight to convince the United States that the Chinese Army was worth helping. "If I am double-crossed by the people I am trying to help I am through for good and I will recommend very radical measures." Stilwell closed by saying that he had done his part; would Sun reciprocate? But despite Stilwell's arguments and threats, General Sun did not meet Stilwell's ideas of how a dynamic field commander should conduct himself. Thus the 114th gradually began to dislodge the Japanese from their positions along the river bank, taking care to annihilate all pockets behind. Stilwell was satisfied with the progress of his offensive and established the northern combat area command on February 1st. This organization would be led by Brigadier General Haydon Boatner and would include American, British and Indian units entering North Burma. But that is all for the wild Burma front as we now need to travel over to New Guinea.   Last time we were in New Guinea, Brigadier Chilton's 18th brigade had just completed their advance upon Shaggy Ridge and Brigadier Hammer's 15th brigade had just relieved the 25th brigade on January 7th. Thus two brigades were flown in and two were flown out, showcasing how far the allied New Guinea air forces had increased their efficiency during the war. The New Guinea force was now under the command of General Milford, though Vasey still retained his task of  "contain hostile forces in the Bogadjim-Ramu area by vigorous action of fighting patrols against enemy posts”. The division's role was still to prevent enemy penetration into the Ramu-Markham valley from Madang and protect the Gusap airfield and the various radar installations the instruction added that the division would "create the impression of offensive operations against Bogadjim Road by vigorous local minor offensive action". This was to be done by holding in strength with two brigades a "line of localities" from Toms' Post on the right to the Mene River on the left, the boundary between the 18th on the right and the 15th on the left being a line from Bebei through Herald Hill to Kankirei Saddle. In addition the 18th Brigade would "by raids and harassing tactics ensure that no major Jap withdrawal takes place undetected and occupy the Mindjim-Faria divide and the high ground to the north and south of it as the administrative position permits". The 15th Brigade would hold the Yogia-Mene River area, delay any enemy advance up the Ramu from the Evapia River, patrol to the Solu River, and deny the 5800 and 5500 Features to the enemy.    Despite this, Vasey was preparing to assault the Kankirei saddle with the fresh 18th brigade. Designated Operation Cutthroat, the seizure of the Kankieri saddle and ultimately that of Shaggy Ridge, Vasey planned to launch an attack against Mount Prothero which was being defended by the 6th company, 78th regiment. He would attack it from the south, preceded by a diversionary attack against Cam's saddle. Brigadier Chilton realized however, that frontal attacks along Shaggy Ridge would not be able to achieve surprise, so he instead wanted to attempt a wide encircling maneuver on the left flank via Canning's saddle to attack Prothero directly. The 18th brigade spent the early part of January patrolling to see if it was possible to advance through Canning's saddle to Prothero 1 while simultaneously and stealthily building a road to Canning's in preparation for the coming offensive.   The possibility of occupying Prothero from Canning's Saddle had been suggested to Chilton by Lt-Colonel Lang of the 2/2nd Pioneers, after a patrol performed by Captain McInnes. Captain McInnes had found an approach along a steep, razor backed spur within a short distance of Prothero's summit where they could hear Japanese. Meanwhile the 2/9th battalion had sent a patrol that found a possible track from McGullough's ridge vie Geyton's Hill to the Mene River. Going up the river bed led one to Canning's saddle. Two companies of the 2/12th spent a few days constructing a track going to the Mene River and they took special precautions to prevent the enemy from finding out. Reconnaissance patrols in general were careful to avoid contact with the enemy and so was the case around Prothero. The jeep track was hurriedly pushed to Guy's Post, existing tracks were improved and shorter and better tracks constructed to improve the supply routes to Shaggy Ridge and Mainstream; reserves of supplies in forward areas were built up, thus enabling a concentration of as many natives as possible to carry for the attacking battalion on the left, and arrangements were made for a limited air dropping at Canning's Saddle at an appropriate time.   To support the upcoming attack, 9 long and two short 25 pounders of the 2/4th field regiment were brought up along with 7000 shells. The guns had to be dragged forward to the Lakes-Guy's Post area. Lt Colonel Charles Bourne's 2/12th battalion was to head the attack. Chilton also planned to have Lt Colonel Charles Geard's 2/10th battalion perform a diversionary attack through Cam's saddle. After Protharo 1 was captured, the 2/10th were to exploit north to Kankieri and south to the Mainstream area; while Lt Colonel Clement Cummins 2/9th battalion attacked northwest along Shaggy Ridge to join up with the 2/12th. By January 18th, the 4000 yard track to Geyton's Hill was complete, allowing the 18th brigade to advance. On that same day, B-25 Mitchell bombers unleashed their cannons and bombed the enemy positions at the junction of Mainstream, the Faria and Shaggy ridge. They dropped 60 delayed action bombs over the Faria river valley and some modified Mitchells sporting 75mm cannons mounted on their chins fired upon the crest of ridges. This cannon, the same used by Sherman tanks, was quite a formidable weapon in the air. To enable its fire, the nose of the B-25G model had to be shortened and the cannon breech positioned behind the pilot from where it could be loaded by the navigator for firing. To fire it the pilot would press a button on his control wheel. The weapon would prove inefficient against shipping, but it would be a lot more successful at hitting ground targets. Over three successive days from 18 to 20 January the Mitchells flew 180 sorties against Shaggy Ridge, firing 135 rounds of 75 mm at the ridge as well as dropping around 200 tons of bombs. The aircraft also fired about 90,000 rounds of .50 caliber. The machine-gun salvos were particularly devastating. From his accompanying Boomerang, Alex Miller-Randle recalled ‘Mitchells strip the trees of Shaggy Ridge clean and shatter the limbs and trunks to matchsticks'.   D-day was the 20th, seeing the 2/10th on the right and 2/12th on the left. Captain Kumnicks company of the 2/10th advanced to Grassy Patch and over on the left a party of the 2/12th led by Major Fraser took vanguard. All of the preliminary actions were completed back on the 19th when Captain Gunn's A company of the 2/10th advanced from Tom's Post for Sprogg's ridge via a Japanese mule track. Later Captain Humnicks D company would use the same track. On the left the 2/12th battalion and B and D company of the 2/2nd Pioneers advanced along the new line of communication to Geyton's. At 8:45am Captain Gunn's company advanced from Sprogg's ridge to attack Cam's Saddle, followed 30 minutes later by Captain Kumnick's company. Operation Cutthroat opened up with artillery and B-25 mitchell bombardments against the Protheros and Kankirei Saddle. By 11 a .m. Captain Gunn was 300 yards from an enemy position on Cam's Saddle while artillery shelled the position until 12.30 pm when the Australians found that the enemy had withdrawn.   Farther on, Captain Gunn's men would be pinned down by Japanese defending the western end of the saddle as Japanese patrols ambushed a signal line party 500 yards behind. Gunn initially tried to outflank the enemy, but then withdrew 200 yards and dug in for the night astride the mule track. At the same time, the 2/12th battalion reached Canning's Saddle by 3:30pm. The next morning, the 2/12th began to silently creep along the razor back ridge towards Prothero 1 with Cameron's C Company taking the lead. At this point Fraser had Captain Cameron's C Company, Captain Geason's A Company  and Captain Thomas's D company enveloping the ridge. They nearly achieved surprise, but the Japanese discovered their advance and rapidly turned their mountain gun upon them causing many casualties. Despite the mountain guns fire, Lt Braithwaites 8th Platoon charged the Japanese and captured the mountain gun upon Prothero 1. The action cost 11 Australian lives with another 44 wounded. The 2/12th had thus captured the key point in the Japanese defenses upon Shaggy Ridge. After the loss of the mountain gun position, Colonel Matsumoto ordered his men to pull back closer to Kankirei. In the process the 2/10th were able to capture Cam's Saddle. On that same day the 2/9th began their attack, sending A Company to envelope the Green Sniper's Pimple defended by a platoon of the 78th regiment. A Company managed to seize the position using stealth and would be met by failed counterattacks. By the end of the day the Japanese defenders were now sandwiched between the 2/9th to the south and the 2/12th to the north, while the 2/10th were advancing from the east.   Way further to the east, General Nakano's men were in an even more dire situation. After the evacuation of Sio, the Japanese were forced to retreat day and night under heavy rainfall, hindered by rough terrain and allied aerial attacks. Lieutenant General Yoshihara Kane, Chief of Staff of the 18th Army, recalled this of the march: “The most wearing part was that with these ranges, when they climbed to the craggy summit they had to descend and then climb again, and the mountains seemed to continue indefinitely, until they were at the extreme of exhaustion. Especially when they trod the frost of Nokobo Peak they were overwhelmed by cold and hunger. At times they had to make ropes out of vines and rattan and adopt "rock-climbing" methods; or they crawled and slipped on the steep slopes; or on the waterless mountain roads they cut moss in their potatoes and steamed them. In this manner, for three months, looking down at the enemy beneath their feet, they continued their move. Another thing which made the journey difficult was the valley streams, which were not usually very dangerous. At times, however, there was a violent squall, for which the Finisterres are famous during the rainy season; then these valley streams for the time being flowed swiftly and became cataracts. Then there were many people drowned... General Shoge was swept away by one of these streams on one occasion but fortunately managed to grasp the branch of a tree which was near the bank and was able to save one of his nine lives.”   The men were malnourished, fatigued, but kept going day by day anticipating an abundant food supply at Gali. When they reached Gali in late January they would find nothing there. This anguish was just the beginning. The base had been shelled by allied warships and bombed by allied aircraft. General Muroya was injured on January 17th during the bombardment. Luckily for the Japanese there was no offensive towards Gali. Since the Saidor landing, General Martin's men were busy expanding the perimeter with outposts extending towards Sel and Bilau. Martin was reinforced with the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 128th regiment on January 16th. Although Martin believed launching an eastern attack upon the withdrawing enemy would provide an excellent opportunity to destroy some of their divisions, General Kreuger refused to permit such a thing. This was because the 32nd division was required for an upcoming offensive in the Hansa Bay area.   Meanwhile General Nakai had brought the bulk of his detachment over to the Mot River area and established a strong outpost on Gabumi. Nakai also sent the 3rd battalion 239th regiment to Bilau to try and contest the control of its outpost. On January 12, the Japanese attacked Biliau, forcing the Americans to retreat behind the river. 30 Americans then tried to retake the outpost the following day but were repelled by the Japanese. On January 15th, the Japanese withdrew, allowing the 1st Battalion, 128th Regiment to occupy it on January 20. Another Japanese attack on January 26 would force them to retreat; and two days later, the Americans were successfully ambushed when they tried to reoccupy the outpost. Nakano's men had thus successfully carried out a fighting withdrawal from Lae. They had suffered horribly for it, crossing unbelievable difficult terrain, with basically no supplies, apart from what meager amounts could be airdropped or brought over via submarine. Yet now they needed to break through towards Madang, and there were 3 possible options of doing so. Number 1, they could advance along the coast, but this one was disregarded immediately because they would have to break directly through the new American defenses. Number 2, codenamed A would be an advance inland through Cabutamon, Monara, Sibog and Bilau towards Mindiri. Option 3 codenamed B was an advance even further inland crossing over the foothills of the Finisterre, through Nokopo, Kwembum, Yugayuga, Gabumi and Singor towards Mindiri. Nakano elected to send the 20th division over plan A while his division would advance in 3 echelons over plan B.   On January 23rd, the 51st division departed Gali along the B route while the 1st battalion, 115th regiment and General Katagiri's 20th division would advance along the A route. Katagiri's 80th regiment and 20th engineer regiment tried the best they could, but the march was only advancing a single kilometer per day. Katagiri's troops had to cut through dense jungle and were facing strong enemy patrols along their route. Facing greater difficulties than expected, Katagiri decided to follow Nakano's 51st division along the A route in the end. Yet unbeknownst to him, the 3rd battalion, 126th regiment had just established new outposts at Sibog and Paramusi on January 22nd. From there they were sending out patrols to Langani and Sindaman. The Americans still could not break through Nakai's defenses at Gabumi giving the Japanese some relief. The bulk of Nakano's forces were withdrawing smoothly, seeing just sporadic harassment from American patrols. On the 1st of February, the 1st battalion, 115th regiment finally made contact with Nakai's forces at Gabumi while the bulk of the 51st division advanced through Yugayuga. A week later, Nakano himself reached Gabumi and began advancing towards Madang. By the 16th of February, the 1st battalion, 115th regiment reached Madang and the 20th division had successfully pulled out of Gabumi.   Late February would see 1667 men in total arrive at Madang, 5469 would reach Singor and 1235 would reach Gabumi. Thus 80% of Nakano's strength had effectively withdrawn. Nakai also managed to collect 500 patients that had been abandoned at Yugayuga and brought them over to Madang by March 1st. It seemed once again, Nakano's men had escaped doom. On the other side, Brigadier Cameron had begun his advance towards Saidor on January 25th. His 4th battalion led by Lt Colonel Percy Crosky, with a Papuan company reached Kiari on January 28th. Without taking a break they continued towards Singor the next day, then Malasanga and Crossingtown by the 31st.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese were slowly but surely losing their hold over Shaggy Ridge. With the loss of the vital artillery position it was just a matter of time before the Australians took over the area, meanwhile Nakano's great retreat was a success, but one does not win a war moving backwards. 

BFM :: Earth Matters
Tak Kenal Maka Tak Cinta Ep7: Kinabatangan River

BFM :: Earth Matters

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 27, 2023 25:10


Tak Kenal Maka Tak Cinta is our monthly tourism-themed series on Earth Matters, which aims to highlight lesser-known ecotourism spots right here in Malaysia. Done in collaboration with the Ecotourism & Conservation Society Malaysia (ECOMY), we want to take you back to the great outdoors, and experience the many off-the-beaten-track nature spots our country has to offer. For this episode, we're heading to Kinabatangan, in Sandakan, Sabah, specifically the Kinabatangan River. At 560 km long, the Kinabatangan River is Sabah's longest river, and Malaysia's second longest river. Whilst the upper reaches of the Kinabatangan River have been extensively logged, the lowland forest and mangroves have survived, and much of the lower Kinabatangan River is gazetted under the Kinabatangan Wildlife Sanctuary. This vast floodplain forest supports a wide array of wildlife, from proboscis monkeys to Irrawaddy dolphins, and also a variety of other birds. Taking us cruising today is our intrepid guide on this series, Andrew Sebastian, the Founder & Chief Executive Officer of ECOMY.Image Credit: 123RFSee omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 73 - Pacific War - Return of the Chindits, April 11-18, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 11, 2023 14:22


Last time we spoke about Admiral Yamamoto's Operation I-Go. The empire of the rising sun had to do something about the allied advance up the solomons and New Guinea. Yamamoto devised a grand counter air offensive to hinder the allies airfield building in the regions. However, this was not 1941, it was 1943 and the Japanese aviation crews and pilots were not the same men they once were. The war was taking its toll on the effectiveness of Japan's airpower and it was showcased during Operation I-Go.  Despite the wild claims of the pilots who would have Japan's leadership believe they shutdown every allied aircraft in existence, the reality was they had only inflicted enough damage to set back the allied timetables for 10 days. Unbeknownst to the Japanese also was that allied cryptanalysts were continuing to break their codes and found out fateful information about the mastermind behind Operation I-Go. But today you need to grab your onions cause were are talking about Chindits. This episode is the return of the Chindits  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  For a few weeks we have been covering what basically can be described as the major strategic shift during the Pacific War. I know I repeat it so often, but the battle of guadalcanal was the real turning point of the Pacific War. It led the allies to grab the initiative for the rest of the war and as a result the Japanese were forced to take a defensive stance. The taking of guadalcanal and the Buna-Gona-Sanananda areas led to a lot of shuffling for both sides. And with all that shuffling came heavy losses and resources being forcefully allocated to certain areas at the cost of others. Now up in the frigid northern waters of the north pacific, the 6 hour battle of the komandorski islands had nearly ended in an American debacle. If admiral Hosogaya had pressed his advantage, he would have most likely destroyed the Salt Lake City alongside several other warships. But as we saw, the high explosive shell fired by a single man had prompted Hosogay to falsely believe American airforces were attacking him and he pulled out. Hosogaya's conservative decision was condemned by his superiors and he was forced into retirement as a result. Admiral McMorris's force suffered damage to 3 ships and lost 7 men, but he walked away and the Japanese convoy failed its mission. It was to be Japan's last attempt to resupply the Attu and Kiska garrisons with surface ships, all future runs would be done via submarine. Thus the success of Admiral Kinkaids daring blockade had sealed the fate of the Japanese garrisons on the two islands. Yet before the Americans could begin invading these two islands they needed to perform basically the same strategy their colleagues were doing in the south pacific. They needed to secure advance bases and island hop their way west. One of the first major moves came when Admiral Kinkaid and General Buckner made the joint decision to move the Army, Navy and Air Force headquarters out to Adak. Adak was a thousand miles nearer to the enemy, but concentrating so much on the island created its own problems. A year prior, there had been only 5000 people in the Aleutians, now there were nearly 40,000. The bottleneck became so severe, Buckner's soldiers were being supplies with just 10 rounds of ammunition per weapon and food rations were very limited. The men were living off canned vegetables and the occasional shiploads of foul-smelling mutton from New Zealand. Mutton in general was notably not very loved amongst American forces. Australians took a notice of this as Americans began to complain in Australia that they were tired of eating it all the time there. Actually a hilarious rumor emerged amongst the Americans in Australia that General MacArthur owned a sheep ranch and was being enriched at their expense. Yes I managed to toss another punch at Dougey. Medical problems began to emerge in the Aleutians as many American bodies began to reject the environment, that is polite talk for Americans who can't handle a bit of cold. Lingering head colds became so bad, the men began to refer to it as “Aleutian malaria”. I mean I do get it, snow can suck, the cold sucks, waking up at 6am to record this podcast only to look out my window at what is becoming a hours shoveling of my driveway sucks, Canadian problems 101.  As for the US Navy, the north pacific submarine force had spent the first few months of Kinkaids command simply gathering strength, building up enough to make a final push, but nothing too exciting. A new PT boat squadron had been assembled employing the Higgens model. Now I don't know about all of you, but the idea of being on a tiny PT boat in the Aleutians sounds horrifying. If you might recall in January, 4 torpedo boats led by Lt CLinton McKeller had departed King cove to sail for Dutch Harbor. They sailed through a squall, coated with 4 inches of ice. The 4 boats made it to the nearest harbor, Dora Harbor on Unimak and were stuck there for nearly a week. There anchored they were bashed around by howling 80 knot winds, and Pt-27 smashed into some jagged rocks, Pt-28 went aground and sank, pt-22 crashed on a reef and sank, but McKellar was able to keep his crews intact. The two surviving boats had to be rescued some days later by the tender Virginia E.  The devastating experiences of the McKeller's men led to this new squadron of PT boats being outfitted with hot-air heaters. To compare to the PT boat crews miseries, the experience of the pilots in the Aleutians was not any better. Butler lost 11 planes due to bad weather in January alone. The weather improved in February allowing for some missions, but they were hampered terribly by a technological issue. The B-24 liberators constantly had their bomb-bay rack mechanisms freeze on them. Thus the bombing missions half the time went bust. Now Admiral Kinkaid suggested an attack on Kiska in January of 1943. The plan found its way to the Casablanca conference in north africa where president FDR, Sir Winston CHurhcill and the allied combined chiefs of staff hammered out the fine details. Kinkaid's plan to attack Kiska actually managed to become an item debated at the conference. The allied leaders approved it and sent it over to the US joint chiefs of staff to develop it into a real operation, which became code named Operation Landcrab. The task was handed over to General John DeWitt, who recommended using the 35th infantry division, but the war department decided instead to use the southwestern 7th motorized division. However this division was trained in desert warfare. The rationale for this was due to Rommel's recent defeat and the lack of need for desert trained troops in Europe.Well obviously the desert tactics nor the tanks, truck and other armored vehicles were of any use to the Aleutians, the entire division required training in arctic amphibious operations which would take over 3 months. Luckily amphibious assault specialists like Major General Holland “Howlin Mad” Smith, Colonels Castner, Eareckson, Alexander and Carl Jones were accustomed to the Aleutian theater and helped retrain the 7th division at Los Angeles. By February Washington had assigned an insufficient number of ships for the invasion of Kiska. This prompted Kinkaid to suggest instead of attacking Kiska to bypass her and hit Attu. Attu was believed to only have a garrison of 500 men and Kinkaid believed seizing Attu, just west of Kiska would prompt the Japanese to abandon Kiska. Thus operation Landcrab was greenlit and ready to go, and all the major commanders of the theater would meet at a conference in San Diego to hash out the final details. The San diego conference quickly deteriorated into a series of arguments between two new commanders, rear-admiral William Ward Smith and Vice admiral Francis Warren Rockwell and the experienced Alaskan leaders Buckner and DeWitt. They squabbled over reconnaissance issues, in truth the Americans did not have a good picture of the western Aleutians. Bucker pointed out that the Navy, Army and Airforce had 4 different sets of map coordinates and asked the issue be rectified. This led the Alaska Scout leader Colonel Castner to urge Major General Albert Eger Brown who would be commanding the 7th infantry division to perform a reconnaissance personally. Brown however did not do this. Furthermore Buckner requested they employ a battalion of his ground forces for the operation to improve their low morale. Rockwell argued his shipping capacity was overstretched, leading DeWitt to assign the commercial ship Perida to take Buckner's troops into the battle. Rockwell then complained the commercial ship would not be able to land his troops quickly enough to protect them it the enemy resisted the landings and Brown threw back at him the addition of these troops just disrupted the entire mission. So as you can see a lot of dick waving. In the end they reached a compromise, to hold Buckner's 4th regiment in reserve at Adak, ready to ship out in less than a day to hit Attu if needed. On April 18th, reconnaissance revealed there were at least 1600 Japanese on Attu, prompting Rockwell to commit the entire 7th division, 10,000 men in all and the extra 4th regiment for operation landcrab. Now before the men his the island Rockwell sent a small team of combat specialists to come up behind the Japanese to prevent them from falling back into the mountains where they could hold out for weeks or even months. Captain Willoughby's Scout battalion, 410 officers and men, trained vigorously in a short amount of time for the operation. They replaced all of their rifles and submarine guns with automatic rifles, machine guns and mortars and soft lead bullets for armor piercing bullets as those could penetrate ice without ricocheting. The mens packs were filled to the brim with grenades.  Meanwhile General Butler began a bombing campaign to soften up the island. A terrible storm prevented air raids during the first half of april seeing winds his 115 miles per hour and gusts over 127. Nonetheless over 1175 combat sorties would be made in april, with over 4000 pounds of bombs falling on Attu. Though it should be mentioned most of the bombers dropped their loads blind as Attu was covered in a thick fog. Finally on April 24th, the 7th division departed San Francisco at 1pm aboard 5 transports. The Aleutian campaign was soon coming to an end. But now we need to grab our onions and travel back to Burma to talk about good ol Wingate and the boys.  Back in Burma, Wingates forces were beginning the last phase of operation Longcloth, fleeing for their lives back to India. Now Fort Hertz and the new Ledo Road had been protectedAt his headquarters in Wuntho Wingate had to make a choice: retire back to India or press on and cross the Irrawaddy. Being Wingate he chose to press on with the Japanese hot on the Chindits trail. Now I do apologize I believe this will be the second time I am rehashing most of the Chindit story, I sort of am forced to do so as a result of how the week by week format laid out this story on the youtube channel. Think of it as a refresher to finish off the operation.  Major calvert's Column 3 and Fergussons column 5 headed towards the Gokteik Gorge to blow up its viaduct; Colonel Alexander's southern group was to rendezvous with the Kachin guerillas at Mongmit; and Wingate would personally lead columns 7 and 8 to hit Inywa one of the main based of the Burmese independence forces. Wingates northern force made its way to the Irrawaddy's principal northern tributary, the Shweli by March 17th. Here the river was so wide, their ropes and dinghies would not suffice, the crossing had to be made by boat. The approach to the stream was over open paddy fields, where they could easily be spotted and gundowned. Another major issue of course was the Burmese liberation Army. Wingate began by sending an envoy across the river to treat with the BLA and they promptly decamped. While this was going on Wingate discovered the local boats and their skilled native paddlers could help move his forces. They helped tow the Chindats RAF circular dinghies using 1500 lb net weights. Upon seeing how the locals managed Wingate wrote notes that in the future he should employ at least 40 men to each column who were skilled in handling boats and that 80 percent of his men needed to know how to swim. Yes many of these Chindits did not know how to swim. The mules as usual proved to be difficult to get across, leading 40 to be abandoned while the rest were tethered to boats and paddled across.  Fergusson's Column 5 crossed the Irrawaddy at Tigyaing with assistance of local villagers, missing the Japanese pursuers by a hair's breadth. Fergusson turned south, but then received orders from Wingate to abandon his mission to help Calvert and instead rejoin the rest of the brigade. Calvert completely unaware of these orders, faced a game of hide and seek with the Japanese, leaving them boody traps as they marched. At Tigyaing, Calverts group's rearguard were being hit by the Japanese as they crossed the river. Further south of him, the Southern group had crossed the river at Taguang on March 10th, continuing east. Wingate's men were making their own way eastwards, but the supply drops were becoming less and less frequent and the amount of wounded men was increasing. Wingate was forced to leave many men behind as the Japanese continued to pressure them. On march the 15th, the Southern group met up with Calvert's column 3 near Pegon where they exchanged information. Despite orders to head for Mongmit, Major dunlop and Colonel Alexander decided to advance to Namhkan, crossing the Shweliriver and making an escape for China. As the southern group continued they ran into Fergusson's column 5 on March 20th at Inbale Chaung. There they received orders to continue with the original plans, so they redirected themselves to Mongmit again. There they were supposed to meet with the Kachin guerrillas, but they were so late the Kachin had departed. Meanwhile Calvert and Fergusson were having a rough time as an entire Japanese battalion had arrived at Myitson and they were fanning out patrols to hunt them down. On March 23rd, Calvert found one of these patrols near the Nam Mit River and laid a trap killing 100 of them. In his words  ‘We let fly with everything we had and a lot of Japs could never have known what hit them. It was one of the most one-sided actions I have ever fought in.' He paid for the ambush with a dozen Gurkhas. Calvert's column made its way towards Gokteik, their glittering prize when disappointment was dealt to them. They received orders from Wingate to withdraw back to India. Wingate also took the care to tell his commanders not to call it a “retreat”, but instead to tell their men they were marching north to cooperate with parachute troops in an attack on Bhamo and Indaw. This was to deceive the enemy if men were captured and to simply boost morale. Calvert complied with the order, but in a bit of defiance decided he wanted to hit a railway on the retreat. Reading Calvert's mind Wingate sent an additional message to Calvert saying he needed to get out as fast as possible and not perform any additional strikes, he finished with this “we can get new equipment and wireless sets. But it will take 25 years to get another man. These men have done their job, their experience is at a premium”. Wingate at this point decided they needed a good supply drop and ordered one for March 24th in a paddy field near the village of Baw, which happened to be held by a Japanese company. This was the same location for the rendezvous with Fergussons column who were in bad need for supplies having been forced to butcher their own mules for meat and eat stews of monkeys, rats, locusts and cockroaches. Disaster struck. Wingate sent his forces to attack the Japanese company at Baw leading the RAF pilots seeing the confused battle to only drop one third of the supplies. Fergusson met up with Wingate on the 25th finding his superior to be a bit manic. Wingate was now claiming because of their actions, the Japanese commander would be hard pressed to annihilate them all to save face. Wingate faced a daunting issue, the Japanese would contest the passage of the Irrawaddy, how would they get through now? He decided to try a bluff, they would march back to Inywa and cross at the identical point they had taken to go east, thinking the Japanese would never expect it. To do this they would have to kill all their remaining mules and lighten their loads, perhaps we can take a moment of silence for these poor mules. Wingate told the men once they got across the river they were to break up into smaller groups, try to sabotage more railway installations and make their way back to Assam. The forces made a dreadful march back to Inywa, slaughtering their mules as they went, much to the grief of the muleteers. It became clear early the Japanese were following them. Colonel Tomotoki Koba had set up three defensive lines between the Chindits and the Indian border: 1 at the Irrawaddy, 1 along the Mu valley and 1 following the line of the Chindits. Koba's orders were pretty simply, to drive the Chindits into a trap as if they were wild beasts to hunt.  Wingate attempted feints and decoys, such as sending Fergusson's Column 5 towards the village of Hintha. This decoy worked great for everyone else of course, as Fergussons men suffered heavy casualties for their efforts. The feints and decoys worked as the bamboozled Japanese never fully caught up to the main body, failing to capture the Chindits in the Shweli loop as it was known. By 4pm on 28th, the main body reached Inywa where they lucked out greatly. It turned out the Japanese had neglected to commandeer the boats along the Shweli. Wingate was able to commander a number of local boats and his men began to cross the river. Column 7 went first followed by 2 and 8. But Column 8 as they made their way were fired upon by Japanese patrols. It was fortunate for the Chindits the Japanese patrols were small and lacked heavy machine guns. Even so, the mortar and rifle fire was enough for Wingate to call off the rest of the columns leaving column 7 on the other side of the river to make their own way home to India. Wingate took the rest of the forces to a secure bivouac 10 miles south east of Inywa where he ordered the men to disperse into 5 smaller groups. It was now every man for himself as they say. The first group to really suffer was Fergussons column 5. After the bitter fight at Hintha, he sent word to Wingate advised him where they should be rendezvousing for a supply drop. But when Fergusson got to the location, there was no drop and no Wingate. Fergusson's radio radio was destroyed at Hintha so he had to rely on runners and now knew he basically was on his own. Fergusson decided to take his column and head for the Kachin hills. When his men tried to cross the Shweli it turned into a disaster. Many men were swept away by a flood and most of their animals alone with them. 46 men had to be abandoned on a sandbank in the middle of the river and in Fergusson's words “‘the decision which fell on me there was as cruel as any which could fall on the shoulders of a junior commander'. His men staggered on half crazed with hunger and thirst. After 15 days they reached the Chindwin on April 24th and would limp over to Imphal 2 days later. Their column suffered horribly, 95 survivors out of an original 318. Major Ken Gilkes column 7 managed to get to China with 150 survivors and would fly back to India. Wingates dispersed groups would have a particularly horrible time on their way home. They had tales to tell of Japanese atrocities, the treachery of Burman villagers, the constant battle to stay awake, the agony of hunger and thirst and the feeling of being hunted down like beasts. Their menu more often the naught was python meat and nettles. There also began a rumor amongst the dispersed groups that Wingate had intentionally taken the easy way out for himself while using the rest of them as decoys.  As for Wingates group, his original thinking was that the trek would take 2 weeks but it took roughly 22 days. They spent 2 full days around the Irrawaddy trying to find a safe way across as the Japanese patrols attacked them. On April 13th, with the help of friendly locals who provided paddlers and bamboo rafts they got across. They planned to go across in three groups, and unfortunately for the last group who was acting rearguard they would be left behind. The starving survivors made their way to the Wuntho-Indaw railway then through the Mangin range. At this point all of the food ran out, making even the Python stews seem appetizing. They would make the mistake of trying to buy rice from a pro-Japanese village who began hitting gongs to summon the Japanese causing them to run. At another more neutral village they were able to buy some buffalo meat. As they continued through the Mangin range they nearly died of starvation if it was not for a stroke of luck when one of their Burmese interpreters contacted a local monastery who sold them chicken, tomatoes, rice bananas and 5 pigs. Refreshed they continued and by the 23ed of april could see the Chindwin river. Wingate recounted stating ‘Behold the Chindwin. It is a poor heart that never rejoices.' The 30 mile trek to the Chindwin was the hardest part of the journey. When finally facing the great river Wingate was forced to divide his men into those deemed strong enough to swim across and those who needed a boat. It took 5 men 7 hours to hack some elephant grass to make rafts. Wingate and others swam the Chindwin at a narrow point 500 yards or so wide. Even the strong swimmers were in danger of drowning, many forced to float on their backs. Wingate himself was pretty close to being swept away but managed to keep afloat using a pack for buoyancy. Everyone who got to the other side of the river were utterly exhausted. To their misery they soon heard the incoming Japanese on the other side of the river. As they hit the first village they came across they devoured the meals they could find. But they had left countless non swimming comrades on the other side and Wingate was desperate to send rescue parties. They found a post manned by some Gurkha rifles and obtained their help grabbing local boats and taking a flotilla back over the Chindwin to save the men they could find. In the end Wingates small group of 43 would see 34 survivors reach Assam. Meanwhile far to the south, Dunlop and Alexander's southern group were the furthest away from India. They decided to try and head back to Fort Hertz, but would be ambushed many times along the way. They crossed at the head of the Irrawaddy using stealth to avoid clashes with the Japanese. With the help of locals who gave them food and boats they made it across by April 20th, but after crossing were hit again by the Japanese suffering heavy casualties. Now down to 350 men, they continued towards the Mu River where they were ambushed yet again on the 28th. Colonel Alxander would be killed among others, as Dunlop recounted  "Clarke told me that the last mortar bomb had blown away most of the Colonel Alexander and officer De La Rue's legs. Edmonds and some orderlies had carried them away into the jungle, but that no one could now be found who knew of their whereabouts." Dunlop led the force of exhausted men to the Chindwin river fighting off multiple Japanese patrols. They would wander into early may and were saved by Karen guerilla forces a very lucky break. Lastly, Calverts column 3 made their way to the Shewli river by March 27th with Japanese patrols hot on their trail. Calvert decided the best course of action was to break up into 9 smaller groups. Out of the 360 men in Column 3, 205 eventually recrossed the Chindwin by mid April. Calvert personally would lead a group to detonate more explosives across the Burmese railway.  So ends operation longcloth. Two major things to note were Wingates character and behavior during the expedition. For the first, it is not surprising to see that extreme stress brought up the brittle personality of mr Wingate. It seems in his own mind, Wingate could never be at fault. Wingate clearly had not factored the importance of river crossings, which is unforgivable given Burma's riverine system. The crossings over the Irrawaddy showcased Wingates glory hunting nature. Wingate also was draconian in his punishment of the men. He told his men if any of them plundered villages or lost their own equipment he would have them shot. This went beyond normal army code. If sentries fell asleep and were caught, Wingate gave them 3 choices; be shot, make their own way back home or be flogged, not surprisingly everyone chose to be flogged. Wingate's behavior likewise kept switching from mania to depression given the circumstances.  The casualty figures of the operation were appalling. Out of 3000 men of the 77th brigade that Wingate took into Burma, 2182 returned; 450 were killed in action and the rest went missing. Out of the southern group 260 men out of the 1000 survived. What had been achieved to justify such losses? There are arguments made on both sides. General Slim said of the operation  “They had blown up bridges and cuttings on the Mandalay–Myitkyina railways that supplied the Japanese northern front, and attempted to reach across the Irrawaddy to cut the Mandalay–Lashio line. Exhaustion, difficulties of air supply, and the reaction of the Japanese, prevented this, and the columns breaking up into small parties made for the shelter of 4 Corps. About a thousand men, a third of the total force, failed to return. As a military operation the raid had been an expensive failure. It gave little tangible return for the losses it had suffered and the resources it had absorbed. The damage it did to Japanese communications was repaired in a few days, the casualties it inflicted were negligible, and it had no immediate effect on Japanese dispositions or plans.'” Even Wingates supporters admit the operation was a failure, some describing it “an engine without a train”. Fergusson would add it ‘What did we accomplish? Not much that was tangible. What there was became distorted in the glare of publicity soon after our return. We blew up bits of railway, which did not take long to repair; we gathered some useful intelligence; we distracted the Japanese from some minor operations, and possibly from some bigger ones; we killed a few hundreds of an enemy which numbers eighty millions; we proved that it was feasible to maintain a force by supply dropping alone.' Really in the end, Wingates exploits were used for propaganda purposes lifting the terrible morale amongst the British. The sacrifice of over 800 men for a rather pointless operation had to be glorified for if not it would have crushed morale further. Sit Winston Churchill would say of Longcloth on July 24th of 1943 ‘There is no doubt that in the welter of inefficiency and lassitude which has characterised our own operations on the Indian front, this man, his force and his achievements stand out; and no question of seniority must obstruct the advance of real personalities in their proper station in war.' Wingate performed a press conference on May 20th to spin the allied propaganda machine. Reuters called them “the british ghost army”, the daily mail hailed Wingate as “clive of Burma”. Wingate had performed the typical British habit of turning obvious defeats into glorious victories, it was very much his Dunkirk. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The mad onion man Wingate successfully, or unsuccessfully performed Operation Longcloth. His exploits became legendary, but perhaps one should look closer at the reality behind what occurred in the depths of Burma.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 69 - Pacific War - Operation Longcloth, March 14-21, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 13, 2023 31:46


Last time we spoke a bit about the ongoings of the Second Sino-Japanese War. Mao Zedong's Fourth Army faced off against the IJA in the western Hubei area causing significant casualties to both sides. The engagement was a mixed one with both sides claiming victory, and it seems it was a tactical draw. Over in the Solomons, Halsey had fixated his eyes on Munda and this prompted him to perform a naval bombardment of it and Vila-Stanmore. Some very unlucky Japanese aboard two destroyers ran right into the Americans enroute to bombard the airstrips and this led to their terrible defeat at the battle of Blackett Strait. The small and short battle showcased the Japanese were being bled and things were only going to continue to get worse for the empire of the rising sun. But today we are venturing back to Burma to talk about the Chindits so grab your onions.  This episode is Operation Longcloth Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A few weeks ago we began the story about Wingate and the Chindits. The first task given to the Chindits was Operation Longcloth which Wingate did not like as a title because it did not hold the grandiloquence he sought. Now a major rationale for Operation Longcloth was to help relieve some pressure from places like Fort Hertz, the last remaining British outpost left in Burma. Fort Hertz was around 60 miles south of the Chinese border manned by Karen levies and was on the brink of collapse. The fort was maintained as an outpost originally by the Myitkyina Battalion, but after the Japanese pushed the allies out of Burma it began to see many retreating allied troops who would garrison it. The military authorities within India however had no direct contact with the fort during most of the summer of 1942. Luckily for the allies, the Japanese did not continue their advance towards the northern Burmese border, most likely because they did not believe a allied outpost could be maintained in such a remote place. To get a picture of what the hell was going on at the Fort, the 153rd Gurkha Indian Parachute Battalion led by Lt Colonel James Owen Merion Roberts were parachuted into upper burma to investigate the state of the Myitkyina area on July 3rd of 1942. Alongside this on August 12th of 1942, Major Hopkins of the 50th Indian Parachute battalion overflew Fort Hertz and discovered unexpectedly that it was still in British hands. Lt Colonel Roberts had reached the fort some days prior and figured out the landing strip near the fort was still usable. The Fort Hertz airstrip served as an emergency landing strip for aircraft flying over the Hump to get supplies into China. The same airstrip was naturally also a supply line for Fort Hertz. The day after the discovery of the usable airstrip was made, a party led by Captain G.E.C Newland of the 153rd indian parachute battalion dropped into Fort Hertz with engineering supplies and they quickly went to work repairing the airstrip. By the 20th the airstrip was fully functional and Lt Colonel Gamble was sent to be the new commander of the area followed by a company of the 7/9th Jat regiment. A special force was created called the Northern Kachin Levies. They were made up of member of the Kachin people under the command of British officers. Originally Colonel Gamble was their leader and they helped various British Indian army units in the area to engage the Japanese and rally locals to their cause. Now way back at the beginning of the war, Chiang Kai-shek sought the construction of a road from Ledo to Assam that would cut through the mountains, forests and rivers of northern Burma to link it with the Burma road at Lungling on the Chinese side. This was to be a colossal amount of work, Chiang kai-shek estimated it would be built in 5 months, while Stilwell's team of experts believed it would take 2.5 years. The British were wary about the Ledo road because it destroyed their private shipping monopoly by allowing the Chinese direct access to India. However washington forced them to accept it, despite Britain trying to obstruct its construction by claiming they would perform a amphibious assault to recapture rangoon to reopen its road to China. Wavell argued that even if the Ledo road was complete it would be too costly to maintain, but washington was adamant about it, so they took full responsibility for its construction and cost. The Ledo road would be agonizingly slow to construct. It would take all of 1943 for the road to be cut from Ledo to assam to Shingbwiyang in Burma, just 103 miles in all. This was not surprising given it consisting of 100,000 cubic feet of earth that had to be removed along a track that ran as high as 4500 feet over the Patka range through thick jungle. The workforce consisted of 15,000 us troops, of which 60% were african-american and 35,000 locals. Churchill famously described the Ledo Road as “a road that would be open only when there was no longer any need for it”.   Chennault likewise eager to do anything to increase his funding for the airforces in CHina began argued that the road used up precious resource that would never provide the 65,000 tons of supplies over the Hump that his pilots could deliver. A lot of the allied analysts crunched the numbers and agreed with Chennault, and even General Slim added his agreement to the mater, stating they should better focus on simply retaking burma by military means and thus the road to china would be open. General Slim actually had a lot to say in the matter and wrote this   “I agreed with Stilwell that the road could be built. I believed that, properly equipped and efficiently led, Chinese troops could defeat Japanese if, as should be the case with his Ledo force, they had a considerable numerical superiority. On the engineering side I had no doubts. We had built roads over country as difficult, and with much less technical equipment than the Americans would have . . . Thus far Stilwell and I were in complete agreement, but I did not hold two articles of his faith. I doubted the overwhelming war-winning value of this road, and, in any case, I believed it was starting from the wrong place. The American amphibious strategy in the Pacific, of hopping from island to island would, I was sure, bring much quicker results than an overland advance across Asia with a Chinese army yet to be formed. In any case, if the road was to be really effective, its feeder railway should start from Rangoon, not Calcutta.”   Regardless the Ledo Road was to be built, all 1072 miles of it . Back in December of 1942, the 45th american engineer regiment and the 823rd aviation battalion, two african-american units arrived to begin the first segment of the colossal project connecting Ledo to Hukawng Valley. To build these 103 miles had the men led by Major General Raymond Wheeler braving the difficult Pangsau Pass of 3727 feet before dropping 700 feet to Shingbwiyang. By January 20th of 1943, construction was being done on a 24 hour basis at a rate of 3 quarters of a mile a day. By February 18th Wheeler was given command of the defense of the Ledo sector and despite Wavell's engineer in chief giving a skeptical estimate that the next 45 miles of the road would only be done by March 1st, on February 28th they crossed the Burmese border.   Meanwhile the 18th division led by General Mutaguchi Renya was given the responsibility of defending northern Burma. General Mutaguchi was a victor of the Singapore campaign. In fact the 18th division was something of an elite division having fought in China, Malaya, Singapore, the Philippines and now Burma. The logistics as you can imagine for his forces all the way in Northern Burma were not good. The men were greatly fatigued by the heavy fighting and lack of everything, so Mutaguchi was content simply garrisoning the region. He deployed a single regiment, the 114th in Hukawng Valley, the 55th in the Indaw area and the 56th in Myitkyina. Mutaguchi's men were plagued by Kachin levies performing guerilla warfare. Soon he was forced to deploy his men to embark on vigorous patrolling north of the area of Myitkyina, leaving his 19th division vulnerable to attrition and without much in terms of replacements for casualties. In the words of Private Fujino Hideo: “Our enemy was not actually British, Chinese, nor Indians but the Kachins. They were quicker than monkeys and talented in shooting … After the eight month occupation, the punitive force at Sumprabum suffered heavy damage and the casualties from the Kachins' guerrilla tactics … In the course of the campaign, the killed and wounded amounted to a great number.”    By february the situation prompted Mutaguchi to redirect his attention towards the Kachin state where he planned to send the 114th regiment to attack Fort Hertz and Hkalak Ga, one of the important bases for which the Kachin levies operated. This also happened to be a place the Kachin levies screened for the building of the Ledo road. Thus in order to save everything, Wavell had gone along with allowing Wingate to launch operation Longcloth in an effort to prevent the offensive against Fort Hertz, the Ledo Road and the Hump air route.   Now the last time we were talking about the Chindits they had scored a success attacking Pinlebu and demolishing major parts of the Bongyaung railway. Wingate 10 miles north of Wuntho had established an HQ in the Bambwe Taung hills and was faced with a large decision, to carry on across the Irrawaddy or to retire back to India. Being Wingate he carried on. However while the Japanese at first were a bit bewildered by the attacks, they soon figured out what kind of force they were facing and set out to search and destroy them. The success of the railway demolition had thus created new perils. The Japanese were gathering in number to the rear of the Chindits. The No 1 column in the southern force that had survived the multiple disasters had blown up the railway bridge at Kyaikthin and crossed the Irrawady at Taguang on their own initiative. By March 10th, they had no time to lose as the Japanese were in hot pursuit. The people of Tigyaing welcomed the British and made boats available for their crossing. Fergusson and the No 5 Column got across by nightfall just before a JApanese column appeared on the westen bank to smash them. Learning the enemy had occupied Tigyaing, Calvert with the No 3 column crossed 5 miles downriver. Then on march 13th they were ambushed. Calvert tried to hold the Japanese off with rearguard actions, while his main body crossed some islands midstream and luckily for the men the Japanese did not press their attack or else the entire column likely would have been annihilated. The Japanese were uncertain of the numbers of this new enemy and were being cautious, again they had been fooled into believing the force facing them might be large. Regardless of getting the majority to safety, 7 of Calverts men were killed with 6 wounded who had to be left on an island. Calvert left a note with the 6 wounded men directed towards the Japanese commander asking him to treat the 6 wounded men in accordance with the code of bushido.   Meanwhile Wingate and the main body of the northern force, around 1200 men left Bambwe Taung and came to a major tributary of the Irrawaddy called Shweli on March 17th. Here the river was so wide it made ropes and dinghies useless and the crossing had to be made by boats. The danger was that the approach to the stream was over open paddy fields, where they could easily be spotted. On top of this intelligence had revealed the far shore was held by units of the Burmese Liberation Army. When Wingate sent across an envoy to treat with them, the fearless warrior of the BLA promptly decamped. Wingates men crossed at once, but yet again their mules gave them trouble. 40 mules had to be left behind, while the rest were tethered to boats waddling across. They crossed during the night of March 17th and all got over by sunset. With Calvert and Fergusson well ahead of him, Wingate signaled the forces to march for the Gokteik viaduct so they could demolish it,thus severing the Mandalay-Lashio road.    Calvert turned south towards Mytison, while Fergusson was ordered to rejoin Wingates force. However Calvert was unaware of this order thinking Fergusson was backing him up as he approached Mytison. Without the extra man power, when he got to Mytison he knew he could not hope to take it head on, so he prepared an ambush. He called the RAF in to bomb the town while his men laid a trap along the Nam Mit river. A japanese patrol walked right into the ambush and lost 100 men. Calvert reported ‘We let fly with everything we had and a lot of Japs could never have known what hit them. It was one of the most one-sided actions I have ever fought in.' For this great feat, the paid with the lives of around 6 Gurkhas. Calvert's group continued on receiving an airdrop on the 19th, a 10 ton dump of supplies that would be the largest drop of the entire expedition. With their supplies in hand they trekked up the hills to prepare for their assault against Gokteik, but they suddenly received an order to return to India. Calverts force were too far south of the main body and would have to achieve the objective on their own initiative, thus he could not hope to ignore them. Calverts men turned back, but made sure to demolition a railway in their retreat. Wingate sent Calvert word that he should get out as fast as possible in order to bring the most survivors he could for quote ‘we can get new equipment and wireless sets. But it will take twenty five years to get another man. These men have done their job, their experience is at a premium.' Calvert and the No 3 column reached the Chindwin on april 14th crossing it without opposition and were the first out of Burma. Calvert and his column were the real success story of Operation Longcloth.   As for Wingate, according to those in his company he came into a “down period” for his bipolar cycle. Many accounts refer to him at this time as “luth suspendu” highly strung, irritable and irrational. During the crossing of the irrawaddy, an officer had reported to Wingate he had a snag and apparently Wingate reacted by throwing himself to the ground in a cry of exasperation despair. Wingates biographer had this to say about the minor event “it was one among a hundred evidences of his impersonality at continual variance with his egotism' he left no record of exactly where he crossed the Irrawaddy. He seems to have concentrated on the negative and discounted the amazing run of luck the Chindits had enjoyed so far – crossing the Chindwin, cutting the railway in 70 different places, crossing the Irrawaddy, all without significant losses – suspecting that, in the words of one of his sergeants, ‘there must be a catch somewhere'. It seems Wingate did not know his men were at their limits and he made the cardinal mistake of funneling his columns together, perfect to bring them into a death trap. Instead of spreading them over a wide area, he compressed them within 15 miles of each other in a king of peninsula surrounded by the Shweli and Irrawaddy rivers, making it much easier for their japanese pursuers to find them. The Chindits were also on a terrain mainly made up of paddy fields rather than jungle, thus they were particularly visible to the enemy. A Japanese spotter plane detected the No 5 column at one point and basically all the Japanese needed to do was take the roads from Mytison to Male where they could have encircled them. But suddenly Wingate realized his predicament and ordered his men to break out of the Shweli loop. This was to be easier said than done. The men were slow, due to hunger, their boots were worn out, they had not had a supply drop in many days. No 5 column had gone 48hours without food and it was becoming apparent Wingates force was too large to be supplied by air.    Back over in Imphal the 4th corps whose role was to provide logistical back up for the CHindits were greatly puzzled by Wingates plans once he had crossed the Irrawaddy. The signaled to know what exactly his intentions were and Wingate replied that his destination was the Kachin hills, from where he would launch an attack against the Lashio-Bhamo road. The 4th corps gently reminded Wingate that such a distance meant they would be unable to supply him by air and suggested he try to instead attack Shwebo west of the Irrawaddy. It was clear they wanted him to go there, but Wingate responded the men could not get back across the Irrawaddy as the Japanese had stolen all their boats and were patrolling the access routes. To this the 4th corps ordered him to end his operation and make their withdrawal back to India. It was actually the order that prompted Wingate to sent his message to Calvert when he did, while he also sent word to Fergusson to rendezvous with him at Baw, where Wingate hoped to get all his men a supply drop before making the journey home. Ferguson's column were in really bad shape, they had no water and began sucking the fluid from any green bamboo stems they could find. They butchered their mules for meat and made stews of monkeys, rats, locusts and cockroaches. They were ridden with lice and leeches. The leeches were particularly bad, as when a man pulled one off, the parasite's head would get stuck in the skin creating an infected oozing sore. Fergusson sent word via radio to Wingate stating a bitter bible verse ‘I can count all my bones: they stare and gloat over me. (Psalms 22:17).'   It was a mistake to send the bible thumper Wingate such a message as he quickly responded back a quote from St John's gospel ‘Consider that it is expedient one man should die for the greater good of all people.'. It seems Wingate was overconfident about the supply drops, having success prior by allowing some of his forces to attack Japanese garrisons while other oversaw aerial drops had driven the CHindits to take it all for granted. At Baw disaster struck. Wingate launched an attack hoping the RAF would support him, but the pilots could not make out friend from foe and ended up flying off after only dropping a third of the supplies. Fergusson finally rendezvous with Wingate at Shaukpin Chuang river on march 25th. Wingate told the men he thought the Japanese commander was pressed to do everything he could to annihilate them all just to save face at this point. Wingate held a conference with the officers where Fergusson recounted it as being ‘the last reunion of a very happy band of brothers before setting out on the perilous homeward journey, which many of them did not survive'. Knowing the Japanese would block their passage across the irrawaddy, Wingate decided to try a bluff. He would march back to Inywa and cross at the identical point of the eastward crossing. They would have to kill all their remaining animals to make the traverse lightly armed, and once across they would to split up into small groups to try and sabotage more railway installations on their way back to India. Wingate arranged for the drops to be made south of the Shweli loop in the hopes of persuading the Japanese that was where the brigade was to buy his men time. He sent No 1 column eastwards to the Kachin hills, basically to their doom to save the rest of his brigade.   All the columns would endure a terrible march back to Inywa. The mules were slaughtered as they went, and the Japanese were hot on their heels. Colonel Tomotoki Koba had set up 3 defensive lines between the Chindits and the border to India: the first position was at the Irrawaddy, the second along the Mu valley and the third following the line of the Chindwin. Meanwhile the Japanese hot on their trail's purpose was to drive them into the trap. Wingate tried to toss the enemy off the scene by using feints and decoys, including ordering Fergussons No 5 column to attack the village of Hintha, halfway between Baw and Inywa. The feints it seems worked as the Japanese never caught up to them, missing the opportune chance to trap the Chindits in the Shweli loop. The main body of the Chindits reached Inywa at 4pm on the 28th and their luck had not run out. While the Japanese had stolen their boats over the Irrawaddy, they had neglected to do so on the Shweli. The Chindits gathered the boats they could and crossed the river. No 7 column was first followed by 2 and then 8. 8 was fired upon by the enemy halfway across, fortunately the Japanese force was quite small and lacked heavy machine guns. Even so their mortars, rifles and light automatics was enough to drive many of the CHindits into the jungle as the No 7 column was left on its own to flee. Wingate tried to secure a bivouac 10 mile south east of Inywa and divided his columns into 5 dispersal groups arranged for supply drops. From that point on, they were on their own initiatives.    Fergusson's No 5 column suffered heavily during their fight at Hintha and having lost his radios equipment they were own their own. Fergusson decided to take his men to the Kachin hills the closest sanctuary it seemed. But when they tried to cross the Shweli it turned into a nightmare. Many of his men were swept away during a flood as were many mules. 46 men were abandoned on a sandbank in the middle of the river as the Japanese began to attack. Fergussons recalled ‘the decision which fell on me there was as cruel as any which could fall on the shoulders of a junior commander'. Fergusson's group staggered on, starving and dehydrated and would limp to Imphal by april 26. Column 5 had suffered tremendously, only 95 survived the ordeal out of 318 men. Column 7 managed to get 150 of his men to China and flew back to India. All the dispersed groups had terrible tales to tell about atrocities committed by the Japanese, or treachery on the part of Burman villagers. Men spoke of having to struggle to stay away, hiding in caves while the enemy hunted them down like dogs. Rice and buffalo meat were rare luxuries for them, more often than naught they ate python and nettles. But here we have to end to story, for the next time we come back to the Chindits we will conclude Operation longcloth and the daring retreat back to India by the Chindits. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The onion eating madman Wingate took his men dangerously into the fray and many of the paid dearly for it. Their success brought the anger of the Japanese bearing upon them, how many would survive the trek back to India? 

The Irrawaddy Broadcasting
Episode 03: The Irrawaddy Newscast

The Irrawaddy Broadcasting

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 26, 2023 23:20


In this week's episode of The Irrawaddy Newscast we hear about the new honeymoon between Russia and Myanmar's military. We also speak with journalist Oliver Slow about his new book 'Return of the Junta.' And at a study center in Thailand, Burmese students learn English — and about their fellow countrymen.

The Irrawaddy Broadcasting
Episode 02: The Irrawaddy Newscast

The Irrawaddy Broadcasting

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 18, 2023 23:13


In this week's episode, we hear from a representative of the National Unity Government about revolutionary investing. We also speak to Joshua Kurlantzick of the Council on Foreign Relations about ASEAN's disappointing response to war in the region. Also listen why leaders in Kayah State are not waiting for the end of the war to try local governance.

The Pacific War - week by week
- 65 - Pacific War - First Chindits expedition and Operation Longcloth, February 14-21, 1943

The Pacific War - week by week

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 14, 2023 45:43


Last time we spoke about the successful execution of operation KE and the battle of Wau. Operation KE was a success and the Japanese had managed to evacuate 10652 men. Simultaneously while Operation KE was going on, the Japanese had refocused on New Guinea and sought to secure their important bases at Lae and Salamaua. In order to secure them the Japanese commenced a new offensive, this time aimed at Wau which held a significant airfield that could be used to threaten Lae and Salamaua. The Japanese managed to land significant forces to hit Wau, but the Australians tenaciously held them back long enough to get reinforcements to Wau to push the Japanese back. The Japanese offensive turned into a catastrophic failure, yet despite being pushed back the Japanese would regroup and plan another offensive to take Wau. But for today we are diving back into the CBI theater. This episode is the First Chindits Expedition: Operation Longcloth  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    The story of Operation Longcloth and the actions that will take place in Burma require us to talk about some notable figures, one who is to put it frankly, a very bizarre but fascinating man. Orde Wingate was born into a military family in February of 1903, his father was a religious fundamentalist who became a member of the Plymouth Brethren. Wingate and his 6 siblings experienced a very repressed childhood and were kept away from other children for fear of spiritual contamination and would endure a regime of religious mania spending entire days reading and memorizing the Old Testament. For Orde, the religious indoctrination was accompanied by a spirit-shrinking spartan regime, something like a secular boot camp. When his family moved to Godalming, in 1916, Orde was sent to a Charterhouse school. He was very much an outsider there and did not mix with the other children nor participated in any sports. Then in 1921 he was accepted into the Royal Military academy at Woolwich, training as an officer in the Royal Artillery. At this point he suffered a salient trauma, Wingate began breaking all the rules and underwent a ritual known as “running”. The other military students summoned Wingate from his room, stripped him naked and had him run between lines of senior students who whacked him with knotted towels before he was tossed into a tank of icy water, it was the good old running the gauntlet. Wingate would stare the other boys right in the eyes and define them to do their worst to him. Many were intimidated by this and ceased hitting him as a result. Then Wingate would toss himself into the icy water tank. Wingate had thus shown himself to be a student of note at an early age.  By 1923 Wingate received his commission as a gunnery officer and a post at Salisbury Plain where he soon gained a reputation for being a skilled horseman and particularly good at the fox hunt.  But many who knew of him described him to have a dark side, yet again he always broke the rules and conventions. This became more of an issue by 1926 when he took a post at the military school of Equitation where he became very alienated by his peers and superiors by his arrogant insubordination. But Wingate enjoyed a powerful patronage for at this point in his life his fathers first cousin, “Cousin Rex”, Sir Reginald Wingate, the former Governor-General of Sudan and High commissioner in Egypt took him under his wing. Wingate took leave and began studying Arabic at the London School of Oriental and African Studies and then served in Sudan and Ethiopia. He also carried on a 5 year affair with a woman named Enid Peggy Jelley, to whom he got secretly engaged. But after 6 years after boarding the liner Cathay at Port Said, returning for his marriage to Peggy, he fell in love with a 16 year old girl named Lorna Paterson who was traveling home from Australia. As soon as he got home to Peggy he notified her he was in love with another.    Wingate married Lorna in 1935, a woman 13 years younger. In 1936 Wingate became an intelligence officer with the British Mandate in Palestine and almost immediately became an ardent Zionist, though he was not himself Jewish. Palestine at this time had an enormous Jewish population since the end of the first world war and a large influx of those fleeing Nazi Germany in the 1930s. The Arab population saw them as a future threat and guerilla groups sprang up. Archibald Wavell the newly arrived commander in chief in Palestine had Wingate form the Special Night Squads (SNS) to combat Arab terrorism. Wingate was an early proponent of using paramilitary actions at night to induce a unique and singular terror in his enemies. He got the SNS to use slavering dogs, a very calculated piece of cruelty since the animals were regarded as unclean by Muslims. The SNS were basically legitimizing Zionist counterterrorism, using Jewish thugs to strike back at Arab thugs.  Wingate performed war crimes and horrible atrocities while leading the SNS and was recalled. This should have been the end to his career, but Wavell and Sir Edmund Ironside kept making up excuses to cover for criticisms against him. These two men managed to get Wingate back into the game by 1941 where he was brought over to Ethiopia to help fight against the Italians. Backed by Wavell, he attempted another go at the SNS, this time named the Gideon Force, a band of irregulars made up of British, Sudanese, Ethiopians and some ex SNS. Wingates force proved spectacularly successful and this time with no controversy. But still because of his tactlessness and insubordination, Wingate ended up getting whisked out of Ethiopia at the end of hostilities.  Wingate found himself in Cairo in a major depression, he tried to kill himself with a Ethiopian knife but was saved by a man who drove him to the hospital. There is considerable evidence to suggest Wingate was bipolar and had experienced an acute episode of downswing for his manic-depression. Wingates enemies and critiques were delighted at the news of his downfall and hoped he would be court-martialed and tossed into an asylum, but Wingates backers prompted him up yet again. His suicide attempt was attributed to delirium induced by malaria, but as Churchill's personal physician Lord Moran would write in his diary about Wingate ‘Wingate seemed to be hardly sane . . . in medical jargon a borderline case.'  Wingate was certainly a bizarre person, he was also an exhibitionist and extremely eccentric as many sources put it. He was careless in dress, always unkempt, had zero respect for military convention and hierarchy and expected his superiors to satisfy his every whim. When General Auchinlack succeeded Wavell as commander in chief in the middle east he met Wingate who came to his office in shorts, with a dirty solar topi and a greasy blue jacket. Wingate loved to go around camps naked, often appearing out of a shower nude to bark orders at other men. He liked to wear an alarm clock around his wrist that would go off on odd occasions for no particular reason that anyone could figure out. He was rarely seen with his trademark Wolseley helmet and fly whisk. He carried on a string around his neck a raw onion which he occasional snacked upon, cant make that one up people. He had a lot of food fads which he imposed upon his subordinates, such as vegetarianism. He rarely changed his clothes and thought doing laundry was unnecessary.  Wingate went through a limbo period until 1942 where Wavell asked for his services to help in South-East Asia. Originally Wingate was told he would be training Chiang kai-sheks forces guerrilla warfare and he was quite unenthusiastic for 2 reasons. 1) such an endeavor he deemed to be like teaching one's grandmother to suck eggs. 2) he wondered what the point was of sending a Middle East expert to the CBI theater? Yet as of February the 27th Wingate found himself departing to be the liberator of Delhi with the rank of major. It would take 3 weeks for him to get over to Wavell and by that time Rangoon had fallen. Wavell told him that his job had thus changed, now he would be in charge of all guerilla operations against the Japanese within Burma.Wingate was sent to Maymyo east of Mandalay to take over the Bush Warfare School being run by another colorful character named Michael Mad Mike Calvert. Calvert was coming back to Maymyo, returning from a failed operation and found Wingate sitting at his desk. Calvert glared at him and asked who he was and calmly Wingate simply stated his name. And would you know it, they got on perfectly fine and even became friends. The two men both decided their first task should be to go down to see Slim at Prome. Slim had met Wingate back in East Africa in 1940, both men serving under Wavell against the Italians. Upon discussing the matters of organized guerilla groups, Slim agreed to some of Wingates ideas but doubted his Ethiopian experience would be relevant for the task. As Slim was becoming very aware, jungle warfare in Burma was a special type of beast. Wingate was very impressed by Slim and said of the man ‘There is only one soldier worthy of the name East of Suez. He is a bad-tempered little terrier by the name of Slim.' When Chiang Kai-shek was departing back to China after a visit in March, Wingate managed to take a seat on the plan alongside him, hoping to learn about warfare in Burma from the generalissimo. However their aircraft was chased by Japanese fighters, ruining times for conversation. Wingate was informed at Chongqing that he would not be receiving Chinese fighters for his programs as they were now going to Stillwell as a result of the catastrophe in Burma. When he returned to Burma he was informed by Calvert they had sent 100 Bush warfare people into the Irrawaddy and only 11 survived, things were chaotic to say the least. Wingate then took Calvert for a week long car tour of the Burmese frontier making careful notes of animals, insects, reptiles, and terrain details. In Delhi on april 24th, Wingate announced he no longer had any interest on training a guerrilla group, but instead wanted to create a more proactive long-range penetration (LRP0 group. He had 3 major motifs for this, 1) the Japanese troops behind the lines had to be inferior to those as the front, thus the British should get behind. 2) They needed to use communications based on radio and supplied by air. 3) They had to cut the Japanese supply lines and destroy their arms dumps, thus typing up disproportionate numbers of the enemy. He continuously made his case to his superiors and many thought him nuts to think he could train men for jungle warfare in just 8 weeks time. But Wingate kept pushing for it, insisting also that all the men must be volunteers and that he needed at minimum 3000 men.  The finer points of his idea brought up the need to supply special units with airdrops, not a particularly new idea, but certainly a gung-ho one. His superiors wanted to outright reject his ideas, but Wavell yet again was championing his cause. Wingate won out the day and it was agreed to allocate men to his project. The 77th Indian brigade was formed and it was certainly a motley collection. The main British component was the 13th battalion of the King's liverpool regiment raised in Glasgow, Manchester and Liverpool in 1941. These were older, married men with no dreams of martial glory, typically employed in the coastal defense of Britain then suddenly shipped to India after the Japanese went supernova in the east. They displayed a lack of enthusiasm for Wingates ideas, many of them were also too old for jungle combat. Wingate rejected 250 of them off the bat and Wavell gave permission to fill the gaps with other units. The rest would come from two oriental units,the first being the 2nd battalion Burma rifles. These were mainly warriors from anti-Japanese hill tribes, the Kachins, Chins, Karens and such, those personally affected by Japans aggression and eager for payback. They were eager and better yet, they taught Wingate a lot about jungle warfare. The other were Gurkhas whom always held high regard amongst the British, though Wingate thought them arrogant, ill-disciplined and overrated. I find that truly bizarre, because all literature i have ever read about Gurkha's troops has been nothing, but praise and something out of a Rambo film. One historian of the Gurkhas said of Wingate ‘Wingate was the only officer in 130 years of service ever to criticise the performance of Gurkha soldiers, characterising them as mentally unsuited for their role as Chindits. Of course the same might be said of Wingate.' Likewise the Gurkhas found Wingate arrogant, overly domineering and someone who paid little heed to them who had vastly more experience fighting in Burma. They also really did not like him because of his rude and autocratic treatment of them.  Wingate divided his force into 8 columns each commanded by a major and each given 15 horses and 100 mules. The columns would be sustained by airdrops, thus an RAF signaling section was attached to each. They trained in the central provinces of India and in the Saugur jungle due south of Gwalior. Within the jungle training the idea was to hit the men with every possible scenario they might face, to push them to the absolute limit. They endured hell. Encounters with giant snakes, mosquitoes, leeches, days filled with half rations deliberately to simulate living off airdrops. Men collapsed from heat, marching with full packs through vegetation. When the monsoons hit, they were marching through mud, rivers and torrential rain. Many days began at 6am with half an hours bayonet drill, followed by unarmed combat. After breakfast they learnt woodcraft, map reading, compass reading, how to forage and distinguish poisonous plants. They learnt how to blow up bridges, lay ambushes, how to storm airfields, how to properly clear paths in jungles, it was grueling.  From the beginning of the training programme there were sickness levels allegedly as high as 70%. Wingate was ruthless, in the case of those saying they were suffering from dysentery, he ordered his officers into the bathrooms to inspect the mens stools to prove if they were lying. Amongst many of his enemies, the Medical Corps would be a large one. Wingate continued to alienate himself and made more and more enemies. At one point Wingate misunderstood the Burmese word for Lion “chinthe” as Chindit and declared it to be the name of his LRP group henceforth, thus they became known as the Chindits. His Burmese aide, Sao Man Hpa told him the word made no sense in Burmese, to which Wingate told the man Chinthe made no sense in English.  Wingate defeated the 70 percent rate of illness, bringing down to a 3 percent, via brutal methodology, most genuinely ill men simply carried on too afraid to be punished. Wingates eccentric qualities spread amongst the men, like his necessity to wear shorts in the rain, to eat raw onions, and to keep a bunch of buffalo to milk because he believed their milk had salubrious qualities. Wingate should have been sacked at countless times, but the rubicon had been crossed and he was expected to lead his men by 1943. By December of 1942, the Chindits and Wingate were ready for action. They had been trained to carry 70 pounds on a march, were equipped with tropical uniform: army bots, mosquito nets, mess tins, sterilizing kits, each man had a rifle or Bren gun plus 50 rounds of .303 ammunition and 6 days worth of rations. The rations were 12 wholemeal biscuits, 2 ounces of nuts and raisins, 2 ounces of cheese, 4 ounces of dates, 2 ounces of chocolate, 20 cigarettes (which greatly annoyed Wingate as he deemed smoking a major hinderance), tea, sugar, powdered milk, salt and vitamin C tablets. The mules of his forces carried 3 inch mortars, ammunition, wireless radio sets and batteries. His force of 8000 were divided into 8 columns of around 400 men each: consisting of 3 rifle platoons, a support platoon with 2-3 inch mortars, 2 Vickers medium machine guns, a mule transport platoon and an RAF air liaison detachment. In addition he had 10 platoons for reconnaissance, scouting and sabotage operations. Now originally Wingates force was supposed to be part of a 3 pronged offensive, utilizing conventional British forces attacking Akyab and the ARakan while the Ledo and Yunnan forces led by Stilwell would secure northern Burma and reopen the land route to China. As we all know during this series, Burma was a colossal mess. Originally 4 Corps would assault Sitang and Kalewa while 15 Corps attacked Akyab and Arakan, but shortages in labour, transport and lack of skilled hands led to the cancellation of the major project. Even worse, Chiang Kai-Shek, greatly pissed off by the decisions made during the Casablanca conference, refused to sanction a Chinese expedition from Yunnan. With all hopes for the great 1943 offensive dashed, Wavell had to consider whether the Chindits were even relevant anymore. Wavell arrived to Wingates HQ on February 7th after countlessly telling the man things were simply postponed. In a 2 hour meeting Wingate fought bitterly to send his men into the fray, but Wavell stated he could not be party to the pointless waste of lives. Wingate made multiple arguments for sending his boys in, 1) cancellation would boost defeatism in the Indian army: 2) it was essential for the British to overcome their current ignorance of Japanese jungle fighting: 3) Fort Hertz, the remaining British outpost in Burma was in desperate need of relief: 4) without a Chindit crossing, the Japanese would dominate the jungle on either side of the Chindwin river: 5) the 77th brigade was not pitch perfect and any delay would be catastrophic to morale: 6) An attack by the 77th brigade would impair and set back Japanese preparations for an offensive. Wavell apparently impressed by Wingates enthusiasm agreed to let the Chindits have their day. The Chindits were not directed south-east to help with the Arakan operation, instead their assignments were to be to cut two railways, one between Myitkyina and Mandalay in northern Burma and the other, the Mandalay-Lashio line. The codename of the operation was Longcloth, which annoyed Wingate because it held no grandiloquence he sought.  In early february the 7 Chindit columns marched south east from Imphal to Moreh on the Assam/Burma border. Once across the border they split into 2 groups, the southern group consisting of columns 1 and 2, around 1000 men and 250 mules which was a feint to throw off the Japanese and the Northern group consisting of columns 3,4,5,7 and 8, around 2000 men and 850 mules who would destroy the railways. Small patrols were sent across the Chindwin marching some 30 miles into enemy territory and coming back without any incident, however doing that with 3000 men was another matter entirely. On February 13th, an advance party of the Northern group crossed at Tonhe around 50 miles north to act as a a doubled bluff to cover for the southern groups feint. Meanwhile a disinformation party with the southern group marched south and ordered a huge quantity of supplies from a village known to be aiding the Japanese, providing a great ruse. The second wave of 2000 men from the Northern group crossed the Chindwin unopposed on the 14th.  Crossing the Chindwin was not easy, while elephants and bullocks swam across with ease, the pack mules proved very skittish, most likely fearing crocodiles. Getting them to the far bank was a nightmare. The southern group also had its problems with their mule. They had the first task of ambushing a 250 strong Japanese garrison at Maingnyaung on the 18th, but ran into a skirmish with a Japanese patrol before they made it there. The enemy was thus alerted and bombarded them with mortars, this spooked the mules and the caused a stampede. Many mules were lost in the jungle, the element of surprise with it and the fiasco cost the southern group a delay of 3 days. The southern group slowly pulled away from the hill country east of the Chindwin, making for the Mandalay-Myitkyina railway. By the night of the 3rd of March they were ambushed in the Mu valley. It was a utter disaster. Radios, ciphers and most of their equipment were lost. Column 2 was almost annihilated, column 1 limped on to the banks of the Irrawady awaiting final orders from Wingate, who instead kept blaming their commander, Major Burnett. As for column 2 he said “the disaster to No. 2 Column, was easily avoidable and would never have taken place had the commander concerned understood the doctrines of penetration”.  Meanwhile Wingate and the Northern group rendezvoused 5 miles inland from the Chindwin and received their parachute drops. Wingate then pondered his options, he could make for Tonmakeng where intelligence reported no enemy presence and wait for the next supply drop and attack the 200 strong Japanese garrison at Sinlamaung or they could bypass it and head into the Mu valley. He kept the men marching and some of his scouts reported a Japanese garrison was at a gold mining village called Metkalet 15 miles east of the Chindwin near Tonmakeng. He ordered columns 3 and 5 under Calvert and Fergusson to attack at once. Then another disaster struck. Fergusson's column got stuck in a swamp and scouts returned again with a new report that no Japanese garrison was in Matkalet after all. So Wingate and Calvert directed the columns to Tonmakeng. Wingates thinking was it was better to strike at an enemy strength he knew, rather than the Mu valley which was an unknown. They reached Tonmakeng without further incident by february 22nd and learnt a Japanese garrison was at Sinlamaung, 10 miles away so WIngate dispatched 3 columns to attack it while the rest of the men waiting for a supply drop expected 3 days away. Disaster struck. The 3 columns were unable to locate Sinlamaung after 3 days and when they finally found it on the 25th, the Japanese garrison had just pulled out. Wingate met with his officers and they decided to march to Zibyutaungdan with Calverts column 3 in the lead. On March 1st they made it to Zibyutaungdan and then proceeded to descend into the Mu Valley. Wingate then ordered the Northern group to disperse into its columns and rendezvous later at the Irrawaddy or beyond. He also dispatched an advance party across the Irrawaddy to the Kachin highlands northeast of Mandalay to try and raise a guerrilla force among the pro-british people there.  By the night of March 3rd disaster struck. At the very same time the southern group was being ambushed, column 4 walked into an ambush, 2 miles west of Pinbon. Major R.B Bromhead, a descendant of the Bromhead famous for fighting the Zulu at Rorke's drift in 1879, did his best to get his panicked mules with their Gurkha handlers to disperse and regroup at a rendezvous point hoping to get help from columns 7 and 8, but while trying to do so, the men were attacked again and by the time they reached the rallying point columns 7 and 8 had moved on. With no food or radios and just a handful of mules left, the column had no choice but to retreat back to India. Within a days time, columns 2 and 4 were broken and on their way back to India. Wingate was livid, his credibility was at stake, but fortunately for him and his men the Japanese assumed when they whipped out Column 2 they had destroyed the entire invasion effort. By March 6th, Calvert and Fergussons columns were within striking distance of the Wuntho-Indaw railway. Calvert and Fergusson hatched a bold and daring plan to assault what was a 800 strong garrison at Pinlebu. They spoke with Major Walter Scott leading Column 8 and told him to attack Punlebu while they supervised a massive supply drop north-east of the town. The idea was that the attackers and supply collectors would support another. Doing so they would set up roadblocks to the north and east of Pinlebu and call upon the RAF to bombard the town, making the Japanese believe they were facing a huge force. The attack turned into an amazing success. The Japanese were quickly confused as Calvert and Fergusson had the railway line demolished. It was a bloody fight, but the line was blown up in several places. The Japanese counterattacked in force trying to stop the demolition. Calverts men also mined 2 railway bridges, one of them a 3-span 120 footer. In the bloody mayhem, Calvert and Fergussons men killed about a third of the Pinlebu defenders and cut railway lines in 70 separate places. During the evening Fergussons column no 5 blew up the 40 foot rail bridge at Bongyaung gorge, leading also to hundreds of rock and rubble going over railway lines around the gorge. Now 10 mites north of Wuntho, Wingate established his HQ in the Babwe Taung hills. He had a tough decision to make, should he retreat back to India or press further and cross the Irrawaddy? Wingate even considered turning his HQ into a new fort like Fort Hertz, to try and push the Japanese to give up the Irrawaddy towns. Wingate as you probably have guessed went with option number 2, despite how unbelievably dangerous it was. The Japanese were hard on their tail as the Chindits made their way trying to cross the Irrawady river. This is where I have to leave our story of the Chindits, but they will come back throughout the war.  We need to make a small detour to speak about the Casablanca conference that took place from January 14 to the 24th. Chiang Kai-Shek had been begging the Americans and British for more aid. FDR told Chiang Kai-shek he would champion his demands to Churchill at the Casablanca Conference, but Churchill brushed this all aside. The conference ended with two large decisions, the first being the controversial doctrine of unconditional surrender. The allies were now confident after the success of operation Torch, the victories at Alamein and at Stalingrad that the Germans were on the run. But over in southeast asia, the Japanese looked impregnable. Thus the 2nd decision made was basically to keep the Europe First course steaming ahead, the Pacific was simply second banana. But for America, the situation in the Pacific had distinctly changed, they had won the initiative and now sought to consolidate their conquests in the east. Admiral King applied considerable pressure to the matter, in private he began urging that if the Pacific did not get 30% of allied resource quote “it would necessitate the US regretfully withdrawing from the commitments in the European theater”. Admiral King wanted to continue the momentum in the Pacific by seizing the Solomones, the eastern New Guinea-Rabaul area, capture back Kiska and the Attu islands in the Aleutians begin operations in the Gilberts, Marshalls, Carolines, take Truk and extend the occupation of New Guinea to the Dutch borders. The British opposed this as they continued to argue the best course was to defeat Germany first then devote all resources against Japan. Now as for the CBI theater, plans were continuing for Operation Anakim and the Burma offensive, but the British were not looking to extend their commitments in the theater very much. They argued that the depleted condition of the eastern fleet prevented them from carrying on a naval supremacy campaign in the Bay of Bengal, and this led Chiang Kai-shek to refuse to support an offensive through northern burma, because of the lack of British naval forces at hand. Thus operation Anakim looked like it was only going to get off in late 1943. For all the failures of the conference, FDR did try to remedy the situation as best as he could with their Chinese allies. FDR made it known he wanted to treat China as a great power that the allies would help build up for the current war and postwar. He also acknowledged the dramatic need to keep supply routes to China open. Stilwell advised 5000 tons of supplies be sent over the Hump per month as a goal to hit by February of 1943, this would require 140 aircraft during good weather and 300 aircraft during monsoon seasons. But Washington at this time could only spare 75 aircraft, another disappointment to Chiang Kai-shek. Another important side aspect to the Casablanca conference was brought forward by Generals Charles de Gaulle and Henri Giraud who were vying to become recognized partners to the allies with their Free French Forces. Until this point, the Japanese had a pretty awkward relationship with their technical ally, Vichy France. This awkward situation led them to simply ignore the Free French forces and by proxy they decided to not touch the French concession of Guangzhouwan which had declared itself part of Free France. French Indochina of course was fully invaded prior to 1941 and remained under nominal Vichy French control, but Guangzhouwan was beginning to stick out like a sore thumb. Chiang Kai-shek recognized Free France's authority over Guangzhouwan and many Chinese forces of the 4th Area Army led by General Zhang Fukui fled into the concession to escape the Japanese. This drew Tokyo's attention and they finally decided to put an end to the Free French presence in China. The 23rd army of General Sakai lent 2 battalions of the 23rd independent mixed brigade from Hong Kong to go over to the Luichow Peninsula. They landed at the village of Peichatsun on February 17th and began skirmishing with some Chinese defenders. They soon overwhelmed the defenders and seized the towns of Hsinlaitsun and Haikang, forcing the Chinese to withdraw towards Suichi. From there the Japanese continued north, seizing Suichi and Chihkan. After these seizures, the Japanese had fully encircled the French concession of Guangzhouwan. The Japanese and representatives of Guangzhouwan soon fell into negotiations and the Free French were forced to declare the concession an open city, allowing the Japanese to occupy it without a fight.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The eccentric or better said madman Wingate got his wish to send the Chindits into the fray, despite just about no one other than Wavell wanting him to do so. With Onions wrapped around their necks they made their first strike against a Japanese railway and it was a surprising mixed success. 

The Irrawaddy Broadcasting
The Irrawaddy Newscast in English

The Irrawaddy Broadcasting

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 11, 2023 24:44


In our first episode, we hear from U.S. Department of State Counselor Derek Chollet about how his country is countering Myanmar's military. We speak to Irrawaddy editor Aung Zaw about what's surprised him most since the coup. And we share voices from some Burmese building a community while abroad.

Instant Trivia
Episode 673 - Prefixes - Comedic Tv Partners - Cold World Out There - The Old Sod - Cry

Instant Trivia

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 15, 2022 7:23


Welcome to the Instant Trivia podcast episode 673, where we ask the best trivia on the Internet. Round 1. Category: Prefixes 1: This thoroughly modern prefix means "one thousandth". milli-. 2: Meaning "between", it comes before "section" and "galactic". inter-. 3: A prefix meaning "after" is found in this word meaning an after-death examination. postmortem. 4: "Pharyngo" and "laryngo" both refer to this part of the body. the throat. 5: Meaning "height", it comes before "phobia" and "polis". acro-. Round 2. Category: Comedic Tv Partners 1: Conan O'Brien. Andy Richter. 2: Carrie Brownstein. Fred Armisen. 3: (Keegan-Michael) Key. Peele. 4: (Dan) Rowan. (Dick) Martin. 5: Cindy Williams, from 1976 to 1982. Penny Marshall. Round 3. Category: Cold World Out There 1: In July 1968 Plateau Station on this continent averaged -99.8 degrees; bottom of the world, Ma!. Antarctica. 2: You can freeze your Aspen off in Fraser in this state, with a year-round average of 32.5 degrees. Colorado. 3: You've been sent to Oymyakon in this 7-letter region of Russia, where it was a brisk -96 in January 1926. Siberia. 4: Snag, in this Canadian territory, had a population of about 10 on a -81 day in February 1947. the Yukon. 5: Located in Lewis and Clark County, Rogers Pass in this large western state chilled out at -70 on Jan. 20, 1954. Montana. Round 4. Category: The Old Sod 1: There once was a king named Richard I, who granted a charter to this Irish port city in 1197. Limerick. 2: Ireland is divided into 32 of these political and geographic units; 6 of them belong to the U.K.. counties. 3: The uachtaran is the Irish president; the taoiseach is this head of government. the prime minister. 4: Ireland has no local police; the island is patrolled by An Garda Siochana, the Guardians of this. peace. 5: Ireland's hospitals were largely funded by this horse-racing lottery that ran from 1930 to 1987. the Irish Sweepstakes. Round 5. Category: Cry 1: Aesop knows that one who raises a false alarm is said to "cry" this creature. wolf. 2: In a text message, "FCOL" is short for this exasperated phrase. "for crying out loud". 3: If you've given up, "cry" this generic relative. uncle. 4: Justin Timerlake sang "cry me" one of these, perhaps the Irrawaddy. a river. 5: "Cry" this "and let slip the dogs of war". havoc. Thanks for listening! Come back tomorrow for more exciting trivia! Special thanks to https://blog.feedspot.com/trivia_podcasts/

MONEY FM 89.3 - The Breakfast Huddle with Elliott Danker, Manisha Tank and Finance Presenter Ryan Huang
Regional Roundup: Myanmar's military government ban publication licence for The Irrawaddy

MONEY FM 89.3 - The Breakfast Huddle with Elliott Danker, Manisha Tank and Finance Presenter Ryan Huang

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 8, 2022 9:13


From what to expect from the upcoming ASEAN Summit, the latest on Malaysia's general election and Myanmar's military government banning and revoking the publication licence for The Irrawaddy.  Nicholas Fang, Managing Director, Black Dot and Director for Security and Global Affairs, Singapore Institute of International Affairs shares more.  See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Fall of Civilizations Podcast
16. Bagan - City Of Temples

Fall of Civilizations Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 2, 2022 127:06


In the lowlands of Burma lie the remains of thousands of crumbling temples... In this episode, we tell one of the most colourful stories of civilizational survival: the story of the Bagan Empire of Myanmar. Find out how this kingdom rose up in the Irrawaddy river valley of central Myanmar, and built one of the most remarkable series of monuments to have survived from the medieval world. Discover what life was like for the people who lived there, and find out what happened to cause its sudden and complete collapse.

Instant Trivia
Episode 563 - Short Stories - Jokers - Lakes And Rivers - Robert Louis Stevenson - Howdy, Partner!

Instant Trivia

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 27, 2022 7:40


Welcome to the Instant Trivia podcast episode 563, where we ask the best trivia on the Internet. Round 1. Category: Short Stories 1: "Uncle Wiggily in Connecticut" was one of the "Nine Stories" he published after "Catcher in the Rye". J.D. Salinger. 2: The 1922 play "Rain" is a dramatization of "Miss Thompson", this author's story about Sadie Thompson. Somerset Maugham. 3: In this O. Henry story, the kidnappers pay the father $250 to take the kid back. "The Ransom of Red Chief". 4: He called his third collection of short stories "The Trimmed Lamp and Other Stories of the Four Million". O. Henry (William Sydney Porter). 5: The character Jesse B. Semple figures prominently in many of this "Harlem" poet's short stories. (Langston) Hughes. Round 2. Category: Jokers 1: He claims he gets mail that says "You may already be a loser"; now that's getting no respect. Rodney Dangerfield. 2: Her, as Liz Lemon: "I took one of those 'Which Gossip Girl Are You?' quizzes, and it said I was the dad's guitar". (Tina) Fey. 3: Ali Wong learned "In order to be a" this "wife, you have to be a" this. "I am more of a commemorative plaque". a trophy. 4: George Carlin and Lily Tomlin were featured in the 1995 special "20 Years of Comedy on" this cable network. HBO. 5: In a 1984 film Rob Reiner said they "earned a distinguished place in rock history as one of England's loudest bands". Spinal Tap. Round 3. Category: Lakes And Rivers 1: Because of their salt water, the Caspian and Aral, 1st and 4th largest lakes in the world, are called these. Seas. 2: About 70% of China's rice crop is grown in this river's basin. Yangtze River. 3: Sam Rayburn Reservoir is this state's largest lake. Texas. 4: The Irrawaddy is a river road to Mandalay in this country. Myanmar or Burma. 5: World's largest lake, nearly 5 times as big as Superior. the Caspian Sea. Round 4. Category: Robert Louis Stevenson 1: The place where Stevenson and his wife spent their honeymoon in 1880 is now a state park in this state's Napa Valley. California. 2: This title character was an "M.D., D.C.L., LL.D....". Dr. Jekyll. 3: (Hi Ho, Kermit the Frog here) As Captain Smollet, I followed the map to this Robert Louis Stevenson island. "Treasure Island". 4: "The Silverado Squatters" was an 1883 tale about Stevenson's experiences in one of these camps in California. mining camp. 5: Around 1890 Stevenson bought 300 acres in what's now this country, where he was called tusitala, or "teller of tales". Samoa. Round 5. Category: Howdy, Partner! 1: 19th century printing partner of Nathaniel Currier. Ives. 2: After his partner's death in 1809, he partnered with Nicholas Biddle to complete the expedition report. (William) Clark. 3: Born in 1895, this lyricist partnered with composers Friml, Romberg, Kern and Rodgers. Hammerstein. 4: He partnered with Edward Williams in 1866 to "Cover the Earth" with paint. Sherwin. 5: In 1673, he and his exploring partner Joliet became the first Europeans to visit the area of Chicago. Marquette. Thanks for listening! Come back tomorrow for more exciting trivia! Special thanks to https://blog.feedspot.com/trivia_podcasts/

Kings and Generals: History for our Future
3.9 Fall and Rise of China: Fall of the South Ming Regime

Kings and Generals: History for our Future

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 15, 2022 72:07


commander in charge of Huguang province, Prince Nikan. Meanwhile Qing princes Shang Kexi and Geng Jimao were dispatched to pacify Guangdong and Guangxi. Wu Sangui was ordered to pacify Sichuan, but was being tied down heavily in its northern sector, maybe he was fighting all the tigers.    Wu had discovered that Sichuan was so devastated it made things ruinous for military campaigns. He lacked the resources to do much against the countless bandits armies and the newly emerged forces of Sun Kewangs which he referred to as a “poison overrunning the province”.  The entire situation as Wu put it “Chengdu was a devastated ruin and all was empty around it. The dead and starving were everywhere and for hundreds of li there were no cooking fires but bandit gangs roamed allying with the ming freely. All of Sichuan is in the hands of bandits and their strategic situation has already improved greatly since their emergence. Without men or materiel where will I get the resources to recover land and extirpate [the bandits]?”   Nonetheless in february of 1652, Wu and his subordinate Li Guohan made an offensive through the Jianmen “sword pass” all the way to Jiading. By april they captured Chongqing and by may northern Sichuan was considered fully pacified. Still Wu and Guohan had no illusions, the bandits and Ming defenses in the south remained dangerous, but the giddy young Qing Emperor assumed Sichuan as a whole was weakened and thought Wu would be able to assist Nikan in his mission. The young Qing emperor also sought to mass large armies to retake Yunnan and Guizhou after Sichuan was taken, quite a large order.    A grandson of Nurhaci, Prince Nikan served with Prince Haoge in western China and held an assortment of administrative posts in the capital before he was appointed “Ding yuan da Jiangjun”, generalissimo in charge of pacifying the distant regions, following Kong Youdes death. Nikan proceeded into Huguang at the head of his army of 100,000. Like most Qing commanders, Prince Nikan was given orders to accept the surrender of anyone who submitted without a fight and that it was paramount to protect the people. Strict military regulations were to be enforced, forbidding the rape and pillaging of whom were supposed to be their subjects. Understandable, you can't go around abusing the people you want to govern after all. Nikan's army marched to Guangxi to do battle with Li Dingguo and he was promised aid from Xi'an. The Qing military operations were consuming more than half the Qing governments revenue and they knew they should be cautious and secure taxable lands before venturing deep into the southwest again. Nikans forces successfully defeated Li Dingguo's subordinates Ma Jinzhong at Yuezhou and Zhang Honggong at Changsha. Nikan pursued them west and encountered Li Dingguo's scouts near Hengzhou. Nikan defeated some of Li's forces at Hengzhou sending him on the run, but then Li set up an ambush near Qiyang where Nikan's army sustained heavy casualties. Nikan pushed forward, with his vanguard running into another ambush near Yongzhou. Li feigned a retreat and soon Nikans army was stretched out widely into 3 groupings. Li then personally led his forces brandishing a great sword on horseback into battle. Nikan fought bravely but was overwhelmed and speared off his mount. Li severed Nikans head from its corpse and paraded it around before falling back to Wugang.   The Qing were absolutely shocked,  Emperor Shunzhi screamed “ “In our dynasty's military history we've never suffered a loss like this!”. The Ming scholar and philosopher Huang Zongxi said of Li Dingguo's victory  “it was the most complete Ming victory since the Wanli reign.”. The prefect of Guilin said of Li's victory ““The duke (Li) uses troops like a god. He's a little Zhuge [Liang]. His laws and regulations are clear and strict without committing the slightest mistake, and he combines the strong and weak in his brigades with all knowing their roles. Thus the people practically fight to join him.” The Qing licked their wounds and now put the veteran collaborator Hong Chengchou in charge of all operations in the far south.    Even though Li had managed to kill Prince Nikan, he was unable to take advantage of the great victory because his subordinates Feng Shuangli and Ma Jinzhong were still working for Sun Kewang in secrecy, undermining him. Soon much of Huguang fell right back into the hands of the Qing and Feng sent word to Sun to stoke his jealousy “I fear that from now on, Dingguo will be hard to control”. Sun tried to remedy his relationship with Li by offering him  the title of Prince of Xining, but Li refused stating “Investitures come from the Son of Heaven. How can one prince enfoeff another?” thus Li was making the argument that only Emperor Yongli could bestow someone as prince outraging Sun, kind of ironic also given the fact it was an argument Sun had made himself, haha. Sun was publicly praising Li's victories, while privately trying to destroy him. Sun sent countless letters summoning Li to “discuss strategy” but instead Li camped in Baoqing and ignored them. It turns out Li was being tipped off by Liu Wenxiu's son that Sun was probably trying to assassinate him. Li worried not just for his life, but for his family who were all in Yunnan.    Now it should be noted Li Dingguo's armies success was primarily a result of his training programs and leadership. Li was an extremely capable military leader, he understood the limitations and strengths of his forces. For one thing he did not believe in sticking around in one place for too long, he knew the limitations of his logistics, such as a need for food. His experience as a bandit leader was of grave importance for the survival of his forces as most of their campaigns relied on moving into territories, securing resources and moving on. He also had a tendency to strike out fast without warning and leav before the Qing could consolidate on that position. Li made sure to build close ties with areas he led his forces into, trying to win over many, and this proved highly successful as unlike his former adoptive father, Li had always tried to limit atrocities. Li also heavily benefited from Yunnan specifically, he was running around with war elephants afterall, fearsome shock units, though very expensive to feed and maintain. It was said that the Qing feared Li and his “southern barbarian forces” as they were known.    Estimates for the total troops available for the South Ming regime are most likely inflated but some sources claim Sun Kewang to have 800,000 men, Li Dingguo 400,000 and Liu Wenxiu 140,000. There is a breakdown of organizational structure as well when it comes to the South Ming armies. For mobile brigades (youji), each with a commander, consisting of 2 brigades (ying), which held around 1750 troops. Then there are 5 vice commanders (dusi) each with 350 troops, divided into 5 separate units of 70, further divided into 5 squads of 13. Now for a regular brigade each held 3000 troops with 10 battalions of 300, subdivided into 2 companies of 150 each. Lt's led platoons of 30 men, sergeants squads of 10.   The South Ming regime were bolstered heavily by minority troops which themselves brought a variety of differing weaponry and military tactics. Its hard to gauge, but some modern scholars estimate there was a ratio of 1 gun per 15 soldiers overall, but other scholars argue they had even more. As already mentioned we see a heavy use of Elephant cavalry amongst Li Dingguo's forces, he also had unique firearms, repeating crossbows and specialized polearms. By the way if you ever have a chance to check out repeating crossbows going back to the ancient times of China, its worthwhile, they are awesome. There were the famous 3 eyed bird guns, western made cannons and much more. Li's force particularly liked using cavalry, favoring the mobility, but horses were in short supply for Yunnan and Sichuan. The war elephants were typically in the frontlines with men firing guns atop their backs, which sounds absolutely awesome.  Li Dingguo's campaigns also came with horrifying consequences for the common folk, it is estimated up to a possibly million commoners were killed during the offensive in 1652 from war conditions and famine. Basically anywhere the Qing and Ming decided to do battle ruined the area, people were pressed into service, killed, pillaged, lost homes and farms and such leading to starvation, many refugees spread into other areas causing more and more problems.     While northern Sichuan was being secured by the forces of Li Guoying and Wu Sangui, Sun Kewang decided to expand into northern Sichuan and sent Liu Wenxiu. The Qing attempted to hold Liu's forces back, but the elephant cavalry proved extremely effective and soon they were pushed back towards Baoning. A large reason the Elephant cavalry was so successful was because they simply spooked the Qing horses, though for anyone who knows their Mongol war history, you can already see how using war elephants might prove disastrous. While horses are indeed spooked by elephants, horses mounted archers can quite easily spook elephants back by pelting them with arrows and flanking them. Regardless from many of the sources I am reading, this seems to not become the case until later on. Liu Wenxiu soon took Chongqing, Chengdu with the aid of his elephants and heavy cannons, he now felt the time was right to march on the Qing stronghold of Baoning. Liu besieged Baoning with 50,000 troops while another Ming commander, Wang Fuchen built floating bridges to cross the Ling River to cut off the escape from Baoning. Wu Sangui argued with Li Guoying that they should retreat to Hanzhong, but Li felt abandoning Baoning would mean the loss of Sichuan completely and that was unacceptable. Li then instructed Wu to place his troops in a position from which they could not escape. This tactic is known as “deadly ground”, the idea was by putting the forces in a life or death situation they would perform at their best. Sure hate to be those forces. Wu Sangui was still looking to retreat, but his colleagues basically told him he would get executed for doing so in Beijing. Abandoning Baoning would set the Qing pacification back for years and thus it was imperative to make this stand.    Baoning was quite a defendable city, it held rivers on 3 sides and a mountain on its 4th. The Ming tried to use that mountain to fire muskets into the city but the range was too far. Liu kept up the pressure on 3 sides of the city while guarding against any relief forces incoming from the north. It was an overly aggressive stance leaving Liu's forces thinly places about, but he had no choice but to take up an aggressive stance in the hopes of breaking the city faster since Liu did not have enough supplies for a long siege, neither did the Qing for that matter. It also seems Liu had his eyes fixated on the prize and may have been too eager. Afterall if he took Baoning it would mean he was the man who took all of Sichuan.   It seems in his efforts to envelope Baoning Liu had left some gaps in his formations and Wu saw this. Liu had arrayed his 13 war elephant cavalry units in the front of the formation intending to use them as shock troops and to protect his more unarmored troops in the formations center. The problem was because the war elephants were in the front like this, the troops behind them could not see what was past the elephants, and elephants unlike horses dont move fast, thus the enemy would be able to maneuver quickly and the troops would not know where they would be hit in time. What made maters even worse was the fact these unarmored troops in the middle had their backs to the Ling River. Lius army consisted mostly of pikemen with rattan shields and some harquebusiers. They were arrayed on the 3 sides of the city, 4 ranks deep with elephants in front followed by pikemen and harquebusiers in the rear. The formation reassembled a crescent moon, stretching some 5 miles around the city. For those of you war gamers you can probably visualize the setup and see some of the issues. For example Liu would employ his elephants into a charge to smash the enemy's cavalry, then open the lines for pikemen to finish them off followed by harquebusiers to shoot straddlers, a good plan? Problem, elephants are quite slow, what if the cavalry simply run around them?  Wu told Zhang that if they could open a gap in the enemy's lines they might be able to win. Liu commanded an attack and Wu feigned a retreat  near the Guanyin Temple which drew the Ming in pursuit. The pursuit separated some of the formation exposing the unarmored troops in the middle of Liu's formation and Wu circled around the flanks concentrating fire up the weak middle. Next Wu's cavalry smashed into some Pikemen formations pushing the enemy closer to the Ling River. Then Wu led his force against Liu Wenxiu, charging at the elephants, but they did not break. So Wu feigned another retreat, goading Liu into a chaotic pursuit. As Liu charged, Wu's forces wheeled back around and hit them with a crossfire of arrows, remember what I said about Mongolian tactics. To make matters worse, Liu's hasty pursuit saw him leaving behind many of the shield bearers, and thus they had no counter to the arrow fire. Liu's forces began to rout and Liu himself was forced to escape by cutting a floating bridge at the head of nearly half his original force of 50,000. Now 10,000 of his men were on the other side of the Ling river, scrambling to get across and they were quickly slaughtered. The Elephants eventually panicked and scattered in their own right. Wu Sangui went on to claim his forces killed and captured more than 40,000 troops during the battle. Li Guoying claimed that no more than 1000 men managed to escape and that they had captured seals of authority, 3 elephants, over 2000 horses and a mountain of firearms. Liu would retreat all the way to Yunnan and be lambasted by Sun and demoted. Liu from then on would resent Sun and fell more into the fold of Li Dingguo. After the battle both Li Guoying and Wu Sangui sent forces wheeling around to pursue the Ming as they withdrew. Wu Sangui's forces eventually stopped at Chengdu wrecking multiple Ming armies. Li Guoying began to consolidate his power in Sichuan, defeating and cornering Ming loyalist forces across the north and west of Sichuan. Li would go as far as to claim north and western Sichuan were fully pacified to Beijing.    Meanwhile the Ming court was still fawning over Li Dingguo like fangirls of a Kpop band and gave him the title of Prince of Xining, really pissing off Sun Kewang. This pushed Sun Kewang to begin a military campaign going east in autumn of 1652 seeking to raise his military profile, but at the same time Hong Chengchou was sent to Hunan to pacify it. Hong did not take an aggressive stance and opted instead to restore the prosperity of the region. Sun's campaign began with the capture of Chenzhou, where he smashed its east gate with his war elephants allowing his infantry to swarm into the city fighting bloody street to street warfare. Sun followed up the massacre, by executing tons of Qing officials and erecting piles of severed limbs to showcase it, so some old fashion Zhang Xianzhong stuff. Sun Kewang afterwards personally commanded his army to attack Baoqing alongside Feng Shuangli and Bai Wenxuan to his left and right. A veteran Qing commander named Tong Tulai held the city and upon seeing the banners of Sun Kewang in the middle formation order the concentration of his forces fire upon the center units. Both sides took equal and heavy casualties, but soon Sun Kewangs army broke and fled with Tong Tulai choosing not to pursue, probably learning a lesson from Prince Nikan's demise.    Sun's defeat at Baoqing and Liu Wenxiu's defeat at Baoning convinced many that Sun Kewang was an incompetant military leader and that he had wasted over 3 years training his forces for nothing. Thus ironically Sun Kewangs efforts to eclipse his rival, Li Dingguo had resulted in the exact opposite, making Li look even better. Sun then began to see the Ming royal family and its ties to Li Dingguo as a threat and he would take a course of action that would effectively doom the South Ming regime.   Despite the setbacks to the strategic position of the South Ming regime in 1653 not all was entirely lost. Emperor Yongli was in a secure and stable position for once and the regime held Yunnan, Guizhou and southern Sichuan firmly. Sun Kewang had brought many Dashun,Da Xi and other bandit groups under their sphere of influence and more importantly under the control of one leader. There was even the possibility that the South Ming regime could eventually link up with the naval resistance led by Koxinga in the southeast coast, someone we will talk about later. The military successes of Li Dingguo gave the South Ming regime a huge morale boost and shocked the hell out of the Qing. But beneath the surface of all of this, things were not well internally for the Ming loyalists. As we saw countless times with the bickering amongst different factions in the South Ming regime, here again it will occur.   Sun was ambitious and jealous of his colleagues, he also shared grotesque traits of his former master Zhang Xianzhong. Emperor Yongli on the other hand was weak willed and a coward who consistently sought his personal safety over all other concerns. He was a mere puppet, content with just being a symbol. Li Dingguo had risen from a peasant leader to become a genuine Ming loyalist who was both brave and charismatic, earning the hearts of many. He did not have the administrative skill like Sun Kewang, but he was a capable military leader who could take territory. In essence the 3 men together made a formidable team, each having something of use, administrative skill for Sun, military capability for Li and a symbol of authenticity in Yongli. But this would never come into reality and the real losers of this game of thrones, would as always be the common people.    Sun Kewang from the early days of just being a bandit leader showed a very notable tendency to be sensitive to any criticism and would attack anyone who he thought slighted him. Li Dingguo was well aware that Sun planned to kill him as early as 1652, yet despite this Li tried to get Sun to work together but it only made Sun more angry and dangerous. Thus by 1653 Li began to move his forces further away from Sun before he might be enveloped. Li left Yongzhou with less than 50,000 loyal troops to Longhu Pass which allowed the Qing quickly snatch up Yongzhou as a result. From there Li went east, skirmishing sometimes with Sun troops and attacking Qing controlled cities. Li's hope was if he managed to get closer to the eastern coast he might be able to join forces with Koxinga whom for his own part was open to the idea and trying his best to join up as well.    In march of 1653, Li besieged Zhaoqing for weeks and despite heavy bombardments failed to take the city and was forced to move on and raid Guangxi. He attacked Guilin where he was wounded and forced to retreat when Qing relief forces came. As Li fought Qing forces in Guangdong and Guangxi throughout 1653, Sun Kewang dispatched Feng Shuangli to attack Li at Liuzhou. Li however, managed to ambush Feng's forces and sent him fleeing. There is a story that as Feng tried to ford a river fleeing, Li supposedly saved him from drowning and thus Feng gave his loyalty to Li and returned to Sun's camp waiting for the right moment to help Li defeat him. Li would take Guilin in late 1653 and the more actions he took the more Emperor Yongli's court saw him as a better alternative to Sun as a military protector. Soon Emperor Yongli offered Li the same rank as Sun Kewang if he could rescue him from Sun's house arrest situation. Li responded that he would be open to the idea of “escorting” Yongli to safety if he successfully took Guangdong. However, Ma Jixiang discovered these messages between Li and Yongli and gave word to Sun Kewang in January of 1654. Sun then accused Yongli of conspiring against him and initiated a plan to redistribute Li Dingguo's wives and concubines in Yunnan among the other high ranking officers, but there was general dissatisfaction amongst his ranks. Almost a full blown mutiny had occurred at one point and thus his devious plan never came to fruition.    On May 6, Sun executed what he called the 18 gentlemen of Anlong for allegedly conspiring against him. Their ringleader, Wu Zhenmin strangled himself while the others were publicly flayed and decapitated. Its been awhile since we had this gruesome stuff eh? It turns out when Yongli was accused he denied the conspiracy and threw all the 18 gentlemen under the bus to save himself. In spring of 1654, Sun with 370,000 troops prepared for another eastern campaign while Li Dingguo had launched his own into Guangdong hoping as always to link up with the infamous Koxinga. Li managed to push all the way to Gaozhou, located in the southeast of the province. Next he besieged Xinhui just a bit south of Guangzhou. While he besieged Xinhui he asked Koxinga for assistance, but this never came to fruition and thus the siege lagged into 1655. Li's situation became very desperate, his men were soon reduced to eating their own horses. Then Qing reinforcements commanded by Shang Kexi arrived and despite Li having arrayed his cannons and elephants for defense the cannons allegedly were not working properly during the battle, allowing the Qing to take some high ground against him. Shang Kexi and his colleague Geng Jimao from the vantage point were able to outflank Li and cause his elephants to rout running through his own army causing massive chaos. Li had already lost countless thousand during the siege and the Qing attack simply broke them, they soon fled for their lives. Shang Kexi boasted “they scattered like rats before the might of the Qing”.    Li fled back southwest with the remnants of his forces, around 10,000 men, with just 3 war elephants left and a possible 60-70 thousand refugees as he was pursued by the Qing. He was finally able to breathe when he destroyed a bridge behind himself stranding the Qing and managing to escape to Nanning. The Qing quickly grabbed up multiple cities and Li's eastern campaign had ended in complete failure. With just a single battle at Xinhui, over 3 years of Ming victories had been swept away.    Meanwhile Sun had launched an assault on Changde in the summer of 1655, bringing with him Liu Wenxiu who had tried to retire in dismay from his major defeat, but Sun would not allow this. When his forces got close to Changde they were ambushed by Qing forces and had to make a fighting retreat, losing 6 subsequent battles to them. Many of Sun's forces fell to the Qing, starvation and disease. Feng Shuangli was wounded and some other 40 generals simply surrendered to the Qing in what became a catastrophic campaign. One thing made Hong Chengchou uneasy despite the great victories, the Ming forces under Sun seemed to be using riverine units to great effect. Thus Chengchou began to pressure the Qing to put more funding into naval capabilities. You see Sun and Li both had mastered using boats to move units quicker through river systems, as cavalry was scarce and their operations required fast mobility. The use of these riverine units alluded the Qing countless times as the Qing did not possess a great number of boats themselves nor plan to build too many.   Throughout 1655 the Qing pushed through Guangxi defeating multiple bandit groups. Li Dingguo in the meantime was returning to Nanning in late 1655, but would soon flee when the Qing attacked the city in February of 1656. It became evident that Li Dingguo was edging closer and closer to Anlong to attempt a rescue of Emperor Yongli, prompting Sun Kewang to order the forceful movement of the emperor. He appointed his subordinate Bai Wenxuan for the task of moving the emperor, completely unaware that Bai was secretly working with  Li Dingguo to relocate Emperor Yongli to Yunnan where Li had a powerbase. As Sun continued to campaign in eastern Sichuan, Li dingguo and Bai Wenxuan sent word to Emperor Yongli to try and convince the him to move to Yunnan. It was a major risk as Li only had 6000 troops under his control at the time and Sun had more than 50,000 garrisoning various places, many of which were in Yunnan. Li then tried to appeal to the Ming loyalism of the commanders scattered about, accusing Sun Kewang of quote “sinking to a depth from which he could not return to allegiance”. He also bribed the hell out of them. In turn Liu Wenxiu turned his back on Sun and made his way to join Li dingguo. Li then dispatched his subordinate Jin Tongwu to take Emperor Yongli to Yunnan in early 1656, but Sun Kewang sent some agents of his own to retrieve the emperor. So basically we are seeing a situation in which Li Dingguo and Sun Kewang are both trying to win the Ming loyalists to their respective side and portraying themselves as being the true savior of the Emperor. By the way if most of this story sounds oddly familiar to parts of the 3 Kingdoms stories its not a coincidence, all the characters were avid readers of those stories and were actively portraying the events as such.    What ends up winning the day, was the cunning and deceptive alliance between Li dingguo and Bai Wenxuan, because despite all that was going on, it seems Sun still thought Bai Wenxuan was his loyal man helping move the emperor for him. At a crucial moment, Sun Kewang sent an army to apprehend the emperor and Bai Wenxuan stopped the force saying “The Son of Heaven is here. Kewang wants to be a murderous traitor. If you wish to do that which is right, how can you follow the commands of an evil murderer and thus counter the Way of Heaven?”.  Meanwhile he was sending letters to Sun Kewang explaining that he would be delivering the Emperor to Guiyang in a few days and not to worry. This deception bought enough time for Li Dingguo and his smaller army to sneak into Anlong and convince 2 Ming commanders, Pang Tianshou and Ma Jixiang (yup Sun's spy loyal man) to switch their allegiances to him. Li dingguo consolidated the forces with those of Ben Wenxuan and they began to escort Emperor Yongli out of Anlong on February 20th.    It is said the populace lined up the roads and wept for joy as Emperor Yongli entered Yunnan alongside Li Dingguo. The emperor quickly occupied Sun Kewangs former residence in Kunming and once he felt safe and comfortable he began to distribute new titles and office to all those who aided his escape. Li Dingguo and Liu Wenxiu were named the Princes of Jin and Shu. Despite all of the craziness, Li Dingguo still hoped to bring Sun Kewang back into the fold and sent Liu Wenxiu back to Guiyang as an envoy. However Emperor Yongli advised Liu not to go in person, remembering the execution of the 18 gentlemen of Anlong, so instead Liu wrote a letter in blood to Sun Kewang. Li even sent out Sun's servants and concubines and the deceptive Bai Wenxuan back to him in a show of good faith. Sun responded as you might guess, angrily, so he sent his own envoys in return as a sign of good faith. In truth he had sent spies such as Wang Ziqi and Zhang Hu, who to his delight sent back word quickly that Li Dingguo only had 20,000 troops. Thus Sun Kewang eagerly prepared for war against Li, not realizing many of his top commanders had changed their allegiances such as his subordinate, Zhang Hu, I guess he can be called a double agent. Bai Wenxuan for his part notified Li that peace was assuredly not an option. On top of this Sun had sent some agents throughout Guizhou and Yunnan to garrison positions and prepare for war which really tipped Li off. Li Dingguo and Liu Wenxiu each sent letters from Kunming to Koxinga hoping for cooperation but no responses came.    During all of this, the Qing were consolidating their empire, especially in Sichuan.  The skirmishes between Sun and Li had enabled the Qing to  grab most of Southwest China. Yet Southern Sichuan was still extremely chaotic. Maimed people walked everywhere, corpses littered the fields, cannibalism was rampant and people were paying taxes to differing authorities. Sun Kewang still held considerable authority in Southern Sichuan. Li Guoying was promoted to governor general of Shaanxi and Sichuan in 1657 and the Qing hoped some martial law might speed up the pacification and end the nightmare that had reigned for over a decade at this point. Li Guoying pointing out that Sichuan contained a mishmash of refugees from all the ongoing wars. There were Eight banner troops, bandits, Ming loyalists, Dashun and Daxi remnants and all these groups made it very difficult to determine reliability and suitability for service under the Qing. Li Guoying thought increasing agricultural productivity would win over most and set to work doing so. Meanwhile Hong Chengchou was gathering forces and supplies in Huguang while promoting agricultural productivity. Thus both Li and Hong were running similar programs trying to win the hearts of the populace to their side.   Now as I mentioned, the Qing took Nanning in 1656 and soon realized that Li Dingguo had slipped away to Anlong. The Qing commanders worried that their supply lines were stretched too thin and Hong Chengchou favored using Guilin as a main base of operations for enclosing the southwest. To Hong Chengchou the main threat was Emperor Yongli and his entourage because he held the most significant challenge to the Qing that of legitimacy. The Qing had word of the growing war between Li Dingguo and Sun Kewang and chose to allow Hong Chengchou to build up his forces and supplies for the time being and let the enemy rot a bit from within. The entire time the Ming were bickering, the Qing were amping up agricultural production in multiple provinces winning over more and more of the populace.    In the summer of 1657 Sun and Li finally came after another. Sun with a 140,000 strong army marched upon Yunnan leaving Feng Shuangli to hold Guiyang. Li and Liu had around 50,000 troops and took up a position at Qujing building up wooden defenses there. By this point Li and Liu had persuaded many of Sun's subordinates to turncoat using every means possible, but despite this they still feared the upcoming clash. Sun arrayed his force into 36 brigades once he hit the Yunnan border and made his way to the nearest city, Jiaoshui. When the 2 armies came 10 miles from each other, Sun placed Bai Wenxuan in his vanguard which would prove a disastrous mistake. Turns out Sun's spies finally told him Bai Wenxuan was a turncoat, so Sun rightfully threw him in front, but unbeknownst to him Bai knew Sun knew and planned for this. Oh how the turntables? At the critical start of the battle Bai sent a signal and his troops wheeled around smashing into Sun's other commanders, aided by another turncoat general. Before Sun could respond, the turncoat units were eliminating his loyal units 1 by 1. Sun panicked and sought to withdraw, but 2 of his loyal subordinates Ma Bao and Ma Weixing both promised they would capture Bai and Liu vowing to quote “eat Bai's flesh for his betrayal. We outnumber them 10 to 1, when one person advances, we retreat. Are there no men among us?”. Thus Sun sent Mao Bao and another subordinate Zhang Sheng with 4000 troops to make a flanking maneuver while he drove straight into the vanguard himself. The outcome was catastrophic. Ma Weixing simply bolted away, Zhang fled towards Kunming hoping to switch sides and Ma Bao did not follow through because it turned out he was also a turncoat. There are even accounts that Ma Bao's men were firing blanks to look like they were helping. To make matters worse, Li Dingguo was fed intel provided by Bai Wenxuan and personally led his units to hit Sun's weakest spot. When Liu Wenxiu advanced, many of Sun's subordinate began to chant “Welcome, Prince Jin! Welcome Prince Jin!” as they cast off their uniforms and defected. Soon banners of Li and Liu were filling the battleground, Sun was being undone by his own army. Even though Sun's loyal forces still outnumbered the enemy 3-1 they quickly collapsed and Sun was forced to flee.    Sun and just a few dozen followers fled through thick forests making their way to the nearest town which was named Puding…haha Puding, anyways of all people Ma Jinzhong was holding the town and he closed the gates on them. When Sun screamed at the gates he was the ruler of the realm, Ma retorted “The ruler of the realm left with an army of 160,000. Now there are only a few thousand. You are certainly bandits.” Next Sun and his followers ran to Guiyang with Liu hot on their heels. When Sun approached the gates of his old capital he found them barred by Feng Shuangli. Feng did however allow Sun to take his family and continue running and Sun also secretly ordered his followers to rape and kill the wife of Bai Wenxuan who was in Guiyangat the time. Soon Sun ran into an underling of Li Dingguo named Li Bengao. He said to Bengao “Bengao, is that my old companion? You've received my favor, but now you want to kill you ruler huh?” Bengao replied “As a court officer it is simple to know the duties of a lord and minister. Bengao does not kill his lord; I've come to kill the leader of bandits.”. But before Bengao could kill Sun, one of Sun's followers snuck up and shot Bengao dead with an arrow. Sun decided enough was enough and to defect to the Qing and did so at Baoqing on December 19th of 1657. He cut his hair in the Manchu fashion and was invested as the Prince of Yi, but would not live too much longer as he died of illness in 1660, some allege he was executed secretly for having dealings with the Koxinga regime in Taiwan.    Speaking of Koxinga, fresh from his victory over Sun, Li Dingguo yet again sent another letter to Koxinga asking if they could join forces and attack Nanjing, but this never came to be. Li Dingguo had a short lived victory as he soon had to perform mop up operations against Sun's loyalists in Yunnan. Li reportedly lost upto 90% of his best commanders and troops simply cleaning up the remnants of Sun, leaving him with a terribly green force to resist the inevitable Qing invasion to come. To make matters worse Liu Wenxiu died of illness in late 1658. Li distrusted most of the commanders at his side as they had been Sun's former commanders and without Liu he simply had too much to do by himself. Remember how Li kept trying to bring Sun Kewang back into the fold, despite the man was trying to kill him? Well you can see why here, despite Li being an incredible military leader, when it came to governance and state building, he simply was not very good at it. He was used to mobile armies, wandering the provinces and plundering while on the move. Sitting idle and trying to build up forces, taxation, production, even defenses works was sort of not his forte. Before L    iu had died, on his deathbed he told Li he should flee and establish a new base of operations in Shaanxi or maybe sail down the Yangtze to join Koxinga. The loss of Liu was a hard one, as Li trusted pretty much no other former commanders under Sun, apart from Bai Wenxuan who proved quite helpful. Regardless Li strove on preparing what defenses he could. 3 Qing armies advanced on Yunnan from 3 directions, planning to converge upon Kunming. Wu Sangui marched from Sichuan, Loto would march from Huguang, Jobeti from Guangxi and Hong Chengchou held overall command. At this time Hong Chengchou was quite old and his health was failing him so he could not take a field command. Just because he was old and ill did not mean he did not have some sneaky tricks however. Hong Chengchou sent a number of spies into Yunnan to gather intel and perform a misinformation campaign to lead Li Dingguo's forces to believe the Qing were much further away than they were.   Wu Sangui's force departed Baoning and first came upon Chengdu which he described to be “a den of tigers, leopards, and bears”. The city was still a wasteland and it is estimated only 2% of the population was alive. Things proved to be just as bad in Chongqing, when Wu and his colleague Li Guohan approached the first things they saw were corpses and bones littering the roads. Unlike Chengdu, Wu's force was hampered at Chongqing by bandit armies, but the Qing artillery proved enough to break them after several battles. It is said the Qing artillery blasted from shorelines filling the river with the bodies of bandits.    The Qing armies advanced through Sichuan, Guangxi and Guizhou battling bandit armies everywhere they went. The more they advanced however, the more easily bandits surrendered and defections began to pour in. Loto captured Guiyang from Ma Jingzhong and within 3 months nearly all of Guizhou fell to the Qing. By 1658 most of the Ming resistance in Huguang and Jiangxi had been smashed with only some large bandit groups holding out. Thus it was decided in 1658 to finally march on Yunnan. Despite the field commanders eagerness, Hong Chengchou advised them all that they had thus far taken mostly empty or under armed cities and they only had a month or so supplies left. He cautioned them that they should advance slowly. Emperor Shunzhi received reports from Hong Chengchou and likewise ordered them to delay their advances so they could recover somewhat and supply up. Alongside this Emperor Shunzhi stressed the necessity to win over the populace as they conquered ““establish order out of chaos and rescue the people.”. Despite these orders, many scholars point out that this stage of the war was quite bloody on the side of the Qing and many commoners suffered.   Meanwhile Li Dingguo had sent Bai Wenxuan to guard the Qixing Pass with 40,000 troops, Wu Zisheng to guard the route from Anlong and other units to the Pan River in the east where he planned to make a base of operations. Li was looking for a place to break away, considering Sichuan or even Vietnam, but the Qing had taken their time to envelop Yunnan forcing him into a corner. Li mobilized the army to go east to defend the approaches to Yunnan and won a few minor battles killing more than 10,000 Qing troops. Despite the victories, the Qing numerical superiority simply overwhelmed Li's forces quickly and they soon had to pull back further into Yunnan.   Li brought his forces to Shuanghekou and Jobtei climbed a nearby mountain to study Li's army formation, searching for signs of weakness. When the battle commenced, Li's forces launched a cannonade, but the wind suddenly blew all the smoke from the cannonade into his battle lines faces. On Top of the blinding effect the smoke lit tall grass on fire all amongst his army. His army had to pull back and in the disarray, allowing Jobtei to outflank Li catching him in a pincer forcing Li to flee. Li's army fled to Kunming destroying bridges as they did to delay the Qing forces. Meanwhile Wu Sangui had intel on an alternate route to get past Bai Wenxuans forces at Qixing Pass and managed to get behind him forcing Bai's force to flee to Zhanyi. The initial campaign to defend Yunnan was a colossal failure. Li lost an estimated 30-40 thousand men, most of them his few surviving veterans with whom held more than 10 years of experience fighting battles from Sichuan to Guangdong. 30 officers were gone, most of his war elephants were also gone and the Qing were now marching on Qujing. Li sent words back to Kunming urging Emperor Yongli to flee. Li would make it back to Kunming by January 5th 1659 and the court of Yongli began to plan their next place to make a stand. Li favored a retreat into Sichuan in the hope of joining some large bandit armies they had friendly connections with. Others in the court argued it was too dangerous and that there was little offensive potential in Sichuan. Many argued they should flee west through Yunnan into Burma. Others said they should flee into Vietnam and perhaps sail out to join Koxinga. But as they debated it turned out the Qing foresaw some of their actions and blocked the way into Vietnam and in the end the decision was made to flee west into Burma.   The royal entourage was around 4300 men that departed Kunming. Li ordered everything that could not be carried to be torched, but the people lamented him for this and he soon changed his mind about the torching. Before leaving he told the people of Kunming “We have stayed in Yunnan for many years and we regard you people as a father regards his sons. But now national affairs have reached dire proportions and the court must move. You may share our hardships together. For I fear that when the Qing troops arrive, they will kill, loot, and rape, and it will be difficult to escape. If you do not flee with his majesty, you should each get far away quickly. Those who don't have only themselves to blame”. This drove the city's populace to abandon the city while weeping for the doom that was brought upon them. The march was a rough one, food became scarce and many died of starvation and disease. They eventually made it to Yongchang in early 1659 as the Qing hit Kunming and to their great surprise found it was fully intact and supplies were everywhere to be found. Li's change of heart on the torching would cost him greatly as the Qing forces recovered several months of supplies in Kunming. Meanwhile some of the Emperors entourage did not want to go west such as Ai Chengye who instead sought to establish ambushes for the Qing, hoping to join Li and the emperor later. Bai Wenxuan began to establish defenses between Dali and Yongchang to delay the Qing as well. It was decided to cover Emperor Yongli's flight, Bai would hold the rearguard while Li rode with the Emperors entourage.    The Qing continued their advance as Bai Wenxuan tried to delay them but suffered multiple defeats and lost countless soldiers, officers and elephants. Meanwhile Li destroyed the bridge at Lancang River hoping to further delay the Qing, but the Qing were very efficient at building rafts and crossed each river with ease. The Qing would reach Yongchang in March of 1659 and proceed to plunder it heavily. Li and Bai held a council of war and Li argued they should try to fight a decisive battle in Yunnan, but Bai argued that Emperor Yongli's safety was more important.    Regardless Li was adamant about fighting and set up multiple ambushes along the mountain range of Mount Mopan west of the Nu River. With only 6000 troops against around 12,000 of a Qing vanguard, Li felt he could do some damage. He split his forces into 3 groups stationed them in ambush sites to hit the vanguard of Wu Sangui. Wu Sangui's vanguard had been having a few easy days with no real excitement so he was marching with a loose formation into the mountain range not expecting an attack. The ambush signal was triggered and Wu immediately ordered a retreat as all hell broke loose and cannons and arrows rained down upon his men. Combat raged all over the mountain range and Li Dingguo got shrapnel into his face as he directed the battle. The fighting went on for half a day seeing corpses pill up on both sides like mountains. In the end Li made a fighting withdrawal. The Ming forces ended up losing a third of their total numbers while inflicting upto 10,000 casualties upon the Qing. After the battle Wu Sangui remarked that Li Dingguo and Bai Wenxuan were indeed great military commanders and they should tread lightly.    The carnage in the mountains bought more time for Emperor Yongli to continue to move into Burma. Li and a few thousand troops fled south camping at Menggen inside Burma and Bai Wenxuan camped at Mubang. When Li and Bai entered Burma they took care not to attack any Burmese forces they were with the Emperor afterall.  As for Emperor Yongli when the entourage entered the Burmese border, the royal party was disarmed by local border guards and apprehended. They were taken by boat over the Irrawaddy river to the capital city of Ava. By this time their entourage was nothing more than 1478 members of which only 600 or so were allowed to be on the boats, the rest had to walk it through thick jungle. Hundreds died to disease while trekking the jungles, some went south to Siam instead, others ended up being captured as slaves. Emperor Yongli's party made it to Ava, completely unaware Li and Bai were trying to find them and one of his court officials was sending word to them that Emperor Yongli had instead fled to Fujian. Over the next 2 years, Li and Bai under the believe that Emperor Yongli was kidnapped, and perhaps he was for all intensive purposes, began to make repeated rescue efforts.    Meanwhile the Qing consolidated their position in Yunnan and their enormous occupational force was exacerbating the province, soon famine spread. For both the populace of Yunnan and the Qing forces the situation was growing quite dire. The costs for garrisoning Yunnan was estimated to exceed the entire military revenue for the empire, over 9 million taels of silver. The situation grew worse when Li Dingguo began to work with local chieftains to form rebellions against the Qing menace. The trouble of banditry and rebellions would plague the Qing in Yunnan for months far into 1661. While some Qing commanders like Wu Sangui pushed for apprehending Emperor Yongli as soon as possible, Hong Chengchou favored a gradual pacification of Yunnan before campaigning. Hong had seen the countless failures in Guangxi, Sichuan and Guizhou and understood the need to win the hearts of the populace so that victory would be less costly.    Meanwhile back in Burma, Bai Wenxuan advanced towards Ava trying to rescue Emperor Yongli who he assumed had been kidnapped. This led the Burmese forces to treat both Bai and Li's small armies as threats. Bai and Li consolidated their armies and defeated a Burmese force killing several thousand. After defeating the Burmese force they negotiated a 3 day truce asking for the Burmese to hand over the emperor. After 3 days instead of handing him over the Burmese sent another army to attack them and they were swiftly defeated. When they demanded the Emperor be handed over again the Burmese commander said “Now how can we send [Yongli] to you? You have the temerity to attack our city, but the land and water [i.e., terrain] don't favor you. We can hold out for two to three years without fear.”. Thus they continued to march on Ava and besieged it, prompting the king of Burma to amass over 150,000 troops with 100 war elephants to defend the capital. The entire time Li and Bai both tried to write countless letters to the emperor failing countless times, but then one letter got through in 1661 and Yongli responded ““Use unorthodox troops to rescue me.”. Thus they did just that, they made a direct attack on the city preparing to cross the Irrawaddy to hit the walls of Ava. That night they opened fire with their heavy cannons and began building floating bridges.   As you can imagine the Ming forces were outnumbered by something like 10 to 1 and certainly outgunned or better said out elephanted. Regardless of their numbers the Burmese using the cover of night, to cut the bridges to Ava forcing the Ming forces to pull back. Then in april of 1661 a Burmese army of 150,000 with apparently 1000 war elephants showed up and gave battle, that number has to be inflated, 1000 war elephants what is this the siege of Minas Tirith? Anyways it is said, Li Dingguo went forth to the front of battle with a large sword and grabbed an elephants tusk as he hacked its trunk off. The elephant fled afterwards making Li the largest bad ass I've ever heard of, and that poor elephant. It is also said Bai Wenxuan managed to perform a rear flank attack killing thousands and drove the Burmese army back, which must of been incredible given the disparity of numbers, 10,000 guys managed to defeat an army of 150,000 and 1000 elephants, yeah. The Ming proceeded to continue building the fleet of boats and rafts after the battle and besieged Ava yet again. The Burmese sent word they would release Yongli if the siege was lifted, I am pretty confused writing about this one, its as if the Burmese army was a paper army or something. I mean this Ming force is 10,000 or less how are they managing to defeat the capital of Burma?. Regardless the Burmese did not hand over the emperor and instead began to construct more defenses in Ava.    Meanwhile the Qing sent letters to Li and Bai to defect to the Qing as they were mobilizing their own assault on Burma to grab Yongli. In june of 1661 the King of Burma, Pindale was executed and replaced by his brother, Pye Min who assumed a more aggressive stance against the Ming forces. For his enthronement there was a “water spirit” ceremony and an official of Yongli's court, Mu Tianbo was chosen to be sacrificed. Mu Tianbo fought ferociously, killing a few guards before being executed. After this Emperor Yongli lost all hope and lamented “The Dowager Empress is sick again and it looks like I will be unable to go back [to China] because the Tartars are coming to kill me. So please return the Dowager Empress's bones to her old home. Now it's obvious that I've been duped by traitorous ministers. If only I had invested Bai Wenxuan as a Prince of the Blood and Ma Bao as a secondary prince and followed the counsel of the meritorious officials, then I wouldn't have these regrets. Still playing the part of the Son of Heaven, he also expressed regret at the fate of his loyal subjects in Yunnan, who were reportedly suffering at the hands of Wu Sangui and Hong Chengchou.”   When Bai and Li heard of the execution they panicked and launched one final attack on Ava. This time they tried to use their 16 boats to get across to the city, but their force was driven back after only 3 days of combat and they lost 11 boats in the process. Now Li and Bai lamented in despair for their situation was very dire. Since the Ming had entered Burma the Burmese government began opening up talks with the Qing hoping to curry favor. This facilitated the Qing march into Burma with a 100,000 strong force in 1661. The Qing immediately sought to separate the forces of Li and Bai as they advanced towards Ava. The Qing had already sent word to the Burmese King that if Yongli was not handed over immediately, Ava would be besieged. As the Qing closed in, Emperor Yongli sent a letter to Wu Sangui begging for his life, but Wu ignored it. When the Qing arrived at Ava, the Burmese told Emperor Yongli Li Dingguo was taking him away to safety as they delivered the emperor straight into the hands of the Qing. Emperor Yongli was brought to Kunming and executed on may 19th 1662 on a small hill overlooking Green Lake. Yongli and his wife were strangled and their ashes were poured around the Lotus Pond in Kunming. Wu Sangui allegedly felt remorse for not trying to save Emperor Yongli, though his story is not quite done.   Li Dingguo and Bai Wenxuan fled north trying to decide their next move, but they knew they stood no chance against the Qing force. Wu Sangui surrounded their camp and Bai lamented “I've disappointed my emperor, and I've let down Prince Jin.”. Bai then surrendered to Wu Sangui's subordinate Ma Bao who happened to be an old friend of his. Li Dingguo was given false word that Emperor Yongli escaped, but required him for rescue. By this point Li had only 5000 or so men and could do little to nothing. Li fled east, hoping as you guessed it, to jin Koxinga, the man I keep naming but never speak much about. Li tried to flee to Vietnam and slipped past the Qing who were much more preoccupied moving Emperor Yongli back to Kunming. Despite the fact Li Dingguo evaded the Qing menace, as he fled through the thick Burmese jungles he was stricken, as were his men with disease. On his death bed just as he got word that Emperor Yongli had been executed, Li Dingguo died on August 10th 1662. He died telling his remaining son to never submit to the Qing and he would be remembered as one of the great loyalist heroes in Chinese history.    10700   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me.  The last pretender to the Dragon throne, Emperor Yongli has been executed and adoptive offspring of Zhang Xianzhong have fallen likewise. Yunnan and the rest of south China is being consolidated into the Qing empire, all that remains is a few bandit groups, or was that all? I've mentioned his name countless times, but one problem still remains for the Qing, Koxinga over in Taiwan.

TỪ ĐIỂN LỊCH SỬ
TÓM TẮT LỊCH SỬ MIẾN ĐIỆN LÃNH ĐỊA NHA PHIẾN, HỒNG NGỌC, ĐẢO CHÍNH, MÁU NƯỚC MẮT

TỪ ĐIỂN LỊCH SỬ

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 15, 2022 28:20


#tomtatlichsumyanmar #myanmar #myanmarmiendien Myanmar (hay còn gọi là Miến Điện tên chính thức là Cộng hòa Liên bang Myanmar, là một quốc gia tại Đông Nam Á. Myanmar có biên giới với Bangladesh, Ấn Độ, Trung Quốc, Lào và Thái Lan. Một phần ba tổng chu vi của Myanmar là đường bờ biển giáp với vịnh Bengal và biển Andaman. Theo số liệu điều tra nhân khẩu năm 2014, Myanmar có 51 triệu cư dân. Myanmar có diện tích 676.577 km² (261.288 mi² dặm vuông). Thủ đô của quốc gia này là Naypyidaw (nây-pi-đô) còn thành phố lớn nhất là Yangon (Rangoon) Các nền văn minh ban đầu tại Myanmar gồm có các thị quốc Pyu nói tiếng Tạng-Miến tại khu vực Thượng Miến và các vương quốc Mon (môn) tại khu vực Hạ Miến. Đến thế kỷ IX 9, người Miến tiến đến thung lũng Thượng Irrawaddy, họ lập nên Vương quốc Pagan trong thập niên 1050, và sau đó ngôn ngữ-văn hóa Miến cùng Phật giáo Nam Tông dần dần chiếm ưu thế tại Myanmar. Vương quốc Pagan sụp đổ trước các cuộc xâm chiếm của quân Mông Cổ, và xuất hiện một số quốc gia thường xuyên giao chiến. Đến thế kỷ XVI 16, Myanmar tái thống nhất dưới Triều Taungoo (tau-gô), sau đó từng trở thành quốc gia lớn nhất trong lịch sử Đông Nam Á. Đến đầu thế kỷ XIX 19, lãnh thổ của triều Konbaung bao gồm Myanmar ngày nay và cũng từng kiểm soát Manipur và Assam trong thời gian ngắn. Người Anh chiếm được Myanmar sau ba cuộc chiến tranh trong thế kỷ XIX 19. Myanmar trở thành một thuộc địa của Anh. Sau đó nước này trở thành một quốc gia độc lập vào năm 1948, ban đầu là một quốc gia dân chủ, song nằm dưới chế độ độc tài quân sự sau cuộc đảo chính năm 1962. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/tu-dien-lich-su/message

How to Travel Vegan w/Tom Simak
The Monthly Paradigm: The Ocean Needs Our Help

How to Travel Vegan w/Tom Simak

Play Episode Listen Later May 1, 2022 91:26


Welcome to The Monthly Paradigm with Tom Simak & Sharna Harrington.This is where we talk about the biggest news stories, all things climate change, veganism, fitness, what we're cooking up, wins of the month and everything in-between.Video version: https://youtu.be/Q_Ou6ClDvmIThe key topics in today's episode:02:00 - Tasmania07:00 - Being efficient with minerals11:00 - Half marathon PB14:00 - Election in Australia18:00 - Closing power plants early23:00 - How Corrupt is JBS27:00 - Meat pumped with Carbon monoxide33:30 - Exploding oil Vessel in Nigeria38:00 - Sea Otters and climate change42:30 - Irrawaddy dolphin populations46:00 - 3,000 sq meters of dead fish found52:00 - Fishing fuels the rich01:00:00 - Whale hunting01:03:00 - Humpback Whales01:05:30 - Great Barrier Reef Bleaching01:09:00 - Sustainable tips01:14:00 - Lottery winner opens foundation01:15:30 - Okra removing microplastics01:17:00 - Less culling of chickens in Germany01:21:00 - Vegan athlete wins01:22:30 - New phone cable laws01:24:00 - New vegan school menusResources:JBS Corrupt - https://www.instagram.com/p/CcwTfjvvdST/?igshid=YmMyMTA2M2Y=Meat and CO - https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5848116/Trinity Spirit Explosion - https://www.proshareng.com/news/Oil%20&%20Gas/SEPCOL-Provides-Update-on-the-Explosion-that-Engulfed-the-Trinity-Spirit-FPSO/61159Irrawaddy Dolphins: WWF ArticleDead Fish in France: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-05/floating-carpet-of-dead-fish-found-off-french-coast/100807580Fishing fuelling the rich: https://www.instagram.com/p/CbtJtX4B7j4/Iceland Whale hunting: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2022/feb/04/iceland-to-end-whaling-in-2024-demand-dwindlesHumpback whales: https://www.abc.net.au/news/2022-02-26/humpback-whales-no-longer-listed-as-endangered/100862644GBR Bleaching: https://www.bbc.com/news/world-australia-60870239Orka Correction: In the episode I said that it sequesters 400 million tonnes, in fact checking myself it's actually 4,000 tonnes: https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2021/sep/09/worlds-biggest-plant-to-turn-carbon-dioxide-into-rock-opens-in-iceland-orcaThesis on Okra: https://www.proquest.com/openview/beff74237ea08df46c9462a651da4d7a/1?pq-origsite=gscholar&cbl=18750&diss=yConnect with me:Instagram | @plant.paradigmYouTube | The Plant Paradigm

Myanmar Oral History Project - life stories
U Hpone Thant (commonly known as Harry) born 1945 talks about his life including his work with the Burma Socialist Programme Party and his involvement with studies of fishermen north of Mandalay where they work cooperatively with Irrawaddy dolphins

Myanmar Oral History Project - life stories

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 11, 2022 61:44


Harry talks about his life story which includes his early education at Lady Paw Tun kindergarten before going on to Methodist English High School (also Daw Aung San Suu Kyi's school).  On graduating, as schools and universities were closed after the 1962 coup by General Ne Win, he applied for and won a scholarship to attend Lomonosov Moscow State University and graduated with a Master in Political Economy.  He spent from 1963 to 1968 in Moscow and describes his experiences there.  On return to Rangoon he joined the Burma Socialist Programme Party, the sole political party at that time and worked there for 20 years until the party was disbanded after the 1988 unrest. During that time he performed many roles, ending as Chief of Staff of the International Affairs and Foreign Relations Affairs Committee.  Following this, until he left for Australia in 2009 he worked as a private tuition teacher, started a travel agency (Swiftwinds) and was a founder and General Secretary of the Union of Myanmar Travel Association.Harry has a keen interest in the history of Yangon and talks about the popularity of horse racing and the Rangoon Turf Club until racing was banned by General Ne Win in 1963 and also discusses the unsafe security situation in Rangoon immediately following independence in 1948.Harry has also been closely involved with Dr Brian Smith in the study of cooperative fishing by fishermen north of Mandalay where they work with Irrawaddy dolphins - https://global.wcs.org/Resources/Publications/Publications-Search-II/ctl/view/mid/13340/pubid/PUB22844.aspx. Related to this is Harry's work as a consultant to Hsithe Village Based Tourism which has been funded by the Harrison Institute of the UK and which has won a number of awards - https://www.destination-ayeyarwady.com/.

BFM :: Earth Matters
1StopBorneo Wildlife

BFM :: Earth Matters

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 29, 2021 29:59


Founded in 2012, 1StopBorneo Wildlife aims to conserve the rainforests and the rich biodiversity of Borneo through education, wildlife rescue, eco-tourism and research. Originally founded in Brunei, it has since expanded to Sarawak and Sabah, and the team works with a wide variety of species and habitats including pangolins, elephants, clouded leopards, Irrawaddy dolphins, and a variety of reptiles, amphibians, insects and flora. We find out more about their work from Shavez Cheema, the Founder and Director of 1StopBorneo Wildlife.Image Credit: 1StopBorneo Wildlife Facebook See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

BFM :: Earth Matters
1StopBorneo Wildlife

BFM :: Earth Matters

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 29, 2021 29:59


Founded in 2012, 1StopBorneo Wildlife aims to conserve the rainforests and the rich biodiversity of Borneo through education, wildlife rescue, eco-tourism and research. Originally founded in Brunei, it has since expanded to Sarawak and Sabah, and the team works with a wide variety of species and habitats including pangolins, elephants, clouded leopards, Irrawaddy dolphins, and a variety of reptiles, amphibians, insects and flora. We find out more about their work from Shavez Cheema, the Founder and Director of 1StopBorneo Wildlife.Image Credit: 1StopBorneo Wildlife Facebook

Hello from Myanmar
Burmese Higher Level Episode: မြန်မာအကျပ်အတည်းကိုင်တွယ်ရေး၊ အမေရိကန်တဆင့် တက်တော့မည်။ Irrawaddy Oct 22,2021

Hello from Myanmar

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 23, 2021 9:13


Burmese Higher Level Episode: Reading article “မြန်မာအကျပ်အတည်းကိုင်တွယ်ရေး အမေရိကန်တဆင့်တက်တော့မည်။” Irrawaddy Oct 22, 2021

Hello from Myanmar
Burmese Higher Level Episode: “Much Has Changed Since 88” translated article part (I), Irrawaddy

Hello from Myanmar

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 20, 2021 7:57


Burmese Higher Level - Reading the translated article “Much Has Changed Since 1988” Part (I) (by Bertil Lintner) in Irrawaddy Oct 14,21

Hello from Myanmar
Burmese Higher Level Episode: “Much Has Changed Since 88” Part (II) (by Bertil Lintner) I Irrawaddy

Hello from Myanmar

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 20, 2021 5:39


Burmese Higher Level - Reading the translated article “Much Has Changed Since 1988” Part (II) (By Bertil Lintner) in Irrawaddy Oct 14, 2021

As I See It with Alan Clements
28 Burma's Terrorist Group MAH-SAC and his terrorist coup is FAILING, badly.

As I See It with Alan Clements

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 26, 2021 33:44


Please share and reshare and ask others to do the same, worldwide. Burma's Terrorist Group MAH-SAC and his terrorist coup is FAILING, badly. MAH-SAC—The World's Latest Designated Terrorist Group: Min(M) Aung (A) Hlaing (H) State (S) Administrative (A) Council (C) MAH-SAC = Burma's Taliban, Boko Haram, Khmer Rouge, ISIS, Al-Qaeda = nationwide terrorism. Lets MAKE SURE it FAILS FULLY. Here's How. 3.3.21 Alan Clements Military Has Turned Into A Terrorist Organization Myanmar Now News https://www.myanmar-now.org/en/news/the-tatmadaw-has-turned-into-a-terrorist-organization ICJ Ruling Crimes Against Humanity https://www.icj.org/myanmar-security-forces-killings-of-protesters-should-be-investigated-as-crimes-against-humanity/?fbclid=IwAR3rEd8FJ3q_r9jEgO3Y9X4IkF4wZZItU6tiXoRaFpuJENVm4PxLU6xHbY0 Protesters Recall Regime's Torture During Detention Riot police and soldiers beat civilians during a crackdown on anti-regime protesters in Mandalay. By THE IRRAWADDY 10 March 2021 “It was a hell,” said 30-year-old Ko Thura, who was tortured in military custody for around four hours in Myeik, Tanintharyi Region. The Irrawaddy interviewed two of the protesters among those being tortured after their release from custody. Thura is a false name used to protect the protester. Around 70 protesters, including many students, were arrested at around 9am on Tuesday in the southern city where they gathered to protest against the military regime. The detainees were sent to Myeik's airbase, separated by gender and the male protesters were ordered to strip, bow their heads and kneel. “There were around 45 of us. They beat us non-stop with belts, rifles butts, pipes, wooden sticks and chains,” Ko Thura said after his release. They were told to shout anti-military slogans and sing revolutionary songs while being beaten, he said. “There were also high-school students. They beat all of us for hours. Those with Amay Suu [State Counselor Daw Aung San Suu Kyi] tattoos were targeted more heavily. They said, ‘You dare to call us military dogs', while hitting us.”

The Irrawaddy Broadcasting
Saturday Roundtable: ကုလသမဂ္ဂက မြန်မာ့ဒီဒေး၊ အောင်ဘာလေထီ တစခန်း ရပ်မလားနဲ့ ၄၄ လမ်းက ပန်းသီး

The Irrawaddy Broadcasting

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 22, 2021 33:02


ကုလသမဂ္ဂက မြန်မာ့ဒီဒေး၊ အောင်ဘာလေတစခန်းရပ်မလားနဲ့ ၄၄ လမ်းက ပန်းသီး စတဲ့အကြောင်းအရာတွေကို ဧရာဝတီ အယ်ဒီတာ ရဲနည်၊ သတင်းထောက်များဖြစ်ကြတဲ့ အောင်သီဟနဲ့ သဇင်လှိုင်တို့က ဆွေးနွေးတင်ပြထားပါတယ်

Kid Friendly Animal Fun Facts
Animal Fun Fact of the Day - Episode 433 - Irrawaddy Dolphins

Kid Friendly Animal Fun Facts

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 23, 2021 1:34


Facts About ! Credits: Executive Producer: Chris Krimitsos Voice, Editor, and Post-Producer: Jimmy Murray "Winner Winner!" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com) Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 3.0 http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/ Facts from Wikipedia Licensed under Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 3.0 Unported License

The Arts of Travel
Let Let Sein on Myanmar: The Violence they've Suffered, The Hope that's Endured, & How the World can Help

The Arts of Travel

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 18, 2021 66:54


I had the honor of speaking to Let Let Sein (a pseudonym) a brave Shan/Karen ethnic women on the ground in Myanmar. We discuss how protesters are using strikes/mutual aid/digital activism and street protests to fight for democracy, the inhuman violence that Myanmar's Military (Tatmadaw) dictatorship is using to brutally claim power, and how the world can help Myanmar's protesters and freedom struggle. For more resources on Myanmar I would recommend the following: Justice for Myanmar: http://justiceformyanmar.org/ Mutual Aid Myanmar: https://www.mutualaidmyanmar.org/ Scholar Geoff Aung: https://nplusonemag.com/online-only/online-only/dead-generations/ Scholar Chu May Paing: https://www.instagram.com/lionwithaflowingmane/?hl=en The Newgroups Myanmar Now & The Irrawaddy: https://www.myanmar-now.org/en , https://www.irrawaddy.com/ Organizers Breanna Randall & Theo Htet: https://speakupformyanmar.com/ , https://twitter.com/theohtet And Historian Edith Mirante: https://www.projectmaje.org/ The photo is of murdered protester Kyal Sin, also know as Angel or (邓家希) who has become a martyr and symbol of these protests. Her tee-shirt reads ' everything will be OK'. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Death_of_Kyal_Sin Music by Prod. Riddiman: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCdSuKogXJOZld5Dzw_9285w

VITAMINA PROJECT - Slow Travel & Viaggi Sostenibili

Nelle pianure asciutte situate nel cuore geografico del Myanmar, attraversate dal grande fiume Irrawaddy e ricoperte da una vegetazione piuttosto brulla, c'è un luogo leggendario, un luogo così bello da non sembrare reale. È il sito archeologico di Bagan, che annovera nel raggio di poco più di 10 Km² oltre 2500 templi.

TẠP CHÍ TIÊU ĐIỂM
Tạp chí tiêu điểm - Trung Quốc đối mặt với tâm lý « bài người Hoa » của quân đội Miến Điện

TẠP CHÍ TIÊU ĐIỂM

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 25, 2021 9:54


Cuộc đảo chính ngày 01/02/2021 làm sụp đổ nền dân chủ non trẻ ở Miến Điện. Tập đoàn quân sự trở lại cầm quyền phải chăng làm Trung Quốc hài lòng ? Tuy nhiên, nhiều nhà quan sát lưu ý : Giới tướng lĩnh Miến Điện, vốn dĩ là những người mang nặng tư tưởng chủ nghĩa dân tộc cứng rắn, cũng rất nghi ngại thế bá quyền của Trung Quốc. Virus « chuyên chế » lan mạnh tại Đông Nam Á ? Chủ Nhật, ngày 21/02/2021, ba tuần sau cuộc đảo chính, người dân Miến Điện vẫn đông đảo xuống đường biểu tình phản đối quân đội. Khác với những lần trước, cuộc biểu tình hôm Chủ Nhật huy động nhiều thành phần xã hội dân sự, từ công chức, y bác sĩ, sinh viên, cho đến người dân đô thị, nông thôn và cả những người thuộc các sắc tộc thiểu số như Shan, Chin, Kachin, Naga… Làn sóng bất phục tùng dân sự giờ đã vượt qua một bước mới. Sự việc cho thấy giới quân sự đã đánh giá thấp sức mạnh tinh thần của người dân. Tuy nhiên, theo quan sát của nhà nghiên cứu về Đông Nam Á, bà Sophie Boisseau du Rocher, Viện Quan hệ Quốc tế Pháp (IFRI), trên đài RFI, cuộc đảo chính này còn phản ảnh một sự thật khác đáng quan ngại: « sự lây lan của mô hình chuyên chế Trung Quốc, đang gậm nhấm dần dần vùng Đông Nam Á. Một nhóm nhỏ các nước tự cho mình có một tính chính đáng lịch sử muốn chiếm lấy các chu trình quyền lực nhân danh tính ổn định. Mô hình này chúng ta thấy rõ ở Cam Bốt, Thái Lan và giờ đây là Miến Điện. » Từ quan sát này, phải chăng cuộc đảo chính tại Miến Điện hôm 01/02 là có lợi cho Bắc Kinh ? Thắng lợi của đảng Liên đoàn Quốc gia vì Dân chủ (LND) trong cuộc bầu cử lập pháp hồi tháng 11/2020 có thể sẽ còn đưa Miến Điện, dưới sự dìu dắt của bà Aung San Suu Kyi, tiếp bước trêncon đường dân chủ hóa. Điều này có thể đẩy « chính sách đối ngoại của Miến Điện phát triển theo hướng củng cố quan hệ với Washington. (…) Một Miến Điện dân chủ hơn có nguy cơ dẫn đến xung đột hệ tư tưởng với Trung Quốc »,  như phân tích của ông Wu Qiang, giáo sư khoa học chính trị, từng giảng dạy tại trường đại học Thanh Hoa, với Radio Free Asia. Quân đội Miến Điện và tâm lý « bài người Hoa » Nhưng ông Dominik Mierzejewski, một nhà nghiên cứu Ba Lan, trong một bài viết đăng trên trang mạng của Trung tâm Nghiên cứu châu Á (CAA), trường đại học Lodz, nhận định : Có lẽ sẽ quá vội vã khi cho rằng Trung Quốc đã có được Miến Điện và sẽ dễ dàng hợp tác hiệu quả với tập đoàn quân sự hơn là với chính phủ bán dân chủ của bà Aung San Suu Kyi. Tác giả nhắc lại rằng tâm lý « bài Trung Quốc » có một vị trí khá lớn trong mối quan hệ giữa hai nước do những yếu tố lịch sử, kinh tế và vấn đề quản lý các vùng biên giới. Trả lời RFI Tiếng Việt, nhà nghiên cứu về Đông Nam Á, David Camroux, CEPI, trường đại học Khoa học Chính trị Paris (Sciences Po), tóm tắt mối quan hệ giữa Trung Quốc với giới tướng lĩnh Miến Điện: « Giới quân sự Miến Điện luôn có thái độ ngờ vực Trung Quốc, và Bắc Kinh cũng không ưa thích gì giới tướng lĩnh Miến Điện. Tuy không rõ nét như Việt Nam, nhưng người Miến Điện có một thái độ nghi kỵ Trung Quốc khá lớn. Mối ngờ vực này được thấy rõ ở việc từ một thập niên nay, giới quân sự Miến Điện mua nhiều vũ khí từ Nga hơn là Trung Quốc. Tôi cho rằng giới tướng lĩnh Miến Điện rất bài Trung Quốc. » Tuy cung cấp đến 50% vũ khí quan trọng cho quân đội Miến Điện trong giai đoạn 2014-2019, cùng lúc Bắc Kinh cũng trang bị khí tài cho các nhóm vũ trang ở các bang miền đông bắc Miến Điện, nổi dậy đòi thành lập các khu tự trị. Tại những vùng nóng bỏng nằm dọc theo biên giới với Trung Quốc, Tatmadaw – tên chính thức của quân đội Miến Điện – chiến đấu từ nhiều thập niên qua chống lại các nhóm sắc tộc nổi dậy, những lãnh chúa buôn thuốc phiện và nạn buôn lậu dưới đủ mọi hình thức. Trong quá khứ, nhiều tướng lĩnh Miến Điện được đào tạo qua các cuộc đối đầu với những nhóm chiến binh được nuôi dưỡng bằng ý thức hệ cộng sản và ít nhiều gì cũng được Bắc Kinh âm thầm hỗ trợ. Nhật báo Pháp Liberation nhắc lại, trong chuyến công du thăm Naypyidaw tháng Giêng năm 2020, Tập Cận Bình đã không thể thuyết phục được giới tướng lĩnh Miến Điện, dù đã phủ nhận việc hậu thuẫn các nhóm nổi dậy. Nhà nghiên cứu Renaud Egreteau, tác giả tập sách Lịch sử Miến Điện đương đại (nhà xuất bản Fayard), từng nhận định Tatmadaw, đôi khi mang tư tưởng biệt lập và lo lắng cho việc bảo vệ những cổ phần béo bở trong các tập đoàn nhà nước, luôn cố gắng không bắt tay với Trung Quốc, thậm chí còn thanh trừng các thành phần thân Trung Quốc trong hàng ngũ của mình. Trung Quốc : « Quân đội Miến Điện tham lam và là một đối tác tồi » Giờ đây cuộc đảo chính này khiến Trung Quốc lo ngại. Năm năm gần đây, Bắc Kinh đã có mối quan hệ hữu hảo với chính phủ dân sự Aung San Suu Kyi và đầu tư khá nhiều vào các dự án cơ sở hạ tầng nằm trong chương trình Con đường Tơ lụa mới tại Miến Điện. Đặc biệt là dự án thiết lập đặc khu kinh tế với một cảng biển nước sâu, nhà máy điện, đường xá và các tuyến đường sắt. Trung Quốc đầu tư nhiều tỷ đô la vào dự án hành lang kinh tế Miến Điện – Trung Quốc, cho phép Bắc Kinh có thể tiếp cận trực tiếp Ấn Độ Dương. Nhưng biến cố đầu tháng Hai nhắc Trung Quốc nhớ lại quyết định bất ngờ dưới thời cựu thống chế Thein Sein. Năm 2011, vào thời điểm chính quyền quân sự quyết định mở cửa, chính quyền Naypyidaw đã đình chỉ dự án xây đập thủy điện Myitsone trên dòng Irrawaddy, cho phép cung cấp một lượng điện đáng kể cho tỉnh Vân Nam lân cận. Sự việc đã khiến Bắc Kinh nổi dóa, vì họ đã đầu tư khá nhiều tiền của, đến mức giờ đây « Bắc Kinh có xu hướng xem quân đội Miến Điện là bội bạc, tham lam, hám tiền và là một đối tác thương mại tồi », theo như phân tích của giáo sư Enze Han, giảng viên thỉnh giảng cho trường đại học Hồng Kông trên tờ East Asia Forum. Trong bối cảnh này, nhà nghiên cứu David Camroux cho rằng Bắc Kinh sẽ chẳng được lợi gì trước những bất ổn chính trị và việc Miến Điện phải trở về với chế độ quân sự. « Tôi nghĩ là Trung Quốc có vẻ khó xử, bởi vì biến cố này chẳng có lợi gì cho Bắc Kinh. Ngay từ những năm 1990, Trung Quốc tìm cách thúc đẩy Miến Điện thoát khỏi sự cô lập. Bắc Kinh khuyến khích Naypyidaw gia nhập ASEAN, thậm chí Trung Quốc còn xúi Miến Điện tạo ra một vẻ bề ngoài dân chủ. Tôi cho rằng Bắc Kinh chẳng có lợi lộc gì khi để Miến Điện quay về với chế độ quân sự. » ASEAN : Chiếc phao cho Trung Quốc tại Miến Điện ? Bị giam hãm trong chiếc bẫy thế nước đôi và trước những mối ngờ vực từ người dân Miến Điện, Bắc Kinh giờ khó thể đứng ra làm trung gian hòa giải, đành phải nhờ cậy đến ASEAN – vốn dĩ có thể là một công cụ ngoại giao có ích cho Trung Quốc khi hữu sự. Tuy nhiên, nhà nghiên cứu về Đông Nam Á, David Camroux, khi trả lời RFI Tiếng Việt, lưu ý rằng trong vấn đề này, bản thân ASEAN cũng bị chia rẽ. « Hoa Kỳ và châu Âu cũng muốn trông cậy vào ASEAN. Chỉ có điều trong vấn đề này ASEAN bị chia rẽ vì có ba nhóm lập trường khác nhau : Nhóm những nước muốn đóng vai trò trung gian hòa giải như Malaysia, đặc biệt là Indonesia. Rồi nhóm những nước như Cam Bốt, Lào cho đấy là chuyện nội bộ. Nhưng có những nước như Thái Lan, cũng là một chế độ bán quân sự, thì lại ủng hộ giới tướng lĩnh Miến Điện. Trên thực tế, giới quân nhân Miến Điện đi theo mô hình của Thái Lan. Họ tiến hành đảo chính với lý do bảo vệ nền dân chủ và hứa hẹn tổ chức một cuộc bầu cử khác trong vòng một năm. Đó là một chiêu thức cổ điển, quen thuộc, nhằm biện minh cho các cuộc đảo chính. Vấn đề là ASEAN không đưa ra được một thông cáo chung về vụ việc này. Chỉ có một thông cáo do chủ tịch ASEAN đưa ra, chứ không phải là toàn bộ thành viên của khối. Chỉ có một nước trong ASEAN đảm nhiệm vai trò này. » Tóm lại, trong bối cảnh bị công luận quốc tế chỉ trích mạnh mẽ trong nhiều vấn đề như người Duy Ngô Nhĩ, Hồng Kông, cách xử lý dịch bệnh…, việc tìm đến ASEAN là cách tháo gỡ duy nhất cho Trung Quốc, nếu không muốn mang tiếng là nguồn hậu thuẫn chính cho chế độ độc tài quân sự, theo như kết luận của bà Sophie Boisseau du Rocher trên đài RFI: « Giờ đây Trung Quốc tìm cách tác động lên các nước ASEAN nhằm tìm kiếm một giải pháp cho cuộc khủng hoảng, bởi vì cùng với các dự án Con Đường Tơ Lụa Mới, Trung Quốc hoàn toàn hiểu rằng nếu như họ bị đánh đồng với hành động tàn bạo của Tatmadaw, những nước khác sẽ kềm hãm các mối quan hệ với Trung Quốc. »

Kings and Generals: History for our Future
2.39. History of the Mongols: Invasion of Burma

Kings and Generals: History for our Future

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 8, 2021 24:04


On a thickly humid day, flanked by dense forest of a deep green, rows of archers astride skittish horses struggle to control their mounts. Their local allies, armed with bows and tightly clutched spears, have their eyes focusing on a mass of men surging forward towards them. Infront comes a vanguard of the beast terrifying the Mongol horses; elephants, adorned in gold, armour and broacde, their tusks spiked and decorated, tall towers on their backs housing archers and spear throwers. The Mongol commander is afraid but refuses to show it; it would do no good to show fear before the men and the vassal troops. As calm as he can, he orders the cavalry to retreat to the treeline and dismount; they would stand before the oncoming host of the King of Pagan, modern Myanmar onfoot, armed with nothing but their bows and the will of Eternal Blue Heaven. I’m your host David, and this is Kings and Generals: Ages of Conquest.   Of all the foreign ventures ordered by Kublai Khan in his later years, it was the invasions of Burma, or rather,, Myanmar, which are among the most poorly known in the west. While not as overtly disastrous as the more famous campaigns against Japan or Vietnam, which we have previously covered, the fighting in Myanmar still showcased the limits of the Mongol military, where tactical victories could not always translate into strategic success.       By the 13th Century, the Kingdom of Pagan [pronounced somewhere between Bagan, Pakam, Pokam] had dominated Myanmar since the mid 9th century. Considered a golden age, from its strategic position on the Irrawadday River, the city of Pagan was the capital of a multi-ethnic, multi-religious and multi-linguistic kingdom straddling both upper and lower Myanmar. Military conquests backed by expanding infrastructure, irrigation and administrative systems laid the groundwork for a stable and regionally dominating empire. Population growth and infrastructure led to the increased development of Lower Myanmar, coupled with the expansion of arable lands to support it. To legitimize themselves, the Kings of Pagans patronized Thereavdic Buddhism and built monumental architecture to celebrate themselves. Huge donations of arable land to the Buddhist monasteries gradually put more and more of the kingdom’s wealth and resources in the hands of the monks; by the thirteenth century, the Pagan kings found themselves in a more and more desperate economic situation, struggling to reclaim lands from the entrenched powers but continually needing to build monuments to legitimize themselves and maintain Buddhist support for their power. Skillful kings  like Kalancacsa, reigning 1084-1111 were able to balance all the elements of the Pagan kingdom, its various ethnic groups and traditions and the Buddhist clergy, but the kings of the thirteenth century lacked this ability- particularly Narathihapade, who took the throne in 1254. By then, long held tensions were bubbling beneath the surface, and the once un-developed Lower Myanmar was becoming a major population and political centre that the king in Pagan struggled to control.  And with so many kingdoms of the thirteenth century, this crockpot of troubles was aggravated by the addition of an extremely potent ingredient;  the Mongol Empire.       Pagan, separated from China and the Song Dynasty by the Kingdom of Dali in Yunnan and Dai Viet in Northern Vietnam, had escaped the attention of the Mongols during their first forays into these kingdoms in the 1250s, as we have covered in previous episodes. With the initial submission of these regions in that decade, the Mongol Empire now shared a border uncomfortably close to Pagan’s northeastern-most outposts. It was in 1271 that the Great Khan Kublai’s first envoys reached the Kingdom of Pagan, requesting the submission of its monarch, King Narathihapade, as well as the necessary trade and tribute demanded upon all subjects of the Mongol Emperor. History has not been kind to Narathihpate, often presented as a vain and greedy ruler. Usually, you’ll be pointed to this incrisiption he place on the Mingalar Zedi Pagoda in 1274, “King Narathiha Pati, supreme commander of 36 million soldiers and who is the consumer of 300 dishes of curry daily, enshrined fifty-one gold and silver figurines of kings, queens, nobles and maids of honour, and over these a solid silver image of Lord Buddha Gautama one cubic high, on Thursday the Full Moon of Kason of the year 636.”   Of course, Narathihapade did not command 36 million soldiers, though his ability to consume curry in prodigious amounts is outside the realm of our discussion today. This is however an example of the earlier mentioned needed for Narathihapade and the Burmese kings to legitimize themselves through large monuments and inscriptions. His kingdom facing an economic problem undermining the very power of its monarchy and his own ancestry and position on shaky ground, Narathihapade had to shore up  his position with boasts and monuments, wasting valuable resources but lacking options. The political system he inherited demanded he put on a show of nearly supernatural power regardless of the reality- a problem hardly unique to the Pagan kingdom, mind you- but one which contributed to the spurning of Kublai’s envoys. The next year Narathihapade followed this up by attacking one of Kublai’s vassal tribes in Yunnan, the Jin Chi, who Marco Polo calls the Cardanan, meaning ‘gold teeth.’ In 1273, Narathihapade completed his trifecta of antagonizing the single most powerful man on earth by killing Kublai’s envoys sent to demand recomponense. By doing so, Narathihapade ensured Kublai, in order to maintain the requisite show of supernatural power and invincibility around the Chinggisid monarchy, would need to react with miltiary force. Kublai’s miltiary response was delayed by the final push against the Song Dynasty and the first invasion of Japan in 1274. Troops could not be deployed to the frontier with Myanmar for some time, and perhaps in recognition of, Narathihapade struck first.       The King of Pagan sent an army into Yunnan in early 1277, though this was probably more of a raid than a full scale invasion. The local Mongol garrison was relatively small, as low as 700 or as many as 12,000, depending on the source. Under their commander,  a fellow named Qutuq, the garrison was enlarged by rallying a number of local Achang and Jin Chi tribesmen. It should be noted in general when we discuss the conflicts with the Mongol-Yuan troops and regional powers in this period, we are mainly talking about forces like this: a small Turkic and Mongolian core around a commander, sometimes a Mongolian, sometimes a Central Asian Muslim or Turk, and the majority of the forces between locally raised troops or perhaps even southern Chinese. The reasons for this were manifest. Firstly, truly Mongolian troops were rarely assigned for garrison duty, being at their greatest use on actual campaign or protecting Kublai’s steppe frontiers. The climate, generally hot and humid, was extremely difficult on both the Mongols and their horses, and the often rugged, densely forested or riverine terrain itself made the preferred wide-ranging horseback warfare less effective, while also minimizing available pasturelands to feed the horses in the first place. A small Mongolian garrison would be maintained in Yunnan’s highlands and small pasture for the remainder of Mongol rule in China, and indeed, there are people of Yunnan today who claim descent from the Mongols- the Khatso, who in the last decades have sought to make contact with Mongolians to “reclaim” some of their “ancient customs.”       Anyways, it was a small body of Mongols and many more locally raised troops under the command of Qutuq who set out to repel the army of Narathihapade in 1277. One of the main descriptions of the ensuing engaement comes from that famous Venetian traveller, Marco Polo, who at the time of the battle was a new arrival in Kublai’s distant court at Khanbaliq. In Polo’s account, command of the Yuan forces is given to the general Nasir al-Din, the son of Yunnan’s governor, a Central Asian Muslim named Sayyid Ajall Shams ad-Din. Polo’s mis-attribution to Nasir al-Din is an easy enough mistake to understand; it’s likely Polo never had in his notes or memory the name of a minor commander like Qutuq, but did recall an association between the well known Nasir al-Din and an exciting battle again the King of Mien, as Polo refers to Narathihapade. For our reconstruction today, we will agree with the scholarship and place Qutuq in command of the Mongol troops.   The site where Qutuq and the Pagan King met is contradicted in the sources, either in the Vochang Valley in Baoshan, or at a site the called by the Burmese  Nga-caung-khyam [Ngasaynggyan- sorry David] in modern Yingjiang. The two sites are approximately 100 kilometres apart, though Nga-caung-khyam is the more commonly given location. It seems that Narathihapate led the invasion force himself, a mixed force of infantry and cavalry spearheaded by a contingent of elephants: on their wide backs were towers built to house archers.       Qutuq was worried and outnumbered, but chose the site of battle carefully. Entering on a level plain early in the morning, he ensured the Yuan flanks and rear were protected by trees, while the ground before them was bare. Qutuq likely arranged his forces in a standard formation for steppe armies, a center and two wings, while Narathihapade’s force advanced in two large, extended wings of cavalry and infantry, staggered behind the line of elephants in the vanguard- 2,000 of them, if we blindly accept Polo’s numbers, along with 60,000 men on foot and horse.  It would be shocking if Narathihapade brought even half as many as this.       According to Marco Polo, the Yuan commander rallied his seemingly outnumbered men through a short speech:       “And calling to him all his hrosemen, he exhorted them with most eloquent words that they would not be of less might than they had been in the past, and that strength did not consist in numbers but in the valour of brave and tried horsemen; and that the people of Mien were inexperienced and not practised in war, in which they had not been engaged as they themselves had been so many times. And therefore they must not fear the multitude of the enemy but trust in their own skill which had already been long tried in many place in so many enterprises that their name was feared and dreaded -not only by the enemy but by all the world; so that they must be of that same valour as they had been. And he promised them certain and undoubted victory.”       After loudly playing their instruments, Narathihapde’s army advanced. The Mongols tried to hold firm, but the scent and sight of the elephants frightened their horses. Once he saw this, Qutuq acted quickly. He ordered his men into the forest beind them, dismounting and tying the horses’ reins to trees, then advancing on foot back onto the plain. Once in the open, the Mongols- and their local allies- began firing volley after volley of arrows into the elephants. The Burmese archers shot back, but clumped as they were in their towers they could not compete with the powerful Mongol bows. Though the elephants’ thick hides could not be penetrated, they panicked under the concentrated barrage of arrows. Before the elephants could meet the Yuan line, they became uncontrollable, and tried to escape: either through the trees, destroying the towers on their backs, or through the Burmese lines.        With this break in Narathihapade’s advance, sections of the Mongols began remounting their horses while the remainder provided covering fire, until the whole force was once more on horseback. Further details of troops movements are scarcer, but the lines finally met and fighting continued until noon. King Narathihapade worked his way up and down his lines encouraging his men, ordering fresh forces from his reserve, but, as per Marco Polo’s account, they were frustrated by the superior armour of the Mongols and their skills with the bow. Finally, Narathihapade and his men began to withdraw, but the Mongols pushed the advantage and it turned into a rout. Losses on both sides were heavy, but the smaller Yuan force had had the better of the day.    The sudden attack and flight of its King made Pagan a more pressing matter to the Yuan court, which finally ordered Nasir al-Din bin Sayyid Ajall against the kingdom in winter 1277. Provided a force of 3,800 Mongols, Cuan and Musuo peoples, Nasir al-Din reached the important fort of Kaung Sin along the Irrawaddy River. Nasir’s force was however too small to progress far into the country, and the onset of hotter weather encouraged him to withdraw back to Yunnan early in 1278. Before he did so, a seemingly humbled Narathihapade agreed to pay tribute to the Great Khan and allowed 100,000 households along the Yunnanese-Burmese border to be placed under Yuan control. When Narathihpate was slow providing tribute, Nasir al-Din returned later in 1278 to enforce the treaty terms. Little is revealed about this expedition, but in July 1279 Nasir returned to the Yuan capital of Dadu with captured Burmese elephants in tow.    By 1279 the Song Dynasty had been destroyed, yet Kublai Khan’s appetite for conquest was not sated, and his attention was increasingly drawn to the kingdoms across southeast Asia where Song loyalists could flee: Dai Viet, Champa, and Pagan. Once Narathihapade again lapsed on the treaty terms, Kublai had little difficulty ordering a proper invasion of Pagan while an invasion of Vietnam was already under way. The Great Khan must have imagined his rule would soon extend right into the Indian ocean. In December 1283, a full invasion of Pagan was launched, with 10,000 soldiers from Sichuan and Miao tribal auxiliaries under the command of Mongol prince Sang’udar.  Sang’udar’s army travelled jointly by land and on vessels on the Irrawaddy, taking Kaung Sin, Biao-dian and even the ancient Burmese capital of Tagaung in 1284, before withdrawing around May before the onset of the summer heat.   So quick was the Mongol movements that Narathihpate fled the capital of Pagan in a panic: it was for this flight that he earned the epithet Taruppye [also written Tarukpliy], “he who fled from the Chinese.” Tarup is the Burmese term for the Chinese, but was at this time used to refer to the Mongols- as such, some have argued it’s possibly a corruption of tujue, or Turk, in reference to Turks among the Mongol army, although the etymology is too difficult to pin down precrisely.    Narathihapade sent one of his top ministers to Khanbaliq to talk terms, and discuss making Pagan into a Mongol protectorate, but these were protracted and went nowhere- or atleast, nowhere fast enough to improve Narathihapade’s position. His flight from the Mongols following his earlier defeat and the sudden overrunning of much of Upper Myanmar greatly diminished his authority, augmenting the existing crises his kingdom was facing- particularly a revolt among the Mon in Lower Myanmar, ongoing since 1273.    Perhaps realizing the opportunity provided by the erosion in Narathihpate’s power, the Yuan rapidly ordered another march into Burma, this time under Kublai’s grandson and the Prince of Yunnan, Esen-Temur- not to be confused with another of Kublai’s  grandsons, Yesun-Temur, who reigned as Great khan from 1323-1328. With 6,000 Yuan troops and 1,000 Jin Chi auxiliaries, Esen-Temur forced his way through Burma in late 1286, taking Taguang again and Mong-Nai-Dian before possibly reaching the city of Pagan itself in spring 1287- it should be noted that some historians like Michael Aung-Thwin are not convinced the Mongols ever reached Pagan itself. Compounding the chaos, the broken and humiliated Narathihapade was murdered by his own son in 1287.    In this breakdown, the Yuan seemed poised to finally bring Pagan under Chinggisid authority. Yet for all the Mongols’ military might, there was little they could do to stop disease from ravaging many of their troops and summer heat punishing the rest. Kublai’s grandson Prince Esen-Temur was forced to abandon Myanmar by 1289 with considerable losses. For troops used to less tropical climates, the rigours of campaign in Myanmar’s hot, humid summers and the quick spread of disease made them particularly deadly.   Diplomacy was sought as alternative; in the aftermath of the fighting after King Narathihapade’s death, one of his sons, the 16 year old Klawcwa, managed to claim the throne with the aid of the famous “Three Shan Brothers.” These brothers were members of the Pagan elite with military backgrounds, rising in stature for valiant efforts against the Mongols. It should be noted that, despite the popular description of the brothers as members of the Shan people, a Thai-speaking people in the region, there is no evidence whatsoever for what their background was; as noted by Michael Aung-Thwin, the description of them as Shans does not appear until the first English language comprehensive history of Burma, written by Sir Arthur Phayrie in 1883! The contemporary sources simply describe them as princes and a part of Pagan’s elite. Yet this single, perhaps accidental, description of them as Shans in a single secondary source from the nineteenth century has become part of their image in the literature ever since- an interesting example of why we should not blindly keep citing and reciting secondary literature, but revisit the primary sources as much as possible, and how modern boundaries of ethnicity are not useful or applicable when discussing events centuries in the past.  What is more significant for our purposes today than their ethnic origins is that by the time of Klawcwa’s ascension, they were among the most powerful men in the kingdom.   King Klawcwa managed sought to reverse the disastrous policy of his father with diplomatic appeasement of the Yuan. In order to regain control over the lower reaches of Pagan and increasingly powerful vassals like the Three Brothers, Klawcwa needed to not fear another disruptive Mongol attack. In 1297 he sent his son-in-law, Kumārakassapa to Khanbaliq, a clear sign of submission- one wasted as the Three Brothers revolted the next year, killed Klawcwa and placed his 13 year old son Sawnit on the throne as a puppet. This was the casus belli for the final Mongol attack on Pagan. On the order of the new Great Khan, Kublai’s grandson Temur Oljeitu Khan, Klawcwa’s son-in-law Prince Kumārakassapa was sent with a Mongol army to avenge the fallen king.  Over winter 1300-1301, the Yuan army besieged the heavily fortified Myin-saing, defended by the Three Royal Brothers,  which held out and ultimately bribed the Mongols into withdrawing,  taking Prince Kumārakassapa with them- an anti-climactic end to the final attempt to extend Mongol authority over Myanmar.   For the Three Brothers, their prestige after another successful repulsing of the Yuan was immense. The King in Pagan was a puppet as the three brothers essentially divided the old kingdom among themselves, each ruling as a de facto monarch in their own rite, until the last surviving brother, Sihasura, declared himself the King of Pagan in 1309. The descendants of one of Sihasura’s brothers would found the Ava Dynasty in 1364. While the Mongols failed to conquer Pagan, they did for a few years collect tribute from its monarchs; while they did not destroy the kingdom themselves, their attacks ruined irrigations systems and paddyfields, undermined the power of the Pagan kings and helped bring about the dissolution of the kingdom by the fourteenth century. Despite winning most of the field engagements, climate forced Mongol withdrawals and tactical successes could not be turned into strategic victories. With the retreat of the army in 1301, Myanmar essentially left the attention of the Yuan, though many of its princes would continue to pay tribute to the Great Khans for decades to come.    Our next episode will take us to one of the least known of all Kublai’s failed expeditions, the attacks on Java, so be sure to subscribe to the Kings and Generals podcast to follow. If you’d like to help us continue bringing you great content, then consider supporting us on patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. This episode was researched and written by our series historian, Jack Wilson. I’m your host David, and we’ll catch you on the next one. 

TẠP CHÍ VIỆT NAM
Tạp chí Việt Nam - Trung Quốc tính gì khi tăng tốc xây tường biên giới với Việt Nam, Miến Điện?

TẠP CHÍ VIỆT NAM

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 8, 2021 9:30


Trung Quốc hoàn thiện 659 km hàng rào tại biên giới với Miến Điện chỉ trong vòng 2 tháng. Đây là một phần trong dự án “Vạn lý trường thành phương Nam” của Trung Quốc, kéo dài dọc biên giới từ Miến Điện (khoảng 2.170 km) đến Việt Nam (gần 1.380 km). Tại sao Bắc Kinh tăng tốc xây rào biên giới ? “Vạn lý trường thành phương Nam” Theo trang Irrawaddy ngày 23/12/2020, Trung Quốc khởi công xây hàng rào dọc biên giới với Miến Điện từ tháng 10/2020 tại các bang Kachin và Shan, “chủ yếu ở các khu đông dân cư”, trong đó nhiều đoạn vi phạm quy định cách đường biên giới 10 mét (thỏa thuận biên giới tháng 10/1960), theo phát biểu của ông U Thein Min Tun, giám đốc vấn đề biên giới Cục Lãnh sự Pháp chế bộ Ngoại Giao Miến Điện. Rất nhiều đoạn video đăng trên mạng xã hội, được truyền thông Miến Điến trích dẫn, cho thấy có những đoạn được rào tạm bằng các cuộn dây thép gai, nhưng rất nhiều đoạn được xây chắc chắn với trụ gạch hoặc bê-tông, chấn song sắt cao khoảng 3 mét, phía trên được cuốn thêm dây kẽm gai. Trả lời RFI Tiếng Việt, giáo sư Jean-Pierre Cabestan, đại học Baptist Hồng Kông, nhận định :   “Ở phía biên giới với Miến Điện, chính quyền Bắc Kinh muốn kiểm soát nghiêm ngặt hơn đường biên giới và tránh gặp quá nhiều rắc rối với Miến Điện, trong đó có vấn đề quản lý các dân tộc thiểu số, như người Kachin, Karen, người Wa hoặc những tộc người khác, thường gặp khó khăn với chính quyền trung ương và vẫn vượt biên sang phía Trung Quốc. Tôi nghĩ đó là một cách để Bắc Kinh ổn định khu vực biên giới với Miến Điện vì thường xuyên xảy ra vấn đề về an ninh, cũng như buôn bán vận chuyển lậu vũ khí. Có thể họ thấy đã không được kiểm soát được nhiều yếu tố, trong đó có những lực lượng nổi dậy ở phía bắc Miến Điện”. Tại biên giới Việt - Trung, hàng rào được cả hai bên xây dựng, không liên tiếp, cách cột mốc hoặc đường phân ranh biên giới từ 3-4 mét để tránh bị trùng dẫm hoặc lấn đường biên giới đã phân định. Từ năm 2012 đến 2017, Trung Quốc xây 12 km tường rào kiên cố, cao hơn 4,5 mét, dọc sông Ka Long (đoạn chảy phía bắc thành phố Móng Cái, tỉnh Quảng Ninh), biên giới tự nhiên giữa hai nước. Tổng trị giá dự án là 29 triệu đô la, theo Tân Hoa Xã được báo mạng Úc ABC trích ngày 24/01/2021. Cuối năm 2019, tỉnh Quảng Ninh cũng tính xây dựng hàng rào dọc dòng sông này, bên phía Việt Nam, để ngăn hàng chuyển lậu qua biên giới. Hàng rào kiên cố được Trung Quốc tiếp tục xây từ khoảng năm 2018 dọc biên giới với hai tỉnh Quảng Ninh và Lạng Sơn, với chiều dài khoảng 200 km, dựa theo những thông tin dưới đây. Quanh khu vực cột mốc 1089 (đồi Keo, tỉnh Lạng Sơn), khi giải trình về tình trạng buôn lậu tại đây, Chi cục Hải quan Tân Thanh, được trang Giadinh.net.vn trích đăng ngày 18/11/2019, cho biết : “Từ tháng 05/2019, toàn bộ các điểm tiếp giáp với phía Trung Quốc trên biên giới thuộc địa bàn kiểm soát” của Chi cục Hải quan Tân Thanh “cơ bản đã được phía Trung Quốc rào chắn bằng hệ thống tường rào cao 3,7 mét (chỉ còn lại một khoảng cách nhỏ tại khu vực điểm đường đầu nối và đồi cao chưa có tường rào)”. Vào đầu tháng 04/2020, trước những thông tin Trung Quốc xây tường biên giới để đưa hàng hóa nhập khẩu vào quy củ, ông Nguyễn Công Trưởng, phó chủ tịch UBND tỉnh Lạng Sơn, giải thích : “Phía Trung Quốc đã xây dựng tường rào từ lâu với chiều dài khoảng 100 km. Tường rào này được xây trên đất Trung Quốc, gần lối mở Co Sa (cửa khẩu Chi Ma, cột mốc 1223, tỉnh Lạng Sơn)”, “đúng quy định về hiệp định biên giới giữa hai bên” và “có thông báo cho Việt Nam” (Tuổi Trẻ, ngày 07/04/2020). Nhiều đoạn video của một số Youtuber Việt Nam cho thấy hàng rào có trụ sơn vàng, chấn song nhọn sơn xanh dương, được bao thêm lớp dây kẽm ở chân tường và phía trên rào, đã được hoàn thiện tại các cột mốc 1270, 1296 và đến tháng 11/2020, tạm ngừng ở cột mốc 1328 (huyện Bình Liêu, tỉnh Quảng Ninh), theo video của Nếm TV trên YouTube. Từ khu vực này có thể nhìn toàn cảnh hàng rào trườn trên những ngọn núi, cắt ngang những lối mòn. Đoạn video còn cho thấy đầu sắt nhô ra chờ tiếp tục thi công “Vạn lý trường thành phương Nam” từ đông sang tây. Xây tường để chống buôn lậu Năm 2018, khi hàng rào biên giới được tăng tốc xây dựng, cũng là thời điểm Trung Quốc chủ trương tăng cường quản lý chất lượng hàng hóa nhập khẩu, đẩy mạnh phòng chống buôn lậu và đưa các hoạt động trao đổi hàng hóa cư dân biên giới vào quy củ. Theo giáo sư Carl Thayer, đại học New South Wales (Úc), “Việt Nam có lợi như Trung Quốc trong việc ngăn chặn buôn lậu qua biên giới, đặc biệt là Việt Nam còn bị thâm hụt thương mại lớn với nước láng giềng”. Thống kê sơ bộ của Hải Quan Việt Nam khẳng định xu hướng này. Năm 2020, Việt Nam nhập siêu từ Trung Quốc 35,2 tỉ đô la, tăng 3,74% so với năm 2019. Trung Quốc tiếp tục là đối tác thương mại lớn nhất của Việt Nam với tổng kim ngạch thương mại song phương đạt 133,09 tỉ đô la, trong đó xuất khẩu của Việt Nam sang Trung Quốc đạt 48,9 tỉ đô la, nhập khẩu từ Trung Quốc đạt 84,1 tỉ đô la. Từ chống nhập cư bất hợp pháp đến kiểm soát dịch Covid-19 Khi dịch Covid-19 bùng phát ở Trung Quốc vào đầu năm 2020, chính quyền Bắc Kinh quyết định thắt chặt kiểm soát người và hàng tại biên giới. Những biện pháp này tiếp tục được tăng cường, đặc biệt là đối với thực phẩm đông lạnh, theo thông tin ngày 21/01/2021 của bộ Công Thương Việt Nam. Vậy ngoài những lý do trên, còn có động cơ nào khác ? Giáo sư Jean-Pierre Cabestan nhận định : “Khó có thể đưa ra câu trả lời cho câu hỏi này. Tôi nghĩ là có nhiều yếu tố. Trước hết là để kiểm soát dịch Covid-19 bằng cách ngăn cản người ra hoặc vào lãnh thổ Trung Quốc. Cũng có thể là nhằm chặn người Trung Quốc muốn di cư. Thực vậy, do dịch Covid-19, hoạt động kinh tế cũng bị giảm, nên rất nhiều người Trung Quốc tìm cách vượt biên để xuống các nước Đông Nam Á, đến sinh sống ở những nước này”. Thực ra, kiểm soát tình trạng nhập cư bất hợp pháp cũng là vấn đề nhức nhối của Việt Nam. Đây là nguồn lây nhiễm Covid-19 tiềm tàng. Càng gần Tết, số người lao động từ Trung Quốc tìm cách về Việt Nam bằng đường mòn, lối mở gia tăng đột biến, để trốn cách ly, trong bối cảnh Việt Nam vẫn đóng cửa biên giới từ tháng 03/2020. Trong 3 tuần đầu tháng 01/2021, chỉ riêng lực lượng biên phòng tỉnh Lạng Sơn (có 231 km đường biên với Trung Quốc) đã “phát hiện, ngăn chặn và thu dung gần 600 lượt nhập cảnh trái phép”, theo trang Soha.vn (25/01/2021). Năm 2020, có 31.460 người bị bắt vì vào Việt Nam bất hợp pháp, trong đó có khoảng 25.000 người đến từ Trung Quốc. Trang VnExpress (bản tiếng Anh, 09/01/2021) cho biết 153 người đã bị điều tra vì “tổ chức cho người khác nhập cảnh vào Việt Nam”. Đà Nẵng, nơi khởi nguồn đợt dịch thứ 2, là thành phố thu hút rất đông người Trung Quốc đến đánh bạc qua mạng, do đồng hương của họ tổ chức, rất bài bản và sử dụng công nghệ cao. Bộ trưởng bộ Công An Việt Nam, vào tháng 09/2019, từng thừa nhận là “tình trạng tội phạm sử dụng công nghệ cao (lừa đảo, tổ chức đánh bạc qua mạng...) là người nước ngoài, lợi dụng địa bàn Việt Nam để hoạt động, có chiều hướng gia tăng”. Về nguyên nhân, theo ông Tô Lâm, được báo mạng Thanh Niên (13/09/2019) trích dẫn, là do sơ hở và thiếu sót trong công tác quản lý cư trú, hoạt động của người nước ngoài. Sau khi Đà Nẵng trở thành tâm dịch Covid-19, từ tháng 08/2020, nhiều đường dây đưa người Trung Quốc vào Đà Nẵng trái phép nhanh chóng bị triệt phá và xét xử. Thường chủ mưu là người Trung Quốc, kết hợp với người Việt địa phương chuẩn bị hậu cần và vận chuyển từ biên giới. Việt Nam cũng là nơi trung chuyển để nhiều người Trung Quốc sang nước thứ ba, ví dụ sang Cam Bốt để đánh bạc. Trung Quốc cũng lo ngại những đối tượng này, khi về nước bất hợp pháp, có thể mang mầm virus corona. Kiểm soát nguồn lực lao động ? Ngoài những đối tượng trên, hàng rào dọc biên giới còn được cho là để ngăn người Trung Quốc di cư vì những lý do khác nhau, theo nhận định của giáo sư Jean-Pierre Cabestan : “Tôi nghĩ Trung Quốc muốn ngăn cản công dân nước này di cư sang Việt Nam. Điều đó sẽ khiến mối quan hệ song phương thêm phức tạp. Theo tôi là như thế nhưng cũng có thể là tôi nhầm. Dù sao thì Trung Quốc muốn kiểm soát đường biên giới của nước. Việc này nằm trong chính sách chung của Bắc Kinh”. Việc làm là một trong những động cơ chính để người Trung Quốc đến Việt Nam. Trung Quốc không muốn mang tiếng rằng công dân của họ đi làm chui hoặc phạm pháp ở một nước khác. Tuy nhiên, đây lại là thực tế từ vài năm gần đây. Để tránh bị vạ lây vì cuộc chiến thương mại Mỹ-Trung, nhiều doanh nghiệp Trung Quốc đã chuyển hoạt động sang Việt Nam. Họ cần ngay nhân công có tay nghề, hiểu chung ngôn ngữ, nên sẵn sàng tuyển cả người Trung Quốc nhập cư bất hợp pháp để tránh mất thời gian đào tạo lao động địa phương. Điều này lại vi phạm quy định của Việt Nam “chỉ được sử dụng lao động nước ngoài khi lao động trong nước không đáp ứng được yêu cầu”. Thực tế này từng được Ủy ban Đối ngoại của Quốc Hội thừa nhận tồn tại trong những năm 2013 đến 2019. Người lao động Trung Quốc sinh sống và làm việc rất đông ở tỉnh Bình Dương, “lập làng, lập xóm” ở những khu vực công ty Trung Quốc trúng thầu, khiến người dân địa phương lo ngại, theo phản ánh của báo Thanh Niên (11/05/2020). Trước khi xảy ra đại dịch, rất nhiều người vào Việt Nam với danh nghĩa tham quan du lịch, nhưng ở lại làm việc. Con đường này bị tạm ngừng vì Việt Nam đóng cửa biên giới chống dịch từ tháng 03/2020, nên tình trạng nhập cư bất hợp pháp có chiều hướng tăng. Cuối cùng, theo nhận định của giáo sư Carl Thayer, bức tường mà Bắc Kinh cho xây dọc biên giới có lẽ còn gây trở ngại cho những nhà bất đồng chính kiến Trung Quốc muốn đào thoát. Tỉnh Vân Nam của Trung Quốc, giáp với Việt Nam, Lào và Miến Điện, từ lâu được coi là “ngả đào thoát cho người Duy Ngô Nhĩ và những người khác muốn xin tị nạn ở phương Tây”. Đây cũng là con đường cho những người Bắc Triều Tiên tìm cách thoát khỏi chế độ Kim Jong Un.

BFM :: Morning Brief
Irrawaddy Turbulence

BFM :: Morning Brief

Play Episode Listen Later Feb 2, 2021 10:31


Sebastien Strangio unpacks how Myanmar's coup by the military junta will impact the country's future, as well as the geopolitical implications in the Asia Pacific region. Image Credit: Kan Sangtong / Shutterstock.com

Cognitive Revolution
Chapter 9: Yangon, Pt I

Cognitive Revolution

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 5, 2020 45:36


What one expects when landing at an airport in South East Asia -- or for that matter, a developing country anywhere in the world -- is madness. Pure madness. A throng of taxi drivers will clamor in a bid for your attention, like a frenzied Wall Street trading floor. A stream of cars will weave through the terminal, disgorging passengers at full speed. To exit the terminal requires picking your way to the street through of an array of stalls offering everything from an arresting waft of the local fare to SIM cards from unknown carriers to offers to exchange currency at rate that only sounds fair while the local money still seems like a collection of meaningless pieces of paper. It is always an order of magnitude hotter and stickier than wherever you came from. This is what one might reasonably expect when stepping off the plane in Myanmar. But no such madness exists at Yangon International airport.The Yangon airport is something much closer to a buddhist monastery situated in some rural outpost like Montana or Kansas. Instead of madness, there is tranquility. A couple guys in sarongs will approach you and gently inquire if you'd be interested in commissioning a taxi. When you shake your head, they shrug their shoulders mildly and wander off. There are hardly any cars in the terminal. And unlike the other capitals of South East Asia, there are no motorbikes. Instead, when you step outside there is only a helpful taxi attendant and a docile queue of cabs. After the passenger drop-off lane, there are five further lanes, like at LAX, though unlike LAX only one of these lanes at any time is likely to have a vehicle in it. The most intrusive noise is the birds.When I stepped out of the terminal, I turned to my right to survey the open road in front of me. It stretched out into a dusk of palm trees lining the smoothly paved highway. I had planned to take the bus into the city, and since there weren't that many vehicles around I didn't have a hard time tracking down the right one. Stepping aboard, I presented the driver with a wad of cash. The written Myanmar language uses a different set of numerals than the standard Arabic ones, so I wasn't sure what I was looking at when it came to picking out the appropriate bill. It probably wouldn't have mattered even if I did, as I didn't know what the bus fare was. The driver shuffled through my available currency and selected a choice note. He beckoned me to go sit down. I took the seat nearest to the door. Then a few minutes later when the next passenger arrived, he negotiated with her to hand her fare over to me. In my serene naiveté, I had evidently paid twice the going rate. The driver had contrived a way to make me whole.After waiting for the bus to be mostly full, we set off on the road in the direction of the ripe sunset. For most of the way, we sailed straight through toward the city, save for a couple congested intersections. There was an astonishing display of cordiality on the roads. Our driver, for instance, actually appeared to stop for people who waved him down on the side of the road, even if they weren't yet at a legitimate bus stop. I didn't hear him use the horn once. Come it to think of it, I didn't hear any horns save for a couple flagrant violations of traffic decency. The roads felt new, though the bus didn't.On the way into the city, I sat with my backpack on my lap as the bus began to fill up. I took some time to study the map of the bus route in front of me. It wasn't an especially helpful chart. For one thing, it was mostly occluded by the passengers sitting in front of it. The only information it offered was the names of the stops on this line, which wasn't all that enlightening given that it was all in Myanmar's unique local script. Even among non-western scripts, the Myanmar writing system is particularly engaging to behold. What mostly it appears to have going on is a series of interlocking circles and squiggles, which are periodically marked off by larger boxes. It's got the buoyant aesthetic sensibility of the kind of script a three year old would come up with when she's imitating adult handwriting. All looping circles and entangled boxes, it is positively delightful.When I exited the bus at my downtown stop, I took a moment to gather my bearings. Then I slung my backpack over my shoulder and made my way down the street. The sidewalks featured the characteristically treacherous cracks of other cities in South East Asia, but with the difference that they were almost totally clean. There was no trash. The only debris was maybe 0.3 cigarette butts per square meter. The city center of Yangon has long, skinny Manhattan blocks. Walking north-south, one needs to take provisions as if undertaking a week long crossing of an expanse of desert. Walking east-west, there's room for maybe one and half store fronts before tumbling into the next intersection. At length, I presented myself at my hostel and checked in. I was officially on the ground in Myanmar.It was December, about a week until Christmas. My plan was to spend the holidays on my own here in this country. My life in England had been complicated over the last few months. My existence felt heavy. I wanted to feel unencumbered again. I wanted to be out there in the world. I wanted to be somewhere untethered from life's responsibilities. I wanted to have the breathing room to do a little soul searching. Myanmar had been a place I had wanted to come for a long time. The country's borders had opened up over the last half decade, after having been more or less shuttered for the past two generations -- since around the time George Orwell was posted in Burma on colonial duty. Of the ten countries in South East Asia, Myanmar has by far the largest land mass. Yet its tourist numbers are on par with Laos, one of the smallest. There are fewer tourists per capita here than anywhere else in this part of the world. But there's no guarantee that will continue. Perhaps it will develop into a tourist mecca, like Thailand or Vietnam. Perhaps it will close down again and slink back to the shadows. Either way, it's a nation in rapid change, and I wanted to see it while still in its blossoming, spring-time phase.I also liked the idea of spending Christmas in one of the most devoutly Buddhist countries on the planet. The official religion of Myanmar, which is practiced by the majority of the population, is Theravada Buddhism. It is generally considered to be the most conservative form of the religion. While everyone back home would be cutting down trees, putting up reindeer, and singing songs of joy and peace (or whatever else one is supposed to do during Christmas), I'd be wandering the exotic alleyways of this Christ-bereft stronghold of Buddhist tradition and stumbling upon the hidden mysteries of its grand and ancient pagodas. Sounded great to me.I had a rough itinerary sketched out. I had my plane tickets in and out of Yangon, the largest city and formerly known as the British colonial headquarters of Rangoon. I had booked most of my hostels in advance for each part of the country. But how I was going to get from place to place or what I was going to do when I got there was all to be determined. Life had felt stiflingly regimented back home. All I had with me now was a backpack. Not the travel-savvy, larger-than-the-girl-lugging-it kind of backpack, but my school backpack. It was filled mostly with books on the country. I wanted to get to know this place. Not just to see it, but to really learn about it, to talk to the people who actually lived here, and to read the words of people who have a deep connection with this land. I was ready to immerse myself. I was also ready for some moment-to-moment, take-it-as-it-comes living. This felt like a country built for just that.On my first morning in country, I set off from my hostel onto the streets. I was in search of nothing in particular. And in this first walkabout that was precisely what I found. The most arresting observation the tourist combing through downtown Yangon makes is one of demography: there are pretty much no white people here. There are many places in the world where this observation would hold. But few of them are cities that feel as developed, as accommodating, as unsullied as Yangon. In a way, it felt like coming to South East Asia for the first time again.When one first starts coming to this part of the world, what stands out is how fantastically different it is. It is a society based on fundamentally different principles than the West. In many ways, the apotheosis of Western culture is the shopping mall: everything is standardized. Each store offers the same things of the same quality and aesthetic of what that store offers anywhere else in the world. The point of a Starbucks Frappuchino is that you can go to practically any country on earth and order essentially the same drink. A shopping mall is laid out so that nothing is obscured, nothing is going to take you by surprise. The organizing principle of a shopping mall is homogeneity.If you're anything like me, you grew up in a culture, a city, a society that has increasingly come to resemble a shopping mall. So when you first come to South East Asia, you see that it's possible to have a society for which every impulse goes in the opposite direction. In many ways it is the antithesis of a shopping mall: nothing is standardized. Everything is unique. There are gapping, inexplicable holes in the infrastructure -- spots where something should exist but nothing does. Surprises abound. You take an action and there is little guarantee of what the subsequent reaction will be. It is completely and totally beguiling.But then after a little more time in this area, you start to see the spoilage. It is the infiltration of shopping mall culture into this otherwise gloriously haphazard vision of society. It is McDonalds and Burger King and KFC and Starbucks. It is the government's prioritization of the needs of tourists over the needs of locals. It is the overwhelming presence of white people. And once you've identified these spoilages, it's tough to recapture that initial sensibility of having uncovered a society of such immensely foreign awesomeness. One of the unfortunate facts of globalization is that so many of the best spots to be a tourist have been all but ruined by the presence of so many tourists. Being in Yangon felt exactly like recapturing that innocent, unspoiled joy of finding oneself in an exotic land of mystery and surprise.Every square inch of sidewalk in Yangon seems to be taken up with informal vendors. They appear to be organized into patches. For two blocks, it will be fruit vendors. Then the next block will feature grimy power tools. Then comes a swathe of clothes and textiles, followed by a sector proffering refurbished iPhones. Each is pocked with its own food stalls catering to adjacent vendors. At no point does one see anything on offer that would be of interest to anyone other than locals. The supply and demand here is clearly geared toward the indigenous population, and not hoards of foreigners swooping in to pay exorbitant sums for trinkets, goodies, or knick knacks.Most of the action takes place on the main drags, which run along the short sides of the blocks. The long sides are residential streets. They are quiet, filled mostly with stretches of worn but not dilapidated apartments atop modest restaurants and other small businesses. It is an immediate contrast. The sidewalks on the arterials bustle with vendors and foot traffic while the residential asides snooze.My first stop was at an ATM. Historically, Myanmar is famous for not having cash machines. This is something you'll hear frequently from people who've been there. It's no longer true. There are ATMs on almost every block. It's easy to get money. The problem, though, is that you have to cart around a lot of currency to have any meaningful amount of dough. Getting a couple hundred dollars worth of Kyat, which would last me for a couple weeks, required a mafioso-style briefcase in which to store all my local currency.That being said, Myanmar isn't exactly a place where a tourist feels exposed on the street. It is difficult not to feel safe in a city where half the population is walking around in skirts, and the other half are women. The tradition garb for a Myanmartian male is type of sarong, known as a Longyi. It gives the local population a certain way of ambling: at once sort of floppy, sort of shuffling, hands behind the back in leisured confidence. One's sandals make way from under the skirt with each shuffle. Everything is flowy and nonchalant. My initial suspicion was that these people wouldn't commit a petty crime if their life depended on it. This suspicion was increasingly strengthened the longer I staid in country. The women, for their part, are marked by Thanaka. It is de rigueur for women to smear Thanaka on their cheeks before leaving the house in the morning. A canonical symbol of Myanmar culture, it is a cosmetic paste ground from the bark of an indigenous tree. In other words, a mud mask that is appropriate, even lauded, to be worn in public. At first, it's a strange sight -- like when a female character in a movie emerges from her quarters in an avocado mask with cucumbers over her eyes. But one gets used to it, and eventually it comes to hold its own intrigue and attractiveness.As I made my way through the downtown area, I came upon an especially crowded intersection, where two big arterials criss-crossed. It was the kind of street that is not so much crossed as negotiated. In an interesting little piece of theatre, our numbers built up to a critical pedestrian mass before bursting out into the street, essentially bullying the steady stream of cars into realizing they couldn't possible run this many people over. Cross walks aren't really a thing here. Sure, there are some zebra crossing patterns painting onto the street. But they do not contribute to reality in any meaningful way.At length I found myself close to the center of the downtown area at the Bogyoke Aung San Market. I knew I was somewhere of central interest, because it was outfitted in the way that the core of all central business districts are during the holidays: with Christmas decorations. I was a bit taken aback. The most conspicuous display of Christmas spirit was a sign that proudly read "Yangon Christmas Festival" on the street running across the entrance to the market. Other strung up ornaments included white cutouts of Christmas trees and snowflakes, as if coniferous evergreens and fresh snowfall were indigenous to the area. It was more than a week before Christmas, but Yangon was already bubbling over with holiday spirit.The Bogyoke Aung San market is named for the man who essentially wrested control of Burma from the colonial British. He is the Myanmar nation's George Washington: the military-leader-cum-first-head-of-state, revered as the Father of the Nation. Bogyoke is an affectionate honorific meaning "major general." Aung San founded the country's military, which has been a central fixture in Myanmar's modern history -- though not always in a good way. Nonetheless, he is looked upon with widespread fondness to this day by the people of his nation, as befits an icon such as George Washington. Where his legacy begins to diverge from Ol' George's is that while Washington was afforded the opportunity to lead his young nation in its earliest and most vulnerable years, Aung San was assassinated six months into his reign. It was a plot by one of his political adversaries, whereby his men basically stormed into an important cabinet meeting and murdered the country's top seven political officials. Somewhat inexplicably, the architect of the assassination, U Saw, believed this would leave the country with no choice but to install him as head of state. In these designs U Saw turned out to be slightly over-optimistic and instead of being asked to lead, he was hanged. In the intervening seventy years since its independence, Myanmar has often entertained much criticism for how little democratic progress it has made.To this point, I think it's worth mentioning that seventy years into America's democracy, the Civil War hadn't even been fought -- meaning that the United States wasn't even yet on the verge of its states uniting in the way we think of them today. And that's without having the Founding Fathers summarily murdered by a political adversary. It takes time to build a functioning democracy -- if that's still a designation you'd like to bestow upon the U.S. -- from the ground up. The main impetus for this democratic building up has been Bogyoke's Nobel Peace Prize winning daughter, Aung San Suu Kyi.At any rate, the market. It was a great open air complex, like a converted airplane hangar with a white roof and white tile housing a brightly lit matrix of stalls. It's designation in the tourist guides -- a "lively bazaar in a multistory colonial building, with vendors selling antiques, jewelry, art & food" -- could describe the rudiments of almost any big market in the world, such as Ben Thanh Market in Saigon, or the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul. But there is one major exception. There were no white people here. I saw two, maybe three, foreigners the entire time. This is an almost unimaginable feature of this sort of market, if you've been to comparable ones throughout the world. Before wandering in here, I had always assumed that surely these sort of structures were built for people just like me -- to give tourists a center of gravity, a point around which to orient themselves in the city. Apparently not.The consequences of this absence of foreigners is tremendous. No one hassles you. No one approaches you in the aisles and tries to foist their s**t upon you. A guy wandering down the aisle asked me something. "No thank you," I mumbled habitually and shook my head. I assumed he had been selling something when he repeated himself. I saw he wasn't carrying anything to sell and realized that he was simply asking me if I needed help finding anything.One peculiar feature of the market were herds of unattended children wandering among the patrons and vendors. Each child had a shaved head with pink monk robes featuring an orange sash across their body. They roamed from stall to stall, whereupon they would half-heartedly chant some two line incantation. Without looking up from her phone, the store owner would stick a small pile of cash into the children's bucket. There were hundreds of these little troops, all around the city. It was like watching a conspiracy of non-Halloween trick-or-treating in progress. At the time, I imagined that this was some sort of mafia, run by eight year old Buddhist of especially feminine fashion sensibilities. I later learned they were nuns.I surveyed the wares at the market. I spied some passionfruit and dragonfruit, among my favorites in this part of the world. Other fruits included the usual suspects: jack fruit, pomelo, little mandarins, apples, pomegranates, and grapes. I had hoped to find the crowned prince of all South East Asian fruits, the Mangosteen, but none availed themselves of me. There was a meat market. It featured chickens in close quartered cages, crabs that might at any moment reach out and snag a passerby, a wriggling catfish that threatened a flailing slap across the face, and black bags fidgeting with unidentified detainees. That sort of stuff makes me feel kind of itchy. But for whatever reason, what inspired the most interest from me were the mandarin oranges. I went to a stall and pointed. The lady began to load up a small plastic bag. When after a moment I told her, "Oh, that's plenty, thanks," she took this a cue to keep piling them into the bag. I didn't really have a use for enough oranges to feed a family of seven for the next week, and I tried to communicate this to her by presenting her with my intended budget, 200 kyat. She took offense to this, as she felt this was a dramatic underestimate of the value of the bag full of oranges. Her counter offer was 1000 kyat. I tried further to explicate my position for her. "No, please just give me enough for two hundred." She stared at me. I handed her a thousand Kyat note and walked off with an arm load of mandarin oranges.Leaving the market, I headed back toward the streets. Without having gotten very far, a store front caught my eye, called J'Donuts. It appeared to be a Burmese version of Dunkin Donuts, a place where surely my money would be better spent than at the orange vendor. Indeed, the pastry case would not have been out of place in a Dunkin or a Tim Horton's, except for the overtly tropical flavors, with fillings such as lychee or choco-coconut. On the wall was a television with what appeared to be a twenty-four hour loop of a commercials in advertisement of J'Donut's products. The commercial was based, evidently, on the twin themes of Christmas and pedophilia. It featured cartoon children in costumes dressed as donuts, provocatively squirting chocolate syrup and festooning one another with sprinkles. These events, it was later revealed, were actually featured in the collective dreams of a small cohort of live action children, alongside the donuts dancing round their heads. Then a series of elves, in some sort of pervert Santa's helper gambit, entered the scene, stage left. I couldn't discern their function in the plot beyond adding a distinct element of seediness. At any rate, all of this was delivered in support of the thesis of J'Donut's cunning marketing slogan: "every day... tasty and fresh." As I sat there, not necessarily savoring but certainly consuming my cloying lychee donut and coffee-flavored sugar milk, an entire Harry Belafonte album -- though not necessarily a Christmasy one -- played all the way through in the background.Perhaps unsurprisingly when I exited J'Donuts I found myself crossing over into what appeared to be the primary expat community of the city. Every store front was either a coffee shop or a restaurant. It seemed the entire population consisted of pairs of white dudes with Asian chicks. The establishments boasted creatively western names like "Toasted Melt" (sells toasted melts), "Minister Cheese" (sells ice cream), "O'thentic Brasserie" (sells... Irish inflected French cuisine?), and "Pizza Heaven" (sells 'slices of heaven'). With the discovery of this enclave, it occurred to me that I had reached a point of diminishing returns and elected to repair to my hostel to doze off for the rest of the afternoon.In the evening I headed back to a side street that I had stumbled upon in my earlier wanderings. Only a couple blocks over from my hostel, it was called 19th Street. It turned out to be one of the more prominent culinary attractions in the city. Anthony Bourdain ate here when he filmed in Yangon. It is an entire block (a long-ways one) strewn with the glorious green and red short stools indigenous to South East Asia. I have attained a sort of Pavlovian conditioning where upon sitting down at one of these bad boys, I know I'm about to be served up something streaming and delicious, ideally spicy, and most likely resulting in some abdominal tumult until my body acclimates. The whole street was a series of food stations, each with their own packed seating area. Everywhere looked good. Everywhere looked fresh. Everywhere looked like they'd be willing to deep fry pretty much substance, foodstuff or otherwise, and present it on a stick for my gustatory contemplation. I picked the place with the best available seating. (Yeah, it was full to the point of having a tough go finding a seat.)I chose a dish for which the English translation was deep fried spicy pork. Because I'm white, the lady double checked about the spicy part -- imploring me to reconsider with a searching confirmation of "spicy?" in conjunction with a raise of the eye brow and the finger-thumb circle with splayed fingers, the universal sign for "Are you sure you can handle this, white boy?" Just try me.I also ordered a beer. When the lady reappeared with my beverage, she popped the tab, pealed off some label underneath and gave me a look that could only mean "Oh wow, you've just come into some money." She asked me if I'd like to exchange the tab. I said sure. She took the cap and came back a couple minutes later with some cash money and handed it to me. God, I've never felt so favorably disposed to a country before. I mean, getting cash back on your beer -- could it get any better? I settled in with my beer, and eventually my pork, and waded into a collection of writings by Aung San Suu Kyi.When not so long thereafter I was too tipsy not to get distracted by my surroundings, I put down the book and picked my head up to survey what was going on. I was alone at my table, and as I was enjoying my evening. Apparently, my solitude was noticed by the men at the table sitting next to me. They invited me to sit with them. So I paid my tab with the lady and moved next door, taking the fourth seat among my three new buddies. As is customary in many parts of the world, they made sure I was sufficiently plied with alcohol and cigarettes before we dug into any personal details. We got another round of beers. I accepted a cigarette, even though I don't smoke them. In fact, I can't. As a long-time cigar smoker, I have a hard time actually performing the act of inhaling smoke, as one is supposed to do with cigarette. I just hold the smoke in my mouth briefly, then let it go. The men I was sitting with noticed that I was doing it wrong. They gave me sidelong looks of moderate confusion. Then, apparently, they let the matter go, probably just chalking it up as an American thing.One of the guys was more comfortable in English than the other two, and he did most of the talking. One of the quiet ones owned a small business. The other two were students, studying something to do with tourism. The gregarious one was especially fascinated with my being American. To him, this was an accomplishment that merited some serious digging into. Attempting to curtail this line of inquiry, I managed to turn the conversation back to Myanmar. They noticed the face of Aung San Suu Kyi on my book. I asked them what they thought of her. Their position was, in essence, decidedly favorable. They felt like she had the country's back. It was the same enthusiasm for a leader that my Indian friends mustered for Narendra Modi when he first took over the country, or the ovation Michelle Obama would receive if she decided to run for president. I asked them what had changed over the last five years, since the country had become more open. Overall, they were a fan of the developments. Over the next five years, they hoped to see a greater separation between the country's military and its government.As well loved as Aung San Suu Kyi may be, she is often accused of being little more than a puppet of Myanmar's authoritarian and decidedly over-enthusiastic military regime. Instead of independent branches of executive, legislative, and judicial powers, the Myanmar government is much more of a highly interdependent morass of military and political interests. This is at the core of the recent claims that the Myanmar government, led by Suu, is supporting a genocide of the Rohingya people on the Bangladesh border. As much good work as she has done, the country's military is a powerful and often malevolent force. Her relationship to this regime is complicated. On the one hand, they are responsible for many atrocities that the Myanmar government perpetrated against its own citizens during the half-century after independence. They also locked Suu up for more than a decade. In 1990, Myanmar had its first democratic elections, and Aung San Suu Kyi's National League for Democracy party won. Instead of stepping aside to let her take the reins of the country, the military ignored the results and placed Suu under arrest. She was a political prisoner -- placing her in the company of the other architects of non-violent, world-shifting activism in the twentieth century, such as Mohandas Gandhi and Nelson Mandela -- for fifteen years. Which, I suppose, is quite a lot to put in the one hand.But on the other hand, it is, at its heart, still her father's military. For better or worse, it is her family's legacy. And as with all family legacies, it is simultaneously an embarrassment and a treasure. Also, what country isn't proud of their military, if they've got one? Anyway, this is why the country is so volatile. Overall, the current seems to be drifting toward the good. But at any moment the military junta could reassert itself. It is, to say the least, a complicated situation.Which, at this point in the evening, we made tragically little progress in solving. After pretending to have smoked a handful of cigarettes and having actually consumed enough beers to fill my quadrant of the table, I wasn't necessarily in a cognitive state conducive for nuanced political discourse. I bid my new friends adieu, and with that toppled my way back to the hostel.I'm not going to lie to you. Life was pretty good in Myanmar. I'd wake up at my leisure and wander downstairs for my first coffee of the day. Each morning I would put in a three hour of shift, with a bit of work, a bit of writing, and a bit of journaling -- a.k.a., three different modes of writing. During this time I'd pound down five or six cups of coffee, since it was free and unlimited in every hostel I staid at. I'd sit in the common area, and take my breakfast when it was ready. People would come and go. Travelers would commune with one another, carrying on the same inane conversations over and over again. "Have you been to the third tree on the east-most corner of Lake Mwandishi? No? Well, you really should. If you don't see that, you haven't really seen the country." I'd put in my headphones and get lost in my own world of curling streams of letters in my notebook or clack away on my keyboard for paragraph upon paragraph. Then I'd spend my afternoons out and about in the city.On this morning I was greeted with a new development at the hostel. The staff was painting Christmas designs onto the front doors of the hostel. Taking inspiration from the marketing team at J'Donuts, they inscribed a red and green nativity of Santa and his elves. Though there were no children depicted in this scene, I assume the elves would've taken more than a passing interest in them had there been. Even more egregiously, the staff all wore Christmas hats. This is when it started to become clear to me that I had come to the wrong country to escape Christmas festivities. The Christmas Spirit is even more fervent here than it is in the U.S., which has been mostly relegated to the more inclusive greetings of "Happy Holidays." I had successfully escaped the Jesusy aspects of Christmas, but that's not really what the holiday is about is it? It's about festivities, conducting oneself in a spirit of celebration and good will, and, above anything else, a fresh haul of new loot. In other words, capitalism -- which is a language that everyone speaks, regardless of religion. With more than a week until Christmas Day, the intrusions of unbidden and overwhelmingly kitsch holiday spirit would get worse before they got better.Only slightly daunted by the saccharine visage of Santa and his helpers, I set off back into town. One thing that I'd like to mention, which isn't my favorite topic to broach, but I sincerely think is worth bringing up, is the women of Yangon. They are easily the best looking population of females I've yet to come across in my travels. Now, pretty much every culture likes to say this of their own women. Especially, for some reason, Russians and Eastern Europeans. But they can't all be correct. As a third party judge, I have to give the award to Myanmar, specifically Yangon. I have a theory about this. Actually, two theories. The first has to do with the 136 indigenous ethnic groups of Myanmar. They are distributed geographically across the country, and Yangon, being the primary metropolitan area, is where all of the ones who are inclined to leave their ancestoral village and mate with someone further afield head to. As I'm sure is an uncontroversial point, mating across ethnic boundaries tends to lead to extremely beautiful offspring. While such mixing is subtle, that seems to be happening here. This is a personal theory of mine, and feel free to adopt it as your own or to reject it. The second theory, which is a more commonly held position is that it has to do with Thanaka. It's a blessing of a relatively high caliber to have baked into one's culture a penchant for excellent skin care. It would be as if Californians took a fancy to smearing avocado on their face when they left the house. After years of ardent commitment to skin care, you get a population of people with nice skin. So, like I said, it's a theory, and you're free to make of it what you will.Another curious and slightly less sexist thing that one begins to notice on the streets of Yangon is that the cars in this country are almost exclusively Japanese. Practically every vehicle is either a Suzuki, Honda, Toyota, Nissan, or, if it's a truck, a Mitsubishi. There isn't a Kia or a Hyundai in sight, let alone a Chevy or an Audi. One reason for this is that Aung San Suu Kyi has always harbored a great deal of admiration for the Japanese, and so there has always been a big-sister, little-sister sort of relationship between the countries. I'm sure there's also a specific economic reason, but I wasn't able to ascertain it throughout further research. At any rate, I'm sure this trend will change as the country continues to avail itself of the world economy.After starting this particular walkabout with no destination in mind, I oriented myself in the direction of the Zoological Gardens, which were enticingly marked on the map just north of the downtown area. Arriving at its gates, or at least, where on the map it appeared that the gates might be, I strolled through an open entrance. Then I heard someone call out "Hello!" The direct translation of this interjection to English would be something like "Hey!! Just where do you think you're going?" A man came from out of my peripheral vision to usher me toward a ticket booth, preventing me from entering the park illicitly.Upon entering the grounds, it was not clear whether what I was entering was a traditional zoo or some sort of nature reserve. All I could see was fauna. There didn't appear to be other people. And there didn't appear to be exhibits. A sign read that there were 133 species. It failed to disclose whether they were held in cages or just wandering about. Making one's way through the paths in this zoo was like rolling up into a ghost town in a Western flick. The protagonist surveys the otherwise desolate street, and as a tumble weed rolls through, remarks that it appears everyone else has been run out of town. The first exhibit I came upon was a cage of monkeys. The fence around the animals' enclosure was about as far from sidewalk where I stood as an extended monkey arm. The monkeys, I noticed, could just about stick their entire bodies through the screen save for their area of greatest circumference. There were no witnesses around in case one of them escaped, murdered me, and snuck back in. There were large patches of unfinished construction projects throughout the grounds, and for all I knew any of them could have been filled with the inert bodies of unsuspecting tourists. I backed away slowly and turned to have a look at what else was around.At length I did start to see other people. Again, I was astounded by the fact that not a single one appeared to be a tourist. I wandered the zoo for almost two hours, and never once saw another westerner. In my uniqueness, this made me an object of interest to the other patrons at the zoo, especially in the presence of some of the more lackluster animals.Certainly one of the reasons there were few tourists was that the Yangon zoo is not among the world's most spectacular zoological habitats. That said, it was quite relaxing to wander in a park where both the animals and the patrons had such generous proportions of Lebensraum. The potential danger posed by the observation that the fortifications keeping the animals from the humans didn't exactly inspire confidence, gave the excursion an added dimension of excitement not usually expected from a trip to the zoo.Making my way north again toward another site of interest on the map, I came upon a sprawling park laid out around a shimmeringly gorgeous azure lake. It was dusk now, and the setting sun was the same color as the sound of a bell marking the start of a meditation. The lake was ringed not only by a verdant lapel of grass, but also by a walking path, hovering over the edge of the water like a halo. Everyone I passed was a local. Each of them gave me a pleasant smile and nod. They seemed like they were just happy to see me enjoying myself in their city. I'd been wearing sandals all day, and my legs had the same gradient of dark clay to airy lightness as the sunset. At length, I came to a point where the walkway suddenly stopped. It's not that the loop had ended, but that there was a blockade in front of a ten yard stretch where there were no boards in the boardwalk -- a hole in the infrastructure, if you will -- and I could go no further.After a brief respite back at the hostel, I repaired in the evening to what appeared to be Yangon's premiere rooftop bar. I had noted they had a jazz band on that night, and I was curious what heights could be attained in this country when it came to the lush life of jazz and cocktails. On top of a hotel in an otherwise residential area, the seating are was exceptionally loungeable, with a corridor of reservable and cushioned alcoves. These mostly appeared to be occupied by European business men, who were out for some shared plates and a bottle or six of wine. They were among colleagues and friends, evidently operating in a celebratory mode. There were also a few groups of mostly upscale Burmese. I snagged a spot at the bar. The roof offered a three-sixty degree view of the city, with the main visual attraction being the Shwedagon Pagoda glowing in the distance like a hovering UFO. Viewed from this vantage, it really becomes clear that Myanmar truly is a kind of dark spot on the map. Situated between the well-lighted civilizations of India, China, and Thailand, the plot of land centered on the Irrawaddy delta is dark when viewed from space, or even just a tall building. Even in the city, most of the land is shaded from urban glow. Between me and the imposing Shwedagon, which is the visual centerpiece of the city, there was nothing but an inscrutable blackness. It is as if showing a laser pointer into a moonless, starless sky. What you see is not so much a view but simply an unlit expanse, like the visual field behind closed eyes.My first order of business was to obtain a drink. I was delighted to find their menu included barrel-aged negronis. I waved in the direction of the glowing panel of alcoholic goodness that was the bar and flagged down one of the bartenders. Normally, in these situations, I'd give the local flavors a shot and order something closer to an indigenous concoction than a tried classic. But this bar didn't have anything like that on offer. Plus the thought of gin, Campari, and vermouth marinating in oak over the course of a few weeks made me all tingly and excited in a way that's difficult to ignore. My cocktail was served with a flair of teak-wood smoke introduced into a glass enclosure around the drink, which upon lifting the enclosure released a fog, like a special effect at a rock concert. It was a little much for my taste. But it was also served with dehydrated orange slices, and I liked that. I sipped my cocktail, and read from my copy of George Orwell's Burmese Days by the under-light of the counter in front of me. Periodically, I'd looked up to survey the patrons of this illuminated fastness situated in the otherwise steely darkness of the landscape around us. I consumed these elegant $5 negronis with a certain ardent liberalism while smoking the Burmese cigars I'd bought, 10 for 50 cents. Soon the band began to play. Mostly it was from the oeuvre of Antônio Carlos Jobim. For the sake of propriety, I won't disclose the exact number of negronis I managed, nor the number of cigars I sucked down. But it's safe to that it was, in a scientific sense, a large enough sample to achieve statistical significance.Then the night took a left turn. I saw a couple of guys hanging out by a table next to mine. They were clearly vibing with the music and looked like locals. I approached them. We got to talking. After the first set was over, the jazz singer who had been on stage came to our table, and introduced herself as a friend as the gentlemen I was sitting with. She was from Japan, propelled by the twin dreams of living in Myanmar and being a jazz singer. The two guys were entrepreneurs. I asked them what business they were in. "Import-export," they told me. As anyone familiar with the espionage genre will infer, they were spies. One of them claimed to be especially fond of America, having made several extended trips to Nebraska. If anyone has ever uttered a statement which more directly implicated them in some sort of covert affair of counterintelligence, I have not heard it.Once the music had wrapped up and the European business men had begun to pack it in out of respect for tomorrow's workday, the two guys asked what I was doing next. "Nothing," I told them. It is at this point that the scene cuts to a drug-addled montage of rave music and altered consciousness, zooming around the city from one neon-lit palace of debauchery to another consuming substances of a dubious and enlivening nature. Or at least as close to that sort of thing as I come in my life.The first stop on our itinerary was the kind of place that one might imagine America is full of if one had never actually been to America: a nifty establishment called the "Beer Pong Bar." This title rather concisely captures the institution's mission statement. Conceptually, it is a bar which dedicates the major of its real estate to arraying cups of beer across a table and enjoining participants on both sides to sink ping pong balls into one another's cups. Beer pong is one of America's most celebrated cultural exports, like the hamburger or the iPad, much loved the world over. As with all of America' greatest innovations, it provides a highly bastardizable palate on which other nations can construct their own cultural inventions. That is how the hamburger differs from, say, classical French cuisine. If you don't cook French food the way they do it in Paris, you're doing it wrong. But anyone can take the basic canvas of the burger, do whatever the hell they want to it, and find themselves in the presence of a creation that is at once delicious and entirely legitimate. Beer pong has been similarly appropriated to great effect in other milieus. The premise of this establishment was to set up in what was essentially an empty, unlit warehouse, a football field's worth of regulation beer pong tables illuminated by the synthetic LEDs of an air hockey table or a laser tag course. The operation's feng shui was so effective that it had evidently attracted the presence of every adolescent in the province to gather with their friends, perch a Gatorade-sized vat of beer on their table, and engage in bouts of competitive drinking until long after peak performance had been achieved. Being an American, I felt a certain patriotic duty to represent my country well. I did what I could.Having reached a point of diminishing marginal returns on any activities which depended on the use of fine motor skills, we took off to the next spot. Upon leaving the beer pong bar, I discovered that our entourage had increased in number. Instead of requiring a single taxi, our crew now required a small fleet of vehicles. I had no real idea who any of these people were. But I was friends with all of them.When I next came to, there was wailing. Or not wailing, but rather singing. Then I immediately ascertained that we were in the plush and intimate confines of a karaoke room. Now, the western and eastern conceptions of karaoke are rather different. In the west, the essential framework for karaoke is to consume enough alcohol to demolish all sense of self-consciousness or social liability in the service of aurally making a fool of oneself in front of a group of total strangers. By contrast, the eastern framework for karaoke is to consume enough alcohol to demolish all sense of self-consciousness or social liability in service of aurally making a fool of oneself in front of a group of one's close friends. Instead of taking place on a stage for any casual observer to judge, it takes place in a private room. It is an infinitely preferable format over the western version. It is, however, still awful. The only way to make karaoke an even slightly palatable activity is to have it catch you completely by surprise. It has to develop organically, on the spur of the moment. It is in this respect like other acts of vulgar semi-public behavior, such as skinny dipping. You don't set a calendar event for your next skinny dipping session. The spirit must take you. At least that's what I imagine to be the case for skinny dipping. No one has ever invited me to go. At any rate, that same conceptual model holds true for karaoke.Having satisfactorily expressed ourselves in song, we ended the evening with a bite to eat -- whatever the Myanmartian equivalent to greasy three-AM kebab is. I ate my fill, then a good deal more, then I regretfully informed my companions that it was time for me to turn in. Without having taken the time to develop an especially solid game plan, I got up to leave. And I found myself walking in no direction in particular toward nothing much. It was 4:30 in the morning, and there were no cars on the road. I did not have internet on my phone. I knew the name of my hostel. I knew that it was somewhere south of where I was currently at. I didn't know which way south was. At the moment I was beginning to draw conclusions about my predicament based on these observations, a taxi pulled into the adjacent intersection. I flagged the driver down and hopped in.I told the driver the name of my hostel. Then he embarked on a protracted exposition in a language I didn't speak. I deduced from the fact that he was explaining instead of driving that I had been unsuccessful in describing the port of call at which I hoped to disembark. More words came from my mouth. I can recall them now probably just about as accurately as he could understand them then. I managed to communicate that I was going somewhere toward the city center, as we were pretty far outside of town at this point, and this satisfied him enough to put the car in gear. At length, we pulled over on the side of a desolate road. He rolled down the window and shouted something. A man emerged from the darkness into the din of nearby street lamp. There was a brief exchange, which I imagined was chiefly about where to dump my body. Then the man leaned into the window and asked me where I wanted to go. I gave him the street number closest to my destination, which he relayed to his colleague in what seemed like more verbiage that was strictly necessary. The man disappeared into the shadows, and we set off toward my place of residence and/or the body drop site. When the car came to a stop I recognized the familiar acrylic visage of Santa and his elves. I had made it home. I was alive, albeit somewhat cognitively impaired. Filled with gratitude, beer, Christmas cheer, patriotic pride, and the unassuageable desire to retire, I turned in for the night.Next Episode:Thanks for checking out Season 1 of Notes from the Field. If you’ve enjoyed it, please consider becoming a premium subscriber. I’m trying to do more of this kind of travel writing in the future. But as you can imagine, it’s hard to have these kinds of experiences while also holding down a job. Your subscription goes a long way toward helping me to do that. Use the link below, and you’ll get 50% off an annual subscription. Thanks! This is a public episode. If you’d like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit codykommers.substack.com/subscribe

The Daily Gardener
July 1, 2020 Dwight Brown’s Urban Oasis, July in the Garden, Vale of York Naturalists Club, Illinois State Flower, July Poetry, The Earth Knows My Name by Patricia Klindienst, and Plant Explorer Finds Adventure in 1932

The Daily Gardener

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 1, 2020 27:52


Today we welcome the new month - July - and we remember the first meeting of the Vale of York Field Naturalists Club. We'll also learn about the Illinois State Flower, which was adopted on this day. We'll usher in the new month with some July poetry. We Grow That Garden Library™ with a book about how gardens and growing food help people maintain their culture. It's a personal favorite of mine. And then we'll wrap things up with a newspaper story from 1932 called "Plant Explorer Finds Adventure." But first, let's catch up on some Greetings from Gardeners around the world and today's curated news.   Subscribe Apple | Google | Spotify | Stitcher | iHeart   Gardener Greetings To participate in the Gardener Greetings segment, send your garden pics, stories, birthday wishes and so forth to Jennifer@theDailyGardener.org And, to listen to the show while you're at home, just ask Alexa or Google to play The Daily Gardener Podcast. It's that easy.   Curated News Before & After: An Urban Oasis - Flower Magazine Dwight Brown of Father Nature Landscapes wanted to honor his client's wishes for a garden that would remind him of his European travels. Brown aged the exterior with a creeping fig (Ficus pumila) for a climber on the side of the house. He also added an Oakland holly, a 'Shi-Shi Gashira' camellia, and a shaped boxwood hedge that edged a gorgeous group of 'Limelight' hydrangea. Brown says, "Much like English ivy, the creeping fig with boxwoods, mondo grass, and hydrangeas helped create the classic cottage look I wanted. We love working edibles into the ornamental landscape. Our goal was to bring back memories of the homeowner's travels to Europe, especially Italy..."   Welcome July in the Garden                         Welcome July and all that you may bring us! For gardeners, July hosts a riot of color in our gardens. History tells us that many flowers have claimed to be the birth flower for the month of July - which, by the way, the Roman Senate named to honor Julius Caesar by. In China, July's birth flower is, fittingly, the water lily. In the rest of the world, other top July blooms for the month include the Larkspur, the Delphinium, the Sweet Pea, and the Rose. Thinking about all of these gorgeous summer blossoms that claim July's top spot reminded me of a sweet verse from the Maud poem by Tennyson. It goes like this: She is coming, my dove, my dear; She is coming, my life, my fate; The red rose cries, "She is near, she is near;" And the white rose weeps, "She is late;" The larkspur listens, "I hear, I hear;" And the lily whispers, "I wait." — Alfred Lord Tennyson, English poet, Maud (Part I) The Rose, the Larkspur, and the Lily; many of July's favorite flowers are in that little verse. Truly, July is a month of abundance and extremes. On the one hand, there's the heat, and on the other, there are the storms. In 2001, the year my daughter was born, it was mighty hot in Minnesota - well over 100 degrees for weeks on end.  As a result, she ended up wearing all of the ridiculous outfits people tend to give you when you have a little baby girl; things like little halter tops and itty bitty bikini tops, teeny tiny little skorts and sundresses.  Now, I always preferred to have my babies properly covered - dressed in layers and bundled.  But the summer Emma was born, I changed my tune.  Suddenly those little outfits seemed mighty appropriate, and I have many pictures of her - san's blankets and sweaters -  keeping cool in her summer barbie-inspired clothes. In reality, the average temperature in most places in America during the month of July is a very pleasant 70 degrees. That said, just don't ask about the range - which can vary wildly.  And, July is traditionally known as the month to make hay. It's been called Haymonth or Maed month, referring to haymaking and the flowering of the meadows.  By July, most gardens are set, and gardeners tend to get their work done in the mornings when it is cooler and less buggy. Still, experienced gardeners know that July's biggest challenge, outside of the heat, is thunderstorms. I remember the summer a dear friend of mine had a garden tour planned for the middle of July. Sadly, it was a tour that never happened.  The night before her big day, a huge storm whipped through the area, taking down trees and pelting the garden with hail.  There was nothing to do but clean up.  And I remember sitting on her patio after we had righted her table and chairs eating one of the little radish and cucumber sandwiches that were supposed to be for the guests that day. That day was as sour as the lemonade we sipped in the chopped salad that was my friend's garden. It's no wonder that the folk sayings of July reflect her temperature extremes. For example: If the first of July be rainy weather, 'Twill rain more or less for four weeks together.                                                     Despite the storms, we seem to remember mainly the heat of July and the vibrant blooms in the garden. It's a glorious month for ornamentals and cut flowers.           One of my personal favorites is Martagon Lilies.  Martagon Lilies are in peak right now in most gardens. They bring the most beautiful architectural aspect and form to the garden; they are so exquisite. Offering a Turk's cap-style bloom, Like many plants, Martagon colonies get better and better with age. Martagons like rich soil and they will be grateful for a dusting of lime every year. And here's a gentle reminder to divide your Flag Iris after they finish blooming. Regular division can re-invigorate your iris and promote healthy new growth. The saddest thing in the garden is to lose your Iris because you failed to divide them. Experienced gardeners know that the best time to divide flag iris is immediately after flowering. Once again, as I like to say, "Prune-time follows bloom-time" - or in this case, division follows bloom-time. In any case, the end of any bloom-time is usually your cue to act - so get going! With the Iris, you'll want to lift out the whole clump with a pitchfork and use a sharp knife to separate any new rhizomes. Finally, don't forget that flag irises need full sun. So if you don't have them situated properly, stage a relocation immediately.   Alright, that's it for today's gardening news. Now, if you'd like to check out my curated news articles and blog posts for yourself, you're in luck, because I share all of it with the Listener Community in the Free Facebook Group - The Daily Gardener Community. There's no need to take notes or search for links - the next time you're on Facebook, search for Daily Gardener Community and request to join. I'd love to meet you in the group.   Today's Important Events 1871  The Yorkshire Herald reported the first meeting of the Vale of York Field Naturalists Club. On that day, the weather was very poor. Still, almost fifty ladies and gentlemen left the Society's Rooms in Micklegate to travel in three four-horsed carriages to go to Rivaulx ("ree-VOH") Abbey. Once they arrived at the Abbey, the group then broke into small parties made up of geologists, botanists, and entomologists, and then they went out and explored the valley by the Abbey. "The geologists were interested in the sections laid bare in the quarries, and many interesting and beautiful fossils were found. [Meanwhile], the botanists collected: Saxiraga tridaclylitet (nailwort) Helianthemum vulgare (rock rose) Cuscuta Epithymum (clover dodder) Aquilegia vulgaris (columbine) Atropa Belladonna (belladonna or deadly nightshade) Polypodium Phegopterit (northern beech fern) P. Dryoplerit (oak fern) Scolopendrium vulgare (hart' s-tongue fern) At six o'clock the party sat down to dinner at the Crown Hotel, Helmsley, which was served in Mr. and Mrs. Cowen's usual substantial style… the Rev. Vice-President Rowe addressed those assembled on the advantages of natural history and the beauties and history of the Abbey. (Rowe was also the hon. secretary of the Architectural Society). It was arranged that the next monthly field day should be held at Bolton Abbey and Woods. They then left for home, after a most agreeable day, which left everyone with the feeling that this the first excursion of the club was a great success."   1908  Illinois adopted the Violet as its State Flower. As with many State Flowers, Illinois decided to let the school children of the state vote to decide the state flower. The purple Violet received 15,591 votes, and the wild rose came in second with 11,903 votes. The children also decided on the state tree, and they selected the white oak. Meanwhile, newspapers were running a piece that blared the headline, "The Reign of the Violet is Over." It said this: "Strange and unbelievable, but a fact, nevertheless, violets are no longer fashionable. Gardenias, Orchids, and American Beauty Roses are as much in evidence as ever, but the reign of the Violet is temporarily over. It is true that a large bunch of deep purple violets relieved by a single mauve orchid, a deep pink rose, or a single wax-like gardenia is still an acceptable gift, but it is not the gift that is so frequently chosen this year, as a small cluster of gardenias or even of two or three exquisitely beautiful orchids… Roses are much in favor at the moment... A new flower hailing from Paris is the pink American Beauty, and well does it deserve the name... The color is an adorable shade of shell pink, and for all decorative purposes, this flower has already a firmly established place in fashion's regard....  One cannot but regret the sense of chivalry of a generation back when etiquette demanded that flowers always be sent to a hostess before even the least formal entertainment, and when a debutante [would rather] stay at home than go to a ball without ... [a] little bouquet of flowers."   1910  The Allentown (Pennsylvania) Democrat paper reported that Joseph Hooker was 93 years old. Here's what it said: "Sir Joseph Hooker, the world-famous botanist, received a personal note of congratulations from King George today on the occasion of his ninety-third birthday. Sir Joseph, who is still remarkably active for a man of his great age, has had a long and brilliant career in his chosen field of science. As early as 1839, he accompanied the expedition of Sir James Ross to the Antarctic region. Later he conducted scientific expeditions to many parts of the world… In the course of his active career, he rendered invaluable services to the British arts, manufacturers and commerce by promoting an accurate knowledge of the floras and economic vegetable products of the various colonies and dependencies of the empire."   Unearthed Words As I mentioned earlier in the show, July is the month of heat and storms, and that is reflected in a number of poems.   In scorched July The storm-clouds fly. — Christina Georgina Rossetti, English poet, The Months If the first of July be rainy weather, It will rain, more or less, for four weeks together. — John Ray, English naturalist and writer, English Proverbs   When storms finally break through the July heat, there is also the immeasurable pleasure that accompanies the deluge: the smell of rain.   A break in the heat away from the front no thunder, no lightning, just rain, warm rain falling near dusk falling on eager ground steaming blacktop hungry plants Thirsty turning toward the clouds cooling, soothing rain splashing in sudden puddles catching in open screens that certain smell of summer rain. — Raymond A. Foss, American poet, Summer Rain   This poem perfectly captures the ferocity of summer storms in the garden: The rain to the wind said, 'You push, and I'll pelt.' They so smote the garden bed That the flowers actually knelt, And lay lodged--though not dead. I know how the flowers felt. — Robert Frost, American poet, Lodged   The July rains encourage special summer blooms. Hot July brings cooling showers, Apricots, and gillyflowers. — Sara Coleridge, English author, The Garden Year If you are wondering what gillyflowers are, you are not alone. Gillyflowers was a term that often referred to plants from the mustard family like the wallflower, carnation, clove pink, or white stock. Gilly is derived from the Latin and Greek words for clove.   Grow That Garden Library The Earth Knows My Name by Patricia Klindienst This book came out in April of 2007, and the subtitle is: Food, Culture, and Sustainability in the Gardens of Ethnic Americans Patricia Klindienst is a master gardener and an award-winning scholar and teacher. She lives in Guilford, Connecticut, and teaches creative writing each summer at Yale University. Patricia Klindienst went to many different gardens - urban, suburban, and rural - in order to write this book. She had seen an old family photo of her Italian immigrant family and was inspired not only to learn about her ancestor's struggle to adapt to America, but also eager to hear stories from other families. The jacket to Patricia's book reminds us that, "As we lose our connection to the soil, we no longer understand the relationship between food and a sense of belonging to a place and a people." How do gardens and growing food help people maintain their culture? This is the question Patricia explores in her book. Vegetables, fruits, and flowers provide so much more than sustenance, food, and beauty. They convey who and where we are and what we are about. In her review of this book, the author Deborah Madison said, "We who are far removed from our own immigrant roots will do well to study these eloquent stories and learn from them. Patricia Klindienst has given us nothing less than a great gift." The book is  208 pages of ways we can connect to the earth - all shared with today's gardener in mind. You can get a copy of The Earth Knows My Name by Patricia Klindienst and support the show, using the Amazon Link in today's Show Notes for around $3.   Today's Botanic Spark 1932  Newspapers worldwide ran a fascinating article about the botanist Frank Kingdon-Ward titled "Plant Explorer Finds Adventure." "Captain Frank Kingdon-Ward, tall, well-built son of Britain, probably one of the world's most noted plant seekers... has journeyed all over the world in search of rare flowers, has led a life as exciting as any explorer and has given the world some of its most beautiful and rare blooms. Now In his late 40's, he is tanned from the winds and suns of tropical India, Asia, and the forbidden land of Tibet. He has collected flowers from the heights of the Himalayas, and from the depths of marshy Indian -jungles. His last expedition occurred In 1931. On it, he discovered a new pass into Tibet 35,000 feet above sea level, through an out-flung range of the Himalayas. His efforts in prying through thick jungles and climbing high mountains were rewarded in the discovery of a new species of slipper orchid, said to be worth about $500. On another of his Tibetan expeditions, he discovered the blue poppy, a flower that is sought by all Horticulturists in this country and obtained by few. To give an idea of the trying conditions under which he labored, consider that he discovered a new river, the Nam-Tamai, the lost source of the Irrawaddy, which no white man in 2,000 years of civilization had found. All along this river, through virgin forest, he and his small band trudged, meeting wild beasts and hostile bands of natives… He located a people … known only as...the Darus. These people had never seen a white man before Kingdon-Ward arrived. One of the most unusual plants he ever discovered was the rare Nomocharis farreri, a beautiful flower of China. This plant was found by accident and during the height of a violent rainstorm. The flower itself Is rose pink outside and dappled with royal purple inside. Each stem, from 12 to 15 inches in height, bears one, two, or three of the flowers, which grow as large as teacups. The flower which Captain Kingdon-Ward prizes most of all is the Campanula Calicola, "perhaps the most beautiful rock plant I discovered." It was found growing in limestone cliffs and is adaptable lo rock gardens. The Orient is rich in flowers. That land has given us many of our choice blooms. Roses come from India and China; pinks, carnations, and daffodils from Asia Minor; and numerous rare orchids come from the wilds of Tibet. Captain Kingdon-Ward describes a land of rare rhododendrons vividly in a book he wrote on his adventures in China and Asia. "You may wander for days ankle-deep through a chromatic surf of rhododendrons, rose pink, ivory white, lavender, plum purple, crimson and amber yellow. They are woven into carpets of queer design and ample pile, or form tuffets, or hassocks or mere tangles, mats, or brooms. "They spread and sprawl everywhere, bushy and twigulous, all; looming Into flower together; still looking across the dark ocean of moorland, you see the billowy hills crested with color; and, where escarpments break the even roll, the plant growth surges high up the rocks. It Is western Szechwan - the Tibetan marshes - [and] home of the 'Lapponicum' rhododendrons.

The Daily Gardener
July 1, 2019 Martagon Lilies, Vale of York Field Naturalists Club, Illinois State Flower, the Violet, Joseph Hooker, Ann Taylor, Tree in the House by Annabelle Hickson, Dividing Flag Iris, and Frank Kingdon-Ward

The Daily Gardener

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 1, 2019 9:48


Martagon Lilies are in peak right now in most gardens.  They bring the most wonderful architectural aspect and form to the garden; they are so very elegant.  Offering a Turk’s cap-style bloom, Like many plants, Martagon colonies get better and better with age. Martagons like sweet soil and they will be grateful for a dusting of lime every year.     Brevities #OTD  It was on this day in 1871, the Yorkshire Herald reported the first meeting of the Vale of York Field Naturalists Club. Although the weather was very unfavorable, forty-seven ladies and gentlemen (members and friends of the club) left the Society's Rooms, in Micklegate, in three four-horsed conveyances. When they reached Rivaulx ("ree-VOH")Abbey,  the company then broke up into small parties - geologists, botanists, and entomologists - and proceeded to examine the valley for their own specialities. "The geologists were interested with the sections laid bare in the quarries, and many interesting and beautiful fossils were found The botanists collected, amongst other plants, Saxiraga tridaclylitet (nailwort), Helianthemum vulqare (rock rose), Cuscuta Epithymum (clover dodder), Aquilegia vulgaris (columbine), Atropa Belladonna (belladonna or deadly nightshade), Polypodium Phegopterit (northern beech fern), P. Dryoplerit (oak fern), besides the common Scolopendrium vuigare (hart's-tongue fern). At six o'clock the party sat down to dinner at the Crown Hotel, Helmsley, which was served in Mr. and Mrs. Cowen's usual substantial style, after doing justice to which the Rev. Vice-President Rowe addressed those assembled on the advantages of natural history and the beauties and history of the Abbey, and also stated he would shortly bring a very interesting piece of information concerning it before the public, he being hon. secretary of the Architectural Society. It was arranged that the next monthly field day should be held at Bolton Abbey and Woods. They then left for home, after a most agreeable day, which left every one with the feeling that this the first excursion of the club was a great success."     #OTD  It was on this day in 1908 that Illinois adopted the Violet as its State Flower. As with many State Flowers, Illinois had decided to let the school children vote to decide on the state flower. The purple violet received 15,591 votes and the wild rose came in second with 11,903 votes. The children also decided the state tree and they selected the white oak.   Meanwhile newspapers were running a piece that blared the headline, "the reign of the violet is over". "Strange and unbelievable, but a fact, nevertheless, violets are no longer fashionable. Gardenias, orchids and American Beauty roses are as much in evidence as ever, but the reign of the violet is temporarily over. It is true that a large bunch of deep purple violets relieved by a single mauve orchid, a deep pink rose, or a single waxlike gardenia is still an acceptable gift, but it is not the gift that is so frequently' chosen this year, as a small cluster of gardenias or even of two or three exquisitely beautiful orchids... Roses are much in favor at the moment, ... A new flower hailing from Paris is the pink American Beauty, and well does it deserve the name...  the color is an adorable shade of shell pink, and for all decorative purposes tins flower has already a firmly established place in fashion's regard. ... one cannot but regret the sense of chivalry of a generation back, when etiquette demanded that flowers be sent always to a hostess before even the least formal entertainment, and when a debutante had better stay at home than go to a ball without her ... little bouquet of flowers."     #OTD   It was on this day in 1910 that the Allentown Democrat out of Allentown PA reported that Joseph Hooker was 93 years old. "Sir Joseph Hooker, the world-famous botanist, received a personal note of congratulations from King George today on the occasion of his ninety-third birthday. Sir Joseph, who is still remarkably active for a man of his great age, has had a long and brilliant career in his chosen field of science. As early as 1839 he accompanied the expedition of Sir James Ross to the Antarctic region. Later he conducted scientific expeditions to many parts of the world including Eastern Bengal, the Himalayas, the Khasia Mountains, Morocco and the Greater Atlas, New Zealand Ceylon, California and the Rocky Mountain region of North America. In the course of his active career he rendered invaluable services to the British arts, manufactures and commerce by promoting an accurate knowledge of the floras and economic vegetable products of the various colonies and dependencies of the empire."     Unearthed Words Today's poem is by Ann Taylor - an English poet and literary critic. In her youth she was a writer of verse for children, for which she achieved long-lasting popularity.  Her sister, Jane, wrote the words to "Twinkle, Twinkle, Little Star".   The Violet   Down in a green and shady bed, A modest violet grew; Its stalk was bent, it hung its head As if to hide from view.   And yet it was a lovely flower, Its color bright and fair; It might have graced a rosy bower, Instead of hiding there.   Yet thus it was content to bloom, In modest tints arrayed; And there diffused a sweet perfume, Within the silent shade.   Then let me to the valley go This pretty flower to see; That I may also learn to grow In sweet humility.     Today's book recommendation: Tree in the House by Annabelle Hickson A Tree in the House is stunning; an ode to flower arranging.  A Tree in the House celebrates the art of arranging flowers for celebrations big, small and in-between held throughout the year. Annabelle Hickson provides ideas and instructions for celebratory botanical installations and arrangements, each staged and photographed in different rural homes, gardens and sheds using the beauty of what's growing wild. Interspersed throughout are snapshots—in words and pictures—of rural life and that aspirational rustic country aesthetic.     Today's Garden Chore   Divide your Flag Iris after they finish blooming Regular division can re-invigorate your plant and promote healthy growth. The best time to divide flag iris is immediately after flowering. Lift the whole clump and use a sharp knife to detach new rhizomes. Don't forget that flag irises need full sun.       Something Sweet  Reviving the little botanic spark in your heart #OTD It was on this day in 1932, that newspapers around the world ran a fascinating article about the botanist Frank Kingdon-Ward titled "Plant Explorer Finds Adventure". "Captain Frank Klngdon-Ward, tall, well-built son of Britain, probably one of the world's most noted plant seekers, who has journeyed all over the world in search of rare flowers, has led a life as exciting as any explorer, and has given the world some of its most beautiful and rare blooms. Now In his late "40's, he is tanned from the winds and suns of tropical India, Asia, and the forbidden land of Tibet. He has collected flowers from the heights of the Himalayas, and from the depths of marshy Indian -jungles. His last expedition occurred In 1931. On It he discovered a new pass into Tibet 35,000 feet above sea level, through an out-flung range of the Himalayas. His efforts in prying through thick jungles and climbing high mountains were rewarded in the discovery of a new species of slipper orchid, said to be worth about $500. On another of his Tibetan expeditions, he discovered the blue poppy, a flower that is sought by all Horticulturists in this country and obtained by few. To give an idea of the trying conditions under which he labored, consider that he discovered a new river, the Nam-tamai, the lost source of the Irrawaddy which no white man in 2,000 years of civilization had found. Along this, river, through virgin forest, he and his small band trudged, meeting wild beasts and hostile bands of natives. Back in the wild country he located a people hitherto known only ; as a vaguely surmised race, the Darus. These people had never seen a white man before Kingdon-Ward arrived. One of the most unusual plants he ever discovered was the rare Nomocharis Farreh, a beautiful flower of China. This plant was found by accident and during the height of a violent rainstorm. The flower itself Is rose pink outside, and dappled with royal purple inside. Each stem, from 12 to 15 inches in height, bears one, two or three of the flowers, which grow as large as teacups. The flower which Captain Kingdon-Ward prizes most of all is the Campanula Calicola, "perhaps the most beautiful rock plant I discovered." It was found growing in limestone cliffs, and Is adaptable lo rock gardens. The Orient is rich in flowers. That land has given us many of our choice blooms. Roses come from India and China; pinks, carnations and daffodils from Asia Minor, and numerous rare orchids come from the wilds of Tibet. Captain Kingdon-Ward describes a land of rare rhododendrons vividly in a book he wrote on his adventures in China and Asia. "You may wander for days ankle-deep through a chromatic surf of rhododendrons, rose pink, ivory white, lavender, plum purple, crimson and amber yellow. They are woven into carpets of queer design and ample pile, or form tuffets, or hassocks or mere tangles, mats or brooms. "They spread and sprawl everywhere, bushy and twigulous, all; looming Into flower together; still looking across the dark ocean of moorland you see the billowy hills crested with color; and, where escarpments break the even roll, the plant growth surges high up the rocks, It Is western Szechwan, the Tibetan marshes. home of the 'Lapponicum' rhododendrons.     Thanks for listening to the daily gardener, and remember: "For a happy, healthy life, garden every day."

Elderberry Tales
The Magic Powder

Elderberry Tales

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 17, 2019 10:43


Once upon a time, in a little village on the banks of the Irrawaddy river, there lived a young woman called Thuza. She was very happily married to handsome young Theingi. But there was one problem that nagged Thuza – her husband believed he would find a way to turn dirt into gold! Did he succeed? Listen to this delightful tale from Myanmar to find out. Story by GreystrokeArt by P. G. Dinesh Thanks to Storyweaver and Pratham Books for making this story available via a Creative Commons License (https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Follow along HERE

TalkTravelAsia
Talk Travel Asia - Ep.93: Living Irrawaddy Dolphin Project with Paul Eshoo

TalkTravelAsia

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 15, 2019 24:30


On this episode of Talk Travel Asia Podcast, we chat with Paul Eshoo about the exotic Irrawaddy Dolphins: which live in rivers across Southeast Asia, including Myanmar, where today’s guest works with the Living Irrawaddy Dolphin Project.

Smarty Pants
#43: Burmese Daze

Smarty Pants

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 30, 2018 30:50


Since August 2017, in the country’s latest wave of Buddhist-on-Muslim violence, over 647,000 Rohingya refugees have fled Myanmar due to systemic violence and ethnic cleansing that has killed more than 10,000 people. Why is a religion seen as so peaceful in the West lashing out with such vehemence, and why are the Rohingya their target? And how did a seemingly local conflict erupt across the entire country? Journalist Francis Wade, who has reported in Myanmar for a decade, gives us the deep history, which stretches farther back than contemporary reports might suggest, and reveals a tangled web of interests: ultranationalist Buddhist monks, a military fearful of losing its grip on power, implicit racial hierarchies, and a democratic political party, led by Aung Sang Suu Kyi, whose very principles are called into question.Go beyond the episode:Francis Wade’s Myanmar’s Enemy Within: The Making of a Muslim “Other”Read the UNHCR’s report on the Rohingya emergencyDuring the reporting of “Massacre in Myanmar,” on the systemic destruction of Rohingya villages, two Reuters reporters were arrested by Myanmar security forces and are still in custodyHanna Beech asks in The New Yorker, “What Happened to Myanmar’s Human-Rights Icon?” For daily coverage of Myanmar politics, read The Irrawaddy Explore the Tea Circle, an Oxford forum for new perspective on Burma/MyanmarTune in every week to catch interviews with the liveliest voices from literature, the arts, sciences, history, and public affairs; reports on cutting-edge works in progress; long-form narratives; and compelling excerpts from new books. Hosted by Stephanie Bastek.Subscribe: iTunes • Feedburner • Stitcher • Google Play • Acast Have suggestions for projects you’d like us to catch up on, or writers you want to hear from? Send us a note: podcast [at] theamericanscholar [dot] org. And rate us on iTunes! Our theme music was composed by Nathan Prillaman.  See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Books That Speak
Mehnat ka Mantra (The Magic Powder - A Folktale from Myanmar) - Hindi Story

Books That Speak

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 26, 2017 9:00


Once upon a time, in a little village on the banks of the Irrawaddy river, there lived a young woman called Thuza. She was very happily married to handsome young Theingi. But there was one problem that nagged Thuza – her husband believed he would find a way to turn dirt into Gold! Did he succeed? Read this delightful tale from Myanmar to find out. Story written by Greystroke, translated into Hindi by Shobhit Mahajan, published by Pratham Books. Narrated by Asawari Doshi.

Up Late w/ The Disney Crew
Ep 002 "It's a Jungle Out Here"

Up Late w/ The Disney Crew

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 27, 2017 69:23


This week a "Brooke-less" Disney Crew travel, like gentlemen, down the dangerous Amazon, Irrawaddy, Nile, and Mekong rivers while discussing the infamous Disney Parks "1 Park 1 Hour 1 FP 1 Snack Challenge" before settling in for a lively debate about the merits of the announcements made at the recent D23 Expo. Pour yourself a glass and get ready to stay Up Late, with the Disney Crew.

Circle of Blue WaterNews
Salween River Dams Intrude on Contested Land

Circle of Blue WaterNews

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 8, 2016 15:34


The great rivers of Southeast Asia -- the Mekong, Irrawaddy, Salween, and others -- are targets for dozens of major dams that will transform the region's politics and ecology. The contest over the Mekong River is perhaps the most well-known, but conflict in the Salween basin is no less active. Fighting between the central government and ethnic groups has displaced thousands of people in recent years as national hydropower plans overlap with long-running political disputes. In a HotSpots H2O interview with Circle of Blue reporter Brett Walton, Dr. Carl Middleton discusses the strain that hydropower development is adding to one of the region's most politically, culturally, and biologically diverse watersheds. Dr. Middleton, director of the Center for Social Development Studies at Chulalongkorn University, in Bangkok, Thailand, also explores alternate futures for the Salween River. This is HotSpots Podcast Episode 03.

The Dirtbag Diaries
No Way Around It

The Dirtbag Diaries

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 2, 2016 38:10


Ben Stookesberry and Chris Korbulic are the expedition kayakers. Over the past decade, the duo have made first descents of over 120 rivers in wildly remote locations across 36 countries and 6 continents. In 2016, Ben and Chris traveled to Myanmar to complete a source to sea descent of the Irrawaddy River.  The both say it was the first time they failed completely to accomplish their objective--and also one of the richest experiences they've ever had.  "Had we floated freely down the Irrawaddy, I don't know that we would've learned nearly as much about what actually was going on," says Ben. "The corruption that's occurring in that area stopped us from running the river. It wasn't just a side note. It was directly in front of us."  Today we, bring you a story about the intersection of politics and adventure, and about the richness in failure.    You can read more about Ben and Chris's trip to Myanmar here. 

myanmar no way wayaround irrawaddy irrawaddy river ben stookesberry chris korbulic
THE FOOD SEEN
Episode 118: Naomi Daguid BURMA

THE FOOD SEEN

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 2, 2012 29:53


On today's THE FOOD SEEN, Naomi Duguid has spent her life exhaustively traveling and documenting the greater part of Southeast Asia. Her cookbooks have introduced the true cuisines of India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka, Cambodia, Laos, Thailand, Vietnam, greater China, and now Burma (aka Myanmar) Her latest tome, BURMA: Rivers of Flavor, explores SE Asia's largest country, a rarely traversed region sitting at the crossroad of India and China. Waterways up and down the Irrawaddy river, a year round growing season, plentiful rice paddies, and deeply personal cooking full of crispy fried shallots, turmeric, banana flowers, dried shrimp powder, curries, culminate with simple yet sensational national dishes like Mohinga, rice noodles with fish broth usually eaten as breakfast. Get your flavor passport ready! This program has been sponsored by Hearst Ranch. “The word ‘steamed' is not very appetizing to people when you think about meat… I don't know where this notion of ‘bland' comes from in in terms of steamed meat, when in fact, it's succulent.” [19:58] “There's a light-handedness to the flavoring [of Burmese food] that I find very interesting.” [24:27] — Naomi Duguid on THE FOOD SEEN

Konflikt
Burmas vägval - Kina eller Väst?

Konflikt

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 17, 2012 56:11


Om Burma och en ny spelplan som tar form för triangeldramat mellan Indien, USA och Kina när det slutna landet nu öppnar sig. Hör om en otålig omvärld som står i startgroparna och väntar på att komma åt Burmas väldiga naturrikedomar. Vi besöker dammbygget som stoppades efter omfattande protester. Men handlar det verkligen om en lyhördhet för folkets vilja eller en reaktion mot kinesisk dominans? Den senaste tiden har vi hört flera positiva nyheter från Burma, eller Myanmar, som landets tidigare ledare döpte landet till. Militärjuntan har släppt makten och landet styrs nu - i alla fall på ytan - av en civil regering. Ekonomin har liberaliserats, man har infört flytande växelkurs och reformerat budgetsystemet. Flera politiska fångar har frigivits, däribland fredspristagen och oppositionsledaren Aung San Suu Kyi. Hon ska nu ställa upp i fyllnadsvalet som hålls senare i vår, ett val som av många ses som en fingervisning om vart Burma egentligen är på väg. Är demokratiseringsprocessen reell och varaktig, eller bara en charad som militärerna spelar med i, med målet att få västvärlden att häva sina hårda sanktioner mot landet? Under många år har Burma bara haft en vän i omvärlden: Kina. Den väldiga grannen i norr har investerat i landets industrier och naturtillgångar, och på så vis hjälpt militärjuntan att hålla sig kvar vid makten. Så när Burmas regering förra året plötsligt bestämde sig för att stoppa ett stort kinesiskt dammbygge uppe i norra delen av landet så vållade det stor förvåning runt om i världen, och ilska i Peking. Men varför stoppades dammen? Var det på grund av de folkliga protesterna, eller fanns det andra orsaker, andra länder som låg bakom, pressade president Thein Sein att sätta stopp för Kinas inflytande? Margita Boström reste upp till Katchinstaten i norra Burma, där den stora och viktiga Irrawaddy-floden har sin mynning. Hon besökte evakueringsbyar och samhällen runt det planerade dammbygget, där människor känner rädsla inför vad ett allt starkare Kina kommer innebära. I Indien ser man gärna att rivalen Kinas expansion begränsas. Och frågan är om det var en slump att Burmas president Thein Sein meddelade beslutet att avbryta dammbygget bara några dagar innan han begav sig på sitt första och mycket betydelsefulla besök till just Indien. Efter att ha betraktat Burma som en del av Kinas intressesfär vill nu också indierna närma sig Burma. Det säger Abanti Bhattacharya vid institutionen för östasiatiska studier vid universitetet i New Dehli, som Konflikts Daniela Marquardt pratade med. Hon ringde också upp professor Ma Ying vid Shanghais insititut för internationella studier, för att höra den kinesiska synen på vad som händer i Burma. I Kina debatteras nu orsakerna till varför dammbygget stoppats, och den allmänna inställningen tycks vara att det bara är en tidsfråga innan bygget återupptas. För en vecka sedan skrev den engelskspråkiga tidningen China Daily om vattenkraftverket som ett legitimt projekt, som kommer att gagna båda länder och lokalbefolkningen. Chefen för det statliga kinesiska kraftbolaget förklarar att "Burma är vår vän och granne så vi hoppas att projeket kan komma igång igen så snart som möjligt." Ma Ying håller med - hon tror att turerna kring dammbygget bara rör sig om ett missförstånd. Den del av Burma där stormaktskampen mellan Indien och Kina märks allra tydligast är hamnstaden Sittwe, som är provinshuvudstad i Arakanstaten med runt 200 000 innevånare. Sjötrafiken har alltid varit livig här där tre floder mynnar ut i den Bengaliska bukten. Men staden saknar en riktigt hamn och de öppna träbåtarna trängs utmed den slitna piren i Sittwe, där det under Margita Boströms besök rådde festivalyra. Och en ny hamn byggs också - men inte för burmeserna... Om man vill förstå hur bilderna av Burma hänger samman - den kinesiska, den indiska och västs, hamnarna och dammarna och alla de andra stora ekonomiska projekten, och hur detta påverkar Burma idag, då är Thant Myint-U personen man ska vända sig till. Thant är historiker och skribent. Han är barnbarn till FNs tidigare generalsekreterare Thant U och har egen erfarenhet som FN-tjänsteman med uppdrag i såväl högkvarteret i New York, som Sarajevo och Phnom Penh. Hans senaste bok, som heter Where China meets India - där Kina möter Indien - kom ut förra året, och nu delar han sin tid mellan Rangoon, där han arbetar med utvecklingsprojekt, och Bangkok, där Konflikts Ivar Ekman nådde honom tidigare i veckan. Enligt Thant Myint-U är den dragkamp vi kan se på marken i Burma idag inte ny, utan resultatet av en månghundraårig utveckling. Programledare: Daniela Marquardt Producent: Lotten Collin