Podcasts about Okamura

Last time we spoke about the battle of Nanchang. After securing Hainan and targeting Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway corridors, Japan's 11th Army, backed by armor, air power, and riverine operations, sought a rapid, surgical seizure of Nanchang to sever eastern Chinese logistics and coerce Chongqing. China, reorganizing under Chiang Kai-shek, concentrated over 200,000 troops across 52 divisions in the Ninth and Third War Zones, with Xue Yue commanding the 9th War Zone in defense of Wuhan-Nanchang corridors. The fighting began with German-style, combined-arms river operations along the Xiushui and Gan rivers, including feints, river crossings, and heavy artillery, sometimes using poison gas. From March 20–23, Japanese forces established a beachhead and advanced into Fengxin, Shengmi, and later Nanchang, despite stiff Chinese resistance and bridges being destroyed. Chiang's strategic shift toward attrition pushed for broader offensives to disrupt railways and rear areas, though Chinese plans for a counteroffensive repeatedly stalled due to logistics and coordination issues. By early May, Japanese forces encircled and captured Nanchang, albeit at heavy cost, with Chinese casualties surpassing 43,000 dead and Japanese losses over 2,200 dead.    #187 The Battle of Suixian–Zaoyang-Shatow Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. Having seized Wuhan in a brutal offensive the previous year, the Japanese sought not just to hold their ground but to solidify their grip on this vital hub. Wuhan, a bustling metropolis at the confluence of the Yangtze and Han Rivers, had become a linchpin in their strategy, a base from which they could project power across central China. Yet, the city was far from secure, Chinese troops in northern Hubei and southern Henan, perched above the mighty Yangtze, posed an unrelenting threat. To relieve the mounting pressure on their newfound stronghold, the Japanese high command orchestrated a bold offensive against the towns of Suixian and Zaoyang. They aimed to annihilate the main force of the Chinese 5th War Zone, a move that would crush the Nationalist resistance in the region and secure their flanks. This theater of war, freshly designated as the 5th War Zone after the grueling Battle of Wuhan, encompassed a vast expanse west of Shashi in the upper Yangtze basin. It stretched across northern Hubei, southern Henan, and the rugged Dabie Mountains in eastern Anhui, forming a strategic bulwark that guarded the eastern approaches to Sichuan, the very heartland of the Nationalist government's central institutions. Historian Rana Mitter in Forgotten Ally described this zone as "a gateway of immense importance, a natural fortress that could either serve as a launchpad for offensives against Japanese-held territories or a defensive redoubt protecting the rear areas of Sichuan and Shaanxi". The terrain itself was a defender's dream and an attacker's nightmare: to the east rose the imposing Dabie Mountains, their peaks cloaked in mist and folklore; the Tongbai Mountains sliced across the north like a jagged spine; the Jing Mountains guarded the west; the Yangtze River snaked southward, its waters a formidable barrier; the Dahong Mountains dominated the center, offering hidden valleys for ambushes; and the Han River (also known as the Xiang River) carved a north-south path through it all. Two critical transport arteries—the Hanyi Road linking Hankou to Yichang in Hubei, and the Xianghua Road connecting Xiangyang to Huayuan near Hankou—crisscrossed this landscape, integrating the war zone into a web of mobility. From here, Chinese forces could menace the vital Pinghan Railway, that iron lifeline running from Beiping (modern Beijing) to Hankou, while also threatening the Wuhan region itself. In retreat, it provided a sanctuary to shield the Nationalist heartlands. As military strategist Sun Tzu might have appreciated, this area had long been a magnet for generals, its contours shaping the fates of empires since ancient times. Despite the 5th War Zone's intricate troop deployments, marked by units of varying combat prowess and a glaring shortage of heavy weapons, the Chinese forces made masterful use of the terrain to harass their invaders. Drawing from accounts in Li Zongren's memoirs, he noted how these defenders, often outgunned but never outmaneuvered, turned hills into fortresses and rivers into moats. In early April 1939, as spring rains turned paths to mud, Chinese troops ramped up their disruptions along the southern stretches of the Pinghan Railway, striking from both eastern and western flanks with guerrilla precision. What truly rattled the Japanese garrison in Wuhan was the arrival of reinforcements: six full divisions redeployed to Zaoyang, bolstering the Chinese capacity to launch flanking assaults that could unravel Japanese supply lines. Alarmed by this buildup, the Japanese 11th Army, ensconced in the Wuhan area under the command of General Yasuji Okamura, a figure whose tactical acumen would later earn him notoriety in the Pacific War, devised a daring plan. They intended to plunge deep into the 5th War Zone, smashing the core of the Chinese forces and rendering them impotent, thereby neutralizing the northwestern threat to Wuhan once and for all. From April onward, the Japanese mobilized with meticulous preparation, amassing troops equipped with formidable artillery, rumbling tanks, and squadrons of aircraft that darkened the skies. Historians estimate they committed roughly three and a half divisions to this endeavor, as detailed in Edward J. Drea's In the Service of the Emperor: Essays on the Imperial Japanese Army. Employing a classic pincer movement, a two-flank encirclement coupled with a central breakthrough, they aimed for a swift, decisive strike to obliterate the main Chinese force in the narrow Suixian-Zaoyang corridor, squeezed between the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains. The offensive erupted in full fury on May 1, 1939, as Japanese columns surged forward like a tidal wave, their engines roaring and banners fluttering in the dust-choked air. General Li Zongren, the commander of the 5th War Zone, a man whose leadership had already shone in earlier campaigns like the defense of Tai'erzhuang in 1938, issued urgent orders to cease offensive actions against the Japanese and pivot to a defensive stance. Based on intelligence about the enemy's dispositions, Li orchestrated a comprehensive campaign structure, assigning precise defensive roles and battle plans to each unit. This was no haphazard scramble; it was a symphony of strategy, as Li himself recounted in his memoirs, emphasizing the need to exploit the terrain's natural advantages. While various Chinese war zones executed the "April Offensive" from late April to mid-May, actively harrying and containing Japanese forces, the 5th War Zone focused its energies on the southern segment of the Pinghan Railway, assaulting it from both sides in a bid to disrupt logistics. The main force of the 31st Army Group, under the command of Tang Enbo, a general known for his aggressive tactics and later criticized for corruption, shifted from elsewhere in Hubei to Zaoyang, fortifying the zone and posing a dire threat to the Japanese flanks and rear areas. To counter this peril and safeguard transportation along the Wuhan-Pinghan Railway, the Japanese, led by the formidable Okamura, unleashed their assault from the line stretching through Xinyang, Yingshan, and Zhongxiang. Mobilizing the 3rd, 13th, and 16th Divisions alongside the 2nd and 4th Cavalry Brigades, they charged toward the Suixian-Zaoyang region in western Hubei, intent on eradicating the Chinese main force and alleviating the siege-like pressure on Wuhan. In a masterful reorganization, Li Zongren divided his forces into two army groups, the left and right, plus a dedicated river defense army. His strategy was a blend of attrition and opportunism: harnessing the Tongbai and Dahong Mountains, clinging to key towns like lifelines, and grinding down the Japanese through prolonged warfare while biding time for a counterstroke. This approach echoed the Fabian tactics of ancient Rome, wearing the enemy thin before delivering the coup de grâce. The storm broke at dawn on May 1, when the main contingents of the Japanese 16th and 13th Divisions, bolstered by the 4th Cavalry Brigade from their bases in Zhongxiang and Jingshan, hurled themselves against the Chinese 37th and 180th Divisions of the Right Army Group. Supported by droning aircraft that strafed from above and tanks that churned the earth below, the Japanese advanced with mechanical precision. By May 4, they had shattered the defensive lines flanking Changshoudian, then surged along the east bank of the Xiang River toward Zaoyang in a massive offensive. Fierce combat raged through May 5, as described in Japanese war diaries compiled in Senshi Sōsho (the official Japanese war history series), where soldiers recounted the relentless Chinese resistance amid the smoke and clamor. The Japanese finally breached the defenses, turning their fury on the 122nd Division of the 41st Army. In a heroic stand, the 180th Division clung to Changshoudian, providing cover for the main force's retreat along the east-west Huangqi'an line. The 37th Division fell back to the Yaojiahe line, while elements of the 38th Division repositioned into Liushuigou. On May 6, the Japanese seized Changshoudian, punched through Huangqi'an, and drove northward, unleashing a devastating assault on the 122nd Division's positions near Wenjiamiao. Undeterred, Chinese defenders executed daring flanking maneuvers in the Fenglehe, Yaojiahe, Liushuihe, Shuanghe, and Zhangjiaji areas, turning the landscape into a labyrinth of ambushes. May 7 saw the Japanese pressing on, capturing Zhangjiaji and Shuanghe. By May 8, they assaulted Maozifan and Xinji, where ferocious battles erupted, soldiers clashing in hand-to-hand combat amid the ruins. By May 10, the Japanese had overrun Huyang Town and Xinye, advancing toward Tanghe and the northeastern fringes of Zaoyang. Yet, the Tanghe River front witnessed partial Chinese recoveries: remnants of the Right Army Group, alongside troops from east of the Xianghe, reclaimed Xinye. The 122nd and 180th Divisions withdrew north of Tanghe and Fancheng, while the 37th, 38th, and 132nd Divisions steadfastly held the east bank of the Xianghe River. Concurrently, the main force of the Japanese 3rd Division launched from Yingshan against the 84th and 13th Armies of the 11th Group Army in the Suixian sector. After a whirlwind of combat, the Chinese 84th Army retreated to the Taerwan position. On May 2, the 3rd Division targeted the Gaocheng position of the 13th Army within the 31st Group Army; the ensuing clashes in Taerwan and Gaocheng were a maelstrom of fire, with the Taerwan position exchanging hands multiple times like a deadly game of tug-of-war. By May 4, in a grim escalation, Japanese forces deployed poison gas, a violation of international norms that drew condemnation and is documented in Allied reports from the era, inflicting horrific casualties and compelling the Chinese to relinquish Gaocheng, which fell into enemy hands. On May 5, backed by aerial bombardments, tank charges, and artillery barrages, the Japanese renewed their onslaught along the Gaocheng River and the Lishan-Jiangjiahe line. By May 6, the beleaguered Chinese were forced back to the Tianhekou and Gaocheng line. Suixian succumbed on May 7. On May 8, the Japanese shattered the second line of the 84th Army, capturing Zaoyang and advancing on the Jiangtoudian position of the 85th Army. To evade encirclement, the defenders mounted a valiant resistance before withdrawing from Jiangtoudian; the 84th Army relocated to the Tanghe and Baihe areas, while the 39th Army embedded itself in the Dahongshan for guerrilla operations—a tactic that would bleed the Japanese through hit-and-run warfare, as noted in guerrilla warfare studies by Mao Zedong himself. By May 10, the bulk of the 31st Army Group maneuvered toward Tanghe, reaching north of Biyang by May 15. From Xinyang, Japanese forces struck at Tongbai on May 8; by May 10, elements from Zaoyang advanced to Zhangdian Town and Shangtun Town. In response, the 68th Army of the 1st War Zone dispatched the 143rd Division to defend Queshan and Minggang, and the 119th Division to hold Tongbai. After staunchly blocking the Japanese, they withdrew on May 11 to positions northwest and southwest of Tongbai, shielding the retreat of 5th War Zone units. The Japanese 4th Cavalry Brigade drove toward Tanghe, seizing Tanghe County on May 12. But the tide was turning. In a brilliant reversal, the Fifth War Zone commanded the 31st Army Group, in concert with the 2nd Army Group from the 1st War Zone, to advance from southwestern Henan. Their mission: encircle the bulk of Japanese forces on the Xiangdong Plain and deliver a crushing blow. The main force of the 33rd Army Group targeted Zaoyang, while other units pinned down Japanese rear guards in Zhongxiang. The Chinese counteroffensive erupted with swift successes, Tanghe County was recaptured on May 14, and Tongbai liberated on May 16, shattering the Japanese encirclement scheme. On May 19, after four grueling days of combat, Chinese forces mauled the retreating Japanese, reclaiming Zaoyang and leaving the fields strewn with enemy dead. The 39th Army of the Left Army Group dispersed into the mountains for guerrilla warfare, a shadowy campaign of sabotage and surprise. Forces of the Right Army Group east of the river, along with river defense units, conducted relentless raids on Japanese rears and supply lines over multiple days, sowing chaos before withdrawing to the west bank of the Xiang River on May 21. On May 22, they pressed toward Suixian, recapturing it on May 23. The Japanese, battered and depleted, retreated to their original garrisons in Zhongxiang and Yingshan, restoring the pre-war lines as the battle drew to a close. Throughout this clash, the Chinese held a marked superiority in manpower and coordination, though their deployments lacked full flexibility, briefly placing them on the defensive. After protracted, blood-soaked fighting, they restored the original equilibrium. Despite grievous losses, the Chinese thwarted the Japanese encirclement and exacted a heavy toll, reports from the time, corroborated by Japanese records in Senshi Sōsho, indicate over 13,000 Japanese killed or wounded, with more than 5,000 corpses abandoned on the battlefield. This fulfilled the strategic goal of containing and eroding Japanese strength. Chinese casualties surpassed 25,000, a testament to the ferocity of the struggle. The 5th War Zone seized the initiative in advances and retreats, deftly shifting to outer lines and maintaining positional advantages. As Japanese forces withdrew, Chinese pursuers harried and obstructed them, yielding substantial victories. The Battle of Suizao spanned less than three weeks. The Japanese main force pierced defenses on the east bank of the Han River, advancing to encircle one flank as planned. However, the other two formations met fierce opposition near Suixian and northward, stalling their progress. Adapting to the battlefield's ebb and flow, the Fifth War Zone transformed its tactics: the main force escaped encirclement, maneuvered to outer lines for offensives, and exploited terrain to hammer the Japanese. The pivotal order to flip from defense to offense doomed the encirclement; with the counterattack triumphant, the Japanese declined to hold and retreated. The Chinese pursued with unyielding vigor. By May 24, they had reclaimed Zaoyang, Tongbai, and other locales. Save for Suixian County, the Japanese had fallen back to pre-war positions, reinstating the regional status quo. Thus, the battle concluded, a chapter of resilience etched into the chronicles of China's defiance. In the sweltering heat of southern China, where the humid air clung to every breath like a persistent fog, the Japanese General Staff basked in what they called a triumphant offensive and defensive campaign in Guangdong. But victory, as history so often teaches, is a double-edged sword. By early 1939, the strain was palpable. Their secret supply line snaking from the British colony of Hong Kong to the Chinese mainland was under constant disruption, raids by shadowy guerrilla bands, opportunistic smugglers, and the sheer unpredictability of wartime logistics turning what should have been a lifeline into a leaky sieve. Blockading the entire coastline? A pipe dream, given the vast, jagged shores of Guangdong, dotted with hidden coves and fishing villages that had evaded imperial edicts for centuries. Yet, the General Staff's priorities were unyielding, laser-focused on strangling the Nationalist capital of Chongqing through a relentless blockade. This meant the 21st Army, that workhorse of the Japanese invasion force, had to stay in the fight—no rest for the weary. Drawing from historical records like the Senshi Sōsho (War History Series) compiled by Japan's National Institute for Defense Studies, we know that after the 21st Army reported severing what they dubbed the "secret transport line" at Xinhui, a gritty, hard-fought skirmish that left the local landscape scarred with craters and abandoned supply crates, the General Staff circled back to the idea of a full coastal blockade. It was a classic case of military opportunism: staff officers, poring over maps in dimly lit war rooms in Tokyo, suddenly "discovered" Shantou as a major port. Not just any port, mind you, but a bustling hub tied to the heartstrings of Guangdong's overseas Chinese communities. Shantou and nearby Chao'an weren't mere dots on a map; they were the ancestral hometowns of countless Chaoshan people who had ventured abroad to Southeast Asia, sending back remittances that flowed like lifeblood into the region. Historical economic studies, such as those in The Overseas Chinese in the People's Republic of China by Stephen Fitzgerald, highlight how these funds from the Chaoshan diaspora, often funneled through family networks in places like Singapore and Thailand, were substantial, indirectly fueling China's war effort by sustaining local economies and even purchasing arms on the black market. The Chao-Shao Highway, that dusty artery running near Shantou, was pinpointed as a critical vein connecting Hong Kong's ports to the mainland's interior. So, in early June 1939, the die was cast: Army Order No. 310 thundered from headquarters, commanding the 21st Army to seize Shantou. The Chief of the General Staff himself provided the strategic blueprint, a personal touch that underscored the operation's gravity. The Army Department christened the Chaoshan push "Operation Hua," a nod perhaps to the flowery illusions of easy conquest, while instructing the Navy Department to tag along for the ride. In naval parlance, it became "Operation J," a cryptic label that masked the sheer scale unfolding. Under the Headquarters' watchful eye, what started as a modest blockade morphed into a massive amphibious assault, conjured seemingly out of thin air like a magician's trick, but one with deadly props. The 5th Fleet's orders mobilized an impressive lineup: the 9th Squadron for heavy hitting, the 5th Mine Boat Squadron to clear watery hazards, the 12th and 21st Sweeper Squadrons sweeping for mines like diligent janitors of the sea, the 45th Destroyer Squadron adding destroyer muscle, and air power from the 3rd Combined Air Group (boasting 24 land-based attack aircraft and 9 reconnaissance planes that could spot a fishing boat from miles away). Then there was the Chiyoda Air Group with its 9 reconnaissance aircraft, the Guangdong Air Group contributing a quirky airship and one more recon plane, the 9th Special Landing Squadron from Sasebo trained for beach assaults, and a flotilla of special ships for logistics. On the ground, the 21st Army threw in the 132nd Brigade from the 104th Division, beefed up with the 76th Infantry Battalion, two mountain artillery battalions for lobbing shells over rugged terrain, two engineer battalions to bridge rivers and clear paths, a light armored vehicle platoon rumbling with mechanized menace, and a river-crossing supplies company to keep the troops fed and armed. All under the command of Brigade Commander Juro Goto, a stern officer whose tactical acumen was forged in earlier Manchurian campaigns. The convoy's size demanded rehearsals; the 132nd Brigade trained for boat transfers at Magong in the Penghu Islands, practicing the precarious dance of loading men and gear onto rocking vessels under simulated fire. Secrecy shrouded the whole affair, many officers and soldiers, boarding ships in the dead of night, whispered among themselves that they were finally heading home to Japan, a cruel ruse to maintain operational security. For extra punch, the 21st Army tacked on the 31st Air Squadron for air support, their planes droning like angry hornets ready to sting. This overkill didn't sit well with everyone. Lieutenant General Ando Rikichi, the pragmatic commander overseeing Japanese forces in the region, must have fumed in his Guangzhou headquarters. His intelligence staff, drawing from intercepted radio chatter and local spies as noted in postwar analyses like The Japanese Army in World War II by Gordon L. Rottman, reported that the Chongqing forces in Chaozhou were laughably thin: just the 9th Independent Brigade, a couple of security regiments, and ragtag "self-defense groups" of armed civilians. Why unleash such a sledgehammer on a fly? The mobilization's magnitude even forced a reshuffling of defenses around Guangzhou, pulling resources from the 12th Army's front lines and overburdening the already stretched 18th Division. It was bureaucratic overreach at its finest, a testament to the Imperial Staff's penchant for grand gestures over tactical efficiency. Meanwhile, on the Nationalist side, the winds of war carried whispers of impending doom. The National Revolutionary Army's war histories, such as those compiled in the Zhongguo Kangri Zhanzheng Shi (History of China's War of Resistance Against Japan), note that Chiang Kai-shek's Military Commission had snagged intelligence as early as February 1939 about Japan's plans for a large-scale invasion of Shantou. The efficiency of the Military Command's Second Bureau and the Military Intelligence Bureau was nothing short of astonishing, networks of agents, double agents, and radio intercepts piercing the veil of Japanese secrecy. Even as the convoy slipped out of Penghu, a detailed report outlining operational orders landed on Commander Zhang Fakui's desk, the ink still fresh. Zhang, a battle-hardened strategist whose career spanned the Northern Expedition and beyond , had four months to prepare for what would be dubbed the decisive battle of Chaoshan. Yet, in a move that baffled some contemporaries, he chose not to fortify and defend it tooth and nail. After the Fourth War Zone submitted its opinions, likely heated debates in smoke-filled command posts, Chiang Kai-shek greenlit the plan. By March, the Military Commission issued its strategic policy: when the enemy hit Chaoshan, a sliver of regular troops would team up with civilian armed forces for mobile and guerrilla warfare, grinding down the invaders like sandpaper on steel. The orders specified guerrilla zones in Chaozhou, Jiaxing, and Huizhou, unifying local militias under a banner of "extensive guerrilla warfare" to coordinate with regular army maneuvers, gradually eroding the Japanese thrust. In essence, the 4th War Zone wasn't tasked with holding Chao'an and Shantou at all costs; instead, they'd strike hard during the landing, then let guerrillas harry the occupiers post-capture. It was a doctrine of attrition in a "confined battlefield," honing skills through maneuver and ambush. Remarkably, the fall of these cities was preordained by the Military Commission three months before the Japanese even issued their orders, a strategic feint that echoed ancient Sun Tzu tactics of yielding ground to preserve strength. To execute this, the 4th War Zone birthed the Chao-Jia-Hui Guerrilla Command after meticulous preparation, with General Zou Hong, head of Guangdong's Security Bureau and a no-nonsense administrator known for his anti-smuggling campaigns, taking the helm. In just three months, Zhang Fakui scraped together the Independent 9th Brigade, the 2nd, 4th, and 5th Guangdong Provincial Security Regiments, and the Security Training Regiment. Even with the 9th Army Group lurking nearby, he handed the reins of the Chao-Shan operation to the 12th Army Group's planners. Their March guidelines sketched three lines of resistance from the coast to the mountains, a staged withdrawal that allowed frontline defenders to melt away like ghosts. This blueprint mirrored Chiang Kai-shek's post-Wuhan reassessment, where the loss of that key city in 1938 prompted a shift to protracted warfare. A Xinhua News Agency columnist later summed it up scathingly: "The Chongqing government, having lost its will to resist, colludes with the Japanese and seeks to eliminate the Communists, adopting a policy of passive resistance." This narrative, propagated by Communist sources, dogged Chiang and the National Revolutionary Army for decades, painting them as defeatists even as they bled the Japanese dry through attrition. February 1939 saw Commander Zhang kicking off a reorganization of the 12th Army Group, transforming it from a patchwork force into something resembling a modern army. He could have hunkered down, assigning troops to a desperate defense of Chaoshan, but that would have handed the initiative to the overcautious Japanese General Staff, whose activism often bordered on paranoia. Zhang, with the wisdom of a seasoned general who had navigated the treacherous politics of pre-war China, weighed the scales carefully. His vision? Forge the 12th Army Group into a nimble field army, not squander tens of thousands on a secondary port. Japan's naval and air dominance—evident in the devastation of Shanghai in 1937, meant Guangdong's forces could be pulverized in Shantou just as easily. Losing Chaozhou and Shantou? Acceptable, if it preserved core strength for the long haul. Post-Xinhui, Zhang doubled down on resistance, channeling efforts into live-fire exercises for the 12th Army, turning green recruits into battle-ready soldiers amid the Guangdong hills. The war's trajectory after 1939 would vindicate him: his forces became pivotal in later counteroffensives, proving that a living army trumped dead cities. Opting out of a static defense, Zhang pivoted to guerrilla warfare to bleed the Japanese while clutching strategic initiative. He ordered local governments to whip up coastal guerrilla forces from Chao'an to Huizhou—melding militias, national guards, police, and private armed groups into official folds. These weren't elite shock troops, but in wartime's chaos, they controlled locales effectively, disrupting supply lines and gathering intel. For surprises, he unleashed two mobile units: the 9th Independent Brigade and the 20th Independent Brigade. Formed fresh after the War of Resistance erupted, these brigades shone for their efficiency within the cumbersome Guangdong Army structure. Division-level units were too bulky for spotty communications, so Yu Hanmou's command birthed these independent outfits, staffed with crack officers. The 9th, packing direct-fire artillery for punch, and the 20th, dubbed semi-mechanized for its truck-borne speed, prowled the Chaoshan–Huizhou coast from 1939. Zhang retained their three-regiment setup, naming Hua Zhenzhong and Zhang Shou as commanders, granting them autonomy to command in the field like roving wolves. As the 9th Independent Brigade shifted to Shantou, its 627th Regiment was still reorganizing in Heyuan, a logistical hiccup amid the scramble. Hua Zhenzhong, a commander noted for his tactical flexibility in regional annals, deployed the 625th Regiment and 5th Security Regiment along the coast, with the 626th as reserve in Chao'an. Though the Fourth War Zone had written off Chaoshan, Zhang yearned to showcase Guangdong grit before the pullback. Dawn broke on June 21, 1939, at 4:30 a.m., with Japanese reconnaissance planes slicing through the fog over Shantou, Anbu, and Nanbeigang, ghostly silhouettes against the gray sky. By 5:30, the mist lifted, revealing a nightmare armada: over 40 destroyers and 70–80 landing craft churning toward the coast on multiple vectors, their hulls cutting the waves like knives. The 626th Regiment's 3rd Battalion at Donghushan met the first wave with a hail of fire from six light machine guns, repelling the initial boats in a frenzy of splashes and shouts. But the brigade's long-range guns couldn't stem the tide; Hua focused on key chokepoints, aiming to bloody the invaders rather than obliterate them. By morning, the 3rd Battalion of the 625th Regiment charged into Shantou City, joined by the local police corps digging in amid urban sprawl. Combat raged at Xinjin Port and the airport's fringes, where Nationalist troops traded shots with advancing Japanese under the absent shadow of a Chinese navy. Japanese naval guns, massed offshore, pounded the outskirts like thunder gods in fury. By 2:00 a.m. on the 22nd, Shantou crumpled as defenders' ammo ran dry, the city falling in a haze of smoke and echoes. Before the loss, Hua had positioned the 1st Battalion of the 5th Security Regiment at Anbu, guarding the road to Chao'an. Local lore, preserved in oral histories collected by the Chaozhou Historical Society, recalls Battalion Commander Du Ruo leading from the front, rifle in hand, but Japanese barrages, bolstered by superior firepower—forced a retreat. Post-capture, Tokyo's forces paused to consolidate, unleashing massacres on fleeing civilians in the outskirts. A flotilla of civilian boats, intercepted at sea, became a grim training ground for bayonet drills, a barbarity echoed in survivor testimonies compiled in The Rape of Nanking and Beyond extensions to Guangdong atrocities. With Shantou gone, Hua pivoted to flank defense, orchestrating night raids on Japanese positions around Anbu and Meixi. On June 24th, Major Du Ruo spearheaded an assault into Anbu but fell gravely wounded amid the chaos. Later, the 2nd Battalion of the 626th overran spots near Meixi. A Japanese sea-flanking maneuver targeted Anbu, but Nationalists held at Liulong, sparking nocturnal clashes, grenade volleys, bayonet charges, and hand-to-hand brawls that drained both sides like a slow bleed. June 26th saw the 132nd Brigade lumber toward Chao'an. Hua weighed options: all-out assault or guerrilla fade? He chose to dig in on the outskirts, reserving two companies of the 625th and a special ops battalion in the city. The 27th brought a day-long Japanese onslaught, culminating in Chao'an's fall after fierce rear-guard actions by the 9th Independent Brigade. Evacuations preceded the collapse, with Japanese propaganda banners fluttering falsely, claiming Nationalists had abandoned defense. Yet Hua's call preserved his brigade for future fights; the Japanese claimed an empty prize. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese operations had yet again plugged up supply leaks into Nationalist China. The fall of Suixian, Zaoyang and Shantou were heavy losses for the Chinese war effort. However the Chinese were also able to exact heavy casualties on the invaders and thwarted their encirclement attempts. China was still in the fight for her life.

Last time we spoke about the climax of the battle of Lake Khasan. In August, the Lake Khasan region became a tense theater of combat as Soviet and Japanese forces clashed around Changkufeng and Hill 52. The Soviets pushed a multi-front offensive, bolstered by artillery, tanks, and air power, yet the Japanese defenders held firm, aided by engineers, machine guns, and heavy guns. By the ninth and tenth, a stubborn Japanese resilience kept Hill 52 and Changkufeng in Japanese hands, though the price was steep and the field was littered with the costs of battle. Diplomatically, both sides aimed to confine the fighting and avoid a larger war. Negotiations trudged on, culminating in a tentative cease-fire draft for August eleventh: a halt to hostilities, positions to be held as of midnight on the tenth, and the creation of a border-demarcation commission. Moscow pressed for a neutral umpire; Tokyo resisted, accepting a Japanese participant but rejecting a neutral referee. The cease-fire was imperfect, with miscommunications and differing interpretations persisting.    #185 Operation Hainan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After what seemed like a lifetime over in the northern border between the USSR and Japan, today we are returning to the Second Sino-Japanese War. Now I thought it might be a bit jarring to dive into it, so let me do a brief summary of where we are at, in the year of 1939. As the calendar turned to 1939, the Second Sino-Japanese War, which had erupted in July 1937 with the Marco Polo Bridge Incident and escalated into full-scale conflict, had evolved into a protracted quagmire for the Empire of Japan. What began as a swift campaign to subjugate the Republic of China under Chiang Kai-shek had, by the close of 1938, transformed into a war of attrition. Japanese forces, under the command of generals like Shunroku Hata and Yasuji Okamura, had achieved stunning territorial gains: the fall of Shanghai in November 1937 after a brutal three-month battle that cost over 200,000 Chinese lives; the infamous capture of Nanjing in December 1937, marked by the Nanjing Massacre where an estimated 300,000 civilians and disarmed soldiers were killed in a six-week orgy of violence; and the sequential occupations of Xuzhou in May 1938, Wuhan in October 1938, and Guangzhou that same month.  These victories secured Japan's control over China's eastern seaboard, major riverine arteries like the Yangtze, and key industrial centers, effectively stripping the Nationalists of much of their economic base. Yet, despite these advances, China refused to capitulate. Chiang's government had retreated inland to the mountainous stronghold of Chongqing in Sichuan province, where it regrouped amid the fog-laden gorges, drawing on the vast human reserves of China's interior and the resilient spirit of its people. By late 1938, Japanese casualties had mounted to approximately 50,000 killed and 200,000 wounded annually, straining the Imperial Japanese Army's resources and exposing the vulnerabilities of overextended supply lines deep into hostile territory. In Tokyo, the corridors of the Imperial General Headquarters and the Army Ministry buzzed with urgent deliberations during the winter of 1938-1939. The initial doctrine of "quick victory" through decisive battles, epitomized by the massive offensives of 1937 and 1938, had proven illusory. Japan's military planners, influenced by the Kwantung Army's experiences in Manchuria and the ongoing stalemate, recognized that China's sheer size, with its 4 million square miles and over 400 million inhabitants, rendered total conquest unfeasible without unacceptable costs. Intelligence reports highlighted the persistence of Chinese guerrilla warfare, particularly in the north where Communist forces under Mao Zedong's Eighth Route Army conducted hit-and-run operations from bases in Shanxi and Shaanxi, sabotaging railways and ambushing convoys. The Japanese response included brutal pacification campaigns, such as the early iterations of what would later formalize as the "Three Alls Policy" (kill all, burn all, loot all), aimed at devastating rural economies and isolating resistance pockets. But these measures only fueled further defiance. By early 1939, a strategic pivot was formalized: away from direct annihilation of Chinese armies toward a policy of economic strangulation. This "blockade and interdiction" approach sought to sever China's lifelines to external aid, choking off the flow of weapons, fuel, and materiel that sustained the Nationalist war effort. As one Japanese staff officer noted in internal memos, the goal was to "starve the dragon in its lair," acknowledging the limits of Japanese manpower, total forces in China numbered around 1 million by 1939, against China's inexhaustible reserves. Central to this new strategy were the three primary overland supply corridors that had emerged as China's backdoors to the world, compensating for the Japanese naval blockade that had sealed off most coastal ports since late 1937. The first and most iconic was the Burma Road, a 717-mile engineering marvel hastily constructed between 1937 and 1938 by over 200,000 Chinese and Burmese laborers under the direction of engineers like Chih-Ping Chen. Stretching from the railhead at Lashio in British Burma (modern Myanmar) through treacherous mountain passes and dense jungles to Kunming in Yunnan province, the road navigated elevations up to 7,000 feet with hundreds of hairpin turns and precarious bridges. By early 1939, it was operational, albeit plagued by monsoonal mudslides, banditry, and mechanical breakdowns of the imported trucks, many Ford and Chevrolet models supplied via British Rangoon. Despite these challenges, it funneled an increasing volume of aid: in 1939 alone, estimates suggest up to 10,000 tons per month of munitions, gasoline, and aircraft parts from Allied sources, including early Lend-Lease precursors from the United States. The road's completion in 1938 had been a direct response to the loss of southern ports, and its vulnerability to aerial interdiction made it a prime target in Japanese planning documents. The second lifeline was the Indochina route, centered on the French-built Yunnan-Vietnam Railway (also known as the Hanoi-Kunming Railway), a 465-mile narrow-gauge line completed in 1910 that linked the port of Haiphong in French Indochina to Kunming via Hanoi and Lao Cai. This colonial artery, supplemented by parallel roads and river transport along the Red River, became China's most efficient supply conduit in 1938-1939, exploiting France's uneasy neutrality. French authorities, under Governor-General Pierre Pasquier and later Georges Catroux, turned a blind eye to transshipments, allowing an average of 15,000 to 20,000 tons monthly in early 1939, far surpassing the Burma Road's initial capacity. Cargoes included Soviet arms rerouted via Vladivostok and American oil, with French complicity driven by anti-Japanese sentiment and profitable tolls. However, Japanese reconnaissance flights from bases in Guangdong noted the vulnerability of bridges and rail yards, leading to initial bombing raids by mid-1939. Diplomatic pressure mounted, with Tokyo issuing protests to Paris, foreshadowing the 1940 closure under Vichy France after the fall of France in Europe. The route's proximity to the South China Sea made it a focal point for Japanese naval strategists, who viewed it as a "leak in the blockade." The third corridor, often overlooked but critical, was the Northwest Highway through Soviet Central Asia and Xinjiang province. This overland network, upgraded between 1937 and 1941 with Soviet assistance, connected the Turkestan-Siberian Railway at Almaty (then Alma-Ata) to Lanzhou in Gansu via Urumqi, utilizing a mix of trucks, camel caravans, and rudimentary roads across the Gobi Desert and Tian Shan mountains. Under the Sino-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact of August 1937 and subsequent aid agreements, Moscow supplied China with over 900 aircraft, 82 tanks, 1,300 artillery pieces, and vast quantities of ammunition and fuel between 1937 and 1941—much of it traversing this route. In 1938-1939, volumes peaked, with Soviet pilots and advisors even establishing air bases in Lanzhou. The highway's construction involved tens of thousands of Chinese laborers, facing harsh winters and logistical hurdles, but it delivered up to 2,000 tons monthly, including entire fighter squadrons like the Polikarpov I-16. Japanese intelligence, aware of this "Red lifeline," planned disruptions but were constrained by the ongoing Nomonhan Incident on the Manchurian-Soviet border in 1939, which diverted resources and highlighted the risks of provoking Moscow. These routes collectively sustained China's resistance, prompting Japan's high command to prioritize their severance. In March 1939, the South China Area Army was established under General Rikichi Andō (later succeeded by Field Marshal Hisaichi Terauchi), headquartered in Guangzhou, with explicit orders to disrupt southern communications. Aerial campaigns intensified, with Mitsubishi G3M "Nell" bombers from Wuhan and Guangzhou targeting Kunming's airfields and the Red River bridges, while diplomatic maneuvers pressured colonial powers: Britain faced demands during the June 1939 Tientsin Crisis to close the Burma Road, and France received ultimatums that culminated in the 1940 occupation of northern Indochina. Yet, direct assaults on Yunnan or Guangxi were deemed too arduous due to rugged terrain and disease risks. Instead, planners eyed peripheral objectives to encircle these arteries. This strategic calculus set the stage for the invasion of Hainan Island, a 13,000-square-mile landmass off Guangdong's southern coast, rich in iron and copper but strategically priceless for its position astride the Indochina route and proximity to Hong Kong. By February 1939, Japanese admirals like Nobutake Kondō of the 5th Fleet advocated seizure to establish air and naval bases, plugging blockade gaps and enabling raids on Haiphong and Kunming, a prelude to broader southern expansion that would echo into the Pacific War. Now after the fall campaign around Canton in autumn 1938, the Japanese 21st Army found itself embedded in a relentless effort to sever the enemy's lifelines. Its primary objective shifted from mere battlefield engagements to tightening the choke points of enemy supply, especially along the Canton–Hankou railway. Recognizing that war materiel continued to flow into the enemy's hands, the Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army to strike at every other supply route, one by one, until the arteries of logistics were stifled. The 21st Army undertook a series of decisive occupations to disrupt transport and provisioning from multiple directions. To sustain these difficult campaigns, Imperial General Headquarters reinforced the south China command, enabling greater operational depth and endurance. The 21st Army benefited from a series of reinforcements during 1939, which allowed a reorganization of assignments and missions: In late January, the Iida Detachment was reorganized into the Formosa Mixed Brigade and took part in the invasion of Hainan Island.  Hainan, just 15 miles across the Qiongzhou Strait from the mainland, represented a critical "loophole": it lay astride the Gulf of Tonkin, enabling smuggling of arms and materiel from Haiphong to Kunming, and offered potential airfields for bombing raids deep into Yunnan. Japanese interest in Hainan dated to the 1920s, driven by the Taiwan Governor-General's Office, which eyed the island's tropical resources (rubber, iron, copper) and naval potential at ports like Sanya (Samah). Prewar surveys by Japanese firms, such as those documented in Ide Kiwata's Minami Shina no Sangyō to Keizai (1939), highlighted mineral wealth and strategic harbors. The fall of Guangzhou in October 1938 provided the perfect launchpad, but direct invasion was delayed until early 1939 amid debates between the IJA (favoring mainland advances) and IJN (prioritizing naval encirclement). The operation would also heavily align with broader "southward advance" (Nanshin-ron) doctrine foreshadowing invasions of French Indochina (1940) and the Pacific War. On the Chinese side, Hainan was lightly defended as part of Guangdong's "peace preservation" under General Yu Hanmou. Two security regiments, six guard battalions, and a self-defense corps, totaling around 7,000–10,000 poorly equipped troops guarded the island, supplemented by roughly 300 Communist guerrillas under Feng Baiju, who operated independently in the interior. The indigenous Li (Hlai) people in the mountainous south, alienated by Nationalist taxes, provided uneven support but later allied with Communists. The Imperial General Headquarters ordered the 21st Army, in cooperation with the Navy, to occupy and hold strategic points on the island near Haikou-Shih. The 21st Army commander assigned the Formosa Mixed Brigade to carry out this mission. Planning began in late 1938 under the IJN's Fifth Fleet, with IJA support from the 21st Army. The objective: secure northern and southern landing sites to bisect the island, establish air/naval bases, and exploit resources. Vice Admiral Nobutake Kondō, commanding the fleet, emphasized surprise and air superiority. The invasion began under the cover of darkness on February 9, 1939, when Kondō's convoy entered Tsinghai Bay on the northern shore of Hainan and anchored at midnight. Japanese troops swiftly disembarked, encountering minimal initial resistance from the surprised Chinese defenders, and secured a beachhead in the northern zone. At 0300 hours on 10 February, the Formosa Mixed Brigade, operating in close cooperation with naval units, executed a surprise landing at the northeastern point of Tengmai Bay in north Hainan. By 04:30, the right flank reached the main road leading to Fengyingshih, while the left flank reached a position two kilometers south of Tienwei. By 07:00, the right flank unit had overcome light enemy resistance near Yehli and occupied Chiungshan. At that moment there were approximately 1,000 elements of the enemy's 5th Infantry Brigade (militia) at Chiungshan; about half of these troops were destroyed, and the remainder fled into the hills south of Tengmai in a state of disarray. Around 08:30 that same day, the left flank unit advanced to the vicinity of Shuchang and seized Hsiuying Heights. By 12:00, it occupied Haikou, the island's northern port city and administrative center, beginning around noon. Army and navy forces coordinated to mop up remaining pockets of resistance in the northern areas, overwhelming the scattered Chinese security units through superior firepower and organization. No large-scale battles are recorded in primary accounts; instead, the engagements were characterized by rapid advances and localized skirmishes, as the Chinese forces, lacking heavy artillery or air support, could not mount a sustained defense. By the end of the day, Japanese control over the north was consolidating, with Haikou falling under their occupation.Also on 10 February, the Brigade pushed forward to seize Cingang. Wenchang would be taken on the 22nd, followed by Chinglan Port on the 23rd. On February 11, the operation expanded southward when land combat units amphibiously assaulted Samah (now Sanya) at the island's southern tip. This landing allowed them to quickly seize key positions, including the port of Yulin (Yulinkang) and the town of Yai-Hsien (Yaxian, now part of Sanya). With these southern footholds secured, Japanese forces fanned out to subjugate the rest of the island, capturing inland areas and infrastructure with little organized opposition. Meanwhile, the landing party of the South China Navy Expeditionary Force, which had joined with the Army to secure Haikou, began landing on the island's southern shore at dawn on 14 February. They operated under the protection of naval and air units. By the same morning, the landing force had advanced to Sa-Riya and, by 12:00 hours, had captured Yulin Port. Chinese casualties were significant in the brief fighting; from January to May 1939, reports indicate the 11th security regiment alone suffered 8 officers and 162 soldiers killed, 3 officers and 16 wounded, and 5 officers and 68 missing, though figures for other units are unclear. Japanese losses were not publicly detailed but appear to have been light.  When crisis pressed upon them, Nationalist forces withdrew from coastal Haikou, shepherding the last civilians toward the sheltering embrace of the Wuzhi mountain range that bands the central spine of Hainan. From that high ground they sought to endure the storm, praying that the rugged hills might shield their families from the reach of war. Yet the Li country's mountains did not deliver a sanctuary free of conflict. Later in August of 1943, an uprising erupted among the Li,Wang Guoxing, a figure of local authority and stubborn resolve. His rebellion was swiftly crushed; in reprisal, the Nationalists executed a seizure of vengeance that extended far beyond the moment of defeat, claiming seven thousand members of Wang Guoxing's kin in his village. The episode was grim testimony to the brutal calculus of war, where retaliation and fear indelibly etched the landscape of family histories. Against this backdrop, the Communists under Feng Baiju and the native Li communities forged a vigorous guerrilla war against the occupiers. The struggle was not confined to partisan skirmishes alone; it unfolded as a broader contest of survival and resistance. The Japanese response was relentless and punitive, and it fell upon Li communities in western Hainan with particular ferocity, Sanya and Danzhou bore the brunt of violence, as did the many foreign laborers conscripted into service by the occupying power. The toll of these reprisals was stark: among hundreds of thousands of slave laborers pressed into service, tens of thousands perished. Of the 100,000 laborers drawn from Hong Kong, only about 20,000 survived the war's trials, a haunting reminder of the human cost embedded in the occupation. Strategically, the island of Hainan took on a new if coercive purpose. Portions of the island were designated as a naval administrative district, with the Hainan Guard District Headquarters established at Samah, signaling its role as a forward air base and as an operational flank for broader anti-Chiang Kai-shek efforts. In parallel, the island's rich iron and copper resources were exploited to sustain the war economy of the occupiers. The control of certain areas on Hainan provided a base of operations for incursions into Guangdong and French Indochina, while the airbases that dotted the island enabled long-range air raids that threaded routes from French Indochina and Burma into the heart of China. The island thus assumed a grim dual character: a frontier fortress for the occupiers and a ground for the prolonged suffering of its inhabitants. Hainan then served as a launchpad for later incursions into Guangdong and Indochina. Meanwhile after Wuhan's collapse, the Nationalist government's frontline strength remained formidable, even as attrition gnawed at its edges. By the winter of 1938–1939, the front line had swelled to 261 divisions of infantry and cavalry, complemented by 50 independent brigades. Yet the political and military fissures within the Kuomintang suggested fragility beneath the apparent depth of manpower. The most conspicuous rupture came with Wang Jingwei's defection, the vice president and chairman of the National Political Council, who fled to Hanoi on December 18, 1938, leading a procession of more than ten other KMT officials, including Chen Gongbo, Zhou Fohai, Chu Minqi, and Zeng Zhongming. In the harsh arithmetic of war, defections could not erase the country's common resolve to resist Japanese aggression, and the anti-Japanese national united front still served as a powerful instrument, rallying the Chinese populace to "face the national crisis together." Amid this political drama, Japan's strategy moved into a phase that sought to convert battlefield endurance into political consolidation. As early as January 11, 1938, Tokyo had convened an Imperial Conference and issued a framework for handling the China Incident that would shape the theater for years. The "Outline of Army Operations Guidance" and "Continental Order No. 241" designated the occupied territories as strategic assets to be held with minimal expansion beyond essential needs. The instruction mapped an operational zone that compressed action to a corridor between Anqing, Xinyang, Yuezhou, and Nanchang, while the broader line of occupation east of a line tracing West Sunit, Baotou, and the major river basins would be treated as pacified space. This was a doctrine of attrition, patience, and selective pressure—enough to hold ground, deny resources to the Chinese, and await a more opportune political rupture. Yet even as Japan sought political attrition, the war's tactical center of gravity drifted toward consolidation around Wuhan and the pathways that fed the Yangtze. In October 1938, after reducing Wuhan to a fortressed crescent of contested ground, the Japanese General Headquarters acknowledged the imperative to adapt to a protracted war. The new calculus prioritized political strategy alongside military operations: "We should attach importance to the offensive of political strategy, cultivate and strengthen the new regime, and make the National Government decline, which will be effective." If the National Government trembled under coercive pressure, it risked collapse, and if not immediately, then gradually through a staged series of operations. In practice, this meant reinforcing a centralized center while allowing peripheral fronts to be leveraged against Chongqing's grip on the war's moral economy. In the immediate post-Wuhan period, Japan divided its responsibilities and aimed at a standoff that would enable future offensives. The 11th Army Group, stationed in the Wuhan theater, became the spearhead of field attacks on China's interior, occupying a strategic triangle that included Hunan, Jiangxi, and Guangxi, and protecting the rear of southwest China's line of defense. The central objective was not merely to seize territory, but to deny Chinese forces the capacity to maneuver along the critical rail and river corridors that fed the Nanjing–Jiujiang line and the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway. Central to this plan was Wuhan's security and the ability to constrain Jiujiang's access to the Yangtze, preserving a corridor for air power and logistics. The pre-war arrangement in early 1939 was a tableau of layered defenses and multiple war zones, designed to anticipate and blunt Japanese maneuver. By February 1939, the Ninth War Zone under Xue Yue stood in a tense standoff with the Japanese 11th Army along the Jiangxi and Hubei front south of the Yangtze. The Ninth War Zone's order of battle, Luo Zhuoying's 19th Army Group defending the northern Nanchang front, Wang Lingji's 30th Army Group near Wuning, Fan Songfu's 8th and 73rd Armies along Henglu, Tang Enbo's 31st Army Group guarding southern Hubei and northern Hunan, and Lu Han's 1st Army Group in reserve near Changsha and Liuyang, was a carefully calibrated attempt to absorb, delay, and disrupt any Xiushui major Japanese thrust toward Nanchang, a city whose strategic significance stretched beyond its own bounds. In the spring of 1939, Nanchang was the one city in southern China that Tokyo could not leave in Chinese hands. It was not simply another provincial capital; it was the beating heart of whatever remained of China's war effort south of the Yangtze, and the Japanese knew it. High above the Gan River, on the flat plains west of Poyang Lake, lay three of the finest airfields China had ever built: Qingyunpu, Daxiaochang, and Xiangtang. Constructed only a few years earlier with Soviet engineers and American loans, they were long, hard-surfaced, and ringed with hangars and fuel dumps. Here the Chinese Air Force had pulled back after the fall of Wuhan, and here the red-starred fighters and bombers of the Soviet volunteer groups still flew. From Nanchang's runways a determined pilot could reach Japanese-held Wuhan in twenty minutes, Guangzhou in less than an hour, and even strike the docks at Hong Kong if he pushed his range. Every week Japanese reconnaissance planes returned with photographs of fresh craters patched, new aircraft parked wing-to-wing, and Soviet pilots sunning themselves beside their I-16s. As long as those fields remained Chinese, Japan could never claim the sky. The city was more than airfields. It sat exactly where the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway met the line running north to Jiujiang and the Yangtze, a knot that tied together three provinces. Barges crowded Poyang Lake's western shore, unloading crates of Soviet ammunition and aviation fuel that had come up the river from the Indochina railway. Warehouses along the tracks bulged with shells and rice. To the Japanese staff officers plotting in Wuhan and Guangzhou, Nanchang looked less like a city and more like a loaded spring: if Chiang Kai-shek ever found the strength for a counteroffensive to retake the middle Yangtze, this would be the place from which it would leap. And so, in the cold March of 1939, the Imperial General Headquarters marked Nanchang in red on every map and gave General Okamura the order he had been waiting for: take it, whatever the cost. Capturing the city would do three things at once. It would blind the Chinese Air Force in the south by seizing or destroying the only bases from which it could still seriously operate. It would tear a hole in the last east–west rail line still feeding Free China. And it would shove the Nationalist armies another two hundred kilometers farther into the interior, buying Japan precious time to digest its earlier conquests and tighten the blockade. Above all, Nanchang was the final piece in a great aerial ring Japan was closing around southern China. Hainan had fallen in February, giving the navy its southern airfields. Wuhan and Guangzhou already belonged to the army. Once Nanchang was taken, Japanese aircraft would sit on a continuous arc of bases from the tropical beaches of the South China Sea to the banks of the Yangtze, and nothing (neither the Burma Road convoys nor the French railway from Hanoi) would move without their permission. Chiang Kai-shek's decision to strike first in the Nanchang region in March 1939 reflected both urgency and a desire to seize initiative before Japanese modernization of the battlefield could fully consolidate. On March 8, Chiang directed Xue Yue to prepare a preemptive attack intended to seize the offensive by March 15, focusing the Ninth War Zone's efforts on preventing a river-crossing assault and pinning Japanese forces in place. The plan called for a sequence of coordinated actions: the 19th Army Group to hold the northern front of Nanchang; the Hunan-Hubei-Jiangxi Border Advance Army (the 8th and 73rd Armies) to strike the enemy's left flank from Wuning toward De'an and Ruichang; the 30th and 27th Army Groups to consolidate near Wuning; and the 1st Army Group to push toward Xiushui and Sandu, opening routes for subsequent operations. Yet even as Xue Yue pressed for action, the weather of logistics and training reminded observers that no victory could be taken for granted. By March 9–10, Xue Yue warned Chiang that troops were not adequately trained, supplies were scarce, and preparations were insufficient, requesting a postponement to March 24. Chiang's reply was resolute: the attack must commence no later than the 24th, for the aim was preemption and the desire to tether the enemy's forces before they could consolidate. When the moment of decision arrived, the Chinese army began to tense, and the Japanese, no strangers to rapid shifts in tempo—moved to exploit any hesitation or fog of mobilization. The Ninth War Zone's response crystallized into a defensive posture as the Japanese pressed forward, marking a transition from preemption to standoff as both sides tested the limits of resilience. The Japanese plan for what would become known as Operation Ren, aimed at severing the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway, breaking the enemy's line of communication, and isolating Nanchang, reflected a calculated synthesis of air power, armored mobility, and canalized ground offensives. On February 6, 1939, the Central China Expeditionary Army issued a set of precise directives: capture Nanchang to cut the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway and disrupt the southern reach of Anhui and Zhejiang provinces; seize Nanchang along the Nanchang–Xunyi axis to split enemy lines and "crush" Chinese resistance south of that zone; secure rear lines immediately after the city's fall; coordinate with naval air support to threaten Chinese logistics and airfields beyond the rear lines. The plan anticipated contingencies by pre-positioning heavy artillery and tanks in formations that could strike with speed and depth, a tactical evolution from previous frontal assaults. Okamura Yasuji, commander of the 11th Army, undertook a comprehensive program of reconnaissance, refining the assault plan with a renewed emphasis on speed and surprise. Aerial reconnaissance underlined the terrain, fortifications, and the disposition of Chinese forces, informing the selection of the Xiushui River crossing and the route of the main axis of attack. Okamura's decision to reorganize artillery and armor into concentrated tank groups, flanked by air support and advanced by long-range maneuver, marked a departure from the earlier method of distributing heavy weapons along the infantry front. Sumita Laishiro commanded the 6th Field Heavy Artillery Brigade, with more than 300 artillery pieces, while Hirokichi Ishii directed a force of 135 tanks and armored vehicles. This blended arms approach promised a breakthrough that would outpace the Chinese defenders and open routes for the main force. By mid-February 1939, Japanese preparations had taken on a high tempo. The 101st and 106th Divisions, along with attached artillery, assembled south of De'an, while tank contingents gathered north of De'an. The 6th Division began moving toward Ruoxi and Wuning, the Inoue Detachment took aim at the waterways of Poyang Lake, and the 16th and 9th Divisions conducted feints on the Han River's left bank. The orchestration of these movements—feints, riverine actions, and armored flanking, was designed to reduce the Chinese capacity to concentrate forces around Nanchang and to force the defenders into a less secure posture along the Nanchang–Jiujiang axis. Japan's southward strategy reframed the war: no longer a sprint to reduce Chinese forces in open fields, but a patient siege of lifelines, railways, and airbases. Hainan's seizure, the control of Nanchang's airfields, and the disruption of the Zhejiang–Jiangxi Railway exemplified a shift from large-scale battles to coercive pressure that sought to cripple Nationalist mobilization and erode Chongqing's capacity to sustain resistance. For China, the spring of 1939 underscored resilience amid mounting attrition. Chiang Kai-shek's insistence on offensive means to seize the initiative demonstrated strategic audacity, even as shortages and uneven training slowed tempo. The Ninth War Zone's defense, bolstered by makeshift airpower from Soviet and Allied lendings, kept open critical corridors and delayed Japan's consolidation. The war's human cost—massive casualties, forced labor, and the Li uprising on Hainan—illuminates the brutality that fueled both sides' resolve. In retrospect, the period around Canton, Wuhan, and Nanchang crystallizes a grim truth: the Sino-Japanese war was less a single crescendo of battles than a protracted contest of endurance, logistics, and political stamina. The early 1940s would widen these fault lines, but the groundwork laid in 1939, competition over supply routes, air control, and strategic rail nodes, would shape the war's pace and, ultimately, its outcome. The conflict's memory lies not only in the clashes' flash but in the stubborn persistence of a nation fighting to outlast a formidable adversary. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese invasion of Hainan and proceeding operations to stop logistical leaks into Nationalist China, showcased the complexity and scale of the growing Second Sino-Japanese War. It would not merely be a war of territorial conquest, Japan would have to strangle the colossus using every means necessary.  

Kvůli komiksu Zelený Raoul se s nimi kdysi soudil Jiří Paroubek, kvůli karikatuře na obálce to stejné dělal Tomio Okamura. Přesto si z politiků utahují dál. „Nejlépe prodávají časopis,“ říká šéfredaktor Reflexu Martin Bartkovský.„Tomio Okamura je samozřejmě Pitomio a my všichni to můžeme říkat. Jak konstatoval soud, musí snést vyšší míru kritiky. Navíc to, kdy jako první věc ve funkci předsedy Sněmovny podrží štafle, aby někdo jiný sundal ukrajinskou vlajku, která se mu nelíbí, je podle mě krystalickou ukázkou chování někoho, komu by se dalo říkat Pitomio,“ vysvětluje Martin Bartkovský, šéfredaktor časopisu Reflex, který byl hostem nejnovějšího dílu podcastu Mediální cirkus.Právě vyobrazení Tomia Okamury jako klauna s nápisem Pitomio je asi nejslavnější obálka Reflexu. A to i díky následnému soudnímu sporu.Vyšla 7. listopadu 2012 v době, kdy se Okamura stal senátorem a pracoval na znásobení známosti svého jména tím, že kandidoval v prvních přímých prezidentských volbách. Po vydání karikatury dal Okamura na Reflex žalobu. Tu ale po mnohaleté soudní tahanici předloni definitivně prohrál.Na obálce fungují Babiš, Zeman a OkamuraČasopis Reflex vychází v Česku už 35 let a na výrazných titulních stranách si zakládá.„Fungují čeští politici. Byla doba, kdy vládl Andrej Babiš s Milošem Zemanem a do toho tam jako třetí vzadu pobíhal Tomio Okamura nebo komunisté, o které se vláda tehdy opírala. Tam stačilo kohokoliv z téhle vlády dát na obálku a hned tam prodeje byly. Dneska už to takhle není,“ říká šéfredaktor Bartkovský. „Filip Turek a jeho volební blitzkrieg v eurovolbách zafungoval velmi dobře. Motoristé fungují. I Andrej Babiš. Funguje i prezident Petr Pavel a vždycky funguje Volodymyr Zelenskyj. Stejně tak Vladimir Putin nebo Donald Trump, ale to jsou jediné zahraniční persony,“ popisuje Bartkovský taktiku při výrobě titulních stran.Vůbec nejúspěšnější titulní strany Reflexu za rok 2025 se ale nakonec politiky vůbec netýkaly. „Byly to obálky in memoriam našich dlouholetých spolupracovníků. Tím jedním byl psycholog Cyril Höschl a tím druhým byl šéf karlovarského filmového festivalu pan Jiří Bartoška,“ dodává Martin Bartkovský.Ten se šéfredaktorem Reflexu stal v prosinci 2023, po půl roce nejistoty ve vedení časopisu. Před ním ho řídil Marek Stoniš a časopis se často dostával na hranu kritiky za texty a titulky zavánějící někdy až xenofobií.„Kvůli obálce s černým Hitlerem chtěla odejít polovina redakce. Občas už jsme byli prostě zbytečně zlí. Vtipné je být vtipní, satiričtí, jízliví, ale když jste vyloženě zlí, a dávali to vědět i čtenáři, tak to vtipné není,“ říká Bartkovský a naráží na titulní stranu s portrétem Adolfa Hitlera coby černocha s monstrózním afro účesem, která vyšla v roce 2020.Babiš jako Slabiš. Nevíme, z koho si utahovat dřívS novou vládou je podle Bartkovského stále těžší si z ministrů dělat legraci, protože v redakci neví, koho karikovat dříve.„Je to vlastně bezprecedentní situace, kdy byste mohli každý týden udělat na každého člena vlády jednu obálku, tedy kromě těch členů SPD, kteří nic neříkají. Ale ti ostatní jsou velmi plodní,“ žertuje novinář s tím, že na obálce tento čtvrtek by chtěl mít Andreje Babiše. „Bude na té obálce jako Slabiš, bude se opírat o Macinku s Turkem a Okamurou a bude se snažit udělat Česko lepší, nejlepší zemí na této planetě,“ směje se Bartkovský.I humor má ale v Reflexu hranice.„Nemáme hranice v tom, z kterého politika si udělat legraci, ale nechceme si dělat legraci ze všedních lidí, obyčejných Čechů, z někoho, kdo se nemůže bránit. My si vždycky děláme legraci z lidí, kteří mají nějakou moc nebo mají pocit, že drží nějakou moc a my je chceme trošku uzemňovat,“ říká šéf oblíbeného časopisu.Co čeká od vlády Andreje Babiše? Co kabinet změní a dotáhne za příští čtyři roky? A jak se vlastně dostal do čela Reflexu?--Mediální cirkus. Podcast Marie Bastlové o dění na mediální scéně. Zajímá ji pohled do redakcí, za kulisy novinářské práce – s předními novináři i mediálními hráči.Sledujte na Seznam Zprávách, poslouchejte na Podcasty.cz a ve všech podcastových aplikacích.Archiv všech dílů najdete tady. Své postřehy, připomínky nebo tipy nám pište prostřednictvím sociálních sítí pod hashtagem #medialnicirkus nebo na e-mail: audio@sz.cz.

Novoroční projev, který naštval opozici. Tomio Okamura jako šéf Sněmovny a jeho postoje proti Ukrajině. Téma pro ukrajinského velvyslance, české ministerstvo zahraničí, premiéra, Pražský hrad i pro Kateřinu Perknerovou, komentátorkou Deníku. Ptá se Matěj Skalický. Všechny díly podcastu Vinohradská 12 můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.

Turek ministrem nebude, protože Babiš za něj odmítá krvácet. Okamura a nová doba. Blízký východ a Venezuela. Byla střední Evropa skutečně unesena? A na konec glosa Ivy Pekárkové. Moderuje Petr Schwarz.

Jak se vládní koalice vyrovnává s reakcemi na novoroční projev Tomia Okamury? Kdo povede Venezuelu po sobotním únosu prezidenta Madura a po tom, co Donald Trump zpochybňuje sílu tamní opozice? A jak reálný je americký plán, podle kterého se do Venezuely vrátí americké ropné společnosti?

Premiér Andrej Babiš (ANO) se po několika dnech mlčení vyjádřil k novoročnímu projevu Tomia Okamura (SPD) a jeho vyznění označil za snahu získat voliče. „Byl to projev předsedy Poslanecké sněmovny,“ oponuje Babišovi v pořadu Osobnost Plus Jindřich Šídlo, komentátor Seznam Zpráv. „To, že byl Okamurův projev natočen jako laciný youtubový klip, je jiná věc. Okamura je předsedou Sněmovny, protože pro něj hlasovali všichni poslanci hnutí ANO. Tohle je jejich spoluodpovědnost.“

Předvolebním heslem Motoristů byl slogan: „Ukončíme Fialu a pohlídáme Babiše.“ Mottem dnešního podcastu by naopak mohlo být: „Kdo pohlídá Okamuru?“ Šéf českého parlamentu totiž vyvolal aférku s mezinárodním pozadím, když kritizoval Západ, že se snaží vyvolat třetí světovou válku, a na adresu okupované Ukrajiny naopak pronášel kritické soudy.Budou tyto výstupy součástí politického fungování Babišovy vlády v příštích čtyřech letech? Podstatou všeho je, že SPD není politická strana, ale názorový kmen. A Tomio Okamura není předseda strany, ale kmenový náčelník. To s sebou nese určitou zátěž. Přes takto orientované protestní a antisystémové voliče se můžete poměrně snadno dostat do parlamentu. Vládnout se s tím však dá jen obtížně.Když máte voličskou základnu stmelenou neustálým nadáváním, vyvoláváním viníků a obětí a mobilizací proti vnějšímu nepříteli, jeví se vám každý vládní kompromis jako zrada. Když kandidát SPD na funkci ministra obrany řekl o válce na Ukrajině věc, která pobouřila hard core příznivce SPD, musel ji nejdříve potupně odvolat, aby následně sám Okamura jeho slova ještě jednou „potřel“ ve svém novoročním projevu.Na něm nebyl ani tak zajímavý proruský postoj, jako naprostá nenávist k Západu jako našim spojencům. A Andrej Babiš usedavě mlčí. Bude jiný, až mu vládní poslanci v únoru odhlasují nevydání k soudnímu řízení? Jak se chce chovat na jednání 18 států tzv. koalice ochotných v Paříži? A udrží muniční iniciativu, kterou chce Okamura vymést z ministerstva obrany?

Novoroční proslov Tomia Okamury bude mít dohru. Opozice chce vyvolat hlasování o odvolání předsedy SPD z postu předsedy Poslanecké sněmovny, Starostové navíc požadují, aby se Sněmovna jako celek od Okamurových výroků, kterými urážel Ukrajince a představitele Evropské unie distancovala. Jakou má taková snaha šanci na úspěch a jaký je vůbec její smysl? A co vůbec říká celá aféra o současné české politice?

Samí politici, žádní státníci, Bulharsko to už má s eurem černé na bílém. My Češi si s korunou stále lžeme do kapsy, Okamura a plané gesto opozice, Na konec mezinárodního práva doplatí Venezuela, ale i Tchaj-wan

Jak by mohla vypadat výměna vlády ve Venezuele pod vlivem Spojených států? Co by zvýšení těžby ropy ve Venezuele znamenalo pro světový obchod s ropou? Jak se premiér a hnutí ANO postaví k urážkám, které na adresu Ukrajinců pronesl předseda sněmovny Okamura?

Celý díl najdete na: https://herohero.co/dobrovskysidloRozpadne se koalice ANO, SPD a Motoristů? Co potřebuje opozice, aby dokázala vyhrát příští volby? A proč je hloupé urážet voliče hnutí ANO? Na dotazy posluchačů odpovídá další epizoda podcastu Dobrovský&Šídlo

Nastoupili Češi cestu do ruské náruče? Babiš a Okamura v odlišných pozicích . V Trumpově Bílém domě je čím dál více prasklin. Jak kroky Babišovy vlády nahrávají Rusku

„Prosím, pokud je to tak, potom panu Zůnovi domluvte, aby neříkal takové věci, protože bych taky mohla dostat infarkt, a to nechci,“ napsala na sociální síť jistá volička SPD předsedovi Okamurovi, poté, co on i jeho zástupce Radim Fiala počali během víkendu vehementně krotit vlnu rozčílených reakcí skalních příznivců hnutí na páteční vystoupení ministra obrany.

Nastoupili Češi cestu do ruské náruče? Babiš a Okamura v odlišných pozicích . V Trumpově Bílém domě je čím dál více prasklin. Jak kroky Babišovy vlády nahrávají RuskuVšechny díly podcastu Názory a argumenty můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.

„Prosím, pokud je to tak, potom panu Zůnovi domluvte, aby neříkal takové věci, protože bych taky mohla dostat infarkt, a to nechci,“ napsala na sociální síť jistá volička SPD předsedovi Okamurovi, poté, co on i jeho zástupce Radim Fiala počali během víkendu vehementně krotit vlnu rozčílených reakcí skalních příznivců hnutí na páteční vystoupení ministra obrany.Všechny díly podcastu Názory a argumenty můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.

Hostkou tohoto dílu podcastu je bývalá poslankyně a předsedkyně Top 09 Markéta Pekarová AdamováNapište si scénář ke speciálnímu dílu podcastu Dobrovský & Šídlo a zašlete nám váš dotaz do 19. prosince pomocí tohoto formuláře nebo na e-mail: podcast@postbellum.cz

Vrcholní představitelé Slovenska si pochvalují první návštěvu nového šéfa Sněmovny Tomia Okamury a jeho delegace v Bratislavě. Na cestu nebyli přizváni zástupci opozice. Jaký dopad to bude mít na další vztahy s našimi sousedy?Hostem Ptám se já byl předseda Senátu Miloš Vystrčil (ODS). Nový předseda Poslanecké sněmovny Tomio Okamura (SPD) pokračuje v oficiální dvoudenní návštěvě Bratislavy. Dnes se sejde spolu s představiteli Slovenska i se zástupci Rakouska. Včera jednal se šéfem slovenského parlamentu Richardem Rašim i dalšími vrcholnými politiky země. První zahraniční cestu šéfa Sněmovny Seznam Zprávy podrobně popsaly v reportáži. Okamura s sebou na Slovensko vzal také poslaneckou delegaci, ovšem složenou pouze ze zástupců vznikající vládní koalice hnutí ANO, SPD a Motoristů. Opozice v rozporu se zvyklostmi chyběla. „Jde o gesto a příslib, že chceme urychleně obnovit nadstandardní vztahy obou zemí,“ komentoval to Tomio Okamura. „Jsem rád, že mohu říct, že naše vztahy s bratry Čechy se opět vracejí tam, kam patří — není totiž žádným tajemstvím, že Šimečka spolu s Fialou cíleně rozbíjeli nadstandardní  slovensko-české vztahy,“ prohlásil Tibor Gašpar, pravá ruka předsedy slovenské vlády Roberta Fica, směrem ke slovenské opozici a českému premiérovi Petru Fialovi. Poslanci dosluhující vládní koalice celou záležitost označují za nestandardní a chystají vlastní cestu na Slovensko. Rozhodnutí nového předsedy Sněmovny kritizuje i šéf Senátu Miloš Vystrčil (ODS). Jak bude vypadat Okamurova zahraniční politika? Jak si bude rozumět Sněmovna se zcela jinak politicky složeným Senátem? A jak si ODS poradí s odchodem Martina Kuby?--Podcast Ptám se já. Rozhovory s lidmi, kteří mají vliv, odpovědnost, informace.Sledujte na Seznam Zprávách, poslouchejte na Podcasty.cz a ve všech podcastových aplikacích.Archiv všech dílů najdete tady. Své postřehy, připomínky nebo tipy nám pište prostřednictvím sociálních sítí pod hashtagem #ptamseja nebo na e-mail: audio@sz.cz.

v dnešnom podcaste si vypočujete aj: Okamura odštartoval v Česku éru nehanebnosti a priniesol ju k nám Progresívne Slovensko neotvára Benešove dekréty. To len tým straší Fico Predá Trump Ukrajinu za výhodné obchody pre jemu blízkych ľudí?

Jen o málokterém šéfovi Sněmovny bylo po jeho nástupu slyšet tolik jako o Tomio Okamurovi. Hned v prvních hodinách sundal ukrajinskou vlajku, pak se pustil do škrtů zahraničních cest. Dělají si poslanci ze Sněmovny cestovku, jak Okamura tvrdí?Hostem Ptám se já byl poslanec Pavel Žáček (ODS).Nový předseda Poslanecké sněmovny Tomio Okamura (SPD) dnes zahajuje svou první zahraniční cestu do Bratislavy. Ještě před tím se pustil do revize zahraničních výjezdů poslanců. Sněmovna v novém volebním období podle Okamury nebude cestovní kancelář, jako tomu mělo být za vedení Markéty Pekarové Adamové (TOP 09). To podle nového šéfa dolní komory ukázal rozbor zahraničních cest za minulé volební období, který si nechal zpracovat. „Jsou tam zahraniční cesty typu, kdy jeden z poslanců (končící vládní koalice) měl dvoudenní cestu za 250 tisíc korun do Spojených států,“ uvedl. Změny už se promítly i do plánované delegace na prosincové shromáždění NATO v USA. Okamura s dalšími členy organizačního výboru z řad sněmovní většiny cestu původně zamítli. Po kritice ji povolili, ovšem v upravené sestavě. S poslankyní končící vlády Heleny Langšádlové (TOP 09) pojede místo Pavla Žáčka (ODS) poslanec zvolený za Motoristy, diplomat Karel Beran. Jak nová politická většina mění a změní Sněmovnu? A je lavírování nad cestou do USA ukázkou změny přístupu k NATO?--Podcast Ptám se já. Rozhovory s lidmi, kteří mají vliv, odpovědnost, informace.Sledujte na Seznam Zprávách, poslouchejte na Podcasty.cz a ve všech podcastových aplikacích.Archiv všech dílů najdete tady. Své postřehy, připomínky nebo tipy nám pište prostřednictvím sociálních sítí pod hashtagem #ptamseja nebo na e-mail: audio@sz.cz.

VŠECHNY EPIZODY V CELÉ DÉLCE NAJDETE NA HEROHERO.CO/STUDION I když takzvaná „křídová revoluce“ na Slovensku není revolucí ve smyslu politického převratu, premiér Robert Fico je z ní podle šéfredaktora Denníku N Matúše Kostolného nervózní. „Nápisy křídami vypadají na první pohled absolutně neškodně a banálně – jako by ničím nemohly pohnout. A přitom to vládě a lidem, kteří stále zůstávají jejími voliči, extrémně vadí. Je to totiž projev svobody: barevný, veselý, nenásilný a politický,“ říká ve Studiu N. Křídové nápisy se začaly šířit po celé zemi jako podpora studentovi gymnázia z Popradu, který touto formou kritizoval Roberta Fica a jejž policie následně odvedla na výslech. „To si umí představit všichni, že vašeho syna, vnuka nebo synovce přijde sebrat policie jen proto, že napsal politický nápis na chodník,“ vysvětluje Kostolný, proč se studentský protest přenesl na chodníky po celé zemi. „Podle mě si ani voliči Roberta Fica nepřejí, abychom žili ve státě, kde policisté buzerují studenty pro vyjádření názoru,“ říká šéfredaktor Denníku N. V rozhovoru se dostáváme také k jeho pohledu na výsledky českých sněmovních voleb. „Nepříjemným způsobem nás kopírujete. Myslím, že bychom vám uměli hodně pomoct, protože vás čekají těžké roky a my už jsme si tím částečně prošli. Zdá se mi, že v české debatě chybí velké části společnosti představivost, co všechno lidé jako pan Turek, Okamura nebo Babiš dokážou udělat. Ta představa, že se v Česku nemůže stát něco takového jako u nás na Slovensku, je podle mě velmi blízko tomu, aby se rozplynula,“ míní. Změna se podle něj v české politice děje v nejhorší možné chvíli. „To, co dělá Putin a Rusko v těchto týdnech na Ukrajině, ale i v Polsku nebo pobaltských zemích, je obrovské varování, že nekráčíme do dobrých časů. A být rozkývaný v takovém období je ještě větší riziko než běžně,“ říká v rozhovoru. Podívejte se na celou epizodu na herohero.co/studion

V době, kdy vzniká nová česká vláda, si lidé po celé republice připomínali výročí sametové revoluce. Jak se vyvíjí politika 36 let po pádu komunistického režimu? „Každý politik, který si myslí, že jemu se podaří vytvořit dokonalou bytost, je na omylu, anebo skončí jako autoritář,“ varuje v pořadu Osobnost Plus Jefim Fištejn, komentátor a esejista, ukrajinský rodák a znalec Ruska, který 17. listopad 1989 pracoval v Rádiu Svobodná Evropa.Všechny díly podcastu Osobnost Plus můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.

Jak se změní Poslanecká sněmovna, když v jejím čele stanul Tomio Okamura? Už stihl sundat ukrajinské vlajky, chce co nejrycheji ustavit novou vládu a bude se snažit, aby Poslanecká sněmovna fungovala více konsenzuálně. „Od paní Pekarové jsme za čtyři roky nedostali telefonát ani jednou. Já už jsem dvakrát volal předsedům poslaneckých klubů, kromě Pirátů,“ říká předseda hnutí Svoboda a přímá demokracie Tomio Okamura.

Jak se změní Poslanecká sněmovna, když v jejím čele stanul Tomio Okamura? Už stihl sundat ukrajinské vlajky, chce co nejrycheji ustavit novou vládu a bude se snažit, aby Poslanecká sněmovna fungovala více konsenzuálně. „Od paní Pekarové jsme za čtyři roky nedostali telefonát ani jednou. Já už jsem dvakrát volal předsedům poslaneckých klubů, kromě Pirátů,“ říká předseda hnutí Svoboda a přímá demokracie Tomio Okamura.

Jak se změní Poslanecká sněmovna, když v jejím čele stanul Tomio Okamura? Už stihl sundat ukrajinské vlajky, chce co nejrycheji ustavit novou vládu a bude se snažit, aby Poslanecká sněmovna fungovala více konsenzuálně. „Od paní Pekarové jsme za čtyři roky nedostali telefonát ani jednou. Já už jsem dvakrát volal předsedům poslaneckých klubů, kromě Pirátů,“ říká předseda hnutí Svoboda a přímá demokracie Tomio Okamura.Všechny díly podcastu Dvacet minut Radiožurnálu můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.

Okamura už úraduje. Prikázal z budovy Snemovne odstrániť ukrajinskú vlajku. To Fico šíri nenávisť. Rybníček mu len nastavil zrkadlo. Slovenská polícia si divne vykladá niektoré slová.

Nová rodící se koalice ANO, SPD a Motoristů má za sebou první zkoušku jednoty, jelikož se hlasovalo o šéfovi Sněmovny. Tím se stal Tomio Okamura, i když se před hlasováním spekulovalo, že nemusí být všem poslancům hnutí ANO po chuti. Jaký bude předseda SPD šéfem Poslanecké sněmovny? A jak budou reagovat opoziční strany? O tom se v 34. epizodě podcastu Vládneme, nerušit bavili redaktoři František Trojan, Filip Zelenka redaktorka Kristýna Jelínková.

Pro odpůrce Tomia Okamury (SPD) ve funkci předsedy Poslanecké sněmovny bylo pěkné pohrávat si s představou, že se v tajné volbě odváží pár zákonodárců hnutí ANO k disentnímu stanovisku a jim třeba pod vousy nejdoucí kontroverzní politik se zvolení aspoň v prvém kole nedočká. Ale bylo to bláhové, klasické přání otcem myšlenky.

On today's show: Controversial figure Tomio Okamura, the leader of the Freedom and Direct Democracy party, has been elected Speaker of the Chamber of Deputies; Czech-Slovak relations under Andrej Babiš and Robert Fico; Pardubice will host the Canicross World Championships for dog racing for the first time; and lastly, we cover former president of Ukraine Viktor Yushchenko's perspective on the War in Ukraine and what the future may hold. Enjoy!

Tomio Okamura v čele Poslanecké sněmovny. Předseda SPD získal v tajném hlasování 107 hlasů - o jeden méně, než kolik jich má k dispozici vznikající vládní koalice. Jeho zvolení předcházely desítky emotivních projevů na půdě sněmovny, kterou bude řídit. Padala obvinění z rasismu, z podněcování k nenávisti vůči menšinám i z proruských postojů člověka, který bude zastávat třetí nejvyšší ústavní post v zemi. Jaký příběh za ním stojí?Host: Jindřich Šídlo - komentátor Seznam Zpráv a tvůrce satirického pořadu Šťastné pondělíČlánek a další informace najdete na webu Seznam Zprávy.Sledujte nás na sociálních sítích X, Instagram, Threads nebo Bluesky. Náměty a připomínky nám můžete psát na e-mail zaminutusest@sz.cz

Tomio Okamura, el nuevo presidente de la Cámara de Diputados al que no vota su familia. Un cuento chino: el argentino que sedujo a una checa de novia con un eslovaco.

Bude Tomio Okamura předsedou Poslanecké sněmovny? K jakému závěru dospěla jednání unijních ministrů životního prostředí o klimatických cílech pro rok 2040? A co rozhodlo o jasném vítězství krajně levicového kandidáta demokratů ve volbách newyorského starosty?

Bude Tomio Okamura předsedou Poslanecké sněmovny? K jakému závěru dospěla jednání unijních ministrů životního prostředí o klimatických cílech pro rok 2040? A co rozhodlo o jasném vítězství krajně levicového kandidáta demokratů ve volbách newyorského starosty?

Poslanci a poslankyně se ve středu sešli na pokračující ustavující schůzi, na které mají mimo jiné zvolit vedení dolní komory. Debata se ale zasekla u návrhu na šéfa Sněmovny. Zatímco končící vláda navrhla Jana Bartoška z KDU-ČSL, hnutí ANO přišlo se jménem šéfa SPD Tomiem Okamurou. U toho zejména poslanci a poslankyně vládní koalice, ale také Piráti, připomínají řadu jeho rasistických a útočných výroků i soudy SPD kvůli možnému extremismu. Podle stále ještě současného premiéra Petra Fialy z ODS by byl Tomio Okamura, kterého nazývá proruským politikem, především bezpečnostním rizikem pro Česko. Jako jeden z nejvyšších ústavních činitelů by měl totiž přístup k těm neutajovanějším informacím. Jak tomu předejít? S čím chce jít do čela dolní komory sám Okamura? A jak má probíhat samotná volba? Nejen o tom mluví ve Výtahu Respektu přímo z Poslanecké sněmovny František Trojan.

Tomio Okamura (SPD) se ve středu pravděpodobně stane předsedou Poslanecké sněmovny a bude tak třetím nejvyšším ústavním činitelem v zemi. Do funkce ho chce navrhnout vznikající koalice. Strany končící vlády naopak nesouhlasí. „Budu pro něj v rámci koaliční dohody hlasovat,” ujišťuje v Pro a proti poslanec hnutí ANO Aleš Juchelka. „Není vhodným kandidátem,” namítá předsedkyně poslaneckého klubu hnutí STAN Michaela Šebelová.

Tomio Okamura (SPD) se ve středu pravděpodobně stane předsedou Poslanecké sněmovny a bude tak třetím nejvyšším ústavním činitelem v zemi. Do funkce ho chce navrhnout vznikající koalice. Strany končící vlády naopak nesouhlasí. „Budu pro něj v rámci koaliční dohody hlasovat,” ujišťuje v Pro a proti poslanec hnutí ANO Aleš Juchelka. „Není vhodným kandidátem,” namítá předsedkyně poslaneckého klubu hnutí STAN Michaela Šebelová.Všechny díly podcastu Pro a proti můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.

Okamura jako šéf Sněmovny. Tajná volba, která budí emoce. Podpoří lídra SPD celá nově vznikající koalice? A co je vlastně úkolem třetího nejvyššího ústavního činitele v zemi? Otázky na Kristýnu Jelínkovou, politickou reportérku týdeníku Respekt. Ptá se Matěj Skalický. Všechny díly podcastu Vinohradská 12 můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.

Okamura jako šéf Sněmovny. Tajná volba, která budí emoce. Podpoří lídra SPD celá nově vznikající koalice? A co je vlastně úkolem třetího nejvyššího ústavního činitele v zemi? Otázky na Kristýnu Jelínkovou, politickou reportérku týdeníku Respekt. Ptá se Matěj Skalický.

Poprvé po volbách se v novém složení schází Sněmovna. V jejím čele by podle předpokladů měl stanout předseda hnutí SPD Tomio Okamura, na kterém se shodla nastupující vládní koalice. Dosavadní předsedkyně dolní komory Markéta Pekarová Adamová (TOP 09) před tím varuje. „Představitele strany, která je extremistická a radikální a v minulém období tu samotnou instituci destruovala, nepovažuji za vhodného nástupce,“ říká v Interview Plus.Všechny díly podcastu Interview Plus můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.

Dělníci kultury #29: V dalším díle podcastu týdeníku Respekt natočeném na festivalu dokumentárních filmů Ji.hlava spolu Jindřiška Bláhová, Pavel Turek a Jan H. Vitvar debatují o tom, co je v uplynulém týdnu v kultuře zaujalo a o své aktuální práci. Tentokrát došlo na:hrozby pro veřejnoprávní média po nástupu nové vládydokumentární filmy Andrese Veiela Riefenstahl, Kim A. Snyder Knihovnice, Jana Strejcovského Má to cenu?! a Barbory Chalupové Virtuální přítelkynědokumentární sérii Rebeccy Miller Mr. Scorsesekoncert skladatelky Caroline Shaw (La Fabrica, 7. listopadu)výstavu Maruja Mallo: Mask and Compass (madridské Museo Reina Sofia)knihu Alany S. Portero Zlozvyk (Prostor)Když už člověk jednou je, tak má sledovat kulturu v Respektu.

Slabost, nebo promyšlená hra pověřeného premiéra Andreje Babiše při nominacích ministrů? Schválí se rozpočet v prvním čtení a jak velký problém představuje SFDI? Sníží se od ledna regulovaná složka elektřiny a z čeho se to zaplatí? Co znamená reakce Evropské komise na dopis minoritářů ČEZ a co muniční iniciativa? Kdo povede ODS, Kupka, Ivan, nebo Kuba? A získá Okamura předsedu Sněmovny bez problému?Partnerem podcastu je advokátní kancelář ROWAN LEGAL a mezinárodní poradenská společnost RSM.

This week, we dissect who's in the hunt for individual event medals, obviously the most important phase of the competition. Who are the favorites? Who could pull off an upset? And how can you watch like an expert? UPDATE: Indonesia has denied all Israeli athlete visas. Vault Preview: Deng Yalan vs. the United States of Cheng Leanne Wong and Joscelyn Roberson are tied for the highest combined two vault D-scores this year, but should we be worried that these vaults won't materialize in time for competition? Why Deng Yalan could be the first Chinese gymnast to win a World Championships vault title since Cheng Fei Why you need to keep your eyes on Karla Navas, Angelina Melnikova, and Valentina Georgieva Will the double-twisting Yurchenko and Lopez group have enough D to sneak into vault finals? What do you need to know to watch vault like an expert?  Chapters  00:00 Intro  01:02 Show Open – Welcome to the Worlds Event Finals Preview 02:14 Update from Singapore – Israeli Visa Controversy & FIG Rules 05:53 How to Watch Worlds – BBC & Broadcast Info 06:25 Vault Preview 07:19 Pre-Meet Favorites – Wong, Roberson, Deng Yalan 10:13 Wide World of Spoilers – Melnikova, Navas, Georgieva 13:20 DTY/Lopez Group Questions – Fontaine, Martin & Co. 17:03 How to Watch Vault Like an Expert – Hand Support & Deduction Drama 22:33 Bars Preview 23:02 Pre-Meet Favorites – Nemour, Yang, Roshchina 25:05 What Is an Inbar Skill & Why It Matters 26:17 Wide World of Spoilers – Italians, Blakely, Dutch Contenders 27:34 Questions – Can You Succeed Without Connections? 29:14 How to Watch Bars Like an Expert – Handstands, Kips, & Deductions 31:45  Beam Preview 32:11 Sam Peszek Promo – Beam Queen Fear & Confidence 32:53 Pre-Meet Favorites – Zhou, Zhang, Hwang 35:04 How the Chinese Score 15s on Beam 37:19 Wide World of Spoilers – Nemour, Flavia, Okamura, Blakely 42:22 Coping with No Manila Esposito – Giulia Perotti 45:04 Team Layout Full – Ossysek & Voinea 46:10 Does Big Difficulty Pay Off? 47:02 How to Watch Beam Like an Expert – Why E-Scores Are “Crimes” 50:28 Beam Deductions Explained – Rhythm, Pauses, and Artistry 53:01  Floor Preview 53:22 Pre-Meet Favorites – Roberson, Voinea, Kalmykova 54:44 Why There Are No Clear Favorites This Year 55:36 Wide World of Spoilers – Moerz, Sugihara, Kishi, Ruby Evans 56:13 Who Doesn't Belong in Dance Prison – Fontaine, Marta Pihan-Kuleza, Petisco 58:03 The 3-Pass vs 4-Pass Debate 58:44 How to Watch Floor Like an Expert – Inquiry Rules Explained 01:01:08 When to File a Floor Inquiry & What's Changed 01:02:05  Show Close & Updates 01:02:36 Thank You Gifts & Travel Blessing from Vicky 01:03:21 Worlds Coverage Schedule & Club Gym Nerd Live Access 01:04:00 Sign-Off – “Take off and split on rights!” Bars Preview: The Kaylia Nemour Show How Kaylia Nemour and her gargantuan 6.9 D-score will win the World bars title Could Yang Fanyuwei and her eponymous full-twisting Jaeger give Nemour a run for gold? Which one of the AIN Russians will use the power of an inbar to make it into bar finals? The wide world of spoilers from the Italians, Skye Blakely, and the Dutch Can you qualify to bar finals without connecting everything? We look at Nakamura Haruka dilemma as a case study How can you watch bars like an expert Beam Preview: The Confidence Game Who are the current world leaders on beam? Why Zhou Yaqin and Zhang Qingying are leading the world beam rankings Whatever you do, DO NOT sleep on Hwang Seohyun and her massive new 6.9 D-score Why being a nonchalant beamer is the key to getting a 15 Is doing big-time F+ elements still worth the risk? There are probably 30 people who could legitimately contend for a World beam title, who else is on our list? Why is beam evaluated so harshly? We go over everything you need to know to watch beam like an expert Floor Preview: Doing Less is More Who are our favorites to win the title? Hint: it's nobody Who is currently leading the world floor rankings? Joscelyn Roberson is coming in HOT with her 6.5 D-score, but is she healthy enough to pull it off? Could this be Sabrina Voinea's Paris revenge tour? Why floor is probably one of the most unpredictable events this year. We have a looong list of gymnasts who could contend for a medal Who doesn't belong in dance prison? Why the three or four pass floor routine debate is the "is a hot dog a sandwich" debate of gymnastics How do you submit an inquiry on floor? What are the new procedures to submit an inquiry? WIN STUFF Raffle: Win a Full Commission Episode for $10! Raffle closes Oct. 7th! Club Gym Nerd Membership Scholarship GymCastic is matching all donations Nearly 50 scholarships have been awarded so far UP NEXT: Behind The Scenes: Live Podium Training Report podcast with Q&A from Jakarta on October 17th. SUPPORT THE SHOW Join Club Gym Nerd: https://gymcastic.com/club/ Headstand Game: https://gymcastic.com/headstand-plugin/ Forum: https://gymcastic.com/community/ Merch: https://gymcastic.com/shop/ Try Huel with 15% OFF for New Customers today using my code GYMCASTIC at https://huel.com/gymcastic. Fuel your best performance with Huel today! RELATED EPISODES: Episode – Jakarta World Championships Preview Part One: AA Draft, Stats, Subdivision Deep Dives Episode – Rolled Ankle-Gate! Selection Camp Down to 8 | Perotti Leads Italian World Team Episode – Jakarta World Team Trials Preview & Sho Nakamori on Judge-Eye-View Cameras Episode – Paris World Cup with Laura Cappelle Behind the Scenes – all episodes NEWSLETTERS Sign up for all three GymCastic newsletters  RESOURCES The Balance: My Years Coaching Simone Biles by Aimee Boorman with Fact Checker. Aimee coached Simone from day one in gymnastics to three back to back World All Around titles, 14 world medals and an unprecedented 5 medals at the Rio Olympics. Get your copy now. And if you loved reading (or listening) to the book, please leave a review. Spencer's essential website The Balance Beam Situation  GIFs of the Week and Meet schedule with links. Gymnastics History and Code of Points Archive from Uncle Tim Kensley's men's gymnastics site Neutral Deductions RESISTANCE RESOURCES > here Cover Art & Photos by Steve Cooper © Gymcastic

Vláda Andreje Babiše se pomalu rodí, jde to ale ve větších bolestech, než si vítěz voleb představoval.„Babiš už touhle dobou chtěl mít vládu hotovou. Se svým volebním výsledkem si představoval, že si všechno nadiktuje a pomalu už bude jako Trump podepisovat dekrety. A teď je na něm vidět, jak ho otravuje, že se musí handrkovat, především s SPD,“ říká v podcastu Václav Dolejší.Lépe se zatím daří Motoristům než papírově silnější SPD. „Motoristé mají výhodu, že Andrej Babiš se chce dohodnout spíš s nimi, jsou jednotní a nebude s nimi problém na Hradě. Okamura je v horší pozici,“ dodává Lucie Stuchlíková.Okamura už před volbami prohlásil, že do vlády SPD vyšle nikoli straníky, ale experty. Jména, která zatím prosakují na večejnost, ale spíš zní jako experti Andreje Babiše než Tomia Okamury. „Jestli Okamura přistoupí na to, aby mu jeho experty nadiktoval Babiš, tak se mu vzbouří jeho už tak vratký poslanecký klub,“ hodnotí Stuchlíková.A šéf SPD si nepomohl ani svým výpadem proti policejnímu prezidentovi, kterého by chtěl odvolat. Což bylo moc i na Babiše. „Okamura, který tady vykřikuje, jak si jeho trestní stíhání objednala vláda, jen cítí příležitost čichnout k moci, tak už odvolává,“ komentuje Dolejší.Kdo by mohl být v nové vládě? Co bude dělat ODS bez Petra Fialy? A na koho byste vsadili v catfightu Vesecká versus Bradáčová? Poslechněte si celou epizodu Vlevo dole!A hlasujte pro svůj oblíbený podcast v anketě Křišťálová lupa.----Vlevo dole řeší politické kauzy, boje o vliv i šeptandu z kuloárů Sněmovny. Vychází každou středu v poledne.Podcast pro vás připravují Lucie Stuchlíková (@StuchlikovLucie) a Václav Dolejší (@VacDol), reportéři Seznam Zpráv.Další podcasty, ale taky články, komentáře a videa najdete na zpravodajském serveru Seznam Zprávy. Poslouchejte nás na webu Seznam Zpráv, na Podcasty.cz nebo ve své oblíbené podcastové aplikaci.Své názory, návrhy, otázky, stížnosti nebo pochvaly nám můžete posílat na adresu audio@sz.cz.Sledujte @SeznamZpravy na sociálních sítích: Twitter // Facebook // Instagram.Seznam Zprávy jsou zdrojem původních informací, nezávislé investigace, originální publicistiky.

Celý díl najdete na: https://herohero.co/dobrovskysidlo

V sobotu se demonstrovalo za změnu režimu, v neděli za pravdu a lásku. Lídři si vynadali v debatě ČT, jen Andrej Babiš si udělal hezký večer s podlézavými dotazy u Lubomíra Veselého. Česko má za sebou opravdu pestrý předvolební víkend.Zástupci Stačilo! a SPD v sobotu burcovali voliče na demonstraci se státotvorným názvem „Pane prezidente, respektujte volby“. Zdravici na tuto akci poslal čerstvý fanoušek koalice Stačilo!, exprezident Miloš Zeman. Ano, stejný Zeman, který si s výsledky voleb a Ústavou vždycky dělal, co chtěl.„Ale co je horší - Zeman pokračuje v podkopávání důvěry v systém. Zase zopakoval, že hrozí zmanipulování voleb jako v Rumunsku. Tam je teda mimochodem manipulovali Rusové,“ říká v podcastu Václav Dolejší.Ostatně Miloš Zeman se do podpory svých nových favoritů opravdu položil - půjde volit ruku v ruce s Janou Bobošíkovou a pojede taky na volební štáb Stačilo! do Ostravy. „To jim i docela přeju. Pokud se do Sněmovny nedostanou, tak je tam pozuráží. A pokud dostanou, tak řekne, že to byla jeho zásluha,“ dodává Lucie Stuchlíková.V neděli večer pak odstartovala série „superdebat“, když se na ČT sešli lídři všech stran (a Karel Havlíček). Vítězem se stal Petr Fiala, který - zřejmě čerstvě ostřílený z konfliktů na náměstích - zcela ovládl debatu.„Kdyby Petr Fiala s takovým zápalem premiéroval, možná bychom dneska byli jinde. A taky je paradoxní, že debatu ovládl díky tomu, že se trochu vykašlal na to, co pořád vyzdvihuje - na slušnost,“ říká Lucie Stuchlíková.Televizní moderátorce se zase podařilo přitlačit ke zdi Tomia Okamuru a Kateřinu Konečnou, když nedokázali říct, že Rusko je největší bezpečnostní hrozba. „V téhle části se mi líbil i výkon Víta Rakušana. Okamura byl celkově zase slabší. A úplně jiná, nižší liga byl v debatě Robert Šlachta,“ hodnotí Václav Dolejší.Jakou hru hrají Starostové, když sledují svého předsedu v televizi? Který politik ANO zatím vítězí v soutěži v servilitě vůči šéfovi? A co je nejzbytečnější otázka předvolebních debat? Poslechněte si Reaktor podcastu Vlevo dole!----Vlevo dole řeší politické kauzy, boje o vliv i šeptandu z kuloárů Sněmovny. Vychází každou středu v poledne.Podcast pro vás připravují Lucie Stuchlíková (@StuchlikovLucie) a Václav Dolejší (@VacDol), reportéři Seznam Zpráv.Další podcasty, ale taky články, komentáře a videa najdete na zpravodajském serveru Seznam Zprávy. Poslouchejte nás na webu Seznam Zpráv, na Podcasty.cz nebo ve své oblíbené podcastové aplikaci.Své názory, návrhy, otázky, stížnosti nebo pochvaly nám můžete posílat na adresu audio@sz.cz.Sledujte @SeznamZpravy na sociálních sítích: Twitter // Facebook // Instagram.Seznam Zprávy jsou zdrojem původních informací, nezávislé investigace, originální publicistiky.

Těmhle vadí inkluze, těmhle zase NATO. Ten nesnáší Zaorálka, tahle Šichtařovou a všichni dohromady nesnášejí Plagu. Tak vypadá rébus, který musí po volbách vyřešit Andrej Babiš: jak sestavit vládu z lidí, kteří se navzájem nenávidí.V Česku před volbami panuje na opoziční scéně paradoxní situace. „Zatímco favorit Babiš je pokorný a neustále opakuje, že nic není vyhráno, malé strany, které nemají ani jistotu, že se dostanou do Sněmovnu, už si říkají o vládní křesla,“ říká v podcastu Václav Dolejší.Šéf ANO je také velmi opatrný v tom, aby s někým vylučoval spolupráci. Maximálně říká, že se Stačilo přímo ve vládě by to asi nefungovalo. A slibuje, že nedopustí referendum o členství v NATO a EU.Zato malé strany mají spoustu podmínek a ještě se melou mezi sebou navzájem. „SPD vadí Maláčová, Stačilo! zase Šichtařová a Motoristům všichni. A navíc se ve straně nedokážou dohodnout, jestli s komunisty ano, nebo ne,“ vyjmenovává Lucie Stuchlíková.Zkrátka, kdybychom všechny tyhle podmínky měli brát vážně, vláda se snad ani nedá sestavit. A to přesto, že jako nejpravděpodobnější varianta se teď jeví menšinová vláda ANO s tichou podporou - což může obrousit hrany.„Ale ono to nakonec tak žhavé nebude. Jak půjde o koryta, ještě se bude Okamura s Maláčovou objímat,“ myslí si Stuchlíková.Otázka je, co to bude Andreje Babiše stát. A to zvlášť v případě, když nebude mít v koaličních partnerech moc na výběr. „Může to být hodně drahé. Tipuji, že Tomio Okamura by se stal předsedou Sněmovny a do vlády by SPD vyslala ‚experty‘,“ dodává Dolejší.Liší se nějak Stačilo a SPD? Kdo je největší hulvát? A kde si spravíte povolební kocovinu? Poslechněte si celou epizodu Vlevo dole a graf si prohlédněte tady!----Vlevo dole řeší politické kauzy, boje o vliv i šeptandu z kuloárů Sněmovny. Vychází každou středu v poledne.Podcast pro vás připravují Lucie Stuchlíková (@StuchlikovLucie) a Václav Dolejší (@VacDol), reportéři Seznam Zpráv.Další podcasty, ale taky články, komentáře a videa najdete na zpravodajském serveru Seznam Zprávy. Poslouchejte nás na webu Seznam Zpráv, na Podcasty.cz nebo ve své oblíbené podcastové aplikaci.Své názory, návrhy, otázky, stížnosti nebo pochvaly nám můžete posílat na adresu audio@sz.cz.Sledujte @SeznamZpravy na sociálních sítích: Twitter // Facebook // Instagram.Seznam Zprávy jsou zdrojem původních informací, nezávislé investigace, originální publicistiky.

Předvolební karikování mezinárodního dění se nám může vymstít. Temné časy v USA. Konečná vs. Okamura. Aneb kdo je ořechovější? Evropa se hádá o klimatické cíle.

Duely lídrů subjektů s reálnými šancemi v říjnových volbách, které od předminulé neděle vysílá Česká televize, podle všeho nezavrší dvojice Fiala-Babiš. Šéf hnutí ANO Kavčím horám nedůvěřuje, a tak se jim v podstatě vyhýbá. Takže možná dojde k finálovému střetu – s prominutím – pouhých místopředsedů největších favoritů. Ale na poslední chvíli se Babiš také může klidně zjevit. Nebylo by to poprvé.

Tomio Okamura, volební lídr SPD. Odpůrce migrantů, drahých potravin a „diktátu Bruselu“. Obžalovaný poslanec, který má talent na dlouhé projevy. Okamura je dalším volebním lídrem v sérii V12 s Marcelou Konrádovou (FSV UK) a s Petrem Justem (Metropolitní univerzita v Praze) – LÍDŘI. Ptá se Matěj Skalický.