Podcasts about Pacific Fleet

Last time we spoke about the fall of Wewak. In June 1945, Allied forces, led by General George Stevens, intensified their campaign to capture the strategic town of Wewak in New Guinea. After years of grueling combat, they relentlessly pressed against entrenched Japanese defenses, including the remnants of General Mano's 41st Division. The Australians achieved critical victories by securing vital supply routes and establishing new airfields, facilitating their advance. By May 8, after intense fighting, Australian troops effectively seized Wewak Point, eliminating entrenched Japanese soldiers in bunkers and caves. Despite suffering casualties, the Australians distinguished themselves through bravery and tactical ingenuity. Ultimately, the successful capture of Wewak marked a pivotal moment in the Pacific campaign, showcasing the determination and spirit of the Allies as they pushed towards victory in the Pacific Theater, bringing an end to a crucial chapter of the war. This episode is Operation Downfall Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  After the fall of Okinawa, the Allies were mopping up campaigns across the Asia-Pacific and planning for what was assumed to be the most cataclysmic battle yet, the invasion of the Japanese home islands. First we are going to travel back to Luzon. By mid-June, General Krueger's 6th Army had successfully captured all key objectives in northern Luzon, southern Luzon, and the area east of Manila, which serves as the capital of the Philippines. Although General Yokoyama's poorly equipped 41st Army had been rapidly scattered and forced into hiding, General Yamashita's Shobu Group still retained enough strength to continue its resistance in northern Luzon. The Shobu Group was primarily gathering its units in a desperate last-stand position along the rugged valley of the Asin River, an area known for its difficult terrain. Interestingly, General Krueger underestimated Yamashita's strategic intentions, still expecting him to make his final stand in the Cagayan Valley, located in the northern part of Luzon. With this assumption, Krueger believed that if General Beigthler's 37th Division could maintain its rapid advance towards Aparri, situated at the northern tip of Luzon, they might be able to conclude the Luzon Campaign in a pivotal stroke. However, intelligence indicated that units of the Shobu Group were retreating into the Cordillera Central mountain range, a formidable natural barrier, located between Routes 4 and 11. In response, Krueger ordered the 1st Corps to exert strong pressure on this mountainous region from the north, south, and west. To implement this strategy, General Swift directed the 6th, 25th, and 33rd Divisions to clear the supply route between Baguio and Aritao, ultimately sealing off Yamashita's last-stand position from the south. Meanwhile, Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla forces were instructed to advance east from Cervantes to capture the crucial junction of Routes 4 and 11 at Sabangan. Recognizing the importance of controlling key roadways, the 63rd Regiment was tasked with pushing up Route 4 to seize the strategic location of Kiangan. In the south, the 130th Regiment began probing southeast towards Pigkian, while the 20th Regiment continued to apply pressure on the remnants of the now-battered 2nd Tank Division. Ultimately, General Iwanaka's weakened forces narrowly avoided entrapment along the Bambang-Pingkian road, retreating northward via treacherous mountain trails and river valleys. They reached the Tubliao area just as early July arrived, illustrating the persistent and relentless nature of this campaign. Looking northward from Cervantes, Volckmann's guerrilla fighters launched attacks toward both Mankayan and Sabangan. By the end of June, their efforts had pressured the beleaguered 19th Division to hastily withdraw from Bontoc, a significant town located in central Luzon, and Sabangan. However, General Ozaki's forces maintained a formidable defensive position at the Lepanto Mine, an area known for its mineral wealth and strategic significance. On June 16, the 63rd Regiment began its advance up Route 4, which runs north through the central highlands toward Kiangan, a town that was critical for controlling the region. By the evening of the following day, American forces had successfully breached the defensive line established by the 105th Division at the Rayambugan Farm School, a local educational institution that was repurposed for military use during the conflict. Continuing their push, the 63rd Regiment encountered the main defenses of General Tsuda on June 19 along Route 4. However, over five days of fierce fighting, utilizing only one battalion for the attack, gained little ground for the Americans. Recognizing the need for greater force, they reinforced their assault on June 24. By June 26, the 63rd began to break through towards Hucab, a small settlement, and by June 29, they had overcome the last organized resistance in the area. Meanwhile, the 37th Division also made significant advances. Resuming its drive up Route 5 on June 17, the 148th Regiment successfully pushed forward to Naguilian, a town that marks a key waypoint on this route. Two days later, the front-line troops reached Bangag, yet here they encountered increased resistance. They were now facing elements of Major-General Yuguchi Shuntaro's 80th Brigade, which was attempting to move south along Route 5. In a series of running engagements from June 19 to 23, the 37th Division inflicted heavy casualties, killing over 600 Japanese soldiers and capturing nearly 285 more in the challenging fifteen-mile stretch between Bangag and Balasig. The remnants of the Yuguchi Force were ultimately forced to retreat eastward into the rugged and uncharted wilderness of the Sierra Madre mountain range, illustrating the intense and chaotic nature of the conflict. General Krueger deemed it essential to execute an airborne operation over the northern Cagayan Valley to ensure the success of the 37th Division's advance. It's possible that Krueger's motivation also stemmed from a desire to secure northern Luzon before the 8th Army took control of operations, which was scheduled for July 1. Despite contrary reports from various sources, including the United States Armed Forces in the Philippines Northern Luzon, 1st Corps, the 37th Division, and ALAMO scout teams, Krueger concluded that Japanese forces in the Cagayan Valley were retreating "in wild disorder on Highway 5 towards Aparri." It's worth noting that, in actuality, the general movement of Japanese troops had been southward for weeks, and no Japanese unit intended to take refuge in Aparri, a flatland area surrounded by mountains that made it a poor defensive position. Based on his assessment of the situation, Krueger decided that in order to achieve the complete destruction of the fleeing enemy forces, he would launch a vertical envelopment of airborne troops to close any escape routes and prevent the Japanese from evading capture in Aparri. Consequently, on June 21, Krueger ordered a battalion combat team from the 511th Parachute Infantry of the 11th Airborne Division to parachute near Aparri on June 23. However, on June 21, the Connolly Task Force entered Aparri without facing any opposition. By the evening of June 22, elements of the Task Force had advanced ten miles south along Route 5, managing to secure the Camalaniugan Airstrip, a crucial airfield integral to the logistics of both sides. Despite the successes of the reinforced Connolly Task Force, Krueger did not change his mind about the desirability and necessity for the airdrop. Instead, he concluded that the "seizure of Aparri without opposition by elements of the Connolly Task Force on 21 June 1945, together with the almost unopposed advance of the 37th Division, indicated clearly that the time had come for mounting the airborne troops to block the enemy's retreat in the Cagayan Valley." It is not clear just what retreat Krueger expected to block. On the morning of June 23, the paratroopers dropped into Camalaniugan unchallenged and immediately began their advance southward to make contact with the 37th Division. That same day, the 129th Regiment took over the offensive, heading north towards Tuguegarao, a significant town in the region. Tuguegarao fell without resistance by June 25. By nightfall, forward elements of the 129th had pushed ten miles beyond Tuguegarao, reaching the town of Iguig. The following day, June 26, the forces made contact with the paratroopers at the Paret River, further solidifying their position. By the close of June, Japanese resistance in the Cagayan Valley had subsided, and General Yamashita's Shobu Group, still capable of fighting, found itself encircled in a last-stand area that would become known as the Kiangan Pocket, named by the Filipino-American forces engaged in its reduction. As the campaign progressed, the last elements of the 25th and 33rd Divisions were relieved. General Gill's 32nd Division took over control of the Baguio-Ambuclao sector, while the bulk of General Hurdis' 6th Division assembled at Hucab. This marked a significant transition as it signaled the conclusion of operations for Krueger's 6th Army and Swift's 1st Corps. The command would soon shift to General Eichelberger's 8th Army and General Griswold's 14th Corps, who would carry out further operations throughout Luzon. General Griswold's plans called for relentless pressure to be maintained against the Shobu Group, which was concentrated in an area known as the Kiangan Pocket. In line with this strategy, Volckmann's guerrilla fighters continued their assaults towards key locations such as Mankayan, Sabangan, and Bontoc. The 126th and 127th Regiments advanced north along Route 11 and into the Agno Valley, engaging mixed forces from the 58th Independent Mixed Brigade and the 19th Division. Simultaneously, the 20th and 63rd Regiments were preparing to renew their attack against the 105th Division located at Kiangan, as the advance led by General Hurdis had been halted by torrential rains that had severely damaged roads and bridges. Meanwhile, the 1st Regiment made its own push northward along Route 4 towards Banaue, a town famous for its rice terraces and mountainous landscape. On July 9, Volckmann's 15th Regiment finally secured Sabangan. The following day, the 11th Regiment captured Bontoc while the 66th Regiment began to break through the defenses set up by General Ozaki in the Lepanto Mines-Mankayan area. By July 12, Kiangan fell to the 63rd Regiment; however, they soon faced even heavier rains, which compelled General Hurdis to halt his advance once again. On July 20, the 1st Regiment reached Banaue. The next day, they made contact with elements of the guerrilla 11th Regiment at Polis Pass before turning east along Route 389. Here, they aimed to engage a concentration of around 2,500 Japanese soldiers from the 103rd Division and the 4th Air Division. Back in the west, Mankayan also fell on July 20. Five days later, elements of the 15th and 66th Regiments made contact at the junction where Routes 11 and 393 intersect. The 19th Division was withdrawing into the upper Agno Valley to establish defensive positions, blocking the northern, western, and southern approaches to Toccucan, a small but strategically important area. The 15th and 121st Regiments began their assaults toward Toccucan, but they soon encountered remnants of the 19th Division, who proved to be still capable of effective resistance. At the same time, the 66th Regiment moved south along Route 11 to establish contact with troops from the 32nd Division, pressing the offensive forward. Looking east on July 24, the 20th Regiment took over positions at Kiangan and began an advance towards Kiangkiang and the Asin River. However, the Americans encountered greater resistance than anticipated along this route, making only a meager gain of three miles by August 15. At the same time, other units were dispatched south towards Tubliao to block the retreat of General Iwanaka's remaining forces. On July 29, elements of the 66th and 127th Regiments finally established contact near Gambang. They then shifted east into the Agno Valley, close to Buguias, and initiated a southward drive to link up with the 126th Regiment, which they successfully met on August 8. By August 15, Volckmann's guerrillas found themselves four miles short of Toccucan from the northwest and a mile and a half short from the west. In the eastern front, elements of the 1st and 11th Regiments advanced south from Banaue along Route 390, reaching a point about five miles south of Banaue by August 9. That same day, they also cleared Route 389 to the east, securing additional pathways for movement. Additionally, during this time, the 37th Division conducted vigorous patrols east of the Cagayan River, pushing enemy troops deeper into the Sierra Madre mountains. Unfortunately, this relentless pressure resulted in an estimated 1,000 Japanese casualties by August 15. Throughout a month and a half of grueling fighting in steep, treacherous terrain and under miserable weather conditions, the Filipino-American forces struggled to project any significant strength into the Asin Valley. They suffered approximately 1,650 casualties in total. In contrast, the 8th Army estimated that Japanese casualties during the same period reached around 13,500, with many killed or succumbing to starvation and disease. This marked the effective conclusion of the Luzon Campaign, a campaign that would soon be overshadowed by Japan's surrender. General Yamashita estimated in June that he had sufficient supplies to sustain his forces until mid-September. Given the scale of effort the 8th Army was willing to dedicate to the campaign between July 1 and August 15, it seems likely that Yamashita would have met this deadline. When food supplies were depleted, Yamashita planned for his most effective remaining troops to attempt a breakout from the Asin Valley into the mountains of far northwestern Luzon, where he hoped to find more provisions. Those not involved in the breakout were to conduct banzai attacks along all fronts to cover the retreat of the main forces. Yamashita anticipated that whether or not the breakout succeeded, it would signal the complete disintegration of his forces. He even planned to commit hara-kiri amidst the chaos of battle. As a result, the end of the war arrived about a month before Yamashita was prepared to officially acknowledge his defeat. By any measure, the Shobu Group accomplished the delaying mission that Yamashita had envisioned. Throughout the 6th Army's control of operations on Luzon, the maximum commitment of major ground forces against the Shobu Group included four reinforced U.S. Army infantry divisions, one separate regiment combat team, an armored group, Volckmann's , and the Buena Vista Regiment. When hostilities ceased on August 15, the Shobu Group was still "entertaining" three reinforced divisions: the 6th, 32nd, and 37th. Additionally, it had a significantly strengthened, the Buena Vista Regiment, and various other guerrilla units. After the war concluded, approximately 50,500 Japanese troops emerged from the mountains of northern Luzon, with nearly 40,000 of these coming from the Asin Valley's last-stand area. Ultimately, the war ended with about a third of the Shobu Group's peak strength still alive and capable of conducting organized and determined delaying operations. It is clear that, over the seven and a half months since January 9, the Shobu Group executed a remarkably effective delaying action. Despite the circumstances, the 14th Area Army had achieved its objective of tying down as many Allied forces as possible in Luzon. This diversion was critical, as it allowed the Japanese Empire valuable time to fortify its defenses in the Home Islands.  Reflecting back to January, General Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko's General Defense Command was operating with a modest force for the land and air defense of Honshu, Shikoku, Kyushu, and the Izu Islands. The primary focus had been on building naval and air power for Operation Sho-Go. In Kyushu and southwestern Honshu, the Western District Army, led by Lieutenant-General Yokoyama Isamu, consisted of only the 86th Division and the 12th Air Division. Meanwhile, the Central District Army, commanded by Lieutenant-General Kawabe Masakazu in central Honshu and Shikoku, had the 44th and 73rd Divisions supported by the 11th Air Division. To the northeast, in Honshu and the Izu Islands, General Fujie Keisuke's Eastern District Army maintained the 72nd Division, along with both the 1st and 3rd Imperial Guards Divisions, the 66th and 67th Independent Mixed Brigades, and the 10th Air Division. Additionally, Lieutenant-General Uemura Toshimichi's 36th Army was positioned as a mobile reserve in the Kanto and Shizuoka area, comprised of the 81st and 93rd Divisions, along with the 4th Tank Division. Further north, Lieutenant-General Higuchi Kiichiro's 5th Area Army had deployed the 7th and 77th Divisions, the 1st Air Division, and the 12th Air Fleet stationed in Hokkaido. It also maintained a mixed brigade at Karafuto. Lieutenant-General Terakura Shozo commanded the 27th Army in the Kuril Islands, which included the 42nd and 91st Divisions, along with the 43rd and 69th Independent Mixed Brigades, and the 3rd and 4th Amphibious Brigades, as well as the Chishima 1st Brigade and Naval Base Force. The air situation was equally dire; Japan had only around 550 aircraft available for offensive operations and a total of about 770 aircraft and 1,200 anti-aircraft guns designated for defensive roles. As preparations for Operation Ten-Go unfolded, the air and ground units in Japan underwent significant reorganization in February. This restructuring led to the formation of several military commands, including Admiral Ugaki's 5th Air Fleet based in Kyushu, Vice-Admiral Maeda Minoru's 10th Air Fleet in Kanto, Lieutenant-General Yoshimoto Teiichi's 11th Area Army in northeast Honshu, derived from the now-defunct 27th Army, and additional area armies such as Fujie's 12th in east-central Honshu, Lieutenant-General Okada Tasuku's 13th in west-central Honshu, Kawabe's 15th in western Honshu and Shikoku, and Yokoyama's 16th in Kyushu. The reorganization of high-level military headquarters was not the sole initiative at this time. The Japanese Empire also approved a large-scale mobilization plan that called for the deployment of 42 divisions, 18 independent mixed brigades, and six tank brigades, amounting to approximately 1.5 million personnel. Following the fall of Iwo Jima and Okinawa, and with intelligence indicating that the Soviet Union was redeploying troops from the European theater to the Far East, Japan began preparing for the defense of its homeland. This preparation involved activating the 1st and 2nd General Armies to replace the General Defense Command and implementing Operation Ketsu-Go. The strategy for Operation Ketsu-Go outlined that the Imperial Japanese Army would strive to defeat American forces while their invasion fleet remained at sea. The plan aimed to deliver a decisive blow against the American naval forces by first destroying as many aircraft carriers as possible, utilizing the special attack units from both the Air Force and Navy. As the amphibious forces approached the range of homeland airbases, the entire air combat strength would be deployed for continuous day and night assaults against these ships. The focus of these air operations was to disrupt American landing plans, targeting primarily troop and equipment transports. Should any American forces successfully land, these would be swiftly assaulted by the IJA to secure a decisive victory. The primary objective of the ground operation was to eliminate the American landing force right on the beach. Operation Ketsu-Go was designed as a comprehensive joint defense effort, mobilizing the full capabilities of the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Navy's essential role was to protect the coasts by attacking invasion fleets using combined surface, submarine, and air forces. The Air General Army would closely coordinate with the Navy to locate and destroy American transports at sea. If the invasion forces succeeded in landing, the local Area Army would take command of all naval ground forces in its assigned territory and would exercise operational control over air units in support of the ground operations. A key component of the Ketsu-Go operational planning involved reinforcing sectors under attack by units transferred from other regions. Given that U.S. air raids had already severely impacted the transportation network, plans were made for troop movements to be conducted on foot. If the battle at the beach held no promise of a successful outcome, the conflict would inevitably shift to fighting inland. To prepare for this, interior resistance was planned. Guard units and Civilian Defense Corps personnel, along with elements of field forces serving as a nucleus, would be utilized as resistance troops. Their mission would involve attriting American forces through guerrilla warfare, espionage, deception, disruption of supply areas, and blockades as enemy landing forces advanced inland. This operation divided Japanese territory into seven zones, where air and naval special attack forces were directed to eliminate invading forces at sea and to establish an aggressive coastal defense. Field Marshal Sugiyama Hashime's 1st General Army established its headquarters in Tokyo, assuming control over the 11th, 12th, and 13th Area Armies. Meanwhile, Field Marshal Hata Shunroku's 2nd General Army set up its headquarters in Hiroshima, overseeing the 15th and 16th Area Armies. Additionally, to provide a cohesive command structure for all Army air units participating in the campaign, an Air General Army headquarters was formed under Kawabe. On the naval front, Admiral Toyoda took command of the General Navy Command, granting him supreme operational authority over all Navy surface and air forces. In the coming months, the Japanese continued to prepare for the anticipated invasion by mobilizing new units and diverting existing forces from Manchuria and other regions. By August, Yoshimoto's 11th Area Army had been reinforced to include seven infantry divisions and two infantry brigades. The 12th Area Army, now under General Tanaka Shizuichi, was significantly larger, comprising 20 infantry divisions, two tank divisions, eight infantry brigades, three tank brigades, three artillery brigades, and one anti-aircraft brigade. Okada's 13th Area Army was organized with six infantry divisions, three infantry brigades, one tank brigade, one artillery brigade, and one anti-aircraft brigade. The 15th Area Army, under the command of Lieutenant-General Uchiyama Eitaro, was formed with eight infantry divisions, three infantry brigades, one artillery brigade, one anti-aircraft brigade, and two tank regiments. Yokoyama's 16th Area Army included a substantial force of 15 infantry divisions, eight infantry brigades, three tank brigades, three artillery brigades, and one anti-aircraft brigade. Additionally, Higuchi's 5th Area Army consisted of six infantry divisions and two infantry brigades. In tandem with these ground preparations, Lieutenant-General Sugawara Michio's 6th Air Army and Ugaki's 5th Air Fleet were assigned the critical role of launching a powerful air counterattack against the American invasion fleet, targeting carriers, gunnery ships, and transport vessels. In conjunction with elements from the 1st Air Army, 5th Air Army, 3rd Air Fleet, and 10th Air Fleet, the Japanese strategy focused on executing strikes against US carriers. For this task, 330 IJNAF aircraft were specifically assigned. An additional 250 aircraft from both the IJAAF and IJNAF were designated to target gunnery ships, while transports would be subjected to round-the-clock suicide attacks over a span of 10 days. Various aircraft types,including trainers, transports, float planes, bombers, and obsolete fighters, would be used in kamikaze missions. The air assaults on the transports would also incorporate all available aircraft not assigned to other operational duties. Although Japanese fighters had limited effectiveness against B-29 raids, they were expected to inflict damage on the invasion fleet. It was essential, however, that IJAAF and IJNAF fighters first establish air superiority over the targeted areas. Achieving this goal was a questionable assumption, especially given the formidable strength of US air power. By the end of June, nearly 8,000 aircraft, predominantly kamikazes, had been assembled for what was expected to be a decisive battle, with an estimated additional 2,500 planes likely to be produced by the end of September. To enhance their efforts, Kaiten suicide midget submarines and various special attack units were also designated to target any invading fleet, underscoring the significance of suicide attacks in Japanese military strategy. The hope was that these suicide, or tokko, units would inflict a 30 to 50 percent loss on the invading forces. However, as of June 30, only 1,235 surface special-attack boats and 324 underwater types had been produced, significantly hampering Japan's preparations for the impending decisive battle. In preparation for the seizure of Japan's industrial heart through an amphibious invasion, General MacArthur was laying the groundwork for a significant military operation. On April 3, the Joint Chiefs of Staff designated him as the Commander in Chief of the United States Army Forces in the Pacific. This appointment granted him administrative control over all Army resources in the Pacific, with the exceptions of the 20th Air Force, the Alaskan Command, and the Southeast Pacific forces. Additionally, all naval resources in the Pacific, except those in the Southeast Pacific Area, were placed under Admiral Nimitz's control, making them available for major operations against Japan. With the conclusion of the war in Europe, plans were proposed to redeploy 10 infantry divisions, 5 armored divisions, and 72 air groups to the Pacific. Consequently, the total forces in the Pacific were set to increase from approximately 1.4 million Army troops as of June 30 to nearly 2,439,400 by December 31. On June 2, the 20th Air Force was reorganized into the U.S. Army Strategic Air Force under General Carl Spaatz. This command would oversee the newly formed 20th Air Force led by Lieutenant-General Nathan Twinning, which had been reorganized from the 21st Bomber Command, and Lieutenant-General James Doolittle's 8th Air Force, which was restructured from the 20th Bomber Command and slated for deployment in the Ryukyus. Simultaneously, MacArthur was developing plans for Operation Downfall, the ambitious strategy for invading Japan. This operation envisaged a massive offensive against the islands of Kyushu and Honshu, utilizing all available combined resources from the Army, Navy, and Air Forces. The invasion plan consisted of two key operations: Operation Olympic and Operation Coronet. The American plan for the invasion of Kyushu focused on seizing only the southern part of the island, delineated by a line extending from Tsuno on the east coast to Sendai on the west. The 3,000 square miles included within this boundary were considered sufficient to provide the necessary air bases for short-range support in the final operations planned against the industrial centers of Honshu. Within the selected southern region for invasion, known as the "Olympic" plan, there were four lowland areas identified as suitable for the development of major airfields. The first area extended from Kagoshima, located on the western shore of Kagoshima Bay, through a narrow corridor to the Kushikino plain along the East China Sea. The second area ran northward from Shibushi on Ariake Bay, traversing a winding valley to Miyakonojo. The third area began at Kanoya, situated east of Kagoshima Bay, and followed the coastline of Ariake Bay. The fourth and largest area was located north of Miyazaki on the east coast. Four months after American troops first landed on Kyushu, the next decisive amphibious operation against Japan was set to be launched. Code-named Coronet, this invasion targeted the Kanto Plain area of Honshu and was scheduled for March 1, 1945. The operation was tasked to two armies: the First and the Eighth, assigned to conduct a major assault against the heartland of Japan. Their immediate objective was to destroy all opposition and secure the Tokyo-Yokohama area. General MacArthur would personally command the landing forces and oversee ground operations on the mainland. Accompanying him would be the advance echelon of his General Headquarters, which would operate as the Army Group Headquarters in the field. The initial landings would involve 10 reinforced infantry divisions, 3 marine divisions, and 2 armored divisions. These forces, launched from the Philippines and Central Pacific bases, would be continuously protected by the ships and aircraft of the Pacific Fleet, alongside land-based air support. Thirty days after the initial assault, each army was set to be reinforced by a corps of 3 additional divisions. Five days following this reinforcement, an airborne division and an AFPAC Reserve Corps consisting of another 3 divisions would be made available. In total, these 25 divisions were tasked with seizing the Kanto Plain, including the general areas of Tokyo and Yokohama, and carrying out any further operations necessary to overcome Japanese resistance. The strategic reserve for the entire operation would comprise a corps of 3 divisions located in the Philippines, along with sufficient reinforcements from the United States, allowing for the deployment of 4 divisions per month. For Operation Olympic, General Krueger's 6th Army was appointed to lead the effort, employing a total of 14 divisions that were already positioned in the Pacific. Meanwhile, the 1st and 8th Armies were designated to conduct Operation Coronet, comprising a total of 25 divisions primarily sourced from the redeployment of troops and equipment from the European theater. Eichelberger's 8th Army planned to land on Sagami Bay and subsequently fan out to secure the western shores of Tokyo Bay, reaching as far north as Yokohama. Concurrently, General Courtney Hodges' 1st Army was set to land at the Kujukuri beaches, with the objective of pushing west and south to clear the eastern shores of both Tokyo and Sagami Bays. To mitigate the risks associated with landing on the heavily fortified and well-garrisoned islands of Japan, a comprehensive campaign of air-sea blockade and bombardment was advocated.  The 20th Air Force, launching from bases in the Marianas and the Ryukyus, aimed to cripple Japan's industrial capacity by ruthlessly attacking factories and transportation systems. This steady assault from the massive B-29 bombers was expected to severely diminish Japan's ability to sustain its large military organization and effectively distribute its remaining power. Simultaneously, carrier task forces would conduct repeated raids on crucial coastal areas, targeting enemy naval and air forces, disrupting shore and sea communications, and supporting long-range bombers in their strikes against strategic objectives. The Far East Air Force, also based in the Ryukyus, would focus on selected targets intended to dismantle Japan's air capabilities both in the homeland and in nearby regions of North China and Korea. By intercepting shipping and shattering communication lines, the Far East Air Force aimed to complete the isolation of southern Kyushu, preparing it for an amphibious assault. As the target date approached, it was planned that these air raids would intensify, culminating in an all-out effort from X-10 to X-Day. In the final ten days before the landing phase, the combined bombing power of all available planes, both land-based and carrier-based, would be unleashed in a massive assault. The objectives included reducing enemy defenses, destroying remaining air forces, isolating the target area, and facilitating preliminary minesweeping and naval bombardment operations. The fortifications within the designated landing areas would be overwhelmed by tons of explosives, while naval vessels and engineering units worked to eliminate underwater mines and barriers. With such concentrated power backing them, it was anticipated that the amphibious forces would be able to execute their assault landings with minimal losses. This strategy aimed to minimize casualties, further diminish Japan's air capabilities, and cut off reinforcements from Asia. There was even a possibility that such measures could compel Japan to surrender, thus eliminating the need for a significant landing on the Home Islands. In a notable first, Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet and Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet were to operate simultaneously. Admiral Spruance's fleet would focus on the landing operations, while Admiral Halsey's fleet would provide strategic support through raids on Honshu and Hokkaido. On July 28, the 16 fast carriers of Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 and the four British carriers of Admiral Rawlings' Task Force 37 commenced operations to weaken the air, naval, and shipping capabilities of the Home Islands. By mid-August, Vice-Admiral John Towers was assigned command of a reinforced Task Force 38, tasked with executing a series of strikes against Japan east of the 135th meridian, while General Kenney's Ryukyus-based Far Eastern Air Forces targeted objectives to the west. Additionally, Rawlings' Task Force 37, enhanced to nine carriers, launched diversionary strikes against Hong Kong and Canton. Starting on October 18, the 3rd Fleet began aggressive operations against aircraft, airfields, and shipping in Kyushu, Shikoku, and Honshu to isolate the assault area for the upcoming Kyushu invasion. Six days later, the Fast Carrier Task Force was divided into Task Force 38 and Task Force 58. Task Force 38 retained 12 fast carriers specifically for strikes against Japan. The pre-invasion air strikes, surface bombardments, and minesweeping operations in the Kyushu landing zones commenced, steadily increasing in intensity as they approached X-Day on November 1. The ten fast carriers of Vice-Admiral Frederick Sherman's Task Force 58 would provide direct support for the Kyushu landings, which were to be conducted by Admiral Turner's Task Force 40, consisting of 800 warships and 1,500 transports. In this effort, three Fire Support groups, each accompanied by an escort carrier group, would launch preemptive assaults on the designated Olympic landing zones.  Off southeastern Kyushu's Ariake Bay, Rear Admiral Richard Connolly's 3rd Fire Support Group (TG 41.3), comprising 6 old battleships, 6 cruisers, 13 destroyers, and 34 support craft, was tasked with eliminating coastal batteries at Toi Misaka, Hi Saki, and Ariake Bay. Additionally, they would target seaplane bases and suicide boat/submarine pens at Oshima, Odatsu, Biro Jima, and Sakida, followed by softening defenses at the XI Corps landing beaches. Meanwhile, approximately 30 miles north along Kyushu's southeastern coast, Rear Admiral Ingolf Kiland's 7th Fire Support Group (TG 41.7), consisting of 3 old battleships, 8 cruisers, 11 destroyers, and 35 support craft, would bombard coastal batteries, suicide-boat nests, and seaplane bases located at Tozaki Hana, Hososhima, and Miyazaki. This group would also destroy rail junctions at Tsumo Jogasaki and Tsuno to disrupt reinforcements heading south, before finally shelling the I Corps invasion beaches near Miyazaki. Off southwestern Kyushu, Rear Admiral Giraud Wright's 5th Fire Support Group (TG 41.5), with 4 old battleships, 10 cruisers, 14 destroyers, and 74 support craft, was set to hammer fortifications within the Koshiki Retto and at the beaches between Kaminokawa and Kushikino. Their mission included knocking out Noma Misaki and Hashimi Saki coastal batteries, the Akune seaplane base, and Kushikino's airfield, while also cutting the Akune–Kushikino road and rail lines. Ultimately, they would provide heavy fire support for the V Amphibious Corps landing beaches. Meanwhile, General Krueger planned to first secure Kagoshima and Ariake Bays as crucial ports of entry. Following that, the objective was to push inland as far as the Tsuno-Sendai line to block mountain defiles and prevent any enemy reinforcements from the north. As a preliminary operation, on October 28, the reinforced 40th Division, now under Brigadier-General Donald Myers, was assigned to seize positions in the Koshiki Island group opposite Sendai. The objective was to establish emergency naval and seaplane bases on these islands while also clearing the sea routes to the coastal invasion area of Kushikino. The 40th Division was also tasked with making preliminary landings on the four islands of Tanega, Make, Take, and Lo off the southern tip of Kyushu, with the goal of safeguarding the passage of friendly shipping through the strategic Osumi Strait. On November 1, General Krueger's three main corps were set to conduct simultaneous assault landings in the designated objective areas. Major-General Harry Schmidt's 5th Amphibious Corps would land near Kushikino, drive eastward to secure the western shore of Kagoshima Bay, and then turn north to block the movement of enemy reinforcements from upper Kyushu. Meanwhile, General Hall's 11th Corps was to land at Ariake Bay, capture Kanoya, advance to the eastern shore of Kagoshima Bay, and then move northwestward to Miyakonojo. Following this, Swift's 1st Corps would assault Miyazaki on the east coast, subsequently moving southwest to occupy Miyakonojo and clear the northern shore of Kagoshima Bay, thereby protecting the northeast flank. Additionally, Major-General Charles Ryder's 9th Corps, initially held in reserve, was selected to execute a diversionary feint off the island of Shikoku while the other three assault corps advanced on the actual landing beaches. Finally, Krueger kept the 77th Division and the 11th Airborne Division in Area Reserve, prepared to follow up the invasion forces. Should these units prove insufficient to fulfill their assigned tasks, a buildup from units earmarked for Coronet would be initiated at a rate of three divisions per month. On the other side, the Japanese anticipated that Kyushu would be the next target and identified the same beaches selected for Operation Olympic as the most likely landing sites. In response, Generals Hata and Yokoyama concentrated the formidable 57th Army under Lieutenant-General Nishihara Kanji around the areas of Ariake Bay and Miyazaki. Meanwhile, Lieutenant-General Nakazawa Mitsuo commanded the 40th Army, which was positioned in the Ijuin-Kagoshima sector to the west. Hata's mobile reserves were stationed near Mount Kurishima, consisting of at least five divisions and several independent brigades, prepared to swiftly engage enemy forces before they could establish secure beachheads. Although Yokoyama and Hata did not anticipate an invasion in northern and central Kyushu, they had many units distributed throughout the region. The Japanese government prioritized defensive preparations for Kyushu over those for Honshu, hoping that a fierce defense of Kyushu would deter American forces from attempting a similar operation on Honshu. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Krueger's forces tackled Japan's Shobu Group in Luzon, while preparing for Operation Downfall, the invasion of Japan itself. Despite tough terrain, American forces made significant gains, encircling the Japanese. Meanwhile, Japan readied for defense, mobilizing troops and launching air counterattacks. As the Allies pressed forward, the impending invasion loomed, with strategies developed to land on Kyushu and Honshu. Ultimately, intense battles shaped the eve of an operation that would determine the war's fate and change history forever.

Today's Topics Dan Schneider and guests, Mark Tirona (US Marine Corps three tours combat vet) and Matthew Weller (US Army Paratrooper and combat vet) discuss current events in the US military and the impact of modern culture on male spirituality 1) Is there such a thing as "Crusader" spirituality? What does Saint Teresa of Avila have to say? 2) The Pentagon has withdrawn Admiral's nomination to lead Pacific Fleet amid renewed attention on "drag shows" https://www.military.com/daily-news/2025/07/11/pentagon-withdraws-admirals-nomination-lead-pacific-fleet-amid-renewed-attention-drag-shows.html 3, 4) Where all the men have gone - and how to bring all the men back https://intellectualtakeout.org/2025/07/where-all-the-men-have-gone-and-how-to-bring-all-the-men-back/

This is a Grave Talks CLASSIC EPISODE! History books say the USS Hornet was decommissioned in 1970—yet countless witnesses swear her crew still marches the steel decks. In this classic episode of The Grave Talks, we set sail (without leaving dock) through hangars that echo with phantom propellers, sick bays where shadow med-techs still make rounds, and officers' quarters where unseen hands slam hatches shut. Hear first-hand accounts from docents, veterans, and investigators who've chased disembodied footsteps into dead-end corridors, captured EVP of frantic battle stations, and seen full-bodied apparitions vanish beneath red emergency lights. Was the Hornet's combat toll simply too heavy to discharge, or did the proud carrier become a spiritual safe harbor for every soul who called her home? Strap on your life vest, grab an EMF meter, and join us where the Pacific Fleet meets the paranormal.  Become a Premium Supporter of The Grave Talks Through Apple Podcasts or Patreon (http://www.patreon.com/thegravetalks) There, you will get: Access to every episode of our show, AD-FREE! Access to every episode of our show before everyone else! Other EXCLUSIVE supporter perks and more!

Welcome to "The Readiness Brief," a limited podcast series hosted by The O2X Podcast, designed to explore the critical importance of readiness within the tactical community. In each episode, we bring to the forefront seasoned members of the O2X Integrated Readiness Platform (IRP) network, engaging in insightful conversations with senior leaders across the tactical population."The Readiness Brief" aims to foster a deeper understanding of the O2X Integrated Readiness Platform (IRP) while spotlighting successes and valuable insights from organizations committed to preparedness.Part 4 features O2X Program Manager Brendan Stickles and Captain David "Heavy" Ganci.Captain David "Heavy" Ganci, a Naval Flight Officer who commissioned through OCS in 1999, has served as a cornerstone of the VAQ Electronic Attack community for over two decades. His operational career spans combat deployments with four distinguished squadrons—the "Gauntlets" of VAQ-136, "Patriots" of VAQ-140, "Gray Wolves" of VAQ-142, and as commanding officer of the "Zappers" of VAQ-130—participating in Operations Southern Watch, Iraqi Freedom, Enduring Freedom, New Dawn, and Inherent Resolve. Between operational tours, he served as a tactics instructor at the Electronic Attack Weapons School, worked as Assistant Aviation Officer Community Manager at PERS-43, earned his Master's degree at the Naval War College, and served in the Pentagon's Office of Legislative Affairs before being selected as Aide-de-Camp to Secretary of the Navy Kenneth Braithwaite. Currently serving as Deputy Commodore of Commander Electronic Attack Wing U.S. Pacific Fleet, Captain Ganci's decorations include the Defense Superior Service Medal, Legion of Merit, Individual Action Air Medal with combat "V," and Strike Flight Air Medal with six awards, reflecting a distinguished career leading the Airborne Electronic Attack Community across the globe.Brendan Stickles currently serves as Program Manager for Federal Government Accounts at O2X Human Performance, following a distinguished career that blended military service with high-level government advisory roles. A Navy Commander with over 18 years of jet flying experience and more than 550 carrier landings, he commanded an EA-18 squadron aboard the USS Eisenhower that earned consecutive "Battle E" awards for combat efficiency during Operation Inherent Resolve. After his military career, Stickles transitioned to serve as Special Advisor for Defense to Vice Presidents Kamala Harris and Mike Pence, where he managed a comprehensive portfolio including veterans' issues, national security, defense innovation, and military readiness as Director on the National Security Council. A Naval Academy graduate with degrees in history, an MBA from UNC, and an MPA from Harvard, he later served as a consultant with Boston Consulting Group before joining O2X in 2023, bringing his unique combination of operational military experience, senior government advisory expertise, and business acumen to the human performance sector.Building Homes for Heroes:https://www.buildinghomesforheroes.org/Download the O2X Tactical Performance App:app.o2x.comLet us know what you think:Website - http://o2x.comIG - https://instagram.com/o2xhumanperformance?igshid=1kicimx55xt4f 

Hey there! Send us a message. Who else should we be talking to? What topics are important? Use FanMail to connect! Let us know!The CopDoc Podcast - Season 8 - Episode 152What happens when a Naval Captain witnesses his crew cheering as his predecessor leaves? For Mike Abershoff, it sparked a leadership revolution that transformed USS Benfold from one of the worst ships in the Pacific Fleet to the best in the entire US Navy – all in just 15 months."The days of top-down command and control, my way or the highway leadership style, are over," Abershoff explains in this riveting conversation. Drawing from his bestselling book "It's Your Ship" (which has sold over 1.5 million copies worldwide), he shares how replacing fear with respect created extraordinary results.Abershoff's methods were unconventional but effective. He interviewed all 310 crew members individually, seeing his ship through their eyes. He published the budget openly, empowering sailors to make financial decisions. He replaced divisive "diversity training" with a unity program based on mutual respect. Most remarkably, he reduced disciplinary cases from 28 to 5 per year, discovering in the process that previous leadership had unconsciously targeted minority sailors.The parallels to policing are striking and instructive. Both military and law enforcement organizations have traditionally valued hierarchy and directive leadership, yet both face increasingly complex challenges requiring adaptability and innovation. "Just because we grew up in a system where our chain of command were buttheads to us doesn't mean we need to continue it," Abershoff advises police leaders.Throughout our conversation, Abershoff reveals himself as a leader still learning – willing to acknowledge self-doubt, emotional connections, and the importance of seeing leadership from different perspectives. His "monkey tree" analogy (what looks like smiling faces from the top looks very different from below) offers a powerful reminder about truly understanding those we lead.Whether you're a veteran police leader, an aspiring supervisor, or simply interested in organizational transformation, Abershoff's insights will challenge conventional wisdom and inspire a more engaged, respectful approach to leadership. Listen now to discover how small, consistent improvements can revolutionize your team's performance and culture.Contact us: copdoc.podcast@gmail.com Website: www.copdocpodcast.comIf you'd like to arrange for facilitated training, or consulting, or talk about steps you might take to improve your leadership and help in your quest for promotion, contact Steve at stephen.morreale@gmail.com

Trident Room Podcast lead host U.S. Navy Cmdr. Alanna Youngblood interviews Cmdr. Matthew Morris and Lt. Cortni Thrasher about their unique experiences while working to complete their theses. Cmdr. Morris first discusses how he, along with his thesis partners, designed experimentation to test previous theories of how to transmit the most important information to units in a denied environment. Lt. Thrasher then speaks about her thesis, which is in direct coordination with U.S. Pacific Fleet objectives and a topic from the Nimitz Research Group, studying how the incorporation of amphibious aircraft can benefit military operations in the Pacific. Cmdr. Matthew Morris graduated from Dickinson College in 2008 with a BA in German and commissioned through OCS as a SWO in 2009, transferring to Information Professional in 2014. He earned an MS in Network Operations at NPS and is an IW WTI in Command and Control/Cyber Operations. His tours include COMM-O onboard USS LASSEN, OPS and NAV for PCC Hotel, ISO and Staff NAV for COMDESRON 9, Flag COMM-O for CSG-9. He is currently serving as the CSO onboard USS GEORGE WASHINGTON. Lt. Cortni Thrasher is an Aerospace Maintenance Duty Officer in the U.S. Navy. She was previously enlisted as an aviation electronics technician after graduation in 2012 with a BS. She worked on Prowlers and Growlers with a deployment on USS STENNIS before transitioning to the AMDO community in 2019 and commissioning through OCS. She then served as a part of VFA 94 in Lamoore, CA as their maintenance material control officer. While there she deployed on the USS NIMITZ for a COVID deployment in 2020 and is now a graduate of the Naval Postgraduate School.

Dr. Li-Meng Yan w/ The Voice of Dr. Yan – Before the spy sent the complete set of films and images to PLA, CCP didn't know that the US had monitored the entire process of the 093-417 accident. By examining the materials from the Pentagon, GS learned that soon after the accident was exposed by Lude Media, the U.S. Pacific Fleet received orders from the Pentagon. Low-altitude reconnaissance satellites...

The sparks before the ignition of war.By FinalStand. Listen to the Podcast at Explicit Novels.Time is not your enemy any more than breathing and your heartbeat are inconvenient."Aya, Why don't you go help Saku," I rechanneled Aya's boundless energy. "Back in the day, every noble was attended to by squires who took care of their gear and served that noble as body servants. In turn, she taught them the art of war." Sakuniyas shot me a nasty look.Aya poked her head between Pamela and Miyako."That sounds like fun," she met Saku's glacial chill with a warm spring breeze."I don't want their help," she grumbled."It sounds like free labor," Pamela smirked."I said I don't want their help," Saku snarled."Okay," I rolled my eyes. "Aya, Fatal Squirts, attention!" They all looked at me. "I command you, as your Celestial Potentate Poohbah, to stare at Sakuniyas until she gives you a task of a personal, to her, nature to do. Get at it."Four sets of precocious, will-eroding cuteness assaulted the Assyrian Queen, victor of a hundred battles and skirmishes."You are despicable," was Saku's chosen acidic barb."I second that motion," Pamela patted me on the back. "I keep finding myself being prouder and prouder of you, every day. Stop it," she teased me.None of those words dampened my mood, or my plan."How much longer is this flight going to take?" Saku groused."Four hours," I lied. It was way closer to two.To my way of thinking, it wasn't like she could get much angrier with me after she discovered my ruse. (I was wrong. She could and did. I'm an idiot.) Saku shook her head, and the task-mastering began. An hour and forty-five minutes later, the pilot alerted us that we were ten minutes from our final approach. Bits and pieces of her armor were all over the front seats and the floor of the exit-way space.Diligent little fingers were still polishing and checking straps for signs of excessive wear or fabric fatigue. Their 'noble' hovered over them, pointing out the right way to do things and what they were doing wrong. Her congratulating them for doing a good job was rather non-Amazon of her, but the kids ate it up.With the ten minute warning still hanging in the air, my duplicity inspired Saku to finally flip out. I was pretty sure she didn't think through what she was doing. She simply drew her 22cm/9in blade and threw it at my face. Miyako caught it between her hands, an effortless clap, fuck."Four hours!" Saku howled at me. "You said we had four hours, I could have held them off for two!""Why do you think I lied to you?" I kept my amusement out of my tone because I was rather attached to the idea of my wagging tongue not being cut out of my mouth.It wasn't lost on us that every member of my SD team was alert and had blades drawn (firefights on planes in mid-flight is severely frowned upon) and were staring at her. I wanted to tell Rachel to 'stand down', except that would be unfair. I wasn't 100% sure Saku was done being furious with me.Telling Rachel to set aside her instincts was something I tried to keep a minimum, only to be used when it I was forced to take in the bigger picture."What is going on here?" Rachel asked with professional calm. So, I told her the truth, the real truth."Oh," Rachel grunted. She gave a motion for her team to rest easy then came my way."Knife," she held out a hand to Miyako who instantly gave it over, pommel first. Rachel deftly flipped it over so she was holding the razor sharp blade then smacked me on the top of my head, hard."Ow, " I whined. "That hurt.""It was supposed to," Rachel glared. She walked down the aisle to Saku, returning her blade."Did you just smack him in the head?" Saku was trying to make sense of what she'd seen."Yes," Rachel nodded."He screwed up and I impressed upon him to not do it again. As you might guess, this is a fairly regular occurrence with him. We all take wicked-fine pleasure in that part of his education.""But you are his bodyguards, is he really the Head of House Ishara, or was that a lie as well?" Saku was still confused by her prideful arrogance and how I was misplacing my own."Sakuniyas, Cáel was not raised in our culture. He has only been a member of the Host for a few weeks. This is not to belittle his impressive education," Pamela intervened. "Both he, and those of the House who know him, agree that the occasional physical chastisement works better than words alone.""You could reward me with sex," I muttered. "Positive reinforcement, ""Forty-six days, Bitch," Rachel growled."You are ferocious in battle, fearless and clever," Saku turned back to me. "Why do you put up with this constant degradation?""Degradation? I'm not insulted by what Rachel did or said," I retorted. "She is trying to teach me things I need to know if I'm going to survive. I respect her superior knowledge in her professional capacity," I continued. "I don't get upset when people tease, taunt, or challenge Cáel 'Wakko' Ishara, that's me, if you are confused.I save my indignation for those who scorn Dot Ishara, Yakko Ishara and all members of House Ishara, past and present. Quite frankly, being disrespectful to me is actually rather difficult because I only care about the sensibilities of a handful of people.""How can any warriors follow a leader into battle if that person has no pride and never shies away from shame?And besides, what is this Wakko/Dot/Yakko nonsense," Saku persisted. "Fatal Squirts, start assembling my armor." Her attention was split between me and her panoply."Hello," I snickered. "I'm a male Amazon. The fact that I haven't run for my life way before now is all the heroic background check anyone should require.Doubting my common sense actually makes sense. Doubting my courage, or loyalty is idiotic in too many ways to count. As for revealing the hallowed and revered enigmatic occult appellations of my House, " I started."Get him!" Tiger Lily showed some faux-outrage."Shit!" I cried out as Delilah, Tiger Lily and the rest of the SD swarmed me. Pamela and Miyako were of no help whatsoever. I could not express my joy more at the resulting physical abuse and humiliation aimed my way. I was tickled. Yes, my Kick-Ass, full-blood, natural born killers pinned me down and tickled me until I nearly peed on myself.In a very short period of time, we'd shared some really nerve-racking moments. Dad dying, my showdown with Hayden, being mugged by Carrig and the rest of the crap that rained down blow after blow once I came out of my coma. They had taken me numerous times to the hospital and had to sit back helplessly while I suffered. Yet, I refused to be repressed by circumstance.I fought for our people, OUR people now, both with the Earth  and  Sky in shared counsel and the Seven Pillars on the battlefield. Rachel hadn't given me word-one of a reprimand for leaving Charlotte to raise the alarm while I rushed into danger. I was an Amazon in her eyes. Charlotte could fix the phone. Miyako and I could not. The bridge had to be secured immediately.We couldn't wait on Charlotte. I didn't even act as if what I did was all that brave. Rachel knew me far better now; she wouldn't make that mistake. Had I been able to fix the phone, I would have stayed and sent Charlotte. Had the whole team been there and Rachel told me to stay, I would have stayed while they ran into the fight.No. The situation hadn't allowed that, so I had killed a number of men and been wounded. The backside of my right thigh had merely been grazed (which my normally mangled left side found to be grossly unfair.) That was another scar to add to my 'sexy'. I had fought in my own insane manner and was alive solely because Saku had decided to shoot another man instead of me.Even after I knew who she was, I had allied with her and charged the rear of the enemy troop convoy. In the after-battle analysis, they weren't sure how many Seven Pillar Special Forces I had killed, both in the gulch and when I annihilated the back section of the attack column, and took my impromptu flying lesson.Credit for destroying the bridge jacks, thus making the BBQ a carnal cookout featuring Chinese 'Long-Pig', was still hanging out there as well. Rachel and company were still pissed with me despite all that. Why? On a purely personal level, they realized they would miss me if I got myself killed. They were not supposed to feel that way about their protectee.I certainly wasn't their first protective detail, though they were starting to believe I'd be their last. No, I had done everything right, by going into harm's way, and they were furious with the universe for placing us in that situation. Since the universe wasn't offering itself up to be punished, it fell on me to soak up their pique.Delilah was simply picking on me because she could get away with it this time."You are all embarrassments," Saku remarked bitterly once my screams began breathless pleas for mercy. "The Host has fallen a great way since my day." What a killjoy. I finally got my breath back."And the Queen on the floor of the Royal chambers, pushing around toy chariots with her two eldest sons and a child-playmate, was the height of decorum."Well, if looks could kill, I would have never made my nineteenth birthday, so Saku's glare was just another walk in the park."That was a personal moment with my family. It was a very private moment," she sizzled."My Mother's line is, it is what it is. My Father was murdered. My Father's sister and I were never close. These people are my family and my choice of kin.""English," Pamela chided us."Having no family to call your own, you welcome so many that 'family' has no meaning," Saku angrily mocked my words.There was a hushed moment then everyone but the three other Squirts and Saku started laughing. The three kids didn't know me either."By what metric do you measure family by?" I snickered."On his third day on the job, Fehér mén (Aya's pet name for me, White Stallion in the Magyar tongue, it is complicated) threw his body over my sisters and me to protect us," Aya said."He spared my foster-sister when she gravely insulted him," Mona volunteered. "He didn't know me. The Amazon, Constanza, would have died by anyone else's hand, except his. You may look down your nose at his mercy. As you do so, consider that it is his mercy that allows you to feel that way about him, and us right now." Whoa,"I have never seen him fight out of pride, or take joy in any combat," Rachel stared down Saku. "My only fear is that Cáel will get himself killed saving my life, or the life of any member of my team. He knows it is wrong. He knows I will be absolutely furious with him, and he accepts that. He is like no other Amazon I have ever known.We have limits. We follow orders. At our best, we put the welfare of the Host over our own survival. Not Ishara, Wakko Ishara. He follows the dictates of his house and those are to seek mercy and peace where appropriate. He is like no Amazon I have ever known, and I have zero doubt that he is one of the best Amazons I will ever know," she finished with a chuckle."I'm speaking my mind, aren't I?" she asked me."Afraid so, sorry about that," I apologized for corrupting her social skills."Saku, your mistake is that you confuse his caring about you and caring about your opinion of him," Pamela finished things up."Sakuniyas, I will work to honor my pledge to you. I will try to keep you alive because you can be a powerful ally of the Host, but also because it is the right thing to do," I enlightened her. "That doesn't make you all that special though. Personally I think you are a horrible, bitter bitch and lousy company for any non-masochist.I'm going to help you in the same way I'm going to help everyone else here. This is despite me feeling confident that not a single Amazon on this planet has a living father. They've never had brothers because their mothers murdered them. Your crappy attitude doesn't influence me one way, or the other. You are a horrible fucking person born to a horrible fucking race, my race, the Amazon Host.""You kill your fathers and sons," Delilah mumbled as she looked from face to face, finding not a single bit of denial, or shame. "I thought that was so much Greek bull's buttocks.""Nope," Aya shrugged. "Before I left for camp, Momma told me they put Daddy, my other Daddy, down when I was two." Kind of like Old Yeller, or Benji. "His name was Paul Twelve."Delilah looked at me with downright worrisome eyes."Yeah, I figured that out on day two on-the- job," I relayed to her. "For the past 2500 years, every male child of the Host has been tossed off a cliff to his death, or left out in the wilds for predators to devour. Every male they have kidnapped has been under a death sentence from the moment of capture.They tried to genetically breed their captive male population with Amazon females, but something went wrong. The males began passing on genetic defects that poisoned the race. In response, they have begun recruiting men, such as myself, and exterminating their old male breeding populace.Initially, I didn't run because I was sure they would hunt me down and kill me. Later, later I came to like enough of the Host to decide that knowing what was going on meant I couldn't let it slide. I couldn't leave this issue for someone else to tackle. I know I'm facing long odds, yet I'll never succeed if I don't try," I wrapped up my little my 'Cáel's Amazon Primer' lecture."Okay, okay, Cáel you are blood nuts, and hellishly brave. The rest of you are just hellish, killing your own kin as infants or if they get too old," Delilah sputtered. "That's plain wrong.""I had sons," Saku stated. "They grew into fine, strong warriors. My daughters married into the nobility.""Delilah, we don't expect you to understand our culture. Twice in our people's history, men have tried to eliminate our society, stealing our homes and property, and enslaving our children and sisters. We let down our guard once, and that nearly destroyed us, except we now have Cáel and a better understanding of what happened that second time," Tiger Lily educated Delilah."It turned out that not all males betrayed us. No, when we needed them the most, they sacrificed themselves for the welfare of our people and we repaid that loyalty with anger and barbarism. That is a burden we have carried all these centuries without understanding it. Only within the past month has the real truth about the Second Betrayal become known.Many of us are now re-evaluating the dictates of our faith concerning men and sons. After all, Cael is the descendent of Amazons of a First House, dating back to the Trojan Wars. He has been welcomed by his ancestors and his goddess, Dot Ishara," she completed."What is it with the Dot, Wakko and, ""Everyone buckle up," the pilot announced over the intercom. "We are on our final approach." Saku and the Squirts had her armor in some kind of order, we buckled up and let the plane coast on down to earth."Delilah and Cáel, since our 'vacation' was cut short, we haven't been able to bring your personal effects back from Africa yet," Rachel told us."Also, there will be four of Javiera's people meeting us in the hangar," she added. "We have been told to view them as non-hostiles.""Oh joy," Pamela muttered then, "There is nothing to worry about folks.""What? Me worry?" I goofy grinned her way.(Governments, horrendous enemies and ruthlessly evil friends)Four SUVs waited for us in the wide-open hangar. No sooner had the pilot given us the 'green light', than Rachel released the door/stairs mechanism and Charlotte began her decent. We had the camp FN P-90's, not the older Havenstone UMP 40's, so that was the weapon whose sights she was looking down as her eyes scanned the room. Five people. Four SUVs.Rachel went next with me right behind her. My SD's precautions turned our guests from a rather annoyed-casual to alert-angry. Standing with our two standard Mercedes GL550's was Wiesława of House Živa. A sole guardian indicated to me that an ass-kicking was in the offing elsewhere. The Golden Mare, Saint Marie was gathering the Havenstone Security Detail for some purpose, which meant she could only spare one more warrior for me.I was fine with that. Not only did I feel bad about denying her the four ladies I had, I knew we were going into this global conflict outnumbered and out-financed. The Seven Pillars had gotten at least one blow in by striking at the Amazon summer camp. I had every reason to believe other unexpected attacks had occurred all across the globe.In the closest black Tahoe SUV (didn't anyone use sedans anymore?) were two men in modestly tailored, off-the-rack suits. One with buzz-cut gray-white hair, was closer to fifty than forty, was as tall as me (a bit over six feet) and close to my weight and build. That guy was pissed off.His partner was smaller (5ft 10in.) and lighter. He was also cocky with that 'I know more than you schmucks' air about him. Beside the farther SUV, a Range Rover (black, of course, I swore in that moment that if I ever got to have my own fleet of House Ishara SUV's, I was going with baby blue, just to fuck with people's heads), were two other men, one cultured and the other a bad-ass.

Last time we spoke about the liberation of Bataan and Corregidor. The Shimbu Group's commander launched a coordinated raid on northern Manila, aiming to weaken enemy defenses. Despite heavy casualties, the Allies captured key locations, including Nichols Field. Meanwhile, General Chase's 38th Division overcame strong Japanese defenses at ZigZag Pass, while General Hall's forces secured Bataan. Plans for an airborne assault on Corregidor were set for February 16, leveraging surprise against the outnumbered Japanese garrison. American forces launched the strategic attack on Corregidor, dropping paratroopers from the 503rd Regiment. Despite facing sporadic fire, they secured key positions. The following days saw intense skirmishes as the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment landed and established a foothold. Over eight days, they repelled numerous Japanese counterattacks, inflicting heavy casualties. By February 26, organized resistance crumbled, leading to the island's capture. Meanwhile, in Manila, American troops advanced, clearing buildings and securing the city, inching closer to victory in the Philippines. This episode is the Invasion of Iwo Jima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A few weeks ago we spoke about Operation Detachment. Admirals Nimitz and Spruance were planning an invasion of Iwo Jima with General Schmidt's 5th Amphibious Corps. During a thorough campaign of preliminary air and naval bombardment against the Volcano Islands, the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, along with other Corps units, were loading at Hawaii between December 25 and January 25. Once training and loading were complete, Admiral Turner's Task Force 51 and Admiral Hill's Task Force 53 left Pearl Harbor on January 27, initially heading toward Saipan. By February 12, Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet had gathered in the Marianas and was prepared to sail for Iwo Jima. Additionally, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 had departed Ulithi to conduct a series of supporting air strikes over and around Tokyo, known as Operation Jamboree. Task Force 58 sortied from Ulithi 10 February and shaped a course eastward of the Marianas and Bonins. On the 12th, the air groups rehearsed with the 3rd Marine Division on Tinian. Two days later the task force fueled at sea from one of Admiral Beary's replenishment groups. Everything possible was done to guard against detection. Measures included radio deception, scouting by Pacific Fleet submarines to dispose of any picket vessels there might be en route, scouting by B-29s and Navy Liberators from the Marianas to clear the air. On the 15th a scouting line of five destroyers ranged ahead of the carriers, and antisubmarine air patrol was set up. At 1900 a high-speed run-in began towards launching positions, where the carriers arrived at dawn 16 February. Thanks to these precautions, and to thick weather most of the way, they arrived undetected. General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command, which was being reinforced by the 313th and 314th Bombardment Wings, would also assist Detachment with several strikes against Japan. Following some unremarkable high-altitude daytime missions in late January, 129 B-29s from the 73rd and 313th Bombardment Wings targeted Kobe on February 3, using a mix of incendiaries and fragmentation bombs. This attack caused significant damage to the urban area and local war production, resulting in the loss of 2 bombers and damage to 35 others. Subsequently, on February 10, a precision strike was launched against Ota's Nakajima aircraft factory, with 84 out of 118 dispatched B-29s successfully bombing the site. However, only 14% of the bombs hit the target, leading to the loss of 12 bombers and damage to 29. Nearly one-third of the factory buildings sustained damage, primarily from the incendiaries combined with high-explosive bombs. Five days later, LeMay dispatched 117 B-29 bombers to target Mitsubishi's engine works in Nagoya. However, an unexpected cold front resulted in only 33 bombers reaching the target area, yielding lackluster results. Meanwhile, after conducting some assault rehearsals, Spruance's amphibious support forces and tractor groups set sail for Iwo Jima on February 14, followed two days later by Turner's main assault convoy. At the same time, the reserve 3rd Marine Division continued loading at Guam, with its 21st Marines departing for Iwo Jima on February 16, followed by the main body of the division the next day. On the morning of February 16, Admiral Blandy's Amphibious Support Force arrived off Iwo Jima and promptly commenced the final preliminary bombardment and minesweeping operations, although inclement weather hindered these efforts. However, the next day, Task Force 52 successfully carried out these missions; beach reconnaissance by UDTs faced heavy mortar fire, resulting in the sinking of one LCI gunboat, damage to eleven others, and casualties of 44 killed and 152 wounded. Despite this, the frogmen encountered no obstacles on the beaches and managed to create accurate maps of the approaches. Meanwhile, by February 16, Mitscher's carriers had quietly moved to a position 60 miles off the coast of Honshu, launching extensive fighter sweeps against airfields in Tokyo Bay and bombing raids on aircraft frame and engine plants in the Tokyo area.  About 100 Japanese fighters attacked Admiral Davison's planes as they crossed the coast and about 40 of them were shot down. American pilots found the Japanese on the whole reluctant to engage; Admiral Mitscher had correctly told his pilots, "He is probably more afraid of you than you are of him". In fact the IJAAF 10th Hiko Shidan immediately ordered an IJAAF night-fighter group and all “second-class” personnel to take cover, while all aircraft not intercepting were ordered to be dispersed, fuel tanks drained, and ammunition unloaded. In contrast, American pilots reported Tokyo antiaircraft fire “the most accurate and intense yet encountered.” By nightfall, Rear-Admiral Matthias Gardner's night-flying carrier group conducted a sweep of night fighters to cover the enemy airfields at dusk. This operation was repeated the following morning, but poor weather ultimately forced the carriers to retreat toward Iwo Jima. Despite this, significant damage was inflicted on aircraft frame and engine facilities, with 10 vessels sunk, including the unfinished escort carrier Yamashio Maru. A total of 531 aircraft were reported destroyed, at the expense of losing 88 planes and damaging two destroyers. On February 18, after the enemy battery camouflage had been obliterated during the previous two days of bombardment. This revealed batteries not previously known to exist, the island's defenses were for the first time properly revealed; and formidable they were indeed. Fortunately for the Americans, the support of UDTs with LCI gunboats had convinced General Kuribayashi that the main landing had started, and to repel it he unmasked batteries that would have caused very heavy casualties on D-day had they not been discovered two days before. This was the only serious mistake made by the Japanese general in his defensive tactics, which won the rueful admiration of his enemies. Blandy opted to focus on the immediate area and flanks of the eastern beaches. Heavy ships moved closer to 2,500 yards to deliver concentrated direct fire on all targets. Consequently, bombardment ships provided continuous direct fire throughout the day, effectively dismantling enemy defenses. However, during the night, the Japanese launched a minor raid that caused significant damage to the destroyer minesweeper Gamble and the destroyer escort Blessman. At 06:00 on February 19, Turner's main force arrived off Iwo Jima and began maneuvering into final positions. Simultaneously, Admiral Rodgers' warships executed the last pre-landing bombardment, coordinated with air strikes from Mitscher's carriers. Between 08:25 and 08:55, as the first wave crossed the line of departure and advanced toward the shore under the protective rocket fire of gunboats, shells fell heavily on Iwo Jima, marking the most intense pre-landing bombardment of World War II. At 08:57, as the leading armored amtracs approached their targets, naval gunfire shifted inland and to the flanks. The LVTs of the first wave touched down on Iwo Jima at 09:02 and began moving forward through the high terraces of soft black volcanic ash, engaging inland targets from the water to support subsequent landings. Three minutes later, the Marines of the 4th and 5th Divisions started landing side by side on the Green, Red, Yellow, and Blue beaches. The assault infantry battalions of the Landing Force received assistance throughout D-Day from all the supporting arms available to the Amphibious Support Force. Carrier pilots of Task Force 58 and the escort carriers of Task Force 52 flew missions all day as airborne observers and spotters maintained constant vigilance over the target. Including pre-H-Hour strikes, 606 support aircraft flew 26 missions on February 19 and dropped 274500 pounds of bombs. These planes also fired 2254 rockets into the island defenses and dropped over a hundred napalm bombs. Air and naval gunfire liaison teams remained in communication with both air and sea supporting units through the hectic hours that followed the beach assault. Naval rifles from 5- to 16-inch caliber pounded enemy positions in response to Marine requests. Gunfire support vessels engaged enemy artillery that covered landing areas from high ground to the north, and concentrated on concealed Japanese mortars that shelled landing areas with deadly effect. The units quickly reorganized and began their advance inland, facing only light resistance, although their progress was hampered by the sandy terrain. General Kuribayashi's forces, however, had been waiting in well-fortified underground positions as planned, emerging only after the bombardment ceased to unleash a barrage of machine-gun, rifle, and mortar fire on the advancing troops. As the initial waves of Marines struggled to advance, congestion along the shore became increasingly critical, while the full force of the Japanese defenders was unleashed shortly after 10:00. By 10:30, elements from all eight assault battalions had landed on the island, successfully bringing ashore about 6,000 men and bulldozers that were clearing paths for tank deployment. On the far left flank, Colonel Harry Liversedge's 28th Marines, having landed on Green Beach, initiated a rapid advance across the half-mile isthmus below Mount Suribachi to isolate this crucial position. The attack unfolded in such a way that some units were delayed while others managed to break through and continue westward despite suffering heavy casualties, ultimately crossing the island while the bypassed enemy was being dealt with. By midday, the reserve 3rd Battalion and tanks landed under heavy fire to join the afternoon assault on Suribachi, but intense enemy fire hindered their progress to the assault positions. Consequently, the 2nd Battalion launched an attack on its own, gaining only 150 yards before retreating to regroup with the 3rd Battalion for the night. At the same time, Colonel Thomas Wornham's 27th Marines had landed on the Red Beaches, making swift progress inland despite increasing casualties and bypassing numerous enemy positions. By 11:30, Company A was moving across the southern end of Airfield No. 1, establishing a presence along the western edge while other units continued to advance past the airfield. The 1st Battalion launched an attack on the airfield with tank support but faced strong enemy resistance, resulting in minimal gains. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion pushed westward and reached the cliffs overlooking the western coast. Additionally, the reserve 3rd Battalion landed and began clearing bypassed positions, while the artillery units from the 13th Marines and General Rockey's reserve 26th Marines also arrived in the afternoon as the 27th and 28th Marines solidified their positions. By nightfall, although the 5th Marine Division was still a considerable distance from the O-1 Line, it had established a firm foothold on the island, with Mount Suribachi isolated and portions of the airfield under their control. To the east, General Cates' 4th Marine Division also landed successfully, with Colonel Walter Wensinger's 23rd Marines coming ashore at the Yellow Beaches and Colonel John Lanigan's 25th Marines landing on Blue Beach 1 and the southern part of Blue Beach 2. The two regiments began their advance inland, hindered by intense enemy fire but managing to gain between 400 and 600 yards by midday. As tanks were being deployed, the 3rd Battalion of the 25th Marines moved to the right to clear the remaining area of Beach Blue 2 and encircle the threatening quarry zone. At this stage, as the assault battalions continued their advance, Wensinger and Lanigan deployed their reserve battalions to cover the gaps in their attack lines. With the support of tanks that had finally reached the front, the 23rd Marines advanced towards Airfield No. 1 and successfully captured its outskirts. Meanwhile, the 25th Marines initiated a coordinated assault, with the 3rd Battalion advancing about 200 yards along the beach to secure the problematic quarry, while the other two battalions moved north to seize the high ground to the northwest of the quarry. By the end of the day, Cates had also landed half of the artillery from the 14th Marines, along with his reserve 24th Marines, which began to relieve some of the frontline units from both assault regiments. Although the penetration by the 4th Marine Division was not as extensive as intended, by nightfall, the front lines included the eastern edge of the airfield and extended sufficiently inland from the Blue Beaches to ensure the beachhead could be held successfully. The Marines, forced to advance across open terrain while enduring intense fire from well-concealed positions that were difficult to target, fell significantly short of the O-1 objective. Nonetheless, by the end of the day, six Marine regiments, an equal number of artillery battalions, and two tank battalions had landed and were positioned to defend the narrow beachhead against a potential night counterattack.  Throughout this first day, the situation on the beaches prevented landing of any but the highest priority "hot cargo." This consisted of ammunition, rations, water, and signal equipment brought to the beach in LCVPs and LCMs. Shore party teams, working under extremely adverse conditions without sufficient trucks and other heavy equipment, could do little more than stack the supplies on the beach above the high water mark. LVTs and weasels made trips from the beach dumps inland carrying these supplies to the troops and returned bearing wounded men. The busy amtracs also made nonstop trips from LSTs, ferrying critically needed items direct to Marines on the front lines. Most of the transports and other vessels of the task force retired from the island at nightfall, but some command ships, preloaded LSTs, and hospital LSTs remained behind. Emergency items, especially 81mm mortar ammunition, were brought in during the night, but actually very little unloading was accomplished and many of the wounded spent this night on the beach because they could not be evacuated. Some progress was made cutting exits through the terrace and clearing mines, but enemy fire and the shortage of equipment limited this activity. Despite this, the Japanese did not launch any large-scale assaults, although their mortars and artillery relentlessly bombarded Marine lines along the front throughout the night. Consequently, Allied casualties on this first day totaled 548 killed and 1,755 wounded. On February 20, the goal was for the 28th Marines to take Mount Suribachi while other units advanced north to capture the two airfields. Initially, in the south, after a coordinated air and naval bombardment, Liversedge launched another assault on the volcano but managed to gain only 75 yards by midday. During the forenoon, Marines gained only 50-70 yards. Aircraft and ships pounded Japanese positions and the 3d Battalion, 13th Marines fired mission after mission, but stiff enemy resistance continued, particularly from well-camouflaged pillboxes hidden in the brush to the front of the Marine lines. These emplacements, too close to friendly troops to be engaged by heavy support weapons, could only be silenced by coordinated attacks of assault demolition teams using flamethrowers and explosive charges. Tanks then moved in to provide support, allowing the attack to progress from pillbox to pillbox; however, by the end of the day, the Marines had only advanced 200 difficult yards. Meanwhile, Schmidt's other regiments initiated a coordinated offensive to the north following extensive artillery, naval gunfire, and air support. Despite facing heavy resistance, the 23rd Marines successfully overran most of Airfield No. 1 by noon. Wensinger continued to push his units in the afternoon, but progress was limited as tanks were hindered by minefields and rough terrain. Wornham's 27th Marines pressed their attack on the left flank, overcoming enemy mortar and artillery fire to gain about 800 yards along the coast. In contrast, Lanigan's 25th Marines, affected by friendly fire, made only minimal advances against enemy crossfire from concealed positions. At 1600, friendly planes misdirected their fire to the 25th Marine's area, adding terror to the situation. An air strike consisting of .50-caliber machine-gun strafing, rockets, and bombs fell on troops of Company B of the 24th Marines, which was positioned on top of the quarry some 400 yards inland from the eastern shore. This strike was made without a preliminary "dry-run", and despite the fact that yellow front line panels were displayed prior to and during the aerial attack. The 1st Battalion, 24th Marines suffered five killed and six wounded as a result of this misguided effort. Shortly after the planes left the area, this battalion reported that friendly artillery and naval gunfire was being registered on its lines. Due to the slow progress, Schmidt attempted to land his reserve 21st Marines, but high seas and congested beaches ultimately thwarted these efforts. Nevertheless, the remaining 14th Marines were landed, albeit with significant casualties, and elements of the corps artillery began to come ashore. During the night, there were no counterattacks on Mount Suribachi, but the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions had to fend off some small counterattacks on their front lines. On February 21, following a strike involving 40 aircraft, Liversedge's 28th Marines launched another assault on the volcano. The 1st Battalion on the right swiftly advanced along the west beach to the base of Suribachi, while the 3rd Battalion in the center pushed nearly to the foot of the mountain despite facing heavy resistance. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion on the left moved cautiously along the east beach toward the volcano's base, with Company F heading toward Tobiishi Point. At the same time, other regiments continued their offensive towards O-1 after a bombardment from air, artillery, rockets, and naval gunfire. Rockey's units made significant progress, advancing over 1,000 yards, while the 23rd Marines achieved similar gains on the left flank, where slightly sheltered areas allowed for local and limited encirclement, but only advanced 100 yards in the right and center. The 25th Marines maintained steady pressure against the strong enemy defenses, gaining between 50 and 300 yards across the front. Colonel Hartnoll Withers' 21st Marines successfully landed this time; due to heavy casualties in the center, they were assigned to relieve the exhausted 23rd Marines. By nightfall, the Marines had to fend off several local counterattacks and infiltration attempts.  During the night, 50 kamikaze planes targeted Blandy's Task Force 52. They were picked up by the radar of the USS Saratoga, a veteran carrier of the Pacific War, and six fighters were sent to intercept. They shot down two Zeros but the remaining Zeros plowed on through the low lying cloud, two of them trailing smoke, and slammed into the side of the carrier turning the hangers into an inferno. Another solitary attacker smashed into the flight deck leaving a gaping hole 100 yards from the bow. Damage control teams worked wonders and within one hour the fires were under control and the Saratoga was able to recover a few of her planes. Another aircraft, a "Betty" twin engined bomber, tore into the escort carrier USS Bismarck Sea. The decks were full of aircraft and the ensuing explosion caused uncontrollable fires. Abandon ship was sounded and 800 men went over the side. Within a few minutes a huge explosion ripped off the entire stern of the carrier and she rolled 38 over and sank. Three other ships were also damaged: the escort carrier USS Lunga Point was showered with flaming debris as four aircraft were blasted out of the sky; the minesweeper Keokuk was damaged when a "Jill" dive bomber hit her deck; and LST 477 loaded with Sherman tanks received a glancing blow. The Saratoga, with destroyer escort, returned to Pearl Harbor, but by the time the damage was repaired the war was over. The kamikazes had done their work well: 358 men killed, one carrier sunk, and another severely damaged. It was a grim preview of the mayhem they would later cause during the invasion of Okinawa in April. On February 22, amidst a dreary cold rain, Liversedge renewed his assault on Suribachi, where only half of the original garrison remained to oppose the Marine advance. There was no let-up in the weather on Wednesday as Marines of the 28th Regiment, drenched to the skin and bent by the wind, prepared to renew the attack on Suribachi. Fresh supplies of ammunition had been brought to the front during the night, but the Shermans were mired in mud and the Navy declined to supply air support in the appalling weather. It was to be up to the foot soldier with rifle, flamethrower, grenade, and demolition charge to win the day. Colonel Atsuchi still had 800-900 men left and they had no intention of allowing the Americans an easy victory. Major Youamata announced: "We are surrounded by enemy craft of all sizes, shapes and descriptions, enemy shells have smashed at our installations and defenses, their planes bomb and strafe yet we remain strong and defiant. The Americans are beginning to climb the first terraces towards our defenses. Now they shall taste our steel and lead." Throughout the day, the 28th Marines engaged Japanese positions on the lower slopes of the mountain, with the 3rd Battalion making the final push to the base of Suribachi while the other two battalions cleared the coastline to completely encircle the volcano. Simultaneously, Schmidt's northern sweep continued, with the 21st Marines replacing Wensinger's troops, and Colonel Chester Graham's 26th Marines taking over on the 5th Division front. The 26th Marines advanced approximately 400 yards in the center but ultimately had to withdraw as the flanking units could not progress; the 21st Marines began their assault on the formidable defenses of Colonel Ikeda's 145th Regiment in front of Airfield No. 2, managing to advance only about 250 yards on the right; and the 25th Marines were unable to launch an attack on the left due to Withers' lack of significant gains and had to fend off several local Japanese counterattacks. Marine "Howlin' Mad" Smith aboard the USS Auburn was counting the cost. Three days of battle and the Regimental Returns listed 2,517 casualties for the 4th Division and 2,057 for the 5th: 4,574 dead and wounded and the O-1 line had just been reached. Little did he know that as his Marines approached the hills, ravines, canyons, gullies, and cliffs of the north the worst was yet to come. Additionally, as the 4th Division remained stalled, Cates ordered Colonel Walter Jordan's 24th Marines to relieve the weary troops of Lanigan on the right. During the night, most of Task Force 58 departed the area for a second air strike against Tokyo, which significantly limited the availability of aircraft for direct support of ground forces on Iwo Jima. On February 23, the 28th Marines under Liversedge launched their final assault on Suribachi. The 2nd Battalion was tasked with scaling the volcano's heights, while the 1st Battalion advanced south around the mountain's western side. To their surprise, they encountered no enemy fire, and small patrols reached the crater's edge by 09:40. 1st Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, executive officer of Company E, and a 40-man detachment set out to follow the patrols and occupy the highest point of land on Iwo Jima. The number of live Japanese lurking in caves along this north face was unknown, so flankers were sent out to guard against ambush as Schrier's men clawed their way warily upward. Still there was a mysterious lack of enemy activity, and the only Japanese encountered were the harmless dead. Positions along the rim of the crater were reached at about 10:15, and as Marines scrambled over the lip, the tenseness was eased by action. A small defending force challenged the patrol and a short, hot fight developed. Even while this skirmish was in progress, some of the men located a length of Japanese iron pipe, secured a small American flag to one end, and raised the Stars and Stripes at 10:20. It was an inspiring sight for thousands of Americans on Iwo as the flag waved bravely from the summit. Shortly after the mounting of this flag that measured only 54 inches by 28 inches, an unidentified Marine went aboard LST 779, beached near the base of the volcano, to obtain a larger set of colors. As this second and larger (8 feet by 4 feet 8 inches) flag was being carried up the slopes of Suribachi, photographer Joe Rosenthal, who covered the Iwo operation for the Associated Press, noticed it and instantly started in close pursuit. His efforts that morning resulted in the now famous picture of the second flag raising. Also since it's one of my favorite movies, I wanted to add this passage from the book “Flags of our Fathers” by James Bradley The Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, had decided the previous night that he wanted to go ashore and witness the final stage of the fight for the mountain. Now, under a stern commitment to take orders from General Holland "Howlin' Mad" Smith, the secretary was churning ashore in the company of the blunt, earthy general. Their boat touched the beach just after the flag went up, and the mood among the high command turned jubilant. Gazing upward, at the red, white, and blue speck, Forrestal remarked to Smith: "Holland, the raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years". Forrestal was so taken with fervor of the moment that he decided he wanted the Second Battalion's flag flying on Mt. Suribachi as a souvenir. The news of this wish did not sit well with 2nd Battalion Commander Chandler Johnson, whose temperament was every bit as fiery as Howlin Mad's. "To hell with that!" the colonel spat when the message reached him. The flag belonged to the battalion, as far as Johnson was concerned. He decided to secure it as soon as possible, and dispatched his assistant operations officer, Lieutenant Ted Tuttle, to the beach to obtain a replacement flag. As an afterthought, Johnson called after Tuttle: "And make it a bigger one." Following this, the 28th Marines conducted mopping-up operations to eliminate remaining enemy positions and seal off caves at the base of Suribachi. All accessible outer and inner slopes were covered as the Marines annihilated enemy snipers and blasted shut the many cave entrances, sealing in an uncounted number of Japanese. Much observation equipment was found, emphasizing the fact that this had been an excellent point of vantage from which hostile observers directed murderous fire against the entire beachhead. Marine artillerymen, ready and eager to seize this advantage, hastened to move flash-ranging equipment into position. By nightfall, approximately 122 Japanese soldiers were killed while attempting to infiltrate American lines. Over the five-day period, the 28th Marines suffered 895 casualties, while nearly 2,000 Japanese were either killed or trapped in over 1,000 caves in the area. Kuribayashi had not anticipated the loss of this strategically significant location so early in the battle, and the survivors who managed to breach American lines faced severe reprimands upon their return to the north. For the remainder of the month, the 28th Marines focused on clearing out stubborn Japanese forces, reorganizing, and reequipping. Meanwhile, fighting in the north persisted as the three assault regiments advanced toward the O-2 Line. The 26th and 21st Marines faced heavy fire and struggled to make progress, while the 24th Marines advanced along their entire front, gaining up to 300 yards in some areas. On this day, the situation on the beach steadily improved as clearance efforts, construction of exits, and unloading continued, facilitating the arrival of essential ammunition and an additional 25 tanks. On February 24, following extensive air, naval, and artillery preparations, the offensive resumed. However, the initial failure of tanks to join the assault due to minefields and heavy anti-tank fire forced the Marines to advance slowly under intense fire from various sources. In the center, the 3rd Battalion, 21st Marines advanced 800 yards, reaching the north side of the east-west runway of Airfield No. 2, while the 2nd Battalion gradually moved northward around the end of the runway by noon. In the afternoon, as tank support began to arrive, Withers' 3rd Battalion captured the hill north of the airstrip after a fierce hand-to-hand battle. Simultaneously, his 2nd Battalion coordinated with the 26th Marines to seize the elevation beyond the airfield. Graham's troops easily secured the ground in front but had to pause their advance when they found themselves about 400 yards ahead of the 21st Marines. On the right flank, the 24th Marines initially made significant progress alongside Withers' men toward the airfield but were ultimately halted by the strong defenses on Charlie-Dog Ridge.  Running along the southeast edge of the east-west runway of Airfield Number 2 was a ridge known only as "Charlie-Dog Ridge." In prolongation of this ridge, on a lower level to the southeast, was a semicircular rise of ground that formed the "Amphitheater." In this area, Japanese engineers had constructed some of the most formidable defenses on the island. From the south, the approach traversed bare flat ground swept by guns on the ridge. To the east, the route led across a weird series of volcanic outcroppings and draws. It was against these positions that the 24th Marines moved out on D-plus-5. Assault squads then had to methodically clear the ridge, moving from one strongpoint to another, using fire and explosives until Charlie-Dog was secured. While the overall gains for the day were notable by Iwo Jima standards, the casualty figures were also high, with the Marines suffering 1,034 killed and 3,741 wounded during the five-day push to the second airfield. Additionally, the remainder of General Erskine's 3rd Marine Division began landing that day to officially take control of the central area. On February 25, a decision was made to hold back the 26th Marines to allow the 3rd Division to align with them. After another intense bombardment, Colonel Howard Kenyon's 9th Marines advanced through the 21st to continue the assault, but the two-battalion attack only managed to gain a meager 100 yards against Ikeda's determined defenders. Kenyon then deployed his reserve 3rd Battalion in the center, but it also failed to break through. To the east, the 23rd and 24th Marines launched simultaneous attacks, but only the 23rd made significant progress, overrunning the eastern end of the strip and establishing a foothold on the high ground to the north. Meanwhile, in the morning, Mitscher's carriers conducted a second strike on Tokyo. The Japanese sighted 600 US carrier aircraft on February 25, but Rear Admiral “Ted” Sherman reported, “The enemy opposition was only halfhearted and Japanese planes which were not shot down seemed glad to withdraw from the scene … as swiftly and unceremoniously as possible. Even here, over their own capital, the enemy were notably inferior to our naval aviators in aggressiveness, tactics, and determination.” TF-58 aircraft hit the Ota and Koizumi aircraft plants, but increasingly snowy, stormy weather meant Mitscher canceled further Tokyo strikes at 1215hrs. Spruance and Mitscher decided to hit Nagoya instead. En route to Nagoya that night destroyers USS Hazelwood and Murray sank three small Japanese craft. Eventually Mitscher realized TF-58 would not reach launching position on time, and at 0530hrs Spruance and Mitscher canceled the Nagoya strikes and headed south to refuel. TF-58 claimed 47 Japanese planes shot down and 111 destroyed on the ground for a total of 158 Japanese planes destroyed on February 25. Two hangars, one radar station, and two trains were destroyed. About 75 percent of the Ota engine plant's buildings were destroyed and an additional 15 percent heavily damaged. The Koizuma plant had also been heavily hit, and five coastal vessels and several smaller craft sunk, with another 14 vessels damaged. Total US losses were nine aircraft to antiaircraft fire and four to operational causes; four pilots were lost.. After TF-58 aircraft had plastered the Nakajima Ota airframe plant with 45 tons of bombs, February 25 photoreconnaissance revealed Ota to be 60 percent destroyed and 30 percent heavily damaged, although half of this was believed due to B-29s. After the photos TF-58 aircraft dropped another 13 tons on the plant. The Nakajima Koizuma plant was attacked on February 25 with 35 to 40 tons of bombs, with hits concentrated in the center of the plant. Reconnaissance showed 20 percent of the Koizuma roof damaged. The Hitachi–Tachikawa aircraft engine plant was attacked by one Task Group strike, with US airmen reporting “excellent results.” Photographs showed many bomb hits, but smoke made precise damage assessments difficult. Slight damage was also inflicted on the Tachikawa airframe plant. TF-58 planes struck the B-29s' nemesis, the Musashino-Tama aircraft engine plant, with 40 tons of bombs in the center of the Tama complex.  On that day, LeMay also dispatched 231 B-29s to attack Tokyo with incendiaries, with 172 successfully dropping 453.7 tons of bombs, incinerating a square mile of the city. This operation served as the "conclusive" test of the incendiary bombs that the 20th Air Force had requested, with valuable lessons to be learned for future use. The next day, the 26th Marines resumed their attack despite the high ground on the left remaining unclaimed, successfully advancing over 300 yards in the right and center. In the center, the 9th Marines continued their assault with the 1st and 2nd Battalions side by side, but they made no notable gains. On the right flank, the 23rd Marines launched another assault towards Hill 382, facing heavy resistance and managing to advance only about 200 yards. Concurrently, Lanigan's 25th Marines moved through the battered 24th Marines, achieving an advance of approximately 100 yards before encountering intense machine-gun fire from the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. On February 27, Wonrham's 27th Marines took over from the exhausted 26th and continued to push northward despite rising casualties, successfully overrunning several strongpoints and gaining about 500 yards across the front. In the center, the 9th Marines finally breached the enemy's main defenses towards Hill 199-O and captured Hill Peter, securing Airfield No. 2. Meanwhile, on the right, the 4th Division pressed on against the heavily fortified Japanese positions at the Meatgrinder, advancing only 150 to 200 yards on each flank while struggling to make headway against the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. In the final attack of the month, the 27th Marines advanced towards Hill 362A, reaching its base but were forced to retreat nearly 100 yards due to Japanese counterattacks and loss of communication. In the center, Withers' 21st Marines moved past the 9th Marines and rapidly advanced north of Airfield No. 2, making significant progress on the right as they swept through Motoyama village and captured the high ground overlooking Airfield No. 3. To the east, Cates continued to send troops into the Meatgrinder, with the 23rd Marines gaining over 200 yards and launching an attack on Hill 382, while the 25th Marines struggled to make any headway against the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob, achieving only minor gains along the coast. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And thus we have begun one of the most brutal battles of WW2, let alone the Pacific War. It was a controversial decision to invade Iwo Jima and the Americans could never have predicted how the Japanese would change their tactics to turn the entire ordeal into one giant meat grinder.

In this Convo of Flanigan's Eco-Logic, Ted speaks with Dr. Joel Peterson, Vice Chancellor and Executive Operations Officer for the San Diego Community College District, overseeing one of California's largest community college systems. Prior to his career in higher education, he served in various roles in the private sector with major corporations where he was responsible for operations, including finance, technology, capital projects, global strategy, and marketing. Early in his career he served as an officer in the United States Navy. During his Navy career, he was director, Capital and Construction Programs and Physical Plant for a U.S. Navy destroyer in the Pacific Fleet. He is also the author of an Amazon Best Selling novel, Dreams of My Mothers.He and Ted talk about his upbringing in Korea, then being adopted by a family from Minnesota, overcoming the odds, to earn a bachelor's degree in economics/foreign affairs from the University of Virginia, a master's degree in business administration from Virginia Tech, and both a master's and doctorate in education/higher education from Claremont Graduate University.With extensive experience in higher education administration, Joel has previously held significant roles, including Director of Facilities, Operations, and Construction at Glendale Community College District, and Assistant Vice President for Capital Projects and Facilities at Harvey Mudd College. Additional expertise includes leadership positions at notable companies such as Level 3 Communications and BellSouth Corporation, focusing on strategy, corporate development, and operations.He and Ted discuss his role as Vice Chancellor and Executive Operations Officer, overseeing facilities and construction for one of California's largest community college districts. He is also  responsible for the SDCCD Police Department and completion of the district's $1.6 billion bond construction program. He shares the make up and demographics of the District, looking to the future to determine its facilities needs. Joel plays a key role in guiding the development of necessary campus housing, and the training programs needed for the next generation and beyond.

REMEMBERING PEARL HARBOR AND THE FIGHT BACK:  5/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment. 1941 PEARL HARBOR

REMEMBERING PEARL HARBOR AND THE FIGHT BACK:  8/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment. 1941 USS OGLALA CAPSIZED

REMEMBERING PEARL HARBOR AND THE FIGHT BACK:  7/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment. 1941 USS HONOLULU

REMEMBERING PEARL HARBOR AND THE FIGHT BACK:  6/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment. 1941 USS CALIFORNIA SINKING

REMEMBERING PEARL HARBOR AND THE FIGHT BACK:  2/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment 1941 HICKAM FIELD PEARL HARBOR

REMEMBERING PEARL HARBOR AND THE FIGHT BACK: 4 /8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment 1941 PEARL HARBOR

REMEMBERING PEARL HARBOR AND THE FIGHT BACK:  3/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment 1941 PEARL HARBOR

REMEMBERING PEARL HARBOR AND THE FIGHT BACK:  1/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment 1941 PEARL HARBOR

Links: C. Travis Reese, et al. “Trends in Maritime Challenges Indicate Force Design 2030 is the Proper Path,” War on the Rocks (January 29, 2024). “Force Design 2030,” Headquarters US Marine Corps, (March 2020). “Force Design 2030: Annual Update,” Headquarters US Marine Corps, (June 2023). Bios: C. Travis Reese retired from the Marine Corps after nearly 21 years of service. While on active duty he served in a variety of billets including tours in capabilities development, future scenario design, and institutional strategy. Mr. Reese is now the director of wargaming and net assessment for Troika Solutions in Reston, VA.Ian T. Brown recently retired from the Marine Corps after 20 years of service. He frequently writes (and wargames) on modern and future war concepts. Ian currently works as a wargame analyst in the private sector.Zach Ota is an infantry officer and an international affairs officer in the Marine Corps. LtCol Ota is also a non-resident fellow at the Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future Warfare who advances issues involving maritime security, alliances and partnerships, and military history in the Pacific. LtCol Ota currently serves as a future operations planner at U.S. Pacific Fleet and U.S. Marine Corps Forces, Pacific.Travis Hord is an infantry officer. LtCol Hord contributed to future concept and capability development while assigned as a planner at the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory.Leo Spaeder is the commanding officer of Combat Logistics Battalion 12 in Okinawa, Japan and a non-resident fellow at Marine Corps University's Brute Krulak Center for Innovation & Future Warfare. In previous assignments, LtCol Spaeder participated in scenario design and capability development related to Force Design 2030. Brian Strom is an intelligence officer in the Marine Corps. Major Strom currently serves as the Marine Corps Forces Pacific Target Intelligence Officer and as part of the U.S. Pacific Fleet staff.Twitter:@CTReese2@MAGTravF@zach_ota@ian_tb03@WDMills1992@PHLexpat

Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Palau Islands. General Rupertus's 1st Marine Division was tasked with attacking Peleliu, while General Mueller's 81st Division would land on Angaur. Prior to the landings, extensive neutralization of Japanese airfields was carried out by Allied forces. On September 6, carrier-based aircraft attacked the Palaus, significantly damaging enemy targets but encountering minimal resistance. The invasion fleet, led by Admiral Fort, began landing operations on September 15. Despite strong Japanese defenses, especially around Peleliu's rugged coral ridges, the Marines made some progress but faced intense resistance. Notable figures such as Eugene Sledge, author of “With the Old Breed,” provided personal insights into the brutal conditions faced. The landing saw heavy casualties and challenges, including ineffective pre-landing bombardments and fierce counterattacks, but the Marines managed to secure key positions by the end of the first day. The 81st Division then proceeded with landings on Angaur on September 17, facing lighter resistance but difficult terrain. This episode is the Battles of Peleliu and Angaur Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last time we left off, Peleliu and Anguar had just been amphibiously assaulted by US Marines. While the landings on Angaur were underway, General Rupertus pressed on with the Peleliu offensive on September 17. In the southern sector, Colonel Hanneken's 7th Marines made headway against the isolated Japanese defenders. The 3rd Battalion cleared a minefield and captured the southeast promontory, while the 1st Battalion took on the southwestern promontory but only managed to secure half of it due to fierce enemy resistance. To the north, the 1st and 5th Marines advanced further, encountering the Umurbrogol Mountains for the first time, where Colonel Nakagawa had fortified his defenses. On the left flank, Colonel Puller's 1st and 3rd Battalions encountered minimal opposition as they moved along the relatively flat coastal plain but had to halt their advance when the 1st Battalion was impeded by a reinforced concrete blockhouse. On the right, Colonel Harris' 2nd Battalion progressed well while staying hidden from Japanese artillery and mortar fire. However, despite reaching their objectives by mid-morning, Harris' 1st Battalion faced difficulty when Puller's 2nd Battalion, after making initial gains, was halted by the Umurbrogol defenses. They fought hard to secure Hill 200 but were immediately met with fire from the next ridge. Additionally, Harris' 3rd Battalion was pinned down by heavy flanking fire from the left. That night, additional armor was sent to the 7th Marines to support the ongoing operations in the south. The next morning, Hanneken's 3rd Battalion launched a final assault. During the night of D+2, additional armor (tanks and 75mm gun-mounted halftracks) was brought up and at 10:00 on September 18 the advance was resumed. Again progress was painfully slow with many reserve elements being attacked by Japanese from bypassed caves and underground emplacements. At 13:44 elements of Companies A and C reached the southern shores, though the area being assaulted by Company B was still heavily defended. Tank support had withdrawn to re-arm and before Company B was in a position to resume the attack, a bulldozer was needed to extricate the gun-mounted half-tracks, which had become bogged down. At that time, several explosions were heard from the Japanese defenses and it was found that remaining Japanese defenders had finished the job for the Marines. The final handful leaped from the cliff tops into the sea in an effort to escape, only to be picked off by Marine riflemen. With the taking of the two promontories, the southern part of Peleliu was secured. 1/7 and 3/7 squared themselves away for a well-earned rest, while headquarters reported "1520 hours D+3, 7th Marines mission on Peleliu completed." Unfortunately, this was not quite the case. Despite the slow progress and intense Japanese resistance, the Marines managed to secure the southern portion of Peleliu by the end of September 18. At the same time, the 1st and 5th Marines continued their fierce and costly push north. On the right flank, Colonel Harris's 2nd Battalion faced only sporadic resistance as it cut through the dense jungle. The Americans eventually reached a causeway leading east to Peleliu's northeastern peninsula, a potentially dangerous obstacle to their advance. After a successful patrol, Harris opted to call in an airstrike before crossing, but the strike missed its target and hit the area while the Marines were crossing. Despite this, the bridgehead was established, though further casualties were incurred due to friendly artillery and mortar fire. With this new foothold, Harris redirected his 3rd Battalion eastward across the causeway to support the 2nd Battalion's advance. On the left flank, the 1st Marines, having sustained 1,236 casualties, were urged by Rupertus to "maintain the momentum." This led Colonel Puller to commit all available reserves, including engineers, support personnel, and Hanneken's reserve 2nd Battalion. The 1st Marines suffered about 240 casualties during the 17th and in Japanese counterattacks the ensuing night; the 3rd Battalion was reduced to about one third of its original strength; and two companies of the 1st Battalion were practically finished as fighting units. On the other hand, there was some reason for optimism. Progress on the 17th had been measured in hundreds of yards in the rough, high ground at the southern end of the central ridges and strong Japanese resistance had been overcome. Whatever optimism may have existed was not to last too long. On the 18th, in what the Marine Corps' history of the operation characterizes as "savage and costly fighting," elements of the 1st and 7th Marines managed to advance more than 500 yards in the center, principally along the ridge lines and hills oriented north and south. But the advance during the day was held up at a group of peaks which seemed at first to form a continuous ridge line that was oriented more east and west than the rest of the Peleliu ridges. Soon, the name Five Sisters came to be applied to a cluster of peaks forming the western side of the terrain feature. A towering hill at its eastern extremity, separated from Five Sisters by a saddle, was designated Hill 300, or Old Baldy. With the 7th Marines held up in the center, at Five Sisters, the units on both sides of the central ridges halted so as not to create exposed flanks. Puller's 3rd Battalion made progress along the coastal plains but had to pause to stay in contact with other units. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion struggled against the Umurbrogol Mountains, capturing Hill 210 before being forced to withdraw due to a fierce Japanese counterattack on Hill 200 behind them. At Anguar, following a three-hour artillery bombardment supported by aircraft, General Mueller's 321st and 322nd Regiments resumed their advance north and west with tank support. After linking their advances, Colonel Venable pushed west and reached the high ground where Major Goto had established his main defenses, while Colonel Dark made significant progress south until his forces encountered the formidable defenses at Green Beach. The night of 18-19 September was noisy and nerve-racking all along the front and few troops got much sleep. Minor Japanese attacks harassed the exposed salient held by the 3d Battalion, 322d Infantry, while bats and large land crabs helped the Japanese to create distraction and started troops firing on nonexistent enemy infiltrators. Apparently no casualties resulted either from Japanese action or indiscriminate small arms fire. Friendly artillery fire did, however, cause some casualties. About 2030, four or five 105-mm. shells from the 316th Field Artillery Battalion hit the lines of the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry, killing 4 men and wounding 15 others. The artillery fire was stopped before further damage could be done. On September 19, following a night of numerous Japanese infiltrations and small-scale counterattacks, the 322nd Regiment swiftly secured Saipan Town and advanced to the north shore of Garangaoi Cove. Meanwhile, the 321st Regiment successfully attacked and captured the Green Beach fortifications from their vulnerable side. To manage the exposed Japanese forces on the beaches, Dark's 2nd Battalion, supported by tanks, maneuvered left and progressed down the southwest of the island, halting just short of the shoreline by nightfall. At Peleliu, Harris' Marines made headway towards the Ngardololok area, overcoming light resistance and quickly dispatching the few enemy stragglers they encountered, reaching Purple Beach by day's end. However, in front of the O-3 line, Puller's weary troops, having endured a grueling night of Japanese counterattacks, resumed their assault on the Umurbrogol Mountains.  Despite some local advances, by evening on 20 September the 1st Marines had been stopped and, ". . . as an assault unit on the regimental level, had ceased temporarily to exist," having suffered almost 1,750 casualties, well over half its strength. Relief was absolutely necessary, not only because casualties were heavy but also because the survivors were physically exhausted from heat, lack of water, and continuous combat. Elements of the 7th Marines therefore relieved all 1st Marines units except those along West Road. While the 7th Marines took over from the exhausted 1st Marines on the right, the 5th Marines continued their advance through western Peleliu, securing its two peninsulas, including Island A and Ngabad Island, by September 21. General Mueller, concerned lest the Japanese reported on the south break through gaps or weak points in the forward lines, had special defenses in depth set up at RED and BLUE Beaches, utilizing Shore Party and antiaircraft troops. All units were alerted to expect Japanese attacks during the night. The division expected (and perhaps hoped) that the Japanese still believed to be located in southern Angaur might launch a suicidal desperation charge during the night or at dawn on the 20th. The night proved very quiet until, toward morning, some small, scattered Japanese parties infiltrated through the lines of both regiments. There was no banzai effort--rather, these Japanese troops were apparently attempting to escape to the northwest hill mass from positions in the mangrove swamp and GREEN Beach 3 areas. Action at dawn was limited to a mopping-up operation directed against four Japanese discovered in the headquarters area of the 2d Battalion, 321st Infantry. By 11:00 on September 20, Mueller reported to General Geiger that all organized resistance on Angaur had ended and that the island was secure. General Mueller's statement was probably prompted by his realization that the remaining Japanese were compressed into the northwest hills and by the reports that about 850 of the enemy had been killed through the 20th. This casualty figure was an overestimation. Probably fewer than 600 Japanese had been killed through the 20th, and Major Goto still had possibly 750 men with which to conduct an organized defense in the northwest. On orders from General Inoue, Goto planned no final banzai attack which would decimate his forces. Instead he withdrew over half his force to rugged terrain and emplaced them in natural or prepared fortifications. His lines of defense in the northwest were well conceived; many of his positions were mutually supporting; the amphitheater configuration of the bowl provided him with defensive areas whence heavy cross fires could be directed at attackers; the broken coral, with its crevices, fissures, caves, and ridgelets, gave him defensive advantages at least as good as those at the Ibdi Pocket on Biak; and he had available a number of artillery and anti-tank weapons, heavy and light mortars, and heavy and light machine-guns, most of them so emplaced as to give maximum support to his riflemen. In addition, he could still exercise effective control over the men he had gathered in the Lake Salome bowl. For whatever it was worth, Goto was ready to conduct a protracted defense, though the best he could hope for was to tie down the 322nd Regiment. Nevertheless, the real issue at Angaur--securing the prospective airfield area--had already been decided. To the north, while southern Angaur was being secured, Venable's men were probing the enemy's northwestern defenses with a series of company-sized attacks. These attacks allowed the Americans to gather crucial information about Goto's remaining positions, centered around the Lake Salome bowl. Venable discovered that organized resistance was still strong, prompting him to rearrange his units for a final push. Following a heavy artillery and air bombardment, the 322nd Regiment attacked the bowl with tank support, initially making some gains but soon encountering obstacles due to the terrain and enemy fire. By the end of September 21, Venable deemed the newly gained positions too exposed and decided to withdraw to the previous night's defenses. Meanwhile, the 1st and 7th Marines continued to face heavy casualties as they fought through the Umurbrogol Mountains, with the latter advancing less than 175 yards after two days of intense combat. Nakagawa's fierce defenders managed to halt the 1st Marine Division on the rough and well-defended terrain, resulting in a total of 4,000 casualties by this time. After visiting the front, Geiger decided to replace the battered 1st Marines with Dark's 321st Regiment, which had suffered minimal casualties and had completed its mission at Angaur. The 1st Marines by this time reported 1749 casualties. One Marine later described the fighting in the Umurbrogol, which attests to the level to which the 1st Marines had deteriorated: "I picked up the rifle of a dead Marine and I went up the hill; I remember no more than a few yards of scarred hillside, I didn't worry about death anymore, I had resigned from the human race. I crawled and scrambled forward and lay still without any feeling towards any human thing. In the next foxhole was a rifleman. He peered at me through red and painful eyes. I didn't care about him and he didn't care about me. As a fighting unit, the 1st Marines was finished. We were no longer human beings, I fired at anything that moved in front of me, friend or foe. I had no friends, I just wanted to kill." OnSeptember 19, he also dispatched Colonel Arthur Watson's reserve 323rd Regiment to secure Ulithi Atoll. After a successful reconnaissance mission, the infantrymen landed on September 22, discovering that the atoll's airfield and seaplane base had been abandoned by the Japanese. The Americans later established a major advanced fleet anchorage, a Marine airbase, and a Navy seaplane base there. Ulithi Atoll contained a 300-berth anchorage and a seaplane base. Occupation of these Western Caroline islands provided still another base from which future operations against the enemy could be supported. The construction of an airstrip on Ameliorate Island made possible fighter plane protection for the anchorage and afforded a base from which US aircraft could continue neutralization of the nearby Japanese bases on Yap. Together with Angaur and Peleliu Islands to the southwest and Guam, Tinian, and Saipan to the northeast, the capture of Ulithi Atoll completed a line of American bases that isolated Japanese holdings in the Central and South Pacific. The occupation of Ulithi Atoll further denied it to the enemy as a fleet anchorage, weather and radio station, and possible air and submarine base, in addition to precluding its use by the enemy to observe and report the activities of American forces in the sector. By September 25 the unloading of all the support ships had been completed and Vice Admiral John H. Hoover, Commander, Forward Areas Western Pacific, took over the task of developing Ulithi Atoll into an advanced fleet base. Within a month after its capture, more than 100 Navy craft from self-propelled types to lighters, floating drydocks, barges, landing craft, and seaplane wrecking derricks were en route to the island. During subsequent operations in the Philippines, the Pacific Fleet found Ulithi to be an extremely valuable base. Prior to the invasion of Okinawa, the island served as a staging area for fleet and amphibious forces. The atoll thus fulfilled a vital strategic role in the final phase of the Pacific War. On that day, Venable resumed his assault on the Lake Salome bowl. The coastal offensive faced little resistance, but the attack through the southern defile encountered heavy enemy fire. Despite this, the troops reached the shores of Lake Salome. However, Venable was severely wounded during the action and had to be evacuated, with his troops retreating to more defensible positions by nightfall. The main strength of the attack was placed on the right (southeast) section of the bowl, and tanks fired along the eastern rim about 200 yards in front of the leading elements. The mediums had been undisturbed by enemy fire all morning, but, apparently attracted by an incautious grouping of officers and men near the lead tanks and defile exit, a Japanese anti-tank gun opened fire from a hidden emplacement along the east rim. Three officers (including Colonel Venable, who was in the forward area to observe the new attack) and one enlisted man were severely wounded and had to be evacuated. During the retirement on the 22nd, one of the three forward tanks was so badly damaged by a mine or buried shell that it could not be moved through the defile. This tank blocked the defile's northern entrance and prevented the withdrawal of another medium, which had to be destroyed to keep it from falling into Japanese hands. In four days of fruitless effort to push into the bowl from the south, three tanks and two 75-mm SPM's had been lost. Heavier infantry losses also began to be sustained now that the Japanese, cornered, were fighting to the death. On that day, for instance, the 2nd Battalion lost 2 men killed and about 35 wounded. At 0730 on the morning of the 23d, the 2d Battalion, with Companies B, C, and E attached, continued the attack into the bowl from the south. Companies B and C worked up the east shore of Lake Salome. Companies I and G pushed toward the southwest and western shores, while Company F paid particular attention to caves along the southwest rim of the bowl. During the first part of the attack all companies moved forward rapidly, and Company I reached the northwest corner of the lake without much trouble. But Company B, pushing forward against increasingly heavy Japanese fire from the north, was pinned down by this fire when it reached the northeast corner of the lake. Company C was sent north on B's right to try to outflank the enemy machine gun and mortar positions from which the fire on Company B originated. The intention was to flush the Japanese from their positions and push them southwest and south against the main body of the 2d Battalion. But Company C could make little progress toward the northern section of the bowl, and its own position became precarious as Japanese mortar and machine gun fire increased and the 1st Battalion's own 81-mm. mortar ammunition ran out, making further mortar support impossible. Japanese fire continued to increase and the positions of all forward companies became untenable. A general withdrawal to the defile entrance was ordered. The withdrawal was painfully slow; companies were broken up; all units suffered more casualties. One small group of Company I, separated from its parent unit, worked over the cliffs and ridges at the bowl's western rim to the coast at BLACK Beach. Company B, retreating in small segments, lost men as it withdrew from the northeast corner of the lake. All told, the 2d Battalion and attached companies lost 18 men killed and over 75 wounded during the day. Concurrently, as the 1st and 7th Marines continued to struggle with the formidable Umurbrogol Mountains, Harris' Company G successfully secured the undefended Carlson Island, finally completing the 5th Marines' original mission. Despite concerns about a potential enemy attack on Koror and Babelthuap after the Peleliu operation, General Inoue decided to reinforce Nakagawa's beleaguered garrison. By 21 September effective Japanese infantry strength in the central ridges was down to 1,300 men. That, of course, does not paint a true picture of the situation in the central pocket. A trained soldier, well armed, can be tenacious on the defense in such terrain as the central ridges of Peleliu whether or not he be trained for infantry service. There were probably 4,000 Japanese troops (including the 1,300 infantrymen) still firmly ensconced in the central pocket as of 21 September, and there were at least 1,000 more troops in the Amiangal Mountain area at northern Peleliu. Nevertheless, Colonel Nakagawa, commanding the Peleliu Sector Unit, clearly needed reinforcements if he was to hold out much longer. There were perhaps 30,000 Japanese troops in the northern Palaus to draw from, including two battalions of the 59th Infantry, two battalions of the 15th Infantry, and four or five recently organized infantry battalions of the 53d Independent Mixed Brigade. The Japanese were not to reach their destination undetected. At 0535, the destroyer H.L. Edwards spotted seven enemy barges about 1,000 yards northeast of Akarakoro Point at the northern tip of Peleliu, obviously headed for the island. The destroyer opened fire, sinking one barge before the remainder reached the beach. A combination of bombing and strafing, naval gunfire, and artillery hit the barges on the beach, and by 0845 the cruiser Louisville reported all barges destroyed. The enemy version of this incident agrees only in part with the American account, adding that "despite receiving severe enemy air and artillery fire at a point two kilometers off the coast, they made a successful landing at 0520 hours under the command of 1st Lieutenant Murahori". Knowing that some Japanese forces had reached Peleliu, Rupertus decided to deploy his own reinforcements between the central ridges and the western shore, targeting the enemy's weak spot for an offensive up the western coast. The 7th Marines supported the Army by attacking enemy positions from the south and center, with Hanneken's 3rd Battalion advancing along the high ground to the right rear of the 321st. After relieving the 1st Marines, Dark sent patrols up the coastal flat to Garekoru, encountering little opposition initially. However, Dark's 2nd Battalion faced heavier resistance in the afternoon and had to retreat, postponing the northward advance until the next day. During the night, Inoue sent the remainder of the 2nd Battalion, 15th Regiment, and despite being shelled, most reinforcements reached Peleliu. By September 23, the Americans had secured important footholds on Peleliu and Angaur. However, intense fighting remained, with the 321st Regiment relieving the 1st Marines against Nakagawa's fortified positions, while the 322nd Regiment continued to attack Goto's defenses on the northwest hills. Yet that is it for the Palau's as we now need to turn to Mortai. General Persons' troops quickly secured and expanded the island perimeter, successfully repelling the enemy's night raids with little difficulty. An example of these raids is the September 18 attack. This is the Japanese report: “On 18 September the main body of the 2nd Provisional Raiding Unit, which had moved into position along the upper Tjao, launched a strong night infiltration attack with the objective of disrupting the enemy's rear area in the vicinity of Doroeba and Gotalalmo. Although deep penetration of the enemy lines was achieved and considerable casualties inflicted, the attack failed to reduce the beachhead or to interfere with the enemy's rapid preparation of Doroeba airfield.” In truth, the Americans easily repelled this attack, suffering very few casualties. These raids would continue throughout September and October. American engineers were busy constructing a new fighter strip at the Pitoe Drome area. This strip was scheduled to be ready for use by September 29 but was eventually abandoned and downgraded to an emergency field. A number of factors influenced the decision to abandon the site, which was renamed Pitoe Crash Strip. Japanese air reaction had been so ineffectual that the need for a fighter base on Morotai was not as urgent as had been expected. Aircraft based on escort carriers, some of which remained in the Morotai area for weeks, were able to keep away most of the Japanese planes, and their efforts were supplemented by long-range land-based fighters from Sansapor. Moreover, the line of approach which planes had to use to land on Pitoe Crash Strip interfered with that of the more important bomber base at Wama Drome. Finally, the terrain at the crash strip was by no means as well drained as that at other locations on the Doroeba Plain, and it was necessary to expend much engineer effort to keep the strip operational. The new field, which acquired the designation Pitoe Drome, was located about 1,200 yards north of Wama Drome. Construction proceeded slowly at Pitoe Drome because so much engineer effort had to be devoted to the completion of Wama Drome. By 4 October almost 7,000 feet at the new site had been cleared, but it was not until the 17th, D plus 32, that even one runway was surfaced, let alone taxiways and dispersal lanes. Meanwhile, the construction of a new bomber field at Wama Drome faced significant delays due to heavy rainstorms and a shortage of suitable surfacing material. Despite almost constant struggles with soggy ground and tropical downpours, engineers managed to make 4,000 feet of Wama Drome operational by October 4. However, the overall progress on building Morotai's new airbase, intended for the upcoming invasion of the Philippines, was slower than anticipated. Nevertheless, the Tradewind Task Force was disbanded on September 25, as the island was considered secure enough. General Hall then assumed command of the Morotai base as the commander of the 11th Corps. However, unbeknownst to the Americans, who believed the only possible Japanese response to the invasion was the ineffective air raids already carried out against them, troops in Halmahera were preparing to embark on a dangerous mission to reinforce Morotai and contest control of this key island. In the meantime, after the successful invasion of the Palaus, new developments were unfolding on the Philippines front following Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 38's recent successful strikes. These strikes had revealed an unexpected vulnerability in the enemy's air defenses, prompting Admirals Halsey and Nimitz to cancel the Yap operation, thereby freeing up many resources for the Philippines Campaign. Approximately 500 aircraft, or about 57% of the 884 believed to be in the Philippines, were rendered nonoperational or destroyed during these air attacks. Consequently, General MacArthur decided to cancel the preliminary Mindanao operations and instead make a direct jump from the Palaus-Morotai line to Leyte on October 20. Shortly after this change in schedule, MacArthur informed the Joint Chiefs that he could advance from Leyte to Luzon by December 20, two months earlier than planned. Meanwhile, the carrier raids on Mindanao and the Visayas strengthened the Southern Army command's belief that the Allies were preparing for an early invasion of the Philippines. As a result, Marshal Terauchi recommended accelerating the reinforcement of the Philippines, activating Operation Sho-Go, and authorizing the 4th Air Army to employ its main strength against enemy carrier task forces. This was in contrast to the current policy of not committing available air strength against enemy raiders, which was failing to conserve Japanese air power for a decisive battle. However, Tokyo denied these last two requests while also receiving concerning reports about General Kuroda's neglect of his duties as field army commander. In the middle of September, IGHQ decided to replace General Kuroda with General Yamashita. Not only did General Kuroda have a concept of the Philippine operations that differed from that of his superiors, but he was charged with neglecting his duty as field army commander. Lt. Col. Yoshie Seiichi of the Personnel Bureau of the War Ministry, who had been sent to the Philippines to investigate personnel matters in the Southern Army, said of the incident: “Stories reached the War Ministry that Lt. Gen. Kuroda was devoting more time to his golf, reading and personal matters than to the execution of his official duties. It appeared that his control over staff officers and troops was not sufficiently strong and that there was a good deal of unfavorable criticism of his conduct among the troops. There were also indications that discipline was becoming very lax. On September 4, I left Tokyo under orders . . . to investigate. As a result I obtained many statements substantiating the unfavorable stories in regard to Lt. Gen. Kuroda. The recommendations of all the staff was that Lt. Gen. Kuroda be relieved as soon as possible, and be replaced by Gen. Yamashita . . . who was a superb tactician and excellent leader.” Random note, for those interested, over on my personal podcast at the Pacific War Channel I did a single episode covering how Yamashita became the Tiger of Malaya and plan to do more pieces on him as I find him to be one of the more interesting generals of the Pacific War. Before an effective change in command could take place, the Japanese were about to experience a more dramatic display of Allied offensive power that they would soon encounter in the Philippines. On September 18, Mitscher's Task Force 38 was ordered to head back toward the islands for a major strike against Luzon, the heart of Japanese control in the Philippines. The American carriers achieved complete surprise and successfully attacked Luzon three days later. Despite the fierce defense by approximately 42 Zeros, between 09:30 and 18:00 on September 21, four waves of over 400 aircraft targeted the harbor area and airfields around Manila with bombs and strafing runs. The assault on the harbor and shipping along the west coast resulted in the sinking or severe damage of 34 vessels totaling over 100,000 gross tons, while the raids on the airfields inflicted significant damage on grounded aircraft. At 0610 the following day, 22 September, search planes discovered the enemy carrier groups still lurking off the coast of Luzon, and at 0730 a hit-and-run attack was carried out by 27 Japanese aircraft, with reported bomb hits on two carriers and one cruiser. Naval air units at Legaspi attempted to carry out a second attack on the enemy carriers during the late afternoon, but the attack force of 19 planes failed to locate the carrier groups. Following the failed Japanese hit-and-run counterattack, Mitscher continued his assaults on Manila, destroying an estimated 110 aircraft in the air and 95 on the ground, and sinking or damaging 44 vessels. After the apparent withdrawal of enemy carriers, the Japanese decided to relocate their remaining ships in Manila Bay to other anchorages, many of which were directed to the secure docks of Coron Bay. However, Mitscher's carriers returned on September 24 to launch further strikes against Luzon, including a raid by about 96 Hellcats and 24 Helldivers on Coron Bay, which resulted in the sinking or damaging of 10 more vessels. Additional attacks on other targets led to the sinking or damaging of 12 more ships. Despite the ongoing air attacks, the Imperial Japanese Navy still deemed it premature to fully activate Operation Sho-Go, believing the decisive battle would take place in or after late October. Meanwhile, the Imperial Japanese Army accelerated its preparations to defend the Philippines. The reserve 1st Division was ordered to move to the islands immediately, and plans were made to assign ten surface raiding regiments to the area. On September 26, as plans for air reinforcement to the Philippines were being approved, General Yamashita was confirmed as the new commander of the 14th Area Army. He arrived in the Philippines on October 6 and found the situation "unsatisfactory," with poor planning for the Leyte campaign and many of his staff unfamiliar with the conditions in the Philippines. Lt. Gen. Makino Shiro, now commanding the 16th Division, which was the major force on Leyte, had directed his efforts since April 1944 toward the construction of defensive positions on the island. The first line of defense, which was on the east coast in the Dulag area, was practically completed by the middle of October. The third defensive line was in the middle of Leyte Valley in the vicinity of Dagami. The second line of defense was between the two others, while the bulk of supplies was assembled in the central mountain range at Jaro. The distribution of the other troops at the time of the American landings was as follows: one battalion of the 9th Infantry Regiment in the Catmon Hill and Tanauan district, and the main strength of the 33d Infantry Regiment in the Palo and Tacloban area. The larger part of the 33d Infantry Regiment, which was less adequately trained than the other regiments, had arrived on Leyte in mid-September from Luzon. Its officers were unfamiliar with the terrain and did not fortify their positions. However, the supply situation was favorable, with Manila serving as the main Japanese depot in the region. Following established plans, he instructed his subordinates that the Area Army would "seek decisive battle on Luzon" while in the central and southern Philippines, the focus would be to delay the enemy's advance and prevent them from securing naval and air bases. However, the September air strikes had led to a noticeable increase in guerrilla activity and civil disorder due to widespread destruction and panic. Small Japanese garrisons were attacked, pro-Japanese Filipinos molested and intimidated, and communications disrupted. In central Luzon there were indications that some guerrilla units were planning a move to the Lamon Bay area in order to be the first to cooperate with an American landing force, and on Negros and Panay guerrilla raids on Japanese airfields became boldly persistent. The Fourteenth Area Army feared that, as soon as enemy forces landed, the guerrillas would not only give them direct assistance as scouts and guides, but seriously hamper Japanese operations by attacking rear communication lines. Consequently, martial law was declared across the archipelago in anticipation of enemy landings. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Despite fierce and costly combat, American forces made significant advances in the Palaus, securing critical islands and establishing bases. The battle for Peleliu was marked by high casualties and intense fighting, with heavy losses on both sides. The successful capture of strategic locations like Ulithi Atoll and the subsequent strikes on Luzon further demonstrated Allied dominance and strategic planning in the Pacific Theater.

Last time we spoke about the fall of Guam and actions in New Guinea. General Shepherd's Marines had secured the Orote Peninsula, while General Turnage's Marines pushed the Japanese northwards. General Bruce's 77th Division prepared for an eastward assault, and engineers attempted, but failed, to build a supply road to Yona. Geiger's offensive began on July 31, with Marines quickly capturing Agaña and advancing despite dense jungle and resistance. The 77th Division faced tough terrain but liberated 2,000 Guamanians. The push north continued, facing logistical challenges and mined roads. By August 7th, coordinated attacks cleared key areas, culminating in the defeat of remaining Japanese forces by August 11. Guam was back in American hands although scattered Japanese forces continued guerrilla warfare until the war's conclusion. Thus the Marianas campaign had finally come to a conclusion, and now the allies were adding more bass of operation to hit the Japanese home islands.  This episode is the Fall of Myitkyina Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  This week we are diving back over to the northern Burma front. Despite holding Myitkyina through a rainy, muddy summer-long siege, by late July, the Japanese had been gradually cornered into a small perimeter, cut off from all supply lines and running short on ammunition. The situation worsened due to a leadership crisis, between the two Japanese leaders was a matter of semantics. Colonel Maruyama of the 114th Regiment who was in charge of the defense of the city, interpreted his orders to “facilitate the future operations of 33rd Army ‘by securing the vital areas in the vicinity of Myitkyina',” as a call to defend the city street-by-street, house-by-house. When General Minakami of the 56th Division arrived, he pointed out that all Maruyama had to do to satisfy his orders was simply to continue to deny the Allies access to the Ledo-Kamaing road. Minakami thus found himself in a rather difficult position in regard to the command of the Myitkyina Garrison. Maruyama had conducted an excellent defense, was fully familiar with the situation and, because of his position as former commander, exercised considerable authority. Shortly after Minakami's assumption of command, General Honda asked how long Myitkyina could stand. Minakami replied that the garrison might be able to hold out for as long as two months. A few days later, Honda was surprised to receive a second message stating, "The Myitkyina Garrison finds it difficult to hold with the poor defense facilities and meager supplies of ammunition." The Army staff concluded that the first message was undoubtedly Minakami's personal opinion as it reflected his determined character and that the second message incorporated the views of Maruyama who was more cognizant of the actual situation. In order that there should be no doubt as to the importance of holding Myitkyina, Honda sent the following message, "Maj. Gen. Minakami will defend Myitkyina to the death” — a message sent with deep regret and sadness according to the staff officers who wrote and dispatched the order. Heavy casualties had reduced the Japanese forces from around 3,000 to fewer than 1,500, further weakening the garrison's defensive capabilities. This number included the heavily wounded and hospital patients, who could only be evacuated by drifting down the Irrawaddy River on rafts, often intercepted by the unforgiving Kachin Levies. On July 24, eight rafts and a boat laden with Japanese were attacked on the Irrawaddy by Kachins of the OSS Detachment 101. Twenty-four Japanese were killed, two captured, and then it was learned these were hospital patients fleeing Myitkyina. Three more Japanese seized by friendly Burmans revealed that hospital patients were being evacuated by the simple expedient of letting them drift down the river on rafts. As these fierce defenders began to falter, General Wessels felt ready to launch his final push. Reinforced by the 149th and 90th Regiments, the American-Chinese forces made daily gains of several hundred yards during the last days of July, though at a significant cost. As the Japanese-held area shrank, counterattacks became less dynamic, captured positions were less fortified, and many Japanese dead were found to be severely wounded men returned to the line. Unbeknownst to the Americans, the desperate defenders had requested a withdrawal to the east by the end of the month. Though Minakami had intended to fight to the last, he ultimately agreed to preserve his men's lives. On the night of August 1, the Japanese began their escape, crossing the Irrawaddy east of the town. Weighing the many evidences that control of the situation was rapidly passing into their hands, Wessels and his colleagues drafted a new plan of attack. It included an ingenious device, credited to General Pan Yu-kun of the 50th Division. A raiding party, formed into fifteen heavily armed sections, was organized and briefed on infiltrating Japanese lines facing the 50th Division. Having made its way through the Japanese lines in darkness, it was to remain hidden until 0430 when the 50th would assault while the raiders spread confusion behind the Japanese lines. Meanwhile, air reconnaissance revealed many rafts moored against the Irrawaddy within the Japanese lines. "At 0300 hours (3 August), when the moon went down and rain and thunder set in, the raiding party of the 50th Division moved out. The approach was detected only once and some shots were fired at the raiders, who hit the ground. The Chinese did not return fire however, and after laying low for a while, moved out again quietly and cautiously." While the raiders created confusion behind Japanese lines, the 50th Division launched a full attack, quickly overwhelming the remaining enemy positions and capturing 187 prisoners, thus securing Myitkyina for the Chinese. However, about 800 Japanese managed to escape eastward and later rejoined their allies. Minakami was not among them. As the 3rd of August meandered on in a haze of gunfire, blood and rain, Minakami went to sit with his back against a tree. There came the sound of a pistol shot. Japanese officers nearby sprinted to the scene. The general's orderly was in tears. They found Minakami's body erect against the tree trunk, facing northeast, towards Japan. The ten-week siege resulted in approximately 3,000 Japanese killed or captured; 972 Chinese killed, 3,184 wounded, and 188 evacuated due to illness; and 272 Americans killed, 955 wounded, and 980 evacuated sick. Overall, the total American-Chinese casualties in 1944 amounted to 13,618 Chinese and 1,327 American casualties. A week later, the Galahad Unit, reduced to only 130 combat-effective men from the original 2,997, was disbanded. The fall of Myitkyina was General Stilwell's greatest victory, earning him a promotion to full general on August 1, two days before the city fell. The attack was costly in terms of suffering and losses, but the Mogaung-Myitkyina area was a significant prize. It allowed Ledo Road builders and American transport planes to move to Myitkyina and enabled ground forces to link up with other Chinese forces in neighboring Yunnan. As the fighting moved further south down the Hukawng and Mogaung valleys, it became safer for transports to use the lower, more southerly routes to China. This, in turn, increased Hump deliveries to China from 13,686 tons in May to 18,235 tons in June and 25,454 tons in July.  While the Allies celebrated victories in northern Burma, the situation in China was dire as the Ichi-Go offensive resulted in many Chinese casualties. By August 1, General Yokoyama had amassed 110,000 troops around Hengyang, equipped with five heavy artillery pieces, fifty mountain artillery pieces, and 40,000 shells. Conversely, General Fang's resilient defenders had dwindled to 3,000 exhausted troops, with their defenses largely destroyed. General Xue Yue's reinforcements had failed to reach Hengyang, leaving the Chinese forces to rely on the 46th Army to launch an attack along the railway. On August 4, Yokoyama initiated his main offensive. The 68th and 116th Divisions launched a significant assault from the south and southwest, while the 58th Division quietly positioned itself near the enemy's northern defenses. Initially, progress was slow. However, by August 5, Yokoyama's forces had captured Yoping and School Hill. The next day, the 116th Division secured part of the city's defenses. On August 6, the 58th Division breached the city walls from the north, forcing Fang to redeploy troops to counter this new threat. Intense street fighting broke out on August 7 as the defenders valiantly tried to repel the Japanese attacks. By nightfall, the 68th Division had overrun the southern defenses and entered part of the Walled City. Gradually, enemy troops began to surrender, and before dawn on August 8, after 48 days of fierce resistance, Fang was compelled to surrender. Following the capture of Hengyang, Yokoyama declared the successful completion of the initial phase of Operation Togo and promptly began preparations for the subsequent offensive. In this phase, the Japanese reported casualties of over 3860 killed, 8327 wounded, and 7099 sick, with an estimated Chinese casualty count exceeding 100,000, including 8400 killed and 5000 captured in Hengyang alone. To spearhead the next stage of Operation Togo targeting Guilin and Liuzhou, General Okamura Yasuji's 6th Area Army was established on August 25, comprising the 11th, 23rd, and 34th Armies, along with the 27th, 40th, 64th, and 68th Divisions, alongside additional support units. This allowed General Hata to focus on countering potential American landings on the Chinese coast while Okamura directed the offensives in eastern China. Ahead of this operation, Lieutenant-General Tanaka Hisakazu of the 23rd Army initiated a preliminary offensive in late June, positioning the 23rd Independent Mixed Brigade in the northeastern sector of the Luichow Peninsula, advancing the 22nd Independent Mixed Brigade to the Tanjiang River, securing the Jiangmen area with the 22nd Division, and capturing the Qingyuan sector with the 104th Division. By late August, Yokoyama had deployed six divisions along the Shuangfeng-Leiyang line, poised to eliminate the enemy in the district west of Hengyang. On August 29, he launched the offensive, with over 100,000 troops advancing southwest amidst heavy artillery bombardment. Intense ground and aerial combat ensued, resulting in the loss of 10 Japanese planes and 15 enemy aircraft. Despite fierce resistance from Chinese defenders over three days, their entire line collapsed on September 1, prompting a retreat towards Shaoyang, Qiyang, and Jiahe. However, the Japanese advanced relentlessly, covering nearly 100 kilometers in the following days without pause. By September 5, both Qiyang and Huochangpingzhen had fallen, followed by the seizure of Lingling Airdrome on September 8 by the 3rd Division. Progressing along a north-south axis, Japanese forces secured Shaoyang and Changning, while the 58th Division captured Dongan on the same day. With initial objectives achieved, Yokoyama ordered further pursuit, with the 3rd and 54th Divisions converging in the Quanzhou area by September 14. Meanwhile, Tanaka prepared for his offensive, with the bulk of the 104th Division moving towards Taipingzhen, and a raiding unit conducting a wide envelopment maneuver along the Zhukeng-Huaiji road towards Wuzhou by September 6. Subsequently, the 23rd Brigade began its northward march from Suixi. However, Tanaka's offensive wouldn't commence for a couple of weeks. Turning to the broader context of the Pacific War, General Stilwell celebrated a major victory with the fall of Myitkyina, while General Slim's successful defense against Operation U-Go further bolstered Allied morale in the CBI Theater. In Thailand, Prime Minister Phibun's regime faced a significant crisis as Japan struggled to meet the country's essential import needs, leading to inflation, rationing, shortages, black markets, smuggling, corruption, and profiteering. The anti-Japanese Free Thai underground movement, spearheaded by Regent Pridi Banomyong, infiltrated the government, stoking public discontent against both the Japanese occupiers and Phibun's administration. As a result, following the downfall of the Tojo government, Phibun found himself compelled to step down in late July. For his part, Phibun also was thinking of ways, he claims, to prepare to turn against the Japanese. Part of these preparations included proposals to move the capital to remote Phetchabun, north of Bangkok, and construct a “Buddhist City,” a sort of center for world Buddhism, near Saraburi—both grandiose projects in typically extravagant Phibun style. Moving to the isolated, mountain-ringed Phetchabun, Phibun later argued, would facilitate a Thai uprising against the Japanese. Yet on July 18, the Tojo government in Japan resigned, and only six days later the Thai National Assembly turned down both government bills and forced the resignation of Phibun as prime minister. The deputies in the assembly voted against these plans motivated in part by the fall of Tojo, who was closely associated in their minds with Phibun, in part by their feeling that the war was turning against Japan, and in part by their feeling that Phibun was too closely identified with an authoritarian past that must now be buried for the sake of improving relations with the Allies.  Politician Khuang Aphaiwong then assumed his position as Prime Minister on August 1. Serving as a compromise candidate, he navigated between Phibun's supporters and the opposition while maintaining cooperation with the Japanese and safeguarding Free Thai members who had collaborated with the Allies. Meanwhile, in China, the success of Operation Ichi-Go led to another leadership crisis. Despite the initial rejection of Stilwell commanding troops in China in 1942, the effective Japanese offensive posed a threat of defeat to the Chinese Government, reigniting the debate over command authority. This was especially significant as Chinese troops under Stilwell's command were achieving significant victories in northern Burma. However, Stilwell's vocal criticism of Chiang Kai-Shek's corrupt regime and incompetent generals strained their relationship. Chiang favored General Chennault, who proposed that with a monthly allocation of 10,000 tons for operations in northern China, his 14th Air Force could halt the Japanese offensive. Despite his strained relationship with Chennault, Stilwell redirected Hump allocations to increase the 14th Air Force's allocation to 8,425 tons, although he couldn't secure an additional 1,500 tons from the Matterhorn allocation. Chennault's aircraft managed to disrupt the Japanese advance, but failed to halt it completely. In late June, Stilwell faced criticism when Vice-President Henry Wallace visited Chongqing. While Wallace persuaded Chiang to allow a small American observer mission into Communist territory, he also recommended Stilwell's recall due to his perceived lack of diplomacy and strained relations with the Chinese leadership. Nonetheless, Stilwell maintained the backing of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and President Roosevelt eventually nominated him to lead the China Theater, on the condition that he make every effort to avoid upsetting the Generalissimo. In July, the President attempted to persuade Chiang to accept this arrangement, but the Generalissimo employed various diplomatic maneuvers to reject the proposal, agreeing "in principle" only after an unspecified period for his forces to adjust. He also requested the presence of a presidential representative to facilitate smooth relations between himself and Stilwell. Major-General Patrick Hurley was appointed to this role and arrived in China in August. Concurrently, the Dixie Mission arrived in Yan'an, where over the following months, American observers assessed Communist society, military tactics, and guerrilla operations, issuing reports that commended them and suggested increased collaboration. Following the fall of Hengyang, tensions escalated in China, with rumors swirling about potential coup plans involving Marshall Li Zhongren and General Xue Yue against the Generalissimo. Meanwhile, Chennault urged Stilwell to divert Hump airlift capacity to supply ground forces in eastern China, a move opposed by Chiang, who feared supporting potential insurgents with lend-lease equipment. Stilwell, anticipating his imminent assumption of leadership in the China Theater, refrained from challenging Chiang's stance. With significant developments looming, the intensifying rift between Stilwell and Chiang foreshadowed the downfall of one of them. Elsewhere in the South Pacific, General MacArthur's troops had finished their final offensive in New Guinea and were preparing to return to the Philippines by way of an intermediate stop at Halmahera Island. To the east, Rabaul was completely surrounded, enduring heavy bombardment from Allied air forces. Meanwhile, on Bougainville, the remaining forces of the 17th Army had retreated to the island's southern region, unable to launch further counterattacks. The living conditions of the Japanese soldiers, never good under the best of circumstances, became increasingly desperate. Added to the dangers that forward troops always faced, such as contact with large American combat patrols, was the growing specter of starvation. Sealed off from regular supplies from New Ireland or New Britain, General Hyakutake's army had to depend entirely on its own laborers to acquire food. The normal rice ration of 750 grams of rice for each soldier was cut in April 1944 to 250 grams, and beginning in September there was no rice ration. A large portion of the available army and naval personnel had to be put to work growing food. Allied pilots took delight in dropping napalm on these garden plots whenever possible. The native workers who had been impressed into service were the first to defect, but soon many soldiers also just walked away from their units, taking the chance of surviving in the jungle on what could be gathered. After the failure of the March attack, morale in most units became deplorably low. There were instances, normally unimagined in the Japanese army, of open insubordination and even mutiny. Although General Hyakutake dreamed of a midsummer offensive, it became obvious that no operations as large as that smashed in March could be undertaken for months, if ever. Thus, almost as if by agreement, both sides adopted a defensive posture that minimized the conflict in the no-man's-land between them. In the Central Pacific, significant progress had been made over the past year, marked by the complete capture of the Gilbert, Marshall, and Mariana Islands, strengthening the Allied presence and providing a launching point for future offensives into the heart of the Japanese Empire. The next target for Admiral Nimitz was the Palaus, to be invaded concurrently with Halmahera. However, the architect of this southwestern advance was not Admiral Spruance, who had been overseeing operations with the 5th Fleet. Instead, it was Admiral Halsey's 3rd Fleet, known as the "Department of Dirty Tricks," that had been strategizing the next moves from Hawaii. Now, Admiral Halsey was set to assume command of the Pacific Fleet, leading the charge to the Palaus and the Philippines. This rotation in leadership between Halsey's 3rd Fleet and Spruance's 5th Fleet was orchestrated by Nimitz to maintain operational tempo and confuse the Japanese. The alternating command structure allowed for continuous planning of future operations while the active fleet conducted current ones. However, Tokyo was apprehensive about a potential invasion of the Philippines and sought to bolster its defenses. Following the surrender of the US Army Forces in the Philippines, the 14th Army, led by Lieutenant-General Tanaka Shizuichi, worked to establish military administration, secure cooperation from civilian institutions, and quell guerrilla groups across the countryside. Despite their endeavors, their control over certain regions, particularly in the Visayas and Mindanao, remained fragile. Allied submarines and aircraft from Australia and New Guinea also delivered supplies like signal equipment, weapons, explosives, propaganda materials, and counterfeit currency to support the guerrilla forces, further impeding Japanese efforts. Additionally, with the deteriorating situation in the South and Central Pacific, more troops were redirected from the Philippines' garrison to other areas, weakening the 14th Army, now commanded by Lieutenant-General Kuroda Shigenori since May 19, 1943. Undermanned and stretched thin, the Japanese halted their suppression operations in August, hoping that the imminent declaration of independence by the Second Philippine Republic would lead guerrillas to surrender. However, this strategy backfired, as the guerrillas only grew stronger during the pause. Consequently, Kuroda restarted intensive suppression operations in 1944, but guerrilla activities escalated in anticipation of the imminent liberation by American forces. As a result, the guerrillas gained strength in the following months, providing valuable intelligence to MacArthur's forces in preparation for their eventual return. Given this context, it was evident that the 14th Army would be ill-equipped to withstand an American invasion under the current circumstances. Due to its crucial strategic location bridging Japan and the southern region rich in natural resources, Japan couldn't risk losing the Philippines. It served as their primary rear base supporting the main defense perimeter. The Philippines were also to play the role of a rear base of operations–an assembly and staging area for troops and supplies and a concentration area for air reserves, to support operations at any threatened point on the main defense perimeter from the Marianas south to Western New Guinea and the Banda Sea area. To implement these plans, IGHQ in October 1943 directed the 14th Army to complete the establishment of the necessary base facilities by the spring of 1944. Major emphasis in this program was laid upon the construction of air bases. The Army alone planned to build or improve 30 fields in addition to 13 already in operational use or partially completed. The Navy projected 21 fields and seaplane bases to be ready for operational use by the end of 1944, expanding its total number of Philippine bases to 33. Line of communications and other rear­ area base installations were also to be expanded and improved. Of the 30 Army airfields projected in October 1943, six had been generally completed by May 1944, and 24 under construction. Of the 21 projected Navy fields, 15 were still incomplete by then. Consequently, in early 1944, the decision was made to strengthen the garrison in the Philippines. Initially, this involved reorganizing and expanding existing garrison units to establish four new independent mixed brigades. These brigades were primarily tasked with suppressing guerrilla activity, while infantry divisions were assigned to defend against potential enemy landings. However, despite the estimation that at least seven divisions were necessary for the defense of Luzon, the Visayas, and Mindanao, only the 16th Division was available. Additionally, it was deemed crucial to bolster air strength with at least two air divisions, anticipating Allied invasions in Halmahera and Palau before advancing to the Philippines. Plans were formulated in March to deploy reinforcements within eight months. In mid-May, General Terauchi relocated his headquarters to Manila to oversee operations more closely. Concurrently, efforts were made to transport the 30th Division to Mindanao and bring the 4th Air Army to Manila. Furthermore, the Philippines were reinforced with the 2nd and 4th Air Divisions, the latter being tasked with constructing 30 new airfields. In June, approximately 20,000 inexperienced replacements were transported to the Philippines to bolster the recently-formed independent mixed brigades, filling them up to division strength. Subsequently, in July, the 100th, 102nd, 103rd, and 105th Divisions were activated, along with the establishment of the 54th and 55th Independent Mixed Brigades. It's ironic that despite this reinforcement, the main Japanese forces were as inexperienced as the Philippine Army during MacArthur's defense. Nonetheless, Terauchi was resolute in further fortifying the Philippines to prevent its fall, unlike MacArthur's situation. By mid-July, the reinforced 58th Independent Mixed Brigade arrived at Lingayen. Later that month, the 14th Army underwent reorganization into the 14th Area Army, with units directly under its command tasked with defending the northern Philippines. Meanwhile, the 35th Army, led by Lieutenant-General Suzuki Sosaki, was established under the 14th Area Army to defend Mindanao and the Visayas. Additionally, Tokyo finalized plans for decisive battle operations, codenamed Sho-Go, covering the Philippines-Formosa-Ryukyus-Japan-Kuriles area. This determined the disposition of Army and Navy air forces across the Pacific, with the Philippines receiving the reorganized 1st and 2nd Air Fleets and the 4th Air Army. The Philippine garrison was strengthened to a total of nine divisions and four brigades, with the 1st Division at Shanghai and the 68th Independent Brigade at Formosa designated as general reserves. Defenses and fortifications were constructed at Luzon in preparation for the decisive battle there.  Known as the Combined Fleet Top Secret Operations Order No. 84,  issued on 1 August, this fixed the new tactical grouping of naval forces for the Sho-Go Operations. Almost the entire surface combat strength of the Fleet was included in a Task Force placed under the overall command of the First Mobile Fleet Commander, Vice­Adm. Ozawa Jisaburo. This force was broken down into three tactical groups: (1) the Task Force Main Body, directly commanded by Vice­Adm. Ozawa and consisting of most of the Third Fleet (carrier forces): (2) the First Striking Force, commanded by Vice Adm. Kurita Takeo and made up of the Second Fleet with part of the 10th Destroyer Squadron attached: (3) the Second Striking Force, commanded by Vice Adm. Shima Kiyohide and composed of the Fifth Fleet plus two destroyer divisions and the battleships Fuso and Yamashiro. The First Striking Force would be stationed at Lingga Anchorage, while the Task Force Main Body and the Second Striking Force would be stationed in the western part of the Inland Sea. However, if an enemy attack was expected, the First Striking Force would advance from Lingga Anchorage to Brunei, Coron or Guimaras while the Task Force Main Body and the Second Striking Force remained in the Inland Sea and prepared to attack the north flank of the enemy task force. During August, the Navy Section of Imperial General Headquarters also took action to give the Combined Fleet more unified operational control of naval forces in order to facilitate the execution of the Sho-Go plans. On 9 August the General Escort Command and units assigned to naval stations were placed under operational command of the Combined Fleet, and on 21 August the China Area Fleet was similarly placed under Combined Fleet command. On 10 August the 1st Carrier Division, reorganized around two newly-commissioned regular carriers, was added to the Task Force Main Body. Vice Adm. Ozawa, Task Force Commander, meanwhile set 15 October as the target date for completion of the reorganization and training of the 3d and 4th Carrier Division air groups. Concurrently with these preparations, steps were taken to strengthen the antiaircraft armament of combat units. Accordingly, the Japanese sought to deploy the 8th and 26th Divisions, the 2nd Tank Division, and the 61st Independent Mixed Brigade to the Luzon region for a decisive battle. However, enemy submarines posed a constant threat. Since February, they had been patrolling the South China Sea, targeting the Hi Convoys supplying Japanese territories in Southeast Asia and Japan itself. During these engagements, Admiral Ijuin was killed aboard the patrol boat Iki. Between August 18 and 25, Admiral Kajioka's Hi-71 convoy, carrying the 26th Division, was attacked by six American submarines. The escort carrier Taiyo, destroyers Yunagi and Asakaze, two oilers, four transports, and three kaibokans were sunk, with 7420 soldiers of the 26th Division lost. The submarine Harder was the only American vessel sunk in retaliation. Kajioka's Hi-72 convoy, returning from Luzon, was also attacked, resulting in the sinking of his flagship, the kaibokan Hirato, and the loss of the destroyer Shikinami, three transports, and one oiler. Despite these setbacks, advance units of the 8th Division, 2nd Tank Division, and 61st Independent Mixed Brigade successfully reached the Philippines in September. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After months the siege of Myitkyina had finally ended. The Japanese had held out as long as they could, but lack of supplies and rather terrible leadership lost them the fight. Meanwhile, in China, Japanese offensives intensified, challenging Chinese defenses and leadership. It seemed war was coming to the Philippines, where the Japanese prepared to fight to the death.

Jim Fanell is a retired U.S. Navy captain, serving twenty-nine-years in the military. He is the former Director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Government Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and Founding Member of the Committee on Present Danger China. Bradl Thayer, Ph.D., is a founding member of the Committee on Present Danger China and a former visiting fellow at Magdalen College, University of Oxford.

Last time we spoke about fall of Tinian and battle of Sansapor. Following the capture of Noemfoor and Biak, the Allies advanced to the Vogelkop Peninsula, constructing vital airbases. MacArthur initially focused on seizing Sorong and Waigeo Island, but operations accelerated, making Klamono oilfields non-viable, and oil rehabilitation projects in the Dutch East Indies were prioritized by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. MacArthur planned reconnaissance in the Mar-Sansapor area. The 6th Division launched Operation Typhoon, and Task Force 77 executed landings on July 30, 1944. Airfields were built, and patrols eliminated Japanese forces. Meanwhile, Tinian saw intense fighting, with Marines securing key objectives by July 31. Following massive bombardments, Marines continued advancing, encountering heavy resistance but eventually declaring Tinian secure on August 1. Guam operations saw similar advances with coordinated attacks overcoming Japanese defenses. This episode is the Fall of Guam Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  This weeks podcast brings us back into the intense action in Guam. As we previously observed in Guam, General Shepherd's Marine brigade had effectively captured the Orote Peninsula, while General Turnage's 3rd Marine Division had reached the designated beachhead line, pushing back a weakened Japanese force retreating northward. Meanwhile, General Bruce's 77th Division maintained control of the southern beachhead line, preparing for a general eastward assault. An engineer battalion began constructing a supply road towards Yona, a project that ultimately failed to support the infantry's advance. On July 30, Turnage's Marines and the infantrymen sent patrols to gauge the strength of the Japanese forces, but dense foliage obscured enemy movements. Geiger eventually concluded that defensive positions were likely near the Agaña-Pago Bay Road. He planned an initial advance toward the general line of Agaña-Famja-Pago Bay, followed by a northeastward attack. Turnage's Marines were assigned to capture the capital, Agaña, and the strategic Tiyan Airfield on the left, while Bruce's infantry aimed to secure the Pago Bay area on the right. Following two days of intense artillery and naval bombardment, Geiger's offensive commenced at 06:30 on July 31. On the left, Turnage's units encountered minimal resistance. The 3rd Marines, now led by Colonel James Stuart, quickly occupied the ruins of the abandoned Agaña and moved beyond the O-1 Line to secure the main northbound roads. The 21st Marines advanced through dense underbrush, reaching O-1 after neutralizing an enemy pillbox near Famja. When Lieutenant Colonel Duplantis 3rd battalion, 21st marines brought his command post forward, a curious incident occurred which illustrated the confusion of the Japanese. Someone in the battalion command group sighted one of the bypassed enemy groups, estimated to be about 15-20, led by an officer, moving toward the new CP area. The Marines held their fire, and when the small unit got to within 150 yards of the waiting men, an interpreter called to the Nipponese to surrender. Apparently thinking they had finally reached friendly lines, they started forward, then stopped to hold a hurried conference. The chattering was interrupted by the interpreter urging them forward, but by this time the aggregation had decided they were in unfriendly territory. They broke and ran in all directions; the Marines opened fire, killing and wounding about half of the intruders. Those still alive escaped into the protecting foliage. The 9th Marines destroyed a delaying detachment at Ordot and two tanks during their successful push to O-1. Colonel Hamilton's 1st and 3rd Battalions, along with Colonel Tanzola's 3rd Battalion, advanced to the right, moving through steep slopes and narrow gorges in columns. They successfully reached Yona and the Pago River without encountering any opposition. With the Reconnaissance Troop protecting the south flank, General Bruce's 77th Infantry Division started toward the east coast of Guam at 7:00, 31 July. Elements of the 307th, with 3/305 attached, led the way in a column of battalions. Lack of enemy resistance permitted battalions to move with companies in column; even so, the march proved most difficult. The troops initially scaled steep slopes, slid down into narrow gorges, and followed along the foothills southwest of the central mountain range of Guam. For a time, vehicles followed, but soon the terrain became so rough that even jeeps could not traverse it. As one infantryman later wrote: “The distance across the island is not far, as the crow flies, but unluckily we can't fly. The nearest I came to flying was while descending the slippery side of a mountain in a sitting position. . . . After advancing a few yards you find that the [bolt] handle of the machine gun on your shoulder, your pack and shovel, canteens, knife, and machete all stick out at right angles and are as tenacious in their grip on the surrounding underbrush as a dozen grappling hooks. . . . The flies and mosquitos have discovered your route of march and have called up all the reinforcements including the underfed and undernourished who regard us as nothing but walking blood banks. We continue to push on. . . .”  During this movement, Hamilton's Company L liberated 2,000 Guamanians from a concentration camp near Asinan. Soldiers willingly gave their rations and cigarettes to the undernourished men and women who were almost overcome with joy at once again seeing Americans. Men of the 77th Division soon forgot the long, tiresome cross-island march as the full realization of the expression, "liberation of enslaved peoples," came to the troops. Following the Orote operations, Shepherd's brigade was ordered to take over the southern half of the beachhead line from Inalas to Magpo Point, relieving the 305th and 306th Regiments. On August 1, Geiger's northward push continued, with the 305th moving to the Yona area and the 306th heading to Pago Bay. The 305th and 307th Regiments advanced slowly through rough terrain without opposition, reaching the O-2 Line by nightfall. On the left, Turnage began his advance with three regiments abreast, but the 3rd and 9th Marines eventually pinched out the 21st upon reaching the intermediate D-2A Line. At 15:00, these two regiments resumed their advance against slight resistance and reached O-2 by nightfall. The main challenge during this period was moving supplies forward, as both divisions relied on the same coastal road, heavily mined by the Japanese. With the rapid advance came the necessity to move supply distribution points closer to the front. Trucks began to roll over the already crowded coast highway to establish an advanced division dump in the Agaña Central Plaza area. Artillery units started to displace forward so that continuous direct support would be available to the assault units. This added traffic, plus the fact that the 77th Division would have to move supplies over the same road, presented a problem to the engineers. In an effort to alleviate the situation, the 25th Naval Construction Battalion and the 19th Marines put all available men to work improving existing roads and trails. Yet despite these efforts, by August 1, the problem of getting supplies forward was becoming more serious. The main coast road –and only one that ran from west to east on northern Guam– over which all traffic had to move had been heavily mined. The Japanese had placed aerial bombs and single-horned mines at road junctions and intersections in and around Agaña. In addition to being mined and heavily congested, the two-lane, hard-surfaced Agaña-Pago Bay Road was overused, poorly maintained and, with frequent rain, soon deteriorated badly. In the end, the engineers could not properly maintain the road and still allow the essential supply convoys through. On the morning of August 2, artillery and warships bombed the new positions General Obata was trying to establish around Mount Santa Rosa. Meanwhile, the Marines and infantrymen continued their pursuit northwards, aiming to reach the O-3 Line behind Japanese delaying positions at Finegayan and Mount Barrigada. On the left, the 9th Marines swiftly captured Tiyan Airfield, but their advance was hampered by dense jungle. Despite this, they managed to gain 1800 yards while the 21st Marines cleared the Saupon Point-Ypao Point area of small enemy groups. On the right, the 77th Division's advance was initially covered by a 14-tank patrol conducting reconnaissance in the Barrigada area, where they faced heavy resistance. The 307th Regiment quickly secured Price Road, but Tanzola's 3rd Battalion was halted by concealed machine-gun positions near Barrigada Well. Subsequently, the 307th, now led by Lieutenant-Colonel Thomas Manuel, was also stopped near the village, with Manuel's 1st and 3rd Battalions becoming mixed up just as an enemy tank broke through their lines. After numerous failed attempts to dislodge the enemy, Companies G and E managed to penetrate the Japanese lines in the afternoon, although Company G had to be evacuated by nightfall. Meanwhile, the 305th moved up and consolidated its lines with the 307th. Since Bruce's infantrymen failed to link up with the Marines, Colonel Butler's 2nd Battalion was sent to fill the gap between the divisions. Following a reorganization, the 305th and 307th Regiments attacked again the next morning, encountering surprisingly little resistance as they moved through Barrigada and secured the vital well. The 77th Division had a special reason for wanting to reach Barrigada quickly. The reservoir and pump, located 100 yards northwest of Road Junction 306, could supply 20000 gallons of water daily to the troops. Until now, the men of the division had quenched their thirst by getting water from streams and creeks. But in the northern part of Guam there were no streams, and the reservoir would be the only source of supply. With tanks leading the way, Manuel's 3rd Battalion advanced quickly and reached the summit of Mount Barrigada, although the 2nd Battalion lagged behind. Meanwhile, the 305th Regiment engaged in several isolated skirmishes but still managed to link up with the 307th. To the left, Turnage had also resumed his advance toward O-3. Although the 3rd Marines encountered little resistance and reached their objective successfully, Colonel Craig's 1st Battalion was halted by heavy fire near Finegayan after destroying a Japanese stronghold. That night, the Marines faced mortar and tank attacks, but these assaults made little progress. Meanwhile, as the 22nd Marines patrolled southern Guam, the 4th Regiment was held in reserve at Toto. On August 4, the remainder of Shepherd's brigade began moving to Toto, leaving only Colonel Schneider's 1st Battalion and the 6th Defense Battalion behind. Following Turnage's orders, the 21st Marines were positioned between the other two regiments to reach O-3 near Dededo. At the same time, Craig's 1st Battalion made minimal gains toward Finegayan, while the rest of the 9th Marines advanced to O-3 and successfully severed the Finegayan-Barrigada Road. To the right, Bruce's infantrymen, following an artillery barrage, advanced to O-3, overcoming terrain difficulties and securing the objective line by nightfall. On August 5, Turnage's three regiments continued their advance, pushing past O-3. The 3rd Marines reached Amantes Point, and Craig's 1st Battalion finally overran the remaining Japanese positions at Finegayan. Behind them, Shepherd's brigade moved to Dededo, preparing to take over the left flank for the final push. Meanwhile, as the 306th Regiment relieved the exhausted 307th, Tanzola's men continued to fight through the dense jungle, with his 2nd Battalion reaching the O-4 Line by nightfall. During a nighttime raid, the 1st Battalion was targeted, resulting in 48 casualties. Following this, the 2nd Battalion encountered the tanks the next morning, eventually neutralizing them but suffering an additional 46 casualties. Bruce's regiments gathered at O-4 to prepare for an attack on Mount Santa Rosa, where Obata had concentrated his forces. Turnage's regiments also resumed their attack, advancing with minimal resistance. Geiger initiated the final push on August 7, with Turnage's Marines facing minor obstacles due to jungle terrain. Despite this, the 3rd Marine Division reached the O-5 Line by nightfall. Shepherd's brigade swiftly progressed along the coast, joining forces with the 3rd Marines. Meanwhile, the 306th and 307th Regiments prepared for a coordinated attack. Bruce's strategy involved the 306th securing ground north of the Japanese defensive lines, the 307th leading a tank-infantry assault on Yigo, and the 305th closing in on Mount Santa Rosa. Once each objective was secured, Santa Rosa would be encircled from Anao to Lumuna Point, leaving the enemy with no escape route except into the sea. By midday, despite facing delays from the narrow road and enemy sniper activity, Manuel's tanks surged ahead of the infantry, veering right to swiftly eliminate several Japanese machine-gun positions at the road's edge. However, their advance was halted by heavy Japanese fire from the left rear as they crested a slight elevation. In a wedge formation, commanded by Captain Seger from his tank at the right rear, the light tanks swept rapidly over the slight crest. As they pushed on there was an explosion to the left of the tanks directly in front of Seger. He radioed to Colonel Stokes: "There's a burst in front of me; could be mine or antitank gun. Call for the mediums." Just before the mediums came up more explosions sounded from the left. The tankers could not locate the source of the fire because of the dense woods to the left and the absence of flash and smoke. When the mediums reached the open area, their crews could tell that the light tanks were in trouble but they could not see where the fire was coming from. Only when they advanced up the slight rise and began themselves to have steel shrapnel and bullets smash on the left of their hulls and turrets did they turn and pour fire back into the woods at the left rear. Fifty yards behind the stricken tanks the infantrymen struggled to push through the positions by the road that the tanks had overrun. Japanese still fired from a pillbox that had been blasted by the medium tanks as they raced ahead. The troops put rifle and machine-gun fire into it. They threw six grenades before one landed inside the position. The enemy continued to fire from it. A flame-thrower man maneuvered cautiously up to the position and put the searing flame in through an opening. The heat was too much for the defenders; one of them scurried out and fell before the American guns. The enemy position, so skillfully concealed from the front but vulnerable from the rear, was built around two light tanks. Two antitank guns, two 20mm guns, six light and two heavy machine guns, plus about a makeshift battalion of infantry added their fire to make the Yigo defense formidable. One medium was hit in its gas tank. Flames shot out of the bottom and quickly enveloped the sides. The crew hastily clambered out of it just before the ammunition inside began exploding. Another tank stalled under the heavy fire. As bullets hit the vehicle, the tankers dashed for a shell hole. Some of the mediums moved on out of the area. One of them tried to sweep around to the right below the line of enemy fire and promptly threw a track. As more tanks came up, they swung their cannons and machine guns around for brief fire on the enemy positions to the left and then passed on to the objective ahead. The leading light tank had similarly been destroyed and another was destroyed shortly afterwards. The American armor suffered losses against this well-concealed enemy position. Fortunately, Colonel Smith's 3rd Battalion, encountering minimal resistance in the jungle, directed Company K to flank the Japanese from the rear, catching them off guard and eliminating them without casualties. This enabled the 307th to secure the Yigo area and the elevated terrain to the northeast in readiness for the Santa Rosa assault. Meanwhile, the 306th consolidated west and north of Yigo, while the 305th advanced to the Lumuna Point line. The day also witnessed the inaugural combat flights of Marine planes from the newly completed Orote airfield over Guam. By nightfall, Obata dispatched his remaining tanks on a futile infantry-tank raid against the 306th, which repelled the attack successfully. On August 8, as the 305th and 307th Regiments closed in on Santa Rosa, Smith's forces continued north towards Lulog to complete the encirclement. Although the 306th captured Lulog, the 307th encountered minimal resistance in capturing Santa Rosa. Consequently, Bruce instructed Smith to push north towards Salisbury, but progress was limited by day's end. On the left flank, Shepherd's brigade and Turnage's division continued their advance. The 22nd Marines progressed to Ritidian Point, establishing three roadblocks. The 4th Marines secured O-5 and advanced to RJ 462. The 21st Marines patrolled the Chaguian area, while the 3rd Marines fought through dense jungle to defeat a Japanese roadblock and reach the Salisbury-Tarague Road. Patrols returned late in the afternoon and reported few enemy contacts, but one such unit from 3/21 had discovered a Japanese truck containing the bodies of 30 native men who had been beheaded. According to the official account of the incident, the Guamanians, found near Chaguian, had not been dead more than 24 hours. The next morning another patrol found an additional 21 bodies in the jungle near the same village. The 9th Marines faced heavy resistance as they dug in around Salisbury, close to Obata's headquarters. A tank-infantry counterattack targeted Stuart's 2nd Battalion at night, dispersing the enemy but necessitating retreat due to the threat of Obata's remaining tanks. Stuart's 3rd Battalion and Butler's 1st Battalion attacked the next morning but found no sign of the tanks. Meanwhile, the 77th Division patrolled the Yigo-Salisbury area, and the 9th Marines advanced rapidly towards the northeastern coast before redirecting patrols to Savana Grande, where 3000 Japanese were suspected to be hiding. Following artillery bombardment, the Marines occupied Savana Grande and Pati Point but found little evidence of Japanese presence. Patrols from the 4th and 22nd Marines also reached the northern beaches, leading Shepherd to declare an end to organized resistance in the brigade zone. The last known resistance persisted in the 3rd Marines' sector, where Obata's tanks were last observed. Accordingly, on August 10th, Stuart's 2nd Battalion initiated an attack to the east, establishing contact with two tanks on the road. Swiftly disabling these tanks, the Marines pressed forward, swiftly overpowering the Japanese positions and successfully seizing a total of seven abandoned tanks. By 11:30, Geiger declared an end to organized resistance on Guam. American casualties up to this point totaled 1214 killed, 5704 wounded, and 329 missing, with 10971 Japanese reported dead. Despite this announcement, Obata persisted at Mount Mataguac, fending off Bruce's infantry patrols since August 8th. Finally, on August 11th, Smith's 1st Battalion launched a meticulously planned attack supported by tanks and mortar barrages, stunning the defenders and enabling soldiers to destroy cave entrances. When the caves were reopened four days later, more than 60 bodies, including General Obata's, were found inside the well-fortified command post. Following the battle, Major-General Henry Larsen's garrison forces maintained intensive patrols on Guam throughout the remainder of the year under close scrutiny from Island Command.  Island Command, Guam under General Larsen, had taken command of Orote Peninsula and Cabras Island on August 2 to begin base development, namely the airfield and seaport. It then assumed formal command of Guam on August 15. Island Command grew rapidly as it took over all logistics, construction, and civil affairs tasks in stages. It included the 5th Naval Construction Brigade with the 27-29th Seabee Regiments with 12 Seabee, four Army, and one Marine engineer battalions plus "Lion 6", a Navy advance base force responsible for building and operating Naval Operating Base, Guam. Island Command was also responsible for the care of 21000 Guamanian civilians and built replacement housing for 15000. Both the 3rd and 77th Divisions maintained an infantry regiment and an artillery battalion in the north to deal with diehards. Up to 80 Japanese were killed each day during the first two weeks after Guam was declared secure. The nightmare would continue for the Japanese for some time to come. The 3rd Marine Division took over sole responsibility for island defense under Island Command on August 22. The 1st Provisional Marine Brigade then departed for Guadalcanal on August 31, where it would be expanded into the 6th Marine Division to fight on Okinawa. The 3rd Marine Division finally remained on the island to train for Iwo Jima, as did the 77th for Leyte and later Okinawa.An estimated 8500 Japanese soldiers remained scattered in the jungles of the north and the mountains of the south, engaging in guerrilla warfare until the war's conclusion. However, most were either killed or captured before then. The final tally for Guam by August 1945 included 18377 Japanese killed and 1250 captured, with American losses totaling 1407 killed, 6010 wounded, and 376 missing. By the conclusion of the Marianas Campaign, the Japanese suffered casualties exceeding 50,000, while the Americans solidified their control by positioning themselves strategically along the inner ring of Imperial defenses. This positioning enabled them to cut off the flow of supply ships and submarines that had previously supported remote enemy garrisons. Additionally, the Americans established a naval base with the capacity to support one-third of the Pacific Fleet, set up extensive forward supply depots, which posed a threat of swifter assaults on the Japanese home islands, and constructed several B-29 airfields. These airfields facilitated the unleashing of devastating aerial bombardments on Japan, bringing the full force of total war to its people through a relentless barrage of explosives and fire. That finishes up the story of the Marianas, now we need to travel back over to New Guinea. Despite the initial success of the Japanese offensive, General Hall's forces successfully halted the enemy advance and reorganized their river line by July 15th, although there remained a 1500-yard gap in the center. Aware of this vulnerability in the American defenses, the Japanese exploited it, particularly under the cover of darkness. However, Colonel Starr's 3rd Battalion actively patrolled this area and occasionally engaged with the enemy, such as the night of July 14th when they eliminated 135 Japanese soldiers. Nonetheless, General Cunningham reported that his South Force had expanded its lines nearly 1000 yards beyond its designated sector without encountering any elements of the 124th Regiment. Consequently, on July 15th, Starr concluded that his regiment had not advanced as far south as previously thought, prompting him to order his units to adjust their positions southward and fortify their defenses along the Driniumor River towards Cunningham's Troop E location. The next morning, the 3rd Battalion began its journey southward to close the gap. However, upon reaching the area by nightfall, Troop E came under attack from two companies of the 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment. As the cavalrymen sought cover from this assault, Starr's 3rd Battalion also faced fire from Colonel Nara's 3rd Battalion, which had redirected southward following its defeat at the Paup villages. This division split the American force, with Companies L and M encountering increasing resistance as they pressed southward towards South Force lines, while Companies I and K fortified their positions for the night. Despite the engagement resulting in the death of several Japanese soldiers and the narrowing of the gap to 500 yards, nightfall on the coast witnessed General Adachi's Coastal Attack Force launching suicide banzai charges towards Anamo, only to be swiftly repelled by the defenders' lethal machine-gun fire, resulting in the complete annihilation of the force. In the rear, Colonel Howe's 1st and 2nd Battalions were dispatched by Hall to eliminate remaining enemy units west of the Driniumor. Over the course of two days, in a series of complex and occasionally disjointed company maneuvers, the Americans successfully subdued Colonel Nara's remaining troops in the area. Meanwhile, further south, Japanese groups were spotted crossing the Driniumor at a fording point approximately 2500 yards south of Afua, prompting Cunningham to deploy Troop A to strategic high ground behind the river to halt westward Japanese movements. There, the 78th and 80th Regiments, led by Major-General Miyake Sadahiko, were gathering in preparation for a fresh offensive. Adachi devised a fresh strategy, envisioning Miyake's forces striking Afua from the southern front, while the 239th Regiment prepared to advance against the Kawanaka Shima area. Furthermore, the retreating 237th Regiment and the reserve 66th Regiment received orders to head south to reinforce future assaults by the 20th Division, although they wouldn't reach the destination until July 25. Meanwhile, as the Miyake Force gradually maneuvered into position on the right and rear of Cunningham's 1st Squadron, Starr faced ongoing challenges in filling the gap in the center, eventually managing to close it by the morning of July 18. That night, Miyake finally dispatched two battalions to launch an assault on the 1st Squadron's command post and the adjacent perimeter held by Troop A, successfully pushing them back 250 yards to the northeast. However, swift reinforcements enabled Cunningham to recapture the lost ground the following morning, prompting the enemy to retreat northwest into the jungles. By afternoon, fresh Japanese units had once again encircled the Troop A position; yet, after an effective artillery barrage, the cavalrymen thwarted Adachi's plans by pushing 600 yards to the southwest. Following this triumph, on July 21, Troop C relieved the battered Troop A; Howe's battalions successfully established a patrol base on the East Branch of Koronal Creek; and Starr's 2nd Battalion relocated to Palauru to enhance outer security southwest of the airfield. Concurrently, on July 19, the initial units of General Wing's 43rd Division commenced landing at Aitape, with the 2nd Battalion, 169th Regiment subsequently assuming control of approximately 1000 yards of the river line on the right flank of the 124th Regiment by July 22. Meanwhile, Adachi instructed the still-reorganizing Miyake Force to launch another assault on Afua from the north and west, while General Nakai's 79th Regiment crossed the Driniumor River to strike from the south. On July 21, in the evening, Miyake initiated an attack on Troop C's position, effectively isolating it from the remainder of South Force. Despite the cavalry's resistance against the intense Japanese onslaughts, Miyake's units successfully thwarted Cunningham's efforts to relieve the besieged troop in the subsequent days. Faced with the threat to his command post and reluctant to divert more forces from the river defenses, Cunningham ultimately opted to establish a new defensive line 1000 yards north of Afua, consequently abandoning the town and leaving Troop C stranded. It was not until the night of 21-22 July that the Japanese forward units were able to organize for any sort of attack. During that night, elements of the 124th Infantry received considerable mortar, machine gun, and rifle fire from east of the Driniumor. This fire increased the next morning, and about noon the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, was attacked from the west by elements of the 237th Infantry. The first Japanese attack was ". . . finally broken up by a bayonet charge . . ." conducted by elements of the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, but other attacks followed as troops of the 1st Battalion, 239th Infantry, tried to move across the Driniumor from the east, striking both the 124th Infantry's unit and part of the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry. Before dark on the 22d, the 3d Battalion, 124th Infantry, counted 155 new Japanese dead in its area. That unit and the 2d Battalion, 169th Infantry, reported their own losses as five killed and twenty-five wounded. Despite further unsuccessful attempts to reopen the river crossing by the 1st Battalion, 239th Regiment, Adachi eventually decided on July 25 to dispatch the 41st Division south to reinforce the southern front. Following the fall of Afua, Hall directed Howe's battalions to depart from their East Branch base and reinforce Cunningham's South Force, successfully arriving at the new defensive line by July 23. With these reinforcements in place, Cunningham early in the afternoon of the same day decided to deploy Troops A and B to advance westward toward Troop C, while Howe's 2nd Battalion pushed southeast to support the isolated troop. Despite the lack of coordination in the attack, infantrymen managed to infiltrate Troop C's perimeter from the northwest, aiding in repelling a fierce Japanese assault from the southwest, while the cavalry troops reclaimed Afua and established new defensive positions. Despite an initial triumph, American efforts to advance on July 24 were thwarted by the resolute defense of the Japanese, who fiercely guarded all paths, trails, and ridges in the densely forested terrain northeast of the perimeter. However, on July 25, Companies E and B under Howe surprisingly made contact roughly 500 yards north of the besieged forces, encountering minimal resistance, which allowed the beleaguered Troop C to retreat. With Troop C relieved, Howe's units continued their assault southward and westward toward the Afua-Palauru trail, driving the Japanese forces into the Torricelli Mountains. Nonetheless, a significant number of Japanese troops remained within a triangular area delineated by the sloping ground, Afua, and Company G's ridgeline position, persistently harassing Cunningham's forces. Throughout the night, additional Japanese reinforcements, including the 66th Regiment, maneuvered behind Howe's 2nd Battalion, securing control over trails leading southeast through dense jungle from the banana patch to a point on the Afua-Palauru trail near the 2nd Battalion's command post. Consequently, on July 26, Howe's 1st Battalion was withdrawn toward the sloping ground, with the 2nd Battalion expanding its positions to the east to cover the vacated area. On July 27, the battalion launched a successful southward attack; however, menacing Japanese movements to the west compelled the American forces to withdraw, despite other units under Cunningham also repelling enemy advances. Subsequently, Cunningham reorganized his lines on July 28 to strengthen defenses, anticipating imminent large-scale Japanese assaults. Nonetheless, on July 29, the 1st Squadron and the 2nd Battalion renewed their offensive toward the south and west into the Triangle, yet this time Adachi's determined defenders successfully rebuffed them. Therefore, local patrol activity was the primary focus on July 30 and 31 while Cunningham devised plans for another offensive into the Triangle. Major combat activity revolved around the withdrawal of Company G, 127th Infantry, from its exposed outpost west of Afua. On the afternoon of the 29th the unit had been driven more than 400 yards east of its original position by Japanese attacks and had established new defenses on high ground about 300 yards west of Afua. On the 30th the company was surrounded and spent all day fighting off a series of small-scale attacks. The next morning it fought its way north to the dropping ground, where it arrived about 1330. Thence, it moved on to the Driniumor and joined the rest of the 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, which had switched positions with the 3d Battalion. During the period from 13 to 31 July, South Force had suffered almost 1,000 casualties, of which 260 had been incurred by the 112th Cavalry. For the understrength cavalry regiment, this was a casualty rate of over 17 percent. The 2d Battalion, 127th Infantry, had also lost heavily and was in need of rest, reorganization, and re-equipment--needs which had prompted General Cunningham to change the places of the 2d and 3d Battalions, 127th Infantry. South Force casualties were as follows: 106 killed, 386 wounded, 18 missing, and 426 evacuated as a result of disease and sickness. South Force estimated that it had killed over 700 Japanese. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. With the capture of Guam, the Marianas campaign had finally come to an end. Yet it seemed apparent to the frontline commanders, the closer the island hopping got to the Japanese home islands, casualties were exponentially mounting. How much American blood was it going to take to end the Pacific War?

PREVIEW: READINESS: Conversation with colleague Ji Fanell, USN retired Intelligence Officer in the Pacific Fleet, re the new Rand report that the US is not prepared for combat confrontation with the PLA. More later. 1927 Wuhan

Where did your "quality journey" start? In this first episode of a new series on quality, Bill Bellows shares his "origin story," the evolution of his thinking, and why the Deming philosophy is unique. TRANSCRIPT 0:00:02.3 Andrew Stotz: My name is Andrew Stotz, and I'll be your host as we continue our journey in the teachings of Dr. W Edwards Deming. Today, I'm continuing my discussion with Bill Bellows, who has spent 31 years helping people apply Dr. Deming's ideas to become aware of how their thinking is holding them back from their biggest opportunities. This is a new series called Misunderstanding Quality, and the topic for today is Quality Management, what century are we in? Bill, take it away.   0:00:35.7 Bill Bellows: Thank you, Andrew. [chuckle] All right.   0:00:39.5 AS: Exciting. I'm excited to hear what you've got going on in your mind about this Misunderstanding Quality.   0:00:45.6 BB: Well, first let me say that whether you're new to quality or looking for ideas on quality and quality management, quality improvement, quality management, the aim I have in mind for this podcast series is to improve your ability to manage quality through deepening your appreciation of the Deming philosophy and how to apply it. But specifically, a focus on quality, time after time, which is where most people heard about Deming, was through Quality, Productivity and Competitive Position. For example, the title of his first book. And relative to the title, what came to mind is an anecdote shared with me by two mentors that both spent a good deal of time with Dr. Deming. The first, Gipsie Ranney, who was a professor of statistics at University of Tennessee when she met Dr. Deming, went on to become a senior statistical consultant to GM and the first president of the Deming Institute, when Dr. Deming and his family, shortly before he died, formed a nonprofit called The Deming Institute. Gipsie and I used to speak literally every day, driving to work, driving home, we... "What's up, what's up?" And we always... It was so cool. I wish I had the recordings. Anyway, she once shared that she once asked Dr. Deming, "What do they learn in your seminars? What do attendees learn in your seminars?" To which she said Dr. Deming said, "I know what I said, I don't know what they heard."   [laughter]   0:02:26.0 BB: And along those lines, in the same timeframe, Bill Cooper who just turned 90, he and my wife share a birthday. Not the same year. Bill turned 90 last November and he was senior civilian at the US Navy's aircraft overhaul facility in San Diego, known as North Island. So as aircraft carriers are coming into San Diego, which is like the... I think they call it... It's like the headquarters of the Pacific Fleet. So as aircraft carriers are coming back, planes for which the repair work cannot be done on the carriers fly off to North Island. And Bill was in charge of, he said, some 5,000 civilians. And his peer on the military side, Phil Monroe was in charge of all the military people, and they got exposed to Dr. Deming's work in the early '80s, went off, left there, became Deming consultants. Anyway, Bill said he once asked Dr. Demings, says, "What percent of the attendees of your seminars walk away really understanding what you said?" And he said... Bill said Dr. Deming said, "A small percentage."   [laughter]   0:03:44.0 BB: And so what I had in mind in this series is... One is, what makes it hard to understand what Dr. Deming is talking about? And so for the listeners, what I'm hoping we can help you understand, what might be some invisible challenges that you're having in your organizations trying to explain this to others. So maybe you think your understanding is pretty good, but like Dr. Deming, maybe people are having a hard time understanding what you're saying. And I know what it's like to be in a room, presenting to people. And I had that same experience. I had one Rocketdyne executive... Rocketdyne was sold a few times. Every time it got sold, our Deming transformation efforts got set back a few years. So when the latest management team came in six, seven years ago, I met with one of the very top people, was explaining... Trying to explain to him for the first time what we had accomplished with some, I thought, absolutely amazing work by managing variation as a system. And he said something like, "So are people rejecting what you're saying?" And I said, "No, that's not it." He says, "So they're accepting what you're saying?" I said, "Well... " he said, "What's the problem?" I said, "What they accepted is not what I said." [laughter]   0:05:19.5 BB: I said, we're not in disagreement, but what they think they heard is... And that's when I found that I've experienced that. So anyway, so I wanted to get some background. So my first exposure to quality circles, and this is like... So I was living in this parallel universe, a heat transfer engineer working on rocket engines, and Quality comes into the organization. And unbeknownst to me, there's this quality movement going on, inspired by Dr. Deming, and we're on this wave. I had no idea. All I know is all of a sudden, we got Quality Circles, quality teams, every department...   0:06:03.8 AS: What year was that, roughly?   0:06:06.1 BB: 1984.   0:06:08.9 AS: Okay.   0:06:10.5 BB: Yeah. And I remember a book I was... I remember there was a pamphlet... You mentioned that. The company was AVCO, A-V-C-O, the Aviation Corporation, which is nearly as old as the Boeing Company. So it was one of the... So, Boeing gets into airplanes, the Wright Brothers get into airplanes, people are... Investors getting in, and AVCO, A-V-C-O, was formed by someone you likely heard of, Averill Harriman, major Wall Street guy at the time. And so anyway, I remember there being an AVCO book on quality circles. As you mentioned, I remember seeing that. And I remember just going along for the ride. I'm new to corporations, I'm just a subject matter expert in gas turbine heat transfer, and we're going to the... We got these things called quality circles, whatever. And I remember our department formed... Our department was a team, we had goals, and I remember going to these quality meetings, and let's say the goal would be that we read an article about heat transfer or something. I was just kind of fumbling with this thing called quality circles.   0:07:28.6 BB: But I remember, looking over the shoulder of the department secretary with a IBM Selectric typewriter, and this is before PCs, so we're using IBM 3270, dumb terminals. And I remember being over near the secretary, Kathy, and she's typing away the weekly activity reports, Friday morning kind of thing. And on a routine basis, I'd be over there and she'd be typing along. And then on the very last page, under the title, "Quality Circles," she would type in "Quality Circles are progressing as planned." [chuckle] 'Cause then these would be distributed to people in the department. So I'm watching her now create the next original. And it dawns on me, two things. One is, it's the very last topic in the meeting, in the weekly minutes, and two is it's the same damn thing every time, "Quality Circles are on plan." And I remember saying to her, "Why don't we just have that printed into the stationary?" [laughter]   0:08:39.5 BB: This is before I knew... For me, quality was just a seven-letter word. I don't know. So this is my exposure. And I remember thinking one of the quality goals we're thinking of in our department is... I think somebody even really brought this up, is we're gonna answer the phone by the second ring. That's gonna be our quality goal. And then, I remember we're negotiating for cleaning services. The floors were a mess. Tile floors, they were just a mess. And I remember in our department, we were lobbying to get better janitorial services, have the things cleaned more often. And next thing, we're negotiating with the VP of Engineering relative to, "Well, if your quality circles are on track, then I'll think about that." And it was just like... So it's some really ugly memories [chuckle] of this whole quality thing.   0:09:34.3 BB: But then I got into... I mentioned on the very first of our previous podcast, getting involved as a problem solving decision-making facilitator. I was hanging out with the HR training people, they had some... Their director of training, our director of training was a very astute guy and he was... I'm convinced, having met many people in that role, he knew what was going on. He knew a lot of the names in quality, not so... He knew of Deming's name, he knew of De Bono's name, Kepner-Tregoe, but he seemed to know his stuff. He's a fun guy to be with. And so, that's likely where I first heard Deming's name and that first book would've been Quality, Productivity and Competitive Position, which is... It's almost impenetrable, but I can remember at some point looking at that.   0:10:29.7 BB: But anyway, but in the fall of '87, I started being assigned a taskforce as helping... 'cause now I'm a problem-solving facilitator. But I still don't know... I don't know what quality is. All I know is I get invited to help solve problems. And we were looking at a very bad wear problem, these gears wearing each other out, enormous visibility to the Pentagon, because the tank engines we were making, 120 a month, were being shipped to the tank plant. And then, these tanks with these engines were being sent... The majority of them, sent to Europe. And they were the frontline of defense in Western Europe. This is the Cold War, Andrew.   0:11:17.4 AS: Right.   0:11:19.2 BB: And so the problem that came up was that a couple of these tanks had these gears wear through each other within 50 hours. And I've never been on such a high visibility taskforce because the Generals concern was that every one of those tanks was likely to not operate. And that might be the opportunity for the "Russki's" to launch World War III, because, what a great time, the tanks... If they knew these tanks weren't working. So it was a lot of stress, a lot of pressure. And after months of slow progress, the Army said, "Hey, why don't you guys go look at this Taguchi thing. The transmission people from General Motors who make the tank transmission, anytime they have a snafu like this, they use this Taguchi stuff." So I got assigned the action to go look at that. And I remember, this is pre-internet. And somehow, I did a literature search. I remember it was through something called Nerac, N-E-R-A-C. And out comes these pages. And the thing on Taguchi was... So first of all, who is this Taguchi guy?   0:12:29.0 BB: What is this quality stuff? I don't know. I'm a problem solving guy. And then I remember the first article on reference to Taguchi says, "Quality is the minimum of loss imparted to society by a product after a shipment to the customer." And I thought, "What does that mean?" So I don't know what... I mean, minimum of... I'm thinking... And I thought, "This can't be anything." So anyway, went out to General Motors and got exposed to what they were doing, and a few years later, realized it wasn't exactly Taguchi, but it was... There's some nuances there. But anyway, they exposed me to Design of Experiments and what's known as fractional factorial testing. And coupled with shifting how we look at the measurement process, we solved this problem within weeks, a problem that had been going on for months. So then I got excited about... This Taguchi thing's kind of cool. I'm liking this. And it was a lot more exciting than what I was doing. And I thought, "I think I wanna do this." So the following year, I went to the Taguchi conference. So we had the application and I was so excited, Andrew, that I was turned down for funding. The Army would have paid for me to go to this conference, 'cause the Army, by that point, had invited me to work on at least two problems.   0:13:54.4 BB: Once we solved the first one, when problems came up, the Army literally turned to the program management people at Lycoming and said, "Do a Taguchi study, get Bill Bellows involved." So I was walking on water. I thought it was kind of cool. So I wanted to go to this Taguchi conference, and it was turned down. And they said, "It's not your job." So I told my boss when they told me it was gonna be turned down, I said, "I'm going to this conference." I said, "Whether the company pays for it or not, I am going." So I drove 14 hours each way to Detroit. And in the room are all the US experts on Taguchi's ideas at the time. I didn't know who Deming was at the time. I still didn't know what quality was, but I walked outta there thinking, "This is what I wanna do." And then, where I'm getting to is, a few months later, I was gonna go out on medical I had surgery planned.   0:14:53.1 BB: I was gonna be out for about two months. So my wife and I lived in New Haven, maybe 10 miles north of Yale. And I remember going to the... Again, this is pre-Amazon. I mean, talk about dating ourselves. What century are we in? So I remember going with my wife to the Yale bookstore, the Yale co-op bookstore, and every book they had on quality, I bought. And I'm gonna sit home for two months and read all these books. And I remember buying books. I'm pretty sure I got books about Deming, some about Taguchi, some by Phil Crosby about Zero Defects. Six Sigma Quality entry was a year away.   0:15:35.7 BB: And so I sat down... I got out of the hospital, I'm resting at home, sitting on the couch every day and reading, and also calling the Taguchi people that I had met, I think, at the previous conference. I met some big names. So I'm reading the books, calling them up. And again, these are like my personal professors. And I remember saying to a few of them... What blew me away, and I don't... It somehow dawned on me, I was naive. In the world of engineering, we use... Most of my exposure, at least in heat transfer, we use the same terms the same way. We talk about radiation heat transfer, conduction heat transfer, convection heat transfer. So many of the terms are the same terms, so we can have a conversation. So I'm thinking the same thing applies in quality, that we're all like the heat transfer people. It's easy to communicate 'cause we got the same models. We're using the same words the same way. Then I started thinking, I'm no longer... And this is a real shock. I'm no longer thinking we're using the same words the same way, hence my introduction to misunderstanding quality, [laughter] or I would say, the beginning of a journey to better understand the... I think there are incredible opportunities for people in quality organizations, or people that wanna get into quality.   0:17:08.3 BB: I think it's an ideal opportunity to introduce Deming's ideas. And I say that because everybody else is doing their own thing. Engineering's off designing, Manufacturing's off producing, and Quality has an incredible opportunity to bring together Deming's sense of a systems view of quality. Nobody else has that charter. So my hope is in our conversations, we can help people that are trying to do some things, whether it's jumpstart their continuous improvement program or get their quality program out of what it currently is. In fact...   0:17:52.4 AS: By the way, I wanna...   0:17:55.9 BB: Go ahead, go ahead.   0:17:56.0 AS: I wanna ask a question about that, because what you've mentioned is interesting, that the systems aspect... Is that unique? Would you say that's unique to Deming? I mean, if we think about Taguchi and I think about the Taguchi Method, I'm thinking about a really powerful tool for understanding variation. But explain what you mean by that.   0:18:24.0 BB: A couple of things come to mind when you ask that question. One is the predominant explanation of quality. And if we have time, I wanna talk about that. The term quality, "qualitas," comes from Cicero, a Roman in ancient times. But by and large, in manufacturing, in corporate quality, in corporations, the operational definition, what do we mean by quality? This thing is... What are Quality organizations doing? And what I find they're doing is calling balls and strikes. They're looking at a given quality characteristics, whether it's the fuel economy of an engine, of a gas turbine engine, the performance, the thrust level of a rocket engine, the diameter of a hole, and asking, "Does that characteristic of surface roughness diameter, does it meet a set of requirements?"   0:19:30.4 BB: And the requirements are typically set... There's a lower one and an upper one. We don't say the meeting is gonna start at 10 o'clock, because if you understand variation, we can't get exactly 10. We can't get exactly 1.00 inch thickness for the plate, for the hole diameter. So then, we define quality. Typically, this is what people do in organizations. This is what I... I didn't know anything about this until I started... Well, what are quality people doing? They're asking, "Does this thing meet requirements?"   0:20:07.4 BB: And even towards that end, I remember asking a... I had a coworker who's a quality engineer, I've got many friends who are quality engineers, and this one guy came into a class one day that I was doing, and he's just beating his head against the wall over... I said, "What's...what have you been doing lately." He says, "All I'm doing Bill is dispositioning hardware, dispositioning hardware," which translates to trying to find out why something doesn't meet requirements and coming up with a corrective action, or buying it as is. So either changing the requirements or explaining why we can use it as is. But he's just like, "That's all I'm doing lately. I'm just getting overwhelmed with all this." So I said, "Well, what if overnight, by some miracle, you were to come in, and beginning first thing tomorrow morning, everything meets requirements." And that's the goal of quality in most organizations, is that everything meets requirements. So I said, "If everything beginning tomorrow morning, through some overnight miracle, meets requirements, hence forth, how would your life change?" He says, "I wouldn't have a job." [laughter]   0:21:26.9 BB: I said, "What other changes would you begin to see throughout the day, the coming days?" He says, "My boss's job wouldn't exist." I said, "Okay, keep going, keep going." He says, "Well, the whole organization will have no reason to exist." [laughter] And that's not farfetched. And I throw that out, the challenge to our listeners is, seriously, if everything in the organization beginning tomorrow morning met requirements through some... Dr. Deming would say as you know, by what method? Let's say the method exists, what would change? Now, I'm not saying these people necessarily get laid off. Maybe they get moved elsewhere. Maybe we set our sights higher and try to do things we've never done before, 'cause now everything's gonna be a home run. But that's what I find in corporations, I think, a very extremely commonplace 21st century Andrew explanation of quality is, "Does it meet requirements?" And that goes... And this whole idea of setting requirements, setting a lower and an upper, allowing for variation, that goes back to the early 1700s. And I've also read that it might go back even longer in China. We were talking earlier about China.   0:22:58.2 BB: And so if it goes back longer, all the better. And the point being, fast forward to today, that's largely where we are today, in this early 1700s. Does it meet requirements? Yes or no? And what Dr. Deming is talking about is not acceptability. First of all, he would say there's a place for acceptability. There's a place for meeting requirements, maybe based on the circumstances, all that matters is that it meets requirements. So if you're a pitcher and you're throwing a ball and the batter can't hit the ball, and as long as it's somewhere in the strike zone, or if you're kicking the ball into the net in a football match or otherwise known as soccer in the States, maybe the goalkeeper's so bad, all you gotta do is... They'll jump out of the way.   0:23:49.7 BB: Now, on the other hand, there may be a different batter or a different goalkeeper where you've gotta go where they aren't. And that gets into understanding variation and where we are in meeting requirements matters. And what I find is most organizations I've ever interacted with, and this is through Rocketdyne, as owned by Boeing, going to many different divisions of Boeing around the country, doing seminars across England, across New Zealand, university classes and university lectures, hundreds of them. I've never come across... With rare exception have I ever come across anyone who says, "Bill, in our organization, quality is more like what Dr. Deming is talking about." Meaning, "We are doing more than meeting requirements, we are focusing on where the ball is placed in the strike zone, where the ball is placed in the net, and we specialize in that because we have seen great advantage." Most people I present this to don't even know that's a possibility, don't even know it's anything to lobby for.   0:25:12.0 BB: And so to that I'd say, whether you're looking at Operational Excellence, which is kind of a hybrid of Lean and Six Sigma or Six Sigma alone, or Lean alone, everything I've studied in all of those go back to the question of quality being... Quality's defined Phil Crosby-wise, which is striving for zero defects, striving for everything meeting requirements, and then we're done. And when I joined The Deming Institute, part of my excitement was helping the organization differentiate Dr. Deming's ideas over these other quality management ideas and other management ideas as uniquely positioned to differentiate, to understand that there's an opport... There are incredible opportunities for realizing that everything that meets requirements is not the same. And how do we put a value on that? And one is, the better we understand that, the better we can minimize scrap and rework problems if we're paying attention to where we are, if the process is in control, if we can use that concept from variation. And then simultaneously, another...   0:26:35.7 BB: There's two opportunities. One is, I think the better we manage variation, the less likely we're gonna have scrap and rework. Wouldn't that be great? And two is that that buys us time to think about... 'cause now that we're not in that constant firefighting mode, now we can start to think about how to manage variation of the system and to improve how things integrate. And we did both of those at Rocketdyne. But I've yet to find many organizations who say, "Been there, done that. Been there, done that."   0:27:12.1 AS: So, if we think about the takeaways for someone listening or watching this, you've talked about Misunderstanding Quality, you've talked about everything meet requirements, you've talked about, what century are we in? So, what should they take back to their business from this discussion that can give them a foundation of a starting point of this series and what you're saying on this point? What do you want them to take away?   0:27:40.3 BB: First, I would say I wouldn't necessarily go tell anybody about this yet. [laughter] I'd say, "Hmm, this Deming stuff. There's something to this. What I'm hearing from Bill is there's something here that I can't get elsewhere." You can listen to our prior sessions. There's 22 of them. We're gonna be adding new aspects to that...   0:28:07.9 AS: Okay. So, let's talk about that for a second. So, learn on your own first. Maybe it's a personal transformation. Start with that?   0:28:09.9 BB: Yes.   0:28:14.8 AS: Okay.   0:28:16.1 BB: Absolutely... Yes, absolutely...   0:28:18.1 AS: What would be number two that you want them to get away from this?   0:28:22.9 BB: Well, my advice is, you're not crazy that there's things about the Deming philosophy that are unique, that are... I think so much... There's a lot of people excited by what Dr. Deming's offering. I think there's more than meets the eye. I mean...   0:28:46.1 AS: Okay, so let's talk about that for a second. So, there's unique things about Deming, and one of them that you talked about is the systems thinking?   0:28:54.6 BB: Yeah. I mean, imagine... What I liken it to, instead of zero defects being the goal, which is what most organizations are striving for, and their quality systems are about, "We wanna get zero defects over here, over here, over here." We're juggling all these places, trying to get to zero defects all over the place. What if they saw zero defects as not the destination, but the starting point? That, to really understand continual improvement, zero defects is not the goal. Imagine that as the starting point. At least, imagine the ability to go across that apparent finish line and realize... Or the analogy I would use is, go through the door called "zero defects is the end," and realize there's a lot more, there's so much more to do when you start to look at things with a Deming view. And so, instead of thinking, we're striving for zero defects and then we're done, to me, that's the starting point to really begin to appreciate what it means to look at systems.   0:30:07.7 AS: Okay. So we've got, start with your own personal transformation and learn the material, and understand that there's some unique things about the Deming teachings, in particular, systems. And understand that... I kind of visualized while you were talking, a person walking along with no knowledge of many things, but they're inquisitive, and what they find is a wrench. And then they start to find that there's ways to use this wrench in their daily life. And then later, they find that there's other tools like a screwdriver. And all of a sudden, they found this world of tools, and now they have this amazing toolbox. But then all of a sudden, they meet someone that's taking those tools and creating a car, or a this, or a that. And then they realize, maybe the tool has gotta be the starting point, or is a starting point. But what the tools can create and what additional tools can create is so much bigger than just that first wrench that you picked up.   0:31:14.2 BB: It's the appreciation. And I'm glad you brought those points up. Dr. Deming talks about tools and techniques. A control chart is a tool. A run chart is a tool. Design of Experiments are... These are tools. And so that's a tool. A technique is, how do we create a control chart? That's a technique. What I try to do with audiences, whether it's clients or university classes or whatever, is help them differentiate. Tools and techniques are about improving efficiency, doing things well. Doing something faster or cheaper... What's unique to Dr. Deming is not the tools you'll find him talking about, but the concepts he's talking about, and the idea of looking at things as a system. Dr. Deming defines quality, and it can be obtuse for people. I find it fascinating. He says, "Product or service possesses quality if it helps someone and enjoys a sustainable market." So, traditional quality is me throwing the ball to you, Andrew, or passing a football or basketball, whatever it is, and judging the quality of the pass when the ball leaves my hand. And we say, "That was a good pass."   0:32:49.9 BB: What Dr. Deming's talking about is, it's a good pass, just as if it's a good conversation, if you can hear what I say, we can go back and forth. And so, Deming's perspective on quality is not what's good for me, the producer, but it's how well does it fit you that I'm delivering something that matches... That we're synchronous, that... It has to be good for you, not just me checking off and saying, "This is good, this is good, this is good. Boom." That it's not good until you say it's good. That's a different view. It's the same thing as, "Well, I told you." Then you say, "Well, I didn't hear it." I says, "Well, then why don't you have your ears checked?" [laughter] Dr. Deming's talking about, it's not a conversation if you can't hear it. And so, when he's explaining to Bill Cooper and Gipsie that people are having a hard time, he was struggling to improve that 'cause he knew that when you begin to understand that what you're saying is not heard, Deming understood it was his obligation to try harder. And part of the Deming philosophy is understanding that it's not just me throwing it and saying, "There it is." It's listening for the feedback as to, "Did it make sense?" So, quality in that arena is a mutual phenomenon, not unilaterally my thing.   0:34:16.7 AS: Okay.   0:34:17.8 BB: And I would welcome anyone, as we've done in the past, to reach out if there are questions, comments, observation you'd like to share, and we can use that feedback in future sessions.   0:34:30.6 AS: Fantastic. Well, that's an excellent kickoff. And let's end with the idea that quality is a mutual phenomenon. I think that's a good statement. So Bill, on behalf of everyone at The Deming Institute, I want to thank you again for this discussion. And for listeners, remember to go to deming.org to continue your journey. And if you want to keep in touch with Bill, just find him on LinkedIn. This is your host, Andrew Stotz, and I'll leave you with one of my favorite quotes from Dr. Deming, "People are entitled to joy in work."

Frank starts the third hour with commendations for the week. He moves on to talk with Bradley Thayer and James Fanell, co-authors of Embracing Communist China: America's Greatest Strategic Failure. James E. Fanell is a retired U.S. Navy captain, serving twenty-nine-years in the military. He is the former Director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Government Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and Founding Member of the Committee on Present Danger China. Bradley A. Thayer, Ph.D., is a founding member of the Committee on Present Danger China and a former visiting fellow at Magdalen College, University of Oxford. They discuss the future of the U.S.'s relationship with China. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Frank starts the show joined by WABC host Dominic Carter to talk about employees of TJ Maxx, Marshalls and Homegoods wearing body cams to prevent theft. He moves on to talk about his experience at the Talkers conference. Frank starts the hour discussing the slow birth rates in Japan and the government creating a dating app to try and help curb the issue. He is later joined by Dr. Jerome Corsi, a Harvard trained political scientist, reporter for World Net Daily and a New York Times best-selling author, whose latest book is The Final Analysis. They discuss JFK's assassination. Frank starts the third hour with commendations for the week. He moves on to talk with Bradley Thayer and James Fanell, co-authors of Embracing Communist China: America's Greatest Strategic Failure. James E. Fanell is a retired U.S. Navy captain, serving twenty-nine-years in the military. He is the former Director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Government Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and Founding Member of the Committee on Present Danger China. Bradley A. Thayer, Ph.D., is a founding member of the Committee on Present Danger China and a former visiting fellow at Magdalen College, University of Oxford. They discuss the future of the U.S.'s relationship with China. Frank wraps up the show talking about the trend of online dating falling. He is also joined by Noam Laden for News You Can Use. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Bradley Thayer and James Fanell, co-authors of “Embracing Communist China: America's Greatest Strategic Failure” (more detailed bio below, not necessary for graphics for podcast notes, promotion and your own edification) James E. Fanell is a retired U.S. Navy captain, serving twenty-nine-years in the military. He is the former Director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, Government Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy, and Founding Member of the Committee on Present Danger China.    Bradley A. Thayer, Ph.D., is a founding member of the Committee on Present Danger China and a former visiting fellow at Magdalen College, University of Oxford.   Topic: the future of our relationship with China Book: https://urldefense.com/v3/__https://www.amazon.com/Embracing-Communist-China-Americas-Strategic/dp/1648210597/ref=sr_1_1?crid=2XZ0YASLBW7NQ&dib=eyJ2IjoiMSJ9.KOsqR8DMktHImRdvZs1QdbvoVC1BsdhkRyzkLJDBJUfGjHj071QN20LucGBJIEps.LVv6fRCLnkfMjFmOvvYS4eDnzZkHJvnR5muYsEGHcAQ&dib_tag=se&keywords=embracing*communist&qid=1717170510&s=books&sprefix=embracing*communist*2Cstripbooks*2C91&sr=1-1__;KyslJQ!!GLfh-cLJdg!eiDxiQKdSd4vjsGSwyCymU4d22UXBGKXWMMc0KmYSel5op1vrhZ4x7n0qo-ocyHwwlEB84fkblOHGNO78d_junTjG24QAtc$ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Retired Navy Captain Jim Fanell—noted expert on the Chinese Navy, former Director of Intelligence for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, and frequent Proceedings contributor—provides an update on the PLA Navy and their operations.

SONS OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER: 8/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment. 1945: USS ENTERPRISE  (CV-6) AT WAR'S END

SONS OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER: 5/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment 1943 USS BROOKLYN

SONS OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER: 6/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment 1943 USS LEXINGTON (CV-16)

SONS OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER: 7/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment. 1942 USS NEW MEXICO

SONS OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER: 4/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment 1942 USS BOISE

SONS OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER: 3/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment 1942 HMAS HOBART

SONS OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER: 2/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment. 1912 USS WYOMING

SONS OF THE UNKNOWN SOLDIER: 1/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. Craig Symonds's Nimitz at War captures Nimitz's composure, discipline, homespun wisdom, and most of all his uncanny sense of when to assert authority and when to pull back. As Symonds's absorbing, dynamic, and authoritative portrait reveals, it required qualities of leadership exhibited by few other commanders in history, qualities that are enduringly and even poignantly relevant to our own moment 1905 DEWEY LEADS THE NAVY LEADERSHIP TO DINNNER WITH TR --NIMITZ CLASS OF 1905 AT ANNAPOLIS

The end of the Cold War was supposed to be the end of history as Francis Fukuyama said—the final victory for democracy and the death knell for Communism. But it turns out China and the Chinese Communist Party had other plans. And the US helped by propping up the Chinese economy. Joining us once again is Captain Jim Fanell, the Former Director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet. And co-author of the new book Embracing Communist China: America's Greatest Strategic Failure. Buy the book! https://www.skyhorsepublishing.com/9781648210594/embracing-communist-china/ YouTube demonetizes our videos, which is why we rely on support from viewers like you. Please join our 50¢ army at: https://www.patreon.com/chinaunscripted https://www.chinauncensored.locals.com https://www.chinaunscripted.com/support Our social media: Twitter: https://www.twitter.com/ChinaUncensored Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/ChinaUncensored Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/ChinaUncensored #China

Sponsor special: Up to $2,500 of FREE silver AND a FREE safe on qualifying orders - Call 855-862-3377 or text “AMERICAN” to 6-5-5-3-2“The first rule of strategy is don't assist your enemy. And of course, we violated that time and time again,” says Bradley Thayer, a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy.After aggressively building up and modernizing its military, China now has a larger navy than the United States.How does the Chinese military compare to America's overall?What would an invasion or blockade of Taiwan look like for the United States?Mr. Thayer and James Fanell, a retired U.S. Navy captain and former Director of Intelligence and Information Operations for the U.S. Pacific Fleet, are co-authors of the new book “Embracing Communist China: America's Greatest Strategic Failure.” They are founding members of the Committee on the Present Danger: China.How has progressive, communist ideology subverted America and America's military?Did the United States get distracted by smaller wars and lose sight of the bigger looming conflict?Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

PRESIDENTS WEKEND: FDR; HARRY TRUMAN:  1/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific 1942 IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY

PRESIDENTS WEKEND: FDR; HARRY TRUMAN:  2/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific 1942 IMPERIAL JAPANESE ARMY BUKA ISLAND

PRESIDENTS WEKEND: FDR; HARRY TRUMAN: 3 /8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Crai3g . Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. 1942 BATTLE OF SAVO ISLAND, AUSTRALIAN NAVY HMAS HOBART

PRESIDENTS WEKEND: FDR; HARRY TRUMAN:  4/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific 1942 ESPIRITU SANTO USS BOISE

PRESIDENTS WEKEND: FDR; HARRY TRUMAN:  5/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific 1943 USS YORKTOWN (CV-10)

PRESIDENTS WEKEND: FDR; HARRY TRUMAN:  6/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific. 1943 USMC BOUGAINVILLE

PRESIDENTS WEKEND: FDR; HARRY TRUMAN:  7/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific 1943 BATTLE OF NEW BRITAIN

PRESIDENTS WEKEND: FDR; HARRY TRUMAN:  8/8: Nimitz at War: Command Leadership from Pearl Harbor to Tokyo Bay by  Craig L. Symonds https://www.amazon.com/Nimitz-War-Command-Leadership-Harbor-ebook/dp/B09Y64QMZT From America's preeminent naval historian, the first full-length portrait in over fifty years of the man who won the war in the Pacific in World War Two. Only days after the Japanese attacked Pearl Harbor, President Franklin D. Roosevelt tapped Chester W. Nimitz to assume command of the Pacific Fleet. Nimitz transformed the devastated and dispirited Pacific fleet into the most powerful and commanding naval force in history. Facing demands from Washington to mount an early offensive, he had first to revive the depressed morale of the thousands of sailors, soldiers, and Marines who served under him. And of course, he also confronted a formidable and implacable enemy in the Imperial Japanese Navy, which, until the Battle of Midway, had the run of the Pacific 1943 USS NEW MEXICO

#Houthis: What is the US Navy plan to respond? James Fanell, government fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and retired U.S. Navy captain who served as director of Intelligence and Information Operations of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, @GORDONGCHANG, GATESTONE, NEWSWEEK, THE HILL: https://www.newsweek.com/real-force-behind-houthis-attacks-us-warships-isnt-iran-its-china-opinion-1853867 https://www.nytimes.com/2023/12/15/world/europe/russia-interest-rates-inflation.html 1866 Suez Canal

#PRC: Where bound the Shandong Carrier Strike Group? James Fanell, government fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and retired U.S. Navy captain who served as director of Intelligence and Information Operations of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill https://www.newsweek.com/china-taiwan-shandong-aircraft-carrier-ally-philippines-1851513 1927 Kido Butain

#PRC: Provocations in the South China Sea.   James Fanell, government fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy and retired U.S. Navy captain who served as director of Intelligence and Information Operations of the U.S. Pacific Fleet, @GordonGChang, Gatestone, Newsweek, The Hill https://www.foxnews.com/world/us-navy-responds-china-claims-american-warship-illegally-intruded-south-china-sea 1875