Podcasts about ely ratner

Ryan and Ely Ratner, assistant secretary of defense for Indo-Pacific security affairs, chatted about, well, it's in his job title. They discussed North Korean intentions, American military posture, deepening cooperation between South Korea and Japan, Chinese military modernization, corruption in the Chinese military, and deterring an attack on Taiwan.

On this week's Defense & Aerospace Report Washington Roundtable, Dr. Patrick Cronin of the Hudson Institute, Michael Herson of American Defense International, former Pentagon Europe chief Jim Townsend of the Center for a New American Security, and former Pentagon Comptroller Dr. Dov Zakheim of the Center for Strategic and International Studies join host Vago Muradian to discuss the Senate's approach to the National Defense Authorization Act, update on appropriations, congressional antics including Sen. Tommy Tuberville's holds and Rep. Pramila Jayapal's Israel comments, Russia's assault on Ukrainian grain and how Washington and the world should respond, Wagner Group reconstitutes in Belarus, Pentagon Asia-Pacific chief Dr. Ely Ratner's testimony on China and Taiwan and how his comments could shape Republican opposition to Ukraine aid, roundup of Indo-Pacific news including Xi Jinping's decision to rebuff John Kerry's climate cooperation proposal, Chinese Foreign Minister Qin Gang's disappearance, and Israeli Prime Minister Bibi Netanyahu's drive to gut the independence of the country's judiciary.

The U.S. dollar's status as the global reserve currency is diminishing, which reduces the power that U.S. leaders have over the global economic system. In this episode, hear highlights from recent Congressional testimony during which financial elites examine the current status of the global financial system and what Congress is being told to do to address perceived threats to it (and to their own power). Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Support Congressional Dish via Patreon (donations per episode) Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536. Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! View the show notes on our website at https://congressionaldish.com/cd276-the-demise-of-dollar-dominance Background Sources Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD269: NDAA 2023/Plan Ecuador CD230: Pacific Deterrence Initiative CD195: Yemen CD187: Combating China CD102: The World Trade Organization: COOL? International Monetary Fund “IMF Financial Activities List 2023.” Updated June 21, 2023. International Monetary Fund. “Weekly Report on Key Financial Statistics.” June 9, 2023. International Monetary Fund. “IMF Lending.” Updated December 2022. International Monetary Fund. Argentina “Argentina: Letter of Intent, Memorandum of Economic and Financial Policies, and Technical Memorandum of Understanding” October 17, 2018. International Monetary Fund. “Argentina Policy Memorandum.” January 11, 1999. International Monetary Fund. Ecuador “Ecuador—Supplementary Letter of Intent.” March 13, 2003. International Monetary Fund. Smaller Banks within the World Trade System International Finance Corporation China “Members and Observers.” World Trade Organization. “ China and the WTO.” World Trade Organization. “From ‘China Shock' to deglobalisation shock: China's WTO accession and US economic engagement 20 years on.” Stephen Kirchner. January 24, 2022. United States Studies Centre. “The China Reckoning: How Beijing Defied American Expectations.” Kurt M. Campbell and Ely Ratner. February 13, 2018. Foreign Affairs. The World Bank “Who can borrow from the World Bank?” December 10, 2020. Bretton Woods Observer. “Domination of the United States on the World Bank.” Eric Toussaint. April 2, 2020. Committee for the Abolition of Illegitimate Debt. “Why Is the World Bank Still Lending to China?” Yukon Huang. January 15, 2020. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Congressional Stock Trade Tracking Quiver Quantitative Unusual Whales US Abuse of Sanctions “The Other Counteroffensive to Save Ukraine.” Lawrence Summers et. al. June 15, 2023. Foreign Affairs. Allies Pivoting “Europe must resist pressure to become ‘America's followers,' says Macron.” Jamil Anderlini and Clea Caulcutt. April 9, 2023. Politico. “US State Dept backs latest raft of Saudi, UAE, Jordan arms sales.” February 2, 2022. Al Jazeera. Witnesses Mark Rosen on Linkedin Daniel F. Runde on Linkedin “Membership Roster.” Accessed June 24, 2023. Council on Foreign Relations. Tyler Goodspeed on Linkedin Carla Norrlof - “Board of Directors.” Atlantic Council. Daniel McDowell bio Marshall Billingslea on Linkedin Audio Sources Dollar Dominance: Preserving the U.S. Dollar's Status as the Global Reserve Currency June 7, 2023 House Financial Services Committee Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Dr. Tyler Goodspeed, Kleinheinz Fellow, Hoover Institution at Stanford University Dr. Michael Faulkender, Dean's Professor of Finance, Robert H. Smith School of Business at University of Maryland Dr. Daniel McDowell, Associate Professor, Maxwell School of Citizenship & Public Affairs at Syracuse University Marshall Billingslea, Senior Fellow, Hudson Institute Dr. Carla Norrlöf, Senior Fellow, The Atlantic Council and Professor, University of Toronto Clips 34:05 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: In 2022, as the Ranking Member highlighted, 88% of all foreign exchange transactions by value involved the United States Dollar, a figure that has been roughly constant since 1989, which is testament to the substantial path dependence in international currency usage due to large positive network externalities. As the Ranking Member also highlighted, 59% of all official foreign exchange reserves were held in US dollars, which is down from a figure of 71.5% in 2001. By comparison 31% of all foreign exchange transactions by value involve the Euro, which is the second most commonly transacted currency, which accounted for 20% of official foreign exchange reserves. 34:50 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: The fact that 90% of all foreign exchange transactions continue to involve the United States dollar, and that global central banks continue to hold almost 60% of their foreign exchange reserves in US dollars confers net economic benefits on the United States economy. First, foreign demand for reserves of US dollars raises demand for dollar denominated securities, in particular United States Treasury's. This effectively lowers the cost of borrowing for US households, US companies, and federal, state and local governments. It also means that on average, the United States earns more on its investments in foreign assets than we have to pay on foreign investments in the United States, which allows the United States to import more goods and services than we export. Second, foreign demand for large reserves of US dollars and dollar denominated assets raises the value of the dollar and a stronger dollar benefits us consumers and businesses that are net importers of goods and services from abroad. Third, large reserve holdings of US currency abroad in effect constitutes an interest free loan to the United States worth about $10 to $20 billion per year. Fourth, the denomination of the majority of international transactions in US dollars likely modestly lowers the exchange rate risks faced by US companies. Fifth, the given the volume of foreign US dollar holdings and dollar denominated debt, monetary policy actions by foreign central banks generally have a smaller impact on financial conditions in the United States than actions by the United States Central Bank have on financial conditions in other countries. 36:40 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: However, the benefits of the US dollar's global reserve status are not without costs. The lower interest rates in the United States benefit US borrowers, especially the federal government. They also lower returns to US savers. In addition, though a stronger dollar benefits US consumers and businesses that net import goods and services from abroad, it does also disadvantage US firms that export goods and services abroad as well as firms that compete against imported goods and services. Furthermore, the perception of the US dollar as a safe haven asset means that demand for the dollar tends to increase in response to adverse macroeconomic events that are global in nature. As a result, the competitiveness of US exporters and US firms that compete against imported goods and services are likely to face an increased competitive disadvantage at times of elevated global macroeconomic stress. 37:35 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: However, despite these costs, studies generally find that the economic benefits of the dollar's prominent global status outweigh the costs, providing a modest net benefit to the United States economy. This does not include the substantial benefit to which the chairman referred of the United States dollar's centrality in global transactions, allowing the United States to utilize financial sanction tools when appropriate in support of national security objectives. 44:50 Dr. Daniel McDowell: With little more than the stroke of the President's pen or through an Act of Congress, the US government can use financial sanctions to impose enormous economic costs on targeted foreign actors, be they individuals, firms, or state institutions, by freezing their dollar assets or cutting them off from access to the banks through which those dollars flow. The consequences for individual targets, known as specially designated nationals or SDNs, are severe, significantly impairing targets capacity to participate in international trade, investment, debt repayment, and depriving them of access to their wealth. Over the last two decades, the United States has used the tool of financial sanctions with increasing frequency. For example, in the year 2000, just four foreign governments were directly targeted under a US Treasury Country Program overseen by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). Today that number is greater than 20, and if we include penalties from secondary sanctions the list gets even longer. The more that the United States has reached for financial sanctions, the more it has made adversaries and foreign capitals aware of the strategic vulnerability that stems from dependence on the dollar. Some governments have responded by implementing anti-dollar policies measures that are designed to reduce an economy's reliance on the US currency for investment in cross-border transactions. But these measures sometimes fail to achieve their goals. Others have produced modest levels of de-dollarization. Notable examples here include Russian steps to cut its dollar reserves and reduce the use of the dollar and trade settlement in the years leading up to its full scale invasion of Ukraine, or China's ongoing efforts to build its own international payments network based on the Yuan, efforts that have taken on a new sense of urgency as Beijing has become more aware of its own strategic vulnerabilities from Dollar dependence. 47:05 Dr. Daniel McDowell: The United States should reconsider the use of so-called symbolic financial sanctions. That is, if the main objective of a tranche of sanctions is to signal to the world or to a domestic audience that Washington disapproves of a foreign government's policy choices, other measures that can send a similar signal but do not politicize the dollar system ought to be considered first. Second, the use of financial sanctions against issuers of potential rival currencies in particular, China and its Yuan should face a higher bar of scrutiny. Even a small targeted sanctions program provides information to our adversaries about their vulnerabilities, and gives them time to prepare for a future event when a broad US sanctions program may be called upon as part of a major security crisis, when such measures will be most needed. Finally, whenever possible, US financial sanctions should be coordinated with our allies in Europe and Asia, who should feel as if they are key stakeholders in the dollar system and not vassals to it. Such coordinated efforts will prevent our friends from seeking to conduct business with U.S. adversaries outside of the dollar system and send a message to the whole world that moving activities into secondary currencies, like the Euro or the Yen, is not a safe haven. 48:35 Marshall Billingslea: I'll say at the outset that I agree with you and others that to paraphrase Mark Twain, reports of the dollar's demise have been greatly exaggerated. That said, we need to remind ourselves that in the 16th century the Spanish silver dollar was the dominant currency, in the 17th century it was Dutch florins, in the 18th century it was the pound sterling. The link between a nation's currency and its role as the relatively dominant political actor on the world stage is pretty clear. And that is why people like Lula from Brazil, Putin and Xi all aspire to undercut the role of the dollar as the global reserve currency. 50:00 Marshall Billingslea: If we look at what Russia did in the run-up to its further invasion of Ukraine, they began dumping ownership of treasury bonds in 2018. In that year, they plummeted from $96 billion and holdings down to $15 billion and they also started buying large amounts of gold. China is now, as the Ranking Member has observed, embarking on its own its own gold buying spree. I haven't seen the data for May, but April marked the sixth straight month of Chinese expansion in its gold holdings, and I'm not sure I believe the official figures. We have to recall that China is the dominant gold mining player around the world and half of those gold mining companies are state-owned. So the actual size of China's war chest when it comes to gold reserves may be far higher. In fact, I suspect inevitably far higher than official numbers suggest. Last year China also started dumping its treasuries. 2022 marked the largest or second largest decrease on record, with a drop of about $174 billion, and China stood at the lowest level since 2010. In terms of its holdings, though, this past March they did reverse course. This bears close watching because a sell-off may be a strong indicator of planned aggression. 51:20 Marshall Billingslea: The sheer size of the Chinese economy dwarfs what we've been contending with in the form of Iran, Russia, and so on. And one of the first things that the Biden administration did in the wake of Russia's attack was start sanctioning Russian banks and de-SWIFTing them. That's one thing when you're going after an economy smaller than the size of Texas; it's quite another when you consider that out of the 100 largest banks in the world, China has 20, and all four of the top four are Chinese banks. And that is why many within the Treasury contended when I was there, and they will contend to this day, that these Chinese banks are simply too big to sanction. I don't agree that we can allow that to stand but I do believe we have to start taking very swift action to put us in a situation where we could take punitive measures on these banks if necessary. 54:10 Dr. Carla Norrlöf: I will note that the Dollar's dominance is not quite as strong amongst private actors and private markets as it is with governments. In private transactions, it averages about 45% of the world's total. That includes FX transactions, but also things like issuance of international debt, securities, and cross-border banking. 54:55 Dr. Carla Norrlöf: The Chinese Yuan poses no immediate threat to dollar dominance. It accounts for roughly 3% of overall reserves. So far China has been successful in promoting the Yuan with its trade partners, but the Yuan is scarcely used by countries outside trade with China. China is a potential long term challenger due to its active pursuit of trade and investment relationships. If the Yuan is increasingly used by third countries, it will pose a greater threat to the dollar. 55:30 Dr. Carla Norrlöf: And in addition to these external threats, there is also a domestic threat. Flirting with the possibility of a voluntary default puts dollar dominance at risk. What should the US do to maintain dominance, to curb the domestic threat? Congress should consider creating an alternative mechanism for resolving political differences on government spending and its consequences. 56:00 Dr. Carla Norrlöf: To rein in external threats the United States should, whenever possible, implement multilateral sanctions in support of broadly endorsed goals to shore up the liberal international order. This is likely to limit dollar backlash. 59:40 Marshall Billingslea: The thing I do worry -- I come back to this fact that they've been buying a lot of gold -- that one of the things that they could do, which would be very concerning, if they wind up having larger reserves of gold than we believe, is they could start issuing Yuan or gold denominated, gold-backed Yuan contracts and that would further their ambition for introducing the Yuan onto the world stage. 1:05:00 Marshall Billingslea: China considers the actual composition of its foreign exchange reserves to be a state secret. So they don't publish and they they view it as a criminal offense to try to obtain that information in terms of the balance of how much is gold, how much Dollar or Euro denominated. But the numbers I've seen suggest that still at this moment, about 50% to 60% of their Foreign Exchange reserves are still in Dollars or Euros, which means that they are at high risk of sanctions; we can affect them. The problem is that that war chest that they've built up is enormous. It's more than $3 trillion that they have in Foreign Exchange reserves. Compare that with what Russia had at the onset of its assault, which was around $680 billion, of which we managed to freeze overseas half of it, but Russia is still keeping its economy going despite the Biden administration sanctions. So imagine how they're going to be able to continue with that sizable war kitty in Beijing if they do decide to go after the Taiwanese. 1:09:00 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: Short term I think the risk is that we continue to see diversification away from the dollar, PRC continuing to push other countries to use trade inverse invoicing and Renminbi, that they continue to promote the offshore Renminbi market, that they continue to promote or force bilateral clearing. Longer term, I think the bigger risk is that foreign investors no longer perceive the United States federal government debt to be as safe and risk free as it is today perceived. 1:41:20 Dr. Daniel McDowell: The demonstration of US control over the actual flow of dollars, of communication, absolutely provides information to adversaries to prepare for events where they may face similar circumstances. And so I think what we're seeing is China, we're seeing Russia, we're seeing other countries try to create alternative payments networks. Russia has its own SPFS payment messaging system. It's quite small. It was launched in 2014, not coincidentally, after the initial round of sanctions targeting Russia. In terms of CIPS, China's cross border payments network, Belarus announced it was having banks join immediately following the 2022 sanctions. So what I'm saying is there's a pattern between when the United States mobilizes control over the pipes and the messaging of cross-border payments and adversaries looking for alternatives. It doesn't mean they're using them, but they're getting plugged into the system as at least sort of a rainy day option in the event of a future targeting. 1:45:35 Dr. Daniel McDowell: I look at China not just as a typical country, because I think they're an alternative service provider. Most countries fall into alternative service users; they're looking for an alternative to the dollar. China, you could perhaps put Europe in this as well, are the only two sort of economic BLOCs capable, I think, of constructing an attractive enough cross-border payments network that could attract those alternative service users that are looking for that network. And so that's why I think again, with China, there should be a higher bar of scrutiny. 2:02:20 Dr. Tyler Goodspeed: As deficits mount and as the debt burden rises above 100%, I think the Congressional Budget Office has it ending the budget window at about 119% of our economy, then we will probably observe an acceleration of diversification away from the dollar as a hedge. Again, I don't see another single currency displacing the dollar as the major international currency or as the major reserve currency, but continued diversification. International Financial Institutions in an Era of Great Power Competition May 25, 2023 House Financial Services Committee Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Jesse M. Schreger, Associate Professor of Business, Columbia Business School Mark Rosen, Partner, Advection Growth Capital and former Acting Executive Director, International Monetary Fund (IMF) Daniel F. Runde, Senior Vice President, Center for Strategic & International Studies(CSIS) Rich Powell, Chief Executive Officer, ClearPath & ClearPath Action Daouda Sembene, Distinguished Nonresident Fellow, CGD and CEO, AfriCatalyst Clips 39:55 Mark Rosen: The IMF is the global lender of last resort to countries that are in economic distress. IMF borrowers usually have a balance of payments problem, are running out of foreign exchange reserves, and so cannot meet their obligations. The IMF negotiates a set of economic policies with the borrower in government to alleviate the crisis, and, conditional on the government implementing the agreed policies, provides a loan in tranches, normally over a three year period. 41:00 Mark Rosen: The biggest challenge the IMF faces today is China which, as we've heard, has lent vast sums to emerging market and low income countries in a non-transparent and irresponsible manner. Many IMF members are now struggling to repay China. 42:05 Mark Rosen: The United States is the largest shareholder in the IMF and has veto power over certain key decisions and it's critical that the US continues to maintain its ownership of more than 15% which enables it to have this veto power. 42:20 Mark Rosen: China for some time, has been pressing for an increased quota share at the IMF. However, given its irresponsible lending, and then willingness to provide debt relief to developing countries, this is not the time to reward China with increased ownership at the Fund. Two other issues I'd like to focus on are anti-corruption and the catalytic role of the private sector in the work of the IMF. Corruption is a severe problem for many emerging market countries, which do not have strong institutions that can confront and root out corruption. The IMF is certainly doing a much better job than it did historically on anti-corruption, but I believe it's critical that it continues to make anti corruption laws and policies front and center in the conditions of its lending programs, as well as a focus of its technical assistance. Only by reducing corruption will many of these countries be able to attract the vast amount of private sector investment which is potentially available and remains the ultimate key to reducing poverty. Establishing a rule of law, including laws to protect private property is key to unlocking this investment. And it should be a focus of the IMF and World Bank to encourage these countries to improve the rule of law and to fight corruption. If they do that, emerging market countries can attract private capital and grow rapidly as many countries that have followed that path have already done so successfully. 44:45 Daniel Runde: Multilateral development banks, MDBs, under US and Western leadership are one way that we can respond with something. The United States built and strengthened the MDB system. MDBs provide money, advice, data and convening power to help developing countries solve problems. If the US exerts its influence over these institutions, they are forced multipliers of a US-led global system. If we disregard our leadership role, then other actors, including China, can exert influence over them. The World Bank Group is a series of institutions: it lends money to national governments, it has a private sector arm, and has an insurance arm. There are a series of other regional development bank's including the InterAmerican Development Bank, the Asian Development Bank -- Taiwan is a member of the Asian Development Bank -- the African Development Bank and the EBRD, the European Bank for Reconstruction Development Bank, focused mainly on countries that used to be behind the Iron Curtain. The United States has been instrumental in creating the majority of these institutions and remains the largest, or one of the largest, shareholders of every afformentioned MDB. Since the founding of these institutions, the US has used its shareholding power to shape the policies and activities of MDBs in indirect support of American foreign policy. 47:10 Daniel Runde: What role does China play in the MDBs? They're a shareholder. China continues to borrow from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank. That is crazy. That needs to stop. China is a shareholder. Also, Chinese firms can bid on MDB projects. China wins a lot of in terms of dollar value, a lot of the dollar value of World Bank contracts. Something to take a look at. 47:35 Daniel Runde: How does the Belt and Road figure into the MDBs? You all have heard of the Belt and Road. Infrastructure is now a strategic issue. China's Belt and Road Initiative is a combination of construction and financing projects for roads, airports, and energy around the world. Unfortunately for us, BRI is an ambitious project that speaks to the hopes of China's friends and potential friends. To counter the BRI, the US needs a positive alternative that says more than, "Don't work with China." Right? That's not a strategy. We've got to have an alternative. 1:12:50 Rep. Andy Barr (R-KY): How do we end China's eligibility to borrow from the World Bank? Daniel Runde: The Asian Development Bank has said they're going to end their eligibility by 2025. We should absolutely hold them to that. There is a temptation for the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank to continue to loan for a couple of reasons. One is they say, "Well, this is a window into how we can understand China better." There's lots of other ways to understand China better. And or this is a way for us to -- for a bunch of lending reasons that they do it. You all have the power of the purse, you have an ability, I think you should have blunted conversations with the administration about this. I suspect it's an open door, but it's going to require, I think, some pushing from Congress. I would encourage this committee to push the administration on ending lending to China. 1:14:30 Jesse Schreger: So fundamentally right now, the Renminbi is not yet positioned to compete with the US dollar for a number of reasons. First and foremost, the reason that the dollar plays the role it does in the international financial system is it provides the global safe asset. You're confident, except for the upcoming debt ceiling, that you will always be paid back if you own US dollars. That's fundamentally what you know. When you contemplate investing in China and holding Chinese Renminbi as reserves, you're not necessarily sure that you're gonna be able to turn that piece of paper into the goods and services that you need or intervening in FX markets. 1:21:15 Jesse Schreger: First and foremost, what China is trying to do is essentially convince countries around the world that the Renminbi is an alternative asset to invoice your trade and to invest in. And so on the investment side, they've been working very hard to actually allow in foreign capital, encouraging foreign central banks to hold Renminbi denominated bonds as their reserves. And on the trade side, they're encouraging firms to invoice, basically price their goods, in Renminbi. There's a few areas in which they've had challenges there. So first, we actually don't know who are holding most of these Renminbi denominated assets. What you can see is after the US sanctioned Russia back in 2014, it was the Russian Central Bank that effectively announced they were moving out of US dollar denominated assets and into Renminbi, so they did that publicly. And so China has effectively been trying to attract foreign capital of that form and a lot of the reasons for that is that China finds itself vulnerable in the dollar-based financial system. And so what I would say the fundamental area in which the United States can assure the dominance of the dollar is making everyone understand that US Treasuries are the world's safe asset that there is no state of the world in which the United States can or will default. 2:03:25 Jesse Schreger: I think the real way in which people start being able to issue and borrow in Renminbi is when people start thinking in terms of the goods that they need to buy and consume are in Renminbi. Fundamentally, most countries around the world, if they issue a bond in Renminbi, the calculation they have to do is then "okay, I'm going to take my renminbi and convert it into US dollars to buy the thing in which I need." And so while actions in the US financial system are certainly going to affect other countries decisions to borrow in Renminbi, the kind of underlying challenges in Chinese financial markets and fundamentally the lack of goods priced and sold in Renminbi are going to continue to hold back kind of a growth of this market for a while. And in particular, the fact that many countries are reluctant to try to raise money inside of China's liquid onshore capital markets for, effectively, fear of capital controls. If you've raised renminbi in China, you can't get that out and to your projects the way you can if you raise money in the US in dollars. 2:14:55 Daniel Runde: The business model of the World Bank is they lend money to richer countries with a pretty good credit rating and then they cross subsidize that by lending to poor countries with a poor credit rating. My view is, China can finance its own development, we should stop this practice. I think the Asian Development Bank has sort of gotten the memo, but the World Bank has not fully gotten the memo and they'll give you kind of World Bank-y answers to this sort of thing. We got to stop it. Rep. Zach Nunn (R-IA): Mr. Runde, I could not agree with you more. And you highlighted earlier, you know, by 2025, China should graduate from this program. I'd offer that 25 is two years too late. We can start funneling them off that now. Daniel Runde: I agree, sir. Rep. Zach Nunn (R-IA): I think you're in the right spot. Thank you. Music Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio) Editing Pro Podcast Solutions Production Assistance Clare Kuntz Balcer Cover photo Eric Prouzet on Unsplash

durée : 00:14:03 - Les Enjeux internationaux - par : Baptiste Muckensturm - Les anticipations vont bon train quant aux futurs agissements de Pékin sur Taïwan. Interrogé par le Sénat étasunien, Ely Ratner, chargé des questions d'Asie-Pacifique au ministère de la Défense, affirme que Pékin avait bien "l'intention" d'attaquer l'île. Comment penser le nationalisme à Taïwan ? - invités : Jean-Pierre Cabestan Directeur de recherche au CNRS rattaché à l‘Institut français de recherche sur l'Asie de l'est de l'INALCO

Trung tá Martin Meiners, Phát ngôn viên của Bộ Quốc phòng Mỹ, hôm 5/9 cho biết rằng Trợ lý Bộ trưởng Quốc phòng Hoa Kỳ phụ trách các Vấn đề An ninh Ấn Độ Dương - Thái Bình Dương, ông Ely Ratner, sẽ bắt đầu chuyến công du hai nước Ấn Độ và Việt Nam trong tuần này.

週三（12月8日），五角大樓印太安全事務高級官員表示，五角大樓正在使美軍能力現代化，且美軍阻止中共侵略和加強台灣防禦能力的努力不會孤立無援。 更多內容請見：https://www.epochtimes.com/b5/21/12/9/n13427780.htm 大纪元,大纪元新闻,大紀元,大紀元新聞,五角大樓, Ely Ratner Support this podcast

On COI #121 Patrick MacFarlane – host of Liberty Weekly – returns to the show to talk China, Iran and the American police state. Pat and Kyle break down a recent viral video of a police officer causing a pregnant woman's car to roll over. Pat explains that the woman acted appropriately, however, the officer is unlikely to be held accountable. Pat breaks down the legal formalities the police state uses to allow its lawmen to remain lawless. While the US government is incapable – or unwilling – to protect American citizens from its own police force, it is planning to spend hundreds of billions in tax dollars to confront China. The Innovation and Competition Act 2021 will spend $250 billion on the rivalry with China. The Pentagon announced that the problem with its China policy is it's all talk. A report from a committee led by hawk Ely Ratner concluded the Pentagon had a 'say-do-gap.' Secretary of Defense Austin is saying the military should stop talking about the Chinese threat and act against it. The Biden administration seems primarily concerned with confronting Russia and China. However, it is still unwilling to lose Iran as an enemy. Recent statements from Secretary of State Blinken suggest the US is unwilling to save the Iran nuclear deal. The opportunities to save the agreement are shrinking as Iran moves closer to electing a new leader. Odysee Donate LBRY Credits bTTEiLoteVdMbLS7YqDVSZyjEY1eMgW7CP Donate Bitcoin 36PP4kT28jjUZcL44dXDonFwrVVDHntsrk Donate Bitcoin Cash qp6gznu4xm97cj7j9vqepqxcfuctq2exvvqu7aamz6 Subscribe Star – Conflicts of Interest  YouTube – Conflicts of Interest Facebook – Conflicts of Interest Twitter – Conflicts of Interest Apple Podcast – Conflicts of Interest Support Our Sponsor Visit Paloma Verde and use code PEACE for 25% off our CBD

On COI #121 Patrick MacFarlane – host of Liberty Weekly – returns to the show to talk China, Iran and the American police state. Pat and Kyle break down a recent viral video of a police officer causing a pregnant woman's car to roll over. Pat explains that the woman acted appropriately, however, the officer is unlikely to be held accountable. Pat breaks down the legal formalities the police state uses to allow its lawmen to remain lawless. While the US government is incapable – or unwilling – to protect American citizens from its own police force, it is planning to spend hundreds of billions in tax dollars to confront China. The Innovation and Competition Act 2021 will spend $250 billion on the rivalry with China. The Pentagon announced that the problem with its China policy is it's all talk. A report from a committee led by hawk Ely Ratner concluded the Pentagon had a 'say-do-gap.' Secretary of Defense Austin is saying the military should stop talking about the Chinese threat and act against it. The Biden administration seems primarily concerned with confronting Russia and China. However, it is still unwilling to lose Iran as an enemy. Recent statements from Secretary of State Blinken suggest the US is unwilling to save the Iran nuclear deal. The opportunities to save the agreement are shrinking as Iran moves closer to electing a new leader. Odysee Donate LBRY Credits bTTEiLoteVdMbLS7YqDVSZyjEY1eMgW7CP Donate Bitcoin 36PP4kT28jjUZcL44dXDonFwrVVDHntsrk Donate Bitcoin Cash qp6gznu4xm97cj7j9vqepqxcfuctq2exvvqu7aamz6 Subscribe Star – Conflicts of Interest  YouTube – Conflicts of Interest Facebook – Conflicts of Interest Twitter – Conflicts of Interest Apple Podcast – Conflicts of Interest Support Our Sponsor Visit Paloma Verde and use code PEACE for 25% off our CBD

On COI #71, Kyle and Will discuss the Biden administration's continued push to extradite Julian Assange. Picking up where Trump left off, Biden's DOJ has submitted an appeal to UK judge Vanessa Baraitser to challenge her January ruling against extradition on grounds of Assange's mental health, apparently still looking to charge him with 17 counts under the Espionage Act.  The president has also ordered a Pentagon review of US China policy under a new task force, but it's unclear what will change from the prior administration, as Biden has already embarked on many of the same provocative military deployments, drills and operations overseas. Leading the task force is Ely Ratner, a known China hawk in DC's liberal interventionist circles who penned an op-ed last September blasting Trump as "weak" on Beijing. More than 12 years removed from Obama's pledge to shut down the Guantanamo Bay prison, President Biden has done the same, ordering an inter-agency review of the detention center with the intention of closing it before the end of this term. It remains to be seen just how committed he'll be to the move.   LBRY Donate LBRY Credits bTTEiLoteVdMbLS7YqDVSZyjEY1eMgW7CP Donate Bitcoin 36PP4kT28jjUZcL44dXDonFwrVVDHntsrk Donate BitcoinCash qp6gznu4xm97cj7j9vqepqxcfuctq2exvvqu7aamz6 Subscribe Star – Conflicts of Interest  YouTube – Conflicts of Interest Facebook – Conflicts of Interest Twitter – Conflicts of Interest Apple Podcast – Conflicts of Interest Support Our Sponsor Visit Paloma Verde and use code PEACE for 25% off our CBD

Jim Kavanagh, a writer at The Polemicist and CounterPunch and author of "The American Farce Unravels: Shreds of January 6th," joins us to discuss the end of the impeachment procedures. House impeachment managers conclude their case with video and a focus on the aftermath of the Capitol protests. Although the probability of mustering the votes for a conviction is close to zero, the case against former US President Donald Trump was vigorously pressed with dramatic video on Wednesday. Also, Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell (R-KY) is not pressing senators in his party to vote for an acquittal. Neil Clark, a journalist and broadcaster, joins us to discuss WikiLeaks founder Julian Assange. The Biden administration has indicated they intend to continue the Trump policy of pursuing espionage charges against the beleaguered publisher. Also, we discuss Dr. Binoy Kampmark's latest article in which he argues, "With changes of presidential administrations, radical departures in policy are always exaggerated. Continuity remains, for the most part, a standard feature." Kampmark discusses US President Joe Biden's record of prosecuting whistleblowers under the Obama administration and supposes that it portends a continuation of legal assaults on press freedom. Gary Flowers, a radio talk show host and public policy analyst, joins us to discuss a possible breakup of the Republican Party. A small number of GOP elders from the Reagan and both Bush administrations are discussing starting a "center-right" party that would be distanced from the Trump wing of the current GOP. Meanwhile, polls show 70% of current Republicans would be interested in a new party formed by former US President Donald Trump. Is the traditional party system in the US about to implode? KJ Noh, a peace activist, writer and teacher, joins us to discuss China. The world watched as US President Joe Biden and Chinese President Xi Jinping held their first official phone call on Wednesday. Xi said the two countries should resolve their differences based on mutual respect and equality. Chinese television also quoted their leader as saying, "A confrontation between China and the United States is absolutely a disaster for the two countries and for the entire world." Meanwhile, in an ominous sign, Biden announced the creation of a Pentagon-run China task force led by notorious China hawk Ely Ratner. Mark Sleboda, a Moscow-based international relations and security analyst, joins us to discuss Eastern European policy. NATO is ramping up provocations in the Black Sea and sending strategic bombers to Norway in what could be considered a dangerous nuclear provocation against Russia. Also, NATO Chief Jens Stoltenberg held a news conference with the Ukrainian prime minister on Wednesday as the two announced the start of the construction for two naval bases in Ukraine, "one in the Black Sea, one in the Azov Sea." Elisabeth Myers, a lawyer, former editor-in-chief of Inside Arabia, and democracy lead for Democrats Abroad, joins us to discuss Yemen. Timothy Lenderking, the US special envoy for Yemen, has traveled to Saudi Arabia and rumors are he is pressing the kingdom to end the military assault on Yemen. The Saudi-led military assault on Yemen has caused the worst humanitarian disaster on Earth. Humanitarian and anti-war groups have been pressuring the Biden administration to end the disastrous conflict as quickly as possible. Dr. Gerald Horne, a professor of history at the University of Houston in Texas, author, historian, and researcher, joins us to discuss a recent article about US sanctions. The Substack article, titled "Sanctions and Drift: America's Alienating Addiction," discusses the post-World War II use of sanctions to propel the US to hyperpower status. The piece goes on to explain how the current unipolar world paradigm is now changing the sanction dynamic wherein they are separating the US from its traditional allies. The profligate use of sanctions against both friends and adversaries alike is causing European nations to rethink their economic loyalty to the US, as they too are crushed under the boot of imperialism. Medea Benjamin, the founder of Code Pink, joins us to discuss the US defense budget. In the midst of a deadly pandemic, many in the US are demanding a decrease in military spending and a redirection of funds to the more proximate issues of health and economic welfare. In a recent interview, Benjamin argues that the Defense Department receives “massive, massive, massive amounts of money" but fails to play a top role in combating domestic terrorism or the COVID-19 pandemic, issues which she says are at the forefront for Americans.

Professor Richard Lachman, Professor at the University at Albany, SUNY and author of "Capitalists in Spite of Themselves," joins us to discuss the change of power at 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue. The political conversation now changes from Donald Trump to policy priorities for the new administration. Will the Biden team be able to focus on internal problems or get hung up with hawkish militarism and external economic confrontation?Jim Kavanaugh, Writer at thepolemicist.net and "CounterPunch" and the author of Over the Rainbow: Paths of Resistance after George Floyd, joins us to discuss President Trump's last-minute flurry of pardons. Trump granted clemency to 143 individuals totaling 73 pardons and 70 commutations. Trump granted clemency to his former policy adviser Steve Bannon and rap star Little Wayne. Bannon was arrested and charged last August with defrauding donors who contributed to a fundraising campaign for a private border wall. In a surprise action, Trump reduced the sentence of former Detroit Mayor Kwame Kilpatrick by 20 years effectively freeing him now. Kevin Gosztola, managing editor of Shadowproof.com, joins us to discuss Julian Assange. President Trump issued a number of pardons but Julian Assange was not one of them. There are reports that Senate Majority leader Mitch McConnell threatened to support the impeachment of the President if he pardoned Assange and/or Edward Snowden. Also, there are reports that Rudy Giulliani asked for 2 million dollars for a single pardon.Margaret Flowers, pediatrician, health reform activist and co-director at Popular Resistance joins us to discuss the DC military occupation. We review a Michael Tracey article in which he discusses the positive media coverage towards this event. Tracey asks why media outlets refrain from asking basic questions about the necessity and safety of the occupation. Also, we discuss whether this is a temporary deployment or it could end up being a permanent occupation of a US City. Scott Ritter, former UN weapons inspector in Iraq, returns to discuss the hawkish nature of the Binde foreign policy team. Notorious war hawk Antony Blinken testified that the US would seek to expand the Iran nuclear agreement, a position which is a non-starter according to Iranian Foreign minister Javid Zarif. Blinken indicated that the Biden team plans to continue Trump's China policies and increase tension with Russia. Additionally, Joe Biden selected China hawk Ely Ratner to advise the incoming administration's Pentagon chief on matters related to Beijing.Margaret Kimberley, editor and senior columnist at Black Agenda Report and author of "Prejudential: Black America and the Presidents," to discuss the potential for a crackdown on dissent. Senate Majority Leader Chuck Schumer has called for a new version of the no-fly list which includes people classified as domestic terrorists. Also, as Senator Dick Durbin introduces a new domestic terrorism legislative package a recent Glenn Greenwald questions the potential for government overreach. Teri Mattson, Latin America coordinator for Code Pink, joins us to discuss the Biden policy towards Venezuela. Secretary of State and notorious hawk Antony Blinken stated that the Biden administration will continue to recognize Juan Guaido as the interim president of Venezuela. Also, Blinken said that they will continue with targeted sanctions in an effort to overthrow the Government of Nicholas Maduro. Blinken's testimony implies that the Maduro government's desire to engage with the Biden team may fall on deaf ears.KJ Noh, peace activist, writer and teacher, joins us to discuss the Biden administration's recent statements about China. Biden's selection of noted China Hawk Ely Ratner to advise the Secretary of Defense coupled with recent statements about the US taking back world leadership are ominous signs for those who seek a resolution through multipolar negotiations. Biden's selection of another China hawk, Kurt Campbell, as his “Indo-Pacific czar” further cements the notion that a significant economic and possibly military confrontation may be at hand.

In the second episode, Hank speaks with two leading experts on US-China relations, Ely Ratner and Evan Feigenbaum. They discuss a current framework for the US-China relationship, how the US can properly balance national security with economic progress, and where the US can achieve positive results while navigating a number of important conflicts with China. Ely Ratner: cnas.org/people/ely-ratner Ely's books: https://amzn.to/2Ss2BVh Evan A. Feigenbaum: carnegieendowment.org/experts/719 Evan's book "China's Techno-Warriors:" https://amzn.to/3cZV1uk

According to an assessment prepared for Congress as mandated by the FY2019 National Defense Authorization Act, the United States and China are “locked in a strategic competition over the future of the Indo-Pacific.” The authors of the report, including Ely Ratner, executive vice president and director of studies at the Center for a New American Security, describe competing visions for the rules, norms, and institutions that will govern international relations in the future and make more than 100 policy recommendations. The United States is free and open; by contrast, China has, in recent years, turned in an increasingly closed and illiberal direction. If China should succeed in its efforts in the Indo-Pacific, the result would be less regional security and prosperity, and the United States would be less able to exert power and influence in the world. The National Committee hosted a virtual event on March 31, 2020, with Ely Ratner to discuss these issues. He presented recommendations to address the critical areas of U.S. policy toward China that could be more consistent, coordinated, and productive.

On today's Global Exchange Podcast, we are broadcasting an armchair discussion with Richard Fontaine on “Modernizing American Homeland Defence” from our 29 Jan. 2019 Modernizing North American Defence conference. The Global Exchange is part of the CGAI Podcast Network. This conference was made possible by the MINDS program from the Department of National Defence. Subscribe to the CGAI Podcast Network on SoundCloud, iTunes, or wherever else you can find Podcasts! Bios: - Colin Robertson (host) - A former Canadian diplomat, Colin Robertson is Vice President of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. - Richard Fontaine: Chief Executive Officer of the Center for a New American Security (CNAS). He served as President of CNAS from 2012-19 and as Senior Advisor and Senior Fellow from 2009-12. Prior to CNAS, he Fontaine served as foreign policy advisor to the McCain 2008 presidential campaign and subsequently as the minority deputy staff director on the Senate Armed Services Committee. RECOMMENDED READINGS: - “Rising to the China Challenge: Renewing American Competitiveness in the Indo-Pacific” by Ely Ratner, Daniel Kliman, Susanna V. Blume, Rush Doshi, Chris Dougherty, Richard Fontaine, Peter Harrell, Martijn Rasser, Elizabeth Rosenberg, Eric Sayers, Daleep Singh, Paul Scharre, Loren DeJonge Schulman, Neil Bhatiya, Ashley Feng, Joshua Fitt, Megan Lamberth, Kristine Lee and Ainikki Riikonen [CNAS Publication] (https://www.cnas.org/publications/reports/rising-to-the-china-challenge) - “1491: New Revelations of the Americas Before Columbus” by Charles C. Mann (https://www.amazon.ca/1491-Second-Revelations-Americas-Columbus/dp/1400032059) - “1493: Uncovering the New World Columbus Created” by Charles C. Mann (https://www.amazon.ca/1493-Uncovering-World-Columbus-Created/dp/0307278247/) - “The Cremation of Sam McGee” By Robert Service [Author], Ted Harrison [Illustrator] (https://www.amazon.ca/Cremation-Sam-McGee-Robert-Service/dp/1554532728) Related Links: - “Modernizing North American Defence” [Conference Program] (www.cgai.ca/modernization_of_no…th_american_defence) - “Centre for a New American Security” (https://www.cnas.org/) Recording Date: January 29, 2020 Give 'The Global Exchange' a review on iTunes! Follow the Canadian Global Affairs Institute on Facebook, Twitter (@CAGlobalAffairs), or on Linkedin. Head over to our website www.cgai.ca for more commentary. Produced by Jay Rankin. Music credits to Drew Phillips.

Matthew Goodman of the Center for Strategic and International Studies joins Emma Ashford and Trevor Thrall to discuss Trump’s trade war with China.Matthew P. Goodman bioMatthew P. Goodman and Ely Ratner, “A Better Way to Challenge China on Trade: Trump’s Harmful Tariffs Aren’t the Answer,” Foreign Affairs, March 22, 2018Eswar Prasad, “Which country is better equipped to win a U.S.-China trade war?” Washington Post, August 9, 2019. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

How did American analysts seem to get China so “wrong”? Why wasn’t there more of a debate until fairly recently inside the halls of power? What concerns drove the Obama administration’s China policy? What would a Chinese-led international order look like? Ely Ratner discusses these issues and many more in the fifth episode of “Jaw-Jaw.” If you'd like to read a full transcript of this episode, click here.   Biographies Ely Ratner is the former deputy national security advisor to Vice President Joe Biden, and he currently is Executive Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American security. His extensive writings on China have been published in Foreign Affairs, The New York Times, Washington Post, and Wall Street Journal, among other outlets.   Brad Carson is a professor at the University of Virginia, where he teaches in the Batten School of Leadership and Public Policy. He served in the U.S. House of Representatives from 2001 to 2005 and was undersecretary of the Army and acting undersecretary of defense for personnel and readiness in the Obama administration. He welcomes comments at brad.carson@warontherocks.com.   Links Liz Economy, The Third Revolution: Xi Jinping and the New Chinese State, (Oxford University Press, 2018) Thomas Wright, All Measures Short of War: The Contest for the 21st Century & the Future of American Power, (Yale University Press, 2017) Music and Production by Tre Hester

People in power tell us constantly that China is a threat but... Why? In this episode, we explore the big picture reasons why China poses a threat to those in power in the United States and what our Congress is doing to combat that threat. Spoiler alert: There's a another U.S. military build-up involved. Please Support Congressional Dish – Quick Links Click here to contribute monthly or a lump sum via PayPal Click here to support Congressional Dish for each episode via Patreon Send Zelle payments to: Donation@congressionaldish.com Send Venmo payments to: @Jennifer-Briney Send Cash App payments to: $CongressionalDish or Donation@congressionaldish.com Use your bank's online bill pay function to mail contributions to: 5753 Hwy 85 North, Number 4576, Crestview, FL 32536 Please make checks payable to Congressional Dish Thank you for supporting truly independent media! Recommended Congressional Dish Episodes CD116: TPP - The Environment Chapter CD115: TPP - Access to Medicine CD114: Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Investment Chapter CD095: Secret International Regulations (TPA & TPP) CD060: Fast Track for TPP CD053: TPP - The Leaked Chapter CD052: The Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Bills/Laws H.R. 5105: BUILD Act of 2018 Became law as a part of H.R. 302: FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 BUILD Act text from FAA law Purposes for which support may be provided The new bank “may designate private, nonprofit organizations as eligible to receive support… to promote development of economic freedom and private sectors” and “to complement the work of the United States Agency for International Development and other donors to improve the overall business enabling environment, financing the creation and expansion of the private business sector.”  Powers of the new development bank The bank “shall have such other powers as may be necessary and incident to carrying out the functions of the Corporation” S. 2736: Asia Reassurance Initiative Act of 2018 Sec. 101: Policy “Promotes American prosperity and economic interests by advancing economic growth and development of a rules-based Indo-Pacific economic community”  Sec 102: Diplomatic Strategy To support the “Association of Southeast Asian Nations”, “Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation”, and the “East Asia Summit” #1: Emphasize our commitment to “freedom of navigation under international law”  #7 : "Develop and grow the economy through private sector partnerships between the United States and Indo-Pacific partners" #8: “To pursue multilateral and bilateral trade agreements … and build a network of partners in the Indo-Pacific committee to free markets”  #9: To work with Indo-Pacific countries to pursue infrastructure projects and “to maintain unimpeded commerce, open sea lines or air ways, and communications”  Sec. 201: Authorization of Appropriations Authorizes $1.5 billion for each fiscal year 2019 through 2023 to be divided among the State Dept., USAID, and the Defense Dept.  Congressional Budget Office: The total authorization is almost $8.6 billion The money is allowed to be used for “foreign military financing and international military education and training programs”  The money is allowed to be used “to help partner countries strengthen their democratic systems”  The money is allowed to be used to “encourage responsible natural resource management in partner countries, which is closely associated with economic growth”  Sec. 205: United States-ASEAN Strategic Partnership Sense of Congress expressing the value of “strategic economic initiatives, such as activities under the United States-ASEAN Trade and Investment Framework Arrangement and the United States-ASEAN Connect, which demonstrate a commitment to ASEAN and the ASEAN Economic Community and build upon economic relationships in the Indo-Pacific region." Sec. 209: Commitment to Taiwan “The President should conduct regular transfers of defense articles to Taiwan”  Sec 213 Freedom of Navigation and Overflight; Promotion of International Law “It is the sense of Congress that the President should develop a diplomatic strategy that includes working with United States allies and partners to conduct joint maritime training and freedom of navigation operations in the Indo-Pacific region, including the East China Sea and the South China Sea, in support of a rules-based international system benefitting all countries.”  Sec. 215: Cybersecurity Cooperation Authorizes $100 million for each year (2019-2023) to “enhance cooperation between the United States and Indo-Pacific nations for the purposes of combatting cybersecurity threats.”  Sec. 301: Findings; Sense of Congress Free trade agreements between the United States and three nations in the Indo-Pacific region have entered into force: Australia, Singapore, and the Republic of Korea  According to the National Security Strategy, the United States will “work with partners to build a network of stated dedicated to free markets and protected from forces that would subvert their sovereignty.”  Sec. 304: Trade Capacity Building and Trade Facilitation (a) “The President is encouraged to produce a robust and comprehensive trade capacity building and trade facilitation strategy, including leveling the playing field for American companies competing in the Indo-Pacific region.”  Authorization of Appropriations:“There are authorized to be appropriated such amounts as many be necessaryto carry out subsection (a)."  Sec. 305: Intellectual Property Protection The President “should” take “all appropriate action to deter and punish commercial cyber-enabled theft of intellectual property” and orders a report on the government’s efforts to do so.  Authorization of Appropriations: “There are authorized to be appropriated to the United States Trade Representative such amounts as may be necessary  to sponsor bilateral and multilateral activities designed to build capacity in the identified priority areas” in the report  Sec. 306: Energy Programs and Initiatives Orders the President to create a strategy, updated every 5 years, to “encourage” Indo-Pacific countries to “implement national power strategies and cooperation with United States energy companies and the Department of Energy national laboratories”  Authorization of Appropriations: $1 million per year from 2019 through 2023 Sense of Congress: “the United States should explore opportunities to partner with the private sector and multilateral institutions, such as the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank, to promote universal access to reliable electricity in the Indo-Pacific region, including Myanmar (Burma)" Sec. 409: Authorization of Appropriations $210 million each year (2019-2023) to “promote democracy” and the money can be given to “universities, civil society, and multilateral institutions that are focusing on education awareness, training, and capacity building.” This money can be spent to “promote democracy” in China.  Sec. 411: Young Leaders People-to-People Initiatives Authorizes $25 million per year (2019-2023) to support the “Young Southeast Asian Leaders Initiative, the ASEAN Youth Volunteers program, and other people-to-people exchange programs that focus on building the capacity of democracy, human rights, and good governance activities in the Indo-Pacific region.”  Sec. 412: Savings Program “Nothing in this Act may be construed as authorizing the use of military force.”  HR 5515: John S. McCain National Defense Authorization for Fiscal Year 2019 Sec. 1252 Amends the NDAA for 2016, which authorized the South China Sea Initiative providing military equipment and training to Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Vietnam, to change the name of the program to the “Indo-Pacific Maritime Security Initiative” and expands the authorization to include the Indian Ocean in addition to the South China Sea and the countries of Bangladesh and Sri Lanka. Adds India to the list of countries allowed to be paid for expenses, along with Brunei, Singapore, and Taiwan. Extends the expiration date from September 30, 2020 to December 31, 2025.  Sec. 1253 Changes the name of the military build-up authorized in NDAA 2018 from the “Indo-Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative” to the “Indo-Pacific Stability Initiative”. Changes the activities authorized to include an increase in “rotational and forward presence” of the US Armed Forces and adds the prepositioning of “munitions” in addition to equipment. Expands the options for funding by removing the requirement that funding come “only” from a section 1001 transfer authority. Requires a 5 year plan be submitted to Congress by the Secretary of Defense by March 1, 2019.  Public Law 115-91: National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2018 Sec 1251  Authorized the “Indo-Asia-Pacific Stability Initiative” to “increase the presence and capabilities” of the United States Armed Forces in the region by building new infrastructure, “enhance the storage and pre-positioning in the Indo-Asia-Pacific region of equipment of the United States Forces”, and with military training and exercises with allies.    Sound Clip Sources Hearing: Democracy Promotion in a Challenging World Senate Foreign Affairs Committee, June 14, 2018. Transcript Watch on YouTube Witnesses: Carl Gershman - National Endowment for Democracy: President Daniel Twining - International Republican Institute: President Kenneth Wollack - National Democratic Institute: President Timestamps & Transcripts  1:43:38 Representative Michael McCaul (TX): I had a briefing yesterday in a classified setting on ZTE and Huawei, and their efforts to conduct espionage in this country. I’ve also seen them in Sri Lanka where they have burdened them with so much debt that they had to turn over a strategic port to the Chinese. We see the Chinese now in Djibouti for the first time, and we see them leveraging the continent of Africa into so much debt that they will be able to eventually take over these countries. They exploit them. They bring in their own workers—they don’t even hire the host countries’ workers—and they export their natural resources in what is this One Belt, One Road policy. 1:45:00 Carl Gershman: In March, The Economist magazine had a cover story on China, and the bottom line of the cover story was—and this is a direct quote—‘‘The West’s 25-year bet on China has failed.’’ The bet was that if China was brought into the World Trade Organization, was encouraged to grow economically, it would become a more liberal society and be part of the liberal world order. 1:46:26 Carl Gershman: It’s a problem with the Belt and Road Initiative, which is not just an economic expansion. This is intimately tied to China’s geopolitical and military strategy precisely to get strategic ports in Sri Lanka or in Maldives because countries fall into the debt trap and pay back by leasing their ports. 1:58:05 Representative Ted Yoho (FL): They’re a form of socialism with Chinese characteristics, and, as we all know, that’s communism. Our form of government empowers the people. Empowered people reach their full potential. China empowers the government where the people are suppressed for the benefit of the government. 2:00:10 Daniel Twining: It’s the surveillance architecture. This Orwellian total surveillance state they’re building with artificial intelligence and facial recognition and all this stuff. It’s very attractive, as you say, not to people but to leaders. 2:07:52 Representative Ted Poe (TX): Globally, what do you personally see is the number-one entity that is a threat to democracy worldwide? Is it China? Is it Russia? Is it North Korea? Is it ISIS? Is it Iran? Pick one. Pick the one you think is the threat. Carl Gershman: China. Rep. Poe: China. Gershman: China. Rep. Poe: Mr. Twining. Daniel Twining: China. Rep. Poe: Mr. Wollack. Kenneth Wollack: Russia. Rep. Poe: Russia. Russia and China. Hearing: The China Challenge, Part 1: Economic Coercion as Statecraft, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity, July 24, 2018. Witnesses: Dan Blumenthal: Director of Asian Studies and Resident Fellow at the American Enterprise Institute Ely Ratner: Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security Timestamps and Transcripts  33:49 Chairman Senator Cory Gardner (CO): This hearing will be the first hearing in a three-part series of hearings titled The China Challenge and will examine how the United States should respond to the challenge of a rising China that seeks to upend and supplant the U.S.-led liberal world order. 34:12 Chairman Senator Cory Gardner (CO): According to the National Security Strategy, for decades U.S. policy was rooted in the belief that support for China’s rise and for its integration into the post-war international order would liberalize China. Contrary to our hopes, China expanded its power at the expense of the sovereignty of others. According to the National Defense Strategy, the central challenge to U.S. prosperity and security is the reemergence of long-term strategic competition by what the National Security Strategy classifies as revisionist powers. It is increasingly clear that China and Russia want to shape a world consistent with their authoritarian model: gaining veto authority over other nations’ economic, diplomatic, and security decisions. 35:28 Chairman Senator Cory Gardner (CO): The question before us now is identifying the tools the United States has at its disposal to counter the disturbing developments posed by China’s less-than-peaceful rise. This is why Senator Markey and I and a bipartisan group of co-sponsors in the Senate joined in introducing the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act, or ARIA, on April 24. The legislation sets a comprehensive policy framework to demonstrate U.S. commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific region and the rules-based international order. ARIA provides a comprehensive set of national security and economic policies to advance U.S. interests and goals in the Indo-Pacific region, including providing substantive U.S. resource commitments for these goals. I’m joined in this legislation on the committee by Senator Kaine, Senator Coons, Senator Cardin, Senator Markey, by Senator Rubio, and Senator Young, as well as Senators Sullivan and Perdue and Graham. 38:12 Chairman Senator Cory Gardner (CO): Our first witness is Senator—is Dan Blumenthal—I almost gave you a demotion there, Dan—who serves as director of Asian studies and resident fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. Mr. Blumenthal has both served in and advised the U.S. government on China issues for nearly two decades. From 2001 to 2004 he served as senior director for China, Taiwan, and Mongolia at the Department of Defense. Additionally, from 2006, 2012 he served as a commissioner on the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, including holding the position of vice chair in 2007. 38:54 Chairman Senator Cory Gardner (CO): Our second witness today is Ely Ratner, who serves as the vice president and director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security. Mr. Ratner served from 2015 to 2017 as the deputy national security advisor to Vice President Joe Biden, and from 2011 to 2012 in the Office of Chinese and Mongolian Affairs at the State Department. He also previously worked in the U.S. Senate as a professional staff member on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and in the office of Senator Joe Biden. 42:01 Dan Blumenthal: I have to state that the era of reform and opening in China is over. It’s been long over. It’s been over, probably for 10 years. And China is back to being run by state-owned enterprises that are related to the party. The private sector is diminishing. That provides the Chinese state with a lot more control over economic coercive policies. 49:27 Ely Ratner: First, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee should hold hearings on the cost and benefits of rejoining the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Rejoining TPP is among the most important things we can do to advance our economic position in Asia and erode the effectiveness of China’s economic coercion. By contrast, U.S. withdrawal has done substantial damage to our standing in the region and is facilitating the development of a Chinese sphere of influence in Asia and beyond. Rejoining TPP would renew confidence in the credibility and commitment of the United States, help to re-route supply chains in the region, open new markets for U.S. companies, and ultimately reduce China’s economic leverage. 56:28 Senator Ed Markey (MA): And through its Belt and Road Initiative, BRI, China is burdening countries receiving infrastructure loans with debts so extreme that they begin to undermine their own very sovereignty. According to a recent New York Times report, this Belt and Road Initiative amounts to a debt trap for vulnerable countries around the world, fueling corruption and autocratic behavior in struggling democracies. 59:30 Senator Cory Gardner (CO): Mr. Blumenthal, you mentioned in your opening statement, you talked about the economic opening in China being over. Could you go into a little bit more detail of what you mean by that? Dan Blumenthal: So, the period of reform and opening, which Deng Xiaoping began in 1978 and allowed for the great growth of China, the great growth of the private sector, private-sector entrepreneurs and brought so many Chinese out of poverty and benefitted the world, ended, probably 10 years ago, the Chinese we now know. The Chinese have gone back to the state sector dominating, taking out room for entrepreneurs to grow. They’ve gone back to things like price controls. They’ve gone back to things like lending on the basis of non-market, non-profitable lending but rather through patronage from the party to state-owned enterprises. They certainly haven’t moved any further than they were 10, 12 years ago on market access, things that we’ve been pressing for. They haven’t stopped subsidizing. In fact, they’ve doubled down on subsidizing their state-owned enterprises, which is probably the single biggest cause of probably the WTO stalling as much as it has. And Xi Jinping is certainly not taking China down the road of another round of market reforms—quite the contrary. He’s a statist and favoring state-owned enterprises and the subsidization of state-owned enterprises over the private sector. 1:11:42 Ely Ratner: China is going to use its economic clout to try to achieve its geopolitical aims, which include dividing American alliances and eroding the influence of the United States in the region. So I think that was a very important episode. It was very revealing. I think we can talk about trying to incorporate China into a rules-based order. I don’t think that’s where we’re going to be in the next several years. I think what we have to do is pull up our socks, get more competitive, slow down Chinese momentum in its efforts to develop this sphere of influence. That’s a much more urgent task than a long-term goal of developing a rules-based order. 1:13:44 Senator Todd Young (IN): Mr. Ratner, thanks for your testimony. As I reviewed your written statement, you seem to be making a pretty simple argument with very serious implications. In short, you seem to be saying we’re in a high-stakes competition with China, that China does not accept this rules-based international order we had hoped to welcome them into back in 2000. The legitimacy of that order and the institutions that were stood up to oversee that order are not respected by China. China, instead, respects power. And we as a nation have insufficient leverage, it seems, to be able to affect the sort of change we want with respect to intellectual-property theft, joint-licensing requirements, dumping, and so many other things. What we lack—and this is language you employed—is a comprehensive strategy. Is that a fair summary of your viewpoint, Mr. Ratner? Ely Ratner: Yes, sir. 1:21:05 Ely Ratner: When it looked like the United States was going to join the Trans-Pacific Partnership and that agreement was going to pass, the Chinese were starting to ask questions quietly at senior levels, with American officials about what they would need to do down the road to improve their practices to join that agreement, and obviously, those conversations are no longer happening today. 1:22:30 Senator Jeff Merkley (OR): Mr. Ratner, under WTO, is China allowed to offer subsidies to its businesses? Ely Ratner: Senator, I’m not a trade lawyer, so I can’t get into the weeds of WTO law, but I think the answer is no, and there’re several other dimensions in which they’re not in compliance with the agreement. Sen. Merkley: Under the WTO, China is required to do an annual report of all of its subsidies to different enterprises. Does it do that report? Ratner: I believe not, Senator. Sen. Merkley: So, when it fails to do the report, we are, under the WTO, allowed to do a report on their subsidies. I did an amendment a few years ago that said if China doesn’t produce a report, our trade representative will be directed to produce our report. And before that amendment, the ink could dry on it, our trade rep under President Obama produced a list of 200 Chinese subsidies, subsidies we’re well aware of but rarely kind of articulated. So that’s—so we certainly have an understanding of massive Chinese subsidies that are not allowed under WTO. How about to offer loans at non-market rates? Ratner: I believe not, sir. Sen. Merkley: Or to provide land for free as a form of subsidy? Ratner: I think that’s right, as well as forced technology transfer and a number of other practices. Sen. Merkley: And how about being required—for our companies to be required to locate in a particular part of China where the infrastructure is inferior to other locations? Ratner: Correct. Sen. Merkley: A couple years ago, when I was a part of a delegation to China, we were at a meeting of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce in which many of these practices were highlighted, but one company in particular stood up and said, and I won’t name the exact company because they probably didn’t want it too much publicized at the time, but they said they were basically told, we have to put our manufacturing center in this far-western city, far from the port infrastructure; we are told we cannot build any size of item that is in direct competition with the Chinese items; they were told they only could build larger versions that the Chinese weren’t yet building, or they would be shut down and shut out of the country. Is that type of activity by the Chinese legal under the WTO? Ratner: No, sir. Sen. Merkley: And what about requiring American companies to do joint-venture arrangements in order to be able to locate in China? Ratner: Also, not part of the agreement. Sen. Merkley: So, and you’re familiar with how these joint-venture agreements are often used as a way to drain U.S. technology? Ratner: Yes, sir. Sen. Merkley: So, what does one say to the American citizen who says, “China is violating all of these rules, and the WTO has no mechanism by which we appear to be able to hold them accountable. Why shouldn’t we work intensely to create an ability to hold China accountable to the structure of the WTO?” Ratner: I think that was the intention of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. 1:45:22 Senator Cory Gardner (CO): In recent writings in the Wall Street Journal, quotes from President Xi, China has its own ideas about how the world should be run, and as he put it, “to lead in the reform of global governance.” Another quote, or another statement, “in at least eight African countries, as well as some in Southeast Asia, Chinese officials are training their counterparts in how to manage political stability through propaganda and how to control media and the Internet,” and that the China model provides “a new option for other countries who want to speed up their development while preserving their independence.” And finally this: China has committed to train 10,000 political elites in Latin America by 2020. All of this speaks to the need for what you have described, Mr. Ratner, what you have described, Mr. Blumenthal, is U.S. leadership and U.S. response, whether it’s the BUILD Act, whether it’s legislation that Senator Young has described, the legislation that we have co-sponsored together—the Asia Reassurance Initiative Act. This is a time for U.S. leadership, and it’s a time to stand boldly for our values that have empowered the world to be a better place, that has lifted up hundreds of millions of people around the globe up and out of poverty through a system of rules and standards that don’t favor one country over another but that give people a chance to participate in global governance and that global rise. Hearing: The China Challenge, Part 2: Security and Military Developments, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity, Septemer 5, 2018. Witnesses: Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro: American Enterprise Institute Abraham Denmark: Director of the Asia Program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars Timestamps and Transcripts  27:50 Chairman Cory Gardner (CO): Our first witness is Dr. Oriana Skylar Mastro, who is the Jeane Kirkpatrick visiting scholar at the American Enterprise Institute where she focuses on Chinese military and security policy in the Asia Pacific. She is also assistant professor of Security Studies at the Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and serves in the United States Air Force Reserve as a political-military affairs strategist at Pacific air forces. Previously, Dr. Mastro was a fellow in the Asia-Pacific security program at the Center for a New American Security. 28:25 Chairman Cory Gardner (CO): Also joined on the panel by Abraham Denmark, who is director of the Asia program at the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. Prior to joining the Wilson Center, Mr. Denmark served as deputy assistant secretary of defense for East Asia, where he supported the secretary of defense and other U.S. senior government leaders in the formulation and implementation of national security strategies and defense policies toward the region. Mr. Denmark also previously worked as senior vice president for political and security affairs at the National Bureau of Asian Research, a fellow at the Center for a New American Security, and held several positions in the U.S. intelligence community. 42:40 Oriana Skylar Mastro: What China is doing is they’re exploiting gaps in the order. So, we talk about the U.S.-led international order and whether China is challenging it or not. But in reality, there’s many areas of the order that lacks certainty, or ambiguous, don’t have consensus. So I would label cybersecurity as one of these areas. And so what China does is it’s trying to build consensus or work on the periphery of the order. So, for example, when they did One Belt, One Road, and they initially moved to the central Asia, they weren’t challenging the United States, because the United States was not there. And so I would say that in addition to strengthening our relationship with traditional partners and allies, the United States needs to think more broadly about its relationships with countries around the globe. Also, in terms of the security initiative, I would recommend that we think more about demand not supply, in kind of business terms. You often, at least in my experience, you think about what the United States has to offer in terms of security assistance, and then we try to put together packages, whether it’s visits, port visits, or a rotation of a squadron or what have you, instead of looking at what those countries actually demand. And so we should move away from this model of increasing advertising and hoping that countries around the world will decide they want what we have to offer, and instead try to look at what they actually want and start supplying that. 1:05:45 Senator Ed Markey (MA): Should the United States abandon the rules-based international system, and what would the concessions be that we would try to extract in order to take such a step? Dr. Mastro. Oriana Skylar Mastro: So, sir, I don’t think we should abandon it. Instead, what I’m arguing for is an expansion of that system. I think that actually the international, is very limited. If you look at the definition, the party to that order, the amount of countries that actually might be involved in certain treaties, it’s not every country possible. For example, India has very different views on things like cybersecurity than the United States does. And so I think if we could manage to build consensus in these areas of uncertainty, we could actually shape China’s choices. And to that end, that gives the United States a lot of political power because the bottom line is one of the main differences between today and maybe 10 years ago is for the United States, the security benefits that we give to our partners, allies, in the region are no longer enough to outweigh the economic benefits that they get from interacting with China. And so we need a security-benefits-plus type of strategy in which we think also about the economic benefits, which is difficult under the current administration, given the trade policy, but also those political benefits by building new international institutions and building new norms and consensus around areas where that consensus has failed to date. 1:07:08 Chairman Cory Gardner (CO): Going back to the question I started to talk about, just the investments that China has made in South America, the investments China is making in Central America. If you look at investments in Panama, El Salvador, and at least apparently in El Salvador, as perhaps part of an agreement as it relates to the decision El Salvador made on Taiwan. Look at the sale of submarines to countries—Thailand—do we see that as continued opportunity for China’s military expansion? Will we see military basing affecting U.S. operations in Thailand? Will we see, perhaps, an opportunity for military entrance into Central America, into South America, China, basing, even, perhaps? Mr. Denmark. Abraham Denmark: Well, I think there’s a lot that remains to be seen. I don’t think there’s a definitive yes or no answer to that question, but I do expect that Djibouti be the first overseas base that China has established. I fully expect that that will not be the last. Where additional facilities may pop up remains to be seen. I personally would expect more facilities to be established along the trade routes from the Western Pacific, through the Indian Ocean, into the Middle East. I would expect to see more there than before I’d expect to see them in Latin America, primarily because of China’s economic interests, but it remains to be seen. 1:20:00 Senator Ed Markey (MA): In September of 2013, China began a concerted effort to build artificial islands in the South China Sea by crushing coral reefs into sand. It built land features where none previously existed. On top of that, China expanded small outposts into military bases capable of conducting operations. Admiral Philip Davidson, the commander of the United States Indo-Pacific Command, stated this year that China’s militarization of the Spratly Islands in the South China Sea means “China is now capable of controlling the South China Sea in all scenarios, short of a war with the United States.” Ms. Mastro, what considerations or challenges do these bases pose for other claimants and the United States in peacetime, in the gray zone, or in conflict? In other words, what are the implications of China’s military bases in the South China Sea? Oriana Skylar Mastro: So, militarily, sir, they expand the range of Chinese capabilities. And so I think I made the point previously that it’s difficult for us to conceive of fighting a war with China using our bases in Korea and Japan, and that’s primarily because of the range of conventional precision-guided munitions that China has that can reach those bases and render them inoperable. In the South China Sea, which is about the size of the United States, China’s power-projection capabilities historically have been quite limited. And in the report, for example, one thing that was highlighted was the H-6K, when it has ______(01:37), now China can extend its range to 3,300 kilometers. But if you actually have bases there, coupled with carriers, then China’s able to sustain combat sorties, for example, for longer periods of time and at farther ranges than it was before. And this is what allows it to be able to control, as the quote suggested, large areas of the South China Sea, the air, and the sea. I would just mention on the gray-zone side, that China can engage in gray-zone activities only because the United States allows it to. There’s nothing that, as far as I understand it, there’s nothing that tells us that, for example, if China says, “Well, this is a Coast Guard,” that we can’t respond with the use of the U.S. Navy. We are too concerned about escalation, and China knows this. They don’t believe in miscalculation and in inadvertent escalation, and so they use this to their advantage. And we should start being very clear about what our redlines are and, obviously, being then able to follow through with that. 1:42:30 Senator Ed Markey (MA): I just have one final area of questioning, if I may, and that just goes back to the Belt and Road Initiative which has resulted in a very generous policy by China of loaning money to countries, which they then can’t pay back, which then results in China being able to extract huge long-term concessions from those countries. Sri Lanka, just a perfect example where they’ve now had to give up a 99-year lease to the Chinese company, which is partially owned by the Chinese government, 15,000 acres of land. And now it appears there are more countries that are deciding to reconsider how far in debt they want their countries or companies to be to a Chinese entity. But at the same time, President Xi, just in the last few days has announced a new $60 billion program—grants, loans—around the world, on top of the $60 billion program that they’ve had in the past that now has these consequences. So, what are the implications for the United States, for global security, of these Chinese strategies in country after country to gain access, or control over, ports in countries? And what would you recommend to the United States that we do to try to make sure that we minimize the ability of this Belt and Road program to build economic and security relationships with companies in a way almost giving them offers they can’t refuse so they become deeper indebted and more entangled into Chinese foreign policy objectives? 1:48:09 Abraham Denmark: The initiative announced several weeks ago by Secretary of State Pompeo in this vein to enhance U.S. engagement, economic engagement, in these areas I thought was a good indication of seeing the problem and trying to address it, not trying to copy the Chinese system, but playing to American strengths of the free market and American corporations. Hearing: The China Challenge, Part 3: Democracy, Human Rights, and the Rule of Law, Senate Foreign Relations Subcommittee on East Asia, the Pacific, and International Cybersecurity, December 4, 2018. Watch on C-SPAN Witnesses: Laura Stone: Acting Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of East Asian and Pacific Affairs at the US Department of State Scott Busby: Deputy Assistant Secretary for Human Rights and Labor at the US Department of State Gloria Steele: Acting Assistant Administrator, Bureau for Asia at USAID Timestamps and Transcripts  01:23:05 Senator Ed Markey (MA): Around the world, all countries, including the United States, rely on the rules-based international order to underpin security and prosperity to help provide a level playing field, to provide the maximum opportunity for the greatest number of people, and to defend and protect certain fundamental rights. So it is of the utmost importance that we do everything in our power to ensure that this system remains. 01:30:00 Senator Cory Gardner (CO): Our first witness is Scott Busby, who serves as deputy assistant secretary of state at the Bureau of the Human Right, Democracy, and Labor. Previously, he served as director for human rights on the National Security Council in the White House from 2009 to 2011, where he managed a wide range of human rights and refugee issues. 01:36:20 Scott Busby: My bureau, DRL, is implementing $10 million of FY 2018 economic support funds to support human rights in China, just as we have done for the past several years. Nevertheless, such programs are increasingly challenged by the difficult operating environment in China, including the new and highly restrictive foreign NGO management law. 1:59:58 Senator Marco Rubio (FL): And then you see sort of what the global reaction has been to it, and there’s reason to be concerned that this post-World War II, pro-democracy, pro-human rights, global norms are being eroded and reshaped and that China is using its geopolitical heft and its economic power to push it in that direction. Meeting: Press availability at the 51st ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting and related meetings, August 4, 2018. Speaker: Secretary of State Mike Pompeo Timestamps and Transcripts  1:15 Secretary of State Mike Pompeo: "Throughout my ASEAN-centered engagements these past days I’ve conveyed President Trump’s commitment to this vital part of the world that continues to grow in importance. Security has been a major focus of our conversations. As part of our commitment to advancing regional security in the Indo-Pacific, the United States is excited to announce nearly $300 million in new funding to reinforce security cooperation throughout the entire region.” 4:50 - Secretary of State Mike Pompeo: "As I said earlier this week, the United States practices partnership economics; we seek partnership, not dominance. Earlier this week at the Indo-Pacific Business Forum hosted by the United States Chamber of Commerce, I outlined the Trump administration’s economic strategy for advancing a free and open Indo-Pacific, and I talked about why U.S. businesses’ engagement in the region is crucial to our mission of promoting peace, stability, and prosperity. There is no better force for prosperity in the world than American businesses. When nations partner with American firms, they can have confidence they are working with the most scrupulous, well-run, and transparent companies in the world. As a down payment on a new era in American economic commitment to a free and open Indo-Pacific, I announced at the forum $113 million in new U.S. Government resources to support foundational areas of the future: the digital economy, energy, and infrastructure. In addition, the Trump administration is working with Congress to encourage the passage of the BUILD Act. It recently passed the U.S. House of Representatives and now before the United States Senate. Under this bill, the government’s development finance capacity would more than double to $60 billion to support U.S. private investment in strategic opportunities abroad." Meeting: Beyond NAFTA and GATT, National Association Southern Center, April 20, 1994. Speaker: Arthur Dunkel - Director of the UN Wrote the “Dunkel Draft” in 1991, a 500 page general outline of what became the WTO 3 years later - it’s basically the WTO’s Constitution “Retired” from GATT in 1993, became a “trade consultant”, and served on the board of Nestle Is a registered WTO dispute panelist Transcript  Arthur Dunkel: If I look back at the last 25 years, what did we have? We had two worlds: The so-called Market Economy world and the sadly planned world; the sadly planned world disappeared. One of the main challenges of the Uruguay round has been to create a world wide system. I think we have to think of that. Secondly, why a world wide system? Because, basically, I consider that if governments cooperate in trade policy field, you reduce the risks of tension - political tension and even worse than that." Additional Reading Article: Disney sets out international leadership team post-Fox deal by Stewart Clarke, Variety, December 13, 2018. Article: IMF delays Sri Lanka's loan discussion on political crisis, Reuters, November 20, 2018. Annual Report: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, USCC.gov, November 14, 2018. Article: Sri Lanka's political shake-up is a win for China by Bharath Gopalaswamy, Foreign Policy, October 29, 2018. Article: Sri Lanka to secure sixth tranche of $250 million IMF's EFF, Press Reader, Sunday Times (Sri Lanka) October 14, 2018. Article: The BUILD Act has passed: What's next? CSIS, October 12, 2018. Article: Power play: Addressing China's belt and road strategy by Daniel Kliman and Abigail Grace, CNAS, September 20, 2018. Article: Taiwan's monthly minimum wage to increase by 5% in 2019 by Keoni Everington, Taiwan News, September 6, 2018. Fact Sheet: U.S. security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region, U.S. Department of State, August 4, 2018. Article: Treasury weakens donor disclosure requirements for some nonprofits by Michael Wyland, Nonprofit Quarterly, July 18, 2018. Article: China is doing the same things to Sri Lanka that Great Britain did to China after the opium wars by Panos Mourdoukoutas, Forbes, June 28, 2018. Article: Chinese firm pays $584 million to secure 99-year lease of Sri Lanka port by Reuters, GCaptain, June 26, 2018. Article: How China go Sri Lanka to cough up a port by Maria Abi-Habib, The New York Times, June 25, 2018. Article: China's use of cercive economic measures by Peter Harrell, Elizabeth Rosenberg, and Edoardo Saravalle, CNAS, June 11, 2018. Article: China's military escalation by The Editorial Board, WSJ, June 4, 2018. Article: China owns US debt, but how much? by Investopedia, April 6, 2018. Article: China's military facilities in South China Sea 'almost ready' by Raul Dancel, The Straits Times, February 6, 2018. Report: China's economic rise: History, trends, challenges, and implications for the United States by Wayne M. Morrison, Congressional Research Service, February 5, 2018. Article: U.S. leadership needed in the Asia-Pacific by James W. Fatheree, U.S. Chamber of Commerce, November 17, 2017. Article: China's new island-building ship raises the stakes in South China Sea by Dan Southerland, Radio Free Asia, November 10, 2017. Report: Taiwan: Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, October 30, 2017. Article: Inside the fight for OPIC reauthorization by Adva Saldinger, devex, February 21, 2017. News Release: Charles A Kupchan and Ely Ratner join CFR as Senior Fellows, Council on Foreign Relations, February 15, 2017. News Report: PG&E receives maximum sentence for 2010 San Bruno explosion by Kate Larsen, ABC 7 News, January 26, 2017. Article: Lockheed Martin scores $395M DHS security operations center contract by Billy Mitchell, Fed Scoop, September 9, 2016. Article: Terror in Little Saigon by A.C. Thompson, ProPublica, November 3, 2015. Article: Taiwan multinationals serving a broader role by Molly Reiner, Taiwan Business TOPICS, October 28, 2015. Article: China's island factory by Rupert Wingfield-Hayes, BBC News, September 9, 2014. Article: Why was the Dalai Lama hanging out with the right-wing American Enterprise Institute? by David Rose, Vanity Fair, February 26, 2014. Article: The secret foreign donor behind the American Enterprise Institute by Eli Clifton, The Nation, June 25, 2013. Article: Inside the secretive dark-money organization that's keeping the lights on for conservative groups by Walt Hickey, Business Insider, February 12, 2013. Article: How Beijing won Sri Lanka's civil war, Independent, May 23, 2010. Article: The one-year review: Obama's Asia policies by Daniel Blumenthal, Foreign Policy, November 3, 2009. Article: Former high-ranking Bush officials enjoy war profits by Tim Shorrock, Salon, May 29, 2008. Report: ChoicePoint sold to LexisNexis parent, Atlanta Business Chronicle, February 21, 2008. Article: Scientists offered cash to dispute climate study by Ian Sample, The Guardian, February 2, 2007. Article: The man who said to much by Michael Isikoff, Newsweek, September 3, 2006. Article: Put a tiger in your think tank, Mother Jones, May/June 2005 Article: What I didn't find in Africa by Joseph C. Wilson, The New York Times, July 6, 2003. Article: Armitage is ready to step into ring by Steven Mufson, The Washington Post, February 14, 2001. Article: Advocacy and lobbying without fear: what is allowed within a 501(c)(3) charitable organization by Thomas Raffa, Nonprofit Quarterly, September 21, 2000. Resources About Page: The CNA Coporation About Page: Kasowitz Benson Torres LLP About Page: The National Bureau of Asian Research About Page: Oriana Skylar Mastro AEI Scholar List: Dan Blumenthal AEI Scholar List: Oriana Skylar Mastro Alexander Hamilton Society: Our Principles American Enterprise Institute: Annual Report 2017 American Enterprise Institute: Board of Trustees American Enterprise Institute: Jeane Kirkpatrick Fellowship and Scholars Program American Enterprise Institute: Leadership American Enterprise Institute: Scholars Armitage International: Our Team Biography: Scott Busby, Deputy Asst. Secretary, Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor Cambridge University Press: Think Tanks, Public Policy, and the Politics of Expertise Center for New American Security: About CNAS Center for New American Security: Victoria Nuland, CEO CRS Report: U.S. Security Assistance and Security Cooperation Programs Center for Strategic & International Studies: Richard L. Armitage, Trustee Interactive Map: China Belt and Road Initiative IRS: Exemption Requirements - 501 (c)(3) Organizations LinkedIn Account: Oriana Skylar Mastro LinkedIn Account: Scott Busby LinkedIn Account: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Lockheed Martin: Board Members - Daniel F. Akerson OpenSecrets: American Enterprise Institute Park Hotels & Resorts: Board of Directors ManTech: Mission, Vision, and Values Report to Congress: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission, November 2018 Right Web: American Enterprise Institute Search Results: Paul | Weiss Professionals Security Cooperation Programs: Fiscal Year 2017 Handbook Special Emergency Authorities Ukraine Security Assistance Initiative SourceWatch: American Enterprise Institute Ties to the Koch Brothers SourceWatch Infographic: Donors Trust Infographic Tesla Investors: James Murdoch Biography Website: American Enterprise Institute Website: Chartwell Strategy Group Website: CNAS Website: U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission Website: Wilson Center Whitehouse Publication: National Security Strategy of the United States of America, December 2017 Wilson Center: Abraham Denmark Wilson Center: Corporate Council World Trade Organization: Overview and Future Direction, updated Nov 29, 2018 Community Suggestions See more Community Suggestions HERE. Cover Art Design by Only Child Imaginations Music Presented in This Episode Intro & Exit: Tired of Being Lied To by David Ippolito (found on Music Alley by mevio)

Ely Ratner, Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security, sat down to discuss America's relationship with China and whether it can rise peacefully.  The post In The Arena – Episode 9: Ely Ratner appeared first on McCain Institute.

Ely Ratner, Vice President and Director of Studies at the Center for a New American Security, sat down to discuss America's relationship with China and whether it can rise peacefully.  The post In The Arena – Episode 9: Ely Ratner appeared first on McCain Institute.

In this episode, we analyze the origin and impact of a Sino-American trade war. As the trading relationship between Washington and Beijing spirals into conflict and protectionism, we are joined by two CSIS experts, Matthew Goodman, Simon Chair in Political Economy, and William Reinsch, Scholl Chair in International Business, to discuss what a trade war actually is, the impact of President Trump’s Section 232 tariffs, the types of tools China and the U.S. can use in this fight, and potential constraints on escalation. Matt and Bill also explain where this leaves the multilateral institutions that govern trade and project the likelihood of miscalculation on either side. Then Dr. Scott Kennedy, director of the Project on Chinese Business and Political Economy at the CSIS Freeman Chair in China Studies, bats cleanup to assess Section 301 penalties that President Trump has imposed, countermeasures from the Chinese leadership, and whether the U.S. and China are truly ready for a full-on trade conflict. Hosted by Will Colson. Audio edited by Ribka Gemilangsari. Written and produced by Jeffrey Bean. To learn more, please see analysis from our experts: A Better Way to Challenge China on Trade | Foreign Affairs by Matthew Goodman & Ely Ratner here. Section 301, Tariffs, and Chinese Trade and Investment | CSIS by Stephanie Segal & William Reinsch here. Surviving March Madness in U.S.-China Trade Relations | CSIS by Scott Kennedy here. Is the U.S. Ready for a Trade War? | Yale Global by Scott Kennedy here. The Shifting Politics of Trade | CSIS by William Reinsch here. Finding the Right Off-ramp from the Trade War | CSIS by Claire Reade here. To read the details of President Trump’s announcements on U.S. trade policy see Section 232 here, Section 301 here.

Two key strategy documents released by the Trump administration signal the United States is finally gearing up for a new era of great power competition. And China is the most daunting competitor on the horizon. Is this the right move? Is the president on board? Are America's allies up for it? What would a war of choice in North Korea do to a Sino-American competition? How can and should America compete politically, economically, and militarily? Was it naive to expect China to become a responsible stakeholder to begin with?   To answer these questions and more, Kelly Magsamen of the Center for American Progress and Ely Ratner of the Council on Foreign Relations sat down with Ryan at WOTR HQ with the aid of three kinds of whisk(e)y. Both Kelly and Ely drew on their experiences in the Obama administration, in which they both served in senior capacities.     Produced by: Tre Hester

In this episode we discuss altering the U.S. policy approach to the South China Sea. Where does the South China Sea rank in the pecking order of U.S. policy interests? How much risk should America be willing to take over these disputed waters? These are just some of the key questions U.S. policymakers, diplomats, military personnel, and wonks have wrestled with over the last eight years. In this joint CogitAsia-AMTI podcast, you’ll hear from Dr. Ely Ratner, Maurice R. Greenberg senior fellow for China studies at the Council on Foreign Relations, and Dr. Amy Searight, senior adviser and director of the Southeast Asia Program at CSIS. Listen as they discuss the background and assumptions animating a recent article Ely published in Foreign Affairs arguing that time is running out to stop China’s advances in the South China Sea. Hosted by Will Colson. Audio edited by Bryce Thompson. Written and produced by Jeffrey Bean. Read Ely Ratner’s article in Foreign Affairs here. Watch or listen to the full seventh annual CSIS South China Sea Conference proceedings here.  

China's military modernization and maritime assertiveness present challenges for the U.S.-China relationship. Middle powers can play a meaningful role in encouraging more constructive Chinese participation in maintaining international security.