Podcasts about Guanxi

Conheça a realidade chinesa dos negócios e faça networking com executivos e empresas chinesas na *Missão China* da StartSe: https://eventosstartse.typeform.com/to/MGewCeOR?utm_source=imersao_china&utm_medium=youtube&utm_campaign=hora_da_china&utm_term=EP_03&typeform-source=www.youtube.com NESTE EPISÓDIO: Prepare-se para mergulhar em uma conversa fascinante sobre os bastidores da relação Brasil-China! Nosso convidado é o Dr. Samuel Liao, advogado formado na China com mais de 20 anos de experiência em negociações internacionais e jurídicas. Ele compartilha histórias reais sobre como a cultura chinesa de confiança (Guanxi) é determinante para fechar negócios, além de revelar os desafios que empresas chinesas enfrentam ao investir no Brasil – e vice-versa. Você vai descobrir também a estratégia por trás dos investimentos bilionários em infraestrutura e tecnologia, o impacto da governança jurídica nos negócios globais e dicas valiosas para empreendedores que querem explorar as oportunidades com a segunda maior economia do mundo. Se você quer entender o que realmente move as grandes parcerias internacionais e o que podemos aprender com o modelo chinês de inovação e crescimento, este episódio é imperdível! Assista agora e compartilhe sua opinião nos comentários!

In this weeks episode Sarah dives into 2 essential concepts for working successfully in the Chinese market: Relationship building and mutual respect. 2025 Is the year of the snake and acknowledging this can make a positive impression. Grab a coffee and let's take a look at how we can navigate these concepts with ease

"But what I didn't realize is that the main reason they wanted us in China was so that they could study our business model and figure out how to copy it over time. And that was something I wasn't expecting, but I should have. If I were less naive, And if I were better prepared, I would have realized that was the intention. So the original title, the working title I had for my book, which I had to change because the publisher didn't like it, my original title was 'One Bed, Two Dreams' (同床异梦).   Because that's a phrase that most Chinese are familiar with." - Ken Wilcox Fresh out of the studio, Ken Wilcox, former CEO of Silicon Valley Bank and author of "The China Business Conundrum", shares his experiences establishing Silicon Valley Bank's joint venture in China, uncovering the challenges of navigating cultural differences, guanxi, and examine China's playbook in bringing successful foreign ventures onshore. He reflects on lessons learned, from differing views on contracts and negotiation tactics to the complexities of building trust in a new business landscape and offers invaluable advice for Western companies eyeing the Chinese market. Last but not least, he concludes by sharing his hopes for the book's impact, emphasizing the importance of understanding and collaboration between the East and West. Audio Episode Highlights: [00:00] Quote of the Day by Ken Wilcox [01:66] Ken Wilcox's career journey and transition to China. [06:35] Life and leadership lessons. [09:47] The One Thing that Ken knows about Doing Business in China that very few do. [12:40] Importance of Silicon Valley Bank in China. [17:12] Cultural and regulatory challenges in China. [26:10] Understanding guanxi in Chinese business. [37:51] Adapting to China and reverse culture shock. [40:14] The Chinese negotiating style centres on leverage and power. [48:37] What happened to the joint venture post-SVB crisis? [53:10] Contrasts in negotiation styles between China and the U.S. [54:51] What does success mean for The China Business Conundrum? [56:18] Recent book recommendations. [57:52] Final reflections on time spent in China. Profile: Ken Wilcox, Author of "The China Business Conundrum: Ensure That "Win-Win" Doesn't Mean Western Companies Lose Twice" Main Site: https://kenwilcoxauthor.com/ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/kenwilcoxsvb/ Substack: https://kenwilcoxauthor.substack.com/ Amazon: https://www.amazon.com/China-Business-Conundrum-Win-Win-Companies/dp/1394294166/ Podcast Information: Bernard Leong hosts and produces the show. Proper credits for the intro and end music: "Energetic Sports Drive" and the episode is mixed & edited in both video and audio format by G. Thomas Craig Analyse Asia Main Site: https://analyse.asia Analyse Asia Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/1kkRwzRZa4JCICr2vm0vGl Analyse Asia Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/analyse-asia-with-bernard-leong/id914868245 Analyse Asia YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@AnalyseAsia Analyse Asia LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/analyse-asia/ Analyse Asia X (formerly known as Twitter): https://twitter.com/analyseasia Analyse Asia Threads: https://www.threads.net/@analyseasia Sign Up for Our This Week in Asia Newsletter: https://www.analyse.asia/#/portal/signup Subscribe Newsletter on LinkedIn https://www.linkedin.com/build-relation/newsletter-follow?entityUrn=7149559878934540288

Ken Wilcox, former CEO of Silicon Valley Bank, discusses his book "The China Business Conundrum" and the challenges of doing business in China. He explains the concept of "one bed, two dreams," highlighting the disparity in goals between western and Chinese joint venture partners. Wilcox details his bank's entry into China, emphasizing the strategic invitations and control exerted by the Chinese Communist Party. He recounts the extensive regulations and control mechanisms, including a three-year restriction on using Chinese currency. Despite the challenges, Wilcox values the experience, noting the complex interdependence between the U.S. and China.If you have any questions, comments, or suggestions for Gene, please email him at contact@economicsexplored.com  or send a voice message via https://www.speakpipe.com/economicsexplored. About this episode's guest: Ken WilcoxKen Wilcox was the CEO of Silicon Valley Bank (SVB) from 2001 to 2011, then the CEO of SVB's joint venture with Shanghai Pudong Development Bank (SPDB-SVB) in Shanghai until 2015, followed by four years as its Vice Chairman. He currently serves on the boards of the AsiaSociety of Northern California, the Asian Art Museum, and UC San Diego's 21st Century China Center, as well as Columbia Lake Partners, a European venture-debt fund. He is on the Board of Advisors of the Fudan University School of Management in Shanghai and an Adjunct Professor at U.C. Berkeley.Ken holds a PhD in German from Ohio State University and an MBA from Harvard Business School. He has given numerous speeches in both English and Chinese, published a variety of articles in the banking press, and recently wrote the management book Leading Through Culture: How Real Leaders Create Cultures That Motivate People to Achieve Great Things (Waterside Productions, 2020) and its accompanying workbook, How About You? (Waterside Productions, 2023). His account of establishing an innovation bank in China, The China Business Conundrum: Ensure that Win-Win Doesn't Mean Western Companies Lose Twice, is forthcoming from Wiley.To connect with Ken, please visit: www.linkedin.com/in/kenwilcoxsvb/Timestamps for EP259Introduction and Overview of the Podcast (0:00)Ken Wilcox's Journey into China (4:40)Challenges and Strategic Invitations in China (8:10)Guanxi and Corruption in Business Relationships (14:13)State Control and Joint Venture Challenges (20:42)Impact of SVB's Collapse and Final Reflections (40:02)TakeawaysJoint ventures in China often suffer from differing goals between Western companies and their Chinese partners, a phenomenon Ken Wilcox refers to as "One Bed, Two Dreams."The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) holds significant control over both private and state-owned companies, making it difficult for foreign businesses to operate independently.Guanxi, a system of mutual obligation and trust, plays a critical role in business relationships in China, but it often involves navigating corruption and complex social expectations.Foreign companies entering China are often targeted for their intellectual property, and the CCP uses strategic partnerships to gain technological insights.Ken Wilcox's experience with Silicon Valley Bank in China illustrates the frustrations foreign firms face due to slow regulatory processes and overwhelming state control.Links relevant to the conversationKen's book “The China Business Conundrum”:https://www.amazon.com.au/China-Business-Conundrum-Win-Win-Companies/dp/1394294166Previous Economics Explored episodes on China:China's Economic Future Under Xi & the Australia-China Relationship w/ Emmanuel Daniel – EP253 https://economicsexplored.com/2024/09/17/chinas-economic-future-under-xi-the-australia-china-relationship-w-emmanuel-daniel-ep253/Enterprise China: what western businesses need to know w/ Prof. Allen Morrison  – EP171https://economicsexplored.com/2022/12/26/enterprise-china-what-western-businesses-need-to-know-w-prof-allen-morrison-ep171/Why we're in the Decisive Decade with China & what the West should do w/ Dr Jonathan D. T. Ward – EP182https://economicsexplored.com/2023/04/09/why-were-in-the-decisive-decade-with-china-what-the-west-should-do-w-dr-jonathan-d-t-ward-ep182/China, Taiwan & the Indo-Pacific w/ Dr Greta Nabbs-Keller – EP146https://economicsexplored.com/2022/07/04/china-taiwan-the-indo-pacific-w-dr-greta-nabbs-keller-ep146/Lumo Coffee promotion10% of Lumo Coffee's Seriously Healthy Organic Coffee.Website: https://www.lumocoffee.com/10EXPLOREDPromo code: 10EXPLORED 

Has the nature of Guanxi changed in the post-COVID era of doing business in China?Thirteen years ago, my personal driver in Shanghai invited my wife and me to a lavish, relatively speaking, dinner party to celebrate my birthday with his relatives. This dinner celebration is unusual for any Western leader assigned a driver in China because these drivers usually lack the Guanxi or cultural incentive to suggest such a gesture to their clients. In the Chinese hierarchical system, the higher-level person usually organizes and pays for these occasions.Why did my driver, XiaoHe (小何), insist on this overture, and what were the reciprocal personal benefits, referred to 利益 (Lìyì), in Chinese?#ChinaBusiness #ChineseCulture #Covid19 #Psychology #Communications #China #CCP #USChina #Tradewar #Geopoliticshttp://provocativechina.com/

Last time we spoke about the Anti-Fengtian War. The Anti-Fengtian War included two major theaters, the Zhejiang-Fengtian War and the Guominjun-Fengtian War. Within China's north, Feng Yuxiang brokered many sneaky deals with other warlords, trying to bring down Zhang Zuolin. One of these warlords was the disgruntled Guo Songling who led a brave or some would say idiotic rebellion, striking at the heart of the Fengtian empire. Feng Yuxiang failed to really exploit Guo Songling's actions, and Wu Peifu ended up joining Zhang Zuolin, simply out of spite for Feng Yuxiang. The war between the Guominjun and Fengtian soon fell apart for Feng Yuxiang as his forces were gradually dislodged from the Beijing area into northwest China. In an ironic case of deja vu, Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu found themselves again working together in Beijing. Little did they know, while they had been fighting in the north, it was the south where real danger lay.   #110 The Northern Expedition Part 1: Invading Hunan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we have now come to a point where the warlord era takes a sharp turn. While we have been talking about countless wars between numerous factions, this is basically the end game as they say. I have no idea how many episodes it will take, so I apologize in advance, but we are going to be covering the Northern Expedition. I've probably mentioned it a hundred times by this point, the northern expedition. Dr Sun Yat-Sens brainchild, put simply build an army and march north to reunify China. Sounds kind of insane given the disparity in strength between whose in the north and south eh?  Facing what can only be described as staggering odds, the Kuomintang over in their separate government based out of Guangzhou suddenly began the most incredible military expedition of the warlord era. On the verge of disintegration with inadequate materials, most of which were coming from the Soviets, the military campaign was a gamble to say the least. Chiang Kai-Shek was ultimately counting on the weakness of his enemies rather than his own NRA forces. His Soviet advisors all told him not to do it, that it would be a terrible blunder. Now if you open up text books, read contemporary buzzfeed like artiles or watch youtube shorts, they would have you believe the northern expedition was this easy sweep northward led by a vanguard of Communist propagandist forces. In reality it was a series of hard fought battles where either side could have knocked out the other completely.  Now for most of its life, this Guangzhou based cabal that the KMT were in control of, had always been on the defensive. For the most part their secure powerbase was Guangdong and from there they would gradually conquer region after region, one by one. Something that can truly be said about the KMT, unlike the other factions, take the Fengtian or Zhili for example was its strong sense of having an ideology and its charismatic strong man at the head of its army. There was of course personal armies within the NRA, they were more or less a confederation, but the ideology of the KMT glued them all together. The other factions, perhaps excluding the Guominjun, simply did not have this. There was a shared concern that the political make up of China needed to be democratic and not devolve into the traditional or imperial autocracies that had plagued China for so long.  The first region Chiang Kai-Shek would target would be the rich middle Yangtze provinces of Hubei and Hunan, both of which had recently come back under the dominion of the Jade Marshal Wu Peifu. The route the NRA would take would be through Hunan and Hubei, down the Yangtze and up into the North China plain before finally marching upon Beijing. Ironically it was an identical path, one Hong Xiuquan once took when he rallied the Taiping against the Qing Dynasty. To first invade Hunan, Chiang Kai-Shek faced a rather daunting task. He did not have the military power to simply defeat the warlords of the province. He needed to exploit the political scene within it. Prior to the northern expedition, Hunan was dominated by northern warlords who were alien to the southern province. This of course antagonized the local populations creating an unstable political environment. This was something the KMT could manipulate. The KMT's nationalistic ideology was something that could potentially win over allies or weaken petty warlords rule. The KMT could exploit local interests and provincialism, self rule movements and such. When the KMT looked at Hunan they could see an ongoing power struggle. The Hunanese gentry class was being kept alive purely upon a desire for provincial autonomy. The governor Chao Hengti, a Hunanese native was subordinate to Wu Peifu, a Shandong native. By 1926 a conflict had emerged between 4 Hunanese divisional commanders. Chao Hengti favored Yue Kaixin the strongest of them controlling the Hunanese 3rd division. Chao Hengti sought to weaken the rest and used Yue to weaken the second largest 4th division led by Tang Shengchih.Tang Shengchih dominated southwestern Hunan and went on the defensive when he figured out the Governor and Yue were after him. The KMT noticed this over in Guangdong. Now political intervention in Hunan required personal connections. Within the KMT party membership were Hunanese civilians and military officials. This was one of the great strengths of the KMT as a clique, how their political membership transcended provincial or regional bases. Similar to the CCP, who had those like Mao Zedong working with the rural masses in Hunan, the KMT had ties to those at some of the top echelons of the province's power structure. One leading KMT figure who pushed for the northern expedition was Tan Yenkai who also had been the governor of Hunan after the 1911 revolution. He had always maintained an interest in Hunan and while in Guangdong had rallied a 15,000 men strong force of Hunanese troops, now renamed the 2nd army of the NRA. Prior to 1926 Tan Yenkai had already led one military campaign to retake Hunan for Dr Sun Yat-Sen. Back in 1924, when Sun Yat-Sen was trying to form a coalition with northern powers, Tan Yenkai launched a rather ill-conceived and short lived campaign, trying to bolster Sun's position in Beijing. Another commander in Jiangxi had pushed Tan Yenkai's force back into Guangdong and the failure provided quite the lesson, that one should also exploit the political realm alongside the military.  By spring of 1926 Chiang Kai-Shek and his top subordinates began planning an invasion of Hunan. Aside for the ex-governor Tan Yenkai, the KMT also had ties to Tang Shengchih. Liu Wentao and Chen Mingshu had been classmates of Tang Shengchih back at the Baoting Military academy in 1912. In 1925 they began reconnecting with the man, arranging a propaganda tour of the province. Liu Wentao, then a professor of political science, began touring China, lecturing all on the Three People's Principles of the KMT. Tang Shenchich went to one of these speeches and many of his men as well. There was also Pai Chungxi, another schoolmate of Tang Shenchih, the leader of the 7th Jiangxi Army of the NRA. The KMT also had loose connections with the hunan divisional commander Ho Yaotsu who was friends with Cheng Chien, a hunanese native and the commander of the 6th NRA army, primarily consisting of Hunanese troops. Now Chiang Kai-Shek began courting Governor Chao Hengti in June of 1926. He approached the man as a fellow member of the older Kuomintang party, pleading in a telegram that they should reunite into a new national movement. Obviously Chiang Kai-shek was making a powerplay to try and win over Hunan without shedding blood, he did not stop sending messages to the man even a week before the shells would fly. In southern Hunan at this time, Tang Shengchih was dominating the Hsiang valley with his 9000 man strong division. Tang Shengchih was a pretty intelligent player. He had numerous connections from his Baoting academy days and he managed to expand his domain to include 27 of Hunans 75 tax-collection districts. However by early 1926 Governor Chao had ordered all 4 Hunan divisional commanders to remit the local taxes they gathered to the provincial capital of Changsha. Obviously this was to centralize the power, and such revenue losses would strangle Tang Shengchih's power. So Tang Shengchih began talks with the KMT as early as february of 1926. It was a dangerous play, many had seen the numerous cases where inviting allies from another province only brought unwelcome guests. Perhaps Tang Shengchih believed by gaining some KMT support, he might be able to overpower Chao Hengti. But he was no idiot, he asked for KMT assurance he would fill the role of governorship and not someone like Tan Yenkai who indeed was lurking in the shadows. Tang Shengchih was given said assurance and signed an alliance treaty on February 24th. When Tang Shengchih unleashed his forces against Governor Chao Hengtai the same month, it was perfect timing. Wu Peifu was preoccupied in north China fighting Feng Yuxiang, thus the governor had no reinforcements. Threatened, Chao Hengti immediately fled Changsha, heading north. While this was occurring, Tang Shengchih labeled the governor nothing but a northern puppet of Wu Peifu. From February to March of 1926 Chiang Kai-Shek was still struggling for authority over the KMT to launch the Northern Expedition. Thus Tang Shengchih's rebellion had preceded it, and was done without KMT resources. Still feeling confident Tang Shengchih began marching into northern Hunan. Back over in Guangzhou, the KMT commissioner of foreign affairs notified everyone that Tang was doing this all on his own, none of their resources had reached him yet. When Tang Shengchih secured Changsha in mid march, a lot of the hunanese gentry began supporting his cause to be governor. Tang Shengchih's forces then overran Yochou along Hunan's northern border. Tang Shengchih had not yet accepted the governorship position, in march he was still looking to see how the KMT alliance would pan out. Yet in March tensions emerged within the KMT over the northern expedition The March 20th coup certainly expedited aid to Tang Shengchih. 5 Days after, Tang Shengchih accepted governorship and with his new position he proceeded to purge his political enemies from the provinces administration while installing his friends. By late March 1926, Wu Peifu finally responded to the threat to his hegemony over Hunan. He began threatening to return south with his Honanese troops. Now Wu Peifu's armies were still facing Feng Yuxiang at this time, but the KMT aid also had not come yet so Tang Shengchih paused. Tang Shengchih began playing down his ties to the KMT in responding to Wu Peifu, posing as a mere neutral. In early april of 1926, Feng Yuxiang had been cast out of the North China plain and now Wu Peifu had a free hand to play against the rebellion in Hunan. Tang Shengchih now under real threat, began recalling his regiments from northern Hunan and evacuated his forces from Changsha as he built a defense in his home valley.  To deal with the menace, Wu Peifu looked to find a Hunanese local to manage the province for him. Wu Peifu turned to the Hunanese 3rd division commander, Yue Kaixin, to make him military governor and commander of the 1st division, with Ho Yaotsu to be civil governor. However the Hunanese gentry cried out immediately at this, stating they would not allow him to overturn their authority. Thwarted, Wu Peifu reverted to violence to pacify the troublesome province. In May, Tang Shengchih suffered a major defeat and was forced to fall back on the defense as Wu Peifu's Hunanese allies were battering him. Until NRA forces advanced into the province, there was little hope for Tang Shengchih and his crumbling defenses within the Xiang valley. Thousands of men from the NRA's 4th and 7th armies began to arrive in late May, but even so they were outnumbered in southern Hunan. It was not until June 2nd, when Tang Shengchih finally caved and accepted the offer from Chiang Kai-Shek to be the commander of the 8th NRA army. Thus Tang Shengchih went from leading a division to an army and his regimental commanders became division commanders. It was also of course a substantial pay raise. This was the type of model the NRA would adopt throughout the Northern Expedition. If you can't beat them, buy them. Just a few days later, the NRA forces within Hunan accepted Tang Shengchih as their front line commander. Tang Shengchih then proclaimed he would head a provisional Hunan government as its governor in the name of the KMT government.  The KMT had done a lot to win over the Hunanese people. The Hunanese people wanted autonomy, so the KMT flouted notions of provincial autonomy with a federal system. It was a marriage of convenience. Another major carrot was promising to end the tyranny of the northern warlords and the exploitation of the foreign imperialists. Some began to refer to the Northern Expedition as the “anti-north campaign” and clearly the first target would be the warlord controlling Hunan, Hubei and Honan, the Jade Marshal. In July the 4th army divisions led by Chang Fangkuei and Chen Mingshu arrived at the front, thus the defense changed to offense. At this point Wu Peifu's armies were still too far in North China and his Hunan allies were now becoming overwhelmed by the NRA swarming out of Guangdong. Under these dire circumstance, Wu Peifu's appointed governor, Chao Hengti made a stand along the north banks of the Xiang, the Lien and Lu rivers. From late June to early July the NRA prepared to ford the Lien river sitting west of the Xiang and the Lu river to its east. Down the Xiang was Changsha. Facing the Lu river were two 4th army divisions and Yue Tings independent regiment and another Hunanese regiment. Over at the Lien river were Jiangxi troops of the 7th army alongside the remainder of Tang Shengchihs 8th army. As the first major offensive kicked out, Tang Shengchih was at the front raising morale for the Hunanese, which was very important, as do remember, all these forces coming out of Guangdong were alien Cantonese to them. A breakthrough emerged along the two-river lines with the 7th and 8th NRA armies over on the left wing on the 5th of July. By the 10th the 4th NRA Army engaged the enemy towards Changsha. Over in the east where Hunan bordered Jiangxi, a subordinate of Sun Chuanfang who controlled the lower Yangtze region was completely undisturbed by the NRA forces. Chiang Kai-Shek and his subordinates had given specific orders not to molest Sun Chuanfang, trying to avoid bringing him into the fight to join Wu Peifu. The NRA also profited off a recent flood of the Yangtze that had backed water up the streams of northern Hunan, hindering enemy communications. Wu Peifu was awaited reinforcements over at his HQ in Wuhan while his generals in Hunan faced the real threat of being encircled and annihilated. To Wu Peifu's western flank, two Guizhou warlords were watching the tide of battle. Wu Peifu was very aware of this and it threatened his western defensives. The season had also been a poor harvest, reducing food stuff for Hunan, a province that was already quite dependent on exports north in places like Wuhan. Even with his riverine navy, Wu Peifu could not hope to move enough foodstuff to his southern front. Another issue he faced was the passive resistance of Hunan's peasantry class who began hiding their produce from suppliers. The loss of the Lien-Lu River line left Changsha completely defenseless, so on July 11th the defenders simply withdraw further north of the city.  With the Guangdong and Juangxi forces entering Hunan, the NRA had gained enough manpower to begin advancing north. From July 11th after taking Changsha until mid August the front moved north only 50 miles. Delays occurred because reinforcements and war materials for the NRA could only be moved halfway up from Guangzhou by rail. Afterwards they had to travel over back-breaking terrain by foot. Soldiers and their hired coolies had to hand carry supplies and arms and this in turn limited the largest weaponry they could move, such as small field cannons which took entire teams of carriers. For those of you who don't know, I specialize in the Pacific War and I can certainly say, the Japanese forces in isolated islands, take Guadalcanal for example, saw this exact type of situation. Japanese artillery teams would have to disassemble artillery pieces and carry them by hand through rough jungles, often under starvation conditions. Not fun. The NRA during these circumstance, much like the Japanese in the 1940's in jungle terrain islands would suffer from terrible ailments, not malaria like the Japanese, but cholera. Cholera was taking a toll on the overheated and exhausted soldiers and civilian coolies. One Chen Kungpo wrote in his memoirs “that hundreds died daily in one mountain town on the route going north”. By August, both sides were gathering in strength along a new front, established near the Milo River. A military advisor wrote “Sometimes there are no provisions, my colleagues tear off some sort of grass, chew it and are full.” However the northern forces could not launch counterattacks without the full support of the Jade Marshall's main army who were still stuck in North China aiding Zhang Zuolin against the treacherous Feng Yuxiang. To remedy the two front situation, Wu Piefu tried but failed to secure loans and aid from his former protege, Sun Chuanfang, who honestly was more foe than friend now. Sun Chuanfang had basically taken the mantle as the strong Zhili leader and certainly did not want to share any of his newfound limelight. Alongside this the British turned a cold shoulder to Wu Peifu and the Japanese never liked him to begin with.  Despite some local floods and the cholera outbreak, Chiang Kai-Shek was able to arrive to Hengyang with over 100,000 NRA troops. These numbers had been recently bolstered by Guizhou warlords such as Peng Hanchang and Wang Tienpei who had watched eagerly the battles of the Lien-Lu line before tossing their lot in with the NRA. The Guizhou forces had marched into western Hunan clearing out pockets of resistance as they did. During the northern expedition, smaller warlords tended to simply defect or join the NRA when the NRA was winning. The NRA now prepared an offensive to break the Milo river line, also emboldened by the peasantry class who were very willing to work. The local floods in northern Hunan, combined with the droughts in southern Hunan had destroyed the peasants' fields, thus they needed to make money. The NRA exploited this to recruit soldiers and coolies en masse and this greatly improved their mobility.  By contrast, Wu Peifu's forces were low on ammunition, rations were also beginning to dwindle and the majority of the soldiers had not been paid in quite some time. In the NRA controlled areas, the Hunanese peasants were selling what produce they could spare, but the NRA were also being supplemented by rice carried from Guangdong. The NRA also made sure to pay coolies properly instead of Shanghai'ing them and did not plunder peasants' foodstuffs. This of course led to wide scale cooperation from the local population, something quite rare for the warlord era. A final conference was held at Changsha on August 12th between Chiang Kai-Shek, the top NRA commanders and Soviet advisors. By the 15th orders were dispatched for a general offensive against the Moli line with the objective of reaching Hubei. The NRA right wing also prepared to defend the army in cause Sun Chuanfang finally extended help to Wu Peifu from Guanxi. Chiang Kai-Shek was filled with excitement, for if successful, the NRA offensive would capture Wuhan and her incredible Hanyang Arsenal. Chiang Kai-Shek dispatched word to his generals before the battle. “The importance of this fight is not only in that it will decide the fate of the warlords. But, whether or not the Chinese nation and race can restore their freedom and independence hangs in the balance. In other words, it is a struggle between the nation and the warlords, between the revolution and the anti-revolutionaries, between the Three People's Principles and imperialism. All are to be decided now in this time of battle … so as to restore independence and freedom to our Chinese race”. The general plan of attack was to breach the Milo river line and quickly capture Wuhan. Speed and timing were critical factors. It was all basically a huge gamle. The NRA needed to secure Wuhan before Wu Peifu or Sun Chuanfang entered the war, thus preventing the NRA incursion into the Yangtze Valley. At the moment the NRA and their immeidate adversary in northern Hunan were around equal number, but if Sun Chuanfang entered the mix he had nearly double what Chiang Kai-Shek had. The 4th and 6th NRA armies made their crossing over the Milo on August 17th, successfully outflanking the enemy line and easing the way for the left wing of the 7th and 8th NRA armies to advance. By the 19th, Wu Peifu's troops were forced out of their trenches and only provided sporadic resistance as they withdrew into southern Hubei. During the two day retreat the northern forces had divided in two with the western flank taking refuse in Wu Peifu's naval stronghold of Yuehzhou. Its port was heavily fortified, however the recent floods had caused water from Dongting lake and the Yangtze to meet, ruining many of the fortifications. The NRA cut across Yuehzhou's railway link to Wuhan and surrounded it. Wu Peifu had frantically orders troops to hold the naval base, until he could detach himself from the Hobei operations to take personal command of the shit storm in Hunan. However during a meeting with Zhang Zuolin at Baoding, Wu Peifu received word his subordinates had simply taken all the naval vessels, riverine vessels and even sampans to head downstream for Wuhan. Yuehzhou fell with ease by the 22nd and Hunan was practically cleared of Wu Peifu's regular forces. Wu Peifu's navy contuined to fight the enemy, but all they could really do is harass NRA units along th baks of Dongting lake or the Yangtze. In response the NRA simply tosses fire rafts at them, a classic and age old tactic.  As the NRA chased the enemy, the local railway workers on lines heading into Hubei cooperated. The workers began cutting railway lines and telegraph lines to obstruct the enemy retreating from Yuehzhou. Entire trainloads of troops and war materials fell directly into the hands of the NRA. The end of August saw Chiang Kai-Shek's gamble pay off. Although Sun Chuanfang could pounce at any moment from Juangxi, the NRA had succesfully given a bloody nose to one warlord. The victory of the NRA over Hunan did not go unnoticed by the surrounding provinces warlords. Guizhou generals began joining the KMT as the war raged and the Milo river line fight influenced some generals under Sun Chuanfang to reconsider their loyalites. It was quite remarkable that Sun Chuanfangs decision to stay out of the immediate fight lost him the easiest chance of ending the NRA altogether. If Sun Chuanfang had intervened in the Hunan war, almost 100% he would have defeated Chiang Kai-Shek and easily march upon Guangzhou to end the first United Front. Losing Guangdong the KMT would have withered away, perhaps the CCP, would cower into the shadows awaited the right moment to pounce. Chiang Kai-Shek would not have withstood such a defeat, his leadership role would have been shattered. But such was not the case, Chiang Kai-Shek took Hunan and proved himself a new formidable player on the board. The Hunan campaign cost the NRA, but now they had the perfect base of operations and springboard for further offensives. By the end of August the NRA's intelligence reported Wu Peifu was advancing south to reinforce Wuhan, thus Chiang Kai-Shek tossed the dice of fate again. Advancing north against the three-city stronghold, was regiments of Chen Mingshu and Chang Fakuei's 4th Army. The withdrawal from the Milo river line had allowed Wu Peifu's Hubei forces to form a new line. The Guangzhou-Hankou railway followed a narrow land route between the Yangtze and highland ranges, crossing over multiple flooded bridgeheads. To further hinder the NRA's advance, the Hunanese had breached nearby dikes of the Yangtze. Then they heavily fortified the Tingszu Brigde with barbed wire and machine gun nests over its northern riverbank. The NRA vanguard attacked the stronghold on August 26th, coming to a abrupt halt. The NRA's superior mobility, aided by local boatsmen allowing the NRA right wing to head upstream and get around the enemy's flank. Likewise the NRA 4th army threatened the railway to Wuhan, making Wu Peifu's forces more vulnerable. The forces defending Wuhan were mainly the same troops who had fled Hunan, exhausted and demoralized. When the first attacks came upon the bridgehead, joined by flank attacks, the defensive line collapsed. During the night of the 26th the NRA stormed several strongpoints and outposts. Here again Wu Peifu's forces jumped onto any vessel they could get away with, or fled aboard the last trains heading north. The Tingszu bridge was captured, but at a bloody cost that would limit the NRA's ability to pursue the fleeing enemy. Once again the floods slowed the advance, alongside Wu Peifu's riverine vessels that continued to fire upon any NRA troops that ventured too close to waterways. Yet Wu Peifu's troops were running low on food while the NRA were accumulating more of it. As the NRA soldiers marched across the Tingszu bridge, locals flocked over to sell them foodstuff as by this time word had spread far about how the NRA paid for what they needed. On August 28th the NRA forces captured Xienning, but further north came across the Hesheng bridge. The bridge was heavily fortified and defended by forces under the personal command of Wu Peifu. Back on August the 25th and Hankou, Wu Peifu received word that Tingszu bridge had fallen, thus he quickened his advance to the front. He was shocked by the fall of the bridge and blamed his subordinates, labeling them cowards. When he arrived at Hesheng, Wu Peifu gathered his officers as he executed the commanders who lost the Tingszu bridge. He had with him mercenaries of the Big Swords Corps functioning as the executioners. On August 29th, Wu Peifu then went on the offensive and attacked the NRA vanguard, elements of Li Tsungjen's 7th Army just a bit due south of the Hesheng Bridge. His attack devastated the vanguard until the main bulk of the 7th and 4th armies arrived. Just before dawn on the 30th, Wu Peifu attacked the NRA's line of defense south of the bridge, probing for a weak point. He hit the 4th and 7th armies sectors, but was gradually met by artillery and rifle fire that took a heavy toll. Wu Peifu then had the Big Swords executioners clip more officers of their heads to boost morale. However as Wu Peifu continued to press his offensive his men eventually routed under pressure. His troops fled right over the Hesheng bridge allowing the 7th army to flank them further upstream where they took another smaller bridge and threatened his lifeline, the railway line to Wuhan.  By noon on the 30th, Wu Peifu's Hunanese and Hubei forces were in a general retreat heading north. Wu Peifu had just lost southern Hubei in what was an absolute clumsy miscalculation. During the retreat the NRA flank attack against his railway line saw them capture 3 trains full loaded with troops and arms. Over the course of the past weeks he had lost two bridgeheads seeing 1000 deaths, 2000 wounded and 5000 captured alongside all their weaponry. After the entire debacle, Wu Peifu began frantically pleading with Sun Chuanfang to come down the Yangtze to help him. But Sun Chuanfang made ambiguous responses and dragged his feet. As he did so the NRA fortified their defenses facing Juangxi. In full retreat Wu Peifu began breaching dikes behind his forces to slow down the NRA as they approached Wuchang, the capital of Hubei. He left a force of 10,000 men to defend the city behind its sturdy walls as he ferried the rest of his men to Hankou. Once his forces landed on the other side of the Yangtze he had half of them take up positions to defend the Hanyang Arsenal, while the others defended Hankou, which served as his new HQ. By September his forces from Honan began to arrive.  On August 31st, Chen Mingshu's 4th army was in hot pursuit of the enemy. His vanguard took a vantage point near Wuchang as reconnaissance investigated the city. On September 2nd, the NRA unleashed frontal assaults to probe its defenses, but they lacked any heavy artillery to actually back up a real attack. As a result the NRA suffered heavy casualties before pulling back to establish a proper siege. Meanwhile by september 5th, Hanyang was also surrounded.  Defending Hanyang was a Hubei division led by Liu Tsolung who placed artillery on some fortified high points. When the NRA was just about to launch an assault, suddenly Liu Tsolung, overseeing the majority of Hanyangs defenses defected and helped capture the city and its arsenal. It was a tremendous blow to Wu Peifu as the NRA vanguard was now bypassing Hanyang to threaten his railway link to Honan. Wu Peifu tried to salvage the units he had left to mount a last ditch defensive line over the border hills between Hubei and Honan. Wu Peifu had now withdrawn to the Wushen pass lying on the border, hoping to hold out as more of his Honanese forces advanced south. Yet once again the NRA's superior mobility deprived Wu Peifu of enough time to dig into the pass. After a few assaults, Wu Peifu lost the pass and was driven further back into Honan. The walled city of Wuchang could not be taken as easily as Hanyang or Hankou. Wu Peifu and his men would defend it for well over a month. The NRA did not have proper siege weapons, and the threat of Sun Chuanfang loomed over them.Yet Wu Peifu had not expected Hunan and Hubei to fall so quickly and had not prepared his capital for a long siege. He had 10,000 soldiers, hundreds of thousands of civilians locked within its walls. There were also foreigners within the city and foreign gunboats. The threat of international intervention loomed upon the actions of the NRA. Chiang Kai-Shek telegrammed his foreign minister that a communique should be sent out to inform the world powers “… on the matter of protecting foreign nationals, I have already informed the armies to observe my prohibition against the military occupying or obstructing affairs in foreign-established churches, schools, and the like….” Chiang Kai-Shek personally overlooked the siege to make sure no foreigners were molested.  Just to clear up something that might be confusing some of you, Wuchang refers to one of the 13 urban districts of the capital of Hubei, Wuhan. Now back in mid August, Chiang Kai-Shek called for the capture of Wuhan at Changsha and he had made secret negotiations with Sun Chuanfang to get him to sit out the war. Sun Chuanfang had been quite ambiguous about what he would do, but it was known to NRA intelligence he was massing troops along the borders of Jiangxi and Fujian. Sun Chuanfang made up the excuse he was simply defending his territory from NRA aggression. Apparently Chiang Kai-Shek offered a nonaggression pact and an open invitation to join the KMT, but Sun Chuanfang did not want to give up his new found control over the 5 southeastern provinces for what was perceived to be a lesser role in the KMT. Sun Chuanfang then prepared a two pronged offensive to relieve Wuchang by driving west into KMT territory. Sun Chuanfang was sitting on 200,000 troops and Chiang Kai-Shek was well aware of the threat he posed. Thus Chiang Kai-Shek would go for broke, casting the dice of fate once more.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek rolled the dice of fate when he unleashed an offensive against Wu Peifu's holdings in Hunan and Hubei. The gambles paid off big time as the NRA swarmed their enemy, taking prisoners and war materials. However Sun Chuanfang was now entering the fray, a real fight would soon unfold.

Isn't the Art of War predicated on overcoming opponents psychologically?More important than China's five thousand years of continuous history is the collective memory and experiences of Chinese people today and how it affects their cultural psychology for business negotiations and cooperation.Few people approach cross-cultural communications with this degree of empathy, but should we?UPCOMING BOOKStrategic Pragmatism for De-Risking Post-COVID China: Circumnavigating Cultural and Psychological Landmines Inside the Chinese Arena is a timely and indispensable guide for Westerners seeking to understand how to collaborate with Chinese stakeholders in the post-pandemic era. Drawing upon an overview of China's historical relationship with the West and how perceptions and misperceptions evolve, this book helps readers develop a winning approach to managing the interpersonal relationships they will need to succeed—Guanxi. This book serves students, entrepreneurs, and business leaders curious about assembling a repertoire of tactics and strategies that better align with the emotional psychologies of Chinese players and the rigid national sentiments they exhibit inside the Chinese arena.New Author Page: https://www.provocativechina.com/

Pragmatic Psychology Explained!Which factors are most important for navigating China business today?I believe two ideas capture the essence of piloting your Guanxi engine toward the best possible outcomes in the Chinese business arena...Pragmatism and Psychology. #chinabusiness #chineseculture #artofwar #guanxi #communications #negotiations #psychologyhttps://www.provocativechina.com/blog/sp6

This is “The Chinese Business Arena” .. And today we're going to discuss the fallacy of our collective myopia in the post-Covid-19 era for doing business in China. We're going to review the REAL CULPRITS that cause communications breaking down with our Chinese counterparts, and I'm going to show you how to operate this...THE GUANXI ENGINE#chinabusiness #Guanxi #chineseculture #Face #Communications #China #Mandarin #learnChineseNew Author Page: https://www.provocativechina.com/

History is woven from different narratives, perspectives, and interpretations, and there is a saying that "History is written by victors." Perhaps more poignantly, Hermann Göring, Churchill's enemy in World War II, is recorded as saying, "The victor will always be the judge, and the vanquished the accused" at the Nuremberg trials. From the Western perspective, China has never been the victor, so our history is the only one we prescribe. Today, as the historically defeated, colonized, and once unequally divided China rises in power and influence, most Westerners fail to contextualize their perspective of history and its collective psychological effect.UPCOMING BOOKStrategic Pragmatism for De-Risking Post-COVID China: Circumnavigating Cultural and Psychological Landmines Inside the Chinese Arena is a timely and indispensable guide for Westerners seeking to understand how to collaborate with Chinese stakeholders in the post-pandemic era. Drawing upon an overview of China's historical relationship with the West and how perceptions and misperceptions evolve, this book helps readers develop a winning approach to managing the interpersonal relationships they will need to succeed—Guanxi. This book serves students, entrepreneurs, and business leaders curious about assembling a repertoire of tactics and strategies that better align with the emotional psychologies of Chinese players and the rigid national sentiments they exhibit inside the Chinese arena.New Author Page: https://www.provocativechina.com/

Last time we spoke about Feng Yuxiang and Zhang Zongchang. Both men were born into poverty, rose through the ranks of the military, earning popularity. Feng became known for his integrity and generosity. He played a pivotal role during the Xinhai Revolution and the subsequent warlord era, often switching allegiances opportunistically. Feng embraced Christianity and enforced discipline among his troops, earning the nickname "the Christian General." On the other side of the shoulder, Zhang Zongchang became infamous for his brutality and excesses as the "Dogmeat General." His rule over Shandong was marked by tyranny, corruption, and lavish indulgence. While Feng focused on discipline, education, and infrastructure, Zhang oppressed his subjects, enriching himself and his inner circle. Feng was often portrayed favorably, while Zhang reveled in his notorious reputation. Ultimately, they were emblematic figures of the tumultuous warlord era, shaping the course of Chinese history.   #96 Meet the Southern Warlords   Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So two episodes back I introduced you all to the Northern Warlords. The father of warlords, Yuan Shikai basically created them all. When Yuan Shikai built his Beiyang Army, many of his best officers became the Northern Warlords after his death. Thus the Northern Faction as its sometimes referred to, really was an elite club of Beiyang Generals who simply were vying for power. They were all scrambling to fund their private armies and whoever at any given time had the strongest force was able to exert control over the Beiyang government located in Beijing. Within this dynamic there was a quasi balance of power going on. For the most part it was dominated by the three largest cliques in the north, the Anhui Clique, Zhili Clique and Fengtian Clique. Yet this really only applied to Northern China. Going back in time somewhat you will remember, when Yuan Shikai stole the presidency, this led to multiple rebellions, notably sprouting in the southern provinces. Dr Sun Yat-Sen stepped down from the provisional presidency, but he had not given up on his dream of a real republic for China. After the assassination of Song Jiaoren in March 1913, many believed Yuan Shikai had ordered the hit. Yuan Shikai proceeded to abuse his power and this led to southern provinces declaring independence. First was Jiangxi, followed by Jiangsu, Anhui, Shanghai, Guangdong, Fujian and so forth. This all culminated with the Second Revolution of 1913. Unfortunately for the rebels, Yuan Shikai's Beiyang Army yet again proved their might, achieving a complete victory over their revolutionary uprisings. KMT loyalist politicians still refused to submit to Yuan Shikai, so he simply dissolved parliament and began reorganizing China using loyal military governors in the provinces. The KMT may have been dissolved, but they were not down for the count.  After Yuan Shikai proclaimed himself emperor, Dr. Sun Yat Sun established the Chinese Revolutionary Party on July 8th of 1914, but this time his old friends and colleagues refused to join him such as Huang Xing, Hu Hanmin, Chen Jiongming and Wang Jingwei. They had seen it all before. Everytime they created a movement against Yuan Shikai, he simply crushed them, they wanted no part of it. As a result, Dr Sun Yat-Sen lost the limelight, he went back into exile, biding his time. After Yuan Shikai's death, Dr Sun Yat-Sen returned to China where he formed a military Junta at Guangzhou to oppose the Beiyang government. The military Junta held a vote, electing Dr Sun Yat-Sen as Generalissimo. Wu Tingfang was appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tang Shaoyi as Chief Finance Officer, although he did not accept the position, Cheng Biguang became the Chief Navy Officer and Hu Hanmin became the Chief Transportation officer. One of the first actions the Junta took was to denounce Duan Qirui and his colleagues as rebels and vowed they would reunify China in a grand “Northern Expedition”. With this proclamation, the Constitutional Protection War had officially begun. The war or better called a movement for now was basically the KMT's third revolution. It was put simply to defeat the Beiyang Government. However, not everyone saw eye to eye. In late 1917, many officials such as Tang Jiyao, Mo Rongxin, Lu Rongting and Tang Shaoyi convened a meeting with southwestern warlords. The purpose of the meeting was to see if they could recognize the Beiyang government and form a coalition with them, basically they were seeking a compromise with the Northern Warlords. Dr Sun Yat-Sen was outraged when he found out and placed blame on the southwestern warlords who he believed had sabotaged the Junta. He resigned angrily in May of 1918, going yet again into exile in Shanghai.While in Shanghai he found supporters and on October 10th of 1919 resurrected the KMT. After this point Dr Sun Yat-Sen would be in conflict with Southern Warlords, basically vying to control southern provincial bases of power. Initially this would be around Guangzhou and Guangdong. Now as most of you probably already know, while Dr Sun Yat-Sen founded the KMT, it ultimately was inherited by a man named Chiang Kai-Shek. Chiang Kai-Shek was born October 31st in Xikou, Zhejiang. He descended from a family of salt merchants. Early in life he became interested in the military. Now he lived during a rough time, China suffered military defeats, natural disasters, famine, rebellion en masse, unequal treaties and such. In 1906 after  his first visit to Japan he began pursuing a military career. He enlisted in the Baoding Military academy that year and then went to the Tokyo Shinbu Gakko, a preparatory school for the IJA Academy for Chinese students. While there he became a revolutionary seeking to end the Qing Dynasty so a Han led Chinese republic could emerge. In 1908 he befriended Chen Qimei and it was Chen who introduced him into the Tongmenghui. After graduating from the Tokyo Shinbu Gakko, Chiang served in the IJA from 1909-1911.  When Chiang heard of the Wuchang uprising he rushed back to China, intending to serve as an artillery officer. He led a regiment in Shanghai under Chen Qimei. Then in 1912 there was a conflict between Chen Qimei and Tao Chengzhang, a revolutionary alliance leader who opposed Dr Sun Yat-Sen. Historians differ on what exactly happened, but its possible Chiang had a hand to play in the assassination of Tao. Regardless Chiang rose up through the ranks and continued to serve under Chen Qimei. Now Chen Qimei had friends in the underworld, such as the Green Gang led by Du Yuesheng. The Green Gang was a criminal syndicate in Shanghai and again historians differ on the extent, but it seems Chiang brushed shoulders with them often. Chiang Kai-Shek became a founding member of the KMT but found himself on the losing end of the Second Revolution in 1913. He fled to Japan in exile, but also secretly traveled to the Shanghai international settlement. Its said there he began working with underworld groups, like the Green Gang. On May 18th, 1916 Yuan Shikai had Chen Qimei assassinated, prompting Chiang to succeed him as leader of the KMT in Shanghai. In 1917 when Dr Sun Yat-Sen came back, Chiang quickly joined up with him, cultivating a spot as his number 2. Now I don't want to give away future episode content just yet, so I will stop it there for the KMT Clique.  The next clique as you may have guessed is of course the Chinese Communist Party. Now we talked quite a bit about its foundation, but for a refresher. After the May Fourth Movement of 1919, numerous foreign ideologies flooded into China, one was Marxism. The Russian Revolution had a profound impact on China. Hundreds of thousands of laborers during WW1 went over to Russia and found themselves stuck in the civil war. They came back and brought with them what they learnt. Two men in particular were greatly inspired by Marxism, Chen Duxiu and Li Dazaho, they were also the first two prominent Chinese figures to endorse Leninism and for a worldwide revolution to take place. They ushered in the New Culture Movement, then aided the May Fourth Movement, but by 1920 they both became very skeptical about reforming the current political situation of China. In 1921 the CCP was founded with help from the USSR. The founding national congress of the CCP was helped between July 23-30th 1921 with only 50 members, amongst whom were Li Dazho, Chen Duxiu and Mao Zedong. The CCP grew quickly, originally being held in a house in the Shanghai French Concession until they were caught by police. They moved to Jiaxing, Zhejiang, electing Chen Duxiu as their 1st General Secretary. Chen became “China's Lenin” and certainly the CCP continued to ally themselves to the USSR for both had a common enemy, Japan. Again just like with the KMT, while Chen Duxiu and Li Dazhao were the initial leaders, Mao Zedong would inherit the leadership.  Mao Zedong was born December 26th of 1893 near Shaoshan in Hunan. His father was an impoverished peasant who grew to be one of the wealthiest farmers in Shaoshan. Mao grew up in rural Hunan and stated in memoirs he was regularly beaten by his father who was a very strict man. His mother, Wen Qimei was a devout buddhist and Mao would follow in her footests trying to become a Buddhist, but ultimately abandoning the path as a teenager. He received a confucian based education and his family arranged a marriage when he was 17 to Luo Yixiu, ultimately to unit their land-owning families. Mao refused to acknowledge the marriage and quickly moved away. The poor Luo was shamed by this and would die in 1910. Mao was a voracious reader, he loved the Romance of the Three Kingdoms and Water Margins from a young age and continued to read whatever he could get his hands on. Eventually his reading led him to a political awakening. He began reading Adam Smith, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, Charles Darwin, Thomas Huxley, Montequieu and other western works. He was also interested in history, he took a particularly interest to Napoleon Bonaparte and George Washington.  Mao moved to Changsha for middle school education in 1911 where he came into contact with the revolutionary fervor of the time. He was inspired by Dr Sun Yat-Sen, even wrote about how he thought he should become president in a school essay. Mao like many others cut off their queues during the Xinhai Revolution. Mao found himself joining a real army as a private soldier, but never saw any real combat. In 1912 he resigned from being a soldier and discovered socialism from a newspaper. Mao then enrolled in a police academy but dropped out. He then tried a soap-production school, law school, an economics school and a government run middle school, dropping out of all of them. He spent his time in Changsha's library, reading classical liberal works. Once his father figured out he was basically not doing anything but reading, he cut his allowance, forcing Mao to move into a hostel. Mao then tried to become a teacher and enrolled in the 1st normal school of Changsha. While there he befriend professor Yang Changjia who introduced him to the newspaper “the New Youth” by Chen Duxiu. Mao became inspired, and organized a Association for Student Self-Government that formed protests against school rules. He published articles in the New Youth beginning in 1917 and joined the Society of the Study of Wang Fuzhi, a revolutionary group in Changsha. He began reading about WW1, finding solidarity with the stories of soldiers, but also with workers. After graduating in 1919 he immediately moved to Beijing where his mentor Yang Changji had a job at Peking University. Yang got him a job as an assistant librarian to Li Dazhao. From here Mao became more and more influenced by Marxism, reading about the Russian revolution from the New Youth and books written by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. Mao joined Li Dazhao's study group becoming more and more enthralled with Marxism. He returned to Changsha working at a primary school while also organizing protests and promoting the New Culture movement there. Mao helped organize a general strike in Hunan, before he returned to Beijing to visit the terminally ill Yang Yangji. After this Mao moved to Shanghai where he met with Chen Duxiu and some prominent KMT members. Mao would brush shoulders with these KMT members often and became one of the founding members of the CCP. Again like with the KMT I don't wont to give away too much future events, so I will stop it there for the CCP. The next group was the Yunnan Clique who were born out of the Xinhai Revolution when Cai E declared Yunnan independent. Cai E had been the commander of the 37th Brigade of the New Army. After the Xinhai Revolution, Cai E tossed his lot in with Yuan Shikai, leaving behind Tang Jiyao to govern Yunnan. When Yuan Shikai initiated operation Walrus Emperor, Cai E covertly departed Beijing and returned to Yunnan to get the old gang back together. He was nearly assassinated on November 11th, but managed to flee to Japan and then Yunnan. Once back in Yunnan he established the local National Protection Army to fight Yuan Shikai. Cai E declared Yunnan independent again and quickly invaded southern Sichuan. Yuan Shikai sent his Beiyang Army south, but found this time his army was less than willing to fight. After Yuan Shikai's death, Cai E retained the position of governor-general over Yunnan and governor over Sichuan. The National Protection War bolstered Cai E as a national hero, however disaster struck in 1916 when he died suddenly of tuberculosis. His chief Lt Tang Jiyao inherited the mantle. Tang Jiyao brushed shoulders with Dr Sun Yat-Sen helping him set up his new KMT in Shanghai and would remain a KMT loyalist. Tang Jiyao also brushed shoulders with the Green Gang who helped him set up an opium trade in Yunnan. Opium grew exceptionally well in Yunnan, its climate was perfect for the plant. Like most of the cliques I will soon be talking about, events unfolded in Northern China that led southern provinces to feel another government was required. A few rival governments would come and go, but the first significant one would be established in Guangzhou and Tang Jiyao joined its committee. Within this government a political war was fought amongst numerous cliques, including Dr Sun Yat-Sen's KMT. As for those other Cliques that would do political battle, one would be the Guizhou Clique. The Guizhou Clique was founded by Liu Xianshi who was born in Xingyi Guizhou. Liu was born into a landlord family who were heavily involved in leading local militias during the late 19th century. He alongside his cousin Liu Xianqian were military men, like their father before them Liu Guanli, who was a regimental commander who helped suppress a Hui uprising. Liu Guanli bolstered his family name to the point the family became heavily dominant within the military forces of Guizhou. During the Wuchang Uprising, Guizhou was tossed into a panic. Li Xianshi went to the capital to help suppress the revolution. Meanwhile, Zhang Bailin, a Tongmenghui leader in Guizhou alongside others stormed the capital and forced the governor, Shen Yuqing to step down. On November 4th, they declared Guizhou independent. However the wannabe revolutionaries failed to take measures to protect their gains and soon Shen Yuqing was fighting back. Liu Xianshi found himself appointed as the Chief of Staff of the Privy Council of a provisional government. Thus emerged a battle between the revolutionaries and counter-revolutionaries. The counter revolutionaries sought assistance and turned to the recently emerged strongman, Cai E of Yunnan. They asked him to invade Guizhou to stop the crisis. Cai E dispatched Tang Jiyao with some troops who entered Guizhou rather peacefully and began to organize proper governance. Then Cai E received panic messages from Tongmenghui Guizhou members asking him to not meddle in Guizhou affairs, and with Sichuan looking more appetizing he backed off. Cai E ordered Tang Jiyao to divert his forces and march into Sichuan. However Tang Jiyao complained that in order to comply he had to take a route through Guizhou and this resulted in his army being chased by revolutionary forces. Well that's one way of stating the story, the other is Tang Jiyao simply sought to conquer Guizhou. Regardless, Liu Xianshi helped Tang Jiyao launch a successful coup against the current Guizhou Junta. Thus Tang Jiyao became the military governor of Guizhou on March 4th of 1912 and Yuan Shikai recognized this a few months later. For his role, Liu Xianshi was appointed Minister of War. Tang Jiyao did what all decent dictators do, he massacred all revolutionary forces he could catch in the province. While Tang Jiyao was at the head, Liu Xianshi used his new political power to begin placing family members in prominent positions. In the meantime Tang Jiyao treated Guizhou like a fiefdom, forbidding modernization efforts and prevented any development of the KMT. It goes without saying Tang Jiyao was not beloved in Guizhou. In November of 1913, Cai E was placed under house arrest and stripped of his rank, so Tang Jiyao ran back to Yunnan to grab his position as governor. This left the mantle of Guizhou to fall into the hands of Liu Xianshi. When Yuan Shikai declared himself Emperor, Liu Xianshi initially kept Guizhou neutral, but as the situation looked more and more dire for Yuan Shikai, he bandwagoned and declared independence on January 27th, 1916. Liu Xianshi sent forces to fight in the National Protection War, then after Yuan Shikai's death, the Beiyang government appointed Liu Xianshi as the military governor over Guizhou. From there Liu Xianshi had pretty much dictatorial power and he soon went to work forming his own Guizhou clique. To make matters even more complicated, within the Guizhou clique were the Xingyi clique, of the Liu family because they came from Xingyi and the Tongzi clique led by Zhou Xicheng. Basically two families and others fought for dominance, leading to a cycle of assassinations followed by seizure of power. Now we come to the Old and New Guangxi Cliques. The Old Guangxi Clique came about after Governor Chen Bingkun declared Guangxi independ during the Wuchang uprising. After the rebellion, Yuan Shikai installed Lu Rongting as the military governor of Guangxi and during the second revolution Lu remained loyal. Yet when Yuan Shikai went Walrus emperor mode, Lu bandwagoned with Cai E and Tang Jiyao. Meanwhile Long Jiguang proclaimed Guangdong independent and after Yuan Shikai's death, Guangxi and Guangdong found themselves at war. The war largely came about when Dr Sun Yat-Sen split from the Guangzhou government, he dispatched a subordinate, Chen Jiongming to seize Guangzhou and effectively get rid of the Guangxi warlords. Both Long Jiguang and Chen Jiongming were KMT loyalists, thus this led Lu Rongting into a bitter war with Guangdong and even Yunnan got involved, and the whole mess saw the Old Guangxi clique beaten severely. Again I don't want to tell to much as it will be covered in future podcasts, but a hell of a mess, lot of backstabbing.  After the Guangxi-Guangdong wars, yes plural, Li Zongren, Bai Chongxi and Huang Shaohong formed the New Guangxi clique alongside a brand new Guangxi Army. Li Zongren was its commander in chief, Huang Shaohong deputy commander and Bai Chongxi chief of staff. They all worked together to kick Guangdong forces out of Guangxi and Li Zongren emerged the military governor over Guangxi. The New Guangxi clique came about during the formation of a new coalition I can't get into here. While both the old and new Guangxi cliques were on the smaller side, they would take part in the reunification of China. Next, although we spoke already a bit about them was the Guangdong Clique. Long Jiguang would die in 1918 leaving the mantle to fall onto Chen Jiongming. Cheng Jiongming had joined the Tongmenghui in 1906 and participated in a coup attempt in 1910 in Guangzhou. During the Xinhai revolution Chen Jiongming was part of another uprising in Guangzhou. After this Chen Jiongming received the post as commander in chief of the Guangdong Army and fought for the KMT. He did however butt heads with Dr Sun Yat-Sen, particularly over the direction of reform the KMT should take. Dr Sun Yat-Sen sought to unify China by force and institute change through a centralized government based on a one party system. Chen Jiongming sought a multiparty federalist system with Guangdong being the model province and hoped for a peaceful reunification of China. There would be a split between the two men and it would be quite violent. The Guangdong clique like the old and new Guangxi clique was again a small part of something bigger cooking in the south. The next is the Sichuan Clique which consisted of a loose group of smaller warlords each with their own regions within Sichuan. Each had their own defensive zone, with their own police, political and economic bases. There were not many large conflicts, it mostly came down to coalitions dismantling a disgruntled warlord. As I already mentioned, Yunnan invaded Sichuan during the Yuan Shikai days, and the local Sichuan warlords initially welcomed the Yunnanese, siding with them to declare independence. But as you can imagine, the Yunnanese soon were seen as overbearing and a lot of soured feelings erupted. This was only further soured when troops from Guizhou came into Sichuan. In 1916, the Sichuan troops were led by General Liu Cunhou who quickly established a ceasefire with the Guizhou and Yunnanese forces. Because of her geography, Sichuan was always relatively isolated from the rest of China, thus she turned inwards instead of outwards. For the majority of the warlord period Sichuan was split into half a dozen districts under military rule. During the late 1920s even into the 1930's 5 Sichuan warlords dominated the scene, Yang Sen, Liu Wenhui, Deng Xihou, Tian Songyao and Liu Xiang. Neither had enough power to take all the others on, thus there was a real balance of power at play. In a true game of thrones like fashion, the Sichuan scene was that of warlords forming secret alliance, pitting one against another, but no one ever truly dominated the province. Of the 5 Sichuan warlords, Liu Xiang would be the most influential. Liu Xiang dominated Chongqing and its surrounding areas. His territory straddled the Yangtze River, thus rich in maritime trade, in essence he wielded significant control over Sichuan's economy. By the 1930's Sichuan was ruled by Liu Xiang in the east; Liu Cunhou in the northeast adjoining Shaanxi; Tian Songyao in the north adjoining Gansu; Deng Xihou in the northwest adjoining Qinghai and Liu Wenhui in the southwest adjoining Xikang and Yunnan. Within a small central enclave was also Yang Sen.  After Yuan Shikai's death the province fell into quite a lot of disorder. All the district governors fought each other and quite often at that, but they rarely ever crossed the Sichuan border. The common people of Sichuan lived in despair and fear nicknamed their warlords as Rotten Melons or Crystal Monkey's. Liu Xiang was born in 1889 to a modest family, received a decent education and joined the military. He rose quickly and saw a lot of warfare. By 1926 he had established a strong base in Chongqing and he held onto it until his death. Now the standard troops of Sichuan were lesser than other parts of China. The Sichuan armies were funded largely by taxes levied on grain, salt and opium. Holding Chongqing along the Yangtze, Liu Xiang had an enormous economic base and thus managed to enrich himself and funded a large army. He enforced strict military discipline, though he was known to turn a blind eye to his officers' rackets. Despite this Liu Xiang's army had a lot of problems facing bandits in the rural areas. One of the other Sichuan Warlords, Yang Sen was quite flamboyant. His nickname was rat face because he had a small mouth. Yang Sen had a small enclave, but it consisted of Chengdu which he tried to clean up. He paved streets with flagstone to help increase rickshaw traffic, a rather new concept for many there. Chengdu happened to have a commodity all warlords wanted, an arsenal, so Yang Sen was by no means a poor warlord. While Sichuan seemed to always be in a state of decline, Chengdu in comparison was quite opulent and luxurious. Now again, and I keep saying it, I don't want to give up too much of the later stories, but Sichuan like many other southern provinces would join the Northern Expedition and help reunify China. Now despite the warlord era being technically ended in 1928 when China was reunified, in reality the warlords were around well into WW2. The Sichuan Clique would brush shoulders a lot with Chiang Kai Shek. During the Second Sino-Japanese War Liu Xiang led the Sichuan 15th Army during the battle of Shanghai and the 23rd Army Group during the battle of Nanjing. Later in 1938 he took 100,000 soldiers out of Sichuan to fight the Japanese, showcasing how far he had come as a commander as well as a warlord. Last there was the Hunan Warlords, a similar situation to that of Sichuan, just a lot more autonomous warlords. The first prominent Hunan Clique member was Tan Yankai, a member of the KMT who became the military governor of Hunan. Tan Yankai had connections amongst Guanxi warlords allowing him loose control over his province. He tried to arouse the people of Hunan to take active opposition to the Northern Warlords, but this prompted Duan Qirui to toss a Hunan born commander, Fu Liangzuo to come take his job. Tan Yankai was forced to take the job as civil governor while Fu became the warlord. Tan Yankai appealed to his Guangxi buddies for help. Even Tang Jiyao of Yunnan asked if he could invade Hunan to help, air quotes on help, but it never came about. Unfortunately for Tan Yankai, Hunan was right beside the Zhili Clique and thus got engulfed in the Northern wars. Hunan basically as a result of geography was stuck in the middle of bigger players and would be tossed around like a ragdoll. Tan Yankai would be backstabbed by a subordinate who favored the Zhili, then later another KMT member would simply grab up Hunan during the Northern expedition. Honestly to call Hunan a Clique is a bit of a stretch as it was more of just an area that had overlaps with other cliques all fighting for territory. Now that basically covers the southern cliques, theres actually more, but if I talk about them we would get lost in the weeds as they say. What is important to know going forward, the North-South divide would see two distinct theaters at play. In the North the Anhu, Zhili and Fengtian Cliques would fight for dominance over Beijing. In the South, many KMT oriented, Communist Orient and independent warlords would fight for dominance over Guangzhou, and later in history other rival southern governments. Typically the Warlord Era is taught North to South and I think that will be the case with us because its simply more cohesive. As Samuel Jackson playing Ray Arnold in Jurassic Park once said, “hold onto your butts” because the warlord Era about to begin.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. So we talked about the Northern Warlords and now the Southern Warlords. Time to put the Game of Thrones intro music on, as we are soon going to jump into a world of cutthroat backstabbing, secret alliance, little fingers and megalomaniac figures who will all fight to reunify China under their own image. As for the Chinese common people, as usual they will suffer tremendously, continuing the Century of Humiliation. 

As a Western leader in China, should you be concerned that promoting someone invariably leads to others feeling apprehensive (焦虑 Jiāolǜ)?Managing Chinese employees is simple: tell them what to do.Leading Chinese employees is complicated for Western leaders, requiring a deep understanding of their cultural and emotional psychologies. Their responses, usually in the form of 'lip service,' are cultural displays of respect and a pragmatic way of deepening Guanxi by giving Face. Rarely do Chinese people reveal their true feelings or intentions, as their reasoning is circular and their perspective of 'Truth' is relative.UPCOMING BOOKStrategic Pragmatism for De-Risking Post-COVID China: Circumnavigating Cultural and Psychological Landmines Inside the Chinese Arena is a timely and indispensable guide for Westerners seeking to understand how to collaborate with Chinese stakeholders in the post-pandemic era. Drawing upon an overview of China's historical relationship with the West and how perceptions and misperceptions evolve, this book helps readers develop a winning approach to managing the interpersonal relationships they will need to succeed—Guanxi. This book serves students, entrepreneurs, and business leaders curious about assembling a repertoire of tactics and strategies that better align with the emotional psychologies of Chinese players and the rigid national sentiments they exhibit inside the Chinese arena.New Author Page: https://www.provocativechina.com/

The term 'Chinese arena' describes any business scenario with participants from mainland China. This term is apt because it encapsulates the emotional and psychological stresses that dominate when values and ideologies clash. Accepting alternative paradigms is possible when we imagine learning tactics for a new 'game' in a new field of play. Tradeoffs feel less personal, and withdrawing ethical and moral considerations become more acceptable. Furthermore, when we reimagine our experiences in China as a game dominated by psychological warfare, like poker, we replace judgment with curiosity and craft a new persona conditioned to win the China game inside the Chinese arena. Instead of studying ancient strategies written over two thousand years ago, we will extrapolate Art of War tactics that Chinese people utilize subconsciously based on common behavior patterns, and we will develop winning tactics that work in the new normal of post-COVID China.UPCOMING BOOKStrategic Pragmatism for De-Risking Post-COVID China: Circumnavigating Cultural and Psychological Landmines Inside the Chinese Arena is a timely and indispensable guide for Westerners seeking to understand how to collaborate with Chinese stakeholders in the post-pandemic era. Drawing upon an overview of China's historical relationship with the West and how perceptions and misperceptions evolve, this book helps readers develop a winning approach to managing the interpersonal relationships they will need to succeed—Guanxi. This book serves students, entrepreneurs, and business leaders curious about assembling a repertoire of tactics and strategies that better align with the emotional psychologies of Chinese players and the rigid national sentiments they exhibit inside the Chinese arena.New Author Page: https://www.provocativechina.com/

Every interaction in China can either improve a relationship or trigger a cloak of deception called goodwill extraction. While this might sound dramatic, it simply contrasts the possible outcomes of every engagement you'll encounter doing business in China. Once you understand your interactions in the proper cultural context, you will no longer be surprised by any response or development. In hindsight, it was entirely predictable when a trusted local partner in Nanjing began lying, cheating, and stealing from our company. When a deficit of goodwill reaches a tipping point, it is natural in Chinese psychology to seek substitutes in other parts of the local value chain. Westerners call it corruption, but in Chinese culture, this behavior is justified and socially acceptable. In my upcoming book, we will refer to any "bad" behavior as GOODWILL EXTRACTION because when your Guanxi engine isn't properly maintained and running smoothly, even good relationships will veer off course, and avoiding a fatal crash should be the priority of anyone competing inside the Chinese arena.UPCOMING BOOKStrategic Pragmatism for De-Risking Post-COVID China: Circumnavigating Cultural and Psychological Landmines Inside the Chinese Arena is a timely and indispensable guide for Westerners seeking to understand how to collaborate with Chinese stakeholders in the post-pandemic era. Drawing upon an overview of China's historical relationship with the West and how perceptions and misperceptions evolve, this book helps readers develop a winning approach to managing the interpersonal relationships they will need to succeed—Guanxi. This book serves students, entrepreneurs, and business leaders curious about assembling a repertoire of tactics and strategies that better align with the emotional psychologies of Chinese players and the rigid national sentiments they exhibit inside the Chinese arena.New Author Page: https://www.provocativechina.com/

How do you perceive China TODAY (post-COVID), and are you aware of how YOUR PERCEPTIONS affect how your Chinese counterpart perceives you?Questions about China in our collective Western consciousness have ebbed and flowed over the centuries, from an exotic oriental kingdom with vast riches to "Yellow Peril," provoking Western fears in the mid-nineteenth century that Asians, in particular the Chinese, would invade our lands and disrupt our values, to becoming our largest economic trading partner at the turn of the century to biggest threat and most consequential geopolitical competitor today.The only thing that has endured that we can agree on is that China matters!UPCOMING BOOKStrategic Pragmatism for De-Risking Post-COVID China: Circumnavigating Cultural and Psychological Landmines Inside the Chinese Arena is a timely and indispensable guide for Westerners seeking to understand how to collaborate with Chinese stakeholders in the post-pandemic era. Drawing upon an overview of China's historical relationship with the West and how perceptions and misperceptions evolve, this book helps readers develop a winning approach to managing the interpersonal relationships they will need to succeed—Guanxi. This book serves students, entrepreneurs, and business leaders curious about assembling a repertoire of tactics and strategies that better align with the emotional psychologies of Chinese players and the rigid national sentiments they exhibit inside the Chinese arena.

Escucha martes y viernes la opinión de Jorge Meléndez Ruiz.

https://www.genejhsu.com/SCUU2024As we enter 2024, what are the trends affecting US-China relations, and what factors are within our control and influence?As an observer, most geopolitical flashpoints are trending negatively. We all know what they are because we are bombarded constantly with reminders in both mainstream and social media while disinformation propaganda campaigns continue to polarize our civil discourse.Within my control, I am sharing the entire Solving CHINA's Unknown Unknowns program for free to anyone who feels we CAN do better in our personal, business, and political relations with our Chinese counterparts.4 modules, 25 video lessons, and a 100-page workbook is my attempt to help my Western friends and colleagues reimagine their "Guanxi" relationships to create more constructive communications with counterparts in China.https://www.genejhsu.com/SCUU2024#uschina #chineseculture #chinabusiness #learnchinese

Watch this Episode on Youtube Episode Description Welcome to another compelling episode of the Working With Us podcast. Today, we journey to Taiwan with global HR solutions consultant and intercultural trainer Sunny Foehr-Huang. Together, we'll unravel the intricacies of Taiwanese work culture, exploring everything from the vital concept of 'Guanxi' to the enduring influence of Confucian values. Whether you're considering business opportunities in Taiwan or are simply fascinated by its unique work environment, this episode promises to be an eye-opener. Join us as we continue our voyage through the world's diverse work cultures.

Minter Dialogue with Ashley Recanati Ashley Recanati is a fellow French-American and now a fellow author. Living in Shanghai and working as the MD of the APAC region for a German industrial company, Ashely recently released his book, "AI Battle Royale, How to protect your job from disruption in the 4th Industrial Revolution," published by Copernicus Book, Springer (Mar 2023). In this conversation, we discuss the challenges faced by people working in business to have the right attitude and skills to adapt to this fast-changing world. How to to futureproof yourself and stay up to date with the new technologies; and how can we help our kids get ready? We look at some of the cultural differences, especially with his perspective being based in China, and we explore some of his key concepts and recommendations in his book. The one I liked the most was Guanxi.   If you've got comments or questions you'd like to see answered, send your email or audio file to nminterdial@gmail.com; or you can find the show notes and comment on minterdial.com. If you liked the podcast, please take a moment to go over to Apple Podcasts or your favourite podcast channel, to rate/review the show. Otherwise, you can find me @mdial on Twitter.

Episodio sponsorizzato da Digital Combat Agency! Seconda parte dell'intervista ad Alberto Giusti, founder di Guanxi e mille altre avventure imprenditoriali. Con Alberto tocchiamo tantissimi temi davvero interessanti: il parallelismo tra i nostri tempi e il rinascimento il modello win-win-win come fare a cambiare carriera l'importanza del feedback e della misurazione dei KPI l'importanza di conoscere noi stessi e le nostre passioni prima di prendere decisioni importanti e molto altro! Trovi show notes e link discussi su https://officeofcards.com/podcasts Scopri la Newsletter di Office of Cards!  Segui il canale YouTube di Office of Cards!  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Episodio sponsorizzato da Digital Combat Agency! Prima parte dell'intervista ad Alberto Giusti, founder di Guanxi e mille altre avventure imprenditoriali. Con Alberto tocchiamo tantissimi temi davvero interessanti: l'importanza di concentrarci sulle nostre reazioni a quello che ci succede il valore dell'esplorazione le opportunità che si creano quando siamo disposti a condividere il rischio le fasi della vita di una startup i modelli organizzativi moderni e molto altro! Trovi show notes e link discussi su https://officeofcards.com/podcasts Scopri la Newsletter di Office of Cards!  Segui il canale YouTube di Office of Cards!  Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Kai held several top management positions in China for many years before he decided to start his own business. In this episode, you will learn what it is like living in the same neighborhood as Tesla in Shanghai and what that means for daily life. You`ll understand several reasons why it is essential to start your business while still being employed elsewhere. (Guanxi, Visa, Language, etc.) You`ll get insights on how to find the right business partner and how to navigate the Chinese business landscape as a foreigner, especially being a first-time entrepreneur. Connect with Kai on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/kai-marcel-dodel-64987467/

RSVP for Weekly Speak, Learn, Practice, Master (SLPM) Chinese Language & Cultural Interactive MeetupsBeginning July 19, 2023 at 10:00am PST"You must be more open-minded and flexible to succeed in China"https://www.genejhsu.com/ (Free RSVP)I'm sure you've heard this advice before? It may be good advice, but it is vague and nonsensical because these suggestions cannot be quantified or qualified in the proper cultural context.vague 费话 fèihuà (to talk at length / to waste one's breath)nonsensical 废话 fèihuà (nonsense / rubbish / superfluous words / gently sarcastic = No kidding!)These words are catchphrases that allow failure to have an excuse rather than being a prescription for elevating performance. So I'll be hosting weekly Zoom interactive workshops for the rest of 2023.Practice key Chinese phrases in the proper cultural contextRole play essential Guanxi rituals with real-time feedbackDiscover critical psychological factors at play in the Chinese arenaMaster perception management with Chinese counterpartsRSVP once and you'll be invited to each weekly session for the rest of 2023, receive a free copy of The Chinese Honeymoon Period, and receive early access to EXACTLY WHAT TO SAY IN CHINA manuscript.10:00am PST bi-weekly sessions starting on July 19, 20237:00pm PST bi-weekly sessions starting on July 26, 2023Demonstrating flexibility and open-mindedness in China is challenging due to cultural differences and inadequate translations, so this interactive event is a must for anyone that wants to be perceived more positively by all Chinese stakeholders.Learn the psychological rules of reciprocity and how to craft a persona that leads and inspires in China."A cultural dichotomy is just a contrast that lacks curiosity."https://www.genejhsu.com/ (Free RSVP)#chinabusiness #chineseculture #speakchinese #mandarinchinese #expatchinese #chineselanguage #chinaexpat #mandarin #chinese #china

Do you need help building successful business relationships (GUANXI 关系) and negotiating more smoothly with Chinese counterparts? Have you ever been perplexed why your goodwill gestures in China appear well-received but rarely yield their intended outcomes?This Chinese language and cultural immersion experience examined how to create a new China persona and approach (modus operandi) that results in more positive and fruitful interaction patterns with Chinese partners. Perception management in the Chinese cultural context is analyzed within five levels of ascension to construct a development plan based on different experience levels and psychological profiles.After this session, you'll begin wondering whether you've been focusing on the wrong things to elevate your success in doing business in China, and you can contact us to access more content, training, and coaching to know EXACTLY WHAT TO SAY IN CHINA.https://www.genejhsu.com/#chinabusiness #chineseculture #speakchinese #mandarin #chineselanguage #expatchinese

Guanxi can be loosely understood as instrumental social relationships that form a network to be used by individuals for their personal benefit. Guanxi is a long-enduring part of Chinese society, but how is it used in a modern context. Is it still important for doing business? How should foreigners understand guanxi? And is guanxi now doing more harm than good in modern world?Chapters00:00: Intro2:18: Definitions  of Guanxi11:39: Origins of Guanxi19:03: Building Guanxi Relationships31:51: Guanxi in China's Business World40:58: Guanxi goes abroad?44:27: Negative Societal Effects of Guanxi49:Negative Societal Effects of Guanxi-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------Sources- Guanxi: How China Workds, Yanjie Bian, 2019- Chinese Guanxi: An Integrative Review and New Directions for Future Research, Chao C. Chen,  Xiao-Ping Chen, and Shengsheng Huang, 2013- Cultivating Guanxi as a Foreign Investor Strategy, John A. Pearce II and Richard B. Robinson, Jr., 2000- Cultural and Organizational Antecedents of Guanxi: The Chinese Cases, Liang-Hung Lin, 2011- Entering Guanxi: A Business Ethical Dilemma in Mainland China?, Chenting Su and James E. Littlefield, 2001- Guanxi Networks in China: Its Importance and Future Trends, Jin Ai, 2006- Guanxi's Consequences: Personal Gains at Social Cost, Ying Fan, 2002- The Culture of Guanxi in a North China Village, Yunxiang Yan, 1996- Whither guanxi and social networks in China? A review of theory and practice, Jane Nolan & Chris Rowley, 2020- What Happens When the ‘Gaokao' Rewards Who, Not What, You Know, Sixth Tone, https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1005924- Qinghai Official Died After Sharing Seven Bottles of Baijiu, Sixth Tone, https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1012818- Bank Worker Slapped, Insulted for Not Drinking With Colleagues, Sixth Tone, https://www.sixthtone.com/news/1006093- Businesses benefiting from political connections harm China's economic growth, https://www.manchester.ac.uk/discover/news/businesses-benefitting-from-political-connections-could-harm-chinas-economic-growth/Support the showSign up for Buzzsprout to launch your podcasting journey: https://www.buzzsprout.com/?referrer_id=162442Subscribe to the Sinobabble Newsletter: https://sinobabble.substack.com/Support Sinobabble on Buy me a Coffee: https://www.buymeacoffee.com/Sinobabblepod

In this Meetup (May 11, 2023 Replay), we debunk common China myths that can lead to poor assumptions and attitudes when doing business in China. We discuss Chinese cultural dichotomies with the West and Art of War tactics that can be employed to create more constructive communication patterns and better outcomes. TimestampsSelf-Introduction Rituals [00:04:08] Gene explains the importance of self-introduction rituals in Chinese culture and how they can open more doors in China than just speaking Chinese.Cultural Dichotomies [00:04:58] Gene discusses the importance of understanding Chinese cultural dichotomies with the West to walk further in China in your own shoes.Paratrooper Manager [00:08:32] Gene explains the concept of a paratrooper manager in China, which metaphorically describes how Chinese people feel about China expats or foreigners assigned to live and work in China.Self-Introduction Rituals [00:09:29] Gene discusses the importance of self-introduction rituals and a scorecard to maximize opportunities to deepen Guanxi.Chinese Cultural Dichotomies [00:13:04] Gene explains the difference between how Westerners and Chinese people view the law and authority differently.Negotiations in China [00:17:52] Gene contrasts how Americans and Chinese people typically approach negotiations differently.Importance of ongoing relationship [00:19:42] Chinese people continue to deepen their relationship with you even after the contract is signed. Why is this important, and how should you adapt?Cultural dichotomy of time [00:23:49] Westerners view time as linear, while Chinese people view it as relative. What other differences exist, and why is it important?Deliberate ambiguity as a weapon [00:28:14] How can this tactic be employed to gain an advantage in negotiations?Importance of cultural dichotomies [00:29:31] Gene discusses the importance of understanding cultural differences and not being judgmental towards Chinese behaviors. Why?Deliberate silence in negotiations [00:31:04] Gene advises Westerners to be deliberately silent during negotiations in China, as it can create an advantage and reduce circular conversations.https://www.genejhsu.com/#chinabusiness #chineseculture #speakchinese #mandarin #chineseemployees #chinaexpat #chinese #china #negotiations

‘This kind of “respect” can be a slow-acting poison. When a person gets used to being “respected”, that's when she is in danger'In the eighty seventh episode of the Translated Chinese Fiction Podcast we are undertaking hard Graft. Betraying little more than a glance askance, Li Peifu shows us how corporate, state, and personal interests fuse all too comfortably. Guanxi-grinding with me is humble translator and noted Sweeney-enjoyer, James Trapp.-// NEWS ITEMS //READ: Massachusetts Review publishes Chiou Charng-Ting's Raining Zebra FinchesWATCH: Book club discussion of Jia Pingwa's Backflow River 倒流河LISTEN: My nemesis tackles poetry from Dalian sex workers-// WORD OF THE DAY //(秀 – xiù – refined/ear of grain)-// MENTIONED IN THE EPISODE //90s -> 10s education policy on foreign language education in England80s & 90s corruption in ChinaJeffrey Kinkley's writing on corruption fictionAphantasia - the inability to form mental imagesZhang Ping - a notable anti-corruption fiction author-// Handy TrChFic Links //Help Support TrChFic // Episode TranscriptsINSTAGRAM

March 8, 2023 HIGHLIGHT REELS - Guanxi (关系) is exceptionally difficult to translate because its application in the Chinese cultural context is dynamic, emotional, and nuanced depending on the “relationship,” often misrepresented as its translation. Grammatically, Guanxi is a noun, but it resolves a situation as an adjective and an explanation like an adverb, as its level is the overarching factor influencing behaviors. Hence, we simplify its understanding with a metaphor, the GUANXI ENGINE, which is the driving force for all interactions in China.Most of the role playing and interactive portions have been removed to highlight the concepts covered during the first portion of this experience.AGENDACuriosity Exercise Chinese Phrases Warm-Up Guanxi Engine Introduction Cultural Dichotomy Business Primer Art of War Negotiation Tactics For more information about Mandarin Savvy Chinese Language and Cultural Immersion Meetups:W: https://www.genejhsu.com/E: info@emechina.us#chinabusiness #chineseculture #speakchinese #mandarin #chineselanguage #expatchinese #guanxi #workshop #meetups

November 17, 2022 - One China Cultural Awareness Center of Orange County Meetup workshopAGENDAI. Introductions (自我介绍 zìwǒ jièshào) - Part 1 (https://youtu.be/GnbkFIWAmBc)II. Deep Immersion  Chinese Cultural Concept Chapter 1: HOW THEY OPERATE (Guanxi 关系) - Part 2 (https://youtu.be/_rDLaG1Nbck)Chapter 2: WHAT THEY CONSIDER (利益 Lìyì) - Part 3III. Role PlayingIV. LIVE Q&A Chinese Introductions 自我介绍 SCORECARDhttps://youtu.be/ifCw4pYjONAOCCAC Meetup Grouphttps://www.meetup.com/one-china-orange-county/After The Chinese Honeymoonhttps://www.genejhsu.com/atchbook

Excerpt from my upcoming book, After The Chinese HoneymoonOne of my first previews of the importance of Guanxi in Asian business culture were the early stories told by my Uncle John, who in the 80s was the National Sales Manager for Zenith based in Austin, Texas. Uncle John was raised in Taiwan following the Chinese Communist Revolution in 1949, so his opportunities to immigrate began much earlier than we have witnessed over the past two decades of Chinese citizens flocking overseas with their wealth and children. #Chinabusiness #Chineseculture #ArtofWar #Guanxi #Dell #MichaelDell https://www.genejhsu.com/atchbook

Guanxi is the oil the greases the engine of life in China. But when things go wrong, it all comes tumbling down, and fast. This is the story of Bo Xilai and Gu Kailai. And then, back to the school.

Are you AWARE of your own Truth-Default, which is your tendency to trust a stranger?It's been studied and sociologically proven that "the majority of people believe most people are mostly honest most of the time."  Chinese people naturally default-to-skepticism toward people they don't know (陌生人 mòshēng rén), not just foreigners, because by definition, they only care about the level of Guanxi. Default-to-skepticism is how they think, but you wouldn't know it by how they behave, as every gesture of friendliness or goodwill is for the sake of developing/deepening Guanxi, while in a literal sense there isn't any ‘trust' as we understand its meaning in the West behind their passion and camaraderie.https://www.genejhsu.com/

Dans ce court numéro solo d'AfrikChine , je reviens sur deux sujets d'actualités. Le premier concerne le scandale de corruption et de trafic d'influence qui touche le conseiller stratégique du président congolais, Felix Tshisekedi. Nous faisons un parallélisme entre le trafic d'influence dans le secteur minier congolais et la culture du guanxi chinoise. Comment ces deux concepts se sont rencontrées en RDCongo et ont facilité, d'une certaine façon, la percée chinoise dans les mines congolaises. Dans le second sujet, nous abordons la question du modèle de paix de la Chine dans la Corne de l'Afrique. À quoi pourrons-nous ou devrons-nous attendre de la part de Pékin dans la région. 

September 14, 2022 - Another amazing opportunity to help our future leaders develop a healthy mindset for China business as a keynote speaker at Scheller College of Business in Atlanta. We explored media bias and our cultural biases in the context of our objectives in China, with Chinese companies, and cooperating with Chinese people.We introduced a framework to develop greater 'Awareness' to create a new China reality and more favorable 'Outcomes.'00:00 Introduction03:35 Preparing your mindset07:05 My promise11:11 Cultural dichotomies13:30 Time dichotomy as an example28:20 Creating a new reality in China36:46 Framework of Awareness, Action, Outcomes44:33 Q1 What advice for doing business in China today?48:45 Q2 What's the #1 Cross-cultural challenge facing foreigners in China today?53:32 Q3 Can you explain the importance of Guanxi?56:14 Q4: Can Guanxi be developed in a short amount of time?#chinabusiness #chineseculture #guanxi #crossculture #mindset #culturalawareness #selfawarenesshttps://www.genejhsu.com/

July 20, 2022 Meetup Replay - Why should you care about HOW our Chinese counterparts think, and what focus can help us acquire that insight?想法 xiǎngfǎ is influenced by a mixture of factors: environmental, media, and social It's based on a set of emotional and psychological factors that reflect a person's attitude, perspective, and Relationship-To-Face, which is the balance of a person's "propensity to give Face as a tactic" and "require Face as an emotional need."什么关系？ shénme guānxì “Guanxi relationship” (Hierarchical)什么感觉？ shénme gǎnjué “Perception” (Bargaining Power) To join our next Meetup and get your copy of The Chinese Honeymoon Period, visit:https://www.genejhsu.com/#chinabusiness #chineseculture #guanxi #mianzi #uschina #learnchinese #mandarinchinese

July 6, 2022 - Replay clip of THEIR (Chinese) ATTITUDE (心态 Xīntài) from our bi-weekly Guanxi practice session Meetup.Where do Chinese attitudes come from (INSIGHT), and how should we engage with them to achieve better outcomes?What's the significance of our 脸色 liǎnsè (facial expressions that reflect one's attitude) in setting a positive tone for a more productive interaction?Practical Definition: 心态 Xīntài is an attitude and corresponding worldview that's derived from a person's upbringing and environment in which they were raised—IT IS IMMUTABLE.To join our next Meetup and get your copy of The Chinese Honeymoon Period, visit:https://www.genejhsu.com/ #chinabusiness #chineseculture #guanxi #mianzi #uschina #learnchinese #mandarinchinese

June 22, 2022 - Replay clip of HOW THEY FEEL (委屈Wěiqu) overview for our bi-weekly Guanxi practice session Meetup.So, how do we understand these Chinese emotions in the proper cultural context AND avoid the consequences of unintentionally causing them?Practical Definition: 委屈 Wěiqu is repressed feelings of injustice, unfairness, and grievance that cannot be conveyed to those who caused it. It is feeling wronged by someone in a position of authority.But, 焦虑 jiāolǜ is an emotion that doesn't exist in Western culture…LISTEN and find out the DIRECT and INDIRECT causes and how to avoid them…To join our next Meetup on July 6, 2022 (links to RSVP >> https://www.genejhsu.com/)

THE CHINESE HONEYMOON PERIOD highlights 10 Chinese cultural concepts that are widely misunderstood but essential for understanding HOW Chinese people think, WHY they behave the way they do, and HOW to create more positive communication patterns that lead to more constructive cooperation.Practical Definition: 铁饭碗 Tiěfànwǎn is a subconscious mentality of ordinary Chinese people that collective lifetime employment, which is sustainable based solely on maintaining Guanxi connections, is desirable.LinkedIn Post on Jan 24, 2022https://www.linkedin.com/posts/genejhsu_practical-definition-%E9%93%81%E9%A5%AD%E7%A2%97-ti%C4%9Bf%C3%A0nw%C7%8En-is-a-activity-6891386239849775104-3kw2Special thanks to all the contributors to this discussion:Dr. Miguel Cerna https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-miguel-cerna-alternatives/Anastasia Chevtchenko https://www.linkedin.com/in/monacolaclasse/Iain Hoggarth https://www.linkedin.com/in/iain-hoggarth-084200a0/Manfred Huschka https://www.linkedin.com/in/manfred-huschka-b8b9a55/Juliette Pitt https://www.linkedin.com/in/juliette-p-845206143/Guan Her Ng https://www.linkedin.com/in/guan-her-ng/Grace Liping Guo https://www.linkedin.com/in/gracelipingguo/Simone Harre https://www.linkedin.com/in/simone-harre-0834a786/Cristina Arcaini https://www.linkedin.com/in/cristinaarcaini/Greg Robb https://www.linkedin.com/in/gregrobb339/All ADD YOUR VOICE posts, videos, and podcasts updated weeklyhttps://www.genejhsu.com/addyourvoicePre-order THE CHINESE HONEYMOON PERIOD (February 18, 2021)https://www.genejhsu.com/chinesehoneymoonFollow me on LinkedIn and join the conversationshttps://www.linkedin.com/in/genejhsu/Subscribe to the China Myth Podcasthttps://www.genejhsu.com/chinamythpodcast Watch the China Myth Podcast on YouTubehttps://www.youtube.com/c/GeneHsu

THE CHINESE HONEYMOON PERIOD highlights 10 Chinese cultural concepts that are widely misunderstood but essential for understanding HOW Chinese people think, WHY they behave the way they do, and HOW to create more positive communication patterns that lead to more constructive cooperation.Practical Definition:  给面子 Gěimiànzi is proactively giving someone OUTWARD demonstrations of flattery, praise, and respect for the purposes of deepening Guanxi.LinkedIn Post on Jan 17, 2022https://www.linkedin.com/posts/genejhsu_%E7%BB%99%E9%9D%A2%E5%AD%90-g%C4%9Bimi%C3%A0nzi-weekly-chinese-cultural-concept-activity-6888862344525557760-GpodSpecial thanks to all the contributors to this discussion:Denis Niedringhaus https://www.linkedin.com/in/denis-niedringhaus-ab547740/Dr. Miguel Cerna https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-miguel-cerna-alternatives/Anastasia Chevtchenko https://www.linkedin.com/in/monacolaclasse/Iain Hoggarth https://www.linkedin.com/in/iain-hoggarth-084200a0/Manfred Huschka https://www.linkedin.com/in/manfred-huschka-b8b9a55/Juliette Pitt https://www.linkedin.com/in/juliette-p-845206143/Guan Her Ng https://www.linkedin.com/in/guan-her-ng/Grace Liping Guo https://www.linkedin.com/in/gracelipingguo/Simone Harre https://www.linkedin.com/in/simone-harre-0834a786/Cristina Arcaini https://www.linkedin.com/in/cristinaarcaini/Liping Yan https://www.linkedin.com/in/liping-y-053900174/Todd Cornell https://www.linkedin.com/in/todd-cornell/ All ADD YOUR VOICE posts, videos, and podcasts updated weeklyhttps://www.genejhsu.com/addyourvoicePre-order THE CHINESE HONEYMOON PERIOD (February 18, 2021)https://www.genejhsu.com/chinesehoneymoonFollow me on LinkedIn and join the conversationshttps://www.linkedin.com/in/genejhsu/Subscribe to the China Myth Podcasthttps://www.genejhsu.com/chinamythpodcastWatch the China Myth Podcast on YouTubehttps://www.youtube.com/c/GeneHsu

Topics Discussed and Key Points:●      China's consumer PC market in the early-to-mid-90s●      Why many companies struggled in the 90s while Intel thrived●      Building the Chinese social networking app Guanxi in the early-2010s●      Co-founding mInfo, the official mobile search provider to the Beijing Olympics in 2008●      What internet marketing looked like 20 years ago and the impact of mobile in the 2000s●      The early days of eCommerce and the reasons for its dramatic growth●      What foreign VR companies should do to localize for the Chinese market●      How VR is perceived in China versus the West and why it took a long time to take off●      Where the world of VR will be in five to ten years●      What Alvin means by: “The metaverse will expand—not replace—the internet.” Episode Summary:Today on The Negotiation, we talk with Alvin Wang Graylin, China President at HTC. Established in 1997, HTC is an award-winning developer of smart mobile, connected technology, and virtual reality products.Alvin is also the Vice President of the Industry of Virtual Reality Alliance (IVRA) and the President of the Virtual Reality Venture Capital Alliance (VRVCA)He has almost three decades of business management experience in the tech industry, including 20 years in Greater China beginning with a Senior Management position at Intel in 1993. Prior to HTC, Alvin was a serial entrepreneur, having founded four venture-backed startups in the mobile and internet spaces, covering mobile social, adtech, search, AI, big data and digital media. Additionally, he has held $100+ million P&L roles at a number of public companies.Today, Alvin is a sought-after speaker and thought leader on the topics of VR/AR/AI in China and globally.According to Alvin, the key consideration of the Chinese government when scrutinizing foreign companies is the potential for technology transfer. It is a tit-for-tat attitude that Intel was able to abide by, resulting in a collaboration that allowed Intel to thrive while most other foreign consumer PC brands of the time failed to penetrate the market.Alvin looks back on an early career in the Chinese tech space where innovation was rampant, including his experience building the Chinese social networking app Guanxi in the early-2010s, as well as co-founding mInfo, the official mobile search provider to the Beijing Olympics in 2008.Finally, Alvin discusses his current role at HTC developing smart mobile and VR products. “In every area of this industry,” he says, “there is innovation happening.” The common thread tying these innovations together is the ever-blurring line between distinct features that make up many of today's devices. In the near future, Alvin foresees smart mobile devices for both personal and business uses, incorporating both VR and AR technologies.Alvin concludes: “Anybody at any age can put on these devices and behave as they do in the real world.” Key Quotes:“There were tons of consumers out there, but how could we get them into this new internet and multimedia trend that's starting to happen? One was getting the prices way down. Two was helping to take all this global content and localizing it. And three was creating low-end consumer channels that were able to reach out to all the different Tier 2, 3, 4, 5 cities that didn't have access to computer stores at all.” “COVID has really accelerated the interest in the VR industry because people are now recognizing that you're able to be productive and eliminate a lot of business travel. But having a video-only interaction doesn't feel personal enough; so, VR is a good alternative to help enhance that sense of being together.” “The old internet—the 2D internet—does not go away. I actually see the Metaverse as, essentially, the internet of today expanded to interact with 3D content, and uses an immersive device—like an AR or VR device—to experience this 3D content. But at the same time, these 3D devices can be used to experience 2D content. [...] This Metaverse needs to be something that's completely open, that anybody can get into through any device, and it needs to be at global standards to be operable across different countries and different operating systems.”

THE CHINESE HONEYMOON PERIOD highlights 10 Chinese cultural concepts that are widely misunderstood but essential for understanding HOW Chinese people think, WHY they behave the way they do, and HOW to create more positive communication patterns that lead to more constructive cooperation.My Definition: Liyi (利益 lìyì) is the perceived personal benefit(s) of deepening Guanxi.LinkedIn Post on December 27, 2021https://www.linkedin.com/posts/genejhsu_my-definition-liyi-%E5%88%A9%E7%9B%8A-l%C3%ACy%C3%AC-is-the-perceived-activity-6881287999989145600-3IEZSpecial thanks for the invaluable insights shared during the holidays:Teacher Liping Yan https://www.linkedin.com/in/liping-y-053900174/Denis Niedringhaus https://www.linkedin.com/in/denis-niedringhaus-ab547740/Juliette Pitt https://www.linkedin.com/in/juliette-p-845206143/Cristina Arcaini https://www.linkedin.com/in/cristinaarcaini/Todd Cornell https://www.linkedin.com/in/todd-cornell/Guan Her Ng https://www.linkedin.com/in/guan-her-ng/ All ADD YOUR VOICE posts, videos, and podcasts updated weeklyhttps://www.genejhsu.com/addyourvoicePre-order THE CHINESE HONEYMOON PERIOD (February 18, 2021)https://www.genejhsu.com/chinesehoneymoonFollow me on LinkedIn and join the conversationshttps://www.linkedin.com/in/genejhsu/Subscribe to the China Myth Podcasthttps://www.genejhsu.com/chinamythpodcastWatch the China Myth Podcast on YouTubehttps://www.youtube.com/c/GeneHsu

THE CHINESE HONEYMOON PERIOD highlights 10 Chinese cultural concepts that are widely misunderstood but essential for understanding HOW Chinese people think, WHY they behave the way they do, and HOW to create more positive communication patterns that lead to more constructive cooperation.My Definition: Guanxi (关系) is the relationship between two people that represent their expectations from each other in terms of favoritism, referrals for connections, and the sharing of inside information.LinkedIn Post on December 20, 2021https://www.linkedin.com/posts/genejhsu_my-definition-guanxi-%E5%85%B3%E7%B3%BB-is-the-relationship-activity-6878767744301572096-7yn8 Special thanks for the invaluable insights shared:Dr. Matthias Niedenführ https://www.linkedin.com/in/matthias-niedenfuehr/Alberto Antinucci https://www.linkedin.com/in/albertoantinucci/Dr. Miguel Cerna https://www.linkedin.com/in/dr-miguel-cerna-alternatives/Juliette Pitt https://www.linkedin.com/in/juliette-p-845206143/Cristina Arcaini https://www.linkedin.com/in/cristinaarcaini/Peter Peverelli https://www.linkedin.com/in/ppeverelli/Chanfang Wang https://www.linkedin.com/in/chanfangwang/Guan Her Ng https://www.linkedin.com/in/guan-her-ng/Álvaro Isidro Paños Cubillo https://www.linkedin.com/in/%C3%A1lvaro-isidro-pa%C3%B1os-cubillo-3887a8129/ Pre-order THE CHINESE HONEYMOON PERIOD (February 18, 2021)https://www.genejhsu.com/chinesehoneymoonFollow me on LinkedIn and join the conversationshttps://www.linkedin.com/in/genejhsu/Watch the China Myth Podcast on YouTubehttps://www.youtube.com/c/GeneHsu

Guanxi (关系) หรือที่อ่านออกเสียงในภาษาไทยกันว่า “กวานซี่” นั้นเป็นคำในภาษาจีนกลางที่มีความหมายว่า สายสัมพันธ์ ซึ่งถือเป็นวัฒนธรรมและประเพณีในอีกรูปแบบหนึ่งของชาวจีนที่สืบต่อกันมา อย่างยาวนานในภูมิภาคโลกตะวันออกอันลึกลับและซับซ้อนยากเกินกว่าที่ฝรั่ง ตาน้ำข้าวจะเข้าใจได้ภายในวันเดียว The Information ได้เผยแพร่รายงานฉบับยาวที่มีรายละเอียดความพยายามของ Tim Cook CEO ของ Apple ในการสร้างความสัมพันธ์ที่แน่นแฟ้นระหว่าง Apple กับเจ้าหน้าที่และหน่วยงานของรัฐบาลจีน โดยอ้างทั้งบทสัมภาษณ์และการเข้าถึงโดยตรงไปยังเอกสารภายในของ Apple เกี่ยวกับการที่ Cook ไปประเทศจีนซ้ำหลายครั้งในช่วงกลางปี ​​2010 รายงานดังกล่าวอธิบายถึงข้อตกลงมูลค่า 275 พันล้านดอลลาร์ ซึ่ง Apple มุ่งมั่นที่จะลงทุนอย่างหนักในด้านโครงสร้างพื้นฐานด้านเทคโนโลยีและการฝึกอบรมในประเทศจีน เลือกฟังกันได้เลยนะครับ อย่าลืมกด Follow ติดตาม PodCast ช่อง Geek Forever's Podcast ของผมกันด้วยนะครับ ========================= ร่วมสนับสนุน ด.ดล Blog และ Geek Forever Podcast เพื่อให้เรามีกำลังในการผลิต Content ดี ๆ ให้กับท่าน https://www.tharadhol.com/become-a-supporter/ ——————————————– ติดตาม ด.ดล Blog ผ่าน Line OA เพียงคลิก : https://lin.ee/aMEkyNA ——————————————– ไม่พลาดข่าวสารผ่านทาง Email จาก ด.ดล Blog : https://www.getrevue.co/profile/tharadhol ——————————————– Geek Forever Club พื้นที่ของการแลกเปลี่ยนข้อมูลข่าวสาร ความรู้ ด้านธุรกิจ เทคโนโลยีและวิทยาศาสตร์ ใหม่ ๆ ที่น่าสนใจ https://www.facebook.com/groups/geek.forever.club/ ========================= ช่องทางติดตาม ด.ดล Blog เพิ่มเติมได้ที่ Fanpage : www.facebook.com/tharadhol.blog Blockdit : www.blockdit.com/tharadhol.blog Twitter : www.twitter.com/tharadhol Instragram : instragram.com/tharadhol TikTok : tiktok.com/@geek.forever Youtube : www.youtube.com/c/mrtharadhol Linkedin : www.linkedin.com/in/tharadhol Website : www.tharadhol.com

Aditya Sehgal is one of the clearest thinkers I have had the pleasure of talking to; he is ex-President of Reckitt Benkiser, worked across multiple countries in top leadership roles, and the best testament to his leadership was that multiple folks I spoke to called him “the best manager / leader they ever worked for”. He has deeply thought out frameworks for career growth, personal development, decision making et al, and has honed these frameworks over decades of personal experience. I learnt a lot from this conversation and I hope you enjoy it as much as I did. Aditya's blog is at www.adityasehgal.com. Detailed timestamps from the conversation are below. If you like this conversation, don't forget to subscribe, and please rate the podcast on Google podcasts, Apple, Spotify, YouTube or wherever you listen to it. Thank you and let's get started. Timestamps: 01:02 Intro 02:50 Frameworks, career journey, and power of compounding. 08:04 Framework of being rich, ideas for his future, being a ‘door opener' for others. 13:20 Personal development, managing time, prioritising family, creating new habits. 18:02 Developing teams, getting promoted, ‘gardening' as a metaphor for building talent. 22:08 Finding purpose. “The journey is all we have”. 25:50 Blitzscaling. “Be fast. Be big. Be bold.” 37:18 Scaling in China. Experiments and learnings. 46:23 Learnings from the China market. Embracing the future. Hunting in packs. ‘Guanxi'. 52:22 Job satisfaction model. 55:10 Quick questions. Disclaimer: The views, information, or opinions expressed during the series are solely personal and do not necessarily represent those of my company / employers.

Hace tiempo se solía definir a China como el país del "caos ordenado". En los últimos años, teniendo en cuenta que se trata de una país donde todo cambia a una velocidad pasmosa, la definición más precisa sería la de "caos disciplinado". Tanto para lo bueno como para lo malo, el estado ha ido imponiendo sus regulaciones en todos los ámbitos de la sociedad china relegando costumbres como el Guanxi a un segundo plano. Gracias a esta disciplina se han solucionado un buen número de situaciones caóticas indeseadas, aunque también se han sufrido consecuencias negativas.

Rodolfo Chung, CEO do Zé Delivery (startup da Ambev), é o convidado desse episódio do podcast A Hora da China. A Ambev está presente no país através de sua holding AB InBeV. Recebido por Felipe Leal (StartSe), Camila Ghattas (Foreseekers) e In Hsieh (Chinnovation), eles discutem as peculiaridades do mercado consumidor chinês -- incluindo o setor de bebidas álcoolicas. Eles discutem: - Guanxi: como os chineses fazem negócios; - O início da AB InBeV na China; - A importância de um ocidental falar mandarim; - Porque as empresas devem ser ambidestras; - E muito mais! --- Semanalmente, nós traremos o áudio da transmissão ao vivo do nosso programa "A Hora da China", que reúne o que está acontecendo de mais importante no país -- seja em inovação, tecnologia, varejo, fintech, cultura e muito mais! Você pode conferir a gravação ou ao vivo no www.youtube.com/StartSeOficial. StartSe, educação do agora. app.startse.com

Chinese people will always figure out a way to compensate themselves for any missing goodwill from you, so we will introduce Jack, my first local channel partner in China who came in at the highest level of Guanxi and as trustworthy as they come.So how could this relationship sour, and what could have prevented Jack from lying, cheating, and stealing (Goodwill Extraction)?DOWNLOAD CHINA MYTH PODCAST LISTENER'S GUIDEhttps://www.genejhsu.com/chinamythpodcast-cheatsheetChina Myth Podcast episodes are also published as The Chinese Honeymoon Period short stories on Kindle Vella.https://www.amazon.com/The-Chinese-Honeymoon-Period/dp/B09756P11G/ Every Tuesday, there is a YouTube Live Recap Q&A Chinese Concept Reviewhttps://www.youtube.com/c/GeneHsu 

Learn how I incorporated “Shanghai life” into my business, and hear the story of an arrogant Brit named Keith and how the power of Yin Yang Guanxi connections can change your fortunes in China.“To be successful in China, you need to manage the different shades of gray because nothing is black or white” - David Chang | China CEO | Philips ChinaDOWNLOAD CHINA MYTH PODCAST LISTENER'S GUIDEhttps://www.genejhsu.com/chinamythpodcast-cheatsheetChina Myth Podcast episodes are also published as The Chinese Honeymoon Period short stories on Kindle Vella.https://www.amazon.com/The-Chinese-Honeymoon-Period/dp/B09756P11G/ Every Tuesday, there is a YouTube Live Recap Q&A Chinese Concept Reviewhttps://www.youtube.com/c/GeneHsu 

Today on The Negotiation, Scott Laprise discusses his transition from a career in diagnostic medicine to a financial analyst and researcher for emerging markets specifically within China.Scott considers Chinese languages the most important to study because of the country's position as a key player in world business. Additionally, it is not enough to converse in English because the Chinese express themselves in a way that is fundamentally different from how Westerners communicate. Scott, therefore, always seeks to understand the Chinese point-of-view on any given topic before negotiating or simply engaging in conversation with them.Asked whether China can still be considered a “communist” country, Scott brings context by explaining that, at one point, China (specifically Mao Zedong) sought to partner with Russia, adopting elements of their political philosophy as a result. Today, however, Scott actually thinks of China as the most capitalist country today: While there are semblances of a planned economy, the Chinese themselves are very business-oriented and are masterful negotiators.Scott also touches on the term guanxi as a cultural aspect that is uniquely Chinese. “The more you know people, the more you can ask things of them, and the more they can ask things of you.” He also notes that time also plays a big role, considering the long-term worldview of China. That is, the longer you have known someone in China, the stronger the reciprocal dynamic present in the relationship.Scott goes on to talk about the ever-growing consumer culture in China. The speed and bottom-line-oriented nature of the economy mean less customer loyalty and a higher amount of unregulated pollution, but all of it speaks to China's ability to pivot and become a dominant player in the market with relative ease.On that note, Scott states that China is not actually innovative but adaptive. The Chinese do not care all that much about patents because they do not focus on novelty. He believes that countries that impose patent laws “are the rich countries that have a lot to lose”. China's point of view, on the other hand, is to simply “catch up”.Scott shares his point of view on the complicated situation around the US-China “Phase 1” trade deal, as well as what gives him an edge as a financial analyst. His viewpoints on these subjects are obviously influenced by the fact that Scott is a Westerner who lives locally—boots on the ground—in China, with business experience in both cultures.

Executive coach Julia Atkinson shares her experiences coaching teams across three different continents, and provides insight into how to thrive when cultures collide. You'll learn:1. The differences between Eastern and Western styles of communication2. A quick rundown of the four different Myers-Briggs preferences, from ENFJ to ISTP3. What is “Guanxi”? A Chinese word that worldview implications worldwideAbout JuliaJulia Atkinson is an Executive Coach with more than 8 years experience of living and working in China before taking her business to the US, Chicago. 10 years of leading teams in Multinationals in IT and Telecommunication give her first hand corporate know-how. Julia uses an interactive coaching process to help clients attain awareness of deeply rooted beliefs and values and related behaviors. From that awareness, she helps them identify and implement shifts that will effect lasting change where they want it.Items mentioned in the show:The Diamond Cutter by Geshe Michael Roach and Lama Christie McNallySleeping, Dreaming, and Dying: An Exploration of Consciousness by the Dalai LamaThe Biology of Belief by Dr. Bruce H. LiptonMyers-Briggs WorkshopMyers-Briggs preferences cheatsheetIdeapodJulia's LinkedIn pageJulia's websiteMore reflection on guanxiView transcript, show notes, and links at https://awesomeatyourjob.com/ep31See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.