Podcasts about social choice

In episode 28 of Recsperts, I sit down with Robin Burke, professor of information science at the University of Colorado Boulder and a leading expert with over 30 years of experience in recommender systems. Together, we explore multistakeholder recommender systems, fairness, transparency, and the role of recommender systems in the age of evolving generative AI.We begin by tracing the origins of recommender systems, traditionally built around user-centric models. However, Robin challenges this perspective, arguing that all recommender systems are inherently multistakeholder—serving not just consumers as the recipients of recommendations, but also content providers, platform operators, and other key players with partially competing interests. He explains why the common “Recommended for You” label is, at best, an oversimplification and how greater transparency is needed to show how stakeholder interests are balanced.Our conversation also delves into practical approaches for handling multiple objectives, including reranking strategies versus integrated optimization. While embedding multistakeholder concerns directly into models may be ideal, reranking offers a more flexible and efficient alternative, reducing the need for frequent retraining.Towards the end of our discussion, we explore post-userism and the impact of generative AI on recommendation systems. With AI-generated content on the rise, Robin raises a critical concern: if recommendation systems remain overly user-centric, generative content could marginalize human creators, diminishing their revenue streams. Enjoy this enriching episode of RECSPERTS - Recommender Systems Experts.Don't forget to follow the podcast and please leave a review(00:00) - Introduction (03:24) - About Robin Burke and First Recommender Systems (26:07) - From Fairness and Advertising to Multistakeholder RecSys (34:10) - Multistakeholder RecSys Terminology (40:16) - Multistakeholder vs. Multiobjective (42:43) - Reciprocal and Value-Aware RecSys (59:14) - Objective Integration vs. Reranking (01:06:31) - Social Choice for Recommendations under Fairness (01:17:40) - Post-Userist Recommender Systems (01:26:34) - Further Challenges and Closing Remarks Links from the Episode:Robin Burke on LinkedInRobin's WebsiteThat Recommender Systems LabReference to Broder's Keynote on Computational Advertising and Recommender Systems from RecSys 2008Multistakeholder Recommender Systems (from Recommender Systems Handbook), chapter by Himan Abdollahpouri & Robin BurkePOPROX: The Platform for OPen Recommendation and Online eXperimentationAltRecSys 2024 (Workshop at RecSys 2024)Papers:Burke et al. (1996): Knowledge-Based Navigation of Complex Information SpacesBurke (2002): Hybrid Recommender Systems: Survey and ExperimentsResnick et al. (1997): Recommender SystemsGoldberg et al. (1992): Using collaborative filtering to weave an information tapestryLinden et al. (2003): Amazon.com Recommendations - Item-to-Item Collaborative FilteringAird et al. (2024): Social Choice for Heterogeneous Fairness in RecommendationAird et al. (2024): Dynamic Fairness-aware Recommendation Through Multi-agent Social ChoiceBurke et al. (2024): Post-Userist Recommender Systems : A ManifestoBaumer et al. (2017): Post-userismBurke et al. (2024): Conducting Recommender Systems User Studies Using POPROXGeneral Links:Follow me on LinkedInFollow me on XSend me your comments, questions and suggestions to marcel.kurovski@gmail.comRecsperts Website

The SPaMCAST 855 features my conversation with Khurram Mir. We talked about testing, quality assurance, control, and frameworks. We discussed whether we would still discuss the link between continual schedule pressure and reduced quality in 19 years. What is your opinion? Let's face it: Effective testing is essential for the effective delivery of value.   Bio Steering Kualitatem as Co-Founder and Chief Marketing Officer, Khurram focuses on nurturing client relationships through transparency and a commitment to quality. The team's dedication to customer satisfaction and growth has been unwavering for over 15 years. With a distinct proficiency in new business development and software applications, they have successfully positioned Kualitatem as a leader in quality assurance. Founding Kualitee highlighted Khurram's journey in product management, channeling his competencies into creating a tool that simplifies and enhances the testing process for teams. The platform reflects their mission to make quality management both efficient and enjoyable. Contact Data: LinkedIN: Web: (Company) Web: (Personal) Email: khurram@kualitatem.com Mastering Work Intake sponsors SPaMCAST! Look at your to-do list and tell me your work intake process is perfectly balanced. Whether you are reacting to your work or personal backlog, it's time to learn to take control!  Buy a copy of Mastering Work Intake (your work-life balance will improve). Keyan Reid bought a copy and wrote a review titled “” Links to buy a copy… JRoss Publishing: Amazon: Interested in continuing the conversation on work intake with peers in a safe space?  Join the Mastering Work Intake Community on LinkedIn   Re-read Saturday News In our re-read of , we tackle Chapter 7, Famines and Other Crises. This chapter examines the impact of freedoms and leadership through the lens of famines and other crises.  This chapter also builds upon Chapter 6's discussion of democracy. Human agency can cause and sustain famines and other crises at all levels of society.  Previous installments of : Week 1: Week 2: Week 3: Week 5: Week 6: Week 7: Week 8: Social Choice and Individual Behavior Week 9: Famines and Other Crises Next SPaMCAST  The SPaMCAST 856 will feature an essay on delivery in an unstable environment and why it is like playing billiards on a boat. The outcome is unpredictable. We will also have a visit from ! Mr Quigley will bring his Alpha and Omega of Product Development column. 

Matthew Weinzierl and Brendan Rosseau are the authors of Space to Grow: Unlocking the Final Economic Frontier.  The new book explains the business side of space. I interview both authors.  Here's my interview with Matthew Weinzierl. Watch the Video Timeline 00:00 Intro 02:00 Low-hanging fruit 07:00 Surprises 09:30 Space is vast and crowded 11:30 Kessler Syndrome 16:30 What won't happen in space? 21:45 Moon and Mars predictions 25:21 Advice for Entrepreneurs 28:00 New news 30:00 Co-authoring advice          About Matt Weinzierl Matt Weinzierl is Senior Associate Dean and Chair of the MBA Program at Harvard Business School, where he is the Joseph and Jacqueline Elbling Professor of Business Administration in the Business, Government, and the International Economy Unit and a Research Associate at the National Bureau of Economic Research. His research focuses on the optimal design of economic policy, particularly taxation, emphasizing a better understanding of the philosophical principles underlying policy choices. Recently, he has launched a set of research projects focused on commercializing the space sector and its economic implications, viewable at www.economicsofspace.com. He has served on the Commonwealth of Massachusetts Tax Expenditure Commission, the board of the National Tax Association, and on the editorial boards of Social Choice and Welfare and National Tax Journal. Before completing his PhD in economics at Harvard University in 2008, Professor Weinzierl served as the Staff Economist for Macroeconomics on the President's Council of Economic Advisers and worked in the New York office of McKinsey & Company.  My Questions In these podcasts, I ask them the following questions: 1. If you were an entrepreneur, what space-related startup idea would you pursue? 2. What are some of the most surprising findings from your research? 3. How do you envision the future of human habitation in space? 4. In what ways can space exploration contribute to solving Earth's economic challenges? 5. What ethical considerations arise from expanding economic activities into space? For example, can we colonize Mars or Europa if we find non-DNA-based bacteria there? 6. What were the challenges you faced during your research? 7. How do you foresee international relations evolving as nations compete for resources in space? 8. What are your predictions for the next decade in space exploration? 9. What are your thoughts on space tourism? 10. Who is the primary audience for this book? 11. What do you hope readers take away from "Space to Grow"? 12. What's a popular vision of space exploration that probably won't happen? 13. What narratives or myths about space need to be challenged? 14. What's the percentage chance that the Kessler Syndrome catastrophe will occur in the 2020s, 2030, and beyond? 15. How can public awareness be raised regarding the importance of investing in space? 16. What advice would you give entrepreneurs looking to enter the space industry? 17. In what ways might our values shift as we become a multi-planetary species? 18. What is a rarely discussed consequence of expanding into outer space? 19. If there was one message you want readers to remember, what would it be? 20. Do you want to clarify any misconceptions about the space economy? 21. What do you wish you had mentioned in the book? Perhaps some breaking news? 22. Lastly, how can interested individuals get involved or contribute to discussions around space economics?  23. What tips do you have for co-writing a book? 24. Did you change your mind about something during your writing process? 25. Do you have action items for the audience? More info You can post comments, ask questions, and sign up for my newsletter at http://wanderlearn.com. If you like this podcast, subscribe and share!  On social media, my username is always FTapon. Connect with me on: Facebook Twitter YouTube Instagram TikTok LinkedIn Pinterest Tumblr My Patrons sponsored this show! Claim your monthly reward by becoming a patron at http://Patreon.com/FTapon Rewards start at just $2/month! Affiliate links Get 25% off when you sign up to Trusted Housesitters, a site that helps you find sitters or homes to sit in. Start your podcast with my company, Podbean, and get one month free! In the USA, I recommend trading crypto with Kraken.  Outside the USA, trade crypto with Binance and get 5% off your trading fees! For backpacking gear, buy from Gossamer Gear.

Gudrun sprach im Januar 2024 mit zwei Studenten ihrer Vorlesung Mathematical Modelling and Simulation: Lukas Ullmer und Moritz Vogel. Sie hatten in ihrem Projekt Wahlmodelle ananlysiert. In dem Gespräch geht es darum, wie man hierfür mathematische Modelle findet, ob man Wahlsysteme fair gestalten kann und was sie aus den von ihnen gewählten Beispielen gelernt haben. Der Fokus ihrer Projektarbeit liegt auf der Betrachtung und Analyse von Wahlen, in denen mehrere verschiedene Wähler zu einem Thema abstimmen. Formal von Relevanz sind hierbei die sogenannten Wahlsysteme, welche die Art der Aggregation der Wählerstimmen beschreiben. Diese fallen in der Praxis recht vielfältig aus und über die Jahre wurden verschiedenste Wahlsysteme vorgeschlagen, angewendet und auch analysiert. In dieser Arbeit werden drei Kategorien präferenzbasierter Wahlsysteme analysiert: vergleichsbasierte Systeme, Scoring-Systeme sowie Approval-Systeme. Aufbauend darauf erfolgt die Konstruktion mehrstufiger und hybrider Wahlsysteme. Desweiteren werden verschiedenen Wahleigenschaften wie z.B. die Nicht-Diktatur oder die Strategiesicherheit betrachtet. Diese meist wünschenswerten Eigenschaften schließen sich teilweise gegenseitig aus. Die Themen Wahlmanipulation und Wahlkontrolle liegen deshalb besonders im Fokus. Literatur und weiterführende Informationen J. Rothe u.a. Einführung in Computational Social Choice: Individuelle Strategien und kollektive Entscheidungen beim Spielen, Wählen und Teilen. Spektrum Akademischer Verlag Heidelberg, 2012. doi: 10.1007/978-3-8274-2571-3. A.D. Taylor and A.M. Pacelli: Mathematics and Politics - Strategy, Voting, Power, and Proof. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, 2nd corrected ed. 2008, corr. 3rd printing, 2009. H.-J. Bungartz e.a.: Modellbildung und Simulation - Eine anwendungsorientierte Einführung Kapitel 4: Gruppenentscheidungen, Springer, 2009. G.G. Szpiro: Die verflixte Mathematik der Demokratie, Springer, 2011. W.D. Wallis. The Mathematics of Elections and Voting. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2014. K. Loewenstein: Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungspraxis der Vereinigten Staaten, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg New York, 1959. Podcasts P. Stursberg, G. Thäter: Social Choice, Gespräch im Modellansatz Podcast, Folge 129, Fakultät für Mathematik, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), 2017. M. Lübbecke, S. Ritterbusch: Operations Research, Gespräch im Modellansatz Podcast, Folge 110, Fakultät für Mathematik, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), 2016. P. Staudt, G. Thäter: Wahlsysteme, Gespräch im Modellansatz Podcast, Folge 27, Fakultät für Mathematik, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), 2014. M. Fehndrich, T. Pritlove: Wahlrecht und Wahlsysteme, Gespräch im CRE Podcast, Folge 128, Metaebene Personal Media, 2009. S. Gassama, L. Harms, D. Schneiderhan, G. Thaeter: Gruppenentscheidungen, Gespräch im Modellansatz Podcast, Folge 229, Fakultät für Mathematik, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), 2020.

Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss Nicolas de Condorcet (1743-94), known as the Last of the Philosophes, the intellectuals in the French Enlightenment who sought to apply their learning to solving the problems of their world. He became a passionate believer in the progress of society, an advocate for equal rights for women and the abolition of the slave trade and for representative government. The French Revolution gave him a chance to advance those ideas and, while the Terror brought his life to an end, his wife Sophie de Grouchy 91764-1822) ensured his influence into the next century and beyond. WithRachel Hammersley Professor of Intellectual History at Newcastle UniversityRichard Whatmore Professor of Modern History at the University of St Andrews and Co-Director of the St Andrews Institute of Intellectual HistoryAnd Tom Hopkins Senior Teaching Associate in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Selwyn CollegeProducer: Simon TillotsonReading list: Keith Michael Baker, Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics (University of Chicago Press, 1974)Keith Michael Baker, ‘On Condorcet's Sketch' (Daedalus, summer 2004)Lorraine Daston, ‘Condorcet and the Meaning of Enlightenment' (Proceedings of the British Academy, 2009)Dan Edelstein, The Enlightenment: A Genealogy (Chicago University Press, 2010)Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (eds), The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2006), especially ‘Ideology and the Origins of Social Science' by Robert WoklerGary Kates, The Cercle Social, the Girondins, and the French Revolution (Princeton University Press, 1985)Steven Lukes and Nadia Urbinati (eds.), Condorcet: Political Writings (Cambridge University Press, 2009)Kathleen McCrudden Illert, A Republic of Sympathy: Sophie de Grouchy's Politics and Philosophy, 1785-1815 (Cambridge University Press, 2024)Iain McLean and Fiona Hewitt (eds.), Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1994)Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment, (Harvard University Press, 2001)Richard Whatmore, The End of Enlightenment (Allen Lane, 2023)David Williams, Condorcet and Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 2004)

Melvyn Bragg and guests discuss Nicolas de Condorcet (1743-94), known as the Last of the Philosophes, the intellectuals in the French Enlightenment who sought to apply their learning to solving the problems of their world. He became a passionate believer in the progress of society, an advocate for equal rights for women and the abolition of the slave trade and for representative government. The French Revolution gave him a chance to advance those ideas and, while the Terror brought his life to an end, his wife Sophie de Grouchy 91764-1822) ensured his influence into the next century and beyond. WithRachel Hammersley Professor of Intellectual History at Newcastle UniversityRichard Whatmore Professor of Modern History at the University of St Andrews and Co-Director of the St Andrews Institute of Intellectual HistoryAnd Tom Hopkins Senior Teaching Associate in the Department of Politics and International Studies at the University of Cambridge and Fellow of Selwyn CollegeProducer: Simon TillotsonReading list: Keith Michael Baker, Condorcet: From Natural Philosophy to Social Mathematics (University of Chicago Press, 1974)Keith Michael Baker, ‘On Condorcet's Sketch' (Daedalus, summer 2004)Lorraine Daston, ‘Condorcet and the Meaning of Enlightenment' (Proceedings of the British Academy, 2009)Dan Edelstein, The Enlightenment: A Genealogy (Chicago University Press, 2010)Mark Goldie and Robert Wokler (eds), The Cambridge History of Eighteenth-Century Political Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2006), especially ‘Ideology and the Origins of Social Science' by Robert WoklerGary Kates, The Cercle Social, the Girondins, and the French Revolution (Princeton University Press, 1985)Steven Lukes and Nadia Urbinati (eds.), Condorcet: Political Writings (Cambridge University Press, 2009)Kathleen McCrudden Illert, A Republic of Sympathy: Sophie de Grouchy's Politics and Philosophy, 1785-1815 (Cambridge University Press, 2024)Iain McLean and Fiona Hewitt (eds.), Condorcet: Foundations of Social Choice and Political Theory (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 1994)Emma Rothschild, Economic Sentiments: Adam Smith, Condorcet and the Enlightenment, (Harvard University Press, 2001)Richard Whatmore, The End of Enlightenment (Allen Lane, 2023)David Williams, Condorcet and Modernity (Cambridge University Press, 2004)

Show notes:Today we tackle a key concept in economics, the idea of market equilibrium, both general and partial. A part of this talk also involves the role of information and that of regulation. We start with polymath Kenneth Joseph Arrow, a key figure in many economic insights. From him we move to a key Chicago school figure and funnyman, George Joseph Stigler. Finally, we star the French economist Gérard Debreu. In season 1 (Danish) we reviewed the history of economic thought before WWII. The coming seasons are dedicated to the Nobel Prize in Economics, and I am joined by economist Otto Brøns-Petersen. The Nobel prize is a good benchmark for how the field and profession of economics developed after WWII. We will focus both on the scientific contributions and on the people behind them. These are all star economists and worthy of your time and attention. Some will mainly feature in one episode, others in several. We therefore advice that you listen in the thematic order we propose – but it is up to you. Rest assured, we will cover all… Eventually.ReferencesKenneth J. Arrow – Prize Lecture. NobelPrize.org. Nobel Prize Outreach AB 2023. Mon. 3 Jul 2023. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1972/arrow/lecture/Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values. Yale University Press, 2012. JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1nqb90. Kenneth J. Arrow; Gerard Debreu. Existence of an Equilibrium for a Competitive Economy. Econometrica, Vol. 22, No. 3. (Jul., 1954), pp. 265-290.Gerard Debreu – Prize Lecture. NobelPrize.org. Nobel Prize Outreach AB 2023. Mon. 3 Jul 2023. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1983/debreu/lecture/George J. Stigler – Prize Lecture. NobelPrize.org. Nobel Prize Outreach AB 2023. Mon. 3 Jul 2023. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1982/stigler/lecture/George J. Stigler – Banquet speech. NobelPrize.org. Nobel Prize Outreach AB 2023. Mon. 3 Jul 2023. https://www.nobelprize.org/prizes/economic-sciences/1982/stigler/speech/George J. Stigler. (2003). Memoirs of an Unregulated Economist. Bibliovault OAI Repository, the University of Chicago Press. George J. Stigler, 1971. "The Theory of Economic Regulation," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 2(1), pages 3-21, Spring.

The Cognitive Crucible is a forum that presents different perspectives and emerging thought leadership related to the information environment. The opinions expressed by guests are their own, and do not necessarily reflect the views of or endorsement by the Information Professionals Association. During this episode, Prof Matt Jackson of Stanford University discusses social learning, game theory, and an optimization methodology for minimizing the spread of disinformation.  Research Question:  There's a difference between entertainment and becoming informed.  How do we produce systems which are both entertaining & informing? Resources: Matt Jackson's Stanford Web Page Learning through the grapevine and the impact of the breadth and depth of social networks by Matthew O. Jackson, Suraj Malladi, and David McAdams The Human Network by Matthew Jackson Measuring Group Differences in High-Dimensional Choices: Method and Application to Congressional Speech by Matthew Gentzkow, Jesse M. Shapiro, and Matt Taddy The Secret of Our Success: How Culture Is Driving Human Evolution, Domesticating Our Species, and Making Us Smarter by Joseph Henrich Link to full show notes and resources https://information-professionals.org/episode/cognitive-crucible-episode-116 Guest Bio:  Matthew O. Jackson is the William D. Eberle Professor of Economics at Stanford University and an external faculty member of the Santa Fe Institute. He was at Northwestern University and Caltech before joining Stanford, and received his BA from Princeton University in 1984 and PhD from Stanford in 1988. Jackson's research interests include game theory, microeconomic theory, and the study of social and economic networks, on which he has published many articles and the books `The Human Network' and `Social and Economic Networks'. He also teaches an online course on networks and co-teaches two others on game theory. Jackson is a Member of the National Academy of Sciences, a Fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences, a Fellow of the Econometric Society, a Game Theory Society Fellow, and an Economic Theory Fellow, and his other honors include a Guggenheim Fellowship, the Social Choice and Welfare Prize, the von Neumann Award from Rajk Laszlo College, an honorary doctorate from Aix-Marseille University, the Jean-Jacques Laffont Prize from the Toulouse School of Economics, the B.E.Press Arrow Prize for Senior Economists, the BBVA Frontiers of Knowledge Award in Economics, Finance, and Management, and teaching awards. He has served on the editorial boards of Econometrica, Games and Economic Behavior, PNAS, the Review of Economic Design, and as the President of the Game Theory Society. About: The Information Professionals Association (IPA) is a non-profit organization dedicated to exploring the role of information activities, such as influence and cognitive security, within the national security sector and helping to bridge the divide between operations and research. Its goal is to increase interdisciplinary collaboration between scholars and practitioners and policymakers with an interest in this domain. For more information, please contact us at communications@information-professionals.org. Or, connect directly with The Cognitive Crucible podcast host, John Bicknell, on LinkedIn. Disclosure: As an Amazon Associate, 1) IPA earns from qualifying purchases, 2) IPA gets commissions for purchases made through links in this post.

In this episode, Jahed and Martin sit down with Christopher Goes who is building Anoma Network with Heliax. In the conversation, we cover definitions of money, what new definitions of money co-designed with local context can unlock in terms of value for communities, what the design space of money is, and promise and perils of privacy-shielded transactions. Show Notes: An Overview of Anoma's Architecture | by Awa Sun Yin Theory of Social Choice on Networks Against Decentralized Finance The Tyranny of Metrics | Princeton University Press Retroactive Public Goods Funding Anoma.net Introducing Namada

With the war in Ukraine escalating, I thought it would be a good idea to bring on a guest with some expertise in international relations. So I called on Daniel Bessner, an intellectual historian, associate professor at University of Washington’s Henry M. Jackson School of International Studies, and a co-host of the American Prestige podcast. Daniel is a man of the left, so we spend a lot of time here arguing, and we have a great time doing it.Note: We recorded on February 22, 2022. Between then and now, the situation in Ukraine has changed quite a bit. In order to avoid confusion, we have edited out a portion of the conversation that is no longer up-to-date.Daniel and I begin by discussing what Putin’s invasion of Ukraine might tell us about the US’s standing in the world. Daniel argues that Putin’s willingness to ignore the US’s warnings reflects the decline of America’s global hegemony. He compares the present situation to America’s geopolitical position in the wake of World War II, arguing that the US imputed unrealistic hegemonic ambitions to the Soviet Union in order to justify the Cold War. He worries that the lesson many nations will draw from Ukraine is that the best way to forestall aggression from a stronger state is to acquire nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, this strategy makes a lot of sense to me. We then take a hard turn away from war to talk about Whoopi Goldberg. Daniel and I agree that the outrage over her remarks about the Holocaust is completely overblown. But he sees in this outrage the sign of a frustrated populace with no other way to express its political will. I’m skeptical of the idea we should want a return to mass politics, though. We shouldn’t throw the fate of our institutions to the political winds. We then debate the role of private industry in administering services to the public. We agree that our public schools are in bad shape, but Daniel thinks that market logic is at the root of the problem, whereas I think the market can help offer solutions. The question of meritocracy emerges, and Daniel argues that real meritocracy is impossible within a highly unequal society. No doubt that’s a problem, but I think abandoning meritocratic principles would be a huge mistake. And finally, we get into a debate over the uses (and possible abuses) of game theory.I truly enjoyed this good-natured sparring match with Daniel, and I hope you do, too!This post is free and available to the public. To receive early access to TGS episodes, an ad-free podcast feed, Q&As, and other exclusive content and benefits, click below.0:00 Daniel: Putin’s actions in Ukraine demonstrate the decline of American global hegemony 7:02 Did the Soviet Union have the same expansionist ambitions as the US? 16:01 How the war in Ukraine could increase nuclear proliferation 23:46 Daniel: It’s absurd that people got so upset about Whoopi Goldberg’s Holocaust comment 27:27 Does the US have “mass politics” anymore? If not, is that a bad thing? 34:35 When does it pay to privatize? 38:55 What’s so bad about utopianism? 44:18 Is true meritocracy possible within a highly unequal society? 58:04 The uses (and possible abuses) of game theoryLinks and ReadingsGlenn’s Intellectual Origins, a series of interviews with DanielDaniel’s podcast, American PrestigeDaniel’s most recent appearance on Chapo Trap HouseStephen Wertheim’s book, Tomorrow, the World: The Birth of U.S. World SupremacyPaul Chamberlin’s book, The Cold War’s Killing Fields: Rethinking the Long PeaceDerek Masters and Katharine Way’s book, One World or None: A Report to the Public on the Full Meaning of the Atomic BombDaniel’s essay, “The End of Mass Politics”Walter Lippmann’s book, Public OpinionWalter Lippmann’s book, The Phantom PublicGlenn’s book, The Anatomy of Racial InequalityDaniel Markovitz’s book, The Meritocracy Trap: How America's Foundational Myth Feeds Inequality, Dismantles the Middle Class, and Devours the EliteKenneth Arrow’s book, Social Choice and Individual ValuesPaul Erickson’s, The World the Game Theorists MadeS.M. Amadae’s book, Rationalizing Capitalist Democracy: The Cold War Origins of Rational Choice LiberalismRobert Fogel and Stanley Engerman’s book, Time on the Cross: The Economics of American Slavery This is a public episode. Get access to private episodes at glennloury.substack.com/subscribe

Leo Katz's work focuses on criminal law and legal theory. By connecting criminal law, moral philosophy, and the theory of social choice, he tries to shed light on some of the most basic building block notions of the law.He is a professor of law at the University of Pennsylvania and the author of numerous articles and books including “Ill-Gotten Gains: Evasion, Blackmail, Fraud, and Kindred Puzzles of the Law,” “Bad Acts and Guilty Minds: Conundrums of the Criminal Law,” and of course, “Why the Law Is So Perverse”.If you never went to law school, this episode will give you a glimpse of what its like. Leo and Greg run through a number of hypothetical cases and legal theories covering black mail, irrational preference ordering, loopholes, consent, and pain as punishment.Episode Quotes:Gray solutions:When people decide not to go to court, it's often because they realize there's a 50% chance it'll go one way, 50% chance it'll go the other way, so we'll settle on 50% of the damage award. But then you wonder, so why doesn't the law do that? I mean, it's an in-between case, so wouldn't the sensible outcome be an in-between verdict? Wouldn't that correspond to the justice of the situation? But it's not what the law does. Although an increasing number of people believe it should and have argued for that.Consent problems: You've got different kinds of consent problems. One is you can't trade it at all. And then others, you just can't give it in advance. it has to be contemporaneous consent, but if it has to be contemporaneous consent, I mean, that often un-does the point of the bargain as in the case of these contracts for performance over service.Duress Defense:The way the law deals with dilemmas is not the way the economist or the consequentialist initially thinks is a sensible way, but instead by accepting intransitivity. And dealing with dilemmas by accepting intransitivity means we're kind of in a different world than that of ordinary consequentialist rationality. We're not in the world of irrationality, but we're in a world that actually pretty much tracks deontological morality.The trolley problem:In most such situations, the trolley problem being this case of this trolley, that heads down a track and if we just let it go, it's going to run over five people. But if we divert it to the side it's going to kill one person, then we will have saved the five. And then there are many other situations of more controversial nature where we can save many at the cost of killing one. And from the consequentialist point of view, putting to the side sort of certain systemic difficulties if this becomes known, they would say everything else being equal, that's what we ought to do. It's a dilemma in the sense that it's unfortunate that someone has to die, but it's not really a dilemma for decision-making. In that it's kind of clear what makes sense. Now what's so striking about the law is that it tends not to do that. In many cases it forbids this sort of trade off.Show Links:Guest Profile:Faculty Profile at University of Pennsylvania Professional Profile at The American Law InstituteHis work:Bad Acts and Guilty Minds: Conundrums of the Criminal Law (Studies in Crime and Justice)Why the Law Is So PerverseIll-Gotten Gains: Evasion, Blackmail, Fraud, and Kindred Puzzles of the Law

Max and Aaron discussion the rule change that the Iraqi government has made in their elections and what this means from a social choice theory stand point. They compare world political systems, and discuss the problem of apportionment and the mathematical paradoxes it creates. localmaxradio.com/203

Tim Roughgarden is a Professor of Computer Science at Columbia University and a winner of the Gödel Prize, which is often considered as “the Nobel Prize of theoretical computer science.” His research interests include the many connections between computer science and economics, as well as the design, analysis, applications, and limitations of algorithms. We'll also talk about his most recent research in the cryptocurrency space, EIP-1559, and the future of Ethereum. Prof. Roughgarden has been awarded the ACM Grace Murray Hopper Award, the Presidential Early Career Award for Scientists and Engineers, the Kalai Prize in Computer Science and Game Theory, the Social Choice and Welfare Prize, the Mathematical Programming Society's Tucker Prize, and the Gödel Prize in theoretical computer science. He was an invited speaker at the 2006 International Congress of Mathematicians, the Shapley Lecturer at the 2008 World Congress of the Game Theory Society, and a Guggenheim Fellow in 2017. He has written or edited ten books and monographs, and is regarded by many students as one of the best educators in algorithmic game theory.

First Bob explains his contest involving Adventures in Pacifism–winner gets 100 smackers. Then he explains the incredibly powerful, and surprisingly Austrian, result by which Kenneth Arrow showed it was impossible to coherently aggregate individual preferences into a social ranking. Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: The blog post explaining the rules for the contest, Adventures in Pacifism: Louie CK EditionBob's link for those interested in joining Liberty Classroom. (If you use this link, the site will remember who sent you if you end up joining.)Bob's mises.org's article explaining Arrow's Theorem in the context of the 2020 electionThe Bob Murphy Show ep. 7, explaining Godel's Incompleteness Theorems For more information, see BobMurphyShow.com. The Bob Murphy Show is also available on iTunes, Stitcher, Spotify, and via RSS.

First Bob explains his contest involving Adventures in Pacifism--winner gets 100 smackers. Then he explains the incredibly powerful, and surprisingly Austrian, result by which Kenneth Arrow showed it was impossible to coherently aggregate individual preferences into a social ranking. Mentioned in the Episode and Other Links of Interest: The blog post explaining the rules for the contest, https://consultingbyrpm.com/blog/2020/11/adventures-in-pacifism-louie-ck-edition.html (Adventures in Pacifism: Louie CK Edition.) http://libertyclassroom.com/dap/a/?a=351 (Bob's link) for those interested in joining Liberty Classroom. (If you use this link, the site will remember who sent you if you end up joining.) Bob's mises.org's https://mises.org/wire/arrows-impossibility-theorem-exposes-big-problem-democracy (article explaining Arrow's Theorem) in the context of the 2020 election. The https://www.bobmurphyshow.com/episodes/ep-7-godel-made-easy/ (Bob Murphy Show ep. 7), explaining Godel's Incompleteness Theorems. http://bobmurphyshow.com/contribute (Help support) the Bob Murphy Show. The audio production for this episode was provided by http://podsworth.com/ (Podsworth Media).

Teaser: Making decisions, especially where there are competing priorities, is complex and sometimes impossible. Arrow describes two ways in which decisions can be made in democratic capitalist countries, markets and politics. Understanding these options are critical to anyone in a position to influence resource use in healthcare...

Organic growth in online business is crucial to the development of an authentic brand. Stop wasting time trying to guess which social options are best to help your brand grow organically. Don't start an online brand without watching this video first. In this episode of Truly Fearless Life: The Podcast, I reveal my absolute top pick for how you can get the most optimal organic growth online, while serving what is best for your personal brand. Is it Instagram? YouTube? Facebook? Twitter? You'll never know unless you listen! Understanding how organic growth online truly works has never been easier. https://www.trulyfearlesslife.com/ National Fibromyalgia Association https://www.fmaware.org/new-home-page/ Fellow Warriors https://www.instagram.com/yourstruly_... https://www.instagram.com/thefibrochr... https://www.instagram.com/myjourneyth... * additional sound effects and music courtesy of https://www.purple-planet.com/ https://www.statista.com/statistics/3... --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app Support this podcast: https://anchor.fm/trulyfearlesslife/support

In den nächsten Wochen bis zum 20.2.2020 möchte Anna Hein, Studentin der Wissenschaftskommunikation am KIT, eine Studie im Rahmen ihrer Masterarbeit über den Podcast Modellansatz durchführen. Dazu möchte sie gerne einige Interviews mit Ihnen, den Hörerinnen und Hörern des Podcast Modellansatz führen, um herauszufinden, wer den Podcast hört und wie und wofür er genutzt wird. Die Interviews werden anonymisiert und werden jeweils circa 15 Minuten in Anspruch nehmen. Für die Teilnahme an der Studie können Sie sich bis zum 20.2.2020 unter der Emailadresse studie.modellansatz@web.de bei Anna Hein melden. Wir würden uns sehr freuen, wenn sich viele Interessenten melden würden. Gudrun sprach im Januar 2020 mit drei Studenten ihrer Vorlesung Mathematical Modelling and Simulation: Samory Gassama, Lennart Harms und David Schneiderhan. Sie hatten in ihrem Projekt Gruppenentscheidungen modelliert. In dem Gespräch geht es darum, wie man hierfür mathematische Modelle findet, ob man Wahlsysteme fair gestalten kann und was sie aus den von ihnen gewählten Beispielen gelernt haben. Wie lassen sich Entscheidungen von Wählergruppen fair in demokratische Willensbildung einbringen? Mit diesem Thema beschäftigt sich u.a. auch die Volkswirtschaftslehre. Die dafür benutzten Modelle sollten einige Eigenschaften haben. Ein grundlegendes Kriterium wäre beispielsweise: Wenn alle der gleichen Meinung sind, sollte diese Meinung auch immer die Gruppenentscheidung sein. Ein weiteres Kriterum könnte verlangen, dass das Ergebnis Pareto-optimal ist, es also kein anderes Ergebnis gibt, mit dem jedes Gruppenmitglied zufriedener wäre. Um die Präferenz der Gruppe auszudrücken, führen die Studenten die Wohlfahrtsfunktion ein. Das ist eine Abbildung, welche als Input die Präferenzen der einzelnen Wähler verknüpft. Das Wahlverfahren wird sozusagen in dieser Abbildung modelliert. Man wünscht sich Anonymität: Jede Stimme sollte gleich gewertet werden. Neutralität: Wenn die Relationen im Input invertiert werden, bewirkt dies das Selbe beim Output. Monotonie: Falls eine Relation aus dem Input, welche nicht den Präferenzen des Outputs entspricht, sich zur Präferenzrelation des Outputs ändert, bleibt dieser gleich. Verfahren wie Rangaddition und Condorcet-Methode sind klassisch und erfüllen leider nicht alle diese Bedingungen. Die Studenten fügen eine weitere Entscheidungsebene im Modell hinzu. Man nennt dies geschachtelte Wahl. Als Beispiele dienen die US Präsidentschaftswahl 2016 und der Eurovision Song Contest 2019. Bei den Präsidentschaftswahlen in den VereinigtenStaaten von Amerika, wird der Präsident von den Wahlleuten der Bundesstaaten für eine Amtszeit bestimmt. Jeder Bundesstaat hat unterschiedlich viele Wahlleute. Die Wahlberechtigten legen unmittelbar nur die Wahlleute fest. Deshalb ist das Modell der US Präsidentschaftswahlen ist ein geschachteltes Modell. Im ersten Schritt, werden in allen 52 Staaten die Wahlen, mit den US Bürgern des jeweiligen Staates als Wähler, mithilfe des Condorcet Modells durchgeführt. Im zweiten Schritt bilden eben jene 52 Staaten die neue Wählermenge, welche dann über eine gewichtete Rangaddition den endgültigen Präsidenten bestimmt. Die Studenten haben im Projekt zwei Datensätze verwendet, um die Präsidentschaftswahlen 2016 in den USA zwischen Donald Trump und Hillary Clinton zu simulieren. Sie geben die Anzahl der Stimmen für Donald Trump und Hillary Clinton in den verschiedenen Wahlbezirken der USA an. Um die Simulation durchzuführen, wurde Google Colab verwendet. Die benutzte Programmiersprache ist Python. Die Wahl wurde folgendermaßen simuliert: Man summiert die Anzahl der Stimmen für alle Kandidaten in jedem Staat. Anschließend vergleicht man die Anzahl der Stimmen für Trump und Clinton in jedem Bundesstaat. Dem Gewinner eines Staates werden die Anzahl der Wahlleute dieses Bundesstaates in das Endergebnis addiert. Zum Schluss werden die Anzahl der Wahlleute, welche für die Kandidaten gestimmt haben verglichen. Trump gewinnt die Wahlen in 30 Bundesstaaten und Clinton in 20 Bundesstaaten, genauer gesagt erhält Trump 304 Wahlleute und Clinton 227. Somit wäre gewinnt Trump gegen Clinton. Alternativ zum geschachtelten Modell, wird anschließend die Abstimmungsmethode direkt auf alle Wahlstimmen angewandt. Dabei erhält Trump 62.984.828 Stimmen, während Clinton 65.853.514 bekommt. Bei diesem Verfahren gewinnt Clinton gegen Trump. Im Gespräch wird besprochen, dass es ein Problem ist, wenn bei recht knappem Wahlausgang pro Bundesstaat eine "Rundung" auf Wahlleute erfolgt und diese dann addiert wird. Im Vergleich hierzu kann es bei vielen Parteien auch durch Instrumente wie die 5%-Hürde, die wir in Deutschland implementiert haben, zu unfairen Effekten kommen. Die Regeln beim Eurovision Song Contest sind wie folgt: Aus den Televoting-Ergebnissen und den Jurywertungen jedes einzelnen Landes setzt sich das Gesamtergebnis für alle Teilnehmenden zusammen. Die besten zehn Titel werden mit eins, zwei, drei, vier, fünf, sechs, sieben, acht, zehn und zwölf Punkten bewertet. Dabei werden die Jury- und Zuschauerwertungen seit 2016 voneinander getrennt. Jedes Land kann einem Teilnehmenden also bis zu 24 Punkte geben - zwölf durch die Jury, zwölf durch die Zuschauer. Wenn zwei Songs auf die gleiche Punktzahl kommen, bekommt das Land die höhere Punktzahl, das vom Publikum höher bewertet wurde. Abgesehen davon, dass es sich auch hierbei wieder um ein geschachteltes Modell handelt, werden hierbei auch noch die gewichtete Rangaddition und ein externes Diktator Modell verwendet. Literatur und weiterführende Informationen A.D. Taylor and A.M. Pacelli: Mathematics and Politics - Strategy, Voting, Power, and Proof. Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg, 2nd corrected ed. 2008, corr. 3rd printing, 2009. H.-J. Bungartz e.a.: Modellbildung und Simulation - Eine anwendungsorientierte Einführung Kapitel 4: Gruppenentscheidungen, Springer, 2009. G.G. Szpiro: Die verflixte Mathematik der Demokratie, Springer, 2011. W.D. Wallis. The Mathematics of Elections and Voting. Springer, Berlin, Heidelberg, 2014. au. edition, 2014. K. Loewenstein: Verfassungsrecht und Verfassungspraxis der Vereinigten Staaten, Springer-Verlag, Berlin Heidelberg New York, 1959. US Election Tracker as xlsx, 2016. nytimes presidential elections 2016 results as csv, 2016. ESC Regelwerk, 2019. ESC Datensatz, 2019. S. Gassama, L. Harms, D. Schneiderhan: Gruppenentscheidungen. Jupyter Notebooks: Eurocontest_2019.ipynb (Web-Viewer), MS_USA_2016.ipynb (Web-Viewer) Podcasts P. Stursberg, G. Thäter: Social Choice, Gespräch im Modellansatz Podcast, Folge 129, Fakultät für Mathematik, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), 2017. M. Lübbecke, S. Ritterbusch: Operations Research, Gespräch im Modellansatz Podcast, Folge 110, Fakultät für Mathematik, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), 2016. P. Staudt, G. Thäter: Wahlsysteme, Gespräch im Modellansatz Podcast, Folge 27, Fakultät für Mathematik, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), 2014. M. Fehndrich, T. Pritlove: Wahlrecht und Wahlsysteme, Gespräch im CRE Podcast, Folge 128, Metaebene Personal Media, 2009.

Alessandra Palmigiano (ILLC) gives a talk at the MCMP Colloquium (10 January, 2013) titled "Duality, Logic and Judgment Aggregation". Abstract: In the last decades, logic has facilitated the build-up of a critical mass of results and insights generalizing the original Arrovian problem in Social Choice, and culminating in the formation of judgment aggregation theory. Within this framework, the Arrovian-type impossibility results are obtained as consequences of characterization theorems, which provide necessary and su_cient conditions for agendas to have aggregator functions on them satisfying given axiomatic conditions. Methodologically, there are two tools, both derived from logic, underlying these generalizations: one is the ultra_lter argument, occurring both in a model-theoretic and in an algebraic setting; the other tool, providing a unifying framework for the agenda-based characterization theorems, is the notion of property space. Duality theory can provide insights into, and connections between, these two tools. In the present talk, Stone-type duality theory will be illustrated, as well as its main logical signi_cance: namely, providing a systematic, triangular connection between logical languages, their model-theoretic semantics and their algebraic semantics. Then, applications of duality theory will be discussed to the ultrafilter argument and property spaces.

Jake Brukhman, the Managing Partner at Coinfund, a blockchain-based investment fund. We chat about Fat Protocols, Cryptokitties, and Social Choice Theory. Support me on Patreon! www.patreon.com/rhyslindmark Thanks to Aaron Foster, Mike Goldin, John Desmond, Colin Wielga, Harry Lindmark, Joe Urgo, John Lindmark, Daniel Segal, Jacob Zax, Katie Powell, Jonathan Isaac, Brady McKenna, Jeff Snyder, Ryan X Charles, Chris Edmonds, Ned Mills, Kenji Williams, Brayton Williams, Scott Levi, Peter Rodgers, Keith Klundt, Andrew O’Neill, Matt Daley, and Kenzie Jacobs for supporting me on Patreon!

Obituary of Author Ken Arrow 1. Arrovian impossibility theorem 2. “…. the celebrated general possibility theorem, or the Arrovian impossibility theorem in the currently prevailing terminology, to the effect that there exists no social welfare function satisfying a set of conditions necessary for democratic legitimacy and informational efficiency.” Source: Arrow, K.J., Sen, A.K., Suzumura, K. (Eds). (2002) Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 1. Elsevier. (p.11). “According to his celebrated general impossibility theorem, a set of seemingly reasonable axioms that are meant to crystallize minimal requirements on the “democratic” rule for resolving the conflicting claims of individuals is demonstrably self-contradictory, so that there cannot possibly exist a satisfactory rule.” 3. Source: Suzumura, K. (2009) Rational choice, collective decision, and social welfare. Cambridge University Press. (p.62). “Pareto principle, … a change from one social state to another social state can be judged as socially good if at least one individual is thereby made better off without making anybody else worse off in return.” 5. Source: Arrow, K.J., Sen, A.K., Suzumura, K. (Eds). (2002) Handbook of Social Choice and Welfare, Volume 1. Elsevier. (p.7). 6. “In a capitalist democracy there are essentially two methods by which social choices can be made: voting, typically used to make ‘political’ decisions, and the market mechanism, typically used to make ‘economic’ decisions.” Source: Arrow, K..J. (1963) Social Choice and Individual Values (2nd Edition). Cowles Foundation for Research in Economics at Yale University (originally published by John Wiley & Sons). (p.1)

Diese Folge ist eines von drei Gesprächen mit Mathematikerinnen und Mathematikern an der TU München (TUM) in Garching bei München, die Gudrun am 10. April 2017 dort geführt hat. Paul Stursberg - hat an der TUM Mathematik studiert und promoviert dort am Lehrstuhl Angewandte Geometrie und Diskrete Mathematik. Wir haben uns über Gruppenentscheidungsmodelle (Social Choice) unterhalten, in denen mitunter auch der Zufall Hilfestellung gibt. Da auch Zuordnung nach Vorlieben (allocation) auf das gleiche Grundproblem führt, wird das Thema unter den Forschungsinteressen von Paul Stursberg als Randomized Social Choice/Ressource Allocation aufgeführt.Das grundlegende Ziel bei Entscheidungen in einer Gruppe ist es, Einzelmeinungen zu einem fairen Gesamturteil zusammen zu führen. Am einfachsten ist es, einer als Anführer von allen anerkannten Person in ihrer Meinung zu folgen. Dieses Modell hat gute mathematische Eigenschaften, funktioniert immer, ist aber leider nicht besonders demokratisch. Je nachdem ob die Leitperson zur Gruppe gehört oder nicht wird es als Modell des internen/externen Diktators bezeichnet. Ein zunächst nahe liegender Zugang zur bestmöglichen Entscheidung in einer Gruppe wäre, eine Nutzenfunktion auzufstellen und danach zu optimieren. Das klingt überzeugend ist aber oft ein unmögliches Unterfangen, weil es sich als sehr schwierig erweist, Vorlieben so zu quantifizieren dass man über die Gruppe konstante Zahlenwerte für einen entstehenden Nutzen findet. Deshalb kann man statt dessen mit ordinalen Präferenzrelationen arbeiten, d.h. im einfachsten Fall mit einer gewünschten Reihenfolge aller Optionen für jede Person der Gruppe. Bevor man über Verfahren sprechen und diese bewerten kann, braucht man Kriterien, die Wahlverfahren (idealerweise) erfüllen sollen. Man muss definieren: Was ist eine gute und faire Entscheidung? Ein grundlegendes Kriterium wäre beispielsweise: Wenn alle der gleichen Meinung sind, sollte diese Meinung auch immer als Ergebnis der Gruppenentscheidung erscheinen. Ein etwas weitergehendes Kriterum könnte exemplarisch auch verlangen, dass das Ergebnis Pareto-optimal ist, es also kein anderes Ergebnis gibt, mit dem jedes Gruppenmitglied zufriedener wäre.Nachdem ein Katalog von Kriterien aufgestellt wurde, kann man sich unter anderem folgende Fragen stellen: Finden wir Wahlverfahren, die all diese Kriterien erfüllen? Wenn ja, welche Wahlverfahren sind das? Können wir sie charakterisieren? Wenn nein, lässt sich zeigen, dass kein Wahlverfahen alle Kriterien zugleich erfüllen kann?Ein bekanntes Beispiel für den letzten Fall ist der Satz von Arrow - ein Unmöglichkeitsresultat, das besagt, dass eigentlich sinnvolle Bedingungen an ein Wahlergebnis für mehr als zwei Optionen nicht gleichzeitig erfüllbar sind.Hinsichtlich der Fairness kommen Wahlverfahren intuitiv schon an ihre Grenzen, wenn sich zwei Leuten abstimmen sollen, die gegensätzliche Wünsche haben: Jede (deterministische) Entscheidung bevorzugt offensichtlich einen der beiden Beteiligten. Hier kann man sich den Zufall zunutze machen, um eine faire Entscheidung zu treffen, was auf das Gebiet der randomisierten Sozialwahltheorie (randomized social choice) führt. Hier hängen viele Kriterien plötzlich davon ab, welche lottery extension verwendet wird, also wie aus ordinalen Präferenzrelationen Präferenzen über Wahrscheinlichkeitsverteilungen abgeleitet werden. Literatur und weiterführende Informationen H.-J. Bungartz e.a.: Modellbildung und Simulation - Eine anwendungsorientierte Einführung Kapitel 4: Gruppenentscheidungen, Springer, 2009. G.G. Szpiro: Die verflixte Mathematik der Demokratie, Springer, 2011. W. J. Cho: Probabilistic assignment: A two-fold axiomatic approach, 2012. H. Aziz, F. Brandt, and M. Brill: On the tradeoff between economic efficiency and strategyproofness in randomized social choice In Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems (AAMAS), pp 455–462. IFAAMAS, 2013. H. Aziz, P. Stursberg: A generalization of probabilistic serial to randomized social choice. In Proceedings of the Twenty-Eighth AAAI Conference on Artificial Intelligence (AAAI-14), pp 559-565. AAAI Press, Palo Alto, 2014. Podcasts M. Lübbecke: Operations Research, Gespräch mit S. Ritterbusch im Modellansatz Podcast, Folge 110, Fakultät für Mathematik, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), 2016. P. Staudt: Wahlsysteme, Gespräch mit G. Thäter im Modellansatz Podcast, Folge 27, Fakultät für Mathematik, Karlsruher Institut für Technologie (KIT), 2014. M. Fehndrich: Wahlrecht und Wahlsysteme, Gespräch mit T. Pritlove im CRE Podcast, Folge 128, Metaebene Personal Media, 2009.

Constanze Binder (Rotterdam) gives a talk at the MCMP Formal Ethics Workshop (11-13 October, 2012) titled "Social Choice and Comparative Justice: Correcting for Parochial Values".

Michael Morreau (University of Maryland) gives a talk at the 9th Formal Epistemology Workshop (Munich, May 29–June 2, 2012) titled "From Social Choice to Theory Choice". Abstract: Arrow's theorem of social choice (Arrow 1951) has been thought to limit the possibilities for choosing rationally among rival scientific theories on the basis of their accuracy, simplicity, scope and other relevant criteria. It does not. Possible orderings of theories by these criteria are so severely restricted that the theorem is irrelevant in this connection. On the contrary, what is known about social choice in restricted domains implies that there are many acceptable procedures for choosing among theories on the basis of their various merits and demerits.

Mark Colyvan (Sidney) comments on Michael Morreau's "From Social Choice to Theory Choice" at the 9th Formal Epistemology Workshop (Munich, May 29–June 2, 2012).

Peter Hammond talks about subjective reporting of wellbeing and how to measure that.

Before I get into the podcast description I want to announce the addition of another member of the Teen Esteem Council. Her name is Brianna and, as you will find out in this podcast, she is wonderful.  Today's podcast continues our discussion of the 4 pillars (I will give anyone a $25 gift certificate if they can come up with a better term for pillars than pillars) that we started last week. This week we talk about choices. Brianna has some great insights as we discuss why teenagers choose to do some of the things that they do.

In his seminal Social Choice and Individual Values, Kenneth Arrow stated that his theory applies to voting. Many voting theorists have been convinced that, on account of Arrow’s theorem, all voting methods must be seriously flawed. Arrow’s theory is strictly ordinal, the cardinal aggregation of preferences being explicitly rejected. In this paper I point out that all voting methods are cardinal and therefore outside the reach of Arrow’s result. Parallel to Arrow’s ordinal approach, there evolved a consistent cardinal theory of collective choice. This theory, most prominently associated with the work of Harsanyi, continued the older utilitarian tradition in a more formal style. The purpose of this paper is to show that various derivations of utilitarian SWFs can also be used to derive utilitarian voting (UV). By this I mean a voting rule that allows the voter to score each alternative in accordance with a given scale. UV-k indicates a scale with k distinct values. The general theory leaves k to be determined on pragmatic grounds. A (1,0) scale gives approval voting. I prefer the scale (1,0,-1) and refer to the resulting voting rule as evaluative voting. A conclusion of the paper is that the defects of conventional voting methods result not from Arrow’s theorem, but rather from restrictions imposed on voters’ expression of their preferences. The analysis is extended to strategic voting, utilizing a novel set of assumptions regarding voter behavior.