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Loneliness is no longer a luxury problem for philosophers and artists. Anthropologist Biao Xiang discusses how it became a mass condition and what gossip, Hannah Arendt, and hummingbirds reveal about a way out of this crisis.
If you enjoy this episode, we're sure you will enjoy more content like this on The Occult Rejects. In fact, we have curated playlists on occult topics like grimoires, esoteric concepts and phenomena, occult history, analyzing true crime and cults with an occult lens, Para politics, and occultism in music. Whether you enjoy consuming your content visually or via audio, we've got you covered - and it will always be provided free of charge. So, if you enjoy what we do and want to support our work of providing accessible, free content on various platforms, please consider making a donation to the links provided below. Thank you and enjoy the episode!Links For The Occult Rejectshttps://linktr.ee/theoccultrejectsOccult Research Institutehttps://www.occultresearchinstitute.org/Cash Apphttps://cash.app/$theoccultrejectsVenmo@TheOccultRejectsBuy Me A Coffeebuymeacoffee.com/TheOccultRejectsPatreonhttps://www.patreon.com/TheOccultRejectsBibliographyThe Mechanics of Magick: Singing Bowls and the Ritual Physics of ResonanceCore Singing Bowl ResearchStanhope, Jessica, and Philip Weinstein. “The Human Health Effects of Singing Bowls: A Systematic Review.” Complementary Therapies in Medicine 51 (2020): 102412. Use for the honesty frame: promising findings around mental health and cardiovascular measures, but limited evidence and need for stronger study design.Cai, Yiqing, Guo-Yan Yang, Yibo Liu, Xiang-yun Zou, Heng Yin, Xinyan Jin, Xue-han Liu, Chenlu Wang, Nicola Robinson, and Jian-Ping Liu. “Therapeutic Effects of Singing Bowls: A Systematic Review of Clinical Studies.” Integrative Medicine Research 14, no. 2 (2025): 101144. Use for the newer clinical overview. Important correction: this appears as 101144, not 101176. Good for anxiety, depression, sleep quality, cognition, autistic behavior, and EEG-related outcomes while still keeping the evidence cautious.Lin, F. W., et al. “Effects of Tibetan Singing Bowl Intervention on Psychological and Physiological Health in Adults: A Systematic Review.” 2025. Useful as another recent review angle, especially for psychological health, physiological measures, HRV, and brainwave-related discussion. Keep it secondary behind Stanhope and Cai.Landry, Jayan Marie. “Physiological and Psychological Effects of a Himalayan Singing Bowl in Meditation Practice: A Quantitative Analysis.” American Journal of Health Promotion 28, no. 5 (2014): 306–309. Use for the controlled relaxation study: 51 participants, randomized crossover design, singing bowl exposure or silence before directed relaxation.Goldsby, Tamara L., Michael E. Goldsby, Mary McWalters, and Paul J. Mills. “Effects of Singing Bowl Sound Meditation on Mood, Tension, and Well-Being: An Observational Study.” Journal of Evidence-Based Complementary & Alternative Medicine 22, no. 3 (2017): 401–406. Use for reductions in tension, anger, fatigue, depressed mood, anxiety, and stress after singing bowl meditation. Good, but frame as observational, not definitive.Rio-Alamos, Cristina, et al. “Acute Relaxation Response Induced by Tibetan Singing Bowl Sounds: A Randomized Controlled Trial.” European Journal of Investigation in Health, Psychology and Education 13, no. 2 (2023): 317–328. Use for Tibetan singing bowl treatment compared with progressive muscle relaxation and a waiting-list control in anxious nonclinical adults.Walter, Nina, et al. “Neurophysiological Effects of a Singing Bowl Massage.” Medicina 58, no. 5 (2022): 594. Use for EEG, ECG, and respiration during singing bowl massage; the authors interpret the results as a shift toward a more mindful or meditative state.Goldsby, Tamara L., et al. “Mood, Emotional, and Spiritual Well-Being Interrelationships.” Religions 13, no. 2 (2022). Useful follow-up for spiritual well-being, emotional interpretation, and how people understand sound-healing experiences.Sound, Anxiety, HRV, and Brainwave CautionMallik, Adiel, and Frank A. Russo. “The Effects of Music & Auditory Beat Stimulation on Anxiety: A Randomized Clinical Trial.” PLOS ONE 17, no. 3 (2022): e0259312. Use this carefully for the broader point that sound-based treatments can reduce somatic and cognitive state anxiety. Do not use it as proof that singing bowls automatically entrain brainwaves.Ingendoh, Ruth Maria, Ella S. Posny, and Angela Heine. “Binaural Beats to Entrain the Brain? A Systematic Review of the Effects of Binaural Beat Stimulation on Brain Oscillatory Activity, and the Implications for Psychological Research and Intervention.” PLOS ONE 18, no. 5 (2023): e0286023. Very useful caution source. Use it when warning against overclaiming “brainwave entrainment” and frequency-healing claims.Vilímek, et al. 2022. Low-frequency sound / HRV / vibroacoustic-related research. Use cautiously if you want to discuss low-frequency vibration, body sensation, and autonomic response. I'd keep this as a secondary source unless you want a dedicated paragraph on vibroacoustics.Physics, Resonance, and CymaticsTerwagne, Denis, and John W. M. Bush. “Tibetan Singing Bowls.” Nonlinearity 24, no. 8 (2011): R51–R66. Use for the physics section: wall vibrations, water-surface waves, Faraday-wave effects, droplet motion, and the visible demonstration of resonance.Jenny, Hans. Cymatics: A Study of Wave Phenomena and Vibration. Newmarket, NH: MACROmedia, 2001. Use carefully for visual sound-pattern history. Good for imagery and occult imagination, but don't overuse it as clinical proof.Rossing, Thomas D. The Science of Sound. 3rd ed. San Francisco: Addison Wesley, 2002. Useful general acoustics source for resonance, overtones, vibration, sound waves, and instrument physics.Sound Baths, Wellness Culture, and Modern RitualSobo, Elisa J. “Sound Baths, Trauma Talk, and the Wellness Paradox in the USA.” Medical Anthropology 43, no. 5 (2024): 367–382. Excellent for the modern sound-bath/wellness-culture angle, especially trauma language, nervous-system talk, ritual performance, and how providers frame sound baths.Sobo, Elisa J. “A Beginner's Guide to Sound Baths — What They Are, How to Choose a Good One and What the Research Shows.” The Conversation (2024). Useful for accessible show-note language and ethical/practical framing.Sobo, Elisa J. “Healing Vibrations.” Anthropology News 64, no. 5 (2023): 28–32, 49. Good anthropology/public-facing source for sound healing and wellness culture.Tibetan Singing Bowls, History, and Cultural CommodificationGrimes, Samuel. “Where Did ‘Tibetan' Singing Bowls Really Come From?” Tricycle (2020). Use for the contested-history section. Strong source for questioning popular origin stories around “Tibetan” singing bowls.Joffe, Ben. “Anthropology and Tibetan Buddhism / Cultural Commodification / Tibetan Mystique.” 2015. Use for the larger argument about how Tibetan/Himalayan aura gets packaged in Western spiritual markets. Good support for the “Tibet as imagined storehouse of hidden wisdom” point.Scheidegger, Daniel A. “Tibetan Ritual Music.” Use for actual Tibetan Buddhist ritual sound: bells, cymbals, long horns, drums, chant, and liturgical soundscape. This helps separate real Tibetan ritual sound from overblown modern singing-bowl mythology.Lopez, Donald S. Prisoners of Shangri-La: Tibetan Buddhism and the West. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998. Excellent support for Western romanticization of Tibet.Bishop, Peter. The Myth of Shangri-La: Tibet, Travel Writing, and the Western Creation of Sacred Landscape. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989. Very useful for the “Tibet as fantasy geography” angle.Ritual, Sound, and Religious ExperienceEliade, Mircea. Shamanism: Archaic Techniques of Ecstasy. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964. Use carefully. Good for altered-state technologies and ritual sound/trance, but don't treat it as the final word on shamanism.Rouget, Gilbert. Music and Trance: A Theory of the Relations Between Music and Possession. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1985. Excellent for sound, music, trance, possession, rhythm, and ritual performance.Becker, Judith. Deep Listeners: Music, Emotion, and Trancing. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004. Strong source for deep listening, music, emotion, trance, and the body.Husserl, Edmund. On the Phenomenology of the Consciousness of Internal Time. Useful if you want to get philosophical about tone, decay, waiting, and how sound reveals time.Ihde, Don. Listening and Voice: Phenomenologies of Sound. Albany: SUNY Press, 2007. Good for sound as experience, listening, voice, and embodied perception.Placebo, Meaning Response, and Healing RitualMoerman, Daniel E. Meaning, Medicine and the “Placebo Effect.” Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002. Use for “meaning response” instead of treating placebo as “fake.”Benedetti, Fabrizio. Placebo Effects: Understanding the Mechanisms in Health and Disease. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009. Useful for placebo mechanisms, expectation, physiology, and therapeutic context.Kaptchuk, Ted J., and Franklin G. Miller. “Placebo Effects in Medicine.” New England Journal of Medicine 373 (2015): 8–9. Good short medical source for placebo effects as real psychobiological phenomena.Csordas, Thomas J. The Sacred Self: A Cultural Phenomenology of Charismatic Healing. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994. Useful for healing, embodiment, ritual, and religious experience.Embodied Cognition, Extended Mind, and Ritual ToolsClAlso want to remind people about the website, if you're into reading we have tons of information by multiple contributors, and we got t-shirts up on the site if you're interested. Fun fact, the art is all based on the eyeball. A
In this episode, we will explore another Chinese herbal formula: Jiā Wèi Xiāng Sū Sǎn or Augmented Cyperus and Perilla Leaf Powder. This formula is in the sub-category of formulas that release exterior wind-cold and is especially good at treating colds with interior qi depression. We are going to do our usual deep dive into this formula and find out if there is any evidence or concerns. And, as usual, we will be adding something a little different…we are going to continue our discussion of pharmacognosy and discuss terpenoids. Each episode of the podcast will go into great depth about a single herb or formula. Besides covering the basics of herbology including category, and functions, we will explore the history, quality, science, pharmacology, evidence, and any potential interactions of each herb or formula. Please join us for another incandescent discussion of herbs as we explore Jiā Wèi Xiāng Sū Sǎn or Augmented Cyperus and Perilla Leaf Powder!
If you enjoy this episode, we're sure you will enjoy more content like this on The Occult Rejects. In fact, we have curated playlists on occult topics like grimoires, esoteric concepts and phenomena, occult history, analyzing true crime and cults with an occult lens, Para politics, and occultism in music. Whether you enjoy consuming your content visually or via audio, we've got you covered - and it will always be provided free of charge. So, if you enjoy what we do and want to support our work of providing accessible, free content on various platforms, please consider making a donation to the links provided below. Thank you and enjoy the episode!Links For The Occult Rejectshttps://linktr.ee/theoccultrejectsOccult Research Institutehttps://www.occultresearchinstitute.org/Cash Apphttps://cash.app/$theoccultrejectsVenmo@TheOccultRejectsBuy Me A Coffeebuymeacoffee.com/TheOccultRejectsPatreonhttps://www.patreon.com/TheOccultRejectsFull show-notes bibliographyCore EEG and oscillationsAbubaker, M., & Dankaerts, W. (2021). Working memory and cross-frequency coupling of neuronal oscillations. *Frontiers in Psychology, 12*, 742860.Axmacher, N., Henseler, M. M., Jensen, O., Weinreich, I., Elger, C. E., & Fell, J. (2010). Cross-frequency coupling supports multi-item working memory in the human hippocampus. *Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 107*(7), 3228–3233.Jensen, O., & Mazaheri, A. (2010). Shaping functional architecture by oscillatory alpha activity: Gating by inhibition. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 4*, 186.Rayi, A., et al. (2022). Electroencephalogram. *StatPearls*. StatPearls Publishing.StatPearls / NCBI Bookshelf. (2024). Introduction to electroencephalography (EEG). *NCBI Bookshelf*.Theta, alpha, beta, gamma, and controlCavanagh, J. F., & Shackman, A. J. (2015). Frontal midline theta reflects anxiety and cognitive control: Meta-analytic evidence. *Journal of Physiology-Paris, 109*(1–3), 3–15.Eisma, J., et al. (2021). Frontal midline theta differentiates separate cognitive control strategies while still generalizing the need for cognitive control. *Scientific Reports, 11*, 14641.Jensen, O., Bonnefond, M., & VanRullen, R. (2012). An oscillatory mechanism for prioritizing salient unattended stimuli. *Trends in Cognitive Sciences, 16*(4), 200–206.Lundqvist, M., Herman, P., & Miller, E. K. (2018). Working memory: Delay activity, yes! Persistent activity? Maybe not. *Journal of Neuroscience, 38*(32), 7013–7019.Sleep architecture, spindles, and memoryCaporro, M., Haneef, Z., Yeh, H.-J., Mohamed, F. B., & Levin, H. S. (2012). Functional MRI of sleep spindles and K-complexes. *Clinical Neurophysiology, 123*(2), 303–309.Chen, P., Miao, X., Chen, J., et al. (2023). The devastating effects of sleep deprivation on memory: Lessons from rodent models, aging, and Alzheimer's disease. *Frontiers in Neuroscience, 17*, 1151639.Ng, T., et al. (2025). Bayesian meta-analysis reveals the mechanistic role of slow oscillation-spindle coupling in sleep-dependent memory consolidation. *eLife, 13*, RP101992.Patel, A. K., et al. (2024). Physiology, sleep stages. *StatPearls*. StatPearls Publishing.Páez, A., Gillman, S. O., Dogaheh, S. B., et al. (2025). Sleep spindles and slow oscillations predict cognition and biomarkers of neurodegeneration in mild to moderate Alzheimer's disease. *Alzheimer's & Dementia, 21*, e14424.Hypnagogia, N1, and dream incubationHorowitz, A. H., Esfahany, S., Boyle, M. R., et al. (2023). Targeted dream incubation at sleep onset increases post-sleep creative performance. *Scientific Reports, 13*, 5055.Lacaux, C., Andrillon, T., Bastoul, D., et al. (2021). Sleep onset is a creative sweet spot. *Science Advances, 7*(50), eabj5866.Meditation, prayer, chanting, and yoga nidraDatta, K., Mallick, H. N., Tripathi, M., Ahuja, G. K., & Deepak, K. K. (2022). Electrophysiological evidence of local sleep during yoga nidra practice in young male volunteers. *Frontiers in Neurology, 13*, 910794.Dobrakowski, P., Błaszkiewicz, M., & Skalski, S. (2020). Changes in the electrical activity of the brain in the alpha and theta bands during prayer and meditation. *International Journal of Environmental Research and Public Health, 17*(24), 9567.Gao, J., Leung, H. K., Wu, B. W. Y., Skouras, S., & Sik, H. H. (2019). The neurophysiological correlates of religious chanting. *Scientific Reports, 9*, 4262.Kaur, C., & Singh, P. (2015). EEG derived neuronal dynamics during meditation: Progress and challenges. *Advances in Preventive Medicine, 2015*, 614723.Lomas, T., Ivtzan, I., & Fu, C. H. Y. (2015). A systematic review of the neurophysiology of mindfulness on EEG oscillations. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 57*, 401–410.Hypnosis and suggestionJensen, M. P., Adachi, T., & Hakimian, S. (2015). Brain oscillations, hypnosis, and hypnotizability. *American Journal of Clinical Hypnosis, 57*(3), 230–253.Kirenskaya, A. V., Novototsky-Vlasov, V. Y., Chistyakov, A. V., & Zvonikov, V. M. (2011). Waking EEG spectral power and coherence differences between highly hypnotizable and low hypnotizable subjects. *International Journal of Clinical and Experimental Hypnosis, 59*(2), 144–164.Mendoza, M. E., & Capafons, A. (2024). Neural correlates of hypnosis: A systematic narrative review. *Frontiers in Psychology, 15*, 1327738.Ritual rhythm, trance, and synchronyHuels, E. R., Kim, H. S., Lee, U., & Mollaahmetoglu, O. M. (2021). Neural correlates of the shamanic state of consciousness. *Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 15*, 610466.Mogan, R., Fischer, R., & Bulbulia, J. A. (2017). To be in synchrony or not? A meta-analysis of synchrony's effects on behavior, perception, cognition and affect. *Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 72*, 13–20.Tarr, B., Launay, J., & Dunbar, R. I. M. (2016). Silent disco: Dancing in synchrony leads to elevated pain thresholds and social closeness. *Evolution and Human Behavior, 37*(5), 343–349.Entrainment, binaural beats, fatigue, and overloadGoodman, S. P. J., et al. (2025). Approaches to inducing mental fatigue: A systematic review and meta-analysis of (neuro)physiologic indices. *Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 170*, 105957.Ingendoh, R. M., Posny, E. S., & Heine, A. (2023). Binaural beats to entrain the brain? A systematic review of the effects of binaural beat stimulation on brain oscillatory activity, and the implications for psychological research and intervention. *PLOS ONE, 18*(5), e0286023.Snipes, S., et al. (2024). Extended wakefulness alters the relationship between EEG theta and alpha bursts and behavioural outcome. *European Journal of Neuroscience, 60*(8), 6268–6284.Xiang, C., et al. (2024). A resting-state EEG dataset for sleep deprivation. *Scientific Data, 11*, 406.Parkinson's disease and pathological betaAsadi, A., et al. (2022). The origin of abnormal beta oscillations in the parkinsonian corticobasal ganglia circuit. *Frontiers in Neuroscience, 16*, 823719.Paulo, D. L., et al. (2023). Corticostriatal beta oscillation changes associated with cognitive function in Parkinson's disease. *NPJ Parkinson's Disease, 9*, 202.Ancient sleep, dreams, and Asclepian healingAskitopoulou, H. (2015). Sleep and dreams: From myth to medicine in ancient Greece. *Journal of Anesthesia History, 1*(3), 70–75.Kapotsis, G., & Steiropoulos, P. (2025). Sleep incubation [enkoimesis] in medical practice at Asclepieia of Ancient Greece — the Ancient Greek sleep medicine. *Sleep Medicine, 130*, 85–89.Pavli, A. (2024). Asclepieia in ancient Greece: pilgrimage and healing. *Journal of Integrative Medicine and Research, 3*(2), 100119.Also want to remind people about the website, if you're into reading we have tons of information by multiple contributors, and we got t-shirts up on the site if you're interested. Fun fact, the art is all based on the eyeball. A
Last time we spoke about the battle Yaoyi. Japan pushed hard into Hubei with a plan: surround the main Chinese forces and seize Yichang, hoping to use it to strike at Chongqing. At first, the fighting was chaotic and punishing. The Chinese side tried to hold the line and disrupt the advance, and they even managed setbacks for the Japanese, pushing back, retaking key ground, and hitting supply and positioning weaknesses. But victory came with a cost: commanders were lost, and every gain was hard-won. Still, the battle didn't unfold as a clean Chinese retreat or a simple Japanese win. As Japanese units shifted and tested for openings, the Chinese forces adjusted—delaying, regrouping, and fighting to keep their formations from being completely trapped. Eventually, Japan managed to break through at critical moments, especially through crossings and maneuvers that the Chinese had not fully sealed off. In the end, Japan succeeded in taking Yichang, but it didn't achieve the decisive annihilation it wanted. #201 The New Fourth Army Incident and the Strained United Front Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. After the catastrophe of the early 1930s, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) entered the war against Japan in a political mood that was both hopeful and wary: it wanted to be seen as a genuine national leader of resistance, yet it also feared being absorbed—or destroyed—by the Guomindang (KMT) state it had spent years battling. That tension became the organizing principle of the war's early years. The turning point came from the Xi'an Incident in December 1936, which forced a new calculation in Nationalist politics. In the months that followed, agreements between KMT and CCP representatives were publicly proclaimed in August and September 1937, after the Shanghai fighting began. Under these arrangements, the CCP accepted constraints that in peacetime would have looked like surrender: it pledged to strive for Sun Yixian's "Three People's Principles," to end its former policies of armed revolt and sovietization, to abolish the soviet government, and to discontinue both the term "Red Army" and the expectation that its forces would operate outside central control. Communist troops would be treated as part of the national military under KMT command, and the revolution's old administrative structures were to be formally dismantled. In return, the KMT offered the CCP something just as important: space to exist publicly and politically. Liaison offices were permitted in key cities; the CCP was allowed to publish the New China Daily; and it could nominate representatives to KMT advisory bodies. Civil rights were extended—political prisoners were released—and subsidies were established to help cover administrative and military expenses in "reintegrated" areas and territories. The war thus transformed the tactical reality on the ground: the CCP could not treat the KMT as an immediate enemy, but it also could not afford to become politically passive. It had to learn how to fight Japan while building legitimacy fast enough to survive the next phase. In the first year and a half, the Party Center focused on three problems that kept returning in different forms: how the "united front" would be defined—especially what the CCP's relationship to the National government should be; how to coordinate military strategy and tactics with Nationalist units without losing control of its own operations; and how leadership should be consolidated, particularly for Mao Zedong in a party that still contained rival centers of authority. These disputes mattered not just for doctrine but for survival, because the CCP's autonomy was constantly being tested by the very alliance that was supposed to protect it. Mao's own approach to the united front combined cooperation with a refusal to surrender independence. Publicly, the CCP praised Jiang Jieshi and the KMT and promised unity, but it did so in language that was deliberately broad. In private (and in internal party debates), Mao treated unity as conditional: the CCP must not split the united front, but it also must not be "bound hand and foot." The strategic idea that emerged was political initiative under constraints—fighting when it could plausibly claim justification, keeping enough restraint that the CCP would not appear self-interested or anti-national, and deciding for itself when to engage and when to withdraw. This balance was reinforced through military reorganization. In August–September 1937, CCP forces were reorganized as the Eighth Route Army (8RA), with roughly 30,000 men drawn from Long March survivors, local forces, and new recruits. The 8RA was divided into three divisions: the 115th, 120th, and 129th, commanded by Lin Biao, He Long, and Liu Bocheng respectively. Shortly after the war began, the National government also authorized a second major Communist force: the New Fourth Army (N4A), to operate in central China. Its core came from those left behind when the Long March began in 1934—small groups surviving in difficult conditions against continuing KMT pressure. Officially authorized at 12,000, it took months to reach that strength. Nominally commanded by Ye Ting, actual military and political control rested with Xiang Ying and Chen Yi. From the start, then, the CCP's wartime "integration" with the National system coexisted with a clear effort to preserve internal control. Ideologically, the CCP worked to make its revolutionary program compatible—at least in appearance—with a national resistance coalition. On the New Democracy demonstrated how this strategy operated on two levels. In KMT-controlled spaces, its language could be read as aligning with liberal-democratic expectations: public participation, multi-party governance, legally protected civil rights. But in CCP-controlled areas, the same text could carry sharper class-based and authoritarian implications. The Party wanted a united front that broadened support without becoming committed to Nationalist limits on how society itself might be reorganized after victory. Meanwhile, even as the rhetoric of unity rose, the CCP worried about something more dangerous than military setbacks: the possibility that the KMT might accommodate Japan. Late 1939 and early 1940 made this fear harder to dismiss. Japan pursued collaboration with Wang Jingwei, culminating in the establishment of a "reorganized" government at Nanjing in March 1940. At the same time, Japanese intermediaries sought approaches to Chiang Kai-shek himself—an effort that the CCP tracked closely as a sign that peace negotiations might be possible even when battlefield conditions looked grim. Propaganda was involved, but the anxiety was real: if Japan and the Nationalists reached an arrangement, the CCP's whole wartime legitimacy-building effort could collapse overnight. As a result, the united front was interpreted inside the CCP not as a permanent coalition with the KMT, but as a flexible strategy with a cardinal purpose: to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Mao's position on the united front reflected this. For him, the alliance was meant to suspend the possibility of a China–Japan settlement, not to end the CCP's separate identity. The CCP could participate in a reconstituted national framework—possibly even a "democratic republic"—to gain legality and influence, but it should remain politically and, where possible, physically separate from the KMT. By 1939, however, the practical meaning of "flexibility" collided with reality. What had seemed, to some observers, like an unusually cordial entente began to fade. The KMT Central Committee adopted measures early in 1939 aimed at restricting Communist expansion, and armed clashes increased through the summer and continued into autumn and winter—especially around North China Communist bases. The period of rising conflict was later labeled by the CCP as the "first anti-Communist upsurge" (roughly spanning December 1939 into March 1940), but the crucial point was that both sides viewed each confrontation as a test of legal rights, moral legitimacy, and control over territory. Strategically, the CCP understood the KMT's effort as an attempt to check unauthorized growth of Communist armed power and to recover areas where influence had already slipped away—either to the Communists or, by indirect effect, to Japan. The KMT emphasized its traditional legal authority; the CCP countered with its claim to an "evolutionary" moral right to challenge the government's legitimacy. In practice, the conflict took the form of increasingly systematic military pressure, including a blockade around the Shen–Gan–Ning region. By this point, the blockade involved large numbers of troops (on the order of hundreds of thousands), halting Communist expansion and disrupting direct contact with other Communist forces farther afield, even as fighting flared along border zones and around vulnerable points in the Communist defensive perimeter. So, by the edge of the "middle years," the wartime alliance had not broken into open civil war—but it had also stopped being secure. The united front survived, yet it operated under strain: its language of cooperation continued, while "friction" between partners hardened into a central feature of the resistance struggle. Transition into the war's second phase began in early 1939, shaped by the stalemate Mao had already anticipated at the sixth plenum in late 1938. Mao argued that during this prolonged "new stage" the forces of resistance—above all, Communist-led forces—would strengthen. The overall result, however, was mixed. In Shandong and Central China, new Communist bases did take shape. But across much of North China, Japanese consolidation cost the resistance heavily in manpower and population. Base-area economies suffered serious strain, and the peasantry endured hardships more severe than at any earlier point. This stalemate had two main dimensions. The first was the growing resentment of the Nationalists toward Communist expansion—resentment made especially sharp by their own losses. As the Nationalists were driven out of regions that had previously provided them their greatest wealth and power in the central and lower Yangtze basin, they also lost the "cream" of their armies. In contrast, the CCP was spreading through the wider countryside behind Japanese lines, extending its influence and winning broader popular support. The second dimension was Japan's desire—and need—to consolidate territories it had only nominally conquered and to extract economic value from them. After all, the logic of the "China Incident" was to draw on China's labor and resources to strengthen Japan, not to bleed Japan's gains away by draining wealth into China's vast interior. A Japanese colonel, lamenting the situation, captured the frustration of this drift into deeper entanglement: he regretted that Japan had not ended the "China Incident" once its initial objectives were reached. Instead, Japan was drawn into the hinterland and became bogged down in endless attrition—leaving it with little more than "real estate" rather than the popular support it believed it would secure from those it claimed to "liberate." To improve their position, Japanese authorities—still fragmented by internal rivalry—pursued several strategies. One was a new peace offensive aimed simultaneously at Jiang Jieshi, alongside efforts to establish a "reformed" Nationalist government under Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing in December 1938. Japan also recruited more collaborators and puppet officials. Finally, it carried out forceful military, political, and economic measures intended to establish effective territorial control and eliminate opposition. During the middle years of the war, the Communists described their conflicts with the Nationalists using the euphemism "friction". By 1939, what many observers—possibly incorrectly—had viewed as an unusually warm alliance began to break down. In early 1939, the KMT Central Committee adopted measures meant to restrict the CCP. From the summer onward, military clashes began and continued into autumn and winter with increasing frequency and intensity, most of them concentrated around and within the North China base areas. The Communists later labeled the period from December 1939 to March 1940 the "first anti-Communist upsurge." Naturally, each side accused the other of aggression and claimed self-defense against unjust attacks. Strategically, though, the North China "upsurge" functioned as a Nationalist attempt to limit the CCP's expansion beyond the areas assigned to it and to regain influence in regions the Communists—or the Japanese—had already taken from the KMT. Jiang Jieshi framed the matter as a defense of legal rights grounded in tradition, while the Communists asserted an "evolutionary" right to challenge the moral legitimacy of those legal claims. During 1939, the Nationalists began to blockade Shen–Gan–Ning around its southern and western perimeter. Within a year, this blockade grew to nearly 400,000 troops, including some of the last remaining Central Army units under the command of Hu Zongnan. The blockade stopped further Communist expansion, especially into Gansu and Suiyuan, and severed direct contact between SKN and Communists operating in Xinjiang (Chinese Turkestan) adjacent to Soviet Central Asia. The Xinjiang Communists—including Mao Zedong's brother—were eliminated in 1942. Meanwhile, fierce fighting erupted along the Gansu–Shaanxi border and in the north-eastern corner of SKN near the Great Wall at Suide, as the blockading forces probed for weak points. Elements of He Long's 120th Division were even pulled back from the Jin–Sui base across the Yellow River to strengthen SKN's regular defenses. Economically, the blockade was even more damaging. During 1939, central government subsidies to the Border Region budget were cut off. Trade between the Border Region and other parts of China nearly stopped, a devastating blow to a region unable to supply itself with many basic commodities. At the same time, Nationalist and regional forces also attempted to expand their military and administrative authority into Hebei, Shanxi, Henan, and Shandong—areas the CCP now considered its base zones. In resisting these efforts, the CCP predictable accused its rivals of harming resistance work and damaging the people's interests. The "experts in dissension" were said to cooperate with the Japanese and their puppets. Based on increasing collaboration by regional units with Japan, the CCP implied that this was a deliberate and cynical strategy—described as "crooked-line patriotism"—intended to preserve those units for future anti-Communist operations. Even so, the CCP tried to avoid an open break with the Nationalist regime in Chongqing. In public, it consistently portrayed these clashes as being initiated by local commanders acting beyond orders from higher authority—despite knowing this depiction was false. Jiang Jieshi, unable to refute the claim outright, effectively permitted it to serve as the justification for a firm Communist response. Mao Zedong outlined the general resistance policy as "justification, expedience, and restraint". The CCP was to fight when it could claim justification and when it could gain advantage, but not to press attacks beyond what the Nationalists would tolerate or in ways that could damage its image as selfless patriots. Communist forces were expected to keep initiative as much as possible in their own hands—deciding when to engage, whether to engage, and when to disengage. The most striking episode of the "first anti-Communist upsurge" was the rupture with Yan Xishan in December 1939. Tensions in Shanxi had been rising throughout the summer and autumn, as Yan and his conservative supporters—associated with the "Old Army"—linked the Sacrifice League and the Dare-to-die Corps of the "New Army" with Communist forces. When base areas and Japanese occupation eventually took over much of his province, Yan was forced into exile at Qiulin across the Yellow River in Shaanxi. In November, Yan ordered his Old Army to disarm the Dare-to-die forces with help from central units dispatched by Hu Zongnan. In the bloody fighting that followed, these elements gradually broke free of even nominal provincial control and fully completed their connection with Communist forces. More than 30,000 people went over to the Communists. One KMT intelligence agent described the process with bitterness and a sense of inevitability: the Communists were first "full of sweet words," flattery, and distortions designed to open things up and conceal their actions. But once they had fully entrenched themselves, and once the low-level base had been established, they turned and bit. The agent suggested they had suspected things might end this way, but were not aware how quickly events would move—or that it could happen precisely while Communist calls for "united front" and "maintenance of unity for resistance" filled the air. About a month later, in February and March 1940, elements of the 8RA beat back this so-called upsurge. Zhang Yinwu's forces were disarmed and dispersed across the plains of north Hebei. To the south, Chu Huaiping and Shi Yusan were pushed out of the base area, as was the KMT-appointed provincial governor Lu Zhonglin. Although some non-Communist forces remained in the region, the CCP's and CCLY bases were never again seriously threatened by forces affiliated with the central government. Reinforcing the CCP's accusations, Shi Yusan was later executed in 1940 by the central government for collaboration with the Japanese. By late 1939, CCP central authorities maintained that the areas where the CCP could expand its armed strength were mainly limited to Shandong and Central China. In those regions, the CCP continued trying to carve out bases where they could operate. The situation in Shandong was complicated. After the Japanese invasion, most Nationalist-affiliated forces stayed in the province, while Communist forces and bases were weaker and more scattered than further west. Only in late 1938 did major 8RA units from the 115th and 129th Divisions—led by Xu Xiangqian and Luo Ronghuan—enter Shandong to link up with the Shandong column and local guerrillas, including survivors of a large band recently decimated by the Japanese. Even with these efforts, Communist actions led to clashes not only with Japanese forces but also with various Nationalist-affiliated groups—groups that were stronger than the Communists at the time. Until late 1940, the CCP's clashes with Nationalist forces in Shandong were actually bloodier than clashes with the Japanese. The CCP understood that its Chinese rivals mistrusted one another, and that their attitudes toward the CCP varied widely. The main Nationalist forces were often not tightly affiliated with Chiang Kai-shek or the central government. Instead, they operated under independent—and at times disgruntled—regional commanders. Communist tactics were expressed through slogans emphasizing ways to win support and isolate hardliners: develop progressive forces and win over fence-sitters while isolating "die-hards"; flatter top echelons, enlist the middle ranks, and hit the rank and file; and win over Yi Xuezhong, isolate Shen Honglie, and eliminate Qin Qirong. Still, unlike other North China base areas, the Communists were unable for several years to neutralize Nationalist forces in Shandong. Even if Japanese mop-up campaigns had not weakened those Nationalists, the text suggests the Communists may still have struggled to do so. By November 1940, Xu Xiangqian claimed meaningful progress while admitting Shandong had not yet become a fully consolidated base. CCP successes were greatest along parts of the Shandong–Hebei border, around the Taishan massif in central Shandong, and near the tip of the peninsula far to the east. Elsewhere, "progressive forces" remained weak. Communist regular troops numbered about 70,000, which was far below the party center's goals of 150,000 regulars and between 1.5 and 2 million self-defense forces. Moreover, systematic economic reforms had barely begun. The CCP relied on familiar practices—confiscations, collections of "national salvation grain," contributions, and loans—alongside a conventional taxation system adjusted to favor poorer peasants. Communist expansion in Central China was even riskier, with a greater likelihood of large-scale conflict with central government forces than in the north. In much of North China, "friction" came primarily from rapid Communist expansion into areas with partial vacuums. In Central China, however, base-building required displacing an existing Nationalist military-administrative presence closely tied to Jiang Kai-shek and the Chongqing government. The burden of this expansion was carried mainly by the 6th Detachment (northern Anhui and Jiangsu) and the 5th Detachment, which was reinforced by 15,000 to 20,000 8RA troops under Huang K'o-ch'eng. As Chen Yi's 1st Detachment crossed from south to north through the corridor provided by Guan Wenwei's local forces, it became actively involved as well. This expansion—driven by increasingly urgent directives from Mao and Liu during the latter part of 1939 and into 1940—brought the N4A north of the river into ever more frequent and sharper clashes with Nationalist authorities in Anhui and Jiangsu, especially with units under Jiangsu governor Han Deqin. South of the river, though, Xiang Ying did not directly challenge Chongqing's commanders. Mao later charged that Xiang Ying may have been influenced by Wang Ming, or else he may simply have seen no realistic alternative. His forces—three detachments plus a headquarters unit—were heavily outnumbered by Qu Chutong's Nationalist units, not to mention Japanese forces and their puppets. Even if Mao insisted bases could be built "anywhere," the Shanghai–Hangzhou–Nanjing triangle was especially difficult terrain. Xiang Ying and his followers had survived with extraordinary tenacity in the mountains of South China between 1934 and 1937, enduring brutal search-and-destroy operations that were not lifted until the war began. It therefore seems unlikely that such survivors would suddenly become "right-wing capitulationists." Yet by spring 1940, Mao was pressing Xiang Ying more intensely. The Central Committee's message was explicit: expansion was necessary in all cases. It meant reaching into all enemy-occupied areas rather than being bound by the Kuomintang's restrictions—going beyond Kuomintang limits, not waiting for official appointments, not depending on higher-ups for financing, and instead expanding armed forces freely and independently. It also meant setting up base areas without hesitation, independently mobilizing the masses in those areas, and building united front organs of political power under Communist Party leadership. The struggle between Nationalists and Communists involved more than contests for control of territory behind Japanese lines. It also involved national-level politics, ideology, and leadership. One worrying development for the CCP was the campaign throughout 1939 to expand Jiang Kai-shek's prestige and formal power—adding more titles for him across major party, government, and military positions. In early 1939, the Central Executive Committee appointed him "director-general" of the Kuomintang, a title reminiscent of the one previously held by Sun Yat-sen. In addition, during the summer and autumn of 1939 there was talk of constitutional rule. In November, the KMT announced plans to convene a constitutional assembly the following year. If Jiang could fulfill these promises, he and his government could gain new legitimacy and wider popularity. Mao and his colleagues could not allow this to go unchallenged. If the Nationalists were to have a paramount leader and authoritative spokesperson, the CCP needed one as well. The timing of Mao's famous "On the new democracy"—written in late 1939 and published the next January—was therefore no accident. Its substance had been anticipated earlier, but its final timing and full development were shaped by the KMT's constitutional movement. The CCP's entry into this competition served as both a bid for support away from the KMT and a statement of the multi-class united front that the CCP wanted to lead. Although "On the new democracy" was written in a tone that seemed moderate, it persuaded many Chinese readers that the CCP had either diluted its revolutionary objectives or postponed them to a distant future. In Kuomintang-controlled areas, the work could be read through the liberal values associated with Anglo-American democracy—popular participation, multi-party government, legally protected civil rights. In CCP-controlled territories, the same language carried stronger authoritarian, class-based meanings. In internal documents meant for party audiences rather than public consumption, the ambiguity was removed, showing a tough but patient and flexible commitment not only to resistance but also to social control and social change. During this same period, the Communists expressed deep concern about Nationalist capitulation to Japan—not only on the battlefield behind Japanese lines but also at the highest levels. Some of this concern was propaganda, but beneath propaganda lay genuine anxiety. In late 1939 and early 1940, politically aware Chinese already knew that Japan was negotiating with the unpredictable Wang Jingwei, who had fled Chongqing a year earlier. A "reorganized national government" in Nanjing was finally established in March 1940, representing the most formidable collaboration with Japan to date. Less well known, but equally important, was that Japan was also seeking an understanding directly with Jiang Kai-shek through intermediaries in Hong Kong. This effort, called "Operation Kiri"—described as spreading a "feast for Chiang"—combined intrigue with a kind of dark comedy. Reports suggested Chiang's reported interest in peace could have been a stratagem designed to discredit Wang Jingwei by keeping him waiting. But even if Chiang had no intention of coming to terms with Japan, the Communists could not be sure what the outcome would be until after the multi-pronged peace offensive had failed. By the middle of 1940, China had never been so isolated. In Europe, the "phony war" ended in the spring when Germany launched a blitz across the Low Countries. France fell soon after, and England appeared likely to be next. Japan used this moment to press China to sever its last tenuous connections to the outside world: cutting the Burma Road, trade with neutral Hong Kong, and the rail link running from Hanoi to Kunming. At the same time, Russia was engaged in a difficult and embarrassing war with Finland and reduced military aid to the Nationalists. The United States was only gradually moving away from isolationism and clearly regarded England as more important than China. In Chongqing and elsewhere in "Free China," signs of war weariness, despair, and demoralization were visible. Under these circumstances, Mao's insistence on aggressive expansion was a calculated risk—either it would deter any Japanese advance, or it would place the Communists in the strongest possible position in case a split between the KMT and the CCP became unavoidable. In Central China, the size and pace of the fighting kept increasing, starting in the final months of 1939. One flashpoint was the clash between Luo Pinghui's 5th Detachment and units of Han Deqin's Jiangsu force near Lake Gaoyou. In the following months, Guan Wenwei's forces ranged along the left bank of the Yangtze, repeatedly running into Luo's troops as they operated farther north. Luo also began receiving some 8RA reinforcements, moving them south through areas controlled by the 6th Detachment. Clearly, a major showdown was taking shape across north and central Jiangsu. At the same time, the South Yangtze Command was doing poorly. Nationalist commanders Leng Xin and Qu Chutong restricted its activities so severely that Mao and Liu gradually abandoned the idea of building a unified, consolidated base in that region. During late spring and early summer, Chen Yi moved most of his 1st and 2nd Detachments north of the Yangtze. In September, the 3rd Detachment followed suit, crossing the river into the area around Lake Chaohu, where the 4th Detachment was already stationed. After these moves, only the Headquarters Detachment—under Ye Ting and Xiang Ying—remained south of the Yangtze, positioned at Qingxian in southern Anhui. As the military situation edged toward an open confrontation, negotiations began in June 1940 between representatives of the KMT and the CCP. The core issues were Communist operating zones and the authorized strength of the armies led by the CCP. Proposals were exchanged, followed by equally sharp and hostile counter-proposals, but no agreement was reached. The KMT viewed it as a concession to permit the CCP "free rein" north of the pre-1938 course of the Yellow River, with the exception of southern Shanxi, which was to remain under the influence of Yan Xishan. In exchange, the KMT demanded that all 8RA and N4A units evacuate Central China. In effect, the KMT was offering the CCP something it was already prepared to allow, in return for the CCP giving up what it might soon be able to obtain by force of arms. Nationalist authorities then issued a set of deadlines, but without clearly stating what would happen if those deadlines were violated. On the surface, the CCP appeared to be complying in part. The movements of Chen Yi and the South Yangtze Command could look like obedience, but in reality they were responses to orders coming from their own superior leadership rather than instructions issued by the Nationalists. Even so, Xiang Ying's continued delays and evasions during the autumn and winter of 1940 remained puzzling. One possibility is that he felt—quite reasonably—that Mao had already lost confidence in him and that once he crossed to the north bank of the river he would lose his command. Another complication was that directives from Yan'an were sometimes ambiguous and even contradictory. He may also have been trying to reach secure understandings with KMT commanders about evacuation routes and guaranteed safe conduct out of the area. For a period, Han Teqin kept most of his forces—estimated at about 70,000 men, far outnumbering the N4A—in north Jiangsu, thereby blocking the expansion of the 6th Detachment and slowing further southern intrusions by 8RA troops. But by mid-summer he realized he would have to counter the N4A build-up in central Jiangsu, or else risk writing that region off to the Communists. A confusing sequence of engagements then unfolded, culminating in a decisive battle in early October 1940 near the central Jiangsu town of Huangjiao. Over the course of four days, several of Han's main-force units belonging to the 89th Army were destroyed, while others were scattered. That battle also served as a signal for the 6th Detachment to advance more aggressively in the north. In the aftermath, one of Han's principal commanders entered collaboration with the CCP, while another defected to the Nanjing government under Wang Jingwei. Although Han Teqin managed to maintain a foothold in Jiangsu until 1943, his real power had been broken. Relatively little attention was paid to the battle of Huangjiao in the Chinese press. The KMT did not want to publicize what it considered a disastrous defeat, while the Communists were satisfied to stay silent about an episode that conflicted with their proclaimed policy of a united front. As could be expected, during the autumn—after Han Teqin's defeat—KMT-CCP negotiations deteriorated further. In early December, Jiang Kai-shek personally ordered that all N4A forces withdraw from southern Anhui and southern Jiangsu by 31 December. He also ordered that the entire 8RA be positioned north of the Yellow River by the same deadline, followed one month later by the N4A. Discussions then followed between Ye Ting and Qu Chutong's deputies concerning the route to be taken, safe conduct, and—astonishingly—the money and supplies that were to be provided to the N4A to help it move. On 25 December, Mao Zedong ordered Xiang Ying to begin evacuating immediately. Yet it was not until 4 January 1941 that Ye and Xiang actually started moving. Almost immediately, Qu Chutong's forces harassed and dispersed the N4A Headquarters Group, which included administrative personnel, wounded soldiers and dependents, as well as combat-ready troops. In an attempt to reorganize, they moved southwest toward Maolin, where they were surrounded by Nationalists and, over the next several days, were cut to pieces. Losses were heavy on both sides. The CCP suffered an estimated 9,000 casualties. Xiang Ying tried twice to break out of the blockade on his own, but failed. He was then denounced as a deserter by Ye Ting, who took over full command of the doomed forces. Xiang Ying eventually escaped, but he was killed a couple of months later by one of his own bodyguards, motivated by the N4A gold reserves that he had taken with him. Up to the very end, Xiang either failed or refused to seek refuge in Liu Shaoqi's domain north of the Yangtze. The unfortunate Ye Ting was arrested and spent the rest of the war in prison. He was finally released in 1946, only to die one month later in a plane crash, along with several other high-ranking party members. On 17 January, Jiang Kai-shek declared that the New Fourth Army was dissolved for insubordination. Direct contacts between Yan'an and Chongqing nearly came to an end, and CCP military liaison offices in several cities held by the Nationalists were closed. This is what became known as the New Fourth Army incident, also referred to as the South Anhui incident. Clearly, it functioned as an act of retaliation for the defeats suffered by Han Teqin in north and central Jiangsu. It ended any realistic prospect of establishing a consolidated Communist base south of the Yangtze. Still, from a strategic perspective, these losses were ultimately more than offset by the gains achieved farther north. In fact, only a few months later, the reorganized N4A quietly began reintroducing some units into this region, where they carried out guerrilla activities without possessing a secure territorial base. Unlike the relative silence surrounding the fighting at Huangjiao, the New Fourth Army incident sparked bitter, prolonged controversy. The CCP argued that it was a second "anti-Communist upsurge," even more serious than the first. Presenting themselves as martyred patriots, they depicted their opponents as people who wanted to end the War of Resistance through what they called "Sino-Japanese cooperation" aimed at "suppressing the Communists." In their account, the Nationalists wanted to replace the war of resistance with civil war, substitute capitulation for independence, trade unity for a split, and replace light with darkness. People were telling each other the news and were horrified. Indeed, they claimed that the situation had never been as critical as it was at that moment. The Nationalist response, of course, was that provocations had been numerous and serious, and that violations of military discipline could not be tolerated. But the KMT's unwillingness to describe in detail its own defeats at the CCP's hands left it speaking in broad generalities. In the propaganda battle, the CCP clearly gained the better position and won more political capital. If it was politically valuable to be regarded as a national hero, it was even more valuable to be seen as a national martyr. Many Chinese—and some outside—observers were genuinely alarmed and feared that civil war might openly resume. Yet, with a few exceptions, the events that culminated in the New Fourth Army incident have generally been interpreted as marking the breakdown of the second united front. That interpretation, however, is described as being wrong in two respects. First, the CCP understood the united front not as a narrow arrangement limited to a few major partners, but as a strategy that could be applied flexibly to all political, military, and social forces in China—from the highest levels of the central government down to the smallest village. Relations with Jiang Jieshi and the Guomindang regime mattered, but they did not, by themselves, constitute the whole of the united front. Even regarding Jiang and the Nationalists specifically, the common reading is said to be misguided. Throughout the war, a cardinal objective of the united front was to prevent peace between Japan and the Nationalists. Therefore, if clashes between CCP forces and those of the central government on such a large scale as at Huangjiao and Maolin could occur without leading to peace with Japan and without triggering a full-scale resumption of civil war, then this should not be understood as the end of the united front—it should be seen as its fundamental vindication. If friction at that scale could nevertheless be tolerated by Jiang Jieshi, then fears about his future accommodation with Japan were greatly reduced. Following the New Fourth Army incident, the CCP reorganized its political and military presence in Central China. The Central Plains and South-east China Bureaus were merged and renamed the Central China Bureau, with Liu Shaoqi placed in charge, reflecting the area's importance to Party Central. The New Fourth Army was also reorganized completely and substantially regularized. Chen Yi became its new acting commander, since Ye Ting was imprisoned. He directed the force, now divided into seven divisions. Each division had territorial responsibilities, and in each region the CCP claimed the establishment of a base. Indeed, base construction proceeded in earnest only after the friction of 1940 and the New Fourth Army incident. In the years that followed, the operating areas of the First through Fourth Divisions contained expanding enclaves of consolidated territory, where military dominance was joined with open party work: administrative control, the development of mass organizations, local elections, and socio-economic reforms. The other three areas fluctuated between semi-consolidated and guerrilla status. With the incident, the worst phase of the KMT-CCP conflict was now over. When CCP documents later speak of a third upsurge in 1943, they refer to something openly political. With the exception of Shandong—where a fairly strong Nationalist presence persisted for a longer time—the overall balance of power among Chinese forces behind Japanese lines had shifted in favor of the CCP by mid-1941. In subsequent years the CCP's predominance became even more pronounced, until by the end of 1943 the Communists were virtually beyond challenge by Chinese rivals. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. After the CCP and KMT entered the united front, cooperation felt conditional from the start. Mao pushed the New Fourth Army to reorganize and preserve Communist autonomy, even as the 1937 agreements publicly pledged obedience to KMT leadership. In 1939–40 the Communists worried that Chiang might negotiate peace with Japan; so they expanded bases and military presence, triggering repeated clashes. The pressure intensified when KMT orders forced the New Fourth Army to evacuate south Anhui in late 1940.
Sometimes the idea that changes everything doesn't arrive in a boardroom, it arrives in a vet clinic, staring at a broken fixed deposit and the creeping realisation that the financial system was never really designed with ordinary people in mind. Teoh Wei Xiang is the co-founder and CEO of Versa Asia, Malaysia's first online platform licensed to distribute investment products digitally and the story of how it came to be is as human as it gets. When his family dog needed emergency surgery, Xiang broke his fixed deposit and lost all the interest he had carefully accumulated, and instead of simply accepting that this was just the way things worked, he asked a different question entirely: why should Malaysians have to choose between their savings and their emergencies? Built from scratch alongside his long-time friends Nelson and Richmond, Versa has since grown into a wealthtech platform trusted by over 270,000 users, 90% of whom are under 40, helping young Malaysians save close to RM500 million in 2024 alone. In a world where personal finance can feel intimidating, inaccessible, and frankly boring, Wei Xiang built something that actually feels like it's on your side, tune in, because this is a conversation about money that has nothing to do with how much of it you already have.
Food is more than food for the Founder of Xi Home Dumplings Bay - whether it's love or an apology, it's the strongest language shared by this family.Wenjun Xiang launched her career while she was still in school, starting the business with her mum at age 17, and while Forbes 30 Under 30 is a mighty accolade to achieve in that time, it's not the only definition of success for her.Join us for a truly unvarnished take on the family business journey with Wenjun, as she describes what makes the relationship with her maternal co-worker a unique challenge…
Last time we spoke about the Wang Jingwei Regime. During the Second Sino-Japanese War, tensions between Chiang Kai-shek and Wang Jingwei escalated amid Japan's aggressive invasion. Disillusioned by Chiang's scorched-earth tactics, such as the Yellow River flood and Changsha fire, Wang defected from Chongqing in December 1938, fleeing to Hanoi to negotiate peace with Japan. An assassination attempt, likely ordered by Chiang, killed Wang's secretary Zeng Zhongming, deepening the rift and sparking retaliatory violence. Wang's group, aided by Japanese agents like Kagesa Sadaaki, navigated scandals and leaks, including a forged agreement exposed in the press. After grueling negotiations in Shanghai and Tokyo, Wang conceded to harsh Japanese terms, including limited sovereignty and economic controls. On March 30, 1940, he established the Reorganized National Government (RNG) in Nanjing, adopting the nationalist flag with a controversial yellow pennant symbolizing "peace, anticommunism, nation-building." Despite Wang's vision of constitutional democracy, the RNG functioned as a wartime puppet, isolated from Chongqing and resented as traitorous. Wang died in 1944, and the regime collapsed in 1945. #195 The Xiang-Gan Operation Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. In the sweltering grip of August 1939, Chongqing languished under an unbearably hot summer, the air thick with humidity and the weight of impending doom. Perched on a sun-baked hillside along the southern bank of the Jialing River, roughly 10 kilometers from the chaotic heart of the city, loomed a two-story Western-style building. This fortress of stone and resolve, known as the "Huangshan Villa," stood as Chiang Kai-shek's official residence in Chongqing, a sanctuary amid the storm of war. Unless urgent meetings or crises at the Military Affairs Commission demanded his presence, it was here that Chiang orchestrated the fate of a nation on the brink. One fateful evening, as shadows lengthened across the villa, the Bureau of Investigation and Statistics delivered a chilling report from Wang Pengsheng, the director of the Military Affairs Commission's Institute for International Affairs. Wang was no ordinary operative; he was a knowledgeable, experienced, and sharp-minded intellectual, a master of Japanese affairs, and one of Chiang's most trusted aides, his insights cutting like a blade through the fog of deception. In this urgent dispatch, Wang distilled the latest machinations from Japan. After the traitor Wang Jingwei defected to the enemy, Japan glimpsed a sinister new path to conquer China: ramping up political inducements for surrender, with brutal military offensives reduced to mere supporting roles. On June 20, the Japanese Imperial General Headquarters unleashed "strategy" tasks upon its troops in China—to incite local armies, those ragtag "miscellaneous troops," to betray their own, isolating and pulverizing the central army units. Wang Pengsheng saw through the ruse; this "attacking the heart" and "subduing strategies," drawn from the ancient wisdom of China's military sage Sun Tzu, betrayed the Japanese army's desperate straits, manpower stretched thin, supplies dwindling to the point of desperation. Chiang Kai-shek's eyes narrowed as he gripped his red pencil, underlining a passage in the report with deliberate strokes, marking it as a thunderclap of importance or urgency: To cooperate with the establishment of the Wang puppet regime and exert military pressure on the Chongqing government, under the direction of the Imperial General Headquarters, the commander of the Japanese 11th Army, Okamura Yasuji, had formulated the "Xiang-Gan Operation Plan" targeting the main forces of the central army in the Ninth War Zone and was intensifying preparations for its implementation. The words hung heavy in the air like a gathering storm. Chiang Kai-shek rose abruptly, his body protesting with a stiff ache from hours of unyielding vigilance. He stretched his weary waist and legs, then pushed open the wooden door beside the vast sun-facing window, stepping out onto the balcony as if seeking solace from the encroaching night. The balcony commanded a sweeping vista, a momentary escape from the suffocating confines of strategy and betrayal. Gazing downward, the "Fog Capital" Chongqing emerged in rare clarity, serene and layered beneath the fiery embrace of the evening glow. The distant murmur of the Jialing River, flowing ceaselessly like the pulse of a defiant heart, whispered a fleeting sense of ease amid the turmoil. Yet even this pause carried the echoes of war's relentless march. After the Japanese horde seized Wuhan and surged onward to claim Yueyang—only to halt their southward thrust—both Mao Zedong in his Yan'an stronghold and Chiang Kai-shek in Chongqing etched this moment as a pivotal divide in China's War of Resistance Against Japan. Mao proclaimed the war had plunged into the "stalemate phase," a grinding impasse. Chiang, ever the resolute leader, declared the "second phase of the war of resistance" ignited from this very point. But across the vast national battlefield, the first half of 1939 roared with unquenched fury, the air thick with the acrid smoke of gunpowder. From the year's dawn, the Japanese army, bolstered by five divisions and eight mixed brigades, launched ruthless "security consolidation" operations in North China to fortify their blood-soaked conquests, only to be harried and bloodied by the Communist Eighth Route Army slipping behind enemy lines and the valiant troops of the First and Second War Zones. In late March, the Japanese 11th Army stormed Nanchang, clashing in a maelstrom of fire with the four group armies of the Ninth War Zone under the iron command of front-line commander Luo Zhuoying. For a grueling month and a half, the battle raged, the Japanese claiming the city at a staggering cost in lives. Chiang Kai-shek, his fury mounting, demanded a counterattack from the Ninth War Zone, but it crumbled into tragedy, over 20,000 souls lost, including Lieutenant General Chen Anbao, the indomitable commander of the 29th Army. Nanchang remained in enemy hands, fueling Chiang's rage like an inferno unchecked. Then, in May, the Japanese Kwantung Army clashed with Soviet and Mongolian forces in the epic conflagration at Nomonhan. What ignited a spark of grim satisfaction in Chiang was not merely the Japanese rout, with nearly 20,000 of their ranks obliterated, but the broader ripple: this Japan-Soviet inferno would heap pressure upon the invaders in China, weakening their grasp. As the war sank into its stalemate phase, Chiang turned his gaze inward, fiercely guarding his military strength while awaiting the winds of change. He clung to a core conviction: the essence of the War of Resistance boiled down to that single, unbreakable word—"resist." Troops could be sacrificed, territories forsaken, retreats endured when battles turned dire, but surrender was unthinkable. As long as resistance endured, the nation would hold its place among the world's powers, and its leaders their rightful thrones. In time, the tides of international intrigue would shift; the imperialist giants, driven by their own insatiable interests, would not stand idly by as China fell to Japan's maw. With resolve hardening like steel, Chiang Kai-shek strode back to his imposing desk and seized the telephone, dialing Xu Yongchang, the Minister of Military Orders. His voice cut through the line with unyielding command: instruct Deputy Chief of Staff Bai Chongxi, currently in the Ninth War Zone dissecting the bitter lessons of the Nanchang debacle, to hasten and aid Chen Cheng in crafting ironclad military deployments against the looming Japanese "Xiang-Gan Operation" and submit them without delay. As the last defiant ray of sunlight plunged below the horizon, the sprawl of Chongqing's urban expanse succumbed to an enveloping darkness, a shroud of uncertainty. Since the government had fled southward, Chongqing had become a relentless target for Japanese bombers, their payloads raining death and devastation in waves of tragedy. By night, the city enforced ironclad blackout controls, its citizens huddling in fear behind heavy curtains, their lives reduced to whispers in the shadows. Chiang Kai-shek's mind drifted to the pre-war nights of the mountain city, when thousands of lights danced like stars upon the river's rippling waves. A deep, weary sigh escaped him, carrying the burden of a leader who refused to yield. Far from the shadowed balconies of Chongqing, as China's War of Resistance Against Japan plunged into its harrowing third year, the misty haven of Guilin clung to its gentle, rain-soaked serenity, a fragile oasis amid the chaos of a nation torn asunder. Farmers, oblivious to the headlines screaming from distant newspapers, trudged barefoot through the lush fields, guiding massive water buffaloes with their backward-curving horns and deceptively gentle temperaments. Verdant tea groves blanketed the undulating hills, their leaves whispering secrets to the wind, while breezes carried the haunting, sweet-and-sour melodies of mountain songs that seemed to defy the encroaching shadows of war. Those weary souls fleeing the bloodied front lines stumbled into this paradise, their eyes widening in awe, as if they had crossed into a dream untouched by the nightmare raging beyond. Nestled in the northwestern suburbs of the city, the Guilin Office pulsed with the raw energy of command, its operations post concealed within a colossal karst cave, a labyrinth of nature's own fortifications. Amid the jagged stalagmites and dripping stalactites, wires snaked like veins, cables coiled in tense anticipation, and radio antennas reached out like desperate fingers grasping for signals. These were the nerves of war, linking this hidden nerve center to the smoke-choked, blood-drenched front lines where heroes and horrors collided in the unyielding struggle for resistance. Deputy Chief of Staff of the Military Affairs Commission and Director of the Guilin Office—Bai Chongxi—unfolded the telegram folder thrust into his hands by his confidential staff, his heart pounding with the weight of destiny: "To Director Bai in Guilin: Telegram received. Deploy operations according to Plan A. Zhongzheng" Before departing Changsha, the Second Department had already whispered warnings of the Japanese horde's intent to strike southward, and fatefully, an urgent call from Xu Yongchang had demanded the swift forging of a battle plan to confront the enemy. As Bai Chongxi devoured the enemy intelligence, a bold strategy ignited in his mind like a flare in the darkness. Chen Cheng, the steadfast Commander of the Ninth War Zone, championed the tried-and-true tactic of successive resistance, but with a grim twist: retreat would be capped north of Changsha. Front-line troops would grind down the Japanese invaders, bleeding them dry before slipping to the east and west flanks. There, they would pounce on the enemy's exposed sides as the foes pressed southward, culminating in a devastating annihilation beneath the walls of Changsha with the aid of the garrison. This blueprint minimized troop movements and promised a swift, brutal clash. Yet Chen Cheng, burdened by his dual role as Minister of the Political Department of the Military Affairs Commission, had delegated command to Xue Yue as acting Ninth War Zone Commander. In heated deliberations, Xue Yue tilted toward Chen's vision, his resolve echoing the caution of survival. But Bai Chongxi, his strategic mind a whirlwind of innovation, saw a bolder path through the storm. The Japanese forces lurking in the Wuhan area were fractured, split between the Yangtze's north and south, facing off against China's formidable heavy troops. Though intelligence on the scale of their assault remained shrouded in mystery, Bai knew their drawable forces couldn't exceed half their might, and their endurance in sustained combat would falter like a dying flame. "To swallow the attackers whole, the battlefield must be vast and unforgiving, our forces luring them deeper while retreating to the Hengyang area, stretching the enemy thin across a sprawling 200-kilometer wasteland." There, the invaders would wither in passivity, their food and ammunition lines stretched to breaking. Then, in a masterful stroke, troops from the Jiuling and Mufu Mountains would surge westward, while those west of the Xiang River drove eastward, severing every land and water escape route in a vise of total annihilation. Both plans stood as ironclad fortresses of logic, each unassailable in its reasoning, and were dispatched simultaneously to Chiang Kai-shek, the arbiter of China's fate. By rank and protocol, Bai's vision claimed the mantle of Plan A, while Chen's bore the label of Plan B. Bai Chongxi had voiced his conviction and released it to the winds, content to let Chiang's judgment prevail. Bai Chongxi was a master of strategy, whispered among allies as the "Little Zhuge," his intellect a weapon as sharp as any blade. Yet Chen Cheng shared Chiang's Zhejiang roots and the unbreakable bonds of Huangpu camaraderie, drawing him even closer in the inner circle of trust. On such pivotal matters, Bai Chongxi often chose the path of restraint, yielding rather than clashing in futile strife. Five agonizing days after the plans vanished into the ether, Chiang's telegram pierced the tension, affirming the adoption of Plan A. A surge of quiet triumph coursed through Bai Chongxi as he signed the missive and strode toward the operations map, his steps echoing with purpose. While strategic minds clashed in hidden caves and distant villas, the front lines pulsed with the raw grit of soldiers readying for battle. Guan Linzheng had been assigned a mount since 1930, when he became commander of the 1st Regiment of the 2nd Training Division, during the Central Plains War between Chiang, Feng, and Yan. He led the regiment to cover the retreat of the division's main force under Zhang Zhizhong. Pursued by several times their number of Feng-Yan troops, they fought while retreating in dire straits. From night to dawn, heavy fog descended, obscuring visibility beyond dozens of paces. Guan Linzheng's chestnut horse suddenly neighed loudly and charged back toward the pursuers. After trying to rein it in unsuccessfully, Guan simply ordered the troops to countercharge into the fog. Shouts of killing filled the air, gunfire intense. The Feng-Yan troops, unclear of the situation in the fog, thought Chiang reinforcements had arrived and ordered a retreat. By the time the fog cleared, they were gone. Guan's bold cunning successfully completed the cover mission, and he was promoted to brigade commander of the division's 2nd Brigade after the war. In July 1932, during Chiang Kai-shek's fourth encirclement of the Hubei-Henan-Anhui Soviet, Guan Linzheng was brigade commander of the 4th Army's Independent Brigade. In battle, he was surrounded by Red Army troops led by Chen Geng and Cai Shenyi of the Red 25th Army Corps in the Anhui town of Zhuanfo Temple. His unit suffered heavy casualties, and a beloved horse was killed, leaving him distressed for a long time. With the outbreak of the War of Resistance, Guan Linzheng's military career entered its golden age. He believed this was truly raising an army of justice, fighting for the people and the nation. After promotions, though equipped with cars, he always kept a warhorse, often riding to survey terrain, inspect work, and command battles. In spare moments, he personally exercised and groomed the horse. That day, he led several staff on horseback to the Xin Qiang River front line, dismounting on the southern bank. 52nd Army Commander Zhang Yaoming and 195th Division Commander Qin Yizhi were waiting. According to the Ninth War Zone deployment, the 15th Army Group had positioned Zhang Yaoming's 52nd Army and Xia Chuzhong's 79th Army, a formidable force of six divisions along the southern bank of the Xin Qiang River, stretching from Xin Qiang to Maishi beyond the provincial border. This ironclad first line of defense spanned over 100 kilometers, a vast bulwark against the gathering storm of invasion. Fifty kilometers to the south, Chen Pei's 37th Army, with its Divisions 60 and 95, held the Miluo River from Miluo to Pingjiang as the unyielding second line, ready to absorb any breach. Meanwhile, Li Jue's 70th Army, commanding Divisions 19 and 107 along the eastern bank of the Xiang River, was deployed north and south of Xiangyin, fiercely guarding the critical landing points like Yingtian, points that could spell victory or catastrophe. 195th Division Commander Qin Yizhi reported to Guan Linzheng with a voice charged with resolve: troop morale soared like a battle cry, fortifications stood complete and impenetrable, and the army's slogan for this fateful clash thundered: "Fight with the prestige of Taierzhuang!" The division's mobilization slogan echoed even fiercer: "Win fame in one battle!" Guan Linzheng nodded with grim satisfaction toward Zhang Yaoming, his eyes gleaming with the fire of shared history. Guan had once commanded the 52nd Army himself, leading it through a gauntlet of brilliant, blood-soaked battles on the anti-Japanese front. As the Japanese hordes prepared to surge across the Xin Qiang River southward, this was the first, most perilous barrier, a crucible where legends would be forged or shattered. He had entrusted his most loyal unit to the point of greatest impact, knowing full well the stakes. Zhang Yaoming and the division commanders, who had marched at his side for years through hellfire, understood the gravity: Commander Guan was setting an unassailable example, issuing orders that rippled through the ranks, no one could afford the slightest lapse, or face the merciless blade of military law! "Who's on the north bank?" Guan Linzheng and the others sat on the hard earth, the weight of impending war pressing down; he pointed to the map's symbols for forward positions across the river, his finger tracing lines of fate. "Guarding the Bijia Mountain position is the reinforced 3rd Battalion of the 195th Division's 131st Regiment under Qin Yizhi," Zhang Yaoming replied without hesitation, his tone steady as stone. "Who's on the north bank?" Guan Linzheng repeated as if he hadn't heard, his voice a low rumble, demanding precision in the face of chaos. Zhang Yaoming hesitated slightly, a flicker of uncertainty crossing his face, and Qin Yizhi stepped in: "3rd Battalion Commander Shi Enhua, Huangpu 8th Class." The Central Military Academy had held its first five classes in Guangzhou's Huangpu, commonly called Huangpu Military Academy. Afterward, the school moved several times, but students continued using the Huangpu name, partly to inherit the revolutionary spirit against imperialism and feudalism from Huangpu's founding, and partly to indicate their central orthodoxy. Army generals, especially the "old Huangpu" big brothers, approved this practice, calling it Huangpu no matter where the school was. Guan Linzheng glared at Zhang Yaoming, his gaze like sharpened steel, then pressed his knee and rose to his feet. Guan's left knee had been shattered by a bullet in 1925 during the Eastern Expedition against Chen Jiongming, a wound that had nearly claimed his leg and his future. Doctors had decreed amputation to save his life, but Liao Zhongkai, the party representative, had visited the wounded and intervened strenuously, preventing it. Otherwise, there would be no later glory for Guan Linzheng. After careful treatment and diligent exercise, the leg's function mostly recovered, though rising from a squat was slightly difficult. Zhang Yaoming reached out to help, but Guan pushed him away with a fierce independence born of countless battles. The group descended to the riverbank and stood in heavy silence, the air thick with unspoken tension. The horses either stood patiently with heads held high, vigilant sentinels, or lowered them to sniff the grass, casually plucking some to hold in their lips, oblivious to the human storm brewing. The Xin Qiang River, an unnamed small river that had flowed quietly for countless years, had no great turbid waves in flood seasons and still shallow clear ripples in dry periods. It flowed peacefully from its source to Dongting Lake over dozens of kilometers. At this moment, it reflected the figures and thoughts of several soldiers, utterly unaware that in a dozen days, its name would leap to the front pages of newspapers nationwide, baptized in blood and etched into history. Amid these preparations on the front lines, deeper internal conflicts simmered among the high command. Xue Yue regretted taking the position of provincial chairman, a decision that now haunted him like a specter from the battlefield's edge. After the nationwide shock of the "Great Fire of Changsha," Zhang Zhizhong was punished with "suspension with retention," continuing to handle daily affairs amid the ashes. He sent several telegrams requesting resignation from the provincial chairmanship, expressing to the Executive Yuan his "shameless guilt and deep pain." On January 17, 1939, the Chongqing Executive Yuan passed a resolution to reorganize the Hunan Provincial Government. That night, Zhang Zhizhong received Chiang Kai-shek's telegram instructing him to hand over work and report to Chongqing. In December 1938, when the Military Affairs Commission issued the order for Xue Yue to act as Ninth War Zone Commander, Chiang Kai-shek personally spoke with Xue, asking: "Brother Boling, do you think this arrangement is acceptable?" Boling was Xue Yue's courtesy name. Chiang, nine years older, addressed him as brother in private. Xue Yue said: "With Changsha in such a state, I truly lack the ability to handle such a major war zone task." Chiang Kai-shek understood Xue's implication about the disunity of military and political affairs making military work difficult. He said: "You go first; we can consider unifying military and political affairs later." According to He Yaozu, then director of the Military Affairs Commission Office who witnessed this: "My impression was that Xue Yue didn't want to avoid the acting commander role, but wanted to combine military and political powers. Chiang knew this, telling me 'If he's willing, let him do it,' words Chiang said to many seeking positions." On February 1, 1939, the Nationalist Government officially appointed Xue Yue as Chairman of the Hunan Provincial Committee of the Kuomintang and Chairman of Hunan Province. With party, government, and military powers combined, troubles followed incessantly, piling upon him like relentless enemy fire. As war zone commander, he first thought of the troops. Upon taking office, Xue implemented a policy to restrict market rice prices for military grain procurement, proposing "flat prices" to acquire grain cheaply, forcing merchants underground. Upon hearing this, Xue angrily summoned major rice merchants, reprimanded them, and ordered them to deliver quotas. The result: insufficient low-price rice, with black market prices rising daily. After half a year, sharp-tongued Hunanese nicknamed him "Xue Pinggui," a name that became household, a mocking whisper that cut deeper than any blade. Coincidentally, his father passed away. Whether Xue instructed it or subordinates "handled it," obituaries flew everywhere, sent to county-level units across the province. Each county had at least 20 units sending condolences, and higher-level cities and provincial units all sent, leading some to secretly calculate. After Xue Yue took charge in Hunan, his family members were transferred from other provinces, and arranging work according to their abilities was reasonable in that old society. His uncle-in-law Fang Xuefen became head of the Provincial Grain Bureau, brother-in-law Qiu Weiyi head of the Provincial Bank. His brother continued business, transporting Hunan rice to Guangdong for barter. Xue Yue's talents shone not in officialdom. Only before military maps, on battlefields of gunfire and flying shells, could one find the general-like Xue Yue; "heaven-born talent" was for warfare. This descendant of an ordinary farming family in Lechang County, Guangdong, who entered Huangpu Army Primary School at 10, became commander of Sun Yat-sen's bodyguard regiment's 1st Battalion at 24, and once carried a machine gun through hails of bullets to protect Madame Sun Soong Ching-ling from rebel encirclement, earned the nickname "Tiger Cub" in blood and fire. What propelled him to life's peak was the Battle of Changsha. On August 21, 1939, with war clouds over Changsha thickening like a noose, Xue Yue received telegrams and calls from Chiang Kai-shek, Bai Chongxi, and Chen Cheng. Chiang's telegram required immediate deployment according to "Plan A." Bai and Chen urged resolute implementation of the Chairman's instructions. Xue Yue stood motionless before the map, his mind a whirlwind of strategy and defiance. Many articles recalling Xue Yue mentioned his daily habit, or hobby, of studying maps; he could do so all day. With battles, he looked; without, he still studied avidly. Perhaps map-reading had evolved from a commander's work need to a professional soldier's spiritual requirement, a way to express emotions, dispel worries, a soldier's way of existence. After Chiang's order to execute "Plan A," rather than comparing plans on the map for stronger bases for his preferred view, he was organizing thoughts, adjusting emotions, and gathering courage in this soul's sanctuary. Hours later, he turned and called Chief of Staff Zhao Zili, dictating three reasons to persist with "Plan B," instructing him to draft a telegram directly to Chiang Kai-shek. He reminded Zhao that the wording should be forceful yet resilient, making the Chairman clearly feel his firm determination. The Ninth War Zone has sufficient forces and confidence to annihilate the Japanese north of Changsha. If our forces retreat to Hengyang, the Japanese 21st Army under Ando Toshikichi in Guangzhou (with 18th and 104th Divisions, Taiwan Brigade, and attached air units) might advance north along the Yue-Han Railway in support, forming a pincer on us, making the battle hard to control. Following Plan A and allowing the Japanese south would lead to Changsha's fall, exploited by enemy propaganda, causing adverse effects domestically and internationally. These three points presented the potential military and political disadvantages of Plan A as tangible, imminent dangers, more argumentative and unyieldingly firm than his original inclination toward "Plan B." Zhao Zili quickly noted the points, his pen flying across the page with the precision of a seasoned warrior, before retreating to the staff office to draft the telegram that could alter the course of battle. A top student of Huangpu's 6th Class, quick-witted and resourceful, Zhao had risen like a comet through the ranks after a few blistering campaigns, pinning the insignia of major general to his shoulders at the tender age of 31, a feat that stirred envy among his classmates like a storm in their hearts. Zhao Zili, of course, understood Xue Yue's true intent, piercing through the layers of strategy to the raw undercurrent of determination and unresolved fury. In May 1938, to avenge the stinging triumph at Taierzhuang, the Japanese had massed their forces in a vengeful storm, aiming to encircle and annihilate the Chinese main forces east of the Longhai Railway, striking from both east and north with ruthless precision. The northern route's 14th Division, under the cunning Dobashi Kenji, found itself surrounded in Lanfeng by a pantheon of fierce Chinese generals, Song Xilian, Yu Jishi, Hu Zongnan, Qiu Qingquan, Wang Yaowu, Li Hanlun, Gui Yongqing, Sun Tongxuan, and Shang Zhen, warriors whose names echoed like thunder across the battlefields. Chiang Kai-shek himself descended upon Zhengzhou to supervise the carnage, appointing Xue Yue as 1st Corps Commander to orchestrate the generals in a full-throttle offensive on the morning of May 25, with the ironclad goal of obliterating that longtime scourge of China and his 14th Division before the dawn of the 26th shattered the night. The odds were a gambler's dream: 150,000 elite Chinese troops against a mere 20,000 second-rate Japanese soldiers. Victory seemed not just possible, but inevitable; Chiang invited journalists to the front lines for live dispatches, while the Wuhan Political Department feverishly prepared celebrations for the "second great Taierzhuang victory." Chiang Kai-shek was exceptionally angry, his rage boiling over in orders that scorched the ranks, reprimanding army commanders for "inept command, cowardly actions, leading to low morale and hesitation," and that "most army, division, and brigade commanders lacked courage and self-motivation, prolonging the battle." After the Lanfeng Battle, Chiang ordered the dismissal and investigation of future Nationalist Navy Commander Gui Yongqing and 1950s Taiwan Army Commander and Provincial Chairman Huang Jie, and executed 88th Division Commander Long Muhan. But he did not hold Xue Yue accountable for leadership responsibility. For a highly self-respecting person, self-blame is more painful than others' blame. Thereafter, Xue Yue spent more time buried in maps, his eyes tracing lines of terrain like a man possessed, seeking a monumental battle to avenge his wounded pride and redeem his tarnished honor. On March 8, 1939, shortly after Xue Yue assumed the mantle of acting Ninth War Zone Commander, Chiang telegraphed him with urgent resolve: "To secure Nanchang and its rear lines, decide to strike first, take the offensive to thwart the enemy's intentions." Chiang valued Nanchang's strategic position, as did Okamura Yasuji, but Chiang was a step slow, his hesitation a fatal crack. The Japanese, wielding two divisions bolstered by the bulk of their army's tanks and artillery, seized the initiative like predators in the night, storming Nanchang before the Chinese heavy forces could muster. Chen Cheng remained the nominal Ninth War Zone Commander, relegating Xue Yue to a watchful perch in Changsha while entrusting the Nanchang front to his confidant Luo Zhuoying. Xue Yue haunted the command room day and night, monitoring the inferno through frantic phone calls and telegrams, his discomfort gnawing at him like an unhealed wound. He bore witness to Nanchang's fall and the counterattack's agonizing collapse. The Nanchang Battle loss was not Xue's fault, but it scarred the Ninth War Zone under his watch, with generals' whispers spreading like venom, knotting his heart in a tangle of regret and resolve. Months of intense map study and on-site inspections had etched Hunan's terrain into Xue Yue's very soul, birthing a strategy that was bold, unique, and brimming with promise—a phoenix rising from the ashes of defeat. But as Zhao Zili understood with crystal clarity, Commander Xue's telegram to Chiang, a forceful plea to reverse the decision, sprang less from cold military "strategy" than from the seething "resentment" accumulated through repeated failures and humiliations, a fire that demanded reckoning. With Chen Cheng's help, Chiang finally agreed to change the plan, bending to the tide of persuasion. Xue Yue was delighted, his spirit soaring like a liberated eagle; Bai Chongxi was angry, his frustration simmering like a storm held at bay. After the battle erupted, Bai, dispatched by Chiang to assist Xue Yue, arrived at the war zone headquarters on Yuelu Mountain atop the Xiang River's west bank in Changsha but remained silent like a mute bodhisattva, his words locked away in disapproval. Even decades later, in his Memoirs of Bai Chongxi, discussing the First Battle of Changsha, he still did not consider it a victory, saying the Japanese "conducted a planned retreat without much loss, which is a fact." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. In 1939, amid the Second Sino-Japanese War's stalemate phase, Chiang Kai-shek received intelligence on Japan's Xiang-Gan Operation, aimed at pressuring Chongqing through military advances in Hunan. Deputy Chief Bai Chongxi proposed Plan A for a deep-lure annihilation south of Changsha, while Chen Cheng and Xue Yue favored Plan B for resistance north of the city. After tense debates, Chiang approved Plan B, influenced by Xue's insistence to avoid Changsha's fall and counter Japanese propaganda.
On today's episode, Sam talks with Alice Xiang, global head of AI governance at Sony and lead research scientist for AI ethics at Sony AI, about what it actually takes to put responsible artificial intelligence into practice at scale. Alice shares how Sony moved early on AI ethics and why governance, not just principles, is now the real challenge as AI spreads across products and workflows. The conversation dives into FHIBE, Sony's publicly available and ethically sourced benchmark for evaluating bias in computer vision, and why measuring fairness is often harder than fixing it. Along the way, they tackle data consent, “data nihilism,” and the very real risks of deploying biased systems in everyday and high-stakes contexts. Read the episode transcript here. Guest bio: As the global head of AI governance at Sony, Alice Xiang leads the team guiding the establishment of AI governance policies and governance frameworks across the company's business units. She's also the lead research scientist for AI ethics at Sony AI, which is working on cutting-edge sociotechnical research to enable the development of more responsible AI solutions. Xiang holds a Juris Doctor from Yale Law School, a master's in development economics from Oxford University, and a master's in statistics and bachelor's in economics from Harvard University. *Please take our listener survey: mitsmr.com/podcastsurvey It's short — we promise! — and all respondents will receive a free MIT SMR article collection, "Maximizing the Value of Generative AI." Me, Myself, and AI is a podcast produced by MIT Sloan Management Review and hosted by Sam Ransbotham. It is engineered by David Lishansky and produced by Allison Ryder. We encourage you to rate and review our show. Your comments may be used in Me, Myself, and AI materials. ME, MYSELF, AND AI® is a federally registered trademark of Massachusetts Institute of Technology. All rights reserved.
What does “smart money” actually mean in beverage — especially in one of the most capital-intensive categories in CPG?In this sponsored episode, we sit down with Karen Xiang, Investment Lead at Btomorrow Ventures, the corporate venture arm backed by British American Tobacco. And we go deep into how corporate venture capital is evolving — and what it really means for founders building functional and full-size beverage brands today.Btomorrow Ventures (BTV) is not a traditional VC fund. With a £150M first fund and a newly launched £200M second fund, BTV is investing across “better brands” and “better habits” — with a particular focus in the U.S. on full-size functional beverages and functional snacks. But capital is only part of the story.Karen explains how BTV's new in-house growth platform is designed to unlock operating leverage — connecting portfolio brands to distribution pilots, commercialization support, data analytics, and internal expertise inside a global FMCG infrastructure.For founders, this episode is an insightful discussion about:• What corporate venture capital (CVC) actually is — and how it differs from traditional VC• What to ask before taking strategic capital• Why beverage remains a difficult category for many VCs — and what that means for your cap table• How to think about partnering with strategics without becoming “the last fry on the truck”Karen also offers a thoughtful framework for avoiding trend-chasing in drinks. In a world of protein pivots and format fads, she argues that fundamentals — consumer clarity, occasion ownership, distribution sequencing — still win over time.For investors, we explore how BTV thinks about co-investing rather than competing — and why having a strategic partner on the cap table can accelerate growth across the entire syndicate.If you're a founder navigating functional beverage, a co-investor evaluating corporate capital, or an operator thinking about long-term category shifts, this episode offers a rare inside look at how one of the industry's more nuanced CVC models is building in the U.S.As always, we focus on the mechanics of growth — not just the headline numbers, but how brands actually scale.Listen in for a grounded, strategic conversation about capital, distribution, and the future of value-add investing in drinks.For the latest updates, follow us:Business of Drinks:Business of Drinks website (sign up for our newsletter!)Business of Drinks YouTubeBusiness of Drinks LinkedInInstagram @bizofdrinksErica Duecy, co-host: Erica Duecy is founder and co-host of Business of Drinks and one of the drinks industry's most accomplished digital and content strategists. She runs the consultancy and advisory arm of Business of Drinks and has built publishing and marketing programs for Drizly, VinePair, SevenFifty, and other hospitality and drinks tech companies.Erica Duecy LinkedInInstagram @ericaduecyScott Rosenbaum, co-host: Scott Rosenbaum is co-host of Business of Drinks and a veteran strategist and analyst with deep experience building drinks portfolios. Most recently, he was the Portfolio Development Director at Distill Ventures. Prior to that, he was the Vice President of T. Edward Wines & Spirits, a New York-based importer and distributor.Scott Rosenbaum LinkedInCaroline Lamb, contributor: Caroline is a producer and on-air contributor at Business of Drinks and a key account sales and marketing specialist at AHD Vintners, a Michigan-based importer and distributor.Caroline Lamb LinkedInInstagram @borkalineIf you enjoyed today's conversation, follow Business of Drinks wherever you're listening, and don't forget to rate and review us. Your support helps us reach new listeners passionate about the drinks industry. Thank you!
On this episode of LID Radio Podcast, we're joined by Catherine Xiang, author of Harmony in Differences: An Introduction to Politeness in Intercultural Communication with China.About Catherine XiangDr Catherine Xiang is an applied linguist and established author, and Head of East Asian Languages at LSE. She is also Programme Director for LSE's BSc International Relations and Chinese, and UK Director of the LSE Confucius Institute for Business London.About Harmony in DifferencesHarmony in Differences explores the role of politeness in intercultural communication with China, offering practical insight into navigating relationships, communication styles, and cultural expectations in international business contexts.
A convincing 3-0 semifinal victory over Vietnam on Tuesday has secured China's youth squad its first ever final berth at the U23 Asian Cup, while sending the country's long-suffering soccer fans into frenzy on a night to remember.周二，中国青年队在U23亚洲杯半决赛中以3-0的比分力克越南队，不仅首次闯入该赛事决赛，更让苦等多年的中国球迷在这一难忘之夜陷入狂欢。Facing a surging Vietnamese side, which had cruised into the semifinals with four straight wins, the Chinese under-23 squad kicked off its first-ever match at the final-four stage of the biennial tournament with pragmatic tactics, keeping its Southeast Asian opponent at bay with solid defense in the first half at the Prince Abdullah Al Faisal Sports City Stadium in Jeddah, Saudi Arabia.面对势头正盛的越南队，中国队以四连胜之势晋级半决赛。中国U23队在沙特阿拉伯吉达市阿卜杜拉·阿尔·费萨尔王子体育场迎来了本届两年一度赛事的首次四强对决。开场后中国队采取务实战术，凭借稳固的防守在上半场成功遏制了东南亚对手的攻势。Guided by Spanish coach Antonio Puche, Team China went into overdrive in the second half, throwing a swift one-two punch from centerback Peng Xiao's 47th-minute header and striker Xiang Yuwang's low shot in the box five minutes later to dictate the play.在西班牙教练安东尼奥·普切的执教下，中国队下半场火力全开，凭借中后卫彭啸第47分钟的头槌破门和前锋向余望五分钟后禁区内的低射连下两城，彻底掌控了比赛节奏。Star forward Wang Yudong's final dagger, scored in the eighth minute of stoppage time, sealed Team China's well-deserved win over Vietnam while booking an ultimate challenge against continental power Japan in its first-ever final appearance at the U23 Asian Cup.中国队前锋王钰栋在补时阶段第八分钟打入制胜一球，锁定胜局，助中国队在U23亚洲杯决赛中战胜越南队，首次闯入决赛便将迎战亚洲劲旅日本队。The Chinese squad had never advanced into the knockout stage at the previous five editions of the U23 tournament from 2014-24.在2014至2024年间的五届U23亚洲杯赛事中，中国队从未晋级淘汰赛阶段。In an earlier semifinal match, Japan outplayed its East Asian archrival South Korea 1-0 to advance into Saturday's final first.在稍早进行的半决赛中，日本队以1-0取胜东亚宿敌韩国队，率先晋级周六的决赛。With the team's confidence boosted by the history-making run, Chinese players are determined to give it all and try to win it all in its final showdown against Japan.凭借这段创造历史的征程，中国男足队员信心倍增，决心在与日本队的最终对决中全力以赴，力争夺冠。"We are really excited and proud. It's like a wild dream come true," the 22-year-old Xiang, who scored China's second goal, said after the match.打入中国队第二粒进球的22岁球员向余望赛后说道：“我们非常激动和自豪，这简直像一场疯狂的梦成真了。”"Now we are heading into the final without any pressure on our side. We will just stay relaxed and play the best game we can to try to win the championship.向余望赛后说道：“如今我们以零压力的姿态挺进决赛，只需保持从容，全力以赴打好比赛，争取夺冠。”"I really appreciate the loud-cheering Chinese fans on the stand tonight and those who've been supporting us unconditionally at home. It's their unwavering support that made us play with a strong motivation."“今晚看台上热情高涨的中国球迷，以及在家乡无条件支持我们的球迷，我由衷感谢。正是这份坚定支持，赋予我们强大的动力。”The last time a Chinese men's soccer team fought into a final at the continental level was 22 years ago when the senior squad reached the 2004 Asian Cup final at the famed Worker's Stadium in Beijing, where it lost 1-3 to Japan.中国男足上一次闯入洲际赛事决赛还要追溯到22年前——2004年亚洲杯决赛，当时国家队在北京著名的工人体育场以1-3不敌日本队。The long-awaited return to the pinnacle stage at an Asian tournament has provided Chinese fans with a much-needed comfort, seven months after the senior national team missed out on FIFA World Cup qualification for a frustrating sixth straight time in June.时隔七年再度站上亚洲顶级赛事的巅峰舞台，为中国球迷带来了久违的慰藉。七个月前，国家队在六月举行的世界杯预选赛中第六次遗憾出局，令人沮丧。biennial tournament/baɪˈeniəl ˈtʊrnəmənt/两年一度的赛事knockout stage/ˈnɒkaʊt steɪdʒ/淘汰赛阶段final dagger/ˈfaɪnl ˈdæɡə/制胜一球Pinnacle/ˈpɪnəkl/n.顶点、顶峰
'I think that flow is quite important. It's almost like a cultural logic.' Intercultural communication is always complex, but for Western leaders seeking to build relationships as a way in to the mighty Chinese market, it's particularly tricky. From seating plans to changing job titles to how to ask for a solution to a problem, there are very different assumptions and unspoken rules. Which is why Catherine Xiang, UK Director for LSE's Confucius Institute for Business, wrote Bridging the Gap: An introduction to intercultural communication with China, named Specialist Business Book of the Year. It's tricky enough when everyone is speaking English, but if you're learning Mandarin, it gets even trickier: get the stress on a word wrong and you could easily proposition someone by mistake! For writers with an eye to the global market, there's a deeper significance too: not only language and metaphor but even the way the book opens or an argument is structured can embody a particular cultural bias. Practical strategies and a thoughtful perspective on how to build genuine, effective cross-cultural relationships, at the meeting table and on the page.
A provocative defense of a forgotten Chinese approach to identity and difference. Historically, the Western encounter with difference has been catastrophic: the extermination and displacement of aboriginal populations, the transatlantic slave trade, and colonialism. China, however, took a different historical path. In Chinese Cosmopolitanism: The History and Philosophy of an Idea (Princeton UP, 2023), Shuchen Xiang argues that the Chinese cultural tradition was, from its formative beginnings and throughout its imperial history, a cosmopolitan melting pot that synthesized the different cultures that came into its orbit. Unlike the West, which cast its collisions with different cultures in Manichean terms of the ontologically irreconcilable difference between civilization and barbarism, China was a dynamic identity created out of difference. The reasons for this, Xiang argues, are philosophical: Chinese philosophy has the conceptual resources for providing alternative ways to understand pluralism. Xiang explains that "Chinese" identity is not what the West understands as a racial identity; it is not a group of people related by common descent or heredity but rather a hybrid of coalescing cultures. To use the Western discourse of race to frame the Chinese view of non-Chinese, she argues, is a category error. Xiang shows that China was both internally cosmopolitan, embracing distinct peoples into a common identity, and externally cosmopolitan, having knowledge of faraway lands without an ideological need to subjugate them. Contrasting the Chinese understanding of efficacy--described as "harmony"--with the Western understanding of order, she argues that the Chinese sought to gain influence over others by having them spontaneously accept the virtue of one's position. These ideas from Chinese philosophy, she contends, offer a new way to understand today's multipolar world and can make a valuable contribution to contemporary discussions in the critical philosophy of race. For readers interested in how GCB and the Greek philosophical justification of GCB, domination, and destruction of barbarians still inform productions and consumptions of racist ideology as embodied in The Turner Diaries, see for example, here, here, and here. Readers interested in the Vāda project that employs Indian epistemology to evaluate contemporary political claims, see here. Jessica Zu is an intellectual historian and a scholar of Buddhist studies. She is an assistant professor of religion at the University of Southern California. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/intellectual-history
Full article: Persistence of Microvascular Obstruction From Early to Late Gadolinium Enhancement Images on Cardiac MRI: Prognostic Utility After STEMI—Analysis of EARLY-MYO-CMR Registry Data What is the role of early gadolinium enhancement images after STEMI? Radhika Rajeev, MD, discusses the AJR article by Xiang et al. evaluating the prognostic impact of persistence of microvascular obstruction between early and late gadolinium enhancement on cardiac MRI.
A provocative defense of a forgotten Chinese approach to identity and difference. Historically, the Western encounter with difference has been catastrophic: the extermination and displacement of aboriginal populations, the transatlantic slave trade, and colonialism. China, however, took a different historical path. In Chinese Cosmopolitanism: The History and Philosophy of an Idea (Princeton UP, 2023), Shuchen Xiang argues that the Chinese cultural tradition was, from its formative beginnings and throughout its imperial history, a cosmopolitan melting pot that synthesized the different cultures that came into its orbit. Unlike the West, which cast its collisions with different cultures in Manichean terms of the ontologically irreconcilable difference between civilization and barbarism, China was a dynamic identity created out of difference. The reasons for this, Xiang argues, are philosophical: Chinese philosophy has the conceptual resources for providing alternative ways to understand pluralism. Xiang explains that "Chinese" identity is not what the West understands as a racial identity; it is not a group of people related by common descent or heredity but rather a hybrid of coalescing cultures. To use the Western discourse of race to frame the Chinese view of non-Chinese, she argues, is a category error. Xiang shows that China was both internally cosmopolitan, embracing distinct peoples into a common identity, and externally cosmopolitan, having knowledge of faraway lands without an ideological need to subjugate them. Contrasting the Chinese understanding of efficacy--described as "harmony"--with the Western understanding of order, she argues that the Chinese sought to gain influence over others by having them spontaneously accept the virtue of one's position. These ideas from Chinese philosophy, she contends, offer a new way to understand today's multipolar world and can make a valuable contribution to contemporary discussions in the critical philosophy of race. For readers interested in how GCB and the Greek philosophical justification of GCB, domination, and destruction of barbarians still inform productions and consumptions of racist ideology as embodied in The Turner Diaries, see for example, here, here, and here. Readers interested in the Vāda project that employs Indian epistemology to evaluate contemporary political claims, see here. Jessica Zu is an intellectual historian and a scholar of Buddhist studies. She is an assistant professor of religion at the University of Southern California. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
A provocative defense of a forgotten Chinese approach to identity and difference. Historically, the Western encounter with difference has been catastrophic: the extermination and displacement of aboriginal populations, the transatlantic slave trade, and colonialism. China, however, took a different historical path. In Chinese Cosmopolitanism: The History and Philosophy of an Idea (Princeton UP, 2023), Shuchen Xiang argues that the Chinese cultural tradition was, from its formative beginnings and throughout its imperial history, a cosmopolitan melting pot that synthesized the different cultures that came into its orbit. Unlike the West, which cast its collisions with different cultures in Manichean terms of the ontologically irreconcilable difference between civilization and barbarism, China was a dynamic identity created out of difference. The reasons for this, Xiang argues, are philosophical: Chinese philosophy has the conceptual resources for providing alternative ways to understand pluralism. Xiang explains that "Chinese" identity is not what the West understands as a racial identity; it is not a group of people related by common descent or heredity but rather a hybrid of coalescing cultures. To use the Western discourse of race to frame the Chinese view of non-Chinese, she argues, is a category error. Xiang shows that China was both internally cosmopolitan, embracing distinct peoples into a common identity, and externally cosmopolitan, having knowledge of faraway lands without an ideological need to subjugate them. Contrasting the Chinese understanding of efficacy--described as "harmony"--with the Western understanding of order, she argues that the Chinese sought to gain influence over others by having them spontaneously accept the virtue of one's position. These ideas from Chinese philosophy, she contends, offer a new way to understand today's multipolar world and can make a valuable contribution to contemporary discussions in the critical philosophy of race. For readers interested in how GCB and the Greek philosophical justification of GCB, domination, and destruction of barbarians still inform productions and consumptions of racist ideology as embodied in The Turner Diaries, see for example, here, here, and here. Readers interested in the Vāda project that employs Indian epistemology to evaluate contemporary political claims, see here. Jessica Zu is an intellectual historian and a scholar of Buddhist studies. She is an assistant professor of religion at the University of Southern California. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies
A provocative defense of a forgotten Chinese approach to identity and difference. Historically, the Western encounter with difference has been catastrophic: the extermination and displacement of aboriginal populations, the transatlantic slave trade, and colonialism. China, however, took a different historical path. In Chinese Cosmopolitanism: The History and Philosophy of an Idea (Princeton UP, 2023), Shuchen Xiang argues that the Chinese cultural tradition was, from its formative beginnings and throughout its imperial history, a cosmopolitan melting pot that synthesized the different cultures that came into its orbit. Unlike the West, which cast its collisions with different cultures in Manichean terms of the ontologically irreconcilable difference between civilization and barbarism, China was a dynamic identity created out of difference. The reasons for this, Xiang argues, are philosophical: Chinese philosophy has the conceptual resources for providing alternative ways to understand pluralism. Xiang explains that "Chinese" identity is not what the West understands as a racial identity; it is not a group of people related by common descent or heredity but rather a hybrid of coalescing cultures. To use the Western discourse of race to frame the Chinese view of non-Chinese, she argues, is a category error. Xiang shows that China was both internally cosmopolitan, embracing distinct peoples into a common identity, and externally cosmopolitan, having knowledge of faraway lands without an ideological need to subjugate them. Contrasting the Chinese understanding of efficacy--described as "harmony"--with the Western understanding of order, she argues that the Chinese sought to gain influence over others by having them spontaneously accept the virtue of one's position. These ideas from Chinese philosophy, she contends, offer a new way to understand today's multipolar world and can make a valuable contribution to contemporary discussions in the critical philosophy of race. For readers interested in how GCB and the Greek philosophical justification of GCB, domination, and destruction of barbarians still inform productions and consumptions of racist ideology as embodied in The Turner Diaries, see for example, here, here, and here. Readers interested in the Vāda project that employs Indian epistemology to evaluate contemporary political claims, see here. Jessica Zu is an intellectual historian and a scholar of Buddhist studies. She is an assistant professor of religion at the University of Southern California. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/chinese-studies
A provocative defense of a forgotten Chinese approach to identity and difference. Historically, the Western encounter with difference has been catastrophic: the extermination and displacement of aboriginal populations, the transatlantic slave trade, and colonialism. China, however, took a different historical path. In Chinese Cosmopolitanism: The History and Philosophy of an Idea (Princeton UP, 2023), Shuchen Xiang argues that the Chinese cultural tradition was, from its formative beginnings and throughout its imperial history, a cosmopolitan melting pot that synthesized the different cultures that came into its orbit. Unlike the West, which cast its collisions with different cultures in Manichean terms of the ontologically irreconcilable difference between civilization and barbarism, China was a dynamic identity created out of difference. The reasons for this, Xiang argues, are philosophical: Chinese philosophy has the conceptual resources for providing alternative ways to understand pluralism. Xiang explains that "Chinese" identity is not what the West understands as a racial identity; it is not a group of people related by common descent or heredity but rather a hybrid of coalescing cultures. To use the Western discourse of race to frame the Chinese view of non-Chinese, she argues, is a category error. Xiang shows that China was both internally cosmopolitan, embracing distinct peoples into a common identity, and externally cosmopolitan, having knowledge of faraway lands without an ideological need to subjugate them. Contrasting the Chinese understanding of efficacy--described as "harmony"--with the Western understanding of order, she argues that the Chinese sought to gain influence over others by having them spontaneously accept the virtue of one's position. These ideas from Chinese philosophy, she contends, offer a new way to understand today's multipolar world and can make a valuable contribution to contemporary discussions in the critical philosophy of race. For readers interested in how GCB and the Greek philosophical justification of GCB, domination, and destruction of barbarians still inform productions and consumptions of racist ideology as embodied in The Turner Diaries, see for example, here, here, and here. Readers interested in the Vāda project that employs Indian epistemology to evaluate contemporary political claims, see here. Jessica Zu is an intellectual historian and a scholar of Buddhist studies. She is an assistant professor of religion at the University of Southern California.
Fluent Fiction - Mandarin Chinese: Ice Capades: A Comedic Spin on New Year's Surprises Find the full episode transcript, vocabulary words, and more:fluentfiction.com/zh/episode/2026-01-01-23-34-02-zh Story Transcript:Zh: 在一个寒冷的冬季，新年的灯笼在冰场周围点亮。En: In a cold winter season, the New Year's denglong were lit around the ice rink.Zh: 欢快的音乐在空中飘荡，冰面上的光芒映照在大家的笑脸上。En: Cheerful music floated through the air, and the light on the ice reflected on everyone's smiling faces.Zh: Xiang和Lian站在角落里，心里充满了期待和一丝紧张。En: Xiang and Lian stood in the corner, their hearts filled with anticipation and a touch of nervousness.Zh: “这个才艺表演我们能行吗？”Lian调皮地问道，眼神中带着鼓励与期待。En: "Do you think we can manage this talent show?" Lian playfully asked, his eyes full of encouragement and expectation.Zh: 事情是这样的：几天前，Xiang偶然看见了冰场上贴着的一张新年冰舞才艺表演的海报。En: Here's what happened: a few days ago, Xiang accidentally saw a poster for the New Year's ice dance talent show on the ice rink.Zh: 他心中隐隐有个愿望，他想在好友面前展示自己与众不同的一面，也希望能从中获得自信。En: He had a vague desire in his heart to show a different side of himself in front of his friends and hoped to gain some confidence from it.Zh: 然而，他并没有意识到这个表演是需要报名参加的。En: However, he didn't realize that signing up was required for this performance.Zh: 于是，当天晚上，他无意间对着Lian说：“要不我们去看看？”话音刚落，工作人员误将他们的对话当成了报名。En: So, that evening, he casually told Lian, "Why don't we go take a look?" As soon as he finished speaking, the staff mistakenly took their conversation as registration.Zh: “哇，看啊，我们被报名了！”Lian大笑起来，似乎对这突如其来的惊喜感到无比兴奋。En: "Wow, look, we've been signed up!" Lian laughed, seemingly extremely excited about the unexpected surprise.Zh: 现在，他们站在门口，Xiang一方面后悔自己当初的粗心，另一方面又觉得也许这是一个展示的机会。En: Now, standing at the entrance, Xiang felt regretful about his carelessness on one hand but also thought it might be an opportunity to showcase himself.Zh: 他想了想，深吸一口气，说：“我们就试试吧，反正也没有什么损失。”En: After a moment's thought, he took a deep breath and said, "Let's give it a try; we have nothing to lose anyway."Zh: 比赛一开始，选手们一个接一个上场，场面既紧张又欢乐。En: When the competition started, the participants took turns stepping onto the rink, the atmosphere both tense and joyful.Zh: 终于轮到Xiang和Lian，En: Finally, it was Xiang and Lian's turn.Zh: 两人互相加油后，忐忑地滑上了冰场。En: After cheering each other on, they anxiously glided onto the ice.Zh: 在耀眼的灯光下，他们相拥滑行，En: Under the dazzling lights, they skated together.Zh: 步调不如预期的那般整齐，却意外地成为一段滑稽的表演。En: Their movements weren't as synchronized as they had hoped, yet unexpectedly, it turned into a comedic performance.Zh: 他们试着跳跃，不成想却双双摔倒，又在冰上滑行一段后，奇迹般地转了个圈圈，不约而同地摆出搞怪的姿势。En: They tried to jump, only to both fall, and after sliding a bit on the ice, they miraculously spun in a circle and spontaneously struck funny poses.Zh: 观众们被逗得哈哈大笑，纷纷为他们喝彩。En: The audience burst into laughter and cheered for them.Zh: 比赛结束时，评委宣布：“最具喜剧效果奖——Xiang和Lian！”En: At the end of the competition, the judges announced, "The Most Comedic Effect Award—Xiang and Lian!"Zh: 人群中爆发出热烈的掌声。En: The crowd erupted into enthusiastic applause.Zh: Xiang笑了，他心中的那份不安随着掌声一同消失。En: Xiang smiled, and his nervousness faded away with the applause.Zh: 他终于明白，尝试新事物并不一定要恐惧失败，有时候，接受挑战本身就是一种胜利。En: He finally understood that trying new things doesn't necessarily mean fearing failure; sometimes, embracing the challenge itself is a victory.Zh: “我们做到了。”Lian拍着Xiang的肩，笑着说道。En: "We did it," Lian said, patting Xiang on the shoulder and smiling.Zh: 在新年的这个特别时刻，Xiang学会了拥抱未知，也收获了与Lian的珍贵回忆。En: During this special moment of the New Year, Xiang learned to embrace the unknown and gained precious memories with Lian.Zh: 冰场上的新年灯笼，仿佛化作跳动的星星，笑意盈盈地陪伴着这对老友，共同开启新年的美好篇章。En: The New Year's denglong on the ice rink seemed to transform into twinkling stars, joyfully accompanying the old friends as they embarked on a beautiful new chapter of the year. Vocabulary Words:anticipation: 期待nervousness: 紧张talent: 才艺vague: 隐隐realize: 意识到registration: 报名regretful: 后悔carelessness: 粗心opportunity: 机会showcase: 展示synchronized: 整齐comedic: 滑稽pose: 姿势cheer: 喝彩enthusiastic: 热烈applause: 掌声embrace: 拥抱unknown: 未知precious: 珍贵chapter: 篇章lit: 点亮casually: 无意间spontaneously: 不约而同地judges: 评委smiling faces: 笑脸touch: 一丝accidentally: 偶然unexpected: 突如其来cheered: 加油transform: 化作
Will They Be Eaten? by Xiang by 826 Valencia
Fluent Fiction - Mandarin Chinese: A Serendipitous Encounter at Beijing Airport: Courage & Hope Find the full episode transcript, vocabulary words, and more:fluentfiction.com/zh/episode/2025-10-28-22-34-02-zh Story Transcript:Zh: 北京首都国际机场的大厅里，充满了行人的喧闹声。En: The hall of Beijing Capital International Airport was filled with the noise of travelers.Zh: 人们来来往往，欢声笑语的气氛中夹杂着月饼的香甜味。En: People came and went, and amidst the atmosphere of laughter and joy was the sweet aroma of mooncakes.Zh: 这是中秋节的前夕，机场的装饰上挂满了象征团圆的灯笼和剪纸。En: It was the eve of the Mid-Autumn Festival, and the airport was decorated with lanterns and paper cuttings symbolizing reunion.Zh: 美丽是一位忙碌的商业女性，此时的她正急匆匆地拉着行李箱，穿梭在人群之中。En: Meili was a busy businesswoman, and at this moment she was hurriedly pulling her suitcase, weaving through the crowd.Zh: 她要飞往国外完成一笔重要的商业交易，这是她事业的一次大好机会。En: She needed to fly abroad to complete an important business deal, which was a great opportunity for her career.Zh: 然而，尽管她看似坚强自信，心中却不断滋生着对飞行的恐惧。En: However, despite appearing strong and confident, her heart was growing increasingly fearful of flying.Zh: 越接近登机口，她的心跳得越快。En: The closer she got to the boarding gate, the faster her heart beat.Zh: 在另一个角落，向是一名认真负责的空乘人员。En: In another corner, Xiang was a diligent and responsible flight attendant.Zh: 他正忙于检查乘客的登机手续。En: He was busy checking the boarding passes of passengers.Zh: 向心中有些许不安，他答应家人中秋节回去，但如今只能尽力维持机场的秩序。En: Xiang felt a bit uneasy; he had promised his family he would come back for the Mid-Autumn Festival, but now he could only try to maintain airport order.Zh: 他多么希望能与家人一起赏月吃月饼。En: How he wished he could watch the moon and eat mooncakes with his family.Zh: 登机快要开始，美丽在排队时感到一阵晕眩，呼吸也越来越急促。En: As boarding was about to begin, Meili felt dizzy while waiting in line, with her breathing becoming more and more rapid.Zh: 她的恐惧终于爆发——一场严重的恐慌袭来。En: Her fear finally erupted—a serious panic attack hit her.Zh: 她不得不靠在墙上，感觉整个人要瘫倒。En: She had to lean against the wall, feeling as if she might collapse.Zh: 正在忙碌的向无意中看见了美丽，于是他走上前询问：“女士，您还好吗？需要帮助吗？”En: Busy with his tasks, Xiang happened to notice Meili, so he approached and asked, “Ma'am, are you okay? Do you need help?”Zh: 美丽无力地摇头，但眼神透出无奈和求助。En: Meili shook her head weakly, but her eyes showed helplessness and a plea for assistance.Zh: 向知道，这样的情况需要冷静处理。En: Xiang knew that such situations required calm handling.Zh: “请跟我做，先慢慢吸气，然后慢慢吐气。”向温柔地指引着美丽做呼吸练习。En: “Please follow me, first breathe in slowly, then exhale slowly,” Xiang gently guided Meili through breathing exercises.Zh: 几分钟后，美丽的心情逐渐平复。En: A few minutes later, Meili began to calm down.Zh: 她努力挤出微笑，“谢谢你，真是麻烦了。”En: She managed a smile, “Thank you, really sorry for the trouble.”Zh: “不客气，这是我的职责，”向说，“祝您一切顺利。”En: “No problem, it's my duty,” Xiang replied, “I wish you all the best.”Zh: 事情结束后，美丽感激地看着向，又坚定地转向登机口。En: After the incident, Meili looked gratefully at Xiang, then resolutely turned toward the boarding gate.Zh: 她知道，自己必须克服恐惧，勇敢面对未来的挑战。En: She knew she must overcome her fear and bravely face future challenges.Zh: 坐在机舱座位上，美丽感受到了抵达目标的希望。En: Sitting in her seat on the plane, Meili felt the hope of reaching her goal.Zh: 而此时的向，终于收到家人传来的视频电话。En: Meanwhile, Xiang finally received a video call from his family.Zh: 他们的脸在屏幕上笑得那么温暖。En: Their faces smiling warmly on the screen.Zh: “我们等你回来呢！”母亲在电话里轻轻地说。En: “We're waiting for you to come back!” his mother said gently over the call.Zh: 挂断电话后，向的内心感到无比踏实。En: After hanging up, Xiang felt an incomparable sense of peace within.Zh: 这天，他不仅帮助了美丽，也更加明白了自己的选择，是值得的。En: That day, he not only helped Meili, but also understood even more that his choice was worthwhile.Zh: 北京的秋风依旧凉爽，但夹杂着那份温暖和爱，En: The autumn wind in Beijing remained cool, but carried with it warmth and love.Zh: 这个中秋夜，为每个人带来了希望和勇气。En: This Mid-Autumn night brought hope and courage to everyone. Vocabulary Words:atmosphere: 气氛aroma: 香甜味reunion: 团圆weaving: 穿梭abroad: 国外confident: 自信diligent: 认真maintain: 维持uneasy: 不安anxiety: 恐慌collapse: 瘫倒guide: 指引calm: 平复resolutely: 坚定incident: 事情incomparable: 无比courage: 勇气challenge: 挑战transaction: 交易responsible: 负责boarding pass: 登机手续breathing exercises: 呼吸练习help: 帮助persistence: 坚强fearful: 恐惧opportunity: 机会smile: 微笑gratitude: 感激encounter: 遇见autumn: 秋
This week the nerds talk about their experience at Yu Xiang Yuan Restaurant and then talk about everything that was announced at PlayStation's State of Play and other announcements that have happened recently. Follow us on Instagram, Facebook, and TikTok: @nerdget1
Today I had the pleasure of talking to Professor Xiang Biao on his new book, Self as Method: Thinking Through China and the World, which was originally written and published in Chinese. The English translation has just come out with Palgrave Macmillan. Self as Method provides a manifesto of intellectual activism that counsels China's young people to think by themselves and for themselves. Consisting of three conversations between Xiang Biao, a social anthropologist, and Wu Qi, a rising journalist, the book probes how China has reached its current stage and how young people can make changes. The Chinese version, 把自己作为方法, was named the “most impactful book of 2021” by Dou4ban4, China's premier website for rating books, films, and music. The English version, which is entirely Open Access and downloadable for free, was translated by David Ownby. The book reached 157,000 downloads in just over a couple of months. Dr. Suvi Rautio is an anthropologist of China. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
Today I had the pleasure of talking to Professor Xiang Biao on his new book, Self as Method: Thinking Through China and the World, which was originally written and published in Chinese. The English translation has just come out with Palgrave Macmillan. Self as Method provides a manifesto of intellectual activism that counsels China's young people to think by themselves and for themselves. Consisting of three conversations between Xiang Biao, a social anthropologist, and Wu Qi, a rising journalist, the book probes how China has reached its current stage and how young people can make changes. The Chinese version, 把自己作为方法, was named the “most impactful book of 2021” by Dou4ban4, China's premier website for rating books, films, and music. The English version, which is entirely Open Access and downloadable for free, was translated by David Ownby. The book reached 157,000 downloads in just over a couple of months. Dr. Suvi Rautio is an anthropologist of China. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/east-asian-studies
Today I had the pleasure of talking to Professor Xiang Biao on his new book, Self as Method: Thinking Through China and the World, which was originally written and published in Chinese. The English translation has just come out with Palgrave Macmillan. Self as Method provides a manifesto of intellectual activism that counsels China's young people to think by themselves and for themselves. Consisting of three conversations between Xiang Biao, a social anthropologist, and Wu Qi, a rising journalist, the book probes how China has reached its current stage and how young people can make changes. The Chinese version, 把自己作为方法, was named the “most impactful book of 2021” by Dou4ban4, China's premier website for rating books, films, and music. The English version, which is entirely Open Access and downloadable for free, was translated by David Ownby. The book reached 157,000 downloads in just over a couple of months. Dr. Suvi Rautio is an anthropologist of China. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/anthropology
Today I had the pleasure of talking to Professor Xiang Biao on his new book, Self as Method: Thinking Through China and the World, which was originally written and published in Chinese. The English translation has just come out with Palgrave Macmillan. Self as Method provides a manifesto of intellectual activism that counsels China's young people to think by themselves and for themselves. Consisting of three conversations between Xiang Biao, a social anthropologist, and Wu Qi, a rising journalist, the book probes how China has reached its current stage and how young people can make changes. The Chinese version, 把自己作为方法, was named the “most impactful book of 2021” by Dou4ban4, China's premier website for rating books, films, and music. The English version, which is entirely Open Access and downloadable for free, was translated by David Ownby. The book reached 157,000 downloads in just over a couple of months. Dr. Suvi Rautio is an anthropologist of China. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/sociology
Today I had the pleasure of talking to Professor Xiang Biao on his new book, Self as Method: Thinking Through China and the World, which was originally written and published in Chinese. The English translation has just come out with Palgrave Macmillan. Self as Method provides a manifesto of intellectual activism that counsels China's young people to think by themselves and for themselves. Consisting of three conversations between Xiang Biao, a social anthropologist, and Wu Qi, a rising journalist, the book probes how China has reached its current stage and how young people can make changes. The Chinese version, 把自己作为方法, was named the “most impactful book of 2021” by Dou4ban4, China's premier website for rating books, films, and music. The English version, which is entirely Open Access and downloadable for free, was translated by David Ownby. The book reached 157,000 downloads in just over a couple of months. Dr. Suvi Rautio is an anthropologist of China. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/economics
In this episode of the AI in Business podcast, host and Emerj Editorial Director Matthew DeMello speaks with Yunke Xiang, Global Head of Data Science for Manufacturing, Supply Chain, and Quality at Sanofi. Together, they examine how generative AI and reasoning models are evolving from simple automation to high-impact copilots across pharmaceutical operations. Yunke shares examples of how AI is enabling “talk to your data” use cases, automating regulatory reporting, and accelerating knowledge transfer for new employees. He also highlights how agentic AI systems may soon extend beyond copilots to function as digital teammates, orchestrating tasks across complex supply chains and ERP migrations. Want to share your AI adoption story with executive peers? Click emerj.com/expert2 for more information and to be a potential future guest on the ‘AI in Business' podcast! If you've enjoyed or benefited from some of the insights of this episode, consider leaving us a five-star review on Apple Podcasts, and let us know what you learned, found helpful, or liked most about this show!
In this episode Randel and Owen talk with Kung Fu Coach and Teacher Abi Moriya about training in Taiwan in the 80's, Tang Sho Tao, Acupuncture and Hong Yi Xiang.Form his Web Site: "Martial artist, movement and Chinese medicine. One of the pioneers of Chinese and Filipino martial arts teachers in Israel. In his youth, in 1987, he embarked on a study trip following the documentary series "The Way of the Warrior," which ended with the late teacher Hong Yi-Shiang in Taiwan. My father balances the way of the warrior with the way of the healer: he is an expert in the martial art of Xingyi Chuan, various Chinese weapons, as well as the Filipino martial art of Serada Eskrima. In the field of health care, my father teaches Qigong and Tai Chi and trains instructors. He practices Chinese medicine with an emphasis on acupuncture, moxibustion and tui-na, as well as shiatsu. Head of the Martial Arts Department at the Nat Holman School for Instructors and Trainers, Wingate Institute. Author of the book "Bright Tiger, Dark Dragon: Chinese Martial Arts in the Mirror of Culture", Madaf 2017.Co-author with Guy Moore of the book "Krav Maga - Teaching with Doubt", self-published, 2016"YouTubeInstagramWebsite#kungfu #taiwan #coaching #podcast #gongfu #hongyixiang #tangshotao #MartialArts #wushu #kungfuconversations #china #abimoriya
Nvidia founder and CEO Jensen Huang expressed resounding confidence in China's technological development during a wide-ranging interview with China Daily in Beijing on Wednesday, highlighting the nation's distinctive advantages in artificial intelligence, advanced manufacturing and electric vehicle innovation. 周三，英伟达创始人兼首席执行官黄仁勋在北京接受《中国日报》的广泛采访时，对中国的科技发展表达了坚定信心，强调了中国在人工智能、高端制造和电动汽车创新领域的独特优势。Huang emphasized China's "unique strengths" driving technological advancement — world-class AI capabilities demonstrated by breakthroughs like DeepSeek's open-source reasoning model; exceptional expertise in mechatronics and electromechanical systems; and a massive manufacturing ecosystem enabling rapid robotics deployment. 黄仁勋强调，中国拥有推动技术进步的 “独特优势”：深度求索（DeepSeek）的开源推理模型等突破展现出世界级的人工智能能力；在机电一体化和机电系统方面拥有卓越专长；以及庞大的制造生态系统，能够实现机器人的快速部署。 These conditions are uniquely concentrated in China, making me incredibly optimistic about its robotics development trajectory. Nvidia has been coming to China for 30 years and China is the second-largest technology market in the world and it is also growing very quickly. So this is a very important market there's a lot of very dynamic and innovative customers. In China, we have very challenging, dynamic and very innovative customers and we want to be able to serve them and I will continue to do that," Huang said. 黄仁勋表示：“这些条件在中国独特地集中在一起，让我对中国机器人产业的发展轨迹感到无比乐观。英伟达进入中国已有 30 年，中国是全球第二大科技市场，且增长非常迅速。因此，这是一个极为重要的市场，有许多充满活力和创新精神的客户。在中国，我们面对的是极具挑战性、充满活力且极具创新力的客户，我们希望能够为他们提供服务，并将继续这样做。” The comments came as the senior executive paid his third visit to China this year, highlighting the importance of the Chinese market to Nvidia, which has become the first company in the world with a market cap of $4 trillion. Huang also attended the opening ceremony of the third China International Supply Chain Expo on Wednesday. 这番言论发表之际，这位高管正进行今年第三次中国之行，凸显了中国市场对英伟达的重要性 —— 英伟达已成为全球首家市值达 4 万亿美元的公司。黄仁勋周三还出席了第三届中国国际供应链博览会的开幕式。 "The electric vehicles in China are probably, in the last five years, the most surprising to the world in terms of the advancement. On purely technical styling, you know, objective basis, the cars are absolutely great," Huang said. 黄仁勋说：“过去五年，中国的电动汽车在技术进步方面可能是最令世界惊讶的。纯粹从技术设计来看，客观地说，这些汽车非常出色。” In a candid remark referencing the unavailability of Chinese EVs such as Xiaomi's cars in the US market, Huang said "That's our misfortune, not yours." 在谈及小米等中国电动汽车无法进入美国市场时，黄仁勋直言：“这是我们的不幸，而非你们的。” When addressing competition with Huawei in AI chips, Huang recognized the Shenzhen, Guangdong province-based firm as "a formidable technology company" with deep excellence in semiconductors and networking infrastructure. 在谈及与华为在人工智能芯片领域的竞争时，黄仁勋认可这家总部位于广东深圳的公司是 “一家令人敬畏的科技企业”，在半导体和网络基础设施方面拥有深厚的卓越实力。 Analyzing China's broader AI landscape, Huang outlined a three-tier ecosystem driving progress — foundational infrastructure including chips and systems; rapidly evolving AI models such as Alibaba's Qwen and Moonshot's Kimi; and hyper-competitive application development. 在分析中国整体人工智能格局时，黄仁勋概述了推动发展的三层生态系统：包括芯片和系统在内的基础架构；快速发展的人工智能模型（如阿里巴巴的通义千问和 moonshot AI 的 kimi）；以及竞争激烈的应用开发。 On Tuesday, Nvidia said it will resume sales of H20 chips to China, and it also announced a new, fully compliant GPU, or graphics processing unit, for the Chinese market. 周二，英伟达表示将恢复向中国销售 H20 芯片，并宣布为中国市场推出一款全新的、完全合规的图形处理器（GPU）。 Nvidia is filing applications to sell the H20 GPU to China again as the US government has assured the company that licenses will be granted, and that Nvidia hopes to start deliveries soon. 英伟达正提交向中国再次销售 H20 GPU 的申请，美国政府已向该公司保证会授予许可，英伟达希望能尽快开始供货。 Xiang Ligang, director-general of the Zhongguancun Modern Information Consumer Application Industry Technology Alliance, a telecom industry association, said the resumption of H20 chip sales was good news for both Nvidia and Chinese companies that seek to purchase such products. 电信行业协会 —— 中关村现代信息消费应用产业技术联盟理事长项立刚表示，恢复 H20 芯片销售对英伟达和有意购买此类产品的中国企业来说都是好消息。 "This is a win-win result," Xiang said, adding that China is the world's largest semiconductor market that companies ignore at their peril. 项立刚称：“这是一个双赢的结果。” 他还表示，中国是全球最大的半导体市场，企业忽视这一市场将自担风险。 The Chinese mainland consumes more than half of the world's semiconductors, which are then assembled into tech products and reexported or sold in the domestic market, said research firm Daxue Consulting. 调研公司大同学术咨询表示，中国内地消耗了全球一半以上的半导体，这些半导体经组装成科技产品后，或再出口，或在国内市场销售。 savvy /ˈsævi/ 智慧，见识 resounding /rɪˈzaʊndɪŋ/ 坚定的，强烈的 formidable /ˈfɔːmɪdəbl/ 令人敬畏的，难对付的 compliant /kəmˈplaɪənt/ 合规的，符合规定的
The Chill MomBoss - Build a Profitable Business from Home while Raising Kids
Ever thought of growing your income but felt overwhelmed by trading, stocks, or finance? In this episode of The Chill Mom Show, I sit down with Chew Wei Xiang, a professional forex trader, XM webinar instructor, and founder of one of Singapore's fastest-growing trading schools. He didn't just master the charts. He got expelled twice from school. Lost $27,000 at 20 years old. And still built a strategy that now manages $70 million in assets. What you'll learn in this episode: ✅ How Wei Xiang rebuilt from rock bottom ✅ Why women NEED to understand financial literacy ✅ How to make your money work harder, even with just $500 ✅ The two golden rules every beginner trader needs to know ✅ The mindset that separates the wealthy from the average
In this episode Randel and Owen talk with Kung Fu Coach and Teacher Abi Moriya about training in Taiwan in the 80's, Tang Sho Tao, Acupuncture and Hong Yi Xiang.Form his Web Site: "Martial artist, movement and Chinese medicine. One of the pioneers of Chinese and Filipino martial arts teachers in Israel. In his youth, in 1987, he embarked on a study trip following the documentary series "The Way of the Warrior," which ended with the late teacher Hong Yi-Shiang in Taiwan. My father balances the way of the warrior with the way of the healer: he is an expert in the martial art of Xingyi Chuan, various Chinese weapons, as well as the Filipino martial art of Serada Eskrima.In the field of health care, my father teaches Qigong and Tai Chi and trains instructors. He practices Chinese medicine with an emphasis on acupuncture, moxibustion and tui-na, as well as shiatsu.Head of the Martial Arts Department at the Nat Holman School for Instructors and Trainers, Wingate Institute.Author of the book "Bright Tiger, Dark Dragon: Chinese Martial Arts in the Mirror of Culture", Madaf 2017.Co-author with Guy Moore of the book "Krav Maga - Teaching with Doubt", self-published, 2016"YouTubeInstagramWebsite#kungfu #taiwan #coaching #podcast #gongfu #hongyixiang #tangshotao #MartialArts #wushu #kungfuconversations #china #abimoriya
In episode 2, I will be talking with Xiang Hui, a Projector man from Singapore. We cover topics on source, variable, nervous determination, being quad right, Ra's frequency, defined ego's, being all motors, Projector relationships, gatekeeping, feelings cognition vs emo authority, and more... Xiang Hui is a 1/3 emo Projector with the Channels of Synthesis, Community and Emoting. You can find Xiang Hui - https://www.instagram.com/thehdist/ You can find Sam - https://www.samzagar.com/ https://www.instagram.com/samzagar/ https://www.youtube.com/@SamZagarHumanDesign
Today's guest is Yunke Xiang, Global Head of Data Science for Manufacturing, Supply Chain, and Quality at Sanofi. Yunke joins Emerj Editorial Director Matthew DeMello to discuss the challenges that slow AI adoption in life sciences manufacturing, highlighting how fragmented data systems and legacy infrastructure create hurdles for AI initiatives. In this episode, Yunke explains how years of acquisitions and siloed data have made building a cohesive data foundation difficult, impacting AI's potential in manufacturing and supply chain optimization. Yunke shares Sanofi's approach to balancing build versus buy decisions for AI solutions and the critical role leadership plays in fostering an environment where data science can thrive. Yunke also reflects on the evolving landscape of AI in pharma manufacturing and the importance of strong governance and collaboration for successful implementation. Want to share your AI adoption story with executive peers? Click emerj.com/expert2 for more information and to be a potential future guest on the ‘AI in Business' podcast! Learn how brands work with Emerj and other Emerj Media options at emerj.com/ad1.
Our next guest is tenacious and thoughtful. She's a mother of two boys and the Founder/Owner of Volition Tea. A specialty tea company that highlights single origin organic teas primarily from China. She's double downed on the importance of traceability so the consumer can appreciate exactly where and when the tea they're consuming was harvested. She yearned for peace at an early age as she entered boarding school and she's maintained that balance as she navigates entrepreneurship, sustainability, and parenthood these days. Please enjoy my conversation with Annie Xiang. https://www.volitiontea.com/https://www.instagram.com/volitionteaco/
The Psychology of Self-Injury: Exploring Self-Harm & Mental Health
In this episode, Dr. Moye Xin from the School of Economic and Administration at Xi'an University in the Shaanxi Province of central China discusses how nonsuicidal self-injury (NSSI) is viewed in Asia and shares his thoughts about how gender role conflict may affect rates of self-harm among university students, particularly young Chinese men. Connect with Dr. Xin on ResearchGate at www.researchgate.net/profile/Moye-Xin or visit his work on SciProfiles at sciprofiles.com/profile/1469611. Below are a few of his research studies referenced in this episode:Xin, M., Petrovic, J., Yang, C., Zhang L., & Yang, X. (2024). Nonsuicidal self-injury among Chinese university students during the post-COVID-19 era: analysis of sex differences and the impact of gender role conflict. Frontiers in Psychology, 15, 1362762.Xin, M., Zhang, L., Yang, C., Yang, X., and Xiang, M. (2022). Risky or protective? Online social support's impact on nssi amongst Chinese youth experiencing stressful life events. BMC Psychiatry, 22, 782.Yang, X., & Xin, M. (2018). "Boy crisis" or "girl risk"? The gender difference in nonsuicidal self-injurious behavior among middle-school students in China and its relationship to gender role conflict and violent experiences. American Journal of Men's Health, 12(5), 1275–1285.Want to have a bigger role on the podcast?:Should you or someone you know be interviewed on the podcast? We want to know! Please fill out this Google doc form, and we will be in touch with more details if it's a good fit.Want to hear your question and have it answered on the podcast? Please send an audio clip of your question (60 seconds or less) to @DocWesters on Instagram or Twitter/X, or email us at thepsychologyofselfinjury@gmail.comWant to be involved in research? Send us a message at thepsychologyofselfinjury@gmail.com and we will see if we can match you to an active study.Want to interact with us through comments and polls? You can on Spotify!Follow Dr. Westers on Instagram and Twitter/X (@DocWesters). To join ISSS, visit itriples.org and follow ISSS on Facebook and Twitter/X (@ITripleS).The Psychology of Self-Injury podcast has been rated as one of the "10 Best Self Harm Podcasts" and "20 Best Clinical Psychology Podcasts" by Feedspot and one of the Top 100 Psychology Podcasts by Goodpods. It has also been featured in Audible's "Best Mental Health Podcasts to Defy Stigma and Begin to Heal."
Fluent Fiction - Mandarin Chinese: From Stage Fright to Standing Ovation: Liang's Bold Performance Find the full episode transcript, vocabulary words, and more:fluentfiction.com/zh/episode/2025-03-28-22-34-02-zh Story Transcript:Zh: 在一个春意盎然的早晨，阳光照在寄宿学校的绿山脚下。En: On a spring morning full of vitality, the sunlight shone on the green foothills of the boarding school.Zh: 校园里，五颜六色的灯笼在微风中摇曳，学生们准备着即将到来的春季演出。En: In the campus, colorful lanterns swayed in the breeze, and the students were preparing for the upcoming spring performance.Zh: 梁，一个有些害羞的男孩，站在学校礼堂的门口，看着里面热热闹闹的排练。En: Liang, a somewhat shy boy, stood at the entrance of the school auditorium, watching the bustling rehearsal inside.Zh: 他一直怕在众人面前说话。En: He had always been afraid of speaking in front of others.Zh: 可是，这次的春季演出对他很重要，因为他想在清明节时，用表演来纪念已经去世的祖父。En: However, this spring performance was very important to him because he wanted to commemorate his deceased grandfather with a performance during Qingming Festival.Zh: “梁，来这里！En: "Liang, come here!"Zh: ”梅，一个活泼开朗的女孩，向梁挥手。En: Mei, a lively and cheerful girl, waved to Liang.Zh: 她是梁最好的朋友，总是支持他。En: She was Liang's best friend and always supported him.Zh: 梁走过去，梅拍拍他的肩膀，“你一定能做到的！En: Liang walked over, and Mei patted him on the shoulder, "You can definitely do it!Zh: 想想你的祖父，他会为你感到骄傲。En: Think of your grandfather, he would be proud of you."Zh: ”这时，梅介绍了一个新朋友，翔。En: At this moment, Mei introduced a new friend, Xiang.Zh: 翔是个表演天才，但他在学校还不能完全融入。En: Xiang was a talented performer, but he hadn't fully integrated into the school yet.Zh: 他向梁微笑并说：“我可以帮你。En: He smiled at Liang and said, "I can help you.Zh: 只要勇敢面对，大家都会为你的勇敢鼓掌。En: As long as you face it bravely, everyone will applaud your courage."Zh: ”于是，梁决定接受翔的帮助。En: So, Liang decided to accept Xiang's help.Zh: 他们在午后的阳光下练习，翔教给他如何放松，如何用微笑面对观众。En: They practiced in the afternoon sunlight, with Xiang teaching him how to relax and how to face the audience with a smile.Zh: 终于，排练的时刻到了。En: Finally, the time for rehearsal came.Zh: 梁走上舞台，手心冒汗，心跳加速。En: Liang walked onto the stage, his palms sweating, and his heart racing.Zh: 他看向台下，梅和翔正给他鼓劲。En: He looked toward the audience, where Mei and Xiang were cheering him on.Zh: 梁深吸一口气，想起祖父的笑脸，感受着他的支持。En: Liang took a deep breath, remembering his grandfather's smiling face and feeling his support.Zh: 然后，梁开始表演。En: Then, Liang began his performance.Zh: 虽然声音有些颤抖，但每一句话都充满了真诚和感情。En: Although his voice trembled a bit, every word was filled with sincerity and emotion.Zh: 台下传来了阵阵掌声，梁看到梅和翔笑着为他鼓掌。En: Bursts of applause came from the audience, and Liang saw Mei and Xiang smiling and clapping for him.Zh: 表演结束时，梁觉得自己从未有过的自信。En: When the performance ended, Liang felt a newfound confidence he had never experienced before.Zh: 他不仅成功地纪念了祖父，也发现了与翔的新友情。En: He had not only successfully commemorated his grandfather but also discovered a new friendship with Xiang.Zh: 从那天起，梁变得更加自信。En: From that day on, Liang became more confident.Zh: 他知道，有朋友的支持，自己可以面对任何挑战。En: He knew that with the support of friends, he could face any challenge.Zh: 春季演出的成功，不仅让梁克服了舞台恐惧，也为他打开了心门，迎接更多的新友谊和可能性。En: The success of the spring performance not only helped Liang overcome his stage fright but also opened his heart to more new friendships and possibilities. Vocabulary Words:vitality: 春意盎然foothills: 山脚lanterns: 灯笼bustling: 热热闹闹rehearsal: 排练commemorate: 纪念deceased: 去世的lively: 活泼cheerful: 开朗auditorium: 礼堂integrated: 融入applaud: 鼓掌sincerity: 真诚emotion: 感情possibilities: 可能性spring: 春季somewhat: 有些entrance: 门口performance: 表演shy: 害羞talented: 天才sweating: 冒汗cheering: 鼓劲trembled: 颤抖friendship: 友情confidence: 自信challenge: 挑战support: 支持afternoon: 午后gaze: 看
In today's episode, we explore the future of building infra for compliance, and the next era of investing following the massive infra wave of 2017-2024.Typically, in crypto there have always been tradeoffs…Want transparency? You lose privacy. Want privacy? Regulators get nervous. Join us as we chat with Wyatt from VanEck Ventures and Xiang Xie from Primus dive into how Primus is using ZKTLS and ZKFHE to transform blockchain data integrity. While traditional systems expose sensitive data through oracles, ZKTLS proves authenticity without revealing the underlying info. Add in ZKFHE's encrypted data computation, and we're looking at a game-changer for onchain finance (according to institutional investors).We break down the investment thesis in Primus and cover insights on crypto infrastructure funding as a whole. We also explore how privacy-preserving financial infrastructure fits into the regulatory landscape, from payment systems to stablecoins and KYC. Plus, we'll tackle the exciting fusion of ZK tech and AI in crypto, showing how it's revolutionizing everything from AI verification to streamlined, privacy-focused KYC.Enjoy.Join The Rollup Edge: https://members.therollup.coWebsite: https://therollup.co/Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/1P6ZeYd..Podcast: https://therollup.co/category/podcastFollow us on X: https://www.x.com/therollupcoFollow Rob on X: https://www.x.com/robbie_rollupFollow Andy on X: https://www.x.com/ayyyeandyJoin our TG group: https://t.me/+8ARkR_YZixE5YjBhThe Rollup Disclosures: https://therollup.co/the-rollup-discl
In this episode, Drs. Beaver and Xiang provide an introduction of new treatment options for IST: Inappropriate Sinus Tachycardia.
Fluent Fiction - Mandarin Chinese: Journey to the Ice Waterfall: A Sibling's Winter Quest Find the full episode transcript, vocabulary words, and more:fluentfiction.com/zh/episode/2025-01-16-23-34-02-zh Story Transcript:Zh: 在隆冬的季节，九寨沟的美景如梦如幻。En: In the depths of winter, the beautiful scenery of Jiuzhaigou is dreamlike.Zh: 大地覆盖着厚厚的白雪，阳光照射在冰面上，反射出耀眼的光芒。En: The land is covered with thick white snow, and the sunlight shining on the ice reflects dazzling light.Zh: 这里的一切都显得那么宁静而美好，仿佛是专为这对兄妹准备的。En: Everything here appears so serene and beautiful, as if exclusively prepared for this brother and sister.Zh: 湘和梅，此时正站在通往山顶的小径旁。En: Xiang and Mei were standing beside the path leading to the top of the mountain.Zh: 湘望着前方，心中充满期待。En: Xiang looked ahead, full of anticipation.Zh: 他最近得到了一个新工作的机会，但在开始前，他希望寻求内心的平静和答案。En: He recently got the opportunity for a new job, but before starting, he wanted to seek inner peace and answers.Zh: 梅站在他身旁，虽然谨慎小心，但她知道此行对湘的重要性，也愿意在他身边同行。En: Mei stood by his side, cautious but knowing the significance of this journey for Xiang, and she was willing to accompany him.Zh: “走吧，让我们去看看上面的风景。”湘说道，他的眼中闪烁着渴望。En: "Let's go and see the scenery up there," Xiang said, his eyes shimmering with longing.Zh: 梅微微点头，尽管心中对冬日山路有些担忧。En: Mei nodded slightly, though she was a bit worried about the winter mountain path.Zh: 山路开始并不困难，脚下的雪发出轻柔的“咯吱”声。En: The mountain trail was not difficult at first, with the snow underfoot making a gentle "crunching" sound.Zh: 但随着他们慢慢攀升，小路变得越来越滑，冰面在太阳的照射下变得异常闪亮。En: But as they slowly climbed, the path became increasingly slippery, with the ice shining brightly under the sunlight.Zh: 湘几次差点滑倒，梅紧紧抓住他的手臂，给了他支持。En: Xiang nearly slipped several times, and Mei held onto his arm tightly, providing support.Zh: “如果太危险，我们可以回去。”梅劝道。En: "If it's too dangerous, we can go back," Mei advised.Zh: 湘沉默片刻，他望向梅，感受到她的关心和支持。En: Xiang was silent for a moment, looking at Mei and feeling her concern and support.Zh: 然后，他坚定地说：“不，我们再走远一点，我相信前面更美。”En: Then, he firmly said, "No, let's go a bit further; I believe it will be more beautiful ahead."Zh: 这个决定让两人更加集中精神，每一步都小心翼翼。En: This decision made them concentrate more intently, taking each step with great care.Zh: 经过好些时辰，他们终于来到了一个天然形成的冰瀑布前。En: After several hours, they finally arrived at a naturally formed ice waterfall.Zh: 瀑布被凝结成了壮观的冰雕，阳光透过冰层，折射出了无数美丽的色彩。En: The waterfall was frozen into a magnificent ice sculpture, with sunlight refracting through the ice, displaying countless beautiful colors.Zh: 梅和湘站在瀑布前，深深震撼于此刻的美。En: Standing in front of the waterfall, Mei and Xiang were deeply moved by the beauty of the moment.Zh: 这个瞬间，使他们深切感受到生命的意义和家人的重要。En: This instant allowed them to profoundly feel the meaning of life and the importance of family.Zh: 湘低声说道：“谢谢你，梅。在我生命的重要时刻，有你在身边真好。”En: Xiang softly said, "Thank you, Mei. It's wonderful to have you by my side at such an important moment in my life."Zh: 梅微笑，温柔地回应：“无论未来有何挑战，我们都会一起面对。”En: Mei smiled and gently replied, "No matter what challenges the future holds, we will face them together."Zh: 站在冰瀑布前，他们分享着宁静和温暖。En: Standing by the ice waterfall, they shared a sense of peace and warmth.Zh: 对湘来说，这不仅仅是一次旅程，更是一场心灵的洗礼。En: For Xiang, this was not just a journey, but a spiritual cleansing.Zh: 他觉得自己已经找到了方向，不再迷失。En: He felt he had found direction and was no longer lost.Zh: 同样，梅也感受到，这次旅行让他们的兄妹情更加深厚。En: Likewise, Mei felt that this journey had deepened their sibling bond.Zh: 漫天飞舞的雪花中，他们再次踏上归途，心中充满了对未来的期待和勇气。En: Amidst the fluttering snowflakes, they embarked on their journey back, hearts filled with expectations and courage for the future.Zh: 对于湘和梅来说，新的一年不仅仅是时间的流逝，更是生命中新开的一段旅程。En: For Xiang and Mei, the new year was not just the passing of time but the start of a new chapter in life. Vocabulary Words:depths: 深处dreamlike: 如梦如幻serene: 宁静anticipation: 期待cautious: 谨慎小心significance: 重要性shimmering: 闪烁crunching: 咯吱slippery: 滑refracting: 折射magnificent: 壮观cleansing: 洗礼profoundly: 深切fluttering: 飞舞expectations: 期待courage: 勇气significance: 重要性anticipation: 期待navigate: 导航splendor: 辉煌advised: 劝告trajectory: 轨迹ventures: 冒险treacherous: 险恶endurance: 耐力resilience: 弹性companion: 同伴sojourn: 寄居reinforce: 强化epiphany: 顿悟
More from Robert Yu's 2002 article in The Journal of Asian Martial Arts Visit our Patreon for Extended Bonus episodes and more.
We look at another issue of Journal of Asian Martial Arts and look at an interview with Robert Yu who discusses in detail his training with Hong Yi Xiang. For ad free, extended and bonus episodes visit our Patreon. Patreon Bonus Episode Part 2
Join Professor Werbach in his conversation with Alice Xiang, Global Head of AI Ethics at Sony and Lead Research Scientist at Sony AI. With both a research and corporate background, Alice provides an inside look at how her team integrates AI ethics across Sony's diverse business units. She explains how the evolving landscape of AI ethics is both a challenge and an opportunity for organizations to reposition themselves as the world embraces AI. Alice discusses fairness, bias, and incorporating these ethical ideas in practical business environments. She emphasizes the importance of collaboration, transparency, and diveristy in embedding a culture of accountable AI at Sony, showing other organizations how they can do the same. Alice Xiang manages the team responsible for conducting AI ethics assessments across Sony's business units and implementing Sony's AI Ethics Guidelines. She also recently served as a General Chair for the ACM Conference on Fairness, Accountability, and Transparency (FAccT), the premier multidisciplinary research conference on these topics. Alice previously served on the leadership team of the Partnership on AI. She was a Visiting Scholar at Tsinghua University's Yau Mathematical Sciences Center, where she taught a course on Algorithmic Fairness, Causal Inference, and the Law. Her work has been quoted in a variety of high profile journals and published in top machine learning conferences, journals, and law reviews. Sony AI Flagship Project Augmented Datasheets for Speech Datasets and Ethical Decision-Making by Alice Xiang and Others
In this episode of the Joy Lab podcast, we explore the complex emotions of envy and gratitude. We'll discuss how practicing gratitude can serve as a powerful antidote to the corrosive effects of envy, and delve into the evolutionary purpose and varieties of envy, including benign and malicious forms. We also take a quick (and hopefully helpful!) detour into the concept of counterfactual thinking and its role in both fueling and easing envy, with a focus on the use of mindfulness and gratitude to transform negative emotions into positive action. Best of all, we'll end with a really helpful way to reframe envy as a signal for self-care and gratitude. Sources and Notes: Joy Lab Program: Take the next leap in your wellbeing journey with step-by-step practices to help you build and maintain the elements of joy in your life. More episodes on uncertainty: Getting Comfy with Not Knowing (ep. 162) Mental Health & The Male Hubris, Female Humility Effect (ep. 157) Seeing the Goodness in Others, Yourself, & The World (ep. 66) You Are That Vast Thing You See with Great Telescopes (ep. 18) The Surprising Benefits of Not Knowing (ep. 16) Epstude, K., & Roese, N. J. (2008). The functional theory of counterfactual thinking. Personality and social psychology review : an official journal of the Society for Personality and Social Psychology, Inc, 12(2). Access here Hill, S. E., & Buss, D. M. (2008). The evolutionary psychology of envy. In R. H. Smith (Ed.), Envy: Theory and research (pp. 60–70). Oxford University Press. Access here. Mujcic, R. & Oswald, A. (2018). Is envy harmful to a society's psychological health and wellbeing? A longitudinal study of 18,000 adults. Social Science & Medicine, 198. Access here. Smith, R. & Kim, S. (2007). Comprehending Envy. Psychological Bulletin, 133. Access here. van de Ven, N. (2016). Envy and Its Consequences: Why It Is Useful to Distinguish between Benign and Malicious Envy. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 10(6). Access here. Xiang, Y., Chao, X., & Ye, Y. (2018). Effect of Gratitude on Benign and Malicious Envy: The Mediating Role of Social Support. Frontiers in Psychiatry. Access here. Xiang, Y., Dong, X., & Zhao, J. (2020). Effects of Envy on Depression: The Mediating Roles of Psychological Resilience and Social Support. Psychiatry investigation, 17(6). Access here. Full transcript here. Please remember that this content is for informational and educational purposes only. It is not intended to provide medical advice and is not a replacement for advice and treatment from a medical professional. Please consult your doctor or other qualified health professional before beginning any diet change, supplement, or lifestyle program. Please see our terms for more information. If you or someone you know is struggling or in crisis, help is available. Call the NAMI HelpLine: 1-800-950-6264 available Monday through Friday, 10 a.m. – 10 p.m., ET. OR text "HelpLine" to 62640 or email NAMI at helpline@nami.org. Visit NAMI for more. You can also call or text SAMHSA at 988 or chat 988lifeline.org.
The first recorded bank robbery in the U.S. resulted in the wrong man sitting in jail, a very strange confession, and a serious lawsuit for the administrators of the bank that was robbed. Research: Avery, Ron. “America's First Bank Robbery.” Carpenters' Hall. https://www.carpentershall.org/americas-first-bank-robbery “Democratic Mystery Unraveled.” The North American. Nov. 20, 1798. https://www.newspapers.com/image/593171719/?match=1&terms=%22isaac%20davis%22 Hunt, Kristin. “The first major bank heist in America happened 225 years ago in Philly — and the wrong guy went to prison.” Philly Voice. Aug. 31, 2023. https://www.phillyvoice.com/first-bank-robbery-us-philly-carpenters-hall-patrick-lyon/ Lloyd, Thomas. “Robbery of the Bank of Pennsylvania in 1798. The Trial in the Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania. Reported from the Notes by T. Lloyd. Upon Which the President of That Bank, the Cashier, One of the Directors (Who Was an Alderman) and Another Person Who Was the High Constable of Philadelphia; Were Sentenced to Pay Patrick Lyon Twelve Thousand Dollars Damages, for a False and Malicious Prosecution against Him, without Either Reasonable or Probable Cause.” Philadelphia: Printed for the publishers. 1808. https://play.google.com/store/books/details?id=WfcdAAAAMAAJ&rdid=book-WfcdAAAAMAAJ&rdot=1 Lyon, Patrick. “The narrative of Patrick Lyon, who suffered three months severe imprisonment in Philadelphia gaol; on merely a vague suspicion, of being concerned in the robbery of the Bank of Pennsylvania: : with his remarks thereon.” Philadelphia. Francis and Robert Bailey. 1799. Accessed online: https://quod.lib.umich.edu/e/evans/N26860.0001.001/1:3?rgn=div1;view=fulltext “Pat Lyon at the Forge.” MFABoston. https://collections.mfa.org/objects/34216/pat-lyon-at-the-forge?ctx=797a5f9d-a27a-4ae4-996d-f277ad579544&idx=0 Rakich, Whitney, PhD. “Patrick Lyon (1769-1829).” Mount Vernon. https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/patrick-lyon-1769-1829#note2 “Well-known Tenants of Carpenters' Hall.” Carpenters Hall. https://www.carpentershall.org/tenants Xiang, Enya. “Carpenters' Hall in Philadelphia: A Crossroads for Early American History.” Global Philadelphia. Aug. 11, 2023. https://globalphiladelphia.org/news/carpenters-hall-philadelphia-crossroads-early-american-history See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
Marcus Brinkman on Hong Yi Xiang's Xingyi and Bagua from JAMA 1999. Includes a discussion on the connection bewteen Xingyi Pi Chuan and Bagua's Single Palm Change. Ad free and bonus episodes available on our Patreon.
This interview is part of Freetrail's 2024 UTMB coverage, the most important global event in the sport of trail running. The show is hosted each day by Dylan Bowman who interviews top athletes and favorites for the key races this week: OCC, CCC & UTMB. Make sure to tune into all of Freetrail's coverage leading into the 2024 UTMB. We'll have a daily show Monday, Tuesday, Wednesday, and Thursday before we head out on course to follow OCC, CCC and UTMB with photo and video coverage. We'll be back with post-race shows on Saturday and Sunday to recap the weekend of racing. You can listen to our Top-10 Storylines of the 2024 UTMB show hosted by Dylan Bowman here: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TMeq7zXgm48. In this show, Dylan is joined by longtime co-host Corrine Malcolm, and Matt Daniels. Tune in to hear what our hosts consider the top 10 storylines to follow in this year's race. What is the storyline you're most excited to follow? What did we miss? Let us know in the comments what you think! Want to learn more about Freetrail? Check out Freetrail.com to learn more and consider joining our membership community, Freetrail Pro, to be part of the best global online community of passionate trail runners. Best sport in the world! Make sure to play Freetrail's own fantasy trail running at https://fantasy.freetrail.com/events. Fantasy winners this week will receive a head to toe trail kit from HOKA as well as other sweet prizes. Our 2024 UTMB coverage is brought to you by our good friends at HOKA. We're grateful for their generous support and belief in Freetrail. HOKA is a proud presenting partner of the UTMB series. And sponsor of this week's Freetrail coverage.Check out the Freetrail coverage all week to learn more about their new release of the Tecton X3. AND if you are here in Chamonix, go experience the HOKA basecamp and join in all the Tecton demo opportunities across the week. Named after the earth's tectonic plates, which inspired its parallel dual carbon fiber plate design, the Tecton X franchise has revolutionized the trail racing world – propelling athletes to new heights. The Tecton X3 features an upgraded midsole featuring two layers of PEBA foam, with one softer layer on top for cushioning and impact, and a slightly firmer layer underneath for agility proprioception on technical terrain. The propulsive parallel carbon fiber plates have evolved – now featuring winglets, the wider plates wrap strategically up the sidewall for additional control in key zones. In the upper, a new knit collar acts as a gaiter to help mitigate trail debris from entering the shoe. Launching just in time for the UTMB Mont Blanc World Series, The Tecton X3 will be seen on HOKA elite athletes competing at the highest level in Chamonix, France. Inviting consumers and fans of the sport to learn about the innovation behind the brand's most pinnacle trail release yet, HOKA will be opening their FlyLab™experience dedicated to the Tecton X 3 in celebration of UTMB, located at the HOKA Base Camp in Chamonix Village, and open from Tuesday - Friday of race week. Freetrail Links: Website | Freetrail Pro | Patreon | Instagram | YouTube | Freetrail Experts
I can't think of a better person to share this conversation with me than Tripti G. Chandorkar. I was blessed to have her as a colleague 17 years ago working in consulting. Our shared experiences bound us, and we are again creating something we both love for Xiang Li Art. In this conversation, we explore the beginning of working together on Xiang Li Art, building up the Etsy store filled with a variety of merch, and running art exhibitions (solo and group shows) at some of the most recognized museums in the state of MA and nationwide, such as Harvard Museums, Worcester Art Museum, and a local boutique event venue named JMAC. Through Xiang Li Art, we celebrate women (including the 3 of us) and women in Chinese history, namely the 200+ empressed paintings all using watercolor on silk by Xiang Li over 12 years (2012 - present). I once wondered if anyone would care, and if Xiang Li's art can truly speak to people who aren't as familiar with Chinese history. Together with Tripti, we discovered the shared experiences and interests with so many women, families, and friends we met along the way. Thank you for listening to any part of the conversation. I hope you'll share your learnings and reflections with us. --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/feisworld/support
Last time we spoke about the Anti-Fengtian War. The Anti-Fengtian War included two major theaters, the Zhejiang-Fengtian War and the Guominjun-Fengtian War. Within China's north, Feng Yuxiang brokered many sneaky deals with other warlords, trying to bring down Zhang Zuolin. One of these warlords was the disgruntled Guo Songling who led a brave or some would say idiotic rebellion, striking at the heart of the Fengtian empire. Feng Yuxiang failed to really exploit Guo Songling's actions, and Wu Peifu ended up joining Zhang Zuolin, simply out of spite for Feng Yuxiang. The war between the Guominjun and Fengtian soon fell apart for Feng Yuxiang as his forces were gradually dislodged from the Beijing area into northwest China. In an ironic case of deja vu, Zhang Zuolin and Wu Peifu found themselves again working together in Beijing. Little did they know, while they had been fighting in the north, it was the south where real danger lay. #110 The Northern Expedition Part 1: Invading Hunan Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So we have now come to a point where the warlord era takes a sharp turn. While we have been talking about countless wars between numerous factions, this is basically the end game as they say. I have no idea how many episodes it will take, so I apologize in advance, but we are going to be covering the Northern Expedition. I've probably mentioned it a hundred times by this point, the northern expedition. Dr Sun Yat-Sens brainchild, put simply build an army and march north to reunify China. Sounds kind of insane given the disparity in strength between whose in the north and south eh? Facing what can only be described as staggering odds, the Kuomintang over in their separate government based out of Guangzhou suddenly began the most incredible military expedition of the warlord era. On the verge of disintegration with inadequate materials, most of which were coming from the Soviets, the military campaign was a gamble to say the least. Chiang Kai-Shek was ultimately counting on the weakness of his enemies rather than his own NRA forces. His Soviet advisors all told him not to do it, that it would be a terrible blunder. Now if you open up text books, read contemporary buzzfeed like artiles or watch youtube shorts, they would have you believe the northern expedition was this easy sweep northward led by a vanguard of Communist propagandist forces. In reality it was a series of hard fought battles where either side could have knocked out the other completely. Now for most of its life, this Guangzhou based cabal that the KMT were in control of, had always been on the defensive. For the most part their secure powerbase was Guangdong and from there they would gradually conquer region after region, one by one. Something that can truly be said about the KMT, unlike the other factions, take the Fengtian or Zhili for example was its strong sense of having an ideology and its charismatic strong man at the head of its army. There was of course personal armies within the NRA, they were more or less a confederation, but the ideology of the KMT glued them all together. The other factions, perhaps excluding the Guominjun, simply did not have this. There was a shared concern that the political make up of China needed to be democratic and not devolve into the traditional or imperial autocracies that had plagued China for so long. The first region Chiang Kai-Shek would target would be the rich middle Yangtze provinces of Hubei and Hunan, both of which had recently come back under the dominion of the Jade Marshal Wu Peifu. The route the NRA would take would be through Hunan and Hubei, down the Yangtze and up into the North China plain before finally marching upon Beijing. Ironically it was an identical path, one Hong Xiuquan once took when he rallied the Taiping against the Qing Dynasty. To first invade Hunan, Chiang Kai-Shek faced a rather daunting task. He did not have the military power to simply defeat the warlords of the province. He needed to exploit the political scene within it. Prior to the northern expedition, Hunan was dominated by northern warlords who were alien to the southern province. This of course antagonized the local populations creating an unstable political environment. This was something the KMT could manipulate. The KMT's nationalistic ideology was something that could potentially win over allies or weaken petty warlords rule. The KMT could exploit local interests and provincialism, self rule movements and such. When the KMT looked at Hunan they could see an ongoing power struggle. The Hunanese gentry class was being kept alive purely upon a desire for provincial autonomy. The governor Chao Hengti, a Hunanese native was subordinate to Wu Peifu, a Shandong native. By 1926 a conflict had emerged between 4 Hunanese divisional commanders. Chao Hengti favored Yue Kaixin the strongest of them controlling the Hunanese 3rd division. Chao Hengti sought to weaken the rest and used Yue to weaken the second largest 4th division led by Tang Shengchih.Tang Shengchih dominated southwestern Hunan and went on the defensive when he figured out the Governor and Yue were after him. The KMT noticed this over in Guangdong. Now political intervention in Hunan required personal connections. Within the KMT party membership were Hunanese civilians and military officials. This was one of the great strengths of the KMT as a clique, how their political membership transcended provincial or regional bases. Similar to the CCP, who had those like Mao Zedong working with the rural masses in Hunan, the KMT had ties to those at some of the top echelons of the province's power structure. One leading KMT figure who pushed for the northern expedition was Tan Yenkai who also had been the governor of Hunan after the 1911 revolution. He had always maintained an interest in Hunan and while in Guangdong had rallied a 15,000 men strong force of Hunanese troops, now renamed the 2nd army of the NRA. Prior to 1926 Tan Yenkai had already led one military campaign to retake Hunan for Dr Sun Yat-Sen. Back in 1924, when Sun Yat-Sen was trying to form a coalition with northern powers, Tan Yenkai launched a rather ill-conceived and short lived campaign, trying to bolster Sun's position in Beijing. Another commander in Jiangxi had pushed Tan Yenkai's force back into Guangdong and the failure provided quite the lesson, that one should also exploit the political realm alongside the military. By spring of 1926 Chiang Kai-Shek and his top subordinates began planning an invasion of Hunan. Aside for the ex-governor Tan Yenkai, the KMT also had ties to Tang Shengchih. Liu Wentao and Chen Mingshu had been classmates of Tang Shengchih back at the Baoting Military academy in 1912. In 1925 they began reconnecting with the man, arranging a propaganda tour of the province. Liu Wentao, then a professor of political science, began touring China, lecturing all on the Three People's Principles of the KMT. Tang Shenchich went to one of these speeches and many of his men as well. There was also Pai Chungxi, another schoolmate of Tang Shenchih, the leader of the 7th Jiangxi Army of the NRA. The KMT also had loose connections with the hunan divisional commander Ho Yaotsu who was friends with Cheng Chien, a hunanese native and the commander of the 6th NRA army, primarily consisting of Hunanese troops. Now Chiang Kai-Shek began courting Governor Chao Hengti in June of 1926. He approached the man as a fellow member of the older Kuomintang party, pleading in a telegram that they should reunite into a new national movement. Obviously Chiang Kai-shek was making a powerplay to try and win over Hunan without shedding blood, he did not stop sending messages to the man even a week before the shells would fly. In southern Hunan at this time, Tang Shengchih was dominating the Hsiang valley with his 9000 man strong division. Tang Shengchih was a pretty intelligent player. He had numerous connections from his Baoting academy days and he managed to expand his domain to include 27 of Hunans 75 tax-collection districts. However by early 1926 Governor Chao had ordered all 4 Hunan divisional commanders to remit the local taxes they gathered to the provincial capital of Changsha. Obviously this was to centralize the power, and such revenue losses would strangle Tang Shengchih's power. So Tang Shengchih began talks with the KMT as early as february of 1926. It was a dangerous play, many had seen the numerous cases where inviting allies from another province only brought unwelcome guests. Perhaps Tang Shengchih believed by gaining some KMT support, he might be able to overpower Chao Hengti. But he was no idiot, he asked for KMT assurance he would fill the role of governorship and not someone like Tan Yenkai who indeed was lurking in the shadows. Tang Shengchih was given said assurance and signed an alliance treaty on February 24th. When Tang Shengchih unleashed his forces against Governor Chao Hengtai the same month, it was perfect timing. Wu Peifu was preoccupied in north China fighting Feng Yuxiang, thus the governor had no reinforcements. Threatened, Chao Hengti immediately fled Changsha, heading north. While this was occurring, Tang Shengchih labeled the governor nothing but a northern puppet of Wu Peifu. From February to March of 1926 Chiang Kai-Shek was still struggling for authority over the KMT to launch the Northern Expedition. Thus Tang Shengchih's rebellion had preceded it, and was done without KMT resources. Still feeling confident Tang Shengchih began marching into northern Hunan. Back over in Guangzhou, the KMT commissioner of foreign affairs notified everyone that Tang was doing this all on his own, none of their resources had reached him yet. When Tang Shengchih secured Changsha in mid march, a lot of the hunanese gentry began supporting his cause to be governor. Tang Shengchih's forces then overran Yochou along Hunan's northern border. Tang Shengchih had not yet accepted the governorship position, in march he was still looking to see how the KMT alliance would pan out. Yet in March tensions emerged within the KMT over the northern expedition The March 20th coup certainly expedited aid to Tang Shengchih. 5 Days after, Tang Shengchih accepted governorship and with his new position he proceeded to purge his political enemies from the provinces administration while installing his friends. By late March 1926, Wu Peifu finally responded to the threat to his hegemony over Hunan. He began threatening to return south with his Honanese troops. Now Wu Peifu's armies were still facing Feng Yuxiang at this time, but the KMT aid also had not come yet so Tang Shengchih paused. Tang Shengchih began playing down his ties to the KMT in responding to Wu Peifu, posing as a mere neutral. In early april of 1926, Feng Yuxiang had been cast out of the North China plain and now Wu Peifu had a free hand to play against the rebellion in Hunan. Tang Shengchih now under real threat, began recalling his regiments from northern Hunan and evacuated his forces from Changsha as he built a defense in his home valley. To deal with the menace, Wu Peifu looked to find a Hunanese local to manage the province for him. Wu Peifu turned to the Hunanese 3rd division commander, Yue Kaixin, to make him military governor and commander of the 1st division, with Ho Yaotsu to be civil governor. However the Hunanese gentry cried out immediately at this, stating they would not allow him to overturn their authority. Thwarted, Wu Peifu reverted to violence to pacify the troublesome province. In May, Tang Shengchih suffered a major defeat and was forced to fall back on the defense as Wu Peifu's Hunanese allies were battering him. Until NRA forces advanced into the province, there was little hope for Tang Shengchih and his crumbling defenses within the Xiang valley. Thousands of men from the NRA's 4th and 7th armies began to arrive in late May, but even so they were outnumbered in southern Hunan. It was not until June 2nd, when Tang Shengchih finally caved and accepted the offer from Chiang Kai-Shek to be the commander of the 8th NRA army. Thus Tang Shengchih went from leading a division to an army and his regimental commanders became division commanders. It was also of course a substantial pay raise. This was the type of model the NRA would adopt throughout the Northern Expedition. If you can't beat them, buy them. Just a few days later, the NRA forces within Hunan accepted Tang Shengchih as their front line commander. Tang Shengchih then proclaimed he would head a provisional Hunan government as its governor in the name of the KMT government. The KMT had done a lot to win over the Hunanese people. The Hunanese people wanted autonomy, so the KMT flouted notions of provincial autonomy with a federal system. It was a marriage of convenience. Another major carrot was promising to end the tyranny of the northern warlords and the exploitation of the foreign imperialists. Some began to refer to the Northern Expedition as the “anti-north campaign” and clearly the first target would be the warlord controlling Hunan, Hubei and Honan, the Jade Marshal. In July the 4th army divisions led by Chang Fangkuei and Chen Mingshu arrived at the front, thus the defense changed to offense. At this point Wu Peifu's armies were still too far in North China and his Hunan allies were now becoming overwhelmed by the NRA swarming out of Guangdong. Under these dire circumstance, Wu Peifu's appointed governor, Chao Hengti made a stand along the north banks of the Xiang, the Lien and Lu rivers. From late June to early July the NRA prepared to ford the Lien river sitting west of the Xiang and the Lu river to its east. Down the Xiang was Changsha. Facing the Lu river were two 4th army divisions and Yue Tings independent regiment and another Hunanese regiment. Over at the Lien river were Jiangxi troops of the 7th army alongside the remainder of Tang Shengchihs 8th army. As the first major offensive kicked out, Tang Shengchih was at the front raising morale for the Hunanese, which was very important, as do remember, all these forces coming out of Guangdong were alien Cantonese to them. A breakthrough emerged along the two-river lines with the 7th and 8th NRA armies over on the left wing on the 5th of July. By the 10th the 4th NRA Army engaged the enemy towards Changsha. Over in the east where Hunan bordered Jiangxi, a subordinate of Sun Chuanfang who controlled the lower Yangtze region was completely undisturbed by the NRA forces. Chiang Kai-Shek and his subordinates had given specific orders not to molest Sun Chuanfang, trying to avoid bringing him into the fight to join Wu Peifu. The NRA also profited off a recent flood of the Yangtze that had backed water up the streams of northern Hunan, hindering enemy communications. Wu Peifu was awaited reinforcements over at his HQ in Wuhan while his generals in Hunan faced the real threat of being encircled and annihilated. To Wu Peifu's western flank, two Guizhou warlords were watching the tide of battle. Wu Peifu was very aware of this and it threatened his western defensives. The season had also been a poor harvest, reducing food stuff for Hunan, a province that was already quite dependent on exports north in places like Wuhan. Even with his riverine navy, Wu Peifu could not hope to move enough foodstuff to his southern front. Another issue he faced was the passive resistance of Hunan's peasantry class who began hiding their produce from suppliers. The loss of the Lien-Lu River line left Changsha completely defenseless, so on July 11th the defenders simply withdraw further north of the city. With the Guangdong and Juangxi forces entering Hunan, the NRA had gained enough manpower to begin advancing north. From July 11th after taking Changsha until mid August the front moved north only 50 miles. Delays occurred because reinforcements and war materials for the NRA could only be moved halfway up from Guangzhou by rail. Afterwards they had to travel over back-breaking terrain by foot. Soldiers and their hired coolies had to hand carry supplies and arms and this in turn limited the largest weaponry they could move, such as small field cannons which took entire teams of carriers. For those of you who don't know, I specialize in the Pacific War and I can certainly say, the Japanese forces in isolated islands, take Guadalcanal for example, saw this exact type of situation. Japanese artillery teams would have to disassemble artillery pieces and carry them by hand through rough jungles, often under starvation conditions. Not fun. The NRA during these circumstance, much like the Japanese in the 1940's in jungle terrain islands would suffer from terrible ailments, not malaria like the Japanese, but cholera. Cholera was taking a toll on the overheated and exhausted soldiers and civilian coolies. One Chen Kungpo wrote in his memoirs “that hundreds died daily in one mountain town on the route going north”. By August, both sides were gathering in strength along a new front, established near the Milo River. A military advisor wrote “Sometimes there are no provisions, my colleagues tear off some sort of grass, chew it and are full.” However the northern forces could not launch counterattacks without the full support of the Jade Marshall's main army who were still stuck in North China aiding Zhang Zuolin against the treacherous Feng Yuxiang. To remedy the two front situation, Wu Piefu tried but failed to secure loans and aid from his former protege, Sun Chuanfang, who honestly was more foe than friend now. Sun Chuanfang had basically taken the mantle as the strong Zhili leader and certainly did not want to share any of his newfound limelight. Alongside this the British turned a cold shoulder to Wu Peifu and the Japanese never liked him to begin with. Despite some local floods and the cholera outbreak, Chiang Kai-Shek was able to arrive to Hengyang with over 100,000 NRA troops. These numbers had been recently bolstered by Guizhou warlords such as Peng Hanchang and Wang Tienpei who had watched eagerly the battles of the Lien-Lu line before tossing their lot in with the NRA. The Guizhou forces had marched into western Hunan clearing out pockets of resistance as they did. During the northern expedition, smaller warlords tended to simply defect or join the NRA when the NRA was winning. The NRA now prepared an offensive to break the Milo river line, also emboldened by the peasantry class who were very willing to work. The local floods in northern Hunan, combined with the droughts in southern Hunan had destroyed the peasants' fields, thus they needed to make money. The NRA exploited this to recruit soldiers and coolies en masse and this greatly improved their mobility. By contrast, Wu Peifu's forces were low on ammunition, rations were also beginning to dwindle and the majority of the soldiers had not been paid in quite some time. In the NRA controlled areas, the Hunanese peasants were selling what produce they could spare, but the NRA were also being supplemented by rice carried from Guangdong. The NRA also made sure to pay coolies properly instead of Shanghai'ing them and did not plunder peasants' foodstuffs. This of course led to wide scale cooperation from the local population, something quite rare for the warlord era. A final conference was held at Changsha on August 12th between Chiang Kai-Shek, the top NRA commanders and Soviet advisors. By the 15th orders were dispatched for a general offensive against the Moli line with the objective of reaching Hubei. The NRA right wing also prepared to defend the army in cause Sun Chuanfang finally extended help to Wu Peifu from Guanxi. Chiang Kai-Shek was filled with excitement, for if successful, the NRA offensive would capture Wuhan and her incredible Hanyang Arsenal. Chiang Kai-Shek dispatched word to his generals before the battle. “The importance of this fight is not only in that it will decide the fate of the warlords. But, whether or not the Chinese nation and race can restore their freedom and independence hangs in the balance. In other words, it is a struggle between the nation and the warlords, between the revolution and the anti-revolutionaries, between the Three People's Principles and imperialism. All are to be decided now in this time of battle … so as to restore independence and freedom to our Chinese race”. The general plan of attack was to breach the Milo river line and quickly capture Wuhan. Speed and timing were critical factors. It was all basically a huge gamle. The NRA needed to secure Wuhan before Wu Peifu or Sun Chuanfang entered the war, thus preventing the NRA incursion into the Yangtze Valley. At the moment the NRA and their immeidate adversary in northern Hunan were around equal number, but if Sun Chuanfang entered the mix he had nearly double what Chiang Kai-Shek had. The 4th and 6th NRA armies made their crossing over the Milo on August 17th, successfully outflanking the enemy line and easing the way for the left wing of the 7th and 8th NRA armies to advance. By the 19th, Wu Peifu's troops were forced out of their trenches and only provided sporadic resistance as they withdrew into southern Hubei. During the two day retreat the northern forces had divided in two with the western flank taking refuse in Wu Peifu's naval stronghold of Yuehzhou. Its port was heavily fortified, however the recent floods had caused water from Dongting lake and the Yangtze to meet, ruining many of the fortifications. The NRA cut across Yuehzhou's railway link to Wuhan and surrounded it. Wu Peifu had frantically orders troops to hold the naval base, until he could detach himself from the Hobei operations to take personal command of the shit storm in Hunan. However during a meeting with Zhang Zuolin at Baoding, Wu Peifu received word his subordinates had simply taken all the naval vessels, riverine vessels and even sampans to head downstream for Wuhan. Yuehzhou fell with ease by the 22nd and Hunan was practically cleared of Wu Peifu's regular forces. Wu Peifu's navy contuined to fight the enemy, but all they could really do is harass NRA units along th baks of Dongting lake or the Yangtze. In response the NRA simply tosses fire rafts at them, a classic and age old tactic. As the NRA chased the enemy, the local railway workers on lines heading into Hubei cooperated. The workers began cutting railway lines and telegraph lines to obstruct the enemy retreating from Yuehzhou. Entire trainloads of troops and war materials fell directly into the hands of the NRA. The end of August saw Chiang Kai-Shek's gamble pay off. Although Sun Chuanfang could pounce at any moment from Juangxi, the NRA had succesfully given a bloody nose to one warlord. The victory of the NRA over Hunan did not go unnoticed by the surrounding provinces warlords. Guizhou generals began joining the KMT as the war raged and the Milo river line fight influenced some generals under Sun Chuanfang to reconsider their loyalites. It was quite remarkable that Sun Chuanfangs decision to stay out of the immediate fight lost him the easiest chance of ending the NRA altogether. If Sun Chuanfang had intervened in the Hunan war, almost 100% he would have defeated Chiang Kai-Shek and easily march upon Guangzhou to end the first United Front. Losing Guangdong the KMT would have withered away, perhaps the CCP, would cower into the shadows awaited the right moment to pounce. Chiang Kai-Shek would not have withstood such a defeat, his leadership role would have been shattered. But such was not the case, Chiang Kai-Shek took Hunan and proved himself a new formidable player on the board. The Hunan campaign cost the NRA, but now they had the perfect base of operations and springboard for further offensives. By the end of August the NRA's intelligence reported Wu Peifu was advancing south to reinforce Wuhan, thus Chiang Kai-Shek tossed the dice of fate again. Advancing north against the three-city stronghold, was regiments of Chen Mingshu and Chang Fakuei's 4th Army. The withdrawal from the Milo river line had allowed Wu Peifu's Hubei forces to form a new line. The Guangzhou-Hankou railway followed a narrow land route between the Yangtze and highland ranges, crossing over multiple flooded bridgeheads. To further hinder the NRA's advance, the Hunanese had breached nearby dikes of the Yangtze. Then they heavily fortified the Tingszu Brigde with barbed wire and machine gun nests over its northern riverbank. The NRA vanguard attacked the stronghold on August 26th, coming to a abrupt halt. The NRA's superior mobility, aided by local boatsmen allowing the NRA right wing to head upstream and get around the enemy's flank. Likewise the NRA 4th army threatened the railway to Wuhan, making Wu Peifu's forces more vulnerable. The forces defending Wuhan were mainly the same troops who had fled Hunan, exhausted and demoralized. When the first attacks came upon the bridgehead, joined by flank attacks, the defensive line collapsed. During the night of the 26th the NRA stormed several strongpoints and outposts. Here again Wu Peifu's forces jumped onto any vessel they could get away with, or fled aboard the last trains heading north. The Tingszu bridge was captured, but at a bloody cost that would limit the NRA's ability to pursue the fleeing enemy. Once again the floods slowed the advance, alongside Wu Peifu's riverine vessels that continued to fire upon any NRA troops that ventured too close to waterways. Yet Wu Peifu's troops were running low on food while the NRA were accumulating more of it. As the NRA soldiers marched across the Tingszu bridge, locals flocked over to sell them foodstuff as by this time word had spread far about how the NRA paid for what they needed. On August 28th the NRA forces captured Xienning, but further north came across the Hesheng bridge. The bridge was heavily fortified and defended by forces under the personal command of Wu Peifu. Back on August the 25th and Hankou, Wu Peifu received word that Tingszu bridge had fallen, thus he quickened his advance to the front. He was shocked by the fall of the bridge and blamed his subordinates, labeling them cowards. When he arrived at Hesheng, Wu Peifu gathered his officers as he executed the commanders who lost the Tingszu bridge. He had with him mercenaries of the Big Swords Corps functioning as the executioners. On August 29th, Wu Peifu then went on the offensive and attacked the NRA vanguard, elements of Li Tsungjen's 7th Army just a bit due south of the Hesheng Bridge. His attack devastated the vanguard until the main bulk of the 7th and 4th armies arrived. Just before dawn on the 30th, Wu Peifu attacked the NRA's line of defense south of the bridge, probing for a weak point. He hit the 4th and 7th armies sectors, but was gradually met by artillery and rifle fire that took a heavy toll. Wu Peifu then had the Big Swords executioners clip more officers of their heads to boost morale. However as Wu Peifu continued to press his offensive his men eventually routed under pressure. His troops fled right over the Hesheng bridge allowing the 7th army to flank them further upstream where they took another smaller bridge and threatened his lifeline, the railway line to Wuhan. By noon on the 30th, Wu Peifu's Hunanese and Hubei forces were in a general retreat heading north. Wu Peifu had just lost southern Hubei in what was an absolute clumsy miscalculation. During the retreat the NRA flank attack against his railway line saw them capture 3 trains full loaded with troops and arms. Over the course of the past weeks he had lost two bridgeheads seeing 1000 deaths, 2000 wounded and 5000 captured alongside all their weaponry. After the entire debacle, Wu Peifu began frantically pleading with Sun Chuanfang to come down the Yangtze to help him. But Sun Chuanfang made ambiguous responses and dragged his feet. As he did so the NRA fortified their defenses facing Juangxi. In full retreat Wu Peifu began breaching dikes behind his forces to slow down the NRA as they approached Wuchang, the capital of Hubei. He left a force of 10,000 men to defend the city behind its sturdy walls as he ferried the rest of his men to Hankou. Once his forces landed on the other side of the Yangtze he had half of them take up positions to defend the Hanyang Arsenal, while the others defended Hankou, which served as his new HQ. By September his forces from Honan began to arrive. On August 31st, Chen Mingshu's 4th army was in hot pursuit of the enemy. His vanguard took a vantage point near Wuchang as reconnaissance investigated the city. On September 2nd, the NRA unleashed frontal assaults to probe its defenses, but they lacked any heavy artillery to actually back up a real attack. As a result the NRA suffered heavy casualties before pulling back to establish a proper siege. Meanwhile by september 5th, Hanyang was also surrounded. Defending Hanyang was a Hubei division led by Liu Tsolung who placed artillery on some fortified high points. When the NRA was just about to launch an assault, suddenly Liu Tsolung, overseeing the majority of Hanyangs defenses defected and helped capture the city and its arsenal. It was a tremendous blow to Wu Peifu as the NRA vanguard was now bypassing Hanyang to threaten his railway link to Honan. Wu Peifu tried to salvage the units he had left to mount a last ditch defensive line over the border hills between Hubei and Honan. Wu Peifu had now withdrawn to the Wushen pass lying on the border, hoping to hold out as more of his Honanese forces advanced south. Yet once again the NRA's superior mobility deprived Wu Peifu of enough time to dig into the pass. After a few assaults, Wu Peifu lost the pass and was driven further back into Honan. The walled city of Wuchang could not be taken as easily as Hanyang or Hankou. Wu Peifu and his men would defend it for well over a month. The NRA did not have proper siege weapons, and the threat of Sun Chuanfang loomed over them.Yet Wu Peifu had not expected Hunan and Hubei to fall so quickly and had not prepared his capital for a long siege. He had 10,000 soldiers, hundreds of thousands of civilians locked within its walls. There were also foreigners within the city and foreign gunboats. The threat of international intervention loomed upon the actions of the NRA. Chiang Kai-Shek telegrammed his foreign minister that a communique should be sent out to inform the world powers “… on the matter of protecting foreign nationals, I have already informed the armies to observe my prohibition against the military occupying or obstructing affairs in foreign-established churches, schools, and the like….” Chiang Kai-Shek personally overlooked the siege to make sure no foreigners were molested. Just to clear up something that might be confusing some of you, Wuchang refers to one of the 13 urban districts of the capital of Hubei, Wuhan. Now back in mid August, Chiang Kai-Shek called for the capture of Wuhan at Changsha and he had made secret negotiations with Sun Chuanfang to get him to sit out the war. Sun Chuanfang had been quite ambiguous about what he would do, but it was known to NRA intelligence he was massing troops along the borders of Jiangxi and Fujian. Sun Chuanfang made up the excuse he was simply defending his territory from NRA aggression. Apparently Chiang Kai-Shek offered a nonaggression pact and an open invitation to join the KMT, but Sun Chuanfang did not want to give up his new found control over the 5 southeastern provinces for what was perceived to be a lesser role in the KMT. Sun Chuanfang then prepared a two pronged offensive to relieve Wuchang by driving west into KMT territory. Sun Chuanfang was sitting on 200,000 troops and Chiang Kai-Shek was well aware of the threat he posed. Thus Chiang Kai-Shek would go for broke, casting the dice of fate once more. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek rolled the dice of fate when he unleashed an offensive against Wu Peifu's holdings in Hunan and Hubei. The gambles paid off big time as the NRA swarmed their enemy, taking prisoners and war materials. However Sun Chuanfang was now entering the fray, a real fight would soon unfold.
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