Podcasts about development party

As the geopolitical landscape constantly shifts, former Moroccan Prime Minister El-Othmani has surprisingly taken a stand to defend normalization with Israel. In recent years, geopolitical associations have become pivotal to nations' policies, and this move by El-Othmani is a testament to that.Previously, El-Othmani played a crucial role in strengthening diplomatic ties between Morocco and Israel. However, this was in stark contrast with the stance of the Moroccan Justice and Development Party's (PJD) new leadership, which has adamantly upheld its anti-normalization attitude towards Israel.Recently, the Party insisted that El-Othmani must offer a public apology to the Moroccan people for his previous role in fostering ties with Israel. The situation encapsulates deep-seated political tension that has been brewing as nations grapple with the question of normalization of relations with Israel.Donald Trump, the 45th President of the United States, played a significant role in brokering the normalization agreements before leaving office. During his tenure, he engineered various deals often referred to as the 'Abraham Accords,' establishing diplomatic ties between Israel and several Middle Eastern countries including the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Sudan, and Morocco.While critics regard these deals as a means of altering regional power balances, others celebrate them as a significant stride towards fostering peace and economic tie-ups. Trump, renowned for his unorthodox approach to international diplomacy, receives credit for these unprecedented accords.Meanwhile, global political researcher, Jack Smith, offers his insights on the implications of this move by the former Prime Minister El-Othmani. He cites this to reflect the broader geopolitical trend that several nations are currently dealing with.El-Othmani's defense of normalization with Israel, Smith suggests, is an indication of the pragmatism that is emerging in global politics. Despite strong local and regional opposition to such normalization, leaders are increasingly recognizing the economic and political benefits that these relationships can bring.However, Smith also highlights the inevitable public backlash and internal tensions such moves are bound to provoke. The Moroccan Justice and Development Party's demand for an apology from El-Othmani is a case in point. In conclusion, El-Othmani's defense of normalization with Israel signals a new era in Morocco's foreign policy, echoing the changing trends in international diplomatic relations. However, one needs to tread carefully considering the predictable antagonism and potential nation-wide implications.

Ezgi Basaran is a Turkish journalist turned academic who has written a new book examining the outsize influence of Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party over Tunisia's Islamist Ennahda party and Egypt's Muslim Brotherhood party. While both have suffered huge setbacks, Basaran argues they will re-emerge and that the pursuit of power will trump ideology.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

In this episode, we delve into Turkey's unique approach to mediation in its foreign policy. Our discussion uncovers how historical traditions, regional ambitions, and contemporary challenges have shaped Turkey's role as a mediator. From its initial engagements in Iraq and Iran to its involvement in the Balkans, Central Asia, and Africa, Turkey's mediation efforts have evolved significantly. We explore the influence of the Ottoman Empire's negotiation practices, the impact of the 1990s geopolitical shifts, and Turkey's strategic positioning as an honest broker free from colonial baggage. The episode also highlights the personalistic turn in Turkey's mediation under the Justice and Development Party, examining both the successes and limitations of this approach. Join us as we discuss Turkey's mediation in Bosnia, Kosovo, Somalia, and Somaliland, and the broader implications for its foreign policy and international standing. This episode also offers a comprehensive understanding of the human capital involved, and the ongoing challenges in achieving sustainable peace.

Rwanda marks thirty years since its genocide against the Tutsis; U.S. President Joe Biden hosts the first trilateral leaders' summit with Japanese Prime Minister Kishida Fumio and Philippines President Ferdinand R. Marcos Jr.; music fans celebrate the fiftieth anniversary of Swedish pop group ABBA's Eurovision win; and Ekrem İmamoğlu is elected mayor of Istanbul, in a rebuke to President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party.   Mentioned on the Podcast   Eurovision Winners, Eurovision World   Frontline: Ghosts of Rwanda, PBS   Mariel Ferragamo, “Thirty Years After Rwanda's Genocide: Where the Country Stands Today,” CFR.org    “Rwanda: Freedom in the World 2024,” Freedom House   “Three Decades After Rwanda's Genocide, the Past is Ever-Present,” The Economist   When Abba Came to Britain, BBC  For an episode transcript and show notes, visit The World Next Week at: https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/rwanda-30-years-after-genocide-us-japan-philippines-summit-abbas-eurovision-legacy-and 

Municipal elections were held in Turkey on March 31, but the election results were contrary to expectations. The local elections that took place on Sunday represented a coup against Recep Tayyip Erdogan and the Justice and Development Party after they won the presidential and parliamentary elections last year. Lawyer and political analyst Sedat Yurtdaş provides his analysis. - Di 31 Adarê de helbijartinên şaredariyan li Tirkiyê cî girtin, lê encamên helbijartinan li bervajî texmînan derketin, em derbarê wê mijarê bi parêzer û siyasetvan Sedat Yurtdaş ji Amedê dipeyvîn. Helbijartinên herêmî yên Yekşemê derbeyek bû ji Recep Teyyip Erdogan û Partiya Dad û Geşepêdanê piştî serketinên wan yên sala borî di helbijartinên serokatiyê û parlamentoyê de.

Less than a year after securing another term, Turkish President Erdogan's Justice and Development Party suffered its worst defeat in its 22-year history in Sunday's municipal elections. All eyes were on Istanbul, where Ekrem Imamoglu easily won reelection and is increasingly cementing his place as Erdogan's political challenger. Amberin Zaman, Al-Monitor's chief correspondent covering major stories on the Middle East and North Africa, including Turkey, joins Thanos Davelis to break down Sunday's results, what this defeat means for Erdogan, and look at whether the opposition's resurgence can now reshape Turkey's national politics. You can read the articles we discuss on our podcast here:Turkey's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan suffers an electoral disasterTurkish local elections: Opposition stuns Erdogan with historic victoryDefense Min unveils ‘Agenda 2030' for armed forces restructuringMitsotakis launches campaign for Euro elections stressing security, stabilityPM notes high stakes of Euro elections

*) US, Israel to discuss Rafah invasion in virtual meeting: report The US and Israel will hold a virtual meeting to discuss alternative proposals from the Biden administration regarding a possible Israeli military invasion of Rafah, where more than 1.5 million Palestinians are taking refuge, Israeli and US officials confirmed to Axios. The meeting, originally scheduled for last week, was cancelled by Netanyahu in protest at a perceived lack of US involvement as tensions escalated after the US refrained from vetoing a UN Security Council resolution calling for a ceasefire in Gaza. *) Israeli forces admit most Gaza killings are civilians The Israeli newspaper Haaretz collected testimony from Israeli officers and soldiers involved in the Gaza war who reportedly admitted that the majority of individuals classified by the army as “terrorists” were actually civilians. The Israeli army claimed that 9,000 terrorists were killed during the Gaza war. However, the officers and soldiers in the report testify to Haaretz that those killed were civilians, their only crime being crossing an invisible line drawn by the Israeli army. Another soldier also stated that they were explicitly instructed to shoot to kill any suspect who ran into a building, even if it resulted in serious civilian casualties. *) Azerbaijan warns Armenia against military ‘provocation' along border Azerbaijan has warned Armenia against any military build-up on the border, saying any provocation would be dealt with firmly. In a statement on Sunday, Azerbaijan's Defence Ministry said intensive movements and military build-ups by the Armenian army had been observed recently. The ministry also added that there has been a further activation of revanchist forces threatening Azerbaijan with war and a concentration of manpower, armoured vehicles, and artillery installations in different directions of the Azerbaijani-Armenian conditional border. *) Rockets target Libyan PM's residence, no casualties reported The residence of Libyan Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah was targeted with rocket-propelled grenades in an attack that caused no casualties, a Libyan minister told the press. The minister, who spoke on condition of anonymity, confirmed in a statement on Sunday that the attack had caused some damage. The minister did not give further details. *) Erdogan declares local elections ‘turning point' for Türkiye Türkiye's President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has said the results of the local elections marked a “turning point” for his Justice and Development Party. Regarding the outcome of the local elections, Erdogan vowed to “respect the decision of the nation.” Speaking from the party's headquarters in the capital Ankara, Erdogan said his party had failed to achieve the expected results in Sunday's local elections and that the party “would evaluate the results of the local elections with an open heart within the party and will engage in self-criticism.”

Media coverage has depicted Turkey's nationwide local elections on Sunday as a major blow for President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and his ruling Justice and Development Party. How significant is this political defeat, and what does it augur both for Turkish and Middle East politics? In this episode, Jacob Heilbrunn speaks with Greg Priddy, a Senior Fellow for the Middle East at the Center for the National Interest. Priddy consults for corporate and financial clients on political risk in the region and previously served as Director for Global Oil at Eurasia Group.Music by Aleksey Chistilin from Pixabay

As experts recover the data recorder onboard container ship ‘Dali', we examine why the Francis Scott Key Bridge collapsed so quickly. Voters in Turkey head to the polls in local elections, with president Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party hoping to win back cities that it lost five years ago. Plus: the latest on the ground from Ukraine and what foreign TV is allowed to be broadcast in North Korea?See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

The results of Turkey's presidential election are finally in and Recep Tayyip Erdogan, who had been forced into a runoff against his chief opponent, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, gets to keep his job as leader of NATO's most troublesome member.Were the elections free and fair? Meh, says Foreign Policy/Council on Foreign Relations expert Steven Cook. This week he joins us to wrap up one of the world's most anticipated elections—even if the suspense was never more than mild.Erdogan isn't either a benevolent dictator or a tyrant. He's an authoritarian of his own flavor—and at least 52 percent of Turks can't get enough of it. In the 20 years he's been in power, he's mostly been a man for his moment, mixing Islamist beliefs with strong ties to at least military modernity. Before the May 28 vote, the 69-year-old had won many elections—by a lot. He was a popular reformist mayor of Turkey's largest and most storied city, Istanbul. He did so well there that he and his Islamist Justice and Development Party, AKP, moved up to the national stage.So, Steven, what's next for Erdogan and the rest of the world that has to deal with him?Listen to the show to find out.Angry Planet has a Substack! Join to get weekly insights into our angry planet and hear more conversations about a world in conflict.https://angryplanet.substack.com/subscribeYou can listen to Angry Planet on iTunes, Stitcher, Google Play or follow our RSS directly.Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/warcollege. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In the past two decades, the consumption of beauty services and cosmetic surgery in Turkey has developed from an elite phenomenon to an increasingly common practice, especially among younger and middle-aged women. Turkey now ranks among the top countries worldwide with the highest number of cosmetic procedures, and with its cultural and economic capital, Istanbul has become a regional center for the beauty and fashion industries. Istanbul Appearances: Beauty and the Making of Middle-Class Femininities in Urban Turkey (Syracuse University Press, 2023) shows the profound effects of this growing market on urban residents' body images, gendered norms, and practices. Drawing upon extensive fieldwork carried out in beauty salons and clinics in different parts of the city, Liebelt explores how standards of femininity and female desire have shifted since the consolidation of power and authoritarian rule of the conservative, pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party.  Arguing that the politics of beauty are intricately bound up with the politics of race, class, gender, and sexuality, Liebelt shows that female bodies have become a major site for the negotiation of citizenship. It is in the numerous beauty salons and clinics that the heteronormative ideals and images of gendered bodies become real, embodied in a complex array of emotional desires of who and what is considered not only beautiful but also morally proper. Claudia Liebelt is professor in social and cultural anthropology at the Free University of Berlin. She is the author of Caring for the ‘Holy Land': Filipina Domestic Workers in Israel. Armanc Yildiz is a doctoral candidate in Social Anthropology with a secondary field in Studies in Women, Gender and Sexuality at Harvard University. He is also the founder of Academics Write, where he supports scholars in their writing projects as a writing coach and developmental editor. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In the past two decades, the consumption of beauty services and cosmetic surgery in Turkey has developed from an elite phenomenon to an increasingly common practice, especially among younger and middle-aged women. Turkey now ranks among the top countries worldwide with the highest number of cosmetic procedures, and with its cultural and economic capital, Istanbul has become a regional center for the beauty and fashion industries. Istanbul Appearances: Beauty and the Making of Middle-Class Femininities in Urban Turkey (Syracuse University Press, 2023) shows the profound effects of this growing market on urban residents' body images, gendered norms, and practices. Drawing upon extensive fieldwork carried out in beauty salons and clinics in different parts of the city, Liebelt explores how standards of femininity and female desire have shifted since the consolidation of power and authoritarian rule of the conservative, pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party.  Arguing that the politics of beauty are intricately bound up with the politics of race, class, gender, and sexuality, Liebelt shows that female bodies have become a major site for the negotiation of citizenship. It is in the numerous beauty salons and clinics that the heteronormative ideals and images of gendered bodies become real, embodied in a complex array of emotional desires of who and what is considered not only beautiful but also morally proper. Claudia Liebelt is professor in social and cultural anthropology at the Free University of Berlin. She is the author of Caring for the ‘Holy Land': Filipina Domestic Workers in Israel. Armanc Yildiz is a doctoral candidate in Social Anthropology with a secondary field in Studies in Women, Gender and Sexuality at Harvard University. He is also the founder of Academics Write, where he supports scholars in their writing projects as a writing coach and developmental editor. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/gender-studies

In the past two decades, the consumption of beauty services and cosmetic surgery in Turkey has developed from an elite phenomenon to an increasingly common practice, especially among younger and middle-aged women. Turkey now ranks among the top countries worldwide with the highest number of cosmetic procedures, and with its cultural and economic capital, Istanbul has become a regional center for the beauty and fashion industries. Istanbul Appearances: Beauty and the Making of Middle-Class Femininities in Urban Turkey (Syracuse University Press, 2023) shows the profound effects of this growing market on urban residents' body images, gendered norms, and practices. Drawing upon extensive fieldwork carried out in beauty salons and clinics in different parts of the city, Liebelt explores how standards of femininity and female desire have shifted since the consolidation of power and authoritarian rule of the conservative, pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party.  Arguing that the politics of beauty are intricately bound up with the politics of race, class, gender, and sexuality, Liebelt shows that female bodies have become a major site for the negotiation of citizenship. It is in the numerous beauty salons and clinics that the heteronormative ideals and images of gendered bodies become real, embodied in a complex array of emotional desires of who and what is considered not only beautiful but also morally proper. Claudia Liebelt is professor in social and cultural anthropology at the Free University of Berlin. She is the author of Caring for the ‘Holy Land': Filipina Domestic Workers in Israel. Armanc Yildiz is a doctoral candidate in Social Anthropology with a secondary field in Studies in Women, Gender and Sexuality at Harvard University. He is also the founder of Academics Write, where he supports scholars in their writing projects as a writing coach and developmental editor. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/islamic-studies

In the past two decades, the consumption of beauty services and cosmetic surgery in Turkey has developed from an elite phenomenon to an increasingly common practice, especially among younger and middle-aged women. Turkey now ranks among the top countries worldwide with the highest number of cosmetic procedures, and with its cultural and economic capital, Istanbul has become a regional center for the beauty and fashion industries. Istanbul Appearances: Beauty and the Making of Middle-Class Femininities in Urban Turkey (Syracuse University Press, 2023) shows the profound effects of this growing market on urban residents' body images, gendered norms, and practices. Drawing upon extensive fieldwork carried out in beauty salons and clinics in different parts of the city, Liebelt explores how standards of femininity and female desire have shifted since the consolidation of power and authoritarian rule of the conservative, pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party.  Arguing that the politics of beauty are intricately bound up with the politics of race, class, gender, and sexuality, Liebelt shows that female bodies have become a major site for the negotiation of citizenship. It is in the numerous beauty salons and clinics that the heteronormative ideals and images of gendered bodies become real, embodied in a complex array of emotional desires of who and what is considered not only beautiful but also morally proper. Claudia Liebelt is professor in social and cultural anthropology at the Free University of Berlin. She is the author of Caring for the ‘Holy Land': Filipina Domestic Workers in Israel. Armanc Yildiz is a doctoral candidate in Social Anthropology with a secondary field in Studies in Women, Gender and Sexuality at Harvard University. He is also the founder of Academics Write, where he supports scholars in their writing projects as a writing coach and developmental editor. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/middle-eastern-studies

In the past two decades, the consumption of beauty services and cosmetic surgery in Turkey has developed from an elite phenomenon to an increasingly common practice, especially among younger and middle-aged women. Turkey now ranks among the top countries worldwide with the highest number of cosmetic procedures, and with its cultural and economic capital, Istanbul has become a regional center for the beauty and fashion industries. Istanbul Appearances: Beauty and the Making of Middle-Class Femininities in Urban Turkey (Syracuse University Press, 2023) shows the profound effects of this growing market on urban residents' body images, gendered norms, and practices. Drawing upon extensive fieldwork carried out in beauty salons and clinics in different parts of the city, Liebelt explores how standards of femininity and female desire have shifted since the consolidation of power and authoritarian rule of the conservative, pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party.  Arguing that the politics of beauty are intricately bound up with the politics of race, class, gender, and sexuality, Liebelt shows that female bodies have become a major site for the negotiation of citizenship. It is in the numerous beauty salons and clinics that the heteronormative ideals and images of gendered bodies become real, embodied in a complex array of emotional desires of who and what is considered not only beautiful but also morally proper. Claudia Liebelt is professor in social and cultural anthropology at the Free University of Berlin. She is the author of Caring for the ‘Holy Land': Filipina Domestic Workers in Israel. Armanc Yildiz is a doctoral candidate in Social Anthropology with a secondary field in Studies in Women, Gender and Sexuality at Harvard University. He is also the founder of Academics Write, where he supports scholars in their writing projects as a writing coach and developmental editor. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/anthropology

In the past two decades, the consumption of beauty services and cosmetic surgery in Turkey has developed from an elite phenomenon to an increasingly common practice, especially among younger and middle-aged women. Turkey now ranks among the top countries worldwide with the highest number of cosmetic procedures, and with its cultural and economic capital, Istanbul has become a regional center for the beauty and fashion industries. Istanbul Appearances: Beauty and the Making of Middle-Class Femininities in Urban Turkey (Syracuse University Press, 2023) shows the profound effects of this growing market on urban residents' body images, gendered norms, and practices. Drawing upon extensive fieldwork carried out in beauty salons and clinics in different parts of the city, Liebelt explores how standards of femininity and female desire have shifted since the consolidation of power and authoritarian rule of the conservative, pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party.  Arguing that the politics of beauty are intricately bound up with the politics of race, class, gender, and sexuality, Liebelt shows that female bodies have become a major site for the negotiation of citizenship. It is in the numerous beauty salons and clinics that the heteronormative ideals and images of gendered bodies become real, embodied in a complex array of emotional desires of who and what is considered not only beautiful but also morally proper. Claudia Liebelt is professor in social and cultural anthropology at the Free University of Berlin. She is the author of Caring for the ‘Holy Land': Filipina Domestic Workers in Israel. Armanc Yildiz is a doctoral candidate in Social Anthropology with a secondary field in Studies in Women, Gender and Sexuality at Harvard University. He is also the founder of Academics Write, where he supports scholars in their writing projects as a writing coach and developmental editor. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/sociology

In the past two decades, the consumption of beauty services and cosmetic surgery in Turkey has developed from an elite phenomenon to an increasingly common practice, especially among younger and middle-aged women. Turkey now ranks among the top countries worldwide with the highest number of cosmetic procedures, and with its cultural and economic capital, Istanbul has become a regional center for the beauty and fashion industries. Istanbul Appearances: Beauty and the Making of Middle-Class Femininities in Urban Turkey (Syracuse University Press, 2023) shows the profound effects of this growing market on urban residents' body images, gendered norms, and practices. Drawing upon extensive fieldwork carried out in beauty salons and clinics in different parts of the city, Liebelt explores how standards of femininity and female desire have shifted since the consolidation of power and authoritarian rule of the conservative, pro-Islamic Justice and Development Party.  Arguing that the politics of beauty are intricately bound up with the politics of race, class, gender, and sexuality, Liebelt shows that female bodies have become a major site for the negotiation of citizenship. It is in the numerous beauty salons and clinics that the heteronormative ideals and images of gendered bodies become real, embodied in a complex array of emotional desires of who and what is considered not only beautiful but also morally proper. Claudia Liebelt is professor in social and cultural anthropology at the Free University of Berlin. She is the author of Caring for the ‘Holy Land': Filipina Domestic Workers in Israel. Armanc Yildiz is a doctoral candidate in Social Anthropology with a secondary field in Studies in Women, Gender and Sexuality at Harvard University. He is also the founder of Academics Write, where he supports scholars in their writing projects as a writing coach and developmental editor. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

*) Myanmar confirms deadly air strike that is feared to have killed 100 Myanmar's ruling junta has confirmed that it carried out an air strike on a village in which some 100 people were reported to have been killed. UN rights chief Volker Turk said he was "horrified" by the strike that hit the remote Kanbalu township in the central Sagaing region. Initial reports put the death toll at around 50, but later tallies reported by independent media raised it to about 100. Turk said it included schoolchildren. The junta claimed that some of the dead were anti-coup fighters. *) US seeks to reassure allies after Ukraine-related documents leak Top US diplomat Antony Blinken and defence chief Lloyd Austin have spoken with their Ukrainian counterparts to reassure them after secret documents leaked online. The breach includes classified information about Ukraine's battle against Russian forces, as well as secret assessments of US allies. One document reviewed by the AFP news agency highlighted US concerns about Ukraine's capacity to keep defending against Russian strikes. Meanwhile, the Washington Post reported that another document expressed doubts about the success of an upcoming offensive by Kiev's forces. *) Pakistan slams India's decision to hold G20 meet in disputed Kashmir Pakistan has condemned India's decision to hold Group of 20 meetings in the disputed Himalayan territory of Kashmir next month. Its Foreign Ministry accused India of acting in "disregard of the UN Security Council resolutions and in violation of the principles of the UN Charter and international law." India's Foreign Ministry did not immediately comment on the statement from Pakistan. *) Türkiye's Erdogan unveils AK Party's election manifesto Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has announced his governing Justice and Development Party's manifesto ahead of the May 14 elections. Speaking in the capital Ankara, Erdogan unveiled a 23-point election manifesto, which firstly focuses on support for earthquake victims in southern Türkiye. He said 81 provinces will be transformed into disaster-resilient cities using what he called a "national risk shield model." *) NASA unveils 'Mars' habitat for year-long experiments on Earth Four small rooms, a gym and a lot of red sand – NASA has unveiled its new Mars-simulation habitat at the space agency's research base in Texas. During three planned experiments, volunteers will live in the habitat for a year at a time to test what life will be like on future missions to Mars. Four volunteers will begin the first trial this summer, during which NASA plans to monitor their physical and mental health to better understand astronauts' "resource use" on Mars.

In this episode of the party cooperation series, Zsolt Enyedi talks with Murat Somer, professor at Koç University working on polarization, religion, ethnic conflicts, democracy, and democratic erosion. He is an advisor to various civil society organizations and opposition political parties.   Turkey is a country with a long experience of cooperation among parties both in the government and outside of it. At the same time, Turkish politics is deeply polarized. The party system is dominated by AKP, the Justice and Development Party, led by Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the country's president. AKP is supported by the so-called People's Alliance. The opposition party with most governmental experience is CHP, the Republican People's Party. CHP leads the Nation Alliance, which is also called the “Table of Six”, having currently five other members. The Pro-Kurdish People's Democratic Party, HDP, is at the head of a third, smaller alliance. The parliamentary and presidential elections are scheduled to take place on 14th of May, six weeks from now.  

In Turkish society today, women have become more and more invisible under the rule of President Erdoğan's Justice and Development Party, illustrated by the absence of female supporters in Turkish football stadiums. This has not always been the case, however, as a recent article in the Soccer and Society journal highlighted. Sezen Kayhan's study focuses on a group of female supporters, the Purple Violets, who follow Orduspor, a team based in the city of Ordu on the Black Sea. In the 1970s, the Purple Violets grew in numbers to such an extent that the club decided to reserve a special place in the stadium just for them, known as the ‘women's bleacher'. Sezen notes that football was not only very popular but was the ‘pioneer social activity' for women in the city of Ordu in the 1970s and 1980s. Since then, however, the group has lost its enthusiasm and stopped going to games, due chiefly to the commercialization of football, the impact of political polarisation in Turkey on football fandom, and government policies strongly discouraging women's presence in public spaces; the latter has manifested itself in sexist chants and attacks on female supporters. Furthermore, the existence of Orduspor is itself under threat, after the local pro-government municipality formed a new team and forced Orduspor out of its stadium, which has now been demolished. *** If you enjoy the podcast, please follow us on social media at ⁠twitter.com/footballsocpod⁠ and leave us a five star review - it helps others discover the show!

A few months after his Justice and Development Party or AKP won Turkey's general elections in 2011, then Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan called on his fellow citizens to confront the past.  In the years that followed several prominent sites of state sponsored violence targeting ethnic and religious minorities and former political opponents of the regime were slated to become memorials and museums.  What inspired this desire to confront the past?  What were these sites of memory?  How did the violent histories of these sites complicate these initiatives?  These are the questions Professor Eray Çaylı examines in his recent book Victims of Commemoration: The Architecture and Violence of Confronting the Past in Turkey.  

In Turkey, the political and diplomatic fallout continues after a deadly bombing on Istiklal Avenue in Istanbul. Turkey blames Kurdish militants backed by the United States for the attack, which comes months before fraught elections. On Saturday, Bulgarian prosecutors charged five people in connection with the blast. Mourners continue to lay flowers at the site of the 13 November bombing in Istanbul's most famous shopping street. The attack killed six, including a mother and son, and a father and daughter. Dozens more were injured. Shop owners are clearing up the devastation and, like the rest of the city, trying to come to terms with this latest attack. "It has been a disaster, " said shopkeeper Lokman Kalkan. "People were fighting for their lives. There was blood everywhere, and screaming and crying. There was nothing we could do." While the country grieves for the dead, the political repercussions are already being felt. Security forces, after detaining the alleged bomber just hours after the attack, claimed it was carried out by the Kurdish militant group the Kurdistan Workers' Party or PKK, a charge it denies.  The PKK is fighting the Turkish state for greater minority rights. But Devlet Bahceli, leader of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's parliamentary coalition partner the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), has called for the closure of the political party that represents Kurds in parliament, the Peoples' Democratic Party or HDP. "We don't want to see separatists in the parliament. We cannot stand seeing terrorists. We cannot tolerate the HDP for even a second," Bahceli bellowed to cheers from his parliamentary deputies. The HDP is already facing closure, accused of having links with the PKK, a charge it denies. Many of its parliamentary deputies are jailed on terrorism charges, convictions condemned as politically motivated by the European Court of Human Rights.  Tension with the US The bombing fallout is also threatening to strain US-Turkish relations further. The police allege the bomber was trained by the Syrian Kurdish militia, the People's Defense Units (YPG), which Ankara says is affiliated with the PKK. Washington backs the Syrian Kurdish group in its fight against Islamic State extremists near the border between Syria and Turkey. Speaking at the site of the bombing, Turkish Interior Minister Suleyman Soylu said Turkey should rethink its relationship with the United States. "We refuse the condolences of the American embassy," Soylu said. "We cannot accept an alliance with a state that sends money from its own senate to these groups, feeding the terror zones in [border town] Kobani, which aims to disturb Turkey's peace. Such a state is in a contradictory situation. This is open and clear." Turkey lays the ground for a smoothing of relations with Syria Turkey and Russia closer than ever despite Western sanctions There is a large audience in Turkey for such anti-American rhetoric, argues Senem Aydin-Duzgit of the Istanbul Policy Centre. "You have the Americans' alliance with the Kurds, in particular in northern Syria. So there is this perception that America is sort of in an alliance with the PKK and the Kurdish nationalist movement. And that creates hostility," she says. "And there is a lot of anti-Americanism in Turkey as well – some of it historical, ideological, because you have anti-Americanism both on the right and the left of the political spectrum." Ghosts of 2015 election Diplomatic fallout between Ankara and Washington appears contained, at least for now. Despite strong words at home, Erdogan recently met US President Joe Biden on the sidelines of the G20 summit in Indonesia. But analysts suggest the real impact could be on Turkey's presidential elections next year. Erdogan and his Justice and Development Party, the AKP, are currently languishing in the opinion polls. Soli Ozel, a professor of international relations at Istanbul's Kadir Has University, is wary of a repeat of the 2015 general elections, when the AKP lost its absolute majority in parliament and an alternative government couldn't be formed. As elections loom in Turkey, Erdogan pulls plug on opposition social media How Turkish voters are beating internet press clampdown before polls That forced the vote to be repeated five months later, and in between violence escalated, says Ozel. "There were terrorist incidents, and one of the most awful terrorist incidents in the country's history with the largest number of deaths took place only 20 days before the repeat election," he recalls. Erdogan's AKP party eventually won the second election with a large majority. Opposition parties are already raising questions over the investigation into the Istiklal Avenue bombing, particularly the speed of the inquiry and its swift conclusions. That scrutiny is only likely to grow given the high political stakes, as many in the country look towards next year's election with increasing foreboding.

Turkey's main opposition party applied to the country's supreme court seeking a suspension of the enforcement of a newly-approved media law that mandates prison terms for people deemed to be spreading “disinformation.” Parliament approved a 40-article legislation that amends press and social media laws with the stated aim of combating fake news. Critics fear that the measure will be used to further crack down on social media and independent reporting as the country heads toward elections. The legislation, which was approved with the votes of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's ruling party and its nationalist allies, came into effect with its publication in the Official Gazette on October 11. The most controversial provision, Article 29, foresees up to three years in prison for spreading information that is “contrary to the truth” about Turkey's domestic and international security, public order and health for the alleged purpose of causing “public worry, fear and panic.” Engin Altay, a senior member of the main opposition Republican People's Party, applied to the Constitutional Court for the suspension of the implementation of Article 29. “This is a law that (aims to) present (the government's) lies as the truth, and the truth as lies, and can't be accepted,” Altay told reporters after submitting the plea. The party would seek the annulment of the entire legislation at a later date, he said. Erdogan argued for a law to combat disinformation and fake news, saying false news and rising “digital fascism” are national and global security threats. His Justice and Development Party and nationalist allies say disinformation prevents people from accessing the truth, undermining freedom of expression. The ruling party denies that the legislation aims to silence critics. This article was provided by The Associated Press.

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In this conversation with RevDem editor Ferenc Laczó regarding contemporary Turkey, Dimitar Bechev discusses how the Justice and Development Party has evolved into a personality cult; how Erdogan pro-active, remilitarized foreign policy has probably reached its limits; how leverage now goes both ways in EU-Turkey relations while Europeanization may also mean a turn to xenophobia; as well as the promising signs of democratic health and political competition.

Myanmar Genting di Bawah Junta, Umat Muslim Pontang-panting dan Terlunta-lunta Oleh. Iranti Mantasari, BA.IR, M.Si (Kontributor Tetap NarasiPost) Voice over talent: Dewi F NarasiPost.Com-Suara desingan peluru, peluh yang bercucuran, dan jiwa yang terombang-ambing menjadi deskripsi singkat akan situasi yang dihadapi oleh Myanmar pasca demonstrasi perlawanan terhadap militer kian memanas. Diwartakan oleh Antaranews, Tatmadaw atau nama junta militer Myanmar telah menghabisi lebih dari 1.375 nyawa dan menangkap 11.200 orang sejak mengudeta pemerintah pada bulan Februari tahun lalu. (Antaranews, 16/01/2022) Selain itu, menurut laporan dari Myanmar NOW, kondisi Myanmar saat ini sangat kacau mengingat perlawanan rakyat terhadap junta yang direspons dengan kekerasan bahkan pembunuhan oleh pasukan militer dan aparat. Pemerintah Myanmar yang secara de facto berada pada kekuasaan junta militer ini juga masih dengan bengisnya melakukan ethnic cleansing atau pembersihan etnis dan pembumihangusan pihak antijunta. Bahkan untuk menjadi lampu hijau bagi tindakan itu, junta tak segan menyebut kelompok-kelompok yang melakukan perlawanan atas kekuasaan hasil kudetanya itu sebagai teroris dan menyebarkan propaganda agar mereka tidak dibantu oleh berbagai elemen di Myanmar. Kondisi mencekam ini jika belum menemukan titik hentinya, maka menempatkan Myanmar di ambang kehancuran, karena konflik vertikal menjadi tak terelakkan. Berbagai upaya yang dianggap mampu menjadi solusi yang dilakukan oleh berbagai pihak bilateral dan multilateral pun hingga saat ini masih menemui jalan buntu. Sementara itu, berlanjutnya situasi ini sama saja dengan “merelakan” nasib rakyat sipil, termasuk di dalamnya adalah umat Islam sebagai kaum minoritas di Myanmar terlunta-lunta tak tentu arah. Junta Myanmar dan Konflik Vertikal Myanmar menjadi negara yang merdeka dari kolonialisme Inggris pada tahun 1948. Sejak mendeklarasikan kemerdekaannya itu, Myanmar menjalankan sistem demokrasi parlementer. Hanya saja, sistem ini berjalan selama 14 tahun saja, karena pada tahun 1962, jenderal militer Myanmar melakukan kudeta dan mengganti arah pemerintahan menjadi republik sosialis dan terus berjalan selama 26 tahun berkuasa. Barulah di tahun 2011, kekuasaan militer ini beralih ke “kekuasaan sipil” setelah partai rival dari militer, yakni Partai Persatuan dan Pembangunan (Union Solidarity and Development Party) memenangkan pemilu tahun 2010 dengan telak. Namun lagi-lagi, pihak junta berhasil merebut kekuasaan _de facto_Myanmar pada tahun 2021 lalu, walaupun militer tidak menjabat sebagai presiden. Naskah selengkapnya: https://narasipost.com/2022/01/24/myanmar-genting-di-bawah-junta-umat-muslim-pontang-panting-dan-terlunta-lunta/ Terimakasih buat kalian yang sudah mendengarkan podcast ini, Follow us on: instagram: http://instagram.com/narasipost Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/narasi.post.9 Fanpage: Https://www.facebook.com/pg/narasipostmedia/posts/ Twitter: Http://twitter.com/narasipost

Steven A. Cook, Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at CFR, leads a conversation on geopolitics in the Middle East.   FASKIANOS: Welcome to today's session of the CFR Fall 2021 Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/Academic, if you want to share it with your colleagues or classmates. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. Today's topic is geopolitics in the Middle East. Our speaker was supposed to be Sanam Vakil, but she had a family emergency. So we're delighted to have our very own Steven Cook here to discuss this important topic. Dr. Cook is the Eni Enrico Mattei senior fellow for Middle East and Africa studies, and director of the International Affairs Fellowship for Tenured International Relations Scholars at the Council on Foreign Relations. He is the author of several books, including False Dawn; The Struggle for Egypt, which won the 2012 Gold Medal from the Washington Institute for Near East Policy; and Ruling But Not Governing. And he's working on yet another book entitled The End of Ambition: America's Past, Present, and Future in the Middle East. So keep an eye out for that in the next year or so. He's a columnist at Foreign Policy magazine and contributor and commentator on a bunch of other outlets. Prior to coming to CFR, Dr. Cook was a research fellow at the Brookings Institution and a Soref research fellow at the Washington Institute for Near East Policy. So, Dr. Cook, thank you for being with us. I thought you could just—I'm going to give you a soft question here, to talk about the geopolitical relations among state and nonstate actors in the Middle East. And you can take that in whatever direction you would like. COOK: Well, thanks so much, Irina. It's a great pleasure to be with you. Good afternoon to everybody who's out there who's on an afternoon time zone, good morning to those who may still be in the evening, and good evening to those who may be somewhere where it's the evening. It's very nice to be with you. As Irina mentioned, and as I'm sure it's plenty evident, I am not Sanam Vakil, but I'm happy to step in for her and offer my thoughts on the geopolitics of the Middle East. It's a small topic. That question that Irina asked was something that I certainly could handle effectively in fifteen to twenty minutes. But before I get into the details of what's going on in the region, I thought I would offer some just general comments about the United States in the Middle East. Because, as it turns out, I had the opportunity last night to join a very small group of analysts with a very senior U.S. government official to talk precisely about the United States in the Middle East. And it was a very, very interesting conversation, because despite the fact that there has been numerous news reporting and analytic pieces about how the United States is deemphasizing the Middle East, this official made it very, very clear that that was practically impossible at this time. And this was, I think, a reasonable position to take. There has been a lot recently, in the last recent years, about withdrawing from the region, from retrenchment from the region, reducing from the region, realignment from the region. All those things actually mean different things. But analysts have essentially used them to mean that the United States should deprioritize the Middle East. And it seems to me that the problem in the Middle East has not necessarily been the fact that we are there and that we have goals there. It's that the goals in the region and the resources Washington uses to achieve those goals need to be realigned to address things that are actually important to the United States. In one sense that sound eminently reasonable. We have goals, we have resources to meet those goals, and we should devote them to—and if we can't, we should reassess what our goals are or go out and find new resources. That sounds eminently reasonable. But that's not the way Washington has worked over the course of the last few decades when it comes to the Middle East. In many ways, the United States has been overly ambitious. And it has led to a number of significant failures in the region. In an era when everything and anything is a vital interest, then nothing really is. And this seems to be the source of our trouble. For example, when we get into trying to fix the politics of other countries, we're headed down the wrong road. And I don't think that there's been enough real debate in Washington or, quite frankly, in the country about what's important in the Middle East, and why we're there, and what we're trying to achieve in the Middle East. In part, this new book that I'm writing called the End of Ambition, which, as Irina pointed out, will be out hopefully in either late 2022 or early 2023, tries to answer some of these questions. There is a way for the United States to be constructive in the Middle East, but what we've done over the course of the last twenty years has made that task much, much harder. And it leads us, in part, to this kind of geostrategic picture or puzzle that I'm about to lay out for you. So let me get into some of the details. And I'm obviously not going to take you from Morocco all the way to Iran, although I could if I had much, much more time because there's a lot going on in a lot of places. But not all of those places are of critical importance to the United States. So I'll start and I'll pick and choose from that very, very large piece of geography. First point: There have been some efforts to deescalate in a region that was in the middle of or on the verge of multiple conflicts. There has been a dialogue between the Saudis and the Iranians, under the auspices of the Iraqis, of all people. According to the Saudis this hasn't yielded very much, but they are continuing the conversation. One of the ways to assess the success or failure of a meeting is the fact that there's going to be another meeting. And there are going to be other meetings between senior Iranian and Saudi officials. I think that that's good. Egyptians and Turks are talking. Some of you who don't follow these issues as closely may not remember that Turkey and Egypt came close to trading blows over Libya last summer. And they pulled back as a result of concerted diplomacy on the part of the European Union, as well as the Egyptian ability to actually surge a lot of force to its western border. Those two countries are also talking, in part under the auspices of the Iraqis. Emiratis and Iranians are talking. That channel opened up in 2019 after the Iranians attacked a very significant—two very significant oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia, sort of scaring the Emiratis, especially since the Trump administration did not respond in ways that the Emiratis or the Saudis had been expecting. The Qataris and the Egyptians have repaired their relations. The Arab world, for better or for worse, is moving to reintegrate Syria into is ranks. Not long after King Abdullah of Jordan was in the United States, he and Bashar al-Assad shared a phone call to talk about the opening of the border between Jordan and Syria and to talk about, among other things, tourism to the two countries. The hope is that this de-escalation, or hope for de-escalation coming from this dialogue, will have a salutary effect on conflicts in Yemen, in Syria, in Libya, and Iraq. Thus far, it hasn't in Yemen, in particular. It hasn't in Syria. But in Libya and Iraq, there have been some improvements to the situation. All of this remains quite fragile. These talks can be—can break off at any time under any circumstances. Broader-scale violence can return to Libya at any time. And the Iraqi government still doesn't control its own territory. Its sovereignty is compromised, not just by Iran but also by Turkey. But the fact that a region that was wound so tight and that seemed poised to even deepen existing conflicts and new ones to break out, for all of these different parties to be talking—some at the behest of the United States, some entirely of their own volition—is, I think, a relatively positive sign. You can't find anyone who's more—let's put it this way, who's darker about developments in the Middle East than me. And I see some positive signs coming from this dialogue. Iran, the second big issue on the agenda. Just a few hours ago, the Iranians indicated that they're ready to return to the negotiating table in Vienna. This is sort of a typical Iranian negotiating tactic, to push issues to the brink and then to pull back and demonstrate some pragmatism so that people will thank for them for their pragmatism. This agreement to go back to the negotiating table keeps them on decent terms with the Europeans. It builds on goodwill that they have developed as a result of their talks with Saudi Arabia. And it puts Israel somewhat on the defensive, or at least in an awkward position with the Biden administration, which has very much wanted to return to the negotiating table in Vienna. What comes out of these negotiations is extremely hard to predict. This is a new government in Iran. It is certainly a harder line than its predecessor. Some analysts believe that precisely because it is a hardline government it can do the negotiation. But we'll just have to see. All the while this has been going on, the Iranians have been proceeding with their nuclear development, and Israel is continuing its shadow campaign against the Iranians in Syria, sometimes in Iraq, in Iran itself. Although, there's no definitive proof, yesterday Iranian gas stations, of all things, were taken offline. There's some suspicion that this was the Israelis showing the Iranians just how far and deep they are into Iranian computer systems. It remains unclear how the Iranians will retaliate. Previously they have directed their efforts to Israeli-linked shipping in and around the Gulf of Oman. Its conventional responses up until this point have been largely ineffective. The Israelis have been carrying on a fairly sophisticated air campaign against the Iranians in Syria, and the Iranians have not been able to mount any kind of effective response. Of course, this is all against the backdrop of the fact that the Iranians do have the ability to hold much of the Israeli population hostage via Hezbollah and its thousands of rockets and missiles. So you can see how this is quite worrying, and an ongoing concern for everybody in the region, as the Israelis and Iranians take part in this confrontation. Let me just continue along the line of the Israelis for a moment and talk about the Arab-Israeli conflict, something that has not been high on the agenda of the Biden administration, it hasn't been high on the agenda of many countries in the region. But since the signing of the Abraham Accords in September 2020, there have been some significant developments. The normalization as a result of the Abraham Accords continues apace. Recently in the Emirates there was a meeting of ministers from Israel, the UAE, Morocco, Bahrain, and Sudan. This is the first kind of face-to-face meeting of government officials from all of these countries. Now, certainly the Israelis and the Emiratis have been meeting quite regularly, and the Israelis and the Bahrainis have been meeting quite regularly. But these were broader meetings of Cabinet officials from all of the Abraham Accords countries coming together in the United Arab Emirates for talks. Rather extraordinary. Something that thirteen months—in August 2020 was unimaginable, and today is something that doesn't really make—it doesn't really make the headlines. The Saudis are actually supportive of the normalization process, but they're not yet willing to take that step. And they're not willing to take that step because of the Palestinian issue. And it remains a sticking point. On that issue, there was a lot of discussion after the formation of a new Israeli government last June under the leadership, first, of Naftali Bennett, who will then hand the prime ministership over to his partner, Yair Lapid, who are from different parties. That this was an Israeli government that could do some good when it comes to the Palestinian arena, that it was pragmatic, that it would do things that would improve the lives of Palestinians, whether in Gaza or the West Bank, and seek greater cooperation with both the United States and the Palestinian authority toward that end. And that may in fact turn out to be the case. This government has taken a number of steps in that direction, including family reunification, so that if a Palestinian on the West Bank who is married to a Palestinian citizen of Israel, the Palestinian in the West Bank can live with the family in Israel. And a number of other things. But it should also be clear to everybody that despite a kind of change in tone from the Israeli prime ministry, there's not that much of a change in terms of policy. In fact, in many ways Prime Minister Bennett is to the right of his predecessor, Benjamin Netanyahu. And Yair Lapid, who comes from a centrist party, is really only centrist in terms of Israeli politics. He is—in any other circumstances would be a kind of right of center politician. And I'll just point out that in recent days the Israeli government has declared six Palestinian NGOs—long-time NGOs—terrorist organizations, approved three thousand new housing units in the West Bank, and worked very, very hard to prevent the United States from opening a consulate in East Jerusalem to serve the Palestinians. That consulate had been there for many, many, many years. And it was closed under the Trump administration when the U.S. Embassy was moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem. The Biden administration would like to reopen that consulate. And the Israeli government is adamantly opposed. In the end, undoubtably Arab governments are coming to terms with Israel, even beyond the Abraham Accords countries. Egypt's flag carrier, Egyptair, announced flights to Tel Aviv. This is the first time since 1979. You could—you could fly between Cairo and Tel Aviv, something that I've done many, many times. If you were in Egypt, you'd have to go and find an office that would sell you a ticket to something called Air Sinai, that did not have regular flights. Only had flights vaguely whenever, sometimes. It was an Egyptair plane, stripped of its livery, staffed by Egyptair pilots and staff, stripped of anything that said Egyptair. Now, suddenly Egyptair is flying direct flights to Tel Aviv. And El-Al, Israel's national airline, and possibly one other, will be flying directly to Cairo. And there is—and that there is talk of economic cooperation. Israeli Prime Minister Naftali Bennett met with Egyptian President Abdel Fattah Al-Sisi in Sharm al-Sheikh not long ago. That was the first meeting of Israeli leaders—first public meeting of Israeli leaders and Egyptian leaders in ten years. So there does seem to be an openness on the part of Arab governments to Israel. As far as populations in these countries, they don't yet seem to be ready for normalization, although there has been some traffic between Israel and the UAE, with Emiratis coming to see Jerusalem and Tel Aviv, and so on and so forth. But there are very, very few Emiratis. And there are a lot of Egyptians. So as positive as that all is, this is—this has not been a kind of broad acceptance among the population in the Arab world for Israel's legitimate existence. And the kind of issue du jour, great-power competition. This is on everybody's lips in Washington, D.C.—great-power competition, great-power competition. And certainly, the Middle East is likely to be an arena of great-power competition. It has always been an arena of great-power competition. For the first time in more than two decades, the United States has competitors in the region. And let me start with Russia, because there's been so much discussion of China, but Russia is the one that has been actively engaged militarily in the region in a number of places. Vladimir Putin has parlayed his rescue of Hafez al-Assad into influence in the region, in an arc that stretches from NATO ally Turkey, all the way down through the Levant and through Damascus, then even stretching to Jerusalem where Israeli governments and the Russian government have cooperated and coordinated in Syria, into Cairo, and then into at least the eastern portion of Libya, where the Russians have supported a Qaddafist general named Khalifa Haftar, who used to be an employee of the CIA, in his bid for power in Libya. And he has done so by providing weaponry to Haftar, as well as mercenaries to fight and support him. That episode may very well be over, although there's every reason to believe that Haftar is trying to rearm himself and carry on the conflict should the process—should the political process in Libya break down. Russia has sold more weapons to Egypt in the last few years than at any other time since the early 1970s. They have a defense agreement with Saudi Arabia. It's not clear what that actually means, but that defense agreement was signed not that long after the United States' rather chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan, which clearly unnerved governments in the Middle East. So Russia is active, it's influential, its militarily engaged, and it is seeking to advance its interests throughout the region. I'll point out that its presence in North Africa is not necessarily so much about North Africa, but it's also about Europe. Its bid in Libya is important because its ally controls the eastern portion of Libya, where most of Libya's light, sweet crude oil is located. And that is the largest—the most significant reserves of oil in all of Africa. So it's important as an energy play for the Russians to control parts of North Africa, and right on Russia's—right on Europe's front doorstep. China. China's the largest investor and single largest trading partner with most of the region. And it's not just energy related. We know how dependent China is on oil from the Gulf, but it's made big investments in Algeria, in Egypt, the UAE, and in Iran. The agreement with Iran, a twenty-five-year agreement, coming at a time when the Iranians were under significant pressure from the United States, was regarded by many in Washington as an effort on the part of the Chinese to undercut the United States, and undercut U.S. policy in the region. I think it was, in part, that. I think it was also in part the fact that China is dependent in part on Iranian oil and did not want the regime there to collapse, posing a potential energy crisis for China and the rest of the world. It seems clear to me, at least, that the Chinese do not want to supplant the United States in the region. I don't think they look at the region in that way. And if they did, they probably learned the lesson of the United States of the last twenty-five years, which has gotten itself wrapped around the axle on a variety of issues that were unnecessary and sapped the power of the United States. So they don't want to get more deeply involved in the region. They don't want to take sides in conflicts. They don't want to take sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict. They don't take sides in the conflict between the United States and Iran, or the competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran. They want to benefit from the region, whether through investment or through extraction, and the security umbrella that the United States provides in the region. I'm not necessarily so sure that that security umbrella needs to be so expensive and so extensive for the United States to achieve its goals. But nevertheless, and for the time being at least, we will be providing that security umbrella in the region, from which the Chinese will benefit. I think, just to close on this issue of great-power competition. And because of time, I'm leaving out another big player, or emerging player in the region, which is India. I'm happy to talk about that in Q&A. But my last point is that, going back to the United States, countries in the region and leaders in the region are predisposed towards the United States. The problem is, is that they are very well-aware of the political polarization in this country. They're very well-aware of the political dysfunction in this country. They're very well-aware of the incompetence that came with the invasion of Iraq, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, or any number of disasters that have unfolded here in the United States. And it doesn't look, from where they sit in Abu Dhabi, in Cairo, in Riyadh, and in other places, that the United States has staying power, the will to lead, and the interest in remaining in the Middle East. And thus, they have turned to alternatives. Those alternatives are not the same as the United States, but they do provide something. I mean, particularly when it comes to the Chinese it is investment, it's economic advantages, without the kind of trouble that comes with the United States. Trouble from the perspective of leaders, so that they don't have to worry about human rights when they deal with the Chinese, because the Chinese aren't interested in human rights. But nevertheless, they remain disclosed toward the United States and want to work with the United States. They just don't know whether we're going to be there over the long term, given what is going on in the United States. I'll stop there. And I look forward to your questions and comments. Thank you. FASKIANOS: Steven, that was fantastic. Thank you very much. We're going to now to all of you for your questions. So the first raised hand comes from Jonas Truneh. And I don't think I pronounced that correctly, so you can correct me. Q: Yeah, no, that's right. Thank you. Thank you very much. Thank you, Dr. Cook, for your talk. I'm from UCL, University College London, in London. COOK: So it is—(off mic). Q: Indeed, it is. Yeah. That's right. COOK: Great. Q: So you touched on it there somewhat particularly with great-power competition, but so my question is related to the current energy logic in the Middle East. The Obama administration perhaps thought that the shale revolution allowed a de-prioritization, if I'm allowed to use that word, of the Middle East. And that was partly related to the pivot to Asia. So essentially does the U.S. still regard itself as the primary guarantor of energy security in the Persian Gulf? And if so, would the greatest beneficiary, as I think you indicated, would that not be China? And is that a case of perverse incentives? Is there much the U.S. can do about it? COOK: Well, it depends on who you ask, right? And it's a great question. I think that the—one of the things that—one of the ways in which the Obama administration sought to deprioritize and leave the region was through the shale revolution. I mean, the one piece of advice that he did take from one of his opponents in 2002—2008, which was to drill, baby, drill. And the United States did. I would not say that this is something that is specific to the Obama administration. If you go back to speeches of presidents way back—but I won't even go that far back. I'll go to George W. Bush in 2005 State of the Union addressed, talked all about energy independence from the Middle East. This may not actually be in much less the foreseeable future, but in really—in a longer-term perspective, it may be harder to do. But it is politically appealing. The reason why I say it depends on who you ask, I think that there are officials in the United States who say: Nothing has changed. Nothing has changed. But when the Iranians attacked those two oil processing facilities in Saudi Arabia, that temporarily took off 50 percent of supply off the markets—good thing the Saudis have a lot stored away—the United States didn't really respond. The president of the United States said: I'm waiting for a call from Riyadh. That forty years of stated American policy was, like, it did not exist. The Carter doctrine and the Reagan corollary to the Carter doctrine suddenly didn't exist. And the entirety of the American foreign policy community shrugged their shoulders and said: We're not going to war on behalf of MBS. I don't think we would have been going to war on behalf of MBS. We would have been ensuring the free flow of energy supplies out of the region, which is something that we have been committed to doing since President Carter articulated the Carter doctrine, and then President Reagan added his corollary to it. I think that there are a number of quite perverse incentives associated with this. And I think that you're right. The question is whether the competition from China outweighs our—I'm talking about “our”—the United States' compelling interest in a healthy global economy. And to the extent that our partners in Asia, whether it's India, South Korea, Japan, and our important trading partner in China, are dependent upon energy resources from the Gulf, and we don't trust anybody to ensure the free flow of energy resources from the Gulf, it's going to be on us to do it. So we are kind of hammered between that desire to have a healthy global economy as being—and being very wary of the Chinese. And the Chinese, I think, are abundantly aware of it, and have sought to take advantage of it. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question, which got an up-vote, from Charles Ammon, who is at Pennsylvania State University. And I think this goes to what you were building on with the great-power competition: What interests does India have in the Middle East? And how is it increasing its involvement in the region? COOK: So India is—imports 60 percent of its oil from the region. Fully 20 percent of it from Saudi Arabia, another 20 percent of it from Iran, and then the other 20 percent from other sources. So that's one thing. That's one reason why India is interested in the Middle East. Second, there are millions and millions of Indians who work in the Middle East. The Gulf region is a region that basically could not run without South Asian expatriate labor, most of which comes from India—on everything. Third, India has made considerable headway with countries like the United Arab Emirates, as well as Saudi Arabia, in counterextremism cooperation. This has come at the expense of Pakistan, but as relations between Pakistan and Saudi Arabia and relations between Pakistan and the UAE soured in recent years, the Indians have been able to take advantage of that. And Indian leaders have hammered away at the common interest that India and leaders in the region have in terms of countering violent extremism. And then finally, India and Israel have quite an extraordinary relationship, both in the tech field as well as in the defense area. Israel is a supplier to India. And the two of them are part of a kind of global network of high-tech powerhouse that have either, you know, a wealth of startups or very significant investment from the major tech players in the world. Israel—Microsoft just announced a huge expansion in Israel. And Israeli engineers and Indian engineers collaborate on a variety of projects for these big tech companies. So there's a kind of multifaceted Indian interest in the region, and the region's interest in India. What India lacks that the Chinese have is a lot more capacity. They don't have the kind of wherewithal to bring investment and trade in the region in the other direction. But nevertheless, it's a much more important player than it was in the past. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Curran Flynn, who has a raised hand. Q: How do you envision the future of Egypt, Sudan, and Ethiopia politics for the next thirty years? Ethiopia controls the Nile dam projects. And could this dispute lead to a war? And what is the progress with the U.S. in mediating the talks between the three countries? COOK: Thank you. FASKIANOS: And that is coming from the King Fahd University in Saudi Arabia. COOK: Fabulous. So that's more than the evening. It's actually nighttime there. I think that the question of the great Ethiopian Renaissance Dam is really an important one, and it's something that has not gotten as much attention as it should. And for those of you who are not familiar, in short the Ethiopians have been building a massive dam on the Blue Nile, which is a tributary to the Nile. And that if—when competed, threatens the water supply to Egypt, a country of 110 million people that doesn't get a lot of rainfall. Ethiopia, of course, wants to dam the Nile in order to produce hydroelectric power for its own development, something that Egypt did when it dammed the Nile River to build the Aswan High Dam, and crated Lake Nasser behind it. The Egyptians are very, very concerned. This is an existential issue for them. And there have been on and off negotiations, but the negotiations aren't really about the issues. They're talks about talks about talks. And they haven't gotten—they haven't gotten very far. Now, the Egyptians have been supported by the Sudanese government, after the Sudanese government had been somewhat aligned with the Ethiopian government. The Trump administration put itself squarely behind the Egyptian government, but Ethiopia's also an important partner of the United States in the Horn of Africa. The Egyptians have gone about signing defense cooperation agreements with a variety of countries around Ethiopia's borders. And of course, Ethiopia is engaged in essentially what's a civil war. This is a very, very difficult and complicated situation. Thus far, there doesn't seem to be an easy solution the problem. Now, here's the rub, if you talk to engineers, if you talk to people who study water, if you talk to people who know about dams and the flow of water, the resolution to the problem is actually not that hard to get to. The problem is that the politics and nationalism have been engaged on both sides of the issue, making it much, much more difficult to negotiate an equitable solution to the problem. The Egyptians have said in the past that they don't really have an intention of using force, despite the fact of this being an existential issue. But there's been somewhat of a shift in their language on the issue. Which recently they've said if red lines were crossed, they may be forced to intervene. Intervene how? What are those red lines? They haven't been willing to define them, which should make everybody nervous. The good news is that Biden administration has appointed an envoy to deal with issues in the Horn of Africa, who has been working very hard to try to resolve the conflict. I think the problem here however is that Ethiopia, now distracted by a conflict in the Tigray region, nationalism is running high there, has been—I don't want to use the word impervious—but not as interested in finding a negotiated solution to the problem than it might have otherwise been in the past. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from Bob Pauly, who's a professor of international development at the University of Southern Mississippi. It got three up-votes. What would you identify as the most significant likely short and longer-term effects of Turkey's present domestic economic and political challenges on President Erdogan's strategy and policy approaches to the Middle East, and why? COOK: Oh, well, that is a very, very long answer to a very, very interesting question. Let's see what happens in 2023. President Erdogan is facing reelection. His goal all along has been to reelected on the one hundredth anniversary of the republic, and to demonstrate how much he has transformed Turkey in the image of the Justice and Development Party, and moved it away from the institutions of the republic. Erdogan may not make it to 2023. I don't want to pedal in conspiracy theories or anything like that, but he doesn't look well. There are large numbers of videos that have surfaced of him having difficulties, including one famous one from this past summer when he was offering a Ramadan greeting on Turkish television to supporters of the Justice and Development Party, and he seemed to fade out and slur his words. This is coupled with reports trickling out of Ankara about the lengths to which the inner circle has gone to shield real health concerns about Erdogan from the public. It's hard to really diagnose someone from more than six thousand miles away, but I think it's a scenario that policymakers in Washington need to think seriously about. What happens if Erdogan is incapacitated or dies before 2023? That's one piece. The second piece is, well, what if he makes it and he's reelected? And I think in any reasonable observer sitting around at the end of 2021 looking forward to 2023 would say two things: One, you really can't predict Turkish politics this far out, but if Turkish elections were held today and they were free and fair, the Justice and Development Party would get below 30 percent. Still more than everybody else. And Erdogan would have a real fight on his hands to get reelected, which he probably would be. His approaches to his domestic challenges and his approaches to the region are really based on what his current political calculations are at any given moment. So his needlessly aggressive posture in the Eastern Mediterranean was a function of the fact that he needed to shore up his nationalist base. Now that he finds himself quite isolated in the world, the Turks have made overtures to Israel, to the UAE, to Saudi Arabia. They're virtually chasing the Egyptians around the Eastern Mediterranean to repair their relationship. Because without repairing these relationships the kind of investment that is necessary to try to help revive the Turkish economy—which has been on the skids for a number of years—is going to be—is going to be more difficult. There's also another piece of this, which is the Middle East is a rather lucrative arms market. And during the AKP era, the Turks have had a significant amount of success further developing their defense industrial base, to the point that now their drones are coveted. Now one of the reasons for a Saudi-Turkish rapprochement is that the United States will not sell Saudi Arabia the drones it wants, for fear that they will use them in Yemen. And the Saudis are looking for drones elsewhere. That's either China or Turkey. And Turkey's seem to work really, really well, based on experience in Syria, Libya, and Nagorno-Karabakh. So what—Turkish foreign policy towards the region has become really dependent upon what Erdogan's particularly political needs are. There's no strategic approach to the region. There is a vision of Turkey as a leader of the region, of a great power in its own right, as a leader of the Muslim world, as a Mediterranean power as well. But that's nothing new. Turkish Islamists have been talking about these things for quite some time. I think it's important that there's been some de-escalation. I don't think that all of these countries now love each other, but they see the wisdom of pulling back from—pulling back from the brink. I don't see Turkey's position changing dramatically in terms of its kind of reintegration into the broader region before 2023, at the least. FASKIANOS: Great. Let's go next to, raised hand, to Caleb Sanner. And you need to unmute yourself. Q: Hello, my name is Caleb. I'm from the University of Wisconsin-Whitewater. So, Dr. Cook, you had mentioned in passing how China has been involved economically in North Africa. And my question would be, how is the U.S. taking that? And what are we doing, in a sense, to kind of counter that? I know it's not a military advancement in terms of that, but I've seen what it has been doing to their economies—North Africa's economies. And, yeah, what's the U.S. stance on that? COOK: Well, I think the United States is somewhat detached from this question of North Africa. North Africa's long been a—with the exception of Egypt, of course. And Egypt, you know, is not really North Africa. Egypt is something in and of itself. That China is investing heavily in Egypt. And the Egyptian position is: Please don't ask us to choose between you and the Chinese, because we're not going to make that choice. We think investment from all of these places is good for—is good for Egypt. And the other places where China is investing, and that's mostly in Algeria, the United States really doesn't have close ties to Algeria. There was a tightening of the relationship after the attacks on New York and Washington in 2001, recognizing that the Algerians—extremist groups in Algerian that had been waging war against the state there over the course of the 1990s were part and parcel of this new phenomenon of global jihad. And so there has been a security relationship there. There has been some kind of big infrastructure kind of investment in that country, with big companies that build big things, like GE and others, involved in Algeria. But the United States isn't helping to develop ports or industrial parks or critical infrastructure like bridges and airports in the same way that the Chinese have been doing throughout the region. And in Algeria, as well as in Egypt, the Chinese are building a fairly significant industrial center in the Suez Canal zone, of all places. And the United States simply doesn't have an answer to it, other than to tell our traditional partners in the region, don't do it. But unless we show up with something to offer them, I'm afraid that Chinese investment is going to be too attractive for countries that are in need of this kind of investment. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to a written question from Kenneth Mayers, who is at St. Francis College in Brooklyn. In your opinion, what would a strategic vision based on a far-sighted understanding of both resources and U.S. goals—with regard to peace and security, prosperity and development, and institutions and norms and values such as human rights—look like in the Middle East and North Africa? COOK: Well, it's a great question. And I'm tempted to say you're going to have to read the last third of my new book in order to get the—in order to get the answer. I think but let me start with something mentioned about norms and values. I think that one of the things that has plagued American foreign policy over the course of not just the last twenty years, but in the post-World War II era all the way up through the present day, you see it very, very clearly with President Biden, is that trying to incorporate American values and norms into our approach to the region has been extraordinarily difficult. And what we have a history of doing is the thing that is strategically tenable, but morally suspect. So what I would say is, I mean, just look at what's happened recently. The president of the United States studiously avoided placing a telephone call to the Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. The Egyptians, as many know, have a terrible record on human rights, particularly since President Sisi came to power. Arrests of tens of thousands of people in the country, the torture of many, many people, the killings of people. And the president during his campaign said that he was going to give no blank checks to dictators, including to Abdel Fattah al-Sisi. And then what happened in May? What happened in May was that fighting broke out between Israel and Hamas and others in the Gaza Strip, a brutal eleven-day conflict. And Egypt stepped up and provided a way out of the conflict through its good offices. And that prompted the United States to—the president of the United States—to have two phone calls in those eleven days with the Egyptian leader. And now the United States is talking about Egypt as a constructive partner that's helping to stabilize the region. Sure, the administration suspended $130 million of Egypt's annual—$130 million Egypt's annual allotment of $1.3 billion. But that is not a lot. Egypt got most of—most of its military aid. As I said, strategically tenable, morally suspect. I'm not quite sure how we get out of that. But what I do know, and I'll give you a little bit of a preview of the last third of the book—but I really do want you to buy it when it's done—is that the traditional interests of the United States in the Middle East are changing. And I go through a kind of quasi, long, somewhat tortured—but very, very interesting—discussion of the origins of our interests, and how they are changing, and how we can tell they are changing. And that is to say that the free flow of energy resources may not be as important to the United States in the next twenty-five years as it was over the course of the previous fifty or sixty years. That helping to ensure Israeli security, which has been axiomatic for the United States, eh, I'd say since the 1960s, really, may not be as important as Israel develops its diplomatic relations with its neighbors, that has a GDP per capita that's on par with the U.K., and France, and other partners in Europe, a country that clearly can take care of itself, that is a driver of technology and innovation around the globe. And that may no longer require America's military dominance in the region. So what is that we want to be doing? How can we be constructive? And I think the answers are in things that we hadn't really thought of too systematically in the past. What are the things that we're willing to invest in an defend going forward? Things like climate change, things like migration, things like pandemic disease. These are things that we've talked about, but that we've never been willing to invest in the kind of the resources. Now there are parts of the Middle East that during the summer months are in-habitable. That's going to produce waves of people looking for places to live that are inhabitable. What do we do about that? Does that destabilize the Indian subcontinent? Does it destabilize Europe? Does it destabilize North Africa? These are all questions that we haven't yet answered. But to the extent that we want to invest in, defend and sacrifice for things like climate, and we want to address the issue—related issue of migration, and we want to deal with the issue of disease and other of these kind of functional global issues in the Middle East is better not just for us and Middle Easterners, but also in terms of our strategic—our great-power competition in the region. These are not things that the Chinese and the Russians are terribly interested in, despite the fact that the Chinese may tell you they are. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Ahmuan Williams, with a raised hand, at the University of Oklahoma. COOK: Oklahoma. Q: Hi. And thank you for being here. You kind of talked about the stabilization of northern Africa and the Middle East. And just a few days ago the Sudanese government—and they still haven't helped capture the parliamentarian there—have recycled back into a military—somewhat of military rule. And it's been since 2005 since the end of their last civil war, which claimed millions of innocent civilians through starvation and strife and, you know, the lack of being able to get humanitarian aid. There was also a huge refugee crisis there, a lot of people who evacuated Sudan. How's that going to impact the Middle East and the American take to Middle East and northern Africa policy, especially now that the Security Council is now considering this and is trying to determine what we should do? COOK: It's a great question. And I think that, first, let's be clear. There was a coup d'état in Sudan. The military overthrew a transitional government on the eve of having to hand over the government to civilians. And they didn't like it. There's been tension that's been brewing in Sudan for some time. Actually, an American envoy, our envoy to East Africa and Africa more generally, a guy named Jeff Feltman, was in Khartoum, trying to kind of calm the tension, to get the two sides together, and working to avert a coup. And the day after he left, the military moved. That's not—that doesn't reflect the fact that the United States gave a blessing for the military to overthrow this government. I think what it does, though, and it's something that I think we all need to keep in mind, it demonstrates the limits of American power in a variety of places around the world. That we don't have all the power in the world to prevent things from happening when people, like the leaders of the Sudanese military, believe that they have existential issues that are at stake. Now, what's worry about destabilization in Sudan is, as you point out, there was a civil war there, there was the creation of a new country there, potential for—if things got really out of hand—refugee flows into Egypt, from Egypt across the Sanai Peninsula into Israel. One of the things people are unaware of is the large number of Sudanese or Eritreans and other Africans who have sought refuge in Israel, which has created significant economic and social strains in that country. So it's a big deal. Thus far, it seems we don't—that the U.S. government doesn't know exactly what's happening there. There are protesters in the streets demanding democracy. It's very unclear what the military is going to do. And it's very unclear what our regional allies and how they view what's happening. What Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, what Saudi Arabia, what Israel—which Sudan is an Abraham Accords country now—what they are doing. How they view the coup as positive or negative will likely impact how effective the United States can be in trying to manage this situation. But I suspect that we're just going to have to accommodate ourselves to whatever outcome the Sudanese people and the Sudanese military come to, because I don't think we have a lot of—we don't have a lot of tools there to make everybody behave. FASKIANOS: OK. So I'm going to take the next question from Elena Murphy, who is a junior at Syracuse University's Maxwell School. And she's a diplomatic intern at the Kurdistan Regional Government's Representation in the United States. COOK: That's cool. FASKIANOS: That's very cool. So as a follow up, how much do you believe neo-Ottomanism and attempting regional hegemony has affected Erdogan's domestic and foreign policy, especially in consideration of Turkey's shift towards the MENA in their foreign policy, after a period of withdrawals and no problems with neighbors policy? COOK: Great. Can I see that? Because that's a long question. FASKIANOS: Yeah, it's a long question. It's got an up-vote. Third one down. COOK: Third one down. Elena, as a follow up, how much do you believe neo-Ottomanism—I'm sorry, I'm going to have to read it again. How much do you believe neo-Ottomanism and attempting regional has affected Erdogan's both domestic and foreign policy, especially in consideration of Turkey's shift towards the MENA in their foreign policy, after a period of withdrawals and no problems with neighbors? OK. Great. So let us set aside the term “neo-Ottomanism” for now. Because neo-Ottomanism actually—it does mean something, but people have often used the term neo-Ottomanism to describe policies of the Turkish government under President Erdogan that they don't like. And so let's just talk about the way in which the Turkish government under President Erdogan views the region and views what Turkey's rightful place should be. And I think the Ottomanism piece is important, because the kind of intellectual framework which the Justice and Development Party, which is Erdogan's party, views the world, sees Turkey as—first of all, it sees the Turkish Republic as a not-so-legitimate heir to the Ottoman Empire. That from their perspective, the natural order of things would have been the continuation of the empire in some form or another. And as a result, they believe that Turkey's natural place is a place of leadership in the region for a long time. Even before the Justice and Development Party was founded in 2001, Turkey's earlier generation of Islamists used to savage the Turkish leadership for its desire to be part of the West, by saying that this was kind of unnatural, that they were just merely aping the West, and the West was never actually going to accept Turkey. Which is probably true. But I think that the Justice and Development Party, after a period of wanting to become closer to the West, has turned its attention towards the Middle East, North Africa, and the Muslim world more generally. And in that, it sees itself, the Turks see themselves as the natural leaders in the region. They believe they have a cultural affinity to the region as a result of the legacies of the Ottoman Empire, and they very much can play this role of leader. They see themselves as one of the kind of few real countries in the region, along with Egypt and Iran and Saudi Arabia. And the rest are sort of ephemeral. Needless to say, big countries in the Arab world—like Egypt, like Saudi Arabia—don't welcome the idea of Turkey as a leader of the region. They recognize Turkey as a very big and important country, but not a leader of the region. And this is part of that friction that Turkey has experienced with its neighbors, after an earlier iteration of Turkish foreign policy, in which—one of the earliest iterations of Turkish foreign policy under the Justice and Development Party which was called no problems with neighbors. In which Turkey, regardless of the character of the regimes, wanted to have good relations with its neighbors. It could trade with those neighbors. And make everybody—in the process, Turkey could be a driver of economic development in the region, and everybody can be basically wealthy and happy. And it didn't really work out that way, for a variety of reasons that we don't have enough time for. Let's leave it at the fact that Turkey under Erdogan—and a view that is shared by many—that Turkey should be a leader of the region. And I suspect that if Erdogan were to die, if he were unable to stand for election, if the opposition were to win, that there would still be elements of this desire to be a regional leader in a new Turkish foreign policy. FASKIANOS: Steven, thank you very much. This was really terrific. We appreciate your stepping in at the eleventh hour, taking time away from your book. For all of you— COOK: I'm still not Sanam. FASKIANOS: (Laughs.) I know, but you were an awesome replacement. So you can follow Steven Cook on Twitter at @stevenacook. As I said at the beginning too, he is a columnist for Foreign Policy magazine. So you can read his work there, as well as, of course, on CFR.org, all of the commentary, analysis, op-eds, congressional testimony are there for free. So I hope you will follow him and look after his next book. Our next Academic Webinar will be on Wednesday November 3, at 1:00 p.m. Eastern time on the future of U.S.-Mexico relations. In the meantime, I encourage you to follow us, @CFR_Academic, visit CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for new research and analysis on global issues. And stay well, stay safe, and thank you, again. COOK: Bye, everyone. FASKIANOS: Bye. (END)

*) Morocco's ruling party suffers crushing defeat in elections Morocco's ruling Justice and Development Party has suffered great losses in the parliamentary elections, according to preliminary results. The PJD went from holding 125 seats to 12 in Parliament. The vote has seen the rise of the main liberal and centre-right parties. The PJD has been in power since 2011 following pro-democracy protests. *) Taliban forbid protests and, possibly, women sports The new Taliban government is seeking to end protests in Afghanistan after days of heavy-handed assaults on protesters as well as journalists covering the demonstrations. The minister has issued an order to end all protests unless demonstrators get prior permission, including approval of slogans and banners. It's unlikely the women who have been leading rallies demanding their rights from the hardline rulers will be allowed to protest under the rules. Women will also be prohibited from playing sports, Australian media quoted the Taliban cultural commission as saying on Wednesday. *) Afghan national flag carrier to resume international flights next week Afghanistan's national flag carrier is preparing to resume international flights next week, its new president has said. Rahmatullah Gulzad praised Qatari and Turkish technical experts for their assistance in getting Kabul airport operational in the shortest possible time. The teams are still working on Kabul airport, he said, adding they will stay for another month to ensure that it meets international standards. *) Libyan warlord Haftar hires American lobbyists to woo Biden Libyan warlord Khalifa Haftar has hired veteran American political insiders to lobby on his behalf with the Biden administration and Congress. Haftar has paid a $40,000 retainer to former special counsel to president Bill Clinton, Lanny Davis and ex-Republican House lawmaker Robert Livingston. A Foreign Agents Registration Act filing dated September 3 shows Haftar will pay some $960,000 over the course of six months. And finally... *) Confederate leader Robert Lee's statue removed in Virginia The statue of the confederate general Robert E Lee has been taken down in the US state of Virginia. The pro-slavery leader's monument was removed after a year-long battle. The figure had been towering over Richmond since 1890. Memorials of confederate leaders had been increasingly targeted in the country's protests against racism.

This Week in Turkey‘s guest was People's Republican Party Representative to the United States, Yurter Özcan. Mr. Özcan provided information on businessman Sezgin Baran Korkmaz's shady dealings in the United States. Mr. Özcan further assesses his arrest and whether his case could be compared with the case of Reza Zarrab. Mr. Özcan evaluated the meaning of the ruling Justice and Development Party's silence over the arrest of SBK and, in the likelihood of SBK's collaboration with the US government, the implications it might have for Turkey.

For the last two decades, Turkey has been ruled by the Justice and Development Party (better known by its Turkish acronym AKP), a political party with its origins in the country's Islamist movement. The rise of the AKP was a profound shock for the secular nationalist elite that had dominated Turkish political life since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey in the early 1920s. Initially, the AKP - under the leadership of Recep Tayyip Erdogan - postured as a liberalizing force in Turkish politics, promising greater political freedom, an end to military tutelage, a resolution to the Kurdish question, and an improvement of relations with neighboring countries. However, over the last decade the AKP and Erdogan have become increasingly authoritarian and repressive internally and aggressive abroad.   What explains this transformation?   What does it mean for the future of Turkey? And what does it mean for the broader Middle East and Balkans?     About Professor Tugal: Cihan Tuğal studies three interlocking dynamics: 1) capitalism's generation and destruction of communities, livelihoods, and places; 2) the implosion of representative democracy; 3) the crisis of liberal ethics. His ongoing research focuses on populism, the radical right, and neoliberalism in the United States and the Middle East. He has also initiated a team project to study the ecological crisis of capitalism, with special emphasis on the role of labor and community struggles in developing sustainable energy. Tuğal's most recent book, Caring for the Poor (2017, Routledge), examines the emergence, globalization, and decline of liberal ethics by focusing on charity, philanthropy, and welfare. The book builds on a Maussian analysis of the gift, as well as Polanyian, Marxian, Bourdieusian, and Foucaultian theorizations of charity. Tuğal has published offshoots of his larger project on welfare ethics in the American Journal of Sociology, Qualitative Sociology, and Rethinking Marxism. His ongoing work explores ethical, religious, and spiritual alternatives to the rationalization and individualization of care and wellbeing.   Three articles on the global uprisings of 2009-2013 provide a snapshot of Tuğal's work on capitalism and politics (see below: “Elusive Revolt”, "Decline of the Monopoly of Legitimate Violence," and “Resistance Everywhere”). Marketization, uneven growth, increasing ineffectiveness of American hegemony, and decimation of middle classes have undermined the (liberal-conservative) mainstream and incited revolt. As Tuğal's collaborative work with De Leon and Desai emphasizes, political creativity (or lack thereof) thoroughly shapes what kind of a route societies take in response to such turbulence. For now, the American far right has scored (important but) restricted victories as a result of this global chaos (see below: "The Counter-Revolution's Long March"). His earlier books unpacked similar processes in Turkey, Egypt, Iran, and Tunisia (Passive Revolution, Stanford University Press; and The Fall of the Turkish Model, Verso). He has also written extensively in Turkish.   Thank you guys again for taking the time to check this out. We appreciate each and everyone of you. If you have the means, and you feel so inclined, BECOME A PATRON! We're creating patron only programing, you'll get bonus content from many of the episodes, and you get MERCH! Become a patron now https://www.patreon.com/join/BitterLakePresents? Please also like, subscribe, and follow us on these platforms as well, (specially YouTube!) THANKS Y'ALL YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCG9WtLyoP9QU8sxuIfxk3eg Twitch: www.twitch.tv/thisisrevolutionpodcast www.twitch.tv/leftflankvets​ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/Thisisrevolutionpodcast/ Twitter: @TIRShowOakland Instagram: @thisisrevolutionoakland Medium: https://jasonmyles.medium.com/kill-the-poor-f9d8c10bc33d  

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan consolidated his power at the Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) recent congress in Ankara, Gökhan Bacık, a lecturer in political science at Palacky University, told an Ahval podcast. Speaking to Ahval Editor-in-Chief Yavuz Baydar, Bacık said the AKP gathering on Wednesday showed a one-party system had been established in Turkey.

Interview with Ashraf Al-Jabari, a Palestinian political activist from Hebron and the head of the Reform and Development Party. He is the Founder of the Judea and Samaria Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as well as a member of the General Authority in the Hebron Chamber of Commerce and Industry. We spoke about his movement to create business relationships with leading Israeli industrialists to create employment opportunities for Palestinians which will eventually lead to peace between the 2 peoples. Mr. Jabari has worked with US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman, and has met with US members of Congress to help advance his agenda. He has called out Mahmood Abbas and the corruption of the Palestinian Authority, and exposed their lies that has kept their people down for decades.

Interview with Ashraf Al-Jabari, a Palestinian political activist from Hebron and the head of the Reform and Development Party. He is the Founder of the Judea and Samaria Chamber of Commerce and Industry, as well as a member of the General Authority in the Hebron Chamber of Commerce and Industry. We spoke about his movement to create business relationships with leading Israeli industrialists to create employment opportunities for Palestinians which will eventually lead to peace between the 2 peoples. Mr. Jabari has worked with US Ambassador to Israel David Friedman, and has met with US members of Congress to help advance his agenda. He has called out Mahmood Abbas and the corruption of the Palestinian Authority, and exposed their lies that has kept their people down for decades.

Over the past decade, President Erdoğan and his Justice and Development Party have promoted a vision of a ‘New Turkey' undergoing a process of Islamization and distancing itself from its secular, modern Republican past. This social engineering project has attempted to make changes to one of the symbolic domains of the secular, urban middle classes, namely football. Turkish football has a fascinating history, which Dr Dağhan Irak explored in an article published in the Soccer and Society journal in 2020. Football was first introduced during the last century of the Ottoman Empire and formed one of the strongest links with Europe and ideas of modernity. Today, over 80% of Turkish football fans support one of the so-called ‘Big Three': Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe, and Galatasaray. Fandom practices among these sets of supporters are shaped in the secular stronghold of Istanbul and in conflict with Erdoğan's Islamization process. Fans of the Big Three were heavily involved in the anti-Erdoğan Gezi Park protests in 2013. Subsequently, the Erdoğan regime introduced measures designed to crack down on dissident supporters, which included banning political slogans inside stadiums and introducing an e-ticket scheme. Furthermore, the regime renamed two football clubs in municipalities run by Erdoğan's AKP party, in an attempt to create a pro-AKP fanbase. Başakşehir and Osmanlispor, however, have received limited support and in some cases employees of the municipality are forced to attend games. Erdoğan, a former semi-professional player himself, is effectively seeking to recreate football and fandom in line with the new regime, ignoring its historical links with the Western world. How successful have Erdoğan's photo opportunities with players such as Mezut Özil been? How did football establish such a central position in Turkish society and culture? Is there more that unites Istanbul rivals Beşiktaş, Fenerbahçe and Galatasaray than divides them? ...all this and more in the tenth episode of the Football and Society podcast. *** If you like the podcast, please subscribe and give us a review via your platform of choice. Follow us on Twitter: www.twitter.com/footballsocpod Follow Dağhan on Twitter: www.twitter.com/daghanirak Dağhan will be speaking at a seminar entitled 'Athletes and Politics: The Fallacy of "Stick to Sport" as a Global Phenomenon' on 11 February 2021. Email Dr. Errol Salamon (e.salamon@hud.ac.uk) for access. *** Each week, Ash, Chris and Norman explore societal issues through the lens of the beautiful game. From the ethics of gambling sponsorship to what a stadium move means for fans, we'll be covering it all each week with expert guests from the worlds of sports journalism and sociology.

In early 2021, after declaring the 2020 election a fraud, armed men rolled into the capital with the intent of capturing members of the government. No, we're not referring to the United States, but to Myanmar. On February 1, the military in Myanmar staged a coup d'état. Why? The associated Union Solidarity & Development Party took a thumping in the 2020 elections. The military quickly called the election a fraud, challenged it in court, and then staged a coup. But the very nature of democracy in Myanmar was meant to serve the interests of the military. Why a coup? Why now? And what's next? In this episode of GDP we're joined by Patrick Balazo, who was a Killam Scholar, and recipient of the Canada Graduate Scholarship in honour of Nelson Mandela. Patrick worked for a Burmese human rights organization in Thailand, and is an expert on statelessness and conflict. Follow Dr. Bob on Twitter: @ProfessorHuish

This Week in Turkey‘s guest was Levent Köker, a professor of public law. Professor Köker evaluated the state of law in Turkey in light of the Defense March launched by bar associations across Turkey in protest to the growing pressure from the ruling Justice and Development Party. Professor Köker also evaluated the decisions relating to Istanbul Provincial head for the CHP Canan Kaftancıoğlu’s prison sentence, and the Constitutional Court’s decision relating to former HDP co-chair Selahattin Demirtaş’s imprisonment. Professor Köker also assessed how far AKP is willing to stretch the limits of legitimacy in the face of growing opposition.

This Week in Turkey’s guest was political scientist Burak Bilgehan Özpek. Mr. Özpek spoke about the new political parties of Turkey and where they fit on the political landscape. He evaluated the parties’ leaders, Future Party Chariman Ahmet Davutoğlu and DEVA Part Chairman Ali Babacan especially in relation to their self-criticism about their time in the Justice and Development Party. Furthermore, Mr. Özpek also provided insight as to how these parties could address the whole of Turkey’s population.

Attitudes toward intoxication can be unstable. The government of Turkey, for example, within a single generation went from producing alcohol and promoting its consumption as civil and modern, to restricting the consumption of alcohol and prohibiting its advertisement, right down to cellphone ringtones that sound like beer bottles opening. A culture once known for its Bektashi Sufis and Janissary soldiers, both famous for enjoying alcohol, now faces increasing pressure to dry out. This remarkable turnaround is indicative of the ways in which societies regulate alcohol by cultural norms and legal statues that are all subject to change. In this episode of Stories from the Stacks, historical geographer Kyle Evered, associate professor at Michigan State University, discusses the culture and regulation of alcohol in Turkey, from the late Ottoman Empire through the early Republican period and up to the present day. Religion, ethnic & sectarian identity, and political ideals all played a role in shaping attitudes toward alcohol. While the Ottomans tolerated alcohol, the early Turkish republic positively promoted it, while the twenty-first century rise of the AKP (Justice & Development Party) has led to increasing restrictions on alcohol in the name of tradition and public health. Using Hagley Library collections, including the Seagram Collections, Dr. Evered discovered that Turkish alcohol producers, such as the global firm Efes Beverage, face similar pressures as did North American firms during prohibition of alcohol in the United States. Strategies deployed by Seagram in attempting to remain economically viable in the face of prohibition, included retooling and relocation of production facilities, and making concerted efforts to push back against the regulatory regime. By studying the Seagram experience, Dr. Evered gained new perspective with which to compare the regulation of alcohol in Turkey. To support his use of Hagley Library collections, Dr. Evered received an Exploratory Research Grant from the Center for the History of Business, Technology, & Society. More information on funding opportunities for research at Hagley can be found at www.hagley.org/research/grants-fellowships. For more Stories from the Stacks, visit www.hagley.org/research/programs/stories-stacks, or subscribe on your favorite podcatcher. Interview by Michael Forino. Produced by Gregory Hargreaves. Image: From the cover of Nation’s Business, August 1921, nationsbiz_081921, Nation’s Business (f HF1.N38), Published Collections Department, Hagley Museum & Library, Wilmington, DE 19807.

Last November I was invited to animate a Round Table conversation in the Faculty of Divinity at Necmeddin Erbakan University in Konya, Turkey. Konya was the home of the great Sufi mystic Rumi and the Faculty of Divinity has a large professoriate and well over 2000 students, mostly women. In my Round Table remarks I discussed American Evangelical Christianity including its current role in America culture.  Several of my remarks resonated with Tahir Uluc, Professor of Islamic Philosophy, and the author of a number of books largely on the Sufi tradition of Islam in Turkey. We met following the Round Table and discussed the gifts and challenges facing Turkey and our larger world. Professor Uluc is a keen observer of Turkey, a fine professor who has a deep interest in his students and in education in Turkey. Some context is important to understand what continues to unfold in Turkey and Professor Uluc’s concerns. When the Ottoman Empire ended following the First World War Mustafa Kemal Ataturk founded the Republic of Turkey and becoming its first President in 1923. His political party led the modernization of Turkey and ushered in a secular state that modeled itself after elements in France following its Revolution in 1789. Religion was removed from its central place in Turkish culture, many religious leaders were executed, some banished, and others went underground. Fine contributions were mixed with virulent ones, as is so often the case with sweeping social change. With the election of Recep Tayyip Erdogan as Prime Minister along with his Justice and Development Party in 2003 another set of remarkable changes were ushered in. I have visited Turkey a number of times in the last decade and appreciated many of these changes. I have also been a critic of how the Western press characterizes the changes coming about in Turkey. The fears expressed show little appreciation for this remarkable country and no understanding for its distinct form of Islam and its potential role in the modern world. I welcome your thoughts on our conversation and may be reached at www.davidgoa.ca/contact.

On March 27th, 1994 Recep Tayyip Erdogan took office as the mayor of Istanbul, launching a career that would eventually make him president of the country. Ever since then, Istanbul has been governed by parties that Erdogan associated himself with. Since 2004, Erdogan’s AK (Justice and Development) Party has ruled Istanbul. On March 31st, 2019, … Continue reading "No Turkish Delight: What Does a Redo of Istanbul’s Election Mean For Turkey?"

Sumantra Bose's new book Secular States, Religious Politics, India, Turkey and the Future of Secularism (Cambridge University Press, 2018) is a fascinating comparison of the rise of religious parties in the non-Western world's two major attempts to establish a post-colonial secular state. The secular experiments in Turkey and India were considered success stories for the longest period of time but that has changed with the rise of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan's Justice and Development Party in Turkey and Prime Minister Narendra Modi's Bharatiya Janata Party in India and the capture of state power by political forces with an anti-secular vision of nationhood. In his ground-breaking book, Bose attributes the rise of secularism to the fact that non-Western states like Turkey and India never adopted the Western principle of separation of state and church and instead based their secularism on the principle of state intervention and regulation of the religious sphere. In doing so, Bose distinguishes between the embedding of secularism in Turkey in authoritarianism entrenched in the carving out of the modern Turkish state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and the fact that secularism in India is rooted in culture and a democratic form of government. With the anti-secular trend in Turkey and India fitting into a global trend in which cultural and religious identity is gaining traction, Bose's study constitutes a significant contribution to the study of the future of secularism and the often complex relationship between religious parties and the secular state. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Singapore's S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.  

Sumantra Bose‘s new book Secular States, Religious Politics: India, Turkey and the Future of Secularism (Cambridge University Press, 2018) is a fascinating comparison of the rise of religious parties in the non-Western world’s two major attempts to establish a post-colonial secular state. The secular experiments in Turkey and India were considered success stories for the longest period of time but that has changed with the rise of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in Turkey and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party in India and the capture of state power by political forces with an anti-secular vision of nationhood. In his ground-breaking book, Bose attributes the rise of secularism to the fact that non-Western states like Turkey and India never adopted the Western principle of separation of state and church and instead based their secularism on the principle of state intervention and regulation of the religious sphere. In doing so, Bose distinguishes between the embedding of secularism in Turkey in authoritarianism entrenched in the carving out of the modern Turkish state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and the fact that secularism in India is rooted in culture and a democratic form of government. With the anti-secular trend in Turkey and India fitting into a global trend in which cultural and religious identity is gaining traction, Bose’s study constitutes a significant contribution to the study of the future of secularism and the often complex relationship between religious parties and the secular state. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Sumantra Bose‘s new book Secular States, Religious Politics: India, Turkey and the Future of Secularism (Cambridge University Press, 2018) is a fascinating comparison of the rise of religious parties in the non-Western world’s two major attempts to establish a post-colonial secular state. The secular experiments in Turkey and India were considered success stories for the longest period of time but that has changed with the rise of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in Turkey and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party in India and the capture of state power by political forces with an anti-secular vision of nationhood. In his ground-breaking book, Bose attributes the rise of secularism to the fact that non-Western states like Turkey and India never adopted the Western principle of separation of state and church and instead based their secularism on the principle of state intervention and regulation of the religious sphere. In doing so, Bose distinguishes between the embedding of secularism in Turkey in authoritarianism entrenched in the carving out of the modern Turkish state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and the fact that secularism in India is rooted in culture and a democratic form of government. With the anti-secular trend in Turkey and India fitting into a global trend in which cultural and religious identity is gaining traction, Bose’s study constitutes a significant contribution to the study of the future of secularism and the often complex relationship between religious parties and the secular state. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Sumantra Bose's new book Secular States, Religious Politics, India, Turkey and the Future of Secularism (Cambridge University Press, 2018) is a fascinating comparison of the rise of religious parties in the non-Western world’s two major attempts to establish a post-colonial secular state. The secular experiments in Turkey and India were considered success stories for the longest period of time but that has changed with the rise of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in Turkey and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party in India and the capture of state power by political forces with an anti-secular vision of nationhood. In his ground-breaking book, Bose attributes the rise of secularism to the fact that non-Western states like Turkey and India never adopted the Western principle of separation of state and church and instead based their secularism on the principle of state intervention and regulation of the religious sphere. In doing so, Bose distinguishes between the embedding of secularism in Turkey in authoritarianism entrenched in the carving out of the modern Turkish state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and the fact that secularism in India is rooted in culture and a democratic form of government. With the anti-secular trend in Turkey and India fitting into a global trend in which cultural and religious identity is gaining traction, Bose’s study constitutes a significant contribution to the study of the future of secularism and the often complex relationship between religious parties and the secular state. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Sumantra Bose's new book Secular States, Religious Politics, India, Turkey and the Future of Secularism (Cambridge University Press, 2018) is a fascinating comparison of the rise of religious parties in the non-Western world’s two major attempts to establish a post-colonial secular state. The secular experiments in Turkey and India were considered success stories for the longest period of time but that has changed with the rise of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in Turkey and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party in India and the capture of state power by political forces with an anti-secular vision of nationhood. In his ground-breaking book, Bose attributes the rise of secularism to the fact that non-Western states like Turkey and India never adopted the Western principle of separation of state and church and instead based their secularism on the principle of state intervention and regulation of the religious sphere. In doing so, Bose distinguishes between the embedding of secularism in Turkey in authoritarianism entrenched in the carving out of the modern Turkish state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and the fact that secularism in India is rooted in culture and a democratic form of government. With the anti-secular trend in Turkey and India fitting into a global trend in which cultural and religious identity is gaining traction, Bose’s study constitutes a significant contribution to the study of the future of secularism and the often complex relationship between religious parties and the secular state. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Sumantra Bose's new book Secular States, Religious Politics, India, Turkey and the Future of Secularism (Cambridge University Press, 2018) is a fascinating comparison of the rise of religious parties in the non-Western world’s two major attempts to establish a post-colonial secular state. The secular experiments in Turkey and India were considered success stories for the longest period of time but that has changed with the rise of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in Turkey and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party in India and the capture of state power by political forces with an anti-secular vision of nationhood. In his ground-breaking book, Bose attributes the rise of secularism to the fact that non-Western states like Turkey and India never adopted the Western principle of separation of state and church and instead based their secularism on the principle of state intervention and regulation of the religious sphere. In doing so, Bose distinguishes between the embedding of secularism in Turkey in authoritarianism entrenched in the carving out of the modern Turkish state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and the fact that secularism in India is rooted in culture and a democratic form of government. With the anti-secular trend in Turkey and India fitting into a global trend in which cultural and religious identity is gaining traction, Bose’s study constitutes a significant contribution to the study of the future of secularism and the often complex relationship between religious parties and the secular state. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Sumantra Bose's new book Secular States, Religious Politics, India, Turkey and the Future of Secularism (Cambridge University Press, 2018) is a fascinating comparison of the rise of religious parties in the non-Western world’s two major attempts to establish a post-colonial secular state. The secular experiments in Turkey and India were considered success stories for the longest period of time but that has changed with the rise of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in Turkey and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party in India and the capture of state power by political forces with an anti-secular vision of nationhood. In his ground-breaking book, Bose attributes the rise of secularism to the fact that non-Western states like Turkey and India never adopted the Western principle of separation of state and church and instead based their secularism on the principle of state intervention and regulation of the religious sphere. In doing so, Bose distinguishes between the embedding of secularism in Turkey in authoritarianism entrenched in the carving out of the modern Turkish state from the ruins of the Ottoman Empire and the fact that secularism in India is rooted in culture and a democratic form of government. With the anti-secular trend in Turkey and India fitting into a global trend in which cultural and religious identity is gaining traction, Bose’s study constitutes a significant contribution to the study of the future of secularism and the often complex relationship between religious parties and the secular state. James M. Dorsey is a senior fellow at Singapore’s S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies.   Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Sumantra Bose‘s new book Secular States, Religious Politics: India, Turkey and the Future of Secularism (Cambridge University Press, 2018) is a fascinating comparison of the rise of religious parties in the non-Western world’s two major attempts to establish a post-colonial secular state. The secular experiments in Turkey and India were considered success stories for the longest period of time but that has changed with the rise of President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Justice and Development Party in Turkey and Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party in India and the capture of state power by political forces with an anti-secular vision of nationhood.

Turkey's parliament votes on constitutional reform debate. We spoke to MP of CHP Mr Sezgin Tanrıkulu on the contents and voting process in Turkish parliament. - TBMM Genel Kurulu'nda Anayasa değişikliği teklifinin birinci tur oylaması muhalefet ve iktidar partileri milletvekilleri arasında sert tartışmalara neden oluyor. Anayasa değişiklik paketi'nin içeriği ve oylaması hakkında CHP Milletvekili Sezgin Tanrıkulu ile görüştük.

Truthunvieled777 The ANTICOINTELPRO SHOW: RED ALERT! COMING TO A POLICE-STATE NEAR YOU!!!! On the evening of Friday, July 15th, 2016, state-run Anadolu agency reported 17 police officers that had been killed in a helicopter attack on police special forces headquarters near Ankara, Turkey. These planes flew above Turkey's capital â?? in attempt to overthrow Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan via a military coup. Deputy Prime Minister Numan Kurtulmus said that Turkey's ruling Justice and Development Party were still in charge of the Turkish Government â?? and such coup attempts ended up failing. However, this military coup resulted in military units patrolling the streets, military troops seizing key bridges in Istanbul, the shutdown of Turkey's Ataturk International Airport â?? thereby resulting in flight cancellations and airport closures, Turkish military declaring martial law, and citizens unable to access social media networks such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube. Not to mention thousands of military officers detained, thousands of people injured, hundreds killed (at least, this is what they're TELLING us), as well as the ongoing riots, protests, and upheaval in Turkey â?? even as we speak. Turkish Prime Minister, Binali Yildirim, has also addressed the media concerning this. But Could This Be Coming To America?!?! THE TRUTH REVEALED!!! SEE THE WORLD AROUND YOU! AND SEE THE WARNING SIGNS AHEAD OF TIME!!! PLEASE SEEK YAHUAH AND HIS TRUE SON YAHUSHA â?? BECAUSE AS YOU CAN SEE, IT'S ONLY A MATTER OF TIME!!!!!!! ALSO SEE â?? More On Nice Attacks! https://youtu.be/QEUXQYCaa_Q ALSO SEE â?? More On RESET 2016! https://youtu.be/tMAlapLLfZo LEARN MORE! Martial Law Military Times: http://www.militarytimes.com/story/mi... Defense News: http://www.defensenews.com/story/defe... USA Today: http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/20... Zerohedge: http://www.zerohedge.com/news/2016-07... Military Coup YNW: http://yournewswire.com/military-coup... RT: https://www.rt.com/news/351343-turkey... CNN: http://www.cnn.com/2016/07/15/world/l... Express: http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/6... President Erdogan Statement TCCB: https://www.tccb.gov.tr/en/news/542/4...

Turkey's Justice and Development Party, also known as AKP, won 317 seats in the General National Assembly with Sunday's elections more than expected and more than the 276 needed for a majority, but not enough to change the constitution directly. The results confounded pollsters since AKP failed to win a majority in June elections or form a coalition government. Confronting renewed conflict with Kurdish militant groups and the devastating consequences of four years of war in Syria, Turks voted to continue current policies to manage the country's long-running conflicts, writes Chris Miller, associate director of Yale University's Grand Strategy Program. Western partners are impatient with the Turkish presidents intolerance of opposition. The decisive win, combined with increased support for AKP from ethnic Kurds, could add pressure for a peace deal with Kurdish PKK militants, Miller explains. Turkey's ruling party and the Kurds have reason to cooperate in battling Islamic State extremists that control large sections of neighboring Syria and threaten the entire region.YaleGlobal