Podcasts about kemalist

Evvela kısa bir girizgâh… 15-16 Şubat tarihlerinde HÜDA PAR Genel Merkezi Diyarbakır'da “Kürt Meselesine İnsani Çözüm” başlığıyla bir çalıştay düzenledi. Çalıştayın ilk günkü oturumunun ilk konuşmacısı bendim. “Geçmişten Günümüze Kürt Meselesinde Çözüm Arayışları ve Neticeleri” konulu konuşmamı yazılı metinden okudum ki o birileri, hatta AK Partili görünen ama gerçekte İttihatçı-Kemalist bir zihne sahip olanlar söylediklerimi çarpıtma yoluna gitmesinler.

“Atatürk ülkemizi tek başına düşmanlardan kurtardı. Cumhuriyet Türkiye'sini yoktan var etti. Gerici, cahil, köhne, tutucu bir güruhtan ilerici, modern, çağdaş, Batılı, laik, bilimin ışığıyla aydınlanmış bir ulus yarattı. Onun için Atatürk bizim rehberimiz, liderimiz, ebedi şefimiz, idolümüz, varlık nedenimiz, üst insan, meta-insan, bugünümüzü sağlayan, her nefesimizi borçlu olduğumuz ulu önderimizdir. Biz hepimiz onun izindeyiz. Biz Mustafa Kemal'in askerleriyiz. Açtığı yolda, gösterdiği ülküde, hiç durmadan yürüyenleriz. Varlığımızı onun varlığına armağan ettik.

Anti Cahiliye'nin yeni bölümü, Post-Kemalizm'in Kökenleri, Sol Kemalizm Yükseliyor Mu, Ulusalcılık Piyasası isimli bir önceki bölümün devamı. Her konuda cehaletin reddedildiği podcast Anti Cahiliye'nin 13. bölümü yayında! Yeni bölümlerde birçok farklı cehalet unsuru sizlerle olacak. #atatürk #kemalizm #ulusalcılık

15 Temmuz darbe ve ihanet girişiminin yıl dönümü dolayısıyla, bir haftadır Fetullahçı terör ve ihanet şebekesini konuşuyoruz. Bir yandan milletimizin destansı direnişini, diğer yandan şeytanın aklına bile gelmeyecek iblislikleri yapan ihanet şebekesini konuşuyoruz. Bu topraklarda her zaman ihanet edenler var olmuştur. Hainler hep bir önceki ihanetin devamı ve takipçisi oldu. Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü önceki bütün ihanetlerin kokteyli ve zirvesidir. İslamiyet'in doğuşundan bu yana üretilen tüm fitne ve fesatları içinde barındıran, İslam karşıtı en büyük münafık şebekesidir Fetullahçılık. Ülkemizdeki İslam düşmanları, bu münafık şebekesini İslam içindeymiş gibi gösterip, hem Müslümanlara iftira atıyor hem de özde birlikte oldukları Fetullahçı hainleri korumaya çalışıyor. Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü, yöntem itibarıyla bu topraklarda büyük kötülüklere imza atmış, Osmanlı Devleti'nin yıkılışının zeminini hazırlamış, Evangelist misyoner teşkilatının devamıdır, yerli yardımcısıdır. Bu yüzden ABD'de çok üst düzey bir koruma altındadır. FETULLAHÇILIK ‘DİNCİ'DİR AMA O DİNİN İSLAM'LA İLGİSİ YOKTUR! Fetullahçı ihanet şebekesi Türkiye toplumunda varlığını hissettirdiği günden beri, sözde Atatürkçü, Kemalist, sol ve İslam karşıtı çevreler tarafından ‘dinci' diye lanse edilmeye çalışılıyor. Üstelik 15 Temmuz'dan sonra ortaya çıkan İslam karşıtlığına ve Hıristiyan ve Yahudi dünyasının koruma girişimlerine rağmen, bu söylem hâlâ devam ettiriliyor. Evet, Fetullahçılık ‘dinci'dir ama o dinin İslam'la bir ilgisi yoktur. Fetullahçılığı İslam ile ilgili tarikat ve cemaatlerle bir tutup, özde İslam'a düşmanlık yapıp, perde arkasında FETÖ'yü gizlemek isteyenler var. Bir kısmı bunları cahilliğinden yapıyor olabilir. Ancak bir kısmının kasıtlı ve bilerek yaptığı gerçeğini bilmemiz gerekir. 28 Şubat sürecinde Fetullah'ın etinden-sütünden yararlanarak, Müslümanlara en büyük kötülüğü yapanlar, bugünlerde Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü'nü dinci bir yapılanmaymış gibi göstererek, geçmişlerini gizlemeye çalışıyor. Fetullah'ın ne olduğunu en iyi onlar biliyor. Çünkü birlikte aynı amaca hizmet ediyorlar. Fetullahçılar dincidir, doğru. Fetullahçılar sapkındır, o da doğru. Firari FETÖ'cü işadamı Mehmet Eldem'in anlattığına göre, örgütlerinin başına gelecekler 1000 yıl önce İzmir'de yazılan İncil'de yer alıyormuş. Papaz mı bilmiyoruz, Paul adında biri söylemiş bunlara. Meseleyi Fetullah'a söylemişler. Fetullah da söz konusu İncil'in yan binadaki kütüphanede olduğunu söylemiş. Sonra Paul ile Jerald'ı Fetullah'ın huzuruna çıkarmışlar. Fetullah da Jerald'a ayakkabılarını hediye etmiş. Jerald da ayakkabıları ayağına değil kafasının üstüne koymuş.

Basmakalıp klişelerle düşünmek, sloganlarla konuşmak, ideolojinin dar çerçevesinde kalmak sıradan insanların işidir. İşi gücü insanları manipüle etmek, kendi çıkarları doğrultusunda yönetip itaat ettirmek olan politikacılar mesajlarını düşünceleri harekete geçirerek, düşünceyi teşvik ederek ve uygulayarak iletmez. Düşüncenin özgürce gelişimi ve gösterebildiği sınırlara kadar gitmesi hiçbir zaman işlerine gelmez. Düşünce ancak kendi istediği yere kadar götürüyorsa makbul, muteber ve meşrudur. Kendi istediği yere götürmeyen, kitleleri kendisine kuzu gibi itaat ettirmeyen düşünce ile işleri olmaz. Bazen ortaya düşünce adamı rollerinin kasvetiyle çıkıp da yeterince taraftar toplayınca işi belli siyasetlerin sloganlarına, klişelerine, ideolojilerine bağlayan sofistler kitleleri uyanık siyasetçilere teba kılma vazifesini de profesyonelce yerine getirirler. Bunların arasında zaten yaptığının ne anlama geldiğini ne işe yaradığını bilmeden bu işi inanarak yapanlar da yok değil elbet. Tarihselcilik diye kastığı büyük lafların nasıl bir tarihselliğin ürünü olduğunu görememenin trajikomik durumu bile çok özgün bir şey değil. Tarih boyunca kendini sürekli tekrarlayan sıradan bir gaflet ve delalet hali. Şeriat tartışmaları Türkiye'de hiçbir zaman düşünceye, bilgiye, bilgeliğe en küçük bir derinleşmeye fırsat vermeyen, sadece sloganların konuşulduğu bir alan olmuştur. Bu ülkede İslam Şeriatını lağvedenler onun yerine kendi şeriatlarını hakim kıldılar ve yaptıkları işi haklı göstermek için bütün kötülükleri yükledikleri bir Şeriat klişesi ürettiler. “Kendi şeriatlarını hakim kıldılar” ifademiz de lafın gelişi, yoksa bunların Şeriatları Hıristiyan İsviçre'den, köhne Roma'dan, oradan buradan anlamadan, bilmeden yapılmış ithal ikamesi bir yamamadan ibaret. Müslüman Türk'ün ne tarihine ne örfüne ne sosyolojisine uymayan bir Şeriat uydurdular ve yüz yıldır bu şeriatla yönetiyorlar bu ülkeyi. Bu şeriat, bugünlerde Vahdettin İnce'nin tezkire.net'teki nitelemesiyle Batı Bedevîyeti'nin daha büyük şeriatının bu ülkeye uyarlanmış halinden başka bir şey değil. Bugünlerde İslam Şeriatına sanki başımıza din adına veya bütün siyasi süreçler adına gelen bütün musibetlerin sebebiymiş gibi atıp tutanların gözden kaçırdıkları veya bizzat kendilerinin de gözünden kaçan en temel gerçek en az yüz yıldır bu ülkede İslam Şeriatından bir eser olmadığıdır. Şeriat-İslam özdeşliği elbette birkaç izahat yapmadan kurulamayacak bir şeydir. Şeriat İslam'ın bir vasfı bir özelliğidir. Şeriatsız İslam olmaz. Tıpkı şeriatsız Yahudilik, şeriatsız Hıristiyanlık, şeriatsız herhangi bir din veya siyasal ideoloji olamayacağı gibi. Nitekim şeriatsız Kemalizm de olmuyor ve yüzyıldır bu ülkede geçerli olan bir Kemalist şeriat vardır. Bu dünyada iki yüzyıldır geçerli olan bir Batı Bedevîyeti şeriatı vardır. Bu bedevîyet Osmanlı'nın I. Dünya Savaşında Batı ile olan savaşında yenik düşmesiyle birlikte İslam'ın Şeriatını lağvedip yerine geçti. Bugün İslam dünyası öyle veya böyle Batı Bedeviyetinin şeriatıyla yönetiliyor. Kimsenin yaşadığı hiçbir olumsuzluğun sebebini İslam Şeriatı'na yüklemeye hakkı yok. Bunu yapanlar ancak emperyalistler adına geçerli olan bir şeriatı güçlendirmek, onu haklılaştırmak, onu sürdürebilmek adına yapıyorlar.

Tacikistan diktatörü İmamali Rahman başörtüsü ve İslâmî bayramları yasakladı! Yasağa önce ismini değiştirerek başlamalıydı komünist KGB artığı, Çin uydusu bu adam! Tacikistan'da başörtüsü ve İslâmî bayramların yasaklanmasına sevinen ve Türkiye'de de yasaklanmalı diyen tiplere rastladım. Araştırın bakın, bunların köken itibariyle Türk de, Müslüman da olmadıklarını görürseniz şaşırmayın!  İSLÂM'DAN NEFRET EDEN TÜRK OLAMAZ!  İslâm'dan nefret eden kişiler köken itibariyle Türk olamaz. Türk, İslâm'dan nefret etmez. Aslâ! Türk, nankör değildir çünkü! Türkler, İslâm'la şereflendikten sonra üç kıtada bin yıl dünya tarihini yapmış, insanlığa adaletin, merhametin ve farklı dinlerle, inançlarla, kültürlerle, düşünce gelenekleriyle bir arada, barış içinde nasıl yaşanabileceğinin en mükemmel formülünü ve modelini geliştirmiş ama trajikomik olan şu ki, önce kendi çocukları tarafından hakkıyla anlaşılamamış ve dünya ölçeğinde de henüz aşılamamış aziz ve leziz, nefis ve nezih büyük bir medeniyet inşa etmeyi başarabilmiştir. Türkler, insanlık tarihine bilim, düşünce, sanat, ahlâk, siyaset ve estetikte Müslüman olduktan sonra büyük katkılar sunmuştur. Müslüman olmadan önce insanlık tarihine yaptıkları katkılar sınırlıdır. Bugün insanlığın önünü açacak, herkese hayat hakkı tanıyan, herkesin adalet, hukuk ve merhamet düzeni içinde huzur içinde yaşamasını sağlayacak medeniyet mefkûresini dünyaya sunacak potansiyele, tarihî tecrübeye, birikime ve ufka biz sahibiz. Türkiye'nin beklenen olduğu, umut olarak görüldüğü bir zaman diliminde bu umudu yok etmeye, bu ufku karartmaya dönük bütün girişimler ya basiretsizliktir ya da büyük bir operasyonun bir parçasıdır. Şunu herkes zihnine iyi kazısın: Bu toprakları biz İslâm'la vatan yaptık. İslâm'a yapılan her saldırı, bu ülkenin birliğine, dirliğine ve kardeşliğine yapılmış bir saldırıdır. İslâm'a yapılan her saldırı, bu ülkenin dünyanın umudu ve ufku olduğu gerçeğini baltalamaya dönük aşağılık ve hâince bir saldırıdır.   İSLÂM'I TERKEDEN, ÜLKEYİ DE TERKEDER KOLAYCA…  İslâmî inançlarını yitiren insanlar bu ülkeyi kolaylıkla terkedecek, ülkeyi kurda kuşa, leş kargalarına, emperyalistlere yem etmekten çekinmeyecek steril, duyarsız insanlardır. Kısa bir araştırma yapın, göreceksiniz bu gerçeği ve ürpereceksiniz! Bana İngilizler pasaport verdiler ama ben suratlarına çarptım. Türkiye'de İngilizlerin veya Amerikalıların filan verdiği pasaportu suratlarına çarpan bir laik / Kemalist görmedim, bilmiyorum; varsa öne çıksın, alnından öpeceğim. Bu ülkede İslâm'a saldıran kişilerin kökenini araştırın, bu kişilerin Türk de, Kürt de olmadıklarını göreceksiniz büyük bir ihtimalle. Ayrıca şunu da artık çok iyi biliyoruz: İslâm'ı yitirirseniz Türklüğünüzü de yitirmeniz kaçınılmazdır. Etrafınıza bakın göreceksiniz bu yakıcı gerçeği: Bulgarlar, Macarlar, Romenler Türk mü şimdi; Türklüklerini neden koruyamadılar, iyi düşünün.

Ülkemizde bazı siyasi geleneklerin zihniyet bağlamından köklü bir değişime uğramayacağına dair bir kanaatim var. Bir yönüyle Arnold Toynbee'nin dediği gibi “Doğu Doğu'dur, Batı da Batı'dır.” Bu bağlamda ülkemiz entelektüellerinin ömrünün tamamına yakını CHP üzerine yapılan mülahazalarla geçmiştir. İnönü'nün eski CHP'si, Ecevit CHP'si, Baykal CHP'si, Kılıçdaroğlu CHP'si ve Özgür Özel'in temsil ettiği ve ilk bakışta iki başlı olan bugünkü CHP. Cumhuriyet Halk Partili politikacılar bugüne kadar geleneksel partililer, Atatürkçülük ve sırasıyla Özal, Erbakan ve Erdoğan korkusuyla iç kaleye sığınmış kitlelerin yönetilmesinden ibaretti. Bu sebepten dolayı herhangi bir belediye başkanı ve siyasetçi, birkaç Kemalist nutuk atınca, konuşmalarda alkış almayınca Atatürk ismini kullanarak daha çok kentleşmesini tamamlamış illerde varlık göstererek siyaseti bugünlere taşıdılar. Daha önce İstanbul, Ankara belediyelerinin CHP tarafından kazanılması ve bugün daha çok rasyonel seçmenin var olduğu illerde birçok belediyenin alınması partiyi doğal olarak yeni arayışlara itmiştir. Seçim sonuçlarının bu şekilde olacağını ne AK Parti ne de Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi bekliyordu. Bu sebepten dolayı seçim sonrası olanı biteni yorumlamak için CHP'de hiç de alışkın olmadığımız bir teenni durumu var. Öncelikli olarak İmamoğlu'nun seçim sonrası beklentisi şu şekilde idi; “Değil mi ki kurultayı ben organize ettim ve Özgür Özel'e kazandırdım, bu partinin doğal lideri benim. Seçimden sonra bu işi bir hal yoluna koyarız.” Seçim sonuçları hiç de İmamoğlu'na hayal ettiği iklimi sunmadı. Partinin başarılı olması, belediye başkanlarının olduğu kadar genel başkanın başarısı olarak görüldü ve Özgür Özel pozisyon almaya başladı.

Türkiye'deki yerli, kökü tarihin derinliklerinde olan tarikat ve cemaatleri salt birer dini yapılanma, dini örgütlenme olarak görenler fena halde yanılıyorlar. Anadolu'nun ve Balkanların Müslümanlaştırılması eli kılıçlı alperenlerin fetihleriyle değil, onlardan önce sınır bölgelerine, uçlara yerleşen dervişlerin cesur ve fedakâr gayretleriyle mümkün olmuştu. Harezm'de, Maverünnehir'de, Türkistan'da, Horasan'da; Buhara, Semerkant, Yesi, Herat, Bağdat gibi şehirlerin medreselerinde eğitimlerini tamamlayan dervişler, orduların henüz giremedikleri uçlara postlarını sermiş, alperenler gelmeden önce gönülleri fethetmiş, kalpleri yumuşatmış, zemini hazırlamışlardı. Yesevilik, Nakşibendilik, Mevlevilik, Ekberilik, Kübrevilik, Aşıkilik, Sühreverdilik, Kalenderilik, Kadirilik, Rüfailik ve daha nicesi maldan, mülkten, dünyevi her şeyden el ve eteklerini çekerek, geri dönmeyi asla düşünmeyerek hep ileriye gitmişlerdi. Tarikat ve cemaatleri Anadolu ile Balkanları sadece İslamlaştıran organizasyonlar olarak görmek de yanıltıcı olacaktır. Bugün eğer bir yurdumuz, vatanımız varsa, istiklal içinde bayrağımız özgürce dalgalanabiliyor, dilimizi yaşatabiliyor ve konuşabiliyorsak, topraklarımızda ezan okunuyorsa, milletimiz parçalanmadan, çatışmadan bir arada durabiliyorsa, bu, hiç tartışmasız, o yerli cemaat ve tarikatların sayesindedir. Cemaat ve tarikatlar Anadolu'yu fethetmekle kalmamış, Anadolu'nun var olmasını, ayakta ve diri kalmasını da sağlamışlardır. Cemaat ve tarikatların dini yaklaşımları, parasal faaliyetleri, siyasete yaklaşımları, kimilerinin çürümesi ve yozlaşması elbette tartışılabilir ama gerçek olan şu ki, dün olduğu gibi bugün de milletimizi, toplumumuzu ayakta tutan bu organizasyonlardır. Cumhuriyetle birlikte cemaat ve tarikatlara yönelik hasmane tutum, özellikle tekke ve zaviyelerin kapatılması girişimi hedefine ulaşsa, başarılı olsa, bugün bir milletten, özellikle de Müslüman bir milletten söz etmek belki de mümkün olmayacaktı. Yasaklama ve kısıtlamalar “Anadolu'nun ruhunu” silip atamadı ama yer altına, merdiven altına sürükledi ve denetimsiz bıraktı. Tekrar edeyim: Dini, parasal ya da siyasi faaliyetleri tartışılabilir, konuşulabilir, eleştirilebilir ama bugün İsmailağa gibi, Menzil gibi büyük yapılanmalar ya da samimiyetinden ve yerliliklerinden şüphe duyulmayacak irili ufaklı örgütlenmeler sessiz, derinden ve kendilerini çok da fark ettirmeden toplumu, sosyal hayatı, birliğimizi, bütünlüğümüzü, imanımızı, ahlakımızı ayakta tutuyorlar. Kemalist tayfa, cemaat ve tarikatların tarihte ve bugün nasıl bir fonksiyona sahip olduklarını göremiyor olabilir ama “elin gâvuru” bunu çoktan fark etti ve uzun zamandır bu yapılanmaları yıpratmak için operasyonlar yapıyor. Bir ABD yapımı olan, ABD'den yönetilen ve var olduğu her yerde ABD çıkarları için çalışan Fetullahçılığın, dini bir yapılanma görüntüsüyle toplumun, milletin imanının, devletin ayarlarıyla nasıl oynadığını hepimiz gördük. En çok da Türkiye'deki yerli cemaat ve tarikatlara savaş açarak onları nasıl bozmaya kalkıştığına şahit olduk. Fetullahçılığın toplumun, özellikle de gençlerin imanında açtığı hasarın bugün nelere yol açtığını da üzülerek müşahede ediyoruz: Ateizmin, deizmin geçmişe nazaran daha görünür olması ya da Budizmin, Hinduizmin, yoga, reiki, çakra, enerji, guru, mantra gibi kavramlarının artık geniş kesimlerde karşılık bulması, çoğu da dolandırıcılık için kullanılan Batılı seküler modern tarikatların Türkiye'de epeyce takipçi bulması oluşan boşluğu ve bu boşluğun nasıl dolmaya başladığını gösteriyor.

Fidiro Kahvesi 5. sezonuna gümbür gümbür bir Kızıl Goncalar analizi ile başlıyor. Henüz iki bölümü yayınlamış olan ve aldığı RTÜK cezaları ile gündeme gelen bu yeni yapım müdavimlerimizi heyecanlı bir sohbetin içine sürüklüyor. Başrollerini Özcan Deniz, Özgü Namal ve Mert Yazıcıoğlu'nun paylaştığı dizi, Faniler isimli temsili bir tarikatın üyeleri ile 28 şubat geçmişi karanlık Kemalist bir ailenin yollarının kesişmesini konu alıyor. Cüneyd karakteri bu çatışmanın neresinde yer alıyor? Tarikatlar hakkında kötü ve haksız bir temsil mi yoksa gerçekçi bir anlatım mı yer alıyor? Senaryo içinde nasıl imkanlar barındırıyor? Kızılcık Şerbeti ve Bir Başkadır gibi yapımlardan nasıl farklılaşıyor?Müdavimlerimizin soru ve beklentileriyle harmanladığı bu tadı damakta kalan muhabbete sizler de buyrun ve dinledikten sonra yorumlarınızı bizimle paylaşmayı unutmayın!Support the show

Kısa Dalga'daki ilk yazımın konusunu seçerken, “Memleketin en can alıcı, herkesi ilgilendiren, sadece bugünü değil, geleceğimizi de belirleyen meselesi nedir” diye düşündüm durdum. Tarikatlarla, cemaatlerle el ele vererek kurulan AKP iktidarının, dindar nesil yetiştirmek için, özellikle de kız çocukları ve kadınlar üzerinden yürüttüğü toplum mühendisliği süregelen bir konu olsa da, güncelliği nedeniyle de, diğer meseleleri geride bıraktı. Kızıl Goncalar dizisinin daha ilk haftadan ratinglerinde ilk üçe girmesi tesadüf değil. Dizinin iki bölümünü de bir oturuşta izledim. Türkiye'nin ideolojik fay hattının üzerine kurulmuş bir senaryo çıktı karşıma. Kolu devletin hemen her kademesine uzanan tarikat / cemaat dünyasının karşısında, Kemalist mesajların özellikle doğrudan ve öğretici bir üslupla verilmesi, bana bilinçli bir tercih gibi geldi. Kemalist ailenin tek liberal ferdinin gördüğü muamele, karikatürize edilmiş hissi yarattı. Zaman zaman kulağa zorlama gelen diyaloglar da vardı, ama bu da bilinçli bir tercih gibi geldi bana. Diziyi benzerlerinden ayıran en önemli taraf ise, bizi, dışarıdan görmesi mümkün olmayan bir hayatın içine sokması. Dizideki tarikat ve senaryo kurmaca olsa da, gördüklerimizdeki gerçeklik payı çok büyük.

Riyad'da sahnelenen futbol komedisi Türkiye'ye anında bir seküler/Kemalist gövde gösterisi olarak yansıdı. Para karşılığı Suudi Arabistan'a giden onlar, organizasyonu ellerine yüzlerine bulaştıran onlar, maç yapmadan Arabistan'dan dönenler de onlar ama gece boyunca Türkiye'de “yallah Arabistan'a” sloganları atıldı. Aynı günlerde Ankara'da bölücü terörü ve İsrail soykırımını protesto etmek amacıyla 150 bin kişinin katıldığı büyük bir gösteri düzenlendi. Bu gösteri de verdiği muhteşem fotoğrafın ötesinde Fatih Altaylı'nın hazımsızlıkla sarf ettiği hakaretler boyutuyla tartışıldı. 1 Ocak'ta, hem de sabah namazından sonra gerçekleştirilen, 250 bin kişinin katıldığı Galata Köprüsü Mitingi ise bir magandanın attığı yumruk ve o yumruğu meşrulaştırmaya çalışanların ürettiği yapay hilâfet tartışmalarının gölgesinde kaldı. Bu ve benzeri olaylar sonrasında özellikle gençlerden şu soruları sıkça duyuyoruz: Dindarlar neden korkaklar, neden pısırıklar? Örneğin yumruk atan magandaya mahallesi güçlü şekilde sahip çıkarken dindarlar mazluma dahi sahip çıkmakta neden çekingenler? Bir avuç azgın azınlık gündem oluşturabilirken her türlü imkâna rağmen dindarlar neden geri planda kalıyorlar? Bu özgüven eksikliği neden? Gençlerin bu sorgulamalarında küçük bir haklılık payı var, ona geleceğiz ama genel olarak Türkiye'de dindar/muhafazakâr kesimi korkak ya da pısırık olarak nitelendirmek doğru olmaz. Birincisi Türkiye'de dindar/muhafazakâr kesim temkinlidir. Gerek Türkiye'de gerek İslam dünyasında son asırda yaşanan hadiseler dindarları temkinli olmaya itmiştir. Fevri, radikal, keskin hareketler kimi zaman katliama varan saldırılara maruz kalmış, çok acılar yaşanmıştır. Muarızları tarafından dindarların yer altına girmeleri, şiddete başvurmaları çok arzulanmış, hatta teşvik edilmiş, ancak dindarlar temkin sayesinde bu tuzağa düşmemiş, ayakta ve diri kalabilmişlerdir. İkincisi dindar/muhafazakâr kesim edep, ahlak ve meşruiyet dairesi içerisinde kalmıştır. Azınlığın cazgırlığı karşısında her zaman mülayimliği tercih etmiştir. Bir kesimin edep, adap, ahlak sınırlarını aşan taşkınlıkları karşısında onlar gibi yapmak, onlar gibi olmak yerine “Edep ya Hu” sırrına ve sabra sığınmıştır. Haksızın yüksek gürültüsü karşısında haklılığın sükûtunu tercih etmiştir. Allah'a inanmanın doğal bir neticesi olarak “İyilerin her zaman kazanacağına” iman etmiş, iyilik dairesini terk etmemiştir. Bundan dolayıdır ki dindar/muhafazakâr kesim, sövgüden, sömürüden, yalan ve iftiradan beslenen medyada, sosyal medyada diğerleri kadar varlık gösteremez. Kuşkusuz bir dezavantaj değil avantajdır. Üçüncüsü, dindar/muhafazakâr kesim iktidarda temsil edilmektedir. Haklarının, seçtikleri eliyle savunulacağını bilmekte, hislerinin yetki verdikleri tarafından dile getirileceğine inanmaktadır.

Kızıl Goncalar dizisinden yola çıkarak hazırladığımız önceki bölümde Nakşibendi Tarikatı Halidiye Kolu'nu işlemiştik. Bu bölümde ise Türkiye'nin nasıl bir Halidi cehennemine dönüştüğünü konuşuyoruz. Bölüm konuğumuz Özyeğin Üniversitesi'nden Doç. Dr. Behlül Özkan.------- Podbee Sunar -------Bu podcast, Enerjisa hakkında reklam içerir.Bu podcast, Meditopia hakkında reklam içerir.Meditopia hakkında detaylı bilgi almak için bu linketıklayarak Meditopia'yı telefonuna indir, yeni yıla özel %60 indirimle huzurlu bir hayata adım at.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Gazze soykırımı 80 günü geride bırakırken, dünyanın egemenleri ‘7 Ekim'in kalıcı etkilerini gündemlerine almaya ve tartışmaya başladı. Avrupa halklarından ABD ve İsrail'e yönelen öfke elbette sosyolojik kırılmalara neden olacaktı. Seküler Batı, çağdaşlığa çocuk kanlarının bulaştığı ve üstünlük kompleksinin iflas ettiği gerçeğiyle yüzleşiyor bir kere. Barbarlığın batılılıkta yeniden vücut bulduğunun itirafı vicdanlı halkların gözlerinden okunuyor. Öyle görünüyor ki; bıçak, ‘medeni Batı'nın da kemiklerine dayandı. Hissedilen acının, öfkeli mahcubiyetin çatırdama sesleri duyuluyor. ‘Doğulu Gazze'nin Batı'yı etkilemesini en az Gazze'deki soykırım kadar konuşuyoruz. Çünkü hayret ediyoruz. Beklenmedik insaniyet refleksleri karşısında şaşırıyor ve heyecanlanıyoruz. Ancak Doğu'da, yani Gazze ile bir tutulan İslam ülkelerindeki toplumsal tepkileri tam olarak gözlemleyemiyoruz. Dışarıdan bakamadığımız için içerimizi göremiyor olabiliriz de. Ancak son günlerde gündeme getirilen eski, kısır tartışmaları dikkate alırsak, Türkiye'nin ‘Barbarlığı' tescillenen Batı'yı rol model almasını arzulayanların; Gazze soykırımından ve şahit olduğumuz vahşetin faillerinin ayan beyan deşifre olmasından bir anlam çıkaramadıklarını, düşünce dünyalarını tıktıkları laik-Kemalist ideolojiden milim sapmadıklarını gözler önüne seriyor. Son 10 günde gündemde olan 28 Şubat kalıntısı tartışmalara bir bakalım. Tuzla Piyade Okulu'ndaki namaz kılan subayları fişleyen ve ölüm tehditleri savuran cuntacı teğmenleri Yeni Şafak gündeme getirdi ve gazetemiz devam haberinde Ümit Özdağ'a uzanan siyasi bağlantıları da yazdı. Cumhuriyet ve Birgün gazetelerinin birkaç aydır “gerici eğitim sistemi” kurmakla suçladığı Milli Eğitim Bakanı Yusuf Tekin, Meclis'teki bütçe görüşmelerinde de politik hedef yapıldı. Bakan Tekin, bazı STK ve cemaatler ile yapılan protokollerin devam edeceğini söyleyince Türkiye'deki ‘laik atak seviyesi' bir anda yükseldi.

Ekonomide en belirleyici tartışmalardan birisi insanların hayırseverliğidir. Fakat kapitalist iktisatta bu konuya bir tabuymuşçasına hiç yer verilmez. Yoktur demiyorum, aşırı heterodokstur. Çünkü rasyonel kabullere göre irrasyonel bir davranıştır. O yüzden kapitalistler, bu davranışı rasyonelleştirmek adına veren elin görünürlüğüne başvurur. Ama İslam iktisadında konu merkezden uzak değildir ve derinlemesine analizlerle bilimsel zeminin genişlediği bir alan ortaya çıkar. O yüzden hayırseverlik üzerine farzıyla da vacibiyle de nafilesiyle de düşünürüm. Philantrophy ile infak arasındaki farkın nazariyeler dünyasındaki yerini yani. Derken semte Kızılay'ın kan bağışı aracı geldi. Üzerinde bir slogan; “Senin 15 dakikan başkasının Ömrü olsun,” yazılı. Güzel bir slogan... Evet, kan verirken zaman da veriyor insan. Fakat bu örnekte asıl bağışlanan zaman değil, kan olmalıydı, dedim. Büyük ihtimalle ellerinde kan vermeye kısıt olarak; zaman bulmayla ilgili çoğunluğun vurgu yaptığı bir bulgu vardır, diye düşündüm. Düşündüm ama böyle bir araştırmayı gösterecek rapora varsa da ulaşamadım. Sonra biraz eleştirel bir değerlendirme yazacakken vazgeçtim. Çünkü sağlık camiasına yakın bir arkadaşıma konuyu açtığımda; sloganda yanlışlık görmediğini zira kanın eksilen bir şey olmadığını, değerlendirdi. Buradan bakınca mesele gerçekten ilginç bir hal alıyor. Sonuçta eksilmeyen şey bağışlanamaz gibi bir yaklaşım bu ortaya konan. Bağışı aitlikle bağlı görmeye bir alternatif yani. Sonra insanın cüzleri ve eczalarına bakınca akıldan ve ilimden başka hakikatte bağışlanacak şey olmadığı gerçeğine çıkıyor yollar... İSRAİL KAN MI ALIYOR, ZAMANINI MI TÜKETİYOR? Konu kana, söz de buraya gelmişken İsrail'e dair de söylenecek söz var. İsrail terörünün Filistin'den aldığı kan, can değildir. Onlar sadece kendilerine verilen zamanı tüketiyorlar. “Yazıktır, günahtır, bu işin ucu size döner,” demenin gayrı zalimlere ve zulmün destekçilerine bir faydası yok. Bebekleri oksijensiz bırakana kim artık kerem eder? Kemalist İslâmcılık

Gündemimiz Gazze. Gündemimiz İsrail'in barbarlığı, vahşeti. Gündemimiz modern Batı'nın modern Haçlı Seferi. Günümüz, gündemimiz Gazze halkının tüm dünyanın gözleri önünde yok edilmesi. Ancak bugün Türkiye gündemine döneceğim. Dostum İsmail Kılıçarslan önceki günkü, memleketteki ‘Kemalist zorbalık' yazısına; “Gazze gündemine ara vermiş gibi olmak istemem ama yazmazsam çatlayacağım. O yüzden sizden de, Filistinli kardeşlerimizden de özür dileyerek yazayım” diye başlamıştı. Ben de memleketteki “LGBT zorbalığının” geldiği noktayı yazmak için aynı özrü diliyorum. Eşcinsel yaşamı benimseme sadece bir tercih değil. Dünyanın egemenleri, dev markalar, medya kuruluşları, Amerika ve Avrupa devletleri bu normal olmayan, ya da dümdüz ifade etmek gerekiyor; sapkın yaşam biçimi üzerinden yeni bir “ideoloji” inşa ettiler. Ben adına ‘LGBT ideolojisi' diyorum. Sözde bayrağı olan, güçlü lobileri olan, ünlü savunucular edinen ve en önemlisi de iletişim araçlarını çok üst seviyede kullanan; baskın, ‘ötekileştirme mağduriyetiyle' ötekileştiren faşizmin de ötesinde bir anlayış. Bu yeni üstün dünya görüşü, kendileri gibi düşünmeyen, yani eşcinselliği yaşamasa da desteklemeyen herkesi yok etmek prensibiyle hareket ediyor. Şöyle bir bakın; devletler, anayasalar, iç hukuklar, liderler, şirketler, sivil toplum kuruluşları, dizi ve film sektörü, futbol kulüpleri, konvansiyonel medya ve de sosyal medya büyük oranda bu LGBT ideolojisine teslim olmuş vaziyette. Yazdıklarımı abartılı bulanlar olacaktır ama ben gözlemlerimin arkasındayım ve bu dalga üzerimize üzerimize geliyor. Çünkü nüfuz ettikleri her ortamda normali savunanları sindiren LGBT ideolojisi Türkiye'de de “kelle almaya” başladı. Üstelik yasal hukuk örgütlenmesin alındı o kelle. Bir avukata, LGBT ideolojisinden alınan güçle, görece hukukun kol gezdiği Ankara Barosu'nda açıkça hukuksuzluk yapıldı. Avukat Merve Ayvalı, geçtiğimiz 14 Haziran'da kayıtlı olduğu Ankara Barosu'nun LGBT etkinliğini sosyal medya hesabından eleştirmişti. Şunu yazmış Ayvalı: “Ankara Barosu LGBT ideolojisinin propagandacısı olmuş, Ankara Barosu'na kayıtlı bir avukat olarak sessiz kalmıyorum, bu etkinlik iptal edilmelidir.” Ankara Barosu, hakkında disiplin kovuşturması başlattı. Meltem Ayvalı sadece baroya kayıtlı avukat değil aynı zamanda Ankara Barosu Çocuk Hakları Merkezi'nin de başkan yardımcısı ve çocuk hakları ile kadın hakları merkezinin üyesi. Kendisini tanıyor, takip ediyorum. Ayvalı, 5 yıldır çocuk hakları için çalışıyordu. Bu merkezin çatısı altında okullarda eğitimler yapılıyor, çalıştaylar düzenleniyor ve adli süreçteki çocuk hak ihlallerine yönelik çalışmalar yürütüyordu.

Anavatanın sınırları dışındaki bir veya birden fazla ülkeye dağılmış insan topluluğu olarak tarif edilen diasporalar günümüzde önemli bir etki aracı olarak değerlendirilmektedir. Bir kimliğe ait olma bilinciyle anavatan için işlevsel olan diasporalar, özellikle bulundukları yerlerin dış politikalarına kendi ülkeleri lehine müdahil olabilmektedirler. Bir tür lobicilik faaliyeti de icra eden diasporaların, uluslararası kararların alınması ve ihtilaflı durumların çözülmesinde, karar alıcılara etki edebilmektedirler. Örneğin 70'lerden bu yana Avrupa'ya işgücü maksadıyla giden Türklerin hem bulundukları ülkelerin karar alma süreçleri hem de Türkiye'ye yönelik politikalarda belirleyici olabilmektedirler. Bugün sadece işgücü olarak değil siyaset ve bürokraside de etkinlik alanını genişleten Türk diasporasının, etkili olduğu ülkelerde bu gücü hissettirdiğini görebiliriz. Benzer biçimde Latin Amerika'da 10 milyonun üzerinde bir nüfusla temsil edilen Arapların yoğun ve güçlü bir diaspora oluşturdukları bilinmektedir. Yine Birleşik Devletler'in yaklaşık yüzde 2'lik nüfusuna tekabül eden Yahudilerin dış politika başta olmak üzere birçok alanda son derece etkili oldukları bilinmektedir. ERMENI DIASPORASI VE TÜRKIYE Son dönemde Türkiye ile ihtilafları üzerinden gündeme gelen Ermeni diasporası da Batı'da oluşturduğu networkler aracılığıyla etkili olmaya çalışmaktadır. Öyle ki ABD ve Fransa'da bir çıkar grubu olarak hareket ederek karar alıcılar üzerinde hayli etkin olan Ermenilerin Türkiye ile ilgili birçok konuda negatif bir tutum takındıkları görülmektedir. Özellikle tarihi gerçekleri çarpıtarak inşa ettikleri “sözde soykırım” konusu başta olmak üzere Dağlık Karabağ ve Kıbrıs gibi başlıklarda negatif kampanyalara imza atmaktadırlar. 2020 seçimlerinde Biden'ı destekleyen diasporanın “sözde soykırım”ın tanınması noktasında kat ettiği mesafe ortada. Biden'ın seçimlerin ardından Trump'tan farklı olarak 1915 olaylarını “soykırım” olarak tanımlaması bu etkiyi çok açık biçimde göstermektedir. Hatırlayacak olursak çok yakın bir tarihte Atatürk dizisinin Disney adlı uluslararası platformda yayınlanmasının engellenmesi de Ermeni lobilerin etkisiyle mümkün olabilmiştir. Başta “The Armenian National Committee of America” (ANCA) olmak üzere birçok grubun düzenlediği karşı kampanya, karar alıcılar nezdinde etkili olmuş ve dizinin yayınlanması engellenmiştir. Uzun süren tartışmaların ardından Ermeni lobisinin taleplerini karşılayan Disney'in, diziye sansür uygulayarak yayınlamaktan vazgeçmesi, diasporadaki Ermenilerin ne kadar etkili olduğunu da göstermiştir. Öyle ki söz konusu lobicilik Türkiye'de de etkili olmuş ve Kemalist kimliği ile temayüz etmiş birçok sanatçı da bu lobinin karşı faaliyetlerine karşı sessiz kalarak Disney'e karşı herhangi bir eleştiri yöneltme-miştir.

In this episode of the Patrick Henningsen Show on TNT Radio which aired on September 20, 2023, Patrick talks with Middle East scholar Dr. Can Erimtan, to discuss his recent article which reveals a major development which as escaped the Western media and political press – that is the transition of Turkey from a Kemalist secularist government to an Islamic state with religion at the center of society, governance and civil affairs. And what are the geopolitical ramifications of this development? All this and more. READ HIS ARTICLE HERE: The New Turkey's Destiny – #Shariah4Turkey via the Classroom More from Dr. Erimtan: Twitter  TUNE-IN LIVE to TNT RADIO for the Patrick Henningsen Show every MON-FRI at 12PM-2PM (NEW YORK) | 5PM-7PM (LONDON) | 2AM-4AM (BRISBANE): https://tntradio.live

In A Sephardi Turkish Patriot: Gad Franco in the Turmoil of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (Hamilton Books, 2023), Anthony Gad Bigio explores the life of Gad Franco (1881–1954), a prominent Sephardi journalist, then a lawyer and a jurist, who worked relentlessly for the Jewish community's belonging to the national Turkish polity, and for the consolidation of the rule of law. This historical biography, written by his grandson, takes the reader from fin-de-siècle Izmir, to the Istanbul of the Roaring Twenties and beyond, tracing his footsteps, including his opposition to Zionism, which he considered a threat to assimilation. The world of Sephardi Jewry, the convulsions and conflicts of the late Ottoman Empire, and the birth, ruthless consolidation, and promising reforms of the young Turkish Republic, provide the context to his intriguing life story. Inflamed by ethno-nationalism, the harassment of minorities deepened in the 1930s, peaking during World War II. By then a wealthy, respected Jewish community spokesperson and staunch Kemalist, Gad Franco was dealt an exemplary punishment in a shocking campaign to Turkify the economy, imposed on all minorities. His dramatic downfall at the hands of the Government shook his beliefs to the core. As their belonging to the nation had been so brutally denied, half of Turkish Jews migrated to Israel in the 1950s, putting an end to Gad Franco's lifelong hopes of integration and acceptance. Reuben Silverman is a Postdoctoral Researcher at Stockholm University's Institute for Turkish Studies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In A Sephardi Turkish Patriot: Gad Franco in the Turmoil of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (Hamilton Books, 2023), Anthony Gad Bigio explores the life of Gad Franco (1881–1954), a prominent Sephardi journalist, then a lawyer and a jurist, who worked relentlessly for the Jewish community's belonging to the national Turkish polity, and for the consolidation of the rule of law. This historical biography, written by his grandson, takes the reader from fin-de-siècle Izmir, to the Istanbul of the Roaring Twenties and beyond, tracing his footsteps, including his opposition to Zionism, which he considered a threat to assimilation. The world of Sephardi Jewry, the convulsions and conflicts of the late Ottoman Empire, and the birth, ruthless consolidation, and promising reforms of the young Turkish Republic, provide the context to his intriguing life story. Inflamed by ethno-nationalism, the harassment of minorities deepened in the 1930s, peaking during World War II. By then a wealthy, respected Jewish community spokesperson and staunch Kemalist, Gad Franco was dealt an exemplary punishment in a shocking campaign to Turkify the economy, imposed on all minorities. His dramatic downfall at the hands of the Government shook his beliefs to the core. As their belonging to the nation had been so brutally denied, half of Turkish Jews migrated to Israel in the 1950s, putting an end to Gad Franco's lifelong hopes of integration and acceptance. Reuben Silverman is a Postdoctoral Researcher at Stockholm University's Institute for Turkish Studies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

In A Sephardi Turkish Patriot: Gad Franco in the Turmoil of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (Hamilton Books, 2023), Anthony Gad Bigio explores the life of Gad Franco (1881–1954), a prominent Sephardi journalist, then a lawyer and a jurist, who worked relentlessly for the Jewish community's belonging to the national Turkish polity, and for the consolidation of the rule of law. This historical biography, written by his grandson, takes the reader from fin-de-siècle Izmir, to the Istanbul of the Roaring Twenties and beyond, tracing his footsteps, including his opposition to Zionism, which he considered a threat to assimilation. The world of Sephardi Jewry, the convulsions and conflicts of the late Ottoman Empire, and the birth, ruthless consolidation, and promising reforms of the young Turkish Republic, provide the context to his intriguing life story. Inflamed by ethno-nationalism, the harassment of minorities deepened in the 1930s, peaking during World War II. By then a wealthy, respected Jewish community spokesperson and staunch Kemalist, Gad Franco was dealt an exemplary punishment in a shocking campaign to Turkify the economy, imposed on all minorities. His dramatic downfall at the hands of the Government shook his beliefs to the core. As their belonging to the nation had been so brutally denied, half of Turkish Jews migrated to Israel in the 1950s, putting an end to Gad Franco's lifelong hopes of integration and acceptance. Reuben Silverman is a Postdoctoral Researcher at Stockholm University's Institute for Turkish Studies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/jewish-studies

In A Sephardi Turkish Patriot: Gad Franco in the Turmoil of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (Hamilton Books, 2023), Anthony Gad Bigio explores the life of Gad Franco (1881–1954), a prominent Sephardi journalist, then a lawyer and a jurist, who worked relentlessly for the Jewish community's belonging to the national Turkish polity, and for the consolidation of the rule of law. This historical biography, written by his grandson, takes the reader from fin-de-siècle Izmir, to the Istanbul of the Roaring Twenties and beyond, tracing his footsteps, including his opposition to Zionism, which he considered a threat to assimilation. The world of Sephardi Jewry, the convulsions and conflicts of the late Ottoman Empire, and the birth, ruthless consolidation, and promising reforms of the young Turkish Republic, provide the context to his intriguing life story. Inflamed by ethno-nationalism, the harassment of minorities deepened in the 1930s, peaking during World War II. By then a wealthy, respected Jewish community spokesperson and staunch Kemalist, Gad Franco was dealt an exemplary punishment in a shocking campaign to Turkify the economy, imposed on all minorities. His dramatic downfall at the hands of the Government shook his beliefs to the core. As their belonging to the nation had been so brutally denied, half of Turkish Jews migrated to Israel in the 1950s, putting an end to Gad Franco's lifelong hopes of integration and acceptance. Reuben Silverman is a Postdoctoral Researcher at Stockholm University's Institute for Turkish Studies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/middle-eastern-studies

In A Sephardi Turkish Patriot: Gad Franco in the Turmoil of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (Hamilton Books, 2023), Anthony Gad Bigio explores the life of Gad Franco (1881–1954), a prominent Sephardi journalist, then a lawyer and a jurist, who worked relentlessly for the Jewish community's belonging to the national Turkish polity, and for the consolidation of the rule of law. This historical biography, written by his grandson, takes the reader from fin-de-siècle Izmir, to the Istanbul of the Roaring Twenties and beyond, tracing his footsteps, including his opposition to Zionism, which he considered a threat to assimilation. The world of Sephardi Jewry, the convulsions and conflicts of the late Ottoman Empire, and the birth, ruthless consolidation, and promising reforms of the young Turkish Republic, provide the context to his intriguing life story. Inflamed by ethno-nationalism, the harassment of minorities deepened in the 1930s, peaking during World War II. By then a wealthy, respected Jewish community spokesperson and staunch Kemalist, Gad Franco was dealt an exemplary punishment in a shocking campaign to Turkify the economy, imposed on all minorities. His dramatic downfall at the hands of the Government shook his beliefs to the core. As their belonging to the nation had been so brutally denied, half of Turkish Jews migrated to Israel in the 1950s, putting an end to Gad Franco's lifelong hopes of integration and acceptance. Reuben Silverman is a Postdoctoral Researcher at Stockholm University's Institute for Turkish Studies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/biography

In A Sephardi Turkish Patriot: Gad Franco in the Turmoil of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic (Hamilton Books, 2023), Anthony Gad Bigio explores the life of Gad Franco (1881–1954), a prominent Sephardi journalist, then a lawyer and a jurist, who worked relentlessly for the Jewish community's belonging to the national Turkish polity, and for the consolidation of the rule of law. This historical biography, written by his grandson, takes the reader from fin-de-siècle Izmir, to the Istanbul of the Roaring Twenties and beyond, tracing his footsteps, including his opposition to Zionism, which he considered a threat to assimilation. The world of Sephardi Jewry, the convulsions and conflicts of the late Ottoman Empire, and the birth, ruthless consolidation, and promising reforms of the young Turkish Republic, provide the context to his intriguing life story. Inflamed by ethno-nationalism, the harassment of minorities deepened in the 1930s, peaking during World War II. By then a wealthy, respected Jewish community spokesperson and staunch Kemalist, Gad Franco was dealt an exemplary punishment in a shocking campaign to Turkify the economy, imposed on all minorities. His dramatic downfall at the hands of the Government shook his beliefs to the core. As their belonging to the nation had been so brutally denied, half of Turkish Jews migrated to Israel in the 1950s, putting an end to Gad Franco's lifelong hopes of integration and acceptance. Reuben Silverman is a Postdoctoral Researcher at Stockholm University's Institute for Turkish Studies. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/eastern-european-studies

Bolu Beyi Tanju Özcan, bugün CHP Genel Merkezi'nin kapısına dayanacak! Bakalım, ona nasıl muamele edecekler?  Dokuz gün boyunca Bolu'dan Ankara'ya “Değişim ve Adalet” talebiyle yürüdü!  On üç senede on üç kez seçim kaybeden Mister Kemal'in koltuğunu bırakması içindi, bu yürüyüş... Vaktiyle, Ankara'dan İstanbul'a “Adalet” diyerek yürümüş olan Genel Başkanı Kemal Bey'e nazire yaptı. -Pişkin Kılıçdarson, kulak asmadı.  Onun yerine CHP Sözcüsü Faik Öztrak, Bolu Beyi'ne şöyle seslendi: “Bilinen bir söz vardır. Yollar yürümekle aşınmaz! Ateş olsa da cirmi kadar yer yakar!”  Yani, Tanju Özcan'ı küçümsedi... Bir nevi, “Anca gidersin!” hareketi çekti. DEMİREL SÖZLÜĞÜ'NDEN “Yollar yürümekle aşınmaz” diye CHP'li Bolu Belediye Başkanı'na dudak bükerken; Genel Başkanı'nın da yürüdüğünü unutmuş görünüyordu, Mister Öztrak... -Baltayı taşa vurduğunun farkında bile değildi!  İşbu “Eski Kaşar” siyasi deyim, Türkiye siyasetine Süleyman Demirel'den miras kaldı.  Biteviye “protesto edenleri, yürüyenleri küçümseyen bir tavır” olarak değerlendirildi: Siyasi hayatı boyunca Süleyman Bey'in hiç peşini bırakmadı, bu replik! İtina ile aleyhinde kullanıldı. O SÖZÜN ÖYKÜSÜ “Yollar yürümekle aşınmaz” sözü; formüle edilmiş, uyarlanmış bir repliktir. Orijinali “Sokaklar eskimez. Takati olan yürür” şeklindedir!  Dönemin Başbakanı Süleyman Demirel... Genel Başkanlığını yaptığı AP'nin (Adalet Partisi) Ankara İl Kongresi'nde, öğrencilerin eylemleri ve yürüyüşlerini değerlendirirken sarf etmişti, bu sözleri!  İlgili haber, 9 Kasım 1968 tarihli Hürriyet ve Milliyet gazetelerinde yer aldı.  Hürriyet'in başlığı... “Demirel: Birtakım yürüyüşler oluyor diye asabınız bozulmasın” şeklindeydi!  Milliyet'in başlığında ise... Sonraları “Yollar yürümekle aşınmaz” haline gelecek olan lafın orijinali vardı: “Demirel: Sokaklar eskimez. Takati olan yürür” ELLİNCİ YIL & YÜZÜNCÜ YIL

Kürtlerle bin yıldır aynı coğrafyada yaşıyor, aynı kaderi paylaşıyoruz. Topraklarımızı hep birlikte savunduk, fetihleri birlikte yaptık. Selahattin Eyyubi komutasında Kudüs'ün fethinden Çanakkale savunmasına, İstiklal Savaşı'na kadar hep birlikteydik. Cumhuriyeti birlikte kurduk. Cumhuriyet sonrası başlatılan yanlış modernleşme hareketi Türklerin ve Kürtlerin ortak inanç ve değerlerini olduğu kadar kardeşliğini de tahrip etti. Uygulanan yanlış politikalar, Türkiye düşmanı devletlerin de teşvik ve desteğiyle terör örgütü PKK için elverişli bir istismar zemini oluşturdu. Kürt meselesi ve PKK terörü özellikle son 40 yıldır Türkiye'ye büyük manevi ve maddi yük yükledi. 10 bin güvenlik görevlimiz şehit edildi; 40 bin insan hayatını kaybetti. Ekonomik fatura ise trilyon dolarlarla ölçülüyor. Terörü salt şiddet hareketi olarak görmek yanıltıcı olur: Dış destekli PKK projesi ve buna karşı devletin yanlış politikaları Kürtler ile Türkler arasındaki muhabbeti zedeledi, Kürt ulusalcılığını besledi, sekülarizmin Kürtler arasında tutunmasını, yayılmasını sağladı. 80'lere kadar Kürtlere nüfuz edemeyen Kemalist modernleşme, PKK eliyle hem Kürt ruhunu bozdu, hem de Türk-Kürt kardeşliğini yaraladı.

Önceki yazımda Türkiye'nin 5 büyük meselesinden 5'incisinin “istikamet” olduğunu, Cumhuriyetle birlikte Türkiye'ye bir istikamet dayatıldığını, bunun topluma dar gelen bir elbise olduğunu yazmıştım. Kemalizm, topluma deli gömleği giydirmek için eğitimi kullandı. Bir modern zaman icadı olan yaygın eğitimin sadece Türkiye'de değil tüm dünyada esas amacı da zaten itaatkâr, kolay ikna edilebilir, üretime ve tüketime programlandırılmış birey yetiştirmek değil midir? Kemalizm işte bu aracı kendi ideolojisini yerleştirmek için devreye aldı. Bugün bile Türkiye'nin dindar/muhafazakâr kesimi “cahillikle” itham edilir. Oysa Türkiye'de bu kesim Kemalist eğitimin etkisini (en azından köyüne gelen öğretmende) görmüş, özellikle Köy Enstitüleri'nin yıkıcı etkisi karşısında büyük bir hikmet ve basiretle modernist eğitime direnmiş, ancak cahil kalmamak için de kendi alternatiflerini üretmişti. Medreseler, Kur'an kursları, sonradan imam-hatipler, cemaat ve tarikatların eğitim mekanizmaları okullardan fazla rağbet görmüştü. Modernist eğitimle toplum Demokrat Parti döneminde kısmen barıştılar. Asıl barışma, hatta kucaklaşma ise 2002'den itibaren AK Parti Hükümetleri döneminde oldu. Erdoğan 21 yılda en büyük yatırımı eğitime yaptı. Eğitimin bütçeden aldığı pay milli savunmayı geçerek ilk sırada yer aldı. Ülkenin her tarafına okullar, derslikler inşa edildi. Her şehirde en az bir üniversite açıldı. Desteklerle, teşviklerle okullaşma oranı, özellikle de kız çocuklarının okullaşması yükseltildi. Zorunlu eğitim 12 yıla çıkarıldı. AK Parti üzerinden devletle barışan muhafazakâr/dindar kesim, başörtüsü yasağının kalkması, imam-hatiplerin yaygınlaşması, okullara Kur'an ve Siyer derslerinin konulması gibi adımlarla çocuklarını gönül rahatlığıyla modernist eğitime teslim etti.

Kemalist Savcılar - Hakimler Nerede? [Mahmut Akpınar] by Tr724

“Kemalist Kültür Devrimi'nin amacı kısaca modern bir millet ve yeni iktidarın o modern millet üzerinden meşruiyetini yaratmak olarak tarif edilebilir. Modernist Türk milliyetçiliğinin bir programı, Milli Mücadele'ye önderlik eden ve daha sonra da cumhuriyeti kuran, Milli Mücadele sırasında Meclis'te 1. Grup olarak var olan, daha sonra Halk Fırkası'nı ve daha sonra Cumhuriyet Halk Fırkası'nı ve daha sonra Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi'ni kendi mecrası olarak sürdüren modernist Türk milliyetçiliğinin hem milliyetçi hem modernist kıvamda bir programının bir icabı, bir sonucu olarak karşımıza çıkıyor…”

Halil Berktay ile Tarihten Güncelliğe, Güncellikten Tarihe programının bu haftaki konusu devrimler ve demokrasi ile ilişkileri: “Devrimler demokrasiyi üretemediği için çok ciddi bir sorun ortaya çıkıyor; devrimin devamlılığı açısından, devrimin benimsenmesi açısından, devrimin nasıl hatırlandığı açısından. Devrim çoğu kez demokrasi adına yapılıyor. Var olandan daha demokratik bir rejim amaçlanıyor. Bir statüko var, bir rejim var ve kötü kabul ediliyor. Gerçekten de kötü pek çok durumda. Devrim bu vaatle çıkageliyor. Ve evet o eski, kötü, gerçekten kötü rejim yıkılıyor. Ama yerine kurulan en azından bir noktadan sonra veya bazı çok temel açılardan eskisinden daha iyisi olmayabiliyor. Birçok durumda ne oluyor? Eski rejimin yerine yeni bir tahakküm rejimi geliyor. Ve bazı hallerde daha da kötü oluyor. Burada dolayısıyla çok ciddi bir demokrasi sorunu ortaya çıkıyor. Ekim Devrimi'nin Sovyetler'de demokrasiyi üretememiş olmasını ve Kemalist devrimin kendi direkt programı, platformu ve özleminin bir parçası olarak Türkiye'de demokrasiyi üretememiş olmasını her iki iki ülke örneğinde gayet net görüyoruz.”

At first glance, there is little that Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, an Islamist and nationalist, has in common with Dogu Perincek, a maverick socialist, Eurasianist, and militant secularist and Kemalist. Yet it is Mr. Perincek, a man with a world of contacts in Russia, China, Iran, and Syria whose conspiratorial worldview identifies the United States as the core of all evil, that Mr. Erdogan at times turns to help resolve delicate geopolitical issues. Thank you to all who have demonstrated their appreciation for my column by becoming paid subscribers. This allows me to ensure that it continues to have maximum impact. Maintaining free distributions means that news website, blogs, and newsletters across the globe can republish it. I launched my column, The Turbulent World of Middle East Soccer, 12 years ago. To borrow a phrase from an early proprietor of The Observer, it offers readers, listeners, and viewers ‘the scoop of interpretation.' If you are able and willing to support the column, please become a paid subscriber by clicking on Substack on the subscription button and choosing one of the subscription options.

The veiling and unveiling of women have been controversial issues in Turkey since the late-Ottoman period. It was with the advent of local campaigns against certain veils in the 1930s, however, that women's dress turned into an issue of national mobilisation in which gender norms would be redefined.  In Anti-Veiling Campaigns in Turkey: State, Society and Gender in the Early Republic (I. B. Tauris, 2022), Sevgi Adak casts light onto the historical context within which the meanings of veiling and unveiling in Turkey were formed. By shifting the focus from the high politics of the elite to the implementation of state policies, the book situates the anti-veiling campaigns as a space where the Kemalist reforms were negotiated, compromised and resisted by societal actors. Using previously unpublished archival material, Adak reveals the intricacies of the Kemalist modernisation process and provides a nuanced reading of the gender order established in the early republic by looking at the various ways women responded to the anti-veiling campaigns. A major contribution to the literature on the social history of modern Turkey, the book provides a complex analysis of these campaigns which goes beyond a simple binary between liberation and oppression. Reuben Silverman is a PhD candidate at University of California, San Diego. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

The veiling and unveiling of women have been controversial issues in Turkey since the late-Ottoman period. It was with the advent of local campaigns against certain veils in the 1930s, however, that women's dress turned into an issue of national mobilisation in which gender norms would be redefined.  In Anti-Veiling Campaigns in Turkey: State, Society and Gender in the Early Republic (I. B. Tauris, 2022), Sevgi Adak casts light onto the historical context within which the meanings of veiling and unveiling in Turkey were formed. By shifting the focus from the high politics of the elite to the implementation of state policies, the book situates the anti-veiling campaigns as a space where the Kemalist reforms were negotiated, compromised and resisted by societal actors. Using previously unpublished archival material, Adak reveals the intricacies of the Kemalist modernisation process and provides a nuanced reading of the gender order established in the early republic by looking at the various ways women responded to the anti-veiling campaigns. A major contribution to the literature on the social history of modern Turkey, the book provides a complex analysis of these campaigns which goes beyond a simple binary between liberation and oppression. Reuben Silverman is a PhD candidate at University of California, San Diego. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

The veiling and unveiling of women have been controversial issues in Turkey since the late-Ottoman period. It was with the advent of local campaigns against certain veils in the 1930s, however, that women's dress turned into an issue of national mobilisation in which gender norms would be redefined.  In Anti-Veiling Campaigns in Turkey: State, Society and Gender in the Early Republic (I. B. Tauris, 2022), Sevgi Adak casts light onto the historical context within which the meanings of veiling and unveiling in Turkey were formed. By shifting the focus from the high politics of the elite to the implementation of state policies, the book situates the anti-veiling campaigns as a space where the Kemalist reforms were negotiated, compromised and resisted by societal actors. Using previously unpublished archival material, Adak reveals the intricacies of the Kemalist modernisation process and provides a nuanced reading of the gender order established in the early republic by looking at the various ways women responded to the anti-veiling campaigns. A major contribution to the literature on the social history of modern Turkey, the book provides a complex analysis of these campaigns which goes beyond a simple binary between liberation and oppression. Reuben Silverman is a PhD candidate at University of California, San Diego. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/gender-studies

The veiling and unveiling of women have been controversial issues in Turkey since the late-Ottoman period. It was with the advent of local campaigns against certain veils in the 1930s, however, that women's dress turned into an issue of national mobilisation in which gender norms would be redefined.  In Anti-Veiling Campaigns in Turkey: State, Society and Gender in the Early Republic (I. B. Tauris, 2022), Sevgi Adak casts light onto the historical context within which the meanings of veiling and unveiling in Turkey were formed. By shifting the focus from the high politics of the elite to the implementation of state policies, the book situates the anti-veiling campaigns as a space where the Kemalist reforms were negotiated, compromised and resisted by societal actors. Using previously unpublished archival material, Adak reveals the intricacies of the Kemalist modernisation process and provides a nuanced reading of the gender order established in the early republic by looking at the various ways women responded to the anti-veiling campaigns. A major contribution to the literature on the social history of modern Turkey, the book provides a complex analysis of these campaigns which goes beyond a simple binary between liberation and oppression. Reuben Silverman is a PhD candidate at University of California, San Diego. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/islamic-studies

The veiling and unveiling of women have been controversial issues in Turkey since the late-Ottoman period. It was with the advent of local campaigns against certain veils in the 1930s, however, that women's dress turned into an issue of national mobilisation in which gender norms would be redefined.  In Anti-Veiling Campaigns in Turkey: State, Society and Gender in the Early Republic (I. B. Tauris, 2022), Sevgi Adak casts light onto the historical context within which the meanings of veiling and unveiling in Turkey were formed. By shifting the focus from the high politics of the elite to the implementation of state policies, the book situates the anti-veiling campaigns as a space where the Kemalist reforms were negotiated, compromised and resisted by societal actors. Using previously unpublished archival material, Adak reveals the intricacies of the Kemalist modernisation process and provides a nuanced reading of the gender order established in the early republic by looking at the various ways women responded to the anti-veiling campaigns. A major contribution to the literature on the social history of modern Turkey, the book provides a complex analysis of these campaigns which goes beyond a simple binary between liberation and oppression. Reuben Silverman is a PhD candidate at University of California, San Diego. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/middle-eastern-studies

The veiling and unveiling of women have been controversial issues in Turkey since the late-Ottoman period. It was with the advent of local campaigns against certain veils in the 1930s, however, that women's dress turned into an issue of national mobilisation in which gender norms would be redefined.  In Anti-Veiling Campaigns in Turkey: State, Society and Gender in the Early Republic (I. B. Tauris, 2022), Sevgi Adak casts light onto the historical context within which the meanings of veiling and unveiling in Turkey were formed. By shifting the focus from the high politics of the elite to the implementation of state policies, the book situates the anti-veiling campaigns as a space where the Kemalist reforms were negotiated, compromised and resisted by societal actors. Using previously unpublished archival material, Adak reveals the intricacies of the Kemalist modernisation process and provides a nuanced reading of the gender order established in the early republic by looking at the various ways women responded to the anti-veiling campaigns. A major contribution to the literature on the social history of modern Turkey, the book provides a complex analysis of these campaigns which goes beyond a simple binary between liberation and oppression. Reuben Silverman is a PhD candidate at University of California, San Diego. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

When I was an undergrad, the chronology of World War One was simple. The war began in August of 1914 and ended in November of 1918. Now, of course, we know it's not that simple. Perhaps (perhaps) it began in 1914. But the violence lingered on well after the armistices of 1918. So did the complicated questions of how to address that violence and the suffering that accompanied it. Amy E. Grubb and Elisabeth Hope Murray are interested precisely in that moment where the official violence had ended but the real life violence continued. Their book British Responses to Genocide: The British Foreign Office and Humanitarianism in the Ottoman Empire, 1918-1923 (Routledge, 2022) asks a simple question: How did diplomats in London and on the ground in the Ottoman Empire attempt to achieve British goals in the maelstrom of violence following the Armistice of Mudros. Their answer is not quite so simple. They argue that the British response consistently prioritized human rights and human suffering. But in an environment of decreasing resources, interallied tensions and increasingly fierce resistance from Kemalist nationalists, their ability to pursue these priorities steadily shrunk. Eventually in the memorable words of the authors, British policy makers in London decided to embrace ethnic cleansing as a means of stopping genocide--exactly the opposite vision possessed by most modern leaders. Grubb and Murray provide a thorough examination of the ways national leaders can fail to protect human rights despite their own desire to do so. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

When I was an undergrad, the chronology of World War One was simple. The war began in August of 1914 and ended in November of 1918. Now, of course, we know it's not that simple. Perhaps (perhaps) it began in 1914. But the violence lingered on well after the armistices of 1918. So did the complicated questions of how to address that violence and the suffering that accompanied it. Amy E. Grubb and Elisabeth Hope Murray are interested precisely in that moment where the official violence had ended but the real life violence continued. Their book British Responses to Genocide: The British Foreign Office and Humanitarianism in the Ottoman Empire, 1918-1923 (Routledge, 2022) asks a simple question: How did diplomats in London and on the ground in the Ottoman Empire attempt to achieve British goals in the maelstrom of violence following the Armistice of Mudros. Their answer is not quite so simple. They argue that the British response consistently prioritized human rights and human suffering. But in an environment of decreasing resources, interallied tensions and increasingly fierce resistance from Kemalist nationalists, their ability to pursue these priorities steadily shrunk. Eventually in the memorable words of the authors, British policy makers in London decided to embrace ethnic cleansing as a means of stopping genocide--exactly the opposite vision possessed by most modern leaders. Grubb and Murray provide a thorough examination of the ways national leaders can fail to protect human rights despite their own desire to do so. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

When I was an undergrad, the chronology of World War One was simple. The war began in August of 1914 and ended in November of 1918. Now, of course, we know it's not that simple. Perhaps (perhaps) it began in 1914. But the violence lingered on well after the armistices of 1918. So did the complicated questions of how to address that violence and the suffering that accompanied it. Amy E. Grubb and Elisabeth Hope Murray are interested precisely in that moment where the official violence had ended but the real life violence continued. Their book British Responses to Genocide: The British Foreign Office and Humanitarianism in the Ottoman Empire, 1918-1923 (Routledge, 2022) asks a simple question: How did diplomats in London and on the ground in the Ottoman Empire attempt to achieve British goals in the maelstrom of violence following the Armistice of Mudros. Their answer is not quite so simple. They argue that the British response consistently prioritized human rights and human suffering. But in an environment of decreasing resources, interallied tensions and increasingly fierce resistance from Kemalist nationalists, their ability to pursue these priorities steadily shrunk. Eventually in the memorable words of the authors, British policy makers in London decided to embrace ethnic cleansing as a means of stopping genocide--exactly the opposite vision possessed by most modern leaders. Grubb and Murray provide a thorough examination of the ways national leaders can fail to protect human rights despite their own desire to do so. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

When I was an undergrad, the chronology of World War One was simple. The war began in August of 1914 and ended in November of 1918. Now, of course, we know it's not that simple. Perhaps (perhaps) it began in 1914. But the violence lingered on well after the armistices of 1918. So did the complicated questions of how to address that violence and the suffering that accompanied it. Amy E. Grubb and Elisabeth Hope Murray are interested precisely in that moment where the official violence had ended but the real life violence continued. Their book British Responses to Genocide: The British Foreign Office and Humanitarianism in the Ottoman Empire, 1918-1923 (Routledge, 2022) asks a simple question: How did diplomats in London and on the ground in the Ottoman Empire attempt to achieve British goals in the maelstrom of violence following the Armistice of Mudros. Their answer is not quite so simple. They argue that the British response consistently prioritized human rights and human suffering. But in an environment of decreasing resources, interallied tensions and increasingly fierce resistance from Kemalist nationalists, their ability to pursue these priorities steadily shrunk. Eventually in the memorable words of the authors, British policy makers in London decided to embrace ethnic cleansing as a means of stopping genocide--exactly the opposite vision possessed by most modern leaders. Grubb and Murray provide a thorough examination of the ways national leaders can fail to protect human rights despite their own desire to do so. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/middle-eastern-studies

When I was an undergrad, the chronology of World War One was simple. The war began in August of 1914 and ended in November of 1918. Now, of course, we know it's not that simple. Perhaps (perhaps) it began in 1914. But the violence lingered on well after the armistices of 1918. So did the complicated questions of how to address that violence and the suffering that accompanied it. Amy E. Grubb and Elisabeth Hope Murray are interested precisely in that moment where the official violence had ended but the real life violence continued. Their book British Responses to Genocide: The British Foreign Office and Humanitarianism in the Ottoman Empire, 1918-1923 (Routledge, 2022) asks a simple question: How did diplomats in London and on the ground in the Ottoman Empire attempt to achieve British goals in the maelstrom of violence following the Armistice of Mudros. Their answer is not quite so simple. They argue that the British response consistently prioritized human rights and human suffering. But in an environment of decreasing resources, interallied tensions and increasingly fierce resistance from Kemalist nationalists, their ability to pursue these priorities steadily shrunk. Eventually in the memorable words of the authors, British policy makers in London decided to embrace ethnic cleansing as a means of stopping genocide--exactly the opposite vision possessed by most modern leaders. Grubb and Murray provide a thorough examination of the ways national leaders can fail to protect human rights despite their own desire to do so. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/genocide-studies

When I was an undergrad, the chronology of World War One was simple. The war began in August of 1914 and ended in November of 1918. Now, of course, we know it's not that simple. Perhaps (perhaps) it began in 1914. But the violence lingered on well after the armistices of 1918. So did the complicated questions of how to address that violence and the suffering that accompanied it. Amy E. Grubb and Elisabeth Hope Murray are interested precisely in that moment where the official violence had ended but the real life violence continued. Their book British Responses to Genocide: The British Foreign Office and Humanitarianism in the Ottoman Empire, 1918-1923 (Routledge, 2022) asks a simple question: How did diplomats in London and on the ground in the Ottoman Empire attempt to achieve British goals in the maelstrom of violence following the Armistice of Mudros. Their answer is not quite so simple. They argue that the British response consistently prioritized human rights and human suffering. But in an environment of decreasing resources, interallied tensions and increasingly fierce resistance from Kemalist nationalists, their ability to pursue these priorities steadily shrunk. Eventually in the memorable words of the authors, British policy makers in London decided to embrace ethnic cleansing as a means of stopping genocide--exactly the opposite vision possessed by most modern leaders. Grubb and Murray provide a thorough examination of the ways national leaders can fail to protect human rights despite their own desire to do so. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/british-studies

When I was an undergrad, the chronology of World War One was simple. The war began in August of 1914 and ended in November of 1918. Now, of course, we know it's not that simple. Perhaps (perhaps) it began in 1914. But the violence lingered on well after the armistices of 1918. So did the complicated questions of how to address that violence and the suffering that accompanied it. Amy E. Grubb and Elisabeth Hope Murray are interested precisely in that moment where the official violence had ended but the real life violence continued. Their book British Responses to Genocide: The British Foreign Office and Humanitarianism in the Ottoman Empire, 1918-1923 (Routledge, 2022) asks a simple question: How did diplomats in London and on the ground in the Ottoman Empire attempt to achieve British goals in the maelstrom of violence following the Armistice of Mudros. Their answer is not quite so simple. They argue that the British response consistently prioritized human rights and human suffering. But in an environment of decreasing resources, interallied tensions and increasingly fierce resistance from Kemalist nationalists, their ability to pursue these priorities steadily shrunk. Eventually in the memorable words of the authors, British policy makers in London decided to embrace ethnic cleansing as a means of stopping genocide--exactly the opposite vision possessed by most modern leaders. Grubb and Murray provide a thorough examination of the ways national leaders can fail to protect human rights despite their own desire to do so. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

When I was an undergrad, the chronology of World War One was simple. The war began in August of 1914 and ended in November of 1918. Now, of course, we know it's not that simple. Perhaps (perhaps) it began in 1914. But the violence lingered on well after the armistices of 1918. So did the complicated questions of how to address that violence and the suffering that accompanied it. Amy E. Grubb and Elisabeth Hope Murray are interested precisely in that moment where the official violence had ended but the real life violence continued. Their book British Responses to Genocide: The British Foreign Office and Humanitarianism in the Ottoman Empire, 1918-1923 (Routledge, 2022) asks a simple question: How did diplomats in London and on the ground in the Ottoman Empire attempt to achieve British goals in the maelstrom of violence following the Armistice of Mudros. Their answer is not quite so simple. They argue that the British response consistently prioritized human rights and human suffering. But in an environment of decreasing resources, interallied tensions and increasingly fierce resistance from Kemalist nationalists, their ability to pursue these priorities steadily shrunk. Eventually in the memorable words of the authors, British policy makers in London decided to embrace ethnic cleansing as a means of stopping genocide--exactly the opposite vision possessed by most modern leaders. Grubb and Murray provide a thorough examination of the ways national leaders can fail to protect human rights despite their own desire to do so. Kelly McFall is Professor of History and Director of the Honors Program at Newman University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

00.00 Intro 00.20 Effective Altruism Nedir Kisa Ozet https://www.effectivealtruism.org/ https://www.givewell.org/ -En verimli yardim kuruluslarini degerlendiren bir organizasyon 02.33 Playpump 04.55 Cizgi romanlara olan sevgim 05.55 Superkahramanlar iyilik konusunda verimli degiller 07.20 Batman nasil verimli olur? 08.39 Fakir superkahramanlar napsin? 09.56 Kemalist Spiderman 10.57 Diger superkahramanlar Turkiye'de napardi? 12.05 Superkahramanlar ilahi figurler, 14.27 AHaber Kemalist Spiderman hakkinda nasil haber yapardi? 15.05 HalkTv Kemalist Spiderman hakkinda nasil haber yapardi? 16.42 Imamoglu/Mansur Yavas/Yilmaz Ozdil 17.44 Hangi fetva verilirdi? 18.05 Medinelilere cok yukleniliyor 19.27 Fetva tamamlaniyor 20.35 Lutfen dava etmeyin plzzzz 21.03 Turkiye'de superkahraman fikirlerinizi paylasabilirsiniz Insta:@arda_enfiyeci Fotograf hesabim: @enfography Twitter: @arda_enfiyeci

Murat Metinsoy on “The Power of the People: Everyday Resistance and Dissent in the Making of Modern Turkey, 1923-38” (Cambridge University Press). The book examines how ordinary people's reaction to Kemalist reforms shaped, modified or softened how those reforms were implemented on the ground. Become a member to support Turkey Book Talk. Members get a 35% discount on all Turkey/Ottoman History books published by IB Tauris/Bloomsbury, transcripts of every interview, transcripts of the whole archive, and over 200 reviews covering Turkish and international fiction, history and politics.

15 Mayıs 1919'da Yunan birliklerinin İzmir'i işgaliyle başlayan Milli Mücadele döneminde 1917 Bolşevik Devrimi'nin ve Almanya'daki Spartakist hareketin etkisiyle Anadolu'da bir dizi sosyalist, komünist örgütlenme ortaya çıkmıştı. Kemalist hareketin İtilaf Güçleri'ni ülkeden çıkarmak için Sovyet Rusya'nın askeri ve mali yardımına muhtaç olduğunun iyice ortaya çıktığı 1920 yılında ise komünizme sempati zirveye çıkmıştı. Ancak 1923'te Cumhuriyet kurulduktan sonra hikaye çok farklı gelişti...

Nerses Babayan 1915 Ermeni Soykırımı'ndan sağ kurtulan Antepli bir din adamıydı. 1915'te tehcir ile başlayıp 1922'de Fransızların Antep'i tamamen boşaltması ve şehrin kontrolünün Kemalist güçlerin eline geçmesiyle sonlanan bu yedi yıllık dönem içerisinde yaşadıklarını günü gününe kaydetti.Ümit Kurt ve Mert Kayhan, "Tarih-i Ahval / Ahval-i Tarih" serisi kapsamındaki bu konuşmada, tehcir ve soykırım sürecini bizzat yaşamış, bu iki ağır olaya maruz kalmış ve felaketten sağ kalarak kurtulmayı başarabilmiş Babayan'ın, orijinal bir tarihsel kayıt olma niteliğine haiz günlüğünü mercek altına alıyor. Ve geç dönem Osmanlı tarihyazıcılığı açısından, bilhassa Ermenice yazılmış anı, otobiyografi ve günlüklerin tarihsel değerine ilişkin değerlendirmelerde bulunuyor.

1947 yılında yayınlan bu kitabın yazar hanesinde “bir heyet tarafından meydana getirilmiştir” yazıyor. Girişte “Türk Genci!” hitabının ardından da “Dindarlık zevki, maddi olmayan bir zevktir. Onu maddi menfaatlere ve dünya işleriyle karıştıranların bu memlekete fenalık ettiklerini tarih anlatmış ve ispat etmiştir. Hâlbuki İslam dininin emrettiği; sırf Yaradan'a minnet borcunu ödemek, iyilik için yaşamak gibi manevi hazları tadabilmek, dünyalara değen en büyük menfaattir... Milliyetine ve dinine güven, iyi bir vatansever olduğun kadar iyi bir dindar da ol!” Bu yıllarda bir heyete bu kitabı yazdıran iklim Türkiye'nin Kemalist devrimciliğin, pozitivizm ruh ikliminin uyandırdığı rahatsızlıktır. Bir orta yol arayışıdır. İslam tarihini, ibadetleri anlatan kitap dönemin ideolojik örgüsünü ve dilini de korur. Mesela “Allah'a iman” değil, “ulu tanrıya iman” der. Kitapta din, namazdan, hacca anlatılır... 1930'lu yılarda ortaya çıkan Cumhuriyetçi muhafazakarların etkisiyle yazıldığına inandığım bu kitap bugünün siyasi tartışmalarının köklerini anlamak için o yıllara bakmak gerektiğini ortaya koyuyor. Ayni siyasi hatlar devam ediyor, benzer tartışmalar yapılageliyor. Kim bu “Cumhuriyetçi muhafazakârlar” 1930'dan sonra bu kadroyu görmeye başlıyoruz. İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu, Peyami Safa, Şekip Tunç, Adalet Ağaoğlu, Hilmi Ziya Ülken bu isimlerden bazıları... Kemalist devrimcilik ile maneviyat arasında bir orta yol bulmaya çalışan bu isimler İttihat Terakki günlerinden hatta onun da öncesinden başlayan keskin ve dayatmacı pozitivist anlayışa karşı çıkıyor, maneviyat ve dinin toplum ve insan için önemine dikkat çekiyor, baskılanmaması gerektiğine inanıyorlar. Özetle devrimlerin keskinliğine karşı çıkıp itidali savunuyorlar. 1926 kongresi sonrası CHP içinde pozitivizmin ve materyalizmin ağır basması, Kemalizmin halka uzak bir şekilde yorumlanması, CHP içerisinde küçük bir grup olan Cumhuriyetçi muhafazakârları telaşlandırıyor ve İsmail Hakkı Baltacıoğlu önderliğinde bir araya gelmelerine neden oluyordu. 1930'ların Kemalizm anlayışları arasındaki yarışta en geride kalmalarına rağmen, Cumhuriyet'in ilerleyen yıllarında merkez sağın ortaya çıkışıyla beraber önem kazanan Cumhuriyetçi muhafazakârların önemli isimlerine birlikte bir göz atalım.

Mahmut Akpınar | Kemalist yobazlık! | 19.10.2021 by Tr724

20. yüzyılın başlarından itibaren, Fransız sömürgeciliğine hem İslamcı gruplardan hem milliyetçi gruplardan hem de solcu gruplardan örgütlü tepkiler gelmeye başlamıştı. Bu üç kesim de farklı nedenlerle Türkiye'deki Kemalist deneyimi büyük ilgi ile izliyorlardı. Kasım 1919'dan itibaren Fransızlar, Adana-Antep-Urfa yöresini işgal ettiklerinde, Fransız birliklerindeki Moritanyalı, Libyalı, Tunuslu ve Cezayirli askerler Moritanyalı, Libyalı, Tunuslu ve Cezayirli askerlerin bir bölümü Türk tarafına geçmişlerdi. Milli Mücadele'nin kazanılmasından sonra da bu askerler Türk vatandaşlığına alındılar, kendilerine bir miktar toprak verilerek Anadolu'nun çeşitli bölgelerinde iskân edildiler. Ama ilgi bununla sınırlı kaldı. 1830'dan beri Fransız sömürgesi olan Cezayir sorununa uluslararası kamuoyunun dikkatini çeken Komünist Enternasyona…

Mahmut Akpınar | Kemalist Cumhuriyet mi, Çoğulcu Demokrasi mi? | 04.10.2021 by Tr724

Siyasetbilimci Berk Esen bu haftaki “Kritik” programında ana muhalefet partisi CHP'nin 98 yıllık serüveni ışığında, bir taraftan Kemalist reformları korumaya çalışırken öte yandan seçim kazanma ihtiyacının partide yarattığı ideolojik dönüşümleri, kırılmaları ve bölünmeleri inceliyor.

After the ‘End of History' is a podcast about International Relations and History. It is part of the Hawks & Sparrows project. Want more? Please consider supporting the podcast on Patreon to receive bonus episodes, as well as early releases of the monthly Hawks & Sparrows newsletter. You can also follow us on Twitter @after_history. Thanks for listening,Mario and Tom *Episode 28 continues our discussion on Turkish political history with a focus on the administrations of Mustafa İsmet İnönü, Adnan Menderes, Sami Süleyman Gündoğdu Demirel, and  Halil Turgut Özal. From World War II to the post-Soviet era, we explore what Perry Anderson means when he describes the post-Kemalist period in terms of "cycles of the Centre-Right."   

Kemalizm konusundaki yayına gelen tepkiler arasında, bugünün sorunun Kemalizm olmadığı, 2021'de 1930'ların konuşulmasının yersizliği gibi yargılar yanında Kemalist halkçılığın sınıfsızlık tezinin inkarına varan değerlendirmeler dikkat çekiyordu. İngiliz Marxist kuramcı Perry Anderson, “Kemalism” başlıklı yazısından sonra kaleme aldığı “Kemal'den Sonra” adlı uzun makalesinde, laiklik ve devletçilik ilkelerindeki değişime rağmen, Kemalizm'in daha derinde yatan temeline, “bütünleşmeci milliyetçiliğe” hiç dokunulmadığını vurguluyor. Kanımca, buradan yola çıkarak, laiklik ilkesindeki değişimin Diyanet'in milli bütünleşme ile görevli kılınması biçiminde karşımıza çıktığını görmekteyiz ki burada Kemalizm ile bir karşıtlık değil, bir devamlılık bulunmaktadır. Aynı şey, özelleştirmeci, piyasacı yaklaşımla devletçilik ilişkisi için de geçerlidir. Keza, bütünleşmeci (tekçi) milliyetçiliğin Rum pogromları, Alevi katliamları ve Kürt sorununu yaratan baskı gibi unsurlarla birlikte sürdürüldüğünü de Kemalizm'in devamlılığı olarak tesbit etmemiz gerekiyor. Buna ek olarak, çok parti ile sınıf çatışması arasında ilişki kuran Kemalizm'in tek-partiyi meşrulaştıran yaklaşımı ile çok partili dönemdeki parti kapatmalar, 12 Eylül'ün seçim ve parti mevzuatına “olabildiğince az parti ve koalisyonsuz iktidar” perspektifinden getirdiği yaklaşım ve nihayet bugün aynı yaklaşımın vardığı bir zirve olarak tek adam otoriterliği aynı devamlılık çizgisi içinde yer almaktadır. Bu devamlılığı teşhis, Türkiye'nin daha demokratik bir geleceğe erişebilmesi için elzem olan yeni anayasa tasavvuru için zorunluluktur.

Bugün 24 Temmuz, 113 yıl önceki “devrim”in yıl dönümü. Erik Jan Zürcher'in yaklaşımıyla Türkiye tarihinde “Jön Türk Dönemi”nin başlangıcı. Pozitivist ve milliyetçi ideolojinin hakimiyetindeki bu dönemin en belirleyici ideolojik programı kuşkusuz “Kemalizm”. Bugün bazı yaklaşımlar “post-Kemalizm”den söz ediyorsa da, ben henüz “post-Kemalizm”in geçerli olmadığı bir dönem içinde bulunduğumuzu düşünmekteyim. “Post-Kemalizm”den söz edebilmek için “post-modernizm”de olduğu gibi, modernizme özgü kazanımlarla sorunların eleştirel bir biçimde aşıldığı bir durumu ifade edebiliyor olmamız gerek. Kemalizmin ilkeleri bu anlamda kazanımları ve problemleriyle birlikte varlığını sürdürmekte. Örneğin halkçılık, hukuk önünde eşitlik ile önemli bir kazanım getirirken, sınıfsal, etnik vb. farkları yadsıması nedeniyle baskıcı, laiklik dinsel temele dayanmayan bir hukuk düzeni öngörmesiyle devrimci, dini ve manevi yaşam alanlarının devlet denetimi altına alınması boyutuyla otoriter, milliyetçilik ise “çağdaşlaşma” içeriği bakımından kazanımları olan ama homojen, monolitik ve merkeziyetçi milli (ulusal) devlet anlayışı ve pratiğiyle anti-demokratik. Milliyetçiliğin Türkçülük ile Türk-İslam sentezciliği arasında gidip gelmesi, işin doğasındaki Kemalist problemi gözlerden saklamamalıdır. Sonuç olarak, Türkiye'nin demokratikleşmesi, kazanımları koruyan, problemleri de daha demokratik bir seviyede, bu anlamda ancak “post-Kemalist” diye anılabilecek olan bir yenileşme düzeyinde sağlanabilecektir.

Milli mücadele yıllarında İstanbul ve Anadolu'da sosyalist ya da komünist eğilimleri temsil ettiği iddiasında olan birçok politik çevre ortaya çıkmıştır. Bu dönemde sol hareketler gerek başkent İstanbul'da gerekse başta Eskişehir ve Ankara olmak üzere Anadolu'nun farklı bölgelerinde Müslüman unsur içinde de belirgin bir etkinlik kazanmıştır. Bunların iki temel çizgi etrafında öbeklendiği söylenebilir. İlki, uluslararası komünist akımla ilişki içinde gelişen ve Komintern çizgisini takip etme gayretinde olan eğilimdir. Bu eğilim tarihsel olarak Türkiye Komünist Partisi'nin (TKP) kuruluş sürecine yön vermiştir. Diğeriyse, Mete Tunçay'ın İttihatçı sol olarak nitelendirdiği, İttihat ve Terakki Cemiyeti'nden kaynaklanan ve anti-emperyalist bir ideolojik/politik çizgiyi ön plana çıkaran harekettir. İttihatçı kadrolar kimi durumlarda kendilerini komünist olarak da adlandırmıştır. Bu sunumun temel amacı, komünist akımlar ve İttihatçı sol dışında, bir üçüncü eğilimin ortaya çıkışına işaret etmektir. Ankara hükümetiyle bağları nedeniyle “Kemalist komünist” olarak nitelendirilen bu çevrenin, komünist ve İttihatçı solun tasfiye edildiği süreçte İstanbul'da ortaya çıktığı iddia edilecek ve Ekim 1920'de kurulan resmî Türkiye Komünist Fırkası'yla ilişkileri tartışılacaktır.

Kemalist Mahallede Peker Aydınlığı [Alper Ender Fırat] by Tr724

DUVAR - Gazete Duvar'da tarihçi Yalçın Çakmak'ın hazırlayıp sunduğu Kebikeç'e bu hafta 'Cumhuriyet'in Doğu'su' kitabının yazarı Doç. Dr. Ercan Çağlayan konuk oluyor. Çağlayan, ulus devletin temellerini ve bu noktada ortaya çıkan sorunları anlatıyor...

Avrupa Birliği Daimi Temsilciliği, Dünya Ticaret Örgütü Daimi Temsilciliği gibi önemli görevlerde bulunmuş, çeşitli başkentlerde Büyükelçilik yapmış emekli diplomatlarımızdan Selim Kuneralp, son derece kutuplaşmış bir toplum haline gelmiş olmamıza rağmen “sağcı ile solcuyu, dindar ile seküleri, muhafazakar ile ilericiyi, Kemalist ile islamcıyı birleştiren bir tek konu var: Batıya karşı şüphe, hatta kin ve nefret” tespitinde bulunmuştu. Bu yayında Kuneralp’ten güncel gelişmeleri de yorumlayarak, iktidar ve muhalefetin ortaklaştığı “Batı düşmanlığı”nı mercek altına almasını istedik.

To better understand the lasting legacy of international relations in the post-Ottoman Middle East, Amit Bein's Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East: International Relations in the Interwar Period (Cambridge University Press, 2017), reexamines Turkey's engagement with the region during the interwar period.  Long assumed to be a period of deliberate disengagement and ruptured ties between Turkey and its neighbors, the volatile 1930s, Bein argues, was instead a period during which Turkey was in fact perceived as taking steps toward increasing its regional prominence.  Bein examines the unstable situation along Turkey's Middle Eastern borders, the bilateral diplomatic relations Ankara established with fledgling governments in the region, grand plans for transforming Turkey into a major transit hub for Middle Eastern and Eurasian transportation and trade, and Ankara's effort to enhance its image as a model for modernization of non-Western societies. Through this, he offers a fresh, enlightening perspective on the Kemalist legacy, which still resonates in the modern politics of the region today. Reuben Silverman is a PhD candidate at University of California, San Diego Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

To better understand the lasting legacy of international relations in the post-Ottoman Middle East, Amit Bein's Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East: International Relations in the Interwar Period (Cambridge University Press, 2017), reexamines Turkey's engagement with the region during the interwar period.  Long assumed to be a period of deliberate disengagement and ruptured ties between Turkey and its neighbors, the volatile 1930s, Bein argues, was instead a period during which Turkey was in fact perceived as taking steps toward increasing its regional prominence.  Bein examines the unstable situation along Turkey's Middle Eastern borders, the bilateral diplomatic relations Ankara established with fledgling governments in the region, grand plans for transforming Turkey into a major transit hub for Middle Eastern and Eurasian transportation and trade, and Ankara's effort to enhance its image as a model for modernization of non-Western societies. Through this, he offers a fresh, enlightening perspective on the Kemalist legacy, which still resonates in the modern politics of the region today. Reuben Silverman is a PhD candidate at University of California, San Diego

To better understand the lasting legacy of international relations in the post-Ottoman Middle East, Amit Bein's Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East: International Relations in the Interwar Period (Cambridge University Press, 2017), reexamines Turkey’s engagement with the region during the interwar period.  Long assumed to be a period of deliberate disengagement and ruptured ties between Turkey and its neighbors, the volatile 1930s, Bein argues, was instead a period during which Turkey was in fact perceived as taking steps toward increasing its regional prominence.  Bein examines the unstable situation along Turkey’s Middle Eastern borders, the bilateral diplomatic relations Ankara established with fledgling governments in the region, grand plans for transforming Turkey into a major transit hub for Middle Eastern and Eurasian transportation and trade, and Ankara’s effort to enhance its image as a model for modernization of non-Western societies. Through this, he offers a fresh, enlightening perspective on the Kemalist legacy, which still resonates in the modern politics of the region today. Reuben Silverman is a PhD candidate at University of California, San Diego Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm

To better understand the lasting legacy of international relations in the post-Ottoman Middle East, Amit Bein's Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East: International Relations in the Interwar Period (Cambridge University Press, 2017), reexamines Turkey’s engagement with the region during the interwar period.  Long assumed to be a period of deliberate disengagement and ruptured ties between Turkey and its neighbors, the volatile 1930s, Bein argues, was instead a period during which Turkey was in fact perceived as taking steps toward increasing its regional prominence.  Bein examines the unstable situation along Turkey’s Middle Eastern borders, the bilateral diplomatic relations Ankara established with fledgling governments in the region, grand plans for transforming Turkey into a major transit hub for Middle Eastern and Eurasian transportation and trade, and Ankara’s effort to enhance its image as a model for modernization of non-Western societies. Through this, he offers a fresh, enlightening perspective on the Kemalist legacy, which still resonates in the modern politics of the region today. Reuben Silverman is a PhD candidate at University of California, San Diego Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

To better understand the lasting legacy of international relations in the post-Ottoman Middle East, Amit Bein's Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East: International Relations in the Interwar Period (Cambridge University Press, 2017), reexamines Turkey’s engagement with the region during the interwar period.  Long assumed to be a period of deliberate disengagement and ruptured ties between Turkey and its neighbors, the volatile 1930s, Bein argues, was instead a period during which Turkey was in fact perceived as taking steps toward increasing its regional prominence.  Bein examines the unstable situation along Turkey’s Middle Eastern borders, the bilateral diplomatic relations Ankara established with fledgling governments in the region, grand plans for transforming Turkey into a major transit hub for Middle Eastern and Eurasian transportation and trade, and Ankara’s effort to enhance its image as a model for modernization of non-Western societies. Through this, he offers a fresh, enlightening perspective on the Kemalist legacy, which still resonates in the modern politics of the region today. Reuben Silverman is a PhD candidate at University of California, San Diego Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

To better understand the lasting legacy of international relations in the post-Ottoman Middle East, Amit Bein's Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East: International Relations in the Interwar Period (Cambridge University Press, 2017), reexamines Turkey’s engagement with the region during the interwar period.  Long assumed to be a period of deliberate disengagement and ruptured ties between Turkey and its neighbors, the volatile 1930s, Bein argues, was instead a period during which Turkey was in fact perceived as taking steps toward increasing its regional prominence.  Bein examines the unstable situation along Turkey’s Middle Eastern borders, the bilateral diplomatic relations Ankara established with fledgling governments in the region, grand plans for transforming Turkey into a major transit hub for Middle Eastern and Eurasian transportation and trade, and Ankara’s effort to enhance its image as a model for modernization of non-Western societies. Through this, he offers a fresh, enlightening perspective on the Kemalist legacy, which still resonates in the modern politics of the region today. Reuben Silverman is a PhD candidate at University of California, San Diego Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

To better understand the lasting legacy of international relations in the post-Ottoman Middle East, Amit Bein's Kemalist Turkey and the Middle East: International Relations in the Interwar Period (Cambridge University Press, 2017), reexamines Turkey’s engagement with the region during the interwar period.  Long assumed to be a period of deliberate disengagement and ruptured ties between Turkey and its neighbors, the volatile 1930s, Bein argues, was instead a period during which Turkey was in fact perceived as taking steps toward increasing its regional prominence.  Bein examines the unstable situation along Turkey’s Middle Eastern borders, the bilateral diplomatic relations Ankara established with fledgling governments in the region, grand plans for transforming Turkey into a major transit hub for Middle Eastern and Eurasian transportation and trade, and Ankara’s effort to enhance its image as a model for modernization of non-Western societies. Through this, he offers a fresh, enlightening perspective on the Kemalist legacy, which still resonates in the modern politics of the region today. Reuben Silverman is a PhD candidate at University of California, San Diego Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm

Ne Mutlu Eşitim Diyene konferans serimiz İnci Özkan Kerestecioğlu'nun konuşmasıyla devam ediyor. Milliyetçilik projeleri milli kimlikleri inşa ederken, cinsiyet kimliklerini ve cinsiyet ilişkilerini düzenleyici bir işlev görür. Toplumsal cinsiyet rejimlerini yeniden kuran etkisiyle milliyetçilik ve feminizm arasında kimi zaman ittifaklara kimi zaman ihtilaflara neden olan bir ilişki vardır. Bu konuşmada İkinci Meşrutiyet ve Erken Cumhuriyet dönemi kadın hareketinin milliyetçi projelerle organik bağlarına dair örneklere ve bu bağın zaman zaman kendini açığa çıkaran çatışmalı yanlarına değinildikten sonra, 1980'le de ortaya çıkan bağımsız feminist hareketin, Kemalist cumhuriyete ve onun kadın politikalarına yönelik eleştirel tutumuna rağmen, nasıl olup da milliyetçi motifleri taşımaya devam ettiği tartışılıyor; Kürt feminist hareketinin ortaya çıkışıyla birlikte yaşanan çatışmalar, yüzleşmeler ve dönüşümler değerlendiriliyor. Konuşmada Kürt feminizminin Türk feminizminin milliyetçiliğine yönelik güçlü eleştirilerinin yanında, Kürt feminizminin Kürt milliyetçiliği ile ilişkisi de çatışan ve uzlaşan boyutlarıyla ele alınıyor.

Türkiye, Gezi Parkı eylemlerinden bu yana giderek otoriterleşen ve 15 Temmuz ile birlikte Batı’dan kopuşa yol açan AKP iktidarının, attığı adımların faturasını ödemeye devam ediyor. Özellikle son yıllarda dış politikada kavgacı bir tutum izleyen Ankara, ABD ve Avrupa Birliği’nden gelen yaptırım adımları ile iyiden iyiye köşeye sıkışmış bir görüntü çiziyor. Gökhan Bacık’la Ergun Babahan, Gidişat’ta bu hafta Amerika’nın kesinleşen S-400 yaptırımları üzerinden Türkiye-Batı ilişkisinin geleceğini konuştu. Avrupa Birliği’nin de net tutum için Biden yönetimini beklediğine işaret eden Bacık, “Erdoğan ve Avrasyacıların Ankara’nın Moskova ve Pekin’den aradığını bulamadığını çünkü Batı dışında başarılı bir ittifak modeli olmadığını” vurguluyor. “İslamcıların Post-Kemalist olduğu” yorumunu yapan Bacık, Türk dış politikasında Doğu'dan bir alternatif çıkarma beklentisinin hep var olduğuna dikkat çekerek, “Ancak Türkiye Doğu'da aradığını bir türlü bulamıyor. Çünkü Batı dışında sistemli, sofistike biçimde ekonomi ve güvenlik konularında fırsatlar sunan örgütler ve yapılar bulmak zor” görüşünü dile getiriyor. Bacık, Senato’dan geçerek Trump’ın imzasına kalan yaptırım adımı üzerinden ABD’nin yeni dönemde Türkiye’yle nasıl bir ilişki içine gireceğine ilişkin olarak, "Konjonktürel koşullar olumsuz görünmekle birlikte, ABD'nin yeni Türkiye siyasetini öğrenmek için Biden ve ekibinin ne yapmak istediğini görmek gerekiyor" ifadesini kullanıyor. Trump’ın ekibindeki isimlerin de Erdoğan’la limoni bir ilişki içinde olduğunu hatırlatan Bacık, “Biden olmasa da yaptırımların geleceği aşikârdı” diyor ve ekliyor: “Erdoğan değişmediği sürece yaptırımlar daha da ağırlaşacaktır. Bir süre sonra Türkiye'deki bu Post-Kemalist İslamcı, milliyetçi, Avrasyacı iktidar bileşenlerinin Batı sistemiyle uzlaşması imkânsız olacaktır. Belli ki, burada Bahçeli ile sorun var. Erdoğan iktidarda kaldığı sürece Bahçeli'ye açık çek vermiş durumda. HDP kapatıldığı zaman ABD ve Avrupa ile pragmatik bir ilişki kuramazsınız."

Türkiye, Gezi Parkı eylemlerinden bu yana giderek otoriterleşen ve 15 Temmuz ile birlikte Batı’dan kopuşa yol açan AKP iktidarının, attığı adımların faturasını ödemeye devam ediyor.Özellikle son yıllarda dış politikada kavgacı bir tutum izleyen Ankara, ABD ve Avrupa Birliği’nden gelen yaptırım adımları ile iyiden iyiye köşeye sıkışmış bir görüntü çiziyor.Gökhan Bacık’la Ergun Babahan, Gidişat’ta bu hafta Amerika’nın kesinleşen S-400 yaptırımları üzerinden Türkiye-Batı ilişkisinin geleceğini konuştu.Avrupa Birliği’nin de net tutum için Biden yönetimini beklediğine işaret eden Bacık, “Erdoğan ve Avrasyacıların Ankara’nın Moskova ve Pekin’den aradığını bulamadığını çünkü Batı dışında başarılı bir ittifak modeli olmadığını” vurguluyor.“İslamcıların Post-Kemalist olduğu” yorumunu yapan Bacık, Türk dış politikasında Doğu'dan bir alternatif çıkarma beklentisinin hep var olduğuna dikkat çekerek, “Ancak Türkiye Doğu'da aradığını bir türlü bulamıyor. Çünkü Batı dışında sistemli, sofistike biçimde ekonomi ve güvenlik konularında fırsatlar sunan örgütler ve yapılar bulmak zor” görüşünü dile getiriyor.Bacık, Senato’dan geçerek Trump’ın imzasına kalan yaptırım adımı üzerinden ABD’nin yeni dönemde Türkiye’yle nasıl bir ilişki içine gireceğine ilişkin olarak, "Konjonktürel koşullar olumsuz görünmekle birlikte, ABD'nin yeni Türkiye siyasetini öğrenmek için Biden ve ekibinin ne yapmak istediğini görmek gerekiyor" ifadesini kullanıyor.Trump’ın ekibindeki isimlerin de Erdoğan’la limoni bir ilişki içinde olduğunu hatırlatan Bacık, “Biden olmasa da yaptırımların geleceği aşikârdı” diyor ve ekliyor:“Erdoğan değişmediği sürece yaptırımlar daha da ağırlaşacaktır. Bir süre sonra Türkiye'deki bu Post-Kemalist İslamcı, milliyetçi, Avrasyacı iktidar bileşenlerinin Batı sistemiyle uzlaşması imkânsız olacaktır. Belli ki, burada Bahçeli ile sorun var. Erdoğan iktidarda kaldığı sürece Bahçeli'ye açık çek vermiş durumda. HDP kapatıldığı zaman ABD ve Avrupa ile pragmatik bir ilişki kuramazsınız."

We are joined by Elif from Kurdish Assembly UK and Nik, an internationalist in the Kurdish freedom struggle to discuss the history and continued relevance of Turkish fascism. We talk about the origins of the Turkish state, the interactions of the Kemalist state with fascism and Nazism, the make up of the contemporary far right in Turkey and the 2019 invasion of Northern Syria. Links for further reading/ information: https://crimethinc.com/2019/11/12/the-roots-of-turkish-fascism-and-the-threat-it-poses https://rojavainformationcenter.com https://anfenglish.com/news https://www.nuceciwan54.com/en/author/ncenglish/ https://medyanews.net/

Hosts: Dina Gusejnova, Georgios Giannakopoulos Guests: Cemil Aydin, Professor of History at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill Marc David Baer, Professor of International History at the London School of Economics Music: Yavuz Akyazıcı, Renkli Rüyalar Oteli, from his Album Turkish Standards, vol. 2 https://archive.org/details/yavuzakyazicisendendahaguzel/Yavuz+Akyaz%C4%B1c%C4%B1+-+Renkli+R%C3%BCyalar+Oteli.mp3 Hacı Arif Bey (1831-1885), ‘Güzel Gün Görmedi Avare Gönlüm', performed by Ahmet Özhan, at Community Audio https://archive.org/details/huzzam/Guzel+gun+gormedi+avare+gonlum.mp3 Erdogan waves goodbye to Kemalism--the end of the post-9/11 moment in Turkey's relations with Europe and the West -the revived legacies of the Ottoman past – Mehmet II's place in Kemalist and conservative Turkish imaginaries -- Mehmet II in the eyes of Nizami Hikmet – Mehmet II´s love poems to Greek youth-- the ambiguous legacies of Ottoman tolerance - the legacies of the Ottoman empire in the modern world – the theme of contested endowment – modern Turkey´s claim on the post-Ottoman world – the reactions from Greek and Russian Orthodox Church representatives – the turn to the right in the regions associated with the ‘antemurale Christianitatis' – the divisions between the Russian state and the Orthodox Church in assessing the incident

Şark musikisinden Garp müziğine... Ayşe Hür: "1924’te Yeni Sinema’da Osman Zeki (Üngör) Bey’in yönettiği orkestra Zeki Bey’in Cumhuriyet Marşı ile Beethoven’in Beşinci Senfonisi’ni çalmıştı. İkinci konsere çıkarken orkestranın adı artık ‘Riyaset-i Cumhur Filarmonik Orkestrası’ idi. 1926’da Darülelhan’ın ‘Şark Musikisi Şubesi’nin kapatılacağını derleme çalışmaları yapmak üzere gittiği Anadolu gezisinden dönüşte öğrenen Darülelhan’ın hocası Rauf Yekta Bey, “bir milletin musikisi resmî bir encümenin kararıyla nasıl ilga olunabilir?” diye şaşkınlığını dile getirmişti. 26 Kasım 1927’deki radyo yayın akışı şöyleydi: 19.00 Stüdyo Musiki Heyetinden Şevketza Faslı. 19.30 Esham ve Tahvilat Borsası Haberleri. 19.40 Telsiz Telefon Orkestrası. 20.10 Zahire Borsası Haberleri. 20.20 Telsiz Telefon Musiki Heyeti. 20.50 Anadolu Ajansı Haberleri. 21.00 Telsiz Telefon Orkestrası. 21.30 Teganni..."

Sevan Nişanyan - Bahattin Çağdaş - 1.Bölüm Kemalist eğitim faşist yetiştiriyor !

Sabah gazetesinin 19 Mayıs sayfası, özellikle Kemalist kesimde büyük tepkiye yol açtı. Sabah, 19 Mayıs kutlamasında Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ile birlikte son Padişah Vahdettin ve Sadrazam Damat Ferit Paşa’nın fotoğraflarına da yer verdi. Resmi tarihe göre İngilizlerle işbirliği içinde Mustafa Kemal ve milli mücadeleye ihanet etmiş bu isimlerin kahraman gibi sunulması yeni bir tartışmaya yol açtı.19 Mayıs gibi bir bayramın bir toplumsal bölünmeye yol açtığı, daha doğrusu mevcut bölünmeleri derinleştirip uzlaşmayı imkânsız hâle getirdiği bir dönemde, Türkiye’nin istikametini, ruh halini Gökhan Bacık ile konuştuk:“Eskiden beri Türkiye’nin yakın tarihi yorumu konusunda Tanzimat’tan bu yana ciddi ayrılıklar var. Bir yandan resmi tarih yaklaşımı, diğer yandan popülist İslamcıların; Abdurrahman Dilipak gibi isimlerin yaklaşımı var. Bu yaklaşımı bütün İslamcılar benimsiyor. Bu gayet doğal, her düşüncenin kendisini meşrulaştırmanın bir yolu da geçmişi adlandırmaktır. İslamiyet’in de kendine göre bir yaklaşımı var ve geçmişi öyle anlamlandırıyor.Resmi tarihe göre, Osmanlı işgal altındaydı… Atatürk kendi çabasıyla Samsun’a çıktı ve milli mücadeleyi başlattı, Türkiye’yi kurtardı. Bunun karşısında, tam zıddı olan İslamcı görüş var. Buna göre her şeyi yapan Vahdettin idi… Hatta İslamcı söylem, Atatürk neredeyse İngilizlerin adamıydı gibi komplocu bir yaklaşımla konuyu ele alıyor.İkincisi şimdi İslamcılar, Türkiye’de iktidarda olduğu için bu tarihi değiştirmek istiyorlar. Bunu fark ediyoruz, mesela Atatürk kavramında yeni bir önerme var. Abdülhamid mesela, iktidar onu yeni bir biçimde tanımlamaya çalışıyor. İslamcılar her alanda olduğu gibi tarih alanında da bir strateji izlemek istiyorlar. Buna göre Kemalizm tarihin akışı içinde bir hata, bir parantez olarak görülmek ve gösterilmeye çalışılıyor. Osmanlı’dan kendilerine direk bir bağ olduğunu göstermek istiyor.Üçüncüsü de PR. Geçen gün bir anlaşma yayımlandı, Türk toplumunun yüzde 50’den fazlası Lozan Anlaşması’nın gizli maddeleri olduğuna inanıyor. Yani şöyle düşünün, inananların yüzde 50’si Kuran’ın bazı hükümlerinin gizlendiğine inansa nasıl bir duruma girmiş oluruz. Bu dehşet verici bir şey, artık rasyonaliteden çıktığımızın göstergesi.Milli Mücadele, İslamcılara göre Padişah’ın stratejisiydi. Padişah İngilizleri oyalarken Mustafa Kemal’e yol açtı. İki yaklaşımın da abartılı yönleri olduğu kesin."Türkiye’de cezaevlerindeki duruma da konuştuk Bacık ile. Koronanın başta Silivri olmak üzere hızla yayılması ve başta muhalefet olmak üzere toplumun buna duyarsızlığının nedenlerini de tartıştık:“Türkiye’de insanlar devletten korkuyor. FETÖ olayı o kadar büyüdü ki, buna girmeyecek kimse yok. Spekülatif bir örnek vereyim, kalkıp MHP lideri Bahçeli’yi kalkıp PKK’den tutuklayamazsınız ama FETÖ’den tutuklayabilirsiniz. Türkiye bu olayda toplumu öyle bir noktaya getirdi ki, Erdoğan’dan tutun Cemaat’in en zıddı isimlere kadar herkes bu sepete girebilir. Türkiye’deki herkes teorik olarak böyle suçlanabilir. En olmayacak insanlar suçlanabilir.Ama burada seküler muhalefeti anlamakta zorlanıyorum çünkü ortada artık bir Cemaat kalmadı… Bir kısmı tutuklu, bir kısmı yurt dışına kaçtı… Bürokraside kalmadı. Artık böyle bir yapı kalmadı. Türkiye düşman yaratmakta başarılı bir ülke ama bu kez kendini aştı gerçekten.Bugün herkes kendi mahallesine çekilerek güvenliğini sağlamaya çalışıyor. Etnik, inanç mahalleleri var artık. Herkes kendi mahallesine gitti ve mahalle içinde başka şeylerle ilgilenmiyorlar.Baskıcı bir iktidar karşısında gelişmekte ülke aydınının önünde üç yol var: Birincisi sürgüne gitmek, ikincisi hapse girmek, üçüncüsü de susmak. Üçüncü seçenekte ülkede baskı, zulüm yokmuş gibi yaşamak zorunda kalıyorsun. Çünkü direndiğiniz zaman başınıza gelecek olanı biliyorsunuz, günlük hayatın içine olağan dışı bir müdahale var. Bu psikoloji üçüncü dünyada yaygındır. Biliyorum ama yokmuş gibi davranıyorum.”

Sabah gazetesinin 19 Mayıs sayfası, özellikle Kemalist kesimde büyük tepkiye yol açtı. Sabah, 19 Mayıs kutlamasında Mustafa Kemal Atatürk ile birlikte son Padişah Vahdettin ve Sadrazam Damat Ferit Paşa’nın fotoğraflarına da yer verdi. Resmi tarihe göre İngilizlerle işbirliği içinde Mustafa Kemal ve milli mücadeleye ihanet etmiş bu isimlerin kahraman gibi sunulması yeni bir tartışmaya yol açtı. 19 Mayıs gibi bir bayramın bir toplumsal bölünmeye yol açtığı, daha doğrusu mevcut bölünmeleri derinleştirip uzlaşmayı imkânsız hâle getirdiği bir dönemde, Türkiye’nin istikametini, ruh halini Gökhan Bacık ile konuştuk: “Eskiden beri Türkiye’nin yakın tarihi yorumu konusunda Tanzimat’tan bu yana ciddi ayrılıklar var. Bir yandan resmi tarih yaklaşımı, diğer yandan popülist İslamcıların; Abdurrahman Dilipak gibi isimlerin yaklaşımı var. Bu yaklaşımı bütün İslamcılar benimsiyor. Bu gayet doğal, her düşüncenin kendisini meşrulaştırmanın bir yolu da geçmişi adlandırmaktır. İslamiyet’in de kendine göre bir yaklaşımı var ve geçmişi öyle anlamlandırıyor. Resmi tarihe göre, Osmanlı işgal altındaydı… Atatürk kendi çabasıyla Samsun’a çıktı ve milli mücadeleyi başlattı, Türkiye’yi kurtardı. Bunun karşısında, tam zıddı olan İslamcı görüş var. Buna göre her şeyi yapan Vahdettin idi… Hatta İslamcı söylem, Atatürk neredeyse İngilizlerin adamıydı gibi komplocu bir yaklaşımla konuyu ele alıyor. İkincisi şimdi İslamcılar, Türkiye’de iktidarda olduğu için bu tarihi değiştirmek istiyorlar. Bunu fark ediyoruz, mesela Atatürk kavramında yeni bir önerme var. Abdülhamid mesela, iktidar onu yeni bir biçimde tanımlamaya çalışıyor. İslamcılar her alanda olduğu gibi tarih alanında da bir strateji izlemek istiyorlar. Buna göre Kemalizm tarihin akışı içinde bir hata, bir parantez olarak görülmek ve gösterilmeye çalışılıyor. Osmanlı’dan kendilerine direk bir bağ olduğunu göstermek istiyor. Üçüncüsü de PR. Geçen gün bir anlaşma yayımlandı, Türk toplumunun yüzde 50’den fazlası Lozan Anlaşması’nın gizli maddeleri olduğuna inanıyor. Yani şöyle düşünün, inananların yüzde 50’si Kuran’ın bazı hükümlerinin gizlendiğine inansa nasıl bir duruma girmiş oluruz. Bu dehşet verici bir şey, artık rasyonaliteden çıktığımızın göstergesi. Milli Mücadele, İslamcılara göre Padişah’ın stratejisiydi. Padişah İngilizleri oyalarken Mustafa Kemal’e yol açtı. İki yaklaşımın da abartılı yönleri olduğu kesin." Türkiye’de cezaevlerindeki duruma da konuştuk Bacık ile. Koronanın başta Silivri olmak üzere hızla yayılması ve başta muhalefet olmak üzere toplumun buna duyarsızlığının nedenlerini de tartıştık: “Türkiye’de insanlar devletten korkuyor. FETÖ olayı o kadar büyüdü ki, buna girmeyecek kimse yok. Spekülatif bir örnek vereyim, kalkıp MHP lideri Bahçeli’yi kalkıp PKK’den tutuklayamazsınız ama FETÖ’den tutuklayabilirsiniz. Türkiye bu olayda toplumu öyle bir noktaya getirdi ki, Erdoğan’dan tutun Cemaat’in en zıddı isimlere kadar herkes bu sepete girebilir. Türkiye’deki herkes teorik olarak böyle suçlanabilir. En olmayacak insanlar suçlanabilir. Ama burada seküler muhalefeti anlamakta zorlanıyorum çünkü ortada artık bir Cemaat kalmadı… Bir kısmı tutuklu, bir kısmı yurt dışına kaçtı… Bürokraside kalmadı. Artık böyle bir yapı kalmadı. Türkiye düşman yaratmakta başarılı bir ülke ama bu kez kendini aştı gerçekten. Bugün herkes kendi mahallesine çekilerek güvenliğini sağlamaya çalışıyor. Etnik, inanç mahalleleri var artık. Herkes kendi mahallesine gitti ve mahalle içinde başka şeylerle ilgilenmiyorlar. Baskıcı bir iktidar karşısında gelişmekte ülke aydınının önünde üç yol var: Birincisi sürgüne gitmek, ikincisi hapse girmek, üçüncüsü de susmak. Üçüncü seçenekte ülkede baskı, zulüm yokmuş gibi yaşamak zorunda kalıyorsun. Çünkü direndiğiniz zaman başınıza gelecek olanı biliyorsunuz, günlük hayatın içine olağan dışı bir müdahale var. Bu psikoloji üçüncü dünyada yaygındır. Biliyorum ama yokmuş gibi davranıyorum.”

Adem Yavuz Arslan | 250 şehit ‘Erdoğan-Kemalist yapı anlaşması’nın neresindeydi? | 10.03.2020 by TR724 E-GAZETE

Uşşaki tarikatı şeyhi Fatih Nurullah Efendi'nin oğlu AHŞ ve adının açıklanmasını istemeyen bir İsmailağa tarikatı mensubu, tarikatların örgütlülüğü, ibadetleri, şeyh-mürit ilişkileri, Alevilerin Sünnileşmesi, azınlık nüfusun yok edilmesi, iktidarın zorladığı radikal toplumsal-siyasal dönüşüme desteklerine kadar pek çok konuda çarpıcı açıklamalar yaptı. İlahiyatçı Abdülaziz Bayındır’ın değerlendirmeleriyle birlikte…Podcast metnini okumak için: https://www.kisadalga.net/tarikatlarin-icinden-muritler-anlatiyor/

Tarihçi Ayşe Hür, bu haftaki programında, 85. yıldönümünde kadınlara seçme ve seçilme hakkı verilmesinin öteki yüzüne bakıyor. Ayşe Hür: Kadın hareketi, Birinci Dünya Savaşı yıllarındaki İttihatçı politikalar yüzünden Gayrimüslim unsurlarını kaybetmiş, 1923’ten itibaren de ulus-devlet mantığına uygun biçimde ‘Türkleşmişti’ ama idealleri değişmemişti. Kemalist erkeklerin Cumhuriyet kadınlarından bekledikleri çok şey vardı. Sadece bu kadınların siyasetle ilgilenmeleri istenmiyordu, o kadar! 1923’te kadınlara oy hakkını savunan Bolu Mebusu Tunalı Hilmi Bey, "nisaiyyundan" (kadın takımından) veya “feminist” sözleriyle alaya alınmış, konuşması “şeriata hürmet ediniz!” bağırışları arasında susturulmuştu. Nezihe Muhiddin öncülüğündeki kadınlar Haziran 1923’te Kadınlar Halk Fırkası’nın kuruluş beyannamesini Dahiliye Vekilliği’ne sundular. Tam sekiz ay sonra, hükümet “kadınların seçme ve seçilme hakkı olmadığı” için fırkanın kuruluşuna izin vermediğini bildirdi.

Uşşaki tarikatı şeyhi Fatih Nurullah Efendi'nin oğlu ve adının açıklanmasını istemeyen bir İsmailağa tarikatı mensubu, tarikatların örgütlülüğü, ibadetleri, şeyh-mürit ilişkileri, Alevilerin Sünnileşmesi, azınlık nüfusun yok edilmesi, iktidarın zorladığı radikal toplumsal-siyasal dönüşüme desteklerine kadar pek çok konuda çarpıcı açıklamalar yaptı. İlahiyatçı Abdülaziz Bayındır’ın değerlendirmeleriyle birlikte…

Batı Trakya'nın Bilinmeyen Tarihi adlı programın 10'uncu bölümünde psikiyatri uzmanı emekli doktor İbram Onsunoğlu, Batı Trakyalı azınlık milletvekillerinin Kemalist - İslamcı ayrımıyla başlayan ve günümüze uzanan sürecin son bölümünü gazeteci Evren Dede'ye anlattı. Bir önceki bölümün devamı niteliğindeki programda günümüze kadar azınlık milletvekillerinden örneklerle yaşananlar aktarılıyor. Eskiden halk meclisinde azınlık milletvekillerinden hesap sorulurduMuncura’nın milletvekili seçilmesi aslında bir ayaklanmaydıBütün küçük esnaf ve köylüler, Koca Kapı aleyhinde olmasına rağmen Muncura’yı desteklemiş ve milletvekili seçmiştirKendisinin planlamadığı azınlıktaki bir ayaklanmanın önderi olmuştur Ahmet MuncuraAzınlıkta kim eleştirilecek Koca Kapı karar verir1980 darbesinde tüm dernekler kapatıldı, tek kapatılmayan Batı Trakyalıların derneğiydi! Çünkü devletin derneğiydiAzınlıktaki kurulu düzene karşı bir isyandı buMilletvekillerinden çok şey beklemiyoruz fakat milletvekilleri hiçbir şey vermiyorMilletvekillerine gereğinden fazla önem veriyoruz, değmez

Batı Trakya'nın Bilinmeyen Tarihi adlı programın 9'uncu bölümünde psikiyatri uzmanı emekli doktor İbram Onsunoğlu, Batı Trakyalı azınlık milletvekillerinin Kemalist - İslamcı ayrımıyla başlayan ve günümüze uzanan süreci gazeteci Evren Dede'ye anlattı.İşte programdan satır başları:- Atatürk aleyhine yayın yapan Batı Trakyalı azınlık milletvekili kimdi?- Alparslan Türkeş hangi Batı Trakyalı milletvekili ile görüştü- Medresedeki boykotu azınlık milletvekilleri durdurmaya koştu- Gümülcine'de kimse görmesin diye kem gözlerden uzak parkta buluştuk- Emekli maaşı almak için milletvekilliğini bırakmadı- Kadir Mısıroğlu gibi Batı Trakya'da fes ile yaşadı, fes ile öldü- İskeçe Pomakları için "Sizde 'cebel' sorunu yok, bizde var' demiştir- Biz Batı Trakya'da Koca Kapı için değil azınlık için çalışan milletvekili istiyoruz- Sanki biz bir çuval patatesiz de kendimizi alacağız Meriç'in öbür tarafına geçeceğiz- Türkiyeliye Batı Trakya ağzıyla "Balkan köyü" dedin mi anlamaz- Koca Kapı'nın desteklediği adaylar hep üçkağıtçı, dolandırıcı çıkmıştır- Soltaridis gibi papazlar varken kilise nasıl yıkılmıyor, hayret ediyorum- Müftü izin almadan nasıl Balkan köylerine gider, ortalık karışmış!

Vahram Ter-Matevosyan new book Turkey, Kemalism and the Soviet Union: Problems of Modernization, Ideology and Interpretation (Palgrave Macmillan, examines the Kemalist ideology of Turkey from two perspectives. It discusses major problems in the existing interpretations of the topic and how the incorporation of Soviet perspectives enriches the historiography and our understanding of that ideology. To address these questions, the book looks into the origins, evolution, and transformational phases of Kemalism between the 1920s and 1970s. The research also focuses on perspectives from abroad by observing how republican Turkey and particularly its founding ideology were viewed and interpreted by Soviet observers. Paying more attention to the diplomatic, geopolitical, and economic complexities of Turkish-Soviet relations, scholars have rarely problematized those perceptions of Turkish ideological transformations. Looking at various phases of Soviet attitudes towards Kemalism and its manifestations through the lenses of Communist leaders, party functionaries, diplomats and scholars, the book illuminates the underlying dynamics of Soviet interpretations. Robert Elliott is a Ph.D. student in the Department of History, Duke University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Vahram Ter-Matevosyan new book Turkey, Kemalism and the Soviet Union: Problems of Modernization, Ideology and Interpretation (Palgrave Macmillan,  examines the Kemalist ideology of Turkey from two perspectives. It discusses major problems in the existing interpretations of the topic and how the incorporation of Soviet perspectives enriches the historiography and our understanding of that ideology. To address these questions, the book looks into the origins, evolution, and transformational phases of Kemalism between the 1920s and 1970s. The research also focuses on perspectives from abroad by observing how republican Turkey and particularly its founding ideology were viewed and interpreted by Soviet observers. Paying more attention to the diplomatic, geopolitical, and economic complexities of Turkish-Soviet relations, scholars have rarely problematized those perceptions of Turkish ideological transformations. Looking at various phases of Soviet attitudes towards Kemalism and its manifestations through the lenses of Communist leaders, party functionaries, diplomats and scholars, the book illuminates the underlying dynamics of Soviet interpretations. Robert Elliott is a Ph.D. student in the Department of History, Duke University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Vahram Ter-Matevosyan new book Turkey, Kemalism and the Soviet Union: Problems of Modernization, Ideology and Interpretation (Palgrave Macmillan,  examines the Kemalist ideology of Turkey from two perspectives. It discusses major problems in the existing interpretations of the topic and how the incorporation of Soviet perspectives enriches the historiography and our understanding of that ideology. To address these questions, the book looks into the origins, evolution, and transformational phases of Kemalism between the 1920s and 1970s. The research also focuses on perspectives from abroad by observing how republican Turkey and particularly its founding ideology were viewed and interpreted by Soviet observers. Paying more attention to the diplomatic, geopolitical, and economic complexities of Turkish-Soviet relations, scholars have rarely problematized those perceptions of Turkish ideological transformations. Looking at various phases of Soviet attitudes towards Kemalism and its manifestations through the lenses of Communist leaders, party functionaries, diplomats and scholars, the book illuminates the underlying dynamics of Soviet interpretations. Robert Elliott is a Ph.D. student in the Department of History, Duke University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Vahram Ter-Matevosyan new book Turkey, Kemalism and the Soviet Union: Problems of Modernization, Ideology and Interpretation (Palgrave Macmillan,  examines the Kemalist ideology of Turkey from two perspectives. It discusses major problems in the existing interpretations of the topic and how the incorporation of Soviet perspectives enriches the historiography and our understanding of that ideology. To address these questions, the book looks into the origins, evolution, and transformational phases of Kemalism between the 1920s and 1970s. The research also focuses on perspectives from abroad by observing how republican Turkey and particularly its founding ideology were viewed and interpreted by Soviet observers. Paying more attention to the diplomatic, geopolitical, and economic complexities of Turkish-Soviet relations, scholars have rarely problematized those perceptions of Turkish ideological transformations. Looking at various phases of Soviet attitudes towards Kemalism and its manifestations through the lenses of Communist leaders, party functionaries, diplomats and scholars, the book illuminates the underlying dynamics of Soviet interpretations. Robert Elliott is a Ph.D. student in the Department of History, Duke University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Vahram Ter-Matevosyan new book Turkey, Kemalism and the Soviet Union: Problems of Modernization, Ideology and Interpretation (Palgrave Macmillan,  examines the Kemalist ideology of Turkey from two perspectives. It discusses major problems in the existing interpretations of the topic and how the incorporation of Soviet perspectives enriches the historiography and our understanding of that ideology. To address these questions, the book looks into the origins, evolution, and transformational phases of Kemalism between the 1920s and 1970s. The research also focuses on perspectives from abroad by observing how republican Turkey and particularly its founding ideology were viewed and interpreted by Soviet observers. Paying more attention to the diplomatic, geopolitical, and economic complexities of Turkish-Soviet relations, scholars have rarely problematized those perceptions of Turkish ideological transformations. Looking at various phases of Soviet attitudes towards Kemalism and its manifestations through the lenses of Communist leaders, party functionaries, diplomats and scholars, the book illuminates the underlying dynamics of Soviet interpretations. Robert Elliott is a Ph.D. student in the Department of History, Duke University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Vahram Ter-Matevosyan new book Turkey, Kemalism and the Soviet Union: Problems of Modernization, Ideology and Interpretation (Palgrave Macmillan,  examines the Kemalist ideology of Turkey from two perspectives. It discusses major problems in the existing interpretations of the topic and how the incorporation of Soviet perspectives enriches the historiography and our understanding of that ideology. To address these questions, the book looks into the origins, evolution, and transformational phases of Kemalism between the 1920s and 1970s. The research also focuses on perspectives from abroad by observing how republican Turkey and particularly its founding ideology were viewed and interpreted by Soviet observers. Paying more attention to the diplomatic, geopolitical, and economic complexities of Turkish-Soviet relations, scholars have rarely problematized those perceptions of Turkish ideological transformations. Looking at various phases of Soviet attitudes towards Kemalism and its manifestations through the lenses of Communist leaders, party functionaries, diplomats and scholars, the book illuminates the underlying dynamics of Soviet interpretations. Robert Elliott is a Ph.D. student in the Department of History, Duke University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Vahram Ter-Matevosyan new book Turkey, Kemalism and the Soviet Union: Problems of Modernization, Ideology and Interpretation (Palgrave Macmillan,  examines the Kemalist ideology of Turkey from two perspectives. It discusses major problems in the existing interpretations of the topic and how the incorporation of Soviet perspectives enriches the historiography and our understanding of that ideology. To address these questions, the book looks into the origins, evolution, and transformational phases of Kemalism between the 1920s and 1970s. The research also focuses on perspectives from abroad by observing how republican Turkey and particularly its founding ideology were viewed and interpreted by Soviet observers. Paying more attention to the diplomatic, geopolitical, and economic complexities of Turkish-Soviet relations, scholars have rarely problematized those perceptions of Turkish ideological transformations. Looking at various phases of Soviet attitudes towards Kemalism and its manifestations through the lenses of Communist leaders, party functionaries, diplomats and scholars, the book illuminates the underlying dynamics of Soviet interpretations. Robert Elliott is a Ph.D. student in the Department of History, Duke University. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Conférence d’İlker Aytürk (Bilkent University) - Le 16 mai 2018 Chaire sécable de l'IISMM/EHESS Since the 1980s, the field of modern Turkish studies (including historiography, sociology, anthropology, political science, cultural studies, and gender studies) is dominated by what I call the post-Kemalist paradigm. Post-Kemalists blamed the CUP and the Kemalists for many of Turkey’s contemporary problems and initiated a process of catharsis to overcome the residues of the policies of the 1913-1950 period. This lecture is not a neo-Kemalist critique of post-Kemalists. However, it does argue that post-Kemalists, with their overemphasis on Kemalism, have blinded us to the rise of the far right in Turkey and authoritarian tendencies in the AKP. It will conclude with an invitation to shift the temporal focus of modern Turkish studies from 1913-1950 to the Cold War years, where we have better chances of discovering root causes what is happening in contemporary Turkey.

Bölüm 1: Batılılaşma-(ma) 50’li yıllar, Türkiye tarihinde büyük bir kırılma noktası. Osmanlı’dan gelen, cumhuriyetle şekillenen ve hızlanan Batılılaşma çalışmaları, bu yıllarda farklı bir boyut kazanıyor. Murat Meriç, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti’nin ilk yıllarını ve 1950’lerdeki değişimi döneme ait kayıtlardan ve taş plaklardan örneklerle anlatıyor. bi'bak'ta gerçekleşen 09.03.2018 tarihli etkinliğin kaydıdır. ----------------- Part I: Westernization or Not? The 50s, a big turning point in the history of Turkey. The attempt of Westernization, which sprang from the Ottoman Empire and was shaped and performed by the Kemalist republic, has reached a new dimension in these years. Murat Meriç tells the early years of the Turkish Republic and the period of change in the 50s by using recording and records. Recording of Yerli Müzik event that took part on 09.03.2018 at bi'bak.

Jacob Shapiro and Kamran Bokhari discuss some recent anomalies in the Middle East and consider the relationship between sectarianism and nationalism in the Muslim world. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0 TRANSCRIPT: Jacob L. Shapiro: Hi everyone and welcome to another Geopolitical Futures podcast. I'm sorry that we missed last week but we're back this week and I am joined once again by Kamran Bokhari, who is one of our senior analysts. Nice to have you back Kamran. Kamran Bokhari: It's good to be back Jacob. JLS: And we're going to pick up a little bit where we left off last week, or not last week, two weeks ago. Two weeks ago, we were talking about the situation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and we thought we'd just have a more general conversation this week about the Middle East, Islam, maybe some nationalism to throw in there. And but Kamran before we get started, we just noticed a report before we were recording that the al-Nuri mosque in Mosul, Iraq apparently has been destroyed in some kind of explosion. This mosque is important because it's where the ISIS founder and leader al-Baghdadi actually declared the caliphate years ago. You were telling me that it kind of struck you as weird. Why was it weird to you, what's going on do you think with this report? KB: We've seen ISIS and other jihadist groups attack mosques of Muslims that they don't deem to be “true Muslims” or from their point of view deviant Muslims. But this is anomalous in that ISIS would actually blow up a mosque that it has been using and it's been sort of a place from where they declared their caliphate and something that they've used. Now, it could be that there may be things or something that's in that mosque that they didn't want coalition forces to get their hands on, so they decided to go ahead and destroy the facility. But it's still very odd that they would take a risk like that because they are already on the defensive and why would they do something that could potentially cause them great backlash. JLS: Yeah, I think one of the things I was thinking about though was according to the reports Iraqi security forces were approaching the mosque and they blew it up as sort of a way to defend themselves and not let the mosque fall into enemy hands, necessarily. But I think this is an example of how ISIS has a very pragmatic ideology. We think of them as religious fanatics, and they are religious fanatics, but they also deal with things pragmatically, especially the defense of the territories and places that they defend and it's something that just popped into my head. It's also strange that fundamentalist groups like this also always seem to have an aversion to anything resembling idolatry. ISIS was famous for blowing up a lot of these antiquities in Palmyra and other places that they've been or taking the antiquities and selling them on the black market. They don't really care about big beautiful structures or things like that. I think in some ways they think of structures as something that the Saudis are building. You think about the Saudis and all the stuff they are building around the Kaaba in Mecca, that sort of comes to mind. And ISIS has always been more spartan, has always been not attached to I don't know larger images or beautiful mosques, that's not really what it's about. So yeah, don't you think it could just be a symbol of their pragmatism in general? KB: I think you are onto something here that's important. I think that what you said in the beginning is that we tend to look at these groups as very rigid in their interpretation of religious text and whatnot, which is true on one level. But on another level, they display a great deal of, for lack of a better term, pragmatism or they make things up as they go and they change interpretations and they adopt interpretations that normally would not be the case. And I think that given the way that ISIS has evolved and grown, one of the key things in their toolkit has been that you don't stick with necessarily the old formulations or understandings of religious texts. As far as buildings are concerned, I think they look at it from a utilitarian point of view. And then of course, this is war, and I think that in war they tend to be a bit more casual about things and because what is at stake is being able to protect themselves as an institution and so buildings may not necessarily be of importance. And again, we're speculating because just not a whole lot of information as to how ISIS blew this up – was it booby-trapped, were there fighters holed up there and they blew themselves up because they didn't want to get caught or wanted to achieve “martyrdom” and especially given it being Ramadan or the tail end of Ramadan. And so there are just too many unanswered questions. JLS: Well another report I wanted to ask you about Kamran, and I haven't raised this with you before but we'll see what you think about it, is that I hadn't realized this but I read a report today that there are actually a number of polio cases in Deir el-Zour in particular but also in Raqqa and other places that the Islamic State and even in other places that the Islamic State is not controlling in Syria and in Iraq right now. And for some reason that really struck me on sort of a symbolic level. I think there maybe is not a better symbol for Western science than vaccines. And in some ways vaccines have had a little bit of a troubled history in the Muslim world, right? There were all those allegations of CIA agents posing in Pakistan as doctors who were giving polio vaccines and that ruining trust in Pakistan for doctors. And Pakistan remains one of the places where polio still exists and – in part because of that distrust. And I don't think that ISIS meant for polio to sprout back up in Syria. I'm not even saying that it's really their fault. We know that you know in a lot of these war-torn places, things like basic hygiene are some of the first things to go. We're seeing a cholera outbreak in Yemen right now, which is affecting tens if not hundreds of thousands of people. But I just wonder how you react to that. On the one hand, ISIS is really staked some of its legitimacy on behaving like a state and on providing basic services and the Assad regime has done some of that too. But at the same time, I think we're really beginning to see both in Syria and some parts of Iraq and Yemen where these wars have been going on for so long, we're beginning to really see the total breakdown of bureaucracy and some of the basics that we've come to expect of 21st century society. So, I just wonder what you think about all of those things that I just threw at you and whether it was as striking to you as it was striking to me. KB: It is striking, and what's striking to me is that wherever there's a jihadist entity that is taking control of an ungoverned space and set up shop and declared an emirate or a caliphate – I mean the parallel with Pakistan is very apt – that we see these diseases that we thought had been largely eradicated from the rest of the world like polio and cholera, they begin to emerge. And obviously it has a lot to do with the lack of governance, sanitation being very poor quality, hygiene not being maintained. A lot of it just may be because of the lack of resources. And it really speaks to the idea that somehow the caliphate was a place where people should migrate to in terms of the recruits of ISIS, people who were inspired by ISIS. One of the things that ISIS was saying to people all across the world was come join the caliphate, you know, you need to come to the land where the caliphate exists. And so that's really a blow to that idea that life is so harsh and we can only speculate as to the availability of food supply and other basic services that we have taken granted for in pretty much the rest of the world. I mean even in Pakistan, even in Syria, there are places that do not have this kind of situation. In fact, these are really small pockets of territory where you have the outbreak of such diseases. In Pakistan, we did have that whole thing about the CIA and the conspiracy theory amongst the jihadists, amongst the Pakistani Taliban and their supporters that we should not allow our children to be immunized by doctors because somehow this is a CIA plot to undermine fertility or trying to gain intelligence through the dispensation of vaccines. But at the same time, it really speaks about how really primitive society and governance becomes once jihadists take over. It speaks to the lack of facilities and the lack of resources and you know utter lack of sophistication when it comes to statecraft or just dispensing basic services – collecting garbage, dealing with cleanliness, having a place where people can be treated for you know injuries or wounds. After all, one of the major enterprises of groups like ISIS and the Taliban is warfare. You would think that they would invest in hospitals. But it seems like this is the place where they were at the very least cutting corners. JLS: Yeah, that's fair enough. Well that was a curve ball to start off with but I want to take us back to something that some of our readers have written in to ask us to talk about. And there's not a better person to ask this question than you Kamran. Tell us the difference in a short group of words about what is the difference between Sunnis and Shiites, what is the big deal, why are Sunnis and Shiites always fighting each other throughout the Middle East and where does this go from here? KB: So initially when it all started, it started right after the death of the prophet. And at the time, there was nothing called a Sunni or a Shia. These were categories that developed many, many years later – many decades later and became full-fledged sects, rival sects over centuries. But at the time, the question was, who is going to succeed the prophet because the prophet himself is reported to have said that when God sent one prophet to the children of Israel and would take him away then he would be replaced by another prophet but after me there are no more prophets. And then his companions and his followers asked, “Well, prophet who will guide us and who will lead us?” And he said there will be caliphs and there will be many, some of whom you would love and they would love you and some of whom would despise you and you would despise you in return and that was sort of the end of that story. But the unanswered question was, well ok, who succeeds the prophet? So those who became later on Sunnis decided to go with an individual by the name of Abu Bakr who was the closest friend of the prophet and an associate and he was an individual of advanced age. But those who later on became Shia, and much later on, said no, the cousin of the prophet and who also happened to be his son-in-law, Ali, is most deserving of the position because he spent so much time, he's young, he's energetic, he's demonstrated his capability as a top aide and also on the battlefield. And eventually that whole dispute over time led to a divide and there was a very early civil war issue on this as well during the time of the third caliph, I would say in the '50s. Eventually, jurisprudence that differed between the two sects didn't emerge until well after, I would say 300 years after, the prophet migrated from Mecca to Medina and established the first Islamic polity. But really the sect, as in full-fledged sects, they didn't emerge – the Shia and the Sunni – in the theological sense until well into the 16th century when the Safavid Empire in Iran adopted Shia Islam as a state religion and expected people to be or subscribe to what became Shia Islam and then Shia Islam is broken down into subsects just as the Sunni side is fragmented. JLS: How would you describe the relationship in terms of its relationship to nationalism currently right now? So there are a lot of different nation-states in the Middle East: there's Iraq, there's Jordan, there's Saudi Arabia, there's Egypt. There's a certain level of national pride for the different groups that live in these states. But then the sectarian stuff when you overlay it doesn't always line up exactly with it, right? Because in Iraq there's a majority Arab population and on the one hand because of the sectarianism, they feel closer to Iran. But there are also Arabs; they're not Persians so in that sense they feel closer to Arabs and it's just this whole mess of things so what do you think is the relationship between nationalism and sectarianism? KB: So I think what you're asking is sort of the geopolitics of sectarianism because when it becomes geopolitical, when you have major states or empires as we had back in the Medieval times when Shia/Sunni – I mean the Shia/Sunni conflict is not new. It's been raging and it has assumed different forms in different time periods so the geopolitics of sectarianism, when sectarianism becomes geopolitical, it's no longer simply a religious divide. It is, no you pray differently, you believe in different things and you have a different view of collective history and shared memory. It really becomes ethnic categories so it's almost like a form of nationalism where the Shia identity becomes very primary and the Sunni identity also becomes really highly sensitized and that happens because in the here and now, especially after the late '70s and early '80s, it's because of the rise of Islamism on both sides of the sectarian divide. You have Iran becaming the first Islamist regime in the Muslim world but it subscribes to Shia Islamism or it's an Islamism or Shia variant. At the same time, you have Islamism on the Sunni side and because of this heightened religiosity, the sectarian identity has become almost the primary identity for at least those people who are waging war against each other. So Saudi Arabia looks at Iran and says we don't like Iran because they're Persians but more so because they're Shia and they want to subvert Sunni orthodoxy. And conversely when the Iranians look at the Saudis they see an entity that is trying to undermine the Shia religious creed and mind you the Shia being the minority have mostly been on the receiving end throughout the history of Islam. So there is this sense of minority status that also kicks in and therefore the Iranian identity sort of gets subdued or exists parallel to the Shia identity. Likewise, on the Sunni side, yes we're Saudis, we're Arabs and people in Lebanon are Lebanese and Iraqis have their national identity but as these nation-states are in meltdown mode and there's growing geopolitical sectarianism, it's the sectarian identity that has become the primary thing. I mean those who are fighting the Assad regime in Syria, they're largely driven by the fact that they see an Alawite Shiite conspiracy to destroy Sunnism in Syria and they're defending Sunni Islam against what they deem as a form of deviants, the Alawite Shiite creed. Same thing in Yemen between the Houthis and their opponents. And so the nation-state is still in somewhere; people haven't completely discarded it. But at the same time, because the nation-state has become weak, this sectarian identity has taken center stage. JLS: Is it fair to say that there are less subcategories of Shiites than there are of Sunnis? Like there are more Sunnis in the Middle East than there are Shiites, but would it be fair to say that the Sunni community throughout the entire Middle East is actually much more fractured and has a number of different subsets? Whereas, because maybe there are less Shiites, that camp is more unified? Or would you say there are actually, when you actually look into the camps themselves, there's actually a lot of subdivisions and internal rivalries that maybe don't even bubble up to the surface or that aren't obvious to the casual observer of news in the Middle East? KB: You are absolutely right and you have pointed to a key characteristic of this sectarian conflict that's brewing. So on the Sunni side, you have not just multiple subsects but you have, as I mentioned earlier, the nation-state or the national identity hasn't completely gone away. And you have multiple claimants who represent Sunni Islam. Saudi Arabia has since its founding tried to position itself as not just a leader of the Sunni world or the Arab world but the Islamic world in general. And in recent times with Turkey moving away from a Kemalist version of secularism to a more religious version of secularism, a more religious society not necessarily a religious state, it also sees itself as the leader of the region, the Middle East and of course the wider Islamic world. And ISIS is doing the same thing; al-Qaida claims the leadership of the Islamic world, the Sunni world as well. There is no unified coherent Sunni camp if you will. Now in contrast and in sharp contrast, because the Shia are a minority, their divisions – so the Syrians aren't mainstream, the Syrian Alawites aren't mainstream Shia. They're a heterodox offshoot of mainstream Shia Islam but yet they're close with mainstream Shiites in Iran, in Iraq and in Lebanon. Likewise, you have the Houthis who are Zaidis, who are another form of Shia Islam, which in a way from a doctrinal way is actually not so close to mainstream Shia Islam. It shares a lot more with Sunni Islam, but nonetheless, it is a form of Shia Islam, so therefore we see this alignment with Iran and that Shia camp. And so what we're seeing is a more coherent Shia camp because the Shia are a minority and they have this collective memory that they hark back to, when they have historically been suppressed at the hands of Sunni powers. And now that Sunni Islam has fragmented along multiple lines and one of the things that has really accelerated this fragmentation is the so-called Arab Spring phenomenon or what we call at Geopolitical Futures the hollowing out of the Arab world. You've written about this yourself. And so that has exacerbated the fragmentation on the Sunni side and the Shia look at this and say this is a historic opportunity and I would go on to say that if we look at the history of sectarianism in the Muslim world, it runs on a 500-year cycle. So around 1000 when the Sunni world was fragmenting, we see the rise of Shia policies such as the Fatimid empire in North Africa extending into the Levant and the west coast of the Arabian Peninsula. You had the Buyid empire in what is Mesopotamia and Persia and as time goes on other Shiite polities emerge. But then the Ottomans come back and they reclaim the Sunni center and Sunni Islam once again begins to thrive until the rise of the Safavid empire, which poses a challenge to the Ottomans, and now 500 years later today, we are once again seeing the rise of Shia Islam because Sunni Islam or Sunni Muslim territories are at war with each other. JLS: Kamran on a practical level, is there any significant difference between a Shiite country and Sunni country? Is that going mean anything for the way that particular country acts? Or are those countries just going to act in their geopolitical interest and whatever sect that country happens to be really doesn't play that much into it? I guess to even sharpen the question, does Iran act the way it does in some cases because it is a Shiite country or is that not really something that you can see? KB: At a practical level, different states, different types of states, you know operate more or less the same. You know, you have interests that are material interests and it doesn't matter whether you are Shia or whether you are al-Qaida or ISIS or Sunni or Turkey or whatever. I think that from a practicality point of view, the sect doesn't matter. You have to pursue your imperatives and deal with your constraints like anybody else and actually you're very similar to your rivals. But sect does come into play in terms of behavior, so I'll give you an example. So Iran realizes that it represents a minority sect and a minority ethnicity. They're Persians and they're Shiites in a Middle East that's largely Arab and largely Sunni. And therefore, that creates limitations and so yes they want to expand into Iraq because the majority of Arabs are Shia there. It has developed and cultivated Hezbollah because a majority of Lebanese Muslims are Shia. It's aligned with the Shia because the Alawite regime or the Alawites have dominated the Syrian regime for a long time. It's playing into Yemen to a certain extent because of the Houthis. But it can't go into Saudi Arabia just yet because that's a stronghold of very hardcore Sunni identity and ideology and they won't find so many converts there or supporters. So the Shiite and the Sunni thing does place constraints and limitations in terms of behavior. For example, ISIS only recently, a few weeks ago, was able to stage an attack inside Iran. It's been cultivating, I am pretty sure that it took a long time for it to cultivate the assets to pull off that attack on the shrine of the founder of the Islamic Republic and the Iranian Parliament. But you don't see the volume of attacks that you see even next door in a Shia majority country like Iraq and of course the list goes on and on. So I think that the sect does place constraints in how far a particular power can expand its tentacles and its influence. JLS: The follow-up question to that is I mean really this sectarian battle is focused in the Middle East mainly around the Levant, maybe extending a little bit outwards. But once you get into North Africa or once you get more to South Asia, countries like Indonesia, Bangladesh, you don't have the same type of sectarian rivalry and we see IS trying to expand outwards into these regions especially as it comes under so much pressure in the caliphate itself. Do you think that IS will have trouble finding the same type of equation that allowed it to rise in Syria and Iraq because there isn't that sectarian divide to join on or is there enough subdivision within Sunni Islam and some of these other countries that those are de facto sects already, if that question makes sense? KB: No absolutely and again this is another important point that you raise. What really made ISIS into the jihadist regime it has become, and controlling territory, having a very sophisticated military force and intelligence service and wreaking havoc all across the region and beyond even in the West, is the fact that it was able to consolidate itself in Iraq and Syria because of the sectarian divide. It exploited heavily the Shia/Sunni anxieties on both sides and created space for itself and essentially took over the leadership of first the Sunnis of Iraq because they're a minority in their country and they were disenfranchised after regime change in 2003 that toppled the Saddam regime. And then in the wake of the civil war and uprising against Assad, it tried to take over the leadership of the Sunnis who were trying to battle the Assad regime and trying to topple it. And it really gave them a boost, and exponentially, we saw the growth of ISIS. Now those things as you just mentioned do not exist in North Africa, those conditions. There aren't that many Shia beyond the Levant and beyond the Arabian Peninsula and that sort of heart of the Middle East, no matter which direction you go. You can even go into Central Asia and you won't find the same sectarian polarization, much less Southeast Asia like Indonesia and the Philippines. But I think that having said that, it may not see a major boost; it may take longer for ISIS to develop itself in a place like Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are already a saturated jihadist market if you will. Much less Bangladesh and Indonesia and Malaysia and the Philippines, but there is sufficient chaos in these other countries and internal divides within Sunni Islam and the question of who speaks for the religion. I was speaking to a journalist who's been doing a lot of work in Indonesia and she was telling me about how a version of Wahhabi Islam or Salafi Islam is really growing by leaps and bounds in a country like Indonesia, which was insulated from this ideology for the longest time. And I think that political conditions, the growing religiosity in Muslim societies across the world, these provide for that fertile ground or these are the conditions with which ISIS can latch onto and then begin to expand. So the scale may be different, the timeframe may be different, but I think that there are enough conditions on the ground in these various areas where there aren't any Shiites that will allow and become enablers for ISIS or other groups to expand. JLS: I want to ask you one more question Kamran before we wrap up and it might be an involved question but I think that it's an important one and it's one that I've been thinking about a lot. The sort of smaller version of this question is: Is it possible for nationalism and Islam to coexist? Are those two ideas that can actually be held at the same time in a person's mind and that they make sense or are they mutually exclusive? And if you zoom out a little bit, I would ask that question of all religions. Do you think it's possible for all religions and nationalism to really work in the same type of way or is it that nationalism is sort of at its core, I don't want to say atheistic because it's not that nationalism is going to say that there is no God, but nationalism is going to say that the nation is the most important thing. The defense of the nation, protection of the national interest is the most important all abiding thing that a state must provide for, whereas religion, if you really get down to it and if you want to be ideologically consistent, religion is not going to tolerate anything being the most important thing besides God. They might be willing to have the nation as a subset of that or a caliphate or something like that as a subset of that, but the most important thing is going to be God and if there is a disjuncture between what is interpreted as what God wants versus what is best for the nation, you know usually what God wants is going to win out or what God wants is going to be reinterpreted such that it is in the best interest of the nation. So we started with this strange report of ISIS potentially blowing up one of their own mosques and we've danced around the subject but I wonder if you could sort of speculate for a second about whether nationalism and religion just can't actually fit together or if they can? KB: Well I mean first of all, any religion emanates from a core text or texts that are considered sacred by the believers and those texts are simply texts collecting dust unless the believers operationalize them and it depends on the context, so there is text without context. And those contexts vary over time and we've seen historically – take the case of Islam. Islam has manifested itself in very, very diverse ways and this is not in the here and now, it all goes back to the very earliest centuries of Islam and you see rival groups practicing Islam in very different ways. Yes, there is a core belief that there is no God but God and Muhammad is his last messenger and there is something called a prayer and fasting and charity and pilgrimage and the list can continue depending on what your sectarian persuasion is. But at the end of the day, if we look at the period of the Umayyads, the first dynasty to rule over the Muslim lands and this dynasty took power very early on in 661 and they ruled until the mid-700s and then beyond that in the Iberian Peninsula. That was a dynasty that was built around a clan and it never really – yes it behaved in a religious way, it was motivated by religion but what was dominate was the power of the dynasty, the ruling clan. You had to be from the Umayyad clan. It was father, son and grandson and so on and so forth and it became an imperial dominion and therefore it became a nationalistic entity in some respect. This is obviously pre-nationalism as we understand in a modern world, post enlightenment. But nonetheless, it was not very religious as we understand religion. It wasn't solely religious. And you move through history. You have the various polities that existed. They were geographic and we had multiple competing caliphates. Some of them didn't even call themselves caliphates; they were sultanates. So the Ottomans never really referred to them on a day-to-day basis; the Ottoman emperors referred to them as Sultans. They called themselves the Ottoman Empire; there was an Ottoman identity and Islam was there but it wasn't really in the forefront. And you had divisions, so there is this sort of understanding that somehow the Middle East and the wider Muslim world has adopted nationalism because of the import-export of European thought and through the vehicle of colonialism and then decolonization. Well that's true, but it's not as if the Muslim world was united on the basis of religion. I mean you had multiple competing entities, all throughout history. So I think that nationalism exists in various forms. In the contemporary world, it exists; it manifests itself as the nation-state. The nation-state is the biggest sort of or the most profound expression of nationalism as we understand it. But nationalism has evolved over time so I don't think that Islam is somehow separate or cannot exist. I think that Islam is operationalized in different spatial, temporal settings and they can vary so who is to say which one is pure Islam and which one is veering towards more nationalism. I think it's a hodge-podge and a complex mixture. JLS: I agree with you, although I think just the last thought that I'll close on which came to me as you were talking was that, and you sort of talked in the beginning about how the main split between Sunni and Shiite really happens after the prophet passes away and some people want Abu Bakr to take over as caliph but then others want Ali to take over as caliph and one of the main reasons for Ali was that he was in the family of the prophet, right? So in some ways we might say that for the Shiites the blood has always been a little bit more important than it was in the Sunnis. I know the Umayyads were also – I mean they were a Sunni type of regime if we can even talk about Sunnis existing back then. But they were on that side of the split, right? They believed the chain went through Abu Bakr and that was the legitimate right of succession.  But the Shiites think that there is something about being in the prophet's family that is very important, and there is this aspect of blood tied into the religion that maybe isn't there in Sunni Islam. KB: You are absolutely right. I would just sort of modify that quickly and say that for the Shia, leadership of the faith and the community and the Muslim community, the ummah is divinely ordained, so the imams, they are divinely ordained and they follow from the family of the prophet. Whereas Sunnis believe that this is a political position that comes about through political ways and in many ways it could be, some would argue it could be democratic, some could argue it comes with the power of who has the stronger military force. But ultimately, it's a political position for the Sunnis and a more religious position for the Shia. JLS: Yeah so if we were going to grossly over simplify, we might say something along the lines of Sunni Islam is more democratic whereas Shiite Islam tends to more nationalistic principles. KB: The Iranian government would beg to differ with us [laughs]. They would say that we have achieved a hybrid between religion and politics. We have elected officials, even our clerics have been popularly elected. I mean, they would make that assertion. JLS: Yes, but not the supreme leader, correct? KB: Not the supreme leader. Although they would argue that he could be removed by the Assembly of Experts, which is a body of popularly elected leaders or clerics. JLS: Well when they do that, we can talk about it. But in the meantime, Kamran thanks for joining us. It's always a pleasure. For listeners out there, thank you for listening. We're sorry we missed last week but we're back on and we are going to keep doing these once a week and maybe even increase them more. As always, if you have comments and critiques: comments@geopoliticalfutures.com or just leave comments here on Sound Cloud or whatever your medium you're listening to us through and we'll see you out there. Thanks.

Kamran Bokhari and Jacob L. Shapiro discuss Turkey's future after the referendum on April 16. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0 TRANSCRIPT: Jacob L. Shapiro: Hello everyone and welcome to another Geopolitical Futures podcast. I am Jacob Shapiro, I am the director of analysis and I am joined by Kamran Bokhari, one of our senior analysts. Thanks for joining us today Kamran. Kamran Bokhari: Thank you for having me again. JLS: I think, Kamran, you're in Missouri right now, right? You're giving a lecture or are about to give a lecture if my memory serves me. KB: Yes, I am going to be giving a lecture this evening in a couple hours. JLS: What's the topic of the lecture? KB: The topic of the lecture is political Islam, sectarianism and the collapse of the Arab world. That's sort of the broad topic. There's a long formal topic, but that's sort of in a nutshell the issues that I'll be addressing. You know ISIS and what's behind ISIS, the underlying geopolitical current and drivers that are shaping the current reality in the Middle East. JLS: So that all dovetails nicely with what we want to talk about today on the podcast, which is last week's referendum in Turkey. It has turned out that the polls that said that the “yes” votes were going to win the referendum were correct and now President Erdoğan seems to have more powers than he did before. I think there are a lot of questions that people are wondering about here and we're going to tackle some of them in succession. But the first one I think we should just start with is the simplest one, which is what does this mean? So maybe Kamran from your perspective, somebody who has been following the AKP in Turkey for a long time, what does this mean in the broad scheme of things? KB: So I think at one level, this is the sort of formalization of a de facto reality, and that de facto reality is that Erdoğan is the most charismatic leader in the country. His party is stronger than anybody else. His prime ministers have been weak. Since he left the office of prime minister and assumed the presidency, he's basically been ruling the country in the way that he envisions and what this referendum does is just basically formalizes it. It allows him to establish a legal system that basically justifies what he's been doing anyway. I don't see the referendum as a monumental shift in and off itself. I think it's the finalization or formalization of a dynamic that's been in play ever since Erdoğan assumed the presidency. JLS: I think one of the important things to point out there is also that it isn't just about Erdoğan. Erdoğan happens to be one particular individual who happens to be a very skilled politician. But the broader thing that is happening here is that you can see this in the way the referendum vote broke down. There's a big divide between the cities like Istanbul and like Izmir and the central Anatolian regions, which are the regions that really give AKP a lot of its electoral heft. I think people at their own risk diminish the importance of those people in the interior because they're prejudiced to think that the things in the cities matter the most. But we've seen this time and time again that there really is a divide between the cities and the interior and Erdoğan has been able to capture that, right? KB: Yes and in many ways, this is just a continuation of the trend that we're seeing worldwide. I mean Brexit was one, the election of President Donald Trump is the other major case in point. There is this divide between those who live in urban areas. In many ways, the people living in Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir have more in common with their counterparts in other cities like that – other mega cities on the European continent, North America, Asia – than they do with their own fellow citizens who live in the rural areas, in many cases not too far out from the city limits of these major metropolises. So I think that, that phenomenon is continuing. And the idea that somehow autocracy is gaining ground in Turkey – I think that is problematic because clearly there is a sizable amount of people in Turkey who do not see it that way, who think that it is their democratic vote that has allowed Erdoğan to become what he is and he represents them and they support him. So I think we have an issue – there is a variance in how people see democracy being played out in practice. JLS: Yeah I think that's a good point. One thing that I would pick up on what you were saying though is that you were talking about comparing what happened in Turkey this past weekend to Brexit and to Donald Trump but I wonder, do you really think that's a good comparison? Because I think on the one hand you have some of that going on in Turkey. But the other deeper problem for Turkey is a problem that really has to do much more with the Muslim world than it has to do with the European world, which is: What is the relationship between politics and the Muslim world and between religion? The AKP gets called an Islamist party and I know, Kamran, you can shed some more light on this, but one thing that I always come back to and I always say when I talk about this is that the most recent Pew survey on attitudes in Turkey showed that, while people are very proud of being Muslims, they don't think that Shariah or Muslim law should be what governs Turkey. They certainly have a sense and especially AKP supporters would like to be able to wear the hijab in public. They don't think of secularism in terms of the radical way in which the French think about it. But they do want to be free to at least practice their Islam in the public sphere and don't want that to be prejudiced or criticized in any particular way. So how do you think about the AKP and about Turkey in general in terms of this conflict, not just between urban and rural but between religious and secular? KB: I mean yes, this is a topic – if I recall correctly you wrote a Reality Check not too long ago in terms of the blurry line between secularism and religion in the context of Turkey. Yes, the religious/secular divide is something George wrote about a couple of days ago as well. The secularism of Turkey is actually undergoing change. The Kemalist version of secularism was based on French laicism. You know, a very hardline, very radical form of secularism where overt public displays of religious symbolism or religious practices were frowned upon. And that was the order of things for many decades until the rise of the AKP or actually some of its predecessors in the '80s and the '90s, and that movement has strengthened. But does that movement call for an Islamic state, a state where Shariah is the basis, is the core of the legal system? No, I think that's not the case. I would argue that the AKP as well as its rival the Gülen movement are struggling to basically take the lead in a post-Kemalist secularism – a secularism that's more American for lack of a better comparison where religion is allowed and tolerated in public affairs, in civil society. As you said, you know, the wearing of the hijab by not just people on the street but in public service, so I mean recently the ban of wearing the head scarf in the military was lifted. So those are the kinds of things I think that do not add up to Sharia and do not add up to sort of that Islamist vision that we see, for example, in Egypt in the case of the Muslim Brotherhood or far more austere representations under the Taliban in Afghanistan or the Saudi government and perhaps the most radical in the form of ISIS. So I think that we have to separate between the two. I think that what the AKP party is trying to do is to strike a balance, as George pointed out in his recent Reality Check, that [Erdoğan] has a population that is secular and he has a population that is more religious. Somehow, he has to ride the tiger and make sure that these two streams do not clash and they go together and there is stability in the state. So I think that that, at the end of the day, is what's shaping the religious/secular debate in the country … Now, the popular perception is that democracy is dead in Turkey and, you know, we're just waiting for Caliph Erdoğan to take his position. That is a view that many people have and I think that is not correct. I think there is more nuance that is being missed. JLS: I agree with that, and we'll get into that in a second Kamran. But I just want to stop and go back to something that you said. This is a question that we get from readers sometimes, and I think you being the expert that you are in the Muslim world, you are uniquely well suited to answer this question. So how would you differentiate between the political ideology of say the Muslim Brotherhood and the AKP party? I mean, obviously, I know there's a difference but how would you think of the difference between those parties? How would you think of the difference in Islam in the way it is practiced in a place like Turkey verses a place like Egypt or Saudi Arabia? What differences can you tell us from the religious perspective that might shed some light on this conversation? KB: So the AKP is the successor to a number of Islamist groups and they came in succession going all the way back to the '80s. That did have ideas very similar to the Muslim Brotherhood – that Islam should be imposed by the state. An Islamic state has to be top down, and the role of the state is to implement Islam. If you ask them, those who believe in this, they will say, “well we need to implement the Shariah, the Islamic laws.” And what are those? Well, that's up for debate. How will that be done? That is a very long story, and many of these people do not know themselves how will they do it. The AKP in sharp contrast with that is simply saying there should be more space for people who are religious to take part in public life. In other words, people should not have to be secular to get a career in the military or the bureaucracy, and we should not completely in a very radical way privatize religion in way that it should not leave the home. In other words, it should be allowed to flourish kind of like the churches in the American heartland. I am here at Springfield, Missouri. This is the home of the Assemblies of God denomination, and there are somewhat in the neighborhood of three hundred churches in this city. And so that is civil society. Does the state impose that? No. Does the state block that? No. And I think that's what the AKP wants. Because the AKP came into a context where overt public display of religiosity, the expansion of mosques and all other religious symbolisms and religious institutions and practices, that was frowned upon. That was seen as backward and people had to do that at home or in their locales where they were not fearful that the state could prevent them from doing that. So I think that that is the clear distinction between those who want an Islamic state and those who want a society in which Islam can flourish, for lack of a better term, or at least religious people can be able to practice their religion the way they want to. JLS: I think that's a really important point and I think in general – and you were mentioning this before –  this is what is so important when thinking about not just Turkey but a lot of different countries, which is being critical of generalizations and trying to compare things to each other that don't necessarily need to be compared. And you were talking earlier about the people who have made the “yes” vote in this referendum out to be the death of Turkish democracy. I can't tell you how many times I have seen that headline actually in the last few weeks. And it's not like we're trying to say here that Turkey is not going to become, that the power is not going to become more centralized in the presidency. And we're also not saying here that Erdoğan doesn't have some authoritarian tendencies. The problem with thinking though that this is the end of Turkish democracy is that you are simply ignoring a couple facts. First of all, the Turks voted for this by a large majority. I know that the OSCE came out with a report afterwards talking about various discrepancies in voting. But if you actually read the OSCE report, the report basically says that from a technical level, there was no interference. It was just that people didn't have access to the proper information, which to me sounds like a way of saying, “oh well their message didn't get out.” And certainly Erdoğan has been cracking down on journalists, he's been cracking down on academics. The political environment in Turkey I can't imagine has been pleasant for a large part of the population since the coup. But it seems to me there is a very large distance between the dictatorship that people are making this out to be and Turkey as it currently stands. But Kamran, I'd be curious how you think in terms of this question because on the one hand we do see Erdoğan has cracked down quite heavily on some parts of society that in most liberal democracies would be respected as the pillars of liberal democracy. And yet on the other hand, he continues to bow to the wishes of the people. He continues to put these moves to popular referendum, and I think that if he lost, I don't think we would've seen him overruling them. I don't think we would've seen him do extra legal things. So how do you tease all of that out? KB: Well I mean when it comes to democracy, there are a number of things that tend to be missed in the popular parlance or the way people popularly conceive and discuss it. And the key thing, the number one thing missing in this debate over Turkey is that the democracy that existed before in Turkey was also problematic. It's not as if the secularists before the AKP came to power were not autocratic, did not have authoritarian tendencies. This is a country where secularists have imposed three direct coups and one indirect – I mean the military coming in and stepping in and really imposing a form of government on the country – and so AKP is not alone in this. And Turkish democracy, I mean we assume that Turkey – if we don't see things the way we are familiar with, we say, “oh democracy is dying, democracy is receding,” and we think that is the end of the line. It's kind of like the end of history argument from Francis Fukuyama back in '89. I mean this is not the end of history, this is not the end of the line for Turkey. Turkey will continue to evolve and it's not going to look like what it is in the West. There are multiple fault lines. There is an ethnic problem that prevents Turkey from being a Western-style democracy. Kurdish separatism is key in that. We've already discussed the religious-minded people verses the more Western-oriented people. There is civil military relations… JLS: Well Kamran, Kamran hold on Kamran. Let me stop you there because I think that is one of the biggest questions – the Kurdish question really is. What do you think the Kurdish question looks like in 10 or 20 years. Now that Erdoğan has solidified power and now that he has gotten what he wanted, can you imagine a situation in which Turkey is able to move forward on that issue and try and integrate Kurds more fully into Turkish society or to come to some kind of resolution to this conflict? I can't imagine that it's in Erdoğan's interest for this conflict to just fester on into eternity, no? KB: No, it's not in his interest. If you have millions of people inside your borders who are of Kurdish ethnic background and you have a very large organization in the form of the PKK engaged in an arms struggle for independence – obviously, that's something that's on your mind. You can't just fight your way through it, and if you look, the Erdoğan regime early on tried to deal with this through negotiations. They tried to work with the Kurdish nominated HDP party several years back. And they tried to bring the Kurds into the political mainstream. Those negotiations did not work out and so it's not as if this is something that the Turks feel that they can militarily impose a solution on, especially now that the issue is not just the PKK. It's also the Syrian Kurds who the Turks view as cousins of the PKK. And so this is a complex problem that I think will have to be solved constitutionally through negotiations and I don't think Erdoğan or anyone at the helm in Ankara thinks otherwise. I think that they know they have to do this but any negotiations cannot be done from a position of any weakness. I don't think that Erdoğan and the AKP think that they can solve this problem outside of the parameters of the constitutional process or through undemocratic means, so this issue will not be resolved any time soon because the government has other priorities at this point. And this problem has been magnified by what's happening in Syria. Had the situation in Syria not taken the path that it did, perhaps AKP could have been far more successful in pushing along that peace process along the domestic front. But the domestic Kurdish problem is being complicated by the cross-border Kurdish problem, and so right now it's an issue of which one do you deal with. And while this is happening, you have a coup in the country. And you have to deal with the coup … which means that the Kurdish issue becomes more of on the backburner if you will – we'll get to it when we get to it because there's a more immediate crisis that has to be dealt with. So there's so many balls that are in the air that have to constantly be juggled by the current government. And I think that what doesn't happen in conventional conversations is empathetic analysis. There is an expectation, there is something that people want to see happen – which is democracy – at all costs and under all circumstances in a certain way. And when they don't see that, then it's Turkey is going into a dark tunnel. Then you've got those kind of cries and slogans being dished out. JLS: Kamran, that was all very brilliant, but you didn't actually answer my question, did you? I mean I was asking whether you think that there is any kind of solution to the Kurdish issue. Do you think that what's happening with Erdoğan is a way of him being able to move forward? Do you think that it's even possible for Turkey to integrate the Kurds in their southeast? Or do you think this will just continue to be a major problem? If we look at other powers in the world, I mean there are different ways of dealing with these kinds of internal problems. The Chinese obviously just subjugate the people in Xinjiang in Tibet. In the West, you either come to some kind of understanding or integrate them politically with full rights. How do you see the integration of the Kurdish issue and the solving of it? I mean, because when a lot of people look at Turkey one of the things that sticks out to them is that there's this continued insurgency that the government can't seem to move past it. KB: I mean a solution anytime soon is unlikely. I think that given the vulnerabilities of the Turks and given the fact that the Kurds think that the odds are in their favor because of what's happening in Syria, the Syrian Kurds get their Kurdistan and that somehow helps Turkish Kurds. As long as this sort of view  exists, I don't see any resolution to that. There's also the element of how long before exhaustion of war sets in, and both sides say ok we can negotiation. Is there a formula in which the Kurds are willing to accept some form of status, special status? I don't know if we can even call it that. I want to avoid using the word autonomy because that could mean anything. But is there a formula that both sides could agree on? And I think that that question cannot be resolved until it becomes clear as to what is the fate of Syrian Kurds because if the Syrian Kurds – as long as they are seen as making progress with their Kurdistan project – then the PKK is in no mood to negotiate seriously. And as long as this Turkish regime feels vulnerable not just from the Kurds but from a host of other issues, I don't think that it is in the mood to negotiate seriously. So eventually, at some point in the future, I can see that happening. But for the foreseeable future, I just don't think that is something that is going to materialize. JLS: I disagree with you a little in the sense of how optimistic you are about the prospect of the Syrian Kurds. It seems to me that they have very, very disadvantageous geography, that they have enemies against them who are much stronger than them and while they are ascendant right now, they're really on an indefensible plain and there's really not a lot they can do. They're surrounded by Sunni Arabs on the one side, as you say they have their PKK cousins across the border on the other. Iraq is another interesting thing, and what's going on in the KRG is perhaps something else to think about for another time. But I think the second thing to think about, and this is really my major concern with Turkey – I am wondering now that the political drama is over, that the Erdoğan government can turn to this, which is that Turkey's economy has just not been doing that well. And I don't think that that's super specific to Turkey, we're seeing a lot of economies not doing well and some of the reasons for Turkey's struggles are not Turkey's fault. After 2007 and 2008, you saw a decline in foreign investment in Turkey. At the same time, I think Turkey was also focusing on boosting exports as a growth strategy. Obviously, a lot of different countries that have been pursuing exports as a strategy have been hurt because there's reduced markets for those exports. And Turkey isn't exactly in a place where it can compete with exports from a country like Germany or even somebody like China, who is probably pushing them out of the market. So there's been a lot of criticism about Erdoğan moving the economy to a more stable plan or system, even about, you know, crony capitalism – although I always feel like crony capitalism is a funny phrase because I don't know any form of capitalism that isn't a bit full of cronyism. But obviously, Erdoğan has been centering not just political control but economic control into people that are close to him, and I think a lot of outsiders, especially Westerners who were maybe bullish on Turkey five to 10 years ago, are much more suspicious now because of the political situation, because of the Kurdish question, because of what is the relationship between Turkey and ISIS and is Turkey going to have to intervene in Syria. And then what is it like for a businessman to be working in Turkey when so much is going consolidated in the center. So I think that one thing to note is that the idea that the Turkish economy is not doing well is certainly true but it's not like there are many economies in the Middle East that are going to challenge Turkey. The Saudi Arabians are a basket case, the Egyptians are a basket case. Iran is maybe the most promising of them, but Iran has its own issues and is also pretty dependent on hydrocarbons for their economy. So on one hand, I see the serious struggles in the Turkish economy, and they concern me in the short to medium term in terms of Turkey's ability to project power. But overall, it still seems to me that they are the main heavyweight in a lot of different ways in the region. What do you think of that Kamran? KB: I agree with you, and I just want to clarify that I don't think the Syrian Kurds are looking at a favorable outcome. At least, I didn't mean to give the impression that I did. But I think that as far as the economy is concerned, one of the plans or the strategy that this government was trying to push forward was to create an energy transit state in Turkey. Taking gas and oil from Russia and from Azerbaijan and even Iraq and there was also talk of Iran channeling its hydrocarbons to Europe, to the European market. Now that was all great when the price of oil was well over $100 a barrel, but those times are long gone and the price of oil is stagnating somewhere in the mid-50s at this point and there's no reason to believe that we're going to see a spike anytime soon. So those plans have really undermined the strategy or one of the strategies of the Erdoğan government to improve the economy. So I think that that's another problem that is holding Turkey back. It's also very dependent on energy from Russia. And then there's been an attempt to try and use Iraq as a way to somehow reduce the dependency on Russia – that hasn't been successful given the politics that's going on inside Iraq and the Kurdish autonomous government struggles with the Shiite-dominated government over control and production and export of hydrocarbons. So I think that should also be kept in mind. As I said, there isn't going to be a turnaround on the energy front anytime soon. So yes, I mean, I share your outlook on the economic front for Turkey. But nonetheless, if we are to compare Turkey with everybody else, it's still far more powerful and it may not be a booming economy, it may not be rising as a heavyweight in the Caucasus or in the Middle East or vis-à-via Europe. But Turkey still is a player, and Turkey is still a large country with an economy that may not been doing well but the fundamentals are still there. And I think that once the global conditions change, then I think Turkey's fortunes will change with it. Other than that, I don't see any structural changes that Turkey itself can do to turn the economy around and all of the sudden, it starts to boom. JLS: Well I will get you out of here on this Kamran. So now that we've finally gotten through with the referendum, and now that Turkey can think forward not just with the referendum, what do you think is the next big thing that's facing Turkey? So much of the media attention on Turkey has been around this referendum. I feel like it's been that way almost since the coup, so in terms of what we're looking for here at GPF for Turkey over the course of the next year – what do you see as the most important development to keep an eye on? KB: I still think that the referendum issue while most of it is behind the Erdoğan regime, there's still some loose ends to tie, so they'll still be focusing until the new constitution is in place. We'll have to see how the new presidential system works, but I think that the next major issue that Ankara will have to deal with is Syria because that is a threat. There are Kurds, there is ISIS. Great powers are intervening in Syria, and Turkey can't just sit back and say, “oh well, we'll let them handle it.” I mean, we have Russia in there, we have the United States – not that either Russia or the United States is making any major moves to really alter the balance of power in Syria. But nonetheless, the intervention itself creates threats, creates opportunities as well and that situation is something that Turkey cannot ignore. So I think that that will be the first order of business in terms of trying to work out a relationship with the United States as to how the Kurds will be managed in Syria and how Turkish reservations about Syrian Kurds can be addressed, while the two sides – while Washington and Ankara – can work towards degrading ISIS. And then there's the question of the future of the Assad regime, which then pulls them towards the Russians. I mean, the Turks have to deal with the Russians and the Iranians. I think this is something that we're going to be seeing Turkey heavily involved in as we move, you know, further into 2017 and beyond. JLS: Well I agree with you, and I know that here at GPF, we'll be watching closely as Turkey is one of the most important countries not just in the Middle East but in the world from our perspective. So Kamran thanks for joining us. Once again this is Jacob Shapiro, and I am director of analysis for Geopolitical Futures. We love comments and feedback so please send that to comments@geopoliticalfutures.com, and if you want to read our stuff please visit us on the web at www.geopoliticalfutures.com.

Professor Halil Berktay delivers the final lecture in the Trinity term East and East Central Europe Seminar Series.