Podcasts about shia sunni

In the Energy News Beat – Conversation in Energy with Stuart Turley, talks with George McMillan delves into the intricate relationship between energy, geopolitics, and global strategy, exploring how energy infrastructure, such as pipelines, shapes regional stability and global alliances. The discussion examines key dynamics, including Russia and China's energy integration, Middle Eastern tensions like the Shia-Sunni divide, and the strategic significance of Iran and Syria. Utilizing frameworks like Mackinder's Heartland Theory, the speakers analyze how regional cleavages are exploited through proxy wars, revolutions, and covert operations, with external powers like the U.S., NATO, and Israel playing pivotal roles. The conversation highlights the economic and military dimensions of energy politics, including battlefield shaping operations and the strategic control of resources, offering a nuanced perspective on the factors driving global power shifts and regional conflicts.George and I have recorded additional updates in production on the German energy policies related to Russian Natural Gas and geopolitics and will be out this week. Thanks, George, for stopping by the podcast. I recommend contacting him on his LinkedIn if you need geopolitical analysis in energy, especially if you are in the new United States administration or an energy company. https://www.linkedin.com/in/george-mcmillan-5665b015/Highlights of the Podcast00:00 - Intro02:17 - Energy Crisis and Global Dynamics04:01 - Sea Power vs. Land Power Strategies06:43 - Middle East Tensions and Regional Analysis08:09 - Energy Politics and Infrastructure12:47 - Historical Context and Regional Power Shifts16:56 - Strategic Models and Global Influence21:10 - Iran's Energy Crisis and Strategic Importance27:20 - Geopolitical Mapping and Future Projections36:27 - Israel, Turkey, and Strategic Alliances45:12 - Energy Economics and Military Strategies53:02 - Predictive Modeling in Geopolitics59:31 - Outro

This week, Sayed Ali and Ahmed react to some dilemmas posted online. This episode is a light listen, with humour and differing opinions along the way. Let us know in the comments how you'd react in these dilemmas, and what your favourite points were! *Necessary Disclaimers:* 1) This episode was recorded in Sep 2024. Please support our Lebanon fundraiser, link below, and continue to pray for those in Gaza, Lebanon and other oppressed areas worldwide. 2) Any views or opinions expressed here are those of the hosts. They are spontaneous thoughts and do not mean the hosts hold all answers/are correct at all. In many cases, there is no set answer for any dilemma. You should always refer back to religious authorities, as well as the consultation of experts (in mental health, family or social matters, etc). We feel each dilemma is precarious, and the hosts each had far more to say about these matters. We hope you understand and we apologise if anyone is offended by anything said - we can promise that this is never an intention of any of the hosts/guests on AM.

☪☪On this popular replay from 2020 (can you believe it's been that long?!?!?!), podcaster mom, Farheen Raza @freeniraza, shared Shia history, practice, and whether or not sects make a difference in America. During this time of division and change in our nation, it DOES matter when we have schisms within Muslim America. Let's close those gaps together. A lot has changed for Farheen since we recorded this, so follow her and find out what that is.☪☪Part 2 of this conversation was aired in June 2020, and we encourage you to follow up with that one next. This week, tune in at 6pm EST on Apple podcasts, Stitcher, Spotify, Amazon Music, or head to our website and listen on the landing page. Share this episode with your Muslim friends who you never thought to ask about their sect (and thank goodness you didn't!).Links:Musings of a Modern Muslim podcast: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/musings-of-a-millennial-muslim/id1489441261On IG: @freenirazaDid you know you can send us a text? Feedback, questions, or recommendations welcomed!Support the Show.1. Web: www.mommyingwhilemuslim.com2. Email: salam@mommyingwhilemuslim.com3. FB: Mommying While Muslim page and Mommyingwhilemuslim group4. IG: @mommyingwhilemuslimpodcast5. YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCrrdKxpBdBO4ZLwB1kTmz1w

This episode of The Bill Walton Show is a riveting discussion with two astute geopolitical analysts, Dr. Steven Bryen and Brandon Weichert.  Together they dissect the exploding tensions in the Middle East, specifically the dramatic escalation by Iran's air attack on Israel.  And the big questions: How are global players like the US, Russia, and even China moving their chess pieces in this high-stakes game?    The episode is a whirlwind tour through the strategies, fears, and potential flashpoints that will likely redraw the map of global power.  Dr. Bryen, with over 50 years national security experience including many stints in the Pentagon where he became a leading expert on the arms trade, shares his insights into Iran's unprecedented missile and drone attack on Israel. Despite its scale, it was largely thwarted by robust air defenses from Israel, the US, and even regional players like Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Still, Iran considers it a success. He highlights the remarkable and historic aspect of Arab nations rallying in defense of Israel. Brandon Weichert, author of The Shadow War: Iran's Quest for Supremacy and known for his pulse-racing analyses, shifts the lens to the broader geopolitical chessboard, articulating how the Shia-Sunni divide and the shadows of the Abraham Accords are playing out in real-time.    Weichert critiques the current US administration's handling of deterrence, and its tacit support of Iran which will destabilize the already volatile region.  Dr. Bryen also skeptically views the Biden administration's Middle East strategy while applauding CENTCOM's pivotal coordination role.  Weichert and Bryen also debate potential military strategies that could weaken Iran's capabilities, while worrying about the critical weaknesses in the US and global defense arsenals. This discussion shines a light on the complex and now dire landscape of international relations that the Biden Administration has wrought.  Buckle up, listeners, because geopolitics just doesn't get more electrifying than this!

With barely weeks to go for the Lok Sabha polls, BJP's Muslim outreach is focused more on welfare politics and catering to the Pasmandas, who RSS believes are converted Hindus. In Episode 1408 of Cut The Clutter, Editor-in-Chief Shekhar Gupta in conversation with Sanya Dhingra, discusses the reasons behind BJP's Muslim outreach, its focus on the Pasmanda Muslims, how both BJP and Congress made use of the Shia-Sunni divide and what it means for the Muslims in India.----more----Read Sanya Dhingra's article here: https://theprint.in/politics/origins-evolution-of-bjps-dalliance-with-shia-muslims-the-minority-within-minority/1979683/

Muslimer er ens over alt - eller er de? I dag i Alis fædreland har jeg sat mig for at fortælle lidt mere om vores nye samarbejdspartnere “Det Globale Syd” og deres interesser, stridigheder og fælles mål. For vi kan ligeså godt vende os til det - Det globale syd er igennem årene blevet stærkere og vil komme til at spille en voksende rolle i international sikkerhed, klima, handel og udenrigspolitik. Gæster:Jacob Kaarsbo, sikkerhedspolitisk kommentator, senioranalytiker, Tænketanken Europa, tidligere chefanalytiker i Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste.Yaqoub Ali, forfatter, foredragsholder, tidligere væbnet islamist i Syrien.Jotam Confino, freelance-journalist med base i Israel for TV 2, BBCWorld, CBSnews m.fl.Vært: Ali Aminali.Redaktør: Pola Rojan Bagger

Who are the most beloved companions of Prophet Muhammad (saww)? Do Muslims universally hold affection for all Sahaba? Can a companion with animosity towards Imam Ali (as) be considered righteous? Join our co-hosts Ahmed & Sayed Ali as they unravel the Shia/Sunni perspectives, exploring the criteria and addressing misconceptions about the Sahaba through Quran and Hadith. The discussion delves into the biographies of some beloved companions of the Ahlulbayt (as). Promising an emotionally charged conversation you won't want to miss.

A gripping conclusion of our Tabarrah in Shiism series!

Speakers corner? TikTok Sheikhs? Fake scholars on YouTube? Dawah on the internet is out of control. We think it's more important than ever to be able to discern between genuine Islamic knowledge and self proclaimed debaters. Unfortunately, Shia youth are being misguided and abused, where do they go for guidance? Tune into this emotional rollercoaster of a discussion with Br. Hassan al-Qadri, where we get into some of the most pressing matters of our online generation.

Join us for an enlightening episode where we explore Surah Al-Mujadilah, one of the most powerful Surahs in the Quran. Through an in-depth analysis of four pivotal questions, we'll uncover the wisdom and guidance hidden within the verses. From the different contexts of the word "Najwa" to the story of the complaining woman, and the presence of Allah, we'll explore the profound meanings behind these topics. Lastly, we'll ponder the implications of the verse that states believers cannot be friends with those who take Allah and His Prophet as enemies and what it means for Shia-Sunni unity. Don't miss this opportunity to deepen your connection with the Quran and enhance your understanding of Islam.

A version of this essay was published by firstpost at https://www.firstpost.com/india/75-years-have-midnights-children-come-of-age-11093221.htmlIt is a bit of a coincidence that, just around the 75th anniversary of India gaining political independence from the British, Salman Rushdie should be in the news again, because he was stabbed in Chautauqua, a literary watering-hole in upstate New York. His book Midnight’s Children was, as is well known, a sensation when it first came out some forty years ago, in 1981.The central conceit in the book is that 100,000 children born all over India on or around midnight on August 15th, 1947, are endowed with magical powers. Their lives are an allegory for India’s progress. It is a picaresque romp centered around the protagonist, Saleem Sinai, who can telepathically connect with and organize them. When I first read the book, I was impressed by the verbal pyrotechnics, and more so the clever interweaving of contemporary events into the magical realism of the ‘children’s’ lives. The great human tragedies and triumphs of Bharat, that is India, are a rich mother-lode to mine for fiction, and another example is the re-telling of the Mahabharata by Shashi Tharoor in The Great Indian Novel. But over time, the book’s impact faded for me. Even though I didn’t pay attention to it on first reading it, now I see it as significant that Saleem Sinai’s principal rivals among the children are ‘Shiva’ and ‘Parvati-the-witch’. Interesting choice of names, wouldn’t you say? A bit like Deepa Mehta’s choice of Radha and Sita for Fire, which I criticized as dog-whistle Hindu-hatred at the time in The problem with Fire.Thank you for reading Shadow Warrior. This post is public so feel free to share it.Nevertheless, Rushdie’s and the book’s charm obviously did not fade for the Anglosphere, because it fit into their world-view of India, as an exotic, barbaric country where bizarre things happen. They awarded it a Booker Prize, and later a Booker of Bookers, basically dubbing it the best book to have been written in English in decades. Rushdie rode his new-found stardom to riches and influence, and became a sort of seer on all things related not only to India, but also literature in general. And he physically moved to the Anglosphere, all the better to suit his new status as an oracle. In this he trod a well-trodden path which, for example, Amartya Sen and V S Naipaul also followed. More on that by and by.If I am not mistaken, Rushdie’s output after Midnight’s Children is hit-and-miss. His only other work that gained fame (notoriety?) was The Satanic Verses, but that was for other reasons, not literary merit. Since I haven’t read that book, I have no particular opinion on it, and the politics is anyway complicated because of Shia-Sunni issues and internal Muslim issues of blasphemy. But I am now beginning to wonder if Rushdie is also a one-horse wonder, like Arundhati Roy. I have not read her The God of Small Things, but her trajectory has been similar to Rushdie’s: one hit, instant elevation to global stardom and a bully pulpit from which to spout all sorts of radical ideas. A pliant Anglo media piled on and lionized both, regardless of actual merit. Furthermore, I am struck by the parallels with Amartya Sen, who also parlayed fame from early works into global demi-god status, marriage into the Rothschild empire, and a Nobel Prize (although technically it is only the Swedish bank’s prize for economics). His theories about the ‘Kerala model’ of development turn out to be pure bunkum, but then who’s counting? Which reminds me, I suspect the always au courant Scandinavians will now award the Nobel Prize in Literature to Rushdie as a knee-jerk reaction to the stabbing, as they awarded the Peace Prize to Barack Obama basically because, he was, well…. black. Well, bully for Rushdie!That, of course, is pure speculation. But the comparison with Naipaul is interesting. Both made Britain their home, and both commented on India in less-than-flattering terms. Naipaul’s An Area of Darkness was fierce, disappointed, and condemnatory. But the difference is that Naipaul, over time, became convinced that India was on the rise. Rushdie, so far as I can tell, does not see any future for India, nor anything worth celebrating.Maybe that’s why I like Naipaul, because he agrees with my prejudices; but objectively speaking his writing has greater insight. Here’s an excerpt from Naipaul’s India Today article on the occasion of the 50th Independence Day. I think that within every kind of disorder now in India there is a larger positive movement. But the future will be fairly chaotic. Politics will have to be at the level of the people now. People like Nehru were colonial-style politicians. They were to a large extent created and protected by the colonial order. They did not begin with the people. Politicians now have to begin with the people. They cannot be too far above the level of the people. They are very much part of the people. The Nehrus of the world have to give way now to the men of the people...It is important, in this apparent mess, for two things not to be interfered with. One is economic growth. I would like to see that encouraged in every way. It is the most important news coming out of India, more important than the politics. I would like to see education extended and extended. If this were to happen, and I feel it might, gradually, the actual level of politics will reflect both the economic life and higher level of education.Rushdie doesn’t have that sympathy, nor the realization that there is something behind the chaos. Fair enough, he is entitled to his opinion. But the point at which I personally became annoyed with Rushdie was when he proclaimed (like Macaulay before him) that there is nothing worthwhile in modern Indian-language literature. I knew this to be false because there is proof of existence: I had read O V Vijayan, Thakazhi, S K Pottekkat, Basheer, Anand, and M Mukundan in Malayalam; Ashapurna Devi and Tarasankar Banerjee in translation from Bengali; S L Bhyrappa in Kannada and a host of other world-class writers. For Rushdie to blithely denigrate them all showed both arrogance and ignorance, typical of India’s ‘liberals’. In fact, it is India’s English-language output that is inferior and derivative. With the exception of a few tour-de-force works such as Vikram Seth’s Golden Gate and Amitav Ghosh’s The Shadow Lines, there’s nothing unique or noteworthy that will stand the test of time. Even Rushdie’s magical realism, I found out, pales before Vijayan’s 1960’s The Legends of Khasak with its shape-shifting odiyans and the disembodied flying oracular head of the ancient magician Kandath Nair; not to mention Gabriel Garcia Marquez’ 1970s English publication of One Hundred Years of Solitude.Thanks for reading Shadow Warrior! Subscribe for free to receive new posts and support my work.It also turns out that Naipaul was right: 25 years later India is finally on an upward trajectory (that graphic from the FT is interesting, although it misrepresents India’s external boundaries). The colonialists are dead and buried, and ordinary men are now taking India forward. With economic growth, everything comes your way; and yes, the education system still sucks, as it’s infested with English and anti-national woke leftism (alas, also derivative and unoriginal). A Rushdie, steeped in the groupthink of Lutyens and Khan Market, has simply failed to see this, which  may mean he lacks the empathy, understanding, and feelings the greatest writers possess. The children and grandchildren of ‘midnight’s children’, however, see this.And what of the real midnight’s children? Hat tip to @NAN_DINI:  they are honoring the flag. They believe. Now personally, I am a little ambivalent about the ‘fly the flag in every house’ request by Prime Minister Modi. Of course, in my neighborhood in leftist paradise Thiruvananthapuram, hardly anybody took up his clarion call. Besides, I feel a little queasy about the American kitsch of flag-waving jingoism. In addition, flying the national flag from temples bothers me. I believe in the separation of ‘church’ and state; and I honestly think the interference of politicians in temples is an abomination. But I guess this Magnificent Generation that suffered through fifty years of kakistocratic dynasty mis-governance (see my earlier piece The Nehruvian Penalty: 50 wasted years) deserves to be applauded because they still believe. I do, too, but maybe I am an old cynic. I am not as old as them, but I remember suffering through those awful years of PL-480 and war and shortages of everything. I left, but then I returned because I, too, do believe. Giving credit where it’s due, I applaud Rushdie for coming up with the vanity of ‘midnight’s children’ and giving it a lot of airplay. But I’m afraid they, and their children and grand-children, have left Rushdie behind. They have moved on. He hasn’t, like the rest of the Anglo-Mughlai elite. Rushdie, midnight’s child himself, stayed stuck in the past while the others moved ahead. And that can become an avalanche, an irresistible force, if all goes well.1470 words, 18 Aug 2022 This is a public episode. If you would like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit rajeevsrinivasan.substack.com

CIMS | Standpoints on the Belief in Imam Mahdi | Shia Sunni Discussion

In conversation with Maryam Kiyani, Research Journalist at PakistanNow, this episode discusses the OIC's 48th Council of Foreign Ministers (CFM) at Islamabad. What is OIC? What is OIC's structure? What was the experience of being at the conference like? What was the agenda of the 48th OIC CFM? What were the speeches at the Inaugural session and the Press Takeout on Day 2? What is OIC's stance on Afghanistan? What is OIC's stance on Kashmir? What is OIC's stance on Russia-Ukraine Conflict? What is OIC's stance on Palestine? Why was China a part of OIC for the first time? What is OIC's stance on Islamophobia? What is OIC's stance on economic development of the Muslim world? How do Shia-Sunni conflicts within the Muslim world manifest in OIC resolutions? Is OIC impactful in being taken seriously by the rest of the world? What does OIC's future look like? #OIC #ThePakistanPivot #PakistanNow

Vasudev Kutumbakam --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/bharatpodcast/message

As UAE gets a rare attack on its soil from the Houthi rebels. Shekhar Gupta traces the long standing, complex & diabolic war in Yemen. Who are the Houthis, what do they control, and other characters - Iranians, Saudis, UAE- in the war. In episode 921 of #CutTheClutter, we discuss if this is yet another Shia-Sunni conflict?

This week Dr. Jasser reflects on Thanksgiving, gratitude, and the inability of those who only seek to divide us over identity to actually come together as a nation even in the setting of Thanksgiving. America needs to have a conversation over what exactly is “justice” and was is not? Zuhdi will also give you the latest on the culture wars between NBA stars Lebron James and Enes Kanter. Why the plight of the Uyghurs should matter to corporate America! Last, in Damascus, Syria, the Shia-Sunni divide is now on full display with Tehran calling the shots. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Shia-Sunni discussion series:Muharram a Time for Sacrifice and Reformation

Shia-Sunni discussion series:Muharram a Time for Sacrifice and Reformation

Shia-Sunni discussion series:Muharram a Time for Sacrifice and Reformation

Shia-Sunni discussion series:Muharram a Time for Sacrifice and Reformation

Shia-Sunni discussion series:Muharram a Time for Sacrifice and Reformation

Shia-Sunni discussion series:Muharram a Time for Sacrifice and Reformation

Shia-Sunni discussion series:Muharram a Time for Sacrifice and Reformation

Shia-Sunni discussion series:Muharram a Time for Sacrifice and Reformation:Prof Inamul Haque

Shia-sunni discussion series Muharram a Time for Sacrifice and Reformation

Shia -Sunni discussion series Muharram a Time for Sacrifice and Reformation

Shaykh Arif Abdulhussain, who after acknowledging that this was a sensitive and polarising event for the Muslims, went on to ask whether it was befitting for Lady Aisha to rise up and in the process oppose the Qur'anic commands[3], in addition to rising up against a legitimate caliph. During the discussion, further questions were also raised such as whether those who rose up were considered rebels (baghi) to which Qari Zahiruddin outlined a Sunni stance that during the battle they were considered rebels, however after the battle they repented and were thus exonerated from being considered rebels. In addition to this, the question was raised as to why the fighters against the first two caliphs were considered abandoning the religion (murtad) whilst the fighters against Ali were let off so easily? Also mentioned during the discussion was how this political incident has led to theological implications, and how the Sunni may have to reconcile the notion of the companions being just & right (Adool) whilst them fighting each other? It was concluded that the event did cause tensions in the community, however, the actions of Ali ibn Abi Talib in dealing with Lady Aisha showed that he did so with utmost respect despite the far-reaching consequences of her actions. This is a learning point for us in emulating his character and learning from history. Chapter: 00:00 Intro 00:13 Sheykh Arif Abdulhussein 07:07 Dr Amra Bone 10:40 Qari Zahirrudin Tahir 11:37 Prof. Liyakat Takim 13:18 Shaykh Umar Ramadhan 15:24 Qari Zahirrudin Tahir 17:00 Dr Ali Reza Bhojani 17:57 Qari Zahirrudin Tahir 19:43 Prof. Liyakat Takim 22:14 Shaykh Umar Ramadhan 23:29 Prof. Liyakat Takim 25:00 Sayed Hamid 32:19 Qari Zahirrudin Tahir 34:39 Dr Fella Lahmar 39:18 Dr Amina Inloes 43:30 Prof. Liyakat Takim 47:01 Sheikh Hasnain Govani 50:44 Qari Zahirrudin Tahir 53:50 Dr Mohammad Khalid 1:05:52 Dr Ali Reza Bhojani 1:07:15 Shaykh Umar Ramadhan

Event date: Feb 2020 Q&A and Shia Sunni panel discussion on the topic of the relationship between Lady Fatima al-Zahra and the Khulafa after the death of the Prophet in light of the dispute over Fadak. (Part 3 of 3)

CIMS Panel discussion on The Door of Fatima: The controversy over the violation of the House of Sayyeda Fatima (as) by companions, after the death of the Prophet Muhammad (s).

The Khilafa of Imam Hassan and his abdication to Muawiya, interesting and informative Shia Sunni Panel Discussion. (Part 3 of 3 videos) Chapters: 00:00 Introduction 00:04 Dr. Muhammad Khalid 05:01 Dr. Ali-Reza Bhojani 05:23 Sayed Hassan Rizvi 06:56 Dr. Seyfeddin Kara 09:13 Shaykh Atabek Shukurov 12:53 Shaykh Umar Ramadhan 17:39 Dr. Seyfeddin Kara 20:03 Sayed Hussain Morteza (Speaks in Urdu) 24:34 Dr. Ali-Reza Bhojani (Translating for Sayed Hussain Morteza) 27:51 Shaykh Atabek Shukurov 32:58 Dr. Ali-Reza Bhojani 33:42 Sr. Fatima Agha 34:38 Dr. Seyfeddin Kara 37:49 Sayyid Jaafar Fadlallah 44:15 Dr. Fella Lahmar 50:08 Dr. Ali-Reza Bhojani 51:00 Shaykh Atabek Shukurov 54:44 Shaykh Hassanain Govani 56:24 Shaykh Atabek Shukurov 58:46 Dr. Ali-Reza Bhojani 59:41 Dr. Seyfeddin Kara 1:03:09 Shyakh Umar Ramadhan 1:05:10 Sayyid Haamid 1:07:24 Shaykh Arif Abudlhussein 1:08:54 Dr. Ali-Reza Bhojani 1:09:48 Shaykh Atabek Shukurov 1:13:00 Dr. Seyfeddin Kara 1:14:25 Dr. Ali-Reza Bhojani

CIMS Discussion: Understanding the stand of Imam Ali and those who opposed him at the battle of Siffin. Shia Sunni scholars discuss various points of view. The discussion prompted further questions around the topic of Khaṭaʾ Ijtihadī (mistakes in interpretation); a notion which would see the wrongs of the companions reduced to a mere error in their judgement, whilst them still being considered worthy of reward due to their effort in the issue. This naturally led to the discussion as to whether Muawiya could be considered a rebel (bāghi), something considered a grave sin by some Muslim jurists, to which the Sunni ulema in the discussion agreed that he, and for that matter, anyone who revolted against Ali, would fall into the category of a rebel. The reverence of Muawiya amongst Sunnis was also discussed, to which some Sunni scholars present made the claim that this is a modern influence of Nasibis on the Sunni community. Syed Fadlallah wrapped up the discussion quoting Quranic verses 2:134 and 12:111, which highlight the importance of taking lessons from such events in history as opposed to it merely being a point of difference. (Part 3 of 3 videos) Chapter: 00:00 Introduction 00:12 Question, Ahmad Kaouri 01:26 Answer, Syed Naveed Shah 06:22 Answer, Shaykh Umar Ramadhan 10:43 Comment, Syed Naveed Shah 11:57 Question & Comments, Sayyid Hamid Al-Hussainy 19:56 Comments, Dr Ali Reza Bhojani 21:37 Answer, Mufti Farukh Sab (Urdu) 24:55 Translation of Mufti Farukh by Dr Ali Reza Bhojani (English) 27:07 Comments, Syed Naveed Shah 29:07 Comments, Shaykh Umar Ramadhan 31:44 Comments, Shaykh Zahiruddin Tahir 33:36 Comments, Dr Sayyid Jaafar Fadlallah 37:18 Question, Shaykh Arif Abdulhussein 39:42 Answer, Shaykh Umar Ramadhan 42:51 Answer, Shaykh Ayman Yacoub 47:15 Comments, Dr Sayyid Jaafar Fadlallah 54:26 Comments, Shaykh Arif Abdulhussein 55:36 Conclusion Dr Ali Reza Bhojani 58:32 Shaykh Arif Abdulhussein gives tribute to Prof. Dr Ataullah Siddiqui

Event Date: 29th May 2021 Shaykh Ladak outlined the Shia stance on Yazid and Imam al-Hussain's rising, and that the Shia hold Yazid directly accountable for the killing of al-Hussain. He outlined the Shia theological stance towards Yazid's status in the hereafter and justifications for why it is permitted to curse him. The practice of cursing, according to Shaykh Jafar, is a positive means of staying away from sins and should not be taken as something negative. (Video part 2 of 3).

Event Date: 13th June 2015 Shia Sunni scholar panel discussion, the Concept of Sahabah & Adalah Ahle Sunnah Perspective (Video part 2 of 2).

Event date: 31st January 2015 Finally, the Shia Sunni panel discussion about holy Quran concluded with an interactive Q&A session allowing the audience to input their knowledge and ask the scholars their questions.

Event date: 18th April 2015 The discussion ended with an interactive Q&A session allowing all scholars and attendees present to take part and iron out any issues or concerns they may have had. In conclusion, the scholars all accepted and agreed on the following statements; – Taqiyyah and Ikrah are synonymous terms from the same origin and are denoted by the Quran on an equal basis. – Taqiyyah is not a new invention in Shi'ism and its terminology is derived from the holy Qur'an making it justifiable in Islam. – Taqiyyah can only be practised in genuine life or death circumstances similar to Idtirar and anything relating to worldly benefits is strictly forbidden and deceptive. – The ulama of both schools of thought have to educate their communities about the true concept and application of Taqiyyah to dissipate the misconceptions around the issue. (Part 3 or 3)

Meeting date: 13th June 2015 CIMS Discussion: Shia and Sunni discussion about the concept of Sunnah from the two various perspectives. (Part 3 of 3 videos)

Event held on: 3rd of October 2015 ‘Who are the Ahlul Bayt?' Shia Sunni Panel Discussion Part 1 of 2. Some of the points of discussion from the presentation and Q&A were; ✔️The wives of the prophet are considered to be part of the ‘Ahlul Bayt' in a more general meaning of the term, whereas the more specific meaning of the term is limited to the five, and this is backed by the different narrations e.g. the event of Mubahila. ✔️ Both Shia and Sunni accept the Ahlul Bayt as role models and sources of guidance. ✔️ According to the Shia school of thought, insulting and use of derogatory language about the wives of the Prophet is strongly prohibited and is against the teachings of the Imams e.g. Imam Ali (a.s) who respected and maintained the honour of the wife of the Prophet even after she stood up against him in the battle of Jamal. ✔️The Shia's unanimously agree that exaggerating (ghulluw) of the status of the Imams is unlawful, and the Imams are below the Prophet in station.

Event held on: 5th of October 2015 ‘Who are the Ahlul Bayt?' Shia Sunni Panel Discussion Part 2 of 2. Some of the points of discussion from the presentation and Q&A were; ✔️According to the madhhab of Ahl al-sunnah, Ahl al-Bayt is a great institution and source of guidance as expounded by the Quran and sunnah of the Holy Prophet. ✔️The wives of the Holy Prophet are also part of the institution of Ahl al-Bayt being as the direct misdaq of the address of the Quran in sura al-Ahzab in the context as has been dealt with. ✔️The Holy Prophet also declared 4 people known as Ahl al-kisa as the members of Ahl al-Bayt in his numerous ahadith on important occasions. ✔️According to some ahadith prohibiting sadaqah, some other people of Banu Hashim such as Al-Abbas, Al Jafar, Al Aqil, Al Muttalib are also made the part of Ahl al-Bayt, but this view is not grounded within Ahl al-Sunnah. ✔️According to Ahl al-Sunnah, the members of Ahl al-Bayt are highly honoured but they are not Masum. (Part 4 of 4)

Event date: 27 February 2016 From amongst the discussions, a number of issues emerged that offer genuine ground for unity despite the differences between the two positions of Ahl al-Sunnah and al-Shia. – Despite his differences of opinion, Imam Ali ultimately accepted the situation as it unfolded after the passing of the Prophet, offering his cooperation, support and help to the Caliphs. – This offer of Imam Ali was for the broader sake of religion and the general interests of the Ummah. Imam Ali's perseverance for the sake of unity was identified as arguably one of his greatest virtues. The need to adopt this spirit in the modern era was agreed upon by all. – Imam Ali is accepted as imam and Khalifah al-Rashid by Ahl al-Sunnah, offering a further basis for unity and harmony despite the diversity within the Ummah. (Part 3 of 3)

Event date: 24th Sept 2021 Of the various points raised, was the implication of the Shia belief in ismah is the raising the Imam's ismah above that of the Prophet. This is because if the Prophet were to make a mistake he would be guided by revelation, whereas the Imam would be guided without revelation, elevating the imams status above the Prophet. The scholars present echoed the Shia belief that the final Prophet is of the highest standard, in both the worship and in ismah. (Video part 3 of 3)

Program date: 19th January 2019 The succession of the Prophet and the event of Ghadeer, Shia Sunni Panel Discussion. (Part 3 of 3 videos)

Event Date: 28th January 2017 Of the questions raised in the discussion was the narration found in Shia hadith works “all the companions committed apostasy (irtadū) except three” to which Sayed Qazwini responded by rejecting this narration based on the lack of chain, in addition to it being logically impossible that only four companions out of the thousands remained on the faith. It was also evident from the discussions that the Shia narrative is one that is over-critical to the Sahaba perhaps due to a reactionary outlook to the Sunni narrative. . Some Shia scholars did however raise that, although the ṣahāba need to be seen in terms of their human capacity, there is a general lack of knowledge amongst the lay Shia about the various companions of the Prophet and their services to Islam. The notion of ʿadūl (trustworthiness) of the companions was also further discussed where it became evident that the term used in the presentation was in reference to the moral integrity of the companions whilst the technical term in this discussion is about the trustworthiness of the companions in narrating hadith (See CIMS discussion on this from Sunni perspective - Link below). This led naturally to the topic of cursing the companions – to which the Shia and Sunni scholars present agreed that cursing and abusing of the companions is categorically wrong, and whilst critiquing the companions' actions does not amount to cursing, it should only ever be done in a respectful manner. (Video part 2 of 2) chapters 0:00 introduction 0:05 Dr Mohammad Khalid 03:44 Sayed Hossein Qazwini 06:15 Shaykh Arif Abdulhussain 11:49 Sayed Hossein Qazwini 18:10 Shaykh Arif Abdulhussain 20:01 Shaykh Umar Ramadhan 23:55 Dr Mohammad Khalid 28:43 Sayed Hossein Qazwini 30:12 Dr Mohammad Khalid 31:21 Shaykh Mohammad Sajjad 33:32 Dr Wahid 37:04 Shaykh Nuru Mohammed 41:32 Sayed Hossein Qazwini 46:08 Dr Mohammad Khalid 48:06 Shaykh Abu Jaffar 49:42 Sayed Hossein Qazwini 52:05 Dr Mohammad Khalid 52:46 Dr Wahid 54:14 Dr Mohammad Khalid 55:10 Shaykh Ayman Yacoubi 1:00:31 Sayed Hossein Qazwini 1:02:59 Dr Ali-Reza Bhojani 1:05:04 Shaykh Mahmood Khattab Fawzy 1:13:18 Maulana Ayaaz Ahmad Ghulam Nabi 1:14:54 Sayed Hossein Qazwini 1:23:11 Dr Mohammad Khalid 1:24:42 Hafeez Idrees 1:28:06 Sayed Hossein Qazwini 1:31:42 Mix discussion

Event Date: 16th December 2017 Dr Mohammed Khalid concluded with the following statements;

Program date: 17th March 2018 ‘Tawassul (Intermediation) in the light of the Islamic Tenet of the Sole Authority of God', Shia Sunni debate. (Part 3 of 3)

Event Date: 23rd March 2019 Was the Prophet denied a chance to record a last testament before his death by his own companions? The issue of qirtas, refers to the incident at the end of the Prophet's life when he asked his companions for a pen and paper to record something but was refused, which has been an ideological dividing line for the Shia and the Ahl al-Sunna. Shia scholars maintain that the Prophet wished to write down the successorship of Imam Ali whilst Sunni scholars refute this understanding. (2 of 4)

Event Date: 14th September 2019 Amongst the points raised in the discussion was that companions not following the Prophet's commands in providing him with paper could be taken as a failure in his mission, and thus should be dismissed as a possibility. However, this was rejected as a weak argument as the disobedience of a people is not an indication of success or indeed a failure of prophets or for that matter God. Of the more interesting points raised during the discussion was the acknowledgement by certain Sunni scholars that the Prophet had indeed wanted Ali to be the successor, however since this was a communal matter, it was up to the community to decide ultimately i.e., the Prophet's words were just advice and not binding. (video part 4 of 4)

Event date: Dec 2019 Early Islamic History, Saqifa and the Appointment of the First Caliph Abubakr, Shia Sunni panel discussion and Q&A. (Part 3 of 3 videos)

Event Date: 1st of April 2017 It was concluded that regarding the fundamentals of faith, despite minor differences, there was an overwhelming overlap between the Shia and Sunni regarding the fundamentals of the faith. (video part 3 of 3)

In Part 3 of “What caused the Shia-Sunni split?” Syedna TUS explains Amirul Mumineen's SA actions and forbearance when his enemies usurped the rightful succession after Rasulullah's SA _wafaat_. His actions and _sabr_ are proofs of Haqq. What was the wisdom in Ali's forbearance? What proofs did Maulatuna Fatema AS assert to establish Ali's right in face of tyranny? What did Ali do when he was brought in Abu Bakr's presence for the _bay'at_? In such difficult circumstances, how did Ali establish the Dawat of Haqq? What happened after the seat of the caliphate returned to Ali? Syedna TUS answers these questions in this Majlis, the 49th in the Majalis al Hikma series. In the next Majlis, Syedna will speak about the split of the Zaydi faction insha'allah. Watch short video in Dawat ni Zabaan: https://youtu.be/TlbbmYWTGzs Watch short video in English: https://youtu.be/o55-iYUkqbw Watch short video in Arabic: https://youtu.be/zZTTX427w6g Listen to audio podcast: https://anchor.fm/fatemidawat Questions can be asked by email to info@fatemidawat.com The next majlis will, Inshaallah, be published next Thursday.

شيعة سني نو فرقه كيم پرهو؟ (Part 3) سيدنا طاهر فخر الدين طع آ سؤال نا جواب ما زيادة ذكر فرماوے چهے، رسول الله صلع نا وفاة بعد امير المؤمنين صع نا منبر محراب غصب كرنار يه غصب كيدو، امير المؤمنين يه صبر كيدو، آپنو عمل انے آپنو صبر آپنا حق ني برهان چهے، حيدر كرار نا صبر كروا ما سوں حكمة هتي؟ مولاتنا فاطمة عم يه علي نو حق ثابت كرتا هوا سوں حجتو كيدي؟ علي نے ابوبكر پاسے بيعة واسطے لئي نے آيا تو آپئے سوں كيدو؟ آ مثل نا حالات ما نبي نا وصي يه حق ني دعوة كيم قائم كيدي؟ تاكه امير المؤمنين ني طرف ظاهري خلافة ولي نے آوي پچهي سوں تهيو؟ مجالس الحكمة ني ٤٩مي مجلس ما سيدنا فخر الدين طع آ سؤالو نو جواب فرماوے چهے، آؤتي مجلس ما سيدنا طع زيدي فرقة الگ تهيو اهني ذكر فرماؤسے انشاء الله تعالىٰ، دعوة ني زبان ما ويديو ديكهو: https://youtu.be/TlbbmYWTGzs انگريزي ما ويديو ديكهو: https://youtu.be/o55-iYUkqbw عربي ما ويديو ديكهو: https://youtu.be/zZTTX427w6g اوديو پودكاسٹ سنو: https://anchor.fm/fatemidawat جه مؤمنين نے كوئي سؤال هوئي ته آ ايميل (info@fatemidawat.com) نا ذريعة سي پوچهي سكے چهے، آؤتي مجلس آؤتا خميس نا دن نشر كرواما آؤسے انشاء الله.

شيعة سني نو فرقه كيم پرهو؟ (Part 2) سيدنا طاهر فخر الدين طع آ سؤال نا جواب ما زيادة ذكر فرماوے چهے، انے جه رسول الله صلع يه امير المؤمنين صع پر غدير خم ما واضح نص كيدي، جه نص كرتي وقت جملة فرمايا اهني سوں حكمة چهے، اهني ذكر فرماوے چهے، رسول الله نا وفاة نا بعد سقيفة ما جمع تهئي امير المؤمنين نا غصب كرنار يه سوں كيدو؟ امير المؤمنين يه سقيفة نا امر پچهي تلوار ميان سكام كيدي؟ سيدنا حميد الدين الكرماني رض يه جه امير المؤمنين نو حق غصب كيدو اهنا پر سوں حجتو كيدي چهے؟ مجالس الحكمة ني ٤٨مي مجلس ما سيدنا فخر الدين طع آ سؤالو نو جواب فرماوے چهے، دعوة ني زبان ما ويديو ديكهو: https://youtu.be/ATR-adNi48E انگريزي ما ويديو ديكهو: https://youtu.be/wxI3743y1MU عربي ما ويديو ديكهو: https://youtu.be/PFxp9SWTOj0 اوديو پودكاسٹ سنو: https://anchor.fm/fatemidawat جه مؤمنين نے كوئي سؤال هوئي ته آ ايميل (info@fatemidawat.com) نا ذريعة سي پوچهي سكے چهے، آؤتي مجلس آؤتا خميس نا دن نشر كرواما آؤسے انشاء الله.

In Part 2 of “What caused the Shia-Sunni split?” Syedna TUS continues to describe the events after Rasullulah's SA wafaat. In this Majlis, Syedna explains Rasulullah's SA khutba and wise words when he appointed Amirul Mumineen SA in Ghadir-e-Khumm. How was Ali's right to succession usurped in the Saqifa gathering after Rasulullah's SA passing? Why did Amirul Mumineen sheath his sword after the events of the Saqifa? What are the arguments of Syedna Hamiduddin al-Kirmani RA against those who usurped Ali's SA right to succession? Syedna TUS answers these questions in this Majlis, the 48th in the Majalis al Hikma series. Watch short video in Dawat ni Zabaan: https://youtu.be/ATR-adNi48E Watch short video in English: https://youtu.be/wxI3743y1MU Watch short video in Arabic: https://youtu.be/PFxp9SWTOj0 Listen to audio podcast: https://anchor.fm/fatemidawat Questions can be asked by email to info@fatemidawat.com The next majlis will, Inshaallah, be published next Thursday.

شيعة سني نو فرقه كيم پرهو؟ خدا تعالىٰ يه پوتانا رسول نے امر كيدو كه "تميں پهنچاؤ جه تمنے فرمان تهيو چهے، جو نهيں پهنچاؤ تو كئي بهي رسالة نه پهنچاوي"، سيدنا المؤيد رض فرماوے چهے – نماز ني مثل، زكوة ني مثل – رسول الله يه پهنچاوي فرمان آيو ته ج وقت، آ ايوي چيز كٹهن سوں چهے كه نهيں پهنچاؤ تو كئي نه پهنچايو؟، انے يه پهنچاؤ اتنو مشكل سكام هتو؟ رسول الله صلع نا وفاة نا بعد امير المؤمنين مولانا علي بن ابيطالب - جه رسول الله نا وصي چهے، اهنو حق غصب كرنار يه غصب كيدو، اسلام ما فرقة پرهي گيا، مسلمين جه علي نے نتهي مانتا، اهنا علماء اهنا كتابو ما سوں لكهے چهے جه نا سي علي نو حق ثابت تهائي چهے؟ اهما سي كتناك غدير خم ما رسول الله نا خطبة ني بهي ذكر كرے چهے، پچهي اهني الگ الگ تفسير كرے چهے، اهنا اوپر اپنا هداة ني حجة سوں چهے؟ مجالس الحكمة ني ٤٧مي مجلس ما سيدنا فخر الدين طع آ سؤالو نو جواب فرماوے چهے، دعوة ني زبان ما ويديو ديكهو: https://youtu.be/0wNVR_kCzBI انگريزي ما ويديو ديكهو: https://youtu.be/zGIXeTaI9Ac عربي ما ويديو ديكهو: https://youtu.be/Rlgh5pyUk9U اوديو پودكاسٹ سنو: https://anchor.fm/fatemidawat جه مؤمنين نے كوئي سؤال هوئي ته آ ايميل (info@fatemidawat.com) نا ذريعة سي پوچهي سكے چهے، آؤتي مجلس آؤتا خميس نا دن نشر كرواما آؤسے انشاء الله.

Allah Ta'ala commands Rasulullah SA in the Quran “proclaim and convey His message. If you do not convey it, you have not conveyed His message at all.” Syedna al-Mu'ayyad al-Shirazi RA argues that Rasullulah conveyed messages like prayer and zakaat immediately. What was this supremely difficult message that Allah warns Rasullulah that if you do not convey it, you will not have conveyed anything? Why did Rasulullah find it hard to convey? The first split that happened in Islam was after Rasulullah SA demise when the rightful succession of Maulana Ali bin Abi Talib SA was usurped. Muslims who deny Ali's succession themselves record events and statements in their books that establish that Rasulullah SA appointed Ali as his successor. What are some of these statements? Several of those scholars also record the Nass of Rasulullah on Ali in Ghadir-e-Khum after the last pilgrimage. How do they interpret Rasulullah's statement “for whomsoever I am Maula, Ali is his Maula.” What are our Hudaat's arguments against their misinterpretation? Syedna TUS answers these questions in this Majlis, the 47th in the Majalis al Hikma series. Watch short video in Dawat ni Zabaan: https://youtu.be/0wNVR_kCzBI Watch short video in English: https://youtu.be/zGIXeTaI9Ac Watch short video in Arabic: https://youtu.be/Rlgh5pyUk9U Listen to audio podcast: https://anchor.fm/fatemidawat Questions can be asked by email to info@fatemidawat.com The next majlis will, Inshaallah, be published next Thursday.

On Iran at the End of History.When the US assassinated Iran's 'shadow commander', Qassem Soleimani, everyone thought WW3 would break out. What happened instead? We talk to the author of a new book on Soleimani about the "local boy who made it", and look at how Soleimani masterminded Iran's interventions all over the region.  We also discuss how the Iranian Revolution represented a degradation of universalism, as it marginalised secular nationalism, socialism and communism. Would the Shia-Sunni conflict, with Iran as leader of the Shia faction, therefore be yet another step away from universalism? And what role did the US play in fomenting sectarian conflict? Readings: Book: The Shadow Commander: Soleimani, the US and Iran's Global Ambitions, Arash Azizi, OneWorld Qassem Soleimani and How Nations Decide To Kill, Adam Entous & Evan Osnos, New Yorker  

This episode talks about the dangerous concequneces of Shia and Sunni infighting and Pakistan is the new battle ground for that --- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app

This week, Rachel discusses the creation of Islam and its empires such as the Umayyads and Abbasids as well as a cool new job for all the teenagers that have ever been called odd. On this week's myth moment, Rachel continues to mispronounce everything while we talk about some special rain that allows you to regrow your pelvis.Leave a review on Spotify, Apple Podcast, or wherever you listen to podcasts to help spread the word! You can also leave a voice message that can be used to give a shoutout to someone, ask a question, or help by fixing pronunciation or a fact and all will be mentioned next week during the break. What myth do you want to be covered next week?We have a website! https://sites.google.com/pobschools.org/historyheardhere/homeWe also have a Pinterest! Just search for History Heard Here.Leave a Voice Message! - https://anchor.fm/HistoryHeardHere/messageGoogle Podcasts - https://www.google.com/podcasts?feed=aHR0cHM6Ly9hbmNob3IuZm0vcy8xYzM3MWE3NC9wb2RjYXN0L3Jzcw==Apple Podcasts - https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/history-heard-here/id1507393073Spotify - https://open.spotify.com/show/2IanAM50kGMjDzLCsKvaJfAnchor - https://anchor.fm/HistoryHeardHerePocket Casts - https://pca.st/39rdqawqBreaker - https://www.breaker.audio/history-heard-hereRadioPublic -https://radiopublic.com/history-heard-here-69PvY3Overcast - https://overcast.fm/itunes1507393073/history-heard-here--- This episode is sponsored by · Anchor: The easiest way to make a podcast. https://anchor.fm/app--- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/historyheardhere/message

I continue our conversation with podcaster and radio personality, Farheen Raza, mom of 3 rambunctious boys. We're talking about what Shiism is--history, practice, and whether or not it matters which sect we identify with in the United States. During this time of division and change in our nation, it matters whether or not we decrease or broaden the schisms between our neighbors and mom sisters.We barely touched the tip of the iceberg on this topic in the first part. Links:https://youtu.be/NrB8Iamo0OAMusings of a Modern Muslim podcast: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/musings-of-a-millennial-muslim/id1489441261On IG: @themodmuslimWeb: www.mommyingwhilemuslim.comEmail: mommyingwhilemuslim@gmail.comFB: Mommying While Muslim page and Mommyingwhilemuslim groupIG: @mommyingwhilemuslimpodcast

Podcaster and radio personality, Farheen Raza, mom of 3 rambunctious boys, joins us today to inform us about what Shiism is--history, practice, and whether or not it matters which sect we identify with in America. During this time of division and change in our nation, it matters whether or not we decrease or broaden the schisms between our neighbors and mom sisters.We barely touched the tip of the iceberg on this topic, so watch out for a second part coming this month as we continue to discuss Muslim identity. There’s already a hot difference of opinion we are having and we cannot wait to continue it on our part deux. Links:https://youtu.be/NrB8Iamo0OAMusings of a Modern Muslim podcast: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/musings-of-a-millennial-muslim/id1489441261On IG: @themodmuslimWeb: www.mommyingwhilemuslim.comEmail: mommyingwhilemuslim@gmail.comFB: Mommying While Muslim page and Mommyingwhilemuslim groupIG: @mommyingwhilemuslimpodcast

Det er Id idag, eller imorgen. Vi snakker om Id-programmet hos NRK, Shia/Sunni hat, terror-saken, flyulykken i Karachi, Malcolm X og svarte muslimers rettighetskamp, og litt mer moro. (1:00) Id-Mubarak, (1:50) Id-program hos NRK, (3:25) Drapet på Aya Hashim, (8:00) Terror-saken, (13:50) Flykrasj i Pakistan, (18:40) Malcolm X Håper dere liker episoden! Følg oss gjerne på Instagram og Twitter (@minareten på begge), og bli med i Facebook-gruppen vår (Minaretens diskusjonsforum).

ISIS is on the run in Iraq and in Syria. Libya's ISIS cohorts are somewhat contained, for the time being. However, the morning after is coming, and very soon. What happens after ISIS is defeated? For the several players in the military theater of the Middle East the roles will shift in a dramatic way, but the horror play will not end anytime soon. The freak show will continue with more bloodshed and a greater risk of war. From ISIS' standpoint, the end of the geographical caliphate, that swath of land cut out from the deserts and cities of both Iraq and Syria, will usher the continuum of a virtual caliphate that spreads from Montreal to Mosul and from Raqqa to Riga. ISIS thrives in the literature of martyrdom, of having lost ‘one battle but not the war', and of portraying the coalition against it as modern-day band of infidel crusaders. The genie is out of the bottle, and the fanatical thoughts and heinous philosophy of waging war against all infidels (as defined by ISIS alone) is a millennial design, and a perpetual effort.  So what if Mosul has fallen and Raqqa is next? The destructive zeal and killing fervor will remain ignited in the hearts of thousands of fanatics, of ignorant, and of lone and banded wolves across the globe. ISIS has gained center stage in the eyes of its terrorist fans and the battle for winning their hearts and minds is complete. The loss of a sanctuary will only make its overt actions go covert. The absence of a dominion has never stopped evil ideas from traveling. Nazism still survives more than 50 years after the surrender of Berlin. The KKK and other supremacist groups have outlived the defeat of the Confederacy. The difference in this instance is that ISIS has a wider audience, willing homegrown suicide bombers in every country on the planet, and Internet, Facebook and Twitter to boost its message. As for Iran, and its proxies, they truly believe that by fighting ISIS –the other face of a religiously inspired terrorism which they themselves embody- they are hiding the ugly truth about their own discriminating, factional and divisive form of insurgencies that run from Iraq, to Yemen, Syria, Bahrain, and Lebanon. Defeating ISIS presents many benefits for Iran and its cohorts: eliminating a Sunni competitor, scaring the moderate Arab regimes into political submission, and sending a message to the West (the US in particular) that Iran is the only force capable of defeating radical Islamic terrorism and of guaranteeing stability in the Middle East. However, what escapes the simple minds of the Iranian leadership is that Iran is viewed, with or without ISIS, as the real State-sponsor of terrorism in the region (if not the world) since the Islamic revolution of 1978. No matter what Iran does or pretends to do, this very fact, this harsh reality will be difficult to erase. In the late 70s and early 80s, the takeover of the US Embassy in Teheran, the bombing of the US Marines Barracks in Beirut, of the US Embassy in Beirut and the kidnapping of US and Western diplomats in Lebanon, were only the early part of this sad series of terrorist acts. In the 1990s there were the bombings of the Marines barracks in Khobar and of the Israeli Embassy and the Jewish Cultural Center in Argentina. More recently, the meddling in the internal affairs of Bahrain, the direct and indirect engagement in combat in Syria along the troops of Assad, and the overt support of the Houthis rebels in Yemen are yet another wave of destabilization that Iran has waged against its neighbors. And, not to put a finer point on it, the mere threat of becoming one armed nuclear nation who has –on more than one occasion- threatened to use such nuclear capability against its avowed enemies, will not transform Iran from a Rogue State into a Rational State by simply joining the fray of routing out ISIS. For the US-led coalition and their Arab allies, the end of ISIS will bring back to the fore the issue of how to deal with the Shia-Sunni divid...

Facebook Rolls Out 'Watch'; EPS-OPS merger likely in Tamil Nadu; Madame Tussauds Delhi unveils Madhubala's wax figure; Shia-Sunni rift in Ram Janmbhoomi dispute; Indian Army orders evacuation of border village.

Jacob Shapiro and Kamran Bokhari discuss some recent anomalies in the Middle East and consider the relationship between sectarianism and nationalism in the Muslim world. Sign up for free updates on topics like this! Go here: hubs.ly/H06mXwR0 TRANSCRIPT: Jacob L. Shapiro: Hi everyone and welcome to another Geopolitical Futures podcast. I'm sorry that we missed last week but we're back this week and I am joined once again by Kamran Bokhari, who is one of our senior analysts. Nice to have you back Kamran. Kamran Bokhari: It's good to be back Jacob. JLS: And we're going to pick up a little bit where we left off last week, or not last week, two weeks ago. Two weeks ago, we were talking about the situation between Saudi Arabia and Qatar and we thought we'd just have a more general conversation this week about the Middle East, Islam, maybe some nationalism to throw in there. And but Kamran before we get started, we just noticed a report before we were recording that the al-Nuri mosque in Mosul, Iraq apparently has been destroyed in some kind of explosion. This mosque is important because it's where the ISIS founder and leader al-Baghdadi actually declared the caliphate years ago. You were telling me that it kind of struck you as weird. Why was it weird to you, what's going on do you think with this report? KB: We've seen ISIS and other jihadist groups attack mosques of Muslims that they don't deem to be “true Muslims” or from their point of view deviant Muslims. But this is anomalous in that ISIS would actually blow up a mosque that it has been using and it's been sort of a place from where they declared their caliphate and something that they've used. Now, it could be that there may be things or something that's in that mosque that they didn't want coalition forces to get their hands on, so they decided to go ahead and destroy the facility. But it's still very odd that they would take a risk like that because they are already on the defensive and why would they do something that could potentially cause them great backlash. JLS: Yeah, I think one of the things I was thinking about though was according to the reports Iraqi security forces were approaching the mosque and they blew it up as sort of a way to defend themselves and not let the mosque fall into enemy hands, necessarily. But I think this is an example of how ISIS has a very pragmatic ideology. We think of them as religious fanatics, and they are religious fanatics, but they also deal with things pragmatically, especially the defense of the territories and places that they defend and it's something that just popped into my head. It's also strange that fundamentalist groups like this also always seem to have an aversion to anything resembling idolatry. ISIS was famous for blowing up a lot of these antiquities in Palmyra and other places that they've been or taking the antiquities and selling them on the black market. They don't really care about big beautiful structures or things like that. I think in some ways they think of structures as something that the Saudis are building. You think about the Saudis and all the stuff they are building around the Kaaba in Mecca, that sort of comes to mind. And ISIS has always been more spartan, has always been not attached to I don't know larger images or beautiful mosques, that's not really what it's about. So yeah, don't you think it could just be a symbol of their pragmatism in general? KB: I think you are onto something here that's important. I think that what you said in the beginning is that we tend to look at these groups as very rigid in their interpretation of religious text and whatnot, which is true on one level. But on another level, they display a great deal of, for lack of a better term, pragmatism or they make things up as they go and they change interpretations and they adopt interpretations that normally would not be the case. And I think that given the way that ISIS has evolved and grown, one of the key things in their toolkit has been that you don't stick with necessarily the old formulations or understandings of religious texts. As far as buildings are concerned, I think they look at it from a utilitarian point of view. And then of course, this is war, and I think that in war they tend to be a bit more casual about things and because what is at stake is being able to protect themselves as an institution and so buildings may not necessarily be of importance. And again, we're speculating because just not a whole lot of information as to how ISIS blew this up – was it booby-trapped, were there fighters holed up there and they blew themselves up because they didn't want to get caught or wanted to achieve “martyrdom” and especially given it being Ramadan or the tail end of Ramadan. And so there are just too many unanswered questions. JLS: Well another report I wanted to ask you about Kamran, and I haven't raised this with you before but we'll see what you think about it, is that I hadn't realized this but I read a report today that there are actually a number of polio cases in Deir el-Zour in particular but also in Raqqa and other places that the Islamic State and even in other places that the Islamic State is not controlling in Syria and in Iraq right now. And for some reason that really struck me on sort of a symbolic level. I think there maybe is not a better symbol for Western science than vaccines. And in some ways vaccines have had a little bit of a troubled history in the Muslim world, right? There were all those allegations of CIA agents posing in Pakistan as doctors who were giving polio vaccines and that ruining trust in Pakistan for doctors. And Pakistan remains one of the places where polio still exists and – in part because of that distrust. And I don't think that ISIS meant for polio to sprout back up in Syria. I'm not even saying that it's really their fault. We know that you know in a lot of these war-torn places, things like basic hygiene are some of the first things to go. We're seeing a cholera outbreak in Yemen right now, which is affecting tens if not hundreds of thousands of people. But I just wonder how you react to that. On the one hand, ISIS is really staked some of its legitimacy on behaving like a state and on providing basic services and the Assad regime has done some of that too. But at the same time, I think we're really beginning to see both in Syria and some parts of Iraq and Yemen where these wars have been going on for so long, we're beginning to really see the total breakdown of bureaucracy and some of the basics that we've come to expect of 21st century society. So, I just wonder what you think about all of those things that I just threw at you and whether it was as striking to you as it was striking to me. KB: It is striking, and what's striking to me is that wherever there's a jihadist entity that is taking control of an ungoverned space and set up shop and declared an emirate or a caliphate – I mean the parallel with Pakistan is very apt – that we see these diseases that we thought had been largely eradicated from the rest of the world like polio and cholera, they begin to emerge. And obviously it has a lot to do with the lack of governance, sanitation being very poor quality, hygiene not being maintained. A lot of it just may be because of the lack of resources. And it really speaks to the idea that somehow the caliphate was a place where people should migrate to in terms of the recruits of ISIS, people who were inspired by ISIS. One of the things that ISIS was saying to people all across the world was come join the caliphate, you know, you need to come to the land where the caliphate exists. And so that's really a blow to that idea that life is so harsh and we can only speculate as to the availability of food supply and other basic services that we have taken granted for in pretty much the rest of the world. I mean even in Pakistan, even in Syria, there are places that do not have this kind of situation. In fact, these are really small pockets of territory where you have the outbreak of such diseases. In Pakistan, we did have that whole thing about the CIA and the conspiracy theory amongst the jihadists, amongst the Pakistani Taliban and their supporters that we should not allow our children to be immunized by doctors because somehow this is a CIA plot to undermine fertility or trying to gain intelligence through the dispensation of vaccines. But at the same time, it really speaks about how really primitive society and governance becomes once jihadists take over. It speaks to the lack of facilities and the lack of resources and you know utter lack of sophistication when it comes to statecraft or just dispensing basic services – collecting garbage, dealing with cleanliness, having a place where people can be treated for you know injuries or wounds. After all, one of the major enterprises of groups like ISIS and the Taliban is warfare. You would think that they would invest in hospitals. But it seems like this is the place where they were at the very least cutting corners. JLS: Yeah, that's fair enough. Well that was a curve ball to start off with but I want to take us back to something that some of our readers have written in to ask us to talk about. And there's not a better person to ask this question than you Kamran. Tell us the difference in a short group of words about what is the difference between Sunnis and Shiites, what is the big deal, why are Sunnis and Shiites always fighting each other throughout the Middle East and where does this go from here? KB: So initially when it all started, it started right after the death of the prophet. And at the time, there was nothing called a Sunni or a Shia. These were categories that developed many, many years later – many decades later and became full-fledged sects, rival sects over centuries. But at the time, the question was, who is going to succeed the prophet because the prophet himself is reported to have said that when God sent one prophet to the children of Israel and would take him away then he would be replaced by another prophet but after me there are no more prophets. And then his companions and his followers asked, “Well, prophet who will guide us and who will lead us?” And he said there will be caliphs and there will be many, some of whom you would love and they would love you and some of whom would despise you and you would despise you in return and that was sort of the end of that story. But the unanswered question was, well ok, who succeeds the prophet? So those who became later on Sunnis decided to go with an individual by the name of Abu Bakr who was the closest friend of the prophet and an associate and he was an individual of advanced age. But those who later on became Shia, and much later on, said no, the cousin of the prophet and who also happened to be his son-in-law, Ali, is most deserving of the position because he spent so much time, he's young, he's energetic, he's demonstrated his capability as a top aide and also on the battlefield. And eventually that whole dispute over time led to a divide and there was a very early civil war issue on this as well during the time of the third caliph, I would say in the '50s. Eventually, jurisprudence that differed between the two sects didn't emerge until well after, I would say 300 years after, the prophet migrated from Mecca to Medina and established the first Islamic polity. But really the sect, as in full-fledged sects, they didn't emerge – the Shia and the Sunni – in the theological sense until well into the 16th century when the Safavid Empire in Iran adopted Shia Islam as a state religion and expected people to be or subscribe to what became Shia Islam and then Shia Islam is broken down into subsects just as the Sunni side is fragmented. JLS: How would you describe the relationship in terms of its relationship to nationalism currently right now? So there are a lot of different nation-states in the Middle East: there's Iraq, there's Jordan, there's Saudi Arabia, there's Egypt. There's a certain level of national pride for the different groups that live in these states. But then the sectarian stuff when you overlay it doesn't always line up exactly with it, right? Because in Iraq there's a majority Arab population and on the one hand because of the sectarianism, they feel closer to Iran. But there are also Arabs; they're not Persians so in that sense they feel closer to Arabs and it's just this whole mess of things so what do you think is the relationship between nationalism and sectarianism? KB: So I think what you're asking is sort of the geopolitics of sectarianism because when it becomes geopolitical, when you have major states or empires as we had back in the Medieval times when Shia/Sunni – I mean the Shia/Sunni conflict is not new. It's been raging and it has assumed different forms in different time periods so the geopolitics of sectarianism, when sectarianism becomes geopolitical, it's no longer simply a religious divide. It is, no you pray differently, you believe in different things and you have a different view of collective history and shared memory. It really becomes ethnic categories so it's almost like a form of nationalism where the Shia identity becomes very primary and the Sunni identity also becomes really highly sensitized and that happens because in the here and now, especially after the late '70s and early '80s, it's because of the rise of Islamism on both sides of the sectarian divide. You have Iran becaming the first Islamist regime in the Muslim world but it subscribes to Shia Islamism or it's an Islamism or Shia variant. At the same time, you have Islamism on the Sunni side and because of this heightened religiosity, the sectarian identity has become almost the primary identity for at least those people who are waging war against each other. So Saudi Arabia looks at Iran and says we don't like Iran because they're Persians but more so because they're Shia and they want to subvert Sunni orthodoxy. And conversely when the Iranians look at the Saudis they see an entity that is trying to undermine the Shia religious creed and mind you the Shia being the minority have mostly been on the receiving end throughout the history of Islam. So there is this sense of minority status that also kicks in and therefore the Iranian identity sort of gets subdued or exists parallel to the Shia identity. Likewise, on the Sunni side, yes we're Saudis, we're Arabs and people in Lebanon are Lebanese and Iraqis have their national identity but as these nation-states are in meltdown mode and there's growing geopolitical sectarianism, it's the sectarian identity that has become the primary thing. I mean those who are fighting the Assad regime in Syria, they're largely driven by the fact that they see an Alawite Shiite conspiracy to destroy Sunnism in Syria and they're defending Sunni Islam against what they deem as a form of deviants, the Alawite Shiite creed. Same thing in Yemen between the Houthis and their opponents. And so the nation-state is still in somewhere; people haven't completely discarded it. But at the same time, because the nation-state has become weak, this sectarian identity has taken center stage. JLS: Is it fair to say that there are less subcategories of Shiites than there are of Sunnis? Like there are more Sunnis in the Middle East than there are Shiites, but would it be fair to say that the Sunni community throughout the entire Middle East is actually much more fractured and has a number of different subsets? Whereas, because maybe there are less Shiites, that camp is more unified? Or would you say there are actually, when you actually look into the camps themselves, there's actually a lot of subdivisions and internal rivalries that maybe don't even bubble up to the surface or that aren't obvious to the casual observer of news in the Middle East? KB: You are absolutely right and you have pointed to a key characteristic of this sectarian conflict that's brewing. So on the Sunni side, you have not just multiple subsects but you have, as I mentioned earlier, the nation-state or the national identity hasn't completely gone away. And you have multiple claimants who represent Sunni Islam. Saudi Arabia has since its founding tried to position itself as not just a leader of the Sunni world or the Arab world but the Islamic world in general. And in recent times with Turkey moving away from a Kemalist version of secularism to a more religious version of secularism, a more religious society not necessarily a religious state, it also sees itself as the leader of the region, the Middle East and of course the wider Islamic world. And ISIS is doing the same thing; al-Qaida claims the leadership of the Islamic world, the Sunni world as well. There is no unified coherent Sunni camp if you will. Now in contrast and in sharp contrast, because the Shia are a minority, their divisions – so the Syrians aren't mainstream, the Syrian Alawites aren't mainstream Shia. They're a heterodox offshoot of mainstream Shia Islam but yet they're close with mainstream Shiites in Iran, in Iraq and in Lebanon. Likewise, you have the Houthis who are Zaidis, who are another form of Shia Islam, which in a way from a doctrinal way is actually not so close to mainstream Shia Islam. It shares a lot more with Sunni Islam, but nonetheless, it is a form of Shia Islam, so therefore we see this alignment with Iran and that Shia camp. And so what we're seeing is a more coherent Shia camp because the Shia are a minority and they have this collective memory that they hark back to, when they have historically been suppressed at the hands of Sunni powers. And now that Sunni Islam has fragmented along multiple lines and one of the things that has really accelerated this fragmentation is the so-called Arab Spring phenomenon or what we call at Geopolitical Futures the hollowing out of the Arab world. You've written about this yourself. And so that has exacerbated the fragmentation on the Sunni side and the Shia look at this and say this is a historic opportunity and I would go on to say that if we look at the history of sectarianism in the Muslim world, it runs on a 500-year cycle. So around 1000 when the Sunni world was fragmenting, we see the rise of Shia policies such as the Fatimid empire in North Africa extending into the Levant and the west coast of the Arabian Peninsula. You had the Buyid empire in what is Mesopotamia and Persia and as time goes on other Shiite polities emerge. But then the Ottomans come back and they reclaim the Sunni center and Sunni Islam once again begins to thrive until the rise of the Safavid empire, which poses a challenge to the Ottomans, and now 500 years later today, we are once again seeing the rise of Shia Islam because Sunni Islam or Sunni Muslim territories are at war with each other. JLS: Kamran on a practical level, is there any significant difference between a Shiite country and Sunni country? Is that going mean anything for the way that particular country acts? Or are those countries just going to act in their geopolitical interest and whatever sect that country happens to be really doesn't play that much into it? I guess to even sharpen the question, does Iran act the way it does in some cases because it is a Shiite country or is that not really something that you can see? KB: At a practical level, different states, different types of states, you know operate more or less the same. You know, you have interests that are material interests and it doesn't matter whether you are Shia or whether you are al-Qaida or ISIS or Sunni or Turkey or whatever. I think that from a practicality point of view, the sect doesn't matter. You have to pursue your imperatives and deal with your constraints like anybody else and actually you're very similar to your rivals. But sect does come into play in terms of behavior, so I'll give you an example. So Iran realizes that it represents a minority sect and a minority ethnicity. They're Persians and they're Shiites in a Middle East that's largely Arab and largely Sunni. And therefore, that creates limitations and so yes they want to expand into Iraq because the majority of Arabs are Shia there. It has developed and cultivated Hezbollah because a majority of Lebanese Muslims are Shia. It's aligned with the Shia because the Alawite regime or the Alawites have dominated the Syrian regime for a long time. It's playing into Yemen to a certain extent because of the Houthis. But it can't go into Saudi Arabia just yet because that's a stronghold of very hardcore Sunni identity and ideology and they won't find so many converts there or supporters. So the Shiite and the Sunni thing does place constraints and limitations in terms of behavior. For example, ISIS only recently, a few weeks ago, was able to stage an attack inside Iran. It's been cultivating, I am pretty sure that it took a long time for it to cultivate the assets to pull off that attack on the shrine of the founder of the Islamic Republic and the Iranian Parliament. But you don't see the volume of attacks that you see even next door in a Shia majority country like Iraq and of course the list goes on and on. So I think that the sect does place constraints in how far a particular power can expand its tentacles and its influence. JLS: The follow-up question to that is I mean really this sectarian battle is focused in the Middle East mainly around the Levant, maybe extending a little bit outwards. But once you get into North Africa or once you get more to South Asia, countries like Indonesia, Bangladesh, you don't have the same type of sectarian rivalry and we see IS trying to expand outwards into these regions especially as it comes under so much pressure in the caliphate itself. Do you think that IS will have trouble finding the same type of equation that allowed it to rise in Syria and Iraq because there isn't that sectarian divide to join on or is there enough subdivision within Sunni Islam and some of these other countries that those are de facto sects already, if that question makes sense? KB: No absolutely and again this is another important point that you raise. What really made ISIS into the jihadist regime it has become, and controlling territory, having a very sophisticated military force and intelligence service and wreaking havoc all across the region and beyond even in the West, is the fact that it was able to consolidate itself in Iraq and Syria because of the sectarian divide. It exploited heavily the Shia/Sunni anxieties on both sides and created space for itself and essentially took over the leadership of first the Sunnis of Iraq because they're a minority in their country and they were disenfranchised after regime change in 2003 that toppled the Saddam regime. And then in the wake of the civil war and uprising against Assad, it tried to take over the leadership of the Sunnis who were trying to battle the Assad regime and trying to topple it. And it really gave them a boost, and exponentially, we saw the growth of ISIS. Now those things as you just mentioned do not exist in North Africa, those conditions. There aren't that many Shia beyond the Levant and beyond the Arabian Peninsula and that sort of heart of the Middle East, no matter which direction you go. You can even go into Central Asia and you won't find the same sectarian polarization, much less Southeast Asia like Indonesia and the Philippines. But I think that having said that, it may not see a major boost; it may take longer for ISIS to develop itself in a place like Afghanistan and Pakistan, which are already a saturated jihadist market if you will. Much less Bangladesh and Indonesia and Malaysia and the Philippines, but there is sufficient chaos in these other countries and internal divides within Sunni Islam and the question of who speaks for the religion. I was speaking to a journalist who's been doing a lot of work in Indonesia and she was telling me about how a version of Wahhabi Islam or Salafi Islam is really growing by leaps and bounds in a country like Indonesia, which was insulated from this ideology for the longest time. And I think that political conditions, the growing religiosity in Muslim societies across the world, these provide for that fertile ground or these are the conditions with which ISIS can latch onto and then begin to expand. So the scale may be different, the timeframe may be different, but I think that there are enough conditions on the ground in these various areas where there aren't any Shiites that will allow and become enablers for ISIS or other groups to expand. JLS: I want to ask you one more question Kamran before we wrap up and it might be an involved question but I think that it's an important one and it's one that I've been thinking about a lot. The sort of smaller version of this question is: Is it possible for nationalism and Islam to coexist? Are those two ideas that can actually be held at the same time in a person's mind and that they make sense or are they mutually exclusive? And if you zoom out a little bit, I would ask that question of all religions. Do you think it's possible for all religions and nationalism to really work in the same type of way or is it that nationalism is sort of at its core, I don't want to say atheistic because it's not that nationalism is going to say that there is no God, but nationalism is going to say that the nation is the most important thing. The defense of the nation, protection of the national interest is the most important all abiding thing that a state must provide for, whereas religion, if you really get down to it and if you want to be ideologically consistent, religion is not going to tolerate anything being the most important thing besides God. They might be willing to have the nation as a subset of that or a caliphate or something like that as a subset of that, but the most important thing is going to be God and if there is a disjuncture between what is interpreted as what God wants versus what is best for the nation, you know usually what God wants is going to win out or what God wants is going to be reinterpreted such that it is in the best interest of the nation. So we started with this strange report of ISIS potentially blowing up one of their own mosques and we've danced around the subject but I wonder if you could sort of speculate for a second about whether nationalism and religion just can't actually fit together or if they can? KB: Well I mean first of all, any religion emanates from a core text or texts that are considered sacred by the believers and those texts are simply texts collecting dust unless the believers operationalize them and it depends on the context, so there is text without context. And those contexts vary over time and we've seen historically – take the case of Islam. Islam has manifested itself in very, very diverse ways and this is not in the here and now, it all goes back to the very earliest centuries of Islam and you see rival groups practicing Islam in very different ways. Yes, there is a core belief that there is no God but God and Muhammad is his last messenger and there is something called a prayer and fasting and charity and pilgrimage and the list can continue depending on what your sectarian persuasion is. But at the end of the day, if we look at the period of the Umayyads, the first dynasty to rule over the Muslim lands and this dynasty took power very early on in 661 and they ruled until the mid-700s and then beyond that in the Iberian Peninsula. That was a dynasty that was built around a clan and it never really – yes it behaved in a religious way, it was motivated by religion but what was dominate was the power of the dynasty, the ruling clan. You had to be from the Umayyad clan. It was father, son and grandson and so on and so forth and it became an imperial dominion and therefore it became a nationalistic entity in some respect. This is obviously pre-nationalism as we understand in a modern world, post enlightenment. But nonetheless, it was not very religious as we understand religion. It wasn't solely religious. And you move through history. You have the various polities that existed. They were geographic and we had multiple competing caliphates. Some of them didn't even call themselves caliphates; they were sultanates. So the Ottomans never really referred to them on a day-to-day basis; the Ottoman emperors referred to them as Sultans. They called themselves the Ottoman Empire; there was an Ottoman identity and Islam was there but it wasn't really in the forefront. And you had divisions, so there is this sort of understanding that somehow the Middle East and the wider Muslim world has adopted nationalism because of the import-export of European thought and through the vehicle of colonialism and then decolonization. Well that's true, but it's not as if the Muslim world was united on the basis of religion. I mean you had multiple competing entities, all throughout history. So I think that nationalism exists in various forms. In the contemporary world, it exists; it manifests itself as the nation-state. The nation-state is the biggest sort of or the most profound expression of nationalism as we understand it. But nationalism has evolved over time so I don't think that Islam is somehow separate or cannot exist. I think that Islam is operationalized in different spatial, temporal settings and they can vary so who is to say which one is pure Islam and which one is veering towards more nationalism. I think it's a hodge-podge and a complex mixture. JLS: I agree with you, although I think just the last thought that I'll close on which came to me as you were talking was that, and you sort of talked in the beginning about how the main split between Sunni and Shiite really happens after the prophet passes away and some people want Abu Bakr to take over as caliph but then others want Ali to take over as caliph and one of the main reasons for Ali was that he was in the family of the prophet, right? So in some ways we might say that for the Shiites the blood has always been a little bit more important than it was in the Sunnis. I know the Umayyads were also – I mean they were a Sunni type of regime if we can even talk about Sunnis existing back then. But they were on that side of the split, right? They believed the chain went through Abu Bakr and that was the legitimate right of succession.  But the Shiites think that there is something about being in the prophet's family that is very important, and there is this aspect of blood tied into the religion that maybe isn't there in Sunni Islam. KB: You are absolutely right. I would just sort of modify that quickly and say that for the Shia, leadership of the faith and the community and the Muslim community, the ummah is divinely ordained, so the imams, they are divinely ordained and they follow from the family of the prophet. Whereas Sunnis believe that this is a political position that comes about through political ways and in many ways it could be, some would argue it could be democratic, some could argue it comes with the power of who has the stronger military force. But ultimately, it's a political position for the Sunnis and a more religious position for the Shia. JLS: Yeah so if we were going to grossly over simplify, we might say something along the lines of Sunni Islam is more democratic whereas Shiite Islam tends to more nationalistic principles. KB: The Iranian government would beg to differ with us [laughs]. They would say that we have achieved a hybrid between religion and politics. We have elected officials, even our clerics have been popularly elected. I mean, they would make that assertion. JLS: Yes, but not the supreme leader, correct? KB: Not the supreme leader. Although they would argue that he could be removed by the Assembly of Experts, which is a body of popularly elected leaders or clerics. JLS: Well when they do that, we can talk about it. But in the meantime, Kamran thanks for joining us. It's always a pleasure. For listeners out there, thank you for listening. We're sorry we missed last week but we're back on and we are going to keep doing these once a week and maybe even increase them more. As always, if you have comments and critiques: comments@geopoliticalfutures.com or just leave comments here on Sound Cloud or whatever your medium you're listening to us through and we'll see you out there. Thanks.

This episode explores religious visions and dreams and night goddesses of old pagan Europe, all the while talking to Rabbi Justin Goldstein and a friend about how they understand those visions. https://www.facebook.com/dreamcatching dreamcatching.podcast@gmail.com@dreamcatching.podcast (IG) EPISODE SOURCES http://bibleresources.americanbible.org/resource/how-the-bible-came-to-us http://www.greatsite.com/timeline-english-bible-history/pre-reformation.html https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Quran https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Shia–Sunni_relations https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Tanakh https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Great_Assembly https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Masoretic_Text http://christopherpenczak.com/who-are-the-gods-part-1-monotheism-polytheism-archetypes/ http://www.theoi.com/Protogenos/Nyx.html http://www.theoi.com/Daimon/Oneiroi.html http://mossdreams.blogspot.com/2013/04/zeus-sends-deceptive-dream.html https://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_night_deities http://www.hinduhumanrights.info/polytheism-in-europe/

Katana will interview President of Pathways to PeaceFoundation, Brenda Naomi Rosenberg.Join us as we’ll discuss why it is important to:Put understanding others first and being heard second.Honor and respect the beliefs and views of others, especially when they are different than yours.Develop a new/tectonic relationship with tensionBrenda Naomi Rosenberg, first female Vice President of Fashion for J.L.Hudson Company, and Senior Vice President of Fashion Merchandising and Marketing for Federated Allied Department stores. Today, a full-time peace builder. Brenda is the recipient of over 18 awards for her trail blazing efforts: first Jewish woman to present a Ramadan sermon at an American mosque, served as a panelist on healing the Shia- Sunni divide, inspired and co-authoring the book Friendship & Faith, created Reuniting the Children of Abraham, a multi media tool kit for peace, and co authored with Samia Bahsoun Harnessing the Power of Tension. To learn more about Brenda Naomi Rosenberg go to www.BrendaNaomiRosenberg.com

The MyIndMakers team on this MyIndPodcast discusses the Netaji files. When should classified information be declassified? Is the nation ready to hear the truth? Are we ready to deal with the truth? We also discuss the fatwa on AR Rahman. Did he get caught in Shia-Sunni crossfire? Why did liberals sound hypocritical when defending him

Sometimes a shallow explanation, the kind you read in newspapers and hear on television, is enough. “The home team was beaten at the buzzer” is probably all you need to know. Sometimes, however, it’s not. The intermittent conflict between the Shias and Sunnis in Iraq (and elsewhere) provides a good example. It is just not sufficient to say, as the major news outlets often do, that the Shias are fighting the Sunnis in Iraq because the Shias were oppressed by the Sunnis under Saddam Hussein, a Sunni. If this is all you understand about the conflict, you do not understand it. And you need to understand it. To even begin to comprehend the Sunni-Shia conflict, you need to know how, out of one revelation, Islam broke into two major parts; how, in the course of time, multi-national empires integrated those parts under one ostensibly pan-Muslim writ; how European imperialist broke up those empires, with their Shia and Sunni parts, and out of them made “nation states” where there were no nations; how Arab nationalists attempted to remake these faux-nations and their Shia and Sunni parts along “international socialist” lines; how radical Islamists, fed up with the aforementioned Arab nationalists, launched a fundamentalist revolt within Islam; how one such group, having decided, bizarrely, that the United States was somehow at fault for the oppression of Muslim “true believers” in the Middle East, murdered 3000 innocent people (from all over the world and of all confessions, it should be said) on September 11, 2001; how, in response, the president and the congress of the United States ordered the invasion of two Middle Eastern states believed to have suborned the attack and international terrorism more generally; how those invasions, and the complete breakdown of law and order that followed them, provided an opportunity for Sunni and Shia militants to settle very old scores in what the Western press blandly calls a “sectarian conflict.” This is not a tale anyone can tell in a headline or even 500 words. So if you want to grasp the “whys” of the Sunni-Shia struggle, you need to look beyond The New York Times. Lesley Hazleton’s marvelous After the Prophet: the Epic Story of the Shia-Sunni Split (Doubleday, 2009) is an excellent place to start. In terms of historical trade-craft, Hazleton has done something quite remarkable: she’s told a complicated story in writerly, yet concise way. You won’t get lost (though the cast of characters is long) and you won’t tire (though the tale stretches over centuries). Moreover, the book is written with great understanding and sympathy. Hazelton allows us to share the feeling of frustration (and worse) that the early followers of the Prophet felt as they tried to work out what Islam would be in his absence. In so doing, she gives us a sense of their frustration (and worse) as they continue to do so in places like Iraq. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Vali R. Nasr discusses Shia-Sunni relations and the implications of the killing of Qasem Soleimani.