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The dollar has been the de facto global currency since World War II, pulling foreign investment into the US and allowing the federal government to borrow cheaply. A strong dollar also makes export-driven domestic industries less competitive, something the Trump administration is trying to offset through tariffs. A rumored “Mar-a-Lago Accord” would attempt to maintain the benefits of cheap borrowing while weakening the dollar. In this episode, we talk with Benn Steil, Senior Fellow and Director of International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, about the history behind the dollarization of global finance, the economic tradeoffs of sustained dollar strength, and how new policies could upend the dollar's role in the post-war financial system.
Panel Discussion at RV Capital's Annual Gathering in Engelberg on 12 January 2025 with Graham Rhodes, Yixin Li, Fred Lui and Sofia Hou. Show Notes Li Lu Talk referenced by Graham: https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/nwdP3GR-H8-m94NUnlsM-g Fred's letter on China: https://www.haydencapital.com/wp-content/uploads/Hayden-Capital-Quarterly-Letter-2021-Q2.pdf Blog referenced by Fred: https://www.baiguan.news/ Rob's book recommendation: "The Battle of Bretton Woods" by Benn Steil
In this episode we discuss The World That Wasn't: Henry Wallace and the Fate of the American Century by Benn Steil. Next time we will discuss Losing the Long Game: The False Promise of Regime Change in the Middle East by Philip H. Gordon.
bto - beyond the obvious 2.0 - der neue Ökonomie-Podcast von Dr. Daniel Stelter
bto#256 – Trotz aller diplomatischen Floskeln befinden sich die USA und China auf einem ökonomischen Kollisionskurs. China hält an der Strategie fest, wichtige Schlüsselindustrien zu erobern und setzt zur Überwindung der Wachstumsschwäche auf Exporte. Die USA (und mittlerweile auch die EU) sind nicht mehr bereit, die Exportüberschüsse abzunehmen und zuzusehen, wie bedeutende Industrien im Wettbewerb mit China nicht mehr bestehen können. Unabhängig davon, wie die Präsidentschaftswahl in den USA ausgeht, muss man fest davon ausgehen, dass sich der Handelskonflikt weiter verschärfen wird. Eine zentrale Rolle wird dabei der US-Dollar spielen, der zurzeit so stark ist wie seit Jahren nicht. Nicht nur Politiker der Republikaner sehen darin ein Problem.Daniel Stelter diskutiert mit dem amerikanischen Ökonomen Dr. Benn Steil, wie der US-Dollar auf die amerikanische Wirtschaft wirkt und welche Szenarien zu erwarten sind. Steil ist Direktor für internationale Wirtschaft beim Rat für Auswärtige Beziehungen in New York. Steil wurde mehrfach für seine Sachbücher ausgezeichnet und ist Gründer und Herausgeber der Zeitschrift International Finance. HörerserviceDie Studie von Bruegel zur Industriestrategie von China finden Sie hier. Neue Analysen, Kommentare und Einschätzungen zur Wirtschafts- und Finanzlage finden Sie unter www.think-bto.com. Den monatlichen bto-Newsletter abonnieren Sie hier.Sie erreichen die Redaktion unter podcast@think-bto.com. Wir freuen uns über Ihre Meinungen, Anregungen und Kritik.ShownotesHandelsblatt – Ein exklusives Angebot für alle „bto – beyond the obvious – featured by Handelsblatt”-Hörer*innen: Testen Sie Handelsblatt Premium 4 Wochen lang für 1 Euro und bleiben Sie zur aktuellen Wirtschafts- und Finanzlage informiert. Mehr erfahren Sie unter: https://handelsblatt.com/mehrperspektiven Werbepartner – Informationen zu den Angeboten unserer aktuellen Werbepartner finden Sie hier. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Today's episode explores one of the big counterfactuals of twentieth-century American politics: David talks to historian Benn Steil about how close the ultraliberal Henry Wallace came to being FDR's running mate in 1944 and successor as president in 1945. How near did Wallace get to making it onto the ticket at the 1944 Democratic National Convention? Who or what stopped him? What would his presidency have meant for the Cold War and the nuclear arms race? Was getting President Truman instead a missed opportunity or a lucky escape?Sign up now to PPF+ to get ad-free listening and all our bonus episodes: coming very soon a new bonus on Michel Houellebecq's explosive political fiction Submission www.ppfideas.com Next time: What if… the Vietnam War had ended in 1964? Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
In this episode we discuss The World Beyond Your Head: On Becoming an Individual in an Age of Distraction by Matthew B. Crawford. Next time we will discuss The World That Wasn't: Henry Wallace and the Fate of the American Century by Benn Steil.
With Jonah still MIA, Chris Stirewalt returns as Remnant guest host extraordinaire, joined by Benn Steil, director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, to discuss Steil's latest book and determine if the bizarreHenry Wallace was a noble man of the soil, an unsophisticated victim, or vindictive villain. To determine how Wallace changed the course of history, Stirewalt and Steil discuss the Soviet Union's duping of an Einsteinian genius, the cult of Nicholas Roerich, and why you should never slaughter 6 million pigs. Show Notes: — Chris' American Enterprise Institute page — Benn Steil's The World that Wasn't — Benn Steil's The Marshall Plan — Oliver Stone's The Untold History of the United States — Benn Steil and Elisabeth Harding's “The Farm Legacy of Henry Wallace: Regressive Subsidies” The Remnant is a production of The Dispatch, a digital media company covering politics, policy, and culture from a non-partisan, conservative perspective. To access all of The Dispatch's offerings—including Jonah's G-File newsletter, weekly livestreams, and other members-only content—click here Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Visit us at Network2020.orgThe International Financial Institutions (IFIs), including prominent entities like the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), have long been pillars of global economic stability and development. However, critics argue that these institutions were mainly designed after World War II, with structures that may not effectively address contemporary challenges such as climate change and social inequalities. Moreover, the emergence of a new era marked by the rivalry between the United States and China has further complicated matters. China's growing influence as a creditor, alongside its unique lending practices that diverge from traditional IFIs, presents novel challenges in addressing sovereign debt crises. As organizations like the World Bank and IMF grapple with these complexities, what reforms are needed to align IFIs with current global realities? How can these institutions navigate the geopolitical tensions between the U.S. and China while fulfilling their mandates? What role should the U.S. play in shaping the future of these institutions amidst evolving global dynamics? What are the perspectives of developing countries?Join us for a conversation between Dr. Daouda Sembene, Distinguished Non-Resident Fellow at the Center for Global Development and Former Executive Director of the International Monetary Fund; and Dr. Benn Steil, Senior Fellow and Director of International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations. The conversation is moderated by James Upton, Network 20/20's Board Member and former Chief Strategic Officer on the Emerging Markets Equity team at Morgan Stanley.
Heartland's Tim Benson is joined by Benn Steil, senior fellow and director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, to discuss his new book, The World That Wasn't: Henry Wallace and the Fate of the American Century. They discuss Wallace's brilliance as a geneticist, his odd obsession with mysticism, and his naivete toward the true nature of the Soviet Union and Soviet communism. They also chat about his collusion with Stalin during his run for the presidency in 1948 and how frequently he was manipulated by Soviet agents and assets during his entire tenure in government service. Get the book here: https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-World-That-Wasnt/Benn-Steil/9781982127824Show Notes:National Review: Amity Shlaes – “What if Henry Wallace Had Been President?”https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2024/04/what-if-henry-wallace-had-been-president/Wall Street Journal: Michael Barone – “‘The World That Wasn't' Review: When FDR Dumped Wallace”https://www.wsj.com/arts-culture/books/the-world-that-wasnt-review-when-fdr-dumped-wallace-9f93bb24Washington Examiner: Mark Melton – “Henry Wallace: The man who was almost (an awful) president”https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/premium/2892932/henry-wallace-the-man-who-was-almost-an-awful-president/Washington Free Beacon: Richard Norton Smith – “Midwest Mystic or Manchurian Candidate?”https://freebeacon.com/democrats/midwest-mystic-or-manchurian-candidate/Washington Post: George F. Will – “Roosevelt fixed his serious VP mistake. Will Biden?”https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/02/23/franklin-roosevelt-changed-running-mates/
Heartland's Tim Benson is joined by Benn Steil, senior fellow and director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, to discuss his new book, The World That Wasn't: Henry Wallace and the Fate of the American Century. They discuss Wallace's brilliance as a geneticist, his odd obsession with mysticism, and his naivete toward the true nature of the Soviet Union and Soviet communism. They also chat about his collusion with Stalin during his run for the presidency in 1948 and how frequently he was manipulated by Soviet agents and assets during his entire tenure in government service.Get the book here: https://www.simonandschuster.com/books/The-World-That-Wasnt/Benn-Steil/9781982127824Show Notes:National Review: Amity Shlaes – “What if Henry Wallace Had Been President?”https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2024/04/what-if-henry-wallace-had-been-president/Wall Street Journal: Michael Barone – “‘The World That Wasn't' Review: When FDR Dumped Wallace”https://www.wsj.com/arts-culture/books/the-world-that-wasnt-review-when-fdr-dumped-wallace-9f93bb24Washington Examiner: Mark Melton – “Henry Wallace: The man who was almost (an awful) president”https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/premium/2892932/henry-wallace-the-man-who-was-almost-an-awful-president/Washington Free Beacon: Richard Norton Smith – “Midwest Mystic or Manchurian Candidate?”https://freebeacon.com/democrats/midwest-mystic-or-manchurian-candidate/Washington Post: George F. Will – “Roosevelt fixed his serious VP mistake. Will Biden?”https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2024/02/23/franklin-roosevelt-changed-running-mates/
Benn Steil is an award-winning writer in the fields of finance, history, and biography. He is a senior fellow and director of international economics at the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations in New York. In this episode of the Serve to Lead podcast, Steil discusses his important new book, “The World That Wasn't: Henry Wallace and the Fate of the American Century.' He explains the ongoing significance of Henry Wallace to our understanding of a hinge point of history, with parallels to our current moment. Get full access to The Next Nationalism at jamesstrock.substack.com/subscribe
After the War, Britain was broke and broken – even broker than France. America was faced with a stark choice: invest billions in a shattered Europe or watch its citizens go hungry, or worse, Communist. So how did the Marshall Plan come to be? And what sort of Britain did it rebuild beyond the Welfare State? Ros Taylor talks to Benn Steil, director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York, and military historian Dr. Steph Hinnershitz about the aid package Britain needed, but wants to forget. Subscribe to Jam Tomorrow for a new episode every fortnight. • “A rubble heap, a charnel house, a breeding ground of pestilence and hate.” – Winston Churchill describes Europe after the War • “We grossly underestimated the destruction to the European economy by the War… Millions of people in the cities are slowly starving.” – William L Clayton, 1947 • “The State Department knew that if it didn't prop up Britain and take over her security responsibilities, we might be headed towards a Third World War.” – Benn Steil Written and presented by Ros Taylor. Produced by Jade Bailey. Original music by Dubstar. Managing Editor: Jacob Jarvis. Group Editor: Andrew Harrison. Jam Tomorrow is a Podmasters production Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Subscribe to The Realignment to access our exclusive Q&A episodes and support the show: https://realignment.supercast.com/REALIGNMENT NEWSLETTER: https://therealignment.substack.com/PURCHASE BOOKS AT OUR BOOKSHOP: https://bookshop.org/shop/therealignmentEmail Us: realignmentpod@gmail.comFoundation for American Innovation: https://www.thefai.org/posts/lincoln-becomes-faiBenn Steil, author of The World That Wasn't: Henry Wallace and the Fate of the American Century and Senior Fellow and Director of International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, joins The Realignment. Benn and Marshall discuss the origins of the Cold War and postwar U.S. foreign policy through the career of Henry Wallace, FDR's VP before Harry Truman. They discuss despite claims from critics of U.S. foreign policy like the director Oliver Stone, a Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union was inevitable.
Henry Wallace was President Franklin Roosevelt's vice president during his third term, 1941-1945. FDR then chose Harry Truman as vice president in his fourth and last term. In author Benn Steil's book "The World That Wasn't: Henry Wallace and the Fate of the American Century," he writes, "Wallace loved humankind but was mostly vexed or bored by humans…" Steil takes us through Wallace's life, from Iowa farm boy to presidential candidate on the Progressive ticket in 1948. Wallace preached the supremacy of human rights over property rights yet excused the absence of human rights in Russia. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
Henry Wallace was President Franklin Roosevelt's vice president during his third term, 1941-1945. FDR then chose Harry Truman as vice president in his fourth and last term. In author Benn Steil's book "The World That Wasn't: Henry Wallace and the Fate of the American Century," he writes, "Wallace loved humankind but was mostly vexed or bored by humans…" Steil takes us through Wallace's life, from Iowa farm boy to presidential candidate on the Progressive ticket in 1948. Wallace preached the supremacy of human rights over property rights yet excused the absence of human rights in Russia. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
With Biden Poised to Retaliate, Both the US and Iran Say They Don't Want a Wider War | In 1944 FDR Ditched VP Wallace For Truman, Should Biden Do the Same With Kamala Harris? | Bipartisan Outrage in the Senate Today at the CEOs of Meta, X, Snap, TikTok and Discord backgroundbriefing.org/donate twitter.com/ianmastersmedia facebook.com/ianmastersmedia
Enter the CFR book giveaway by February 13, 2024, for the chance to win one of ten free copies of The World That Wasn't: Henry Wallace and the Fate of the American Century by Benn Steil. You can read the terms and conditions of the offer here. Mentioned on the Episode Danny Rocco, Convention Benn Steil, The Battle for Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order Benn Steil, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War Benn Steil, The World That Wasn't: Henry Wallace and the Fate of the American Century Oliver Stone, The Untold Story of American History Henry Wallace, “Text of Wallace Letter to Stalin Calling for Peace Program,” New York Times For an episode transcript and show notes, visit The President's Inbox at: https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/henry-wallace-and-origins-cold-war-benn-steil
Historically Thinking: Conversations about historical knowledge and how we achieve it
Henry Wallace was an Iowan, an accomplished geneticist who hybridized corn; an entrepreneur who co-founded Pioneer Hi-Bred to produce seed, still an agricultural behemoth; the third-generation of editors of an influential American newspaper; a mystic who had a mysterious guru; and a “liberal philosopher”, according to no less an authority than Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He was also at various times Secretary of Agriculture, Secretary of Commerce, Vice President of the United States, and a third-party candidate for President of the United States in the 1948 election. Like America, Henry Wallace contained multitudes. With me today is Benn Steil, author of The World That Wasn't: Henry Wallace and the Fate of the American Century. Benn Steil is a Senior Fellow and Director of International Economics at the Council of Foreign Relations. His previous books have been on the Marshall Plan, and on the financial arguments focused upon the Bretton Woods conference. In this book we have yet another study examining the central moment of the twentieth century–both chronologically as well as in many other ways–but from the extraordinary and idiosyncratic point of view of Henry Wallace. For Further Investigation For more on Wallace's Midwestern ethos, see my conversations with Jon Lauck about the Midwest: here, way back in Episode 13 (!!!), and again in Episode 299: The Good Country Benn Steill's previous books are The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War, and The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order Henry Cantwell Wallace (1866-1924): Secretary of Agriculture, father of Henry Cantwell Wallace "A Magazine Called Wallace's Farmer" The connection between George Washington Carver, Henry Wallace, and Norman Borlaug
Zongyuan Zoe Liu, the Maurice R. Greenberg fellow for China studies, sits down with James M. Lindsay to discuss the causes and consequences of China's faltering economy. Mentioned on the Podcast “China's Economy Is Slowing. Here's Why That Matters,” Bloomberg Thomas Hale and Andy Lin, “Chinese Economy Falls Into Deflation as Recovery Stumbles,” Financial Times Zongyuan Zoe Liu, “Zero-COVID Is the Least of Xi's Economic Problems,” Foreign Policy Zongyuan Zoe Liu, “Beijing Needs to Junk Its Economic Playbook,” Foreign Policy Zongyuan Zoe Liu, “China's Pensions System Is Buckling Under an Aging Population,” Foreign Policy Zongyuan Zoe Liu and Benn Steil, “Xi's Plan for China's Economy Is Doomed to Fail,” Foreign Affairs For an episode transcript and show notes, visit us at: https://www.cfr.org/podcasts/chinas-economic-downturn-zongyuan-zoe-liu
Zongyuan Zoe Liu, fellow for international political economy at CFR, leads the conversation on global economics. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to today's session of the Fall 2022 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We're delighted to have Zongyuan Zoe Liu with us to talk about global economics. Dr. Liu is a fellow for international political economy at CFR. She previously served as an instructional assistant professor at Texas A&M's Bush School of Government and Public Service in Washington, D.C. And before that, she completed postdoctoral fellowships at the Columbia-Harvard China and the World program and the Center for International Environment and Research Policy at Tufts University. She served as a research fellow and research associate at many institutions—the Reischauer Center for East Asian Studies, NYU's Stern Center for Sustainable Business, and at the Institute for International Monetary Affairs in Tokyo. Dr. Liu is the author of Can BRICS De-dollarize the Global Financial System?, published by Cambridge University Press; and Sovereign Funds: How the Communist Party of China Finances its Global Ambitions, forthcoming in 2023 by Harvard University Press. So we will stay tuned for that. So, Dr. Liu, thank you very much for being with us. This is a very broad topic, but it would be great if you could give us your analysis of the state of the global economy today. LIU: Yeah, thank you very much, Irina, for inviting me to do this. I really, truly appreciate the opportunity to engage with our college and national universities, both the faculties and the students. This makes me feel I'm very much still part of the academia community. So thank you very much, Irina, and thank you, everybody, for tuning in today. So I wanted to begin by saying that as an economist one thing that I learned is that we are very bad at making forecasting. And, once that forecasting is already very bad, but—and forget about the long run. But that being said, I hope our conversation today can at least exchange some perspectives in terms of how we think about global economy and how we think about some policy-relevant natures. So the first—I will begin by saying two statement, and then I will delve into it. The first statement I would say that I'm afraid that geopolitics probably would make economic forecasting, which is already a very difficult business, but geopolitics would likely make this business even more difficult going forward. And this is because global economic prospect will be more influenced by geopolitics and geopolitical tensions, in addition to pure supply and demand. So that is to say, for our—all our college students and our graduate students, who are either pursuing a political science degree, international relations, or economics, or anybody who are vaguely interested in understanding global economics, now this is the time to realize, well, the models may not—the models had their limitations before, and their limitations are probably going to be even more pronounced going forward. The pure supply-demand dimensions—price is set in certain ways—probably are not necessarily going to go that way. One such example would be the European Union and the United States are considering putting a price cap on Russian oil. And what does that mean? That probably means, well, it almost feel like for a long period of time there was this global cartel called the OPEC or OPEC+. These are the so-called sellers' cartel. And they have the power, the monopolistic power almost, in terms of setting the price of oil in the global market. But now we are probably going to see the other part of the story, which is what about a global buyers' cartel? And that is essentially what a price cap means. So long story short, I think geopolitics would play a lot into our analysis of global economics forecasting going forward. And then my second sort of quick statement would be in terms of global economic status today. I would say the key—like, let me take a step back. When we think about economic development, we tend to think about factors of production. Like, for our—again, for our students who probably learned this at the beginning of the semester, this is the time to refresh your concept. But key factors of production—one is resource, the other is technology, and then the other is labor. In terms of resources, you can think about natural resources as well as capital. So these three fundamental factors of production, I would say, they are all going through a period of changes. And these changes are not necessarily in a good way. So that, long story short, a lot of the changes now in global economic conditions may not necessarily be good. And I'm happy to go into a detailed analysis of why resources are not necessarily changing in a good way, or technology, or in terms of labor and demographics. But I'm also happy to stop here and then sort of answer questions or explain further going forward as well. FASKIANOS: Great. We will go to all of you to ask your questions. (Gives queuing instructions.) So we already have a question. It's from Fordham University. Raised hand. So you're going to tell us—have to tell us who you are and unmute yourself, or accept the unmute prompt. There you go. Q: Can you hear me? FASKIANOS: Yes. Q: OK, great. Yes, so I'm a third-year student at Fordham University. My name is Valerie Bejjani. And my question for you, Dr. Liu, pertains to your paper—your Cambridge-published paper—about non-dollar alternatives, which I find very fascinating. And it made me think about something I read for an international political economy class about how Keynes first introduced a non-dollar alternative called the bancor during the Bretton Woods Conference, but the U.S. shot it down. So I was curious about your opinion on this, whether you think it was a mistake for the U.S. not to accept it, and what you think the implications—the historical implications are for BRICS countries today that are trying to devise their own non-dollar alternatives? LIU: Thank you very much, Valerie, for your great question. And I have to—since we're on the record—I just have to say, this is not a planted question. (Laughs.) And I very much appreciate that you've given me the opportunity to talk about the research that I did before. So just a quick background about that research that I did, I finished the research last year—yeah, last year in the summer, in July. So when I submitted my manuscript, there was a review process, right? And then that was the moment when not everybody were interested in SWIFT, in SPFS, in China's cross-border banking—Cross-Border Payment System, or CIPS. So a lot of these alphabetic soups that everybody here are familiar with now, last year before Russia's invasion of Ukraine nobody was even interested. And one of the reviewers was even telling—had a comment there saying that, well, you know, don't necessarily think that these are good examples that deserve to—so many real estate. (Laughs.) But and then my publisher somehow engineered it such that my—that Cambridge publication came out right on the day of Russia's invasion of Ukraine, which was—that was—as a researcher, you probably can never hope the timing in that way. So going back to your question, Valerie, I would say I highly appreciate that you raised the question. And I respect that—highly respect that you are already getting yourself familiarized with Keynesian and all the other historically speaking alternative monetary system or monetary concept as well. So that's all good. So keep doing what you are doing now and I look forward to continuing our conversation going forward. So your question, if I understand it correctly, so is it a good idea for the United States to shut it down, right? So I mean, if I were—I was obviously not in the policymaking room in those days, but I can certainly understand why the United States would want to maintain the dollar's dominant currency status in the global financial system. That's because if you are able to—if the dollar were the dominant currency, in the existing dollar—in the existing global financial system, that basically means on the one hand we can issue debt cheaply. And that literally means the U.S. Treasury is the proxy for risk re-asset. That has huge implications not just for our government debt and our physical expenditure. It also has a tremendous amount of stabilizing factor for our domestic financial institutions and the expansion of our banks in the international market. So from both public perspective and the international perspective, those are good. And the United States has, from a policymaking perspective, all our financial policymakers had their right to shut it down. Now, but if you ask this question from an alternative perspective—say, if you ask the question for—to, let's say, Bank of England Governor Mark Carney—former governor. If you ask him, he would probably tell you, well, this is a terrible idea that the United States would shut it off, because he specifically said in 2019 at the Jackson Hole symposium, when all the major central bankers were gathered in the big hall and talking about monetary policies, he was the one standing in front of everybody saying that, well, it's a terrible idea to have one single currency, which is the U.S. dollar, to dominate the global financial and monetary system. That is the reason why the system is not stable, hence we need to have an alternative system. Like a basket currency or something like that. So, if you ask people like him, he would be—like, be in favor of the diversity—of a more diversified global monetary system. And again, if you ask the countries like China or, for that matter, Russia or Iran, they would be way much more in favor of a much more diversified monetary system as well. And that may not necessarily, from, exchange rate perspective, exchange rate risk is an important aspect, but the more important aspect probably is from the geopolitical hegemonic power of the U.S. dollar. Which means, the U.S. sanctioning power really resides in the dollar being the dominant currency. So right now, we hear about U.S. can sanction Russia, sanction other countries. How that is being executed, it is literally being executed by our banks no longer processing the bank transactions of all the Russian banks. Hence, when people talk about kicking Russia off the SWIFT system, it's not just that the transaction cannot go out. It literally means in practice nobody can send a message with Russian banks. Like, there was no communication. So the entire dollar system is based upon the SWIFT system, which 90 percent of the messaging to process the transactions are using dollar. And then, because the expansive power of our U.S. banks, it literally means all international trade literally has to be settled—the settlement has to be done by U.S. bank, who has U.S. dollars. And in order to access that transaction mechanism, only SWIFT can get the job done. You also have to literally tap into either the Fedwire System or the CHIPS system, which is the clearinghouse system based here in New York. So in order for this whole system—in order to have this whole system to make your dollar payment work, you literally have to maintain on the one hand a connection, on the other hand have connections with the dollar settlement system. And that's why when Russia was kicked out of SWIFT, a lot of other countries who are not necessarily on the good side of the United States started to get worried because people used to think, well, kicking somebody—kicking some banks off the SWIFT system is almost the financial version of a nuclear bomb. It's the nuclear option of cutting somebody from the international financial system, of which the U.S. dollar is the dominant currency, the primary invoicing currency as well. And then on the other hand, lesson learned from this sanction experience, especially from the perspective of China, is that, well, previously we've already laid out a lot of this planning system—meaning the infrastructure used to internationalize the renminbi, such as the China—the China's CIPS system. Policymakers inside China started to wonder, well, since the planning is already there, it's not too much to ask just to add additional function. So the previously, from a functional-wise, China's renminbi payment infrastructure is really not about bypassing sanctions, because in my research I realized when—I interviewed people who actually participated in the designing of the system. And I remember talking to three people on three different occasions, and they all mentioned one point, which is without the CIPS system, the international using of renminbi, really—the user experience was really, really terrible. And the reason it was terrible was simply because there are more than two thousand of small and medium-size banks in China. You are familiar with the big four—ICBC, Bank of China and all that—but those are the major banks. More Chinese bank—more than two thousand of the smaller Chinese banks, they don't have a direct connection with the SWIFT system. Which basically means in order to make transactions across border, it really takes time and the cost of transactions are extremely high. Therefore, in order to improve user experience, they literally had to design a system that can facilitate this cross-border transaction. But when geopolitics plays into it, especially since 2018 when U.S.-China trade war started to get really escalated to a higher level, a lot of those conversations started domestically. And then Russia's invasion of Ukraine really accelerated this whole process. So I hope that sort of give you a broader—it's a long answer, but I hope that gives you a deeper understanding of what has been going on, and what are the—what are the instrument—the functions of the instrument. FASKIANOS: Fantastic. I'm going to take a written question from Abraham—he goes by Abe—Borum. Dr. Liu, you mentioned OPEC within the context of NATO and the U.S. efforts to limit Russia energy policy. What are the second- to third-order effects on other sectors of global markets? And Abe is a graduate student at the National Intelligence University. LIU: Abe, that's a great question, I have to say. And I would strongly encourage everybody here, especially our undergrad and graduate students—to think not just the first-order or direct impact, but also the second-order effect. So I appreciate this question, because then you give me a little bit opportunity to elaborate on why I think on the natural resource aspect our global economy is not necessarily heading towards the right direction. So just tie back into Abe's question to begin with, right now since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the hydrocarbon prices, and more specifically oil prices, oil prices have been increasing. Although in recent—in recent weeks, it has relatively been stabilized a little bit, but it's still way much higher than pre-pandemic, that would be 2019, right, Irina? 2019, right? (Laughs.) My timeline is all blurred. So I checked this morning, price might have changed slightly. But when I checked it this morning Brent today, this morning when I checked, it was trading about $88 per barrel. And remember in 2019 what the price was? That was something around—the average price in 2019, that was $64. So we are literally talking about more than $20 per barrel more expensive. And then WTI, that is, what, U.S. benchmark, right? WTI was trading at $96 per barrel – close to 96 (dollars). Like 95.99, something like that. And in 2019, Brent was trading on average $57 per barrel. So close to double. So higher energy prices, that basically would directly translate into higher production costs across the board for energy—because every sector need energy, whether it is electricity, whether it is other types of energy. So it directly translate into higher electricity prices. This is important for the United States. This is very relevant for the European Union as well. So higher production costs would literally raise the price of the output. And that is going to further exacerbate the inflationary pressure. And that is going to make the Federal Reserve, and the ECB, and the Bank of England measures to curb inflation even more difficult. And then on the other hand, I also wanted to mention that right now the added layer of geopolitics making this even more difficult. We already see this happening, which is, Biden made his trip to Saudi Arabia, but it did not get the intended consequence or intended result, which is trying to get Saudi Arabia and OPEC in general to stabilize the global oil market. And OPEC+, about a week ago, decided that they are going to cut their production by about two million barrels per day. That is about the daily consumption of, I believe it's China, or something like that. So from that perspective, by limiting production, that is going to further—that is from a pure supply/demand perspective, right? If we hold supply—we hold demand constant and if you reduce the supply, that is going to further raise the upward pressure for the prices. So geopolitics is probably going to further put upward pressure for the prices as well. And then finally, the final point I would want to make there is that right now OPEC countries—OPEC+ countries in particular—they might be—have this existential threat, which is the net zero transition. Right now, what is most valuable for Russia, or for Iran, for UAE, for Saudi Arabia—their most valuable export comes from hydrocarbon. It could be oil. It could be natural gas. So in the long run, when the entire global economy moved to zero dependence on hydrocarbon, that basically means for Russia—that's probably more close to 70 percent of their GDP and government revenue. That is going to be gone. Think about how the Russian economy can make up that much amount of revenue in the short run? That's very difficult to think about, especially these days. And this can be applied for countries like Saudi Arabia as well. Therefore, these countries—these hydrocarbon-exporting countries—they have this existential threat. Which is their most valuable export might become no longer valuable in the long run. So that's why they are—they are inherently very interested in carving a closer relationship and, more importantly, a relatively stable relationship with their stable buyers. And the buyers these days are going to not necessarily be the United States because, you've heard all these stories about the U.S. are energy independent and so on and so forth. But, you know, we can—that's a different story. And when people say U.S. is very largely energy independent, there are so many reasons that argument can be rebutted. But let me just say, U.S. does not necessarily consume a lot of energy from—exported by Saudi Arabia. But who does? China and India. So right now, China's largest energy—in terms of volume—largest energy supplier is Russia. But in terms of pure monetary value that China actually pays, and the largest receiver of Chinese money for energy, that is Saudi Arabia. Therefore, earlier this year you probably read the news about Saudi Arabia might consider allowing renminbi to pay for Saudi oil. There might be more opportunity in there, because they might be very interested, especially MBS, because of all his behaviors, might expose a lot of the Saudis individuals under U.S. sanctions. And on the other hand, China already established a renminbi denominated oil futures market. And that—although, the volume today is relatively—the volume today is relatively low, but the growth is very rapidly. So if all these major oil-exporting countries hypothetically—if they decided to suddenly switch their—the pricing of their oil overnight into renminbi instead of the dollar, we could potentially see the dollar's pricing power and invoicing power in global trade would be diminished. And that is because the infrastructure, the facility is already there. Although the volume of renminbi-denominated oil futures is still relatively low, the plumbing is there. And once you have the plumbing there, there is no way to go back. So now what the United States should do is to make sure that everybody is still very much interested in maintaining the existing dollar-based system and maintaining the pricing of commodity using U.S. dollar. And that brings in the discussion about putting an oil price to Russian oil instead of just a wholesale sanction of Russian oil. As long as we are putting a price cap to it, that basically means we are—yes, we are hurting Russian export, but still we are allowing Russian oil flowing into the international market. That still makes the dollar's pricing power in global commodities relevant. So from that perspective, I think it's the right move to preserve the dollar system. But on the other hand, those countries that are not—again, not necessarily on the geopolitical good side of the United States, they do have the intention to hedge against the risk of being sanctioned. And they need the—they need buyers to buy whatever that they have are valuable today. I hope that makes sense to you. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. I'm going to take the next question, a spoken question, from Dr. Seebal Aboudounya, an associate lecturer at the University of College London. You can correct me on the pronunciation of your name. Q: Yes. Hi. The pronunciation is perfect. Thank you very much. So I have two students here from the international public policy program. And they would like to ask questions. So I will just hand over to them. Thank you. Q: Hi, professor. I'm Cici and I'm a graduate student from UCL. I'm really glad you can give me a speech and answer my questions. And I want to ask questions about Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). As we all know, that Belt and Road Initiative has employment more than ten years, since 2013. And it seems as the most important foreign policy for China and their President Xi. And it has already achieved many success. So I want to ask, what's the core purpose of Belt and Road Initiative, and how can we evaluate it? And do the countries in BRI view it in a positive or a negative way? Thank you. Q: Thank you very much. And the second student will now ask a question. Q: Hi, Doctor. My question is, what's the future of global economy under the impact of Ukraine war, China-U.S. competition, and COVID-19? Thank you. Q: Thank you very much. LIU: All right. Thank you very much, Professor Aboudounya. And let me just being with the first question from Cici, right? Thank you very much, Cici, for asking this important question. And I'm so glad that you are asking something about BRI, because I do think it's important for people to understand this whole Chinese initiative. You are absolutely right that the BRI is a very important Chinese foreign policy initiative. And I would even say that the BRI is—or, the Belt and Road Initiative—is Chinese President Xi Jinping, his signature foreign policy initiative during his first two terms. Now he just recently got his—as the general secretary of the party—he just got this third term. So we'll see how BRI being played out going forward. But at least during his first term as the president of China and as the party general of the Chinese Communist Party, that was his signature foreign policy initiative, or grand strategy, if you will. So in terms of what it is and how we think about it, those are great questions. So there are very simple answer to say—to describe what BRI is. You can think about it as a global-spanning infrastructure project. So that's what it looks like. If you just put—if you just—if we have an Excel spreadsheet and we just look at, at least all the—every single project that BRI has been doing, it's really about infrastructure. And more specifically, more than 70 percent of BRI infrastructure projects are related to energy, are energy-related infrastructure projects. Therefore, you can also think about BRI as infrastructure orientated and combined with the idea of establishing China's access to global energy resources. And then, if you think about it from China's domestic perspective, why Xi Jinping decided to start this BRI initiative and what are the connections of the BRI with previous Chinese policies? I would say the reason—fundamental reason why Xi Jinping started this BRI was because of the fundamental domestic problem which is the overcapacity in China's production sector, especially steel, concrete, and a lot of these infrastructure-related sectors. And that takes place after global financial crisis, and then China's spending four trillion—four trillion yuan to stimulate its economy, and it created the major overcapacity issue at home. And the international economy—or international demand or demand from outside of China was not enough—or especially the Western market like United States or European market, they were not growing as fast to be able to absorb China's overcapacity. Therefore China really have to think about how to distribute in a broader global market to solve its overcapacity issue. So Xi Jinping, in one of his meetings, he had this saying—and I think it's very revealing, so I quote him. So he did say this, and I translate it, obviously, into English. So he said: Our overcapacity problem might be other countries—might be beneficial to other countries. In other word, we are producing a lot of this stuff that we do not use, and we are losing money. But if we are able to sell it to other countries, that might be good for them and good for us, as well. So that was—could we—if we give him the benefit of the doubt, is that a good way—is that a good intent? Sure. If we give him the benefit of the doubt, if everything he implemented perfectly, that could be mutually beneficial. And indeed, if you look at all these BRI forums or BRI summit, a lot of these are related to improve their connectedness, solve overcapacity issue, and even BR specific government-to-government level industrial production coordination fund. In other word, if government are establishing lots of money to coordinate—so much you are going to produce, how much I am supposed to produce. The idea is really to tackle the problem of overcapacity. But again, reality when you are looking at how this is being implemented, nowadays it varies. There's a very good Rhodium Group report that you probably—if you just google Rhodium Group BRI, they have this report analyzing the BRI lending. And that's where BRI really come into—really encountered a lot of problem. So you are probably familiar with the whole narrative of the data trap, so depending upon who you are talking to—so if you talk with—if you talk to Chinese project managers, or if you talk to Professor Deborah Bräutigam at SAIS/Johns Hopkins who runs the China Africa Research Initiative—if you talk to folks like them, they might tell you, well, you know, it's really not about the data trap but really speaks to the fact that China is really, really inexperienced in terms of the development finance and in terms of lending, and that the reason is that they really have a limited capacity to do, on the one hand, the environmental impact assessment. Many of these—you will be shocked. Many of these projects they do not even have a real environmental impact assessment. And on the other hand, because a lot of these lendings are directly being lent out by Chinese policy banks—and more specifically, if you look at Africa, that would be China import and export bank, they have a limited capacity to evaluate all these business plans. And I remember talking to a project manager in Mali, so I asked him, have you interacted with all those folks on how you do your—how you do your bidding in order to get the money. So this person, he was very frank with me, and he said, well, I understand how the—I understand how they want the number to look like in order to give me the loan, so I just cook the numbers so that I can get the loan. In other word, there is not necessarily an internally robust risk management process in getting out of these loans. Therefore, am I surprised to see that so much of Chinese—so much of China's BRI loan now are in trouble, like in countries like Zambia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and a couple of others. So am I—am I surprised about that? I'm not surprised because if you followed this and if you realized that there is a lack of the internal risk management process, that's the result you are going to get. And it is also because of the debt, combined with the contract term, which is when you are signing a contract like—it's like, I go to the bank and I say, I am Zoe, and I bank with Charles Schwab or Bank of America. Hey, I'm going to buy a house, so how about you lend me the money. This is literally the way how contract negotiating works. And then, guess what? The banks are going to say, hey, Zoe, I do not know who you are, although you look like a good person. I do not want to lend you the money at this rate. I'm going to lend you the money, and you have to put down a collateral. So collateral is the idea that, in case I, Zoe, can no longer pay back my loan, I literally have to give up some sort of tangible asset to the bank. Now in the case of Sri Lanka, that was what happened to Hambantota. So long story short, is that combined with the collateralization of this BRI debt really feeds this debt trap narrative because, well, if it looks like you are setting the countries up to debt, and you are collateralizing their critical infrastructures, this looks like debt trap to many observers. So I can't—I have a lot of sympathy to this debt trap narrative, but really, when we think about BRI debt and how BRI is being implemented, we really need to think about two sides: on the one hand, the policy side; and the other side is really about implementation, because without implementation the policies are only a piece of paper, isn't it? So, I really encourage you to look more specifically into the details, and if you are interested in learning more about BRI, there are a lot of data set that are available. On the one hand, William & Mary—William & Mary have the aid data. If you just google William & Mary and google aid data, you will see their entire data related to BRI. And then the other website that—I would have to say, my colleague and I here at the Council, we have this BRI tracker. My colleague Benn Steil, he run—he had this BRI tracker. So you can take a look at that. And then the Council also published a BRI report last year—last year, right, Irina? We have a BRI Task Force report, so definitely check that out. And then finally there is also Boston University has the global policy institute. They have this China—they have a specific China-oriented research team, and they have—they also run seminars occasionally, and webinars—you can sign up for it and you can have access to their research. We also have this BRI data, so make sure that you check those out so that you can look at all the contract, you can look at what are the—where exactly—at what level project are being implemented. I hope that sort of covered the ground for that with BRI. And then go back to the other question—the other question about the future of global economy, especially the impact on Ukraine. I really appreciate this question as well because it's—it's really dear to my heart, too, and the research in itself is dear to my heart and to many of my colleagues here at the Council. And then, on the other hand, we also—everybody are surprised about how fast and how coherent the sanctions on Russia were able to take place. It used to be like—I myself included—like when the Europeans decided—the European Union decided, basically the next day after—following the U.S. sanctions, they basically decided that they are going to do the same. I was like, oh, gee, looking across the Atlantic, I don't think I understand you guys. It almost feel like you guys could never agree on anything anytime soon, but now, it's like overnight there is this agreement on sanction of Russia. I feel like, oh, this is unprecedented. So from that perspective, I do think the—Russia's war on Ukraine, it reunited the U.S. alliance system, and from economic perspective, I think it's very important in the sense that a lot of the economic differences that we used to have—for example, the Eurozone or, in particular, the ECB might have interest in letting the euro play a bigger role in the global system and all that. So a lot of these are—a lot of these disagreement are going to be surpassed by the priority, which is to address Russia's aggression in Ukraine. And then on the other hand, we are also seeing that, yes, European Union, despite of their heavy dependence on Russian oil and gas—and Russian gas in particular, they are willing to participate in setting a deadline to say by this—by the end of this year we are going to phase out Russia's—our dependence on Russian energy. And in that context, it is good for American energy industry in the sense that we can—here in the United States we can—in the context of making sure that our domestic energy security is secured, right, or we can't export our LNG to our—to meet the need of our European allies. So that is another good aspect of it, and then in terms of—and then finally, I would—along the line of energy I would also say this probably is also going to accelerate the transition to net zero in terms of technology and putting more resources into this technology related to energy transition. That might be related to hydrogen. Canada is already exporting its hydrogen energy to Germany and German trains are now—some German trains are now run on hydrogen power. It would be cool to check it out—how it looks, right? So that means, from energy perspective at least we are seeing the realignment of this energy supply, energy demand dynamic. And because energy is so important for production and for energy growth, that is sort of a stabilizing factor. But that being said, still we are not—I am not saying that the Europeans aren't going to—are no longer having problems. And the Europeans are still going to have problems and the IMF revised downward European growth prospect next year. They downgraded to—even further to a lower point. I believe it's point—it used to be—it used to be about 1.3 in the energy outlook earlier in July, but I think this time—a few days ago when I checked again, there are new economic outlook. They've revised it down for EU—European advanced economies that it was revised down to .06 percent growth. From that perspective combined with high inflation, literally we are seeing that Europe—the advanced European economies—or broadly speaking, Eurozone as a whole—probably are going to head towards, maybe recession is a very, very harsh word, but it definitely going to run into serious economic troubles. So in the long run, this is not a good—this is not good looking. And in the short run, at least, this is not good looking, right, and in the—if we broaden the horizon back, focusing on the economy. Another factor that constrained European growth are, in particular, let's say, the major powerhouses like Germany. A critical part of that is, they are suffering from two issues. One is their cost of electricity is simply too high, and I'm talking about this relative to—it's much higher than the United States for sure, but they are not—they are much higher than China, as well. So China energy per kilowatt is in the magnitude of 0.002 or 0.003 magnitude. And where is Germany? Germany is something like ten times of that. We are talking about .38 per kilowatt. So that basically means if your fundamental electricity cost is high, and when energy price goes up higher, electricity price is also going to go up high, and then your entire manufacture industry is going to face a higher cost. And that, combined with demographic challenges, refugee challenges, it simply means that the government are going to have a whole lot of difficult time to deal with their expenditures. So again, both from energy perspective, from cost-of-production perspective, from the demographic perspective—aging population, refugee problem—and on top of that you probably would also have to think of—take care of the aging population, meaning added social welfare costs and pension costs, so those are—those mean slowing economy, especially on advanced economies, are not necessarily looking nice. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to go next to Isaac Alston-Voyticky, who has written a question but also said, happy to ask it, so why don't you unmute yourself, please, and give us your affiliation. Q: Hello, my name is Isaac Alston-Voyticky. I am at CUNY School of Law and CCNY's Colin Powell School. I am actually graduating this semester, so—(laughs)—anyway, so my question is you posed the three classic core components of economics. Would you think in the modern day, given the immaterial nature of so much of our global market and marketplace, that knowledge as the foundation of neoclassical economics, plays an equal role as a component of modern economics? And I mean that obviously in the concept that knowledge is known, unknown, real, surreal, and unreal, of course. But also, to your first kind of opening point when you said that, you know, it's really hard for economists to model out and do predictions. When we talk about improving data sets and analysis across like IPE, international affairs, you know, implementation of international law, one of the issues we have is a lot of our economic models are still too variable-based, and that we haven't really gone past that. So if we think about it from the quantum computing, we have X, Y, Z, and T, and that's just your bare, you know, next level. And I would imagine we can do that if we find the right components so, hopefully—and, I mean, I don't know what kind of answer you have, but I'm very interested to hear. LIU: Yeah, Isaac, first of all, congratulations for getting—you are in CUNY, right? And so you are right here in the neighborhood, so you know—right? So feel free to—feel free to, on the one hand definitely check out our award-winning website, and then if me or our colleagues could be of help, just feel free to stop by. And so these are two great questions obviously, and you touch upon a lot of the complaints and the frustrations that I have with modeling—(laughs)—right? So the first question, knowledge, I fully agree with you that so far our economic models have not been able to fully appreciate, or fully absorb, or fully model the role of knowledge; for that matter, even finance. Finance, at least has this term called the intangible asset when you are evaluating a firm, and therefore your mergers and acquisitions, you pay the so-called goodwill based upon how much you value the intangible asset; meaning like knowledge, expertise, and so on, so forth—so patent and all that. So from that perspective, I think the knowledge is definitely going—knowledge is definitely going to be extremely more important going forward, and I say that both—from three aspects. The first is knowledge can improve the quality of your human resources, which touch upon basically the labor force which reverts back to one of our three factors of production. And then knowledge also is necessary for technology, and that is another factor of production. And then finally the other would be knowledge, technology, and other resources. So resources, there is capital and non-capital, meaning natural resource and all that. And there are—then the confounding factor of knowledge is being played more here because better financial expertise—well, obviously, depending upon how you use it, but sometimes, financial expertise tend to run itself in trouble. It outsmart itself; it's not necessarily good. But if we are able to—if we have better knowledge about financial market, about our debt—I go back to your second question—better data about financial market and better knowledge to improve our use of natural resources or the efficiency—improve the efficiency. Or the next day, if we all have a battery and move toward renewables—these are going to be extremely—go back to the Schumacher model—these are going to be extremely disruptive, but in a very good way. But the reason I am cautious about, you know, we may not necessarily going there overnight is because, on the one hand—technology R&D takes some time, it's expensive, but then on the other hand, it's just in the processing, the implementation part. It's really—a lot of geopolitical factors plays into it because when we think about knowledge, knowledge and the technology, those are the things that we tend to think they tend to diffuse themselves, like knowledge—you exchange knowledge, and that's the foundation of new knowledge being created. You stand on the giant's shoulders, right? Knowledge and technology tend to diffuse itself, and right now what we are observing is, on the one hand, there are a lot of—there are a lot of export controls towards certain countries, and then on the other hand, countries like China are also—are trying very hard to lower the cost of the relatively cheaper technology, right, or the less advanced technology. And that basically means if a country can or—especially a country like China can quickly achieve economies of the scale, are able to find an alternative that is cheaper but at a lesser technology, but will still get the job done, then probably that—in the short term, it can service China and also service a lot of developing economies. But for a country like China, that is not necessarily good in the long run. And then on top of that, because of export controls, because of a lot of geopolitical tensions between China and the rest of the world, but the long-run trajectory over China's indigenous development capacity is still there; China's people—there are still U.S.-trained Chinese scientists going back to China, but it is going to tremendously slow China down and making it very difficult and very costly. So if we think that, for the past forty years or so—or for the past twenty years since China joined WTO, if we believe that cheap Chinese goods tend to be—tend to benefited the rest of the world in many ways, then a slowed-down Chinese economy is bad news for the global economy, probably more true than not. China is the largest trading partner for more than 120 countries in the world, so if Chinese economy slow down, that have major ramifications for the rest. And then go back to your second question with regard to, you improve the database and in terms of modeling the limitations—that's a frustration that I have nowadays. Yes, the model themselves—oftentimes I go into a meeting, listen to a talk—especially in the econ papers, the econ paper would begin with—it's very sterilized. You begin with assumptions, and then you talk about your independent variables, your dependent variables. Right now we are really in a world where your independent variables can be—your independent variables might be suddenly changed because of geopolitics, or because of some disruptive technology, or simply because supply chain means you used to be able to get rare earth, but then if you are Japan in 2007, you were no longer able to get rare earth reliably from China. So those are going to significantly shift your calculation. Therefore I would say, I really don't have a good answer in terms of how to improve at researcher perspective, but hopefully, as you said, quantum computing, artificial intelligence might help us to get as much better information as possible. But that being said, quantum—a lot of these quantum computing and artificial intelligence is—it used to be the case that a lot of statistics are garbage in, garbage out. Hopefully, our AI and the quantum computing, as we train themselves, they can learn better than the human beings. I'm not exactly comfortable about saying that, but that's my hope. FASKIANOS: I have some—a written question from Todd Barry, adjunct professor at Hudson County Community College in New Jersey. Is it possible that China would turn inwards and switch an economy to import substitution industrialization, producing all goods domestically, without imports, like Latin America tried to in the 1970's? LIU: Right, that's a great question, and when you were asking that I was immediately thinking about the Chile and its car industry. And that was a disaster. The East Asian model, in terms of the import substitution—that's the East Asian miracle, especially applicable to, Singapore, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea to a certain extent, as well. In the case of China I would say I would be really hesitant to—in retrospect if we have this conversation twenty years down the road, I would be really, really—I would be really sad to realize that this year is the moment—or October is the—October 2022 is the moment when China started to turn inward because that is going to be disastrous for China's long-term growth. China's decade-long of double-digit growth benefitted from an open economy, benefitted from being able to trade with the rest of the world, and the United States actually welcomed China into the global system. Therefore I would be very, very sad to see this is the moment. Now is there a—is there the risk? I do see the risk, and I do see the narrative there, especially with President Xi Jinping's emphasis on domestic circulation. If you think—I would argue—in my latest publication with the CFR.org, I made this argument to say the important—the dual circulation, especially the domestic circulation, it is a departure from previous going-on strategy because going out is starting from Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao. These are really the idea of prioritizing the international market. It's really about using international market to develop the Chinese economy. And dual circulation is a departure from that. It's not to totally abandon globally—the global market, but it really is—it prioritizes domestic market: domestic demand, domestic supply, domestic technology and—domestic technological innovation capacity, and making international market relatively supplementary. And if even—and Xi Jinping even—if Xi Jinping even intend to make the international market more dependent on China's domestic market, meaning making the rest dependent more on China. So there is the narrative there. However, in practice, I don't—I don't see how Chinese companies are able to do this because the Chinese company—a lot of Chinese companies, especially multinational Chinese companies, they still need to have access to global capital, global technology. And although it becomes—especially on the technology side has become increasingly difficult. But it is to the benefit of the Chinese company, Chinese people, and China's long-term growth potential to maintain an open economy. But there is the chance that might not happen, and if we think—if we do believe that Xi Jinping has a timeline with reference to Taiwan, then he—obviously, if there is a war breaking out, then obviously there will be consequences, and we can imagine Western sanctions, and that basically means the Chinese economy is going to be severely isolated from the global system. So from that perspective, right now a lot of these zero-COVID policies are very much—the way that I think about it is it could be interpreted as it's a drill, or it's a preparation to make sure that China is developing internal capacity to be able to absorb as much sanction shock as possible. But I don't think that—I do not think Xi Jinping is going to make up a decision and going to make a move to Taiwan, say, tomorrow. As long as we can kick the can down the road, I think that's good. FASKIANOS: Out of time, and I am sorry to say that we couldn't get to all the questions, but we appreciate it. Zoe did mention a few resources that our task force on the Belt and Road Initiative, as well as the Belt and Road tracker—we dropped the link in the chat, but we'll also send a follow-up note with links to some of those things. She also does a lot of writing on CFR.org In Briefs and articles, so you should go to CFR.org. And you can follow her on Twitter at @zongyuanzoeliu. So I encourage you all to do that. This has been a terrific hour, so thank you again, Zoe. We appreciate it. LIU: Thank you, Irina, for having me. And I really do appreciate this opportunity to engage with every participant here. If I did not get a chance to answer your questions, or if you have other questions, just feel free to reach out to Irina or feel free to reach out to me. We are here, and the Council really appreciate and the—really appreciate the colleges and student, and the Council actually—we do a lot of stuff related to education, you know—not just at a college level. We also do at high-school level— FASKIANOS: High school— LIU: —middle-school level, and even—we also even have games for kids. So if you haven't tried those out yet, just try it out. FASKIANOS: Thank you, Zoe. So our next academic webinar will be on Wednesday, November 9, at 1:00 p.m. (EST) with Lauren Kahn, who is here at the Council, on military innovation and U.S. defense strategy. And again, I just wanted to shout out. We have our CFR fellowships application deadline for educators is available. You can check it out at CFR.org/fellowships. The deadline is October 31 so it's right around the corner. Follow us at @CFR_Academic. And again, go to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org. So thank you all for being with us. Have a great rest of your day. (END)
In this special episode of The World Next Week, Heather A. Conley, president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, joins James M. Lindsay and Robert McMahon to discuss the books they recommend reading, the books they're looking forward to reading, and the podcasts they're listening to for fun this summer. (This is a rebroadcast.) Read more about Jim, Bob, and Heather's picks on Jim's blog, The Water's Edge. Jim's Picks Michael Mandelbaum, The Four Ages of American Foreign Policy (2022) Richard Cohen, Making History: The Storytellers Who Shaped the Past (2021) Laszlo Montgomery, The China History Podcast, Teacup Media Bob's Picks Catherine Belton, Putin's People (2020) Honorée Fanonne Jeffers, The Love Songs of W.E.B Du Bois (2021) Cynthia Graber and Nicola Twilley, Gastropod, Vox Media Podcast Network Heather's Picks Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and How America Helped Rebuild Europe (2007) Patrick Radden Keefe, Say Nothing: A True Story of Murder and Memory in Northern Ireland (2018) Todd Schulkin, Inside Julia's Kitchen, Heritage Radio Network Additional Books, Podcasts, and Shows Mentioned on the Podcast Karen Dewisha, Putin's Kleptocracy (2014) Aaron L. Friedberg, Getting China Wrong (2022) Joseph Marion Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (1965) Michael Kimmage, The Abandonment of the West (2020) Sebastian Mallaby, The Power Law (2022) George Mitchell, Making Peace (1999) Yascha Mounk, The Great Experiment (2022) Benn Steil, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War (2019) Ali Wyne, America's Great-Power Opportunity (2022) Heather A. Conley, “How Will Biden Handle Russia?” The President's Inbox, December 1, 2020 David Crowther, The History of England Mike Duncan, The History of Rome Jamie Jeffers, The British History Podcast Michael Mandelbaum, “America's Rise to Power,” The President's Inbox, May 7, 2022 Robin Pierson, The History of Byzantium Julia, HBO Max (2022)
In this special episode of The World Next Week, Heather A. Conley, president of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, joins James M. Lindsay and Robert McMahon to discuss the books they recommend reading, the books they're looking forward to reading, and the podcasts they're listening to for fun this summer. Read more about Jim, Bob, and Heather's picks on Jim's blog, The Water's Edge. Jim's Picks Michael Mandelbaum, The Four Ages of American Foreign Policy (2022) Richard Cohen, Making History: The Storytellers Who Shaped the Past (2021) Laszlo Montgomery, The China History Podcast, Teacup Media Bob's Picks Catherine Belton, Putin's People (2020) Honorée Fanonne Jeffers, The Love Songs of W.E.B Du Bois (2021) Cynthia Graber and Nicola Twilley, Gastropod, Vox Media Podcast Network Heather's Picks Greg Behrman, The Most Noble Adventure: The Marshall Plan and How America Helped Rebuild Europe (2007) Patrick Radden Keefe, Say Nothing: A True Story of Murder and Memory in Northern Ireland (2018) Todd Schulkin, Inside Julia's Kitchen, Heritage Radio Network Additional Books, Podcasts, and Shows Mentioned on the Podcast Karen Dewisha, Putin's Kleptocracy (2014) Aaron L. Friedberg, Getting China Wrong (2022) Joseph Marion Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (1965) Michael Kimmage, The Abandonment of the West (2020) Sebastian Mallaby, The Power Law (2022) George Mitchell, Making Peace (1999) Yascha Mounk, The Great Experiment (2022) Benn Steil, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War (2019) Ali Wyne, America's Great-Power Opportunity (2022) Heather A. Conley, “How Will Biden Handle Russia?” The President's Inbox, December 1, 2020 David Crowther, The History of England Mike Duncan, The History of Rome Jamie Jeffers, The British History Podcast Michael Mandelbaum, “America's Rise to Power,” The President's Inbox, May 7, 2022 Robin Pierson, The History of Byzantium Julia, HBO Max (2022)
The Biden administration has announced dozens of sanctions against Russian individuals and organizations in an attempt to squeeze Vladimir Putin and abandon his war of choice in Ukraine. David Rothkopf talked Ed Luce of the Financial Times, Benn Steil of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Caroline Atkinson the former Deputy Director of National Security for International Economics about the impact of the sanctions and how they should be used moving forward. Are sanctions effective? Have we used them too much? How does the rest of the world view this? Find out during this thoughtful episode. Join us!Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/deepstateradio. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.
The Biden administration has announced dozens of sanctions against Russian individuals and organizations in an attempt to squeeze Vladimir Putin and abandon his war of choice in Ukraine. David Rothkopf talked Ed Luce of the Financial Times, Benn Steil of the Council on Foreign Relations, and Caroline Atkinson the former Deputy Director of National Security for International Economics about the impact of the sanctions and how they should be used moving forward. Are sanctions effective? Have we used them too much? How does the rest of the world view this? Find out during this thoughtful episode. Join us!Support this show http://supporter.acast.com/deepstateradio. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.
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Benn Steil is a senior fellow and director of international economics, as well as the official historian in residence, at the Council on Foreign Relations. His most recent book, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War, was named the winner of the New-York Historical Society's Barbara and David Zalaznick Book Prize, awarded each year to the best work in the field of American history or biography. Before his death, FDR developed four pillars of a post-WWII foreign policy: peaceably dismantle the British Empire; build permanent peace between the United States and the Soviet Union; profitably dismember and deindustrialize Germany, and integrate the global economy with short-term IMF loans. This represented the hope for a one-world architecture where the US and Soviet Union got along. Circumstances quickly forced then-President Harry Truman to pivot and begin dividing the world between Marshall states- countries that asserted liberal democracy and free markets- and Soviet states under communist rule. This marked the dawn of the Cold War. “When we get to 1947 and the Marshall plan, the Truman Administration is already in a major corrective mode. The State Department is already talking openly about a two-world vision for the post-war order.” ————————————————————————— To learn more about this episode, including podcast transcripts and show notes, visit *salt.org/talks* ( http://salt.org/talks ) Moderated by Anthony Scaramucci.
À l'aube de la Guerre froide. En librairie le 19 septembre 2020 et sur https://www.lesbelleslettres.com/livre/4319-le-plan-marshall. À partir de nouvelles sources américaines, russes, allemandes et d’autres archives européennes, Benn Steil livre une histoire limpide du plan Marshall.
I read this next book, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War, by Benn Steil, in an attempt to take the idea of a “Marshall Plan for post-Covid recovery” seriously. I’m glad I di… https://www.ribbonfarm.com/2020/09/30/notes-the-marshall-plan-by-benn-steil/ The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold Wartweeted on March 28the original threadThe Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold WarMorganthau PlanBretton WoodsLong TelegramUNRRAHalford MackinderWilliam Lockhart ClaytonPotsdamSWNCC committee reportPPS/1: Policy Planning Staff paper 1JCS 1067GATTTrump’s Real Trade War Is Being Waged on the WTOJames Reston 1946 US loan to the UKHerter committeeRichard BissellMarshall Plan committee.a price tag of $192Ba late battle to capture itPotsdamC-54 SkymasterSPD Social DemocratsPaul HoffmanOECDCOMECONinitiating legislationKonrad Adenauernothing
In the aftermath of World War II, Europe had been wrecked by six years of war as plans over the fate of Europe became conflicted between the two world superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union. The United States undertook a bold economic aid program to help Western European countries get back on their feet economically and secure the security of these nations from the Soviet Union. However, this started the Cold War as the two superpowers could not agree on the plan or the division of Germany which began almost 40 years of hostilities. We interviewed Dr. Benn Steil who is a senior fellow and director of international economics, as well as the official historian in residence, at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He is also the founding editor of International Finance, a scholarly economics journal, lead writer of the Council's Geo-Graphics economics blog. His work includes, “The Battle of Bretton Woods” and the “Marshall Plan” which was the winner of the American Academy of Diplomacy Douglas Dillon award.
A History of Plagues and Pandemics; How the Democratic Party Dealt With the Bernie Sanders of 1944; The Short-Lived Deal in Afghanistan Which Now Has Two Presidents
Author Benn Steil visits the Museum & Library to discuss his book which provides a detailed recounting of The Marshall Plan which focuses on the critical years of 1947 to 1949.
Author Benn Steil visits the Museum & Library to discuss his book which provides a detailed recounting of The Marshall Plan which focuses on the critical years of 1947 to 1949.
Monday Night Philosophy features author Benn Steil, winner of the 2018 American Academy of Diplomacy Douglas Dillon Prize for best book. Steil will discuss the gripping history behind the Marshall Plan. In the wake of World War II, with Britain's empire collapsing and Stalin's on the rise, U.S. officials under new Secretary of State George C. Marshall set out to reconstruct Western Europe as a bulwark against Communist authoritarianism. Their massive, costly and ambitious undertaking would confront Europeans and Americans alike with a vision at odds with their history and self-conceptions. In the process, they would drive the creation of NATO, the European Union and a Western identity that continues to shape world events. Focusing on the critical years 1947 to 1949, Steil's account brings to life the Prague Coup, the Berlin Blockade, the division of Germany, and Stalin's determination to crush the Marshall Plan and undermine American power in Europe. As Putin's Russia is again rattling the world order, the tenuous balance of power and uncertain order of the late 1940s is as relevant as ever. MLF ORGANIZER NAME George Hammond NOTES MLF: Humanities Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
"I think what makes a good writer is empathy — empathy with the reader. It is about being able to split your mind in two...being an expert on a certain topic, but also being able to communicate it to a reader who hasn't had your experiences." Benn Steil sat down with Nandeeni and Zach to discuss the importance of the 1944 Bretton Woods conference, why he considers World War II the pinnacle of American foreign policy, and China's growing influence in the academic world.
The military is one of the most successful institutions that builds and develops leaders. Over half of the United States Presidents have served in the military. Russ sits down with Lee Delony and Ric McClain, both retired Military service members to talk about their time in the service and what they have learned about leadership and how that can translate to help anyone who wants to be a leader in whatever capacity.“THE DAY THE SOLDIERS STOP BRINGING YOU THEIR PROBLEMS IS THE DAY YOU STOPPED LEADING THEM. THEY HAVE EITHER LOST CONFIDENCE THAT YOU CAN HELP THEM OR CONCLUDED THAT YOU DO NOT CARE. EITHER CASE IS A FAILURE OF LEADERSHIP.”GENERAL COLIN POWELL, RETIRED FOUR-STAR GENERAL IN THE UNITED STATES ARMY AND FORMER SECRETARY OF STATEA big point of emphasis was servant leadership. Each person in the armed forces has a specific job they are specialized in and it is the leaders job to removed all distractions and impediments for their men and women to do their job effectively. As leaders, our job is to help those we lead be excellent at what they do.Show Notes:Why Courage Matters by John McCain – https://amzn.to/2zomr9E Team of Teams: New Rules of Engagement for a Complex World by Stanley A. McChrystal – https://amzn.to/2NPeR1b Founding Brothers by Joseph J. Ellis – https://amzn.to/2Jyh3Wv The Marshall Plan by Benn Steil – https://amzn.to/2P4owCv Ulysses S Grant by William S. McFeely Ph.D. – https://amzn.to/2SCSf3F Crusade in Europe by Dwight D. Eisenhower – https://amzn.to/2Ok7M4N
On today's 'Global Exchange' Podcast, we begin a new series on international trade diversification. Join host Colin Robertson in conversation with CGAI Fellow, and Vice-President of Policy, International and Fiscal Issues at the Business Council of Canada, Brian Kingston for a wide-ranging discussion on how Canada can diversify its trade regime, and how it can prioritize that process. Bios: Colin Robertson (host) - A former Canadian diplomat, Colin Robertson is Vice President of the Canadian Global Affairs Institute. Brian Kingston - Vice-President of Policy, International and Fiscal Issues at the Business Council of Canada. Prior to joining the Council, Brian gained comprehensive experience across the federal government through various positions at the Department of Finance, Global Affairs Canada, the Treasury Board Secretariat and the Privy Council Office. Brian is an Action Canada Fellow, World Economic Forum Global Shaper and alumnus of the 2015 Governor General's Canadian Leadership Conference. Related Links: - "Hedging Our Bet: A Diversification Strategy for Canadian Trade" by Brian Kingston (https://www.cgai.ca/hedging_our_bet_a_diversification_strategy_for_canadian_trade) [CGAI Policy Update] - "The Security Dimension of a China Free Trade Agreement: Balancing Benefits and Risk" by Gordon Houlden (https://www.cgai.ca/the_security_dimension_of_a_china_free_trade_agreement_balancing_benefits_and_risk) [CGAI Joint Policy Paper] - "A Look at Canadian Trade: What Legislators Need to Do" by Colin Robertson (https://www.cgai.ca/a_look_at_canadian_trade_what_legislators_need_to_do) [CGAI Commentary] - "Beware of the Dragon: The Challenges of China's Assertive Posture" by Mathew Fisher (https://www.cgai.ca/beware_of_the_dragon_the_challenges_of_china_s_assertive_posture) [CGAI Policy Update] Book Recommendations: Brian Kingston: "Factfulness: Ten Reasons We're Wrong About the World--and Why Things Are Better Than You Think" by Hans Rosling (https://www.amazon.ca/Factfulness-Reasons-World-Things-Better/dp/1250107814/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1535394582&sr=8-1&keywords=Factfulness) | "Draft Animals: Living the Pro Cycling Dream (Once in a While)" by Phil Gaimon (https://www.amazon.ca/Draft-Animals-Living-Cycling-Dream/dp/0143131249/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1535394725&sr=8-1&keywords=draft+animals) Colin Robertson: "The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War" by Benn Steil (https://www.amazon.ca/Marshall-Plan-Dawn-Cold-War/dp/1501102370/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1535394746&sr=8-1&keywords=The+Marshall+Plan) | "The Year of the Snake: Murder in the Senate" by M.J. Trow & Maryanne Coleman (https://www.amazon.ca/Year-Snake-Murder-Senate-ebook/dp/B07FJ6JHZG/ref=sr_1_1?ie=UTF8&qid=1535394801&sr=8-1&keywords=Year+of+the+Snake) Recording Date: August 15th, 2018 Follow the Canadian Global Affairs Institute on Facebook, Twitter (@CAGlobalAffairs), or on Linkedin. Head over to our website at cgai.ca for more commentary. Produced by Jared Maltais. Music credits to Drew Phillips.
Doug Kass, Seabreeze Partners President, explains why his forward looking concerns are plentiful. Robert D. Kaplan, Eurasia Group Senior Advisor and Center for a New American Security Fellow, observes that world leaders do not know how to analyze and predict President Trump ahead of his visit to Europe next week. Benn Steil, CFR Senior Fellow and Director of International Economics, says Russia is ratcheting up its actions on NATO's borders. Diane Swonk, Grant Thornton Chief Economist, discusses how the U.S. could de-escalate and avoid a major trade war. Learn more about your ad-choices at https://www.iheartpodcastnetwork.com
This week on CFTC Talks, we speak with Benn Steil, senior fellow and director of international economics for the Council on Foreign Relations (CFR). We cover the risks to the global financial system, interest rates, emerging markets and his new book, "The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War".
Doug Kass, Seabreeze Partners President, explains why his forward looking concerns are plentiful. Robert D. Kaplan, Eurasia Group Senior Advisor and Center for a New American Security Fellow, observes that world leaders do not know how to analyze and predict President Trump ahead of his visit to Europe next week. Benn Steil, CFR Senior Fellow and Director of International Economics, says Russia is ratcheting up its actions on NATO's borders. Diane Swonk, Grant Thornton Chief Economist, discusses how the U.S. could de-escalate and avoid a major trade war.
CFR's Benn Steil delves into the strategies and political triumphs of the Marshall Plan, as well as its implication on the state of current world affairs.
Building the Future: Freedom, Prosperity, and Foreign Policy with Dan Runde
In this podcast, Dan Runde is joined by Benn Steil, Senior Fellow and Director of International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations. In February 2018, Dr. Steil published a new book, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War, that places foreign aid to Western Europe in the context of the Cold War and U.S. national security interests. You can find CSIS’ review of the book here. Dan and Dr. Steil also discuss his earlier work, The Battle of Bretton Woods, which focuses on the Bretton Woods conference which established the World Bank Group and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The role of Soviet espionage in the conference is rarely discussed and prepares you for his later work focused on the Marshall Plan. A Marshall Plan announced today would be worth closer to $103 billion and an enormous amount of effort from people like General Marshall and Arthur Vandenberg was required to ensure that it passed through Congress. For more, check out the book event hosted at CSIS.
April 6, 2018 - Dr. Benn Steil, Senior Fellow and Director of International Economics at the Council on Foreign Relations, discusses his new book, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War. Dr. Steil uses archival documents to portray how the initiative’s champions in the State Department were able to realize this grand plan despite immense complexity, uncertainty, and pushback at home and abroad. Steil explains the significance and implications of the Marshall Plan for our modern world, including lessons learned for the Korean Peninsula. Steil joins Korea Society President Tom Byrne in conversation. For more information, please visit the link below: https://www.koreasociety.org/policy-and-corporate-programs/item/1087-the-marshall-plan-in-retrospect-implications-for-the-modern-world
Economist and award-winning author Benn Steil talks to Matt Klein about the history of the post-World War II European recovery plan, implemented by then secretary of state George C Marshall as a means of defending against communist authoritarianism. It's the subject of Steil's new book, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War. Music by Podington Bear. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.
Please join the Project on Prosperity and Development at CSIS for a public conversation with Dr. Benn Steil on Wednesday, April 4 at 10:00 AM to discuss his new book, The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War. Dr. Steil's new book brings to life the most ambitious development undertaking in history: The Marshall Plan. Born out of post-war realignment, the Marshall Plan focused on a trifecta of objectives: the reconstruction of Europe, preventing the spread of Communism, and defining the contours of a new global liberal order. The Marshall Plan resulted in the creation of NATO and the European Union, the thriving economies of Western Europe, and the enduring idea that enlightened foreign intervention was possible. But the recovery program, which included aid equivalent to $800 billion today as a percentage of U.S. output, was not easy nor unifying. It accelerated the collapse of U.S.-Soviet relations, precipitating the Prague coup, the Berlin blockade, and the division of Germany. Today, with Russian assertiveness in global affairs on the rise, and a U.S. commitment to the alliances and multilateral institutions it created on the wane, the Marshall Plan is again one of the most important case studies in American Grand Strategy. Please join as Dr. Steil recounts the history of the Marshall Plan and the ways in which it echoes into today's global contexts. This event is made possible through general support from CSIS.
Benn Steil is an American economist, author of a great new book on “The Marshall Plan”, and senior fellow and director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations. HOW TO LISTEN If you’re already a subscriber, you can listen to the full show in the player below or subscribe through iTunes or any […]
Economist and author Benn Steil explains the background to the 1947 US aid initiative to Europe and describes how it helped shape relations between the USA and USSR. He also considers what impact it had on European recovery after the Second World War See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.
On July 30, 1947, then Congressman Nixon was selected by Speaker of the House Joe Martin to to be one of the nineteen members of a select committee headed by Congressman Christian Herter to make a trip to Europe and prepare a report in connection with the post -war foreign aid plan that Secretary of State George Marshall unveiled at Harvard University in June of that year. “I learned a great deal from the Herter Committee trip,” Nixon later recalled. “I had taken a poll and found that 75 percent of my constituents in the 12th district [of California] were resolutely opposed to any foreign aid. This was the first time I had experienced the classical dilemma, so eloquently described by Edmund Burke, that is faced at one time or another by almost any elected official in a democracy: how much should his voters register his constituents’ opinions, and how much should they represent his own views and convictions? After what I had seen in and learned in Europe, I believed so strongly in the necessity of extending economic aid that I felt I had no choice but to vote my conscience and then try my hardest to convince my constituents.” On this edition of the Nixon Now Podcast, we discuss the history of the Marshall Plan with Benn Steil. Dr. Steil is senior fellow and director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations in New York. He is also the founding editor of International Finance, a scholarly economics journal; lead writer of the Council’s Geo-Graphics economics blog; and creator of three web-based interactives tracking Sovereign Risk, Global Monetary Policy, and Central Bank Currency Swaps. Prior to his joining the Council in 1999, he was director of the International Economics Programme at the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London. His previous book “The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order” was called “a triumph of economic and diplomatic history” by the Financial Times. His new book, which he discusses in this podcast is called the “The Marshall Plan: Dawn of the Cold War.” The Cold War historian John Lewis Gaddis calls the book “An Outstanding — and certainly timely — accomplishment. Former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan, says this book “will open eyes and minds.” Highlights: — Overview of the state of post-war Europe — Political attitudes in the United States following World War II — Who was George Marshall? — Soviet activity in post-war Europe — The theory of containment. — How the Marshall Plan was devised — U.S. Congress’s reaction to the Marshall Plan, and other criticisms — The legacy of the Marshall Plan Interview by Jonathan Movroydis.
The Marshall Plan may well have been the most significant and effective strategic decision made by the U.S. in the postwar era. The post Benn Steil on the Marshall Plan and the Modern World appeared first on Octavian Report.
Steve Wieting, Citi Private Bank Global Chief Strategist, says there is an underlying sense of optimism from companies. Carsten Brzeski, ING-DiBa Chief Economist, says Italy is still one of the laggards of the eurozone cycle. Sen. Rob Portman (R-OH), Senate Finance Committee member, says Congress ought to readdress the legal purchasing age for rifles. Benn Steil, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow and Director of International Economics, says President Trump may be losing sight of the immense power the U.S. has had via the use of soft power. Learn more about your ad-choices at https://www.iheartpodcastnetwork.com
Steve Wieting, Citi Private Bank Global Chief Strategist, says there is an underlying sense of optimism from companies. Carsten Brzeski, ING-DiBa Chief Economist, says Italy is still one of the laggards of the eurozone cycle. Sen. Rob Portman (R-OH), Senate Finance Committee member, says Congress ought to readdress the legal purchasing age for rifles. Benn Steil, Council on Foreign Relations Senior Fellow and Director of International Economics, says President Trump may be losing sight of the immense power the U.S. has had via the use of soft power.
Benn Steil, author of the 2014 Lionel Gelber Prize shortlisted book “The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order”, speaks with Robert Steiner, Director, Fellowships in Global Journalism at the Munk School of Global Affairs.
In this edition of “Real Conversations,” Benn Steil, director of international economics at the Council on Foreign Relations and author of "The Battle of Bretton Woods" discusses the significant challenges facing investors as global central bankers continue to manipulate and flummox markets with Hedgeye CEO Keith McCullough. “This environment has never been more complicated for investors,” explains Dr. Steil. “They can no longer count on what monetary policy makers are telling them.”
Today on The Larry Kudlow Show, Larry talks with Patrick Brennan, Opinion Editor at National Review. Also on the show is Benn Steil, author of:"The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order." Dan Greenhaus, Managing Director & Chief Global Strategist at BTIG and Jeff Kleintop, Senior VP and Chief Global Investment Strategist @ Charles Schwab are also on the show. More great guests include Eliana Johnson, Washington Editor for National Review and Kori Schake,Research Fellow at Hoover Institution. As always, the great money/politics panel with Steve Moore and John McIntyre. All this and much more on The Larry Kudlow Show!
Today on The Larry Kudlow Show, Larry talks with Patrick Brennan, Opinion Editor at National Review. Also on the show is Benn Steil, author of:"The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order." Dan Greenhaus, Managing Director & Chief Global Strategist at BTIG and Jeff Kleintop, Senior VP and Chief Global Investment Strategist @ Charles Schwab are also on the show. More great guests include Eliana Johnson, Washington Editor for National Review and Kori Schake,Research Fellow at Hoover Institution. As always, the great money/politics panel with Steve Moore and John McIntyre. All this and much more on The Larry Kudlow Show!
Today on The Larry Kudlow Show, Larry talks with Patrick Brennan, Opinion Editor at National Review. Also on the show is Benn Steil, author of:"The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order." Dan Greenhaus, Managing Director & Chief Global Strategist at BTIG and Jeff Kleintop, Senior VP and Chief Global Investment Strategist @ Charles Schwab are also on the show. More great guests include Eliana Johnson, Washington Editor for National Review and Kori Schake,Research Fellow at Hoover Institution. As always, the great money/politics panel with Steve Moore and John McIntyre. All this and much more on The Larry Kudlow Show!
Benn Steil of the Council on Foreign Relations and author of The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order talks with EconTalk host Russ Roberts about Bretton Woods, the conference that resulted in the IMF, the World Bank, and the post-war international monetary system. Topics discussed include America and Britain's conflicting interests during and after World War II, the relative instability of the post-war system, and the personalities and egos of the individuals at Bretton Woods, including John Maynard Keynes and Harry Dexter White.
Today on The Larry Kudlow Show, Larry talks with Benn Steil, AUTHOR:"The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order." John Cahill, Counsel @ Chadbourne & Park and CEO of Pataki-Cahill Group. Also on the show is Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia University Graduate School of Business. Former Deputy Asst. More great guests include Jim Paulsen and Ken Polcari, along with Governor Bobby Jindal (R-LA). As always the great Money/Politics Panel with James Pethokoukis, Steve Moore, and John McIntyre. All this and much more on The Larry Kudlow Show!
Today on The Larry Kudlow Show, Larry talks with Benn Steil, AUTHOR:"The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order." John Cahill, Counsel @ Chadbourne & Park and CEO of Pataki-Cahill Group. Also on the show is Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia University Graduate School of Business. Former Deputy Asst. More great guests include Jim Paulsen and Ken Polcari, along with Governor Bobby Jindal (R-LA). As always the great Money/Politics Panel with James Pethokoukis, Steve Moore, and John McIntyre. All this and much more on The Larry Kudlow Show!
Today on The Larry Kudlow Show, Larry talks with Benn Steil, AUTHOR:"The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order." John Cahill, Counsel @ Chadbourne & Park and CEO of Pataki-Cahill Group. Also on the show is Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia University Graduate School of Business. Former Deputy Asst. More great guests include Jim Paulsen and Ken Polcari, along with Governor Bobby Jindal (R-LA). As always the great Money/Politics Panel with James Pethokoukis, Steve Moore, and John McIntyre. All this and much more on The Larry Kudlow Show!
Today on The Larry Kudlow Show, Larry talks with Governor Rick Perry (R-TX). Also on the show is Governor Mike Pence (R-IN). Benn Steil, author of:"The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order" joins the show. More great guests include Mike Ozanian, Co-host "Sports Money" on the YES Network and Barry Ritholtz, author of: "Bailout Nation" and Weblog: "The Big Picture." Peter Wallison, author of NEW BOOK: "Hidden in Plain Sight: What Really Caused the World's Financial Crisis and Why It Could Happen Again." As always, the Money/Politics Panel with James Pethokoukis, Steve Moore, and John McIntyre. All this and much more on The Larry Kudlow Show!
Today on The Larry Kudlow Show, Larry talks with Governor Rick Perry (R-TX). Also on the show is Governor Mike Pence (R-IN). Benn Steil, author of:"The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order" joins the show. More great guests include Mike Ozanian, Co-host "Sports Money" on the YES Network and Barry Ritholtz, author of: "Bailout Nation" and Weblog: "The Big Picture." Peter Wallison, author of NEW BOOK: "Hidden in Plain Sight: What Really Caused the World's Financial Crisis and Why It Could Happen Again." As always, the Money/Politics Panel with James Pethokoukis, Steve Moore, and John McIntyre. All this and much more on The Larry Kudlow Show!
Today on The Larry Kudlow Show, Larry talks with Governor Rick Perry (R-TX). Also on the show is Governor Mike Pence (R-IN). Benn Steil, author of:"The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order" joins the show. More great guests include Mike Ozanian, Co-host "Sports Money" on the YES Network and Barry Ritholtz, author of: "Bailout Nation" and Weblog: "The Big Picture." Peter Wallison, author of NEW BOOK: "Hidden in Plain Sight: What Really Caused the World's Financial Crisis and Why It Could Happen Again." As always, the Money/Politics Panel with James Pethokoukis, Steve Moore, and John McIntyre. All this and much more on The Larry Kudlow Show!
Did U.S. Federal Reserve Chair Ben Bernanke cause the Ukraine crisis? "You can certainly say that Bernanke was at least the butterfly wings that precipitated the crisis," argues Benn Steil, senior fellow at the Council on Foreign Relations and the author of "Taper Trouble" in the July/August 2014 edition of Foreign Affairs. "I would argue that if the Fed had remained dovish, say for another six months or so, it is possible that Ukraine could have gotten over this hump and Yanukovych would still be in power today."Steil recently sat down with Foreign Affairs Editor Gideon Rose for a wide-ranging conversation on the international consequences of Fed policy. Original video interview published on ForeignAffairs.com on August 2, 2014.
McAlvany Weekly Commentary About this week's show: Dr. Benn Steil: Director of Intl. Economics at C.F.R. Recent article by Benn Steil: Taper Trouble: The International Consequences of Fed Policy Be sure to read, The Battle of Bretton Woods by Benn Steil 1870-1914 classical gold standard really worked Current monetary system inherently unstable The McAlvany Weekly Commentary with David McAlvany […] The post Dollar Demise…or Continued Dollar Domination? appeared first on McAlvany Weekly Commentary.
When turmoil strikes world monetary and financial markets, statesmen invariably call for "a new Bretton Woods" to prevent catastrophic economic disorder and defuse political conflict. The very name of the remote New Hampshire town where representatives of 44 nations gathered in July 1944, has become shorthand for enlightened globalization. The actual story surrounding the historic Bretton Woods accords, however, is full of startling drama, intrigue, and rivalry. Benn Steil will bring the saga to life, and talk about some of its lessons for understanding today's central economic issues.
In this podcast, Benn Steil considers John Maynard Keynes' role at Bretton Woods. Pick up our June issue and read Benn's article, The Dunkirk Diplomat. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.
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This week, Porter and I sit down with Dr. Benn Steil, author of The Battle of Bretton Woods: John Maynard Keynes, Harry Dexter White, and the Making of a New World Order.
Author Benn Steil visits the Museum & Library to discuss his book which provides a detailed recounting of The Marshall Plan which focuses on the critical years of 1947 to 1949.