Podcasts about uss saratoga

La maldición del portaviones El equipo se sumerge en busca de un bombardero Douglas A3 Skywarrior que en 1960 tuvo un accidente sospechoso cuando trataba de aterrizar en el portaaviones USS Saratoga. Los gigantes desaparecidos Entre noviembre y diciembre de 1941, el gigantesco USS Proteus desapareció mientras cruzaba el Triángulo y, dos semanas después, un segundo buque casi idéntico, también se esfumó.

Last time we spoke about the liberation of Bataan and Corregidor. The Shimbu Group's commander launched a coordinated raid on northern Manila, aiming to weaken enemy defenses. Despite heavy casualties, the Allies captured key locations, including Nichols Field. Meanwhile, General Chase's 38th Division overcame strong Japanese defenses at ZigZag Pass, while General Hall's forces secured Bataan. Plans for an airborne assault on Corregidor were set for February 16, leveraging surprise against the outnumbered Japanese garrison. American forces launched the strategic attack on Corregidor, dropping paratroopers from the 503rd Regiment. Despite facing sporadic fire, they secured key positions. The following days saw intense skirmishes as the 3rd Battalion, 34th Regiment landed and established a foothold. Over eight days, they repelled numerous Japanese counterattacks, inflicting heavy casualties. By February 26, organized resistance crumbled, leading to the island's capture. Meanwhile, in Manila, American troops advanced, clearing buildings and securing the city, inching closer to victory in the Philippines. This episode is the Invasion of Iwo Jima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    A few weeks ago we spoke about Operation Detachment. Admirals Nimitz and Spruance were planning an invasion of Iwo Jima with General Schmidt's 5th Amphibious Corps. During a thorough campaign of preliminary air and naval bombardment against the Volcano Islands, the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions, along with other Corps units, were loading at Hawaii between December 25 and January 25. Once training and loading were complete, Admiral Turner's Task Force 51 and Admiral Hill's Task Force 53 left Pearl Harbor on January 27, initially heading toward Saipan. By February 12, Admiral Spruance's 5th Fleet had gathered in the Marianas and was prepared to sail for Iwo Jima. Additionally, Admiral Mitscher's Task Force 58 had departed Ulithi to conduct a series of supporting air strikes over and around Tokyo, known as Operation Jamboree. Task Force 58 sortied from Ulithi 10 February and shaped a course eastward of the Marianas and Bonins. On the 12th, the air groups rehearsed with the 3rd Marine Division on Tinian. Two days later the task force fueled at sea from one of Admiral Beary's replenishment groups. Everything possible was done to guard against detection. Measures included radio deception, scouting by Pacific Fleet submarines to dispose of any picket vessels there might be en route, scouting by B-29s and Navy Liberators from the Marianas to clear the air. On the 15th a scouting line of five destroyers ranged ahead of the carriers, and antisubmarine air patrol was set up. At 1900 a high-speed run-in began towards launching positions, where the carriers arrived at dawn 16 February. Thanks to these precautions, and to thick weather most of the way, they arrived undetected. General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command, which was being reinforced by the 313th and 314th Bombardment Wings, would also assist Detachment with several strikes against Japan. Following some unremarkable high-altitude daytime missions in late January, 129 B-29s from the 73rd and 313th Bombardment Wings targeted Kobe on February 3, using a mix of incendiaries and fragmentation bombs. This attack caused significant damage to the urban area and local war production, resulting in the loss of 2 bombers and damage to 35 others. Subsequently, on February 10, a precision strike was launched against Ota's Nakajima aircraft factory, with 84 out of 118 dispatched B-29s successfully bombing the site. However, only 14% of the bombs hit the target, leading to the loss of 12 bombers and damage to 29. Nearly one-third of the factory buildings sustained damage, primarily from the incendiaries combined with high-explosive bombs. Five days later, LeMay dispatched 117 B-29 bombers to target Mitsubishi's engine works in Nagoya. However, an unexpected cold front resulted in only 33 bombers reaching the target area, yielding lackluster results. Meanwhile, after conducting some assault rehearsals, Spruance's amphibious support forces and tractor groups set sail for Iwo Jima on February 14, followed two days later by Turner's main assault convoy. At the same time, the reserve 3rd Marine Division continued loading at Guam, with its 21st Marines departing for Iwo Jima on February 16, followed by the main body of the division the next day. On the morning of February 16, Admiral Blandy's Amphibious Support Force arrived off Iwo Jima and promptly commenced the final preliminary bombardment and minesweeping operations, although inclement weather hindered these efforts. However, the next day, Task Force 52 successfully carried out these missions; beach reconnaissance by UDTs faced heavy mortar fire, resulting in the sinking of one LCI gunboat, damage to eleven others, and casualties of 44 killed and 152 wounded. Despite this, the frogmen encountered no obstacles on the beaches and managed to create accurate maps of the approaches. Meanwhile, by February 16, Mitscher's carriers had quietly moved to a position 60 miles off the coast of Honshu, launching extensive fighter sweeps against airfields in Tokyo Bay and bombing raids on aircraft frame and engine plants in the Tokyo area.  About 100 Japanese fighters attacked Admiral Davison's planes as they crossed the coast and about 40 of them were shot down. American pilots found the Japanese on the whole reluctant to engage; Admiral Mitscher had correctly told his pilots, "He is probably more afraid of you than you are of him". In fact the IJAAF 10th Hiko Shidan immediately ordered an IJAAF night-fighter group and all “second-class” personnel to take cover, while all aircraft not intercepting were ordered to be dispersed, fuel tanks drained, and ammunition unloaded. In contrast, American pilots reported Tokyo antiaircraft fire “the most accurate and intense yet encountered.” By nightfall, Rear-Admiral Matthias Gardner's night-flying carrier group conducted a sweep of night fighters to cover the enemy airfields at dusk. This operation was repeated the following morning, but poor weather ultimately forced the carriers to retreat toward Iwo Jima. Despite this, significant damage was inflicted on aircraft frame and engine facilities, with 10 vessels sunk, including the unfinished escort carrier Yamashio Maru. A total of 531 aircraft were reported destroyed, at the expense of losing 88 planes and damaging two destroyers. On February 18, after the enemy battery camouflage had been obliterated during the previous two days of bombardment. This revealed batteries not previously known to exist, the island's defenses were for the first time properly revealed; and formidable they were indeed. Fortunately for the Americans, the support of UDTs with LCI gunboats had convinced General Kuribayashi that the main landing had started, and to repel it he unmasked batteries that would have caused very heavy casualties on D-day had they not been discovered two days before. This was the only serious mistake made by the Japanese general in his defensive tactics, which won the rueful admiration of his enemies. Blandy opted to focus on the immediate area and flanks of the eastern beaches. Heavy ships moved closer to 2,500 yards to deliver concentrated direct fire on all targets. Consequently, bombardment ships provided continuous direct fire throughout the day, effectively dismantling enemy defenses. However, during the night, the Japanese launched a minor raid that caused significant damage to the destroyer minesweeper Gamble and the destroyer escort Blessman. At 06:00 on February 19, Turner's main force arrived off Iwo Jima and began maneuvering into final positions. Simultaneously, Admiral Rodgers' warships executed the last pre-landing bombardment, coordinated with air strikes from Mitscher's carriers. Between 08:25 and 08:55, as the first wave crossed the line of departure and advanced toward the shore under the protective rocket fire of gunboats, shells fell heavily on Iwo Jima, marking the most intense pre-landing bombardment of World War II. At 08:57, as the leading armored amtracs approached their targets, naval gunfire shifted inland and to the flanks. The LVTs of the first wave touched down on Iwo Jima at 09:02 and began moving forward through the high terraces of soft black volcanic ash, engaging inland targets from the water to support subsequent landings. Three minutes later, the Marines of the 4th and 5th Divisions started landing side by side on the Green, Red, Yellow, and Blue beaches. The assault infantry battalions of the Landing Force received assistance throughout D-Day from all the supporting arms available to the Amphibious Support Force. Carrier pilots of Task Force 58 and the escort carriers of Task Force 52 flew missions all day as airborne observers and spotters maintained constant vigilance over the target. Including pre-H-Hour strikes, 606 support aircraft flew 26 missions on February 19 and dropped 274500 pounds of bombs. These planes also fired 2254 rockets into the island defenses and dropped over a hundred napalm bombs. Air and naval gunfire liaison teams remained in communication with both air and sea supporting units through the hectic hours that followed the beach assault. Naval rifles from 5- to 16-inch caliber pounded enemy positions in response to Marine requests. Gunfire support vessels engaged enemy artillery that covered landing areas from high ground to the north, and concentrated on concealed Japanese mortars that shelled landing areas with deadly effect. The units quickly reorganized and began their advance inland, facing only light resistance, although their progress was hampered by the sandy terrain. General Kuribayashi's forces, however, had been waiting in well-fortified underground positions as planned, emerging only after the bombardment ceased to unleash a barrage of machine-gun, rifle, and mortar fire on the advancing troops. As the initial waves of Marines struggled to advance, congestion along the shore became increasingly critical, while the full force of the Japanese defenders was unleashed shortly after 10:00. By 10:30, elements from all eight assault battalions had landed on the island, successfully bringing ashore about 6,000 men and bulldozers that were clearing paths for tank deployment. On the far left flank, Colonel Harry Liversedge's 28th Marines, having landed on Green Beach, initiated a rapid advance across the half-mile isthmus below Mount Suribachi to isolate this crucial position. The attack unfolded in such a way that some units were delayed while others managed to break through and continue westward despite suffering heavy casualties, ultimately crossing the island while the bypassed enemy was being dealt with. By midday, the reserve 3rd Battalion and tanks landed under heavy fire to join the afternoon assault on Suribachi, but intense enemy fire hindered their progress to the assault positions. Consequently, the 2nd Battalion launched an attack on its own, gaining only 150 yards before retreating to regroup with the 3rd Battalion for the night. At the same time, Colonel Thomas Wornham's 27th Marines had landed on the Red Beaches, making swift progress inland despite increasing casualties and bypassing numerous enemy positions. By 11:30, Company A was moving across the southern end of Airfield No. 1, establishing a presence along the western edge while other units continued to advance past the airfield. The 1st Battalion launched an attack on the airfield with tank support but faced strong enemy resistance, resulting in minimal gains. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion pushed westward and reached the cliffs overlooking the western coast. Additionally, the reserve 3rd Battalion landed and began clearing bypassed positions, while the artillery units from the 13th Marines and General Rockey's reserve 26th Marines also arrived in the afternoon as the 27th and 28th Marines solidified their positions. By nightfall, although the 5th Marine Division was still a considerable distance from the O-1 Line, it had established a firm foothold on the island, with Mount Suribachi isolated and portions of the airfield under their control. To the east, General Cates' 4th Marine Division also landed successfully, with Colonel Walter Wensinger's 23rd Marines coming ashore at the Yellow Beaches and Colonel John Lanigan's 25th Marines landing on Blue Beach 1 and the southern part of Blue Beach 2. The two regiments began their advance inland, hindered by intense enemy fire but managing to gain between 400 and 600 yards by midday. As tanks were being deployed, the 3rd Battalion of the 25th Marines moved to the right to clear the remaining area of Beach Blue 2 and encircle the threatening quarry zone. At this stage, as the assault battalions continued their advance, Wensinger and Lanigan deployed their reserve battalions to cover the gaps in their attack lines. With the support of tanks that had finally reached the front, the 23rd Marines advanced towards Airfield No. 1 and successfully captured its outskirts. Meanwhile, the 25th Marines initiated a coordinated assault, with the 3rd Battalion advancing about 200 yards along the beach to secure the problematic quarry, while the other two battalions moved north to seize the high ground to the northwest of the quarry. By the end of the day, Cates had also landed half of the artillery from the 14th Marines, along with his reserve 24th Marines, which began to relieve some of the frontline units from both assault regiments. Although the penetration by the 4th Marine Division was not as extensive as intended, by nightfall, the front lines included the eastern edge of the airfield and extended sufficiently inland from the Blue Beaches to ensure the beachhead could be held successfully. The Marines, forced to advance across open terrain while enduring intense fire from well-concealed positions that were difficult to target, fell significantly short of the O-1 objective. Nonetheless, by the end of the day, six Marine regiments, an equal number of artillery battalions, and two tank battalions had landed and were positioned to defend the narrow beachhead against a potential night counterattack.  Throughout this first day, the situation on the beaches prevented landing of any but the highest priority "hot cargo." This consisted of ammunition, rations, water, and signal equipment brought to the beach in LCVPs and LCMs. Shore party teams, working under extremely adverse conditions without sufficient trucks and other heavy equipment, could do little more than stack the supplies on the beach above the high water mark. LVTs and weasels made trips from the beach dumps inland carrying these supplies to the troops and returned bearing wounded men. The busy amtracs also made nonstop trips from LSTs, ferrying critically needed items direct to Marines on the front lines. Most of the transports and other vessels of the task force retired from the island at nightfall, but some command ships, preloaded LSTs, and hospital LSTs remained behind. Emergency items, especially 81mm mortar ammunition, were brought in during the night, but actually very little unloading was accomplished and many of the wounded spent this night on the beach because they could not be evacuated. Some progress was made cutting exits through the terrace and clearing mines, but enemy fire and the shortage of equipment limited this activity. Despite this, the Japanese did not launch any large-scale assaults, although their mortars and artillery relentlessly bombarded Marine lines along the front throughout the night. Consequently, Allied casualties on this first day totaled 548 killed and 1,755 wounded. On February 20, the goal was for the 28th Marines to take Mount Suribachi while other units advanced north to capture the two airfields. Initially, in the south, after a coordinated air and naval bombardment, Liversedge launched another assault on the volcano but managed to gain only 75 yards by midday. During the forenoon, Marines gained only 50-70 yards. Aircraft and ships pounded Japanese positions and the 3d Battalion, 13th Marines fired mission after mission, but stiff enemy resistance continued, particularly from well-camouflaged pillboxes hidden in the brush to the front of the Marine lines. These emplacements, too close to friendly troops to be engaged by heavy support weapons, could only be silenced by coordinated attacks of assault demolition teams using flamethrowers and explosive charges. Tanks then moved in to provide support, allowing the attack to progress from pillbox to pillbox; however, by the end of the day, the Marines had only advanced 200 difficult yards. Meanwhile, Schmidt's other regiments initiated a coordinated offensive to the north following extensive artillery, naval gunfire, and air support. Despite facing heavy resistance, the 23rd Marines successfully overran most of Airfield No. 1 by noon. Wensinger continued to push his units in the afternoon, but progress was limited as tanks were hindered by minefields and rough terrain. Wornham's 27th Marines pressed their attack on the left flank, overcoming enemy mortar and artillery fire to gain about 800 yards along the coast. In contrast, Lanigan's 25th Marines, affected by friendly fire, made only minimal advances against enemy crossfire from concealed positions. At 1600, friendly planes misdirected their fire to the 25th Marine's area, adding terror to the situation. An air strike consisting of .50-caliber machine-gun strafing, rockets, and bombs fell on troops of Company B of the 24th Marines, which was positioned on top of the quarry some 400 yards inland from the eastern shore. This strike was made without a preliminary "dry-run", and despite the fact that yellow front line panels were displayed prior to and during the aerial attack. The 1st Battalion, 24th Marines suffered five killed and six wounded as a result of this misguided effort. Shortly after the planes left the area, this battalion reported that friendly artillery and naval gunfire was being registered on its lines. Due to the slow progress, Schmidt attempted to land his reserve 21st Marines, but high seas and congested beaches ultimately thwarted these efforts. Nevertheless, the remaining 14th Marines were landed, albeit with significant casualties, and elements of the corps artillery began to come ashore. During the night, there were no counterattacks on Mount Suribachi, but the 4th and 5th Marine Divisions had to fend off some small counterattacks on their front lines. On February 21, following a strike involving 40 aircraft, Liversedge's 28th Marines launched another assault on the volcano. The 1st Battalion on the right swiftly advanced along the west beach to the base of Suribachi, while the 3rd Battalion in the center pushed nearly to the foot of the mountain despite facing heavy resistance. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion on the left moved cautiously along the east beach toward the volcano's base, with Company F heading toward Tobiishi Point. At the same time, other regiments continued their offensive towards O-1 after a bombardment from air, artillery, rockets, and naval gunfire. Rockey's units made significant progress, advancing over 1,000 yards, while the 23rd Marines achieved similar gains on the left flank, where slightly sheltered areas allowed for local and limited encirclement, but only advanced 100 yards in the right and center. The 25th Marines maintained steady pressure against the strong enemy defenses, gaining between 50 and 300 yards across the front. Colonel Hartnoll Withers' 21st Marines successfully landed this time; due to heavy casualties in the center, they were assigned to relieve the exhausted 23rd Marines. By nightfall, the Marines had to fend off several local counterattacks and infiltration attempts.  During the night, 50 kamikaze planes targeted Blandy's Task Force 52. They were picked up by the radar of the USS Saratoga, a veteran carrier of the Pacific War, and six fighters were sent to intercept. They shot down two Zeros but the remaining Zeros plowed on through the low lying cloud, two of them trailing smoke, and slammed into the side of the carrier turning the hangers into an inferno. Another solitary attacker smashed into the flight deck leaving a gaping hole 100 yards from the bow. Damage control teams worked wonders and within one hour the fires were under control and the Saratoga was able to recover a few of her planes. Another aircraft, a "Betty" twin engined bomber, tore into the escort carrier USS Bismarck Sea. The decks were full of aircraft and the ensuing explosion caused uncontrollable fires. Abandon ship was sounded and 800 men went over the side. Within a few minutes a huge explosion ripped off the entire stern of the carrier and she rolled 38 over and sank. Three other ships were also damaged: the escort carrier USS Lunga Point was showered with flaming debris as four aircraft were blasted out of the sky; the minesweeper Keokuk was damaged when a "Jill" dive bomber hit her deck; and LST 477 loaded with Sherman tanks received a glancing blow. The Saratoga, with destroyer escort, returned to Pearl Harbor, but by the time the damage was repaired the war was over. The kamikazes had done their work well: 358 men killed, one carrier sunk, and another severely damaged. It was a grim preview of the mayhem they would later cause during the invasion of Okinawa in April. On February 22, amidst a dreary cold rain, Liversedge renewed his assault on Suribachi, where only half of the original garrison remained to oppose the Marine advance. There was no let-up in the weather on Wednesday as Marines of the 28th Regiment, drenched to the skin and bent by the wind, prepared to renew the attack on Suribachi. Fresh supplies of ammunition had been brought to the front during the night, but the Shermans were mired in mud and the Navy declined to supply air support in the appalling weather. It was to be up to the foot soldier with rifle, flamethrower, grenade, and demolition charge to win the day. Colonel Atsuchi still had 800-900 men left and they had no intention of allowing the Americans an easy victory. Major Youamata announced: "We are surrounded by enemy craft of all sizes, shapes and descriptions, enemy shells have smashed at our installations and defenses, their planes bomb and strafe yet we remain strong and defiant. The Americans are beginning to climb the first terraces towards our defenses. Now they shall taste our steel and lead." Throughout the day, the 28th Marines engaged Japanese positions on the lower slopes of the mountain, with the 3rd Battalion making the final push to the base of Suribachi while the other two battalions cleared the coastline to completely encircle the volcano. Simultaneously, Schmidt's northern sweep continued, with the 21st Marines replacing Wensinger's troops, and Colonel Chester Graham's 26th Marines taking over on the 5th Division front. The 26th Marines advanced approximately 400 yards in the center but ultimately had to withdraw as the flanking units could not progress; the 21st Marines began their assault on the formidable defenses of Colonel Ikeda's 145th Regiment in front of Airfield No. 2, managing to advance only about 250 yards on the right; and the 25th Marines were unable to launch an attack on the left due to Withers' lack of significant gains and had to fend off several local Japanese counterattacks. Marine "Howlin' Mad" Smith aboard the USS Auburn was counting the cost. Three days of battle and the Regimental Returns listed 2,517 casualties for the 4th Division and 2,057 for the 5th: 4,574 dead and wounded and the O-1 line had just been reached. Little did he know that as his Marines approached the hills, ravines, canyons, gullies, and cliffs of the north the worst was yet to come. Additionally, as the 4th Division remained stalled, Cates ordered Colonel Walter Jordan's 24th Marines to relieve the weary troops of Lanigan on the right. During the night, most of Task Force 58 departed the area for a second air strike against Tokyo, which significantly limited the availability of aircraft for direct support of ground forces on Iwo Jima. On February 23, the 28th Marines under Liversedge launched their final assault on Suribachi. The 2nd Battalion was tasked with scaling the volcano's heights, while the 1st Battalion advanced south around the mountain's western side. To their surprise, they encountered no enemy fire, and small patrols reached the crater's edge by 09:40. 1st Lieutenant Harold G. Schrier, executive officer of Company E, and a 40-man detachment set out to follow the patrols and occupy the highest point of land on Iwo Jima. The number of live Japanese lurking in caves along this north face was unknown, so flankers were sent out to guard against ambush as Schrier's men clawed their way warily upward. Still there was a mysterious lack of enemy activity, and the only Japanese encountered were the harmless dead. Positions along the rim of the crater were reached at about 10:15, and as Marines scrambled over the lip, the tenseness was eased by action. A small defending force challenged the patrol and a short, hot fight developed. Even while this skirmish was in progress, some of the men located a length of Japanese iron pipe, secured a small American flag to one end, and raised the Stars and Stripes at 10:20. It was an inspiring sight for thousands of Americans on Iwo as the flag waved bravely from the summit. Shortly after the mounting of this flag that measured only 54 inches by 28 inches, an unidentified Marine went aboard LST 779, beached near the base of the volcano, to obtain a larger set of colors. As this second and larger (8 feet by 4 feet 8 inches) flag was being carried up the slopes of Suribachi, photographer Joe Rosenthal, who covered the Iwo operation for the Associated Press, noticed it and instantly started in close pursuit. His efforts that morning resulted in the now famous picture of the second flag raising. Also since it's one of my favorite movies, I wanted to add this passage from the book “Flags of our Fathers” by James Bradley The Secretary of the Navy, James Forrestal, had decided the previous night that he wanted to go ashore and witness the final stage of the fight for the mountain. Now, under a stern commitment to take orders from General Holland "Howlin' Mad" Smith, the secretary was churning ashore in the company of the blunt, earthy general. Their boat touched the beach just after the flag went up, and the mood among the high command turned jubilant. Gazing upward, at the red, white, and blue speck, Forrestal remarked to Smith: "Holland, the raising of that flag on Suribachi means a Marine Corps for the next five hundred years". Forrestal was so taken with fervor of the moment that he decided he wanted the Second Battalion's flag flying on Mt. Suribachi as a souvenir. The news of this wish did not sit well with 2nd Battalion Commander Chandler Johnson, whose temperament was every bit as fiery as Howlin Mad's. "To hell with that!" the colonel spat when the message reached him. The flag belonged to the battalion, as far as Johnson was concerned. He decided to secure it as soon as possible, and dispatched his assistant operations officer, Lieutenant Ted Tuttle, to the beach to obtain a replacement flag. As an afterthought, Johnson called after Tuttle: "And make it a bigger one." Following this, the 28th Marines conducted mopping-up operations to eliminate remaining enemy positions and seal off caves at the base of Suribachi. All accessible outer and inner slopes were covered as the Marines annihilated enemy snipers and blasted shut the many cave entrances, sealing in an uncounted number of Japanese. Much observation equipment was found, emphasizing the fact that this had been an excellent point of vantage from which hostile observers directed murderous fire against the entire beachhead. Marine artillerymen, ready and eager to seize this advantage, hastened to move flash-ranging equipment into position. By nightfall, approximately 122 Japanese soldiers were killed while attempting to infiltrate American lines. Over the five-day period, the 28th Marines suffered 895 casualties, while nearly 2,000 Japanese were either killed or trapped in over 1,000 caves in the area. Kuribayashi had not anticipated the loss of this strategically significant location so early in the battle, and the survivors who managed to breach American lines faced severe reprimands upon their return to the north. For the remainder of the month, the 28th Marines focused on clearing out stubborn Japanese forces, reorganizing, and reequipping. Meanwhile, fighting in the north persisted as the three assault regiments advanced toward the O-2 Line. The 26th and 21st Marines faced heavy fire and struggled to make progress, while the 24th Marines advanced along their entire front, gaining up to 300 yards in some areas. On this day, the situation on the beach steadily improved as clearance efforts, construction of exits, and unloading continued, facilitating the arrival of essential ammunition and an additional 25 tanks. On February 24, following extensive air, naval, and artillery preparations, the offensive resumed. However, the initial failure of tanks to join the assault due to minefields and heavy anti-tank fire forced the Marines to advance slowly under intense fire from various sources. In the center, the 3rd Battalion, 21st Marines advanced 800 yards, reaching the north side of the east-west runway of Airfield No. 2, while the 2nd Battalion gradually moved northward around the end of the runway by noon. In the afternoon, as tank support began to arrive, Withers' 3rd Battalion captured the hill north of the airstrip after a fierce hand-to-hand battle. Simultaneously, his 2nd Battalion coordinated with the 26th Marines to seize the elevation beyond the airfield. Graham's troops easily secured the ground in front but had to pause their advance when they found themselves about 400 yards ahead of the 21st Marines. On the right flank, the 24th Marines initially made significant progress alongside Withers' men toward the airfield but were ultimately halted by the strong defenses on Charlie-Dog Ridge.  Running along the southeast edge of the east-west runway of Airfield Number 2 was a ridge known only as "Charlie-Dog Ridge." In prolongation of this ridge, on a lower level to the southeast, was a semicircular rise of ground that formed the "Amphitheater." In this area, Japanese engineers had constructed some of the most formidable defenses on the island. From the south, the approach traversed bare flat ground swept by guns on the ridge. To the east, the route led across a weird series of volcanic outcroppings and draws. It was against these positions that the 24th Marines moved out on D-plus-5. Assault squads then had to methodically clear the ridge, moving from one strongpoint to another, using fire and explosives until Charlie-Dog was secured. While the overall gains for the day were notable by Iwo Jima standards, the casualty figures were also high, with the Marines suffering 1,034 killed and 3,741 wounded during the five-day push to the second airfield. Additionally, the remainder of General Erskine's 3rd Marine Division began landing that day to officially take control of the central area. On February 25, a decision was made to hold back the 26th Marines to allow the 3rd Division to align with them. After another intense bombardment, Colonel Howard Kenyon's 9th Marines advanced through the 21st to continue the assault, but the two-battalion attack only managed to gain a meager 100 yards against Ikeda's determined defenders. Kenyon then deployed his reserve 3rd Battalion in the center, but it also failed to break through. To the east, the 23rd and 24th Marines launched simultaneous attacks, but only the 23rd made significant progress, overrunning the eastern end of the strip and establishing a foothold on the high ground to the north. Meanwhile, in the morning, Mitscher's carriers conducted a second strike on Tokyo. The Japanese sighted 600 US carrier aircraft on February 25, but Rear Admiral “Ted” Sherman reported, “The enemy opposition was only halfhearted and Japanese planes which were not shot down seemed glad to withdraw from the scene … as swiftly and unceremoniously as possible. Even here, over their own capital, the enemy were notably inferior to our naval aviators in aggressiveness, tactics, and determination.” TF-58 aircraft hit the Ota and Koizumi aircraft plants, but increasingly snowy, stormy weather meant Mitscher canceled further Tokyo strikes at 1215hrs. Spruance and Mitscher decided to hit Nagoya instead. En route to Nagoya that night destroyers USS Hazelwood and Murray sank three small Japanese craft. Eventually Mitscher realized TF-58 would not reach launching position on time, and at 0530hrs Spruance and Mitscher canceled the Nagoya strikes and headed south to refuel. TF-58 claimed 47 Japanese planes shot down and 111 destroyed on the ground for a total of 158 Japanese planes destroyed on February 25. Two hangars, one radar station, and two trains were destroyed. About 75 percent of the Ota engine plant's buildings were destroyed and an additional 15 percent heavily damaged. The Koizuma plant had also been heavily hit, and five coastal vessels and several smaller craft sunk, with another 14 vessels damaged. Total US losses were nine aircraft to antiaircraft fire and four to operational causes; four pilots were lost.. After TF-58 aircraft had plastered the Nakajima Ota airframe plant with 45 tons of bombs, February 25 photoreconnaissance revealed Ota to be 60 percent destroyed and 30 percent heavily damaged, although half of this was believed due to B-29s. After the photos TF-58 aircraft dropped another 13 tons on the plant. The Nakajima Koizuma plant was attacked on February 25 with 35 to 40 tons of bombs, with hits concentrated in the center of the plant. Reconnaissance showed 20 percent of the Koizuma roof damaged. The Hitachi–Tachikawa aircraft engine plant was attacked by one Task Group strike, with US airmen reporting “excellent results.” Photographs showed many bomb hits, but smoke made precise damage assessments difficult. Slight damage was also inflicted on the Tachikawa airframe plant. TF-58 planes struck the B-29s' nemesis, the Musashino-Tama aircraft engine plant, with 40 tons of bombs in the center of the Tama complex.  On that day, LeMay also dispatched 231 B-29s to attack Tokyo with incendiaries, with 172 successfully dropping 453.7 tons of bombs, incinerating a square mile of the city. This operation served as the "conclusive" test of the incendiary bombs that the 20th Air Force had requested, with valuable lessons to be learned for future use. The next day, the 26th Marines resumed their attack despite the high ground on the left remaining unclaimed, successfully advancing over 300 yards in the right and center. In the center, the 9th Marines continued their assault with the 1st and 2nd Battalions side by side, but they made no notable gains. On the right flank, the 23rd Marines launched another assault towards Hill 382, facing heavy resistance and managing to advance only about 200 yards. Concurrently, Lanigan's 25th Marines moved through the battered 24th Marines, achieving an advance of approximately 100 yards before encountering intense machine-gun fire from the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. On February 27, Wonrham's 27th Marines took over from the exhausted 26th and continued to push northward despite rising casualties, successfully overrunning several strongpoints and gaining about 500 yards across the front. In the center, the 9th Marines finally breached the enemy's main defenses towards Hill 199-O and captured Hill Peter, securing Airfield No. 2. Meanwhile, on the right, the 4th Division pressed on against the heavily fortified Japanese positions at the Meatgrinder, advancing only 150 to 200 yards on each flank while struggling to make headway against the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob. In the final attack of the month, the 27th Marines advanced towards Hill 362A, reaching its base but were forced to retreat nearly 100 yards due to Japanese counterattacks and loss of communication. In the center, Withers' 21st Marines moved past the 9th Marines and rapidly advanced north of Airfield No. 2, making significant progress on the right as they swept through Motoyama village and captured the high ground overlooking Airfield No. 3. To the east, Cates continued to send troops into the Meatgrinder, with the 23rd Marines gaining over 200 yards and launching an attack on Hill 382, while the 25th Marines struggled to make any headway against the Amphitheater and Turkey Knob, achieving only minor gains along the coast. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And thus we have begun one of the most brutal battles of WW2, let alone the Pacific War. It was a controversial decision to invade Iwo Jima and the Americans could never have predicted how the Japanese would change their tactics to turn the entire ordeal into one giant meat grinder.

The Tactical Air Reconnaissance Pods System (TARPS) was a significant advancement in reconnaissance technology, particularly for the U.S. Navy during the late 20th century. TARPS, developed and deployed during the Gulf War (1990-1991), was a crucial system designed to enhance real-time intelligence-gathering capabilities for naval aviation, especially for carrier-based aircraft. The system was integrated into F-14 Tomcat fighter jets, allowing them to conduct high-resolution imagery and reconnaissance missions. TARPS utilized a sophisticated suite of sensors, including high-definition cameras and infrared systems, to capture imagery and data over enemy territory. This made it a valuable asset for targeting and surveillance, providing crucial intelligence during the conflict. One of the individuals behind the deployment of TARPS was Chris Bacon, a Navy veteran who played a role in the system's operational success. In August 1998, at 17 years old, Chris Bacon joined the Navy and started basic training in Orlando, Florida. After graduation, he went to Photo School in Pensacola, Florida. Upon graduating, he received orders to report to the VF-103, F-14 Fighter Squadron. VF-103 was part of Carrier Air Wing 17, based in Virginia Beach, Virginia. Shortly after, he deployed for workups in preparation for a six-month deployment. As scheduled, the airwing deployed on August 7 aboard the USS Saratoga and made a rapid crossing of the Mediterranean as Iraq invaded Kuwait. Ten days after deploying, the US began Operation Desert Shield. On the evening of January 28, the USS Saratoga received orders to initiate Desert Storm. After seven months and 21 days of deployment, with 11,700 arrested landings, 12,700 sorties flown, and 36,382 miles traveled, the USS Saratoga returned to its home port on March 28 with fewer sailors. The success of TARPS marked a significant milestone in the evolution of naval reconnaissance capabilities, enabling Navy pilots to gather detailed intelligence in real time while remaining out of the enemy's direct line of fire. During the Gulf War, the U.S. Navy utilized TARPS extensively for various missions, including target identification, battle damage assessment, and strategic reconnaissance over Iraq and Kuwait. The system's ability to gather high-quality imagery and intelligence played a vital role in guiding airstrikes and shaping military strategy. The data collected by TARPS provided commanders with timely and actionable intelligence, which greatly enhanced the effectiveness of allied forces during the conflict. TARPS became a benchmark for future reconnaissance technologies, demonstrating the importance of integrating advanced sensors into military aircraft to improve operational effectiveness. It also highlighted the growing importance of real-time intelligence in modern warfare, a trend that would continue to evolve in subsequent conflicts and military technologies. In addition to its use in the Gulf War, TARPS continued to serve as a vital tool in the U.S. Navy's arsenal for many years after the conflict. It contributed to numerous intelligence-gathering operations and was a crucial component of naval reconnaissance efforts in the post-Cold War era. TARPS' legacy paved the way for future advancements in aerial reconnaissance systems and underscored the importance of technological innovation in military operations. Overall, the development and deployment of TARPS represented a major leap forward in naval aviation technology. Thanks to the efforts of individuals like Chris Bacon and the broader U.S. Navy team, TARPS played a critical role in the Gulf War, providing essential reconnaissance data that helped shape the outcome of the conflict. Its impact on military reconnaissance continues to be felt today as modern systems build on the foundation laid by TARPS. January 1, 1994, marked Chris's final six-month deployment, which coincided perfectly with Operation Deny Flight and Operation Provide Promise, which enforced the UN's no-fly zone and provided air support over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Upon his return, the USS Saratoga docked in Jacksonville, Florida, and was decommissioned. Her last day at sea was his last day in the Navy. We're grateful to UPMC for Life and Tobacco Free Adagio Health for sponsoring this event!

Last time we spoke about the battle for Kohima and the mop up of the Admiralty islands. The battle for Kohima led to battles raging over the Kohima Ridge. At one point only 2500 allied defenders were facing nearly 15,000 Japanese. Numerous features fell to the Japanese top Kohima ridge. The Japanese were taking heavy casualties while pushing the defenders close to Kohima. A decisive moment presented itself, the Japanese had an open shot against Dimapur. However, mostly because of animosity towards General Mutaguchi the chance to deliver a kill blow was lost. If Dimapur had been taken, it may have changed the entire Burma War. Over in the Admiralty Islands, Los Negros and Manus were finally all mopped up and now the allies had forward airfields to further smash the inner Japanese perimeter. General MacArthurs triumphant return to the Philippines was on its way. This episode is the Defense of India Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Last we spoke, General Mutaguchi had initiated a grand offensive against Kohima. General Slim, knew the seizure of Kohima would be attempted only in conjunction with the seizure of the much more important target, Dimapur. It was at Dimapur where an enormous allied supply dump lied over the Ledo-Imphal line, it was the hub for which all allied activity in the region revolved. If Dimapur fell, the province of Manipur would be impossible to defend and the Brahmaputra valley would be interdicted thus cutting off all overland supply to China. To everyone's shock the Japanese instead invested an entire division to attack Kohima. Slim thought this was a enormous blunder on the part of General Sato Kotoku, going as far as to ask the RAF not to bomb the Generals HQ as “it never struck him that he could inflict terrible damage on us without taking Kohima at all”. In truth it was not really Sato at fault, it was more so upon his superior General Kawabe Mazakazu who did not trust nor like Mutaguchi and rightly suspected the man's megalomaniac plan to invade India. Thus Mutaguchi's Operation U-Go, the intended invasion of India saw the 33rd and 15th divisions closing in on Imphal by the end of March as the 31st Division attacked Kohima. General Cowan's 17th Division was able to effectively retreat to Imphal by April 4th, with the 49th Brigade acting as rearguard. Meanwhile General Yanagida had just replenished ammunition and provisions after the battle at Tonzang and now ordered the 214th and 215th Regiments to resume their advance. Colonel Sasahara Masahiko's 215th regiment departed Singgel on March 27th and crossed the India-Burma border by April 3rd. They advanced to Churachandpur by the 7th as the 214th followed closely behind them. Meanwhile, the Right Assault Unit, the Yamamoto unit had been in hot pursuit of General Gracey's 20th division since the start of April, and the 3rd battalion, 213th regiment of the Mitsui Unit had just captured the town Chamol. Additionally the 1st battalion, 60th regiment attempted, but failed to break through Laiching Hill in late March. Afterwords the unit was ordered to turn back and attempt a development of Gravey's left flank by Moving through Lamlong and then Kampang in early April. To the north, General Yamauchi's Divisional Headquarters advanced to Kasom on March 28. Yamauchi ordered two companies of the 1st Battalion, 67th Infantry to attack and occupy Kameng, which presented an easy approach route to Imphal. The 123rd Indian Brigade, 5th Indian Division had closed the gap with barbed wire and set up defensive positions in the hills to the immediate north and south of the road. The attack was made on the night of April 3 against the positions held by the 1/17th Dogras of the 123rd Indian Brigade on a hill off the Ukhrul Road, south of the village of Kameng, but failed to achieve its objective. They were then furiously counter-attacked by the guns of the 28th Field Regiment and by the Dogras themselves. A troop of tanks each of the 3rd Carabiniers and 7th Cavalry were also positioned on either side of the hill and fired on what were easy targets. By the next morning, almost 100 Japanese bodies were found; the few survivors had withdrawn. It is believed that the ultimate objective of this attack had been the fair-weather Kangla Airfield farther south. It was now felt the 15th Division's strength was spreed too thinly, thus the Japanese believed their detachments holding along the Imphal-Ukhrul road were badly in need of reinforcement. As such, Yamauchi ordered the 60th and 51st regiments to get into closer contact and by the 4th of April they were moving into positions north of Imphal. On that same day, Colonel Matsumura started moving down the road to seize the supply depot known as the 221 Advance Ordnance Depot, the largest in the Imphal Area justnorth of Kanglatongbi. As Japanese pressure on the road increased, its men and some of the most valuable supplies, including ammunition and explosives, were moved into a defensive area at Kanglatongbi known as Lion Box. The 2nd battalion managed to take Hill 3813 by April 6th, the 3rd battalion was less fortunate facing the Lion Box. The Lion Box had very few fighting troops among the several thousand men within its perimeter. The box was defended against mounting Japanese assaults from 4 to 7 April, while the evacuation of the supplies to Imphal continued apace. Its defense was assisted by units of the 9th Indian Brigade and tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers, who would travel up from Sekmai in the south during the day. On the 5th while the 9th Indian BRigade and tanks of the 3rd Carabiniers were patrolling forward to help out the Lion Box, Cowan's 63rd Brigade arrived to Sekmai to reinforce the northern defenses, and this in turn allowed the 9th Brigade to take up a position to defend Nungshigum. On the 6th, Colonel Omoto's 3rd battalion attacked Nungshigum's northern Hill, known as Hill 3833, successfully overrunning the hastily developed Indian defenses there, while the 1st battalion marched upon Hill 4057. There was a heroic counter attack by a platoon led by 18 year old Jemadar Abdul Hafiz serving as Naib Subedar, Junior Commissioned Officer in the 9th Jat Regiment, British Indian Army. His platoon managed to recover Hill 3833 by the end of the day. Jemadar Abdul Hafiz was tasked with recovering it with two sections of his platoon. He fearlessly led the way and recovered the feature in the face of a hail of machine-gun fire and grenade attacks, killing several Japanese in the process. Injured by now, Hafiz continued the attack, fought to his death and was posthumously awarded the Victoria Cross. The hill became known as Runaway Hill because of the way the Japanese had fled from Hafiz's brave actions. April the 7th saw a follow-up charge with Omoto's 3rd battalion re-seizing the hills around Nungshigum. In the four days that followed, Nungshigum exchanged hands a couple of times: the 3/9th Jats recovered it, only to lose it again to the Japanese of the 3/51st Battalion by 11 April who dug in well on the northern and southern bumps around Nungshigum. Meanwhile Matsumura was continuing to exert heavy pressure upon the Lion Box, finally forcing the battle weary defenders to evacuate the box as the position became impossible to defend. The valiant efforts of the Lion Box defenders had earned the British-Indian troops valuable time to evacuate a large amount of critical supplies back to Imphal, preventing their use to the Japanese. Do remember Mutaguchi literally planned the entire offensive on the basis their logistical supply line was simply seizing the allies supply depots. That is what we call a bold strategy. Matsumura's troops had suffered heavy casualties in their efforts against the Lion Box. Now he ordered the 60th regiment east to reassemble around the villages of Tingsat, Molvom and their surrounding heights by April 8th. They would be reinforced by the honda raiding units coming from the north. On the 9th, Omoto's 1st battalion assaulted Hill 4057 taking it from elements of the 123rd Indian Brigade, as the 3rd battalion secured Nungshigum. This breakthrough posed an unacceptable threat to the British, leaving the 4th Corps HQ, the Imphal Main and Kangla airfield vulnerable to further Japanese attacks. This prompted General Brigg's to get forces together to evict the Japanese from their recently gained heights. Brigg's was reinforced with the 254th Indian Tank Brigades armor for the job. An unrelenting artillery and aerial bombardment began against the 51st regiment, greatly reducing the strength of Omoto's companies. Suffering such horrific losses, Omoto was forced to retreat over to the eastern side of the Iril River. At around dusk on the 12th, Omoto's 3rd battalion withdrew from Nungshigum to take up better positions in the hills north of Hill 4057. From this position the 3rd battalion was able to cover the 1st battalion's withdrawal from Hill 4057 during the night.  Simultaneously, Briggs launched his main counteroffensive, tossing two companies of the 1/17th Dogras and B Squadron of the 3rd Carabiniers. That morning, the infantry and tanks began climbing up via two spurs on the south-eastern side of Nungshigum. On each spur was a troop of M3 Lee-Grant tanks, together with a company of Dogras. The division's artillery, together with another troop of tanks, had been placed to the east and west of Nungshigum on the plain. As the infantry and armor climbed, the Vengeance dive-bombers and Hurricanes bombed and strafed the peaks. Soon thereafter, the 88 pieces of artillery and tanks on the plain plastered the same area. The two groups of infantry and tanks joined up at the peak named Pyramid and proceeded in a single file up a narrow ridge towards the Japanese on Southern Bump. As they approached the Japanese defenses, fierce fighting erupted. The tanks were sprayed with machine-gun and rifle fire, and grenades were thrown at them. But there was only so much the Japanese could do. The use of armor on Nungshigum, which rose over 1,000ft above the valley floor, was a masterstroke. The Japanese had never expected to encounter tanks and they had nothing to counter them effectively. The British had to pay a high price, too. All of the British tank officers were killed and the infantry officers wounded later that day. The former had been shot as they stuck their heads out of their tanks' turrets to guide them safely on the narrow and steep ridgeline. It was finally left to the VCO of the Dogras, Subadar Ranbir Singh, and Squadron Sergeant-Major Craddock of the 3rd Carabiniers to complete the battle. They rose to the occasion; the tanks finally destroyed the main bunkers and the infantry charged at and killed any survivors. There were casualties on both sides, but Japanese losses were especially heavy, leaving 250 bodies. This was the closest the Japanese would come to Imphal as a large, organized force in 1944. Yamauchi's 15th Division would never be able to pose such an urgent threat from the north again.  On April 13th, the Honda unit and 2nd battalion, 60th infantry launched an unsuccessful attack against Sengmai. In another attack on the 18th, the 2nd battalion gained a foothold in the enemy positions on the eastern hill of Sengmai, but would be forced off it quickly losing 150 men. The failure to breach the defenders at Sengmai marked a turning point in the operation, forcing the Right Assault Unit onto the defensive. Meanwhile Omoto's withdrawal had opened a gap between his units and Matsumura's, leaving Matsumura isolated around the Imphal-Kohima road and the Mapao-Molvom range. This also left Matsumura's supply lines increasingly vulnerable to attacks by Brigg's 5th Division. General Scoones ordered the 23rd Indian Division to push back on the Ukhrul Road to regain control over the area, while Briggs cleared the Japanese out of the Imphal-Kohima and Mapao-Molvom Range. For this Major-General Ouvry Roberts dispatched the 37th Brigade up the Ukhrul Road while the 1st Brigade made a wide flanking maneuver to the right to swing north in an attempt to capture Yamauchi's HQ. A composite unite of the 51st regiment known as the Suzuta unit formed out of two companies and Suzuta's HQ managed to resist the Indian attacks at Yaingangpokpi. Their mission was to hold the pass near Hill 3524 and they were met by numerous enemy counterattacking groups. The Suzuta Unit was faced with a serious crisis when it was attacked by a strong enemy tank force on 18 April. Meanwhile back on the 15th, the sudden appearance of the 1st Brigade at Hill 5515.. With his headquarters threatened by this new enemy maneuver, Yamauchi decided to move 15th Division headquarters and the Suzuta Unit to the rear of the Right and Center Assault Units. This move was complicated in that it entailed the evacuation of large numbers of casualties, among whom was General Yamanouchi himself. Upon arriving in the vicinity of Nungga intense enemy activity was encountered. It was found impossible to move west, to the desired destination and the headquarters was forced to move toward Lungshong via Ukhrul. The Suzuta Unit troops reverted to their parent organizations. The command post of the Division was finally established at a point about three miles southwest of Lungshong on 29 April. By april 22nd, Robert's Brigades made contact over the Ukhrul Road near Litan and began hunting down Yamauchi's HQ. They searched for it around Shongphel to the north. They converged on the spot, only to find Yamauchi was not there. To the east the 9th Brigade attacked the Mapao-Molvom Range on the 23rd, making some initial gains at Mapao. Their field guns with Hurricane bombers smashed Mapao, allowing the Jats and Punjabis to fight their way up and capture it in two days. But farther north, the heights around Molvom were better defended and the Japanese defied attempts to infiltrate these positions. The brigade soon got bogged down. Further east the 123rd Brigade advanced up the Iril River Valley facing some of Omoto's retreating men and would reach Sengmai by mid-may. The Japanese at this point were also preparing to continue their offensive further south. General Yanagida received reports on the progress of the 15th Division and that Kohima had already fallen. So he decided to bypass the expected resistance in the Moirang vicinity and advance directly upon Imphal. This prompted Colonel Sasagara to send his 2nd battalions of the 215th and 213th regiment to attack the Torbung positions on the 9th. They managed to successfully outflank the 49th brigade and exerted so much pressure in the area, the 49th brigade were forced to withdraw over the next few days. With the Japanese in hot pursuit, Cowan dispatched the 32nd Indian Brigade to defend the Tiddim Road with Brigadier David MacKenzie shifting his main position further back to Bishenpur. The Bishenpur village was well located: it was where the hills touched the Tiddim Road to its west; to the east lay the upper reaches of the Loktak Lake. Bishenpur was considered the best place to position a defense of the southwestern approach to Imphal. It was also important because from here a track wriggled west over the mountains to Silchar in Assam. Besides the Imphal–Kohima Road, the Bishenpur–Silchar Track was the only other navigable route back out to the rest of India. Unsurprisingly then, it was also of interest to the Japanese. On April 12th the Japanese attacked Potsangbam, but the 2nd battalion, 213th regiment was held up by heavy artillery and aerial bombardment from Bishenpur. The Japanese forayed into the villages of Kwa Siphai and Khoijuman to the northeast, but they were rebuffed. To counter them, aerial bombardments were called in on Potsangbam and the next large village, Ningthoukhong. Strategic Air Force Liberators pattern-bombed the two villages with 1,000lb bombs. The British sent tanks, together with infantry units, across the paddy fields towards Potsangbam, but their advance was held up by fierce opposition. Unlike at Nungshigum, the Japanese here were armed with anti-tank guns. Evicting them would require that much more effort. The 4th Independent Engineer Regiment was brought up to reinforce the 2nd Battalion, 213th Infantry at Potsangbam about 20 April, but it would be unable to break through nonetheless. To the west Sasahara's men tried to break through Kokadan on the 14th. They made repeated attacks for over a month, but would be unable to penetrate Mackenzie's defenses. The 214th regiment tossed three attacks against Hill 5846 from their position on Ingourok by April 24th. Hand-to-hand fighting ensued as each side sought to gain possession of these hills. The British had brought up a troop of Lee-Grant tanks of the 150th Regiment Royal Armoured Corps from Bishenpur and these were pressed into battle, firing in close support of the infantry. By 26 April, Point 5846 and Wooded Ridge were under their firm control, while the Japanese had Wireless Hill. Meanwhile the 2nd battalion reinforced the 214th regiment to skirt around Hill 5846 from the west, going just due north of the track. This endeavor ultimately failed in the end, and the men would have to turn back by the end of the month. Due to his failures and disagreements, General Mutaguchi consequently lost faith in Yanagida, who was ignored from this point onwards while his chief-of-staff, Colonel Tanaka Tetsujiro, effectively commanded the 33rd Division.  Meanwhile over on the hill of the Shenam Saddle, the battle for Nippon Hill had been raging since early April. Gracey's initial piecemeal attempts to retake the feature only saw his men fail. On the other side, the Yamamoto Detachment launched a general attack from Chamol on the 8th, trying to make a breakthrough to Nippon Hill, to relieve the outnumbered 11th company, 213th regiment. While the Japanese were held up by crossfire from Tengnoupal, the 80th Brigade sent three companies of the 1st Devon's to recapture Nippon Hill on the 11th. Following heavy artillery and aerial bombardment, the British troops stormed the hill with a fierce lobing of grenades and machine gun fire, seizing the feature by the end of the day. Nonetheless the Japanese, General Yamamoto kept committing troops to continuous attacks over the next few days. What was witnessed on Nippon Hill was to be repeated on many occasions around Imphal. Japanese defensive positions would be subjected to intense bombardments, which it was hard to imagine anyone surviving. And yet, time and again, the Japanese would emerge out of the targeted positions and counter-attack. In fact, Nippon Hill was one such place where, even days after it had been recaptured by the British, a lone Japanese soldier would emerge from the rubble and attack. This after being buried for hours, or even days, usually without recourse to food or water. This behavior was a measure of the extraordinary capabilities of the Japanese, as defenders in particular, and of their dedication to their cause in general. It was also a testament to the strength of their defenses. On features like Nippon Hill, the Japanese had shown themselves to be adept at digging an extensive, deep network of underground tunnels and holes within their positions. These allowed them to withstand bombardments, while the small openings allowed for a sustained fire to be kept up on anyone who approached. After a week of fighting, the 3rd Battalion, 213th Regiment finally recaptured Nippon Hill on April 16, and this time it was to stay with the Japanese until the end of July. The hill would allow the Japanese to observe allied movements over the Shenam Saddle and the road below, so accurate firing from well-sited guns on this hill and the adjacent ridge would cause many casualties among the defenders. Yamamoto ramped up his efforts trying to break through towards Imphal. With additional tank and artillery support the 3rd battalion, 213th regiment managed to overrun Crete East on the 22nd as the 80th Brigade evacuated to the isolated Cyprus. Pressing onwards, Yamamoto attacked Crete West, tossing multiple attacks at the feature over the next two weeks. Despite the ferocity of the invaders, the defenders would manage to hold on until the end of April. Meanwhile the 1st battalion, 60th regiment was unable to break through Hill 5240 near Kampang, so on the 20th they were redirected to hit the northern sector of Palel. The battalion had suffered 300 casualties, unable to pose much of a threat any longer to Gracey's men. To their left was the 1st INA Division's 2nd Gandhi Brigade,  deployed on the left flank of Yamamoto Force and an initial group that had rushed through the hills towards Palel. They were targeting the airfield from the south in coordination with the Japanese closing in via Langgol from the east. They clashed with Indian and Gurkha defenders at Purum Chumban on May 2nd. There are differing accounts of what happened during the battle of Purum Chumbang. One has the INA group reaching very close to the airfield, while another has it reach some 8km short of it. What is common to both, however, is the reaction of the Fourteenth Army units (Indian and Gurkha) to the INA's effort. A parley between the two is supposed to have taken place at some point, where the latter tried to convince their brethren on the British side not to fight. This being rejected, the INA attacked and was repulsed. At least 50 INA men were killed in the retaliatory response. It has been argued that these attacks by their fellow Indians affected INA morale. They had not expected to be considered traitors by their former comrades of the Indian Army. Several hundred INA men deserted before the end of the battle, although the majority of the force remained in the hills around the Tamu–Palel Road, wracked by disease and hunger. In the meantime, the Kohima Garrison received relief on their ridge positions, now General Grover was formulating a plan to recapture lost territory in the Kohima area and to annhilate the 31st division. His plan was to hold Zubza and Periphema in the rear while Brigadier John Shapland's 6th Brigade would launch an attack against the Japanese center and gradually push them towards the southern and southwestern flanks of the Kohima Ridge. Brigadier Victor Hawkins 5th Brigade would would perform a flanking maneuver to the north while Brigadier William Goshcens 4th Brigade did the same in the south. On April 18, Hawkins thus dispatched his first units across the deep Zubza nullah to the Merema Ridge to cut the Kohima-Merema-Bokajan road, with the rest of the brigade following in an excruciating march and finally assembling at the Merema Ridge by April 27.  Further to the north, in parallel with the 2nd Divisions advance, Brigadier Perowne's men have been performing an extremely difficult march into the Naga Hills. Their task was to prevent the Japanese from escaping the Brahmaputra Valley, taking a track leading from Merema to Bokajan. For weeks the Chindit Brigade had conducted an effective operation, ambushing Japanese supply routes, denying them territory, encouraging local Naga resistance efforts and causing general havoc. General Mutaguchi and ordered Sato to send his 124th Infantry Regiment to support the struggling 15th Division in the south.  Sato decided to occupy Garrison Hill prior to complying with Mutaguchi's directive, immediately sending the 1st Battalion, 138th Regiment to support the attacks of the 58th Regiment. The assault failed on the 23rd and this further convinced Sato he would be unable to hold Kohima if he sent the reinforcements Mutaguchi requested. His decision was also heavily influenced by his increasing anger at his superior as Mutaguchi was completely failing to supply his men. He had been promised at least 250 tons of resupplies would arrive by April 8, Sato testily demanded food and ammunition. In fact, very few supplies ever reached the 31st Division from Burma, the men having to survive on what they had brought with them, what they could beg or steal from Naga villages, or what 'Churchill Rations' they could capture from British stockpiles. Sato's fury at the lack of promised supplies reaching Kohima was fuelled by his belief that the 31st Division was being let down by Mutaguchi's abject failure to break into Imphal. In response to Mutaguchi's demand that he send troops to assist in the Imphal battle, on April 20 Sato sent the first of a number of increasingly tetchy signals to the army commander: 'We captured Kohima in three weeks as promised. How about Imphal?' Mutaguchi replied: 'Probable date for capture of Imphal April 29', which was the Emperor's birthday. Sato plainly did not believe him. On April 30, Sato signaled again: '31st Division at the limit of its endurance. When are you going to destroy Imphal?' To this he received no reply.  The relationship between Sato and Mutaguchi had never been good, but now it was really bad. Over the next two weeks, the battles on Kohima Ridge were not seeing results. Repeated attacks were made against Garrison Hill as Shapland's men tossed desperate attacks at the extreme northern edge of the ridge allowing for a troop of Lee/Grant tanks to lumber up the western end of Naga Hill in order to provide armored support for the 5th Brigade. The plan to get tanks onto the back of Naga Hill by driving through the Japanese positions overlooking the TCP finally succeeded on April 27, the Lee/Grants trundling along the track, wary of mines, but taking the Japanese entirely by surprise at this stroke of legerdemain. Peppered on all sides futilely by bullets, they joined 5th Brigade on Naga Hill, albeit at the cost of 28 Dorset dead, who had kept intense pressure on the TCP end of the Kohima Ridge to distract the Japanese during the operation. In the fighting for control of the tennis court no means of overcoming Japanese bunkers could be discovered using infantry alone, and attempts were made to bulldoze a path up to the remains of the Deputy Commissioner's bungalow to allow a Lee/Grant tank to move onto the tennis court and engage the bunkers directly with its 75mm gun. Unhappily the first effort failed when the Lee/Grant went into reverse, pulling the bulldozer to which it was attached back down the steep slope in a heap of crashing, twisted metal. Four days later a similar attempt with a Stuart Light tank of the 45th Indian Light Cavalry also failed, as the Japanese had brought up a 3.7in. anti-tank gun that put the tank out of action, fortunately with no loss to the crew.By the 27th, the tanks made a break through to the Naga Hill. The Japanese suffered terrible casualties causing them to suspend operations against Garrison Hill. The 31st división was not fully adopting a defensive stance. Meanwhile, Goschen's men had set out on a long march to cut the Imphal Road below the Aradura Spur on the night of April 25. They were advancing through some of the worst terrain of the entire region, it was deep, nearly vertical jungle-covered gullies falling between  Mount Pulebadze and the face of Mount Japfu.  The 4th Brigade would reach the valley between Pulebadze and Japfu in three days. One there, General Stopford ordered Goschen to climb over Pulebadze Ridge then come down into Kohima to hit the Japanese position on the GPT ridge, which were giving serious problems to Shaplands men. The brigade accordingly turned left, climbing up and over the Pulebadze Ridge and beginning the slow descent through the jungle down onto the Kohima side. A prominent pimple above the GPT Ridge known as Oaks Hill, sitting at 6,000ft, was occupied by the Norfolks and the 143rd Company on 1 May, the presence of British troops 1,500ft above the Japanese positions becoming known to them for the first time. But that is all for today for India, as there is something else cooking up in the CBI theater. Since early 1943, the United States had steadily increased its air force in China. By the beginning of 1944 there were more than 500 US planes in this area, whereas, in spite of the organization of the 5th Air Army,the Japanese Air Force had less than half this number of planes in China. Furthermore, with the war situation rapidly growing worse in the Pacific, the Japanese Air Force in China could not hope for any replenishment. Enemy planes not only interfered with Japanese ground operations, but also harassed the lines of communication and attacked the occupied areas. General Chennault's 14th Air Force had been causing such problems, the Japanese were forced to act. The catalyst for their future action was because of a raid against Formosa carried out by 14 B-25s, 8 P-38s and 8 P-51s on November 25, 1943, which caught the Japanese by surprise as the Chinese-American aircraft strafed and dropped bombs over Shinchiku airfield, successfully destroying its installations along with 42 planes on the ground at the cost of three fighters lost.  This prompted the Japanese commanders to target strategic points along the Hunan-Guangxi, Guangzhou-Hankou and Southern Beijing-Hankou Railways. Thus the infamous Operation Ichi-Go was born. Ichi-Go's primary targets were Guilin and Liuzhou's airfields where the US was developing bases for B-29's to launch strikes against the Japanese home islands. If you are interested in a in-depth talk about this by the way, over on the Pacific War Channel on Youtube or Spotify, I did an interview with Dave from the Coldwar about the bombing of Japan and we talked about this very subject. Pretty neat episode I recommend it! Now in general the main objectives were to link railways in Beijing and Hankou in northern China to the southern Chinese coast at Guangzhou. This would spare shipping and avoid the pesky American submarine force who were now ruining havoc; it was also to take out airfields in Sichuan and Guangxi to thwart further US bombing of Formosa and the Japanese home islands. This also in turn would open a land route to Indochina and hopefully would destroy enough NRA units to collapse Chiang Kai-Sheks government, finally solving the China Problem. Ichi-Go would start in late April with an offensive  by the 12th Army of Lt General Kita Seiichi, later replaced by Lt General Uchiyama Eitaro. This was codenamed Operation Kogo, tasked with capturing the areas along the South Beijing-Hankou railway, centered around Zhengzhou and Luoyang, and destroying the main strength of the 1st War Area. Then, early in June, the 11th Army of General Yokoyama would launch Operation Togo, with the objective of capturing Changsha and Hengyang and destroying the main force of the 6th and 9th War Areas. Following the conclusion of the first phase, late in July, the 11th Army would be assisted by the 23rd Army of Lt General Tanaka Hisaichi and the Indochina Garrison Army of Lt General Viscount Machiiji Kazumoto would capture Guilin and Liuzhou and the destruction of the 4th War Area.  Finally, the third phase of Operation Togo would see the 23rd Army capture the strategic areas along the south Canton-Hankou railway, centered around Nanning, by destroying the 7th War Area in September while the 11th Army continued the advance south towards Suichwan Arfield to link with the Indochina forces. For the entire operation, the 5th Air Army of Lt General Shimoyama Takuma would support the offensives from the skies, tasked with annihilating the American-Chinese air force and attaining air supremacy over China. The logistics of Operation Ichi-Go constituted was one of the most notable examples of the IJA's offensive preparations. Between some of the measures taken was the emplacement of dozens of anti-air batteries throughout the Yangtze River to limit the Chinese-American air activity against troop concentrations at its southern channel; the transfer of dozens of thousands of troops by railway without interference from Chinese guerrillas because security at the railway lines was increased; the monthly river transport of 40000 tons of supplies; the secret storage of 600 pontoons; and the constructions of hideouts for a munitions arsenal that should last for two years and of hundreds of deposits that harbored 50 million liters of gasoline that should last for eight months: 40 million for land vehicles and 10 million for planes.By early April General Hata had amassed 62,000 men, 52,000 Japanese and 10,000 collaborationist units alongside 800 tanks, 1550 artillery pieces, 250 aircraft, 15550 motorized vehicles and 100000 horses.  Meanwhile the British Eastern Fleet had been receiving more naval resources due to the successes in the Mediterranean and Northern Europe and could now carry out more aggressive actions in the Indian and Pacific Oceans. Agreement had been reached, after objections from Admiral Ernest King, but new procedures would need to be learnt by naval crews and Fleet Air Arm aircrew. To this end, Operation Diplomat, a training exercise, took place in late March 1944. The objective was for the fleet to rendezvous with a group of tankers, escorted by the Dutch cruiser HNLMS Tromp and practice refueling at sea procedures. The ships then rendezvoused with USN Task Group 58.5 built around aircraft carrier USS Saratoga and three destroyers. To further support the coming Hollandia and Aitape landings, Admiral King requested that, during April, the Eastern Fleet should engage Japanese forces in their area and hold them there to reduce the opposition that could be encountered by the Americans at Western New Guinea. In response, Admiral Somerville launched Operation Cockpit on April 16, an air attack against Sabang off Sumatra. The fleet sailed from Trincomalee on 16 April, and two days later the Gambia and Ceylon were detached from Force 69 to strengthen the anti-aircraft defense of the carrier force. On the morning of April 19, 17 Barracudas and 13 Corsairs from the carrier Illustrious and 29 Dauntless and Avenger bombers and 24 Hellcats from Saratoga took off towards Sumatra and subsequently caught the Japanese completely by surprise, finding no opposition there. Thirty Japanese aircraft were destroyed on the airfield and a direct hit by a 1000-pound bomb set a large oil tank on fire. The power-station, barracks and wireless station were badly damaged. The submarine HMS Tactician reported large fires in the dockyard burning fiercely hours after the fleet had left the area. The raid was a clear success, with Somerville later saying that the Japanese "had been caught with their kimonos up".  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The invaders it seems bit off more than they could chew when they attacked India. General Mutaguchi was facing a determined enemy and very pissed off and somewhat insubordinate colleagues. Operation Ichi-Go was being prepared and the Royal Navy was sending forces into the Indian and Pacific Oceans adding to the IJN's misery.

Last time we spoke about the landing at Saidor and the drive against Sio. The Australians were still advancing across Shaggy Ridge when General MacArthur unleashed an amphibious assault against Saidor to cut off the Japanese escape and isolate Sio. Numerous features were seized up the large ridge and the Americans successfully amphibiously assaulted Saidor and seized their airfield. General Adachi placed the 51st and 20th divisions under the command of General Nakano, who was tasked with advancing to Gali to try and secure a new supply point. Meanwhile efforts were made to try and contain the new threat in Saidor while simultaneously holding back the Australians in the south. Over on new britain the airdrome was seized as Colonel Katayama launched a failed counter attack against the Marines. The Marines tossed back the attack and began their own advance further inland. This episode is Ledo Road Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  The Americans had landed at Cape Gloucester, Saidor and were carrying out massive attacks against Rabaul. As we had seen previously, on November 5th, aided by bad weather, a surprise air raid was made by the USS Saratoga and Princeton, led by Rear-Admiral Frederick Sherman that inflicted heavy damage to 4 cruisers within the harbor; Maya's engine room was smashed by a bomb killing over 70 men; a 500 lb bomb hit Mogami; Takao took 2 500 lb bomb hits while 3 500 lb bombs narrowly missed Atago killing 23 seamen and caused severe damage to the ship's plating. 2 other cruisers and 3 destroyers also suffered light damage. Captain George Chandler flying a P-38 fighter pilot described how “There were B-24 bombers up high and B-25 bombers attacking right down on the deck dropping ‘frag' bombs on the airplanes along the runways … we did our best work at high altitude, but we also took part in combat a thousand feet off the ground.” The devastation caused Admiral Miniechi Koga to withdraw his forces to Truk, thus ending the IJN threat to Bougainville. A Japanese naval officer would later admit that they had given up on Bougainville mainly because of “the serious damage received by several Second Fleet cruisers at Rabaul by carrier attack …” The successful  raid against Rabaul left Halsey ecstatic. “It is real music to me and opens the stops for a funeral dirge for Tojo's Rabaul.” On November 8th, reinforcements led by Rear-admiral Alfred Montgomery task force 38, with the new fleet carriers USS Bunker Hill, Essex and Independence. With the added carrier strength on November 11th, a follow up air raid was made seeing the IJN cruiser Agano torpedoed and badly damaged, while 35 Japanese aircraft out of 120 launched in a counter attack against the carrier force were shot down. Montgomery would not lose a single ship. Admiral Koga's decision to send carrier pilots to bolster Rabaul had quite literally blown up in his face. Koga's air fleet had lost 43 of its 82 Zeros, 38 of its 34 Vals, 34 of its 40 Kates and 6 Judy spotter planes. Over 86 of his 192 experienced pilots and crew had perished, and he had only inflicted minimal damage to Nimitz fleet, it was a disaster. Yet the fantastical reports from Japanese pilots kept pouring in, claiming the air battles over Bougainville were infact won by the IJN air forces. Newspapers in Japan reported victories that added up to the destruction of 5 American battleships, 10 carriers, 19 cruisers and 7 destroyers. The reality was the destruction of 2 cruisers, the USS Birmingham and Denver. By mid november Vice Admiral Kusaka was finding it difficult to sustain attacks against allied convoys feeding supplies to Empress Augusta Bay. On November 12th, Rabaul only had 113 Zero's of which only 59 were operational. Crews were suffering from malaria and other diseases, no one was granted rest as they were limited in personnel and under constant attack. The quality of ground crews and pilots was deteriorating every week.  From November 12 through December 16, the daytime skies over the Gazelle Peninsula remained relatively quiet, as the US carrier forces had departed to support operations in the Central Pacific. AirSols received a new commander on the November 20th, Major General Ralph Mitchell who continued to support operations in Bougainville and General Kenney's Fifth Air Force was supporting preparations for the landings in western New Britain. The lull gave Admiral Kusaka a brief opportunity to recuperate as replacements began to arrive from the Marshalls and Truk. The Imperial Japanese Navy would take six months to replenish its carrier pilots with less well-trained and inexperienced replacements. In the meantime the carrier fleet itself, Japan's most expensive and precious strategic asset, was forced to remain idle in Truk as Nimitz began his island hop through the Central Pacific Meanwhile the Torokina airfield had become crude but operational. The Seabees had created a single 4750 foot by 200 foot strip. It lacked taxiways, hardstands and buildings, but by December 10th it could launch aircraft. Soon the Seabees would carve 2 additional landing trips in the jungle 3 miles further inland. The first would be a mile long, the second 8000 feet or so for bombers. Unlike the Japanese airfields on the Gazelle Peninsula which would take more than a year to complete, both of these American airfields took a month. You often hear, especially from marine veterans of the pacific, praise for the Seabees, such a colossal advantage in logistics paved the way to victory. A massive fighter sweep was launched on December 17 consisting of 32 Corsairs, 24 F6Fs, and 24 RNZAF Kittyhawks from airfields at New Georgia and Vella Lavella who rendezvoused at Torokina, topped off their fuel tanks, and hit  Rabaul. The strike was led by Major Greg “Pappy” Boyington, the commanding officer of Marine Fighter Squadron 214, better known by its nickname, the "Black Sheep Squadron". The three types of aircraft had different flying characteristics and different cruising speeds. The Kittyhawks, slowest of the bunch, took off first. The plan was for them to come in at 15,000ft, and lure out the Japanese. Next came the Hellcats, flying above the Kittyhawks. And the last were the Corsairs, who flew top cover. It was a long flight over open water, calculated to make the pilot of a single-engine aircraft nervous. If the engine failed it was a long swim home. They were intercepted by 35 Zeros, with the Kittyhawks getting the first jump on them. After the Kittyhawks made their first pass, shooting down a Japanese fighter, the advantage switched over to the more agile  Zeros. The Kittyhawk squadron leader's plane was fatally damaged and a second Kittyhawk went down after colliding with a Zero. Remarkably, both pilots survived. Meanwhile the Hellcats and Corsairs, at high altitudes, were coming up empty. The Corsairs circled Lakunai field finding no targets. Pilot Boyington exchanged insults with an English-speaking Japanese officer over the radio, but despite his challenges found no targets in the air. When all aircraft returned to base, the score was even. Two Kittyhawks and two Zeros were lost; one each due to the collision and one shot down by both sides. It was a rather disappointing fighter sweep, but would become just one of many against Rabual over the course of the next 3 weeks. The next raid came two days later seeing 48 B-24s launched, but 32 were forced turned back. The remaining 16 bombers escorted by 51 were intercepted by 94 Japanese fighters, yet they also suffered from the bad weather. Less than half made contact with the enemy. In the resulting fight, 5 Zeros were shot down and 10 allied aircraft were lost, but only two were shot down. The other eight were due to a mid-air collision and landing mishaps, all near home. The weather persisted to be so bad, it was only on the 23rd another sortie could be launched. B-24s escorted by Corsairs and Hellcats bombed Lakunai. Radar gave the Japanese some early warning and nearly 100 Zeros were scrambled. 60 made contact with the bombers after they hit Lakunai. No bombers were lost, but 2 Corsairs were shot down in the ensuing dogfights. Yet the Americans had a twist, they followed up the raid with a fighter sweep of 48 Corsairs. They arrived 15 minutes after the bombers left, surprising the airborne Japanese fighters, most of whom lacked radios. 6 Zeros were shot down, several others damaged and only 2 Corsairs lost.  2 days later, another fighter sweep preceded by bombers was launched claiming 18 aircraft kills, but it was probably closer to 5. In comparison the Japanese pilots would claim 55 kills, a number greater than the american force sent. On the 27 another sweep was launched against Cape Gloucester downing 7 Japanese aircraft for one American. 28 Corsairs returned the next day but this time the Japanese held the advantage, sandwiching the Marines between 2 large groups of Zeros. 3 Corsairs were shot down, but so were 3 Zeros, with 2 others badly damaged. On 30th 36 Liberators escorted by 20 Hellcats and 20 Corsairs, bombed Rabaul. 1 B-24 was lost on the raid, hit by antiaircraft fire. No air combat occurred. On New Years day 15 B-24s and 68 escorting fighters met heavy fighter opposition. 40 Zeros had been sent to Rabaul from Truk, manned by veteran pilots. 1 B-24 was shot down, and two others badly damaged. On January 2 48 US fighters raided and on the 3rd another 44. The two sweeps took out a handful of fighters. The last sweep was on the 5th seeing another 2 zeros downed. Meanwhile back on December 24th, Admiral Sherman's task force 37 raided Kavieng. The operation had two purposes, 1) was to distract attention from the landings at Cape Gloucester and 2) to interdict sea traffic between Truk and Rabaul. The 5000-ton naval transport Tenyru Maru was sunk and several other ships were damaged. After this task force 37 made several raids against Kavieng through January 4th. They managed to shoot down 10 Japanese fighters, damaged IJN cruiser Noshiro and destroyers Fumizuki and Satsuki. On Janaury 6th, the bomber strip at Piva became operational, thus Rabaul was now within range of allied light and medium bombers, basically it was pounding time.   On January 7th, 16 Avengers and 24 Dauntless raided Tobera airfield. From medium altitudes the Avengers dropped 2000lb pounds smashing the paved runways. The Japanese managed to shoot down 3 fighters and one dauntless, but Tobera was temporarily not operational. It was the first time any Rabaul airbase was neutralized from bomb damage. This would be followed up on the 11th by a low level attack against Vunakanau by B-25's, damaging 8 parked aircraft. Then on the 14th, Simpson Harbor was attacked by 16 Avengers , 36 Dauntless and fighter escorts. The Japanese tossed 84 fighters but the allies held such a tight formation it was difficult to get at the bombers. 2 bombers were lost before reaching Lakunai; 1 to a mid-air collision and 1 to antiaircraft fire. When the Allied aircraft finally arrived, clouds shielded Lakunai so the bombers switched to targeting the ships in Simpson Harbor. The Avengers carried 2,000lb bombs, limiting their effectiveness. Regardless, they landed hits on the 15,400-ton-displacement oiler Naruto, and thus ended its goal of becoming the Hokage. . . sorry folks could not resist that one. The destroyer Matsukaze was also damaged alongside 5 other vessels.    AirSols came back to hit simpson harbor and blanche bay 3 days later sinking  the Komaki Maru, Kosei Maru, Yamayuri Maru, Hakkai Maru and Iwate Maru. To take down the combined 30,000 tons of shipping AirSols lost 8 P-38s, 1 Hellcat, 1 F4U, 1 Avenger, and 1 Dauntless. The rest of January saw so many raids, sometimes 2-3 on the same day, thus I can't spend the entire podcast listing their actions, but the losses were brutal. For the Americans they would lose 23 aircraft between January 23rd-30th, for the Japanese it was around 37. By the end of the month, Rabaul was being bled dry of planes, thus the rest was withdrawn to Truk with around 40 pilots. To make up for the withdrawal, Admiral Koga brought over the air groups of carriers Junyo, Hiyo and Ryuho on the 25th adding 62 zeros, 18 vals and 18 kates to Admiral Kusakas dwindling forces. Does that not sound like performing the exact same action that saw such devastating losses in late december to early january? Yes, yes it does.    Moving over to New Britain, General Shepherd had just smashed the Japanese positions along Suicide Creek. While seizing Suicide Creek some Americans captured a Japanese dispatch saying “It is essential that we conceal the intention that we are maintaining positions on Aogiri Ridge. Concerning the occupation of this position, it is necessary that Aogiri Yama is maintained.” While making arrangements for the Japanese assault against Target Hill one, Lieutenant Abe had occasion sent field dispatches to Warrant Officer Kiyoshi Yamaguchi, one of his platoon leaders. The dispatch mentioned command post locations, hour of attack, and other orders. Yamaguchi, with that seemingly incredible indifference to basic security which the Japanese so often demonstrated, simply stuck the dispatch in his pocket and carried it with him to the assault. Marines found it on his body the following morning, thereby gaining their first inkling of the existence of a terrain feature which appeared as such on none of their maps but upon which the Japanese appeared to place great importance, for reasons not yet clear. Aoigiri Ridge was not in the American maps and it was currently held by the 2nd battalion, 53rd regiment and 2nd battalion, 141st regiment. Behind the ridge was a wide trail leading to Magairapua, connecting Matsuda's HQ with Borgen Bay. The trail was heavily used and concealed extremely well from American aircraft. Back over at the American lines, by January 5th, the 3rd battalion, 7th marines had pulled back into the reserve, allowing the weapons company, 7th marines to occupy the extreme left along the shore to prepare for Shepherds offensive against Hill 150. The new formation launched their attack at 11am on the 6th. Tanks surged forward to smash a roadblock held by the 2nd battalion, 141st regiment on the left trail. Artillery was deployed on a nearby hill hitting the Japanese lines as A company tried to break through but was quickly pinned down by the roadblock. The tanks eventually burst through the roadblock sending the Japanese packing.   The americans advanced through the increasingly swampy terrain, facing weaker resistance. B company crossed a small stream and stormed Hill 150 during the afternoon, securing it. Further right, C company and the 3rd battalion, 5th marines were surprised to be held up by extremely heavy fire from the until then unknown feature, Aogiri ridge. The men had no other choice than to pull back to a safe distance to dig in as they reported back the presence of the heavily fortified position. The Japanese would unleash carnage upon the men for 2 days whenever they tried to press forward. On the 7th the commanding officer of the 3rd battalion, 5th Marines, was wounded and replaced by Lt Colonel Lewis Walt. The next day, Walk's men were cautiously inching forward under heavy enemy fire through dense jungle, when they first encountered the ground rising in steepness. At this point Walt realized the feature had to be Aogiri Ridge.    On the 9th, the assault battalions resumed their attacks, this time with heavy artillery support against Aogiri ridge. Walt was reinforced with Companies K and L from the 7th marines, but the advance was extremely slow and painful. Two Japanese bunkers were knocked out with white phosphorus grenades, but that ended the limited gains. Walt personally began pushing a 37mm gun excruciating foot by foot up Aogiri ridge, firing a volley of canisters every few feet. Somehow he managed to get the gun up the steep slope into a decent position to sweep the ridge, allowing the gain of a foothold on the crest of Aogiri. The loss of the ridge was a huge threat to Matsuda and Katayama's positions, so the latter decided to throw his reserves in a desperate but ferocious counterattack.   At 1:15am on the 10th, Katayama sent his recently arrived 3rd battalion to attack the reverse slope. However the Marines held firm and would end up repelling 5 consecutive banzai charges with a fury and persistence unparalleled in the campaign. On the 4th try a Japanese major and two company officers succeeded in knifing through the Marine cordon almost to Colonel Walt's fox hole, 50 yards behind the front line. At that instant one of two short rounds in a 60-round artillery barrage burst in a tall tree almost directly overhead, and the major died there, sword in one hand and a pistol in the other. The 5th charge was blunted by artillery and the Japanese finally cut their losses and pulled back. The Japanese had suffered immense casualties, seeing all 3 of their battalions depleted, forcing Katayama to pull off Aogiri ridge that very night. The morning of the 10th saw Walk's men securing the feature and then discovering the vital Magairapua trail. The marines went to work mopping up the area until January 12th, whereupon Shepherd planned to seize Hill 660. The feature was guarded by the 6th company, 141st regiment supported by a number of guns of the 30th machine cannon company. The fresh 3rd battalion, 7th marines, led by lt colonel Henry Buse Jr were to perform the main assault, with the 1st battalion extending the perimeter behind them. To help the effort, the weapons company,7th marines of Captain Buckley would begin constructing a roadblock between the eastern base of Hill 660 to the shore of Borgen Bay, hoping to cut off the defenders escape route.   At 08:00am on the 13th, after artillery, mortars and the 5th Air Force performed a bombardment of the area, the last Marine offensive commenced. A intricate system of small arms and automatic weapon positions going up the summit unleashed fire upon the marines, quickly pinning down I company. L Company attempted swinging to the right, but were also pinned down. Engineers worked a light tank forward far enough to place fire across a gorge demolishing the more troublesome enemy weapons. By late afternoon, together with artillery supporting fire, the pinned-down companies were rescued and withdrawn for the night. Meanwhile the Weapons company worked with their bulldozer, by 1030 they had skirted the eastern base of the hill and set up an all-around perimeter. There they dug in clearing fields of fire for about 60 yards to both north and south, placing their half-tracks and tanks in supporting positions. The only opposition they encountered during the advance was by two Japanese machine guns and emplaced near the summit of the hill. With all said and done they successfully cut off the Japanese line of retreat.  On the morning of the 14th, the 3rd battalion resumed their assault, with their leading companies advancing to the right working their way up. One unit nearly got atop the crest before coming under fire from heavy machine guns. They got to a position where they could bring 60mm mortars to bear, and went to work neutralizing the machine gun positions before a final surge carried them across the summit. The Japanese fled down the crest heading east, coming straight into the line of fire of the Weapons company below. The result was a terrible rout, seeing many escape to the safety of the swamps to the hills southeast. By the end of the 14th, the marines had seized Hill 660 and were performing mop up operations through the following day. At 5:30am on the 16th, Katayama ordered the 6th and 11th companies, 141st regiment to counter attack Hill 660. Soon the marines were face to face with a large banzai charge, seeing the fighting getting up close and personal. But small arms, rifles, 60mm mortars and 81mm artillery broke the Japanese. Over 110 Japanese bodies would be found after the fight. This ended Shepherds offensive, as the remnants of Colonel Sumiya's forces began to arrive to the Borgen Bay area. Over the next few days, the exhausted 7th marines were relieved by the 5th marines and 2nd battalion, 1st marines who had recently been recalled after completing their mission at Green Beach.  After suffering the defeated in Borgen Bay, General Sakai decided to order the 1st battalion, 54th regiment to reinforce Talasea and for Matsuda to launch a last ditch effort, a suicidal one at that, to obliterate the enemy. But the men were in no condition for such an offensive, thus Katayama elected to postpone it for now. Since every man was needed for the defense of Borgen Bay, Colonel Sato took the remainder of his commander and departed Rooke Island to join the main body. Now that Hill 660 was secured, the Americans began a new method of patrolling; this time their patrols would specifically seek out and destroy what was presumed to be exhausted Japanese units, before the division would attack the defensive line at Borgen Bay-Itni river. Yet that is it for new Britian, as we are going to be traveling over to the CBI theater. Between November 22 to December the 1st, two conference were held between the Allied leaders. The first was the Cairo or “sextant” conference on November 22-26th, between President FDR, Sir Winston Churchill and Chiang Kai-shek. The second was held in Tehran on November 28-December 1st between FDR, Churchill and Joseph Stalin. You might be asking, why did they all not meet up together. The crux of it was the Soviet-Japanese neutrality Pact and to a lesser extent, though probably not in Chiang Kai-Shek's mind, Stalin was aiding the CCP. Because the Soviets had not declared war on the Japanese, it would not look to good if they met with the leader of China, likewise Chiang Kai-shek was not too forthcoming to meet with Stalin. The easy fix was to just have two different conferences. Overall the conferences did not really touch too much upon the Pacific war. But Stalin did promise to declare war on Japan within ninety days after the end of the European War. In return he demanded military and logistical concessions in Manchuria, maintenance of Outer Mongolia under Soviet control as well as sovereignty over the Kuril Islands that stretched from north of Japan to Russia's Kamchatka Peninsula. When Chiang Kai-shek heard about this he had suspicious and noted “The influence of this conference on China will be great. I hope Roosevelt isn't plotting with Churchill and Stalin against me.” Soon his suspicion would turn to anger when he discovered there were secret protocols relating to Manchuria.  Stalin had made some assurances to Mao Zedong that once the Soviets were in the war against Japan, they would have forces to bear down into China to help tip the scale for the CCP against the NRA. Yet after the war, it would seem promises made by Joseph Stalin were not always kept.  Another important aspect of the conferences was the British decision to cancel Operation Buccaneer, the invasion of the Andaman Islands, because Admiral Mountbatten's landing crafts were required for landings in southern france. The Joint chiefs of staff were livid at this, because it came at the same time the Japanese were reinforcing Burma. FDR overruled them and agreed to the British decision and this in turn greatly pissed off Chiang Kai-Shek. Yet at the same time, the Cairo declaration had lifted up the morale for the Chinese army and people to continue their war against the Japanese. The declarations made by the Tehran conference implied publicly that the CBI theater was all but abandoned to the mercy of Japan's air and land forces. Thus it would be no coincidence the Japanese thought it ripe to launch an all-out offensive against China.  In the meantime, the rather aggressive Admiral Mountbatten was trying to salvage what he could of the situation. To try and please Chiang Kai-Shek, he proposed Operation Pigstick. The operation was something Mountbatten had wargamed a bit, it was to be a landing on the southern Mayu peninsula aimed at hitting Akyab. He began assigning landing craft for the amphibious operation, only to be immediately slapped down by Alanbrooke and told to return 3 fast tank landing crafts that were direly needed for operations against Italy. Mountbatten hoped to retain 2 slower tank landing craft, but Cunningham requested them. Pigstick was to be 2 divisions plus 2 brigades who would be used in a southward advance down the peninsula and 1 division in an amphibious assault aimed at surrounding and destroying not less than 20,000 Japanese. An additional landing similar to PIGSTICK, could perhaps be launched in the Ramree-Cheduba area, could take staging areas that would put 15 Corps within reach of Rangoon. Speaking of Ramree, if any of you have heard this kind of myth about over 1000 Japanese being eaten by crocodiles on that island, over on my personal channel the pacific war channel I did a full investigation into the so called “ramree island massacre” story. A little sad about its performance not going to lie. Dramatically improved my lackluster animation skills for it, came out really well and I did a silly impersonation at the beginning, anyways check it out its a fun one! Alongside Pigstick, Mountbatten changed the Tarzan operation into Operation Gripfast, calling for an offensive on north and central Burma with an airborne landing at Indaw to sever the Japanese line of communications to Myitkyina. But now Chiang Kai-Shek was very wary of anything British, so he rejected the plans on December 19th. Alongside pissing off Chiang Kai-Shek, his estranged wife, Joseph Stilwell was also again angry with the British, particularly Mountbatten. At one point Mountbatten proposed moving certain American units into the Hukawng valley to help the offensive there and Stillwell burst out ‘I should like it placed on record that I am responsible for the training of all American forces in this theatre and I am the person to decide when they are adequately trained and can move forward.' Mountbatten replied: ‘I accept that in principle, but would remind you that these troops are being trained under British officers. I am responsible for operations and will decide when units move into the fighting lines. In other words, general, I should like to place on record that I am Supreme Commander out here and what I say goes.' Stilwell took it good-humouredly and laughed. ‘We none of us dispute that,'”. That day Stilwell wrote a letter to his wife, referring scathingly to Mountbatten as ‘the glamour boy. He doesn't wear well and I begin to wonder if he knows his stuff. Enormous staff, endless walla-walla but damn little fighting . . . And of course the Peanut is unchanged. The jungle is a refuge from them both.' The men would all share some screaming matches against another, until Stilwell would shock everyone by exclaiming “I am prepared to come under General Slim's operational control until I get to Kamaing.” It was a truly bizarre idea, Mountbatten asked how such a thing would work, and both Slim and Stilwell asked to discuss the matter amongst themselves. The two men would agree on tactical essentials such as getting more Chinese divisions for the Ledo force and to use the Chindits to assist in hitting Myitkyina. Slim and Stilwell shook hands and Stilwell said to him ‘I would fight under a corporal as long as he would let me fight.' Slim would later reflecte ‘In practice this illogical command set-up worked surprisingly well. My method with Stilwell was based on what I had learnt of him in the Retreat – to send him the minimum of written instructions, but, whenever I wanted anything, to fly over and discuss it with him, alone. Stilwell, talking things over quietly with no one else present, was a much easier and more likeable person than Vinegar Joe with an audience. Alone, I never found him unreasonable or obstructive. I think I told him to do something he did not approve of on only two or three occasions, and on each he conformed, I will not say willingly, but with good grace.' In the end Operation Pigstick never became a reality, because the landing crafts were needed for the Italian campaign and thus the hope of meeting Chiang Kai-sheks continued demand for an amphibious operation was gone. It was almost like the British never intended to go through with such a thing in the first place, woops that is just my opinion. Meanwhile the British-Indian command elected to start a new operation in Arakan. The brutal hard-won lessons of 1st Arakan battle had been absorbed in India Command, with senior British officers determined to avoid similar mistakes. The new operation was the subject of meticulous reconnaissance, planning, and rehearsals. A series of lectures, war games, models of the grounds and syndicate discussions were held for commanders, staff and regimental officers whom carefully considered countering Japanese offensive tactics and assaulting prepared defensive positions like those witnessed at Donbaik. A carefully planned programme of continuous, progressive and intensive training was put in hand for all corps and divisional fighting, support and administrative troops to practice necessary skills, including using brigade boxes, aerial resupply and the infiltration and envelop- ment of enemy positions. This comprehensive training programme culminated in intensive rehearsals and combined arms training with artillery, tanks and close support aircraft carried out near Lohardaga, over ground resembling Arakan, simulating attacks on mock Japanese defensive positions on jungle-clad hills. General Auchinleck assigned the 15th corps, reconstituted at Ranchi with the 3 best trained divisions available: Major-General Harold Briggs' 5th Indian Division; Major-General Frank Messervy's 7th Indian Division and Major-General Christopher Woolner's 81st West African Division.The 26th Indian Division formed the corps reserve. Command of the 15th corps would be given to Lt General Philip Christison. The plan called for the 5th and 7th Indian divisions to advance along the summit of the Mayu range towards Maungdaw and Buthidaung while the 5th and 6th west african brigades would provide flanking protection. On November 1st, the 2 Indian divisions began their advance and by mid november would make contact with a Japanese outpost.As the 7th Indian division advanced astride the Kalapanzin River they ran into stiff resistance. Efforts to dislodge Japanese defenders near Awlanbyin and Letwedet, showcased the formidable difficulties that attacking Japanese defensive bunker positions presented. Most were built on razor-back ridges, through which were burrowed fire positions, affording a limited approach, while the reverse slopes protected troops from view and bombardment. With the precipitous Goppe Pass initially only suitable for porters, pack transport and pack artillery, 7th Indian Division quickly devised other methods to overcome enemy defenses, since normal stereotyped, set-piece attacks stood little chance of success without supporting field artillery. Aircraft proved an ineffective substitute, moreover, with dive-bombing having only a transitory effect since the broken terrain and dense jungle absorbed blast leaving defenses and morale largely intact unless a lucky direct hit was made. The Indian forces began to infiltrate and bypass the well-entrenched Japanese defenses, giving the impression they would soon unleash a frontal attack upon them at any moment. General Messervy's would say of the action  “'We will undoubtedly have a Neapolitan sandwich of British - Japs - British, but it will be one made by ourselves, and with the initiative in our hands it will soon be transformed to British - British - Jap.” They were gaining ground and with it valuable combat experience. On the night of November 30th, the 15th Indian Corps commenced large-scale operations to drive in the Japanese outpost line astride the Mayu Range. A series of brisk skirmishes were fought by 33rd Indian Infantry Brigade on the jungle-cloaked ridges south of Awlanbyin quickly evicting small determined parties of Japanese infantry from carefully prepared platoon and company defensive localities. This was by no means an easy task since most heavily camouflaged positions were built atop steep hillsides overlooking paddy fields that provided an open field of five and difficult going for advancing troops. Earlier directions about infiltration paid off in practice. An attack on Awlanbyin west redoubt from the rear through thick jungle achieved complete surprise. Although a neighboring Japanese position initially held out, its garrison withdrew on 2nd December after being cut off. The 33rd Brigade columns  crossed the Ngakyedauk Chaung and occupied the area from Ngakyedauk village to the ridge about 1.5 miles north-west of Sinohbyin village. By December3rd, they extended the area of operation to the hills overlooking Maungyithaung and Sinohbyin. The 89th Brigade, meanwhile, pushed forward down Tatmin Chaung and established forward positions on the hills south of the chaung, one mile west of Tatmingyaungywa. By mid-month, 7th Indian Division had reached the main enemy positions covering the Tunnels and Buthidaung, and the opening of the Ngakyedauk Pass to wheeled traffic in late December considerably eased resupply and allowed the divisional artillery to join the formation. However, both the Indian divisions were under orders not to get engaged in serious fighting with the Japanese, so the advance stopped there. It is also important to note, in November 1943,  Spitfires were deployed in Bengal for the first time. The 615th and 617th squadrons were based in Chittagong to protect the vital port and also to cover the Arakan. Within one month, the Spitfires destroyed four Japanese photographic reconnaissance aircraft. Previously, the Dinah's range, speed and height had enabled them to fly with impunity over the Allied forward bases and the Hurricanes were unable to catch them. The Japanese reacted by sending out fighter sweeps in order to test the Spitfires and whittle down Spitfire strength. However, by the end of December, the Japanese lost 22 aircraft, another 33 were damaged, and the Allied loss was only 13 aircraft. The greatest air battle occurred on the last day of 1943. On that day, No. 136 Squadron destroyed 12 and damaged 11 when a mixed force of Japanese fighters and bombers attempted to attack the light naval force along the Arakan Coast. The Japanese carried out one strategic attack when on 5 December 1943, 60 bombers and fighters, including some naval aircraft, in two waves bombed Calcutta. The Japanese lost two aircraft and another five were damaged. The three and a half squadrons of Hurricane fighters, including half a squadron of night fighters which were defending the area lost five aircraft and another six were damaged.  To the west the 5th Indian Division had also encountered stiffening resistance from Japanese outposts as it advanced southwards along the coastal plain towards Maungdaw, through the foothills further north and along the spine of the jungle-clad Mayu Mountains. They soon discovered that overcoming Japanese bunker defenses presented particular difficulties. As the division would report "The great difficulty in attacking Jap "hill top" positions lies in the concealment of the actual bunker or weapon pit' one brigade commander later wrote, and in the practical impossibility of deploying attacking troops in thick jungle, particularly where the approach runs along the top of a razor backed ridge.' In each case, patrols infiltrated between these localities isolated them from supplies and reinforcements with the result that Japanese normally gave up ground without a contest. A newsletter prepared by the HQ of 5th Indian Division reported: 'The only way to deal with the Jap def positions is by INFILTRATION. Recent experience has shown that the Jap has produced nothing new in def tactics... It is almost physically impossible in hilly and thick country to have every post covered by another, the posts can be eliminated piece- meal by infiltration tactics.' After the outline of the main Japanese defenses became apparent this approach was also increasingly applied at brigade level. At the end of December 1943, the 5th Indian Division held the area from the sea to the crest of the Mayu Peninsula and the 7th Indian Division moved into the Kalapanzin Valley. By the end of the month they reached Maungdaw. The advancing 5th Indian Division discovered that frontal assaults could not be completely avoided, however, when Japanese troops were determined to stay put. During this advance, the 161st Brigade moved to the high ground to the northeast of Bakkagona about five miles to the north of Razabil. On 30th December, 161st Indian Infantry Brigade assaulted Point 124, but the 4/7th Rajputs were held up by dense jungle and heavy mortar and machine fire and suffered heavy casualties. For six days assaults continued with the forward infantry regularly reaching the Japanese defenses before being driven off by showers of hand grenades and supporting machine-gun from every other enemy defensive position within range. Only after a 'policy of strangulation, starvation, and attrition was adopted', did its defenders withdraw. The 5th Indian Division immediately began probing the main Razabil defenses, while its 123rd Indian Infantry Brigade patrolled the western foothills of the Mayu Range and northern side of Razabil, particularly two hill positions dubbed Wrencat and Wrenkitten. To do so an indirect approach was again advocated by Major-General Harold Briggs in note on tactical policy issued on 4th January, stressing the importance of patrolling to identify positions held by the Japanese and infiltration to seize vital ground in their flanks or rear that would either provoke Japanese counterattacks or force a withdrawal. Meanwhile Stilwell arrived to Shingbwiyang on December 21st and assumed command of the Chinese forces in India. To relive the trapped battalion of the 112th regiment at Yupbang Ga, Stilwell and General Sun planned to send the entire 114th regiment to break the Japanese center at Yupang Ga to rescue the 112th, then hook north to envelope the northern fragment of the Japanese defensive line. On December 24th, they unleashed artillery and launched the infantry into the Japanese lines. The 114th regiment managed to envelop the Japanese right flank by the afternoon and soon a breakthrough emerged allowing for them to make contact with the 112th. Sun's men then surrounded the Japanese pocket during the night and would wipe them out the next morning. And thus the Chinese had gained their first victory at Yupbang Ha, though the Japanese still held the river crossing, so Stilwell began plans for another assault set after Christmas. On December 28th, Sun ordered 3 battalions to attack the north, while the 1st battalion, 112th regiment would sweep to the right, getting behind the 3 Japanese outer strongpoints. The chinese forces rapidly broke the Japanese outer defenses creating a breach while the 1st battalion, 114th regiment broke through the river defensive line. The Japanese tossed a large counterattack, but it would be repelled by the night time. Now Yupbang Ga was in allied hands as the surviving Japanese companies split into smaller groups trying to hold out for many days. With the fall of Yupbang Ga, the Japanese were forced to withdraw from Sharaw Ga as well, so elements of the 2rd battalion, 113th Regiment were be able to seize it by December 30. In the meantime, as the 22nd Division's 65th Regiment had been sent towards the Taro Plain to try and secure the southern flank, the 2nd and 3rd Battalions of the 114th Regiment had been sent south to cross the Tanai Hka at the Kantau ford in an effort to cut off the enemy withdrawal line. By the end of 1943, with the loss of 315 killed and 429 wounded, Sun's 38th Division had gained complete control of the Tarung Hka.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Things were deteriorating for the Japanese on New Britain as American Marines were seizing features and gradually pushing them into Borgan Bay. Within the CBI theater a ton of drama amongst the high commanders was surprisingly not resulting in disaster, as operations in Burma were kicking off with great results. Perhaps Burma could be saved.

#Panama: Serial crises from the drought to the reduced Canal capacity to the closing of the copper mine to the presidential election and to the tens of thousands trekking the Darien Gap.  @Michael_Yon  https://fortune.com/2023/12/04/panama-canal-dry-backed-up-brutal-drought-shippers-paying-4m-jump-queue/ 1932 USS Saratoga in the Panama Canal

  Last time we spoke about the invasion of the Treasury Islands. The time had come to begin operations against Bougainville, but in order to do so the allies had a few tricks up their sleeves. In order to make sure the landings at Cape Torokina at Empress Augusta Bay went safely, the allies would perform raids against Choiseul and the Treasury islands. It was hoped such actions would work as a diversion and confused the Japanese as to where the real operations were aimed. The landing on Mono saw some New Zealanders and Americans annihilate a 200 strong Japanese garrison. On Choiseul Paratroopers boldly raided a force 6 times larger than them. The raid was a success and thanks to John F Kennedy the Paratroopers were grabbed off the island before the Japanese could obliterate them. In the end the landings at Cape Torokina were a success and now a battle would be unleashed.  This episode is the battle of Empress Augusta Bay Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  So last time we covered the planning behind Operation Cherryblossom, the landings at Cape Torokina. As a means of confusing the enemy, the allies also chose to invade the Treasury islands and raided Choiseul. With Operation Cherryblossom in full swing, so begins the Bougainville campaign which we are going to be diving into now. At the end of October, after successfully invading the Treasury islands and the extremely bold attack upon Choiseul where the Paratroopers were outnumbered 6-1, combined with General Kenny's 5th air force and AirSols neutralizing Rabaul and nearly every airfield on Bougainville, the landings at Cape Torokina were finally launched. In a final act to aid operation cherryblossom, Admiral Sherman's Task force 38 departed Espiritu Santo on October 28th and Admiral Merrills Task Force did the same from Florida island on November 1st. They hoped to rendezvous near the Buka Passage three days later so they could prepare an attack against the Buka and Bonis airfields.  During the morning of November 1st, Admiral Merrill's cruisers arrived to their station and began firing upon the arifields. Then Sherman's carriers arrived off Buka passage to launch two separate air strikes. The first airstrike consisting of eighteen fighters, fifteen dive bombers, and eleven torpedo bombers hit Buka just after daylight. The second consisting of fourteen fighters, twenty-one dive bombers, and eleven torpedo bombers hit Buka again at midmorning. The airstrikes managed to shoot up a number of small ships within the harbor. Meanwhile after firing 2700 5 and 6 inch shells all over Buka and Bonis's airfields, Merrils task force 39 departed the Shortlands to bombard Poporang, Ballalo and Faisi.  On November 2nd, Sherman performed air strikes against Buka and Bonis's fields before departing south for Guadalcanal. Within those two days the Americans estimated they had destroyed around 30 aircraft and several small ships at the cost of 11 aircraft lost. The attacks had rendered the two Japanese airfields closest to Empress Augusta Bay basically unusable for when the landings would be made. The Japanese were now convinced that any invasion of Bougainville would have to be countered with all the aircraft and ships available within the southern theater. Yet they could not concentrate their entire naval and air forces against the Solomons, because the American and Australian forces on New Guinea would most likely be performing a landing on New Britain at any moment. Admiral Koga also expected the Americans to attempt a landing in the Gilbert or Marshalls. Thus the two pronged allied strategy was serving to freeze the Japanese army units within the New Guinea and Solomon areas.  Meanwhile Admiral Wilkinson's task force 31 were making final preparations for transport the 3rd Marine division. The amphibious assault would be facing a landing area defended by roughly 270 men. Once they overcame them, a defense perimeter would have to be hastily made because it was certain the Japanese commander on Bougainville would hammer them hard. General Vandergrift's plan was to land the 3rd and 9th marine regiments of Colonel George McHenry and Colonel Edward Craig and the 2nd raider battalion of Lt Colonel Joseph McCaffery abreast on 11 designated beaches covering a distance of 8000 or so yards. The 3rd raider battalion lt be Lt colonel Fred Beans would land at the same time on Puruata island to overcome an estimated 70 Japanese defenders there. Wilkinson wanted to land the forces abreast as quickly as possible and to have the transport unload the supplies off the bay by nightfall because he expected a rapid Japanese response, similar to what had occurred at Savo island.  On October 28th, General Turnage's men departed the New Hebrides in 20 combat transports and cargo ships commanded by Commodore Lawrence Reifsnider. The convoy proceeded using different routes, hoping to prevent the Japanese from discovering the size of their force, the three transport divisions would rendezvous with Wilkinsons destroyers by October 31st. Once linked up they would approach Bougainville under the cover of naval PBYs and Liberators. During the morning of November 1st, Minesweepers led by the destroyer Wadsworth were sent in to clear mines from the landing areas and to determine how dangerous the shoals were. The minesweepers found no mines, but did find plenty of uncharted shoals. Wadsworth radar confirmed that Cape Torokina's position within their naval charts was misplaced. Wadsworth had a number of tasks ahead of her. In addition to helping with the fire support at a range of around 3000 yards, she was to use her radar to confirm the actual location of Cape Torokina, Puruata island and the landing beaches. The coast of Bougainville had been chartered by the German Admiralty in 1890. The Germans had placed Cape Torokina and Mutupina Point around 9 miles southwest of their actual locations. Thankfully the submarine USS Guardfish reported that the air force and naval charts had misplaced Cape Torokina by around 7 miles and this is why Wadsworth was sent to investigate. Unsexy logistical stuff, but gravely important, as you don't want to waste any time during an amphibious landing searching for a lost beach. Wilkinson decided not the land the men until after daylight when it was possible to detect the offshore shoals. Shortly before sunrise, the minesweepers and destroyers began their bombardment. The Sigourney and Wadsworth fired at ranges of 13,000 yards upon Puruata Island, while the Terry bombarded closer to the shore of Cape Torokina. As each transport passed the cape, they fired 3 inch anti-aircraft guns hoping to hit Japanese positions or at least minimize their artillery. By 6:45am the transports began arriving off the beaches around 3000 yards from the shore. At 7:10am the LCVP's began taking men ashore. Simultaneously Wilkinsons destroyers began systematically bombarding the perimeter while 31 bombers from New Georgia bombed and strafed the landing areas. Within a few minutes around 7500 troops, roughly half of the total force were scrambling ashore and unloading with great speed and smoothness. The preliminary bombardment had failed however to smash the well concealed Japanese machine gun nests located on the southern beaches. These machine gun nests unleashed their lead upon the landing craft. The landing craft bearing a third of the force had immediately come under fire from Puruata island and some pillboxes on Cape Torokina. The 3rd raiders in particular were hit by machine gun fire from Puruata. Around 4 land craft were sunk from this, 10 others were badly damaged, over 70 men would be lost in the process.  The 9th marines landed themselves on 5 beaches to the north and were lucky to find little resistance from the Japanese. Once ashore they sorted themselves out quickly and began to move inland to discover the terrain was a nightmare. The beaches where they were led straight into some impassable swamp land. Nevertheless where there is a will there is a way, the marines began using fallen logs and debris to traverse the swamp until they came across some solid ground. By midmorning they would establish a narrow perimeter and began patrolling the greater area. They would establish a strong outpost on the Laruma River by 1pm. The boat crews were experienced a lot of issues with the high surf, combined with a lock of experience amongst them. Some of the LCVPS found themselves smashing into another, some dropped their men in deep water, some did not lower their ramps properly and the marines were forced to toss themselves over the sides into waist deep water. More than 30 landing craft were wrecked during the initial phase of the operation. Around 64 LCVPS and 22 LCMS were beached, many with damage beyond repair.  The 3rd marines and 2nd raiders would have a hell of a time landing. The 3rd marines landing south of the Koromokina river, they had no issues with shoals, nor the high surf, but they had landed directly in front of the main Japanese defenses. There was roughly 300 Japanese, but they did not have permanent defenses along the beaches of Yellow 2, Blue 2, and Blue 3. As the 3rd marines landed they began fighting with some Japanese killing many and sending them fleeing into the Jungle. Patrols were quickly organized who worked alongside the 2nd raiders patrols to fan out. The raiders upon landing found tougher resistance in the form of a reinforced platoon operating out of two bunkers and trenches located 30 yards inland. Once the raiders had blasted out the bunkers, the remaining Japanese began to retreat into the jungle. Like the 9th marines they would find swamp lands ahead of Yellow 1 making it difficult to advance. By midmorning the raiders reached the Buretoni Mission Trail. The main Japanese resistance hit the men who landed at Blue 1, just adjacent to Cape Torokina. There the Japanese had constructed 25 large and small log and earthen pillboxes around the perimeter of the cape. There were trenches connecting the pillboxes, some of the larger pillboxes measuring 6 feet by 6 feet, containing 75mm field guns. Each pillbox was covered by earth and camouflaged using jungle plants. Only 3 pillboxes had been hit by the naval and aerial bombardments prior to the landings. When the Americans hit the beaches in the area they immediately were forced to charge into the enemy bunkers. The Japanese 75 mm gun at Cape Torokina caused havoc upon the attackers. It was a well placed log and sand bunker and its approaches were protected by two smaller bunkers with a series of trenches manned by numerous Japanese. Sergeant Robert Owens of A company, 3rd marines grabbed 4 marines and charged the two small bunkers directly upon the mouths of some machine guns. The marines entered an emplacement through a fire port and drove the gun crew out. The surrounded trenches concentrated their fire on the brave marines, Sergeant Owns would be found later dead riddled with bullets. He was posthumously awarded the Medal of Honor for the action. Lt Colonel Joseph McCaffery was immediately mortally struck four times in the chest as he led the marines forward, he was replaced temporarily by Major Alan Shapley for the 2nd raiders. Despite the horrible losses the Americans cleared the Japanese positions and pushed further inland to pursue and kill the fleeing defenders. It is worthy to mention over 24 Doberman Pinschers, the official dog of the USMC between 1943-1945 from the 1st marine dog platoon proved invaluable during this point of the battle. The dogs were able to point out hidden snipers concealed in underbrushed. 549 War dogs would return from the war with only 4 not being able to return to civilian life, all very good boys. The 3rd raiders landing at Puruta had nearly all their boats shot at, but it was mostly small machine gun fire and did little to no damage. The Japanese had 3 or 4 deep well sandbagged emplacement on the seaward side where their machine guns nests fired upon the raiders. It took the raiders two hours upon landing to secure their beachhead around125 yards inland. Beans committed his reserves early in the afternoon, supported by some 75mm guns borrowed from the 9th marines, they moved halfway across the island, encountering sporadic Japanese sniper fire. The Japanese were outnumbered, by 3:30pm their resistance all but ended. The marines suffered 5 deaths and 32 wounded, around 29 dead Japanese would be found. They estimated another 70 Japanese escaped to Bougainville.  Soon after all the landing craft began to pull out, the Japanese began launching air strikes. For around two hours the transports and supply ships were zigzagging for their lives to evade dive bombers and fighters coming from Rabaul. The first air strike consisted of 9 Vals and 44 Zeros, they hit at around 7:35am almost immediately after the landings were made. General Twinning's 8 Kittyhawks and 8 P-38s managed to fight them off, downing 7 Japanese aircraft. The Wedsworth received a near miss during the battle. 10 minutes later, AirSols beat off another attack taking down another 8 Japanese aircraft. During the last attack, roughly 70 Japanese aircraft came in around 1pm and were met by 34 AirSols fighters. After all three attacked, the Japanese has used around 120 aircraft and lost 26, inflicting no serious damage to allied ships nor the marines ashore. But the air attacks did result in major delays for the unloading of supplies for some hours. To try and speed up the unloading process, Wilkinson stripped some men from the assault units to help unload cargo ashore. Additionally Wilkinson employed a method of light combat loading. It would take some days for the beaches to be fully sorted out, while the naval forces departed Empress Augusta Bay before nightfall to return to Guadalcanal. Thus 14,000 men and 6200 tons of supplies had been successfully placed ashore in 8 hours. By the end of the first day the marines had contested a ⅓ sector and reached their initial objectives, digging in uncomfortably for the night under torrential rain. The divisional perimeter was established by forward landing teams, who had very little to work with for maps. To the extreme left of the perimeter would be Company G of the 9th marines, who were in a vulnerable spot along the Lrauma river. Lucky for them the Japanese were quite disorganized and many were located southeast of Cape Torokina. At dusk there was only sporadic sniper fire directed at the ⅓ in the vicinity of the cape plantation and later an attack was made against the 2nd raiders at a roadblock they established along Mission Trail. General Turnage was now the official owner of a new lodgement on Bougainville. Generals Imamura and Hyakutake were quite slow to react to the landings. They sent the Iwasa detachment led by Major General Iwasa Shun, commanding the 6th infantry group. Backing him up would be the 1st and 3rd battalions of the 23rd regiment. Their first task was to hit the new enemy beachhead. As predicted by the allies, Admirals Kusaka and Samejima mustered every naval and aerial strength they had to try and smash the invaders. As part of Operation RO, Admiral Koga had sent over 250 aircraft from the 5 carriers of Admiral Ozawa's air fleet. Koga specifically stated the bulk of these were only going to be loaned for a short time, obviously they would have to return to the main fleet. Well the invasion of Bougainville certainly upset the plans, the planes would not be coming back on schedule. As Admiral Fukudome SHigeri, Koga's Chief of staff would later note “although the planes were not originally to be used in such offensive operations, we could not just stand by and not employ them." By midday on October the 31st, the Japanese had discovered the American task force that had departed Guadalcanal en route for Bougainville. The IJN were determined to interrupt the operation. Kusaka sent a cruiser-destroyer task force led by Vice admiral Omori Sentaro. Departing Rabual Omori had the two heavy cruisers, Myoko and Haguro; two light cruisers, Sendai and Nagara; and two destroyers. Now Omori was the commander of Cruiser division 5 of the Combined fleet, not of the 8th fleet. He just happened to be at Rabaul covering the movement of the 17th division at the time, he was given command of his division and the main strength of the 8th fleet. Omori sailed out at 3pm in the direction of the Shortland islands believing that to be the allied target. Poor weather hindered his force and his search planes failed to locate any allied ships. Thus by 9am on November the 1st he was on his way back to Rabaul. Yet right as his ships were turning around, suddenly they received reports that the Americans had hit the beaches of Cape Torokina. Omori was quickly reinforced with a destroyer squadron and a destroyer transport group consisting of the Amagiri, Fumizuki, Uzuki, Yunagi and Minazuki each carrying 200 troops of a 1000 special trained raider group of the 17th division. This was the 2nd mobile raiding units from the 2nd battalion, 54th regiment led by Major Miwa Mitsuhiro. They were going to perform a counter landing against the marines at Mutupino point near the village of Toroko, due south of the marine beachhead. Within 6 hours, Omoro departed once again to hit the enemy fleet, but he lacked a real battle plan. At 6:30pm Omori rendezvoused with the transports at the St. George channel and together they proceeded towards Bougainville. At 7:20 the convoy was spotted by an american bomber who dropped a bomb nearly hitting the Sendai. Based on this Omori knew the Americans knew he was coming so he concluded a counterlanding was far too dangerous. Instead he decided to send the slower destroyer transports back to Rabaul. Omori believed the enemy transports were still in Empress Augusta Bay, thus if he could sneak in and destroy them, the marines would be stuck on the island without much of their supplies and without hope of quick rescue.  Meanwhile Merrills task force 39 had retired to the vicinity of Vella Lavella, but soon received news of Omori's incoming convoy. Halsey had to order his only naval force in the area to go out once again to protect the beachhead and intercept the enemy. Merrills crews had been at it for more than 24 hours by this point and were quite exhausted. Now Merrill's force went in very cautiously, because they were aware the Japanese would be outgunning them and of course the IJN held the dreaded long lance torpedoes. Thus Merrill chose to detach his destroyers who would go out in front to see if they could intercept Omori's forces before the long lances could be put to use. He intended to take the fight to the west of Empress Augusta Bay where he could block the enemy from the beachhead. He had his leading destroyers 3 miles ahead and deployed his forces along a north-south axis with the cruisers in the center, maintaining a range of 19,000 yards or more from the deadly IJN destroyers and their feared long lances. His plan was to exploit the offensive capabilities of his destroyers by letting them unleash their attacks before he would have his cruisers unleash their 6 inch guns. He hoped his destroyers would be able to sneak into range and hit the Japanese destroyers before they could launch their torpedo salvos. Omori was at a disadvantage intelligence wise, he had no idea about Merrills forces whereabouts. Moreover he had to rely on spotter planes because he was forewarned their radar would give away their location to the enemy if used. As Omori would later tell interrogators  “We had some modified aircraft radar sets in action but they were unreliable. I do not know whether the sets or operators were poor, but I did not have confidence in them.” Thus he had no idea of the position or size of the American flotilla, still he believed the enemy transports were in the bay, though in reality they would be nearly 40 miles south. Omori still lacking any real battle plan arrayed his force in three columns with his two heavy cruisers Myoko and Haguro in the center; Ijuins screen of light cruiser Sendai; and destroyers Shiratsuyu, Samidare and Shigure to the left and rear admiral Osugi Morikazu's screen of light cruiser Agano; and destroyers Wakatsuki, Hatsukaze and Naganami. As the Japanese approached the area, task force 39 were sailing 20 miles west of the beachhead. Merrills flagship Montpelier was the first to make radar contact with the enemy at 2:30 on November 2nd. Omori's fleet was 35,900 yards out. Merrill's changed his course to head due north then reversed south with his cruisers to find a favorable position to try and cross Omori's T. Merrill sent Commander Bernard Austins destroyed out to hit the Japanese southern flank while Captain Burke was ordered to take an intercept course that would force the Japanese to be in a vulnerable position for the destroyers to launch torpedoes into their left flank. At 2:45am a Japanese aircraft finally spotted the Americans and began dropping flares over them to allowed the light cruiser Sendai to lead the northern column over. However by this point it was all but too late for the Japanese. Burke had closed in on their left flank and launched 25 torpedoes at Ijuin's column. After launching the torpedoes Burke had his ships separate and it would be an hour before they could all be gathered again to form a full circle and return to their firing positions. The battle would be very chaotic, the US destroyers experienced a hard time trying to maintain contact with each other and several times would fire upon each other by accident. All 25 torpedoes would miss, because Omori ordered his ships to make a hard right turn. At 2:50 the Samidare launched a full salvo of 8 torpedoes which missed their main targets but a single torpedo managed to hit the destroyer USS Foote blowing up a large part of her stern. Cruiser Cleveland and destroyer Spence would accidentally run into each other doing light damage trying to avoid the damaged Foote. Merrill could no longer wait for the results of the destroyer attacks and ordered his cruisers to open fire at 2:50am. Merrills cruisers would unleash a continuous fire using their 6 inch guns while maintaining a coordinated figure 8 pattern to confuse the enemy and avoid torpedoes. The tactic had been very well rehearsed and the commanders were perfectly in tune with another. James Fahey, a sailor aboard Merrill's flagship Montpelier, described the long night illuminated by lightning, flares, star shells, and muzzle flashes. “The big eight inch salvos, throwing up great geysers of water, were hitting very close to us. Our force fired star shells in front of the Jap warships so that our destroyers could attack with torpedoes. It was like putting a bright light in front of your eyes in the dark. It was impossible to see. The noise from our guns was deafening.” The Sendai was the first to be hit taking a 6 inch shell to her rudder before it exploded near her boiler rooms. Sendai experienced a series of explosions and quickly sank. The destroyers Samidare and Shiratsuyu behind the Sendai collided with another trying to evade the naval gunfire and would end up taking positions around the stricken Sendai already sinking by this point. Merrill then shifted the focus to the other two Japanese columns forcing Osugi's column to head west running across Omori's cruisers. The Hatsukaze tried to move between two heavy cruisers and collided with the Omori's flagship Myoko at 3:07. Hatsukaze was so crippled by the collision she was much easier to hit as a result was found by Burkes reformed 45th destroyer division by 5:30am and 5 of the destroyers proceeded to batter her with shells until she sank at 5:40am. The Myoko meanwhile was hit by 6 shells, but fortunately for her 4 of them were duds, not causing enough damage to slow down the flagship. Next the USS Spence and Thatcher ran into another, but were able to carry on the fight. Both sides were having trouble running into each other, Merrills cruisers performing the 8 pattern at high speed allowed them to evade most gunfire. At 3:20 Omori opened fire with his heavy armament, both torpedoes and naval gunfire from his cruisers. The torpedoes missed, but 3 dud shells hit Denver into her forward section, causing water to slow the ship down. The other cruisers were forced to slow their speed to match her. Light cruisers Columbia received a 8 inch shell hit, luckily it also failed to explode. The Japanese fire was becoming heavier and more accurate forcing Merrill to respond with a smoke screen in front of his cruisers. Merrill made sure to keep his distance from the Japanese. When their range closed in on 13,000 yards at 326 am he ordered a 180 degree turn to the north. The radical maneuvering by Merrills cruisers made it extremely difficult to accurately fire upon them, but also for Merrills cruisers to hit Omori's. At 3:30am Omori decided to retire in the mistaken belief that his Long Lances had sunk or heavily damaged Merrill's cruisers. Omori had received a false report claiming “one torpedo hit on leading US cruiser, two torpedo hits on second US cruiser, two torpedo hits on third US cruiser. Shell fire also reported on US Force.” In the meantime Burkes destroyers had re-entered the fray of battle and began firing upon the doomed Sendai. After they pursued the Shiratsuyu and Samidare but both destroyers got extremely lucky when Commander Austin confused Burke into believing that the ship he saw turning northwards was actually the Spence. By 4:00am the Sendai was sinking taking with her 185 crew. Ijuin and 311 other survivors would later be rescued on November 3rd by Submarine RO-104. The Hatsukaze would be the last to sink at 5:40am. As dawn was breaking, Merrill urgently called for all available fighters to come to his aid as he expected the Japanese to toss the kitchen sink of air forces at him. Just before 8am a formation of 80 Zeros and 18 dive bombers arrived and began attacking his cruisers desperately performing anti-aircraft maneuvers. The allied aircraft were delayed by bad weather resulting in only 8 Hellcats, 1 marine corsair, 3 P-38s and 4 New Zealander P40s showing up. The allied pilots would claim to down 16 Japanese aircraft, though in reality it would only be 8. Merrills forces performing a defensive circular cordon would claim to down 17 further Japanese aircraft. The Japanese managed two hits, one causing minor damage to the USS Montpelier. The Japanese had lost their chance to stop the invasion of Bougainville. Merrills handling of the battle, particularly his figure 8 maneuver, had negated the dreaded super weapon of the enemy, the Type 93 long lance torpedo. It was to be the last major surface engagement of the Solomons area. Halsey would later reflect on the Japanese attempt to hit the landing forces at Cape Torokina  “was the most desperate emergency that confronted me in my entire term as COMSOPAC (Commander South Pacific).” Commodore Reifsnider was ordered to bring his transports back to Cape Torokina to resume the unloading. The unloading of the cargo would be completed by 3pm. Vice admiral Omori's force withdrew back to Rabaul. It was soon joined by four more cruisers and a number of destroyers from Truk. The reluctant Admiral Koga according to Admiral Fukudome decided to commit some of the very best units from the undamaged 2nd fleet “to cooperate with the carrier-based planes which had been sent from Vice-Admiral Ozawa's fleet in order to check the [US] Bougainville operations.” 7 heavy cruisers, the Takao, Maya, Atago, Suzuya, Mogami, Chikuma, and Chokai; a light cruiser, the Noshiro; four destroyers; and a number of service ships would depart Truk on November 3. The once dominant IJN fleet so surely footed in the early days of the war now was hesitant and indecisive. Nevertheless, Koga would unleash another attack against Empress Augusta Bay. Koga placed the new naval force under Admiral Kurita who would attempt to intercept futher American forces enroute to Bougainville. On November 4th, Wilkinson would be bringing the 21st marines aboard 8 destroyer transports and 8 LSTs. 3548 men led by Colonel Evans Ames, alongside 5000 tons of supplies and equipment escorted by destroyers Waller, Saufley, Philip, Renshaw, Eaton and Sigourney.  Halsey received word of the new Japanese force and realized the situation was critical. If Halsey did not turn back the incoming threat, his forces on Bougainville would not receive their planned reinforcements. Halsey was thus ready to take a risk, he was going to send carriers. As Halsey would later write “perhaps the success of the South Pacific War, hung on it being stopped.”. Against conventional wisdom, that carriers should not be exposed to land-based aircraft attacks, he ordered Rear Admiral Sherman's task force built around the USS Saratoga and Princeton to face a force of possibly 200 Japanese aircraft. The risks for Hasley were personal as well as professional “I sincerely expected both air groups to be cut to pieces and both carriers stricken, if not lost. (I tried not to remember my son Bill was aboard one of them), but we could not let the men at Tokorina be wiped out while we stood by and wrung our hands.” Halsey's Chief of Staff, Admiral Carney, recalled that before making the decision to attack with his carriers, his commander “suddenly looked 150 years old.” Shermans task for now designated Task Group 50.4 consisted of carrier Saratoga; light carrier Princeton; and destroyers Stack, Sterett, Wilson, Izard, Conner, Bell, Charrette, Boyd, Bradford and Cowell. He would be supported by General Twinings AirSols in any way possible. Halsey also requested MacArthur allow Kenney's 5th air force to join in on the battle. On November 5th, aided by some bad weather, a surprise air raid was performed against Rabaul. Sherman's carrier force was 230 miles away from Rabaul near Cape Torokina when they began launching aircraft at 9am. The Saratoga launched 16 Avengers and 22 Dauntless. Princeton launched 7 Avengers. The carrier aircraft were escorted by 52 hellcats making a formation of 97 aircraft in all. This was their entire payload . The aircraft flew at a low level as they approached Rabaul anti-aircraft defenses by 10:20. They kept a tight formation, flying right through the flak which prevented the 70 Zeros from intercepting them properly. As we have seen during this series, the Japanese anti-aircraft guns were honestly pretty terrible. Added to this, the American aircraft enjoyed much better armor than their Japanese counterparts, particularly the Zero fighter. Commander Henry Caldwell led the bombers towards Blanche Bay where they peeled off at 14,500 feet. The Dauntless dive bombed the targets before them as the Avengers time their approaches to hit the same targets at the same time. Within just 30 minutes the attack absolutely devastated the Japanese plans. Heavy cruiser Maya was trying to leave the harbor during the attack but took a 500 lb bomb hit to her catapult area which set off a series of explosions, blowing up her engine rooms and causing heavy casualties. As Maya was left fully disabled, the Mogami managed to clear the harbor but took a torpedo hit. Her number 1 and 2 turrets were flooded, forcing her crews to scramble to put out fires.  The Atago suffered three very near misses, which damaged her hull, armament, and machinery.  The Takao took a bomb to her starboard side, damaging her hull and machinery. TheChikuma received only slight damage and was able to depart for Truk at 20:38. The Suzuya, which was just preparing for refueling, tried to evade and was only slightly damaged. Aside from this the other light cruisers and destroyers did not receive any damage. 70 sailors died aboard the Maya, 23  died aboard the Mogami, Takao and Atago. Captain George Chandler, a P-38 fighter pilot described how “There were B-24 bombers up high and B-25 bombers attacking right down on the deck dropping ‘frag' bombs on the airplanes along the runways … we did our best work at high altitude, but we also took part in combat a thousand feet off the ground.” Taking advantage of Hasleys daring attack, General Kenney sent 27 B-24's and 67 P-38s to bomb the warehouse area on the western side of the harbor. They were challenged by only 15 Zero's who would lose two in the process. The Japanese facilities were wrecked by the attack. The Americans lost 5 bombers and 5 fighters while taking down 11 Zeros. The cautious Admiral Mineichi Koga withdrew his forces back to Truk. The Japanese Naval threat to the invasion of Bougainville was ended. A Japanese naval officer later admitted that they had given up on Bougainville mainly because of “the serious damage received by several Second Fleet cruisers at Rabaul by carrier attack …” The success of the raid on Rabaul left Halsey ecstatic. “It is real music to me and opens the stops for a funeral dirge for Tojo's Rabaul.” Sherman grabbed all of his returning places expecting a Japanese counterstrike. A Japanese scout plane discovered Sherman's task force around midafternoon and Kusaka immediately dispatched eighteen torpedo bombers after the Americans. At around dusk the Japanese discovered what they believed to be the task force and attacked. Although they later claimed a great air victory, in reality they hit at an LCI and a PT boat escorting an LCT back from Cape Torokina. A torpedo lodged in the engine room of the LCI and killed one man. That was the extent of the damage to the "task force." In return, the Japanese lost one plane. It was hardly an even exchange, and no compensation at all for the havoc wreaked earlier upon the 2nd Fleet. Halsey yet again showed what a formidable and aggressive commander he could be, his gamble paid off greatly. The Americans had secured their naval superiority in the South Pacific and it would remain that way for the rest of the war. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Admiral Merrill performed an excellent battle against a larger IJN force. Admiral Hasley lived up to his reputation, he performed a bold gamble and it paid off big time. Now the Americans would dominate the South Pacific for the rest of the Pacific War.  

1/2: #USNavy: The deterence policy of "naval presence" and the deployment of two carrier strike groups to the wars. Jerry Hendrix , Sagamore Institute. https://sagamoreinstitute.org/jerry-hendrix-interview/ 1932 USS Saratoga in the Canal

More USS Saratoga Play! Jim and Michael play and record their collaborative Captain's Log game and make it an episode of Continuing Conversations. After the recording, we will write up a post-play report for the scene(s). https://linktr.ee/StudioTembo

NOTE: This episode is best on YouTube Jim and Michael Launch the Adventures of the USS Saratoga. Watch as Jim and Michael continue developing their collaborative Captain's Log epic tale! The birth of our Captain and Commander and the rebirth of the U.S.S. Saratoga!  https://linktr.ee/studiotembo

Caroline Moore visits with Tom Savage, the president of the NAACP for Cookeville/Putnam County. The two talk about growing up in Livingston playing different sports growing up, the diversity Tom saw while serving on the USS Saratoga in the Navy, and how the work experience as a union official prepared him for leadership roles in the NAACP. Listen to the latest Local Matters Podcast… Presented by Office Mart. Visit them at 215 S Jefferson Ave in Cookeville to see what they can do for your office News Talk 94.1 · Presented By Office Mart

On February 21, 1945, the newly upgraded aircraft carrier USS Saratoga was supporting the landings on Iwo Jima. The night before she was detached with a small escort to bomb Japanese forces on Chichi Jima. The next day is overcast with very low cloud cover. Out of the low clouds screamed six Japanese planes, who manage to hit the Sara's forward end, causing heavy damage and killing one hundred and twenty-three of her sailors. Another one hundred and ninety-two are injured. Sara will survive the attack, but she will never serve in combat again. She is converted into a training Carrier, and then into a transport for operation Magic Carpet at the end of the war. She was then determined to be obsolete and surplus. On 25 July, 1946 she was sunk during Test Baker of Operation crossroads, the first large scale test of the atomic bombs effects against naval vessels. Of those one-hundred and twenty three men killed on February 21, 1945, sixty-four could not be recovered and were sealed in the ship as she traveled back to Bremerton for repairs. There, they are removed, but cannot be identified. They are interred in one of the saddest and yet most honored places in the Pacific Northwest, Ivy Green Cemetery. --- Send in a voice message: https://anchor.fm/plausibly-live/message

April 21, 1946 - Aboard the U.S.S. Saratoga Navy aircraft carrier docked in the San Francisco Bay, a week and a half before it left for Bikini where it would sink in an atom bomb test that summer. References include Fred Allen, dehydrated powder eggs, and galley slaves.

The Battle of Guadalcanal took place from August 1942 until February 1943.  Because Guadalcanal is an island, both the Japanese and the Americans relied on the sea to supply their forces and bring in reinforcements.    James D. Hornfischer's “Neptune's Inferno” tells the story of the fight to control the seas around Guadalcanal.  These sea battles cost roughly three times as many American lives as the fighting on the island and gave the American surface fleet a hard lesson in modern fleet-on-fleet action.

Ethics, morality and placing a good face on a difficult situation all feature in this weeks episode as the Vidiians seek to carve up our recording with technical difficulties. We also take a moment to remember Lt Peter James Durst Born 14th September 2338 in Brooklyn, New York Durst graduated from Star Fleet Academy in 2366 and was assigned to the USS Saratoga but was unable to take up the post due it its destruction at the battle of wolf 359. Durst was assigned to the utopia Planitia shipyards as operations security while waiting for another posting and became involved in the construction of the voyager. After the voyager's completion Durst applied for a posting on the new voyager starship and was promoted to Lieutenant. Lt Peter Durst was killed in the line of duty by the vidiians on star date 48784.2 while helping his voyager crewmates escape capture.

Greetings Students!!!On this week's episode of The Professor Travel Podcast, our Visiting Professor Fran Gower, talk with us about a recent cruise she made to The Bahamas!!! This trip was part of a reunion network of service members and their families who served aboard the USS Saratoga. Join us as we travel from Baltimore to Coco Cay, Port Canaveral, and Charleston before heading back to Baltimore aboard the Royal Caribbean Radiance of the Seas.You can download this podcast for FREE on Pod-O-Matic, Spotify, and on Apple Podcasts.Enjoy and make every day a travel adventure!!!

In which the USS Saratoga drifts off to an unknown fate, the Council President gets an update from Admiral Cartwright, and we get our first appearance of a Starfleet clipboard in this film...  

In which the opening credits finish, a mysterious object emerges from the nebula, and we meet some of the crew of the USS Saratoga...

How did the United States win the Cold War at sea? This edition of the Nixon Now podcast explores these and other questions about U.S. Maritime power with John Lehman, author of a newly released book on the subject, "Oceans Ventured." Secretary Lehman is founding director of J.F. Lehman and Company. His government service includes serving as Secretary of the Navy, Deputy Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and senior staff member on the National Security Council during the Nixon administration. Photo: President Nixon with Navy personnel, aboard the USS Saratoga flight deck duirng an Armed Forces Day celebration, May 17, 1969 (Richard Nixon Presidential Library). Introduction Music: “Victory at Sea" by Richard Rodgers (1952) Interview by Jonathan Movroydis.

High Level Games is proud to present the first episode of our newest series! Introducing Star Trek Adventure! We have been streaming the gaming sessions as they happen but this podcast is a fully produced and edited version. We hope you enjoy it! During a battle with the Borg in Wolf 359, the USS Saratoga is utterly destroyed with many of the crew perishing. Years later, survivors of that fateful encounter are reunited to serve on the USS Bonaventure.

Starbases and the USS Saratoga. As Discovery's first season winds down and the war against the Klingons reaches its climax, Admiral Cornwell is all about the numbers. There's a twenty here, a twelve there, a nineteen and a one. What does it all mean, and have these numerical locales played a role in past Star Trek? In this episode of Notes from The Edge, in which we deep-dive into connections between Star Trek: Discovery and the broader Star Trek universe, host C Bryan Jones shares his thoughts on key character moments, the status of the way, and the magical spore plan. We also explore appearances in past Star Trek by the USS Saratoga, Starbase Twelve (there are more than you think) and Starbase One (not so much). Chapters Intro (00:00:00) Status of the War (00:02:26) Tyler and Burnham (00:04:52) The Spore Plan (00:11:25) The Return of Georgiou (00:13:41) Sarek and Burnham (00:16:58) USS Saratoga (00:19:53) Starbase Twelve (00:27:06) Starbase One (00:35:33) Closing (00:35:00) Host C Bryan Jones Production C Bryan Jones (Editor and Producer) Matthew Rushing (Executive Producer) Ken Tripp (Executive Producer) Norman C. Lao (Associate Producer) Tony Robinson (Associate Producer) Thomas Puleo (Associate Producer) Lisa Slack (Associate Producer) Shoaib Mirza (Associate Producer) Richard Rutledge (Associate Producer) James Muldrow (Associate Producer) Cornelia Reutner (Associate Producer) Richard Marquez (Production Manager) Brandon-Shea Mutala (Patreon Manager)

Synopsis: In which Commander Sinclair's past bad decisions catch up to him as an Earthforce colonel with a score to settle and his pet telepath come to the station.We've raved about Space: Above and Beyond before but seriously, it's one of the better seasons of television that either of us have ever seen. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Space:_Above_and_BeyondThere are even some interesting connections to the other big Fox genre shows of the time, X-Files and Millennium, suggesting they shared a universe (along with the apparently completely unavailable Strange Luck).Here's a great clip of Col. McQueen for those of you unfamiliar with the show: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2p5KOq6Ekwg(This clip won't mean much to anyone not familiar with Space:Above and Beyond, but Wang impersonating Col. McQueen is still just amazing: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=M0hsvt4Nbko)We're going to assume that Kirk, Picard, Sisko, Janeway and Adama are all familiar to you.The Trolley and the Fat Man - a classic thought experiment about making tough choices when there are no good options. Kirk would have probably cheated and rigged the trolley to tip over before the switch. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem“The Immunity Syndrome” - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Immunity_Syndrome_(Star_Trek:_The_Original_Series)Commodore Matthew “There is no third planet!” Decker - https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Doomsday_Machine_(Star_Trek:_The_Original_Series)In the Space:Above and Beyond episode “Sugar Dirt” Colonel McQueen and the USS Saratoga are forced to abandon a squadron of marines planetside for months, without any promise of rescue (except that this is a serialized American TV show so we know the main characters will get out). It is positively harrowing.Captain Avatar of Star Blazers. Best. Captain. Ever. http://starblazers.wikia.com/wiki/Captain_Avatar Except for maybe Garrett or Georgiou...Jeffrey Combs has just been in everything: http://www.imdb.com/name/nm0001062/?ref_=tt_cl_t13The Doom Patrol. I mean, seriously.

This show is dedicated to Marine Cpl. Sara A. Medina who died in the crash with Capt. Dustin R. Lukasiewicz, 29, a helicopter pilot from Harlan, Neb.; Capt. Christopher L. Norgren, 31, a pilot from Sedgwick, Kan.; Sgt. Ward M. Johnson IV, 29, a crew chief from Seminole, Fla.; Sgt. Eric M. Seaman, 30, a crew chief from Riverside, Calif.; and Lance Cpl. Jacob A. Hug, a combat videographer from Maricopa, Ariz. The two Nepalese soldiers who died were Tapendra Rawal and Basanta Titara. Defending the Republic with Annie "The Radio Chick" and Dan, of Pundit Press Radio is an ongoing discussion of recent events, issues and the upcoming elections. Special Guest: Curtis Bennett, Author hails from Philadelphia, Pa and currently resides in Florida. Prior navy, he served honorably aboard the nuclear aircraft carrier USS Nimitz and the conventional carrier USS Saratoga. CS is a decorated Gulf War veteran (Desert Shield/Desert Storm). He also has earned a BS degree in Social Science from Bethel College (now university), a BA degree in Criminal Justice from the University of North Florida and a BA degree in Political Science from the University of North Florida. He graduated with honors (Magna Cum Laude) and is a member of the National Political Science Honor Society (Pi Sigma Alpha). Author has worked in the food management/service, Naval Intelligence, and Child Protective Services fields. CS loves to swim,cook, surf the Net, read and write. He has written several romance/adventure novels, military action novels, and books about his work in Child Protective Services. He's also written a powerful book based on politics. His latest book is "The Sacrifical Ram" http://theoriginalradicals.com/ https://www.facebook.com/CSBennettFromPhilly/info It's a battle of Conservative values and principles in defense of our Republic!

This show is dedicated to Marine Cpl. Sara A. Medina who died in the crash with Capt. Dustin R. Lukasiewicz, 29, a helicopter pilot from Harlan, Neb.; Capt. Christopher L. Norgren, 31, a pilot from Sedgwick, Kan.; Sgt. Ward M. Johnson IV, 29, a crew chief from Seminole, Fla.; Sgt. Eric M. Seaman, 30, a crew chief from Riverside, Calif.; and Lance Cpl. Jacob A. Hug, a combat videographer from Maricopa, Ariz. The two Nepalese soldiers who died were Tapendra Rawal and Basanta Titara.Defending the Republic with Annie "The Radio Chick" and Dan, of Pundit Press Radio is an ongoing discussion of recent events, issues and the upcoming elections.Special Guest: Curtis Bennett, Author hails from Philadelphia, Pa and currently resides in Florida. Prior navy, he served honorably aboard the nuclear aircraft carrier USS Nimitz and the conventional carrier USS Saratoga. CS is a decorated Gulf War veteran (Desert Shield/Desert Storm). He also has earned a BS degree in Social Science from Bethel College (now university), a BA degree in Criminal Justice from the University of North Florida and a BA degree in Political Science from the University of North Florida. He graduated with honors (Magna Cum Laude) and is a member of the National Political Science Honor Society (Pi Sigma Alpha). Author has worked in the food management/service, Naval Intelligence, and Child Protective Services fields. CS loves to swim,cook, surf the Net, read and write. He has written several romance/adventure novels, military action novels, and books about his work in Child Protective Services. He's also written a powerful book based on politics. His latest book is "The Sacrifical Ram"http://theoriginalradicals.com/https://www.facebook.com/CSBennettFromPhilly/infoIt's a battle of Conservative values and principles in defense of our Republic!

This show is dedicated to Marine Cpl. Sara A. Medina who died in the crash with Capt. Dustin R. Lukasiewicz, 29, a helicopter pilot from Harlan, Neb.; Capt. Christopher L. Norgren, 31, a pilot from Sedgwick, Kan.; Sgt. Ward M. Johnson IV, 29, a crew chief from Seminole, Fla.; Sgt. Eric M. Seaman, 30, a crew chief from Riverside, Calif.; and Lance Cpl. Jacob A. Hug, a combat videographer from Maricopa, Ariz. The two Nepalese soldiers who died were Tapendra Rawal and Basanta Titara.Defending the Republic with Annie "The Radio Chick" and Dan, of Pundit Press Radio is an ongoing discussion of recent events, issues and the upcoming elections.Special Guest: Curtis Bennett, Author hails from Philadelphia, Pa and currently resides in Florida. Prior navy, he served honorably aboard the nuclear aircraft carrier USS Nimitz and the conventional carrier USS Saratoga. CS is a decorated Gulf War veteran (Desert Shield/Desert Storm). He also has earned a BS degree in Social Science from Bethel College (now university), a BA degree in Criminal Justice from the University of North Florida and a BA degree in Political Science from the University of North Florida. He graduated with honors (Magna Cum Laude) and is a member of the National Political Science Honor Society (Pi Sigma Alpha). Author has worked in the food management/service, Naval Intelligence, and Child Protective Services fields. CS loves to swim,cook, surf the Net, read and write. He has written several romance/adventure novels, military action novels, and books about his work in Child Protective Services. He's also written a powerful book based on politics. His latest book is "The Sacrifical Ram"http://theoriginalradicals.com/https://www.facebook.com/CSBennettFromPhilly/infoIt's a battle of Conservative values and principles in defense of our Republic!

Jarrah, Sue and Grace discuss the Starfleet women who held the rank of captain, other than Captain Janeway, from the captain of the USS Saratoga in Star Trek IV to Erika Hernandez in Enterprise. Hosts Jarrah, Sue, and Grace Editor Jarrah Contact Us www.womenatwarp.com @womenatwarp facebook.com/womenatwarp crew@womenatwarp.com Support the Show patreon.com/womenatwarp

Jarrah, Sue and Grace discuss the Starfleet women who held the rank of captain, other than Captain Janeway, from the captain of the USS Saratoga in Star Trek IV to Erika Hernandez in Enterprise. Hosts Jarrah, Sue, and Grace Editor Jarrah Contact Us www.womenatwarp.com @womenatwarp facebook.com/womenatwarp crew@womenatwarp.com Support the Show patreon.com/womenatwarp

This show is dedicated to: 21 USS Saratoga Sailors, who drowned Saturday, December 22, 1990, when a ferry capsized in Haifa, Israel. Defending the Republic with Annie "The Radio Chick" and Dan, of Pundit Press Radio is an ongoing discussion of recent events, issues and the upcoming elections. Special Guest: Curtis Bennett, Author hails from Philadelphia, Pa and currently resides in Florida. Prior navy, he served honorably aboard the nuclear aircraft carrier USS Nimitz and the conventional carrier USS Saratoga. CS is a decorated Gulf War veteran (Desert Shield/Desert Storm). He also has earned a BS degree in Social Science from Bethel College (now university), a BA degree in Criminal Justice from the University of North Florida and a BA degree in Political Science from the University of North Florida. He graduated with honors (Magna Cum Laude) and is a member of the National Political Science Honor Society (Pi Sigma Alpha). Author has worked in the food management/service, Naval Intelligence, and Child Protective Services fields. CS loves to swim,cook, surf the Net, read and write. He has written several romance/adventure novels, military action novels, and books about his work in Child Protective Services. He's also written a powerful book based on politics. Bryan Preston, is the Editor-At-Large of PJMedia.com. He has been a leading conservative blogger and opinionator since founding his first blog in 2001. Bryan is a military veteran, worked for NASA, was a founding blogger and producer at Hot Air, was producer of the Laura Ingraham Show and, most recently before joining PJM, was Communications Director of the Republican Party of Texas. It's a battle of Conservative values and principles in defense of our Republic!  

This show is dedicated to: 21 USS Saratoga Sailors, who drowned Saturday, December 22, 1990, when a ferry capsized in Haifa, Israel.Defending the Republic with Annie "The Radio Chick" and Dan, of Pundit Press Radio is an ongoing discussion of recent events, issues and the upcoming elections.Special Guest: Curtis Bennett, Author hails from Philadelphia, Pa and currently resides in Florida. Prior navy, he served honorably aboard the nuclear aircraft carrier USS Nimitz and the conventional carrier USS Saratoga. CS is a decorated Gulf War veteran (Desert Shield/Desert Storm). He also has earned a BS degree in Social Science from Bethel College (now university), a BA degree in Criminal Justice from the University of North Florida and a BA degree in Political Science from the University of North Florida. He graduated with honors (Magna Cum Laude) and is a member of the National Political Science Honor Society (Pi Sigma Alpha). Author has worked in the food management/service, Naval Intelligence, and Child Protective Services fields. CS loves to swim,cook, surf the Net, read and write. He has written several romance/adventure novels, military action novels, and books about his work in Child Protective Services. He's also written a powerful book based on politics.Bryan Preston, is the Editor-At-Large of PJMedia.com. He has been a leading conservative blogger and opinionator since founding his first blog in 2001. Bryan is a military veteran, worked for NASA, was a founding blogger and producer at Hot Air, was producer of the Laura Ingraham Show and, most recently before joining PJM, was Communications Director of the Republican Party of Texas.It's a battle of Conservative values and principles in defense of our Republic! 

We’re going to HeroesCon! If you’re going to be in Charlotte, North Carolina this weekend, come find us and say hello! Your beloved hosts will be moderating some panels and wandering around the con all weekend. This week Brett (X-Men devotee) and Ben (self-described Trekkie) join forces to read two of the strangest crossover stories in comic book history: Star Trek/X-Men #1 (1996) by Scott Lobdell (with art provided by pretty much everyone that ever worked at Top Cow) and Star Trek: The Next Generation/X-Men: Second Contact #1 (1998) by Dan Abnett, Ian Edginton and Cary Nord. Spoiler: these books are actually pretty good, crazy as they may be. Topics discussed include: the Top Cow hip hop crew; are the X-Men helping out Star Trek, or vice versa?; Gary Mitchell and other villain names; the relative sizes of things in outer space; the late ‘90s multimedia craze; and how to induce sentimentality with judicious use of time travel and alternate realities. Where’s Matt? Well, due to technical difficulties (which also made this episode late) we had to re-record this one, and schedules did not work out. But we were able to salvage some audio from the first session, so his comments are here too. These issues are out of print, so enjoy looking at some of these excerpts as you listen. Star Trek/X-Men #1 Scotty says “Laddie” a lot Gladiator in space Did he just punch my ship?“ Detailed Wolverine, featureless Scotty. Dr. McCoy? Check out Wolverine’s bone claws! Wolverine speaking to an instrument panel. Friend of yours? Bishop is impossibly buff. Cyclops throws Phoenix under the bus. Gary/Proteus is defeated, everyone go home. Gambit flirting with Uhura. Star Trek: The Next Generation/X-Men: Second Contact #1 Painstaking attempt at continuity. Brief cameo by The Thunderbolts. Colussus sneaking up on Mr. Data, who is dressed like your dad. Kang and his color-coded costume. The far flung future of 2013. Battle of Wolf 359. John Proudstar serving aboard the USS Saratoga. Kitty is growing up, right? Kitty destroys a sentinel. Kitty finally sees her mind travel. Kitty Pryde kissing Wesley Crusher. Riker and Banshee (two of Brett’s crushes) team up. Wolverine gave Worf a cigar. Computer coloring creates Deanna Troibot. You can also watch/read (most) of the first comic on YouTube. And, as always, you can click the comic book covers to purchase these issues on MyComicShop.com. See you at HeroesCon! "Benjamin Ragheb / Star Trek X-Men Comics" originally appeared at http://mattandbrettlovecomics.com/podcast/2013/star-trex-men.html