Podcasts about Biosafety

Saeed Khan, Ph.D., Head of the Department of Molecular Pathology at Dow diagnostic research and reference laboratory and President of the Pakistan Biological Safety Association discusses the importance and challenges of biosafety/biosecurity practices on both a local and global scale. He highlights key steps for biorisk assessment and management and stresses the importance of training, timing and technology. Ashley's Biggest Takeaways Adequate biosafety and biosecurity protocols depend on a thorough understanding of modern challenges, and scientists must be willing and able to respond to new technological threats appropriately. In the microbiology lab, the threat goes beyond the physical pathogen. Implications of genomics and cyber security must be built into biorisk management techniques, including data storage and waste management practices. Risk assessments involve evaluation of both inherent and residual risk. Inherent risk is linked to the pathogen. Residual risk varies according to the lab, equipment, employee, environment, etc. As a result, biosafety and biosecurity risks are constantly changing, and assessments must be repeated strategically and often. Khan recommended repeating a risk assessment whenever a key variable in the equation changes, i.e., new equipment, new employee, new pathogen. He also recommended (at minimum) conducting routine risk assessments every 6 months, or twice a year. Featured Quotes:  “We need to have basic biosafety and biosecurity to stay away from these bugs and the modern challenges, like cyber biosecurity and genomics. These are the new areas, which are potential threats for the future, and where we need to train our researchers and students.” “Starting from simple hand washing or hand hygiene, the basic things we use are gloves, goggles and PPE to protect the workers, the staff and the patient from getting infected from the environment, laboratory or hospitals. These are the basic things, and it's very crucial, because if one is not using gloves in the lab or not wearing the lab coat, he or she may get infected from the sample, and the patient can get infected from the physician and doctors or nurse if they are not following the basic biosafety rules. These [things] are routinely important. Every day we should practice this.” “But there are [also] new challenges. Particularly in the microbiology lab, we [used to] think that once we killed the bacteria, then it's fine. But nowadays, it's not the way we should think about it. Though you kill the bacteria practically, it still has a sequence, [which] we call the genome, and if you have that information with you, you theoretically have the potential to recreate that pathogen… that can be used or maybe misused as well.” “[Working with] scripts of pathogens, like smallpox or the polioviruses, we call this synthetic biology. Different scientists are doing it for the right purposes, like for production of vaccines, to find new therapeutics, to understand the pathology of the diseases. But on [the other hand]—we call it dual use research of concern (DURC)—the same can be misused as well. That's why it's very important to be aware of the bugs that we are working with, and the potential of that pathogen or microbe, to the extent that can be useful or otherwise.” “So, we should be aware of the new concern of the technology, synthetic biology and DURC. These are new concepts—cyber, biosecurity and information security [are all] very much important these days. You cannot be relaxed being in the microbiology lab. Once we have identified a pathogen, declared a result to the patient and the physician, and it's been treated, we [still] need to be worried about waste management—that we discard that waste properly and we have proper inventory control of our culture. It should be safe in the locker or on in the freezers and properly locked, so we should not be losing any single tube of the culture, otherwise it may be misused.” Risk Assessment “The best word that you have used is risk assessment. So, it should gage the severity of the issue. We should not over exaggerate the risk, and we should not undermine the risk. Once the risk assessment been made, we can proceed.” “Right from the beginning of touching a patient or a sample of the patient until the end of discarding the sample, that is called biorisk management. It's a complete science that we need to be aware of—not in bits and pieces. Rather a comprehensive approach should be adopted, and each and every person in the organization should be involved. Otherwise, we may think [we are] doing something good, but someone else may spoil the whole thing, and it will be counterproductive at the end.” “We should involve each and every person working with us and the lab, and we should empower them. They should feel ownership that they are working with us, and they are [as] responsible as we are. So, this the whole process needs to be properly engaged. People must be engaged, and they should be empowered, and they should be responsible.” “Each and every lab has different weaknesses and strengths of their own, which play an important role in the risk assessment.” “There is inherent risk, which is linked with the pathogen, and there is another thing we call residual risk. So, residual risk everywhere and varies. Though the inherent risk may be the same, the residual risk is based on the training of the person, the lab facility that is available, the resources that labs have and the potential threats from the environment.” “It's not usually possible that you do a risk assessment every day. So, when you have different factors involving a new pathogen in your lab, you have new equipment in your in your lab, or some new employee in your lab—[a new] variable factor that is involved—you should [perform] the risk assessment. Otherwise, [a routine risk assessment] should [be done] twice a year, after 6 months.” “Training is important, and response time is very much crucial. And different technology plays a vital role, but the lack of technology should not be an excuse for not responding. There is always an alternative on the ground that you may do the risk assessment. And within the given resources and facility, we should mimic the technology and respond to any outbreaks or disease within our given resources.” Links for the Episode ASM Guidelines for Biosafety in Teaching Laboratories Pakistan Biological Safety Association Training to be a Biosafety Professional (video) Take the MTM listener survey!

The emergence of the SARS-CoV-2 pathogen in late 2019, and the ensuing investigation into its origins, revealed a dangerous lack of concern among bureaucrats and elected officials for biosafety and biosecurity. Not only did our government fund research to make viruses more deadly to humans, but it continues to do so, refusing to back down or admit any wrongdoing, paving the way for a future pandemic that makes COVID-19 look like the common cold. In his research for "The Coverup" series, which examines the national security apparatus' involvement in the development of the COVID virus, Matt Kibbe speaks with Bryce Nickels, professor of genetics for Rutgers University and co-founder of Biosafety Now, to find out what we as a society should be doing to prevent the development and spread of future pathogens. Their conversation also serves as a preview of the upcoming episode of "The Coverup" featuring Dr. Richard Ebright.

In this episode we look at the history of bio-threat assessment. With a review provided by Michael Parker, who has collated a list of threat assessments produced over the past century. You can find further details on the project here! Do check it out!   https://cobrabiosecurity.org/   Further reading: Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents A BRIGHTER LINE Committee on Scientific Milestones for the Development of a Gene Sequence-Based Classification System for the Oversight of Select Agents National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine. 2010. Sequence-Based Classification of Select Agents: A Brighter Line. Washington, DC: The National Academies Press. https://doi.org/10.17226/12970.  The Select Agent Regulations: Structure and Stricture Shreya Kalra ▸Michael Parker (2022)  The Select Agent Regulations: Structure and Stricture | Georgetown Scientific Research Journal (gsrjournal.org)  Opinion: Coronavirus and Regulating Access to High-Risk Pathogens Overbearing restrictions on research into toxins and pathogens such as SARS-CoV-2 could undermine public health and security in the long run. Michael Parker Shreya Kalra and Bryce Kassalow (2022) Opinion: Coronavirus and Regulating Access to High-Risk Pathogens | The Scientist Magazine® (the-scientist.com)    Comment from Parker, Michael Posted by the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention on Jan 19, (2022)  Regulations.gov Improving U.S. Biosafety and Biosecurity: Revisiting Recommendations from the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel and the Fast Track Action Committee on Select Agent Regulations Authors: Clint A. Haines  and Gigi Kwik Gronvall  (2022) Improving U.S. Biosafety and Biosecurity: Revisiting Recommendations from the Federal Experts Security Advisory Panel and the Fast Track Action Committee on Select Agent Regulations | Applied Biosafety (liebertpub.com)      

Most people shudder at the idea of an infectious disease outbreak — patients stricken with a mysterious illness, hospitals overflowing, and cities going into lockdown. But for Syra Madad, DHSc, MSc , MCP, rushing into such a scenario, donned in a hazmat suit, to control the chaos has been a dream since childhood. Today, she is an epidemiologist, biosecurity advisor, and a pathogen preparedness expert who serves as Senior Director of the System-Wide Special Pathogens Program at New York City Health and Hospitals, which operates the municipal health care system of New York City. Over the course of our conversation, Dr. Madad shares what excites her about the work of infectious disease control, why she believes we have emerged from the Covid-19 pandemic worse prepared for the next pandemic, how scientists and doctors can better communicate with the public in the absence of clear data, the importance of utilizing trusted messengers in the community to fully deploy the power of public health, and more. In this episode, you'll hear about: 2:09 - How a movie led Dr. Madad to become an infectious disease preparedness expert6:54 - An overview of Biosafety levels (BSL)  9:30 - Moments in Dr. Madad's career when disease containment went well and moments when it did not. 12:27 - How Dr. Madad mentally and emotionally manages the heavy weight of often-lethal infectious diseases18:05 - Dr. Madad's opinion on how COVID-19 policies were handled 24:02 - Dr. Madad's personal thoughts on the potential origins of COVID-19 26:55 - What concerns Dr. Madad most about future pandemics and how we can make positive steps toward recovering trust in science35:40 - Dr. Madad's advice for those considering a career in public health or infectious diseases Dr. Syra Madad appears in the Netflix special Pandemic: How to Prevent an Outbreak.Dr. Syra Madad can be found on Twitter/X at @syramadad.Visit our website www.TheDoctorsArt.com where you can find transcripts of all episodes.If you enjoyed this episode, please subscribe, rate, and review our show, available for free on Spotify, Apple Podcasts, or wherever you get your podcasts. If you know of a doctor, patient, or anyone working in health care who would love to explore meaning in medicine with us on the show, feel free to leave a suggestion in the comments or send an email to info@thedoctorsart.com.Copyright The Doctor's Art Podcast 2024

How is Bioengineering Different than GMOs? “Bioengineered food refers to food products that have been altered at a genetic or molecular level using biotechnology, which includes genetic engineering and nanotechnology. This involves modifying the genetic material of a food source or manipulating matter on a nanoscale to achieve improved traits such as enhanced nutritional content, pest resistance, longer shelf life, or targeted delivery of bioactive compounds. The modifications are made using lab techniques that cannot be created through conventional breeding or found in nature. As nanotechnology continues to evolve, its applications in bioengineering food are expected to grow, potentially offering new ways to enhance the safety, quality, and nutritional value of our food supply.” This is Scientists Playing God. Bioengineering: Applies engineering principles to biological systems and biomedical technologies. Involves design and analysis of biological systems. Nanotechnology: Manipulates matter on an atomic, molecular, and supramolecular scale. Applied in bioengineering for creating new functional materials and devices for medical applications. Synthetic Manipulation: Part of bioengineering where biological entities are artificially manipulated to achieve desired outcomes. Genetic engineering is a prime example. mRNA (Messenger RNA): Conveys genetic information from DNA to the ribosome, specifying the amino acid sequence of the protein products of gene expression. Used in bioengineering for various applications, including the development of mRNA vaccines. CRISPR-Cas9: A gene-editing system that allows scientists to modify an organism's DNA with precision and efficiency. Has transformed genetic engineering and has broad implications in biotechnology, agriculture, and medicine. President Biden's Executive Order on Advancing Biotechnology and Biomanufacturing Innovation but this tech is an abomination. Here is the propaganda: Innovative Solutions: Advance biotechnology and biomanufacturing for solutions in health, climate change, energy, food security, agriculture, supply chain resilience, and national and economic security. Equity, Ethics, Safety, and Security: Emphasize these principles to ensure access to technologies, processes, and products that benefit all Americans and the global community. Economic Growth: Recognize the economic potential of biotechnology and biomanufacturing, referred to as “the bioeconomy”. Investment in Scientific Capabilities: Invest in foundational scientific capabilities, including the development of genetic engineering technologies and techniques, unlocking the power of biological data, and advancing the science of scale-up production. Biosafety and Biosecurity: Invest in and promote biosafety and biosecurity to ensure that biotechnology is developed and deployed in ways that align with United States principles and values and international best practices. Domestic Production: Ensure that what is invented in the US can be made in the United States, creating jobs at home, building stronger supply chains, and lowering prices for American families. Addressing Global Challenges: Drive advances in biomanufacturing that can improve food and energy security, mitigate the impacts of climate change, and help people live longer and healthier lives through advances in medicine.

205. R-Zero | Grant Morgan was developing a powerful UV-C disinfection device capable of destroying over 99.99% of pathogens to make commercial space as safe as possible for employees and customers. Grant, along with his co-founders, runs R-Zero Systems, which is a biosafety company dedicated to making safer everyday spaces and common places. Among their top priority is to thoughtfully design the most effective technologies and protocols that would reduce our world of deadly pathogens such as the Coronavirus, Influenza, norovirus, E. coli, common cold, and other common infectious diseases.   *** For Show Notes, Key Points, Contact Info, Resources Mentioned, & the Fabulous 4 Questions on this episode visit our website: Grant Morgan Interview. ***   If you have land in Georgia, then check out: https://bubba-land.com/georgia/  

Earl is joined by Bryce Nickels, Robert H. Ebright, and Simon Wain-Hobson from Biosafety Now to discuss the dangers 'gain of function' research poses to public health and general safety. Gain of function refers to a type of research in which the transmissibility and/or lethality of a virus is artificially enhanced in a laboratory. With the proposal of Bill AB413 and AB401, Wisconsin looks to become the first state to regulate and limit this type of research. Bryce, Robert, and Simon are world-renowned scientists, with Ph.D.'s in chemical biology, genetics, and microbiology, that are now speaking out against the lack of transparency in the field. Biosafety Now is a global NGO dedicated to educating the public on the threat of research-generated pandemics and passing legislation to protect the public from the creation of non-natural pathogens. https://biosafetynow.org/ The Earl Ingram Show is a part of the Civic Media radio network and airs Monday through Friday from 8-10 am across the state. Subscribed to the podcast to be sure not to miss out on a single episode! To learn more about the show and all of the programming across the Civic Media network, head over to https://civicmedia.us/shows to see the entire broadcast line up. Follow the show on Facebook and X to keep up with Earl and the show! Guests: Bryce Nickels, Robert H. Ebright, Simon Wain-Hobson

Earl continues the discussion with Bryce Nickels, Robert H. Ebright, and Simon Wain-Hobson on gain of function research and the dangers of non-natural pathogens. Gain of function refers to a type of research in which the transmissibility and/or lethality of a virus is artificially enhanced in a laboratory. With the proposal of Bill AB413 and AB401, Wisconsin looks to become the first state to regulate and limit this type of research. Bryce, Robert, and Simon are world-renowned scientists, with Ph.D.'s in chemical biology, genetics, and microbiology, that are now speaking out against the lack of transparency in the field. Biosafety Now is a global NGO dedicated to educating the public on the threat of research-generated pandemics and passing legislation to protect the public from the creation of non-natural pathogens. https://biosafetynow.org/ The Earl Ingram Show is a part of the Civic Media radio network and airs Monday through Friday from 8-10 am across the state. Subscribed to the podcast to be sure not to miss out on a single episode! To learn more about the show and all of the programming across the Civic Media network, head over to https://civicmedia.us/shows to see the entire broadcast line up. Follow the show on Facebook and X to keep up with Earl and the show! Guests: Bryce Nickels, Robert H. Ebright, Simon Wain-Hobson

Major General (ret) Dr. Aamer Ikram is currently the Director of the Pakistan Field Epidemiology and Laboratory Training Program (FELTP), as well as Chairperson of the Training Programs in Epidemiology and Public Health Interventions Network ( TEPHINET - https://www.tephinet.org/aamer-ikram ) Advisory Board; a global network of Field Epidemiology Training Programs spanning more than 80 programs actively training field epidemiologists in more than 200 countries and territories. Dr. Ikram recently spent 7 years in leadership as Executive Director of the National Institute of Health Pakistan ( https://www.nih.org.pk/ ). Dr. Ikram is also a member Board Gavi, The Vaccine Alliance; Executive Board International Association of National Public Health Institutes (IANPHI); Executive Committee Institute of Safety in Technology & Research, UK; Technical Advisory Group – Biosafety, WHO; adjunct faculty Emory University; Ex-Executive Council of International Society for Infectious Diseases; and Co-Chair Biological Sciences Committee, Higher Education Commission; and member multiple National Working Groups. Dr. Ikram has extensive experience working with International Health Regulations, Global Health Security Agenda, Integrated Disease Surveillance & Response, One-Heath, Biosafety & Biosecurity. Dr. Ikram graduated from Army Medical College with a Diploma in Pathology, qualified MCPS (Clinical Pathology) and Fellowship (Clinical Microbiology), and then did his Ph.D. in molecular biology. He is a Registered Biosafety Professional from the American Biological Safety Association, a Biosafety Professional from the Institute of Safety in Technology and Research (UK), and an International Federation of Biosafety Associations (IFBA) Certified Professional. Furthermore, he was awarded Fellowship of the Royal College of Physicians (FRCP) by the Royal College of Edinburgh; FRCPath by the Royal College of Pathologists in London; and a Fellowship in Public Health from Royal Colleges UK. He was also recently elected as a Fellow in the Pakistan Academy of Sciences. Dr. Ikram has served as the President of the Pakistan Biological Safety Association (PBSA); Ex-President of the Medical Microbiology and Infectious Diseases Society (MMIDSP); Higher Education Commission Focal Point of Expertise for Medical Research, and Convener of Microbiology Pakistan Health Research Council. Support the show

This is a selection of highlights from episode #171 of The 80,000 Hours Podcast.These aren't necessarily the most important, or even most entertaining parts of the interview — and if you enjoy this, we strongly recommend checking out the full episode:Alison Young on how top labs have jeopardised public health with repeated biosafety failuresAnd if you're finding these highlights episodes valuable, please let us know by emailing podcast@80000hours.org.Highlights put together by Simon Monsour, Milo McGuire, and Dominic Armstrong

"Rare events can still cause catastrophic accidents. The concern that has been raised by experts going back over time, is that really, the more of these experiments, the more labs, the more opportunities there are for a rare event to occur — that the right pathogen is involved and infects somebody in one of these labs, or is released in some way from these labs. And what I chronicle in Pandora's Gamble is that there have been these previous outbreaks that have been associated with various kinds of lab accidents. So this is not a theoretical thing that can happen: it has happened in the past." — Alison YoungIn today's episode, host Luisa Rodriguez interviews award-winning investigative journalist Alison Young on the surprising frequency of lab leaks and what needs to be done to prevent them in the future.Links to learn more, summary, and full transcript.They cover:The most egregious biosafety mistakes made by the CDC, and how Alison uncovered them through her investigative reportingThe Dugway life science test facility case, where live anthrax was accidentally sent to labs across the US and several other countries over a period of many yearsThe time the Soviets had a major anthrax leak, and then hid it for over a decadeThe 1977 influenza pandemic caused by vaccine trial gone wrong in ChinaThe last death from smallpox, caused not by the virus spreading in the wild, but by a lab leak in the UK Ways we could get more reliable oversight and accountability for these labsAnd the investigative work Alison's most proud ofProducer and editor: Keiran HarrisAudio Engineering Lead: Ben CordellTechnical editing: Simon Monsour and Milo McGuireAdditional content editing: Katy Moore and Luisa RodriguezTranscriptions: Katy Moore

Dr. Andy Spry, Consultant to the Planetary Protection Officer, NASA April 21, 2023 In this episode, we discuss NASA's Office of Planetary Protection, which focuses on mitigating contamination risk for space missions. Their efforts cover both forward contamination—ie, contaminating extraterrestrial bodies with organisms from Earth—and backward contamination—ie, contaminating Earth with extraterrestrial life. Planetary protection functions much like laboratory biosafety, but on a much larger scale! The Planetary Protection office is responsible for developing and implementing the processes and standards necessary to ensure cleanliness and containment, and these considerations are part of the long-term planning that goes into all of NASA's space missions, including historical, current, and future efforts to return sample materials collected from the Moon, asteroids, and Mars.

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: EA Germany Community Health Documents & Processes, published by Milena Canzler on August 30, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Our goal with these documents is to build a safe community for all our members by making sure any interpersonal harm is appropriately dealt with and encouraging harmed individuals to reach out to us. This is a collection of all the documents we created for EA Germany during the Community Health Project (March - July 2023). We were asked to share these with the wider community. We welcome others to use and adapt them and invite feedback. We created two types of documents: Public: to inform our community about our Code of Conduct, event standards, ways to report misbehaviours and ask for help, processes for evaluating and responding to reports, confidentiality, professional contact points, and Awareness Workshop results. Internal: description of the role and responsibility of the Community Health Contact, their interaction with the Equal Opportunities Officer of our association, and handover processes. Why we need this Last week, Ninas, a new group organizer, was alerted by group member Sayat about allegations against a long-term member. Unaware of any past issues, Ninas informs Sayat, causing Sayat to feel belittled and cease work on a promising Biosafety camp. After confronting the accused and mistakenly revealing Sayat as the source, retaliation against Sayat ensues. Ninas, now shocked and believing Sayat, uncovers additional troubling stories about the long-term member after further inquiry. Ninas regrets not knowing earlier, as this knowledge could have prevented Sayat's distress and withdrawal from their project due to harassment. Imagine if Ninas, the hypothetical group organiser, had a starter pack of information about Community Health and previous incidents in their group. Imagine if they didn't botch their first conversation with Sayat and were better informed about confidentiality procedures. As part of the Community Health Project, which started in March 2023, we created a series of documents to inform our members about our offers and to document internal processes for the team. These documents exist to support us in staying in line with our vision and values. They further help identify areas for improvement and serve as the foundation for action. Setting in Germany To appreciate how these documents work, here is an overview of the system in and for which they're created. Other communities will have to adapt the processes for their own structure, culture and laws. Our structure: The German EA community has 27 active local groups. EA Germany is organised as a membership association Effektiver Altruismus Deutschland (EAD) e.V. with over 100 members. We currently have a team of five employees, some full-time and some part-time. The association also elects an Equal Opportunities Officer who checks our processes and important documents for discrimination. They also provided us with feedback on these documents. The resources Part of our strategy for 2023 is to provide a trained Community Health Contact, implement standards and offer documents for Community Health. With the support of colleagues, the Equal opportunities officer, CEA's Community Health team and experts, I assessed our options to create a safer community. This assessment is ongoing. Here is the summary of what needed to be done and the results so far: Public documents Community Health Contact Mental Health First Aid training to qualify me for this role in our team Informed our community about this offer; also in German Anonymous contact forms established; also in German Code of Conduct We added avenues of reporting violations and responses to reports, an alcohol and drug policy and anonymous contact forms. During our annual meeting at the start of June, we asked the memb...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Biosafety in BSL-3, BSL-3+ and BSL-4 Laboratories: Mapping and Recommendations for Latin America, published by JorgeTorresC on August 23, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Executive summary This article addresses biosafety and biosecurity in high-containment level laboratories (BSL-3 and BSL-4) in Latin America, with a focus on classification, current status, and regulatory frameworks. In the region, the lack of uniformity in data collection makes it difficult to accurately understand the infrastructure of high-containment laboratories. Regulatory frameworks vary across the region and present challenges in terms of standardization. Although countries like Colombia have made progress in this area, there is a need to establish updated and centralized regulatory frameworks in each country. To improve biosafety and biosecurity, we make a series of recommendations such as the implementation of biological risk management systems in laboratories, the promotion of non-punitive incident reports, the standardization of supervision processes, collaboration between institutions, and the exchange of best practices. Introduction Biosafety and biosecurity in high-containment level laboratories (BSL-3 and BSL-4) are of vital importance for the protection of public health. These laboratories work with dangerous biological agents, so it is essential to ensure that practices, equipment, and security measures are adequate and rigorous. In this context, this article focuses on analyzing the current situation of BSL-3, BSL-3+, and BSL-4 laboratories in Latin America. We explore the increase in the construction of these laboratories at a global level, the regulatory frameworks by which they are governed, and the challenges that some Latin American countries face in their implementation. In addition, we propose several recommendations to improve biosafety and biosecurity in these laboratories. To consult the complete map follow the link: Classification of laboratories by biosafety levels In 1974, the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) published a document titled "Classification of etiologic agents on the basis of hazard", proposing the classification of pathogens into four risk groups. Subsequently, both the National Institutes of Health (NIH) of the United States and the World Health Organization (WHO) updated this system, thus establishing the bases for the classification of laboratories according to the risk group of the pathogens they handle (Villegas et al. al., 2007). Out of the classification of risk groups, four levels of biosafety in laboratories have been established. These levels are determined taking into account several factors, such as the infectious capacity of the pathogen, the existence of treatments or vaccines for it, the severity of the disease it causes, its transmissibility, whether it is of exotic origin or not, and the nature of the work carried out in the laboratory (Lara-Villegas et al., 2008). Level 1 (BSL-1) laboratories use elemental equipment and practices for teaching purposes. They work with well-defined and characterized strains of microorganisms that do not cause disease in healthy people. The use of special protective equipment is not required. Level 2 (BSL-2) laboratories adopt appropriate practices, equipment, and measures to realize clinical analysis, diagnoses, and pathology. These laboratories handle microorganisms of moderate risk that are present in the community and are associated with human diseases of variable severity. Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratories implement appropriate practices, equipment, and measures to realize clinical analysis, diagnoses, and research. These laboratories handle known or unknown agents that have the potential to be transmitted by aerosol or splash and that can cause life-threatening infections...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: An overview of standards in biosafety and biorisk, published by rosehadshar on July 26, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. Linkpost for This report represents ~40 hours of work by Rose Hadshar in summer 2023 for Arb Research, in turn for Holden Karnofsky in response to this call for proposals on standards. It's based on a mixture of background reading, research into individual standards, and interviews with experts. Note that I didn't ask for permission to cite the expert interviews publicly, so I've anonymised them. I suggest reading the scope and summary and skimming the overview, then only looking at sections which seem particularly relevant to you. Scope This report covers: Both biosecurity and biosafety: Biosecurity: "the protection, control and accountability for valuable biological materials (including information) in laboratories in order to prevent their unauthorized access, loss, theft, misuse, diversion or intentional release." Biosafety: "the containment principles, technologies and practices that are implemented to prevent unintentional exposure to pathogens and toxins or their accidental release" Biosecurity and biosafety standards internationally, but with much more emphasis on the US Regulations and guidance as well as standards proper. I am using these terms as follows: Regulations: rules on how to comply with a particular law or laws. Legally binding Guidance: rules on how to comply with particular regulations. Not legally binding, but risky to ignore Standards: rules which do not relate to compliance with a particular law or laws. Not legally binding. Note that I also sometimes use 'standards' as an umbrella term for regulations, guidance and standards. Summary of most interesting findings For each point: I've included my confidence in the claim (operationalised as the probability that I would still believe the claim after 40 hours' more work). I link to a subsection with more details (though in some cases I don't have much more to say). The origins of bio standards (80%) There were many different motivations behind bio standards (e.g. plant health, animal health, worker protection, bioterrorism, fair sharing of genetic resources.) (70%) Standards were significantly reactive to rather than proactive about incidents (e.g. lab accidents, terrorist attacks, and epidemics), though: There are exceptions (e.g. the NIH guidelines on recombinant DNA) Guidance is often more proactive than standards (e.g. gene drives) (80%) International standards weren't always later or less influential than national ones (70%) Voluntary standards seem to have prevented regulation in at least one case (e.g. the NIH guidelines) (65%) In the US, it may be more likely that mandatory standards are passed on matters of national security (e.g. FSAP) Compliance (60%) Voluntary compliance may sometimes be higher than mandated compliance (e.g. NIH guidelines) (70%) Motives for voluntarily following standards include responsibility, market access, and the spread of norms via international training (80%) Voluntary standards may be easier to internationalise than regulation (90%) Deliberate efforts were made to increase compliance internationally (e.g. via funding biosafety associations, offering training and other assistance) Problems with these standards (90%) Bio standards are often list-based. This means that they are not comprehensive, do not reflect new threats, prevent innovation in risk management, and fail to recognise the importance of context for risk There's been a partial move away from prescriptive, list-based standards towards holistic, risk-based standards (e.g. ISO 35001) (85%) Bio standards tend to lack reporting standards, so it's very hard to tell how effective they are (60%) Standards may have impeded safety work in some areas (e.g. select agent designation as a...

Raina MacIntyre (MBBS Hons 1, M App Epid, PhD, FRACP, FAFPHM) is Head of the Biosecurity Program, Kirby Institute, UNSW & author of DARK WINTER. She has over 450 peer-reviewed publications, has received many awards including the Sir Henry Wellcome Medal from the Association of Military Surgeons of the US and is a member of the WHO COVID-19 Vaccine Composition Technical Advisory Group and WHO Smallpox and monkeypox working group.

Do you know how the biosafety risks of oncolytic immunotherapies and their combination with immune checkpoint inhibitors can be mitigated? Credit available for this activity expires: 6/22/24 Earn Credit / Learning Objectives & Disclosures: https://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/993479?ecd=bdc_podcast_libsyn_mscpedu

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: How biosafety could inform AI standards, published by Olivia Jimenez on June 9, 2023 on LessWrong. Context: Simeon Campos and I wanted to understand how other industries handle catastrophic risks, then write pieces about how any standards from them could be applied to AI for policy readers. This is a draft slightly modified for LessWrong. Epistemic status: Very shallow dive, though I checked my understanding with people with more biosecurity and policy expertise, like David Manheim (thanks!). Related posts I recommend: Six Dimensions of Operational Adequacy in AGI Projects, High Reliability Orgs, and AI Companies, “Carefully-Bootstrapped Alignment” is organizationally hard How biosafety could inform AI standards Leading AI executives and researchers recently signed a statement saying “Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war.” If we take this seriously, it's worth looking at how much we do to mitigate pandemic and nuclear risks. (Spoiler: a lot.) This post addresses the first half of that, outlining my understanding of biosafety standards and how they could inform standards for high-risk AI research. Biosafety & its relevance The field of biology has comprehensive standards for maintaining safety while working with potentially dangerous biological agents, such as viruses that could escape the lab and infect many people. Biosafety standards are applied in a tiered approach, where the riskiest research can only occur in laboratories taking the most stringent precautions. The levels of laboratory precautions range from biosafety level 1 (BSL-1, the lowest) to biosafety level 4 (BSL-4, the highest). BSL standards also govern the storage and transportation of biological agents, access to these labs, and similar. BSL-1 has minimal standards; it allows places like high school labs to easily experiment. BSL-4 has very restrictive standards; there are only around 50 BSL-4 labs in the world. BSL-4 labs are the only places where easily-transmissible and lethal diseases like Ebola can be studied. By enforcing tiered standards according to research risk at all labs, biology has been relatively successful at mitigating the two types of risks it faces: accident risks, such as a virus escaping the lab because it was accidentally mishandled, and misuse risk, such as a virus being intentionally taken out of the lab by someone who intends to cause harm with it. There are notable parallels to AI here. Different AI research poses different risks, and most are easily manageable. However, research on the most powerful systems poses significant accident and misuse risks that are difficult to manage (in some cases, we don't even know how we could manage them): powerful systems could get out of developers control or they could be used to cause harm. Accordingly, labs conducting that research should probably be held to particularly high standards of reliability and security. Below I outline some standards for US biosafety level 3 and 4 labs, which handle pathogens that pose catastrophic risks. Other countries' standards at these levels are very similar, so I haven't taken the time to spell out differences. Then, I outline how they could be applied in AI. I'm not going to defend these particular applications here; they're just examples. That said, I've chosen examples I'm pretty sympathetic to. Selected biosafety standards & potential applications in AI 1. High-risk research must be conducted in designated labs subject to stringent standards. The USDA maintains a list of biological agents that pose severe public health and safety threats (henceforth select agents). Any lab wishing to work with a select agent must be licensed by the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP). These facilities are continu...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: How biosafety could inform AI standards, published by Olivia Jimenez on June 9, 2023 on The AI Alignment Forum. Context: Simeon Campos and I wanted to understand how other industries handle catastrophic risks, then write pieces about how any standards from them could be applied to AI for policy readers. This is a draft slightly modified for LessWrong. Epistemic status: Very shallow dive, though I checked my understanding with people with more biosecurity and policy expertise, like David Manheim (thanks!). Related posts I recommend: Six Dimensions of Operational Adequacy in AGI Projects, High Reliability Orgs, and AI Companies, “Carefully-Bootstrapped Alignment” is organizationally hard How biosafety could inform AI standards Leading AI executives and researchers recently signed a statement saying “Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war.” If we take this seriously, it's worth looking at how much we do to mitigate pandemic and nuclear risk. (Spoiler: a lot.) This post addresses the first half of that, outlining my understanding of biosafety standards and how they could inform standards for high-risk AI research. Biosafety & its relevance The field of biology has comprehensive standards for maintaining safety while working with potentially dangerous biological agents, such as viruses that could escape the lab and infect many people. Biosafety standards are applied in a tiered approach, where the riskiest research can only occur in laboratories taking the most stringent precautions. The levels of laboratory precautions range from biosafety level 1 (BSL-1, the lowest) to biosafety level 4 (BSL-4, the highest). BSL standards also govern the storage and transportation of biological agents, access to these labs, and similar. BSL-1 has minimal standards; it allows places like high school labs to easily experiment. BSL-4 has very restrictive standards; there are only around 50 BSL-4 labs in the world. BSL-4 labs are the only places where easily-transmissible and lethal diseases like Ebola can be studied. By enforcing tiered standards according to research risk at all labs, biology has been relatively successful at mitigating the two types of risks it faces: accident risks, such as a virus escaping the lab because it was accidentally mishandled, and misuse risk, such as a virus being intentionally taken out of the lab by someone who intends to cause harm with it. There are notable parallels to AI here. Different AI research poses different risks, and most are easily manageable. However, research on the most powerful systems poses significant accident and misuse risks that are difficult to manage (in some cases, we don't even know how we could manage them): powerful systems could get out of developers control or they could be used to cause harm. Accordingly, labs conducting that research should probably be held to particularly high standards of reliability and security. Below I outline some standards for US biosafety level 3 and 4 labs, which handle pathogens that pose catastrophic risks. Other countries' standards at these levels are very similar, so I haven't taken the time to spell out differences. Selected biosafety standards & potential applications in AI 1. High-risk research must be conducted in designated labs subject to stringent standards. The USDA maintains a list of biological agents that pose severe public health and safety threats (henceforth select agents). Any lab wishing to work with a select agent must be licensed by the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP). These facilities are continuously monitored for compliance. Additionally, each BSL-4 research project must get specific approval before it can be conducted. Researchers must submit detailed research plans an...

Link to original articleWelcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: How biosafety could inform AI standards, published by Olivia Jimenez on June 9, 2023 on LessWrong. Context: Simeon Campos and I wanted to understand how other industries handle catastrophic risks, then write pieces about how any standards from them could be applied to AI for policy readers. This is a draft slightly modified for LessWrong. Epistemic status: Very shallow dive, though I checked my understanding with people with more biosecurity and policy expertise, like David Manheim (thanks!). Related posts I recommend: Six Dimensions of Operational Adequacy in AGI Projects, High Reliability Orgs, and AI Companies, “Carefully-Bootstrapped Alignment” is organizationally hard How biosafety could inform AI standards Leading AI executives and researchers recently signed a statement saying “Mitigating the risk of extinction from AI should be a global priority alongside other societal-scale risks such as pandemics and nuclear war.” If we take this seriously, it's worth looking at how much we do to mitigate pandemic and nuclear risks. (Spoiler: a lot.) This post addresses the first half of that, outlining my understanding of biosafety standards and how they could inform standards for high-risk AI research. Biosafety & its relevance The field of biology has comprehensive standards for maintaining safety while working with potentially dangerous biological agents, such as viruses that could escape the lab and infect many people. Biosafety standards are applied in a tiered approach, where the riskiest research can only occur in laboratories taking the most stringent precautions. The levels of laboratory precautions range from biosafety level 1 (BSL-1, the lowest) to biosafety level 4 (BSL-4, the highest). BSL standards also govern the storage and transportation of biological agents, access to these labs, and similar. BSL-1 has minimal standards; it allows places like high school labs to easily experiment. BSL-4 has very restrictive standards; there are only around 50 BSL-4 labs in the world. BSL-4 labs are the only places where easily-transmissible and lethal diseases like Ebola can be studied. By enforcing tiered standards according to research risk at all labs, biology has been relatively successful at mitigating the two types of risks it faces: accident risks, such as a virus escaping the lab because it was accidentally mishandled, and misuse risk, such as a virus being intentionally taken out of the lab by someone who intends to cause harm with it. There are notable parallels to AI here. Different AI research poses different risks, and most are easily manageable. However, research on the most powerful systems poses significant accident and misuse risks that are difficult to manage (in some cases, we don't even know how we could manage them): powerful systems could get out of developers control or they could be used to cause harm. Accordingly, labs conducting that research should probably be held to particularly high standards of reliability and security. Below I outline some standards for US biosafety level 3 and 4 labs, which handle pathogens that pose catastrophic risks. Other countries' standards at these levels are very similar, so I haven't taken the time to spell out differences. Then, I outline how they could be applied in AI. I'm not going to defend these particular applications here; they're just examples. That said, I've chosen examples I'm pretty sympathetic to. Selected biosafety standards & potential applications in AI 1. High-risk research must be conducted in designated labs subject to stringent standards. The USDA maintains a list of biological agents that pose severe public health and safety threats (henceforth select agents). Any lab wishing to work with a select agent must be licensed by the Federal Select Agent Program (FSAP). These facilities are continu...

Sen. Marco Rubio, R-Fla., has published a report that suggests that the COVID-19 outbreak was tied to "a serious biosafety incident."Advertising Inquiries: https://redcircle.com/brandsPrivacy & Opt-Out: https://redcircle.com/privacy

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Write more Wikipedia articles on policy-relevant EA concepts, published by freedomandutility on April 3, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. One way I think EA fails to maximise impact is by its focus on legible, clear and attributable impact over actions where the impact is extremely difficult to estimate. Writing Wikipedia articles on and around important EA concepts (except perhaps on infohazardous bioterrorism incidents) has low downside risk and extremely high upside risk, making these ideas much more easy to understand for policymakers and other people in positions of power who may come across them and google them. However, the feedback loops are virtually non-existent and the impact is highly illegible. For example, there is currently no dedicated Wikipedia page for “Existential Risk” and “Global Catastrophic Biological Risk”. Writing Wikipedia pages could be a particularly good use of time for people new to EA and people in university student groups who want to gain a better understanding of EA concepts or of EA-relevant policy areas. Some other ideas for creating new Wikipedia articles or adding more detail to existing ones: International Biosecurity and Biosafety Initiative for Science Alternative Proteins Governance of Alternative Proteins Global Partnership Biological Security Working Group Regulation of gain-of-function biological research by country Public investment in alternative proteins by country Space governance Regulation of alternative proteins UN Biorisk Working Group Political Representation of Future Generations Political Representation of Future Generations by Country Political Representation of Animals Joint Assessment Mechanism Public investment in AI Safety research by country International Experts Group of Biosafety and Biosecurity Regulators Tobacco taxation by country Global Partnership Signature Initiative to Mitigate Biological Threats in Africa Regulations on lead in paint by country Alcohol taxation by country Regulation of dual-use biological research by country Joint External Evaluations Biological Weapons Convention funding by country Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

How do research communities contend with controversial science? J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Ph.D., Arizona State University, Alysson Muotri, Ph.D., UC San Diego, Matthew Porteus, M.D., Ph.D., Stanford University, and Jacob (Yaqub) Hanna, M.D., Ph.D., Weizmann Institute of Science, explore controversial case studies and the limitations of scientific deliberation/dissent/ambivalence. Series: "Stem Cell Channel" [Health and Medicine] [Humanities] [Science] [Show ID: 38729]

How do research communities contend with controversial science? J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Ph.D., Arizona State University, Alysson Muotri, Ph.D., UC San Diego, Matthew Porteus, M.D., Ph.D., Stanford University, and Jacob (Yaqub) Hanna, M.D., Ph.D., Weizmann Institute of Science, explore controversial case studies and the limitations of scientific deliberation/dissent/ambivalence. Series: "Stem Cell Channel" [Health and Medicine] [Humanities] [Science] [Show ID: 38729]

How do research communities contend with controversial science? J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Ph.D., Arizona State University, Alysson Muotri, Ph.D., UC San Diego, Matthew Porteus, M.D., Ph.D., Stanford University, and Jacob (Yaqub) Hanna, M.D., Ph.D., Weizmann Institute of Science, explore controversial case studies and the limitations of scientific deliberation/dissent/ambivalence. Series: "Stem Cell Channel" [Health and Medicine] [Humanities] [Science] [Show ID: 38729]

How do research communities contend with controversial science? J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Ph.D., Arizona State University, Alysson Muotri, Ph.D., UC San Diego, Matthew Porteus, M.D., Ph.D., Stanford University, and Jacob (Yaqub) Hanna, M.D., Ph.D., Weizmann Institute of Science, explore controversial case studies and the limitations of scientific deliberation/dissent/ambivalence. Series: "Stem Cell Channel" [Health and Medicine] [Humanities] [Science] [Show ID: 38729]

How do research communities contend with controversial science? J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Ph.D., Arizona State University, Alysson Muotri, Ph.D., UC San Diego, Matthew Porteus, M.D., Ph.D., Stanford University, and Jacob (Yaqub) Hanna, M.D., Ph.D., Weizmann Institute of Science, explore controversial case studies and the limitations of scientific deliberation/dissent/ambivalence. Series: "Stem Cell Channel" [Health and Medicine] [Humanities] [Science] [Show ID: 38729]

How do research communities contend with controversial science? J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Ph.D., Arizona State University, Alysson Muotri, Ph.D., UC San Diego, Matthew Porteus, M.D., Ph.D., Stanford University, and Jacob (Yaqub) Hanna, M.D., Ph.D., Weizmann Institute of Science, explore controversial case studies and the limitations of scientific deliberation/dissent/ambivalence. Series: "Stem Cell Channel" [Health and Medicine] [Humanities] [Science] [Show ID: 38729]

How do research communities contend with controversial science? J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Ph.D., Arizona State University, Alysson Muotri, Ph.D., UC San Diego, Matthew Porteus, M.D., Ph.D., Stanford University, and Jacob (Yaqub) Hanna, M.D., Ph.D., Weizmann Institute of Science, explore controversial case studies and the limitations of scientific deliberation/dissent/ambivalence. Series: "Stem Cell Channel" [Health and Medicine] [Humanities] [Science] [Show ID: 38729]

How do research communities contend with controversial science? J. Benjamin Hurlbut, Ph.D., Arizona State University, Alysson Muotri, Ph.D., UC San Diego, Matthew Porteus, M.D., Ph.D., Stanford University, and Jacob (Yaqub) Hanna, M.D., Ph.D., Weizmann Institute of Science, explore controversial case studies and the limitations of scientific deliberation/dissent/ambivalence. Series: "Stem Cell Channel" [Health and Medicine] [Humanities] [Science] [Show ID: 38729]

In this episode of the Debugged Podcast, Medha Gupta chats with Dr. Marian L. McKee, the Vice President Biosafety at Eurofins Biopharma Product Testing labs. McKee goes in depth about her role, which is working to ensure the safety of pharmaceutical products by testing for viral contaminants. McKee shares her journey from her interest in zoology to a career in microbiology. The duo discuss the importance of understanding science, the integration of technology in science, and following your passion. Tune into McKee's amazing journey as a leader in biosafety and inspiration to many!

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Advice on communicating in and around the biosecurity policy community, published by Elika on March 2, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. TL;DR The field of biosecurity is more complicated, sensitive and nuanced, especially in the policy space, than what impressions you might get based on publicly available information. As a result, say / write / do things with caution (especially if you are a non-technical person or more junior, or talking to a new (non-EA) expert). This might help make more headway on safer biosecurity policy. Generally, take caution in what you say and how you present yourself, because it does impact how much you are trusted, whether or not you are invited back to the conversation, and thus the potential to make an impact in this (highly sensitive) space. Why Am I Saying This? An important note: I don't represent the views of the NIH, HHS, or the U.S. government and these are my personal opinions. This is me engaging outside of my professional capacity to provide advice for people interested in working on biosecurity policy. I work for a U.S. government agency on projects related to oversight and ethics over dual-use research of concern (DURC) and enhanced pandemic potential pathogens (ePPP). In my job, I talk and interface with science policy advisors, policy makers, regulators, (health) security professionals, scientists who do DURC / ePPP research, biosafety professionals, ethicists, and more. Everyone has a slightly different opinion and risk categorisation of biosecurity / biosafety as a whole, and DURC and ePPP research risk in specific. As a result of my work, I regularly (and happily) speak to newer and more junior EAs to give them advice on entering the biosecurity space. I've noticed a few common mistakes with how many EA community members – both newer bio people and non-bio people who know the basics about the cause area – approach communication, stakeholder engagement, and conversation around biosecurity, especially when engaging with non-EA-aligned stakeholders whose perspectives might be (and very often) are different than the typical EA-perspective on biosecurity and biorisk. I've also made many of these mistakes! I'm hoping this is educational and helpful and not shaming or off-putting. I'm happy to help anyone unsure communicate and engage more strategically in this space. Some Key Points that you might need to Update On. Junior EAs and people new to biosecurity / biosafety may not know how to or that they should be diplomatic. EA communities have a trend of encouraging provoking behaviour and absolutist, black-and-white scenarios in ways that don't communicate an understanding of how grey this field is and the importance of cooperation and diplomacy. If possible, even in EA contexts, train your default to be (at least a bit more) agreeable (especially at first). Be careful with the terms you use and what you say Terms matter. They signal where you are on the spectrum of ‘how dangerous X research type is', what educational background you have and whose articles / what sources you read, and how much you know on this topic. Example: If you use the term gain-of-function with a virologist, most will respond saying most biomedical research is either a gain or loss of function and isn't inherently risky. In an age where many virologists feel like health security professionals want to take away their jobs, saying gain-of-function is an easy and unknowing way to discredit yourself. Biosafety, biorisk, and biosecurity all indicate different approaches to a problem and often, different perspectives on risk and reasonable solutions. What terms you use signal not only what ‘side' you represent, but in a field that's heavily political and sensitive can discredit you amongst the other sides. Recognise how little (or how much) you know Biosec...

Welcome to The Nonlinear Library, where we use Text-to-Speech software to convert the best writing from the Rationalist and EA communities into audio. This is: Biosecurity newsletters you should subscribe to, published by Sofya Lebedeva on January 29, 2023 on The Effective Altruism Forum. TL;DR I searched for other lists of biosecurity newsletters specifically and didn't find one that suited my needs, so I made one! Please leave a comment with any other newsletters that I missed so that I can add them. I hope you find something useful in this list. Newsletters Johns Hopkins Center for Health Security (CHS) subscribe here Health Security Headlines (also from CHS) subscribe here Center for Infectious Disease Research and Policy (CIDRAP) subscribe here Global Biodefence subscribe here Pandora Report subscribe here Nuclear Threat Initiative (NTI) subscribe here Bipartisan Commission on Biodefence subscribe here The Association for Biosafety and Biosecurity (ABSA) subscribe here (scroll to the bottom) Council on Strategic Risks (CSR) subscribe here Biomedical Advanced Research and Development Authority (BARDA) subscribe here Administration for Strategic Preparedness and Response (ASPR) do not recommend subscribing as it is very narrowly biosafety oriented and is sometimes poorly referenced. Comments I sourced a lot of these from recommendations by Caitlin Walker, as well as from looking through various posts by Chris Bakerlee and Tessa Alexanian. Please don't hesitate to point out any links that are broken, comment about the relative quality of the above newsletters, or comment with any newsletters that I have missed. Thank you! Thanks for listening. To help us out with The Nonlinear Library or to learn more, please visit nonlinear.org.

This episode kicks off Season 2 of Wildlife Rehabilitation: From Rescue to Release! I am so excited about this episode. I think you will enjoy listening to it as much as Leslie Kollmann and I had recording it. I know you probably would not normally put “joy” and “infection control” in the same room, let alone the same sentence but when you find out how you can take simple steps to protect yourself and the animals you care for, you may actually stand up and cheer. Leslie Kollmann is a Certified Veterinary Technician from the Minnesota Department of Health's Zoonotic Disease Unit. Prior to working at the Minnesota Department of Health (MDH), Leslie was Infection Control and Safety Technician at the University of Minnesota Veterinary Medical Center. She has experience in all areas of veterinary related Infection Control and Occupational Health. Her wide-ranging experiences include working on a Veterinary Occupational Health and Infection Control Assessment Pilot Program as well as a pilot program for wildlife rehabilitators, sanctuaries, and zoos called the Wildlife Occupational Health and Infection Control Assessment-or fondly referred to as WOHICA.Leslie has authored two book chapters on Infection Control and Zoonotic Diseases and has been a co-author on various other articles. Leslie and I had a wonderful and joyful conversation about how we as rehabilitators can use simple thoughtful techniques to improve infection control practices for ourselves and the animals that come into our care. We did spend a bit of time talking about hand washing. You may think you know all there is to know about washing your hands, but I think you will find out there is more to learn. There is a great activity you can do at home or with other rehabilitators to see just how well you wash your hands. There are lotion products that when seen under UV light, show you just how well - or not - you have washed your hands. One of the products is called Glo-Germ. There are videos of the Glow Germ exercise on the site Glo Germ: Handwashing training .  Sometimes just simply putting up reminders to wash your hands increases your infection control. The MDH has a lot of great posters on hand washing that you can print, laminate, and post. Here is a great hand hygiene printout.We weren't done yet. We talked about cleaning and disinfection, how to make a make a makeshift sink from Pinterest when you are in places without a handwashing sink.We also talked about higher levels of protection, such as wearing gowns. But you need to know how to put on (don) and take them off (doff) properly. Here are some videos to help you practice if you need to wear gowns/N95 , and another on how to Special thanks to Partners For Wildlife and The Raptor Center at the University of Minnesota College of Veterinary Medicine. Our executive producer and host is Gail Buhl. Our producer is Kirk Klocke.To learn more about The Raptor Center, visit Homepage | The Raptor Center (umn.edu). For more on Partners for Wildlife, visit Partners for Wildlife Home | The Raptor Center (umn.edu).

https://westminster-institute.org/events/will-the-war-in-ukraine-be-a-turning-point-for-the-east-mediterranean/ Dr. Basem Shabb served in the Lebanese Parliament from 2005 to 2018. During his tenure, he served on several committees addressing important challenges such as defense, economic policy, and human rights. He was also a member of the Parliamentary Network of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund as well as the Congressional US-Lebanon Friendship Caucus. He was a parliamentary representative at the EU-Lebanese security committee on illicit firearms, small arms and light weapons, and served as Lebanon's representative at the International Institute for Justice and the Rule of Law. Additionally, Dr. Shabb was part of the Lebanese parliamentary delegation that visited Norway to gather more information about oil and gas exploration and legislation. He is a surgeon and a clinical associate professor of surgery at the Lebanese American University. He is a founding member of the Euro-Asian Bridge Society of Cardiac Surgeons and as well as that of the Lebanese Association for Biosafety, Biosecurity, and Bioethics.

En La Ventana de Navarra, César Gonzalvo, ingeniero industrial, CEO de Biosafety y director comercial de Iruña Tecnologías de Automatización, explica los avances en la utilización de un exoesqueleto de uso industrial con el fin de mejorar los procesos de rehabilitación y la calidad de vida de las personas con hemiparesia. Un proyecto en el que se ha implicado Adacen, la Asociación de Daño Cerebral de Navarra. 

Biological safety cabinets available in Class I, Class II (Type A2) and Class II Type (B1 and B2) Provide personnel, product, and environmental protection, We offer NSF certified BSCs and EN 12469 certified biosafety cabinets in lowest price. Get more information: https://www.globallabsupply.com/Biological-safety-Cabinet-s/2221.htm

Today's show is a conversation between four past winners of APHL's Leadership in Biosafety and Biosecurity Award. Jill Power, Christina Egan, Carrie Anglewicz and Andrew Cannons share their thoughts on the past, present and future of biosafety in public health laboratories. Andrew C. Cannons, PhD Laboratory Director Bureau of Public Health Laboratories –Tampa Florida Department of Health Jill J. Power, MS Deputy Director New Hampshire Public Health Laboratories New Hampshire Department of Health and Human Services Carrie Anglewicz, MS Biosafety Officer, Laboratory Outreach Bureau of Laboratories Michigan Department of Health and Human Services Christina Egan, PhD Deputy Director, Division of Infectious Diseases Chief, Biodefense and Mycology Laboratories Wadsworth Center New York State Department of Health Links: Leadership in Biosafety and Biosecurity Award Strengthening Lab Biosafety & Biosecurity APHL Blog posts about biosafety

This week, the Biden regime issued an executive order establishing a new Biosafety and Biosecurity Initiative. The order seeks to “reduce biological risks associated with advances in biotechnology, biomanufacturing, and the bioeconomy.” It also wants to ensure that biotechnology is not used “in ways that lead to accidental or deliberate harm to people.” The Biden regime is laying the groundwork for a Republican takeover of Congress when it inevitably becomes widely known and accepted that COVID-19 came out of a lab. The fact that we will—one way or another—find out the truth is also evident from newly released Fauci emails. Once again, the bulk of Dr. Anthony Fauci's emails has been unjustifiably redacted by National Institutes of Health censors. But from what we can see, it again becomes clear that Fauci and his boss, Francis Collins, know a lot more about COVID's origin than they let on. ⭕️Watch in-depth videos based on Truth & Tradition at Epoch TV

Biological safety cabinets available in Class I, Class II (Type A2) and Class II Type (B1 and B2) Provide personnel, product, and environmental protection, We offer NSF certified BSCs and EN 12469 certified biosafety cabinets in lowest price.Get more information: https://www.globallabsupply.com/Biological-safety-Cabinet-s/2221.htm

Genetic Engineering and Society Center GES Colloquium - Tuesdays 12-1PM (via Zoom) NC State University | http://go.ncsu.edu/ges-colloquium GES Mediasite - See videos, full abstracts, speaker bios, and slides https://go.ncsu.edu/ges-mediasite Twitter - https://twitter.com/GESCenterNCSU Pioneering Work in Genetic Engineering of Crops and It's Adoption in Africa Florence M. Wambugu, PhD, DSc., Founding Director and CEO, Africa Harvest Biotech Foundation International Website | Twitter @AfricaHarvestKe & @DrFWambugu Factors influencing the adoption of GE crops in Africa, and Dr. Wambugu's pioneering work on GE sweetpotato and with the Africa Biofortified Sorghum (ABS) project. Abstract Despite huge adoption of Genetically Engineered (GE) Crops globally in the last two decades, the debate continues especially among interest groups in the public, policy makers, regulators & researchers. During the early days of GE Crops debate, anti-GE Lobby groups argued that Africa lacked capacity to regulate the GE technology and Africa policy makers feared they would lose trade with EU. These positions have changed and according to the latest report of the ISAAA Brief 55, on the Global Status of Commercialized GE Crops in 2019, Africa leads the progress among the regions of the world in adopting GE crops by doubling the number of adopting countries in 2019. Africa has been regarded as the region with the biggest potential to benefit from GE crop adoption because of the immense challenges relating to poverty, hunger, and malnutrition. However, from an initial list of limited GE crops adopters in 2018, Africa have significantly increased adopters from 2019 to harness the benefits of GE technology. Globally, different continents and regions have taken different positions, with the USA, Canada, Australia, China, and Latin America leading in adoption of GE crops, while the EU remains generally cautious on case-by-case basis by different states. However, Africa is rising from the negative influence of EU anti-GE lobby groups, based on fear of losing trade opportunities, telling by the increased GE confined field trails (CFTs) targeting food security crops. In this colloquium, Dr. Florence Wambugu will discuss the factors that earlier contributed, and continue to influence adoption of GE crops in Africa, highlighting GE Crops Research & Development by Africa Scientists using existing Biosafety laws. She will also discuss her pioneering work of GE Sweet-potato and promising GE work with Africa Biofortified Sorghum (ABS) Project in Africa. Related links: Dr. Wambugu profile on SourceWatch Speaker Bio Dr. Florence M. Wambugu is the Founding Director and Chief Executive Officer of Africa Harvest Biotech Foundation International (AHBFI) — also known as Africa Harvest — in Kenya since 2002. She is a plant pathologist with specialization in virology holding a Ph.D. from the University of Bath, England (1991), Post-Doctoral Research Associate – Biotechnology with a life science company in USA, and holds an Honorary Doctor of Science from University of Bath, England (2008). For over 30 years she has dedicated her life to agricultural research where she's made significant contributions to the improvement of sorghum, maize, pyrethrum, banana and sweet potato with significant impact on the livelihoods of smallholder farmers. Dr. Wambugu has authored/co-authored over 300 papers, publications, and books in local and international journals, written two books including “Modifying Africa”- How Biotechnology Can Benefit the Poor and Hungry (2001, 2004), and Biotechnology for Africa; Emergence, Initiatives and Future (2014) by Springer. Dr. Wambugu holds several awards and honors from local and international institutions in recognition of her work in Africa including first place medal winner in Global Development Network Awards under science and technology category in Year 2000 for the TC banana project impact. Named as one of the world top 100 most influential people in biotech today by the Scientific American Worldview special report 2015, Awarded Yara Prize 2008, from the Norway-based Yara Foundation for her significant contribution to fight hunger and poverty in Africa. Dr. Wambugu was awarded the Eve Woman of the year Award by the EVE Magazine, in February 2004 in East Africa in recognition of her contribution to science and its application to combat hunger and poverty in Africa. Another award was given to Dr. Wambugu by the South African government during the commemoration of 10 years of democratic rule for her consistent support to agricultural development. In 2002 she was awarded “Woman of the Year” recognition by the American Biographical Institute for empowering the power through increased food production. She is also a recipient of International Institute of Tropical Agriculture's (IITA) award in 1981 for successful establishment of a tissue culture laboratory in support of root and tuber crops germplasm improvement; KARI's 1989 Crop Science award for excellent performance in scientific conferences; International Potato Centre's (CIP) 1989 Regional Research award, for outstanding advancements in sweet potato research; Pyrethrum Marketing Board of Kenya 1990 farmers support award for successful establishment of a rapid micro-propagation laboratory for pyrethrum (Chrysanthemum) in 1986/7. Recognized by Virology Division of Horticultural Research International in England and KARI in 1991, as exemplary Ph.D. candidate for outstanding dissertation contributions on sweet potato virus disease research work done in Kenya, Monsanto Company Outstanding Performance Award for 1992 and 1993. Participated in key boards including Member of DuPont Biotech Advisory Panel-USA, International Plant Genetic Research Institute, UN Millennium Development goals Hunger Task Force, The Science Board of Bill and Melinda Gates Global Health Challenge and as a Council Member of the Science Technology and Society of Japan. GES Colloquium is jointly taught by Drs. Jen Baltzegar and Sumit Dhole, who you may contact with any class-specific questions. Please subscribe to the GES newsletter and Twitter for updates. GES Center - Integrating scientific knowledge & diverse public values in shaping the futures of biotechnology. Find out more at https://ges-center-lectures-ncsu.pinecast.co

This 1993 song gives focus to so much, including emotional men struggling with their feels (or their apathy) and their words. How can the Smooth music listener contend with the voice of Satan and still get to yoga on time? Childhood mini-traumas. The Ying and Yang of Hair and skin pigments. Canadian contributions to culture and the cinematic climax of Dumb and Dumber. Pretentious use of the word "vignette". Othering. C+C Music Factory and Arsenio Hall. The inertia of hair colour. Biosafety. PentaCostco and godly or Nazi salutes. The mystery of skin and hair conditions, and the bigger mystery of "reaction videos". Albino witchcraft and preventative murder in Africa. Corrective Frankenstein shoes. Empathy-gasms. Extra teeth and extra toes. Total Recall mutations. Weird Al Yankovic. Venom versus the Melanocyte. Marie Antoinette. Stem cells. Cancel culture and cosmetic clinics. Anal probes. Who hasn't seen "Sling Blade"? Audio soundscapes of pizza. Door handle life-hacks. Would you like to appear (well, vocally) on the show? Do you have a pop song or ear-worm from the SMOOTH FM genre that's infested your mind and needs to be investigated? Visit this page anchor.fm/peter-davis6 and press the message button to record me your own voicemail hot-take on your specific smooth song of suckiness. You can be on a future episode! (you can always email sound files or text your thoughts to poidadavis@gmail.com if that's easier). Cheers! Sound clips are included for educational reference, criticism, satire and parody in fair use. Clips remain the property of the respective rights holder and no endorsement is implied. All information and opinion is performed and expressed in-character and does not reflect reality or genuine commentary on any persons (living or dead), bands or other organisations, or their works, and is not recommended listening for anyone, anywhere.

Biological safety cabinets available in Class I, Class II (Type A2), and Class II Type (B1 and B2) Provide personnel, product, and environmental protection, We offer NSF certified BSCs and EN 12469 certified biosafety cabinets at the lowest price. Get more information visit: https://www.globallabsupply.com/Biological-safety-Cabinet-s/2221.htm

Biologist and Author, Matt Ridley joins us in the studio. His latest title, co-authored with Alina Chan, Viral: The Search for the Origin of COVID-19, is now available. Join our exclusive TRIGGERnometry community on Locals! https://triggernometry.locals.com/ OR Support TRIGGERnometry Here: https://www.subscribestar.com/triggernometry https://www.patreon.com/triggerpod Bitcoin: bc1qm6vvhduc6s3rvy8u76sllmrfpynfv94qw8p8d5 Buy Merch Here: https://www.triggerpod.co.uk/shop/​​​ Advertise on TRIGGERnometry: marketing@triggerpod.co.uk Join the Mailing List: https://www.triggerpod.co.uk/sign-up/​​​ Find TRIGGERnometry on Social Media:  https://twitter.com/triggerpod​​​ https://www.facebook.com/triggerpod​​​ https://www.instagram.com/triggerpod​​​ About TRIGGERnometry:  Stand-up comedians Konstantin Kisin (@konstantinkisin) and Francis Foster (@francisjfoster) make sense of politics, economics, free speech, AI, drug policy and WW3 with the help of presidential advisors, renowned economists, award-winning journalists, controversial writers, leading scientists and notorious comedians. - CHAPTERS: 00:00 Intro 01:46 Lab Leak: Conspiracy Theory to Mainstream 04:12 Why Does it Matter Where COVID Came From? 05:48 The Evidence for Wuhan Lab Leak Theory 15:36 Gain-of-Function Research: Purpose and Risks 29:51 Biosafety at the Wuhan Institute of Biology  34:13 Previous Lab Leaks and Cover-Ups 37:15 How Do We Prevent Another Pandemic? 50:02 Will We Ever Find Out What Happened? 52:57 Biotechnology / De-extinction

Andy Dybala shares his research into monkeys being cloned in China and how it relates to the synthetic nanoparticle CoronaVirus. He also shares the disgusting the future technology of primate to human organ transplant. And a surprise at the end of how the worlds Biosafety labs were built by old Nazi pharmaceutical & chemical companies IG Farben and Hauscht AG. Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/andydybala Twitter: https://twitter.com/LivewithAndy NeighborhoodNewsStudio.com/

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Disease testing has never been more a part of our day-to-day lives, just as constant awareness of a worldwide infectious disease threat has never been more a part of our lives. Even with this presence, like me, you might never have thought to look under the hood of the testing process.  In this episode of the PandemicTech Podcast, we bring you an exploration of biosafety and biosecurity, diagnostic practices that have become intensely personal for all of us over the last twelve months, whether we realized it or not.  Today, we'll get to know Luis Ochoa-Carrera and Maureen Ellis, two biosafety and biosecurity specialists who manage the safe handling and process of live infectious disease pathogens like COVID that threaten the safety and health of citizens across the globe. Featured in this episode: https://www.linkedin.com/in/luis-alberto-ochoa-carrera-055137145/ (Luis Ochoa Carrera) http://www.imss.gob.mx/ (Instituto Mexicano del Seguro Social) https://internationalbiosafety.org/who-we-are/governance-structure/maureen-ellis/ (Maureen Ellis) https://internationalbiosafety.org/#:~:text=The%20International%20Federation%20of%20Biosafety%20Associations%20%28IFBA%29%20is,Biosafety%20Associations%20from%20all%20areas%20of%20the%20world. (International Federation of Biosafety Associations) https://www.msn.com/en-ae/news/other/coronavirus-meet-harley-mexico-citys-fluorescent-green-raincoat-wearing-pug-spreading-joy-amongst-frontliners/ar-BB14demw (“Coronavirus: Meet Harley, Mexico City's fluorescent green raincoat wearing pug, spreading joy amongst frontliners”) MSN, 17 May 2020 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1985_Mexico_City_earthquake (1985 Mexico City Earthquake) https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2017_Puebla_earthquake (2017 Puebla Earthquake) Read the https://drive.google.com/file/d/1XDQ2t6Wh4yZmKckUIkL3AxVIw2isIgew/view?usp=sharing (transcript of this episode). Follow the PandemicTech Podcast wherever you listen to podcasts. Connect with us on https://www.linkedin.com/company/pandemictech/ (LinkedIn) and https://twitter.com/pandemic_tech (Twitter) From PandemicTech, the world's first innovation ecosystem dedicated to fighting pandemics.

Episode 45 – The Middle Sees and Joan Rivers Exposé Update!  What is the big question after Episode 44 regarding the Level 4 Biosafety labs?  And how does the COVID-19 Corona virus relate to an over-arching theme from the Trump Presidency? Let's have some fun!  Have you heard the story about the comedic pioneer, a sarcastic joke, and the confusing death that followed? Joan Rivers makes a sarcastic joke? Joan Rivers dies. Official cause of death. What is an esophagogastroduodenoscopy (EGD)? What is a nasolaryngoscopy? Strange circumstances surrounding Joan Rivers death. Investigation. Report by Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services. Follow up a year later. Email Feedback to theconservativehippiepodcast@gmail.com Sponsors: The Perfect Vaporizer! SmokinJs.com … Use Code HIPPIE for 15% off Your Order ME! StonerHoroscope.com Moody Beats The post The Middle Sees and Joan Rivers Exposé appeared first on Conservative Hippie Podcast.

Dr Motiur Rahman from our OUCRU unit in Ho Chi Minh City, Vietnam, tells us about his responsibilities in laboratory management. OUCRU laboratories provide support to the unit's extensive clinical research programme, from level 2 laboratory to SAPO 4 laboratory for high-risk pathogens responsible for zoonotic infections. Early diagnosis and detection of antimicrobial resistance help prescribe the right medicine in time, contributing to better patient management.

Accidents happen in science labs all over the world, but when you're working with deadly pathogens the consequences can be disastrous. The reputation of America's ‘gold standard' The Centres for Disease Control and Prevention in Georgia has recently become tarnished as news emerged that 80 workers were inadvertently exposed to live anthrax, and a deadly strain of flu was accidentally sent to another lab. Further reports of tick-box safety culture, lethal samples sent in ziplock plastic bags and vials of smallpox from the 1950s being found in the back of a fridge have increased calls for a review of the work being done on some of the world's most dangerous pathogens.Andrew Luck-Baker looks at the impact of these recent biosafety lapses for BBC WS Discovery. Some scientists are now arguing for the reduction of laboratories working with deadly viruses and the closing down of research which is potentially risky. But does the benefit of the work outweigh its potential risks to the public? And how can human error be eliminated?(Photo: Bio hazard warning symbol. Credit: Getty Images)