Podcasts about nonproliferation

French President Emmanuel Macron's announcement that France would increase its nuclear arsenal is a major blow to non-proliferation efforts, but what does this new development mean for European and American security? Communications Associate and host Farah Sonde sat down with Marc Finaud, Senior Advisor and Associate Fellow at the Geneva Centre for Security Policy; Francesca Giovannini, Executive Director at the Project on Managing the Atom; and John Erath, Senior Policy Director at the Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation, to discuss France's new approach to its nuclear arsenal, how it aligns with French tradition and how the United States should respond. Show Notes – Marc Finaud's op-ed on President Macron's speech - https://www.pressenza.com/2026/04/emmanuel-macrons-paradoxical-speech-on-nuclear-deterrence-a-step-back-and-a-wild-rush-forward/ The Initiatives for Nuclear Disarmament (IDN) Action Plan for the Non-Proliferation Treaty's Review Conference in April and May - https://www.abolition2000.org/wp-content/uploads/2026/04/IDN-Action-Plan-2026_ENG.pdf

In light of an increasingly volatile world order, the future of the European security architecture is back on the agenda and seems more pressing than at any point in recent history. After decades of reduced military spending across Europe, recent developments from Ukraine, over Greenland and from the Middle East as well as the rifts in the Transatlantic partnership have prompted European states to reassess their own vulnerabilities and defence capabilities. Germany's ambition to modernise its Armed Forces and to fully implement the so-called Zeitenwende can be described as the centrepiece of the efforts currently undertaken by governments inside and outside of the European Union. What is the German perspective on the future of the European security architecture? Which measures could and should be taken at EU level to complement national efforts? How can Europe position itself effectively in a “world on fire” and which role can militarily neutral states such as Ireland play in the bigger picture of European security? Roderich Kiesewetter has been Member of the German Bundestag since 2009 and is a former General Staff Officer of the Bundeswehr (Colonel GS, Federal Armed Forces). He currently serves on the Committee on Foreign Affairs. He is also a Substitute Member of the Subcommittee on Arms Control and Proliferation Control, Non-Proliferation, and International Disarmament as well as the Subcommittee on Crisis Prevention, Strategic Foresight, Stabilization, and Peacebuilding. Furthermore, he is the Vice-Chair of the Working Group on Foreign Relations of the CDU/CSU Parliamentary Group. As one of the CDU's most outspoken experts on security and defence policy, he is regularly quoted in newspapers and on national television. This event has been organised in conjunction with the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung UK and Ireland.

Iran's violation of uranium enrichment limits challenges the Non-Proliferation Treaty's effectiveness. Peter Huessyexplains how nations like North Korea and China have successfully circumvented international rules to develop and proliferate nuclear weapons. (3/16)1931

米軍の空爆を受けたイラン核施設、２０２５年６月、イスファハン【ニューヨーク時事】ニューヨークの国連本部で開催中の核拡散防止条約再検討会議で１３日、成果文書草案の改訂版が配布された。 The ongoing Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT, is expected to adopt an outcome document that addresses nuclear disarmament education, as proposed by Japan, it was learned Wednesday.

The ongoing Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, or NPT, is expected to adopt an outcome document that addresses nuclear disarmament education, as proposed by Japan, it was learned Wednesday.

PREVIEW for Later Today: China's Legacy of Nuclear Proliferation Since 1982. Guest: Peter Huessy. Since 1982, China has secretly spread nuclear technology to nations like Pakistan and North Korea. This legacy undermines the Non-Proliferation Treaty, yet international consequences remain minimal due to China's significant economic leverage.1951 LAS VEGAS

"The Myth of Inalienable Enrichment Rights." GUEST: Henry Sokolski Henry Sokolski discusses the UN review of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, arguing that an "inalienable right" to enrich fissile material is imaginary and poses risks.

For four years—from July 16, 1945, the date of the first atomic test, to August 29, 1949, when the Soviet Union detonated its first nuclear device—the history of nuclear weapons might appear to be an exclusively American story. But even that is misleading.From the earliest theorization of the chain reaction, nuclear development was international: a web of scientific collaboration, technological transfer, espionage, and strategic imitation. As my guest David Holloway argues, nuclear weapons have always had an international history—one that can only be understood by examining not just individual states, but their relationships, perceptions, and interactions.To approach nuclear weapons in this way, he suggests, “requires an effort to understand the different parties involved, their strategies, their policies, their behavior, and, above all, their relationships and interactions.” In this conversation, we explore that history—from Los Alamos to Moscow, from Atoms for Peace to nuclear brinkmanship, and from non-proliferation to the limits of the nuclear order itself.  David Holloway is Raymond A. Spruance Professor of International History, Professor of Political Science, and Senior Fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies (Emeritus) at Stanford University. His work focuses on the international history of nuclear weapons, Soviet science and technology, and the relationship between international history and international relations theory. His latest book, Nuclear Weapons: An International History, represents a culmination of decades of scholarship.Chapters0:02:31 — What Is International History?0:07:11 — The International Roots of Nuclear Science0:12:23 — Technology Transfer and the Klaus Fuchs Connection0:16:51 — The Soviet Bomb: Hesitation and Espionage0:19:06 — Atoms for Peace0:21:13 — The Thermonuclear Turning Point0:24:02 — Nuclear Weapons and Marxist Theory0:30:08 — Brinkmanship: Dulles, Khrushchev, and the Logic of the Brink0:33:50 — Non-Proliferation and the NPT0:43:57 — India, Pakistan, and the Blind Eye

5: Henry Sokolski Previews his discussion on the Non-Proliferation Treaty's failure to prohibit uranium enrichment, highlighting how these legal loopholes allow nations like Iran to develop nuclear weapons capabilities under the guise of peaceful energy programs.1951 LAS VEGAS

Toughening the Non-Proliferation Treaty: Henry Sokolski argues the NPT needs updating to deny states the "right" to make nuclear fuel. He highlights that the Bushehr reactor contains spent fuel rods capable of producing 200 plutonium bombs. He recommends that Saudi Arabia or other Gulf states pay to return this dangerous material to Russia. Henry Sokolski (9)1606

It's Monday, April 20th, A.D. 2026. This is The Worldview in 5 Minutes heard on 140 radio stations and at www.TheWorldview.com.  I'm Adam McManus. (Adam@TheWorldview.com) By Adam McManus Russia strikes Ukrainian Baptist church killing pastor at prayer meeting Russia struck a Baptist church in the southeastern Ukrainian city of Zaporizhzhia during a prayer meeting, killing at least one person, a minister, and injuring at least eight others, reports The Christian Post. The Embassy of Ukraine in the U.S. gave the casualty figures in a public statement issued while rescue workers were still on the scene, identifying the targeted building as The House of the Gospel Church, which had served the community for years, according to the Baptist Press. The embassy called the strike a deliberate attack on people of faith who had gathered peacefully to pray. Promoters of a documentary series entitled “A Faith Under Siege” on Russia's persecution of Christians, identified the man killed as Ruslan Utyuzh, a minister at the bombed church. Utyuzh is survived by his wife and two children. Psalm 116:15 says, “Precious in the sight of the LORD is the death of His saints.” Despite the attack, the congregation held services as normal the following morning with a large turnout, and 200 people came forward to be baptized. Iran reverses course on reopening Strait of Hormuz President Donald Trump said Iran "can't blackmail us" after the country announced they were reimposing restrictions on the Strait of Hormuz on Saturday morning, reports Fox News. He added, "We have very good conversations going on. It's working out very well. They got a little cute, as they have been doing for 47 years, and nobody ever took them on. We took them on. They have no Navy. They have no Air Force. They have no leaders. They have no nothing. …  It is regime change." Despite Iran wanting to close the strait again, Trump said in the Oval Office that negotiations are "going actually along very well." Trump also cited how oil tankers are now coming to U.S. ports to fuel up, including in Texas and Louisiana. President Trump said, "We're taking a tough stand. They've killed a lot of people. A lot of our people have been killed. A lot of your fellow soldiers have been killed over the years by Iran.” He cited how he ordered the strike that killed Qasem Soleimani, the commander of Iran's elite Quds Force, in January 2020. Trump described Soleimani as the "father of the roadside bomb." He explained, "When you see soldiers with no legs, with no arms or face that's been smashed, that was Soleimani, it was Iran that did that. So we have a much different view on it than other presidents. They've gotten away with murder for 47 years. They're not getting away with it anymore." While Iran wants to keep enriched uranium, Trump won't allow that Iran had sought an agreement allowing them to “down-blend” their enriched uranium. According to Axios, “A top priority for the Trump administration is ensuring Iran can't access the stockpile of nearly 4,400 pounds of enriched uranium buried in its underground nuclear facilities, in particular the 992 pounds enriched to 60% purity.” The Center for Arms Control and Non-Proliferation noted that most commercial nuclear power plants use 3 to 5 percent enriched uranium compared to 90 percent enriched uranium for nuclear weapons. Before the outbreak of the war, U.S. special envoy Steve Witkoff told Fox News that in March, Iranian negotiators boasted to him that they had enough enriched uranium to build 11 nuclear weapons. He explained that the Iranian negotiators apparently said “they had the inalienable right to enrich all their nuclear fuel that they possessed. We, of course, responded that the president feels we have the inalienable right to stop you dead in your tracks.” The Wall Street Journal reported that the U.S. blockade of the Strait of Hormuz initiated last Monday was costing Iran up to $435 million a day, including $276 million in lost exports. The blockade, coupled with weeks of air strikes from the U.S. and Israel, which devastated Iran's steel and petrochemical facilities, has the country's economy on the brink of collapse. Homosexual “dads” mock their surrogate-born baby for crying “mama” A homosexual male couple has triggered outrage across the internet after posting a video of themselves mocking their surrogate-born baby for crying “mama,” reports LifeSiteNews.com. Country music singer and songwriter Shane McAnally, a homosexual, posted the video of his faux “husband” Michael Baum lying on a couch, playfully bouncing the baby on his stomach as he asks, “Who do you want, Dada or Pop?” BAUM: “Who do you want Dada or Pop?” BABY: “Mama, ma.” BAUM: “Do you want Dada or Pop?” BABY: (fusses) BAUM: “Who do you want? Dada or Pop?” BABY: “Mom.” BAUM: ”Nope. Do you want dada? You want pop? BABY: “Mom.” BAUM: “No way, Jose. There is no mama.” BABY: (starts crying) BAUM: “So sorry. You have Dada and Pop.” McANALLY: “Two choices.” BABY: (cries more) BAUM: “No Mama.” Oddly enough, they posted that video on line. Officials with Surrogacy Concern, an organization that seeks to end the evils of surrogacy, wondered, “Who films their child crying and uploads it to the internet? And who subjects a child to their pathetic vanity like this? Babies need their birth mothers.” And children's rights activist Chris Elston, better known as “Billboard Chris,” wrote, “These men laugh as the baby cries and says ‘ma ma ma.' They think it's funny because ‘there is no mama,' This baby was designed to never have a mother so that two men could satisfy their selfish desires. It's impossible for a normal person to watch this without instinctual disgust.” In Matthew 19:4-5, Jesus asked, ““Haven't you read, that at the beginning the Creator ‘made them male and female,' and said, ‘For this reason a man will leave his father and mother and be united to his wife, and the two will become one flesh'?” Anniversary of death of Martin Luther's aid who translated Bible And finally, on April 20, 1558, Johannes Bugenhagen, the prominent Lutheran reformer and pastor who helped Martin Luther translate the Bible, died. He said, ““The church is not a place but a people, gathered by the Word of God and sustained by faith.” Bugenhagen also explained that “True worship is not found in outward ceremonies, but in a heart that trusts in God's grace.” The Lutheran reformer introduced the Protestant Reformation in the Duchy of Pomerania and Denmark in the 16th century.  After the death of Luther in 1546, Bugenhagen kindly took care of Luther's widow, Katharina von Bora, and Luther's children. Proverbs 21:21 says, “Whoever pursues righteousness and kindness will find life, righteousness, and honor.” Close And that's The Worldview on this Monday, April 20th, in the year of our Lord 2026. Follow us on X or subscribe for free by Spotify, Amazon Music, or by iTunes or email to our unique Christian newscast at www.TheWorldview.com.  Plus, you can get the Generations app through Google Play or The App Store. I'm Adam McManus (Adam@TheWorldview.com). Seize the day for Jesus Christ.

In this episode of Policy Chats, Thomas Countryman joins host Dori Pham to discuss his career in diplomacy and the realities of nuclear arms control policymaking. Drawing on his experience as Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Nonproliferation, he explains how negotiations actually work inside government and why consistency is critical in preventing nuclear proliferation. The conversation explores the 2015 Iran nuclear deal, current U.S.–Iran tensions, and the challenges of balancing ideal goals with practical outcomes in diplomacy. The episode concludes with insights on the future of global arms control and why sustained dialogue remains essential in reducing nuclear risk.- Thomas Countryman's path to becoming a career diplomat- The role of the State Department in arms control and nonproliferation- How diplomacy works behind the scenes vs. public perception- The importance of consistency in nuclear nonproliferation policy- The 2015 Iran nuclear deal and lessons from its negotiation- Current U.S.–Iran tensions and challenges in modern diplomacy- The role of NGOs like the Arms Control Association in shaping policy- The future of global arms control and nuclear risk reduction

The Chinese Foreign Ministry has released a national report on implementing the Treaty on Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, reaffirming China's nuclear policy featured by responsibility, consistency and transparency.

In this episode of NucleCast, renowned nuclear expert David Albright offers a clear‑eyed assessment of Iran's nuclear program—where it began, where it stands today, and the risks that lie ahead. Drawing on decades of experience tracking nuclear proliferation, Albright explains how Iran built its nuclear capabilities, the role of foreign assistance and clandestine networks, and why enrichment capacity remains at the center of global concern.The conversation examines current regional tensions, including Israeli threat perceptions and the broader implications of ongoing conflict for nuclear escalation. Albright also explores how quickly Iran could move toward a nuclear weapon, the challenges facing international inspections and diplomacy, and the critical leadership role the United States must play in preventing further proliferation.Looking ahead, this episode considers possible future scenarios—from diplomatic breakthroughs to worst‑case outcomes—and closes with reflections on what a lasting path toward security and nonproliferation might look like in one of the world's most volatile regions.Socials:Follow on Twitter at @NucleCastFollow on LinkedIn: https://linkedin.com/company/nuclecastpodcastSubscribe RSS Feed: https://rss.com/podcasts/nuclecast-podcast/Rate: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/nuclecast/id1644921278Email comments and topic/guest suggestions to NucleCast@anwadeter.org

This is part two of our collaboration with Bula COP31! We recommend listening to part one first.  This November, Türkiye hosts COP31 with Australia leading the negotiations. In this cross-continental episode, James and Daisy are joined by Jack Whelan and Heidi Dumesich (hosts of Bula COP31!) for an intergenerational conversation on what we hope to see from this year's conference. What will make it onto the Action Agenda? What is the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty? And what should the COP31 closing speech say? SOME RECOMMENDATIONS: BulaCOP31! – To learn more about what it means for Australia and Türkiye to co-host COP31, listen to Jack and Heidi's podcast.OTHER ADVOCATES AND RESOURCES:COP31 – Türkiye will be the formal COP31 President while Australia will serve as the President of Negotiations.COP30 (2026) – The Action Agenda is the space for actors who do not negotiate, but who are essential for implementation. The COP30 Action Agenda was organized around six thematic pillars and the “Five Year Vision” established a framework to guide the acceleration of Paris Agreement implementation between 2026 and 2030. Climate Watch – 62 countries have yet to submit updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).Pacific Resilience Facility – The first Pacific-led, member-owned and managed regional financing facility. The Guardian (2026) – A leaked draft of the COP31 Action Agenda includes 14 items but omits mention of fossil fuel phaseout, prioritising “zero waste” and “tourism and cultural heritage” instead.Dialogue Earth (2025) – Türkiye is one of the world's largest electric arc furnace steel producers and Australia is the world's biggest iron ore exporter.Ember – In 2024, Türkiye's renewable electricity generation (156 TWh) outpaced Australia's (98.8 TWh).The Fossil Fuel Treaty Initiative – An alliance of nation-states and civil society working to secure a global just transition from coal, oil and gas. 18 nations have already joined. UN – The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) is a landmark international treaty whose objective is to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and weapons technology, to promote cooperation in the peaceful uses of nuclear energy and to further the goal of achieving nuclear disarmament and general and complete disarmament.Transitioning Away from Fossil Fuels – Colombia and the Netherlands will co-host this conference in Santa Marta (24-29 April 2026) as a space for countries, subnational governments and other stakeholders that recognize the need to implement a transition away from fossil fuels in a just, orderly and equitable manner, in line with climate goals and the best available science.IEA (2025) – Fossil fuels still comprised 10% of Colombia's GDP and 45% of total exports in 2024. The Belém Declaration – An agreement supported by 35+ countries aiming to accelerate green industrialization.Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB) – The flagship publication of the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD) on UN environment and development negotiations. UNFCCC – Article 6 of the Paris Agreement enables international cooperation to tackle climate change and to unlock financial support for developing countries.COP30 (2026) – In this letter, COP30 President Corrêa do Lago proposes a “two-tier” model for multilateralism: one anchored in consensus, and one focused on implementation.WEF (2026) – Prime Minister of Canada, Mark Carney, made a special address at Davos: “We know the old order is not coming back. We shouldn't mourn it. Nostalgia is not a strategy, but we believe that from the fracture, we can build something bigger, better, stronger, more just.”Thank you for listening! Please follow us on social media to join the conversation: LinkedIn | Instagram | TikTokYou can also now watch us on YouTube.Music: “Just Because Some Bad Wind Blows” by Nick Nuttall, Reptiphon Records. Available at https://nicknuttallmusic.bandcamp.com/album/just-because-some-bad-wind-blows-3Producer: Podshop StudiosHuge thanks to Siobhán Foster, a vital member of the team offering design advice, critical review and organisation that we depend upon.Stay tuned for more insightful discussions on navigating the transition away from fossil fuels to a sustainable future.

In Episode 23 of Strategy Speaks, Daniel Fiott sits down with Alexander Mattelaer, Laura Vansina and Wannes Verstraete to discuss the 2026 NPT Review Conference and nuclear risks. __________This episode of Strategy Speaks was made possible with the generous support of the Political Affairs and Security Division of NATO. Alexander and Laura speak in a personal capacity and their views do not necessarily reflect the views of NATO and its Allies.

1. Iran's Nuclear Status and the NPT Framework Guest: Henry SokolskiSummary: Sokolski analyzes Iranianhardliners' threats to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He explores the military risks of targeting nuclear sites like Dimona and the strategic complexities of attacking national electric grids. (1)1918 BREST-LITOVSK

In 2012, US President Barack Obama stated that the Syrian government's use of chemical weapons on its population would cross a red line that would require the US government to reconsider its approach to the civil war then underway in Syria. Syria subsequently used such weapons, creating a policy dilemma for the United States about how to respond to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's violation of the red line.In Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons (Oxford UP, 2025), Matthew Moran, Wyn Q. Bowen, and Jeffrey W. Knopf examine efforts by the United States, sometimes acting with France and the United Kingdom, to respond to Syria's possession and use of chemical weapons over the course of its civil war. In particular, they focus on US strategy during the presidencies of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, which relied heavily on coercion, including deterrent and compellent variants. As the authors show, policies directed at the ruling Assad regime in Syria attempted to deter chemical weapons attacks and to compel Syria to give up its chemical arsenal with mixed outcomes. Drawing on the existing literature on deterrence and coercive diplomacy to identify three propositions — concerning credibility, motivations, and assurances — the book explains the mixed record of coercive success and failure and examines how effective coercive strategies were at different points and why.Drawing on the most significant attempt in the post-Cold War era to deter the use of a weapon of mass destruction, this book offers theoretical and practical lessons for both security studies scholars and policymakers. Our guest is Professor Jeff Knopf, a Professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS), where he serves as chair of the M.A. program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies. Our host is Eleonora Mattiacci, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. She is the author of "Volatile States in International Politics" (Oxford University Press, 2023). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In 2012, US President Barack Obama stated that the Syrian government's use of chemical weapons on its population would cross a red line that would require the US government to reconsider its approach to the civil war then underway in Syria. Syria subsequently used such weapons, creating a policy dilemma for the United States about how to respond to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's violation of the red line.In Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons (Oxford UP, 2025), Matthew Moran, Wyn Q. Bowen, and Jeffrey W. Knopf examine efforts by the United States, sometimes acting with France and the United Kingdom, to respond to Syria's possession and use of chemical weapons over the course of its civil war. In particular, they focus on US strategy during the presidencies of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, which relied heavily on coercion, including deterrent and compellent variants. As the authors show, policies directed at the ruling Assad regime in Syria attempted to deter chemical weapons attacks and to compel Syria to give up its chemical arsenal with mixed outcomes. Drawing on the existing literature on deterrence and coercive diplomacy to identify three propositions — concerning credibility, motivations, and assurances — the book explains the mixed record of coercive success and failure and examines how effective coercive strategies were at different points and why.Drawing on the most significant attempt in the post-Cold War era to deter the use of a weapon of mass destruction, this book offers theoretical and practical lessons for both security studies scholars and policymakers. Our guest is Professor Jeff Knopf, a Professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS), where he serves as chair of the M.A. program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies. Our host is Eleonora Mattiacci, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. She is the author of "Volatile States in International Politics" (Oxford University Press, 2023). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history

In 2012, US President Barack Obama stated that the Syrian government's use of chemical weapons on its population would cross a red line that would require the US government to reconsider its approach to the civil war then underway in Syria. Syria subsequently used such weapons, creating a policy dilemma for the United States about how to respond to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's violation of the red line.In Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons (Oxford UP, 2025), Matthew Moran, Wyn Q. Bowen, and Jeffrey W. Knopf examine efforts by the United States, sometimes acting with France and the United Kingdom, to respond to Syria's possession and use of chemical weapons over the course of its civil war. In particular, they focus on US strategy during the presidencies of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, which relied heavily on coercion, including deterrent and compellent variants. As the authors show, policies directed at the ruling Assad regime in Syria attempted to deter chemical weapons attacks and to compel Syria to give up its chemical arsenal with mixed outcomes. Drawing on the existing literature on deterrence and coercive diplomacy to identify three propositions — concerning credibility, motivations, and assurances — the book explains the mixed record of coercive success and failure and examines how effective coercive strategies were at different points and why.Drawing on the most significant attempt in the post-Cold War era to deter the use of a weapon of mass destruction, this book offers theoretical and practical lessons for both security studies scholars and policymakers. Our guest is Professor Jeff Knopf, a Professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS), where he serves as chair of the M.A. program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies. Our host is Eleonora Mattiacci, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. She is the author of "Volatile States in International Politics" (Oxford University Press, 2023). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/middle-eastern-studies

In 2012, US President Barack Obama stated that the Syrian government's use of chemical weapons on its population would cross a red line that would require the US government to reconsider its approach to the civil war then underway in Syria. Syria subsequently used such weapons, creating a policy dilemma for the United States about how to respond to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's violation of the red line.In Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons (Oxford UP, 2025), Matthew Moran, Wyn Q. Bowen, and Jeffrey W. Knopf examine efforts by the United States, sometimes acting with France and the United Kingdom, to respond to Syria's possession and use of chemical weapons over the course of its civil war. In particular, they focus on US strategy during the presidencies of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, which relied heavily on coercion, including deterrent and compellent variants. As the authors show, policies directed at the ruling Assad regime in Syria attempted to deter chemical weapons attacks and to compel Syria to give up its chemical arsenal with mixed outcomes. Drawing on the existing literature on deterrence and coercive diplomacy to identify three propositions — concerning credibility, motivations, and assurances — the book explains the mixed record of coercive success and failure and examines how effective coercive strategies were at different points and why.Drawing on the most significant attempt in the post-Cold War era to deter the use of a weapon of mass destruction, this book offers theoretical and practical lessons for both security studies scholars and policymakers. Our guest is Professor Jeff Knopf, a Professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS), where he serves as chair of the M.A. program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies. Our host is Eleonora Mattiacci, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. She is the author of "Volatile States in International Politics" (Oxford University Press, 2023). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

In 2012, US President Barack Obama stated that the Syrian government's use of chemical weapons on its population would cross a red line that would require the US government to reconsider its approach to the civil war then underway in Syria. Syria subsequently used such weapons, creating a policy dilemma for the United States about how to respond to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's violation of the red line.In Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons (Oxford UP, 2025), Matthew Moran, Wyn Q. Bowen, and Jeffrey W. Knopf examine efforts by the United States, sometimes acting with France and the United Kingdom, to respond to Syria's possession and use of chemical weapons over the course of its civil war. In particular, they focus on US strategy during the presidencies of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, which relied heavily on coercion, including deterrent and compellent variants. As the authors show, policies directed at the ruling Assad regime in Syria attempted to deter chemical weapons attacks and to compel Syria to give up its chemical arsenal with mixed outcomes. Drawing on the existing literature on deterrence and coercive diplomacy to identify three propositions — concerning credibility, motivations, and assurances — the book explains the mixed record of coercive success and failure and examines how effective coercive strategies were at different points and why.Drawing on the most significant attempt in the post-Cold War era to deter the use of a weapon of mass destruction, this book offers theoretical and practical lessons for both security studies scholars and policymakers. Our guest is Professor Jeff Knopf, a Professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS), where he serves as chair of the M.A. program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies. Our host is Eleonora Mattiacci, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. She is the author of "Volatile States in International Politics" (Oxford University Press, 2023). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 2012, US President Barack Obama stated that the Syrian government's use of chemical weapons on its population would cross a red line that would require the US government to reconsider its approach to the civil war then underway in Syria. Syria subsequently used such weapons, creating a policy dilemma for the United States about how to respond to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's violation of the red line.In Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons (Oxford UP, 2025), Matthew Moran, Wyn Q. Bowen, and Jeffrey W. Knopf examine efforts by the United States, sometimes acting with France and the United Kingdom, to respond to Syria's possession and use of chemical weapons over the course of its civil war. In particular, they focus on US strategy during the presidencies of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, which relied heavily on coercion, including deterrent and compellent variants. As the authors show, policies directed at the ruling Assad regime in Syria attempted to deter chemical weapons attacks and to compel Syria to give up its chemical arsenal with mixed outcomes. Drawing on the existing literature on deterrence and coercive diplomacy to identify three propositions — concerning credibility, motivations, and assurances — the book explains the mixed record of coercive success and failure and examines how effective coercive strategies were at different points and why.Drawing on the most significant attempt in the post-Cold War era to deter the use of a weapon of mass destruction, this book offers theoretical and practical lessons for both security studies scholars and policymakers. Our guest is Professor Jeff Knopf, a Professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS), where he serves as chair of the M.A. program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies. Our host is Eleonora Mattiacci, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. She is the author of "Volatile States in International Politics" (Oxford University Press, 2023). Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In 2012, US President Barack Obama stated that the Syrian government's use of chemical weapons on its population would cross a red line that would require the US government to reconsider its approach to the civil war then underway in Syria. Syria subsequently used such weapons, creating a policy dilemma for the United States about how to respond to Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's violation of the red line.In Coercing Syria on Chemical Weapons (Oxford UP, 2025), Matthew Moran, Wyn Q. Bowen, and Jeffrey W. Knopf examine efforts by the United States, sometimes acting with France and the United Kingdom, to respond to Syria's possession and use of chemical weapons over the course of its civil war. In particular, they focus on US strategy during the presidencies of Barack Obama and Donald Trump, which relied heavily on coercion, including deterrent and compellent variants. As the authors show, policies directed at the ruling Assad regime in Syria attempted to deter chemical weapons attacks and to compel Syria to give up its chemical arsenal with mixed outcomes. Drawing on the existing literature on deterrence and coercive diplomacy to identify three propositions — concerning credibility, motivations, and assurances — the book explains the mixed record of coercive success and failure and examines how effective coercive strategies were at different points and why.Drawing on the most significant attempt in the post-Cold War era to deter the use of a weapon of mass destruction, this book offers theoretical and practical lessons for both security studies scholars and policymakers. Our guest is Professor Jeff Knopf, a Professor at the Middlebury Institute of International Studies at Monterey (MIIS), where he serves as chair of the M.A. program in Nonproliferation and Terrorism Studies. Our host is Eleonora Mattiacci, an Associate Professor of Political Science at Amherst College. She is the author of "Volatile States in International Politics" (Oxford University Press, 2023).

PRVIEW FOR LATER: Henry Sokolski from the Non-proliferation Policy Education Center evaluates threats to nuclear plantsin Iran and Israel. Striking these facilities could cause radiological releases requiring massive civilian evacuations. (5)1945 TRINITY

HEADLINE: Erosion of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) GUEST: Henry Sokolski The integrity of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) has been compromised by "whispering campaigns" and policy waivers, notably the U.S. agreement with India. By allowing India to receive civil nuclear energy benefits despite possessing nuclear weapons, the international community signaled it would prioritize business interests over treaty enforcement. This precedent makes it harder to hold other signatories, such as Iran, accountable for their own potential violations. (8)1945 THE GADGET

### Segment 7 Headline: Nuclear Proliferation Challenges and the Future of the Non-Proliferation Treaty Summary:Henry Sokolski discusses China's nuclear ramp-up, the upcoming NPT review conference, and how the war in Iranimpacts global efforts to control nuclear weapons spread. Guest: Henry Sokolski Number: 7 (7)1954 B-36

One of Donald Trump's stated reasons for going to war with Iran is to destroy the nuclear threat he says it poses.  But by starting the conflict has he made the world less safe? There are concerns around what happens to Iran's enriched nuclear material and the lessons other countries will take from Iran's being hit while remaining at the threshold short of getting a bomb.Today, Kelsey Davenport from the Arms Control Association on why it could all lead to more nuclear weapons around the world.Featured: Kelsey Davenport, Director for Nonproliferation Policy at the Arms Control Association

Henry Sokolski reports that military laser tests accidentally downed a border drone, while Russia uses propaganda about NATO nuclear deployments to influence upcoming Non-Proliferation Treaty reviews at the UN. 16.1956

For 15 years, the New Start treaty bound the United States and Russia to curb their nuclear arsenals – until it expired earlier this month. Researcher Benoit Pelopidas tells RFI what hope remains for disarmament now that there are no longer fixed limits on the world's two largest nuclear powers. In what could mark a major turning point in the history of arms control, New Start expired on 5 February. Neither US President Donald Trump nor his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin has shown interest in renewing it.  The treaty was signed between the United States and Russia on 8 April 2010 and came into force on 5 February 2011. Initially planned to last 10 years, it was extended for another five in 2021. Its goal was to limit each side to 800 missile launchers and 1,550 nuclear warheads, with the two countries authorised to inspect each other's stockpiles. It was never a global treaty. Other countries signed up to the broader Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), which came into force in 1970 and now has 191 parties, including the US and Russia. But Washington and Moscow also had bilateral arms control agreements in place continuously since 1972 – until now, notes Benoît Pelopidas, an expert on nuclear threats at Sciences Po university in Paris. "But it would be false to deduce from that that the arms race has not started yet and might start now," he tells RFI.  "There are reasons to think that the arms race started as early as the spring of 2010." Europe confronts ‘new nuclear reality' as Macron signals broader deterrence role 'Possible acceleration' Even before New Start expired, implementation of the treaty deteriorated over time, culminating in Russia suspending its participation in 2023. "And now we're at a full level where it's no longer implemented at all," says Pelopidas. "It's new diplomatically, and it enables the possible acceleration of an ongoing arms race." NATO called for "restraint and responsibility" after the treaty expired. "Russia's irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and coercive signals on nuclear matters reveal a posture of strategic intimidation," an official told French news agency AFP, speaking on condition of anonymity. "NATO will continue to take the measures necessary to ensure its credibility and the effectiveness of its overall deterrence and defence position." The Kremlin had proposed continuing to comply with New Start's limits until February 2027, but the White House did not respond. Moscow considers the treaty's expiration "a negative development", Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov told reporters. "We express our regret in this regard." China shuns calls to enter nuclear talks after US-Russia treaty lapses Disarmament still possible According to Pelopidas, disarmament is possible and has been partially achieved before, especially in the early 1990s after the end of the Cold War.  "In 1991, we had 58,000 nuclear weapons on the planet. And we're now at a level of roughly 12,000 in 2025, which is a massive decrease," he says.  "We have, between 1986 and today, dismantled or retired over 80 percent of the existing arsenal in the world. So it is not materially impossible to dismantle or disarm." The world's remaining nuclear stockpile still has the potential to wreak huge destruction, he stresses, a fact that he believes should drive all nuclear powers to work towards de-escalation. "If the theory of nuclear winter is correct, a so-called limited nuclear war between India and Pakistan that led to the explosion of 100 Hiroshima-sized bombs – that is, roughly 1 percent of the existing arsenal – would lead to the death of 2 billion people by starvation due to its indirect consequences over two years," Pelopidas says. "That's how destructive the capacity of the existing arsenal is." Episode mixed by Erwan Rome.

Henry Sokolski notes amidst expired treaties, the US reintroduces extended deterrence language and recommits to the NPT, though non-proliferation enforcement remains inconsistent and challenging against determined adversaries.DECEMBER 1956

For more than five decades, nuclear arms control treaties were enforced between Russia and the US until this week. The last agreement has been allowed to lapse without a new one to replace it. So, why has this happened, and what are the dangers? In this episode: Thomas Countryman, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for International Security and Non-Proliferation under the Obama administration Rebecca E Johnson, Co-founder and first President of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons Nikolai Sokov, Senior Fellow at the Vienna Center for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Host: Tom McRae Connect with us: @AJEPodcasts on X, Instagram, Facebook, and YouTube

Andrea Stricker evaluates the stressed Non-Proliferation Treaty ahead of a review conference, noting Middle Eastproliferation risks and the challenge of deterring near-peer adversaries in an evolving threat environment.1940

Andrea Stricker argues the Non-Proliferation Treaty remains historically effective in limiting nuclear states, despite current stresses and the outlier of North Korea which escaped the regime's constraints.1952

Warnings Against a US-Saudi Nuclear Deal: Colleague Andrea Stricker warns against a US-Saudi nuclear deal that allows uranium enrichment, advocating for the "gold standard" of non-proliferation, arguing any agreement must include the Additional Protocol for inspections and ensure the US retains a right of return for nuclear materials.

120 Jahre und zwei Weltkriege sind vergangen, seit die österreichische Pazifistin und Autorin Bertha von Suttner den Friedensnobelpreis erhielt.Aktuell erleben wir ein globales Aufrüsten. Über Atomwaffen, KI und vernünftige Regularien spricht Monika Fischer mit dem Abrüstungsexperten Alexander Kmentt. Er leitete bis Ende November 2025 die Abteilung für Abrüstung, Rüstungskontrolle und Nonproliferation im Außenministerium, seit 1. Dezember ist er ständiger Vertreter Österreichs bei den Vereinten Nationen in Genf. 

US Greenlights ROK Enrichment, Raising Proliferation Fears Guest: Henry Sokolski, Executive Director of the Non-Proliferation Policy Education Center The US agreement to support the Republic of South Korea's civil uranium enrichment and spent fuel reprocessing for peaceful uses is viewed by Sokolski as a movement toward proliferation. Sokolski notes that this decision greenlights the ROK—a treaty ally with a history of attempting to use its civil programs to make nuclear weapons—to a position similar to Iran's. The ROK successfully leveraged the inconsistency of US policy, pointing out that Japan has permission to enrich and reprocess fuel and possesses a massive plutonium stockpile. Granting the ROK these capabilities sets a concerning precedent, potentially compelling the US to allow other countries like Saudi Arabia to seek similar nuclear options. The proliferation concern is heightened further by the ROK's desire for a nuclear-powered submarine, which could lead to pursuit of a full nuclear weapons triad. 1958

NPT Enforcement and the Golden Dome Defense Concept GUEST NAME: Henry Sokolski Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Non-proliferation Policy Education Center, debates whether the US should abandon the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), citing foreign criticism and industry constraints. He argues the US should stay to enforce the NPT by clarifying red lines, justifying the bombing of nuclear facilities. Sokolski also discusses the proposed Golden Dome defense system, intended to protect the Western Hemisphere against missiles and drones. The viability of the system, particularly regarding Low Earth Orbit defenses, remains unclear and requires greater Congressional buy-in.

NPT Enforcement and the Golden Dome Defense Concept GUEST NAME: Henry Sokolski Henry Sokolski, executive director of the Non-proliferation Policy Education Center, debates whether the US should abandon the 1970 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), citing foreign criticism and industry constraints. He argues the US should stay to enforce the NPT by clarifying red lines, justifying the bombing of nuclear facilities. Sokolski also discusses the proposed Golden Dome defense system, intended to protect the Western Hemisphere against missiles and drones. The viability of the system, particularly regarding Low Earth Orbit defenses, remains unclear and requires greater Congressional buy-in. 1945

More than three years into Putin's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, our European allies are reconsidering whether or not frozen Russian assets, totaling $300 billion on the continent, can be used to help Ukraine. As part of a broader brought about by the Trump Administration, Western countries are finally prepared to act in concert to overcome financial concerns, investment retaliation, and collective action challenges in supporting Ukraine. In addition, the Cuba-oriented Helms-Burton Act provides useful precedent for the options on the table to further pressure the Russian economy. With the noose tightening via proposed oil sanctions, potential Tomahawk missiles, and mobilized transatlantic support for Ukraine, what choices does Putin have left? Will he be forced to face the music? And what will ultimately bring him to the negotiating table?Stephen Rademaker currently serves as Senior of Counsel at Covington and Burling LLP, helping clients navigate international policy, sanctions, and CFIUS challenges. With over 20 years of experience working on national security issues in the White House, the State Department, and the U.S. Senate and House of Representatives, Stephen served as an Assistant Secretary of State from 2002 through 2006 and headed three bureaus of the State Department, including the Bureau of Arms Control and the Bureau of International Security and Nonproliferation. Read the transcript here.Subscribe to our Substack here.

HEADLINE: Interpretations of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Iran's Nuclear Program GUEST NAME: Henry Sokolski SUMMARY: Henry Sokolski discusses his article questioning Iran's interpretation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The debate centers on whether a country suspected of being a weapons maker has the right to enrich uranium, given the NPT's language concerning "peaceful" use. Iran claims Article 4 permits any activity claimed to be civilian. 1852 TEHRAN

NPT: Answering with the Nonproliferation Enforcement Initiative. Henry Sokolski, NPEC 1957

NPT: Answering with the Nonproliferation Enforcement Initiative. Henry Sokolski, NPEC continued 1958

Send me a messageIn this replay episode of the Climate Confident podcast, I revisit one of the most urgent and eye-opening conversations I've hosted - my conversation with Tzeporah Berman, Chair and Founder of the Fossil Fuel Non-Proliferation Treaty Initiative.We dig into the uncomfortable truth: while governments champion renewables and set emissions targets, fossil fuel exploration and extraction are still expanding at a pace that locks in climate chaos. Tzeporah explains why climate policy has largely ignored the supply side of the equation, how subsidies distort markets, and why the Paris Agreement doesn't even mention fossil fuels. Her insight is blunt, what we build today will be what we use tomorrow.Tzeporah outlines the vision for a Fossil Fuel Treaty, modelled on the nuclear non-proliferation treaty, that could create international rules to phase out production fairly and equitably. We explore the role of debt-for-renewables swaps for the Global South, how equity must be baked into any transition, and why simply building “the good stuff” without constraining “the bad stuff” will never deliver climate safety.We also discuss how to shift public perception, challenge the fossil industry's greenwashing, and confront the false comfort of net zero targets. Tzeporah makes it clear: action is the antidote to despair, and citizens have more power than they think.This is not just a debate about emissions, but about survival, justice, and reshaping the rules of the global economy. If you care about ending fossil fuel expansion, ensuring a just transition, and accelerating real climate solutions, this episode is essential listening.

Preview: Nonproliferation Treaty 1970: Colleague Henry Sokolski comments on the ineffectiveness of bombing suspect nuclear weapons programs. More. 1953

TRINITY TEST: AND NONPROLIFERATION. HENRY SOKOLSKI 1945 TRINITY TEST

TRINITY TEST: AND NONPROLIFERATION. HENRY SOKOLSKI CONTINUED 1945 TRINITY TEST

Iran is accused by Israel of pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and President Trump is weighing US military intervention. In this episode we chart the history of nuclear non-proliferation, and assess Iran in light of it.

PREVIEW: Colleague Henry Sokolski of Non-Proliferation Education Center comments on the possibility that Iran will withdraw from the NPT as did North Korea—and build a bomb quickly. More. 1955 NEVADA TEST RANGE

Preview: Colleague Henry Sokolski of Non-Proliferation Education Center reports that the US is watching ally South Korea, because there is talk of arming with nukes. More. 1958 KIM