Podcasts about Tajik

On this episode, rural sociologist Dr. Irna Hofman explores how Tajikistan's cotton fields illuminate shifting power dynamics in Central Asia, historically and in the present. She discusses how the Soviet Union once showcased cotton production to visiting delegations—particularly from Muslim-majority countries—as evidence of its development model. Now, as global powers, including Russia, China, and the EU, vie for influence in the region, cotton has again become a strategic commodity—used to forge political ties, secure resources, and drive infrastructure projects. Hofman highlights local communities' active role in shaping these developments, emphasizing that rural landscapes are not simply backdrops for a “New Great Game,” but sites where broader geopolitical forces and grassroots agency intersect. Through her long-term fieldwork, she illustrates how Tajik farmers navigate and negotiate these overlapping external interests, and in doing so, reframe Central Asia's future amidst geopolitical tensions. Dr. Hofman specializes in agrarian and social change in Central Asia, where she has worked since 2012. She completed post-doctoral research at Oxford's Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies as part of an ERC-funded project "China, law and development." In 2019, she obtained her Ph.D. from Leiden University in the Netherlands with a dissertation focused on the political economy of agrarian transformation in Tajikistan: "Cotton, control, and continuity in disguise: The political economy of agrarian transformation in lowland Tajikistan." Her research interests span political economy, political ecology, and political sociology. In recent years, she has focused on rural labour, gender, and commodity politics. Dr. Hofman is completing a monograph based on her dissertation and post-doctoral research projects. Her research agenda for the coming years centers on the rural everyday of geopolitics, focusing on China's growing assertiveness in the global agrifood regime, shifting geographies of production, and rural labour. Dr Irna Hofman | School of Geography and the Environment | University of Oxford @irnahofman Resources: Hofman, I. (2024) Seeds of empire or seeds of friendship? The politics of the diffusion of Chinese crop seeds in Tajikistan. Journal of Agrarian Change, 24(2): e12581. Hofman, I. (2022) Tajikistan. The people's map of global China Hofman, I. (2021) Migration, crop diversification, and adverse incorporation: Understanding the repertoire of contention in rural Tajikistan. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 42(4): 499-518. Hofman, I. (2021). Chinese cotton diplomacy in Tajikistan: greasing the ties by reviving the cotton economy. Research Brief. Hofman, I. (2018). Politics or profits along the “Silk Road”: What drives Chinese farms in Tajikistan and helps them thrive? In The Geoeconomics and Geopolitics of Chinese Development and Investment in Asia, pp. 183-208. Routledge. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

On this episode, rural sociologist Dr. Irna Hofman explores how Tajikistan's cotton fields illuminate shifting power dynamics in Central Asia, historically and in the present. She discusses how the Soviet Union once showcased cotton production to visiting delegations—particularly from Muslim-majority countries—as evidence of its development model. Now, as global powers, including Russia, China, and the EU, vie for influence in the region, cotton has again become a strategic commodity—used to forge political ties, secure resources, and drive infrastructure projects. Hofman highlights local communities' active role in shaping these developments, emphasizing that rural landscapes are not simply backdrops for a “New Great Game,” but sites where broader geopolitical forces and grassroots agency intersect. Through her long-term fieldwork, she illustrates how Tajik farmers navigate and negotiate these overlapping external interests, and in doing so, reframe Central Asia's future amidst geopolitical tensions. Dr. Hofman specializes in agrarian and social change in Central Asia, where she has worked since 2012. She completed post-doctoral research at Oxford's Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies as part of an ERC-funded project "China, law and development." In 2019, she obtained her Ph.D. from Leiden University in the Netherlands with a dissertation focused on the political economy of agrarian transformation in Tajikistan: "Cotton, control, and continuity in disguise: The political economy of agrarian transformation in lowland Tajikistan." Her research interests span political economy, political ecology, and political sociology. In recent years, she has focused on rural labour, gender, and commodity politics. Dr. Hofman is completing a monograph based on her dissertation and post-doctoral research projects. Her research agenda for the coming years centers on the rural everyday of geopolitics, focusing on China's growing assertiveness in the global agrifood regime, shifting geographies of production, and rural labour. Dr Irna Hofman | School of Geography and the Environment | University of Oxford @irnahofman Resources: Hofman, I. (2024) Seeds of empire or seeds of friendship? The politics of the diffusion of Chinese crop seeds in Tajikistan. Journal of Agrarian Change, 24(2): e12581. Hofman, I. (2022) Tajikistan. The people's map of global China Hofman, I. (2021) Migration, crop diversification, and adverse incorporation: Understanding the repertoire of contention in rural Tajikistan. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 42(4): 499-518. Hofman, I. (2021). Chinese cotton diplomacy in Tajikistan: greasing the ties by reviving the cotton economy. Research Brief. Hofman, I. (2018). Politics or profits along the “Silk Road”: What drives Chinese farms in Tajikistan and helps them thrive? In The Geoeconomics and Geopolitics of Chinese Development and Investment in Asia, pp. 183-208. Routledge. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/political-science

On this episode, rural sociologist Dr. Irna Hofman explores how Tajikistan's cotton fields illuminate shifting power dynamics in Central Asia, historically and in the present. She discusses how the Soviet Union once showcased cotton production to visiting delegations—particularly from Muslim-majority countries—as evidence of its development model. Now, as global powers, including Russia, China, and the EU, vie for influence in the region, cotton has again become a strategic commodity—used to forge political ties, secure resources, and drive infrastructure projects. Hofman highlights local communities' active role in shaping these developments, emphasizing that rural landscapes are not simply backdrops for a “New Great Game,” but sites where broader geopolitical forces and grassroots agency intersect. Through her long-term fieldwork, she illustrates how Tajik farmers navigate and negotiate these overlapping external interests, and in doing so, reframe Central Asia's future amidst geopolitical tensions. Dr. Hofman specializes in agrarian and social change in Central Asia, where she has worked since 2012. She completed post-doctoral research at Oxford's Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies as part of an ERC-funded project "China, law and development." In 2019, she obtained her Ph.D. from Leiden University in the Netherlands with a dissertation focused on the political economy of agrarian transformation in Tajikistan: "Cotton, control, and continuity in disguise: The political economy of agrarian transformation in lowland Tajikistan." Her research interests span political economy, political ecology, and political sociology. In recent years, she has focused on rural labour, gender, and commodity politics. Dr. Hofman is completing a monograph based on her dissertation and post-doctoral research projects. Her research agenda for the coming years centers on the rural everyday of geopolitics, focusing on China's growing assertiveness in the global agrifood regime, shifting geographies of production, and rural labour. Dr Irna Hofman | School of Geography and the Environment | University of Oxford @irnahofman Resources: Hofman, I. (2024) Seeds of empire or seeds of friendship? The politics of the diffusion of Chinese crop seeds in Tajikistan. Journal of Agrarian Change, 24(2): e12581. Hofman, I. (2022) Tajikistan. The people's map of global China Hofman, I. (2021) Migration, crop diversification, and adverse incorporation: Understanding the repertoire of contention in rural Tajikistan. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 42(4): 499-518. Hofman, I. (2021). Chinese cotton diplomacy in Tajikistan: greasing the ties by reviving the cotton economy. Research Brief. Hofman, I. (2018). Politics or profits along the “Silk Road”: What drives Chinese farms in Tajikistan and helps them thrive? In The Geoeconomics and Geopolitics of Chinese Development and Investment in Asia, pp. 183-208. Routledge. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/central-asian-studies

On this episode, rural sociologist Dr. Irna Hofman explores how Tajikistan's cotton fields illuminate shifting power dynamics in Central Asia, historically and in the present. She discusses how the Soviet Union once showcased cotton production to visiting delegations—particularly from Muslim-majority countries—as evidence of its development model. Now, as global powers, including Russia, China, and the EU, vie for influence in the region, cotton has again become a strategic commodity—used to forge political ties, secure resources, and drive infrastructure projects. Hofman highlights local communities' active role in shaping these developments, emphasizing that rural landscapes are not simply backdrops for a “New Great Game,” but sites where broader geopolitical forces and grassroots agency intersect. Through her long-term fieldwork, she illustrates how Tajik farmers navigate and negotiate these overlapping external interests, and in doing so, reframe Central Asia's future amidst geopolitical tensions. Dr. Hofman specializes in agrarian and social change in Central Asia, where she has worked since 2012. She completed post-doctoral research at Oxford's Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies as part of an ERC-funded project "China, law and development." In 2019, she obtained her Ph.D. from Leiden University in the Netherlands with a dissertation focused on the political economy of agrarian transformation in Tajikistan: "Cotton, control, and continuity in disguise: The political economy of agrarian transformation in lowland Tajikistan." Her research interests span political economy, political ecology, and political sociology. In recent years, she has focused on rural labour, gender, and commodity politics. Dr. Hofman is completing a monograph based on her dissertation and post-doctoral research projects. Her research agenda for the coming years centers on the rural everyday of geopolitics, focusing on China's growing assertiveness in the global agrifood regime, shifting geographies of production, and rural labour. Dr Irna Hofman | School of Geography and the Environment | University of Oxford @irnahofman Resources: Hofman, I. (2024) Seeds of empire or seeds of friendship? The politics of the diffusion of Chinese crop seeds in Tajikistan. Journal of Agrarian Change, 24(2): e12581. Hofman, I. (2022) Tajikistan. The people's map of global China Hofman, I. (2021) Migration, crop diversification, and adverse incorporation: Understanding the repertoire of contention in rural Tajikistan. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 42(4): 499-518. Hofman, I. (2021). Chinese cotton diplomacy in Tajikistan: greasing the ties by reviving the cotton economy. Research Brief. Hofman, I. (2018). Politics or profits along the “Silk Road”: What drives Chinese farms in Tajikistan and helps them thrive? In The Geoeconomics and Geopolitics of Chinese Development and Investment in Asia, pp. 183-208. Routledge. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/world-affairs

On this episode, rural sociologist Dr. Irna Hofman explores how Tajikistan's cotton fields illuminate shifting power dynamics in Central Asia, historically and in the present. She discusses how the Soviet Union once showcased cotton production to visiting delegations—particularly from Muslim-majority countries—as evidence of its development model. Now, as global powers, including Russia, China, and the EU, vie for influence in the region, cotton has again become a strategic commodity—used to forge political ties, secure resources, and drive infrastructure projects. Hofman highlights local communities' active role in shaping these developments, emphasizing that rural landscapes are not simply backdrops for a “New Great Game,” but sites where broader geopolitical forces and grassroots agency intersect. Through her long-term fieldwork, she illustrates how Tajik farmers navigate and negotiate these overlapping external interests, and in doing so, reframe Central Asia's future amidst geopolitical tensions. Dr. Hofman specializes in agrarian and social change in Central Asia, where she has worked since 2012. She completed post-doctoral research at Oxford's Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies as part of an ERC-funded project "China, law and development." In 2019, she obtained her Ph.D. from Leiden University in the Netherlands with a dissertation focused on the political economy of agrarian transformation in Tajikistan: "Cotton, control, and continuity in disguise: The political economy of agrarian transformation in lowland Tajikistan." Her research interests span political economy, political ecology, and political sociology. In recent years, she has focused on rural labour, gender, and commodity politics. Dr. Hofman is completing a monograph based on her dissertation and post-doctoral research projects. Her research agenda for the coming years centers on the rural everyday of geopolitics, focusing on China's growing assertiveness in the global agrifood regime, shifting geographies of production, and rural labour. Dr Irna Hofman | School of Geography and the Environment | University of Oxford @irnahofman Resources: Hofman, I. (2024) Seeds of empire or seeds of friendship? The politics of the diffusion of Chinese crop seeds in Tajikistan. Journal of Agrarian Change, 24(2): e12581. Hofman, I. (2022) Tajikistan. The people's map of global China Hofman, I. (2021) Migration, crop diversification, and adverse incorporation: Understanding the repertoire of contention in rural Tajikistan. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 42(4): 499-518. Hofman, I. (2021). Chinese cotton diplomacy in Tajikistan: greasing the ties by reviving the cotton economy. Research Brief. Hofman, I. (2018). Politics or profits along the “Silk Road”: What drives Chinese farms in Tajikistan and helps them thrive? In The Geoeconomics and Geopolitics of Chinese Development and Investment in Asia, pp. 183-208. Routledge. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/economics

On this episode, rural sociologist Dr. Irna Hofman explores how Tajikistan's cotton fields illuminate shifting power dynamics in Central Asia, historically and in the present. She discusses how the Soviet Union once showcased cotton production to visiting delegations—particularly from Muslim-majority countries—as evidence of its development model. Now, as global powers, including Russia, China, and the EU, vie for influence in the region, cotton has again become a strategic commodity—used to forge political ties, secure resources, and drive infrastructure projects. Hofman highlights local communities' active role in shaping these developments, emphasizing that rural landscapes are not simply backdrops for a “New Great Game,” but sites where broader geopolitical forces and grassroots agency intersect. Through her long-term fieldwork, she illustrates how Tajik farmers navigate and negotiate these overlapping external interests, and in doing so, reframe Central Asia's future amidst geopolitical tensions. Dr. Hofman specializes in agrarian and social change in Central Asia, where she has worked since 2012. She completed post-doctoral research at Oxford's Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies as part of an ERC-funded project "China, law and development." In 2019, she obtained her Ph.D. from Leiden University in the Netherlands with a dissertation focused on the political economy of agrarian transformation in Tajikistan: "Cotton, control, and continuity in disguise: The political economy of agrarian transformation in lowland Tajikistan." Her research interests span political economy, political ecology, and political sociology. In recent years, she has focused on rural labour, gender, and commodity politics. Dr. Hofman is completing a monograph based on her dissertation and post-doctoral research projects. Her research agenda for the coming years centers on the rural everyday of geopolitics, focusing on China's growing assertiveness in the global agrifood regime, shifting geographies of production, and rural labour. Dr Irna Hofman | School of Geography and the Environment | University of Oxford @irnahofman Resources: Hofman, I. (2024) Seeds of empire or seeds of friendship? The politics of the diffusion of Chinese crop seeds in Tajikistan. Journal of Agrarian Change, 24(2): e12581. Hofman, I. (2022) Tajikistan. The people's map of global China Hofman, I. (2021) Migration, crop diversification, and adverse incorporation: Understanding the repertoire of contention in rural Tajikistan. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 42(4): 499-518. Hofman, I. (2021). Chinese cotton diplomacy in Tajikistan: greasing the ties by reviving the cotton economy. Research Brief. Hofman, I. (2018). Politics or profits along the “Silk Road”: What drives Chinese farms in Tajikistan and helps them thrive? In The Geoeconomics and Geopolitics of Chinese Development and Investment in Asia, pp. 183-208. Routledge. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

On this episode, rural sociologist Dr. Irna Hofman explores how Tajikistan's cotton fields illuminate shifting power dynamics in Central Asia, historically and in the present. She discusses how the Soviet Union once showcased cotton production to visiting delegations—particularly from Muslim-majority countries—as evidence of its development model. Now, as global powers, including Russia, China, and the EU, vie for influence in the region, cotton has again become a strategic commodity—used to forge political ties, secure resources, and drive infrastructure projects. Hofman highlights local communities' active role in shaping these developments, emphasizing that rural landscapes are not simply backdrops for a “New Great Game,” but sites where broader geopolitical forces and grassroots agency intersect. Through her long-term fieldwork, she illustrates how Tajik farmers navigate and negotiate these overlapping external interests, and in doing so, reframe Central Asia's future amidst geopolitical tensions. Dr. Hofman specializes in agrarian and social change in Central Asia, where she has worked since 2012. She completed post-doctoral research at Oxford's Faculty of Asian and Middle Eastern Studies as part of an ERC-funded project "China, law and development." In 2019, she obtained her Ph.D. from Leiden University in the Netherlands with a dissertation focused on the political economy of agrarian transformation in Tajikistan: "Cotton, control, and continuity in disguise: The political economy of agrarian transformation in lowland Tajikistan." Her research interests span political economy, political ecology, and political sociology. In recent years, she has focused on rural labour, gender, and commodity politics. Dr. Hofman is completing a monograph based on her dissertation and post-doctoral research projects. Her research agenda for the coming years centers on the rural everyday of geopolitics, focusing on China's growing assertiveness in the global agrifood regime, shifting geographies of production, and rural labour. Dr Irna Hofman | School of Geography and the Environment | University of Oxford @irnahofman Resources: Hofman, I. (2024) Seeds of empire or seeds of friendship? The politics of the diffusion of Chinese crop seeds in Tajikistan. Journal of Agrarian Change, 24(2): e12581. Hofman, I. (2022) Tajikistan. The people's map of global China Hofman, I. (2021) Migration, crop diversification, and adverse incorporation: Understanding the repertoire of contention in rural Tajikistan. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 42(4): 499-518. Hofman, I. (2021). Chinese cotton diplomacy in Tajikistan: greasing the ties by reviving the cotton economy. Research Brief. Hofman, I. (2018). Politics or profits along the “Silk Road”: What drives Chinese farms in Tajikistan and helps them thrive? In The Geoeconomics and Geopolitics of Chinese Development and Investment in Asia, pp. 183-208. Routledge. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This episode we continue to follow the monk Xuanzang on his path along the silk road.  From Gaochang, he traveled through the Tarim Basin, up over the Tianshan Mountains, to the heart of the Western Gokturk Qaghanate.  From there, he traveled south, through the region of Transoxania to Bactria and the land of Tukhara.  He pushed on into the Hindu Kush, witnessing the stone Buddha statues of Bamiyan, and eventually made his way to the land of Kapisa, near modern Kabul, Afghanistan.  From there he would prepare to enter the Indian subcontinent: the home of the historical Buddha. For more discussion and some photos of the areas along this journey, check out our podcast blog at https://sengokudaimyo.com/podcast/episode-121   Rough Transcript Welcome to Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.  My name is Joshua, and this is Episode 121: Journey to the West, Part 2   The cold winds blew through the travelers' doubled up clothing and thick furs.  Cold, wet ground meant that even two sets of boots were not necessarily enough after several days.  The frozen mist would often obscure everything except for the path immediately in front, hiding the peaks and making the sky a uniform white. In many places, the path would be blocked by rock, ice, or snow—the remnants of an avalanche, which could easily take an unsuspecting traveler.  And there was the elevation.  Hiking through the mountains, it was easy enough to reach heights of a mile or higher, and for those not accustomed to that elevation the thin air could take a surprising toll, especially if you were pushing yourself.  And the road was no less kind to the animals that would be hauling said travelers and their gear. And yet, this was the path that Xuanzang had agreed to.  He would continue to push through, despite the various deprivations that he would be subjected to.  No doubt he often wondered if it was worth it.  Then again, returning was just as dangerous a trip, so why not push on?   Last episode we introduced the monk Xuanzang, who traveled the Silk Road to India in the 7th century and returned to China.  He brought back numerous sutras to translate, and ended up founding a new school, known as the Faxian school—or the Hossou school in Japan.   As we mentioned last time, Xuanzang during his lifetime met with students from the archipelago when they visited the continent.  The records of his travels—including his biography and travelogue—are some of the best information we have on what life was like on the silk road around this time. In the last episode, we talked about Xuanzang: how he set out on his travels, his illegal departure from the Tang empire, and his perilous journey across the desert, ending up in Gaochang.  There, King Qu Wentai had tried to get him to stay, but he was determined to head out.  This episode we are going to cover his trip to Agni, Kucha, and Baluka—modern Aksu—and up to the Western Gokturk Qaghanate's capital of Suyab.  From there, we'll follow his footsteps through the Turkic controlled regions of Transoxania and into Tukhara, in modern Afghanistan.  Finally, we'll cover the last parts of his journey before he reached the start of his goal:  India. From Gaochang, Xuanzang continued on, through the towns he names as Wuban and Dujin, and into the country of Agni—known today as the area of Yanqi—which may also have been known as Wuqi.  The route was well-enough known, but it wasn't necessarily safe.  At one point, Xuanzang's caravan met with bandits, whom they were fortunately able to pay off.  The following night they encamped on a river bank with some merchants who also happened to be traveling the road.  The merchants, though, got up at midnight and headed out, hoping to get to the city early so that they could be the first ones to the market.  They only made it a few miles down the road, however, before they encountered more bandits, who slaughtered them and took their goods.  The following day, Xuanzang and his retinue came upon the merchants' remains lying in the road and saw the aftermath of the massacre. This was an unforgiving land, and the road was truly dangerous, even for those who traveled it regularly.  And yet Xuanzang was planning to travel its entire length until he reached India. So with little alternative, they carried on to the royal city of Agni. Agni, or Yanqi, sits on the southwestern edge of the basin, west of Bositeng lake, on the border between the Turfan basin and the larger Tarim Basin.  The name is thought to be a Tocharian—or Turfanian—name for the city, which is also known as Karashr. According to the biography by Huili, Xuanzang and his party didn't stay long in Agni.  Apparently Agni and Gaochang were not exactly on friendly terms, and even though the King of Agni and his ministers reportedly came out to greet Xuanzang and welcome him to their city, they refused to provide any horses.  They spent a single night and moved on. That said, Agni still made an impression on Xuanzang.  He noted how the capital was surrounded by hills on four sides, making it naturally defensible.  As for the people, he praises them as honest and straightforward.  They wore clothing of felt and hemp cloth, and cut their hair short, without hats or any kind of headwear.  Even the climate was pleasant, at least for the short time he was there.  He also notes that they used a script based on India—likely referring to the Brahmic script, which we find in the Tarim basin. However, as for the local lord, the King of Agni, he is a little less charitable.  Xuanzang claimed he was brave but “lacked resourcefulness” and he was a bit of a braggart.  Furthermore, the country had “no guiding principles or discipline and government orders are imperfect and not seriously implemented.”  He also mentioned the state of Buddhism in the country, noting that they were followers of Sarvastivada school, a Theravada sect popular along the Silk Road at the time.  Xuanzang was apparently not too pleased with the fact that they were not strict vegetarians, including the “three kinds of pure meat”.  From Agni, Xuanzang continued southwest, heading for the kingdom of Kucha.  He seems to have bypassed the nearby kingdom of Korla, south of Agni, and headed some 60 or 70 miles, climbing over a ridge and crossing two large rivers, and then proceeding another 200 miles or so to the land of Kucha. Kucha was a kingdom with over one hundred monasteries and five thousand monks following a form of Theravada Buddhism.  Here, Xuanzang was welcomed in by the king, Suvarnadeva, described as having red hair and blue eyes.  While Xuanzang was staying in Kucha, it is suspected that he probably visited the nearby Kizil grotto and the Buddhist caves, there, which include a painting of King Suvarnadeva's father, King Suvarnapuspa, and his three sons. You can still visit Kucha and the Kizil grottos today, although getting there is quite a trek, to be sure.  The ancient Kuchean capital is mostly ruins, but in the Kizil caves, protected from the outside elements, you can find vivid paintings ranging from roughly the 4th to the 8th century, when the site was abandoned.  Hundreds of caves were painted, and many still demonstrate vibrant colors.  The arid conditions protect them from mold and mildew, while the cave itself reduces the natural bleaching effect of sunlight.  The paintings are in numerous styles, and were commissioned by various individuals and groups over the years.  They also give us some inkling of how vibrant the city and similar structures must have been, back when the Kuchean kingdom was in its heyday. The people of Kucha are still something of a mystery.  We know that at least some of them spoke an Indo-European language, related to a language found in Agni, and both of these languages are often called Tocharian, which we discussed last episode.  Xuanzang himself noted that they used Indian writing, possibly referring to the Brahmi script, or perhaps the fact that they seem to have used Sanskrit for official purposes, such as the inscription on the cave painting at Kizil giving the name of King Suvarnapuspa.  The Kucheans also were clothed in ornamental garments of silk and embroidery.  They kept their hair cut, wearing a flowing covering over their heads—and we see some of that in the paintings. Xuanzang also notes that though we may think of this area as a desert, it was a place where rice and grains, as well as fruit like grapes, pomegranates, plums, pears, peaches, and almonds were grown.  Even today, modern Xinjiang grows some absolutely fantastic fruit, including grapes, which are often dried into raisins. Another point of interest for Xuanzang may have been that Kucha is known as the hometown of none other than Kumarajiva.  We first mentioned Kumarajiva back in episode 84.  Kumarajiva was one of the first people we know of who translated many of the sutras from India that were then more widely disseminated throughout the Yellow River and Yangzi river basins.  His father was from India and his mother was a Kuchean princess.  In the middle of the 4th century, when he was still quite young, he traveled to India and back with his mother on a Buddhist pilgrimage.  Later he would start a massive translation project in Chang'an.  His translations are credited with revolutionizing Chinese Buddhism. Xuanzang was initially welcomed by the king, his ministers, and the revered monk, Moksagupta.  They were accompanied by several thousand monks who set up tents outside the eastern gate, with portable Buddha images, which they worshipped, and then Xuanzang was taken to monastery after monastery until sunset.  At one of the monasteries, in the southeast of the city, there were several tens of monks who originally came from Gaochang, and since Xuanzang had come from there, they invited him to stay with them. The next day he met and feasted with the King, politely declining any meat, and then went to the monastery in the northwest to meet with the famous monk: Moksagupta.  Moksagupta himself had made the journey to India, and had spent 20 years there himself.  It seems like this would have been the perfect person for Xuanzang to talk to about his plans, but instead, the two butted heads.  Moksagupta seems to have seen Xuanzang's Mahayana faith as heretical.  He saw no reason for Xuanzang to travel all the way to India when he had all the sutras that anyone needed there in Kucha, along with Moksagupta himself.   Xuanzang's response seems to have been the Tang dynasty Buddhist version of “Okay, Boomer”, and then he went ahead and tore apart Moksagupta's understanding of his own sutras—or so Xuanzang relayed to his biographers.  We don't exactly have Moksagupta's side, and, let's face it, Xuanzang and his biographers are not necessarily reliable narrators.  After all, they followed Mahayana teachings, which they considered the “Greater Vehicle”, and they referred to the Theravada teachings as the “Hinayana” or “Lesser Vehicle”.  Meanwhile, Theravada Buddhists likely saw many of the Mahayana texts as extraneous, even heretical, not believing them to actually be the teachings of the Buddha. It must have been winter time, as the passes through the mountains on the road ahead were still closed, and so Xuanzang stayed in Kucha, spending his time sightseeing and meeting with various people.  He even went back to see Moksagupta, but the older monk shunned him, and would get up and exit the room rather than engaging with him, so they had no more conversations. Eventually, Xuanzang continued on his way west, following along the northern rim of the Tarim basin.  Two days out from Kucha, disaster struck.  Some two thousand or so Turkish bandits suddenly appeared—I doubt Xuanzang was counting, so it may have been more or less.  I imagine that memories of what had happened to the merchants near Agni must have gone through Xuanzang's mind.   Fortunately, for him, they were fighting over loot that they had pillaged from various travelers, and since they couldn't share it equally, they fell to fighting each other and eventually dispersed. He travelled for almost 200 miles after that, stopping only for a night at the Kingdom of Baluka, aka Gumo—the modern city of Aksu.  This was another Theravada Buddhist kingdom.  Xuanzang noted tens of Buddhist temples, and over 1000 Buddhist monks.  The country was not large—about 200 miles east to west and 100 miles north to south.  For reference that means it was probably comparable in size with Kyushu, in terms of overall area, or maybe the size of Denmark—excluding Greenland—or maybe the US state of Maryland.  Xuanzang described the country as similar to Kucha in just about every way, including the written language and law, but the spoken language was different, though we don't get many more details. From Baluka, he crossed northward through the Tianshan mountains, which are classified as an extension of the Pamirs known as the Ice Mountains.  Had he continued southwest, he would have hit Kashgar and crossed over between the Pamir and Tian Shan ranges into the Ferghana valley, but instead he turned north. We don't know exactly why he took this perilous option, but the route that may have been popular at the time as it was one of the most direct routes to the seat of the Western Gokturk Empire, which he was currently traveling through. The Tian Shan mountains were a dangerous journey.  Avalanches could block the road—or worse.  Xuanzang describes the permanent ice fields—indeed, it is the ice fields and glaciers of the Tian Shan that melt in the summer and provide the oasis towns of the Tarim Basin with water, even to this day.  In Xuanzang's day, those glaciers were likely even more prevalent than today, especially as they have been recorded as rapidly disappearing since 1961.  And where you weren't on snow and ice, the ground was probably wet and damp from the melt.  To keep warm, you would wear shoes over your shoes, along with heavy fur coats, all designed to reduce exposure. Xuanzang claims that 3 or 4 of every 10 people didn't survive the crossing—and that horses and oxen fared even worse.  Even if these numbers are an exaggeration, the message is clear:  This was a dangerous journey. After about seven days, Xuanzang came out of the mountains to the “Great Pure Lake”, the “Da Qing Hai”, also known as the Hot Sea or the Salt Sea, which likely refers to Issyk Kul.  The salt content, along with the great volume of water it possesses, means that the lake rarely freezes over, which is likely why it is seen as “hot” since it doesn't freeze when the fresh water nearby does.  This lake is the second largest mountain lake in the world, and the second deepest saltwater lake.  Traveling past the lake, he continued to Suyab, near modern Tokmok, in Kyrgyzstan, just west of the modern capital of Bishkek.  This was an old Sogdian settlement, and had since become the capital of the Western Gokturks.  Sogdians—like Xuanzang's guide, Vandak—were integral to the Gokturk kingdom. Their language was the lingua franca of the Silk Road, and at the time of the Gokturk Khaganate, it was also the official court language, and so when Xuanzang appeared at the court of the Great Khagan of the Western Gokturks, it was likely the language of diplomacy. When we think of Turkic people, many in the English speaking world think of Turkiye, and perhaps of the mighty Ottoman empire.  Some may think of Turkmenistan, Kazhakstan, Kyrgyzstan, or Uzbekistan, among others.  And of course, there are the Uyghur people in Xinjiang.  All of these people claim roots in the ancestral Turkic homeland in the Altai mountains, which sit largely in western Mongolia, north of China's Xinjiang region.  Much like the Xiongnu and the Mongols, they were pastoral nomads, moving their herds across the steppes, often covering great distances.  They would regularly move through different regions, perhaps returning each season, though sometimes not returning for years at a time.  They were often seen as barbarians by settled people living in cities, and yet their goods and horses were highly prized. Nomad and sedentary lifestyles would often collide.  Farmers would turn pastureland into fields, and when the nomadic people returned on their circuits, they would find walls and fences where there was once open land, and the people there would claim to “own” the land, a concept often foreign to people who were always on the move.  Nomadic people, such as the Gokturks, were not necessarily keeping vast libraries of records about themselves and their histories, and so much of what we get comes from external sources, which do not always have incredibly reliable narrators.  To many of the settled agriculturalists, groups like the Turks were marauders who raided their villages and farms.  They were a great bogeyman of the steppes, which required the firm hand of strong defenses to keep out—or so their opponents would want people to think. While they were known for their warfare, which incorporated their mobility, but they were keenly interested in trade, as well.  They understood the value of the trade routes and the various cities and states that they included in their empire.  Thus, the Sogdians and the Gokturks seem a natural fit: the Sogdians were more settled, but not entirely so, as demonstrated by their vast trade networks.  And the Sogdians also were part of the greater central Eurasian steppe culture, so the two cultures understood each other, to a degree.  They are even depicted similarly in art, with slight differences, such as long hair that was often associated with Turks over the Sogdians.  In some areas of the Gokturk empire, Sogdians would run the cities, while the Gokturks provided military aid and protection. Xuanzang's description of the people of Suyab, or the “City of Suye River”, doesn't pick out anyone in particular, and he even says that it was a place where traders of the Hu, or foreign, tribes from different countries mingle their abodes.  He mentions the people here as being called Suli, which is also the name given to the language—this may refer to “Sogdian” in general.  They write with an alphabet that is written vertically rather than horizontally—this may refer to a few scripts that were written this way, possibly based off Syriac or Aramaic alphabets that were adapted to Sogdian and other Iranian languages, but it isn't clear. We are told that the people dressed in felt and hemp clothing, with fur and “cotton” garments.  Their clothes fit tightly, and they kept their hair cut short, exposing the top of their heads—though sometimes they shaved it completely, tying a colored silk band around the forehead. He goes on to describe these people as greedy liars, possibly a reference to the mercantile nature of many of the people at the time. Something to note: The Turks of this time had not yet encountered Islam, which was just now starting to rise up in the Middle East.  The Prophet Muhammad is said to have been born around the end of the 6th century CE and was preaching in the early 7th century, though his teachings would begin to spread outward soon enough.  But that means that the Gokturks were not an Islamic empire.  Rather, their own traditions seem to have focused on the worship of Tengri, an Altaic personification of the universe, often simplified as a “sky god”.  Tengrism can be found amongst the Xiongnu, Mongols, and others, and it was the national religion of the Gokturks themselves, but there were many who also adopted other religions that they encountered, including Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Manichaeism, and Buddhism.  In fact, Xuanzang notes that the Turks he met in Suyab would not sleep or sit on beds made of wood because wood was thought to contain the spirit of fire, which he says they worshipped.  That sounds similar to Zoroastrian beliefs, where fire is associated with Ahura Mazda, who is also worshipped as a sky god.  These may have been beliefs inherited from their Eastern Iranian Sogdian partners. In Xuanzang's biography, we are given more details about his visit to Suyab.  Apparently, as he was headed to the city, he met a hunting party, which we are told was the retinue of Yehu Khan.  Hunting was an important part of life on the steppes, and it continued to be a favorite sport of the Gokturk nobility. Yehu Khan—possibly Yagbhu Khan, though that is up for some debate—is described as being dressed in a green silk robe, with his hair exposed, and wearing  a turban of white silk about ten feet long that wrapped his forehead and hung behind his back.  His “hunting” expedition wasn't just a couple of the guys.  It included about 200 officials, all with plaited hair and dressed in brocade robes—they weren't exactly out there roughing it.  He also had his soldiers, dressed in furs, felt, or fine woolen clothes, and there were so many cavalry that they stretched out of sight.  The Khan seemed pleased to meet Xuanzang, but his hunt was expected to last another couple of days, at least, so he sent an attendant named Dharmaja to take Xuanzang back to wait for the Khan to return. Three days later, Xuanzang was given an audience.  The khan was seated in a large yurt.  Xuanzang noted the seeming incongruity between the khan, sitting there in the tent, decorated with golden flowers, with the officials dressed in magnificent brocade garments sitting in two long rows in front of him and the armed guards behind him, compared to the simple felt walls of the tent. A ”yurt” is a common feature of nomadic life on the steppes.  It wasn't exactly a single person operation to haul them around, but they can be taken down and put up with relative ease.  And while yurts could be relatively simple, there are examples of much more elaborate structures.  There is little reason they couldn't be made larger, perhaps with some extra support.  In later centuries, there are examples of giant yurts that seem like real construction projects.  Use of tents, even in a city, where they had permanent palace buildings, was likely a means of retaining the nomadic steppe traditions, even while enjoying the benefits of city life. Whom exactly Xuanzang met with is a matter of debate.  His records seem to indicate that it was Tong Yabghu Qaghan of the Western Gokturk Khaganate, but other sources say that Tong Yabghu Qaghan died in 628, and the earliest Xuanzang could have been meeting with him was 630, two years later, so if that is the case, he must have met with Tong Yabghu's son, Si Yabghu Qaghan.  It is likely that Xuanzang, who was dictating his accounts years after, mentioned the Qaghan and then, when they looked up who it was, they simply made a mistake.  Remember, Xuanzang would have had everything translated through one or two languages.  He did know what he saw, however, and he recounted what he remembered. Tong Yabghu Qaghan oversaw the height of the Gokturk Qaghanate, and appears to have favored the Buddhist religion, though there were many different religions active in their territories at the time.  They oversaw an extremely cosmopolitan empire covering huge swaths of central Eurasia, including the lucrative silk road.  Xuanzang notes that at the court there were individuals from Gaochang and even a messenger from the Han—which is to say the Tang Empire.  One wonders if Xuanzang—or anyone at that time—realized just how tenuous the Khan'sposition was.  After Tong Yabghu's death, the Qaghanate would decline, and less than a decade later it would fall to the Tang dynasty, who took Suyab and made it their western outpost.  In fact, Suyab is thought to have been the birthplace, over a century later, of a young boy who would find a love of poetry.  That boy's name was Li Bai, or Ri Haku, in Japanese. He would become one of the most famous poets in Chinese history, and his poems were even known and studied in Japan.  And it was largely through Japanese study of Li Bai's poems that his works came to the English speaking world: first through Ernest Fenollosa, who had studied in Japan, and then by the celebrated Ezra Pound, who had used Ernest's notes to help with his own translations of the poems. This was, though, as I said, over a century after Xuanzang's journey.  At the time of our story, the Qaghan was throwing a feast, including Xuanzang and all of the foreign envoys.  Xuanzang comments on the food and drink—his hosts provided grape juice in lieu of wine, and cooked a special vegetarian feast just for him, while the other guests ate a feast of meat, such as veal, lamb, fish, and the like.  There was also the music of various regions along the Silk Road, which Xuanzang found to be catchy, but of course not as refined as the music he was used to, of course.  After dinner Xuanzang was asked to expound upon the Darma, largely about the basic principle that you should be kind to one another—I doubt he was getting into the deep mysteries of Buddhist philosophy. Xuanzang stuck around the court for three more days, during which time the Qaghan tried to get him to stay, but Xuanzang insisted that he had to make it to India.  And so the Qaghan relented.  He found men in his army who could translate for Xuanzang along his journey, and had letters of introduction written to at least as far as the state of Kapisa, in modern Afghanistan. And so, armed with the Qaghan's blessing and a fresh translator, Xuanzang struck out again.  They headed westward for over one hundred miles, eventually reaching Bingyul, aka the Thousand Springs.  This is the area where the Qaghan and his court would spend his summers, and the deer in the area were protected under his orders, so that they were not afraid of humans—which sounds similar to the situation with the deer in Nara.  Continuing on another fifty miles or so—the distances are approximate as Xuanzang's primary duty was not exactly to map all of this out—Xuanzang arrived at the city of Taras, in modern Kazakhstan, another place where the cultures of the Silk Road mixed and mingled.  Xuanzang didn't have much to say about Taraz, apparently, though it is one of the oldest cities in Transoxania, founded near the beginning of the Common Era.  A few miles south of there, Xuanzang reportedly found a village of re-settled ethnic Han that had been captured by the Gokturks and settled here.  They had adopted the dress and customs of the Turkic people, but continued to speak a version of Chinese. Southwest of that he reached the City of White Water, likely referring to Aksukent.  This is the same “Aksu” as the city in Xinjiang, both of which mean “White Water” in Turkic, but this one is in the south of Kazakhstan.  Xuanzang found the climate and products an improvement over what he had experienced in Taras.  Beyond that, he next arrived at the city of Gongyu, and then south again to Nujkend, and then traveling westward to the country of Chach, aka Tashkent.  Both Nujkend and Chach were large cities in nations of smaller, mostly autonomous city-states, which made up a lot of the political geography of Transoxania. I would note that Xuanzang's notes here are much more sparse than previously.  This may be because these were outside of the Tarim basin and therefore of less interest to individuals in the Tang empire.  Or perhaps he was just making his way more quickly and not stopping at every kingdom along the way. From Tashkent, he continued southeast to the Ferghana valley—the country of Feihan.  Oddly, this country doesn't appear in Xuanzang's biography, even though the Ferghana Valley seems to have been fairly well known back in the Tang Empire—it was known as the home of some of the best horses, which were one of its first major exports.  In fact, the Han dynasty even mounted a military expedition to travel to Ferghana just to obtain horses.  Xuanzang is oddly silent on this; however, he does talk about the fertile nature of the land.  He mentions that their language here is different from the lands he had been traveling through up to this point, and also points out that the people of the Ferghana valley were also visibly different from others in the area. From the Ferghana valley, Xuanzang headed west for about 300 miles or more to the land of Sutrushana—perhaps referring to the area of Ushrusana, with its capital of Bunjikat.  This country was also largely Sogdian, and described as similar to Tashkent.  From there, he traveled west through a great desert, passing skeletons, which were the only marker of the trail other than a view of the far off mountains.  Finally, they reached Samarkand, known as the country of “Kang” in Chinese, which was also the term used to mark Sogdians who claimed descent from the people of Samarkand. Samarkand is another of the ancient cities of Central Asia, and even today is the third largest city in modern Uzbekistan.  Human activity in the region goes back to the paleolithic era, and the city was probably founded between the 8th and 7th centuries BCE.  Samarkand was conquered by Alexander the Great, and during the Achaemenid Empire it was the capital of Sogdiana.  During Xuanzang's visit, Samarkand was described as an impenetrable fortress with a large population. For all of his travel, Samarkand was the first place Xuanzang notes as specifically not a Buddhist land.  In fact, there were two monasteries, suggesting that there had been Buddhists, but if any monks tried to stay there then the locals would chase them out with fire.  Instead, they worshipped fire—likely meaning Ahura Mazda and Zoroastrianism.  This leads to a story that I have to wonder about, given the reliability of our narrators. It is said that Xuanzang was met by the King with arrogance, but after staying the night Xuanzang was able to tell the King about Buddhism and its merits.  The king was intrigued, and asked to observe the Precepts, and treated Xuanzang with hospitality and respect.  So when two of Xuanzang's attendants went to the monasteries to worship, they were chased out with fire.  When the king heard about this, he had the people arrested and ordered their hands to be cut off.  Xuanzang could not bear to witness such suffering, however, and he intervened to have them spared.  So instead the king had them flogged and banished from the city.  Ever since then, all the people believed in Buddhism. Some parts of this strike true.  It was likely that the king would entertain this strange wanderer who had arrived with letters from the great Qaghan—that may have even explained why Xuanzang had been encouraged to make the dangerous journey to Suyab in the first place, so that he could obtain such permission.  And it would not be strange for the king to listen to his teachings.  If Xuanzang's attendants were attacked, that would have been a huge breach of hospitality, and however the King felt about it, he no doubt had to do something about it.  And so all of that sounds somewhat believable.  Does that mean everyone suddenly converted to Buddhism?  I don't know that I'm quite willing to go that far.  It is also likely that there were Buddhists there already, even if the majority religion was Zoroastrianism. From Samarkand, Xuanzang traveled farther southwest, to the country of Kasanna, which seems to have been the edge of what we might call Sogdiana.   According to his biographers, however, there was a little more to all of this.  Rather, he headed west to Kusanika.  Then he traveled to  Khargan, and further on to the country of Bukhara, and then to Vadi.  All of these were “An” in Chinese, which was the name element used for Sogdians from this region.  He then continued west to the country of Horismika, on the other side of the Amu Darya, aka the Oxus River of Transoxanian fame. From there he traveled further southwest, entering into the mountains.  The path here was often such that they had to travel single-file, and there was no food or water other than what you brought with you.  Eventually they came to a set of doors, known as the Iron Gate.  This was a Turkic fortress.  It was no doubt fortuitous that he had come from his meeting with the Qaghan, and likely had permission to pass through.  From there, they entered the country of Tukhara. As we noted in Episode 119, Tukhara was in the region of Bactria.  It was bordered by the Pamir range in the east, and the Persian empire in the west.  There were also the Great Snow Mountains in the south, likely referencing the Hindu Kush. Tukhara had been conquered by the Gokturks just within the past couple of decades, and Xuanzang notes that the country had been split into largely autonomous city-states as the local royalty had died without an heir many years before.  With the Gokturk conquest, it was now administered by Tardu Shad, the son of Tong Yabghu Qaghan.  “Shad” in this case was a local title. Here, Xuanzang's narrative gets a little dicey, especially between his biography and his records.  The records of the Western Regions denotes various countries in this area.  It is unclear if he traveled to all of them or is just recounting them from records he obtained.  He does give us at least an overview of the people and the region.  I would also note that this is one of the regions he visited, again, on his return trip, and so may have been more familiar with the region than those areas he had passed through from Suyab on down. For one thing, he notes that the language of the region was different from that of the “Suli”, which appears to refer to the Sogdians.  This was the old territory of the Kushan empire, and they largely spoke Bactrian.  Like Sogdian, it was another Eastern Iranian language, and they used an alphabet based largely on Greek, and written horizontally rather than vertically.  They also had their own coins. This region had plenty of Buddhist communities, and Xuanzang describes the cities and how many monasteries they had, though, again, it isn't clear if he actually visited all of them or not.  These are countries that Li Rongji translates as “Tirmidh”, “Sahaaniyan”, “Kharuun”, “Shuumaan”, etc. It does seem that Xuanzang made it to the capital city, the modern city Kunduz, Afghanistan. Xuanzang actually had something specific for the local Gokturk ruler, Tardu Shad.  Tardu Shad's wife was the younger sister of King Qu Wentai of Gaochang, whom we met last episode.  Qu Wentai had provided Xuanzang a letter for his younger sister and her husband.  Unfortunately, Xuanzang arrived to learn that the princess of Gaochang had passed away, and Tardu Shad's health was failing.  It does seem that Tardu Shad was aware of Xuanzang, however—a letter had already come from Qu Wentai to let them know that Xuanzang was on his way.  As I mentioned last episode, letters were an important part of how communities stayed tied together.  Of course, given the perils of the road, one assumes that multiple letters likely had to be sent just in case they didn't make it.  The US Postal Service this was not. Tardu Shad, though not feeling well, granted an interview with Xuanzang.  He suggested that Xuanzang should stick around.  Then, once the Shad had recovered from his illness, he would accompany Xuanzang personally on his trip to India.  Unfortunately, that was not to be.  While Xuanzang was staying there, he was witness to deadly drama.  Tardu Shad was recovering, which was attributed to the recitations by an Indian monk who was also there.  This outcome was not exactly what some in the court had wanted.  One of the Shad's own sons, known as the Tagin prince, plotted with the Shad's current wife, the young Khatun, and she poisoned her husband.  With the Shad dead, the throne might have gone to the son of the Gaochang princess, but he was still too young.  As such, the Tagin Prince was able to usurp the throne himself, and he married his stepmother, the young Khatun.  The funeral services for the late Tardu Shad meant that Xuanzang was obliged to stay at Ghor for over a month. During that time, Xuanzang had a seemingly pleasant interaction with an Indian monk.  And when he finally got ready to go, he asked the new Shad for a guide and horses.  He agreed, but also made the suggestion that Xuanzang should then head to Balkh.  This may have meant a bit of backtracking, but the Shad suggested that it would be worth it, as Balkh had a flourishing Buddhist community. Fortunately, there was a group of Buddhist monks from Balkh who happened to be in Kunduz to express their condolences at the passing of Tardu Shad, and they agreed to accompany Xuanzang back to their hometown, lest he end up getting lost and taking the long way there. The city of Balkh is also known as “Baktra”, as in “Bactria”, another name of this region.  A settlement has been there since at least 500 BCE , and it was already an important city when it was captured by Alexander the Great.  It sits at the confluence of several major trade routes, which no doubt were a big part of its success.  Xuanzang's biography notes that it was a massive city, though it was relatively sparsely populated—probably due to the relatively recent conquest by the Gokturks, which had occurred in the last couple of decades.  That said, there were still thousands of monks residing at a hundred monasteries in and around the city.  They are all characterized as monks of Theravada schools.  Southwest of the city was a monastery known as Navasamgharama, aka Nava Vihara, or “New Monastery”.  Despite its name, the monastery may have actually been much older, going back to the Kushan emperor Kaniska, in the 2nd century CE.  Ruins identified as this “New Monastery” are still visible south of Balkh, today. The monastery is described as being beautifully decorated, and it seems that it had a relic—one of the Buddha's teeth.  There are also various utensils that the Buddha is said to have used, as well.  The objects would be displayed on festival days.  North of the monastery there was a stupa more than 200 feet in height.  South of the monastery was a hermitage.  Each monk who studied there and passed away would have a stupa erected for them, as well.  Xuanzang notes that there were at around 700 memorial stupas, such that they had to be crammed together, base to base. It was here that Xuanzang met a young monk named Prajnaakara, who was already somewhat famous in India, and well-studied.  When questioned about certain aspects of Buddhism, Xuanzang was impressed by the monk's answers, and so stayed there a month studying with the young monk. Eventually, Xuanzang was ready to continue on his journey.  He departed Balkh towards the south, accompanying the teacher Prajnakara, and together they entered the Great Snow Mountains, aka the Hindu Kush.  This path was even more dangerous than the trip through the Tian Shan mountains to Suyab.   They eventually left the territory of Tukhara and arrived at Bamiyan.  Bamiyan was a kingdom in the Hindu Kush, themselves an extension of the Himalayan Mountain range.  It Is largely based around valley, home to the modern city of Bamyan, Afghanistan, which sits along the divide between Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent.  Today it is a major center for individuals of the Hazara ethnic group, one of the main ethnic groups in Afghanistan, which is a multi-ethnic state that includes, today, the Pashtun, Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek people, along with a number of smaller ethnic groups.  Today they largely reside in the mountainous areas of the Hindu Kush. Bamiyan made an impact on our protagonist.   Their language was slightly different from that in Tukhara, but using the same—or similar enough—writing system.  Buddhism was thriving in the capital, and we are told of a rock statue of the standing Buddha, over a hundred feet in height, along with a copper statue of the standing Buddha nearby.    There was also another reclining Buddha a mile or two down the road.  There were multiple monasteries with thousands of monks, and the ruler of that kingdom received Xuanzang well. Xuanzang wasn't the first monk to travel to Bamiyan from the Middle Kingdom—in this he was, perhaps unwittingly, on the trail of the monk Faxian.  Faxian likely did not see these statues, though, as we believe they were built in the 6th and early 7th century—at least the stone Buddha statues.  They were a famous worship site until February 2001, when the Taliban gave an order to destroy all of the statues in Afghanistan.  Despite this, they were inscribed as UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2003. Fortunately, we have images from before their destruction.  These statues were a blend of Greco-Buddhist and Gandharan art styles—appropriate as it stands between the Hellenistic area of Tukhara and the ancient region of Gandhara—including the modern city of Kandahar and into the Indus Valley region of Pakistan. Continuing east through the mountains, Xuanzang eventually came out at the kingdom of Kapisa.  This may have had its capital around modern-day Bagram, north of modern Kabul, but the country seems to have been quite large.  Kapisa over saw some tens of other countries, and it is thought that at one time its influence extended from Bamyan and Kandahar to the area of modern Jalalabad.  Their language was even more different than that of Tukhara, but they were still using the same writing system.  The king of Kapisa is said to have been of Suli ethnicity—which would seem to indicate that he was Sogdian, or at least descended from people of the Transoxanian region.    Xuanzang notes that the ruler, as rough and fiery as he is described—as a true warlord or similar—he nonetheless made a silver image of the Buddha, eighteen feet in height, every year.  He also gave charity to the poor and needy in an assembly that was called every five years.  There were over one hundred monasteries and some 6000 monks, per Xuanzang's recollection, and notably, they were largely following Mahayana teachings. For the most part the monks that Xuanzang had encountered on this journey were Theravada—Xuanzang refers to them as “Hinayana”, referring to the “Lesser Vehicle” in contrast to Xuanzang's own “Mahayana”, or “Greater Vehicle”.  “Theravada” refers to the “way of the elders” and while Mahayana Buddhism largely accepts the sutras of Theravada Buddhism, there are many Mahayana texts that Theravada Buddhists do not believe are canonical.  We discussed this back in Episode 84. There was apparently a story of another individual from the Yellow River being sent as a hostage to Kapisa when it was part of the Kushan Empire, under Kanishka or similar.  Xuanzang recounts various places that the hostage, described as a prince, lived or visited while in the region.  Xuanzang's arrival likely stirred the imagination of people who likely knew that the Tang were out there, but it was such a seemingly impossible distance for most people.  And yet here was someone who had traveled across all of that distance.  One of the monasteries that claimed to have been founded because of that ancient Han prince invited Xuanzang to stay with them.  Although it was a Theravada monastery, Xuanzang took them up on the offer, both because of the connection to someone who may have been his countryman, but also because of his traveling companion, Prajnakara, who was also a Theravada monk, and may not be comfortable staying at a Mahayana monastery. Xuanzang spends a good deal of ink on the stories of how various monasteries and other sites were founded in Kapisa and the surrounding areas.  He must have spent some time there to accumulate all of this information.  It is also one of the places where he seems to have hit at least twice—once on the way to India, and once during his return journey. The King of Kapisa is said to have been a devotee of Mahayana Buddhism.  He invited Xuanzang and Prajnakara to come to a Mahayana monastery to hold a Dharma gathering.  There they met with several leading figures in the monastery, and they discussed different theories.  This gathering lasted five days, and at the end, the king offered Xuanzang and the other monks five bolts of pure brocade and various other gifts.  Soon thereafter, the monk Prajnakara was invited back to Tukhara, and so he and Xuanzang parted ways. And it was about time for Xuanzang to continue onwards as well.  From Kapisa, he would travel across the “Black Range” and into Lampaka.  This may refer to the area of Laghman or Jalalabad.  Today, this is in modern Afghanistan, but for Xuanzang, this would have been the northwestern edge of India.  He was almost there. And so are we, but we'll save his trip into India for next episode. Until then thank you for listening and for all of your support. If you like what we are doing, please tell your friends and feel free to rate us wherever you listen to podcasts.  If you feel the need to do more, and want to help us keep this going, we have information about how you can donate on Patreon or through our KoFi site, ko-fi.com/sengokudaimyo, or find the links over at our main website,  SengokuDaimyo.com/Podcast, where we will have some more discussion on topics from this episode. Also, feel free to reach out to our Sengoku Daimyo Facebook page.  You can also email us at the.sengoku.daimyo@gmail.com.  Thank you, also, to Ellen for their work editing the podcast. And that's all for now.  Thank you again, and I'll see you next episode on Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.

Wayne Cassidy's Tajik Mountain Traverse is an awesome sounding race that takes place in the Mountains of Tajikistan. It offers runners a unique mix of history, culture, and natural beauty. The race is designed to challenge endurance athletes and immerse them in the culture of the Tajik people."The Tajik people are just some of the warmest, most hospitable people," Wayne shares. "Strangers will be inviting you to come in for tea. That's just an amazing experience to have." The event takes runners through an environment steeped in history, from the ancient Silk Road to the footsteps of explorers like Alexander the Great and Marco Polo​.The nine-day format is a blend of adventure and cultural exploration, with participants dealing with high altitude mountain passes and enjoying stunning turquoise lakes. Wayne describes it as a beautiful and majestic place. It's clear that the location is one he loves and a key feature that sets this race apart​.Wayne hopes to see growing participation in the future, with the aim of including more and more athletes from around the world, all drawn to this hidden gem in Central Asia. The race already garners interest from international runners, with the goal of creating a community that shares both the passion for endurance sports and an appreciation for the unique cultural heritage of Tajikistan​​.It was awesome to have Wayne on and learn more about this place and his race! Chantelle and I enjoyed it thoroughly, and you can even catch an article that Chantelle has prepared in the next edition of Canadian Running Magazine!What do you think of the race? Is it something you'd want to check out? Let us know what you think! Did you catch The Long Run before this episode? If not, here it is so you can stay up to date! Get full access to Community Trail Running at communitytrailrunning.substack.com/subscribe

Tajikistan has been acknowledged by Freedom House as one of the worst human rights violators for years, but 2025 has seen Tajik authorities take repression to new levels. Eight former government officials and political opposition figures were convicted at a closed-door trial of plotting a coup and given lengthy prison sentences. In addition, a journalist was convicted of treason for reporting on Tajik citizens' opinions on Chinese influence in their country, and the OSCE said it would not observe Tajikistan's March 2 parliamentary elections because Tajik authorities failed to give assurances of accreditation. Joining host Bruce Pannier to discuss events in Tajikistan in early 2025 are guests Muhamadjon Kabirov, editor at Azda.tv, a media outlet run by exile Tajik journalists; Edward Lemon, the president of the Washington-based Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs; and Steve Swerdlow, a rights lawyer who is currently an associate professor at the University of Southern California.

On this episode I sit down with Yulia as she talks about her experience being a Russian citizen in Korea. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

I kjølvannet av #metoo har den franske offentligheten vært preget av en rekke historier om seksuelle overgrep. Gjennom bøker som Vanessa Springoras Samtykket og Camille Kouchners Den store familien, har temaer som overgrepskultur, seksuell lavalder, samtykke, og maktmisbruk blitt problematisert.Trist tiger av Neige Sinno (til norsk ved Egil Halmøy) skriver seg inn i denne rekken utgivelser, samtidig som boka tar samtalen til et litterært nivå. Varslingen er nødvendig, men også tung, og for å ta et oppgjør med sin egen overgrepshistorie, går Sinno til skjønnlitteraturen. Ved å analysere verk av blant annet Vladimir Nabokov, Virginia Woolf, Toni Morrison og Virginie Despentes, utforsker hun makt og maktesløshet, forutinntatte sannheter i kulturen, og hvordan man skal finne et språk for å snakke om denne typen erfaringer.Neige Sinno er en fransk forfatter, med doktorgrad i amerikansk litteratur. Trist tiger ble hennes store gjennombrudd både i Frankrike og internasjonalt.Boka ble en bestselger og vant en lang rekke priser, blant annet Prix Femina, Prix Littéraire Le Monde, og Prix Goncourt des lycéens (tilsvarende Ungdommens Kritikerpris her i Norge), og har blitt trukket fram av forfattere som Annie Ernaux og Kathrine Nedrejord.Hadia Tajik er stortingsrepresentant og justispolitisk talsperson for Arbeiderpartiet, med utdannelse innen journalistikk, menneskerettigheter og rettsvitenskap. Her møtes Sinno og Tajik til samtale om overgrepskultur og maktmisbruk, og å bruke litteraturen som inngang til levde erfaringer.Samtalen er på engelsk. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Farrukh Pirumshoev is a young Tajik entrepreneur based in the northwestern Chinese city of Xi'an, specializing in the international trade of automobiles between China and Central Asia. His company thrives by trading approximately 30 cars each week, benefiting from the expanding Chinese economy and the rising economic exchanges between China and Central Asian nations.If you enjoy feature stories like this one, be sure to check out "Footprints" on your favorite podcast platform!

China's parcel delivery industry shattered all previous records in 2024, handling a staggering 174.5 billion packages—equivalent to more than 124 per person in the country. The rapid expansion of the sector underscores not only the growing dependence of Chinese consumers on e-commerce, but also the increasing role express delivery plays as a barometer of the economy.2024年，中国快递业打破了所有历史纪录，处理了1745亿件包裹，相当于全国人均包裹数超过124件，业务量惊人。该行业的迅速扩张不仅凸显出中国消费者对电商的日益依赖，也反映出快递作为经济晴雨表的作用日益增强。This explosive growth comes as no surprise. The total volume of express delivery services last year reached 174.5 billion parcels, marking a 21 percent increase over the previous year. Meanwhile, business income from these services surged to 1.4 trillion yuan ($191 billion), reflecting a 13 percent growth.这一爆炸式增长并不令人意外。去年，快递业务总量达到1745亿件，同比增长21%。同时，快递业务收入飙升至1.4万亿元人民币（1910亿美元），同比增长13%。"The postal and express delivery industry has become a driving force in China's logistics sector, and for 11 straight years, it has ranked first globally in delivery volume," said Zhao Chongjiu, head of the State Post Bureau of China, at the bureau's annual conference on Wednesday in Beijing.1月8日，中国国家邮政局局长赵冲久在北京举行的全国邮政工作会议上介绍：“邮政快递业已成为中国物流业的驱动力，并且连续11年在全球快递业务量上稳居第一。”"The integration of express delivery into daily life has been profound. It now serves as a vital indicator of both economic vitality and development," he added.“快递已深刻融入日常生活中。它现在是经济活力和发展的重要指标，”他补充说。As more parcels move through the country's vast logistics network, it is clear that express delivery is no longer just about transporting packages from point A to point B—it has become a powerful symbol of China's thriving economy.随着越来越多的包裹在全国庞大的物流网络中流通，显然，快递已不仅是将包裹从A点运送到B点的简单行为——它已成为中国经济繁荣发展的有力象征。Across the nation, particularly in the central and western regions, delivery networks have been rapidly expanding. In 2024, express delivery volumes in these regions grew by 30 percent and 35 percent, respectively, compared to the previous year. This expansion has significantly helped bridge the development gap between urban and rural areas.在全国范围内，特别是在中西部地区，快递网络扩张迅速。与上一年相比，2024年中部、西部快递业务量分别增长了30%、35%。这一扩张显著缩小了城乡发展差距。Subsidized shipping policies to remote villages, such as those in the Xinjiang Uygur and Inner Mongolia autonomous regions, have brought e-commerce services to areas that once struggled with limited access to goods and services.针对偏远乡村（如新疆维吾尔族自治区和内蒙古自治区的乡村）实施的补贴运输政策，让那些原本获取商品和服务受限的地区也能享受电商服务。This growth has also unlocked new economic opportunities, enabling businesses in emerging sectors such as livestreaming e-commerce and cross-border trade to thrive. Online retail sales of physical goods soared last year, and the delivery industry played a crucial role in facilitating these transactions. This makes it an essential partner in the ongoing digital transformation of the economy.快递业务的增长也催生了新的经济机遇，使直播电商和跨境贸易等新兴行业得以蓬勃发展。去年，实物商品网络零售额飙升，快递行业在其中发挥了至关重要的作用，并成为持续推进经济数字化转型的重要力量。The result of this booming logistics network is felt in every corner of the country—transforming not only how businesses operate, but also how ordinary people live.蓬勃发展的物流网络带来的影响遍及全国各个角落——不仅改变了企业的运营模式，也改变了普通人的生活方式。One striking example is the story of Zilati, a young man from the Tajik ethnic group who married last year in a remote village in Tashikurgan Tajik autonomous county, Xinjiang.一个典型的例子是来自塔吉克族的小伙子兹拉提，去年他在新疆塔什库尔干塔吉克自治县的一个偏远村庄举行了婚礼。As he prepared for his wedding, Zilati was able to purchase nearly everything online—from decorations to large appliances such as a refrigerator—and have it delivered directly to his home. In the past, such a task would have required a long and arduous journey to Kashgar, the nearest big city. Thanks to the expanding logistics network, he was able to concentrate on enjoying his special day.在筹备婚礼时，兹拉提几乎能够在网上购买所有物品——从装饰品到冰箱等大家电——并直接送货到家。在过去，需要长途跋涉到距离最近的大城市喀什才能完成这些事情。得益于不断扩大的物流网络，他可以专心享受自己的特别日子。"I never imagined that my wedding could be this easy," Zilati said. "It's so convenient. I bought the wedding chocolates and decorations online. In the past, we had to travel to Kashgar, which took more than 10 hours. Now, thanks to online shopping, I was able to focus on celebrating my wedding rather than worrying about logistics."“我从未想过我的婚礼能这么轻松，”兹拉提说。“真是太方便了。我在网上买了婚礼巧克力和装饰品。过去，我们得花10个多小时跑去喀什。现在，多亏了网购，我可以专心庆祝婚礼，而不必担心物流问题。”In 2024, the average Chinese consumer received over 120 parcels annually, with the country's delivery network processing more than 5,500 every second.2024年，中国消费者人均一年收到120多个包裹，全国快递网络每秒处理5500多个包裹。Looking ahead, the industry is showing no signs of slowing down. In 2025, express delivery volume is projected to reach 190 billion, with corresponding revenue of 1.5 trillion yuan.展望未来，该行业仍将继续保持稳步上升态势。预计2025年快递业务量将达到1900亿件，相应快递业务收入将达到1.5万亿元。"The key growth drivers for the express delivery industry in 2025 will mainly come from the domestic e-commerce market, which continues to grow rapidly, especially with emerging e-commerce platforms like Douyin and Kuaishou driving market expansion. Internationally, cross-border e-commerce will be a major driver, with express delivery companies accelerating their global expansion, contributing to the growth of national delivery services," said Zhou Zhicheng, director of the Research Office of China Federation of Logistics and Purchasing.中国物流与采购联合会研究室主任周志成表示：“2025年快递行业增长的重要驱动力将主要来自国内电商市场，该市场将持续快速增长，尤其是抖音、快手等新兴电商平台将推动市场扩张。在国际上，跨境电商将成为主要驱动力，快递公司加速全球扩张，推动国家快递服务增长。”As China's express delivery sector continues to expand, it is clear that the logistics industry is not only driving economic growth, but is also becoming an integral part of everyday life for millions.显然，随着中国快递行业的持续扩张，物流行业不仅驱动着经济增长，也正成为数百万人日常生活不可或缺的一部分。barometern.晴雨表，标志arduousadj.艰难的,费力的

Last time we spoke about the beginning of the Kumul Rebellion. In 1931, tensions in Kumul escalated after a Muslim girl spurned Han tax collector Chang Mu, leading to his violent death at a family dinner. Enraged, Uyghurs retaliated against Chinese officials, igniting a rebellion. Chaos ensued as rebels targeted Han settlers, ultimately capturing Kumul with little resistance. Amidst the unrest, Yulbars Khan sought support from military leader Ma Chongying, who planned to mobilize his forces to help the Uyghurs. What began as a local incident spiraled into an all-out revolt against oppressive rule. In 1931, young warlord Ma Chongying sought to establish a Muslim empire in Central Asia, leading a small force of Tungan cavalry. As his army attempted to besiege Kumul Old City, they faced fierce resistance from Chinese troops. Despite several assaults, the lack of heavy artillery hampered Ma's progress. Eventually, Ma faced defeat due to a serious injury. After his recuperation, his forces joined with Uyghur insurgents, sparking a guerrilla war against oppressive provincial troops, leading to increasing unrest and rebellion.   #133 Kumul Rebellion part 2: Uprisings in southern Xinjiang Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So in the last episode we spoke about the beginning of the Kumul Rebellion. Now the Kumul Rebellion is actually a series of other rebellions all interlaced into this larger blanket known as the Xinjiang Wars. To be blunt, Xinjiang was the wild west from the 1930s until basically the formation of the PRC. We briefly went over the various groups that inhabit northwestern China, they all had their own interests. I want to start off by looking at the situation of southern Xinjiang. Back in June of 1924, Ma Fuxing, the T'ai of Kashgar was executed. His executioner was Ma Shaowu who had just received the post of Taoyin over the oasis city of Khotan. There was of course always tension, but southern Xinjiang was relatively peaceful in the 1920s. Then Governor Yang Zengxin was assassinated in July of 1928. During the last years of his rule, southern Xinjiang often referred to as Kashgaria, remained entrenched in the British sphere of influence after the collapse of Tsarist Russia and the subsequent closure of the Imperial Russian consulate-General at Kashgar.  Going further back in time, in August of 1918, Sir Geoerge Macartney, the long standing British Consul General to Kashar had retired. His successor was Colonel P. T Etherton, a hardcore anti-communist who actively was cooperating with anti-Soviet Basmachi guerillas in the western portion of Turkestan. One of his missions was to curb Soviet influence in southern Xinjiang. Yang Zengxin understood the British policy towards Xinjiang was to push the Soviets out via enabling the survival of his independent Han led regime. Thus Yang Zengxin was very friendly to the British and allowed them to exercise considerable political influence in Tien Shan. Despite this Soviet influence spread in Ili and Zungharia. This prompted Yang Zengxin to secretly cooperate with the British in Kashgar to counter the looming red growth north of his province. Now by 1924, through a combination of military necessities and the re-emergence of Soviet Russia as Xinjiang's largest trading partner, this forced Yang Zengxin to push away the British. Following the Sino-Soviet agreement of 1924 which effectively saw the establishment of diplomatic relations between Moscow and Beijing, the Soviet government at Omsk dispatched an envoy to Xinjiang to discuss mutual consular representation. Both sides reached an agreement on October 6th, providing for an exchange of consulate-generals between Tashkent and Urumqi and for Soviet consulates in Chuguchak, Kulja, Shara Sume and Kashgar. The new Soviet presence in Kashgar was quite upsetting for the British. It also allowed the Soviets direct access to the densely populated oases of Tarim Basin, the source of nearly all Xinjiang's revenue.  Shortly after the Soviet Consulate in Kashgar officially opened on October 10, 1925, a local power struggle emerged involving Max Doumpiss, the Soviet Consul, of Latvian origin, Major Gillan, the British Consul-General at that time, and the Taoyin of Kashgar. Sino-Soviet relations in southern Xinjiang took a troubled turn in November 1925 when large quantities of silver bullion were discovered hidden in thirty-four boxes labeled as Soviet 'diplomatic bags,' intended for the Kashgar consulate. The Kashgar Taoyin, who was reportedly offended by the 'subtle spread of Soviet propaganda' in the southern oases, retaliated by expelling several suspected Russian agents. In March 1926, significant riots erupted in Kashgar, which the Chinese authorities attributed to an interpreter at the Soviet Consulate named Akbar 'Ali. The unrest was quelled by a force of 400 local Tungan troops, and Akbar 'Ali was imprisoned; the Taoyin ignored subsequent Soviet demands for his release. The rapid increase in the number of European consular staff from around fifteen in 1925 to between thirty and forty by 1927 also alarmed Chinese officials. All these developments were likely reported to Governor Yang Tseng-hsin in Urumchi, who was likely dealing with similar situations at the newly established Soviet Consulates in Kulja, Chuguchak, and Shara Sume. It appears that, with discreet British support, Yang decided to take actions to curb the expansion of Soviet influence in Kashgar. The Kashgar Taoyin then took up a strong anti-soviet stance. Alongside this Yang Zengxin's nephew, the officer in command of Chinese troops along the Kashgar northern frontier, suddenly became a frequent visitor to the British consulate General at Chini Bagh. After the death of the old Taoyin in 1927, Ma Shaowu came over from Khotan to replace him and with this came heightened anti-soviet policies in southern Xinjiang. Ma Shaowu first began by imprisoning 60 alleged local communists and tightened Chinese control over Kashgars northern frontier. The freedom of the Soviet Consul team to travel within southern Xinjiang was tightened to the extreme and all Kashgar citizens suspected of pro-soviet sympathies became targets for confiscation of their property or deportation to other oases. Yang Zengxin backed Ma Shaowu's attempts to limit Soviet influence in Tarim Basin by imposing severe tax on Muslims leaving southern Xinjiang to go on Hajj via the USSR. Similarly, new legislative was unleashed requiring merchants going into the USSR to deposit large sums of money to the Chinese authorities in Kashgar who would forfeit if the depositor failed to return to Xinjiang within 60 days.  These policies did not completely insulate southern Xinjiang from Soviet influence; however, they did ensure that at the time of Yang Zengxin's assassination in 1928, the southern region of the province—especially Ma Shao-wu's domain around Kashgar, Yarkand, and Khotan—maintained a significant degree of independence from the Soviet Union. This stood in stark contrast to areas like the Ili Valley, Chuguchak, and Shara Sume, where Soviet influence became dominant shortly after 1925, and even to the provincial capital of Urumqi, where, by the spring of 1928, the Soviet Consul-General had considerable sway. It was likely due to Ma Shaowu's anti-Soviet position and the persistent dominance of British influence in southern Xinjiang during the final years of Yang Zengxin's administration that Kashgar emerged as a hub of conservative Muslim opposition to Chinese governance in the 1930s. Yang Zengxins intentional efforts to sever southern Xinjiang from Soviet influence resulted in the Uighurs and, to a lesser extent, the Kirghiz of the Tarim Basin being less influenced by the 'progressive' nationalist propaganda from Soviet-controlled Western Turkestan compared to the Turkic-speaking Muslims of the Ili Valley and Zungharia. This is not to imply that the socialist nationalism promoted by the Jadidists after 1917 was entirely ineffective south of the Tien Shan; however, Kashgar, situated outside the Soviet zone in northwestern Sinkiang, became a natural refuge for right-wing Turkic nationalists and Islamic traditionalists who opposed Chinese authority yet were even more fiercely against the encroachment of 'atheistic communism' and its Soviet supporters in Central Asia. Many of these right-wing Turkic-speaking nationalists were former Basmachi guerrillas, primarily of Uzbek, Kazakh, and Kirghiz descent, but also included several Ottoman Turks and, according to Caroe, "old men who had fought against the Chinese at Kashgar." Among the most notable Basmachi leaders who sought refuge in Kashgar was Janib Beg, a Kirghiz who would play a significant role in the politics of southern xinjiang during the early 1930s. Following Yang Zengxin's assassination in July 1928, Soviet influence in southern Xinjiang began to grow rapidly; nevertheless, at the onset of the Kumul Rebellion in 1931, reports of forced collectivization and the suppression of nomadic lifestyles in Western Turkestan led many Turkic Muslims in southern Xinjiang to be wary of Soviet intentions. If, during the late 1920s and early 1930's, the Turkic Muslims of southern Xinjiang were divided in their approach towards the Soviets and the newly formed Turkic-Tajik SSR's in western Turkestan, they all were united in their attitude towards their Tungan brethren to the east. Unlike the Turkic Muslim rebels of Kumul, the Uyghurs and Kirghiz of southern Xinjiang were far too distant from Gansu to appeal for assistance from the Tungan warlords, such as the 5 Ma Clique. Besides the Han Chinese officials, rule over the oases of Tarim Basin had long been held by Tungans. Ma Fuxing, the Titai of Kashgar had ruthlessly exploited his Turkic Muslim subjects between 1916-1924. He himself was a Hui Muslim from Yunnan, as was Ma Shaowu. The Turkic Muslims of southern Xinjiang therefore had zero illusions of any “muslim brotherhood” with their Tungan brethren. It was Tungan troops who intervened to suppress any demonstration against Chinese rule. The Tungans of Tarim Basin were allies to the Han Chinese administration and thus enemies to the Turkic Muslim peoples. The western rim of Tarim Basin was in a unique political situation during the later half of Yang Zengxins rule as a large part of its Turkic Muslim population looked neither to the progressive Muslim leadership of western Turkestan nor the Tungan warlords of Gansu. Instead they looked at the regimes in Turkey and Afghanistans, both quite conservative. Contacts in these places were sparse ever since the Qing reconquest of Xinjiang. After the defeat of the Ottoman Empire in WW1, contact ceased to exist at all. Emotional links to what once was however lingerd, and the nationalist revolution of Ataturk sprang something of a Turkish renaissance inspiring Turkic peoples from Crimea to Kumul.  As for Afghanistan, there existed more concrete religious and political contacts with southern Xinjiang. In 1919, Amir Aman Allah, the last Muhammadzay ruler of Afghanistan had taken the throne after the death of his father. He became an impetuous ruler who brought forth his own downfall through a series of radical reforms that caused a revolution by 1928. Yet in his first years of rule he had widespread support of Muslim peoples in central asia, especially after he began the Third Afghan war against Britain, combined with a Jihad for Afghan independence. Because of this the British were forced to recognize Afghanistan's right to independent foreign policy. During this period, it is rumored Amir Aman Allah had toyed with the idea of forming an Islamic Confederacy which would have included Afghanistan, Bukhara, Khiva and Khokand. He would have also been interested in influence over Xinjiang where numerous Afghan merchants resided under British protection. Following Britains recognition of Afghanistan's right to independent foreign policy, with the 1919 treaty of Peshawar, British diplomatic protection for Afghan citizens in Xinjiang was lifted. Amir Aman Allah then established independent diplomatic links between Kabul and Urumqi, sending a delegation in 1922 led by Muhammad Sharif Khan. The Chinese officials regarded the Afghan mission as a trade delegation, but Muhammad Sharif Khan carried with him printed visiting cards styling himself as Afghanistan's Consul-General in Xinjiang. Alongside this he brought draft agreements demanding full extraterritorial rights and other privileges for Afghan subjects in Xinjiang and the right to import opium freely into the province. It is to no surprise Yang Zengxin refused to recognize the mission causing a dispute that would drag on for years. It became a long standing issue for th Turkic speaking Muslims of southern Xinjiang. There were many who looked to Afghanistan to help them against Chinese oppression. Now getting back to our timeline, with the initial outbreak of the Kumul Rebellion and the Tungan invasion, Jin Shujen had made every effort to prevent news of these events occurring mostly in the northeast from getting into the south. But of course one cannot stop the flow of information completely. Rumors and reports of the rebellious activities northeast flooded into the oases of Tarim Basin, invigorating anti-Chinese zeal, from peoples already suffering from increased taxation and inflation caused by unbacked paper currency paying for Jin's war efforts. Jin was well aware of the discontent south in his province, but he was emboldened by his victory of Ma Chongying as well as the recent delivery of 4000 rifles and 4 million rounds of ammunition from British held India. Thus he determined to maintain his current stance. It would prove to be a very fateful decision. The Kumul Rebellion was not crushed by any means. In fact the brutality following the relief of Kumul Old City caused outrage amongst the Turkic speaking peoples and sent refugees westwards towards Turfan. By May of 1932, Ma Chongying had dispatched a young Tungan Lt, Ma Shihming to take command over his Tungan forces remaining in Xinjiang. Ma Shihming quickly established his HQ in Turfan and began to cooperate with the Turkic speaking Muslim insurgents who owed their allegiance to Yulbars Khan and Khoja Niyas Haiji. It's also believed he made contact with Ma Fuming, a Tungan officer in command of the Xinjiang provincial forces at Turfan.  By mere coincidence, in May of 1932, Jin had also elected to seek revenge against Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen, the Torgut Mongol regent inhabiting Tien Shan. That same guy he had asked for military aid from who simply took his army away. Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen was invited to come back to Urumqi where he was to attend an investigation into the assassination plot laid against him. On May 21st, shortly after his arrival, he alongside two Torgut officers and the young Torgut Prince were all invited to an official banquet at Jin Shujens yamen. Now you might be thinking, who in their right mind would fall for that shit? Especially given the Yang Zengxin banquet story. Well according to R.P Watts, the British Vice Consul General at Kashgar who happened to be in Urumqi at the time. “While drinking the usual preliminary cup of tea the regent and the two military officers were led out into a courtyard and executed. According to Chinese custom in such matters proper observance was accorded to the high rank of regent even at the moment of execution. A red carpet was spread on the ground on which he was invited to seat himself. He was then killed by being shot through the head from behind by one of the governor's special executioners. His two companions being men of inferior rank were not given the privilege of a red carpet to sit on whilst being executed.”  The young Torgut prince was allowed to return to Kara Shahr, man that must have been an awkward desert. So Jin hoped the harsh action would terrify the young prince into submission. As you may have guessed, Jin actions were quite toxic for the Torgut Mongols. Might I add the Torgut Mongols were probably the only non Chinese group in Xinjiang that may have sided with Jin against the Turkic peoples? So to tally up things a bit here. Jin pissed off the Uyghurs and Tungans of Turfan, the Kirghiz of Tian Shan and now the Torguts.  In early 1932, Turkic Muslim opposition to forced collectivization and suppression of nomadism by Stalin in the Kazakh and Kirghiz regions of Soviet Central Asia, saw many spill over into Xinjiang. By March of 1932, large numbers of Kirghiz fled the border and were pursued by Soviet forces. A series of skirmishes and raids broke out in the border region. The Soviet Kirghiz naturally received aid from the Xinjiang Kirghiz and in June a Chinese official was killed by Kirghiz insurgents in Tien Shan. The Chinese were outraged, prompting Ma Shaowu to unleash 300 troops from Kashgar New City and 200 troops from Kashgar Old City to defend the frontier area. These units were soon joined by another 100 troops from Opal and 200 from Uch Turfan all under the leadership of Brigadier Yang, the nephew to the late Yang Zengxin. In July Yang's men began joint operations with the Soviets against the Kirghiz insurgents who were led by Id Mirab. The Chinese forces were said to quote “The Chinese forces had been suffering badly from want of opium', and reportedly behaved very badly towards Kirghiz, a number of whom were driven to take refuge in Russian territory”. To try a force the submission of the Kirghiz, Yang's forces took 70 hostages from Kirghiz families and brought them to imprisoned them the oases of Khotan, Keriya and Charchan. Thus Jin and Ma Shaowu had succeeded within a few months of Ma Chongyings withdrawal back into Gansu in both alienating the Turkic speaking and Mongol nomads of Tien Shan. The Sino-Soviet cooperation against the Kirghiz had also not gone unnoticed by other Muslim groups.  Meanwhile the Kumul Rebellion had spread westwards. By Autumn of 1932, months after the arrival of Ma Shihming to Turfan, Ma Fuming joined the rebels cause. Wu Aichen wrote it was his belief that Ma Fuming's decision was based on the continuing flow of Muslim refugees from Kumul to Turfan combined with reports of mass executions being carried out by Xing Fayu. But like I had mentioned, there is also strong evidence Ma Shihming probably negotiated an alliance with Ma Fuming. Wu Aichen wrote Ma Fumings first rebellious action was to send a telegram to Jin requesting he dispatch reinforcements while he also sent a letter to Xing Fayu over in Kumul to come quickly to Turfan. The reinforcements arrived at the oasis without suspecting a thing and were “shot down to the last man” by Ma Fumings forces as they passed the city gates. A few days later another detachment of 100 men led by Xing Fayu reached Turfan only to suffer the same fate. Xing Fayu was taken captive and “tortured to death in public with every refinement of cruelty and vileness of method”. Following Ma Fumings official defection, the Turfan Depression quickly emerged as the main center of Muslim rebellion in northeastern Xinjiang. Kumul which had been laid to ruin by Jin was abandoned to the Turkic Muslim insurgents and a handful of Tungan troops. A large portion of Tungan forces consisting of those following Ma Fuming and Ma Sushiming massed at Turfan preparing to march upon Urumqi, lying 100 miles northwest. The storm brewing in Turfan was followed up by a series of uncoordinated uprisings amongst the Turkic speaking Muslims of southern Xinjiang. The Uyghurs of Tarim Basin and Kirghiz of Tien Shan realized Jin's grip over the province was weakening and the presence of Tungan forces in Turfan effectively cut off the oases of the south from Urumqi and Jin's White Russian troops, whom otherwise may have scared them into submission. The White Russians and other provincial forces were hard pressed by Ma Fuming and Ma Shihming. Reports also spread that Ma Chongying would soon re-enter the fray in person and that Chang Peiyuan, the Military commander over at Ili had fallen out with Jin. Thus the Turkic speaking Muslims of southern Xinjiang knew the time was ripe to rebel against Chinese rule. In the winter uprising began at Pichan, just east of Turfan and at Kara Shahr about 175 miles southwest. Lack of Torgut support at Kara Shahr following the murder of Tsetsen Puntsag Gegeen basically sealed the fate of the Chinese forces within the city. The new Tungan leader, Ma Chanzeng emerged the commander of rebel forces in the region. Disregarding the increasingly intense conflict between Ma Shih-ming and the provincial forces along the Turfan-Urumqi road, Ma Chan-ts'ang moved westward, seizing Bugur in early February and progressing to Kucha. There, he formed a strategic alliance with Temiir, the local Uyghur leader, who was noted by Wu Aichen as "a capable individual who had managed the mule wagon service." After occupying Kucha without any resistance, the combined forces of Ma Chanzeng and Temiir continued their advance toward Aksu, capturing the small town of Bai along the way. Ma Shaowu was the Taoyin of Kashgar and second most powerful official in the provincial administration after Jin, thus found himself cut off from Urumqi by two separate armies of Muslim rebels each composed of Tungan and Turkic factions. One of these armies held a small but militarily competent Tungan force led by Ma Chanzeng with a large contingent of poorly armed Uyghur peasants owing their allegiance to Temur. This force advanced southwest towards Aksu, while the other army consisting of a loose coalition of competent Tungan troops under Ma Shihming and Ma Fuming with Turkic speaking Muslim peasants owing allegiance to Khoja Niyas Haiji and Yulbars Khan pressed their attack directly upon Urumqi. In February of 1933 to add further confusion in the south, the rebellion against the Chinese spread southwards across the Tarim Basin to its southern rim. Uprising against the Chinese administration broke out simultaneously amongst the gold miners of the southern oases who had long resented the provincial governments fixed rate for the purchase of gold in Xinjiang alongside brutal working conditions. The spiraling inflation from Jin's worthless currency which was used to pay for the gold only made things worse. By spring their patience had run out, the Uyghurs led by Ismail Khan Khoja seized control of Kara Kash killing a large number of Han Chinese. Meanwhile the Uyghurs at Keriya seized control over the Surghak mines and threatened to take control over the whole oasis. Prominent rebel demands included a fair price for gold and silver and prohibition of the purchase of precious metals with paper currency. More urgent demands were lowering taxes, ending government tyranny, introducing Shari a law and stationing Muslim troops in every city. Now these demands were very real, they were willing to stand down if they were met. One anonymous writer of the demand notices placed at Karakash was as follows “A friend for the sake of friendship will make known a friend's defects and save him from the consequences of his defects. You, who are supposed to rule, cannot even realize this, but try to seek out the supporter of Islam to kill him. Foolish infidels like you are not fit to rule ... How can an infidel, who cannot distinguish between a friend and a foe, be fit to rule? You infidels think that because you have rifles, guns ... and money, you can depend on them; but we depend upon God in whose hands are our lives. You infidels think that you will take our lives. If you do not send a reply to this notice we are ready. If we die we are martyrs. If we survive we are conquerors. We are living but long for death”. Ma Shaowu elected to first move against the Muslim insurgents threatening Aksu, most likely reasoning that if Ma Chanzeng and Temur were defeated the weaker rebel forces at KaraKash and Surghak would just crumble. There also was the fact Ma Shihmings men at Turfan had severed the telegraph line between Urumqi and Kashgar, and that line had been re-routed via Aksu, but if Aksu fell to the rebels, communications with the capital would only be possible via the USSR. At this point its estimated Brigadier Yang had a mixed army of 280 cavalry and 150 infantry as he set out for Aksu on February 6th. Ma Shaowu's position was not good. On February 9th, Jin Shujen's younger brother, Jin Shuqi the commander in chief at Kashgar New City suddenly died of illness. He was replaced with a Chinese officer called Liu who took command of his three detachments of cavalry, about 480 men and a single detachment of artillery, about 160 men. Ma Shaowu held control over two regiments of cavalry, 700 men and 3 detachments of infantry, around 300 men all stationed at Kashgar Old City. In mid february reports reached Kashgar that Brigadier Yang was heavily outnumbered by the rebels under Ma Chanzeng and Temur and had fallen back from Aksu to a defensive line at Maral Bashi. On the 23rd celebrations were held at Kashgar to mark Jin handing Ma Shadowu the new title of Special Commissioner for the Suppression of Bandits. During the celebration, salutes were fired at the yamen and KMT flags were flown from buildings throughout the city. Afterwards all of Liu's forces were sent to Maral Bashi to bolster Yang.  Now in a bid to suppress the uprisings at Surghak and KaraKash before a full scale uprising could develop on the southern road, 200 men led by Colonel Li were dispatched to Khotan, while another force under Colonel Chin was dispatched to Yarkland. Because of these movements of troops to Khotan and Maral Bashi, there was a serious depletion of defenders for Kashgar. Thus Ma Shaowu ordered a raising of Kirghiz levies and recalled some Chinese troops from the frontier districts west of Kashgar. Thus the Chinese garrison at Sarikol pulled out to Kashgar, leaving the region's Tajik population to their own devices. At Kashgar, troops posted on the walls of both cities had strict orders to close all gates at 7pm, with major curfew laws set into place.Despite all of this the provincial troops proved very inept at stemming the rebel advance along both the north and south roads into Kashgar. On the 25th, the rebels entered Aksu Old City, shooting up all its Chinese residents, seized their property, stormed the arsenal and looted the treasury. Later on Ma Changzeng and Temur led an estimated 4700 ill armed Uyghur irregular army to advance on Maral Bashi and Kashgar.  In the Keriya, the Chinese officials consented to convert to Islam and to surrender their possessions; however, on March 3, thirty-five Chinese individuals, including top officials, were executed, with their heads displayed in the marketplace. On February 28, the Old City of Khotan fell into the hands of rebels with little resistance, while the New City of Khotan was besieged before capitulating to the insurgents on March 16th. Following the rebel successes in Khotan, it was reported that 266 Han Chinese converted to Islam, and both the treasury and arsenal of the New City—containing "thousands of weapons and nearly a ton of gold"—were seized by the insurgents. Additionally, uprisings led by a Uighur named ‘Abd ai-Qadir took place in Chira, and in Shamba Bazaar, several Han Chinese and two Hindu moneylenders were killed. Further afield from Keriya, the town of Niya succumbed to the rebel forces from Khotan, while even farther east, at the isolated oases of Charchan and Charkhlik, reports indicate that peaceful insurrections occurred after a small Tungan contingent loyal to Ma Shih-ming entered the region via a little-used desert route connecting Kara Shahr and Lop. Meanwhile, to the west of Khotan, Uighur forces under Isma'il Khan Khoja obstructed the main route to Yarkand at the Tokhta Langar caravanserai, repelling all but two delegates sent from Kashgar by Ma Shao-wu, who aimed to negotiate with the rebel leaders in Khotan. No further news was received from the two Begs allowed to continue to Khotan, and with their diplomatic mission's failure, the entire southern route from the eastern outskirts of the Guma oasis to the distant Lop Nor fell out of Chinese control. To fortify their position against potential counterattacks from Kashgar, the rebel leaders in Khotan destroyed roadside wells in the desert east of Guma and began establishing a clearly Islamic governance in the areas they had liberated. By mid March, Ma Shaowu's control over southern Xinjiang was limited to just a wedge of territory around Kashgar, Maral Bashi and Yarkland. Moral was so low, Ma Shaowu asked the British Indian government for military assistance as it seemed apparent no help would come from Urumqi. Ma Shaowu had received 3 telegrams from Jin via the USSR lines; the first confirmed his position as Commander in Chief; the second relayed Jin's brothers death and the third directed Jin Kashgar representatives to remit a large sum of money to his personal bank account in Tientsin. That last signal must have been a banger to read. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Kumul Rebellion quicked off a storm of different groups' grievances and Jin Shujen did a banger job of pissing off…pretty much every single group. In the southern portions of Xinjiang massive uprisings began and it seemed a tidal wave would hit the entire province.  

Living under the Samanid dyansty in modern-day Tajikistan, Rudaki is considered the first of the great classical Islamic Persian poets and the father of Tajik literature. Despite being a celebrated, patronised court poet, he would fall into poverty near the end of his life dying blind and alone. To discuss with us today the life, works and legacy of Rudaki is Ali Hammoud. Ali Hammoud is a PhD candidate at Western Sydney University. He is broadly interested in Shīʿīsm and Islamicate intellectual history. Q1. Rudaki was born around 858CE and died around 941CE at around 83 years old. He lived under the Samanid dynasty who at their height ruled much  of modern day central Asia under the auspices of the Abbasid caliphs in Baghdad. Tell us about the cultural context in which he was born. Q2. We know little about his life. We know we he was patronised by the Samaind vizier Abū al-Faḍl al-Balʿamī. What else can we say with certainty about his life?    Q3. Rudaki was as much a musician and singer as he was a poet. How is his work characterised. Q4. If people want to learn more about Persian literature in general, where would you recommend they start? What translations would you recommend of Rudaki? Q5 Finally before we end, give us a sample of Rudaki's work.  Ali Hammoud: https://x.com/AliHammoud7777 https://alihammoud7.substack.com/ 

EBpisode Description Sign up to receive this Unreached of the Day podcast sent to you:  https://unreachedoftheday.org/resources/podcast/ People Group Summary: https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups/15201 #PrayforZERO is a podcast Sponsor.         https://prayforzero.com/ Take your place in history! We could be the generation to translate God's Word into every language. YOUR prayers can make this happen.  Take your first step and sign the Prayer Wall to receive the weekly Pray For Zero Journal:  https://prayforzero.com/prayer-wall/#join Pray for the largest Frontier People Groups (FPG): Visit JoshuaProject.net/frontier#podcast provides links to podcast recordings of the prayer guide for the 31 largest FPGs.  Go31.org/FREE provides the printed prayer guide for the largest 31 FPGs along with resources to support those wanting to enlist others in prayer for FPGs

At the height of literary nationalisms in the twentieth century, leftist internationalists from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India, and the Soviet East bonded over their shared love of the classical Persian verses of Hafiz and Khayyam. At writers' congresses and in communist literary journals, they affirmed their friendship and solidarity with lyric ghazals and ruba'iyat. Persianate poetry became the cultural commons for a distinctively Eastern internationalism, shaping national literatures in the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and South Asia. By the early Cold War, the literary entanglement between Persianate culture and communism had established models for cultural decolonization that would ultimately outlast the Soviet imperial project. In the archive of literature produced under communism in Persian, Tajik, Dari, Turkish, Uzbek, Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Russian, this book finds a vital alternative to Western globalized world literature. Samuel Hodgkin is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature at Yale University. His articles have appeared in Comparative Literature Studies, Iranian Studies, Philological Encounters, Cahiers de Studia Iranica, and Cahiers d'Asie centrale.  Morteza Hajizadeh is a Ph.D. graduate in English from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. His research interests are Cultural Studies; Critical Theory; Environmental History; Medieval (Intellectual) History; Gothic Studies; 18th and 19th Century British Literature. YouTube channel. Twitter. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

At the height of literary nationalisms in the twentieth century, leftist internationalists from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India, and the Soviet East bonded over their shared love of the classical Persian verses of Hafiz and Khayyam. At writers' congresses and in communist literary journals, they affirmed their friendship and solidarity with lyric ghazals and ruba'iyat. Persianate poetry became the cultural commons for a distinctively Eastern internationalism, shaping national literatures in the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and South Asia. By the early Cold War, the literary entanglement between Persianate culture and communism had established models for cultural decolonization that would ultimately outlast the Soviet imperial project. In the archive of literature produced under communism in Persian, Tajik, Dari, Turkish, Uzbek, Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Russian, this book finds a vital alternative to Western globalized world literature. Samuel Hodgkin is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature at Yale University. His articles have appeared in Comparative Literature Studies, Iranian Studies, Philological Encounters, Cahiers de Studia Iranica, and Cahiers d'Asie centrale.  Morteza Hajizadeh is a Ph.D. graduate in English from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. His research interests are Cultural Studies; Critical Theory; Environmental History; Medieval (Intellectual) History; Gothic Studies; 18th and 19th Century British Literature. YouTube channel. Twitter. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/literary-studies

At the height of literary nationalisms in the twentieth century, leftist internationalists from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India, and the Soviet East bonded over their shared love of the classical Persian verses of Hafiz and Khayyam. At writers' congresses and in communist literary journals, they affirmed their friendship and solidarity with lyric ghazals and ruba'iyat. Persianate poetry became the cultural commons for a distinctively Eastern internationalism, shaping national literatures in the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and South Asia. By the early Cold War, the literary entanglement between Persianate culture and communism had established models for cultural decolonization that would ultimately outlast the Soviet imperial project. In the archive of literature produced under communism in Persian, Tajik, Dari, Turkish, Uzbek, Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Russian, this book finds a vital alternative to Western globalized world literature. Samuel Hodgkin is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature at Yale University. His articles have appeared in Comparative Literature Studies, Iranian Studies, Philological Encounters, Cahiers de Studia Iranica, and Cahiers d'Asie centrale.  Morteza Hajizadeh is a Ph.D. graduate in English from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. His research interests are Cultural Studies; Critical Theory; Environmental History; Medieval (Intellectual) History; Gothic Studies; 18th and 19th Century British Literature. YouTube channel. Twitter. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/central-asian-studies

At the height of literary nationalisms in the twentieth century, leftist internationalists from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India, and the Soviet East bonded over their shared love of the classical Persian verses of Hafiz and Khayyam. At writers' congresses and in communist literary journals, they affirmed their friendship and solidarity with lyric ghazals and ruba'iyat. Persianate poetry became the cultural commons for a distinctively Eastern internationalism, shaping national literatures in the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and South Asia. By the early Cold War, the literary entanglement between Persianate culture and communism had established models for cultural decolonization that would ultimately outlast the Soviet imperial project. In the archive of literature produced under communism in Persian, Tajik, Dari, Turkish, Uzbek, Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Russian, this book finds a vital alternative to Western globalized world literature. Samuel Hodgkin is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature at Yale University. His articles have appeared in Comparative Literature Studies, Iranian Studies, Philological Encounters, Cahiers de Studia Iranica, and Cahiers d'Asie centrale.  Morteza Hajizadeh is a Ph.D. graduate in English from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. His research interests are Cultural Studies; Critical Theory; Environmental History; Medieval (Intellectual) History; Gothic Studies; 18th and 19th Century British Literature. YouTube channel. Twitter. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/middle-eastern-studies

At the height of literary nationalisms in the twentieth century, leftist internationalists from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India, and the Soviet East bonded over their shared love of the classical Persian verses of Hafiz and Khayyam. At writers' congresses and in communist literary journals, they affirmed their friendship and solidarity with lyric ghazals and ruba'iyat. Persianate poetry became the cultural commons for a distinctively Eastern internationalism, shaping national literatures in the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and South Asia. By the early Cold War, the literary entanglement between Persianate culture and communism had established models for cultural decolonization that would ultimately outlast the Soviet imperial project. In the archive of literature produced under communism in Persian, Tajik, Dari, Turkish, Uzbek, Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Russian, this book finds a vital alternative to Western globalized world literature. Samuel Hodgkin is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature at Yale University. His articles have appeared in Comparative Literature Studies, Iranian Studies, Philological Encounters, Cahiers de Studia Iranica, and Cahiers d'Asie centrale.  Morteza Hajizadeh is a Ph.D. graduate in English from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. His research interests are Cultural Studies; Critical Theory; Environmental History; Medieval (Intellectual) History; Gothic Studies; 18th and 19th Century British Literature. YouTube channel. Twitter. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies

At the height of literary nationalisms in the twentieth century, leftist internationalists from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India, and the Soviet East bonded over their shared love of the classical Persian verses of Hafiz and Khayyam. At writers' congresses and in communist literary journals, they affirmed their friendship and solidarity with lyric ghazals and ruba'iyat. Persianate poetry became the cultural commons for a distinctively Eastern internationalism, shaping national literatures in the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and South Asia. By the early Cold War, the literary entanglement between Persianate culture and communism had established models for cultural decolonization that would ultimately outlast the Soviet imperial project. In the archive of literature produced under communism in Persian, Tajik, Dari, Turkish, Uzbek, Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Russian, this book finds a vital alternative to Western globalized world literature. Samuel Hodgkin is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature at Yale University. His articles have appeared in Comparative Literature Studies, Iranian Studies, Philological Encounters, Cahiers de Studia Iranica, and Cahiers d'Asie centrale.  Morteza Hajizadeh is a Ph.D. graduate in English from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. His research interests are Cultural Studies; Critical Theory; Environmental History; Medieval (Intellectual) History; Gothic Studies; 18th and 19th Century British Literature. YouTube channel. Twitter. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/intellectual-history

At the height of literary nationalisms in the twentieth century, leftist internationalists from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India, and the Soviet East bonded over their shared love of the classical Persian verses of Hafiz and Khayyam. At writers' congresses and in communist literary journals, they affirmed their friendship and solidarity with lyric ghazals and ruba'iyat. Persianate poetry became the cultural commons for a distinctively Eastern internationalism, shaping national literatures in the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and South Asia. By the early Cold War, the literary entanglement between Persianate culture and communism had established models for cultural decolonization that would ultimately outlast the Soviet imperial project. In the archive of literature produced under communism in Persian, Tajik, Dari, Turkish, Uzbek, Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Russian, this book finds a vital alternative to Western globalized world literature. Samuel Hodgkin is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature at Yale University. His articles have appeared in Comparative Literature Studies, Iranian Studies, Philological Encounters, Cahiers de Studia Iranica, and Cahiers d'Asie centrale.  Morteza Hajizadeh is a Ph.D. graduate in English from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. His research interests are Cultural Studies; Critical Theory; Environmental History; Medieval (Intellectual) History; Gothic Studies; 18th and 19th Century British Literature. YouTube channel. Twitter. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/south-asian-studies

At the height of literary nationalisms in the twentieth century, leftist internationalists from Turkey, Iran, Afghanistan, India, and the Soviet East bonded over their shared love of the classical Persian verses of Hafiz and Khayyam. At writers' congresses and in communist literary journals, they affirmed their friendship and solidarity with lyric ghazals and ruba'iyat. Persianate poetry became the cultural commons for a distinctively Eastern internationalism, shaping national literatures in the Soviet Union, the Middle East, and South Asia. By the early Cold War, the literary entanglement between Persianate culture and communism had established models for cultural decolonization that would ultimately outlast the Soviet imperial project. In the archive of literature produced under communism in Persian, Tajik, Dari, Turkish, Uzbek, Azerbaijani, Armenian, and Russian, this book finds a vital alternative to Western globalized world literature. Samuel Hodgkin is Assistant Professor of Comparative Literature at Yale University. His articles have appeared in Comparative Literature Studies, Iranian Studies, Philological Encounters, Cahiers de Studia Iranica, and Cahiers d'Asie centrale.  Morteza Hajizadeh is a Ph.D. graduate in English from the University of Auckland in New Zealand. His research interests are Cultural Studies; Critical Theory; Environmental History; Medieval (Intellectual) History; Gothic Studies; 18th and 19th Century British Literature. YouTube channel. Twitter.

Shared taxi rides are a ubiquitous mode of transportation in Dushanbe, Tajikistan. What I found fascinating were the choices of music/audio playing out of the vehicle's speakers.  The music was often Tajik pop de jour, but the range was really wide - from Russian prison chanson to Qur'anic verses performed melodically. I often wondered if the choice of the sound reflected the driver's inner state of mind or his (drivers are almost exclusively all male) understanding of what the clientele would like to hear.  This particular motif was preaching of the transience of life and worldly pains and pleasures. Indeed, it was a sobering soundtrack to an early morning work commute... Recorded by Shahnoza Nozimova.

Det kan virke som en forbannelse. Er du blitt valgt av Jonas Gahr Støre som en av Aps fremste tillitsvalgte ender du med å bli kastet ut – ikke bare av regjering, men også av Stortinget. Det skjer samtidig som Trond Giske, han som virkelig ble kastet ut av partiet, trosser alle regler og er på vei tilbake. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Høyre og Frp kan ikke begge få viljen sin på formuesskatt.Høyre fortjener honnør for å stå på sitt i formuesskatt-debatten, til tross for riking-retorikken fra venstresiden. Det er i hvert fall ikke populisme, noe man kan si om Frp som typisk er opptatt av direkte appell til brede (velger-) lag, også i skattespørsmålet.Og i Oslo vant Kamzy Gunaratnam solid over Hadia Tajik i kampvoteringen om annenplassen til stortingslisten. Det til tross for at en samlet Oslo Ap-elite ville ha Tajik. Den politiske situasjonen diskuterer hvorfor. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Tajik opposition activist Dilmurod Ergashev arrived in Tajikistan on November 7, after he was deported from Germany, where he had been seeking asylum since 2011. Ergashev was immediately arrested on his return by Tajik authorities; he hasn't been heard from since. Ergashev is one of several Central Asian opposition activists sent back to their homelands; dozens more continue to pursue asylum claims in Europe. Why, despite knowing the repressive tendencies of Central Asian governments and being party to international agreements against “refoulement,” do some European countries still deport people to countries where returnees are routinely imprisoned? Joining host Bruce Pannier to discuss this are Leila Seiitbek, a lawyer and chairwoman of the NGO Freedom for Eurasia, and Hugh Williamson, the Europe and Central Asia director for Human Rights Watch.

从生命科学的角度聊聊咖啡豆种、风味感官与人体健康！这次串台源于「生物漫游指南」的一期节目《咖啡因虽好，可不要多喝哦~ | 漫谈“咖啡因”》，听两位主播科普了关于咖啡因摄入的各种民间传说和科学研究后，萌生了请他们从生命科学的角度跟我们聊一聊咖啡的想法，看看爱好者和遗传学博士眼里的咖啡能不能对齐“颗粒度”？作为一档咖啡播客，我们日常交流谁家上架了好豆子，怎么冲咖啡更好喝，最火热的竞标在哪里，又出了什么味谱惊人的新豆种，我们是别人眼中的“豆子爱好者”，原本以为对罗豆、阿拉比卡、瑰夏、波旁、铁皮卡、卡蒂姆这些物（品）种已经如数家珍了，直到聊完才惊觉以往的狭隘，不曾料到生命与遗传的奥秘竟如此纷繁多彩，又多了一些理解咖啡的视角！除此之外，咖啡中的酸、甜、水果和花香，是怎样作用于人体感受器的，我们的大脑又是如何解码这些复杂的风味的？喝咖啡到底会上火还是能抗炎？一起来探索一下吧～感谢RightPaw Coffee赞助本集听友福利！RightPaw的烘焙风格干净，轻盈，明亮，喜欢用轻柔且甜美的烘焙风格表达豆子的产地风味，深得咖啡爱好者们的喜爱，也是Coffeeplus播客三周年的合作联名烘焙商！可关注订阅小红书、淘宝店铺！嘉宾：蝌蚪 & 奶树遗传学专业博士生命科学科普账号 biokiwi 制作人（公众号、知乎、小红书等平台）知乎生物学优秀答主播客《生物漫游指南》主播本期内容：咖啡的物种起源04:30 咖啡，走出非洲！14:26 阿拉比卡的物种起源21:03 动态变化的“物种”27:03 罗豆和尤金的基因怎么在阿拉比卡表达的？人类驯化和品种的形成33:16 从生命科学的角度重新理解咖啡品种！35:59 老品种：铁皮卡和波旁37:10 抗病杂交种：Timor和卡蒂姆Catimor40:27 “基因宝库”埃塞？多样性堪忧43:22 单一栽培种：埃塞741xx系列45:22 人类驯化对咖啡的影响48:02 基因和环境对风味的表达哪个更重要？咖啡的风味和感官感知52:17 当“发芽”成为处理法的一部分01:01:15 咖啡豆中的风味物质01:04:45 人体感受器的工作方式：味觉和嗅觉01:06:48 舌头的味觉分区，是伪科学！01:14:05 鼻前嗅觉和鼻后嗅觉01:21:41 人脑如何解码咖啡风味咖啡中的生物碱和身体作用01:29:43 咖啡是绿原酸含量最丰富的植物？01:34:50 为什么我们痴迷抗氧化、抗炎？01:39:49 喝咖啡怎么抗氧化？01:50:00 ending部分参考资料：Salojärvi J, Rambani A, Yu Z, et al. The genome and population genomics of allopolyploid Coffea arabica reveal the diversification history of modern coffee cultivars[J]. Nature genetics, 2024, 56(4): 721-731.Coffee in health and disease prevention (Second Edition)[M]. Academic Press, 2024.Wang Y, Wang X, Hu G, et al. Anaerobic germination of green coffee beans: A novel strategy to improve the quality of commercial Arabica coffee[J]. Current Research in Food Science, 2023, 6: 100461.Cornelis MC. The Impact of Caffeine and Coffee on Human Health[J]. Nutrients. 2019;11(2):416. 2019 Feb 16.Barcelos RP, Lima FD, Carvalho NR, Bresciani G, Royes LF. Caffeine effects on systemic metabolism, oxidative-inflammatory pathways, and exercise performance[J]. Nutrition Research. 2020 Aug;80:1-17.Tajik, N., Tajik, M., Mack, I., & Enck, P. The potential effects of chlorogenic acid, the main phenolic components in coffee, on health: a comprehensive review of the literature[J]. European journal of nutrition, 2017, 56(7), 2215–2244.Bojanowski V, Hummel T. Retronasal perception of odors[J]. Physiology & behavior, 2012, 107(4): 484-487.主播：Yujia / Yike封面设计：AI片头音乐：Country Cue 1 - Audionautix片尾音乐:Some College - National Sweetheart小红书:Coffeeplus播客微信订阅号:Coffeeplus播客呀如果你喜欢我们的节目内容,请记得订阅频道。推荐您在小宇宙App,苹果Podcasts, Spotify，豆瓣播客等泛用性客户端收听我们的节目,你还可以通过喜马拉雅,网易云音乐,QQ音乐,Google podcast等平台收听我们的节目。如果您喜欢我们的内容，请别忘了在小宇宙App给我们留言、点赞，在苹果Podcast给我们五星好评，也请多分享播客给朋友们！也可以搜索添加微信yujiajia_wx, 记得备注“播客”哦，邀请您进入微信社群～

The Oxus Society for Central Asian Affairs just released a detailed report on military and security forces in Tajikistan. The comprehensive work examines the 30-year history of the Tajik defense forces, their mission and composition, how they are deployed, and the role of foreign countries in training and equipping Tajik forces. Joining host Bruce Pannier to discuss the report are two of its authors: Michael Hilliard, the host of the Redline podcast, which deals with military and security matters around the world; and Derek Bisaccio, Forecast International's lead analyst for international defense markets, specializing in the defense trade in Eurasia and the Middle East.

Monocle's Fernando Augusto Pacheco speaks with the founder of Ostinato Records Vik Sohonie, who just released a new compilation entitled ‘Synthesizing the Silk Roads: Uzbek Disco, Tajik Folktronica, Uyghur Rock & Crimean Tatar Jazz from 1980s Soviet Central Asia'See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Aleksandra Kilczewska, known by her stage name "Apsara Afsanera," is a dancer, choreographer, and alternative model based in Warsaw. She is a pioneer in her country, specializing in Persian dance as well as other Silk Road styles, including Uzbek, Tajik, Afghan, Azeri, and Uyghur dance. In addition to her expertise in these forms, she is also a skilled Tribal Belly dancer. Before delving deeply into Silk Road dances, Apsara trained extensively in various Indian dance styles and has a strong foundation in ballet, modern, jazz, and contemporary dance techniques. She continuously seeks to create her unique form of expression by blending these diverse techniques, drawing inspiration from music, poetry, literature, and film.In this episode you will learn about:- Historical connections between Persian and Georgian dances- Types of Georgian dance- Benefits of training in various dance style- The psychology of teaching kids vs seniors- University degree for dancersShow Notes to this episode:Find Apsara Afsanesara on Instagram, FB, and Youtube, and website.Previous interview with Apsara Afsanesara:Ep 20. Apsara Afsanesara: What Do You Know About Persian Dance?Details and training materials for the BDE castings are available at www.JoinBDE.comFollow Iana on Instagram, FB, and Youtube . Check out her online classes and intensives at the Iana Dance Club.Find information on how you can support Ukraine and Ukrainian belly dancers HERE.Podcast: www.ianadance.com/podcast

Persian, Dari, Tajik: Language Evolution and Varieties The transition from the Sasanian Empire to the Islamic period marked a crucial shift in the Persian language. Following the Arab-Islamic conquest (632-651 CE), Persian evolved into Early New Persian (ENP), spanning from the 8th to the 12th centuries. This period, characterized by gradual linguistic transformation rather than abrupt change, saw Persian shift from Middle Persian (MP) to a form written in Arabic script. Despite these changes, the linguistic differences between 7th-century MP and 10th-century ENP were less pronounced compared to those between ENP and modern Persian. ENP is notable for its regional and religious varieties. Key types include Standard ENP, used by Muslim Iranians and written in Arabic script; Early Judaeo-Persian (EJP), written in Hebrew script by Persian-speaking Jews; Manichean NP, from northeastern Iran; Christian NP, mainly in Central Asia; and Zoroastrian NP, with texts in Middle Persian and Avestan scripts. Manuscripts from these periods vary in preservation and authenticity, with EJP texts providing particularly valuable insights. The Islamic conquest integrated Iran into the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates, yet Persian retained its cultural significance. The Samanid Dynasty (819-1005) and later dynasties like the Ghaznavids and Saljuqs played a key role in establishing Persian as a prominent literary and administrative language. By the late 11th century, Persian had become a major language of literature and scholarship, extending its influence across Central Asia and North India. In Afghanistan, Persian (Dari) and Pashto are the primary languages, with Dari serving as the most widely spoken language and Pashto holding official status. Afghanistan's linguistic landscape reflects its diverse history and geography, with various languages being promoted and preserved. Tajik Persian, or Tojik, is a variant of New Persian used in Central Asia, particularly in Tajikistan and parts of Uzbekistan. It features significant Russian and Uzbek influences and retains some archaic elements of Persian.

Vice President Kamala Harris closes in on the Democratic Party's nomination as enough delegates pledge to endorse her. Ahead of the Paris Olympics, French police forge deeper ties with Tajiks in the wake of two major attacks authorities say were carried out by Tajik members of ISIS-K. And Kamala Harris' campaign embraces her meme status. Sign up for the Reuters Econ World newsletter here. Listen to the Reuters Econ World podcast here. Recommended read here. Visit the Thomson Reuters Privacy Statement for information on our privacy and data protection practices. You may also visit megaphone.fm/adchoices to opt out of targeted advertising. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Oddstrader Women's strawweight competitors Amanda Lemos and Virna Jandiroba headline this weekend's UFC fight card The post UFC Vegas 94 Preliminary Card Best Bets: The Tajik Tank Strikes Again appeared first on SPORTS BET FORUM.

A country in which almost everyone is Muslim might seem an unlikely place for the government to impose a ban on the hijab. So why has the parliament of Tajikistan done so?

Lars og Sarah har besøk av Aftenposten-kommentator Andreas Slettholm. De snakker om Oslo-politikken og hvordan et nytt huskjøp - og en innmelding - kan si noe om planene til Arbeiderpartiets Hadia Tajik. Det blir også diskusjon rundt kåringen av Norges fremste intellektuelle og så drister de seg ut i VAR-debatten. Hør episoden som abonnent hos Podme eller Aftenposten. Få nyhetsbrevet på www.aftenpodden.no

The threat of terrorism is never far from the minds of officials in Central Asia, who know that their region shares a 2,000-kilometer border with Afghanistan. In recent weeks, Tajikistan's speaker of parliament has warned about a growing number of militants in northern Afghanistan and in Kyrgyzstan, where authorities detained 15 suspected members of Islamic State-Khorasan (IS-K), a group operating out of Afghanistan. Suspected IS-K militants who are Tajik nationals have been blamed for terrorist attacks in Moscow in March and Iran in January. Joining host Bruce Pannier to look at who these militants are and where they are active are guests Lucas Webber, the co-founder and editor of militantwire.com and a research fellow at the Soufan Center; and Riccardo Valle, an analyst focused on jihadism security and the director of thekhorasandiary.com.

In the Weekly Security Sprint, Andy and Jen covered the following topics. Opening. TLP:CLEAR | FB-ISAO Newsletter H2OSecCon Spring 2024: A Resounding Success in Water and Wastewater Sector Security.   Security Awareness/Scams/PSA | Vacation Planning and Travel Scamming Protect Yourself from Summer Vacation Scams: Stay Cyber Aware During Your Vacation Phone Scammers Impersonating CISA Employees CISA - National Internet Safety Month: This June, Take 4 Easy Steps to Stay Safe Online Other Notables – I love when big orgs put money where their mouth is… America's rural hospitals keep getting attacked by cybercriminals. Microsoft and Google are working to fix that   Summer Scams & CISA is BIG TIME! Protect Yourself from Summer Vacation Scams: Stay Cyber Aware During Your Vacation Phone Scammers Impersonating CISA Employees CISA - National Internet Safety Month: This June, Take 4 Easy Steps to Stay Safe Online.    Terror Alarms, NTAS Bulletins and FUD! 8 people with suspected ties to ISIS arrested in Philly, NYC and LA: Sources Feds arrest 8 Tajik nationals in US after surveillance abroad found potential ties to terrorism, sources say Pressure mounts on Biden admin to issue national terrorism alert after arrest of suspected ISIS-tied border crossers.  Related Reminder: DHS Continues to See High Risk of Foreign and Domestic Terrorism in 2024 Homeland Threat Assessment. Turner says US is at ‘highest level of a possible terrorist threat' New York Threat 'Extremely Serious,' Official Warns, as ISIS Crosses Border Dr. Paul Leads Letter Requesting Hearing on Threat of Terrorists Exploiting Southern Border Threats of terrorism in the U.S. are ‘more diverse and difficult to counter.' Recorded Future: Israel-Hamas Conflict and US Elections Drive Violent Extremist Threats in 2024 Fort Worth Man Charged With Threatening Federal Agent: ‘Guns Will Come Out.' Arizona Man Charged with Selling Guns for Use in Mass Shooting Man arrested in New York City with a gun, 8 loaded magazines, an NYPD vest and other weapons   Vulnerability Management: Living on the Edge! Edge Devices: The New Frontier for Mass Exploitation Attacks2024 Attack Intelligence Report   Hurricane Season! CSU: Forecast for 2024 Hurricane Activity   AI/Preparedness/Resilience CISA, JCDC, Government and Industry Partners Conduct AI Tabletop Exercise Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative (JCDC) Artificial Intelligence Cyber Tabletop ExerciseRoadmap for AI Scenario Document | Joint Cyber Defense Collaborative Artificial Intelligence Cyber Tabletop Exercise   Quick Hits Executive Order on White House Council on Supply Chain Resilience Alleged Boss of ‘Scattered Spider' Hacking Group Arrested How Email Scammers Hit Arlington, Mass., Covered Their Tracks Europol: Announcement of two major actions targeting terrorist propaganda online on a global scale Major takedown of critical online infrastructure to disrupt terrorist communications and propaganda Attorney General Merrick B. Garland Statement on FBI's Quarterly Uniform Crime Report FBI Releases 2024 Quarterly Crime Report and Use-of-Force Data Update IIJ REMVE Initiative: Addressing the Threat of REMVE Radicalization to Violence in the Americas Terrorist Designations of Nordic Resistance Movement and Three Leaders Global leader of ISIS targeted and possibly killed in U.S. airstrike Joint U.S.-Türkiye Designations of an ISIS Smuggling Network Teenager's chilling five-word warning as he plotted suicide bomb attack on synagogue 'Neo Nazi' knifeman attacks two children, leaving 12-year-old seriously wounded at Finnish shopping centre Catoosa County man charged with terroristic threats after posting videos online Nashville school shooter's violent rant REVEALED at last: Audrey Hale wrote about her 'torture' as a trans girl and how she would 'kill' to get puberty blockers Aghan teen arrested for knife attack on women in Germany ISIS tells Americans they'll 'drink their blood' in terrifying promise to attack  

In this week's update, we look at a new Islamic State (ISIS-K) propaganda poster calling for lone wolf attacks on infidels and apostates. We also look at a related story about the arrest of eight Tajik nationals across three US cities, each of whom entered the country illegally and is believed to have ties to ISIS-K. You can subscribe to our weekly Threat Journal newsletter by visiting https://www.ThreatJournal.com . A link to this issue will be sent to you via email. AlertsUSA Homepage http://www.AlertsUSA.com – (Homeland Security Alerts for Mobile Devices) Use promo code 'SAFE24' for a steep discount. AlertsUSA on Facebook https://www.facebook.com/alertsusa AlertsUSA on Twitter https://twitter.com/alertsusa Threat Journal on Twitter https://twitter.com/threatjournal Threat Journal Homepage https://www.ThreatJournal.com

Two years have passed since the Tajik government launched its crackdown on residents of the Gorno-Badakhshan Autonomous Oblast, or GBAO. On May 16, 2022, police and security forces attacked peaceful protesters in the GBAO capital, Khorugh, and dozens of people were killed in the weeks that followed. After the shooting stopped, the state's repression of the region continued with the arrests of hundreds of GBAO natives – including this month, when at least 35 residents of GBAO's Yazgulom district were detained. Joining host Bruce Pannier to discuss the Tajik government's crackdown in GBAO are guests Syinat Sultanalieva, a researcher covering Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan for Human Rights Watch, and Bakhtiyor Safarov, the founder of the firm Central Asia Consulting in the United States who is originally from Gorno-Badakhshan.

In the inaugural episode of our new mini-series, we dive deep into the military landscape of Central Asia, starting with a spotlight on Tajikistan. This first episode uncovers the region's convoluted command structures and the unique challenges faced by the national armed forces operating here. Why does the Tajik army operate the way it does? What hidden factors influence their command, doctrines, and equipment? Our expert panel will unravel these complexities, providing captivating insights into the evolving dynamics of Tajikistan's military and its increasingly pivotal role in Central Asian politics. Don't miss this deep dive into the heart of Central Asian defence strategies. On the panel this week: - Bruce Pannier (Central Asia Journalist) - Derek Bisaccio (Forecast International) - Katie Putz (The Diplomat) - Steve Swerdlow (USC) - Edward Lemon (The Oxus Society) Follow the show on @TheRedLinePod Follow Michael on @MikeHilliardAus Support The Red Line at: https://www.patreon.com/theredlinepodcast Submit Questions and Join the Red Line Discord Server at: https://www.theredlinepodcast.com/discord For more info, please visit: https://www.theredlinepodcast.com/ Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Can an authoritarian government's policies contribute to its citizens becoming terrorists? Tajik President Emomali Rahmon's government has received financial and security aid from many governments and for more than three decades, in an effort to keep Tajikistan from becoming a second Afghanistan or Syria. During that time, Rahmon has exploited these concerns to crush all potential opposition and allow his family to take control of nearly every profitable business in the country. In recent months, a few dozen citizens of Tajikistan have carried out -- or been accused of carrying out or abetting -- terrorist attacks in several countries. Should the Tajik government also be held responsible? Joining host Bruce Pannier to discuss this are guests Marius Fossum, the regional representative in Central Asia for the Norwegian Helsinki Committee, and Steve Swerdlow, a rights lawyer with long experience in Central Asia and currently an associate professor of the practice of human rights at the University of Southern California.

Russian security forces arrested several Tajik citizens in the wake of the March 22 attack on the Crocus City Hall outside Moscow that left more than 140 dead, claiming they were the perpetrators of the massacre. The news touched off a wave of xenophobia against Central Asian migrant laborers in Russia, with most of the suspicion and hostility directed toward ethnic Tajiks. This overt racism is also spilling over into Tajik-Russian relations. Joining host Bruce Pannier to discuss these matters and more are Edward Lemon, a professor at Texas A&M University and president of the Oxus Society for Central Asia; and Salimjon Aioubov, director of RFE/RL's Tajik Service.

The Rich Zeoli Show- Hour 3: 5:00pm- Four-term U.S. Congresswoman and 2020 presidential candidate Tulsi Gabbard—Author of “For Love of Country: Leave the Democrat Party Behind”—joins The Rich Zeoli Show to discuss the ongoing chaos at the U.S. Southern border and her opposition to Congress's recently passed bill that could ultimately ban TikTok. Plus, are the rumors true—is she being considered as a potential running mate for Donald Trump or Robert Kennedy Jr.? Her book, "For Love of Country: Leave the Democrat Party Behind,” will be released on April 30th. You can pre-order it now at book.tulsigabbard.com or on Amazon. 5:40pm- Valerie Hopkins and Alina Lobzina of The New York Times write: “An attack Friday at a popular concert venue near Moscow killed 137 people, the deadliest act of terrorism the Russian capital region has seen in more than a decade. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack; American officials have attributed it to ISIS-K, a branch of the group. Russian officials and state media have largely ignored ISIS's claim of responsibility and instead suggested that Ukraine was behind the violence. Ukraine has denied any involvement, and American officials say there is no evidence connecting Kyiv to the attack. Russian authorities have detained at least 11 people, including four migrant laborers described as Tajik citizens who have been charged with committing a terrorist act, but they have not identified most of the accused assailants or their motives.” You can read the full article here: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world/europe/moscow-concert-hall-attack-what-we-know.html

The Rich Zeoli Show- Full Episode (03/25/2024): 3:05pm- Rebecca Picciotto of CNBC writes: “President Joe Biden on Saturday signed Congress' $1.2 trillion spending package, finalizing the remaining batch of bills in a long-awaited budget to keep the government funded until Oct. 1. Almost halfway into the fiscal year, the president's signature ends a months-long saga of Congress struggling to secure a permanent budget resolution and instead passing stopgap measures, nearly averting government shutdowns.” You can read the full article here: https://www.cnbc.com/2024/03/23/biden-signs-1point2-trillion-spending-package.html 3:25pm- In response to the House of Representatives passing a $1.2 trillion spending package on Friday, Congressman Scott Perry (R-PA) publicly objected to money going towards “processing” migrants entering the country unlawfully instead of prioritizing security at the U.S. Southern border which would prevent their entry in the first place. 3:30pm- On Sunday, New Jersey First Lady Tammy Murphy announced that she was suspending her campaign for U.S. Senate. In a video posted to social media Murphy explained her decision: “I have been genuine and factual throughout—but it is clear to me that continuing in this race will involve waging a very divisive and negative campaign, which I am not willing to do.” You can read more here: https://www.politico.com/news/2024/03/24/nj-first-lady-tammy-murphy-to-end-senate-campaign-to-replace-bob-menendez-00148728 3:45pm- Ben Protess and William K. Rashbaum of The New York Times write: “With Donald J. Trump on the clock to secure a nearly half-billion-dollar bond in his civil fraud case, a New York appeals court handed the former president a lifeline on Monday, saying it would accept a far smaller bond of $175 million. The ruling by a panel of five appellate court judges was a crucial and unexpected victory for Mr. Trump, potentially staving off a looming financial disaster. Had the court denied his request for a smaller bond in the fraud case, which was brought by the New York attorney general, Mr. Trump risked losing control over his bank accounts and even some of his marquee properties.” While speaking to the press outside of the courthouse, Trump said he plans to pay the newly reduced bond in cash. You can read more here: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/25/nyregion/trump-bond-reduced.html 4:05pm- The Wall Street Journal Editorial Board writes: “This isn't the right kind of March madness. The Education Department's confused rollout of the new Free Application for Federal Student Aid, or Fafsa, grew more chaotic Friday when it announced that incorrect data had been sent to colleges for hundreds of thousands of students. Congress in its infinite unwisdom jammed through a Fafsa redesign in the December 2020 omnibus spending bill. The new Fafsa was supposed to be simpler, but myriad government snafus have caused headaches for colleges, parents and students. ‘This is another unforced error that will likely cause more processing delays for students,' the National Association of Student Financial Aid Administrators (Nasfaa) CEO Justin Draeger said Friday. ‘At this stage in the game and after so many delays, every error adds up.' Fafsa usually becomes available in early October, but the Education Department didn't launch the new form until late December.” You can read more here: https://www.wsj.com/articles/student-aid-march-madness-fafsa-college-loans-18ae8361?mod=opinion_lead_pos2 4:30pm- Is it in the bill? A TikTok video has gone viral—asking viewers to guess whether or not five progressively insane expenditures are in the $1.2 billion budget bill signed into law by President Joe Biden. Can you guess what's real and what's made up? Rich and Henry go head-to-head! 4:50pm- Ben Protess and William K. Rashbaum of The New York Times write: “With Donald J. Trump on the clock to secure a nearly half-billion-dollar bond in his civil fraud case, a New York appeals court handed the former president a lifeline on Monday, saying it would accept a far smaller bond of $175 million. The ruling by a panel of five appellate court judges was a crucial and unexpected victory for Mr. Trump, potentially staving off a looming financial disaster. Had the court denied his request for a smaller bond in the fraud case, which was brought by the New York attorney general, Mr. Trump risked losing control over his bank accounts and even some of his marquee properties.” While speaking to the press outside of the courthouse, Trump said he plans to pay the newly reduced bond in cash. You can read more here: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/25/nyregion/trump-bond-reduced.html 4:55pm- While appearing on CNN with Erin Burnett, Bess Freeman—the CEO of a luxury real estate firm— confirmed that Mar-a-Lago is worth far more than the $18 million estimated by New York Attorney General Letitia James. Freeman estimated the property was worth hundreds of millions of dollars. 5:00pm- Four-term U.S. Congresswoman and 2020 presidential candidate Tulsi Gabbard—Author of “For Love of Country: Leave the Democrat Party Behind”—joins The Rich Zeoli Show to discuss the ongoing chaos at the U.S. Southern border and her opposition to Congress's recently passed bill that could ultimately ban TikTok. Plus, are the rumors true—is she being considered as a potential running mate for Donald Trump or Robert Kennedy Jr.? Her book, "For Love of Country: Leave the Democrat Party Behind,” will be released on April 30th. You can pre-order it now at book.tulsigabbard.com or on Amazon. 5:40pm- Valerie Hopkins and Alina Lobzina of The New York Times write: “An attack Friday at a popular concert venue near Moscow killed 137 people, the deadliest act of terrorism the Russian capital region has seen in more than a decade. The Islamic State claimed responsibility for the attack; American officials have attributed it to ISIS-K, a branch of the group. Russian officials and state media have largely ignored ISIS's claim of responsibility and instead suggested that Ukraine was behind the violence. Ukraine has denied any involvement, and American officials say there is no evidence connecting Kyiv to the attack. Russian authorities have detained at least 11 people, including four migrant laborers described as Tajik citizens who have been charged with committing a terrorist act, but they have not identified most of the accused assailants or their motives.” You can read the full article here: https://www.nytimes.com/2024/03/23/world/europe/moscow-concert-hall-attack-what-we-know.html 6:05pm- Attorney Linda Kerns joins The Rich Zeoli Show to discuss her latest editorial for The Federalist, “If Pennsylvania Is Going To Flood Elections With Mail-In Ballots, We Need A Flood Of Poll Watchers.” Kerns writes: “When Pennsylvania counted its ballots in 2020, observers simply could not see what was happening in many counties in Pennsylvania, especially the larger ones like Philadelphia. The Pennsylvania legislature had just changed the law, no longer requiring an excuse to vote on a paper mail ballot before election day. Almost the same laws that historically applied to processing a limited number of paper absentee ballots remained in place for the thousands—or in larger counties, hundreds of thousands—of paper mail ballots. Pennsylvanians, and the entire country, soon learned that the laws for absentee balloting to mail-in balloting might have needed a bit more tweaking.” You can read Kerns' full article here: https://thefederalist.com/2024/03/25/if-pennsylvania-is-going-to-flood-elections-with-mail-in-ballots-we-need-a-flood-of-poll-watchers/. And learn more about election integrity at: www.lindakernslaw.com. 6:30pm- An increasingly large number of rappers are openly endorsing Republican presidential candidate Donald Trump in the 2024 election. Could this have an impact on the election's outcome? You can read more here: https://www.breitbart.com/entertainment/2024/03/24/11-rappers-backing-donald-trump-in-2024-hes-a-soldier-we-miss-you/

...but it won't change the outcome of the war. 133 dead civilians mowed down at a concert in Moscow by 4 Tajik gunmen-for-hire. Who paid them? Western media is sure they were 'ISIS', yet they were caught trying to escape to Ukraine. And that this occurred amidst increasing strikes and counter-strikes between Ukraine and Russia, the true motive for this atrocity is clear: to unsettle Russia and provoke Putin into escalating and/or deviating from 'the SMO plan' to demilitarize Ukraine. Also in...

//The Wire//1700Z March 23, 2024////ROUTINE////BLUF: U.S. DOJ LAUNCHES NEW RED FLAG PORTAL, CROCUS SHOOTING SUSPECTS ARRESTED IN RUSSIA.// -----BEGIN TEARLINE------International Events-Russia: Though details are challenging to verify with any veracity, the death toll following the Crocus terror attack has reportedly risen to over 120. FSB agents have arrested over a dozen suspects in connection with the attack. Almost all of the shooters have been captured alive, and most appear to ethnically be of Tajik descent, or at minimum not ethnically Russian.Far East: Tensions between Taiwan and China have increased slightly above baseline this week following the deployment of American troops to Kinmen Island. The occupation of this observation post, though largely having been an open-secret over the past few years has reignited local tensions and provided another opportunity for escalation.-HomeFront-Washington D.C. – This morning the Department of Justice launched the National Extreme Risk Protection Order Resource Center. AC: This is essentially a learning portal intended to share information with local police, medical providers, and informants on how to more effectively confiscate guns and remove rights via red flag laws and other extrajudicial processes.-----END TEARLINE-----Analyst Comments: Though again details are impossible to verify independently, the Russian FSB has released initial field interrogation videos of several of the Crocus shooting suspects taken immediately after arrest. Accounting for the fact that these videos are always taken under a state of duress and probably scripted (or at minimum, rehearsed), all of the shooting suspects indicated they were recruited on Telegram and paid to conduct the attack. Again, it must be stressed that most of these “field interrogations” involve clearly documented cases of torture, so any confessions made aren't very reliable from an intelligence collection standpoint.However, in the interest of expediency being the most effective method of countering runaway theories, this is an important distinction to make as the mainstream media is running with the story that the attackers were ISIS and the attack was carried out for ideological reasons. Considering these very rough initial details, at the very least it would be operationally prudent to remember that none of the other confirmed details of this attack match the typical ISIS attack profile. The assailants surviving the attack alone is a strong indicator of ideology not being the driving factor behind this incident.Analyst: S2A1//END REPORT//

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