Podcasts about Hazara

In this episode, I speak with Ali Reza Yawari — a Hazara refugee from Afghanistan currently living in transit country Indonesia — who shares his lived and witnessed experiences of deep and horrifying pain, resilience, forgiveness, deep compassion, healing and hope. Together we explore the battles within and around the refugee journey living in a transit country for a very long period of time, and how, even in the darkest places, lovecontinues to rise. Love is still winning! Trigger Warning: This episode includes discussions of war, forced displacement, trauma, and witnessing a suicide.Please listen with care and pause if you need to. Your well-being matters.  Timestamp:00:00:00.   Opening00:02:12.     Introduction of Ali Reza Yawari. 00:07:41.     Ali's life experiencing forceddisplacement as a Hazara man. Key highlights of what he experienced since in Indonesia as a transit country.00:18:02.     What Refugees in Indonesia are allowed andnot allowed doing.00:23:48.     What happens in other transit countries?00:26:48.   Explanation about the reason why staying in Indonesia as a transit country is very long.00:30:49.     How Ali survives the past ten years - his unseen battles and victories  00:44:08.    Ali's experience with local Indonesian people.00:53:20.     The type of safe space that refugees needto be able to live in a transit country well.00:57:45.     The implication of all these restrictionswithin the refugee's youth population in Indonesia who never travelled abroad before nor interacting closely with other cultures before until they reached Indonesia. How the life in detention centers negatively impacted the youngpeople. 01:08:43.     Why Ali cofounded Emplace Youth Initiativewith Muna. 01:12:15.     Ali's healing journey so far.01:17:23.     Forgiveness as an act of liberation for Ali.01:22:58.     The role of intuition in Ali's life. Howthe lack of belonging and living being oppressed impacts Ali's relationship with his intuition.01:29:29.     What compassion means for Ali.01:32:09.     Ali reads for us one of his poems: “I donot belong here”. 01:34:32.   Ali's hope for the future.  01:38:02.     What you can take from this sharing. Ali'sinvitation to connect and how to get in touch with him. 01:40:56.     Closing. To get in touch with Ali Reza Yawari:Email: alirezaind786@gmail.comLI: ⁠ https://www.linkedin.com/in/ali-reza-yawari-819486155/Emplace Initiative: https://www.linkedin.com/company/emplace-initiative/IG: https://www.instagram.com/mr_yawari/IG: ⁠⁠ https://www.instagram.com/emplaceinitiative/ Please contact Astuti at astuti@upliftmylife.today when you have more questions about Uplift Transformation.  Follow her on: IG: ⁠https://www.instagram.com/astutimarto⁠ Online Transformation:https://embodiment.upliftmylife.today/Web: ⁠https://www.upliftmylife.today⁠ Podcast: https://open.spotify.com/show/6ckwxhqgmI8TQdLnV8zTpTFB: ⁠https://www.facebook.com/upliftmylifetoday⁠  Copyrights, etc.: Music used in this episode: “On My Way” by Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com). Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 3.0 License  "Blue Feather" Kevin MacLeod (incompetech.com)Licensed under Creative Commons: By Attribution 4.0 Licensehttp://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/ #YouthResilience#StatelessNotVoiceless#HealingJourneys #Transformation #RefugeeVoices #LeadershipThroughAdversity  #EmplaceInitiative#UpliftMyLifeToday #LoveWins#TraumaHealing #Authentic #Love #UnconditionalLove #Peace #UnconditionalSelfLove#Authenticity #Freedom # t #AncestralTrauma #SystemicHealing #Selflove#AstutiMartosudirdjo#Inspiration #Podcast #UpliftingStory #ForcedDisplacement

On this week's episode we listen to the story of Fayeza, a 21 year old woman born and living in Afghanistan. Fayeza comes from the Hazara ethnic group of Afghanistan. She was preparing for medical university when the Taliban came back to power and banned education for women. In this conversation we talk about her life journey, her insights into the political situation, and her aspirations.

Kíváncsi vagy, hogyan él együtt egy több diplomás hazara lány egy magyar rendőrrel Ausztráliában? Ebben a videóban bepillantást nyerhetsz a vegyes házasságuk mindennapjaiba. Megmutatjuk, hogyan találkozik a magyar virtus a hazara szokásokkal és az ausztrál lazasággal, hogyan ünnepelika karácsonyt és persze, hogy ki a konyhafőnök náluk!

This episode we continue to follow the monk Xuanzang on his path along the silk road.  From Gaochang, he traveled through the Tarim Basin, up over the Tianshan Mountains, to the heart of the Western Gokturk Qaghanate.  From there, he traveled south, through the region of Transoxania to Bactria and the land of Tukhara.  He pushed on into the Hindu Kush, witnessing the stone Buddha statues of Bamiyan, and eventually made his way to the land of Kapisa, near modern Kabul, Afghanistan.  From there he would prepare to enter the Indian subcontinent: the home of the historical Buddha. For more discussion and some photos of the areas along this journey, check out our podcast blog at https://sengokudaimyo.com/podcast/episode-121   Rough Transcript Welcome to Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.  My name is Joshua, and this is Episode 121: Journey to the West, Part 2   The cold winds blew through the travelers' doubled up clothing and thick furs.  Cold, wet ground meant that even two sets of boots were not necessarily enough after several days.  The frozen mist would often obscure everything except for the path immediately in front, hiding the peaks and making the sky a uniform white. In many places, the path would be blocked by rock, ice, or snow—the remnants of an avalanche, which could easily take an unsuspecting traveler.  And there was the elevation.  Hiking through the mountains, it was easy enough to reach heights of a mile or higher, and for those not accustomed to that elevation the thin air could take a surprising toll, especially if you were pushing yourself.  And the road was no less kind to the animals that would be hauling said travelers and their gear. And yet, this was the path that Xuanzang had agreed to.  He would continue to push through, despite the various deprivations that he would be subjected to.  No doubt he often wondered if it was worth it.  Then again, returning was just as dangerous a trip, so why not push on?   Last episode we introduced the monk Xuanzang, who traveled the Silk Road to India in the 7th century and returned to China.  He brought back numerous sutras to translate, and ended up founding a new school, known as the Faxian school—or the Hossou school in Japan.   As we mentioned last time, Xuanzang during his lifetime met with students from the archipelago when they visited the continent.  The records of his travels—including his biography and travelogue—are some of the best information we have on what life was like on the silk road around this time. In the last episode, we talked about Xuanzang: how he set out on his travels, his illegal departure from the Tang empire, and his perilous journey across the desert, ending up in Gaochang.  There, King Qu Wentai had tried to get him to stay, but he was determined to head out.  This episode we are going to cover his trip to Agni, Kucha, and Baluka—modern Aksu—and up to the Western Gokturk Qaghanate's capital of Suyab.  From there, we'll follow his footsteps through the Turkic controlled regions of Transoxania and into Tukhara, in modern Afghanistan.  Finally, we'll cover the last parts of his journey before he reached the start of his goal:  India. From Gaochang, Xuanzang continued on, through the towns he names as Wuban and Dujin, and into the country of Agni—known today as the area of Yanqi—which may also have been known as Wuqi.  The route was well-enough known, but it wasn't necessarily safe.  At one point, Xuanzang's caravan met with bandits, whom they were fortunately able to pay off.  The following night they encamped on a river bank with some merchants who also happened to be traveling the road.  The merchants, though, got up at midnight and headed out, hoping to get to the city early so that they could be the first ones to the market.  They only made it a few miles down the road, however, before they encountered more bandits, who slaughtered them and took their goods.  The following day, Xuanzang and his retinue came upon the merchants' remains lying in the road and saw the aftermath of the massacre. This was an unforgiving land, and the road was truly dangerous, even for those who traveled it regularly.  And yet Xuanzang was planning to travel its entire length until he reached India. So with little alternative, they carried on to the royal city of Agni. Agni, or Yanqi, sits on the southwestern edge of the basin, west of Bositeng lake, on the border between the Turfan basin and the larger Tarim Basin.  The name is thought to be a Tocharian—or Turfanian—name for the city, which is also known as Karashr. According to the biography by Huili, Xuanzang and his party didn't stay long in Agni.  Apparently Agni and Gaochang were not exactly on friendly terms, and even though the King of Agni and his ministers reportedly came out to greet Xuanzang and welcome him to their city, they refused to provide any horses.  They spent a single night and moved on. That said, Agni still made an impression on Xuanzang.  He noted how the capital was surrounded by hills on four sides, making it naturally defensible.  As for the people, he praises them as honest and straightforward.  They wore clothing of felt and hemp cloth, and cut their hair short, without hats or any kind of headwear.  Even the climate was pleasant, at least for the short time he was there.  He also notes that they used a script based on India—likely referring to the Brahmic script, which we find in the Tarim basin. However, as for the local lord, the King of Agni, he is a little less charitable.  Xuanzang claimed he was brave but “lacked resourcefulness” and he was a bit of a braggart.  Furthermore, the country had “no guiding principles or discipline and government orders are imperfect and not seriously implemented.”  He also mentioned the state of Buddhism in the country, noting that they were followers of Sarvastivada school, a Theravada sect popular along the Silk Road at the time.  Xuanzang was apparently not too pleased with the fact that they were not strict vegetarians, including the “three kinds of pure meat”.  From Agni, Xuanzang continued southwest, heading for the kingdom of Kucha.  He seems to have bypassed the nearby kingdom of Korla, south of Agni, and headed some 60 or 70 miles, climbing over a ridge and crossing two large rivers, and then proceeding another 200 miles or so to the land of Kucha. Kucha was a kingdom with over one hundred monasteries and five thousand monks following a form of Theravada Buddhism.  Here, Xuanzang was welcomed in by the king, Suvarnadeva, described as having red hair and blue eyes.  While Xuanzang was staying in Kucha, it is suspected that he probably visited the nearby Kizil grotto and the Buddhist caves, there, which include a painting of King Suvarnadeva's father, King Suvarnapuspa, and his three sons. You can still visit Kucha and the Kizil grottos today, although getting there is quite a trek, to be sure.  The ancient Kuchean capital is mostly ruins, but in the Kizil caves, protected from the outside elements, you can find vivid paintings ranging from roughly the 4th to the 8th century, when the site was abandoned.  Hundreds of caves were painted, and many still demonstrate vibrant colors.  The arid conditions protect them from mold and mildew, while the cave itself reduces the natural bleaching effect of sunlight.  The paintings are in numerous styles, and were commissioned by various individuals and groups over the years.  They also give us some inkling of how vibrant the city and similar structures must have been, back when the Kuchean kingdom was in its heyday. The people of Kucha are still something of a mystery.  We know that at least some of them spoke an Indo-European language, related to a language found in Agni, and both of these languages are often called Tocharian, which we discussed last episode.  Xuanzang himself noted that they used Indian writing, possibly referring to the Brahmi script, or perhaps the fact that they seem to have used Sanskrit for official purposes, such as the inscription on the cave painting at Kizil giving the name of King Suvarnapuspa.  The Kucheans also were clothed in ornamental garments of silk and embroidery.  They kept their hair cut, wearing a flowing covering over their heads—and we see some of that in the paintings. Xuanzang also notes that though we may think of this area as a desert, it was a place where rice and grains, as well as fruit like grapes, pomegranates, plums, pears, peaches, and almonds were grown.  Even today, modern Xinjiang grows some absolutely fantastic fruit, including grapes, which are often dried into raisins. Another point of interest for Xuanzang may have been that Kucha is known as the hometown of none other than Kumarajiva.  We first mentioned Kumarajiva back in episode 84.  Kumarajiva was one of the first people we know of who translated many of the sutras from India that were then more widely disseminated throughout the Yellow River and Yangzi river basins.  His father was from India and his mother was a Kuchean princess.  In the middle of the 4th century, when he was still quite young, he traveled to India and back with his mother on a Buddhist pilgrimage.  Later he would start a massive translation project in Chang'an.  His translations are credited with revolutionizing Chinese Buddhism. Xuanzang was initially welcomed by the king, his ministers, and the revered monk, Moksagupta.  They were accompanied by several thousand monks who set up tents outside the eastern gate, with portable Buddha images, which they worshipped, and then Xuanzang was taken to monastery after monastery until sunset.  At one of the monasteries, in the southeast of the city, there were several tens of monks who originally came from Gaochang, and since Xuanzang had come from there, they invited him to stay with them. The next day he met and feasted with the King, politely declining any meat, and then went to the monastery in the northwest to meet with the famous monk: Moksagupta.  Moksagupta himself had made the journey to India, and had spent 20 years there himself.  It seems like this would have been the perfect person for Xuanzang to talk to about his plans, but instead, the two butted heads.  Moksagupta seems to have seen Xuanzang's Mahayana faith as heretical.  He saw no reason for Xuanzang to travel all the way to India when he had all the sutras that anyone needed there in Kucha, along with Moksagupta himself.   Xuanzang's response seems to have been the Tang dynasty Buddhist version of “Okay, Boomer”, and then he went ahead and tore apart Moksagupta's understanding of his own sutras—or so Xuanzang relayed to his biographers.  We don't exactly have Moksagupta's side, and, let's face it, Xuanzang and his biographers are not necessarily reliable narrators.  After all, they followed Mahayana teachings, which they considered the “Greater Vehicle”, and they referred to the Theravada teachings as the “Hinayana” or “Lesser Vehicle”.  Meanwhile, Theravada Buddhists likely saw many of the Mahayana texts as extraneous, even heretical, not believing them to actually be the teachings of the Buddha. It must have been winter time, as the passes through the mountains on the road ahead were still closed, and so Xuanzang stayed in Kucha, spending his time sightseeing and meeting with various people.  He even went back to see Moksagupta, but the older monk shunned him, and would get up and exit the room rather than engaging with him, so they had no more conversations. Eventually, Xuanzang continued on his way west, following along the northern rim of the Tarim basin.  Two days out from Kucha, disaster struck.  Some two thousand or so Turkish bandits suddenly appeared—I doubt Xuanzang was counting, so it may have been more or less.  I imagine that memories of what had happened to the merchants near Agni must have gone through Xuanzang's mind.   Fortunately, for him, they were fighting over loot that they had pillaged from various travelers, and since they couldn't share it equally, they fell to fighting each other and eventually dispersed. He travelled for almost 200 miles after that, stopping only for a night at the Kingdom of Baluka, aka Gumo—the modern city of Aksu.  This was another Theravada Buddhist kingdom.  Xuanzang noted tens of Buddhist temples, and over 1000 Buddhist monks.  The country was not large—about 200 miles east to west and 100 miles north to south.  For reference that means it was probably comparable in size with Kyushu, in terms of overall area, or maybe the size of Denmark—excluding Greenland—or maybe the US state of Maryland.  Xuanzang described the country as similar to Kucha in just about every way, including the written language and law, but the spoken language was different, though we don't get many more details. From Baluka, he crossed northward through the Tianshan mountains, which are classified as an extension of the Pamirs known as the Ice Mountains.  Had he continued southwest, he would have hit Kashgar and crossed over between the Pamir and Tian Shan ranges into the Ferghana valley, but instead he turned north. We don't know exactly why he took this perilous option, but the route that may have been popular at the time as it was one of the most direct routes to the seat of the Western Gokturk Empire, which he was currently traveling through. The Tian Shan mountains were a dangerous journey.  Avalanches could block the road—or worse.  Xuanzang describes the permanent ice fields—indeed, it is the ice fields and glaciers of the Tian Shan that melt in the summer and provide the oasis towns of the Tarim Basin with water, even to this day.  In Xuanzang's day, those glaciers were likely even more prevalent than today, especially as they have been recorded as rapidly disappearing since 1961.  And where you weren't on snow and ice, the ground was probably wet and damp from the melt.  To keep warm, you would wear shoes over your shoes, along with heavy fur coats, all designed to reduce exposure. Xuanzang claims that 3 or 4 of every 10 people didn't survive the crossing—and that horses and oxen fared even worse.  Even if these numbers are an exaggeration, the message is clear:  This was a dangerous journey. After about seven days, Xuanzang came out of the mountains to the “Great Pure Lake”, the “Da Qing Hai”, also known as the Hot Sea or the Salt Sea, which likely refers to Issyk Kul.  The salt content, along with the great volume of water it possesses, means that the lake rarely freezes over, which is likely why it is seen as “hot” since it doesn't freeze when the fresh water nearby does.  This lake is the second largest mountain lake in the world, and the second deepest saltwater lake.  Traveling past the lake, he continued to Suyab, near modern Tokmok, in Kyrgyzstan, just west of the modern capital of Bishkek.  This was an old Sogdian settlement, and had since become the capital of the Western Gokturks.  Sogdians—like Xuanzang's guide, Vandak—were integral to the Gokturk kingdom. Their language was the lingua franca of the Silk Road, and at the time of the Gokturk Khaganate, it was also the official court language, and so when Xuanzang appeared at the court of the Great Khagan of the Western Gokturks, it was likely the language of diplomacy. When we think of Turkic people, many in the English speaking world think of Turkiye, and perhaps of the mighty Ottoman empire.  Some may think of Turkmenistan, Kazhakstan, Kyrgyzstan, or Uzbekistan, among others.  And of course, there are the Uyghur people in Xinjiang.  All of these people claim roots in the ancestral Turkic homeland in the Altai mountains, which sit largely in western Mongolia, north of China's Xinjiang region.  Much like the Xiongnu and the Mongols, they were pastoral nomads, moving their herds across the steppes, often covering great distances.  They would regularly move through different regions, perhaps returning each season, though sometimes not returning for years at a time.  They were often seen as barbarians by settled people living in cities, and yet their goods and horses were highly prized. Nomad and sedentary lifestyles would often collide.  Farmers would turn pastureland into fields, and when the nomadic people returned on their circuits, they would find walls and fences where there was once open land, and the people there would claim to “own” the land, a concept often foreign to people who were always on the move.  Nomadic people, such as the Gokturks, were not necessarily keeping vast libraries of records about themselves and their histories, and so much of what we get comes from external sources, which do not always have incredibly reliable narrators.  To many of the settled agriculturalists, groups like the Turks were marauders who raided their villages and farms.  They were a great bogeyman of the steppes, which required the firm hand of strong defenses to keep out—or so their opponents would want people to think. While they were known for their warfare, which incorporated their mobility, but they were keenly interested in trade, as well.  They understood the value of the trade routes and the various cities and states that they included in their empire.  Thus, the Sogdians and the Gokturks seem a natural fit: the Sogdians were more settled, but not entirely so, as demonstrated by their vast trade networks.  And the Sogdians also were part of the greater central Eurasian steppe culture, so the two cultures understood each other, to a degree.  They are even depicted similarly in art, with slight differences, such as long hair that was often associated with Turks over the Sogdians.  In some areas of the Gokturk empire, Sogdians would run the cities, while the Gokturks provided military aid and protection. Xuanzang's description of the people of Suyab, or the “City of Suye River”, doesn't pick out anyone in particular, and he even says that it was a place where traders of the Hu, or foreign, tribes from different countries mingle their abodes.  He mentions the people here as being called Suli, which is also the name given to the language—this may refer to “Sogdian” in general.  They write with an alphabet that is written vertically rather than horizontally—this may refer to a few scripts that were written this way, possibly based off Syriac or Aramaic alphabets that were adapted to Sogdian and other Iranian languages, but it isn't clear. We are told that the people dressed in felt and hemp clothing, with fur and “cotton” garments.  Their clothes fit tightly, and they kept their hair cut short, exposing the top of their heads—though sometimes they shaved it completely, tying a colored silk band around the forehead. He goes on to describe these people as greedy liars, possibly a reference to the mercantile nature of many of the people at the time. Something to note: The Turks of this time had not yet encountered Islam, which was just now starting to rise up in the Middle East.  The Prophet Muhammad is said to have been born around the end of the 6th century CE and was preaching in the early 7th century, though his teachings would begin to spread outward soon enough.  But that means that the Gokturks were not an Islamic empire.  Rather, their own traditions seem to have focused on the worship of Tengri, an Altaic personification of the universe, often simplified as a “sky god”.  Tengrism can be found amongst the Xiongnu, Mongols, and others, and it was the national religion of the Gokturks themselves, but there were many who also adopted other religions that they encountered, including Zoroastrianism, Christianity, Manichaeism, and Buddhism.  In fact, Xuanzang notes that the Turks he met in Suyab would not sleep or sit on beds made of wood because wood was thought to contain the spirit of fire, which he says they worshipped.  That sounds similar to Zoroastrian beliefs, where fire is associated with Ahura Mazda, who is also worshipped as a sky god.  These may have been beliefs inherited from their Eastern Iranian Sogdian partners. In Xuanzang's biography, we are given more details about his visit to Suyab.  Apparently, as he was headed to the city, he met a hunting party, which we are told was the retinue of Yehu Khan.  Hunting was an important part of life on the steppes, and it continued to be a favorite sport of the Gokturk nobility. Yehu Khan—possibly Yagbhu Khan, though that is up for some debate—is described as being dressed in a green silk robe, with his hair exposed, and wearing  a turban of white silk about ten feet long that wrapped his forehead and hung behind his back.  His “hunting” expedition wasn't just a couple of the guys.  It included about 200 officials, all with plaited hair and dressed in brocade robes—they weren't exactly out there roughing it.  He also had his soldiers, dressed in furs, felt, or fine woolen clothes, and there were so many cavalry that they stretched out of sight.  The Khan seemed pleased to meet Xuanzang, but his hunt was expected to last another couple of days, at least, so he sent an attendant named Dharmaja to take Xuanzang back to wait for the Khan to return. Three days later, Xuanzang was given an audience.  The khan was seated in a large yurt.  Xuanzang noted the seeming incongruity between the khan, sitting there in the tent, decorated with golden flowers, with the officials dressed in magnificent brocade garments sitting in two long rows in front of him and the armed guards behind him, compared to the simple felt walls of the tent. A ”yurt” is a common feature of nomadic life on the steppes.  It wasn't exactly a single person operation to haul them around, but they can be taken down and put up with relative ease.  And while yurts could be relatively simple, there are examples of much more elaborate structures.  There is little reason they couldn't be made larger, perhaps with some extra support.  In later centuries, there are examples of giant yurts that seem like real construction projects.  Use of tents, even in a city, where they had permanent palace buildings, was likely a means of retaining the nomadic steppe traditions, even while enjoying the benefits of city life. Whom exactly Xuanzang met with is a matter of debate.  His records seem to indicate that it was Tong Yabghu Qaghan of the Western Gokturk Khaganate, but other sources say that Tong Yabghu Qaghan died in 628, and the earliest Xuanzang could have been meeting with him was 630, two years later, so if that is the case, he must have met with Tong Yabghu's son, Si Yabghu Qaghan.  It is likely that Xuanzang, who was dictating his accounts years after, mentioned the Qaghan and then, when they looked up who it was, they simply made a mistake.  Remember, Xuanzang would have had everything translated through one or two languages.  He did know what he saw, however, and he recounted what he remembered. Tong Yabghu Qaghan oversaw the height of the Gokturk Qaghanate, and appears to have favored the Buddhist religion, though there were many different religions active in their territories at the time.  They oversaw an extremely cosmopolitan empire covering huge swaths of central Eurasia, including the lucrative silk road.  Xuanzang notes that at the court there were individuals from Gaochang and even a messenger from the Han—which is to say the Tang Empire.  One wonders if Xuanzang—or anyone at that time—realized just how tenuous the Khan'sposition was.  After Tong Yabghu's death, the Qaghanate would decline, and less than a decade later it would fall to the Tang dynasty, who took Suyab and made it their western outpost.  In fact, Suyab is thought to have been the birthplace, over a century later, of a young boy who would find a love of poetry.  That boy's name was Li Bai, or Ri Haku, in Japanese. He would become one of the most famous poets in Chinese history, and his poems were even known and studied in Japan.  And it was largely through Japanese study of Li Bai's poems that his works came to the English speaking world: first through Ernest Fenollosa, who had studied in Japan, and then by the celebrated Ezra Pound, who had used Ernest's notes to help with his own translations of the poems. This was, though, as I said, over a century after Xuanzang's journey.  At the time of our story, the Qaghan was throwing a feast, including Xuanzang and all of the foreign envoys.  Xuanzang comments on the food and drink—his hosts provided grape juice in lieu of wine, and cooked a special vegetarian feast just for him, while the other guests ate a feast of meat, such as veal, lamb, fish, and the like.  There was also the music of various regions along the Silk Road, which Xuanzang found to be catchy, but of course not as refined as the music he was used to, of course.  After dinner Xuanzang was asked to expound upon the Darma, largely about the basic principle that you should be kind to one another—I doubt he was getting into the deep mysteries of Buddhist philosophy. Xuanzang stuck around the court for three more days, during which time the Qaghan tried to get him to stay, but Xuanzang insisted that he had to make it to India.  And so the Qaghan relented.  He found men in his army who could translate for Xuanzang along his journey, and had letters of introduction written to at least as far as the state of Kapisa, in modern Afghanistan. And so, armed with the Qaghan's blessing and a fresh translator, Xuanzang struck out again.  They headed westward for over one hundred miles, eventually reaching Bingyul, aka the Thousand Springs.  This is the area where the Qaghan and his court would spend his summers, and the deer in the area were protected under his orders, so that they were not afraid of humans—which sounds similar to the situation with the deer in Nara.  Continuing on another fifty miles or so—the distances are approximate as Xuanzang's primary duty was not exactly to map all of this out—Xuanzang arrived at the city of Taras, in modern Kazakhstan, another place where the cultures of the Silk Road mixed and mingled.  Xuanzang didn't have much to say about Taraz, apparently, though it is one of the oldest cities in Transoxania, founded near the beginning of the Common Era.  A few miles south of there, Xuanzang reportedly found a village of re-settled ethnic Han that had been captured by the Gokturks and settled here.  They had adopted the dress and customs of the Turkic people, but continued to speak a version of Chinese. Southwest of that he reached the City of White Water, likely referring to Aksukent.  This is the same “Aksu” as the city in Xinjiang, both of which mean “White Water” in Turkic, but this one is in the south of Kazakhstan.  Xuanzang found the climate and products an improvement over what he had experienced in Taras.  Beyond that, he next arrived at the city of Gongyu, and then south again to Nujkend, and then traveling westward to the country of Chach, aka Tashkent.  Both Nujkend and Chach were large cities in nations of smaller, mostly autonomous city-states, which made up a lot of the political geography of Transoxania. I would note that Xuanzang's notes here are much more sparse than previously.  This may be because these were outside of the Tarim basin and therefore of less interest to individuals in the Tang empire.  Or perhaps he was just making his way more quickly and not stopping at every kingdom along the way. From Tashkent, he continued southeast to the Ferghana valley—the country of Feihan.  Oddly, this country doesn't appear in Xuanzang's biography, even though the Ferghana Valley seems to have been fairly well known back in the Tang Empire—it was known as the home of some of the best horses, which were one of its first major exports.  In fact, the Han dynasty even mounted a military expedition to travel to Ferghana just to obtain horses.  Xuanzang is oddly silent on this; however, he does talk about the fertile nature of the land.  He mentions that their language here is different from the lands he had been traveling through up to this point, and also points out that the people of the Ferghana valley were also visibly different from others in the area. From the Ferghana valley, Xuanzang headed west for about 300 miles or more to the land of Sutrushana—perhaps referring to the area of Ushrusana, with its capital of Bunjikat.  This country was also largely Sogdian, and described as similar to Tashkent.  From there, he traveled west through a great desert, passing skeletons, which were the only marker of the trail other than a view of the far off mountains.  Finally, they reached Samarkand, known as the country of “Kang” in Chinese, which was also the term used to mark Sogdians who claimed descent from the people of Samarkand. Samarkand is another of the ancient cities of Central Asia, and even today is the third largest city in modern Uzbekistan.  Human activity in the region goes back to the paleolithic era, and the city was probably founded between the 8th and 7th centuries BCE.  Samarkand was conquered by Alexander the Great, and during the Achaemenid Empire it was the capital of Sogdiana.  During Xuanzang's visit, Samarkand was described as an impenetrable fortress with a large population. For all of his travel, Samarkand was the first place Xuanzang notes as specifically not a Buddhist land.  In fact, there were two monasteries, suggesting that there had been Buddhists, but if any monks tried to stay there then the locals would chase them out with fire.  Instead, they worshipped fire—likely meaning Ahura Mazda and Zoroastrianism.  This leads to a story that I have to wonder about, given the reliability of our narrators. It is said that Xuanzang was met by the King with arrogance, but after staying the night Xuanzang was able to tell the King about Buddhism and its merits.  The king was intrigued, and asked to observe the Precepts, and treated Xuanzang with hospitality and respect.  So when two of Xuanzang's attendants went to the monasteries to worship, they were chased out with fire.  When the king heard about this, he had the people arrested and ordered their hands to be cut off.  Xuanzang could not bear to witness such suffering, however, and he intervened to have them spared.  So instead the king had them flogged and banished from the city.  Ever since then, all the people believed in Buddhism. Some parts of this strike true.  It was likely that the king would entertain this strange wanderer who had arrived with letters from the great Qaghan—that may have even explained why Xuanzang had been encouraged to make the dangerous journey to Suyab in the first place, so that he could obtain such permission.  And it would not be strange for the king to listen to his teachings.  If Xuanzang's attendants were attacked, that would have been a huge breach of hospitality, and however the King felt about it, he no doubt had to do something about it.  And so all of that sounds somewhat believable.  Does that mean everyone suddenly converted to Buddhism?  I don't know that I'm quite willing to go that far.  It is also likely that there were Buddhists there already, even if the majority religion was Zoroastrianism. From Samarkand, Xuanzang traveled farther southwest, to the country of Kasanna, which seems to have been the edge of what we might call Sogdiana.   According to his biographers, however, there was a little more to all of this.  Rather, he headed west to Kusanika.  Then he traveled to  Khargan, and further on to the country of Bukhara, and then to Vadi.  All of these were “An” in Chinese, which was the name element used for Sogdians from this region.  He then continued west to the country of Horismika, on the other side of the Amu Darya, aka the Oxus River of Transoxanian fame. From there he traveled further southwest, entering into the mountains.  The path here was often such that they had to travel single-file, and there was no food or water other than what you brought with you.  Eventually they came to a set of doors, known as the Iron Gate.  This was a Turkic fortress.  It was no doubt fortuitous that he had come from his meeting with the Qaghan, and likely had permission to pass through.  From there, they entered the country of Tukhara. As we noted in Episode 119, Tukhara was in the region of Bactria.  It was bordered by the Pamir range in the east, and the Persian empire in the west.  There were also the Great Snow Mountains in the south, likely referencing the Hindu Kush. Tukhara had been conquered by the Gokturks just within the past couple of decades, and Xuanzang notes that the country had been split into largely autonomous city-states as the local royalty had died without an heir many years before.  With the Gokturk conquest, it was now administered by Tardu Shad, the son of Tong Yabghu Qaghan.  “Shad” in this case was a local title. Here, Xuanzang's narrative gets a little dicey, especially between his biography and his records.  The records of the Western Regions denotes various countries in this area.  It is unclear if he traveled to all of them or is just recounting them from records he obtained.  He does give us at least an overview of the people and the region.  I would also note that this is one of the regions he visited, again, on his return trip, and so may have been more familiar with the region than those areas he had passed through from Suyab on down. For one thing, he notes that the language of the region was different from that of the “Suli”, which appears to refer to the Sogdians.  This was the old territory of the Kushan empire, and they largely spoke Bactrian.  Like Sogdian, it was another Eastern Iranian language, and they used an alphabet based largely on Greek, and written horizontally rather than vertically.  They also had their own coins. This region had plenty of Buddhist communities, and Xuanzang describes the cities and how many monasteries they had, though, again, it isn't clear if he actually visited all of them or not.  These are countries that Li Rongji translates as “Tirmidh”, “Sahaaniyan”, “Kharuun”, “Shuumaan”, etc. It does seem that Xuanzang made it to the capital city, the modern city Kunduz, Afghanistan. Xuanzang actually had something specific for the local Gokturk ruler, Tardu Shad.  Tardu Shad's wife was the younger sister of King Qu Wentai of Gaochang, whom we met last episode.  Qu Wentai had provided Xuanzang a letter for his younger sister and her husband.  Unfortunately, Xuanzang arrived to learn that the princess of Gaochang had passed away, and Tardu Shad's health was failing.  It does seem that Tardu Shad was aware of Xuanzang, however—a letter had already come from Qu Wentai to let them know that Xuanzang was on his way.  As I mentioned last episode, letters were an important part of how communities stayed tied together.  Of course, given the perils of the road, one assumes that multiple letters likely had to be sent just in case they didn't make it.  The US Postal Service this was not. Tardu Shad, though not feeling well, granted an interview with Xuanzang.  He suggested that Xuanzang should stick around.  Then, once the Shad had recovered from his illness, he would accompany Xuanzang personally on his trip to India.  Unfortunately, that was not to be.  While Xuanzang was staying there, he was witness to deadly drama.  Tardu Shad was recovering, which was attributed to the recitations by an Indian monk who was also there.  This outcome was not exactly what some in the court had wanted.  One of the Shad's own sons, known as the Tagin prince, plotted with the Shad's current wife, the young Khatun, and she poisoned her husband.  With the Shad dead, the throne might have gone to the son of the Gaochang princess, but he was still too young.  As such, the Tagin Prince was able to usurp the throne himself, and he married his stepmother, the young Khatun.  The funeral services for the late Tardu Shad meant that Xuanzang was obliged to stay at Ghor for over a month. During that time, Xuanzang had a seemingly pleasant interaction with an Indian monk.  And when he finally got ready to go, he asked the new Shad for a guide and horses.  He agreed, but also made the suggestion that Xuanzang should then head to Balkh.  This may have meant a bit of backtracking, but the Shad suggested that it would be worth it, as Balkh had a flourishing Buddhist community. Fortunately, there was a group of Buddhist monks from Balkh who happened to be in Kunduz to express their condolences at the passing of Tardu Shad, and they agreed to accompany Xuanzang back to their hometown, lest he end up getting lost and taking the long way there. The city of Balkh is also known as “Baktra”, as in “Bactria”, another name of this region.  A settlement has been there since at least 500 BCE , and it was already an important city when it was captured by Alexander the Great.  It sits at the confluence of several major trade routes, which no doubt were a big part of its success.  Xuanzang's biography notes that it was a massive city, though it was relatively sparsely populated—probably due to the relatively recent conquest by the Gokturks, which had occurred in the last couple of decades.  That said, there were still thousands of monks residing at a hundred monasteries in and around the city.  They are all characterized as monks of Theravada schools.  Southwest of the city was a monastery known as Navasamgharama, aka Nava Vihara, or “New Monastery”.  Despite its name, the monastery may have actually been much older, going back to the Kushan emperor Kaniska, in the 2nd century CE.  Ruins identified as this “New Monastery” are still visible south of Balkh, today. The monastery is described as being beautifully decorated, and it seems that it had a relic—one of the Buddha's teeth.  There are also various utensils that the Buddha is said to have used, as well.  The objects would be displayed on festival days.  North of the monastery there was a stupa more than 200 feet in height.  South of the monastery was a hermitage.  Each monk who studied there and passed away would have a stupa erected for them, as well.  Xuanzang notes that there were at around 700 memorial stupas, such that they had to be crammed together, base to base. It was here that Xuanzang met a young monk named Prajnaakara, who was already somewhat famous in India, and well-studied.  When questioned about certain aspects of Buddhism, Xuanzang was impressed by the monk's answers, and so stayed there a month studying with the young monk. Eventually, Xuanzang was ready to continue on his journey.  He departed Balkh towards the south, accompanying the teacher Prajnakara, and together they entered the Great Snow Mountains, aka the Hindu Kush.  This path was even more dangerous than the trip through the Tian Shan mountains to Suyab.   They eventually left the territory of Tukhara and arrived at Bamiyan.  Bamiyan was a kingdom in the Hindu Kush, themselves an extension of the Himalayan Mountain range.  It Is largely based around valley, home to the modern city of Bamyan, Afghanistan, which sits along the divide between Central Asia and the Indian subcontinent.  Today it is a major center for individuals of the Hazara ethnic group, one of the main ethnic groups in Afghanistan, which is a multi-ethnic state that includes, today, the Pashtun, Hazara, Tajik, and Uzbek people, along with a number of smaller ethnic groups.  Today they largely reside in the mountainous areas of the Hindu Kush. Bamiyan made an impact on our protagonist.   Their language was slightly different from that in Tukhara, but using the same—or similar enough—writing system.  Buddhism was thriving in the capital, and we are told of a rock statue of the standing Buddha, over a hundred feet in height, along with a copper statue of the standing Buddha nearby.    There was also another reclining Buddha a mile or two down the road.  There were multiple monasteries with thousands of monks, and the ruler of that kingdom received Xuanzang well. Xuanzang wasn't the first monk to travel to Bamiyan from the Middle Kingdom—in this he was, perhaps unwittingly, on the trail of the monk Faxian.  Faxian likely did not see these statues, though, as we believe they were built in the 6th and early 7th century—at least the stone Buddha statues.  They were a famous worship site until February 2001, when the Taliban gave an order to destroy all of the statues in Afghanistan.  Despite this, they were inscribed as UNESCO World Heritage Site in 2003. Fortunately, we have images from before their destruction.  These statues were a blend of Greco-Buddhist and Gandharan art styles—appropriate as it stands between the Hellenistic area of Tukhara and the ancient region of Gandhara—including the modern city of Kandahar and into the Indus Valley region of Pakistan. Continuing east through the mountains, Xuanzang eventually came out at the kingdom of Kapisa.  This may have had its capital around modern-day Bagram, north of modern Kabul, but the country seems to have been quite large.  Kapisa over saw some tens of other countries, and it is thought that at one time its influence extended from Bamyan and Kandahar to the area of modern Jalalabad.  Their language was even more different than that of Tukhara, but they were still using the same writing system.  The king of Kapisa is said to have been of Suli ethnicity—which would seem to indicate that he was Sogdian, or at least descended from people of the Transoxanian region.    Xuanzang notes that the ruler, as rough and fiery as he is described—as a true warlord or similar—he nonetheless made a silver image of the Buddha, eighteen feet in height, every year.  He also gave charity to the poor and needy in an assembly that was called every five years.  There were over one hundred monasteries and some 6000 monks, per Xuanzang's recollection, and notably, they were largely following Mahayana teachings. For the most part the monks that Xuanzang had encountered on this journey were Theravada—Xuanzang refers to them as “Hinayana”, referring to the “Lesser Vehicle” in contrast to Xuanzang's own “Mahayana”, or “Greater Vehicle”.  “Theravada” refers to the “way of the elders” and while Mahayana Buddhism largely accepts the sutras of Theravada Buddhism, there are many Mahayana texts that Theravada Buddhists do not believe are canonical.  We discussed this back in Episode 84. There was apparently a story of another individual from the Yellow River being sent as a hostage to Kapisa when it was part of the Kushan Empire, under Kanishka or similar.  Xuanzang recounts various places that the hostage, described as a prince, lived or visited while in the region.  Xuanzang's arrival likely stirred the imagination of people who likely knew that the Tang were out there, but it was such a seemingly impossible distance for most people.  And yet here was someone who had traveled across all of that distance.  One of the monasteries that claimed to have been founded because of that ancient Han prince invited Xuanzang to stay with them.  Although it was a Theravada monastery, Xuanzang took them up on the offer, both because of the connection to someone who may have been his countryman, but also because of his traveling companion, Prajnakara, who was also a Theravada monk, and may not be comfortable staying at a Mahayana monastery. Xuanzang spends a good deal of ink on the stories of how various monasteries and other sites were founded in Kapisa and the surrounding areas.  He must have spent some time there to accumulate all of this information.  It is also one of the places where he seems to have hit at least twice—once on the way to India, and once during his return journey. The King of Kapisa is said to have been a devotee of Mahayana Buddhism.  He invited Xuanzang and Prajnakara to come to a Mahayana monastery to hold a Dharma gathering.  There they met with several leading figures in the monastery, and they discussed different theories.  This gathering lasted five days, and at the end, the king offered Xuanzang and the other monks five bolts of pure brocade and various other gifts.  Soon thereafter, the monk Prajnakara was invited back to Tukhara, and so he and Xuanzang parted ways. And it was about time for Xuanzang to continue onwards as well.  From Kapisa, he would travel across the “Black Range” and into Lampaka.  This may refer to the area of Laghman or Jalalabad.  Today, this is in modern Afghanistan, but for Xuanzang, this would have been the northwestern edge of India.  He was almost there. And so are we, but we'll save his trip into India for next episode. Until then thank you for listening and for all of your support. If you like what we are doing, please tell your friends and feel free to rate us wherever you listen to podcasts.  If you feel the need to do more, and want to help us keep this going, we have information about how you can donate on Patreon or through our KoFi site, ko-fi.com/sengokudaimyo, or find the links over at our main website,  SengokuDaimyo.com/Podcast, where we will have some more discussion on topics from this episode. Also, feel free to reach out to our Sengoku Daimyo Facebook page.  You can also email us at the.sengoku.daimyo@gmail.com.  Thank you, also, to Ellen for their work editing the podcast. And that's all for now.  Thank you again, and I'll see you next episode on Sengoku Daimyo's Chronicles of Japan.

Behrouz Boochani and Abdul Samad Haidari speak about their journeys as refugees, the systems which demonize asylum seekers as criminals, Manus Prison Theory and structural oppression, and the role of art, literature and storytelling in resistance an healing. Guest Profiles:Behrouz Boochani is a Kurdish-Iranian journalist, human rights defender, writer, film producer and research fellow at Canterbury University. He, along with Omid Tofighian, developed the Manus Prison Theory which is a framework to understand offshore detention facilities and how this system functions as a form of systemic violence and oppression against asylum seekers. Behrouz himself was detained at Manus Island for two years after its official closure in 2019 and his memoir, No Friend But the Mountains: Writing from Manus Prison, won the Victorian Prize for Literature and the Victorian Premier's Prize for Nonfiction in January 2019.https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2018/jul/31/writing-from-manus-prison-a-scathing-critique-of-domination-and-oppressionAbdul Samad Haidari is journalist, poet and refugee advocate. From the Hazara community in Afghanistan, he was forced to flee Afghanistan on multiple occasions having spent his childhood as a refugee in Pakistan and Iran before returning. His journalism had a particular focus on women and children's rights, terrorist group actions, transparency and accountability in government, and the systematic persecution of minority groups in both Afghanistan and Pakistan.  He spent 9 years in a refugee camp in Indonesia before making in to New Zealand. The podcast title "I am but more than a refugee" is an homage to one of the poems in his recent book. "The Unsent Condolences" https://abdulsamadhaidari.wixsite.com/site/booksSupport the showSupport us and reach out!https://smoothbrainsociety.comhttps://www.patreon.com/SmoothBrainSocietyInstagram: @thesmoothbrainsocietyTikTok: @thesmoothbrainsocietyTwitter/X: @SmoothBrainSocFacebook: @thesmoothbrainsocietyMerch and all other links: Linktreeemail: thesmoothbrainsociety@gmail.com

Today we look at the life, career and legacy of Chief Justice Qazi Faez Isa. The Pakistan Experience is an independently produced podcast looking to tell stories about Pakistan through conversations. Please consider supporting us on Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/thepakistanexperience To support the channel: Jazzcash/Easypaisa - 0325 -2982912 Patreon.com/thepakistanexperience And Please stay in touch: https://twitter.com/ThePakistanExp1 https://www.facebook.com/thepakistanexperience https://instagram.com/thepakistanexpeperience The podcast is hosted by comedian and writer, Shehzad Ghias Shaikh. Shehzad is a Fulbright scholar with a Masters in Theatre from Brooklyn College. He is also one of the foremost Stand-up comedians in Pakistan and frequently writes for numerous publications. Instagram.com/shehzadghiasshaikh Facebook.com/Shehzadghias/ Twitter.com/shehzad89 Join this channel to get access to perks: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC44l9XMwecN5nSgIF2Dvivg/join Chapters: 0:00 Introduction 2:10 Early Career and refusing PCO 3:35 Chief Justice Balochistan and Memogate 6:10 Justice Khwaja Sharif Commission 7:20 Hazara killings Suo Moto and Baloch killings Suo Moto 9:00 2016 Quetta Massacre Commission 10:15 NAB vs Hudaibiya Mills 12:43 QFI opposed Military Trials 13:30 Imran Khan and Polarization 17:01 Qazi Faez Isa's Philosophy 20:46 Monal Case 21:36 Faizabad Commission Judgment 23:30 Military Hounding Qazi Faez Isa 24:50 Why officers get plots? 29:00 Umar Ata Bandial's tenure and 63-A 32:00 Qazi Faez Isa's legal philosophy 36:43 Qazi Faez Isa becomes Chief Justice of Pakistan 38:00 Propaganda against Qazi Faez Isa 38:52 Qazi Faez Isa did not do enough for the Baloch cause 41:20 Military Establishment strengthened under QFI 43:00 Opening the Supreme Court to the media 44:36 Supreme Court Practice and Procedures Act 48:22 Mazhar Ali Naqvi and a divided Supreme Court 50:30 Qazi Faez Isa's important cases 51:50 Bat Symbol Judgment 57:23 QFI should not have sat in PTI's cases 59:30 Supreme Court did not do enough on May 9 and February 8 1:01:30 Reserved Seats Judgment 1:05:48 Mansoor Ali Shah's letter 1:08:00 26th Constitutional Amendment 1:09:51 Mubarak Sani Case 1:12:00 Donuts 1:13:41 Qazi Faez Isa's legacy

Three years ago the Taliban regained control of Afghanistan.  From his new home in Adelaide, Australia, Hazara human rights activist and photographer Muzafar Ali watched warlords returning to the places he had loved but had been forced to leave. He saw Western journalists describing a place they didn't know and didn't really understand.  So last month, Muzafar returned to Afghanistan at great personal cost to document what life is like there. He found a network of underground schools where girls are risking their lives to get an education.  Socials: Stay in touch with us on Twitter and Instagram Guest: Hazara human rights activist and photographer Muzafar Ali

Pakistan-born Asif Khan Hazara achieved the title of Asia Pacific in Australia in 2022. Currently residing in Melbourne, Hazara is competing for two Australian clubs with the ambition of becoming the first person from Pakistan to win a world championship. He is seeking support from the Pakistan government as he is self-funding his rigorous training and all other expenses. - آصف ہزارہ کہتے ہیں کہ بچپن میں کھیل کود سے شروع ہونے والا شوق وقت کے ساتھ ان کا ''پیشن‘‘ بن گیا ۔ آسٹریلیا میں ایشیاء پیسفک کا ٹائیٹل اپنے نام کرنے والے پاکستانی باکسر آج کل آسٹریلیا میں کیا کر رہے ہیں سنئیے اس پوڈکاسٹ میں۔

Episode Description Sign up to receive this Unreached of the Day podcast sent to you:  https://unreachedoftheday.org/resources/podcast/ People Group Summary: https://joshuaproject.net/people_groups//18801/IV #PrayforZERO is a podcast Sponsor.         https://prayforzero.com/ Take your place in history! We could be the generation to translate God's Word into every language. YOUR prayers can make this happen.  Take your first step and sign the Prayer Wall to receive the weekly Pray For Zero Journal:  https://prayforzero.com/prayer-wall/#join Pray for the largest Frontier People Groups (FPG): Visit JoshuaProject.net/frontier#podcast provides links to podcast recordings of the prayer guide for the 31 largest FPGs.  Go31.org/FREE provides the printed prayer guide for the largest 31 FPGs along with resources to support those wanting to enlist others in prayer for FPGs

Hàng năm, cộng đồng Hazara ở Úc lại cùng nhau ghi nhận những thành công trong học tập của thanh thiếu niên. Đêm trao giải tôn vinh giáo dục - điều mà nhiều người trong cộng đồng này coi là một đặc ân.

Every year, the Hazara community in Australia come together to acknowledge the academic success of their youth. The Awards Night celebrates education - something that many in this community consider a privilege.

Hazara refugee Dr Kumail Jaffry draws on multiple language skills to connect with patients from diverse backgrounds. It's vital in one of Australia's most multicultural communities. - چهارشنبه، ۲۱ فبروری، روز جهانی زبان مادری بود. به همین مناسبت، با پناهنده هزاره‌ای آشنا شوید که به چندین زبان تسلط دارد و در یکی از شلوغ‌ترین شفاخانه‌های آسترالیا کار می‌کند.

Người tị nạn Hazara, bác sĩ Kumail Jaffry đã vận dụng nhiều kỹ năng ngôn ngữ để kết nối với các bệnh nhân có nguồn gốc khác nhau. Điều này rất quan trọng ở một trong những cộng đồng đa văn hóa nhất nước Úc.

Hazara refugee Dr Kumail Jaffry draws on multiple language skills to connect with patients from diverse backgrounds. It's vital in one of Australia's most multicultural communities.

The Afghan Bruce Lee Abbas Alizada talks with Andrew Staton direct from the UK Martial Arts Show 2023 He reveals; How did he find out he looked like Bruce Lee? What was the first Bruce Lee film he saw? How he was discovered in Afghanistan? Was he already training in martial arts? He reveals he trains with Sifu Samuel Kwok in WING CHUN, who is a direct student of Ip Chun who was taught by his father Ip Man who famously taught Bruce Lee Abbas Alizada saw his first Bruce Lee movie as an eight-year-old in Afghanistan. However watching Fist of Fury, The Big Boss and Alizada's favourite, Enter the Dragon, was very dangerous. The Taliban a hardline Islamic regime that now rule Afghanistan have banned all television, music and cinema. “If caught I would have been punished,” said Alizada, now 29, “People were beaten and had their hands and feet chopped off.” But Alizada's connection to Lee did not stop at a love for martial arts and his movies. In 2014, Alizada shot to social media fame after friends posted photos of him on Facebook. His striking resemblance to Lee did not go unnoticed. “Afghanistan's Bruce Lee,” he said. “That's what people called me ... I was getting recognised in the street.” His looks now made him a target, as did his ethnicity. Alizada is a member of the Hazara group, one of Afghanistan's largest ethnic minority groups that has long faced violence and discrimination. “I was in danger – my training partner was killed by the Taliban.” He also feared for his wife who holds a brown belt in karate. “For women and girls life was difficult.” Under the Taliban, women are banned from many jobs, education and denied access to public parks and gyms. A British charity, along with Alizada's London-based lawyer Mahtab Aziz, helped Alizada and his family flee the war-torn country. It was a long and complicated process that included six months in Pakistan and time in Iran. One day he hopes to return to Afghanistan. “I love Kabul and I want my children to see their birth place,” he said. “I want to return when peace has returned … I believe the Taliban will be removed one day.” Interviewer Andrew Staton Filmed in 4K and directed by Matt Routledge With thanks to Bob Sykes, Paul Barnett and the UK Martial Arts Show. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Muzafar Ali is a football-loving photographer from Afghanistan, now living in Australia. When he discovered the long history of Afghan cameleers in the outback, he set off, with his camera, to find out more

Muzafar Ali is a football-loving photographer from Afghanistan, now living in Australia. When he discovered the long history of Afghan cameleers in the outback, he set off, with his camera, to find out more

On August 30th 2021, the US and its coalition partners ended their nearly twenty-year occupation of Afghanistan. Two weeks before they left, the Taliban swept across the country taking major urban centers, including Kabul. As embassies were abandoned, and as Afghans government officials fled the country, those Afghan citizens who had worked with the occupying forces faced the very real prospect of execution by the Taliban as collaborators. Yet, just Afghan interpreters had been abandoned in years past, many were left behind when the last US flight left the country. Now they, and the millions of Afghans who never had any hope of being evacuated to begin with, were left to scramble for their survival. Basir Bita last appeared on Latitude Adjustment Podcast just two weeks before the Taliban takeover of Kabul, and a month before US and international forces left the country. Though he and his family had been issued a visa for his work with the Canadian government, they were left behind. This episode is the first of a two-part series in which Basir recounts what happened next. This is the first of a two-part episode.  Also, be sure to listen to our last episode with Basir, before the fall of Kabul.Our interview with Afghan photographer and interpreter Abdul Saboor, who escaped over land to France. And our field reports and interviews with refugees in Greece. Support Latitude Adjustment Podcast on Patreon! 

Wrestling champion and Hazara refugee Ali Asghar Hussaini is finally on the road to representing Australia after 10 years in limbo. Arriving in Australia by boat, Hussaini was stuck on Safe Haven Enterprise visa but after being granted a pathway to citizenship, he's now closer to his Olympic dream.

The Haftara for Parashat Shemini, taken from the Book of Shemuel II (chapter 6), tells of the tragic events that took place during what was to have been the joyous occasion of the transportation of the Aron (ark) to King David's city near Jerusalem. The ark had been captured by the Pelishtim many years earlier, and now it was finally being returned to the capital city. During the festive procession, the ark appeared as though it would fall, and so one of the two brothers charged with transporting the sacred article – Uza – quickly put his hand on the ark to support it. G-d immediately killed Uza for disrespecting the ark. This story is read as the Haftara for Parashat Shemini, which tells the similar story of the death of two brothers – Aharon's two oldest sons, Nadab and Abihu. They, like Uza, were killed on what had been a joyous, festive occasion – the inauguration of the Mishkan. The Talmud explains that Uza was killed because he should have known that the ark did not need his support. After all, "Aron Noseh Et Nosav" – the ark actually transported those who carried it. When people appeared to carry the ark, in truth, the ark was carrying them. Thus, the ark certainly did not need anybody to keep it from falling. This mistake was regarded as a grievous sin, and thus Uza was killed. The Malbim (Rav Meir Leibush Weiser, 1809-1879) adds that Uza forgot the special Kedusha of the Aron, and displayed a lack of reverence for Hashem. This was an especially severe infraction, the Malbim explains, because Uza "forgot the fear of the King when he was still standing in front of him." Uza was standing in G-d's presence, and the failure to show awe and reverence to G-d while standing before Him constitutes a grave sin. The Malbim writes that such a sin is "Gadol Mi'neso" – "too great to bear." It is frightening to note that we find this same expression used by Maran (Rav Yosef Karo, 1488-1575), in the Shulhan Aruch (Orah Haim 124:7), in reference to the sin of conversing during the Hazara – the Hazan's repetition of the Amida prayer. After establishing that one may not engage in mundane conversation during the Hazara, Maran adds, "If one did converse, he is a sinner, and his iniquity is too great to bear." Not coincidentally, the Malbim describes the severity of Uza's sin with this same terminology. Speaking during the prayer service is precisely the same offense, forgetting "the fear of the King" while "still standing in front of him." As we stand before G-d during prayer, we must maintain an aura of respect and reverence. Engaging in conversation as we stand before Hashem is very disrespectful, and, in a sense, resembles Uza's sin, failing to conduct oneself with awe and respect in G-d's presence. Let us learn from this tragic episode the importance of maintaining decorum in the synagogue, that we must stand before G-d with respect, and show reverence for the sanctity of the Bet Kenesset.

Another bombing ripped through Kabul as the security situation continues to be a complete disaster in the country, with the Taliban being hard pressed to provide even basic security. In today's episode, we see that once again as another suicide bomb targets the Hazara community.(commercial at 7:15)to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/30/asia/kabul-explosion-education-center-intl-hnk/index.html

Another bombing ripped through Kabul as the security situation continues to be a complete disaster in the country, with the Taliban being hard pressed to provide even basic security. In today's episode, we see that once again as another suicide bomb targets the Hazara community.(commercial at 7:15)to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/30/asia/kabul-explosion-education-center-intl-hnk/index.html

Kansas City is home to a growing community of refugees from Afghanistan, including an ethnic minority known as the Hazara who are finding a place here and spreading awareness of what they call a genocide back home.

Qasim Rahimi came to Kansas City in June 2021 after the U.S. military withdrew from Afghanistan and the Taliban took over. Rahimi is a member of the Hazara, an ethnic minority group that has faced decades of violent persecution at the hands of the Taliban, and now he's working to warn the world about the genocide being carried out against his people.

In Taliban's Afghanistan, Hazara cousins, both blast victims who loved to read and learn, inspire an outdoor library - and new readers.Written by Ruchi Kumar. Read by Erica Sand. 

The Taliban, a Sunni Islamic fundamentalist and predominantly Pashtun movement, controlled most of Afghanistan from 1996 to 2001. In October 2001, U.S. and allied forces invaded the country and quickly ousted the Taliban regime following its refusal to hand over terrorist leader Osama bin Laden in the wake of al-Qaeda's 9/11 attacks. In February 2020, the U.S. government and the Taliban signed a peace deal, the so-called Doha Agreement, that set a timeline for the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan. Under the agreement, the United States pledged to draw down U.S. troops to approximately 8,500 within 135 days and complete a full withdrawal within fourteen months. In return, the Taliban pledged to prevent territory under its control from being used by terrorist groups and to enter into negotiations with the Afghan government. In April 2021, U.S. President Joe Biden announced that U.S. military forces would leave Afghanistan by September 2021. The summer of 2021, the Taliban continued its offensive, threatening government-controlled urban areas and seizing several border crossings. In early August, the Taliban began direct assaults on multiple urban areas, including Kandahar in the south and Herat in the west. The takeover threatens to reverse advances made in securing the rights of women and girls, many of which have already been significantly eroded. • In this podcast, we have Siamoy E. join us, an Afghan scholar majoring in management and international relations. She openly shares her perspective on the matter starting with life in Afghanistan before the influence of Taliban. She also discusses the ongoing initiatives to support the civilians in the country and especially women as it pertains to their education. • resources to learn moor: 1. Kite Runner- by Khaild Hussaini specifically about Hazara 2. Thousands splendid land by Khalid Hussaini

Hazara refugee and photographer Muzafar Ali fled Afghanistan in 2012 and arrived in Adelaide via Indonesia. In his quest to find belonging in a new country, Muazafar goes back in time to the Afghan cameleers, who migrated to Australia 160 years ago and whose camel trains became the foundation of the rural economy. Joey Watson follows Muzafar's journey to discover the past and present of the cameleers and Australia's colonial history

Closing the curtain on one phase of your life and starting the next can be terrifying. Moments where we choose to change, or life forces us to suddenly shift, can happen many times throughout our lives But we do it in hopes of finding a life that is better, one closer to who we truly are. A Hazara woman who was forced to flee her home in Afghanistan starts over in Saskatoon. An Oji-Cree man reclaims his family name as he prepares to fulfill his musical dreams A former Olympian goes on a journey to find who he truly is after having his career cut short. And after a couple of tumultuous decades, a 58 year old woman finds a new life in law.

There are many halachic issues concerning leaving food on the fire from before Shabbat. The use of a blech or Shabbat hotplate alleviates these concerns. Hazara is a general prohibition of returning or placing food on the fire on Shabbat itself. It is forbidden under all circumstances to put any type of food on an open flame on Shabbat. This applies even to hot, solid, fully cooked foods. One might ask, "Why is it prohibited to put even cooked food on an open fire? If it's already been cooked before Shabbat, it can't be cooked a second time? The reason is that when one puts it back on an open flame, even though it's already cooked, it appears that it is now being cooked for the first time. This concern is known as Mechzay K'Mivashel. Therefore, the Rabbis said, if one uses a blech or a Shabbat hotplate, there is no concern of Mechzay K'Mivashel. Since these apparatuses are not the normal method of cooking, it does not appear that one is actually cooking. It would then be permitted to reheat cooked food on Shabbat, under three conditions: First, the fire must not be an open flame. One must use either a blech or a Shabbat hotplate to avoid the issue of Mechzay K'Mivashel and the concern that one may adjust the heat (stoke the coals). Second, the food must be already cooked. If it hasn't been cooked, one would be violating the Torah prohibition of cooking on Shabbat. Third, we must determine whether the food must still be hot. If it's a liquid food, it must still be hot. Reheating a cold liquid constitutes an act of cooking and is forbidden under any circumstance. However, if the food is solid, like rice for example, there are poskim that permit taking it even from the refrigerator, on Shabbat, and putting it back on the blech or hotplate. This is Hacham Ovadia's opinion in Hazon Ovadia as well as in Yehave Da'at. This is also the position of the Menuchat Ahava (1:3, Rabbi Moshe Halevi (1961-2001)) and Hacham David, in his new book (p. 247). This is also the opinion of Hacham Yitzchak Sternbaum in Yitzchak Yiranen. He explains that one is allowed to put cold solid food from the refrigerator back onto the blech or hotplate even though the Shulhan Aruch rules that one is allowed to return something only if it wasn't put down yet. Having a blech or hotplate allows one to take it out of the refrigerator, which is considered "put down", since this is a different apparatus and not the usual method for cooking. Summary: It is always forbidden to put food on an open flame on Shabbat. It is always forbidden to reheat cold liquids, even on a blech or hotplate. One can be lenient and take cold, solid food from the refrigerator on Shabbat and put it on the blech or hotplate.

Afghanistan's Hazara community, a Shiite minority, is regularly targeted by the Afghan branch of the Islamic State (IS) group, which considers Hazaras as heretics. Dozens of people, mostly girls, were killed in an attack on an education centre in a Shiite neighbourhood of Kabul on September 30. Although the attack has not been claimed, the IS group is the main suspect. Since the Taliban seized power a year ago, Hazaras denounce systemic discrimination and the inability of the new authorities to ensure their safety. Our correspondents report.

Another bombing ripped through Kabul as the security situation continues to be a complete disaster in the country, with the Taliban being hard pressed to provide even basic security. In today's episode, we see that once again as another suicide bomb targets the Hazara community. (commercial at 7:15)to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/30/asia/kabul-explosion-education-center-intl-hnk/index.html

Another bombing ripped through Kabul as the security situation continues to be a complete disaster in the country, with the Taliban being hard pressed to provide even basic security. In today's episode, we see that once again as another suicide bomb targets the Hazara community. (commercial at 7:15)to contact me:bobbycapucci@protonmail.comsource:https://www.cnn.com/2022/09/30/asia/kabul-explosion-education-center-intl-hnk/index.html

About 20 people have been killed and dozens wounded in a suicide blast at a Kabul tutoring centre on Friday.

In this latest Hindi bulletin: The Australian government urged to step up its response to help, after Hazara students are attacked in Kabul; Health advocates urge more resources for the public hospital system, as COVID-19 measures are further wound back; India stayed away from voting in the United Nations Security Council on resolution demanding Russia's immediately withdrawal from Ukraine and more news.

The Australian government urged to step up its response to help, after Hazara students are attacked in Kabul and Healthcare workers concerned over the scrapping of COVID isolation rules ahead of potential November wave. - اردو خبریں یکم اکتوبر 2022

President Putin has announced at the Kremlin that occupied parts of four regions of Ukraine - Luhansk, Donetsk, Kherson and Zaporizhzhia - are now parts of Russia. Ukraine, its allies, and the United Nations Secretary General have all denounced the claim as an escalation and illegal under international law. We hear from a Russian MP and a Ukrainian MP, and from an unhappy resident of occupied Kherson. And we report from Zaporizhzhia, where at least 25 people were killed after a humanitarian convoy was shelled by Russian forces. Also in the programme: we hear from the Afghan capital Kabul, where a suicide bomber has killed at least nineteen people, most of them female students, at an educational centre in the Hazara area of the city. (Image: Russian President Vladimir Putin delivers a speech during a ceremony to declare the annexation of the Russian-controlled territories of four of Ukraine"s regions, Moscow, Russia, September 30, 2022 . Credit: Sputnik/Grigory Sysoyev/Kremlin via Reuters)

*) Putin to annex four Ukraine territories with 'major speech' as West fumes Russia is set to formally annex four occupied regions of Ukraine at a ceremony that the Kremlin says will feature a major speech by President Vladimir Putin. In a presidential decree, Putin has already recognised the independence of Zaporizhzhia and Kherson. He made a similar move in connection with Donetsk and Luhansk in February. Kiev and its Western allies have denounced the annexation, describing the Moscow-backed separatist votes that preceded it as a sham and an attempt at unlawful land grab. *) Suicide attack at tutoring centre in Afghan capital kills 19 A suicide attack at a learning centre in the Afghan capital has killed at least 19 people. There was no immediate claim of responsibility for the blast. The incident happened in a neighbourhood of western Kabul that is a predominantly Shia Muslim area home to the minority Hazara community. Students were preparing for an exam when a suicide bomber struck at the educational centre, police said, adding that over 20 people have suffered injuries. *) Hurricane Ian veers toward Carolinas after pummeling Florida A resurgent Hurricane Ian has barrelled north toward a second landfall in South Carolina, a day after carving a path of destruction across central Florida. Ian, which had weakened to a tropical storm, regained Category 1 hurricane strength while churning toward South Carolina above the Atlantic Ocean. Ian first came ashore in Florida on Wednesday as one of the most powerful storms ever to hit the US mainland. President Joe Biden has said that preliminary reports suggested a "substantial" loss of life. *) Iran ups pressure on celebrities, media over Mahsa Amini protests Iran has stepped up pressure on celebrities and journalists over the recent wave of protests, which has been backed by filmmakers, athletes, musicians and actors. Iran's warnings came after almost two weeks of demonstrations across Iran and a deadly crackdown that rights groups say has been marked by violence by security forces. Public anger has flared since authorities announced the death of 22-year-old Mahsa Amini, who had been held for allegedly wearing a hijab headscarf in an improper way. And finally… *) FIFA World Cup: Fans won't need Covid jabs but negative tests required Coronavirus vaccinations will not be mandatory for the million-plus fans going to Qatar for the football World Cup that starts on November 20. But all visitors aged over six will have to produce negative Covid-19 tests before taking flights to Qatar. Players and match officials may be forced into a secure "bio-bubble" if Covid-19 cases take off again. The tournament will be the first major global sporting event with fans since the eruption of the Covid pandemic in December 2019.

Marked as enemies of the new Taliban regime by his work with Westerners and his family's Hazara ethnicity, Hamid, his wife, their 8-year-old daughter, and their new baby move furtively from place to place, living under assumed names. Their year in Taliban-controlled Afghanistan echoes Hamid's own war-torn childhood as he tries to guarantee his daughter's future. Suddenly, an escape route opens: Will they finally make it out?Created by Afghans forced into exile when the Taliban took over last year, “No Way Home” tells of the perilous exodus born of two decades of broken promises in the U.S. war on terror. Through the stories of four Afghans who tried to leave when the U.S. military pulled out of Afghanistan last summer, these Afghan storytellers use their own experiences of departure, loss, and resilience to illuminate the dark end of America's longest war. A production of The Intercept and New America, “No Way Home” is a four-part series available on the Intercepted podcast. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

On this Gendering Geopolitics with Emily Prey the BBC's Sana Safi discusses Biden's decision to unfreeze Afghan funds for in-country relief and 9/11 families, the risks facing the Hazara, and the situation for Afghan Women.

Ethnic and religious minorities in Afghanistan have historically faced persecution and violence, which intensified at the hands of various armed groups over the last four decades. The Hazara, an ethnic and religious minority group, remain a primary target of attacks. On June 3, USIP and the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum’s Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide held a discussion with distinguished experts and activists to assess the atrocity risks faced by Hazaras and other vulnerable groups in Afghanistan and the key perpetrators driving the rising threat. Speakers Scott Worden, introductory remarksDirector, Afghanistan & Central Asia, U.S Institute of Peace Rina Amiri, keynote remarks U.S. Special Envoy for Afghan Women, Girls and Human RightsFarkhondeh AkbariPostdoctoral Fellow, Gender, Peace and Security Centre, Monash University Lauren BaillieSenior Program Officer, Atrocity Prevention, U.S Institute of Peace Shukria DellawarLegislative and Policy Manager for the Prevention of Violent Conflict, Friends Committee on National Legislation Naomi Kikoler, moderator Director, Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide, U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum For more information about this event, please visit: https://www.usip.org/events/preventing-mass-atrocities-afghanistan

Siamo tornati in Texas, dove dopo la strage alla scuola elementare di Uvalde - nella quale sono rimasti uccisi 19 bambini e due insegnanti - tra qualche giorno si terrà la convention della National Rifle Association: ne abbiamo parlato con Joe Lansdale (scrittore texano, il suo ultimo romanzo è "Moon Lake", pubblicato in Italia da Einaudi editore) e Patrick Blanchfield (Associate Faculty Member del Brooklyn Institute for Research, fa ricerca su diffusione delle armi da fuoco e violenza). Subito dopo siamo tornati in Ucraina, dove la Russia pone un ritiro delle sanzioni come condizione per l'allentamento dei controlli sui carichi di grano custoditi nei porti del Mar Nero: ne abbiamo parlato con l'Ammiraglio Giuseppe De Giorgi (ex Capo di Stato Maggiore della Marina e docente alla Webster University). Infine siamo andati in Afghanistan, dove i giornalisti di Tolo News hanno deciso di andare in onda con i volti coperti per solidarietà alle colleghe donne - costrette a coprire il volto dai talebani - mentre proseguono gli attentati suicidi contro la comunità Hazara: ne abbiamo parlato con Zirak Faheem (caporedattore di ToloNews) e abbiamo sentito le risposte del portavoce dei Talebani Bilal Karimi, raccolte dal giornalista Morteza Pajhwok.

On the first full day of the Russian offensive to capture the Donbas, Ukrainian forces say they're holding the line in the east of the country against a broad attack, despite intense bombardment in the Luhansk region. Also in the programme: the British prime minister, Boris Johnson, has given what he called a wholehearted apology to parliament after he was fined for breaking Covid lockdown laws; and a Hazara student in Kabul tells us what life is like now for the predominantly Shia ethnic group on the day that six Hazara pupils were killed in a suspected targeted bomb attack. (Photo: A Ukrainian serviceman with a dog stands on a position in a zone between Luhansk and Donetsk areas, Ukraine, 18 April 2022, amid increasing Russian troops activity. Credit: EPA/STR)

Oggi, cinquantacinquesimo giorno della guerra in Ucraina, è iniziata la fase due dell'offensiva russa, la fase forse decisiva, quella che sancirà o meno la caduta di Mariupol. Ne abbiamo parlato con Vincenzo Camporini, consigliere scientifico IAI, già capo di stato maggiore della Difesa, e con Mara Morini, docente di Politica dell'Europa Orientale all'Università di Genova. Almeno 25 persone sono rimaste uccise in diverse esplosioni avvenute questa mattina nelle vicinanze di alcune scuole di Kabul. Nel quartiere abita una folta comunità Hazara. Ne abbiamo parlato con Morteza Pahjwok, giornalista freelance in Afghanistan, e Zakaria Ulfat, insegnante della Scuola Abarrahim Shahid.

From the heart of the Mongolian steppe, to North China's loess plateaus; from the rugged edges of Northern India, to the hot sands of Syria and the Levant, to humid jungles in southeastern Asia, rocky islands off the coast of Japan, the high peaks of the Caucasus, Himalayas, Altai, Tien Shan and Carpathian Mountains, to the frozen rivers  in Rus' granting access to Eastern Europe, and everywhere in between.  Our series on the Mongol Empire has taken you across Eurasia, meeting all sorts of figures; the brutal Tamerlane, the indefatigable Sultan Baybars, the brave if shortsighted Jalal al-Din Mingburnu and his foolish father Muhammad Khwarezmshah; the cunning Jia Sidao, the silver-tongued Qiu Chuji, the thorough scholar Rashid al-Din, and travellers like John de Plano Carpini, William of Rubruck, and Ibn Battuta, to the exhausted but noble-hearted Yelü Chücai. And of course, the Mongols themselves: the powerful Öz Beğ, Khan of the Golden Horde; the thorough and pious convert Ghazan Il-Khan; the scheming Du'a of the Chagatais, the stout Qaidu Khan of the Ögedaids, to the Great Khans of the thirteenth century, the most powerful of men; Khubilai, whose hands scrambled for more until his body and empire failed his ambitions; his brother Möngke, whose steely determination sought to solidify the empire at all costs, no matter the bloodshed; Güyük, a reluctant and unfortunate man to ascend to the throne; his mother Törögene, whose fierce will forced her son to that same throne; Ögedai, a drunk who despite his failings built the infrastructure of the empire. And of course, Chinggis himself; once a scared boy in the steppes, turned into the greatest conqueror of them all. Today we end our journey with the Empire of the Great Khans, and reflect on the passage of the Chinggisids. I'm your host David, and this is Kings and Generals, Ages of Conquest.       Back in our first episode, we highlighted certain trends to look for over the course of this series. The first emphasized looking for the middle ground between the Mongols as inherently evil or good forces, but as people whose expansion was rooted in historical events and personages. The second was the struggles that came with the management of a world empire, and the need to rely on non-Mongolian subject peoples—Chinese, Central Asian Muslims, Persians, Turks and others. The third was the struggle for the purpose of the empire; should it be continued conquest, or consolidation and serving the needs of the imperial princes. This was the balance between the Khan and his central government, or the Chinggisid and military aristocrats. The fourth was the steady assimilation, particularly Turkification, of the Mongols outside of Mongolia, as Mongolian was replaced as the language of administration, legitimacy and finally, among the ruling family itself, even while retaining the Mongolian imperial ideology.        Regarding the first theme, we have sought to highlight in our many discussions of sources their often complicated, conflicting portrayals or events and persons. While authors like Ibn al-Athir, Nasawi and Juzjani had little good to say about the Mongols or Chinggis Khan, and fit well with the popular model the destructive brute, we've also looked at many sources which had more positive portrayals of the khans. Some of these are rather obvious, imperial-produced sources such as the Secret History of the Mongols, but even sources from outside the empire could give glowing reviews of Chinggis Khan. For instance, the fourteenth century English writer Geoffrey Chaucer, in the Squire's Tale of his famous Canterbury Tales, opens with the following lines:   At Tzarev in the land of Tartary There dwelt a king at war with Muscovy Which brought the death of many a doughty man This noble king was known as Cambuskan And in his time enjoyed such great renown That nowhere in that region up or down Was one so excellent in everything; Nothing he lacked belonging to a king.       Written at the same time as Toqtamish Khan of the Golden Horde was fighting for control of that Khanate, here Chaucher remembered Chinggis Khan not as a bloodthirsty barbarian, but as a monarch embodying all ideal qualities of kingship. Chaucer continues thusly;   As to the faith in which he had been born He kept such loyalties as he had sworn, Then he was powerful and wise and brave, Compassionate and just, and if he gave His word he kept it, being honourable, The same to all, benevolent, and stable As is a circle's centre; and in fight As emulous as any squire or knight. Young personable, fresh and fortunate, Maintaining such a kingliness of state There never was his match in mortal man, This noble king, this Tartar Cambuskan.        For writers in fourteenth century England, obviously distant from the Mongol Empire itself, it was not unbecoming to idealize the portrayal of Chinggis Khan. This is not to say that Chaucher's description is accurate, or necessarily reflects any actual qualities about the man or any of his descendants. But rather, it reflects historical perception. How an individual is perceived by contemporaries, history, and modern people often bears little resemblance to actual details of the individual.  Instead, people will contort an image for whatever use suits their current purposes, context and political climate. Thus, warlords from the late imperial, and post-Mongol world styled Chinggis' image to suit their needs. In Central Asia Chinggisid descent remained one of the most prestigious, and necessary, requirements for rulership up until the nineteenth century in some areas. This was problematic though with the spread of Islam, given that Chinggis Khan's actual life produced very few episodes to nicely accommodate an Islamic narrative. Certain Persian writings during the Ilkhanate sought to fix this by making Chinggis a Muslim in all but name. On the tomb of Tamerlane, an inscription likely added during the reign of his grandson Ulugh Beğ, makes Tamerlane a descendant of both the Prophet Muhammad and of Chinggis Khan. Later post-imperial authors had a more direct solution; simply making Chinggis Khan outright a Muslim. As the destruction of the conquests slipped further back in time, this became easier and easier to accomplish.    Religion was not the only aspect which can be molded, for Chinggis' very status as a Mongol becomes malleable in state efforts to construct national mythos, in both medieval and modern settings. Today, you can find countries where official propaganda, or influential theorists, incorporate Chinggis into the desired story of their nation-state. In China, there remains a significant Mongolian population, largely in what the Chinese call the Inner Mongolian Autonomous Region, the land south of the Gobi desert but north of the mountains which divide it from the North China plain. The Chinese government has taken to presenting China's non-Han peoples, Mongols among them, more or less as Chinese minority peoples and actively encourages their adoption of the state-language, Mandarin, and Han Chinese culture. In this view, the Mongol conquests are sometimes presented as a period of national reunification rather than foreign conquest. The efforts of Khubilai Khaan to legitimize the Yuan Dynasty based on Chinese dynastic legal precedent becomes the quote-on-quote “historical evidence,” that Chinggis Khan was actually Chinese, or that in fact, the Mongol conquerors were fully assimilated into the Chinese population and culture. The borders of the Yuan Dynasty served to justify later Chinese territorial claims in Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang, Manchuria, Tibet and Yunnan; places that were, before the Mongols, inconsistently in the Chinese sphere of influence, but since the conquests have often remained dominated by empires based in China. Not coincidentally, such narratives serve to support the narrative of 5,000 years of a continuous Chinese Empire, and remove the sting that may accompany the embarrassment of being conquered by perceived barbarians.    Likewise, various Turkic peoples, most notably Kazakhs, Tatars, and Anatolian Turks, have sought to claim Chinggis as their own, and there are even groups in Korea and Japan that will argue that Chinggis was actually one of theirs. The Japanese version has Chinggis as the Samurai Minamoto no Yoshitsune, who faked his death and fled Japan for the steppe! Khubilai's later invasions of Japan again become not foreign assaults, but attempts at national reunification or the efforts by Yoshitsune's descendants to return home. And of course, fringe groups even in Europe and Russia which, refusing to believe a barbarian horseman could conquer such great states, insist that Chinggis was actually a red-haired, green-eyed man of European ancestry. Such claims often include vague references to the mummies of the Tarim Basin, who bore some features associated with Caucasian populations. The fact that these mummies pre-date Chinggis by millenia is often conveniently left out. All of these people care much more about ethnic categorization than Chinggis himself likely ever did.        Just as religion or ethnicity can be forced to fit certain agendas, so too can portrayal as barbarian or saviour. In Mongolia today, Chinggis Khan's unification of the Mongols, his introduction of a writing system, religious tolerance, laws and stability are most heavily emphasized. For building a post-soviet national identity, obviously these are useful attributes to appeal to for the desired national character. But the Mongolian governmet also tends to gloss over the aspects less appreciated in the twenty-first century: namely, the destruction of people and property on a massive scale, mass-rapes, towers of skulls and wars of conquest. The fact that Mongolia's two neighbours, Russia and China, suffered particularly under Mongol onslaughts, also avoids some diplomatic hurdles to step past these military aspects. For most of the twentieth century during Mongolia's years as a Soviet satellite state, Chinggis was largely pushed aside, framed as a feudal lord. Instead, Mongolia's hero of the 1921 socialist revolution, Damdin Sükhbaatar, became the preferred national icon. After Mongolia was democratized in the 1990s after the fall of the USSR, Chinggis Khan has seen a massive resurgence in popularity. Today, Chinggis and Sükhbaatar remain national icons, with monuments to both throughout the country. Outside Mongolia's parliament, the main square has changed names from Sükhbaatar to Chinggis Square, and since back to Sükhbaatar square. An equestrian statue to Sükhbaatar sits in the middle of that square. More than a few foreign observers had mistakenly called this a statue of Chinggis. In fact, only a few metres away from the equestrian statue of Sükhbaatar sits a massive Chinggis Khan on a throne flanked by his generals, at the top of the steps leading into Mongolia's parliament. In a way it is metaphorical. No matter how prominent any later hero of Mongolia may be, he will always stand in the shadow of Chinggis Khan.  And that's not even mentioning the 40 metre tall silver monstrosity about 50 kilometres outside of Ulaanbaatar. Speaking of state narratives, much of the cost for this statue was covered by the company owned by Khaltmaagin Battulga, a former professional sambo wrestler who from 2017-2021 served as the fifth President of Mongolia.       Outside of Mongolia though, Chinggis and the Mongol Empire remain a top-point of reference to paint someone in the most unfavourable light. One of the highest level cases of recent years was when the President of Iraq, the late Saddam Hussein, compared former US President George W. Bush to Hülegü, Chinggis' grandson and conqueror of Baghdad. The American bombing and capture of Baghdad, and ensuing tragedies that Iraq as suffered in the aftermath of the campaign, have only solidified the connection for a number of Muslims.  Meanwhile Russian television and education tend to present the Mongols in a style comparable to Zack Snyder's film 300, such as the 2017 Russian film Легенда о Коловрате [Legenda O Kolovrate], also known as Furious. Like the Spartans in the film or Frank Miller's graphic novel, the Rus' soldiers are presented as formidable warriors fighting monstrous, untrained hordes from the east. Only through sheer numbers or trickery do the disgusting Orientals overcome the pasty-white heroes of the story— though few of the heroes in the Russian films have Scottish accents. Russia has turned the so-called Tatar Yoke into a catch-all to explain any perceived deficiencies compared to western Europe, from government absolutism to alcoholism. Not only the Russians have employed the comparison: “scratch a Russian and you'll find a Tatar,” Napoleon Bonaparte is supposed to have quipped. And in 2018 the Wall Street Journal released a particularly poorly written article, which compared the political machinations of current president Vladimir Putin as “Russia's turn to its Asian past,” accompanied by vague comparisons to the Mongols and an awful portrait of Putin drawn in Mongolian armour. In contrast, the Russian Defence Minister, at the time of writing, is Sergei Shoigu, a fellow of Tuvan descent who is alleged to enjoy comparisons of himself to Sübe'edei, the great Mongol general popularly, though inaccurately, portrayed as a Tuvan. The 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, essentially a good old-fashioned war of conquests accompanied by war crimes and destruction of cities, has also earned many comparisons to the Mongol conquests by many online commentators. Though unlike the Russians, the Mongols actually took Kyiv.   Somewhat surprisingly, most cinematic portrayals of Chinggis himself lean towards sympathetic or heroic. One of the most recent is a 2018 Chinese film entitled Genghis Khan in English, which features a slim Chinese model in the titular role, and one of his few depictions without any facial hair. In that film he battles a bunch of skeletons and monsters, and it could be best described as “not very good,” as our series researcher can, unfortunately, attest. One popular portrayal is the 2007 film Mongol, directed by Sergei Bodrov and starring a Japanese actor in the role of Chinggis. That actor, by the way, went on to play one of Thor's buddies in the Marvel movies.  Here, Chinggis is a quiet, rather thoughtful figure, in a film which emphasizes the brutal childhood he suffered from. Another sympathetic portrayal, and one perhaps the most popular in Mongolia, is the 2004 Inner Mongolian series where Ba Sen, an actor who claims descent from Chagatai and appeared in the previously two mentioned films, plays the role of Chinggis.       Hollywood does not tend to portray Chinggis Khan or the Mongols in films at all, but when it does, it really goes for a swing and a miss. Bill and Ted's Excellent Adventure has Chinggis essentially only a step above a cave-man in that film. Other Hollywood endeavours are infamous for having non-Asian actors in the role, such as Egyptian-born Omar Shariff in 1965's Genghis Khan, Marvin Miller in 1951's The Golden Horde and the most infamous of them all, the cowboy John Wayne in 1956's The Conqueror. That film's theatrical release poster bears the tasteful tagline of, “I am Temujin…barbarian… I fight! I love! I conquer… like a Barbarian!” The film was also produced by Howard Hughes, founder of Playboy Magazine, and was filmed near a nuclear testing site.  As you may suspect, that film bears as much resemblance to the historical events as an opium-induced fever dream.        The appearance and depiction of Chinggis and his successors varies wildly. The internet today loves the stories of Chinggis being the ancestor of millions of people, and killing so many people that it changed the earth's climate. The articles that made both of these claims though, rested on shaky evidence. In the first, which we dedicated an entire episode of this podcast too, the study claimed that high rates of a certain haplotype among the Hazara of Afghanistan demonstrated that Chinggis himself bore that haplotype, and Chinggis was extrapolated to be the ancestor of other peoples bearing such a haplotype. But the historical sources indicate Chinggis and his immediate descendants spent little time in Afghanistan, and the associated Haplotype was probably one associated with various populations leaving Mongolia over centuries, rather than specifically Chinggis himself.  Likewise, the study which spawned the claim that the Mongols killed enough people to cool the climate, firstly did not make that claim itself, but moreso incorrectly made the Mongol conquests last from 1206 to 1380, and presented it as an almost two-century period of population decline brought on by Mongolian campaigns; despite the fact that the major destructive Mongolian military campaigns largely halted after 1279. While campaigns continued after that, they were never on the level of the great-campaigns of conquest. Thus it's irresponsible to claim that any atmospheric carbon loss over the fourteenth century was brought on by continued Mongol military efforts.       What these two popular descriptions lend themselves to, is one of extremes. The internet loves extremes of anything. For instance, since 1999 the Internet has always sought to outdo itself in declaring the latest Star Wars product to actually be the worst thing ever made. And the Mongol Empire, as history's largest contiguous land-empire, responsible for immense destruction and long-ranging campaigns and forced migrations, can easily slot in this ‘extreme manner.' A “top-ten” list where the author writes about how the Mongols were the most extreme and destructive and badass thing ever, repeating the same 10 facts, probably gets released on the internet every other month. Just as national-myth makers in Ulaanbaatar, Beijing and Moscow set how to portray the Mongol Empire in the way most suited to them, so too does the internet and its writers choose an aspect of the empire to emphasis; be it religious tolerance, free-trade, brutality, multi-culturalism, Islam, clash of civilizations, human impact on climate, the territorial expanse of a certain country or its national identity, or whatever argument the author hopes to make.        The Mongol Empire though remains in the past, and should be treated, and learned about, as such.  The events which led to the rise, expansion and fall of the Mongol Empire do not fit into nice, sweeping modern narratives, but their own historical context and situation. The Mongol Empire was not predetermined to ever expand out of Mongolia, or to break apart in 1260; had Chinggis Khan been struck by an arrow outside the walls of Zhongdu, or Möngke lived another ten years, in both cases the empire, and indeed the world, would look dramatically different. History is not the things which ought to be or needed to happen or were supposed to happen; it is the things that did happen, and those things did not occur simply for the purposes of the modern world to exist. A million choices by hundreds of millions of individuals, affected by climate and geography with a healthy dose of luck and happenstance, resulted in the world as we know it. Reading backwards from the present to understand the course of the Mongol Empire, and attempting to make it fit into the political narratives we like today, only does a disservice to history. It should be seen not as a virtuous force bringing continental peace justified by easier trade, nor as a demonic horde, but as an event within human history, in which real humans took part, where great tragedy occured in the pursuit of empire.     History is not just written by the victor of the actual battles; as we've detailed across this series, we have no shortage of historical sources on the Mongol Empire; imperial approved sources, sources by travellers passing through the empire, to sources written by the peoples the Mongols crushed. Instead, the history learned in schools and passed down through historical memory and media is built on top of preferred state narratives, those made today and in the past.   Our series on the Mongol Empire concludes next week with a final afterward on Mongolia after 1368, so be sure to subscribe to the Kings and Generals podcast to follow. If you enjoyed this was want to help us keep bringing you great content, then consider supporting us on patreon at www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. This episode was researched and written by our series historian, Jack Wilson. I'm your host David, and we'll catch you on the next one. 

Anne C. Richard, distinguished fellow and Afghanistan coordination lead at Freedom House, will lead a conversation on refugees and global migration. FASKIANOS: Thank you. Welcome to the final session of the Winter/Spring 2022 CFR Academic Webinar Series. I'm Irina Faskianos, vice president of the National Program and Outreach here at CFR. Today's discussion is on the record, and the video and transcript will be available on our website, CFR.org/academic. As always, CFR takes no institutional positions on matters of policy. We are delighted to have Anne Richard with us today to talk about refugees and global migration. Ms. Richard is a distinguished fellow and Afghanistan coordination lead at Freedom House. She has taught at several universities including Georgetown, University of Virginia, Hamilton College, and the University of Pennsylvania. From 2012 to 2017, Ms. Richard served as an assistant secretary of state for population, refugees, and migration, and before joining the Obama administration she served as vice president of government relations and advocacy for the International Rescue Committee. She has also worked at the Peace Corps headquarters and the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, and is a member of CFR. So, Anne, thank you very much for being with us today. With your background and experience, it would be great if you could talk from your vantage point—give us an overview of the current refugee trends you are—we are seeing around the world, especially vis-à-vis the war in Ukraine, the withdrawal from Afghanistan, et cetera. RICHARD: Thank you so much, Irina, for inviting me today and for always welcoming me back to the Council. And thank you to your team for putting this together. I'm very happy to speak about the global refugee situation, which, unfortunately, has, once again, grown yet larger in a way that is sort of stumping the international community in terms of what can well-meaning governments do, what can foundations and charitable efforts and the United Nations (UN) do to help displaced people. I thought we could start off talking a little bit about definitions and data, and the idea is that I only speak about ten minutes at this beginning part so that we can get to your questions all the more quickly. But for all of us to be on the same wavelength, let's recall that refugees, as a group, have an organization that is supposed to look out for them. The UN High Commissioner for Refugees is the title of the number-one person in the organization, but the entire organization is known by that name, UNHCR, or the UN Refugee Agency. It also has a convention—the 1951 Refugee Convention—that came about after World War II and was very focused on not allowing to happen again what had happened during World War II where victims of the Nazis and, as time went on, people fleeing fascism, people fleeing communism, couldn't get out of their countries and were persecuted because of this. And there's a legal definition that comes out of the convention that different countries have, and the U.S. legal definition matches very much the convention's, which is that refugees have crossed an international border—they're not in their home country anymore—and once they've crossed an international border the sense is that they are depending on the international community to help them and that they're fleeing for specific purposes—their race, their religion, their ethnicity, their membership in a particular social group such as being LGBTQ, or political thought. And if you think back to the Cold War, these were some of the refugees coming out of the former Soviet Union, coming out of Eastern Europe, were people who had spoken out and were in trouble and so had to flee their home countries. So what are the numbers then? And I'm going to refer you to a very useful page on the UN High Commissioner for Refugees website, which is their “Figures at a Glance” presentation, and we're going to reference some of the numbers that are up there now. But those numbers change every year. They change on June 20, which is World Refugee Day. And so every year it hits the headlines that the numbers have gone up, unfortunately, and you can anticipate this if you think in terms of the summer solstice, the longest day of the year. It's usually June 20, 21, 22. So June 20, that first possible day, is every year World Refugee Day. So if you're working on behalf of refugees it's good sometimes to schedule events or anticipate newspaper articles and conversations about refugees ticking up in—at the end of June. So if you were paying attention last June for World Refugee Day, UNHCR would have unveiled a number of 82.4 million refugees around the world, and so this upcoming June what do we anticipate? Well, we anticipate the numbers will go up again and, in fact, yesterday the high commissioner was in Washington, met with Secretary of State Tony Blinken, and they met the press and Filippo Grandi, the current high commissioner, said that he thinks the number is closer to ninety-five to ninety-six million refugees. So, clearly, a couple things have happened since last June. One is that so many people are trying to flee Afghanistan and another is so many people have fled Ukraine. So if we went back to that $82.4 million figure that we know we have details on, we would find that this is the figure of people who are displaced because of conflict or persecution around the world. The ones that count as refugees who have actually crossed an international border is a smaller number. It's 20.7 million people that UNHCR is concerned about and then another close to six million people who are Palestinians in the Middle East whose displacement goes back to 1948, the creation of the statehood of Israel, and upheaval in the Middle East region as Palestinians were shifted to live elsewhere. And so—and they are provided assistance by a different UN agency, UNRWA—UN Relief Works Administration in the Near East—and so if you see a number or you see two sets of numbers for refugees and they're off by about five or six million people, the difference is the Palestinian, that number—whether it's being counted in, which is for worldwide numbers, or out because UNHCR cares for most refugees on Earth but did not have the responsibility for the Palestinians since UNRWA was set up with that specific responsibility. So what's the big difference then between the eighty-two million, now growing to ninety-five million, and this smaller number of refugees? It's internally displaced persons (IDPs). These are people who are displaced by conflict or are displaced by persecution, are running for their lives, but they haven't left their own countries yet. So think of Syrians who, perhaps, are displaced by war and they have crossed their own countries and gone to a safer place within their own country but they haven't crossed that border yet. Others who have crossed into Lebanon or Turkey or Jordan or Iraq or have gone further afield to Egypt, those would be considered refugees. Who's responsible for the IDPs then? Well, legally, their own countries are supposed to take care of them. But in my Syria example, the problem is Syria was bombing its own people in certain areas of the country, and so they were not protecting their own people as they should be. People can be displaced by things other than war and conflict and persecution, of course. More and more we talk about climate displacement, and this is a hot issue that we can talk about later. But who's responsible then when people are displaced by changing climactic conditions and it's their own governments who are supposed to help them? But more and more questions have been raised about, well, should the international community come together and do more for this group of people—for internally displaced persons—especially when their own governments are unwilling or unable to do so? What about migrants? Who are the migrants? Migrants is a much broader term. Everyone I've talked about so far who's crossed a border counts as a migrant. Migrants are just people on the go, and the International Organization for Migration estimates there's about 281 million migrants on Earth today—about 3.6 percent of the world population—and one of the big issues I've pushed is to not see migrants as a dirty word. Unfortunately, it often is described that way—that migratory flows are bad, when, in fact, lots of people are migrants. Students who travel to the U.S. to take classes are migrants to our country. The secretary general of the United Nations, António Guterres, who was himself for eleven years the high commissioner for refugees, he says, I am a migrant, because he's a Portuguese person working in New York City. People hired by Silicon Valley from around the world to work in high-paid jobs, legally in the United States, they are migrants. More concerning are vulnerable migrants, people who are displaced and don't have the wherewithal to, necessarily, protect themselves, take care of themselves, on the march or where they end up, or also if they're seen as traveling without papers, not welcome in the places where they're going, that can be a very, very dangerous situation for them. So be aware that migrants is a really broad all-encompassing term that can include travelers, businesspeople, as well as vulnerable and very poor people who are economic migrants. Finally, immigrants are people who set out and migrate because they intend to live somewhere else, and when we were talking about the Trump administration's policies to reduce the number of refugees coming to the U.S. we also see that immigration to the U.S. also was decreased during that administration as well. So both the refugee program and a lot of the immigration pathways to the U.S. are now being examined and trying to be not just fixed, because a lot of them have needed care for quite some time, but also put back on a growth trajectory. And then asylum seekers are people who get to a country on their own, either they have traveled to a border or they pop up inside a country because they have gotten in legally through some other means such as a visitor visa or business visa, and then they say, I can't go home again. It's too dangerous for me to go home again. Please, may I have asylum? May I be allowed to stay here and be protected in your country? So that's a lot of different terminology. But the more you work on it, the more these terms—you get more familiar using them and understand the differences between them that experts or legal experts use. So ninety-five to ninety-six million people, as we see another eleven million people fleeing Ukraine and of that four million, at least, have crossed the borders into neighboring countries and another seven million are internally displaced, still inside Ukraine but they've gone someplace that they feel is safer than where they were before. When we looked at the eighty million refugees and displaced people, we knew that two-thirds of that number came from just five countries, and one of the important points about that is it shows you what could happen, the good that could be done, if we were able to push through peace negotiations or resolutions of conflict and persecution, if we could just convince good governance and protection of people—minorities, people with different political thought, different religious backgrounds—inside countries. So the number-one country still remains Syria that has lost 6.7 million people to neighboring countries, primarily. Secondly was Venezuela, four million. Third was Afghanistan. The old number from before last August was 2.6 million and some hundreds of thousands have fled since. And the only reason there aren't more fleeing is that they have a really hard time getting out of their country, and we can talk more about that in a moment. The fourth are Rohingya refugees fleeing from Burma, or Myanmar. That's 1.1 million, and the fifth was Southern Sudanese, 2.2 million, who have fled unrest and violence in that country. So we know that we have not enough peace, not enough solutions, and we have too much poverty, too, and dangers. In addition to the Venezuelans, another group that has approached the U.S. from the southern border that were in the paper, especially around election times, is from the Northern Triangle of Central America, so El Salvador, Guatemala, and Honduras. These are people who could be fleeing because of economic situations and could also be fleeing from criminal violence, gangs, warfare, narcotraffickers. And so if they are fleeing for their lives and approaching our southern border, we are supposed to give them a hearing and consider whether they have a case for asylum, and the—unfortunately, that is not well understood, especially not by folks working at our borders. The Customs and Border Protection folks are more and more focused on, since 9/11, ensuring that bad guys don't come across, that terrorists don't come across, that criminals don't come across. And we heard in the Trump administration conversations about Mexicans as rapists, gang warfare being imported into the U.S. from Central America when, in fact, some of it had been originally exported, and this sense that people from the Middle East were terrorists. And so really harsh language about the types of people who were trying to make it to the U.S. and to get in. Some final thoughts so that we can get to the question and answer. The U.S. government has traditionally been the top donor to refugee and humanitarian efforts around the world. The bureau at the State Department I used to run, the Population, Refugees, and Migration Bureau, was a major donor to the UN High Commissioner for Refugees—UNRWA—the International Committee of the Red Cross, and also the International Organization for Migration, which used to be an independent organization and is now part of the UN since 2016. We were also the number-one resettlement location, the formal program for bringing refugees to the United States, and when I was assistant secretary we brought seventy thousand refugees per year to the United States, invited them to come through a program that took eighteen months to twenty-four months, on average, to get them in because they had to be vetted for security reasons. They had to pass medical tests. Their backgrounds had to be investigated to see that they were who they said they were. And that number went higher in the last year of the Obama administration to eighty-five thousand refugees and, in fact, the Obama administration proposed some very strong additional measures to help refugees. But the Trump administration threw that all into reverse with a completely different set of policies. So the numbers then became reduced every year—fifty-three thousand in the first year of the Trump administration, 22,500 the next year, thirty thousand in 2019, 11,814 in 2020, a similar number in 2021, and slow numbers coming today, this despite bringing so many Afghans through an evacuation exercise last summer. Many of the people who were evacuated were American citizens or green card holders. Afghans who had worked for the U.S. but did not have their formal paperwork yet were brought in under what's called humanitarian parole, and the problem with that program is that it's no guarantee for a longer-term stay in the United States. So there's a bill in Congress right now to address that. A lot of the people who worked on that, especially within the U.S. government, are proud that they've scrambled and brought so many people so quickly—120,000 people brought from Afghanistan. At the same time, those of us who are advocates for refugees would say too many people were left behind and the evacuation should continue, and that's a real concern. In terms of resettlement in the U.S., it's a program run—public-private partnership—and we've never seen so many volunteers and people helping as there are right now, and initiatives to help welcome people to the United States, which is fantastic. I would say the program should be one of humanity, efficiency, and generosity, and that generosity part has been tough to achieve because the government piece of it is kind of stingy. It's kind of a tough love welcome to the United States where the refugees are expected to get jobs and the kids to go to school and the families to support themselves. So let me stop there because I've been just talking too long, I know, and take questions. FASKIANOS: It's fantastic, and thank you for really clarifying the definitions and the numbers. Just a quick question. You said the U.S. government is the top donor. What is the percentage of DVP? I mean, it's pretty— RICHARD: Tiny. Yeah. FASKIANOS: —tiny, right? I think there's this lack of understanding that it may seem like a big number but in our overall budget it's minuscule. So if you could just give us a— RICHARD: Yeah. It's grown in the last few years because of all these crises around the world to ten to twelve million—I mean, ten billion dollars to twelve billion (dollars) between the U.S. Agency for International Development and the State Department, which was bigger. It was around seven or eight billion (dollars) when I was the assistant secretary five, six years ago. But the important part of it was it provided the whole backbone to the international humanitarian system. Governments, some of them, saw Americans sometimes as headaches in terms of we, Americans, telling them what to do or we, Americans, having our own ideas of how to do things or we, Americans, demanding always budget cuts and efficiencies. But the fact is the whole humanitarian enterprise around the world is based on American generosity, especially the big operating agencies like World Food Programme, UNHCR, UNICEF, UN Development Program. FASKIANOS: Great. Thank you. So now we're going to go to all you for your questions. Hands are already up and Q&A written questions. So I'll try to get to everybody as much as I can. I'm going to go—the first question from Rey Koslowski, and if you can unmute yourself and give us your institution that would be fantastic. RICHARD: Hi, Rey. Q: All right. Rey Koslowski, University at Albany. Hi, Anne. Good to see you. I'd like to pick up on the use of humanitarian parole. So, as I understand it, it's being utilized for Afghan evacuees, Afghans, who you mentioned, who didn't—weren't able to get on the flights and were left behind, but also for Ukrainians. You know, President Biden announced a hundred thousand Ukrainians. I mean, a very—we're using other channels but we've had, I believe, three thousand at the U.S.-Mexican border and, I believe, they're being paroled for the most part, right. As I understand it, we're—one DHS letter that I saw said that there were forty-one thousand requests for humanitarian parole for Afghan nationals. But I'm wondering about capacity of the USCIS to handle this, to process this, because, you know, normally, I think, maybe two thousand or so, a couple thousand, are processed, maybe a couple of people who do this, and also in conjunction with the challenges for processing all of the asylum applications. So, as I understand it, back in the fall there was some discussion of hiring a thousand asylum officers—additional asylum officers. I was wondering, what are your thoughts about our capacity to process all of the—the U.S. government's capacity to process the humanitarian parole applications and the asylum applications, and if you have any insights on new hires and how many— RICHARD: Well, you know, Rey, at Freedom House now I'm working on a project to help Afghan human rights defenders and— Q: Right. RICHARD: —the idea is that they can restart their work if we can find a way for them to be safe inside Afghanistan, which is very hard with the Taliban in charge right now, or if in exile they can restart their work. And so we're watching to see where Afghans are allowed to go in the world as they seek sanctuary and the answer is they don't get very far. It's very hard to get out of the country. If they get to Pakistan or Iran, they don't feel safe. They have short-term visas to stay there, and the programs that might bring them further along like resettlement of refugees are—take a much longer time to qualify for and then to spring into action, and so they're stuck. You know, they're afraid of being pushed back into Afghanistan. They're afraid of becoming undocumented and running out of money wherever they are, and so they're in great need of help. The humanitarian parole program sort of—for bringing Afghans into the U.S. sort of understood that our eighteen- to twenty-four-month refugee resettlement program was a life-saving program but it wasn't an emergency program. It didn't work on an urgent basis. It didn't scoop people up and move them overnight, and that's, really, what was called for last August was getting people—large numbers of people—out of harm's way. And so when I was assistant secretary, if we knew someone was in imminent danger we might work with another government. I remember that the Scandinavians were seen as people who were more—who were less risk averse and would take people who hadn't had this vast vetting done but would take small numbers and bring them to safety, whereas the U.S. did things in very large numbers but very slowly. And so this lack of emergency program has really been what's held us back in providing the kind of assistance, I think, people were looking for the Afghans. I was surprised we even brought them into the United States. I thought after 9/11 we'd never see that kind of program of bringing people in with so little time spent on checking. But what they did was they moved up them to the front of the line and checked them very quickly while they were on the move. So it was safe to do but it was unusual, and I think part of that was because the military—the U.S. military—was so supportive of it and U.S. veterans were so supportive of it and we had, for the first time in a while, both the right and the left of the political spectrum supporting this. So the problem with humanitarian parole is I remember it being used, for example, for Haitians who had been injured in the Haitian earthquake and they needed specialized health care—let's say, all their bones were crushed in their legs or something. They could be paroled into the U.S., get that health care that they needed, and then sent home again. So we've not used it for large numbers of people coming in at once. So what refugee advocates are seeking right now from Congress is the passage of the Afghan Adjustment Act, which would give people a more permanent legal status. They would be treated as if they were—had come through the refugee resettlement program and they'd get to stay. So you're right that the numbers being granted humanitarian parole at one time is just not the normal way of doing things. You're also right that the—this is a lot of extra work on people who weren't anticipating it, and more can continue with the hundred thousand Ukrainians who the president has said we will take in. And so the thing is when we have these kind of challenges in the United States one way to deal with it is to spend more money and do a better job, and that seems to be an option for certain challenges we face but not for all challenges we face. With these more humanitarian things, we tend to have tried to do it on the cheap and to also use the charity and partner with charities and churches more than if this were sort of a more business-oriented program. So we need all of the above. We need more government funding for the people who are working the borders and are welcoming people in or are reviewing their backgrounds. We need more assistance from the public, from the private sector, from foundations, because the times demand it. And it's very interesting to me to see Welcome US created last year with three former U.S. presidents—President Bush, President Clinton, President Obama—speaking up about it, saying, please support this, and people from across the political aisle supporting it. I wish that had existed in 2015 when we were grappling with these issues at the time of candidate Trump. So the needs are greater. Absolutely. But that doesn't mean we have to just suffer through and struggle through and have long backups like we do right now. We could be trying to put more resources behind it. FASKIANOS: I'm going to take the next written question from Haley Manigold, who's an IR undergrad student at University of North Florida. We know that the war in Ukraine is going to affect grain and food supplies for the MENA countries. Is there any way you would recommend for Europe and other neighboring regions to manage the refugee flows? RICHARD: The first part of that was about the food issue but then you said— FASKIANOS: Correct, and then this is a pivot to manage the refugee flows. So— RICHARD: Well, the Europeans are treating the Ukrainians unlike any other flow of people that we've seen lately. It goes a little bit back and reminiscent to people fleeing the Balkans during the 1990s. But we saw that with a million people in 2015 walking into Europe from Syria, Pakistan, Afghanistan—mix of economic migrants and real refugees—that Europe, at first, under Angela Merkel's leadership were welcoming to these folks showing up, and then there was a backlash and the walls came up on that route from the Balkans to Germany and to Sweden. And so in the last few years, Europeans have not been seen as champions in allowing—rescuing people who are trying to get to Europe on their own. You know, especially the Mediterranean has been a pretty dismal place where we see Africans from sub-Saharan Africa working their way up to North Africa and trying to get from Libya across the Mediterranean to Europe. These are mostly economic migrants but not solely economic migrants, and they deserve to have a hearing and, instead, they have been terribly mistreated. They get stopped by the Libyan coast guard, the Europeans push boats back, and they are offloaded back into Libya and they are practically imprisoned and mistreated in North Africa. So that's a terribly inhumane way to treat people who are trying to rescue themselves, their families, and find a better life. And another point to the Europeans has been, couldn't you use these young people taking initiative trying to have a better life and work hard and get on with their lives, and the answer is yes. Europe has this sort of aging demographic and could definitely use an infusion of younger workers and talented people coming in. But, instead, they have really pushed to keep people out. So what's happened with Ukrainians? They're seen as a different category. They're seen as neighbors. There's a part of it that is positive, which is a sense that the countries right next door have to help them. Poland, Moldova, other countries, are taking in the Ukrainians. The borders are open. If they get to Poland they can get free train fare to Germany. Germany will take them in, and that's a beautiful thing. And the upsetting thing is the sense that there is undertones of racism, also anti-Islam, where darker-skinned people were not at all welcome and people who are not Christian were not welcome. And so it's probably a mix of all the above, the good and the bad, and it's potentially an opportunity to teach more people about “refugeehood” and why we care and why it affects all of us and what we should do about it and that we should do more. FASKIANOS: Thank you. All right, I'm going to take the next question from Kazi Sazid, who has also raised their hand, so if you could just ask your question yourself and identify yourself. Q: Hello. So I'm Kazi. I'm a student at CUNY Hunter College and I happen to be writing a research paper on Central American and Iraq war refugee crises and how international law hasn't changed the behavior of a state helping them. So my question is, how does confusion and ignorance of migration and refugee terminology by state leaders and the general populace impact the legally ordained rights of refugees such as having identity documents, having the right to education, refoulement, which is not being sent back to a country where they are danger? One example is like Central Americans are termed as illegal immigrants by the right wing but the reality is they are asylum seekers who are worthy of refugee status because gang violence and corruption has destabilized their country and the judicial systems. I think femicide in El Salvador and Honduras is among the highest and—so yeah. RICHARD: Yeah. Thank you for asking the question, and I have a soft spot in my heart for Hunter College. Only one of my grandparents went to college and it was my mother's mother who went to Hunter College and graduated in the late 1920s, and as we know, it's right down the street from the Harold Pratt House, the home of the Council on Foreign Relations. So I think a lot of what you—I agree with a lot of what you've said about—for me it's describing these people who offer so much potential as threats, just because they are trying to help themselves. And instead of feeling that we should support these folks, there's a sense of—even if we don't allow them in our country we could still do things to ease their way and help them find better solutions, but they're described as these waves of people coming this way, headed this way, scary, scary. And if you follow the debates in the United States, I was very alarmed before and during the Trump administration that journalists did not establish that they had a right to make a claim for asylum at the border. Instead, they talked about it as if it were two political policies duking it out, where some people felt we should take more and some people felt we should take less. Well, the issue that was missed, I felt, in a lot of the coverage of the Southern border was the right to asylum, that they had a right to make a claim, that we had signed onto this as the United States and that there was a very good reason that we had signed onto that and it was to make sure people fleeing for their lives get an opportunity to be saved if they're innocent people and not criminals, but innocent people who are threatened, that we'd give them a place of safety. So I agree with you that the lack of understanding about these basic principles, agreements, conventions is something that is not well understood by our society, and certainly the society was not being informed of that by a lot of the messengers describing the situation over the past few years. FASKIANOS: Thank you. So I'm going to take the next question from Lindsey McCormack who is an undergrad at Baruch—oh, sorry, a graduate student at Baruch College. My apologies. Do you see any possibility of the U.S. adopting a protocol for vetting and accepting climate refugees? Have other countries moved in that direction? And maybe you can give us the definition of a climate refugee and what we will in fact be seeing as we see climate change affecting all of us. RICHARD: I don't have a lot to say on this, so I hate to disappoint you, but I will say a couple things because, one, I was on a task force at Refugees International, which is a very good NGO that writes about and reports on refugee situations around the world and shines a light on them. I was part of a task force that came out with a report for the Biden administration on the need to do more for climate migrants, and so that report is available at the Refugees International site and it was being submitted to the Biden administration because the Biden administration had put out an executive order on refugees that included a piece that said we want to do a better job, we want to come up with new, fresh ideas on climate migrants. So I don't know where that stands right now, but I think the other piece of information that I often give out while doing public speaking, especially to students, about this issue is that I feel not enough work has been done on it, and so if a student is very interested in staying in academia and studying deeper into some of these issues, I think climate migration is a field that is ripe for further work. It's timely, it's urgent, and it hasn't been over-covered in the past. I admire several people, several friends who are working on these issues; one is Professor Beth Ferris at Georgetown University who was, in fact, on the secretary general's High Level Panel on Internal Displacement and she made sure that some of these climate issues are raised in very high-level meetings. She was also part of this task force from Refugees International. Another smart person working on this is Amali Tower, a former International Rescue Committee colleague who started a group called Climate Refugees and she's also trying to bring more attention to this; she's kind of very entrepreneurial in trying to do more on that. Not everybody would agree that the term should be climate refugees since “refugees” has so much legal definitions attached to it and the people displaced by climate don't have those kind of protections or understandings built around them yet. But I think it's an area that there definitely needs to be more work done. So I think the basic question was, did I think something good was going to happen anytime soon related to this, and I can't tell because these crazy situations around the world, the war in Ukraine and Taliban in charge in Afghanistan—I mean, that just completely derails the types of exercises that the world needs of thinking through very logically good governance, people coming together making decisions, building something constructive instead of reacting to bad things. FASKIANOS: Thank you. I'm going to take the next question from raised hand Ali Tarokh. And unmute your—thank you. Q: Yes. OK, I am Ali Tarokh from Northeastern University. I came here in the United States ten years ago as a refugee. And I was in Turkey—I flew Iran to Turkey. I stayed there fourteen, sixteen months. So this is part of—my question is part of my lived experience in Turkey. So one part is humanitarian services, helping refugees move into the third country, OK? The one issue I—it's my personal experience is the UNHCR system, there is many corruptions. This corruption makes lines, OK, produce refugees—because some countries such as Iran and Turkey, they are producing refugees and there is no solution for it, or sometimes they use it as—they use refugees as a weapon. They say, OK, if you don't work with me—Turkey sent a message to EU: If you don't work with me, I open the borders. I open the borders and send the flow of refugees to EU. Even some—even Iran's government. So my question is, how can we in the very base on the ground—the level of the ground—how can we prevent all these corruption or how can we work out with this kind of government, countries that are—I named them the refugee producers. And by the time there is two sides of the refugees—one is just humanitarian services, which is our responsibility, United States playing globally there; and other side it seems refugees issue became like industry. In Turkey, the UNHCR staff, some lawyers/attorneys, they take money from people, they make fake cases for them. Even they ask them: Hey, what country—which country would you like to go, United States, Canada, Scandinavian countries? So what is our strategy? What is our solution to help real refugees or prevent produce refugees? RICHARD: Well, there's several things that are raised by your question. Turkey and, now we see, Russia have both been countries where we have seen instances where they can turn on the flow of refugees and turn it off. And Turkey was watching people walk through Turkey, cross the Mediterranean is very scary, dangerous trip between Turkey and Greece in these rubber boats in 2015, 2016, and then they would make their way onward, and then, because of this big EU-Turkey deal that involved 3 billion euros at the time, all of a sudden, the flow stopped. And then in further negotiations going on and on, Turkey would say things that seemed like it came right from a Godfather movie, like, gee, I'd hate to see that flow start up again; that would be a real shame. And so it was clear it was sort of a threat that if you didn't cooperate it could play this very disruptive role on the edges of Europe and deploying people, as you said, which is so cruel not just to the people who are receiving them but to the individuals themselves that they're not being seen as people who need care but instead as a problem to be deployed in different directions. And we saw that also with Belarus and Poland and now also it may have been part of the thinking of Vladimir Putin that by attacking Ukraine, by going to war with Ukraine that there would be exactly what is happening now, people scattering from Ukraine into Europe and that that would be a way to drive a wedge between European countries and cause a lot of not just heartache but also animosity between these countries. So what the Russians didn't seem to appreciate this time was that there would be so much solidarity to help the Ukrainians, and that has been a bit of a surprise. So you've also talked about corruption, though, and corruption is a problem all over the world for lots of different reasons, in business and it's embedded in some societies in a way that sometimes people make cultural excuses for, but in reality we know it doesn't have to be that way. But it is very hard to uproot and get rid of. So I find this work, the anti-corruption work going on around the world, really interesting and groups like Transparency International are just sort of fascinating as they try to really change the standards and the expectations from—the degree to which corruption is part of societies around the world. So UNHCR has to take great care to not hire people who are going to shake down and victimize refugees, and it's not—there's never a perfect situation, but I know that a lot of work is done to keep an eye on these kinds of programs so that the aid goes to the people who need it and it's not sidetracked to go to bad guys. And the way I've seen it is, for example, if I travel overseas and I go to someplace where refugees are being resettled to the U.S. or they're being interviewed for that, or I go to UNHCR office, there will be big signs up that will say the resettlement program does not cost money. If someone asks you for money, don't pay it; you know, report this. And from time to time, there are mini scandals, but overall, it's remarkable how much corruption is kept out of some of these programs. But it's a never-ending fight. I agree with you in your analysis that this is a problem and in some countries more than others. FASKIANOS: So I'm going to take the next question from Pamela Waldron-Moore, who's the chair of the political science department at Xavier University in New Orleans. There are reports in some news feeds that African refugees from Ukraine are being disallowed entry to some states accepting refugees. I think you did allude to this. Is there evidence of this, and if so, can the UN stop it or alleviate that situation? RICHARD: We saw before the Taliban took over in Afghanistan that some European countries were saying it was time for Afghans to go home again, and the idea that during this war it was safe for Afghans to go back—and especially for Afghans who are discriminated against even in the best of times in Afghanistan, like the Hazara minority. It's just—I found that sort of unbelievable that some countries thought this was the right time to send people back to Afghanistan. And so at the moment there's a weird situation in Afghanistan because it's safer in some ways for the bulk of the people because the active fighting has—in large parts of the country—stopped. But it's deadly dangerous for human rights defenders, women leaders, LBGTQ folks—anyone who tries to stand up to the Taliban—you know, scholars, thinkers, journalists. And so those are the folks that, in smaller numbers, we need to find some kind of way to rescue them and get them to safety while they are still inside Afghanistan or if that's outside Afghanistan and in the region. The borders—the border situations change from time to time. For a while they were saying only people with passports could come out, and for most Afghan families, nobody had a passport or, if they did, it was a head of household had a passport for business or trade. But you wouldn't have had passports for the spouse and the children. And so this has been a real dilemma. We also see a whole series of barriers to people getting out; so first you need a passport, then you need a visa to where you're going, and then you might need a transit visa for a country that you are crossing. And what has come to pass is that people who are trying to help evacuate people from Afghanistan—a smaller and smaller number as the months go on; people are trying to make this happen because it's so hard—that they will only take people out of the country if they feel that their onward travel is already figured out and that they have their visas for their final-destination country. So the actual number that's getting out are tiny. And the people who have gotten out who are in either Pakistan or Iraq are very worried. And they're afraid to be pushed back. They're afraid they will run out of money. They are afraid—I think said this during my talk before—they're afraid that there are people in Pakistan who will turn them in to the Taliban. And so it's always hard to be a refugee, but right now it's really frightening for people who are just trying to get to a safe place. FASKIANOS: And in terms of the discrimination that you referenced for refugees leaving the Ukraine, I mean, there have been some reports of EU—discrimination in European countries not accepting— RICHARD: Well, like African students who are studying in Ukraine— FASKIANOS: Yes. RICHARD: —who were not treated as if they were fleeing a country at war— FASKIANOS: Correct. RICHARD: —but instead were put in a different category and said, you know, go back, go home. FASKIANOS: Yes. RICHARD: Yeah, that's—that is quite blatant— FASKIANOS: And there's— RICHARD: And that was happening at the borders. FASKIANOS: Is there anything the UN can do about that, or is that really at the discretion of the countries—the accepting countries? RICHARD: Well, the—yeah, the UNHCR has these reception centers that they've set up, including between the border of Poland and Ukraine, and I think the other neighboring countries. And so if one can get to the reception center, one could potentially get additional help or be screened into—for special attention for needing some help that maybe a white Christian Ukrainian who spoke more than one language of the region would not need. FASKIANOS: Great. So let's go to Susan Knott, who also wrote her question, but has raised her hand. So Susan, why don't you just ask your question? And please unmute and identify yourself. KNOTT: OK, am I unmuted? FASKIANOS: Yes. KNOTT: OK. I am Susan Knott, University of Utah, Educational Policy and Leadership doctoral program. I am also a practicum intern at ASU, and I'm also a refugee services collaborator. And I'm engaged in a research project creating college and university pathways for refugees to resettle. I'm just wondering what your feel is about the current administration efforts in seeking to establish the pathway model similar to ASU's Education for Humanity Initiative with Bard, and is there helping lead the Refugee Higher Education Access program that serves learners who require additional university-level preparation in order to transition into certificate and degree programs. And I just—I'm not just—and all of this buzz that's going on since all of terrible crises are occurring, I'm not seeing a whole lot that—based on my own experience working with refugee education and training centers at colleges—on the college level, and learning about the Presidents' Alliance on Higher Ed and Immigration. I'm just wondering—and they're saying let's have this be more of a privately funded or partnerships with the university scholarships and private entities. What about a federally-funded university sponsorship program for refugee students given that the numbers or the data is showing that that age group is the largest number of just about every refugee population? RICHARD: That's a really fascinating set of issues. I'm not the expert on them, so I'm going to disappoint you. but I appreciate that you took a little extra time in how you stated your intervention to add a lot of information for this group, which should very much care about this. I get a lot of questions every week about university programs that Afghan students could take advantage of. I don't have a good handle on it, and I'm trying to do that with—I'm overdue for a conversation with Scholars at Risk in New York. Robert Quinn is the executive director of that, I believe. And so I'm glad you raised this and I'm not going to have a lot of extra to say about it. FASKIANOS: Anne, are there—is there—there's a question in the chat in the Q&A about sources for data on U.S. initiatives toward refugees. Where would you direct people to go to get updates on the latest programs, et cetera? RICHARD: Sometimes I'm embarrassed to say the best summaries are done by not-for-profits outside the government than by the government. The best source for data on resettlement of refugees to the U.S. is a website that is funded by the U.S. government called WRAPSNET.org—WRAPS spelled W-R-A-P-S-N-E-T dot-O-R-G. And in double-checking some of the things last summer, I felt that DHS had better descriptions of some of the programs than the State Department did, and that's my bureau that I used to—run, so—but they are responsible for determining who is in and who is out of these different programs, so maybe that's why they do. So there's a lot on the DHS website that's interesting if you are looking for more information. And one of the things the Council does, it has done a number of these special web presentations: one on refugees that I got to help on a couple of years ago, and I think there's one up now on Ukrainians. And this is the type of public education function that the Council does so well I think because they fact-check everything, and so it's very reliable. FASKIANOS: Thank you for that plug. You can find it all on CFR.org—lots of backgrounders, and timelines, and things like that. So we don't have that much time left, so I'm going to roll up two questions—one in the Q&A box and one because of your vast experience. So what role do NGOs play in refugee crises and migration initiatives, particularly in resettlement? And just from your perspective, Anne, you have been in academia, you've worked in the government, you worked at IRC, and now are at Freedom House. And so just—again, what would you share with the group about pursuing a career in this—government, non-government perspectives and, what students should be thinking about as they launch to their next phase in life. RICHARD: Yeah, that we could have a whole ‘nother hour on, right? That's—(laughs)— FASKIANOS: I know, I know. It's unfair to, right, do this at the very end, but— RICHARD: NGOs play really important roles in both the delivery of humanitarian assistance overseas and the help for resettlement in the United States. In the U.S. there are nine national networks of different groups; six are faith-based, three are not. They are non-sectarian, and they do amazing work on shoe-string budgets to—everything from meeting refugees at the airport, taking them to an apartment, showing them how the lights work and the toilet flushes, and coming back the next day, making sure they have an appropriate meal to have, and that the kids get in school, that people who need health care get it, and that adults who are able-bodied get jobs so they can support themselves. The other type of NGO are the human rights NGOs that now I'm doing more with, and I guess if you are thinking about careers in these, you have to ask yourself, you know, are you more of a pragmatic person where the most important thing is to save a life, or are you an idealist where you want to put out standards that are very high and push people to live up to them. Both types of organizations definitely help, but they just have very different ways of working. Another question for students is do you want high job security of a career in the U.S. government—say, as a Foreign Service Officer or as a civil servant where maybe you won't move up very quickly, but you might have great sense of satisfaction that the things you were working on were making a difference because they were being decisively carried out by the U.S. or another government. Or do you prefer the relatively lean, flatter organizations of the NGO world where, as a young person, you can still have a lot of authority, and your views can be seen—can be heard by top layers because you're not that far away from them. And so, NGOs are seen as more nimble, more fast moving, less job security. Having done both I think it really depends on your personality. Working in the government, you have to figure out a way to keep going even when people tell you no. You have figure out—or that it's hard, or that it's too complicated. You have to figure out ways to find the people who are creative, and can make thing happen, and can open doors, and can cut through red tape. In NGOs you can have a lot of influence. I was so surprised first time I was out of the State Department working for the International Rescue Committee one of my colleagues was telling me she just picks up the phone and calls the key guy on Capitol Hill and tells him what the law should be. That would never happen with a junior person in the U.S. government. You have to go through so many layers of bureaucracy, and approvals, and clearances. So, really, it depends on the type of person you are, and how you like to work, and the atmosphere in which you like to work. I can tell you you won't get rich doing this type of work, unfortunately. But you might be able to make a decent living. I certainly have, and so I encourage students to either do this as a career or find ways to volunteer part-time, even if it's tutoring a refugee kid down the block and not in some glamorous overseas location. I think you can get real sense of purpose out of doing this type of work. Thank you, Irina. FASKIANOS: Thank you very much. And I have to say that your careful definitions of the different categories—and really, I think we all need to be more intentional about how we explain, talk about these issues because they are so complex, and there are so many dimensions, and it's easy to make gross generalizations. But the way you laid this out was really, really important for deepening the understanding of this really—the challenge and the—what we're seeing today. So thank you very much. RICHARD: Thank you. Thanks, everybody. FASKIANOS: So thanks to all—yeah, thanks to everybody for your great questions. Again, I apologize; we're three minutes over. I couldn't get to all your questions, so we will just have to continue looking at this issue. We will be announcing the fall Academic Webinar lineup in a month or so in our Academic Bulletin, so you can look for it there. Good luck with your end of the year, closing out your semester. And again, I encourage you to go to CFR.org, ForeignAffairs.com, and ThinkGlobalHealth.org for research analysis on global issues. And you can follow us on Twitter at @CFR_Academic. So again, thank you, Anne Richard. Good luck to you all with finals, and have a good summer. (END)

This is a continuation of the dialogue between the guests from Episode 10 except guest Freshta Karimi could not join us and Ilaha Eli Omar, Founder and Director of Uplift Afghanistan joins to offer more perspective of the humanitarian crisis on the ground following the withdrawl at the end of August 2021 by the United States government.  This episode explores more about the legal, humanitarian and human rights issues facing Afghanistan, its people and the growing Afghani diaspora following the events of 2021.   In this episode we discuss: The current state of the humanitarian crisis on the ground in December 2021 The legal and media response of the world community The feelings of abandonment by the world community that some Afghans are feeling as this crisis starts to fade from the top of news cycles The United States government creation of special visas for certain Afghans as well as humanitarian parole  The failing thusfar by the United States to offer protection to Afghan citizens in need of an escape route Contrasting the United States vs. Canadian response and resettlement by Canada Farnoosh and Ilaha discuss their work together in Afghanistan  What can people do and where can they give to aid the effort    These are the sources recommended by our guests for giving or volunteer efforts: 1)  Uplift Afghanistan (Guest Ilaha Eli Omar is the Founder and Director)  http://www.upliftafghanistan.org 2)   Lifeline Afghanistan (in Canada)   http://www.lifelineafghanistan.ca 3) Afghan  American Artists and Writers Association  http:///www.aaawa.net 4) Afghan Legal Empowerment Portal (Guest Farnoosh Hashemian is a co-founder of this resource)  BIOGRAPHIES FARNOOSH HASHEMIAN Farnoosh Hashemian is an Iranian-American human rights lawyer with over two decades of experience advancing rights and dignity of vulnerable people around the globe. Notably, in 2011, she worked with Afghanistan Independent Human Rights Commission on security sector reform and from 2014-2018 she led and provided technical support to an Afghan coalition of prominent criminal justice reform groups and government officials, to draft and pass, the country's groundbreaking anti-torture legislation. She is currently the Acting Director for Law Exchange with the Open Society Foundations' Public Health Program, where she works on legal empowerment initiatives that improve health justice for marginalized groups. Since the beginning of the crisis, and in her personal capacity, she has co-led Afghan Legal Empowerment Portal, aiming to secure a safe right of passage for all Afghan grassroots activists left behind. Throughout her career, Farnoosh has sought to honor the work of justice defenders who came before her, build on collective local wisdom, and do the deliberate and careful intersectional work in pursuit of gender justice. In her view, it is indeed a feminist's job to counter the alarming overuse of policing, surveillance, detention, and oppressive measures that replicate in the war on terror, the war on drugs, and the war against migrants. H HASHEMIAN   RANA HAZARAT Rana Hazarat is an Afghan-Canadian human rights lawyer based in Vancouver, BC. She arrived with her family to Canada as refugees. She is of Tajik and Hazara descent. Her lived experience as a refugee impacted her desire to pursue a legal education. Rana studied Political Science and Economics at the University of British Columbia and obtained a Juris Doctor from the Peter A. Allard School of Law. I currently work for Lawyers for Human Rights as a legal intern, which is funded by the Canadian Bar Association and Global Affairs Canada. She works with LHR's Refugee and Migrant Rights Programme. She  is also working on several national and international initiatives in response to the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, such as assisting with the resettlement of Afghans in Canada, facilitating refugee sponsorship applications, and drafting public legal education materials, calls to actions, and policy papers.  You can reach Rana by contacting the podcast if you have questions or a message for her.    ILAHA ELI OMAR Ilaha Eli Omar is an Afghan-American grassroots mobilizer with over 20 years of international development work and on-the-ground experience in Afghanistan, Haiti, and Kenya. Using her experience as an entrepreneur and founder of a successful technical consulting company, Ilaha enables nonprofits to transition from donor-dependent to self-sustainable organizations. In addition, Ilaha is currently a board and advisory council member for several nonprofits that focus on poverty alleviation, disability rights, emergency aid, and access to healthcare and education for all in Afghanistan, Haiti, and Kenya. Recently Ilaha launched Uplift Afghanistan Fund, a charitable fund aimed at connecting impact-driven donors with grassroots and community-led initiatives in Afghanistan. Ilaha holds a Global MBA from Thunderbird School of Global Management, is a member of the US-Afghan Women's Council, and is currently based in San Francisco, California.  JESSICA SMITH BOBADILLA Please find Jessica Smith Bobadilla's bio at her website attorneyjessica.com.  Please follow the podcast on Apple Podcasts, Spotify and Stitcher.  Look out for bilingual Spanish content soon for all our episodes as well as addition of the video to our Youtube channel, I Am Attorney Jessica, The Podcast.

When Afghanistan was under Taliban control in 1996-2001, the Taliban discriminated against and violently persecuted the Hazara Shi'a community—which they labeled as “heretical.” Subsequently, the Hazara community continued to face targeted attacks over the last 20 years by the Taliban and ISIS-K. In the first half of 2021 alone, the United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan documented at least 20 violent incidents targeting Hazara.Religious freedom conditions in Afghanistan have drastically deteriorated since the Taliban seized control of Afghanistan last month. This does not bode well for vulnerable minorities in Afghanistan such as the Hazara community.We discuss the current situation for the Hazara community in Afghanistan with Farkhondeh Akbari and Andrea Gittleman. Ms. Akbari is a PhD candidate at the Australian National University who is a member of the Hazara Shi'a community, and Ms. Gittleman is with the Simon-Skjodt Center for the Prevention of Genocide at the United States Holocaust Memorial Museum.Read more USCIRF reporting on Afghanistan here.

La importancia e historia de Afganistán

Afghanistan:  A Background Briefing This is the first podcast Briefing, focusing upon something in the headlines.  I would often do briefings such as this in a class, when some major event occurred.  Some of those classroom briefings were fairly short, maybe 15 minutes.  Others would last over an hour.   Students liked these.  The briefings linked analysis with the headlines. The goal of this podcast is to give you some context for what is happening in Afghanistan.  My version of context starts in the 1840s and extends up to the afternoon of August 26, 2021 when I recorded these thoughts.  As I recorded this, I had been listening to reports of the bombings in the Kabul airport where American soldiers were conducting evacuations. Someone else might have started context with Alexander the Great. I think simple explanations often go wrong.  History and politics and world struggle are too complex to be understood by a single explanation.  It's the oil.  It's the Zionists.  It's racism.  It's the military-industrial complex. Please.  Spare me.  If everything can be explained by one thing then you are listening to ideology, not insight or analysis. I remember hearing someone say, “The Arab world makes a serious mistake when they try to understand what the Americans are doing.  They assume we are smarter than we are.”  Afghanistan is not a part of the Arab world, but the point is still valid.  Sometimes our leaders are just not very bright.   Sometimes they get fixated on some way of thinking and just don't let their minds open up to alternate possibilities.  Sometimes they get locked into a policy and can't figure out a way to escape from it.  Sometimes they get charmed by an advisor and pay too much attention to that person's explanations and suggestions.  Sometimes they are just afraid of the voters.  I hope you will come out of this podcast with more questions than answers.  Even as I am posting it, I am second guessing myself. Have fun, and thanks for listening. Update on September1.  All of our troops are out and nearly 122,000 people were evacuated. The war is over.   Bravo! Some terms and names used, in case you don't recognize them. Mujahideen, Taliban, Madrasa, The Scramble for Africa, geopolitics, Jihad, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Malindi, Stinger missiles, Al Qaeda, ISIS, reconstruction, nation building, Doha Agreement of 2020, Pushtun, apartheid, Shia, Hazara, Ashura, Ali, Hassan, Hussein, Osama bin Laden,  William Casey, Rudyard Kipling,   Gorbachev, Brezhnev, Tony Blair, Abdul Ghani Baradar,  Secretary of State Pompeo, Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana,  Jomo Kenyatta, Nelson Mandela,  Najibullah.  Film OsamaBook: Ahmed Rashid, Taliban Book: Lawrence Wright, The Looming Tower