American advisor, diplomat, political scientist and historian
POPULARITY
12 episodes with george kennan
16 episodes with george kennan
14 episodes with george kennan
4 episodes with george kennan
4 episodes with george kennan
4 episodes with george kennan
2 episodes with george kennan
4 episodes with george kennan
3 episodes with george kennan
THE COLD WAR SHIFT: GEORGE KENNAN'S STRATEGIC PIVOT Colleague Professor Gary J. Bass. By 1948, the trial's context shifted dramatically with the onset of the Cold War and the Chinese Civil War. George Kennan, the architect of containment, visited Tokyo to convince MacArthur that democratization was less important than establishing Japan as a strong anti-communist bulwark against the Soviets. Kennan argued that the US must secure Japan as a strategic prize rather than focus on China, which was falling to Mao. This "reverse course" prioritized stability and industrial strength over the initial progressive reforms, viewing Japan as the essential anchor for Americanforeign policy in the Pacific. NUMBER 51929 TOKYO
In this episode, hosts Ray Powell and Jim Carouso welcome Peter Mattis, President of the Jamestown Foundation and former CIA analyst, to dissect the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) "political warfare" against Taiwan. Mattis argues this is not merely diplomatic maneuvering, but "United Front work playing out on a global scale" - a comprehensive campaign to reshape the international order by recreating China's domestic political controls abroad.War by Other MeansMattis grounds the political warfare concept in George Kennan's Cold War definition: the logical application of Clausewitz's doctrine in peacetime. For Beijing, unification is a political objective requiring total control over Taiwan's social, economic, and political life - goals that military force alone cannot secure. The CCP seeks to "pull in" global interests, ensuring they are mediated through Beijing rather than through alliances or international law.The View from TaiwanFor the Taiwanese, this warfare is felt on a spectrum. It ranges from the overt "gray zone" harassment of military aircraft and sand dredgers to the psychological grinding of CCP-aligned media narratives. These narratives are designed to paint the U.S. as unreliable and unification as inevitable. Mattis specifically highlights the corrosive effect of espionage, noting that every spy scandal erodes the critical trust necessary for Taiwan's own bureaucracy and its security partners.United Front: A Global DragnetA key mechanism discussed is the "Council for the Promotion of the Peaceful Reunification of China," which operates chapters globally, including in the U.S. and the Philippines. Mattis explains how these groups mobilize diaspora communities, often hijacking the voices of pragmatic businesspeople, to influence local politicians. He cites the recent indictment of former New York state official Linda Sun as a prime example of how these influence operations effectively bury engagement with Taiwan inside democratic institutions without leaving a public trace.The Japan Example & Global SignalingWhen Japan's Prime Minister recently called a Taiwan contingency an "existential threat," China responded with fierce rhetoric and economic coercion. Mattis explains this reaction was double-edged: it aimed to punish Tokyo, but also served as a signal to the "Malaysias and Indonesias" of the region. The message is clear: if Beijing can inflict pain on a major power like Japan, smaller nations should fear the consequences of stepping out of line.The Democratic DeficitWhy do democracies struggle to push back? Mattis argues our institutions are too siloed: the military ignores non-kinetic threats, diplomats fear rocking the boat, and law enforcement is jurisdiction-bound. China exploits these seams to operate without consequence. Mattis suggests democracies must stop looking for "symmetric" responses - which often don't exist - and instead pursue asymmetric, disproportionate measures to re-establish deterrence and uncertainty for Beijing.
As the Cold War set in (1948), George Kennan urged MacArthur to halt progressive liberalization policies. Kennan argued that extensive democratization risked communist subversion, emphasizing the need for a strong, stable, anti-communist Japan. This marked a major shift, recognizing Japan, rather than China, as the crucial strategic anchor for American foreign policy in Asia.
Peter Robinson sits down at Yale University with the “dean of Cold War historians,” John Lewis Gaddis—Pulitzer Prize–winning biographer of Long Telegram author George F. Kennan and one of America's most influential thinkers on grand strategy. From the origins of the Cold War to the nuclear age, from Vietnam to détente, and from Ronald Reagan to Mikhail Gorbachev, Gaddis offers a masterclass in how nations think, plan, and learn from history. Gaddis explains why students today often have little grasp of the Cold War, how the atomic bomb reshaped global politics, why George Kennan predicted the Soviet collapse decades before it happened, and why détente faltered in the 1970s. He revisits the debates around Vietnam, assesses Ronald Reagan's strategic instincts, and reflects on how the Cold War ultimately ended. The discussion then turns forward: the future of American grand strategy, the challenges posed by China and Russia today, the tension between promoting democracy and maintaining global stability, and why understanding the past is essential for navigating the 21st century. Along the way, Gaddis shares stories of teaching grand strategy, the influence of the classics, his unexpected path from small-town Texas to Yale, and why he remains optimistic about the humanities—and about America. Subscribe to Uncommon Knowledge at hoover.org/uk
Pri pohľade na súčasnú bezpečnostnú situáciu vo svete, by sa mohlo zdať, že ide o podobnosť čisto náhodnú. Ale zrejme za tým predsa len niečo bude. Uveďme preto jeden citát. „Základom kremeľského neurotického prístupu k svetovým udalostiam je ruský tradičný inštinktívny pocit neistoty.“ Tieto slová Georga Kennana, amerického diplomata, znalca ruských pomerov a popredného člena americkej diplomatickej misie v Sovietskom zväze v kľúčových rokoch 1944 až 1946, sú tak trochu psychologickou diagnostikou. Tá je zároveň súčasťou tzv. Dlhého telegramu, ktorý Kennan adresoval predstaviteľom americkej administratívy. Zahraničná politika Spojených štátov sa krátko po 2. svetovej vojne potácala pri zmätených úvahách o tom, ako utlmiť podozrievavosť niekdajšieho spojenca na východe a kam vlastne ustúpiť, aby bolo možné upokojiť paranoidnú myseľ sovietskeho vodcu Josifa Stalina. Nebol to však len George Kennan, ale aj niekdajší britský vojnový premiér Winston Churchill a mnohí ďalší, ktorí upozorňovali, že reakciou predsa nemôže byť politika ústupkov, ale naopak jedine asertívny a odvážny prístup, ktorý voči vonkajšej hrozbe nasadí rovnako silovú odpoveď. Tieto úvahy získavajú na svojej aktuálnosti i teraz, keď vo vzduchu visí osud Ukrajiny, hrozba jej rozparcelovania a nový ústupok voči tradične agresívnej kremeľskej politike. Pred viac než 75 rokmi sa asertívna odpoveď Západu pretavila do vzniku Severoatlantickej aliancie. A aká je jeho odpoveď dnes? Nebude na škodu pripomenúť si časy, keď Západ dokázal vzdorovať. Prinášame preto staršiu epizódu podcastu Dejiny. Jaro Valent z časopisu Historická revue sa rozprával s Petrom Marešom, dlhoročným českým diplomatom, historikom a riaditeľom Medzinárodného vyšehradského fondu. – Ak máte pre nás spätnú väzbu, odkaz alebo nápad, napíšte nám na jaroslav.valent@petitpress.sk – Všetky podcasty denníka SME nájdete na sme.sk/podcasty – Odoberajte aj denný newsletter SME.sk s najdôležitejšími správami na sme.sk/suhrnsme – Ďakujeme, že počúvate podcast Dejiny.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
The provided text argues against the widely accepted narrative that Russia's 2022 invasion of Ukraine was unprovoked. It asserts that Western actions, particularly NATO's eastward expansion and interference in Ukrainian politics, served as long-term provocations. The author cites warnings from figures like George Kennan and William Burns, alongside Vladimir Putin's own statements, highlighting Russia's consistent opposition to these moves. Furthermore, the text suggests that the 2014 Maidan uprising was not a purely spontaneous event but rather was significantly influenced by Washington, leading to a civil war in Donbas that predated the 2022 invasion. Ultimately, the source contends that the conflict was "cultivated, warned against, and made inevitable" by decades of Western policy, emphasizing that the narrative of an "unprovoked war" ignores crucial historical context.
This week, Jeremi and Zachary speak with Colonel Nathaniel Lauterbach about the significant changes in the US military over the past 20 years, and their implications for US foreign policy and civil-military relations. Jeremi sets the scene with some words from a lecture from George Kennan, an influential American diplomat and historian. Colonel Nathaniel Lauterbach is an active-duty United States Marine Corps officer. He recently commanded a squadron in California. He previously served as an operational planner and strategist with the 2d Marine Aircraft Wing, responsible for war plans and long-range planning for all combat marine aviation on the US East Coast. Colonel Lauterbach served as a lead planner for NATO and efforts to integrate military robotics and artificial intelligence into the Marine Corps. He received his B.A. from the University of Wisconsin-Madison, where he was a student of Professor Suri.
This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit andrewsullivan.substack.comEd is the US national editor and columnist at the Financial Times. Before that, he was the FT's Washington Bureau chief, the South Asia bureau chief, Capital Markets editor, and Philippines correspondent. During the Clinton administration, he was the speechwriter for Larry Summers. The author of many books, his latest is Zbig: The Life and Times of Brzezinski, America's Great Power Prophet.For two clips of our convo — on how China played Trump on rare minerals, and Europe's bind over Russian energy — head to our YouTube page.Other topics: growing up in West Sussex near my hometown; the international appeal of English boarding schools; the gerontocracy of the USSR; Ed making a beeline to the Berlin Wall as it fell; Fukuyama's The End of History; Brzezinski's The Grand Failure — of Communism; enthusiasm for free markets after the Cold War; George Kennan warning against Ukraine independence; HW Bush and the Persian Gulf; climate change and migration; a population boom in Africa; W Bush tolerating autocracy in the war on terrorism; Trump tearing up his own NAFTA deal; the resurgence of US isolationism; the collapsing security umbrella in Europe leading to more self-reliance; Germany's flagging economy; the China threat; Taiwan's chips; TACO on tariffs; the clean energy cuts in OBBBA; the abundance agenda; national debt and Bowles-Simpson; the overrated Tony Blair; Liz Truss' “epic Dunning-Kruger”; Boris killing the Tory Party; the surprising success of Mark Carney; Biden's mediocrity; Bernie's appeal; and the Rest catching up with the West.Browse the Dishcast archive for an episode you might enjoy (the first 102 are free in their entirety — subscribe to get everything else). Coming up: Tara Zahra on the revolt against globalization after WWI, Scott Anderson on the Iranian Revolution, Shannon Minter debating trans issues, Thomas Mallon on the AIDS crisis, and Johann Hari turning the tables to interview me. Please send any guest recs, dissents, and other comments to dish@andrewsullivan.com.
SPONSORS: 1) Brunt: Get $10 Off at BRUNT with code JULIAN at https://www.bruntworkwear.com/JULIAN #Bruntpod 2) Huel: Get Huel today with this exclusive offer for New Customers of 15% OFF + a FREE Gift with code JULIAN at https://huel.com/JULIAN (Minimum $75 purchase). PATREON: https://www.patreon.com/JulianDorey (***TIMESTAMPS in Description Below) ~ Mike Benz is a former official with the U.S. Department of State and current Executive Director of the Foundation For Freedom Online, is a free speech watchdog organization dedicated to restoring the promise of a free and open Internet. MIKE's LINKS: X: https://x.com/MikeBenzCyber WEBSITE: https://foundationforfreedomonline.com/ FOLLOW JULIAN DOREY INSTAGRAM (Podcast): https://www.instagram.com/juliandoreypodcast/ INSTAGRAM (Personal): https://www.instagram.com/julianddorey/ X: https://twitter.com/julianddorey LISTEN to Julian Dorey Podcast Spotify ▶ https://open.spotify.com/show/5skaSpDzq94Kh16so3c0uz Apple ▶ https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/trendifier-with-julian-dorey/id1531416289 JULIAN YT CHANNELS - SUBSCRIBE to Julian Dorey Clips YT: https://www.youtube.com/@juliandoreyclips - SUBSCRIBE to Julian Dorey Daily YT: https://www.youtube.com/@JulianDoreyDaily - SUBSCRIBE to Best of JDP: https://www.youtube.com/@bestofJDP ****TIMESTAMPS**** 00:00 – Censorship, AI Wack-a-Mole, Deep Blue, DARPA Docs 12:34 – Weapons of Mass Deletion, NetzDG, Election Control, Russiagate, USAID, Trump Hold-Ups 23:29 – USAID Origins, Sopranos Agencies, Shadow Networks, EU DSA, CIA Outsourcing 32:40 – USAID Scandals, Identity Dominance, Cuba HIV Hoax, ZunZuneo 44:32 – Social Media Control, CIA & Rap, Media Machine, Vatican–CIA–Mafia 57:12 – George Kennan, Political Warfare, Plausible Deniability, CIA in Italy 1:07:32 – USAID = Plausible Deniability, Tom Donilon 1:22:55 – Mike Donilon, Shadow Cabinet, BlackRock, Pentagon Black Hole, Congressional Favors 1:34:17 – Gorbachev Pizza Ad, Systemic Corruption, Pepsi–Allende Coup 1:42:31 – The Blob, Friedman's Free Market Lie, Empire Blindspot 1:53:15 – USAID = Bribes, Mike Benz Dual Role, Dirty Roots 1:57:40 – MAGA Blindspot, Empire Preservation 2:09:02 – USAID–Supreme Court, Norm Eisen, Bread & Corruption 2:18:19 – Opium Wars, Institute of Peace, Syrian Democratic Forces, George Foote 2:35:13 – Peace Institute Overthrows, Drug-Funded Empire, Pitchfork & Scalpel 2:44:14 – State Dept vs CIA, 1961 Reorg, Visas for Terror 3:00:57 – Elon & DOGE, ROI, Reloading Strategy 3:12:25 – Tesla vs Unions, Unions as Ops Tools OTHER JDP EPISODES MENTIONED IN THIS EPISODE: - Episode 307 - Roya Hakakian: https://youtu.be/NQeoCeSk_Zc - Episode 303 - Martin Dugard: https://youtu.be/rcoiIUfz_N4 - Episode 97 - Andrew Bustamante: https://youtu.be/2PUs7l2jW9c - Episode 107 - Andrew Bustamante: https://youtu.be/7jNz3-WPV5I - Episode 150 - Andrew Bustamante: https://youtu.be/dUlc2d6fDzg - Episode 224 - Andrew Bustamante: https://youtu.be/Gv-YWfNWwkM - Episode 249 - John Kiriakou: https://youtu.be/5_FDZozJ9zE - Episode 250 - John Kiriakou: https://youtu.be/5HuyORiWoDM - Episode 278 - John Kiriakou: https://youtu.be/_CFWmuIgQIE - Episode 279 - John Kiriakou: https://youtu.be/scrGRKVa-Q4 CREDITS: - Host, Editor & Producer: Julian Dorey - COO, Producer & Editor: Alessi Allaman - https://www.youtube.com/@UCyLKzv5fKxGmVQg3cMJJzyQ - In-Studio Producer: Joey Deef - https://www.instagram.com/joeydeef/ Julian Dorey Podcast Episode 309 - Mike Benz Music by Artlist.io Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices
Mark Weber of the Institute for Historical Review returns to explore the legacy of Cold War strategist George Kennan. The Cold War-era diplomat is a forgotten realist whose prophetic insights challenge today's bipartisan foreign policy consensus.Listen now and rediscover the wisdom the foreign policy establishment chose to ignore.Follow IHR's work here:Website:https://ihr.org/X/Twitter: https://x.com/HistoryinReviewAre you concerned about your wealth during this times of economic uncertainty? Allocating parts of your wealth into physical precious metals is your best play. Whether you are:* An institutional client,* A HNWI or UHNWI,* Or a retail customer,You should contact my good friend Claudio Grass directly.Claudio is a veteran precious metal investor and wealth manager who has mastered precious markets and knows how to protect people's wealth no matter the economic and political circumstances. He will grant you access to his carefully-selected network of trustworthy partners which he has been working for multiple years. Claudio will advise you on the best players, the appropriate terms, and the necessary safeguards you must take to protect your wealth. In addition, he will guide you each step of the way when you buy, sell, and store physical bullion. Your precious metals will be privately stored in Switzerland outside of the banking system, and you can physically pick them up at the vault anytime at your own convenience. Are you ready to make your wealth recession-proof? Do not hesitate to contact Claudio; his initial consultations are free.Contact him below and tell him that José Niño was your reference: https://claudiograss.ch/contacts/ This is a public episode. If you'd like to discuss this with other subscribers or get access to bonus episodes, visit josbcf.substack.com/subscribe
PREVIEW: PROFESSOR GARY BASS, AUTHOR," Judgment at Tokyo," highlights how the famous George Kennan recognized that defeated Japan would become a great ally. More later. 1930 Tokyo
PREVIEW: WAR CRIMES: FIREBOMBING: Professor Gary Bass, author of "Judgment at Tokyo," discusses George Kennan's post-surrender analysis of Japan: that the country should be restored as an Asian power and U.S. ally, largely because Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists in China were proving unreliable in their civil war against Soviet-backed Maoist forces. More next month. 1930 Tokyo
Konstantin Kisin is an author, an essayist, and the co-host of the YouTube channel and podcast Triggernometry. A rebroadcast from 2022.------------Book Dan to do an interview or a meeting------------Keep Talking SubstackSpotifyApple PodcastsSocial media and all episodes------------Support via VenmoSupport on SubstackSupport on Patreon------------(00:00) Intro(1:00) Transition from Soviet Union to wealth in post-collapse Russia(4:00) Impact of the Soviet collapse on ordinary people's lives(6:31) Personal resilience shaped by tumultuous childhood experiences(8:30) Lack of education about the Soviet experience in the West(11:06) The Russian Revolution and its implications for society today(11:20) Overview of the dictatorship of the proletariat concept.(12:55) Impact of property expropriation on wealthy families during the revolution.(14:03) Consequences of collective farming in Soviet society.(16:12) The Soviet Union's attempt at equality led to widespread poverty.(19:02) Insights on the Russian psyche from democratic experiments in the 90s.(23:42) Describing the chaotic aftermath of the Soviet Union's collapse.(25:12) Painful experiences shaped Russian society during the 1990s.(27:11) Russia's surrender to terrorists: a psychological shock for citizens.(29:07) Vladimir Putin emerged as a strongman leader in chaos.(30:46) Boris Yeltsin's legacy and Putin's rise to power explained.(36:57) Freedom of expression as the foundation of Western society.(39:09) The importance of free speech and its recent threats discussed.(40:11) The roots of political correctness and free speech erosion.(41:34) Exploring the dangers of hierarchical ideologies in society.(43:15) The natural dynamics between men and women in relationships.(45:23) Martin Luther King's vision for character over skin color.(46:00) Concerns about societal divisions and their historical implications.(48:14) The universal threat of believing some people are superior to others.(49:00) Thought-provoking quotes(54:00) The West and the importance of individual rights(1:00:41) George Kennan's insights on containment and Western values.(1:01:13) Concerns about identity politics and its impact on society.(1:02:41) The danger of losing a unified national identity.(1:05:41) Internal division as the real threat to powerful nations.(1:08:30) Contextualizing slavery and colonialism in world history.(1:12:31) The role of comedy in challenging mainstream narratives.
Eric and Eliot host James Graham Wilson, an historian in the Department of State's Historian's Office to discuss his new book America's Cold Warrior: Paul Nitze and National Security From Roosevelt to Reagan. They discuss Nitze's background as an America First supporter between the wars, his anti-Semitism and his family's connection to the Black Tom sabotage incident during World War I. They talk about his pioneering work as a national security professional on the Strategic bombing survey during and after World War II as well as his role in drafting NSC 68 during the Truman Administration, his vexed personal relations with George Kennan (who he succeeded as Director of Policy Planning at State), Henry Kissinger, and Robert McNamara. His relentless focus on the strategic nuclear balance and the character traits that perhaps kept him from ever becoming the Cabinet Officer he longed to become while nonetheless serving and influencing national security policy for more than 40 years. They close noting that his concerns about nuclear self-deterrence seem eerily relevant in today's circumstances of great power competition. https://a.co/d/5thvl34 Shield of the Republic is a Bulwark podcast co-sponsored by the Miller Center of Public Affairs at the University of Virginia.
David Blankenhorn is an author, an activist, a community organizer, and the co-founder and President of Braver Angels. During our conversation, David talks about polarization in the United States, the workshops that Braver Angels puts together to bring together politically opposed Americans for conversation and common ground, the threat of division to the future of the country, the receding of a "civil religion" in the U.S., the importance of approaching disagreements with a sense of goodwill, and having hope in this dark time.------------Book a meeting with Dan------------Keep Talking SubstackRate on SpotifyRate on Apple PodcastsSocial media and all episodes------------Support via VenmoSupport on SubstackSupport on Patreon------------00:00 Intro00:37 The state of civic friendship in America04:27 The growth of Braver Angels11:22 What motivates Braver Angels' members?16:46 The work and mission of Braver Angels23:29 We're less polarized than we've been told27:34 Who is benefiting from social division?33:12 Habits to maintain one's humanity40:23 Politics replacing civic virtues in modern times49:37 George Kennan's threat of internal division55:34 The example of Daryl Davis
Guest: Frank Costigliola is the author of Kennan: A Life between Worlds. He is also a Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Connecticut. The post George Kennan: The Cold War Architect Who Opposed The War appeared first on KPFA.
How To Think About Revenge 2024. Trump well above the fray, prefers "success" over settling scores. Gentle Dr. Phil agrees. But Bannon not so much, goes hard against Deep State "Gestapo." Confirmed FBI liar McCabe plays victim on CNN. Observing the guilty conscience of the Ruling Class, hands too long in the cookie jar. It's on them. Shakespeare on how "the whirligig of time brings in his revenges." The wisdom of George Kennan on how to deal with raging communists. Wyatt Earp v. Ike Clanton. Call it accountability? Call it justice? Meanwhile, a Las Vegas crowd sings Happy Birthday to Trump. Billionaire David Sacks endorses Trump in a very thoughtful essay. Plus, the Washington Post suddenly realizes it's lost half its readership. Hard times for Deep State stenography. With Great Listener Calls.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
The American diplomat George Kennan was the architect of the Cold War "containment" policy toward the Soviet Union. Writing in the late 1940s, Kennan viewed the USSR as a hostile expansionist enemy, but one that would be willing to compromise if checked by the United States. Containment did not mean the U.S. could or should militarily crush the Soviets. Can Kennan's ideas be applied to Vladimir Putin's Russia? In this episode, historians Michael Kimmage and Frank Costigliola discuss the enduring influence of Kennan's ideas on American policy-makers.
This week on Sinica, I chat with Sulmaan Wasif Khan, professor of history and international relations at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, about his book The Struggle for Taiwan: A History of America, China, and the Island Caught Between, which comes on May 14.4:28 — The Cairo Agreement6:59 — General George Marshall, George Kennan, and the change in the idea of American trusteeship of Taiwan?17:08 — The debate over the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu23:55 — Mao's evolving interest in Taiwan27:49 — The averted crisis of 196232:06 — Peng Ming-min and the Taiwan independence movement37:14 — What changed in 1971?42:51 — The legacy of Chiang Ching-kuo45:14 — The story of Lee Teng-hui52:37 — The change within the Kuomintang1:00:11 — Why Taiwan has become “sacred” for China1:10:26 — Sulmaan's own narrative shift1:13:26 — Chen Shui-bian and the threat of independence referendums1:17:53 — The Sunflower Movement1:25:21 — The causal direction of Taiwan's importance in the U.S.-China relationship1:28:32 — Why the status quo shifted1:30:51 — Drawing parallels between Taiwan and Ukraine1:33:26 — Sulmaan's sources for his book1:35:38 — Agency versus structure1:39:29 — Feedback (so far) on the new book and what's next for SulmaanRecommendations:Sulmaan: Emily Wilson's translation of The Iliad Kaiser: The “My China Priors” series (and other essays), available on the Sinica Substack; Angus Stewart's essay, “Alien Bless You: A Review of Netflix's 3 Body Problem” See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.
„Základom kremeľského neurotického prístupu k svetovým udalostiam je ruský tradičný inštinktívny pocit neistoty.“ Tieto slová Georga Kennana, amerického diplomata, znalca ruských pomerov a popredného člena americkej diplomatickej misie v Sovietskom zväze v kľúčových rokoch 1944 až 1946, sú tak trochu psychologickou diagnostikou. Tá je zároveň súčasťou tzv. Dlhého telegramu, ktorý Kennan adresoval predstaviteľom americkej administratívy. Zahraničná politika Spojených štátov sa krátko po 2. svetovej vojne potácala pri zmätených úvahách o tom, ako utlmiť podozrievavosť niekdajšieho spojenca na východe a kam vlastne ustúpiť, aby bolo možné upokojiť paranoidnú myseľ sovietskeho vodcu Josifa Stalina. Nebol to však len George Kennan, ale aj niekdajší britský vojnový premiér Winston Churchill a mnohí ďalší, ktorí upozorňovali, že reakciou predsa nemôže byť politika ústupkov, ale naopak jedine asertívny a odvážny prístup, ktorý voči vonkajšej hrozbe nasadí rovnako silovú odpoveď. Keď pred 75 rokmi, 4. apríla 1949 ministri zahraničných vecí 12 zakladajúcich štátov Severoatlantickej aliancie podpisovali Washingtonskú zmluvu, Európa i svet sa nachádzali už v inom politickom ovzduší. Eufória z víťazstva nad nacizmom pominula a čoraz hmatateľnejšie bolo možné sledovať narastajúci prízrak komunizmu, ktorý medzičasom ovládol strednú Európu, vrátane Československa. Ako sa teda rodilo NATO? A vari ešte dôležitejšou otázkou je, prečo táto obranná aliancia vôbec vznikla? A je diagnostika, ktorú v roku 1946 vyslovil George Kennan nečakane aktuálna aj dnes? Jaro Valent z časopisu Historická revue sa rozprával s Petrom Marešom, dlhoročným českým diplomatom, historikom a v súčasnosti riaditeľom Medzinárodného vyšehradského fondu. – Podporte podcasty denníka SME kúpou prémiového predplatného a užívajte si podcasty bez reklamy na webe SME.sk alebo v mobilnej aplikácii SME.sk. Prémiové predplatné si kúpite na predplatne.sme.sk/podcast – Ak máte pre nás spätnú väzbu, odkaz alebo nápad, napíšte nám na jaroslav.valent@petitpress.sk – Všetky podcasty denníka SME nájdete na sme.sk/podcasty – Odoberajte aj denný newsletter SME.sk s najdôležitejšími správami na sme.sk/suhrnsme – Ďakujeme, že počúvate podcast Dejiny.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
(Bonus) The Truman Doctrine is an American foreign policy that pledges American "support for democracies against authoritarian threats."[1] The doctrine originated with the primary goal of countering the growth of the Soviet bloc during the Cold War. It was announced to Congress by President Harry S. Truman on March 12, 1947,[2] and further developed on July 4, 1948, when he pledged to oppose the communist rebellions in Greece and Soviet demands from Turkey. More generally, the Truman Doctrine implied American support for other nations threatened by Moscow. It led to the formation of NATO in 1949. Historians often use Truman's speech to Congress on March 12, 1947 to date the start of the Cold War. Truman told Congress that "it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures."[4] Truman contended that because totalitarian regimes coerced free peoples, they automatically represented a threat to international peace and the national security of the United States. Truman argued that if Greece and Turkey did not receive the aid, they would inevitably fall out of the United States sphere of influence and into the communist bloc with grave consequences throughout the region. The Truman Doctrine was informally extended to become the basis of American Cold War policy throughout Europe and around the world.[5] It shifted U.S. policy toward the Soviet Union from a wartime alliance to containment of Soviet expansion, as advocated by diplomat George Kennan. It was distinguished from rollback by implicitly tolerating the previous Soviet takeovers in Eastern Europe.
It's perhaps one of history's funny accidents that relations between the U.S. and Russia were changed not by one, but two, George Kennans. Decades before George F. Kennan wrote his famous Long Telegram that set the tone for the Cold War, his predecessor was exploring Russia's Far East on a quest to investigate the then-Russian Empire's practice of exiling political prisoners to Siberia. What Kennan saw on his journey shook him to his very core, forcing him to question his respect for the Russian Empire. And as writer Gregory Wallance explains in his book Into Siberia: George Kennan's Epic Journey Through the Brutal, Frozen Heart of Russia (St. Martin's Press, 2023), Kennan's advocacy upon his return turned U.S. views from Russia away from being a faraway friend to something far more skeptical. Gregory Wallance is a lawyer and writer in New York City. He is the author of Papa's Game (Ballantine Books: 1982) which received a nonfiction nomination for an Edgar Allan Poe Award; America's Soul In the Balance: The Holocaust, FDR's State Department, And The Moral Disgrace Of An American Aristocracy (Greenleaf Book Group: 2012), The Woman Who Fought an Empire: Sarah Aaronsohn and Her Nili Spy Ring (Potomac Books: 2018), and the historical novel Two Men Before the Storm: Arba Crane's Recollection of Dred Scott And the Supreme Court Case That Started the Civil War (Greenleaf Book Group: 2015). He is currently an opinion contributor for The Hill. Today, Gregory and I talk about Kennan, his many trips to Siberia, and the effect his journalism had on American views of Russia. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Into Siberia. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
It's perhaps one of history's funny accidents that relations between the U.S. and Russia were changed not by one, but two, George Kennans. Decades before George F. Kennan wrote his famous Long Telegram that set the tone for the Cold War, his predecessor was exploring Russia's Far East on a quest to investigate the then-Russian Empire's practice of exiling political prisoners to Siberia. What Kennan saw on his journey shook him to his very core, forcing him to question his respect for the Russian Empire. And as writer Gregory Wallance explains in his book Into Siberia: George Kennan's Epic Journey Through the Brutal, Frozen Heart of Russia (St. Martin's Press, 2023), Kennan's advocacy upon his return turned U.S. views from Russia away from being a faraway friend to something far more skeptical. Gregory Wallance is a lawyer and writer in New York City. He is the author of Papa's Game (Ballantine Books: 1982) which received a nonfiction nomination for an Edgar Allan Poe Award; America's Soul In the Balance: The Holocaust, FDR's State Department, And The Moral Disgrace Of An American Aristocracy (Greenleaf Book Group: 2012), The Woman Who Fought an Empire: Sarah Aaronsohn and Her Nili Spy Ring (Potomac Books: 2018), and the historical novel Two Men Before the Storm: Arba Crane's Recollection of Dred Scott And the Supreme Court Case That Started the Civil War (Greenleaf Book Group: 2015). He is currently an opinion contributor for The Hill. Today, Gregory and I talk about Kennan, his many trips to Siberia, and the effect his journalism had on American views of Russia. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Into Siberia. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history
It's perhaps one of history's funny accidents that relations between the U.S. and Russia were changed not by one, but two, George Kennans. Decades before George F. Kennan wrote his famous Long Telegram that set the tone for the Cold War, his predecessor was exploring Russia's Far East on a quest to investigate the then-Russian Empire's practice of exiling political prisoners to Siberia. What Kennan saw on his journey shook him to his very core, forcing him to question his respect for the Russian Empire. And as writer Gregory Wallance explains in his book Into Siberia: George Kennan's Epic Journey Through the Brutal, Frozen Heart of Russia (St. Martin's Press, 2023), Kennan's advocacy upon his return turned U.S. views from Russia away from being a faraway friend to something far more skeptical. Gregory Wallance is a lawyer and writer in New York City. He is the author of Papa's Game (Ballantine Books: 1982) which received a nonfiction nomination for an Edgar Allan Poe Award; America's Soul In the Balance: The Holocaust, FDR's State Department, And The Moral Disgrace Of An American Aristocracy (Greenleaf Book Group: 2012), The Woman Who Fought an Empire: Sarah Aaronsohn and Her Nili Spy Ring (Potomac Books: 2018), and the historical novel Two Men Before the Storm: Arba Crane's Recollection of Dred Scott And the Supreme Court Case That Started the Civil War (Greenleaf Book Group: 2015). He is currently an opinion contributor for The Hill. Today, Gregory and I talk about Kennan, his many trips to Siberia, and the effect his journalism had on American views of Russia. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Into Siberia. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/biography
It's perhaps one of history's funny accidents that relations between the U.S. and Russia were changed not by one, but two, George Kennans. Decades before George F. Kennan wrote his famous Long Telegram that set the tone for the Cold War, his predecessor was exploring Russia's Far East on a quest to investigate the then-Russian Empire's practice of exiling political prisoners to Siberia. What Kennan saw on his journey shook him to his very core, forcing him to question his respect for the Russian Empire. And as writer Gregory Wallance explains in his book Into Siberia: George Kennan's Epic Journey Through the Brutal, Frozen Heart of Russia (St. Martin's Press, 2023), Kennan's advocacy upon his return turned U.S. views from Russia away from being a faraway friend to something far more skeptical. Gregory Wallance is a lawyer and writer in New York City. He is the author of Papa's Game (Ballantine Books: 1982) which received a nonfiction nomination for an Edgar Allan Poe Award; America's Soul In the Balance: The Holocaust, FDR's State Department, And The Moral Disgrace Of An American Aristocracy (Greenleaf Book Group: 2012), The Woman Who Fought an Empire: Sarah Aaronsohn and Her Nili Spy Ring (Potomac Books: 2018), and the historical novel Two Men Before the Storm: Arba Crane's Recollection of Dred Scott And the Supreme Court Case That Started the Civil War (Greenleaf Book Group: 2015). He is currently an opinion contributor for The Hill. Today, Gregory and I talk about Kennan, his many trips to Siberia, and the effect his journalism had on American views of Russia. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Into Siberia. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/russian-studies
It's perhaps one of history's funny accidents that relations between the U.S. and Russia were changed not by one, but two, George Kennans. Decades before George F. Kennan wrote his famous Long Telegram that set the tone for the Cold War, his predecessor was exploring Russia's Far East on a quest to investigate the then-Russian Empire's practice of exiling political prisoners to Siberia. What Kennan saw on his journey shook him to his very core, forcing him to question his respect for the Russian Empire. And as writer Gregory Wallance explains in his book Into Siberia: George Kennan's Epic Journey Through the Brutal, Frozen Heart of Russia (St. Martin's Press, 2023), Kennan's advocacy upon his return turned U.S. views from Russia away from being a faraway friend to something far more skeptical. Gregory Wallance is a lawyer and writer in New York City. He is the author of Papa's Game (Ballantine Books: 1982) which received a nonfiction nomination for an Edgar Allan Poe Award; America's Soul In the Balance: The Holocaust, FDR's State Department, And The Moral Disgrace Of An American Aristocracy (Greenleaf Book Group: 2012), The Woman Who Fought an Empire: Sarah Aaronsohn and Her Nili Spy Ring (Potomac Books: 2018), and the historical novel Two Men Before the Storm: Arba Crane's Recollection of Dred Scott And the Supreme Court Case That Started the Civil War (Greenleaf Book Group: 2015). He is currently an opinion contributor for The Hill. Today, Gregory and I talk about Kennan, his many trips to Siberia, and the effect his journalism had on American views of Russia. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Into Siberia. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/intellectual-history
It's perhaps one of history's funny accidents that relations between the U.S. and Russia were changed not by one, but two, George Kennans. Decades before George F. Kennan wrote his famous Long Telegram that set the tone for the Cold War, his predecessor was exploring Russia's Far East on a quest to investigate the then-Russian Empire's practice of exiling political prisoners to Siberia. What Kennan saw on his journey shook him to his very core, forcing him to question his respect for the Russian Empire. And as writer Gregory Wallance explains in his book Into Siberia: George Kennan's Epic Journey Through the Brutal, Frozen Heart of Russia (St. Martin's Press, 2023), Kennan's advocacy upon his return turned U.S. views from Russia away from being a faraway friend to something far more skeptical. Gregory Wallance is a lawyer and writer in New York City. He is the author of Papa's Game (Ballantine Books: 1982) which received a nonfiction nomination for an Edgar Allan Poe Award; America's Soul In the Balance: The Holocaust, FDR's State Department, And The Moral Disgrace Of An American Aristocracy (Greenleaf Book Group: 2012), The Woman Who Fought an Empire: Sarah Aaronsohn and Her Nili Spy Ring (Potomac Books: 2018), and the historical novel Two Men Before the Storm: Arba Crane's Recollection of Dred Scott And the Supreme Court Case That Started the Civil War (Greenleaf Book Group: 2015). He is currently an opinion contributor for The Hill. Today, Gregory and I talk about Kennan, his many trips to Siberia, and the effect his journalism had on American views of Russia. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Into Siberia. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/american-studies
It's perhaps one of history's funny accidents that relations between the U.S. and Russia were changed not by one, but two, George Kennans. Decades before George F. Kennan wrote his famous Long Telegram that set the tone for the Cold War, his predecessor was exploring Russia's Far East on a quest to investigate the then-Russian Empire's practice of exiling political prisoners to Siberia. What Kennan saw on his journey shook him to his very core, forcing him to question his respect for the Russian Empire. And as writer Gregory Wallance explains in his book Into Siberia: George Kennan's Epic Journey Through the Brutal, Frozen Heart of Russia (St. Martin's Press, 2023), Kennan's advocacy upon his return turned U.S. views from Russia away from being a faraway friend to something far more skeptical. Gregory Wallance is a lawyer and writer in New York City. He is the author of Papa's Game (Ballantine Books: 1982) which received a nonfiction nomination for an Edgar Allan Poe Award; America's Soul In the Balance: The Holocaust, FDR's State Department, And The Moral Disgrace Of An American Aristocracy (Greenleaf Book Group: 2012), The Woman Who Fought an Empire: Sarah Aaronsohn and Her Nili Spy Ring (Potomac Books: 2018), and the historical novel Two Men Before the Storm: Arba Crane's Recollection of Dred Scott And the Supreme Court Case That Started the Civil War (Greenleaf Book Group: 2015). He is currently an opinion contributor for The Hill. Today, Gregory and I talk about Kennan, his many trips to Siberia, and the effect his journalism had on American views of Russia. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Into Siberia. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/american-studies
It's perhaps one of history's funny accidents that relations between the U.S. and Russia were changed not by one, but two, George Kennans. Decades before George F. Kennan wrote his famous Long Telegram that set the tone for the Cold War, his predecessor was exploring Russia's Far East on a quest to investigate the then-Russian Empire's practice of exiling political prisoners to Siberia. What Kennan saw on his journey shook him to his very core, forcing him to question his respect for the Russian Empire. And as writer Gregory Wallance explains in his book Into Siberia: George Kennan's Epic Journey Through the Brutal, Frozen Heart of Russia (St. Martin's Press, 2023), Kennan's advocacy upon his return turned U.S. views from Russia away from being a faraway friend to something far more skeptical. Gregory Wallance is a lawyer and writer in New York City. He is the author of Papa's Game (Ballantine Books: 1982) which received a nonfiction nomination for an Edgar Allan Poe Award; America's Soul In the Balance: The Holocaust, FDR's State Department, And The Moral Disgrace Of An American Aristocracy (Greenleaf Book Group: 2012), The Woman Who Fought an Empire: Sarah Aaronsohn and Her Nili Spy Ring (Potomac Books: 2018), and the historical novel Two Men Before the Storm: Arba Crane's Recollection of Dred Scott And the Supreme Court Case That Started the Civil War (Greenleaf Book Group: 2015). He is currently an opinion contributor for The Hill. Today, Gregory and I talk about Kennan, his many trips to Siberia, and the effect his journalism had on American views of Russia. You can find more reviews, excerpts, interviews, and essays at The Asian Review of Books, including its review of Into Siberia. Follow on Twitter at @BookReviewsAsia. Nicholas Gordon is an editor for a global magazine, and a reviewer for the Asian Review of Books. He can be found on Twitter at@nickrigordon Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/asian-review
This is a free preview of a paid episode. To hear more, visit www.americanprestigepod.comDanny chats with Frank Costigliola, Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, about diplomat and historian George F. Kennan. They discuss his legacy as a realist with an unending belief in diplomacy, the “long telegram”, his wariness of the public holding sway in foreign relations, the emphasis on industrial …
EPISODE 1891: In this KEEN ON show, Andrew talks to Gregory Wallance, author of INTO SIBERIA, about the original George Kennan and his epic journey through the frozen heart of RussiaGREGORY J. WALLANCE is a New York-based lawyer (a retired partner at Kaye Scholar and Arnold & Porter), writer, and former federal prosecutor and human rights activist. Gregory is the author of Papa's Game, about the theft of the French Connection heroin, which received a nonfiction nomination for an Edgar Allan Poe Award (The New York Times: “a colorful account [and] an inside look at an interesting, if ugly, period in the history of law enforcement.”); Two Men Before the Storm: Arba Crane's Recollection of Dred Scott and the Supreme Court Case That Started The Civil War (The Boston Globe: “an evocative historical novel”); and America's Soul in the Balance: The Holocaust, FDR's State Department, and the Moral Disgrace of An American Aristocracy (Jewish Book Council: ''An important contribution to the debate surrounding the Roosevelt Administration and the politics of rescue. Reads like a thriller''). He has traveled to countries on several continents on human rights missions for, among others, Amnesty International and Helsinki Watch, was a producer of the HBO film Sakharov, starring Jason Robards and Glenda Jackson. Gregory has written op eds for national publications, including The New York Times, The Los Angeles Times, USA Today, The Chicago Tribune, and the Wall Street Journal. He has also appeared as a commentator on CNN, Fox News, MSNBC, C-SPAN, and NBC's The Today Show, and is currently a Contributor for The Hill. Named as one of the "100 most connected men" by GQ magazine, Andrew Keen is amongst the world's best known broadcasters and commentators. In addition to presenting KEEN ON, he is the host of the long-running How To Fix Democracy show. He is also the author of four prescient books about digital technology: CULT OF THE AMATEUR, DIGITAL VERTIGO, THE INTERNET IS NOT THE ANSWER and HOW TO FIX THE FUTURE. Andrew lives in San Francisco, is married to Cassandra Knight, Google's VP of Litigation & Discovery, and has two grown children.
#Ukraine: #Gaza: DC POV: Missing George Kennan, Professor H.J. Mackinder, International Relations. #FriendsofHistoryDebatingSociety 1910
Nicholas Thompson is the CEO at The Atlantic. Nick brings editorial expertise from Wired and Newyorker.com. He boosted digital subscriptions at Wired by 300% after implementing paywalls. Thompson co-founded Atavist, authored "The Hawk and the Dove: Paul Nitze, George Kennan, and the History of the Cold War," and covers topics like Facebook scandals and marathon running. On The Menu: 1. Strategies for ensuring The Atlantic's relevance and growth in the digital age 2. The transition to consumer revenue: The Atlantic's path to sustainability 3. Targeting new subscribers: Geographic expansion strategies. 4. Addressing bias in AI algorithms 5. The use of AI in The Atlantic's operations: Current and future applications 6. Digitizing and monetizing historical content: The Atlantic's archive project 7. OpenAI's rise over Google in attracting top AI talent and implications for the future
Hello Fully Automated listeners! This is a rebroadcast of Episode 7 of Class Unity: Transmissions, as posted here. Transmissions is the official podcast of Class Unity, and I want to thank them for their permission to use this episode. You can find out more about Class Unity over at https://classunity.org/ For those curious, there will be more independent ‘Fully Automated' content coming soon. But I will continue to repost those ‘Transmissions' episodes in which I am involved, as I think they will be of interest to listeners of this show, too. Welcome to Episode 7 of Class Unity “Transmissions.” In this episode we are joined by Doug Lain, Commissioning Editor at Sublation Media. Lain is a real veteran of the left podcast scene. From his old philosophy podcast "Diet Soap,” which ran from 2009 through 2014, to his work as host of the Zero Books podcast, Zero Squared, Lain's impact as a formative voice on the contemporary socialist left cannot be understated. In this show we cover a wide range of topics, including Lain's recent ban from Elon Musk's newly “pro-free speech” Twitter (for a joke about RFK Jnr). However, the real purpose of the interview is to revisit an old Tweet of his, from April this year. On April 15, Lain posted three priorities that, he said, “an independent left” should be focused on right now: Ending the conflict in Ukraine by opposing the very dangerous continuing escalation; Protecting the working class from the consequences from the continuing financial and fiscal crisis that has been expressed through inflation and the banking crisis; Opposing the war on disinformation and the expansion of the security state into the “whole of society.” In recent months, Lain has been particularly strident on the first and the third of these priorities. However, his arguments have not been especially well received (his recent encounter with the Majority Report's Matt Binder offers a fairly representative example of the disdain many progressives have for Lain's views). Noting the vehemence of this response, we were curious. And so we decided to invite Lain for a chat. We start by asking Lain what he means by the phrase “an independent left”? We then move onto the first of his priorities, the war in Ukraine. The US left has been strangely quiet on this conflict. Where it has addressed the issue, it has usually been in handwaving fashion, arguing that it is a case of “imperialism on both sides.” We put it to Lain that this is kind of an inversion of Trump's infamous “very fine people on both sides” comment. Perhaps the imperialism on both sides argument had some empirical application in the lead up to World War I. But Russia has a GDP close to that of Italy. Equally, US foreign policy insiders like Former Ambassador to USSR Jack Matlock, George Kennan, William Burns have warned DC policymakers for decades about eastwards NATO expansion, saying in no uncertain terms that Ukraine would be the hardest of red lines for Russia. Moreover, now, as Lev Golonkin reports in The Nation in June, the US is openly funding and arming the Ukrainian military despite the presence in its ranks of openly fascist regiments. It seems clear therefore not only who started this war, and why, but that its moral costs and risks for future catastrophe are unacceptable. So why is the left so adamant in its avoidance of this topic? Lain's second priority is protecting the working class from the continuing financial and fiscal crisis. Lain argues “there was never any chance to transform the democratic party into a vehicle for socialism.” But where does that now leave us, on the question of socialist strategy? Does he think the Bernie wave is over, and the left is now basically done with parliamentary politics for another couple of generations? As he surveys the landscape of the contemporary left, what hope does he see for a revolutionary politics? The third topic for Lain essentially stems from his commitment t...
Guest: Frank Costigliola is a Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Connecticut. He is the author of The Kennan Diaries, Roosevelt's Lost Alliances, and his latest, Kennan: A Life between Worlds. The post KPFA Special – George Kennan: The Architect of the Cold War Who Opposed the War appeared first on KPFA.
Israel racist? anti-Semitic! Whites racist? Yep! Philly druggies hanging out! Cornel West for Russia! Lindsay Lohan, disappointing! The Hake Report, Wednesday, July 19, 2023 AD TIME STAMPS * 0:00:00 Start: JLP 3rd hour Rumble-only* 0:01:06 Topics: Racism, anti-Semitism, drugs, NATO…* 0:03:15 Hey, guys! Prime Pizza navy tee* 0:05:46 Snow White latina: Every child a princess* 0:13:30 Pramila Jayapal: Israel "racist state"* 0:24:20 Israel: Kevin McCarthy vs Democrats* 0:29:00 Netanyahu, Trump, Biden, Nick* 0:36:22 RUSS, VA: Broke my back* 0:44:39 RUSS: Why you Christian? I'm not irritable!* 0:53:04 Druggies hanging out in Philly (Hassan)* 1:04:58 Desert Rose - White Heart (1990)* 1:10:16 Supers/Shoutouts: "Racist" = winning, caller bashing* 1:14:04 Coffees: Palestinians? CashApp? Happy B-day* 1:15:58 Cornel West, George Kennan, Russia vs NATO* 1:26:28 Russia/NATO continued (Hassan, rap music)* 1:30:15 Dana Nessel, MI AG, charges 16 "fake electors"* 1:36:34 Social media "addicting" children: not Christian!* 1:44:51 Mrs. Lindsay Lohan (Shammas) had a boy* 1:55:26 Thanks, all! (Last supers during music)* 1:56:23 I Wanna Be a Ramone - Huntingtons (2000)BLOG https://www.thehakereport.com/blog/2023/7/19/the-hake-report-wed-7-19-23 PODCAST by HAKE SubstackHake is LIVE Mon-Fri 9-11 AM PT (11AM-1PM CT / 12-2 PM ET) - Call-in: 1-888-775-3773 - thehakereport.com VIDEO YouTube | Rumble* | BitChute | Facebook | Twitter | Odysee* | DLive | Kick PODCAST Apple | Spotify | Castbox | Podcast Addict | Pocket Casts | Substack (RSS) *SUPER CHAT on asterisked platforms, and/or: Ko-fi | BuyMeACoffee | Streamlabs SUPPORT / EXCLUSIVES Substack | SubscribeStar | Locals || SHOP Teespring SEE ALSO Hake News on The JLP Show | Appearances elsewhere (other shows, etc.) Get full access to HAKE at thehakereport.substack.com/subscribe
Heartland's Tim Benson is joined by Frank Costigliola, Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, to discuss his new book, Kennan: A Life between Worlds. They chat about why George Kennan was one of the most important, and complex, figures in the history of American foreign policy, his diplomatic career in the Soviet Union, his rise to fame and preeminence, and his swift fall from power and influence. They also discuss how Kennan was impossible to classify and whether his diplomatic vision holds any lessons for today. Get the book here: https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691165400/kennanShow Notes:Financial Times: Anatol Lieven – “Kennan: A Life Between Worlds — lessons for the containment of Russia”https://www.ft.com/content/76231e54-063a-4366-acd1-cecd314c470eFirst Things: Patrick Porter – “Cold War Contradictions”https://www.firstthings.com/article/2023/04/cold-war-contradictionsForeign Affairs: Fredrik Logevall – “The Ghosts of Kennan”https://www.foreignaffairs.com/reviews/ghosts-george-kennan-lessons-cold-warForeign Policy: Michael Hirsh – “Is Cold War Inevitable?”https://foreignpolicy.com/2023/01/23/cold-war-george-kennan-diplomacy-containment-united-states-china-soviet-union/The New Republic: Patrick Iber – “George Kennan's False Moves”https://newrepublic.com/article/169557/george-kennans-false-movesTimes Literary Supplement: Harold James – “Kissing Stalin on the mouth”https://www.the-tls.co.uk/articles/kennan-frank-costigliola-book-review-harold-james/Washington Examiner: Damir Marusic – “The divided George Kennan”https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/the-divided-george-kennan
George Kennan was a man of contradictions: an icon yet something of an enigma, a strategist who “used emotionally evocative language in the name of cool, calculated realism,” a bold thinker who warned of overreach. Frank Costigliola puts the architect of Cold War containment in a larger context in his new book, Kennan: A Life between Worlds (https://press.princeton.edu/books/hardcover/9780691165400/kennan). He joins host Richard Aldous to discuss our continuing fascination with this public intellectual par excellence.
Guest: Frank Costigliola is the author of Kennan: A Life between Worlds. He is also a Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Connecticut. The post George Kennan: The Cold War Architect Who Opposed The War appeared first on KPFA.
Modern American foreign policy would look much different if we listened to George Kennan. It would be much more peaceful and a lot less expensive. https://mcclanahanacademy.com https://brionmcclanahan.com/support http://learntruehistory.com --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/brion-mcclanahan/message Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/brion-mcclanahan/support
In our latest, we talk with historian Professor Frank Costigliola, Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Connecticut, about the life of diplomat, architect of the U.S.'s Cold War containment strategy and, later, critic of U.S. policy George Kennan. We talked about Kennan's early life, his time in the State Dept where he penned "The Long Telegram" and a Foreign Affairs article that outlined "containment" as a strategy against the Soviet Union. We also talked about his later life as a critic of militarized Cold War policies, the Vietnam War, the Iraq War and the expansion of NATO. Bio// Frank Costigliola is a Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Connecticut. His books include "The Kennan Diaries" and "Roosevelt's Lost Alliances." His most recent book is “George Kennan: A Life Between Worlds” ------------------------------------------------ Outro- "G&R Blues" by Moody Links// Foreign Affairs: Kennan's Warning on Ukraine (https://bit.ly/41eYUUy) Kennan: A Life Between Worlds (https://bit.ly/3mA9ZAD) Follow Green and Red// G&R Linktree: https://linktr.ee/greenandredpodcast Where you find all the good news about G&R: https://greenandredpodcast.org/ Support the Green and Red Podcast// Become a Patron at https://www.patreon.com/greenredpodcast Or make a one time donation here: https://bit.ly/DonateGandR This is a Green and Red Podcast (@PodcastGreenRed) production. Produced by Bob (@bobbuzzanco) and Scott (@sparki1969). “Green and Red Blues" by Moody. Editing by Isaac.
Tent Life in Siberia A New Account of an Old Undertaking; Adventures among the Koraks and Other Tribes In Kamchatka and Northern Asia
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow #Ukraine: George Kennan warned not to separate Russia and Ukraine and not to expand NATO. Katrina vanden Heuvel, Nation https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/george-kennan-warning-on-ukrainee
Photo: No known restrictions on publication. @Batchelorshow #Ukraine: George Kennan warned not to separate Russia and Ukraine and not to expand NATO. Katrina vanden Heuvel, Nation https://www.foreignaffairs.com/ukraine/george-kennan-warning-on-ukrainee
Guest: Frank Costigliola is a Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of History at the University of Connecticut. He is the author of The Kennan Diaries, Roosevelt's Lost Alliances, and his latest, Kennan: A Life between Worlds. The post George Kennan: The Architect of the Cold War Who Opposed the War appeared first on KPFA.
{"@context":"http://schema.org/","@id":"https://theanalysis.news/vietnam-blood-bath-to-prove-america-had-balls-christian-appy-on-rai-3-5/#arve-youtube-xxevvurjpma63c0466b758d8997915150","type":"VideoObject","embedURL":"https://www.youtube.com/embed/xXEvVurjpMA?feature=oembed&iv_load_policy=3&modestbranding=1&rel=0&autohide=1&playsinline=0&autoplay=1&enablejsapi=1","name":"Vietnam Blood Bath to Prove America Had "Balls" - Christian Appy on RAI (3/5)","thumbnailUrl":"https://i.ytimg.com/vi/xXEvVurjpMA/hqdefault.jpg","uploadDate":"2023-01-12T12:41:58+00:00","author":"Reality Asserts Itself with Paul Jay","description":"This interview was originally published May 29, 2015. On Reality Asserts Itself, Mr. Appy says that presidents Kennedy and Johnson pursued the Vietnam war largely to prove the U.S., and themselves personally, had the u201ccourageu201d to wage war. TranscriptListenDonateSubscribeGuestMusic PAUL JAY, SENIOR E"} This interview was originally published May 29, 2015. On Reality Asserts Itself, Mr. Appy says that presidents Kennedy and Johnson pursued the Vietnam war largely to prove the U.S., and themselves personally, had the “courage” to wage war. .kt-post-loop_d936b9-f5 .kadence-post-image{padding-top:0px;padding-right:0px;padding-bottom:0px;padding-left:0px;}.kt-post-loop_d936b9-f5 .kt-post-grid-wrap{gap:30px 6px;}.kt-post-loop_d936b9-f5 .kt-blocks-post-grid-item{border-top-width:0px;border-right-width:0px;border-bottom-width:0px;border-left-width:0px;border-top-right-radius:0px;border-bottom-right-radius:0px;border-bottom-left-radius:0px;border-top-left-radius:0px;}.kt-post-loop_d936b9-f5 .kt-blocks-post-grid-item .kt-blocks-post-grid-item-inner{padding-top:10px;padding-right:25px;padding-bottom:25px;padding-left:9px;}.kt-post-loop_d936b9-f5 .kt-blocks-post-grid-item header{padding-top:0px;padding-right:0px;padding-bottom:0px;padding-left:0px;margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0px;}.kt-post-loop_d936b9-f5 .kt-blocks-post-grid-item .entry-title{padding-top:5px;padding-right:0px;padding-bottom:10px;padding-left:0px;margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0px;font-size:16px;line-height:17px;}.kt-post-loop_d936b9-f5 .entry-content{padding-top:0px;padding-right:0px;padding-bottom:0px;padding-left:0px;margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0px;}.kt-post-loop_d936b9-f5 .kt-blocks-post-footer{border-top-width:0px;border-right-width:0px;border-bottom-width:0px;border-left-width:0px;padding-top:0px;padding-right:0px;padding-bottom:0px;padding-left:0px;margin-top:0px;margin-right:0px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0px;}.kt-post-loop_d936b9-f5 .entry-content:after{height:0px;}.kt-post-loop_d936b9-f5 .kb-filter-item{border-top-width:0px;border-right-width:0px;border-bottom-width:2px;border-left-width:0px;padding-top:5px;padding-right:8px;padding-bottom:5px;padding-left:8px;margin-top:0px;margin-right:10px;margin-bottom:0px;margin-left:0px;} Vietnam Blood Bath to Prove America Had “Balls” – Christian Appy on RAI (3/5) “American Does Bad Things for Good Reasons” – Christian Appy on RAI (2/5) “America Does Bad Things for Good Reasons” – Christian Appy on RAI (1/5) Transcript Listen Donate Subscribe Guest Music PAUL JAY, SENIOR EDITOR, TRNN: Welcome back to Reality Asserts Itself on The Real News Network. I'm Paul Jay. In his book American Reckoning: The Vietnam War and American Identity, Christian Appy writes: the need to demonstrate presidential balls has been an under-acknowledged but enduring staple of American foreign policy. Aggressive masculinity shaped American Cold War policy and still does. Deep-seated ideas about gender and sexuality cannot be dismissed as mere talk–they have explanatory value. U.S. policy in Vietnam was driven by men who were intensely concerned about demonstrating their own and the nation's toughness. As every other justification of the war grew threadbare, it became increasingly important to appear firm. Now joining us in the studio is Christian Appy. Thanks for joining us again. CHRISTIAN G. APPY, AUTHOR, AMERICAN RECKONING: You're welcome. JAY: So one more time, his latest book is American Reckoning: The Vietnam War and Our National Identity. And Christian teaches history at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. So this has always seemed to me, this need to develop, portray firmness and strength and so on, you know, it's akin to, like, a loan shark, and it's actually a lot akin to a loan shark, given how much of American commerce is based on lending people money–and I shouldn't say people; lending countries money, and assuming they're going to pay back. And for most loan sharks, you've got to break some knees once in a while to make sure people pay you the exorbitant interest you're trying to collect. Talk about this need to projected toughness, and start with Kennedy in Vietnam. APPY: Well, Kennedy early on in his presidency suffered a couple of real blows to his reputation, most obviously when he supported the–orchestrated the invasion of Cuba in an effort to overthrow Castro at the Bay of Pigs. And it was a debacle, and it failed. Every one of the Cuban exiles that was trained to carry out the operation was either killed or captured. And Kennedy was forced to actually pay ransom to get the prisoners back. So what was to be a secret operation was quickly exposed, and it was felt that he felt it as deeply humiliating. And then later that same year he met for the first time with Khrushchev, and Khrushchev effectively kind of bullied him, and once again Kennedy felt that he had not demonstrated his presidential gravitas and was already beginning to look at foreign-policy interventions. JAY: Can I just add one thing? APPY: Sure. Yeah. JAY: And internally taking tremendous flack from some sections of the military and certainly the whole conservative /pʌndərˈæpɨs/–can't say it, but you know what I mean–about being weak. APPY: Yes. JAY: I mean, why didn't he go in with a full-fledged invasion of Cuba? APPY: Right. That, and he was already beginning to sort of move toward a neutralist solution to the communist insurgency in Laos, so he was beginning to think that maybe Vietnam would be the place to assert American credibility and power. But before that really began to develop, we had the Cuban missile crisis, and this for him was a great boost to his reputation and to his reputation for strength and steely resolve. JAY: Again, really quickly–some of our viewers don't know that what that is. APPY: Yeah. Well, the United States discovered, through U-2 reconnaissance photographs, that the Soviet Union– JAY: That was the spy plane. APPY: –the spy plane–that the Soviet Union was beginning to install medium-range nuclear missiles in Cuba–in response, actually, to the U.S.-backed invasion. They were put there as a kind of deterrent, really defensive, though of course all nuclear weapons are almost by definition dangerous. JAY: And also there were nuclear–United States had weapons in Turkey which were awfully close to Russia. APPY: We had–exactly. And indeed you speak to the exact resolution of the missile crisis. Kennedy made clear on television that it would not be tolerated. Interestingly enough, he couldn't tolerate it because he had made a speech a couple of months earlier saying that if offensive weapons were put on Cuba by the Soviet Union, he would not allow that. And once it happened, he asked some advisers, does this really change the balance of power in the world? And Kennedy said–McNamara said, no–this is Secretary of Defense McNamara. And Kennedy agreed. He said, I wish I had never said that. I wish I had never drawn that line. JAY: Yeah, 'cause what could they do with them? APPY: Yeah. So he had–but now he felt he had to do something. And what he did, thankfully, was to be a little patient and to say no to those of his advisers that immediately wanted to launch airstrikes and take a more aggressive response. They negotiated a settlement. So it really was diplomacy, not bluster or militarism, that solved the crisis. They were willing to say to the Soviets, okay, we will publicly promise never to invade Cuba, and privately we'll agree to remove our missiles from Turkey that are threatening very close to your borders. But the narrative that they wanted to go out to the public was a tougher narrative, that we stared them eyeball to eyeball and the other fellow blinked–that was attributed to–. JAY: Yeah, 'cause America set up all these military ships, Navy ships as a blockade around Cuba. APPY: Yes, the sort of the–yes, the quarantine. And Kennedy even went so far as to suggest that Adlai Stevenson, who was representing us at the United Nations, had wanted to sell us out, had wanted to, quote-unquote, Munich, because he had advised that we remove our missiles from Turkey to solve the crisis. And that's exactly what did solve the crisis. But Kennedy didn't want anybody to know that, so he actually threw Stephenson under the bus as a weakling. Anyway, privately he told people that–Kennedy bragged in private to friends that he had cut off Khrushchev's balls. So that really is deeply embedded in the American foreign policy of the period. And it becomes more important, as I write, as the other justifications for the war are no longer believed even by the policymakers. By 1965 or 1966, I believe, Johnson was not convinced that the war in Vietnam posed any threat to national security. JAY: I want to get to Johnson, but I just want to stay on Kennedy for a minute. APPY: Okay. Sure. JAY: You know, there's a lot of debate about the Kennedy assassination. That's whether or not he was really going to pursue Vietnam or not. What's your take? APPY: Well, I waffle on this issue. As I tell students, it's hard enough as a historian to figure out what actually happens, and nearly impossible to figure out what might've happened if x or y or z had been different. So really these are interesting speculations, but really impossible to nail down. The truth is there's documentary evidence that would support both positions. I mean, those who would like to believe that Kennedy would have pulled us out of Vietnam can cite documents where they're talking about withdrawing 1,000 troops at a time and slowly drawing down our presence. But Kennedy was pretty clear in a lot of that planning that those withdrawals had to be contingent on success. And there was some hope at the time that maybe success was coming, but it needs to be remembered that Kennedy, although he never put more than 16,000 troops into Vietnam, which seems quite a small number when you compare it to the 540,000 that finally ended up there under Johnson, those 16,000 troops had already put into place many brutal practices that would only get expanded. We were–by 1962 we were already using chemical defoliants on South Vietnam. We were using napalm. We were engaged in aerial bombing of South Vietnam, the very land we claimed to be defending. And we were already beginning the forced relocation of people from the rural countryside into what were then called strategic hamlets. JAY: Concentration camps. APPY: Effectively concentration camps. So all of that had begun. And even on the last day of his life, he gave a speech that morning–or maybe it was the night before; I think it was that morning–in which he reaffirmed the necessity of America's standing against communist aggression in South Vietnam. That was to a Texas audience, but he did tick off all the ways in which we had built up the military and were–. JAY: I interviewed Gore Vidal a few times and got to know him fairly well, and he knew Jack Kennedy, President Kennedy, fairly well. I think he was a stepbrother to Jackie Kennedy. And he was quite convinced that Jack–and this goes back to you've got to have balls theme–he was quite convinced that Jack wanted to pursue the war in Vietnam, and to a large extent to prove he could be a wartime president, and maybe that he had the balls to go to war in Vietnam. But as you say, this becomes a much even bigger issue for Johnson. In fact, I'm going to read a quote from your book. APPY: Sure. JAY: By 1966, Assistant Secretary of Defense John McNaughton concluded that avoiding humiliation had moved from 70 percent of America's goal in Vietnam to 100 percent. Quote, the reasons why we went into Vietnam to the present depth are varied, but they are now largely academic. Why we have not withdrawn is by all odds one reason: to preserve our reputation. We have not hung on to save a friend or to deny the communists the added acres and heads. Christian writes, to preserve an image of strength, LBJ systematically escalated the war. Perhaps the most shocking moment in Robert Dallek's biography of Johnson comes when a group of reporters, pressed by LBJ to explain why he continued to wage war in spite of so many difficulties and so much opposition, the president, quote, unzipped his fly, drew out his substantial organ, and declared, quote, this is why. Other key policymakers may not have displayed their genitals, but all the men who sent America to Vietnam felt a deep connection between their own masculinity and national power. Expand a bit. APPY: Well, it's true. I mean, the group of policymakers did not share Johnson's crudity, at least, or his poorer background from the hill countries of Texas–they came from, really, a different class background, many of them very privileged private schools, Ivy League colleges, elite military service, all-men's Metropolitan Club, secret societies. That whole world inbred a kind of code of masculinity that made personal toughness inseparable from the toughness of the state. And so they really did own that idea that it was their mission, kind of a Spartan mission, to uphold American strength, and that anybody who questioned that could not really be part of that team. JAY: It goes back a little bit, I think, to what I was talking about as the loan sharks having to prove–someone has to be the test case, the model of getting their knees broken so everyone else will pay. I mean, it's in prison too. You know, you're not shown–if you show weakness, then someone will take advantage of you. This mentality that if America shows any weakness, then other powers are going to take advantage of that weakness, it seems to be almost at the core of U.S. policy, because it keeps ending in debacle. APPY: Yes. And it needn't be that way. I mean, at this precise time that they're digging their heels in, grounds of toughness, a whole new countercultural and antiwar movement is developing that is challenging this idea of masculinity and rejecting sort of the John Wayne image that they had grown up with, and coming to the conclusion that maybe it's really braver and tougher to express a kind of moral courage that can say, no, this is wrong, and we really need to withdraw. And there were occasionally some people close to power who were starting to say that, and they would immediately get sort of shut out. I mean, they were saying, for example, that, you know, yes, it might be–as George Kennan, one of the great architects of the policy of containment, said when he was called before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee to testify–William Fulbright was the chair at the time, and it was widely televised. So George Kennan was asked, what do you think would happen if we withdrew from Vietnam? This is 1966 again. He said, well, honestly, I think it would be a six-month sensation, but it would blow away, it wouldn't really have any fundamental effect on our national security, and it actually, in terms of our international reputation, might improve it. So one of the ironies of this period for me is that Johnson, who was always credited as being the master politician who could read the tea leaves and count every vote, completely miscalculated the direction of the American public, because had he withdrawn early in his presidency, before the massive escalation, I think he might well have been reelected. I think he could have made the case that this really was not in our interest and not so much a sign of weakness but of really pragmatic realism. And another irony: all these guys prided themselves on being hard-headed realists who could see the world with steely eyes and unaffected by sentimentality or namby-pamby moralism, and yet in the face of the evidence that they were receiving on a daily basis, that the war was going poorly, that they had privately very little optimism that they could achieve their objectives–certainly not in any time soon, maybe five, ten, 15 years down the road–those same pragmatists were willing to continue a war they knew they weren't winning, because they didn't want to be seen as weak, didn't want to be the first president to lose a war. JAY: But then doesn't Johnson at the end–near the end of his presidency he does come to the conclusion to try to end it and negotiate in secret a ceasefire that might lead to a final settlement that gets torpedoed by Nixon. APPY: Yeah, he does make some small steps it that direction, though the ceasefire over the bombing in the North, first, it's only above the 20th parallel, and then just days before he leaves office it's all the way down to the 17th parallel, but he never stops the bombing of the South. And one thing that Americans to this day don't quite realize is that our bombing of South Vietnam was far more intense and unconstrained than the bombing of the North. We dropped 4 million tons of bombs on the South, 1 million tons of bombs on the north. That's a lot. But South Vietnam became by far the most bombed country in world history. We were using B-52 bombers that could hold, each one of these planes, 30 tons of bombs. They, of course, had been designed to drop nuclear weapons, but were retooled to be used in Vietnam. But, again, on the South, within 25 miles of Saigon. JAY: But doesn't Johnson–Johnson does negotiate a ceasefire, right, I mean, a full-scale ceasefire that never takes place 'cause Nixon talks the North Vietnamese into withdrawing. APPY: Well, no, he continues the war. What I think maybe you're alluding to is he does initiate peace discussions, the sort of those Paris peace talks, which do slowly begin in the last year of his presidency, though the South Vietnamese president, Nguyễn Văn Thiệu, wanted nothing to do with them. JAY: But this idea of having balls and showing American power, in spite of the war starting to unravel–but there's also economic interest here. I mean, there's a lot of people making a lot of money out of the war. APPY: It's true. Certainly defense contractors are making bushels of money. But one of the interesting things is that over time, by the late '60s, high-level executives are beginning to believe that the war is actually hurting the economy, because it's–. JAY: Or hurting them. APPY: Yeah. Well, they see [crosstalk] JAY: Their section of the economy. APPY: Yeah. And defense industry aside, there's a moment in which the CEO of the Bank of America, no less, goes before Congress and makes the case that the war is bad for business, that corporate profits have actually peaked in '65 just as the massive escalation began and had declined steadily since then and that inflation was ticking up. And so he really is calling for an end to the war. JAY: Yeah, it was an interesting part of your book. You talk about how–'cause unemployment gets so low,– APPY: Right. JAY: –inflation starts to go up, corporate profits start to go down. APPY: Right. JAY: So you have a real division, I guess, within the American elites about those who are still making money out of the war and those who aren't making as much money as they want to be. APPY: Right, or people who are ideologically committed to the war, even if it doesn't necessarily support business. So it is an interesting period. But it does suggest how broad-based opposition to the war was by 1970 and '71. JAY: And for some of our younger viewers or people that forget, let's just remind people this isn't just when someone wants to continue a war because they want to pull their organ out of their pants, they want to prove how tough they are, prove how tough America is, was. Just remind us again how many people suffered and were killed in the war. APPY: Well, now the best estimate for the number of Vietnamese–the Vietnamese say that 3.8 million were killed during the American phase of the war. And former secretary of defense McNamara, before he died, said he has every reason to believe that they were correct. American historians tend to say that it was at least 2 million. Sort of that's the conservative estimate. So we don't actually know the proper figure. But when you include the fact that we were also bombing Laos very heavily and Cambodia, you can add roughly another at least a million and a half to that total. So this is a real bloodbath. And for the United States, certainly more troops were lost than at any time after World War II–more than 58,000. And, of course, hundreds of thousands wounded, and many more who suffered psychological casualties from that experience. One further cost of the war that is not always noted is that after the war ended in 1975, many Vietnamese and Cambodians and Laotians have died from unexploded ordnance. Roughly 2 percent of every American bomb that was dropped, or even artillery shell, doesn't explode. So ten, 20, even 30 years later, a farmer can be plowing his field and hit one of those things and it can go off. Or a child can pick up–they had these really small baseball-size bombs that were called cluster bombs that–they would come inside a large conventional bomb, and then, when they exploded, they would send out these smaller bombs, and inside each one of these small bombs were hundreds of little steel pellets or dart-like–they were called flechettes that would go in every possible direction, designed as the classic antipersonnel weapon that would kill people but not structures and that would burrow into your body and not necessarily kill you but require other people to take care of you or lead to a slow and horrible death. And as I say, a kid could pick up one of these little baseball bombs and it could go off again. So the estimate now is that some 40,000, anyway, Vietnamese have died from that cause since the war, which is extraordinary, and many more wounded. JAY: And when you look at American media and this narrative of American exceptionalism, the real victim of the Vietnam War was America. APPY: Right. JAY: And we're going to get into the America-as-victim narrative in the next segment of our interview with the Christian Appy on Reality Asserts Itself on The Real News Network. Select one or choose any amount to donate whatever you like any amount $5 $15 $25 $50 $100 $500 $1,000 Custom Amount $ Make this donation each month (optional) Donate with Credit Card var gform;gform||(document.addEventListener("gform_main_scripts_loaded",function(){gform.scriptsLoaded=!0}),window.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded",function(){gform.domLoaded=!0}),gform={domLoaded:!1,scriptsLoaded:!1,initializeOnLoaded:function(o){gform.domLoaded&&gform.scriptsLoaded?o():!gform.domLoaded&&gform.scriptsLoaded?window.addEventListener("DOMContentLoaded",o):document.addEventListener("gform_main_scripts_loaded",o)},hooks:{action:{},filter:{}},addAction:function(o,n,r,t){gform.addHook("action",o,n,r,t)},addFilter:function(o,n,r,t){gform.addHook("filter",o,n,r,t)},doAction:function(o){gform.doHook("action",o,arguments)},applyFilters:function(o){return gform.doHook("filter",o,arguments)},removeAction:function(o,n){gform.removeHook("action",o,n)},removeFilter:function(o,n,r){gform.removeHook("filter",o,n,r)},addHook:function(o,n,r,t,i){null==gform.hooks[o][n]&&(gform.hooks[o][n]=[]);var e=gform.hooks[o][n];null==i&&(i=n+"_"+e.length),gform.hooks[o][n].push({tag:i,callable:r,priority:t=null==t?10:t})},doHook:function(n,o,r){var t;if(r=Array.prototype.slice.call(r,1),null!=gform.hooks[n][o]&&((o=gform.hooks[n][o]).sort(function(o,n){return o.priority-n.priority}),o.forEach(function(o){"function"!=typeof(t=o.callable)&&(t=window[t]),"action"==n?t.apply(null,r):r[0]=t.apply(null,r)})),"filter"==n)return r[0]},removeHook:function(o,n,t,i){var r;null!=gform.hooks[o][n]&&(r=(r=gform.hooks[o][n]).filter(function(o,n,r){return!!(null!=i&&i!=o.tag||null!=t&&t!=o.priority)}),gform.hooks[o][n]=r)}}); Never miss another story Subscribe to theAnalysis.news - Newsletter Email(Required) Name(Required) First Last Δdocument.getElementById( "ak_js_1" ).setAttribute( "value", ( new Date() ).getTime() ); “Christian Gerard Appy is a professor of history at the University of Massachusetts Amherst. He is widely known as a leading expert on the Vietnam War experience. The most recent of his three books on the subject is American Reckoning: The Vietnam War and Our National Identity.” theAnalysis.news theme music written by Slim Williams for Paul Jay's documentary film “Never-Endum-Referendum“. Never-Endum-Referendum Artist Website Paul Jay's Documentaries
https://youtu.be/YynHmjv1hmQ After America emerged as the undisputed leader of the West in 1945, however, the shocks, reversals, and humiliations at the hands of Stalin were greater than those that had caused Britain to declare war in 1939. America, however, chose a different course. Embracing the wisdom of George Kennan, America pursued a policy of containment and conscious avoidance of a Third World War. When Stalin trashed the Yalta agreement, terrorizing the peoples of Poland and Eastern Europe for whom Britain had gone to war, America was stunned and sickened but issued no ultimata. When Moscow blockaded Berlin in violation of Allied rights, Truman responded with an airlift, not armored divisions or atom bombs. When Stalin's agents carried out the Prague coup in 1948, Truman did not see in Czechoslovakia an issue that justified war, as Churchill had when the Czechs were forced to give up the Sudetenland. America's answer was NATO, drawing a red line across Europe that the West could defend, as Britain should have done in that March of 1939, instead of handing out the insane war guarantee to Poland. And where the British had failed to line up a Russian alliance before giving its war guarantee, America enlisted ten European allies before committing herself to defend West Germany. Unlike Churchill in the 1930s, American leaders of the late 1940s and 1950s believed that, while the fate of Poland and Czechoslovakia was tragic, both were beyond any U.S. vital interest. From 1949 to 1989, the American army never crossed the Yalta line. When East Germans rose in 1953 and Hungarians in 1956, Eisenhower declined to act. In 1959, Ike welcomed the “Butcher of Budapest” to Camp David. When Khrushchev built the Berlin Wall, Kennedy called up the reserves, then sent them home after a year. In the missile crisis of 1962, Kennedy cut a secret deal to take U.S. missiles out of Turkey for Khrushchev's taking Russian missiles out of Cuba. When the Prague Spring was crushed in 1968, LBJ did nothing. U.S. inaction was not due to cowardice but cold calculation as to what was worth risking war with a nuclear-armed Soviet Union and what was not worth risking war. When the Polish workers' movement, Solidarity, was crushed in 1981, Ronald Reagan denounced the repression but he neither broke diplomatic relations with Warsaw nor imposed economic sanctions. Eisenhower and Reagan were not Chamberlains, but neither were they Churchills. Who ruled in the capitals east of the Elbe was not to them a vital U.S. interest worth a war. – Patrick J. Buchanan, Churchill, Hitler, and the Unnecessary War p. 417-8 Article discussed: Our Greatest Strength is Liberty, Not Force by Jeffrey Wernick Kyle Anzalone on the Libertarian Institute Conflicts of Interest on Odysee Kyle Anzalone on Twitter Spotify
Photo: G.K. [i.e., George Kennan] in Siberian exile dress, each piece given by an exile from the dress he had worn 1/2: #Ukraine: The return of NSC 68 (1950) and roll-back. Anatol Lieven, @LievenAnatol Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft. Georgetown University Atlantic Monthly. https://quincyinst.org/2022/06/01/cold-war-catastrophes-the-u-s-can-avoid-this-time/ Containing Russia is a good idea. Crusading against it is not. by Anatol Lieven https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2022/06/us-russia-cold-war-containment-ukraine/661146/
The February 24th Russian invasion of Ukraine has rattled the world and has unleashed misery, death and destruction. What prompted Moscow's attack? From their perspective, the expansion of NATO, a U.S.-led military alliance, up to Russia's borders threatens their national security interests. It went against assurances given by Washington that that would not happen. Years ago, George Kennan, the much venerated State Department diplomat warned against NATO expansion. With great foresight he said, it “would be the most fateful error of American policy in the entire post-cold-war era. Such a decision may be expected to inflame the nationalistic, anti-Western and militaristic tendencies in Russian opinion; to have an adverse effect on the development of Russian democracy; to restore the atmosphere of the cold war to East-West relations, and to impel Russian foreign policy in directions decidedly not to our liking.”
This week on “The Learning Curve,” co-host Cara Candal talks with John Lewis Gaddis, the Robert A. Lovett Professor of Military and Naval History at Yale University, and the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of George F. Kennan: An American Life. He shares some of the wider background knowledge, major historical themes, and key events that today’s students should know about […]
© 2020-2026 Ivy Podcast Discovery LLC
