Podcast appearances and mentions of George Marshall

Dr. Jonathan Abel sits down with Dr. Bill Nance to discuss how the US Army prepared for World War II. They begin with the period of austerity in the 1920s and the three competing Army missions in the Philippines, on the Mexican border, and training at home. They move through the era of rising tensions in the 1930s as George Marshall worked to build cadres for a future conscript army. They conclude by examining the early years of the war and how that system came to fruition to provide the armies that won the war for the US. “History is only a confused heap of facts.” – Philip Dormer Stanhope, Earl of Chesterfield Host: Dr. Jonathan Abel, CGSC DMHDMH Podcast Team: Drs. Jonathan Abel, Mark Gerges, and Bill NanceArtwork: Daniel O. NealMusic: SSG Noah Taylor, West Point Band

TVC 687.3: Peter Ford, son of screen legends Glenn Ford  and Eleanor Powell and the author of Glenn Ford: A Life, talks to Ed about how his dad used his star power to hire directors and actors on Cade's County (CBS, 1971-1972) with whom he'd worked before, including George Marshall, Leo Penn, Edgar Buchanan, Barbara Rush, and Broderick Crawford; how James Woods saved Peter's life in 1976 while the two of them filmed a scene together for “Sins of Thy Father,” an episode of Barnaby Jones; and some of the notable people who hired Peter during his twenty-year career as a building contractor, including Don Simpson, Frank Gehry, Blake Edwards, George Clooney, Sally Kellerman, Mary Kay Place, and Steve Tisch. Glenn Ford: A Life is available wherever books are sold through University of Wisconsin Press.

Comedy and Westerns on a ThursdayFirst a look at this day in History.Then The Screen Directors Playhouse, originally broadcast April 3, 1949, 76 years ago, Ghost Breakers starring Bob Hope. Based on the 1940 American mystery/horror comedy film directed by George Marshall and starring Bob Hope.  A radio broadcaster, his quaking manservant and an heiress investigate the mystery of a haunted castle in Cuba.Followed by The Joan Davis Show, originally broadcast April 3, 1948,  77 years ago, Is Joan Married to John Payne?  Joan has bragged to her old friend that she's married to John Payne...and now she's got to deliver!Then Gunsmoke starring William Conrad, originally broadcast April 3, 1954, 71 years ago, Mr. and Mrs. Amber.  After Neil Amber is caught stealing seeds from the General Store, Pete Fletcher, a wealthy rancher, accuses Amber's wife of stealing one of his calves.Followed by Have Gun Will Travel starring John Dehner, originally broadcast April 3, 1960, 65 years ago, Shanghai is a Verb.  Hey Boy has disappeared from the Barbary Coast. Bubonic plague and a shanghai ensue. Finally Lum and Abner, originally broadcast April 3, 1942, 83 years ago, RKO Studios Premiere.   Here's a suggestion for what to do with the $10,000: everyone in Pine Ridge (including Clark Gable and Grover Cleveland!) wants a new pinball machine! The new Lum and Abner movie ("The Bashful Bachelor") is about to premiere. Find the movie on YouTube here…  https://youtu.be/ANsf_axGe6g?si=m_W__6fkvwjv4jwaThanks to Sean for supporting our podcast by using the Buy Me a Coffee function at http://classicradio.streamFind the Family Fallout Shelter Booklet Here: https://www.survivorlibrary.com/library/the_family_fallout_shelter_1959.pdfhttps://wardomatic.blogspot.com/2006/11/fallout-shelter-handbook-1962.htmlAnd more about the Survive-all Fallout Sheltershttps://conelrad.blogspot.com/2010/09/mad-men-meet-mad-survive-all-shelter.html

A podcast exploring emotions, sustainability and positive action, with Professor Rosie RobisonFeeling overwhelmed by climate change? In the second edition of this podcast, ARU Professor of Social Sustainability Rosie Robison explores why the obvious action may not always be the most helpful one, when it comes to managing our feelings about climate change. Joined by child and adolescent therapist Deb Lane and activist Manda Brookman, they explore the role of emotion in sparking meaningful action. By the end of the episode, you might just discover some surprising reasons to feel more positive. Dive deeper into these conversations on Rosie's website: www.begreenchange.com (https://www.begreenchange.com)Details of books mentioned in this episode: “Don't even think about it, why our brains are wired to ignore climate change” by George Marshall; “Wilful Blindness” by Margaret Heffernan; “Rocking the boat” by Debra Meyerson. Event presented as part of the Cambridge Festival (https://www.aru.ac.uk/events/cambridge-festival) .For an accessible version of this episode watch on ⁠YouTube⁠ (⁠https://youtu.be/GT3CLkmnr3M⁠)Listen to the previous episode: Spotify (https://open.spotify.com/episode/5qYGeL9nHn2rQkKtEYeqNZ?si=bd78f159bf2e49c7) and Apple Podcasts (https://podcasts.apple.com/gb/podcast/how-to-feel-better-about-climate-change/id1469428173?i=1000673577274).Production: Rosie Robison and Rowan JamesSound recording and editing: Rowan James

On April 3, 1948, President Harry Truman signed the Economic Recovery Act of 1948, aka the Marshall Plan. Named after Secretary of State George Marshall, who in 1947 proposed that the United States provide economic assistance to restore the economic infrastructure of postwar Europe, the Plan contributed $13.3 billion in aid to 16 European nations between 1948 and 1951. The successful design, planning and execution of the Plan has been a role model for several development plans across the globe.

Presenting the kick off of the 56th year of our annual Perspectives in Military History Lecture series with author Mr. Ted Aldrich. Mr. Aldrich will discuss his new book, The Partnership: George Marshall, Henry Stimson, and the Extraordinary Collaboration That Won World War II, that captures the insightful revelations regarding the major roles played by General George C. Marshall and Henry L. Stimson to prepare America for war and ensure the Allies' victory in World War II.   Ted Aldrich, a career-long New York-based commodity and trade finance banker, has had a lifelong passion for history. The book has received critical acclaim from historians such as Walter Isaacson, Kai Bird, and Evan Thomas, and his talk features engaging stories about the lives and partnership of Stimson, Marshall, and the Allied leaders they worked with, including President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill, and general officers Dwight D. Eisenhower, George S. Patton Jr, Douglas MacArthur, and Omar N. Bradley.

We're reasonably good at imagining what nuclear war would be like (although it'd probably be even worse than that). But it's not the same for most other complicated, really really scary risks. Eg: the UK government is still not taking seriously the risk of another pandemic - and that's despite the fact we LITERALLY JUST HAD ONE, GUYS.  And it's the same for climate change - with knobs on. For sure, our politicians, banks and cultures just aren't ready for the climate-clusterfudge. But if you're anything like me, there's a limit to how much of it you can take into your overloaded little brain as well. Why? Are we just not evolved for it? Are we doomed to sail merrily into a storm we don't want to see coming?  No, says this episode's guest, the fab Laurie Laybourn from the Strategic Climate Risk Initiative.  Yes, it's hard to wrap your head around. But Laurie thinks we're very far from doomed - as long as we first understand where we're actually starting from. Listen for a chat that's sometimes vertiginous, sometimes funny, and always inspiring. And you can't say you weren't warned, but here's Threads (1984) on iPlayer. These new-format episodes take a long time to record, script, and edit. If you like it - that'll make me happy. Let me know your thoughts on the show - hello@yourbrainonclimate.com. Please rate, review and subscribe, and share the show on socials. Please consider chucking this humble indie podcaster a few quid at www.patreon.com/yourbrainonclimate. Owl noises = references: 20:48 - Derailment risk: a paper by Laurie and others. 25:50 - 58% of Americans say climate change contributed to the LA wildfires. 26:12 - George Marshall's important book, Don't Even Think About It.36:17 - Normalcy Bias over at the Decision Lab: why we believe nothing bad will happen. 37:05 - Scope insensitivity, courtesy of Wiki. 38:28 - Laurie's report, the Security Blind Spot. 41:13 - The Daily Telegraph's investigation into the pandemic prep exercise too scary to publicise. 41:42 - The UK's under preparedness for Covid, via the BBC. 50:31 - Going Infinite, Michael Lewis's superb book about Sam Bankman-Fried. 51:54 - In 2019 I quit my job live(ish) on Sustainababble #169. The show is hosted and produced by me, Dave Powell, who you can find @powellds on Bluesky and X/Twitter, although I don't use the latter any more. YBOC theme music and iterations thereof, by me.  Show logo by Arthur Stovell at www.designbymondial.com. Other music in this episode by Robertothenice. 

"PREVIEW: GENERALS AND ADMIRALS: Colleague Steve Deal, USN (Ret) examines the selection process for three and four-star commanders - and how this protocol fails to develop leadership for future conflicts. More details to follow." 1944: Ike chosen by George Marshall

George Marshall (born 1964) is a British environmental campaigner, communications specialist and writer. He is the founder of Climate Outreach and is a specialist in climate communication. He is the author of Carbon Detox (2007) and Don't Even Think About It: Why Our Brains Are Wired to Ignore Climate Change (2014). Links ______________________________ Profile: https://uk.linkedin.com/in/climategeorgeIntergroup Conflict Paper: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1002/ejsp.3127 Conservative vs Socialist Paper: https://theconversation.com/conservative-governments-protect-more-land-while-socialists-and-nationalists-threaten-more-species-236519 Timestamps ______________________________ 0:00 - Introduction 0:22 - Why psychology is critical to mitigating the impact of climate change 9:33 - How can we communicate more effectively on climate change? 14:29 - Can climate change be addressed as a policy issue, rather than a political issue? 22:07 - Building broader political identities to mobilise action on Climate Change 32:38 - The need for trusted messengers 43:00 - How to push beyond political identities to mobilise action? 51:39 - The weaknesses of climate change as a motivator for action

In an earlier conversation in this series, Evan Thomas discussed his 1986 book, "The Wise Men." There were 6 of them: Messrs. Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, McCloy, Lovett, and Kennan. In this episode, we asked Edward "Ted" Aldrich to discuss his book titled "The Partnership: George Marshall, Henry Stimson, and the Extraordinary Collaboration That Won World War II." Mr. Aldrich writes: "FDR paired Stimson, as Secretary of War, with Gen. George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, in the summer of 1940 in anticipation of the global war into which all three men knew the United States could shortly be drawn." Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In an earlier conversation in this series, Evan Thomas discussed his 1986 book, "The Wise Men." There were 6 of them: Messrs. Acheson, Bohlen, Harriman, McCloy, Lovett, and Kennan. In this episode, we asked Edward "Ted" Aldrich to discuss his book titled "The Partnership: George Marshall, Henry Stimson, and the Extraordinary Collaboration That Won World War II." Mr. Aldrich writes: "FDR paired Stimson, as Secretary of War, with Gen. George Marshall, Chief of Staff of the Army, in the summer of 1940 in anticipation of the global war into which all three men knew the United States could shortly be drawn." Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Far from a sure thing, the Allied victory in World War II was the result of a multitude of factors—especially leadership. On this week's “Leaders and Legends” podcast, we interview Ted Aldrich about his compelling new book “The Partnership: George Marshall, Henry Stimson, and the Extraordinary Collaboration that Won World War II.” The relationship between the Army Chief of Staff and the Secretary of War in the Great Crusade is without a doubt the most important in our country's history. Sponsors• Veteran Strategies• NFP - A leading insurance broker and consultant• Garmong Construction• Crowne Plaza Downtown Indianapolis Historic Union Station About Veteran Strategies‘Leaders and Legends' is brought to you by Veteran Strategies—your local veteran business enterprise specializing in media relations, crisis communications, public outreach, and digital photography. Learn more at www.veteranstrategies.com.See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

This week Harrison will review ""The Blue Dahlia" (1946) starring Alan Ladd and Veronica Lake and directed by George Marshall. This podcast was recorded before our beloved friend David Lowe, the other half of the Face 4 Radio Podcast and The 4KLowedown passed away after losing his fight with cancer. Rest in Peace buddy. #thebluedahlia #alanladd #veronicalake #georgemarshall #reelyoldmovies #VeteransDay David's GoFundMe: https://www.gofundme.com/f/help-the-family-man-david-lowe-beat-cancer?lang=en_US&utm_campaign=fp_sharesheet&utm_medium=customer&utm_source=copy_link Rich's Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/turnerfan77/ Rich's YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@turnerfan77 Faces 4 Radio Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/faces.for.radio/ Faces 4 Radio YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCQSMOwgmFDqHfo_iHARBF3A Buy The Blue Dahlia here: https://a.co/d/afoO57K Join my Discord!: https://discord.gg/VWcP6ge2 Social Media Links: https://linktr.ee/reelyoldmovies

Today I'm taking a look at three very different men with one identical last name - the Marshalls. Each one of them was critical to our nation, and might have become president under different circumstances. I'll investigate and rate each one: John Marshall, Federalist Chief Justice of the Supreme Court George C. Marshall, General and Secretary of State during WWII Thurgood Marshall, first Black justice of the Supreme Court

This is the second in a 2-part series with David Roll, a Washington-based attorney, who has written books on Harry Hopkins, George Marshall, and Louis Johnson. Now comes his fourth book, "Ascent to Power," which focuses on Franklin Roosevelt's final days through the sudden transition to the presidency of Harry Truman. Spanning the years 1944-1948, David Roll's newest book looks at the struggles of a relatively unknown Missouri senator, Harry Truman, who had served the U.S. as vice president for only 82 days before FDR's death on April 12, 1945. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

This is the second in a 2-part series with David Roll, a Washington-based attorney, who has written books on Harry Hopkins, George Marshall, and Louis Johnson. Now comes his fourth book, "Ascent to Power," which focuses on Franklin Roosevelt's final days through the sudden transition to the presidency of Harry Truman. Spanning the years 1944-1948, David Roll's newest book looks at the struggles of a relatively unknown Missouri senator, Harry Truman, who had served the U.S. as vice president for only 82 days before FDR's death on April 12, 1945. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

David Roll, a Washington-based attorney, has written books on Harry Hopkins, George Marshall, and Louis Johnson. Now comes his fourth book, "Ascent to Power," which focuses on Franklin Roosevelt's final days through the sudden transition to the presidency of Harry Truman. Spanning the years 1944-1948, David Roll's newest book looks at the struggles of a relatively unknown Missouri senator, Harry Truman, who had served the U.S. as vice president for only 82 days before FDR's death on April 12, 1945. This is the first of a 2-part interview with David Roll. Part two will be posted next week. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

David Roll, a Washington-based attorney, has written books on Harry Hopkins, George Marshall, and Louis Johnson. Now comes his fourth book, "Ascent to Power," which focuses on Franklin Roosevelt's final days through the sudden transition to the presidency of Harry Truman. Spanning the years 1944-1948, David Roll's newest book looks at the struggles of a relatively unknown Missouri senator, Harry Truman, who had served the U.S. as vice president for only 82 days before FDR's death on April 12, 1945. This is the first of a 2-part interview with David Roll. Part two will be posted next week. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

See the From the Mic website for great bonus content, including pictures and audio, transcripts, and more. Click here to download the transcript directlyAnd the Country Dance and Song Society for information about Contra and English country dance across the continentShow NotesSound bites featured in this episode (in order of appearance):Clip of George calling the dance Worth the Wait by Dana Parkinson at the Glen Echo Contra Dance in 2012 with music by SwallowtailClip of George calling the dance Salute to Larry Jennings by Ted Sannella and Russell Owen at the Greenfield, MA contra dance in 2011 with music by Wild Asparagus

The Joint Readiness Training Center is pleased to present the sixty-third episode to air on ‘The Crucible - The JRTC Experience.' Hosted by the Commander of Ops Group (COG), COL Matthew Hardman. Today's guest is the Deputy Commanding General of United States Army Forces Command, Lieutenant General Stephen Smith.   Forces Command is the largest United States Army command and provider of expeditionary, regionally engaged, campaign-capable land forces to combatant commanders. FORSCOM trains and prepares a combat ready, globally responsive total force in order to build and sustain readiness to meet combatant command requirements. The vision of Forces Command is to provide combat ready and globally responsive total Army forces that are well led, disciplined, trained, and expeditionary that will win in a complex world. Its organizations are expeditionary, campaign focused, and tailorable to provide combatant commanders the required capabilities to be decisive across the range of military operations. They have the Hollywood call-sign of “Freedom” and the motto of “Freedom's Guardian.”   In this episode we discuss the necessity for our leaders and their formations to receive realistic, rigorous, and relevant training for combat across multiple domains as it's key for success on tomorrow's battlefields. Specifically, we look at the battalion through corps echelons requirement for such training as it is essential to prepare soldiers for the complexities of modern warfare across multiple domains. Battalions should focus on integrating small unit tactics with real-time intelligence and cyber capabilities, while brigades emphasize combined arms operations and interoperability with joint and coalition forces. Corps-level training should prioritize strategic planning, large-scale maneuver coordination, and multi-domain command and control to ensure dominance in a contested environment.   In testifying to Congress to justify the expense of a large-scale maneuver just prior to our entry into WWII, General George Marshall stated, “My God, Senator, that's the reason I do it. I want the mistakes down in Louisiana, not over in Europe.” Today we continue this legacy of realistic, rigorous, and relevant training at the DoD's combat training centers, such as the Joint Readiness Training Center. At home-station, this is done through the divisions managing their intensive training cycles and at the battalion and brigade echelons through becoming predictable, through synchronizing the warfighting functions, and set the conditions for subordinate units to succeed.   Part of S01 “The Leader's Laboratory” series.   Don't forget to check-out FORSCOM's social media pages, their handles are ‘U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM)' on Facebook, ‘FORSCOM' on X, and ‘US Army FORSCOM' on Instagram.   For additional information and insights from this episode, please check-out our Instagram page @the_jrtc_crucible_podcast   Be sure to follow us on social media to keep up with the latest warfighting TTPs learned through the crucible that is the Joint Readiness Training Center.   Follow us by going to: https://linktr.ee/jrtc and then selecting your preferred podcast format.   Again, we'd like to thank our guests for participating. Don't forget to like, subscribe, and review us wherever you listen or watch your podcasts — and be sure to stay tuned for more in the near future.   “The Crucible – The JRTC Experience” is a product of the Joint Readiness Training Center.

In late July 1944, President Roosevelt met with General Douglas MacArthur and Admiral Chester Nimitz at Pearl Harbor, Hawaii. The future of the war in the Pacific was discussed at this Pearl Harbor Conference, or Pacific Strategy Conference as it is also called. It was not a "real" conference in the sense that it did not include Admiral Ernest King or General George Marshall, but it was a very consequential meeting. Recently, MacArthur Memorial historians Jim Zobel and Amanda Williams sat down to discuss what happened before, during, and after the meeting.Have a comment about this episode? Send us a text message! (Note: we can only read the texts, we can't reply) Follow us on:Twitter: @MacArthur1880; @AEWilliamsClarkFacebook: @MacArthurMemorialwww.macarthurmemorial.org

Jim talks with Samo Burja about lessons military strategists should take from the Russo-Ukrainian War so far. They discuss why military stockpiles are less useful than previously assumed, the scaling up of drone production, the impossibility of envisioning what tech will be needed, 4 factors that caused Russian miscalculation, offensive vs defensive dominance, the possibility of a U.S. military draft, the changing role of conscription, the high average age in Russia & Ukraine, the rapid evolution of drones, a comparison between drone pilots & snipers, the muted relevance of the air force, empty symbols of military strength, the progress of autonomous drones, the reevaluation of civilian casualties with changing tech, the information complexity of drone warfare, the importance of artillery, the need for a new George Marshall figure in the U.S., a war of production, how the Ukraine War can inform the Taiwan situation, the idea of an amphibious assault, autonomous submersible vehicles, and much more. JRS EP 243 - Yaroslav Trofimov on Ukraine's War of Independence JRS EP 221 - George Hotz on Open-Source Driving Assistance Samo Burja is the founder and President of Bismarck Analysis, a consulting firm that specializes in institutional analysis for clients in North America and Europe. Bismarck uses the foundational sociological research that Samo and his team have conducted over the past decade to deliver unique insights to clients about institutional design and strategy. Samo's studies focus on the social and material technologies that provide the foundation for healthy human societies, with an eye to engineering and restoring the structures that produce functional institutions. He has authored articles and papers on his findings. His manuscript, Great Founder Theory, is available online. He is also a Research Fellow at the Long Now Foundation and Senior Research Fellow in Political Science at the Foresight Institute. Samo has spoken about his findings at the World Economic Forum at Davos, Y Combinator's YC 120 conference, the Reboot American Innovation conference in Washington, D.C., and elsewhere. He spends most of his time in California and his native Slovenia.

One does not simply invade Taiwan — but George Marshall once thought long and hard about it. In 1944, in the middle of the island-hopping campaign, American war planners set their sights on Japanese-controlled Formosa. What did the American invasion plan look like? Why did Marshall decide to go another route? What lessons do this and other amphibious invasions hold for Taiwan's current force posture? To discuss, ChinaTalk interviewed US Army Field Artillery Lieutenant Colonel J. Kevin McKittrick, currently at the Air War College in Alabama and a veteran of multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Co-hosting today is our resident Taiwan consultant Nicholas Welch. We discuss: The US military's aborted plan to invade Taiwan during WWII; Why bigger is better when it comes to amphibious assaults; What the US got right and the CCP gets wrong about civil-military relations; Taiwan's defense concept, and the opportunities presented by “operational pause”; The awful, unending relevance of traditional artillery in modern war; And why the US doesn't need its own “rocket force” … yet. Outtro music: 被動 (Passive) by 伍佰 Wu Bai&China Blue. Youtube Link. Photo: White House, July 29, 1942. Left to right: Admiral Ernest King, Admiral William Leahy, and General George Marshall. | Wikimedia Commons Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

One does not simply invade Taiwan — but George Marshall once thought long and hard about it. In 1944, in the middle of the island-hopping campaign, American war planners set their sights on Japanese-controlled Formosa. What did the American invasion plan look like? Why did Marshall decide to go another route? What lessons do this and other amphibious invasions hold for Taiwan's current force posture? To discuss, ChinaTalk interviewed US Army Field Artillery Lieutenant Colonel J. Kevin McKittrick, currently at the Air War College in Alabama and a veteran of multiple deployments in Iraq and Afghanistan. Co-hosting today is our resident Taiwan consultant Nicholas Welch. We discuss: The US military's aborted plan to invade Taiwan during WWII; Why bigger is better when it comes to amphibious assaults; What the US got right and the CCP gets wrong about civil-military relations; Taiwan's defense concept, and the opportunities presented by “operational pause”; The awful, unending relevance of traditional artillery in modern war; And why the US doesn't need its own “rocket force” … yet. Outtro music: 被動 (Passive) by 伍佰 Wu Bai&China Blue. Youtube Link. Photo: White House, July 29, 1942. Left to right: Admiral Ernest King, Admiral William Leahy, and General George Marshall. | Wikimedia Commons Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

Rick Howard, N2K CyberWire's Chief Analyst, CSO, and Senior Fellow, commemorates Memorial Day. References: Abraham Lincoln, 1863. The Gettysburg Address [Speech]. Abraham Lincoln Online. Amanda Onion, Original 2009, Updated 2023. Memorial Day 2022: Facts, Meaning & Traditions [Essay]. HISTORY. Brent Hugh, 2021. A Brief History of “John Brown's Body” [Essay]. Digital History. Bob Zeller, 2022. How Many Died in the American Civil War? [Essay]. HISTORY. General George Marshall, 2014. President Lincoln's Letter to Mrs Bixby [Movie Clip - Saving Private Ryan]. YouTube. JOHN LOGAN, 1868. Logan's Order Mandating Memorial Day [Order]. John A. Logan College. John Williams, Chicago Symphony Orchestra, 2012. The People's House: Lincoln (Original Motion Picture Soundtrack) [Song]. Apple Music. John Williams, Chicago Symphony Orchestra, 2012. The Blue and the Grey: Lincoln (Original Motion Picture Soundtrack) [Song]. Apple Music - Web Playe. Livia Albeck-Ripka, 2023. A Brief History of Memorial Day [Essay]. The New York Times. Paul Robeson, 2021. John Brown's Body [Song]. YouTube. Robert Rodat (Writer), Steven Spielberg (Director), Harve Presnell (Actor), 1998. Saving Private Ryan [Movie]. IMDb. Staff, 2020. A Brief Biography of General John A. Logan [Biography]. John A. Logan College. Staff, 2024. Civil War Timeline [WWW Document], American Battlefield Trust. Thomas Jefferson, 1776. Declaration of Independence: [Transcription]. National Archives. Winston Churchil, 1940. Never was so much owed by so many to so few - Winston Churchill Speeches [Speech]. YouTube.

Rick Howard, N2K CyberWire's Chief Analyst, CSO, and Senior Fellow, commemorates Memorial Day. References: Abraham Lincoln, 1863. The Gettysburg Address [Speech]. Abraham Lincoln Online. Amanda Onion, Original 2009, Updated 2023. Memorial Day 2022: Facts, Meaning & Traditions [Essay]. HISTORY. Brent Hugh, 2021. A Brief History of “John Brown's Body” [Essay]. Digital History. Bob Zeller, 2022. How Many Died in the American Civil War? [Essay]. HISTORY. General George Marshall, 2014. President Lincoln's Letter to Mrs Bixby [Movie Clip - Saving Private Ryan]. YouTube. JOHN LOGAN, 1868. Logan's Order Mandating Memorial Day [Order]. John A. Logan College. John Williams, Chicago Symphony Orchestra, 2012. The People's House: Lincoln (Original Motion Picture Soundtrack) [Song]. Apple Music. John Williams, Chicago Symphony Orchestra, 2012. The Blue and the Grey: Lincoln (Original Motion Picture Soundtrack) [Song]. Apple Music - Web Playe. Livia Albeck-Ripka, 2023. A Brief History of Memorial Day [Essay]. The New York Times. Paul Robeson, 2021. John Brown's Body [Song]. YouTube. Robert Rodat (Writer), Steven Spielberg (Director), Harve Presnell (Actor), 1998. Saving Private Ryan [Movie]. IMDb. Staff, 2020. A Brief Biography of General John A. Logan [Biography]. John A. Logan College. Staff, 2024. Civil War Timeline [WWW Document], American Battlefield Trust. Thomas Jefferson, 1776. Declaration of Independence: [Transcription]. National Archives. Winston Churchil, 1940. Never was so much owed by so many to so few - Winston Churchill Speeches [Speech]. YouTube. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

We tend to look at today's world as a consequence of World War II. Yet, in the first years after that war, there were several directions which the world could have turned. There was a chance that China would not have become communist. There was also a chance that Europe would have become much more communist. A few years ago, Daniel Kurtz-Phelan, the current editor of Foreign Affairs magazine, wrote The China Mission, a book in which he explores the attempt by George Marshall, the architect of the Allies' victory against the Nazis, to bring China closer to America. Find the book: https://wwnorton.com/books/9780393240955 We discuss why this mission failed, how the world could look differently if it had succeeded, and what lessons we can draw from that episode for today's world. We also talk about how Russia's invasion of Ukraine is changing the world now. Daniel Kurtz-Phelan is the Editor of Foreign Affairs. His book The China Mission was published in 2018 and named a best book of the year by The Economist and an editor's pick by the New York Times Book Review. Host: Volodymyr Yermolenko, Ukrainian philosopher, chief editor of UkraineWorld, and president of PEN Ukraine UkraineWorld (ukraineworld.org) is brought to you by Internews Ukraine, one of the largest Ukrainian media NGOs. Listen on various platforms: https://li.sten.to/explaining-ukraine Support us at patreon.com/ukraineworld. We provide exclusive content for our patrons. You can also support our volunteer trips to the frontlines at PayPal: ukraine.resisting@gmail.com.

This week on Sinica, I chat with Sulmaan Wasif Khan, professor of history and international relations at the Fletcher School at Tufts University, about his book The Struggle for Taiwan: A History of America, China, and the Island Caught Between, which comes on May 14.4:28 — The Cairo Agreement6:59 — General George Marshall, George Kennan, and the change in the idea of American trusteeship of Taiwan?17:08 — The debate over the offshore islands of Kinmen and Matsu23:55 — Mao's evolving interest in Taiwan27:49 — The averted crisis of 196232:06 — Peng Ming-min and the Taiwan independence movement37:14 — What changed in 1971?42:51 — The legacy of Chiang Ching-kuo45:14 — The story of Lee Teng-hui52:37 — The change within the Kuomintang1:00:11 — Why Taiwan has become “sacred” for China1:10:26 — Sulmaan's own narrative shift1:13:26 — Chen Shui-bian and the threat of independence referendums1:17:53 — The Sunflower Movement1:25:21 — The causal direction of Taiwan's importance in the U.S.-China relationship1:28:32 — Why the status quo shifted1:30:51 — Drawing parallels between Taiwan and Ukraine1:33:26 — Sulmaan's sources for his book1:35:38 — Agency versus structure1:39:29 — Feedback (so far) on the new book and what's next for SulmaanRecommendations:Sulmaan: Emily Wilson's translation of The Iliad Kaiser: The “My China Priors” series (and other essays), available on the Sinica Substack; Angus Stewart's essay, “Alien Bless You: A Review of Netflix's 3 Body Problem” See Privacy Policy at https://art19.com/privacy and California Privacy Notice at https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

Or: how chinwags can save the world. Imagine I could give you a superpower. The ability to make people trust you who currently don't. To help them change their own mind, on their own terms. And to maybe even heal society, perhaps just a little bit. WELL I CAN. It's called 'having a grown up conversation', and it's perhaps the most underrated thing we can all do about climate change.Joining me to talk about all things chatting, nattering and deep canvassing is the charming Alex Evans, founder and director of the charity Larger Us.  We (yes) have a conversation about the best ways to have a good ol' chinwag, why we're all shouting at each other more, and the psychology behind why we perhaps we don't disagree anywhere near as much as we might think. Plenty owl noises this week:--  05:19: Climate Outreach's Britain Talks Climate research toolkit, which is fab in which I have precisely no vested interest whatsoever. -- 11:18: Dave Fleischer's TED Talk about deep canvassing. -- 15:23: George Marshall's brilliant book, Don't Even Think About It. -- 23:55: Bill Bishop came up with the Big Sort idea back in 2004.-- 28:00: Hannah Arendt on totalitarianism, via Wiki. -- 30:52: Bobby Duffy's Divided Britain report. -- 36:30: Oil and gas workers team up with greenies. Your Brain on Climate is a podcast about human psychology vs the climate crisis: what we think, why we think it, and how it all adds up to a planet-sized emergency.  Contact the show:  @brainclimate on Twitter, or hello@yourbrainonclimate.com. Support the show on Patreon: www.patreon.com/yourbrainonclimate. The show is hosted and produced by me, Dave Powell, who you can find @powellds on Twitter.  Original music by me too. Show logo by Arthur Stovell at www.designbymondial.com.  

David L. Roll, author of George Marshall and The Hopkins Touch, joins Daniel Ford on the show to discuss his latest book Ascent to Power: How Truman Emerged from Roosevelt's Shadow and Remade the World. Writer's Bone is proudly sponsored by The Bookshop: Lou's Literary Line, Libro.fm, and Everyday Shakespeare.

Hear from George Marshall, Author of “Don't Even Think About It: Why Our Brains Are Wired To Ignore Climate Change,” as we dive into the psychology of climate change. If you follow this podcast, you probably already have a good understanding of the nature of climate change, the risks it poses and why we need to act decisively and with urgency. But many people don't listen to the podcast, and even if they did, they might think it was a lot of nonsense. Depending on people's worldview, values, and socio-cultural background, the same message can be interpreted in many ways. That's why in today's episode, we're focusing on the psychology of climate change. We'll be exploring questions such as: ·       What is it about the human brain that makes it so hard for us to accept the reality of climate change and take steps to address it? ·       How is it possible that, when presented with overwhelming evidence of climate change, even the evidence of our own eyes, we can still choose to ignore it? ·       And given our biases and shortcomings, how can we still find effective ways to communicate the dangers of climate change to audiences that are typically closed off to receiving those messages? To find out more about the Sustainability and Climate Risk (SCR®) Certificate, follow this link: https://www.garp.org/scr For more information on climate risk, visit GARP's Global Sustainability and Climate Risk Resource Center: https://www.garp.org/sustainability-climate If you have any questions, thoughts, or feedback regarding this podcast series, we would love to hear from you at: climateriskpodcast@garp.com Speaker's Bio George Marshall, Author and Climate Change Communication Expert George is a consultant in the public communication of climate change, and the psychological obstacles to attitude and behaviour change. His key interest is the design of narratives that can build a consensus for climate action across the whole of society. His insights draw on hundreds of focus groups and structured interviews listening to people expressing their hopes, fears and doubts about climate change.  His book “Don't Even Think About It: Why Our Brains Are Wired to Ignore Climate Change”, explores the social and psychological obstacles to climate action. It is currently on its seventh printing and was listed by Esquire as one of the ‘15 essential books on climate change.'

In this Paramount 1946 episode we look at two movies featuring Veronica Lake which otherwise could not be more dissimilar: Miss Susie Slagle's (directed by John Berry), about the trials of pre-WWI Johns Hopkins medical students living in a boarding house presided over by Lillian Gish; and famous Lake/Ladd noir outing, The Blue Dahlia (directed by George Marshall and written by Raymond Chandler). We discuss the potential influence of the leftists involved in making Miss Susie Slagle's on its portrayal of race and gender and debate the amount of damage done to The Blue Dahlia by the studio-mandated change to the plot. And in Fear and Moviegoing in Toronto, we take a brief look at three very different movies: Tarkovsky's Nostalghia (stolen by a German Shepherd), Joseph L. Mankiewicz's A Letter to Three Wives (stolen by Linda Darnell), and Douglas Sirk's All I Desire (starring Barbara Stanwyck).  Time Codes: 0h 00m 35s:      MISS SUSIE SLAGLE'S [dir. John Berry] 0h 27m 06s:      THE BLUE DAHLIA [dir. George Marshall] 0h 48m 13s:      Fear and Moviegoing in Toronto – Nostalghia (1983) by Andrei Tarkovsky; A Letter to Three Wives (1948) by Joseph L. Mankiewicz; and All I Desire (1953) by Douglas Sirk Studio Film Capsules provided by The Paramount Story by John Douglas Eames Additional studio information from: The Hollywood Story by Joel W. Finler                                     +++ * Marvel at our meticulously ridiculous Complete Viewing Schedule for the 2020s * Intro Song: “Sunday” by Jean Goldkette Orchestra with the Keller Sisters (courtesy of The Internet Archive) * Read Elise's latest film piece on Preston Sturges, Unfaithfully Yours, and the Narrative role of comedic scapegoating. * Check out Dave's new Robert Benchley blog – an attempt to annotate and reflect upon as many of the master humorist's 2000+ pieces as he can locate – Benchley Data: A Wayward Annotation Project!  Follow us on Twitter at @therebuggy Write to us at therebuggy@gmail.com   We now have a Discord server - just drop us a line if you'd like to join! 

Thank you very much. Chancellor Kohl, Governing Mayor Diepgen, ladies and gentlemen: Twenty-four years ago, President John F. Kennedy visited Berlin, speaking to the people of this city and the world at the city hall. Well, since then two other presidents have come, each in his turn, to Berlin. And today I, myself, make my second visit to your city.We come to Berlin, we American Presidents, because it's our duty to speak, in this place, of freedom. But I must confess, we're drawn here by other things as well: by the feeling of history in this city, more than 500 years older than our own nation; by the beauty of the Grunewald and the Tiergarten; most of all, by your courage and determination. Perhaps the composer, Paul Lincke, understood something about American Presidents. You see, like so many Presidents before me, I come here today because wherever I go, whatever I do: "Ich hab noch einen koffer in Berlin." [I still have a suitcase in Berlin.]Our gathering today is being broadcast throughout Western Europe and North America. I understand that it is being seen and heard as well in the East. To those listening throughout Eastern Europe, I extend my warmest greetings and the good will of the American people. To those listening in East Berlin, a special word: Although I cannot be with you, I address my remarks to you just as surely as to those standing here before me. For I join you, as I join your fellow countrymen in the West, in this firm, this unalterable belief: Es gibt nur ein Berlin. [There is only one Berlin.]Behind me stands a wall that encircles the free sectors of this city, part of a vast system of barriers that divides the entire continent of Europe. From the Baltic, south, those barriers cut across Germany in a gash of barbed wire, concrete, dog runs, and guardtowers. Farther south, there may be no visible, no obvious wall. But there remain armed guards and checkpoints all the same—still a restriction on the right to travel, still an instrument to impose upon ordinary men and women the will of a totalitarian state. Yet it is here in Berlin where the wall emerges most clearly; here, cutting across your city, where the news photo and the television screen have imprinted this brutal division of a continent upon the mind of the world. Standing before the Brandenburg Gate, every man is a German, separated from his fellow men. Every man is a Berliner, forced to look upon a scar.President von Weizsacker has said: "The German question is open as long as the Brandenburg Gate is closed." Today I say: As long as this gate is closed, as long as this scar of a wall is permitted to stand, it is not the German question alone that remains open, but the question of freedom for all mankind. Yet I do not come here to lament. For I find in Berlin a message of hope, even in the shadow of this wall, a message of triumph.In this season of spring in 1945, the people of Berlin emerged from their air raid shelters to find devastation. Thousands of miles away, the people of the United States reached out to help. And in 1947 Secretary of State—as you've been told—George Marshall announced the creation of what would become known as the Marshall Plan. Speaking precisely 40 years ago this month, he said: "Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine, but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos."In the Reichstag a few moments ago, I saw a display commemorating this 40th anniversary of the Marshall Plan. I was struck by the sign on a burnt-out, gutted structure that was being rebuilt. I understand that Berliners of my own generation can remember seeing signs like it dotted throughout the Western sectors of the city. The sign read simply: "The Marshall Plan is helping here to strengthen the free world." A strong, free world in the West, that dream became real. Japan rose from ruin to become an economic giant. Italy , France , Belgium—virtually every nation in Western Europe saw political and economic rebirth; the European Community was founded.In West Germany and here in Berlin, there took place an economic miracle, the Wirtschaftswunder. Adenauer, Erhard, Reuter, and other leaders understood the practical importance of liberty—that just as truth can flourish only when the journalist is given freedom of speech, so prosperity can come about only when the farmer and businessman enjoy economic freedom. The German leaders reduced tariffs, expanded free trade, lowered taxes. From 1950 to 1960 alone, the standard of living in West Germany and Berlin doubled.Where four decades ago there was rubble, today in West Berlin there is the greatest industrial output of any city in Germany—busy office blocks, fine homes and apartments, proud avenues, and the spreading lawns of park land. Where a city's culture seemed to have been destroyed, today there are two great universities, orchestras and an opera, countless theaters, and museums. Where there was want, today there's abundance—food, clothing, automobiles—the wonderful goods of the Ku'damm. From devastation, from utter ruin, you Berliners have, in freedom, rebuilt a city that once again ranks as one of the greatest on Earth. The Soviets may have had other plans. But, my friends, there were a few things the Soviets didn't count on Berliner herz, Berliner humor, ja, und Berliner schnauze. [Berliner heart, Berliner humor, yes, and a Berliner schnauze.] [Laughter]In the 1950s, Khrushchev predicted: "We will bury you." But in the West today, we see a free world that has achieved a level of prosperity and well-being unprecedented in all human history. In the Communist world, we see failure, technological backwardness, declining standards of health, even want of the most basic kind—too little food. Even today, the Soviet Union still cannot feed itself. After these four decades, then, there stands before the entire world one great and inescapable conclusion: Freedom leads to prosperity. Freedom replaces the ancient hatreds among the nations with comity and peace. Freedom is the victor.And now the Soviets themselves may, in a limited way, be coming to understand the importance of freedom. We hear much from Moscow about a new policy of reform and openness. Some political prisoners have been released. Certain foreign news broadcasts are no longer being jammed. Some economic enterprises have been permitted to operate with greater freedom from state control. Are these the beginnings of profound changes in the Soviet state? Or are they token gestures, intended to raise false hopes in the West, or to strengthen the Soviet system without changing it? We welcome change and openness; for we believe that freedom and security go together, that the advance of human liberty can only strengthen the cause of world peace.There is one sign the Soviets can make that would be unmistakable, that would advance dramatically the cause of freedom and peace. General Secretary Gorbachev, if you seek peace, if you seek prosperity for the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, if you seek liberalization: Come here to this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, open this gate! Mr. Gorbachev, tear down this wall!I understand the fear of war and the pain of division that afflict this continent—and I pledge to you my country's efforts to help overcome these burdens. To be sure, we in the West must resist Soviet expansion. So we must maintain defenses of unassailable strength. Yet we seek peace; so we must strive to reduce arms on both sides. Beginning 10 years ago, the Soviets challenged the Western alliance with a grave new threat, hundreds of new and more deadly SS-20 nuclear missiles, capable of striking every capital in Europe. The Western alliance responded by committing itself to a counterdeployment unless the Soviets agreed to negotiate a better solution; namely, the elimination of such weapons on both sides. For many months, the Soviets refused to bargain in earnestness. As the alliance, in turn, prepared to go forward with its counterdeployment, there were difficult days—days of protests like those during my 1982 visit to this city—and the Soviets later walked away from the table.But through it all, the alliance held firm. And I invite those who protested then—I invite those who protest today—to mark this fact: Because we remained strong, the Soviets came back to the table. And because we remained strong, today we have within reach the possibility, not merely of limiting the growth of arms, but of eliminating, for the first time, an entire class of nuclear weapons from the face of the Earth. As I speak, NATO ministers are meeting in Iceland to review the progress of our proposals for eliminating these weapons. At the talks in Geneva, we have also proposed deep cuts in strategic offensive weapons. And the Western allies have likewise made far-reaching proposals to reduce the danger of conventional war and to place a total ban on chemical weapons.While we pursue these arms reductions, I pledge to you that we will maintain the capacity to deter Soviet aggression at any level at which it might occur. And in cooperation with many of our allies, the United States is pursuing the Strategic Defense Initiative—research to base deterrence not on the threat of offensive retaliation, but on defenses that truly defend; on systems, in short, that will not target populations, but shield them. By these means we seek to increase the safety of Europe and all the world. But we must remember a crucial fact: East and West do not mistrust each other because we are armed; we are armed because we mistrust each other. And our differences are not about weapons but about liberty. When President Kennedy spoke at the City Hall those 24 years ago, freedom was encircled, Berlin was under siege. And tod

David Brooks' book The Road to Character is full of real stories about people who spent significant time and effort in the forming of a significant life.  Dorothy Day, Samuel Johnson, George Marshall, Bayard Rustin.  Some of the names might mean more to you than others, but the stories have a common thread—the road to character is […]

Ryan Woods is a leading world expert on UFO crash retrieval operations and leaked Majestic-12 classified documents. In December 2023, he released an updated edition of his pioneering book MAJIC Eyes Only where he analyses 104 UFO crash retrieval operations from around the world. His books and UFO Crash Retrieval Conferences (2003-2209) predate by two decades the more recent testimonies by David Grusch and others on UFO crash retrieval operations. In his second Exopolitics Today interview Wood discusses historical UFO crash retrieval cases such as the 1933 Italy crash; the 1941 Cape Girardeau crash; the 1942 Los Angeles Air Raid incident; the 1947 Roswell crash; and the 1948 Aztec flying saucer crash. In addition, he comments on several Majestic Documents such as leaked correspondence between President Franklin Roosevelt and General George Marshall on the Los Angeles incident; the Interplanetary Phenomenon Unit Assessment of the Roswell crash; the Special Operations Manual detailing procedures for crash retrieval operations; and a leaked 1989 Defense Intelligence Agency briefing document. Finally, Wood describes the process he used to gather historical data on UFOs from thousands of pages of leaked and official documents, and a vast library of books and journals to upload to an Artificial Intelligence program that would then respond to a list of 30 key questions about alien life and their agendas. Ryan Wood's website is MajicEyesOnly.com --- Support this podcast: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/exopolitics/support

Garrett Chaffin-Quiray and Ed Rosa examine one middle brow entertainment that earned an inflation-adjusted box office gross of over $1,000,000,000 in North America.***Referenced media:“The Bridges of Madison County” (Clint Eastwood, 1995)“Indecent Proposal” (Adrian Lyne, 1995)“Star Wars: Episode IV – A New Hope” (George Lucas, 1977)“In the Heat of the Night” (Norman Jewison, 1967)“On the Waterfront” (Elia Kazan, 1954)“Fitzcarraldo” (Werner Herzog, 1982)“My Best Fiend” (Werner Herzog, 1999)“The Sound of Music” (Robert Wise, 1965)“How the West Was Won” (Henry Hathaway, John Ford, and George Marshall, 1962)“The Andy Griffith Show” (Sheldon Leonard, 1960-1968)“For a Few Dollars More” (Sergio Leone, 1965)“A Patch of Blue” (Guy Green, 1965)“The Flight of the Phoenix” (Robert Aldrich, 1965)“The Spy Who Came In from the Cold” (Martin Ritt, 1965)“Thunderball” (Terence Young, 1965)“Bad Girls Go to Hell” (Doris Wishman, 1965),“Dracula: Prince of Darkness” (Terence Fisher, 1966)“Horror of Dracula” “Terence Fisher, 1958)“The Chase” (Arthur Penn, 1966)“E.T. the Extra-Terrestrial” (Steven Spielberg, 1982)“Blade Runner” (Ridley Scott, 1982)“War and Peace: Part I” (Sergei Bondarchuk, 1966)“War and Peace: Part II” (Sergei Bondarchuk, 1966)“War and Peace: Part III” (Sergei Bondarchuk, 1967)“War and Peace: Part IV” (Sergei Bondarchuk, 1967)“I Love Lucy” (Jess Oppenheimer, 1951-1957)“The Dick Van Dyke Show” (Carl Reiner, 1961-1966)“Lawrence of Arabia” (David Lean, 1962)“The Bridge on the River Kwai” (David Lean, 1957)Audio quotation:“Main Title”, “Lara's Theme”, “Lara Reads Her Poem”, “Intermission”, and Lara and Komarovsky Dancing Up a Storm” from “Doctor Zhivago” (David Lean, 1965), written by Maurice Jarre“Colonel Bogey March” from “The Bridge on the River Kwai” (David Lean, 1957), written by Kenneth J. Alford

British-born author Nick Bunker, our guest this week, has written books on the Mayflower Pilgrims, the Revolutionary War, and a biography of Benjamin Franklin. Lately he has turned his attention to America and the world in 1950. His book is titled "In the Shadow of Fear." Nick Bunker, a graduate of King's College, Cambridge, and Columbia University, focuses on names like Joseph McCarthy, Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, Margaret Chase Smith, George Marshall, Robert Taft, Alger Hiss, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong. In addition, Bunker pays close attention to the Korean War. Make your donation at: c-span.org/donate Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

British-born author Nick Bunker, our guest this week, has written books on the Mayflower Pilgrims, the Revolutionary War, and a biography of Benjamin Franklin. Lately he has turned his attention to America and the world in 1950. His book is titled "In the Shadow of Fear." Nick Bunker, a graduate of King's College, Cambridge, and Columbia University, focuses on names like Joseph McCarthy, Harry Truman, Dean Acheson, Margaret Chase Smith, George Marshall, Robert Taft, Alger Hiss, Winston Churchill, Joseph Stalin, and Mao Zedong. In addition, Bunker pays close attention to the Korean War. Make your donation at: c-span.org/donate Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

[00:00:00] John Sommerville: I was in the elevator at General Mills one day with the president of our division. There were about eight of us in the elevator and the elevator stopped between two floors. And I was the one closest to the buttons. And I had no idea what to do. The elevator stuck. The president of the division reached around me, opened up the little box with the telephone in it, and called on the telephone to get the building supervisor to come and get us out. And what I learned from that is when you have a problem, do something, just get started.  And I was standing there frozen what in the world do we do? And he took action. ++++++++++++++++++++ [00:00:38] Tommy Thomas: Our guest today is John Somerville. I first met John when JobfitMatters conducted the search that brought Alec Hill to the presidency of InterVarsity. John was a board member of InterVarsity at the time. He's had an amazing career. After getting his MBA from Indiana University, John took a marketing position for General Mills and worked there for 11 years. If you've ever noticed the heart on a box of Cheerios, you've seen some of John's marketing skills at work. He conceived and implemented the major heart-healthy campaign for Cheerios, which landed them the American Heart Association Certification. Following his time at General Mills, he was in senior leadership at Wooddale Church. Then he planted the City Church in Minneapolis. In 2021, he assumed the role of Vice President of Finance and Operations at The University of Northwestern - St. Paul. Let's pick up on my conversation with John Somerville. [00:01:44] Tommy Thomas:  Before we dive too deep into your professional career, I'd like to go back to your childhood, and what are some, maybe two or three, remembrances that you have that have been fairly formative in your life? [00:02:01] John Sommerville:  Even as an elementary school kid, I was always organizing things. And I remember that I was fascinated with the Olympics in 1968, at 10 years old. I was completely blown away by the whole experience of watching it on television. So, I decided that our block needed an Olympics. And so I made up events. We had a 40-yard dash. It was the first three houses on the block. Our house was the second house. So, I organized that. We had a high jump pit that we put leaves in. And we did this Olympics, and there were probably about a dozen kids from a couple of blocks that came over, and we made medals and all that sort of thing. And so I had this desire to organize things, to get things moving. And then one of the things I later looked back on when I became a pastor and started a church was an experience I had in high school. The church I went to was a really good church but they didn't have a youth group that was vital and really engaging. And as a sophomore in high school, I wrote a proposal to the church board. I went to their board meeting, and I presented this proposal, and I told them that we should hire someone, should buy a pop machine. I put it in the fellowship hall of the church. We should get a pool table. That's by the way, where the whole thing went off the rails. But I wrote this proposal on how to make the group a better group and the board didn't go for it. I have always had a tendency to look at a problem or an opportunity and try to make something happen. That was part of who I was, even as a kid. I ended up becoming involved in Youth for Christ had a thing called Campus Life, and that was for my junior and senior year in high school, I got involved in. I had a tendency to look at a problem or an opportunity and try to make something happen. That was part of who I was, even as a kid. So, I look back as I think about what was I like. I was reflective, I read, but I also wanted things to happen. [00:03:54] Tommy Thomas: What was the greatest gift that you think your parents gave you? [00:03:55] John Sommerville: Curiosity. My parents are still living there in their mid-90s. My father was the earliest intellectual influence in my life. He's a reader and a thinker and read lots of books to us, and encouraged us to do the same. My mother was a nurse and very interested in nature. She used to have a bird book that sat in the kitchen. She'd look at birds out of the backyard and identify them. And so, I think that kind of curiosity openness to the world, and learning was one of the greatest gifts that my parents gave me. And their faith. Maybe that goes without saying, but watching them have quiet times, time with God, the way that their faith was really integrated into all of their lives. Those were big influences on me as a young one growing up. [00:04:41] Tommy Thomas: So, did you have a job in high school? In high school, I worked at a grocery store and on a farm.  As I look back, I think that's when I realized that I needed a work ethic. [00:04:43] John Sommerville: I worked for a year at a grocery store which was interesting. As I look back, I think that's when I realized that you needed a work ethic. I worked with a lot of folks who were around my age who were mostly lazy. I worked on a farm for a summer. Years later, the farmer that I worked for went to the church that I grew up in. And I'd gone to college, and I think I was probably a sophomore or junior in college, and he called me over and he introduced me to all of his friends. And he said I'm the reason this kid went to college. In other words, working on the farm gave me a hunger for learning and maybe doing something different. I don't know if that's a direct, but it's somewhat true. So those were a couple of experiences that I had working during high school. [00:05:28] Tommy Thomas:  When you went to college, how did you decide on your major? [00:05:33] John Sommerville:  My father was a practical person. And he said, I want you to get something that you can get a job with. But I was also interested in history and philosophy and other sorts of things like that. So, I found a major, it was Personnel Administration, what you now call HR or People Management. And it allowed me to take classes in the business school, so I could take accounting and finance and other things like that. And also take liberal arts classes. I took classical Greek, for example, as a language. At the time, I was wrestling with the direction that my life might take, and I had two ideas. One was to work in business. The other was to work in the church, and I had to try to discern that, and it wasn't just what I took in the classroom, but some of the experiences I had outside that helped guide me in that direction, to figure that out, and ironically, I ended up doing both as part of my career. [00:06:27] Tommy Thomas:  You graduated from college, you went on to get your MBA at Indiana. What do you remember about the first time you managed people? [00:06:34] John Sommerville: I think I'd been at General Mills about two years when I was promoted to a manager position. And what I remember is being an individual contributor. You're only responsible for yourself, just getting your own work done. But all of a sudden, you've got to direct the energies and work of others. And I remember pretty quickly understanding that there were some things I needed to do and one was to give everybody clear direction. I always appreciated people who supervised me, giving me a clear idea of what they were expecting. As a manager, I realized that if I gave vague directions, I got vague output.  I realized that I needed to give clear direction. And I realized pretty quickly that if I gave vague directions, I got vague output. And so, I learned that I needed to be able to give clear direction. And then I think the idea of both affirmation and correction is woven together. So, see people when they're doing something that they're doing right. My parents used to say that they tried to catch us as children doing the right thing and then reinforce that. I think that principle applies as well as quickly correcting. And so those are some principles that I think early on that I learned and it's hard to be consistent in those. Sometimes you just assume people are going to do the right thing and know what to do.  But those are things that I kept coming back to in those early years. [00:07:44] Tommy Thomas: What was the highlight at General Mills when you think back on that chapter of your life? [00:07:48] John Sommerville:  I had a really great experience in the organization. I'll give you a couple. The very first thing I was assigned to, I was brand new, I was put on a a project team to develop a boxed salad.  We ended up calling it Suddenly Salad. It was a boxed pasta salad mix. At the time what they were looking at was trends in food where pasta salads were starting to appear in restaurants and other places, and they wanted to take advantage of that, and I worked in the division that made Hamburger Helper and some of the Betty Crocker potatoes, and so they had the technologies available, so in six months this project team developed that product and I was brand new on it, so I had a lower level role. But it was so much fun to work and see this project on a fast track become a reality. I spent quite a bit of time in new products and in new markets when I worked in Europe. That new product development thing was really significant. The other was the opportunity I had when I was the Marketing Manager of Cheerios. My wife and I lived in Switzerland for three years where I worked for a joint venture for General Mills and Nestle. When I came back, I was assigned to be the Marketing Manager of Cheerios, and the brand was declining in volume. And what we found serendipitously is that oats have the effect of reducing cholesterol. And we did a clinical study that led to the ability to make a claim around the heart healthiness and the cholesterol-reducing properties of oats. And introduced that, the heart-shaped bowl on the box came out at that time. Very satisfying experience. I left right as that was being implemented, but it had led to a real resurgence of that brand. So had great satisfaction about being involved with others in that process. [00:09:37] Tommy Thomas: What do you think of all the things you learned in the private sector, what did you take to the nonprofit sector that you think has helped you the most? There is an underappreciation in some ministry organizations and churches and others for the disciplines of financial management, and operational leadership of getting systems and structures to work for you. [00:09:49] John Sommerville: I think there is an underappreciation in some ministry organizations and churches and others for the disciplines of financial management, operational leadership, of getting systems and structures to work for you. For example, in starting a church, one of the things that I was committed to, even when we were relatively small, was the idea of building systems and structures that made our work more efficient, more effective, and allowed us to do more of what we really needed to do.  Working with people doing services and that sort of thing. ++++++++++++++++++++++ [00:10:23] Tommy Thomas: Let's stay in your private sector world for another minute or two, were there mentors there that kind of took you under the belt and what did that look like? [00:10:31] John Sommerville: I've had a number of mentors in my life and one of the most important was a guy named Leith Anderson who was the Senior Pastor at Wooddale at the time, who later became the President of the National Association of Evangelicals. And Leith, early on when I was brand new in the church, showed an interest in me and gave me some opportunities for leadership, being on boards and task forces, and things like that. And at one point, he asked me if we could get together. We went to a local restaurant one evening after a meeting for pie, and he asked me, what are you going to do with the rest of your life? And at the time, my vision was I'd work until I was 55. Then I'll quit and go work for a ministry organization. And his question for me was, why not now? Now, it would be five years before I left General Mills. But his point was, you don't have to wait all that time maybe it would be a sooner deal. And it did turn out to be that. But I think with mentors, I think we need multiple mentors in our lives. I've heard one say that if you have just one mentor, you become a clone. If you have two, you're confused. If you have 10, you become wise, and your mentors don't all have to be living. I think one of my mentors is George Marshall, the general who became the architect of the Marshall Plan and the great diplomat. I've read a number of books about him and those are examples of people that I admire, and their lives, in one sense or another, have shaped me. [00:11:58] Tommy Thomas: What's the most ambitious project you've ever taken, and how did it come out? [00:12:03] John Sommerville: I think starting a church. There's something about entrepreneurs, church planters, and others. They are naive and they often don't understand what they're taking on. And I think that is good. Because sometimes it's more daunting maybe than you realize. And I think deciding that we could start a church in an established neighborhood that was not particularly hospitable to an Orthodox expression of Christian faith was probably the most daunting thing. And looking back on it, I wonder how in the world we got the courage to do it. But that was probably the most, and I believe today, even today, and probably will be for the rest of my life, the most significant, important thing that I have given my life to. And I believe brought great satisfaction.  But it was not easy. [00:13:00] Tommy Thomas: I'd like for you to respond to this quote “A group is a bunch of people in an elevator. A team is a bunch of people in the elevator, but the elevator is broken”. [00:13:11] John Sommerville: I'll tell you a story and it's an elevator story. I was in the elevator at General Mills one day with the president of our division. There were about eight of us in the elevator and the elevator stopped between two floors. And I was the one closest to the buttons. And I had no idea what to do. The elevator stuck. And the president of the division reached around me and opened up the little box with the telephone in it and called on the telephone to get the building supervisor to come and get us out. And what I learned from that is when you have a problem, do something, just get started. And I was standing there frozen. What in the world do we do? And he took action. And I think what he did is he led us, now obviously he was the one doing something. But it could have been somebody else, but he just did something. And I think teams need to just start moving. I don't know if that's exactly what you're looking for, but that was certainly very memorable. [00:14:10] Tommy Thomas: I want to ask you some generational difference questions and there's no right or wrong answer. I talked to somebody the other day and he said, I don't think there's very much difference in the generations and he had a good rationale. And then I've talked to others. I talked to Tom Lynn at InterVarsity and Tom had some thoughts on leading different generations. You've obviously, in your four environments, led different generations and now you're working with different generations at the University of Northwestern St. Paul. Maybe when you think about at least broad categories of Boomers, Gen Xers, Millennials, and Gen Z, any observations on the differences of them working as a team together? [00:14:51] John Sommerville: I would fall in between your two guests. I think that we sometimes confuse generational differences for life stages. In other words, 20s have a certain set of concerns, and we sometimes forget the cycle we went through as we grow up. There are some things that I sometimes hear when people are reading an article about generational differences, and I think you're just thinking about life stages. There are some things that I sometimes hear when people are reading an article about generational differences, and I think you're just thinking about life stages, but I also think there are things that are different from one generation to another. My parents were raised in the Great Depression, and the way that they function and still function in their mid-90s now is around the idea of scarcity. They're very concerned, very frugal, and they have really a scarcity mindset. Boomers tend to have more of an abundance mindset because that's what they grew up with. And then as you move forward, different generations with things playing out different ways. And I'm watching this now with college students and those that are in their early 20s, just the influence of the cell phone and technology. There are distinct differences and I think we need to adapt what we do to be able to communicate well with each new generation. And sometimes that's being sensitive and learning ways that can contextualize what it is we're trying to communicate or work through with them. I think those are really important. [00:16:09] Tommy Thomas: What about creativity and innovation between the generations? [00:16:12] John Sommerville: I've thought so much about that. I will say that I think that creativity and innovation is a mindset that has to, in an organization, has to be nurtured and fostered. Some people tend to be more creative than others. They think in more novel ways and other people just need to be given the freedom to actually do that. And that's one of the things that leaders are not always effective at because they tend to believe they know the right answers and they tend to not let people think long enough and hard enough about a new idea to be able to see where it might go. And I think the older leaders, the more impatient they get, and at the same time, the more nurturing they need to get of ideas that maybe they might initially disagree with but might have fruit. [00:17:00] Tommy Thomas: I want to go to resilience. Most of us hope we learn something about resilience during the pandemic. I want to give you a couple of definitions. It's too strong of a word but maybe not. So the University of Massachusetts Global says resilience is not a one-time action. It's a sustained effort to adapt, survive, and thrive in times of stress and uncertainty. Forbes -  Resilience provides the ability to recover quickly from change, hardship, or misfortune. It's the product of a broad perspective. Your thoughts? [00:17:36] John Sommerville: There's a Greek word, hupomene sometimes it's translated steadfast endurance or endurance in the New Testament, I mentioned earlier, that I took Classical Greek as an undergrad. That word really stuck with me, and the reason why is that it's translated sometimes in a very flat way in English, and yet the Greek word has this idea of persistence, of resilience, of tenacity, of sustained effort toward something that is, it's an undaunted kind of approach to life. And I think that this is undervalued by many because I think the assumption is that if it's something that I'm gifted to do or it's something that needs to be done, it will be easy. And I found that most things worth doing are like pushing water or pushing a rock uphill. It's just most things that are worth doing are hard. Woody Allen once said that 85% of success is just showing up. And I think that part of what we have to do as leaders and as people of character is just keep showing up. And so t resilience is a very important character quality. ++++++++++++++++ Most of us are afraid to fail because we don't like to be embarrassed. [00:18:50] Tommy Thomas:  It's been said that we learn most from our failures. And if that's the truth, or if that's the case, why are most of us so afraid to fail? [00:18:57] John Sommerville: I think because we don't like to be embarrassed. We don't like to invest in something that we feel, the equivalent of the oil industry person drilling a dry hole. We don't like effort that seems to not go anywhere. And so, I think sometimes we need to remember that risking things is the only way we're actually going to achieve things. And sometimes you have to fail several times before things actually go right, and I think sometimes we're just way too afraid of finding ourselves in a place where we might feel embarrassed, or we wasted time. I think the other thing is that we sometimes think that the consequences of failure are permanent, and they aren't. We're often in a place in life where we at least know one thing that doesn't work. So, then we can try something else and figure out what does work. [00:19:53] Tommy Thomas: Let's go to authenticity. There's a great power in authenticity.  Arthur Wilde said, be yourself, everyone else is already taken. Saint Catherine of Siena said, be who God meant you to be and you will set the world on fire. What lessons have you learned about authenticity over these four chapters of your life? We need to be transparent with people enough that they can see what actually is going on rather than trying to put on some persona. [00:20:12] John Sommerville:  I would say a couple of things. First of all, we need to be transparent with people enough that they can see what actually is going on rather than trying to put on some persona. And so, authenticity means in part that we're in a place where we're letting people see who we are and not trying to fake something, the transparency is very important. Now, the one thing I'll say about authenticity is authenticity can also be an excuse. In other words, authenticity can be an excuse for immaturity. We need to understand that being authentic can mean also that we might be in sin. One of the things that we need to do as Christians is to be made into the likeness of Christ, which means there may be character qualities or things that might be authentically us. But also, maybe sin, so part of it is to let people see enough inside of us, but at the same time recognize that authenticity whether it's anger or greed or impatience may be things that God needs to work on and process of sanctification needs to be the exercised in those areas. [00:21:24] Tommy Thomas: You've observed a lot of leaders. Over the years, what do you think is the most dangerous behavior that tends to derail a leader's career? [00:21:33] John Sommerville: I believe character. I think we're in a generation where we are so impressed with competence, so impressed with people who have outsized skills in one way or another that we have forgotten that those skills, if not tempered by character, if not shaped by character, not channeled through character, can end up being toxic or worse.And I really think that character is really the foundation. It's not all of it, because we need competence, but competence alone is not enough. [00:22:07] Tommy Thomas: Maybe a little lighter question.   We've been diving deep into some serious thoughts here. If you were a judge on a nonprofit version of the shark tank and people were coming to you for early-stage investments in their nonprofits, what questions do you need answers to before you open your purse? [00:22:25] John Sommerville:  I think the first question is, what need do you believe exists that your ministry or organization will serve? And how is what you're doing, how will that serve that need? Because if there's a true need I think many things follow from that. And if you have something unique that will really help meet that need, then the organization needs to exist. So, I think those are big questions. And by the way, the other thing that I often ask is, who else is doing this? What I find is that there are people who are pioneers who do something for the very first time, and we write books about those people, but often what we need is that the people who are innovators are just being novel without actually being effective and so it's important to understand the need, be able to meet the need, and then also give examples of how that works. You may have a unique spin on it, but the core of it needs to be channeled into an area that others have been successful in the past. [00:23:31] Tommy Thomas: If you were creating a dashboard to get at the non-profit's organizational health, what is your dashboard going to measure? [00:23:38] John Sommerville: I think that the effectiveness of whatever you're doing, whatever effort you're doing, is it effective? If you're taking care of orphans, or if you're feeding the hungry, or if you're ministering to ex-offenders who are trying to reintegrate into society, is what you're doing effective? Can you show that? Can you measure that? The other is economic viability. Many people are very motivated. They're compassionate people, but there does need to be some economic foundations and economic viability for what you're doing. And that can be achieved in a lot of different ways, but that needs to be there because otherwise an under-resourced organization will not be effective long term. [00:24:20] Tommy Thomas:  Give me some of those illustrations of economic viability. [00:24:24] John Sommerville: One thing that organizations operate in a lot of different ways, sometimes there's a revenue stream that helps to fund the ministry. And that could be, I'm familiar with an organization here that works with high school students through the schools and they have figured out how to work with school districts to provide programming and content that is useful and effective. It's a Christian organization, but it works with public schools and does a very effective job. They figured out a way to balance philanthropic revenue and revenue from many of their programs. And they've done it very effectively for 30 years. Other organizations are purely philanthropic. And they need to develop a core base of people that are interested in the ministry and constantly replenish that. But showing effectiveness, and developing a sense of passion, not only for the people who work for the organization but those who are connected as donors. And then there are ministries that really do function as businesses, per se, a publishing organization or something like that may generate almost all its revenue from some kind of sales or revenue, but still, it needs to be mission-driven.  There are a lot of different ways to think about that. +++++++++++++++++++++ Tommy Thomas Thank you for joining us today. If you are a first-time listener, I hope you will subscribe and become a regular. You can find links to all the episodes on our website. www.JobfitMatters.com/podcast. If there are topics you'd like for me to explore my email address is tthomas@jobfitmatters.com.   Word of mouth has been identified as the most valuable form of marketing. Surveys tell us that consumers believe recommendations from friends and family over all other forms of advertising. If you've heard something today that's worth passing on, please share it with others. You're already helping me make something special for the next generation of nonprofit leaders. I'll be back next week with a new episode. Until then, stay the course on our journey to help make the nonprofit sector more effective and sustainable.   Links & Resources JobfitMatters Website Next Gen Nonprofit Leadership with Tommy Thomas   Connect tthomas@jobfitmatters.com Follow Tommy on LinkedIn

Lena Andrews discusses her new book "Valiant Women: The Extraordinary American Servicewomen Who Helped Win World War Two." It was General George Marshall who first recognized that the Americans could not possibly win World War Two without the active participation of women. The book examines the contributions made by the 350,000+ American women in uniform- and some of the resistance which they confronted.

Operation Pedestal would ensure that Malta stayed in the fight. But Stalin is not appeased. He wants a Second Front. So does Gen. George Marshall and he's coming to London to say so. The British had to come up with a plan, big enough to impress the Russian and the American, but good enough not to get everyone killed. Enter the new head of Combined Operations, Lord Louis Mountbatten. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices

George Marshall was one of America's most significant statesmen during the mid twentieth century. He was born and raised in Uniontown, PA and attended VMI before earning a commission in the U.S. Army in 1902. During World War II he led the Army as Chief of Staff and after the war served as Secretary of State where he initiated the Marshall Plan for the recovery of Europe. In this episode, Army War College professor Tom Bruscino joins us to talk about Marshall's memoir of his service as a staff officer with the American forces in Europe during World War I. pcntv.com/donate pcntv.com/membership-signup pcntv.com

Last time we spoke about the aftermath of the battle for Attu. The American victory over Attu meant the end of the Aleutian campaign for the Japanese, Tokyo decided to pull everyone out. Over 6000 Japanese needed evacuation from Kiska and it would be very tricky for the Japanese to get past Admiral Kinkaids blockade. Then we finished up the West Hubei offensive, with a part of it being known colloquially as the Rice Bowl Campaign. The Japanese had brutalized the Chinese, but we're stopped short of invading Chongqing or Sichuan. Thus for the Chinese it was a victory, but at the same time the Japanese had secured exactly what they wanted, stealing vast amounts of property, notably rice. Vessels left Yichang and sailed further west through the riverways acquiring large sums of goods to help the China war cause. Today we are diving back into the south Pacific. This episode is Operation Cartwheel starts rolling Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  So honestly for awhile now we have been hitting the North Pacific and China theaters, which certainly was a change of pace, but as you can imagine these events do not simply move along in a vacuum. Yes a lot was going on in the other theaters and this episode is going to be tackling a lot of different events so buckle up buckos. First we are going to talk about Operation Cartwheel. The ULTRA intelligence that brought Yamamoto's death was not the only information the Americans received in April. A lifeboat bearing a list of the names of 40,000 active Japanese officers washed ashore after the battle of the Bismarck Sea. Using this Cryptographers were able to match each name to radio signals from Japanese army units, ensuring General MacArthurs intelligence remained as operationally up to date as it could be. At the same time William Bull Hasley showed to on April 15th to Brisbane to meet with MacArthur and the two hit it off. Halsey would later write this about their first encounter. “Five minutes after I reported, I felt as if we were lifelong friends. I have seldom seen a man who makes a quicker, stronger, more favorable impression. He was then sixty-three, but he could have passed as fifty. His hair was jet black; his eyes were clear; his carriage erect….My mental picture poses him against the background of these discussions; he is pacing his office, almost wearing a groove between his large, bare desk and the portrait of George Washington that faced it; his corncob pipe is in his hand (I rarely saw him smoke it): and he is making his points in a diction I have never heard surpassed. “ Both men would hammer out a plan on April 26th, it was a revision to MacArthur's Elkton plan, this one would be known as Elkton III, but it was soon to be coded as Operation Cartwheel.  The plan consisted of 13 amphibious landings in just 6 months with MacArthur and Halsey providing maximum support to each others efforts. The first phase of the plan would see MacArthur seizing Woodlark and the Kirwina islands while Hasley invaded New Georgia. Phase 2 would commence 2 months after the start of the offensive where MacArthur would capture Lae, Salamaua and Finschhafen. Phase 3 would be the seizure of the Shortland islands and Bougainville in the south pacific. In December MacArthur would seize Cape Gloucester in Western New Britain and shortly after that they would seize Rabaul. Halsey's forces would knock out Japanese air bases on Buka, allowing MacArthurs men to clear the northwestern half of New Guinea. By January of 1944, MacArthur and Halsey figured they would be ready for the final assault on Rabaul which was their ultimate objective for victory. MacArthur resisted sending details of their joint plan to Washington, probably fearing the Europe first obsessed chiefs of staff would veto their ambitious thrust. He told them only that he anticipated that the first move toward Woodlark and Kirwina would start in June. However this was too slow for Admiral King. King wanted his protege Admiral Nimitz to begin a thrust into the central pacific, heading through the Marshalls in November and proposed shifting the Marine 1st and 2nd divisions, the ones that fell under MacArthurs and Halsey's command to help with the Marshalls offensive, this alongside two bomber groups promised to General Kenney. MacArthur was very pissed off and he sent a distressed message to George Marshall damning the entire central Pacific strategy as a quote “unnecessary and even wasteful diversion from what should be the main pacific strategy”,  that being MacArthur's own.”. He added in “from a broad strategic viewpoint, I am convinced that the best course of offensive action in the Pacific is a movement from Australia through New Guinea to Mindanao. Air supremacy is essential to success, for the southwestern strategy where large numbers of land-based aircraft are utterly essential and will immediately cut the enemy lines from japan to his conquered territory to the southward. Pulling any additional heavy bombers groups would in my opinion, collapse the offensive effort in the southwest pacific area…in my judgment the offensive against Rabaul should be considered the main effort, and it should not be nullified or weakened ”. But King was adamant. There would indeed be a thrust through the central pacific led by the navy with its main axis passing through the Marshalls and Marianas towards Japan,which might I remind you listening, bypasses the Philippines. It of course was a strategy completely at odds with MacArthurs. Marshall supported King, as did the other Joint Chiefs. But in the end MacArthurs whining forced King to relent on the transfer of the two marine divisions and the bomber groups, thus MacArthur revealed his timetable for operation Cartwheel. He told them he planned to take Kiriwna and Woodlark in the Trobriand Island around June 30th. The advance on New Georgia would start on the same date, and in September the First Cavalry and 3 Australian divisions would begin operations against the Madang-Salamaua area. Meanwhile MacArthur's 43rd division would invade southern Bougainville on October 15th, while the 1st Marines and 32nd division would invade Cape Gloucester on December 1st.  For all of these amphibious landings, there were no serious problems when it came to shipping and landing craft….that is for Nimitz designated areas. However at the beginning of 1943, MacArthur had practically no amphibious equipment nor experts in these types of operations. The only units available to him were the Army's engineering special boat brigade which had very few small craft. The man who would be responsible for the amphibious assaults during much of the coming campaigns was to be Rear Admiral Daniel Barbey. On January 10th, 1943 he took command of the forces that would later be designated the 7th Amphibious force. Barbey from the offset established good relations with MacArthur…because well anyone who worked with MacArthur had to. He had nearly nothing to work with in the beginning, but started with establishing bases at Toobul Bay, near the mouth of the Brisbane river and Point Stephens. MacArthur had requested more small craft and transports as early as mid 1942, but because of the European and central pacific being a priority, little had come his way. Before the equipment came, MacArthur was receiving American and Australian troops, so he got Barbey's team to improvise. They began training the troops in debarking from larger ships down cargo nets to smaller landing craft. However Barbey had no attack transports (APA), which was the key to this kind of operation. To solve this they rigged nets from cliffs, boy that must have been fun. The first Landing ship tanks LSTs and Landing craft tanks LCTs would not arrive until mid january, and on Easter Sunday 13 Landing craft infantry's LCI's were delivered, giving them very little time before the first operations were to begin to train the crews on how to use them.  Now on the other side Halsey had his own three phase operation. Part 1 saw the invasion of New Georgia, part 2 was the seizure of Buin and Rekata Bay if possible and last 3 was the seizure of Kieta and the neutralization of Buka. Phase 1 was codenamed Operation Toenails. Halsey described the operation to Nimitz as “a infiltration and staging operation”. The operation would see simultaneous landings at Wickham Anchorage to hit its landing craft base; Segi point for its airfield site; Viru Harbor for its small craft base and Rendova Harbor which would serve as a new base to stage troops for a future attack upon Munda. This would all occur on June 30th. The main force assigned to Operation Toenails was General Hester's 43rd division. Admiral Turner and his Task Force 31 were in charge of the amphibious landings while Admiral Fitch would toss 1182 aircraft to give them aircower and Admiral's Ainsworth and Merrill's Task force 36 would provide further naval support. On the other side, interservice coordination between the Japanese Generals and Admirals remained intermittent and largely ad hoc, when it was not hostile. General Imamura's 8th area army HQ at Rabaul stood above Hyakutake's 17th Army, comprising 3 divisions spread over the SOlomons and New Britain, and General Hatazo Adachi's 8th Army had 3 divisions on New Guinea. Troop reinforcements were arriving in Rabaul bolstering the garrison at one point to 90,000 men. Vice Admiral Jinichi Kusaka remained in command of navy forces at Rabaul and held responsibility for the defense of the central solomons. Admiral Mineichi Koga had succeeded the slain Yamamoto as commander in chief of the combined fleet, based at Truk. Nowhere in the theater was there a blended command, the army and navy had to coordinate their operations through a meticulous process of “nemawashi / digging around the roots” for a consensus. The Japanese moved new air units into the theater, including more of the elite carrier aircrews that had trained and honed their skills prior to the war, but the loss ratios in air combat was ruining them.  As a result of the devastating loss during the battle of the Bismarck Sea, the Japanese were forced to change plans. USAAF and RAAF aircraft based at Port Moresby and Milne Bay had slaughtered an entire convoy of Japanese transports attempting to land troops in the Lae-Slaamaua area using a new technique called “skip bombing”. Imperial General HQ set up a joint Army/Navy investigation board to study the disaster, seeing the IJA accused the IJN of being too focused on the Solomons rather than on New Guinea. The Army argued New Guinea was vital for the national defenses and proposed that if a retreat became necessary, it would be as a direct result of the navy's lack of support. If this were to happen they would have to pull back and create a defensive line from northwest New Guinea to Timor. The Navy's representatives argued that the Huon Peninsula must be held or its loss would swing open the western gate to Rabaul, forcing the combined fleet to withdraw from Truk. Well the fighting eventually resulted in an ultimatum with both sides agreeing the army/navy operations should focus on eastern New Guinea. It was decided that both the army and navy would literally operate as one unit, because that would go well. The Central solomons were still under the overall responsibility of the 8th fleet, now commanded by Vice Admiral Baron Samejima Tomoshige with some IJA units placed under naval command according to agreements made between General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka. It seems the Japanese could get along once and awhile, as just like Halsey and MacArthur, Imamura and Kusaka developed a deep friendship. Both of their staffs ate lunch together once or twice a week, where southeast area affairs were discussed informally and their respective staffs got to know another personally. Kusaka went on the record to say Imamura was a very great person. Many army units would be sent to reinforce the New Georgia defenses and by late May the bulk of the 229th regiment arrived to Munda, and the 13th regiment went to Vila by late June. Imamura placed both regiments under the command of Major General Sasaki Noboru's southeast detachment who responded directly to Samejima. Samejima's first orders were to arrange the responsibilities between General Sasaki's southeast detachment and Admiral Ota's 8th combined SNLF, seeing Sasaki in charge of Munda and Ota in charge of the Enogai and Bairoko area's. If the situation arose, command would be unified under the senior officer on New Georgia, General Sasaki. Ota would also have responsibility for coastal artillery defense, radio communications, and barge operations. Admiral Koga in his new role as commander of the combined fleet, preemptively sent move of his forces back to the home islands in preparation to reinforce Attu. But as the fate of the Aleutians became sealed by late May, Koga decided to concentrate the combined Fleet at Truk, so it would be primed and ready for a decisive naval battle with the Americans. Without the aid of Koga's carriers, Kusaka had launched another air counteroffensive after I-Go, this one taking place in June. The aim was yet again to prevent the Americans from invading the central solomons . Kusaka began tossing waves of Bety's against American shipping east of San Cristobal and night raids over guadalcanal. Simultaneously he also unleashed Operation SO; a major offensive to smash allied air power in the Solomon islands; and operation SE: which targeted airfields and shipping. He sent 105 Zeros to sweep and bomb the enemy airfields with a new type of gasoline bomb. Operation SE began with 25 Val dive bombers attacking US shipping in the Guadalcanal-Tulagi area and Operation SO began on June 7th with 81 Zeros led by Lt Commander Shindo Saburo assaulting the Russels. However the Russel group ran right into 104 allied fighters who shot down 9 Zeros. A follow up attack was made on the 12th with 74 Zeros led by Lt Miyano Zenjiro, this time the Japanese lost 7 fighters but took down 6 American. As usual the Japanese pilots made wild claims, stating the first attack saw 41 American fights shot down and the second attack 24.  Kusaka launched the main attack of Operation SE on June 16th led by Lt commander Saburo consisting of 24 Vals and 70 Zero escorts who swung south of the Russells, turning at Beaufort Bay. Yet again they were intercepted, this time by 74 allied fighters over BEaufort Bay and the ensuing ari battle rolled over the mountainous spine of guadalcanal. This time the Japanese lost 15 Zeros and 13 Vals while only shooting down 6 allied fighters. The Japanese lost first rate pilots such as Lt Miyano who had scored a total of 16 kills during the war. Again Japanese veteran pilots were being bled dry severely affecting the nation's airpower. Despite their waves being intercepted nearly every time, the Vals were able to press through with their attacks and managed to hit the cargo ships Caleno and LST-340. But such results were hardly worth the cost, so Kusaka began to urgently request reinforcements. The carrier Ryhuo would lend her bombers to replace the lost ones, arriving on the 2nd of July. The losses taught the Japanese pilots some bitter lessons and never again would the fly over guadalcanal during daylight as the American CAP was far to powerful. Over in New Guinea, General Blamey was laying out his plan for the capture of Lae, codenamed Operation Postern which was approved by MacArthurs headquarters. Before the allies would invade Woodlark and Kiriwana, MacArthur proscribed the seizure of Lae and the Markham and Ramu valley. The Markham operations were to be based on Port Moresby while the north coast operations would be staged from Buna and Milne Bay. The invasion of Woodlark and Kiriwana islands codenamed Operation Chronicle would be entrusted to Lt General Walter Kruegers 6th army. The islands northeast of the Papuan coast would allow the allies to have air bases closer to Japanese targets in the Solomons and around Rabaul, thus Blamey had devised his plan to secure the northeastern part of New Guinea. The first phase of his plan was Lae and the Markham and Ramu Valleys; the 2nd phase was to seize a shore base within 60 miles of Lae, he chose Nassau Bay. Nassau Bay would help with the supply problems in the Wau-Mubo-Bobdubi area, as all the supplies were being flown in from Port Moresby. The mountains were serious obstacles for transport aircraft, not to mention the Japanese fighters that could spring out of nearby Lae. Taking Nassau Bay would greatly shorting supply lines for allied troops fighting in the Salamaua region and also allow a junction to be made with General Saviges forces operating at Mubo The 162nd American Regiment led by Colonel Archibald MacKechnie would help hit Nassau Bay, they would be known as the MacKechnie force. They would seize the high ground around Goodiew Junction and Mount Tambu and the ridges running down therefrom to the sea, allowing the Australians to link up with the 15th brigade at Bobdubi and the American landing force at Nassau. D-day for the Nassau Landing was set for June 30th and it was all going to act as a feint, hoping to lure Japanese forces from Lae to Salamaua.  Now the last time we left off in New Guinea, General Savige had launched a limited offensive against the Japanese at Mubo and Bobdubi ridge. General Nakano was certain Salamaua was the main allied target and this prompting him on the 29th to order Major General Chuichi Muroya to lead the 51st division to fortify it. In the process Muroya's men expelled Warfe's commandos from the northern ridge. To the east of Mubo, Brigadier Moten was trying to take the Pimple, but his 17th brigade would be performing more patrolling than actual attacks throughout the later half of May. Eventually Savige would relieve the exhausted 2/7th battalion with the 2/6th battalion led by Lt Colonel Frederick Wood who would begin an advance on May the 27th. Meanwhile Nakano had brought more reinforcements to defend Mubo and launched a strong counterattack in early May, nearly breaking through towards the main Australian camp at Lababia ridge. On May 23rd Nakano received two battalions of the 66th regiment and began to work out a plan for assembling supplies and ammunition in the Mubo area to prepare for an offensive. Men would move at night in a single file along the narrow jungle trails carrying the materials by hand, through mud and rain. The main train was a slope on Komiatum ridge known to the Japanese as Regret Hill as the hard working soldiers became more exhausted with each passing day marching along it. The Japanese sought to clear out Lababia ridge as far as Guadagasal, thus securing Mubo. On June 3rd, allied patrols discovered Nakano had reoccupied Markham point which forced Savige to keep the bulk of the 24th away from the action at Bobdubi and Mubo. From their camp at the bank of the Markham Savige ordered patrols to investigate the Nadzab area. On June 14th, a 3 man patrol came across friendly natives at the village of Gabsonkek who informed them of the Japanese activity in the area. They said "that the Japs come to the village every day between 10:00 and 12:00 hours taking everything in sight—pigs, fowls, fruit, etc., without paying; they take native girls back to Lae if they can catch them. The guides would not proceed farther to Ngasawapum because Japan man come up Big Road, cut us off", and they would not go to Narakapor because they claimed there were too many Japs and two big guns". The patrol went back to camp by the 18th informing command. A second patrol was made, led by Lt Dave Burke who forded the Tabali River to get to Nassau Bay. Their report indicated the area was suitable for landing and road construction. To further prepare for the American landings, the Australians began building a footbridge over the Bitoi River and blazed a track up to Bitoi Ridge. On Lababia Ridge the main defensive position withdrew to a junction on the Jap Tracks where it would be easier to counter enemy encirclement attempts. Reports came in from forward platoons that there was considerable enemy activity along the Komiatum-Mubo track. This was Nakano's 66th regiment carrying the food and ammunition in preparation for the upcoming offensive. In response to this, Savige ordered Brigadier Frank Hosking of the 15th brigade to assume command of the Bobdubi ridge area and to begin harassing the Japanese supply route. Meanwhile the 58th/59th battalion relieved the 2/3rd independent company at Hote and a party of Warfe's commando's were sent to attack the Komiatum-Mubo track. However disaster struck as the Australians ran into their own booby-traps on June 16th suffering a number of casualties. By June 20th, the commando's established ambush positions along a ridge near the junction of Stephens Track and the Komiatum Track. They successfully ambushed some Japanese later that day, killing a few men and capturing valuable documents about the arrival of Nakano's 66th regiment. However by this point Nakano's units were already assembling in front of Lababia ridge and the offensive was about to begin. Now we gotta finish up the episode talking about some developments in India. After the disastrous first Arakan Campaign, Marshal Wavell was to receive a promotion, and by promotion I mean he was kicked upstairs as they say, succeeded Lord Linlithgow as the new Viceroy of India. But until then he began looking into training his forces in jungle warfare as the bitter lessons learned at Arakan proved the men were very unprepared. Wavell also wanted to investigate what the hell had happened during the disaster, so he sent Major General Roland Richardson in late May to head a infantry committee at New Delhi for the task. The committee's report about the Arakan campaign found the troops fighting spirit was fundamentally sound, but the major problems that affected their combat performance were more about the over expansion of the army in India. The army mobilization had been rushed, they barely met basic training and the supplying of their sheer numbers was a catastrophe. There were also issues regarding their low status, inferior pay for the infantry, which further deprived them of skilled and well educated recruits.  Yet above all else the Infantry committee found their lack of jungle training to be the most egregious issue. As observed “This is the most urgent problem facing us, and one which requires prompt and energetic action if results are to be produced in time for the winter campaigning season.” The lack of jungle training severely undermined their ability to fight efficiently and ultimately led to the breakdown of infantry battalions in the Arakan. And of course there was the ever present unseen enemy, that of malaria, alongside an assortment of other ailments that were wreaking havoc on the men. But many of these problems could not be tackled until June 20th, when General Claude Auchinleck was officially appointed as the new Commander in Chief in India. For General Slim this was excellent news and certainly worked in his favor alongside the sacking of Irwin. The “Auk” as he was called, had always been a Slim supporter and was the one who recommended him to Wavell for advancement when Wavell was Commander in Chief of the middle east back in 1941. The Auk had wanted to retain Slim in the middle east and fought hard to dissuade Wavell from taking him over to Burma. Churchill never held Wavell ever in high regard and was tired of his quasi-academic effusions and preferred a “fighting general” in Burma. Alongside the Auk, Irwin was replaced with General George Giffard, and Slim had this to say of the replacement.  “The new Army Commander had a great effect on me. A tall, goodlooking man in the late fifties, who had obviously kept himself physically and mentally in first-class condition, there was nothing dramatic about him in either appearance or speech. He abhorred the theatrical, and was one of the very few generals, indeed men in any position, I have known who really disliked publicity . . . But there was much more to General Giffard than good taste, good manners and unselfishness. He understood the fundamentals of war – that soldiers must be trained before they can fight, fed before they can march, and relieved before they are worn out. He understood that front-line commanders should be spared responsibilities in the rear, and that soundness of organization and administration is worth more than specious short-cuts to victory” Auckinleck went to work from the offset of his new command by improving the welfare, health and feeding of the Indian army to foster improved morale. General Giffard as the new commander of the Eastern Army had Major General Temple Gurdon to oversee some reforms for training and the development of new doctrines. A lot of effort was made to conduct intensive collective training under jungle conditions. The men would train near Nasik, Ranchi, Dehradun and in the Jhansi-Nowgong-lalitpur region. Commanders low to high were given a chance at handling units to improve standards of staff work, practice combined army tactics and build team spirit. Auchinleck also initiated a policy of active patrolling at Assam and Arakan to gather intelligence and maintain touch with the Japanese as to destroy the feeling that they were super soldiers.    I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. A lot of chess pieces were moved around the board this week. Bitter lessons had been learnt in multiple theaters of the war and now it came time to reorganize and try new things to ultimately bring the war against Japan to a closer end. 

It was a tremendous honor & pleasure to interview Richard Rhodes, Pulitzer Prize winning author of The Making of the Atomic BombWe discuss* similarities between AI progress & Manhattan Project (developing a powerful, unprecedented, & potentially apocalyptic technology within an uncertain arms-race situation)* visiting starving former Soviet scientists during fall of Soviet Union* whether Oppenheimer was a spy, & consulting on the Nolan movie* living through WW2 as a child* odds of nuclear war in Ukraine, Taiwan, Pakistan, & North Korea* how the US pulled of such a massive secret wartime scientific & industrial projectWatch on YouTube. Listen on Apple Podcasts, Spotify, or any other podcast platform. Read the full transcript here. Follow me on Twitter for updates on future episodes.Timestamps(0:00:00) - Oppenheimer movie(0:06:22) - Was the bomb inevitable?(0:29:10) - Firebombing vs nuclear vs hydrogen bombs(0:49:44) - Stalin & the Soviet program(1:08:24) - Deterrence, disarmament, North Korea, Taiwan(1:33:12) - Oppenheimer as lab director(1:53:40) - AI progress vs Manhattan Project(1:59:50) - Living through WW2(2:16:45) - Secrecy(2:26:34) - Wisdom & warTranscript(0:00:00) - Oppenheimer movieDwarkesh Patel 0:00:51Today I have the great honor of interviewing Richard Rhodes, who is the Pulitzer Prize-winning author of The Making of the Atomic Bomb, and most recently, the author of Energy, A Human History. I'm really excited about this one. Let's jump in at a current event, which is the fact that there's a new movie about Oppenheimer coming out, which I understand you've been consulted about. What did you think of the trailer? What are your impressions? Richard Rhodes 0:01:22They've really done a good job of things like the Trinity test device, which was the sphere covered with cables of various kinds. I had watched Peaky Blinders, where the actor who's playing Oppenheimer also appeared, and he looked so much like Oppenheimer to start with. Oppenheimer was about six feet tall, he was rail thin, not simply in terms of weight, but in terms of structure. Someone said he could sit in a children's high chair comfortably. But he never weighed more than about 140 pounds and that quality is there in the actor. So who knows? It all depends on how the director decided to tell the story. There are so many aspects of the story that you could never possibly squeeze them into one 2-hour movie. I think that we're waiting for the multi-part series that would really tell a lot more of the story, if not the whole story. But it looks exciting. We'll see. There have been some terrible depictions of Oppenheimer, there've been some terrible depictions of the bomb program. And maybe they'll get this one right. Dwarkesh Patel 0:02:42Yeah, hopefully. It is always great when you get an actor who resembles their role so well. For example, Bryan Cranston who played LBJ, and they have the same physical characteristics of the beady eyes, the big ears. Since we're talking about Oppenheimer, I had one question about him. I understand that there's evidence that's come out that he wasn't directly a communist spy. But is there any possibility that he was leaking information to the Soviets or in some way helping the Soviet program? He was a communist sympathizer, right? Richard Rhodes 0:03:15He had been during the 1930s. But less for the theory than for the practical business of helping Jews escape from Nazi Germany. One of the loves of his life, Jean Tatlock, was also busy working on extracting Jews from Europe during the 30. She was a member of the Communist Party and she, I think, encouraged him to come to meetings. But I don't think there's any possibility whatsoever that he shared information. In fact, he said he read Marx on a train trip between Berkeley and Washington one time and thought it was a bunch of hooey, just ridiculous. He was a very smart man, and he read the book with an eye to its logic, and he didn't think there was much there. He really didn't know anything about human beings and their struggles. He was born into considerable wealth. There were impressionist paintings all over his family apartments in New York City. His father had made a great deal of money cornering the markets on uniform linings for military uniforms during and before the First World War so there was a lot of wealth. I think his income during the war years and before was somewhere around $100,000 a month. And that's a lot of money in the 1930s. So he just lived in his head for most of his early years until he got to Berkeley and discovered that prime students of his were living on cans of god-awful cat food, because they couldn't afford anything else. And once he understood that there was great suffering in the world, he jumped in on it, as he always did when he became interested in something. So all of those things come together. His brother Frank was a member of the party, as was Frank's wife. I think the whole question of Oppenheimer lying to the security people during the Second World War about who approached him and who was trying to get him to sign on to some espionage was primarily an effort to cover up his brother's involvement. Not that his brothers gave away any secrets, I don't think they did. But if the army's security had really understood Frank Oppenheimer's involvement, he probably would have been shipped off to the Aleutians or some other distant place for the duration of the war. And Oppenheimer quite correctly wanted Frank around. He was someone he trusted.(0:06:22) - Was the bomb inevitable?Dwarkesh Patel 0:06:22Let's start talking about The Making of the Bomb. One question I have is — if World War II doesn't happen, is there any possibility that the bomb just never gets developed? Nobody bothers.Richard Rhodes 0:06:34That's really a good question and I've wondered over the years. But the more I look at the sequence of events, the more I think it would have been essentially inevitable, though perhaps not such an accelerated program. The bomb was pushed so hard during the Second World War because we thought the Germans had already started working on one. Nuclear fission had been discovered in Nazi Germany, in Berlin, in 1938, nine months before the beginning of the Second World War in Europe. Technological surveillance was not available during the war. The only way you could find out something was to send in a spy or have a mole or something human. And we didn't have that. So we didn't know where the Germans were, but we knew that the basic physics reaction that could lead to a bomb had been discovered there a year or more before anybody else in the West got started thinking about it. There was that most of all to push the urgency. In your hypothetical there would not have been that urgency. However, as soon as good physicists thought about the reaction that leads to nuclear fission — where a slow room temperature neutron, very little energy, bumps into the nucleus of a uranium-235 atom it would lead to a massive response. Isidore Rabi, one of the great physicists of this era, said it would have been like the moon struck the earth. The reaction was, as physicists say, fiercely exothermic. It puts out a lot more energy than you have to use to get it started. Once they did the numbers on that, and once they figured out how much uranium you would need to have in one place to make a bomb or to make fission get going, and once they were sure that there would be a chain reaction, meaning a couple of neutrons would come out of the reaction from one atom, and those two or three would go on and bump into other Uranium atoms, which would then fission them, and you'd get a geometric exponential. You'd get 1, 2, 4, 8, 16, 32, and off of there. For most of our bombs today the initial fission, in 80 generations, leads to a city-busting explosion. And then they had to figure out how much material they would need, and that's something the Germans never really figured out, fortunately for the rest of us. They were still working on the idea that somehow a reactor would be what you would build. When Niels Bohr, the great Danish physicist, escaped from Denmark in 1943 and came to England and then United States, he brought with him a rough sketch that Werner Heisenberg, the leading scientist in the German program, had handed him in the course of trying to find out what Bohr knew about what America was doing. And he showed it to the guys at Los Alamos and Hans Bethe, one of the great Nobel laureate physicists in the group, said — “Are the Germans trying to throw a reactor down on us?” You can make a reactor blow up, we saw that at Chernobyl, but it's not a nuclear explosion on the scale that we're talking about with the bomb. So when a couple of these emigres Jewish physicists from Nazi Germany were whiling away their time in England after they escaped, because they were still technically enemy aliens and therefore could not be introduced to top secret discussions, one of them asked the other — “How much would we need of pure uranium-235, this rare isotope of uranium that chain reacts? How much would we need to make a bomb?” And they did the numbers and they came up with one pound, which was startling to them. Of course, it is more than that. It's about 125 pounds, but that's just a softball. That's not that much material. And then they did the numbers about what it would cost to build a factory to pull this one rare isotope of uranium out of the natural metal, which has several isotopes mixed together. And they figured it wouldn't cost more than it would cost to build a battleship, which is not that much money for a country at war. Certainly the British had plenty of battleships at that point in time. So they put all this together and they wrote a report which they handed through their superior physicists at Manchester University where they were based, who quickly realized how important this was. The United States lagged behind because we were not yet at war, but the British were. London was being bombed in the blitz. So they saw the urgency, first of all, of eating Germany to the punch, second of all of the possibility of building a bomb. In this report, these two scientists wrote that no physical structure came to their minds which could offer protection against a bomb of such ferocious explosive power. This report was from 1940 long before the Manhattan Project even got started. They said in this report, the only way we could think of to protect you against a bomb would be to have a bomb of similar destructive force that could be threatened for use if the other side attacked you. That's deterrence. That's a concept that was developed even before the war began in the United States. You put all those pieces together and you have a situation where you have to build a bomb because whoever builds the first bomb theoretically could prevent you from building more or prevent another country from building any and could dominate the world. And the notion of Adolf Hitler dominating the world, the Third Reich with nuclear weapons, was horrifying. Put all that together and the answer is every country that had the technological infrastructure to even remotely have the possibility of building everything you'd have to build to get the material for a bomb started work on thinking about it as soon as nuclear fusion was announced to the world. France, the Soviet Union, Great Britain, the United States, even Japan. So I think the bomb would have been developed but maybe not so quickly. Dwarkesh Patel 0:14:10In the book you talk that for some reason the Germans thought that the critical mass was something like 10 tons, they had done some miscalculation.Richard Rhodes 0:14:18A reactor. Dwarkesh Patel 0:14:19You also have some interesting stories in the book about how different countries found out the Americans were working on the bomb. For example, the Russians saw that all the top physicists, chemists, and metallurgists were no longer publishing. They had just gone offline and so they figured that something must be going on. I'm not sure if you're aware that while the subject of the Making of the Atomic Bomb in and of itself is incredibly fascinating, this book has become a cult classic in AI. Are you familiar with this? Richard Rhodes 0:14:52No. Dwarkesh Patel 0:14:53The people who are working on AI right now are huge fans of yours. They're the ones who initially recommended the book to me because the way they see the progress in the field reminded them of this book. Because you start off with these initial scientific hints. With deep learning, for example, here's something that can teach itself any function is similar to Szilárd noticing the nuclear chain reaction. In AI there's these scaling laws that say that if you make the model this much bigger, it gets much better at reasoning, at predicting text, and so on. And then you can extrapolate this curve. And you can see we get two more orders of magnitude, and we get to something that looks like human level intelligence. Anyway, a lot of the people who are working in AI have become huge fans of your book because of this reason. They see a lot of analogies in the next few years. They must be at page 400 in their minds of where the Manhattan Project was.Richard Rhodes 0:15:55We must later on talk about unintended consequences. I find the subject absolutely fascinating. I think my next book might be called Unintended Consequences. Dwarkesh Patel 0:16:10You mentioned that a big reason why many of the scientists wanted to work on the bomb, especially the Jewish emigres, was because they're worried about Hitler getting it first. As you mentioned at some point, 1943, 1944, it was becoming obvious that Hitler, the Nazis were not close to the bomb. And I believe that almost none of the scientists quit after they found out that the Nazis weren't close. So why didn't more of them say — “Oh, I guess we were wrong. The Nazis aren't going to get it. We don't need to be working on it.”?Richard Rhodes 0:16:45There was only one who did that, Joseph Rotblat. In May of 1945 when he heard that Germany had been defeated, he packed up and left. General Groves, the imperious Army Corps of Engineers General who ran the entire Manhattan Project, was really upset. He was afraid he'd spill the beans. So he threatened to have him arrested and put in jail. But Rotblat was quite determined not to stay any longer. He was not interested in building bombs to aggrandize the national power of the United States of America, which is perfectly understandable. But why was no one else? Let me tell it in terms of Victor Weisskopf. He was an Austrian theoretical physicist, who, like the others, escaped when the Nazis took over Germany and then Austria and ended up at Los Alamos. Weisskopf wrote later — “There we were in Los Alamos in the midst of the darkest part of our science.” They were working on a weapon of mass destruction, that's pretty dark. He said “Before it had almost seemed like a spiritual quest.” And it's really interesting how different physics was considered before and after the Second World War. Before the war, one of the physicists in America named Louis Alvarez told me when he got his PhD in physics at Berkeley in 1937 and went to cocktail parties, people would ask, “What's your degree in?” He would tell them “Chemistry.” I said, “Louis, why?” He said, “because I don't really have to explain what physics was.” That's how little known this kind of science was at that time. There were only about 1,000 physicists in the whole world in 1900. By the mid-30s, there were a lot more, of course. There'd been a lot of nuclear physics and other kinds of physics done by them. But it was still arcane. And they didn't feel as if they were doing anything mean or dirty or warlike at all. They were just doing pure science. Then nuclear fission came along. It was publicized worldwide. People who've been born since after the Second World War don't realize that it was not a secret at first. The news was published first in a German chemistry journal, Die Naturwissenschaften, and then in the British journal Nature and then in American journals. And there were headlines in the New York Times, the Los Angeles Times, the Chicago Tribune, and all over the world. People had been reading about and thinking about how to get energy out of the atomic nucleus for a long time. It was clear there was a lot there. All you had to do was get a piece of radium and see that it glowed in the dark. This chunk of material just sat there, you didn't plug it into a wall. And if you held it in your hand, it would burn you. So where did that energy come from? The physicists realized it all came from the nucleus of the atom, which is a very small part of the whole thing. The nucleus is 1/100,000th the diameter of the whole atom. Someone in England described it as about the size of a fly in a cathedral. All of the energy that's involved in chemical reactions, comes from the electron cloud that's around the nucleus. But  it was clear that the nucleus was the center of powerful forces. But the question was, how do you get them out? The only way that the nucleus had been studied up to 1938 was by bombarding it with protons, which have the same electric charge as the nucleus, positive charge, which means they were repelled by it. So you had to accelerate them to high speeds with various versions of the big machines that we've all become aware of since then. The cyclotron most obviously built in the 30s, but there were others as well. And even then, at best, you could chip a little piece off. You could change an atom one step up or one step down the periodic table. This was the classic transmutation of medieval alchemy sure but it wasn't much, you didn't get much out. So everyone came to think of the nucleus of the atom like a little rock that you really had to hammer hard to get anything to happen with it because it was so small and dense. That's why nuclear fission, with this slow neutron drifting and then the whole thing just goes bang, was so startling to everybody. So startling that when it happened, most of the physicists who would later work on the bomb and others as well, realized that they had missed the reaction that was something they could have staged on a lab bench with the equipment on the shelf. Didn't have to invent anything new. And Louis Alvarez again, this physicist at Berkeley, he said — “I was getting my hair cut. When I read the newspaper, I pulled off the robe and half with my hair cut, ran to my lab, pulled some equipment off the shelf, set it up and there it was.” So he said, “I discovered nuclear fission, but it was two days too late.” And that happened all over. People were just hitting themselves on the head and saying, well, Niels Bohr said, “What fools we've all been.” So this is a good example of how in science, if your model you're working with is wrong it doesn't lead you down the right path. There was only one physicist who really was thinking the right way about the uranium atom and that was Niels Bohr. He wondered, sometime during the 30s, why uranium was the last natural element in the periodic table? What is different about the others that would come later? He visualized the nucleus as a liquid drop. I always like to visualize it as a water-filled balloon. It's wobbly, it's not very stable. The protons in the nucleus are held together by something called the strong force, but they still have the repellent positive electric charge that's trying to push them apart when you get enough of them into a nucleus. It's almost a standoff between the strong force and all the electrical charge. So it is like a wobbly balloon of water. And then you see why a neutron just falling into the nucleus would make it wobble around even more and in one of its configurations, it might take a dumbbell shape. And then you'd have basically two charged atoms just barely connected, trying to push each other apart. And often enough, they went the whole way. When they did that, these two new elements, half the weight of uranium, way down the periodic table, would reconfigure themselves into two separate nuclei. And in doing so, they would release some energy. And that was the energy that came out of the reaction and there was a lot of energy. So Bohr thought about the model in the right way. The chemists who actually discovered nuclear fusion didn't know what they were gonna get. They were just bombarding a solution of uranium nitrate with neutrons thinking, well, maybe we can make a new element, maybe a first man-made element will come out of our work. So when they analyzed the solution after they bombarded it, they found elements halfway down the periodic table. They shouldn't have been there. And they were totally baffled. What is this doing here? Do we contaminate our solution? No. They had been working with a physicist named Lisa Meitner who was a theoretical physicist, an Austrian Jew. She had gotten out of Nazi Germany not long before. But they were still in correspondence with her. So they wrote her a letter. I held that letter in my hand when I visited Berlin and I was in tears. You don't hold history of that scale in your hands very often. And it said in German — “We found this strange reaction in our solution. What are these elements doing there that don't belong there?” And she went for a walk in a little village in Western Sweden with her nephew, Otto Frisch, who was also a nuclear physicist. And they thought about it for a while and they remembered Bohr's model, the wobbly water-filled balloon. And they suddenly saw what could happen. And that's where the news came from, the physics news as opposed to the chemistry news from the guys in Germany that was published in all the Western journals and all the newspapers. And everybody had been talking about, for years, what you could do if you had that kind of energy. A glass of this material would drive the Queen Mary back and forth from New York to London 20 times and so forth, your automobile could run for months. People were thinking about what would be possible if you had that much available energy. And of course, people had thought about reactors. Robert Oppenheimer was a professor at Berkeley and within a week of the news reaching Berkeley, one of his students told me that he had a drawing on the blackboard, a rather bad drawing of both a reactor and a bomb. So again, because the energy was so great, the physics was pretty obvious. Whether it would actually happen depended on some other things like could you make it chain react? But fundamentally, the idea was all there at the very beginning and everybody jumped on it. Dwarkesh Patel 0:27:54The book is actually the best history of World War II I've ever read. It's about the atomic bomb, but it's interspersed with the events that are happening in World War II, which motivate the creation of the bomb or the release of it, why it had to be dropped on Japan given the Japanese response. The first third is about the scientific roots of the physics and it's also the best book I've read about the history of science in the early 20th century and the organization of it. There's some really interesting stuff in there. For example, there was a passage where you talk about how there's a real master apprentice model in early science where if you wanted to learn to do this kind of experimentation, you will go to Amsterdam where the master of it is residing. It's much more individual focused. Richard Rhodes 0:28:58Yeah, the whole European model of graduate study, which is basically the wandering scholar. You could go wherever you wanted to and sign up with whoever was willing to have you sign up. (0:29:10) - Firebombing vs nuclear vs hydrogen bombsDwarkesh Patel 0:29:10But the question I wanted to ask regarding the history you made of World War II in general is — there's one way you can think about the atom bomb which is that it is completely different from any sort of weaponry that has been developed before it. Another way you can think of it is there's a spectrum where on one end you have the thermonuclear bomb, in the middle you have the atom bomb, and on this end you have the firebombing of cities like Hamburg and Dresden and Tokyo. Do you think of these as completely different categories or does it seem like an escalating gradient to you? Richard Rhodes 0:29:47I think until you get to the hydrogen bomb, it's really an escalating gradient. The hydrogen bomb can be made arbitrarily large. The biggest one ever tested was 56 megatons of TNT equivalent. The Soviet tested that. That had a fireball more than five miles in diameter, just the fireball. So that's really an order of magnitude change. But the other one's no and in fact, I think one of the real problems, this has not been much discussed and it should be, when American officials went to Hiroshima and Nagasaki after the war, one of them said later — “I got on a plane in Tokyo. We flew down the long green archipelago of the Japanese home island. When I left Tokyo, it was all gray broken roof tiles from the fire bombing and the other bombings. And then all this greenery. And then when we flew over Hiroshima, it was just gray broken roof tiles again.” So the scale of the bombing with one bomb, in the case of Hiroshima, was not that different from the scale of the fire bombings that had preceded it with tens of thousands of bombs. The difference was it was just one plane. In fact, the people in Hiroshima didn't even bother to go into their bomb shelters because one plane had always just been a weather plane. Coming over to check the weather before the bombers took off. So they didn't see any reason to hide or protect themselves, which was one of the reasons so many people were killed. The guys at Los Alamos had planned on the Japanese being in their bomb shelters. They did everything they could think of to make the bomb as much like ordinary bombing as they could. And for example, it was exploded high enough above ground, roughly 1,800 yards, so that the fireball that would form from this really very small nuclear weapon — by modern standards — 15 kilotons of TNT equivalent, wouldn't touch the ground and stir up dirt and irradiate it and cause massive radioactive fallout. It never did that. They weren't sure there would be any fallout. They thought the plutonium and the bomb over Nagasaki now would just kind of turn into a gas and blow away. That's not exactly what happened. But people don't seem to realize, and it's never been emphasized enough, these first bombs, like all nuclear weapons, were firebombs. Their job was to start mass fires, just exactly like all the six-pound incendiaries that had been destroying every major city in Japan by then. Every major city above 50,000 population had already been burned out. The only reason Hiroshima and Nagasaki were around to be atomic bombed is because they'd been set aside from the target list, because General Groves wanted to know what the damage effects would be. The bomb that was tested in the desert didn't tell you anything. It killed a lot of rabbits, knocked down a lot of cactus, melted some sand, but you couldn't see its effect on buildings and on people. So the bomb was deliberately intended to be as much not like poison gas, for example, because we didn't want the reputation for being like people in the war in Europe during the First World War, where people were killing each other with horrible gasses. We just wanted people to think this was another bombing. So in that sense, it was. Of course, there was radioactivity. And of course, some people were killed by it. But they calculated that the people who would be killed by the irradiation, the neutron radiation from the original fireball, would be close enough to the epicenter of the explosion that they would be killed by the blast or the flash of light, which was 10,000 degrees. The world's worst sunburn. You've seen stories of people walking around with their skin hanging off their arms. I've had sunburns almost that bad, but not over my whole body, obviously, where the skin actually peeled blisters and peels off. That was a sunburn from a 10,000 degree artificial sun. Dwarkesh Patel 0:34:29So that's not the heat, that's just the light? Richard Rhodes 0:34:32Radiant light, radiant heat. 10,000 degrees. But the blast itself only extended out a certain distance, it was fire. And all the nuclear weapons that have ever been designed are basically firebombs. That's important because the military in the United States after the war was not able to figure out how to calculate the effects of this weapon in a reliable way that matched their previous experience. They would only calculate the blast effects of a nuclear weapon when they figured their targets. That's why we had what came to be called overkill. We wanted redundancy, of course, but 60 nuclear weapons on Moscow was way beyond what would be necessary to destroy even that big a city because they were only calculating the blast. But in fact, if you exploded a 300 kiloton nuclear warhead over the Pentagon at 3,000 feet, it would blast all the way out to the capital, which isn't all that far. But if you counted the fire, it would start a mass-fire and then it would reach all the way out to the Beltway and burn everything between the epicenter of the weapon and the Beltway. All organic matter would be totally burned out, leaving nothing but mineral matter, basically. Dwarkesh Patel 0:36:08I want to emphasize two things you said because they really hit me in reading the book and I'm not sure if the audience has fully integrated them. The first is, in the book, the military planners and Groves, they talk about needing to use the bomb sooner rather than later, because they were running out of cities in Japan where there are enough buildings left that it would be worth bombing in the first place, which is insane. An entire country is almost already destroyed from fire bombing alone. And the second thing about the category difference between thermonuclear and atomic bombs. Daniel Ellsberg, the nuclear planner who wrote the Doomsday machine, he talks about, people don't understand that the atom bomb that resulted in the pictures we see of Nagasaki and Hiroshima, that is simply the detonator of a modern nuclear bomb, which is an insane thing to think about. So for example, 10 and 15 kilotons is the Hiroshima Nagasaki and the Tsar Bomba, which was 50 megatons. So more than 1,000 times as much. And that wasn't even as big as they could make it. They kept the uranium tamper off, because they didn't want to destroy all of Siberia. So you could get more than 10,000 times as powerful. Richard Rhodes 0:37:31When Edward Teller, co-inventor of the hydrogen bomb and one of the dark forces in the story, was consulting with our military, just for his own sake, he sat down and calculated, how big could you make a hydrogen bomb? He came up with 1,000 megatons. And then he looked at the effects. 1,000 megatons would be a fireball 10 miles in diameter. And the atmosphere is only 10 miles deep. He figured that it would just be a waste of energy, because it would all blow out into space. Some of it would go laterally, of course, but most of it would just go out into space. So a bomb more than 100 megatons would just be totally a waste of time. Of course, a 100 megatons bomb is also a total waste, because there's no target on Earth big enough to justify that from a military point of view. Robert Oppenheimer, when he had his security clearance questioned and then lifted when he was being punished for having resisted the development of the hydrogen bomb, was asked by the interrogator at this security hearing — “Well, Dr. Oppenheimer, if you'd had a hydrogen bomb for Hiroshima, wouldn't you have used it?” And Oppenheimer said, “No.” The interrogator asked, “Why is that?” He said because the target was too small. I hope that scene is in the film, I'm sure it will be. So after the war, when our bomb planners and some of our scientists went into Hiroshima and Nagasaki, just about as soon as the surrender was signed, what they were interested in was the scale of destruction, of course. And those two cities didn't look that different from the other cities that had been firebombed with small incendiaries and ordinary high explosives. They went home to Washington, the policy makers, with the thought that — “Oh, these bombs are not so destructive after all.” They had been touted as city busters, basically, and they weren't. They didn't completely burn out cities. They were not certainly more destructive than the firebombing campaign, when everything of more than 50,000 population had already been destroyed. That, in turn, influenced the judgment about what we needed to do vis-a-vis the Soviet Union when the Soviets got the bomb in 1949. There was a general sense that, when you could fight a war with nuclear weapons, deterrence or not, you would need quite a few of them to do it right. And the Air Force, once it realized that it could aggrandize its own share of the federal budget by cornering the market and delivering nuclear weapons, very quickly decided that they would only look at the blast effect and not the fire effect. It's like tying one hand behind your back. Most of it was a fire effect. So that's where they came up with numbers like we need 60 of these to take out Moscow. And what the Air Force figured out by the late 1940s is that the more targets, the more bombs. The more bombs, the more planes. The more planes, the biggest share of the budget. So by the mid 1950s, the Air Force commanded 47% of the federal defense budget. And the other branches of services, which had not gone nuclear by then, woke up and said, we'd better find some use for these weapons in our branches of service. So the Army discovered that it needed nuclear weapons, tactical weapons for field use, fired out of cannons. There was even one that was fired out of a shoulder mounted rifle. There was a satchel charge that two men could carry, weighed about 150 pounds, that could be used to dig a ditch so that Soviet tanks couldn't cross into Germany. And of course the Navy by then had been working hard with General Rickover on building a nuclear submarine that could carry ballistic missiles underwater in total security. No way anybody could trace those submarines once they were quiet enough. And a nuclear reactor is very quiet. It just sits there with neutrons running around, making heat. So the other services jumped in and this famous triad, we must have these three different kinds of nuclear weapons, baloney. We would be perfectly safe if we only had our nuclear submarines. And only one or two of those. One nuclear submarine can take out all of Europe or all of the Soviet Union.Dwarkesh Patel 0:42:50Because it has multiple nukes on it? Richard Rhodes 0:42:53Because they have 16 intercontinental ballistic missiles with MIRV warheads, at least three per missile. Dwarkesh Patel 0:43:02Wow. I had a former guest, Richard Hanania, who has a book about foreign policy where he points out that our model of thinking about why countries do the things they do, especially in foreign affairs, is wrong because we think of them as individual rational actors, when in fact it's these competing factions within the government. And in fact, you see this especially in the case of Japan in World War II, there was a great book of Japan leading up to World War II, where they talk about how a branch of the Japanese military, I forget which, needed more oil to continue their campaign in Manchuria so they forced these other branches to escalate. But it's so interesting that the reason we have so many nukes is that the different branches are competing for funding. Richard Rhodes 0:43:50Douhet, the theorist of air power, had been in the trenches in the First World War. Somebody (John Masefield) called the trenches of the First World War, the long grave already dug, because millions of men were killed and the trenches never moved, a foot this way, a foot that way, all this horror. And Douhet came up with the idea that if you could fly over the battlefield to the homeland of the enemy and destroy his capacity to make war, then the people of that country, he theorized, would rise up in rebellion and throw out their leaders and sue for peace. And this became the dream of all the Air Forces of the world, but particularly ours. Until around 1943, it was called the US Army Air Force. The dream of every officer in the Air Force was to get out from under the Army, not just be something that delivers ground support or air support to the Army as it advances, but a power that could actually win wars. And the missing piece had always been the scale of the weaponry they carried. So when the bomb came along, you can see why Curtis LeMay, who ran the strategic air command during the prime years of that force, was pushing for bigger and bigger bombs. Because if a plane got shot down, but the one behind it had a hydrogen bomb, then it would be just almost as effective as the two planes together. So they wanted big bombs. And they went after Oppenheimer because he thought that was a terrible way to go, that there was really no military use for these huge weapons. Furthermore, the United States had more cities than Russia did, than the Soviet Union did. And we were making ourselves a better target by introducing a weapon that could destroy a whole state. I used to live in Connecticut and I saw a map that showed the air pollution that blew up from New York City to Boston. And I thought, well, now if that was fallout, we'd be dead up here in green, lovely Connecticut. That was the scale that it was going to be with these big new weapons. So on the one hand, you had some of the important leaders in the government thinking that these weapons were not the war-winning weapons that the Air Force wanted them and realized they could be. And on the other hand, you had the Air Force cornering the market on nuclear solutions to battles. All because some guy in a trench in World War I was sufficiently horrified and sufficiently theoretical about what was possible with air power. Remember, they were still flying biplanes. When H.G. Wells wrote his novel, The World Set Free in 1913, predicting an atomic war that would lead to world government, he had Air Forces delivering atomic bombs, but he forgot to update his planes. The guys in the back seat, the bombardiers, were sitting in a biplane, open cockpit. And when the pilots had dropped the bomb, they would reach down and pick up H.G. Wells' idea of an atomic bomb and throw it over the side. Which is kind of what was happening in Washington after the war. And it led us to a terribly misleading and unfortunate perspective on how many weapons we needed, which in turn fermented the arms race with the Soviets and just chased off. In the Soviet Union, they had a practical perspective on factories. Every factory was supposed to produce 120% of its target every year. That was considered good Soviet realism. And they did that with their nuclear war weapons. So by the height of the Cold War, they had 75,000 nuclear weapons, and nobody had heard yet of nuclear winter. So if both sides had set off this string of mass traps that we had in our arsenals, it would have been the end of the human world without question. Dwarkesh Patel 0:48:27It raises an interesting question, if the military planners thought that the conventional nuclear weapon was like the fire bombing, would it have been the case that if there wasn't a thermonuclear weapon, that there actually would have been a nuclear war by now because people wouldn't have been thinking of it as this hard red line? Richard Rhodes 0:48:47I don't think so because we're talking about one bomb versus 400, and one plane versus 400 planes and thousands of bombs. That scale was clear. Deterrence was the more important business. Everyone seemed to understand even the spies that the Soviets had connected up to were wholesaling information back to the Soviet Union. There's this comic moment when Truman is sitting with Joseph Stalin at Potsdam, and he tells Stalin, we have a powerful new weapon. And that's as much as he's ready to say about it. And Stalin licks at him and says, “Good, I hope you put it to good use with the Japanese.” Stalin knows exactly what he's talking about. He's seen the design of the fat man type Nagasaki plutonium bomb. He has held it in his hands because they had spies all over the place. (0:49:44) - Stalin & the Soviet programDwarkesh Patel 0:49:44How much longer would it have taken the Soviets to develop the bomb if they didn't have any spies? Richard Rhodes 0:49:49Probably not any longer. Dwarkesh Patel 0:49:51Really? Richard Rhodes 0:49:51When the Soviet Union collapsed in the winter of ‘92, I ran over there as quickly as I could get over there. In this limbo between forming a new kind of government and some of the countries pulling out and becoming independent and so forth, their nuclear scientists, the ones who'd worked on their bombs were free to talk. And I found that out through Yelena Bonner, Andrei Sakharov's widow, who was connected to people I knew. And she said, yeah, come on over. Her secretary, Sasha, who was a geologist about 35 years old became my guide around the country. We went to various apartments. They were retired guys from the bomb program and were living on, as far as I could tell, sac-and-potatoes and some salt. They had government pensions and the money was worth a salt, all of a sudden. I was buying photographs from them, partly because I needed the photographs and partly because 20 bucks was two months' income at that point. So it was easy for me and it helped them. They had first class physicists in the Soviet Union, they do in Russian today. They told me that by 1947, they had a design for a bomb that they said was half the weight and twice the yield of the Fat Man bomb. The Fat Man bomb was the plutonium implosion, right? And it weighed about 9,000 pounds. They had a much smaller and much more deliverable bomb with a yield of about 44 kilotons. Dwarkesh Patel 0:51:41Why was Soviet physics so good?Richard Rhodes 0:51:49The Russian mind? I don't know. They learned all their technology from the French in the 19th century, which is why there's so many French words in Russian. So they got good teachers, the French are superb technicians, they aren't so good at building things, but they're very good at designing things. There's something about Russia, I don't know if it's the language or the education. They do have good education, they did. But I remember asking them when they were working, I said — On the hydrogen bomb, you didn't have any computers yet. We only had really early primitive computers to do the complicated calculations of the hydrodynamics of that explosion. I said, “What did you do?” They said, “Oh, we just used nuclear. We just used theoretical physics.” Which is what we did at Los Alamos. We had guys come in who really knew their math and they would sit there and work it out by hand. And women with old Marchant calculators running numbers. So basically they were just good scientists and they had this new design. Kurchatov who ran the program took Lavrentiy Beria, who ran the NKVD who was put in charge of the program and said — “Look, we can build you a better bomb. You really wanna waste the time to make that much more uranium and plutonium?” And Beria said, “Comrade, I want the American bomb. Give me the American bomb or you and all your families will be camp dust.” I talked to one of the leading scientists in the group and he said, we valued our lives, we valued our families. So we gave them a copy of the plutonium implosion bomb. Dwarkesh Patel 0:53:37Now that you explain this, when the Soviet Union fell, why didn't North Korea, Iran or another country, send a few people to the fallen Soviet Union to recruit a few of the scientists to start their own program? Or buy off their stockpiles or something. Or did they?Richard Rhodes 0:53:59There was some effort by countries in the Middle East to get all the enriched uranium, which they wouldn't sell them. These were responsible scientists. They told me — we worked on the bomb because you had it and we didn't want there to be a monopoly on the part of any country in the world. So patriotically, even though Stalin was in charge of our country, he was a monster. We felt that it was our responsibility to work on these things, even Sakharov. There was a great rush at the end of the Second World War to get hold of German scientists. And about an equal number were grabbed by the Soviets. All of the leading German scientists, like Heisenberg and Hans and others, went west as fast as they could. They didn't want to be captured by the Soviets. But there were some who were. And they helped them work. People have the idea that Los Alamos was where the bomb happened. And it's true that at Los Alamos, we had the team that designed, developed, and built the first actual weapons. But the truth is, the important material for weapons is the uranium or plutonium. One of the scientists in the Manhattan Project told me years later, you can make a pretty high-level nuclear explosion just by taking two subcritical pieces of uranium, putting one on the floor and dropping the other by hand from a height of about six feet. If that's true, then all this business about secret designs and so forth is hogwash. What you really need for a weapon is the critical mass of highly enriched uranium, 90% of uranium-235. If you've got that, there are lots of different ways to make the bomb. We had two totally different ways that we used. The gun on the one hand for uranium, and then because plutonium was so reactive that if you fired up the barrel of a cannon at 3,000 feet per second, it would still melt down before the two pieces made it up. So for that reason, they had to invent an entirely new technology, which was an amazing piece of work. From the Soviet point of view, and I think this is something people don't know either, but it puts the Russian experience into a better context. All the way back in the 30s, since the beginning of the Soviet Union after the First World War, they had been sending over espionage agents connected up to Americans who were willing to work for them to collect industrial technology. They didn't have it when they began their country. It was very much an agricultural country. And in that regard, people still talk about all those damn spies stealing our secrets, we did the same thing with the British back in colonial days. We didn't know how to make a canal that wouldn't drain out through the soil. The British had a certain kind of clay that they would line their canals with, and there were canals all over England, even in the 18th century, that were impervious to the flow of water. And we brought a British engineer at great expense to teach us how to make the lining for the canals that opened up the Middle West and then the West. So they were doing the same thing. And one of those spies was a guy named Harry Gold, who was working all the time for them. He gave them some of the basic technology of Kodak filmmaking, for example. Harry Gold was the connection between David Greenglass and one of the American spies at Los Alamos and the Soviet Union. So it was not different. The model was — never give us something that someone dreamed of that hasn't been tested and you know works. So it would actually be blueprints for factories, not just a patent. And therefore when Beria after the war said, give us the bomb, he meant give me the American bomb because we know that works. I don't trust you guys. Who knows what you'll do. You're probably too stupid anyway. He was that kind of man. So for all of those reasons, they built the second bomb they tested was twice the yield and half the way to the first bomb. In other words, it was their new design. And so it was ours because the technology was something that we knew during the war, but it was too theoretical still to use. You just had to put the core and have a little air gap between the core and the explosives so that the blast wave would have a chance to accelerate through an open gap. And Alvarez couldn't tell me what it was but he said, you can get a lot more destructive force with a hammer if you hit something with it, rather than if you put the head on the hammer and push. And it took me several years before I figured out what he meant. I finally understood he was talking about what's called levitation.Dwarkesh Patel 0:59:41On the topic that the major difficulty in developing a bomb is either the refinement of uranium into U-235 or its transmutation into plutonium, I was actually talking to a physicist in preparation for this conversation. He explained the same thing that if you get two subcritical masses of uranium together, you wouldn't have the full bomb because it would start to tear itself apart without the tamper, but you would still have more than one megaton.Richard Rhodes 1:00:12It would be a few kilotons. Alvarez's model would be a few kilotons, but that's a lot. Dwarkesh Patel 1:00:20Yeah, sorry I meant kiloton. He claimed that one of the reasons why we talk so much about Los Alamos is that at the time the government didn't want other countries to know that if you refine uranium, you've got it. So they were like, oh, we did all this fancy physics work in Los Alamos that you're not gonna get to, so don't even worry about it. I don't know what you make of that theory. That basically it was sort of a way to convince people that Los Alamos was important. Richard Rhodes 1:00:49I think all the physics had been checked out by a lot of different countries by then. It was pretty clear to everybody what you needed to do to get to a bomb. That there was a fast fusion reaction, not a slow fusion reaction, like a reactor. They'd worked that out. So I don't think that's really the problem. But to this day, no one ever talks about the fact that the real problem isn't the design of the weapon. You could make one with wooden boxes if you wanted to. The problem is getting the material. And that's good because it's damned hard to make that stuff. And it's something you can protect. Dwarkesh Patel 1:01:30We also have gotten very lucky, if lucky is the word you want to use. I think you mentioned this in the book at some point, but the laws of physics could have been such that unrefined uranium ore was enough to build a nuclear weapon, right? In some sense, we got lucky that it takes a nation-state level actor to really refine and produce the raw substance. Richard Rhodes 1:01:56Yeah, I was thinking about that this morning on the way over. And all the uranium in the world would already have destroyed itself. Most people have never heard of the living reactors that developed on their own in a bed of uranium ore in Africa about two billion years ago, right? When there was more U-235 in a mass of uranium ore than there is today, because it decays like all radioactive elements. And the French discovered it when they were mining the ore and found this bed that had a totally different set of nuclear characteristics. They were like, what happened? But there were natural reactors in Gabon once upon a time. And they started up because some water, a moderator to make the neutrons slow down, washed its way down through a bed of much more highly enriched uranium ore than we still have today. Maybe 5-10% instead of 3.5 or 1.5, whatever it is now. And they ran for about 100,000 years and then shut themselves down because they had accumulated enough fusion products that the U-235 had been used up. Interestingly, this material never migrated out of the bed of ore. People today who are anti-nuclear say, well, what are we gonna do about the waste? Where are we gonna put all that waste? It's silly. Dwarkesh Patel 1:03:35Shove it in a hole. Richard Rhodes 1:03:36Yeah, basically. That's exactly what we're planning to do. Holes that are deep enough and in beds of material that will hold them long enough for everything to decay back to the original ore. It's not a big problem except politically because nobody wants it in their backyard.Dwarkesh Patel 1:03:53On the topic of the Soviets, one question I had while reading the book was — we negotiated with Stalin at Yalta and we surrendered a large part of Eastern Europe to him under his sphere of influence. And obviously we saw 50 years of immiseration there as a result. Given the fact that only we had the bomb, would it have been possible that we could have just knocked out the Soviet Union or at least prevented so much of the world from succumbing to communism in the aftermath of World War II? Is that a possibility? Richard Rhodes 1:04:30When we say we had the bomb, we had a few partly assembled handmade bombs. It took almost as long to assemble one as the battery life of the batteries that would drive the original charge that would set off the explosion. It was a big bluff. You know, when they closed Berlin in 1948 and we had to supply Berlin by air with coal and food for a whole winter, we moved some B-29s to England. The B-29 being the bomber that had carried the bombs. They were not outfitted for nuclear weapons. They didn't have the same kind of bomb-based structure. The weapons that were dropped in Japan had a single hook that held the entire bomb. So when the bay opened and the hook was released, the thing dropped. And that's very different from dropping whole rows of small bombs that you've seen in the photographs and the film footage. So it was a big bluff on our part. We took some time after the war inevitably to pull everything together. Here was a brand new technology. Here was a brand new weapon. Who was gonna be in charge of it? The military wanted control, Truman wasn't about to give the military control. He'd been an artillery officer in the First World War. He used to say — “No, damn artillery captain is gonna start World War III when I'm president.” I grew up in the same town he lived in so I know his accent. Independence, Missouri. Used to see him at his front steps taking pictures with tourists while he was still president. He used to step out on the porch and let the tourists take photographs. About a half a block from my Methodist church where I went to church. It was interesting. Interestingly, his wife was considered much more socially acceptable than he was. She was from an old family in independence, Missouri. And he was some farmer from way out in Grandview, Missouri, South of Kansas City. Values. Anyway, at the end of the war, there was a great rush from the Soviet side of what was already a zone. There was a Soviet zone, a French zone, British zone and an American zone. Germany was divided up into those zones to grab what's left of the uranium ore that the Germans had stockpiled. And there was evidence that there was a number of barrels of the stuff in a warehouse somewhere in the middle of all of this. And there's a very funny story about how the Russians ran in and grabbed off one site full of uranium ore, this yellow black stuff in what were basically wine barrels. And we at the same night, just before the wall came down between the zones, were running in from the other side, grabbing some other ore and then taking it back to our side. But there was also a good deal of requisitioning of German scientists. And the ones who had gotten away early came West, but there were others who didn't and ended up helping the Soviets. And they were told, look, you help us build the reactors and the uranium separation systems that we need. And we'll let you go home and back to your family, which they did. Early 50s by then, the German scientists who had helped the Russians went home. And I think our people stayed here and brought their families over, I don't know. (1:08:24) - Deterrence, disarmament, North Korea, TaiwanDwarkesh Patel 1:08:24Was there an opportunity after the end of World War II, before the Soviets developed the bomb, for the US to do something where either it somehow enforced a monopoly on having the bomb, or if that wasn't possible, make some sort of credible gesture that, we're eliminating this knowledge, you guys don't work on this, we're all just gonna step back from this. Richard Rhodes 1:08:50We tried both before the war. General Groves, who had the mistaken impression that there was a limited amount of high-grade uranium ore in the world, put together a company that tried to corner the market on all the available supply. For some reason, he didn't realize that a country the size of the Soviet Union is going to have some uranium ore somewhere. And of course it did, in Kazakhstan, rich uranium ore, enough for all the bombs they wanted to build. But he didn't know that, and I frankly don't know why he didn't know that, but I guess uranium's use before the Second World War was basically as a glazing agent for pottery, that famous yellow pottery and orange pottery that people owned in the 1930s, those colors came from uranium, and they're sufficiently radioactive, even to this day, that if you wave a Geiger counter over them, you get some clicks. In fact, there have been places where they've gone in with masks and suits on, grabbed the Mexican pottery and taken it out in a lead-lined case. People have been so worried about it but that was the only use for uranium, to make a particular kind of glass. So once it became clear that there was another use for uranium, a much more important one, Groves tried to corner the world market, and he thought he had. So that was one effort to limit what the Soviet Union could do. Another was to negotiate some kind of agreement between the parties. That was something that really never got off the ground, because the German Secretary of State was an old Southern politician and he didn't trust the Soviets. He went to the first meeting, in Geneva in ‘45 after the war was over, and strutted around and said, well, I got the bomb in my pocket, so let's sit down and talk here. And the Soviet basically said, screw you. We don't care. We're not worried about your bomb. Go home. So that didn't work. Then there was the effort to get the United Nations to start to develop some program of international control. And the program was proposed originally by a committee put together by our State Department that included Robert Oppenheimer, rightly so, because the other members of the committee were industrialists, engineers, government officials, people with various kinds of expertise around the very complicated problems of technology and the science and, of course, the politics, the diplomacy. In a couple of weeks, Oppenheimer taught them the basics of the nuclear physics involved and what he knew about bomb design, which was everything, actually, since he'd run Los Alamos. He was a scientist during the war. And they came up with a plan. People have scoffed ever since at what came to be called the Acheson-Lilienthal plan named after the State Department people. But it's the only plan I think anyone has ever devised that makes real sense as to how you could have international control without a world government. Every country would be open to inspection by any agency that was set up. And the inspections would not be at the convenience of the country. But whenever the inspectors felt they needed to inspect. So what Oppenheimer called an open world. And if you had that, and then if each country then developed its own nuclear industries, nuclear power, medical uses, whatever, then if one country tried clandestinely to begin to build bombs, you would know about it at the time of the next inspection. And then you could try diplomacy. If that didn't work, you could try conventional war. If that wasn't sufficient, then you could start building your bombs too. And at the end of this sequence, which would be long enough, assuming that there were no bombs existing in the world, and the ore was stored in a warehouse somewhere, six months maybe, maybe a year, it would be time for everyone to scale up to deterrence with weapons rather than deterrence without weapons, with only the knowledge. That to me is the answer to the whole thing. And it might have worked. But there were two big problems. One, no country is going to allow a monopoly on a nuclear weapon, at least no major power. So the Russians were not willing to sign on from the beginning. They just couldn't. How could they? We would not have. Two, Sherman assigned a kind of a loudmouth, a wise old Wall Street guy to present this program to the United Nations. And he sat down with Oppenheimer after he and his people had studied and said, where's your army? Somebody starts working on a bomb over there. You've got to go in and take that out, don't you? He said, what would happen if one country started building a bomb? Oppenheimer said, well, that would be an act of war. Meaning then the other countries could begin to escalate as they needed to to protect themselves against one power, trying to overwhelm the rest. Well, Bernard Baruch was the name of the man. He didn't get it. So when he presented his revised version of the Acheson–Lilienthal Plan, which was called the Baruch Plan to the United Nations, he included his army. And he insisted that the United States would not give up its nuclear monopoly until everyone else had signed on. So of course, who's going to sign on to that deal? Dwarkesh Patel 1:15:24I feel he has a point in the sense that — World War II took five years or more. If we find that the Soviets are starting to develop a bomb, it's not like within the six months or a year or whatever, it would take them to start refining the ore. And to the point we found out that they've been refining ore to when we start a war and engage in it, and doing all the diplomacy. By that point, they might already have the bomb. And so we're behind because we dismantled our weapons. We are only starting to develop our weapons once we've exhausted these other avenues. Richard Rhodes 1:16:00Not to develop. Presumably we would have developed. And everybody would have developed anyway. Another way to think of this is as delayed delivery times. Takes about 30 minutes to get an ICBM from Central Missouri to Moscow. That's the time window for doing anything other than starting a nuclear war. So take the warhead off those missiles and move it down the road 10 miles. So then it takes three hours. You've got to put the warhead back on the missiles. If the other side is willing to do this too. And you both can watch and see. We require openness. A word Bohr introduced to this whole thing. In order to make this happen, you can't have secrets. And of course, as time passed on, we developed elaborate surveillance from space, surveillance from planes, and so forth. It would not have worked in 1946 for sure. The surveillance wasn't there. But that system is in place today. The International Atomic Energy Agency has detected systems in air, in space, underwater. They can detect 50 pounds of dynamite exploded in England from Australia with the systems that we have in place. It's technical rather than human resources. But it's there. So it's theoretically possible today to get started on such a program. Except, of course, now, in like 1950, the world is awash in nuclear weapons. Despite the reductions that have occurred since the end of the Cold War, there's still 30,000-40,000 nuclear weapons in the world. Way too many. Dwarkesh Patel 1:18:01Yeah. That's really interesting. What percentage of warheads do you think are accounted for by this organization? If there's 30,000 warheads, what percentage are accounted for? Richard Rhodes 1:18:12All.Dwarkesh Patel 1:18:12Oh. Really?  North Korea doesn't have secrets? Richard Rhodes 1:18:13They're allowed to inspect anywhere without having to ask the government for permission. Dwarkesh Patel 1:18:18But presumably not North Korea or something, right? Richard Rhodes 1:18:21North Korea is an exception. But we keep pretty good track of North Korea needless to say. Dwarkesh Patel 1:18:27Are you surprised with how successful non-proliferation has been? The number of countries with nuclear weapons has not gone up for decades. Given the fact, as you were talking about earlier, it's simply a matter of refining or transmuting uranium. Is it surprising that there aren't more countries that have it?Richard Rhodes 1:18:42That's really an interesting part. Again, a part of the story that most people have never really heard. In the 50s, before the development and signing of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which was 1968 and it took effect in 1970, a lot of countries that you would never have imagined were working on nuclear weapons. Sweden, Norway, Japan, South Korea. They had the technology. They just didn't have the materials. It was kind of dicey about what you should do. But I interviewed some of the Swedish scientists who worked on their bomb and they said, well, we were just talking about making some tactical

Last time we spoke about Operation Vengeance, the assassination of Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto. When the decrypted intelligence hit Admiral Nimitz desk about the vulnerability of his Japanese rival, he wondered what he should do. Was it moral? Would it even benefit the allies, Yamamoto was arguably losing the war on his own? In the end he ordered the hit and sent the job over to Admiral Halsey who enthusiastically took the bull by the horns. A special squadron of P-38 Lightnings were sent over to perform an extremely precise interception of Yamamoto's G4M Betty aircraft enroute to Ballale airfield on Bougainville. Yamamoto's aircraft was shot down killing him and all those aboard it. The death of the admiral was hidden from the Japanese public for an entire month and upon learning of it the Japanese people all mourned. It was a terrible moment for the Japanese, one of the greatest had fallen, how would the rest of the war play out?  This episode is the Japanese counteroffensive in Arakan Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.    Before we jump back into the CBI theater some action was heating up in New Guinea. The Okabe detachment was defeated during the battle of Wau seeing the Australians controlling the area from Waipali to Buibaining and much of the Mubo Valley. However the Japanese remained resilient and would not give up Mubo without a fight. Vigorous patrolling and ambushes were all the Australians could perform, because they did not have the necessary numbers to launch a major offensive. In early March General MacKay sent word to Blamey, advising him he believed the Japanese might try another shot to seize Wau. He believed even with the projected arrival of the 4th and 15th brigades they would still be outnumbered by the Japanese. MacKay estimated the Japanese had roughly 7500 men in the Lae-Salamaua area and were maintaining a formidable defense in the Mubo region. Therefore he wanted to continue to restrict their activity to patrols to prevent the Japanese from surprising Wau again and allowing vital time to build up the defenses. The attack on Mubo in January had not accomplished its objectives, but it did show the Japanese at Lae and Salamaua how much of a hornet's nest they had stirred up by attacking Wau. The Japanese were not done however and hoped to launch a counteroffensive. They planned to bring the 51st division in a large convoy across the Bismarck Sea. But as we saw in a previous episode this was met with catastrophe during the battle of the bismarck sea, denying the reinforcements, equipment and supplies the Japanese at Mubo desperately needed. 800 units, mostly from the 102 regiment held various positions at Mubo and they could not hope to launch a counteroffensive.  The supply situation in New Guinea remained a nightmare for both sides. In January Blamey authorized the construction of a new jeep trail going from Bulldog to Wau and it would take months to complete the 68 mile path. By April the Australians improved their situation in the Mubo area by occupying the heights called Saddle and Vicker's ridge. They began placing artillery on the heights and on the 20th began to bombard the Japanese position on Green Hill. On the 23rd, Major General Stanley Savige of the 3rd division established his Headquarters at Bulolo. Kanga force had been officially dissolved, thus henceforth the 3rd division was responsible for offensives in the Wau-Lae-Markham area. For months the focus had been on reinforcing Wau, expecting a major Japanese offensive. But the Australians had also maintained a small force 11 miles from Salamaua guarding the entrance to the Markham valley. The 2/3rd independent company was occupying in the vicinity of Missim village along the Francisco river between the Powerhouse and Salamaua. In early april they began performing reconnaissance of the area. On the 21st the ambushed a column of 60 Japanese managing to kill over 20 of them and wounding 15. Soon after their commander was notified by Moten that they were going to launch an offensive against Mubo finally set for the 24th. The offensive against Mubo was actually part of something grander. General Blamey planned to capture Lae forming a plan codenamed Operation postern which was quickly approved by General MacArthur. For the plan to work, the allies needed to trick General Adachi that Salamaua was the primary target for a major offensive. Thus to accomplish this, the Australians had the ⅔ independent company operate just a few miles from Salamaua. General Stanley Savige would not even be aware of these grander planes until June of 1943. Postern called for a large pincer movement, involving an amphibious assault east of Lae and an airborne assault near Nadzab 50 kms to the west of Lae. Planning for Postern had begun in May, with Generals Blamey and Herring proposing to seize Nadzab as soon as possible with Brigadier Eather's 25th Brigade and a parachute battalion, while the 9th Australian Division, now under the command of Major-General George Wooten, was to take Lae in early August. Nadzab was an obvious target, undefended and of immense value, not only for the Lae operation but also for extending the range of Allied air power. In the meantime Blamey had various forces drive the Japanese from key areas, but not to attack Salamaua directly. The Japanese were going to be in for a major surprise. But now we are turning over to the CBI theater. Last time we were speaking about General Irwins Arakan disaster and the mad onion man Wingate's operation Longcloth. Irwins blunders had cost countless lives and provided General Koga's 55th division ample time to regroup. By March 20th, Wavell, Irwin and Lloyd were accepting they would have to withdraw the forces to the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line. Wavell was incredibly pissed off and decided to make Lloyd a scapegoat. Lloyd was dismissed and replaced by Major General Lomax who was ordered to simply carry on doing what Lloyd had been doing. Lomax came just in time to meet General Koga's counteroffensive which practically annihilated the 47th brigade. Irwin looking to blame anyone and anything but himself, shifted the blame to the brigade itself rather than his tactical blunders and tried again to bring Slim into his mess. The British forces were forced to flee east of the Mayu river and this severely beat India morale which was already horrible to begin with.   Now how bad was morale? By early April morale had plummeted to an all time new low. This was because of the series of terrible defeats, terrible casualties and growing more from malaria. The 6th brigade wsa evacuating 50 men due to malaria a day. Despite using mepacrine as a suppressive treatment alongside anti-moquito nets, cream and wearing long clothes at night, in 8 weeks the 6th brigade lost half its total strength. Desertions were on the rise from many units, causing the British commanders a lot of anxiety over their loyalty.  General's Slim and Lomax met at Chittagong as Koga was sweeping everything before him. Both generals scoured over the maps and agreed, Koga's next logical step was an assault on the Maungdaw-Buthidaung line. To meet this attack, Slim and Lomax devised a stratagem for catching Koga in a box along the Mayu peninsula. The box was to involve 6 battalions, two on the ridges of the Mayu hills, two along the mayu river and two in the hills south of the Maungdaw-Buthidaung road. The idea was to let the Japanese advance through the most likely location, some tunnels on a disused railway track. Once the Japanese were along the tunnels, they would close the lid on the box using a force of brigade level strength. The hope was to achieve a perfect encirclement, chasing the legendary glory of Hannibal's victory at the battle of Cannae. To do this they had exhausted and unbelievably demoralized men and would have to achieve a scheme of geometric perfection.  The troops Lomax came to command were shaken badly, malaria riden battalions, departing the disastrous Arakan campaign at the point of exhaustion. There were no trained formations available in India to replace them, thus they would have to be retained in combat. By early April, Lomax had skillfully managed to stabilize the front at the Maungdaw-Buthidaung. On April 14th Marshall Wavell had appointed General Slim's 15th corps to lead the British-Indian forces retreat. The Japanese sensing weakness amongst the allied forces continued their advance. On April 24th, the Japanese reached the British defenses at Buthidaung and Maungdaw. The 55th indian Brigade held the first attack at Kanthe while carefully preparing their entrapment box strategy, pushing the Japanese advance along the spine of the Mayu mountains; however it all went to shit. Two demoralized battalions gave way to Japanese pressure, breaking the box. This forced everything to come undone and soon the British-Indian forces were yet again performing a fighting withdrawal going north.  It was reported that the fighting efficiency was so low by April 28th, the men of the 8/13th frontier force regiment had literally fired off all their ammunition at an imaginary opponent, and when they actually were attacked the next day they had no option but to retreat. The withdrawal culminated with the capture of Buthidaung on May 9th. The 55th brigade narrowly escaped annihilation by abandoning their vehicles and heavy equipment while limping by foot over some jungle covered hills to safety. Five days later the port of Maungdaw was evacuated and the British-Indian defenders began to take up defensive positions in the open rice-field country near Cox's Bazar. As General Slim noted “Our only hope of stabilizing the front, if the Japanese really pushed us, was to hold the rice-field country. Our men were still untrained for the jungle; they feared it more than they did the enemy. We had to select areas where we could give our troops reasonable fields of fire and open maneuver.‘It was too much like 1942 over again, with the added bitterness that this time we had been defeated by forces smaller than our own.” Slim was very better about the entire ordeal. To make matters worse, the men only pulled out after Slim's incessant pressure applied to Lomax, because Irwin was counter arguing they should toss the kitchen sink for a siege strategy. All the way over in London Sir Winston Churchill had this to say “‘This campaign goes from bad to worse, and we are being completely outfought and outmanoeuvred by the Japanese. Luckily the small scale of the operations and the attraction of other events has prevented public opinion being directed upon this lamentable scene.” Churchill was writing at a time, after the Anglo-American victory in North Africa and the crushing soviet victory at Stalingrad. It was obvious to Churchill and the other allied leadership, Europe was won. Churchill was furious with Wavell, a man he never really liked. The Americans likewise were not happy with Wavell. Meanwhile Irwin kept blaming everyone except himself, even sending reports of how cowardly his troops were. Irwins last absurdity was to signal a recommendation that General Slim by removed from commanding the 15th corps. But Wavell, under severe criticism of himself by this point was determined that Irwin would be canned. Slim was ordered to report to Irwin's HQ. Slim told his colleagues around him he was about to be dismissed as he made his way. When he got to Irwin he was met with this ‘You're not sacked. I am.' Upon hearing this, Slim remarked: ‘I think this calls for the opening of a bottle of port or something if we have one.'   The British-Indians forces had  916 dead, 2889 wounded and 1252 missing; the Indian high command had suffered another heavy blow, with the myth of Japanese superiority, excellence and skill as a jungle fighter being strongly reinforced in the minds of British and Indian troops, something that gravely affected their morale General Slim held a rather remarkable ability, mental toughness with some extraordinary resistance to stress. The frustrations of all the defeats and the constant shuffling between HQs and the front was a lot to bear. Slim actually found something positive about the Arakan disaster. The British battle casualties were high, but they could have been a hell of a lot higher, given Irwins insistance to perform endless frontal attacks. The British had learnt valuable lessons about the Japanese and the lack of their own training in specific areas. There had been over 7500 cases of malaria and they were only truly learning on the spot how to deal with the pesky disease. Troops heanceforth would be routinely issued with mosquito nets, repellents and by autumn of 1943 a wonder drug was developed, Mepacrine which significantly helped with the symptoms of malaria.  But by far and large the most significant long term development in 1942-1943 was the gradual reasseration of allied air superiorirty. By the end of 1942, 150 new airfields were constructed, RAF pilots and aircraft began to arrive to them in large numbers and the Americans had sent 10,000 air force personnel to serve in the CBI theater. Heavy B-24 Liberator bombers began to appear at the battlefront for the first time and in November of 1942 some made the spectacular 2760 mile return trip after bombing Bangkok. The Japanese quickly realized their proposed Burma-Siam railway was very vulnerable. When the war in the middle east came to a close in early 1943, the US army airforce transferred a ton of their heavy bombers to the far east. Bombing raids on Bangkok, Rangoon and Mandalay were increased significantly by Christmas of 1942. The Japanese were gradually losing their air superiorirty and this was deeply troubling for them.  During the Arakan campaign a Japanese colonel issued the following orders ‘There must be no fear of aircraft. As long as you are not discovered you must seek to remain so. If once our position is revealed, the enemy planes must be shot down. It is not permissible to suppose that our soldiers are no match for aircraft.' The Japanese were forced to yield the skies over Arakan even though they had taken its ground. The RAG would conduct search and destroy missions over Thaitkido, Buthidaung, Sinho and Akyab island in June. 6 Hurricanes would escort some Blenheim bombers on a long range raid against Ramree island, even though they were not safe. Allied air superiority would eventually become the crucial factor to win the struggle over Burma. Now we cant talk about Burma without talking a bit more about the mad onion man Wingate. While the Arakan campaign was coming to its disastrous conclusion, Operation Longcloth had reached its own. The last remaining columns made their way back to allied territory. 2182 returned out of the original 3000 men that entered Burma; an estimated 818 men had been killed, taken prisoner or died of disease. There was a ton of criticism tossed at the operation and the effectiveness of the Chindits, but the operation was moderately successful. To be brutally honest, the Burma campaign had basically no success stories except for the Chindits, thus it got inflated quite heavily. Wavell was very pleased with the performance of Wingate's forces, so much so he put in an order to form the new Long Range Penetration group, the 111th Indian Brigade. Wavell handpicked their commander, Brigadier William Lentaigne who would come to hate Wingate and Wingate hated him haha. The success of the Chindits would be tossed in all the major headlines of every newspaper from England to India. The British had to do something to raise morale and the Chindits kind of just fell into it. Now one last major event that occurred during all of this was a major conference. Wavell had been flown to Washington to partake in the Trident Conference which was carried from May 12-25th. The main focus of the conference was on the European theater, in fact there was an obsession over the Mediterranean cross channel invasion plans. When it came to theaters like Burma there was little interest. In fact Churchill would often only talk about Singapore when the east was brought up, showcasing full and well he only sought to revitalize the prestige of the British empire over other things. Churchill was quite in favor of bypassing Burma which he viewed as only being beneficial to China, a subject he could not understand why FDR obsessed over. It seemed the Churchill FDR regarded China as the emerging dominant power in the far east, while he only regarded CHina as a pacific power, ignoring China's claims over Tibet, Mongolia and northeastern Burma, and of course Churchill would completely ignore any mention of Hong Kong. FDR was seen to be extremely Pro-Chiang Kai-shek, almost maniac by British accounts. The British began to adopt a machiavellian stance of supporting Chiang Kai-shek and Chennault's airpower idea, thinking it would surely fail, which served Britain just fine.  Meanwhile, Vinegar Joseph Stilwell also at the Trident conference, kept trying to persuade his president that Chiang Kai-Shek was cunning and quite evil. He stressed the danger of American becoming a solitary atlas bearing the burden of the world because the British were outplaying them. He underlined Chiang Kai-sheks ambitions to get rid of him and replace him with a “yes man”, so he could acquire lendlease material for his own ends without any pushbacks. Stilwell recommended sending US troops to the CBI theater; to get Chiang Kai-shek to make specific commitments and stop wiggling around issues and above all to stop Chiang Kai-sheks stab-in-the-back secret diplomacy antics. Stilwell would find the British at Trident very unimpressed with him and his opinions. Stilwell also chose to bitterly argue with Field Marshal Alanbrooke, the chief of the imperial staff and a rampant Americanphobe. It got so bad, George Marshall told Stimson ‘Stilwell shut up like a clam and made an unfavourable impression.'  During the conference FDR did ask Stilwell in private what he thought of Chiang Kai-shek to which Stilwell said ‘He's a vacillating, tricky, undependable old scoundrel who never keeps his word.' By contrast Chennault, when asked a similar question, replied: ‘Sir, I think the generalissimo is one of the two or three greatest military and political leaders in the world today. He has never broken a commitment or promise made to me.' Meanwhile Chiang Kai-sheks representatives including his wife were threatening to pull out of Burma and to make a separate peace with Japan, unless the British finally took action to seize Rangoon. Instead it was agreed, more supplies would be tossed over the Hump and for the future operation Anakim to be shelved, to which Stilwell argued that if the allies waited another year before launching a land-based campaign, China would collapse.  Trident was chaotic as hell. Admiral King slammed the table with his fists many times violently supporting Marshall and Stilwell. King and Marshall wanted the land route to China open, but the British kept tossing their support for the Hump operations. Stilwell was not having a good time, but then he had a surprising victory. Stilwell met with Churchill privately, complaining about the abysmal situation in Burma, and Churchill 100% agreed with his criticisms. Churchill acknowledged the high command in India was terrible and that he was going to replace Wavell. As Stilwell wrote after the experience.   “With Wavell in command, failure was inevitable; he had nothing to offer at any meeting except protestations that the thing was impossible, hopeless, impractical. Churchill even spoke of it as silly. The Limeys all wanted to wait another year. After the Akyab fiasco, the four Japanese divisions in Burma have been scared to death. The inevitable conclusion was that Churchill has Roosevelt in his pocket. That they are looking for an easy way, a short cut for England, and that no attention must be diverted from the Continent at any cost. The Limeys are not interested in the war in the Pacific, and with the President hypnotised they are sitting pretty. Roosevelt wouldn't let me speak my piece. I interrupted twice but Churchill kept pulling away from the subject and it was impossible.' Thus Wavell was as they say “kicked up stairs”, promoted to viceroy of India and replaced as commander in India with Sir Claude Auchinleck. Stilwell returned to China and participated on a celebrity tour arranged by George Marshall to heighten his profile. Once that was done, Stilwell fell into a depression writing this  “‘Back to find Chiang same as ever – a grasping, bigoted, ungrateful little rattlesnake.Any Jap threat will put the Peanut in an uproar, and if they are wise they will repeat their attempt, for this if for no other reason. And if they seriously want to gain the game, they can attack Kunming or Chungking, or both, with five divisions on either line and finish the matter. If we sting them badly enough in the air, they are almost sure to try it . . . The Peanut's promise of picked men for India is so much wind; last year 68% of the men sent were rejected for trachoma or skin disease . . . This is going beyond all bounds. This insect, this stink in the nostrils, superciliously inquires what we will do, who are breaking our backs to help him, supplying everything – troops, equipment, planes, medical, signal, motor services, setting up his goddam SOS, training his lousy troops, backing his dastardly chief of staff, and general staff, and he the Jovian dictator, who starves his troops and is the world's worst ignoramus, picks flaws in our preparations and hems and haws about the Navy, God save us.” Stilwell's frustration was a bit understandable as Chiang Kai-shek had still not replied to FDR about if or when he could commit forces into Burma again. Stilwell was baffled by his nations continued support of what he saw as a fascist regime in China, while simultaneously fighting the fascist regimes in Europe. What Stilwell really wanted was to be made field commander in China, and if he ever got that position, the first thing he would do was cancel the lendlease. Things were not going so well for the married couple of Vinegar Joe and Peanut. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Things were not going well in Burma to say the least. Well except for the Chindits minor success, but that simply could not overcome the incredible low morale of the far east allied forces in the face of what seemed an unstoppable Japanese goliath. 

General James C. McConville is the 40th Chief of Staff of the United States Army, filling a critical position for our nation once occupied by individuals such as General John J. Pershing, Douglas MacArthur, George Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, and Omar Bradley. A West Point graduate, soldier, leader, and aviator, General McConville has commanded the famous 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault) and led in combat including in Iraq and Afghanistan. Now, as Army Chief of Staff, his job is to ensure our soldiers have the training and equipment they need to accomplish their missions and return home safely. In this position, he's also a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, helping to advise some of our nation's senior civilian leaders on vital national security decisions. General McConville sat down with Bradley Bowman — senior director of FDD's Center on Military and Political Power (CMPP), filling in for host Cliff May — just days after the one-year anniversary of Putin's unprovoked large-scale invasion of Ukraine and amidst reports of Beijing considering the provision of lethal aid to Moscow for use against Ukrainians. Bradley and General McConville discuss the war in Ukraine and what's at stake for Americans, how to strengthen the U.S. defense industrial base, the nature of the threat from China, and what the Army is doing to deter aggression in the Indo-Pacific and beyond. Bradley also asks him for an update on the Army's ongoing modernization efforts — the most significant the service has conducted in four decades and one that will determine whether Americans can prevail on future battlefields.

The Drumbeats of War: Episode 3 explores the 10th Mountain Division's backstory in the lead-up to America's entry into World War II. The episode includes abridged interviews with Chris Juergens, PhD, the Anschutz Curator of Military History at History Colorado, on the history of Germany's mountain troops, and Sepp Scanlin, the former director of the 10th Mountain Division and Fort Drum Museum, on the resistance the idea of an American mountain division faced from within the War Department. The episode also includes an overview of Minnie Dole's Herculean efforts to establish a ski division, as well as the way world events—and America's climbers—helped persuade military leaders that maybe we really did need a mountain division after all. See here for show notes and resources.  Available only to patrons, the Unabridged episode of Episode 3 also includes: Unabridged versions of both interviews A complete chronology of events leading up to General George Marshall's decision to conduct exploratory ski patrols in the winter of 1940-41. A narrative account of the involvement of The American Alpine Club members H. Adams Carter, Bob Bates, Bill House, Walter Wood Jr. and Dr. James Grafton Rogers in the lobbying efforts for a mountain division.

General George Catlett Marshall graduated from Virginia Military Institute, and served in the Philippines and in World War I.  He was later an aide to General John Pershing and assistant commandant of the Army's infantry school where he taught many future commanders.  As chief of staff of the U.S. Army he directed army operations throughout World War II.  After his retirement in 1945, President Harry Truman sent him to China to mediate the civil war there.  As Secretary of State, Marshall proposed the European aid program known as the Marshall Plan and initiated discussions that led to the formation of NATO.  He resigned because of ill health but was called back by Truman to become Secretary of Defense and to prepare the armed forces for the Korean War. In 1953 he was awarded the Nobel Prize for Peace.  Given everything he accomplished in his life, he truly is an Immortal.See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.

Five years after World War II ended, Winston Churchill said he was still amazed that the United States, which before WWII had a tiny military and was fully committed to isolationism, “were able not only to build up the armies and air force units, but also to find the leaders and vast staffs capable of handling enormous masses and of moving them faster and farther than masses have ever been moved in war before.” He was speaking in general about the United States, but much of the credit arguably was with Chief of Staff Gen. George Marshall and Secretary of War Henry Stimpson.From 1940 until the end of the war, Marshall and Stimson headed the army machine that ground down the Axis. Theirs was one of the most consequential collaborations of the twentieth century. According to Dwight Eisenhower, the two possessed more greatness than any other men he had ever met.The general and the secretary traveled very different paths to power. Educated at Yale, where he was Skull and Bones, and at Harvard Law, Henry Stimson joined the Wall Street law firm of Elihu Root, future secretary of war and state himself, and married the descendant of a Founding Father. He went on to serve as secretary of war under Taft, governor-general of the Philippines, and secretary of state under Hoover. An internationalist Republican with a track record, Stimson ticked the boxes for FDR, who was in the middle of a reelection campaign at the time. Thirteen years younger, George Marshall graduated in the middle of his class from the Virginia Military Institute (not West Point), then began the standard, and very slow, climb up the army ranks. During World War I he performed brilliant staff work for General Pershing. After a string of postings, Marshall ended up in Washington in the 1930s and impressed FDR with his honesty, securing his appointment as chief of staff.Today's guest is Edward Aldrich, author of The Partnership: George Marshall, Henry Stimson, and the Extraordinary Collaboration that Won World War II. Marshall and Stimson were two very different men who combined with a dazzling synergy to lead the American military effort in World War II, in roles that blended politics, diplomacy, and bureaucracy in addition to warfighting. They transformed an outdated, poorly equipped army into a modern fighting force of millions of men capable of fighting around the globe. They, and Marshall in particular, identified the soldiers, from Patton and Eisenhower to Bradley and McNair, best suited for high command. They helped develop worldwide strategy and logistics for battles like D-Day and the Bulge. They collaborated with Allies like Winston Churchill. They worked well with their cagey commander-in-chief. They planned for the postwar world. They made decisions, from the atomic bombs to the division of Europe, that would echo for decades.

Edward Aldrich comes on the show to discuss his book that covers the highly effective teamwork of Secretary of War Henry Stimson and Army Chief of Staff George Marshall. Once they are both in position, they will have 17 months to ready the American Armed Forces before Pearl Harbor. Not that they know this. What they do know is war is coming, yet half of the country wants to stay out and FDR can't say much to publicly support to their efforts. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit podcastchoices.com/adchoices