Podcasts about Market design

In this episode we are talking to Vitali Gretschko about how generative AI can be used to simulate strategic behaviour in auctions. We explore where AI tools can support auction design, where they fall short, and how practitioners should interpret simulation results. Vitali also explains why AI is best seen as a co-intelligence that needs expert guidance.   Vitali Gretschko is Professor for sustainable Market Design at the University of Münster. His research focuses on auction theory, market design, and applying game theory to practical strategic problems.

Your next big career move won't happen by accident. Want insider strategies top performers use to dominate their fields? Click here fields. https://www.5minutecareerhack.com/careerpowerplay1Ready to stop applying and start creating your ideal career? In this week's episode, I reveal the secret to tapping into the hidden job market where the best opportunities in 2025 are found.Learn a powerful formula to identify business problems, showcase your unique ability to solve them, and present yourself as the indispensable solution – even if the role doesn't exist yet!Discover actionable tactics you can implement tomorrow morning, including:↳Research-based outreach to target companies.↳Creating a compelling one-page value proposition matrix.↳Developing a persuasive first 90-day impact plan.Stop thinking like an applicant and start acting like a consultant. Tap into more control and higher salaries by learning this crucial career advancement strategy.WATCH STRATEGY #8 https://youtu.be/Yjx2LuNoH1k

On 15 October 2024 Future of Finance hosted a one-day event at the offices of AON in London. Entitled Tokenisation of securities and funds is going to happen. How will you and your organisation survive it?, the event attracted 200 registrants from banks, asset managers, brokers, central banks, financial market infrastructures and FinTechs. This is an account of what they contributed to the six panels that day, as well as what they learned from the panellists and each other.This episode is a summary of Panel 5, titled "Why the benefits of tokenisation depend on the issuance of “native” rather than “asset-backed” (or "digital twin”) digital assets". The Panellists taking part were Anthony Woolley, Head of Business Development and Marketing at Ownera; Emma Lovett, Credit Lead for the Markets Distributed Ledger Technology team at J.P. Morgan; Ian Hunt, independent authority and adviser on buy-side business processes and technology; Vic Arulchandran, Director and Head of Digital Product and Market Design at Deutsche Börse| Clearstream; and Stephen McConville, Head of Structuring at Hedgehog Invest. Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In the latest installment of The Checkup, our health reporting team finds out why the generic drug market is in trouble. IndyGo's long-awaited Blue Line is one step closer to completion. Democratic gubernatorial candidate Jennifer McCormick says Indiana needs to refocus its economic development strategy. Thirty-two students at an elementary school in Avon were arrested last school year, according to a recent state report – but a WFYI investigation found those arrests never happened. Want to go deeper on the stories you hear on WFYI News Now? Visit wfyi.org/news and follow us on social media to get comprehensive analysis and local news daily. Subscribe to WFYI News Now wherever you get your podcasts. Today's episode of WFYI News Now was produced by Drew Daudelin and Abriana Herron, with support from News Director Sarah Neal-Estes.

Energy market design across the US varies from one Regional Transmission Operators (RTOs) or Independent System Operators (ISOs) to another. With each organization encompassing a distinct generation mix, the market design differs to optimize outcomes with their respective infrastructure and tools on hand. With the increase of storage and renewables growing, what changes in market design are we seeing and what policy shifts are in motion to support this going forward?In today's episode, Quentin talks with Gary Cate, Director of Energy Market Analytics at Fluence USA. Over the conversation, Gary and Quentin cover:Key differences in market designs across RTO's and ISO's across the USAERCOT's market design and its intended goals.How current market design supports battery energy storage.The key considerations for market designers with more renewables connecting to the grid.Policy Hot Topics for Battery Energy StorageAbout our guestFluence is on a mission to create a more sustainable future by transforming the way we power our world. Fluence brings proven energy storage products and services, and digital applications for renewables and storage to support the modernization of our energy networks. For more information on the services Fluence provides, check out their websiteAbout Modo EnergyModo Energy provides benchmarking, forecasts, data, and insights for new energy assets - all in one place.Built for analysts, Modo helps the owners, operators, builders, and financiers of battery energy storage solutions understand the market - and make the most out of their assets. Modo's paid plans serve more than 80% of battery storage owners and operators in Great Britain and ERCOT.All of our podcasts are available to watch or listen to on the Modo Energy site. To keep up with all of our latest updates, research, analysis, videos, podcasts, data visualizations, live events, and more, follow us on Linkedin or Twitter. Check out The Energy Academy, our video series of bite-sized chunks explaining how different battery energy storage systems work. For more information on market design, check out our written research.

Energy market design across the US varies from one Regional Transmission Operators (RTOs) or Independent System Operators (ISOs) to another. With each organization encompassing a distinct generation mix, the market design differs to optimize outcomes with their respective infrastructure and tools on hand. With the increase of storage and renewables growing, what changes in market design are we seeing and what policy shifts are in motion to support this going forward?In today's episode, Quentin talks with Gary Cate, Director of Energy Market Analytics at Fluence USA. Over the conversation, Gary and Quentin cover:Key differences in market designs across RTO's and ISO's across the USAERCOT's market design and its intended goals.How current market design supports battery energy storage.The key considerations for market designers with more renewables connecting to the grid.Policy Hot Topics for Battery Energy StorageAbout our guestFluence is on a mission to create a more sustainable future by transforming the way we power our world. Fluence brings proven energy storage products and services, and digital applications for renewables and storage to support the modernization of our energy networks. For more information on the services Fluence provides, check out their websiteAbout Modo EnergyModo Energy provides benchmarking, forecasts, data, and insights for new energy assets - all in one place.Built for analysts, Modo helps the owners, operators, builders, and financiers of battery energy storage solutions understand the market - and make the most out of their assets. Modo's paid plans serve more than 80% of battery storage owners and operators in Great Britain and ERCOT.All of our podcasts are available to watch or listen to on the Modo Energy site. To keep up with all of our latest updates, research, analysis, videos, podcasts, data visualizations, live events, and more, follow us on Linkedin or Twitter. Check out The Energy Academy, our video series of bite-sized chunks explaining how different battery energy storage systems work. For more information on market design, check out our written research.

Ari Peskoe describes himself as an electric utility critic and has advice for electric utility enthusiasts.Ari Peskoe is the Director of the Electricity Law Initiative at the Harvard Law School Environmental and Energy Law Program and a prolific writer about regulation of the U.S. power sector on issues ranging from constitutional challenges to states' energy laws to interstate transmission development. The interview is wrapped in commentary from co-hosts Paul Dockery, Ahlmahz Negash, and Farhad Billimoria.You can find the podcast on Apple Podcast, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. Share with friends that are energy enthusiasts, like us!03:11 - 30 seconds of theoryFarhad on Cost of Service vs Incentive based regulationJoskow, P.L., 2024. The Expansion of Incentive (Performance-Based) Regulation of Electricity Distribution and Transmission in the United States. Review of Industrial Organization, pp.1-49.Ahlmahz on Procedural JusticeJenkins, K., McCauley, D., Heffron, R., Stephan, H. and Rehner, R., 2016. Energy justice: A conceptual review. Energy research & social science, 11, pp.174-182.11:01 - Ari Peskoe on Governance11/01/2023 - CleanLaw Podcast - Electricity Law InitiativeCleanLaw–Replacing the Utility Transmission Syndicate's Control, Hannah Dobie interviews Ari Peskoe about his new article in Energy Law JournalPeskoe, A., 2023. Replacing the Utility Transmission Syndicate's Control. Energy LJ, 44, p.447.Market Configuration Matters; Effects of Market Choices on Consumers in the Northwest US51:10 - Ranking Governance, Configuration, and Market Design59:37 - Ari Peskoe's Energy System Analogy1:04:48 - Debriefing on transmission, governance, and public power with Ahlmahz Negash and Farhad BillimoriaPublic Power Underground, for electric utility enthusiasts! Public Power Underground, it's work to watch!

In this episode of Know Power, Noha and Mike speak with Pat Wood, a pivotal figure in transforming energy markets through regulatory innovation. With a distinguished career spanning leadership roles at the Public Utility Commission of Texas and the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Wood brings a unique perspective on energy policy, market design, and the balance between regulation and innovation. Caitlin Smith, representing Jupiter Power, joins as a co-host, contributing insights from the renewable energy sector.Guest bio: Pat Wood III is the past Chairman of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) and of the Public Utility Commission of Texas (PUCT). The son of a small businessman, Mr. Wood has been a forceful advocate throughout his career for replacing government-centered monopoly regulation with customer-centered, technology-unleashing competition.Today, as CEO of Hunt Energy Network, Mr. Wood's focus is on new power system infrastructure and the related business systems to integrate it into competitive power markets. Mr. Wood also serves as the Lead Independent Director of solar pioneer SunPower (NASDAQ: SPWR), and Director of specialty construction firm Quanta Services (NYSE: PWR), including his recent appointment to Luma Energy, overseeing the Quanta-ATCO joint venture to operate the Puerto Rico utility system. He is also a Director of Spring Valley Acquisition Corp. (NASDAQ: SV). In the past, he was Board Chairman of independent power producer Dynegy and a Director of TPI Composites, among others. ______________________________________________________________________[00:02:05] Pat Wood's origins in the energy sector, from Port Arthur to FERC[00:03:27] Transitioning gas utilities to competitive markets, drawing parallels to electricity[00:04:30] Market design and the unfinished business of standardization[00:06:16] The complexity of implementing a standard market design across diverse regions[00:07:31] Efforts in renewable energy integration and the role of competitive markets[00:10:05] The dynamic interplay between state and federal energy regulations[00:18:32] Discussion on grid constraints and integrating new generation resources[00:22:43] The potential of demand response and distributed energy resources in grid management[00:27:41] Future outlook on infrastructure development and renewable energy support[00:34:18] The socio-economic impacts of energy policy and infrastructure development[00:38:05] Examining successful renewable energy projects and key takeaways[00:42:22] Technological advancements and their implications for energy storage and distribution[00:45:37] Strategies for enhancing grid reliability in the face of growing energy demands[00:49:08] Global energy trends influencing domestic energy policies[00:53:17] The importance of consumer education in energy conservation and choice[01:02:09] Energy innovation and the collaborative effort towards a sustainable energy futureLearn more and stay up to date at KnowPowerShow.comConnect with our HostsNoha SidhomLinkedInMike BorgattiLinkedInGabel Associates

We have another best-of episode for you today. This one is a conversation with Irene Lo about the work she's doing to study and leverage markets for social impact — think markets for public school assignments, or medical school residency matches. Irene reminds us that markets exist to help effectively allocate limited resources, and not all marketplaces are based in cash. We hope you'll tune in again to this thought provoking conversation to hear Irene talk about the changing face of markets.Episode Reference Links:Stanford Profile: Irene LoConnect With Us:Episode Transcripts >>> The Future of Everything WebsiteConnect with Russ >>> Threads or Twitter/XConnect with School of Engineering >>> Twitter/XChapters:(00:00:00) IntroductionHost Russ Altman introduces guest Irene Lo, a professor of management science and engineering at Stanford.(00:03:23) Unique Challenges of Non-Financial MarketsThe unique challenges in markets where monetary transactions are not feasible or ethical.(00:04:21) School Choice and District PerspectivesThe multifaceted decisions parents and school districts face in school choice.(00:06:54) Collaboration with San Francisco School DistrictConnecting with the San Francisco School District to redesign their student assignment system.(00:08:27) Algorithms and Testing of School Assignment PoliciesThe extensive simulations and community engagement involved in testing the new school assignment policies algorithm before implementation.(00:11:18) Goals and Issues of the Old SystemWhy the old school assignment system failed to achieve its goals of predictability, proximity, and diversity.(00:12:52) Algorithm Adaptation for Broader UseThe potential for adapting the San Francisco school assignment algorithms for use in other cities and districts.(00:14:42) Applying Market Design to Medical Residency MatchesAdapting market design principles to medical residency placements, emphasizing multifactorial considerations.(00:19:07) Market Design in the Developing World: Indonesian Palm Oil MarketInsights into the challenges and solutions in improving the supply chain for palm oil in Indonesia.(00:24:08) Crowdsourcing InformationHow crowdsourcing information can help improve market efficiency for palm oil farmers and the challenges involved.(00:26:32) Market Manipulation and AlgorithmsThe future application of advanced algorithms to improve market dynamics once sufficient data is gathered.(00:28:08) Conclusion Connect With Us:Episode Transcripts >>> The Future of Everything WebsiteConnect with Russ >>> Threads or Twitter/XConnect with School of Engineering >>> Twitter/X

Robert Tivadar Discusses Fulton Market Design Days in Chicago by Floor Focus Magazine

The next season of Public Power Underground is coming soon with a new format and new regular hosts. Subscribe to make sure you don't miss the season premiere!After a short break, Public Power Underground is coming back for its sixth season of energy enthusiasm! This season Paul Dockery and Ahlmahz Negash will be joined by world-renowned energy researchers Conleigh Byers and Farhad Billimoria to investigate energy industry and energy-industry-adjacent topics by bringing together expert insights with practitioner perspectives. The episode format for Public Power Underground has evolved for Season 6, which will include a new, season-spanning energy-inspired game. Tune in for the season premiere for more.Season 6 ContributorsPaul Dockery is a Senior Manager of Energy Resource Strategy & Planning for Seattle City Light and the Creative Director of Public Power Underground. Ahlmahz Negash is a Principal Data Analyst for Tacoma Power, an energy system researcher, and Executive Producer of Public Power Underground.Conleigh Byers is an Environmental Fellow at the Harvard University Center for the Environment based at the Harvard Kennedy School of Government. She uses tools from operations research, electrical engineering, and economics to design decarbonized energy systems, with a focus on power systems operations and planning. Her current research focuses on achieving resource adequacy under deep decarbonization, hosted by Professor William Hogan. She holds a doctorate in Electrical Engineering from ETH Zürich and a dual masters in Electrical Engineering & Computer Science and Technology & Policy from MIT.Farhad Billimoria is the Director, Electricity Markets for S&P Global and a Visiting Research Fellow at the Oxford Institute for Energy Studies. He has previously served as a Principal in Market Design at the Australian Energy Market Operator and has a background in international infrastructure and energy finance, investment and capital markets.The Sisterhood of the Traveling ElectronDuring the Season 5 Finale, friend-of-the-underground Jordan White referenced the buildout of transmission infrastructure as a “Sisterhood of the Traveling Electron”. As an enthusiast of both romantic comedies and electric utilities, the cross-over merch idea was too perfect to pass up. After-all, just like the magical pants from the early-aughts classic The Sisterhood of the Traveling Pants, transmission keeps us connected across distances during tough transitions.Public Power Underground doesn't have a storefront to sell merch anymore, but there is a feature where I can share a design for others to order from Printful. There's no revenue coming to Public Power Underground from the sale and I provide no warranty or guaranty for the merch. But I did promise that if I ever translated concept to merch, I'd send it to subscribers of the newsletter. For links to Sisterhood of the Traveling Electron merchandise subscribe on substack at publicpowerunderground.substack.com.

In this episode we are talking to Shengwu Li about simplicity in game theoretic concepts. He explains to us, what simple means in this context, how this notion facilitates application of game theory to the "real world" and what an obviously dominant strategy is. We discuss how this understanding of game theory can be particularly helpful when conducting auctions and what practitioners need to know beyond that to harness game theory's predictive powers.   Shengwu Li is Associate Professor of Economics at Harvard University. His research is focused on Microeconomic Theory, Market Design and Behavioral Economics.

From 2018 - Pulitzer Prize winning author Alvin E. Roth discusses his book "Who Gets What - and Why: The Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design."

This episode is long overdue (we recorded 8+ weeks ago!) but I enjoyed talking to Scott so much that we recorded for almost 2 hours - hence, editing was a nightmare! Scott is brilliant and has so many varied interests that I could have gone on talking to him all day. In this episode, we talked about Scott's work applying market design principles to make the process of obtaining kidney donors more efficient, Scott's passion for tech and crypto, and his teaching at HBS. Enjoy! For more info on Scott: http://www.scottkom.com/ https://www.linkedin.com/in/scott-kominers/ https://twitter.com/skominers

learning lessons about deeply decarbonized electricity markets from around the world including optimal prices in non-convex markets, reliability insurance, and system securityFarhad Billimoria, Conleigh Byers, PhD, Ahlmahz Negash, PhD, and Paul Dockery discuss adaptation of market design for the energy transition including fat tails and increased exposure to extremes; batteries and price responsive demand; natural gas fragility and marginal pricing; and inverter-driven resources and system security. Then the team plays a new game where they synthesize expert explanations of convex vs non-convex pricing and reliability insurance. You can find the podcast on Apple Podcast, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. Share with friends that are electric utility enthusiasts, like us!05:30 - Lessons Learned on deeply decarbonized electric systems from electricity markets around the world with “Handbook on Electricity Markets” and P.L. Joskow's “From hierarchies to markets and partially back again in electricity: responding to decarbonization and security of supply goals” as background07:06 - Lesson 1: natural gas fragility and marginal pricing17:20 - Lesson 2: batteries and price responsive demand24:23 - Lesson 3: fat tails and increased exposure to extremes38:20 - Lesson 4: Inverter based grids and system security (synchronous condensers and grid inertia)48:15 - Wonky energy game synthesizing expert explanations Farhad Billimoria provides a 2 minute 20 second explanation of A reliability insurance overlay on energy-only electricity markets1; followed by the rest of the crew's interpretation Conleigh Byers, PhD, provides a 2 minute 20 second explanation of Long-run optimal pricing in electricity markets with non-convex costs2; followed by the rest of the crew's interpretation (and discussion of computational time for a solution using the Convex Hull pricing34) 1:27:36 - Ahlmahz's insightful question of the week1:32:18 - Conleigh Byers, PhD's Closing ThoughtsPublic Power Underground, for electric utility enthusiasts! Public Power Underground, it's work to watch!1 Farhad Billimoria, Rahmatallah Poudineh, Market design for resource adequacy: A reliability insurance overlay on energy-only electricity markets, Utilities Policy, Volume 60, 2019, 100935, ISSN 0957-1787, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jup.2019.100935.2 Conleigh Byers, Gabriela Hug, Long-run optimal pricing in electricity markets with non-convex costs, European Journal of Operational Research, Volume 307, Issue 1, 2023, Pages 351-363, ISSN 0377-2217, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2022.07.052.3 P. Andrianesis, D. Bertsimas, M. C. Caramanis and W. W. Hogan, "Computation of Convex Hull Prices in Electricity Markets With Non-Convexities Using Dantzig-Wolfe Decomposition," in IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 37, no. 4, pp. 2578-2589, July 2022, doi: 10.1109/TPWRS.2021.3122000.4 C. Byers and G. Hug, "Flexibility Compensation with Increasing Stochastic Variable Renewable Energy in Non-Convex Markets," 2022 17th International Conference on Probabilistic Methods Applied to Power Systems (PMAPS), Manchester, United Kingdom, 2022, pp. 1-6, doi: 10.1109/PMAPS53380.2022.9810627.

ICIS Director of Energy Analytics, Matteo Mazzoni and Matthew Jones, Lead Analyst, discuss the key takeaways of the electricity market design reform proposals.

In this episode Piotr Dworczak explains to us how Market Design can contribute to alleviating inequality by increasing accuracy of policies targeting inequality. He does so using an example from the housing market which shows that more often than not it is very difficult to ensure that subsidies actually reach people in need since they cannot be easily identified. This is where Market Design comes into play: by generating targeted incentives which have a selection effect, it makes e.g. affordable housing policies more effective.   Piotr Dworczak is associate Professor at the Department of Economics at Northwestern University and Researcher at the Group for Research in Applied Economics (GRAPE) in Warsaw, Poland. He does research on Mechanism and Information Design, specifically with more applied interests in inequality-aware Market Design.

On March 14th, the European Commission plans to publish its proposal to reform the European Electricity Market Design (EMD). Although the political discussion has focused on the short-term wholesale markets and their impact on consumer prices, in the recently closed public consultation, the Commission additionally suggested different longer-term instruments to incentivise a fast growth in renewable generation capacity as a way to help Europe become more independent from imports of Russian gas.With growing shares of variable generation, the volatility in the electricity supply-demand balance is increasing, requiring significantly higher system flexibility. Industry stakeholders suggest that technology that ensures generation adequacy in periods of low variable renewables supply (i.e. wind, sun) should fall under the category of investments needed to create a greener and more secure energy system.The Commission has acknowledged the importance of flexible solutions by including these in the consultation text. This suggests it's the perfect time to involve multiple stakeholders in a full exchange on the importance of flexible solutions to the energy system we are building for ourselves and for future generations.Relisten to this EURACTIV Hybrid Conference to learn more about “flexibility” to facilitate a more resilient energy market and a decarbonised energy system. What are the different flexibility needs and the available technical solutions? What investments are needed and how can the electricity market design benefit from these investments?

Join David Arkell, John Pooley, Lysandra Naom, and Sheldon Fulton, President of Forte Business Solutions Ltd. on an episode all about energy market design. This episode features merits of regulated and unregulated markets, net zero energy markets, DERS, energy security, and more. Check out our 360 Carbon Excellence Program here: www.carbonexcellence.com. Find us at our website www.360energy.net or LinkedIn and Youtube at 360 Energy Inc. Email us at podcast@360energy.net with any comments, questions, or recommendations!

Fans have frequently experienced the frustration of event tickets selling out in a matter of minutes and then being resold for twice as much or more. This combination of underpriced tickets in the primary market and rent-seeking speculation in the secondary market has long puzzled economists.  In a paper in the American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, authors Eric Budish and Aditya Bhave show that auctions are an easy way to fix broken ticket markets by looking at changes Ticketmaster made in 2003. However, the benefits of using auctions in primary markets are unlikely to be felt by consumers. Budish says that other reforms, such as preventing resales, could be a way for artists and sports teams to reward their die-hard followers. Budish recently spoke with Tyler Smith about Ticketmaster's efforts to curb secondary markets with auctions, and how reforming the primary market for tickets benefits sellers as well as society.

ICIS Director of Energy Analytics Matteo Mazzoni and Lead Analyst Matthew Jones discuss: what are the European Commission trying to achieve, current situation of PPAs, role of CfDs, main positions of the member states on key issues and what the outcome is likely to be.

In this episode, Vitali Gretschko sheds some light on a fundamental game theoretic concept: Commitment. He explains why commitment is a crucial prerequisite of auctions and introduces different ways of generating commitment. We also explore how commitment is linked to the concept of information and discuss auction concepts which make it less likely for the auctioneer to break their commitment afterwards. Vitali Gretschko is Professor of Market Design at the University of Mannheim and head of the ZEW Research Department "Market Design". In the interview, Vitali mentions papers explaining how to use cryptography to create commitment in mechanism designs. You can find them here and here.

In this week's episode of Energy Unplugged, our Managing Director for UK and Ireland, Dan Monzani is delighted to be joined by Dan McGrail, Chief Executive at RenewableUK. Dan joined RenewableUK as Chief Executive in May 2021. Previously, during his time as a senior leader at Siemens for close to two decades, Dan played a critical role in the innovation and manufacture of key energy technologies including wind turbine blades and efficient thermal engines. As well as being the CEO of Siemens Engines until last year, Dan was also the Chair of the Association for Decentralised Energy from 2016 to 2019. The main topics include: • How broadly should green hydrogen be defined • What is needed to hit the government's new offshore wind targets • The disruptions in the global supply chain • The current debates around market design

You can apply economics to just about anything. Economics provides you with a perspective and a toolbox that enables you to see things that you wouldn't otherwise see before. This is part of our guests specialty, with books titles like “An Economist Goes to the Game: How to Throw Away $580 Million and Other Surprising Insights from the Economics of Sports,” and “Everything I Ever Needed to Know About Economics I Learned from Online Dating.”Paul Oyer is the Mary and Rankine Van Anda Entrepreneurial Professor and Professor of Economics, as well as the Senior Associate Dean for Academic Affairs at the Stanford Graduate School of Business.Paul studies the economics of organizations and human resource practices. His current projects include studies of the "Gig Economy" the impact of peoples background on their entrepreneurial careers. In this episode, you'll hear about talent acquisition & retention in Silicon Valley, what economics and other industries can learn from the sports world, dating markets, and the wealth of data in dating platforms.Episode Quotes:Dating market is just the same as employment So from my perspective, the dating market is no different than the employment market, except that no money changes hands. And that's what made it particularly interesting to me to write a book about, because people think, oh, economics, it's money, it's banking. It's whatever terms, they associate with economics. And as a micro economist, I don't see it that way at all. Right? Money is just a convenience by which we exchange. But you know, the world is about utility. It's not about money. So matching people in the dating market is really just the same as employment.How are athletes and managers different?The big difference between a baseball player or any athlete and managers in most organizations is the ability to measure their performance effectively.Do people fail to consider the complementarities and potential they can get from their employer?I think that people don't think enough before starting jobs, but I also think you don't know until you've started. And so, learning, figuring out on the job, just what does and doesn't work takes some time, and you sometimes have to try things before, you know, for sure. Show Links:Recommended Resources:unSILOed: Game Theory and the Art of Transforming Strategic Situations feat. David McAdamsunSILOed: Game Theory and Market Design feat. Al RothGuest Profile:Faculty Profile at Stanford Graduate School of BusinessProfessional Profile at Freeman Spogli Institute for International StudiesProfessional Profile at National Bureau of Economic ResearchPaul Oyer on LinkedInPaul Oyer on TwitterHis Work:Paul Oyer on Google ScholarAn Economist Goes to the GameRoadside MBA: Back Road Lessons for Entrepreneurs, Executives and Small Business OwnersEverything I Ever Needed to Know about Economics I Learned from Online Dating

In the third episode on electricity market design, Tom and Emma ask "What is Time?". But they're not physicists, so they can't answer this question. But they can answer: What's a Settlement Period? What's an EFA Block? What do futures contracts represent? All this - and more - in the latest episode of the Substation Podcast.

This week, we have a special Energy Unplugged podcast episode on the topic of the current energy price crisis and the implications for market design. The Head of our Berlin office, Hanns Koenig is joined by two very distinguished guests: Lion Hirth – Professor of Energy Policy at the Hertie School in Berlin and Robert Gross – Director at UKERC (The UK Energy Research Centre) and also a Professor of Energy Policy at Imperial College London. Lion is one of the leading thinkers on power market design in Europe and Rob is an authority in power market design in Great Britain. Main topics include: • What is going on in the European power markets at the moment • Why are power prices so high and what are the implications for market design • Splitting markets for renewables and conventional generation • Gas price caps for the power sector and the windfall tax

In this episode Alexander Teytelboym walks us through the intricacies of uniform-price auctions. While often praised for their theoretical properties, putting them into practice successfully can turn out to be quite the challenge. Alex shares with us what can be learned about auction design from observing uniform-price auctions in the fishing industry and how game theory can explain fishermen's bids that resemble "crank handles". This research by Alex is based on joint work with Sanna Laksa and Daniel Marszalec.   Alex Teytelboym is associate professor at the Department of Economics at the University of Oxford. His research interests are in the areas of market design and the economics of networks including their applications to environmental economics and energy markets, among others.

Professor Frank Wolak, the Holbrook Working Professor of Commodity Price Studies in the Department of Economics at Stanford University who also works as the Director of the Program on Energy and Sustainable Development, joins Paul Dockery for the third installation of our Electric Market Enthusiasm series. 04:13 - my lede for Professor Wolak's working paperWolak, Frank A. "Long-term resource adequacy in wholesale electricity markets with significant intermittent renewables." Environmental and Energy Policy and the Economy 3.1 (2022): 155-220.10:22 - the Reliability Externality and it's relation to the Missing Money problem16:48 - suspending exports in scarcity events20:27 - Standardized Fixed Price Forward Contract market auctions34:50 - the Energy Market Game48:28 - The Future of Electricity Retailing and How We Get There52:43 - developing market depth on the demand sideYou can find our merch on shopify. You can find the podcast on Apple Podcast, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. Remember to share this with any friends you have that are electric utility enthusiasts like us!Public Power Underground, for electric utility enthusiasts! Public Power Underground, it's work to watch!

Emma and Tom talk about the latest development in market design in GB, the Government's Review of the Electricity Market Arrangements - REMA. It will be a wide-ranging review, with an ambitious scope, considering all aspects of markets and mechanisms. They talk about historical experience with market reform in GB, possible interventions following REMA, tne importance of governance, and the importance of good acronyms.

Building tokenized products means bridging the gap between theory and practice. Before tackling the practical complexities of tokenomics, you need to have a solid theoretical understanding of economics. Our guest for this episode ticks both these boxes. He has a unique way of combining economic theory with practical solutions to real-world problems. Scott Kominers is a professor at Harvard Business School. He is also a part of a16z's crypto research team, and an advisor to many web3 companies. Over the years, Scott has published insightful research on how tokens can help design markets and build reputation-based systems. His work is invaluable for anyone looking to deeply understand web3. We hope you enjoy this conversation as much as we did! 

Jacob Mays, Assistant Professor in the School of Civil and Environmental Engineering at Cornell University, answers Paul's remedial questions on how electric markets function and what the Pacific Northwest should be considering when approaching market expansion incrementally in a wide ranging and engaging conversation. Since Professor Mays is an academic, it feels fitting to include citations for the materials referenced. Please excuse any errors in citation. Mays et al., Private risk and social resilience in liberalized electricity markets, Joule (2022), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joule.2022.01.004 Mays, Jacob and Jenkins, Jesse, Electricity Markets under Deep Decarbonization (April 19, 2022). USAEE Working Paper No. 22-550, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=4087528 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4087528 Mays, J., Morton, D.P. & O'Neill, R.P. Asymmetric risk and fuel neutrality in electricity capacity markets. Nat Energy 4, 948–956 (2019). https://doi.org/10.1038/s41560-019-0476-1 F. A. Wolak, Economic and political constraints on the demand-side of electricity industry re-structuring processes, Review of Economics and Institutions 4 (1) (Feb. 2013). doi:10.5202/rei.v4i1.101.URL https://doi.org/10.5202/rei.v4i1.101 Grubert, E., & Hastings-Simon, S. (2022). Designing the mid-transition: A review of medium-term challenges for coordinated decarbonization in the United States. Wiley Interdisciplinary Reviews: Climate Change, e768. https://doi.org/10.1002/wcc.768 Mays, J., A mini-thread on my and @JesseJenkins working paper, Electricity Markets under Deep Decarbonization. (April 28, 2022). Twitter.com.  Jenkins, J., Texas's grid is straining again, as a spring heat wave finds ERCOT with about 1/3 of thermal power plants down, some for scheduled outages (prep for summer), others forced outages due to equipment failures, including 1 coal and 6 gas units. A few threads on the situation... (May 14, 2022). Twitter.com.  You can find our merch on shopify. You can find the podcast on Apple Podcast, Spotify, or wherever you get your podcasts. Remember to share this with any friends you have that are electric utility enthusiasts like us!Public Power Underground, for electric utility enthusiasts! Public Power Underground, where you're valued and appreciated.

In the second in the series on electricity market design, Tom and Emma discuss the two different approaches to pricing and despatch in electricity markets –central despatch and self despatch. They talk about how we moved from a centralised 'pool' market to a de-centralised market in Great Britain and ask whether there could be a case to move back again.

In this episode, Tom and Emma dive into electricity market design. Marignal pricing is a key concept in electricity market design, with the most expensive unit needed to meet demand setting the price for all generators. They explain Marginal Pricing and ask whether in a world of rising gas prices and increasing proportions of renewables the marginal pricing principle is still fit for purpose. Could a two phase market work, with a separate 'green power pool' so that pricing is no longer set by expensive fuelled generation? How would this work, and what would the implications be?

Economists are no longer simply describing and understanding markets, but are often playing the role of “economic engineer”, improving existing markets and sometimes, designing market mechanisms from scratch. Al Roth is a professor of economics at Stanford University and the author of “Who Gets What ― and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design.” And although this book came out about seven years ago, it is still so, so fresh. He and Greg talk about the growing field of market design, liquidity in modern day markets, game theory and stable matching.Episode Quotes:How speed & technology have changed trading & markets:So right now a lot of trading engines are co-located with exchange servers in the same buildings, because the speed of light is bound on how fast you can find these trades. Majority of trades these days are algorithmic trades and they make very little money on each trade, but they make many, many trades.And it's not clear that that's helping price discovery or efficiency, because people who are making markets or offering bids and asks, have to take wider spreads in order to defend themselves against having traded on a stale bid or ask when someone who's a little faster than they gets new information from one of the markets.The growth of game theory & economics: I think a little bit that's the way economics developed. For a long time we took markets as things that happened and our job was to study them. But one of the things you can study and particularly with the advent of game theory in the 20th century, one of the things you can study is the details of how markets work. What is their design? And once you start studying their design, you can start talking about maybe helping to alter it and fix it.How Al got his start:It turned out the future of game theory was in economics. And so my claim when I speak to [Operations Research] audiences these days is that I didn't change my field, I stood my ground and the disciplinary boundaries moved around me. So I'm an economist because game theory is about economics. But increasingly it's coming back to operations research because market design is about the operations of certain kinds of companies that run markets.Show Links:Guest Profile:Faculty Profile at Stanford UniversityFaculty Profile at Harvard Business SchoolProfessional Profile at The Nobel Prize's WebsiteAl Roth at Talks at GoogleHis Work:Al Roth on Google ScholarWho Gets What ― and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market DesignWho Gets What - And Why

On a monthly basis, we discuss the Energy Markets in this podcast. In this ‘Energy Markets Talk’, Christian Baer, Secretary General of Europex discusses the current energy prices surges and how the energy market design keeps on evolving.* Europex is the Association of European Energy Exchanges, representing the interests of exchange-based wholesale electricity, gas and environmental markets by focusing on developments of the European regulatory framework for wholesale energy trading. *Recorded prior to the conflict in Ukraine.

A Teoria dos Jogos tem mais aplicações na prática do que aquelas que podemos imaginar: está subjacente aos leilões de arte mas também aos leilões do peixe ou das flores; está por detrás da colocação de professores em escolas ou de médicos em hospitais. Até a turma onde a sua filha foi colocada na Faculdade é determinada por esta teoria que afinal tem aplicações muito mais concretas do que parece.Joana Pais e Hugo Van Der Ding largam o lado teórico e trocam agora a Teoria dos Jogos por miúdos, fazendo jus ao objectivo do IN PERTINENTE: dar respostas às perguntas de todos e contribuir para uma sociedade mais informada.REFERÊNCIAS E LINKS ÚTEIS:Leilões:Krishna, Vijay. Auction theory. Academic press, 2009. Milgrom, Paul Robert. Putting auction theory to work. Cambridge University Press, 2004 Desenho de mercados em geral:Roth, Alvin E. The economist as engineer: Game theory, experimentation, and computation as tools for design economics." Econometrica 70.4 (2002): 1341-1378.Roth, Alvin E. "What Have We Learned from Market Design?." The Economic Journal 118.527 (2008): 285-310. Scott Duke Kominers, Alexander Teytelboym, and Vincent P. Crawford. An invitation to market design. Oxford Review of Economic Policy Matching theory:Gale, David, and Lloyd S. Shapley. "College admissions and the stability of marriage." The American Mathematical Monthly 69.1 (1962): 9-15. Scientific Background on the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel 2012: https://www.nobelprize.org/uploads/2018/06/advanced-economicsciences2012.pdfRoth, Alvin E. "The evolution of the labor market for medical interns and residents: a case study in game theory." The Journal of Political Economy(1984): 991-1016. Alvin Roth, Marilda Sotomayor, Two-sided matching (1990), Cambridge university press (Econometric Society Monograph)Alvin Roth (2015), Who gets what - and why: The new economics of Matchmaking and Market Design, Eamon Dolan / Houghton Mifflin Harcourt Michael A. Rees, Ty B. Dunn, Christian S. Kuhr, Christopher L. Marsh, Jeffrey Rogers, Susan E. Rees, Alejandra Cicero, Laurie J. Reece, Alvin E. Roth, Obi Ekwenna, et al. Kidney exchange to overcome financial barriers to kidney transplantation. American Journal of Transplantation, 17:782–790, 2017.BIOSJOANA PAISJoana Pais é professora de Economia no ISEG da Universidade de Lisboa. Obteve o seu Ph.D. em Economia na Universitat Autònoma de Barcelona em 2005. Atualmente é coordenadora do programa de Mestrado em Economia e do programa de Doutoramento em Economia, ambos do ISEG, e membro da direção da unidade de investigação REM - Research in Economics and Mathematics. É ainda coordenadora do XLAB – Behavioural Research Lab, um laboratório que explora a tomada de decisão e o comportamento económico, político e social, suportado pelo consórcio PASSDA (Production and Archive of Social Science Data). Os seus interesses de investigação incluem áreas como a teoria de jogos, em particular, a teoria da afetação (matching theory), o desenho de mercados, a economia comportamental e a economia experimental.HUGO VAN DER DING Hugo van der Ding nasceu nos finais dos anos 70 ao largo do Golfo da Biscaia, durante uma viagem entre Amesterdão e Lisboa, e cresceu numa comunidade hippie nos arredores de Montpellier. Estudou História das Artes Decorativas Orientais, especializando-se em gansos de origami. Em 2012, desistiu da carreira académica para fazer desenhos nas redes sociais. Depois do sucesso de A Criada Malcriada deixou de precisar de trabalhar. Ainda assim, escreve regularmente em revistas e jornais, é autor de alguns livros e podcasts, faz ocasionalmente teatro e televisão, e continua a fazer desenhos nas redes sociais. Desde 2019 é um dos apresentadores do programa Manhãs da 3, na Antena 3.

A transcript of this episode is available here: https://thedanceedit.com/transcript-episode-103Subscribe to The Dance Edit Extra: https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/the-dance-edit-extra/id1579075769Links referenced in/relevant to episode 103:-information about and application for the Creatives Rebuild New York program: https://www.creativesrebuildny.org/apply/-New York Times feature on the closure of the Kirov Academy: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/08/arts/dance/kirov-academy-ballet-school-closing.html-Dance Data Project report on collegiate dance program faculty and administration: https://www.dancedataproject.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/02/Collegiate-Dance-Programs-Faculty-and-Administration-Report.pdf-video of a young Nathan Chen performing with Ballet West: https://www.instagram.com/p/CZ0XDr1gcPd/-Dance Magazine article on the ballet job market: https://www.dancemagazine.com/ballet-job-market/-New York Times feature on "Sleep No More" reopening: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/09/theater/sleep-no-more-reopens.html-former "Then She Fell" performer Bre Short's Dance Magazine essay on the future of immersive theater: https://www.dancemagazine.com/immersive-theater-then-she-fell/-New York Times piece on ballet skiing: https://www.nytimes.com/2022/02/11/arts/dance/ski-ballet-internet.html

In February 2021, a severe cold weather event, known as Winter Storm Uri, caused numerous power outages, derates, or failures to start at electric generating plants scattered across Texas and the south-central U.S. The Electric Reliability Council of Texas (ERCOT), which manages the power supply for about 90% of the load in Texas, ordered a total of 20,000 MW of rolling blackouts in an effort to prevent grid collapse. According to the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), this was “the largest manually controlled load shedding event in U.S. history.” More than 4.5 million people in Texas lost power—some for as long as four days. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration's National Centers for Environmental Information reported that the event resulted in 226 deaths nationwide and cost an estimated $24 billion. There has been a lot of finger pointing surrounding the blackouts that occurred. Several studies have been done into the causes, including one spearheaded by FERC, the North American Electric Reliability Corp. (NERC), and NERC's regional entities. The key finding from the FERC/NERC report was that a critical need exists “for stronger mandatory electric reliability standards, particularly with respect to generator cold weather-critical components and systems.” The study found that a combination of freezing issues (44.2%) and fuel issues (31.4%) caused 75.6% of the unplanned generating unit outages, derates, and failures to start. But Bernard McNamee, a former FERC commissioner, and current partner with the law firm McGuireWoods and a senior advisor at McGuireWoods Consulting, suggested the study missed the real cause of the problem. Speaking as a guest on The POWER Podcast, McNamee said, “I think the reality is, is that there was a market design problem in Texas, and that was that, as you had more subsidized resources driving down the overall cost of power, you're not providing enough financial incentive for other dispatchable resources to harden their systems—winterize their systems—to be available when the wind wasn't blowing or the sun wasn't shining.” McNamee didn't blame power generators for being ill-prepared. He suggested they simply made decisions based on cost-benefit analysis. “Why would you [spend money on weatherization] if you're a natural gas company or generator and you think you're going to make most of your money, you know, five to 10 days in the summer? You're not expecting to operate in the winter and make money, [so] why would you spend the capital that you're not going to be able to recover?” McNamee asked. “I think that the market design is something that has not been talked about enough [and] was one of the leading causes of what happened,” McNamee said. “I think what happened in the winter storm in Texas, and what happened in August of 2020 in California, were really warning signs for the rest of the country about how we really need to pay attention to market design, and maybe costs that aren't being priced into the market but that are necessary for reliability.” However, McNamee also doesn't blame the growth of renewable resources for the problem. “It doesn't mean that wind and solar are bad. They provide some great benefits,” he said. “It's not that one resource is good or bad. It's thinking about how does the system all work together, so it's there when you need it 24/7. And it can't be, ‘Well, on average, the power will be available.' It's got to be available every moment.”

In this (not so) short episode, Emma and Tom do a page turn on the November 2021 publication from National Grid on Net Zero Market Reform. Read along at: https://www.nationalgrideso.com/document/221776/download

Irene Ng is a Professor of Marketing and Service Systems and the Director of the International Institute for Product and Service Innovation at WMG, University of Warwick. An industrial economist through her doctoral training, Irene's research lies in the trans-disciplinary understanding of value and the design of markets and economic/business models. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

What are some of the reforms that can make electricity markets more friendly to the technologies and needs of the energy transition?

What are some of the reforms that can make electricity markets more friendly to the technologies and needs of the energy transition?

In Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design (Mariner Books, 2015), Nobel Memorial Prize Winner Alvin Roth explains his pioneering work in the study of matching markets such as kidney exchange, marriage, job placements for new doctors and new professors, and enrollments in schools or colleges. In these markets, “buyers” and “sellers” must each chose the other, and getting the prices right is only a small part of what makes for a successful transaction, if cash is even involved at all. Roth's work has led the way in taking microeconomics outside the halls of academic theory to become a practical “engineering” tool for policymakers and businesses. In our interview, we range far beyond the examples from the book to discuss the implications of his work for the design of tech's market-making “platform” businesses like Airbnb, Amazon, Lyft, or Uber, the challenges he faces when countries or people view some kinds of transactions as “repugnant” or morally unacceptable, and the reasons why San Francisco's school district (unlike Boston's or New York's) chose not to implement the un-gameable school choice plan his team devised for them. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices

In Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design (Mariner Books, 2015), Nobel Memorial Prize Winner Alvin Roth explains his pioneering work in the study of matching markets such as kidney exchange, marriage, job placements for new doctors and new professors, and enrollments in schools or colleges. In these markets, “buyers” and “sellers” must each chose the other, and getting the prices right is only a small part of what makes for a successful transaction, if cash is even involved at all. Roth's work has led the way in taking microeconomics outside the halls of academic theory to become a practical “engineering” tool for policymakers and businesses. In our interview, we range far beyond the examples from the book to discuss the implications of his work for the design of tech's market-making “platform” businesses like Airbnb, Amazon, Lyft, or Uber, the challenges he faces when countries or people view some kinds of transactions as “repugnant” or morally unacceptable, and the reasons why San Francisco's school district (unlike Boston's or New York's) chose not to implement the un-gameable school choice plan his team devised for them. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/science-technology-and-society

In Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design (Mariner Books, 2015), Nobel Memorial Prize Winner Alvin Roth explains his pioneering work in the study of matching markets such as kidney exchange, marriage, job placements for new doctors and new professors, and enrollments in schools or colleges. In these markets, “buyers” and “sellers” must each chose the other, and getting the prices right is only a small part of what makes for a successful transaction, if cash is even involved at all. Roth's work has led the way in taking microeconomics outside the halls of academic theory to become a practical “engineering” tool for policymakers and businesses. In our interview, we range far beyond the examples from the book to discuss the implications of his work for the design of tech's market-making “platform” businesses like Airbnb, Amazon, Lyft, or Uber, the challenges he faces when countries or people view some kinds of transactions as “repugnant” or morally unacceptable, and the reasons why San Francisco's school district (unlike Boston's or New York's) chose not to implement the un-gameable school choice plan his team devised for them. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/systems-and-cybernetics

In Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design (Mariner Books, 2015), Nobel Memorial Prize Winner Alvin Roth explains his pioneering work in the study of matching markets such as kidney exchange, marriage, job placements for new doctors and new professors, and enrollments in schools or colleges. In these markets, “buyers” and “sellers” must each chose the other, and getting the prices right is only a small part of what makes for a successful transaction, if cash is even involved at all. Roth's work has led the way in taking microeconomics outside the halls of academic theory to become a practical “engineering” tool for policymakers and businesses. In our interview, we range far beyond the examples from the book to discuss the implications of his work for the design of tech's market-making “platform” businesses like Airbnb, Amazon, Lyft, or Uber, the challenges he faces when countries or people view some kinds of transactions as “repugnant” or morally unacceptable, and the reasons why San Francisco's school district (unlike Boston's or New York's) chose not to implement the un-gameable school choice plan his team devised for them. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/book-of-the-day

In Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design (Mariner Books, 2015), Nobel Memorial Prize Winner Alvin Roth explains his pioneering work in the study of matching markets such as kidney exchange, marriage, job placements for new doctors and new professors, and enrollments in schools or colleges. In these markets, “buyers” and “sellers” must each chose the other, and getting the prices right is only a small part of what makes for a successful transaction, if cash is even involved at all. Roth's work has led the way in taking microeconomics outside the halls of academic theory to become a practical “engineering” tool for policymakers and businesses. In our interview, we range far beyond the examples from the book to discuss the implications of his work for the design of tech's market-making “platform” businesses like Airbnb, Amazon, Lyft, or Uber, the challenges he faces when countries or people view some kinds of transactions as “repugnant” or morally unacceptable, and the reasons why San Francisco's school district (unlike Boston's or New York's) chose not to implement the un-gameable school choice plan his team devised for them. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/public-policy

In Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design (Mariner Books, 2015), Nobel Memorial Prize Winner Alvin Roth explains his pioneering work in the study of matching markets such as kidney exchange, marriage, job placements for new doctors and new professors, and enrollments in schools or colleges. In these markets, “buyers” and “sellers” must each chose the other, and getting the prices right is only a small part of what makes for a successful transaction, if cash is even involved at all. Roth's work has led the way in taking microeconomics outside the halls of academic theory to become a practical “engineering” tool for policymakers and businesses. In our interview, we range far beyond the examples from the book to discuss the implications of his work for the design of tech's market-making “platform” businesses like Airbnb, Amazon, Lyft, or Uber, the challenges he faces when countries or people view some kinds of transactions as “repugnant” or morally unacceptable, and the reasons why San Francisco's school district (unlike Boston's or New York's) chose not to implement the un-gameable school choice plan his team devised for them. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/finance

In Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design (Mariner Books, 2015), Nobel Memorial Prize Winner Alvin Roth explains his pioneering work in the study of matching markets such as kidney exchange, marriage, job placements for new doctors and new professors, and enrollments in schools or colleges. In these markets, “buyers” and “sellers” must each chose the other, and getting the prices right is only a small part of what makes for a successful transaction, if cash is even involved at all. Roth's work has led the way in taking microeconomics outside the halls of academic theory to become a practical “engineering” tool for policymakers and businesses. In our interview, we range far beyond the examples from the book to discuss the implications of his work for the design of tech's market-making “platform” businesses like Airbnb, Amazon, Lyft, or Uber, the challenges he faces when countries or people view some kinds of transactions as “repugnant” or morally unacceptable, and the reasons why San Francisco's school district (unlike Boston's or New York's) chose not to implement the un-gameable school choice plan his team devised for them. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design (Mariner Books, 2015), Nobel Memorial Prize Winner Alvin Roth explains his pioneering work in the study of matching markets such as kidney exchange, marriage, job placements for new doctors and new professors, and enrollments in schools or colleges. In these markets, “buyers” and “sellers” must each chose the other, and getting the prices right is only a small part of what makes for a successful transaction, if cash is even involved at all. Roth's work has led the way in taking microeconomics outside the halls of academic theory to become a practical “engineering” tool for policymakers and businesses. In our interview, we range far beyond the examples from the book to discuss the implications of his work for the design of tech's market-making “platform” businesses like Airbnb, Amazon, Lyft, or Uber, the challenges he faces when countries or people view some kinds of transactions as “repugnant” or morally unacceptable, and the reasons why San Francisco's school district (unlike Boston's or New York's) chose not to implement the un-gameable school choice plan his team devised for them. Host Peter Lorentzen is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics at the University of San Francisco, where he leads a new digital economy-focused Master's program in Applied Economics. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/economics

In order to advance the “green revolution”, the EU has set some ambitious goals to drastically increase renewable energies in their energy portfolio. Part of that strategy is to award “support” (i.e. state subsidies) to renewable energy projects. Today's guest Marion Ott explains to us how these subsidies are allocated, which rules are discussed to improve this process and their (unintended) effects. In particular, we are discussing “endogenous rationing”, which tries to increase competition in the subsidies tenders by artificially reducing the supply.   Marion Ott is researcher at the  ZEW and member of the research department "Market Design". Her work is focussed on auction and market design. You can find details on her current research activities on her homepage. In particular, Marion recently published two papers on endogenous rationing, which you can find here (in English) and here (in German only).

Richard Metzger from Quantsys.net joins us to discuss how to combine algos using state-based market design techniques for more consistent trading performance, including: Why it's important to be sceptical of your algos, The main causes of poor algo performance and how state-based market design can address these issues, How to define market states into "buckets" and why you should keep them simple, Combining state-based algos to create a system, plus Adjusting inputs for market states, combining strategies in Tradestation, market states vs regime filters, and much more!

Funny, passionate, and kindhearted - Margarey Valdez. The owner of Market Design Team guides us through the world of Marketing! Margarey explains an array of marketing strategies, how she evaluates her clients needs and what all goes into creating a successful brand. Margarey has worked with a number of amazing businesses in the Brazoria County area such as: Brew & Bake, County Seat Barbers, Picket Fence and more! Follow Margarey Valdez and Market Design Team below: IG: @Margareya IG: @marketdesignteam Facebook: Margarey Valdez Facebook: Market Design Team Websites: www.marketdesignteam.com Follow Jon and Mike on Instagram @curiositywithjonandmike Follow Jon and Mike on Facebook @curiositywithjonandmike

In this episode we are talking to Vitali Gretschko, professor of economics and market design. With him, we explore how moral behaviour affects decisions in market environments. We discuss a recent research project in which he jointly with colleagues designed an experiment to understand details on the relevance of social norms for market interactions. We also discuss how markets can be set up and designed to increase moral behaviour.   Prof. Dr. Vitali Gretschko is head of the ZEW Research Department "Market Design", Professor of Market Design at the University of Mannheim, and a member of the Research Unit "Design and Behaviour" at the German Research Foundation (DFG). Vitali's team published a working paper on the research project he mentions in the interview  - you can download it at https://www.zew.de/publikationen/social-norms-and-market-behavior-evidence-from-a-large-population-sample

We discuss with TWS Partners' CEO Marcus Schreiber which economic reasons led to the impressively short development time for a vaccine against SARS-CoV-2. Marcus describes that risk mitigation and clever incentive structures set by the governments significantly contributed to this success story. This can be seen as a prime example for market design, a subfield of game theory. For our German listeners: You can read more on this topic in Marc's column in the Handelsblatt (https://www.handelsblatt.com/meinung/kolumnen/expertenrat/schreiber/expertenrat-marcus-schreiber-gut-dass-staaten-die-impfstoffentwicklung-nicht-allein-dem-markt-ueberlassen/26663870.html)

In this pilot episode, Stephen Woodhouse shares his thoughts on where electricity markets have come from and where they are headed. What does the future hold for electricity markets? What have been the objectives of electricity markets, and how do they now need to change? What kind of framework do we need to achieve these new objectives and how do we create it? And what are the opportunities? See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

Today, we continue part 2 of the economics of insurance. This episode is a deep dive into Nexus Mutual, $NXM. I'm not saying that DeFi is all about bonding curve....... but I'm 100% going to talk about bonding curve. **Note: This bonding curve is DIFFERENT from the AMM bonding curve! Watch the previous video if you have not done because this is part 2: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=i97PVvQrcnc This episode, we cover the general workings of Nexus Mutual and how they used token to align incentives of the various agents: risk assessors, claim assessors and insurance cover buyers. More importantly, we also dive into the math of Nexus Mutual and answer the questions about the monetary policy of $NXM. The why and how things are affected in the curve. In general, we follow the economics design framework, looking at Market Design, Mechanism Design and Token Design aspects of the token. Enjoy! Want more in-depth content? Join our patreon for premium content at www.patreon.com/economicsdesign

In our eighth episode, host Dave Finch discusses how to get from prototype to market, zeroing in on the process of DFM or, more accurately DFX, which stands for "Design for" ...well, anything that comes after the design. Why does cost go up after a product's been released for a while? When should you consider certifcation in the design process? How can young engineers hope to familiarize themselves with DFM if they never even designed a full board in school? Learn the many good reasons engineers should know their board manufacturers. Consider how EMS (electronic manufacturing services) companies have evolved from mere contractors into design partners. And hear some truly unfortunate stories about what happens when you fail to plan beyond the circuit design stage appropriately.

In this episode, I talk to Alvin Roth of Stanford University about market design and game theory. We delve into topics like market structures, market failures, game theory applications, and more! Check out the episode to learn about market design and game theory in a simplified way! Alvin Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University. He specializes in market design, game theory, and behavioral and experimental economics. In addition to being a professor, he was the President of the American Economics Association in 2017. In 2012, he won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences jointly with Lloyd Shapley for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design. Before teaching at Stanford, Alvin taught economics at Harvard, where he now holds emeritus status. He is the author of Who Gets What and Why, which is linked below. Alvin received his undergraduate degree from Columbia University in Operations Research and both his master’s and doctorate degrees from Stanford, both in Operations Research. Follow Stanford University on Twitter here! Follow StreetFins on Twitter, Instagram, and Facebook here, and follow me on Twitter @rohaninvest! Find and subscribe to Finance Simplified on Apple Podcasts, Google Podcasts, and Spotify! Alvin’s Book: Who Gets What ― and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design (2015) Want to learn more? Check out some StreetFins articles relating to topics mentioned in the episode: Intro to Economics Intro To Microeconomics

Often, we like to think that token economics is all about the token. That is not true. It also comes with the design of the environment, which the token exists in. And that's market design. In this episode, we uncover what market design is, what are the 3 aspects to consider and examples of how they can be applied when you design your token ecosystem. Want more in-depth content? Join our Token Economics 201 course at www.education.economicsdesign.com! Watch on YouTube for visual learners and Substack for those who prefer reading.

Judd Kessler is an Associate Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at the Wharton School. He received a B.A. in Economics from Harvard University in 2004, an M.Phil. in Economics from Cambridge University in 2005, and a Ph.D. in Business Economics from Harvard University in 2011. In his research, Judd uses a combination of laboratory and field experiments to answer questions in Public Economics, Behavioral Economics, and Market Design. He investigates the economic and psychological forces that motivate individuals to contribute to public goods, with applications including organ donation, worker effort, and charitable giving. He also investigates market design innovations, placing particular emphasis on bringing market design from theory to practice, with applications including course allocation and priority systems for organ allocation. His research has appeared in general interest journals including the American Economic Review, the Quarterly Journal of Economics, the Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, and Management Science. In 2012, Judd was named one of Forbes Magazine's "30 under 30" in Law and Policy. Corinne Low is an Assistant Professor of Business Economics and Public Policy at the Wharton School, specializing in labor and development economics.  Her research brings together applied microeconomic theory with lab and field experiments to understand the determinants of who gets how much across gender and age lines. Current ongoing projects focus on a new technology to examine hiring discrimination, the tradeoff women make between career and family in the US, and the impact of teaching girls negotiation skills in Zambia. Corinne received her PhD in economics from Columbia University and her undergraduate degree in economics and public policy from Duke University, after which she worked as a consultant for McKinsey and Co. At Wharton, Corinne teaches Managerial Economics in the MBA program.

The PJM Interconnection has several market design changes underway, including adjustments to energy reserve price formation and the way its capacity market is structured that will significantly impact market participants going forward. Andy Ott, president and CEO of PJM Interconnection, talks with...

This seminar was given on November 1, 2018 by Severin Borenstein, Professor and Faculty Director, Energy Institute at Haas, UC Berkeley. It was given as part of the Regulatory Policy Program's weekly seminar series.

Event podcast: At this Energy Futures event ACCC Chair Rod Sims, Grattan Institute’s Tony Wood and Dr Leslie Martin from The University of Melbourne's Department of Economics and the Centre for Market Design, discussed the ACCC report, its recommendations to governments on solutions and the expectations we should have for real improvements in the short to medium term.

More at https://www.philosophytalk.org/shows/repugnant-markets. We might ban buying or selling horse meat in the US not for the protection of horses, but because we find it morally repugnant. Yet this moral repugnance is clearly not universal, and on some level may even be arbitrary, given France's attitude towad horse meat. What role, if any, should moral repugnance play in determining the rules of our marketplaces? Even if we want to eliminate the influence of moral repugnance, can we? Debra and Ken hold their noses with Nobel-laureate economist Alvin Roth, author of "Who Gets What ― and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design."

More at https://www.philosophytalk.org/shows/repugnant-markets. We might ban buying or selling horse meat in the US not for the protection of horses, but because we find it morally repugnant. Yet this moral repugnance is clearly not universal, and on some level may even be arbitrary, given France's attitude toward horse meat. What role, if any, should moral repugnance play in determining the rules of our marketplaces? Even if we want to eliminate the influence of moral repugnance, can we? Debra and Ken hold their noses with Al Roth from Stanford University, author of "Who Gets What ― and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design."

Chuck and Rachel recap recent events in New Haven, CT and New York, NY. They also discuss some recent success stories of Strong Towns members in action. Mentioned in this podcast: "An Open Letter to the City of Springfield" by Chuck Marohn "One Million Strong" by Chuck Marohn Join us for this week's slackchat at 12pm CT on Wednesday "Putting Portland's Urban Highway in its Place" by Rachel Quednau "Placemaking Projects Create a Stronger Iron Range" by Rachel Quednau Debt: The First 5,000 Years by David Graeber Who Gets What ? and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design by Alvin Roth

After attending a conference jointly organised by Eurelectric and the Florence School of Regulation on the electricity market design of the future, Pradyumna Bhagwat (FSR) and Nicolò Rossetto (FSR) summarise their main takeaways. First, thinking out of the box is fundamental. We live in transformative times and electricity markets must be able to manage uncertainty and adapt to new, unpredictable conditions. Second, the European Commission and the electricity industry believe in the strong role free markets can play but have a different view on what those markets should look like. On the one side, scarcity pricing may scare policy-makers and investors, while on the other, capacity mechanisms may distort the internal market and hinder integration. Convergence of opinions between the industry, the Commission and most of the academics is more apparent on the need to engage consumers, foster flexibility and the breakthrough that turning reliability into a private good could represent. Finally, the parallel sessions showed how useful it is for academia and the industry to sit down together and merge their theoretical and practical knowledge to understand the current changes better and advance proposals for tackling society’s problems.

At the end of the EURELECTRIC – FSR conference on the market design of the future, Nicolò Rossetto (FSR) and Professor Graham Weale (Bochum University) discuss the market design for electricity in 2050. Despite the relevance the European Commission attributed to scarcity prices, Professor Weale is sceptical of the idea that energy-only markets will be enough to induce and remunerate adequate investment in generation capacity. According to him, political opposition to excessively high spot prices, an increased cost of capital and the wide-ranging deployment of renewables with low variable costs can undermine a market design based on few, infrequent price spikes. A second revenue stream to remunerate capacity could be necessary for the electricity market of the future. This position is beloved by Eurelectric. At FSR we see it as controversial as it is not widely agreed upon by many scholars and practitioners. However, “retweeting is not supporting”. What is less controversial and we support is the importance to adopt a holistic and gradual approach to market reform in order to avoid unintended consequences and side-effects.

Recorded 18 May 2017, Brussels Description: Nicolò Rossetto (FSR) and Juan Alba Rios (chairman of the EURELECTRIC Markets Committee) discuss the 2016 legislative proposals of the European Commission on a new market design for the electricity sector. Alba Rios expresses a positive view on the proposal, which strengthens the role of markets in providing signals to economic actors and acknowledges the possibility of establishing capacity remuneration mechanisms to complement the existing energy-only markets. Indeed, short-term scarcity prices are not enough to foster adequate investment decisions in generation capacity and must be supported by additional, market-based, incentives. According to EURELECTRIC, although the Commission's proposal is not perfect, it goes in the right direction and provides a good starting point for building the market design of the future.

Economics Professor Alvin Roth of Stanford University won the 2012 Nobel Prize in Economics for his work on market design. What is "market design," and how can it be applied to kidney donation, getting married, and medical students choosing residency programs?

本期节目邀请到了『掘金』的创始人阴明，来和我们聊聊他们的创业故事和他对创业中的技术选型的一些看法。 掘金 香港中文大学 University of Cambridge Product Hunt Hacker News Arc Programming Language Growth hacking 掘金翻译计划 LeanCloud Parse Node.js Heroku Striking.ly 掘金的后端架构 Express AngularJS Backbone.js Meteor Firebase Vue.js vue-loader 掘金 Vue.js 专区 React Pokemon Go ,中国区玩法教程小白帖（不需要越狱） 共享经济：市场设计及其应用 Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design Moo.do Special Guest: 阴明.

http://energylawforum.eu/ The Vienna Forum on European Energy Law is a joint initiative between the Florence School of Regulation and the Energy Community Secretariat. It is designed to promote engagement and discussion on the most relevant issues currently facing the EU and the countries of Eastern and South Eastern Europe. In an ever-changing energy landscape, the forum considers the complex and challenging legal aspects of EU energy policy, and the opportunities of integration with the EU internal energy market.

Jason ushers us into this episode by taking us through Julie Malinowski's article “6 Trends Among Landlords and Tips to Outperform the Norm”. He also reminds us there are a few tickets left to the upcoming Meet the Masters event and about the upcoming Venture Alliance Mastermind in Dubai.   In today's guest interview, Alvin E. Roth has written a book about markets. If you are wondering what type of market, as Mr. Roth tells us himself, it's not important what type of market. It's the market itself. He guides us through the interview discussing chapters of his book, “Who Gets What and Why” with real life examples of the organ donation market, the online matchmaking market and even shares his thoughts on how realtors have survived in our internet-based, do it yourself economy.   Key Takeaways:   Jason's Editorial: [2:42] Does ISIS really make over 1 Billion dollars a year? [3:50] Gino from Cozy will be speaking at Meet the Masters [4:44] Getting ripped off [7:45] Julie Malinowski's article about 6 important property management trends and tips [19:28] The 17th Meet the Masters event is coming up and there are a few tickets left [20:35] Join the Venture Alliance Mastermind group during February in Dubai   Alvin E. Roth Guest Interview:   [21:56] The rules of a marketplace constitutes its design [25:15] Alvin Roth analyzes the surprising U.S. real estate market [28:30] Give realtors the 6% they deserve? [33:10] Matching markets allow you to choose and to be chosen without pricing [34:30] The matching market of organ donations i.e., kidney exchanges [37:51] What rules should apply to repugnant transactions [42:40] The government both interferes and supports all types of contracts [45:19] “Who Gets What and Why” can be used as a field guide to markets [46:28] How to understand signals of interest [47:46] The matchmaking market signal experiment [50:34] Contact information for Alvin Roth   Mentions: JasonHartman.com Venture Alliance Mastermind EZ Landlord Forms 6 Trends Among Landlords and Tips to Outperform the Norm Who Gets What and Why Redfin Living Kidney Donors Network Match

Today's guest, Alvin E. Roth, has written a book about markets. If you are wondering what type of market - as Mr. Roth tells us himself - it's not important what type of market. It's the market itself. He guides us through the interview discussing chapters of his book, Who Gets What – and Why, with real life examples of the organ donation market and the online matchmaking market. He even shares his thoughts on how realtors have survived in our internet-based, do-it-yourself economy.   Key Takeaways: [2:15] The rules of a marketplace constitute its design [5:34] Alvin Roth analyzes the surprising U.S. real estate market [9:48] Give realtors the 6% they deserve? [13:33] Matching markets allow you to choose and be chosen [15:59] The market of donating organs [18:10] What rules should apply to repugnant transactions [21:55] The government both interferes and supports all types of contracts [25:35] Who Gets What – and Why can be used as a field guide to markets [26:44] How to understand signals of interest [27:58] The matchmaking market signal experiment [30:52] Contact information for Alvin Roth   Mentions: Hartman Media Who Gets What and Why Redfin Living Kidney Donors Network Match

Nobel-prize-winning economist Alvin Roth explores the markets that shape our lives, particularly our work, our health care and our schools. He also explains how key technologies enable companies like Uber, Airbnb, and Google to thrive. His insights extend beyond products, services, and features to include how successful companies attract and hire the most talented employees. Alvin Roth is a Stanford University Professor, and bestselling author of Who Gets What - and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design. In this episode you will learn: how one phone call and a pivotal decision ultimately led to a Nobel Prize the important differences between markets the role of markets when it comes to marriage, loans, and more the role of social support in markets the ways the Internet and mobile technology shape market possibilities the three key factors that influence the success of companies like Airbnb and Uber the ways Smartphones are influencing markets how labor market findings influenced the market designs of today what game theory can teach us about getting into college and getting a job how market designers are applying their skills to the growing global refugee crisis Alvin also shares what got him interested in the economics of market design and the potential this new field holds for helping us rethink what markets are and can do. Links to Topics Mentioned in this Podcast Bob Beran National Resident Matching Program   Operations research   Roth-Peranson Algorithm Elliott Peranson United Network for Organ Sharing (UNOS) School Choice Programs Black Market Repugnant Markets   Lloyd Shapley David Gale The Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences 1962 paper of Lloyd Shapley and David Gale Stable Matching (or Marriage) Problem (SMP) Game Theory Parag A. Pathak Atila Abdulkadiroglu If you enjoyed the podcast, please rate and review it on iTunes. For automatic delivery of new episodes, be sure to subscribe. Thanks for listening! Thank you to Emmy-award-winning Creative Director Vanida Vae for designing the Curious Minds logo! @GAllenTC www.gayleallen.net LinkedIn

Alvin E. Roth is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University. He is also the Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration Emeritus at Harvard University. Professor Roth has made significant contributions to the fields of game theory, experimental economics and market design and is known for his emphasis on applying economic theory to solutions for "real-world" problems. In 2012, Alvin won the Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences jointly with Lloyd Shapley "for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design” Alvin has a B.S form Columbia University,  and earned his MS and Ph.D. from Stanford University. Alvin’s latest book Who Gets What and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design is now available on Amazon. In this episode you will learn: what economics is and if we need money to allow a market to operate efficiently. about the price discovery process in economics. what is match-making markets and how similar the labor market is to the dating market. what is market design and why it is important. how entrepreneurs and start-ups, like Airbnb and Uber, use market failure to solve a problem. what is a repugnant market. the difference between a thick and a thin market. what makes a market thick. about the black market for kidneys. how kidney exchange works. and much more. Subscribe to the Economic Rockstar podcast on iTunes and never miss an episode. Check out the shownotes and links mentioned in this episode at www.economicrockstar.com/alvin-roth

Alvin Roth, winner of the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences and Professor of Economics at Stanford University joins us on The Big Trade Series for an insightful conversation on market design. Alvin introduces his concepts on the commodity and matching markets. A discussion follows on which category the stock market falls into and its implications, as well as the impact of capital control and the role of high frequency trading. Peter shares his concerns regarding the TPP, particularly on protectionism and its impacts on multinational companies. The conversation then shifts to repugnant transactions as Alvin provides examples including Uber, same sex marriage, kidney transplants and more. The dialogue quickly progresses into the role of government intervention in the free market. The episode wraps up as Alvin shares some useful takeaways from his new book Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design.

Jason Hartman talks with Alvin Roth, Craig & Susan McGaw Professor of Economics at Stanford and author of "Who Gets What and Why" Key Takeaways[5:28] - what aspect of the real estate market surprises him the most[11:45] - The market of organ donation[16:24] Repugnant Transactions[20:51] Government's role in contracts[24:56] Signals and two kinds of messages we send

On the show this week we talk to Nobel Memorial Prize winning economist Alvin Roth about his latest book Who Gets What—and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design.iTunes: itunes.apple.com/us/podcast/inquiring-minds/id711675943RSS: feeds.feedburner.com/inquiring-mindsStitcher: stitcher.com/podcast/inquiring-mindsTumblr: http://inquiringshow.tumblr.com

If you’ve ever sought a job or hired someone, applied to college or guided your child into a good kindergarten, asked someone out on a date or been asked out, you’ve participated in a kind of market. Most of the study of economics deals with commodity markets, where the price of a good connects sellers and buyers. But what about other kinds of “goods,” like a spot in the Yale freshman class or a position at Google? This is the territory of matching markets, where “sellers” and “buyers” must choose each other, and price isn’t the only factor determining who gets what.  Our guest this week, Alvin E. Roth, is one of the world’s leading experts on matching markets. He has even designed several of them, including the exchange that places medical students in residencies and the system that increases the number of kidney transplants by better matching donors to patients. Alvin is the Craig and Susan McCaw Professor of Economics at Stanford University. He is also the Gund Professor of Economics and Business Administration Emeritus at Harvard University. He works in the areas of game theory, experimental economics and market design. He is also the author of the fantastic new book, Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design, and in 2012 he won the Nobel Prize in Economic Sciences "for the theory of stable allocations and the practice of market design" ...whatever that means. ____ "Markets are what people do. It's how we get along with each other. When you're not alone and you're interacting with other people there is a good chance you're engaged in some kind of marketplace." - Alvin Roth Quotes from Alvin: What we learn in this episode: What is the true definition of a market? What are matching markets and what are some examples? What is a repugnant transaction? What's a great trick to increase your chances of being accepted to the college of your choice? Resources: Who Gets What — and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design http://marketdesigner.blogspot.com/ http://web.stanford.edu/~alroth/ -- This episode is brought to you by: Animoto: Visit Animoto.com/smartpeople and use promo code “SMARTPEOPLE” to get 15% off to receive 15% off an Annual Pro subscription! Lynda.com: Do something good for yourself in 2015 and sign up for a FREE 10-day trial to Lynda.com by visiting Lynda.com/smartpeople.

Want a job at Google, a gorgeous hideaway on Airbnb, a spot on the Stanford faculty, a romantic partner or even a kidney?Good news, bad news. You have a say, but so do they.It's all part of a phenomenon called "matching markets."Markets are what make businesses possible. But not all markets operate on the exchange of cash for goods. In fact, some of the most important markets go so far as to outlaw cash. In other markets, like romance, many societies just find cash morally repugnant. And, no matter how much you may want something, there's another person who'll have a say in whether you get it.When you understand these often complex and hidden markets, the nuanced rules and games that get played, you end up in a better place to both get what you need from them and give more effectively to those you seek to serve.That's what we're talking about in this week's conversation with Nobel Prize-winning economist, Stanford professor and author of the fascinating new book, Who Gets What - and Why: The New Economics of Matchmaking and Market Design, Al Roth.This discussion pulls back the curtain on why we are willing to do so much, for one thing, person or opportunity and yet so little for another and how that is redefining our options, how they are presented, and how much control we really have over any of it.

The Florence School of Regulation presents: Jean-Michel Glachant's Energy Today #007 31 March 2015, at DG Energy, Brussels. Jean-Michel asks Klaus Dieter Borchardt, Director of the Internal Energy Market at DG Energy of the European Commission on market design and network codes, and has a look around Borchardt's office to see if a 4th package can be found. “Jean-Michel, let me tell you I hate talking about a 4th package because you just put a label on something and you do not know what is in there. To think we come forward with new package where we develop a new policy, a new design for electricity market is wrong.”

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. Mao Ye observes that tick price regulation causes different relative tick sizes at differently priced stocks. He suggests that there may be a causal relationship between high-speed competition at large relative tick size. Thus high frequency traders have an advantage when the relative tick sizes are large.

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. Kevin Leyton-Brown’s work suggests that algorithmic game theorists may not be using the best theoretic tools for addressing complex realistic problems. He proposes two pragmatic tools for such uses.

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. Fuhito Kojima proposes a new double auction mechanism to address incompatible incentives that sometimes lead to inefficient outcomes. Their mechanism - the "groupwise price mechanism" - satisfies both approximate efficiency and incentive compatibility.

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. John Hatfield examines how market mechanisms affect the level of investment before participants formally enter the market. They offered the example of ex ante investment in human capital induced by later entrance into the labor market. The researchers then looked at how these levels of investment may be optimized. Their results show that investment is optimized when the mechanism is ex post efficient and strategy proof.

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. This talk examines the benefits of speeding up high-frequency trading on financial exchanges. The authors found that increasing the speed of exchange does not necessarily improve liquidity. It did cause traders to increase the spread at which they were willing to trade, which in turn makes it more expensive to trade stocks, and allows firms to collect higher rents.

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. Michael Pavlin proposes a methodology for using inverse optimization to reconstruct the pricing mechanism and distribution of market power using location prices in commodity markets. Pavlin applies his method to the Midcontinent Independent Service Operator (MISO) electricity market.

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. Sam Hwang attempts to use moment inequalities to determine if Seoul's school choice mechanism for children entering high school might be altered to yield greater levels of total welfare. Seoul's mechanism is partially revealed and non-strategyproof, so Hwang derives a series of moment inequalities, but the resulting estimates were not narrow enough to determine the direction of the change in welfare in his simulation.

Professor Alvin Roth of Stanford and Harvard University gave the 2013-2014 Marshall Lecture. The Question and Answer Session took place after on Thursday 20th February 2014

Professor Alvin Roth of Stanford and Harvard University gave the 2013-2014 Marshall Lecture. Lecture 1 was given on Wednesday 19th February 2014

Professor Alvin Roth of Stanford and Harvard University gave the 2013-2014 Marshall Lecture. Lecture 2 was given on Thursday 20th February 2014

Ahead of Platts' European Power Summit in Berlin on 28-29 April, 2014, Henry Edwardes-Evans spoke to Angela Knight, Chief Executive of trade association Energy UK, about regulator Ofgem's wholesale power market reforms, the government's proposed capacity mechanism and how market dynamics will fare...

If you experience any technical difficulties with this video or would like to make an accessibility-related request, please send a message to digicomm@uchicago.edu. As part of his course Price Theory and Market Design, E. Glen Weyl, Assistant Professor in Economics and the College, presents a lecture on pessimistic social choice, optimistic social choice, and the problems of voting. This course aims to show how the classical tools of price theory in the Marshallian tradition can be used to aid the design of efficient market structures and social institutions.

In liberalized electricity markets strategic firms compete in an environment characterized by fluctuating demand and non-storability of electricity. While spot market design under those conditions by now is well understood, a rigorous analysis of investment incentives is still missing. Existing models, as the peak-load-pricing approach, analyze welfare optimal investment and find that optimal investment is higher with more competitive spot markets. In this article we want to extend the analysis to investment decisions of strategic firms that anticipate competition on many consecutive spot markets with fluctuating (and possibly uncertain) demand. We study how the degree of spot market competition affects investment incentives and welfare and provide an application of the model to electricity market data. Our results show that more competitive spot market prices strictly decrease investment incentives of strategic firms. The reduction of investment incentives can be so intense to even offset the beneficial impact of more competitive spot market design. Those results obtain with and without free entry. Our analysis thus demonstrates that investment incentives necessarily have to be taken into account for a meaningful assessment of proper electricity spot market design.