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Play Episode Listen Later Sep 25, 2023 46:05

Last time we spoke about the unleashing of Operation Postern and the continued advance towards Salamaua. The landings at Lae and droppings at Nadzab went pretty uncontested. Red beach and yellow beach were secured with minimal Japanese aerial raids trying to hinder the movement of men and supplies. defensive perimeters were quickly established and units began their drive towards Lae and Nadzab. Meanwhile the offensive against Salamaua raged on while the Japanese commanders received the shocking news of the landings in the Lae area. General Adachi frantically ordered forces to withdraw from the salamaua area to rush over to Lae's defense. Meanwhile Shoge and Mukai took the little forces they had and prepared to mount a defense to the death to try and hold back the allies from claiming their ultimate prize. But in the end would it not result in the loss of both? This episode is Fall of Lae-Salamaua Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. So as we concluded last time, the landings were a success. The Australian 9th Division, transported by five destroyers, landed to the east of Lae on 4 September. Aside from a few air raids from Rabaul it all went unopposed. As Admiral Barbey noted “Unloading of LSTs, each containing 400 men, 35 vehicles and 80 tons of bulk stores was excellent. One LST was unloaded in 1 hour 42 minutes. Unloading of the remainder was completed within 2 hours 15 minutes.”By 10.30 a.m. 7,800 troops and 1,500 tons of stores were ashore. The 503rd parachute infantry regiment dropped at Nadzab pushing small amounts of Japanese forces. And at Salamaua, General Milfords forces held down the bulk of the Japanese troops, who now had to frantically rush over to Lae. General Milford's 5th division were applying an enormous amount of pressure upon the Salamaua defenses, trying to tie down the bulk of General Nakano's forces. Despite the frantic orders to withdraw over to Lae, the Salamaua defenders would continue to offer strong resistance against Milford's attacks as they still wanted to retain Salamaua. North of the francisco river, the Japanese had considerable artillery to support a defense and continued to fire upon the advancing attackers. In response at 5am on september 5th, Captain Dawsons 2/6th field regiment directed their artillery concentration upon Rough Hill and Arnold's Crest. A patrol of the 58/59th and 2/7th battalions tried to peak at both and were forced back under heavy fire. During the afternoon, the 12th platoon of Lt Albert Farley's B company attacked the pimple, a prominent feature near the middle of what was being called E ridge. It was a razorback that approached along the Lokanu ridge. It allowed no flanking maneuvers. The platoon was met with australian grenades, it seems the Japanese had stolen at some point. During the night, a detachment of SNLF marines performed a surprising counterattack. They began with a mortar attack before creeping within 10 meters of the Australian lines. According to Keith Ross, the Japanese did not even have bullets in their gun spouts, believing someone might prematurely fire a shot making the enemy aware of their presence. When they got within 10 meters they began to cock their weapons. Ross recalled ‘When they charged the magazines they made a hell of a racket and we realized they were there.'. The Japanese charged with fixed bayonets and were met by a wall of fire, forcing them to withdrew. Over on Charlie Hill Companies 1 and 3 of the 66th regiment led by Lt Usui Genkichi were trapped, so they set up ambush positions to try and cut off the supply lines of A and B companies of the 42nd battalion. As a ration train was moving around the western slopes of CHarlie Hill to supply Greer's B company, the Japanese fired upon them from a newly established position on a ledge. The next day another ration train was hit 100 yards down the ridge to the west. This prompted Davidson to have the ration trains bypass the ambush areas more widely. Usui then ordered his men to light fires that would burn towards the Australian positions. Using wind, Usui hoped to dislodge the Australians. On the 6th, the 12th platoon maneuvered to cut off the Japanese supply line, but at 5pm a kunai fire forced them out. The 10th platoon rushed over to retake the position but likewise was burned out. The following morning another platoon came over but the Japanese were already there digging in. This little fire trick protected the Japanese from being completely cut off. It was a surprising victory for Usui and worked to prevent the allied supplies from getting through, forcing the assault upon Charlie Hill to a halt. Meanwhile, on September 6th, General Nakano accompanied the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment with some SNLF marines as they debarked Salamaua aboard 73 barges enroute to Lae. Over at Lae General Shoge and Admiral Fujita were commanding the meager amount of combat forces they had alongside numerous inexperienced non-combatants to try and halt the allied advance. Nakano ordered his forces to commence their withdrawal towards Lae on September 8th. He began by deploying the 1st battalion, 115th regiment at Buang, near the coast north of Malolo to cover the retreat. His forces south of the Francisco river were to pull back across the river while 200 men of the 15th independent engineer regiment would hold the line connecting Yalu and Markham point. Against them, Brigadier Evan's had established a supply point at G Beach which was on the western mouth of the Burep River. There he had set up the 24th brigade's HQ and brought up two 25 pounder guns for support. This greatly lessened the supply line to the front. Meanwhile, Brigadier Whiteheads men were beginning to reach the east bank of the Busu river and General Woottens 2/24th and 2/28th were advancing towards Busu. When Lt Ed Shattock's platoon of the 2/24th battalion reached the Busu, Shattock was ordered not to cross it. He recalled ‘The Japs were not in position opposite me; we could have done it,'. In reality his force had reached a point on the Busu that held a extremely fast current. Perhaps his best swimmers may have been able to ford it without clothes or equipment, but it would have been dangerous as hell, especially if the Japanese caught them on the other side. Whitehead was eager to cross it, but knew the danger so he waited to bring bridging equipment over. He also ordered the 2/4th independent company over in Burep to advance west through some thick jungle to take a position east of the Busu. Over in the coastal area, Lt Colonel Colin Norman's 2/28th battalion reached the Busu in the afternoon. They noticed the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment were assembling at the Busu river line, along with remnants of the 3rd battalion, 115th regiment led by Major Mukai. The river looked to be swollen from recent heavy rains, thus the Japanese likewise needed to build a bridge to get across. Back over at Nadzab, the 871st airborne engineers continued their labor, under terrible torrential rain allowing the 2/33rd battalion to arrive by September 9th. This was the same battalion that underwent the terrible accident when a B-24 liberator crashed on take-off after clipping a branch and rammed into 5 troop trucks full of soldiers waiting to debark. Its 4 500 lb bombs exploded tossing 2800 gallons of fuel in all directions killing 59 and wounding 92. Thus the weakened battalion alongside the 2/25th would begin an advance down the Markham valley towards Lae. They were met with the traditional New Guinea welcome, torrential rain, most of Nadzab's airtrip was so flooded it delayed the arrival of the 2/31st battalion until September 12th, much to General Vasey's dismay. Back over at Charlie Hill, the isolated Japanese were taking advantage of the torrential rain. They began evacuating pill boxes upon the knolls between Charlie Hill and Lewis Knoll. During the night of september 8th the whole of the Charlie-Lewis-Breger hill area would be evacuated. At 9:30am the next day, a mortar barrage began as platoons crossed their start lines on the northern slopes of Charlie hill. 15 minutes later the first platoon managed to occupy the first part of the Japanese perimeter without opposition. The second platoon passed through them and occupied the rest of the perimeter, Charlie Hill was now in Australian hands. Wasting no time, Davidson ordered the B Company now under the command of Captain Ganter to pursue the fleeing Japanese towards Nuk Nuk, which I had to say 3 times before not laughing. God I love New Guinea. At the same time, the 47th battalion also found abandoned pillboxes facing them, so they began a pursuit of the fleeing enemy. Colonel MacKechnies men found the same situation over at Berger Hill. On September 9th the 15th battalion were carrying out a two pronged attack upon the crest of scout ridge. C company came from the Bamboos while D company performed a outflanking maneuver from the enemy's rear. Both forces had a limited approach area allowing only a platoon front. At 2:40pm the outflanking companies forward platoon reached the crest of Scout ridge finding no opposition. At 3:35 they reached the southwest edge of the Japanese position facing the Bamboo's and alongside the other companies platoons began an attack. The enemy fired green flares and withdrew upon seeing them leading to only a minor skirmish. Over on Lokanu ridge, Lt Turner was leading a platoon assault under artillery and mortar support. They attacked the last Japanese strongpoint on its eastern tip overlooking the sea. The Japanese had hastily evacuated the position fleeing into the jungle below, leaving many dead and abandoned a lot of equipment. Further patrols from the Bamboos completely what was becoming a relieving picture, the Pimple and Knoll on Lokanu ridge were abandoned. After a 10 day initiation in the battle area, Lt Colonel Jack Amies commander of the 15th battalion signaled Milford late on September 9th “the 15th now holds line of Lokanu ridge complete from sea at Lokanu to crest of scout ridge”. The brigadiers met on the 9th with Milford who ordered them to speed up the divisions advance so they could give the enemy no respite to reorganize and occupy new positions. Thus the race to Salamaua was on. Brigadiers Hammer and Monaghan began a competition to see who would reach Salamau first. Hammer would state that Monaghan and come in at the “death knock” and Monaghan replied “that Hammer could relax and leave the battle to the 29th brigade who would clean it up for you” Meanwhile General Wootten's men were preparing to cross the Busu. During the morning their patrols had gone across to find suitable crossing points, but finding none. Over at the coast, one patrol reached a large island, named Rooke's Island as Lt Rooke led the patrol. The island was in the center of the Busu's mouth, Colonel Norman ordered Captain Leo Lyon's A company to attempt a crossing. They sent one platoon across via a sandbank at the mouth, while the remainder of the company covered them with fire from Rook's island. Captain Leo Lyon watched as two leading scouts moved across the sandbar about 50 meters apart with their rifles over their heads. The lead scout got about 80 meters from the far bank when the Japanese began opening fire from near the mouth of the river on the west bank. Both men fall and were washed out to sea, but one was only wounded and fought his way back through the current to the allied side. Worried by the delays, Wootten ordered his brigadiers to seize some bridgeheads over the Busu. Norman assembled his battalion on the east bank near Rooke's island and crossed the last channel of the Busu in four extended lines by the late afternoon. After stealthily forded over to Rooke's island, the 2/28th egan crossing the channel under the cover of 25 pounder fire at 5:30pm. Each company moved to the startline one after another at two minute intervals. It was a very difficult crossing, many were swept off their feet by the fierce current. Many had their weapons snatched from them. As men began to be swept off, they tried grasped for anything on the western bank, like overhanging boughs and kunai. This shocked the Japanese, they had not considered it possible to cross. Most of the Japanese machine guns and grenade launchers were at the mouth point tip and thus when they began scrambling to hit the allies fording the channel it was too late. Norman's men lost apparently 25% of their weapons crossing and suffered 13 deaths, but they gained Wootten's desired bridgehead. On September 9th, at the height of the battle, Admiral Mori arrived at Lae via the I-174. He relieved Admiral Fujita, who would return to Rabaul on the same submarine. He soon discovered most of the navy's forces were allocated to support tasks while Nakano directed the IJA forces to man the main defenses of Lae. The 2nd machine gun company of the 238th regiment and the 25th machine cannon company were sent to Munum and Ngasawapum to keep the road open to Boana. Back over at Norman's bridgehead, some Japanese units crept through some kunai grass to surprise attack them using machine gun and mortar fire. But it was all for naught, as Norman's C company counterattacked with fixed bayonets charging into a waist deep swamp where the Japanese were hiding. B Company came to support them and gradually the Japanese scattered after 63 deaths while the Australians suffered 21 casualties. Feeling more confident, Evans had the 2/43rd battalion hand over their weapons to be ferried across over to the 2/28th. A LCVP was able to make 40 trips taking some 1200 troops and much supplies over to the west bank of the Busu. To the north, Whitehead's 26th brigade had been delayed 36 hours waiting for some rubber boats and suitable rope to get their men across. The 2/24th battalion began to work with the engineers to get across the Busu at a place where the river separated into 3 channels around 20, 30 and 14 meters wide. Their currents ran around 25 kms per hour with a depth of over 2 meters. With all the rain, it became apparent the crossing was going to be impossible with the materials on hand. None the less when there is a will there is a way. Warrant officer Bill McCallum and two engineers swam the river with signal wire and managed to drag a rope across, securing it to the west bank. However when they began hooking boats to the rope there soon became swamped, ruining the entire ordeal. Further north the 2/4th independent company managed to bridge and cross the Sankwep river which lay on a junction of the Busu. They soon established an ambush position on the east bank of the Busu near the Kunda bridge. It was at this point General Herring decided to reinforce Wootten with Brigadier Cedric Edgar's 4th brigade, consisting of the 22nd, 29/46th and 37/52nd battalions. They would take over the beachhead areas after landings were made. They departed Milne Bay in 6 LST's and 6 LCI's on September 9th, successfully landing at Red Beach by the night of the 10th. Meanwhile to the north the 2/25th battalion had reached Jensen's plantation when they were fired upon for the first time. The Australians had taken over 5 days from capturing Nadzab to contact Japanese positions west of Lae and the delay unnerved the Japanese commanders. General Yoshihara would write ‘The movement of the units which had dropped on Nadzab were very sluggish; if they had attacked with their vast strength, it would have been the hour of death of Lae in a matter of a few hours. It was a piece of good luck in the midst of misfortune', the Japanese command, although ‘unable to understand the reason', was given time to bring troops across from Lae and Salamaua to defend the western approaches of Lae.” Thus the Japanese had been given a minor window to retreat some of their forces from Salamaua to Lae. Back over at Salamaua, the heavy rains continued to mask the Japanese retreat across the francisco river, while simultaneously hindering the Australians from crossing it. Brigadier Monaghan's men managed to reach scout hill. The 15th battalion began their pursuit of the enemy going north east of scout ridge on the 10th. In their rapid advance they managed to kill a few stragglers and secured some high ground overlooking the mouth of the francisco river. Patrols south west of Nuk Nuk linked up with the 42nd battalion. North of the Francisco, Brigadier Hammer began testing enemy defenses at Rough Hill. Captain Jago's C company of the 58/59th tossed 3 platoons at Rough Hill, Bob Lanes 7th, Ted Griff's 8th and Arthur O'Rourkes 9th. Each made up up the hill around 50-100 yards before being fired upon and forced to pull out. After this Lewin's platoon from the 2/3rd independent company fought its way up Savige Spur were they too faced heavy fire and had to pull out. They gradually managed to capture the Savige Spur, leading to an encirclement of the position. Meanwhile the 2/7th battalion along with 3 other companies of the 58/59th and two independent company platoons moved up Sandy Creek. The Japanese launched a counterattack dislodging units from the outskirts of Rough Hill and Arnolds Crest, preparing for a final withdrawal that was set to begin the following night. Thus when the Australians launched their attack the next day they found an abandoned Rough Hill. To the south, C company of the 15th battalion crossed the overflowing francisco river near its mouth to dominate the isthmus. Davidson's B company crossed the francisco river in the morning and advanced northeast across the Salamaua airfield without opposition quickly captured Logui I. As the Australians entered Salamaua it appeared to them like a shell. The allied bombing campaigns against Salamaua had been devastating. Private Ted Griff would write “The isthmus was lined with bomb craters.” Private Peter Hemery wrote “not a building is left standing – just an occasional heap of scattered wreckage”. Private Jack Glynn wrote ‘Salamaua was a shambles; a building wasn't left standing, by the look of the place it was very good bombing.' The bombing had killed an estimated 200-300 Japanese in Salamaua, many were left unburied leaving a terrible nauseating stench in the air. A great quantity of supplies were discarded or destroyed. Two cargo ships laid offshore, and further down the beach were numerous wrecked barges. The aircraft hangers had roughly 40 damaged aircraft and it looked obvious the airfield had not been used since the 9th division had landed.To be blunt, most of the Japanese stationed there were relieved to depart it. In the end it was Monaghan who won the race. Over to the west, after crossing the river, the 47th battalion advanced unopposed and converged with Hammer's forces. They soon captured Arnold's crest, Edwards Spur and launched their first attacks against Kela ridge known as “the hand”. The Japanese had concentrated at Malolo where they were evacuating by barge towards Law on the night of september 11th. To cover them, General Nakano ordered units from the 80th and 238th regiments to defend a last line that ran from the Kela ridge all the way to Malolo. Wootten brought up 14 25 pounders to support the advance. Australian forces now past the Busu began to unleash hell with their artillery. The Japanese command at Lae believed the artillery spelt their doom. Meanwhile the 2/24th battalion had unsuccessfully tried to bridge the busu using some felled logs supported on stone pylons. The men tried to build the bridge placing the felled logs around the large stone pylons and were initially successful when it was just a 20 meter stream. However during the night the river rose and the logs went up with them. The current was so strong the logs that did not rise because they were stuck with the stone just snapped in two. The men had to abandon the attempt. Lt Evans was forced to strip the 2/43rd battalion of their weapons and ferried them over the Busu during the afternoon by rope. Eventually Evans managed to arrange a deal with some American boatmen to lend him an LCVP for a few trips which allowed for his 2/28th fully equipped to get over. Logistics logistics logistics. The 2/28th managed to create a bridgehead with a sigh of relief I imagine. To the north, the 25 pounders were gradually moving closer to hit Lae more accurately. The 2/25th battalion ran into 200 men of the 15th independent engineer regiment who had the unfortunate task of delaying them. The Japanese defensive positions were strung out back along the road behind Whittakers bridge and strongpoints north of Lae airfield known as Heaths, Edwards and Jacobsens. 30 of them were killed outright as the withdrew past heaths plantation. The 2/33rd battalion and 2/2nd pioneer battalion advanced towards Markham point. C company of the 24th battalion launched and attack, beginning by lobbing 126 mortars and 8 rounds of smoke at a point called River Ambush. As the mortar fire ceased the leading platoons surged forward, but the Japanese defenders advanced past the smoke and quickly repulsed the incoming attackers. The next day, the 2/31st battalion arrived to the scene and joined the 2/25th battalion to clear Jenyn's plantation. They encountered some heavy resistance further down the road at a bridge near Whittakers plantation. The 24th battalion made another attempt against markham point on the 12th. Four platoons hit some southern pillboxes, but were repulsed quite quickly. Lt Richards went on the record to say "that a further ground attack without support will not be successful and application has again been made for a synchronized air and artillery attack." Over on the coast the 2/32nd and 2/43rd battalions had just arrived and Evans directed the 2/28th to continue the advance towards Malahang while the 2/43rd would hit New and Old Yanga. Captain Catchloves company patrolled towards New Yanga while Captain Gordon's company patrolled towards Old Yanga. During the morning both skirmished and dispersed enemy patrols then at 2:30pm it was reported that New Yanga looked abandoned. At 3:35 Catchlove was organizing an assault against the outskirts of New Yanga when suddenly heavy firing came out from the direction of a hut. The Australians were surprised by this but quickly called in some artillery support from the 14 25 pounders brought up from Red Beach alongside mortars. They hit New Yanga with 525 shells as the infantry tried to storm in but they were met with heavy casualties. They attempted a second assault during the afternoon, but again the Japanese held them back. Back over at the Salamaua area, the Japanese continued their frantic withdrawal as the 5th division began mop up operations. Patrols combed the peninsula finding two naval and two anti aircraft guns, large quantities of unused arms, medical supplies, some wireless transceivers and a portable generator. The Japanese HQ were some well furnished huts, allies found food still on the table, indicating it was a rushed withdrawal. The Japanese had built several camps on the waters edge and inside cave networks. Some patrols found female clothing, lipstick and powder indicating the presence of women, and you can imagine what that was. The 42nd Battalion would manage to occupy Kela Point; one of Major Warfe's patrols reached the coast half way between Kela Point and Mission Point; and the 2/7th Battalion would capture the now-abandoned Kidney Hill before continuing forward towards Malolo. The Japanese at Kela ridge continued to fire back upon the enemy performing a bitter fighting withdrawal, until their final evacuation by barge on September 13th. By the 13th the bulk of General Nakono's 51st division had reached Lae and were now preparing to withdraw even further to the Kiari-Sio area. Nakano had devised two plans to withdraw the Lae garrison; one plan was to go across the Saruwaged Range to the north coast, the other was to go over the foothills of the Finisterre ranges heading west parallel to the Markham valley. Engineering officer Kitamoto Masamichi who knew about both routes was asked to give his opinion and he recalled ‘It was a responsibility too heavy for just a Lieutenant to decide, I thought, but, well aware that Allied aircraft could easily interdict the route through the open kunai of the Markham Valley foothills. The second plan is impossible. The first plan is difficult but there is still some chance of success. I would choose plan one. However, the sacrifice will be great.We should ready our packs as we would retreat over the mountains from 10th to 15th of September,'' Nakano agreed and issued the withdrawal orders which went out to all units on september 8th. Beginning on the 12th, the 7th base force main units consisting of Admiral Mori's men began their withdrawal. The original plan called for them to cross the Busu river at the kunda bridge, then to travel via Gawan and Bungalumba to the summit of the Saruwaged Range. However the kunda bridge was blocked by Australian commandos, so they would need to find another way across the Busu then the Boana while fighting the enemy back. Engineers of the 51st and 30th engineer regiments were sent first to construct and repair the road to Mount Sarawaget. Colonel Araki commanded the second group coming over from Edwards plantation, consisting of the 51st divisional HQ, the 66th regiment, the 3rd battalion 21st regiment; the 1st battalion, 80th regiment and the bulk of the 14th field artillery regiment. The last group who would act as a rearguard were the 2nd and 3rd battalions of 115th regiment coming from Malahang and Busu, the 15th independent engineer regiment and the 1st battalion of the 11th regiment coming from Whittaker, Heaths, Edwards and Jacobsens plantations. Admiral Mori's men were ambushed from the start by and american patrol of the 1st battalion, 503rd parachute regiment due east of Nadzab. This forced them to divert into the jungle towards Yalu. Over at the Lae field hospital were patients who were unable to be evacuated via submarine nor was it possible for them to be carried across the mountains, so they volunteered to protect the divisions rears. Meanwhile Salamaua was now destined to become a large allied base. When General Herring arrived at Milfords HQ on september 14th, he took one look at the insanitary shell of what was Salamaua town, its poor airfield and near by swamp. He immediately wiped it as a base, it was to be discarded to ruin. Some Americans camped nearby it would call it "a filthy, rat-ridden, pestilential hole". Perhaps a lackluster jewel after fighting bitter months for it. The Salamaua campaign was over. The 15th battalion charged up the coast chasing after the Japanese catching some south of the Markham river. The campaign was a brutal one. The 17th brigade reported 135 killed, 354 wounded; the 15th Brigade reporting 124 killed and 346 wounded; the 162nd Regiment reporting 81 killed and 396 wounded; and the 29th Brigade reporting 76 killed and 155 wounded. Against them, Nakano's 51st Division suffered an estimated 2200 casualties since the end of July, for a total of over 8000 casualties, including 2722 killed, in the entire campaign. Back over at Lae, the evacuation saw standard infantry equipment being carried at 120 round of ammunition, 2 grenades and provisions for 10 days. Infantry had to carry their machine guns, small mortars, while artillery units had to carry their 75mm mountain guns and machine cannon company's their 20mm guns. With supplies no longer being sent to the Salamaua front, there were provisions available for the withdrawal. General Yoshihara would write later that the generally healthy men of the Lae based naval forces were able to carry enough provisions for 14-15 days, but the IJA units most of whom had been fighting for Salamaua for months, were in extreme exhaustion and only able to carry half the amount. Over to the east the 2/24th battalion on september 13th began constructing a box-girder bridge over the Busu. It was launched after midday under enemy fire. When it nearly got across the gap, it overbalanced and was swept away downstream. Later in the afternoon more box-girders were brought over. A 25 meter single box-girder bridge was assembled using 3 box and 2 hornbeam sections. 100 men picked up the bridge and carried it through water over a meter deep across the first 20 meter channel to a mid river island. However they had no beachhead thus on the far bank only a mortar barrage could keep the enemy at a distance. They began to doubt the crossing would ever be made, so Whitehead on the 13th asked Wootten permission to send 120 men over the Busu at its mouth to advance north to the other side where the 2/24th battalion were. An hour later, Lt Colonel Ainslie of the 2/48th brigade crossed and began advancing north, but the jungle proved difficult and communications were bad. Further north the 2/4th independent company tried to cross the river, but the Japanese held them back. The men were led by Lt Staples and as they forded the river he was wounded by a Japanese sniper. The remainder of his section were swept off their feat and scattered along the bank of the river. This prompted other men to try and use the kunda bridge. The Japanese employed a trick often used against them, they allowed a bunch to cross the bridge before unleashing their guns. 7 men were cut to ribbons, many other became marooned on the wrong side. In the desperate situation private Jaggar charged and attacked two enemy machine gun nests and a mortar post killing several Japanese and capturing a lot of equipment. Jagger then waited for darkness before swimming back. The platoon that had gotten over lost 7 men with several wounded. Along the coast the 2/43rd found New Yanga unoccupied while the 2/28th encountered stiff resistance at Malahang. Lt Connor's platoon were advancing at 11:20am when they ran into the enemy who were entrenched at a track junction 1000 yards east of Malahang anchorage. Connor went ahead with Corporal Torrent to charge 3 foxholes where 6 Japanese including an officer were killed. Connor was killed, so Torrent took command and he ordered an advance at 3:30pm where they found Japanese abandoned positions. The defenders were hitting the men as hard as they could. Artillery commander Lt COlonel Sukenobu Watanabe believed that the artillery troops were of no use ‘if they could not fire a shot on the battlefield'. Thus for his tired and weakened unit, ‘one cannon would be enough but they must also carry some shells'. His men sacrificed carrying sufficient food as he led them up the Saruwaged carrying mountain gun components weighing up to 50 kg's each. Meanwhile Hiromatsu Sato's anti-aircraft unit abandoned their guns in the Atzera Range in order to carry additional food. Sato and his men had enough food for 4 days and were told it could take 20 days to reach the northern coast. ‘We were stricken with apprehension, the effect of salt worked wondrously… those of us without salt became weakened… I used my salt sparingly and never drank unboiled water'. Back over to the west, Brigadier Eather ordered the 2/25th to put pressure on Whittakers plantation while the 2/33rd moved around south to establish a roadblock at Heath's plantation. Artillery and mortar fire began the advanced as Major Robertson's company of the 2/25th captured the bridge at Whittakers while Captain Gow and Captain Butler's Companies advanced towards heaths plantation. There was a fierce battle but a single platoon managed to overrun the enemy HQ on the northern sector of heaths plantation. Meanwhile two patrols advanced west and southwest converging towards Heaths plantation only to find it abandoned. Thus the 2/33rd occupied Heaths plantation without a fight. During the night, the Japanese had evacuated Whittakers and the second echelon of forces had successfully departed Lae to march north to the Butibum rivers and than towards Boana. At 5pm on the 14th, Eather learnt from divisional HQ that one of the documents captured by the 2/25th the previous day indicated the Japanese operation order dated september the 8th. It showcased the evacuation of Lae which was of great excitement for General Vasey when he found out. Now every member of the division sought to race the 9th division to Lae, also hoping to prevent as many of the enemy from escaping as possible. Vasey's staff concluded the Japanese were already withdrawing up the Busu. Thus Vasey believed that it would not be a good idea to weaken Eather's assault on what he now realized were stubborn Japanese rearguards, remembering how brutal the Japanese rearguards were in the Papuan campaigns. So he ordered the 25th brigade to push vigorously towards Lae. Eather elected to quickly seize Edwards plantation. On september 14th Eather's forces drove the Japanese from their positions at Lane's bridge and continued to pursue them in the direction of Edwards plantation. Over to the east, Whiteheads engineers were at last able to create a bridge over the third channel, allowing Captain McNamara's company of the 2/24th to get across. The Japanese were surprised by this and began to unleash as much fire as they could on the newly established bridgehead. But Whitehead quickly sent another company led by Captain Finlay to support the bridgehead successfully fighting the Japanese off after 4 hours of combat. The rest of the battalion crossed afterwords uncontested, then the 2/23rd and the 2/48th. Along the coast, Evans 24th brigade advanced against harsh Japanese resistance. Evan's received word the 2/43rd were approaching Wagan from the north so he sent the 2/32nd battalion to hit Wagan from the south. Lt Day was leading a platoon around the right flank when he began getting sniped from tree top Japanese. Day's platoon suffered heavy casualties and he himself took a shot through his spine. He was dragged away by Warrant officer Dalziel, but Dalziel was shot dead in the process. Day was then killed by a grenade, prompting Sergeant McCallum to take over, who advised the situation was quite warm and required some mortar support. The men backed up to give room for mortars to fire off and at 4:15, 12 3 inches and 10 2 inches began lobbing. This time a few platoons with machine gun crew support made a frontal attack with others hitting flanks. They met heavy fire back at 30 yards or so and suffered 6 more casualties. The Japanese began to waver as the platoons continued their assault and soon it became a full flight towards the village. As the platoons charged, many mopped up the snipers and apparently some fowls who would be destined for the nights dinner. The 2/32nd captured Wagan village by dusk while the 2/28th while the 2/28th advanced towards Malahang anchorage. The men began infiltrating a road behind a Japanese position. At 9;15am they unleashed an attack killing 12 Japanese without any loss and at 12:40pm killed another 14. A company found two abandoned 75 mm dual purpose guns north of the anchorage during the afternoon patrol. A few patrols went further north of the anchorage circling around establishing positions that would seal the anchorages fate. Wootten ordered the 2/24th to recross the river and reinforce the kunda bridge position while Vasey earmarked Brigadier Dougherty's 21st brigade to advance upon the Boana. On September 15th, Whitehead was finally able to launch his main offensive, tossing the 2/23rd battalion against Kamkamun and the 2/48th battalion at the Malahang airfield. A bit to the south the 2/32nd were capturing Malahang mission and the 2/43rd were just entering Wagan village. To the west, Eather's men were facing strong resistance from Japanese rearguards at Edwards plantation. The 2/33rd were performing a frontal assault trying to draw enemy attention while the 2/31st moved around the right flank to secure some high ground behind the Edwards Plantation. Despite their resilience, Edwards plantation was completely surrounded and by the late afternoon the Japanese were forced to make a break for it, heading north over Edwards bridge, thus completely abandoning Lae to its fate. As they fled, 64 Japanese would be cut down by machine gun fire, trying desperately to climb a spur, being pursued by Eather's men. Along the coast, the 2/28th were moving through Malahang anchorage with just a few skirmishes occurring. Both divisions raced to be the first to enter Lae. General Nakano's 8650 men, including 2500 naval personnel had managed to get out, heading north towards the Busu. Southeast of Yalu, Admiral Mori's first echelon were intercepted by the 3rd battalion, 503rd parachute regiment. The Paratroopers clashed with a vanguard of 34 men forcing the rest to head northwest across the Atzera Range. Despite being closer to Lae, Wootten's men halted their advance at the Bumbu river by midday on september 16th. Eather's however considered his advance was not speedy enough, therefore he urged the leading company to hasten. In the words of Captain Butler “Up at daylight and off again. "C" Company leading the Brigade this time. Men are a bit nervous again and went pretty steadily. Sick Japs along track kept holding things up and we expected to run into something at any moment. Then along the track and into the middle of us came a jeep crowded with Brigade HQ. Passed me and up to the leading platoon. The old Brig jumped out and started urging the troops to hurry along. The troops weren't very impressed as they thought the Jap was in front. Finally the Brigadier, armed with a pistol, acted as leading scout, and the troops followed in column of route behind… A brigadier is not an ideal section leader. The whole reason for his action was that he wanted the brigade to be first onto the beach. He managed it O.K. I had to send a patrol down the beach and back so we have that honour—doubtful one—as there were no Japs. Unfortunately we advanced too quickly—due to no opposition—and the Yanks came over and strafed us.” Eather's men took Jacobsen's plantation without opposition, then a patrol reached Lae's Voco Point at 11:30. Not knowing Vasey had won the race, Wootten launched a final attack preceded by an aerial strike and artillery barrage after midday. They actually mistook the 2/25th to be Japanese almost leading to calamity, but Wootten stopped his artillery quickly when it became apparent. Both divisions finally entered Lae, ending the Lae-Salamaua campaign. Operation Postern was a success, though they were unable to prevent the Japanese from evacuating Lae. The overriding failure on the allied side was due to an underestimation of the enemy. There had been an overriding assumption that the Japanese forces at Lae would fight to the death to hold it. Back on September 8th, General MacArthur, cause you know I have to say something don't you. Well he put out a triumphant communique, claiming they had enveloped 20,000 Japanese. Wootten's staff estimated there had been around 8240 Japanese at Lae and 6934 at Salamaua. Vasey's staff thought it was 6420 at Lae and 7041 at Salamaua. In truth Nakano had roughly 11,000 men and the majority got away, over 8000, a considerable feat. The Japanese had inflicted 150 deaths and 397 wounded on the 9th division and 38 deaths and 104 wounded upon the 7th division. Wootten wrote upon seeing Lae "It was in an indescribably filthy condition and had been very thoroughly wrecked", Vast dumps of stores and discarded weapons littered the area. The airfield had not been used since just before the landing, the hangars were wrecked and about forty damaged planes were mute witnesses to the power of the Allied air force. The typical nauseating stench of an area occupied by the Japanese army pervaded Lae as it had Salamaua six days before. Lae would become a major forward base of operations, as Buna had become earlier. Another stepping stone to Tokyo. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. And thus ends the Salamaua-Lae campaign. The deceptive strategy to pressure Salamaua to entice the enemy to loosen its grip on Lae resulted in both bases being overrun in a dramatic fashion. Now the allies had a major forward base of operations to continue the push north.

american men law fall americans australian japanese kings north island tokyo companies engineering engineers hammer evans edwards worried norman jap passed logistics southeast davidson hq vast wasting warrants brigades allied lieutenant bamboo generals whitehead whittaker yanks battalion jacobsen brig crest rook markham milford infantry torrent monaghan pimples sato regiment lewin new guinea artillery knoll paratroopers lci buna brigadier opium wars kela unloading usui pacific war patrols nakano finisterre rooke lst kunda dalziel lae general macarthur vasey papuan japs c company rabaul yalu craig watson heaths whittakers keith ross sandy creek lsts busu malolo milne bay jaggar

- 93 - Pacific War - Mopping up in New Georgia, August 29 - 5 September, 1943

Play Episode Listen Later Aug 30, 2023 34:05

Last time we spoke about the major planning leading to a thrust into the central pacific and General Kenney's neutralization efforts of the Lae area. Admiral Nimitz and Douglas MacArthur had been battling it out for a long time leading finally to some concrete plans for twin campaigns, one in the Central Pacific and one in the South and Southwest Pacific. Countless meetings, deals and minds were put to work trying to figure out how to prepare the gradual advance towards the Japanese home islands. To finally make some waves into the central pacific it was to be the Ellice Islands, Gilbert Islands and Nauru as first objectives. Meanwhile in New Guinea the advance upon Salamaua and Lae raged on, but to really break them first air supremacy was required. Kenney unleashed a massive campaign with some innovative new toys completely desolating Wewakes airpower. This episode is Mopping up in New Georgia Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. New Georgia was falling apart for the Japanese. When Munda was seized it spelled doom. General Sasaki ordered his forces to withdraw to places like Baanga Islands after fighting a series of desperate holding operations against the forces of General Griswold. Again, the seizure of Munda was a colossal undertaking. The Americans had tossed 30,000 troops to overcome 5000 Japanese. The Americans lost 1136 of said troops and the Japanese 1500. The Japanese managed this type of bulwark defenses by building up a network of entrenchment systems around Munda Point. The US air supremacy over New Georgia gave them little advantage because the island was simply too dense in vegetation to properly spot enemy positions. Rear Admiral Turner likewise learnt a valuable lesson, that no matter how many transport boats were tossed into an invasion plan, more would always be needed. These lesson led to some radical rethinking of strategy going forward for future operations, like in the Central pacific. Admiral Ota used his fleet of barges to move 5 to 8 in a group, every night. Colonel Tomonari's 13th regiment and Sasaki's HQ were moved to Vila in an effort to reinforce what would be the new main Japanese outpost in the Central Pacific. Further north the Americans successfully invaded Vella Lavella, completely bypassing Kolombangara and thus cutting off the enemy's supply line. In response to this Admiral Samejima established a barge staging base at Horaniu. Samejima then advised Sasaki to simply proceed with the course of action he thought best. Sasaki decided to do what he had been arguing for sometime now, to concentrate all his forces at Kolombangara. However with Zieta in the hands of the Americans, he would have to figure out a clever way to carry out the logistics of such a plan. Thus he split his forces in two, taking up positions at Bairoko and Baanga. Ota was given the task of evacuating the northern forces at Bairoko using his barge fleet, but the men to the south in Baanga were going to perform a fighting withdrawal of both Baanga and Arundel. Luckily for the Japanese, the 27th regiment had bypassed the Yano battalion in Baanga, to advance upon Piru Plantation and Sunday inlet. The forces at Baanga would be facing against the landings of 3 battalions; the 2nd and 3rd battalions, 169th regiment and the 3rd battalion, 172nd regiment led by General Barker. While Barker was getting his men to assembly positions, the Yokosuka 7th's 12cm guns and two mountains began to fire upon Munda Field. This caused only slight damage with some casualties, but it was a nuisance nonetheless. On August 16th, Barkers 136th field artillery battalion positions at Munda began counter firing against the Yokosuka guns. This was followed up by aerial attacks by 13 Avengers and 17 Dauntless who performed carpet bombing. For those who don't know this is the practice of bombing over a large area simultaneously. Imagine hitting a km area of vegetation by spreading your aircraft and timing everything just right, it produces what would look like a carpet of bombs hitting. So when you take a carpet and toss it over your floor, that was kind of the mental image received by this maneuver. The results were devastating. The Yokosuka 7th guns would not fire again. Meanwhile the recently landed 2nd battalion, 169th regiment faced the strongest pocket of Japanese as they attempted pushing the defenders further west. The 3rd battalion, 172nd regiment would eventually join in on this attack. When the 2nd battalion was showing signs of slow progress, Barker decided to toss the 172nd in on August 18th. But the fiercest fighting would be seen between the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment who continued to resist against Barkers 4 battalions as Sasaki's men were crossing over to Baanga and Arundel island. On August 19th, the 1st battalion finally managed to break through to the southwestern coast, where they came across the now abandoned 12cm guns of the enemy. During that night the 3rd battalion, 23rd regiment had slipped through a swamp making their way north to join their fleeing comrades over to Arundel. By nightfall of the next day all had successfully gone over. The cost of mopping up Baanga as recorded by the 169th was 44 dead, 74 wounded and 300 non-battle casualties, the ever present dangers of tropical island warfare. For the 172nd records, it was 8 dead, 36 wounded and nearly 200 men requiring evacuation from tropical diseases. For the Japanese there was no estimation or rough counts for casualties. Such dire numbers would see General Wing replace Barker as commander of the 43rd division effective August 20th. Now Admiral Halsey also wanted to see Arundel seized as it had become an important position, but the allies did not realize the amount of forces that had been snuck onto the small island. Meanwhile the 25th division continued their advance north through painfully rough swamp terrain, pursuing a rather elusive enemy. As the regiments advanced, bulldozers of the 65th engineer battalion tried to build jeep trails behind them. However the rain was so bad they became a nasty type of tropical mud and the bulldozers were struggling. Thus the supplies would have to be carried onwards to the front by hand, typically on the men's backs, or occasionally via air drops. By mid August the 161st regiment would finally reach the rendezvous point at Mount Bao where General Collins planned to have them turn west to secure an artillery position at Mount Tirokiambo. Once the artillery was set up, it could support an assault of Bairoko. Bairoko would be hit from the west by the 3rd battalion, 145th regiment of Colonel Dalton and from the east by the 1st battalion, 27th regiment of COlonel Liversedge. But mother nature is a cruel mistress and she places some impassable swamps, preventing the 140th field artillery battalion from reaching Mount Tirokiambo. On August 21st, the marine defense battalion tractors had to pull the 155mm's of the 136th Field artillery battalion over the soft road to get onto a position on Zieta Hill. However this took too long and while it was occurring the Japanese had successfully evacuated Bairoko. Admiral Ota's fleet of barges had been running to Bairoko every night under the cover of darkness and the cover of some guns placed on Kolombangara that fired upon US PT boats trying to harass the barges. American intelligence believed all of this activity was actually reinforcing Bairoko, thus they planned for a daylight raid to hit the barges in their bases. Rendova launched some PT boats, the 15th corps lent some demolition teams of the 117th engineer battalion and the NGAF provided fighter cover. The raid failed and the boats were forced to retreat. On August 23rd, Dalton and Liversedge's men entered Bairoko to find a completely deserted base. On that same day, the 27th regiment arrived to the Piru Plantation after slogging through swamps prompting Collins to remark “Crossing that swamp was the toughest physical test I underwent during the war.” On August 23rd, Samejima sent new orders to Sasaki, instructing him to hold the Gizo-Kolombangara-Arundel line and to wait until a proper evacuation date was set. Sasaki sent the 1st company of Major Kinoshita Seishu to occupy some high ground on the western part of Arundel and the 4th company of 1st lt Ito Saburo at the base of the Stima Peninsula on its northeast coast. On August 25th Ota's barges were continuing to run nightly runs to Arundel bringing the 6 and 7th companies of Major Yamada Tadaichi over to Vila. By late August most of the other units arrived to Vila, with the Kure 6th SNLF taking the task of defending Kolombangara's western coast and the 229th regiment were deployed at Mbambare Harbor to protect its eastern coast. In addition, Captain Miyazuki Toshio departed Rabaul with 3 destroyers, the Hamakaze, Shigure and Isokaze to evacuate men at Rekata Bay back on August 22nd. However they were harassed by a PBY around Bougainville and realizing the Americans might toss a naval mission against them, they were forced to abort. Another evacuation run was attempted 3 days later, seeing Admiral Ijuin leading light cruiser Sendai and 2 destroyers to escort Captain Toshio's group. The diversion was discover by Australian coastwatchers and soon Toshio was intercepted by 10 PBY's in the Bougainville strait. The Hamakaze's forecastle was hit by a bomb that caused 36 casualties again they had to abort. Two days after this light cruiser Sendai the destroyer Sazanami finally broke through to Rakata Bay and managed to grab most of the troops there. To grab the rest of the troops, 6 flying boats and a submarine were sent. Detachments of the Kure 7th SNLF would be landed at Sumbe Head and Sambe Head over on Choisuel, who would work to establish new staging bases for the rest of the troops being brought back to Buin. Over at Horaniu, the Japanese were constructing a new barge deport. Admiral Wilkinsons 3rd echelon led by Captain Grayson Carter consisting of 2 LSTs and the destroyers Philip and Waller were sent over to Barakoma on August 20th. They were intercepted by enemy planes in the Gizo strait which saw Philip collide into Waller providing some slight damage. The last convoys of the month would manage to unload at Barakoma under excellent weather and good air cover. Altogether Wilkinsons landed 6505 men, 1097 tons of rations, 843 tons of petroleum, 2247 tons of ammunition and 2528 tons of vehicles, By September 27th the field would be fully operational. The Americans also managed to construct an airfield at Ondonga, giving General Wing further support to mop up Arundel. On August the 29th, the 2nd battalion of the 172nd regiment were moving to the east coast while the 1st battalion moved west. Both had to advance over mangroves and hardcoral shorelines, because the interior was far too dense with underbrush. Meanwhile over on Vella Lavella, Wilkinsons turned command over to General Griswold on September 3rd. The americans expected no resistance as they planned to occupy the entire island. Admiral Halsey gave the task to Major General Harold Barrowcloughts 3rd New Zealand division who were scheduled to arrive in mid september. But in the meantime, Griswold landed the 1st battalion, 145th regiment at Brakoma to allow Major Delbert Munsons 1st battalion, 35th regiment to advance up the east coast to secure the Kokolope Bay area, where the American wanted to set up a new radar site. Munson's men made good progress as the reached Lambu Lambu cove by September 4th. From there they dispatched Companies A and C with some Fijian commandos to patrol. The patrols got to the Boko Mission where A company ran suddenly into a strong Japanese patrol. A firefight broke out taking the lives of 12 Japanese. The men examined the bodies and their equipment and sent word back that they were facing recently landed enemy forces. The next morning, the 4th company of the Mikami battalion assaulted A company who were dug in at the Boko Mission. A company managed to fight them off, but had 2 deaths and 2 wounded in the process. Because of the attacks, General McClure sent forward his 3rd battalion followed up by units of the 64th field artillery battalion. The artillery men took up a position at Ruravai to support the advance. At the same time Munsons men cleared up the Boko Mission area, allowing for supplies to come up to it by boat. Munson then directed his forces to hit the main Japanese defenses at Baka Baka. As the men advanced they faced a steep ridge holding Japanese machine gun nests which greatly hindered their progress. Meanwhile on September 5th, the 2nd battalion, 172nd regiment discover the main enemy positions on Arundel while the 1st battalion was landing at Bustling Point trying to secure a forward artillery position. The 1st battalion would then occupy the tip of Bomboe Peninsula. The Japanese units meanwhile were reporting great success in their efforts and also requested they be allowed to assault the enemy artillery at Piru Plantation. On the last day of August, the 9th defense battalions 155mm's at Piru Plantation had begun opening fire on Kolombangara. They also dropped some leaflets upon the Japanese at Vila describing the agonizing death their artillery would provide them, cheeky. The leaflets read “ask the survivors from the 229th what it was like on Bakudan Hill”. The next morning Takabayashi told the 3rd battalion “enemy shelling and firing will be intensified in the future, any rambling activity must be avoided and everyone must always be on the alert.” All of this prompted Sasaki to order a counterattack. At around midnight on September 9th, Takabayashi's 3rd battalion, 13th regiment aided by a platoon of the 6th engineers snuck across the Blackett strait using barges to Sagekarasa island, their orders were to drive the enemy out of northern Arundel. Just a few hours later, Griswold ordered Colonel Sugg's 27th regiment to Bomboe Village to attack from the west. Sugg's men began their advance on September 12th, and his 3rd battalion forded the Bomboe Lagoon to seize Sagekarasa Island, effectively cutting off the 13th regiment. The Japanese were taken by surprise and began counterattacking with Takabayashi from the west and Ito from the east, but the Americans held on. Further south, Sugg's 2nd battalion ran into the Japanese main position, meeting heavy gun fire. Additionally the 1st battalion, 169th regiment began an occupation of the Fringe Island and the 82nd chemical battalion began deploying their 4.2 inch mortars at Bomboe to prepare a killing field for the Japanese at Safekarasa. From their positions on Fringe Island, the Americans were able to observe and track the Japanese barges with moonlight seeing them depart Vila and approach the landing area. This provided Sugg's the perfect amount of information to launch a deadly accurate mortar bombardment. The proceeding bombardement took countless lives including the 3rd battalion commander Takabayashi. On the night of September the 15th, Colonel Tomonari brought his HQ across and ten minutes later while he was sitting on a log listening to a company commanders report, he was killed instantly by a mortar shell that landed at his feet. Kinoshita took temporary command of the 13th regiment, 3 days later Colonel Muta Toyoji would become the new 13th regiment commander. On that same day the Americans attacked the main Japanese position, but were beaten back. Griswold responded by bringing forward the 1st battalion, 27th regiment from Enogai with 5 marine tanks of the 11th defense battalion the following afternoon. On September the 17th the tanks charged forward with 3 rifle companies lined abreast behind them. Artillery and mortar concentrated upon Kinoshita's position, shocking the Japanese and forcing them to pull back. However the following day, the Japanese had quickly learnt their lesson and came back with anti-tank guns. They knocked out two tanks before pulling back to the Stima Peninsula. After two more days, the Japanese began evacuating Arundel. During the night, the 3rd battalion evacuated under some heavy mortar and artillery fire while the Yokosuka 7th guns covered them. The following night barges grabbed the 1st battalion troops, bringing the battle of Arundel to a close. For Colonel Muta Toyoji's 13th regiment, the fight for Arundel was a costly endeavor, they suffered 243 killed, 363 wounded, including many officers. For the Americans it was 31 dead and 225 wounded. Back on September 10th, McClure's batteries began to arrive at Lambu Lambu and as soon as they were put into position they began firing against the Japanese. You see during one of the fights between the Japanese and Munson's forces, a dead Japanese officer was found to be carrying a sketch map of the Japanese positions at Horaniu. Captain Jorn Burden translated the Japanese sketch onto their maps and added details from other patrol reports. This gave A and C batteries an incredibly accurate firing grid that proved to be deadly. The concentration of fire was so accurate the Japanese were forced to abandon their positions almost immediately. When troops later came to the area they found the dugouts had suffered direct shell hits with corpses still holding picks and shovels in their hands. The Japanese realized the American gunners knew exactly where they were located so they made a panicked withdrawal to the northwest coast. On September 14th Munson finally unleashed an attack upon Horaniu only to find the dugouts empty. Fijian commandos were sent to pursue the fleeing Japanese as the 1st battalion moved back to Lambu Lambu and the 3rd battalion occupied Horaniu. The New Zealanders would take over the fight for Vella Lavella, but now we need to venture back over to Green Hell. With the loss of Mubo and Lababia ridge, General Nakano was forced to establish a rough arc of defensive positions in the heavily timbered ground from Bobdubi on the south bank of the Francisco river through Komiatum village to the Tambu Peninsula on the coast. Nakano had risen to the bait of General Blamey who had hoped he would and poured more men into this area in order to defense Salamaua from what he believed to be the actual allied goal. Naknao reinforced the area with the 3rd battalion, 238th regiment and the 3rd battalion, 21st regiment who had been stationed at Lae. The new key position in the Japanese line was Charlie Hill. The new Japanese defensive line ran east along the Yamada Yama known to the allies as Scout ridge to the coast at Lokanu and north over the Francisco river along the ridges of Rough Hill, Arnold's Crest, Kidney Hill and the coast near Malolo. Charlie Hill held 4 perimeters. Below ground the Japanese constructed an intricate tunnel system to protect them and their supplies from bombardments. The entrance shafts had vine covered ladders that went down 6 meters. Galleries branched off the main tunnel like catacombs with benches cut into the sides for sleeping. Near Charlie Ridge was Davidson Ridge where Nakano deployed some new reinforcements from the 115th regiment. On August 24th, Nakano told his men “If this line cannot be maintained, the division is to be honorably annihilated.” Meanwhile, Colonel MacKechnie was tossing patrols past Roosevelt ridge. On August 16th I Company, down 2/3rds of its strength, basically down to a single platoon level, crept forward to toss grenades at some Japanese around Scout ridge while Sergeant Warren unleashed mortar cover. The Japanese sought revenge that night and performed a dusk to dawn attack, but grenades and mortars held them back. It was to be the start of two bitter weeks of such small skirmishes, and the Japanese hunkered down in their foxholes guarded Scout Ridge with their lives. On August 18th, K company performed a frontal assault along the ridge, but Japanese barricades and machine gun fire kept them back. 3 Americans were killed, 7 wounded for their efforts, including a courageous medic who ran into the fray. The Japanese positions on Scout ridge were very strong, with lines in depth going back all the way towards Salamaua. Scout ridge provided the defenders with countless defensive positions along its crest with four intersecting ridges behind Roosevelt ridge. On August 20th, Colonel Davidson ordered his men of the 42nd battalion to capture what he thought were only two knolls to the north of the battalion's positions on Davidson ridge. The smaller knoll was occupied without opposition and the other knoll only had slight opposition. However the next morning, scouts reported there was another feature, they called Bamboo Knoll about 600 yards farther north. Davidson then ordered it captured and it was with little opposition. Crouching in some kunai grass atop that knoll, the scouts could see Salamaua and allied artillery hitting it. They could not see the airstrip because another hill was in the way, that hill was Charlie Hill. Davidson's intelligence told him they had already seized Charlie hill because their maps were not quite accurate. This caused a lot of headaches for historians going through diaries, trying to piece together the movement of troops. Thought I would try to add some frustrating information on their part. Now to intercept the enemy fleeing from Mount Tambu into the area between Komiatum and Davidson ridge, Brigadier Monaghan's 29th brigade were assembled east of Mount Tambu. Meanwhile Major Warfe was performing an offensive against the junction of Bobdubi, Komiatum and the Bench Cut Track. Warfs A Platoon led by Lt John Lewin had cut off a point at a junction between Bobdubi and Stevens track on August 14th. Warfe planned to toss A and B Platoons against the enemy while the 2/7th battalion's D company took up a further point on the track. At the same time the 58/59th battalion were going to launch a diversionary attack against Erskine Creek. On August 17ths, Warfes commandos advanced south under artillery and mortar support attacking the enemy along Buirali creek and Salamaua track. However the enemy proved too intense to overcome, leading the commando platoons to pull back somewhat. Then the 2/7th company came to the right of A platoons position filling a gap in the center of the enemy line. They exploited the gap and advanced towards the western edge of the main Japanese camp. Lewin's A company kept prodding the enemy lines until 6:30pm when the Japanese made a vicious counterattack causing 5 deaths including Lt Barry and 11 wounded. By dusk the Australian attacking force was thrust like a wedge into the enemy positions with Lewin and A platoon on the left, the 2/7th company in the middle and B company on the right. The following day the Japanese were forced to pull back to the line of the Komiatum track By August 19th, the Japanese were being hit hard. On their northern lines they had 23 deaths, the commander of the 80th battalion, Major Jinno was dead. The Komiatum track was cut by the 17th brigade at Laver's knoll. They were withdrawing across the front, most were now taking up positions further east at Charlie Hill and Kunai Spur. Brigadier Hammer's 58/59th were able to occupy Erskine Creek and C company of the 2/7th seized Orodubi. The following day the 2/7th battalion occupied the junction of Bobdubi and the salamaua track. They captured quite a few forward pill boxes, found the enemy was still holding some in the back so they began raining mortar upon them. At dawn on August 21st patrols found the Komiatum track abandoned, now they could push further on. On august 21st as a result of the enemy giving so much ground, Hammer ordered the mento ford the Francisco river to put more pressure on Salamaua. Lt Henry Mallett's 11th platoon of the 2/7th battalion forded the Francisco river near its south end at Bobdubi ridge. They advanced over a razorback spit towards Rough Hill where they ran into Japanese machine gun fire. They were quickly bolstered by another platoon and by 3pm took the position, to gain fire support to allow others to cross the river. During the afternoon a composite platoon led by Lt Owen Edwards advanced further to occupy a dominant hill, which was named Arnold's Crest after captain Ted Arnold the commander of C company. Like I said if you wanted a mountain, ridge, or hill named after you it seems New Guinea was the place. By August 22nd Hammer's men were occupying Arnolds Crest giving covering fire to allow more forces to cross the river. Once enough men had crossed they began expanding the perimeter. Then on August 27th 420 Japanese from companies from the 115th and 80th regiments counterattacked Arnold's Crest, successfully cutting off the allied line of communications to the south. The Australians did not give it up without a fight however, the counter attacked trying to seize the nearby Fisher's knoll. The Japanese were forced to give up Fishers Knoll but repelled the allied attacks upon the crest itself. Despite still holding Arnold's Crest the following morning saw the Japanese withdrawing westwards. Now it seems Hammer got too excited when he ordered his forces to occupy so many forward positons. Hammer signaled his new divisional commander, General Milford “unreliability of 58/59th battalion troops has forced me to withdraw to hold a tighter line Buiris Creek”. Basically he believed he had overextended the 58/59th who were currently surrounded by a company or so of Japanese. The 58/59th were down to less than 30 or so men, carrying many wounded back and sending reports they were running low on ammunition. However on the ground, John Bethune's B company were holding strong, keeping the situation together. Another company commander named Newman went on the record stating “Hammer had weak companies flung out into the blue where they could not be reinforced or supplies” After all was said and done, upon reflecting on the situation, Hammer would sign off on a recommendation to award John Bethune a military Cross, writing “‘Displaying grit and determination Lt Bethune tenaciously held the area until shortage of amn [ammunition] and supplies forced him to withdraw.' The situation forced Hammer to tone down the aggression somewhat lest a catastrophe were to occur. He ordered the men to form a defensive line from Rough Hill to Arnold's Crest, while more forces came to prepare for another offensive. On August 21st, the Taylor Force had rejoined its regimental force, allowing MacKechnie to launch a new attack in force. On August 27th, A company advanced along a trail going up George Ridge successfully cutting the Japanese supply line. The men dug in, expecting a lot of angry Japanese counter attacks. Captain George of A company wrote this of the experience “‘We began to feel chill in the stomach. Every rush meant firing a few more clips, throwing a few more grenades. As the dark suddenly quietened, our hands counted blindly the few clips left in our belts, the last grenade or two on the parapet – like a thirsty man in the desert checking his last water. For when ammo ran out, they would overwhelm us – waves of many Japs with long bayonets. Home was a long way off indeed, over dark waters to Oregon.'” The fighting fell into hand to hand combat, from foxhole to foxhole. Men fought and died around George who knew the position could not be held. The next day George heard 4 rifle shots signaling permission for his battered unit to withdraw. They fought off 10 consecutive counter attacks before tossing in the towel. Not all was lost on the action for George's men however, so many Japanese were employed for the counter attacks, they had to give up a position they held known as Bald Hill. Other companies of Taylor force seized the hill as the Japanese retreated to positions on Berger hill and Egg knoll. Over to the west, Brigadier Moten's battered 17th brigade were relieved by Monaghan's men who took up positions north of Mount Tambu. Davidson's 42nd battalion occupied Bamboo Knoll after tossing back a ton of Japanese counterattacks. Davidson then tossed some patrols towards Charlie Hill, which would receive its name after Davidson's given name. The Japanese presence on Charlie Hill was far to strong for smaller units to prod it, so more forces would be brought up. Back over to the north, Warfe's commando's attempted to overrun the Kunai Spur, a dominant position blocking the way along the Francisco river to Salamaua. On the morning of August 22nd, B Company of the 58/59th crossed the Buirali creek and one of their patrols advanced north to Kunai spit. Three simultaneous attacks were directed on Kunai Spur the following day by Captain Cramps 2/7th company from the north, Sergeant Tom Pot's 58/59th platoon from the west and Lt Russell Matthews 58/59th platoon from the east. It was a very steep climb, when Matthews men finally go atop the spit they were face to face with a machine gun nest that nearly took them out. On August 25th the 2/7th platoon managed to outflank the enemy position near Buirali Creek which caused them to counter attack. They failed to take the Kunai SPur and were relieved by Lt colonel Ken Montgomery's 47th battalion on the 26th. At this point Monaghan took command, and his first order of business was going to be an assault against Nakano's last line in front of Salamaua. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The allies were cleaning up on New George while continuing their deceptive assault on Salamaua on New Guinea. General Nakano's men were beginning to feel the wall behind their backs as the allies closed in on Salamaua, but still they did not realize Lae was the actual target.

- 88 - Pacific War - The Mysterious Battle of the Pips, July 25 - 1 August, 1943

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 31, 2023 41:21

Last time we spoke about the allied drive to Munda and General Sasaki's major counter offensive. General Wing began the drive upon Munda Point, but General Sasaki predicted many of the routes the Americans would take and ordered his forces to create tedious roadblocks and defensive positions to foil their advances. The allied progress was brutally slow, despite having the enormous advantage in artillery, naval and aerial bombardment support. The Japanese pillboxes were proving to be devastating to the allied infantry, requiring tanks to be brought over to New Georgia. When things began to halt, suddenly General Sasaki performed a counter offensive seeing a daring attack directed at the headquarters of the 43rd division. The attack nearly broke the lines of communications, but luckily the Fijian commandos outperformed the japanese at their own game of night fighting. Lastly the IJN suffered terrible losses to allied aircraft collapsing their reinforcement efforts. This episode is the Mysterious Battle of the Pips Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. The battles in New Guinea and New Georgia were particularly bloody, in all honesty things had begun to really escalate when you look at it from a numerical point of view. Over on Green Hell, General Savige had just seized Mubo, the Pimple, Green Hill and Observation hill taking them out of Japanese hands. The Japanese had withdrawn to Komiatum while simultaneously trying to defend the Bobdubi ridge area against Brigadier Hammer's 15th brigade. General Savige, still unaware Salamaua was not the main target and in fact was being used as a deception to cover for Lae, continued his offensive, hoping to drive the enemy north of the Francisco River. Over on the other side, General Nakano's 1st battalion of the 80th regiment had managed to push Companies B and A off their ambush position on the Bench Cut Track. They were forced to withdraw towards Gwaibolom by July 10th. Meanwhile to the south Major Warfe launched an attack along Goodview junction. Captain Wally Meares of C platoon marched up Stephens Track while Captain John Winterflood's B platoon took Walpoles track. Lt Hugh Egan created a blocking position using just 7 men around 800 meters south of Goodview Junction. The platoons went to work advancing down the steep ridges dislodging Japanese from outposts. Captain Meares platoon were continuing along the Stephens track when they suddenly encountered strong resistance from some Japanese who took a position along the Tambu Saddle which is at a junction between Stephens track and the Mule track. After engaging the Japanese, the platoon was forced to bypass them moving along the Mule track towards the Komiatum track where they ran into more Japanese. Meares men killed 13 Japanese on the Mule track before deciding to withdraw back to the Stephens track and dug in. The Japanese had surprised Warfe's men. The forces they were running into were mainly the 1st and 2nd companies of the 66th battalion along with Araki's HQ staff who had been on the run from Mubo to Komiatum. The Japanese tried to press on with a counter attack aimed at Winterflood's B platoon. The Japanese tossed mortar and machine gun fire, but received terrible losses to the commandos, forced to pull back up Walpole track. The next day Warfe ordered Winterflood's platoon to make a frontal assault, but quickly found themselves pinned down by machine gun fire and during the night received a heavy counter attack that forced them to dig in. The Japanese continued to block the way, covering their withdrawal further east, but all the mayhem prompted General Savige to relieve the commandos by tossing up companies C and B of the 2/5th who adopted the name Bennett force as they were led by Captain Cam Bennett. The rest of the 2/5th marched up the Buigap. Meanwhile General Herring was dealing with a supply issue for the 3rd Australian division. The 3rd division was too far from the coast and thus had been relying on supply via airdrops, which we have seen during this series to not be particularly accurate and quite inadequate. The supply problems mounted more when the decision was made to target Lae as such a campaign required building up reserve dumps. Warfe's men were critically low on supplies; the 58/59th had nearly used up all the supplies they received, being brought up via the Missim Track and from airdrops. Getting further and further away from the source of supplies and with declining carrier capacity, Warfe's men were reaching starvation point. Further back, Companies A and C of the 2/6th battalion got drafted the job of moving the supplies from Mubo to Buigap creek. General Herring considered it extremely difficult, but not impossible to maintain further units in the Salamaua area, if they were closer to the coasts. To solve the problem General Herring designated Tambu Bay as a new coastal base for supplies and it would also help as an artillery position. And thus, the 3rd battalion, 162nd regiment of Major Archibald Roosevelt landed at Nassau Bay back on July 12th commencing with their coastal advance. They were accompanied by Brigadier General Ralph Coane's artillery that had landed prior to them. Yet their advance would begin in an extremely confused and chaotic manner. The question of command was at the core of the issue, General Fuller had decided to separate units such as Archibald Roosevelts from the MacKechnie Force, and thus they were now placed under the command of the Coane Force. General Herring was forced to intervene, placing the Coane Force under General Savige. At the same time, Colonel MacKechnie was relieved of his command because Fuller felt that he had favored the Australians over the Americans. To dig depper into this mess, what occurred was General Savige and Colonel MacKechnie were both unaware that two-thirds of the 162nd regiment had been allocated to the Coane Force when General Herring sent the a confusing message to try and clarify things “all units MACK force are under operational control of 3 Aust Div”. Troubles began at Moten ordered Major Roosevelt to advance north, but Roosevelt had also been told by General Fuller that he was not under Australian command. Thus Roosevelt bluntly replied to Moten “For your information I obey no orders except those from my immediate superior”. Then MacKechnie tried to smooth things over with Moten when he was informed of Fuller's position. He apologized for Roosevelt's message, and tried to speak about how great all the Australian/American cooperation was going. Fuller and Herring then tried to clarify the situation by placing the Coane Force under General Savige, but Fuller also decided to dismiss MacKechnie, mostly because he had relinquished command of his men to the Australians and thus had failed to protect American interests. As I say on my personnel channel, often when talking about China's Warlords in the 1920's, this is some kindergarten bullshit. Back to the action at hand, the Coane Force was being aided by a Papuan company who were scouting ahead of the Americans. They managed to confirm that Tambu Bay and the Dot Inlet were occupied and fortified by the Japanese. A platoon of the 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment were holding a position on Tambu Bay while the remnants of the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment were on a ridge overlooking the bay, which would later be named Roosevelt Ridge. On July 18th, Roosevelt led the troops with Companies L and I taking the lead, guided by two Papuan platoons. L Company with a Papuan company advanced along an inland track while K Company likewise did so along the coast. K Companies's Papuan guides hit a Japanese outpost south of Boisi on July 18th. On the morning of the 20th, the Papuan platoon managed to kill four Japanese before K Company helped destroy the outpost. By the 20th they seized Boisi and Roosevelt with the others approached the Tambu bay. Roosevelt had Coane's artillery support, they brought up four 25 pounders of the 2/6th Australian field regiment originally placed at Nassau Bay along with 2 batteries of the 218th American field artillery battalion, 8 75mm guns from north Salus, a battery of the 205th American field artillery battalion and 4 105mm guns. Under the cover the artillery they attacked the enemy, but they were met with heavy mortar fire coming from Roosevelt Ridge. Roosevelt Ridge extended westwards from the sea for nearly 2000 yards, forming kind of bulwark that shielded the northern end of Tambu Bay. Thus Tambu Bay could not be secured unless the ridge was taken first. The Australian broadcasting commission correspondent, Peter Hemery described the ridge like this “a piece of old style razer blade jutting into the sea”. According to some Japanese sources they had this to say of it “The area around Boisi had a lay of land most suitable to the arrest of the enemy advancing northward along the coast” General Nakano had also decided to reinforce the ridge with 250 men of the 1st battalion, 115th regiment, but of course this came at the coast of Salamaua's defense. By this point the bulk of the 102nd regiment was at the Malolo-buang coastal area and the bulk of the 115th regiment, the 2nd Maizuru SNLF, two companies of the 5th Sasebo SNLF and the 14th field artillery regiment were at Salamaua, around 150 men in total. On the other side, after the fall of Mubo Brigadier Moten had the men advance north. The Bennet Force took over Goodview Junction; Companies A and D of the 2/5th advanced to Mount Tambu. Mount Tambu was the highest feature along the route between Mubo and Salamaua. It consisted of a series of razorback ridges covered in dense jungle, ideal for camouflage pillboxes. Its area was defended by roughly 700 Japanese from the 2nd and 3rd battalions of the 66th regiment led by Lt Colonel Fukuzo Kimura and Major Sakai Sugiyama. On July 16th, Captain Mick Walter led 60 men of Company A up the steep track leading to the south crest of Mount Tambu. Walter led the men to storm the two forward knolls, taking the Japanese by complete surprise. The two knolls were captured, but during the night the Japanese counterattacked in force. The Japanese crawled up the knolls through some heavy undergrowth before they unleashed mortars and mountain gun fire. Walters men however had captured some Japanese pillboxes upon the two knolls and thus the turn tables. 8 counterattacks were tossed at Walters men, each repulsed with heavy losses, around 39 casualties for the Australians and 350 for the Japanese. The following day, D company came up to help the Australian defenders, bringing much needed mortars. They dug in on a knoll around 300 yards back on the track. Alongside D company also came much needed supplies and an additional platoon to reinforce his men who he deployed on his western flank. On July 18th, Walter ordered an advance going northwest in an attempt to secure the southern portion of Mount Tambu. The advance was spearheaded by Lance Corporal Jackson who alongside his comrades tossed grenades into a Japanese pillbox. Jackson then stormed inside killing 3 Japanese with this Tommy gun. Alongside Jackson, mortar and mountain gun fire aided Walters men to gain 80 additional yards, securing the southern portion of Mount Tambu. They could advance no further however as it became much more difficult from this position as the Japanese basically were encircling them upon razer back ridge to their north. Walter would write later on “we dug in on the new ground and shortened our perimeter to the narrowing plateau”. For this action the Australians paid with 6 lives, 13 wounded while the Japanese lost 82. At this point Walter had D company with one of his platoon holding the western flank; A company held the northern knoll and two platoons from D company held the eastern knolls. The Japanese had been devastated, losing hundreds of men and allied artillery was becoming a nightmare. Captain Newman's C Company of the 162nd battalion had come to a junction of the Buigap and Bui Eo. From there a reconnaissance patrol found suitable artillery positions northwest of the junction. With the help of native carriers and 80 men of the 2/6th battalion, two guns were hauled over the Buigap track and by July 17th another 4 guns of the American 218th battalion were hauled up from the southern arm of the Bitoi river to Green Hill. From these positions the allies could smash multiple Japanese defensive positions. General Nakano realized Mount Tambu was an essential component of General Muroya's defensive line so he sent the remainder of the 3rd battalion, 66th regiment to reinforce Colonel Araki's men. Then during the early hours of July 19th a large earth tremor startled the Australian defenders. It was the prelude to an assault led by Captain Kunizo Hatsugai's 9th company of the 66th regiment. They had crept up silently managing to get behind the southern knolls then suddenly charged up under the cover of darkness. But the defenders had their guard up and were not taken by surprise. A Bren gunner managed to knock out one of the Japanese raiders machine guns with a lucky hit in the dark. As the Japanese scrambled to try and recover it they were met with fire causing severe casualties. The Japanese surprise attack was a failure, forcing them to withdraw by first light, leaving 21 dead across the knoll. While this raid was occuring, Walters men were also repelling a series of attacks against the Northern Knoll. During these attacks, Walter was injured. Luckily for Walter and his company, they were relieved on the 19th by D Company. Another American unit, C Company of the 1st battalion, 162nd regiment led by Captain Delmar Newman also arrived to take up a position on the southern knolls. Until july 23rd, the Australians limited their actions to patrols. On the 20th, Bennet led a patrol making contact with a strong Japanese position on the Walpole track; Another company led by Morse found a Japanese position in the Goodview area dug within 100 yards of their own. Meanwhile the Japanese also limited their actions to a few patrols proding Mount Tambu for weaknesses. On July 23rd Moten ordered the 2/5th battalion to attack the remaining Japanese positions on the Tambu Knoll, but it was the most heavily fortified yet. Basically it was like a castle keep, complete with a ravine for a moat, near vertical walls and deep tunnels going through the knoll. Mount Tambu's peak held 10 log reinforce bunkers connected by the tunnels which could shelter half a battalion or so. They also had a chain of weapon pits set up on lower ledges. Later on when investigating the entire system, the allies found weapon pits to be around 4 logs thick, interconnected by crawl trenches. Many of these weapon puts had been carefully sited within the roots of large trees, making them impervious to allied artillery fire. The tunnel entrances were dug into the side of the peak directly behind the defensive positions, allowing the defenders to storm out from their shelters underground within seconds. It was these kind of ingenious defensive works that would be built upon later on in the war to create absolute nightmares for the allies. Moten had not carried out a thorough reconnaissance of the Japanese positions prior to ordering the attack and thus many of his subordinates elected to make a frontal assault instead of encircling them. D company took the center for the frontal attack while to the left were the 16th platoon led by Sergeant Alvin ‘Hungry' Williams and the 18th platoon led by Lt Bernard Leonads; and A company advanced along a Caffins track heading for the western flank of Mount Tambu to try and cut off the main Japanese supply route going back to Komiatum. 15 minutes before they charged, Australian and American artillery and mortars fired upon Mount Tambu. Two Australian mountain guns fired 90 rounds while the 4 75mm American guns fired 60 per gun from Green hill. D company began their attack around midday, trying to drive a wedge between two lines of pillboxes. Corporal John Smith laid cover fire as Captain Lin Cameron crept forward, getting within 15 yards of the pill boxes on the left side of the track. Cameron counted around 7 pill boxes in two lines of defense going across both sides of the track. The steep slopes on both sides gave little venues of approach, allowing around just a platoon at a time. There was also sharpened bamboo pickets on the left flank, leading Cameron to believe that an attack was expected there. The Japanese knowingly let two platoons reach their line of forward pillboxes before unleashing hell upon them. The casualties were terrible. As Cameron recounted, “we were within 20 meters of the enemy bunkers before all hell let loose”. One of the men in the forward sections was killed outright, Cameron was wounded, his right elbow was shattered by a machine gun bullet. As he saw his men hesitate, he screamed out “forward! Get stuck into them!” With his right arm now useless and his eyesight dimming, Cameron handed command over to Lt Martin. Despite the horror, the Australians pressed on. Corporal Carey led his depleted platoon forward in a great dash and swept the outer ring of the Japanese pillboxes. On his left were Leonards men who stormed two pillboxes before heavy enfilade fire pinned them down. Then the 17th platoon led by Corporal John Smith charged up Mount Tambu from behind with their bayonets fixed. Smith screamed out “follow me!” as he charged. 3 other men out of the 11 managed to keep up with Smith, but soon Japanese grenades began to rain down on them. The grenades caught them just as they passed a third line of pillboxes. Smith was hit, but he kept charging and when he reached the peak of Mount Tambu with his back to the enemy he screamed “come on boys! come on boys!”. Without additional support and with no indication A company were making progress over on the left flank, the 4 men on the peak were forced to withdraw. The gallant Smith had to be dragged down and would die from severe wounds two days later. Smith was decorated for bravery in Syria in 1941, when he cleared out 3 machine gun nests at a roadblock and despite being wounded during the battle of Wau he still had gas left in the tank for some more. Scouts had made their way towards the Tambu saddle track and spotted Japanese soldiers, around 125 of them a full company or so. The scouts quickly realized they were outnumbered, thus when the artillery began to open up and Walter's company moved in for the attack across the saddle, no sooner then they started the enemy halted them in their tracks. Walter had no choice but to withdraw around 500 yards south east as the Japanese were too strong. Walter's inability to make progress in the west ultimately ruined the entire attack. Despite the defeat, Companies A and D had done very well against such a heavily fortified position. Meanwhile, Warfe and his men were marching when they discovered Ambush Knoll had come back under the hands of some Japanese from the 2nd battalion, 66th regiment. On July 15th, Warfes commandos launched an attack, with C Platoon performing a frontal assault along the narrow ridge top track. There were 16 men in the attack and they found themselves face to face with well dug in Japanese. The Japanese were behind a bamboo barricade with some pillboxes scattered about. The platoon got within 50 feet of the main barricade, but the Japanese fire was too much and casualties were mounting quickly. Meanwhile B Platoon was maneuvering around the Japanese eastern flank. At 5:30 B Platoon began attacking the eastern side of the knoll. The men got behind an enemy pillbox covering the track from Orodubi, but the Japanese quickly saw the Australians and began tossing grenades at them. Despite the resistance, B Platoon managed cut off the Japanese supply line to Ambush Knoll. With their supply lines cut the Japanese were forced to withdraw With Ambush Knoll back under allied control, Brigadier Hammer ordered A company of the 58/59th battalion to depart Gwaibolom and attack Orodubi from its southern flank. Even with the help of the 58/59th company, the commando's yet again failed to dislodge the Japanese. On the night of July 19th, fresh troops of the 1st company, 80th battalion used the light of the full moon to come up the ridge. This became a staging point for them to attack Ambush Knoll, seeing artillery fire beginning in the morning to support their attack. Warfe's commandos were manning the trenches on Ambush Knoll, turning the tables on the Japanese and inflicting heavy casualties upon them. The Japanese were forced to retreat. The next day Warfe reinforced Ambush Knoll with two Vickers guns, which gave the Japanese a nasty surprise when they attacked again. On the 20th, the Japanese opened fire with mortars and artillery before charging the ridge. They managed to get as far as to cut the Australian lines of communication, but were ultimately repealed once again. Over 14 consecutive attacks would be made on the 20th, and even more on the 21st, but it all came to nothing, Warfe's commandos held their ground. Facing such pressure from the Japanese, Hammer still felt the greater weight of their attention was directed at Bobdubi and not towards Tambu, believing it to all be a consequence of Moton's lack of progress. General Savige decided to order Motens 2/6th battalion to take responsibility over Bobdubi ridge. The 2/6th then came across the Japanese rear near the slopes of Ambush Knoll and began harassing them. On the 22nd the Japanese tried yet again to attack Ambush Knoll, but were beaten back firmly, forcing them to finally withdraw to Sugarcane Ridge. By July 23rd, Warfes' exhausted commandos earned a relief by the 2/6th and were sent to relieve A company at Gwaibolom, while A company advanced north. The 2/6th likewise would advance north. But now we are moving away from the troubles of New Guinea and heading back up north to the frigid Aleutians. After the successful seizure of Attu, now Admiral Kinkaid and General Buckner needed to plan the invasion of Kiska. Kiska was the last Japanese bulwark in the Aleutians and held an incredible underground city. There were miles of tunnels, buried ammunition dumps, barracks, 3 hospitals, dental clinics, mess halls, machine shops, warehouses, photo labs, telephone rooms, all shoved and shored with wood. Ventilation pipes connected the maze of caves and tunnels, with Japanese troops wearing great fur lined coats busy at work. The Americans had experienced hell, on Attu, over 2872 Japanese had been killed or committed suicide, just 28 men were captured and it cost 549 american lives, 1148 wounded and nearly another 2000 ill or battered by harsh climate. The American leadership expected Kiska to be another hellscape and did not want to come at it lightly. The 7th division led by Brigadier General Archibald Arnolrd, Buckner's 4th regiment, the 87th Mountain infantry regiment, the 13th Canadian Brigade, consisting of the 6th Canadian division led by Major General George Pearkes, the Canadian Fusiliers regiment, the 1st battalion of Winnipeg grenadiers, the Rocky Mountain rangers regiment and e Regiment de Hull along with the 1st Special Service Force led by Colonel Robert Frederick were to be part of the invasion of Kiska, codenamed Operation Cottage. Unfortunately, the actual invasion will not be happening in this episode, you will actually have to wait weeks for that one, but I just so happened to have recently done a podcast with a Canadian Military Historian named Brad St.Croix from the Youtube channel OTD Military History, the same gentleman who I interviewed for this series about the battle of Hong Kong. The podcast we recently did was on the Canadian experience of the Pacific War and the battle of Kiska is 1/3rd of it, so if you are, impatient and want to learn some neat stuff about how Canadians had to change their entire military organization and use American equipment for the battle of Kiska, check out my Youtube channel, the Pacific War channel for the full episode. Now the last time we spoke about Kiska, the Japanese were forced to perform a bit of a miracle to evacuate their boys. After Attu had fallen, Rear Admiral Akiyama Monzo alongside 6000 men were ordered to evacuate Kiska. To try and do this, the Japanese began by sending 13 I-class submarines of the 1st submarine squadron of Rear Admiral Kouda Takeo. Despite these Type C submarines being enormous in size, they could only carry around 150 men per trip, thus it would have took 40 successful journey's to evacuate the entire Kiska garrison. With the US Navy fully decked out with sonar, this was not going to be a walk in the park. The efforts had begun on May 27th and by July, the submarines had managed to get 800 men safely back to Japan, but lost 300 due to american attacks. Meanwhile Admiral Giffen had a considerable armada to work with consisting of a trio of older battleships; the Mississippi, Idaho and New Mexico, a quintet of cruisers; Louisville, Portland, San Francisco, Santa Fe and Wichita and 9 destroyers. He was ordered to bombard Kiska who already had been smashed with aerial attacks all throughout June and early July. On July 6th, Giffen steamed towards Kiska with 4 cruisers and 4 destroyers and bombarded the island for 22nd minutes causing a handful of casualties. It was not all that impressive, but it convinced Admiral Kawase that the Americans were about to invade Kiska at any moment.Admiral Kawase Shiro realized the futility of the submarine effort and was forced to come up with a new plan. Kawase came up with a bold plan, he was going to wait for a night when a thick fog was occurring and would take a surface fleet to sneak over into the Aleutians to assault enemy warships and evacuate all the remaining men on Kiska in a single go. To be blunt, it was a dumb idea. The American warships were equipped with radar that would pick up any surface ship with ease despite any type of fog, but what was about to occur can only be described as spectacular and bizarre. Rear Admiral Kimura, the victor of the battle of the bismarck sea, would lead the force and he had at his disposal Destroyer Squadron 1: consisting of Yugumo, Kazagumo, Asagumo, Akigumo, Usugumo, Hibiki (one of my favorite whiskeys), Shimakaze, Samidare, Naganami, Wakaba, Hatsushimo and light cruisers Abukuma and Kiso. In close support of these there was also a covering force consisting of heavy cruisers Nachi, Maya, light cruiser Tama and destroyers Nokaze and Namikaze. The large convoy force departed from Paramushiro on July 7th with Takeo's 1st submarine squadron performing reconnaissance. The covering force departed Paramushiro on July 10th and by July 12th the fleet was around 500 miles south of Kiska. When they took up this assembly position, the sailors were in despair to see the fog was quite low. While it did not matter for warships with radar, Kimura knew full well what allied aircraft could do to his forces if they were not better concealed. Thus he elected to wait until the fog reappaered to cover his force. But the weather did not change, the skies remained clear forcing him to head back on July 15th. Meanwhile on Kiska, Rear Admiral Monzo was frantically ordering his troops to lay out a road from the underground base to the harbor piers to help facilitate the impending evacuation. All of the Japanese on Kiska felt an impending doom placed upon them. If the Americans landed first, it was all but over for them. Luckily, Japanese weather stations reported a dense fog would emerge over Kiska by July 25th, and unlike here in Montreal Canada, I guess these weather reporters are accurate. Kimura once again departed Paramushiro on July 22nd, accompanied by Admiral Kawase aboard cruiser Tama. Yet a few days prior, on July 19th, Admiral Kinkaid had ordered Admiral Giffen to bombard Kiska again. This time Giffen took a two pronged naval attack force consisting of battleships Mississippi and Idaho, cruisers Portland, Wichita, San Francisco, Louisville, Santa Fe and destroyers Abner Read, Farragut, Monaghan, Perry, Aylwin, Bache, Hughes, Morris and Mustin. Giffen's force reached Kiska on July 22nd and his ships smashed the island with 424000 lbs of high explosive shells. Just an hour later, a PBY suddenly detached with her radar 7 radar pips southwest of Attu. The PBY maintained contact for around 6 hours before low fuel forced her to return to base. These radar pips alarmed Admiral Kinkaid which was being reported in conjunction with a massive increase in Japanese radio activity on Kiska. Kinkaid believed a major Japanese fleet had just entered Aleutian waters, most likely a reinforcement convoy. Kinkaid immediately ordered Rear Admirals Giffen and Griffin to intercept the suspected enemy. However, by doing this he had also done something extremely favorable for the Japanese, he had left Kiska Harbor open and unguarded. Kinkaid dispatched a quartet of PT boats to try and provide a makeshift blockade, but the terrible weather forced the smaller vessels to return to port as trying to dash over to Kiska would probably see them all sunk. While this was occurring, Kimura's ships were traveling through the dense fog separately. The fog prevented the Americans from intercepting them initially, and having failed to make contact with the enemy, Kinkaid became nervous the Japanese might escape the blockade and ordered the force to return to Kiska at maximum speed on July 25th. The American ships dutifully turned back while Kinkaid sent the Oiler Pecos out to meet them for refueling. By dusk of the 25th, the American ships were around 90 miles from Kiska, when the fog had all but disappeared showing a cloudless sky. Kimura's vessels seeing their fog betray them, all reunited as a single force, now bearing 400 miles south of the American warships. At precisely 12:43am on July 26th the American warships picked up 7 strong radar pips around 15 miles northeast. It was Mississippi's SG radar that first picked them up, the American destroyers were actually unable to detect any pips on their radar due to the curvature of the ocean's surface at such a distance. The New Mexico, Portland, San Francisco and Wichita began picking up the same radar pips. The radar pips zigzagged across the sea surface, changing direction in much the same way ships attempting to evade detection might. The ships were being detected all at different angles, verifying to the Americans there were physical presences of some kind occupying definite points in space. On top of this, the immobile radar signature of Kiska's volcano at a range of 78 miles appeared clearly the entire time, verifying the validity of the pips moving with a fixed landmark. The radar pips converged 22,000 yards ahead of the Americans forcing them to spring into action. Admiral Giffen called for the entire fleet to turn left to intercept the pips on their southerly heading and in the hopes of foiling a possible torpedo attack. All of the American ships turned their guns to fire salvo's into the night. Great flame lances stabbed into the darkness as destroyers launched volleys of torpedoes and radar plotters frantically calculated salvo corrections. For 67 minutes the Americans tracked the 7 radar pips firing wildly at them. At 1:30am the Mississippi's log recorded zig-zags and a 20 degree course change, but not a single sailor saw an enemy ship. Cruisers San Francisco and Santa Fe registered shell splashes, but never an enemy target. 75 miles over on Kiska, the Japanese were watching a spectacle. From their point of view it was like a night-time light show over the horizon. By 2:22am the radar pips thinned, faded and vanished completely. During the morning surface ships and aircraft fanned out looking for wreckage, ships, floating papers, oil slick, anything to indicate something was even out there! The American warships reported no return fire, it was as if they faced ghosts. With a lack of fuel and ammunition, the US ships began refueling on the 28th and resumed their blockade of Kiska. What famously has become known as the battle of the Pips left the US Navy with a mystery that remains unsolved to this very day. The radar equipment was operating at times where there was a cloudless night with no fog, zero reasons for false radar echoes. An Aleutian crab fishing captain named Captain George Fulton may have solved the mystery in 1991 when he managed to duplicate the radar signatures observed during the battle by using his radar on a natural phenomenon common to the area. He presented his findings to the Alaska War Symposium in 1993 in a letter “I […] duplicated the Battle of the Pips using color radar. Sure enough there were blips on the tube and their density changed from red to orange to yellow and finally to black, providing an exact replication of the Battle of the Pips. What you described fits exactly the […] pattern of dense flocks of mutton birds or dusky shearwaters […] As mutton birds fly they veer left and right. This accounts for the zigzagging that was reported on the radar logs” Captain Fulton further went on to say how these huge flocks continue until they see large schools of fish, such as pollack. When the birds see them they begin landing on the sea surface then dive for their prey. This maneuver causes them to vanish from radar screens entirely. In the 1990s Aleutian fishing crews use this trait to locate large concentration of pollack, identifying the blips by their zigzagging motion and cast their nets accordingly. Were the Japanese saved by shearwater birds? Another answer came from the US Navy who officially stated that atmospheric echoes, a sort of phenomena caused the radar pips, that explanation has been highly contested. Its also been speculated that the American radar pips were 7 IJN submarines running reconnaissance. What we do know is Kimura made it to Kiska on the 28th undetected and unharmed while the US warships were enroute miles back. No American ships were anywhere near Kiska on the 28th. Admiral Kimura pulled the ships into Kiska anchorage and evacuated the entire remaining forces on the island, all 5183 men onto 8 vessels all within 55 minutes. The Japanese soldiers made sure to spend their last moments on the island setting up a plethora of booby traps. Four days later Kimura and Kawase were back in Paramushiro, successfully evacuating Kiska without firing a single shot. The Americans had no idea the evacuation occurred. In the words of one disgruntled American Colonel after the Kiska ordeal ““How I hate those bastards but I've got to give them credit for the most masterly evacuation by any army at any time and I'm not forgetting Dunkirk” I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The drive to Lae and Salamaua rages on New Guinea as the American Navy in the frigid northern seas fought perhaps a ghost ship army. Or perhaps some pesky birds looking for tasty pollock saved the entire Japanese garrison on the island of Kiska.

american china battle japan americans san francisco canadian green australian japanese kings portland facing mountain hong kong mississippi new mexico idaho syria louisville hammer morris mysterious troubles hughes us navy winnipeg hq santa fe rocky mountains fuller stephens roosevelt hull walters observation wichita mule scouts morse generals tama herring sg croix bennet vickers ventilation buckner monaghan pimples warlords regiment pips new guinea fijian kimura montreal canada opium wars bache pacific war greenhill walpole australian american salus green hell moten araki type c munda farragut moton giffen hibiki no american aleutian lae kiska takeo wau leonards another american american navy mustin nachi kinkaid kiso two australian papuan ijn attu c company aylwin tambu craig watson brad st malolo wakaba

- 85 - Pacific War - The battle of Kula Gulf, July 4-11, 1943

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 13, 2023 31:33

Last time we spoke about the amphibious assaults for Operations Chronicle and Toenails. General Douglas MacArthur finally performed his landings at Nassau Bay, Woodlark and Kiriwina islands. Woodlark and Kiriwina proved to be cake walks, while Nassau Bay proved a tougher nut to crack. Then over in the Solomons, Admiral Halsey unleashed his landings at Wickham Anchorage, Segi Point, Viru Harbor and Rendova. Now the Japanese were more alert to the invasions and offered some resistance, although ultimately Sasaki would order many forces to simply withdraw from the invaders. Admiral Kusaka tossed a ton of airpower at the incoming allies only to lose a disastrous quarter of his air fleet, forcing him to ask his Army colleague Immamura for additional support. However with all of these landings came a large amount of allied warships to bring them, and such actions could only bring about one conclusion, another naval battle for the pacific war. This episode is the Battle of Kula Gulf Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. Before we jump into the naval battle of Kula Gulf a lot was occurring in New Guinea and the Solomons. Over in the Bobdubi front, the Australian 15th brigade under the temporary command of Colonel Guinn were preparing for the main offensive, hoping to trap the Japanese defending Mubo. To support the Nassau Bay landing, Colonel Guinn ordered the untested 58/59th battalion to advance upon the Japanese high ground position at the Old Vicker's, Coconuts and Bobdubi area. They would be marching from Orodubi to the Coconuts while Major Warfe's commandos would raid Malolo and Kela. Company A and C of the 58/59th would make the initial attack seeing A attacking Gwaibolom and C the Old Vicker's position. Following close behind them was B company who were to advance across the ridge to gain control over the Bench Cut Track. D Company were to be held in reserve at the Kunda-vine. On June 26th, A company set off from Missim heading towards their forming up point at Namling. On the 28th, the other remaining companies made departed Meares Camp heading for the New Bobdubi kunda bridge. The next day 17 of Warfe's commandos were ambushed by 30 Japanese. They managed to escape, but were forced to abandon a Bren gun. By the night of June 29th, the 58th/59th crossed the Francisco River and began preparations for the launch of the main attack which would occur the next morning. The next morning saw lackluster allied air strikes against Gwaibolom, Salamua, Old Vickers and the Coconut area. Companies B and C left their start up point of Uliap Creek, seeing C attack Buggert village, just a bit south of the Old Vickers position being held at this time by a company of the 115th regiment led by Lt Ogawa Takeshi. They successfully outlanked the Japanese and captured the village, suffering only 2 casualties for their efforts. From there the Australians assaulted the Old Vickers position, but the Japanese defenders repealed them right back to Buggert village. The Japanese defenders had well established positions, hiding in dugouts 40 feet down from the top. The failure to seize the Old Vickers position, prevented B Company from reaching their objective, the Bench Cut Track and now they were being met with Mortar fire as they crossed the ridge. Meanwhile A Company began their assault on Orodubi, but anticipating booby-traps the men had left on the Bench Cut Track around 70 yards south of Orodubi, they chose to climb a 40 foot kunai slope to join the main track just 10 yards within the enemy. Around 80 men of Company 10 led by Lt Gunji Toshio saw the Australians doing this and promptly began tossing grenades at close range and fired down upon them. The Australians were forced to flee back to Namling as a result. The next day it was decided they would use a platoon to contain Orodubi while the others bypassed it to go onwards and capture Gwaibolom and Erskine Creek, which they managed to do by July 2nd. While this was occurring, B Company was trying to find another way across the ridge, but were failing to do so. So on July 2nd, they were ordered to move across the ridge via the newly established positions at Gwaibolom and Erskine Creek, and would reach the Komiatum Track / bench track junction where they would prepare an ambush by the 3rd. At around 5pm on the 3rd, B company managed to ambush a party of 20 Japanese trying to move towards Old Vickers and this quickly fell into hand to hand combat killing half the Japanese and one of their officers. Meanwhile Colonel MacKechnie's men were fighting to keep their beachhead alive at Nassau Bay. AA and C Companies had fought through the night against Japanese until their 300 yard perimeter was secured. At dawn on June 30th, C company began advancing south to find the Papuan infantry battalion who were around Cape Dinga. C Company made their way to a place just due west of Cape Dinga, following the Tabali River, while A Company was patrolling north and south of an arm of the Bitoi river where they ran into the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment. A Company backed by some other units attempted to hit the Japanese western flank, but they were overwhelmed and forced to turn back. It would actually be Amphibian engineers who would save the day, who came in at the last minute to help A company out just as the Japanese tossed a banzai charge at them. Upon receiving word of the Japanese attacks, C company rushed over to join A by 3pm. Yet unbeknownst to them, the Japanese were not actually trying to break through, they were trying to withdraw by crossing the Tabali river. General Nakano had ordered them to withdraw to a new position at Lake Salus when he heard word over 1000 men had landed at Nassau Bay. Nakano also had ordered the 3rd battalion of the 66th regiment to send 150 men to march south from Salamua to help out in the Nassau Bay area. These men were tasked with carrying out only limited attacks against the allied forces around Nassau Bay, such as delaying actions to help the Nassau Bay garrison withdraw towards Lake Salus. Nakano was also coordinating with Colonel Araki who was now operating out of an HQ in Mubo, he had likewise brought forces over to Mubo from Salamua. As for the Papuan infantry, they were marching north and they ran into the 3rd battalion, 102nd regiment around Cape Dinga as well. They managed to attack their rear killing at least 26 Japanese who were holding out in a bunker. After this they continued their march to the Nassau Bay beachhead. At around 4:30pm C company began sending reports that they were seeing some Japanese crossing over the Tabali River just south of their position. They were ordered to return to the beachhead perimeter to take the southern flank, but before they were able the Japanese attacked their rear taking 5 men and a platoon commander. Around the beachhead a hastily prepared defensive line was established by an ad hoc force of Engineers, Australian infantry and Headquarters personnel. As the night fell on, C company reached the southern part of the perimeter, quickly taking up positions. The Japanese began a series of attacks throughout the entire night from all sides using machine guns, grenades, mortar and rifle fire. Smaller parties of Japanese were trying to infiltrate positions. It was a terrifying experience for the defenders who would dub it “guy fawkes night”. Many of the men had itchy fingers which led to tragic accidental casualties throughout the night. It was a pitch black night and the noises of the jungle and Japanese screaming stuff in english unnerved the allied forces. The Japanese had tossed a ton of stuff into the perimeter trying to get the allies to use up their own munitions in response. As a result the allied forces had 18 deaths and 27 wounded several of which were the result of friendly fire. The Japanese it seems to have around 50 deaths during the night. Back over in the north, on June 30th, Captain Dexter was leading forward a number of patrols in preparation for an assault upon Duali. However as they advanced they ran into a Japanese ambush along the Bitoi track, thus canceling their planned assault. The next day, Brigadier Moten ordered Dexter's exhausted men to move forward regardless. With some support of Beaufighters strafing the Japanese positions, the Australians charged straight through the enemy positions, and to their shock they found them abandoned. As Dexter recalled ‘We advanced through the Japanese position with fixed bayonets and searched the scrub on each side. Everywhere was evidence of a hasty evacuation, dropped equipment and personal rice bags, and evidence of extensive bomb damage. But of the Japs, no sign.' Thus Dexter and his men captured the mouth of the Bitoi by early afternoon. Shortly after the capture, Dexter made contact with MacKechnie who was busy expanding his perimeter northwards. By nightfall, PT boats led by Lt Commander Barry Atkins covered the landing of 11 landing craft full of reinforcements. The PT boats staffed nearby villages to cause a lot of ruckus, hoping to dissuade nearby Japanese from firing on the vulnerable landing craft. The reinforcements were mostly from B company who had failed to land during the third wave. On July 2nd, Moten began to pressure MacKechnie, stating he had to get his troops moving inland at once. Thus MacKechnie decided to leave C company to defend the perimeter while Lt Colonel Harold Taylor would lead the rest of the men towards Napier. Luckily for the men, 4 75mm pack howitzer m1 artillery guns had been unloaded that night with the reinforcements giving them ample firepower. The gun were positioned on the beach and immediately went to work shelling targets at the mouth of the Tabali River, Cape Dinga and the area between Duali and the Bito River's southern arm. On July the 3rd, the men now designated the Taylor Force accompanied by Dexter's company were marching for Napier, but their march was a slow one as the jungles were thick and they were carrying heavy equipment. While this was occurring the 3rd battalions of the 102nd and 66th regiments were consolidating around Lake Salus looking to create a defensive position. The coastal area however proved to be too difficult to fortify, so they moved over the Tambu where they joined a SNLF platoon of the 5th Sasebo to make a position there. At this point General Savige decided to send the Papuans north along the coast to keep pressuring the enemy's retreat. By the 4th, Taylor Force had taken a position at Napier and were now under the direct command of Moten's 17th brigade. Back over on the beaches at Nassau Bay a total of 1477 troops had been landed, thus securing the beachhead. Dexters company marched back over to Guadagasal taking a coastal route, getting themselves ready for a future assault against Mubo slated for July 7th. MacKechnie believed the loss of some of his landing craft had greatly delayed the entire operation, perhaps up to 3 weeks. He did not think he would be able to move artillery or large quantities of supplies further inland. He also did not think it was tactically sound to leave his base, as the Japanese proved to be quite a nuisance in the area. Orders from the top were demanding a artillery road be built, but his troops at the assembly area would probably run out of rations in a day or two and he had no native carriers on hand. In his words "To be very frank we have been in a very precarious position down here for several days and my sending the rifle troops inland was contrary to my own best judgment. Troops had gone inland stripped to the bone. Without heavy weapons and mortar and machine-gun ammunition. "Therefore, these troops who are up there now are in no position to embark upon an offensive mission until we are able to get food, ammunition and additional weapons up to them." In response to the situation, on July 6th, Moten ordered 1000 rations and 100 boy loads of ammunition…god you have to love the australians, boy-loads haha. Anyways this was to be dropped over Napier. Moving over to the Solomons, Admiral Halsey had successfully occupied Rendova, Segi point, Viru Harbor and Wickham anchorage forcing the smaller number of Japanese to withdraw to their main base at Munda. Admiral Kusaka tossed a series of air strikes against the invaders, suffering horrible losses whereupon he had to request General Immamura reinforce him with the 21st air flotilla at Saipan and from the 6th air division. For the battle of Munda, Admiral Halsey had assembled the largest air force ever assembled in the Solomon islands campaign. It was a force that was needed as the Japanese in Rabaul tossed every bomber that was available to try and thwart the US amphibious invasion. The June air battles had greatly depleted the Japanese air power, but they were not done. On July 1st the Japanese hit Kahili using 6 Vals and 34 Zeros. They were trying to knock out the 3rd battalion, 103rd infantry who were unloading at Poko plantation on the west coast of Rendova. However they were met by 20 P-40's and F4Fs that ripped them to pieces taking down 3 Vals, 5 Zeros and losing 5 P-40's in the process. Although the allies were scoring massively high success against the Japanese in ratios, by this point it reached 7 to 1, they were still unable to sustain round the clock 32 fighter or more CAP. To do this required a total of 96 operational aircraft and after 10 days of fighting in the skies over New Georgia the pilots were also becoming increasingly exhausted. Colonel Merrill Twining requested more P-38 Lightnings, the aircraft that had become the most comfortable fighter to those in the south pacific by this point. But Hap's Arnold over in Washington was heavily committing forces for General Patton and Montgomery's invasion of Sicily at the time so he had to deny this request. As Arnold stated back “every trained unit must be thrown against the German until he is beaten”. Regardless, with Rendova secured, General Hester was landing the bulk of his forces for the final push against Munda. The unloading process had been heavily hampered by poor planning and a failure to allocate adequate personnel for beach control and unloading duties however. To clear the new beachhead and distribute the combat stores, infantrymen were detailed to carry out the work. When transports carrying the next echelon arrived, many of the boats grounded offshore and had to be unloaded manually by troops wading ashore. On July 2nd, Admiral Kusaka coordinating with General Itahana formed a combined strike led by Major Endo Misao consisting of 18 Ki-21 bombers, 23 Ki-43's and Ki-61s with 29 Zero escort. Unfortunately for the allies, Admiral Mitscher had recalled the Rendova patrol due to bad weather, so a total of 18 Ki-21 bombers came to the scene unmolested and hit the congested area around the harbor. The strike caused 200 or so casualties, mostly upon the 2nd battalion, 172nd, the 24th seabees, the 9th defense battalion and staff officers of various headquarters. The strike also knocked out a lot of equipment and supplies. With the failure of the June air battles to hold back the allied invasion, Admiral Koga turned to the Navy for the task of providing new supplies to the defenders at Munda Point. The Tokyo Express was back in business, a convoy of 10 destroyers were sent to New Gerogia led by Rear Teruo Akiyama aboard his flagship Niizuki. His force was ordered to attack Rendova and he had with him the old Yubari, Yunagi, Mikazuki who would operate south of the Treasuries as a diversion, while Niizuki, Amagiri, Hatsuyuki, Nagatsuki, Satsuki, Mikazuki and Mochizuki would hit the allied shipping and shell the harbor. The Japanese destroyers were spotted right away, but bad weather prevented 3 American strike forces consisting of PBY's and B-25's from hitting the incoming enemy. In the meantime, Akiyama closed in on the southern tip of Rendova. She circled the island and opened fire on a point due west of the harbor. The bombardment was quite ineffective, but some allied PT boats rushed in to attack her which caused a wild 10 minute mini battle seeing 2 of them running aground. On the ground, General Hester ordered the 1st battalion, 172nd regiment and A company of the 169th regiment now designated Southern Landing Group to land at Zanana beach. Led by General Wing on the afternoon of the 2nd they made a crossing over Blanche Channel using 16 landing crafts. With the support of Brigadier General Harold Barkers artillery they successfully formed a perimeter. Now the Japanese air and naval attacks were worrying Halsey. He expected the Japanese to launch a major counterlanding with substantial forces perhaps on the 3rd. Therefore he ordered Admiral Ainsworth to lay in wait off the west coast of Rendova for the enemy. However July the 3rd would not bring an enemy, this was because General Imamura and Admiral Kusaka agreed with the lack of air and naval forces on hand at this time they could not perform such a feat, to the disgust of General Sasaki who had assumed command over the defense for Munda on the 2nd. Sasaki was so adamant about landing reinforcements at around midnight on July 3rd he proposed violating orders to simply make a counter landing using the 13th regiment and Ota's barges. He had a crazy idea to simply bring the vessels in and mix them with the American landing craft who were making rountrips to the mainland through the Honiavasa passage. He thought even if half his forces perished, the attack would be worth it. Ota objected to this on the grounds the barges would be needed for other transports scheduled for July 4th and 5th, apparently this made Sasaki visibly upset, who adjourned the meeting and left the room. Ota pushed Sasaki to write his plans down and submit them to Rabaul, which he did, and Rabaul squashed it immediately. On July 3rd the Japanese performed an unsuccessful fighter sweep over Rendova and the next day reconnaissance reported the island was secured by the Americans who had heavily reinforced it with anti aircraft guns and radar. They also reported landings on Zanana and that it looked like Rice Anchorage would be next, thus cutting off Japanese reinforcements from coming down the Munda trail from Bairoko. Imamura and Kusaka had to wait for an accumulation of forces to bring reinforcements to New Georgia; they had no intention of losing it like Guadalcanal. 4000 soldiers of the 13th and 45th regiments were earmarked for departure. Kusaka ordered Itahana to launch another combined strike, this time aimed at Roviana island. However the Japanese were intercepted by 32 F4F's causing the loss of 6 Ki-21s, 3 Ki-43's and a zero without a single loss for the Americans. This would be the fateful end of the joint air operations as Itahana needed to take his forces to help the Salamaua area. Luckily for Kusaka he received reinforcements in the form of the 201st Kokutai from the 25th flotilla which would allow him to gradually rebuild his air strength by mid july. Meanwhile Admiral Turner had assigned 7 destroyer transports, 2 fast minesweepers and 4 Destroyers to carry the 1st raider battalion, the 3rd battalion, 145th infantry regiment and the 3rd battalion, 148th infantry regiment of the 37th division led by Colonel Liversedge into the Kula Gulf. Their escort cover was Ainsworth task group 36.1 consisting of the Cruisers Honolulu, St Louis, Helena and destroyers Nicholas, O'Bannon, Strong and Chevalier. They were also tasked with bombarding Vila and Bairoko. On July 4th, Ainsworth led the group up the slot while the Rear Admiral Teruo Akiyama's Tokyo Express were on their way to Vila carrying 1300 troops of the 13th regiment towards Vila. At around midnight Ainsworth entered Kula Gulf carefully avoiding the mindfield laid back in May. His force proceeded to shell Vila, but they failed to detect the Japanese who were heading south. The Japanese detected the Americans at 12:15 thanks to their brand new radar system; the 1-shiki 2-go radar which was outfitted on the Niizuki. The IJN were eager to test out the radar so they fastened it to the flagship of Destroyer squadron 3. Oh how the turn tables as they say. The radar indicated they were heavily outnumbered, so Akiyama decided to abort the mission, but before doing so he ordered 14 torpedoes to be launched at a range of 10 miles. The type 93 long lance torpedo remained the best weapons of the kind in the Pacific theater and one his destroyer Strong at 12:43 practically cutting her in two. Can't stress it enough what an immense advantage Japan had over the Americans in terms of torpedo power during the first half of the war, hell if any of you play World of Warships, you know Japanese DD is base as hell. When the torpedo hit, the Japanese were already heading back up the Slot and Ainsworth thought he was being attacked by IJN submarines. Thus while Liversedge's men were landing on the southside of the Pundokono River, Ainsworth dispatched destroyers O'Bannon and Chevalier to rescue the survivors of Strong. The Strong was settling fast off the Enogai inlet. When Chevalier and O'Bannon came to the scene picking up survivors a gun duel emerged between them and some batteries on Enogai. By 1:22am Chevalier had 239 men come aboard before her commander said it was time to go. His ship was getting battered by the batteries and he unfortunately was forced to ram the Strong to keep it from capsizing which ripped a 10 foot fash in Chevaliers bow. A near miss from one of Enogai's guns had opened her seams aft and another shell knocked out her NO 3 gun mount. When Chevalier was pulling away from the Strong, breaking her in two in the process, 3 of Strong's depth charges went off under Chevalier lifted the entire boat out of the water causing her to flood in forward sections, talk about bad luck. Over in Rice Anchorage, despite the terrible stormy weather and some gunfire from Enogai, Turner ordered the transport group to clear the Gulf by 7am so they could quickly unload their cargo. 300 men of the 148th regiment landed further north at Kobukobu inlet because of the terrible weather. It would take them until July 7th to meet up with the main body. Though the USS Strong had been sunk, the Tokyo Express failed her run, thus Akiyama elected to bring the bulk of his shipment to Vila the following night, but this time he brought 10 destroyers; Niizuki, Suzukaze, Tanikaze, Mocizuki, Mikazuki, Hamakaze, Amagiri, Hacujuki, Nagacuki and Sacuki. Halsey got advance word of this and ordered Ainsworth to return to Kula Gulf to wait for the Japanese to show up. Halsey also reinforced him with destroyers Jenkins and Radford. Ainsworth went into this with a simple but ultimately flawed plan. He overestimated the capabilities of radar guided 6 inch guns against fast moving targets. On top of that he seemed to be totally ignorant of the IJN's Type 93 Long Lance torpedo's capabilities. His plan was to wait passively until radar detected the enemy than he would toss his cruisers at the enemy using their 6 inch guns, hoping to fire over 8,000 yards or so. He believed that was the effective Japanese torpedo range, why he believed this I do not know. For his destroyers, they would launch torpedoes at the enemy. Akiyama's Tokyo Express departed Buin after sundown divided into a covering force of 3 destroyers in the front and the main bulk behind them. Around midnight on July 6th, Ainsworth's force were just northwest off New Georgia, entering the mouth of the Kula Gulf. The Japanese were also arriving to the Kula Gulf whereupon they detached the first transport unit to land 1600 troops. By 1:06am, Niizuki's radar detected Ainsworth's force, but this time Akiyama was prepared for a fight. Akiyama detached his second transport unit at 1:43am and 7 minutes later American radar picked up the Japanese. Ainsworth took his force in closer until the enemy was 7000 yards away. Then at 1:56am at around a range of 6800 yards the Americans Cruisers began to open fire. Akiyama quickly recalled the second transport unit before he engaged the enemy. Unluckily for Akiyama the Americans concentrated their fire upon the Niizuki which was pulverized quickly. She became a burning wreck before she was sunk by 6 inch shell fire taking Rear Admiral Akiyama's life alongside 300 sailors. Within 20 minutes the Americans would fire 612 shells, 6 of which smashed the Niizuki. Despite the loss of of their commander, the well drilled torpedo crews pulled off a salvo of 16 torpedoes at the American gun flashes. Ainsworth ignorant of the long lance range could do little to avoid it. The light cruiser USS Helena was the first to be struck, her bow was blown off virtually up to the number 2 turret, nearly cracking her in two as she sank taking 190 of her 1177 crew with her. St Louis was hit by a torpedo that fortunately did not detonate and another nearly missed Honolulu. The Japanese fled as fast as they could for Buin as Ainsworth directed his two remaining cruisers to shell the second transport unit. Of the four destroyers in this group, Amagiri escaped with minor damage, while Hatsuyuki was hit by 2 6inch shells, but luckily for her they were duds and she limped away. Nagatsuki was hit by a single 6 inch shell to her rear ship which would force her to run aground near Bambari Harbor. The next morning she would be destroyed by American aircraft. At 3:30am, Ainsworth ordered his forces to return to Tulagi as he dispatched the Radford and O'Bannon to pick up survivors while Nicholas chased the fleeing Japanese. The Japanese dispatched Amagiri to pick up their survivors and she would be intercepted by Nicholas taking 4 hits before she made her retreat. While this was going on the First transport unit completed unloading its 1600 troops and bolted through the Blackett Strait and Kula Gulf. The Japanese had managed to land their reinforcements and sunk the USS Strong and Helena, so they considered it a tactical victory, though the loss of the Niizuki and her commander was terrible. The battle for New Georgia was nowhere near done. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The landings and early offensives were well on their way on New Georgia and the drive upon Lae was closing in. The Battle of Kula Gulf gave the Americans a bloody nose and now the Japanese had more forces at their disposal to try and dislodge the Americans from New Georgia.

O finagalo le Atua e te malolo (God wants you to rest)

Samoan Devotional

Play Episode Listen Later May 15, 2023 4:55

OPEN HEAVENSMATALA LE LAGI MO LE ASO LULU 17 ME 2023 Manatu Autu: O finagalo le Atua e te malolo (God wants you to rest) Tauloto – Tusi Paia: Mareko 6:31 ‘Ona fetalai atu lea o ia ‘iā te i latou, “‘Inā ō mai ia, tau lava o i tatou, i se mea tu‘ufua, se‘i tou mapu a‘e teisi” Auā e to‘atele ē na feoa‘i ai, ‘ua lē mafai ai i latou ‘ona ‘a‘ai.'. Faitauga - Tusi Paia: Numera 8:23-26 Upu FolafolaE taua tele I le Atua le malolo. Na malolo o ia ma faamanuia I le aso fitu ina ua maea ona ia foafoaina le lalolagi (Kenese 2:1-3). Ona saunia lea e le Atua o isi vaitau e malolo ai le tagata. I le Esoto 35:2, na faatonuia e le Atua le sapati I vaiaso uma e malolo ai ma sa faamanatuina I le aso fitu I le Feagaiga Tuai. I le Levitiko 25:4-5, na faatonuina e le Atua le Tausaga lona fitu e malolo ai e le galueaina le eleele, o tagata ma meaola uma e malolo uma mo le Tausaga atoa e aunoa ma le faia o galuega. E le tatau la ona faateia I tatou I le Esoto 31:14 o loo faapea mai: 14‘Ia ‘outou tausi i le sapati, auā e pa‘ia lava ia ‘iā te ‘outou; o lē na te solia, ‘ia fasiotia lava o ia; auā ai se tasi e fai ai se galuega, ‘ia vavae‘eseina lea i lona nu‘u. E taua tele le malolo I le Atua ma e iai lava faasalaga iai latou e le usitaia. E ui e usitaia pea e le nuu o Isaraelu nei vaitau e malolo ai, o lo'o faatupulaia lona tamaoaiga pe a fua I nuu tuaoi e le faamamaluina nei malologa. E tupu lea tulaga ona o le Salamo 127:1 A fai e lē atiina a‘e e le ALI‘I le fale, e galulue fua i latou o ē atiina a‘e; ‘āfai e lē leoleo e le ALI‘I le ‘a‘ai, e mataala fua o lē na te leoleoina. O lona uiga, o le galue e aunoa ma se malolo e le faapea e mafai ai ona siitia le mauoa pe siitia galuega e mafai ona e faia. O lo'o faaalia e Iesu Keriso le taua o le malolo I le Mareko 6:31 ina ua ia faapea atu I le ‘au so'o ina ua maea le latou talaiga muamua. “‘Inā ō mai ia, tau lava o i tatou, i se mea tu‘ufua, se‘i tou mapu a‘e teisi” Na toeitiiti lava oti Tavita I le taua ona o le leai o se malolo. Na faapea mulimuli ane taitai'au ‘E te lē toe maliu atu ma i matou i le tau‘a, ‘ina ne‘i tineia le malamalama o Isaraelu.' (2 Samuelu 21:15-17). E toatele tagata e o'o I faifeau a le Atua o lo'o maliliu I ma'i o le tino ona o le lē lava o le malolo. Le au uso e, o lo'o faatonuina e le Atua le malolo aua e maua ai lou malosi ma e manuia ai. E o'o ia te a'u, ou te faamautinoaina o lo'o aofia le malolo I le faatulagaina o au galuega e faia tusa po'o le a le tele o mea e tatau ona faia. E moni, e sili atu mea e mafai ona e faia I le tulaga lelei pe a lava lau malolo. Le au pele, e pei lava ona finagalo le Atua e te galue punouai ma le filiga, e finagalo o ia ia lava lau malolo. Tatalo, Tama, faamolemole fesoasoani mai ia te a'u ina ia lava la'u malolo mai galuega uma, I le suafa o Iesu Keriso, Amene.

god ia tama atua ona malolo mareko

- 76 - Pacific War - Operation Postern, the drive to Salamaua, May 2-9, 1943

Play Episode Listen Later May 2, 2023 32:10

Last time we spoke about actions in New Guinea and the Japanese counteroffensive in Arakan. The good ol boys down unda were getting ready to launch a major offensive aimed to seize Lae and Salamaua. The Australian and American forces gradually built up enough strength to commence the offensive and high command decided to launch some feints, such as at Mubo to distract the Japanese from their real intentions. Over in Arakan, Irwins disaster was still paying dividends to the Japanese as General Koga launched a massive counterattack. Things were continuing to get worse for the British in Burma, though General Slim was beginning to make improvements. Lastly the British began a propaganda campaign to boost morale in the far east using the mad onion man Wingates recent adventure with the Chindits. Things were looking rough in the CBI theater. This episode is the Operation Postern, the drive to Salamaua Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945. I just want to say before we begin, this episode will feel a bit like one of those old tv episodes that rehashes what happened during that season. You've heard me say it a few times, but because we do this series in the week by week format sometimes we get into these messy weeks where either not much occurs or too much occurs. Regardless this episode is about multiple ongoing operations that culminate into the drive upon Salamaua and for the sake of coherency I am going to have to summarize a lot of what occurred in the south west pacific area for early 1943. General Blamey devised a plan to capture Lae, codenamed Operation Postern. General MacArthur approved of the plan, which was quite complex and reflected the growing power of the allied forces in the southwest pacific. Blamey moved to New Guinea to take overall charge, reverting Herring to commander of the 1st corps, responsible for tactical operations. The key to quick success lay in convincing General Adachi, that Salamaua was the primary target for any major offensive. To accomplish this, it was necessary for the Australian and American forces to press upon the Japanese around the Salamaua area, but not Salamaua. Operation Postern was preceded by three simultaneous operations occurring in the South west pacific area and the south pacific area. Together the three operations helped set up the conditions necessary to allow for an amphibious landing at Lae, by tying up the Japanese ground, naval and airpower in the region alongside creating important feints. The invasion of New Georgia was the first of these operations carried out by Admiral Bull Halsey and the 1st raider battalion. That offensive codenamed operation Toenails took up a lot of the Japanese ground, sea and air forces and would gradually see the allies capturing Munda. The 2nd was operation Chronicle, the seizure of Kiriwina and Woodlark islands located just northeast of Milne Bay. With their seizure, the allies were able to create new forward airfields from which to launch air strikes against Rabaul and provide air cover for multiple other operations in the region. Lastly the third operation was to be an assault on Nassau Bay, which we will talk about a bit later. Now back to the ground forces. The 8th Area Army at Rabaul sent General Adachi and the 18th army to secure important areas west of Lae and Salamaua and to do so an offensive was launched against Wau. This prompted the Australian high command to send Brigadier Moten and the 17th brigade over to defend Wau in January of 1943. The battle to defend was tough, but the allies were able to prolong the Japanese advance long enough to transport enough troops to save Wau. The Japanese were sent retreating over to the Mubo area, but instead of pursuing the enemy, Moten limited his men's actions to patrols. The New Guinea force wished to pursue the Japanese, but was prevented by logistical difficulties. As the Australians gathered more strength, the Japanese prepared a second attempt to capture Way. This time the Japanese planned to approach Wau from the north, building a road from Markham point into the snake river valley. From there the Japanese advance would hit Wau. The 51st division was earmarked for the task, but the battle of the Bismarck sea had caused devastating losses to the convoy bringing them over in March of 1943. The battle of the Bismarck sea had pressed upon the Japanese high command the increasing allied airpower, leading them to reformulate their plans. The Japanese began to construct a road to compensate for their inability to transport men and materials to New Guinea via the sea. As the Japanese did this, on the other side, the allies now felt very secure at Wau and were willing to perform some offensives. General Savige's 3rd division was given command of the Wau-Bulolo area. For this task he had the 17th brigade, the 2/3rd, 25th and 2/7th independent companies. It was believed the Japanese had around 5500 men around Lae and Salamaua with around 6-8 thousand at Madang and 9- 11 thousand at Wewak. Savige was ordered not to attack Salamaua directly, so he decided to establish firm bases as far forward as possible to harass the Japanese, basically you can see this as forward offensive patrol actions. Now the Japanese had dug in some defensive positions in places called the Pimple, Green Hill and Observation Hill which were along the main track from Wau to Mubo. On April 24th, the 2/7th independent company were given a new mission; to clear the Japanese from the vicinity of Mubo. Moten approved a plan for the seizure of the Pimple and Green Hill, ordering Major Warfe and his 2/3rd company to harass the Japanese logistical routes in Mubo as a distraction as the 2/7th hit the Pimple. The Japanese had made the Pimple a nightmare for the allied forces. They had taken defensive positions on commanding ground allowing for concealed ambushes. They cleared firing lanes to enable their machine guns to gundown anyone who took a forward approach. By holding the high grounds they also thwarted the allies from utilizing grenades effectively. On the morning of April 24, after 20 minutes of air attacks by Boston aircraft against Green Hill, Stony Creek, Observation Hill and Kitchen Creek, the offensive kicked off with a two pronged attack. The 2/7th would start from the Vicker's ridge track, moving in two columns: one going along the Jap track towards the Pimple; the other would move north along the Laws track, a very difficult and quite unknown trail to try an encircle the Pimple from the west. When the two columns got within 100 yards of the pimple, they were met with light machine gun fire and snipers. The Australians attempted an all out assault in the late afternoon, but were unable to gain any ground. The next morning 3 Bostons came roaring in to strafe and bomb Green Hill while allied artillery began to bombard the Pimple. Despite the increased firepower the Australians still were unable to dislodge the enemy with their proceeding assaults. It turns out the Australians had greatly underestimate the defensive capabilities of the Pimple position. Reconnaissance had failed to pinpoint the enemy positions prior to the offensive. A major lack of communication between the two columns because they had no telephone lines or wireless communications led to a lack of coordination, neither allied column knew the plight of the other. Runners were used, but they were too slow and extremely vulnerable to Japanese snipers. The offensive was quickly falling apart as the Japanese continued to reinforce their lines. Meanwhile Warfe's men conducted a number of raids and ambushes in the Missim area, Komiatum Hill and Bobdubi Ridge. Warfe then sent a patrol from Namling along the Bench Cut track to ambush the Japanese at the junction between the Francisco river and the Buirali Creek. The ambush was a large success leading to the deaths of 18 Japanese. Warfe tried to perform an identical operation on April 28th, but this time his men were ambushed by the Japanese at Goodview junctions suffering considerable casualties. As a result of the forward patrolling of Warfe's men, the allies had learned the Dobdubi ridge area was defended quite lightly. Having learnt this, Ware decided to order a second platoon to capture the northern part of the ridge on April 27th. By the end of the month Warfe had two platoons spread over the Bobdubi ridge area, with a 3rd platoon held in reserve at Missim. Over in his headquarters, Moten now realized the offensive against the Pimple was far too costly and he decided the men should simply bypass it. However the commander in the field, General Savige continued to launch attacks. The reason why Savige pressed on was because on April 28th, one of his reconnaissance patrols found a position on Pimple unoccupied and kicked seized it before the Japanese could return to man it. Colonel Guinn on the ground there deduced the Japanese must have been expecting an airstrike and momentarily left their positions. He therefore elected to order another company led by Captain Leslie Tatterson brought forward to assault the pimple. This time however, the allies used deception. Instead of launching an airstrike and artillery against the Pimple they passed over it and bombarded Green Hill. The deception did not work as planned and Saviges men yet again were unable to make any ground against the pimple. By early May the 2/7th battalion had lost 12 men dead with 25 wounded against the pimple with no end in sight. Meanwhile on May 3rd, an offensive was launched against the northern part of the Bobdubi ridge. The Australians were able to fight their way close to the mouth of the Francisco river, prompting the Japanese to pull up reinforcements in the form of 70 SNLF marines from Salamua. A battle was fought in a place called the South Coconuts on May 5th. The Australians performed encircling maneuvers, managing to surround large pockets of the Japanese whom they smashed with artillery. The Australians were met with 3 major counter attacks but held their ground successfully occupying another place called the Center Coconuts by May 7th. However the Japanese then performed another counterattack, utilizing mortars to great effect, pushing the Australians back. The Japanese further reinforced the area with 60 additional men coming up from Salamaua, but they were ambushed by the Australians at the North Coconuts location suffering 20 casualties. On May 9th, Captain Tattersons men were struck a lethal blow when they ran into a Japanese booby trap along the Jap Track. The Japanese opened fire upon the Australians on the track and began to encircle them. Colonel Guinn led a small force along the track to break the encirclement while Tatterson's men resisted tenaciously against the Japanese. Tatterson's force had been completely surrounded by the afternoon of May 9th and were in a state of desperation. The Australians utilized booby-traps, fire control and mass grenade attacks to force the Japanese to give them breathing room. The next day the Japanese launched a fierce attack against Tatterson's rear. The Australians could hear Japanese officers screaming orders as their riflemen poured lead upon them. As the Japanese pressed upon them they were receiving 500 additional reinforcements from the 102nd and 115th regiments. Meanwhile the 3rd battalion of the 102nd regiment in Nassau bay received orders “to capture the high area on the right bank of the Buyawim River fork” to be done in coordination with the May 9th attacks. This action would have endangered the allied positions at Lababia camp, but luckily the Japanese commander decided instead to hold a defensive positions at the bank of the Bitoi mouth. This allowed Colonel Guinn to concentrate some of his forces at Lababia camp. By May 11th, a company of 60 men managed to break the Japanese encirclement of Tatterson's men. According to Tatterson, by 7am on the 11th, the Japanese had continued to fire heavily upon his force, but made no further attempts to advance. It seemed to him the Japanese were actually withdrawing and the increased rifle fire and mortars was a cover. Tattersons men had been battered, he himself was wounded. His force received 12 casualties and estimated they had inflicted 100 casualties upon the enemy with possibly 50 deaths. Having saved Tatterson, Guinn reorganized his forward units and began to dig in along the Jap track and Lababia camp. From May 15th onwards the 17th brigade focused on aggressive patrolling in all sectors. Aggressive patrols each day harassed the Japanese around the Pimple and Observation Hill. The Australians set up booby-traps, practically paralyzing the Japanese troop movements outside their trenches. General Okabe received some much needed reinforcements over the course of the week and began to launch some limited attacks against the south, central and north Coconut areas. Okabe's forces were repelled on the 12th and 13th, but things would greatly change on the 14th. The 14th saw a heavy shelling of the Bobdubi ridge area before Okabe launched a full scale attack that overwhelmed the Australian defenders forcing them to make a fighting withdrawal from the north and central area further down in the south coconut area. General Nakano was displeased with his troops and issued an address of instruction of May 17th, it is as follows "In the attack at Bobdubi, although a certain group was advancing on a height on the enemy's flank, instead of really carrying out the attack in such a way as to prepare the way for an assault by our main force, they went no further than a vain firing at the enemy with their weapons. The spiritual and physical strength which was worn down in the Wau campaign is at the present time still lower, but I believe it can easily be restored if the officers will take the initiative, set an example and command as leaders of their men." Despite Nakano's criticism, his men would take a lot of ground forcing the Australians further south, dangerously close to Warfe's headquarters. Warfe realized maintaining the position would lead to heavy casualties, so he pulled his force out and took up a position at Namling. It was quite fortunate as the day after he made this decision, 20 Japanese dive bombers strafed and bombed the village of Bobdubi. This was part of a Japanese heavy air raid that began on May 15th, culminating in over 100 Japanese aircraft hitting multiple Australian positions over the course of a few days. Three heavy raids were performed, but these air attacks focused general far into the Australian rear, leaving the forward positions rather untouched. On may 17th and 18th large formations of Japanese aircraft performed a raid against Wau's airfield. Although the Australians ultimately were forced to withdraw from many forward positions, such as Warfe's units, they managed the ultimate objective of operation Postern, to take Japanese resources away from Mubo and Lae. They had inflicted numerous casualties upon the Japanese including against Major General Okabe who had stepped on a booby trap that put a bullet through his right foot. Okabe had to be evacuated on the night of may 16th as a result, flown back over to Rabaul. Command was handed over to Major General Muroya Chuichi of the 51st division. The battle for Dobdubi was nowhere near done. General Nakano sent 170 soldiers of the 115th regiment on May 17th to attack Hote via the Malolo track. Nakano estimated the Australians had around 50 men defending Hote. The Japanese force ran into 25 Australians at Cissembob along the way and the defenders inflicted 50 casualties upon the Japanese before withdrawing towards Ohibe. One Australian commander at Cissembob had this to say about the engagement "During this running fight, all men were under very heavy fire, but once again it was brought out what rotten shots the Japanese were. Not one of our boys were hit, and believe me things were hot." The Australians would return to the Hote area on the 22nd to find it completely deserted, so they simply reoccupied their lost positions. That is it for the New Guinea campaign, but other significant events unfolded for the Pacific War during this time period. On April 21st, with a heavy heart President Roosevelt announced to the American people the Japanese had executed several airmen from the famous Doolittle raid. To refresh your memories, 8 of the Doolittle pilots had been captured in Jiangsu province and put on military trial within China and sentenced to death “because of their act against humanity”. They were then transported to Tokyo where the Army ministry reviewed their case. Hideki Tojo initially opposed the death sentences for fearing the Americans would retaliate against Japanese living in America, he would be right about this. Sugiyama and the rest of the Army general staff however insisted on executing all 8 of the pilots who had contributed to the deaths of around 50 civilians and thwart possible future air raids against Japan. The executions would be authorized by an ex post facto military regulation specifically drafted by the army ministry. What is interesting to note, is Emperor Hirohito chose to intervene and commuted the punishment of 5 out of the 8 pilots. Why he allowed the other 3 to die in violation of international law is unknown as the Japanese destroyed nearly all documentation pertaining to prisoners of war by the end of the war. Some historians theorize Hirohito wished to demonstrate his benevolence. Yet again, this is one of those moments that showcases Hirohito was a very active participant, despite the claims made for decades after the war that he was merely a powerless hostage. The 3 men were executed via firing squad at a cemetery outside Shanghai in China on October 14th of 1942. It was not until april of 1943 that the Doolittle Raid operation was fully disclosed to the American public. The US war department said the chief reason for not explaining the full details of the Doolittle raid sooner was the need to bring the Doolittle pilots safely home and to prevent reprisals against their Chinese allies who aided the pilots. In April of 1943 the 5 surviving pilots were moved to Nanjing and in December of 1943 Pilot Robert Meder died of beri beri. He had been starving for months and rejected medical assistance. His death would result in improvements of conditions for the remaining 4 pilots. A truly tragic part of this war and to add to this I would like to read a short piece written by one of the pilots who survived the captivity and became a Christian missionary in Japan after the war. I Was a Prisoner of Japan By Jacob DeShazer I was a prisoner of war for 40 long months, 34 of them in solitary confinement. When I flew as a member of a bombing squadron on a raid over enemy territory on April 18, 1942, my heart was filled with bitter hatred for the people of that nation. When our plane ran out of petrol and the members of the crew of my plane had to parachute down into enemy-held territory and were captured by the enemy, the bitterness of my heart against my captors seemed more than I could bear. Taken to prison with the survivors of another of our planes, we were imprisoned and beaten, half-starved, terribly tortured, and denied by solitary confinement even the comfort of association with one another. Three of my buddies were executed by a firing squad about six months after our capture and 14 months later, another one of them died of slow starvation. My hatred for the enemy nearly drove me crazy. It was soon after the latter's death that I began to ponder the cause of such hatred between members of the human race. I wondered what it was that made one people hate another people and what made me hate them. My thoughts turned toward what I heard about Christianity changing hatred between human beings into real brotherly love and I was gripped with a strange longing to examine the Christian's Bible to see if I could find the secret. I begged my captors to get a Bible for me. At last, in the month of May, 1944, a guard brought me the book, but told me I could have it only for three weeks. I eagerly began to read its pages. Chapter after chapter gripped my heart. In due time I came to the books of the prophets and found that their every writing seemed focused on a divine Redeemer from sin, One who was to be sent from heaven to be born in the form of a human babe. Their writings so fascinated me that I read them again and again until I had earnestly studied them through six times. Then I went on into the New Testament and there read of the birth of Jesus Christ, the One who actually fulfilled the very prophecies of Isaiah, Jeremiah, Micah, and the other Old Testament writers. My heart rejoiced as I found confirmed in Acts 10:43, "To Him give all the prophets witness, that through His Name, whosoever believeth on Him shall receive remission of sins." After I carefully read this book of the Acts, I continued on into the study of the epistle Paul wrote to the Christians at Rome. On June 8, 1944 the words in Romans 10:9 stood out boldly before my eyes: "If thou shalt confess with thy mouth the Lord Jesus and shalt believe in thine heart that God hath raised Him from the dead, thou shalt be saved." That very moment, God gave me grace to confess my sins to Him and He forgave me all my sins and saved me for Jesus' sake. I later found that His Word again promises this so clearly in 1 John 1:9, "If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive us our sins and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness." How my heart rejoiced in my newness of spiritual life, even though my body was suffering so terribly from the physical beatings and lack of food! But suddenly I discovered that God had given me new spiritual eyes and that when I looked at the enemy officers and guards who had starved and beaten my companions and me so cruelly, I found my bitter hatred for them changed to loving pity. I realized that these people did not know anything about my Savior and that if Christ is not in a heart, it is natural to be cruel. I read in my Bible that while those who crucified Jesus had beaten Him and spit upon Him before He was nailed to the cross, on the cross He tenderly prayed in His moment of excruciating suffering, "Father, forgive them for they know not what they do." And now, from the depths of my heart, I too prayed for God to forgive my torturers, and I determined by the aid of Christ to do my best to acquaint these people with the message of salvation that they might become as other believing Christians. With His love controlling my heart, the 13th chapter of 1 Corinthians took on a living meaning: "Love suffereth long, and is kind; love envieth not; love vaunteth not itself, is not puffed up, doth not behave itself unseemly, seeketh not her own, is not easily provoked, thinketh no evil, rejoiceth not in iniquity but rejoiceth in truth; beareth all things, believeth all things. Love never faileth." A year passed by and during that year the memories of the weeks I had been permitted to spend with my Bible grew sweeter and sweeter day by day. Then, one day as I was sitting in my solitary confinement cell I became very sick. My heart was paining me, even as my fellow prisoner had told me his was paining him just before he died of starvation. I slid down onto my knees and began to pray. The guards rushed in and began to punish me, but I kept right on praying. Finally they let me alone. God, in that hour, revealed unto me how to endure suffering. At last freedom came. On August 20, 1945 parachutists dropped onto the prison grounds and released us from our cells. We were flown back to our own country and placed in hospitals where we slowly regained our physical strength. I have completed my training in a Christian college, God having clearly commanded me: "Go, teach those people who held you prisoner, the way of salvation through the blood of Jesus Christ," and am now back in that land as a missionary, with one single purpose--to make Christ known. I am sending this testimony to people everywhere, with the earnest prayer that a great host of people may confess Jesus Christ as their personal Savior. Alongside the unfortunate news for the Americans on May 14th a major tragedy occurred for the Australians. At 4:10am on the 14th, the Australian Hospital Ship Centaur was on a run from Sydney to Port Moresby when she was torpedoed by a Japanese submarine. The torpedo struck her portside oil fuel tank below the waterline, creating a 10 meter hole, igniting fuel and setting the ship ablaze. The ship was luckily not carrying patients, but held her normal crew staff, around 332 personnel on board. Many of those on board were killed instantly from the concussion blast, others from the blazing inferno. Centaur quickly took on water from her breach, rolled to port and sank bow-first, submerging within 3 minutes. Her rapid sinking prevented the deployment of lifeboats, though two would break off as she went down. According to Centaurs second officer Gordon Rippon, she was hit 44km northeast of Point Lookout. Of the 332 people onboard, only 64 would survive, most of the crew had been asleep when she was hit, giving barely a chance to react. It is estimated that 200 people may have been alive inside Centaur as she sank. Several who escaped the ship would die of shrapnel wounds or drown having found nothing to support them in the water. The survivors spent 36 hours in the water clinging to barrels, wreckage and two damaged lifeboats. The survivors drifted around 36 kms in the water going further north east. On the morning of May 15th, the destroyer USS Mugford departed Brisbane, escorted the New Zealand freighter Sussex when she saw some of the shipwrecked survivors. Sailors aboard the Mugford took up positions with rifles fending off sharks from the survivors. It took an hour and 20 minutes to rescue all 64 people. One of the survivors was sister Ellen Savage, the only surviving nurse from 12 aboard the Centaur. In 1944 Ellen Savage was presented the George Medal for providing medical care, boosting morale and displaying courage during the time they waited for rescue. The identity of the attacker was suspected to be a Japanese submarine. At the time of the attack three KD7 Kaidai class submarines were operating off Australians east coast; The I-177 commanded by Hajime Nakagawa, the I-178 commanded by Hidejiro Utsuki and the I-180 commanded by Toshio Kusaka. None of these submarines survived the Pacific War; the I-177 was sunk by the USS Samual S Miles on october 3rd of 1944; the I-178 was sunk by the USS Patterson on august 25th of 1943 and the i-180 was sunk by the USS Gilmore on april 26th of 1944. In December of 1943 following protests, the Japanese government issued an official statement denying any responsibility for the sinking of the Centaur. The sinking of a hospital ship was a war crime, and investigations were conducted between 1944-1948. The conclusion of the investigate suspected the I-177 of Nakagawa to be the most likely culprit, but there was not enough evidence, thus the case was closed on december 14th of 1948. Nakagawa survived the war and until his death in 1991 refused to speak about the suspected attack on the Centaur. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Australian and American forces in New Guinea were fighting tooth and nail towards their ultimate goal of Salamaua, trying to deceive the Japanese the whole while. Soon battles for Lae and Salamaua will be fought to rid New Guinea of the Japanese menace.

america god love jesus christ american father china bible japan british americans christians chinese christianity australian japanese kings romans army drive new zealand south acts rome corinthians savior tokyo laws old testament new testament operation prisoners shanghai command his word brisbane redeemer jap aggressive sailors roosevelt sussex runners ware chronicle coconut burma generals herring his name bismarck nassau centaurs reconnaissance markham doolittle pimples cbi new guinea toenails nanjing opium wars pacific war greenhill guinn nakano moten port moresby bostons jiangsu munda hirohito lae wau general macarthur doolittle raid hote emperor hirohito okabe point lookout postern one australian rabaul stony creek craig watson irwins arakan hideki tojo malolo milne bay vicker george medal woodlark

Ui ina malolo ae ua siamupini i finagalo o tagata Samoa

Play Episode Listen Later Nov 20, 2022 2:30

Toa Samoa and fans (Toa Samoa facebook pg, nrl).

samoa toa samoa malolo

EP99: Conference Finals Rugby, It's Just Different Ft. Sama Malolo

MLR Kickoff

Play Episode Listen Later Jul 22, 2021 71:35

With Week 18 drawn to a close Dan and Pete look at the implications the matches had ahead of the Conference Finals. In hard fought matches both Eastern Playoff teams enter the match on Saturday with a loss in their rear view mirror. Utah gain some confidence with a win over LA that pushed them to the brink, knowing that when they play LA in the Coliseum they'll have to play just as hard if they want to make it to their first Major League Rugby Shield Final.Sama Malolo has been around the world, twice appearing for the Australian U-20s at the 2017 and 2018 Junior World Championships and playing Rugby in Japan. Although his 2021 season has been brief due to injury, it has been nothing short of outstanding leading to 10 tries in eight games played. See acast.com/privacy for privacy and opt-out information.

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Pasia le aso malolo i Amerika e faamanatu ai le faamutaina o le faapologaina o tagata uli.

Rob Has a Podcast | Survivor / Big Brother / Amazing Race - RHAP

Play Episode Listen Later Jun 23, 2021 7:08

A faaigoaina o le Juneteenth - le Aso 19 o Iuni - o le aso lenei i le tausaga 1865 na pasia ai le tulafono i Texas ma avea ai ma solitulafono le toe avea o se tagata uli ma meatotino poo pologa a se tagata papalagi i Amerika.

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Errores técnicos típicos de novato y cómo solucionarlos

El café del fotógrafo

Play Episode Listen Later May 3, 2021 22:48

Hoy vamos a hablar sobre errores técnicos que son super típicos al empezar a hacer fotos, que la inmensa mayoría de nosotros hemos cometido y que quizás si no llevas mucho tiempo haciendo fotos, estés cometiendo en este momento y ni siquiera sepas que se trata de un error. Este miércoles, 5 de mayo, directo comentando las fotos del reto. Además, sorteo 6 meses gratis premium. En Premium llegamos a las 230 clases online disponibles. Acceso inmediato a todo nada más daros de alta. Ya sabéis que podéis contactar conmigo para dudas, preguntas, sugerencias, lo que haga falta a través del formulario de contacto y que las responderé en un episodio del podcast de preguntas y respuestas. Los que seáis premium, desde el contacto premium que tiene preferencia y que ya sabéis que las respondo lo más rápido posible, incluso de forma inmediata en algunos casos. Errores típicos de novato en fotografía Como siempre, os dejo el resumen, esquema o escaleta del episodio para todos los suscriptores No usar la compensación de la exposición o ajustar manualmente la exposición más adecuada.Gris neutroElemento blanco o luminoso - foto subexpuestaElemento oscuro o poco luminoso - foto sobreexpuestaMidiendo la luz sobre un elemento neutro y ajustando la exposición a ceroMidiendo la luz sobre un elemento claro y compensando la exposición hacia la sobreexposiciónMidiendo la luz sobre un elemento oscuro y compensando la exposición hacia la subexposiciónMiedo de subir el ISONos dicen que subir el ISO es maloLo dejamos siempre al mínimo - 100Cierto, sería peor no saber que subir el ISO es maloPero hay ocasiones en las que no queda otra que subirloEvitamos fotos movidasMejor mantenerlo lo más bajo POSIBLE, lo subimos sólo lo necesario y sólo cuando es necesarioVídeo situaciones y cómo hacer fotos con el ISO al mínimo, pero al mínimo posible según la escena.Es decir, si tenemos que subirlo, lo subimos, pero lo mínimo posible.Dejar que se quemen las zonas luminosas o altas lucesSobre todo si disparamos en RAWPodemos recuperar altas luces un pocoPero pasado un límite no se recuperarán jamásAprender el concepto de "Límite máximo de sobreexposición"También os dejé vídeo de qué es y cómo averiguarlo de forma prácticaOs lo dejo enlazadoPensar que la profundidad de campo sólo se controla con el diafragmaEs importante controlarlaPero también la podemos controlar conObjetivo utilizadoDistancia de la cámara al sujetoDistancia del sujeto al fondoCombinando objetivo, distancia y diafragma conseguimos la PdC adecuadaNivel 2 Profundidad de campoUsar el enfoque de zona automáticaLa cámara enfocará donde quieraMejor usar el de punto únicoY mover el punto de enfoqueO dejarlo en el centro, pulsar para enfocar, mantener pulsado y reencuadrarTambién os dejo enlazado un vídeo de Youtube en el que os lo explicoNo usar trípode por perezaEs un rollo, lo admitoPesaLo hace todo más lentoMás complejo encuadrar, etcPero nos libera las manosNos permite alargar el tiempo de exposiciónNos aporta nitidezEl trípode como ayuda no como incordioUsar el trípode malPeor todavía que no usarloEs usarlo malTe estás complicando la vidaPero además no tienes los beneficiosLo más típico - no enroscar bien la cámaratambién - no usar disparador remotoUso del tripode correcto - EpisodioNo pensar qué objetivo o distancia focal es mejor para la fotoPuede que sea por desconocimientoHablamos en varios episodios, los dejo enlazadosY en curso Nivel 3 os lo enseño de forma prácticaUna vez que conocemos los efectosPensar antes de hacer la fotoUn 18-200 es un sólo objetivoPero con efectos diferentes a 18, a 35, a 70 o a 200, cambia mucho.Querer aprender demasiado rápido... o pensar que la fotografía es más fácil de lo que es.Ya se, no es un error técnicoPero querer aprender mil cosas a la vezO empezar la casa por el tejadoSuele dar como resultado un desconocimiento mayorO frustraciónRecomiendo aprender con calmaDisfrutar del caminoDejarse sorprender con cada cosa que aprendemosY si q...

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Survivor All-Time Top 40 Rankings | #32: Ghost Island

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 4, 2021 187:59

We're picking the mic up as we recap the 32nd BEST season of Survivor, Ghost Island, on the RHAP All-Time Top 40 season rankings The post Survivor All-Time Top 40 Rankings | #32: Ghost Island appeared first on RobHasAwebsite.com.

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Episode 74: "Let's just go sailing for... 3 months" Britt and Matt on SV Malolo

Life off the deep end podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 13, 2021 32:08

In the first interview in the new chapter of our podcast, we talk to Matt and Britt on SV Malolo. We catch up and talk about how they first decided to sail for 3 months? 6 months? 12 months? And now over 2 years! Also, find out where they spent the first few months of the pandemic! We're jealous. Follow us! www.lifeoffthedeepend.com www.facebook.com/lifeoffthedeepend www.instagram.com/lifeoffthedeepend www.twitter.com/lifeoffdeepend www.youtube.com/c/lifeoffthedeepend Theme music by PO Boxx- Reset my Day. www.facebook.com/poboxxmusic

sailing malolo

E le o se malolo fa'atamali'i, o le malolo fa'ali'i - le togia le solo a Donald Trump.

Play Episode Listen Later Dec 11, 2020 7:14

E le o se malolo faatamali'i, ae o le malolo fa'ali'i.

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Episode 9: Solo Swordfish Battle!!!

The Offshore Explorer

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 26, 2020 45:35

This week, Chase recap's what it takes to go toe to toe with a Swordfish solo. The battle included losing multiple gaffs, a tangled leader and radioing in a friend for help at the end. The second half of the podcast is about Chase's recent trip on the Malolo research vessel as they hoped to deploying satellite tags in Swordfish and also deploy a new prototype SPOT tag in a Striped Marlin.

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Jean-Charles Mbotti Malolo, après le bip

Animation Hotline

Play Episode Listen Later Sep 1, 2020 4:22

Jean-Charles Mbotti Malolo est un dessinateur, réalisateur et danseur français. J'ai pensé à lui lors de l'annonce de l'annulation du Festival d'Annecy et de sa migration en ligne. C'est en effet lui qui, aux côtés de Simon Roussin, a créé l'affiche de cette édition. Nous nous étions vus au Festival en 2019, alors qu'il présentait son dernier film "Make it soul" lors d'une séance spéciale très rythmée, à son image. Son parcours professionnel allie ses passions que sont le dessin et la danse, pour nous offrir des expériences cinématographiques et sensorielles vibrantes.Retrouvez-le sur:VimeoInstagramLa Piraterie

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37. Encuentra tu estilo fotográfico

El café del fotógrafo

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 21, 2020 17:28

Buenos días! Hoy quiero hablaros de cómo y qué cosas podéis hacer para encontrar vuestro estilo fotográfico propio. Bienvenidos a El Café del Fotógrafo, un podcast en el que hablamos de todas esas cuestiones, ideas, charlas o conversaciones que suelen surgir cuando se unen un grupo de fotógrafos para tomar un café tras una sesión de fotos. Soy José Barceló, y estoy aquí para cualquier cosa que necesitéis relacionada con el mundo de la fotografía.Volvemos un martes más con un episodio sobre creatividad y estilo fotográfico. Hoy quiero hablaros de lo qué podéis hacer para encontrar vuestro estilo fotográfico.Pero antes... Os recuerdo como podéis mandarme las fotos minimalistas del reto mensual. Las subís a alguna plataforma, red social, dropbox, google drive, o incluso a través de wetransfer y luego me mandáis a través del formulario que encontráis en josebarcelo.com/contacto el enlace a las fotos. Desde el formulario no se pueden adjuntar archivos.Por eso tenéis que copiar y pegar el e nlace a las fotos para que pueda descargarlas, verlas y seleccionar algunas para el vídeo que haré a principios de febrero comentando cada una de las fotosLos autores o autoras de las fotos seleccionadas os llevaréis el primer mes gratis de vuestra suscripción a los cursosQue digo un mes, voy a ser más generoso, que lo que quiero es que os motivéis a hacer más fotos y a experimentar un poco. Los que hayáis hecho las fotos que seleccione para el vídeo os lleváisademás del comentario sobre las fotosno úno, sino los TRES primeros meses de suscripción a los cursos online totalmente gratis.Si ya sois suscriptores, avisadme al mandarme las fotos y os daré el cupón de descuento para que podáis regalárselo a alguien o ya vemos cómo lo arreglamos. Ya sabéis que podéis contactar conmigo para dudas, preguntas, sugerencias, lo que haga falta a través del formulario de contacto que encontraréis en JOSEBARCELO.COM/contacto Encuentra tu estilo fotográfico Os dejo como siempre el resumen del episodio a todos los suscriptores: Recuerdo cuando empezaba que leía en las revistas (casi no había ni blogs) artículos tipo“Los cinco consejos para encontrar tu estilo"Y después de leerlo acababa agobiadísimo¡Eso era complicadísimo, nunca encontraría mi estilo!Tu estilo fotográfico es cómo definirías tus fotografíasPuede ser únicoTus fotos será fáciles de reconocerO parecerse a muchos otrosNo se te reconocerá tan fácilmente¿Qué más da? - ¿Te gusta tu estilo?No se trata de hacer fotos de un temaNo es fotografiar los pueblos deshabitados de españaO retratos de gente con gorroSe trata de hacerlas de una forma determinadaCon un aspecto visualUna composiciónUnos coloresPara que os hagáis una idea os dejo una lista con algunos fotógrafos y fotógrafas en las notas del programaYa sabéis, en josebarcelo.com/podcast/37Si alguien tiene un estilo vistiendo, definimos cómo visteY da igual que vaya de calle, al trabajo o a una bodaSi es fiel a su estilo, cambiará su ropa pero en su mismo estilo¿Para qué un estilo? No lo necesitas,Es más, es probable que cuando interiorices que no lo necesitas, será cuando lo encuentresEstá bien si lo que buscas es diferenciarteO si tienes interés en poder definir tus fotosA nivel comercial para venderte de una forma determinadaSería como reespecializarteSoy fotógrafo de bodas y además con un estilo XO fotógrafo de reportaje y mis fotos son muy dinámicas y coloridas¿Puede ser malo tener un estilo muy definido?Tampoco diría que sea maloLo malo es no evolucionarEncajonarseSería como el grupo de música que todas las canciones son idénticasAntes de ver cómo encontrar tu estilo - Opción más “marketiniana"¿Sientes que necesitas un estilo?¿Para qué lo quieres?¿necesitas que sea un estilo diferente, original?Teniendo esto claro podrías definir una hoja de rutaPersonalmente prefiero otro camino Si acabamos aquí el podcastExperimentaHaz lo que te de la ganaRepite lo que más te haya gustadoEn serio,

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TONKOCAST: Make It Soul (2018), Jean-Charles Mbotti Malolo

TONKOCAST

Play Episode Listen Later Jan 17, 2020 55:37

Do you want to see more of Jean-Charles' work? Vimeo: https://vimeo.com/jeancharlesmbottimaloloYouTube: https://www.youtube.com/user/poppinjc38 Tonko House has been blessed with tremendous support from this amazing community of animation industry. One thing we love talking about is "animation and filmmaking." And another thing we are most grateful is our talented circle of friends. Tonkocast is all about what we love about---talking animation with our friends once a month.Website: http://www.tonkohouse.com/YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC0JyYj-OHh2xzrpf11zndggInstagram: https://www.instagram.com/tonkohouse/**Tonkocast is a total DIY operation recorded with non-professional equipment. So excuse our home made quality everyone!

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Fautuaina ni aso malolo e totogi mo tina e le au ma'itaga, miscarriage. - Fautuaina ni aso malolo e totogi mo tina e le au ma'itaga, miscarriage.

Play Episode Listen Later Oct 16, 2019 5:23

Ua talosagaina e nisi o faalapotopotoga le malo ina ia faatulafonoina ni aso malolo totogi mo tina e le au o latou ma'itaga. - Ua talosagaina e nisi o faalapotopotoga le malo ina ia faatulafonoina ni aso malolo totogi mo tina e le au o latou ma'itaga.

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Survivor Ghost Island Recap Show 4-18-18

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 18, 2018 176:00

Survivor Ghost Island returns as last week we saw the end of the Dom vs Chris war with Don Dom coming out on top. What will be the fallout from last week's vote? Will someone look to take a shot at Dom due to his wealth of power in the game? Will Dom dictate who leaves next? Who will be able to stomach this week's classic survivor challenge? Will Naviti go back to voting out Malolo, keeping their numbers advantage? Or has the ousting of Chris signaled a new era in this season? Find out Wednesday night as Jim Early and Missyae Productions present another edition of the Missyae Podcast: Survivor Ghost Island Recap Show! Call in at (657) 383-1308 to get your thoughts in on this week's episode and what may be coming next!

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Survivor Ghost Island Recap Show 4-11-18

Reality TV Improvised: The Improv-ision Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 11, 2018 176:00

It's MERGE TIME as the Malolo tribe ended the curse just in time, coming into the merge down in numbers 8-5. What will happen when Chris and Dom wage war once again? Who will come out on the victorious side? How will this impact the numbers advantage currently belonging to Naviti? Will Ghost Island rules change with the move over to a merged tribe? Will Don Dom get his way this week? Find out this Wednesday night as Jim Early presents another edition of the Missyae Podcast: Survivor Ghost Island Recap Show! To get in on the conversation, call in at (657) 383-1308!

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Survivor - Ghost Island Episode 6 - Ghost Island Post production meeting / Chelsea may be a show crasher / Chris is better at EVERYTHING / Don't touch Desiree's bag / Production give up on Malolo

Play Episode Listen Later Apr 1, 2018 50:32

Survivor is on and so are we! Once again we are bringing you the improvised hilarity from episode 6 of Survivor: Ghost Island. After James is gone, but he couldn’t swim anyway, so on we roll. Also this week, Harvey and Myrtle are still on the road heading for Hollywood, but maybe not for long as the cops are on their tail! Hopefully we’ll get another ‘Improv-ision News,’ where they discuss stuff they’re watching this week. IF YOU LIKE WHAT YOU HEAR, SUBSCRIBE AND TELL EVERYONE YOU KNOW!! On this week's podcast, we improvise the producers thinking Chelsea crashed the show, Chris explaining how he is better than everyone at everything, the wrath of Desiree when someone touches her teams bag, and how even production has given up on Malolo! Kerry and Rich are improv comedians who love to watch reality TV. Every week, they take their favorite reality shows, discuss the episode and improvise moments that you may or may not have seen on the air. We love TV and all the awesome characters that make it so fun to watch. We just help bring to life our funny interpretations of their world. Harvey and Myrtle are retiree's from Miracle Acres Retirement Community somewhere in Florida who have been given microphones and a laptop and have decided to become world famous podcast news correspondents. They have joined the Improv-ision team and will bring you the latest entertainment news every week. We'll be back again next week, with another awesome episode of Survivor as we bring you more comedy, news and improv. Follow us on on Twitter: @improv_ision Like us on Facebook: @improvisionpodcast And keep laughing with your funny friends Rich and Kerry every week on our Improv-ision podcast! Send us an email to improvisionpodcast@gmail.com with your thoughts.

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Ghost Island Week 5 Recap

Survivor Fans Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 28, 2018 46:54

Michael may be on to something. The curse of Malolo beach may be real. Do you think he has realized that he is the other common element in this unfortunate theme? The editors pulled a fast one on us again, presumably to keep it entertaining. What do you think about the episodes that end and you realize that they chose to withhold a critical detail so the outcome wasn't obvious prior to Tribal Council. We can't be far from the merge now. Bring on the next episode! Who would you target when faced with a choice of someone in your alliance that leaves you unsure if you can trust them versus someone in the minority alliance that represents physical strength for the tribe in challenges? Who do you think is playing the best, and who is still in jeopardy of being voted out before the merge? Who impressed you the most this week? Who do you think will be next to go? Here are the tribes after week 5. New New Malolo:Angela, Desiree, Kellyn, and Michael New New Naviti:Bradley, Chelsea, Dominick, Donathan, and Libby Yanuya: Chris, Jenna, Laurel, Sebastian, and Wendell We've got several ways you can reach us. You can call and leave a voicemail at 206-350-1547 or toll-free at 844-643-8737. You can record an audio comment and attach it or just type up a quick text message and send it to us via email at joannandstacyshow@gmail.com. Listener Feedback is due by Saturday Noon PST. Please keep it to 3 minutes or less. 00:00 Date 00:04 Ghost Island Theme by Aaron 00:32 Introductions 34:42 NToS 44:01 JSFL Update 45:48 Ghost Island Theme by Aaron Links for Today's Show Paul's Visual Roster Survivor Fans Podcast Fans group on Facebook JSFL SFP on Twitter Contact Info: Voicemail: 206-350-1547 Toll Free Voicemail: 844-643-8737 Email: joannandstacyshow@gmail.com Survivor Fans Podcast P.O. Box 2811 Orangevale, CA 95662 Enjoy, Jo Ann and Stacy

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Survivor Ghost Island Recap Show 3-21-18

Got Nothin' For Ya - A Survivor Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 21, 2018 175:00

Survivor Ghost Island returns after a shocking blindside of the former Malolo leader, Brendan. With Michael playing his idol on Stephanie, the votes instead were cast on the former Malolo leader, sending him out of the game. However, will fortunes change for Michael and company as a showmance begins to blossom? Will cracks begin to form in Bradley's majority alliance? What's brewing over in Naviti with the war between Dom and Chris? Are Donathan and Laurel truly willing to work with Dom and Wendell to take out Chris? Who went to Ghost Island this episode and what was the result of their visit? Find out all of this and more as Jim Early and Missyae Productions present the Survivor Ghost Island recap show! Call in after the episode to give your thoughts on this week's show, as well as what could be coming up on next week's and future weeks! Call (657) 383-1308 to get in on the conversation!

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Episode 3: Malolo Blew a 28-3 Lead

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 20, 2018 47:16

We couldn't believe it, I'm sure you couldn't either. Lot to unpack in this exhilarating episode. Do we have a new enemy of the 'cast?

blew malolo

Episode #4: Ghost Island E04 Discussion

The Winners Edit: A Survivor Story and Edgic Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 19, 2018 69:37

Here in Episode 4 of The Winner's Edit, we see some storylines rise to the surface as other characters work in the background. We talk about what Donathan and Laurel's potential flip means for all of Naviti, and where the Malolo 4 (now 3) stand with Brendan's departure. As always we share winner contenders, consider upcoming boots, and tip our hats to the invisible ones who have no chance (and Bradley). Thanks for joining us! Dan's Edgic - https://i.gyazo.com/e1f299232f0d596c3a474a0742307348.png Joe's Edgic - https://media.discordapp.net/attachments/188525296981377024/423658930737119232/unknown.png?width=252&height=462 Dans confessional transcript https://docs.google.com/document/d/1DNVbt98Z0V-gnSr0LlaI9dW9hW1gK9H1scEfgvISeNo/edit?usp=drivesdk

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Survivor: Ghost Island Episode 4 - Domenick trying to figure out how to use the Legacy advantage / Kellyn not doing anything on Ghost Island / production sabotaging Malolo during the challenge

Reality TV Improvised: The Improv-ision Podcast

Play Episode Listen Later Mar 19, 2018 38:42

Cue the Survivor theme music!! We are back with episode 4 of Survivor: Ghost Island! From the fallout of the big vote last week, to another tribal council, we improvise some of the best scenes from the show. If you want some ‘ha,’ to go with your ‘ha,’ then listen! Also this week, Harvey and Myrtle are back with some timely news on the upcoming Jesus Christ: Superstar, the potential cancellation of Brooklyn Nine-Nine, and how much the kid from Black Panter made per day on the ‘Improv-ision News,’ from Miracle Acres. IF YOU LIKE WHAT YOU HEAR, SUBSCRIBE AND TELL EVERYONE YOU KNOW!! On this week's podcast, we improvise Domenick trying REALLY hard to use the legacy advantage, and not being able to figure out how, Kellyn boring everyone during her ‘scary,’ trip to Ghost Island, and Production trying to spice up the challenge by sabotaging Malolo. Kerry and Rich are improv comedians who love to watch reality TV. Every week, they take their favorite reality shows, discuss the episode and improvise moments that you may or may not have seen on the air. We love TV and all the awesome characters that make it so fun to watch. We just help bring to life our funny interpretations of their world. Harvey and Myrtle are retiree's from Miracle Acres Retirement Community somewhere in Florida who have been given microphones and a laptop and have decided to become world famous podcast news correspondents. They have joined the Improv-ision team and will bring you the latest entertainment news every week. We'll be back again next week, with another awesome episode of Survivor as we bring you more comedy, news and improv. Follow us on on Twitter: @improv_ision Like us on Facebook: @improvisionpodcast And keep laughing with your funny friends Rich and Kerry every week on our Improv-ision podcast! Send us an email to improvisionpodcast@gmail.com with your thoughts. ‘Hangman’s Noose’ courtesy of Celtic Harp Robertson @ https://archive.org/details/CelticHarpRobertson Funky Element courtesy of bensound @ http://www.bensound.com/royalty-free-music/track/funky-element 'News intro' courtesy of www.looperman.com

Survivor Ghost Island Recap Show 3-7-18