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Last time we spoke about the end of the Bougainville campaign. In June 1945, the Australia and Allied forces intensified their campaign in the Pacific, spearheaded by General Hammer, as they battled entrenched Japanese troops on Bougainville. Following the capture of the Soraken Peninsula, the Australians aimed to control the strategic Hongorai River but faced fierce resistance. Meanwhile, General Kanda adjusted his strategies, pulling back Japanese forces to a defensive perimeter around Buin, allowing his troops to regroup. Australian battalions, notably the 24th and 57th/60th, pressed forward, making significant gains despite encountering numerous obstacles, including concealed mines and relentless counterattacks. The turning point came when they crossed the Hongorai River, marking a vital milestone in their advance. Ultimately, the combination of perseverance and tactical maneuvers set the stage for future successes within the broader context of the Pacific Theater. This episode is the Fall of Wewak Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  In the last episode we finished off the Bougainville campaign. Now its been 4 long ass grueling years for the boys fighting in New Guinea. Today we are finally going to finish that story.  As we last saw, by early April 1945, General George Stevens and his 6th Australian Division were making significant strides in their Wewak offensive. The campaign, aimed at capturing the strategically important town of Wewak, was crucial for disrupting Japanese forces in New Guinea and aiding in their eventual defeat. Brigadier King's 16th Brigade had effectively secured the But and Dagua areas, notable locations that played vital roles in the region's agricultural landscape and supply lines. Simultaneously, Brigadier Moten's 17th Brigade was concentrating its efforts along the Ninab River, a key waterway that would facilitate the final drive toward Maprik, a town essential for both its infrastructure and resources. Facing intense Australian pressure, the remnants of General Mano's 41st Division were forced to retreat northwestward to Wora, a strategic village located near the coast, while the Miyake Force reorganized itself along the defensive line formed by the Imbia, Neligum, Kumbungua, and Bainy rivers. This area is characterized by its rugged terrain, dense jungles, and numerous waterways, making it a challenging environment for military operations. On April 3, General Moten ordered the 2/7th Battalion to advance toward Maprik and the Agricultural Station, aiming to seize this vital supply center. At the same time, the 2/6th Battalion was tasked with moving towards the Screw River to block any potential enemy retreats to the north. Hayforce, a composite group of Australian troops, was directed to push forward to the Maprik-Marui road. This mission was critical as it aimed to establish a new airfield, designated as Hayfield, to alleviate the pressing supply issues faced by Australian forces. The Australians began their assault towards Maprik, yet they quickly discovered that the enemy was well-prepared to defend this food-producing region. Throughout the week, they were largely limited to patrol actions as they engaged with scattered enemy forces. Concurrently, Hayforce advanced eastward, encountering strong resistance at Wora on April 10. This strategic location, once teeming with activity, had become a focal point for Japanese defense. On April 12, feeling increasingly under pressure, General Mano opted to abandon Wora, allowing him to concentrate his forces more effectively at Bainyik. This decision was pivotal, as it permitted Australian forces to secure the site of the proposed airstrip, enhancing their logistical capabilities.  Meanwhile patrols had been pressing on from village to village. On 28th March, for example, Sergeant J. W. Hedderman, of the 2/6th, a notable leader in these as in earlier operations, had led a reconnaissance to Kulkuil and Gwanginan. Next day he led a fighting patrol which took Kulkuil with a carefully-planned surprise attack. On the 30th Lieutenant Errey's platoon (16), with Hedderman as platoon sergeant, attacked Gwanginan. Hedderman confused the enemy by shouting to imaginary platoons to right and left (thus incidentally drawing fire on himself); and when the leading section was halted he brought down supporting fire and enabled it to move again. A man was wounded within 10 yards of the enemy's pits; Hedderman went forward, killed two Japanese with grenades, and dragged his comrade to safety. The enemy were 25 to 30 strong and the attack failed despite these gallant efforts. Hedderman covered the withdrawal, firing until all others had gone. On 30th March a patrol found Mairoka clear of the enemy and on 4th April Lieutenant Gordon's platoon established a patrol base there. On the 7th Errey's platoon attacked a village to the east of the Milak villages but without success, Lieutenant Errey being killed, and Sergeant Layfield wounded. Chicanambu was occupied on the 9th. On April 15, two companies from the 2/6th pushed eastward towards the Screw River. Over the next five days, they faced strong opposition as they engaged in fierce skirmishes and patrol actions to secure critical territories, ultimately capturing Wambak, Kombichagi, and Bungara. Each of these locations represented not only strategic advantages but also a deepening impact on the local population and the broader campaign dynamics. On April 15, 1945, the 2/7th Battalion launched its main assault, with one company advancing towards the line of Nimrod Creek. This location, nestled within the dense jungles of New Guinea, proved to be strategically significant yet perilous. As they approached, Australian troops encountered heavily defended and camouflaged pillboxes, fortifications designed to protect the Japanese troops stationed in the area. Despite the challenges, they managed to secure a long, kunai-covered spur to the northeast of a critical area known as Maprik 2 by the following day. On April 17, another company from the 2/7th continued the offensive, advancing toward a target referred to as Maprik 1. They reached a point approximately 400 yards northwest of the objective but soon found themselves in a precarious situation as they became surrounded on both flanks the next day. It was not until April 19 that they successfully broke through to the southwest, escaping their encirclement.   The House Tamboran feature, a prominent ridge north of Maprik 1, was finally secured on April 20. This strategic high ground was essential for controlling the surrounding terrain and allowing further advances in the area. The following day, the 2/7th began probing towards the Maprik airstrip and Bainyik. Their efforts to secure the airstrip were fruitful within the next few days; however, they faced staunch resistance at both Maprik 2 and Bainyik, where Japanese forces continued to mount a determined defense. On April 25, the Australians crossed the Screw River, a vital waterway that flows through this region, on their way toward Midpum Creek, which they reached the following day. This movement was crucial for maintaining momentum in the campaign. While the 2/7th Battalion was engaged in heavy fighting, patrols from the 2/6th Battalion successfully secured the Neligum villages, although they encountered strong Japanese resistance at Mangumbu. This locality, bordered by lush vegetation and steep hills, served as a vital defensive position for Japanese forces. Simultaneously, intelligence reports about a small enemy contingent under Lieutenant-Colonel Takenaga Masaharu positioned at Tau prompted a swift response. On April 16, a platoon from the 2/5th Battalion departed from Aitape, a coastal town known for its strategic significance during the campaign. They tracked down the Japanese troops and engaged them at Kubriwat on April 24. After the Kubriwat engagement, Colonel Takenaga's troops managed to shake off pursuit by the Australians; yet as the Australians continued to harass them, Takenaga ultimately decided that they would surrender. They took a leaflet containing a notice of surrender that one of the soldiers had been carrying, added some conditions underneath in English, tied it to a pole for the Australians to find, and left the area. Scouts from Miles' platoon then found the leaflet and brought it back with them. On May 2, the Australian platoon spotted Takenaga's unit near Womgrer village, and asked a native to help them make contact. Two truce bearers from the Japanese side came to the Australians to negotiate, and on the following day Takenaga's unit surrendered at Womgrer and were disarmed. At the time of surrender, Takenaga's unit consisted of 42 men: five officers (including Takenaga), four warrant officers, and 33 non-commissioned officers and soldiers. They were equipped with five light machine guns, 17 rifles, five pistols, and 750 rounds of ammunition. The prisoners, escorted by Miles' platoon, marched for three days in an orderly fashion to Maprik Airport, and were then transported to Aitape. Takenaga's unit were held in Aitape for around one month, before being broken up and sent to prison camps in Lae and in Australia, where they received good treatment. They were all interrogated, and in particular, Takenaga was transported to Manila for a detailed interrogation. As well as giving character information about the commanders of the 18th Army, Takenaga gave his opinion of how the Allies should deal with Emperor Hirohito: "If the Emperor is killed then the Japanese people will resist until the bitter end, but if there is an order from the Emperor then they will probably surrender peacefully." Back in the Maprik sector, while Hayforce conducted probing operations and successfully captured Yentagim in early May, the Miyake Force began a withdrawal toward the Loanim-Yamil-Kumbungua line. This defensive line was a series of natural features and fortified positions designed to obstruct the advancing Australian troops. On the northern flank, the 2/6th Battalion also continued to patrol eastward, successfully securing the strategically important Mangumbu on May 2. This advancement not only disrupted enemy operations but also paved the way for further Australian advances in the region. On May 8, 1945, the 2/7th Battalion launched a decisive attack, successfully capturing part of the Kumbungua Ridge, a strategically significant high ground dominating the surrounding terrain. Two flame-throwers had now been received by the 2/7th and on 8th May these were used to drive the enemy from part of the narrow steep-sided Kumbungua ridge. The Japanese made off, abandoning 30 weapon-pits, but engaged the Australians from a knoll farther up the ridge. Just three days later, they captured the southern end of the ridge while another company moved to occupy Waigakum 1, a forward position that offered a crucial vantage point over the area. Flame-throwers were proving very effective. On 10th May the 2/7th occupied Waigakum 1, and on the 11th a platoon with flame-throwers attacked and took a position where the defenders abandoned 50 packs. Another platoon approached the knoll at the south end of the Kumbungua ridge from the south, attacked up a steep slope and put to flight the defenders who abandoned 25 packs and 100 sticks of gelignite. The Japanese opened fire, however, from higher up and, the ground being unsuitable for defence, the platoon withdrew. By May 13, following effective air support that softened enemy defenses, central Kumbungua was found abandoned by Japanese forces, a testament to the pressure the Australians had applied. The following day, after another heavy bombardment from both aircraft and artillery, the entire ridge was finally secured, marking a significant accomplishment in the campaign. Pressing on, the Australians cleared the area northeast of Kalabu by May 26. However, they faced stiff resistance and found it challenging to make further advances. As a result, the 2/7th Battalion reorganized to defend the captured positions, consolidating their gains to ensure they could withstand potential counterattacks from the tenacious enemy. In the meantime, on May 17, Waigakum 2 fell to Australian troops. This success forced the cutoff remnants of General Mano's 41st Division to begin their retreat to the east, as the Australians patrolled further towards Malba, another critical location along their advance. The loss of Waigakum to the 2/7th Battalion in mid-May had a very upsetting effect on the Japanese. It was the point of junction between Miyake Force, now 800 strong, and the 41st Division and, according to General Yoshiwara, this loss led directly to the withdrawal from Kalabu and Loanim. On the 19th a platoon, guided by natives, surprised six Japanese in a garden south-east of Kalabu. Here Private Jenkins" came upon one Japanese asleep outside a weapon-pit. As he was within feet of me (wrote Jenkins later) I thought it was an excellent opportunity to take a prisoner so I woke him with a light kick and pulled him to his feet with my left hand, keeping my Owen gun in my right. I had managed to get my prisoner some paces from his position when a slight noise alerted his mates and they opened fire on the patrol. With this the Jap broke from my grasp and I was forced to shoot him. One other Japanese was killed and the others made off.Turning their attention northward, the 2/6th Battalion attempted to attack the village of Jamei on May 20. However, they were met with fierce resistance from Japanese defenders, which compelled the Australians to bombard the area intensively with artillery and air strikes until the enemy was finally forced to retreat on May 25. While the Australians were continuing to probe towards Yamil, elements of the 2/7th Battalion executed successful attacks in the Malba area, which was ultimately secured by the end of the month. This marked a crucial step in their advance as they pushed deeper into enemy territory. Meanwhile, in the coastal sector, Brigadier King's 16th Brigade concentrated its efforts east of the But River, extending up to the Kofi area. At the same time, Brigadier Martin's 29th Brigade assembled at But, preparing for the final drive toward Wewak, a town that had become a strategic target for Allied forces in their campaign to eradicate Japanese presence in New Guinea. On April 14, the 2/1st Battalion passed through the lines of the 2/2nd Battalion, launching an attack toward the Karawop-Wisling area. This sector, known for its rugged topography and dense underbrush, finally fell to the relentless Australian assaults two days later after a series of intense company-level attacks. On April 25, the 2/1st Battalion occupied the crucial 1800 Feature without facing any opposition. This high ground provided them with significant tactical advantages in the ongoing conflict. Meanwhile, the 2/3rd Battalion, positioned to the north, successfully launched an attack on Boiken Plantation. Their efforts were rewarded as they advanced to Kalimboa the following day, further consolidating Australian positions in the region. On April 27, 1945, the 2/2nd Battalion moved swiftly through the advancing lines, pushing forward to Hawain and crossing the river in their quest to engage Japanese forces. Concurrently, the 2/3rd Battalion patrolled south along Boiken Creek, where they encountered significant enemy resistance in the Koanumbo area. After a series of determined assaults, this area was ultimately secured by May 2, allowing the Australians to fortify their positions. At this point in the campaign, Brigadier Martin's 19th Brigade took over the advance towards Cape Wom, and subsequently, the strategic objective of Wewak. This movement coincided with preparations by Lieutenant-Colonel Eric Hennessy's 2/6th Commando Regiment, which was organizing for a surprise landing east of Cape Moem, a critical maneuver aimed at outflanking Japanese defenses. On May 3, the 2/4th Battalion advanced from Hawain, managing to cover six miles without facing any opposition. By the next day, they reached Wom without incident. As night fell, Australian patrols had already established a presence along the Waringe River, preparing for further actions. During this time, patrols targeted Japanese stragglers in the vicinity, eliminating several and gathering intelligence. Reconnaissance units were then sent forward to Minga Creek to assess enemy positions while the 2/4th secured Yarabos on May 7, progressively tightening the noose around Japanese defenses. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Battalion, positioned on the right flank, engaged in a series of minor clashes, successfully capturing Ranimboa on May 4, followed by Numikim just days later. These advances were crucial in pressuring the remaining Japanese forces, which, under Generals Adachi and Nakano, were increasingly evident in their abandonment of the substantial base at Wewak. Their main forces began to withdraw over the rugged terrain of the Prince Alexander Mountains, leaving behind strong rearguards tasked with covering their exit routes from Wewak. To counter this withdrawal, the 2/11th Battalion and the 2/7th Commando Squadron were dispatched on a wide encircling movement towards the Sauri villages and Wirui Mission, aiming to cut off the retreating Japanese forces. Meanwhile, the 2/4th Battalion crossed Minga Creek and launched an attack towards Wewak on May 8, seeking to claim the final strategic stronghold. Two days later, bolstered by supporting tanks and artillery, the 2/4th Battalion initiated a vigorous assault on Wewak Point. This area, positioned at the very tip of the peninsula, was essential for controlling the coastal approaches to Wewak. After a hard-fought engagement, the Australians successfully seized the entirety of Wewak Point, subsequently mopping up the remaining Japanese soldiers who had entrenched themselves in the caves along the cliffs, effectively concluding the intense fighting in this region. At 12.15 two companies were ordered to mop up.cThat afternoon a flame-thrower fired into a bunker apparently lit a dump of bombs which blew up. Smith's company found several occupied caves and, since the Japanese would not surrender, merely picqueted them until engineers arrived and blew up the entrances, sealing the Japanese in. It was estimated that about 50 perished in the caves; by midnight 65 other dead had been counted and three 75-mm guns and two 20-mm had been captured. In a brilliant action the Australians, supported by tanks and more than 40 field guns, had lost only 2 killed and 17 wounded. Mopping up was continued next day, and no live Japanese remained on the point by midday. Finally it was estimated that from 180 to 200 Japanese had been killed. On May 11, 1945, following their progress along the Big Road, the 2/11th Battalion set out to occupy the strategic 620, 710, and 770 Features. However, they soon encountered unexpected resistance over the following days. This was not merely an isolated skirmish; it was part of a broader engagement as they pressed their advance against the entrenched Japanese defenders. Meanwhile, an important operation was unfolding to the west. The 2/9th and 2/10th Commando Squadrons, supported by a small flotilla formed around the sloop Swan, successfully landed on Dove Bay's Red Beach, located just to the west of Forok Point. This maneuver was critical, as it disrupted Japanese supply lines and provided the Australians with a foothold to cut off the Wewak Road. Following their landing, the squadrons dispatched patrols eastward, further isolating Japanese forces. The next day, the 2/3rd Machine-Gun Battalion secured the junction of the Wewak Road and Forok Creek, a key point for controlling the surrounding areas, while the 2/9th Commando Squadron patrolled past Mandi, gaining valuable intelligence. The 2/4th Battalion, capitalizing on this chaos, pressed forward to secure the Wewak airfield and the Wirui Mission, both of which were vital for maintaining air support and supply routes in the theater of operations. On May 13, the 2/11th Battalion successfully captured the 620 Feature, a crucial hill that provided vantage points over the battlefield. However, they struggled to take the 710 Feature the next day, as Japanese resistance intensified in the rugged foothills south of the Big Road.  On 14th May, the 2/11th being heavily engaged in the foothills south of the Big Road, Lt Martin had ordered the 2/4th to attack Wirui Mission, which was on a steep kunai-covered hill about 300 feet high dominating the airfield. Approaching from the east through tall kunai the leading com-pany with a troop of tanks soon took the first objective-dominating ground about half way up the hill. Captain Smith's company passed through and, with the tanks, whose crews estimated that they killed about 30 Japanese, reached the top. By nightfall the top and the eastern slopes were held but the Japanese were fighting back from bunkers on the north-west slopes. Next day Smith's company attacked these remaining bunkers. The lead-ing section was halted by intense fire after several men had been hit. Private Kenna, in the supporting section, which was firing on the bunkers at a range of only 50 yards, stood up in the kunai grass in full view of the enemy and fired his Bren at one of the Japanese machine-gun posts. The Japanese machine-gunners returned his fire but failed to hit him. Kenna then said to Private Rau who was beside him that the Japanese "had a bead on him" and he asked for Rau's rifle. Still standing, he fired four rifle shots and silenced the enemy post. He then took the Bren again and opened fire on another post about 70 yards away and silenced it too. The remaining post was then knocked out by a tank; soon the 2/4th and 2/11th were in contact. About 40 Japanese were killed and perhaps 20 escaped in the fight for the mission. Large quantities of weapons, vehicles, generators, tele-phones and other equipment were found there. Possession of Wirui Mission gave complete control of the Wewak coastal plain. Captured papers made it possible to make a fairly precise estimate of the forces immediately round Wewak: Kato Force, built round the 25th Airfield Battalion and about 300 strong, was holding from Sauri to Wirui Creek; Jinka Force, about 400 strong, was holding from Wirui Creek to the east, including Boram airfield, and south into the range as far as Passam; to the east was Aoyama Force, of unknown strength; the coastal plain to a depth of about 1,000 yards was not held in strength, and it was thought that there would be little opposition on the coast at least as far as Boram airfield Supported by artillery fire and through persistent efforts, the 2/11th finally took the 710 Feature on May 15, which allowed them to begin patrolling towards the 770 Feature and the nearby Klewalin, two additional strongholds that were key to the entire operation. Simultaneously, since May 11, the 2/7th Commando Squadron had been engaged in fierce fighting. They maneuvered through a series of knolls in the Sauri villages area, which they ultimately cleared by May 16, further tightening the noose around Japanese defenses. On that same day, after intense air and naval bombardments prepared the way, the 2/8th Battalion began their advance toward Boram. This crucial location fell into their hands unopposed by nightfall, allowing significant advances in the Australian front line. However, on May 17, as the 2/8th Battalion continued its push to the mouth of Boram Creek, they encountered a strongly-held Japanese position. This area, characterized by intricate terrain and dense jungle cover, presented formidable challenges as they sought to advance further into Japanese-occupied territory. The enemy bunkers would remain a formidable obstacle until May 20, when a heavy bombardment finally rendered them inoperative. Following this, the Australians seized the opportunity to exploit their gains and advanced further east to occupy Cape Moem. This maneuver allowed them to establish contact with the commando force at Brandi Plantation just two days later, strengthening their foothold along the coast. On May 24, the 2/11th Battalion occupied the strategic 770 feature after enduring its own heavy bombardment. Three days later, they managed to destroy the last remnants of enemy forces south of the 710 feature, marking a significant step in the campaign. On May 25, the 2/4th Battalion also launched a patrol into the village of Koigin, taking the location after a sharp and intense fight. However, amidst these operations, Brigadier Martin fell ill with malaria and was temporarily replaced by Lieutenant-Colonel John Bishop, a shift that would guide the troops through the operational challenges ahead. By the end of May, the 6th Division had pushed most remnants of the Japanese 18th Army away from the coast, including their vital base at Wewak. The Japanese forces were now confined within the rugged, mountainous terrain, squeezed between the 17th Brigade, positioned forward of Maprik to the west, and the remainder of the 6th Division to the north. In preparation for the next phase of their campaign, General Moten set out to secure the line from Solongan to Kulauru Mission. The 2/5th Battalion relieved the 2/7th Battalion and moved against Kulauru and Ulupu, while the 2/6th Battalion advanced towards Yamil. The Australians acted swiftly and decisively, rapidly capturing Newton's Knoll and Palketia during the first week of June. On June 10, after extensive air strikes and bombardments weakened enemy defenses, the 2/6th Battalion successfully entered Yamil. Just three days later, on June 13, the 2/5th Battalion continued their momentum by capturing Yamil 3 and Yuman as the beleaguered Miyake Force began its retreat towards Ulupu, indicating the deteriorating situation for Japanese forces in the region. Despite the Australians' relentless advance and the heavy bombardment inflicted upon them, the Japanese remained determined to defend Kunai Spur. Their tenacity meant that the Australians could only secure Yamil 4 on June 24, underscoring the intensity of the fighting in this strategic area. At this critical juncture, the 2nd New Guinea Battalion arrived in the Hayfield area to patrol southwards towards Kwimbu, Mikau, and Kunjinge. These movements further reinforced the Australian positions and set the stage for the continuing efforts to dismantle the last remnants of Japanese resistance in the region. On June 11, 1945, the 2/8th Battalion successfully seized Hill 1 after a concentrated air and artillery bombardment that softened up the enemy defenses. This pivotal victory allowed them to establish a critical foothold in the area, vital for subsequent operations. Just five days later, on June 16, both artillery and aircraft targeted Hill 2 and Shiburangu, two crucial positions that had become points of interest in the ongoing campaign. After numerous attempts and repeated efforts by the infantry, the Australians ultimately captured Hill 2, a strategic vantage point that further pressured Japanese forces in the region.At 8 a.m. on 16th June aircraft struck both Hill 2 and Shiburangu and then the artillery began a program in which 3,000 rounds were fired. One company began to advance on Hill 2 at 9.30. Warrant-Officer Fisk's platoon, which was forward, met heavy fire from snipers on both flanks and machine-gun fire from the hills and lost one man killed and one wounded. It withdrew to the cover of the spur and moved to outflank the enemy on the left. Meanwhile at 9.45 a second company had taken the pocket without opposition. At 10 a.m. the first company was still held. The men rested under the lip of the hill while the artillery again bombarded the enemy's positions and flame-throwers were brought forward. At 1.30 the company surged over the crest of the hill and, after close fighting in which each bunker was grenaded, the surviving Japanese fled leaving 38 visible dead and perhaps another 20 buried by the air and artillery bombardment. The Australians lost 2 killed and 3 wounded. "Aerial bombing coupled with artillery concentration does not deter the enemy from fighting nor unsettle him unduly," wrote the battalion diarist. "Such fanatical resistance in face of such odds makes the capturing of these strong points no light task." Meanwhile, the 2/4th Battalion worked diligently to clear the eastern side of the Koigin-Tazaki track, progressing 600 yards south of Koigin by June 13. This advancement helped secure vital supply routes and reinforced the Australians' operational capabilities. On June 14, the Australians continued their momentum by successfully securing Mount Kawakubo, another significant terrain feature. Five days later, on June 19, the 2/4th and 2/11th Battalions launched a coordinated attack towards Tazaki. Thanks to the overwhelming support of air and artillery bombardments, Tazaki ultimately fell into Australian hands by June 24, marking yet another victory in their relentless push against Japanese defenses. On June 22, the 2/8th captured the last knoll before Shiburangu. Following this success, artillery began to register targets on Shiburangu, setting the stage for a significant assault. By June 27, after a particularly heavy air and artillery bombardment that saturated the area with firepower, the 2/8th Battalion launched a bold attack to seize Shiburangu. Utilizing an outflanking maneuver, they managed to surprise the fierce defenders, overcoming their determined resistance. As the 2/4th Battalion cleared the remaining enemy pockets in the Tazaki area, the 2/8th Battalion pressed their advantage, attacking and securing the area to the west on July 3. The two battalions effectively linked up two days later, solidifying their control over the region and paving the way for further advances in the campaign. Looking back to the southwest, after nearly three weeks of stiff resistance, the Japanese finally abandoned Kunai Spur on July 3, 1945. This withdrawal opened the door for Australian forces, who swiftly occupied Ulupu just two days later. The effort to clear the surrounding area began in earnest, but it wasn't until July 8 that the strongly-held northern knoll was taken after intense fighting. On July 9, through a sustained bombardment, the Japanese were driven out of Ulum, marking a significant breakthrough; their defense system had been shattered. Following this success, patrols from the 2/5th Battalion advanced rapidly, moving forward about 2000 yards with only minor skirmishes. They reached and occupied Kulauru Mission on July 11, reinforcing the Australians' control over the area. Pressing northeast, the remaining Japanese forces in the vicinity were rapidly dispersed, and by July 18, Ilipem fell into Australian hands. During this time, the 2/6th Battalion was busy securing the Ulunkohoitu Ridge, further consolidating the Australians' hold on the region. At the same time, the 2nd New Guinea Battalion had been probing south and east, successfully securing critical locations such as Kongambe, Kwandaning, Naila, and Gisanambu. With the Japanese now regrouping along the Kaboibus-Ahegulim-Gwalip line, General Moten aimed to accelerate the advance, directing both the 2nd New Guinea Battalion and the rested 2/7th Battalion to converge on Gwalip. Meanwhile, the 2/5th and 2/6th Battalions pressed east towards Kaboibus. Despite facing challenges and some failed attacks against Dunbit and Aoniaru, the New Guineans were able to concentrate their forces near Gwalip by July 22, and five days later, Sigora fell to their determined assault. On July 30, they launched an attack and captured Ulama, nearly catching General Mano's headquarters at Winge in the process, which forced the defenders to retreat towards Suaui. As momentum continued to build, the 2/5th Battalion pressed on, supported by heavy air strikes. By August 1, they had successfully taken Gwenik, further disrupting Japanese lines. The following day, as the Australians advanced along the Kaboibus Ridge, they successfully occupied the Kaboibus villages. To their astonishment, they encountered only minor opposition, underscoring the disarray within the Japanese ranks as the Australians continued their relentless push through the region. On August 4, 1945, the 2/5th Battalion successfully seized Ahegulim, a strategic location that added to their momentum. Three days later, they captured Malabeim, completing their objectives in the region. Following this success, the Australians began probing towards Mount Irup, further extending their influence over the landscape. Concurrently, on August 6, the 2/7th Battalion embarked on a wide movement from Sigora aimed at Kiarivu, reaching this target two days later. This advance was part of a broader campaign in which New Guinean troops also secured key areas such as Miyamboara and Mananingi, reflecting the persistent efforts of Moten's 17th Brigade as they conducted their final offensive actions. Turning to the eastern front, the 8th Brigade's 30th and 35th Battalions had relieved the 2/4th and 2/11th Battalions in early July, taking charge of the Wirui Creek-Mandi area. On July 13, Brigadier Martin, who had resumed command of the 19th Brigade, ordered the 2/8th Battalion to capture the critical positions known as The Blot and Hambrauri. Following this directive, the Australians successfully attacked and seized The Blot the very next day. On July 16, Hambrauri 1 fell into Australian hands without opposition, allowing them to begin probing towards another strategically important feature: St. Patrick's. After significant preparations and a heavy bombardment, St. Patrick's was captured on July 21. The following day, the 2/8th Battalion captured Hambrauri 2 with little resistance, showcasing their growing operational effectiveness. During this time, the 2/1st Battalion executed a diversionary thrust along the Sambukaua Track, drawing Japanese attention away from main Australian advances. Simultaneously, the 2/6th Commando Regiment faced daring infiltration attempts to the west in the vicinity of Boiken, further complicating the operational landscape.  On June 24 five Japanese approaching along the beach entered the Angau compound at Wisling, stole 3 Owen guns, a pistol, and 3 Japanese rifles. A patrol followed these marauders, killed 2 and retrieved the weapons. Next day about 10 Japanese ambushed a party of the 2/10th Commando Squadron south of Boiken Plantation and killed Lieutenant Martin and wounded 4 others; and that night about 20 stole into the plantation. On June 28 signs were found that some 35 Japanese had slept the previous night 400 yards from a commando perimeter. On July 23 a commando patrol had a sharp clash with perhaps 40 Japanese in the hills south of Wanpea and more than 15 miles west of Wewak; 8 Japanese were killed as well as 4 Australians. The Japanese were justly proud of the valour and successes of the raiding parties which harassed the Australians between Wewak and Dagua in May, June and July. Several groups were organised and trained for these enterprises, the most celebrated being led by Lieutenant Saito Hachiro of the 78th Regiment who had first earned fame as a patrol leader in the Huon Peninsula fighting. In June his party set off to raid Maprik, but was intercepted, Saito and most of his followers being killed. From June 15 onwards two parties of raiders operated in the Karawop and Boiken areas with the object of diverting their enemy's strength away from the 51st Division farther east. These parties, which claimed to have killed more than 100 Australians (a wild overestimate) were the ones coped with by the 2/6th Commando Regiment. Another series of raids in late July and early August were considered less successful, because of improved Australian security measures. On July 25, Japanese General Adachi issued orders for a "last stand" around the areas of Nyakombi and Sassuia. The main body of the 18th Army was now in an are facing north and west. The 51st Division was on the right opposing the troops advancing from Wewak, the 20th Division in the centre and the 41st on the left. Yoshiwara had now reported that the food resources of the Sepik area were less than had been believed, though there might be more in the hinterland. Already about 2,800 troops were stationed in the Sepik Valley from Marienberg to about Kanganaman and were living off the country. Adachi decided to make a last stand in the area embracing, in the north, Nyakombi and Sassuia. Here they would fight on "as long as ammunition and food are available and at least until the end of September". Liaison was to be maintained with the force in the Sepik area which was to prepare to carry on "ambush warfare" after the main force had been wiped out. This plan had been conveyed to Field Marshal Terauchi, commanding the Southern Army, and he approved it on 8th July. Despite its many setbacks during the campaign, Terauchi sent a citation to the 18th Army. It was the first time that a Japanese army had been so honoured. The citation ran: "To the 18th Army and all attached units: With Lieut-General Hatazo Adachi as your com-mander, you have fought vigorously for three years in north-east New Guinea, where numerous epidemics prevailed and where the terrain was hitherto unknown to any Japanese. When the enemy occupied the west coast in April 1944, to cut off supplies, you learned to live off grass and trees, and by making the best of the situation, you conquered all unfavourable conditions. Officers and soldiers alike displayed the true spirit of the Japanese Army. Wherever you encountered the enemy, you crushed them and inflicted many casualties. You have inspired fear into the hearts of the enemy and diverted their sea and air strength, thereby contributing much to the Southern Army's operations and furthermore, to all the Armies of the Empire. You were able to accomplish this through the excellent leadership, planning, fidelity and character of your Army Commander. By the sense of sincerity, loyalty and moral obligation of all the troops, you have set a model for all men to follow. I hereby present this citation and proclaim this to all the Armies."  Amidst these developments, Major General Stevens was orchestrating a series of troop reliefs along the front lines. King's 16th Brigade was set to replace the 19th Brigade, which in turn would relieve the 17th Brigade to the west, ensuring continuous pressure on Japanese positions while maintaining the momentum of the Australian advance. Consequently, on July 28, 1945, the 2/2nd Battalion relieved the 2/8th in the Hambrauri area, immediately dispatching patrols to probe towards Numoikum. Their operational efforts culminated in the successful seizure of Mount Shoto on August 2. By August 6, with the backing of artillery fire, the Australians had secured Numoikum and Rindogim. However, this marked the last offensive action in the area, as the Australians shifted their focus to patrolling forward in order to consolidate their gains. By the end of the Aitape-Wewak Campaign, the 6th Division had sustained significant casualties, with 442 men killed and 1,141 wounded, while inflicting heavy losses on Japanese forces, estimated at around 9,000 killed and capturing 269 prisoners. With this chapter closed, it was time to shift the scene to Balikpapan, where the conclusion of the Borneo Campaign awaited. As we rejoin the action, by July 9, General Milford's 7th Australian Division had largely secured the Balikpapan area. Brigadier Chilton's 18th Brigade executed a successful landing at Penadjam, Djinabora, and Teloktebang on the western side of the bay. Simultaneously, Brigadier Eather's 25th Brigade advanced towards Batuchampar along Milford Highway, while Brigadier Dougherty's 21st Brigade secured key positions in the Sepinggang and Manggar areas. On July 10, the 2/31st Battalion secured the Cello position and the fallen-timber area directly in front with crucial support from artillery and tanks. In a bold move, one of their companies launched an attack towards the position known as Coke; however, this assault was met with fierce resistance and was ultimately repelled by intense crossfire from well-entrenched defenders. To the left of their advance, the 2/6th Commando Squadron probed toward Sumber Kiri, successfully securing the village and bolstering the Australians' hold in the region. At this moment, the 2/27th Battalion took over the left flank at Manggar, which allowed the exhausted 2/14th Battalion to probe towards Sambodja without risk of being outflanked. The next day, as the 2/27th moved through the 2/14th to occupy Lamaru, the 2/25th Battalion began the process of relieving the weary 2/31st, ensuring that fresh forces could continue the advance. On July 12, the commandos initiated probing operations towards a position known as Charm, successfully occupying both Cloncurry and Abash in the following two days. These captures were significant in securing the area and maintaining the momentum of the Australian advance through Balikpapan. After extensive patrolling on both sides of the highway, the 2/25th Battalion finally dispatched two companies on July 14 to occupy the strategic locations of Cart and Calm. These efforts led to the successful securing of Cocoa, Calm, and Chair, all achieved without resistance. That same day, to the east, patrols discovered Amborawang and the ridges north of Bale unoccupied. Recognizing this opportunity, the 2/27th Battalion moved into the area three days later. On July 15, the 2/9th Battalion sent patrols towards Separi and along the Parehpareh River, aiming to cut the enemy's lines of communication. Concurrently, the 2/25th Battalion solidified its control over Cart, enabling them to dominate the highway from both the east and west. However, their position was soon contested as they faced a series of heavy Japanese counterattacks during the following nights, testing their resolve and defensive capabilities. By July 17, the 2/25th had moved to occupy Charm, situated prominently by the highway, while a company from the 2/33rd Battalion took over Cart, allowing both units to repel yet another strong night counterattack from Japanese forces. The next day, the 2/27th finally entered the unoccupied Sambodja area, while patrols began to probe westward toward the Milford Highway. On July 19, the 2/31st Battalion cleared the last remnants of Japanese presence from the highway, paving the way for uninterrupted Australian operations. The following day, the 2/25th destroyed a robust enemy pocket, allowing them to occupy Abide without further incident. On July 21, the remaining Japanese forces retreated from the Batuchampar area, prompting the Australians to push toward Pope's Track while extensively patrolling northward. By this time, the bulk of the 2/1st Pioneer Battalion had been landed at Djinabora, establishing a patrol base in the Tempadung area. A week later, following a naval bombardment, the Australians occupied Pamaluan and began probing operations to the east and north. This series of actions marked the conclusion of the Battle of Balikpapan. The Australians opted to halt any offensive operations at this point and instead focus on consolidating their positions through enhanced patrolling. During the course of the battle, Australian forces tragically suffered 229 killed and 634 wounded, while inflicting significant losses on the Japanese, with approximately 2,032 killed and 63 captured. Thus, Australian casualties for the broader Borneo Campaign totaled around 2,100, while Japanese losses were estimated at around 4,700. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General George Stevens led brave troops against the entrenched Japanese forces aiming to capture the strategic town of Wewak. Despite fierce resistance and rugged terrain, they successfully advanced, featuring key victories after relentless battles. Australian artillery and infantry engaged in daring assaults, securing vital positions like the Kumbungua Ridge and establishing airfields. As the campaign progressed, Japanese forces dwindled, ultimately surrendering at Wewak. 

Last time we spoke about the allied invasion of Balikpapan. In June 1945, the war in the Pacific escalated as American forces, spearheaded by Generals Eichelberger and Krueger, fiercely battled the entrenched Japanese on Luzon. Despite harsh conditions and fierce resistance, the Americans made crucial advances, capturing key positions that rekindled hope for the Filipino people. Concurrently, preparations for the invasion of Balikpapan intensified. The Australian 7th Division assembled for a July 1 amphibious assault against a heavily fortified Japanese defense, known for its formidable coast artillery and entrenched positions. The Australians faced fierce opposition upon landing; however, skilled maneuvering and robust artillery support allowed them to swiftly gain a foothold. As the Australians secured their beachhead, they marked the beginning of a challenging campaign against determined Japanese forces in Balikpapan, setting the stage for further confrontations in the Pacific theater.  This episode is Victory at Bougainville  Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  We last left off on Bougainville, by mid-April, Brigadier Heathcote Hammer's 15th Brigade had commenced its crucial task of relieving Brigadier Field's weary and battered 7th Brigade. This transition came at a pivotal moment when Brigadier Stevenson's 11th Brigade successfully secured the Soraken Peninsula, a strategic point on Bougainville's southern coast, while also continuing their efforts to contain enemy forces along the notorious Numa Numa Trail, a crucial supply route for Japanese troops. Supported by reinforcements in artillery and air power, Generals Savige and Bridgeford were optimistic about continuing their limited offensive toward the south. Their immediate objective was to capture the line of the Hongorai River, considered a significant tactical advantage, followed by the Hari River, which would serve as the 15th Brigade's main aim. On the opposing side, General Kanda had learned a harsh lesson about the ineffectiveness of banzai charges during the fierce fighting at the Battle of Slater's Knoll. This costly experience prompted him to alter his strategy significantly. He decided to pull his remaining troops back to a defensive perimeter focused around Buin, which is located in the southern region of Bougainville. Here, he reinforced his defenses with garrison troops from Kieta, situated on the eastern side of Bougainville, the Shortlands Islands to the northwest, and the Fauros Islands to the northeast. However, with this concentration of forces not expected to be operational until July, the troops stationed in the forward areas were tasked with executing a critical delaying action in the meantime, buying precious time for reinforcements to arrive. Meanwhile, on April 17, the Australian 24th Battalion began its advance along the Buin Road, a vital route for both supply and troop movement. Two companies made their way toward Dawe's Creek, while another company launched an assault against the enemy strongholds at Kindara. Remarkably, they broke through enemy lines the following day, pushing further to Sindou Creek and Umam Creek. Here, they faced multiple sharp counterattacks over the next week, demonstrating the fierce resistance from Japanese forces determined to hold their ground. As patrols moved deeper into the thick jungle on either side of the Buin Road, the struggle became increasingly intense. Each advance was hard-fought, marked by skirmishes that tested the resolve and endurance of the Australian soldiers. Finally, on April 26, the advance resumed in earnest, making rapid gains toward the Hongorai River. The combination of heavy air support and relentless artillery bombardment had effectively dispelled any opposition along the route, allowing the Australians to push forward with renewed vigor. By May 4, as the 24th Battalion finally approached the banks of the Hongorai River, they encountered significant resistance. However, on the 4th Lieutenant Lawn's platoon was advancing with two tanks and a bulldozer when the crew of the leading tank came to a log across the road and saw movement in the bush. A burst of machine-gun fire from the tank cut the leaves away and revealed the barrel of a field gun. The first round fired from the tank's 2-pounder disabled the enemy gun and the enemy seemed to flee. Farther ahead, however, a mine exploded at the rear of the second tank. It was discovered that it had been exploded with a wire by a Japanese concealed in the bush. Henceforward mines and concealed guns were encountered more and more frequently. They were detected chiefly by the practised eyes of the engineer teams of Major Needham's 15th Field Company who became increasingly skilful. Mechanical detectors were defeated by several sorts of mine employed wooden boxes filled with T.N.T., for example; but their presence was betrayed by protruding fuses, wires, disturbed earth, and confirmed by prodding with a bayonet. As the 24th Battalion neared the Hongorai it became evident that the Japanese intended to make the Australians pay a price for each advance, and that they were willing to trade a field gun for a tank at every opportunity. On the 4th and many later occasions leading tanks were fired on at a range of a few yards by guns cleverly concealed beside the track, but in positions from which the Japanese could not hope to extricate them. In other respects also the Japanese tactics were improving and their striking power was strengthened. Each forward Australian battalion was now under frequent artillery fire, evidently directed by Japanese observers who remained close to the Australian advance, and it was this which was now causing most of the casualties. The shells usually burst in the trees and their fragments were scattered over a wide area with lethal effects. To counter the tanks the Japanese were now establishing their positions not astride the track but about 100 yards from it in places where the tanks could not reach them until a side track had been made. The Hongorai River, a critical geographical landmark, ran through Bougainville's lush terrain, acting as both a natural barrier and tactical objective. In late April, the 9th Battalion had continued to push forward across the Huio River, a vital waterway that intersected with Japanese defenses. They faced some enemy resistance but managed to clear the Horinu-Rumiki Trail by the end of the month. This narrow, winding path had strategic importance, connecting various units and enabling supplies to move closer to the frontline. On May 3, the 9th Battalion was finally relieved by the 57th/60th Battalion, which, due to its relative inexperience, found progress challenging along the Commando Road a route named after the elite Australian commandos who often operated in this area. Their inexperience in facing seasoned Japanese troops led to slower advances in the crucial days that followed. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Commando Squadron had been conducting deep reconnaissance patrols towards the Hari River and along the Tiger Road, determined to discover the extent of Japanese defenses south of the Hongorai. The Tiger Road, notorious for its rugged conditions, was pivotal for troop movements in the region. On May 5, the 24th Battalion, now bolstered by a newly assigned tank squadron, resumed its advance with renewed determination. However, they were once again halted by fierce defenders who launched a strong yet costly counterattack the following morning. This desperate but valiant effort by the Japanese troops resulted in significant casualties and demonstrated their resolve to maintain control of the Hongorai line. Subsequently, the Japanese forces ultimately abandoned their positions along the Hongorai during the night. Finally, on May 7, the Australians reached the Hongorai River, marking a significant milestone in their campaign. At that moment, the 57th/60th Battalion was securing a crucial crossing over the Hongorai on the Commando Road, enabling further advances into enemy territory. With the next objective focused on the line stretching from the Hari River to Monoitu and Kapana, Brigadier Hammer's battalions shifted their tactics for the second and third weeks of May. They undertook deep patrols into Japanese-occupied territory, gathering vital intelligence while also seeking to harass the enemy and disrupt their operations. Additionally, the commandos maintained their patrols along the challenging Tiger Road and established a new patrol base further north at Monorei. This base would serve as a critical outpost for monitoring enemy movements and launching further operations. Meanwhile, the 58th/59th Battalion explored the rugged areas south of the Buin Road, successfully clearing the Aitara Mission. This mission played a crucial role in their broader strategies, as it prepared them to execute a wide flanking maneuver aimed at cutting the road east of the Hongorai, further encircling Japanese forces. To support the advancing Australian forces, New Zealand aircraft launched significant attacks on Japanese concentrations positioned along the Buin and Commando Roads. On May 17, the 57th/60th Battalion crossed the upper reaches of the Hongorai River, advancing across a wide front along the Commando Road to draw the enemy's attention to that area. On the eve of this move Hammer issued an order of the day in a characteristic style. He spoke of his "undying admiration" for and "extreme confidence" in his men and told them that the next few weeks might see the major defeat of the Japanese in south Bougainville. "Go to battle as you have done in the last month and no enemy can withstand you." In the subsequent days, they successfully secured territory up to the Torobiru River, creating pressure on the Japanese lines and disrupting their defensive operations. On May 20, following a powerful air and artillery bombardment, the 24th Battalion finally launched its long-anticipated assault across the Hongorai River. This marked a turning point as they occupied the strategically significant Egan's Ridge by May 22. Egan's Ridge offered an elevated position that overlooked the surrounding terrain, making it crucial for controlling movement in the vicinity. Meanwhile, the 58th/59th Battalion executed a stealthy wide flanking maneuver towards Mayberry's Crossing, positioning themselves strategically to disrupt Japanese supply lines and communication. On May 21, the Australians moved out once more to cut the Buin Road at Runai, an essential route that facilitated movement and supplies for the Japanese forces. In the following days, the remaining sections of this critical road were secured as the Japanese forces west of the Hari River were forced to retreat, effectively diminishing their operational capabilities in the region. As these operations unfolded, the 2/8th Commando Squadron established a new base on Morokaimoro, positioning themselves for further reconnaissance and engagements. They began patrolling towards Taitai and the Mivo River, both vital points of interest as the Australians sought to gather intelligence on enemy movements. In the meantime, the 57th/60th Battalion pressed on to capture the Oso Junction by May 27. However, they encountered harassment from night raiding parties and artillery fire, which highlighted the persistent threat of Japanese resistance in this area. On 2nd June the main advance was resumed, the 58th/59th moving forward without opposition through positions which had been "completely devastated by air, artillery and mortars". "Not one enemy was found alive or dead," wrote the battalion diarist, "although a strong smell of death pervaded the whole area." A prisoner taken later in the day said that the air strike had completely demoralised the defenders, and when they heard the tanks approaching they had fled. On the left the 57th/60th reached the Sunin River against slight opposition. On the 3rd and 4th the 58th/59th continued the advance, moving slowly because of the need to disarm an unprecedentedly large number of mines and booby-traps-more than 100 in three days-until they reached the Peperu River. Patrols moving stealthily forward to the Hari and across it found evidence of much confusion, many positions dug but unoccupied, and small groups of Japanese at large. It was decided to attack frontally towards the Hari next day. At the same time, the 57th/60th Battalion also reached the Sunin River, facing only slight opposition during their advance. On June 6, the 58th/59th Battalion launched an attack towards the Hari River, but despite their efforts, they only managed to gain about 500 yards against strong defensive positions held by the Japanese. The next three days proved challenging as the 58th/59th Battalion, supported by tanks, found their progress impeded by swampy terrain, a road littered with hidden mines, and intermittent shellfire threatening their advance. The combined obstacles of the natural environment and determined enemy resistance severely limited their ability to make significant gains. In light of the pressing circumstances, Brigadier Hammer made a pivotal decision to send the 58th/59th Battalion on a shallow outflanking march to the north. Their mission was clear: cut the Buin Road several miles east of the Hari River. At the same time, the 57th/60th Battalion was tasked with thrusting wide to the south, maneuvering around the Ogorata River to intercept the same road near Rusei. After four days of concentrated air and artillery bombardment designed to weaken enemy defenses, the 58th/59th Battalion commenced its operation on June 12. They sent two companies forward to secure a position along the road, located 2,000 yards east of the Hari. This forward position was critical for their strategy to disrupt Japanese supply lines. Two days later, on June 14, these forces continued their advance eastward toward the Ogorata River, while the remainder of the battalion engaged the enemy at the Hari ford, a crucial crossing point. Despite the fierce opposition, the ford was finally secured on June 15, following another extensive bombardment that significantly diminished the Japanese presence along the road west of the Ogorata. This success was instrumental in facilitating further operations in the area.  Concurrently, the 57th/60th Battalion had embarked on their mission on June 11, making slow but steady progress through the challenging, trackless bush. They ultimately found a path leading from Kingori to Rusei, where they began encountering Japanese resistance. Pushing through treacherous swampy terrain and dense bamboo thickets, the Australians reached the Buin Road at Rusei by June 15, successfully coordinating with patrols from the 58th/59th Battalion the following day. In addition to securing Rusei, a robust patrol from the 57th/60th Battalion set out along the northern flank to establish a patrol base north of Musaraka. This base detected a significant enemy presence behind them, leading to a critical reassessment of their positions. Consequently, in late June, the 24th Battalion was dispatched to take over the Taitai-Kingori-Katsuwa area, reinforcing the Australian foothold and securing vital routes in the region. Meanwhile, back to the south, the 57th/60th Battalion began to push eastward toward the Mobiai River on June 16. However, their advance quickly met strong opposition just 400 yards into enemy territory. Faced with determined resistance, the battalion executed a wide outflanking maneuver, a tactical shift that successfully forced the Japanese forces to withdraw by June 19, allowing the Australians to continue their advance. In the following days, the 57th/60th Battalion pressed steadily forward, ultimately encountering increased opposition near the Mobiai River on June 24. A heavy bombardment was launched in an attempt to dislodge the entrenched Japanese forces, but it proved ineffective. However, the next day, the Japanese troops had mysteriously withdrawn, allowing the Australians to secure a vital crossing over the river. Taking advantage of this opportunity, the 58th/59th Battalion moved in to occupy the newly attained Mobiai positions. Meanwhile, the 57th/60th and 24th Battalions advanced farther north, preparing for an outflanking maneuver aimed at Shishigatero, a critical tactical point lying to the northeast. In anticipation of an Australian offensive, General Kanda dispatched the 23rd Regiment to establish a defensive base near the Mivo ford. This strategic relocation was part of his preparations for the final defenses behind the Mivo River, as Japanese troops sought to hold their ground against the advancing Australians. By June 28, the 57th/60th and 24th Battalions reached their designated assembly areas, where they successfully repelled several Japanese counterattacks. The next morning, they began their advance southeast, shrouded in the loud thunder of artillery barrages that paved the way for their push. They reached the Buin Road at the confluence of the Ivana, Koopani, and Mivo Rivers, making significant headway. At the same time, the 58th/59th Battalion aimed to open the road for the 24th Battalion, positioned about 1,000 yards away. However, they encountered sharp resistance from Japanese forces defending their positions fiercely. Following this notable success, as Hammer's units faced and repelled various Japanese counterattacks at their new positions, General Bridgeford directed Brigadier Noel Simpson's 29th Brigade to the frontline to relieve the beleaguered 15th Brigade. Each incoming battalion was met with sharp clashes as they moved up, as Japanese forces sought to maintain their hold on strategic territory. Finally, on July 10, Hammer's units were relieved, a long-awaited reprieve after weeks of grueling combat. Despite the shift in command, Simpson's battalions began sending patrols forward in preparation for a crossing of the Mivo River. Unfortunately, due to the heavy resistance encountered and the onset of relentless rains that would continue throughout the month, this final offensive was never carried out. Instead, the troops were limited to vigorous patrolling activities during July and August, maintaining a presence but unable to launch significant offensives in the harsh conditions. Many of these patrols encountered fierce opposition, signaling that the enemy intended to mount a determined defense along the Mivo line. These patrols regularly captured crucial documents from Japanese soldiers ambushed along the tracks leading to their forward positions, allowing Australian forces to construct a clearer picture of the enemy's intentions and deployments. Among these daring reconnaissance missions was one conducted by a patrol from the 42nd Battalion, led by Lieutenant Oldfield. Tasked with scouting a potential crossing at the Mivo, Oldfield and four other soldiers discovered the river was in flood. Undeterred, they stripped off their gear, swam across the turbulent waters, and advanced 500 yards beyond the riverbank, without any weapons. The weight of the Australian artillery and mortar bombardments altered the enemy's tactics. Rather than holding fixed positions, the Japanese began to dig in less and instead employed a strategy of hit-and-run raids and ambushes executed by small groups of three to ten men. Before July 10 arrived, the relentless rain compelled a second postponement of the advance; the new date for the operation was set for July 24. However, the downpour continued to intensify. By July 10, even the patrols could not cross the flooded Mivo. "Torrential rain flooded the divisional area, reducing the Buin Road to a treacherous sea of mud and creating a series of islands between the various rivers." On July 17, conditions worsened further, with a dramatic eight inches of rain falling in just 36 hours. The new challenge was no longer about advancing troops but ensuring that the men were fed where they remained. Virtually all the bridges along the lines of communication were washed away, and all the rivers were flooded; the Mivo was now surging at a speed of twelve miles an hour. As a result, the forward units could only be supplied via air transport. It would take weeks to repair the damaged roads and bridges, leading to D-day being postponed until late August. As the southern operations unfolded, General Savige made a strategic decision to bring Brigadier Arnold Potts' 23rd Brigade from Munda and its surrounding islands to Torokina. Upon arrival, Savige immediately tasked the 27th Battalion with taking over the central sector beyond Pearl Ridge. The Australians quickly began bombing and launching attacks in the Berry's Hill-Hunt's Hill area, ultimately securing this crucial location on May 16. Following the seizure of Berry's Hill, the 27th Battalion conducted patrols toward key positions at Sisivie, Tokua, Base Point 3, and Wearne's Hill throughout late May. On June 3, they initiated an attack towards Tiernan's Spur, making significant progress before being relieved by the 7th Battalion. The 7th Battalion, upon taking over, adopted an aggressive posture, and on June 11, they attacked Tiernan's Spur, successfully securing the feature this time. Soon after, a combination of reconnaissance and air bombardment set the stage for an assault on Wearne's Hill on June 16. However, they encountered strong opposition and were unable to seize its crest until June 20. In parallel operations, a company captured Sisivie without encountering resistance on June 12. Another company was dispatched to establish a forward base in the Wakunai Valley, successfully creating observation posts that overlooked Inus Point and the large Numa Numa Plantation by June 21. After conducting extensive bombardments against remaining Japanese positions, the Australians finally secured the remainder of Wearne's Hill on June 24. Starting June 26, the 7th Battalion began probing towards Centre Hill, which they ultimately found abandoned on July 6. Meanwhile, on July 3, Tokua was occupied as a base for future operations probing north toward Ibu and Buritsiotorara. Artillery and aircraft continued to harass North Hill, which was finally captured on July 13. Just five days later, Cameron's Hill was also successfully attacked and secured. The 7th Battalion then pressed forward along the main track towards Charlie Creek and McInnes Hill, achieving their objectives by August 8 as the remaining Japanese forces were forced to retire to Numa Numa. Looking north, the 55th/53rd Battalion took over from the exhausted 26th Battalion in early April, following the fall of the Soraken Peninsula. Upon assuming command, Lieutenant Colonel Stevenson immediately directed the 55th/53rd to cross the Nagam River and launch an attack towards Pora Pora, a key strategic location in the region. The battalion pressed on along the main coastal track, but on April 13, they faced an unsuccessful assault against the enemy positioned at McKinnon's Ridge. Meanwhile, a company from the battalion moved through an inland route, encountering no resistance as they advanced to a position just two miles from Pora Pora. Recognizing the resolute enemy defenses along the main track, the Australians initiated a program of heavy artillery bombardment, complemented by flanking maneuvers designed to outmaneuver the entrenched defenders. This relentless strategy began to pay off, eventually forcing the Japanese to retreat on April 21. During this critical period, the unopposed company on the inland track continued to push forward until it was only one mile from Pora Pora. In the following four days, the 55th/53rd Battalion fought its way into the Pora Pora bottleneck, engaging in fierce combat that successfully expelled the Japanese forces by April 30. With this victory, the Australians were able to continue their advance northward, making rapid gains against a retreating enemy. On May 4, they captured the Ratsua jetty, a vital logistics point that facilitated further operations. Two columns of the 55th/53rd commenced a swift march towards Ruri Bay, while a company from the 26th Battalion successfully seized Torokori Island on May 6. Three days later, as they finally approached Ruri Bay, the Australians successfully repelled an enemy ambush. However, Brigadier Stevenson's orders were now to halt their advance at the Ratsua-Ruri Bay line and focus on active patrolling extending northward to Tarbut and Tarlena. Despite this directive, the situation became increasingly precarious. The Japanese, bolstered by four small provisional battalions of naval troops under Captain Kato Ekichi, grew aggressive beyond the established line. Daily patrol clashes erupted, with Australian positions and supply lines subjected to constant ambushes. Recognizing the need for reinforcements, the weary 55th/53rd Battalion was relieved by the 26th Battalion on May 21. In response, the 26th immediately dispatched two companies to thrust forward in the area south and east of Buoi Plantation. However, these units quickly encountered strong counterattacks, while patrols faced heavy resistance around Siara and Chindawon. As Stevenson's forces found themselves facing a fortified opponent stronger than anticipated, permission was granted to send two companies from the 31st/51st Battalion to take over the western sector on June 3. Despite this reinforcements, the Australians continued to struggle to make meaningful progress northward. After the 26th Battalion had been in the line for three hard weeks its diarist wrote that the campaign had become one of "holding a superior number of enemy by the aggressive action of a tired depleted battalion-companies were no more than half strength and had been in forward areas continuously for four months". The battalion's fighting strength on 3rd June was only 23 officers and 353 other ranks. The constant patrolling, the artillery fire and the raids on jeep trains on tracks well to the rear were wearing down the men's spirits. In response to the persistent challenges, a strategic decision was made to outmaneuver the Japanese by landing a reinforced company of the 31st/51st Battalion at Porton Plantation, aiming to approach the enemy from the western flank. During the early hours of June 8, the assault force successfully landed unopposed and swiftly established a perimetric defense reaching 150 yards inland. However, the surprised defenders quickly regrouped, unleashing a barrage of machine-gun fire that effectively thwarted the unloading of heavy weapons, reserve ammunition, and essential supplies. Although supporting artillery fire was effectively directed at the Japanese positions, the Australians soon found themselves pinned down as Captain Kato reinforced the defenses surrounding their perimeter. To complicate matters further, a convoy of Australian supplies and reinforcements attempting to reach the newly established perimeter was successfully repelled by the tenacious defenders during the night. The next morning, it was decided to withdraw the force late that evening. However, as the Australians prepared for their retreat, the Japanese launched a strong counterattack from three sides. The enemy attacked in relentless waves, and although they were met with devastating Australian fire, the pressure forced the company to pull back towards the beach. In the morning they launched what was evidently intended as a final blow, thrusting from three sides. Now estimated at over 400 they attacked in waves and were mowed down by the Australian fire. To confuse their enemy they shouted English phrases such as "Watch the right flank", "Throw it in the middle", "It's only me, Jack", and so on. The Australians pulled back towards the beach and at 1 p.m.  During the afternoon, three landing craft moved towards the beach under heavy enemy fire in an effort to embark the soldiers. Unfortunately, two of the crafts were overloaded and became stranded. One eventually drifted off with the tide during the evening; however, the other remained besieged by heavy fire throughout the night. On June 10, Australian forces continued their attempts to rescue the stranded men, launching efforts under the cover of a strong air attack. At dawn on June 10, there were 38 living men on board the besieged landing craft, commanded by Corporal Hall. Their meager arsenal included two Bren guns, five Owen submachine guns, and nine rifles. The remaining rations consisted of eight tins of fruit or vegetables, three or four tins of meat, and three tins of condensed milk. Corporal Hall devised a defensive plan to maximize their chances of survival. He removed the wooden shelves under the overlapping sides of the ALCA to create protective cover under the flaps for all the troops. The dismantled wireless set was discarded overboard to free up additional space. To assist with breathing during rising tides, each man was issued six-inch lengths of copper piping. A continuous watch was kept from the coxswain's enclosure to monitor Japanese movements and report any developments. The soldiers cleaned and oiled their weapons using lubricant sourced from the engines, ensuring that they were well-maintained and ready for use. A medical kit was placed in the capable hands of a member of the 19th Australian Field Ambulance, who diligently distributed morphine and dressings as needed. At 15:30 on June 10, a concerted effort to rescue the stranded survivors commenced. An intense and precise air attack targeted the enemy positions, but unfortunately, it failed to hit the pillbox from which most of the fire directed at the barge was originating. Bombers dropped inflated rubber rafts near the landing craft in an attempt to assist, but Japanese gunfire prevented any men from reaching these lifelines. Under the cover of an artillery smoke screen, a landing craft attempted to reach the shore. However, enemy fire wounded several crew members, including the coxswain, damaging the steering gear and causing the craft to circle out of control. Amidst this chaos, Corporal Hall attempted to silence the pillbox with a Bren gun, but his efforts were in vain. In a desperate bid to assist the aircraft in locating the target, he splashed bullets towards the pillbox, yet the attempt proved futile as the damaged landing craft was forced to withdraw. They successfully repelled several Japanese parties attempting to swim out to the immobilized craft during the night. Finally, in the early hours of June 11, the besieged Australians were rescued by three assault boats, managing to pull them from the critical situation. In this endeavor, the Australian forces suffered significant losses, with 23 men reported killed or missing and 106 wounded. Among these casualties, five killed and seven wounded belonged to the 42nd Landing Craft Company. Estimates suggest that the Japanese forces faced losses of approximately 147 confirmed dead, with an additional 50 likely killed. The infantry units suffered specifically dire consequences, with two officers killed and three wounded, these included both company commanders, leaving only Lieutenants Patterson and Reiter, two young veterans from the 6th Division, as the sole surviving leaders from six platoon commanders. Additionally, 14 other ranks were reported killed or missing, while 57 were wounded. Of those wounded, five were sent to the field ambulance suffering from exposure, and nine sustained cuts and bruises. The repulse of the Australian attempt to land near Porton on June 8, 9, and 10 significantly boosted Japanese morale. Observers reported that the landing occurred on a rough strip of beach, making it difficult for the enemy to negotiate the surrounding reefs. The high ground in the vicinity provided an excellent vantage point for the Japanese, allowing for optimal placement of automatic weapons. In response to the Australian advance, Captain Kato swiftly dispatched 150 troops from Chabai to reinforce the approximately 100 men already engaged in combat. These reinforcements succeeded in thwarting any further enemy landings, ultimately pushing the Australians back to the beach, from where their remaining forces were evacuated in haste. Kato estimated that around 250 Australians had landed, resulting in the loss of 60 killed and 100 wounded, alongside 26 Japanese fatalities. If the Japanese report regarding their own losses is accurate, it suggests that both sides engaged in this grim action sustained approximately equal losses. Moreover, during this battle, the reinforced 26th Battalion failed to exploit this diversionary attack, missing the opportunity to push against the stubborn resistance of Captain Kato's isolated posts. On June 20, Brigadier Potts' 23rd Brigade began taking over the northern sector, with orders to contain the Japanese forces in the Bonis Peninsula and patrol towards Buka Passage. This relief operation was completed by the end of the month. However, the 8th and 27th Battalions continued to face harassment from Kato's deep patrols throughout July. Ultimately, the overextended 27th Battalion on the right flank was withdrawn on July 22 to allow the 8th Battalion to successfully attack and capture Commo Ridge the following day. On July 24, the 8th Battalion launched an unsuccessful attack on Part Ridge. However, this heavy assault shook the defenders, paving the way for the Australians to capture the ridge against light opposition on August 5. This marked the last major action of the Bougainville Campaign. In total, Savige's 2nd Corps endured losses of 516 Australians killed and 1,572 wounded. It is estimated that approximately 8,500 Japanese soldiers were killed by Australian forces and their native allies, while an additional 9,800 succumbed to illness during the Australian period on Bougainville. By the end of the campaign, only 23,571 men remained out of about 65,000 who had been on the island when the Americans launched their attack in November 1943. Now, attention turned westward to Balikpapan, where General Milford's 7th Australian Division successfully landed on July 1. They secured an important perimeter extending through Santosa Hill, Parramatta, Mount Malang, and Stalkudo. The battle resumed the following day, with the 2/14th Battalion advancing along the Vasey Highway to seize the Sepinggang airstrip unopposed. Meanwhile, the 2/3rd Commando Squadron took over the area northeast of Stalkudo, though they made little progress toward the Lady Schofield feature due to heavy enemy fire. The 2/27th Battalion strengthened and extended its hold on the high ground northwest of Stalkudo. The 2/16th Battalion pressed northward, successfully capturing Resort, Owen, and Oxley without sustaining any losses. The 2/12th Battalion took Potts and consolidated its position on Portee. The 2/10th Battalion conducted mopping-up operations in the secured areas, patrolling vigorously forward, and also seized Mount Sepuluh. Lastly, the 2/9th Battalion, supported by a troop of tanks, cleared Kandasan town along the coast as far as Signal Hill. By the end of the day, Brigadier Eather's 25th Brigade had landed to take over the central portions of the front, tasked with pushing inland astride the Milford Highway. On July 3, one company of the 2/10th Battalion advanced through the port, while another cleared the Tank Plateau, and a third focused on the lower ground between the plateau and Parramatta. Concurrently, the 2/9th Battalion, supported by its troop of tanks, successfully took the Santosa barracks, which they had bypassed the previous day. The division now held a bridgehead approximately five miles wide and one mile deep, successfully securing one of the two airstrips. On July 3, light aircraft began operating from this newly established base. However, unloading heavy equipment and stores proved to be a challenging task, causing considerable anxiety among the troops. A swell made it difficult to transfer loads to Landing Craft Tank (LCTs) and small craft, while it was impossible to run the Landing Ship Tank (LSTs) directly onto the beach. By 06:00 on July 3, progress was evident, with 985 vehicles and 1,932 tons of various equipment and stores successfully landed, alongside 16,950 men ashore. Later that morning, an LST began unloading at a pontoon jetty constructed on Green Beach by an American naval construction battalion. The captured port was a scene of devastation, characterized by wrecked workshops and warehouses, leaving little more than twisted, rusty steel and piles of rubble where houses once stood. The seven wharves designed for ocean-going vessels had all been burned, rendering them unusable. Among the debris, one dump of scrap iron collected by the Japanese from the ruins measured 520 yards long, with another scrap pile opposite it stretching about 150 yards. As unloading operations continued on the main beaches, the 2/14th Battalion began moving towards the Manggar airstrip but found themselves halted at Batakan Kechil. The 2/27th Battalion took over the defense of the Sepinggang strip, and the 2/3rd Commando Squadron discovered the Lady Schofield feature abandoned, allowing their patrols to press on more than a mile across the high ground overlooking the Sepinggang River. Meanwhile, the 2/33rd Battalion encountered heavy opposition in the hills above Chilton Road but managed to capture Opus, Operator, and Oxygen, as well as a height to the northeast named Orange. The 2/31st Battalion advanced along Milford Highway, facing increasing opposition, but they rapidly secured the junction with Chilton Road. However, they were unable to capture the strong enemy defenses at Nobody and Nurse. The 2/12th Battalion began a march towards Pandansari but had to assault Nail to eliminate the threat of enemy harassing fire. The following day, while the 2/33rd Battalion occupied Letter and Lewis, the 2/31st found Nobody and Nurse abandoned, allowing them to easily secure these features. One company also took control of Nail and began probing towards Lodge. At the same time, the 2/14th Battalion resumed its advance towards Manggar. They successfully crossed the river and pushed 1,300 yards across the airstrip without facing any opposition. However, after midday, heavy Japanese fire unexpectedly swept across the airfield, resulting in the deaths of several officers at the control tower. Despite this setback, and aided by the fire from destroyer Eaton, the Australians pressed on and ultimately secured Manggar and its airfield. By the end of the day, General Milford had successfully pushed the enemy out of Balikpapan and further secured the Sepinggang and Manggar strips. However, it became clear that Admiral Kamada was attempting to withdraw the remnants of his force to the Batuchampar area, aiming to delay any advance along the Milford Highway for as long as possible. The 454th Independent Battalion continued to hold the commanding terrain north of Manggar, and on July 5, its defenses came under intense naval, air, and artillery bombardment, which initially failed to silence the Japanese guns. Meanwhile, Brigadier Eather pressed his advance north in the center. The 2/25th Battalion took control of the positions at Nurse and Nail, while the 2/33rd pressed on against dwindling opposition to capture Mackay, Marshall, Mutual, and Margin. The 2/31st Battalion moved forward to seize Letter and Lewis, followed by the capture of Laverton and Liverpool. Recognizing the necessity of securing the western side of Balikpapan Bay to facilitate port operations, Milford ordered Brigadier Chilton's 18th Brigade to land the reinforced 2/9th Battalion at Penadjam. Following a naval and artillery bombardment, the landing was executed unopposed during the afternoon of July 5, with patrols of the 2/9th immediately probing north and south to secure the perimeter. The following day, a patrol moved south toward Nanang village and onward to the Sesumpu River, while other units explored the area towards the Riko River and Separi. On July 6, the 2/33rd Battalion successfully attacked and captured Metal and Muffle, but they were ultimately repelled from Judge. Meanwhile, the 2/25th pressed onward, taking control of Liverpool and occupying Huon. Looking southeast, the 2/14th Battalion began to probe enemy positions on this day. A strong patrol successfully captured Waites' Knoll but had to repel a series of strong counterattacks during the night, while another patrol was forced back along Vasey Highway. Over the next few days, the Australians continued to engage, probing and bombarding the commanding enemy positions. Ultimately, the 2/14th launched an attack and captured the Frost and Brown features on July 9, effectively eliminating the enemy threat in that area. Meanwhile, the 2/16th Battalion and the 2/5th Commando Squadron attacked an enemy concentration at Gate on July 6 and secured the position two days later, further solidifying their hold on Grand by July 9. To the northwest, on July 7, the 2/25th Battalion moved to Cult and then attempted an assault on Jam but was repelled by fierce defenders. The following day, while Jam underwent probing and bombardment, the 2/33rd Battalion discovered Justice abandoned after heavy shelling and pressed on toward Joint and Judge. Concurrently, Brigadier Eather had dispatched the 2/6th Commando Squadron into the hills overlooking the Sumber River. They successfully occupied Job on July 8 and seized Freight the following day. By July 9, after a concentrated artillery barrage, Jam, Joint, and Judge finally fell as the 25th Brigade secured the first stretch of the Milford Highway to Batuchampar. The 2/31st Battalion then advanced to a road bend due north of Junior, where they encountered an ambush by Japanese raiders. Meanwhile, a company of the 2/9th Battalion landed unopposed at Djinabora on the afternoon of July 8, and on the following day, a patrol base was established at Teloktebang. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. General Hammer launched a fierce campaign across Bougainville, battling entrenched Japanese troops, they secured the strategic Soraken Peninsula and advanced toward the vital Hongorai River. By July, they had reached the Hari River, significantly weakening Japanese defenses. However, relentless rain hindered further operations.

The story of work is a story of design and in this conversation between Julia Hobsbawm, Founder and CEO of Workathon and Ryan Anderson, Vice President of Global Research and Planning at design powerhouse Miller Knoll they cover a century of design's influence in the workplace, declaring an unofficial Movement of contemporary Changemakers just as influential in the story of work today as Herman Miller and Hans and Florence Knoll were did in the twentieth century.Julia and Ryan explore how place shapes innovation and work relations and the importance of collectives for creativity. From his grandfather's job making furniture to the underlying values of social good, Ryan Anderson's own story of work is told and tells of a passion for how we live and work today.The Nowhere Office is a Fully Connected production. Music is by Julian Brezon. Discover more at https:workathon.io. and https://www.millerknoll.com/

Knoll, Christiane www.deutschlandfunk.de, Forschung aktuell

From a dirt road in rural Alabama to leading global teams at Herman Miller, Knoll, and Hightower, Monique Lecomte's journey is a masterclass in resilience, adaptability, and authentic leadership. In this episode, Monique joins host Gregg-Brooke Koleno to explore what it means to be an "expert generalist," how to create psychologically safe spaces in the workplace, and why true leadership is about building trust—not titles. Monique shares how raising her younger brother at 27 shaped her leadership style, the impact of long-term relationship building over transactional communication, and the power of showing up as your authentic self. Her insights are both deeply personal and widely applicable to anyone seeking to influence with purpose and compassion.

Alex Lloyd interviews World War II veterans Frederick and Marjorie Logan. Life on the Line tracks down Australian military veterans and records their stories. Frederick and Marjorie Logan are both veterans of World War II. Fred served in an artillery regiment and fought against the Japanese in the Battle of Slater's Knoll, in Bougainville, 1945. After the war, he served in the NSW Police Force for over 3 decades. His wife, Marjorie, served in the Australian Women's Army Service, driving ambulances for soldiers and Australian Prisoners of War returning from overseas. Today, Fred is 100 years old and Marjorie is 98. Alex Lloyd spoke with them both, on the date of their 75th wedding anniversary, in their nursing home in Queensland. The episode referenced at the end of the podcast is #127 Reg Chard (also a video podcast), as well as the FOR SCHOOL AND COUNTRY video documentary miniseries and BARNEY GREATREX book. To see photos related to today's interview, visit our website - www.lifeonthelinepodcast.com - or follow us on social media: @lifeonthelinepodcast on Facebook and Instagram, @LOTLpod on Twitter and 'Thistle Productions' on LinkedIn.

Last time we spoke about the Liberation of Mindanao. In the spring of 1945, as the battle for Okinawa intensified, American forces relentlessly confronted entrenched Japanese troops. General Buckner's 10th Army faced fierce resistance amidst harsh weather and dwindling supplies. Despite these challenges, they captured the strategic Shuri Castle, marking a critical turning point as Japanese troops retreated. Simultaneously, the liberation of Mindanao was underway. American troops, under General Eichelberger, rapidly advanced, overcoming fortified Japanese defenses in mountainous terrain. With the 24th Division securing key locations like Digos and Davao, the 31st Division pushed northward against General Morozumi's forces. Despite stubborn resistance, American forces displayed tenacity and courage, leading to significant victories. By May 20, the Americans approached Malaybalay, where remnants of the 30th Field Artillery Regiment held their ground. As Japanese troops attempted to regroup, they faced relentless assaults from the advancing American divisions. Throughout the campaign, the Americans endured heavy casualties, but their determination led to more than 10,000 Japanese losses. This episode is the North Borneo Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  As we continue our story, by June 9, General Buckner's forces had pushed through to the enemy's main defensive line on the Kiyamu Peninsula. It was there that General Ushijima was preparing to make his final stand. Meanwhile, General Shepherd's 6th Marine Division landed on the Oroku Peninsula, determined to dismantle a stubborn pocket held by Admiral Ota's naval units. On June 10, the pace of the assault quickened dramatically. Colonel Shapley's 4th Marines broke through enemy defenses, capturing the strategic Hills 58 and 55(2). At the same time, Colonel Roberts' 22nd Marines secured Hills 28 and 55(1). Although Colonel Whaling's 29th Marines made only limited progress, they effectively identified the last significant pocket of resistance in the high ground west of Oroku village. Looking south, General Del Valle's 1st Marine Division also reignited its offensive. Colonel Snedeker's 7th Marines successfully advanced into Itoman and Tera, while Colonel Mason's 1st Marines, supported by tanks, cleared the southern slopes of the key ridge between Tera and Yuza, capturing Yuza Hill in the process. To the east, General Bradley's 96th Division launched a renewed attack, bolstered by artillery and tank support. Colonel May's 383rd Regiment advanced approximately 700 yards toward the town of Yuza. Meanwhile, Colonel Halloran's 381st Regiment pushed into Yunagusuku and Tomui. However, they faced fierce resistance, quickly encountering heavy machine-gun fire originating from the heights of Yaeju Dake, which halted their advance. Meanwhile, General Arnold's 7th Division continued its relentless push toward Nakaza, employing the full might of their tanks and artillery. Colonel Finn's 32nd Regiment steadily advanced onto the eastern slopes of Hill 95, pressing toward Hanagusuku. At the same time, Colonel Pachler's 17th Regiment fought to solidify its precarious position on the southeast end of Yaeju Dake. Back at sea, a kamikaze attack tragically sank the destroyer William D. Porter. That same day, Admiral McCain's Task Force 38 unleashed a barrage of bombs and artillery on Minami Daito Island before retreating to Leyte-Samar after 89 consecutive days off the coast of Okinawa. This marked the conclusion of their role in Operation Iceberg. The following day, the sustained pressure from Arnold's offensive began to fracture General Suzuki's 44th Independent Mixed Brigade on both flanks.Seas of flame engulfed Hill 95 on 11 June as 1/32 slowly advanced toward the crest of the enemy position behind the jets of armored flame throwers. Flame fuel was pumped and sprayed from hoses over portions of the ridge inaccessible to tanks and then ignited. Infantrymen moved among the still hot and smoking rocks and drove back the surviving defenders. That night the battalion dug in just short of the Hill 95 peak. Although little forward progress was made by 2/32 or the 17th Infantry on 11 June, the enemy position was considerably weakened. Intensive fire from supporting weapons was concentrated against the slopes of Yaeju Dake, and strong patrols cleaned out enemy groups that held positions near the 7th Division front lines. The 32nd Regiment achieved a significant victory by capturing the peak of Hill 95, while the 17th Regiment struggled to make further headway To the west, advances in the 96th Division zone were minimal as Bradley's regiments focused on consolidating their newly-won positions amidst intense enemy fire. Simultaneously, at Yuza Hill, fierce counterattacks were thwarted, and Mason's 2nd Battalion accomplished the critical capture of Hill 69, just west of Ozato, despite heavy machine-gun fire coming from Yuza Dake. Further east, ahead of the 7th Marines, some 800 yards from the southern fringes of the two settlements, lay "the scene of the most frantic, bewildering, and costly close-in battle on the southern tip of Okinawa"Kunishi Ridge. This precipitous coral escarpment constituted the western-most anchor of the last heavily defended line on Okinawa. The ridge contained innumerable caves, emplacements, and tombs on both the forward and reverse slopes. The intervening area between this formidable fortress and the lines of the 7th Marines was a broad valley of grassy fields and rice paddies which offered no protection to advancing infantry. The supporting tanks were restricted to two approaches into the position: a road across the valley which cut through the center of the ridge and another along the coast line. Both of these routes were covered by anti-tank guns. Shortly after noon patrols from the 1st and 2nd Battalions moved out with armored support to probe the Japanese defenses. Intense frontal fire from Kunishi Ridge, enfilade fire from the enemy on Hill 69 opposing the attack of 2/1, and artillery concentrations directed at the tanks forced a withdrawal at 14:47. Because of the complete fire coverage of the open valley enjoyed by the Japanese, both from the heights and slopes of the ridge itself and from the Yuza Dake area, it was apparent that a daylight assault of the position would be a costly affair. Consequently, after Colonel Snedeker had made a personal reconnaissance of the objective from a light liaison plane, it was determined to attack at night. The commanding officers of the assault battalions were oriented on the general plan during the afternoon. The central road and a line of telephone poles was designated as the boundary between battalions upon which the assault units would guide. The scheme of maneuver contemplated a penetration of the ridge where the road passed through it, followed by an expansion of the initial foothold to the right and left flanks to secure the remainder of the objective in the regimental zone of action. Normal artillery would be placed alternately on Kunishi Ridge and Mezado Ridge (500-600 yards southwest of Kunishi) until H-Hour and thereafter on the latter. On June 11, General Shepherd launched a concerted attack. The 22nd Marines successfully secured the Tomigusuki area and Hill 53, while the 29th Marines faced stiff opposition, making only limited gains against the heavily fortified hills west of Oroku. Meanwhile, the 4th Marines worked to strengthen their line, completing the encirclement of Ota's naval forces. Nevertheless, the ramparts of the Oroku fortress were cracking, and Admiral Ota released his last dispatch to General Ushijima: “Enemy tank groups are now attacking our cave headquarters. The Naval Base Force is dying gloriously at this moment… We are grateful for your past kindnesses and pray for the success of the Army.” During the night, artillery units successfully targeted and either killed or dispersed a group of Japanese troops attempting to cross the Kokuba River. Meanwhile, 51 infiltrators were eliminated as they tried to breach the lines held by the 22nd Marines. The following day, the 4th and 29th Marines intensified their efforts to compress the enemy pocket west of Tomigusuki, breaking through to seize Easy Hill while the 22nd Marines consolidated their positions. The capture of this key terrain feature forced the enemy into the alluvial flats along the coast between Oroku and Hill 53. "In the late afternoon enemy troops began displaying flags of surrender. Language officers equipped with loud speaker systems were dispatched to the front line areas to assist in the surrender of those Japs who desired to. The attempt was partially successful, 86 enemy soldiers voluntarily laid down their arms." For several days General Buckner had been sending messages to the Japanese commander by radio broadcast and air drops pointing out the hopelessness of the enemy situation in an attempt to persuade General Ushijima to surrender. During the afternoon of 11 June, Tenth Army representatives were conducted to the 2d Battalion OP overlooking Itoman to await any enemy party that might desire to negotiate. At 1700 all fire was suspended in the 7th Marines' area pending the doubtful appearance of a white flag. About 15 Japanese wearing white headgear appeared in the 1/7 zone in front of Company A at 1740, but dispersed when hailed. Six of the enemy surrendered to Company C at 1802, but the situation returned to normal two minutes later when hostile mortar fire fell on the captors' position. Final orders for the resumption of the attack were issued by Colonel Snedeker about 2000 setting H-Hour at 0330, 12 June. Both 1/7 and 2/7 were to make the assault with one company each, and at 0225 Company C moved out to establish contact with Company F on the line of departure. The attack was launched on schedule at 0330 and at 0500 Companies B and G moved out in support of the assault companies. Concurrently, Company F reached the objective at a point 500 yards north of Mezado village, as Company C came up on its left to extend the line eastward. The enemy was completely surprised and several small groups were wiped out by Company C while they were engaged in preparing breakfast. At the same time, the 1st Battalion extended the line eastward toward Kunishi. However, the Japanese quickly regrouped, pinning down the attackers for the rest of the day, though the Marines managed to reinforce and consolidate their hard-won gains. By midnight the positions there could be considered reasonably secure. But as General del Valle put it, "The situation was one of those tactical oddities of this peculiar warfare. We were on the ridge. The Japs were in it, both on the forward and reverse slopes." Elsewhere, the 1st Marines focused on mopping up Hill 69, dispatching patrols south through Ozato and maintaining their defenses on Yazu Hill. To the east, another pre-dawn attack initiated by the 17th Regiment caught the defenders off guard.  Colonel Pachler had compelling reasons for favoring a night operation. The defenders held a significant advantage in observation, which had posed serious challenges when the 3rd Battalion of the 17th Infantry seized the southeast end of the escarpment. The coral wall of the escarpment was particularly high at this end, and the narrow routes leading to the high ground were easily controlled by Japanese fire. After days of holding positions at the base of the 170-foot cliff, the troops had grown familiar with the terrain and, as their commander, Major Maynard Weaver, noted, they were eager to reach the top and finally see something new. The night attack was primarily planned for the 1st Battalion, but Colonel Pachler decided to coordinate a move to expand the territory held by the 3rd Battalion as well. The final plan involved three assault companies: Company A would occupy a cluster of coral about a hundred yards beyond the edge of the escarpment, near the boundary between the 7th and 96th Divisions. Company B aimed for a similar objective located about 200 yards to the southeast, while Company L was assigned to capture a small hill situated between the 1st Battalion's targets and the positions held by the 3rd Battalion since June 11. Each company was given a separate route: Company A's path led straight up the cliff's face, Company B needed to head south to reach a break in the escarpment before turning right toward its goal, and Company L had an accessible objective near the edge of the escarpment. Movement was set to begin at 0400 on June 12. Since the attack relied on stealth, no artillery preparation was planned. However, two battalions of 105-mm artillery, one battery of 155-mm howitzers, and an 8-inch howitzer battalion were scheduled to deliver heavy harassing fire during the night. Additionally, 21 batteries registered their fire on the afternoon of June 11 and were ready to provide protective artillery support if needed once the objectives were reached. For added firepower, a section of heavy machine guns was assigned to each assault company. Colonel Pachler meticulously planned the attack, ensuring that every soldier involved understood the details of the operation. Reconnaissance patrols had scouted the trails leading to the high ground, and demolition teams had already prepared known cave positions at the cliff's face with satchel charges. Despite thorough preparations, there was a collective apprehension about potential confusion caused by the unknown conditions of darkness. This anxiety was amplified at 2000 on the night of June 11 when the 7th Division G-2 Section intercepted an enemy radio message indicating, "Prepare to support the attack at 2300." Soon after, another intercepted message stated, "If there are any volunteers for the suicide penetration, report them before the contact which is to be made one hour from now." Meanwhile, from dusk until almost 2300, the Japanese unleashed a heavy artillery barrage, leading front-line troops to anticipate a counterattack. That counterattack did come, aimed at the 1st Battalion of the 32nd Infantry, which had reached the summit of Hill 95 earlier that day, as well as against the 96th Division. However, there was no enemy activity observed in the 17th Infantry's sector. As night illumination and harassing fire ceased shortly before 0400, the attack proceeded according to plan. The companies moved out in single file. Remarkably, a heavy fog settled over southern Okinawa, creating the perfect conditions for concealment while allowing the troops to follow their paths without confusion. On the high ground, Company A encountered a few civilians wandering about, while the leading platoon of Company B unexpectedly came across three Japanese soldiers as they reached the shelf of the escarpment. The Americans chose to ignore them and continued silently on their way, with the enemy surprisingly not opening fire. By 0530, just minutes after dawn, Companies A and B were in position without firing a single shot. Company L also successfully reached its objective, and eager to capitalize on the fog and absence of enemy fire, its commander sent a support platoon to a small hill fifty yards beyond. This objective was secured quickly, but not without incident; two enemy soldiers were killed in the process. The platoon leader reported their progress but quickly called for mortar fire as about fifty Japanese troops approached in a column. The Americans opened fire with rifles and BARs, disrupting the formation and resulting in thirty-seven enemy soldiers killed, while the rest managed to escape. The men of the 1st Battalion celebrated the success of the night attack. Shortly after Company A took position, four enemy soldiers stumbled into view and were swiftly eliminated. A few moments later, another four followed suit, meeting the same fate. Company B remained undisturbed until around 0530 when Japanese soldiers attempted to emerge from several caves within the company's area. Although the cave entrances were heavily reinforced with concrete and couldn't be sealed with demolition charges, the Marines guarded the openings and shot at the Japanese as they appeared. Not long after daylight, Company C began clearing the caves at the base of the escarpment, eventually regrouping with the rest of the battalion on the high ground. By 0800, the situation had stabilized, and the 17th Infantry held strong positions on Yaeju Dake. During the night, the Japanese had withdrawn their front-line troops from Yaeju Dake to escape the punishing artillery fire, intending to reoccupy it before the anticipated 0700 attack. Fifteen hours after the 32nd Infantry fought their way to the top of Hill 95, the 17th Infantry had executed a masterful night attack to seize their portion of Yaeju Dake. Throughout the day, the 2nd Battalion of the 17th Infantry relieved Companies I and K, and with Company L attached and supported by medium and flame tanks, continued the offensive. The 1st Battalion maintained its position, firing at enemy soldiers who were slow to realize that their defensive terrain had been lost. Company B alone accounted for sixty-three Japanese soldiers killed throughout the day. Taking advantage of this breakthrough, the 381st Regiment advanced to occupy the slopes of Yaeju Dake, while the 383rd extended the division front and secured Yuza. As the situation unfolded, Japanese troops maintained control over Big Apple Peak, which towered about sixty feet above the surrounding plateau. However, by the evening of June 12, the 7th and 96th Divisions had succeeded in forcing the reconstituted 44th Independent Mixed Brigade from the southeastern end of the enemy's line. General Ushijima acted swiftly, given the limitations imposed by his damaged communication system and the chaos among his front-line units. With his artillery nearly silenced by enemy bombardments and his supplies dwindling faster than his manpower, Ushijima's only hope lay in sending more troops into the relentless shellfire and flames unleashed by American forces sweeping across the frontline. His urgent order read: “The enemy in the 44th IMB sector has finally penetrated our main line of resistance. The plan of the 44th IMB is to annihilate, with its main strength, the enemy penetrating the Yaeju-Dake sector. The Army will undertake to reoccupy and hold its Main Line of Resistance to the death. The 62nd Division will place two selected infantry battalions under the command of the CG, 44th IMB.” Unfortunately, the 64th Brigade, the part of the 62nd Division that had shifted from Shuri to reserve positions near Makabe, didn't receive this order until late on June 13, a full thirty hours after it became critical. This piecemeal commitment of reserve troops proved to be grossly inadequate. By June 13, the 44th Brigade was teetering on the brink of destruction. When reinforcements finally arrived, they found the remnants of the 44th Brigade overwhelmed and absorbed into the reinforcing battalions, with still not enough men to hold the line. In a last-ditch effort, the enemy committed the main strength of the 62nd Division, his final reserve, with a desperate plea for cooperation and orders to "reoccupy and secure the Main Line of Resistance." However, by the time the 62nd Division moved onto the line, they ran headlong into General Hodge's forces, who were advancing southward across the coral-studded plateau. The Americans pressed forward, shielded by the fire of machine guns and tanks, advancing over the bodies of Japanese defenders who had fought fiercely to hold their last stronghold "to the death." On June 13, General Arnold resumed his assault against the rapidly disintegrating 44th Independent Mixed Brigade. The 32nd Regiment successfully secured the Hill 95-Hanagusuku area, while the 17th Regiment expanded its control over the escarpment's summit. To the west, May's 3rd Battalion and Halloran's 2nd Battalion struggled to capture the top of the escarpment despite repeated attempts. However, they significantly diminished the defenders' strength with a relentless volume of covering fire. At the same time, May's 1st Battalion advanced through Yuza and swept southward to successfully secure Ozato. Meanwhile, General Del Valle prepared to commit the 1st Marines to the fight on Kunishi Ridge, as the isolated 7th Marines continued to be pinned down by heavy Japanese fire, relying on tanks for supplies and evacuation. Further north, the 29th Marines launched an attack southeast to eliminate the enemy pocket, while Shapley's 3rd Battalion moved swiftly toward the beach, progressively chasing the demoralized Japanese forces from the thick brush and marshy terrain along the waterfront. As they reached the sea wall, the assault turned into a rout. Some of the enemy threw down their arms and fled at the Marines' approach. Large numbers surrendered; but some fought back with hand grenades in desperate, individual last ditch stands, while many more used grenades to destroy themselves in despair. The sea wall was reached at noon, and the remainder of the day was spent running to earth small groups hiding in the cane fields and rice paddies. In the late afternoon General Shepherd notified General Geiger that all organized resistance on Oroku had ceased. In the early hours of June 14, Mason's 2nd Battalion advanced toward Kunishi Ridge, tenaciously fighting their way to positions east of the 7th Marines, which remained isolated. Simultaneously, Shepherd's reinforced Reconnaissance Company successfully landed on Senaga Island, completing the occupation of the Oroku Peninsula. Looking south once again, May's 1st Battalion completed the cleanup in Ozato but soon had to withdraw from its vulnerable position, while the rest of the 383rd Regiment pressed forward to the edge of the escarpment west of Yaeju Dake. To the east, despite heavy mortar and machine-gun fire, the 381st Regiment maintained constant pressure on the northern face of Yaeju Dake, finally reaching the top of the escarpment by nightfall. Their success allowed them to link up with the 7th Division, which dealt a crushing blow to the 13th Independent Battalion, advancing approximately 300 yards across the front. After a night of disorganized counterattacks and infiltration attempts, the 7th Division launched an assault toward Hills 115 and 153, advancing about 1,200 yards and reaching the outer slopes of the hill positions. To the west, the 381st Regiment and May's 3rd Battalion successfully secured the escarpment between Yuza and Yaeju Dake, although the remainder of the 383rd struggled to move forward due to heavy fire from Yuza Dake. On Kunishi Ridge, the pressure from the Japanese remained relentless, restricting the 7th Marines to only minor local gains. However, Mason's 2nd Battalion managed to inch its way along the ridge, successfully extending the line by about 200 yards to the east. Behind them, Colonel Griebel's 5th Marines began to relieve the weary 1st Marines, with Griebel's 2nd Battalion finally moving forward during the night to support Mason's isolated 2nd Battalion. On June 16, after an intense bombardment of artillery, mortars, and rockets, the 7th Marines finally broke through. Snedeker's 1st Battalion advanced along the northern slope of Kunishi Ridge, while the 2nd Battalion extended the line into the initial high ground of the Mezado hill mass. Concurrently, Griebel's 2nd Battalion advanced, making slow but steady progress until they secured a coral peak on the ridge that commanded their position. To the east, the 62nd Division, attempting to move from its reserve locations southwest of Makabe to support the faltering Japanese lines, faced devastating fire from artillery, ship guns, and aerial bombardments of rockets and napalm. Seizing the opportunity created by the relentless bombardment of enemy rear areas, Bradley launched his battalions through the Yuza Dake perimeter. Colonel Dill's 382nd Regiment pushed through the 383rd and advanced toward Ozato, aiming to gain control of the high ground southwest of Yuza, while May's 3rd Battalion successfully captured Yuza Dake. Additionally, the 381st Regiment gained approximately 600 yards along its front, reaching the saddle between Yuza Dake and Hill 153. Meanwhile, the 17th Regiment pressed onto the forward slopes of Hill 153, and the 32nd Regiment, driving down the coast, took Hill 115, effectively eliminating the 15th Independent Mixed Regiment. Back at sea, despite a significant depletion of Japanese air strength, a kamikaze attack succeeded in sinking the destroyer Twiggs.  But now, it's time to leave Okinawa and turn our attention to Borneo, where we continue covering the Australian offensive. As we last noted, by May 6, Brigadier Whitehead's 26th Australian Brigade had successfully landed on Tarakan, pushing the Japanese garrison into the island's rugged interior. By the evening of 6th May fairly copious information obtained from prisoners and Indonesians and from captured documents indicated that the enemy had about 390 naval troops in the Mount Api area, about 400 troops and civilians in the Fukukaku headquarters area (embracing Hills 105 and 102), 200 from Sesanip along Snags Track to Otway, 300 on Otway and in District VI, 300 in the Amal River area and 60 at Cape Juata. Having lost the airfield and the water-purifying plant and hospitals "the enemy at this time was displaying a decided disinclination to hold ground. In particular he was shunning any ground which could be subjected to heavy bombing, shelling, or attack by tanks; or against which large-scale attacks could be launched by our troops"; and he was directing his operations to delaying the attackers, particularly with mines, booby-traps, suicide raids, and isolated parties fighting to the death in tunnels and dugouts. The 4th Company of Tokoi Force (IJA) plus the 1st Company of the 2nd Naval Guard Force were on Hill 105, Margy and Janet; the 1st Company of Tokoi Force, and other troops were on Hill 102. In the north was a composite group. To secure the recently captured airfield from potential counterattacks, raids, or indirect fire, Brigadier Whitehead decided to deploy the 2/48th Battalion to gain the high ground north of the town, reaching up to Snags Track. The 2/4th Commando Squadron was tasked with advancing along Snags Track toward the Sesanip oilfields, while the 2/3rd Pioneers were assigned to sweep the high ground east of the town and move along John's Track to the mouth of the Ama River. Meanwhile, the Dutch company was to clear the unoccupied Cape Batu peninsula, a task that proved surprisingly straightforward. In the Mount Api area, however, the 2/23rd Battalion faced fierce resistance, particularly at Tiger and along Crazy Ridge, resulting in minimal progress until they were relieved by the 2/24th Battalion on May 9. Further to the right, the 2/48th Battalion seized Otway without opposition, and the commandos successfully cleared Snags Track up to Haigh's by May 8, though tanks could not advance any further. The pioneers, on the other hand, encountered heavy resistance along John's Track, which they couldn't overcome until May 9. That day, a long-distance patrol from the 2/24th Battalion also succeeded in driving the Japanese out of the Juata oilfields after a skirmish. On May 10, while the 2/48th and the commandos patrolled aggressively forward, the pioneers began their assault on the heavily defended Helen feature, which would successfully repel repeated Australian attacks for the next five days. Simultaneously, the 2/24th faced strong resistance in the Mount Api area but tenaciously pushed forward to Hill 105 on May 11, capturing Tiger the following night. They conducted patrols that probed about 1,000 yards southeast, cutting Snags Track at several points. On May 12, the 2/48th set out to cut King's Track and clear the heights from Sykes to Butch. The next morning, they successfully attacked and captured the knoll north of Snags Track. Meanwhile, following a highly effective air bombardment, the key Helen feature was found abandoned on May 15. This allowed the pioneers to clear John's Track and reach the coast at the mouth of the Amal River. Concurrently, the commandos secured the Agnes feature, followed by the 2/24th Battalion's capture of Elbow on May 16. The remaining positions on Hill 105 were then subjected to intensive bombing and bombardment, leading to an Australian assault on May 19. They finally captured the feature the following day. In the meantime, the 2/48th Battalion moved to Agnes to attack the Freda feature on May 14.  It was now evident that if the Freda hill was to be taken the attack must have heavier support. Therefore, on 22nd May, 12 Liberators and 12 Lightnings were sent out with bombs and napalm, but the cloud was so low that some of the heavy bombers did not find the objective. Then the artillery and mortars fired, and a two-company attack went in, the infantry moving very close behind the barrage. Gooden's company thrust from the east, and Captain Nicholas's advanced with one platoon pushing east along Snags Track towards Track Junction Knoll and another pressing north. The former platoon (Lieutenant Harvey), moving through very difficult country along a razor-back so narrow that only two men could be deployed on it, edged forward under heavy fire; after losing one killed and 4 wounded and finding the enemy becoming stronger Harvey manoeuvred out of this position. It was then found that a wounded man was not with them, so Harvey and three volunteers thrust back and engaged the enemy fiercely while the wounded man was carried out. During the day Gooden's company on the right had encountered two strongly-held knolls. Derrick's platoon succeeded in cutting the saddle between them and taking one knoll. Derrick's platoon and another launched “a most courageous attack up the steep slopes of Knoll 2 in the fading light. Here, in some of the heaviest and most bitter close-in fighting of the whole campaign these two platoons finally reached the top and secured the Knoll after inflicting heavy casualties on the enemy.... [Lance-Sergeant] Fennells time and again ... crawled ahead of the attacking troops, even to within five yards of the enemy, and gained vital information. On one occasion, when his section was forced to ground he had charged the Jap positions with his Owen gun blazing and had silenced the enemy post, killing the occupants. In a similar manner, Private W. R. How found the advance of the troops checked by a well-sited pill-box, raced forward with his Owen firing until within grenade range, and then, throwing grenades, moved in for the kill until he fell wounded. He had silenced the post and killed the machine-gunner, thus allowing the advance to continue.” At this stage 28 enemy dead had been counted; one Australian had been killed and 15 wounded.  Unfortunately, the Japanese counterattacked the following day, effectively recapturing the position. Following a devastating combination of air and artillery bombardment, the Australians managed to secure Freda and Track Junction Knoll on May 25. During this time, the 2/23rd Battalion remained in close contact with a resolute enemy at Janet and Margy but struggled to make significant progress. The 2/24th Battalion continued probing northward and captured the Droop feature on May 26. After another failed attack on May 29, a heavy air and artillery bombardment supported the 2/23rd as they finally captured Margy on May 31. Concurrently, the 2/24th successfully attacked and held the Poker Hills. On June 1, the 2/48th Battalion then attacked Hill 102, supported by aircraft and machine-gun fire. Lieutenant O'Rourke's platoon attacked, following an artillery barrage as closely as they could, and bringing with them three flame-throwers. They gained the forward slopes without being fired on and then saw five Japanese moving towards them, evidently to re-enter their positions after the bombing. These were fired on while the flame-throwers were brought into action. One operator sprayed the slope from side to side while another fired straight up it. “The result was devastating (said O'Rourke later). The hill was set completely ablaze to a depth of 50 yards, two of the five Japs were set on fire and the other three killed in their posts. The platoon was able to advance almost immediately through the flames, and with the help of the flame-throwers the feature was com-pletely captured within 15 minutes of the advance commencing. The flame which was fired up a slight rise hit the trees on the crest and also sprayed the reverse slope and had the effect of completely demoralising the enemy.“ While the Australians launched an unsuccessful assault on Wally, the 2/23rd Battalion was engaged in clearing out the remaining Japanese forces from Margy and its surrounding areas. On June 6, the Australians finally secured Wally, and the 2/24th Battalion also managed to capture Roger. In the early hours of June 10, the Japanese launched a counterattack toward Hill 105, but it was easily repelled. At the same time, the defenders began preparing for a withdrawal northeast into the island's interior, planning to split into independent groups to wage guerrilla warfare. Despite the looming withdrawal, Whitehead's battalions commenced attacks on Beech 2, Joyce, and Linda on June 11. However, progress was slow over the next three days, with the only notable achievement being the capture of Sandy on June 13. By nightfall that day, the Japanese finally began their withdrawal, leaving behind only rearguards to hold the crucial Essie Track. This allowed the Australians to capture the abandoned features of Linda, Joyce, Clarice, Hilda Paddy, Melon, and Aunty on June 14. The next day, the Australians took Nelly and Faith, but the Japanese rearguard on Essie Ridge managed to temporarily halt their pursuit. Eventually, however, Essie Ridge was overrun, and by June 16, Fukukaku was cleared. The 2/48th Battalion then pursued the Japanese as they fled eastward from Essie. On June 18, they caught a few but found that a large group had scattered into smaller parties. By June 19, patrols were radiating east, north, and west in pursuit, with Japanese forces standing firm at several points. Ultimately, the fall of Hill 90 on June 20 marked the end of organized resistance on Tarakan. Following this victory, Whitehead initiated a mop-up operation that would continue until the war's end. While the 26th Brigade was fighting to secure Tarakan, General Wootten's 9th Australian Division was preparing to launch the invasion of the Brunei Bay area of north Borneo, codenamed Operation Oboe VI. At the Manila conference in April General Morshead had learnt that OBOE I (Tarakan), OBOE VI (north Borneo) and OBOE II (Balikpapan) were to be carried out in that order. 34 LSTs would be allotted for OBOE VI but had to be released by 23 days after the landing. There were other fairly severe restrictions on the vessels available: the one boat battalion of the American Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment and the one amphibian tractor battalion allotted to OBOE VI had to be used for Balikpapan. Morshead and his staff arrived back at Morotai from Manila on April 21 and next day the Corps issued its staff study of the north Borneo operation, and the 9th Division's staff, which from April 4 to 17 had been planning an operation against Balikpapan, began preparing an outline plan for an attack on Brunei Bay instead. This was presented to Corps and approved on April 26; the final plan, which contained no major changes, was approved on May 16. Meanwhile a variety of problems had arisen at the Corps level and above. On May 1, 2200 troops and 1200 vehicles (including guns) of the 9th Division were still in the Cairns or Atherton areas awaiting shipment, and some of the stores and equipment were not scheduled to arrive at Morotai until May 25, two days after the proposed date of the landing. It also appeared that, on the day of the landing, the 24th Brigade would lack some unit stores and vehicles, and the 20th Brigade would possess only one battalion; there would be no field or anti-aircraft guns, a shortage of signal vehicles and equipment, no equipment for building wharves and bulk oil storage, and neither of the casualty clearing stations allotted would be present. Due to a series of issues at the Corps level and above, the invasion plan had been scaled down to a landing by a brigade on Labuan Island and just a battalion on Muara Island, with the operation further postponed to June 10. The strategy involved landing Brigadier Selwyn Porter's 24th Brigade on Victoria Harbor's Brown Beaches to capture the Labuan airfield and eliminate all hostile forces on the island. Simultaneously, Brigadier William Windeyer's 20th Brigade would put ashore the 2/15th Battalion on Muara Island's White Beach and the 2/17th Battalion on Brunei Bluff's Green Beach. These units were tasked with capturing Brooketon and securing the southern and western sides of Muara Island, setting the stage for an advance on Brunei Town. Upon capturing these objectives, the 9th Division was to occupy and defend the Brunei Bay-Beaufort area and take control of the Miri-Lutong-Seria regions. Once again, Admiral Barbey's Naval Attack Force, primarily comprising Admiral Royal's transports and Admiral Berkey's cruisers, was designated to facilitate the amphibious movement of troops to Brunei Bay. In preparation for the invasion, American and Australian air forces, under General Kenney's command, targeted airfields and other military installations, focusing particularly on destroying bridges on the railway to Jesselton to prevent the arrival of reinforcements to Labuan by rail. On June 4, Barbey's convoy finally departed Morotai, embarking on its 1,100-mile voyage to Brunei Bay. Air attacks intensified on June 5, successfully rendering the Papar River bridge unusable. Four days later, on June 9, the air campaign reached its peak: 54 Liberators and 24 Mitchells launched strikes against targets on Labuan, while 23 Liberators targeted the Brooketon area. In the meantime, minesweepers successfully cleared a channel into the bay, destroying 69 mines between June 7 and 9. Berkey's cruisers sailed ahead and shelled the Brown, White, and Green Beaches in the two days leading up to the landings. The convoy finally arrived at the main channel between Labuan Island and Brunei Bluff just before sunrise on June 10, fully prepared to execute the invasion. Opposing them, General Baba's 37th Army had assembled General Nozaki's depleted 56th Independent Mixed Brigade in the Brunei Bay sector. This included two battalions near Brunei, one at Beaufort, and one garrisoning Labuan. Additionally, the 553rd Independent Battalion was stationed in the Miri area; however, none of these units were equipped to make a stand at the beaches. At 08:15, Barbey's warships commenced a bombardment of the southern beaches as the troops were loading onto the landing vessels. Shortly after 09:05, the first waves began to advance, preceded by craft firing rockets and artillery. As anticipated, there was no opposition on the landing areas. The 2/15th Battalion successfully reached the shore at 09:15, followed by the 2/17th Battalion, which made landfall three minutes later, approximately 1,000 yards east of its intended location. By dusk, the 2/15th had scoured the swampy terrain of Muara Island and reported no Japanese presence. The 2/17th pushed forward a few miles along the road to Brunei, while the 2/13th Battalion landed and moved into reserve behind the 2/17th. Meanwhile, the 2/28th Battalion landed without incident at 09:15 and quickly secured Labuan town, with the 2/43rd Battalion following ashore at 09:20 to initiate the advance toward the airfield.  There was no opposition until 10:45, when the leading troops came under rifle fire just south of Flagstaff Hill. This post was quickly bypassed and taken, but the Australians continued to face strong resistance from the 371st Independent Battalion. Despite this, the defenders could not prevent the 2/43rd from capturing the airfield by nightfall. During the day, Porter also landed the 2/11th Commando Squadron on the unoccupied Hamilton Peninsula, with one troop initiating a move north along Charlie Track. On June 11, while the 2/43rd patrolled north and west, overcoming some opposition, the 2/28th slowly advanced toward the Able and Baker routes, where they encountered the bulk of enemy resistance. Meanwhile, after repelling an enemy patrol overnight, the 2/17th continued its advance to Brunei unopposed, with a company from the 2/15th moving up the Brunei River to land about four miles downstream from the town. The following day, the 2/17th reached and seized the airstrip, finally encountering defenses manned by the 366th Independent Battalion. On Labuan, the 2/43rd moved unopposed to Hamilton Road and successfully linked up with the commandos, leaving behind one company and three tanks to destroy a bypassed stronghold to the northwest. At the same time, the 2/28th probed the strongly held area astride MacArthur Road and to its west, making good progress to compress the resilient enemy into a pocket. On June 13, although the 2/43rd occupied an emergency airstrip at Timbalai, the primary objective remained to continue compressing the enemy into "the Pocket" and mop up the remainder of the island. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. Australian troops, under Brigadier Whitehead, landed on Tarakan, swiftly overcoming Japanese strongholds. By May 20, they began the North Borneo Offensive, achieving significant territorial gains amid brutal combat. As Japanese forces faltered, some surrendered, signaling a turning tide. The campaign showcased immense courage and sacrifice, with heavy casualties on both sides, ultimately paving the way for Allied victories in the Pacific theater.

292 Yellow Submarine w/Casey KnollSteven is joined with the amazingly talented Casey Knoll to discuss 1968's Yellow Submarine! Please check out her work by going to:jamiejupiter.thecomicseries.comPlease send feedback to DieCastMoviePodcast@gmail.com or leave us a message on our Facebook page.Thanks for listening!

Andrew Scheid grabbed his first win of the young season on Memorial Day Weekend; now he's preparing for one of the biggest races of the year, the Money in the Bank 150. Meanwhile, Rylee Knoll flipped his car Friday night at Tri-City before grabbing a win Saturday night at Merritt!

In der neuen Folge von Auf Buchfühlung sprechen Irene und Rebekka mit der Wiener Autorin Ursula Knoll über ihren Roman "Zucker", der im März 2025 in der Edition Atelier erschienen ist. Im Roman erzählt Knoll entlang von sechs Frauenschicksalen eine globale Kulturgeschichte des Zuckers – von der Kolonialzeit bis zur Zukunftstechnologie. Es geht um Ausbeutung, Aufbruch, Erfindungsgeist – und immer wieder auch um die Frage: Was kostet uns der süße Stoff wirklich? Ursula Knoll hat Germanistik, Judaistik und Romanistik unter anderem in Wien, Washington D.C. und Prag studiert und sich in ihrer Dissertation mit NS-Täter*innenschaft auseinandergesetzt. Es folgte eine Ausbildung zur Dramatikerin am Burgtheater Wien und bei den wiener wortstaetten. Für ihren Debütroman "Lektionen in Dunkler Materie" (2022) wurde sie mit dem Bloggerpreis Das Debüt ausgezeichnet. Für einen Auszug aus "Zucker" erhielt sie 2023 den Theodor-Körner-Preis für Literatur.

Jocks in Jills Merch is HERE!!!CAN is live here: https://ca.shop.thepwhl.com/collections/jocks-in-jillsUS is live here: https://shop.thepwhl.com/collections/jocks-in-jillsSharkNinja is a proud Founding Partner of the PWHL. Visit ⁠https://sharkclean.ca⁠⁠ https:// sharkbeauty.ca⁠⁠ https://ninjakitchen.ca⁠ to learn more.FACTOR _Heat. Eat. Compete. Canada's #1 Ready-to-Eat Meal Delivery ServiceUse code PWHLPOD25 for $75 off your first 4 boxes http://factormeals.ca/pwhlpod25The Princess Margaret Road Hockey to Conquer Cancer, fueled by Longo's, is the world's largest street hockey fundraiser! Use the PWHL promo code for 50% off the team registration fee. Head to https://roadhockeytoconquercancer.ca/ and use promo code PWHL What a night! Minnesota takes Game 3 of the series in an unforgettable triple overtime thriller. We basically got two games in one—and we're breaking it all down for you.First, we're joined by Becky Kellar, who shares her insights on the gameplay and turning points of the night. Then, the OT hero herself, Katy Knoll, stops by to give us her post-game reaction and what it felt like to score the game-winner.With the stakes sky-high heading into Game 4, we're asking: Will Ottawa force a Game 5 or will Minnesota raise their second Walter Cup? Everything you need to know before puck drop is right here.00:00:00 - Start of Show!00:04:06 - Becky Kellar up for the party!00:18:50 - Buckles!00:25:27 - Katy Knoll Postgame00:35:14 - Pizza Pizza Free Delivery PWHLDEL00:36:38 - FACTOR OF THE GAME00:39:09 - Break it down w Buckles00:46:50 - PWHL NEWS00:52:29 - Princess Margaret Road Hockey to Conquer Cancer00:54:32 - PREDICTIONS00:57:58 - Merch Shop!01:01:37 - End of Show - Thank You!

AI can do more than it's ever done… but there's a lot of unfounded hype, especially when it comes to user research. When should you delegate tasks to AI? And when should you insist on keeping the human in the loop? In this episode, Therese Fessenden sits down with Alexander Knoll, co-founder of Condens, to discuss the strengths and limitations of AI tools for research, and the evolving role of the user researcher.About Alexander & Condens: LinkedIn | Condens.ioResearch Repository Guide: https://condens.io/guides/research-repository-guide/On-Demand Recording of Condens Event: Making an Impact with User Research: How to Drive Change and Get NoticedAlex's Article with NN/g: Common-Sense AI Integration: Lessons from the Cofounder of CondensOther Related NN/g Articles & Courses:Free Articles about AI & UXCourse: UX Basic TrainingCourse: Accelerating Research with AICourse: AI for Design WorkflowsCourse: Designing AI Experiences

Elsäßer, Fabian www.deutschlandfunk.de, Corso

Die WHO beschließt ein Pandemie-Abkommen. Beate Kampmann, Direktorin des Instituts für Internationale Gesundheit an der Berliner Charité, betont die globale Verantwortung und Gerechtigkeit des Abkommens. Doch viele Fragen bleiben offen. Knoll, Christiane www.deutschlandfunk.de, Forschung aktuell

Knoll, Christiane www.deutschlandfunk.de, Forschung aktuell

Mon, 19 May 2025 17:05:00 +0000 https://jungeanleger.podigee.io/2263-wiener-borse-party-905-atx-schwacher-zertifikate-brav-andi-knoll-vs-robert-ottel-vs-jj-vs-jj27-vs-schas-vs-schass 24c2403b3d17bccadfb10e2fd0b6cdf4 Die Wiener Börse Party ist ein Podcastprojekt für Audio-CD.at von Christian Drastil Comm.. Unter dem Motto „Market & Me“ berichtet Christian Drastil über das Tagesgeschehen an der Wiener Börse. Inhalte der Folge #905: - ATX startet schwächer in die neue Woche - Pierer Mobility gesucht - News zu VIG, Award für Raiffeisen Zertifikate - Research zu Polytec - Zertifikate Depot bei dad.at sehr brav https://photaq.com/page/index/4173 - Vintage zu VIG und Pierer Mobility - Ö-Gewinnmitnahmen bei wikifolio - Andi Knoll vs. Robert Ottel vs. JJ vs. JJ72 vs. Schas vs. Schaß - weiter gehts im Podcast Links:  - Börsepeople: Am 26.5. startet die S19 unter http://www.audio-cd.at/people - kapitalmarkt-stimme.at daily voice Playlist auf spotify: http://www.kapitalmarkt-stimme.at/spotify - kapitalmarkt-stimme-Jingle-Mann Steve Kalen: https://open.spotify.com/intl-de/artist/6uemLvflstP1ZerGCdJ7YU  - Stockpicking Österreich: https://www.wikifolio.com/de/at/w/wfdrastil1? ATX aktuell: https://www.wienerborse.at/indizes/aktuelle-indexwerte/preise-mitglieder/??ISIN=AT0000999982&ID_NOTATION=92866&cHash=49b7ab71e783b5ef2864ad3c8a5cdbc1 Die 2025er-Folgen der Wiener Börse Party (Co-verantwortlich Script: Christine Petzwinkler) sind präsentiert von Wienerberger, CEO Heimo Scheuch hat sich ebenfalls unter die Podcaster gemischt: https://open.spotify.com/show/5D4Gz8bpAYNAI6tg7H695E . Risikohinweis: Die hier veröffentlichten Gedanken sind weder als Empfehlung noch als ein Angebot oder eine Aufforderung zum An- oder Verkauf von Finanzinstrumenten zu verstehen und sollen auch nicht so verstanden werden. Sie stellen lediglich die persönliche Meinung der Podcastmacher dar. Der Handel mit Finanzprodukten unterliegt einem Risiko. Sie können Ihr eingesetztes Kapital verlieren. Und: Bewertungen bei Apple (oder auch Spotify) machen mir Freude: http://www.audio-cd.at/spotify http://www.audio-cd.at/apple 2263 full no Christian Drastil Comm.

Knoll, Christiane www.deutschlandfunk.de, Forschung aktuell

Knoll, Christiane www.deutschlandfunk.de, Forschung aktuell

Today I would like to discuss the level of furniture that can be found in shops and department stores. It is a sensitive issue that is rarely brought up in public but remains a hot subject in the architecture and design communities. I have heard people describe it as ordinary, mediocre, poorly made, and less inspiring and innovative than it has been at any other time in history. It should not be forgotten that furniture design has always had a tremendous impact on the taste of the time.In the 20th century, manufacturers were motivated in producing avant-garde furniture, and this why it became available to consumers. The Primavera department store in Paris, for example, was the source for high end Art Deco furnishings in the 1920s. American department stores Macy's, Lord & Taylor, and Abraham Strauss offered the American public the most up to date and daring furniture available. During the mid-century years, it was Herman Miller and Knoll that were famously investing and responsible for the some of the iconic furniture of the century. The Japanese department store Takashimaya was the source for art furniture in the 1950s, and it is particularly memorable for the benchmark exhibition of French design curated by Charlotte Perriand. In the 1970s and 1980s, it was Bloomingdales that became the lead tastemaker by exhibiting chic, fantastical space age furniture, brilliantly curated.What really happened to furniture design and why the best of it is found only in galleries and museums, but not in shops?For this discussion I invited Sami Reiss. He writes the bestselling newsletter Snake, covering auctions, design, vintage furniture and fashion. Sami's articles have been published in GQ, the Wall Street Journal, ESPN and the New York Times.

Knoll, Christiane www.deutschlandfunk.de, Forschung aktuell

Knoll, Christiane www.deutschlandfunk.de, Forschung aktuell

Join us as we examine the potential underwater UFO base known as Sycamore Knoll. What's going on off the coast of Southern California?

Miriam "Mimi" Knoll, M.D., DABR, is the co-founder and CEO of JOWMA and a radiation oncologist at Northwell Health in New York.Dr. Knoll earned her medical degree from New York University School of Medicine and completed her radiation oncology training at Mount Sinai Medical Center in New York.She serves as a section editor for Advances in Radiation Oncology, the peer-reviewed journal of the American Society of Radiation Oncology (ASTRO), and is an active volunteer with ASCO, ASTRO, NRG, and the RTOG Foundation.An international speaker and researcher, Dr. Knoll focuses on the medical workforce, women in medicine, and social media in medicine. She is a Forbes Healthcare contributor and writes for the American Society of Clinical Oncology (ASCO) Connection and various other media outlets.You can follow her on Twitter @MKnoll_MD and on Instagram @Dr.Mimi.K.Sponsor the JOWMA Podcast! Email digitalcontent@jowma.orgBecome a JOWMA Member! www.jowma.org Follow us on Instagram! www.instagram.com/JOWMA_org Follow us on Twitter! www.twitter.com/JOWMA_med Follow us on Facebook! https://www.facebook.com/JOWMAorgStay up-to-date with JOWMA news! Sign up for the JOWMA newsletter! https://jowma.us6.list-manage.com/subscribe?u=9b4e9beb287874f9dc7f80289&id=ea3ef44644&mc_cid=dfb442d2a7&mc_eid=e9eee6e41e

Episode 243 - Meredith Michaelis, Flint Knoll Wines by Michelle Mandro

Last time we spoke about the fall of Iwo Jima. General Schmidt pushed through Japanese defenses, facing strongholds like Cushman's Pocket and General Senda's positions, with intense fighting and heavy casualties on both sides. Despite stubborn resistance, the Marines gradually advanced, employing tanks and artillery support. The Japanese, under General Kuribayashi, fought tenaciously, culminating in a final assault on March 26. After brutal combat, Iwo Jima was declared secured, but at great cost: 18,000 Japanese and over 6,800 American lives lost. Meanwhile, in New Britain, Australian forces continued their offensive, capturing strategic positions despite fierce enemy resistance. In the midst of a fierce conflict, Australian battalions advanced into enemy territory, capturing strategic positions while facing heavy resistance. Notable victories included the successful ambushes by the 2/7th Battalion and the capture of key locations like the But airfield. Despite facing fierce counterattacks from the Japanese, particularly at Slater's Knoll, the Australians maintained their momentum. As the Japanese command faced internal crises, the Australians continued their relentless push, ultimately leading to significant territorial gains and weakening enemy forces. This episode is the Visayas Offensive Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Within northern Luzon, by mid-March, General Clarkson's 33rd Division was exploring the western routes to Baguio. Colonel Volckmann's guerrilla unit had taken control of San Fernando and was engaged in combat around Cervantes. Meanwhile, General Mullins' 25th Division had advanced to Putlan, and General Gill's 32nd Division was involved in a fierce battle at Salacsac Pass. Following the capture of Putlan, General Swift instructed Mullins to push through Balete Pass to secure the vital Santa Fe region. On March 12, the 27th and 161st Regiments began advancing north and northwest, successfully clearing the Minuli area and establishing a foothold on Norton Ridge by March 15. At the same time, the 35th Regiment initiated a broad maneuver around Balete Pass via the Old Spanish Road, but this was soon hindered by intense artillery and mortar fire from the positions of the 11th Independent Regiment. The road also required significant engineering efforts to support the outflanking force, leading Mullins to ultimately halt the 35th's assault. However, General Konuma was unaware of this; fearing an outflanking maneuver from Carranglan, he had no choice but to keep around 3,000 of his best troops in this seemingly secure area. On March 15, Mullins ordered the reinforced 161st Regiment to launch a holding attack to the north while the majority of the 27th Regiment executed a flanking maneuver over Myoko Ridge, Mount Myoko, and Lone Tree Hill to encircle Balete Pass from the east. After regrouping at Putlan, the 35th was also tasked with capturing Mount Kabuto to subsequently advance northwest along Balete Ridge and connect with the 27th at Myoko. Mullins launched a renewed offensive on March 16, facing stubborn resistance from the 161st as it gradually advanced toward Norton's Knob, which was successfully captured by the end of the month. On March 22, the 27th began its flanking maneuver, with the 1st Battalion moving east into the elevated terrain south of Kapintalan by March 28, while the 2nd Battalion advanced nearly 3,750 yards up the wooded Myoko Ridge to the east. Meanwhile, the 35th's attempt to encircle the enemy via Kabuto started off well, reaching the northern slope of Balete Ridge on March 22. However, Konuma's recently arrived reinforcements launched a series of strong counterattacks and harassment raids, forcing the 35th to withdraw by March 28. With the other two regiments stretched thin and unable to penetrate the enemy's main defenses, Mullins ordered the 35th to position itself between the 27th and 161st Regiments to assault Highley Ridge from the east. By the end of March, the 161st was advancing northeast along Highley Ridge toward Crump Hill, which finally fell on April 8, bringing the advance to a halt. The 35th supported this effort with an attack on Kapintalan, which was ultimately captured by April 21. Meanwhile, the 27th continued to struggle through the challenging terrain of Myoko Ridge against fierce opposition, not reaching Woody Hill until April 12. This slow progress allowed Konuma to reinforce the Myoko sector with four understrength infantry battalions. Nevertheless, the brave soldiers of the 27th Regiment persevered, securing the Pimple on April 15 and advancing an additional 350 yards northeast by April 21. Looking west, Clarkson aimed to advance battalion combat teams toward Baguio via Route 11, the Galiano road, and the Tuba Trail. However, Swift declined to approve such ambitious plans, limiting the 33rd Division to a more restrained offensive. Although dissatisfied, Clarkson continued the attack along Route 11, managing to reach Camp 3 by the end of March. In the central area, patrols faced no opposition as they approached within a mile of Galiano, but other patrols discovered increasing signs that the Japanese were preparing to defend the Tuba Trail vigorously. Eventually, a robust reconnaissance force secured Bauang on March 19, with patrols then moving east to occupy Naguilan four days later and Burgos by the month's end. Meanwhile, at Salacsac Pass, the 127th Regiment fought from Hill 502 to Hill 504 against fierce resistance, while Gill sent the 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment up the trail from Valdez toward Imugan, where they were ultimately halted by vigilant Japanese forces. By March 23, the 1st Battalion of the 127th Regiment reached the crest of Hill 504; the 2nd Battalion advanced past it to Hill 505; and the 3rd Battalion managed to position one company at the base of Hill 507D. However, with its forces stretched thin and dwindling, the 127th was unable to capitalize on its seemingly advantageous position, allowing General Iwanaka to launch a strong counterattack on Hill 507D that successfully repelled the 3rd Battalion. As a result, Gill decided to withdraw that unit and the stalled 2nd Battalion, 128th Regiment, while the majority of the 128th relieved the 127th in the Hill 502 sector. Beginning on March 25, the 128th Regiment advanced aggressively eastward, successfully capturing the previously overlooked Hill 503, fully securing Hill 504, and expanding its control over Hill 505 by the month's end. However, on the night of March 31, Iwanaka launched a daring counterattack, reclaiming Hill 504 and nearly taking all the territory east of Hill 502. By April 4, both the 127th and 128th Regiments had sustained significant casualties and could no longer continue the offensive. Consequently, Swift had to order the 33rd Division to relieve the beleaguered 126th Regiment in the Ambayabang and Arboredo River valleys, allowing this unit to reposition north of the Villa Verde Trail to execute a flanking maneuver along the Miliwit River valley. Fortunately for Clarkson, General Krueger persuaded MacArthur to free the 129th Regiment from its duties in Manila, sending it to bolster the now overstretched 33rd Division. Once the rest of the 37th Division arrived at the Baguio front, which Krueger anticipated would happen in early April, Swift could initiate a two-division assault on Baguio. In the meantime, Clarkson promptly dispatched the 129th to Burgos, and by April 1, it had advanced to Salat.  The Japanese opposing the reinforced 33d Division were no longer in the shape they had been at the end of February. The 58th IMB and the 23d Division had both suffered heavy losses during March, losses that probably stemmed largely from lack of food and medical supplies rather than from combat action. By mid-March Japanese supply problems on the Baguio front had progressed from bad through worse to impossible. First, supplies had moved westward over the new Baguio-Aritao supply road far more slowly than anticipated, a development attributable in large measure to Allied Air Forces strikes on that road and along Route 5 north and south of Aritao. Second, operations of the 66th Infantry, along Route 11 north from Baguio, and the activities of the 11th Infantry, , in the Cagayan Valley, had made it virtually impossible for the Japanese to bring any food into the Baguio area from the north. Third, the Japanese tried to do too much with the limited amount of supplies available on the Baguio front. They were attempting to supply 23d Division and 58th IMB troops along the MLR; send certain military supplies north up Route 11 for the 19th Division; feed 14th Area Army headquarters and a large civilian population in Baguio; and establish supply dumps north and east of the city against the time of eventual withdrawal. Almost inevitably the principal sufferers were the front-line troops. By mid-March the best-fed Japanese combat troops on the Baguio front were getting less than half a pound of rice per day as opposed to a minimum daily requirement of nearly two and a half pounds. Before the end of the month the troops on the MLR were down to less than a quarter of a pound of rice a day. Starvation and diet-associated diseases filled hospitals and sapped the strength of the combat units. Generally, effective frontline strength was far lower than reported ration strength indicated. Medical supplies were consumed rapidly, and by the end of March, for example, there was virtually no malaria phophylaxis left in Baguio area hospitals. Looking upon the situation on the Baguio front with frank pessimism, Yamashita in mid-March directed inspection of terrain north, northeast, and east of the city with a view toward preparing a new defense line. His attitude became even plainer when, on or about 30 March, he ordered Japanese civilians and the Filipino puppet government to evacuate Baguio. Indeed, the future on the Baguio front was so bleak by the end of March that almost any other army would have withdrawn to new defenses forthwith, thereby saving troops for future battle. But not so the Japanese. Yamashita decided that the existing MLR would be held until the situation became hopeless. At the end of March that portion of the MLR held by the 23d Division was still intact, and the 58th IMB was busy deploying additional strength along its section of the line. One independent infantry battalion was on high ground north of Route 9 at Sablan; and another held defenses at Sablan. A reinforced company was at Burgos and, less that company, another independent infantry battalion held reserve positions at Calot, a mile and a half southeast of Sablan. One understrength battalion was responsible for defending the rough terrain from Sablan six miles south to Mt. Apni, where a tie-in was made with the right flank of the 23d Division. Maj. Gen. Bunzo Sato, commanding the 58th IMB, expected that the emphasis of any Allied drive in his sector would come along Route 9, but he did not neglect the other approach in his area, the Galiano road. Since the understrength battalion stationed astride the road was not strong enough to withstand a concerted attack, he directed his main reserve force, the 1st Battalion of the 75th Infantry, 19th Division, to move west out of Baguio to defenses at Asin. This step left in Baguio a reserve force of roughly three provisional infantry "battalions," which together probably could not muster over 750 effectives. In the Salacsac area, as casualties in the western pass were rapidly increasing and Allied air and artillery strikes made it nearly impossible for the 2nd Tank Division to transport supplies, Iwanaka concluded that his forward positions were nearly untenable. He began planning to redeploy forces to defend the eastern pass. Consequently, when the 126th Regiment launched its new offensive on April 5, it faced unexpectedly light resistance, quickly capturing Hills 518 and 519 within two days and cutting off a Japanese supply route leading north from Hill 504 across the eastern slopes of Hill 519 and up Mount Imugan. However, Iwanaka swiftly recognized the emerging threats and sent reinforcements to intercept the 126th's advance, delaying the capture of Hills 511 and 512 until March 13 and effectively halting further progress. At the same time, the reorganized 128th Regiment resumed its assault eastward on April 7, successfully retaking the Hill 504-505 sector and capturing Hill 506 by April 10. The following week, the 128th fought tenaciously to secure this elevated ground against fierce resistance, managing to push all the way to Hills 506B, 507C, and 507D with their remaining strength, nearly securing the western pass by April 17. Meanwhile, after the fall of San Fernando, General Krueger instructed Volckmann to advance inland along Route 4 toward Bontoc. However, the Provisional Battalion established at Cervantes could only withstand the relentless enemy pressure until April 4, when it was ultimately forced to retreat into the hills northwest of the town. Consequently, Volckmann had to quickly deploy the 121st Regiment to barrio Butac in preparation for an eastward push along Route 4. After a week of intense back-and-forth combat, this elite guerrilla unit succeeded in establishing footholds along the northern parts of Lamagan and Yubo Ridges. Over the next few days, the 121st made slow and arduous progress, ultimately gaining control of Route 4 nearly to the southeastern edge of Bessang Pass by mid-April. Further south, by mid-March, General Wing's 43rd Division had effectively secured the Antipolo sector, while General Hurdis' 6th Division was advancing well toward Mount Baytangan. At this point, General Hall's 11th Corps assumed responsibility for operations against the Shimbu Group, now rebranded as the 41st Army. However, he quickly decided to maintain the offensive against General Yokoyama's left flank, with the 20th and 1st Regiments focusing on an eastward push alongside the 43rd Division. Meanwhile, General Noguchi had completed his withdrawal to the Sugarloaf Hill-Mount Tanauan line, where he would receive reinforcements from elements of the Kogure Detachment. Simultaneously, General Kobayashi was struggling to stabilize his left flank, bolstered by one reserve battalion. On the morning of March 15, the American offensive resumed, with the 103rd Regiment continuing its assaults on Benchmark 7 Hill to secure Route 60-A, while the 172nd Regiment launched its initial attacks toward Sugarloaf Hill, facing fierce resistance. On March 17, the 1st Regiment renewed its advance toward Baytangan, initially making good progress and digging in about a mile west-southwest of the mountain's summit. However, during the night, a barrage of mortar fire followed by an infantry counterattack forced the Americans to retreat in disarray. As a result of this setback, the 1st Division began to advance eastward more cautiously, facing determined resistance and heavy mortar fire. By March 22, it was only slightly closer to Baytangan's crest than it had been five days earlier. The 20th Regiment on the left also encountered strong resistance, managing to reach a point a mile and a half west of Baytangan by March 22. At the same time, a company maneuvering to the north established a foothold on a wooded ridge overlooking the Bosoboso Valley. Meanwhile the 103d Infantry finally overran the defenses on Benchmark 7 on 18 March, killing about 250 Japanese in the process. The Japanese battalion there had delayed the 103d's attack toward Mt. Tanauan until the morning of 18 March, but by evening of that day the regiment's troops had begun swarming up the bare, rocky, southern and southwestern slopes of the mountain. Over the next three days, American forces slowly advanced through a complex of caves and bunkers until they secured the mountain's summit, while other units captured Benchmark 23 Hill and patrolled northward into the southeastern part of the Bosoboso Valley. By March 19, the 172nd Division was halted, containing Sugarloaf to the west. They bypassed it to the north and east, initiating new assaults toward Mounts Yabang and Caymayuman, making significant progress to the east but less so to the north by March 22. Despite concerns that Hall's four exhausted regiments might lack the strength to turn the 41st Army's left flank, the ongoing pressure and the failure of previous counterattacks ultimately compelled Yokoyama to order his threatened units to withdraw to new positions east of the Bosoboso River. Therefore, when the 6th and 43rd Divisions resumed their attacks on the morning of March 23, the withdrawal was already in full progress. Over the next three days, the 1st and 20th Regiments faced only scattered and disorganized resistance, allowing them to establish positions over a mile north and south of Baytangan along the ridgeline that overlooks the Bosoboso Valley. Meanwhile, the 172nd Regiment successfully captured Mount Yabang and most of Mount Caymayuman, while the 103rd Regiment advanced quickly northward, taking barrio New Bosoboso, Mount Balidbiran, and Benchmark 21 Hill. On March 27, the 1st Regiment secured the crest of Baytangan, and the 172nd Regiment eliminated the last organized opposition at Sugarloaf Hill. With Yokoyama's left flank collapsing, Hall could focus on capturing Wawa Dam and destroying the remaining elements of the Kobayashi Force west of the Bosoboso River, a mission assigned to the 6th Division. During this initial offensive, approximately 7,000 Japanese soldiers were killed since February 20, while American casualties included 435 killed and 1,425 wounded. Hurdis' initial strategy for capturing Wawa Dam involved the 1st and 20th Regiments advancing northward to clear Woodpecker Ridge and Mount Mataba, while the 63rd Regiment conducted diversionary attacks on the western slopes of Mataba. This new offensive began on March 28 but quickly faced intense small arms, machine-gun, and mortar fire, leading to a back-and-forth struggle against fierce enemy resistance. By April 3, the 20th Regiment had advanced less than half a mile toward Mataba, and the 1st Regiment had gained only 250 yards to the north. General Hurdis had hoped his attack, directed against the Kobayashi Force southern flank, would be far more successful, but the Kobayashi Force, rapidly and efficiently, had reoriented its defenses, which it had laid out primarily to face an attack from the west. The force's two remaining provisional infantry regiments, the Central and Right Sector Units, were still relatively intact, and the Central Sector Unit, bearing the brunt of the 6th Division's offensive, had recently been reinforced by remnants of the Left Sector Unit and elements of the Shimbu Group Reserve. Other factors bearing on the 6th Division's slow progress were the declining strength and deteriorating combat efficiency of its infantry regiments. The 20th Infantry could muster only 2,085 effectives on 3 April; some of its rifle companies were reduced to the combat strength of platoons. The situation within the 1st Infantry, with an effective strength of 2,150, was little better. As of 3 April the commanders of both regiments rated their units' combat efficiency only as "fair," the lowest ranking of three terms each had employed since the Lingayen Gulf assault.To bolster protection for Hurdis' right flank, the 103rd Regiment also captured Hill 1200 on the east bank of the Bosoboso River by the end of the month. Due to the slow progress of Hurdis' offensive, on April 5, Hall assigned General Cunningham's Baldy Force, which consisted of the 112th Cavalry Regiment and the recently arrived 169th Regiment, to take control of the area north of Mount Oro. This move would free up most of the 63rd Regiment to support the 20th Regiment and continue the assault north toward Mataba, while the 1st Regiment maintained its position along Woodpecker Ridge. From April 6 to 9, the 63rd made only limited progress to the east; however, on April 10, it shifted its focus to an offensive on the western slopes of Mataba, quickly securing the southwestern quarter of the mountain with minimal resistance. In response, Kobayashi promptly redirected his forces back to Mataba from the north-south ridge to prevent the 63rd from reaching the mountain's summit until April 17. At the same time, the 1st Regiment resumed its advance along Woodpecker Ridge but again faced strong enemy opposition, resulting in only limited gains. Looking further south, by March 23, the 187th Glider Regiment and the 511th Parachute Regiment had advanced to Santo Tomas and Tanauan but were unable to completely clear these areas. Meanwhile, the 158th Regiment secured Balayan, Batangas, and the Calumpan Peninsula, pushing toward Mount Macolod, where they were ultimately halted by significant forces from the Fuji Force. At this stage, as Krueger planned to launch an offensive into the Bicol Peninsula using the 158th, he needed to relieve the 11th Airborne Division with the barely rested 1st Cavalry Division. This division quickly took control of the Santo Tomas-Tanauan area, while General Swing's units maneuvered around the west side of Lake Taal to relieve the 158th at Macolod. As a result, General Griswold renewed his offensive on March 24. The 187th attempted to attack Macolod but was unsuccessful. A task force composed of units from Swing's other two regiments advanced quickly north toward Lipa, only to be halted at the hills southeast of the town. The 8th Cavalry captured Santo Tomas after a fierce battle and took Tanauan two days later. The 7th Cavalry advanced about five miles east into the corridor between Mounts Maquiling and Malepunyo, while the 12th Cavalry pushed along Route 21, moving about four miles beyond Los Baños. On March 27, Swing's task force finally overcame the enemy defenses southeast of Lipa, but it was the 8th Cavalry that ultimately secured this strategic town two days later. Griswold's successful offensive also forced around 2,000 troops from the Fuji Force to retreat along Route 21 and through the Santa Maria Valley to join Yokoyama's forces in the mountains east of Manila. In response, Krueger devised a plan to prevent the potential influx of Japanese reinforcements around the eastern and northern shores of Laguna de Bay. He instructed Hall to clear the northern shore of the lake, block the Santa Maria Valley, and secure Route 21. While the 187th continued its assault on Macolod, Griswold ordered his other units to push eastward to secure Laguna de Bay and Tayabas Bay. Accordingly, on March 30, the 103rd Regiment advanced in small increments along the northern shore of Laguna de Bay, reaching Siniloan by April 4. The 12th Cavalry moved to Calauan and then south along a secondary road toward San Pablo, encountering strong enemy positions that wouldn't be overcome until April 5. The 5th and 7th Cavalry Regiments fought through the Maquiling-Malepunyo corridor against determined but disorganized Japanese resistance, successfully occupying San Pablo by April 2. Additionally, elements of the 188th Glider Regiment pushed east through the mountain corridors, reaching Tiaong on April 3 and Lucena three days later. By April 6, the 5th Cavalry and the 103rd Regiment had established contact at Pagsanjan, effectively isolating the 41st Army. The next day, patrols from the 11th Airborne Division headed north from Lucena, while 1st Cavalry Division patrols departed from Pagsanjan heading south. They successfully linked up at Lucban by April 10 and then advanced eastward to Mauban. At the same time, a company from the 188th traveled along Route 1 across the Bondoc Isthmus, reaching Atimonan on April 11. Griswold's patrols also moved towards Mount Malepunyo, where the Fuji Force was preparing for its final stand. By April 16, preliminary assaults had concentrated enemy resistance around Mount Mataasna-Bundoc. Meanwhile, after a week of intense aerial bombardment, Brigadier-General Hanford MacNider's 158th Regiment successfully landed at Legaspi Port with minimal opposition on April 1. They quickly secured the port and the nearby airfield, then advanced to Daraga before moving south along Route 1 to occupy the Sorsogon Peninsula, where they encountered machine-gun fire from the Mount Bariway-Busay Ridge. The following morning, the troops had to retreat east of Daraga, and in the coming days, the 158th faced tough fighting in the challenging, jungle terrain to overcome resistance in the Daraga area. Concerned about delays in occupying the Sorsogon Peninsula, MacNider landed his anti-tank company at Bacon on April 6, which occupied Sorsogon without opposition. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion continued its overland advance, reaching Bulan by April 12, where they targeted a significant Japanese concentration. Simultaneously, MacNider's other two battalions attacked Camalig on April 11 and began their unsuccessful assault on enemy positions in the Cituinan Hills. By April 1, the 188th had successfully eliminated the last organized resistance in the rugged hills south of Ternate. Meanwhile, the 2nd Battalion of the 151st Regiment launched an assault on Caballo Island on March 27 but could not fully dismantle the entrenched enemy positions until April 13. The Japanese in the pits and tunnels created an almost insoluble problem for the 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry. The Japanese had so emplaced their weapons, which included machine guns and mortars, that they controlled all approaches to the mortar pits but could not be reached by American artillery or mortar fire. When the 151st Infantry concentrated its mortar fire against the pits' entrances, the Japanese simply withdrew into the tunnels. When the American fire ceased--at the last possible moment before an infantry assault--the Japanese rushed out of the tunnels to man their weapons. Tanks were of no help to the American troops. From positions near the rim of the pits the tanks were unable to depress their guns sufficiently to do much damage to the Japanese. If the tanks tried to approach from above, they started sliding down Hill 2's slopes into the pits. No combination of tank, artillery, and infantry action proved of any avail, and the 151st Infantry had to give up its attempts to take the Japanese positions by assault. On 31 March engineers tried to pour diesel oil into one of the tunnels connecting the mortar pits, employing for this purpose a single ventilator shaft that was accessible to the 151st Infantry. Nothing came of the effort since it was impossible to get enough oil up the steep slopes of the hill to create a conflagration of significant proportions within the tunnels. Nevertheless, burning the Japanese out seemed to promise the only method of attack that would not risk the unduly heavy casualties of a direct infantry assault. No one, of course, wanted to throw away the lives of experienced troops on such an insignificant objective. Finally, the commander of the 113th Engineers, 38th Division, suggested pumping oil up the hill from the beach through a pipeline from a ship or landing craft anchored at the shore line. The Allied Naval Forces happily fell in with this idea and supplied the 151st Infantry with two oil-filled ponton cubes; the Allied Air Forces provided a 110-horsepower pump and necessary lengths of pipeline and flexible hosing; and the 592d Engineer Boat and Shore Regiment came through with an LCM to carry the pump and the ponton cubes. On 5 April over 2,500 gallons of diesel fuel were pumped into the pits and tunnels through the ventilator and were then ignited by white phosphorus mortar shells. "Results," the 38th Division reported, "were most gratifying." A huge flash fire ensued, followed by a general conflagration and several explosions. The engineers repeated the process on 6 and 7 April, and on the latter day carefully lowered two large demolition charges through the ventilator shaft and placed another at an accessible tunnel entrance. Set off simultaneously, the three charges caused an enormous volume of flames and several terrific explosions. For the next few days the 2d Battalion, 151st Infantry, tried to persuade a few Japanese who had lived through the holocausts to surrender and also executed a few infantry probing attacks. On 13 April a patrol entered the pits and tunnels, killed the lone surviving Japanese, and reported the positions cleared and secured. Following this, El Fraile was targeted, with Company F of the 151st and the 113th Engineers effectively neutralizing Fort Drum using gasoline and explosives. On April 16, troops from the 1st Battalion of the 151st Regiment attacked Carabao Island, facing no opposition. Looking towards the Visayas, after capturing Palawan and Zamboanga, General Eichelberger set his sights on the Sulu Archipelago, where new airfields were to be established. On March 16, a reinforced company from the 162nd Regiment landed unopposed on Basilan Island and spent the next two days searching Basilan and nearby islets, finding no signs of Japanese forces. On April 2, the reinforced 2nd Battalion of the 163rd Regiment landed on Sanga Sanga Island, successfully clearing the Tawi Tawi Group by April 6. The remainder of the regiment made an unopposed landing near Jolo Town on April 9. Over the next two days, the Americans drove approximately 2,400 men of the 55th Independent Mixed Brigade from the heights immediately south and southeast of the town to secure a nearby airstrip. However, the Japanese retreated to more fortified hill masses further inland, where they had long prepared their defenses and began to resist fiercely. After initial attacks by Colonel Alejandro Suarez's guerrillas failed to breach the Japanese positions, the 1st Battalion of the 163rd Regiment joined the fight and managed to overrun the enemy defenses by April 22. On April 25, the 3rd Battalion launched an assault on Lieutenant-General Suzuki Tetsuzo's final positions at Mount Tumatangus, which were ultimately subdued by May 2. However, the remaining Japanese forces continued to engage in guerrilla warfare. By this time, airfields in Zamboanga and Sanga Sanga had become operational to support the forthcoming invasion of Borneo.The first field at Zamboanga was a dry-weather strip 5000 feet long, completed on March 15 and immediately put to use by Marine Corps planes. The field, named Calarian Drome, could not answer the need for an all-weather strip 6000 feet long. Accordingly, engineers constructed a new strip, which the Marine aviators based there called Moret Field, about a mile to the east, and had it ready for all-weather operations by May 16. Used primarily by Marine Air Groups 12, 24, and 32, Moret Field was also employed by a 13th Air Force night-fighter squadron, an emergency rescue squadron, and 13th Air Force B-24s and P-38s staging through for strikes against Borneo. Marine Corps planes on March 16 executed the first support mission flown from a field in the Zamboanga area, covering the landing on Basilan Island. Later, Marine Corps planes from Zamboanga flew support for the Tawi Tawi and Jolo operations and undertook pre-assault bombardment and cover for the invasion of eastern Mindanao. While 13th Air Force planes executed most of the support for the invasion of Borneo, Marine Corps B-25s from Zamboanga also flew some missions. At Sanga Sanga Island there was a Japanese coral-surfaced strip about 2800 feet long. Engineers repaired and extended this strip to a length of 5000 feet by May 2, when fighters of the 13th Air Force began moving to Sanga Sanga from Palawan to provide close support for the initial landings on Borneo. These US Army planes were replaced in mid-May by units of the Royal Australian Air Force, which employed the all-weather Sanga Sanga field during later operations on Borneo. Finally, a Japanese field 3800 feet long on Jolo Island was repaired and used for aerial supply and evacuation operations in support of ground troops throughout the Sulu Archipelago. Eichelberger's next target was the Central Visayan Islands. For the Panay-Guimaras-northern Negros operation, codenamed Victor I, he assigned General Brush's 40th Division, excluding the 108th Regiment, which had recently been assigned to Leyte. The 40th Division departed Lingayen Gulf on March 15 aboard ships from Admiral Struble's Task Group 78.3. After a brief stop at Mindoro, they arrived at Panay before dawn on March 18. Following a short bombardment by destroyers, the 1st and 3rd Battalions of the 185th Regiment landed unopposed about twelve miles west of Iloilo, where they were joined by Colonel Macario Peralta's guerrillas, who already controlled much of the island. The 185th quickly expanded its beachhead against light, scattered resistance and began advancing along the coastal road toward Iloilo in the afternoon, forcing the 170th Independent Battalion to retreat to the mountainous interior. With Iloilo secured by March 20, G Company of the 185th Regiment successfully captured Inampulugan Island on March 22, while other elements of the regiment cleared the unoccupied Guimaras Island by March 23. Additionally, Brush decided to assign the 2nd Battalion of the 160th Regiment to garrison Panay alongside Peralta's guerrillas. No pursuit of the 170th Independent Battalion was made, allowing the Japanese to continue their guerrilla activities until the end of the war. Meanwhile, for the operation against northern Negros, Brush planned to launch an assault with the 185th Regiment on March 29, followed by the majority of the 160th Regiment the next day, while keeping the 503rd Parachute Regiment in reserve for potential airdrops. Opposing him, Lieutenant-General Kono Takeshi's 77th Brigade had a total of 15,000 troops but was prepared to retreat into the mountains of north-central Negros for a prolonged defense, leaving only token forces in the coastal plain to delay American advances. On March 29, the 185th Regiment landed unopposed near Pulupandan and quickly secured a bridge over the Bago River. The 185th then spread north and east, with the 160th Regiment following, successfully securing nearly the entire coastal plain of northwestern Negros by noon on April 2. As they closed in on Kono's inner fortress, the Americans overran the main Japanese outposts while the 511th was landed to bolster the assault. On April 9, Brush launched his general offensive, with his three regiments advancing slowly into rugged terrain where the Japanese held significant defensive advantages.  On June 4 General Kono, realizing that his remaining forces were incapable of further sustained effort, directed a general withdrawal deep into the mountains behind his broken defensive lines. The surviving Japanese dispersed into small groups seeking food and hideouts and trying to avoid contact with Colonel Abcede's guerrillas who, under the direction of the 503rd Parachute Regiment, took over responsibility for the pursuit of Kono's men. On June 9 the 503rd then relieved all elements of the 40th Division in northern Negros. By that date the Japanese had lost over 4000 men killed. Kono lost another 3350 troops, mainly from starvation and disease, before the end of the war. After the general surrender in August 1945, over 6150 Japanese came down from the mountains to turn themselves in, joining about 350 others who had been captured earlier. In all, about 7100 Japanese lost their lives in northern Negros, pinning down the equivalent of an American infantry division for over two months. The 40th Division's casualties for the operation, including those of the attached 503rd Parachute, totaled approximately 370 men killed and 1035 wounded. Meanwhile, Eichelberger's final objective in the Central Visayas was Cebu, assigned to Major-General William Arnold's Americal Division. For Operation Victor II, Captain Albert Sprague's Task Group 78.2 was set to land the bulk of the division at Cebu City while Colonel James Cushing's guerrillas secured the water sources. Opposing them were Rear-Admiral Harada Kaku's 33rd Naval Special Base Force and Major-General Manjome Takeo's 78th Brigade, which together comprised approximately 14,500 troops, including the 173rd Independent Battalion and the 36th Naval Guard Unit stationed at Cebu City. Additionally, around 750 soldiers from General Kataoka's 1st Division were positioned in northern Cebu. Although the command situation on the island was chaotic, General Suzuki's 35th Army headquarters in Leyte had been evacuated by two large motorized landing barges between March 17 and 25. Taking control of all forces on Cebu, Suzuki appointed Manjome as the de jure commander in the Cebu City area while leaving Kataoka in charge of northern Cebu, as he prepared to retreat to Mindanao. General Manjome designed his defenses so as to control--not hold--the coastal plains around Cebu City, and for this purpose set up defenses in depth north and northwest of the city. A forward line, constituting an outpost line of resistance, stretched across the first rising ground behind the city hills 2.5 to 4 miles inland. A stronger and shorter second line, the main line of resistance, lay about a mile farther inland and generally 350 feet higher into the hills. Back of this MLR were Manjome's last-stand defenses, centering in rough, broken hills 5 miles or so north of the city. Anticipating that American forces would attempt to mount wide envelopments of his defensive lines, Manjome set up one flank protective strongpoint in rugged, bare hills about 3.5 miles north of barrio Talisay, on the coast about 6 miles southwest of Cebu City, to block the valley of the Mananga River, a natural axis of advance for forces enveloping from the south and west. Similarly, he established strongpoints on his left to block the valley of the Butuanoan River, roughly 4 miles northeast of Cebu City. Against the eventuality that the American invading forces might land north of Cebu City and strike into the Butuanoan Valley, Manjome set up another flank protective position in low hills overlooking the beach at Liloan, 10 miles northeast of Cebu City. Manjome did not intend to hold the beaches, but at both Talisay and Liloan, the best landing points in the Cebu City region, he thoroughly mined all logical landing areas. The Japanese also constructed tank barriers along the shore line and planted tank traps and minefields along all roads leading inland and toward Cebu City. The inner defense lines were a system of mutually supporting machine-gun positions in caves, pillboxes, and bunkers. Many of these positions had been completed for months and had acquired natural camouflage. Manjome's troops had an ample supply of machine guns and machine cannon and, like the Japanese on Negros, employed remounted aircraft and anti-aircraft weapons. Manjome had some light and heavy mortars, but only a few pieces of light artillery. For the rest, however, Manjome's forces were far better supplied than Kono's troops in northern Negros. After an uneventful journey, Task Group 78.2 and the Americal Division arrived off Cebu in the early hours of March 26. Following an hour of bombardment by three light cruisers and six destroyers from Admiral Berkey's Task Force 74, the leading waves of the 132nd and 182nd Regiments landed unopposed on beaches just north of Talisay at 08:30. However, the landing was chaotic, as Japanese mines just a few yards beyond the surf line disabled ten of the first fifteen LVTs. Fortunately for the Americans, Manjome had chosen to withdraw from the beaches to establish inland defenses, resulting in minimal casualties. Once they cleared the beach minefields by 10:00, Arnold's leading units cautiously advanced through abandoned defenses toward the main highway to Cebu City, ultimately stopping for the night about a mile and a half south of their objective. The following day, the infantry secured Cebu City without opposition and on March 28 proceeded to clear Lahug Airfield and Hill 30 to the north. The Americans began their assault on Go Chan Hill on March 29, during which Company A of the 182nd Regiment was completely annihilated by the explosion of an ammunition dump located in caves along the hill's eastern spur. Fueled by a desire for revenge, nearly the entire 182nd returned to the attack on March 30 and successfully captured Go Chan Hill. Meanwhile, the 132nd Regiment cleared the coastal plains area north to the Butuanoan River, further securing the city's water supply sources by April 2. Unopposed, troops from the 132nd also successfully landed on Mactan Island, quickly securing an airstrip. In the meantime, as guerrillas had already taken control of much of Masbate, the 2nd Battalion of the 108th Regiment successfully landed on the island by April 7. Facing minimal opposition, the Americans pursued the scattered Japanese remnants through the hills and jungles of Masbate, killing approximately 120 Japanese soldiers by May 4.   I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. On March 29th, the Americans attacked Go Chan Hill, suffering heavy losses. Seeking revenge, they captured it the next day, securing water supplies and defeating Japanese forces in Masbate. Then in April, Allied forces advanced strategically, overcoming fierce Japanese resistance, securing key positions, and establishing airfields, culminating in significant victories across the Philippines.

IN THIS EPISODE~ Rob Clark ("The Lone Gunman Podcast") and Doug Campbell ("The Dallas Action") are BACK with a timely marathon episode for YOU. Among the many, many topics discussed:   Of course, the HUGE news in the Assassination Research Community: the recent release of tens-of-thousands of pages of JFK Assassination Records, beginning on March 18. We will break down the now-infamous "Schlesinger Memo", and the information contained within that was redacted for 60+ years; How many pages/documents/pdf files are we talking about?; A discussion of media & Research Community reaction, and we'll give our tentative takes on the files release (and what might be in them); Dallas PD Officer Roscoe White and the "Mandarin"-documents; The strange and intriguing tale of Adele Edison and the mysterious "Dr. Rivera", who seemed to know too much about Lee Oswald in early 1963, and the guys debate "Dealey Plaza Shot-Number/Shooter Placement".PLUS, the Cuban Government smells something fishy regarding "Oswald-In-Mexico City", President Kennedy is warned early in his administration that Cuban Operations were getting "out of control", The CIA swarms the US State Department worldwide, Rob & Doug remember middle-aged hotties from the golden age of TV, Momo keeps quiet and MUCH MUCH MORE!JOIN US!Written & Hosted by Rob Clark & Doug CampbellRecorded & Engineered by Momo Scaranucci, Jr. for Drop-D Podcast ProductionsBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/quick-hits-the-jfk-assassination--3682240/support.

durée : 00:49:39 - Affaires sensibles - par : Fabrice Drouelle, Franck COGNARD - Aujourd'hui dans Affaires sensibles, Mireille Knoll, une dame juive de 85 ans est retrouvée morte dans son appartement du 11e arrondissement de Paris le 23 mars 2018, - réalisé par : Charles De Cillia

Last time we spoke about the fall of Mandalay. Fierce battles raged over northern Luzon as General Clarkson's forces advanced, capturing key locations while Colonel Volckmann's guerrillas targeted enemy positions. The challenging terrain favored Japanese defenses, creating fierce resistance. Despite this, American troops steadily progressed, securing hills and towns. By mid-March, the 38th Division's relentless push led to significant Japanese losses. The brutal history of POW massacres fueled American resolve, leading to further victories in the region, American forces, led by Major-General Jens Doe were given the task of invading Palawan. Despite facing fortified defenses and rough terrain, the 41st Division advanced under artillery and air support. Meanwhile, in Burma, British-Indian forces clashed with the Japanese, capturing key positions and repelling assaults. As tensions rose in French Indochina, the Japanese executed a coup, disarming French forces and establishing puppet governments. The conflict intensified, reshaping the region's power dynamics. This episode is the Fall of Iwo Jima Welcome to the Pacific War Podcast Week by Week, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about world war two? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on world war two and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel you can find a few videos all the way from the Opium Wars of the 1800's until the end of the Pacific War in 1945.  Today we are picking up on Iwo Jima. By March 10, General Schmidt's Marine forces had finally breached the determined enemy defenses to reach the northeastern shore of the island. However, there were still some Japanese strongholds to eliminate in the central and southern areas. One of these was Cushman's Pocket, named after the commander of the 2nd Battalion, 9th Marines, and located around a devastated ridge overlooking the sea, which housed the stubborn resistance southwest of Hill 362C. The other stronghold, held by General Senda's remaining troops, was established on March 11 after General Cates initiated his final push southeast toward the sea. Consequently, while Colonel Wensinger's 23rd Marines advanced quickly to the coast, Colonel Lanigan's 25th Marines struggled to make headway, as they were quickly halted by intense rocket, mortar, and small-arms fire from Senda's pocket. Unbeknownst to the Americans, Senda had committed suicide on March 8 following the failure of his banzai counterattack, leaving the disorganized Japanese forces in the pocket without leadership. Meanwhile, General Rockey's 5th Marine Division had advanced all the way to General Kuribayashi's last line of defense in northern Iwo Jima, where the battered defenders were prepared to make their final stand. Following a 50-minute preparation involving air, naval, and artillery support on March 11, Colonel Liversedge's 28th Marines launched their attack on the left with three battalions in line, while Colonel Wornham's 27th Marines attacked on the right with four battalions. However, fierce resistance soon forced the combat to close quarters, resulting in the Marines advancing only a few yards—up to 50 yards—across the front. To the right, while the 21st Marines advanced northward to connect with the 5th Division, Colonel Kenyon's 9th Marines resumed their assaults on Cushman's Pocket. The 1st and 3rd Battalions effectively eliminated all resistance in the eastern sector, completely sealing off the area controlled by the Japanese. On March 12, these battalions launched an attack westward toward Cushman's Pocket, with Colonel Withers' 3rd Battalion serving as a holding force on the opposite flank. However, the Marines faced strong opposition and could only advance slowly against the camouflaged enemy positions. To the north, Rocky's units continued to face intense resistance, with Liversedge making no progress and Wornham achieving only minor advances. An intelligence officer with the 5th Division estimated that a minimum of 1,000 Japanese troops were defending the northern end of the island, and stated ". . . there is no shortage of manpower, weapons, or ammunition in the area the Japanese have left to defend." The entire northern tip of the island seemed to be honeycombed with caves and passageways. When a 500-pound bomb landed in the mouth of a cave near Kitano Pint, a big puff of smoke blew out the side of a cliff over 400 yards away, and another bomb landing in a cave entrance in the same area caused a ring of smoke and dust to come up through the ground for a radius of 200 yards around the point of impact. Meanwhile, to the south, the 25th Marines pressed eastward while Colonel Jordan's 3rd Battalion contained the pocket from the north. Supported by tanks, flamethrowers, bazookas, anti-tank grenades, and 60mm mortars, Lanigan's troops engaged in fierce combat with the heavily fortified Japanese forces in the pocket for four days. During this time, Jordan's 2nd Battalion cleared the beach road, allowing the Shermans to move behind the pocket. On March 13, as Withers' 3rd Battalion returned to the 21st Marines, Kenyon's 1st and 3rd Battalions continued their offensive from the east, making significant gains that reduced Cushman's Pocket to 250 yards. Meanwhile, following a successful water-borne reconnaissance of Kama and Kangoku Rocks the previous afternoon, an armored amphibian company landed on these islets without encountering any resistance. At the same time, Rocky's weary Marines maintained pressure on the ridge above the gorge, achieving only slight gains on the right. Fortunately, by March 14, it seemed that the slow, arduous progress of the past three days had enabled the 27th Marines to push through the last strong enemy positions along the northeastern side of the island. As a result, Liversedge was instructed to hold position while the 26th and 27th Marines advanced north and northwest against lighter resistance, successfully gaining up to 1,000 yards by March 15.After armored dozers hacked paths forward, tanks were able to lend support. The flame tanks were particularly effective during this phase and provided "the one weapon that caused the Japanese to leave their caves and rock crevices and run." Army planes flew the last air support missions of the operation on 14 March when five P-51's dropped fire bombs (gasoline and diesel oil mixture) and strafed in front of 3/27 from 1030 to 1100. From then on, the narrow confines of the area of operations prevented use of those planes that had performed so well in supporting ground troops. Artillery and destroyers continued to furnish limited support, firing a preparation for RCT 26 on 15 March and performing night harassing and illumination missions. Meanwhile, operations against Cushman's Pocket entered their final phase on March 14, when Kenyon's 1st and 3rd Battalions finally breached the last enemy defenses by nightfall and completed the cleanup of the pocket two days later. On March 15, Lanigan redirected the main focus of the attack on Senda's pocket to the south, ordering the two battalions in the center to engage aggressively, resulting in a gain of approximately 200 yards and a deep penetration into the left flank of the Japanese's strongest positions. During the night, enemy forces attempted to infiltrate Marine lines from the south, but each attempt was detected and thwarted. Lanigan launched his final assault on March 16, facing only small, isolated pockets of resistance that were quickly eliminated as his battalions advanced toward the beach road. That day, with organized resistance in the 3rd Division's area of operations coming to an end, the 21st Marines were deployed to relieve the 27th Marines on the right flank to continue the northwest attack. With strong naval and artillery support, Withers' 1st Battalion encountered light resistance in its sector on the right, while the 2nd Battalion faced tougher opposition from scattered enemy positions. Nevertheless, both battalions reached the coastline at Kitano Point by the afternoon and began mopping up. To the left, Colonel Graham's 26th Marines also advanced cautiously northwest, with tanks effectively neutralizing enemy positions as the Marines gained about 400 yards. Despite the presence of 500 determined enemy troops still resisting in the western section of Kitano Point and the draw to the southwest, Iwo Jima was officially declared secured by the end of the day. However, on March 17, the battle for the gorge commenced as the 26th Marines advanced under moderate rifle fire, reaching the northern coast before shifting their focus southwestward to confront the gorge in front of the 28th Marines. The gorge in which the last resisting Japanese were now cornered was rocky and steep-sided, approximately 700 yards long and between 200 and 500 yards wide. Rock outcrops cut this ravine into other minor draws that constituted major obstacles to all types of movement. The entire area was ideally suited to the type of last ditch defense the Japanese had adopted. All routes into the main gorge were swept by heavy and accurate fire from machine guns and rifles concealed in cave positions in the cliffs and outcrops. The plan for attacking this strong point called for the 28th Marines, with attached elements of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and Division Reconnaissance Company, to hold the southern rim along the steep cliffs, while the reinforced 26th Marines worked in from the north and east. For the next nine days exhausted Marines carried out a battle of attrition against the thoroughly entrenched enemy. Advances into the east end of the ravine were measured in yards as each cave had to be sealed off before further progress could be made. Flame-thrower tanks, armored bulldozers, and infantry combined operations to provide the power and teamwork necessary to penetrate the last stronghold. As they gradually pushed down the ravine, resistance concentrated around a large concrete structure built into a knoll near the eastern end. After two days of assaults that silenced the supporting positions, engineers used bulldozers to seal a door on the north side and then demolished the structure with five charges totaling 8,500 pounds of explosives. Nevertheless, the battle of attrition persisted, and it wasn't until the end of March 24 that the pocket was reduced to an area of about 50 by 50 yards at the northwest end of the draw. The following morning, units of the 28th Marines, which had taken full responsibility for the pocket, reached the coastal cliffs to finally eliminate the last remnants of resistance in the gorge. On March 20, the 147th Regiment, set to take over the defense of Iwo Jima, arrived from New Caledonia, and by March 24, it had relieved the 21st Marines to establish night ambushes and patrols. The Japanese defenders fought tenaciously until the very end, choosing death over surrender. However, Kuribayashi had one final assault planned. In the pre-dawn darkness of March 26, the final act of the tragedy was performed. Between 200 and 300 Japanese troops from Death Valley and other scattered positions on the west coast silently crept through the ravines of the 5th Division sector headed for a tented area between Airfield No. 2 and the sea occupied by a mixture of Seabees, Air Force personnel, Shore Parties and AA Gunners. Most of them were sleeping, secure in the knowledge that the battle was virtually over. In a coordinated three-pronged attack against unsuspecting Marines and Air Force ground crews, aiming to create maximum chaos and destruction. Kuribayashi and his men stealthily cut through tents, bayoneted sleeping soldiers, and threw hand grenades, resulting in the deaths of around 44 Airmen and 9 Marines. The noise soon alerted troops from the surrounding area, and Marines from a nearby Pioneer Battalion, african american troops from a Shore Party, and soldiers from the 147th Infantry joined battle in a frenzy of shooting, punching, kicking and stabbing. Once the initial surprise wore off, the defenders retaliated, engaging in a chaotic hand-to-hand combat until the 5th Pioneer Battalion quickly organized a defensive line and halted the attack. Dawn revealed the full extent of the carnage in the ruined encampment: 44 Airman and 9 Marines lay dead with a further 119 wounded; of the attackers 262 were killed and 18 captured. Lt Harry Martin of the 5th Pioneers had hurriedly organized a defense line during the attack and single-handedly killed four enemy machine gunners before dying himself. He was to be Iwo Jima's final Medal of Honor hero, bringing the total to an incredible 27.  The circumstances of General Kuribayashi's death have always been shrouded in mystery. Over the years various sources have suggested that he died in the fighting around Death Valley or that he killed himself in his HQ. According to General Kuribayashi's son, Taro: “It seems that it was after sunset on March 25 to the dawn of the 26th that surviving Imperial Japanese forces were obliged to stand still under the US onslaught and showering shells. Under such circumstances, he had his sword in his left hand and ordered the chief staff officer, Colonel Takaishi, who was beside him, 'Send snipers to shoot'. Sargent Oyama heard the order. Oyama, who was seriously wounded in the last combat, fell unconscious, was hospitalized by the US and after having served as a POW came back and testified the dreadful account of the night to me. My father had believed it shameful to have his body discovered by the enemy even after death, so he had previously asked his two soldiers to come along with him, one in front and the other behind, with a shovel in hand. In case of his death he had wanted them to bury his body there and then. It seems that my father and the soldiers were killed by shells, and he was buried at the foot of a tree in Chidori Village, along the beach near Osaka Mountain. Afterwards General Smith spent a whole day looking for his body to pay respect accordingly and to perform a burial, but in vain.” Following the destruction of this final force, the capture and occupation phase of the Iwo Jima operation was declared complete. Over 34 days of combat, approximately 18,000 Japanese soldiers were killed, and 216 were taken prisoner, while the American side suffered heavy losses: 6,821 killed, 19,217 wounded, and 137 tanks destroyed. On April 4, the 147th Regiment took over full responsibility for the ground defense of Iwo Jima as the Marines were departing the island. Throughout April and May, aggressive patrols and ambushes by infantrymen resulted in an additional 867 prisoners and 1,602 Japanese killed, with the Americans losing 15 killed and 144 wounded. Meanwhile, General LeMay's 21st Bomber Command continued its firebombing campaign against Japan. After the successful Tokyo Great Air Raid and a less effective attack on Nagoya, LeMay decided to send 301 B-29s on the afternoon of March 13 to strike Osaka. Despite having to use radar bombing due to cloud cover, American bombardiers achieved a denser and more uniform bombing pattern than the impressionistic methods employed in Nagoya. This resulted in the destruction of 8.1 square miles in the city's core, including commercial and industrial areas, and caused 13,129 civilian casualties, with the loss of 2 bombers and 13 others damaged. Keeping up the intensity of the firebombing campaign, LeMay dispatched 307 B-29s to attack Kobe on the night of March 16. They faced 314 enemy interceptors, which proved ineffective against the Superfortresses unleashing fire over the port. Consequently, the fire on March 17 spiraled out of control, obliterating the eastern half of the business district and devastating a significant industrial zone to the southeast, including the Kawasaki shipyards. Japanese statistics show that the destruction was appalling. About 500 industrial buildings were destroyed, 162 damaged. The loss of 65,951 houses left 242,468 persons homeless. Police reported 2,669 dead or missing and 11,289 injured. Although the destruction was devastating for the Japanese, LeMay was disheartened to find that only 2.9 square miles of the city had burned. To complete his campaign, LeMay sent 313 bombers back to Nagoya on the night of March 19, utilizing radar techniques to cover a large portion of the city. This resulted in the burning of 3 square miles, including the Nagoya arsenal, freight yards, and Aichi's engine works. With an average of 380 aircraft, the 21st Bomber Command conducted 1,595 sorties over 10 days, dropping a total of 9,365 tons of bombs. The results far exceeded expectations, as the B-29s left a trail of destruction across four major cities, decimating 32 square miles and destroying numerous critical targets. Thus, LeMay's strategy proved successful, leading to incendiary area bombing becoming standard practice in the future. The focus now shifts from the Central Pacific to the South Pacific, where we need to address the ongoing Australian operations in New Britain. Following the capture of Milim and Ea Ea in January, General Ramsay's 5th Division aimed to continue its limited advances to the north. To secure crossings over the Ip River and patrol towards Henry Reid Bay, the entire 6th Brigade began moving to the Kiep-Milim area on January 26, completing this relocation by February 11. Concurrently, the 14th/32nd Battalion had advanced beyond the Ip and was conducting patrols towards Kalai Plantation, where they faced enemy resistance. The 36th Battalion also moved forward to Mavelo Plantation, leading to retaliatory actions against the new Australian outpost at Baia. In response, Ramsay dispatched stronger patrols to the Sai River throughout February, successfully establishing a new defensive line along the Mavelo River by the month's end. Returning to Wide Bay, after a series of aggressive patrols and nighttime ambushes, the 14th/32nd Battalion managed to reach Kamandran Mission by mid-February. The Australians continued to advance, and by the end of the month, the 19th Battalion, which had replaced the 14th/32nd at Gogbulu Creek, secured crossings over the Mevelo River and patrolled east toward the Wulwut River. On March 3, Ramsay ordered the 6th Brigade to cross the Wulwut and capture the Waitavalo Ridge. Two days later, the 19th Battalion initiated the assault but struggled to push more than one company across the river due to fierce enemy resistance. On March 6, following an artillery bombardment, another company successfully crossed and quickly seized Cake Hill. The next day, Lone Tree Hill was taken following another round of artillery bombardment. By March 10, Moose Hill, Young's Hill, and Perry's Knoll had also been captured. In the days that followed, Australian artillery began to suppress enemy mortars as infantry moved toward Kath's Hill. By mid-March, the 14th/32nd Battalion replaced the 19th Battalion, and on March 16, the Australians resumed their offensive, facing fierce resistance but successfully encircling Bacon Hill. The assault continued the next day as the 14th/32nd fought to reach the summit of the hill. On 18th March the mortar fire was intensified from the few remaining enemy positions, and it seemed that the Japanese were firing off their ammunition while they could. The attack was resumed. When Corporal Martin's section was halted on the steep spur by fire from three posts he jumped up shouting, "They can't do that to me", and went on alone, firing posts, killing five, before he himself was hit. The decisive attack was launched through this foothold. By 3 p.m. all the Japanese had been cleared from Bacon Hill; and a patrol from Kath's, under Lieutenant Lamshed,3 penetrated to a knoll 800 yards to the east and found no enemy there. No Japanese now remained in the Waitavalo-Tol area. In the five days from the 16th to the 20th 4 officers and 53 others had been killed or wounded.  In the following days, patrols ventured deep into enemy territory but found few stragglers. On March 21, the 19th Battalion took over again and advanced toward the Bulus and Moondei Rivers. On March 28, Ramsay ordered the 13th Brigade to relieve the 6th Brigade, a transition that was completed by April 12. Following the capture of Waitavalo Ridge, there were four months of infantry patrolling and routine maintenance by other troops, with the 16th Battalion patrolling forward to Jammer Bay in this area. Additionally, looking west, a company from the 36th Battalion successfully landed north of the Sai on March 30 but could not proceed to the Matalaili River due to heavy rains. However, Japanese positions there were heavily bombarded by aircraft and the sloop Swan, prompting the defenders to withdraw to the Toriu River in April. Meanwhile, Brigadier King's 16th Brigade advanced to the Ninahau River by March 12, while Brigadier Moten's 17th Brigade continued its westward push through the Torricelli Mountains, aiming to capture the Japanese base at Maprik. Throughout March, the 2/7th Battalion executed several successful ambushes from their new bases at Ilahop, Balangabadabil, and Bombeta, while Hayforce advanced through Sinahau to the north of Utumugu and eastward to Tatimba. By early March, Moten had cleverly led the enemy to believe that the primary offensive would be launched by the 2/10th Commando Squadron from the north via Ami. As a result, the Japanese bolstered their forces in that area, successfully driving back Australian patrols from Chaulak, Gwanginan, and Wambak. On March 13, the commando outpost at Milak came under attack, with the Japanese gradually encircling the position in the following days but failing to overcome the defenders' steadfast resistance. Fortunately, by March 17, patrols had restored communication lines, and two days later, the enemy pressure finally subsided. During this time, smaller Japanese forces also targeted the commando outposts at Murak and Aupik, but the defenders managed to repel these attacks as well. However, as the 2/10th was completely exhausted, the 2/6th Battalion was dispatched to relieve the commandos in late March amid a new wave of Japanese assaults. Meanwhile, the 2/7th Battalion was engaged in assaults on the fortified enemy positions at Ilaheta, which fell on March 20. The Australians then turned their attention to the Aupik villages, successfully focusing their efforts on the west bank of the Ninab River by the end of March, coinciding with Hayforce's crossing of the Amuk River. In the following three days, the 2/7th Battalion cleared all opposition along the eastern side of the Ninab in preparation for the final push toward Maprik. Consequently, General Miyake's 78th Regiment was ultimately compelled to retreat toward Jamei. Looking further north, King decided to initiate his advance towards But. By mid-March, a company from the 2/2nd Battalion had crossed the Ninahau on March 14 and quickly moved through Bai and Ultan. Although the Australian advance faced a strong enemy position that delayed progress for two days, the 2/2nd ultimately broke through Manib Creek, catching the defenders off guard and swiftly capturing the But airfield on March 17. Following this, the Australians patrolled the foothills and the Old German Road towards the Dagua airfield, encountering minimal resistance. Consequently, on March 21, the 2/2nd advanced rapidly again, successfully taking Dagua while the 2/1st Battalion moved in to secure But. At this stage, Japanese resistance along the coast was light, as General Adachi had focused on the Maprik district, which could produce more food. With the main enemy forces now concentrated in the hills to the south, King directed the 2/2nd to clear the foothills south of Dagua and eliminate the enemy in the Tokoku Pass, while the 2/3rd Battalion launched a flanking attack in the Mabam River-Hamsuk-Yalaminuni area. The 2/2nd then patrolled deep towards Magahen and Wonginara Mission, facing strong resistance at the 1410 Feature. On March 24, they finally captured the feature, while another patrol reached Wonginara without encountering enemy forces. However, in the final days of March, the Australians struggled to advance against the strong resistance of the Japanese defenders on the Wonginara Track, although one patrol successfully probed towards Kauremerak Hill. On April 2, following intense air and artillery bombardments, the 2/2nd Battalion finally managed to break through to Tokoku Pass, which was secured the next day. Meanwhile, another patrol advanced south from Dagua to the Autogi-Walanduum area and then to the coast near Kofi. The 2/3rd Battalion moved south from Feature 1410 towards the Mabam River and Wonginara Mission, successfully eliminating a series of Japanese ridge positions by April 6. The 2/1st Battalion patrolled deep into the hills south and west of But, completely clearing the area by April 1 while also pushing eastward to capture Saburuman. Concurrently, the 2/3rd Machine-Gun Battalion advanced to the upper Ninahau, effectively clearing the region up to a north-south line about two miles beyond Muguluwela by the end of March. In early April, the machine-gunners successfully cleared the Marabus area and connected with the 2/1st Battalion. Finally, it was time to shift focus to Bougainville to continue covering the Australian offensives on the island. As previously noted, Brigadier Stevenson's 11th Brigade had secured the Tsimba Ridge area, while Brigadier Field's 7th Brigade was advancing south towards the Puriata River. The swift capture of Mosigetta and the unexpected secondary landing at Toko had already compelled the Japanese to retreat behind the river amid a command crisis. The Japanese policy of resisting the southward advance more strongly even if it entailed heavier casualties failed to impose the hoped-for delay of the Australians. Nevertheless the Japanese leaders considered that the 13th Regiment's "swift damaging hit-and-run tactics" were well executed. However, Mosigetta was at length abandoned and a withdrawal south of the Puriata ordered. The landing at Toko was unexpected and caused an acceleration of this withdrawal. There now occurred a major crisis in the Japanese command. The young reserve officers were highly critical of the conduct of the campaign and blamed the policies of the older professional officers for the constant reverses. This criticism became so outspoken that, in February, a number of the younger officers were relieved of their commands; perhaps partly as an outcome of this crisis, General Hyakutake suffered a paralysis of his left side. General Kanda took command of the 17th Army and Lieutenant-General Akinaga Tsutomu, Chief of Staff of the Army, succeeded him in command of the 6th Division. "This change of command was regarded favourably by the younger officers, but it soon became apparent that Kanda intended to pursue the same policy as Hyakutake. Kanda was a shrewd, hard, fussy little professional soldier of long experience. He was steeped in tradition and a ruthless commander, but even his bitterest critics admitted his capabilities. Akinaga… was a dyed in the wool militarist and a strict disciplinarian. Unused to an active command he was plunged into a situation which was a little out of his depth. One of his staff stated that he spent too much time doing a corporal's job in his forward battalions to be a good divisional commander." In late February, General Bridgeford's forces advanced toward the Puriata, facing only minor rearguard positions. The 25th Battalion captured Barara on February 22 and a five-acre garden two days later, while the 61st Battalion took control of another garden measuring 600 by 400 yards near the river on March 1. Meanwhile, the 2/8th Commando Squadron was sent to secure the Makapeka area, successfully taking Commando Ridge and a ford across the Makapeka River by March 5. With General Savige aiming to reach the Hari River next, Bridgeford promptly ordered the 7th Brigade to move to the Hongorai River line. As a result, Field planned to initiate his main advance on March 11, utilizing the 25th Battalion and the 2/8th Commando Squadron, while the 61st Battalion pushed forward toward Horinu. In response, Kanda dispatched the 23rd Regiment to bolster the 13th at the front, preparing both units for a full-scale counterattack should the Australians cross the Puriata, aiming to delay the enemy long enough to finalize preparations for a decisive battle along the Silibai-Porror Rivers. By March 5, the 25th Battalion had already crossed the river and swiftly captured Slater's Knoll, which soon came under enemy mortar fire. Patrols were sent ahead and found that the 13th Regiment was poised to fiercely contest the Australian advance. Although the northern flank of the 25th Battalion would be effectively contained along the Buin Road on March 11, two Australian companies managed to maneuver through Tokinotu to the south, reaching Hiru Hiru by the end of the day. One of these companies moved along the eastern side of the Buin Road toward Slater's Knoll, but from March 15 to 17, they faced a heavy counterattack that ultimately forced them to withdraw. In response, Field initiated a strong offensive along the Buin Road on March 19, managing to push the Japanese back to some rear positions. Following a significant air and artillery bombardment, the attack resumed on March 22, successfully overcoming all enemy resistance. Meanwhile, the commandos advanced to Nihero, where they began extensive patrols southward towards Unanai, Hari, and the Buin Road. During one of these patrols, they captured detailed orders for a large-scale Japanese offensive planned for early April. As a result, Bridegeford decided to pause his offensive and send the 15th Brigade along with a tank squadron to Toko to reinforce his perimeter. On March 28 and 29, before Akinaga's main assault, the Japanese conducted a series of raids on the Australian lines of communication and rear areas, all of which were successfully repelled by vigilant defenders. On March 30, the 13th Regiment launched several strong attacks against the 25th Battalion, all of which were costly for the attackers and repelled, while the armored squadron advanced toward Tokinotu. Just as the tanks reached the front, the Japanese initiated another wave of fierce attacks against the 25th Battalion on March 31, which were thankfully repelled with the support of the armored units. Consequently, on April 1, two companies advanced again, establishing a perimeter 1,000 yards south of Slater's Knoll. That evening, and for the following three days, Akinaga launched a series of raids to facilitate the arrival of the 23rd Regiment for a renewed assault. In the early hours of April 5, the Japanese began infiltrating the Australian perimeter, launching a vigorous two-pronged assault on Slater's Knoll later that morning. The 23rd Regiment attacked about 1,000 yards to the right of the 13th and north-east of it. The attack failed, Kawano was killed and the regiment withdrew south to the rear of the 13th. The 13th Regiment with 600 men made the main attack from north and east.  Until 6.20 a.m. wave after wave charged forward and was brought low. Some Japanese fell within four yards of the weapon-pits. The artillery sent over accurate defensive fire, registered the previous day. At dawn the surviving Japanese were heard digging in on dead ground. As the light became clearer, the Australians saw that "enemy dead lay, literally, in heaps in front of the wire", and bodies could be seen scattered over an area some 200 yards square. It was gruesome evidence of the efficient siting of weapons and choice of fields of fire in preparation for expected attack. The attackers were ordered to dig in until darkness and make full use of grenades and mortars. However, in the afternoon, tanks and artillery fire drove the Japanese from the positions they had gained, and the Japanese commander accepted defeat. All three battalion commanders in the 13th were killed. After Akinaga had reported his failure Kanda said to his Chief of Staff, Colonel Yoshiyuki Ejima: "It would not have happened if I had been in command. The enemy right flank was wide open. I would have severed his life line and controlled Toko. We could have delayed the enemy for three months."  Concurrently, around 100 Japanese troops attacked the two forward companies along the Buin Road but were similarly repelled with ease. Following the unsuccessful counteroffensive by Akinaga, Slater's Knoll received reinforcements while the remaining Japanese forces were being dealt with, resulting in 620 Japanese fatalities since March 28, compared to 189 Australian casualties. However, Bridgeford could not capitalize on this victory due to the prolonged supply line, which temporarily halted his offensive. As a result, while the 2/8th Commando Squadron moved forward along the Commando Road, the 13th Brigade began to relieve the battered 7th Brigade under Field on April 13. Meanwhile, in the northern sector of the 11th Brigade area, the 26th Battalion launched a significant advance northward on February 21, successfully overrunning the Lalum-Downs' Ridge area by March 8. Two companies then advanced further north to secure the crossing of the Nagam River. On March 13, another company landed near the southern edge of Soraken Plantation and quickly pushed the enemy back behind the Nagam. Australian patrols harassed the Japanese forces at Horseshoe Knoll until March 20, when they finally withdrew. Simultaneously, the 26th Battalion eliminated the remaining enemy positions at the Compton River and secured the Soraken Peninsula, while the Taiof and Saposa Islands were also captured off the coast. The next battalion to take over the forward positions was the 31st/51st Battalion. Perhaps the outstanding patrol leader in the 31st/51st was Lieutenant Reiter, who led out 3 patrols which killed 10 out of the 78 Japanese killed by this battalion's forays. One of these patrols was named by the battalion "the raid on Reiter's Ridge". Reiter and 15 men were given the task of harassing the Japanese occupying a prominent ridge just east of Sisivie and discovering their strength. They departed from Keenan's Ridge at 17:30 on March 27, bivouacked at a former artillery observation post and moved on at 03:00 next morning for a dawn attack. At 06:00 “the patrol moved in, and throwing grenades and firing LMG occupied a small knoll (its report stated). 2 Japanese were killed and 1 pillbox containing LMG destroyed. Patrol raced down narrow neck to a wide clearing in which several huts were sighted. Phosphorus and HE grenades were thrown. In a matter of seconds 4 more Japanese killed (2 in slit trenches, 1 as he ran and another while abluting). 2 were wounded by phosphorus grenades. 3 huts were blazing and 1 (considered to be an ammunition dump) blew up. Enemy opened up with one LMG and 15 rifles and patrol pulled out with 1 man wounded.” Instead of hastening them away Reiter assembled his men nearby in concealment and watched the enemy. At length Japanese began to move about again, and soon they were washing clothes, chopping wood and performing other tasks. There were from 25 to 30 enemy in the post. The Australians watched throughout the morning and at 12:30 opened fire with all their weapons. 2 Japanese were killed and 4 more huts set on fire. The enemy fired back, and at 01:15 Reiter withdrew his men and returned to Keenan's Ridge leaving an ambush on the enemy's track. The ambush party returned later and reported that it had seen no movement.  On the 29th, the day after Reiter's return, a platoon of the 1st New Guinea Infantry Battalion under Lieutenant Martin set out for Buritsiotorara along the Wakunai River. There they found three huts and a large garden with seven Japanese moving about unarmed. Throwing grenades and firing from the hip the native soldiers attacked and killed all seven. Three more who emerged from a hut were chased and killed. Three of the dead men were found to be lieutenants; three machine-guns were cap-tured. Next day at Aviang, 1,200 yards away, seven more Japanese were seen, of whom three including another lieutenant were killed and the others fled. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The battle for Iwo Jima had come to a bitter end. The lessons learnt on Iwo Jima would become guidelines for the Battle of Okinawa in April and would influence allied plans for the invasion of the Japanese home islands. The war planners would later notably take into account that around a third of the troops committed to Iwo Jima, and later again at Okinawa, had been killed or wounded and that they could expect far more in Japan.

Supporta BLMP genom att bli en patron! Spana in de olika alternativen på http://www.patreon.com/blmetalpodcast Eller bidra genom att swisha: 0708-961174 Biljetter till Malmö Massacre: https://nortic.se/ticket/event/66525 Mäktigt ändå att man får podda och att vi kan lyssna på HÅRD rock tillsammans! Mycket missnöje! Playlist: Wolfbrigade - Hide and Seek Dakini - A Religion without a Goddess is halfway to Atheism Dead Chasm - Spectral Tyranny Dormant Ordeal - Halo of Bones Hate Eternal - Spiritual Holocaust Knoll - As Spoken Obscureviolence - Refuting the Flesh 7 Seconds - Regress No Way I samarbete med Medborgarskolan.

Check out the latest episode of the Black Lincoln Collective Podcast for a laugh-packed adventure! This week, we're talking about Fred's chaotic trip to Dallas, where nothing went as planned. From battling hotel sickness to exploring the iconic Fort Worth Stockyards, Fred shares his funny travel mishaps and the struggle of getting around the city without a car. The crew breaks down the craziness of overpriced convenience store items and the unique charm of Texas hospitality.And that's not all! Get ready for the epic Roast of Fred, featuring the funniest and most brutal listener submissions. With sharp jokes and clever comebacks, the guys take on the best roasts, leaving Fred both cracking up and squirming. And, of course, it's Whack History month, and we're looking at the whackest foods of all time. Don't miss this episode full of hilarious travel stories, witty commentary, and unforgettable moments. Tune in now and join the fun! #blcpodcast #podcastingforthepeople #funny #podcast #greenvillesc #scpodcast #yeahthatgreenville Listen at: https://blc.world/ Tweet the Show: https://twitter.com/blcworld Follow us on Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/blcpodcast/ Check us out on Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/blcpodcast/ Buy Fred and Allan Beer: https://www.patreon.com/blcworld

Was machen, nachdem der Wald gebrannt hat? Pierre Ibisch hat im Forschungsprojekt Pyrophob untersucht, wie sich Eingriffe des Menschen nach einem Brand auf den Wald auswirken. Ergebnis: Am besten erholt sich der Wald, wenn er in Ruhe gelassen wird. Knoll, Christiane www.deutschlandfunk.de, Forschung aktuell

Knoll, Christiane www.deutschlandfunk.de, Forschung aktuell

Coyne and Knoll return with Super Bowl and Season Long Prop recaps (11:39). Next, the guys draft remakes and covers in the Remake America Great Again Draft (34:25). Lastly, Knoll tries to stump Coyne (1:02:15).

The Black Lincoln Collective Comedy Podcast: Episode #93 on PopCulturePros (or #178 if you've survived this long)Title: Assy KnollHold on to your hats (and your stomachs), because this week's episode is a chaotic travel tale, a roast fest, and a whack history celebration all rolled into one glorious mess.First up: Fred's disastrous trip to Dallas. If you've ever wondered what happens when you mix hotel-induced illness, no car, and a trip to the Fort Worth Stockyards, you're about to find out. It's a story of cowboy hats, overpriced beef jerky, and the kind of Texas hospitality that says, “Bless your heart,” but also charges $9 for a bottle of water.But the real magic? It's the Roast of Fred. We opened the inbox, and y'all did not hold back. Listeners came with scorched earth energy, and we loved every minute of it. Fred? Not so much. Whether it's his wardrobe, his hot takes, or his “sick in Texas” saga, no part of him was safe—and it's hilarious.And because we're still celebrating Whack History Month, the crew dives into a list of the whackest foods of all time. Jellied meats? Canned cheeseburgers? Raisin hot dogs? You'll laugh. You'll gag. You'll question humanity.So tune in to Episode #93 for comedy, chaos, and more salt than Fred's hotel snacks. It's Assy Knoll—and it's exactly as weird as it sounds.

Die Ursachen für chronische Darmkrankheiten wie Morbus Crohn sind noch nicht erforscht. Aber bekannt ist, dass eine bestimmte Genvariation schützt. Das Wissen über diese Steinzeit-Gene hilft auch bei der Entwicklung von Medikamenten. Knoll, Christiane www.deutschlandfunk.de, Forschung aktuell

Knoll, Christiane www.deutschlandfunk.de, Forschung aktuell

Send us a textEthics and Obligation of Healing

Heather Srigley is VP of Marketing at NeuReality. She held leadership roles driving go-to-market, brand building, demand creation, and product launch across B2B, B2C, and B2E marketing and communications. She built her 25+ year experience at Intel, Dow, Chemical, and Vacasa before founding The Brand Bunker in 2020. Website: https://www.neureality.ai/ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/heather-srigley/ Yoel Knoll has led marketing, product marketing, media, and investor relations teams across Israel and internationally and has over 20 years of experience doing so. At companies like Quantum Machines, OTORIO, Ceragon, and Infineon, he built and managed global teams to drive demand generation, content strategy, product marketing, and event management. His leadership has been pivotal in successful M&A communications, market expansions into the U.S. and Europe, and high-impact digital and offline campaigns. Yoel's expertise spans cybersecurity, quantum computing, and telecommunications, with deep experience in branding, media, demand generation, event management, and public relations. Website: https://www.quantum-machines.co/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/quantummachines LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/yoel-knoll YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/c/QuantumMachines In this episode, we uncover Heather Srigley's journey with NeuReality and Yoel Knoll's quantum tech innovations, and how AI, storytelling, and account-based marketing redefine success in today's tech landscape.   Apply to join our marketing mastermind group: https://notypicalmoments.typeform.com/to/hWLDNgjz Follow No Typical Moments at: Website: https://notypicalmoments.com/ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/no-typical-moments-llc/ YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC4G7csw9j7zpjdASvpMzqUA Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/notypicalmoments Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/NTMoments

Heather Srigley is VP of Marketing at NeuReality. She held leadership roles driving go-to-market, brand building, demand creation, and product launch across B2B, B2C, and B2E marketing and communications. She built her 25+ year experience at Intel, Dow, Chemical, and Vacasa before founding The Brand Bunker in 2020. Website: https://www.neureality.ai/ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/heather-srigley/ Yoel Knoll has led marketing, product marketing, media, and investor relations teams across Israel and internationally and has over 20 years of experience doing so. At companies like Quantum Machines, OTORIO, Ceragon, and Infineon, he built and managed global teams to drive demand generation, content strategy, product marketing, and event management. His leadership has been pivotal in successful M&A communications, market expansions into the U.S. and Europe, and high-impact digital and offline campaigns. Yoel's expertise spans cybersecurity, quantum computing, and telecommunications, with deep experience in branding, media, demand generation, event management, and public relations. Website: https://www.quantum-machines.co/ Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/quantummachines LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/yoel-knoll YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/c/QuantumMachines In this episode, we uncover Heather Srigley's journey with NeuReality and Yoel Knoll's quantum tech innovations, and how AI, storytelling, and account-based marketing redefine success in today's tech landscape.   Apply to join our marketing mastermind group: https://notypicalmoments.typeform.com/to/hWLDNgjz Follow No Typical Moments at: Website: https://notypicalmoments.com/ LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/company/no-typical-moments-llc/ YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UC4G7csw9j7zpjdASvpMzqUA Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/notypicalmoments Facebook: https://www.facebook.com/NTMoments

Coyne and Knoll are finally back with some beers, and they simply need to talk about the Luka trade (11:04). Next, some takeaways from the 2024 NFL season (22:52), including Knoll's top five Commanders moments of the year (49:17). Most importantly, it's time for Super Bowl Propapalooza (1:02:22)! Lastly, Coyne tries to Stump Knoll with some Super Bowl trivia (1:25:18).

This week, we profile a character who burst onto the drag racing scene in a gigantic way through the early 2000's, pouring massive funding into the sport, but what nobody knew was that money, belonged to the U.S. taxpayers, its Evan Knoll! Find us: X- @racingcrime Instagram- @racecarsandjailbars Facebook.com/racecarsandjailbars racecarsandjailbars@gmail.com

Join retired Secret Service agent Todd Hiles and retired FBI agent Stewart Fillmore as they take you under the crime scene tape and back to one of the most infamous cases in American history: The JFK Assassination. Kicking off the highly anticipated Season 2 of Back in Crime, this three-part series begins with The South Knoll Shooter. Questions have been flooding in after a groundbreaking discovery by Texas Crime Travelers, who uncovered new evidence that could rewrite history. Sound familiar? This case captured the world's attention, and the mystery has only deepened with the recent announcement that President Trump will be declassifying the JFK files. With expert insight and engaging storytelling, Hiles and Fillmore analyze the history-altering revelation, retrace the investigation, and weigh in on what the new evidence could mean. Join them as they unpack this decades-old mystery and reveal the shocking twists that await. Corresponding images: https://open.substack.com/pub/texascrimetravelers/p/case-16-the-jfk-assassination-the?r=55ik6v&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true Full 60 page essay: https://open.substack.com/pub/texascrimetravelers/p/new-photographic-and-physical-evidence?r=55ik6v&utm_campaign=post&utm_medium=web&showWelcomeOnShare=true Follow Texas Crime Travelers: TikTok: ⁠https://www.tiktok.com/@texascrimetra...⁠ Instagram: ⁠https://instagram.com/texascrimetrave...⁠ Facebook: ⁠https://www.facebook.com/texascrimetr...⁠ Substack: https://substack.com/@texascrimetravelers https://texascrimetravelers.com/ Have a specific case in mind that you'd like us to explore or just want to get in touch?  Case Request/Contact Form: ⁠https://forms.gle/hynpjFrKEVvG6FWw9⁠ For business inquiries or opportunities to sponsor our next podcast episode, please reach out to us at ⁠hello@texascrimetravelers.com   Music by: Eddie Bandas Contact: edbandas@outlook.com

Have you ever heard of the secret underwater base 3 miles off the coast of Malibu? Let's learn together about Sycamore Knoll, and all of the controversy and possibilities of what this 5 square mile structure is. With the situation in LA being what it is, how have we never learned about this place before? Is it an underwater submarine docking station for the US military? Is it an ancient Native built structure thousands of years old? Is it a launching platform for the orbs and UAPs??? Let's OPEN UP THAT THIRD EYE together and find out!To sign up for our Patreon go to-> Patreon.com/cultofconspiracypodcast   To Join the Cajun Knight Patreon---> Patreon.com/cajunknight  To Find The Cajun Knight Youtube Channel---> click here  10% OFF Rife Machine---> https://rifemachine.myshopify.com/?rfsn=7689156.6a9b5c   To find the Meta Mysteries Podcast---> https://open.spotify.com/show/6IshwF6qc2iuqz3WTPz9Wv?si=3a32c8f730b34e79    50% OFF Adam&Eve products---> :adameve.com (promo code : CULT) To Sign up for our Rokfin go to --> Rokfin.com/cultofconspiracy    Cult Of Conspiracy Linktree ---> https://linktr.ee/cultofconspiracyBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/cult-of-conspiracy--5700337/support.

Knoll, Christiane www.deutschlandfunk.de, Forschung aktuell

Knoll, Christiane www.deutschlandfunk.de, Lebenszeit

Knoll, Christiane; www.deutschlandfunk.de, Forschung aktuell

Knoll, Christiane; www.deutschlandfunk.de, Forschung aktuell

This week, we chat with you from the Dublin World Cup, in Ireland. This is Maghalie's first race back in Europe and the spirits are high! We also have a special guest, as 17 year old Canadian racer Nico Knoll joins the podcast. Nico shares her story as she is on a 2 month European trip - by herself - to race cyclocross. We are very impressed and inspired by Nico's maturity and dedication to her sport and wanted to hear more about how she manages such a big endeavour to follow her dreams! We also hear from our friend and team photographer/videographer Alexandra, and she shares her impressions of her first Cyclocross World Cup!This episode is brought to you by Hammerhead. Use code "FEVER-HRM" at check out to get a free Heart Rate Monitor with the purchase of your Karoo cycling computer. Plus, you'll get a 50$ gift car for Velocio if you purchase before January 6th.

Recorded Monday 11/18: Coyne and Knoll return for beers and football (14:15). The guys pitch the next fight for Jake Paul (30:29). Bookie Show picks are retroactive for Week 12, so you can laugh at our losses (44:48). Lastly, Knoll gives Coyne some trivia in Stumptown (55:42).

In today's episode we are chatting with my fellow former corporate gal, business coach and founder of The Consultant Code - Holly Knoll. Aside from business coaching, Holly is the host of The Everyday Entrepreneur podcast, creator of The Vine - a community for like-minded professional women in Minneapolis and runs a tech consulting company to assist CIO's and their teams in maturing and growing their operations. Living in Minneapolis, Holly loves to be a dog mom to her Cavalier King Charles Maggie and is always planning her next international adventure. In this episode, we get into: - our own personal transition stories from our corporate careers to entrepreneurship - steps that you can take while still working your 9-5 to prepare to take your next big leap (whatever that may be) - strategies to start building your network while you're still punching someone else's clock CONNECT WITH HOLLY: Instagram: @hollyknoll LinkedIn: Holly Knoll Fire Yourself + Hire Yourself Freebie: Business Blueprint Podcast: Everyday Entrepreneur Podcast | S.4 E.47 When, Why and How to Pivot Your Business with Haley Westfall CONNECT WITH HALEY Instagram: @thehaleywestfall LinkedIn: Haley Westfall Live Event: The Table Experience Live 2/21-2/22/25 in Tempe, Arizona: Get Your Tickets 20 Minute Tactical Audio Training: Table Talk - 4 Steps to Maximizing In Person Events