Podcasts about Araki

I dagens episode introduserer Runar og Julie Karin for den vidunderlige rare verdenen til den nye skeive filmbevegelsen på 1990-tallet, og en av dens nøkkelpersoner, filmskaper Gregg Araki. Vi diskuterer alt fra romvesener til kommunisme, og hva som kjennetegner Araki som filmskaper. Filmene som diskuteres i dagens epiosde er Nowhere (1997), Mysterious Skin (2004) og Smiley Face (2007).

Greg Araki's The Doom Generation  This week Mr. Chavez & I explore the 1990s with a cult film that is remembered as an early classic of New Queer Cinema. Greg Araki's The Doom Generation is remembered as a violent and trashy exploration of 1990s alternative cinmea.  A Gen X Bisexual Bonnie & Clyde/Badlands profile of alienation and stylized camp, Araki's film is the second edition of his "Teen Apocalypse Trilogy". For Mr. Chavez the episode is a nostalgic look at a film that left an impression; for me, the film is an attempt to understand a genre that was somehow missed. We both dive into a discussion sliding through our memories of the decade and our attitudes on what the genre and respective films would mean to a voice that had only been hinted at and often censored.  Take a listen and let us know what you think. As always, we can be reached at gondoramos@yahoo.com - Many, Many Thanks. For those of you who would like to donate to this undying labor of love, you can do so with a contribution at https://www.buymeacoffee.com/watchrickramos - Anything and Everything is appreciated, You Cheap Bastards.

RSS/iTunes/Spotify Check out the full Bartel Me Something Good archive right here On this free-wheeling episode of BARTEL ME SOMETHING GOOD we’re doubling up with two films featuring notable Paul Bartel ACTING performances. Uh.. kinda. We start with the cult-classic killer robots in a mall horror film CHOPPING MALL, directed by Jim Wynorski. With an all-star cast including Kelli Maroney, Barbara Crampton, DICK MILLER, Gerrit Graham, Mel Welles, Angus Scrimm and – of course – Paul Bartel and Mary Woronov, reprising their roles from EATING RAOUL! Then we put on our deerstalker hats and pull out our magnifying glasses as we solve the mystery of WHERE IS PAUL BARTEL (as “Twister Master”) IN GREGG ARAKI’S THE LIVING END?! The record will be changed PERMANANTLY as we discuss Araki’s transgressive 1992 road comedy-drama ALSO featuring an appearance by Mary Woronov. Have a listen, friends!The post Episode 321 – Bartel Me Something Good – Chopping Mall (1986) & The Living End (1992) first appeared on Cinema Smorgasbord.

**Come see WTO/99 at The Balboa Theater SF on Sunday, April 26th 7:30pm, hosted by Hit Factory featuring a post-screening Q&A w/ director Ian Bell. Tickets are available here.**Prolific filmmaker Alice Maio Mackay joins us to discuss her newest feature The Serpent's Skin (expanding this week to Los Angeles and San Francisco) alongside the high-gloss, sugary sweet, and characteristically transgressive Gregg Araki film Splendor. Structured as a prototypical romantic comedy, the film subverts the classic love triangle dynamic to explore the unique dynamics and language of intimacy that develops between a romantically committed threesome. We begin with a discussion of Alice's latest film The Serpent's Path - a lush, bold trans lesbian fantasy that wears its debts to teen classics like The Craft and Buffy the Vampire Slayer proudly on its sleeve. Then, we dive into the 90s work of Gregg Araki, and how Splendor subverts the expectations laid by the director's previous films in the Teen Apocalypse trilogy while losing none of the director's antagonisms toward the stricutres of heteronormative American society. Finally, we interrogate the film's subtle complexities, how Araki navigates the shifting dynamics of the threesome within the language of the romcom, and how the film pushes past the trap of "selling out vs. buying in" customary to so many films of the decade. See The Serpent's Skin, now playing in NY, SF & LA.Follow Alice Maio Mackay on Twitter. Get access to all of our premium episodes and bonus content by becoming a Hit Factory Patron for just $5/month.....Our theme song is "Mirror" by Chris Fish. 

[Go to 17:14 for SBR Episode 2-ish talk]In a strange twist of fate, we got episode 2 of Steel Ball Run a lot earlier than we thought. It's pretty out there, but after the ending of part 6, all bets must be off! We may just have to consider this part of Araki's strange genius. Besides covering episodes 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3 of SBR, we also talk about Alyssa Liu's first pitch, game tutorials, what goes on in Netflix boardrooms, and what animes will tide us over while we wait for SBR to bring us back to the old West. |

Alguna cosa s'està movent al 3Cat… però és el canvi que esperàvem o només un cop d'efecte? Si t'importa l'anime en català, aquest PÒDCAST et toca directament. El 3Cat ha anunciat un nou canal temàtic d'anime amb títols com Neon Genesis Evangelion, Fullmetal Alchemist Brotherhood i Conan, el noi del futur. Analitzem què implica això per al doblatge en català, el futur del Sx3 i la normalització real del manganime a Catalunya. A la Càpsula del Temps reivindiquem Shingo Araki, el geni visual darrere de Saint Seiya, Lady Oscar o Galaxy Express 999, amb nota d'àudio d'Oriol Estrada. I a la Doraxarxa, parlem clar sobre la castellanització de senyalitzacions a Catalunya. Al Tenkaichi Musical sona “Kill the Noise” de Sentenced to be a Hero, versionada per Aventura x Japó.

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Dimenticate la perfezione dei ciliegi in fiore: oggi entriamo nel Giappone viscerale di Nobuyoshi Araki. Dal leggendario "Sentimental Journey" con la moglie Yoko alla controversa arte del Kinbaku, esploriamo una Tokyo in cui la fotografia diventa un atto disperato per fermare la morte. Un viaggio tra le luci della "Bubble Economy", i graffi della censura e le ombre del consenso nell'era del #MeToo. Ascolta ora per scoprire cosa si nasconde dietro quelle corde.Araki edito da Tachen Tokyo Lucky HoleAscoltaci sul tuo lettore di podcast - Giappone nel mondo - Spotify: https://open.spotify.com/show/0sQVMNeMTKFivcSJkEsIr4 Apple Podcasts: https://podcasts.apple.com/it/podcast/giappone-nel-mondo/id1481765190?l=en-GB YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@giapponenelmondo YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/@plot-twister Instagram GnM: https://www.instagram.com/giapponenelmondo/ Instagram PlotTwister: https://www.instagram.com/plottwistertv/4. Hashtag Instagram#podcast #giappone #italia #cultura #storia #fotografiagiapponese #araki #nobuyoshiaraki #kinbaku #tokyo #artecontemporanea #sentimentaljourney #bubbleeconomy #culturapop #erosethanatos #podcastitaliani #youtubeitalia #storytelling #giapponenelmondo #episodio

TUTAMÉIA participa de encontro com o sheik Mohsen Araki, um dos principais líderes dos xiitas, integrante do Conselho Diretor da assembleia que seleciona e supervisiona as atividades do líder supremo do Irã. No encontro, ele analisou a situação política do país, condenou os ataques de Israel à Palestina e ao Líbano e apontou o papel dos Estados Unidos como promotor de guerras mundo afora para saciar seus interesses econômicos de dominação imperialista. A reunião de Araki com grupo brasileiro foi realizada no escritório do dirigente xiita em Qom, importante centro de formação religiosa no Irã e local de peregrinação dos xiitas, 140 quilômetros ao sul de Teerã. 

People are arguing online about the attractiveness of Melania Trump as opposed to Rama Duwaji. Apparently it's necessary to have such useless tribal and trivial debates in order to cope with two failed political systems. On the other hand, this might remind one of the “Which Way Western Man” meme that went super viral on social media. Earlier in 2025 across all the major social media platforms an image of Sydney Sweeney was compared to one of former Japanese idol-Saori Araki and men were asked to vote for which was more preferable. Most men also had no idea who Araki was, instead believing it to be some random asian girl. In every poll and survey, men from all over the world and Internet, though some women may have voted and some men may have voted more than once - these were unofficial polls - chose the seemingly random asian woman in a business suit over a sultry photo of the Hollywood blonde bombshell. The reason? Araki appeared “relatable,” “wholesome,” and most importantly “low-maintenance.” Sweeney appeared the total opposite. Turns out that Araki was also a model, too, but yet embodied a different presence as a girl in comparison with Hollywood standards. Attraction is about more than sex appeal and it appears that guys in these surveys preferred innocence as opposed to worldliness. How could this be when women were taught by fashion, makeup, the media, and subgroups of men that Sweeney is the ideal human female? Remember, Araki was also a model but embodying a different style completely. No blatant sexuality, cleavage, rear-end shots, or dumb expression. Just cute and innocent. Yes, these things are cultural, relative, subjective, and prone to change, but something else was happening here. Strangely, Araki's image is not unique, since conservatives have embraced the “trad wife” motif online, which represents all the same qualities of the former idol. For conservatives, however, Sweeney was the standard, and possibly so because she represents the total opposite of the alternative option: fat, dyed hair, obnoxious, loud, assertive, masculine feminists who have come to represent all western women. Compare Sweeney to some girl in Asia and she still loses. Maybe conservatives don't understand femininity either. Is it a defending of what some politically see as “white culture,” or is there more to the story?We are simultaneously watching statistics build an indication that men overwhelmingly reject fake women, their careers, personalities, and even overt sexuality in favor of simplicity and kindness. This goes for obnoxious liberal women and fake conservative women too. Nowhere is this more evident than in the ironic OnlyfansTV which now offers fully clothed woman doing the unthinkable - cooking. That's right, former and current porn stars, mostly well established ones that need no publicity, trying to stay relevant by embracing cooking while being fully dressed. It's almost as if the problems have corrected themselves. Women are now saying, “okay, you'll pay me to keep my clothes on and just cook….well, at least it's better than being a wife….”*The is the FREE archive, which includes advertisements. If you want an ad-free experience, you can subscribe below underneath the show description.FREE ARCHIVE (w. ads)SUBSCRIPTION ARCHIVEX / TWITTER FACEBOOKWEBSITEBuyMe-CoffeePaypal: rdgable1991@gmail.comCashApp: $rdgable EMAIL: rdgable@yahoo.com /TSTRadio@protonmail.comBecome a supporter of this podcast: https://www.spreaker.com/podcast/the-secret-teachings--5328407/support.

Hey guys before you listen to this one, do realize this is part 3 on a series about General Kanji Ishiwara, so if you have not already done so I would recommend listening to Part 1 & 2.    This episode is General Kanji Ishiwara part 3: The gradual fall into War with China   I tried so hard this time to finish this up neatly in part 3 and utterly failed. I wrote pages and even deleted them to keep squeezing, but theres simply too much to the story. Part 3 will be focusing on the insane politics of the 1930's and how Ishiwara tried to prevent war with China.   Its rather ironic that the man who was the chief instigator that ushering in the conquest of Manchuria was unable to impose his will when it came to molding Manchukuo. Now while Ishiwara Kanji was the operations officer given official responsibility over the planning and conduct of military operations to seize Manchuria, the arrangements for that new state, being political in nature, were not in his sphere of influence. Regardless, Ishiwara was extremely vocal about his opinions on how Manchukuo should develop and he heavily emphasized racial harmony. He continuously hammered his colleagues that the economic development of Manchukuo should reflect the spirit of racial cooperation. Ishiwara assumed the economic interests of Manchukuo would simply coincide with that of the Kwantung army, by definition both's ultimate goals would be unity of Asia against the west. He was very wrong. Ishiwara was consumed by his theory of final war, everything he did was to prepare for it, thus his obsession of racial harmony was another part of the plan.    In 1932 the self government guidance board was abolished in march, leaving its functions and regional organizations to be tossed into brand new bureaus of the new government of Manchukuo. An organization emerged in April called the (Kyowakai / Concordia Association). It was brought together by Yamaguchi Juji and Ozawa Kaisaku, and its purpose was to promote racial harmony and it was backed by members of the Kwantung army, notably Ishiwara, Itagaki and Katakura. The Kwantung army flooded money into the organization and it grew rapidly…well amongst the Japanese anyways. General Honjo was a bit weary about how much the organization might have in the political sphere of Manchukuo, he did not want to see it become an official political party, he preferred it remain in a educative role. By educative role, I of course mean, to be a propaganda arm of the Kwantung army to exert influence over Manchukuo without having real skin in the game.    But to Ishiwara the Concordia Association was the logical means to unify the new nation, guiding its political destiny, to be blunt Ishiwara really saw it should have much more authority than his colleagues believed it should. Ishiwara complained in August of 1932, that Manchuria was a conglomerate of conflicting power centers such as the Kwantung army, the new Manchukuo government, the Kwantung government, the Mantetsu, consular office and so on. Under so many hats he believed Manchukuo would never become a truly unified modern state, and of course he was one of the few people that actually wanted it to be so. He began arguing the Kwantung army should turn over its political authority as soon as possible so “Japanese of high resolve should hasten to the great work of the Manchurian Concordia Association, for I am sure that we Japanese will be its leaders. In this way Manchukuo will not depend on political control from Japan, but will be an independent state, based on Japanese Manchurian cooperation. Guided by Japanese, it will be a mode of Sino-Japanese friendship, an indicator of the present trends of world civilization” Needless to say the Concordia Association made little headway with the Chinese and it began to annoy Japanese leaders. The association gradually was bent into a spiritless propaganda and intelligence arm of the IJA, staffed largely by elite Japanese working in the Manchukuo government.    Ishiwara began using the Concordia Association to promote things such as: returning leased territories like the Railway zone, abolition of extraterritoriality, equalizing payment between the races working in Manchukuo, the kind of stuff that would promote racial harmony. Such advocacy as you can imagine deviated heavily with the Japanese military, and Ishiwara's reputation would be hurt by this. The Kwantung Army staff began shifting dramatically, seeing Ishiwara isolated, aside from Itagaki and a few other followers being around. The upper brass as they say had had enough of the nuisance Concordia Association's and gradually took control of it and made sure to stop the talk of concessions. In August of 1932 Ishiwara received a new assignment and it seems he was only too happy to leave Manchuria.   Ishiwara returned to Japan, disgusted with the turn of direction Manchuria was going, and believing he would be blamed for its future failures he submitted his resignation. But the IJA knew how popular Ishiwara was and how dangerous he could become so they rejected his resignation. Instead they gave him a military decoration. He was in a very strange spot now, for the youthful officers of the Kodoha faction loved Ishiwara, but the senior top brass of the IJA were extremely suspicious of him and lets just say he was kept under close watch.   Now with Ishiwara back in Japan he would get himself involved in a bit of a war between two factions. As many of you probably already know, the Japanese military of the late 1920s and early 1930's saw the emergence of two factions: the Kodoha “imperial way” and Tosei “control” factions. The Kodoha sought what they called a “showa restoration” to give the emperor absolute power like the good olds days as they say. They were willing to even form a coup if necessary to make this happen. Another thing they believed was in the Hokushin-ron “northern strike” war plan. The idea behind this was that the USSR and communism as a whole was Japans largest threat and the IJA needed to invade the USSR. Now the Tosei faction believed in most of what the Kodoha did, but they differed on some issues. Number 1) they were not willing to perform a coup to usher in a showa restoration, no they thought they could work with the existing Zaibatsu elites and politicians to get things done. THe Kodoha hated the politicians and Zaibatsu to the point they wanted to murder them, so differing opinions. The Tosei also believed the next world war would require a total war strategy, to build up Japan to fight the USSR, but probably the US as well. They favored Nanshin-ron “the southern strike” policy, to target the resources of south east asia necessary to give Japan what it needed to be self sufficient. Another thing that separated these two factions, the Kodoha typically were younger officers.   Despite their differences, everyone in the Japanese military understood forceful expansion into Asia was going to happen and this meant collison with the USSR, America and Britain. Ishiwara's first assignment back in Japan was a temporary duty with the foreign ministry, he was a member of the Japanese legation to the league of nations under Matsuoka Yosuke. The league of nations at this time was performing the Lytton Commission which was investigating the Macnhurian problem, ie: Japan invading Manchuria. Upon returning to Japan in summer of 1933, Ishiwara sought a regimental command, but found it difficult to acquire because of his troublemaker like history. Then General Prince Higashikuni Naruhiko who commanded the 2nd sendai division gave him command over the 4th infantry regiment. Ishiwara went to work training the men under him to counter the latest soviet infantry tactics and of course he lectured extensively about his final war theories. During this time rumors emerged that Ishiwara supported the Nanshin-ron strategy. Many of his old colleagues who supported Hokushin-ron demanded he explain himself and Ishiwara did. These rumors were actually false, it was not that Ishiwara favored the Nanshin-ron strategy, it was simply that he did not back all aspects of the Hokushin-ron strategy.   Ishiwara believed to challenge the USSR, first Japan needed an Asian union, which he thought would take probably 30 years to create. But to usher such an Asian union, first Manchukuo needed to be hammered out properly, something Ishiwara thought Japan was failing to do. Also Japan's military strength was insufficient to overwhelm the multiple enemies before her, the war she would enter would be a protracted one. To win such a war she needed resources and allies, notably Manchukuo and China. To confront the USSR, Japan would need to subvert outer mongolia, but to confront the USA and Britain she would have to seize the Philippines, Singapore, Hong Kong and Guam. It was going to be a global clash.   Ishiwara was gravely concerned with how powerful the USSR was becoming in the early 1930s. In the 3 years since he had left Manchuria, the Soviet divisions in east asia had jumped from 8 to 14 by the end of 1935, while Japanese divisions in Manchuria were only 3. For aircraft the Soviets had 950 vs 220 for Japan. On top of that the Soviets had TB-5 long range bombers, capable of hitting Japan, but the Japanese had no comparable aircraft. A large reason for such build up's were literally because Kodoha leaders were publicly threatening the Soviets such as Generals Sadao Araki. The Kodoha faction faced a lot of challenges as to how they could hope to face off against the USSR. They figured out three main principles needed to be overcome: 1) Japan had to prevent the USSR from being able to defeat its enemies to the west and east one at a time, Japan should seek diplomatic aims in this like allying with Germany. 2) A devastating blow was necessary to the USSR far east, perhaps against the Trans-siberian railway and air bases in the maritime provinces. 3) If Japan was able to demolish Soviet resistance in the far east, Japan would need to take forward positions on the Manchurian border for a protracted war. Ishiwara tried to figure out ways to get by these principles. First he advocated for Japanese troops strength in Manchuria and Korea to be 80% equivalent to that of the Soviets east of Lake Baikal at the offset of hostilities. He also urged cooperation with Germany and to preserve friendly neutral relations with Britain and the US, that is until the soviets were dealt with of course. Ishiwara vigorously felt the Nanshin ron strategy to push into southeast asia and the pacific was far too ambitious for the time being and that all efforts should be made to consolidate Manchuria for resources. Ishiwara tried to win over some Naval support for his plans, but none would be found. When Ishiwara showed his formal plans for Asia to the war ministry, they told him his projections in Manchuria would cost at least 1 billion 300 million yen. They also notified Ishiwara the navy were asking for about the same amount for their programs. Now while Ishiwara spent years trying to produce a 6 year plan to build up Manchuria, other significant things were going on in Japan.   The Kodoha faction as I said had a lot of younger officer support and a lot of these were men who came from rural parts of Japan. A lot of these men came from poor families suffering, and it looked to them that Japan was a nation full of social injustice and spiritual disintegration. These young officers were becoming more and more vocal in the early 1930's about wanting a showa restoration. They thought Japan would be better off as a military state with the emperor on top. Ishiwara empathized with the desire for a showa restoration, and many of the young officers calling for it claimed he was one of their champions. He made some fiery speeches in 1935 linking the evils of capitalism to the destitution of rural japan. He argued farmers were bearing crushing burdens because of economic privation. In his words “if the clash between the exploiters (landlords and capitalists) and the exploited continues much longer the exploited will be ground to bits. The present system of free economic competition has produced a situation where there is a small number of fabulously rich and limitless number of desperately poor. The national has indeed reached a national crisis. Liberal capitalism must inevitably give way to a newer system". What that “newer system was” however differed from what the youthful officers saw as their Showa restoration. Ishiwara wanted the Japanese government to create plans and policy, the Kodoha hardliners wanted to form a violent coup.    Kodoha officers began to push Ishiwara to champion their cause more and more. However by late 1935 Ishiwara's name would actually begin to be connected to the Tosei faction. While Ishiwara supported much of the Kodoha ideology, he simply did not share their beliefs in the same Showa restoration, he was more akin to the Tosei in that regard. Now after the manchurian incident the two factions kind of went to war with another to dominate the military. The Kodoha faction was early on the most powerful, but in 1934 their leader Araki resigned from the army due to failing health and he was replaced by General Senjuro Hayashi who favored the Tosei. In November of 1934, a plot was discovered that involved Kodoha officers seeking to murder some top ranking politicians. The result of this saw the Tosei faction force the resignation of the Kodoha leader General Jinzaburo Masaki, who was serving as the inspector general of military education. In retaliation to this, the Kodoha officer Saburo Aizawa murdered the Toseiha leader General Tetsuzen Nagata. This caused a frenzy, things began to really escalate, and many looked at Ishiwara Kanji to prove which side he favored. While in prison awaiting trial, Aizawa asked Ishiwara to be his defense counsel, to which he promised he would consider it. At the same time other Kodoha officers began pressing Ishiwara to support their cause openly. It is really hard to see where exactly Ishiwara was in all of this as all of his speeches prior were purposely ambiguous. He looked like a fence sitter and after what will be the February coup of 1936, there was testimony that Ishiwara was a middle-echelon member involved in the coup, other testimony literally had him on the list of people to be assassinated. A few weeks before Aizawa's trial, Ishiwara refused his request.   On February 26th, Ishiwara was awakened at his Tokyo home by a telephone call from Colonel Suzuki Teiichi informing him a rebellion was underway. Ishiwara, though ill at the time rushed over to the Military police HQ in Kudan. There he was informed of what was going on and how the officers were now taking the side of the showa restorationists or to quell the rebellion. From there he rushed to meet War Minister Kawashima Yoshiyuki where he demanded a proclamation of martial law to cope with the rebellion. He then urged Vice Chief of staff Sugiyama to order units from garrisons around Tokyo to overwhelm the rebels. Within 24 hours of the event, Ishiwara was then named operations officer of the Martial Law headquarters and he began coordinating plans to deal with the crisis. Thus Ishiwara occupied a crucial position in quelling the coup. On the night of the 27th a bunch of officers who sympathized with the rebels came to the HQ to argue for delaying actions against them. To this Ishiwara rose up and announced “we shall immediately carry forward plans for an assault. All units will assemble for that purpose. The army will wait until noon of the 28th; then it will begin its assault and crush the rebellion”. The next day,  Ishiwara went to the main entrance of the War Ministers office, where a large number of the rebels occupied and he demanded to talk to their leaders face to face. He hoped the youthful officers who looked up to him would see reason. They let him in, after they had shot Captain Katakura Tadashi for trying to do the same thing. Ishiwara then told them he shared many of their goals, but condemned their use of force. With a pistol pointed at him Ishiwara declared this “If you don't listen to reason you will be crushed by the severest measures”. He delivered his ultimatum and just walked out the door.    By the 28th the tides turned on the rebels. Emperor Hirohito put his foot down, demanding an end to the mutiny, many of the top Kodoha leaders walked away because of this. The Navy brought all of its power to Tokyo bay including its SNLF marines, all guns were on the rebels. Some of the rebels held out, still hoping the Emperor would change his mind and order a showa restoration, but by the 29th it fell apart. The rebels surrendered, aided by Colonel Tomoyuki Yamashita (one of my favorite generals of WW2, fascinating character). In the words of Matsumura Shuitsu a member of the Martial law HQ “In the midst of all the confusion and commotion, Ishiwara never lost sight of his objective and dealt with the criss with cool efficiency. If ever there was a case of the right man in the right place it was Ishiwara at that time. No doubt, what brought about the ultimate surrender of the rebel forces, was, of course, the Imperial command. But I believe that in a large part the collapse of the rebellion was due to the decisiveness of Ishwara, who never swerved, never hesitated. In short, Tokyo was saved by Ishiwara's courage”. It is rather ironic, many would point out it was Ishiwara who instigated the insurrection, but when it came time for it, he was the largest one to stamp down upon it. One could argue, by suppressing the rebellion, Ishawara had exploited the crisis in order to earn the political power necessary to bring about his version of a Showa Restoration.   During the mutiny, after meeting the rebels, Ishiwara actually had a secret meeting with two Kodoha officers at the Imperial Hotel. They were Colonel Hashimoto Kingoro and Colonel Mitsui Sakichi. He spoke to them about the possibility of forming a new government. The 3 of them came to these conclusions to actually perform a real Showa restoration. The rebels needed to go back to their barracks; the emperor needed to endorse the showa restoration; and members of the cabinet and top military leaders had to support it. Ishiwara then went to the Martial Law HQ and demanded Army vice chief of staff Sugiyama that he submit to the emperor a petition “to establish a restoration which would make clear the spirit of the nation, realize the national defense, and stabilize the peoples livelihood”. Sugiyama wanted nothing to do with this and told him “its simply impossible to relay such a request from the army” Ishiwara knew Sugiyama's position was too strong to challenge directly so he backed off, this was his last attempt to alter the nation's course through confrontation. Because of his actions during the quelling of the rebellion, this little scene was forgotten, his reputation was not tarnished…well it was amongst the Kodoha hardliners who saw him as a traitor, but other than that. Yet again he seems to be a man of many contradictions.  After the February coup the Kodoha faction ceased to exist and the Toseiha's ideology grabbed most of the military, though they also faded heavily.     Ishiwara went back to planning and lecturing taking a heavy notice of how Germany and Italy's totalitarian models were looking like the most efficient ones that Japan should emulate. He pushed heavily for a national defense state. He kept advocating for a 5 year plan he had to push Japan into a total war economy, but the industrialists and economists kept telling him it was far too much. I could write pages on all the ideas he had, he covered every aspect of Japanese society. He wanted the whole of Japan to devote itself to becoming the hegemonic power in Asia and this required self-sufficiency, more territory, alliances, an overhaul of Japan's politics, economy, etc etc he worked on this for years. One thing I find amusing to note, Ishiwara's plans had the national defense state not run directly by the military. No instead the military would only focus on military affairs to maximize their efficiency, thus civilians would lead the government. In his words “the tactics and strategy of national defense in the narrow sense are unquestionably the responsibility of the military. But national defense in the widest sense, industry, economy, transportation, communications are clearly related to the field of politics. Of course, the military can naturally express their opinion on these matters in order to counsel some minister whose duties are political, but to go before the general public and discuss the detailed industrial and economic is an arrogation of authority”. So ye, Ishiwara actually sought to remove military officers from political positions.    In 1937 Ishiwara was promoted to the rank of major general and his duties were of the operations division of the general staff. Because of his popularity and now his rank, some began to see him almost as that of a rising dictator. In January of 1937, the government of Hirota Koki who had come to power largely because of the february coup were having problems. Politicians were unable to deal with the rising military budgets. Ishiwara was eager to press forward his national defense state idea. Alongside this Captain Fukutome Shigeru, his naval counterpart was angry at the cabinet for hindering funding and called for their dissolution. In one meeting Ishiwara blurted out “if there's any disturbance the military should proclaim martial law throughout the country until things were straightened out”. Well within days the cabinet fell on its own and now everyone looked to a successor.    The Army and Navy fought for their candidate. The Nazi favored Ugaki Kazushige, but the Army held grudges against him. Ishiwara also did not like his appointment stating he had a bad political past, by bad that meant he had advocated for military budget cuts. Ugaki refused the job because of the pressure and made a note about Ishiwara's remarks towards him. Seeing Ugaki pushed aside, Ishiwara and his followers pushed for 3 other candidates; Hayashi Senjuro, House President Konoe Fumumaro and President of the privy council Hiranuma Kiichiro. Ishiwara sent to each man his 5 year plan to test their enthusiasm for it. Hiranuma didn't like it, Konoe was neutral and Hayashi liked it. So Ishiwara backed Hayashi go figure. All of his Manchurian oriented followers pushed to get him into office. When Hayashi was given Imperial command to head a new government, Ishiwara met with his Manchurian faction friends to draw a list of people to put in the cabinet. Itagaki Seishiro was chosen as war minister; Admiral Suetsugu Nobumasa known to have radical reformist leanings for navy minister; Matsuoka Yosuke or SHiratori Toshio for foreign minister, industrialist Ikeda Seihin for finance, Tsuda Shingo for commerce and industry, Sogo Shinji as chief cabinet secretary and Miyazaki as chairman. Ishiwara himself stayed carefully in the background to make it seem like he was only attending military duties.    But rivals to Ishiwara began working against him, especially some of those Kodoha hardliners who felt he betrayed them. They pressed Hayashi to not accept many of Ishiwara's cabinet candidates such as Itagaki and Hayashi backed off the majority of them as a result. The effort to form a Macnhurian cabal failed and this further led to a lack of enthusiasm for Ishiwara's national defense plans. Hayashi's government which Ishiwara had placed his hopes upon became antagonistic towards him and his followers.    Now over in Manchuria, the Kwantung army was looking to seize territory in northern China and inner mongolia. This was something Ishiwara was flip floppy about. At first he began speaking about the need to simply develop Manchukuo so that China and Inner mongolia would follow suite, but gradually he began to warm up to schemes to invade. Though when he heard his former Kwantun colleagues were basically going to perform the exact same plan he had done with the Mukden incident he traveled back to Manchuria to dissuade them. Ishiwara landed at Dairen and within days of his arrival he learned that 15,000 troops under Prince Demchugdongrub, known also as Prince Teh of Mongolia, backed by Kwantung arms and aircraft were launching a full scale invasion of Suiyuan province. Ishiwara was furious and he screamed at the General staff “the next time I visit the Kwantung Army I'm going to piss on the floor of the commanders office!”    Within a month, the Warlord Yan Xishan, now fighting for the NRA turned back Prince Teh's forces. This angered the Kwantung army, fueling what Ishiwara always feared, a war between China and Japan. Ishiwara began lecturing left right and center about how Japan needed to curb her imperialist aggression against China. He advocated as always racial harmonization, about the East Asian League idea, cooperation between China and Japan. He thought perhaps China could be induced by joined a federation with Japan and to do all of this Japan should help develop Manchukuo as a positive model. Ishiwara warned any aggressive actions against China would waste valuable resources needed dearly to be directed against the USSR. In his words “China was an endless bog that would swallow men and materiel without prospect of victory and it would cripple the possibility of East Asian Union” Prophetic words to be sure.   Ishiwara was still influential and many in Hayashi's cabinet headed him, trying to push for more diplomacy with China. But by spring of 1937 Tokyo HQ had split over the issue. On one side were Ishiwara and those seeking to obtain a sort of treaty with China to form an alliance against the USSR. On the other hand the Nationalists and Communists were on the verge of forming a united front allied to the USSR, thus the invading China faction was gaining steam. This faction simply sought to get China out of the way, then focus on the USSR. As much as Ishiwara fought it, the China War would come nonetheless.   In June of 1937, a report from a Japanese civilian visiting China reached Colonel Kawabe Torashiro. The report stated that the China Garrison Army in the Peking area were planning an incident similar to what had occurred in Mukden in 1931. Kawabe took the report to Ishiwara who said he would investigate the matter. Ishiwara pressed the war ministry to send Colonel Okamoto Kiyotomi to the military administration section to north china to warn Generals Hashimoto Gun of the China Garrison Army and Kwabe Msakazu commander the brigade station in the Peking area that Tokyo would not tolerate provocation actions. Okamoto came back and stated they reassured him it was just rumors and nothing was occurring.   Two weeks later on July 7th, the infamous Marco Polo Bridge incident began WW2. When it began, Tokyo took it as a minor incident, just some skirmishes between minor forces, but the fighting grew and grew. The two factions in Tokyo who we can call the “expansionists and non expansionists” began arguing on what to do. The expansionists argued this was the time to deliver a quick and decisive blow, which meant mobilizing and dispatching divisions into northern China to overwhelm them. The non expansionists argued they needed to terminate hostilities immediately and seek diplomacy before the conflict got out of hand. From the offset of the conflict, Ishiwara led the doomed non expansionists. Ishiwara tried to localize the conflict to prevent more Japanese from getting involved. To do this he urged Prince Kan'in to send a cable on July 8th to the local Japanese forces to settle the issue locally. But they reported back that the Nanjing government was tossing 4 divisions of reinforcements to the area, prompting the Japanese to mobilize 3 divisions in response. For 3 days Ishiwara tried to halt the reinforcements, but the Nanjing report came true, the Chinese reinforcements arrived to the scene, pushing the Japanese to do the same. General Kawabe Masakazu argued 12,000 Japanese civilians were in the area and now under threat, thus Ishiwara had to stand down.   The conflict at the Marco Polo Bridge quickly got out of hand. Ishiwara was very indecisive, he tried to thwart the spread of the conflict, but he was continuously forced to stand down when reports false or true poured in about Chinese offensives. In fact, Ishiwara's efforts were getting him in a ton of trouble as his colleagues began to point out they were hindering the military operations which at the time were trying to end the conflict quickly. Ishiwara did not go down without a fight tossing one last attempt to stop the conflict. He urged Prime Minister Konoe to fly to Nanjing to speak directly with Chiang Kai Shek, it was a last ditch effort before the Japanese reinforcements arrived. When Konoe received requests to do this from multiple Japanese military leaders on urged on by Ishiwara, he was initially favorable to the idea and had a plane prepared for the trip. But within hours of the idea leaked out raising a storm of protests from the expansionists. Sugiyama then told Konoe it was Ishiwara pushing the idea and that his views represented a small minority in the military. Konoe ultimately back down and chose not to do it. Ishiwara was outraged when he found out screaming “tell the Prime minister that in 2000 years of our history no man will have done more to destroy Japan than he has by his indecisiveness in this crisis”.   Ishiwara began fighting with his colleagues as the situation worsened. He tabled a motion to press Nanjing to support Manchukuo in order for the Japanese to withdraw, but his colleagues blocked it. By August the conflict had spread as far as Shanghai and now even the IJN were getting involved. To this Ishiwara argued they should just evacuate Japanese civilians in Shanghai and pay them several hundred million yen in compensation as it would be cheaper than a war. He was quickly overruled. Thus the North China Incident simply became the China incident. In early september Ishiwara tried one last attempt to negotiate a settlement, trying to get Germany to mediate, but by mid september Ishiwara's influence had dropped considerably. By late september Ishiwara was removed from the General staff by General Tada. The remnants of Ishiwara's followers in the central army were defeated, particularly when Konoe declared in January of 1938 that Japan would not treat with Chiang Kai-shek. Ironically Konoe would quickly come around to believe Japan had made a grave mistake. By 1938 24 IJA divisions were tossed into China, the next year this became 34. 

Last week at the 2025 World Dairy Expo, we sat down with Tommy Araki, of STgenetics Japan. In this insightful conversation, Tommy, assisted by translator Makoto, discusses the establishment and growth of STgenetics in Japan since 2015. He highlights key market trends, the rising demand for genetic efficiency and sustainability and the future opportunities for Japanese dairy producers. Tommy also discusses the role of popular bulls in Japan, including CAPTAIN and Delta-LAMBDA.00:00 Introduction and Welcome00:36 Mr. Tommy Araki's Background and Role01:48 Growth and Achievements of STgenetics Japan02:46 Current Market Trends and Demands03:34 Future Opportunities for Japanese Dairy Producers04:28 Genetic Needs and STgenetics Portfolio05:19 Future of STgenetics in Japan06:19 Popular Bulls in Japan08:20 Upcoming Events and Conclusion

“Polaraki” Mille polaroids d'Araki Nobuyoshiau Musée national des arts asiatiques – Guimet, Parisdu 1er octobre 2025 au 12 janvier 2026Entretien avecCécile Dazord,conservatrice, chargée de mission pour l'art contemporain, musée Guimet, etÉdouard de Saint-Ours, conservateur des collections photographiques, musée Guimet, commissaires de l'exposition, par Anne-Frédérique Fer, à Paris, 30 septembre 2025, durée 24'50,© FranceFineArt.https://francefineart.com/2025/10/09/3648_araki-nobuyoshi_musee-national-des-arts-asiatiques-guimet/Communiqué de presse Commissariat scientifique :Cécile Dazord, conservatrice, chargée de mission pour l'art contemporain, musée GuimetÉdouard de Saint-Ours, conservateur des collections photographiques, musée GuimetPhotographe japonais prolifique, obsessionnel et volontiers provocateur, Araki Nobuyoshi est, depuis les années 1960, un protagoniste incontournable de l'histoire de la photographie japonaise et internationale. Issue d'une donation exceptionnelle reçue par le musée Guimet, l'exposition POLARAKI dévoile un aspect essentiel de son oeuvre : l'exploration des possibilités infinies offertes par le Polaroid, source d'expérimentation centrale dans le travail de l'artiste.L'usage de la photographie à développement instantané constitue un geste quotidien pour l'artiste japonais Araki Nobuyoshi. Né à Tokyo en 1940, il suit des études de photographie avant de travailler pour une firme publicitaire à partir 1963. Devenu indépendant en 1972, il rencontre un succès considérable au Japon puis sur la scène internationale pour son regard nouveau sur l'intime. Il est aujourd'hui plus connu pour ses vues monumentales de fleurs et, dans une démarche qui a fait polémique, ses mises en scène du corps féminin à la frontière entre érotisme et pornographie.En contrepoint de ces compositions soigneusement élaborées, il adopte dans les années 1990 le Polaroid qui lui permet de saisir son environnement familier à chaque instant. Cette technique alimente dès lors un journal visuel chaotique et poétique autour duquel s'articule l'ensemble de son oeuvre, hanté jusqu'à l'obsession par l'amour, le sexe, la vie et la mort.En 2025, Stéphane André a fait don au musée Guimet de sa collection de polaroids d'Araki, constituée de près d'un millier de tirages acquis depuis 2000. Donnant à voir pour la première fois l'installation conçue par le collectionneur dans son appartement parisien, l'exposition POLARAKI rend hommage tant à l'importance du Polaroid chez l'artiste qu'à son appropriation par un particulier sous une forme apparentée au cabinet de curiosités.Le Polaroid comme journal visuelLe travail d'Araki nourri par son histoire personnelle, comme en témoignent trois séries consacrées à sa vie avec Aoki Yoko entre 1971 et 1992, de leur voyage de noces au décès de cette dernière. Figure centrale du courant shi-shashin (photographie du je), Araki s'empare dans les années 1990 de la photographie à développement instantané. Le procédé, inventé par Edwin Land et commercialisé à partir de 1948 par la marque Polaroid, lui permet de capturer sans relâche son quotidien en produisant une quantité considérable de ces tirages carrés. Le médium offre également de nouvelles opportunités plastiques à Araki, qui intervient sur les images à coups de ciseaux, de feutre ou de pinceau ; découpe, raboute et expose bord à bord ses tirages sous forme de grilles aux dimensions parfois monumentales. Les polaroids d'Araki se succèdent en un flux continu qui brouille les limites entre les sphères intime et publique, anticipant ainsi certains usages contemporains des images photographiques.[...] Hébergé par Acast. Visitez acast.com/privacy pour plus d'informations.

Hello Youtube Members, Patreons and Pacific War week by week listeners. Yes this was intended to be an exclusive episode to join the 29 others over on my Youtube Membership and Patreon, but since we are drawing to the end of the Pacific War week by week series, I felt compelled to make some special episodes to answer some of the bigger questions. Why did Japan, or better said, why did Emperor Hirohito decide to finally surrender? It seems obvious on the face of it, but there is actually a lot more to it than bombs or Soviet invasions. I guess you can call this episode a teaser or a shameless plug for going over to my Youtube Membership or Patreon. There's honestly a lot of interesting subjects such as ‘why was the japanese army so brutal”, “Hirohito's war time responsibility”, “the 4 part Kanji Ishiwara series”. Thus if you liked this one please show some love and check out my other stuff on my Youtube Membership or over at www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel.   Stating all of that lets just jump right into it.   We first need to start off briefly looking at Emperor Hirohito.    Upon taking the throne, Emperor Hirohito in 1926 Hirohito inherited a financial crisis and a military that was increasingly seizing control of governmental policies. From the beginning, despite what many of you older audience members may have been told, Hirohito intensely followed all military decisions. Hirohito chose when to act and when not to. When the Kwantung Army assassinated Zhang Zuolin, he indulged their insubordination. This emboldened them to invade Manchuria in 1931, whereupon Hirohito was furious and demanded they be reigned in. Attempts were made, but they were heavily undermined by radicals. Hirohito could have put his foot down, but he chose not to. On September 22nd, at 4:20pm Hirohito said to the IJA Chief of General staff, Kanaya Hanzo “although this time it couldn't be helped, the army had to be more careful in the future”. Thus Hirohito again acquiesced to the military, despite wanting them to stop or at least localize the conflict. The military had disregarded his wishes, they should have been severely punished. Why did Hirohito not take a firmer stance?    Again for older audience members you may have heard, “hirohito was a hostage at the whim of his own military”. This narrative made it seem he was some sort of hostage emperor, but this is not the case at all. In fact Hirohito was instrumental in many military decisions from 1931-1945. The reason this, I will call it “myth” , went on was because after Japan's surrender, the US basically rewrote the Japanese constitution and covered up the Emperor's involvement in all the nasty stuff, to maintain control over Japan. Yeah it sounds a bit conspiracy esque, but I assure you it was indeed the case. This narrative held firm all the way until Hirohito's death, when finally meeting notes and personal accounts from those close to him came out, illuminating a lot. Though to this day, many records are still red -tapped.   The reason Hirohito did not stamp his foot down has to do with the Kokutai.    The Kokutai   So before I carry on, I have to explain what exactly is the Kokutai.    The Kokutai, loosely translated as "national essence," refers to the qualities that distinguish the Japanese identity. However, this concept is remarkably vague and poorly defined; even Japanese historians acknowledge this ambiguity. In contrast to Kokutai is seitai, or "form of government." While the Kokutai embodies the eternal and immutable aspects of Japanese polity—rooted in history, traditions, and customs centered around the Emperor—Japan's seitai has evolved significantly throughout its extensive history. For instance, shoguns governed for over 700 years until 1868, when the Meiji Restoration reinstated direct imperial rule.   Nevertheless, Emperor Meiji's direct authority came to an end with the adoption of the Meiji Constitution in 1889, which established a constitutional monarchy, introducing significant complexities into the governance system.   Article 4 of the constitution declares: “The Emperor is the head of the Empire, combining in Himself the rights of sovereignty, uniting the executive, legislative, and judicial branches of government, although subject to the consent of the Imperial Diet.” Under this framework, the Emperor alone possessed the power to appoint or dismiss ministers of state, declare war, negotiate peace, conclude treaties, direct national administration, and command the army and navy.   A glaring flaw in this arrangement is the inherent ambiguity of the Meiji Constitution. While it established a democratic parliament, it simultaneously afforded the Emperor absolute authority to usurp it. The document failed to clearly define the relationships between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches, and its language was intentionally vague. Most critically, the military—the army and navy—were not directly accountable to the civilian government.    So with the kokutai, the Emperor is a divine figure who embodies the state's sovereignty. It was not necessarily the Emperor's job to surrender on behalf of the official government of Japan, but he most certainly could do so, given the Japanese people still remained faithful to the kokutai.    Now Hirohito did not live an ordinary life. According to the imperial custom, Japanese royals were raised apart from their parents, at the age of 3 he was placed in the care of the Kwamura family who vowed to raise him to be unselfish, persevering in the face of difficulties, respectful of the views of others and immune to fear. One thing that was absolutely indoctrinated into him was to defend the kokutai. It became his top mission as a monarch, it was the only mission in many ways. At the very core of how he saw the world and how he acted, it was always to protect the kokutai.    So when the Japanese military began these insubordinate acts, Hirohito's primary concern was to the kokutai, ie: anything that threatened his imperial authority and the imperial institution itself. Although the military usurped his authority, the operations had been successful. Hirohito was not at all opposed to seeing his empire expand. He understood the value of manchuria, he was fully onboard with the military plans to eventually seize control over it, but these radicals were accelerating things to quickly for everyone's liking. He turned a blind eye, dished light punishments and carried on. However the local conflict escalated. It traveled to Shanghai by 1932 and here Hirohito took action. He understood Shanghai was full of western powers. Nations like Britain and America could place economic sanctions on Japan if things were allowed to get out of hand here. So he ordered General Yoshinori Shirakawa to bring the Shanghai expedition to a close.    During this period, two factions emerged within the Japanese military: the Kodoha, or “Imperial Way,” and the Toseiha, or “Control” faction. The Kodoha was founded by General Sadao Araki and his protégé, Jinzaburo Masaki. Their primary objective was a Shōwa Restoration aimed at purging Japan of corrupt politicians and businessmen, especially those associated with the zaibatsu. Composed mainly of young army officers, the Kodoha espoused a romanticized and radical interpretation of Bushido, idealizing pre-industrial Japan, which Araki believed had been tainted by Western influences. To achieve their goals, they resorted to assassinations and planned a coup d'état.   In response, the Toseiha faction was formed, initially led by Lt. General Tetsuzan Nagata and later by Hideki Tojo. Like the Kodoha, the Toseiha sought a Shōwa Restoration but adopted a more moderate and conservative approach. They recognized the importance of preserving traditional values while integrating Western ideals, advocating for a balanced perspective. The Toseiha promoted pragmatic military strategies to navigate the complexities of modern warfare. Although they acknowledged the existence of corrupt politicians and zaibatsu, they preferred to work within the existing political system, anticipating that future total wars would necessitate a strengthened industrial and military capacity. Their ranks primarily included promising graduates from the Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) Academy, Army Staff College, and select naval members. The most significant distinction between the two factions was that the Toseiha explicitly rejected the use of a coup d'état in pursuit of their goals.   Between 1932-1936 radical officers, mostly of the Kodoha faction assassinated politicians and military leaders trying to usher in a showa restoration. You might be led to believe this was in the interest of Hirohito, you would be mistaken. Hirohito did not want a military dictatorship at the whim of the cult of the emperor. Ironic to say, given how WW2 turns out mind you. This really would have been a hostage situation. Hirohito wanted to maintain the exact ambiguous situation that was Showa Era Japan pre 1945. He saw this as the most ideal structure to defend the kokutai, because blame could not be placed solely upon his shoulders. He always maintained a get out of jail free card one could say.    The February 26 incident of 1936, was the climax of the Kodoha faction. They performed a mutiny trying to usher in a SHowa restoration. They assumed when their messenger came to the emperor he would join them and take direct rule. Instead Hirohito was furious. His first thought was the mutineers were trying to enlist his brother Chichibu to overthrow him. He dragged his brother who was a fraternizer amongst the kodoha members mind you, into a meeting, demanding he never associate with them again nor attempt to challenge him. Then Hirohito furious demanded the mutineers be dealt with. At one point he even threatened to lead the imperial guards to put them down. The coup failed, the kodoha faction was destroyed. Ironically the toseiha faction were the ones to do it and thus they became the defacto ruling clique.    The military, especially the kwantung army did not stop with their insubordination.    On July 8th of 1937 the Kwangtung army performed the Marco Polo Bridge incident, ushering in the second sino-japanese war. This was one of many false flag operations they had pulled off over the years. Upon being told about this Hirohito's first response was whether the USSR would invade Manchukuo over the matter. This is what he said to Prime Minister Konoe and army minister Sugiyama “What will you do if the Soviets attack us from the rear?” he asked the prince. Kan'in answered, “I believe the army will rise to the occasion.” The emperor repeated his question: “That's no more than army dogma. What will you actually do in the unlikely event that Soviet [forces] attack?” The prince said only, “We will have no choice.” His Majesty seemed very dissatisfied. Hirohito furious demanded to know what contingency plans existed and his advisors told him before he gave his red seal of approval to invade northern china.   Henceforth he micromanaged a lot of the military decisions going forward and he oversaw the forming and dissolving of numerous cabinets and positions when things went his way or did not in the military and political scene.  Emperor Hirohito was presented with several opportunities to cause cease-fires or peace settlements during the war years. One of the best possible moments to end it all came during the attack on Nanking when Chiang Kai-sheks military were in disarray. On July 11 of 1938, the commander of the 19th division fought a border clash with the USSR known to us in the west as the battle of Lake Khasan. It was a costly defeat for Japan and in the diary of Harada Kumao he noted Hirohito scolded Army minister Itagaki “Hereafter not a single soldier is to be moved without my permission.” When it looked like the USSR would not press for a counter attack across the border, Hirohito gave the order for offensives in China to recommence, again an example of him deciding when to lay down the hammer.   By 1939 the US began threatening sanctions for what Japan was doing in China. Hirohito complained to his chief aide de camp Hata Shunroku on August 5th “It could be a great blow to scrap metal and oil”. Hirohito was livid and scolded many of his top officials and forced the appointment of General Abe to prime minister and demanded of him “to cooperate with the US and Britain and preserve internal order”.   Fast forward a bit, with war raging in Europe Hirohito, on June 19th of 1940 Hirohito asked if chief of staff Prince Kan'in and Army Minister Hata “At a time when peace will soon come in the European situation, will there be a deployment of troops to the Netherlands Indies and French Indochina?” This question highlighted Hirohito's belief at that time that Germany was close to achieving victory, which led him to gradually consider deploying troops to French Indochina and the Dutch East Indies since neither of those parent nations was in a position to protect their territories and vital resources. Regarding the war in China, the Japanese aimed to stop the flow of materials entering China from places like Hong Kong. Hirohito received reports indicating that Britain would not agree to block the shipment of materials into China via Hong Kong. The military recognized that an invasion of Hong Kong might be necessary, which would mean declaring war on Britain. When this was communicated to him, Hirohito responded, “If that occurs, I'm sure America will enforce an embargo, don't you think?” In response, Kido, the lord of the privy seal, reassured him by stating, “The nation must be fully prepared to resist, proceeding with caution and avoiding being drawn into events instigated by foreign interests.”   Hirohito went through countless meetings, but eventually signed order number 458 authorizing the invasion of French Indochina, knowing full well the consequences. The US,UK and Netherlands began embargoes of oil, rubber and iron. In the words of Admiral Takagai “As time passes and this situation continues, our empire will either be totally defeated or forced to fight a hopeless war. Therefore we should pursue war and diplomacy together. If there is no prospect of securing our final line of national survival by diplomatic negotiations, we must be resolved to fight.” Hirohito understood the predicament full well, that each day Japan was wasting its oil reserves, if they were to strike it had to be quickly.   On October 13th Hirohito told his closest advisor Koichi Kido “In the present situation there seems to be little hope for the Japan–U.S. negotiations. If hostilities erupt this time, I think I may have to issue a declaration of war.”   The reason I am bringing up all this stuff is to solidify, Hirohito had agency, he was micromanaging and forming decisions. After the war broke out with the west, Hirohito did have the ability to stamp his foot down. Of course there could have been wild repercussions, his military could have usurped him with Chichibu, it was definitely possible. But you need to keep this mind set, as far as why Hirohito acts or doesn't, its always to protect the Kokutai. Thus one of the levers for peace, solely rested on Hirohito's perception if the kokutai could be retained or not.    From the outset of the Pacific War, Hirohito believed Germany was going to defeat the USSR. In line with his military leaders, they all believed Japan had to seize everything they could in the asia-pacific and thwart off the US until a negotiated peace could be met. Hirohito committed himself to overseeing the war, determined to achieve victory at any cost. He was a very cautious leader, he meticulously analyzed each campaign, anticipating potential setbacks and crafting worst-case scenario predictions. He maintained a skeptical view of the reports from his senior officials and was often harshly critical of high commanders.   While he did not frequently visit the front lines like other commanders in chief, Hirohito wielded significant influence over theater operations, shaping both planning and execution whenever he deemed necessary. Similar to his approach during the war in China, he issued the highest military orders from the Imperial Headquarters, conducted audited conferences, and made decisions communicated under his name. He regularly welcomed generals and admirals to the imperial palace for detailed briefings on the battlefront and visited various military bases, battleships, and army and naval headquarters. His inspections encompassed military schools and other significant military institutions, adding to his comprehensive involvement in the war effort.   Now the war went extremely well for Japan until the battle of Midway. This was as major setback, but Japan retained the initiative. Then the Guadalcanal campaign saw Japan lose the initiative to the Americans. Upon receiving the initial report of the Ichiki detachment's destruction, Hirohito remarked, “I am sure it [Guadalcanal] can be held.” Despite the numerous reports detailing the devastating effects of tropical diseases and starvation on his troops, he persistently demanded greater efforts from them. Hirohito exerted continuous pressure on his naval and land commanders to retake the island. On September 15th, November 5th, and November 11th, he requested additional Imperial Japanese Army (IJA) troops and aircraft to be allocated to the cause.   General Sugiyama expressed concerns about dispatching more IJA pilots due to their inexperience in transoceanic combat, preferring to reinforce the North China Army for an attack on Chongqing instead. Hirohito pressed the issue again, but Sugiyama responded that the IJA had diverted its air resources to New Guinea and Rabaul. Undeterred by the objections from senior commanders, Hirohito persisted in his demands. By late November, it became evident that Guadalcanal was a lost cause.   At an Imperial Headquarters conference on December 31st, 1942, the chiefs of staff proposed canceling the attempts to recapture Guadalcanal. Hirohito sanctioned this decision but stated, “It is unacceptable to just give up on capturing Guadalcanal. We must launch an offensive elsewhere.” He insisted on this point, leading to the selection of new strategic targets in the Solomons, north of New Georgia, and in the Stanley Range on New Guinea. Hirohito even threatened to withhold authorization for withdrawing troops from Guadalcanal until a new plan was established. He later opposed the withdrawal from Munda Airfield, as it contradicted the newly defined defensive line.   As the defensive perimeter in the central and northern Solomons began to crumble, Hirohito continued to insist that the navy engage in decisive battles to regain the initiative, allowing for the transport of supplies to the many soldiers trapped on various islands. When he learned of the navy's failure to reinforce Lae on March 3rd, he asked, “Then why didn't you change plans immediately and land at Madan? This is a failure, but it can teach us a good lesson and become a source of future success. Do this for me so I can have peace of mind for a while.” The phrase “Do this for me” would come to be his signature rallying cry.   After Guadal canal, it was loss after loss for Japan. By February of 1944, Hirohito forced Sugiyama to resign so Hideki Tojo could take his position as chief of the general staff, note Tojo was prime minister and army minister at this point. Hirohito worked alongside Tojo to plan some last ditch efforts to change the war situation. The most significant one was Operation Ichi-Go. As much damage as they did to China with that, Chiang Kai-Shek's government survived. Hirohito watched as island by island fell to the Americans. When the Americans were poised to take Saipan he warned Tojo “If we ever lose Saipan, repeated air attacks on Tokyo will follow. No matter what it takes, we have to hold there.” Saipan fell, so Hirohito stopped supporting Tojo and allowed his rivals to take down his cabinet by june 18th of 1944.    Hirohito remained resolute in his determination to wrest victory from the Allies. On October 18th, the Imperial Headquarters ordered a decisive naval engagement, leading to the Battle of Leyte Gulf. After the war, Hirohito publicly stated, "Contrary to the views of the Army and Navy General Staffs, I consented to the showdown battle at Leyte, believing that if we launched an attack and America hesitated, we might find an opportunity to negotiate." Leyte Gulf didnt work. The military began the kamikaze program. On new years day of 1945 Hirohito inspected the special last meal rations given to departing kamikaze units. Iwo Jima fell. Okinawa remained, and Hirohito lashed out “Is it because we failed to sink enemy transports that we've let the enemy get ashore? Isn't there any way to defend Okinawa from the landing enemy forces?” On the second day of Okinawa's invasion Hirohito ordered a counter landing by the 32nd army and urged the navy to counterattack in every way possible. It was a horrible failure, it cost the lives of up to 120,000 Japanese combatants, 170,000 noncombatants. The Americans lost 12,500 killed and 33,000 wounded. An absolute bloodbath.    The Surrender time   Now we come to the time period where Japan seriously began looking for ways to surrender. In Europe Germany was heading to its defeat and Japan knew this. As for Japan, their army in Burma had been annihilated. Their forces in China were faring better after Operation Ichi-go, having opened up a land corridor along the main railway from Beiping to Wuhan and from throughout Guangdong but still stuck in a deadlock stalemate, facing a guerrilla war that was costing them 64% of their military expenditures. They deeply feared once the Soviets finished up with Germany, they would undoubtedly turn east against Manchuria. With the Soviets attacking from the north, the US would attack from the south, perhaps landing in Shanghai and the home islands. The Kamikaze tactics were proving formidable, but not nearly enough. By 1945, 43% of the IJA were now stationed in Japan, Korea and Formosa, bracing for the final stand. Former prime minister Reijiro Wakatsuki came out of retirement in may of 1945, having heard Germany collapsed, to urge Hirohito and the Prime Minister Kantaro Suzuki to open negotiations with the US as soon as possible. However he also said “the enemy must first be made to see the disadvantages of continuing the war”. To this Hirohito's chief counselor Makino Nobuaki said that “the ultimate priority is to develop an advantageous war situation.” Advisor admiral Kesiuke Okada said Japan should wait for “a moment favorable for us,” then make peace. Advisors Kiichiro Hiranuma and Koki Hirota advised the emperor to fight on until the end.   Now I want to bring in a key player to the surrender decision, that of Prince Konoe. Konoe was very close to Hirohito and understood the emperors mentality, especially how he viewed things in relation to the kokutai.    The senior statesman Prince Konoe had been consulting with Hirohito for over 18 months at this point trying to convey the message that if the war continued it would threaten the kokutai. Many months prior, he confided in the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, that the army was suffering from “a cancer” in the form of the Toseiha faction. However, he noted that “Kido and others” did not share his perspective, while “his Majesty is relatively unconcerned with ideological issues.” For the past four years, he continued, the emperor had been advised and still believed that “the true extremists are the Kodoha faction.” In reality, the greater threat to the kokutai arose from the Toseiha faction. Konoe further asserted that if the war escalated, they would attempt to alter the kokutai.   Konoe speculated that whether the threat originated from communists within the nation, primarily referring to left-wing radicals in the Toseiha faction, or from the “Anglo-American enemy,” both would seek to preserve the emperor while pushing towards the country's communization.In his written report to the emperor on February 14, which Kido listened to attentively, Konoe elaborated on his conspiracy theory. He asserted that the Soviet Union regarded Japan as its primary threat in East Asia. The Soviets had allied with the Chinese Communists, the largest and most formidable Communist party in Asia, and were collaborating with the United States and Britain to drive Japan out of China. He warned that they would enter the war when the opportunity arose.   Defeat, he cautioned the emperor, was inevitable if the conflict persisted. However, he emphasized that a far greater fear was the potential destruction of the kokutai. The ongoing war was eroding the domestic status quo, unleashing forces that threatened Japan and its imperial institution from within as much as from external adversaries. The real danger lay in the emperor's and Kido's trust in the generals of the Toseiha faction, who were unintentionally facilitating the communization of Japan. Konoe implored for a swift peace settlement before a Communist revolution emerged, making the preservation of the kokutai impossible. Hirohito agreed with Konoe but stated “ To end the war would be “very difficult unless we make one more military gain.” Konoe allegedly replied, “Is that possible? It must happen soon. If we have to wait much longer, . . . [a mere battle victory] will mean nothing.” Hirohito replied “If we hold out long enough in this war, we may be able to win, but what worries me is whether the nation will be able to endure it until then.”   On February 15th of 1945, Hirohito's intelligence warned the Soviet Union would likely abrogate its Neutrality Pact with Japan. Even Tojo conceded there was a 50/50 chance the USSR would invade Manchuria. In March, the US began B-29 incendiary bombing raids over Tokyo, turning 40% of the capital into ash. On March 18th, Hirohito with some aides drove around the capital to witness the devastation. The civilians looked exhausted and bewildered to Hirohito. Factory production was collapsing, absenteeism was rising, instances of lese majeste were running rampant. For the next 5 months imperial family members and senior statesmen all began speaking to Hirohito about the “crises of the kokutai”. The threat Konoe had warned about for months was becoming the main talking point. It seemed like the Japanese people within the countryside and urban areas remained steadfast in the resolve to obey their leaders, work and sacrifice for their nation, but for how long would they feel so?    It was only after the battle for Okinawa was lost and 60 Japanese cities had been leveled by American incendiary bombs that Hirohito openly indicated he wanted to negotiate a surrender.   Kido's diary reveals the first clear indication that the emperor might be urged to consider an early peace on June 8, 1945, when Kido drafted his “Draft Plan for Controlling the Crisis Situation.” This marked a pivotal moment. It followed the unintentional bombing of the Imperial Palace, the complete loss of hope for saving Okinawa, and coincided with the day the Supreme War Leadership Council adopted the “Basic Policy for the Future Direction of the War.” With the fighting in Europe concluded, Japan found itself entirely isolated. Kido's plan, although vague, proposed seeking the Soviet Union's assistance as an intermediary to help Japan gain leverage in negotiations with its adversaries. By drafting this plan, Kido signaled the end of his long alliance with the military hard-liners. Hirohito's acceptance of it indicated his readiness for an early peace.   Hirohito was moved to an underground bunker in the mountains of Matsushiro in Nagano prefecture where upon those around him noted he fell into a deep depression. On June 22nd  Hirohito informed the Supreme War Leadership Council he wanted them to open diplomatic maneuvers to end the war. In early July Soviet Ambassador Jacob Malik broke off inconclusive talks with Hirota. Hirohito stepped in immediately and ordered a new special envoy be sent to Moscow. However Hirohito nor the Suzuki government had concrete plans on how to mediate a surrender through the Soviets. The only things they did prioritize was a guarantee of the emperors political position and retainment of the imperial system, ie the kokutai. This was taken into consideration rather than ending the war as quickly as possible to save the lives of millions.    From April 8, 1945, until Japan's capitulation, the Suzuki government's chief war policy was “Ketsugo,” an advanced iteration of the “Shosango” (Victory Number 3) plan for defending the homeland. The hallmark of this strategy was a heavy reliance on suicide tactics, including deploying a massive number of kamikaze “special attack” planes, human torpedoes launched from submarines, dynamite-stuffed “crash boats” powered by truck engines, human rocket bombs carried by aircraft, and suicide assaults by specially trained ground units.   While preparations for Operation Ketsu progressed, the Imperial Diet convened on June 9 to pass a Wartime Emergency Measures Law, along with five additional measures aimed at mobilizing the entire nation for this final battle. On the same day, the emperor, who had yet to initiate efforts to end the war, issued another imperial rescript in conjunction with the Diet's convocation, instructing the nation to “smash the inordinate ambitions of the enemy nations” and “achieve the goals of the war.” Concurrently, the controlled press launched a daily die-for-the-emperor campaign to foster gratitude for the imperial benevolence and, from around mid-July onward, initiated a campaign to “protect the kokutai.”   The Americans countered with their own propaganda aimed at breaking Japan's will to fight. B-29 bombers dropped millions of leaflets written in Japanese, announcing the next scheduled targets for bombing raids and urging surrender, while using the emperor to challenge the militarists. Leaflets bearing the chrysanthemum crest criticized the “military cliques” for “forcing the entire nation to commit suicide” and called on “everyone” to “exercise their constitutional right to make direct appeals [for peace] to the Emperor.” They asserted that “even the powerful military cliques cannot stop the mighty march for peace of the Emperor and the people.” One notable batch of seven million leaflets conveyed the terms of the “joint declaration” issued by the United States, Great Britain, and China. “Today we come not to bomb you,” they stated. “We are dropping this leaflet to inform you of the response from the United States government to your government's request for conditions of surrender.... Whether the war stops immediately depends on your government. You will understand how to end the war if you read these two official notifications.”   Amid pressures from imperial edicts to continue preparations for a final battle and focus solely on victory, the Japanese people were also subjected to an intense American psychological warfare campaign in addition to aerial bombardment. During late July and August, prefectural governors, police chiefs, and officers of the “special higher police” submitted reports to the Home Ministry detailing the rapidly deteriorating national morale.    Now on the other side, Roosevelt made it known back in January of 1943 at the Casablanca conference, the allies would only accept unconditional surrender. By 1945, the allies understood the predicament this left Japan with. On May 8th of 1945, Truman added “Japan's surrender would not mean the extermination or enslavement of the Japanese people” trying to indicate a non vindictive spirit. However the Kokutai question always remained ambiguous. State Department Joseph Grew, the former ambassador to Japan, began arguing to Truman they needed to make public a clear definition of the terms to persuade Japan to surrender. As he argued to Truman: Emperor Hirohito was seen as the key figure in Japan's surrender, likened to a "queen bee in a hive... surrounded by the attentions of the hive." Throughout the war, he was characterized in various ways—as a “puppet” of the militarists, a constitutional monarch, and a pacifist. Grew had immense faith in the influence exerted by what he referred to as the “moderates” surrounding the Japanese throne.    However many of Grew's colleagues argued the future existence of the monarchy was intolerable as it was akin to fascism. Many wanted to punish the emperor. Truman was in a tug of war. The Potsdam declaration issued on July 26th of 1945 came in the form of a ultimatum aiming to quicken japans surrender. Truman clarified the terms for the unconditional surrender at the end of its terms: "We call upon the government of Japan to proclaim now the unconditional surrender of all Japanese armed forces, and to provide proper and adequate assurances of their good faith in such action. The alternative for Japan is prompt and utter destruction." Zero mention of the emperor. Grew had argued to add “this may include a constitutional monarchy under the present dynasty.” But it was deleted from the article. The status of the emperor was not guaranteed, the kokutai was thus up in the air.    The next day, the Suzuki cabinet rejected the terms. The Japanese leadership and Hirohito were still banking and awaiting Soviet replies to their terms.    Lets talk about the Soviet talks now   Back on July 12th ambassador Naotake Satō sent this message to the Soviets: “His Majesty the Emperor, mindful of the fact that the present war daily brings greater evil and sacrifice upon the peoples of all the belligerent powers, desires from his heart that it may be quickly terminated. But so long as England and the United States insist upon unconditional surrender, the Japanese Empire has no alternative but to fight on with all its strength for the honor and existence of the Motherland”.  However the Soviets had made commitments to their allies, promising in fact to invade Japan to aid them.    As for the Soviets their primary objective was to ensure unrestricted access to the Pacific Ocean. The year-round ice-free areas of the Soviet Pacific coastline, particularly Vladivostok, could be blockaded by air and sea from Sakhalin Island and the Kurile Islands. Securing these territories to guarantee free access to the Soya Strait was their main goal. Secondary objectives included acquiring leases for the Chinese Eastern Railway, the Southern Manchuria Railway, as well as gaining control over Dairen and Port Arthur.   To achieve these aims, Stalin and Molotov prolonged negotiations with the Japanese, creating a false sense of hope for a Soviet-mediated peace. Simultaneously, in their discussions with the United States and Britain, the Soviets insisted on strict adherence to the Cairo Declaration, which had been reaffirmed at the Yalta Conference. This declaration stipulated that the Allies would not accept a separate or conditional peace with Japan; thus, the Japanese would need to surrender unconditionally to all the Allies. The Soviets aimed to prolong the war by opposing any efforts to dilute this requirement. This approach would provide the Soviets with the necessary time to complete the transfer of their troops from the Western Front to the Far East and to conquer Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, northern Korea, South Sakhalin, the Kuriles, and potentially Hokkaidō, starting with an assault on Rumoi. AUGUST 1945   Thus we come to at last the critical point, August of 1945.    The Americans prepared for the deployment of atomic bombs and for an invasion of southern Kyushu, known as Operation Olympic, scheduled to commence on November 1. At 8:15 A.M. on August 6, a single B-29 bomber, the Enola Gay dropped little boy, devastating much of the undefended city of Hiroshima, instantly killing an estimated 100,000 to 140,000 people and leading to the deaths of possibly another 100,000 over the next five years. At the epicenter of the explosion, “a light appeared 3,000 times brighter than the sun,” creating a fireball that emitted thermal radiation capable of “instantly scorching humans, trees, and houses.” As the air heated and rushed upward, cold air surged in to ignite a firestorm. Hours later, a whirlwind escalated the flames to their peak until more than eight square miles were virtually reduced to cinders. Subsequently, black, muddy rain filled with radioactive fallout began to fall. Two days later, using Japan's rejection of the Potsdam Declaration as a pretext, the Soviet Union declared war on Japan. Then on August 9, the United States dropped a second atomic bomb on Nagasaki, resulting in the immediate deaths of approximately 35,000 to 40,000 people and injuring more than 60,000.   Meanwhile, in Tokyo, during the critical period between the Potsdam Declaration and the atomic bombing of Hiroshima, Emperor Hirohito remained silent about accepting the Potsdam terms. However, on July 25 and 31, he explicitly conveyed to Kido that the imperial regalia must be defended at all costs. The three sacred objects—a mirror, a curved jewel, and a sword—symbolized the legitimacy of his rule through the northern court and were integral to his identity as the divine sovereign. Hirohito's focus was on protecting these symbols of office, as he insisted on having them brought to the palace. This fixation on maintaining his symbols occurred during a pivotal moment when the pressing issue was whether to accept immediate capitulation. Reflecting on this, he was unprepared to seize the opportunity to end the war himself.   Prime Minister Suzuki, following his initial rejection of the Potsdam ultimatum, also saw no need for further action. His Cabinet Advisory Council, which included the president of Asano Cement, the founder of the Nissan consortium, the vice president of the Bank of Japan, and other representatives from the nation's leading business interests that had profited significantly from the war, convened on the morning of August 3. They recommended accepting the Potsdam terms, arguing that the United States would permit Japan to retain its non-military industries and continue participating in world trade.    Here are some reactions to the two bombs and invasion of Manchuria.    Yonai Mitsumasa said to admiral Takagi Sokichi, on August 12, that “I think the term is perhaps inappropriate, but the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war are, in a sense, gifts from the gods [tenyu, also “heaven-sent blessings”]. This way we don't have to say that we quit the war because of domestic circumstances. I've long been advocating control of our crisis, but neither from fear of an enemy attack nor because of the atomic bombs and the Soviet entry into the war. The main reason is my anxiety over the domestic situation. So, it is rather fortunate that we can now control matters without revealing the domestic situation”.    Konoe's characterized the Soviet involvement in the war as “a godsend for controlling the army,”. Kido viewed of both the atomic bombings and the Soviet entry into the conflict as “useful” elements for ensuring a smooth transition. A nascent power struggle was unfolding, rendering the potential death toll—whether one hundred thousand or two hundred thousand—immaterial to those involved, as long as their desired outcome was achieved: an end to the war that would leave the monarchy intact and capable of managing the discontent that defeat would inevitably provoke. Throughout the final acts of this wartime drama, the Japanese “moderates” found it easier to capitulate to external pressures than to take decisive action on their own to conclude the war.   Another illuminating looks at Japan's elite's perspective on surrender terms was the document titled “Essentials of Peace Negotiations” (wahei kosho no yoryo). Drafted by Konoe and his adviser, retired Lt. Gen. Sakai Koji, after Konoe had reluctantly accepted a mission to Moscow, this document, stipulated the preservation of the emperor system, along with most of the imperial prerogatives, as the absolute minimum condition for peace. It defined the “original” or “essential homeland” as including the southern half of the Kurile Islands but showed a willingness to concede all overseas territories to the enemy, including Okinawa and the American-occupied Bonin Islands, as well as the southern half of Sakhalin. The “Essentials” also accepted complete disarmament for an unspecified period, thereby compromising on the issues of demobilizing and disarming the armed forces. More significantly, an “explanation” attached to the “Essentials” emphasized that “the main aim is to secure the imperial line and maintain the political role of the emperor.”    Why Japan surrendered   We come to it atleast after a long podcast. Why did Japan ultimately surrender?   The twin psychological shocks of the first atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war, combined with Kido's and the emperor's concern over escalating public criticism of the throne and its occupant, fueled an almost paranoid fear that, sooner or later, the populace would react violently against their leaders if the war persisted much longer. These factors ultimately led Hirohito to accept, in principle, the terms of the Potsdam Declaration.   At the first meeting of the six member constituents of the Supreme War Leadership Council, held from 10:30 A.M. to 1:00 P.M. on August 9, Army Minister Anami Korechika, Chiefs of Staff Umezu Yoshijiro, representing the army, and Yonai, representing the navy, along with Tōgō, from the Foreign Ministry, were expected to discuss the acceptance of the Potsdam Declaration. Instead, the conversation revolved around whether to attempt a conditional surrender—specifically, should they insist on one condition, the preservation of the kokutai, or four?   After Suzuki addressed the assembly regarding the atomic bombing of Hiroshima and the Soviet attack, Yonai, as recounted by Navy Chief of Staff Toyoda, was the first to speak, framing the issue in terms of four conditions. “Let's start to talk, Do we accept the Potsdam Declaration with no conditions? If not, and we wish to insist on attaching hopes and conditions, we may do so this way. First, preservation of the kokutai; then for the rest, the main items in the Potsdam Declaration: treatment of war criminals, method of disarmament, and the matter of sending in an army of occupation.” Thus, the participants identified what they perceived to be the ambiguous points within the Potsdam Declaration and used them as the foundation for their discussions.   The army insisted on four conditions: First, the preservation of the kokutai, which they considered distinct from the Potsdam Declaration itself. The other conditions proposed were, second, that the Imperial Headquarters assume responsibility for disarmament and demobilization; third, a prohibition on occupation; and fourth, the delegation of the punishment of war criminals to the Japanese government. The army equated the kokutai with the emperor's right of supreme command. Their self-serving desire for autonomous war crimes trials was based on the belief that the Allies would use such trials to politically indict the military. Consequently, army leaders aimed to preempt the activities of any international tribunal by conducting their own trials—similar to the approach taken by the uninvaded and unrepentant Germans after World War I.   Supporting the military's views during cabinet meetings that day were three civilian members of the Suzuki cabinet: Justice Minister Matsuzaka Hiromasa, Home Minister Yasui Toji, and Minister of Health Okada Tadahiko. At the imperial conference that night, which extended into the early hours of the tenth, Foreign Minister Tōgō's interpretation of the “preservation of the kokutai” referred solely to the safeguarding of the Imperial House or dynasty, rather than the continuation of Hirohito's reign.   Hiranuma, another advocate for the single condition, interpreted the kokutai as the “emperor's sovereign right to rule the state [not] deriving from national law. Even if the entire nation is sacrificed to the war, we must preserve both the kokutai and the security of the imperial house.” This discrepancy illustrated that there was no completely unified understanding of what the kokutai entailed; the debate over one condition versus four represented conflicting visions for the future of the Japanese state and masked the competition for political power that was already unfolding.   It remains doubtful whether the emperor and Kido initially sided with Tōgō against the four conditions proposed by the senior military leaders. A more likely inference is that both men retained sympathies for the hardliners, both military and civilian, who preferred to continue the futile war rather than surrender immediately and unconditionally. This may explain why, on August 9, Konoe had Hosokawa Morisada approach Navy General Headquarters to urge the emperor's brother, Prince Takamatsu, to pressure Hirohito (through Kido) to accept the Potsdam terms. Later that afternoon, Konoe enlisted the help of diplomat Shigemitsu Mamoru to persuade Kido to reconsider his stance on the four conditions. Ultimately, at the urging of Takamatsu and Shigemitsu, Kido did shift to support Tōgō's position.   At the end of the war, as at its beginning and throughout every stage of its progression, Emperor Hirohito played a highly active role in supporting the actions carried out in his name. From the very beginning of the Asia-Pacific war, the emperor played a significant role in the unfolding events around him. Prior to the Battle of Okinawa, he consistently advocated for a decisive victory. Afterward, he acknowledged the necessity of pursuing an early peace, although he did not favor an immediate cessation of hostilities. Instead, he wavered, steering Japan toward ongoing warfare rather than direct negotiations with the Allies. When the final crisis fully unfolded, the only option left was unconditional surrender. Even then, he continued to procrastinate until the atomic bomb was dropped and the Soviets launched their attack. The wartime emperor ideology that once sustained morale made it exceedingly difficult for Japan's leaders to accept the act of surrender. Aware of their objective defeat, yet indifferent to the suffering the war inflicted on their own people—as well as on the populations of Asia, the Pacific, and the West whose lives they had disrupted—the emperor and his military leaders sought a means to lose without appearing to lose. They aimed to mitigate domestic criticism following surrender while preserving their power structure.   Blinded by their fixation on the fate of the imperial house and committed to an overly optimistic diplomacy toward the Soviet Union, Japan's leaders missed several opportunities to end their lost war. Would Japan's leaders have surrendered more promptly if the Truman administration had “clarified” the status of the emperor before the cataclysmic double shocks of the atomic bomb and the Soviet entry into the war? Probably not. However, it is likely they would have surrendered to prevent the kokutai from being destroyed from within. The evidence suggests that the first atomic bomb and the Soviet declaration of war led Hirohito, Kido, and other members of the court to believe that continuing the war would inevitably result in that destruction. They recognized that the populace was war-weary and despondent, with rising hostility toward the military and the government, accompanied by increasing criticism of the emperor himself. More specifically, Kido and Hirohito were privy to Home Ministry reports, which contained information from governors and police chiefs nationwide. These reports indicated that citizens were beginning to label the emperor as an incompetent leader responsible for the deteriorating war situation.   This is the third variable, never spoken about. Many first look at the atomic bombs. Bigger brain people turn to the Soviet Invasion of Manchuria. But hardly anyone reads about how the collapse of Japan's social fabric, scared the shit out of the Emperor and his closest advisors. You can't have a kokutai, without a populace that worshiped you.    When the emperor expressed in February, “What worries me is whether the nation [could] endure” long enough to achieve victory, he was not merely voicing concern for the suffering of his subjects; rather, he feared that such suffering could lead to social upheaval—in short, revolution. At that time, he referred to the ordinary, war-related hardships of food shortages, air raids, devastated cities, destruction of homes, and the omnipresent grief from the loss of loved ones. The atomic bomb escalated death, pain, and suffering to unimaginably higher levels, intensifying the threat from within. After the bombings of Japan and two atomic bombs, Hirohito was in a dark way, given a golden get out of jail free card. Hirohito could now save his suffering people from further anguish by surrendering, allowing him to deflect responsibility for leading them into misery while adopting an air of benevolence and care. Indeed, Hirohito did care—though not primarily for the Japanese people, but rather for the survival of his own imperial house and throne.   After the bombing of Hiroshima, Hirohito delayed for a full two days before instructing Kido, shortly before 10 A.M. on August 9, to “quickly control the situation” because “the Soviet [Union]” had declared war. Kido immediately communicated with Prime Minister Suzuki, who began arrangements for an Imperial Conference scheduled for later that night. Following the seidan of August 10, Chief Cabinet Secretary Sakomizu took charge of drafting the “Imperial Rescript Ending the War” based on Hirohito's directives. Assisted by two scholars of the Chinese classics, Kawada Mizuho and Yasuoka Masahiro, Sakomizu worked tirelessly for over three days before submitting a version of the rescript to the Suzuki cabinet. After six hours of contentious discussion on the night of August 14, the cabinet modified and approved the document. Hirohito promptly signed it, and Shimomura and Kido persuaded him to record a suitably opaque final version for broadcast to the nation.   On the night of August 14, the Suzuki government notified the United States and other Allied nations that it had accepted both the Potsdam Declaration and the Byrnes letter of August 11. Accelerating the emperor's actions during this climactic moment of the unconditional surrender drama was the American psychological warfare campaign. When a leaflet dropped from B-29 bombers came into Kido's possession on the night of August 13 or the morning of the fourteenth, he conferred with the emperor and explained the gravity of the situation. The latest enemy leaflets were informing the Japanese people of the government's notification of surrender under one condition, along with the full text of Byrnes's response. If this continued, it would undermine the imperial government's reliance on secrecy to obscure the true nature of the lost war and the reasons for the prolonged surrender delay.   Given Kido's and the emperor's concerns about rising signs of defeatism, including criticism of the throne, immediate action was necessary to prevent the populace from acting on their own initiative. Thus, the second seidan was convened. At noon on August 15, the Japanese people gathered around their radio receivers and heard, for the first time, the high-pitched voice of their emperor telling them:    “After pondering deeply the general trends of the world and the actual conditions obtaining in Our Empire today, We have decided to effect a settlement of the present situation by resorting to an extraordinary measure. We have ordered Our Government to communicate to the Governments of the United States, Great Britain, China and the Soviet Union that Our Empire accepts the provisions of their Joint Declaration. To strive for the common prosperity and happiness of all nations as well as the security and well-being of Our subjects is the solemn obligation which has been handed down by Our Imperial Ancestors and which lies close to Our heart. Indeed, We declared war on America and Britain out of Our sincere desire to ensure Japan's self-preservation and the stabilization of East Asia, it being far from Our thought either to infringe upon the sovereignty of other nations or to embark upon territorial aggrandizement. But now the war has lasted for nearly four years. Despite the best that has been done by everyone—the gallant fighting of the military and naval forces, the diligence and assiduity of Our servants of the State, and the devoted service of Our one hundred million people—the war situation has developed not necessarily to Japan's advantage, while the general trends of the world have all turned against her interest. Moreover, the enemy has begun to employ a new and most cruel bomb, the power of which to do damage is, indeed, incalculable, taking the toll of many innocent lives. Should we continue to fight, not only would it result in an ultimate collapse and obliteration of the Japanese nation, but also it would lead to the total extinction of human civilization. Such being the case, how are We to save the millions of Our subjects, or to atone Ourselves before the hallowed spirits of Our Imperial Ancestors? This is the reason why We have ordered the acceptance of the provisions of the Joint Declaration of the Powers... The hardships and sufferings to which Our nation is to be subjected hereafter will be certainly great. We are keenly aware of the inmost feelings of all of you, Our subjects. However, it is according to the dictates of time and fate that We have resolved to pave the way for a grand peace for all the generations to come by enduring the unendurable and suffering what is unsufferable”.   Clearly Hirohito sought to justify his decision to surrender by citing the dropping of the atomic bombs. He wanted to become the saviour of the Japanese people. Hirohito wanted to obfuscate the issue of accountability, to prevent expressions of strife and anger and to strengthen domestic unity around himself, to protect and raise the kokutai.  Interestingly, the surrender declaration to the civilian population was not the same one sent to the military. On August 17th Hirohito issued a second “rescript to soldiers and sailors” throughout the asia-pacific.   “ Now that the Soviet Union has entered the war against us, to continue . . . under the present conditions at home and abroad would only recklessly incur even more damage to ourselves and result in endangering the very foundation of the empire's existence. Therefore, even though enormous fighting spirit still exists in the Imperial Navy and Army, I am going to make peace with the United States, Britain, and the Soviet Union, as well as with Chungking, in order to maintain our glorious national polity”.   The lesser-known August 17 rescript to the army and navy specified Soviet participation as the sole reason for surrender, while maintaining the kokutai as the primary aim. Dissembling until the end—and even beyond—it was noted that the emperor presented two different justifications for his delayed surrender. Both statements were likely true.   Months later Hirohito's said this about his decision to surrender “The main motive behind my decision at that time was that if we . . . did not act, the Japanese race would perish and I would be unable to protect my loyal subjects [sekishi—literally, “children”]. Second, Kido agreed with me on the matter of defending the kokutai. If the enemy landed near Ise Bay, both Ise and Atsuta Shrines would immediately come under their control. There would be no time to transfer the sacred treasures [regalia] of the imperial family and no hope of protecting them. Under these circumstances, protection of the kokutai would be difficult. For these reasons, I thought at the time that I must make peace even at the sacrifice of myself.”    There exists this sort of childish argument today whether it was the atomic bombs or the Soviet Invasion that caused Japan to surrender. However, this overlooks as I think I've explained in 9000 words jeez, the influence of the kokutai. Defending the kokutai was Hirohito's number one priority. The Soviets threatened it. Communism threatened it. What Japan perceived to be “democracy” threatened it. American victory threatened it. And the destruction of Japan's social fabric threatened it. I love this one piece of history, that I have only come across in one book, that being the main one I am using here.   On August 12th, Hirohito came to the imperial family to tell them he had made the decision to surrender. His uncle Prince Yasuhiko Asaka asked him whether the war would be continued if the kokutai could not be preserved. Hirohito replied “of course”.

This week, we dive into Gregg Araki's The Doom Generation (1995), a neon-soaked, blood-splattered road movie that's equal parts satire, nightmare, and Gen X fever dream. Following the nihilistic trio of Jordan, Amy, and Xavier as they spiral through a world of violence, sex, and black humor, Araki crafts a brutal portrait of lost youth at the edge of America's cultural meltdown.We unpack the film's shocking violence, its biting commentary on consumerism and morality, and how it fits within Araki's “Teenage Apocalypse Trilogy.” From its campy dialogue to its disturbing finale, we ask: is The Doom Generation pure provocation, or does it reveal something deeper about identity, alienation, and the rage of a generation?If you're ready to confront a film that MTV once called “the first true Gen X movie,” buckle up—this ride is messy, grotesque, and unforgettable.Show E-Mail: cultcinemacircle@gmail.comFollow Bobby on InstagramFollow Cult Cinema Circle on Instagram, Bluesky, and Letterboxd Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

In this episode, we dive into Gregg Araki's Totally Fucked Up (1993), the raw, DIY cornerstone of his Teenage Apocalypse Trilogy. Blurring the lines between documentary-style confessional and narrative chaos, the film follows a group of queer teens navigating love, alienation, and survival in early '90s Los Angeles. We unpack its fragmented structure, its unfiltered portrayal of youth on the margins, and the way Araki captures both the aimlessness and urgency of adolescence. From grainy camcorder intimacy to punk-fueled rebellion, we explore how Totally Fucked Up remains a defiant, vulnerable time capsule of Gen X disillusionmentIntro/Outro Music: "Phantom Fun" by Jonathan Boyle----Show E-Mail: cultcinemacircle@gmail.comFollow Cult Cinema Circle on Instagram, Bluesky, and Letterboxd Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

The podcast makes its second visit to Hawaii. UIAAA Connection #236 – Pastor Rob Araki, CMAA, Former Director of Athletics – Hanalani Schools K-12, is now available. PastorRob grew up in Greenville, South Carolina, near Wade Hampton High School, where former NIAAA President Darryl Nance worked. His mother hoped he would attend Bob Jones University, but he found his way to being a pastor by othermeans. He earned a degree in Business Administration. Now serving as the state coordinator in Hawaii, Rob recently co-authored LTC 718, a leadership course focused on navigating tragic events. His advice centers on three key principles: finding a reliable mentor, intentionally scheduling rest tomaintain balance, and prioritizing family care. These practices support strong, compassionate leadership and long-term personal and professional well-being. PleaseListen, Learn, and Share! You can subscribe to UIAAA TV on YouTube! This podcast is also available on Amazon Music, Apple Podcasts, Breaker, Castbox, Google Podcasts, iHeartRadio, Overcast, Pocket Casts, RadioPublic, Spotify,Stitcher, and YouTube.

This week, Bella is joined by special guests Melia and Henry Chendo to celebrate Pride with a look at Gregg Araki's Teen Apocalypse Trilogy:Totally F***ed Up (1993)The Doom Generation (1995)Nowhere (1997)A trailblazer of New Queer Cinema, Araki captured the chaos of queer youth in the '90s like no one else. These films are loud, sexy, surreal, and devastating — soaked in color, contradiction, and emotion.In this episode, we talk about his portrayal of the queer experience through his signature thematic and aesthetic style — how he balances camp comedy with emotional darkness, and how sex, love, drugs, violence, and warped reality all collide in his stories.There's a constant tension in these films between disconnection and desire, between the feeling of being completely lost and the desperate need to be seen. Araki doesn't offer clean resolutions or easy answers — his stories unravel in fragments, in bursts of color and chaos. Still, somewhere in the wreckage, he makes room for vulnerability, longing, and the aching need to be understood.Happy Pride!

Amidst the profound social change and political turmoil of post-war Japan, a bold generation of avant-garde artists and photographers emerged in the 1960s, forever transforming the global art landscape. Japanese Avant-Garde Pioneers' director Amélie Ravalec attended the Dutch premiere at De Balie in Amsterdam to talk about the film with our cinema curator Stefan Malešević. Watch the film screening of Japanese Avant-Garde Pioneers until June 23, exclusively at De Balie.The 1960s era in Japan was a time of profound social change, political unrest and student protests. The turbulent times of the postwar era inspired an artistic explosion in Japan, with the emergence of a revolutionary scene of avant-garde artists who pioneered many disciplines: experimental and erotic photography, “Angura” theatre and underground street performances, apocalyptic Butoh dance, surreal illustrations and seminal graphic design.A new aesthetic of photography was born: “Are, Bure, Boke” (rough, dark and out of focus), pioneered by Moriyama Daidō and the Provoke magazine photographers. Araki beautified bondage and Hosoe Eikoh sublimated the male body. Ishiuchi Miyako captured her experience of American military bases. Kawada Kikuji's era-defining photobook The Map captured the poignancy of Hiroshima's trauma.Master of underground theatre Terayama Shūji produced countless magical, surreal and vividly colourful films, plays and photobooks, Yokoo Tadanori and Awazu Kiyoshi revolutionised graphic design with their incandescent theatre posters, Tanaami Keiichi, Japan's answer to Andy Warhol, developed his unique kaleidoscopic vision of Pop-Art, and Butoh founders Hijikata Tatsumi and Ohno Kazuo impacted modern dance forever with their dance of darkness and light.Watch the official trailer here.Get your tickets for the film screening at De Balie here.Intro music: Andrii Poradovskyi---Want to know more about Forum on European Culture? Here you can find more information.Zie het privacybeleid op https://art19.com/privacy en de privacyverklaring van Californië op https://art19.com/privacy#do-not-sell-my-info.

  Last time we spoke about China's preparations for War. In December 1936, the tension in China reached a boiling point as Nationalist General Chiang Kai-shek was captured by his own commanders, Zhang Xueliang and Yang Hucheng. Disillusioned by Chiang's focus on fighting communists instead of the encroaching Japanese forces, the generals sought a unified response to Japanese aggression. After being held in Xi'an, Chiang reluctantly agreed to collaborate with the Chinese Communist Party, marking a significant shift in strategy against Japan. Amidst the rising chaos, Chiang's government reviewed historical military strategies and prepared for a prolonged conflict. However, they faced challenges, including inadequate supplies and a lack of modern equipment compared to the Japanese. By 1937, China was ill-prepared for war, with Chiang later expressing regret about their military readiness. Despite these setbacks, the alliance formed with the communists laid a foundation for a united Chinese front against the brutalities of the Sino-Japanese War that would follow.   #153 Japan Prepares for War Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So in the last episode we talked about how China was preparing itself for war, now its time for Japan. Since Japan's invasion of North China, Japanese field armies had promoted a series of autonomous zones in northern China. Officers from the Kwantung Army, skeptical of China's capacity to modernize, believed that the vast region would inevitably fragment into regional factions. This policy effectively maintained a weak and divided China, which served Japan's to defend Manchukuo. However many Japanese military leaders frequently pointed to the threat posed by the KMT's five-year plan, initiated in 1933 with assistance from German military advisors, aimed at modernizing and expanding the national army. To counter what they perceived as a Chinese threat, the field armies advocated for a preemptive war to dismantle Chiang Kai-shek's regime. Any attempt by Tokyo to alter the military's China policy faced vigorous opposition from the Kwantung Army, which, in February 1937, pushed for intensified covert actions to expel the KMT from northern China and supported a preemptive war to secure strategic areas for future operations against the Soviet Union. At a March meeting in Tokyo, staff officers from the China Garrison and Kwantung armies insisted that any concessions to China would be a grave mistake and would likely yield only temporary outcomes. In early spring 1937, Prince Konoe Fumimaro inherited a China policy fraught with competing views, however, there was consensus that China must not distract the empire from its preparations against the USSR. The end goal was clear, but the means to achieve it remained uncertain. The cabinet's approval of the "Fundamentals of National Policy" in August 1936 indicated a need for stability as the army and navy reconfigured Japan's war machine. The challenge lay in aligning long-term strategic goals with practical short-term interests in northern China without upsetting the existing balance of power. Expanding demands propelled the army's contingency planning, which had traditionally focused on safeguarding Japanese interests and the approximately 13,000 Japanese citizens residing in the region. Tokyo typically responded to serious incidents by deploying troops from homeland garrisons to address localized emergencies and then withdrawing them. However, by the mid-1930s, the growing Soviet threat to Manchukuo rendered this doctrine obsolete. Incidents in northern China gained strategic importance as they diverted resources from the Kwantung Army's preparations against the Soviet Union. Disruptions in northern China hindered access to essential raw materials necessary for army modernization and rearmament, while hostile Chinese forces threatened the Kwantung Army's strategic left flank in the event of war with the Soviets. With these considerations in mind, the army revised its operational war plans, assuming that northern China would serve as Japan's strategic rear area for operations against the USSR. In 1911 Japan's plan for general war mandated thirteen divisions to occupy southern Manchuria, capture Beijing, and subsequently occupy Zhejiang and Fujian. Limited contingency operations in northern China required two divisions to secure rail communications from Beijing to the coast. In the weeks following the 1931 Manchurian Incident, the General Staff in Tokyo drafted plans to counter a Sino-Soviet alliance, anticipating a 2 month campaign involving 15-16 divisions, with the majority engaged against the Soviet Red Army. 2 divisions were designated to secure northern China, while smaller units would monitor the Inner Mongolian front to protect Japan's western flank in Manchuria. After further refinement, the General Staff identified three contingencies for China in early 1932: maintaining the traditional mission of safeguarding Japanese interests and citizens with a standard two-division force; ensuring a secure line of communication between the Chinese capital and the sea with the China Garrison Army, which consisted of approximately 1,700 officers and men, reinforced by one division; and, in a worst-case scenario of all-out war, deploying three divisions to reinforce the Kwantung Army, along with 7 additional divisions and 3 cavalry brigades to suppress resistance in northern China and the Shandong Peninsula, while two additional divisions secured key areas in central China. Between 1932-1936, China received less attention as the General Staff focused on the Soviet military buildup in the Far East. Anxiety, stemming from the Soviet buildup in the Far East, was a pervasive concern reflected in the draft rearmament plan submitted to the throne on May 21, 1936, as part of the national budget formulation process. The army proposed countering the Soviet threat by enhancing Japanese strategic mobility in Manchukuo through the renovation and expansion of airfields, ports, roads, and rail infrastructure, and by constructing army air force arsenals, storage depots, and medical facilities. The positioning of Japanese divisions in eastern Manchuria suggested their wartime objectives, with the Kwantung Army relying on a mobile independent mixed brigade composed of armored car and mounted cavalry units stationed in Gongzhuling, central Manchuria, as its immediate response force for contingencies in northern China. Major units were not concentrated in western Manchuria, where they would be expected to deploy before any planned invasion of northern China. Nevertheless, General Staff planners remained vigilant regarding developments in China, where the resurgence of nationalism, Communist movements advancing north of the Yellow River in February 1936, and the spread of anti-Japanese sentiments across northern China raised the specter of limited military operations escalating into full-scale warfare. China's improving military capabilities would likely hinder Japanese forces from accomplishing their objectives. For example, around Shanghai, Chinese defenses were bolstered by extensive, in-depth, and permanent fortifications. In mid-September 1936, the General Staff in Tokyo issued orders to preempt significant outbreaks in northern China by repositioning a division in Manchukuo closer to the boundary. If hostilities broke out, the China Garrison Army, supported by Kwantung Army units, would launch punitive operations against Chinese forces as necessary. Higher headquarters expected local commanders to act swiftly and decisively, employing rapid maneuvers and shock tactics to address outbreaks with minimal force. Given that no alternative responses were considered, Japanese operational planning for northern China relied on an all-or-nothing approach to force deployment, even for minor incidents. Yet, the senior leadership of the army remained deeply divided over its China policy. Influenced by Ishiwara, the General Staff wanted to avoid military actions that could lead to a full-scale war with China, focusing instead on advancing the army's extensive rearmament and modernization program. In contrast, a majority of high-ranking officers in the Army Ministry and General Staff, particularly within the 2nd Operations Section and the Kwantung Army, favored forceful action against China, believing it necessary to quell rising anti-Japanese sentiments. Drawing from past experiences, these officers anticipated that the Chinese would quickly capitulate once hostilities commenced. This lack of a unified military strategy reflected broader disagreements among the army's leadership regarding operations in China. While operational planning called for the permanent occupation of large regions in northern and central China, the General Staff aimed to contain outbreaks to maintain focus on Soviet threats. There was a clear absence of long-term operational planning; instead, the army concentrated on initial battles while relegating planning for prolonged combat operations to contingent circumstances. In summary, the Japanese army preferred to avoid military force to address Chinese issues whenever feasible but was equally unwilling to concede to Chinese demands. Since 1914, Tosui Koryo or “Principles of Command” had served as the foundational doctrine for senior Japanese army commanders and staff officers engaged in combined arms warfare at the corps and army levels. The advent of new weapons, tactics, and organizational changes during World War I compelled all major military forces to reassess their existing military doctrines across strategic, operational, and tactical dimensions. In response, Japan modified the Principles of Command to blend its traditional post-Russo-Japanese War focus on the intangible factors in battle with the newest concepts of modern total war. A revision in 1918 recognized the significance of “recent great advances in materiel” for total warfare, yet it maintained that ultimate victory in battle relied on dedication, patriotism, and selfless service. In the 1920s, the General Staff's Operations Section, led by Major General Araki Sadao, who would become the leader of the Kodoha faction, had produced the most significant and impactful revision of the Principles. A staunch anti-communist and ideologue who valued the intangible elements of combat, Araki appointed Lieutenant Colonel Obata Toshishiro and Captain Suzuki Yorimichi as the principal authors of the manual's rewrite. Obata, a Soviet expert, was strongly influenced by German General Count Alfred von Schlieffen's classic theories of a “war of annihilation,” while Suzuki, the top graduate of the thirtieth Staff College class, shared Araki's focus on “spiritual” or intangible advantages in warfare. Both men were brilliant yet arrogant, working in secrecy to create a doctrine based on what Leonard Humphreys describes as “intense spiritual training” and bayonet-led assaults to counter the opponent's material superiority.  The latest version of the Principles of Command preserved the operational concept of rapid Japanese mobile offensive operations, aiming to induce a decisive battle or “kaisen” early in the campaign. It reaffirmed the sokusen sokketsu or “rapid victory' principle of rapid warfare. Attaining these goals relied exclusively on offensive action, with the army expecting commanders at all levels to press forward, defeat enemy units, and capture key territories. The troops were indoctrinated with a spirit of aggression and trained to anticipate certain victory. The emphasis on offensive action was so pronounced that Araki eliminated terms like surrender, retreat, and defense from the manual, believing they negatively affected troop morale. This aggressive mindset also infused the Sento Koryo or “Principles of Operations”, first published in 1929 as a handbook for combined arms warfare tailored for division and regimental commanders. The manual emphasized hand-to-hand combat as the culminating stage of battle, a principle regarded as unchanging in Japanese military doctrine since 1910. Senior commanders were expected to demonstrate initiative in skillfully maneuvering their units to encircle the enemy, setting the stage for climactic assaults with cold steel. Infantry was deemed the primary maneuver force, supported by artillery. To complement rapid infantry advances, the army developed light and mobile artillery. Operationally, encirclement and night attacks were vital components of victory, and even outnumbered units were expected to aggressively envelop enemy flanks. In assaults against fortified positions, units would advance under the cover of darkness, avoiding enemy artillery fire and positioning themselves for dawn attacks that combined firepower with shock action to overwhelm enemy defenses. In encounters with opposing forces, commanders would maneuver to flank the enemy, surround their units, and destroy them. If forced onto the defensive, commanders were expected to seize opportunities for decisive counterattacks to regain the initiative. These high-level operational doctrines were distilled into tactical guidelines in the January 1928 edition of the Infantry Manual or “Hohei Soten”, which saw a provisional revision in May 1937 . Both editions opened with identical introductions emphasizing the necessity for a rapid victory through the overpowering and destruction of enemy forces. Infantry was identified as the primary arm in combined arms warfare, and soldiers were taught to rely on cold steel as fundamental to their attacking spirit. The 1928 Infantry Manual underscored the commander's role in instilling a faith in certain victory or “hissho shinnen”, drawing from the glorious traditions of Japanese military history. The 1928 infantry tactics employed an extended skirmish line with four paces between soldiers. Individual initiative in combat was generally discouraged, except under exceptional circumstances, as success relied on concentrating firepower and manpower on narrow frontages to overwhelm defenders. An infantry company would create a skirmish line featuring two light machine gun squads and four rifle squads, preparing for a bayonet-driven breakthrough of enemy defenses. For the final assault, the infantry company would line up along a 150-yard front, likely facing casualties of up to 50% while breaching the enemy's main defensive line. Historical analysis reveals the shortcomings of these tactics. During World War I, armies constructed extensive, multi-layered defenses, trenches, pillboxes, and strong points, each independent yet all covered by artillery. If assaulting infantry suffered heavy losses breaching the first line, how could they successfully prosecute their assault against multiple defense lines? The 1937 revision elaborated on new tactics to overcome entrenched Soviet defenses, drafted in anticipation of arms and equipment that were either in development or production but not yet available for deployment. This became official doctrine in 1940, but as early as summer 1937, units from the China Garrison Army were field-testing these new tactics. The provisional manual adopted combat team tactics, forming an umbrella-like skirmish formation. This involved a light machine gun team at the forefront with two ammunition bearers flanking it to the rear. Behind the machine gun team were riflemen arranged in a column formation, maintaining six paces between each. The light machine gun provided cover fire as the formation closed in on the enemy for hand-to-hand combat. Increased firepower expanded the assault front to 200 yards. The combination of wider dispersion and night movement aimed to reduce losses from enemy artillery fire while the infantry advanced through successive lines of resistance. Commanders at the platoon level were responsible for leading the final assault into enemy lines, with increased tactical responsibility shifting from platoon to squad leaders, allowing for greater initiative from junior officers and non-commissioned officers. This emphasis on broader dispersal and fluidity on the battlefield required frontline infantry to exhibit aggressiveness and initiative. Contrary to popular belief, the Japanese military did not solely rely on the bayonet or an offensive spirit during engagements with Chinese forces. They effectively employed superior firepower and modern equipment within their combined arms framework, using heavy weapons and artillery to soften enemy positions before launching infantry attacks. Without such firepower, unsupported infantry attacks would have struggled to achieve their objectives. In January 1937, the Imperial Japanese Army consisted of approximately 247,000 officers and men, organized in a structure comprising seventeen standing infantry divisions, four tank regiments, and fifty-four air squadrons equipped with a total of 549 aircraft. The China Garrison Army and the Taiwan Garrison Army each included two infantry regiments, while a separate independent mixed brigade was stationed in Manchuria. Two divisions were permanently based in Korea, with four more assigned on a rotating basis to the Kwantung Army in Manchukuo. The remainder of the forces were stationed in the Japanese home islands. A substantial pool of reservists and partially trained replacements was available to mobilize, enabling the expansion of peacetime units to their wartime strength as needed. Conscription provided the primary source of enlisted manpower for the army, though a handful of young men volunteered for active duty. For conscription purposes, Japan was divided into divisional areas, which were further subdivided into regimental districts responsible for conscription, mobilization, individual activations, and veteran affairs within their jurisdictions. Typically, conscripts served with the regiment associated with their region or prefecture. However, the Imperial Guards regiments in Tokyo selected conscripts from across the nation, as did the Seventh Infantry Division, which recruited from the sparsely populated Hokkaido area and from regular army units stationed in Korea, China, and Taiwan. Draftees from Okinawa Prefecture usually served with Kyushu-based regiments. All males reaching the age of 20 underwent an army-administered pre-induction physical examination conducted between December 1 and January 30 of the following year. This evaluation classified potential conscripts into three categories: A “suitable for active duty”, B1, and B2, while others were deemed unfit for the demands of military life. In 1935, 29.7% of those examined received A classifications, while 41.2% were graded as B1 or B2. Among the 742,422 individuals eligible for conscription in 1937, approximately 170,000 were drafted, amounting to 22.9% of the cohort; this figure had remained relatively consistent since the post-Russo-Japanese War years. Within the conscripted group, 153,000 men were classified as A and an additional 17,000 as B. Conscripts served for two years of active duty, with variations based on their military specialty and any prior civilian military training. After their discharge, they were subject to a lengthy reserve obligation. In total, 470,635 individuals fell into the B category, being otherwise fit for service but excess to the army's active personnel needs. These men were assigned to the First Replacement Pool, where they underwent around 120 days of basic military training, primarily focused on small arms usage and fundamental tactics. Regular officers and NCOs led the training in their respective regimental districts. Following their initial training, the army called these replacements and reservists to active duty annually for several days of refresher training. Army leaders regarded discipline as the cornerstone of military effectiveness. Basic training emphasized the necessity of unquestioning obedience to orders at all levels. Subsequent training focused on fieldcraft, such as utilizing terrain strategically to surprise or encircle the enemy. However, training exercises often lacked diversity due to the limited maneuver areas available in Japan, leading to predictable solutions to field problems. The training regimen was rigorous, merging strict formal discipline and regulated corporal punishment with harsh informal sanctions and unregulated violence from leaders to instill unwavering compliance to orders. As an undergrad taking a course specifically on the Pacific War, it was this variable my professor argued contributed the most to the atrocities performed by the Japanese during WW2. He often described it as a giant pecking order of abuse. The most senior commanders abused, often physically their subordinates, who abused theirs, going through the ranks to the common grunts who had no one else but civilians and the enemy to peck at so to speak. Of course there were a large number of other variables at play, but to understand that you outta join my Patreon Account over at the www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel , where I made a fan favorite episode on “why the Japanese army performed so many atrocities”. In there I basically hit a big 10 reason list, well in depth, I highly recommend it! As the concept of the “Imperial Army” and the cult of the emperor gained prominence, appeals to imperial symbols and authority bolstered this unquestioning obedience to superiors, who were seen as the conduits of the emperor's will. It was during this period that the term kogun or “imperial army” gained favor over kokugun or “national army”, reflecting a deliberate effort by military authorities to forge a direct connection between the military and the imperial throne. The 1937 Japanese infantry division was structured as a square formation, with a peacetime strength established at approximately 12,000 officers and men organized into two brigades, each comprising about 4,000 personnel, formed from two infantry regiments, about 2,000 men each. The division included a field artillery regiment, an engineer regiment, and a transport battalion as organic units. Each infantry regiment was composed of three battalions, approximately 600 men each, which contained three rifle companies, 160 men each and a weapons platoon. A rifle company consisted of three rifle platoons and one light machine gun platoon. Regiments also included infantry assault gun platoons, and battalions contained a heavy machine gun company. Upon mobilization, a fourth infantry company augmented each battalion, along with reserve fillers, nearly 5,000 personnel assigned as transport and service troops, raising the authorized wartime strength of an infantry division to over 25,000 officers and men.  Reforms implemented in 1922 reduced personnel numbers in favor of new and improved weapons and equipment. Among these advancements, the 75 mm Type 90 field artillery piece, which boasted increased range and accuracy, was integrated into the forces in 1930, along with the 105 mm Type 10 howitzer and 75 mm pack mountain artillery which could be disassembled for transport using pack animals. These became standard artillery components for divisions. The emphasis on light, mobile, and smaller-caliber field artillery enabled swift deployment during fast-moving engagements. By minimizing the size of the baggage train, infantry and artillery units could quickly set up off the march formation and maneuver around enemy flanks. Army leaders further streamlined road march formations by eliminating the fourth artillery battery from each regiment, thus sacrificing some firepower for enhanced speed and mobility. Heavier artillery pieces were still used in set-piece battles where mobility was less critical. In a typical 1936 division, the field artillery regiment, equipped with Type 90 field artillery or lighter Type 94 mountain artillery, had thirty-six guns. Training focused on quality rather than quantity, reflecting the conservative doctrine of “one-round-one-hit”. Live-fire training was infrequent due to the scarcity of artillery firing ranges in Japan. Ammunition stockpiles were inadequate for anticipated operational needs; government arsenals produced over 111,000 artillery shells in 1936, which was fewer than one-tenth of the quantities specified in wartime consumption tables. Similar industrial shortcomings also hampered advancements in motorization and armor. Motorization proved costly and relied on foreign supply, presenting challenges given the inferior road networks in Manchuria, northern China, and the Soviet Far East. Military estimates suggested a need for 250,000 trucks to fully motorize the army, a goal beyond the capabilities of the nascent Japanese automotive industry, which produced fewer than 1,000 cars annually until 1933. Japanese tanks, described as “handcrafted, beautifully polished, and hoarded” by Alvin Coox, suffered from shortages similar to heavy artillery and ammunition. The army prioritized light weighing ten tons or less and medium tanks sixteen tons or less due to the necessity of deploying armor overseas, size and weight were crucial for loading and unloading from transport ships. Smaller tanks were also more suitable for the terrains of northern China and Manchuria, as they could traverse unbridged rivers using pontoons or ferries. The Japanese industrial base, however, struggled to mass-produce tanks; by 1939, factories were producing an average of only twenty-eight tanks of all models per month. Consequently, in 1937, foot soldiers remained as reliant on animal transport for mobility as their ancestors had been during the Russo-Japanese War. Despite enjoying technological and material superiority over disorganized Chinese forces, these deficiencies in heavy artillery, armor, and vehicles would prove catastrophic against more formidable opponents. Another significant factor constraining Japanese industry's capacity to produce tanks, trucks, and artillery was the 1936 decision to expand the army's air wing and homeland air defense network. This policy diverted resources, capital, and technology away from the army's ground forces. The nascent Japanese Army Air Force or “JAAF” aimed to support ground operations through reconnaissance, bombing enemy bases, and achieving air superiority. However, direct support for ground operations was limited, and Japanese military planners did not anticipate that aerial bombardment could supplement or replace artillery bombardments. The expanded air arm's strategic mission centered on executing preemptive air strikes against Soviet air bases in the Far East to thwart potential air attacks on Japan. By the mid-1930s, the army had approximately 650 aircraft, roughly 450 of which were operational. The JAAF emphasized rigorous training that prioritized quality over quantity, producing only about 750 pilots annually up until December 1941. Basic flight skills were developed through this training, while specialized tactical instruction was deferred to newly established pilot units. According to logistics doctrine, Japanese maneuver units typically operated within a 120 to 180-mile radius of a railhead to facilitate resupply and reinforcement. A field train transport unit was responsible for moving supplies daily from the railhead to a division control point for distribution. The division established a field depot to manage the transfer of supplies from field transport to company and lower-echelon units. At the depot, transport troops would hand over supplies to a combat train that ferried ammunition, rations, and equipment directly to frontline units. Horse-drawn wagons and pack animals were the primary means of transportation. Each wartime division included a transport battalion, which varied in size from approximately 2,200 to 3,700 personnel, depending on the type of division supported. The division typically carried enough supplies for one day. Upon mobilization, the logistical framework was reinforced with the addition of an ordnance unit, a field hospital, a sanitation unit, and additional field and combat trains. The size of the transport regiment grew from around 1,500 officers and men with over 300 horses to nearly 3,500 troops and more than 2,600 animals. In the battalion, one company generally transported small-arms ammunition while two companies handled artillery shells and two others carried rations; this arrangement was flexible based on operational needs. Pack horses and dray horses were assigned to each company to carry or tow infantry assault artillery, mortars, artillery ammunition, and rations. Infantry soldiers carried minimal rations, approximately two and a half pounds, primarily rice, along with tinned condiments and salt. Consequently, the field train included a field kitchen stocked with fresh vegetables, rice or bread, soy sauce, and pickles. Each evening, a forward echelon train distributed supplies received from the field transport unit to the combat unit's bivouac area. When combat seemed imminent, a section of the transport battalion would move forward to deliver essential combat supplies, ordnance, equipment, medical supplies, directly to frontline units. These units would also handle resupply, medical evacuation, and repair of ordnance and equipment once fighting commenced.  On the evening of September 18, 1936, the fifth anniversary of the Manchurian Incident, Chinese troops from the Twenty-Ninth Army clashed with Japanese soldiers from the Seventh Company's rear-guard medical unit at Fengtai. When a Japanese officer arrived on horseback, a Chinese soldier struck his horse, prompting the Chinese troops to retreat to their barracks. Major Ichiki Kiyonao, the battalion commander, ordered an emergency assembly, surrounded the Chinese encampment, and demanded that Chinese authorities surrender the aggressors immediately. To defuse the situation, Major General Kawabe Masakazu, the brigade commander and Ichiki's superior, instructed Regimental Commander Mutaguchi to resolve the incident swiftly. Mutaguchi negotiated an agreement that required the Chinese to apologize, punish those responsible, withdraw from the vicinity of the Japanese barracks, and maintain a distance of two miles. Although Mutaguchi and Ichiki wanted to disarm the Chinese forces, they ultimately complied with Kawabe's wishes and allowed the Chinese to retain their weapons “in the spirit of Bushido.” Later, the Chinese claimed the Japanese had refrained from disarming them due to their fear of the strength and influence of the 29th Army. This insult infuriated Mutaguchi, who vowed not to make any further concessions and promised to eliminate the anti-Japanese provocateurs decisively if another incident occurred. He warned his officers against allowing an “overly tolerant attitude toward the Chinese” to undermine the prestige of the imperial army and emphasized the need for swift, decisive action to prevent such incidents in the future. Tensions were further exacerbated by large-scale Japanese field exercises conducted from late October to early November. These maneuvers, the largest ever executed by Japanese forces in China, mobilized about 6,700 active-duty and reserve troops for a series of complex battle drills, night maneuvers, and tactical field problems. During these exercises, Japanese troops were quartered in Chinese homes. Although local residents were compensated for any damage caused, the exercises nonetheless heightened tensions between the two sides. The fallout from the Suiyuan Fiasco in December 1936, coupled with a tumultuous summer and fall, led to rising anti-Japanese sentiment and prompted Tokyo to caution the Kawabe brigade against actions that might escalate the already precarious situation. In March 1937, during the annual personnel assignments, Ishiwara was promoted to major general and appointed chief of the 1st Department Operations of the General Staff. However, Army Vice Minister Umezu, a hardliner regarding China and a rival of Ishiwara, successfully maneuvered the Hayashi cabinet into approving the command choices for army and navy ministers, overriding Ishiwara's proposals. General Sugiyama Hajime, another hawk on China, replaced the terminally ill General Nakamura Kotaro as army minister shortly after Nakamura's appointment and remained in that position until June 1938. Lieutenant General Imai Kiyoshi, army vice chief of staff and an Ishiwara supporter, was also battling a terminal illness that rendered him largely ineffective during his short five-month tenure from March to August 1937. Imai was expected to play a crucial role in high command because the army chief of staff, Prince Kan'in, had been appointed in 1931 as a figurehead due to internal factions preventing agreement on a candidate. Ishiwara further complicated his conciliatory approach by selecting Colonel Muto Akira, a known hardliner who believed force was the only means to resolve the Japan-China conflict, for the vital position of chief of Operations Section within the General Staff. From Kwantung Army headquarters, Commanding General Ueda Kenkichi and his chief of staff, Lieutenant General Tojo Hideki, advocated for a preemptive war against China to serve the Kwantung Army's interests. In contrast, the China Garrison Army, under Lieutenant General Tashiro and his chief of staff, adopted a more moderate stance, aligning with central headquarters' policy of restraint. The China Garrison Army estimated the 29th Army to consist of 15,000–16,000 troops, with its main strength centered around Peking and an additional 10,000 troops in the surrounding area. Starting in spring 1937, Japanese units began observing tactical indicators suggesting that the Chinese were preparing for war. These indicators included increased guard presence at Peking's gates in June, bolstering units near the Marco Polo Bridge to over two battalions, preparing new fighting positions, digging trenches and constructing concrete pillboxes near the Marco Polo Bridge, infiltrating agents into Japanese maneuver areas for intelligence on night tactical exercises, and heightened strictness among Chinese railroad guards evident since late June. Nevertheless, the Japanese commanders did not view China as a formidable opponent. They believed that Chinese armies would quickly disintegrate due to what they perceived as a lack of fighting spirit and ineffective leadership. By 1937, Japan's national policy was shifting away from the persistent and aggressive efforts of field armies to undermine Chinese political authority in northern China toward a more conciliatory stance. This shift resulted in increased tensions between field armies and the General Staff in Tokyo, leading to substantial fractures among senior officers regarding the “solution” to their so-called China problem. Those tensions broke the camels back that year.  I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Japanese grossly underestimated their enemy and their own logistical capabilities. There was to say “too many cooks in the kitchen” of the Japanese military and competing visions ultimately were leading Japan and China into an official full blown war. Japan assumed they could bully China until it was so fragmented it would be a simple matter of grabbing the pieces it liked, that was not to be the case at all.   

Last time we spoke about Operation Chahar. In the turbulent year of 1935, tensions surged in North China as the Kwantung Army defied Tokyo's orders, encroaching deeper into Chahar province. This period was marked by widespread anti-Japanese sentiments, fueled by local revolts and the assassination of pro-Japanese figures, which infuriated Japanese authorities. On May 20, the Kwantung Army launched an offensive against a bandit group led by Sun Yungqin, seeking to exert control over the demilitarized regions established by earlier agreements. Their swift victory forced the resignation of local officials opposing Japanese interests. As chaos escalated, the Chinese government, under pressure to appease Japan, dismantled anti-Japanese factions and dismissed key leaders. The climax in this saga came with the signing of the He-Umezu Agreement, stripping China of authority in Hubei and Chahar, signaling Japan's increasing dominance and setting the stage for further exploitation of the region.   #150 The February 26 Incident Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more  so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. While this podcast is supposed to be given through the Chinese perspective, I apologize but yet again I need to jump over to the Japanese side. You see, a very pivotal moment during the Showa era would occur in the year of 1936. I think it's crucial to understand it, and the underlying issues of it, to better understand what we will be stuck in for the unforeseeable future, the Second Sino-Japanese War. I've briefly mentioned the two factions within the Japanese military at this time, but now I'd really like to jump into them, and a major incident that made them collide. In the aftermath of WW1, 2 prominent factions emerged during this tumultuous period: the Kodoha, or Imperial Way Faction, and the Toseiha, or Control Faction. Each faction represented distinct visions for Japan's future, deeply influencing the nation's course leading up to World War II. The Kodoha rose to prominence in the 1920s, driven by a fervent belief in Japan's divine destiny and its right to expand its imperial reach across Asia. This faction was characterized by its adherence to traditional Japanese values, rooted in the samurai ethos. They viewed the Emperor as the embodiment of Japan's spirit and sought to return to the moral foundations they believed had been eroded by “Western influence”. The Kodoha was often critical of the West, perceiving the encroachment of Western thought and culture as a threat to Japan's unique identity. Their ideology emphasized a robust military force, advocating for aggressive campaigns in regions like Manchuria and China to assert Japan's dominance. Contrasting sharply with the Kodoha, the Toseiha began to emerge as a more dominant political force in the late 1930s. The Toseiha embraced a pragmatic approach, advocating for a disciplined military that could engage effectively with the complexities of modern warfare. They recognized the importance of retaining some traditional values while also integrating Western military techniques. Rather than rejecting Western influence entirely, the Toseiha believed in adapting to global shifts to ensure Japan's strength and security. The Toseiha's moderation extended to their governance strategies, as they prioritized political stability and control over radical ideology. They saw this approach as crucial for creating a robust state capable of managing Japan's expansionist ambitions without provoking the backlash that Kodoha tactics elicited. Their more calculated approach to military expansion included securing partnerships and pursuing diplomatic solutions alongside military action, thereby presenting a less confrontational image to the world. Now after Manchuria was seized and Manchukuo was ushered in, many in the Japanese military saw a crisis emerge, that required a “showa restoration' to solve. Both factions aimed to create military dictatorships under the emperor. The Kodoha saw the USSR as the number one threat to Japan and advocated an invasion of them, aka the Hokushin-ron doctrine, but the Toseiha faction prioritized a national defense state built on the idea they must build Japans industrial capabilities to face multiple enemies in the future. What really separated the two, was the Kodoha sought to use a violent coup d'etat to make ends meet, whereas the Toseiha were unwilling to go so far. The Kodoha faction was made up mostly of junior and youthful officers, typically country boys as we would call them. These were young men whose families were not the blue bloods, farmer types. They viewed the dramatic changes of Japan in light of their own family experiences, many were impoverished by the dramatic changes. A very specific thing these Kodoha boys hated were the Zaibatsu. The Zaibatsu were large Japanese business conglomerates, primarily active from the Meiji period until WW2. They combined various industries, including banking, manufacturing, and trading. Prominent examples included Mitsubishi and Sumitomo. The reason they hated the Zaibatsu was because they believed they were influenced by western thought and that they super succeeded the authority of the emperor. More or less you can think of it as “we hate the fat cats who are really running things”.   Now the Toseiha faction were willing to work with the Zaibatsu to make Japan stronger. Basically they believed them to just be a necessary evil, you had to play ball to get things rolling. Random note, Hirohito's brother Prince Chichibu sympathized with the Kodoha faction and repeatedly counseled his brother that he should implement direct imperial rule even if it meant suspending the constitution, aka a show restoration. Hirohito believed his brother who was active in the IJA at the time was being radicalized. Now I cant go through the entire history of it, but this time period is known as the “government by assassination” period for Japan. Military leaders in the IJA, IJN and from within the Kodoha and Toseiha factions kept assassinating politicians and senior officers to push envelopes forward. Stating all of that, I now want to talk about the February 26th incident and I will add I am using a specific source, simply because it's my favorite. That is Herbert P Bix's Hirohito and the Making of Modern Japan. In late 1934, several officers from the Imperial Way faction at the Army Cadet School were arrested for plotting a coup. Although there were no immediate repercussions, the following year, two of the same Kodoha officers, named Isobe Asaichi and Muranaka Takaji were arrested again for distributing a document accusing Toseiha faction officers, like Major General Nagata Tetsuzan, of previously drafting coup plans against the government. This time, the army's upper echelons responded firmly, condemning Isobe and Muranaka's accusations as acts of disloyalty, resulting in both officers losing their commissions. Meanwhile, other Imperial Way officers sought retaliation against Nagata, who was rumored to be planning a major purge to eliminate factionalism within the army. Tatsukichi Minobe was a Japanese statesman and scholar of constitutional law and in the 1930s he began a movement bringing up the very real issue with the Meiji constitution in relation to the role of the emperor. In August 1935, amid a populist movement denouncing Minobe's interpretation of the constitution, Lt colonel Aizawa Saburo from Kodoha faction entered Nagata's office and fatally attacked him with his katana. This marked a significant escalation in the military struggle over state reform and the push for increased military funding, which was intertwined with the movement against Minobe. Meanwhile anti- Prime Minister Okada factions within the army, continuing to use slogans like “kokutai clarification” and “denounce the organ theory,” intensified their attacks on the emperor's advisers and hereditary peers. Senior generals from the Kodoha faction arranged a public court-martial for Aizawa, held by the 1st Division, a group heavily populated by Kodoha officers based in Tokyo. When Aizawa's trial commenced on January 12, 1936, his defense team transformed it into an emotional condemnation of the Okada cabinet, the court entourage, and Minobe's constitutional theories. This strategy garnered support across the nation, even reaching unexpected places like the imperial palace, where Dowager Empress Teimei Kogo, a staunch rightist, expressed sympathy for Aizawa. However, before the trial could progress, a military mutiny disrupted proceedings in the capital. Shockwaves rippled through the army after Army Minister Hayashi dismissed Kodoha member General Mazaki from his position overseeing military education and ordered the transfer of the 1st Division to Manchuria, which ignited the largest army uprising in modern Japanese history. The uprising was orchestrated through a series of meetings held from February 18 to 22 by key individuals including Nishida, Yasuhide Kurihara, Teruzō Andō, Hisashi Kōno, Takaji Muranaka, and Asaichi Isobe. Their plan was relatively straightforward: the officers would assassinate the most prominent adversaries of the kokutai, seize control of the administrative center of the capital and the Imperial Palace, and present their demands, which included the dismissal of certain officials and the establishment of a new cabinet led by Mazaki. They did not establish long-term goals, believing that those should be determined by the Emperor. However, it is suspected that they were prepared to replace Hirohito with Prince Chichibu if necessary. The young Kodoha officers felt they had at least implicit support from several influential Imperial Japanese Army officers after making informal inquiries. This group included figures such as Araki, Minister of War Yoshiyuki Kawashima, Jinzaburō Mazaki, Tomoyuki Yamashita, Kanji Ishiwara, Shigeru Honjō, as well as their immediate superiors, Kōhei Kashii and Takeo Hori. Later, Kawashima's successor as Minister of War remarked that if all the officers who had endorsed the rebellion were forced to resign, there would not have been enough high-ranking officers left to replace them. To articulate their intentions and grievances, the young officers prepared a document titled "Manifesto of the Uprising" “Kekki Shuisho”, which they intended to present to the Emperor. Although the document was authored by Muranaka, it was written under the name of Shirō Nonaka, the highest-ranking officer involved in the plot. The document aligned with Kokutai Genri-ha ideals, criticizing the genrō, political leaders, military factions, zaibatsu, bureaucrats, and political parties for jeopardizing the kokutai with their selfishness and disregard for the Emperor, and emphasized the need for direct action: “Now, as we face immense foreign and domestic challenges, if we do not eliminate the disloyal and unjust who threaten the kokutai, if we do not remove the villains obstructing the Emperor's authority and hindering the Restoration, the Imperial vision for our nation will come to naught [...] Our duty is to purge the malevolent ministers and military factions surrounding the Emperor and eradicate their influence; we shall fulfill this mission.” Seven targets were selected for assassination for "threatening the kokutai". Keisuke Okada served as Prime Minister, where he notably advocated for the London Naval Treaty and supported the "organ theory" of the kokutai. His actions reflect a commitment to international agreements and specific ideological principles at the time. Saionji Kinmochi, a Genrō and former Prime Minister, also supported the London Naval Treaty. However, his influence extended further, as he played a role in prompting the Emperor to establish inappropriate cabinets, impacting political stability. Makino Nobuaki, the former Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and Foreign Minister, was another key figure who supported the London Naval Treaty. He notably prevented Prince Fushimi from voicing protests to the Emperor during this period, and he established a court faction in collaboration with Saitō, further entrenching political alliances. In his capacity as Grand Chamberlain, Kantarō Suzuki supported the London Naval Treaty but faced criticism for "obstructing the Imperial virtue," suggesting tensions between political decisions and traditional values. Saitō Makoto, who served as Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and former Prime Minister, was involved in advocating for the London Naval Treaty and played a significant role in Mazaki's dismissal. He, too, formed a court faction with Makino, indicating the intricacies of court politics. Takahashi Korekiyo, as Finance Minister and former Prime Minister, engaged in party politics with the aim of diminishing military influence. His approach was focused on maintaining the existing economic structure amid the shifting political landscape. Finally, Jōtarō Watanabe, who replaced Mazaki as Inspector General of Military Education, supported the "organ theory" of the kokutai yet faced criticism for refusing to resign, despite being considered unsuitable for his position. On the night of February 25, Tokyo experienced a heavy snowfall, which uplifted the rebel officers as it evoked memories of the 1860 Sakuradamon Incident. During this event, political activists known as shishi assassinated Ii Naosuke, the chief advisor to the Shōgun, in the name of the Emperor. The rebel forces, organized into six groups, began mobilizing their troops and departing from their barracks between 3:30 and 4:00 AM. At 5:00 AM, they launched simultaneous attacks on key targets, including Okada, Takahashi, Suzuki, Saito, the Ministry of War, and the headquarters of the Tokyo Metropolitan Police. At around five o'clock on the morning of February 26, 1936, a rebellion erupted, fueled by the long-standing tensions surrounding the kokutai issues that had plagued 1935. Twenty-two junior officers led over 1,400 armed soldiers and non-commissioned officers from three regiments of the 1st Division and an infantry unit of the Imperial Guards in a mutiny in snow-covered Tokyo. The attack on Okada involved a contingent of 280 men from the 1st Infantry Regiment, commanded by 1st Lieutenant Yasuhide Kurihara. The troops encircled the Prime Minister's Residence and compelled its guards to open the gates. Upon entering the compound, they attempted to locate Prime Minister Okada but were met with gunfire from four policemen stationed there. All four policemen were killed, wounding six rebel soldiers in the process. However, the shots served as a warning for Okada, prompting his brother-in-law, Colonel Denzō Matsuo, to help him find refuge. Matsuo, who closely resembled Okada, was eventually discovered by the soldiers and killed. After comparing Matsuo's wounded face to a photograph of the prime minister, the attackers mistakenly believed they had accomplished their mission. Okada managed to escape the following day, but this information was kept confidential, and he did not play any further role in the events. After Matsuo's death, Kurihara's men took up guard positions around the compound, reinforced by sixty soldiers from the 3rd Imperial Guard. In another key operation, Captain Kiyosada Kōda led a group of 160 men to seize control of the Minister of War's residence, the Ministry of War, and the General Staff Office. Upon entering the Minister's residence at 6:30 AM, they demanded to see Minister Kawashima. Once admitted, they read their manifesto aloud and presented a document detailing several demands, including: A prompt resolution to the situation that would further "advance the cause of the Restoration." A call to prevent the use of force against the Righteous Army. The arrest of Kazushige Ugaki (Governor-General of Korea), Jirō Minami (commander of the Kwantung Army), Kuniaki Koiso (commander of the Korean Army), and Yoshitsugu Tatekawa for their roles in undermining military command. The immediate dismissal of Lieutenant Colonel Akira Mutō, Colonel Hiroshi Nemoto, and Major Tadashi Katakura from the Imperial Japanese Army for promoting "factionalism." The appointment of Araki as the new commander of the Kwantung Army. Ugaki, who served as Minister of War during two separate terms, had overseen significant reductions and modernization efforts within the army. He had also failed to support the March Incident plotters, who had hoped to install him as Prime Minister. Minami, Mutō, Nemoto, and Katakura were all influential members of the Tōsei-ha faction; Katakura had been partly responsible for reporting on the Military Academy Incident. Later that morning, Isobe encountered Katakura outside the Ministry of War and shot him non-fatally in the head. During this tumultuous period, several officers sympathetic to the rebels, including General Mazaki, General Tomoyuki Yamashita, and General Ryū Saitō, joined the uprising. Saitō praised the young officers' spirit and encouraged Kawashima to accept their demands. Shortly before 9:00 am, Kawashima indicated he needed to speak with the Emperor and left for the Imperial Palace. Meanwhile, Captain Hisashi Kōno led a team of seven, comprised mostly of civilians, to attack Makino Nobuaki, who was staying at Kōfūsō, part of the ryokan Itōya in Yugawara, Kanagawa Prefecture, with his family. Arriving at 5:45 am, they stationed two men outside while entering the inn with weapons drawn. Inside, policemen opened fire, leading to a lengthy exchange of gunfire. A policeman managed to alert Makino and his party of the danger, guiding them to a rear exit. Although the assassins fired at the escaping group, Makino successfully evaded capture. Kōno sustained a gunshot wound to the chest, and one policeman, Yoshitaka Minagawa, was killed. As Kōno was evacuated from the scene, the assailants set fire to the building. Hearing a gunshot, Kōno assumed that Makino had shot himself inside. After his recovery at a nearby military hospital, Kōno and his team were arrested by military police. Around 10:00 am, Kurihara and Nakahashi loaded a fleet of three trucks with sixty men and drove from the Prime Minister's Residence to the offices of the Asahi Shimbun, a significant liberal newspaper. They stormed the building, ordering the evacuation of employees and declaring their actions as "divine retribution for being an un-Japanese newspaper." The rebels then overturned and scattered the newspaper's type trays, containing 4,000 different characters, temporarily halting its publication. Following this attack, the men distributed copies of the uprising's manifesto to nearby newspapers before returning to the Prime Minister's Residence. On another front, 1st Lieutenant Motoaki Nakahashi of the 3rd Imperial Guard gathered 135 men and, under the pretext of paying respects at Yasukuni Shrine, marched to Takahashi Korekiyo's residence. There, he divided his forces, sending one group to attack while the other remained to guard the entrance. After breaking into the compound, Nakahashi and Lieutenant Kanji Nakajima found Takahashi in bed, where Nakahashi shot him while Nakajima delivered a fatal sword strike. Takahashi died without waking. Once his target was eliminated, Nakahashi regrouped with the soldiers and proceeded to the Imperial Palace, aiming to secure it. Entering through the western Hanzō Gate at 6:00 am, Nakahashi informed Major Kentarō Honma, the palace guard commander, that he had been dispatched to reinforce the gates due to earlier attacks. Honma, already aware of the uprisings, accepted Nakahashi's arrival. He was assigned to help secure the Sakashita Gate, the primary entrance to the Emperor's residence. Nakahashi planned to signal nearby rebel troops at police headquarters once he controlled access to the Emperor. However, he struggled to contact his allies, and by 8:00 am, Honma learned of his involvement in the uprising and ordered him, at gunpoint, to vacate the palace grounds. Nakahashi complied and returned to join Kurihara at the Prime Minister's Residence, while his soldiers remained at the gate until relieved later that day, preventing their inclusion in the government's official count of rebel forces. Elsewhere, 1st Lieutenant Naoshi Sakai led a detachment of 120 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment to Saitō Makoto's home in Yotsuya. After surrounding the policemen on guard, five soldiers entered the residence and found Saitō and his wife, Haruko, in their bedroom. They shot Saitō dead, prompting Haruko to plead for her life, saying, "Please kill me instead!" While they pulled her away, she was unwittingly wounded by stray gunfire. Following Saitō's assassination, two officers directed another group to target General Watanabe, while the remaining men moved to strategically position themselves northeast of the Ministry of War. In Kōjimachi, Captain Teruzō Andō commanded 200 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment to assault Suzuki's residence across from the Imperial Palace. After disarming the police on duty, they located Suzuki in his bedroom and shot him twice. When Andō moved to deliver the coup de grâce with his sword, Suzuki's wife implored to be allowed to do it herself, believing her husband to be fatally wounded. Andō obliged and, apologizing for the act, explained it was for the nation's sake. After saluting Suzuki, the soldiers left to guard the Miyakezaka junction north of the Ministry of War. Following the assault on Saitō, a party of twenty men, led by 2nd Lieutenants Tarō Takahashi and Yutaka Yasuda, headed to Watanabe's residence in Ogikubo after 7:00 AM. Despite the two-hour delay since previous attacks, no measures had been taken to alert Watanabe. As they attempted to storm the front entrance, military police inside opened fire, wounding Yasuda and another soldier. The troops then gained entry through the rear, confronting Watanabe's wife outside their bedroom. After shoving her aside, they found Watanabe using a futon as cover. He opened fire, prompting one soldier to retaliate with a light machine gun. Takahashi then rushed in and fatally stabbed Watanabe, witnessed by his nine-year-old daughter, Kazuko, who hid nearby. The soldiers departed, taking their wounded to a hospital before positioning themselves in northern Nagatachō. In a significant move, Captain Shirō Nonaka led nearly a third of the rebel forces, comprising 500 men from the 3rd Infantry Regiment, to assault the Tokyo Metropolitan Police headquarters. Their objective was to secure communication equipment and prevent dispatch of the police's Emergency Service Unit. Meeting no resistance, they quickly occupied the building, possibly due to a strategic decision to leave the situation in the military's hands. After securing the police headquarters, 2nd Lieutenant Kinjirō Suzuki led a small group to attack Fumio Gotō's residence, the Home Minister's, but found that Gotō was not home, thus allowing him to escape. This attack appeared to result from Suzuki's independent decision, rather than a coordinated effort among the officers. Despite all of these actions, the Kodoha boys had failed to secure the Sakashita Gate to the palace, which allowed the palace to maintain communication with the outside world, and they neglected to address potential naval interventions. At the Yokosuka naval base, Rear Adm. Yonai Mitsumasa and his chief of staff, Inoue Shigeyoshi, positioned marines to defend the Navy Ministry and prepared warships in Tokyo Bay to suppress the rebellion. By the morning of February 28, after unsuccessful negotiations through sympathetic officers at army headquarters, the commander under martial law transmitted an imperial order to disperse. Most troops returned to their barracks, one officer committed suicide, and the remaining leaders surrendered, resulting in the uprising ending with minimal further violence. Nevertheless, martial law in Tokyo continued for nearly five months. The rebel officers had initially planned for General Kawashima, a staunch ally of the Kodoha, to relay their intentions to the emperor, who they assumed would issue a decree for a “Showa restoration.” Despite their radical objectives of overthrowing the political order, the mutineers, like other military and civilian extremists of the 1930s, sought to operate within the imperial framework and maintain the kokutai. They believed the emperor was under the control of his advisers and lacked a genuine will of his own. Once the Lord Keeper of the Privy Seal and the Grand Chamberlain were removed, they expected the emperor to appoint General Mazaki as prime minister, a leader they believed would reinforce the military and effectively address the China issue. At the onset of the insurrection, they had a real chance of success. The Tokyo military police commander, General Kashii Kohei, sympathized with their cause, and the emperor's chief aide, General Honjo, was related to rebel officer Capain Yamaguchi Ichitaro. Support for the mutineers was present at military bases nationwide. Historian Hata Ikuhiko notes that the rebels contacted General Honjo by both phone and written message before attacking the Okada cabinet. As the first in the imperial entourage to learn of the mutiny, Honjo could have warned the intended targets but chose not to do so. By the time he arrived at court at 6:00 am. on the 26th, key advisors like Chief Secretary Kido, Imperial Household Minister Yuasa Kurahei, and Vice Grand Chamberlain Hirohata Tadakata were already aware of the potential danger. Suzuki was murdered, and the emperor was deeply affected, awakening to the news at 5:40 am from the chamberlain on night duty, Kanroji Osanaga. He learned that his old ministers had been attacked and a coup was underway. Upon receiving this information, Hirohito resolved to suppress the uprising. He was outraged by the killing of his ministers and feared that the rebels might use his brother, Prince Chichibu, to force him to abdicate. He donned his army uniform and summoned Honjo, ordering him to “end it immediately and turn this misfortune into a blessing.” Hirohito adopted a strategy proposed by Kido, who had acted swiftly earlier that morning, instructing Honjo to assess the Imperial Guard Division's potential actions if the mutineers advanced on the Palace. Kido aimed to prevent the establishment of a new provisional cabinet until the mutiny was fully quelled. At 9:30 am Army Minister Kawashima, who had previously met with one of the rebel officers, arrived at court. He urged the emperor to form a cabinet that would “clarify the kokutai, stabilize national life, and fulfill national defense.” Surprised by Kawashima's tone, Hirohito reprimanded him for not prioritizing the suppression of the mutiny. He also expressed his frustration to Chief of the Navy General Staff Prince Fushimi, dismissing him when he inquired about forming a new cabinet. Later that day, Kawashima met with the Supreme Military Council, consisting mainly of army officers sympathetic to the rebels. The council decided to attempt persuasion before relaying the emperor's orders a move contrary to Hirohito's directive. According to historian Otabe Yuji, an “instruction” was issued to the rebel officers at 10:50 am, acknowledging their motives and suggesting the emperor might show them leniency. This message was communicated to the ringleaders by martial law commander General Kashii. That evening, when members of the Okada cabinet came to submit their resignations, Hirohito insisted they remain in power until the mutiny was resolved. On February 27, the second day of the uprising, Hirohito announced “administrative martial law” based on Article 8 of the Imperial Constitution. This invoked his sovereign powers to address the crisis while freeing him from needing cabinet approval for his actions. Hirohito displayed remarkable energy throughout the subsequent days, sending chamberlains to summon Honjo for updates and threatening to lead the Imperial Guard Division himself when dissatisfied with the reports. Honjo, however, resisted the emperor's demands and exhibited sympathy for the rebels. During the uprising, Hirohito met with Prince Chichibu, who had recently returned from Hirosaki. Their discussions reportedly led Chichibu to distance himself from the rebels. However, rumors of his sympathy for them persisted, leading to concerns about potential conflicts within the imperial family. On the second day, Rear Admiral Yonai and his chief of staff demonstrated their loyalty to Hirohito. By February 29, the fourth day of the uprising, Hirohito had reasserted his authority, troops were returning to their barracks, and most rebel leaders were captured. Seventeen of these leaders were court-martialed and executed in July without legal representation. Shortly after, during the obon festival, Hirohito allegedly instructed a military aide to secure seventeen obon lanterns for the palace. This action, though secret, may have provided him some personal comfort amidst the turmoil. An investigation following the mutiny revealed that the rebels' sense of crisis was amplified by the recent general elections, which had shown an anti-military sentiment among voters. Despite their populist rhetoric, most ringleaders were not motivated by the agricultural depression; their goal was to support the kokutai by advocating for increased military rearmament. During this period, military spending steadily rose from 3.47% of GNP in 1931 to 5.63% in 1936. Intriguingly, the ringleaders and their senior commanders shared a desire for state control over production to mobilize resources fully for total war. While united in this goal, their ideas about how to achieve a “Showa restoration” varied greatly, with some leaders, like Isobe, calling for complete economic consolidation and a return to strong state power. The February mutiny reinforced Hirohito's belief in the constitutional framework that underpinned his military authority. He became increasingly cautious about decisions that could compromise his command and developed closer ties to the army's Control faction, justifying military spending increases. Yet, the memory of the mutiny left him feeling uncertain about the throne's stability. Now you know me, whenever I can bring up Hirohito's involvement in the war related times I gotta do. After WW2, in an apparent effort to downplay his role as supreme commander, Hirohito provided a deliberately distorted account of the February events. “I issued an order at that time for the rebel force to be suppressed. This brings to mind Machida Chuji, the finance minister. He was very worried about the rebellion's adverse effect on the money market and warned me that a panic could occur unless I took firm measures. Therefore I issued a strong command to have [the uprising] put down. As a rule, because a suppression order also involves martial law, military circles, who cannot issue such an order on their own, need the mutual consent of the government. However, at the time, Okada's whereabouts were unknown. As the attitude of the Army Ministry seemed too lenient, I issued a strict order. Following my bitter experiences with the Tanaka cabinet, I had decided always to wait for the opinions of my advisers before making any decision, and not to go against their counsel. Only twice, on this occasion and at the time of the ending of the war, did I positively implement my own ideas. Ishiwara Kanji of the Army General Staff Office also asked me, through military aide Chojiri [Kazumoto], to issue a suppression order. I don't know what sort of a person Ishiwara is, but on this occasion he was correct, even though he had been the instigator of the Manchurian Incident. Further, my chief military aide, Honjo, brought me the plan drafted by Yamashita Hobun, in which Yamashita asked me to please send an examiner because the three leaders of the rebel army were likely to commit suicide. However, I thought that sending an examiner would imply that they had acted according to their moral convictions and were deserving of respect. . . . So I rejected Honjo's proposal, and [instead] issued the order to suppress them. I received no report that generals in charge of military affairs had gone and urged the rebels to surrender.”  On February 26, when Hirohito ordered the immediate suppression of the rebels, his anger was directed not only at the insurgents who had assassinated his closest advisors but also at senior army officers who were indecisive in executing the crackdown. The following day, in addition to his role as Minister of Commerce and Industry, Machida took on the responsibilities of finance minister. Concerns over economic panic and confusion contributed to the emperor's sense of urgency, despite not being the primary motivation for his actions. Hirohito believed that every hour of delay tarnished Japan's international reputation. Since the Manchurian Incident, the emperor had frequently clashed with the military regarding encroachments on his authority, though never about fundamental policy issues. At times, he had managed to assert his political views during policy discussions, similar to his earlier influence under the Hamaguchi cabinet. The February 26 mutiny highlighted to Hirohito and Yuasa his privy seal from March 1936 to June 1940, and the first lord keeper of the privy seal to attend court regularly the necessity of fully exercising the emperor's supreme command whenever the situation demanded it. Even when faced with opposition from Honjo, Hirohito managed to gain support and assert his authority through a decisive approach. His resolution marked the end of a period during which alienated “young officers” attempted to leverage his influence as a reformist figure to challenge a power structure they could not manipulate effectively. However, Hirohito learned how to adeptly manage that establishment in most situations. The decision-making process within the government was characterized by secrecy, indirect communication, vague policy drafting, and information manipulation, creating a landscape of confusion, misunderstanding, and constant intrigue aimed at achieving consensus among elites. This was the modus operandi in Tokyo and a reflection of how the emperor operated. Once again, Hirohito reminded the tightly-knit elite that he was essential to the functioning of the system. On May 4, 1936, during his address at the opening ceremony of the Sixty-ninth Imperial Diet, while Tokyo remained under martial law, Hirohito closed the chapter on the February mutiny. Initially, he contemplated sending a strong message of censure to the military, but after considerable deliberation over three months, he ultimately chose to issue a brief, innocuous statement: “We regret the recent incident that occurred in Tokyo.” The response from his audience of Diet members and military officials was one of startled awe, with some privately expressing disappointment. Once again, at a critical juncture, Hirohito avoided an opportunity to publicly rein in the military through his constitutional role. Nonetheless, due to his behind-the-scenes actions, the drift in domestic policy that had characterized Japan since the Manchurian Incident came to an end. In the following fourteen months, the emperor and his advisors largely aligned with the army and navy's demands for increased military expansion and state-driven industrial development. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. So some very unruly young Japanese officers got the bright idea of forcing a showa restoration by killing all the culprits they believed held their emperor hostage. Little did they know, this event spelt the end of the Kodoha faction and rise of the Toseiha faction. Henceforth the military was even more in charge and would get even more insane.   

Click here to send us a message!This week we're joined by film scholar Syd Wrigley, who joins the podcast to discuss Gregg Araki's famed Teen Apocalypse Trilogy. Starting with Totally Fucked Up in 1993, he followed it with The Doom Generationin 1995 and finally Nowhere in 1997, the trilogy that would define a generation and stands at the center of the New Queer Cinema movement. Recently re-released via Criterion, these films are being discovered by a brand new generation, and Araki is only now finding auteur status. 

Today, we're traveling back to 1997 for a conversation with one of the most distinctive and rebellious filmmakers of the indie film scene—Greg Araki. By the time Nowhere hit theaters in ‘97, Araki had already made a name for himself with his bold, surreal, and unapologetically queer storytelling. As the final entry in his “Teen Apocalypse Trilogy,” Nowhere pushed boundaries with its wild mix of sex, drugs, existential dread, and alien abductions—all wrapped in the signature Araki aesthetic.

Super Bowl ads are often the pinnacle of advertising creativity and cultural relevance. But with Taco Bell's return after a three-year hiatus, how do you craft a campaign that doesn't just capture attention but also becomes a moment fans will never forget?Joining us today are two creatives reshaping the way we think about food, culture, and branding: Guto Araki, Founder and CEO of Biite, and Alex Jacobs, Co-Founder and COO. Together, they've been at the forefront of some of the industry's most groundbreaking campaigns, including Taco Bell's much-anticipated 2025 Super Bowl ad and Resy's upcoming brand campaign. Biite began as a platform for limited-edition collaborations with chefs and restaurants and has evolved into a powerhouse agency creating unforgettable campaigns for some of the biggest brands.About BiiteGuto and Alex originally started Biite in 2021 as a food culture collaboration studio that connects emerging chefs and culinary creatives to drop super limited, one-of-a-kind food items and experiences. This expertise and deep understanding of what's happening in the food industry coupled with their background in advertising led to brands such as Taco Bell turning to Biite for food-focused campaign ideas.About Guto ArakiGuto Araki, Founder and CEOAward-winning advertising creative behind Taco Moon, Taco Swap, Taco IRL, #IseeATaco, Test Kitchen, Emoji Engine, Quesalupa and others. Former Executive Creative Director of Taco Bell NA & Global.About Alex JacobsAlex Jacobs, Co-founder and COOAlex is a seasoned marketer with 20 years of experience leading iconic brands including American Express, Taco Bell, The New York Times, Google and many more.RESOURCESBiite: https://biite.club/Taco Bell 2025 Big Game Teaser | Photobomb feat. Doja CatResy - Right This WaySuccess of the Taco Bell campaign and other work can be found on Biite's Instagram.Don't miss Medallia Experience 2025, March 24-26 in Las Vegas: Registration is now available: https://cvent.me/AmO1k0 Use code MEDEXP25 for $200 off registrationRegister now for HumanX 2025. This AI-focused event which brings some of the most forward-thinking minds in technology together. Register now with the code "HX25p_tab" for $250 off the regular price.Connect with Greg on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/gregkihlstromDon't miss a thing: get the latest episodes, sign up for our newsletter and more: https://www.theagilebrand.showCheck out The Agile Brand Guide website with articles, insights, and Martechipedia, the wiki for marketing technology: https://www.agilebrandguide.comThe Agile Brand podcast is brought to you by TEKsystems. Learn more here: https://www.teksystems.com/versionnextnowThe Agile Brand is produced by Missing Link—a Latina-owned strategy-driven, creatively fueled production co-op. From ideation to creation, they craft human connections through intelligent, engaging and informative content. https://www.missinglink.company Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.

Super Bowl ads are often the pinnacle of advertising creativity and cultural relevance. But with Taco Bell's return after a three-year hiatus, how do you craft a campaign that doesn't just capture attention but also becomes a moment fans will never forget? Joining us today are two creatives reshaping the way we think about food, culture, and branding: Guto Araki, Founder and CEO of Biite, and Alex Jacobs, Co-Founder and COO. Together, they've been at the forefront of some of the industry's most groundbreaking campaigns, including Taco Bell's much-anticipated 2025 Super Bowl ad and Resy's upcoming brand campaign. Biite began as a platform for limited-edition collaborations with chefs and restaurants and has evolved into a powerhouse agency creating unforgettable campaigns for some of the biggest brands. About Biite Guto and Alex originally started Biite in 2021 as a food culture collaboration studio that connects emerging chefs and culinary creatives to drop super limited, one-of-a-kind food items and experiences. This expertise and deep understanding of what's happening in the food industry coupled with their background in advertising led to brands such as Taco Bell turning to Biite for food-focused campaign ideas. About Guto Araki Guto Araki, Founder and CEO Award-winning advertising creative behind Taco Moon, Taco Swap, Taco IRL, #IseeATaco, Test Kitchen, Emoji Engine, Quesalupa and others. Former Executive Creative Director of Taco Bell NA & Global. About Alex Jacobs Alex Jacobs, Co-founder and COO Alex is a seasoned marketer with 20 years of experience leading iconic brands including American Express, Taco Bell, The New York Times, Google and many more. RESOURCES Biite: https://biite.club/ Taco Bell 2025 Big Game Teaser | Photobomb feat. Doja Cat Resy - Right This Way Success of the Taco Bell campaign and other work can be found on Biite's Instagram. Don't miss Medallia Experience 2025, March 24-26 in Las Vegas: Registration is now available: https://cvent.me/AmO1k0 Use code MEDEXP25 for $200 off registration Register now for HumanX 2025. This AI-focused event which brings some of the most forward-thinking minds in technology together. Register now with the code "HX25p_tab" for $250 off the regular price. Connect with Greg on LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/gregkihlstrom Don't miss a thing: get the latest episodes, sign up for our newsletter and more: https://www.theagilebrand.show Check out The Agile Brand Guide website with articles, insights, and Martechipedia, the wiki for marketing technology: https://www.agilebrandguide.com The Agile Brand podcast is brought to you by TEKsystems. Learn more here: https://www.teksystems.com/versionnextnow The Agile Brand is produced by Missing Link—a Latina-owned strategy-driven, creatively fueled production co-op. From ideation to creation, they craft human connections through intelligent, engaging and informative content. https://www.missinglink.company

This past Tuesday, December 17th, celebrated the birthday of filmmaker and UCSB alum Gregg Araki. Back in March of this year, we were joined with Araki at the Pollock Theatre for a screening of his newly restored 90s classic, Nowhere, in addition to a Q&A. This event was co-sponsored by UCSB's film and media studies program, and our very own KCSB-FM. Araki is known for directing films such as Mysterious Skin, The Doom Generation, Smiley Face, his work on the show 13 Reasons Why, amongst other films. His film ‘Nowhere', along with the other films within his Teen Apocalypse Trilogy have recently been remastered and restored from the 35mm negative to 4k. It's complete with scenes that were deleted for the original release due to rating restrictions, and the original score. KCSB's Kelly Darroch spoke with Araki for a few minutes after the screening and Q&A!

At the center of the circle is Eiko Araki, a master of the Sanuki Kagari Temari, a Japanese traditional craft passed down for more than 1,000 years on the southwestern island of Shikoku. Each ball, or “temari,” is a work of art, with colorful geometric patterns carrying poetic names like “firefly flowers” and “layered stars.” A temari ball takes weeks or months to finish. Some cost hundreds of dollars (tens of thousands of yen), although others are much cheaper. These kaleidoscopic balls aren't for throwing or kicking around. They're destined to be heirlooms, carrying prayers for health and goodness. They might be treasured like a painting or piece of sculpture in a Western home. The concept behind temari is an elegant otherworldliness, an impractical beauty that is also very labor-intensive to create. “Out of nothing, something this beautiful is born, bringing joy,” says Araki. “I want it to be remembered there are beautiful things in this world that can only be made by hand.” The region where temari originated was good for growing cotton, warm with little rainfall, and the spherical creations continue to be made out of the humble material. These days, temari is getting some new recognition, among Japanese and foreigners as well. Caroline Kennedy took lessons in ball-making when she was United States Ambassador to Japan a decade ago. Araki has come up with some newer designs that feel both modern and historical. She is trying to make the balls more accessible to everyday life—for instance, as Christmas tree ornaments. A strap with a dangling miniature ball, though quite hard to make because of its size, is affordable at about 1,500 yen ($10) each. Today, only several dozen people, all women, can make the temari balls to traditional standards. “The most challenging aspect is nurturing successors. It typically takes over 10 years to train them, so you need people who are willing to continue the craft for a very long time,” Araki said. “When people start to feel joy along with the hardship that comes with making temari, they tend to keep going.” This article was provided by The Associated Press.

"And I realize, yes, I was only dreaming, for there's a guard and there's a sad, old padre."Y'know I went back and looked and the show notes for the past like 6 episodes of this show all start with some variation of "hello, we're back from break and are gonna be more consistent about uploading this show!" So I'm just gonna drop the pretense :p We're busy folks and coordinating our schedules on top of the normal show is tricky!ANYWAY, these eps blow! Araki loves to kill off a character to heighten the stakes but he picked the wrong one this time!GENERAL CONTENT WARNING: JoJo's Bizarre Adventure is often a crass series that incorporates a wide variety of fraught subject matter, and prioritizes using that fraught material for high drama and unconventional action scenes over approaching the subjects with appropriate care or consideration. We'll include more specific content warnings when covering especially rough episodes, but as a baseline, assume that most topics are handled with insufficient levels of sensitivity. Also, JJBA is a show that heavily features bloody violence and body horror.

On today's show, we finish up our Araki series by looking at--or trying to look at--'White Bird in a Blizzard.' We also talk two new films: Zoe Kravitz's directorial debut, 'Blink Twice,' and a spooky golem tale, 'Oddity.' Oasis also comes up...       Keep in touch and read more at whydoesthewilhelmscream.com on instagram and threads @whydoesthewilhelmpod  Find out more about upcoming Fort Worth Film Club screenings and events at fortworthfilmclub.com and @fortworthfilm Support the next generation of film lovers at reelhousefoundation.org and on facebook reelhousefoundation Artwork by @_mosla_

Writer/director Gregg Araki joins moderator Bhaskar Sarkar (Film and Media Studies, UCSB) for a discussion of his film, Nowhere. Araki reflects on post-punk and do-it-yourself subcultures, as well as his memories taking film classes at UCSB as an influence on his work. He also discusses the cult following and home distribution of the film, the legacy of independent and new queer cinema on his career, and finding influence in new wave film movements and the city of Los Angeles. Series: "Carsey-Wolf Center" [Humanities] [Show ID: 39781]

Writer/director Gregg Araki joins moderator Bhaskar Sarkar (Film and Media Studies, UCSB) for a discussion of his film, Nowhere. Araki reflects on post-punk and do-it-yourself subcultures, as well as his memories taking film classes at UCSB as an influence on his work. He also discusses the cult following and home distribution of the film, the legacy of independent and new queer cinema on his career, and finding influence in new wave film movements and the city of Los Angeles. Series: "Carsey-Wolf Center" [Humanities] [Show ID: 39781]

This week we're taking a look at two films from Gregg Araki. One of the architects of the New Queer Cinema movement of the 1990's, Araki pivoted in the new century after finding critical success with Mysterious Skin. He followed up that award winner by pivoting to a stoner comedy that Max argues is worth revisiting every April 20. Say Hi!

On today's episode: more Araki! We look at the first of the Teen Apocalypse Trilogy with 'Totally F***ed Up.' And we dig into the Brat Pack with Andrew McCarthy's new doc 'Brats' and the movie that set flames to a generation of stars, 'St. Elmo's Fire' (terrible songs in this movie, terrible).        Keep in touch and read more at whydoesthewilhelmscream.com on instagram and threads @whydoesthewilhelmpod  Find out more about upcoming Fort Worth Film Club screenings and events at fortworthfilmclub.com and @fortworthfilm Support the next generation of film lovers at reelhousefoundation.org and on facebook reelhousefoundation Artwork by @_mosla_

Boy, Jason really dislikes 'Hit Man' (more people should). But we talk about some films that he does like, namely 'The Last Stop in Yuma County,' and the prequel (?) to Gregg Araki's Teen Apocalypse Trilogy, 'The Living End.' Come for the Glenn Howard discussion, stay for the talk about how important Araki is and how he doesn't get his due.     Keep in touch and read more at whydoesthewilhelmscream.com on instagram and threads @whydoesthewilhelmpod  Find out more about upcoming Fort Worth Film Club screenings and events at fortworthfilmclub.com and @fortworthfilm Support the next generation of film lovers at reelhousefoundation.org and on facebook reelhousefoundation Artwork by @_mosla_

Jojo’s Bizarre Adventures : Stardust Crusaders est enfin au programme de l’émission ! Et si la série est évoquée régulièrement, deux émissions ont déjà traité des deux premières parties. La saga d’Araki est aussi d’autant... L'article Jojo’s Bizarre Adventures : Stardust Crusaders – La 5e de Couv’ – #5DC – Saison 9 épisode 32 est apparu en premier sur La 5e de Couv' - Le podcast de débat autour du manga !.

We discuss Nobuyoshi Araki's prolific work, how he's both internationally famous yet pigeonholed, censorship, his surprising versatility, obsessions and more!

Gregg Araki, probably best known for THE DOOM GENERATION (1995), though not prolific, he has come out with a number of films of note including MYSTERIOUS SKIN (2004). The script was written by Araki based off a novel of the same name written by author Scott Heim. A Patreon pick from one of our listeners, the podcast takes a look at the film.Brian Lackey (Brady Corbet), a young man, remembers passing out as a child for unknown reasons. During one of his episodes he sees a shadowy figure staring down at him. When he sees a documentary about alien abductions on televisions, he goes visits a young woman his age that claims she too had been abducted. His discussions with her lead to him searching out Neil McCormick (Joseph Gordon-Levitt) who appears in photographs with him as a youngster. Does Neil have an answer or is there a bigger story?The film stars Joseph Gordon-Levitt, Brady Corbet, Mary Lynn Rajskub, Michelle Trachtenberg, Bill Sage, and Elizabeth Shue. Due to its subject matter, the film received the “dreaded” NC-17 rating. Controversial, the film still received fine reviews from critics including Roger Ebert. Your co-hosts take a look at the film and give their thoughts.

A. MRD5 - https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/medgen/382611  B. SYNGAP1 NSID - https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/21237447/ (Hamdan, 2011) C. SYNGAP1 NDD - https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC6128754/ (Kilinc, 2011) D. Confusing https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/pdf/10.1002/ajmg.a.37189 (Parker, 2015) De Novo, Heterozygous, Loss-of-Function Mutations in SYNGAP1 Cause a Syndromic Form of Intellectual Disability E. SYNGAP1 DEE - https://pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/30541864/ (Vlaskamp, 2019) F. SYNGAP1 Related-ID - ICD-10 & Hopkins  - https://www.pnas.org/doi/abs/10.1073/pnas.2308891120 (Araki 2023)  - https://curesyngap1.org/blog/syngap1-assigned-its-own-icd-10-code-f78-a1-srf/ (ICD-10, 2021) G. SYNGAP1 Related Disorders - https://www.chop.edu/conditions-diseases/syngap1-related-disorders H. SYNGAP1 Syndrome - ICD-11  - https://twitter.com/cureSYNGAP1/status/1730629792137883800 (2024) My vote (today) is that we have a disease that is a DEE called SYNGAP1 Related Disorders (SRD). These monogenic disorders are anything but monolithic. Disease vs. Syndrome, read this: https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC1480257/ (Cavalo, 2003) A syndrome is a recognizable complex of symptoms and physical findings which indicate a specific condition for which a direct cause is not necessarily understood...Once medical science identifies a causative agent or process with a fairly high degree of certainty, physicians may then refer to the process as a disease, not a syndrome. NDD vs DEE - We are a DEE “Neurodevelopmental disorders (NDD) encompass highly prevalent conditions such as autism and epilepsy, with cognitive disabilities alone affecting 1-3% of the global population. Developmental epileptic encephalopathies (DEE) are NDD characterized by epilepsy and delayed development or loss of developmental skills. Although the prevalence of DEEs remains to be determined, studies estimate that single-gene epilepsies occur in around 1 in 2100 births annually.” https://medicalxpress.com/news/2022-12-neurodevelopmental-epilepsy-disorder-genetic.html Give all three of our podcasts 5 stars everywhere.   https://podcasts.apple.com/us/channel/syngap1-podcasts-by-srf/id6464522917  This is a podcast subscribe! https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/syngap10-weekly-10-minute-updates-on-syngap1/id1560389818  Episode 133 of #Syngap10 - Feb 13, 2024 #epilepsy #autism #intellectualdisability #id #anxiety #raredisease #epilepsyawareness #autismawareness #rarediseaseresearch #SynGAPResearchFund #CareAboutRare #PatientAdvocacy #GCchat #Neurology #GeneChat

Manga by Ono, Genki   What if Araki made a sports manga?   David and Jordan give their first thoughts on Shonen Jump manga Full Drive. Listen in as they give an overview of the first chapter, where they think it will go from there, and ultimately their “power word” to describe the series so far. They also dive into some listener questions.    Show Notes: • You can reach us at Twitter @shonenflopcast or email us shonenflop@gmail.com   • Help keep the show running by joining the Shonen Flop Patreon at patreon.com/shonenflop. Get perks like early access to episodes; joining us during recordings, and exclusive episodes on manga like Agravity Boys, Magu-chan: God of Destruction, and PPPPPP.   • Get Shonen Flop merch, including this episode's cover art, on a shirt, mug, print, or whatever else might catch your eye https://www.teepublic.com/stores/shonen-flop?ref_id=22733   • Become a member of our community by joining our Discord. You can hang out with us, submit your questions or six word summaries! Find it at https://discord.com/invite/4hC3SqRw8r   • Want to be a guest? You can ask to be on a future episode at bit.ly/shonen_flop_guest   Credits:   • Shonen Flop is hosted by David Weinberger and Jordan Forbes   • Additional editing assistance by Dylan Crider you can find his podcast, Anime Out of Context at animeoutofcontext.com   • Episode art by Shannon (IG: illuminyatea)   MAL Description: 9-year-old Tamashiro Dan is teased relentlessly by others for being weak and small until his grandfather teaches him table tennis and gives him an old worn-out racket. Four years later he's left Germany with his family to Japan, to prove himself on a bigger stage.  

The Doom Generation: Movie Review from the Ray Taylor ShowShow topic: Dive into the anarchic world of "The Doom Generation," Gregg Araki's explosive 1995 indie film, in this comprehensive episode of the Ray Taylor Show. Join Ray as he navigates the nihilistic odyssey of two teenage lovers, Amy Blue and Jordan White, portrayed by Rose McGowan and James Duval, who, along with a mysterious adolescent drifter played by Jonathan Schaech, find themselves on a surreal journey marked by sex, violence, and a series of bizarre convenience store encounters.Labelled as "A Heterosexual Movie by Gregg Araki," this film stands as a seminal piece in the Teenage Apocalypse trilogy, bridging the gap between "Totally Fucked Up" (1993) and "Nowhere" (1997). This episode not only explores the film's thematic content and visual aesthetics but also delves into the performances that brought these complexcharacters to life, offering listeners an in-depth analysis of their motivations and the film's critique on youth and society.Whether you're a die-hard fan of Araki's work or a newcomer intrigued by the film's cult status, this episode provides a fresh perspective on "The Doom Generation," its place in'90s indie cinema, and its legacy within the pantheon of cult classics. Tune in for a riveting discussion on this chaotic journey through the dark heart of teenage angst and rebellion.JOIN Inspired Disorder +PLUS Today! InspiredDisorder.com/plus Membership Includes:Ray Taylor Show - Full Week Ad Free (Audio+Video)Live Painting ArchiveEarly Access to The Many FacesMember Only Discounts and DealsPodcast Back Catalogue (14 Shows - 618 Episodes)Ray Taylor's Personal BlogCreative WritingAsk Me AnythingDaily Podcast: Ray Taylor Show - InspiredDisorder.com/rts Daily Painting: The Many Faces - InspiredDisorder.com/tmf ALL links: InspiredDisorder.com/linksGenres: Comedy - Drama - Crime

Jason gives you a quick overview of Godzilla 1954.Read the essay here: https://historywiththeszilagyis.org/hwts228 Find us on Twitter:The Network: @BQNPodcasts The Show: @HistorySzilagyi. Chrissie: @TheGoddessLivia. Jason: @JasonDarkElf.Send topic suggestions via Twitter or on our Facebook page History with the Szilagyis.History with the Szilagyis is supported by our patrons: PatiSusan Capuzzi-De ClerckLaura DullKris HillVince LockeJoin these wonderful supporters by visiting patreon.com/historywiththeszilagyis. The BQN Podcast Collective is brought to you by our listeners. Special thanks to these patrons on Patreon whose generous contributions help to produce this podcast and the many others on our network! You can join this illustrious list by becoming a patron here: https://www.patreon.com/BQN

Totally F***ed Up: Movie Review from the Ray Taylor ShowShow topic: Explore the pivotal world of '90s queer cinema with Ray Taylor as he reviews 'Totally F***ed Up,' a groundbreaking 1993 American drama by Gregg Araki. This film marks the first installment of Araki's influential Teenage Apocalypse trilogy and is renowned for its significant role in the New Queer Cinema genre. The film offers a raw and unfiltered look into the lives of six gay adolescents who form their own familial bond while navigating the complexities of identity, relationships, and societal challenges.In this episode, Ray Taylor delves into the film's avant-garde style, its impactful narrative, and how it blends elements of experimental cinema with a queer twist on the teen movie genre, reminiscent of a John Hughes film. The podcast provides an in-depth analysis of the characters' dynamics, their struggles, and the film's cultural significance, particularly in representing the queer youth experience.Listeners can expect a thoughtful and engaging discussion on 'Totally F***ed Up,' which premiered at the 1993 Sundance Film Festival and has since become a touchstone in LGBTQ+ film history. Join Ray Taylor for a deep dive into this influential film and its lasting impact on cinema and the queer community.JOIN Inspired Disorder +PLUS Today! InspiredDisorder.com/plus Membership Includes:Ray Taylor Show - Full Week Ad Free (Audio+Video)Live Painting ArchiveEarly Access to The Many FacesMember Only Discounts and DealsPodcast Back Catalogue (14 Shows - 618 Episodes)Ray Taylor's Personal BlogCreative WritingAsk Me AnythingDaily Podcast: Ray Taylor Show - InspiredDisorder.com/rts Daily Painting: The Many Faces - InspiredDisorder.com/tmf ALL links: InspiredDisorder.com/linksGenres: Comedy - Drama

The Australian Core Gift Alliance is off and running… Filippa Araki and Diane Hewitt are founding members of the Australian Core Gift Alliance, a collaborative that has come together to spread the word of gifts by being certified to teach the Core Gift Master Facilitator and other gift-related courses in Australia. Diane is a seasoned Executive coach with a host of certifications for working with a diverse range of individuals and groups. Filippa came into the Core Gifts world from her training expertise in Non-Violent Communication and being a University educator. Each of them have done more than seventy-five interviews and have recently finished a contract for twenty-five Core Gift Discovery interviews for a University Leadership program. They are both very skilled Core Gift Facilitators and have an in-depth perspective on the interview process, how it effects people, and the impact that gifts has had in each of their own lives. Find out more about the Core Gift Institute by visiting our website, www.coregift.org Thanks to Jeff Hoyt at Hoyt's Greater Community Radio for vocal additions. Music by Benson.

for the full episode join the Patreon [patreon.com/fashiongrunge]--There are times when I think about the films and directors that shaped me in my teenage years.  Back in the 90s I could have never imagined connecting with anyone outside of my own friend group who liked the same weird movies and things I did. Now, because of this magical place called the internet it's easy to find people from all corners of the world and generations with shared interests.This brings me to the latest interview episode. I connected with Kev via IG on our love for Gregg Araki movies. Since there is all this hype surrounding the latest remastered editions of The Doom Generation and Nowhere, it was great to chat with someone who has been to the screenings and has some 'irl' experience with the cast. We get into how we discovered Araki, Gen Z and Millennial culture, and much more! ---GIVE US A 5 STAR RATING & SUBSCRIBE to the main Fashion Grunge Podcast feed on  (mostly) 90s films!Guest: Kev Creature @kevcreatureHost: Lauren @lauren_melanieFollow Fashion Grunge PodcastSubstack The Lo Down: a Fashion Grunge blog/newsletterInstagram @fashiongrungepodTwitter @fgrungepodLetterboxd Fashion Grunge PodcastTikTok @fashiongrungepod 

In Dreams in Double Time: On Race, Freedom, and Bebop (Duke UP, 2023), Jonathan Leal examines how the musical revolution of bebop opened up new futures for racialized and minoritized communities. Blending lyrical nonfiction with transdisciplinary critique and moving beyond standard Black/white binary narratives of jazz history, Leal focuses on the stories and experiences of three musicians and writers of color: James Araki, a Nisei multi-instrumentalist, soldier-translator, and literature and folklore scholar; Raúl Salinas, a Chicano poet, jazz critic, and longtime activist who endured the US carceral system for over a decade; and Harold Wing, an Afro-Chinese American drummer, pianist, and songwriter who performed with bebop pioneers before working as a public servant. Leal foregrounds that for these men and their collaborators, bebop was an affectively and intellectually powerful force that helped them build community and dream new social possibilities. Bebop's complexity and radicality, Leal contends, made it possible for those like Araki, Salinas, and Wing who grappled daily with state-sanctioned violence to challenge a racially supremacist, imperial nation, all while hearing and making the world anew. "Dreams of Autumn" on Spotify. "Dreams of Autumn on Apple Music. Nathan Smith is a PhD candidate in Music Theory at Yale University Email: nathan.smith@yale.edu Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/african-american-studies

In Dreams in Double Time: On Race, Freedom, and Bebop (Duke UP, 2023), Jonathan Leal examines how the musical revolution of bebop opened up new futures for racialized and minoritized communities. Blending lyrical nonfiction with transdisciplinary critique and moving beyond standard Black/white binary narratives of jazz history, Leal focuses on the stories and experiences of three musicians and writers of color: James Araki, a Nisei multi-instrumentalist, soldier-translator, and literature and folklore scholar; Raúl Salinas, a Chicano poet, jazz critic, and longtime activist who endured the US carceral system for over a decade; and Harold Wing, an Afro-Chinese American drummer, pianist, and songwriter who performed with bebop pioneers before working as a public servant. Leal foregrounds that for these men and their collaborators, bebop was an affectively and intellectually powerful force that helped them build community and dream new social possibilities. Bebop's complexity and radicality, Leal contends, made it possible for those like Araki, Salinas, and Wing who grappled daily with state-sanctioned violence to challenge a racially supremacist, imperial nation, all while hearing and making the world anew. "Dreams of Autumn" on Spotify. "Dreams of Autumn on Apple Music. Nathan Smith is a PhD candidate in Music Theory at Yale University Email: nathan.smith@yale.edu Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/latino-studies

In Dreams in Double Time: On Race, Freedom, and Bebop (Duke UP, 2023), Jonathan Leal examines how the musical revolution of bebop opened up new futures for racialized and minoritized communities. Blending lyrical nonfiction with transdisciplinary critique and moving beyond standard Black/white binary narratives of jazz history, Leal focuses on the stories and experiences of three musicians and writers of color: James Araki, a Nisei multi-instrumentalist, soldier-translator, and literature and folklore scholar; Raúl Salinas, a Chicano poet, jazz critic, and longtime activist who endured the US carceral system for over a decade; and Harold Wing, an Afro-Chinese American drummer, pianist, and songwriter who performed with bebop pioneers before working as a public servant. Leal foregrounds that for these men and their collaborators, bebop was an affectively and intellectually powerful force that helped them build community and dream new social possibilities. Bebop's complexity and radicality, Leal contends, made it possible for those like Araki, Salinas, and Wing who grappled daily with state-sanctioned violence to challenge a racially supremacist, imperial nation, all while hearing and making the world anew. "Dreams of Autumn" on Spotify. "Dreams of Autumn on Apple Music. Nathan Smith is a PhD candidate in Music Theory at Yale University Email: nathan.smith@yale.edu Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network

In Dreams in Double Time: On Race, Freedom, and Bebop (Duke UP, 2023), Jonathan Leal examines how the musical revolution of bebop opened up new futures for racialized and minoritized communities. Blending lyrical nonfiction with transdisciplinary critique and moving beyond standard Black/white binary narratives of jazz history, Leal focuses on the stories and experiences of three musicians and writers of color: James Araki, a Nisei multi-instrumentalist, soldier-translator, and literature and folklore scholar; Raúl Salinas, a Chicano poet, jazz critic, and longtime activist who endured the US carceral system for over a decade; and Harold Wing, an Afro-Chinese American drummer, pianist, and songwriter who performed with bebop pioneers before working as a public servant. Leal foregrounds that for these men and their collaborators, bebop was an affectively and intellectually powerful force that helped them build community and dream new social possibilities. Bebop's complexity and radicality, Leal contends, made it possible for those like Araki, Salinas, and Wing who grappled daily with state-sanctioned violence to challenge a racially supremacist, imperial nation, all while hearing and making the world anew. "Dreams of Autumn" on Spotify. "Dreams of Autumn on Apple Music. Nathan Smith is a PhD candidate in Music Theory at Yale University Email: nathan.smith@yale.edu Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/history

In Dreams in Double Time: On Race, Freedom, and Bebop (Duke UP, 2023), Jonathan Leal examines how the musical revolution of bebop opened up new futures for racialized and minoritized communities. Blending lyrical nonfiction with transdisciplinary critique and moving beyond standard Black/white binary narratives of jazz history, Leal focuses on the stories and experiences of three musicians and writers of color: James Araki, a Nisei multi-instrumentalist, soldier-translator, and literature and folklore scholar; Raúl Salinas, a Chicano poet, jazz critic, and longtime activist who endured the US carceral system for over a decade; and Harold Wing, an Afro-Chinese American drummer, pianist, and songwriter who performed with bebop pioneers before working as a public servant. Leal foregrounds that for these men and their collaborators, bebop was an affectively and intellectually powerful force that helped them build community and dream new social possibilities. Bebop's complexity and radicality, Leal contends, made it possible for those like Araki, Salinas, and Wing who grappled daily with state-sanctioned violence to challenge a racially supremacist, imperial nation, all while hearing and making the world anew. "Dreams of Autumn" on Spotify. "Dreams of Autumn on Apple Music. Nathan Smith is a PhD candidate in Music Theory at Yale University Email: nathan.smith@yale.edu Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/asian-american-studies

Blane & Ashley Dallen & Melissa Oakley in Canada just raised over $10k together with two events. SynGAP Paddle Slap Stats: They had 12 teams play in the tournament.  About 120 people joined the crawfish boil.  Actual $ breakdown: Total Actual Income $23,250.00. Article https://www.localmemphis.com/article/life/family/rare-disease-research-promoted-integra[…]1-austim-epilepsy/522-b805046b-d05e-4f17-a8ab-69421293f926  Minnie's article in the Chicago Tribune. (behind firewall) https://www.chicagotribune.com/people/health/ct-hayden-cheng-syngap-diagnosis-0525-20230527-zacxfmtrhbd4bm5gbc3su5hsr4-story.html  Vicky & Paulina in Chihuahua, Mexico at Sociedad Mexicana de Neurología Pediátrica's annual conference https://twitter.com/cureSYNGAP1/status/1659250923611496449  Two blogs en Español https://www.syngapresearchfund.org/post/vacacionar-con-un-syngap1-147  https://www.syngapresearchfund.org/post/notas-de-terliz-mama-syngap1-145  STUDIES ENDD S1 NHS - Email ENDD@chop.edu to sign up and please cc mike@curesyngap1.org, lauren@curesyngap1.org & sydney@curesyngap1.org https://drive.google.com/file/d/1ASUkKQOgjbs9hkJVCJ40N8MbVFH4X9_h/view#  Watch #S10e105 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qy5YrPIlH0I  Cornell study English https://redcap.link/syngapcaregiversurvey  Spanish https://redcap.ctsc.weill.cornell.edu/redcap_protocols/surveys/?s=MWTW743PHENPPRPY  COMBINEDBrain Biorepository - https://www.syngapresearchfund.org/webinars/74-combinedbrain-biobank-our-partnership-with-srf-for-syngap1  SCIENCE 1st Syngap Patient Derived Models from SRF grant to Dr. Araki & Dr. Huganir https://www.biorxiv.org/content/10.1101/2023.05.25.542312v2  "Eye of the Fly" Chow article - https://www.ksl.com/article/50638506/eye-of-the-fly-how-fruit-flies-could-help-find-treatment-for-a-rare-genetic-disease  EVENTS June 10 - MDBR https://charity.pledgeit.org/t/Optdm6sOX9  June 21 - Splash for Syngap https://www.syngapresearchfund.org/post/share-your-love-for-someone-with-syngap1-for-splash4syngap  August 26 - Syngap Soiree  https://e.givesmart.com/events/wiH  October 7 - Scramble for Syngap https://secure.givelively.org/event/syngap-research-fund-incorporated/scramble-for-syngap-2023  October 21 - SynGAP Research Fund Gala Honoring Caren Leib - https://e.givesmart.com/events/wBy/  CONFERENCE Nov 30-Dec 1 - SYNGAP1 Conference 2023 hosted by SRF https://www.syngapresearchfund.org/professionals/syngap1-roundtable-2023-syngap-research-fund  Conference pre-registration link: https://Syngap.Fund/2023conf  Book hotels ASAP: https://Syngap.Fund/2023hotel Tshirts: https://www.bonfire.com/srf-syngap1-conference-2023/  WEBINARS June 8 - Therapeutic strategies for autism: Targeting Three levels of the central dogma of molecular biology - Dr. Lilia Iakoucheva & Mr. Derek Hong https://www.syngapresearchfund.org/webinars/78-therapeutic-strategies-for-autism-targeting[…]tral-dogma-of-molecular-biology-with-a-focus-on-syngap1  June 15 - Quantifying perturbed SYNGAP1 Function Caused by Coding Mutations - Dr. Michael Courtney from Turku in Finland https://www.syngapresearchfund.org/webinars/79-quantifying-perturbed-syngap1-function-caused-by-coding-mutations  PODS - Syngap Stories, interviews, see #8 with Heather Bensch https://www.syngapresearchfund.org/podcast-episodes/syngap1-stories-episode-008  - Syngap Stories, interviews, see #9 with Lauren Perry https://www.syngapresearchfund.org/podcast-episodes/syngap1-stories-episode-009  This is a podcast: subscribe to and rate this 10 minute #podcast #SYNGAP10 here  - https://www.syngapresearchfund.org/syngap10-podcast Apple podcasts:  https://podcasts.apple.com/us/podcast/syngap10-weekly-10-minute-updates-on-syngap1-video/id1560389818 Episode 106 of #Syngap10 - June 6, 2023 #epilepsy #autism #intellectualdisability #id #anxiety #raredisease #epilepsyawareness #autismawareness #rarediseaseresearch #SynGAPResearchFund #CareAboutRare #PatientAdvocacy #GCchat #Neurology #GeneChat --- Send in a voice message: https://podcasters.spotify.com/pod/show/syngap10/message