Secret police of the Soviet Union
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Lev Davídovich Bronstein (Yánovka, Ucrania, 26 de octubre/jul./ 7 de noviembre de 1879 -Ciudad de México, 21 de agosto de 1940), más conocido como León Trotski, fue un político y revolucionario soviético. Aunque inicialmente simpatizó con los mencheviques y tuvo disputas ideológicas y personales con el líder bolchevique, Vladímir Lenin, Trotski fue uno de los organizadores clave de la Revolución de Octubre, que permitió a los bolcheviques tomar el poder en noviembre de 1917 en Rusia. Durante la guerra civil, subsiguiente, desempeñó el cargo de comisario de asuntos militares. Negoció la retirada de Rusia de la Primera Guerra Mundial mediante la Paz de Brest-Litovsk. Tuvo a su cargo la creación del Ejército Rojo, que consolidaría definitivamente los logros revolucionarios, venciendo a un pobre apoyo de ejércitos extranjeros y a los ejércitos blancos durante la guerra civil rusa; apoyó al Terror Rojo y fue condecorado con la Orden de la Bandera Roja. Posteriormente, se enfrentó política e ideológicamente a Iósif Stalin, liderando la oposición de izquierda, lo que le causó el exilio y posterior asesinato. Tras su exilio de la Unión Soviética, fue el líder de un movimiento internacional de izquierda revolucionaria identificado con el nombre de trotskismo y caracterizado por la idea de la «revolución permanente». En 1938, fundó la Cuarta Internacional. Murió asesinado en México por Ramón Mercader, un agente español del NKVD soviética, por orden de Stalin
Agradece a este podcast tantas horas de entretenimiento y disfruta de episodios exclusivos como éste. ¡Apóyale en iVoox! Acceso anticipado para Fans - ** VIDEO EN NUESTRO CANAL DE YOUTUBE **** https://youtube.com/live/JXkGr55TMCM +++++ Hazte con nuestras camisetas en https://www.bhmshop.app +++++ El Proyecto Venona fue un programa de contrainteligencia de Estados Unidos iniciado durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial por el Servicio de Inteligencia de Señales del Ejército estadounidense y posteriormente absorbido por la Agencia de Seguridad Nacional (NSA). Funcionó oficialmente desde el 1 de febrero de 1943 hasta el 1 de octubre de 1980. Su objetivo: descifrar los mensajes encriptados de las agencias de inteligencia soviéticas (NKVD, KGB y GRU). Lo más sorprendente: comenzó cuando la Unión Soviética era aliada oficial de Estados Unidos y Reino Unido, y continuó durante toda la Guerra Fría, cuando ya era considerada enemiga. En sus 37 años de existencia, Venona descifró y tradujo aproximadamente tres mil mensajes. Gracias a él se destapó la red de espionaje de los Cinco de Cambridge en el Reino Unido y, sobre todo, la infiltración soviética en el Proyecto Manhattan (el desarrollo de la bomba atómica estadounidense). En este programa con el historiador Pere Cardona repasamos con rigor y documentos desclasificados: • Los antecedentes y el contexto histórico de 1943 • Cómo funcionaba el sofisticado sistema soviético de “libretas de uso único” • Los nombres clave que salieron a la luz: Alger Hiss, Klaus Fuchs, el matrimonio Rosenberg… • La paradoja de que los propios soviéticos infiltraron Venona (gracias a Kim Philby) • Por qué este caso sigue siendo clave para entender las operaciones de inteligencia rusas actuales Rigor histórico absoluto, fuentes primarias de la NSA desclasificadas en 1995 y una mirada objetiva y occidental: ni conspiraciones ni revisionismo. Solo hechos documentados. ¿Sabías que Stalin ya espiaba a sus aliados mientras luchaban juntos contra el Eje? ¿Crees que las técnicas de infiltración y contraespionaje de entonces siguen vigentes en el conflicto de Ucrania actual? Cuéntame en comentarios SUSCRÍBETE para no perderte ningún programa y únete a nuestra comunidad de apasionados por la historia militar y los conflictos del mundo. Apóyanos para seguir creando contenido riguroso e independiente: Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/bellumartis PayPal: https://www.paypal.me/bellumartis Bizum: 656 778 825 Síguenos también en redes: Instagram: https://www.instagram.com/bellumartis Twitter / X: https://twitter.com/Bellumartis Bellumartis Historia Militar — Porque entender el pasado es prepararse para el futuro. #Bellumartis #ProyectoVenona #EspionajeSoviético #GuerraFría #SegundaGuerraMundial #ProyectoManhattan #KlausFuchs #AlgerHiss #Rosenberg #KimPhilby #CincoDeCambridge #NKVD #GRU #Contrainteligencia #HistoriaDelEspionaje #PereCardona #HistoriaMilitar #Geopolítica #EspionajeClásicoEscucha este episodio completo y accede a todo el contenido exclusivo de BELLUMARTIS PODCAST. Descubre antes que nadie los nuevos episodios, y participa en la comunidad exclusiva de oyentes en https://go.ivoox.com/sq/618669
They tell you the modern surveillance state began in Moscow in 1917 — that Lenin invented it, that the KGB built the entire thing from scratch. That's too small of a story.The real surveillance state was built thirty-six years earlier, by a Russian son who watched his father die in the snow. He created an institution called the Okhrana — the Department for the Protection of Public Safety and Order — and operated it out of an ordinary-looking building on a canal in St. Petersburg called Fontanka 16. Over the next thirty-six years, his secret police invented every technique that would later define the Cheka, the NKVD, the KGB, the Stasi, and almost every modern intelligence service. Mail interception. Agent provocateurs. Police-controlled unions. Forged documents for narrative management. Double agents inside revolutionary movements who reported back to the state.This isn't conspiracy. It isn't ideology. It's architecture — and the architecture survives the regime that built it.In this video:→ Why Alexander III's response to his father's assassination created the prototype for every modern police state→ How the Okhrana intercepted the entire Russian mail system before wiretaps existed→ The agent provocateur invention — and the moment the state realized infiltration was more powerful than arrest→ Zubatovshchina: police-run unions, the original "controlled opposition" architecture→ The two greatest double agents in the history of political infiltration — Yevno Azef and Roman Malinovsky→ How the Bolsheviks studied the Okhrana files and built every Soviet intelligence service on the same blueprintSubscribe to Hidden Forces in History for civilizational autopsies of the empires, institutions, and patterns shaping the world we live in now.CHAPTERS:00:00 The Surveillance State Begins With a Bomb01:21 March 1881: Alexander III's Decision02:43 Fontanka 1603:35 Perlustration: The Mail Was the First Internet06:08 The Invention of the Agent Provocateur08:36 Zubatovshchina: When the Police Built the Unions10:38 Bloody Sunday: The System Creates the Revolution11:30 The Paris Office: From Surveillance to Narrative Management13:12 Azef and Malinovsky: The Provocateur System at Scale15:22 1917: The Bolsheviks Inherit the Blueprint17:19 Same Playbook, Different Century
Josh Ireland details how, in Mexico, Trotsky faced constant threats from Stalin's assassins. Despite the fortified walls of his compound, the NKVD relentlessly monitored his correspondence and successfully infiltrated his inner circle with undercover agents. (4/16)1906
Josh Ireland recounts how the Mercader family, led by the radicalized Caridad, was recruited by the NKVD during the Spanish Civil War. Her son Ramon was trained as a ruthless agent capable of carrying out high-stakes assassinations. (5/16)1907
SCHEDULE THE JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW-5-25-2026.1789 NEW YORK.Guest Author Josh Ireland discusses his book The Death of Trotsky: The True Story of the Plot to Kill Stalin's Greatest Enemy. The Russian Revolution began with Bolshevik fanatics using violence to impose their will on the masses. Irelandexplains the emerging rivalry between Trotsky and Stalin amidst the brutal purge of original revolutionaries. (1/16)In The Death of Trotsky, Josh Ireland describes how the intellectual Trotsky and bureaucratic Stalin competed for power following Lenin's death. Stalin maneuvered patiently to isolate Trotsky, who missed Lenin's funeral while recovering from a mysterious and poorly timed illness. (2/16)Josh Ireland explains that Trotsky was expelled from the Politburo after labeling Stalin the "gravedigger of the revolution." He began a global exile, eventually finding sanctuary in Mexico at the invitation of muralist Diego Rivera. (3/16)Josh Ireland details how, in Mexico, Trotsky faced constant threats from Stalin's assassins. Despite the fortified walls of his compound, the NKVD relentlessly monitored his correspondence and successfully infiltrated his inner circle with undercover agents. (4/16)Josh Ireland recounts how the Mercader family, led by the radicalized Caridad, was recruited by the NKVD during the Spanish Civil War. Her son Ramon was trained as a ruthless agent capable of carrying out high-stakes assassinations. (5/16)Josh Ireland describes how Ramon Mercader seduced Sylvia Ageloff to penetrate Trotsky's inner circle under a false identity. Meanwhile, a chaotic machine-gun raid by Stalinist gunmen failed to kill Trotsky, leading to even tighter security measures. (6/16)Josh Ireland recounts how Ramon Mercader used a mountaineer's ice pick to fatally wound Trotsky inside his study. Captured by guards, Ramon maintained a web of lies to conceal his true role as a Soviet operative. (7/16)Josh Ireland explains that following Trotsky's death, Ramon served twenty years in a Mexican prison before returning to Moscow as a hero. Trotsky's wife, Natalia, lived a diminished final chapter after losing her entire family. (8/16)Guest Author Edward J. Larson discusses his book Declaring Independence: Why 1776 Matters. The unprovoked burning of Norfolk, Virginia, by the Royal Navy in January 1776 served as a catalyst for independence. This violence convinced many colonists that reconciliation with the British Crown was impossible. (9/16)In Declaring Independence, Edward J. Larson describes how Henry Knox executed a daring winter transport of heavy artillery from Fort Ticonderoga to Boston. This logistical feat allowed Washington to fortify Dorchester Heights, forcing the British to evacuate the city. (10/16)Edward J. Larson recounts how Washington attempted to defend New York against a massive British armada. The Howe brothers tried to negotiate a peace deal, but American commitment to independence remained firm despite the overwhelming force. (11/16)Edward J. Larson explains that George Mason drafted the Virginia Declaration of Rights while Washington realized he must preserve his army through retreat. The revolution shifted toward establishing independent state governments based on popular sovereignty. (12/16)Edward J. Larson details how, during a grueling retreat through New Jersey, Thomas Paine's The American Crisisrevitalized colonial spirits. British and Hessian atrocities against civilians further alienated the population and strengthened the resolve for independence. (13/16)Edward J. Larson recounts how Abigail Adams urged her husband to "remember the ladies" during the debates over independence. Revolutionary ideals of equality began to raise significant questions regarding the status of women and enslaved people. (14/16)Edward J. Larson describes how Washington led a desperate Christmas crossing of the Delaware River to surprise the Hessians at Trenton. The subsequent victory at Princeton provided the moral triumph needed to sustain the struggling Continental Army. (15/16)Edward J. Larson explains that the formal signing of the Declaration of Independence marked a permanent break with monarchy. New state constitutions prioritized popular sovereignty, establishing the rule of law as the foundation of the Republic. (16/16)
The Soviet Union used Lend-Lease to "plunder" American technology, including entire Ford factories and suitcases of blueprints guarded by NKVD agents. Harry Hopkins personally intervened to facilitate the shipment of specialized chemicals and enriched uranium to the USSR. Sean McMeekin notes that while some officials like Harry Dexter Whitewere identified as NKVD agents, Hopkins acted as a devoted "agent of influence," routinely overruling ambassadors like Averell Harriman when they attempted to exert leverage over these transfers. Hopkins ensured that the flow of vital resources remained unconditional, viewing Stalin's interests as his own and outmaneuvering anyone who raised concerns. (7/8)UNDATED BAKU
In 1943, with Nazi Germany reeling from catastrophic defeat at Stalingrad, Hitler allegedly approved one of the most audacious assassination plots in history — a plan to kill Roosevelt, Churchill, AND Stalin simultaneously. All three Allied leaders. In one city. In one strike. Operation Long Jump, as it has come to be known, was an alleged German scheme to eliminate all three leaders in a single, devastating strike. The plan reportedly relied on a sophisticated intelligence network already embedded in Iran, a country that, despite Allied occupation, remained a hotbed of Axis sympathizers and covert operatives. German intelligence services, operating under a fractured and rivalrous Nazi security apparatus, are said to have activated assets in Tehran to support the mission — a logistical undertaking of enormous complexity in the middle of a world war. Yet the operation never came to fruition, and the reasons why remain a matter of significant historical debate. Soviet intelligence claimed credit for uncovering and dismantling the plot before it could be executed. Roosevelt, meanwhile, was persuaded to relocate from the American legation to the Soviet embassy, ostensibly for security reasons — a move that, intentionally or not, placed him squarely within the reach of NKVD surveillance and raised uncomfortable questions about Allied trust and communication security. The validity of Operation Long Jump has been questioned by historians ever since. British and American intelligence agencies expressed skepticism at the time, and the absence of corroborating German documentation makes the plot difficult to verify. Much of the evidence originates from Soviet sources, including confessions extracted by the NKVD through methods that were notoriously coercive. Historians point out that the operation, as described, would have been logistically near-impossible given the wartime conditions of 1943. Compounding the intrigue is the context of Roosevelt's rapidly deteriorating health, which made his presence at Tehran symbolically vital yet physically precarious. The conference went ahead, the leaders survived, and the war continued on its course — leaving Operation Long Jump as one of history's most compelling, and most contested, what-ifs. Don't forget I have a Youtube Membership: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCbp8JMZizR4zak9wpM3Fvrw/join or my Patreon: https://www.patreon.com/pacificwarchannel where you can get exclusive content like "What if Japan invaded the USSR during WW2?"
In this episode of the Explaining History Podcast, we are joined by author Piers Blofeld to discuss his new book, Master of Lies: The Untold Story of Anthony Blunt, which re‑examines the most underestimated member of the Cambridge Spy Ring.Anthony Blunt was exposed as a Soviet agent in 1979 – long after the defections of Burgess, Maclean and Philby. For decades, he has been treated as something of an afterthought, a cultured art historian who happened to pass a few secrets to the Russians during the war. But Blofeld's research paints a very different picture – one in which Blunt was not a minor player but a master of deception whose actions had catastrophic consequences.Blunt was recruited by the NKVD in the 1930s, joined MI5 during the war, and rose to become Surveyor of the Queen's Pictures. Officially, he stopped spying in 1945. In reality, he continued operating well into the 1950s and 60s, using his flat to debrief agents and helping to investigate the very defections of his fellow spies.But his most significant work was not stealing documents – it was disinformation. Blofeld argues that the “postgraduate level” of espionage is misleading your enemy, and Blunt was a virtuoso. He ran a deception operation that mirrored the famous “Garbo” double‑agent network, feeding the Germans false information that helped ensure the success of D‑Day. Crucially, Blunt's information arrived at German High Command via Sweden four hours before Garbo's did – making the deception far more convincing.Yet just three months later, Blunt sabotaged Operation Market Garden, releasing detailed Allied order of battle to the Germans. The result was 16,000 Allied casualties, a failed advance into Germany, and a prolonged war that allowed Stalin to seize Eastern Europe. Blunt's betrayal, Blofeld argues, directly contributed to the partition of Berlin and the shape of the Cold War.We also explore how Blunt was protected by the British establishment for decades, how he edited incriminating evidence after Burgess and Maclean fled, and why Margaret Thatcher – herself misled by her own security services – finally named him in 1979.**Topics covered:**- The Cambridge Spy Ring and Anthony Blunt's role- Blunt's continued espionage after 1945- Disinformation as the highest form of espionage- The Garbo deception and Blunt's mirror operation- Operation Market Garden and Blunt's sabotage- The cover‑up and protection of Blunt by MI5- Thatcher's outing of Blunt and its aftermath---*Piers Blofeld's *Master of Lies* is available from all good bookshops. Please consider buying from an independent retailer.**If you enjoy the podcast, please consider supporting us – we are migrating from Patreon to Substack. Details in the show notes.*Explaining History helps you understand the 20th Century through critical conversations and expert interviews. We connect the past to the present. If you enjoy the show, please subscribe and share.▸ Support the Show & Get Exclusive ContentBecome a Patron: patreon.com/explaininghistory▸ Join the Community & Continue the ConversationFacebook Group: facebook.com/groups/ExplainingHistoryPodcastSubstack: theexplaininghistorypodcast.substack.com▸ Read Articles & Go DeeperWebsite: explaininghistory.org Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Na území popraviště v Katyni, kde bylo příslušníky sovětské NKVD v roce 1940 popraveno 22 tisíc polských důstojníků a civilistů, nedávno Ruská vojensko-historická společnost umístila panelovou výstavu nazvanou „Deset století polské rusofobie“. Její součástí jsou i tvrzení zpochybňující vinu Sovětského svazu za Katyňský masakr, všímá si ruský nezávislý portál Novaja Gazeta. Všechny díly podcastu Svět ve 20 minutách můžete pohodlně poslouchat v mobilní aplikaci mujRozhlas pro Android a iOS nebo na webu mujRozhlas.cz.
Storycomic Presents: Interviews with Amazing Storytellers and Artists
#LaurenEnnis #DaughtersOfAttrition #GraphicNovel #IndieGraphicNovel #ChildrensBooks #MiddleGradeBooks #HistoricalFiction #Kabul #AfghanistanStories #BooksThatMatter #ABoysBestComrade #DogBooks #Moscow1938 #AuthorInterview #Storycomic On this episode, I'm joined by author Lauren Ennis, who writes historical fiction that hits you right in the heart—and doesn't pull punches when it comes to what kids endure when the world shifts under their feet. We talk about her brand-new graphic novel Daughters of Attrition, a story set against the fall of Kabul, centered on Noor, a ten-year-old girl sent to a Kabul orphanage after her father is killed while assisting American forces against the Taliban. At the orphanage, Noor forms a deep friendship with Laila, a rebellious, artistic kid who helps her hold onto imagination and hope while danger closes in. We also dig into Lauren's middle-grade historical novel A Boy's Best Comrade, set in Moscow, 1938, where a young boy named Yuri and his dog Sasha are forced onto the streets after the NKVD arrests Yuri's parents—turning a loyal promise (“take care of Yuri”) into a fight for survival. If you care about stories that spotlight friendship, resilience, and the bond between kids and the people (and animals) who stick with them—this conversation is for you. The Title sequence was designed and created by Morgan Quaid. See more of Morgan's Work at: https://morganquaid.com/ Storycomic Logo designed by Gregory Giordano See more of Greg's work at: https://www.instagram.com/gregory_c_giordano_art/ Want to start your own podcast? Click on the link to get started: https://www.podbean.com/storycomic Follow us: Are you curious to see the video version of this interview? It's on our website too! www.storycomic.com www.patreon.com/storycomic www.facebook.com/storycomic1 https://www.instagram.com/storycomic/ For information on being a guest or curious to learn more about Storycomic? Contact us at info@storycomic.com Thank you to our Founders Club Patrons, Michael Winn, Higgins802, Von Allan, Stephanie Nina Pitsirilos, Marek Bennett, Donna Carr Roberts, Andrew Gronosky, Simki Kuznick, and Matt & Therese. Check out their fantastic work at: https://marekbennett.com/ https://www.hexapus-ink.com/ https://www.stephanieninapitsirilos.com/ https://www.vonallan.com/ https://higgins802.com/ https://shewstone.com/ https://www.simkikuznick.com/ Also to Michael Winn who is a member of our Founders Club!
STREAMING THE MAKING OF THE JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW, FEATURING GRANT NEWSHAM, 4-14-20261909 BRUSSELS.Host John Bachelor discusses a wide variety of geopolitical and historical topics, beginning with the unpredictable nature of the Trump administration and its impact on global markets. He highlights the profitability of American corporations like JP Morgan and the success of private space ventures like SpaceX, which he credits to visionary government subsidies from NASA. Transitioning to his personal reading list, Bachelor summarizes narrative historiescovering the secretive religious themes in Vermeer's art, the NKVD's assassination of Leon Trotsky, and the collapse of global trade during the Bronze Age. He is joined by Colonel Grant Newsham, who provides analysis on the U.S. naval blockade of Iran and the strategic challenges of securing the Strait of Hormuz. Together, they critique China's predatory economic model, comparing its subsidized manufacturing surplus and use of forced labor to a modern-day plantation system. Their dialogue concludes by examining how China's lack of corporate profitability and currency manipulation threaten to destabilize international competition.
SHOW SCHEDULE JOHN BATCHELOR SHOW, 3-27-2026.1925 STALIN AND TROTSKY, MOSCOW1. Iran's Nuclear Status and the NPT Framework Guest: Henry Sokolski Summary: Sokolski analyzes Iranian hardliners' threats to withdraw from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. He explores the military risks of targeting nuclear sites like Dimona and the strategic complexities of attacking national electric grids. (1)2. Taiwanese Nuclear Policy and Barksdale Drone Incursions Guest: Henry Sokolski Summary: Taiwan considers restarting nuclear plants to mitigate energy desperation. Meanwhile, jam-resistant drone swarms at Barksdale Air Force Base suggest potential Chinese interference intended to delay American responses to nuclear-related operations. (2)3. The SAVE Act and the Debate Over Voter Eligibility Guest: Richard Epstein Summary: Epstein discusses the SAVE Act, which requires documentary proof of citizenship for voting. He weighs the balance between preventing election fraud and the potential burdens placed on legitimate voters by strict identification. (3)4. The Removal Dispute of Judge Pauline Newman Guest: Richard Epstein Summary: Epstein critiques the suspension of 98-year-old Judge Pauline Newman, arguing her colleagues lack cause for removal. He characterizes the move as "manipulative shenanigans" driven by internal politics rather than intellectual incompetence. (4)5. Gas Prices and the Start of Pennsylvania Trout Season Guest: Jim McTague Summary: McTague highlights rising fuel costs and a slowing retail economy in Lancaster County. He contrasts the "amateur hour" of opening day trout fishing with the tranquil, native-stocked streams of Central Pennsylvania. (5)6. Italian Soccer Pressure and Meloni's Cabinet Reshuffle Guest: Lorenzo Fiori Summary: Fiori previews the Azzurri's high-stakes match against Wales and explains Prime Minister Meloni's firing of controversial officials. He also stresses the importance of authentic Parmesan and the beauty of Sardinian heritage. (6)7. NASA Restructuring and the Pivot to a Moon Base Guest: Bob Zimmerman Summary: NASA's new administrator pauses the Lunar Gateway to focus on building a permanent lunar base by 2033. Zimmerman contrasts these government plans with the rapid commercial success and valuation of SpaceX. (7)8. Observing Comet Nuclei and the Outer Planets Guest: Bob Zimmerman Summary: Astronomers witness a rare reversal in a comet's rotation as its nucleus sublimates. Zimmerman reviews new imagery of Saturn and Neptune, arguing for more orbiters to explore the solar system's significant "gaps". (8)9. The Revolutionary Background of the Mercader Family Guest: Josh Ireland Summary: Ireland details the radicalization of the Mercader family, led by the charismatic Caridad. He explains how her son Ramon was recruited by the NKVD during the Spanish Civil War for future espionage. (9)10. Infiltrating Trotsky's Compound Through Seduction Guest: Josh Ireland Summary: Ramon Mercader seduces Sylvia Ageloff to penetrate Trotsky's fortress in Mexico City. Despite the heavy guard and fortifications, Ramon gains the trust of the household by posing as a politically disinterested playboy. (10)11. Planning the Assassination with a Mountaineer's Ice Pick Guest: Josh Ireland Summary: Following a failed armed raid, the NKVD tasks Ramon with murdering Trotsky. They select an ice pick for the attack to ensure a silent kill that carries a brutal, symbolic impact. (11)12. The Aftermath of Trotsky's Death and the Assassin's Legacy Guest: Josh Ireland Summary: Trotsky dies a day after the attack, while Ramon serves twenty years in a Mexican prison. Caridad lives her final years in bitter exile, and Stalin barely registers the mission's success. (12)13. Vegas Transformation: Sports, Tech, and Nuclear History Guest: Jeff Bliss Summary: Bliss explores the Las Vegas strip's evolution into a sports capital and the introduction of Zooks robo-taxis. He notes the area's grim history with atmospheric nuclear testing and resulting radiation claims. (13)14. Political Turmoil and the Homeless Crisis in Los Angeles Guest: Jeff Bliss Summary: Bliss reports on the visual horrors of homeless encampments and the political pressure on Mayor Karen Bass. He also examines the "jungle primary" system and stalled recovery in Pacific Palisades. (14)15. The Enlightenment Foundations of American Civic Education Guest: Jacob Howland Summary: Howland discusses Thomas Jefferson's focus on applied science and the role of liberal education in a republic. He emphasizes Eva Brann's belief that classroom seminars cultivate the habits necessary for civil debate. (15)16. The Crisis of Activism in Modern Higher Education Guest: Jacob Howland Summary: Howland critiques universities for prioritizing the training of social activists over traditional knowledge transmission. He argues that regarding the professorship as a political podium cheats students of a real, broad education. (16)
9. The Revolutionary Background of the Mercader Family Guest: Josh Ireland Summary: Ireland details the radicalization of the Mercader family, led by the charismatic Caridad. He explains how her son Ramon was recruited by the NKVD during the Spanish Civil War for future espionage. (9)1921 MOSCOW RED GUARD
11. Planning the Assassination with a Mountaineer's Ice Pick Guest: Josh Ireland Summary: Following a failed armed raid, the NKVD tasks Ramon with murdering Trotsky. They select an ice pick for the attack to ensure a silent kill that carries a brutal, symbolic impact. (11)1924
The Truth About Ruby Cooper by Liz Nugent If my sister hadn't been beautiful, none of it would have happened. Ruby Cooper and her sister, Erin, live an idyllic life in their close-knit church community in Boston. But when Ruby is sixteen, she is involved in an incident that causes her family's world to implode. Across decades, the fallout leaves a wake of destruction behind Ruby in Dublin and Erin in Boston. Not that Ruby wants to think about the past. But it can't stay a secret forever. Battle of the Arctic by Hugh Sebag-Montefiore Winston Churchill called it 'the worst journey in the world'. But was even this telling quote, describing the nightmarish torment experienced while transporting military aid to northern Russia during World War Two, an understatement? As this book's title implies, Battle of the Arctic tells a unique story. For much of the conflict was complicated by terrific storms, snow, ice, fog, whales and Arctic mirages, so that what is chronicled at times sounds like a cross between the nightmarish torment experienced by both Shackleton in his ship Endurance and Scott of the Antarctic, and an Arctic version of Robinson Crusoe. The action unfolded as Allied naval and merchant seamen, airmen, submariners, soldiers and intelligence officers delivered on their countries' promise to take arms to Russia notwithstanding the German attempts to hunt them in their aircraft, U-boats and surface fleet spearheaded by Tirpitz and Scharnhorst. When ships were attacked, and went down in seas so cold that a man could die after five minutes of immersion, it triggered events reminiscent of the do-or-die moments during the sinking of the Titanic. Men perished one by one in lifeboats, and as castaways on deserted Arctic islands where they were stalked by polar bears. Frostbitten and wounded survivors ended up in primitive Russian hospitals where amputations were carried out without anesthetics. Others, while stranded for months in the communist state they were aiding, experienced the murky worlds of the NKVD, and the gulag, as well as famine and prostitution. Using new material unearthed in American, British, Russian and German archives, as well as Polish, Norwegian, French and Dutch sources, and a remarkable collection of vivid witness accounts brought together at the passing of the last survivors, Hugh Sebag-Montefiore can at last shine a revealing light on this extraordinary tale that oscillates between the sailors' eye view on the front line, and the controversies that infuriated world leaders. LISTEN ABOVE See omnystudio.com/listener for privacy information.
For Soviet Jews, matzah represented a longing for freedom – one we take for granted. This episode tells the hidden story of those heroes who risked everything to keep Pesach alive behind the Iron Curtain, and of the global networks that brought matzah into the USSR by every means, under the watchful eyes of the NKVD. Jewish life in the USSR was strongly policed. Starting with Stalin in 1925, Judaism was actively hunted down. But every spring, Jews in Moscow, St Petersburg and Odessa as well as in far‑flung provincial cities risked surveillance, arrest, and labour camps to fulfill this mitzva on Seder night. Clandestine matzah bakeries sprung up, with children posted as lookouts. In 1929 the 6th Lubavitcher Rebbe succeeded in bringing 10,000s of matzos into Russia. In later years, there would be the suitcases stuffed with contraband food moving through international airports, carried by tourists, businessmen, and non-Jewish acquaintances, given to them by people in the free world who never stopped caring for their fellow Jews. This is the story of how a fragile food became a symbol of spiritual defiance, and how a festival of freedom was observed under totalitarian rule. _____________________________________________________ "Undaunted" by Rabbi Eliezrie is available on Amazon for purchase
4. Philps recounts a chaotic press conference involving correspondent Ralph Parker and his secretary Valentina. Despite rumors of NKVD ties, Valentina died in poverty. The mystery of Parker's true loyalties—whether he was a British, American, or Soviet spy—remains unresolved, illustrating the pervasive atmosphere of suspicion and paranoia within the Metropol. (21)1942 BRITS IN NORTH AFRICA
Send a textfind out about Cross Word Books podcasthttps://bookclues.com./A single ice axe swung in a quiet Mexico City study, but the shockwave started decades earlier, on the edges of a collapsing empire. We follow the combustible rivalry between Leon Trotsky and Joseph Stalin—from exile and revolution to a propaganda war that turned one man's image into the regime's most useful enemy. Our guest, author Josh Ireland, brings meticulous research and narrative clarity to a story where ideology cuts into daily life, and private love becomes a public weapon.We dig into the fractures that shaped Soviet power: the Bolshevik belief in a tight revolutionary vanguard, the Menshevik alternative that lost momentum, and the way that early choices hardened into a state ethos of control. You'll hear how the NKVD evolved into a sprawling security apparatus that hunted at home and abroad, and why Stalin's paranoia wasn't just a psychological quirk—it was a method for governing through fear. Along the way, we trace Trotsky's exile from Turkey to Norway to Mexico, his brief orbit with Diego Rivera and Frida Kahlo, and the shrinking circle of trust that defined his final years.At the center stands Ramon Mercader, a handsome Spaniard whose path to murder ran through the Spanish Civil War, a ruthless handler, and a calculated romance with Sylvia Ageloff. Their honey trap shows how Soviet intelligence manipulated intimacy to breach fortified lives. After the killing, Mercader's airtight cover story holds for years, his mother faces the cost of loyalty in Moscow, and Sylvia fades into obscurity, carrying a wound history rarely credits. Threaded through it all is a modern echo: the institutional lineage from Cheka to NKVD to KGB to today's security state, and the cultural logic that still shapes power in Russia.If you're drawn to political history, true crime, or the human drama behind world-shaping events, this conversation delivers context, character, and consequence. Subscribe, share with a friend, and leave a review to help others find the show—what part of Trotsky's story surprised you most?find Josh Ireland at https://www.joshireland.co.uk/Dutton publishing https://www.penguin.com/dutton-overview
Last time we spoke about the climax of the battle of Changkufeng. A 7–10 August clash near Changkufeng and Hill 52 saw a brutal, multi-front Soviet push against Japanese positions in the Changkufeng–Hill 52 complex and adjacent areas. The Korea Army and Imperial forces rapidly reinforced with artillery, long-range 15 cm and other pieces, to relieve pressure. By 7–8 August, Soviet assault waves, supported by tanks and aircraft, intensified but Japanese defenses, including engineers, machine-gun fire, and concentrated artillery, prevented a decisive breakthrough at key positions like Noguchi Hill and the Changkufeng spine. By 9–10 August, continued Japanese counterfire, improved artillery neutralization, and renewed defenses kept Hill 52 and Changkufeng in Japanese control, though at heavy cost. The frontline exhaustion and looming strategic concerns prompted calls for intensified replacements and potential diplomatic considerations. It seemed like the battle was coming to an end. #184 The Lake Khasan Truce Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. The casualties were atrocious for both sides, yet they continued to mobilize more forces to the conflict area. While the Russians appeared uninterested in all-out war, they were not rushing to settle the crisis through diplomacy and, at the front, were launching "reckless" counterattacks at inconvenient locations, presumably to occupy positions useful for bargaining. The local Soviet military, having ceded the hills at the outset, must also have been anxious about its prestige. The Kwantung Army's potential threat to the flank undoubtedly made the Russians nervous. Although the leading echelon of the 104th Division did not reach Hunchun until the evening of 13 August, Japanese intelligence heard that the Red Army Headquarters staff at Khabarovsk had detected movements of Kwantung Army elements around 10 August and had been compelled to take countermeasures: they reinforced positions along the eastern and northern Manchurian frontiers, concentrated the air force, ordered move-up preparations by ground forces in the Blagoveshchensk district, and commandeered most of the motor vehicles in the Amur Province. By shifting its main strength to the eastern front, the Kwantung Army exerted, as intended, a silent pressure. The covert objective was to restrain and divert the Russians and to assist Japanese diplomacy, not to provoke war. Nevertheless, an American correspondent who visited the Changkufeng area in mid-August privately reported that the Kwantung Army was massing large numbers of troops near the border and expected further trouble. Toward its weak neighbor in Korea the Kwantung Army rendered every support. Apart from its major demonstration in eastern Manchuria, the Kwantung Army promptly sent whatever reinforcements of artillery, engineers, and other units that Seoul had desired. Being also intimately involved in anti-Soviet military preparations, the Kwantung Army understandably wanted the latest and most authentic information on Russian Army theory and practice. The Changkufeng Incident furnished such a firsthand opportunity, and the professional observers sent from Hsinking were well received at the front. Military classmate ties contributed to the working relationships between the armies. As one division officer put it, the teams from the Kwantung Army came as "friends," not only to study the battlefield by their respective branches of service but also to assist the front-line forces; "the Kwantung Army was increasingly helpful to us in settling the incident." Foreign Minister Ugaki felt that the pressure of troop movements in Manchuria played a major part in the Russians' eventual decision to conclude a cease-fire. From Inada's viewpoint, it had been a "fine and useful demonstration against the Soviet Union." Pinned at Changkufeng, the Russians did not or could not choose to react elsewhere, too. Army General Staff officers believed that clear and consistent operational guidance furnished by Tokyo produced good results, although the fighting had been very hard for the front-line Japanese troops because of the insistence on exclusive defense, the curbs on interference by the Kwantung Army, and the prohibition on the use of aircraft. It had been close, however. Only by conscious efforts at restraint had the small war at Changkufeng been kept from spilling over into neighboring areas. Escalation of combat in early August had caused the Japanese government to try to break the diplomatic impasse while localizing the conflict. On 2 August Premier Konoe assured the Emperor that he intended to leave matters for diplomacy and to suspend military operations as soon as possible, an approach with which the government concurred. The Changkufeng dispute had been accorded priority, preceding overall settlements and the creation of joint commissions to redefine the borders. On the 3rd, after coordinating with the military, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs advised Shigemitsu that the front-line situation had become "extremely critical" and that a quick suspension of fighting action should be proposed. Soviet and Japanese troops should be pulled back to the setup as of 30 July. In the midst of the Changkufeng Incident, the USSR intensified harassing tactics against the last Japanese consulates located within the Soviet Union. Forty-eight hour ultimatums to quit the country were delivered to the consuls at Khabarovsk and Blagoveshchensk on 3 and 4 August, respectively. Although the Japanese government warned that it might retaliate, the Russians were unyielding. The foreign ambassadors, Mamoru Shigemitsu and Maxim Litvinov met on August 4th, whereupon Shigemitsu argued, the best procedure would be to suspend military operations on both sides and to restore the status quo. Litvinov in a long manner explained the stance of the USSR as Shigemitsu put it "the Soviet side had a disposition to cease fighting, provided that conditions were satisfactory." The Russians were stalling at the very time the Red Army was bending every effort to retake Changkufeng. Coordination between the Army, Navy, and Foreign Ministers produced cease-fire conditions which were rushed to the Japanese ambassador on 6 August. Two alternate lines were proposed, to which both armies would pull back. After the creation of a buffer zone, discussions could begin concerning delineation of boundaries in the region of the incident. The Hunchun pact could be the basis for deliberations, demarcation to be effected by joint investigations on the spot in consultation with documents in the possession of Manchukuo and the USSR; the Japanese would serve only as observers. Shigemitsu conferred once more with Litvinov for three and a half hours on 7 August, but no progress was made. Litvinov insisted that a clash could be averted only if Japanese forces pulled However Litvinov's positive reaction to the idea of a demarcation commission was seen as a good sign. On August the 10th, both sides seemed to have reached a similar conclusion that a cease-fire needed to rapidly be implemented. At 11pm that night Litvinov called the embassy, asking for Shigemitus to see him as fast as possible. Shigemitsu arrived around midnight whereupon Litvinov showed him a draft of a final accord: 1. Japanese and Soviet forces shall cease all military activities on 11 August at noon local time. Instructions to that effect are to be issued immediately by the governments of the USSR and Japan. 2. Japanese as well as Soviet troops shall remain on those lines which they occupied at midnight local time on 10 August. 3. For redemarcation of the portion of frontier in dispute, there shall be created a mixed commission of two representatives from the USSR and two representatives from the Japanese-Manchurian side, with an umpire selected by agreement of both parties from among citizens of a third state. 4. The commission for redemarcation shall work on the basis of agreements and maps bearing the signatures of plenipotentiary representatives of Russia and China. Shigemitsu agreed to the inclusion of a Japanese commissioner on the Manchukuoan delegation, but he could not assent to the addition of a neutral umpire. Moscow received the news of the truce with gratification mingled with surprise. Few realized that the USSR had taken the step of appeasing or at least saving face for the Japanese even after Shigemitsu had pleaded for and won a cease-fire. The world was told by the Russians only that specific overtures for cessation of hostilities had originated with the Soviet authorities. In general, it was not difficult to guess why the Russian government, distracted by the European political scene and apprehensive about a two-front war, agreed to a cease-fire at Changkufeng. The slowness of communication across the many miles between Moscow and Tokyo did nothing to alleviate nervousness in the Japanese capital during the night of 10–11 August. Ugaki wrote in his diary that, "after ten days of tension, the struggle between the Japanese and Soviet armies on the USSR–Manchukuo border had reached the decisive brink". Complicating the situation was the fact that, late on 10 August, the president of Domei News Agency conveyed to Konoe a message from one of his Moscow correspondents. Purporting to sum up Shigemitsu's latest outlook, the report stated that success in the negotiations seemed unlikely. The contents of the message were transmitted to Ugaki and Itagaki. Consequently, Konoe and his associates spent a fearful and depressed night. Shigemitsu's own report, sent by telegram, arrived frustratingly slowly. After definite information had been received from Shigemitsu, Harada happily called Kazami Akira, the prime minister's chief secretary, and Konoe himself. "Until the accord was implemented," Kazami had said, "we would have to be on the alert all day today." Konoe and Kazami seemed "a little relaxed anyhow." Inada had finally retired past midnight on 10–11 August, "agreement or no agreement. I must have been dozing from fatigue when the jangle of the phone got me up. It was a message saying that a truce had been concluded the preceding midnight. Just as I had been expecting, I said to myself, but I felt empty inside, as if it were an anticlimax." The call had to have been an unofficial communication, perhaps the latest Domei news, since the records showed that definitive word from the embassy in Moscow did not reach Tokyo until after 10:00. Attache Doi's report to the Army General Staff came at about 11:00. This was extremely late in terms of getting Japanese troops to cease operations at 13:00 Tokyo time (or noon on the spot); a tardy imperial order might undo the Moscow accord. Complicating this matter of split-second timing was the fact that the first official telegram from Shigemitsu referred to unilateral Japanese withdrawal by one kilometer. At the Japanese high command level, there was agitated discussion when initial word of these arrangements arrived. Inada speculated that on 10 August the Russians had staged persistent close-quarter assaults against Changkufeng and seized the southern edge eventually, although repulsed at all other points. Moscow may have agreed to a truce at that midnight because they expected that the crest of Changkufeng would be in their hands by then and that a fait accompli would have been achieved. Some officers argued that the Russian forces were suffering "quite badly and this caused the authorities' agreeability to a cease-fire." Most exasperating, however, was the provision stipulating a one-sided military withdrawal. Admittedly, such action had been under discussion by the Army General Staff itself, particularly after Terada's sobering appeal of 10 August. It was another matter to have a Japanese withdrawal dictated by the USSR while Russian troops did not have to budge. Initial puzzlement and chagrin began to yield to rationalization. The Japanese side seemed to have made a concession in the negotiations, but there must have been significance to the phrase which said, "the line occupied by Japanese forces has been taken into due consideration." Japanese troops had presumably advanced to the edge of the frontier, while Russian soldiers had not come even close. Thus, it must have been necessary to have the Japanese units withdraw first, to fix the boundaries, since it had been the Japanese who had done the greater advancing. One Japanese office remarked "A pull-back was a pull-back, no matter how you looked at things—and we were the ones who had to do it. But the atmosphere in the command had been far from optimistic on 10 August; so we decided that it was unnecessary to complain about this issue and we approved the agreement in general. Both the senior and junior staff levels seemed to be quite relieved." The 11th of August had been an awkward day to conduct liaison between the Foreign Ministry, the Army, and the Throne, since the Emperor was leaving Hayama to visit naval installations in the Yokosuka area and the navy air unit in Chiba from morning. By the time a conclusive report on the cease-fire could be conveyed to the monarch, he was aboard the destroyer Natsugumo at Kisarazu. Naval wireless facilities in Tokyo had to be used to transmit coded messages to Admiral Yonai, the Navy Minister, for delivery to the Emperor. This was done shortly before 14:45 According to Yonai, the Emperor "was very pleased and relieved when I reported to him… about the conclusion of the truce accord." The appropriate Imperial order was approved promptly. But not until 15:00, two hours after cease-fire time at Changkufeng, did word of Imperial sanction reach the high command. Japanese soldiers in the lines recalled nothing special on 11 August. "We didn't hear about the truce till the last minute," said one, "and we had become so inured to enemy artillery we hardly noticed any 'last salute.' From Tokyo, on 11 August, it was reported that the Japanese side had suspended operations promptly at noon, as agreed, but that sporadic bursts of fire had continued to come from the Soviet side. Colonel Grebennik, when asked after the war whether the combat did end at noon, replied petulantly: "Yes, but not quite so. The fighting actually ceased at 12:05." According to him, the tardiness was the Japanese side's fault. The Japanese press told readers that "the cease-fire bugle has sounded—the frontier is cheerful now, 14 days after the shooting began." All was quiet in the area of Changkufeng, where the sounds of firing ceased at noon "as if erased." The most intense period of stillness lasted only a few minutes and was followed by the excited chattering of soldiers, audible on both sides. Korea Army Headquarters spoke of the "lifting of dark clouds [and] return of the rays of peace." In Hongui, a Japanese combat officer told a Japanese correspondent: "Suddenly we noticed the insects making noise; the soldiers were delighted. Once the fighting stopped, Japanese national flags were hoisted here and there along our front. … After the Russians observed what we had done, they broke out red flags also, at various points in their trenches." Some Japanese soldiers were given cookies by Soviet medical corpsmen. At Hill 52, an infantryman remembered, the Japanese and the Russians were facing each other, 50 meters apart, that afternoon. "We just lay there and stared at each other for two hours, waiting grimly. But it was well past cease-fire now, and those same Russians finally started to wave at us. Later that day, when Soviet troops came to salvage their KO'd tanks, we 'chatted' in sign language." After the cease-fire, Ichimoto, whose battalion had seen the most difficult fighting, stuck his head above the trench and waved hello to some Soviet officers. "They waved back. It gave me an odd sensation, for during the furious struggle I had considered them to be barbarians. Now I was surprised to see that they were civilized after all!" A rifleman at Changkufeng remembered swapping watches with an unarmed Russian across the peak. The Japanese front-line troops stayed in their positions confronting the Russians and conducted preparations for further combat while cleaning up the battlefield. Soviet troops also remained deployed as of the time of the cease-fire and vigorously carried out their own construction. The day after the cease-fire went into effect, Suetaka escorted an American reporter to the front. At Changkufeng: "carpenters were making wooden receptacles for the ashes of the Japanese dead. Funeral pyres still were smoldering. . . . From our vantage point the lieutenant general pointed out long lines of Soviet trucks coming up in clouds of dust [which] apparently were made deliberately in an effort to conceal the trucks' movements, [probably designed] to haul supplies from the front. Soviet boats were pushing across [Khasan] . . . and Soviet soldiers were towing smashed tanks back from no-man'sland. On the Japanese side there was a pronounced holiday spirit. Soldiers, emerging from dugouts, were drying white undershirts on near-by brush and bathing in the Tumen River. The soldiers were laughing heartily. A few were trying to ride a Korean donkey near Changkufeng's scarred slope. The general pointed out three Soviet tanks behind the Japanese advance lines east of Changkufeng. He said the Russians had hauled back seventy others [on the night of 11 August]. . . . The writer was shown a barbed wire fence immediately behind a wrecked village on the west slope of Changkufeng which the general said the Soviet troops built at the beginning of the fighting. Possiet Bay also was pointed out, clearly visible across the swamp." Soviet losses for what became known as the battle of Lake Khasan for the Russians and the Changkufeng incident for the Japanese, totaled 792 killed or missing and 3,279 wounded or sick, according to Soviet records. The Japanese claimed to have destroyed or immobilized 96 enemy tanks and 30 guns. Soviet armored losses were significant, with dozens of tanks knocked out or destroyed and hundreds of "tank troops" becoming casualties. Japanese casualties, as revealed by secret Army General Staff statistics, were 1,439 casualties, 526 killed or missing, 913 wounded; the Soviets claimed Japanese losses of 3,100, with 600 killed and 2,500 wounded. The Soviets concluded that these losses were due in part to poor communications infrastructure and roads, as well as the loss of unit coherence caused by weak organization, headquarters, commanders, and a lack of combat-support units. The faults in the Soviet army and leadership at Khasan were blamed on the incompetence of Blyukher. In addition to leading the troops into action at Khasan, Blyukher was also supposed to oversee the trans-Baikal Military District's and the Far Eastern fronts' move to combat readiness, using an administrative apparatus that delivered army group, army, and corps-level instructions to the 40th Rifle Division by accident. On 22 October, he was arrested by the NKVD and is thought to have been tortured to death. At 15:35 on 11 August, in the Hill 52 sector, high-ranking military delegates bearing a white flag emerged from the Soviet lines and proceeded to Akahage Hill, about 100 meters from the Japanese positions. Cho, as right sector chief, was notified. He sent three lieutenants to converse with the Russians; they learned that the Soviets wanted the Japanese to designate a time and place for a conference. This word was conveyed to Suetaka, who had already dispatched Lieutenant Kozuki to the heights east of Shachaofeng to contact the Russians. Around 4:20, the commander canceled Kozuki's mission and instructed Cho to reply that the delegation ought to convene near the peak of Changkufeng at 18:00 Cho set out promptly with several subordinates; they reached the Changkufeng crest a little before 6. The Russians then said they wanted to meet the Japanese near the Crestline southeast of Changkufeng, the excuse being that the peak was too far for them to go and that they could not arrive by the designated time. Cho took his team to the location requested by the Russians. There, the Japanese found 13 Soviet soldiers and a heavy machine gun on guard, but the Russian delegates had not arrived, although it was 6:18. The irked Japanese clocked a further delay of two minutes before the Russian truce chief, Gen. Grigory M. Shtern, rode up on horseback with a party of eight. Both delegations saluted, the chiefs and team members identified themselves, and all shook hands. The Soviet team was made up of Corps General 3rd rank Shtern, 38, chief of staff, Far East area army; Brigade Commissar Semenovsky political major general, 37 or 38; Colonel Fedotev, 42; and Major Wabilev, about 30. Interpreting for the Russians was Alexei Kim. In Colonel Cho's opinion, "It was always necessary to take the initiative in dealing with the Soviets. So, even in such matters as shaking hands or conversing, he always did things first." During the exchange of greetings, Cho teased Shtern about his bandaged forehead. "A Japanese artillery shell got you, didn't it?" he asked. But Cho began formal discussions on a more dignified note: "Cho: It is very much to be regretted that the Japanese and Soviet armies had to get involved in combat around Changkufeng. Nevertheless, I laud the consummation of the Moscow accord on the part of both governments. And, I must say, your forces were quite brave and patriotic. Shtern: I agree with you. The Japanese Army, too, was courageous and strong." Negotiations would go on at the local level and diplomatic level for many days. In Tokyo, on the morning of 13 August, Ugaki had gone to the Meiji shrine to "report" on the cease-fire and to express his gratitude. At 10:00, when received in Imperial audience, he discussed the Changkufeng Incident. "I humbly regret to have troubled Your Majesty so unduly in connection with an unimportant affair on the Soviet-Manchurian frontier" at a time when the monarch was confronted by grave national problems. A long and winding road lay ahead before the incident as a whole was settled, but a good start had been made and "we are going to be even more careful in handling matters, although the Soviet regime consists of devious, vicious scoundrels." Recognition of the Japanese Army's performance was accorded by the highest authorities in the homeland. As soon as the fighting ceased, Kan'in transmitted a message of appreciation. The day after the cease-fire, the command in North Korea issued a generous communique: "We pay homage to the Japanese for defending themselves against 100 planes, 200 tanks, and 60 pieces of heavy artillery. Our admiration for the bravery of both armies is of the highest." At 14:00 on the 15th, Kan'in was received in audience and reported on the settlement of the crisis. Said the Emperor: "We are gratified by the fact that, during this incident at Changkufeng, Our officers and men achieved their mission fully and manifested prudence and forbearance while confronting difficult circumstances with small forces. Our profound condolences to the casualties. Convey this message to the officers and men." A wire was dispatched promptly to Nakamura. With Imperial use of the wording "Changkufeng Incident," the nomenclature for the affair was fixed in Japan. When the cabinet met on 16 August, the decision was reached officially. After the Changkufeng affair, Japanese officers claimed that the Soviets had dispatched tactical experts "to ascertain why their elite Far Eastern forces had not been able to achieve satisfactory results. They realize the urgency of this investigation in preparation for any great war." Specifically, the AGS heard that on the day of the cease-fire, Blyukher had sent an investigative team of commissars under Romanovsky to the scene. Japanese experts on the USSR speculated that the experience at Changkufeng ought indeed to have impressed the Red Army: "Our forces did seize the hill and hold it. After comparing the strengths involved ... the Russians may well have had to modify their estimates." According to one Japanese commentator, improvements in political leadership were judged imperative by the USSR, gainsaying claims that the Soviet Army had been strengthened through the purge of alleged Japanese tools. Soviet authorities would conclude "As a test of doctrine, the fighting had confirmed the correctness of the basic principles embodied in the 1936 Field Service Regulations." The Soviet infantry had paid dearly for this, as well as for the deficiencies in tactical training. Defense Commissar Voroshilov admitted, "We were not sufficiently quick in our tactics, and particularly in joint operations in dealing the enemy a concentrated blow." In the view of historian Mackintosh: "The Soviet success at Lake Khasan was bought at the cost of heavy casualties and exposed serious defects in the mobilization machinery and the training of troops. There can be little doubt that these factors checked to some extent the Soviet Government's overoptimistic estimate of its own military strength and cast doubt on the effectiveness of its policy of expansion in all fields of military organization". Writing a year and a half after Changkufeng, an Mainichi reporter observed that the greatest harvest from the incident was tangible Japanese experience in determining the fighting strength of the Russians. Purchased with blood, this knowledge could provide valuable evidence for future combat operations. It was a question whether Changkufeng really possessed such strategic significance as was claimed for it, but the Soviet policy of bluff could be interpreted as substantiating the weakness of the defenses of Vladivostok. "The Russians used all kinds of new weapons at Changkufeng and tipped their whole hand. But although mechanization of the Red Army had attained high levels with respect to quantity, their weaknesses in technique and quality were laid bare." Imaoka observed that since the Changkufeng Incident marked the first time that the Japanese and Soviet armies engaged each other in combat involving large strategic elements, divisional and above, Russian fighting strength was studied with keen interest. The Japanese did not rate the capacity of the officers or Soviet quality, in general, as especially high. Still, the Russians did possess quantitative abundance, and Japanese losses had been heavy because the enemy had fired masses of ammunition against fixed targets. Suetaka seemed to have comprehended the scope of tangible Soviet strength in equipment and materiel, as shown by his comment: "I felt deeply that if the gap in manpower went beyond limits, it would be inevitable for our casualties to increase tremendously; this might even cause us danger in specific local areas." Few Japanese officers saw anything new in Soviet tactical methods, although considerations of mass were ever-present. Not only intelligence experts but the whole army worked on ways of coping with Soviet forces that would have the numerical advantage by 3:1. Most awesome was the "fantastic abundance" of hostile materiel, although the Russians could not deploy to surround the Japanese because of the geography. An AGS expert on the USSR summed it up: "We learned that Soviet strength was up to expectations, whereas Japanese arms and equipment had to be improved and reinforced." Worded in a multiplicity of ways, the Japanese conclusion was that patient imperial forces had won a great victory by defending the contested border with flesh vs. steel and by limiting the Changkufeng Incident, till the end, against enemy hordes supported exclusively by planes and tanks. Japanese infantrymen admit that the combat soldiers did not savor their disadvantages. "All our materiel was inferior in quality and particularly in quantity. We had the impression that whereas we relied on muscle power, the enemy used engines. This rendered our fighting particularly hard, but we had full confidence in our spiritual strength [i.e., superiority]." Nevertheless, the Japanese mode of tactical operation, asserted Iwasaki, the Korea Army senior staff officer, was "the worst possible: fighting with hands tied." This meant that the Russians could fight "to their hearts' content," committing tanks and planes, and striking from all directions. A front-line infantry commander commented: "One's troops ought to be provided meaningful reasons for fighting and for dying happily. It is cruel to ask officers and men to meet masses of steel and to shed their blood without visible cause, and apparently because of inadequate combat preparations." The cease-fire agreement was concluded "at just the right time," General Morimoto admitted. A secret report prepared by AGS analysts sheds light on the larger question of what the army thought it had learned about itself and the Soviet enemy: "In studying Changkufeng, one ought to bear a number of cautions in mind: (1) The incident broke out when we were concentrating on the holy war against China; severe limitations on combat operations were imposed by the necessity to adhere to a policy of nonenlargement. (2) Apparently, the enemy also adopted a policy of localization while continuously attempting to recapture the high ground in the Changkufeng area. (3) Our forces employed units which were on Phase-1 alert from beginning to end; in terms of quality, the personnel were excellent—mainly active-duty types, from key men down. But our numbers were far inferior, and our organization and equipment were not of the best. In addition, we committed no planes or tanks, whereas the enemy used plenty. (4) The 19th Division was thorough, rigorous, and realistic in its combat training prior to the engagement. (5) Battlefield terrain seriously limited the enemy's attacks, especially tank action. But while the Tumen restricted assaults against our flanks and rear, it hampered our own services of supply, notably the provision of position construction materials." The Japanese learned few or erroneous lessons from the Changkufeng affair; the Kwantung Army, for example, was convinced that everything had been handled badly in 1938 by the Korea Army and the high command. When a dispute arose in 1939 at Nomonhan on another border lying between Outer Mongolia and Manchukuo, the staff in Hsinking fostered escalating measures. The USSR, however, learned in 1937 and 1938 that the Japanese Army seemed to respect only force. I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The Changkufeng incident or battle of Lake Khasan clash saw a fierce Soviet push against Japanese positions around Changkufeng and Hill 52. The cease-fire ended the incident, but not the conflict. Despite the brutal lessons learned by both sides, a much larger conflict would explode the next year that would alter both nations throughout WW2.
Episode Summary:In this episode of Explaining History, Nick takes a deep dive into the grim reality of the Soviet camp system. Drawing on Anne Applebaum's Gulag: A History, we explore how the camps evolved from disorganized prisons into a vast industrial complex of slave labour.We examine the "Great Terror" of 1937-38 not just as a political purge, but as a bureaucratic process driven by quotas and paranoia. Why did Stalin purge the very men—Yagoda, Yezhov, Berman—who built the Gulag system? How did the failure of forced industrialization lead to a search for scapegoats? And why were the death rates in the camps actually higher during the famine of 1932-33 and the war years than during the height of the political terror?Plus: A huge announcement for A-Level and IB History students! Nick unveils the dates for our upcoming live masterclasses on Russia, America, China, and Germany. Listen to the end for details on how to book your spot.Key Topics:The Great Terror: Why 1937-38 marked a watershed moment for the camps.Quotas of Death: How the NKVD assigned arrest targets to regions like production goals.The Purge of the Purgers: The downfall of the Gulag's founders.Clientelism and Paranoia: Why Stalin feared networks of loyalty within the Soviet bureaucracy.Books Mentioned:Gulag: A History by Anne ApplebaumEveryday Stalinism by Sheila FitzpatrickExplaining History helps you understand the 20th Century through critical conversations and expert interviews. We connect the past to the present. If you enjoy the show, please subscribe and share.▸ Support the Show & Get Exclusive ContentBecome a Patron: patreon.com/explaininghistory▸ Join the Community & Continue the ConversationFacebook Group: facebook.com/groups/ExplainingHistoryPodcastSubstack: theexplaininghistorypodcast.substack.com▸ Read Articles & Go DeeperWebsite: explaininghistory.org Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
HALIFAX, HITLER, AND THE SOVIET FEAR Colleague Charles Spicer. By late 1937, the Anglo-German Fellowship was under surveillance by both MI5 and the NKVD, as Stalin feared the organization might successfully broker an alliance between Britain and Germany against the Soviet Union. In November, Foreign Minister Lord Halifax visited the Berghof, where the cultural disconnect was so profound that he initially mistook Hitler for a footman. Although Halifax was appalled by Hitler's brutality—specifically his suggestion to shoot Gandhi to solve problems in India—he was momentarily fooled into believing Hitler did not want war. This meeting highlighted the dangerous gap between the civilized assumptions of British diplomacy and the predatory reality of the Nazi regime. NUMBER 8 1945-46 NUREMBERG
Programa completo en You Tube aquí: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=4jpTIKwHI68 ¿Te apetece hacer un viaje con nosotros a Normandía, Ardenas, El Alamein o Berlín? - Escríbenos a viajeshistoriasbelicas@gmail.com ▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬▬ Redes sociales y Telegram Canal de Telegram para No perderte Nada! https://t.me/segundaguerramundialtelegram Canal de Whatsapp https://whatsapp.com/channel/0029VaSmnrC0QeatgWe2Lm27 ¿Conoces la historia de los 11.000 soldados de Stalingrado que se negaron a rendirse tras la capitulación de Paulus y Strecker? ¿Cómo fue su final? ¿Por que siguieron luchando? ¿Qué hizo la NKVD soviética con ellas? Esta es su historia...
Před pár dny se roztrhl pytel s nostalgickými vzpomínkami některých politiků na Ludvíka Svobodu. Je na místě připomínat jen těch několik jeho světlých okamžiků a zamlčovat temná místa jeho kariéry? Netrpíme tu až příliš selektivní pamětí? Jaká byla role Svobody v roce 1945, pustil do armády agenty NKVD a nebyl to vlastně především snadno manipulovatelný politik?
Pokalbis su sportininke ir verslininke Roma Puišiene apie jos įspūdingą savaitę - 7 maratonai per 7 dienas 7 žemynuose ir visuose juose - pergalės.Pasirodė komiksas, pasakojantis apie 1945 m. vykusį Merkinės miestelio puolimą - partizanai, vadovaujami Adolfo Ramanausko- Vanago, siekė atkeršyti už draugų žūtį. Tada žuvo 5 partizanai, o priešas neteko 15 NKVD karių ir 7 stribų. Pokalbis su komikso „Kartą Merkinėje“ autoriais Aiste Petrauskiene ir Dovydu Čiupliu.Šįkart LRT „Ieškos sprendimų“ žurnalistai domisi, kaip mažinti jaunimo priklausomybę nuo ekranų ir socialinių tinklų. Amerikiečių šeima, kaip alternatyvą išmaniesiems telefonams, savo vaikams nupirko senuosius laidinius telefonus. Per metus tokius telefonus įsigijo dar bent trisdešimt netoliese gyvenančių šeimų. Iniciatyvos pradininkė Kerol Mors sako, kad laidiniai telefonai skatina bendravimą ir atsakomybės jausmą, o kartu padeda jaunuolėms išvengti išmaniųjų prietaisų keliamų rizikų.O kiek Lietuvoje dar populiarūs laidiniai telefonai? Kas jais naudojasi?Rusijos sportininkai galės dalyvauti dziudo varžybose su savo šalies vėliava - Tarptautinė dziudo federacija atšaukė neutralų statusą, kuris jiems buvo nustatytas po plataus masto karo prieš Ukrainą pradžios.Ved. Agnė Skamarakaitė
It's the last mission at Pashkovskaya and the Season Finale!! Nino and Dimi do their best to prepare for the NKVD's inevitable involvement at the next duty station while Rita tries desperately to say goodbye to a dear friend. Like it's the hardest thing she's ever done. Seriously. Special thanks to Matti Wells, Kevin DiFazio, Matthew Kastner, Chloe Familton, Will Cloud, Justin - The DM's Guide, GM Ashowan, Nate Scott Jones, Mars Sultar, lightningwing and someone who wished to remain anonymous - for providing additional mission pool points or "biscuits" for us to use in times of great peril (and bad rolls).Want to support the folks in the cockpit who are making this show happen?Tip us on Kofi, and follow us on social media https://linktr.ee/wingwomenpodGeneral CW: War/Military Themes and Violence, Language, Suggestive dialogue and situations.Timestamped CWs Suggestive situations/dialogue 1:28-1:35, 20:34-22:29, 25:08-25:23, 31:08-31:20Description of dead, decomposing bodies 3:48-4:03, 25:34-25:40, 26:31-28:35, 29:15-29:26Fly/Bug Sounds 3:48-4:03, 4:36-4:46, 26:31-26:46Illusions to mistreatment of queer individuals in Soviet Russia: 9:24-10:00, 11:21-12:18 Mention of bullet wound: 23:29-23:44Air Raid Siren: 29:46-30:10Bomb/Gun SX: 30:28-30:42, 31:25- 31:35, 32:33-32:45, 35:56-36:12Description of plane crash: 38:43-39:05, 39:15-41:57Mention of dead NPCs/lost friends: 42:17- 42:55 Hosted on Acast. See acast.com/privacy for more information.
Under Yezhov's leadership the NKVD launched a campaign of arrests targeting party members, military officers, and civilians that saw widespread purges, forced confessions, and executions. Estimates of those killed range into the hundreds of ...
Last time we spoke about the Changsha fire. Chiang Kai-shek faced a brutal choice: defend Wuhan to the last man or flood the land to slow the invaders. He chose both, pushing rivers and rallying a fractured army as Japanese forces pressed along the Yangtze. Fortresses at Madang held long, but the cost was high—troops lost, civilians displaced, a city's heart burning in the night. Wuhan fell after months of brutal fighting, yet the battle did not break China's will. Mao Zedong urged strategy over martyrdom, preferring to drain the enemy and buy time for a broader struggle. The Japanese, though victorious tactically, found their strength ebbing, resource strains, supply gaps, and a war that felt endless. In the wake of Wuhan, Changsha stood next in the Japanese crosshairs, its evacuation and a devastating fire leaving ash and memory in its wake. Behind these prices, political currents swirled. Wang Jingwei defected again, seeking power beyond Chiang's grasp, while Chongqing rose as a western bastion of resistance. The war hardened into a protracted stalemate, turning Japan from an aggressive assailant into a wary occupier, and leaving China to endure, persist, and fight on. #175 The Soviet-Japanese Border Conflicts Welcome to the Fall and Rise of China Podcast, I am your dutiful host Craig Watson. But, before we start I want to also remind you this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Perhaps you want to learn more about the history of Asia? Kings and Generals have an assortment of episodes on history of asia and much more so go give them a look over on Youtube. So please subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry for some more history related content, over on my channel, the Pacific War Channel where I cover the history of China and Japan from the 19th century until the end of the Pacific War. So based on the title of this one, you probably can see we are taking a bit of a detour. For quite some time we have focused on the Japanese campaigns into China proper 1937-1938. Now the way the second sino-japanese war is traditionally broken down is in phases. 1937-1938, 1939-1942 and 1942-1945. However there is actually even more going on in China aside from the war with Japan. In Xinjiang province a large full blown Islamic revolution breaks out in 1937. We will be covering that story at a later date, but another significant event is escalating border skirmishes in Manchukuo. Now these border skirmishes had been raging ever since the USSR consolidated its hold over the far east. We talked about some of those skirmishes prior to the Sino-Soviet war in 1929. However when Japan created the puppet government of Manchukuo, this was a significant escalation in tensions with the reds. Today we are going to talk about the escalating border conflicts between the Soviets and Japan. A tongue of poorly demarcated land extends southeast from Hunchun, hugging the east bank of the Tumen River between Lake Khasan to the east and Korea to the west. Within this tongue stands Changkufeng Hill, one of a long chain of highlands sweeping from upstream along the rivers and moors toward the sea. The twin-peaked hill sits at the confluence area several miles northwest of the point where Manchuria, Korea, and the Russian Far East meet. The hill's shape reminded Koreans of their changgo, which is a long snare drum constricted at the center and tapped with the hands at each end. When the Manchus came to the Tumen, they rendered the phonetic sounds into three ideographic characters meaning "taut drum peaks" or Chang-ku-feng. The Japanese admired the imagery and preserved the Chinese readings, which they pronounce Cho-ko-ho. From their eastern vantage, the Russians called it Zaozernaya, "hill behind the lake." Soviet troops referred to it as a sugar-loaf hill. For many years, natives and a handful of officials in the region cultivated a relaxed attitude toward borders and sovereignty. Even after the Japanese seized Manchuria in 1931, the issue did not immediately come to a head. With the expansion of Manchukuo and the Soviet Far East under Stalin's Five-Year plans, both sides began to attend more closely to frontier delimitation. Whenever either party acted aggressively, force majeure was invoked to justify the unexpected and disruptive events recognized in international law. Most often, these incidents erupted along the eastern Manchurian borders with the USSR or along the 350-mile frontier south of Lake Khanka, each skirmish carrying the seeds of all-out warfare. Now we need to talk a little bit about border history. The borders in question essentially dated to pacts concluded by the Qing dynasty and the Tsardom. Between the first Sino-Russian Treaty of Nerchinsk in 1689 and the Mukden Agreement of 1924, there were over a dozen accords governing the borders. Relevant to Changkufeng were the basic 15-article Convention of Peking, supplementing the Tientsin Treaties of November 1860, some maps made in 1861, and the eight-article Hunchun Border Protocol of 1886. By the 1860 treaty, the Qing ceded to Tsarist Russia the entire maritime province of Siberia, but the meaning of "lands south of Lake Khanka" remained rather vague. Consequently, a further border agreement was negotiated in June 1861 known as "the Lake Khanka Border Pact", by which demarcations were drawn on maps and eight wooden markers erected. The border was to run from Khanka along ridgelines between the Hunchun River and the sea, past Suifenho and Tungning, terminating about 6 miles from the mouth of the Tumen. Then a Russo-Chinese commission established in 1886 drew up the Hunchun Border Pact, proposing new or modified markers along the 1860–1861 lines and arranging a Russian resurvey. However, for the Japanese, in 1938, the Chinese or Manchu texts of the 1886 Hunchun agreement were considered controlling. The Soviets argued the border ran along every summit west of Khasan, thereby granting them jurisdiction over at least the eastern slopes of all elevations, including Changkufeng and Shachaofeng. Since the Qing dynasty and the house of Romanov were already defunct, the new sovereignties publicly appealed to opposing texts, and the Soviet side would not concede that the Russian-language version had never been deemed binding by the Qing commissioners. Yet, even in 1938, the Japanese knew that only the Chinese text had survived or could be located. Now both the Chinese and Russian military maps generally drew the frontier along the watershed east of Khasan; this aligned with the 1861 readings based on the Khanka agreement. The Chinese Republican Army conducted new surveys sometime between 1915 and 1920. The latest Chinese military map of the Changkufeng area drew the border considerably closer to the old "red line" of 1886, running west of Khasan but near the shore rather than traversing the highland crests. None of the military delimitations of the border was sanctified by an official agreement. Hence, the Hunchun Protocol, whether well known or not, invaluable or worthless, remained the only government-to-government pact dealing with the frontiers. Before we jump into it, how about a little summary of what became known as the Soviet-Japanese border conflicts. The first major conflict would obviously be the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-1905. Following years of conflict between the Russian Empire and Japan culminating in the costly Battle of Tsushima, Tsar Nicholas II's government sought peace, recognizing Japan's claims to Korea and agreeing to evacuate Manchuria. From 1918 to 1920, the Imperial Japanese Army, under Emperor Taishō after the death of Meiji, assisted the White Army and Alexander Kerensky against the Bolshevik Red Army. They also aided the Czechoslovak Legion in Siberia to facilitate its return to Europe after an Austrian-Hungarian armoured train purportedly went astray. By 1920, with Austria-Hungary dissolved and Czechoslovakia established two years earlier, the Czechoslovak Legion reached Europe. Japan withdrew from the Russian Revolution and the Civil War in 1922. Following Japan's 1919-1920 occupations and the Soviet intervention in Mongolia in 1921, the Republic of China also withdrew from Outer Mongolia in 1921. In 1922, after capturing Vladivostok in 1918 to halt Bolshevik advances, Japanese forces retreated to Japan as Bolshevik power grew and the postwar fatigue among combatants increased. After Hirohito's invasion of Manchuria in 1931–1932, following Taishō's death in 1926, border disputes between Manchukuo, the Mongolian People's Republic, and the Soviet Union increased. Many clashes stemmed from poorly defined borders, though some involved espionage. Between 1932 and 1934, the Imperial Japanese Army reported 152 border disputes, largely tied to Soviet intelligence activity in Manchuria, while the Soviets accused Japan of 15 border violations, six air intrusions, and 20 cases of "spy smuggling" in 1933 alone. Numerous additional violations followed in the ensuing years. By the mid-1930s, Soviet-Japanese diplomacy and trust had deteriorated further, with the Japanese being openly labeled "fascist enemies" at the Seventh Comintern Congress in July 1935. Beginning in 1935, conflicts significantly escalated. On 8 January 1935, the first armed clash, known as the Halhamiao incident, took place on the border between Mongolia and Manchukuo. Several dozen cavalrymen of the Mongolian People's Army crossed into Manchuria near disputed fishing grounds and engaged an 11‑man Manchukuo Imperial Army patrol near the Buddhist temple at Halhamiao, led by a Japanese military advisor. The Manchukuo Army sustained 6 wounded and 2 dead, including the Japanese officer; the Mongols suffered no casualties and withdrew after the Japanese sent a punitive expedition to reclaim the area. Two motorized cavalry companies, a machine‑gun company, and a tankette platoon occupied the position for three weeks without resistance. In June 1935, the first direct exchange of fire between the Japanese and Soviets occurred when an 11‑man Japanese patrol west of Lake Khanka was attacked by six Soviet horsemen, reportedly inside Manchukuo territory. In the firefight, one Soviet soldier was killed and two horses were captured. The Japanese requested a joint investigation, but the Soviets rejected the proposal. In October 1935, nine Japanese and 32 Manchukuoan border guards were establishing a post about 20 kilometers north of Suifenho when they were attacked by 50 Soviet soldiers. The Soviets opened fire with rifles and five heavy machine guns. Two Japanese and four Manchukuoan soldiers were killed, and another five were wounded. The Manchukuoan foreign affairs representative lodged a verbal protest with the Soviet consul at Suifenho. The Kwantung Army of Japan also sent an intelligence officer to investigate the clash. On 19 December 1935, a Manchukuoan unit reconnoitering southwest of Buir Lake clashed with a Mongolian party, reportedly capturing 10 soldiers. Five days later, 60 truck‑borne Mongolian troops assaulted the Manchukuoans and were repulsed, at the cost of three Manchukuoan dead. On the same day, at Brunders, Mongolian forces attempted three times to drive out Manchukuoan outposts, and again at night, but all attempts failed. Further small attempts occurred in January, with Mongolians using airplanes for reconnaissance. The arrival of a small Japanese force in three trucks helped foil these attempts; casualties occurred on both sides, though Mongolian casualties are unknown aside from 10 prisoners taken. In February 1936, Lieutenant-Colonel Sugimoto Yasuo was ordered to form a detachment from the 14th Cavalry Regiment to "drive the Outer Mongol intruders from the Olankhuduk region," a directive attributed to Lieutenant-General Kasai Heijuro. Sugimoto's detachment included cavalry guns, heavy machine guns, and tankettes. They faced a force of about 140 Mongolians equipped with heavy machine guns and light artillery. On February 12, Sugimoto's men drove the Mongolians south, at the cost of eight Japanese killed, four wounded, and one tankette destroyed. The Japanese began to withdraw, but were attacked by 5–6 Mongolian armored cars and two bombers, which briefly disrupted the column. The situation was stabilized when the Japanese unit received artillery support, allowing them to destroy or repel the armored cars. In March 1936, the Tauran incident occurred. In this clash, both the Japanese Army and the Mongolian Army deployed a small number of armored fighting vehicles and aircraft. The incident began when 100 Mongolian and six Soviet troops attacked and occupied the disputed village of Tauran, Mongolia, driving off the small Manchurian garrison. They were supported by light bombers and armored cars, though the bombing sorties failed to inflict damage on the Japanese, and three bombers were shot down by Japanese heavy machine guns. Local Japanese forces counter-attacked, conducting dozens of bombing sorties and finally assaulting Tauran with 400 men and 10 tankettes. The result was a Mongolian rout, with 56 Mongolian soldiers killed, including three Soviet advisors, and an unknown number wounded. Japanese losses were 27 killed and 9 wounded. Later in March 1936, another border clash occurred between Japanese and Soviet forces. Reports of border violations prompted the Japanese Korean Army to send ten men by truck to investigate, but the patrol was ambushed by 20 Soviet NKVD soldiers deployed about 300 meters inside territory claimed by Japan. After suffering several casualties, the Japanese patrol withdrew and was reinforced with 100 men, who then drove off the Soviets. Fighting resumed later that day when the NKVD brought reinforcements. By nightfall, the fighting had ceased and both sides had pulled back. The Soviets agreed to return the bodies of two Japanese soldiers who had died in the fighting, a development viewed by the Japanese government as encouraging. In early April 1936, three Japanese soldiers were killed near Suifenho in another minor affray. This incident was notable because the Soviets again returned the bodies of the fallen servicemen. In June 1937, the Kanchazu Island incident occurred on the Amur River along the Soviet–Manchukuo border. Three Soviet gunboats crossed the river's center line, disembarked troops, and occupied Kanchazu Island. Japanese forces from the IJA 1st Division, equipped with two horse-drawn 37 mm artillery pieces, quickly established improvised firing positions and loaded their guns with both high-explosive and armor-piercing shells. They shelled the Soviet vessels, sinking the lead gunboat, crippling the second, and driving off the third. Japanese troops subsequently fired on the swimming crewmen from the sunken ships using machine guns. Thirty-seven Soviet soldiers were killed, while Japanese casualties were zero. The Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs protested and demanded the Soviet forces withdraw from the island. The Soviet leadership, apparently shocked by the incident and reluctant to escalate, agreed to evacuate their troops. By 1938 the border situation had deteriorated. The tangled terrain features, mountain, bog, stream, forest, and valley, would have complicated even careful observers' discernment of the old red line drawn in 1886. Fifty years later, the markers themselves had undergone a metamorphosis. Japanese investigators could find, at most, only 14 to 17 markers standing fairly intact between the Tumen estuary and Khanka—roughly one every 25 miles at best. The remainder were missing or ruined; five were found in new locations. Marker "K," for example, was 40 meters deeper inside Manchuria, away from Khanka. Japanese military experts noted that of the 20 markers originally set along the boundaries of Hunchun Prefecture alone, only four could be found by the summer of 1938. The rest had either been wrecked or arbitrarily moved and discarded by Russian or Chinese officials and inhabitants. It is even said that one missing marker could be seen on display in Khabarovsk. The Chinese had generally interpreted the boundary as the road line just west of Khasan, at least in practice. Free road movement, however, had become a problem even 20 years before the Japanese overran Manchuria in 1931–1932 during the so-called Manchurian Incident. The Japanese adopted, or inherited, the Chinese interpretation, which was based on the 1886 agreement on border roads; the key clause held that the frontier west of Khasan would be the road along the lake. Japanese sources emphasize that local residents' anger toward gradual Soviet oppression and penetrations westward into Manchurian territory fueled the conflict. Many natives believed the original boundaries lay east of the lake, but the Soviets adjusted the situation to suit their own convenience. In practice, the Russians were restricting road use just west of Khasan by Manchurian and Korean residents. There was speculation that this was a prelude to taking over the ridgelines, depending on the reaction of the Manchukuoan–Japanese side. Villagers who went to streams or the lake to launder clothing found themselves subjected to sniper fire. Along a 25-mile stretch of road near Shachaofeng, farmers reported coming under fire from new Soviet positions as early as November 1935. Nevertheless, Japanese and Koreans familiar with the Tumen area noted agrarian, seasonal Korean religious rites atop Changkufeng Hill, including fattened pigs sacrificed and changgo drums beaten. Village elders told Japanese visitors in 1938 that, until early the preceding year, no Russians had come as far as Changkufeng Hill. Looking only at the border sector around Changkufeng, the easy days were clearly behind us. In the summer of 1938, Gaimusho "Foreign Ministry" observers described the explosive situation along the Korea–Manchuria–USSR borders as a matter of de facto frontiers. Both sides pressed against each other, and their trigger-happy posture was summed up in the colloquial refrain: "Take another step and we'll let you have it." Near dawn on 13 June 1938, a Manchurian patrol detected a suspicious figure in the fog swirling over Changlingtzu Hill on the Siberian–Manchurian frontier. Challenged at 15 feet, the suspect hurled two pistols to the ground and raised his hands in surrender. At headquarters, the police soon realized this was no routine border-trespassing case. The man was a defector and he was a Russian general, in fact he was the director of all NKVD forces in the Soviet Far East. Beneath a mufti of spring coat and hunting cap, he wore a full uniform with medals. His identification card No. 83 designated him as G. S. Lyushkov, Commissar 3rd Class, countersigned by Nikolai Yezhov, NKVD head in Moscow. Lyushkov was promptly turned over to the Japanese military authorities, who transferred him to Seoul and then to Tokyo under close escort. On 1 July, the Japanese press was permitted to disclose that Lyushkov had sought refuge in Japan. Ten days later, to capitalize on the commissar's notoriety and to confound skeptics, the Japanese produced Lyushkov at a press conference in Tokyo. For the Japanese and foreign correspondents, who met separately with him, Lyushkov described Soviet Far East strength and the turmoil wracking the USSR, because for those of you unfamiliar this was during the Stalinist purges. Clearly, the Japanese had gained a unique reservoir of high-level intelligence and a wealth of materials, including notes scratched in blood by suspects incarcerated at Khabarovsk. A general tightening of Russian frontier security had recently been reported. Natives of Fangchuanting asserted that a Soviet cavalry patrol appeared in June, seemingly for the first time. Contact with Yangkuanping, northwest of Khasan, was severed. More importantly, Japanese Army Signal Corps intelligence detected a surge of Soviet message traffic from the Posyet Bay district. After Lyushkov's defection, a drastic reshuffle in the local Russian command apparently occurred, and responsibility for border surveillance seems to have been reallocated. Japanese records indicate that the Novokievsk security force commander was relieved and the sector garrison replaced by troops from Vladivostok. Gaimusho intelligence also received reports that a border garrison unit had been transferred from Khabarovsk or Chita to the Tumen sector. The Kwantung Army signal monitors also intercepted two significant frontline messages on 6 July from the new Russian local commander in the Posyet region, addressed to Lieutenant General Sokolov in Khabarovsk. Decoded, the messages suggested (1) that ammunition for infantry mortars amounted to less than half the required supply; and (2) a recommendation that higher headquarters authorize Russian elements to secure certain unoccupied high ground west of Khasan. The commander noted terrain advantages and the contemplated construction of emplacements that would command Najin and the Korean railway. As a start, at least one Russian platoon should be authorized to dig in on the highest ground (presumably Changkufeng) and deploy four tons of entanglements to stake out the Soviet claim. Korea Army Headquarters received a telegram from the Kwantung Army on 7 July conveying the deciphered messages. On the same day, the 19th Division in North Korea telephoned Seoul that, on 6 July, three or four Soviet horsemen had been observed reconnoitering Manchurian territory from atop a hill called Changkufeng. The alarming intelligence from the Kwantung Army and the front warranted immediate attention by the Korea Army. Some Kwantung Army officers doubted the significance of the developments, with one intelligence official even suggesting the Russian messages might be a deliberate ploy designed to entrap the Japanese at Changkufeng. On 7–8 July, all staff officers in Seoul convened at army headquarters. The name of Changkufeng Hill was not well known, but maps and other data suggested that neither the Japanese nor the Russians had previously stationed border units in the ridge complex west of Khasan. As early as March 1936, Army Commander Koiso Kuniaki had distributed maps to subordinate units, indicating which sectors were in dispute. No patrol was to enter zones lacking definitive demarcation. Until then, the only Japanese element east of the Tumen was a Manchurian policeman at Fangchuanting. Ownership of the high ground emerged as an early issue. A number of other points were raised by the Kwantung Army: At present, Soviet elements in the area were negligible. The intrusion must not be overlooked. The Russians could be expected to exploit any weakness, and half-measures would not suffice, especially regarding the Japanese defense mission along a 125-mile frontier. In Japanese hands, Changkufeng Hill would be useful, but two excellent observation posts already existed in the neighboring sector of the Manchurian tongue. With dissidence and purges underway, the Russians may have judged it necessary to seal border gaps, particularly after Lyushkov's defection. They may also have sought to control Changkufeng to offset Japanese dominance of the high ground to the north. Soviet seizure of Changkufeng would upset the delicate status quo and could provoke a contest for equivalent observation posts. In broader terms, it mattered little whether the Russians sought a permanent observation post on Changkufeng Hill, which was of relatively minor strategic value. Japan's primary concern lay in the China theater; Changkufeng was peripheral. The Japanese should not expend limited resources or become distracted. The matter required consultation with the high command in Tokyo. In the absence of more comprehensive intelligence, the assembled staff officers concluded that the Korea Army should, at a minimum, ignore or disregard Soviet actions for the time being, while maintaining vigilant observation of the area. The consensus was communicated to Major General Kitano Kenzo, the Korea Army chief of staff, who concurred, and to Koiso. Upon learning that the recommendation advocated a low posture, Koiso inquired only whether the opinion reflected the unanimous view of the staff. Having been assured that it did, he approved the policy. Koiso, then 58, was at the threshold of the routine personnel changes occurring around 15 July. He had just been informed that he would retire and that General Nakamura Kotaro would succeed him. Those acquainted with Koiso perceived him as treating the border difficulties as a minor anticlimax in the course of his command tour. He appeared unemphatic or relaxed as he prepared to depart from a post he had held for twenty-one years. Although neither Koiso nor his staff welcomed the Soviet activities that appeared under way, his reaction likely reflected a reluctance to make decisions that could constrain his soon-to-arrive successor. On 8 July Koiso authorized the dispatch of warnings to the 19th Division at Nanam, to the Hunchun garrison, and to the intelligence branch at Hunchun. These units were instructed to exercise maximum precautions and to tighten frontier security north of Shuiliufeng. In response to the initial appearance of Soviet horsemen at Changkufeng, the Kucheng Border Garrison Unit of the 76th Infantry Regiment maintained close surveillance across the Tumen. By about noon on 9 July, patrols detected approximately a dozen Russian troops commencing construction atop Changkufeng. Between 11 and 13 July, the number of soldiers on the slopes increased to forty; there were also thirty horses and eleven camouflaged tents. Operating in shifts on the western side, thirty meters from the crest, the Russians erected barbed wire and firing trenches; fifty meters forward, they excavated observation trenches. In addition to existing telephone lines between Changkufeng, Lake Khasan, and Kozando, the Russians installed a portable telephone net. Logistical support was provided by three boats on the lake. Approximately twenty kilometers to the east, well within Soviet territory, large forces were being mobilized, and steamship traffic into Posyet Bay intensified. Upon learning of the "intrusion" at Changkufeng on 9 July, Lt. General Suetaka Kamezo, the commander of the 19th Division, dispatched staff officers to the front and prepared to send elements to reinforce border units. The special significance of Suetaka and his division stemmed from a series of unusual circumstances. Chientao Province, the same zone into which Lyushkov had fled and the sector where Soviet horsemen had appeared, fell within Manchukuo geographically and administratively. Yet, in terms of defense, the configuration of the frontier, the terrain, and the transportation network more closely connected the region with North Korea than with southeastern Manchuria. Approximately 80% of the population was of Korean origin, which implied Japanese rather than Manchukuoan allegiance. Consequently, the Korea Army had been made operationally responsible for the defense of Chientao and controlled not only the three-battalion garrison at Hunchun but also the intelligence detachment located there. In the event of war, the Korea Army's mission was defined as mobilization and execution of subsidiary operational tasks against the USSR, under the control and in support of the Kwantung Army. The Korea Army ordinarily possessed two infantry divisions, the 19th in North Korea and the 20th stationed at Seoul, but the 20th Division had already departed for China, leaving only the 20th Depot Division in the capital. Beyond sparse ground units, devoid of armor and with weak heavy artillery, there were only two air regiments in Korea, the nearest being the unit at Hoeryong. The Korea Army was designed to maintain public security within Korea as well as fulfill minimal defensive responsibilities. Such an army did not require a full-time operations officer, and none was maintained. When needed, as in mid-1938, the task fell to the senior staff officer, in this case Colonel Iwasaki Tamio. In peacetime, training constituted the primary focus. Thus, the 19th Division was entrusted with defending northeastern Korea. Its commander, Suetaka, a seasoned infantryman, resented the fact that his elite force had never engaged in combat in China. He intensified training with zeal, emphasizing strict discipline, bravery, aggressiveness, and thorough preparation. Japanese veterans characterized him as severe, bullish, short-tempered, hot-blooded, highly strung, unbending, and stubborn. Nonetheless, there was widespread respect for his realistic training program, maintained under firm, even violent, personal supervision. His men regarded Suetaka as a professional, a modern samurai who forged the division into superb condition. Privately, he was reputed for sensitivity and warmth; a Japanese phrase "yakamashii oyaji" captures the dual sense of stern father and martinet in his character. At the outset, however, Suetaka displayed little aggression. Although not widely known, he did not welcome the orders from army headquarters to deploy to the Tumen. Until late July, he remained somewhat opposed to the notion of dislodging the Soviets from the crest, a proposition arising from neither the division staff nor, initially, Suetaka himself. Colonel Sato noted that, for a week after reports of Soviet excavation at Changkufeng, the division's response was limited to preparations for a possible emergency, as they perceived the matter as a local issue best settled through diplomacy. Korea Army officers acknowledged that, around the time the Soviets consolidated their outpost strength at Changkufeng, an informal and personal telegram arrived in Seoul from a Kwantung Army Intelligence field-grade officer who specialized in Soviet affairs. If the Korea Army hesitated, the Kwantung Army would be obliged to eject the Russians; the matter could not be ignored. While the telegram did not demand a reply and struck several officers as presumptuous and implausible, the message was promptly shown to Koiso. Koiso was driven to immediate action, he wired Tokyo asserting that only the Korea Army could and would handle the incident. One staff officer recalled "We felt we had to act, out of a sense of responsibility. But we resented the Kwantung Army's interference." The Korea Army staff convened shortly after receipt of the unofficial telegram from Hsinking. Based on the latest intelligence from the division dated 13 July, the officers prepared an assessment for submission to the army commander. The hypotheses were distilled into three scenarios: The USSR, or the Far East authorities, desires hostilities. Conclusion: Slightly possible. The USSR seeks to restrain Japan on the eve of the pivotal operations in China: the major Japanese offensive to seize Hankow. Conclusion: Highly probable. The Posyet district commander is new in his post; by occupying the Changkufeng ridges, he would demonstrate loyalty, impress superiors, and seek glory. Conclusion: Possible. Late on 13 July or early on 14 July, Koiso approved the dispatch of a message to the vice minister of war, and the Kwantung Army chief of staff: "Lake Khasan area lies in troublesome sector USSR has been claiming . . . in accordance with treaties [said Secret Message No. 913], but we interpret it to be Manchukuoan territory, evident even from maps published by Soviet side. Russian actions are patently illegal, but, considering that area does not exert major or immediate influence on operations [Japan] is intending and that China Incident is in full swing, we are not going to conduct counterattack measures immediately. This army is thinking of reasoning with Soviets and requesting pullback, directly on spot. . . . In case Russians do not accede in long run, we have intention to drive Soviet soldiers out of area east of Khasan firmly by use of force." The message concluded with a request that the Tokyo authorities lodge a formal protest with the USSR, on behalf of Manchukuo and Japan, and guide matters so that the Russians would withdraw quickly. Dominant in Japanese high command thinking in 1938 was the China theater; the Changkufeng episode constituted a mere digression. A sequence of Japanese tactical victories had preceded the summer: Tsingtao fell in January; the Yellow River was reached in March; a "reformed government of the Republic of China" was installed at Nanking several weeks later; Amoy fell in early May; Suchow fell on the 20th. With these gains, northern and central fronts could be linked by the Japanese. Yet Chinese resistance persisted, and while public statements anticipated imminent Chinese dissension, private admissions acknowledged that the partial effects of Suchow's fall were ominous: control might pass from Chiang Kai-shek to the Communists, Chinese defiance might intensify, and Soviet involvement could ensue. A Hankow drive appeared desirable to symbolize the conclusion of the military phase of hostilities. The Japanese and their adversaries were in accord regarding the importance of the summer and autumn campaigns. Even after Suchow's fall, the government discouraged public insinuations that enemy resistance was collapsing; when Chiang addressed the nation on the first anniversary of hostilities, Premier Konoe prophetically proclaimed, "The war has just begun." Colonel Inada Masazum served as the Army General Staff's principal figure for the Changkufeng affair, occupying the position of chief of the 2nd Operations Section within the Operations Bureau in March 1938. A distinguished graduate of the Military Academy, Inada completed the War College program and held a combination of line, instructional, and staff assignments at the War College, the Army General Staff, and the War Ministry. He was recognized as a sharp, highly capable, and driveful personality, though some regarded him as enigmatic. Following the capture of Suchow, Imperial General Headquarters on 18 June ordered field forces to undertake operational preparations for a drive to seize the Wuhan complex. Inada favored a decisive move aimed at achieving a rapid political settlement. He acknowledged that Soviet intervention in 1938, during Japan's involvement in China, would have been critical. Although Japanese forces could still defeat the Chinese, an overextended Japanese Army might be fatally compromised against the Russians. Soviet assistance to China was already pronouncedly unwelcome. The Soviets were reported to possess roughly 20 rifle divisions, four to five cavalry divisions, 1,500 tanks, and 1,560 aircraft, including 300 bombers with a range of approximately 3,000 kilometers, enabling reach from Vladivostok to Tokyo. Soviet manpower in Siberia was likely near 370,000. In response, Japanese central authorities stressed a no-trouble policy toward the USSR while seeking to "wall off" the border and bolster the Kwantung Army as quickly as possible. Nevertheless, the envisaged correction of the strategic imbalance could not occur before 1943, given shortages in ammunition, manpower, and materiel across existing theaters in China. By the end of 1937 Japan had committed 16 of its 24 divisions to China, bringing the standing force to roughly 700,000. Army General Staff planners reallocated three ground divisions, intended for a northern contingency, from north to central China, even as the Kwantung Army operated from a less favorable posture. Attitudes toward the northern problem varied within senior military circles. While concern persisted, it was not universal. As campaigns in China widened, planning at the high command level deteriorated, propagating confusion and anxiety to field armies in China. The Japanese Navy suspected that the Army general staff was invoking the USSR as a pretext for broader strategic aims—namely, to provoke a more consequential confrontation with the USSR while the Navy contended with its own strategic rivalries with the Army, centered on the United States and Britain. Army leaders, however, denied aggressive intent against the USSR at that time. The Hankow plan encountered substantial internal opposition at high levels. Private assessments among army planners suggested that a two-front war would be premature given operational readiness and troop strength. Not only were new War Ministry officials cautious, but many high-ranking Army general staff officers and court circles shared doubts. Aggressive tendencies, influenced by subordinates and the Kwantung Army, were evident in Inada, who repeatedly pressed Tada Shun, the deputy army chief of staff, to endorse the Wuhan drive as both necessary and feasible, arguing that the USSR would gain from Japan's weakening without incurring substantial losses. Inada contended that Stalin was rational and that time favored the USSR in the Far East, where industrial buildup and military modernization were ongoing. He argued that the Soviet purges impeded opportunistic ventures with Japan. He posited that Nazi Germany posed a growing threat on the western front, and thus the USSR should be avoided by both Japan, due to China and Russia, due to Germany. While most of the army remained engaged in China, Tada did not initially share Inada's views; only after inspecting the Manchurian borders in April 1938 did he finally align with Inada's broader vision, which encompassed both northern and Chinese considerations. During this period, Inada studied daily intelligence from the Kwantung Army, and after Lyushkov's defection in June, reports suggested the Soviets were following their sector commander's recommendations. Russian troops appeared at Changkufeng, seemingly prepared to dig in. Inada recollects his reaction: "That's nice, my chance has come." I would like to take this time to remind you all that this podcast is only made possible through the efforts of Kings and Generals over at Youtube. Please go subscribe to Kings and Generals over at Youtube and to continue helping us produce this content please check out www.patreon.com/kingsandgenerals. If you are still hungry after that, give my personal channel a look over at The Pacific War Channel at Youtube, it would mean a lot to me. The simmering Soviet–Japanese border clashes centered on Changkufeng Hill near Lake Khanka, set within a broader history of contested frontiers dating to Qing and Tsarist treaties. Japan, prioritizing China, considered Changkufeng peripheral but ready to confront Soviet encroachment; Moscow aimed to consolidate border gains, with high-level war planning overlaying regional skirmishes. Conflict loomed over Manchuria.
Le 13 juin 1957, à New York, les agents de FBI sont sur le point de mettre un terme à quatre ans d'enquête. Vers 22h00, un homme âgé d'une cinquantaine d'années, corpulence moyenne, cheveux gris fins, vient de commettre l'erreur d'allumer les lumières de son logement. Depuis deux semaines, cet appartement typique du quartier de Brooklyn, est soupçonné d'abriter l'un des espions russes les plus dangereux du moment. Les informations qu'il détient pourraient mettre en péril la défense du pays. Lorsqu'ils l'aperçoivent à sa fenêtre, les agents n'ont plus aucun doute. C'est bien ce fameux Mark, alias Rudolf Abel... Ou s'agit-il plutôt d'un autre espion, William Fisher ?Secrets d'agents • Histoires Vraies est une production Minuit.
Le 13 juin 1957, à New York, les agents de FBI sont sur le point de mettre un terme à quatre ans d'enquête. Vers 22h00, un homme âgé d'une cinquantaine d'années, corpulence moyenne, cheveux gris fins, vient de commettre l'erreur d'allumer les lumières de son logement. Depuis deux semaines, cet appartement typique du quartier de Brooklyn, est soupçonné d'abriter l'un des espions russes les plus dangereux du moment. Les informations qu'il détient pourraient mettre en péril la défense du pays. Lorsqu'ils l'aperçoivent à sa fenêtre, les agents n'ont plus aucun doute. C'est bien ce fameux Mark, alias Rudolf Abel... Ou s'agit-il plutôt d'un autre espion, William Fisher ?Häyhänen a tout intérêt à fournir des informations pertinentes aux autorités américaines. Le FBI ne le sait pas, mais s'il retourne à Moscou, il risque très gros. Pendant son séjour à New York, le comportement de l'agent laisse à désirer. Secrets d'agents • Histoires Vraies est une production Minuit.
Le 13 juin 1957, à New York, les agents de FBI sont sur le point de mettre un terme à quatre ans d'enquête. Vers 22h00, un homme âgé d'une cinquantaine d'années, corpulence moyenne, cheveux gris fins, vient de commettre l'erreur d'allumer les lumières de son logement. Depuis deux semaines, cet appartement typique du quartier de Brooklyn, est soupçonné d'abriter l'un des espions russes les plus dangereux du moment. Les informations qu'il détient pourraient mettre en péril la défense du pays. Lorsqu'ils l'aperçoivent à sa fenêtre, les agents n'ont plus aucun doute. C'est bien ce fameux Mark, alias Rudolf Abel... Ou s'agit-il plutôt d'un autre espion, William Fisher ?Tout commence à Brooklyn, dans la soirée du 22 juin 1953, lors de la tournée de Jimmy Bozart, un jeune livreur de journaux de 14 ans. Ce soir-là, il doit livrer le Brooklyn Eagle à deux institutrices résidentes au sixième étage du 3403 Foster Avenue. Il n'y a pas d'ascenseur, mais ses efforts sont toujours récompensés par un pourboire de 15 cents...Secrets d'agents • Histoires Vraies est une production Minuit.
En este video exploramos la vida y el papel histórico de Nikolai Yezhov, jefe de la NKVD (la policía secreta soviética) durante los años más oscuros de la Unión Soviética. Conocido como el “Enano Sanguinario”, Yezhov fue uno de los principales responsables de la Gran Purga de, donde millones de personas fueron arrestadas, deportadas o ejecutadas bajo órdenes directas de Stalin.
Agradece a este podcast tantas horas de entretenimiento y disfruta de episodios exclusivos como éste. ¡Apóyale en iVoox! En 1936, el Gobierno republicano de Francisco Largo Caballero decidió trasladar 510 toneladas de oro (el 72% de las reservas del Banco de España) a la URSS. El objetivo era protegerlas del avance de los sublevados y pagar con ello el armamento y los suministros de una guerra que ya presumían larga. La situación era muy delicada. La República se encontraba aislada por la decisión de franceses y británicos de no intervenir, lo que dejó el campo libre a Stalin, que utilizó la guerra de España para expandir su influencia y hacer un excelente negocio. Los sublevados, apoyados por Alemania e Italia, se colocaron en apenas dos meses en las puertas de Madrid y las tensiones internas entre facciones republicanas complicaban la situación. El Gobierno temía que el oro cayese en manos de Franco y se trataba de una cantidad considerable, nada menos que la cuarta reserva más grande del mundo. Su tamaño se debía a la neutralidad de España en la primera guerra mundial. Pero no regresó una sola onza, lo que desató poco después un encendido debate sobre si fue una medida necesaria o un robo. El traslado, organizado por Juan Negrín, se realizó en secreto en septiembre de 1936. El oro salió de Madrid hacia Cartagena, luego a Odesa en cargueros soviéticos, y finalmente a Moscú, donde fue custodiado bajo supervisión de la NKVD. Entre 1937 y 1938, se vendieron 473 toneladas para pagar armas. El Gobierno de la URSS se aprovechó de tener el oro en su territorio para cobrar comisiones por la gestión y aplicar sobreprecios en los envíos de armas y municiones. Eso y que el Gobierno republicano estaba muy necesitada para sostener el esfuerzo de guerra hizo que el tesoro durase poco más de un año El franquismo calificó el traslado como un robo, aunque, eso sí, la República envió el oro voluntariamente y se encargó de ir vendiéndolo entre 1937 y 1938. Las reclamaciones posteriores no prosperaron. Los archivos soviéticos, abiertos en 1991, confirmaron que el oro se usó para financiar la guerra. A pesar de ello, este episodio sigue generando polémica, lo que viene a recordarnos que muchos aún interpretan todo lo que sucedió en la guerra civil en clave presente como si hubiese ayer. · Canal de Telegram: https://t.me/lacontracronica · “Contra el pesimismo”… https://amzn.to/4m1RX2R · “Hispanos. Breve historia de los pueblos de habla hispana”… https://amzn.to/428js1G · “La ContraHistoria del comunismo”… https://amzn.to/39QP2KE · “La ContraHistoria de España. Auge, caída y vuelta a empezar de un país en 28 episodios”… https://amzn.to/3kXcZ6i · “Contra la Revolución Francesa”… https://amzn.to/4aF0LpZ · “Lutero, Calvino y Trento, la Reforma que no fue”… https://amzn.to/3shKOlK Apoya La Contra en: · Patreon... https://www.patreon.com/diazvillanueva · iVoox... https://www.ivoox.com/podcast-contracronica_sq_f1267769_1.html · Paypal... https://www.paypal.me/diazvillanueva Sígueme en: · Web... https://diazvillanueva.com · Twitter... https://twitter.com/diazvillanueva · Facebook... https://www.facebook.com/fernandodiazvillanueva1/ · Instagram... https://www.instagram.com/diazvillanueva · Linkedin… https://www.linkedin.com/in/fernando-d%C3%ADaz-villanueva-7303865/ · Flickr... https://www.flickr.com/photos/147276463@N05/?/ · Pinterest... https://www.pinterest.com/fernandodiazvillanueva Encuentra mis libros en: · Amazon... https://www.amazon.es/Fernando-Diaz-Villanueva/e/B00J2ASBXM #FernandoDiazVillanueva #guerracivil Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals
Agradece a este podcast tantas horas de entretenimiento y disfruta de episodios exclusivos como éste. ¡Apóyale en iVoox! En 1936, el Gobierno republicano de Francisco Largo Caballero decidió trasladar 510 toneladas de oro (el 72% de las reservas del Banco de España) a la URSS. El objetivo era protegerlas del avance de los sublevados y pagar con ello el armamento y los suministros de una guerra que ya presumían larga. La situación era muy delicada. La República se encontraba aislada por la decisión de franceses y británicos de no intervenir, lo que dejó el campo libre a Stalin, que utilizó la guerra de España para expandir su influencia y hacer un excelente negocio. Los sublevados, apoyados por Alemania e Italia, se colocaron en apenas dos meses en las puertas de Madrid y las tensiones internas entre facciones republicanas complicaban la situación. El Gobierno temía que el oro cayese en manos de Franco y se trataba de una cantidad considerable, nada menos que la cuarta reserva más grande del mundo. Su tamaño se debía a la neutralidad de España en la primera guerra mundial. Pero no regresó una sola onza, lo que desató poco después un encendido debate sobre si fue una medida necesaria o un robo. El traslado, organizado por Juan Negrín, se realizó en secreto en septiembre de 1936. El oro salió de Madrid hacia Cartagena, luego a Odesa en cargueros soviéticos, y finalmente a Moscú, donde fue custodiado bajo supervisión de la NKVD. Entre 1937 y 1938, se vendieron 473 toneladas para pagar armas. El Gobierno de la URSS se aprovechó de tener el oro en su territorio para cobrar comisiones por la gestión y aplicar sobreprecios en los envíos de armas y municiones. Eso y que el Gobierno republicano estaba muy necesitada para sostener el esfuerzo de guerra hizo que el tesoro durase poco más de un año El franquismo calificó el traslado como un robo, aunque, eso sí, la República envió el oro voluntariamente y se encargó de ir vendiéndolo entre 1937 y 1938. Las reclamaciones posteriores no prosperaron. Los archivos soviéticos, abiertos en 1991, confirmaron que el oro se usó para financiar la guerra. A pesar de ello, este episodio sigue generando polémica, lo que viene a recordarnos que muchos aún interpretan todo lo que sucedió en la guerra civil en clave presente como si hubiese ayer. · Canal de Telegram: https://t.me/lacontracronica · “Contra el pesimismo”… https://amzn.to/4m1RX2R · “Hispanos. Breve historia de los pueblos de habla hispana”… https://amzn.to/428js1G · “La ContraHistoria del comunismo”… https://amzn.to/39QP2KE · “La ContraHistoria de España. Auge, caída y vuelta a empezar de un país en 28 episodios”… https://amzn.to/3kXcZ6i · “Contra la Revolución Francesa”… https://amzn.to/4aF0LpZ · “Lutero, Calvino y Trento, la Reforma que no fue”… https://amzn.to/3shKOlK Apoya La Contra en: · Patreon... https://www.patreon.com/diazvillanueva · iVoox... https://www.ivoox.com/podcast-contracronica_sq_f1267769_1.html · Paypal... https://www.paypal.me/diazvillanueva Sígueme en: · Web... https://diazvillanueva.com · Twitter... https://twitter.com/diazvillanueva · Facebook... https://www.facebook.com/fernandodiazvillanueva1/ · Instagram... https://www.instagram.com/diazvillanueva · Linkedin… https://www.linkedin.com/in/fernando-d%C3%ADaz-villanueva-7303865/ · Flickr... https://www.flickr.com/photos/147276463@N05/?/ · Pinterest... https://www.pinterest.com/fernandodiazvillanueva Encuentra mis libros en: · Amazon... https://www.amazon.es/Fernando-Diaz-Villanueva/e/B00J2ASBXM #FernandoDiazVillanueva #guerracivil Escucha el episodio completo en la app de iVoox, o descubre todo el catálogo de iVoox Originals
In this two-part True Spies story, author and journalist Shaun Walker unmasks the greatest generation of Russian spies - the Great Illegals. In Part Two, Shaun tells the story of Iosif Grigulevich - the Lithuanian Illegal who rose to the upper echelons of Italy's diplomatic community. From SPYSCAPE, the home of secrets. A Cup And Nuzzle production. Series producer: Joe Foley. Produced by Frank Palmer. Shaun Walker is the Central and Eastern Europe correspondent for The Guardian newspaper. He is the author of The Illegals: Russia's Most Audacious Spies and Their Century-Long Mission to Infiltrate the West. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
In this two-part True Spies story, author and journalist Shaun Walker unmasks the greatest generation of Russian spies - the Great Illegals. In Part One, Shaun tells the story of Nikolai Khokhlov - the music-hall 'whistler' turned deep-cover spy in Nazi-occupied Belarus. From SPYSCAPE, the home of secrets. A Cup And Nuzzle production. Series producer: Joe Foley. Produced by Frank Palmer. Shaun Walker is the Central and Eastern Europe correspondent for The Guardian newspaper. He is the author of The Illegals: Russia's Most Audacious Spies and Their Century-Long Mission to Infiltrate the West. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices
In today's war diary, Alexander Shelest and Alexey Arestovich discussed the main news on the 1236th day of war:814,299 views Streamed live on Jul 16, 2025➤ 00:00 Conversation format. Poll: Why does Zelensky need a new Cabinet of Ministers? — Feels like it's falling apart.➤ 04:36 The meaning and goals of Zelensky's re-shuffle.➤ 09:26 Umerov got off easy?➤ 10:53 Sviridenko — a good prime minister?➤ 13:28 Zelensky: Trump will be able to end the war. Is Putin afraid of the return of military personnel to Russia?➤ 17:20 The story with fakes about Trump.➤ 18:45 Proxy war between Israel and Turkey?➤ 25:20 Will the Russians regret not agreeing to a ceasefire, as the war is moving to their territory?➤ 33:00 Russia was given another 50 days to fight.➤ 35:10 Ukraine is incapable of long-term systemic efforts against Russia.➤ 38:27 Lviv is ready to exchange the remains of NKVD agents for Ukrainian defenders…➤ 44:44 Death of a man with a Hungarian passport in Ukraine. Orban: Ukraine cannot be a member of the EU if their drafting commission is practicing "people-catching".Olexiy Arestovych (Kiev): Advisor to the Office of Ukraine President : https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oleksiy_ArestovychOfficial channel: https://www.youtube.com/channel/UCjWy2g76QZf7QLEwx4cB46gAlexander Shelest - Ukranian journalist. Youtube: @a.shelest Telegram: https://t.me/shelestlive
World War II as an Identity Project (Ibidem, 2022) explores the relationship between history, legitimacy, and violence in the building and breaking of nations and states on the territory of contemporary Ukraine during the Second World War and in its aftermath. At its center are various institutions of the Soviet state. Other states and rival political movements also enter the picture insofar as their acitivities influenced Soviet policies. Methodologically, the study shifts attention from a limited body of normative texts and their creators within the Soviet political and cultural elite to a wider array of practices, organizations, and players engaged in power struggles and production of knowledge about the past in different social domains. Specifically, it brings into focus groups not normally thought of as participants in the production of Soviet memory discourse, notably NKVD officers, Soviet archivists, Ukrainian nationalists, Nazi collaborators, and former partisans in the German-occupied territories. The book not only demonstrates the complexity of nation-shaping processes, but also restores agency to some seemingly powerless actors. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/military-history
World War II as an Identity Project (Ibidem, 2022) explores the relationship between history, legitimacy, and violence in the building and breaking of nations and states on the territory of contemporary Ukraine during the Second World War and in its aftermath. At its center are various institutions of the Soviet state. Other states and rival political movements also enter the picture insofar as their acitivities influenced Soviet policies. Methodologically, the study shifts attention from a limited body of normative texts and their creators within the Soviet political and cultural elite to a wider array of practices, organizations, and players engaged in power struggles and production of knowledge about the past in different social domains. Specifically, it brings into focus groups not normally thought of as participants in the production of Soviet memory discourse, notably NKVD officers, Soviet archivists, Ukrainian nationalists, Nazi collaborators, and former partisans in the German-occupied territories. The book not only demonstrates the complexity of nation-shaping processes, but also restores agency to some seemingly powerless actors. Learn more about your ad choices. Visit megaphone.fm/adchoices Support our show by becoming a premium member! https://newbooksnetwork.supportingcast.fm/new-books-network
Send us a textToday, we cover the third Moscow Show Trial based on the actual transcript, translated into English.Support the show
Cutting Through the Matrix with Alan Watt Podcast (.xml Format)
--{ "Public Persuasion, Ain't It Amazin'"}-- Era of Change, Industrial Revolution, New World Order - Planned Society, Genetic Enhancement - Control of the Mind, Authority Over Life and Death - Terrorism, War on World. Foundation Fronts - Intergenerational Planning, Fanaticism - French Revolution, Depopulation Programs, United Nations - Darwin, Huxley Family, Eugenics - UN Treaties. Public Relations, Predictive Programming - Internet, Information Wars - Marketing, Psychology - Beria of NKVD, Upgraded Scientific Indoctrination. Pentagon and Military "Education" (Propaganda) - "Extremist" Groups - Pentagon Media, Psychological Operations, "Winning Hearts and Minds". Soviet System, Merger with West - Green Party - Britain, Sammy Wilson, Climate Change Adverts - Parroted Terminology - Planetary Takeover, Regulation. "Free Flow of Capital and Labor" - Restricted Travel (Essential Only) - Agenda 21. Loyola Science Meetings, Brain Chips and Public Acceptance, Novels, Cartoons, "Final Cut" movie. Australia, Chip Implantation, Surveillance - Microchipped Animals, VeriChip - Human "Black Box", Tracking.
HOW STALIN'S NKVD MANAGED THE INFORMATION WAR, 1941-45: 5/8: The Red Hotel: Moscow 1941, the Metropol Hotel, and the Untold Story of Stalin's Propaganda War by Alan Philps (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Hotel-Metropol-Stalins-Propaganda/dp/1639364277/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= In 1941, when German armies were marching towards Moscow, Lenin's body was moved from his tomb on Red Square and taken to Siberia. By 1945, a victorious Stalin had turned a poor country into a victorious superpower. Over the course of those four years, Stalin, at Churchill's insistence, accepted an Anglo-American press corps in Moscow to cover the Eastern Front. To turn these reporters into Kremlin mouthpieces, Stalin imposed the most draconian controls – unbending censorship, no visits to the battle front, and a ban on contact with ordinary citizens. The Red Hotel explores this gilded cage of the Metropol Hotel. They enjoyed lavish supplies of caviar and had their choice of young women to employ as translators and share their beds. On the surface, this regime served Stalin well: his plans to control Eastern Europe as a Sovietised ‘outer empire' were never reported and the most outrageous Soviet lies went unchallenged.1918 REVOLUTION
HOW STALIN'S NKVD MANAGED THE INFORMATION WAR, 1941-45: 7/8: The Red Hotel: Moscow 1941, the Metropol Hotel, and the Untold Story of Stalin's Propaganda War by Alan Philps (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Hotel-Metropol-Stalins-Propaganda/dp/1639364277/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= In 1941, when German armies were marching towards Moscow, Lenin's body was moved from his tomb on Red Square and taken to Siberia. By 1945, a victorious Stalin had turned a poor country into a victorious superpower. Over the course of those four years, Stalin, at Churchill's insistence, accepted an Anglo-American press corps in Moscow to cover the Eastern Front. To turn these reporters into Kremlin mouthpieces, Stalin imposed the most draconian controls – unbending censorship, no visits to the battle front, and a ban on contact with ordinary citizens. The Red Hotel explores this gilded cage of the Metropol Hotel. They enjoyed lavish supplies of caviar and had their choice of young women to employ as translators and share their beds. On the surface, this regime served Stalin well: his plans to control Eastern Europe as a Sovietised ‘outer empire' were never reported and the most outrageous Soviet lies went unchallenged.1900 RUSSIA
HOW STALIN'S NKVD MANAGED THE INFORMATION WAR, 1941-45: 6/8: The Red Hotel: Moscow 1941, the Metropol Hotel, and the Untold Story of Stalin's Propaganda War by Alan Philps (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Hotel-Metropol-Stalins-Propaganda/dp/1639364277/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= In 1941, when German armies were marching towards Moscow, Lenin's body was moved from his tomb on Red Square and taken to Siberia. By 1945, a victorious Stalin had turned a poor country into a victorious superpower. Over the course of those four years, Stalin, at Churchill's insistence, accepted an Anglo-American press corps in Moscow to cover the Eastern Front. To turn these reporters into Kremlin mouthpieces, Stalin imposed the most draconian controls – unbending censorship, no visits to the battle front, and a ban on contact with ordinary citizens. The Red Hotel explores this gilded cage of the Metropol Hotel. They enjoyed lavish supplies of caviar and had their choice of young women to employ as translators and share their beds. On the surface, this regime served Stalin well: his plans to control Eastern Europe as a Sovietised ‘outer empire' were never reported and the most outrageous Soviet lies went unchallenged.1911 BORODINO
HOW STALIN'S NKVD MANAGED THE INFORMATION WAR, 1941-45: 8/8: The Red Hotel: Moscow 1941, the Metropol Hotel, and the Untold Story of Stalin's Propaganda War by Alan Philps (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Hotel-Metropol-Stalins-Propaganda/dp/1639364277/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= In 1941, when German armies were marching towards Moscow, Lenin's body was moved from his tomb on Red Square and taken to Siberia. By 1945, a victorious Stalin had turned a poor country into a victorious superpower. Over the course of those four years, Stalin, at Churchill's insistence, accepted an Anglo-American press corps in Moscow to cover the Eastern Front. To turn these reporters into Kremlin mouthpieces, Stalin imposed the most draconian controls – unbending censorship, no visits to the battle front, and a ban on contact with ordinary citizens. The Red Hotel explores this gilded cage of the Metropol Hotel. They enjoyed lavish supplies of caviar and had their choice of young women to employ as translators and share their beds. On the surface, this regime served Stalin well: his plans to control Eastern Europe as a Sovietised ‘outer empire' were never reported and the most outrageous Soviet lies went unchallenged.1917 KREMLIN
HOW STALIN'S NKVD MANAGED THE INFORMATION WAR, 1941-45: 4/8: The Red Hotel: Moscow 1941, the Metropol Hotel, and the Untold Story of Stalin's Propaganda War by Alan Philps (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Hotel-Metropol-Stalins-Propaganda/dp/1639364277/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= In 1941, when German armies were marching towards Moscow, Lenin's body was moved from his tomb on Red Square and taken to Siberia. By 1945, a victorious Stalin had turned a poor country into a victorious superpower. Over the course of those four years, Stalin, at Churchill's insistence, accepted an Anglo-American press corps in Moscow to cover the Eastern Front. To turn these reporters into Kremlin mouthpieces, Stalin imposed the most draconian controls – unbending censorship, no visits to the battle front, and a ban on contact with ordinary citizens. The Red Hotel explores this gilded cage of the Metropol Hotel. They enjoyed lavish supplies of caviar and had their choice of young women to employ as translators and share their beds. On the surface, this regime served Stalin well: his plans to control Eastern Europe as a Sovietised ‘outer empire' were never reported and the most outrageous Soviet lies went unchallenged.1914
HOW STALIN'S NKVD MANAGED THE INFORMATION WAR, 1941-45: 3/8: The Red Hotel: Moscow 1941, the Metropol Hotel, and the Untold Story of Stalin's Propaganda War by Alan Philps (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Hotel-Metropol-Stalins-Propaganda/dp/1639364277/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= In 1941, when German armies were marching towards Moscow, Lenin's body was moved from his tomb on Red Square and taken to Siberia. By 1945, a victorious Stalin had turned a poor country into a victorious superpower. Over the course of those four years, Stalin, at Churchill's insistence, accepted an Anglo-American press corps in Moscow to cover the Eastern Front. To turn these reporters into Kremlin mouthpieces, Stalin imposed the most draconian controls – unbending censorship, no visits to the battle front, and a ban on contact with ordinary citizens. The Red Hotel explores this gilded cage of the Metropol Hotel. They enjoyed lavish supplies of caviar and had their choice of young women to employ as translators and share their beds. On the surface, this regime served Stalin well: his plans to control Eastern Europe as a Sovietised ‘outer empire' were never reported and the most outrageous Soviet lies went unchallenged 1945 POLISH ARMY
HOW STALIN'S NKVD MANAGED THE INFORMATION WAR, 1941-45: 2/8: The Red Hotel: Moscow 1941, the Metropol Hotel, and the Untold Story of Stalin's Propaganda War by Alan Philps (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Hotel-Metropol-Stalins-Propaganda/dp/1639364277/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= In 1941, when German armies were marching towards Moscow, Lenin's body was moved from his tomb on Red Square and taken to Siberia. By 1945, a victorious Stalin had turned a poor country into a victorious superpower. Over the course of those four years, Stalin, at Churchill's insistence, accepted an Anglo-American press corps in Moscow to cover the Eastern Front. To turn these reporters into Kremlin mouthpieces, Stalin imposed the most draconian controls – unbending censorship, no visits to the battle front, and a ban on contact with ordinary citizens. The Red Hotel explores this gilded cage of the Metropol Hotel. They enjoyed lavish supplies of caviar and had their choice of young women to employ as translators and share their beds. On the surface, this regime served Stalin well: his plans to control Eastern Europe as a Sovietised ‘outer empire' were never reported and the most outrageous Soviet lies went unchallenged.1945
HOW STALIN'S NKVD MANAGED THE INFORMATION WAR, 1941-45: 1/8: The Red Hotel: Moscow 1941, the Metropol Hotel, and the Untold Story of Stalin's Propaganda War by Alan Philps (Author) https://www.amazon.com/Red-Hotel-Metropol-Stalins-Propaganda/dp/1639364277/ref=tmm_hrd_swatch_0?_encoding=UTF8&qid=&sr= In 1941, when German armies were marching towards Moscow, Lenin's body was moved from his tomb on Red Square and taken to Siberia. By 1945, a victorious Stalin had turned a poor country into a victorious superpower. Over the course of those four years, Stalin, at Churchill's insistence, accepted an Anglo-American press corps in Moscow to cover the Eastern Front. To turn these reporters into Kremlin mouthpieces, Stalin imposed the most draconian controls – unbending censorship, no visits to the battle front, and a ban on contact with ordinary citizens. The Red Hotel explores this gilded cage of the Metropol Hotel. They enjoyed lavish supplies of caviar and had their choice of young women to employ as translators and share their beds. On the surface, this regime served Stalin well: his plans to control Eastern Europe as a Sovietised ‘outer empire' were never reported and the most outrageous Soviet lies went unchallenged.1945
Rick Spence is a historian specializing in the history of intelligence agencies, espionage, secret societies, conspiracies, the occult, and military history. Thank you for listening ❤ Check out our sponsors: https://lexfridman.com/sponsors/ep451-sc See below for timestamps, transcript, and to give feedback, submit questions, contact Lex, etc. Transcript: https://lexfridman.com/rick-spence-transcript CONTACT LEX: Feedback - give feedback to Lex: https://lexfridman.com/survey AMA - submit questions, videos or call-in: https://lexfridman.com/ama Hiring - join our team: https://lexfridman.com/hiring Other - other ways to get in touch: https://lexfridman.com/contact EPISODE LINKS: Rick's Website: https://www.uidaho.edu/class/history/faculty-staff/richard-spence Rick's Courses: https://bit.ly/40dIZbw SPONSORS: To support this podcast, check out our sponsors & get discounts: AG1: All-in-one daily nutrition drinks. Go to https://drinkag1.com/lex NetSuite: Business management software. Go to http://netsuite.com/lex BetterHelp: Online therapy and counseling. Go to https://betterhelp.com/lex MasterClass: Online classes from world-class experts. Go to https://masterclass.com/lexpod Shopify: Sell stuff online. Go to https://shopify.com/lex OUTLINE: (00:00) - Introduction (09:04) - KGB and CIA (23:21) - Okhrana, Cheka, NKVD (38:53) - CIA spies vs KGB spies (45:29) - Assassinations and mind control (52:23) - Jeffrey Epstein (59:15) - Bohemian Grove (1:11:09) - Occultism (1:22:20) - Nazi party and Thule society (2:02:38) - Protocols of the Elders of Zion (2:35:43) - Charles Manson (3:02:30) - Zodiac Killer (3:13:24) - Illuminati (3:20:48) - Secret societies PODCAST LINKS: - Podcast Website: https://lexfridman.com/podcast - Apple Podcasts: https://apple.co/2lwqZIr - Spotify: https://spoti.fi/2nEwCF8 - RSS: https://lexfridman.com/feed/podcast/ - Podcast Playlist: https://www.youtube.com/playlist?list=PLrAXtmErZgOdP_8GztsuKi9nrraNbKKp4 - Clips Channel: https://www.youtube.com/lexclips SOCIAL LINKS: - X: https://x.com/lexfridman - Instagram: https://instagram.com/lexfridman - TikTok: https://tiktok.com/@lexfridman - LinkedIn: https://linkedin.com/in/lexfridman - Facebook: https://facebook.com/lexfridman - Patreon: https://patreon.com/lexfridman - Telegram: https://t.me/lexfridman - Reddit: https://reddit.com/r/lexfridman
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